The Science of Virtue: A Framework for Research 1108490050, 9781108490054

Citation preview

THE SCIENCE OF VIRTUE

Integrating psychological and philosophical research on virtue and moral development, this book presents a real-world program for virtue science. Offering empirically testable hypotheses, the chapters deliver theoretical and methodological guidance that shows how existing research can become a cohesive and truly interdisciplinary science of virtue. The authors’ unique “STRIVE-4 Model” defines a unifying conceptual framework, making the book an indispensable resource for a new generation of scholars and students. This empirically tested model provides the much-needed foundation that can put to rest traditional worries about moral science. While mapping out the relevant areas of psychology and value-focused inquiry, the book lays out an interdisciplinary approach to many questions, including the problem of knowledge about character. Written for those researching virtue, drawing on personality, developmental, moral, and positive psychology, as well as moral philosophy and character education, the book demonstrates the importance and applications of studying virtues empirically. Bl a ine J. Fow er s  is Professor of Counseling Psychology at the University of Miami, USA. He conducts theoretical and empirical investigations of virtue, practical wisdom, and flourishing. He has published five books and over a hundred articles and book chapters. He is a fellow of the American Psychological Association and a recipient of the Joseph B. Gittler Award. Br a dfor d Cok el et  is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kansas, USA. He conducts cross-cultural philosophic research into different ideals of virtue and cross-disciplinary work on moral virtues, moral emotions, and how ethics classes can effectively promote ethical change. He has published widely, including a coedited book, The Moral Psychology of Guilt (2019). Nat h a n D. L eonh a r dt  is Assistant Professor of Family Life at Brigham Young University, USA. He studies virtues and flourishing in close relationships. He has over fifty academic publications. He was a Vanier scholar at the University of Toronto, Canada, and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

T H E S C I E NC E OF V I RT U E A Framework for Research BL A I N E J. FOW ER S University of Miami

BR A DFOR D COK E L ET University of Kansas

NAT H A N D. L EON H A R DT Brigham Young University

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467 Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge. We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108490054 DOI: 10.1017/9781108779968 © Blaine J. Fowers, Bradford Cokelet, and Nathan D. Leonhardt 2024 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment. First published 2024 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-1-108-49005-4 Hardback ISBN 978-1-108-74798-1 Paperback Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Contents

Acknowledgmentspage vii Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?

1

Part I  Philosophical Resources and Prospects

23

1 Virtue Theory

25

2 A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

53

Part II Psychological Resources and Prospects

71

3 Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

73

4 Moral Development and Virtue

95

5 Personality and Virtue

124

6 The Place of Values in Virtue Science

150

Part III Organizing Virtue Research with the STRIVE-4 Model

175

7 Virtues as Scalar Traits

177

8 The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

202

9 Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

223

10 Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

242

11 The Four Components of Virtue

266

v

Published online by Cambridge University Press

vi

Contents

Part IV  The Science and Pr actice of Virtue

289

12 Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

291

13 Virtue Science and Psychology

310

References Index

333 374

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Acknowledgments

This book is the product of cross-disciplinary work between two ­psychologists (Fowers and Leonhardt) and a philosopher (Cokelet). It is also an elaboration of a paper we published with Jason Carroll (Fowers et al., 2021). Although much of the content is similar to the article, we were able to elaborate a great deal about developmental and personality psychology and the influences of situations and roles in virtue expression. The biggest content difference is in practical wisdom becoming one of the four elements of virtue in the STRIVE-4 Model instead of dispositions. Interdisciplinary work is never easy, but we have found it enormously enriching in bringing the knowledge of separate disciplines together and allowing ourselves to challenge one another. We hope this will be beneficial to readers as well. We are grateful to many current and past colleagues and friends for advice, support, and comments on both the book and its earlier life as an article. We want to single out a few people who generously helped us to refine some of our thoughts: Will Fleeson, Eranda Jayawickreme, Kareem Khalifa, Tobias Krettenauer, Kristján Kristjánsson, Dan McAdams, Lukas Novak, Josh May. Janka Romero, and Rowan Groat at Cambridge University Press have earned our thanks for being unreservedly supportive of the book project and the many delays throughout its writing. The patience, support, and encouragement of our partners and families cannot be adequately appreciated because they must live with us as we struggle through the writing process (or with the tasks and challenges that keep us away from writing). Blaine and Brad want especially to offer their thanks to Susan Green and Sarah Hoadley.

vii

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

Why Study Moral Virtue?

We are living in a time that has been characterized as “post-truth” and “post-morality” (Lazer et  al., 2018; Pew Research Center, 2017). As morality has seemed to become increasingly relativized to individual and narrow group interests, disunity, divisiveness, and prejudicial conflict have grown apace. The need for convincing moral knowledge and widely accepted understandings of decency and the common good has seldom been greater. We might hope that scientific knowledge will enable us to develop the kind of moral knowledge that can equip us to bridge these rifts. But in order for science to help us with disunifying relativism, the first challenge is to confront and significantly rethink traditional demands to keep science and morality strictly separate. One way to approach morality scientifically is the study of moral virtue,1 which is the focus of this book. Fortunately, we are in the midst of a renaissance of philosophical interest in virtue and in a position to learn from a rapidly expanding set of social scientific studies on virtues or character strengths. Thanks to the intelligence and diligence of many researchers, there is now a growing, interdisciplinary body of work that promises to answer many questions about morality, decency, and how we can promote moral progress. But this research is in its early days and the empirical work on virtue remains a patchwork. In order to fully tackle these vital questions the emerging science of virtue needs a unifying, cohesive framework. A primary reason that existing work on virtue and moral development is disunified is that it has been siloed within different disciplines and subdisciplines. Moreover, virtue research lacks the kind of systematic, empirically oriented conceptual framework that can ground and integrate the collage of empirical studies. This book charts the contours of the two problems 1

We focus on the moral virtues in this book, so we do not address the epistemic virtues or what are sometimes called the performance virtues.

1

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

2

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?

and lays the groundwork for possible solutions: a unified, grounded interdisciplinary science of virtue that can illuminate human moral life in fresh and practical ways. Before tackling questions about how to pursue virtue science effectively, we address questions about need for virtue science. Why should social scientists study virtue at all? In this introductory chapter, we explore five reasons for pursuing empirical virtue research: (1) Humans are moral animals, (2) moral behavior can be understood as an expression of acquired traits, (3) it is psychologically realistic to think that ordinary humans can acquire and express virtue traits, (4) moral education is valuable, and (5) virtues are often taken to be essential to a good life. After explaining these five reasons in favor of pursuing empirical virtue research, we address the three main challenges that virtue scientists must face: (1) the absence of empirically oriented virtue theory, (2) the overreliance on simple survey design in psychology, and (3) virtue skeptics.2 Finally, we explain the overarching argument of our book, breaking down how each part supports the overarching argument, and how each chapter contributes to its part.

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research Humans as Moral Animals The first reason to study virtue is that moral behavior is central for human beings (Fowers, 2015; Tomasello, 2019). Although there is healthy debate about what moral behavior is, there is virtually no disagreement about whether humans, throughout history and across cultures, form shared moral understandings within their cultural groups. Debates about the specific content of morality often obscure the ubiquity of moral frameworks in human societies. Two basic facts3 point to more specific ways in which humans are fundamentally moral creatures. First, we are profoundly social creatures that are entirely dependent on one another for everything from basic physical necessities to understanding how to live. For this reason, humans have been termed ultrasocial animals (Fowers, 2015; Tomasello, 2014). The extent of this interdependence means that every individual’s welfare is powerfully affected by the 2

3

One form of skepticism about virtue science is the idea that there should be a dichotomy of facts and values, with virtues placed in the values category. We discuss our disagreement with this dichotomizing at length in Chapter 6. Of course, some may disagree about the factual claims we are making here, but the alternatives to them seem implausible to us.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

3

ways that she is treated.4 Therefore, the quality of one’s life is due, in no small part, to whether others treat one fairly or unfairly, respectfully or disrespectfully, kindly or unkindly. Because of this strong, mutual influence on one another’s welfare, we are often held accountable to others for how we act. Both welfare influencing and accountability are constant features of human experience, from forager bands to modern urban life. This means that moral questions are ubiquitous for humans because virtually every action can affect others’ welfare in some way, and we might hold one another responsible for those effects. The stability and quality of every human group depends on the answers it has to these moral questions. Second, it seems possible to live a better or worse life. We take seriously the ancient idea that ethics is about how well one lives and that the moral virtues might be needed to live well. The ideal of living well was expressed in the Greek term “eudaimonia,” which we translate as flourishing,5 and we recommend, here and elsewhere (e.g., Fowers, Novak, Kiknadze, & Calder, 2023a), a thorough study of the concept of flourishing, which is often understood as a person that is fulfilling her potential as a human being. We have much more to say about what constitutes a good life and the idea that virtue science can investigate the importance of morality for flourishing in Chapters 1 and 10. The idea that to understand morality we need to think about the good life for individuals is somewhat foreign to most moderns, as we typically understand morality in terms of right and wrong actions. The most common contemporary understanding of morality is a “rail guard” formulation in which morality is guided by rules and motivated by guilt, punishment, and reward. It is true that these kinds of motivation are important, and that right and wrong actions are an important component of morality. According to ancient virtue theories, however, morality and moral motivation are understood much more broadly. There is a focus on virtue traits and not just actions, and moral motivation is taken to often arise from the positive pursuit of goods. That is, moral motivation is often based on attraction to what is good rather than on respect for rights, duties, or imperatives, or a concern to avoid bad consequences. Another contrast with common contemporary views of morality is the idea that morality enhances the welfare of the moral agent. The basic idea is that human beings will benefit if they develop virtue 4 5

Rather than use awkward gender-neutral phrasing such as “he or she,” we alternate feminine and masculine pronouns in the chapters of the book. Eudaimonia is usually translated as happiness, but we avoid that translation because it can connote an ephemeral emotional state, and the ancient Greeks saw eudaimonia in terms of a whole life, not just felicitous moments.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

4

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?

traits that involve positive attraction to the good – a thick form of morality that goes beyond mere “right action” that embodies respect for the moral rules or rail guards. We expand on these distinctions in the remainder of the book and explain how virtue science can test the ancient philosophic hypothesis that morality is essential to the good human life. It is important at the beginning to emphasize the hypothetical tone of this book. We advance a lot of hypotheses, many based on ancient Aristotelian and Confucian thought, but we see these as hypotheses that may or may not garner empirical support. This openness to disconfirmation is vital because we are proposing many contentious ideas that should be empirically examined rather than assumed to be true. The two central hypotheses about human life – that we are often accountable for how we treat one another and that a good human life may well require us to develop moral virtues – support the view that humans are fundamentally moral creatures. Indeed, morality appears to be central to typical human lives. If that is the case, what could be a more important aspect of human life to study? We propose studying morality in terms of virtues because virtue traits make it possible for people to act consistently in moral ways, as we discuss in the next section. And the relationships among the virtues and a flourishing life are some of the important empirical questions we hope a virtue science will help us to answer (Chapter 10). Can Moral Behavior Be Understood in Terms of Acquired Traits? The second important reason to study virtues empirically is to investigate the claim that moral behavior, especially virtue, can be seen as a traitlike characteristic of individuals (Brewer, 2009; Cokelet & Fowers, 2019; Fleeson et al., 2014; Fowers, 2005a; Jayawickreme & Fleeson, 2017a; Kim, 2016; Mower, 2013; Russell, 2009; Snow, 2010).6 The renaissance of interest in ancient Greek and Chinese moral philosophy has suggested the hypothesis that moral behavior can be understood in terms of acquired traits (Chapter 5). These philosophies focus on the complete moral life which reflects a person’s character or agency, and this presumably involves having traits that produce reliable and spontaneous actions that promote what is good. Ancient philosophers, East and West, discussed this reliably moral behavior in terms of virtues such as courage, fairness, generosity, and honesty. 6

We are aware that the concept of a trait is fraught. We discuss many of the interpretations of that term and trait theories in Chapter 5.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

5

The idea that moral behavior can be based on acquired traits is exciting and attractive, partially because it takes us beyond the idea of traits as inherited temperaments. The allure of virtue is also apparent in its prominence in many cultures, including such diverse groups as ancient Greeks, Confucians, Buddhists, Christians, and Lakotas (Sioux). Importantly, this concept of virtue suggests that no group of people is ruled out when it comes to acquiring virtues. We suggest that virtues can be acquired by virtually anyone regardless of gender, race, or similar characteristics.7 Seeing virtues as traits also emphasizes the idea that individuals with virtue traits will reliably and spontaneously express that trait through virtuous behavior in appropriate circumstances. In Chapter 1, we discuss how virtuous traits motivate individuals to act morally. Psychologists have begun to study virtues as acquired traits as well. Positive psychology provided a strong impetus for this research (e.g., Bleidorn & Denisson, 2015; Peterson & Seligman, 2004), but psychologists interested in empirical studies of virtue extend well beyond that movement (e.g., Lefevor & Fowers, 2016; Meindl et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2017). Although there is accumulating evidence for virtues as acquired traits (Bleidorn & Denisson, 2015; Fowers et al., 2019; Meindl et al., 2013), the “traitness” of virtues remains an open question. We see the qualifier “acquired” as important theoretically and empirically, and we suggest some hypotheses to test that idea (Chapters 1–5). By focusing on acquired traits, we differentiate virtue traits from inherited, temperament-based traits and from traits that are conceived in essentialist terms. Aristotle did not give a very fulsome account of the acquisition of virtue, but he suggested that virtues are acquired through example and practice. There are many other possibilities, including ritual practice (Hutton, 2021; Olberding, 2016), and through friendship (Kristjánsson, 2020). In the end, identifying and clarifying the pathway(s) toward virtue acquisition are the empirical questions we discuss in Chapter 4. In addition, in Chapter 5, we present moral virtues as traits that are chosen and cultivated because the individual sees them as worthy characteristics. The important point we suggest here is that consistently acting morally can be conceptualized in terms of virtue traits. If people can cultivate traits that make it possible to act reliably and spontaneously for their own and others’ welfare, the question of whether humans can acquire and practice 7

Of course, it may turn out that evidence shows that cultivating virtues may not be possible for some groups (e.g., psychopaths) or without certain contextual features (e.g., the absence of civil war), but such traits and situations are thankfully unusual.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

6

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?

virtues is among the most important sets of questions there are for understanding humans. Psychologically Realistic Virtues Third, many moral philosophers (e.g., Flanagan, 1991; Miller, 2014; Snow, 2010) have become increasingly interested in psychologically realistic portrayals of and empirical evidence for virtues. One important reason for seeking a realistic portrayal of virtues is that this can make it possible to study them with the methods of science. These philosophers have been clear in calling for a science of virtue, although, as philosophers, they are generally not equipped to explain how that science can be conducted. Some recent interdisciplinary collaborations have shown promise for helpfully illuminating virtue (e.g., Carr et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2015; Snow & Narvaez, 2019; Vittersø, 2016), and we hope the same can be said of this book. Philosophers’ interest in a science of virtue is one key reason we have written this book. We believe that philosophical contributions to our understanding of virtue have been enormously enlightening and useful. Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend how the concept of virtue could have been revived without its philosophical renaissance. Unfortunately for those interested in virtue science, however, philosophical accounts of ­virtue are often formulated in psychologically unrealistic terms (Cokelet & Fowers,  2019; Flanagan, 1991). We describe in Chapter 2 how this ­problem can be dealt with and how philosophers can fruitfully contribute to ­interdisciplinary research. For a theory of virtue to be psychologically realistic means that it can describe and explain how ordinary human beings can acquire and practice virtues in everyday life. When a theory is unrealistic, it offers us an overly abstract or demanding picture of the virtues that may well represent an admirable ethical ideal, but not one that we can use to understand and explain the moral traits and behavior of ordinary folk. One way that social scientists can contribute to virtue theory and ethics more broadly is to complement abstract and sometimes psychologically unrealistic philosophical work on virtue with psychological theories that focus on virtues as characteristics that ordinary people implicitly recognize and care about. This book addresses that need through the creation of a psychologically realistic, empirically testable model of virtue. We examine the contributions that developmental and personality psychology can make to this project in Chapters 4–6 and then formulate our model in Part III.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

7

Our model differs from philosophical theories of virtues in that it is more concretely descriptive and heuristically productive for empirical research. Theories offer abstract, general accounts of what makes a trait a virtue, the kinds of values that virtues have, the ways in which virtue traits relate to right and wrong actions, and how we should conceive of ideal virtues. These topics are important but the theories designed to answer them cannot be counted on to fruitfully inform empirical studies. The model we formulate in this book (termed the STRIVE-4 Model) provides a conceptual model that describes the general features of ordinary virtue traits that ordinary people ascribe to one another. This model also offers concrete, heuristic guidance for future virtue research, and we offer many hypotheses in this book that we think will be useful in guiding the empirical study of virtues. These hypotheses are numbered by the chapter in which they are discussed and a complete list of the hypotheses is available in Figure 1.

I-1: Virtue expression will vary across cultures. 3-1: There will be more compatibility among virtues than competition and exclusivity. 3-2: The strength of one virtue trait will correlate positively with the strength of other virtue traits. 4-1: Virtue development will be positively associated with greater ownership of behavior by the developing agent. 4-2: Virtue development will be positively associated with greater caregiver responsiveness and synchrony between caregiver and child. 4-3: Virtue development will be positively associated with stronger conscience development in the developing agent. 4-4: Virtue development will be positively associated with responsiveness to moral expectations in the developing agent. 4-5: Virtue development will be positively associated with stronger capacity for self-direction in the developing agent. 4-6: Collective identity will be positively related to virtue development in children. 4-7: The capacity for joint attention, an element of collective intentionality, will be a prerequisite for virtue development. 4-8: The capacity for taking an intersubjective perspective, an element of collective intentionality, will be a prerequisite for virtue development. Figure 1  STRIVE-4 Model hypotheses.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

8

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue? 4-9: Normative sensitivity in children will be a prerequisite for virtue development. 4-10: Recognition of mutual obligation toward completing joint tasks will be a prerequisite for virtue development. 4-11: Reason giving for actions will be a prerequisite for virtue development. 4-12: Recognition of the equal rewards principle will be a prerequisite for virtue development. 4-13: When people observe moral exemplars, it can enhance virtue development. 4-14: The integration of self-interested and other-interested values will contribute to virtue development. 4-15: Specific virtues will increase in strength among some individuals over time. 4-16: Virtue traits may be acquired intentionally through training and practice. 4-17: Increased practice of a virtue will lead to it being practiced in more diverse situations. 4-18: The rudiments of virtue can develop over time into mature virtue. 4-19: Children’s role adoption will influence virtue development. 4-20: Children over six can perceive human goods. 4-21: Children over six can act in the service of the goods they perceive. 5-1: Virtue measures will be only moderately related to personality dimensions. 5-2: Virtue measures will have incremental validity above and beyond traditionally defined personality traits. 5-3: Agency is present in the cultivation of virtues. 6-1: Virtues are generally and explicitly understood as choiceworthy characteristics because they contribute to a flourishing life. 6-2: Individuals cultivate virtues for the sake of living well. 6-3: The expression of virtues includes substantial other-benefiting. 6-4: The expression of virtues includes substantial self-benefiting. 6-5: Virtues are moderate expressions of a strength that contrast with the excesses and deficiencies associated with those strengths. 7-1: Virtues are scalar or measurable and can be assessed quantitatively. 7-2: Virtue traits will have incremental validity regarding criterion variables beyond social desirability. Figure 1  (cont.)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

9

7-3: Lay informants can provide valid and meaningful reports on a target person’s virtuous behavior. 7-4: Individuals will cultivate virtue intentionally as an approach to crafting a good life. 7-5: Virtue assessments will demonstrate significant between-person variability. 7-6: Virtue assessments will demonstrate significant within-person consistency over time. 7-7: There will be within-person variability in virtue trait expression. 8-1: Virtue trait expression will be contextualized to fit situations, roles, and relationships. 8-2: Individuals’ virtue expression will vary with respect to their acknowledged roles. 8-3: Virtue trait expression will vary within persons across personal, professional, and civic roles. 8-4: Virtue trait expression will vary between-persons based on the social role context. 8-5: The degree of practical wisdom will be negatively correlated with the degree of role conflict. 8-6: Appropriate virtues will be more strongly related to a given role enactment than will personality dimensions between-persons. 8-7: Appropriate virtues will be more strongly related to a given role enactment than will personality dimensions within-persons. 8-8: There will be between-person differences in virtue possession depending on the individuals’ social roles. 8-9: Observed parenting quality will be positively correlated with commitment to the parenting role. 8-10: Observed parenting quality will be positively correlated with investment in the child’s welfare 8-11: Observed parenting quality will be positively correlated with the virtue of patience. 8-12: Changes in parenting quality will be positively correlated with personal growth. 8-13: Observed parenting quality will be positively related to loyalty. 8-14: Observed parenting quality will be positively related to kindness. 8-15: Observed parenting quality will be positively associated with the virtue of compassion. Figure 1  (cont.)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

10

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue? 8-16: Observed teaching quality will be positively related to the virtue of loyalty. 8-17: Excellence in law enforcement among police officers will be positively correlated with the virtue of courage. 8-18: Excellence in law enforcement among police officers will be positively correlated with the virtue of fairness. 8-19: The degree of compassion will be positively correlated to the observed expertise of healing professionals. 8-20: The degree of trustworthiness will be positively correlated to the observed expertise of healing professionals. 8-21: The degree of honesty will be positively correlated to the observed expertise of healing professionals. 9-1: Virtue traits will also predict differences in the types of situations that individuals encounter. 9-2: Differences in encountered situations will be more acutely perceived based on the strength of the virtue trait. 9-3: Individuals with stronger virtue traits will evoke desirable alterations in situation perception and action for participants in the situation. 9-4: Situation perception will vary appropriately with the strength of individuals’ virtue traits. 9-5: Virtue traits and relevant situational factors will interact to influence agents’ behavior. 9-6: People with stronger virtue traits can recognize and transform situations in ways conducive to virtuous actions. 9-7: Adeptness in recognizing the morality in situations will be positively correlated with practical wisdom. 9-8: The greater an individual’s phronesis the more the individual will perceive the possibilities for moral action excellently. 9-9: Situation perception guided by phronesis will enable better moral action possibilities. 10-1: Eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of shared meaning. 10-2: Participating in shared meaning means being willing to act together. 10-3: Eudaimonia will be positively related to the quality of an individual’s friendships. 10-4: Eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of character friendship. Figure 1  (cont.)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

11

10-5: Eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of the quality of the individual’s belonging to choiceworthy social groups. 10-6: Progress in achieving goals related to mid-level human goods will be positively related to eudaimonia. 10-7: The virtues (e.g., honesty, patience) related to a good (e.g., knowledge production) will be positively related to various indicators of success in pursuing that good. 10-8: The virtues related to knowledge acquisition will be positively related to various indicators of success in knowledge acquisition. 10-9: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to an individual’s group-favoring actions. 10-10: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to the individual’s perception of belonging to the group. 10-11: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to the group members’ acknowledgement of the individual’s group membership. 10-12: The virtue of loyalty will be positively related to the degree of coordinated actions among group members. 10-13: Virtuous activities will contribute to well-functioning communities. 10-14: Trait virtues will be more strongly related to goods and their associated goals than state versions of similar characteristics. 10-15: An individual can successfully pursue a specific good to the degree that that individual expresses the virtues associated with that good. 10-16: The assessments of flourishing from various perspectives (including subjective and observable perspectives) will overlap significantly. 10-17: There will be unique variance in flourishing assessments from various perspectives. 10-18: Longitudinal measurement of flourishing will be more stable and will provide more information than single-timepoint assessments of flourishing. 10-19: Perceived belonging (both by the target individual and other members of the group) to groups will be positively related to indicators of eudaimonia. 10-20: Perceived belonging is necessary for eudaimonia. 10-21: Relevant virtues (e.g., loyalty, forgiveness) will be positively related to perceived group belonging (both by the target individual and other members of the group). Figure 1  (cont.)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

12

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue? 10-22: There will be a positive relationship between belonging-relevant virtues and indicators of eudaimonia. 10-23: The positive relationship between belonging-relevant virtues and indicators of eudaimonia will be mediated by perceived group belonging. 10-24: Indicators of close personal relationship (CPR) quality will be positively related to indicators of eudaimonia. 10-25: High-quality CPRs are necessary for eudaimonia. 10-26: Relevant virtues (e.g., loyalty, forgiveness, friendship) will be positively related to CPR quality. 10-27: There will be a positive relationship between CPR-relevant virtues and indicators of eudaimonia. 10-28: The positive relationship between CPR-relevant virtues and indicators of eudaimonia will be mediated by CPR quality. 10-29: Indicators of meaning and purpose (personal or impersonal) will be positively correlated with indicators of flourishing. 10-30: The presence of meaning and purpose are necessary for flourishing. 10-31: Depending on the source of meaning and purpose (individual or group), virtues (courage and open-mindedness or loyalty, respectively) will be related to reports of meaning and purpose in life. 10-32: Among those who see meaning and purpose as individual aims, indicators of meaning and purpose will mediate the relationship between indicators of the virtues of courage and open-mindedness and indicators of flourishing. 10-33: Among those who look for meaning and purpose in the collective, indicators of meaning and purpose will mediate the relationship between indicators of the virtue of loyalty and indicators of flourishing. 11-1: The four components (behavior, cognition, affect/motivation, and practical wisdom) of the STRIVE-4 Model can be measured for any given virtue. 11-2: The four components (behavior, cognition, affect/motivation, and practical wisdom) of the STRIVE-4 Model are necessary for the expression of any given virtue. 11-3: Virtue behavior can be observed in experimental or observational studies. 11-4: Self-reported virtue behavior will be related to relevant criterion variables (e.g., well-being). Figure 1  (cont.)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

13

11-5: Virtue behavior (observed or self-reported) will add incremental validity to the ability to predict virtue-related criteria. 11-6: Virtue-related knowledge can be assessed as a distinct component of any virtue. 11-7: Virtue-related knowledge will add incremental validity to the ability to predict virtue-related criteria. 11-8: Virtue-related motivation can be assessed as a distinct component of any virtue. 11-9: Virtue-related motivation will add incremental validity to the ability to predict virtue-related criteria. 11-10: Virtue-related emotion can be assessed as a distinct component of any virtue. 11-11: Virtue-related emotion will add incremental validity to the ability to predict virtue-related criteria. 11-12: Indicators of virtue will be positively associated with indicators of practical wisdom. 11-13: High-quality appraisals of situations will be positively associated with indicators of practical wisdom. 11-14: The adjudication among appropriate virtues for a situation can be assessed as a component of practical wisdom. 11-15: The proper adjudication among appropriate virtues for a situation will be positively related with indicators of virtue. 11-16: The blueprint for life can be assessed as a component of practical wisdom. 11-17: The blueprint for life will be positively related with indicators of virtue. 11-18: The integration of emotion and cognition can be assessed. 11-19: The integration of emotion and cognition is positively related to virtuous action. 11-20: Virtue acquisition can be fostered by well-designed, structured interventions among adults and children. 11-21: Virtue-related behavior can be increased with simple, short-term interventions. 11-22: Virtue traits will be associated with variations in neural structure. 11-23: Virtue traits will be associated with variations in neural processes. Figure 1  (cont.)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

14

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue? 11-24: Indicators of virtues will be negatively correlated with latency in moral responses. 11-25: Indicators of virtues will be negatively correlated with control system involvement in moral responses. 13-1: Are cultural differences in virtues based on (1) multiple incommensurable types of virtue or (2) variations in virtues that form family resemblances? Figure 1  (cont.)

The Value of Moral Education Fourth, although many scholars believe that humans have a built-in interest in moral concerns (Darwin, 1871/1981; de Waal, 1996; Flanagan, 2017; Fowers, 2015; Taylor, 1989; Tomasello, 2014, 2019), no one believes that children are born with a full understanding of and capacity for acting morally. These and many other scholars have presented arguments and evidence that humans have a built-in moral sensitivity that develops naturally, but that the specifics of what is moral are learned in the cultural environment. We suggest as our first general hypothesis (I-1): that virtue expression will vary across cultures. We make this our first hypothesis because it is so important to recognize the cultural relativity of what is meant by virtue. In fact, everything we suggest in this book will need to be assessed for how thoroughly culture must be seen as a moderator. In addition, significant cognitive, emotional, and social development are necessary for children to learn about moral ways of living. Therefore, moral behavior and acquired virtue traits must be learned, and that learning will occur in many settings, including the home, through religious institutions, in schools, with peers, in higher education and professional education, and in community relations. Much of this learning will be informal and vicarious, but children need to be explicitly educated about how to act morally as well. A reasonable case can be made that learning to act morally to some degree or other is essential to good interpersonal and communal relationships (cf. Fowers, 2000, 2015). Indeed, consistently treating one another honestly, generously, and fairly seem foundational to good interpersonal relationships and to communities. Questions about the roles that virtues play in relationships and communities are, to a large degree, empirical questions that virtue science can help us answer. For these reasons, a great deal of effort has been devoted to moral education in all these settings (Kristjánsson, 2016, 2017, 2021; Lapsley & Power,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Five Reasons for Empirical Virtue Research

15

2005). Despite the importance of moral education, we lack the detailed scientific knowledge necessary to conduct this education confidently and with the most refined practices. Character (virtue) education, for example, has grown tremendously in recent times, and the available evidence on its efficacy (Berkowitz & Bier, 2007; Johnson et al., 2023) and the efficacy of similar programs (e.g., social emotional learning; Durlak et  al., 2011) is positive and encouraging, if a bit spotty. We wish to emphasize that the development of a productive science of virtue can provide a stronger basis for thinking about why and how children can learn and can ground a more firmly evidence-based moral education. For example, this science can increase educators’, parents’, and policymakers’ confidence in character education and guide program design and implementation. As our knowledge of the moral virtues increases, our understanding of the environments that encourage virtue, as well as of how virtues are cultivated and enacted, will grow. We believe that this knowledge will help educators to foster good character. Virtues as a Pathway to a Good Life Finally, ancient Western and Eastern philosophers argued that the surest way to live well as a human being was to cultivate the virtues (Aristotle, 1999; Fowers, 2005a, 2012; Keown, 2016; Olberding, 2016; Russell, 2009). Social scientific and philosophical interest in the good life has exploded in recent years. If the ancient Greeks, Indians, Chinese, and others were correct about virtues as a necessary foundation for the best kind of life, then it is vital for us to understand how individuals can cultivate and maintain virtues and how those traits relate to a good life. Although the evidence is far from complete, growing social science research suggests that the ancient Greeks may have been on the right track about the positive relationship between virtues and living well (Bleidorn & Denissen, 2015; Davis et al., 2011; Lotz et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2017). This suggests that virtue science may have much to contribute to the ­scientific study of individual and social well-being. Accordingly, scholars from many disciplines have taken an interest in positive moral behavior in recent decades (Crocker et al., 2017; Hare, 2017; Keltner et al., 2014; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010; Tomasello, 2019), and there are scores of empirical studies of virtues (which we detail in Part III). Yet we lack a systematic framework to organize and guide that knowledge seeking. A heuristic framework can help us to empirically assess the degree to which the Ancients were correct is seeing virtue as vital to human flourishing. Our aim in this book is to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

16

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?

provide the kind of framework necessary for a fruitful science of virtue. We provide many hypotheses designed to test the relationships among virtues and flourishing in Chapter 10. To summarize, we suggest that developing a science of virtue is important for five reasons. First, humans are moral creatures, and a reasonably complete understanding of human activity must include its moral dimension. Second, consistent moral behavior may be trait-like, and understanding consistent human moral behavior requires the assessments of such traits. Third, a science of virtue is needed to examine virtues as psychologically realistic traits rather than abstract or extraordinarily ideal characteristics. Fourth, moral education is necessary, and virtue science can provide important guidance for that education. Finally, a science of virtue is needed to assess the idea that virtues provide a foundation for living well as a human being. We find these reasons compelling, but there are also some obstacles to virtue science. We address those hindrances to virtue science briefly in the next section and indicate where we deal with them more fully in the book.

The Primary Challenges for a Science of Virtue The scientific research that has been conducted on virtues has been fueled by interest in several subdisciplines of psychology (e.g., development, social, personality, and positive psychology) and in other social sciences. The social science of virtue has been encouraged by the several decades-long philosophical renaissance of virtue scholarship. Extending this interdisciplinary trend, we focus on integrating high-quality philosophical analyses of virtue with cutting-edge social science. Although scores of studies have been conducted, this research has not yet developed into a mature science of virtue. To get there – to develop a cogent and fruitful scientific inquiry into virtue – we think three main problems must be addressed: the absence of an empirically oriented virtue theory, an overreliance on simple survey studies, and virtue skepticism. The Absence of Empirically Oriented Virtue Theory The first difficulty is the lack of cohesive theoretical guidance for empirical virtue research. Although many social scientists are interested in virtue, their efforts have been hobbled by an atheoretical approach, leading to patchwork research rather than a cohesive, cumulative science. Without a general framework, virtue scientists may not develop constructs and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Primary Challenges for a Science of Virtue

17

measures that capture all the dimensions of a given virtue trait, they may not see interesting hypotheses that an ambitious science of virtue can tackle, and as a group virtue scientists will not be able to integrate their studies of different virtues, which are often pursued with different theoretical assumptions and orientations based on their subareas (e.g., personality psychology or moral development). Philosophical theories of virtue might be thought to help because they are very general, but their high level of abstraction makes it difficult for social scientists to find guidance for their empirical investigations. To overcome these issues, we present an ecumenical version of virtue theory in Chapter 1 that forms the basis for our empirically oriented and hypothesis-focused model of virtue. This theory is informed by philosophy but is also tailored to inform empirical science. The theory we present captures the key elements of virtue in a way that we believe will be broadly acceptable to virtue scholars. This theory provides the conceptual and explanatory basis that leads to our virtue model in Part III and the research recommendations we make in Part IV. Rather than persuade staunch critics of the concept of virtue, our approach centers on providing conceptual resources to virtue-friendly thinkers. The model is enriched by philosophical insight and cutting-edge scientific methods to offer detailed, theoretically informed research design guidance and dozens of hypotheses that can encourage a more structured, robust, and wideranging social science of virtue. Accordingly, our book provides tangible, heuristic guidance for hundreds of studies, which we hope will provide essential resources for scholars interested in virtue. The Overreliance on Simple Survey Designs in Psychology Second, in Chapters 5 and 7, we discuss unresolved methodological challenges that arise because of researchers’ overreliance on single-timepoint survey methods. This kind of measurement generally produces only summary global self-assessments of a respondent’s virtue(s). We describe more sophisticated methods for virtue researchers that can underwrite a more robust and confident description, explanation, and pedagogy of virtue in Parts III and IV. For example, because a trait should manifest reliably in a person’s life, a basic requirement for testing whether virtues are traits is to conduct research that provides evidence of within-person consistency over time. That means the same individuals must be assessed repeatedly rather than just once to obtain solid evidence for traits. In addition, it is vital for virtue research to include both self-report methods and the observation of virtue-related behaviors. We address this problem by describing

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

18

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?

and exemplifying currently available research methods that can strengthen the rigor and hypothesis testing in virtue research, thereby supporting the development of a science of virtue. Virtue Skeptics Third, virtue skeptics have lodged principled objections to the s­cientific study of virtue (Chapters 3, 6, and 12). Although we could simply d ­ ismiss these skeptics and just get on with the promotion of virtue science, we believe that there are good reasons to address virtue skeptics. First, ­scientific objectivity requires dealing straightforwardly with serious c­ ritics of one’s perspective. Second, the objections go to the heart of whether and how virtues can be studied empirically and in an interdisciplinary manner. Third, virtue-friendly scholars need cogent arguments to c­ ounter ­skeptical questions. Finally, the ways these philosophers go wrong in thinking about virtue traits and appropriating psychological research are extremely instructive regarding how to productively interpret the results of virtue science. Several philosophers (Doris, 2002; Harman, 2009; Miller, 2014) have questioned the viability of virtue science. They examined portions of the empirical psychological literature and argued that this research demonstrates the nonexistence of virtues. We recognize and applaud their interdisciplinary interest in empirical evidence. In brief, these philosophers’ sincere efforts went awry for two main reasons. First, virtue skeptics have generally adopted an idealized concept of virtue rather than a psychologically realistic one (Cokelet & Fowers, 2019), despite their focus on psychological science (which also generally lacks a fully formulated, realistic virtue concept). As we explained elsewhere (Cokelet & Fowers, 2019), psychologically realistic virtue traits – such as the ones picked out by the model we offer in Part III – are relatively unscathed by their critique. Second, virtue skeptics tend to dial into a small portion of the psychological literature. This is natural in attempting to address another vast discipline, but it can lead one astray. In contrast, we discuss a broader array of psychological theory and research focused especially on developmental and personality psychology (in the chapters in Part II). We also show that a more comprehensive understanding of psychological research actually opens the way toward virtue science rather than closing the door to it (Chapters 4 and 5). For these reasons, we want to encourage philosophers to turn their attention to positive interdisciplinary scholarship on virtues.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Organizing Virtue Science

19

Some social scientists also object to virtue science, insisting on a strict fact–value dichotomy. Fact–value dichotomizers believe that the cornerstone of scientific objectivity requires an exclusive focus on observed facts to the exclusion of value and moral questions. In contrast, some social scientists have set aside the fact–value dichotomy, but they seldom provide a fulsome argument against the dichotomy (see Brinkmann [2011] for an exception). We believe the latter group has the right idea, and we argue for that position in Chapter 6. We claim that human behavior (including scientists’ behavior) is value-imbued and must be understood and studied accordingly. We argue that facts and values are difficult, perhaps impossible, to keep truly separate. This leads social scientists frequently to make normative8 claims without realizing they are doing so. Because these claims are not explicit and considered, they tend to rely on unreflective presuppositions rather than well-considered conceptual positions. Therefore, the normative claims tend to be muddled and difficult to identify and question. In Chapters 6 and 13, we argue that making normative claims explicit allows values to be productively acknowledged in social science, fostering open critiques of these values. Scientists’ value commitments can thereby undergo clarification and improvement if they are found to be worthwhile or dismissed if the value commitments lack merit.

Organizing Virtue Science This book is divided into four parts, and we provide an overview of those parts and the chapters here. Part I introduces the topic of virtues to social scientists and others who can benefit from better understanding the philosophical and theoretical fundamentals of virtue theory. One of our main points in this book is to urge social scientists to deepen their theoretical understanding of virtues rather than continuing to rely on common-sense or popular conceptions of virtue. The conceptual muddiness that characterizes much psychological research has been a major impediment to virtue science. In Chapter 1, we describe a fundamental and ecumenical theoretical understanding of virtues written to be accessible to social scientists. Chapter 2 discusses the ways that philosophers can be informative for 8

The term “normative” is used in different ways in psychology and philosophy. We use this term in the philosophical sense of normative claims expressing value commitments or beliefs about reasons or obligations rather than in the psychological sense of a phenomenon appearing frequently in a population.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

20

Introduction: Why Study Moral Virtue?

social scientists. Although philosophy is somewhat daunting to outsiders, there are many very accessible philosophers who study virtues, and there are many valuable insights available in that discipline. This chapter will be of interest to philosophers who wonder how they can productively contribute to empirical research. Of course, there are many philosophers and some social scientists who may not find this background necessary, and they may want to skip to Part II. In Part II, we discuss the virtue science resources already available in psychology. We set the stage for that in Chapter 3, with a discussion of the currently patchy nature of virtue research, which has lacked inherent cohesion and has not been cumulative so far. Instead, there are many atheoretical psychologists studying a disconnected set of largely independent virtues. In Chapter 4, we examine the resources for virtue science in the rich but disconnected scholarship on moral development. Surprisingly, moral development researchers have said relatively little about virtues, but that scholarship offers multiple resources to virtue researchers. And moral development research can be greatly enriched if scientists bring virtue measures into their studies. In Chapter 5, we discuss the plentiful resources that can be gleaned from personality psychology. Contrary to some authors (Jayawickreme & Fleeson, 2017a; Wright et  al., 2021), we believe that virtues need to be carefully differentiated from personality dimensions. Nevertheless, there are valuable integrative theory and research methods in personality psychology that can make vital contributions to virtue theory and research. Finally, at the end of Part II, we take a step back from the various subareas of psychological research to review a strong but largely implicit demand in psychology and many other social sciences to dichotomize facts and values. In Chapter 6, we question this dictum and propose an alternative to it that we think will foster the development of virtue science. Building on Parts I and II, in Part III we present our STRIVE-4 Model of virtue as a framework for resolving the theoretical and methods problems of virtue research. We see this systematic conceptualization as a critical step toward encouraging a mature science of virtue. The model’s acronym clarifies that we propose virtues as empirically testable, Scalar Traits that are Role sensitive, that involve situation by trait Interactions, and are guided by key human Values that partly constitute Eudaimonia (human flourishing). The model also holds that virtue traits have four major components: knowledge, behavior, emotion/motivation, and practical wisdom. These components are detailed in the chapters of Part III, including a discussion of virtues as acquired, scalar traits (Chapter 7),

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Organizing Virtue Science

21

role-related aspects of virtues (Chapter 8), interactions of situational influences and virtues (Chapter 9), how values and eudaimonia can guide virtue expression (Chapter 10), and the four components of virtue (Chapter 11). We illustrate the heuristic value of the STRIVE-4 Model for a science of virtue with dozens of hypotheses. In Part III, we also discuss each STRIVE-4 Model hypothesis in light of the extant evidence to indicate which aspects of the model have or have not been assessed. Extant studies focus on many different virtues and use a wide variety of approaches, including survey, intensive longitudinal, ­informant-based, experimental, and neuroscientific methods. Our discussion of the methods and results of these studies demonstrates that social scientists have made a good start toward a science of virtues, and we describe how well-formulated conceptual guidance and a multimethod approach can expand and enrich this science. We explain how this approach can transform this large but siloed research domain into a science of virtue. In Part IV, we conclude by summarizing how the theoretical and methods guidance we offer can unify extant research and help to develop it into a cohesive, cumulative science. We focus on the contributions philosophers can make in Chapter 12 and on the contributions psychologists can make in Chapter 13. We think the STRIVE-4 Model can provide a vital reference that can fruitfully guide research for years to come. Our contention is that a science of virtue can guide important practical efforts to cultivate virtues in children, citizens, professionals, people in business, and civic leaders. We also believe that a science of virtue can strengthen character education, one of the most widely used forms of moral education. Because we see human action as a morally engaged activity, and we believe that consistent moral behavior is best conceptualized in terms of acquired virtue traits, we see the conceptual and empirical study of virtues as one of the most urgently needed domains of social science.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Part I

Philosophical Resources and Prospects

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 1

Virtue Theory

Although the term “virtue theory” may seem exotic to nonphilosophers, it has a straightforward meaning. Our focus is on moral virtue and we will offer a theory of the general features of moral virtue to guide ­scientific work, including work on specific virtues such as fairness, ­compassion, kindness, and curiosity. Today, many philosophers recognize the need to develop a virtue theory, but many disagreements remain about the role it should play in a broader account of moral right and wrong and of human welfare or happiness. Roughly, those associated with the term “virtue ethics” claim that virtue and virtue theory should have a central or dominant role in our ethical thinking and theorization. Meanwhile, opponents of virtue ethics instead assign virtue a secondary or derivative role. Our interest in this book is in virtue theory and the science this theory can inspire to investigate moral virtues empirically. We assume that philosophers interested in virtue ethics will naturally have an i­ nterest in our project, but we take no stand in the debate about virtue ethics and the role that virtue or virtue theory should play in a general ethical theory. Empirical virtue researchers have not generally relied on robust virtue theory. This is partly due to the difficulty of interdisciplinary work. But even social scientists who actively engage with the philosophical literature find that most philosophers, the primary purveyors of virtue theory, tend to offer highly abstract accounts that are not designed to guide empirical science. Simply put, the existing philosophical literature does not, for the most part, offer a robust virtue theory that is of use to psychologists. Although this helps to explain the absence of robust virtue theory in psychology, it does not negate benefits that would come from robust theory. Without a unifying theory of virtue, scientific studies have developed without guidance, and the result is a patchwork of relatively disconnected studies of specific virtues based on ad hoc assumptions about those virtues. Without a theory that lays out the common conceptual core of all virtues, 25

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

26

Virtue Theory

it is difficult to create a cohesive, cumulative research domain. And it is also likely that some researchers will study some aspects of a virtue, some will study another aspect, and some aspects may simply be ignored. In this chapter, we offer a general theory of realistic virtues that we have formulated to be directly relevant to empirical study – one that can help virtue scientists to work together and achieve unified and cumulative results. Our virtue theory is inspired by philosophic work, both historical and contemporary, but it has different aims and does not engage in the contentious debates active in philosophical approaches to virtue. Western virtue theorists have, since the ancient Greeks, been multivocal and engaged in lively discussion about how to conceptualize ideal forms of virtue that few if any human beings can hope to achieve. There are famous differences in the accounts of ideal virtue provided by Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Aquinas, Luther, Hume, and Nietzsche, to name just a few (e.g., Annas, 1993; De Caro & Vaccarezza, 2021). Contemporary virtue theorists are not univocal either and they strongly disagree about the nature of the moral virtues that a saint, sage, or moral hero would have. They also disagree about how we can best understand specific virtues (e.g., justice), about how humans can develop virtues, and about the value of these virtues for individuals and groups. We certainly cannot resolve these disagreements in this chapter, but we do not need to either. Our general view is that virtue scientists can and should leave aside the debates about the nature and importance of ideal human virtue. Instead, the focus should be on the shared structural features of the ordinary virtues that are typically ascribed to people who are morally good, at least in the relevant respects, even if they fall short of various saintly, heroic, and sagely ideals. By turning from inspiring ideals to ordinary, realistic virtues, in this book we focus on the common features of various moral virtues that are relevant to scientific study. And a theory of realistic ordinary virtue that focuses on these features can be accepted by people who disagree and argue about what ideal virtue is like. So, scientists can use this virtue theory to improve and unify their studies while remaining neutral on contentious abstract questions about ethics, metaphysics, and theology that divide people in modern, pluralistic societies. In this way, our realistic virtue theory is designed to be ecumenical in the sense discussed by Snow (2010) and Russell (2009). It is also our hope to increase the conceptual cohesion and depth of virtue research through proposing hypothesis testing, especially regarding philosophically contentious ideas. For example, we do not discuss debates about which virtues belong on the most complete but parsimonious list of virtues, claims about ideal

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Theory

27

virtues being the result of divine agency or grace, or the unity of virtue thesis (roughly the idea that having one virtue entails having them all). Rather than delving into these philosophical debates about the nature and source of ideal virtue, we content ourselves in this chapter with presenting the structural features that we believe define the virtues that ordinary people talk and care about. Further, when it comes to debates about how to understand various specific virtues, about how humans can develop virtues, and about the value of these virtues for individuals and groups, we think that scientists can convert many of the relevant views into interesting empirical hypotheses. For example, the claim that the moral trait of justice is conducive to both group and personal flourishing is made by philosophers in ancient Greece and China and we think that this hypothesis is one that virtue scientists can and should formulate and test. And, in a related vein, scientists could study two different understandings of a virtue – for example, libertarian and liberal justice – and compare which better promotes group cooperation or individual well-being. In this way, virtue scientists can make use of the range of reasonable but conflicting philosophic views regarding the virtues and investigate an ambitious set of empirically tractable research hypotheses that will help us learn about how humans can develop various virtues and about the value of these virtues for a variety of purposes. Much Western virtue theory is Aristotelian in origin, and many claim that Aristotelian virtue theory is the richest available account of virtues (e.g., Fowers, 2005a; Russell, 2009; Wright et al., 2021). Other traditions exist, however, and we believe that scientists studying virtues will be best served by an account that captures broadly shared assumptions. For contingent personal reasons, the theory we propose in this book is mainly inspired by Western work in the Aristotelian tradition, but it is also substantively informed by the Confucian tradition, and we occasionally gesture toward evidence that our theory is acceptable to adherents of various world traditions. We present a virtue theory that forms the conceptual foundation for the empirical model we propose to support virtue science. Our basic view is that moral virtues are (1) acquired traits, (2) manifested in behavior, (3) steered by knowledge, and (4) fully motivated. It is important for us to differentiate “action” and “behavior” at this point. Psychologists generally refer to behavior in the belief that observed activity is minimally interpreted (or even not interpreted at all!). These claims have been widely criticized (e.g., Danziger, 1990; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1985). In our usage, behavior is activity that may or may not be associated with

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

28

Virtue Theory

specific knowledge or motivation. In contrast, our usage of action denotes a cohesive integration of behavior, knowledge, emotion, and motivation. Although there are many kinds of action, we stipulate that action only qualifies as virtuous when it includes all four components. In addition to this basic account of moral virtue, we think virtue science should be geared to assess additional classic contentions about virtue’s importance. One is that moral virtues are guided by practical wisdom or intelligence (our hypothesis 11-12).1 Another is that moral virtues contribute to, or are even necessary for, a good human life (our hypotheses 10-16, 10-17, 10-21, and 10-26).2 These hypotheses are inspired by claims about the connections between virtue, wisdom, and the good life that are found in philosophic and religious traditions from all parts of the globe, but we propose them as guiding hypotheses in part because they are not universally accepted (Driver, 2001; van Zyl, 2018). Due to this contention, we recognize that these claims call for empirical investigation. Moreover, we believe that by investigating them, virtue science will become more interesting, important, and useful. This means linking up virtue science with other areas of psychological research that are independently pursued. First, practical wisdom is the subject of broad and vibrant psychological study (e.g., Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; de Caro & Vaccarezza, 2021; Grossman et al., 2020) that does not always directly involve studying moral virtues. Scholars will need to bring together results from practical wisdom research with the results of work on moral virtues to identify and test specific hypotheses about virtue–wisdom links. But virtue scientists might also draw on work on wisdom and intelligence to improve their studies of individual virtues (cf. Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2022). Similarly, both personal and relationship well-being or flourishing are studied by a range of psychologists, only some of whom are interested in moral virtues (e.g., Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2014; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010; Robles et al., 2014). And scholars can bring together results from those areas with the results of work on the moral virtues to identify and test specific hypotheses about virtue–good life links (cf. Fowers, 2005a, 2012, 2016). Virtue scientists can draw on work on well-being and relationship health to advance the study of individual moral virtues and their importance. As this suggests, our 1 2

We number the hypotheses according to where they are discussed in a chapter in the book. Thus, this first-mentioned hypothesis is discussed in detail in Chapter 11 as the twelfth hypothesis in that chapter. Aristotle and most contemporary virtue theorists hold that virtue is not sufficient in itself for a good life because “external” goods such as friends, health, social harmony, and a reasonable degree of wealth are also necessary. We accept this premise as well.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues as Traits

29

approach involves developing a general model of moral virtue that can unify and guide virtue science. This can also point to the ways in which virtue science can be connected with other areas of psychological research to produce more interesting and valuable scientific results.

Virtues as Traits Aristotle (1999) was clear that virtues are reliable attributes, and this assumption is found in other traditions, for example, the Confucian one. Aristotle (1999) stated that “no function of man [sic] possesses as much stability as do activities in conformity with virtue” (1100b 13) and that the actions of a virtuous person “must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character” (1105a 32–35). But we adopt the less contentious view that virtues are stable characteristics that are expressed consistently, but not constantly or perfectly (hypothesis 7-6). There are, of course, virtue skeptics and some thinkers who question the stability of virtues (e.g., Doris, 2002; Harman, 2009; Miller, 2014). Their views have been widely discussed (e.g., Cokelet & Fowers, 2019; Wright et al., 2021) and we think it is clear that these skeptics tend to focus on the stronger claims just mentioned rather than more limited, realistic ones. We consider virtues to be traits because an individual who has a virtue will generally act reliably when that virtue is called for. Among trait theorists, however, there is considerable debate about what is meant by a trait, with scholars’ views ranging from “purely descriptive concepts to biologically based causal concepts” (John & Srivastava, 1999, p. 130). Therefore, we must specify what we mean by virtue as a trait. We specify five aspects of virtue traits. First, we do not believe that virtue traits are biologically given. Instead, we argue in the next section that virtues are acquired traits (hypothesis 7-4). Second, we do not see virtue traits as causal forces that determine behavior, at least not in the way that contemporary social scientists typically understand causation. Moreover, these traits are not an essential interior characteristic of individuals. Rather, virtue traits are modes of activity that are achieved when individuals’ thoughts, emotions, and behavior are shaped to be appropriately responsive to situations. This means that virtues are an intelligent mode of activity that is reliably responsive to the environment rather than an interior causal force that determines behavior in a mechanistic manner. We discuss this distinction in more detail in Chapter 5. For example, courage might be glossed as the intelligent capacity to protect what is valuable (persons, communities, or property) despite danger

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

30

Virtue Theory

and fear. There is no internal essence that causes one to act courageously. One acts with courage because one recognizes the need to protect something valuable. We have more to say about this intelligent ability to perceive what is necessary in the section “Virtues and Their Components 4: Practical Wisdom” in this chapter. Very briefly, the ability to recognize what is at stake in a given situation and act appropriately helps to constitute one as a person who has a virtue trait. Having a virtue trait means that one has acquired the capacity to act reliably with courage (or generosity, fairness, etc.) when a situation calls for it. Third, we suggest that virtues are generally personally desirable traits that are related to what individuals find valuable in life and to the way they want to live. If, for example, someone values fairness in relationships, he will be readily motivated to act fairly toward the people in his life for the sake of relational fairness. Put otherwise, virtues are typically valued characteristics, in part, because they help people to enact their ideals about how to live. Fourth, our understanding of virtue traits as desirable characteristics suggests that many people will want to intentionally cultivate them and that they may be able to do this (hypothesis 7-4). For example, some individuals may decide to intentionally develop virtues such as kindness and loyalty, in part because they believe these traits are important for maintaining the friendships they value. In Chapter 10, we discuss the relationship between virtues and what is seen as a good life overall, but the point for now is that virtues involve a form of intelligent responsiveness that sets them apart from the temperaments with which people are born. Our core theory of virtue assumes that virtues involve intelligence and we suggest that virtue science investigate the possibility that people can and do intentionally develop or cultivate these traits. For example, scientists can draw on various philosophic and psychological traditions to identify hypotheses about specific interventions or methods of cultivation (meditations, rituals, etc.) that people can use to develop or strengthen specific virtue traits. Finally, it is important from the outset to make it clear that we do not endorse the simplistic view of traits that suggests that they are continuously expressed. Rather, we argue that trait expression is responsive to (or moderated by) situations and social roles (hypotheses 8-1 and 9-5). We discuss this variability at length in Chapters 8 and 9. When one has a virtue trait, one is generally motivated to act in accordance with that trait, but this is compatible with tailoring one’s actions to the current situation and to one’s social roles. In addition, there are situations that seem to call on us to embody some virtues instead of others. For example, when tasked

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues as Traits

31

with giving awards to people based on important achievements, embodying the virtue of justice would be appropriate, while embodying the virtue of loyalty to a friend or family member would be less appropriate. This responsiveness to situations and roles means that virtues will be expressed when they fit the circumstances, rather than in a monotonously continuous manner. Trait Consistency and Variability The two important empirical conditions for claiming that a characteristic or virtue is a trait are that individuals who have the trait enact it with a significant degree of consistency and that there is variation across individuals in the degree to which the trait is expressed. That is, there should be within-person consistency (hypothesis 7-6) and between-person variability (hypothesis 7-7). For example, if someone has the trait of generosity, we expect that individual to act generously with some consistency and score higher on measures of generosity than others. Unfortunately, most studies on virtues have relied on single-timepoint survey studies with a global assessment of virtue, followed by aggregate analyses of sample level data (Fowers, 2014). These studies cannot assess this key requirement of trait theory (consistency over time within persons). Contemporary trait theorists recognize the necessity of multiple assessments of the candidate trait over time to document consistency (Fleeson, 2001; Jayawickreme et al., 2014). We discuss this approach to trait measurement more fully in Chapter 7. In addition to within-person consistency, some people will be more generous than others. As Carver and Scheier (2008) suggested, “trait theories assume that people occupy different points on continuously varying dimensions. For that reason, this is sometimes called a ‘dimensional’ approach. In trait theories, differences among people are seen as quantitative rather than qualitative” (p. 46, emphasis in original). We discuss this between-person variability more in Chapter 7 and cite many studies that demonstrate clear between-person variability on a variety of virtues. These consistent individual differences results support the idea that individuals have differences in the degree to which they evidence virtues. Within-Person Variability As already noted, our claim for trait consistency does not require that an individual constantly express a trait, even if the virtue is well developed.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

32

Virtue Theory

Clearly, no trait is appropriate in all circumstances. For example, a generous individual would be generally expected to be giving in many situations but not in others (e.g., when giving is likely to be exploited). In addition, no human being is perfect, which means that even the most virtuous person will not act in the best way on every occasion. If a characteristically generous person does not give something he can ordinarily be expected to give, he seems to be acting “out of character.” Human imperfection means that one can act suboptimally due to fatigue, distraction, or error. One way that our portrayal of virtue is psychologically realistic is that virtue trait consistency implies neither perfection nor constant expression (hypothesis 7-7). Virtues and Personality Traits The discussion of virtues as traits raises the question whether virtues can be subsumed within the category of personality traits. This is a natural question, given well-developed theory and research on personality traits. If it turns out that virtues are no more than restatements of what is already captured by personality psychology, then a science of virtue would be redundant. Scholars have taken a variety of positions on whether virtues can be subsumed within established personality frameworks (e.g., Fowers et al., 2021; Jayawickreme et al., 2014; Wright et al., 2021). We discuss this question in detail in Chapter 5. In brief, our view is that virtue traits have similarities with personality traits, but the differences are sufficiently important to maintain a distinction between the two types of traits (hypothesis 5-1).

Virtues as Acquired Traits In his account of the acquisition of virtue, Aristotle (1999) frankly denies any dichotomy of nature and nurture, saying: “The virtues are implanted in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive them, and habit brings this ability to completion and fulfillment” (1103a 24–26). A similar view can be found in Mencius, who argues that to have virtues we must develop or extend naturally occurring “moral sprouts” (e.g., Flanagan, 2014). Contemporary scholars will readily agree with Aristotle’s dismissal of a nature–nurture dichotomy, but some will balk at his firm assertion that virtue traits are acquired through intentional habituation (hypothesis 7-4). Aristotle (1984b) reinforced this idea many times, saying in the Eudemian Ethics that “character (virtue), being as its name indicates something that grows by habit … consider,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues as Acquired Traits

33

then, character to be this, viz. a quality in accordance with governing reason” (1220a 39–1220b 5). Because some contemporary virtue theorists – and philosophers in the past – disagree with these sorts of claims, we believe that intentional habituation should be approached as an interesting and potentially empirically tractable topic. We think that hypotheses about intentional virtue development are fit subjects for ambitious and interesting virtue science (see Chapter 5). The ultimate aim of virtue development is presumably robust virtue, with consistent and appropriate expression. We think virtue science can productively focus on the hypothesis that virtues are morally desirable traits that can be intentionally cultivated or developed, but that a general thesis and more specific hypotheses about the processes that will enable people to effectively cultivate various virtues call for scientific study. Some philosophic traditions claim that individuals can or must cultivate virtues through intentional habit-forming practices, and this is one specific view of intentional development that virtue science should investigate. This view suggests that people decide how to act repeatedly in dayto-day life and predicts that if one chooses consistently to act generously or courageously, these actions become habitual and those habits, in turn, become settled dispositions or traits. In other words, developing a virtue trait is based on enacting the virtue recurrently, so that acting well becomes one’s habitual response. That means that one characterizes oneself by making these actions habitual, and this self-characterization occurs whether one acts virtuously, viciously, or just splits the difference (Fowers, 2005a). One’s endorsement of many similar decisions through time shapes one as a particular kind of person rather than another kind. One becomes generous by giving, loyal by standing by one’s friends and family, brutish by following one’s baser impulses, and so forth. This can be seen as an accretive process because each time one acts, it contributes to or detracts from the solidity of a virtue trait, albeit ever so slightly in each instance. Each action reinforces or undermines one’s virtue or vice traits and therefore one’s dispositions to act (in)consistently with a virtue. Practicing acts of courage and generosity can help us to become comfortable with those kinds of actions and to make them part of our identity. The idea is to act as though one has a virtue on the way to internalizing that virtue and identifying with it. This is what it means to cultivate virtues (Broadie, 1991). The process is often compared to skills (Annas, 2011; Stichter, 2018), such as woodworking, jazz, or chess. One becomes a skilled woodworker, for example, only through the choice to practice and one needs both intentional

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

34

Virtue Theory

commitment and extended guidance to become adept at making beautiful objects with wood. Creating a few pieces of merely functional furniture would not qualify one as an expert woodworker, only a novice. To become a master woodworker, one needs to develop intelligent skills that integrate discursive knowledge and know-how. Similarly, the beginning of practicing courage or generosity would not be considered virtue because these actions have not yet become second nature and they do not reflect the agent’s intelligent skill and know-how. We would count someone as courageous or just or temperate only when they become skilled at responding in courageous, just, or temperate ways and exercising that skill becomes to some extent second nature. Regardless of whether one endorses a habit-formation model or not, intentional virtue development will presumably involve the element of choice. On these models, cultivating virtues involves an intentional set of choices over an extended period. The primacy of choice in intentional virtue trait development models is a key differentiation between virtue and personality traits, one which we discuss in greater depth in Chapter 5. This agentic emphasis means that one’s decisions and actions do not generally occur episodically or independently of the rest of one’s life and trait makeup. Rather, choices and actions are outgrowths of one’s life and character and they also constitute that life and character. The accretive structure of virtue is sometimes said to underline the way in which virtues are continually under development (Annas, 1993). On the intentional models, each circumstance provides new opportunities to hone and refine one’s capacity for virtuous action. For example, if one develops habitual generosity, it rests on repeated decisions to endorse and shape one’s generous disposition in myriad situations. Of course, one may act ungenerously occasionally, but the extensive practice of generosity simply makes it easier to enact giving as a matter of course (Annas, 1993). The general process of virtue acquisition is seen by intentional practice theorists as an active, conscious process involving choices made explicitly for the purpose of virtue development. Nevertheless, many of one’s choices and actions do not require conscious consideration. The closer to second nature a virtue-related choice and action is, the less deliberative is the process. On some views, the goal of virtue development is even to make virtuous acts generally automatic. This is consistent with the contemporary understanding of automaticity, wherein automatic actions can be based primarily or solely on inherited or biological sources, or can be habituated over time to become the default response (Bargh, 1994).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues in Cultural Context

35

Finally, in addition to considering and empirically investigating various models of virtue acquisition, virtue science should proceed by considering the possibility that most if not all human beings have natural capacities that can be developed into virtues (hypothesis 4-18). Virtue science should also integrate findings that tell us something about the possible natural tendencies that impede some or all humans from developing in a virtuous direction. Positive “seeds” of virtue might be found, for example, in the inclinations toward fairness that emerge by three years of age (Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2011) and toward beneficence that has been documented at one year of age (Hamlin, 2013; Kuhlmeier et al., 2003). These tendencies emerge naturally in children, whether or not they have been taught fairness or beneficence, and serve notice that humans appear to be naturally ethically minded (Fowers, 2015). These capacities are often lumped into the bland term “prosociality” by psychologists, but if we think of them as possible seeds of virtue, we will be encouraged to frame and investigate hypotheses about their making it possible for us to develop and cultivate more specific adult virtues. An analogy can clarify this point. Humans are generally born with the capacities to speak and understand language, but we must learn to speak in ways that are intelligible to others. Learning to speak is a long process that requires shaping vocalizations into meaningful utterances, with extensive feedback and encouragement from caregivers. Speech development can lead to the appreciation (and even composition) of beautiful prose or poetry. But the process of understanding and composing excellent expressions of language also requires a lengthy process of education. There is no certainty about whether children will come to appreciate the finest written language just because they are generally born with the capacity for speech, but that ability is a prerequisite that is available for cultivation. Similarly, humans are not born with the knowledge of how to act in the best ways. Each child must learn what is considered the best ways to act because human ethical mindedness involves a general interest in acting morally, but it is not a fully defined or inevitable inclination (Fowers, 2015). Clearly, this learning is culturally conditioned and virtue concepts vary across historical cultures, a point that we now discuss.

Virtues in Cultural Context Even if individual choice and commitment are crucial for virtue development, it is important to remember that individuals always operate in concrete sociohistorical contexts, which shape both how individuals conceive

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

36

Virtue Theory

of the virtues and how they can best attempt to develop them. This cultural dependency is clear in the variations in virtue concepts in various cultures. Two quick examples are the culturally elevated importance of honor as a virtue term in many warrior societies, such as ancient Greece, and Li, a Confucian virtue which involves demonstrating the appropriate reverence for cultural rituals (Ivanhoe, 2013; Woodruff, 2001). Although both are recognizable to contemporary Westerners, neither is emphasized as a central, morally desirable virtue trait in the West today. In contrast, it is relatively easy to make a case for morally desirable traits related to the appreciation of diversity and the inclusion of people from various backgrounds, at least in liberal Western circles. (Fowers & Davidov [2006] termed this the virtue of openness to the other.) This openness and welcoming of people from diverse backgrounds has become increasingly important (and contested) as migration and cultural differences have become more prominent in the contemporary world. This is an example of cultural change in the increasing importance of the ideal of inclusion. This inclusion leads to cultivating excellence in welcoming and appreciating people with various backgrounds. The cultural and temporal variability of virtue concepts (hypothesis I-1) presents several issues. First, cultural variability suggests one reason why it is unlikely that there will ever be a once-and-for-all, definitive list of virtues. Each cultural group defines and enacts virtues in its own way in response to new challenges and changes that are hard to foresee (Herman, 1997). The cultural dependency of virtue concepts also raises worries about our ability to develop a justifiable, if not final, list of virtues. Because these background assumptions about virtue traits are culturally and perhaps evolutionarily conditioned, it is possible that some are not sound or justified: for example, a certain culture might treat a trait that is actually harmful and shameful as a virtue. But it is not clear how we can justify our decisions about which concepts to keep on our lists and which to toss out as defective (Crisp, 2015; Williams, 2006). Second, cultural groups may deploy assumptions about the virtues that are incompatible and that appear incommensurable and unintelligible across cultural divides. This makes it unclear how we can rationally decide which virtues to include on our list and how we can reduce the list to a manageable size. Both worries are serious, but we do not think they undermine the prospects for developing a robust program of virtue science. We first discuss our concept of culture because this helps to clarify the degree of variability that we need to worry about. Cultural relativity is a real and important phenomenon, but, as we argue in the following paragraphs,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues in Cultural Context

37

that cultural relativism is not decisive in rendering a virtue valueless. The first two points clarify the reality of cultural variation and the second two indicate how this variation does not rule out virtue science. First, by definition, a culture is a temporally extended group of people that has been able to foster a relatively stable way of life, suggesting that the group has fostered the kind of socially beneficial traits that promote enough social harmony for self-maintenance. Although cultural perspectives vary on what morally desirable traits are, there is generally an internal logic to each culture that makes it sustainable. Moreover, even if one does not endorse another group’s views on virtue, this logic may be generally intelligible and the nobility of the virtue-related actions can be appreciated from an outsider’s perspective, as the examples of honor cultures and Li suggest.3 Of course, there are many examples of cultures that have collapsed or been absorbed by other cultural groups. The relationship between cultural group trajectories and virtue conceptions is a fascinating domain of study (cf. Appiah, 2011; Glover, 2012) but well beyond the scope of this book. A major concern about cultural relativity is that cultural norms and ideals not only differ across cultures but also can appear immoral from other cultural perspectives. In particular, cultural groups that seem to value the extreme xenophobia that underwrites ethnic cleansing or the domination and exploitation of other groups come to mind. This concern is best addressed directly by recognizing that cultures can go wrong in their views of virtue (e.g., the desirability of a strong tendency to dehumanize people from other cultural or religious groups). This raises the second reason that we do not see the cultural variability of virtues as delegitimizing virtue. Cultural norms and ideals can be critiqued both internally and from alternative perspectives. Of course, no one has an unassailable critical perspective or a god’s eye viewpoint, but with appropriate modesty, questions can be raised among fellow humans regarding cultural ideals. Raising such questions can be difficult, but it is far from impossible to have reasonable discussions about cultural ideals. Moreover, progress in cultural ideals is always possible, and no culture can progress without questioning its reigning ideals. Because cultures are dynamic rather than static, cultural change is a constant, and it is a mistake to see cultural norms and ideals as sacrosanct and beyond critique. Moral outlooks can and should be questioned, albeit with the appropriate modesty and circumspection. Virtue scientists can study a variety of different 3

We understand that this intelligibility can be doubted, but we see no reason to assume a kind of incommensurability.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

38

Virtue Theory

virtues from a variety of different traditions and cultures without needing to claim that one set of virtues or one tradition is best or right. The critique of cultural norms brings up the third way to address the cultural variability of virtue. We suggest that virtues are defined as traits, the exercise of which is typically taken to foster healthy human communities (hypothesis 10-13) and individual welfare (hypotheses 10-11 to ­10-34). Of course, both relations need empirical assessment. We discuss the available evidence and suggest more hypotheses about those relations in Chapter 10. To give a few examples, fairness fosters trust and social harmony, courage allows the protection of what is valued when it is threatened, and forgiveness allows relational healing after a transgression. The virtues of fairness, courage, and forgiveness are valued in many cultures because they promote desirable states of affairs such as social harmony, value protection, and relational healing. Questions about whether culturally promoted attributes promote genuine goods is one important basis for critiquing a group’s views on morally desirable traits. For instance, the military subculture in Western societies places great value on respect for and obedience to people with higher ranks. This clearly serves the ends of unit cohesion and coordinated action that, in turn, leads to effective defense, the primary purpose of the military. Yet that respect for and obedience to authority goes seriously wrong when it is deployed to cover up errors or transgressions within the unit or by the ranking officers. Serious cover-ups of atrocities and sexual offenses are abhorrent both within and outside the military. The recognition that such actions are serious transgressions shows that respect for authority cannot be an absolute value but must be balanced with other ideals such as justice and honesty. Those who wish to cover up transgressions often do so by touting an absolute valuing of obedience. Although obedience is important, absolute obedience can support covering up serious transgressions, which is damaging to the primary purposes of the military (unit cohesion and its role in effective defense). This means that the virtue of obedience must be tempered by virtues such as justice and honesty to maintain the goods that are internal to the military, as well as the trust and support of the military by a broader polity that cannot accept atrocities or sexual misconduct. This is just one example of how important ideals can be critiqued and clarified, and it remains an ongoing challenge in many forms of organization. Nevertheless, it indicates the respectfulness and shape that cultural critiques can have. More ambitiously, an argument has been made (Fowers, 2015, 2017) that some of these robust virtues are important elements of basic human

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Behavioral Patterns

39

functions, such as standing up to harm or exploitation (courage), communication (honesty), benefaction (generosity), and social harmony (justice). We do not reiterate that case here, but we do want to suggest that the selection of which traits are virtues is not made arbitrarily by individuals or cultures. Virtues are socially recognized and often directly encouraged within societies based on recognizable cultural ideals. The fourth reason that cultural relativity does not necessarily render virtue conceptions arbitrary is that many virtue traits are not only intelligible across cultures, but these virtues show up across many groups’ virtue understandings. Traits commonly recognized cross-culturally are virtues such as courage, honesty, generosity, and justice. To be sure, there are variations in ways of understanding these virtues across cultures, but the virtues are easily recognized in differing cultural contexts and the variations tend to involve nuances rather than incommensurabilities. For example, Tudge and colleagues (O’Brien et al., 2018; Tudge et al., 2018) have studied the virtue of gratitude cross-culturally, and they report that there are identifiable cultural differences in the expression of gratitude. Nevertheless, the differences they found occurred within a family resemblance across gratitude conceptions and expressions because the differences emerged in the degree to which various aspects of gratitude (e.g., verbal and behavioral gratitude) are emphasized in the four cultural groups they studied. In our view, cultural variations in virtue understandings are important and ineliminable. We must attend to culture as an important source of virtue conceptions and actions. Yet it seems unreasonable to simply throw up our hands in despair about the general concept of virtue based on cultural variation. Although cultural differences in virtues still need more attention from virtue theorists, we believe that culture can be incorporated in virtue theory in ways that nuance and deepen that theory rather than undermine it. We have only scratched the surface of this question here, but a deeper consideration of these questions is beyond the scope of this book.

Virtues and Their Components 1: Behavioral Patterns Our model of virtue involves several components. The first is behavior, which registers the hypotheses (11-13 to 11-15) that fully developed virtues are characteristically expressed in patterns of observable behavior. Generous thoughts or courageous feelings may in some cases be enough for low-grade generosity or courage, but when we think of a fully fledged generous or courageous person we think of someone whose “inner” states are manifest in

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

40

Virtue Theory

durable patterns of action.4 For example, while we may grant that someone who has a locked-in syndrome and cannot act could be classified as generous if her thoughts and feeling are all generous, we would consider someone who has such thoughts, and acts on them, even more generous. And someone who acts on generous thoughts and feelings once or twice but does not exhibit a pattern of extended behavior can hardly be called generous at all. This focus on patterns of action is built into our thinking about virtue and it is also congenial to psychologists’ interest in observable phenomena. As we explore in more detail in Chapter 3, however, one of the shortcomings of virtue research to date is that it relies too much on singletimepoint, global self-reports of virtues; there are relatively few studies of observable virtue behavior or patterns of behavior that are temporally extended. Relying primarily on self-report provides relatively weak evidence of virtue behavior due to questions about respondents’ ability and willingness to accurately report on their behavior. In addition, singletimepoint assessments require respondents to summarize vast amounts of behavior across a set of individual items. We discuss several methods for reducing these burdens in Part III. In addition, we discuss the behavioral aspects of virtue in Part III and Chapter 7.

Virtues and Their Components 2: Intentional, Intelligent Agency Although our model draws attention to the importance of patterned behavior, it also reflects the idea that behavior alone is insufficient for the ascription of fully fledged virtue. In addition, we offer hypotheses 11-16 and 11-17 that virtue requires knowledge (i.e., intention and understanding). In other words, we suggest that virtues are not blind habits. To make these points more vivid, think again about a generous person. To be generous, someone needs to be disposed to share their goods (e.g., wealth, time, or talent) in ways that are not legally or morally required. But a fully generous person will also act intentionally and with knowledge and understanding. For example, proper gift-giving requires knowledge about the occasions for gift-giving, understanding the sort of gift that is fitting to the occasion, and an appreciation of how the relationship one has with the recipient conditions appropriate gift-giving. It is possible that someone would be raised or habituated to get these things right while remaining 4

Of course, the Stoics, Plato, and other views suggest that one can have inner virtues without ever expressing them in action.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Intentional, Intelligent Agency

41

unable to articulate the relevant knowledge or understanding in any systematic way. If they are generous, however, they will still have the knowhow or intelligent sensitivity that will allow them to give appropriate gifts and be able to recognize mistakes on their own part or on the part of others. In most cases, explicit knowledge of what makes things appropriate or not will also be a good thing because it allows us to better explain and guide our actions. Explicit knowledge can also facilitate teaching virtues to others. Virtues are intentional in the sense that they involve more than accidental behavior, but virtue requires that one must not only intentionally act virtuously but also act for the right reasons. To continue with the example of generosity, there are clearly many reasons that one might contribute money, time, or talent. These reasons can include a genuine desire to share one’s abundance, the wish to be praised for one’s generosity, a plan to reduce one’s taxes, or an intention to atone for past transgressions. Clearly, the reasons for action are an important component in whether a behavior counts as virtuous. If someone intentionally performs generous acts over time and displays intelligent know-how in picking out the best ways to give gifts, we might initially think of him as generous. But if we found out that apparently good gift choices were merely accidental, we would either entirely withdraw the attribution of generosity or downgrade it and hold that this person is minimally generous but not as generous as someone who acts similarly based on their knowledge of generosity (Gulliford & Morgan, 2016). Similarly, the fully fledged virtue of loyalty is motivated by a desire to promote or maintain a valued relationship or group, not just to conform or avoid exclusion. According to theorists in many traditions, one of the important elements of the development of virtues is the capacity to intellectually understand virtue. There is good evidence that children commonly and spontaneously behave in ways that benefit others, through helping, cooperating, and expressing moral emotions (Killen & Smetana, 2015; Tomasello, 2019; Walker, 2014). As individuals mature, they develop the ability to understand better how one can benefit others, how to properly modulate one’s emotions and impulses, and how to adjudicate among competing priorities. Acting well becomes more and more a matter of acting for the right reasons and less acting from impulse. Transforming the natural other-benefiting impulses of children into real virtues may also involve cultivating a self-conscious, intentional kind of virtue, which means that one can act on other-benefiting inclinations in a consistent and excellent manner rather than in a hit or miss way. But that claim about intentional enactment of virtue being important for the cultivation

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

42

Virtue Theory

and expression of consistent and excellent virtue is contentious, so we think this should be among the hypotheses that virtue science tests, rather than a part of the core theory of virtue. Although we have emphasized cognition in this section, there is little to be gained by thinking of cognition, emotion, and motivation as separate domains of human experience. Acting virtuously actually involves a concordance of emotion, motivation, and understanding because a proper understanding of what is good is itself motivating. We now turn to the question of the roles of emotion and motivation in virtue.

Virtues and Their Components 3: Emotion, and Motivational Concordance In addition to behavioral enactment and cognitive understanding, we predict that fully fledged virtue involves concordant emotions and being motivated properly (hypotheses 11-8 to 11-11). This means that a virtuous person’s emotions are in line with his intelligent sensitivity to the ethically relevant aspects of the situations he encounters and that they reflect his intrinsic concern for these ethically relevant considerations. Aristotle (1999) saw emotion as integral to virtue as well, and he clarified that when one sees a situation rightly, one’s emotions will be consistent with acting well: Thus, we can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity and generally any kind of pleasure and pain either too much or too little, and in either case not properly. But to experience all this at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner—that is the median and the best course, the course that is the mark of virtue. (1106b 18–23)

Virtues are manifested in how one’s emotions align with the circumstances and with one’s actions. From an observational standpoint, the match between emotion and behavior can be observed in facial features, as well as other nonverbal and paraverbal indicators. Another aspect of emotion and virtue is that individuals enact virtues gladly. Alternatively, people who lack virtue or who are less virtuous will often act grudgingly. The willingness to act wholeheartedly is due to the way that one’s emotional responses correspond to the good reasons to act in a particular way. As already noted, a loyal person acts loyally because he values a relationship or group, and he acts courageously because he values what he is protecting. Emotional concordance adds that his fear or reluctance to loyally and courageously put himself at risk reflects his primary

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Practical Wisdom

43

sensitivity to the ethically significant costs he might bear. For example, if his courageous and loyal act of whistleblowing would put his child at risk, he would feel fear or reluctance, but if it would only cost him invitations to dinner parties with his unethical peers, then he would feel no reluctance and gladly stand up for what is right. We agree with Aristotle and Confucius that the bottom line about emotions in virtue theory is that one’s emotions reveal the kind of person one is. One’s character is revealed by the kinds of things that elicit feelings of delight or pleasure and by the sorts of things that evoke pain or revulsion. As Aristotle (1999) put it, “it is the mark of virtue both to be pleased and to be pained at the right objects and in the right way” (1121a 3–4). Emotion is an integral aspect of virtue, and it arises spontaneously in our responses to situations. For someone who has cultivated the virtues, one’s emotional response primes one to act in the best way, given the circumstances. Therefore, a virtuous person experiences compassion rather than contempt when observing undeserved suffering and joy rather than envy when seeing excellent performance. One’s emotions are, at best, concordant with acting in the best ways in the given circumstance. This concordance between emotion, cognition, and behavior renders one’s experiences and actions wholehearted and focused. This emotion–action harmony is a vital component of virtuous activity because one’s motives and emotional experience can either resonate with and enhance one’s actions or create disharmony and thereby undermine one’s activity. The process of character development, which we examine in greater detail in Chapter 4, includes schooling or cultivating one’s emotions so that they are consistent with acting well. According to many traditions in moral philosophy, it is possible to train one’s emotions because our affective experience is responsive to our appraisals of situations, through which we identify what is important. On these views, the point of training oneself to be properly affected is to increase one’s attachment to what is best in life and to recognize how to act in ways that bring that goodness into being. By adopting a virtue model that builds concordant emotion into virtue, we set ourselves up to test the empirical hypotheses embedded in these views and to explore various other ways in which we might be able to become more virtuous (Chapter 11).

Virtues and Their Components 4: Practical Wisdom Last but not least, we suggest that virtue science should investigate the contention that one’s degree of virtue is partially a function of one’s degree of

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

44

Virtue Theory

practical wisdom (hypothesis 11-12). To explain what we mean, however, we must pause to say a bit more about what practical wisdom is.5 One of the most remarkable characteristics of Aristotle’s famous treatise on ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, is that it contains virtually no rules for ethical behavior. This is because he understood that the human world is far too complex to be managed with a rule book or a set of algorithms. In everyday life, individuals confront particulars rather than abstract or general patterns. The particulars of the situations people encounter are often delicately balanced, obscured by other specifics, and connected to still other particulars, making each situation somewhat unique and complex. Reasoning about such complex and changeable matters cannot be too precise or guided effectively by the application of general rules (Darnell et al., 2019). If one had a workable set of general rules, one would need guidelines for how to apply them to a wide range of specifics. Because situations are so variable, one would need a nearly infinite set of such guidelines to ensure proper rule-following. This would make a rule book far too lengthy and cumbersome to have any practical value. Instead, moral philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Kant, and Confucius advocate the cultivation of good judgment or practical wisdom that can guide individuals in acting for the best in the myriad circumstances we encounter. Despite all their disagreements, they are united in thinking that the guidance of practical wisdom is central to virtuous activity. It is also worthwhile to distinguish practical wisdom from two other conceptions: skills expertise and cleverness. It is true that Aristotle and other virtue theorists frequently mention skills as a metaphor for virtue, and expertise as a metaphor for practical wisdom, but it is important to bear in mind that this relationship is metaphorical rather than isomorphic. Skills and expertise refer to specific domains of production, wherein the product is the primary concern. With skills (e.g., carpentry), the productive outcome (e.g., a cabinet) is what is important, and various means could be recruited to achieve the outcome.6 In contrast, virtue and practical wisdom refer to the overall process of living, with a way of life as the primary concern. Living ethically requires the ongoing, daily engagement with ethical concerns. 5

6

In our first two publications on the STRIVE-4 Model (Cokelet & Fowers, 2019; Fowers et al., 2021), the fourth component was focused on disposition, but this was somewhat redundant with the concept of trait, and we recognized that we had not given practical wisdom its due. For those reasons, we have altered our model to make practical wisdom the fourth component of virtue. Stichter (2018) has articulated a skills approach to virtue and practical wisdom that is much less instrumental than is portrayed here and is illuminating. We remain committed to the view that virtues and practical wisdom are modes of living rather than skills, however.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Practical Wisdom

45

The only way to do this is to act in a consistently ethical manner, making the means (acting ethically) and the end (a moral life) inseparable. We discuss this way of being in more detail in the last section of this chapter. Practical wisdom can be fruitfully differentiated from cleverness as well. Cleverness is the capacity to figure out how to obtain what one desires. Once again, the emphasis is on the outcome – the attainment of a desired state of affairs. Clever people can figure out different pathways to their goals, and the pathway may be taken to be less important than the goal. In addition, there is no ethical constraint on the desire a clever person can pursue. One can be a clever inventor, artist, thief, or human trafficker. In contrast, virtue theory stipulates that the purpose of practical wisdom is to pursue what is good (knowledge, justice, etc.). Therefore, cleverness by itself can be deployed for ethically unpalatable goals, but practical wisdom cannot. Darnell et al. (2019, 2022) developed a neo-Aristotelian theory of practical wisdom that incorporates the most recent insights of moral psychology and has four functions. We discuss here only two of the functions they described, as a way to introduce practical wisdom.7 The first is the guidance practical wisdom provides in recognizing the ethically relevant features of the situation at hand. This has been termed the constitutive function (Darnell et al., 2019). The second is the ability to prioritize and harmonize competing ethical demands in a justifiable or admirable way when various virtue-relevant features or considerations conflict. Darnell and colleagues called this the integrative function. We offer hypotheses 11-13 to 11-17, to explore individual differences in these components. The Constitutive Function With respect to practical wisdom, the term constitutive refers to what constitutes or makes up a virtue. The constitutive function of practical wisdom is the process of determining what constitutes a virtue, given the particulars of a situation. Practical wisdom involves moral perception (Fowers, 2005a) because it depends on perceiving the ethical dimensions of a situation accurately. Seeing one’s circumstances properly involves sorting the central features of the situation from what is peripheral so that one can respond to the most essential elements, rather than being distracted by less important concerns. In many cases, this is very simple and quickly resolved, as in complimenting someone who has performed 7

The other two functions – emotional regulation (integrating affect and reason) and the blueprint (overall understanding of the good life) functions – are discussed at length in Chapters 10 and 11.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

46

Virtue Theory

well, expressing gratitude for a kindness, or deciding to give an award to someone who is clearly the most deserving. For a virtuous person, the appropriate behavior, cognition, and motivation is usually recruited instantaneously, as a matter of habit. This habituation is the aim of virtue cultivation. When circumstances are relatively simple or when one has dealt with many similar situations, virtuous action is quickly enacted because it has become habitual. Of course, not all situations are simple and straightforward. In some cases, it is not immediately clear what would constitute virtuous action, even if it is clear which virtue is appropriate. Courage – the inclination to take risks to protect what is valuable – provides a simple example because what constitutes courage varies by situation, which includes how much protection a specific item merits. Imagine a firefighter working to contain a building fire. When a parent begs the firefighter to go into the building to save a child, we can imagine that the firefighter will risk injury or death to save the child (assuming that there is a sufficient chance of success – another possible constitutive factor of courage). If we imagine another person asking the firefighter to enter the burning building to save his stamp collection, it would be far more reasonable for the firefighter to decline (and even marvel that someone would ask him to risk injury or death for such a reason). The central point here is that the value of what is to be preserved helps to determine what constitutes courage in a dangerous situation. Whereas it could well be courageous to attempt to save the child, it would be foolhardy to attempt to save the stamps if there were significant risk. In such cases, some degree of deliberation may be required to establish how to act in a justifiable or admirable way. This deliberation may be quick and close to automatic (as efforts to save lives tend to be) or more extended when the moral elements of the situation are more difficult to perceive and assess. In the firefighter’s case, the deliberation is focused on how much risk is merited in the situation. The firefighter could take excessive risks, appropriate risks, or be deficient in his risk-taking, given the stakes of the situation. Attempting to save a child would usually be an appropriate risk and refusing a reasonable request to save a child would generally be seen as deficient risk-taking. In contrast, taking significant risks to save a stamp collection would typically be viewed as excessive. A more difficult deliberation might involve taking risks to save the Mona Lisa or an original copy of the Magna Carta. The intensity of the flames and the structural integrity of the building are additional sources of complexity. The question of excess, proper, and deficient risk-taking is almost always a matter of judgment about the specifics of the situation.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Practical Wisdom

47

Other virtues have a similar structure, with contextual cues that call for them, and particulars that guide one in deciding what is excessive, appropriate, and deficient. Another simple example is gift-giving. There are many occasions and relationships in which gift-giving is customary. One must decide what sort of gift would be extravagant (excessive), appropriate, or miserly (deficient) based on the particulars of the situation. The constitutive function of practical wisdom is a decision-making process that guides one in deciding what constitutes a virtue, given the specifics of the situation that calls for the virtue. But there are also cases where multiple virtues are evoked, some of which may not be entirely compatible, and this calls for the integrative function of practical wisdom. The Integrative Function Practical wisdom is even more important in situations that are thornier, less well defined, or present conflicting demands. For example, Derrick had worked with a colleague, Stan, for many years. Derrick and Stan are good friends and spend time together both at work and outside work. Stan was promoted to supervise their unit in the organization, and he relied on Derrick a good deal for keeping the unit functioning smoothly. As this reliance increased over time, Derrick began to feel overburdened. When Stan made a new request for Derrick to take on more responsibility, Derrick felt this was too much to ask, but he also felt a call to respond to his friend. Derrick felt significant loyalty to Stan, given their friendship, and Derrick wanted to act generously because he could see how the management responsibilities weighed on Stan. Yet the requests felt somewhat unfair because Derrick was assisting far more than other unit personnel of equal standing, and it seemed like simply accepting the responsibility would be cowardly and self-sacrificial. Derrick resolved this set of conflicting calls to action by making the conflict explicit. He told Stan that, as Stan’s friend, he would do anything he could to support Stan, but as his co-worker, a spouse, and a parent, Derrick did not think it was wise or fair for him to take on more responsibility. He left the decision about the responsibility to Stan, who, as Derrick’s friend, recognized that this responsibility should be delegated to someone else. Of course, the exercise of practical wisdom does not always result in such a harmonious resolution, but the point of practical wisdom is to identify and enact some justifiable or admirable course of action. We think that is as much as ordinary mortals can do. When one’s circumstances are complex, it is still sometimes possible to recognize a good course of action quickly, without much conscious

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

48

Virtue Theory

deliberation. Yet difficult situations also arise about which one needs conscious deliberation to arrive at the best course of action. The claim that conscious consideration may be necessary on some occasions seems to contradict the Social Intuition Model (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2013), in which conscious thought is portrayed as mainly occurring after one has acted in a particular way, with the purpose of the cognition being to justify the act post hoc. Although post hoc justification certainly occurs, we see the inadequate account of moral deliberation in the Social Intuition Model as a major flaw. Practical wisdom does not spontaneously spring into existence. Rather, many thinkers see it as cultivated in much the same way as virtues are fostered. For example, Confucius and Aristotle hold that it is taught and exemplified by wise individuals, practiced by the developing person, and taken on board through habituation. We have more to say about these hypotheses (11-12 to 11-19) about virtue and practical wisdom cultivation in Chapters 4 and 11. We have only scratched the surface of practical wisdom here. There are many more extensive discussions that have informed this section but go significantly beyond this brief description (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Dunne, 1993; Fowers, 2003, 2005a; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2022; Kristjánsson et al., 2021; Russell, 2009; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). For example, we have not touched on controversial claims about the unity of the virtues, which we think is better left aside in virtue science (for reasons we give in Chapter 2). To summarize this discussion of practical wisdom, we set out to make three important points. First, it is not possible to formalize ethical action in a set of rules or principles, the application of which provides sufficient moral guidance. Acting morally requires making good judgments about what is at stake and what is called for, and about justifiable or admirable ways to pursue what is good. We have described this judgment as practical wisdom. Second, enacting virtues always involves practical wisdom to decide what constitutes acting well in each situation, whether or not that wisdom emerges in conscious deliberation. As virtues and practical wisdom are cultivated, more and more of their enactment is spontaneous and automatic. Making virtue and practical wisdom “second nature” is the goal of virtue cultivation. Finally, practical wisdom makes it possible to prioritize and harmonize the best expressions of multiple virtues when they are called for, which has been termed the integrative function of practical wisdom. We have intimated that practical wisdom is also informed by a robust understanding of what is good. We describe our views of the relationships

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue and the Good Life

49

among virtues, practical wisdom, and the good life in the next section, and we enumerate these views as hypotheses in Chapter 10.

Virtue and the Good Life: A Potentially Orienting Hypothesis for Virtue Science One of Aristotle’s (1999) primary goals in writing the Nicomachean Ethics was to describe the good life and how to achieve it. He termed it eudaimonia (flourishing) and argued that the role of the virtues is to foster eudaimonia, as the best kind of life. As we stated in the Introduction, eudaimonia is a matter of how one’s life comes together as a whole over the course of myriad decisions and actions. Aristotle claimed that acting virtuously, as guided by practical wisdom, is the pathway to a eudaimonic life. We think these are exciting and interesting hypotheses that virtue science should be oriented to test (our hypotheses 10-1 to 10-6, 10-16, 10-33). To motivate this proposal and to begin to point to the relevant orienting hypotheses, we need to review the broadly Aristotelian way of thinking about virtues and their role in the good life. Before we do so, however, we should note that the authors of this book endorse this approach to varying degrees. This might sound surprising and lead readers to wonder why we think it is wise to discuss this approach in detail.8 The answer is that while not all of us fully endorse the Aristotelian approach, we all agree that virtue science will be greatly enriched if it tests hypotheses that are suggested by various rich and varied traditions in philosophy. So, our intention is to describe one tradition – the Aristotelian one – in some detail to concretely demonstrate how philosophy and theory can enrich virtue science. We hope that others will follow this lead and mine other traditions to enrich the fund of interesting and important hypotheses that virtue science investigates. With that said, we turn to a sketch of the broadly Aristotelian or “eudaimonic” view. Crucially, this approach suggests that virtues are traits, which means that one is generally likely to act well across a variety of circumstances. The reason that virtues need to be habituated and forged into a trait is to make this form of activity the default option, thereby creating a way of life in which one consistently enacts what is good. Because one’s life is the cumulative result of an untold number of decisions and actions, 8

The doubts about the Aristotelian connection between virtue and welfare focus primarily on how universally this perspective applies. It is possible that strengthening some virtues in some populations may turn out to decrease welfare or leave it unchanged in that group.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

50

Virtue Theory

an individual can develop increasingly potent ethical resources to act well in many circumstances. A well-developed set of virtues positions a person to consistently pursue the kind of integrated life that can be described as flourishing. In the contemporary West, ethics is commonly restricted to a matter of acting rightly in a limited domain of occasions that are somehow identified as especially “ethical.” This creation of a special domain of ethics is mistaken from a eudaimonic viewpoint because the latter perspective views ethics as integral to one’s life as a whole. From a eudaimonic perspective, cultivating and enacting virtue is integral to all one’s activities, including how one approaches work, the kind of jokes one tells, the sorts of personal relationships one has, and the things in which one takes pleasure. The upshot is that virtue and flourishing are a way of life, not a discrete set of activities, and certainly not an identifiable set of outcomes (e.g., wealth, fame, or simple pleasures). This focus on creating an ethically good life as the goal of ethics seems to us to make virtue theory a thoroughly comprehensive and integrative form of ethics. The idea that virtues are integral to all aspects of a person’s life suggests that virtues are taught, cultivated, and enacted through engaging in the ordinary activities of life in an excellent manner. As Broadie (1991) clarified, “an excellence or virtue, as Plato and Aristotle understand that concept, is nothing but a characteristic which makes the difference between functioning and functioning well” (p. 37). There are two important caveats to this rosy-sounding picture. First, even the most virtuous person will fail to act virtuously on occasion. This can be due to confusion, fatigue, illness, or extremely trying circumstances. Neither virtue, practical wisdom, nor eudaimonia require or suggest perfection because that is simply impossible for humans. The idea of virtues as traits means that a virtuous person will typically act according to virtue. Contemporary understandings of traits portray traits as responsive to one’s internal and external circumstances, rather than being independent of factors that moderate them (cf. Fleeson, 2007). We discuss the interaction of virtue traits and situational factors at length in Chapter 9. Second, as Aristotle (1999) and most ancient Greeks recognized, eudaimonia is partly dependent on having the good fortune to have the kind of resources and context that make it possible. Factors such as extreme poverty, pervasive family dysfunction, persistent discrimination or exploitation, incessant warfare or social disharmony, tyranny, or plague can render it very difficult to create a eudaimonic life. Of course, some individuals manage to overcome such obstacles in exemplary ways, but these factors impair most individuals’ capacity for the cultivation of virtue and the good life.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

51

We also want to indicate some of the substantive components of eudaimonia. What constitutes a flourishing life? Neo-Aristotelian views on the goods that humans need to flourish are no doubt contentious, but we think it is worthwhile to briefly present some more tangible substance to make eudaimonia more comprehensible. Fowers (2015) has argued that what is good for human beings can be recognized by understanding what helps humans to live well. There are many important contributors to human welfare, including good social relationships (Fowler & Christakis, 2008; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010), clarity about the meaning and purpose of one’s life (Fowers et al., 2010; McGregor & Little, 1998), communal harmony (Boehm, 2008; Kruger & Nesse, 2007), and group belonging (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008; Steptoe et al., 2013), to name a few. Fowers (2015) presents evidence that these are ubiquitously pursued human goods that contribute to a flourishing life, and we encourage the investigation of these relationships in hypotheses 10-11 to 10-33. Our core theory of virtue does not presuppose that any specific virtues are vital for the good life, but with the neo-Aristotelian view in mind, we suggest that virtue science can and should investigate whether any virtues play this role and, if so, which ones. In other words, we propose that virtue science should be oriented to study various virtues and their connections to various aspects of the good life. Chapter 10 is devoted to describing these human goods more fully and to expressing them as worthwhile hypotheses to investigate.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have presented a brief, ecumenical version of virtue theory, discussing both a core theory that we think most if not all thinkers would endorse and a variety of contentious hypotheses that we think virtue science can and should test. We have also discussed Aristotle’s (1999) ethics in general, which suggest that virtues are the traits that make it possible to cultivate a flourishing life based on pursuing the goods that underwrite human flourishing. Seeing virtues as traits clarifies that consistency is important and raises the question about whether virtue and flourishing are ways of life. The value of this chapter is in its provision of a theoretical basis for the model we have developed as a framework for virtue science. We suggest that virtually all the hypotheses we have presented, and the numerous others we identify in what follows, are subject to empirical investigation. Of course, it takes many different methods to investigate such a rich set of

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

52

Virtue Theory

claims, and virtually all the individual studies of virtue concepts examine small portions of these claims in ways that are far from ideal. We intend to contribute to the growing interdisciplinary efforts to incorporate the richness of philosophical analysis and the rigors of social science research in studying virtue and flourishing. This is a challenging endeavor. It is extremely difficult to do justice to philosophical analysis in empirical research, and conceptual analysis is often too abstract and idealistic to support good empirical study. We aim to chart a course in which philosophically strong theory can inform high-quality empirical methods to illuminate human ethical mindedness and its excellent expression. The pursuit of this knowledge requires that we avoid the tendency to make the perfect into the enemy of the good. The analyses, model, and evidence we present will not satisfy all critics, answer all questions, or constitute a final understanding of virtue and flourishing. We can only attempt to take the next reasonable steps to move this research forward. We do so by formulating a framework for a science of virtue that is informed by moral philosophy and proposes social scientific study of the virtue concepts that philosophers have clarified. We see the illumination of virtue and flourishing as one of the most important and valuable avenues of study in which philosophers and social scientists can engage. The next step in this endeavor is to clarify what we mean by a psychologically realistic theory of virtue in Chapter 2.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 2

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

In Chapter 1, we laid out the contours of our virtue theory: our general, schematic account of the formal aspects of various virtue traits. We also suggested big picture questions about virtue’s importance and development that we think should orient virtue science. In Chapter 3, we say more about the science of virtue and how it builds on, but also offers more than, the pathbreaking VIA research program initiated by Peterson and Seligman (2004). In short, the STRIVE-4 Model does better because it offers an explicitly articulated multicomponent scheme that virtue scientists can use to assess the work that has been done on specific virtues. It also clearly identifies where future work can and should be done. We demonstrate how the STRIVE-4 Model can, in that way, fruitfully guide virtue science by discussing work on the virtue of gratitude and new avenues of research on that virtue that come into view with this approach. In later chapters, we also discuss how it can integrate and advance some existing areas of psychological research, such as moral development and personality psychology. Before getting into those details, however, we want to highlight the theoretical or philosophic assumptions that lie behind the STRIVE-4 Model and clarify how philosophic work on virtue and specific virtues can best enrich virtue science. Philosophers in a variety of cultures have been debating questions about the nature, value, and development of virtue for centuries, and contemporary philosophic debates on these topics, as with other ones, often involve the development of various incompatible views. Given this dizzying amount of material and the lack of consensus on most topics of contemporary philosophic debate, virtue scientists may be tempted to simply ignore philosophic work on the virtues, or to draw on whatever work they happen to encounter and find inspiring. Although those reactions would be understandable, we think there is a better, more systematic approach that scientists can and should adopt. 53

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

54

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

Although philosophers seldom reach consensus on questions about virtue and its development (or on anything really!) their collective habits of analysis, argument, and debate enable us to rigorously distinguish and assess the pros and cons of various views. Of course, while many of these topics will interest virtue scientists, not all of them are directly relevant to questions about how to pursue scientific research best and most fruitfully. For example, virtue scientists would probably be interested in philosophic debates about whether a virtuous exemplar would have an abortion or not in some specific situation and in debates about whether what a virtuous exemplar would do is a good guide to what is morally required or not. But those questions about how exemplars act, and the moral relevance of those facts, are issues that scientists can and should set aside when they are thinking about how to fruitfully study virtue and virtue development. Scientists can certainly take an interest in those issues for their own sake and, as we discuss in Chapter 12, the results of virtue science may have a bearing on philosophic debates about how to evaluate and develop competing theories in normative ethics (e.g., Kantian, utilitarian, and virtue ethical), but in this chapter we mainly focus on philosophic debates that can and should inform virtue science. The short answer is that there are three relatively accessible areas of philosophic debate on the virtues that scientists can fruitfully learn about themselves or tap philosophers to learn about. First, there are numerous claims that philosophers, historical and contemporary, have made about virtue and virtue development. Awareness of these claims will enable scientists to either identify and test new empirically tractable hypotheses or recognize any contentious theoretical background assumptions that they are making. Second, philosophers have long disagreed about how virtue and virtue development are related to human happiness, well-being, or flourishing, both individually and relationally or communally. Awareness of the range of positions and the different conceptions of virtue and well-being in philosophic debates enables scientists to identify and test new hypotheses or to recognize when they are making contentious theoretical background assumptions. Finally, philosophers have offered, and continue to offer, competing conceptual analyses of various virtue concepts and traits; and awareness of those concepts and traits enables scientists to assess and improve scales, measures, and constructs. It also enables the recognition of contentious assumptions that they are making and building into their studies and interpretations of the results. In the rest of the chapter, we provide some examples and details to illustrate these points. We also highlight the benefits that virtue science

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Moral Philosophy Transcends Virtue Science

55

can expect as it becomes an increasingly interdisciplinary project. We start by saying a bit more about the main areas of moral philosophy and some of the interesting philosophic debates, including debates about virtue, that we think scientists can safely set aside. This clarifies our point about many philosophic debates being interesting but irrelevant to scientific inquiry. It also allows us to clarify some disciplinary differences between philosophers and psychologists when it comes to the study of virtue. After that, we turn to the three sorts of philosophic debates that virtue scientists can and should mine either on their own or through interdisciplinary consultation or collaboration.

How Moral Philosophy Transcends the Concerns of Virtue Science Generally speaking, scientists are interested in studying the kinds of moral traits that show up in the people they study and that human beings in various cultures recognize in ordinary life (not just in scientific contexts) as moral virtues. In conducting studies of these virtue traits, their development, and their impact on human lives and relationships, scientists have to make theoretical assumptions about the relevant virtues. For example, we need to make assumptions about compassion and justice in order to build models and scales, which we use to investigate who is compassionate and just and what promotes or hinders increased compassion and justice. These theoretical assumptions enable scientists to measure virtue traits that ordinary subjects recognize, value, and attribute to themselves and others. As we explain in the next section, however, some philosophic work can usefully inform this scientific work because it can help scientists to think creatively and responsibly about the virtue traits they aim to measure, the possible processes of moral trait development, and the forms of well-being or flourishing that virtue might facilitate. But in this section, we want to clarify that many of the main subjects in moral philosophy, and even a good bit of the philosophic work on virtue itself, goes well beyond what is relevant for science. Much of moral philosophy can be divided into two subjects: normative ethics and metaethics. Normative ethics is primarily devoted to questions about moral right and wrong, moral virtue and vice, rationality and irrationality, well-being and suffering, and impersonal good and bad. Normative ethicists develop and argue for different general theories on these broad topics, and they also delve into “applied” ethical debates, such as the debates about the morality of abortion and euthanasia. Metaethics in

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

56

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

effect brackets all these normative questions about which things are right, wrong, virtuous, vicious, etc., and turns to questions about the nature and importance of normative properties and the language that is used to talk about them. For example, metaethicists address questions about how morality fits into the natural world, about whether there are objective facts about morality and virtue, and about whether morality or rational moral commitment depends on some sort of supernatural or theistic assumptions. As this makes clear, moral philosophy tackles a variety of important and perennial topics, but it should also be clear that much of moral philosophy has no direct relevance to virtue science. Individual scientists may adhere to various metaethical views, for example about how moral facts fit into the natural world, but it is unlikely that their approach to virtue science hinges on those assumptions, so those assumptions do not necessarily need to (or even can) be empirically assessed. Similarly, virtue scientists are likely to be interested in debates about the morality of abortion and perhaps general questions about moral obligation and how we should respond to wrongdoers. However, moral philosophic work on these topics generally does not bear directly on how we think about virtue traits and study them in a scientific setting, so they can be set aside too. The main areas of moral philosophy that are directly relevant to virtue science are the parts of normative ethics that focus on virtue and personal good (well-being, happiness, etc.), but, perhaps surprisingly, even some central work on virtue is not relevant to virtue science due to disciplinary differences between philosophy and empirical science. The basic difference here is that while scientists aim to understand, predict, and explain the realistic human moral virtues that are valued in ordinary practice (e.g., by the people they study), philosophers are more interested in developing general theories of ideal virtue. These theories are often revisionary relative to ordinary thought and practice and also have a kind of maximal generality so that they can apply to real or possible beings who have psychologies that differ from human beings (e.g., angels or aliens). Insofar as philosophers argue that we should radically revise ordinary thought or broaden their scope beyond human beings and human psychology, virtue scientists can safely leave their work aside for purposes of scientific inquiry. As an example of philosophers offering an account of ideal virtue that revises and therefore goes against ordinary thought about moral virtues, consider the doctrine of the unity of the virtues. Some famous moral philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics argued that we should reject the ordinary assumption that people can have some virtue traits but not others and that sometimes people embody virtues in action but fail to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Moral Philosophy Transcends Virtue Science

57

act in optimal or ideal ways.1 Against this, they hold that there is a unity of the virtues such that one cannot have one virtue trait and lack any others and that all virtues involve a kind of practical wisdom which ensures that no action that expresses a genuine virtue can be a mistake (all things considered). As proponents of this unity doctrine would admit, these are revisionary views that conflict with ordinary thought and practice, and that are for this reason in need of philosophic defense. In ordinary practice, we often treat virtue traits as modular and fallible, allowing that someone could be compassionate but also a bit cowardly or that someone could act in a kind and humble way that is less than ideal in some circumstances because they are conflict averse. Moreover, if we adopt the strong unity of the virtues view, it is likely that no one you know has any virtue traits because, on that view, no one has individual virtue traits such as kindness or courage unless they have an overall virtuous character of the sort that we would normally associate with sages or saints. Of course, there are interesting philosophic arguments that aim to push people to accept these and other revisionary normative views (see Cooper, 1998; Russell, 2009; Wolf, 2007), and scientists may no doubt be interested in the revisionary normative ideals that philosophers argue we should adopt. But they can safely ignore those ideals and arguments insofar as they aim to investigate the common-sense or ordinary kinds of moral traits that we, and the subjects of virtue science experiments, attribute to one another in our day-to-day lives. In addition to developing revisionary but rationally mandated normative ethical ideals, philosophers also aim to provide maximally general philosophic accounts – roughly maximally general conceptual analyses2  – of concepts such as right action, virtue, and well-being. The salient point here is that scientists aim to understand and explain the moral traits of human beings in this world, so facts about human evolution and human psychology are relevant to their investigations, and they need not be concerned about what virtues would look like in an alien species with a very different psychology. By extension, they need not be concerned with philosophic debates about the nature or concept of virtue that aim for that kind of larger generality. To make this concrete, consider the lively debate among philosophers about whether virtue traits must involve positive inner attitudes, such as 1 2

For an intelligent and nuanced interdisciplinary discussion of the unity of virtues that suggests a modified and more modest version of this doctrine, see Wright et al. (2021). We describe philosophers as providing conceptual analyses because we think it is a helpful term for virtue scientists, but we also note that many philosophers would prefer an alternative description.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

58

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

emotions and intentions, toward good things such as others’ flourishing and preclude positive attitudes toward bad things (e.g., a sadistic desire to cause others pain and suffering). Although ordinary thought and talk about human virtues pretty clearly does assume that virtues must involve good inner states and preclude bad ones, there are philosophers who defend the externalist and broadly consequentialist view that traits are virtues, just in case they tend to have overall good impacts in the local environment and that any kind of inner psychological traits can be a part of a virtue trait (if, that is, it enables positive external impact). To see how this plays out, consider an example given by Driver (2001), the foremost defender of virtue externalism: Imagine a society that has evolved differently from human society. These creatures, Mutors, have evolved in an extremely harsh environment and have developed unusual strategies for survival. It happens to be the case that for them, beating one’s child severely when it is exactly 5.57 years old actually increases the life expectancy of the child by 50 percent … It is also the case that the only way a Mutor could ever bring himself to so treat a child is to develop an intense pleasure in doing so. So some Mutors have a special trait – they intensely desire to beat children who are exactly 5.57 years old … On my view this trait would be a virtue. It is an “excellence of character” because it is valuable in that it actually does produce good and a significant social benefit, and the trait is specific enough so as not to produce overwhelming bad consequences. (pp. 55–56)

Of course, Driver realizes that this claim about conceivable but unrealistic cases is bound to strike most of us as counterintuitive, but she thinks this is because our intuitions about what is a virtue or not are trained up in more realistic and actual cases. Our best philosophic account of virtue may differ from the common-sense concept because philosophers aspire to attain kinds of generality and theoretical coherence that are not embodied in common-sense thinking. As she puts it: [T]o say that human beings are so constructed as to be unable to be virtuous while acting with bad intentions is to state something contingent, something about human nature; it is not to state something definitive about virtue unless one can argue for a chauvinistic thesis that moral virtue can obtain only for human beings, and not for any intelligent social creature. A theory of virtue should be broader than this. It must be conceptually possible to speak of the moral virtues of Mr. Spock. (p. 56, emphasis added)

In response, defenders of “virtue internalism” agree that our common-sense intuitions about virtue clash with what Driver says about this far-flung case. They also defend general theories that fit and extend the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Moral Philosophy Transcends Virtue Science

59

common-sense assumptions that her theory rejects. Many of them hold, for example, that moral virtues, even if instantiated in imagined Vulcans or Mutors, must involve positive attitudes toward good things and negative attitudes toward bad things. For this reason, even if traits involving sadism happen to lead to good results in some environments, they are nonetheless not moral virtues. Put otherwise, internalists argue that, even in Driver’s imagined Mutors case, we should call the traits instrumentally beneficial vices, not moral virtues. This dispute illustrates the fact that Driver and many other philosophers are interested not just in the concepts of virtue and vice that human beings actually use and that apply to human beings with normal or realistic human psychologies, but in philosophically more general accounts of virtue that apply to even the most artificial and far out cases.3 In addition, philosophers are interested in resolving disputes about which lists and understandings of virtue are best or objectively correct and about how important or valuable virtue is. Although some argue that all rational agents should aim to become as virtuous as possible or at least should develop some specific virtues, others disagree. All of this work is important and interesting, but virtue scientists can safely set it aside while conducting research. As mentioned in Chapter 1, virtue scientists can recognize the importance of respectful internal critique but also be ecumenical and simply recognize and study the diverse lists and understanding of the virtues that they encounter in various cultures and subpopulations. Doing so does not require simply assuming these traits are best, because one can consciously bracket that question and questions about how virtuous people should be. As we discuss more in Chapter 12, the results of virtue science can even help us answer questions on those fronts. For example, if the results show that some currently valued trait is conducive to individual or social harm, then that should be taken into account in philosophic debates about keeping that trait on our best list of virtues and debates about developing that trait. In sum, philosophers aim to develop ambitious and maximally general accounts of virtue and to tackle questions about the best list of the virtues and the importance or value of virtues. These are certainly vital and interesting topics that will interest most virtue scientists, but they can and should be left aside by psychologists and philosophers while they are pursuing virtue science. They may safely bracket questions about what the best completely general theory of virtue looks like and focus their attention on 3

See Van Zyl (2018) for an overview of this and related philosophic debates about the virtues.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

60

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

the realistic virtue concepts that people use in ordinary practice and that apply to human beings with realistic human psychologies.

How Philosophy Can Enrich Virtue Science In addition to the philosophic work on virtue that is revisionary, ideal, and maximally general, there are areas of philosophic inquiry and speculation in moral philosophy that are relevant to virtue science. As we explain, this philosophic work can enrich scientific inquiry by enabling scientists to either (1) recognize contentious theoretical assumptions that they are making or (2) identify empirically tractable hypotheses that can be scientifically investigated. Naturally, we cannot offer a comprehensive survey of all relevant philosophic work, but we illustrate three main subareas of philosophic research that are relevant. In each case, we give an example, highlight how awareness of various philosophic views can inform virtue science, and suggest that virtue science can be enriched by philosophic material. Reason, Emotion, and Developmental Pathways to the Moral Virtues First, there are philosophic debates, both historical and contemporary, about the roles of reason, intuition, and emotion in virtues and their development. There are actually many debates here, in part because “reason” can be used to refer to many different things, but the salient debate here is between philosophers who think that moral virtues such as gratitude and honesty (or at least high-grade versions of these traits) must involve some kind of articulate and discursive evaluative knowledge or deliberation and those who downplay or reject the importance of articulateness and deliberative rationality or wisdom. Philosophers in the second camp do think that virtues involve a kind of intelligent sensitivity to values and the evaluative considerations that are salient in a given situation, but they usually think that this sensitivity is a matter of (native or skilled) intuition or emotional sensitivity, whereas deliberation involves virtue concepts and conceptual articulateness about why responses are virtuous. This deliberation may not be necessary to have virtue traits. For example, Driver (2001) argues that modesty and several other kinds of virtue involve ignorance, not articulate knowledge, and Slote (2010) maintains that moral virtue is centrally a matter of mature empathy, not articulate knowledge or deliberative rationality. We, the authors, favor the former camp of philosophers who hold that discursive, deliberative knowledge is an inherent aspect of at least

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Philosophy Can Enrich Virtue Science

61

many high-grade virtue traits. But we recognize that this is a contentious position and think that virtue scientists who build one view or another into their models and studies should recognize the contentiousness of the assumption that they are making. They should recognize this both because the relevant assumption is a contentious one about the ordinary moral virtue traits that one is trying to study, and because the philosophic debate in this area reflects a diversity of views that one would likely find in different cultures and research participants. In addition to these debates about the role of articulate knowledge and rational deliberation in virtue traits, there is a historical and contemporary philosophic debate about the processes of moral development – a debate which centers on questions about whether virtue traits are best developed, or can even be effectively promoted, by reflection, habituation, meditation, argument, teaching, or some other means. For example, philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition tend to assume that the pursuit of discursive knowledge and reflection on one’s values and life are conducive to virtue development and cultivation (Annas, 2011; Hills, 2015), whereas that position is hotly contested in the Confucian tradition, with some agreeing and others strongly favoring practices of meditation and self-reflection that aim toward acting in accord with one’s conscience or innate knowledge of right and wrong (Angle & Tiwald, 2017). And, unsurprisingly, philosophers such as Slote (2010), who give empathy pride of place in their theory of moral virtue, hold that empathy-encouraging processes and not rational reflection or deliberation promote moral virtue most effectively. As in the previous case, we think virtue scientists may reasonably adopt their own contentious assumptions on these issues when pursuing their work, but that if they do so they should recognize that they are making the assumptions. This recognition of assumptions also means that scientists should be open to others pursuing research on different assumptions. Even better, we think scientists should try to find ways to empirically test the relevant assumptions where possible. If virtue scientists pursue this third, ambitious option, they can help to settle longstanding and seemingly intractable philosophic debates about virtue and virtue development by converting the core theses of the opposing sides on various debates into empirical hypotheses that can be tested. For example, instead of assuming that a virtue trait such as gratitude, honesty, or modesty will be strengthened by reflection on the value of the trait (perhaps by writing about personal experiences or exemplars) or by deliberation about what would count as manifesting the virtue or not, we can treat them as interesting empirical hypotheses to be tested scientifically.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

62

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

Morgan and colleagues (2017) adopted this approach in their studies of gratitude as a virtue. They empirically examined multiple components of gratitude (knowledge, emotion, attitude, and behavior) and found that each of the components contributed to the explanation of well-being, even when controlling for the other components. Their studies provide an example of testing the value of theoretical concepts (virtues with multiple components) that can be usefully emulated by other scientists. To see why this is an important point that may not be obvious to all virtue scientists, consider the framework for virtue science recently proposed in Wright and colleagues (2021).4 These authors meld an impressive blueprint for empirical investigations, which we discuss and broadly agree with in later chapters, with a broadly Aristotelian theory of virtue. Some parts of the resulting program are ones we endorse because we think that they make only philosophically uncontentious assumptions about realistic, human moral virtues. A prime example is the authors’ helpful and plausible distinction between three functional aspects of virtue traits: patterns of input uptake, characteristic social-cognitive processing of inputs, and outputs in the form of “trait-relevant responses.” Compassion, for example, might be thought to involve dispositions to notice when others are suffering (input), to feel empathy and a desire to help (social-cognitive processing), and to then act beneficently (output). This three-part model is useful because, like Morgan and colleagues (2017), it encourages conceptual questions about what virtue traits involve, and it can guide empirical studies by highlighting various aspects of a virtue for empirical research to target and measure. Moreover, the authors distinguish various aspects of the three parts and show how they can be assessed in studies in order to measure the dynamic inner structure of virtue traits that are embodied at different times and in different contexts (pp. 34–60, 121–187). The resulting model and the extensions they make to measuring multiple virtues, their interaction, and the ways we can model overall character are insightful and fit in well with our STRIVE-4 approach. Things become contentious, however, when it comes to Wright and colleagues’ claims about practical wisdom and its role in virtue and virtue development. First, the authors take practical wisdom to involve both developed forms of intelligent responsiveness to situations and a set of more strongly rational tendencies that involve things such as reflection, 4

It is worth noting that this book is a collaboration between two psychologists (Wright, Warren) and a philosopher (Snow). It is an excellent example of the kind of interdisciplinary collaboration we are advocating in this book.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Philosophy Can Enrich Virtue Science

63

deliberation, and reason-based judgment (pp. 22–30; Snow et al., 2021). In the former vein, they mention (1) situational comprehension or apt perception and (2) sympathy-informed awareness of how it is appropriate to respond to perceived situations and people. In the latter vein, they mention (3) theoretical and practical problem-solving abilities, (4) sound deliberative reasoning about how to achieve chosen ends, (5) wise reflective choice of ends to pursue, and (6) wise reflection on one’s values, one’s roles and relationships, the kind of person one is and wants to be, and the narrative structure or unity of one’s life as a whole. There is nothing inherently problematic about using “practical wisdom” to refer to all six of these abilities or achievements, but to avoid confusion we use “nondeliberative practical wisdom” to refer to items 1 and 2 discussed earlier and “deliberative practical wisdom” to refer to items 3 through 6. The main point in the current context is that, when Wright and colleagues (2021) suggest that virtue scientists should adopt a framework which assumes that deliberative practical wisdom is integral to moral virtue traits, they are in effect suggesting that scientists adopt philosophically contentious assumptions. We think that can be fine, but that scientists need to recognize and flag contentious philosophic assumptions, if and when they make them – ones that some philosophers reject and that we can also expect many ordinary people to reject. In addition to helping scientists to recognize and flag their contentious assumptions, awareness of relevant philosophic debates enables scientists to sometimes formulate competing empirical hypotheses that can be tested to help settle the underlying philosophic debates. So, for example, instead of assuming that increased theoretical and practical problem-solving abilities correlate with increased gratitude or some other virtue, we think this could be formulated as an interesting hypothesis that could be tested. Philosophers who endorse other approaches to virtue and virtue development (e.g., the hypothesis that increased empathic abilities correlate with increased gratitude) may also suggest complementary hypotheses that are worth testing. Similar conclusions apply to views on the processes that facilitate moral virtue development. To see this, consider the four functions that Wright et al. take practical wisdom to serve in the manifestation and development of virtue traits: “guiding the action of specific virtues,” “regulating interactions among multiple virtues,” “regulating virtuous emotions,” and “guiding reflection on one’s life as a whole” (2021, p. 30).5 We believe 5

We note the strong similarities in Wright and colleagues’ (2021) model of practical wisdom and the Aristotelian Phronesis Model (APM) proposed by Kristjánsson and colleagues (2021). The APM

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

64

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

that Wright and colleagues’ Aristotelian model mixes uncontentious and contentious theoretical or philosophic assumptions in ways that can and should be parsed apart. In this case, we believe that the first three factors are uncontentious. They pick out aspects of ordinary moral virtue that are compatible with our model and with a broad array of philosophical positions. In other words, we think that anyone interested in studying good character and promoting virtue can agree that to develop robustly good character traits, many, if not all, developing humans initially need to improve at expressing their traits. This includes accurately hitting the “targets” of the relevant virtues, integrating or regulating their dispositions in cases where different virtues seem to point in different directions, and harboring and expressing virtuous emotions in the most appropriate fashion. For example, when children are still developing a robust trait relating to justice, they may need guidance to express their concern for justice in a productive and compassionate way or they may need to learn from experience in order to develop the courage to act on their sound sense of justice. Things get more problematic, however, when it comes to the more robustly rational and deliberative aspects of practical wisdom and Wright and colleagues’ (2021) apparent assumption that to develop overall virtue, practical wisdom needs to guide “reflection on one’s life as a whole.”6 These Aristotelian claims are philosophically contentious and reflect disagreements that persist at the level of ordinary thought and practice, so we suggest that scientists who are tempted to make them should either flag them as contentious or convert them (and opposing views helpfully expressed in the philosophic literature) into empirical hypotheses. For an example of how this would play out in detail, consider the authors’ useful idea that we could present people with vignettes in which the demands of various virtues are in apparent conflict. Wright and colleagues seem to assume that practical wisdom is the best way for subjects to regulate or adjudicate the apparent interaction or tension in such cases; they say that “practical wisdom must help her navigate the situation” (2021, p. 152) and to assess people’s degree of wisdom, and hence virtue, they suggest that experimenters track how people reflectively think about the situations as new nuances are introduced. The assumption seems to be that people who are “able to successfully articulate how and why they

6

should also be tested in the ways we indicate for the Wright and colleagues’ model, and this empirical testing has begun (e.g., Darnell et al., 2022). The APM has a similar component, called the “blueprint component,” and empirical results were consistent with the blueprint component in a “proof-of-concept” study (Darnell et al., 2022). Further empirical examination of the blueprint component is under way.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Philosophy Can Enrich Virtue Science

65

would respond to [changes in virtue-relevant stimuli] and why they would respond to them in the way they’ve reported” (p. 153) are more likely to navigate actual situations of virtue conflict better (cf. Snow et al., 2021, pp. 71–72). But many philosophers would disagree, and assuming one among many possible answers to a conceptual question before we do studies is an unnecessarily contentious approach. That is, we recommend admitting the contentiousness of the assumption at the outset. Of course, we see it as even better to develop and test a set of competing hypotheses. Similarly, consider Wright and colleagues’ (2021) suggestion that overall virtue and virtue development can be best promoted by reflection on one’s values, one’s roles, virtues one has or aspires to have, and the narrative structure of one’s life as a whole (e.g., pp. 27–29, 47–48, 278–291). Once again, we think that a comparison of competing philosophic theories of virtue gives us reason to reduce how much is built into the theory of virtue and to increase our stock of competing empirical hypotheses. Consider, for example, the lively and complex debate among Chinese neo-Confucian philosophers when it comes to virtue and virtue development (see Angle & Tiwald, 2017, especially chapters 6 and 7). Very roughly, some philosophers such as Zhu Xi (1126–1271) thought virtue could be best developed by the intellectual study of the moral exemplars illustrated in various canonical texts, by comparative rational reflection on one’s virtues or vices, and by deliberate attempts to then instantiate the ideals derived from exemplary models. This approach seems to fit hand in glove with the Aristotelian model of virtue and virtue development that Wright and colleagues recommend. This approach was strongly rejected by philosophers such as Wang Yangming (1472–1529), who thought it was a mistake to divide virtue development into a two-aspect process involving the development of intellectual rational knowledge and then the internalization or application of that knowledge in action. Wang held that human beings have an innate ability to know right from wrong and that the task of virtue cultivation should focus on eliminating things such as selfish desires or self-centered psychological tendencies that block our natural tendency to act on our knowledge of what is morally best. So, he would presumably reject Wright and colleagues’ assumption that practical wisdom is needed, or would be useful, for virtue development and suggest an alternative. When it comes to the actual practice of virtue cultivation, Wang would suggest that educators, parents, and others interested in virtue cultivation should adopt a set of strategies that promote awareness and the expression of innate moral knowledge. They should drop any existing attempts to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

66

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

promote Aristotelian practical wisdom of the sort that involves reflection on exemplars and self-reflection on an ideal that one hopes to instantiate. We think that scientists ought to at least flag their contentious philosophic assumptions and that, ideally, they would work together to identify different hypotheses that are suggested by competing philosophic traditions. This paves the way to differentiate which ones are supported by empirical evidence (keeping in mind that the evidence could be different for different populations or for different moral virtues). The Moral Virtues and Personal Good Just as philosophers have long disagreed about the roles of reason and emotion in moral virtue and on the kinds of processes that generate moral development, they have long disagreed about whether moral virtue and its development are conducive to happiness, well-being, flourishing, and meaning. We can broadly classify all these terms under the heading of “personal good.” Philosophers disagree about whether there is any robust connection to be expected between moral virtue and personal good and, if there is a connection, which aspect of personal good is linked to virtue. We think that the lessons of the previous section on reason and emotion and virtue development apply in similar ways here. First, philosophic work on the different aspects of personal good (happiness, well-being, flourishing, and meaning) can inform and already has been informing work in virtue science and positive psychology. An awareness of philosophic disputes can help scientists to recognize and flag their contentious philosophic assumptions, and also help them to identify new empirical hypotheses to test. In addition, however, we propose that virtue scientists should engage in interdisciplinary work to better identify various contentious claims that philosophers have made about the connection, or lack of connection, between moral virtue and its development and personal good in its various dimensions. (We suggest many such hypotheses in Chapter 10.) We can illustrate our view here by considering the contentious Aristotelian assumption that wise reflection on the narrative unity of one’s life as a whole, on one’s values, and on the roles and relations one inhabits will be conducive to overall virtue or good character. The theoretical presupposition is that broad evaluative self-reflection will be effective and is perhaps a necessary means to achieving overall good character. This also suggests an assumption that there is a conceptual connection between having overall good moral character and living a good or flourishing life, but both

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Philosophy Can Enrich Virtue Science

67

assumptions are philosophically contentious. Of course, there are various philosophers and psychologists, East and West, who agree with those views, but there are others who defend contrary views, and in this case the bone of contention is not just about whether deliberative or reflective rationality will be an effective, or the best, process for the promotion of overall virtue. The larger question is the background assumption that overall good moral character is, in fact, always conducive to living a good and flourishing life or to being a good parent, friend, or human being. The assumption that moral virtue is conducive to or converges with personal good is certainly common in various longstanding (ancient) philosophic traditions. For example, there are Aristotelians, Hedonists, Stoics, Buddhists, and Confucians who endorse the convergence thesis. But one familiar mark of modern moral philosophy is skepticism about convergence. Western post-Enlightenment thinkers commonly assume that morality and moral virtue are bound to be in tension with personal good and self-interest. In fact, perhaps the central debate among postEnlightenment philosophers is about whether and why we should be moral given our likely forced choice between morality and personal good (Deigh, 2010). For example, the prime modern anti-moralist, Nietzsche, argued that moral virtue is antithetical to healthy psychological development and agency both in individuals and in larger cultures. Following Nietzsche, we should aim to reject and replace moral virtues and cultural assumptions about their supreme importance or value, thereby freeing human beings from their “false consciousness” about morality (Leiter, 1997). Less extremely, contemporary philosophers such as Williams (1981) and Wolf (1982) suggest that it is rationally permissible to choose our personal good over morality and to refuse to develop saintly forms of moral virtue because doing so would require too much personal sacrifice. Although her work is broadly neoAristotelian, Tessman (2005) has argued that people in oppressed groups will often have good reason to develop “burdened virtues” that are morally admirable but costly in terms of personal well-being. Other philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant and his many contemporary followers, would agree with Wolf, Williams, and Tessman that moral virtue often leads to reduced happiness or well-being (at least absent assumptions about a divinely provided afterlife), but they argue that we are rationally bound to act morally and to aim to develop virtuous moral traits. Finally, a third group of modern moral philosophers assumes that morality and self-interest diverge and express skepticism about our ability to establish what one should favor, rationally speaking. This group

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

68

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

includes Sidgwick, who argues that there is a dualism of practical reason – a conflict between the rational demand to promote our own good and the independent rational demand to act morally – that cannot be resolved (Crisp, 2015). It also includes existentialists such as Sartre, who argues that when moral, prudential, and other evaluative standards conflict, reason cannot tell us what to do. On his view, we are responsible for making a fundamentally nonrational personal choice between morality and personal good when they predictably point us in different directions (Deigh, 2010). All these views about how to live stand in contrast to the more optimistic views about personal good and moral virtue converging, and they are all live options in contemporary philosophy. So, as in other cases, we think that if psychologists make contentious assumptions about a moral virtue and personal good converging or diverging, then those should be flagged as contentious, and scientists should be glad if others question their assumptions in the interest of scientific open-mindedness and comprehensiveness. Even better, we think that virtue scientists should aim to convert the relevant contentious views into competing empirical hypotheses. Scientists can do this either by studying the philosophic literature themselves or by enlisting philosophers to help them identify contentious assumptions and interesting new empirical hypotheses. That can enable virtue science to be more responsible, ambitious, and exciting. Conceptual Analysis and the Moral Virtues The third kind of philosophic research that can helpfully inform virtue science is the increasing range of work on specific moral virtues and what we can think of as the conceptual analysis of moral virtues. Many philosophers are working on historical and contemporary accounts of specific virtues such as modesty, courage, and justice. They tend to offer carefully articulated accounts of what these virtues involve. These philosophers often offer incompatible accounts and argue about which ones are most plausible. One thing these emerging and growing literatures can do is encourage scientists to be aware of possible contentious assumptions they are making about specific virtues when they are building their constructs, scales, or measures. As an example, consider the literature on humility and modesty. There is a wide variety of views that philosophers have defended but many of them have defined themselves against Driver’s (2001) claim that humility and modesty are “virtues of ignorance” which involve people falsely underestimating their excellences or accomplishments, or at least being

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

69

ignorant of their excellences or accomplishments. Critics have objected to that account for a variety of reasons (Bommarito, 2018). Proposed alternatives include attention-based accounts on which modest and humble people have true beliefs about their excellences or accomplishments, but on which they are disposed to not draw attention to those excellences or accomplishments, or not disposed to think about them when interacting with others. Regardless of which view readers favor, the general point is that this sort of debate can help scientists to think creatively and critically about the constructs, scales, and studies they might design. They could either incorporate ideas from different philosophic analyses into their studies, or they could posit different aspects and kinds of humility and modesty and conduct studies to understand their relations or differences. Another obvious option here would be to explore the tacit assumptions about virtue concepts that various populations make and that might be affecting things, such as self-report.

Summary In general, we have in mind the fact that whereas philosophers prize conceptual clarification and exquisitely precise statement and argument, scientists prize constructs, scales, and measures that can be validated and lead to actual research results. Scientists must also design things in light of the fact that their research participants cannot be expected to attend to fine-grained conceptual nuances. As these points suggest, there are good methodological reasons for scientists to adopt theoretical assumptions that are bound to seem somewhat unclear and ham-handed to philosophers and for philosophers to split hairs in ways that scientists are bound to find useless. So, when philosophers aim to help scientists build better models, constructs, and measures, or scientists look to philosophy for greater clarity, they should take care to remember that different disciplinary aims can make this kind of interdisciplinary work frequently trying and inevitably somewhat difficult. In the end, however, we have been arguing that virtue scientists can indeed gain a lot from an acquaintance with philosophic work, both by recognizing contentious assumptions that they may be making and by broadening the scope of their empirical hypotheses to cover a range of interesting issues that have long been left to philosophic speculation. In this chapter we have addressed questions about philosophy’s relevance to virtue science. We have clarified that much of moral philosophy (normative ethics and metaethics) is not relevant to virtue science, even

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

70

A Philosophically Informed Virtue Science

though it may interest scientists. We have also drawn attention to some aspects of the philosophic debate that can usefully inform virtue science. Having clarified how philosophy can improve virtue science, it is natural to wonder about whether and how virtue science can enrich philosophic debates. After we have further developed our unifying STRIVE-4 framework in Parts II and III, we return to the debates about if and how virtue science can inform or should constrain moral philosophy or not (Chapter 12). For now, we hope to have clarified the interdisciplinary resources that have helped to inform our STRIVE-4 Model and that we think other virtue scientists can fruitfully mine in their own research.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Part II

Psychological Resources and Prospects

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 3

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

Both psychology and philosophy have had an on-again, off-again relationship with virtue theory and virtue ethics (Brewer, 2009; Russell, 2009). The modern renaissance of virtue in philosophy began with Anscombe’s (1958) famous article arguing for a revival of interest among moral philosophers and has expanded greatly since that time. Virtue was an important topic in the early decades of psychology (Nicholson, 1998), but fell out of favor as psychology moved toward a strict fact–value dichotomy in the mid-twentieth century (discussed in Chapter 6), with Allport (1937) leading the charge to replace character and virtue with personality. In addition, there were early disappointments in empirical studies of virtue that discouraged the study of this topic. There was very little theoretical or empirical interest in virtue among psychologists until the beginning of the twenty-first century, and that renewed interest was fueled largely by the positive psychology movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). In this century, extensive research on virtue in philosophy and psychology has produced a growing body of serious interdisciplinary work co-authored by philosophers and psychologists (e.g., Fowers & Cokelet, 2019; Morgan et al., 2017; Wright et al., 2021). This book is another instance of that interdisciplinarity. Despite the increase in this activity, empirical research on virtue remains relatively fragmented. The purpose of this chapter is to describe that fragmentation and begin to suggest how virtue researchers can move toward a more integrative, cumulative science of virtue.

A History of Virtue Science We begin this chapter by tracing the history of virtue science, in order to set the stage for our STRIVE-4 Model and to clarify the work that must be done to create a mature scientific approach to virtues. After examining this history, we conclude the chapter by examining how we can move beyond 73

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

74

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

the atheoretical fragmentation which the positive psychology movement has left in its wake. Early Empirical Disappointments and Their Reinterpretation As part of the early twentieth-century interest in virtue in psychology, several famous studies of honesty (e.g., Hartshorne & May, 1928; Hartshorne et al., 1929) were conducted, but they appeared to be unsuccessful in documenting trait honesty in children. The standard interpretation of the results (Doris, 2002; Mischel, 2004) has been that children, given the opportunity, are prone to lying or cheating, because many children took advantage of experimenters’ contrived opportunities for dishonesty. This seemed to be true even of the students rated as honest by their peers and teachers. In addition, the authors found rather low correlations among various instances of (dis)honesty over time, suggesting inconsistency rather than trait stability. Hartshorne et al. (1930) claimed that approximately 60 percent of the observed honesty was determined by the situation. The canonical conclusion was that situational factors determine moral behavior more than character. This interpretation contains several misunderstandings about virtue, however. First, even as reported by the original authors, these results are entirely consistent with a virtue perspective. Virtue researchers would never predict that the majority of adults would exhibit ideally consistent virtuous behavior, much less that most children would. Expressing virtue consistently is an achievement that takes years to habituate and considerable maturity to master. Children are rather poor research participants if one wants to observe mature, consistent virtue. Second, a well-informed virtue researcher would only expect some research participants to reliably act honestly. Hartshorne and colleagues’ results suggest that a significant minority of children’s honesty could not be explained by situational factors. The important question is whether some specific children could be identified as consistently honest, not whether there were correlations among variables in an aggregated sample. A more person-centered form of research is crucial for virtue science. Aggregating relationships among variables between persons can tell us nothing about any individual’s degree of virtue. We have much more to say about this in Chapters 7–11. The first two caveats are conceptually based. A third, more telling issue with Hartshorne et al.’s conclusions is that their empirical methods were deficient. In fairness to them, this deficiency is only clear in hindsight – we

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A History of Virtue Science

75

can see it now but only because of new developments that have clarified how to assess traits. Hartshorne and colleagues correlated single instances of (dis)honesty, which seriously underestimates trait-related behavior. Several reanalyses of the original data suggest different conclusions than the ones drawn by Hartshorne and colleagues. First, Burton (1963) performed a more direct test on honesty by reanalyzing the original results with factor analysis. Although situational factors were important in his results, he concluded that an underlying trait of honesty was present. Second, Rushton (1984) pointed out that the more reliable measures of honesty were more strongly correlated with teacher ratings of honesty (in the range of 0.5 to 0.6). Third, Epstein and O’Brien (1985) aggregated multiple measures of honesty and reported stronger correlations with their aggregated honesty measures. The reason for this difference is that the aggregated variables provided better estimates of the virtue of honesty and were more reliable than individual variables taken by themselves. Finally, as Fleeson et al. (2014) helpfully puts it, “according to the principle of aggregation, … the average of a set of multiple measurements is more stable and unbiased than any single measurement from that set” (p. 184).1 This suggests that the widely held conclusion, based on the Hartshorne et al. studies, that character traits are weak or nonexistent was ill-founded on an empirical basis. From Character to Personality In addition to the standard interpretation of the Hartshorne and colleagues’ (1929) studies, another impetus pushing character and virtue into disfavor was the discipline’s decisive movement toward an apparently more value-neutral study of personality (Nicholson, 1998). This occurred in the context of a popular cultural shift from character-focused thinking to personality-focused thinking. The cultural historian Warren Sussman (1973) termed the nineteenth century a culture of character, which was preoccupied with things such as citizenship, integrity, duty, honor, and reputation. He commented that this Victorian “vision of self-sacrifice began to yield to that of self-realization” (p. 273), which resulted in a culture of personality. “From the beginning the adjectives most frequently associated with personality suggest a very different concept from that of 1

In Chapters 5 and 7, we discuss how Fleeson and colleagues (2001; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009) have taken this insight about aggregation much further by aggregating reports of behavior within persons to estimate trait strength. Their approach allows a far better assessment of virtue traits than were previously available.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

76

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

character: fascinating, stunning, attractive, magnetic, glowing, masterful, creative, dominant, forceful” (pp. 276–277, emphasis in original). The culture of personality focuses on distinctiveness and success for individuals in an ever more competitive world and replaces the Victorian culture which was focused on virtue and character. Thus, character lost traction in both the scientific and the popular spheres during the same decades. Allport (1937) is frequently identified as a central player in changing the scientific topic from character to personality. He penned a pointed couplet that pithily captures this move: “Character is personality evaluated, and personality is character devaluated” (p. 52, emphasis in original). The aim of “devaluating” character was an important element of psychology’s movement away from evaluative and popular terms to the apparently more scientific personality psychology. Of course, Allport was not interested in the popular fascination focused on standing out from the crowd or in personality’s role in material success. Yet it is important to notice that his refocus onto personality was not separate from the parallel cultural shift at that time. He did repeatedly stress the uniqueness of the individual, which echos the popular emphasis on distinctiveness. Allport (1937) began his seminal book on personality with “[t]he outstanding characteristic of man is his individuality. He is a unique creation of the forces of nature”2 (p. 3). To create a science of personality, Allport (1937) repeatedly claimed that it was necessary to rigidly separate that science from the normative evaluations built into assessments of character and virtue. Yet in his historical account of Allport’s work, Nicholson (1998) commented that Allport “was convinced that the solution to America’s ethical dilemmas lay not in history, culture, or religion, but in science, in particular, psychology” (p. 64). Despite Allport’s call for value-neutral science, he seemed to have had mixed feelings about devaluating character. This shows up in several ways, including his worry that psychologists would not do “justice to the richness and dignity of human personality” (Allport, 1937, p. vii, emphasis added). But his tacit and untheorized commitment to a morally informed interpretation of a good life was even clearer when he described “the mature personality”: [H]e can lose himself in work, in contemplation, in recreation, and in loyalty to others … Egocentricity is not the mark of a mature personality. Contrast the garrulous Bohemian, egotistical, self-pitying, and prating of self-expression, with the man of confident dignity who has identified 2

There are several authors who refer to humans in male terms, which we do not endorse. We do not continue to call attention to this. Henceforth, we simply quote them as they wrote.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A History of Virtue Science

77

himself with a cause that has won his devotion … Unless directed outward toward socialized and culturally compatible ends, unless absorbed in causes and goals that outshine self-seeking and vanity, any life seems dwarfed and immature … Whenever a definitive objective orientation has been attained, pleasures and pains of the moment, setbacks and defeats, and the impulse for self-justification fade into the background, so that they do not obscure the chosen goals. (p. 213)

Clearly, Allport was unable to devalue character and focus on value-free “personality” assessments, because his theory is suffused with substantial normative and evaluative terms. He was obviously committed to a view that contrasted better and worse ways to live (e.g., devotion to culturally compatible goals vs. egocentricity, confident dignity vs. vanity). He saw one combination of traits as admirable and another set of traits as base. Whether or not one agrees with Allport’s recommended traits, this passage demonstrates that he did not, in fact, separate scientific facts from normative values. Allport was not alone in finding it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sharply distinguish moral ideals from objective facts about personality. Nor was this just a matter of the undeveloped state of psychological science in the early twentieth century. In Chapter 5, we argue that value terms and cultural ideals are thoroughly intertwined with personality traits and theories. As we discuss in Chapter 6, although many still hope to distinguish between factual and evaluative elements of psychological phenomena, it does not seem feasible to entirely separate them. Despite the evident difficulties of separating facts and values, psychological science shifted away from theorizing or empirically studying virtues in the first half of the twentieth century. Virtues essentially disappeared from the discipline for the remainder of the century. Positive Psychology and the Reemergence of Virtue in Psychology Interest in virtue increased dramatically at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The positive psychology movement has played a large role in this reemergence (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), but there has been a wider resurgence of interest in virtue among psychologists (Fowers, 2001, 2005a; Meara & Day, 2003; Tjeltveit, 2003). Positive psychology has been a mixed blessing for those interested in studying virtue. On the one hand, it has brought the topic into the scholarly conversation in a big way, and it maintains an unwavering commitment to empirical research. On the other hand, many philosophers and psychologists have critiqued the scholarly shortcomings of positive psychology

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

78

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

(e.g., Fowers, 2008; Held, 2005; Kristjánsson, 2013; Richardson & Guignon, 2008). In this section, we describe both the encouraging role positive psychology has played in virtue research and the shortcomings that have left this research domain fragmented. The central concern of positive psychology has been to promote human strengths and their sources. Peterson and Seligman (2004) began their influential virtue handbook by saying that “this book is intended to reclaim the study of character and virtue as legitimate topics of psychological inquiry and informed social discourse” and “to make possible a science of human strengths” (p. 3). They intended to inaugurate a new approach to research positive experiences and the strengths of character that make a good life possible. Many positive psychologists have built on this work, focusing their research on virtue and its contributions to living well (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Schnitker, 2012). A key early contribution to positive psychology was the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual (DSM) style classification of virtues formulated by Peterson and Seligman (2004). They defined six virtues (wisdom and knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence) that comprise twenty-four character strengths. They stated that “we started by creating our own list” (p. 33) of virtues, and that they searched Chinese, South Asian, and Western traditions to populate the list. They “were particularly attracted to those authors who had deliberately developed a catalog, and were even more pleased when these had clear beginnings and ends in the form of explicitly numbered virtues” (p. 34). This approach contrasts strongly with many contemporary virtue theorists who argue that a canonical list of virtues is a problematic aim that is unlikely to be attained (Curzer, 2015; Fowers, 2016). More recently, challenging questions about the cultural validity of the VIA classification have been raised (Fowers et al., 2023a). Peterson and Seligman also termed virtues “signature strengths” and stipulated that one could be “of good character if he or she displays but 1 or 2 strengths within a virtue group” (p. 13). This approach departs from neo-Aristotelian and Confucian virtue theory, which emphasize the integration of virtues and the idea that each virtue is not a stand-alone characteristic. Peterson and Seligman went on to develop a set of ten criteria for what qualifies as a character strength and a lengthy self-report inventory to assess virtues and character strengths called the VIA (McGrath, 2015; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). They view virtue as an individual differences concept that can be assessed on a continuum, and they suggest, but do not describe, a developmental acquisition of virtues.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Research Fragmentation in Positive Psychology

79

Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) criteria for character strengths overlap with the STRIVE-4 Model we discuss in Part III in some respects, but we also see many differences in the two approaches. Among the areas of agreement, we already noted that Peterson and Seligman favor a scalar, continuum-based understanding of virtue. They also see virtue as traitlike, although they explicitly endorse a contentious “more is better” view of virtues which conflicts with, for example, the neo-Aristotelian view that understands virtue as the mean between deficiency and excess (discussed in Chapter 7). Next, Peterson and Seligman also suggest that virtues should contribute to a fulfilling life, which has some similarity to our emphasis on hypotheses regarding eudaimonia (Chapter 10), but they simultaneously evince a serious ambivalence about values and goods (see next section) and do not identify empirically tractable hypotheses. Third, Peterson and Seligman are clear that virtues have behavioral, cognitive, and affective elements, three of the four elements that we cite in our model. But they do not adequately discuss the part that roles play in virtue expression (Chapter 8), the interaction of traits and situations (Chapter 9), or the possible roles of practical wisdom (Chapter 11). Finally, Peterson and Seligman included criteria that we do not see as especially relevant, such as the existence of virtue prodigies, people entirely lacking a virtue, or the negative criterion that if the expression of a characteristic diminishes other people, it is not a virtue. Despite these differences (which we take to be weaknesses), Peterson and Seligman should be credited with spearheading a positive psychology movement that jump-started an expanding field of empirical research on virtue. We discuss this research in detail in Chapters 7–11. The research includes over a hundred studies on a variety of virtues or closely related characteristics ranging from courage to humility. This was partly inspired by Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) book, often fueled by funding from the John Templeton Foundation, and facilitated by the advent of two journals dedicated to positive psychology: The Journal of Positive Psychology and The Journal of Happiness Studies. Although there are many virtue researchers who do not identify as positive psychologists, the positive psychology movement can be credited with inspiring many scholars.

The Sources of Virtue Research Fragmentation in Positive Psychology The contributions of positive psychology have been very valuable, but this movement is the source of several challenges that continue to plague the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

80

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

developing science of virtue. There have been many critiques of positive psychology, and we do not provide an exhaustive review of that literature here. Instead, we focus on the three difficulties that we see as central to this book: the insufficiency of virtue theory, the focus on a diagnostic scheme, and ambivalence about values. Insufficiency of Virtue Theory Although there are now scores of empirical studies of virtue, and positive psychologists mention virtue with great frequency, virtue theory remains generally missing in action. In what follows, we illustrate this atheoretical quality of positive psychology in its primary originating text (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), in research that asserts but does not define virtues, and in research on isolated virtues without tying them to a more general model or even to other virtues. References to Aristotle, especially his Nicomachean Ethics (c. 330 bce/1999) are frequent in positive psychology texts, including Peterson and Seligman (2004), who stated that “we can describe our classification as the social science equivalent of virtue ethics” (p. 89, emphasis added). Nevertheless, robust discussion of Aristotelian theory, and an awareness of other philosophic theories, is quite underdeveloped among these writers. The combination of frequent mentions with the generally superficial incorporation of actual theory is more or less the norm (Fowers, 2005a, 2008; Kristjánsson, 2013). This atheoretical approach began with Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) honest acknowledgment of the limits of the theory underlying their project. They noted that it lacks a “yet-to-be-articulated good theory that makes sense of the classification entries, individually and collectively … positive psychology will thrive when … there becomes available one or more theories of the good life” (p. 9). They also admitted that “it proved beyond our ability to specify a reasonable theory” (p. 6). Peterson and Seligman did present ten criteria to assess whether a given characteristic should be considered a virtue, but they did not present an overall theory or model of virtue. They considered following other theorists, who “grounded their classification in an a priori theory and generated a structure on theoretical grounds,” but then stated that “we find this strategy premature” (p. 80). Reasonable people can disagree about what was premature in the early 2000s, but the absence of theory has persisted for two decades. Even if it was premature to formulate a theory or model of virtue in the early days of the revival of empirical research on virtue, it is certainly time for

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Research Fragmentation in Positive Psychology

81

formulating theory on the basis of decades of modern virtue theory in philosophy and scores of empirical studies of virtue in psychology. We have written this book to argue that the time for a clearly formulated model of virtue has come; the emerging interdisciplinary area of virtue science is ready to upgrade and mature. To move forward, we need to develop and incorporate a theoretical model that can organize available research and to foster systematic, cumulative research in the future. It is difficult to envision a systematic, progressive science of virtue without conceptual clarity and organization. After all, how can one study something in depth when one has no conceptual understanding of it? The lack of theoretical guidance is not only evident in Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) influential handbook. It permeates the positive psychological literature. Since the handbook was written, psychological research on virtue has remained largely atheoretical. There just is no general or broadly adopted theory or model of virtue, so each research team chooses a desirable characteristic of interest and simply asserts that it is a virtue or character strength. The rationale for the research is made in terms of other empirical studies of desirable characteristics, personality theory and research, or a practical issue such as the benefits of the characteristic to the actor’s life, to relationships, or to communities (e.g., Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). The first way that theoretical superficiality shows up is that it is extremely rare for authors to define what it is that makes the characteristic of interest a virtue. This means that scholars are relying exclusively on colloquial, intuitive definitions of what constitutes a virtue rather than clarifying what features or structure constitute a characteristic as a virtue. They seldom tell us how the characteristic can be distinguished from an affective experience, a standard personality trait, or a coping mechanism. We clarify this problem with the widely studied virtue of gratitude in the last section of this chapter. The insufficiency of theory is also evident in the fact that very few of the studies refer to any model or theory of virtue. A few cite Aristotle, but only rarely in any detail or depth. Some reference Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) character strengths and virtue framework, but, as just noted, this framework backs away from providing a genuine model or theory for the virtues, even on the authors’ own account. A few other authors reference Fredrickson’s (2001) “broaden and build” theory of positive emotions, but this is a theory of affective experience and associated behaviors, not a theory or model of virtue. Although she used the terms “flourishing” and “strength,” she did not refer to virtues or character strengths. Given the lack of a general theory or model of virtue, it is no wonder that this domain of research has not

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

82

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

produced an integrated, cumulative body of results. To be cumulative and mature as a science, research must cohere in important ways and studies must build on what has gone before. This coherence and progression among a growing group of individual researchers requires a core theory or model that provides a shared research orientation. Since it lacks that, the domain of virtue research remains a fragmented patchwork of studies. In addition, empirical studies of virtues are almost always focused on a single, stand-alone characteristic. Researchers typically study forgiveness, gratitude, fairness, or kindness in isolation (Breen et al., 2010). There are some notable exceptions, such as those cited in this paragraph, but the general tendency to study virtues separately leaves the field siloed and fragmented. In their study on gratitude and cheating, DeSteno and colleagues (2019) noted that, “[t]raditionally speaking, virtues have been studied in silos, with the potential of one to affect the emergence of others rarely being considered” (p. 979). In two studies, these authors found that gratitude reduced cheating behavior (honesty). They summarized that “not all moral qualities need to be studied in silos but, rather, that hierarchies exist wherein certain virtues might give rise to seemingly unrelated others” (p. 979). Krause and Hayward (2015) concur about the siloing, commenting that “[a]lthough this type of research [one virtue at a time] is invaluable, it creates a body of work that is disjointed and contributes relatively little to the scientific goal of cumulative knowledge building” (p. 193). The authors cited in the previous paragraph are exceptions to the general tendency to study virtues in isolation. These exceptions comprise interdisciplinary teams of researchers, which we discuss in the next subsection. These are promising beginnings, and it is our hope that our book can support and encourage more of this interdisciplinary, cumulative, and integrative research. The Diagnostic Scheme A second systematic problem with Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) approach to virtue is that they framed it in terms of a traditional diagnostic scheme for character strengths. This is problematic because the aims of a traditional diagnostic scheme (Peterson and Seligman frequently refer to the DSM as a comparison) is to narrow the diagnostic picture as much as possible and to categorize individuals with manifestations of similar patterns. Diagnostic schemes are designed to discriminate individuals’ conditions through differential diagnosis, which, as an analytical tool, is intended to distinguish one manifestation pattern from another

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Research Fragmentation in Positive Psychology

83

and thereby to categorize individuals and suggest ameliorative treatments. Ideally this would result in a single diagnosis (i.e., a single virtue for an individual). Diagnosis is inherently categorical.3 One either has cancer or one does not. Of course, the degree or “stage” of cancer can be quantified, but that begins with the categorical distinction between those who have it and those who do not. Jablensky (2012), a critic of psychiatric diagnoses commented, that “[t]he requirement that the categories of a typology should be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive has never been fully met by any psychiatric classification” (p. 261). The exemplar diagnostic scheme (DSM) is widely seen as flawed (Awaad & Reicherter, 2016; Bredström, 2019; Watters, 2010), and this perception reduces any confidence one could have in Peterson and Seligman’s approach because it was modeled on the DSM. In contrast, we are advocating a thoroughly multidimensional assessment of virtues, wherein individuals can have varying degrees of a given virtue, as well as a profile of multiple virtues (see Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of this point). To really diagnose character strengths would amount to identifying a set of people with courage, another set with humility, and so forth. Clearly, some people would merit multiple diagnoses, but that generally means that there are “co-morbidities” that may or may not be related to one another. The fact that someone has a particular form of cancer generally tells us nothing about whether they have another disease, such as diabetes or Alzheimer’s disease. A diagnosis of lung cancer is even quite distinct from a diagnosis of prostate cancer. In no diagnostic scheme would it be reasonable to assign all of the diagnoses to someone (e.g., twenty-four character strengths in Peterson and Seligman’s scheme) or even a majority of them. The more diagnoses individuals have, the less specificity and validity the scheme has. Although it offers an intriguing view regarding virtues, a diagnostic approach contradicts a basic premise of traditional virtue accounts, in which individuals are encouraged to develop a wide range of virtues.4 Most 3

4

A relatively recent movement toward dimensional diagnosis, which involves creating patient profiles on a finite number of dimensions, is more similar to our scalar approach. There is, however, significant debate about whether dimensional or categorical diagnostic procedures are superior and about the proper dimensions and their scaling. Despite the possibility of dimensional diagnosis, our primary point is that Peterson and Seligman appeared unaware of how poorly a categorical approach to diagnosis fits virtue theory. It contradicts the traditional “unity of character” premise to an even greater degree. A strong version of the unity of character thesis is that if a person has one virtue, he has all of the virtues. We are not advocating a unity of virtues perspective here, but the possible entailment of one virtue by another is another empirical question that can only be posed if researchers are attendant to such possibilities.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

84

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

classical virtue ethics is not focused on differentiating character strengths in anything like the manner advocated by Peterson and Seligman. The theoretical and practical aim is, instead, to understand how to integrate as many of the virtues as possible and render their expression harmonious. Contrary to a diagnostic approach, it is quite plausible, even very desirable, for an individual to have many virtues. Diagnostic procedures also function by ruling out closely related conditions to increase the confidence in and the specificity of a single diagnosis. It is intuitively clear that seeking to rule out one virtue (e.g., humanity) cannot increase one’s confidence that a person is best understood as having another virtue (e.g., justice). Of course, it could be helpful to know that an individual may be more humane than just, but there is no nondiagnostic reason to see the two virtues as competitive descriptors of a person’s character. They are at least as likely to be compatible and mutually supportive as being competitors. The function of the “rule out” demonstrates just how ill-fitting the diagnostic approach to virtue is. In the end, the relationships among various virtues is an empirical question, but we hypothesize (3-1) that there will be more compatibility than competition and exclusivity among them. One of Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) primary aims was to foster the development of virtue measurement in order to promote empirical research. We concur with this aim and share their interest in the scalar measurement of virtues and research on how virtues relate to other phenomena of interest. We believe that this research has real-world value, but a categorical diagnostic framework and its attendant logic are unnecessary to this project and may well have encouraged the fragmentation of virtue research. The implication from a diagnostic scheme is that virtues can be, in principle, isolated and perhaps ought to be studied as distinct manifestations. In contrast, virtue theory suggests that virtues are most likely related, with some degree of mutual support and mutual entailment among them. The exact nature of those relationships has not been worked out conceptually, and these relationships need to be examined empirically. In addition, there are many circumstances in which two or more virtues are called for in a situation, and their expression must be harmonized, or at least prioritized. For example, when someone hurts another person, there is a need to consider both the generosity involved in forgiving the transgressor and the justice involved in holding them accountable. Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) assertion that individuals should focus on developing a few “signature strengths” and that a relatively small number of character strengths could constitute good character is consistent with their diagnostic approach. This proposal misses a central point of

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Research Fragmentation in Positive Psychology

85

virtue theory that clarifies the strong context-dependency of virtues. We hypothesize (8-1) that the perceived characteristics of the specific situation are the key to specifying which virtue(s) are appropriate (Darnell et al., 2019; Fowers, 2003, 2005a; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010). To give two simple examples, circumstances that involve risk indicate the appropriateness of courage, and situations characterized by vulnerability tend to evoke compassion for a virtuous person. According to virtue theory, every individual faces many different situations in which a wide variety of virtues are called for. Approaching virtues in the “pick and choose” manner advocated by Peterson and Seligman will not prepare a person to act in a reliably virtuous way across these contexts. Of course, Peterson and Seligman did not entirely dismiss context as an important factor, but they also did not systematically account for the role of context for virtue. We address how the STRIVE-4 Model incorporates the key element of context for virtue in Chapters 8 and 9. It is worth noting that the diagnostic approach appears to have been eschewed by positive psychologists in recent years. It seems to be so rarely invoked that it appears that positive psychologists have voted with their feet by leaving it behind. To the extent that we are correct in this interpretation, it seems like a wise choice. Ambivalence about Values The third way that Peterson and Seligman (2004) got off to a problematic start with positive psychology is by taking a rather ambivalent stance about the role of values and evaluative considerations. To be sure, this is a difficult problem for psychologists in general, whose default position is to endorse a strict fact–value dichotomy. This problem is so important that we have devoted Chapter 6 to it. Peterson and Seligman understood that virtues involve a significant degree of evaluation, but they unsuccessfully attempted to finesse this difficulty, thereby inaugurating an approach to positive psychology marked by confusing ambivalence. In their leaning toward value neutrality, they stated that “psychology needs to downplay prescriptions for the good life (moral laws) and instead emphasize the why and how of good character” (p. 10, emphasis added). On the other hand, they write a few pages later that “each strength is morally valued in its own right” (p. 19, emphasis added). They seem to settle on an arm’s length approach to values by stating that: “Although our classification is decidedly about such values, it is descriptive of what is ubiquitous, rather than prescriptive” (p. 51). They, like many psychologists seem to worry that

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

86

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

allowing values into their research is tantamount to prescribing certain ways of life. As explained in Chapter 6, we think this worry about values being connected to prescription is a non sequitur. Our view is that values cannot be divorced from the facts about virtues, and that scientists should simply recognize or “own” the value assumptions with which they work. We have argued that virtues just are valued characteristics that conduce to (according to some scholars) worthwhile goods (Cokelet, 2015; Fowers, 2005a, Fowers et al., 2017). We believe that the best kind of virtue science straightforwardly recognizes that the world of facts is thoroughly imbued with values. Some researchers may prefer an arm’s length relationship with evaluative questions, insisting that they are only describing their participants’ values rather than engaging in any value judgments themselves. It is possible to conduct virtue research from this standpoint, but we argue in Chapter 6 that this approach leaves out central aspects of virtues and just obscures the researcher’s values rather than removing them from the research.

Beyond Positive Psychology Importantly, there exists a substantial body of research on virtues that is not clearly identified with positive psychology. Whether or not empirical virtue research is identified with positive psychology, it tends to share three key flaws with that movement. First, research unaffiliated with positive psychology is also quite atheoretical, lacking a systematic conceptual framework. This absence has resulted in a fragmented and noncumulative body of studies outside of positive psychology, as well as within it. Second, this fragmentation is perpetuated further by studying virtues in a stand-alone way, neglecting relationships among the virtues. We believe that the fragmentation of virtue research can be overcome best through interdisciplinary research combining the conceptual resources of philosophy with cutting-edge social science, as in the STRIVE-4 Model. Third, existing research has not drawn on philosophy to identify different ways of conceptualizing virtues or to identify ambitious and interesting guiding hypothesis, for example about the connection between virtues and flourishing or the connection between practical wisdom and specific virtues or their integration. In this book, we focus on integrating psychological and philosophical research, but an increasing number of scholars from other social sciences are applying the methods of their discipline to this problem as well (Han, 2016; Michalski, 2022; Walker, 2022). Combining the resources of philosophy and the social sciences in an empirical model can promote a mature

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Beyond Positive Psychology

87

science of virtue. In what follows, we describe some of this interdisciplinary research. In the last section, we illustrate these two problems with a brief review of recent research on gratitude, a popular topic in recent years. Promising Research Alternatives Positive psychological research has contributed to understanding virtues, but it is far from the only game in town. Virtue scholars should know that there are research efforts that transcend the main difficulties we cite here about positive psychology. Beginnings of Empirically Oriented Virtue Theorizing Recent scholarship from the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtue (2022) is an exception to the insufficiency of theory problem. This interdisciplinary team consists of educators, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and others. One of the best examples of their interdisciplinary and theoretically informed work is a study of the virtue of gratitude (Morgan et al., 2017). We discuss gratitude at length in the last section of the chapter. They based this study on a rich conceptual account of gratitude as a virtue and developed a multicomponent assessment that empirically demonstrated the necessity of four gratitude components. This team has also investigated the virtue of friendship (Walker et al., 2015), online virtues (Morgan & Fowers, 2022), and practical wisdom (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022). We cite another example of interdisciplinary work by Wright and colleagues (2021) frequently in this book. This is a team of two psychologists (Wright and Warren) and one philosopher (Snow), who created a framework for measuring and studying virtues based on a thoroughly theoretically approach. Snow has also led other interdisciplinary projects that similarly add theoretical depth to social scientists’ empirical efforts to understand virtues (Snow, 2015; Snow & Narvaez, 2019). This book and the STRIVE-4 Model represent another interdisciplinary approach to virtues combining conceptual and empirical analyses. This ongoing interdisciplinary partnership has produced both conceptual (Cokelet & Fowers, 2019; Fowers & Cokelet, 2019; Fowers et al., 2021) and empirical research (Fowers et al., 2019, 2020; Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022; Lefevor & Fowers, 2016) on virtues. There are also other interdisciplinary teams that are combining highquality conceptual and empirical analyses. This interdisciplinary collaboration is important because social scientists can make valuable contributions

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

88

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

to empirical study and philosophers can make valuable contributions through their conceptual capacities. We hope that the conceptual discussion and empirical testing of these general models and approaches for virtue research leads to an interactive network of scholars who can thereby construct a systematic, cumulative science. We also suggest that this research is best conceptualized and pursued with an interdisciplinary approach. Research Simultaneously Examining Multiple Virtues The fragmentation of virtues being studied in silos has also been breached to a limited extent (Breen et al., 2010; DeSteno et al., 2019; Krause & Hayward, 2015; Pury & Kowalsky, 2007). In addition to these studies, which include two virtues, other research has examined multiple virtues at the same time. Several of these studies have used experience-sampling methods (Bleidorn & Denissen, 2015; Fowers et al., 2019; Meindl et al., 2013), and some studies have employed the VIA inventory (Peterson & Seligman, 2003; McGrath, 2015). The difficulty with the VIA scales is that there is no consensus on how many and which virtues it assesses (Macdonald et al., 2008; McGrath, 2014; Shryack et al., 2010). One qualitative study examined kindness and fairness (Fowers et al., 2020). These studies do not, however, capitalize fully on the investigation of multiple virtues (e.g., by assessing the unity of character thesis or examining how closely virtues are related to one another and whether multiple virtues make independent contributions to well-being, relationship quality, or other aims). This is a circumstance that can and should be rectified in future research. One way to encourage this research is to offer hypothesis 3-2 that the strength of one virtue trait correlates positively with the strength of other virtue traits.

Absence of Theory in Gratitude Research Gratitude has become an enormously popular research topic in psychology. A recent Psychinfo search in 2023 produced 1,139 journal articles reporting on empirical studies with gratitude as a key word. The research dates to 1976 (Lane & Anderson, 1976), with 1,135 studies published since 2000. Interestingly, only forty-six of these studies use the term “virtue” and forty-nine studies contained the term “character.” Arguably, Peterson and Seligman (2004) inaugurated this boom in gratitude research after they clearly identified gratitude as a character strength that is an aspect of their virtue of transcendence. They identified many religious sources of the concept of gratitude and noted that it was not considered a virtue by Aristotle.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Absence of Theory in Gratitude Research

89

Gratitude has most often been studied as a characteristic that is not considered a virtue or character strength (83 percent of the studies that used gratitude as a key word). Emmons and McCullough (2003), who were among the earliest contemporary gratitude researchers, characterized the confusion among researchers because “[g]ratitude defies easy classification. It has been conceptualized as an emotion, an attitude, a moral virtue, a habit, a personality trait, or a coping response” (p. 377). Years later, Breen and colleagues (2010) noted that not much consistency had been attained because gratitude was still being described “as a moral virtue, attitude, emotion, habit, personality trait, and coping response” (p. 932). There is no evidence for greater conceptual clarity or consensus to this day, leaving research on gratitude quite fragmented. This collective conceptual muddle is exactly what we mean when we note that research on characteristics that can be considered virtues is unsystematic and lacks conceptual organization. We are not arguing that the only correct way to proceed is to study gratitude as a virtue. After all, there is evidence that gratitude could function as a short-term coping mechanism that would not fit our definition of a virtue (e.g., Mofidi et al., 2014). Rather, we are arguing that researchers need to clarify their conceptualizations of what category or categories these characteristics fall into, and then to fashion their measurement and research to assess the chosen conceptualization. There are three specific weaknesses in the studies that do claim to investigate gratitude as a virtue or character strength. First, although scholars often provide some degree of clarity about what they mean by gratitude, these investigators seldom provide a clear definition of what gratitude features or structures make it a virtue or character strength. What makes it a virtue rather than some other form of desirable characteristic? Exceptions to this are Morgan and colleagues (2017) and the Development of Gratitude Research Group (e.g., O’Brien et al., 2018; Tudge et al., 2018). Some researchers rely on Peterson and Seligman’s definition of virtue (e.g., Kashdan et al., 2018), but, as detailed earlier, their definition does not provide a solid conceptual grounding. This is a significant conceptual problem because if researchers do not provide an explicit and systematic conceptualization, it appears that they are trading on intuitive or popular concepts of virtue. As a result, they may in fact be studying different aspects of gratitude, ignoring important aspects, or studying completely different things. Second, only one investigation of gratitude was built on a clearly identified and discussed general model of virtue. Morgan et al. (2017) articulated an Aristotelian model of virtue that led them to investigate whether the components of gratitude could be identified and measured. Although

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

90

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

there are scattered investigations of other virtues that were constructed following well-described virtue theory, such systematicity is rare. It is worth describing the systematic and explicit neo-Aristotelian theory Morgan and colleagues (2017) engaged to create a multi-component gratitude measure (MCGM). They argued that gratitude included the components of virtue-related emotions, attitudes, disposition, and behavior. They carefully formulated self-report scale items to measure each component according to virtue theory. They found the expected factor structure and reported that each of these components was related to existing measures of gratitude. They also found that each component contributed independently to satisfaction with life, subjective happiness, and positive affect after controlling for the “Big 5” personality traits and other measures of gratitude. This supports the incremental validity of the components. This kind of careful application of virtue theory to empirical research has promise for developing a cumulative science of virtue. We can imagine researchers using this kind of multicomponent model to examine other virtues. A general multicomponent model of virtue could possibly be inductively developed if multiple research teams build on this study by adopting a multicomponent approach. In fact, the MCGM partly inspired the development of the STRIVE-4 Model. Three of the four elements of virtue we include as the “4” in the model are behavior, affect/motivation, and cognition, which have significant overlap with the MCGM. We are proposing a general model of virtue derived from our reading of virtue theory and existing empirical studies that can be used to assess virtue measurement, the existence of virtues, and the relationships among virtues and other processes and outcomes. We discuss the predictions that the model makes throughout the book. Third, with only a few exceptions (Morgan et al., 2017; Tudge et al., 2018) the researchers who were ostensibly studying gratitude as a virtue or character strength used the same measures of gratitude as those who did not conceptualize it as a virtue. These measures are typically singletimepoint, self-report scales that do not provide strong evidence of a trait (discussed more fully in Chapter 7), much less of a virtue trait. The most frequently used measures include the Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6; McCullough et al., 2002), and the Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test (GRAT; Watkins et al., 2003). The GQ-6 is a brief measure that essentially assesses the emotional experience of thankfulness, which means that it is not (and was not intended to be) a measure of the virtue of gratitude. The GRAT comprises three subscales: Sense of Abundance, Simple Appreciation, and Appreciation of Others.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Absence of Theory in Gratitude Research

91

The Sense of Abundance measures the degree to which one feels deprived or has received one’s due in life. Simple Appreciation assesses the emotional experiences associated with beauty and other positive aspects of life. Appreciation of Others taps the emotion of thankfulness toward other people. These subscales clearly do not assess gratitude as a virtue (nor were they intended to). This indicates that all but a few investigators of gratitude as a virtue did not really assess a virtue at all. We suspect that the GQ-6 and the GRAT will be related to measures designed to assess gratitude as a virtue, and this is what Morgan and colleagues (2017) reported, but it seems to us that one of the necessary elements of a science of virtue is that the studies that comprise it are self-consciously assessing virtues rather than some other characteristic. This requires the construction and use of virtue measurement. To our knowledge, these confusions about the conceptualization and measurement of a virtue of gratitude have rarely been addressed thoroughly. Researchers seem to assume that their conceptualizations and measures are sufficient, but our foray into the development of virtue science has raised the question about whether this is a reasonable assumption. A charitable interpretation of this state of affairs is that researchers utilized “off the shelf” measures in their initial studies to obtain a proof of concept, with more specific measures of virtue to be developed subsequently. This interpretation has seldom been borne out in such a progression, however. It seems to us that it ought to be possible for researchers to decide whether gratitude is better understood as an affective trait, a personality trait, or a virtue trait. We suspect that at least some researchers avoid terms such as character and virtue because they want to maintain an arm’s length relationship to clearly value-imbued words, but gratitude is virtually always seen as a positive, desirable, and socially salutary characteristic that is associated with many desirable aims, such as subjective well-being (Morgan et al., 2017), relationship quality (Kashdan et al., 2018), and parenting quality (Timmons & Ekas, 2018). Therefore, these researchers’ distance from evaluative terms seems rather tenuous. Finally, just as we noted about virtue research in general, gratitude is typically studied as a stand-alone virtue or in an experimental induction. In most cases, it is simply correlated with desirable aims such as well-being or relationship quality, but not compared to other virtues. Exceptions to this include Breen and colleagues (2010), DeSteno and colleagues (2019), and Krause and Hayward (2015). There are two ways in which our approach to a science of virtue can catalyze and upgrade the state of gratitude research. The first, and primary, way

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

92

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

that we intend this book to be helpful is in proposing a large set of tests whereby a given characteristic can be assessed to evaluate the plausibility of considering a characteristic to be a virtue. This would allow scholars to examine the evidence for whether a characteristic such as gratitude can be better understood as a trait or an emotional experience, for example. If it appears to be a trait, is gratitude better considered a personality or virtue trait? Indeed, we designed the STRIVE-4 Model precisely for the purpose of guiding virtue research in a conceptually systematic, evidence focused manner. We believe it is of value to examine how gratitude research can be enhanced with the STRIVE-4 Model (the virtues are Scalar, Traits that are Role sensitive, Interact with situational factors, are associated with Value, are conducive to Eudaimonia, and are composed of the 4 components of behavior, cognition, affect/motivation, and practical wisdom). We present a much broader discussion of how the model can guide virtue research more generally in Chapters 7–11. In the case of gratitude, the scalar question (whether a characteristic of gratitude can be quantitatively measured) has been answered in the affirmative through many studies. There is some evidence that gratitude functions as a trait (e.g., Simons et al., 2019), but this hypothesis is far from fully confirmed. Due to the common reliance on single-timepoint self-report measurement, we cannot have strong confidence in trait gratitude. As we have noted, most studies do not shed any light on whether gratitude is a virtue trait, however. As is the case for most candidate virtues, there is virtually no evidence about how role-sensitive gratitude is. In contrast, some results suggest that gratitude is responsive to at least some situational factors, particularly the factors that signal the appropriateness of gratitude (Morgan et al., 2017). Many studies have confirmed that gratitude is associated with desirable goods such as physical health (e.g., Schache et al., 2019), psychological well-being (e.g., Breen et al., 2010), positive relationships (e.g., Kashdan et al., 2018), and sleep (e.g., Wood, Joseph, Lloyd, & Atkins, 2009). One study also indicates a positive relationship between gratitude and eudaimonic well-being (Nezlek et al., 2017), but this research was limited to a self-reported, subjective measure of eudaimonia, meaning that more through assessments of the relationship between gratitude and eudaimonia are needed. There is an abundance of evidence that gratitude has an emotional component, but the other three elements of gratitude as a virtue have not been as thoroughly assessed. One study assessed the cognitive element (Morgan et al., 2017) and self-reports of gratitude behavior have been obtained (Morgan et al., 2017), but gratitude behavior has seldom been observed.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

93

The evidence for the role of practical wisdom in gratitude is missing. Although there have been hundreds of studies on gratitude, there remain many unanswered questions. In addition, our approach can help in a second way because we are advocating a straightforward acceptance of the value-imbued nature of virtue research (Chapter 6). In our view, researchers can view their work as an inherently moral endeavor (Fowers, 2022) without reducing or compromising their commitment to science in the least. In fact, we argue that acknowledging and “owning” one’s value commitments promotes objectivity, allows for assumptions to be questioned, and reduces the need for a pretense of value neutrality. We recognize that not all social scientists find this alternative desirable or feasible. Therefore, we outline a milder alternative to our position that many researchers have worked out, in which they see themselves as simply describing others’ values and taking no value position themselves (discussed in Chapter 6).

Summary In this chapter, we have described the fragmented state of virtue research. We began by documenting the abandonment of virtue research by psychologists in the twentieth century and the reappropriation of these topics in the twenty-first century. Psychologists became interested in empirical research on virtue following the renaissance of virtue theory in philosophy and the inauguration of the positive psychology movement. Many psychologists within and outside this movement have been studying virtues empirically, and a growing number of psychologists are actively collaborating with philosophers to deepen their work conceptually. Unfortunately, the absence of one or more systematic, cohesive, and empirically oriented models or theories has made it difficult to conduct research on virtues that is cumulative and organized. As a result, the research domain remains disjointed and noncumulative. The positive psychology movement has generally taken an atheoretical approach to virtue research, perhaps encouraging this trend, but investigators outside this movement have also approached their research with little attention to an overarching model or theory. We believe that this is a tendency that is widely shared by psychological researchers (Fowers & Cokelet, 2019; Richardson et al., 1999), not just positive psychologists or virtue researchers. For this reason, we have recommended interdisciplinary work in which social scientists collaborate extensively with philosophers, who tend to have strong theoretical expertise.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

94

Toward Reconciling the Fragmentation of Virtue Science

We argue, in Chapters 7–11, for the value of a model of virtue that can guide virtue research and provide a framework to which these studies can cohere. Up to now, virtue research has taken an inductive, atheoretical approach and has produced encouraging results but relatively little coherence. We have introduced the STRIVE-4 Model as one candidate for this role (Fowers et al., 2021). A second shortcoming of virtue research has been the tendency to study singular virtues in isolation from one another. We suggested that the diagnostic approach to virtues has encouraged the study of virtues as stand-alone features. We argued that a diagnostic approach to virtues is ill-fitting because, ideally, individuals will have many virtues, not just one or two, contra Peterson and Seligman (2004). A few researchers have commented on and begun to rectify this insular approach to studying virtues. Continued effort to study the interrelations of virtues is another way to overcome the current fragmentation of the field. It is possible that some virtues enable others or that clusters of virtues may emerge. It is also important to learn how individuals who are adept at virtuous action can harmonize or prioritize the virtues in situations that evoke multiple virtues. Finally, we exemplified the atheoretical and fragmented approach to virtue research with the popular characteristic of gratitude. Although there are hundreds of studies on gratitude, a very small number explicitly characterize it as a virtue. The studies of gratitude as a virtue are generally bereft of virtue theory or even a definition of what makes gratitude a virtue. Moreover, these studies overwhelmingly use the same self-report measures of gratitude as researchers who do not consider gratitude a virtue. The virtue literature generally has similar shortcomings. The good news is that we have a wealth of descriptive information about virtues and sophisticated research tools with which we can construct a more scientific approach. It is our hope that this book will help scholars by providing guidance and an anchor point for developing a science of virtue.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 4

Moral Development and Virtue

Because many virtue theorists posit that virtues have a history of training and must be cultivated, they are likely to have a developmental trajectory. Aristotle gestured at this development, but no one sees his gestures as a sufficient account. Fortunately, many developmentalists have recognized the importance of moral development and a good deal of work has been done to explicate it. In this chapter, we explore the degree to which moral development research can inform us about virtue development. We also explain how moral development research will benefit if it is integrated with virtue science – by adopting a virtue development perspective, developmentalists will be able to locate lacunae in the existing research and work to fill them. Developmental science is unusual in psychology in that most developmentalists are relatively comfortable with the idea that there is a reasonably specifiable norm toward which individuals develop. Simply put, a developmental process assumes a normative picture of completed development. As Walker and Frimer (2011) put it, “specifying the developmental end point (and thus the prescriptive claim) is critical in evaluating any model of human development” (p. 244). This creates an affinity between developmental science and normative concepts (in both the descriptive and evaluative senses) that is unusual in psychology. Many contemporary developmental scholars follow the two initial giants of developmental science, Piaget (e.g., Kohlberg) and Vygotsky (e.g., Tomasello), and have elaborated and progressed beyond those beginnings. Although Kohlberg (1963) was central in defining moral development as a distinct area of study, most scholars see the field in post-Kohlbergian terms, with diminished interest in the kind of stage developmental model that Kohlberg promoted and attention to various developmental factors, not just improving moral deliberation and judgment. As Killen and Smetana (2015) put it, a developmental understanding of morality is important because “the foundations of moral awareness are present in infancy and toddlerhood” (p. 740) and develop progressively 95

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

96

Moral Development and Virtue

from that point. They stress that “children are neither passive recipients of information, nor are they ruled by selfish and aggressive instincts. Concepts of morality emerge very early, and for the most part, young children have an awareness of equality, fairness, and rights, which becomes much more fully formed by adolescence” (p. 741). In other words, developmental scholars frequently maintain that children are moral agents who make judgments about what they observe, and are active learners rather than merely passive recipients of moral teachings. There is one key divergence between virtue theory and most moral development research. Moral developmental theory and research generally focuses on the typical development of children, including the timeline for the appearance of various capacities and the ordering of those developments, including moral development. With some exceptions (e.g., moral identity theory, moral exemplar research), there is less attention to individual differences and excellences in moral behavior, which are key elements of virtue theory. Therefore, there is some tension between accounts that emphasize development as an orderly and relatively consistent pattern across individuals and accounts that focus on individual differences in development. This division between developmental processes and individual differences (also reflected in Chapter 5 of this book) is partly an artifact of creating separate developmental and personality subfields in psychology. Although these subfields have cross-pollinated in personality trait development, and there is a recent push to integrate the two fields (Baumert et al., 2017), they remain generally independent. Despite the considerable research on virtues and on moral development, we know relatively little about how virtue traits develop and whether various developmental hypotheses suggested by traditional virtue theories can be verified. Our focus in this chapter is on how much the major themes in moral development research illuminate virtue development. We focus primarily on children’s moral development because research with children can tell us much about the basic capacities that undergird moral action, but we also discuss some lifelong developmental processes. We cannot discuss the entirety of moral development research in a single chapter, so we have selected the topics that seem most promising from a virtue development perspective. We begin by examining three necessary and apparently naturally developing preconditions for virtue development: (1) the ability to choose, (2) an interest in collective welfare, and (3) an interest in normativity. These three are relatively high-level capacities that are preceded and undergirded by important functions that we do not discuss, such as perspective taking, metacognition, representation, and executive

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Preconditions for Moral Development

97

functions.  After we discuss these three preconditions, we evaluate what moral development research can tell us about virtue and list some reasonable hypotheses for future research, organized by the elements of the STRIVE-4 Model. In other words, we will ask: What does this research tell us about virtues as scalar traits that are role sensitive, interact with situational influences, help the individual to attain valued ends, and promote a flourishing life? To what degree does moral development research illuminate virtue-related cognition, behavior, motivation, and practical wisdom? What does virtue science suggest as future research questions?

Preconditions for Moral Development Agency in Moral Development Early moral development theories proposed by Freud and Skinner had a strong deterministic flavor, but with Piaget and Vygotsky, agency became an important element of moral development (Turiel, 2006). Following Piaget, Kohlberg (1963) rejected the idea that morality is largely imposed on children by their parents,1 their learning history, or their environment. He saw children as agents or “moral philosophers” who actively formulate their moral reasons based on their situation, their relationships, and their interests. Nor did Kohlberg see children’s morality as merely controlling selfish impulses in favor of others’ interest. Rather, he argued that children attend to their social world, attempt to understand relationships with others, and see others’ interests as legitimate. These views on children’s agency are widely shared by moral development scholars (Turiel, 2006). Sokol and colleagues (2015) defined agency as “a person’s autonomous control over his or her actions … including a sense of what individuals can accomplish themselves and responsibility or ownership over one’s actions” (p. 284). Sokol and colleagues cited human capacities for meaning making, reflexivity, self-awareness, and self-control as the bases for agency, and argued that agency is embedded in sociocultural networks rather than acting in opposition to those social structures. That is, agency is grounded in selfdirected activity but also enabled and influenced by social arrangements. 1

It is difficult to choose a single term for the people who care for and support the development of infants and children. We are ambivalent about the terms available (caregiver, parent, mother, father, etc.). Caregiver is most general but lacks the connotation of the intense involvement of the parent, but not all caregivers are parents, and males and females both provide care. Our resolution of this problem is to alternate the use of these terms, by which we mean that all the terms are relevant, and none have ultimate priority.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

98

Moral Development and Virtue

Sokol and colleagues (2015) pointed out that, in its beginnings, children’s agency is not a matter of “symbolically representing the world, and then acting based on those representations, [rather] children act and later in the developmental sequence come to reflect on action (i.e., representation becomes a later developmental achievement)” (p. 293). Children begin with what psychologists call prereflective agency (Martin & Sugarman, 1999), which is acting to alter their environment without directly symbolizing (or mentally representing) those actions. Early in infancy, this is recognizable in numerous ways, including attachment behaviors, distress signals, and infants’ use of gaze, all of which is designed to influence their caregivers. No one believes that neonates are self-aware or consciously acting to alter their environment, but they do seem to have implicit goals for comfort, feeding, safety, and stimulation. These seem to elicit systematic patterns of actions, which rapidly increase in scope and sophistication in the first year of life. For example, Bowlby (1969/1982) documented that, through their movements and signals, infants systematically elicit caregiving activities (e.g., attention, proximity, warmth, and feeding). As children develop, between the ages of 3.5 and 5 years, they begin to pursue and coordinate a variety of personal goals and they can also represent others’ goals, intentions, beliefs, and emotions (Nobes et al., 2016), tending to represent others as acting with good reasons (Roessler & Perner, 2013). This opens the possibility of pursuing shared goals with others when the reasons for action are shared (discussed in the “Collective Intentionality” section). Sokol and colleagues’ social structuring of agency is apparent in the ways that parents actively scaffold children’s learning by structuring situations to allow a child to develop abilities (e.g., helping the child to balance as she takes her first steps or teaching the child about choice by offering a range of options). Within the first six weeks of life, children demonstrate their strong interest in social interaction through concentrated attention and social smiling, and mutual gaze emerges by two months (before infants can reliably grasp objects). At three months, infant and caregiver engage in rhythmic interactions, wherein cycles of stimulation (gaze, touch, and emotion expression) and rest emerge, which Feldman (2007) called synchrony. The infant actively cues maternal behaviors by alternatively gazing at the mother to engage her and looking away to decrease stimulation. The mother’s responsiveness helps the infant to regulate the duration and intensity of the stimulation. This synchrony helps infants to align positive emotions with caregivers and develops into turn-taking (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). These authors stated that “this active involvement in communication of rudimentary

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Preconditions for Moral Development

99

intentions and feelings confirms that the human mind is, from the start, motivated … for cooperative psychological learning – the mastery of socially or interpersonally contrived meaning specified in reciprocal social engagements” (p. 7). Joint attention is when two people coordinate their attention on the same object, often aimed at jointly taking note of or manipulating an object (Moll et al., 2008). Sharing attention with a caregiver scaffolds the infant’s ability to explore the world. Joint attention begins with following another person’s gaze at 6–8 months of age (Corkum & Moore, 1998), but, by the second year of life, children increasingly initiate and effortfully maintain joint attention as an apparently important goal (Aureli & Presaghi, 2010). When engaging in joint attention, children (often through pointing) tend to persist until an adult shares the child’s attentional focus and excitement (Liszkowski et al., 2007). In normally developing infants, joint intentionality culminates in enabling infants to maintain concerted activity with an adult. Another important part of moral development is learning what others expect. Kochanska (2002a) studied the development of conscience, which she called “committed compliance.” Kochanska (2002b) argued that conscience results from an interactive process that involves more than the mere imposition of morality by parents and society. In her view, parents and children are necessary co-participants in a cooperative process of learning moral expectations, with willing compliance by children. Children appear to be more responsive to moral expectations when adults use reasons (e.g., pertaining to harm or welfare) to classify actions as moral than when they simply direct children how to behave (EisenbergBerg & Geisheker, 1979; Nucci, 1984). Many studies (e.g., Carlo et al., 2011; Hastings et al., 2007; Laible et al., 2008) have documented children’s reasoning about moral matters by clarifying that children reject adults’ directives when the directives violate recognized moral expectations (e.g., to steal or harm). Action that reflects sensitivity to reasons and not just directives is a strong indicator of developing agency. Wright and Bartsch (2008) reported that two-year-old children readily engaged in conversations about moral matters with adults. They found that children actively initiated moral conversations, rather than just responding to adults. By their second birthday, most children engage in volitional speech and use terms such as want, need, have to, and can, and preference terms such as like and dislike (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Recchia & Howe, 2008), which incorporate concepts of permissions and prohibitions, right and wrong, good and bad.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

100

Moral Development and Virtue

Self-recognition is an essential element of agency because it makes the ownership of actions possible. The mirror test – a classic assessment of explicit self-recognition – verifies that self-recognition is evident in the second year in virtually all normally developing infants (Stipek et al., 1990), and children reference themselves with language early in the third year of life (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004; Sokol et al., 2015). Agency can be roughly defined as self-directed activity, meaning that one directs oneself to act in specific ways. The set of basic capacities necessary for self-direction are known loosely as executive functions, with researchers focused primarily on behavioral self-regulation (Barkley, 2012) but also studying other capacities (e.g., focused attention, working memory, action prioritization, and mental set shifting; Garon et al., 2008). Barkley’s (2012) definition of executive functions relates them clearly to agency as, “those self-directed actions needed to choose goals and to create, enact, and sustain actions toward those goals or more simply as self-regulation to achieve goals” (p. 60, emphasis in original). (Recall from Chapter 1 that goal pursuit is a concrete form of pursuing what is good.) Self-direction is important when a person perceives a desirable future and shapes her activity to actualize that future. Because this prospective action includes choices, goals, and ownership of actions, self-direction is a form of agency (Barkley, 2012). Studies in Canada and the USA suggest that fathers scaffold this development, with observed scaffolding correlating with executive functions (Hammond et al., 2012; Landry et al., 2002) and the development of executive functions extends into nominal adulthood, attaining stability at about age thirty (Green et al., 1996). Kochanska (2002a) documented self-direction in young children who spontaneously self-reference in verbalizing self-instruction (e.g., saying aloud “no-no toys” or “we don’t touch” when contemplating play with a prohibited toy). Those self-directions gradually become more covert, complex, and focused on longer-term goals (Barkley, 2012). Fernyhough (2010) clarified that “children gain enhanced control over their own behavior when words which were previously used to regulate the behavior of others, or which others used to regulate the child’s behavior, become employed in regulating the self” (p. 63). As self-regulatory behavior becomes solidified, children can begin to reflect on how they can act to realize a desirable future. Of course, all of this can be construed in causal determinative terms, with the idea that agency is a comforting illusion. The difficulty with this portrayal is that it is unclear why humans would have such robust self-directive, behavioral regulative, self-recognizing, planning, and goaldirective processes just to create the illusion of agency. It seems far more

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Preconditions for Moral Development

101

parsimonious to recognize these capacities as supporting agentic action that is self-directed to create desirable futures. In virtue terms, desirable futures typically include the goods and ideals that individuals decide to pursue, and virtues are traits that often make that reliable pursuit possible. While pursuing virtue science we think it makes sense to follow Piaget, Vygotsky, and their followers in thinking that children are agents who actively shape their world based on their ends. We propose that all these elements related to agency are related to virtue development. Several hypotheses can be tested. In each case, we expect the agency component to be positively related to virtue development (keeping in mind that children will only have proto-virtues rather than fully mature virtues): hypothesis 4-1, greater ownership of behavior; hypothesis 4-2, greater caregiver responsiveness and synchrony; hypothesis 4-3, stronger conscience development; hypothesis 4-4, greater responsiveness to moral expectations; hypothesis 4-5, stronger capacity for self-direction. Children’s Interest in Collective Welfare Understanding humans as agents is insufficient for moral behavior because individuals could direct themselves toward entirely nonmoral ends. So, it is natural to wonder why and how people adopt moral ends. Put otherwise: Why do humans care about others’ welfare, the common good, or acting morally? In what follows we discuss the answers that current research suggests. In short, it suggests that typical humans are profoundly interdependent, and that mutual reliance and belonging require that we take certain others’ welfare and the common good quite seriously. These shared interests show up clearly in collective identity and collective intentionality. Collective Identity Tajfel (1981) and Brewer (1991) recognized decades ago that human identity is not simply an individual matter. Brewer developed theory and conducted research clarifying that people have both individual and group membership aspects of their identities. These group memberships include families, professions, cities, states, nations, clubs, hobbies, and so forth. In addition, these researchers studied the ways in which individual identities are formed within a social matrix. Most obviously, when humans form their individual identities, they differentiate themselves from others. Without such contrasts, individual identities do not form. Because it is impossible for a human to grow up as an isolated individual, humans do not have entirely self-originating identities. Because humans expend

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

102

Moral Development and Virtue

considerable energy establishing and maintaining an identity and identities are formed in relation to others, it is reasonable to assume that identities impact how one functions in the social world. Individual identity also has a social ontogeny. The development of individual identities occurs within relationships and communities that predate the individual. Infants begin life engaged in relationships before they have an identity, and their individual identity develops within those relations. As Decety and Chaminade (2003) put it, “the sense of self emerges from the activity of the brain in interaction with other selves” (p. 578). There is a consensus among developmental psychologists that infancy is characterized by intersubjectivity wherein infants interact with caregivers long before the infant fully recognizes her distinctiveness from others (e.g., Feldman, 2007; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). Dozens of studies (Feldman, 2007; Kochanska, 2002b; Tomasello, 2019) corroborate the development of the social capacities necessary for these interactions (e.g., joint attention, intention reading, synchronous interaction, turn-taking). Moreover, children typically cannot maintain their own identity without ongoing social definition and mutual activity through which other people confirm and solidify that identity. Humans begin life as members of a group prior to establishing an individual identity and depend on the group for the formation and maintenance of that identity. This helps to explain why individuals care about others’ welfare and about the common good. Moreover, humans do not act primarily and always in self-interested ways; we frequently act on behalf of the collective interests we share with others. Ultimately, there is no bright line dividing individual and group interests. Accordingly, we hypothesize (4-6) that collective identity will be positively related to virtue development in children. Humans do more than identify with one another collectively; we also cooperate extensively, which requires having shared intentions or collective intentionality. Collective Intentionality Tomasello (2019) used the term “collective intentionality” to describe the intensive and extensive form of cooperation characteristic of humans. He presented voluminous empirical evidence and persuasive arguments about the strong human inclination to cooperate with others and described the emergence of the social-cognitive capacities required for this cooperative activity by three years of age. Tomasello (2019) clarified that these social capacities are not added on to an already complete individual who simply extracts benefits from

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Preconditions for Moral Development

103

the world. Rather, the social abilities develop early and systematically to help constitute the individual as a morally responsive group member. He cited extensive evidence that children actively participate in joint activities as soon as maturationally possible. We can only summarize Tomasello’s richly detailed account of collective intentionality development here, but even this is instructive. By nine months of age, a set of social-cognitive capacities enables what Tomasello (2019) calls “joint intentionality” with adult caregivers, which is facilitated by gaze following and joint attention. Human infants follow others’ gaze rather precisely (Tomasello et al., 2007). Infants find joint visual attention toward an object very reinforcing, likely because it is a form of emotion sharing with others (Carpenter et al., 1998), which is, in turn, vital to social bonding with primary and secondary caregivers (Tomasello, 2019). Tomasello (2019) noted that “joint attention is a back-and-forth negotiation in which two partners in an interaction not only have shared goals and interests, but each has her own individual goals and interests as well … The process is thus one of individuals constantly attempting to align their goals and attention” (p. 65). Joint attention is “a kind of ‘meshing of minds,’ which naturally includes the partners’ differing perspectives on their joint attentional focus” (p. 191). This means that joint attention includes attending both to one’s own perspective on the activity and to imagining an interaction partners’ perspective. From nine months of age onward, children can perceive multiple perspectives. Perspective taking emerges in recognizing the apparent differences in the perspectives of the people attending to an object. For example, a small child sees a large dog as threatening, but the adult knows that the dog is friendly, and some resolution is needed when in the presence of the dog. Successful joint action requires the alignment of perspectives, which necessitates a comparison of the differences. Children seem to be motivated to align those inevitable differences in perspectives. Two other important capacities are associated with joint intentionality. First, children recognize common ground when they share intentionality with someone. Children recognize their shared history with that person, and that common ground becomes a backdrop for future interactions (Tomasello, 2019). Second, joint intentionality includes a shared interest and the ability to switch roles to accomplish the goal (Fletcher et al., 2012), meaning that young children recognize others as equal partners in the endeavor. The possibility of equality and mutual dependence is an important precondition of moral action.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

104

Moral Development and Virtue

Tomasello (2019) then pointed out that practice with perspective taking entails an “intersubjective”2 perspective, meaning that children can compare various perspectives. Children come to recognize that perspectives can be accurate or inaccurate, and they evaluate perspectival accuracy according to an intersubjective standpoint. This intersubjective perspective is an imagined standpoint that supersedes all subjective perspectives. Children employ this intersubjective perspective to allow them to align their understandings with their interaction partners. Language bolsters this intersubjective perspective because it is an inherently intersubjective phenomenon. From three years of age onward, children increasingly recognize the intersubjective perspective on facts and regularly use conventional language reflective of their cultural world. Therefore, a cultural common ground emerges that significantly expands and redefines the initial dyadic common ground. Learning correct language usage involves collective intentionality par excellence because one is conforming to the conventions of expression that exist only in the common ground of one’s language community (Tomasello, 2019). The growth of children’s recognition of an intersubjective perspective enables them to form an active “we” with the group (Tomasello, 2019). From age three onwards, children actively align their emotions and actions with collectively held norms. From three years old, children increasingly engage in collective intentionality with peers, affording interactions among equals rather than only with adults. Children seem motivated simply by the collaborative nature of an activity (Rekers et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2012), and they work harder when they are collaborating (Butler & Walton, 2013). By age six, children have acquired these abilities through practice and feedback. Children’s recognition of the “we” is important because that is a grouplevel identification, partly comprising the normative standards accepted by the group. Early in ontogeny, children guide their behavior from an intersubjective perspective, which frequently supersedes an “I” or “you” perspective. This opens the moral questions about which interests to pursue and how they should be balanced. These developmental pathways vary across cultures. For example, adults in many non-Western cultures engage in less child-directed gaze and childdirected speech than Westerners (Feldman et al., 2006; Keller et al., 2004). 2

Tomasello uses the term “objective,” but we prefer the term “intersubjective” because the former is so thoroughly freighted with contested commitments to detachment and value neutrality in the social sciences. Tomasello implies neither detachment nor value neutrality in child “objectivity” but using the term “objective” within social science circles risks confusion.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Preconditions for Moral Development

105

However, the general pattern of children’s development toward collective intentionality does not differ significantly across cultures even though adult behavior does vary considerably (Tomasello, 2019). Irrespective of culture, children become capable of collective intentionality. Children learn to coordinate their activity with specific others both through maturation and proximal interaction with adults. Cultural differences emerge as children internalize cultural norms and interact more extensively with peers, but collective intentionality is recognizable across cultures. A reasonable interpretation is that collective intentionality develops naturally in young children without explicit teaching, and older children employ collective intentions as they are shaped by cultural norms. The evidence clarifies that collective identification and collective intentionality develop through childhood and are operative in adult behavior. This highlights a profound interdependence in humans, wherein we depend on others both for successful outcomes and for acting meaningfully, individually and collectively. These traits of dependency and collectivity develop very early in life and help explain why individuals care about others’ welfare and the common good. Indeed, these abilities are so fundamental to human action that we easily take them for granted. Yet this collectivity is basic to human morality, with virtue development and expression entirely dependent on it. Following this rich literature on collective intentionality, we propose that two elements of collective intentionality are prerequisites of virtue development: hypothesis 4-7, joint attention; and hypothesis 4-8, a capacity for taking an intersubjective perspective. Children’s Interest in Normativity Agency and collective identity by themselves are still insufficient for a fully developed morality. Collective identity implies normative standards in its notions of common ground, reason giving, the intersubjective perspective, and adherence to cultural norms, but collective identity is morally ambiguous because cultural norms may be only social conventions. Full-blown morality, as we understand it, requires the capacity to assess standards as right or wrong, good or bad. It requires what we can call a normative sensibility (in the evaluative meaning) to critically assess shared standards and ideals and the strength of one’s reasons to follow them or not. So, the question is, do children develop that sort of normative sensibility, which imbues actions and aims with a moral and rational significance that goes beyond mere compliance with convention?

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

106

Moral Development and Virtue

We think that the first buds of children’s normative sensibility shows up strongly in imitation research, wherein they demonstrate high fidelity in imitating adults. Children often focus on imitating others’ actions faithfully, emphasizing acting consistently with an adult more than the outcome to be obtained. They imitate so faithfully that it has been termed “high-fidelity imitation” (Kenward, 2012; Schmidt et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2013). Even infants (Hurley & Chater, 2005; Kenward, 2012) tend to complete activities just as they see others complete them. They frequently generalize quickly from single occurrences to infered normative expectations (Tomasello, 2019). Children seem to assume that many adult activities have a normative structure, which makes learning the activities accurately a central way to follow norms. Yet children are active and critical imitators. When an adult model fails at a task, but the goal is clear, children will complete the action to fulfill the apparent goal rather than repeating the failure (Meltzoff, 1995). Children are also critical in that they are selective regarding whom they imitate (e.g., Williamson et al., 2008). An extensive literature documents children’s rapid and eager uptake of social standards and expectations (e.g., Forman et al., 2004; Kochanska, 2002b), but high-fidelity imitation suggests only sensitivity to cultural norms, not necessarily normative sensitivity. For example, children in their third year recognize social expectations and self-evaluate about how well they have met those expectations (Kochanska et al., 2002). Meeting standards gives rise to pride and falling short elicits guilt (Tracy et al., 2010), as children evaluate the correctness of their actions. A meta-analysis of forty-two studies indicated moderate relationships between guilt, pride, and “prosocial” and “antisocial” behaviors3 (Malti & Krettenauer, 2013). Normative sensitivity, in contrast, shows up in children’s protests about the violation of what they take to be norms of behavior – whether based on adults’ actions or directions or their own decisions (e.g., violating the rules of a board game; Göckeritz et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2011, 2016a). Crucially, children are enforcing a group’s norms rather than their personal wishes because they enforce norms that affect another person or game play, not just for their own benefit (Vaish et al., 2011). Tomasello

3

We have much more to say about the confusions and difficulties with “prosocial behavior” in Chapter 6, but we use the term in this chapter because it is the one that is commonly used in psychological research.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Preconditions for Moral Development

107

(2019) explained that “[n]orm enforcement is thus not a personal act, but a group-minded cultural act” (p. 257). Tomasello (2019) cites three elements that move children from conventional conformity to full-blown moral action. The first is the “normative sense of obligation” (p. 249) that emerges around the third birthday. He suggested a shift from simple “prosociality,” and interest in succeeding in joint tasks, to recognizing the intersubjective standards for how one should act and treat others. Three-year-olds recognize those standards, adhere to them, and protest their violation, but two-year-olds do not. Children internalize this cultural learning by mentally simulating the evaluation of potential courses of action and directing themselves to follow the norms. This increasingly internalized self-evaluation shifts children from simple conformity to moral concerns about the right and wrong ways to act. Second, when individuals jointly commit to a task, three-year-olds recognize an obligation for the partners to complete it (Gräfenhain et al., 2009, 2013). Joint commitments mean that each partner agrees to play her collaborative role to complete the activity, making the partners responsible to one another. Three-year-olds demonstrate a mutual responsibility in working for a partner’s reward even when they have already received their own reward (Hamann et al., 2012). They also act to overcome a partner’s errors or omissions (Gräfenhain et al., 2013). Third, at three years old, children give reasons for their actions, grounding their actions in their culture’s norms (Tomasello, 2019), although they do not differentiate better and worse reasons until age eight (Mercier et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2016b). Tomasello (2019) clarified that legitimizing reasons for actions are only intelligible and convincing if they are based on the common ground in the interlocutors’ cultural world. Some reason giving is, of course, simply ad hoc and strategic in convincing others to accept one’s actions. Frequently, however, the goal of reason giving is to demonstrate that one’s actions are appropriate considering the relevant shared standards and expectations. The rationales that “work” best are those to which others already adhere and have already acknowledged. That is, operative shared standards guide reason giving. Equal reward distribution for equal participation is one moral standard that children follow. When pairs of two- and three-year-old children collaborated equally to obtain rewards, but one child obtained three rewards the other child only obtained one, most three-year-olds shared the rewards to create a 2:2 split, but two-year-olds did not (Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2011).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

108

Moral Development and Virtue

Tomasello (2019) pointed out that norm sensitivity has both maturational and experiential elements. Maturationally, one cannot teach a one-year-old to understand normative rules. Through experiences of collaborative activity and teaching, three-year-olds learn the specific content of the group’s norms, but children are not taught the motivation to follow those norms. Ultimately, Tomasello (2019) argued that moral development culminates in a moral identity that ties the child’s self-understanding to her community’s norms and standards. As children learn to self-evaluate and self-regulate, they recognize their accountability to others and to intersubjective standards. They attend to community standards for evaluating their own and others’ actions in terms of rightness, not simply conformity. Turiel’s (1983) social-cognitive domain theory highlights children’s discrimination of moral questions (viewed as unchangeable standards about helping, justice, and rights) and questions of social conventions (viewed as changeable standards of attire, etiquette, social mores) by four years of age (Smetana & Breages, 1990). Although this theory has been widely critiqued (e.g., Shweder et al., 1997; Walker & Frimer, 2011), many studies corroborate that children readily distinguish between local, changeable conventions and broader moral standards (e.g., Killen et al., 2013; Lahat et al., 2012; Yau & Smetana, 2003). By three years of age, children appear to see moral standards as obligatory and binding, but conventional standards as only binding on group members. Therefore, children recognize the obligatory nature of moral standards as generally binding and therefore different to the conventions of their particular group. This literature on normative sensitivity suggests several hypotheses. We predict that virtue development will be positively associated with the following elements of normative sensitivity: hypothesis 4-9, normative sensitivity; hypothesis 4-10, recognition of mutual obligation toward completing joint tasks; hypothesis 4-11, reason giving for actions; and hypothesis 4-12, recognition of equal rewards principle. In summary, developmental research strongly supports moral development in general and documents many prerequisites of morality: self-awareness, self-evaluation, agency, collective identity, collective intentionality, intersubjectivity of norms, fairness, normative sensibility, and norm enforcement. This research generally focuses on aggregate assessments of children’s development at various ages rather than the development of virtues by the individual. Thus, it provides support for some prerequisites of virtue development, but little support for its key premises. Nevertheless, the research suggests that the fundamentals of virtue development are evident in children’s development.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Topics Can Explain Virtue Development?

109

What Specific Topics in Moral Development Can Explain Virtue Development? We now turn to how well specific topics in developmental research inform us about virtue development. Moral development theory and research can inform virtue development with its capacity for scalar measurement, its attention to behavior, and its foci on moral identity and moral emotions. However, virtue development theory also poses some important questions that can stimulate valuable research in moral development, the subject of the last section of the chapter. Scalar Assessment of Moral Development The first valuable contribution of moral development to virtue development is that moral psychologists have conscientiously rendered moral concepts measurable or scalar. Of course, qualitative and phenomenological elements of moral development are also illuminating, but the quantification of these concepts is widely seen as a necessary element of a science of moral development. All the concepts discussed in this chapter have quantitative measurement (which is standard in psychology), so this research is nominally consistent with the scalar view of virtues, but the systematic, quantitative study of virtue development has been lacking. A Focus on Behavior in Moral Development Because empirical research on moral development is located primarily within psychology, there is a strong and consistent focus on identifying and observing behavior. There is some degree of reliance on self-reports, but self-reports are usually focused on behavior. For example, researchers on prosocial behavior typically define it as “voluntary behavior intended to benefit another” (Eisenberg et al., 2015, p. 610). Two general results of prosocial research are that other-benefiting behavior is observable in children long before they could have been taught prosocial values and that children do not act solely in selfish ways prior to explicit moral instruction (Turiel, 2006). Prosocial behavior in reaction to another person’s affect becomes fully evident in the second year of life (Knafo et al., 2008; Liew et al., 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2008), with expressions of sorrow, comforting, helping, or sharing (Brownell et al., 2013; Svetlova et al., 2010; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). These and other prosocial behaviors increase further between two and four

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

110

Moral Development and Virtue

years of age (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013). When an inference is necessary to enable prosocial behavior (giving a blanket when someone is cold), ­eighteen-month-olds need guidance more than two-year-olds do (Brownell et al., 2009, 2013; Svetlova et al., 2010). There appears to be a steady increase in prosocial understanding and behavior from toddlerhood through adolescence (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998), and prosocial behavior based on reflective and abstract cognition appears around age twelve and increases into adulthood (Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2005, 2013). Several studies have indicated that prosocial behavior is related to other-oriented values and social responsibility among preschool children (Cornell & Frick, 2007), adolescents (Silfver et al., 2008), and emerging adults (Barry & Wentzel, 2006). There is evidence that reasons guide children’s prosocial behavior because they are selective in how they engage in it. For example, toddlers respond more to adult needs than to peers’ needs (Nichols et al., 2009). Children attend more to actual harms than to nonharmful occurrences (Hepach et al., 2012; Vaish et al., 2009) and are more helpful to in-group rather than out-group members (Weller & Lagattuta, 2013). Prosocial behavior research can be interpreted through a causal lens, as Eisenberg and colleagues (2015) exemplify by focusing on causal influences on its occurrence (e.g., biological differences, socialization, individuals’ socialcognitive and dispositional characteristics, temporary affective states, parenting, etc.). Yet causal accounts raise questions about the degree to which the behavior is moral, or about what is meant by “moral” because if a behavior is caused rather than chosen, its standing as a moral behavior is unclear. Researchers favoring a causal explanation tend to focus on aggregate results and lean toward studies designed to support lawlike generalizations consistent with causal accounts, rather than research that can reveal agency. These tendencies run contrary to a virtue perspective, wherein agency is central to virtuous actions. We do recognize that there are causal factors in human behavior, but our virtue perspective suggests that individuals can choose how to respond to those causal factors. By our lights, to the degree that behavior is due to causes unrelated to volition, it would not be considered a virtuous action. In contrast, the neo-Aristotelian focus on agency clearly places intentional other-benefit in the moral domain. Many moral development studies have revealed, in many ways, that young children seem to develop sophisticated understandings of fairness, cooperation, and helping very early. As early as six months of age, children behaviorally prefer those who are fair and helpful, and do not prefer those who harm others (Hamlin, 2013), and sixteen-month-olds demonstrate

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Topics Can Explain Virtue Development?

111

more interest in fair than unfair actors (Geraci & Surian, 2011). Children under six appear to recognize the importance of equal resource distribution (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Warneken et al., 2011). Vaish and colleagues (2011) found that three-year-olds protested harmful action by one puppet toward another. Children also favor preferential distributions for friends (Moore, 2009; Olson & Spelke, 2008) and in-group members (Moore, 2009; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Plötner et al., 2015). There is a shift from equal distribution to greater consideration of merit, need, and other morally relevant factors from five years of age onward (Almås et al., 2010; Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & Olson, 2012). The early emergence of behaviors related to fairness is an important aspect of moral development, which suggests that some broad, systematic moral considerations (e.g., equality, deservingness, in-group membership) seem to guide young children’s behavior.4 Spontaneous cooperation, helpfulness, and the maintenance of cooperation with adults increases from twelve months of age onward (Brownell et al., 2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009; Warneken et al., 2006). By thirty months old, children will even pay a high cost to help others (Svetlova et al., 2010). This helping appears to be self-motivating, as young children help when no one seems to be watching (Warneken & Tomasello, 2013) or when the person being helped does not know about the help (Hepach et al., 2017; Warneken, 2013). A key feature of cooperation and helping is understanding another person’s intentions, thoughts, and beliefs, which is usually referred to as mentalizing or theory of mind. Smooth collaboration is made possible by recognizing and responding to one another’s states of mind. Intention recognition has been well documented in six- and nine-month-olds (Behne et al., 2005; Csibra et al., 2003; Daum & Gredebäck, 2011), before the infant can even conduct the intentional behavior the adult is enacting (Csibra et al., 2003; Gergely et al., 2002). That is, young children can see a situation from multiple perspectives (Martin & Gillespie, 2010), which is facilitated by many “games” characterized by repetitive and perspective-switching activities (e.g., peekaboo, hide and seek). Perspective switching is foundational for moral development, as we discussed in the section on “Collective Intentionality.” As children mature, they make more nuanced moral judgments, taking the actor’s beliefs and intentions into account (Decety et al., 2012; Lagattuta, 2005). 4

We recognize that in-group favoritism has many dubious results, and we do not endorse those, but consideration of the morality of in-group favoritism is beyond the scope of this book.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

112

Moral Development and Virtue

In summary, the research on children’s interest in fairness and cooperation clarifies an important goal they are motivated to achieve. Even young children go to some lengths to establish and maintain fairness and to sanction unfairness. Their strong protests against unfair or harmful behaviors clarify their typical emotional investment in fairness. These findings suggest that research on moral behavior development is consistent with virtue development. We note, however, that it focuses on developmental milestones and aggregate analyses. Understanding virtuous behavior requires research focused on the development of within-person stability in that behavior. This brings us to the consideration of whether moral development may involve traits. Traits in Moral Development Although individual differences and particularly trait development have been relatively neglected in moral development research, three lines of research can be informative: moral identity, moral emotions, and moral exemplars research. Interestingly, in the limited research on trait-related behavior, two longitudinal studies did find temporal stability in prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2013). Moral Identity Moral identity research is a relevant and productive domain of moral development from a virtue development perspective. Moral identity is understood as a stable personal commitment to acting ethically that is central to one’s identity (Hart et al., 1998). Aquino and colleagues (2009) defined moral identity as a cognitive schema “consisting of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts” (p. 124) that is positively associated with acting morally. It is an individual difference variable that implies automaticity, and schemata can be seen as relatively stable social-cognitive processes (discussed in Chapter 5). Greater activation of a moral identity schema can be due to priming, temperament, or chosen acts of self-definition. Priming morality tends to accentuate moral behavior even among those high in moral identity (Aquino et al., 2009). Moral identity is relevant to virtue development both because of its presumed developmental trajectory and because it is an individual difference variable wherein excellence can be identified (although this focus is rare). Moral identity development involves the commitment to moral behavior, which becomes stronger, more internalized, more agentic, and more unified over time (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). A well-developed moral identity

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Topics Can Explain Virtue Development?

113

motivates moral action because an individual has chosen and accepted ownership of her moral commitments. This harmony between desire and moral commitments is also characteristic of virtue. In Hertz and Krettenauer’s (2016) meta-analysis of seventy-seven studies (participants aged twelve and up), moral identity was mildly to moderately related to moral behavior. They concluded, however, that “[m]oral identity, thus, does not appear to be an extraordinarily strong predictor of moral behavior” (p. 135). They went on to state that “there is no reason to prioritize the moral identity construct as a predictor of moral action at the expense of other factors. Instead, it seems more appropriate to consider moral identity in a broader conceptual framework where it interacts with other personological and situational factors to bring about moral action” (p. 136). Moral identity is generally thought to develop in young adulthood (Blasi & Glodis, 1995), but some have argued for its emergence in adolescence (Kingsford et al., 2018). Krettenauer and Hertz (2015) noted, however, that moral identity development has not frequently been studied directly, and the cross-sectional and longitudinal studies that do exist have failed to find the expected positive correlation between age and moral identity (Hardy et al., 2012, 2014; Krettenauer, 2011; Krettenauer & Casey, 2015; Pratt et al., 2003). Moreover, because moral identity is generally thought to develop at the earliest in adolescence (Kingsford et al., 2018), it cannot explain children’s moral actions. Despite the overlap in moral identity and virtue, the empirical moral identity literature is only patchily informative regarding how virtue develops. The moral identity perspective also suggests that moral commitments or values are central aspects of identity (Hardy et al., 2014). Despite the importance of this premise, very little research has been conducted on how moral values are formed developmentally (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015), but we summarize what is available here. In one study, Pratt et al. (2003) reported that involvement in community activities and an authoritative parenting style promoted prosocial values in late adolescents. These authors suggested that these effects were due to role modeling, as there were similarities in the adolescents’ and parents’ moral ideals. Similarly, Hardy and colleagues (2014) found that adolescents’ endorsement of moral ideals was concurrently correlated with parents’ reports of aggression, altruism, and environmentalism. The concepts of moral intentionality and intrinsic motivation are key to moral identity, and existing theory and research have a direct bearing on their development. For example, social standards are widely seen as internalized by children (Tomasello, 2019). This internalization is very

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

114

Moral Development and Virtue

important from both moral identity and virtue perspectives. Csibra and Gergeley (2009) discussed a natural pedagogy in which children are evolutionarily prepared to be taught normative standards by adults. From three years old onward, children generalize what they are taught because they interpret the teaching to be reliable and important (Butler & Tomasello, 2016). Researchers also reported that three-year-olds engage in teaching generic rules about object use and normative standards, using phrases such as “these things go there!” (Göckeritz et al., 2014; Köymen et al., 2014). Hart and Fegley (1995) reported that a group of inner-city adolescents who volunteered extensively differed from a matched control group in seeing their moral aims as central to their identity, with a much closer relationship between their actual and ideal selves. These authors found that their participants’ aims were deeply integrated into their identities and that participants pursued these aims wholeheartedly and gladly. Both Barkley (2012) and Tomasello (2019) argued that the ability to teach others also allows children to direct themselves to act appropriately. At first, children engage in overt speech to self-direct, but by five or six, they have mostly internalized this speech (Winsler, 2009). This internalization of teaching and self-direction follows from the role reversal children learn through games and joint activities (Martin & Gillespie, 2010; Tomasello, 2019). The child applies the capacity to guide others’ actions to herself through the intersubjective perspective. Tomasello (2019) concluded that “children’s internalizations of adult pedagogical interactions … constitutes a form of normative self-regulation in which children begin to evaluate whether their decisions are good and their knowledge is valid, using as points of comparison the normative standards of rational action … from their cultural group” (p. 159). As early as three years old, children can explicitly state the intersubjective standard that guides their actions. This allows them to give mutually acceptable reasons for their actions. Although children (and some adults) cannot necessarily articulate the rationale for those standards beyond conventional justifications (e.g., that’s the way we do it), they understand and generally follow those expectations. Self-Determination Theory (SDT) has been a rich source of theory and research on value internalization. SDT suggests that “people are inherently prone toward psychological growth and integration” and that intrinsic motivation leads to higher achievement, whereas attempting to “control achievement outcomes directly through extrinsic rewards … generally backfires, leading to lower-quality motivation and performance” (Ryan & Deci, 2020, pp. 1–2). In SDT, intrinsic motivation pertains to engaging in actions for their own sake, such as play, exploration, and curiosity-induced

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Topics Can Explain Virtue Development?

115

activities. Extrinsic motivation, in contrast, is engaged in for reasons other than the satisfaction inherent in the activity (e.g., rewards, sanctions, others’ expectations). SDT researchers have conducted scores of experimental and observational studies documenting intrinsic motivation and that the introduction of external rewards to accompany inherently satisfying activity tends to reduce motivation and persistence in both children and college students (Deci et al., 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2020). SDT theorists also emphasize the element of choice; individuals are more intrinsically motivated and have better outcomes when they experience ownership of their motivations and actions (Patall et al., 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2020). Although SDT is not universally accepted, intrinsic motivation for activities related to learning and growth and the importance of agency in those activities are well documented. These premises are consistent with other research discussed in this chapter that corroborated the roles of internalizing social norms, ownership of actions, and self-directed action (Barkley, 2012; Kochanska, 2002a, 2002b). As we argue in Chapter 11, our neo-Aristotelian account of intrinsic motivation differs from the SDT version, but those differences need not concern us here. It is sufficient to recognize that the importance of agency and intrinsic motivation in moral development have ample support. These forays into moral identity and value commitments among children and adolescents suggest its promise for future research, but our knowledge remains spotty, and research is generally conducted at a single timepoint. The research up to this point leaves the developmental sequence and the person-level development of moral identity opaque. Moral Emotions Moral emotions such as guilt and pride also have a developmental trajectory. For example, Orth and colleagues (2010) studied moral emotions cross-sectionally (participants aged thirteen to eighty-nine) and found that guilt about immoral actions and pride about moral actions increased with age. In addition, one longitudinal study found that moral emotions among adolescents were negatively related to antisocial behavior in adulthood (Krettenauer et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a meta-analytic study of moral emotion found no age difference in moral emotions but did find that the ability to forecast emotional responses to one’s behavior positively related to age (Malti & Krettenauer, 2013). For example, Nunner-Winkler (2009) reported that anticipating negative moral emotions (e.g., guilt) increased from ages four to twenty-three when individuals act immorally. Krettenauer and colleagues (2014) found that anticipating positive moral

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

116

Moral Development and Virtue

emotions (e.g., pride) when acting prosocially increased from ages fifteen to twenty-one. As people mature, they get better at predicting how they will feel about their behavior. Research suggests children experience pride when they meet the social standards they have internalized and guilt when they fall short (Tracy et al., 2010). These emotions are normative for children, and typically developing children tend to follow rules spontaneously, even when they are not being observed (Kochanska et al., 2002; Tomasello, 2019). These emotions seem to gain strength into young adulthood (Krettenauer et al., 2014; Nunner-Winkler, 2009; Orth et al., 2010). Yet we know relatively little about the development of emotional concordance with moral decisions and actions, which is the primary question about moral emotion for virtue theorists and researchers. Despite the mixed results of moral emotion research, it is generally consistent with a virtue development process. There is some evidence for individual differences and a strengthening of moral emotions over time, but the kind of longitudinal intraindividual consistency and development that is central to virtue development is less well documented. Moral Exemplars Some research has been conducted on moral exemplars: those who have demonstrated exemplary moral actions (e.g., Dunlop et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2010). In adolescents, Reimer and Reimer (2015) found that exemplars’ self-descriptions had greater coherence than a matched comparison sample did, indicating a greater sense of agency and integration of goals and values. Most moral exemplar research has not had a developmental focus and has been conducted with adults, however, so its contribution to understanding virtue development is limited. A neo-Aristotelian perspective predicts that when people observe moral exemplars, it can enhance virtue development (hypothesis 4-13). Moral exemplar research suggests that internalization can progress so far that exemplars experience less conflict between egocentric and ­group-centered motivations and actions than people on average, although this has only been documented among adults (e.g., Dunlop et al., 2013). The integration of self-interested and other-interested values is thought to develop in young adulthood, but this premise has only indirect ­support. This integration is deeply interesting to virtue theorists and researchers because the presence of an unconflicted interest in others’ welfare is a signature feature of virtue. The development of this integration is likely another contributor to virtue development (hypothesis 4-14).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Topics Can Explain Virtue Development?

117

Character Strength Development Research on the development of character strengths has barely begun. There is some literature on the development of virtue, but the studies are somewhat scattered. For example, Shubert and colleagues (2021) conducted a six-month longitudinal study in which they found that adolescents’ inhibitory self-control was related to patience as a virtue. One important result was that anger and sadness regulation were related to patience differently, with anger predicting patience and patience predicting sadness regulation. Tudge and colleagues (2018) studied the virtue of gratitude with seven- to fourteen-year-olds in seven countries. They found age-related differences, especially that younger children express gratitude more concretely, whereas thirteen- to fourteen-year-old children were more likely to express gratitude in a way that took the benefactor’s desires and interests into account. In another study, Thoma and colleagues (2019) examined similarities and differences in how adolescents reasoned about three virtue-focused dilemmas. They found that adolescents in the USA, UK, Macedonia, Taiwan, and Mexico generally reasoned in similar ways, with a clear age trend favoring older adolescents. The primary cultural difference emerged in that participants in Taiwan and Mexico were better able to respond with honesty, even if there was some cost to a friend, whereas the other three groups favored the friend over the honesty response. Reimer and colleagues (2009) identified four strengths that increased from grade nine to grade twelve (caring/dependable, principled/ idealistic, fair, and honest). The caring/dependable and principled/idealistic traits were also related to volunteer activity in their study. A science of virtue would encourage more person-centered research on the degree to which such moral development involves cultivating stable moral traits. This leads to hypothesis 4-15: that specific virtues will increase in strength among some individuals over time. The VIA-Youth form (Park & Peterson, 2006) has been the focus in several studies on adolescents. Readers will recall that the VIA is the selfreport measure of virtues created in the early days of positive psychology (McGrath, 2015; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; see also Chapter 3). Overall, the VIA-Youth character strengths remain largely stable through adolescence (Brown et al., 2020; Shubert et al., 2019), but there is evidence that some strengths (e.g., leadership, justice) were higher in older adolescents (Ferragut et al., 2014; Weber et al., 2013). Soshani and Slone (2014) found that temperance and transcendence strengths were associated with adjustment to school among adolescents, as were life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect. In their original psychometric study of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

118

Moral Development and Virtue

VIA-Youth, Park and Peterson (2006) found positive links between four strengths (hope, love, gratitude, and zest) and life satisfaction. Toner and colleagues (2012) reported that hope, optimism, and future-mindedness were associated with two happiness measures. Most of the VIA-Youth research has been cross-sectional, but one longitudinal study indicated that the strength of temperance negatively predicted depression, whereas the strength of leadership positively predicted depression over a one-year period (Gillham et al., 2011). These authors also reported that temperance, transcendence, other directedness, and intellectual strengths positively predicted life satisfaction. The direction of prediction was strengthened by showing that well-being measures did not predict any of the character strengths over time. Wang and colleagues (2015) found that participants in scouting programs showed relative increases in many strengths (e.g., obedience, cheerfulness, kindness) over a thirty-month period. The idea of virtue acquisition parallels Bargh and colleagues’ (2001) description of a goal-dependent automaticity process. Automaticity was initially conceptualized as being entirely absent in controllability, intention, awareness, and focused attention. Yet two decades ago it was made clear that “a process can have some qualities of an automatic process (e.g., efficient, autonomous), while simultaneously having qualities of a controlled process as well” (Bargh, 1994, p. 3). A person can pursue a goal to become a kinder person by observing examples and practicing kindness when opportunities arise. In this way, one may be able to activate any operational goal in relevant circumstances, because it is chronically accessible. It is not mindless. We hypothesize that this activation is intentionally chosen (hypothesis 4-16), and it can be intelligently and flexibly enacted. Kindness takes different forms across varying circumstances. The more one practices kindness or any other virtuous action, the more automatic they are likely to become. Kim and Enright (2016) may be right that the more one practices a virtue such as kindness, the more different situations arise in which one is able to practice kindness. This can be formulated as a general hypothesis (4-17): that increased practice of a virtue leads to it being practiced in more diverse situations. On this view, if one habitually acts kindly, then one is more likely to develop the virtue of kindness. This is the hypothesized pathway to virtue through habitual action. The development of personality traits (e.g., Conscientiousness, Agreeableness) over time has recently become an important topic as ­scholars have begun to integrate the personality and development domains (Baumert et al., 2017). We discuss personality change in Chapter 5.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Fruitful Questions Raised by Virtue Theory

119

Fruitful Questions Raised by Virtue Theory about Moral Development Virtue theory can contribute to moral development in at least five domains. First, virtue theory encourages the person-centered developmental study of moral traits. Although longitudinal research on moral behavioral consistency is infrequently conducted, Eisenberg and her colleagues (1999) found that spontaneous moral behaviors observed in four-year-olds predicted prosocial behavior in early adulthood. In addition, Eisenberg and colleagues (1995) found consistency in prosocial behavior, empathy, and perspective taking from ages thirteen to eighteen. These studies only included aggregate analyses rather than person-centered analyses, but they indicate tantalizing consistency over long periods. Since virtues can be assessed as scalar dimensions, they can be assessed over time, potentially shedding light on a developmental virtue-acquisition process. This development must be based on the building blocks of moral development discussed in this chapter, such as agency, moral emotions, and collective identity and intentionality. We hypothesize (4-18) that through development and practice, the rudiments of virtue can develop into more reliable behaviors, knowledge, well-defined motivations, and a disposition to act morally. Developmental research on virtues has generally followed the predictions of hypotheses 4-16 to 4-18 and these predictions have been partially confirmed. These are extremely broad hypotheses that require many studies to assess, so we are not even close to confirming or refuting them. It is worth noting that some (e.g., Soto & Tackett, 2015) see the physiological and psychosocial processes associated with adolescents as potential disruptors of developmental capacities. The jury remains out on the positive or disrupted development of virtue in adolescence. Second, as we discuss in Chapter 8, our model of virtue emphasizes hypotheses 8-2 to 8-8: that individuals’ adoption of specific roles are likely to influence virtue expression. Developmentally, this raises the question about whether children’s and adolescents’ role-related activity (e.g., family relationships, volunteer activity, team membership) could facilitate virtue development, which could add to our knowledge. This possibility has not been widely or systematically investigated and examining how social roles influence moral and virtue development could be informative. Therefore, hypothesis 4-19 is that children’s role adoption influences virtue development. Third, there has been minimal research on how situations affect moral development because the focus tends to be on identifying and mapping

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

120

Moral Development and Virtue

developmental milestones in aggregate analyses. This is another area where virtue development questions may prompt new research. Therefore, hypothesis 8-1 is that the situational and role context (e.g., parenting) influences virtue development. Fourth, there has been relatively little study of eudaimonia in development. Most studies focus on the eudaimonic well-being of college undergraduates or adults (Kiang & Ip, 2018), and we are aware of only one study of eudaimonia as a developmental process. Kiang and Ip (2018) found a moderate degree of stability in eudaimonic well-being among Asian American adolescents across four years. Therefore, virtue science will likely be enhanced by research on eudaimonia or flourishing among pre-adult populations. Finally, the concept of practical wisdom has not been studied developmentally, despite the fact that thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Confucius, and Kant argued that practical wisdom is vital to moral action. Of course, these thinkers did not describe its development, suggesting only that individuals learn practical wisdom from exemplars and through practice. There is a growing psychological literature on wisdom as a general capacity, with some recent focus on practical wisdom (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Grossman et al., 2020; Kristjánsson et al., 2021). This literature has focused primarily on wisdom in adulthood, but some research exists on what can be seen as the precursors of wisdom at earlier ages. Developmental researchers have focused on concepts related to practical wisdom, such as executive functions, emotional intelligence, metacognition, and expertise. Some insights may be gleaned from these areas for practical wisdom development. Among the many accounts of wisdom in adulthood, a recent model was developed by many researchers pooling their views and has been called the “common model” (Grossman et al., 2020). This model emphasizes metacognition (thinking about thinking) and moral aspirations, both of which have their beginnings in childhood. We have already discussed the development of metacognition in terms of the self-directed external and internal speech involved in executive functioning (Barkley, 2012), committed compliance (Kochanska, 2002a), and perspective taking (Martin & Gillespie, 2010; Tomasello, 2019). The field of metacognitive development is large, and we cannot review it at length here. Suffice it to say that the ability to reflect on and direct one’s own thoughts develops throughout childhood but does not become fully mature until young adulthood (Green et al., 1996). Moral aspirations seem to begin with some basic intuitions about fairness and helping (Tomasello, 2019) and progress to willingly and actively incorporating community expectations about behavior (Fernyhough,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Fruitful Questions Raised by Virtue Theory

121

2010; Kochanska, 2002a). Children’s understanding of moral actions and aspirations becomes gradually more sophisticated over time (Tomasello, 2019). There are also notable individual differences in how important moral considerations are and in how assiduously people adhere to moral concerns (Hardy et al., 2014). One of the key elements of most formulations of mature wisdom is the recognition that there are moral considerations one may not fully know. This prompts metacognitive reflection, perspective taking, and consultation with others. As Grossman et al. (2020) put it, “by adolescence and emerging adulthood, people have become autobiographical authors, with organized recollections of the past that give rise to a sense of personal identity” (p. 113). These autobiographical processes include reflectivity, perspective taking, and recognizing others’ concerns as legitimate. Although the development of wisdom is an important concept, present in much educational programming (e.g., projectwisdom.com), we know remarkably little about the developmental sequences involved or in the degree to which training programs can enhance wisdom development (Grossman et al., 2020). Cross-sectional studies indicate that adolescents exhibit varying degrees of moral judgment, with better recognition of the best action than of the justification for that action (Thoma et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2017). Darnell and colleagues (2022) conducted a suggestive cross-sectional study of practical wisdom among late adolescents and young adults and found that practical wisdom emerges as a second-order factor comprising moral emotion, moral identity, virtue identification (how correctly participants could identify virtues called for in a vignette), and virtue relevance (how well participants could identify how relevant virtues were in a vignette). The second-order factor structure was very similar among adolescents and young adults. These studies represent a bare beginning to studying the development of practical wisdom. The research on moral emotions, moral identity, and moral judgment among children and adolescents suggests that the components of practical wisdom develop through time, and theory indicates that the capacity for practical wisdom only begins to cohere in late adolescence, likely not becoming fully available until the late twenties. Although several elements of practical wisdom have been studied, our portrayal of practical wisdom development remains largely conjectural as measurement in this domain is quite provisional and no high-quality longitudinal studies of practical wisdom have been conducted to date. Much more extensive research is required for an adequate account of this important capacity. Therefore, hypothesis 4-18 suggests that virtues, including practical wisdom, develop over time within individuals.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

122

Moral Development and Virtue

Summary Although moral development research has been ongoing for decades (Killen & Smetana, 2015), researchers have rarely addressed the development of virtues directly. Moral development researchers have focused on four elements that can be considered prerequisites of virtue: agency, collective identity, collective intentionality, and interest in normativity. There is a substantial and persuasive case for agency as a normally developing feature of humans, although this evidence may not convince committed deterministic thinkers. Developmental science demonstrates that children are profoundly embedded in relationships and groups, which are dependent on this social matrix for individual and collective identity and for the cooperation necessary for survival. These strong social ties give children and adults powerful reasons to be interested in others’ and the group’s welfare. Children are also deeply interested in following normative standards. They engage in high-fidelity imitation, protest violations of social expectations, recognize shared obligations to complete a task, and typically follow group rules. This interest in normativity contributes to group-minded actions that are common among three-year-olds, but not typical among two-year-olds. These research domains do not offer direct support for the presence of virtues, but they support moral development generally and the possibility of virtues specifically. Collective identity and collective intentionality appear in normally developing children, but they tell us relatively little about what excellence in moral action looks like developmentally. The evidence for intrinsic motivation suggests that the strongest motivations are based on choice and seeing the inherent value of the activity. Contemporary moral development research on moral exemplars provides another potential avenue for expanding our knowledge on excellence in motivation, but only one single-timepoint study has been conducted with nonadult moral exemplars to date (Reimer & Reimer, 2015). In Chapter 1, we suggested that a primary source for the kind of emotional concordance that partly constitutes virtuous behavior is a matter of loving what is good. This recognition of what is good inspires a spontaneous desire to bring that goodness into the world. Therefore, there is a developmental question of great interest regarding the degree to which children can perceive human goods and act in the service of those goods. We therefore suggest hypotheses 4-20 (that children over six can perceive human goods) and 4-21 (that children over six can act in the service of the goods they perceive). We suggest that the development of a love for what

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

123

is good begins in childhood. If people can perceive what is good and act to bring it about, this is surely a developmental accomplishment. Quantitative research on moral development is congenial to a ­neo-Aristotelian perspective, as is the emphasis on behavior. Moral identity and moral emotion research have some bearing on virtue traits, but a clear and documented developmental sequence has not been established. There is virtually no research available on excellent moral identity or moral emotion in children or adolescents. A virtue science perspective suggests several ways to expand moral development research, including research on how social roles affect moral development, on children’s and adolescents’ value commitments and how they form, on eudaimonia or flourishing among children and adolescents, and on the development of practical wisdom or judgment. Although limited research has been conducted on these themes, the available studies provide encouragement for more research. Moral developmental research offers many useful concepts, measures, and paradigms for the study of virtue development, as well as clear support for virtue prerequisites among children. Virtue development research has much to offer the broader field in its interest in within-person research, traits, social roles, the interaction of traits and situational factors, strong commitment to values, flourishing, intrinsic motivation, virtue cognition, and practical wisdom. Attention to these topics can significantly enrich the field of moral development.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 5

Personality and Virtue

Many psychologists ask the reasonable question about how virtues and personality psychology are related. This question has become more pressing and salient over the past several decades as psychological scientists have begun to more commonly study the virtues, after the long period of neglect that lasted through most of the twentieth century. In this chapter, we follow Baumert and colleagues (2017), who noted that “[t]heory and research on personality and individual differences can be grouped roughly according to their main foci on (i) structures of inter-individual differences, (ii) intra-individual processes that guide behaviour, and (iii) development” (p. 503). Personality development deals with the longitudinal stability and systematic change in personality over time. Accordingly, we briefly recount the two most general approaches to personality as structural dimensions – Big 5 and HEXACO (Humility, Extraversion, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience) – the most common approach to (i), and as social-cognitive processes (Cognitive-Affective Processing System or CAPS), the most common approach to (ii). Cervone and Tripathi (2009) called approach (i) “personality structure” (p. 32), which frequently relies on factor analytic studies that illuminate between-person differences. They called approach (ii) “personality architecture” (p. 33), which focuses on within-person social-cognitive processes such as schemata, beliefs, and appraisals. The tension between structural and process approaches to personality has a long history, but some personality psychologists have attempted to integrate various combinations of structural dimensions and socialcognitive processes. Therefore, we examine two integrative theories (Whole Trait Theory [WTT] and the Three-Tiered Framework of Personality [TTFP]). There are many accounts of personality, but we have limited the scope of this discussion to a relatively small number of perspectives to provide sufficient depth within a single chapter. 124

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

To What Degree Are Virtues Distinct from Personality?

125

We welcome explorations of the relationships between the personality theories and virtues that we do not discuss. The purpose of this chapter is to examine what personality theory and research can tell us about the study of virtue. To anticipate our conclusion, we argue that, although there is some overlap between personality and virtue (e.g., Agreeableness, Honesty-humility, situational responsiveness, and goals), personality theory and research do not sufficiently encompass the features of virtue described in Chapter 1. This suggests that virtues may not be subsumable in personality theory, or, at a minimum, that personality theory must be substantially expanded to include virtue. We note that some empirical studies of the overlap between personality and virtue measures suggest the substantial independence of personality and virtue. We discuss this research more fully in Chapter 11, and this chapter focuses on the conceptual overlap of virtue and personality. We begin by discussing possible distinctions between personality and virtue.

To What Degree Are Virtues Distinct from Personality? Opinions on how the two topics are related vary widely. After an initial period of interest in character and virtue early in the history of psychology, Allport (1937) encouraged psychologists to abandon character and virtue. This was the dominant viewpoint during the twentieth century. Interest in virtue has grown dramatically in the twenty-first century, and Jayawickreme and colleagues (2014) commented that “we see no reason a priori to think that virtue traits would not share many of the same properties as other personality traits” (p. 290). McGrath and colleagues (2017) added that “character as a set of attributes of the individual represents a component of the broader concept personality,” but they clarified that “the concept of character has moral and social implications not inherent in the concept of personality” (p. 1). Peterson and Seligman (2004) similarly expressed the belief that research on virtues will likely indicate that “they are consistent with the Big 5 tradition” (p. 69), but these authors also noted that, in contrast to personality traits, virtues are intentionally cultivated because they contribute to one’s life plan. McAdams (2015) stated that personality and virtues both focus on individual differences, but that virtues emphasize the actor’s choices and must be cultivated, whereas choice and cultivation are deemphasized in personality psychology. Wright and colleagues (2021) clarified that “by ‘character,’ we mean the integration of a constellation of virtues within personality” (p. 8), thereby locating character and virtues within personality. Clearly, opinions vary widely about the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

126

Personality and Virtue

virtue–personality relationship, but no one argues that they are unrelated. In our view, there are two grounds for thinking that virtue and personality are distinct: conceptual argument and empirical evidence. Conceptually, we suggest that there are at least four important reasons suggesting the distinctness of virtues and personality, which are also discussed in Chapter 1. First, virtues have, from Aristotle’s (1999) time, been theorized to require agency. Many contemporary theorists recognize that characteristics count as virtues only if they have been chosen by an agent (e.g., McAdams, 2015; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Wright et al., 2021). Second, enacting virtue is an agentic process because virtues are characteristic ways of responding that, on some views, must be intentionally cultivated. Although developmental change has been evidenced in personality dimensions (more on this later), intentional change is optional for personality traits but essential to virtue trait development on many views. Third, virtues explicitly relate to moral behavior and personality theories are generally equivocal about whether trait-based behavior is moral. Although relationships between personality and moral behavior have been identified, none of these theories take the explanation of moral behavior as a primary aim. Finally, neo-Aristotelian accounts of virtue require practical wisdom because it is necessary to decide which virtue(s) are appropriate to a given situation, and what would constitute virtuous action in the pursuit of worthwhile aims. Although psychologists have theorized domains of cognition that have deliberative and decision-making functions (e.g., executive functions, metacognition), no psychologically theorized cognitive function can account for the functions of practical wisdom (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022). These four conceptual reasons clarify that attempting to subsume virtues in personality theory may be ill-advised unless and until personality theory can fully account for these four central functions of virtues. Of course, these arguments must also be assessed empirically, suggesting many hypotheses. Overall, to what degree can moral action be teased apart from behavior that emanates from personality structure (hypothesis 5-1) and process (hypothesis 5-2)? One avenue for resolving this question is through examining the incremental validity of virtue vis-à-vis personality. That is, can virtues explain various criteria above and beyond what personality can explain? The subsumption of virtues into personality psychology remains an unsettled question, but, as we discuss in Chapter 11, the evidence suggests that virtue assessments complement what personality dimensions can tell us. Some additional questions also suggest themselves. Can agency be documented in the cultivation of virtues (hypothesis 5-3)? Can the functions of practical wisdom be documented (hypothesis 11-12)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Personality Structure

127

and are they necessary for virtuous action (hypothesis 11-19)? We discuss the limited affirmative evidence for these questions in Chapters 7–11. We now turn to a description of the “structural” or dimensional approach to personality. This is most commonly exemplified by the Big 5 and HEXACO traditions.

Personality Structure The best-known approach to personality is the Big 5 trait model, with the traits of Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (McCrae & John, 1992). One response to the development of the Big 5 was research that identified a sixth ­factor, called Honesty-Humility and the HEXACO model (Ashton et al., 2014). The Big 5 The Big 5 developed over many decades, beginning with the lexical hypothesis that “most of the socially relevant and salient personality characteristics have become encoded in the natural language” (John et al., 2008, p. 117). John and his colleagues described an iterative process of research and conceptualization that organized a large array of personality variables into the widely recognized Big 5 model. As Costa and McCrae (2008) stated, “it began to become clear in the 1980s that five factors were necessary and more or less sufficient to encompass the trait-descriptive terms in natural languages” (p. 224). This research largely consisted of singletimepoint, factor analytic studies that identify between-person differences in self-reported trait descriptions. The development of the Big 5 was atheoretical, and most scholars see personality dimensions as descriptive rather than explanatory. Several research measures of the Big 5 produce minor variations in the results, but John and colleagues (2008) suggested that the NEO questionnaires are the best validated measures. The statuses of the Big 5 and the NEO measures have not changed substantially since he made that claim. The factor structure of the Big 5 has been replicated in dozens of studies (Costa & McCrae, 2008) and has shown temporal stability (Gosling et al., 2003). The Big 5 dimensions have been linked to many outcomes, including relationship satisfaction (O’Meara & South, 2019), well-being (Duckworth et al., 2012), and education (Noftle & Robins, 2007). Although most Big 5 research involves self-reporting, self-reported and other informants’ reports of personality correlate substantially

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

128

Personality and Virtue

(Costa & McCrae, 2008). There is also evidence that the Big 5 has validity across cultural groups (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Importantly, personality psychologists do not posit traits or dimensions that are invariant across situations. As John and colleagues (2008) put it over a decade ago, “personality traits are important because they influence the way individuals interact with particular environments” (p. 141). The dominant current view is that behavior results from interactions of personality and environment (Webster, 2009). The distinctions between personality and virtues are complicated because some have argued that virtues are parts of personality (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Wright et al., 2021). In addition, there is a longstanding recognition that Agreeableness (A) and Conscientiousness (C) are clearly related to traditional virtue terms. As McCrae and John (1992) put it: “Like A, C is a highly evaluated dimension: indeed, A and C are the classic dimensions of character describing ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ and ‘strong-willed’ versus ‘weak-willed’ individuals. Perhaps it was these moral overtones that often led scientific psychologists to ignore these factors, but in fact, both represent objectively observable dimensions of individual differences” (p. 197, emphasis added). Although agreement about the facets of the Big 5 traits is less than perfect, one well-known inventory (NEO-PR-3; Costa & McCrae, 2010) includes six facets for each trait. For example, the facets of Agreeableness in this inventory are labeled Trust, Straightforwardness, Altruism, Compliance, Modesty, and Tender-Mindedness. Clearly, these facet terms are related to morality and virtue. The dimension of Conscientiousness also has six facets: Competence, Order, Dutifulness, Achievement Striving, SelfDiscipline, and Deliberation, some with apparent links to moral and virtue terms. The debate about the place of moral questions in personality remains unresolved, however, and the HEXACO model has compounded that debate. HEXACO Ashton and Lee (2005) argued that the relatively weak loadings of the two facets of Straightforwardness and Modesty on the Agreeableness dimension indicated the presence of a sixth dimension, which they termed HonestyHumility. When they added this sixth factor, the underlying meaning of the Agreeableness and Neuroticism factors were altered somewhat, but Extraversion, Openness to Experience, and Conscientiousness remained largely unchanged. This six-factor solution resulted in the HEXACO

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Personality Structure

129

model of personality structure. The corresponding factors of the Big 5 and the HEXACO models correlated strongly (Ashton et al., 2014; Gaughan et al., 2012). The HEXACO model has also been replicated across cultures (Ashton et al., 2014; Thielmann et al., 2020). There is evidence that HEXACO measures have incremental validity vis-à-vis the Big 5 for some outcomes, such as psychopathic traits (Gaughan et al., 2012), risk-taking (Weller & Thulin, 2012), and desire for power (Lee et al., 2013). Of interest to virtue researchers, the Honesty-Humility dimension is negatively correlated with exploitiveness, noncooperation, and cheating (Hilbig et al., 2012; Zettler et al., 2013). Although the comprehensiveness of the Big 5 has been frequently claimed (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1986; O’Connor, 2002), the HEXACO model accounts for variance above and beyond the Big 5 (Ashton et al., 2014), as do several other personality dimensions (e.g., risk-taking, narcissism; Feher & Vernon [2020]). Although the Big 5 model remains dominant in personality research, advocates for alternatives remain active (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2020). Implications Several important lessons for virtue science arise from research on personality structure. First, hundreds of studies have clarified that stable dimensions of personal characteristics can be measured. Second, those characteristics are related to important criterion variables. Third, self-reports of personality dimensions are related to others’ reports about the target person. Fourth, there is substantial consistency across many cultures in natural language trait description. Finally, neither the Big 5 nor the HEXACO models account for all variation in personal characteristics. These five implications point in useful directions in virtue research, as we describe later. Given the conceptual and empirical overlap of virtue and personality terms, these two concepts require greater conceptual clarity, which is one purpose of this chapter. Until the conceptual distinctions between virtue and personality are more fully articulated for psychologists1 (see Wright et al. [2021] for a strong beginning), disentangling virtue and personality will be impossible. Empirical study of the distinctions and overlaps of the two concepts is also essential, and this is the science of virtue for which we advocate in this book. 1

Virtue has, of course, been thoroughly articulated and debated within philosophy, but few psychologists have absorbed this corpus, and it does not lend itself to empirical study.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

130

Personality and Virtue

Personality Process The second tradition in personality research has focused on social-cognitive processes such as schemata, beliefs, and appraisals, and it generally explains behavior by identifying stability and variability within the individual. Like personality structure, there have been multiple perspectives on personality process. In this chapter, we focus only on the CAPS developed by Mischel and colleagues (Mischel, 2004; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) because it is the most widely cited approach, and our primary interest is in contrasting the personality structure and process approaches. We follow this contrast by discussing two efforts to integrate personality structure and process. Mischel and Shoda (1995) introduced CAPS to explain why individual behaviors are not fully consistent across situations. They then explained personality stability despite cross-situational behavioral variation with persistent cognitive and affective processes. These cognitive and affective processes explain how individuals select, interpret, and respond to the elements of situations. They focused on the activation of affect, expectancies, goals, and behavioral scripts. Between-person differences in the chronic activations of particular cognitions and affects are also important to personality. Mischel and Shoda (1995) insightfully identified the psychological features of situations that illuminate why behavior is consistent in situations that seem nominally different. They also clarified that personality processes can be activated both by the situation external to the person and by the person’s thoughts, plans, and imagination. These personality processes interact dynamically, and their stable organization constitutes personality in the CAPS approach. Indeed, in CAPS, situations are partly constituted by the person’s interpretation of the meanings they have. Mischel and Shoda (1995) emphasized that “[t]he theory views the person not as reacting passively to situations, nor as generating behavior impervious to their subtle features, but as active and goal-directed, constructing plans and selfgenerated changes, and in part creating the situations themselves” (p. 252). With these elements, Mischel and Shoda identified the personality system as the organization of distinctive networks of cognitive-affective elements and the personality state as the pattern of cognitive and affective activations in a specific situation. From the CAPS perspective, “a personality type consists of people who share a common organization of relations among mediating units in the processing of certain situational features” (Mischel, 2004, p. 14). The use of the term “system” is extremely important because they viewed the personality functioning as a whole rather

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Longitudinal Stability and Change in Personality

131

than being a mere collection of disparate elements. Mischel (2004) discussed how various situations activate different social-cognitive processes that, in turn, create a cascade of activations. A coherent personality system does not necessarily imply internal consistency, because goals and plans can conflict. Moreover, they saw individuals as capable of influencing their own personality states and behaviors through self-reflection and the selection and shaping of their environment. This allows changes in the person’s appraisal of any given situation to alter how one responds. In this way, Mischel (2004) highlighted the largely nascent theme of agency as an important element for future research. Implications The CAPS approach brings the stable organizations of cognition and affect into focus to explain reliable stability within individuals and differences between individuals. In addition, CAPS emphasizes the person’s ability to meaningfully interpret and even reshape situations. CAPS leaves ample room for personal agency, although agency has not been explored in depth in this approach. These developments are welcome to virtue theorists. Virtues are generally viewed as a meaningful, stable network of cognition, affect, and behavior. As we have emphasized, one key hypothesis for virtue science is that agency is indispensable for virtue development and enactment. The capacity to alter one’s characteristic patterns of response included in CAPS makes room for the cultivation of virtue. Given the compatibility of the CAPS approach and virtue theory, it is no wonder that some virtue theorists have forwarded CAPS as a conceptualization of virtue (e.g., Snow, 2010; West, 2018).

Longitudinal Stability and Change in Personality There is substantial evidence for the long-term stability of personality (Roberts & Damian, 2019), and this stability used to be a core working assumption for many personality psychologists. For example, the stability in the rank ordering of personality dimensions appears to increase with age, and Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) called this the cumulative continuity principle, attributing this continuity largely to genetic factors. Roberts and Damian (2019) stated “that the cumulative continuity principle is one of the most robust, replicable, and consistently supported patterns of personality development” (p. 155). Despite this stability, contemporary research also documents longitudinal changes in personality. Some life experiences and transitional

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

132

Personality and Virtue

changes seem to be related to shifts in personality. To give a few examples, the transition to a first romantic relationship is accompanied by higher Extraversion and lower Neuroticism (e.g., Neyer & Lehnart, 2007; Wagner et al., 2015), the shift from high school to college appears to increase Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness, and decrease Neuroticism (e.g., Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011), and entry into the workforce is associated with increased Conscientiousness (Specht et al., 2011). In contrast, individuals who are fired from their jobs decrease in Conscientiousness and increase in Neuroticism (Costa et al., 2000). In general, there is a tendency toward greater maturity (defined as social adaptiveness) in personality over the lifespan (i.e., increasing Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, and decreasing Neuroticism [Roberts et al., 2006]). In contrast, although these findings might lead one to expect that becoming a parent would also induce personality change, it does not seem to do so (Galdiolo & Roskam, 2014). Roberts and Damian (2019) concluded that “[t]he longitudinal evidence in support of the maturity principle is impressive because it encompasses data from multiple, independent research teams, and multiple longitudinal studies from a variety of countries” (p. 156). It appears that this maturity development occurs at different ages across cultures, depending on when individuals take on adult roles (Bleidorn et al., 2013). For example, a fifty-year longitudinal study with a large US sample indicated a positive shift in means for Agreeableness and Conscientiousness and a negative shift in Neuroticism ranging between one and one and a half standard deviations (Damian et al., 2019). Roberts and colleagues (2004) linked changes in personality dimensions to shifts in personal goals, which is a social-cognitive process. They found that personal goals were as stable as personality dimensions and that valuing economic goals was associated with increases in Conscientiousness. In contrast, valuing relationship goals was related to increases in Agreeableness. Nevertheless, Roberts and colleagues (2004) recommended that these two domains remain distinct areas of inquiry. In contrast, Baumert and colleagues (2017) recommended integrating goals and personality dimensions because trait development may be important for attaining valued ends. Consistently pursuing goals can give rise to habits that can stabilize into traits. One pathway to stabilization is automaticity, which affords fast and consistent performance at relatively low psychological cost. Achieving some goals can also be facilitated within certain settings. Consistently placing oneself in particular environments also tends to stabilize trait-related behavior.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Integrative Approaches

133

Implications The formulations of longitudinal changes in personality and the personality–goals relation are compatible with our virtue model because we see virtues as goal directed and view virtues as acquired traits that facilitate a good life. Cultivating virtues is often seen as a process of habituation, with strong similarities to automaticity, but the development of traits has attracted limited attention in moral psychology (see Chapter 4).

Integrative Approaches Several research teams have integrated the structural and process approaches to personality. These scholars have reasoned that the two approaches are complementary, and a complete theory of personality must address both aspects. A prominent, large working group of personality psychologists endorsed this project, stating that their aim was “to highlight the close interdependencies of personality processes, structure, and development involved in answering what we regard as the key questions of personality psychology” (Baumert et al., 2017, p. 504). This group concluded that processes such as reinforcement sensitivity, self-regulation, and goal pursuit can explain broader traits. Although there are several such theories, we exemplify this integrative approach with just two: WTT (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015) and TTFP (McAdams, 1996). Whole Trait Theory Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) called their integrative approach Whole Trait Theory (WTT).2 WTT has two major components, the first of which is a descriptive dimension of personality that relies on the Big 53 or other descriptive accounts. The second dimension is an explanatory account that relies on cognitive and affective processes. The structural or descriptive component is useful in identifying and assessing between-person differences in trait expression, and the process or explanatory component is useful both for explaining traits and assessing within-person variation 2 3

Prior to developing WTT, Fleeson and colleagues introduced the density distribution concept of personality, which is broader than WTT, and we discuss it in Chapter 7. Fleeson and colleagues refer most frequently to the Big 5 for trait descriptions, but there is no reason, in principle, that the HEXACO or some other structural description of traits could not replace the Big 5. In fact, they mention HEXACO in their initial presentation of WTT (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

134

Personality and Virtue

in trait manifestation. That is, broad patterns of action can be used to describe personality profiles, and individual differences in a person’s social-cognitive responses to a situation (e.g., situation appraisal and relevant goals) can explain trait expression and its variations. Within-person variability in personality expression is abundant (Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009), which provides scope for social-cognitive explanations. Fleeson and Jayawickreme suggested that this variability is substantially systematic because individuals’ social cognitions are relatively stable over time, but they guide behavior differentially depending on the situation. Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) argued that it is necessary to go beyond describing traits to be able to explain those trait manifestations. Their explanatory account builds on CAPS theory and research; it includes social-cognitive processes such as situational appraisals, homeostatic processes, goals, and beliefs. For instance, Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) clarified that “extraversion state levels are the function of interpreting the current situation as favorable toward extraversion, pursuing a goal that produces extraverted behavior, a homeostatic tendency toward extraverted behaviors, an ongoing trend that leads to extraverted behavior” (p. 87). In this way, factors such as situational appraisal and goals help explain how a trait manifests, with its variability across differing situations. Their conclusion is that, “[f]ar from being antagonistic, and more than being compatible, social-cognitive and trait approaches appear to imply each other” (p. 84). Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) offered five generic social-cognitive processes: the interpretive process (interpreting inputs), the motivational process (approach and avoidance goals), the stability process (homeostasis and habits), the temporal process (influence of past on present), and the random error process. These processes interact with one another and with the situation, so that trait manifestations tend to be reasonable responses to individuals’ perceptions of situations and their possibilities. The interpretive and motivational processes continuously influence the actor’s understanding of their circumstances and which goals can be pursued. In fact, McCabe and Fleeson (2016) reported that 50–75 percent of the variation in individuals’ personality states could be predicted from the actors’ momentary goals. Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) highlight the cognitive and motivational domains as constituent elements of personality traits. They emphasize that traits cannot be separated from these social-cognitive processes and that “there is no single variable that is ‘the trait.’ There is no essence to a person that is the person’s trait, and that is who the person ‘really is’” (p. 89).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Integrative Approaches

135

They suggest that broad trait dimensions are formed as the accretion of multiple narrow explanatory social-cognitive traits. They proposed that this accretion occurs through traits becoming linked together by generalization, learning, logical, biological, and cultural processes. Accretion is important to WTT because “accretion is what produces the Big 5 and is what allows social-cognitive mechanisms to be the explanation of the Big 5” (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015, p. 88). Accretion also means that personality is continually developing, according to WTT. Jayawickreme and colleagues (2019) discussed accretion as influenced by the outcomes of trait manifestations. For example, positive outcomes encourage such manifestations by strengthening the links between inputs, intermediates, and outputs. They recognized that such changes in linkages can be voluntary but because their account is written largely in standard causal deterministic language, the concept of agency does not have a significant role in WTT. We discuss the role of agency later in the section “Can WTT Provide an Integrative Model of Personality and Virtue?” The Three-Tiered Framework of Personality In addition to WTT, McAdams (1996) offered another integrative approach. He began by questioning the comprehensiveness of the Big 5 model and outlined a three-tiered framework that includes traits but is also considerably broader. He clarified that despite the Big 5 model’s predictive and conceptual power, traits are “not robust and multifaceted enough to account for the full gamut of personality” (p. 253). To maintain temporal coherence, individuals construct self-narratives to integrate changes and organize the anticipated future. McAdams (1996) suggested that it is “a coherent and vivifying life story that best provides the modern adult with that quality of selfhood that goes by the name of identity” (p. 299, emphasis in original). The TTFP includes three tiers (McAdams, 2006, 2015, 2021). Tier 1 comprises broad, decontextualized traits (McAdams, 1996) and is currently discussed as “the social actor” (McAdams, 2015). McAdams (1996) noted that “no description of the person is adequate without trait attributions, but trait attributions themselves yield little beyond A Psychology of the Stranger” (p. 301, emphasis in original). Although Tier 1 parallels personality structure or trait accounts, McAdams (2015) described traits arising in the preschool period and forming a basic personality profile that is overlain and modified by the other two tiers. Tier 2, initially termed characteristic adaptations, and more recently discussed as the motivated

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

136

Personality and Virtue

agent, includes strivings, life tasks, skills, and values (McAdams, 2015). He suggested that Tier 2 has many parallels with social-cognitive process accounts and clarified that personal concerns are generally framed motivationally and emphasized the agency and moral quality of Tier 2. Tier 2 seems to develop in later childhood and layers over and “thickens” Tier 1 personality features. The motivated agent defines actions largely in terms of future goals. Tier 3 comprises the narrative(s) that people tell to unify their lives, and these narratives layer over Tiers 1 and 2, broadening and thickening them. These constructions have the form of stories about the person. McAdams termed this “authoring” one’s own life, creating meaning, and connecting episodes. Through autobiographical reasoning, the person is a storyteller who synthesizes experiences into an integrative life story that includes the past, present, and future. The person develops a narrative identity because the story tells them and others who they are and how they came to be that person. Autobiographical reasoning generally becomes possible in adolescence and increases in sophistication through adulthood. McAdams (2015) thoroughly contextualized the three tiers of TTFP by clarifying that personality variability emerges from human evolution (Tier 1) and elaborating that the motivated action (Tier 2) is structured by the social world, and that narratives (Tier 3) are situated in and drawn from the cultural context in which the individual lives. He discussed trait detection as important evolutionarily to facilitate social choices based on reputations (e.g., cooperator, good hunter, or untrustworthy person). Agentic action is related to personality traits but transcends them by forming the specific motives and goals the person chooses and modifies over time. Although one’s life story is self-constructed, its themes, images, and plots are drawn from the meanings of one’s culture. For example, for modern Westerners, personality concepts tend to focus on the preoccupations of modernity, such as unity, purpose, identity, and self-reflexiveness (McAdams, 1996, 2009; Taylor, 1989). The self-narrative is also constrained by the self-narratives and relational narratives of other people with whom one has important relationships. Culture influences the different levels of personality to varying degrees, exerting the least influence on dispositional traits, with progressively more influence on characteristic adaptations and life narratives. McAdams (1996) clarified that an individual can have more than one life narrative, but that a Western tendency favors an integrated whole. Narratives typically do not change dramatically in the short term, but they do tend to change significantly over the longer term, making life narratives a work in progress throughout one’s life. McAdams suggested

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Do Personality Theories Tell Us about Virtue?

137

that life narratives tend to have an emotional tone, are characterized by imagery, include motivational themes, are based on a perspective of what a good life is (e.g., coherence, openness, differentiation, generativity), and contain nuclear episodes, such as high, low, and turning points. He developed prototypical life narratives, such as commitment stories that emphasize involvement in paid work or volunteer activities, and generative stories that highlight shifts from negativity to positivity and contributions to others. One of the ways that McAdams’ theory differs from most personality theories is that he explicitly and systematically includes moral concerns in his views. He suggested that “human beings have evolved to be moral animals” (McAdams, 2009, p. 14). He placed morality as central to characteristic adaptations because these matters involve individuals’ goals and strivings and are strongly shaped by “value-laden cognitive schemas  and  personal ideologies,” in particular by “people’s most cherished beliefs and values about what is good and true” (p. 17). The details of a moral life are fleshed out in the moral goals and schemata of characteristic adaptations. The personal narrative gives shape to one’s identity by connecting one’s past, present, and future, and must be told in terms of meaning and purpose in life, which is another element of morality (McAdams, 2009).

Conclusion: What Do These Personality Theories Tell Us about Virtue? Many psychologists remain committed to Allport’s (1937) dictum regarding the necessity of “devaluing” virtue to develop a purely descriptive, “objective” account of personality. This is more frequently an implicit stance than an explicit statement, but the power of the position shows up in the common practice of virtue researchers demonstrating that the virtue under study accounts for variance in criterion variables beyond what Big 5 traits can account for (see Chapters 7–11). Given the vast literature documenting the Big 5 model and its precedence over virtue science in psychology, it is reasonable to ask whether virtue cannot simply be subsumed into personality theory and research. Can Virtue Be Conceptually Subsumed in Personality Theory? To anticipate our discussion in Chapter 7, every published study that has assessed the incremental validity of virtues vis-à-vis personality dimensions

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

138

Personality and Virtue

has found that virtues have incremental variance above and beyond what personality dimensions can explain. Thus far, hypothesis 5-2 – that virtue measures will show incremental validity vis-à-vis personality measures – has been answered in the affirmative. This evidence suggests that virtues cannot be reduced to Big 5 dimensions. We also offered four conceptual arguments for why virtue cannot be subsumed by personality theory in the section “To What Degree Are Virtues Distinct from Personality?” earlier in this chapter. Although TTFP encompasses agency, intentional self-cultivation, and morality to some degree, we do not see it as capacious enough to subsume virtue, as discussed later. In Chapter 7, we also argue that virtues are a kind of trait. We are not the first to suggest this, but personality theory and research can tell us a good deal about traits. These traits are most often summarized in the Big 5 and HEXACO models. This well-trodden path has encouraged many psychological and philosophical virtue researchers to endorse a trait conception. However, both structural personality models have relied on a set of single-timepoint, global self-report measures of traits, which has also encouraged virtue researchers to use similar measures. This reliance on simple and inexpensive assessments is a reasonable place to begin a new research topic, but it is important to develop additional assessment strategies to supplement self-report. We suggest other reports and longitudinal research as alternatives in Chapter 7. What Does the Structural Approach to Personality Tell Us about Virtue Science? Earlier, we enumerated five implications of the structural approach to personality for virtue science. First, structural personality research has succeeded in demonstrating stable between-person differences. Second, those dimensions are meaningfully related to interesting criterion variables. Third, self-reports of personality dimensions are related to other reports on the target person. Fourth, natural language trait description shows substantial consistency across many cultures. Finally, neither the Big 5 nor the HEXACO models account for all the variance in personal characteristics. These five points have important implications for virtue research. The first four points suggest that dimensions of personal characteristics can be meaningfully and usefully assessed, encouraging the substantive assessment of virtue dimensions or traits. In addition, there is clearly room for the measurement of virtues because existing personality models do not exhaust the trait space. We anticipate that, when the criterion measures

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Can WTT Provide a Model of Personality and Virtue?

139

have a recognizable moral quality (e.g., fairness or kindness behavior), appropriate virtue measures will likely be superior predictors compared with personality scales (hypothesis 5-2).

What Does the Process Component of Personality Tell Us about Virtue? We want to highlight two valuable lessons for virtue science from personality process approaches. First, the CAPS and WTT explanatory accounts help explain how and when personality traits are activated and expressed. This is a valuable precedent for virtue science, which places a high premium on cognition, affect, and motivation as necessary virtue components. This obligates virtue researchers to explain the activation and form that virtue trait expression takes, but we approach that task in a different way than is available in CAPS (or almost any personality model built on CAPS concepts4). In Chapters 1 and 2, we introduced the concept of practical wisdom (phronesis) as the proximate explanation of virtue expression. We see practical wisdom as a metavirtue that guides the manifestations of the other virtues (hypotheses 11-12 and 11-15) and we return to this concept later in this chapter. The second valuable lesson is that personality process theorists have incorporated situations in their theories and research. This provides a useful response to trait skepticism (e.g., Doris, 2002; Harman, 2009). Personality theories that include social-cognitive processes suggest that the stability of personality is due to those processes in interaction with situations. It is vital that virtue science follows these two leads to deal effectively with trait skepticism. We discuss the inclusion of situational influences on virtue traits in Chapter 9 and trait skepticism in Chapter 12.

Can WTT Provide an Integrative Model of Personality and Virtue? Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a, 2017b) have argued that WTT encompasses both personality and virtue traits based on their similarities, but we think it is important to emphasize the distinctness of virtue. Simply put, we worry that it may be too easy for the distinctive features of virtues to 4

As we have already noted and discuss more fully later, Wright and colleagues (2021) and Snow and colleagues (2021) have augmented WTT theory substantially to accommodate practical wisdom, but they are exceptions to the general tendency for psychologists to ignore practical wisdom or to reduce its importance drastically compared to a neo-Aristotelian approach.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

140

Personality and Virtue

be ignored and not studied, and for the interesting hypotheses that virtue science orients us toward to go untested if virtue is subsumed into personality. Of course, one could see this worry as an artifact of our focus on differentiating virtue science in this book. Yet because virtue science is new and its distinctive value is not widely recognized in psychological research, we believe that its place needs to be clearly demarcated. Wright and colleagues (2021) have recently endorsed a modified WTT model for research on virtue, and there is substantial compatibility between WTT and the STRIVE-4 Model. Both approaches urge empirical research on virtues and see virtues as measurable traits that are responsive to situational influences, and are manifested in behavior, cognition, and emotion/ motivation. Although the STRIVE-4 Model emphasizes role sensitivity and virtue knowledge to a greater degree than WTT does, these seem to be points of emphasis rather than incompatibilities because Wright and colleagues (2021) were able to modify WTT to accommodate these emphases. Perhaps a larger difference shows up in the fact that our STRIVE-4 Model highlights the value of formulating contentious but empirically tractable hypotheses in order to develop an ambitious and more fruitful form of virtue science. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, while Wright and colleagues seem to assume that certain forms of reflection on one’s life and self will help strengthen virtue traits, we take that as one contentious hypothesis (Chapter 11) that should be tested along with others that are suggested by thinkers who propose different interventions for virtue cultivation. Our emphasis on identifying and testing contentious hypotheses is also apparent in the inclusion of hypotheses about virtue being connected to human flourishing (Chapter 10) – topics that Wright and colleagues consciously leave out because they are contentious. Although we see great merit in WTT, and it is a good approach to virtue science in many respects, we have four reasons for doubting that personality and virtue traits have the same structure. First, we are concerned that WTT does not sufficiently prioritize the morality of virtue (although Wright et al. [2021] indicate how this might be done). Relatedly, WTT offers no obvious place for the central concept of eudaimonia (and Wright et al. [2021] demur on this question). Second, the role of practical wisdom is unclear within WTT itself,5 but it is central in virtue theory. Third, 5

Several authors have argued extensively for the importance of practical wisdom in psychological theory, research, and practice (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Fowers, 2005a, 2012; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2010; Wright et al., 2021). In fact, Wright et al. incorporate a robust version of practical wisdom in their revision of WTT.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Can WTT Provide a Model of Personality and Virtue?

141

despite their discussions of personality change (e.g., Blackie et al., 2014; Jayawickreme et al., 2019), hypotheses about the intentional cultivation of virtue are not robustly incorporated into WTT, which focuses primarily on a causal account of traits.6 Finally, the frequent and extensive discussion of the similarities between personality and virtue traits may be a slippery slope toward subsuming virtue within personality psychology. We address each of these concerns in the next four subsections. Virtues as Moral Traits and WTT Moral considerations have had a checkered history in personality psychology, from Allport to McAdams, Jayawickreme, and Fleeson. Whereas Allport (1937) advocated the eschewal of evaluative questions, the last three authors write comfortably about the moral elements of personality and virtue traits (e.g., Jayawickreme & Fleeson, 2017a; McAdams, 2015). Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017b) stated that “virtues are in fact personality traits” (p. 121) and they advocate the same methods to study the two. Thus, Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a) make their case for virtues as personality traits by noting many ways in which the two are similar, such as being traits, being volitionally changeable, and being explained by socialcognitive processes. Although these similarities are well worth noting, no list of similarities can ever amount to a case that two objects of interest are members of the same species. For example, cats and dogs have many similarities, such as being warm-blooded, sexually reproductive, and fourlegged (among many others), but no one would say that cats and dogs belong to the same species or even genus. Because Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a) focus on the similarities of personality and virtue traits, the question becomes: What, if anything, differentiates them? For these authors, the moral centrality in virtues does not differentiate virtue and personality traits because the latter also have moral content. Nor does agency in virtue development differentiate the trait types because these authors suggest that intentional trait development is active in both forms of traits. Therefore, these authors’ focus on the similarity of personality and virtue traits leaves the question of differentiating them open. Although Jayawickreme and Fleeson’s (2017a) acknowledgment that moral questions are important in both personality and virtue traits is welcome, morality remains tangential in WTT. We see this tangential role as 6

In contrast with Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a), Wright and colleagues (2021) suggest that virtues are morally desirable traits and that practical wisdom plays a significant role.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

142

Personality and Virtue

insufficient for theorists of moral virtues because morality is central in the conception and practice of virtue.7 For example, it would be inappropriate to describe virtuous kindness or vicious cruelty in morally indifferent terms. Yet it is likely also inappropriate to describe extraversion as morally admirable and introversion as morally reprehensible. The centrality of morality in virtue and the peripherality of morality in personality suggests that the two kinds of traits may not be of the same species. Another question is whether virtues are the stable capacities that enable a good human life, as many neo-Aristotelian and Confucian thinkers claim (Fowers, 2005a; Kim, 2020; Russell, 2009). As we noted in Chapter 2, some philosophers doubt the connection between virtue and a good life, but the importance of this relationship requires taking some position on it, and the good life is seldom mentioned by WTT scholars. They do discuss the relationships among personality dimensions and the broader concept of wellbeing (Blackie et al., 2014; Jayawickreme et al., 2019), but they do not claim that any configuration of personality dimensions is necessary for a good life. In contrast, many (but not all) virtue theorists view the presence of virtues as necessary for a good life. The well-documented fact that personality dimensions contribute to well-being does not mean that they are central to and partly definitive of eudaimonia in the ways that virtues are thought to be.8 As it stands, the absence of a concept of the good life and what it is to act morally in WTT are significant omissions from an ambitious virtue science perspective. It is possible that WTT can be revised to more fully embrace the ethical core of moral virtues, but such a clear embrace of morality cuts against the grain of most personality psychology. As we have noted, Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a) comfortably discuss morality, so a more robust inclusion of morality in this theory is possible. We see anything less than a full and explicit commitment to the morality of virtues as a serious shortcoming. It is worth noting that Snow and her colleagues (Snow et al., 2021; Wright et al., 2021) have explicitly avoided a commitment to the centrality of eudaimonia and have done so for the 7

8

Some virtue scholars attempt to distinguish sharply between different forms of virtues (e.g., ­intellectual, performance, and aesthetic), but we still see all these virtues as being directed at what is good. Our view therefore takes all virtues to be moral at their core, but this is far from consensual among virtue theorists. It is important to note that some virtue scholars do not agree that virtues are defined by their relationship with the good life (e.g., Driver, 2001). Partly in deference to these scholars, and even more because we consider the question of the relationships between virtues and flourishing to be at least partly empirical questions, we propose a set of hypotheses about these relationships (hypotheses 10-1 to ­10-34). A neo-Aristotelian perspective suggests that these relationships are positive and constitutive, but this is not a consensual position, making the empirical exploration of these hypotheses important.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Can WTT Provide a Model of Personality and Virtue?

143

purpose of making their account ecumenical.9 In contrast, we propose a set of hypotheses (10-11 to 10-34) regarding the strong and positive relationships among virtues, characteristic human goods, and eudaimonia, and we call for the empirical evaluations of those predictions. Practical Wisdom and WTT Because WTT was initially developed as a theory within personality psychology, there was no clear reason for including the concept of practical wisdom in it. In many ways, Jayawickreme and Fleeson’s (2017a, 2017b) argument that their theory can also explain virtue traits is persuasive. Although these authors mention practical wisdom (phronesis) in their two primary publications on WTT and virtue, they do so only once in each publication and each mention is attributed to a philosopher, who recommends incorporating practical wisdom in virtue concepts. Instead, Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a) redefine it as behavior that is based on a “well motivated disposition to do the right thing” (p. 76), without specifying what “well motivated” or “the right thing” means. These are central questions for practical wisdom, wherein terms are defined explicitly and in depth. Jayawickreme and Fleeson’s (2017a) relative silence about practical wisdom means that significant work remains to make WTT an adequate framework for studying the virtues and various interesting and empirically tractable questions about them. In contrast, we suggest several predictions about this relationship (hypotheses 11-12 to 11-19) in Chapter 11. The Intentional Cultivation of Virtue and WTT Increasing evidence has accumulated that personality dimensions change over the lifespan, generally in a direction that can be considered as maturation (Roberts & Damian, 2019), and that people can make volitional changes in their personality dimensions (Hudson & Fraley, 2015; McCabe & Fleeson, 2016). These changes seem to be related to normative life transitions (e.g., a first romantic relationship, transitioning out of high school or into the workforce). This evidence is roughly consistent with what virtue development would look like. WTT explicitly includes goals and discusses 9

This demurral appears to be a tactical step in their book on the development of virtue measurement. In other places, Snow and colleagues (2021) have little hesitation in claiming that practical wisdom is partly defined by the goods they are meant to facilitate. They state, for example, that “phronesis cannot exist unless it is motivated by the desire to be virtuous and to pursue the kinds of goods that virtue enables us to attain” (p. 88).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

144

Personality and Virtue

trait development as often goal-oriented and a matter of “accretion.” These recent developments suggest similarities in volitional trait change for personality and virtue traits. The research on volitional personality change can provide useful paradigms for studies of virtue development. Although deterministic language predominates in WTT, it includes psychological causation, wherein an individual’s choices can be understood as causes of behavior (Fleeson, 2021; Jayawickreme, 2021). For example, Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a) state that social-cognitive processes (e.g., goals) “are the determinants of behavior … and such processes are likely implicated in morality as well” (p. 122). Their account of causation and its relationship to agency is underdeveloped, which creates unresolved questions about which sources of traits are agentic and which are nonagentic. Given the centrality of agency in virtue theory, this underdevelopment is significant and requires more theoretical space and empirical evidence than is currently available. Because this question has not been addressed empirically, we propose it as hypothesis 4-16: Do individuals intentionally cultivate virtues? Wright, Warren, and Snow’s Reinterpretation of WTT It is vital to touch on substantial reinterpretations of WTT by Snow and her colleagues (Snow et al., 2021; Wright et al., 2021) to provide a psychologically realistic, philosophically informed account of virtue. These scholars recognized and discussed several differences between standard views of personality and virtue traits. Regarding our first question about WTT, Snow and colleagues maintain that virtues are moral traits, whereas personality traits have moral elements but are not inherently moral. They also clarify that some elements of traits are virtue supportive, whereas others are core to virtue (Snow et al., 2021). For example, gregariousness may make it easier to be publicly generous, but one need not be gregarious to practice generosity. In Wright and colleagues (2021), they demurred regarding the relationship of flourishing and virtue, so their views are unavailable on this question. Regarding the second question about WTT, they explicitly incorporated a robust portrayal of practical wisdom as central to virtue and located it in the social-cognitive mechanisms. Snow and colleagues (2021) acknowledge that WTT has not explicitly incorporated practical wisdom, but then state “that WTT is a hospitable empirical framework that can accommodate elements of phronesis, among other mechanisms, in explaining how trait-relevant stimuli are perceived” (p. 81). Unfortunately, they did not clarify what practical wisdom’s place is vis-à-vis the other social-cognitive

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Can TTFP Form an Integrative Framework for Virtue?

145

mechanisms or personality traits, raising many questions. Is practical wisdom a higher-order operation that guides the other mechanisms or is it just one among many? Is practical wisdom the integration of social-cognitive mechanisms such that their operation trends toward excellence? How do Snow and her colleagues keep practical wisdom from becoming a homunculus (an agent within the agent) that guides trait expression? Is practical wisdom a trait itself with its own descriptive side or just a mechanism that helps explain the other trait manifestations? Does practical wisdom also regulate personality trait expression or only virtue trait expression? Although the authors likely have answers to these questions, those answers have not been made fully explicit. Regarding our third question about WTT, Wright and colleagues (2021) differentiate the intentional development of virtue traits as necessary for virtue but only optional for personality traits. Given the breadth, depth, and importance of these amendments to WTT, we remain unconvinced that WTT is fully consistent with virtue. Given the qualitative differences between virtue science and WTT, we think it makes sense to think of them as independent, if related theories rather than what we see as a somewhat hasty subsumption of virtue into personality. To return to the biological metaphor, one possibility is that there may be a trait genus with personality and virtue as separate species within the genus. Such a framework would acknowledge both the similarities and differences between the two types of traits. Although we have significant agreement with Wright, Warren, and Snow’s reinterpretation of WTT, we remain puzzled by their assertion that virtues can be subsumed in personality even as they recognize the key differences between virtues and personality dimensions. These and other questions about Wright and colleagues’ reinterpretation are important for virtue theorists, but our main concern in this chapter is with personality theories themselves, so we do not pursue these important questions further here.

Can TTFP Form an Integrative Framework for Virtue? The second integrative framework we examined, TTFP, may lend itself to being an account for virtue as well. McAdams (1996, 2009) has consistently recognized the presence of something like personality traits, and he has generally framed this in terms of inherited or dispositional traits. Yet, similar to WTT, TTFP also describes persons as motivated actors, providing a flexible and useful explanation for within-person variation in trait expression. In another parallel with WTT, however, TTFP does not

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

146

Personality and Virtue

have a well-defined role for practical wisdom, making it liable to the same critiques we offered earlier about WTT. Two ways that TTFP differs from WTT are, first, in how explicitly and extensively McAdams emphasizes the centrality of morality and agency in human life. He frequently discusses meaning, purpose, and belonging as central goods for humans, at least in Western culture. Second, for McAdams, agency and morality do not differentiate personality and virtue. So far, the case for including virtues in TTFP is slightly better than the one for WTT, but challenges remain. McAdams (1996, 2009, 2015) does not shy away from seeing personality in moral terms for several reasons. First, he recognizes that the attempts to create pure descriptions of personality traits have built moral concerns into those traits, and, unlike many psychologists, he welcomes the inclusion of morality in personality. Second, McAdams has recognized that personality is deeply implicated in pursuing goals and expressing themes that are inextricably moral. This recognition of the morality inherent in human life is encouraging because it parallels others’ understanding of the ubiquity of moral virtues (e.g., Fowers, 2008; Kristjánsson, 2018). Of course, it is possible for psychologists who are uncomfortable with this inherent morality to view their research as merely describing their participants’ morality, but our view is that social scientists cannot easily maintain an arm’s length distance from morality. We discuss the place of morality in psychological science in Chapter 6. Third, McAdams’ Tier 3 is unique to TTFP. Although WTT does include processes that can have a lifelong span and WTT scholars do mention narratives as a social-cognitive mechanism, WTT is seldom framed in terms of an integrative narrative, whereas TTFP is. This could be a simple matter of emphasis, but the explicit focus of TTFP on the narrative function and its cultural roots is extremely valuable from our perspective. McAdams explicitly stated that narratives are inextricably moral because they involve choices about pursuing what is valued. In focusing on the moral dimension of life choices and self-interpretation, the narrative element evokes the hypothesized blueprint function we ascribe to practical wisdom (see Chapters 1 and 11 for more on this). We agree with McAdams’ view that temporality and development are important elements of human life and that, from middle childhood on, humans are inherently prospective in their thinking and emoting. McAdams’ developmental framing of personality has some parallels with virtue theory accounts of virtue cultivation and habituation. It is only in middle childhood that serious virtue cultivation can begin. McAdams’

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Is the Integration of Personality and Virtue Desirable?

147

concept of autobiographical reasoning first emerges in adolescence, which may be parallel to the possibility of practical wisdom, as both require metacognitive abilities. Humans have goals and aspirations, and these goals are the concrete manifestations of what are called goods in a neo-Aristotelian perspective. We discuss the relations between virtue manifestation, goals, and goods in Chapter 10 and propose a set of hypotheses regarding those relations (hypotheses 10-11 to 10-34). Ultimately, McAdams made the same move as WTT in arguing for including virtue in personality theory and research. This decreases the conceptual distance between personality and virtue traits without attending fully to their differentiation. In our view, this may make it all too easy, from the points of view of WTT and TTFP, for the term virtue to simply be submerged in personality because these theories offer few reasons for their distinctness. We are not inclined to blur the boundary between personality and virtue in these ways, as we discuss in the next section. We do recognize that there are multiple viewpoints (e.g., Jayawickreme & Fleeson, 2017a; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Wright et al., 2021) about the relationships between personality and virtue, and we look forward to continuing conceptual clarification and empirical investigation. Finally, although TTFP is easily understood in moral terms, its version of living well is not directly tied to eudaimonia or to virtues as the characteristics that makes a good life possible. McAdams (2009) does discuss personality traits and characteristic adaptations as having clear roles in fostering a good life, but these connections are rather cursory and not explicitly and sufficiently made from a virtue perspective. Our conclusion is that TTFP has good potential if one is looking for a framework that can integrate personality and virtue. We have lingering doubts about the wisdom of such an integration, as we discuss in the final section of this chapter.

Is the Integration of Personality and Virtue Desirable? It is possible that future theory and empirical research will eventually recommend seeing personality and virtue traits in sufficiently similar ways such that integrating them within a single framework will be advisable. We assert, however, that we have not reached that point. Despite Wright and colleagues’ (2021) impressive efforts, we do not think any personality theory has been sufficiently enriched or elaborated to accommodate the conceptual richness, and exciting and empirically tractable hypotheses that are suggested by, virtue theory’s neo-Aristotelian or Confucian traditions. A less demanding version of virtue theory would be more easily accommodated,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

148

Personality and Virtue

but these two traditional viewpoints have stipulations and hypotheses that personality theory and research, as currently practiced, are unlikely to accomodate and test. We summarize three main sticking points here. First and foremost, virtues are traditionally understood to be moral characteristics that aim toward a moral end. With a few exceptions (e.g., Jayawickreme & Fleeson, 2017a; McAdams, 2009; Ryan et al., 2008), academic psychologists have been extremely uncomfortable with concepts that are inherently moral, aiming for an ostensibly objective description of facts about human behavior. In Chapter 6, we argue that this project has already failed. We suggest an alternative, evaluative bullet-biting approach that recognizes humans as inextricably moral creatures and human activities as generally imbued with moral purpose and import. The debate about the place of morality has not been resolved in psychology, and until morality can be relatively easily incorporated into psychological theories, moral virtues cannot be meaningfully and fully integrated with personality or any other traditional psychological research topic. As noted, Snow and colleagues (Snow et al., 2021; Wright et al., 2021) have made a good start in proposing such an interdisciplinary integration. Their framework is promising, but it is far from consensually accepted by psychologists or philosophers. Second, practical wisdom is a centerpiece for most neo-Aristotelian virtue theories (e.g., Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Fowers, 2005a; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024), although there are different views of what constitutes it. Practical wisdom is seen by many as a metavirtue that guides the manifestations of the virtues and is integral to the relations between virtues and eudaimonia. Others see practical wisdom as necessary for virtue but focus on its functions rather than seeing it as a trait (e.g., Snow et al., 2021). Neither the authors of WTT nor of TTFP have themselves incorporated a robust version of practical wisdom. Wright and colleagues (2021) incorporated practical wisdom in their reinterpretation of WTT to more fully incorporate virtue, and we see their work as a helpful reformulation. Nevertheless, their version of WTT left some questions unanswered for us, so we do not see their reinterpretation as fully satisfactory. Practical wisdom is both a moral and a teleological capacity. It is moral because practical wisdom is always about morally better and worse courses of action and aims. Practical wisdom is telic in being ultimately aimed at the end of embracing the good. Until hypotheses about practical wisdom can be fully integrated in psychological theory, we do not think that virtue can be successfully incorporated in personality or any other traditional psychological research topic. Three proposals (Grossman et al., 2020; Kristjánsson et al., 2021; Wright et al., 2021) for this integration have been made recently, but the dust has far from settled on this key question.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Is the Integration of Personality and Virtue Desirable?

149

Third, from a neo-Aristotelian perspective, virtues are also inherently teleological in that their cultivation and practice are aimed at a good life. In addition, virtues are intentionally cultivated, habitual modes of action. For both these reasons, it is vital for virtue science to investigate the hypothesis that agency is central to virtue. With few exceptions (e.g., Martin & Gillespie, 2010; McAdams, 2015; Nucci, 1984), psychologists are much more comfortable discussing causal relations than telic or agentic relations. From our perspective, this discomfort in discussing telic or agentic relations is due to historical choices favoring causal accounts because they seemed more “scientific” and mimicked the physical sciences. The debate about whether humans are best conceived as a nexus of causal forces has been active throughout the history of psychology, despite many compelling critiques of that viewpoint (e.g., Martin & Sugarman, 1999; Richardson et al., 1999). There are many domains of psychology that are flavored by telic and agentic thinking, such as goal pursuit (e.g., Baumert et al., 2017) and developmental psychology (e.g., Sokol et al., 2015), but even these domains are frequently characterized by thin, causal language. We cannot resolve that debate here, but we note the frequent use of causal terminology even in a contender for an integrative view of personality and virtue: WTT. Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2017a) stated, for example, that WTT “postulates a number of processes causally implicated in the manifestation of behavior” and “that several such processes are the determinants of behavior” (p. 122). This causal language is neither casual nor accidental, and although these authors occasionally discuss agency, they do not mention teleology or telic relations. In our view, to the degree that psychologists insist on causal models that lack clear places for telic and agentic relations, it will be impossible to integrate virtue with personality or any other traditional psychological research topic. In conclusion, there is much to be gained for virtue science from personality theory and research, including the guidance that theory and research can provide for conceptualizing and measuring traits as individual differences, intraindividual stability and variation, the interactions of situations and traits, and trait change over time, and the value of examining life narratives and cultural influences on trait expression. We have also highlighted important discordances between standard psychological theory and research and conceptions of virtue, especially regarding the place of morality, agency, eudaimonia, and practical wisdom. We turn to a more complete discussion of the place of values in psychology in Chapter 6.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 6

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

Our concept of a virtue science sits squarely athwart one of the foundational dicta of psychology as a science: the fact–value dichotomy. That is, we see the scientific study of virtues as entailing both observable facts and moral commitments. Despite the persistence and empirical success of virtue researchers, many psychologists harbor doubts, or at least worries, about the development of a science of virtue. This is because psychological scientists tend to uphold a dichotomy of what they see as observable facts on the one hand and subjective values on the other, and many believe that the two should be kept strictly separate. The core assumption of the fact–value dichotomy seems to be the “value-free ideal,” which Betz (2013) characterized as the position that “the justification of scientific findings should not be based on nonepistemic (e.g., political or moral) grounds” (p. 1). This dichotomy remains potent even though it has been frequently challenged in the social sciences and philosophy (Brinkmann, 2011; Danziger, 1990; Gorski, 2013; Michalski, 2022; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1985; Tjeltveit, 2003). The difficulty we address here is that if the fact–value dichotomy is judged to be valid, then the term “virtue science” would be a contradiction in terms. The point of the fact–value dichotomy has been to support a certain form of scientific objectivity.1 That is, to try to represent the human world well (Jon, 2021). But in this chapter we will argue that this is a mistaken way to think about the objectivity of science. Moreover, we will point how how adherence to a strict fact value dichotomy actually impedes responsible and fruitful scientific inquiry. A simple example of how the fact–value dichotomy distorts the human world is in research on physical health, which entails both observable facts (e.g., physical markers) and that health is generally highly valued. Arbitrarily eliminating the value of 1

Several philosophers (e.g., Jon, 2021; Longino, 1990) have pointed out that the term objectivity has had many meanings and recommend against using it. Accordingly, we focus instead on the primary aim of social science being the accurate representation of the human world.

150

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Why the Fact–Value Dichotomy Should Be Rejected

151

health would truncate our understanding of it. We discuss this mutual entailment of facts and values throughout the chapter. The purposes of this chapter are: (1) to explain why we think the fact– value dichotomy should be rejected as an inadequate way to represent the human world and (2) to outline a psychological science that incorporates both facts and values as a better way to represent the human world. This alternate view of psychological science fully recognizes the central role of values and evaluative processes in human life, as well as in psychological investigations. If we are right, the fact–value dichotomy is not a simple orthodoxy that rules out virtue science tout court, as some assume. We argue instead that it is an unjustified dogma.

Why the Fact–Value Dichotomy Should Be Rejected To begin with, an extreme fact–value dichotomy is a nonstarter as a requirement for even a purely descriptive psychological science. Humans frequently, rapidly, and pervasively evaluate themselves and others in terms of morality and goodness (Brambilla et al., 2011; Cottrell et al., 2007; Goodwin et al., 2014). In fact, humans make rather accurate judgments of trustworthiness within 100 milliseconds of seeing a facial photograph (Todorov et al., 2009). Hundreds of virtue terms have been identified in many languages in lexical studies (Lomas, 2018). Given the ubiquity of such human evaluations, it seems impossible to accurately portray humans without mentioning these evaluations. The Place of Values in Disengaged Description and Evaluation Bullet-Biting Kristjánsson (2018) has identified one way in which psychologists attempt to maintain this dichotomy in the face of ubiquitous human evaluations: Many see themselves as merely describing “the world of evaluation” rather than evaluating “the world of facts” (p. 6). Some have construed virtue science as just another instance of this approach to research (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004). By seeing themselves as simply describing the world of evaluation, psychological scientists can plausibly claim that they are disengaged from the values they study. If the research participants are the only evaluators, the fact–value dichotomy appears to have been upheld for the scientists. Let us call this group of scholars the “disengaged describers” (Fowers et al., 2021). Many challenges to the disengaged describer position have been lodged in psychology (Brinkmann, 2011; Cushman, 2019; Dewey, 1926; Fowers,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

152

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

2010, 2015; Richardson et al., 1999) and in other social sciences (Boehm, 2008; Gorski, 2013; Smith, 2015). We summarize several of these challenges to the legitimacy of the fact–value dichotomy in this chapter. In various ways, these challengers assert that scientific descriptions unavoidably entail evaluations. To anticipate our conclusion somewhat, because humans have a ubiquitous tendency to act based on evaluations, then scientists, as humans, will likely be unable to eliminate evaluations from their work. If that premise is correct, then it appears necessary to work out how to include evaluations in virtue science. Let us call the investigators who pursue this approach the “evaluation bullet-biters.” Accepting this premise does not mean that we recommend the unregulated guidance of research by personal idiosyncrasies and biases; nor do we see the acceptance of values in science as a license to prescribe how others should act and live (a common error). We describe our approach to biting the evaluative bullet by incorporating value positions (along with critiques of them) into psychological science in the final section of the chapter. We cannot resolve the fact–value dichotomy in this chapter, but we hope to outline a proposal for fruitful bullet-biting. Of course, one resolution would be to simply double down on the dichotomy and insist that the mixture of facts and values be more rigorously disambiguated. Alexandrova (2017) has convincingly argued, however, that such disambiguation is untenable with scientific claims about phenomena, such as well-being or virtue, and asserted that such claims are “mixed claims” (descriptive and evaluative). Mixed claims should be retained, she argued, and not disambiguated, because the normative element of concepts such as well-being or virtue are crucial to the concepts and to the scientific study of them (Alexandrova, 2017). Another resolution could be to condemn psychology (or just virtue science) as hopelessly value-laden and conclude that it cannot be a science. However, this is just the opposite of the failed attempt at value neutrality and accomplishes nothing. This is because attempting to remove value-laden topics from science is simply a restatement of the dichotomy: Psychology is either value-free and scientific, or it is value-laden and unscientific. Another alternative might be turning a blind eye to value biases, but this seems untenable. Once the value genies are out of the bottle, they cannot simply be reinserted. As noted, many scholars argue that it is just not possible to prevent scientists’ values from creeping into their problem statements, procedures, results, and interpretations, no matter how hard they try to prevent this. Our preferred resolution is to develop an approach to psychology that portrays the value-imbued human world more rather than less clearly.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Why the Fact–Value Dichotomy Should Be Rejected

153

Fortunately for virtue science, virtues can be productively studied following either a disengaged describer or an evaluation bullet-biter approach. Investigators already approach their research from both perspectives. We do think it is important for authors to make their position on description and evaluation explicit and to consistently enact that position in their research. Although we, the authors, are avowed bullet-biters, we have striven in this book to present virtue science as amenable to both the disengaged describer and evaluation bullet-biter approaches, except where we explicitly take a bullet-biting position. Facts about the Scientific Study of Virtues As we consider the place of values in virtue science, it is important to keep in mind three indisputable facts about science and virtues. First, the rudiments of virtue science are already well underway, with over a hundred empirical studies on various virtues, additional studies on practical wisdom, and scores of studies on eudaimonia or flourishing. In many ways, the cat is already out of the bag. There is substantial confusion about the fact–value dichotomy in virtue research, however. Some investigators just ignore it and pursue their studies as though there is no real question about the legitimacy of studying virtues (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Otake et al., 2006). Others use euphemisms (e.g., health, functioning, self-efficacy, prosociality), perhaps to maintain the illusion that they are not actually studying value-infused constructs (e.g., Cohen, 2004; Cottrell et al., 2007; Krause, 2010). As noted, we also have the two approaches to the presence of values in virtue research: the disengaged describers (e.g., Bleidorn & Denissen, 2015; Jayawickreme & Fleeson, 2017a; Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and the evaluative bullet-biters (e.g., Darnell et al., 2022; Lefevor & Fowers, 2016; Wright et al., 2021). Second, as we noted, there have been many challenges to the fact–value dichotomy. We briefly describe four such objections in the next section. Third, despite the lengthy, repeated, and cogent arguments against the fact–value dichotomy, the dichotomy is rarely publicly and explicitly defended. The only examples we are aware of are from Kendler (2002) and Huesman (1993), neither of whom satisfy the critics of the dichotomy because they presented mere assertions rather than systematic arguments. This general silence in the face of high-profile, systematic argumentation for abolishing the fact–value dichotomy strikes many critics as evidence for the dichotomy as a dogma, rather than a well-rationalized scientific principle. We welcome pushback on this

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

154

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

interpretation, but dichotomy adherents and advocates have seldom deigned to defend it. Let us be clear that we, along with Dewey (1926), do see a legitimate distinction between facts and values: one that recognizes the importance of both in human affairs. The important differences between a distinction and a dichotomy is that distinctions have a limited range of applicability and sometimes fuzzy boundaries. Therefore, we are unsurprised if they do not apply universally, whereas we expect dichotomies to apply universally (Putnam, 2004). Nor are we surprised that distinctions are sometimes difficult to sort neatly. However, we argue that there is no bright line that divides facts and values in psychological science, with facts expressing the ineluctable evaluations of those defining the facts, and values having inherent factual elements. Specific Arguments against the Fact–Value Dichotomy We briefly summarize four critiques of the fact–value dichotomy in this section to provide a flavor of the criticisms. There are many more (e.g., Dewey, 1926; Fowers, 2022; Gorski, 2013; Taylor, 1985), but we have limited ourselves to four to prevent bloating this chapter. We have kept these summaries brief but interested readers can easily look further for in-depth treatments. Our primary aim is to illustrate that there are multiple perspectives from which this dichotomy has been critiqued and indicate how anemic the defenses of this dichotomy have been. We discuss our preferred, neo-Aristotelian critique of the dichotomy in the next major section of the chapter. A Communitarian Critique Bellah and colleagues (1985) conducted a fascinating study of individualism and commitment in American life from a sociological perspective and identified what they termed “ontological individualism” in scholarly and popular thought. Ontological individualism portrays people as individuals who (1) are ultimately discrete and predate social connections, (2) have social groups and relationships as affiliations that are secondary to their individuality, (3) are egocentrically motivated, and (4) are autonomous. This means that social groups and relationships have the purpose of satisfying individual desires and aims. Ontological individualism promotes a deep psychologism wherein one’s quality of life is defined as the satisfaction of one’s desires and a predominance of positive over negative affect.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Why the Fact–Value Dichotomy Should Be Rejected

155

Individualism’s profound influence on Western lay and professional psychology has been extensively documented as a value position (Cushman, 2019; Danziger, 1990; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1985, 1989). Psychologists generally deny that they have adopted individualism, but the focus on the internal psychology of distinct individuals is apparent from experimental laboratories, to survey research, to the predominance of individual psychotherapy theory and practice to psychological ethics codes. What makes individualism a value position is that it champions individual autonomy and assumes individual rights and dignity as among the most important theoretical and practical values for psychologists. When psychologists espouse individualism, this value commitment prescribes that individuals should be central to theory, research, and practice in psychology. Moreover, individualism renders human phenomena that involve close coordination, mutual identification, and common goods opaque and difficult to grasp. Because individualism is seldom acknowledged, however, its influence goes unrecognized, which is why we go on to discuss it as a disguised ideology. Bellah et al.’s (1985) ultimate point is that social scientists have been flatly unable to separate facts and values. The widespread and unacknowledged influence of the values of individualism signify the failure of psychology’s value neutrality aspiration. A Disguised Ideology Critique Richardson and colleagues (1999) provided the broadest and most systematic discussion of the role of ideology in psychology and its fact–value dichotomy. To begin, an ideology is (1) a set of widely held beliefs (e.g., racism, individualism) that (2) advantage one group over another (e.g., white people over Black people or the powerful over the ordinary citizen), and (3) challenges to the ideology are punished (e.g., jailing, beating, ostracism). Richardson et al. argued that several disguised ideologies guide psychological theory, research, and practice. They focused particularly on individualism and instrumentalism, claiming that these value positions implicitly guide virtually all psychological work and that they are disguised because psychologists are taught to eschew value positions, requiring such value commitments to be submerged in psychological science and practice. This ideological role means that few, if any, psychologists explicitly espouse individualism or instrumentalism. This is partly because they are taught that it is improper to do so (irony intended) and partly because these perspectives are so thoroughly implicit that psychologists seldom even recognize the influences of individualism and instrumentalism.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

156

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

Despite this lack of explicit avowal, Richardson and colleagues (1999) identified deeply held assumptions in psychological theory, research, and practice. Individualist assumptions include the ideas that individuals are the primary social reality, are ultimately egocentrically motivated, and are imbued with autonomy, dignity, and human rights. They also identified instrumentalist assumptions in the pervasive idea that action justification has a means–end structure in psychological theory and research. These authors then argue that individualist and instrumentalist assumptions undermine the goals of psychological work, often perpetuating the very problems psychologists attempt to resolve. For example, Fowers and Richardson (1993) argued that the ubiquitous but largely unspoken aim of cognitive aggression theory is a reduction in aggression. Nevertheless, by portraying aggression as a means–end form of activity, this theory makes it possible to justify aggression whenever it is the most efficient or effective method for reaching an individual’s goals (the ultimate individualist justification). Richardson and colleagues’ ultimate point is that not only have psychologists failed to uphold the fact–value dichotomy, but that the dichotomy itself plays an ideological role in covering up the systematic inclusion of specific value positions. This argument made a strong claim that the attempt to separate facts and values in psychological science is itself untrustworthy because it has led to the widespread inclusion of value positions, which have then been systematically covered up with a patina of “objectivity.” We must add that this argument does not claim that anyone has done this intentionally or even consciously. Ideology guides its practitioners almost entirely unconsciously, as a kind of presupposition (Habermas, 1971). The implicit operation of ideologies makes their detection and amelioration very difficult. As Jon (2021) pointed out, ideological biases are operative pre-epistemically, in that they help to form the context for theory and hypothesis generation, affecting scientific thought from the ground up. The Interdefinition of Facts and Values Critique Putnam (2004) argued that the failure of the logical positivists to conclusively separate facts and values resulted in “the collapse of the fact/value dichotomy” (p. 5). Logical positivism was the reigning philosophy of science in the first half of the twentieth century, and it posited, roughly, that matters of fact are either statements of positive observation or logical statements that are subject to the rules of logic. According to Putnam, Quine (1953) argued, to the satisfaction of most philosophers, that the logical positivist version of science also presupposed values, or at the very

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Why the Fact–Value Dichotomy Should Be Rejected

157

least epistemic (coherence, reasonableness, simplicity) and aesthetic (e.g., beauty, symmetry) values. Some have suggested (e.g., Haack, 1996) that in science, epistemic values are acceptable but ethical values are unacceptable. Alternatively, Putnam argued that even ethical values cannot be ruled out of scientific description. He noted that specific descriptors (e.g., cruelty) are “thick” ethical concepts because they are both descriptive and evaluative, meaning that thick concepts rely (at least implicitly) on a relevant, indispensable ethical viewpoint. Putnam further argued that facts and values are inextricably entangled, and that human life, including science, will entail value commitments in any factual descriptions of that world. Therefore, he asserted that attempts to eliminate value positions from psychological science will represent the world less well than incorporating those value positions because facts and values are inextricably intertwined. The Psychology as a Moral Science Critique Putnam is a philosopher, and his critique of the fact–value dichotomy may seem oblique to many psychologists, but Brinkman (2011) has even more radically and pointedly critiqued the fact–value dichotomy in psychology. He argued that psychology is a moral science in the fullest sense of that term. His main conclusion is that psychology as a discipline “cannot be understood if the moral normativity of the human world is ignored or left out. Psychological phenomena are saturated with morality” (p. 3). The reason for this, Brinkman stated, is that “psychological phenomena are constituted by normative moral orders” with “moral normativity … as a precondition for what we call psychological phenomena, and not as a resulting epiphenomenon of psychological operations” (p. 3). In other words, “morality is not like butter on psychological bread, but rather like the flour that goes into making any psychological bread … all psychological theories are moral theories, and all psychological practices are moral practices” (p. 3). According to Brinkman, the split between “objective” facts and “subjective” morality that underlies the fact–value dichotomy in psychology was part of a larger historical project to render humans as scientific objects, similarly to how physical entities (e.g., chemicals, galaxies) are scientific objects. Success in this endeavor was premised on making morality subjective, which he traced back to Rousseau and Hume, who helped to psychologize morality and much of human life. In contrast, Brinkman (2011) argued that value terms identify features of the real human world: They are necessary for self-understanding and indispensable to scientific psychology. This is because “there are certain objective moral values (e.g., truthfulness,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

158

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

justice, and respect for rituals) that are presupposed in our having discursive practices at all” (p. 148). Importantly, he pointed out that “[m]ental life is related to reasons (for action, feeling, thinking), and the distinction between good and bad reasons is not to be drawn in terms of subjective states of the agent, but rather in terms of objective moral values” (p. 149). Brinkman argued strongly for including values in psychological science, and even refers to “objective values.” An admirable feature of his argument is locating the intertwining of facts and values squarely in human psychological architecture, meaning that aspiring to a strict fact–value separation is simply not psychologically realistic. We concur with Brinkman’s idea that participation in science involves making value claims and making intersubjective assumptions about value that one could call “objective” (while noting that this is an unhelpfully ambitious and opaque word), but we do not think his argument goes quite far enough. Although he adverts to objective values, he does so as a hedge against relativism and frames this with MacIntyre’s (1981) theory of values as constituting institutional arrangements. We see values and goods being located squarely in human psychology, not only in human institutions. That is, humans are typically inherently valuing creatures who cannot simply set aside the worth of their projects (including science) as we pursue them. As Fowers (2022) put it: “Science is a moral endeavor because humans are designed to care about knowing about the world and knowing accurately” (p. 9). We are motivated to know and understand. That motivation is inextricable from our science because the central goal of science is to know the world as well as possible. Scientists are decidedly and rightly not neutral about that ultimate goal. Brinkman has nicely set the stage for our elaboration of our perspective on the place of values in human life and psychological science. The Neo-Aristotelian Critique of the Fact–Value Dichotomy A great advantage of neo-Aristotelian approaches to virtue is that Aristotle (1999) presented a systematic theory of virtue and values and their inextricable centrality in human life and practices (science included). His theory has been appropriated by contemporary scholars in ways that can guide psychological theory and research (e.g., Fowers, 2005a, 2012; Wright et al., 2021). This theoretical grounding is largely absent in the psychological literature, even though many authors refer to Aristotle without elaborating his views. The core of Aristotle’s (1999) moral psychology is the claim that “every action and choice seem to aim at some good” (1094a 2–4), and,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Why the Fact–Value Dichotomy Should Be Rejected

159

by “every action and choice,” Aristotle would undoubtedly include scientific work. Even skeptics of Aristotle’s claim (e.g., people who think that human action only often or typically aims at some good) can grant that most scientists do aim at some good and that this aim animates their research. Acknowledging that fact encourages us to ask: What is the good that scientific action aims at? If we take the scientific project at anything like face value, one portrayal of the overall good of science is that it provides reliable or trustworthy knowledge of the world, including the human world. If that is correct, then the goal of trustworthy knowledge helps to constitute what we mean by science. Eliminating that goal would render scientific activity incoherent or not worth pursuing.2 We have argued that scientists and scientific institutions typically involve assumptions about both personal and interpersonal values. But how can we tell which value assumptions like this are valid? Is there a nonarbitrary method for identifying what is valuable to humans in general? Aristotle’s answer to this problem was the function argument, which has been systematically integrated with contemporary evolutionary science to describe what is good for humans (Arnhart, 1998; Fowers, 2015). The advantage of the neo-Aristotelian evolutionary view is that it can ground what is good for humans in an evolutionary account of human nature, which makes it an ontological account. There are three reasons not to take that tack here. First, the authors of this book have different views on what the function argument can establish. Second, the function argument has lost favor with many philosophers and is unknown to most psychologists. Third, many scholars will find the evolutionary evidence off-putting. Consequently, we attempt to take a more ecumenical approach to identifying what is good for humans that is amenable to a variety of viewpoints. Our focus is more inductive, relying on a set of empirical results about humans that have strongly entailed values and that are widely endorsed. By linking facts and values in this way, we hope to convince readers that many such linkages exist and that the fact–value dichotomy is a false one. 2

One alternative to the good of science as knowledge is the pragmatist view that the good of science is usefulness (i.e., that science provides useful information to facilitate other human projects). If one takes the pragmatist position, however, this merely adds one or more steps in the role of goals, rather than eliminating the importance of goals. Science becomes a means to some other end (e.g., efficient transportation, government, or education). A second alternative would be some form of the view that science is just part of the power machinations of the contemporary world. But this view raises two problems. First, in this view, science is a means to a different goal: power. Second, seeing science as merely one aspect of power relations does not take it seriously, and few, if any, scientists would accept this characterization.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

160

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

How to Include Values in a Science of Virtue Now that we have summarized the arguments against the fact–value dichotomy, it is incumbent on us to clarify how values can be fruitfully incorporated in the science of virtues. The first answer is that values have always been entwined in psychology (Cushman, 2019; Fowers, 2022; Richardson et al., 1999; Slife & Williams, 1995). But we now go further and argue that additional values, beyond the ones that are typically built into the very nature of the scientific enterprise, can be a very productive element of scientific psychology when they are made explicit. Fact–Value Linkages in Psychology Because the evaluative dimension of psychology has been explicitly eschewed, value commitments tend to be disguised (Richardson et al., 1999). Therefore, fully fledged alternatives to the fact–value dichotomy – such as the one we offer in this chapter – in which psychologists take full and explicit account of the value commitments inherent in their work, are relatively thin on the ground. This subsection explores linkages between facts and values, the advantages of recognizing them, and the vicissitudes of values in psychology. Advantages of Value Inclusion There are at least four advantages of recognizing the place of values in psychological science. First, it means that values need not be disguised and that they are not “merely” subjective. Of course, values can be incorporated unawares as presuppositions, but if they are explicitly acknowledged, the wisdom of relying on them can be challenged. In some cases, the values will be out of place and will therefore be removed (e.g., ethnocentric or androcentric biases). In other cases, the values will be affirmed. In both cases, the presupposed values become undisguised. When scientists affirm values that they think are good, they can do so because those values are choiceworthy in the relation of the values to what is good for human beings (according to our best understanding). In such cases, these values go well beyond subjective preference or personal taste. Of course, accounts of what is good for humans are sometimes based on subjective experiences of pleasure and positive affect alone, but many scholars see them as too thin to provide an adequate account of what is good for humans (e.g., Fowers, 2012; Ryff, 1989; Taylor, 1985). Moreover, the potential biases of subjectively

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How to Include Values in a Science of Virtue

161

grounded values are precisely why value incorporation has been seen as so problematic. Therefore, subjectively grounded values are both questionable based on the worry about biases and insufficient in undergirding choiceworthiness. Another basis for value incorporation is needed, and we suggest that this basis resides in the elements of life that are demonstrably good for human beings. We discuss goods such as friendship, justice, and social order in Chapter 10. We think it is likely true that these are human goods because humans are profoundly social creatures, whose quality of life is typically partly constituted by having friendships, experiencing and practicing fairness, and having a relatively orderly society (Fowers, 2015). That is, pursuing loving relationships and social belonging are not merely randomly and arbitrarily chosen values. Rather, they are choices that typical humans are strongly inclined to make because we are social creatures. Of course, these goods have been interpreted in many ways, so there is no singular correct form of friendship, justice, or social order. The most important point for now is that human goods cannot be boiled down to random and arbitrary values. As we argue in Chapter 10, science can test empirically tractable hypotheses about virtues and the participation in specific activities and relationships being good for human beings. These are hypotheses about virtues and activities having a kind of nonarbitrary value (which philosophers call prudential value). Second, an account of what is good for humans does not constitute a set of imperatives, which is a common contemporary way to see morality. Rather, the account clarifies what typically enables humans to enjoy well-being or flourishing and invites people to pursue flourishing if they decide to. This way of understanding values does not carry the baggage of imperative ethics, with the threat of coercion and the idea that the values can or should be imposed on others. Third, it sources the human good in the kinds of beings that humans are, based on substantial empirical support that, ideally, has been derived from large and culturally varied samples. This is necessary because there are many theories of human nature (cf. Stevenson et al., 2017), and a major worry about any proposed “objective” account of human values is that the account may be simply based on the values that the authors happen to favor (subjectively or culturally). Requiring empirical support reduces (but, of course, does not eliminate) the risk that the list will comprise the favored values of the authors. In addition, empirical inquiry into what is good for humans is unlikely to generate an account of human goods that is recalcitrantly alien to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

162

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

ordinary people. If value claims are grounded in observations of ordinary people, rather than derived from an abstract conception, the basis of those claims will likely be more congenial to ordinary people. Fourth, there are many human values, and these values are continually being reinterpreted. This indicates that human values are manifold and open-ended rather than unitary or determinate. There is unlikely be a singular, correct way to live. The process of making the variety of value commitments explicit and empirically testing hypotheses related to them can itself allay contemporary fears that a list of human goods and values will be used to dictate how one should live. Values and Their Vicissitudes in Psychology Ultimately, it is important to remember that the fact–value dichotomy was created, not discovered. It is useful only if it leads us to a better description of the human world than scientific accounts that accommodate both factually and value-based claims. The many critiques of the ideal of value freedom make it clear that this ideal is thoroughly contested and difficult to defend. Proponents of the value-free ideal have extensive work to do to make a case for that view. We suggest that the demonstration of linkages between facts and values clarifies that there are no necessary bright lines between factual and valuable accounts of many aspects of the human world. These linkages are especially apparent in well-being research, but they can be easily identified in many domains of psychological research (Fowers, 2022; Richardson et al., 1999). We follow Alexandrova’s deep dive into well-being research but note that all of these points apply equally well to virtue research. We discuss the values inherent in well-being research as a prelude to our discussion of three aspects of life that seem to contribute to human well-being in the next section. In her development of a philosophy for the scientific study of well-being, Alexandrova (2017) argued that there are many constructs that include mixed claims, which she defined as claims that have both an empirical basis and include a moral, prudential, or political value judgment. Her focus was on well-being, but a similar argument can be applied to health, longevity, and other quality-of-life variables.3 She argued that studying well-being and other quality-of-life variables begins with value judgments 3

Of course, it is possible to conjure counterexamples of the possible disvalue of any of these variables, but we are not attempting to make a case for the absolute and universal value of these variables. Rather, our interest is in seeing these variables as, ceteris paribus, good for people. This involves obtaining the kind of evidence found in the social sciences of substantial correlations or group differences supportive of relations among variables rather than claims of universal truth.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How to Include Values in a Science of Virtue

163

(e.g., well-being is an important variable to understand) and continues throughout the scientific process (choices about the specific construct of well-being, sampling, measures, research design, interpretation, and the application of results). She suggested that attempting to remove value judgments from any phase of science would unravel the construct of wellbeing because those value judgments partly constitute the construct. That is, well-being is a choiceworthy aim and studying it requires methods and choices that have fidelity to that aim. Well-being is generally a clearly desirable state, but researchers typically study it through subjective methods (e.g., self-reports of positive emotion, satisfaction, or flourishing), generally rendering well-being a thoroughly psychologized concept. This seems to preserve the researcher’s neutrality about well-being by focusing on the participant’s perception of a positive state. A scholar can plausibly argue that the respondent is the sole authority for reports on the quality of her life. Yet this preservation of investigator neutrality comes at the cost of the limits of self-reports (e.g., social desirability, positive illusions, low correlations with less subjective measures). A person can easily be mistaken about her well-being, either overestimating it due to ignorance or bias or underestimating it due to excessive expectations or unreasonable negativity. It is unusual for investigators to use nonsubjective assessments of well-being. Some psychologists (e.g., Biswas-Diener et al., 2009) believe they can study well-being without committing to a value position by defining it entirely subjectively, in terms of pleasure or positive emotion. Alexandrova (2017) clarifies that this subjectification is itself a value judgment, in part because there are two other widely endorsed ways to understand wellbeing: life satisfaction and flourishing. Investigators must choose among these alternatives, and this choice entails a value commitment to some portrayal of what is good for humans. Our point is not that there is a correct, “objective” way of understanding well-being that can be ascertained with appropriate measures or methods. Rather, we are suggesting that any measurement of well-being includes value commitments, and that this is built into the concept of well-being. It is also interesting that even as they subjectify well-being, researchers in this domain typically and erroneously assume that well-being is universally understood and valued (Fowers et al., 2023). One reason that they may demur from justifying that assumption is because doing so would require the explicit expression of their own value commitments regarding well-being.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

164

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

Psychologists seem generally unaware that the study of entirely subjective evaluations of well-being and the choices about using specific measures of well-being are themselves contentious evaluative decisions. In addition to choosing a specific form of well-being to study, choosing self-report measures of positive emotion, life satisfaction, or flourishing is an implicit claim that subjective evaluation is the ultimate arbiter of well-being. Because these claims are implicit, they are very hard to recognize and critique, but making the subjective evaluation of psychological experience virtually the only marker of well-being is straight out of the individualistic playbook (Richardson et al., 1999). Therefore, by attempting to avoid value commitments in research, psychologists have unselfconsciously and inadvertently endorsed the values of individualism, a rather self-defeating outcome. Unfortunately, psychologists seldom recognize the import of their methods’ choices. This approach to well-being not only makes the individual the centerpiece, but it also portrays this as a scientific fact, which is very difficult to question within the science and is then taken as the truth by research consumers, which is a rather pernicious way to obscure one’s value commitments. Another approach to avoiding value commitments in well-being research is the use of euphemisms. Euphemisms include terms such as functionality, maturity, or adaptiveness and use of them can cover up value commitments rather than avoid them. The veneer of neutrality is pierced by simply asking what is meant by these terms. When one asks, for instance, what constitutes functionality or adaptiveness, the scholar’s values are revealed (e.g., self-efficacy, flexible problem-solving, self-direction). A third way to avoid value commitments is to advert to simple facts, such as health and mortality. There are many nonsubjective indicators of health (e.g., vital signs, inflammatory markers). Such physical indicators can be precisely measured physiologically, and mortality can be directly assessed in terms of longevity. We strongly endorse the broadening of well-being measurement to include such indicators because they help us to transcend self-report as the core metric. Although the concepts of health and mortality are, to a significant degree, observable facts, it is also vital to recognize that they are also strongly valued. Health is an excellent example of a fact that is also a value, as Aristotle might have pointed out. Our point is that health and longevity are very important values that should not be positioned entirely on the side of brute facts. One way to obviate the fact–value dichotomy is to acknowledge health and mortality as both the factual and value-laden concepts that they are.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How to Include Values in a Science of Virtue

165

Three Contributors to Well-Being Scores of studies have investigated the three conceptions of well-being (positive affect, life satisfaction, and flourishing) identified by Alexandrova (2017) and Haybron (2013). Substantial evidence and general agreement suggest that many actions are associated with, predict, and, in some cases, cause well-being, health, longevity, and other quality-of-life indicators. These activities seem good for humans because they appear to promote human welfare in various ways. We provide three examples of such activities. First, humans’ well-being is positively related to being embedded in social networks (Fowler & Christakis, 2008; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010) and perceiving and being perceived as belonging to a group or groups (Fowers, 2015; Pancheva & Vásquez, 2022). In contrast, feelings of exclusion, loneliness, and isolation are causal influences on ill-being, illness, and mortality (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2014; Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008). Therefore, we suggest that belonging is a crucial concern for humans that is both empirically describable and of significant value to people (i.e., both a fact and a value). Second, close relationships, including friendships, family relationships, and romantic relationships, have strong associations with life satisfaction (Lee & Ono, 2012; Robles et al., 2014), positive affect (Demir & Özdemir, 2010), flourishing (Fowers et al., 2016), health, and longevity (Miller et al., 2013; Robles et al., 2014). Simply having close relationships is positively related to these quality-of-life indicators, but the relationships are considerably stronger when the quality of the relationship is correlated with the quality of life (Miller et al., 2013). As just noted, when individuals are not involved in close relationships, they languish and experience ill-health. Third, despite the century-long drumbeat of psychological theorizing about egocentricity as the fundamental human motivation, people obviously, frequently, and intentionally act to benefit others (Crocker et al., 2017; Keltner et al., 2014). The renewed interest in other-benefiting in psychology and its relationship to virtue science is worthy of an extended discussion. Beneficial action is most common with family members, friends, and people in personal relationships, but some other-benefiting4 occurs with strangers as well. Other-benefiting is so widespread that individuals 4

It is important to note that we do not see “other-benefiting” as synonymous with “altruism,” because the latter tends to assume a self-interest–other-interest dichotomy. We think this is another false dichotomy because many, if not most, actions intentionally and obviously benefit both the actor and others (Calder et al., 2022). We also prefer the more descriptive term “other-benefiting” to the more common term “prosocial.” Prosociality often includes altruism as one of its modalities and typically disregards the actor’s intentions (Keltner et al., 2014).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

166

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

commonly deliver mildly costly benefits to strangers even in the strange setting of psychology laboratories (Lefevor et al., 2017). Neither laboratory nor field experimental research is consistent with the presumption of egocentricity (e.g., Dunn et al., 2008; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Nor does survey research confirm it, whether singletimepoint surveys (e.g., Le et al., 2018), longitudinal research (e.g., Crocker et al., 2010), or large international surveys (e.g., Aknin et al., 2013). Several prominent theoretical syntheses have also contested the egocentricity thesis. Keltner and colleagues (2014) summarized that “[k]indness, it seems, may very well be a basic instinct” (p. 430). Crocker et al. (2017) concurred and theorized “otherish motivation,” and Hare (2017) entitled his review of the literature “The Survival of the Friendliest.” These authors recognize that people can be motivated egocentrically, but they document at least two kinds of motivation: self-interested and other-interested. They also contend that people may be motivated to benefit others at least as often as being motivated by self-interest. Crocker et al.’s (2017) focus on the relationship between “otherish motivation” and well-being is of special interest. They established that “the assumption of self-interest pervades the social sciences, particularly economics and psychology” but “empirical research suggests that this assumption is wrong or at least overstated” (p. 300). This result also follows from Richardson et al.’s (1999) contention that the value position of individualism may lead to erroneous conclusions. Crocker et al. (2017) suggested “that concern for others, or otherishness … is as much a part of human nature as selfishness” (p. 301). They documented that benefiting others predicts many benefits to the actor (e.g., happiness, meaning, relationship bonding, physical health) and reduces psychological distress and mortality. “In contrast, selfishness does not appear to foster psychological well-being, physical health, or healthy relationships” (Crocker et al., 2017, p. 316). Kindness appears to be cross-culturally prevalent, as Aknin et al. (2013) documented in 136 cultures. Similarly, Tomasello (2019) also documents a pervasive inclination for very young children to be helpful, even to strangers. Infants and toddlers seem to be intrinsically motivated to help other persons almost indiscriminately.5 5

Although bystander studies seem to contradict this pervasive helpfulness, the apparent help-dampening effects of bystanders occurs primarily when the bystanders are experimental stooges who are constrained from helping and therefore model passivity in the face of distress (Fischer et al., 2011). When research participants know the bystanders, the participants are actually more likely to help someone in need (Fischer et al., 2011). Moreover, in hundreds of studies, over 40 percent of the participants offer help to strangers when there is no incentive for doing so (Lefevor et al., 2017).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How to Include Values in a Science of Virtue

167

Are Virtues Just Instances of Prosocial Behavior? Because virtues so often benefit others, many think it reasonable to see virtue research as a subfield of the prosocial behavior research domain. Currently, the concepts and empirical research on both prosociality and virtue are in their infancy, and no authoritative version of either research domain exists. Therefore, it is at least premature to combine them, and it is preferable to retain virtue science and prosocial research as separate but related research domains until there is evidence to the contrary. In addition, Fowers and colleagues (2021) delineated seven differentiae of prosociality and virtue that render them distinct research domains. We focus here on how the two research domains address the fact–value dichotomy differently. Prosociality researchers generally attempt to retain the dichotomy in their typical focus solely on the actor’s behavior that happens to generate benefits to another person. That is, prosociality researchers typically define benefit without reference to the actor’s intentions. For them, prosocial behavior occurs whether the actor is motivated to help or harm another person, or even if the actor is oblivious to the other’s benefit or harm. This allows investigators to retain their self-portrayal as neutral about whether benefiting others is of value. Yet the move to maintain this investigative neutrality has confused the concept of prosociality because an action can be counted as prosocial even if one intended to harm the other person. Conversely, if a person attempts to benefit someone else but fails, this does not count as prosocial. Moreover, the question of whether an action is beneficial is a matter of perspective. It may seem beneficial from the actor’s viewpoint or from a third-person perspective, but the recipient of the “prosocial” behavior may see it as harmful or offensive. For example, unwanted and unnecessary physical “help” given to a person with a physical disability is often experienced as offensive rather than helpful. Therefore, the concept of prosociality is more confusing than clarifying. In contrast to prosociality researchers’ avoidance of motivation and intention, these constructs are definitive of virtues. This is important because acting virtuously means that one is acting for the right reasons, and inadvertent or accidental other-benefiting would not qualify as virtuous action even though it would count as prosocial behavior. The inability to differentiate intentional and unintentional benefiting is a serious shortcoming created by the arm’s length distance from values that prosociality researchers typically maintain in their research. In addition, prosociality researchers generally emphasize physical or external causal sources of other-benefiting behavior (Keltner et al., 2014), whereas virtue researchers are more focused on the actor’s choices or

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

168

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

agency as sources of virtue. The element of agency is important in virtue research because virtuous action is moral in nature, and morality requires agency, according to many virtue theorists. Virtues are generally and explicitly understood as choiceworthy characteristics because they contribute to a flourishing life. We see this as one of the primary predictions of our virtue perspective (hypothesis 6-1). We also hypothesize that individuals cultivate virtues for the sake of living well (hypothesis 6-2), which naturally includes substantial other-benefiting (hypothesis 6-3). This also indicates that virtue traits may be acquired through training and practice (hypothesis 4-16). Neither the concept of choiceworthiness nor the idea of intentional personal development is given much play in the prosociality literature. Although there are significant differences between prosociality and virtue science, we want to also acknowledge the substantial overlap in these research domains. Both domains recognize inclinations among humans to act in socially salutary ways that are characteristic of our species. Both also recognize the positive association of socially beneficial action and the actor’s welfare. Both domains recognize multiple influences on moral behavior, despite emphasizing different sources. Finally, both perspectives acknowledge that situational factors are important to other-benefiting. Additionally, we acknowledge that there are multiple perspectives on prosociality research. Some researchers call for more multidimensional considerations of prosociality, arguing that the intent to benefit is a crucial component in making a behavior prosocial; they also consider motivational factors and agency (e.g., Padilla-Walker & Carlo, 2014). We are simply pointing out, however, that these factors are generally less at the forefront of prosociality research, whereas we consider them integral to virtue research. Our view is that the differences in how these two research domains address the fact–value dichotomy tend to be definitive of the two approaches. We recognize that our argument about values in scientific research may not convince everyone, but this discussion is yet another instance of both the pervasive influence of the dichotomy and how standard psychological theory and research retain it even when aiming to investigate value-laden topics. All three examples of the study of value-laden topics (social belonging, close relationships, and other-benefiting) can be more clearly, extensively, and accurately described with value inclusion than with value exclusion. We suggest that these instances exemplify the advantages of value inclusion, and now turn to how values can be fruitfully included in psychological science.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Can We Study the Facts and the Values of Virtues?

169

How Can We Study both the Facts and the Values of Virtues? Many scholars have claimed that psychology and other social science disciplines are value-imbued (e.g., Fowers, 2022; Richardson et al., 1999; Slife & Williams, 1995; Smith, 2015; Taylor, 1985), and most recommend that researchers explicitly identify their value commitments. But how would this work? One worry is that this might just open these scientific disciplines up to endless value debate that will ultimately lead to interminable disagreements based on personal preferences and ideologies. The worry is that unless we can render our science entirely “objective,” we will find ourselves in an endless morass of subjective opinion and preference. The anxiety about this possibility helps to motivate the fact–value dichotomy. If it were possible to neatly divide the human world into clean, brute objective facts on the one hand and subjective desires, preferences, and opinions on the other, the worry about subjectivity overtaking science might be legitimate. It follows from our argument in this chapter, however, that the objectivity–subjectivity dichotomy is also a false one. We have discussed how research topics have ineliminable subjective aspects. But subjective elements also abound in apparently objective psychological research methods despite the extraordinary efforts of so many brilliant psychologists to eliminate subjectivity (Alexandrova, 2017; Fowers, 2022; Schwartz, 2022). Many scholars have pointed out that decisions about which populations and samples to study, the choice of methods, and the interpretation of results are premised on decisions made by researchers for personal, pragmatic, or theoretically preferred reasons, although they are typically described as simple, apparently objective methods (Danziger, 1990; Guthrie, 2004; Richardson et al., 1999; Slife & Williams, 1995; Thalmayer et al., 2021). Examples of the inclusion of subjective choices and value commitments are ubiquitous in psychological research. Generally, those choices and commitments are disguised, but sometimes investigators discuss their choices and commitments directly (e.g., Morgan et al., 2017; Ng & Tay, 2020; Tudge et al., 2018). We give several pertinent examples of the beneficial role of making value commitments explicit in psychological science and questioning those values. Then we provide a general account of how facts and values can coexist fruitfully in psychological science.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

170

The Place of Values in Virtue Science Examples of Productive Scientific Valuing

One example of the fruitfulness of explicit scientific valuing has recently come to light in well-being research. Values arise in choices of populations and samples because Western, educated samples predominate (Hendriks et al., 2019), with a strong oversampling of college students in the USA. Although this sampling bias is pragmatically understandable, its implications are potentially stark. If our knowledge of well-being is restricted to such samples, does that mean that the prevailing model of well-being in Western, affluent societies is the objectively correct one for the entire world? Or is the implication that well-being is only relevant to Western populations? Both implications are clearly unacceptable, but this exemplifies how methods decisions (sampling) include inescapable evaluative concomitants. (The same critique has been lodged about psychological research in general by Henrich et al., [2010].) More importantly, recognizing sample bias clarifies how raising value questions can aid us in conducting better research. The outcome of this questioning has been to encourage well-being researchers to cast a much wider sampling net, and many scholars recognize that this necessarily includes assessments of well-being that have not been used with Western samples (Lambert et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2021; We¸ ziak-Białowolska et al., 2019). Similarly, the questions we raised about the prevalence of self-report research on well-being suggest that more multidimensional measurement should be included in future research to obviate the self-report biases and individualism inherent in this dominant approach (Lambert et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2021). Efforts are currently underway to ameliorate these sampling and subjectivist biases (e.g., Fowers, Novak, Kiknadze, & Calder, 2022; Fowers et al., 2023a). This example seems to corroborate our claim that addressing value commitments can have salutary effects on research progress. Many important questions related to evaluations have been raised in virtue research as well. The first is whether the concept and practice of virtue is ultimately self-interested. That is, is it self-centered and self-serving to cultivate virtue? This question has pushed virtue scholars to clarify that virtues always have a socially valuable element and serve to benefit both the person cultivating the virtue and those affected by it (e.g., Fowers, 2016). Simple examples include generosity, honesty, and fairness. This question also calls for research on the degree to which virtues are otherbenefiting (hypothesis 6-3) or relationship-benefiting (hypothesis 6-4). The question about whether virtues are essentially self-interested has been

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

How Can We Study the Facts and the Values of Virtues?

171

productive in calling for virtue investigators to clarify whether virtues are beneficial to both the agent and to other people proximal to the agent. This is important because some early formulations of virtues were markedly individualistic (e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Peterson & Seligman, 2004), contrary to our reading of virtue theorists. A more specific example is the virtue of loyalty. An important question is sometimes raised: Is being loyal an invitation to being exploited in personal relationships such as marriage or by employers (e.g., Tessman, 2005)? This question has pushed virtue scholars to clarify that virtues are moderate expressions of personal strengths, with the extremes of deficiency and excess as problematic. This is especially important because most virtue scales are written with the assumption that “more is better” (Ng & Tay, 2020). But this is countered by the understanding that strong adherence to an exploitive relationship partner or organization may well be blind allegiance rather than loyalty. Work has only just begun on measuring virtues as the appropriate degree of strength expression (see Ng & Tay, 2020; Wright et al., 2021). Hypothesis 6-5 calls for research assessing virtues as moderate expressions of a strength that contrast with the excesses and deficiencies associated with those strengths. It is fruitful for this kind of question to be raised because it challenges virtue measurement to be truer to the underlying theory rather than adopting a simplistic “more is better” approach. Focusing on the appropriate response to a given situation, in contrast to a “more is better” approach, also highlights the centrality of practical wisdom in virtue theory and research. Renewed attention (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Fowers et al., 2021; Grossman et al., 2020; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024) to this neglected topic is shedding light on how choices about action need to be guided by the ability to recognize the moral demands of a situation, to adjudicate incompatible demands, to guide actions with good reasons, and to have a reasonably clear idea about how to promote goodness (Kristjánsson et al., 2021). These examples indicate how value-related questions can help improve diverse research domains. A General Account of the Place of Values in Virtue Research Our considered viewpoint is that values and evaluative stances are necessary and ineluctable in virtue science (and more generally in psychological science). We view it as implausible to study virtues as strengths of character that may be inherently related to eudaimonia without, at the same time, thinking that having knowledge about these matters is valuable and at least

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

172

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

potentially beneficial. The question is, how do we propose to pursue these value-imbued topics in a way that is respectful of both science and the various value commitments people have? The answer is that science does not require the fact–value dichotomy, because facts and values are consistently intertwined and because science can and should tackle hypotheses that are suggested by various philosophies and evaluative worldviews. Denying the dichotomy does not obviate the distinction, however. It remains important for psychologists to be able to recognize and address their value assumptions, while we continue to theorize, investigate, and practice psychology. Just as there are empirical questions and conceptual questions, there are factual questions (e.g., the high school graduation rate) and value questions (e.g., the priority of secondary education to individuals and to a community). In a basic way, including evaluative questions in our science is simple. It requires only that we recognize that accurately describing human psychology means including rather than excluding value commitments. Our approach includes an openness to evidence and argument regarding value questions, whether it favors or undermines one’s views, and a willingness to subject all of one’s views to critical scrutiny, including the value commitments entailed in one’s work. It remains important to retain the conceptual distinction between facts and values so that both can be questioned and refined properly. In broad terms, we advocate rethinking the facts as we understand them in terms of our values and our values as we understand them in terms of the facts we come to know. When psychologists explicitly own their value commitments, those commitments can be scrutinized, debated, and reformulated in open intellectual discourse. We provided several productive examples of such discourse in the previous section. This scrutiny serves the salutary end of reducing the self-serving and ideological biases that everyone recognizes as problematic. Of course, perspectives, procedures, and practices for this form of mutual critique must be developed. Authors, editors, reviewers, and readers will need to learn to understand and practice this form of critique. But it is no different, in principle, from the theoretical or methods critiques that form the bulk of peer review processes, and the peer review process provides an essential forum for this kind of critique (in addition to comments on one’s own and others’ published work). In our view, this kind of openness to others’ viewpoints and to allowing one’s value commitments to be questioned and evaluated is a higher form of science than the attempt at value neutrality. Longino (1990) made a similar recommendation for recognizing and critiquing value commitments in science in general. She noted four

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Conclusion

173

requirements for a scientific community to recognize and critique their inevitable value commitments: (1) there are public venues for open criticism; (2) scientists attend to critics and change their practices, if appropriate; (3) there are public standards for assessing criticism; and (4) critics are accorded intellectual standing so that they are not dismissed out of hand. Longino suggested that failing to include this kind of dialogue undermines the trustworthiness of science. Jon (2021) advocated making “social discussion constitutive of objectivity” (p. 44). In her exploration of the science of well-being, Alexandrova (2017) proposed three “rules” for incorporating values (which can also be applied to other social science domains). She suggested that researchers should (1) make their value presuppositions explicit, (2) evaluate whether their empirical claims are robust to alternative value positions, and (3) if the claims are not robust, engage in inclusive deliberation (including scientists, critics, and the concerned community) about the facts and values. Like Longino and Alexandrova, the evaluation bullet-biter perspective we advocate recommends that scholars explicitly reveal their value commitments so that those commitments can be challenged by alternative viewpoints, just as factual claims are challenged. This openness to questioning is key to any reasonable science of the human world. The goal is not to attempt to eliminate investigator values. Rather, we recommend that researchers and reviewers assess the researcher’s values in choices about topics, methods, analyses, and interpretations, and evaluate the validity of those choices from alternative perspectives. A second worry that animates the fact–value dichotomy is that incorporating values in science will result in a prescriptive psychology. This worry strikes us as baseless because there is little, if any, coercive prescriptivism among evaluation bullet-biters. Although some evaluation bullet-biters recognize the legitimacy and inevitability of discussions of better and worse ways to act and live (Richardson et al., 1999; Smith, 2015; Taylor, 1985), not all do so (e.g., Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009). Moreover, virtually no one claims to have identified any definitively final answers to questions about how best to live. We are not aware of any psychological scholar who directly prescribes what is moral or immoral. Therefore, this worry can be set aside.

Conclusion We have argued that the metaphysical concept underlying the fact–value dichotomy is fundamentally flawed and need not preclude virtue research, either as a description of research participants’ behaviors and perceptions

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

174

The Place of Values in Virtue Science

or in the evaluation bullet-biter mode. In any case, the fact–value dichotomy has been widely questioned, clarifying that it has not been universally accepted. Following this discussion, our conclusion is that the fact–value dichotomy should be set aside in favor of a form of objectivity in which investigators acknowledge their value commitments and subject those commitments to the same sort of criticism that peer reviews already provide. We recognize that this would be a substantial revision in how psychological science is understood, but we believe that this more expansive approach is a vital part of the continuing maturation of psychology as a science. Moreover, expanding our science to include explicitly owning and questioning our value commitments is an indispensable element of a virtue science that is worth having.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Part III

Organizing Virtue Research with the STRIVE-4 Model

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 7

Virtues as Scalar Traits

As we have highlighted throughout the book, a major challenge for a ­science of virtue is the early stages of the effective collaboration between philosophers and psychologists. Philosophers tend to focus on descriptions of virtue and explanations for their role in human life, but their work is sufficiently abstract to limit its application for empirical study, often because they propose moral theories that are unrealistic for human beings. Psychologists, in contrast, tend to empirically study virtues in isolation, and tend to lack in-depth theory and conceptualizations of those virtues to guide their work and incorporate those studies into a richer account of virtue. Our inspiration for proposing the STRIVE-4 Model is to bridge the interdisciplinary gap with a philosophically informed, systematic, and empirically tractable model of virtue. As highlighted in Chapter 1, this model is designed to be ecumenical, focusing on elements of virtue that are widely agreed upon by virtue theorists, but it is also designed to encourage the scientific investigation of contentious and interesting hypotheses that are suggested by different virtue traditions. In particular, it highlights hypotheses endorsed by neo-Aristotelian theorists (Broadie, 1991; Fowers, 2005a; Kristjánsson, 2013; Snow, 2010). Of the many hypotheses we outline in this book, some will be disconfirmed in empirical study. Others will garner some support. Still others will be partially accurate but need revision considering empirical data. As with any testable model, it is important to retain empirical openness to adjusting the model considering ongoing research. In this chapter, we begin our empirical review of the STRIVE-4 Model. As previously mentioned, the acronym stands for Scalar Traits that are Role sensitive, including situation by trait Interactions, and are related to important Values that constitute Eudaimonia (human flourishing). The 4 major components of virtue are knowledge, behavior, emotion/motivation, and practical wisdom. In this chapter, we highlight empirical evidence showing the value of virtues conceptualized as scalar traits. 177

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

178

Virtues as Scalar Traits

The STRIVE-4 Model of Virtues and Its Research Agenda The philosopher of science Carl Hempel (1961) pointed out that many sciences begin to study the phenomena of interest through qualitative categories, but then shift to a more dimensional or scalar approach, as more accurate measurement and better theory indicate that a dimensional portrayal provides a better understanding of the phenomena. Psychologists have approached virtues in a quantitative way as a matter of course. Quantification is deeply engrained in psychology, but it remains important to explicitly frame virtues as scalar concepts and to explore that framing. Social scientists and their philosophical collaborators (e.g., Morgan et al., 2017; Wright et  al., 2021) have increasingly adopted that explicit scalar framing, focusing on how individuals vary in the degree to which they have a virtue. Many philosophers turn to empirical psychology in order to understand the realistic virtues that ordinary people have and talk about, but others bracket questions about the nature and value of realistic virtues. They tend to offer critiques of ordinary thought and practice while proposing demanding moral ideals – including black and white, nonscalar ideals of virtue – that few human beings will realistically understand and instantiate. But for the purposes of virtue science, which aims to shed light on realistic virtues and ordinary human evaluative practice, we think that even these ambitious philosophers can agree that it is best to conceive of virtues as scalar traits. For one thing, if we conceive of realistic virtue traits as scalable then we are able to measure them. To document attempts at measuring various virtues, we review dozens of studies that highlight their measurability. As mentioned in Chapter 1, we do not aim to present a definitive list of virtues, as a canonical list of virtues is both improbable and impractical. Instead, we highlight previously studied virtues in empirical research. In this chapter, we also provide additional empirical evidence concerning whether virtues constitute traits. As highlighted in Chapters 1 and 5, we define virtue traits as desirable, acquired characteristics that are often taken to be chosen and cultivated as habits. As we discuss the measurability and traitness of virtues in the STRIVE-4 Model, we make general quantitative predictions that extend from it.1 Some predictions already have support; some predictions require additional research; some predictions have indirect support from bodies of research not explicitly intended to study virtue; and some predictions have not been tested. We see 1

We have highlighted a number of hypotheses from the STRIVE-4 Model in a previous work (Fowers et al., 2021). Although Part III of this book has overlap with that journal article, our review and commentary of the literature has greater depth here and includes some updates.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The STRIVE-4 Model of Virtues and Its Research Agenda

179

the hypotheses we highlight as applying to many frequently studied virtues (e.g., gratitude, generosity, justice, kindness, honesty), giving our model wide scope. The proposed hypotheses are listed in Figure 1. We include a list of the studies evaluating our predictions in this section of the book. Scalar Virtues When first reading Aristotle (1999), one might agree with the Stoics (Brennan, 2005) that the transition to virtue is total and sudden: a matter of category rather than continuity. A psychological approach, however, frames virtue in scalar terms, meaning that individuals have virtues to a greater or lesser extent. In Chapter 1, we highlighted the key assumption that, as humans, we cannot expect anyone to develop perfect virtues. Someone could hypothetically show virtue more in some areas of life than others, and also demonstrate virtue on some occasions more than others, while still being considered as having a significant degree of the virtue trait (cf. Russell, 2009). For example, someone may be more generous at home than at school. Someone may be more generous in a romantic relationship than in a business relationship. Despite some fluctuation in generosity across situations, the person might still be considered generally and consistently generous. The initial prerequisite for a quantitative science of virtue is that virtues can be measured, and there is a growing body of evidence that this is possible. This measurement has been approached in many ways, four of which we discuss in this subsection on the scalar feature of virtues. First, we discuss attempts to capture virtues with self-report measures. This is an area of research that has some weaknesses but provides an important starting point through the establishment of reliability and construct validity of virtue measurement. Second, a question that many psychologists have about the scalar virtue measurement is its potential overlap with personality characteristics. Fortunately, a growing body of evidence highlights the distinctness of virtues and personality dimensions. We discuss several studies that indicate expected moderate correlations between personality measures and virtue measures, suggesting that they are related but distinct. We also consider studies that indicate the incremental validity of virtues in predicting outcomes of interest after taking personality into account. Third, we discuss concerns about social desirability, a common worry in empirical virtue research. As participants rate their agreement with statements constituting a virtue, they are likely to recognize that agreeing with the statement would reflect positively on them. Fortunately, several

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

180

Virtues as Scalar Traits

researchers have taken social desirability into account in their research efforts, and their results indicate only a modest link between social desirability and self-reported virtue. Therefore, social desirability does not seem to be an insurmountable obstruction to virtue research. Fourth, we discuss informant reports of virtue. These informant reports have shown some convergence with self-reported virtue while also showing enough distinction to highlight the importance of assessing virtue through informants’ perspectives. These studies are less common than self-report survey research, but the available studies highlight their unique value. Overall, this research on the scalability of virtue measurement confirms the prediction that virtues are scalar or measurable (hypothesis 7-1). Self-Reported Virtues Because self-report is the easiest and simplest form of measurement, it is typically the first form of assessment for an area of research. Self-report measurement can help to assess whether a topic warrants more arduous research efforts. Successfully establishing self-report measures requires two things: scale reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the quantitative consistency in how scale items hold together in forming a larger construct (i.e., each item in a scale is strongly correlated with other items) or to the consistency of measurement over time. Construct validity refers to the scale being related to other measures in theoretically expected ways. Assessments of the utility of measurement in quantitative work include reliability and construct validity evaluations, which tell us how much confidence we can have that a scale is assessing what we want to capture. Efforts have been conducted to establish the reliability and construct validity of scales designed to capture virtues. Survey studies abound for many virtues. Most studies include single-timepoint, global measurement (about which we say more later) of a virtue and associations with various other-benefiting and well-being measures. We would expect virtue scales to relate to scales assessing happiness, well-being, and other-benefiting, among other things. We detail empirical research on courage, justice sensitivity, gratitude, kindness, compassion, forgiveness, and humility to illustrate the empirical support highlighting the utility of scalar virtue measurement. Courage Courage is a commonly cited characteristic. Some have referred to courage specifically in virtue terms (e.g., Pury & Kowalski, 2007; Sekerka et al., 2009; Woodard & Pury, 2007), but others have not (e.g., Norton & Weiss, 2009;

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The STRIVE-4 Model of Virtues and Its Research Agenda

181

Woodard, 2004). These researchers have created several self-report measures of courage (Norton & Weiss, 2009; Pury & Kowalski, 2007; Sekerka et al., 2009; Woodard, 2004; Woodard & Pury, 2007). Norton and Weiss (2009) created a twelve-item measure that had good internal reliability in two time points (T1 α = 0.88, T2 α = 0.92). The authors also reported no significant mean difference over three weeks and a moderate test–retest correlation (r = 0.66). Some scales have also focused on courage in specific contexts. Woodard and Pury (2007) developed subscales for courage in work/employment, patriotic/religion-based belief systems, and specific social-moral-based, independent-based or family-based courage. Sekerka and colleagues (2009) developed a scale specifically for courage in the professional environment; some researchers distinguished between general courage (actions courageous for anyone) and personal courage (actions courageous only in the context of an individual’s life) (Pury & Kowalski, 2007). At this point, little research has assessed how courage is linked to outcomes, but Pury and Kowalski (2007) found that courage was linked to VIA strengths of persistence, bravery, integrity, and kindness. Also, Norton and Weiss (2009) found that self-reported courage was related to overcoming a fear of spiders. Justice Justice has been studied primarily with the moral trait of Justice Sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 2010). Justice Sensitivity reflects affective reactions to injustice, though the creators of the measure do not refer to it explicitly in virtue terms. One study (Schmitt et al., 2005) found that scales assessing Justice Sensitivity toward victims, observers, and beneficiaries were highly reliable (αs = 0.95, 0.97, 0.96, respectively). They also reported that trait consistency (rs = 0.60, 0.60, 0.63, respectively) was higher than occasion specificity (rs = 0.33, 0.36, 0.32, respectively). Schmitt and colleagues (2010) also reported construct validity evidence for these three scales assessing Justice Sensitivity and for a fourth scale for sensitivity to the respondent’s own perpetration of injustice. Investigators have reported that these scales are distinct from measures of anger and trust (Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010). Researchers have found predictive utility for Justice Sensitivity scales in their relations to self-reported solidarity with disadvantaged others, perceiving procedural injustice, anger, political protest against injustice, wellbeing, prosocial behavior, and altruism (Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Lotz et al., 2013; Rothmund et al., 2014; Schmitt et al., 2005). Justice sensitivity has also predicted behavioral outcomes such as benefiting others in dictator (Edele et al., 2013) and third-party punishment games (Lotz et al., 2011).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

182

Virtues as Scalar Traits

Justice sensitivity is conceptualized as a moral trait but not as a virtue trait. Its focus is on the affective response to injustice. In contrast, Fowers, Lane, and colleagues (2022) framed their research in explicit virtue terms and created an Interpersonal Fairness Scale, which evidenced good construct validity with other self-report scales and with behavior in a resource game. Gratitude The characteristic of gratitude has received significant empirical attention. Ma and colleagues’ (2017) meta-analysis identified 252 effect sizes from 91 studies across 65 articles and found a moderate positive correlation between gratitude and prosociality. But, as we noted in Chapter 3, much research on gratitude remains siloed and without a unified framework, with research focusing on gratitude as an emotion, a behavior, an attitude, or a coping response, often lacking the connotations of a moral trait (Desteno et al., 2019; Krause & Hayward, 2015). In fact, the meta-analysis did not refer to gratitude as a virtue. Rather, gratitude is typically measured as an affective response (e.g., in the GQ-6 [McCullough et al., 2002] or the GRAT [Watkins et  al., 2003]). The GQ-6 was initially assessed for validity with four studies and has been frequently used since. In the original study, the scale had acceptable reliability across the datasets, with studies consistently showing reliability above 0.80. The GRAT also had acceptable construct validity in four studies and showed alpha reliability above 0.90 (Watkins et  al., 2003). These two measures have frequently been used as proxy measures of a gratitude virtue. Gratitude has shown predictive validity in its positive correlations with subjective well-being (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Watkins et  al., 2003; Wood, Joseph, & Maltby, 2008, 2009), prosocial characteristics, positive affect, empathy (McCullough et  al., 2002), better sleep (Mills et al., 2015; Wood, Joseph, Lloyd, & Atkins, 2009), and motivation to care for a partner (Lambert et al., 2010). It also has been negatively correlated with depression, envy, and materialistic attitudes (McCullough et  al., 2002; Mills et al., 2015). It has also evidenced physiological prediction in being linked to lower inflammatory markers (Mills et al., 2015). Morgan and colleagues (2017) explicitly conceptualized gratitude as a virtue. In a series of studies, they found strong reliability and validity for their MCGM. The MCGM assesses the cognitive, affective, attitudinal (including motivational), and behavioral aspects of gratitude. They reported that each aspect of gratitude contributed independently to subjective well-being.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The STRIVE-4 Model of Virtues and Its Research Agenda

183

Generosity/Kindness Generosity and kindness can be conceptualized as two virtues or aggregated into one. Due to the overlap in the content of these virtues, we treat them as one here without claiming that this is the only way to understand them. Some researchers avoid virtue terminology by using the term “altruism” rather than generosity. For example, Johnson and colleagues (1989) presented evidence for the cross-cultural validity of their altruism scale, with similar results in Australia, Egypt, Korea, China, the United States, and Yugoslavia regarding help-giving and -receiving. Across all countries, Johnson and colleagues’ help-giving scale had an alpha reliability coefficient of at least 0.89. We favor thinking of help-giving as generosity rather than altruism because the former does not have the undocumented and problematic connotation of the absence of benefit for the actor (Calder et al., 2022). Several studies of self-reported generosity/kindness have predictive utility. Otake and colleagues (2006) reported that kindness was positively correlated with happiness among Japanese participants. Dunn and colleagues (2008) reported that spending money on other people is positively associated with happiness. Aknin and colleagues (2013) found that charitable giving was positively related to subjective well-being in 120 of 136 countries. They reported that “donating to charity has a similar relationship to subjective well-being as a doubling of household income” (p. 638). In a national sample of 1,368 couples, generosity was positively linked to marital satisfaction and negatively correlated with marital conflict and perceived divorce likelihood (Dew & Wilcox, 2013). In another study with the same dataset, marital generosity was linked to shared housework and childcare, as well as marital commitment for both husbands and wives (Wilcox & Dew, 2016). A study also suggested that generosity predicted observed helping behavior (Lefevor & Fowers, 2016). Though generosity and kindness are occasionally framed in terms of virtue (Lefevor & Fowers, 2016), many researchers do not use virtue terminology (e.g., Aknin et al., 2013; Dunn et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 1989; Wilcox & Dew, 2016) Compassion Compassion has garnered substantial interest, though it is generally framed as an emotion rather than a virtue. One scale that has captured it as an emotion is the Compassion scale from the Dispositional Positive Emotion Scales (Shiota et al., 2006). The Compassion scale was reliable (0.80), had expected correlations with Big 5 dimensions and was associated with lower attachment avoidance. More recent research has confirmed the psychometric properties of this Compassion scale through

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

184

Virtues as Scalar Traits

factor analyses with multiple samples and convergent validity with positive and negative emotion. Additional studies have established the predictive utility of this Compassion scale. For example, Oveis and colleagues (2010) studied compassion and pride as agonistic processes (in Study 1), with compassion being linked to care-taking behavior and pride being negatively correlated with care-taking behavior. They reported that Compassion was positively related to perceived similarity to others, especially to weak or vulnerable others, whereas pride was positively correlated with perceived self–other similarity with strong others, and negatively associated with perceived similarity to weak others. It could be illuminating to study compassion as a virtue rather than primarily focusing on it as an emotion. Forgiveness Forgiveness is sometimes considered a stand-alone virtue and sometimes as an aspect of generosity (Fowers, 2005a). Many researchers have focused narrowly on a disposition to forgive (e.g., Brown, 2003; McCullough & Witvliet, 2002), so we discuss it separately from generosity here. One example of a frequently used trait-like scale is the Tendency to Forgive scale, which has reasonable reliability (α = 0.75; Brown, 2003). Researchers (Brown, 2003; Rye et al., 2001) reported that dispositional forgiveness was positively correlated with self-reported likelihood of forgiveness, religiosity, and well-being, and negatively associated with trait anger, vengeance, and depression. It has also indicated predictive validity beyond self-reported outcomes, with links to physiological indicators of attenuated stress and improved health (Witvliet et al., 2001). Although Brown (2003) explicitly discusses forgiveness as a virtue, other researchers do not. Humility A prominent example of assessing humility comes from Ashton and Lee (2005), who created a trait measure of “Honesty-Humility” that they see as a sixth personality factor, as discussed in Chapter 5. They found evidence for four constituent facet-level scales of Honesty-Humility: sincerity, fairness, greed-avoidance, and modesty. Recent work meta-analyzed the correlates of the Honesty-Humility scale as a whole and found that it was linked to variables such as personal growth, purpose in life, and life satisfaction (Anglim et al., 2020). Kruse and colleagues (2017) created the Brief Humility Scale to assess what they termed a “core psychological process” (p. 399), which was inversely correlated with the belief that other people should treat one as special because of one’s accomplishments and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The STRIVE-4 Model of Virtues and Its Research Agenda

185

positive characteristics (Banker & Leary, 2020). Some scholars have cited humility as a virtue (e.g., Tangney, 2000). Krause (2010) and Krause & Hayward (2015) found that the Humility scale of the VIA (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) was positively related to self-reported health. Although Krause (2010) and Krause & Hayward (2015) referred to humility as being a virtue, the other researchers did not frame it as a virtue. Summary Overall, reliability and construct validity have been established for several measures of characteristics (e.g., courage, compassion, forgiveness, etc.) many consider to be virtues. Many of these scales did not have complete virtue conceptualization, but this unfortunately siloed work on the constructs has still highlighted the potential for virtue measures to be empirically tractable. Much work remains to be done in finding ways to capture these constructs with more holistic virtue conceptualization as highlighted in the STRIVE-4 Model. Personality and Virtue Another concern about virtue measurement is whether virtues can be fully accounted for by personality measurement. Therefore, hypothesis 5-1 posits that virtue measures are distinct from personality dimensions (e.g., correlations between the constructs are not too high) and that virtue measures will predict morally focused outcomes, even after taking personality into account (i.e., virtue measures will have incremental validity vis-à-vis personality measures; hypothesis 5-2). We discussed the conceptual distinctions among virtues and personality constructs in Chapter 5. Here, we highlight the empirical distinctions in personality and virtue measurement. In a notable example, McGrath and colleagues (2017) conducted a large-scale study of the distinctiveness of virtue measures from personality dimensions. They assessed the correlations of fifty-four personality facets and twenty-four virtues.2 They found moderate overlap between personality and virtue measures, indicating that they are not fully independent. They also reported that, in over 90 percent of the analyses, the VIA character strength scales evidenced incremental validity for several criterion measures vis-à-vis the Big 5 and HEXACO personality measures. That is, 2

The Big 5 factor measure contained six facets for each of five personality domain and the HEXACO measure consists of four facet scales for each of six personality domains. The authors used the VIA, which contains twenty-four character strength scales.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

186

Virtues as Scalar Traits

the study suggested that VIA variables are related to personality facets but are not reducible to them. Studies on individual virtues have produced similar results. For example, in a study of the Justice Sensitivity scales, Big 5 correlations with those scales ranged from 0.00 to 0.36 (Schmitt et al., 2005), and the correlations ranged from 0.02 to 0.19 in another study (Rothmund et al., 2014). Schmitt et al. (2010) used thirty NEO personality facet scales to predict the four forms of Justice Sensitivity (victim, observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator sensitivity) with German participants. All NEO-PI-R correlations were below 0.30, signifying moderate links between personality facets and the four Justice Sensitivity scales. Taken together, the Big 5 facets accounted for a maximum of 33 percent of the variance in the Justice Sensitivity scales (Schmitt et al., 2010). The Justice Sensitivity scales have also been found to predict outcomes above and beyond personality facets (e.g., observer sensitivity had incremental validity with predictions of political engagement [Rothmund et al., 2014]). In another example, Breen and colleagues (2010) assessed the simultaneous predictive validity of both gratitude and forgiveness while controlling for the Big 5 dimensions. They assessed gratitude with the GQ-6 (McCullough et al., 2002) and forgiveness with the Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Thompson et al., 2005), which comprises forgiveness of self, forgiveness of others, and forgiveness of situations. Both gratitude and forgiveness were correlated with Agreeableness (rs from 0.32 to 0.58), Extraversion (rs from 0.17 to 0.22), Conscientiousness (rs from 0.27 to 0.39), Neuroticism (rs from −0.27 to −0.59), and Openness (r = 0.19; only the Forgiveness of Self subscale). Unfortunately, the study did not focus on the incremental validity of forgiveness and gratitude vis-à-vis the personality variables, but the correlations between the measures do suggest significant distinctness of virtue and personality scales. Brown (2003) found mild to moderate correlations between trait forgiveness and Agreeableness (r = 0.43) and Neuroticism (r = −0.39), but no relationships with the other Big 5 dimensions. He also did not test incremental validity of trait forgiveness over personality. Several studies have also highlighted the distinctiveness of gratitude and personality measures as well as the incremental validity of gratitude. McCullough and colleagues (2002) reported that gratitude (GQ-6) had low to moderate correlations with each Big 5 dimension. The highest correlation throughout four studies was with Agreeableness (r = 0.41). Taken together, the Big 5 dimensions accounted for 21 percent of gratitude variance. Gratitude also significantly predicted positive affect, well-being,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The STRIVE-4 Model of Virtues and Its Research Agenda

187

and prosocial behaviors and traits after controlling for the Big 5 dimensions. Wood, Joseph, and Maltby (2009) found similar results, with low to moderate correlations between the GQ-6 and the thirty facets of the Big 5 (NEO-PI-R). The highest correlation was between gratitude and the positive emotions facet of Extraversion (r = 0.43). Gratitude demonstrated incremental validity over the thirty facets of the Big 5 in uniquely predicting satisfaction with life. Other studies have also controlled for the Big 5 and found that gratitude indicated incremental validity with criterion measures (Morgan et  al., 2017; Wood, Joseph, Lloyd, & Atkins, 2009; Wood, Joseph, & Maltby, 2008, 2009). Finally, two experimental studies assessed the relative predictive capacity of Big 5 dimensions and self-report virtue traits of kindness and justice (Lefevor & Fowers, 2016; Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022). In the two studies, a kindness measure predicted kind behavior and the Interpersonal Fairness Scale predicted fair behavior, after controlling for the Big 5 dimensions of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. The Interpersonal Fairness Scale was moderately related to Agreeableness (r = 0.63), but it was unrelated to Conscientiousness (Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022). One study found that self-reported awe was still correlated with friends’ reports of the person’s humility after controlling for the Big 5 dimension of Openness (Stellar et al., 2018). Summary Overall, it appears that virtues are distinct from personality dimensions, which is consistent with hypotheses 5-1 and 5-2. Virtues also evidenced predictive and incremental forms of validity for relevant dependent variables, such as well-being. To our knowledge, no study has found that virtue traits can be entirely subsumed in personality measures. Social Desirability One specific concern with self-report measures of virtue is their potential susceptibility to social desirability biases. We suggest (hypothesis 7-2) that virtue measurement will have incremental validity regarding criterion measures beyond those relating to social desirability. Several studies of selfreport virtue scales have examined the extent to which the two forms of social desirability (impression management and self-deception; Paulhus, 1991) explain responses to virtue scales. Woodard (2004) deleted items from the courage scale that were associated with social desirability. Justice Sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 2005), gratitude (McCullough et al., 2002), and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

188

Virtues as Scalar Traits

forgiveness (Brown, 2003; Rye et al., 2001) scales all have modest correlations with social desirability scales, ranging from 0.19 to 0.34. The combined evidence suggests that scales that are used to measure virtues are often associated with social desirability, but the association is weak enough to indicate clear distinctions between constructs. Furthermore, virtue scales tend to predict relevant outcomes even after controlling for social desirability. For example, gratitude expression positively predicted concern for a partner cross-sectionally, longitudinally, and experimentally, after controlling for social desirability (Lambert et al., 2010). McCullough and colleagues (2002) found that gratitude was positively associated with positive affect, well-being, and prosocial behaviors after controlling for social desirability. In studies of the virtues of kindness and fairness (Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022; Lefevor & Fowers, 2016), the researchers found relationships between the virtue measures and behavioral measures of helping and fairness after controlling for impression management and self-deception. Experience-sampling studies also reduce worries about social desirability. We discuss experience sampling and social desirability later in the “Experience Sampling” section. Overall, the evidence indicates that the overlap between social desirability and virtue self-reports is small. Informant Reports Given concerns about self-report, such as social desirability (we further address concerns about single-timepoint self-report in our section on “Virtues as Traits” later in this chapter), some researchers have focused on informants reporting on others’ virtues. An observer of a person’s dayto-day behavior should be able to see the extent that an individual enacts virtue. Therefore, hypothesis 7-3 is that observers will be able to report meaningfully on another person’s virtuous behavior. Studies of informant reports have indicated that observer reports converge with self-report but have enough divergence that informant assessment provides unique information. In what follows, we summarize studies indicating the value of informant reports. General Observer Reports With 1,674 German speakers, Ruch and colleagues (2010) assessed self and peer reports of the twenty-four virtue scales of the VIA and reported that the median convergence was 0.40, with some correlations reaching 0.60.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The STRIVE-4 Model of Virtues and Its Research Agenda

189

In another study, McCullough and colleagues (2002) solicited selfreports and peer reports of gratitude and reported that the average selfreport and other-report had a correlation of 0.33. This moderate correlation indicates some convergence, but also suggests some independence between observer perspectives and self-report. Both the self-report and informant report were positively correlated with outcomes such as positive affect, well-being, perspective taking, and prosocial behavior. Breen and colleagues (2010) also found moderate convergence between self-reports and observer reports of forgiveness and gratitude (rs from 0.20 to 0.30). Stellar and colleagues (2018) focused on the relationship between awe and humility and a correlation of self-reported awe and other-reported humility of 0.22 after controlling for self-reported openness and positive affect. Davis and colleagues (2011) created an informant report scale of humility, and scores on this scale were positively related to forgiveness and empathy toward an offender. Romantic Partners as Informants In addition to more general observer reports, there are several studies specifically highlighting romantic partners as informants. Brown (2003) asked partners to report on their own and their heterosexual dating partner’s tendency to forgive. Self-reports and partner reports tended to converge with a correlation of 0.46 for women and 0.38 for men. Partner reports of virtues such as generosity and other-centeredness have been positively correlated with relationship problem-solving efficacy in married heterosexual couples (Veldorale-Brogan et al., 2012) and with relationship quality when controlling for individual adjustment and negative communication (Hawkins et al., 2007; Veldorale-Brogan et al., 2009). In an online sample of 679 committed heterosexual couples, self-reports of commitment and forgiveness were positively associated with perceptions of their partners’ effort and strategies for partners to maintain the relationship (Novak et al., 2018). Park and colleagues (2019) found added utility for assessing reports of a partner’s behavior beyond self-report. That is, partner reports on the other person’s gratitude behavior reduced the influence of insecure attachment on relationship satisfaction and commitment. A daily diary study (Reis et  al., 2017) also indicated the advantage of multiple perspectives. They found that reporting on one’s own expression of compassionate love predicted both one’s own and the partner’s relationship satisfaction the following day. Additional analyses indicated that on days that both partners recognized a compassionate act, that mutual recognition was

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

190

Virtues as Scalar Traits

more influential than when only one of them acknowledged the act as compassionate. Overall, the convergence of informant reports and self-reports suggests that virtues can be measured meaningfully with both methods. Also, the divergence between self and informant reports highlights the added utility in obtaining multiple perspectives when assessing virtue. Summary The combined reliability and construct validity of many self-report scales that measure some aspect of virtue provide a valuable starting point for virtue science. The evidence to this point confirms that measuring virtues is possible, and that these virtues seem to be consequential. Researchers have provided initial evidence to confirm the validity of self-reports through alternative methods. As we have highlighted, some studies show connections between virtues such as kindness, forgiveness, justice, and gratitude to various behavioral and physiological measures. Although a fully fledged virtue science requires more studies of the relationships among virtues and criterion variables, the available studies provide a useful starting point. Most of this research has been single-timepoint, self-report surveys, which provide useful information, but the success of self-report virtue measurement suggests that it is time for researchers to assess virtues through more sophisticated methods (e.g., informant reports, behavior outcomes, intensive longitudinal research). The available evidence indicates a moderate overlap between virtue scales and personality scales, yet the former uniquely predict a variety of outcomes. Because a small number of virtues have been assessed in this way, and this research has been heavily focused on the Big 5, additional study is needed. Nevertheless, the evidence to date is consistent with hypotheses 5-1 and 5-2: that virtues are empirically independent from personality measures. Consistent with hypothesis 7-2, the available evidence suggests that virtue research is not problematically influenced by social desirability. Virtue measures have modest correlations with social desirability scales, and several studies have shown the incremental validity of virtues in predicting outcomes after accounting for social desirability. When researchers develop new assessments of virtues, it remains important to test the influence of social desirability. The convergence of informant reports and self-reports provides additional evidence that virtues can be measured meaningfully. There is, however, enough divergence between self and informant reports to highlight the added utility in obtaining multiple perspectives on a person’s virtue.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues as Traits

191

This research is still in its infancy, with relatively few studies of a smattering of virtues, suggesting the need for more research to study hypothesis 7-3: that self-reported and informant-reported virtues will have significant convergence.

Virtues as Traits Another key premise of the STRIVE-4 Model and virtue theory is that virtues are acquired traits. If someone has a virtue, it means that person will act reliably virtuously in situations that call for that virtue. This requirement is why we rebuffed virtue trait skepticism previously (Fowers et al., 2021). As discussed in Chapter 5, scholars disagree about what traits are, with views ranging from seeing traits as “purely descriptive concepts to biologically based causal concepts” (John & Srivastava, 1999, p. 130), but virtually no one suggests that traits should be monotonically expressed across all situations. We addressed our definition of “trait” in Chapters 1 and 5 but provide a brief reminder here. First, in contrast to the view that virtue traits are biologically given, we agree with Aristotle (1999) that “virtues are implanted in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature; we are by nature equipped with the ability to receive [acquire] them” (1103a 24–26). Second, we suggest that virtue traits are not simple causal mechanisms. Instead, four components (behavior, motivation/emotion, knowledge, and practical wisdom) constitute a virtue trait. We discuss the four specific components in greater detail in Chapter 11. Third, we see virtues as more than descriptive labels because people tend to view virtues as desirable traits, and as closely related to the kind of life they want to live. For example, someone may be motivated to habitually act loyally and kindly to a friend because the person values the friendship. Fourth, the hypothesis that traits can be intentionally cultivated relates to how desirable virtue traits are. Someone may be motivated to develop virtues such as loyalty and kindness because he believes that these traits are important for highly valued relationships. This sort of belief about the possibility and value of intentional cultivation is sufficiently important to suggest hypothesis 7-4: that individuals will cultivate virtue intentionally as an approach to crafting a good life. We address ideas about values and a flourishing life more extensively in Chapter 10. Fifth, we are not suggesting a simplistic concept of traits, namely that they are continuously expressed. We recognize that social roles and situations influence trait expression, which we cover more extensively in Chapters 8 and 9. The claim that someone has a virtue trait

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

192

Virtues as Scalar Traits

suggests only that their actions reflect the consistent expression of that trait in situations and roles wherein the virtue is appropriate. Situations virtually always influence action, as we discuss in Chapter 9. Between-Person Variability Two empirical conditions must be met to claim that a characteristic is a trait. First, individuals must differ in the extent to which they enact the trait. Some people tend to be humbler, kinder, or more generous than others. We agree with Carver and Scheier’s (2008) comment that “trait theories assume that people occupy different points on continuously varying dimensions … In trait theories, differences among people are seen as quantitative rather than qualitative” (p. 46). Therefore, hypothesis 7-5 is that there will be significant between-person variation in virtue assessments. The many scalar virtue studies we highlighted earlier support this hypothesis. Each study revealed relations to other variables in noteworthy ways, which requires between-person variability in virtues. The difference between individuals’ scores on virtue scales has been amply demonstrated in their variances (i.e., standard deviations). Within-Person Consistency Exhibiting consistency in cognition, behavior, and affect within individuals over time is the second required aspect of traits. A shortcoming of single-timepoint, self-report research methods on virtues is the reliance on a single, global assessment (Fowers, 2014). These studies do not assess whether traits are consistent over time for a person. Within-person stability simply cannot be detected through aggregate analyses of betweenperson data. Instead, multiple assessments of a trait and within-person analyses over time are needed to document consistency (Fleeson, 2001; Jayawickreme et al., 2014). Thus, hypothesis 7-6 suggests that people will show considerable within-person consistency in virtue traits over time, but this hypothesis has only been assessed in a few studies, which we discuss in the “Experience Sampling” section. An additional problem with global self-report measurement is that participants are required to aggregate perceptions of themselves into summary statements over significant time periods. This likely decreases the accuracy of self-reports. Intensive longitudinal research helps remedy these two limitations by including many assessments of the same person over time.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues as Traits

193

Experience Sampling Experience sampling (e.g., multiple reports each day for one to three weeks) and daily diaries (e.g., one report per day for multiple weeks) are the most common forms of intensive longitudinal research. Each assessment refers to only a single day, or a few hours (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013), which reduces participants’ burden of summarizing a large sample of behaviors over an extensive period. Asking about shorter time periods seems to reduce problems with social desirability and provides more accurate data (Schwartz, 2011). An important recent development in personality and virtue research has been Fleeson’s (2001, 2007) conceptualization of traits as density distributions of trait-related behaviors. He suggested that many assessments of trait-related behaviors over time could be aggregated to indicate the strength of a trait. He deployed experience-sampling methods by sampling research participants’ trait-related behavior, multiple times per day, for one to four weeks, which provides a distribution of behavior reports within individuals over time (Fleeson, 2001, 2007; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009). The data are typically self-reports of behavior within the last few hours – a far cry from the extensive summaries required in single-timepoint self-reports. Each report is viewed as a sample of behavior representing trait enactment in a relatively short period of time (Fleeson, 2001). The overall degree to which an individual has a trait is represented in these trait enactments. Multilevel modeling of these data allows within-person and between-person variations in the trait enactments to be analyzed both separately and simultaneously. This approach was an initial step toward integrating the structure and process of personality (described as WTT in Chapter 5) because it offered a more dynamic approach to personality while still examining personality structures, such as the Big 5. Research on the density distribution approach has led to three important results. First, there is significant variability in trait-related reports within individuals over time, with individuals manifesting behavior at virtually all degrees of each trait examined. Fleeson (2007) interpreted this withinperson variation in personality as individuals fitting their behavior to varying situations. Second, clear between-person differences in the frequency and strength of traits emerged, paralleling the results of single-timepoint personality research. Third, the average degree of trait-related behavior within persons is extraordinarily consistent over time (correlations within individuals range from 0.7 to 0.9).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

194

Virtues as Scalar Traits

In their study of within-person personality expressions and situation types, Sherman and colleagues (2015) found that their respondents’ reported behavior was more consistent than could be explained by situational consistency, suggesting that personality is needed to explain that consistency. Moreover, personality dimension scores were strongly related to within-person personality states, and deviations from the individual’s central tendencies on personality dimensions were explained by situational variation. Most experience-sampling studies take place in naturalistic settings, which means that situational variance is uncontrolled and differs across individuals. Therefore, Fleeson and Law (2015) conducted a study with 321 undergraduates who rated their own behavior and were rated by observers in a laboratory setting with each participant interacting in twenty controlled situations. In both self-rating and observer-rating, the investigators found both interindividual differences and strong within-person stability. Moreover, the participants were also consistent across varying situations. Fleeson and Gallagher’s (2009) meta-analysis also supports these results. The experience-sampling evidence for Big 5 personality dimensions is now strong. The findings from these studies provide exactly the sort of evidence that enables claims about traits. Fleeson and his colleagues’ work culminates a tradition (e.g., Epstein, 1979) that counters early trait skepticism based on low correlations between two single behaviors (e.g., Hartshorne et al., 1930). Aggregating multiple behaviors within people over time provides a strong answer to worries about situation-based variability in trait expression because the sampling of behaviors includes many situations and allows behavioral consistency to emerge. It turns out that both situations and traits are important in understanding behavior. The density distribution approach has recently been applied to studying the within-person consistency of virtues in three studies. Meindl et al. (2013) conducted two experience-sampling studies (thirty-five students and eighty-one community members), wherein participants completed five reports per day for nine days on the degree to which they expressed the virtues of honesty, compassion, and fairness. They divided the participants’ responses into two sets of results (randomly, on even and odd days, and the first and second half of the responses) and correlated those split halves of respondents’ reports. They found very strong within-person consistency, with both approaches to splitting the responses and correlations ranging from 0.67 to 0.93. This pattern also held after controlling for social desirability.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues as Traits

195

Bleidorn and Denissen (2015) conducted a ten-day experience-sampling study with eighty-three German working mothers and fathers. They modified items from the VIA to assess virtue states for the six VIA virtues: wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. They also measured personality states and affect six times per day. They also reported high within-person consistency in the six virtues, with split-half correlations ranging from 0.77 to 0.95. Fowers and colleagues (2019) conducted a fourteen-day experiencesampling study with four reports per day with community adults focused on interpersonal fairness and kindness. They found high within-person consistency over time as well, with split-half correlations3 ranging from 0.81 to 0.90. Experience-sampling studies also suggest that virtue measurement does not appear to be derailed by social desirability. Meindl et al. (2015) found modest correlations between social desirability responding and honesty (0.30), compassion (0.38), fairness (0.31), moral behavior (0.20), and moral thought (0.32). After controlling for social desirability, the authors still found these facets of virtue to be reported consistently. Fowers and colleagues (2019) reported that social desirability was mildly related to only one of six virtue measures. Additionally, virtue measures had roughly normal within-person distributions, suggesting that participants were not inflating their reports to appear highly virtuous. Overall, research suggests that virtues and social desirability have only modest correlations, with sufficient distinction to indicate that self-reported virtues are not simply a reflection of social desirability, which is consistent with hypothesis 7-2. Furthermore, reports of virtue consistently predict relevant outcomes above and beyond measures of social desirability. Within-Person Variability Claiming trait consistency is not an assertion that people will constantly express the trait; no trait is appropriate for all situations. For example, a generous person will not give in every situation (e.g., when exploitation is probable). Furthermore, even the most virtuous individuals will not always act in the best possible way because no human is perfect. When a characteristically generous person withholds something he can be rightly expected to give, we would say that he is acting “out of character,” perhaps 3

Researchers sometimes split their experience sampling data in half and then correlate an individual’s responses across the two halves to get an evaluation of the consistency in the responses.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

196

Virtues as Scalar Traits

due to distraction, fatigue, or error. Having a trait does not mean constant or perfect trait enactment; having a trait means characteristically acting congruently with the trait. Due to human imperfection and situational variation, hypothesis 7-7 is that virtue expression will have significant variability within persons. The experience-sampling studies of virtue suggested that behaviors seem responsive to situational variations, thus revealing within-person trait variability (Bleidorn & Denissen, 2015; Fowers et al., 2019; Meindl et al., 2015). Several additional daily diary researchers have predicted within-person variability of virtues.4 For humility, in a fourteen-day study, Stellar et al. (2018) found that, on days when participants experienced something that induced awe, they also reported being humbler, even after controlling for positive affect, compassion, and how humble they reported being on the previous day. For compassion, in a fourteen-day daily diary study of compassionate love expression in newlywed couples, Reis and colleagues (2014) found that a partner reporting more positive acts toward the other partner was also more likely to report receiving more compassionate love acts that day. They also found evidence that daily compassionate love acts contributed to both spouses’ daily marital satisfaction (signifying a within-person effect), while controlling for general positivity or negativity of behavior toward the partner. For gratitude, across two studies of romantic couples, Visserman and colleagues (2019) found that the degree to which a partner is perceived to have made a sacrifice to make the respondent happy was related to the respondent’s gratitude. They also found that the association was partially mediated by perceived partner responsiveness, after controlling for positive mood. Additionally, Gordon and colleagues (2012) reported that daily gratitude predicted daily increases in responsiveness and commitment. Finally, other studies have found that the within-person variability of gratitude positively predicted marital satisfaction for oneself and the partner (Gordon et al., 2011) and respondent well-being (Nezlek et al., 2017). Summary The available evidence suggests that virtues are traits consistent with several STRIVE-4 Model predictions. Ample evidence suggests 4

We note that many of these studies do not capture the several components of virtue we highlight as valuable. Many, for example, focus on the virtue primarily as an emotion or behavior. Nevertheless, these studies highlight some initial evidence of within-person variability, which we believe is important to address.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Vicious Traits

197

between-person variability (hypothesis 7-5) in both single-timepoint and longitudinal research. In density distribution studies, within-person consistency (hypothesis 7-6) was found repeatedly. Unfortunately, these studies included only relatively affluent samples from North Atlantic countries and only examined a few virtues. Additional studies are needed to increase confidence in the generalizability of findings and the breadth of studied virtues. We further discuss the limited available evidence for the systematicity of within-person variance in Chapter 9.

Vicious Traits Although a full discussion of the concept of vicious traits is beyond the scope of this book, we would be remiss if we did not at least mention them, because virtue theory also suggests that vicious traits exist. Vices include cruelty, exploitiveness, lust, gluttony, greed, and so forth. Like virtue, it seems impossible to create an exhaustive list of vices. Also like virtue, someone must consistently act according to a vice for that vice to be considered a trait. Naming and describing vices may increase worries about virtue theory being needlessly judgmental, but recognizing vice traits does not entail a judgmental stance any more than the diagnosis of a mental health disorder or physical illness does. Recognizing vice traits is simply a way to orient one’s responses properly in interacting with others. For example, it would be foolish to trust a co-worker who is consistently exploitive. One does not have to be judgmental toward a vicious person, but one should recognize the folly of putting oneself in a vicious individual’s power. If someone is incapable of understanding vice, that person is more likely to be exploited or harmed by someone vicious. Understanding vice can also heighten our understanding of virtue. Denying the study and existence of vice may inadvertently deny life realities that give virtue meaning. Hunter (2001) highlighted the impossibility of positive aims without recognizing their opposites: We want strong morality but without the emotional burden of guilt or shame; we want virtue but without particular moral justifications that invariably offend; we want good without having to name evil; we want decency without the authority to insist upon it; we want more community without any limitations to personal freedom. In short, we want what we cannot possibly have on the terms that we want it. (p. xv)

The acknowledgment and future study of vice traits may help counter the implausible onesidedness that Hunter decries as well as tendencies toward relativism that can rob virtue research of its rationale and value.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

198

Virtues as Scalar Traits

Considerations of vice traits are also worthy of discussion considering broader critiques of positive psychology’s onesidedness (Fowers, 2008; Gable & Haidt, 2005; McNulty & Fincham, 2012). Critics have also noted that traits such as forgiveness and kindness are not necessarily positive in some interpersonal contexts. In one example, in a seven-daydiary study with 135 newlywed couples, McNulty (2010) found that one partner was more likely to report that the other had engaged in negative behavior on days after the offender had been forgiven than on days they had not been forgiven. This was replicated and nuanced in additional studies (McNulty & Russell, 2016). In a survey study, an experiment, a four-year longitudinal study, and a fourteen-day diary study, partner forgiveness was positively associated with subsequent offending among less agreeable people but negatively associated with subsequent offending among more agreeable people. Study 4 provided an explanation of this moderation, clarifying that more agreeable partners were less likely to transgress against forgiving partners because they felt motivated to refrain from engaging in behaviors the partner does not like. In contrast, more disagreeable partners engaged in more transgression among forgiving partners because they perceived those partners to be less easily angered.5 This kind of study raises important questions about the nature of vice and the extent to which virtue traits are scalable. One might argue that scoring highly on a forgiveness scale could reach the point of being a vice, in line with Aristotle’s (1999) conceptualization of the “golden mean” that is flanked by vices of deficiency and excess. We recognize these complexities and encourage their future study. Unfortunately, very little research has adopted the Aristotelian perspective on virtues being flanked by two vices or profited from philosophic attempts to improve on that Aristotelian framework (Hursthouse, 2006). For example, an action attributed to an excess (e.g., forgiveness) may actually be due to an incorrect understanding of the virtue; hypothetically, someone may inaccurately view unearned trust as a component of forgiveness. Conceptualizing virtues as scalar does not directly address the “golden mean” concept of flanking virtue with vices of deficiency and excess. One possibility for capturing the “golden mean” concept would require assessing the point where virtue falls between vices of deficiency and excess. 5

We are not suggesting that disagreeableness is necessarily a vice, but it is a generally undesirable trait that can have negative consequences in the context of forgiveness. More research is necessary to identify and explore whether a vice is operative in this case. Our chief point is that there are conditions when reporting high forgiveness may not be the appropriate response to transgression (according to a respondent’s understanding of forgiveness).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

199

In this case, we would expect a curvilinear relation with desirable outcomes, with virtue at the center. This would be complex, especially since it includes the agent’s judgment about whether an action is appropriate for a specific context. Due to this complexity, it may not be practical for social scientists to deviate from assessing virtues as linear, “more is better” constructs. This complexity is also likely why virtually all virtue research has taken a “more is better” approach. It is interesting to note that the “more is better” approach has worked reasonably well. This does not mean we reject the principle of the golden mean concept; we simply acknowledge the complexity of creating a truly curvilinear scale. Ng and Tay (2020) have also addressed some of the complexity of the “golden mean.” They have suggested that virtues “are literally defined by excellence because they are optimal conditions of character between their respective vices of deficiency and excess” (p. 2). They suggest that situational optimality needs to be considered for both measurement and evaluation, meaning that someone demonstrates the optimal level of a virtue-relevant behavior in each situation type. We eagerly anticipate the success of their project. Possible examples of how to capture a vice (although we have not discussed this construct as a virtue) are the scales for assessing communion and unmitigated communion. Communion is assessed in terms of care and concern for the welfare of others, with participants agreeing with statements such as “when making a decision, I take other people’s needs and feelings into account.” It does not appear that agreement with these statements is related to problematic outcomes (Le et al., 2018). Alternatively, unmitigated communion specifically conceptualizes the construct as a form of care devoid of agency and self-oriented concern. For example, one item is: “I always place the needs of others above my own.” Particularly when communion and unmitigated communion are assessed together, unmitigated communion seems to capture the idea that care for others can be excessive, by capturing a care that neglects any concern for the self (e.g., Le et al., 2018; Muise et al., 2017). Another potential model for vice assessment may be the Dark Triad (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy). These constructs are thought to share a core of manipulation, callousness, and selfishness and have been found to relate to many negative outcomes (Lyons, 2019). The Dark Triad scales seem to capture vicious traits.

Summary In this chapter, we have highlighted the scalar and trait aspects of our STRIVE-4 Model. We have provided evidence suggesting that virtues can

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

200

Virtues as Scalar Traits

be assessed as scalar traits while also highlighting gaps in the literature that deserve further research. Self-report and informant report studies converge to provide evidence of virtue measurement scalability; divergence from social desirability and personality scales further highlight the possibilities of virtue measurement. Between-person variability and within-person consistency converge to suggest that virtues can be considered traits. Vice traits are worthy of more a detailed discussion, particularly concerning critiques surrounding the interpersonal context (McNulty & Fincham, 2012) and the golden mean (Aristotle, 1999), but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this book. For more detailed treatment of this subject see Fowers and colleagues (2017) and Kristjánsson (2013). Altogether there is enough emerging evidence on the value of assessing virtues as scalar traits that we suggest it is time to advance virtue research with more sophisticated methods. As mentioned at the outset, our view of virtue science is that it aims to understand the nature and value of realistic virtue traits as they are identified and instantiated in ordinary life. Philosophers routinely critique ordinary thought and practice, however, and work to develop more demanding, revisionary ideals of virtue and moral right and wrong. As we discuss in Chapter 12, virtue science and its results can enrich practical philosophy and complement and catalyze philosophers’ critical and revisionary work. It is worth closing this chapter by mentioning that philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary people may, in various instances, productively question ordinary assumptions about realistic virtues and their value. For example, some may worry that alleged virtues that are picked out by selfreport and informant report may not be good for individuals or that they may reduce the odds of social progress. Such worries about loyalty and other “bourgeois virtues” are indeed worth taking seriously, as are worries about ordinary virtue concepts leading to problems when they are applied to people in various oppressed or neuroatypical groups. Taking an interest in such critiques and worries can inform virtue science in at least two main ways. First, if scientists can identify specific worries about how moral virtues are understood in ordinary thought and practice, then they can convert those worries into testable hypotheses. For example, a Marxist feminist critique of bourgeois virtue might suggest that women’s relational and personal well-being may decrease as they develop stronger virtues of loyalty, kindness, and compassion. Tessman (2005) has suggested that “burdened virtues” may mean that

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

201

strengthening traits of justice and patience might detract from oppressed people’s well-being.6 Second, awareness of critiques of ordinary virtue concepts can help virtue scientists to build constructs to study moral traits that embody some revisionary concepts. For example, a disability rights critique of the ordinary concept of compassion may suggest applying it differently to people with autism. A disability rights advocate might suggest revising the typical understanding of compassion that avoids attributing low compassion to neuroatypical individuals who express compassion in unexpected ways. If so, a virtue scientist could then develop a construct to measure this sort of nonstandardly understood moral trait. Of course, measuring atypical traits will likely be harder than more neurotypical traits, but this just illustrates the fact that virtue scientists who study more typical moral virtues need to remain aware of the contingent, questionable, and revisable assumptions that are built into their work. As emphasized in Chapter 6, we think that these are the kinds of value assumptions that scientists almost inevitably make, and that they should aim to recognize and critically evaluate them rather than pretend that they can somehow avoid them. 6

Of course, virtue theorists may simply claim that Tessman (2005) and others have simply mischaracterized the virtues they discuss in that “burdened virtues” may not be virtues at all. We welcome her viewpoint, however, as one that can enrich virtue research.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 8

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

One of the most common errors in thinking about personality or virtue is to conceive of these characteristics as traits that do not vary in their expression and are not influenced by aspects of the environment. In this chapter and Chapter 9, we discuss two important ways in which personality and virtue traits are systematically influenced by the roles and situations within which people live. As Wood and Roberts (2006) pointed out, “trait models of personality have long been criticized for their failure to successfully incorporate the effect of context on behavior” (p. 780). Their view reflects an important trend in personality psychology that we discuss at length later. We are taking their advice in discussing the importance of context in virtue traits. Our most general hypothesis (8-1), is that virtue trait expression will be contextualized to fit situations, roles, and relationships. It would be simplistic to ignore the influence of these factors and exclude them from consideration when conceptualizing and studying virtue. In contrast, we find that roles and other situational factors shape virtue expression, to the point of partly constituting what it means to enact virtues. Roles (e.g., parent, sibling, friend, professional, neighbor, teacher, etc.) have been identified as key influences on actions because they involve repetitive, socially structured actions (Roberts et al., 2005; Stryker, 2007). Therefore, we propose general hypothesis 8-2: that individuals’ virtue expression will vary with respect to their acknowledged roles. Our original contributions here are that we anticipate that role sensitivity will be shaped by significant normative reasons related to role expectations. This focus on role differentiation is one way in which the STRIVE-4 Model is more specific than most versions of virtue theory. Another general hypothesis (8-3) is that we expect variations in the quality or strength of a virtue trait from one role context to another, for any individual. For example, those who have the virtue of generosity are likely to enact this virtue differently based on the role they inhabit vis-à-vis the recipient. That is, generous 202

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A Sociological Approach to Roles and Relationships

203

individuals willingly give to charitable organizations to assist others in need, but they are not expected to give to charitable organizations to the same degree that they might give to their children or family members. Virtue traits are role-differentiated in that some social role contexts have greater opportunities or exert greater expectations than others. For example, the virtue of courage is generally called for to a greater degree among first responders and armed services members than ordinary citizens. Such variations in virtue possession and expression tend to increase the variation in virtue traits across people in different social roles, which is general hypothesis 8-4. This role differentiation highlights the fact that virtue theory and the STRIVE-4 Model do not propose that there is a single correct model of personhood. In addition, roles are shaped culturally, and we discuss cultural variation in virtue conceptions. There is currently very limited evidence for the role sensitivity of virtues, but we propose testable predictions in this chapter.

A Sociological Approach to Roles and Relationships Now that we have motivated the chapter, it is time to make our definitions of roles and situations more explicit. We begin with roles and generally follow Stryker’s (2007) Identity Theory, which is a variant of symbolic interactionism, to explicate the social structures in this chapter. We have chosen this theory because it illuminates the relationships between roles and traits. For roles, Stryker (2007) defined “a role [as] a set of behavioral expectations attached to a position in an organized set of social relationships. Since behavioral correspondence to expectations is variable, defining roles in terms of behavior per se bypasses important social-psychological issues. Role expectations specify the meaning of roles” (p. 1083). We add that roles also include opportunities, but the key point is that roles include both expectations and opportunities; they are one aspect of the organized, repetitive social structure that individuals inhabit. Stryker also pointed out that roles can become internalized, leading individuals to have role identities that are internalized expectations attached to the particular roles the individual enacts. It is important to remember that these expectations are accompanied by real contingencies (Roberts, 2007) wherein conformity can garner reward and acceptance, and nonconformity can elicit punishment and social disapproval. A key aspect of roles is that they exist within a specific social structure. This “involves the recognition that most of a person’s social interaction tends to be with the same or only slowly changing casts of others who do

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

204

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

essentially the same things on a repetitive basis in either groups (sets of persons who, in the extreme, interrelate – e.g., some families, some work groups) or networks (sets of others who, again in an extreme, relate to others only via a chain of relationships)” (Stryker, 2007, p. 1084). There are many kinds of social structures, from dyads to families to social networks to cultures and societies. All include roles for participants in the structures. It is vital to recognize that modern people, especially in the West, inhabit many roles virtually simultaneously. This can occasion role strain, role conflict, and the demand for rapidly switching roles. It is also one aspect of the richness of life that few would willingly relinquish in the contemporary West.1 This is a topic on which Aristotle provides insufficient guidance to us because complex, modern societies are packed with many different roles (e.g., Facebook friend, therapist, college student, scientist) that compete with varying sets of expectations and opportunities. This is a domain that is often fraught with difficult decisions and challenging prioritization in contemporary life. These varying contextual features may be harmonious, or they may be conflicting. We discuss the navigation of the various roles, with their motivations, expectations, and opportunities as a matter of practical wisdom, in what follows. A relationship comprises a pattern of interaction that occurs over an extended period of time with one or more other individuals, including family connections, romantic relationships, friendships, exchange relationships, and so forth. Every person begins life in a relationship with caregivers, for example, and some degree of exchange and cooperation relationships are part of every human’s life. These relationships can vary in terms of commitment, intimacy, duration, and centrality. The concept of a pattern of interaction makes it clear that relationships can constrain individual actions because relationships are one of the factors that render some actions meaningful, desirable, and intelligible. In contrast, individuals choose how they participate in relationships. For example, the common Western belief in monogamy may constrain sexual and emotional relationships with people outside the relationship for some but not for others. As Roberts and colleagues (2005) point out¸ despite the variability in how individuals can interpret and enact their relationship roles, individuals are likely to show marked stability in their enactment of roles and relationships. Because relationships virtually invariably include roles (parent, 1

Although we recognize the frequent fantasy of relinquishing role demands or simplifying one’s life, we also see the rarity with which that option is exercised. This tension could be formulated in numerous interesting hypotheses that are beyond the scope of this book.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A Sociological Approach to Roles and Relationships

205

spouse, mentor, etc.), we focus the remainder of the chapter on roles rather than referring, somewhat redundantly, to relationships. This brings us to the question of individual agency. If we assume that humans have agency, as virtue theory encourages us to do, and that roles, relationships, and situations help to shape that person’s actions, then the question of which roles, relationships, and situations an individual opts for becomes a salient question.2 The key point is that our commitment, as authors, to agency means that there is a bidirectionality to the influence of social structure and individual. Many scholars recognize the influence of social structure on persons, but not all see how persons influence social structure. One way this occurs is through the choices individuals make regarding roles, relationships, and situations. We discuss individual choice with regard to situations at length in Chapter 9 and focus on roles in this chapter. One individual choice that influences social structure includes the selection of roles to adopt. One can choose to be a parent or not, an educator or not, and so forth. Another set of choices involves how one inhabits those roles. Of course, the facts of a role and the manner that an individual inhabits it are matters of interpretation for everyone involved. For any given role, there is a wide range of acceptable actions, so that different individuals enact the same role variously (Matsumoto, 2007). The ways that a person inhabits a given role or relationship is itself an interpretation of that part of the social structure. Consider the ways in which individuals interpret their roles as teachers, for example. One can approach teaching as the inculcation of facts, with the demeanor of a martinet, as a provocateur intent on inciting critical thought, as a friendly guide, and so on. Each enactment of the teaching role is an interpretation of that role that will, to some degree, encourage others to interpret the role in some way and open up or narrow those possibilities within a social structure. Therefore, we are suggesting that choices about roles are an important factor in a person’s actions and that the expectations and opportunities that roles provide also constrain those actions. To touch on situations in this chapter, the primary fact is that situations have been poorly defined in psychology, often amounting to an amorphous catch-all that somehow encompasses everything that is salient outside the individual (Furr & Funder, 2021; Stryker, 2007). Social roles 2

We recognize that some see these “choices” as caused by other factors and not a matter of individual agency. We do not argue for agency here. Rather, we rely on the fact that agency is a viable interpretive option when determinism has not been proven as a universal fact.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

206

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

have been one way that psychologists have attempted to assess situations because roles can be seen as “conglomerations of situations that all share a common thread of expectations and behavioural signatures” (Roberts, 2007; p. 1073). Roles can be studied in a sufficiently focused way to allow informative research, but not so narrowly defined that they have reduced predictive capacity (Bleidorn, 2009). Therefore, social roles may provide a way to organize situations into thematically consistent categories that have a breadth similar to personality traits. They have sufficient focus to capture the basic components of context without being so narrow as to only have a limited impact (Roberts, 2007). Although individuals can exercise choice about roles and situations, it is important to remember that social structures tend to be enduring, resistant to change, and self-reproducing. This suggests that individuals are likely to find themselves channeled into sets of expectations and norms that will influence their actions with or without their knowledge. One way this durability and resilience is discussed is through the concept of culture, which can be understood as a large-scale social structure that includes roles, relationships, situations, norms, meanings, and strata (e.g., class, age, gender, religion, ethnicity; Stryker, 2007). In addition, broad, societal structures influence individual choices regarding roles and situations. For example, societies have norms about mate selection, childrearing, and relative economic independence, along with practices that embody those norms. These expectations and practices can influence who, when, and how roles and relationships are entered. This channeling by social context is important in shaping individual choice and experience. Stryker (2007) emphasized that committing oneself to a role is an important part of clarifying one’s identity. This commitment involves accepting the role with its expectations and opportunities and internalizing those expectations and opportunities so that they can be readily enacted. An important element of roles is that they require both the commitment of the individual to them and the acknowledgment of others that the person inhabits the role (Fowers, 2015; Stryker, 2007). As several authors have discussed (e.g., Stryker, 2007; Wood & Roberts, 2006), the psychological parallel to the kind of identity to which Stryker refers is a trait, and many suggest the interpenetrability of traits and roles. Whereas roles and relationships always point to the social dimension of life, traits have typically been seen as aspects of an individual’s make-up. We see great value in conjoining these terms to understand traits in terms of role identifications, and role commitments as closely related to traits. We discuss recent

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Personality and Roles

207

work in personality psychology that has begun to address how roles and relationships influence traits in the next section. The fundamental premise of Identity Theory is that commitment to a role makes it salient for one’s identity. The psychological centrality of that role shapes one’s actions in a systematic and recurring manner (Stryker, 2007). The salience of identity is the degree of likelihood that the identity will be called into play in a variety of situations based on how important the role or relationship is to the individual. It is important to keep in mind that commitment is not just an individual choice. It also reflects the individual’s ties to the social network within which the role resides. As Stryker (2007) so aptly stated: “To the degree that one’s relationships to specific others depend on being a particular kind of person, one is committed to being that kind of person” (p. 1093). One way to measure commitment is to assess the costs of giving up alternative courses of action that are incompatible with a role. For example, a professional who is also a parent of an adolescent may choose to forego a move to achieve an attractive promotion or job offer because of a parental commitment to avoid upsetting the adolescent’s social network or schooling (or vice versa).

Personality and Roles Personality psychologists have recognized that traits change over time. Interestingly, personality traits seem to change in a systematic way through the life course, which has been dubbed “the maturity principle” (Roberts & Damian, 2019). Meta-analyses (Lodi-Smith & Roberts, 2007; Roberts et al., 2006) have indicated that individuals become more agreeable, conscientious, and emotionally stable through early adulthood. Age-related changes in adults’ Conscientiousness have been found in fifty countries (McCrae & Terracciano, 2005). Individuals who begin long-term romantic relationships tend to have increases in Emotional Stability compared to their single peers (Lehnart et al., 2010). Klimstra and colleagues (2013) investigated commitment to romantic relationships and personality and produced somewhat mixed findings. In a one-year longitudinal study, they reported that changes in committed romantic relationships were associated positively with Agreeableness among high school students but not college students. The best available explanation for this pattern is Social Investment Theory (SIT), which fits a broad and growing empirical literature better than change based on personality genetics (Hudson & Roberts, 2016; Roberts et  al., 2005). SIT suggests that these cross-culturally observed

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

208

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

changes in personality at least partly reflect the adoption of important developmental roles, such as entering the workforce or developing a longterm committed mating relationship. Hudson and Roberts (2016) wrote: “To the extent that most individuals within a society share common experiences (e.g., commitment to romantic partners and/or careers), they may be shaped in similar ways, producing normative trends” and these trends could “coalesce into enduring trait change” (p. 13). This process involves the commitment to and persistent enactment of a social role, and SIT suggests that roles influence patterned self-identities, cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (personality states) that can lead to trait development over time. Two longitudinal studies (Hudson et al., 2012; Hudson & Roberts, 2016) found that changes in social investment in work roles were positively related to changes in Conscientiousness over three years. Despite the lack of aggregate change in social investment in the sample, changes in social investment were positively related to change in Conscientiousness. Hudson and Roberts (2016) concluded that “small state-level changes to thoughts, feelings, and behaviors can eventually coalesce into enduring trait-level changes” (p. 22). To assess the two competing explanations for this change (genetics or roles), Roberts and colleagues (2005) reviewed the literature on developmental change in personality. They concluded that “the data that does exist does not support the argument that personality change, especially in adulthood, is governed by genetics” (p. 170). SIT is similar to Identity Theory in four ways (Roberts et  al., 2005). First, it views identity as closely related to commitment to social roles. Second, many social roles comprise expectations and opportunities that create a context favorable to greater maturity. Third, the key roles are quasi-universal (i.e., they are primarily focused on work and love). Finally, commitment to the roles is vital, as the mere occupation of a role may not generate the investment necessary for personality change. Bleidorn and colleagues (2013) predicted, as a test of the SIT predictions, that personality development toward maturity would occur earlier in cultures with an earlier onset of work or family roles. Across sixty-two nations, they found that cultures with earlier work role onset (as measured by an index of employment) did have earlier increases in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. They did not find the expected relationships between earlier onset of family responsibilities (as measured by an index of marriage and parenthood) and earlier personality change, however. Another approach to studying roles and personality is to assess which personality dimensions are most prominent when the same individual is in different roles. Bleidorn (2009) followed this method with undergraduates

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Personality and Roles

209

in an experience-sampling study by examining personality expression when the participants were in a student role or a friend role. She found the student role had a positive relationship with Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability, whereas the friend role had a positive relationship with Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Openness to Experience. The relationships among these variables were strong, with 41 percent of the variance in Extraversion being due to whether the respondent was in the student or friend role. Heller and colleagues (2007) used three research paradigms (surveys, experience-sampling studies, and experimental studies) to obtain similar results. Individuals reported greater Conscientiousness in work roles, and job satisfaction was more closely related to personality at work, whereas marital satisfaction was more closely related to personality at home. When experimenters primed participants with a student or friend role, the participants rated themselves as more agreeable and were more cooperative than when they were in the student role. Heller and colleagues (2009) suggested that roles can help to explain situations because they capture the “active ingredients” of psychological meaning for individuals (p. 173). Certain roles and the associated goals may encourage personality change, such as the positive relationships between career satisfaction and Conscientiousness (Roberts, 1997; Roberts et  al., 2003) and between healthier marriages and Conscientiousness (Robins et al., 2002). Although there is substantial evidence that entering work or romantic partner roles and participating in student or friend roles influence action and help to shape one’s traits, there is a surprising lack of evidence for personality change when one becomes a parent (e.g., Bleidorn et al., 2013; Galdiolo & Roskam, 2014). Van Scheppingen and colleagues (2016) conducted a thorough longitudinal study in which they were able to compare personality traits before becoming a parent and after becoming a parent with a matched sample of people who did not have a child. This allowed them to test whether personality changes occurred before the transition to parenthood or after the arrival of a child. They found no systematic change in personality across these three groups. This parallels Bleidorn’s (2009) results. As noted, roles and role identities are significantly shaped by culture. Wee (2014) discusses filial piety as an interesting example of a role identity that is uniquely shaped by Confucian culture. Many philosophers attempt to understand and explain filial piety as similar to Western practices of special obligation, including debt, friendship, and gratitude. Wee clarifies that none of these Western practices fit the concept of filial piety well, although

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

210

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

they seem related in some respects. She concludes that, “[g]iven the very distinctive elements that make up this relation, there is nothing else that it [filial piety] is like” (p. 95, emphasis in original). She suggests that a more promising way to understand filial piety is to learn about Confucian teachings rather than analogize to more familiar Western concepts. It seems to us that there are likely to be many such culturally rich roles, the understanding of which requires study of the culture that grounds them.

Roles and Virtues In this section, we extend the scholarship from roles and personality to roles and virtues. There are three important reasons that virtues form a more natural companion to role-related actions than personality dimensions. First, roles involve an intrinsic set of expectations and norms, the fulfillment of which tends to fit more naturally with virtues than with personality traits, because moral standards are less relevant to personality traits. Recall that we have conceived of virtues as scalar traits, and that individuals have these characteristics in varying degrees. Our argument in this section is that the contours and shape of virtues are partly constituted by concrete role and relationship contexts. Second, the developmental changes in personality traits have been recognized relatively recently, and the SIT was devised to explain the maturity principle that seemed to be at work in this development. The developmental progression of virtues has been anticipated from the beginning. Indeed, two of our guiding premises are that virtues are acquired traits and that individuals actively and explicitly cultivate them for the sake of living well. This expected personal growth is the second reason that the role–virtue relationship may be more natural than the role–personality relationship. Third, recall the emphasis that Stryker (2007) and Roberts and colleagues (2005) place on how commitment to roles helps to shape personality traits. Once again, there is a natural fit between the relationship of commitment to a role and excellence in carrying out that role in terms of virtuous action. As we discuss in this section, one way to enact excellence in roles is by cultivating virtues. This section is structured to discuss four related topics. First, we explain how role enactments are manifested through emotions, cognitions, and behavior and seem isomorphic with the enactment of virtues. Second, we examine how roles shape virtues. Third, we discuss the variety of virtues that are naturally related to specific roles and how enacting those roles can assist individuals to cultivate those virtues. Finally, we discuss some

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Roles and Virtues

211

professional roles and the ways that virtues are essential to enacting those roles with excellence. Role and Virtue Enactments We have discussed how role enactments have multiple components, and these components map well on to the four components we have proposed for virtues: behavior, cognition, affect, and practical wisdom. To enact a role, one must adopt the perspective or identity that accompanies that role. That is, one looks on a situation as a physician, a carpenter, a nurse, or an educator. Adopting the perspective or identity of a particular role means that one sees the situation in a specific light, as one that calls for the expectations and capacities that attend that role. This means that one appraises a situation from the perspective of the role identity. That appraisal gives rise to the thoughts, emotions, and behavior that are consonant to the role. These are the three elements we have discussed that comprise actions. Role enactments are also inherently social because roles are based on a social structure and shared set of expectations for the role bearer. Practical wisdom, with its four functions, could plausibly affect the quality of the role enactment. From a practical wisdom perspective (Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024), playing a particular role well means that one can (1) recognize the important and central elements of a situation clearly, (2) harmonize various concerns, and (3) harmonize one’s cognition and affect related to the situation. Kristjánsson and Fowers suggest a fourth element that is somewhat more contentious: (4) recognizing how this situation relates to living well as a person. For example, when physicians face an emergency situation with an injured person, they might (1) recognize the life-threatening issues as demanding primary attention, (2) understand that addressing these emergency medical issues must be harmonized with concerns about the patient’s emotional state and comfort, and (3) remain calm and deliberate despite the severity of the emergency. And perhaps some of them (4) recognize that this enactment of the physician role is central to the calling of being a healer, which is in turn a core element of the goodness of their lives. This leads us to hypothesis 8-5: that the degree of practical wisdom is negatively correlated with the degree of role conflict. It is no coincidence that we have hypothesized that these four components help to constitute virtues as well. The reason for this isomorphism is that ordinary behavior can be enacted well or poorly, and this also applies to role enactments. One way to understand virtues is simply excellence in

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

212

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

ordinary actions (Broadie, 1991). It is reasonable to expect that excellent role enactments can be facilitated through virtue development, whether the role is as a parent, a police officer, a neighbor, or a car mechanic. Two more important parallels between role and virtue enactment are the central role of commitment and repetitive actions in both roles and virtues. Recall that the SIT explains that roles shape personality through commitment and repetitive actions. Virtues, to a greater extent than personality, are often thought to be based on a commitment to an excellent form of action, and many virtue scholars suggest that they are learned and become “second nature” through practice. This leads to the second topic of this section on how roles shape virtues. Given the greater apparent overlap between virtues and roles, compared to personality dimensions and roles, we suggest hypothesis 8-6: that appropriate virtues are more strongly related to a given role enactment than are personality dimensions. We think it is worth assessing whether this relationship holds both within persons (hypothesis 8-7) and between persons (hypothesis 8-8). Roles as Shapers of Virtues Roles are likely to shape virtues due to the repetitive, normative, and socially coordinated aspects of role enactments. This shaping may be clearest in the ubiquitous parental role. Of course, parenting takes different shapes in various cultures and times, and some individuals enact the culturally defined role of parenthood excellently and others do so poorly. We presently examine the role of parenting in one of its contemporary forms in the United States to exemplify how this role can shape virtues. Roberts (2007) suggests that roles be analyzed along two dimensions: affiliation and power. These two dimensions can serve to structure this discussion of parenting. The most obvious characteristic of a newborn is utter helplessness. The entirety of care that the newborn requires must be provided by parents or other caregivers (hereafter simply parents). This care includes feeding, clothing, sheltering, cleaning, soothing, holding, and so on. Importantly, infants require emotional nurturance and affective connection as well as having their physical needs met (McDermott et al., 2012). Caregiving in parenting is generally seen as affiliative, with parents offering the care in a loving way.3 As McDermott and colleagues 3

In using the term “love,” we do not refer simply to an emotion. Rather, we refer to a pattern of loving action that includes cognition, affect, and behavior patterned in a way that is directed toward the welfare of the infant.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Roles and Virtues

213

have documented, when infants do not receive this loving care, their psychosocial development is seriously and enduringly damaged. Parents are also in the position of teaching, structuring, and guiding their children, which emphasizes the second dimension of power. Young children have immense learning needs, and they are, in many ways, incapable of looking out for their own safety and welfare. Parents must teach their children and guide them in acquiring the knowledge and skills they need to navigate the world. Parents often simply model actions, but they occasionally need to use rewards or punishments to ensure their children remain safe and learn the important lessons of early life. Generally speaking, the necessities of the affiliative and power dimensions of parenthood are immediately obvious, and they often feel overwhelming. New parents frequently and rightly feel inadequate in caring for a helpless newborn. This perception of inadequacy is engendered by the immensity of the newborn’s utter dependency and inability to communicate clearly. As parents gain experience with their child and receive guidance and assistance from family, friends, and professionals, they gradually gain knowledge and confidence in providing care to the child. However, certainty and guarantees regarding decisions are not available, with mistakes and regrets being common. This brief discussion has highlighted several elements of the parenting role, two of which we want to emphasize. First, parents recognize an immense responsibility for the care and guidance of a newborn and this relationship is decidedly unidirectional. Children cannot do for their parents what parents must do for their children. This responsibility is typically experienced as complete and often seen as unending. In the beginning of a child’s life, this responsibility guides nearly every action a parent takes, and it remains central to parenthood throughout life for many people. Second, this responsibility and attachment shapes how parents see the remainder of their world, in terms of the opportunities, risks, and requirements that confront both them as parents and their child as a growing person. The scope of parenting responsibility and interest requires parents to grow into this role; to develop their capacities for the sake of their child’s welfare. The repetitive activities of parenting require great commitment and perseverance, especially in the first months of life, when infants need so much care and can communicate only obliquely. To enact the role of parent well requires commitment, deep investment in the child’s welfare, and the virtue of patience. Parenting is a ubiquitous role that can be enacted poorly or excellently. This leads us to hypothesis 8-9: that observed parenting quality will be positively correlated with commitment to the parenting

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

214

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

role, investment in the child’s welfare (hypothesis 8-10), and the virtue of patience (hypothesis 8-11). Similarly, hypothesis 8-12 suggests that changes in parenting quality will be positively correlated with personal growth. Parenthood is just one of many roles that people adopt. It is a ubiquitous role with great responsibility and import, but the adoption of any role has similar characteristics. One begins as a novice and only gradually and haltingly develops expertise. One’s perceptions and priorities are shaped by the role, and one must develop capacities to fulfill the role. The specifics of the virtues that the excellent enactment of each role requires will vary, which is the topic of the next section. Two experience-sampling studies provide some evidence for the ways that inhabiting social roles seem to influence virtue expression. Although Bleidorn and Denissen (2015) and Fowers and colleagues (2019) documented high within-person consistency in the assessed virtues, they also reported within-person variability that partly depended on the role that the respondent inhabited at the time of data collection. Bleidorn and Denissen reported that the virtues of wisdom, courage, and justice were more pronounced in work environments and that the virtues of temperance, humanity, and transcendence were more prominent when parenting. Fowers and colleagues found that respondents reported stronger expressions of fairness and kindness among family and friends compared with work contexts. Similarly, they also found stronger fairness and kindness virtue expression at home, compared to work or commercial contexts. Therefore, there is some evidence that roles help to shape virtues, but much more research is required to assess this point.

Virtues and Roles The virtues required for each role can be variously listed and described and there are different views on what it takes to fill various roles well or poorly. We do not claim any special privilege in the ways that we discuss them here. We only wish to exemplify the close relationships among some conceptions of good role fulfillment and some virtues. In line with our general approach, we think that virtue scientists should go ahead and make specific value-laden predictions about what good role fulfillment looks like and what virtues are like and then study how they interact. If scientists are upfront about these decisions and commitments, the resulting science can be sound and provide useful information. Generally speaking, adopting a role can emphasize the development of the virtues related specifically to the enactment of the role. We cannot give

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues and Roles

215

an exhaustive description of these connections because there are so many of them. Instead, we sketch a few examples of the connections that can be posited and then tested. We, as authors, vary in our confidence about these predictions, but we think this is a good example of how virtue science can be advanced by developing speculative and possibly contentious hypotheses, and then testing them. The Parenting Role We have already discussed the role of parent in terms of the growth and development that adopting this role seems to elicit. Another widely recognized feature of parenthood is that it calls for special obligations to one’s child vis-à-vis all other children in the world. An entirely depersonalized ethical view would give no special status to one’s own children, but there are few advocates of such a view when it comes to parent–child relationships.4 Instead, it is widely thought that parents have special duties to nurture and protect their children and to advance their well-being where possible. There are several virtues that might be associated with these expectations, including the virtue of loyalty. On some views, loyalty is a virtue that acknowledges and promotes exactly the kinds of special obligations that parenthood entails. When it comes to allocating time and resources, the standard expectation in many cultures is that parents are disproportionately devoted to their own children and secondarily to other children. A second virtue in parenthood might be fairness, in terms of treating multiple children equitably or in terms of being fair to any given child, given his particular strengths, weaknesses, developmental status, and aims. This suggests two hypotheses: that parenting quality will be positively related to loyalty (hypothesis 8-13) and to kindness (hypothesis 8-14). Given the special relationship between parents and their children, it might also be reasonable to expect parents to have stronger emotions toward their children and their children’s welfare than toward other people. If one’s child is hurt, for instance, it may be expected that one’s compassion should be activated more strongly than if a stranger or a mere acquaintance is hurt. If so, an anemic response to one’s child’s harm would seem to be a stronger indicator of the weakness of a virtue of compassion than a mild response to a co-worker’s harm. This is an example of how the intensity of a virtue response could be systematically related to the role one 4

Plato’s position in The Republic is a notable exception to advocating the special relationship of parents and children.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

216

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

inhabits. It also suggests hypothesis 8-15: that observed parenting quality is positively associated with the virtue of compassion. The Teaching Role Being a teacher in an elementary school is another role that has many parallels with parenthood. Being a teacher emphasizes the aims of nurturing and teaching the young, and teachers are typically assigned a small group of students for whom they are responsible. This contingent assignment of responsibility for a specific group of students also seems to call for the virtue of loyalty. Thus, we propose hypothesis 8–16: that observed teaching quality will be positively related to the virtue of loyalty. The elementary teacher has a special obligation to guide and nurture this group of children, and this special obligation might be thought to trump the relationships he has with other students in the school or to children in general. If, for example, this teacher has a special gift for teaching mathematics, a reasonable expectation could be that this ability is exercised with the students for whom the teacher is responsible before it is made available to other students in the school through study groups or tutoring. It frequently occurs that the special obligations of teachers can become complicated. Consider, for example, the situation of a teacher who is a member of a minority group that is only weakly represented at a school. This could be the case with many forms of minority, including ethnic, racial, religious, sexual orientation, and so forth. This teacher may experience a special obligation to other members of the minority group at the school, and students, staff, or junior colleagues might turn to the teacher for guidance and nurturance. This might create a loyalty bind for this teacher, given the expectations of loyalty to the students in the class and the needs of other minority group members in the school. We think many people experience this sort of bind, which requires them to prioritize their loyalty expressions in the best way that they can. We do not think there is an abstract formula for how best to accomplish this prioritization and harmonization. Rather, it is a matter of exercising practical wisdom regarding what is most important in the given situation. This is a special case of hypothesis 11-12. Police Officer Role Another role necessary for every well-organized community is the role of police officer. The immediate question with law enforcement is about the purpose of that enforcement. For some, the enforcement is its own end,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues and Roles

217

and this conveys powerful authority on the police officer. If enforcement is taken to be the end, however, this may leave many problematic means available, including coercion, excessive aggression, and rigid assertions of authority. If, however, public safety is taken to be the end of law enforcement, this end rules out many means because means such as coercion or unnecessary aggression are inimical to public safety. It is clear, however, that even in pursuing public safety, there are times when risks are necessary for police officers. In risk-laden situations, courage is a primary virtue. It is generally expected that police officers are experts at risky situations and will act in a courageous manner. One of the role expectations for police officers is that they will engage danger directly where possible. This expectation was violated in the case of the 2022 school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, in which many police officers stood by while a shooter continued to kill school children. This apparent failure of action has engendered great anger and anguish, especially among the bereaved. In contrast, in another 2022 shooting in a Colorado nightclub, two military veterans, Joseph Fierro and Thomas James, wrestled a shooter to the ground to halt the shooting. Fierro’s comments about the incident are enlightening. He stated that “I was in (fighting) mode. I was doing what I did down range. I trained for this” (Vera, 2022). James highlighted his reasons for action by saying that “I simply wanted to save the family I found” (Liebermann et al., 2022). These courageous individuals were military veterans, but this same kind of courage is a standard expectation for police officers. Having the responsibility for public safety means that police officers need to cultivate the virtue of courage through training and on-the-job experience. Having the responsibility for public safety also engages the virtue of fairness, and both violations and instantiations of fairness receive a great deal of attention. This suggests two hypotheses: that excellence in law enforcement among police officers will be positively correlated with the virtues of courage (hypothesis 8-17) and fairness (hypothesis 8-18). Virtues and the Roles of Healers Having outlined the relationships among several important roles and virtues, we complete this chapter with a more in-depth exploration of the virtues associated with the professional roles of healers. This broad category includes medical professionals, psychotherapeutic professionals, and many others. People have been going to healers since time immemorial, but these roles have become professionalized in the West, and individuals now engage in paid employment as doctors, nurses, psychotherapists,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

218

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

and so forth. There is a growing literature calling for the development of virtues in the professions (e.g., Del Castillo, 2021; Fowers, 2005b; Fowers & Winakur, 2014; Hawking et al., 2017). One of the key commonalities across the healing professions is that people come to these professionals in significant pain or distress. People seek relief from that pain or distress, but they are often driven to seek help because it has become unbearable or threatens their life or way of life. This suggests that the virtue of compassion is necessary for healers. A compassionate response to pain is likely to be the beginning of healing and allows the professional to get a more complete account of the difficulties. Healing professionals seem to require a highly developed virtue of compassion, however, because the people who need them often present difficulties that are extremely painful, private, or difficult to handle (Fowers & Winakur, 2014; Hawking et al., 2017). Psychotherapy provides a good example of the degree of compassion that may be required (Fowers et al., 2017). Clients often present concerns about which they are ashamed or about which they feel disgust. For instance, clients frequently come to therapy, in part, because they loathe themselves and frequently berate themselves. At some point, this self-hatred must be discussed and dealt with so that the person can learn to see themselves as a worthy person who has a legitimate claim on being loved and on a good life. Part of the difficulty is that people who think of themselves as unworthy understandably experience great pain and reluctance in confronting that self-loathing. They reject certain parts of themselves (or their whole being) and they expect others to do the same. The role of the psychotherapist requires the ability to listen to their clients’ self-loathing with acceptance and caring. Clients learn how to accept themselves because they see their psychotherapist accept them, even when they present the least acceptable aspects of themselves. On many views, the compassion and acceptance offered by the therapist needs to be complete for this process to bear fruit, so it must have all the features of a virtue, including an understanding of compassion and the reasons for it, emotions and motivations consonant with compassion, behavior resonant with compassion, and practical wisdom to guide it. In some instances, a client’s pain and perhaps their self-hostility is due to mistreatment from others. Such mistreatment takes many forms, but this abuse, neglect, or traumatization often induces deep shame in the sufferer, leading to self-blame and the belief that they deserve the mistreatment. Working through such a history is painful in the same ways described in the previous paragraph, and healing occurs through the therapist’s

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtues and Roles

219

compassion for and acceptance of the sufferer. Of course, this healing also involves the repudiation of abuse and other forms of mistreatment, but this repudiation has to be carefully separated from the individual suffering from mistreatment. A second requirement of healing professionals is that they must be trustworthy because seeking treatment requires vulnerability (Fowers & Winakur, 2014). If the sufferer cannot trust the professional, it is impossible to present the sources of suffering in a way that facilitates treatment. Of course, many people seeking treatment may take some time to come to trust a professional, and some professionals are not trustworthy. The reason we focus on trustworthiness instead of trust is that trustworthiness is something that the professional can develop and that a professional can offer to a sufferer. It is up to the sufferer to decide whether or not to trust a professional, and trustworthiness is the best way to facilitate that trust. If we take a physician as an example, it is essential to trust that the physician is primarily interested in healing, or at least seeking the best therapy for one’s malady (Garcia, 2020). If it seems that the physician is acting primarily for financial or reputational gain, trust will be threatened. Professionalism itself is geared toward helping practitioners in being trustworthy. There are many practices oriented to this aim, including professional ethics, the capacity to listen, and the knowledge and gravitas of a professional. Trustworthiness requires that the professional is fully committed to the healing process, and this shows up in the professional’s thoughts, emotions, and behavior. Practical wisdom also seems necessary to guide the professional in trustworthiness, especially when the sufferer is unsure whether to trust or not (Fowers, Novak, Calder, & Sommer, 2022). A close companion of trustworthiness is the virtue of honesty. Although it can be difficult to be honest in situations of suffering, a lack of truthfulness can seriously impede the healing process, partly through reducing trustworthiness and partly through misguiding the sufferer about the condition and the best form of treatment (Begley, 2008; Fowers & Winakur, 2014). Of course, honesty does not entail absolute frankness or transparency. Healers are not required to voice all their knowledge or experiences with sufferers, but what they do share needs to be true and valuable. From a neo-Aristotelian perspective, virtues are flanked by a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess (Fowers, 2005a, 2008). For honesty, the deficiency is untruthfulness, and the excess is undue truthfulness. The former is easy to understand, but the excess amounts to a recognition that healers are not required to disclose all their thoughts and experiences to the sufferer. Withholding some information may be a matter of timing or compassion.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

220

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

For example, if a physician discloses all the diagnostic possibilities before assessing and ruling some in or out, it is likely to induce unnecessary anxiety in a patient. At the same time, some discussion of the diagnostic process is likely to help a patient to be more compliant with and tolerant of it. The bottom line is that healers need to be honest with the people who seek their help even though this is often difficult, such as in cases of serious, frightening diagnoses, difficult treatment regimens, or when helping someone to confront their self-hatred or self-defeating behavior. We cannot provide an exhaustive list of virtues even for this limited range of roles. Even the lists and background claims about how to assess role fulfillment are potentially contentious. Our point in developing the examples we have is to illustrate the appeal and plausibility of the general idea that roles and virtues are connected in important and interesting ways that virtue science can and should take into account. For example, when it comes to healers, we have focused on one view of virtues that make it possible for people to be good or excellent healers. In addition, we emphasized that to fulfill the role well one is likely to need more robust forms of some virtues than is needed by a person who has not adopted that role. We therefore propose three hypotheses: that the degree of compassion (hypothesis 8-19), trustworthiness (hypothesis 8-20), and honesty (hypothesis 8-21) will be positively correlated to the observed expertise of healing professionals. Such virtues may be supererogatory in ordinary life, but they appear necessary to provide the assistance that sufferers need.

Roles and the Science of Virtue This chapter has revealed the vital position of roles and role identities in human life, and this position means that these roles likely shape the specific virtues (justice, compassion, courage, and so forth) that individuals and theorists adopt. This means that the kinds of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors that are taken to indicate a virtue’s strength or weakness, presence or absence, depends partly on the role context. For example, it seems reasonable to expect stronger emotional responses in a parent than in another person who is a mere co-worker when a child (who is also a coworker) is harmed, and we anticipate that this expectation is reflected in how readers think about a virtue such as compassion. The lack of strong concern in a parent would indicate weak compassion while it might not influence our interpretation in a co-worker. Therefore, as virtue scientists, it is important to track roles and their influence on our individual and collective thinking about virtue traits when measuring virtue traits and their

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

221

strengths. This may require taking facts about roles into account when designing measures, conducting studies, or interpreting results. It is also likely that cultures include varying assumptions about the roles in a given society. For these reasons, we recommend that virtue science involve collaboration between philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists to understand the role expectations or norms that are in play and that should be taken into account in research on virtue traits. This also means that when designing studies and interpreting results, virtue scientists may have different assumptions about roles from those they are studying. These could generate differences in conceptions of virtue. Virtue science can ideally tackle interesting questions about how virtues enable people to fulfill roles well or not. As we discussed in Chapter 2, philosophers and virtue scientists can collaborate to chart realistic standards for being a good teacher, lawyer, partner, parent, and so on. They can then jointly empirically study how much virtues in various degrees facilitate or hinder people from living up to these role standards. For example, virtue science could ideally determine empirically whether compassion, justice, or courage tends to correlate with being a good parent or physician.

Summary In this chapter, we have outlined the important position that roles have in understanding human activity in general, along with exploring how to understand the dependency of traits, especially virtue traits, on role adoption. We began with Stryker’s (2007) Identity Theory to understand the social situatedness of roles and role identities. This theory clarified that roles are ubiquitous, normative, and repetitive sets of activities that have a place in an organized social world. Because roles are normative and repetitive, they are expected to result in role identities, wherein persons adopt the normative expectations of the role into their identities. Role identities turn out to be a socially facing parallel to traits, which tend to direct the view inward to the person. Personality traits develop through adulthood, following what appears to be a “maturity principle.” The personality traits of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism seem to be influenced by the adoption of role identities such as employment, long-term romantic relationship partner, friend, and student. The research is more consistent with a social role interpretation of these personality developments than a purely genetic explanation. We argued that virtue traits should be more closely related to role adoption than personality dimensions because virtues and roles are normatively

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

222

The Role Sensitivity of Virtues

structured, include personal growth and strength cultivation, and are based on commitment. Roles have very similar components to virtues, including cognition, affect, and behavior. Practical wisdom or judgment is necessary for both as well. This is all subject to empirical assessment. We outlined some of the virtues that might be associated with prominent roles, such as parenthood, education, law enforcement, and healer roles. We should test the plausible hypotheses that virtues such as loyalty, compassion, patience, and fairness are necessary for fulfilling these roles well. We also suggested numerous hypotheses that can guide research on roles and virtues, which has been very limited to date. We see such research as a wonderful opportunity for collaboration among philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists. Input from sociology and anthropology will be particularly helpful as these disciplines have historically attended to the structures and meanings of cultures and social roles to a greater extent than philosophy and psychology have. In Chapter 9, we continue to expand on the ways in which context is an important aspect of virtue development and expression by discussing various person–situation interactions.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 9

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

For much of the history of psychology, there was a strident debate about whether situational factors or personality dimensions were the chief causes of human behavior. During the middle of the twentieth century, the situationist view seemed to have carried the day, with hundreds of experimental studies documenting the effects of seemingly minor situational factors (e.g., noise, experimenter instructions) on behavior. The landscape has changed, however, with psychologists settling into a consensus that both situational influences and personality dimensions are important sources of behavior, and that they frequently interact (Tracy et al., 2009; Webster, 2009). Furr and Funder (2021) have put an exclamation point on the importance of the person–situation interaction by stating that “person–situation interaction should be a key foundation for any personality theory” (p. 667). The STRIVE-4 Model incorporates this consensus and predicts that the expression of virtue traits varies across situations. In fact, the interaction of person and situation factors is an important prediction of virtue theory. This is immediately apparent once one jettisons the outdated and simplistic premise that traits manifest continuously and in ways that are unaffected by situational factors. Virtue theory holds that traits are virtually always enacted in ways that are sensitive to situations. The general prediction is that individuals with stronger virtue traits are less influenced by situational factors than are individuals with weaker virtue traits. That is, individuals with stronger virtue traits act in ways consistent with those traits in many situations, but individuals with weaker virtue traits are influenced more by situational influences, to act either more or less ethically, depending on the situational influence. The interactions between aspects of the situation and aspects of the person can take multiple forms and lead to multiple hypotheses. We begin this chapter with an explication of some forms of situational influence and person–situation interaction. 223

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

224

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

Situational Influence Before we discuss the interaction of person–situation factors, we acknowledge that both person and situation factors sometimes independently influence an individual’s actions. We discussed the ways that traits can influence action in Chapters 5 and 7. In this section, we briefly address the large social-psychological literature that documents direct situational influences and the limitations of that literature. Hundreds of experimental investigations have clarified that relatively minor features of situations influence behavior. These features range from location to ambient smells or noise, and famously include bystander studies. The studies typically examine relatively consequential behavioral outcomes such as helping someone who appears to be injured or reporting an apparent theft. For example, two recent meta-analyses that included hundreds of studies reported that helpfulness is affected by minor situational factors (e.g., Fischer et al., 2011; Lefevor et al., 2017). Helpful behavior is reliably increased by situational factors that encourage it and reliably decreased by situational factors that discourage it. Although there is no question that situational factors influence behavior, there are important nuances to these effects. Fisher and colleagues (2011) examined the well-known effect that bystanders decrease helping behavior. They found the same degree of decreases in helping with bystanders as have been found in previous studies with bystanders who are strangers, and this effect is augmented by larger numbers of bystanders. However, they also reported that helping actually increased when the research participant knew the bystanders and when the severity of the problem needing help was greater. These important results are seldom acknowledged, but they modify our understanding of the bystander effect in important ways. After all, people are frequently in the company of people they know, at work, at home, and in leisure time. Helping behavior is therefore frequently increased by the presence of acquaintances, friends, and family members. In addition, in severe situations (when helping is most important), people help more. It is worth noting that stranger bystanders are generally stooges of the investigator who have been explicitly instructed not to help. Their passivity is generally taken to be a neutral condition, but it is not neutral because it helps to set a behavioral norm for not helping in the situation. Lefevor and colleagues (2017) also found the standard effects of situational helping, but they asked additional questions about what proportions of participants helped in the control conditions and help-discouraging conditions,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Types of Person–Situation Interactions

225

which are seldom examined. They found that a relatively high percentage of people helped in the control (42 percent) and help-discouraging conditions (39 percent) across 185 and 70 studies, respectively. These percentages are lower than the percentage of participants who helped in help-encouraging conditions (51 percent), which is why an aggregate group difference is generally found across conditions in helping. Yet the differences across the groups are relatively small rather than categorical or overwhelmingly large, and large effects are usually implied by researchers based on their aggregate statistical results. This suggests that there may be personal factors at work in participants’ decisions about helping, but virtually none of the hundreds of studies that Lefevor and colleagues examined assessed any important personal factors. This absence of evidence is important, because it fails to provide evidence of absence, with the latter being fallaciously concluded by some observers (e.g., Doris, 2002). The absence of evidence is also important in revealing that these researchers simply did not assess potentially relevant person variables because they did not see them as important. Another consideration regarding situational influence on behavior is that some situations influence behavior only slightly, whereas other situations have a strong influence. Situations with little influence are sometimes called weak situations (e.g., a public park), and those with greater influence are sometimes called strong situations (e.g., a well-monitored final exam session; Mischel, 1973). In weak situations, there can be many reasonable actions, and individuals can choose among them. In a strong situation, the range of appropriate or sensible actions is more constrained. From a virtue perspective we recognize that some situations provide significant latitude for individual and communal agency, but that there are other situations that can be quite constraining for choice. We return to this topic in the trait–situation section.

Types of Person–Situation Interactions As Furr and Funder (2021) put it, “behavior arises not simply from both person attributes and situation attributes, but from processes through which persons and situations shape each other’s effects on behavior. Persons shape how situations impact behavior, and situations shape how a person’s attributes impact behavior” (p. 672). The variations in the systematic ways that actions are influenced by person and situation factors have been parsed in many ways. For our purposes, we focus on four ways that person–situation interactions influence actions. First, many scholars now interpret personality dimensions in terms of contextualized constructs rather than cross-situationally monotonic dispositions. Second,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

226

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

individuals can act to alter situations in multiple ways. That is, person factors can influence situational factors. Third, situations can interact with traits to influence behavior. Fourth, individuals tend to differ in their abilities to recognize the demands and opportunities available in various situations. There are other forms of person–situation interactions, but these four cover the majority of possibilities. Viewing Person Variables as Contextualized Dispositions Although personality dimensions have traditionally been viewed as broad dispositions that influence action in stable ways, many scholars are gravitating to the view that personality characteristics are contextualized and affect actions differentially depending on that context. Such contextualized dispositions would remain stable over time, but may be relevant only to some situations, not all circumstances. We discussed such situationally cued dispositions in terms of social-cognitive processes (Chapter 5) that were originally proposed by Mischel and Shoda (1995) and incorporated into WTT (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015) and the Three-Tiered Theory of Personality (McAdams, 2021). There are many such contextualized dispositions, ranging from the Big 5 and the HEXACO1 to rejection sensitivity (Romero-Canyas et al., 2009) and self-schemas (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Once the potential for contextualized dispositions is recognized, within-person variation in the expression of traits or dispositions can be systematically studied.2 That is, within-person variation in trait expression is not simply individual diosyncratic or random but also likely to be systematic. This is one of the outcomes of the growing literature on density distributions of person characteristics, which has suggested that individual variation is not only common and large but also potentially explainable (Fleeson & Law, 2015; McCabe & Fleeson, 2016). At the same time, individuals have very stable responses over time that indicate their average traits (e.g., Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009), which means that there is both stability in personal characteristics and meaningful variation. 1

2

As a reminder, the Big 5 and HEXACO are widely recognized structural depictions of traits (see Chapter 5). The Big 5 comprises Agreeableness, Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism. The dimensions of the HEXACO are Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Emotionality. Recall from Chapter 7 that traits can be studied in aggregate between-persons research and in within-person research. The results of the two approaches are sometimes consistent and sometimes at variance in important ways. Person-centered research has become more prominent in psychology in recent decades.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Types of Person–Situation Interactions

227

Yao and Moskowitz (2015) studied a specific example of this form of person–situation interaction. They noted that reactivity to others’ affability or quarrelsomeness is well-established, and others’ degree of quarrelsomeness is an example of a situation variable. Yao and Moskowitz investigated whether reactivity to others was qualified by the Agreeableness of the respondent. They found that respondent Agreeableness reduced reactivity to others’ quarrelsomeness, which is an important interaction of a person characteristic with a situational feature. Fleeson and Law (2015) conducted an experience-sampling study in a laboratory setting in which they assigned up to twenty situations to participants, and the participants and untrained observers rated participant behavior on the Big 5 factors. They found significant within-person variability, significant stability, and significant between-person differences in personality ratings. Correlations of the first and second half of the situations ranged from 0.7 to 0.9, indicating strong consistency in rated behavior. The combination of within-person stability and between-person differences, even in the presence of between situation differences, led these authors to conclude that “these correlations mean that actors were stable because of who they are … [and] was not a result of differences in situations or of highly specific reactions to repeated situations” (pp. 1095, 1099–1100). Although this literature is small, it is consistent with the concept of contextualized dispositions of personality variables. Up to this point, the research has focused on personality variables. We suggest the general hypothesis 9-1: that virtue trait expression will be contextualized to fit situations, roles, and relationships. This hypothesis can be ramified into many specific hypotheses for each virtue and relevant context. Individual Influence on Situations Situational factors may not have unilateral influence on persons and actions. In fact, several investigators have documented some ways in which the situation can be altered by one or more aspects of the person. To take a simple example, the size and liveliness of a social gathering is likely influenced differentially by the presence of extraverted or introverted participants at the gathering. People influence situations strongly enough that it seems that the same situation is different for individuals who are different in relevant ways (Mischel, 1973; Odling-Smee et al., 2003). In what follows, we discuss three primary ways that persons shape situations: selection, perception, and evocation (Furr & Funder, 2021).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

228

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

Selection of Situations Individuals can choose to participate in some situations but not others (e.g., church meetings, bars, or protest rallies), and those choices clearly influences one’s actions. That is, people frequently do not just passively find themselves in situations. One way this occurs is that individuals often select the situations in which they place themselves to be consonant with how they see themselves or to facilitate their aims. That is, the individual’s short- and long-term goals can guide people into specific situations as a way to further their goals (Heller et al., 2009). As Furr and Funder (2021) put it, “individuals may seek situations that ‘fit’ their personality – situations that allow them to engage in the types of activities they enjoy, to have the types of experiences they value, to be in environments that they find comfortable, or to express themselves in ways that they value” (p. 677). In one study of the relationships among situation selection by persons, Wrzus and colleagues (2016) examined how the frequency of situation exposure related to Big 5 personality dimensions and found differences across those dimensions. To give two examples, people higher in Neuroticism reported being more often alone, doing chores more frequently, and watching television more than those scoring lower in Neuroticism. Participants higher in Extroversion reported being with friends more often and being less likely to do chores than those scoring lower in Extroversion. These authors predicted but did not find that older individuals would report personality–situation compatibility more frequently than younger participants due to lifelong situational selection. Sherman and colleagues (2015) also studied the relationships among the HEXACO and situation types and reported that there were both between-individual differences in situation type frequencies and withinperson differences. To give two examples of between-person differences, scores on Honesty-Humility were negatively related to reporting involvement in deceptive situations and Emotionality (parallel to Neuroticism in the Big 5) scores were positively correlated with negativity. Most correlations between personality dimensions and situational features were small, however. This small but growing literature suggests that personality variables are related to the situation types that individuals encounter. This is consistent with general hypothesis 9-1: that virtue traits also predict differences in the types of situations that individuals encounter. In addition, we propose general hypothesis 9-2: that the differences in encountered situations will be more acutely perceived based on the strength of the virtue trait.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Types of Person–Situation Interactions

229

Situation Evocation In some cases, an individual’s actions or perhaps just their presence changes the situation in important ways. For example, imagine a pair of six-yearolds playing on their own, and the way a parent’s arrival on the scene can change the situation. Many changes are possible (shifts in the play, looking to the adult for guidance, asking the adult for assistance), but some shift in the situation is highly likely. As Furr and Funder (2021) note, situation evocation is relatively understudied, despite its potential importance. They explain that this may be partly due to the challenges involved in categorizing and assessing the alteration of situations and partly due to the lack of a systematic set of variables that can adequately characterize situations and their dynamics. It also seems likely that persons with strong virtue traits also evoke different aspects of situations, and this likelihood leads to general hypothesis 9-3: that the stronger an individual’s virtue trait, the more likely they are to evoke desirable alterations in situation perception and action for participants in the situation. An example of a specific evocation could be that the instances of victim-blaming will be lower when a person who is known to have or expresses a strong compassion trait is involved in a discussion of victimization. Situation Perception Psychologists have long recognized that situation perception is important. To give two examples, Mischel (1977) stated that “any given, objective stimulus condition may have a variety of effects, depending on how the individual construes and transforms it” (p. 253) and Bem and Allen (1974) commented that “the classification of situations … will have to be in terms of the individual’s phenomenology, not the investigator’s” (p. 518). It is easy to recognize that an individual’s personal perception of a situation has a more direct effect on their actions than any nonsubjective or nominal features of the situation (Furr & Funder, 2021), because all situations must be appraised and interpreted through the individual’s subjective perspective. It is widely recognized that different individuals might perceive the same circumstances divergently. For example, someone with social anxiety sees a social gathering differently than those without social anxiety. Some research has been conducted on situation perception. Todd and Funder (2012) had participants rate video clips and found that those who rated the clips differently than other observers also had higher scores on Neuroticism and Openness. Two additional studies found that positive situation perception was positively correlated with participants’

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

230

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

Extraversion and Openness scores, and negatively related to the participants’ Neuroticism scores (Morse, Sauerberger, et al., 2015; Morse, Sweeny, & Legg, 2015). This small literature also suggests the heuristic value of a general hypothesis 9-4: that situation perception varies appropriately with the virtue traits. It seems clear that situation selection, evocation, and perception have been understudied. The available research suggests that persons do affect situations. There are good reasons for the paucity of research in this area, as noted by Furr and Funder (2021). Above all, this discussion of how individuals shape the situations in which they act raises the important question of how we can even know what the “situation” is (Rauthmann et al., 2015). Situations are dynamic, alterable, and subject to individuals’ perceptions, suggesting that a clear dichotomy of person and situation is unlikely to represent the human world accurately, particularly the social world. Distinguishing between situations and persons remains useful, as long as we remember that we, as scholars, are making such distinctions for the purpose of teasing apart aspects of our world that are unlikely to be fully separable in reality. Making such distinctions can be illuminating, but the moment one sees a distinction created for research purposes as a dichotomy that is true of the world, the scholar begins to distort their picture of that world. This insight is part of what led to the current consensus that both situations and person factors are important influences on actions. Trait–Situation Interactions As we noted, trait expression has greater latitude in weaker situations, but less space in stronger situations. We discuss several studies in this section that have documented the converse as well: that the weaker an individual’s trait is, the more situational factors will influence that individual. Take, for example, helpfulness in a situation with many task demands, such as a high-pressure workplace. It is reasonable to expect that people are less likely to help the more task demands there are. In a less task-burdened or less structured situation, helping is more likely on average. As Carver and Scheier (2008) pointed out, the recognition of trait–situation interactions clarifies that traits are not autonomous dispositions. Rather, traits are relative and responsive to situational features. In one situation, a particular trait-related behavior may be more appropriate than another trait-related behavior, but in a second situation, the second trait may be more fitting than the first. For this reason, no advocates of traits (to our knowledge) expects that trait behaviors manifest constantly or show

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Types of Person–Situation Interactions

231

up in the same way across varying situations. This contextualization of traits is well understood by personality psychologists, but outdated and stereotyped understandings of traits portray them as manifesting monotonically in all circumstances, regardless of appropriateness. It is important to discard such stereotypic views as unfounded and insupportable.3 Trait– situation interactions have been studied with (1) classical personality traits, (2) broad person characteristics,4 and (3) moral characteristics of persons. Classical Personality Trait–Situation Interactions Several studies have assessed interactions between situational characteristics and Big 5 and HEXACO personality dimensions. Sherman and colleagues (2015) assessed within-person variation in personality expression using the personality states approach from the density distribution model (see Chapter 7), which provides a distribution of each personality dimension within each individual over time. Their most interesting result was that situational contingencies related to within-person personality expression. To give two examples, they found that when a person was, for example, in a deception situation, she reported less Honesty-Humility than she did on average, and in a sociality situation, she reported more Extraversion than she did on average. This indicates an interaction between the participant’s general personality trait (a within-person variable) and the situational characteristic (a between-individuals variable) on personality expression (a within-person variable). Zettler and Hilbig (2010) examined the HEXACO-based prediction that individuals low in Honesty-Humility would tend to engage in counterproductive work behavior (CWB; e.g., rudeness, revealing organizational secrets) when the situation encourages CWBs, but individuals higher in that trait would not do so. These authors found main effects both for Honesty-Humility and for the degree of reported politics in the workplace on CWBs, but they found that the main effects were qualified by an interaction in which the combination of the predictors accelerated the tendency to CWBs. This interaction suggested that only those low in Honesty-Humility were affected by a politicized workplace and responded with negative behavior, but those with a stronger HonestyHumility trait did not respond with negative behavior, even when the 3 4

We tend to see this portrayal of traits as monotonically and constantly expressed as a kind of “straw person” argument used to undermine the idea of a trait. Some see all person characteristics as part of the personality, but we have not defined personality in such broad terms, so we differentiate between classical personality dimensions (e.g., Big 5 and HEXACO) and other person characteristics (e.g., intelligence, rejection sensitivity, virtues).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

232

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

workplace was politicized. Chirumbolo (2015) conducted a similar study examining whether people with job insecurity would be more likely to report engaging in CWBs, depending on Honesty-Humility. They found a main effect for Honesty-Humility and an interaction with job insecurity on CWBs. Only those low in Honesty-Humility engaged in CWBs, whereas those higher on Honesty-Humility did not, even in the presence of job insecurity. Hilbig and Zettler (2009) used the standard dictator and ultimatum economic games to test the person–situation interaction. In the dictator game, the participant stipulates how a reward is divided between themselves and a recipient, with no input from the recipient. In the ultimatum game, the participant offers a division of the money, and the recipient can accept or reject the offer. If the offer is rejected, neither player receives any reward. They found that Honesty-Humility had a main effect on reward division for both games, and that people who had low Honesty-Humility scores gave themselves a significantly greater proportion of the reward in the dictator game compared to the ultimatum game. The interaction means that when the situation (game) allowed people low in HonestyHumility to take advantage of another person, they did so. In another economic game experiment, Hilbig and colleagues (2012) used a public goods game to investigate the possible interaction of Honesty-Humility and punishment. In a typical public goods game, the experimenter provides an award of a specific amount of money or tokens to each participant, and portions of the award can be put into a communal pool by the participants. Typically, if participants collectively put half of their award into the communal pool, the experimenter doubles what is in the communal pool, and the reward is split equally among all participants (whether they contributed to the communal pool or not). This game provides a measure of whether individuals contribute to the common good or attempt to preserve their own endowment and possibly free ride on others’ contributions. Punishment for failing to contribute to the common good typically reduces free riding. Hilbig and colleagues found a main effect of Honesty-Humility and an interaction with the presence of punishment on how much participants contributed in a public goods game. This interaction means that participants low in Honesty-Humility engaged in free riding when the situation (no punishment) allowed it but contributed when punishment was possible. In contrast, those high in Honesty-Humility did not engage in free riding, with or without punishment. Similarly, Allgaier and colleagues (2015) reported that, among adolescents, positive rewards for antisocial behavior (situational variable)

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Types of Person–Situation Interactions

233

interacted with the strength of the participants’ Honesty-Humility trait. Those with a weaker Honesty-Humility trait were more likely to join in the antisocial behavior, whereas those with a stronger Honesty-Humility trait were less likely to join in the antisocial behavior. That is, those lower on Honesty-Humility were more strongly influenced by the situation. One criticism of most research on person–situation interactions is that these studies tend to rely on self-reports of person traits and behavior, sometimes even of the characteristics of the situation. Although this criticism raises questions about this research, it does not invalidate it. Leikas and colleagues (2012) addressed this by controlling the situation and by using behavioral ratings of specific participant behaviors in dyadic interactions with actors enacting social stances (e.g., agreeable, quarrelsome). Big 5 personality dimensions were based on self-report. They found significant situation–personality interactions with Extraversion (number of speaking turns), Openness (higher dominance), Conscientiousness (asking questions and showing interest), and Agreeableness (head nodding), but no person–situation interaction effects with Neuroticism. The specificity and observer-based rating undercuts the critique that only self-reported behavior is subject to these interactions. This literature leads us to propose general hypothesis 9-5: that virtue traits interact with situational variables. The shape of this interaction is that individuals stronger in the relevant virtue trait will be less influenced by the situational factor than those who are weaker in the virtue trait. Broad Person Characteristic Interactions with Situational Features In two studies, Simpson and Willer (2008) tested whether simple egocentric motives can account for giving behavior in general, as suggested by some versions of evolutionary psychology. They reasoned that some individuals would conform to egoistic predictions and others would not. They assessed whether participants were more egoistically motivated or preferred an equal distribution of resources.5 They found that this difference in orientation to benefit distribution moderated sharing behavior depending on whether their responses could be seen by others or were private. They predicted and found that allocations of resources were similar for both groups of participants when the participants’ responses were 5

Their assessment is called the Social Value Orientation (SVO), and they termed the difference as “egoism” and “altruism,” but we think the term altruism is misplaced because the SVO assesses whether individuals focus on getting more resources for themselves or on an equal distribution of resources. The latter does not fit any extant definition of altruism because the benefits are equally distributed to the self and the other person.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

234

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

publicly shown, but when the participants’ responses were private, egoists allocated the resources in more self-serving ways than those preferring equal allocation. This resulted in a significant person–situation interaction in both studies. In contrast, Moussaoui and colleagues (2020) attempted to identify an interaction between environmentally friendly prompts and environmental attitudes on environmentally sustainable behavior in three studies. They found main effects for both the situational feature and the person characteristic but did not find an interaction. Interactions between Moral Characteristics of Persons and Situational Features Several studies examine how moral characteristics of persons moderate situations. This is a broad category that has been inspired by several theoretical perspectives, including moral identity, Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2013), and virtue theory. The virtue trait–situation interaction is a core empirical prediction for the STRIVE-4 Model. In an experimental study, Aquino et al. (2009) found that when other people apparently acted in self-interested ways, cooperative behavior was more likely to be maintained when participants had stronger moral identities. This result indicates the joint influence of both personal (moral identity) and situational factors (others’ self-interested action). However, Hart (2005) cautioned that: [M]oral identity [and, by extension, virtue] is too valuable a construct to allow it to become only another individual difference, personality trait-like variable … We need to respect the depth of commitment to, and enmeshment in, the specific identities which organize the pursuit of moral virtue: environmentalist, animal liberationist, civil rights activist, and so on. These identities and many others can and do become central in the moral lives of many individuals, and a full notion of moral identity ought to be able to address this fact. (pp. 258–259)

This caution is important because it highlights the ways that moral identity and virtues are central to a person’s identity and way of life, and many individual difference variables often lack this centrality. In three studies, Süssenbach and colleagues (2019) examined an expected interaction between concern for harm and responsiveness to others’ suffering. They found that greater depicted suffering (situation) interacted with the concern about harms (person) to produce more responsiveness to the suffering. They drew on Moral Foundations Theory and its prediction that the moral foundations should be cued by situational features. They found

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Recognition of Situational Demands and Opportunities

235

that the moral foundations that interacted with the visual presence of suffering in that those higher on “binding foundations” (in-group loyalty, authority, and purity) were less responsive to suffering than those higher on “individualizing foundations” (justice, harm concern). Bolderdijk and colleagues (2013) examined whether environmentally themed videos and individually held environmental values would prompt environmentally friendly intentions. Environmental values were related to intentions to act in an environmentally friendly way, but the videos were ineffective unless the participant already held environmental values. This interaction of personal and situational variables suggests that the effectiveness of environmental informational programming may depend on the recipient’s valuing of the environment. In a direct examination of a virtue–situational interaction, Fowers, Lane, et al. (2022) conducted an experiment with three conditions: fairness encouraging, neutral, and fairness discouraging. They made the moderation prediction that the stronger an individual’s fairness trait, the more likely they would act fairly in all conditions, whereas those with weaker fairness traits would tend to act fairly in the fairness-encouraging condition but less so in the fairness-discouraging condition. This prediction was confirmed. Two experiments on Justice Sensitivity (Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Lotz et al., 2013) were also consistent with the STRIVE-4 Model person–situation interaction hypothesis, in that conditions favoring unfair behavior only influence those who are low on Justice Sensitivity. Lefevor and Fowers (2016) attempted a similar experimental test with trait kindness and situational variation in predicting helping behavior. They found a main effect for kindness on helpful behavior, but the study did not produce a main effect for a situation or a trait–situation interaction effect.

Person-Related Recognition of Situational Demands and Opportunities The discussion of person–situation interactions generally does not go beyond the three forms we have discussed so far, but virtue theory predicts a fourth form of interaction (general hypothesis 9-6), wherein people with stronger virtue traits can recognize and transform situations in a way conducive to virtuous actions (which we describe as practical wisdom in Chapter 11) in ways that most people cannot. This is the final way that we consider person–situation interactions, and it concerns the differential ability of individuals to recognize situational demands

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

236

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

and opportunities.6 It seems obvious that some people recognize what is required or what can be done in particular circumstances better than others. This amounts to a form of expertise in perceiving and responding to specific features of situations. To give two examples, an excellent rock climber recognizes a pathway to ascending a cliff better than a novice, and an expert psychotherapist sees the promise of a line of intervention better than a beginning trainee (Fowers, Novak, Calder, & Sommer, 2022). It is also possible to see that this kind of capacity can be used for morally problematic actions, such as when someone prone to victimizing others can recognize the possibilities for taking advantage of or subjugating another person better than the average person. Lo Presti (2020) argued that this perceptual ability is frequently normative in the human world because it involves recognizing what is proper or is based on what it means to treat others responsibly. Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) take this further in stating that “[e]xercising an ability can be better or worse, adequate or inadequate, correct or incorrect in the context of a particular situation, hence there is a normative dimension to the abilities” (p. 326). The ability to recognize possibilities in one’s environment is often critical to the expression of a capacity, skill, or virtue. For example, physicians acquire the ability to recognize a pattern of symptoms as indicating a particular malady, but to the average person, the symptoms are baffling. To give two examples of virtues, being compassionate requires recognizing that another person is suffering and that some form of support or assistance would aid that person. To be fair requires the recognition that some resource or burden is available, and to understand that there are more and less fair ways to share it. Therefore, people with certain capacities, skills, or virtues are more capable of recognizing the relevant features of a situation that call for a response. Therefore, it is the intersection of the features of the situation and the capacities of the person that makes certain actions possible. Both the situational features and the expertise needed to recognize and engage them must be present, or the action (diagnosis, compassion, fairness) is not possible, and the action occurs at the intersection of person and situation (Hampson et al., 2021). There are three important caveats to this capacity. First, being able to appropriately size up a situation and engage in a fitting response also 6

Readers familiar with the concept of affordances will note that this section is somewhat parallel with that literature. We have not employed the concept of affordance because it is contested in many ways and the literature on it is primarily conceptual and subject to many interpretations. Broadly, affordances are possibilities for action that are available to a specific organism in a particular situation.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Recognition of Situational Demands and Opportunities

237

changes the character of the situation, which we discussed earlier as another form of person–situation interaction. Once a person engages with the features of the situation, new possibilities emerge. For example, when a physician diagnoses a problem by recognizing a pattern of symptoms, treatment options tend to become available as well as the importance of explaining the problem and potential treatments to the patient. Second, because situations are so dynamic and multidimensional, perceptions of the features of situations may not be simple and direct. Rather, proper perception may involve some degree of discernment. This discernment depends not only on a person’s capacities, but also on his or her goals and intentions. The possibilities for action may be more or less visible depending on the goals and concerns of an actor when they are present. For example, both compassionate people and victimizers recognize others’ vulnerabilities, but they respond very differently because they have divergent aims. Because we are concerned with virtues and more broadly with moral considerations, we have focused our attention in this section on social situations wherein harms or benefits to others are possible. We also recognize that the features of social situations are often shared, and the best perception of those features must be sensitive to social conventions and norms, which are shaped by sociocultural frameworks. These frameworks are both part of the situation and contribute to shaping the participants in the situation. Perceiving these sociocultural frameworks clearly and responding to the expectations, permissions, and prohibitions that apply are part of the capacity to recognize what is possible and desirable in the situation. It is straightforward to recognize that many social situations make virtuous action appropriate. For example, suffering calls for compassion and birthdays provide possibilities for generosity. Those who consistently recognize the opportunities for virtuous activity and who respond appropriately are enacting virtue. As we just noted, recognizing the possibility for moral action may be simple but sometimes difficult to enact. Many situations are complex and confusing and require the ability to correctly recognize what is at stake and what is possible. We, along with Hampson and colleagues (2021), describe the ability to correctly recognize the morality of situations as phronesis or practical wisdom. We have more to say about practical wisdom in Chapter 11, and this ability has become a burgeoning topic of interest at the intersection of philosophy and psychology (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; De Caro & Vaccarezza, 2021; Grossman et al., 2020; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024; Wright et al., 2021).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

238

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

In concluding this discussion of person–situation interactions, we want to make the point that people vary in their ability to recognize what is important in a situation and what is possible. We hypothesize (9-7) that someone who is adept at recognizing the morality in situations is exercising practical wisdom and is termed a phronimos (person with phronesis). We predict that the phronimos sees features of the situation that are opaque to others and recognizes action possibilities that conduce to more goods than others. Therefore, we also predict that the phronimos perceives the possibilities for moral action excellently (hypothesis 9-8), which enables the best available moral action possibilities (hypothesis 9-9). It is reasonable to believe that the situation appears differently to the phronimos than it does to others, due to this moral perception.

Applying Person–Situation Research to Virtues There are several important lessons from the existing person–situation interaction literature that are important for virtue science. The first is that several studies have indicated that the use of greater specificity of the person variable relative to the situation is likely to generate better research results. For example, the person–situation interaction that follows from Moral Foundations Theory suggests that the specificity of the person construct is important (Süssenbach et al., 2019). The Honesty-Humility dimension is more specific to moral concerns than the Agreeableness or Conscientiousness dimensions of the Big 5 because it was primarily differentiated from those two dimensions in the development of the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2005). As a result, the Honesty-Humility dimension of the HEXACO can better predict some morally based outcomes than the Big 5 dimensions (Allgaier et al., 2015; Sherman et al., 2015; Zettler & Hilbig, 2010). It remains to be seen whether virtue traits are more specific than Honesty-Humility because such comparisons have not yet been conducted, which is another important avenue for future research. This leads us to reiterate hypothesis 5-2: that virtue trait measures will be related to relevant outcomes when controlling for personality characteristics (including HEXACO). Fowers, Lane, et al. (2022) did report that trait fairness was a better predictor of fair behavior than Agreeableness (as discussed in Chapter 5). Second, virtue theory suggests that the degree to which individuals play an active role in selecting, evoking, and perceiving situations highlights the individual’s agency. Although it is possible that the effects of the person are passive rather than active, many personality psychologists contend that

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Applying Person–Situation Research to Virtues

239

there is a significant degree of choice involved (Bauer et al., 2005; Blackie et al., 2014; McAdams, 2015). Many virtue theorists see the aim of virtue development as becoming a person who puts themselves in the appropriate situation, evokes the important features of the situation, and perceives how best to act in the situation. It follows that developing into such a person involves cultivating or acquiring the traits needed to place oneself in the best way in the circumstances of one’s life. This trait acquisition and expression is at the center of the STRIVE-4 Model. Therefore, we proposed hypothesis 9-7 earlier. Because the perception of opportunities and dangers is central to virtue and an important element of practical wisdom, we return to it in what follows. This literature on the person–situational nexus also raises many questions for virtue researchers that we have put in the form of hypotheses. First, we proposed hypothesis 7-6: that there will be within-person variability in virtue trait expression. We suggest that situations will (and should) alter virtue expression. If so, then within-person variation in virtue traits must exist. As we noted in Chapter 5, there is already some evidence for this within-person variation in trait expression for both personality traits (Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009) and for virtue traits (Bleidorn & Denissen, 2015; Fowers et al., 2019; Meindl et al., 2015). Second, hypothesis 8-4 predicts that virtue trait expression will vary between persons based on the social role context. There is also some evidence for this hypothesis in experience-sampling studies wherein Bleidorn and Denissen (2015) found that respondents reported different frequencies of virtues in work and parenting settings and Fowers et al. (2019) reported differential virtue expression in work and leisure settings. One interesting direction for virtue researchers to take is to attempt to replicate Sherman and colleagues’ (2015) personality–situation results with virtues. They found that between-person personality dimension scores were strongly related to within-person personality states, and deviations from the individual’s central personality dimension tendency were partly explained by situational variation (hypothesis 9–5). Third, hypothesis 9-3 predicts that individuals with stronger virtue traits will influence others to act in more desirable ways (e.g., other-benefiting, promoting social harmony). That is, other people, by definition, are part of any social situation, and the situation evocation literature suggests that individuals can influence their situations through their presence or their actions. It is reasonable to believe that evocation occurs, and if virtue traits are one way to influence situations, then other people should be positively influenced by a virtue expressed by one person. We are not aware of

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

240

Virtue Trait by Situation Interactions

research directly examining individuals’ influence on others’ virtue expression, but there are some analogous studies focused on the experience of elevation. For example, Algoe and Haidt (2009) found that observing moral excellence in another person increased participants’ emotions (e.g., elevation and gratitude) and self-improvement intentions. Other researchers reported that inducing elevating emotions promoted other-benefiting behaviors in laboratory experiments (Schnall et al., 2010; Thomson & Siegel, 2017). In addition, a longitudinal study (Cox, 2010) found that elevation experienced as part of a service trip on spring break predicted volunteer actions three months later. Another set of studies suggest that elevation experiences are correlated with neural activations related to mentalizing, action planning, emotional experience (Englander et al., 2012) and social engagement (Piper et al., 2015). Thomson and Siegel’s (2017) review of this literature cited many ways in which elevation affects otherbenefiting behavior. This literature is analogous to hypothesis 9-3 because observing others enacting moral excellence seems to influence observers to act in desirable ways. Nevertheless, the influence of specific virtues on others’ behavior has not been studied to date, and this is an important avenue for future research. Finally, seeing virtues as acquired traits evokes a general developmental hypothesis (4-18): that the rudiments of virtue can develop over time into mature virtue. This broad hypothesis can spawn a great deal of research, but it is important because many virtue theorists see virtues as acquired traits that are cultivated over time. These theorists see mature virtue as the kind of trait that can produce excellent actions that can alter situations favorably and influence others positively. On this view, mature virtue must develop over time. There is relatively little research on the development of virtue. One indirect source of evidence can be found in narrative research. For example, McAdams (2012) reported that highly generative individuals (adults who care for and are committed to promoting younger individuals’ welfare) frequently told their life narratives in terms of a redemption sequence. Redemption sequences are descriptions of experiences that begin with an emotionally negative situation that turns out to have a positive result. McAdams suggests that those whose life narratives contain multiple redemptive sequences can be termed redemptive persons. Narrative studies of virtue development could be similarly illuminating. Another example of developmental research that is indirectly related to virtue development is Kochanska’s (2002a) research on the development of “committed compliance” by the third year of life. She found that in the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Applying Person–Situation Research to Virtues

241

context of reciprocal positive relations with a parent, children internalize the parent’s standards and willingly and eagerly act according to the standards whether or not they are being observed. By six years of age, committed compliance can develop into a moral self, the presence of which fosters children’s spontaneous and consistent moral emotions and standard keeping (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; Kochanska et al., 2010). Committed compliance and the moral self are general developmental constructs that seem to underlie virtue development. In conclusion, there is emerging evidence that person–situation interactions are an important source of behavior. This evidence is growing regarding both personality and virtue traits. Person–situation interactions are an important element of the STRIVE-4 Model, and additional studies of these interactions are necessary to develop the science of virtue.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 10

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

The connection between virtues, values, and eudaimonia or flourishing were important to Aristotle and to many neo-Aristotelians, but these relationships have also been contentious in philosophical scholarship (e.g., Driver, 2001; Wright et al., 2021) and frequently absent in virtue research. Because there is sufficient contention about these connections, we present our views about virtues, values, and eudaimonia as a set of hypotheses, leaving much of its assessment to empirical studies. Nevertheless, we begin by providing some reasons for thinking that the connections between virtues, values, goods, and eudaimonia are crucial to understanding these concepts. As we have argued throughout this book, there are both theoretical and empirical questions to answer in the science of virtue. Although we focus primarily on developing the empirical questions that can be answered best with scientific methods, we also clarify some theoretical views that motivate our hypotheses (see also Fowers, 2016; Fowers et al., 2023b). We also wish to forewarn the reader that there are many disagreements and unresolved issues in the study of flourishing, and that this effort is in its infancy. Before diving into these topics, some definitions are in order. The STRIVE-4 Model is our extended definition of virtue. When we write about values, we are referring to the things, experiences, and processes that have worth to people. At the outset, we want to clarify that values are not necessarily reducible to individual choices or possessions that are entirely unique to that person, as a strongly individualistic viewpoint would suggest. Of course, values are often embodied and expressed by individuals, but they are not always the result of individual idiosyncratic choices. An embodied value is one that is exhibited in one’s actions, including behavior, thoughts, emotions, and motivations, and it can help constitute a person in a certain way. For example, one could be described as a healthy or active, or considerate person, all of which would be embodied values. Whether or not an individual can be said to embody a value in this robust sense often transcends individual choice. For example, it may 242

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

243

involve the internalization of social or shared understandings rather than some sort of individual, idiosyncratic preference. As one matures, one takes on or internalizes understandings of what is valued in one’s social milieu. There is often some degree of transformation of these socially held values as the individual adopts them, but the internalized values of the individual retain a relationship, be it positive or adversarial, to what is valued in the collective. In addition, many values are held in common, such as the value of one’s family life or democratic practices. Values are often discussed as if they were “owned” or “possessed” by individuals. From a neo-Aristotelian viewpoint, however, one might say that our values possess us, because they guide or shape our actions. Indeed, we refer to values as embodied by people and as enacted throughout life to clarify that values are much more than perceptions or beliefs. We suggest that values are typically manifested in action. We link the terms “value” and “good for” because things that are valued are often taken to be good for us, in the sense we discussed in Chapter 1. For example, many people value justice, and many also take justice to be an important human good, as Aristotle, Confucius, and many other thinkers assert. Similarly, knowledge, social harmony, and health are all often valued and taken to be human goods – things that are good for humans or at least typical ones in good circumstances. The meaning of the term “eudaimonia” is contentious, so we simply provide our own provisional gloss on it, rather than diving into unnecessary debates. As already discussed, Wright and colleagues (2021) saw the connection between virtues and eudaimonia as sufficiently contentious that they chose to set eudaimonia aside completely. In contrast, we see the topic as too important to set aside. We think it will be most fruitful for virtue scientists to recognize the live debates about how to understand eudaimonia, well-being, and happiness, and about how various virtues related to them, and to identify hypotheses that are suggested by various positions in these debates. In this way, scientists can avoid staking a philosophic position for a contentious view while enriching science by identifying and investigating the claims that these differing views suggest. For more extended discussions of the relevant debates that can be mined by virtue scientists, see, for example, Fowers, Novak, Kiknadze, and Calder, (2023a, 2023b), Haybron (2013), and Vittersø (2016). Eudaimonia is usually translated as happiness, but, for many people, happiness connotes an emotion that tends to be somewhat effervescent. We prefer the term “flourishing” because this connotes a richness that transcends emotion and any temporary experience to include a person’s complete life. In other words, we are interested in the view that eudaimonia is

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

244

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

more a way of living than it is a state that can be achieved or just a subjective experience, and on which eudaimonia is living in a way that fulfills the best aspects of human nature. Outlining this conception of eudaimonia is an example of taking a philosophical position on a contentious topic without providing a justification for it, which we discussed as an option for crossdisciplinary work between psychology and philosophy in Chapter 2. We take this approach so that we can focus our attention on the hypothesized relationships between eudaimonia and virtue and because we do not foresee a consensual definition of eudaimonia in the near future. Despite the contentiousness regarding the meaning of eudaimonia and its connections with virtue (which we will not continue to belabor), our approach in this chapter is to advance virtue science by laying out neo-Aristotelian views, owning them, and then identifying the empirically tractable hypotheses that they suggest. In this way, setting out neo-Aristotelian ideas can fruitfully inform virtue science (whether or not they find empirical support), so that relevant hypotheses can be tested. It is worth reiterating that the hypothetical tone of this book means that we see our hypotheses as defeasible predictions that require testing. Therefore, we see this interpretation of Aristotle’s views as a pathway toward testable hypotheses.

Aristotle and Eudaimonia Aristotle recognized that there are many human goods and values, which are often subject to interpretation or specification rather than being fixed and determinate. This indicates that human goods and values are typically manifold at any given time and temporally open-ended. It emphasizes that humans are choice-making, self-interpreting beings whose nature is to ask about, debate, and continually reinterpret what is worthwhile in our lives. The ways that people portray these goods is inevitably shaped by identities in particular groups, languages, and customs. This is an important reason why ethics is necessary: Because humans can choose which actions to take, we require reasons for choosing one course of action rather than another. Having a reasonably coherent set of values1 provides direction in life and makes a cohesive self-understanding possible. Moreover, if those values are shared, it makes it possible to coordinate our actions with others. Aristotle saw the good life in terms of a nature-fulfillment perspective, which means that eudaimonia involves fulfilling one’s potential as a human 1

We take no position here on whether these values need to be explicit or systematized. It is an empirical question whether explicitness or systematicity contribute to a good life.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Aristotle and Eudaimonia

245

being. This differs from many contemporary psychologists who believe that eudaimonia, or, as it is often more prosaically termed, well-being, is about self-fulfillment or self-development (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2017; Waterman, 1993). The difference is important because neither Aristotle nor the ancient Greeks had a concept of “the self,” and they tended to discuss the good life more as a matter of life embodying virtues than the life of fulfilling personal desires or formally defined self-development. Aristotle understood humans as reasoning social beings, and that suggests that he saw fulfilling our nature in terms of (1) having good reasons for our actions and (2) participating in well-functioning personal relationships and social groups. This is to say that characteristically human activities include those that are associated with acting according to reasons that are recognizable in a deeply social context. Aristotle and many neo-Aristotelians have given the reasoning element of human nature primacy, but it is impossible to understand typical human reasoning outside a social context. We discuss Aristotle’s argument for emphasizing reason in his doctrine of the soul (psyche) in the next section. Before discussing that, we give some of our reasons for seeing human sociality as central to human nature because human social nature has not received the attention it deserves among researchers studying virtue or well-being, in our view. For example, a simple and pervasive way to recognize the intertwining of reason and sociality is in humans’ ubiquitous use of language. Language use is an inherently social function, and our capacity to learn to reason, including reason giving, is formulated in and shaped by language. There are four conceptual reasons for seeing human sociality as a core feature of human nature and closely related to human reasoning. First, the reasoning and social domains are deeply related because having good reasons for acting is more than simply lucid self-understanding. It also includes our ability to discuss, explain, justify, and persuade other people about the merits of our actions. Second, the reasons for our actions are typically drawn from our social world and are familiar to those around us, which is part of what makes them compelling for all of us. Central to our good reasons for actions is that we have incorporated the values of our social world and we therefore share those reasons for actions with others. That is, those reasons are intersubjective rather than being merely subjective (Fowers & Lefevor, 2015). The inescapable intersubjectivity in meaning is seldom recognized in meaning research conducted by psychologists (e.g., Heintzelman & King, 2014; Steger, 2021), but we claim that the shared understandings we have for our actions are critical constituents of meaningful reasons and actions. Third, our actions are typically

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

246

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

coordinated with other people, which tends to enhance their meaningfulness and our social solidarity. We recognize that the importance of shared reasons for action is an empirical question. Therefore, we offer hypothesis 10-11 (that eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of shared meaning) and hypothesis 10-12 (that participating in shared meaning means being willing to act together). Finally, we call attention to the fact that Aristotle focuses specifically on human sociality repeatedly in the Nicomachean Ethics. Two of its ten books are devoted to friendship, which he saw as a central feature of eudaimonia. The focus of the Politics (Aristotle, 1996) is on how to understand and create a just society. Such social relationships were so important to Aristotle (1999) that he stated that “no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others” (1169b 16–18). This suggests that fulfillment of human social nature can occur in at least two domains: close personal relationships (Anderson & Fowers, 2020; Fowers & Anderson, 2018; Kristjánsson, 2021) and living in harmonious, just societies (Fowers, 2015, 2019; Irerra, 2005). According to this neoAristotelian view, humans are at least as much social beings as separate individuals, a view that has been echoed among some social scientists who have called humans ultrasocial creatures (Fowers, 2015; Tomasello, 2014). The term ultrasociality suggests a maximal form of sociality in humans, which includes ubiquitous cooperation2 (e.g., full-time division of labor, food provisioning, information sharing, and collective defense). Accordingly, we offer three hypotheses. Hypothesis 10-13 suggests that eudaimonia will be positively related to the quality of an individual’s friendships. Hypothesis 10-14 predicts that eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of character friendship3 (Anderson & Fowers, 2020; Fowers & Anderson, 2018). Hypothesis 10-15 suggests 2

3

Underestimating human cooperation is easy because counterexamples of indifference, exploitation, and enmity abound. One way to understand the counterexamples is that they are so readily available because humans are vigilant about cooperation, with excellent capacities for cheater detection (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) and trust assessment (Brambilla et al., 2011; Goodwin et al., 2014). On this view, noncooperation is so salient because humans expect cooperation, and noncooperation elicits negative emotion. Evidence of human cooperation is abundant, from ordinary traffic patterns to market transactions to responses to one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games in laboratories (Sally, 1996). Character friendship is one of three types of friendship Aristotle describes. Utility and pleasure are the other two. Fowers and Anderson (2018) suggest that a character friendship includes a deep devotion to the friendship, admiration of the friend, a strong interest in the friend’s well-being, and pursuing genuine goods that the friends value.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What Makes a Good Life Good?

247

that eudaimonia will be positively related to indicators of the quality of the individual’s belonging to choiceworthy social groups.

Formal Characteristics of a Good Life The idea of a good human life raises the difficult question of how we can identify what is good for humans. Aristotle (1999) famously set out three formal characteristics of a good life: ultimacy, desirability, and sufficiency. First, if eudaimonia exists, he thought it should be our ultimate goal. This is because one would not seek to live well for the sake of another goal, such as wealth or power. Of course, Aristotle left room for the possibility of misunderstanding the good life (e.g., seeing power accumulation as the most important goal). Aristotle also argued that the good life should be the most desirable way to live, meaning that people want to flourish and value flourishing. Aristotle thought eudaimonia would be enjoyable as well. Of course, there are disagreements about what people mean by flourishing, but these disagreements tend to focus on differences in what is valued and about what is factual. Finally, Aristotle argued that flourishing is sufficient in itself. This might be taken as the claim that nothing can be added to a flourishing life to make it better. Based on these reasons, one could argue that flourishing is the best and most desirable way to live, making it a higher goal than pleasure, wealth, power, or fame. In addition to these three formal criteria, Aristotle (1999) discussed eudaimonia as a complete life, or we might say as a way of life rather than as an outcome one could achieve definitively. What might those constituents be? He defined eudaimonia as an activity of the soul (psyche) in conformity with virtue in a complete life (1198a 16–19). In this and many other passages, Aristotle tied virtue and eudaimonia closely together, but he also called eudaimonia an activity, differentiating it from a state or a potential.

What Makes a Good Life Good ? Although these formal criteria suggest some parameters for a good life, they do not, in themselves, provide a clear, substantive account of a good life. One possibility is that greater clarity about the constituents of a good life can emerge from an inquiry into the sorts of activities that comprise a good life. In the first sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (1999) defined activities as aiming at something good or worthwhile, and he noted that there are many goods at which one can aim. He also clarified two general kinds of activities: those that cumulate in outcomes or

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

248

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

products, and those that are worthwhile in themselves. The first kind of end is defined by a means–end process, and although the end can be important, the means is generally disposable and can be easily replaced by another means. Eudaimonia is not this kind of end because it is a way of life rather than an outcome. Eudaimonia is constituted by the kind of activities that are inherently good or worthwhile for humans, rather than being a separable outcome or product of those activities. Following this distinction, Fowers et al. (2010) found that inherently good activities were related to eudaimonic well-being, whereas means–end activities were associated with hedonic well-being. The distinction between means–end and constituent–end activities remains too abstract to guide practical decisions. Are the activities associated with eudaimonia also aimed at more conceptually tractable (or what we can call mid-level) goods? We think that they may be, and understanding Aristotle’s nested hierarchy of psyche (soul) might help to clarify this. In the de Anima, he stated that there are three degrees of soul, and if an organism has soul in a higher degree, it also has the lower degree of soul (Aristotle, 1984a, 413a 23). The three are the nutritive (growth, reproduction) soul that plants have, the locomotive (movement, perception) soul that animals have, and the rational or reasoning (thought) soul that humans have. The activities of the soul are those activities that require that degree of soul and that are good for that level of soul. This suggests that characteristically human activities conducive to eudaimonia require the exercise of the reasoning soul and that they may also require the nutritive or locomotive soul.4 Aristotle (1984b) understood “a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake” (1362a 21–22). He (1984b, 1999) also provided extensive lists of such goods in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics, and the Rhetoric, including friendship, belonging, health, knowledge, justice, pleasure, honor, and wealth. Aristotle might see these mid-level goods as the constituents of eudaimonia because seeking them requires the exercise of the reasoning soul. On this view, although there is continuity in the souls and activities of humans and other animals, humans evidence an unparalleled degree of complexity and depth in these characteristics. Indeed, this complexity is made possible by an unparalleled degree of behavioral flexibility. Therefore, humans must choose, implicitly or explicitly, how we cooperate, create hierarchy, recognize authority, select friends, and 4

We are not claiming that Aristotle’s account of soul is the correct one, only that it can guide us in understanding what is good for humans in terms of the exercise of reason. Of course, Aristotle predated Christianity, so the common Christian reading of the term “soul” is anachronistic.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Relations between Goods, Goals, and Virtues

249

so forth. This necessity of choice and the human ability to reflect on our choices creates unavoidable ethical questions for us that require our responses. Despite the clear analogues many of these goods have in plants and animals, they all involve the reasoning soul more deeply in humans because these goods also tend to be symbolized and imbued with cognitive meaning. For example, any living thing can be characterized as more or less healthy, but the capacities to think and self-direct are relevant to human health in ways that are not relevant to the health of plants and most animals.5 The necessity and centrality of reasoning activities appear to be one element of what makes specific goods characteristically human. Even these mid-level goods can be overly abstract for psychological researchers. Fortunately, goods can be broken down into constituent goals that are sufficiently concrete and particular to be measured in psychological research. Indeed, goods can be understood as abstract ends that can never be fully realized (e.g., knowledge), with goals being the concrete embodiment of goods (e.g., knowledge about blood chemistry or cognitive development). Aristotle, Confucius, and most other philosophers noticed that humans are goal-oriented creatures, and there is a great deal of contemporary empirical research that supports this view (e.g., Denissen et al., 2013; McAdams, 2015). We are suggesting that we can pick out mid-level goods that are connected to concrete goals, which gives rise to general hypothesis 10-16: that progress in achieving goals related to mid-level human goods will be positively related to eudaimonia. Because there are many mid-level goods, and each good is associated with many goals, there are many specific hypotheses that can guide the investigation of the relations between mid-level goods, their associated goals, and eudaimonia.

Relations between Goods, Goals, and Virtues Astute readers will recall that the activities of the soul conducive to eudaimonia must be “according to virtue” in Aristotle’s view. Because this is a book primarily about virtue, we discuss three ways in which virtues relate to values or goods by making those goods: (1) possible, (2) enduring, and (3) what they are (i.e., constituting the goods). These three connections are central to the place of goods, values, and eudaimonia in our STRIVE-4 Model. 5

Science has taught us recently that many animals have cognitive capacities, including problem solving, proto-justice, and planning capacities (e.g., primates, cetaceans, and corvids), so they clearly have a greater degree of reasoning soul than Aristotle knew to ascribe to them. Although it is not clear how to make all the distinctions, it does seem that humans have reasoning capacities not found in other animals evidencing cognitive capability.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

250

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues Virtues Make Goods Possible

The first way to recognize the relationship between virtues, goods, and goals is that each of the goods and its attendant goals can be seen as closely related to specific virtues that enable their actualization. This close relationship is due to what the virtue and the good have in common. For example, consider the good of knowledge and the goal of scientists to discover new knowledge. This is typically pursued through the scientific procedures established in a discipline of study, and each set of disciplinary practices and goals differs from the others. Nevertheless, there are some important characteristics that scientists must have if they are to generate genuine knowledge. Two obvious virtues that conduce to generating knowledge are (1) honesty in procedures and reporting the science and (2) patience in conducting the scientific work, which typically takes years, if not decades. One could add many other virtues to this list, such as treating the work of other scientists justly or the practical wisdom to choose the best research questions, methods, and interpretations, but the connection between the good of knowledge and several virtues seems evident. This view leads to the need for empirical testing, and we suggest the general hypothesis 10-17: that the virtues (e.g., honesty, patience) related to a good (e.g., knowledge production) will be positively related to various indicators of success in pursuing that good. Of course, the closely related good of knowledge acquisition requires similar virtues. If one wants to learn about pedagogy or respiratory therapy, one must exercise both honesty and patience. One must be honest about what one knows and does not know, must pursue the learning honestly (i.e., eschew cheating), and must represent one’s degree of knowledge accurately. Any significant course of learning requires the patience to stick with the process, deal with setbacks, and take the learning one step at a time. This gives rise to hypothesis 10-18: that the virtues related to knowledge acquisition will be positively related to various indicators of success in knowledge acquisition. The good of belonging to one or more groups is another apt example of this connection. The kind of belonging that seems characteristic of humans is a tie between individuals and groups that is lasting and partly defines the individual. Belonging can easily be studied in terms of belonging to a specific group, such as a profession, a religious group, or a sporting team, any of which makes the research target tractable in its specificity. We suggest that belonging has two components based on the actions and self-perception of the individual and the actions and perceptions of other group members. Belonging to a group seems to require the individual to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Relations between Goods, Goals, and Virtues

251

act in accordance with group norms, accept the values of the group, and participate in the group in a way that facilitates the accomplishment of its goals. This activity is based on the individual’s identification with the group and the desirability of the group and its goals. These actions seem to be related to the virtue of loyalty, which makes it possible to adhere to and participate in group norms, values, and goals. For full group belonging, it is reasonable to predict that other members of the group must accept the individual as a group member and coordinate their actions with the individual. That is, other group members must acknowledge the individual’s group membership and act toward that person as a fellow group member. Stated hypothetically, the following hypotheses emerge about the virtue of loyalty. Loyalty will be positively related to (1) an individual’s group-favoring actions (hypothesis 10-19), (2) the individual’s perception of belonging to the group (hypothesis 10-10), (3) the group members’ acknowledgment of the individual’s group membership (hypothesis 10-11), and (4) the degree of coordinated actions among group members (hypothesis 10-12). In a more general prediction, we offer hypothesis 10-13: that virtuous activities will contribute to well-functioning communities. Virtues Make Goals Enduring The second proposed aspect of the relationships between goods or values and virtues relates to the traitness of virtues. Recall that we have described virtues as being trait-like, which suggests that they are characteristically expressed over time by the individual in appropriate circumstances. This trait-like characteristic is an important aspect of how virtues are related to the pursuit of goals and goods. Choiceworthy goods and goals are frequently pursued over long time periods, which makes the trait-like feature of virtues essential for successful pursuit of the goal or good. That is, pursuing choiceworthy goods requires consistent, strongly motivated activity and the trait-like aspect of virtues lends itself to this kind of activity over time. This traitness is a prerequisite to goods and eudaimonia being ways of life rather than episodic activities. This gives rise to hypothesis 10-14: that trait virtues will be more strongly related to goods and their associated goals than state (temporary) versions of similar characteristics. Virtues Constitute Goods The third proposed aspect of the relationships between goods or values and virtues is that both involve ways of being or living. That is, both goods and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

252

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

virtues are embodied because having a virtue such as honesty means that consistent honesty can constitute one as an honest person, not just that one often chooses to be honest. To take the example of the scientist, honesty is not simply a choice one makes from time to time: To be a scientist means that one is an honest knowledge seeker. Our point is to suggest that honesty and knowledge seeking partly constitute the identity of the scientist and the activities of science. Honesty and knowledge seeking are not contingent features of science in the way that wearing a lab coat or using a piece of equipment can be. Honesty and knowledge seeking are inherent to science and are partly definitive of it. The same is true for other goods and the virtues that make them possible. These three proposed aspects of the relationships among goods or values and virtues seem to conceptually converge on a point: Virtues appear to be necessary for the consistent pursuit of the goods with which they are associated and partly definitive of those goods. This is, like many of the relationships in this chapter and the book overall, an empirical question. We suggest general hypothesis 10-15: that an individual can successfully pursue a specific good to the degree that that individual expresses the virtues associated with that good. We have provided specific examples, such as honesty and patience in knowledge production, and loyalty in group belonging. Because there are many goods and many attendant virtues, there are many specific hypotheses that fall under general hypothesis 10-15.

Empirical Bases for Seeing Reason and Sociality as Central Elements of Human Nature One view of humans is that there is a species-wide human nature that can be identified and understood to a significant degree. We recognize that the question of a human nature is hotly contested by many scholars, and a common position is to claim that there is no such thing as human nature because people and cultures vary so much that no common core can be identified (e.g., Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009). To date, no one has developed conceptual arguments capable of settling this question to everyone’s satisfaction, yet there is empirical evidence suggesting that humans do have a species-wide nature, and this is especially prominent in the evolutionary literature. In evolutionary thought, human nature is a matter of common descent, with the human species being defined by a process of evolution (Arnhart, 1998; Buss, 2016; Fowers, 2015). The evolutionary approach is based on solid argument and extensive evidence that provide substantial credibility.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Challenges in Assessing Eudaimonia

253

Although an evolutionary account can provide a solid conceptual and empirical basis for claims about ethics being inherent to human nature, we recognize that this perspective is strongly contested, both by those who doubt the legitimacy of evolutionary thought as a basis for understanding human nature and by those who believe that an evolutionary account requires the reduction of ethics to mechanistic evolutionary factors. Given the fact that this is not a book about evolution, we must set these controversies aside. Instead, we approach this question differently by focusing on the available empirical evidence about the relationships among mid-level goods and well-being among humans, and we suggest hypotheses that can guide researchers in assessing these relationships more broadly and deeply. Before we begin exploring these relationships and hypotheses about them, we briefly review the nascent state of empirical research on eudaimonia and its many challenges.

The Challenges in Assessing Eudaimonia There are multiple challenges to assessing eudaimonia. We summarize the five biggest challenges we see. They are: (1) its existence, (2) dissensus about its content, (3) lack of argument for its universality, (4) empirical challenges in measurement, and (5) ethnocentric biases. The Challenge to the Existence of Eudaimonia The most basic challenge in assessing eudaimonia is the conceptual question of whether eudaimonia exists separately from hedonic well-being. Haybron (2013) has helpfully categorized three major approaches to understanding human well-being: positive emotion, life satisfaction, and flourishing or eudaimonia. Some scholars claim that a good life is simply one that has a preponderance of positive over negative affect (e.g., Biswas-Diener et al., 2009). Life satisfaction is widely viewed as a cognitive evaluation of the satisfactoriness of one’s life as a whole (e.g., Diener, 2012). Scholars who favor the concept of flourishing tend to see it in more multidimensional and richer terms, defining well-being in terms of concepts such as meaning, purpose, personal growth, and social connection (Fowers, 2005a; Ryff, 1989; Vittersø, 2016). We have more to say about this multidimensionality later in this chapter. Some scholars suggest that well-being boils down to positive affect, or possibly the combination of positive affect and life satisfaction, and that flourishing is simply an artful elaboration of one or both of these basic

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

254

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

approaches to well-being (e.g., Biswas-Diner et al., 2009). This is a decadeslong debate, with many voices favoring flourishing as a distinct form of well-being (Fowers, 2005a; Ryff, 1989; Vittersø, 2016), and the reductive arguments have simply been unconvincing and conceptually problematic because they are based primarily on assertions (Flanagan et al., 2023). The weakness of the conceptual and empirical bases for the reductionist case suggests that flourishing cannot be ruled out as a form of well-being. There is also a substantial body of research that suggests an empirical basis for the importance of seeing flourishing as a separate form of well-being (e.g., Bauer, 2022; Fredrickson et al., 2013; Thorsteinsen & Vittersø, 2020), but this question has not been entirely solved. Disagreement about the Content of Eudaimonia In this book, we take eudaimonia to be a sufficiently distinct form of well-being to merit study. Virtually all scholars of eudaimonia (e.g., Keyes, 2002; Ryff, 1989; VanderWeele, 2017) take eudaimonia to be a multidimensional concept that likely includes elements of life such as meaning, purpose, personal growth, good personal relationships, group belonging, and so forth. This multidimensionality is one of the few agreements among those researching flourishing, but the agreement extends only to multidimensionality and unfortunately not to which specific dimensions to include. Novak et al. (2023) examined the dimensions included by the eight most prominent flourishing measures. They found the following number of times a construct was included in the eight measures: meaning and purpose (8), personal relationships (7), mastery or competence (6), happiness or optimism (6), engagement (5), personal growth (4), self-esteem or self-acceptance (4), autonomy (3), social contributions (2), and eight constructs were only included in one of the measures. When Novak and colleagues examined the measures at the item level, they found even less consensus about what the authors meant by the dimensions of flourishing that sounded the same. This dissensus about the dimensions of flourishing is the second major conceptual challenge to the assessment of flourishing. This means that there is significant work required to come to a consensus about the empirical constituents of flourishing. One possibility is to hew more closely to the consensual dimensions (e.g., meaning and close relationships), but we cast doubt on that approach based on the ethnocentrism of this list that we address later in this chapter. Consensus on the specific dimensions of eudaimonia remains a work in progress.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Challenges in Assessing Eudaimonia

255

Lack of Argument for the Universality of Eudaimonia A third significant challenge is that virtually all of those researching flourishing have assumed that it is a species-wide possibility for humans, regardless of culture or time. This assumption may or may not be fruitful, but it has not been conceptually established (Fowers et al., 2023a, 2023b). That is, those researching flourishing have not taken the possibility of its nonuniversality seriously and given us reasons to believe that flourishing is a universal possibility that does not vary unreasonably across cultures. We have more to say about this apparent ethnocentrism later. The central point, however, is that the conceptual grounding for a universalist, a relativist, or a hybrid portrayal of eudaimonia remains unarticulated. Empirical Challenges to Eudaimonia Measurement Virtually all flourishing assessments to date have taken the form of single-timepoint, self-report scales (see Huta [2015] for an exception). All the usual concerns about self-report scales apply, including social desirability and other response biases. One can counter that there are no better observers of their own flourishing than the respondents themselves. If flourishing were a purely subjective concept, this argument for the value of self-reports would be convincing. The difficulty is that many scholars, including Aristotle, claim that flourishing comprises both subjective and intersubjectively observable components. We provide three examples to indicate how self-report is insufficient from a neo-Aristotelian perspective. When considering the good of health, surely both self-reports and medical tests should be deployed. People often have serious, unrecognized maladies that are discovered through medical testing. When examining wealth, one’s relative wealth in a society is as important as one’s subjective perception of wealth, and relative wealth in a society is, by definition, beyond an intersubjective fact. The recognition of justice clearly transcends an individual’s perceptions, inasmuch as people are frequently not treated equally or equitably and one’s position in a group might make it difficult to recognize some injustices. Even if a person has a subjective perception of a just society, others may disagree sharply based on aspects of the society that might be obscure to the one perceiving justice. All this is to suggest that although self-reports of flourishing are surely useful and worthwhile, they are insufficient. The value of assessing flourishing beyond self-report should be tested (Alexandrova, 2017; Bauer, 2022; Fowers, 2016; Fowers et al., 2023b) by including other people’s reports

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

256

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

on a given person, physical assessments, and trained observer ratings. We propose hypothesis 10-16: that the assessments of flourishing from various perspectives (including subjective and observable perspectives) will overlap significantly. To the degree that hypothesis 10-16 is confirmed, we can have greater confidence in various forms of flourishing assessments. Hypothesis 10-17, however, suggests that there will be unique variance in flourishing assessments from various perspectives. Self-report assessments of flourishing have another significant flaw in that they are almost universally single-timepoint measures. Respondents are, therefore, being asked to summarize years of experience into a single numeral indicating their agreement with one or more general statements or an assessment of the frequency of some occurrences over their lifetimes. This summarizing is generally accomplished quickly by respondents (typically five items per minute), which raises doubts about the accuracy of the summaries. The burden of summarizing a lifetime’s worth of experience and boiling it down to a single numeral is too great to inspire strong confidence. Alternatively, researchers can assess flourishing over time, which offers the opportunity to examine within-respondent variability. If the intervals between assessments are relatively brief (e.g., hours), the researcher can ask the respondent about the degree to which they experienced some aspect of flourishing in the last few hours (Huta, 2015). This reduces the summarizing burden, and these short-term reports appear to be less subject to social desirability and response biases (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013; Hamaker, 2011; Schwartz, 2011). Hypothesis 10-18 suggests that longitudinal measurement of flourishing will be more stable and will provide more information than single-timepoint assessments of flourishing. Ethnocentrism in Eudaimonia Assessment Perhaps the greatest empirical challenge to measuring flourishing is that all currently available, prominent flourishing measures were developed in the USA and Europe, with virtually no input from the nearly 90 percent of the world’s population outside those regions (Fowers et al., 2023b; Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023). Measure developers have simply assumed that their concepts of flourishing are universally applicable to all humans. In their celebrated article, Henrich et al. (2010) pointed out the pitfalls of generalizing the concepts and empirical findings developed in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies to humans in general.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Challenges in Assessing Eudaimonia

257

To be fair, all eight prominent measures have been translated and administered to multiple cultural groups, so these researchers have not entirely ignored cultural variation (Fowers et al., 2023a). The problem with taking this “cross-cultural” evidence seriously is that these researchers contented themselves with simply translating their measures into the languages of the cultures they surveyed. They did not conduct any assessment of whether the concepts and terminology they were using mapped on to how people in those non-Western societies understood the good life. That means that the Western biases of the researchers were simply incorporated into the translated measures, with no opportunity to assess whether that was appropriate for the studies’ participants. There was virtually no opportunity for people to respond that items seemed inappropriate or that there were better ways to understand flourishing in nonWestern societies. Despite the limited attention to cultural value questions, some scholars have recognized that flourishing research appears to be guided by normative assumptions (Fernández-Ríos & Novo, 2012; Lambert et al., 2020; Lee et al., 2021; Ryff, 1989). A casual perusal of cross-cultural and anthropological research on well-being clarifies that WEIRD views of flourishing are not widely held by people outside Western cultures (e.g., Mathews & Izquierdo, 2009). Western researchers intensely focus on the interior lives of individuals and their ability to satisfy their egocentric desires. In contrast, living well is often described in terms such as social interdependence, duty, responsibilities, and balance with the social and physical environment (Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023). Moreover, in many cultures around the world, the concept of flourishing is located at the communal level, rather than (or in addition to) the degree to which any individual is flourishing. The ethnocentrism involved in conceiving of and measuring flourishing in terms of subjective meaning, the satisfactoriness of personal relationships to the individual, personal mastery, positive affect, and so on appears plain when compared to the frequency with which non-Western respondents emphasize interdependence and their responsibilities to others. A qualitative study of the views of respondents around the world confirmed that flourishing is viewed more expansively than Westerners have imagined (Nicolas et al., 2023). These daunting challenges could tempt one to simply give up on a science of eudaimonia, but we see these challenges as surmountable. In addition, despite the significance of these challenges, there is evidence for its existence and for its relationships with a number of mid-level goods, goals, and virtues (Fowers et al., 2023a). These empirical results can be expanded

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

258

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

even as scholars work to overcome the challenges in assessing eudaimonia. In other words, it is not necessary to await advances in flourishing assessment prior to studying the relationships among mid-level goods, goals, and virtues. This research can be pursued with available measures, and it must be replicated and extended as more broadly defined, more culturally appropriate, and otherwise improved measures of eudaimonia become available. Our suggestion is to build on what already exists rather than discarding all of it and starting from scratch. In that spirit, we now discuss some of the available empirical evidence and hypotheses related to our claims about the relationships among goals, mid-level goods, virtues, and eudaimonia.

Research on Goods, Goals, Virtues, and Eudaimonia Unsurprisingly, the research literature on well-being is far from univocal, measuring different indicators of good living such as well-being, life satisfaction, positive emotion, and flourishing. In this section, we do not differentiate among the most common conceptualizations of good living, as some have done fruitfully (e.g., Haybron, 2013), because these conceptualizations tend to be strongly related (Giuntoli et al., 2021; Thorsteinsen & Vittersø, 2020). In most cases, differences among them seem less important than our aim of identifying how goals, goods, and virtues contribute to good living, broadly defined. With few exceptions, most predictors of any form of well-being also apply to flourishing. A few contributors to flourishing (e.g., meaning) correlate inconsistently with life satisfaction or positive affect but are generally seen as important contributors to flourishing (Baumeister et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2023). Generally, however, we see no reason to believe that flourishing is decisively distinct from other approaches to well-being (Haybron, 2013). In the end, how the forms of flourishing and their sources are related are empirical questions that await testing. We doubt that the resolution of these questions will strongly affect our reasoning about the relations between goods and human flourishing, but we remain openminded about empirical results and willing to amend our model following empirical results. Conceptually, we think that a good place to start is to identify a few of the human goods it is reasonable to believe help to constitute eudaimonia. Aristotle’s realist perspective about goods makes them empirically verifiable. He is also considered to be an “objective list” theorist of goods because he believed that goods are not merely subjective. Instead,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Research on Goods, Goals, Virtues, and Eudaimonia

259

he thought goods are worthwhile for all normal humans whether an individual recognizes them as goods or not.6 We do not endorse the connotations of the term “objective” that suggest a subject/object dichotomy, but it remains worthwhile to distinguish between subjective elements of eudaimonia (e.g., self-reports) and the intersubjectively observable elements (e.g., other reports, physical assessments, observable pursuits of human goods). Rather than dichotomize, we endorse the use of both subjective and intersubjectively observable indicators of eudaimonia (e.g., Fowler & Christakis, 2008; Fredrickson et al., 2013). Many researchers have studied the relations between aspects of human life and a variety of well-being indicators (including positive emotions, life satisfaction, and eudaimonia). We provide three examples of goods (group belonging, close relationships, and meaning) that research has linked to well-being in the next three subsections. We could provide more, but that would make the chapter excessively long without substantially improving it. Similar analyses are possible with other human goods (e.g., justice, social harmony, and knowledge). This literature clarifies that several ordinary goods are correlated with, predict, and may even cause well-being. We suggest that these activities are goods because they seem to promote well-being. Given the limits of the data, we see this approach as very promising for recognizing the relationships between goods and human flourishing. Group Belonging It should come as no surprise that, as ultrasocial creatures, human wellbeing is so intricately bound to group belonging and to social harmony. Flack and de Waal (2000) clarified that every individual has a big stake in her group functioning well: [I]nasmuch as every [group] member benefits from a unified, cooperative group, one expects them to care about the society they live in, and make an effort to improve and strengthen it … Each and every individual has a stake in the quality of the social environment on which its survival depends. In trying to improve this quality for their own purposes, they help many of their group mates at the same time. (p. 14)

Although relatively few neo-Aristotelians attend to this, Aristotle (1996, 1999) recognized the centrality of group belonging for flourishing. This is 6

Although controversial, this contention may be necessary to avoid the view that eudaimonia is entirely subjective in nature.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

260

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

particularly apparent in the Politics. There are several large cross-sectional studies of the relationships between social networks membership and well-being (e.g., Fowler & Christakis, 2008; Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010) suggesting that perceiving and being recognized as belonging to groups is associated with well-being (McPherson et al., 2006). Conversely, the opposite of social engagement (i.e., feeling excluded, lonely, and isolated) strongly induces languishing, illness, and mortality (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015; Steptoe et al., 2013). Loneliness turns out to be a stronger predictor of death than many physical factors (e.g., smoking, obesity, or lack of exercise; Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008). This evidence suggests that social belonging is a crucial good for humans that is both empirically measurable and highly valued. That is, it is both a fact and a value. This suggests hypothesis 10-19: that perceived belonging (both by the target individual and other members of the group) to groups will be positively related to indicators of eudaimonia. A stronger version of this hypothesis (10-20) would be that perceived belonging is necessary for eudaimonia. As we noted earlier, the virtue of loyalty seems to be necessary for ongoing belonging to a group because it facilitates the adoption of the group’s norms, expectations, and aims, and long-term adherence to the group. A second important virtue for belonging is forgiveness because group members are imperfect and, at times, disappoint or hurt their fellow group members. Relationship repair is required for these ruptures. Therefore, hypothesis 10-21 suggests that relevant virtues (e.g., loyalty, forgiveness) will be positively related to perceived group belonging (both by the target individual and other members of the group). Hypothesis 10-22 suggests that there will be a relationship between belonging-relevant virtues and indicators of eudaimonia, and that this relationship will be mediated by perceived group belonging (hypothesis 10-23). Close Personal Relationships (CPRs) Aristotle (1999) also understood the necessity of CPRs for flourishing. He famously devoted two of the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics to friendship both as a good (a relationship between individuals) and as a virtue (a character strength of an individual). Some scholars place all social relationships into a single classification (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2017), but we believe that this elides important differences among various kinds of social ties. Whereas group belonging relies primarily on group-level dynamics and can be impersonal (Brewer, 1991; Tajfel, 1981), CPRs rely on dyadic processes and are deeply personal (Fowers, 2015; Fowers et al., 2016; Novak

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Research on Goods, Goals, Virtues, and Eudaimonia

261

et al., 2023). Moreover, one can succeed in one domain and flounder in the other, so they should not be conflated. CPRs (e.g., friendships, romantic relationships, and family ties) are strongly associated with life satisfaction (Lee & Ono, 2012; Robles et al., 2014), positive affect (Demir & Özdemir, 2010), flourishing (Anderson & Fowers, 2020), health, and longevity (Shor et al., 2013). The mere presence of a CPR is positively correlated to well-being. For example, single or divorced adults have lower well-being than individuals in romantic relationships (Liu, 2009). However, relationship quality has an even stronger correlation with one’s quality of life than relationship status (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010). Of course, there are many forms of CPRs, and we see psychology’s current obsession with romantic relationships as more a Western cultural emphasis than a feature of human nature (Fowers et al., 2016). This suggests hypothesis 10-24: that indicators of CPR quality will be positively related to indicators of eudaimonia. A stronger version of this hypothesis 10-25 would be that high-quality CPRs are necessary for eudaimonia. There are many virtues that appear important to high-quality CPRs (e.g., Fowers, 2000; Fowers & Owenz, 2010; Fowers et al., 2016). The virtues of loyalty and forgiveness are among them. Aristotle also suggested a virtue of friendship, which includes the ability to see the good in another person, to love that goodness, and to be as invested in the friend’s well-being as one is in one’s own well-being (Anderson & Fowers, 2020). This suggests three hypotheses parallel to the ones we cited for belonging. Hypothesis 10-26 suggests that relevant virtues (e.g., loyalty, forgiveness, friendship) will be positively related to CPR quality. General hypothesis 10-27 further suggests that there will be a positive relationship between CPR-relevant virtues and indicators of eudaimonia, and general hypothesis 10-28 suggests that that association will be mediated by CPR quality. Meaning A common element in the contemporary flourishing literature is meaning (Cooke et al., 2016; Novak et al., 2023), and meaning is usually discussed in combination with purpose. One definition of purpose is having one’s activities guided by valued goals (personal or impersonal) and meaning can be defined as the significance and coherence of one’s life (King & Hicks, 2021). Although meaning and purpose are ubiquitous in modern accounts of flourishing, Aristotle (1999) did not discuss either as part of eudaimonia. Of course, Aristotle believed that eudaimonia would include a reasonably clear and coherent understanding of human purpose, but

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

262

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

he thought of purpose in terms of the human telos rather than in personal terms, as moderns tend to do. That is, what was important to him was whether an individual lived well as a member of the human species and as a member of a community, rather than whether one has worked out an individualized purpose for one’s specific life (Fowers et al., 2023b; Kristjánsson, 2020). This historical shift in conceptions of eudaimonia is one clear indicator of why our account is neo-Aristotelian. Our account is consistent with and partially inspired by Aristotle’s thought, but modern sensibilities and concerns require us to adapt his philosophy. This includes the importance of specifying meaning and purpose in the contemporary West and excluding Aristotle’s views on women and slaves. This is necessary because all humans are shaped by their time and culture. Therefore, Aristotle’s statements about the second-class status of women and about some people being “natural” slaves were outgrowths of his context in ancient Greece, where both views were widely accepted. We have not incorporated these views in our model because they are unacceptable to us, the authors, and to most modern Westerners, and they are unnecessary for an understanding of flourishing. Perhaps Aristotle did not discuss personal meaning and purpose because he could, largely, take meaning and purpose for granted for a member of an ancient city state, where the individual’s life was significantly determined by his or her place in the community. It may be that for Aristotle, being eudaimon was partly defined by that membership in a specific community, which means that the meaning and purpose of individual lives could be largely taken as settled. Still, meaning and purpose may have always been central for human beings, but, given the common modern Western view that the universe and even societies are indifferent to human, and to individual, concerns, questions about meaning and purpose may be especially open and pressing for modern Westerners. Some plausibly claim that the reaction to the possibility that the universe is indifferent to humans has been very strong because seeing human life as meaningless or without purpose can be devastating (e.g., Frankl et al., 2010; Glaw et al., 2017). Modern Western outlooks also have far looser connections between the individual and society and tend to emphasize human agency, often making questions about meaning and purpose quite personal and open questions. Coherent and compelling answers to those questions may seem necessary for living well in the modern West. In any case, the degree to which meaning and purpose are personal is presumably an important form of cultural and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Research on Goods, Goals, Virtues, and Eudaimonia

263

historical variation that must be accommodated in any understanding of flourishing (Cooke et al., 2016; Kiknadze & Fowers, 2023). For example, meaning is often seen collectively and taken for granted in many contemporary non-Western cultural groups (Mathews & Izquierdo, 2009). Although personalized and explicit meaning making is likely to be valued in the West, more collective and implicit meanings may suffice for flourishing in many groups. One example of the relationships between meaning, purpose, and well-being is found in the landmark development of the Psychological Well-Being scales. Ryff (1989) created a Purpose in Life scale as one of its six components. This Purpose in Life scale is widely used in research on well-being, and it is consistently correlated with the other five elements of Psychological Well-Being (e.g., Fowers et al., 2010; Keyes, 2002; Nelson et al., 2016). Assessments of meaning tend to be relatively stable over time (e.g., Steger & Kashdan, 2007) and positively correlated with indicators of wellbeing and negatively related to depression (e.g., Huang et al., 2020; King et al., 2006; Steger & Kashdan, 2007; Steger et al., 2006) and suicidal ideation (Corona et al., 2019). Correlations between meaning and life satisfaction have ranged from 0.41 to 0.71 (Steger & Kashdan, 2007).7 Experiencing life as meaningful is commonly endorsed, with 91 percent of people from 132 countries indicating that their lives are meaningful (Oishi & Diener, 2014). All of this suggests that some form of meaning seems to be involved in well-being, and scholars can usefully attend to the sources of meaning (personal, relational, social, religious) and to how participation in cultural groups might influence the meaningfulness of lives. This suggests hypothesis 10-29: that indicators of meaning and purpose (personal or impersonal) will be positively correlated with indicators of flourishing. A stronger prediction would be that the presence of meaning and purpose are necessary for flourishing (hypothesis 10-30). The virtues that make a meaningful and purposive life possible depend on the sources to which people look for that significance. Among more secular people in the modern West, where personalized meaning and purpose are prized, the virtue of courage may be important in facing up to the possibility that life lacks inherent and obvious meaning or purpose. It also 7

Steger et al. (2006) distinguished between recognizing one’s life as meaningful and searching for meaning. Whereas seeing one’s life as meaningful is positively related to well-being, searching for meaning, (implying a perceived lack of meaning) is generally negatively associated with well-being (Steger & Kashdan, 2007, 2013; Steger et al., 2006; To & Sung, 2017).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

264

Values and Eudaimonia as Guideposts for Virtues

seems likely that some form of virtuous open-mindedness may be necessary so that one can consider various forms of meaning. In contrast, if meaning and purpose are believed to reside primarily in cultural or religious membership in a community, then a virtue such as loyalty to the group may be paramount to facilitating and maintaining meaning through endorsing the group’s identity, practices, and aims. This gives rise to a set of hypotheses. Hypothesis 10-31 predicts that depending on the source of meaning and purpose (individual or group), virtues (courage and open-mindedness or loyalty, respectively) will be related to reports of meaning and purpose in life. Hypothesis 10-32 suggests that for those who see meaning and purpose as individual aims, indicators of meaning and purpose will mediate the relationship between indicators of the virtues of courage and open-mindedness and indicators of flourishing. Similarly, hypothesis 10-33 anticipates that for those who look for meaning and purpose in the collective, indicators of meaning and purpose will mediate the relationship between indicators of the virtue of loyalty and indicators of flourishing. In this section, we have discussed three human goods and their documented and hypothesized relationships with eudaimonia and a set of virtues. There are, of course, many human goods. Moreover, there is no canonical list of goods because any such list would have to vary significantly across cultures and times. Therefore, we demur about a final and complete listing of goods. The conceptual point we attempted to make is that ostensible goods should have an empirical relationship with eudaimonia and with a subset of virtues. The three goods we have cited have demonstrable empirical relationships to well-being, and we hypothesized that these goods will also be related to subsets of virtue indicators. We anticipate that other goods will also have such relationships. For goods such as justice, social harmony, and knowledge, to take a few examples, one can imagine and hypothesize relationships with eudaimonia and with relevant virtues. Although this process of hypothesis generation may be complex, both conceptually and empirically, and it may be difficult in practice, it is certainly conceivable. A major advantage of specifying these goods and their relations to flourishing and virtues is that this can encourage empirical research on the constituents of flourishing.

Summary We have discussed a neo-Aristotelian view on which there is an overarching, ultimate good life that can be called eudaimonia. On this view eudaimonia takes many different forms, meaning that there are many ways to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

265

live well, varying across individuals, cultures, and time periods. Although these claims are value-laden, there is no threat of value imposition from the STRIVE-4 Model because it instructs us to explicitly note the contentious assumptions we make and to identify hypotheses to investigate that can guide the choices of people who share the assumptions, without dictating anything to people with different assumptions. For example, the most general hypothesis of this chapter, albeit one that would be very difficult to test, is that eudaimonia is the ultimate end for the sake of which humans act. This is a key neo-Aristotelian hypothesis that is contentious but is nevertheless an interesting and important hypothesis that science should investigate. The chapter also suggests that eudaimonia is constituted by the pursuit of characteristically human goods or values, such as belonging, good personal relationships, and experiencing life as meaningful and purposive. Finally, it hypothesized that subsets of virtues are required for the long-term, successful pursuit of these aims. This suggests a set of mediation hypotheses in which the relationships between various virtues and eudaimonia are mediated by the presence of the appropriate characteristic human goods. This rich and complex set of hypotheses can be tested, and we see these hypotheses as a valuable program of guidance for virtue researchers that only becomes available through the STRIVE-4 Model of virtues, which is based on a philosophical understanding of virtues that makes a social scientific approach to virtues possible. Researchers may embrace the model and methods we are recommending but choose to investigate different hypotheses than those we have mentioned. By drawing on competing value assumptions and traditions, we can collectively identify numerous hypotheses for science to investigate and we can develop an ambitious and mature form of virtue science that can inform personal and collective decision making without legislating values to anyone.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 11

The Four Components of Virtue

A key final proposition of the STRIVE-4 Model is that we hypothesize that virtues are partly constituted by four components in being (1) behaviorally expressed, (2) guided by knowledge about the virtue, (3) moved by concordant motivation and emotion, and (4) shaped by practical wisdom. The STRIVE-4 Model hypothesizes that these four components can be identified and measured (general hypothesis 11-11) and that each facet is integral to virtue (general hypothesis 11-12). In line with Chapter 2, we think that some aspects of practical wisdom are more contentious than others, but that this is compatible with scientists empirically testing all of them. However, we also think it is useful to keep in mind that there is debate about how important things such as whole-life reflection, argument, and articulateness are to virtue and virtue development. Each component is necessary for a characteristic to be seen as virtue (general hypothesis 11-12). For example, virtue-like feelings or motivations that are not expressed in behavior do not qualify as virtuous. That is, the most generous thoughts or loyal sentiments are not virtuous unless enacted in the appropriate circumstances. By the same token, behavior that appears to be virtuous must be properly motivated and be accompanied by fitting emotion to qualify as virtue expressions. For example, generous behavior would not qualify as virtuous if it is enacted with begrudging affect or primarily to ingratiate oneself. It is important to reiterate the way we distinguish “action” and “behavior” in this context. Behavior is a commonly used term in psychology to signify observable conduct, and we retain that usage. However, we see action as both observable and as the cohesive integration of the four components we discuss here. Behavior is one of the components, and one can have virtue-related behavior that does not qualify as virtuous because it lacks one or more of the other components. Of course, this “thicker” understanding of actions applies to all human conduct, whether it is virtuous or not (Taylor, 1985), but it is particularly important to avoid limiting 266

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Multidimensional Virtue-Like Characteristics

267

ourselves to thin behavioral descriptions of virtue because an action only qualifies as virtuous if it entails all four components. That is, the behavioral aspect of virtues is generally observable, but other aspects may need to be inferred. Just as virtues include behavior and motivation, the STRIVE-4 Model emphasizes that virtuous action is based in correctly understanding what one is doing while acting virtuously. Behaviors that appear virtuous but that are incidental, accidental, or due to an inherited tendency would not fit this definition of virtue. The knowledge component of virtue means that one acts for sound reasons. That reason-responsiveness is typically integrated with emotion and motivation in that the reasons inform one’s desire to act well. On some views, understanding the virtue is itself motivating because of the desire to express human excellence. Finally, virtue must be guided by practical wisdom. Roughly this means that a virtue is partly constituted by being enacted, as Aristotle (1999) put it, “at the right time, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way” (1106b 21–22). Practical wisdom includes the abilities to see a given situation properly, integrate emotion and cognition, harmonize the virtues, and, on some views, strive to create a worthwhile life. From a neo-Aristotelian perspective, for example, virtues require good judgment to be properly tuned to the context to recognize what constitutes a virtue in that situation (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Kristjánsson et al., 2021; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024). In Chapter 1, we provided some conceptual basis for the four components. In this chapter, we present empirical research that is suggestive of the operation of these four components of virtue. We have already discussed some of the studies we include here, but we focus on the four components in this chapter.

Examples of Multidimensional Virtue-Like Characteristics In general, researchers choose various measures to assess virtue from study to study, and these measures sometimes capture one of the four components, but there are only a handful of studies that have specifically assessed a virtue with multiple components. The variety of approaches to assessing virtues is part of the conceptual disarray of virtue research (Chapter 3). We recommend that investigators employ as much of the STRIVE-4 Model as possible to aim at more comprehensive virtue measurement. Another aspect of the disarray of virtue research is that investigators seldom provide a clear conceptualization of the virtue they are studying, leaving it unclear

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

268

The Four Components of Virtue

whether they are researching a virtue, an affective tendency, or an otherbenefiting behavior. Sometimes the authors state that they are studying a virtue but do not explicitly provide a virtue conceptualization. In other cases, authors study a characteristic that is often seen as a virtue, but they define it as an “affective trait” or with another psychological term. We discuss how well the studies accomplish these two desiderata (assessing multiple features of a virtue and providing clear conceptualizations of a virtue) as we describe this research. We exemplify these difficulties by beginning with two virtues (forgiveness and gratitude) that have received extensive attention. They are among the best-researched virtue topics. This allows us to examine some of the best available research and to illustrate the varying conceptualizations and measurement strategies that researchers use. Forgiveness The variety of approaches to virtue assessment is apparent in the very popular study of forgiveness. This variety is also partly due to scholarly disagreement regarding how to define forgiveness, which has occasioned lengthy debate and little consensus (e.g., Brown, 2003; Gao et al., 2022). These disagreements lead to differences in how this characteristic and its components are assessed. There are two general measures of forgiveness, one dispositional and the other focused on specific situations (Gao et al., 2022). We focus only on the dispositional conception, without claiming that it is discontinuous with specific instances of forgiving (Kim & Enright, 2016). In the dispositional forgiveness literature, there are some commonalities, such as the presence of some form of transgression, the relinquishing of hostility or resentment due to the transgression, and the hope for a good relationship future. Moreover, forgiveness is sufficiently ubiquitous and necessary for good relationships that McCullough (2008) argued that it is a human instinct. In an early effort, Gorsuch and Hao (1993) approached their research from a distinctly Christian perspective and found four factors that comprised forgiveness: Forgiving Motive (a motive to forgive), Religious Response (prayer and God’s forgiveness), Forgiving Pro-Action (attempts to reconnect with the offender), and Hostility (whether it has been relinquished toward the offender). In a subsequent study of forgiveness, Walker and Gorsuch (2004) identified five components of forgiveness: God’s Forgiveness, Hurt and Anger, Emotional Forgiveness, Empathy, and Reconciliation. They modeled these components as sequential, with

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Multidimensional Virtue-Like Characteristics

269

Hurt and Anger and God’s Forgiveness preceding Emotional Forgiveness, which is followed by Empathy and Reconciliation. One difficulty with this approach is that the Christian component may be problematic for some because a less religious person may score low on that component but still have forgiven. Walker and Gorsuch were not able to shed any light on this because only a small proportion of their sample saw religion (of any kind) as important to them. Some researchers have opted to study forgiveness without reference to religion or divinity because they see forgiveness as appropriate to any lasting relationship among imperfect beings. Several dispositional scales have been created, such as the Forgiveness Scale (Rye et al., 2001), Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Thompson et al., 2005), Trait Forgiveness Scale (Berry et al., 2005), the Tendency to Forgive Scale (Brown, 2003), and the Enright Forgiveness Inventory (Subkoviak et al., 1995). These measures have been used successfully in many studies, in that they generally confirm the expected relationships with mental and physical health, with some exceptions. Among these scales, only the Enright Forgiveness Inventory has been explicitly conceptualized as a virtue. We have more to say about this later. Most forgiveness researchers study it as a psychological characteristic and downplay its moral aspects. In addition, most research on forgiveness emphasizes its emotional and motivational aspects (hurt, anger, empathy, desire for a relationship). There is some discussion of behavior wherein forgiveness is generally believed to halt the pre-forgiveness behavioral avoidance of the offender. Forgiveness research has been so prolific that it has given rise to several meta-analyses that summarize various aspects of the domain. Although there are multiple studies suggesting that forgiveness is related to mental health, Gao and colleagues (2022) reported that some research did not support this conclusion. Therefore, they conducted a meta-analysis of eighty-three studies and found that forgiveness was mildly positively correlated with subjective well-being, happiness, and positive emotion, and mildly negatively associated with negative emotion. Similarly, Lee and Enright (2019) conducted a meta-analysis of 128 studies and found a small positive relationship between forgiveness and physical health. A recent meta-analysis of fifteen studies indicated that forgiveness interventions with adults were effective in reducing depression, anger, and stress (Akhtar & Barlow, 2018). In a meta-analysis of twenty studies, Rapp and colleagues (2022) reported that forgiveness interventions for children and adolescents had positive effects on forgiveness, anger, and empathy, and that the first two results were significant in follow-up assessments.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

270

The Four Components of Virtue

In contrast with much of the forgiveness literature, Enright and colleagues (Kim & Enright, 2016; Subkoviak et al., 1995) explicitly conceptualize forgiveness as a virtue. They provide a substantial neo-Aristotelian account of forgiveness and defend it from skeptics. They criticize psychologists for “reduc[ing] the term forgiveness to less than what it is, making the construct too simplistic and distorted and thus resulting in confusion” (p. 33). Although this publication predates the STRIVE-4 Model, they cite almost all the elements of the model, particularly the four components discussed in this chapter. They especially emphasize cognition about forgiveness and the importance of forgiving based on a good understanding of what forgiveness means (i.e., that it is distinct from reconciliation). They created the sixty-item Enright Forgiveness Inventory (Subkoviak et al., 1995) and later constructed a thirty-item version (Enright et al., 2022). Each inventory contains subsets of items that assess both positive and negative aspects of behavior, cognition, and emotion, three of the four STRIVE-4 components. Although the behavioral, cognitive, and affective measures were highly correlated (Subkoviak et al., 1995), Enright et al. (2022) presented a confirmatory factor analysis that supported the distinctness of the three basic elements when they are separated into their positive and negative aspects (totaling six components). To our knowledge, Enright and his colleagues have not taken their construct assessment of the three elements further. We recommend research documenting what roles the three elements they identify play in forgiveness and well-being. With the exception of Enright and his colleagues’ work, forgiveness research does not map well onto a virtue conception, nor does it adequately assess the four components we discuss in this chapter. For one thing, dispositional forgiveness measurement is virtually all based on selfreports of general tendencies or dispositions (Berry et  al., 2005; Brown, 2003; Rye et  al., 2001; Subkoviak et  al., 1995; Thompson et  al., 2005). Some measures also include a motivational element prompting the goal of forgiveness, such as a desired future relationship (e.g., McCullough et al., 2002). Some measures have also been designed to assess forgiveness as multidimensional rather than unidimensional (Subkoviak et al., 1995; Thompson et al., 2005), but this multidimensionality is generally limited to emotional/motivational features. The bulk of the forgiveness literature focuses on psychological characteristics related to forgiving and on the consequences of forgiving or not. Except for Enright and his colleagues’ inventory, the forgiveness scales neglect the key cognitive element, leaving the understanding of forgiveness out.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Multidimensional Virtue-Like Characteristics

271

None of the measures assess anything like practical wisdom, which can guide individuals in deciding when it is appropriate to forgive and what constitutes forgiveness in particular situations. Wise choices about when and how to forgive can be quite difficult and this element of forgiveness deserves more attention. It may be that neglecting this understanding and wisdom can partly explain the low correlations between forgiveness and various measures of health. After all, forgiving inappropriately may have as many negative consequences as refusing to forgive. In contrast, a virtue perspective suggests the importance of knowledge and wise choices about forgiveness, which clarify that forgiveness can be inappropriate in some cases (e.g., ongoing abuse or exploitiveness). In fairness, the measurement of practical wisdom is in its infancy (Darnell et al., 2022), and although forgiveness scholars have neglected practical wisdom, they cannot be faulted for the absence of good measurement of this concept. Gratitude As we discussed in Chapter 3, there has been extensive recent work on gratitude, and this research exemplifies many of the issues we discussed earlier regarding the four components of virtue. As noted earlier, Chapter 3 focused primarily on theoretical issues with gratitude research, and this chapter highlights more empirical concerns related to the measurement of the four components we see as necessary for virtue. Gratitude has been studied with various conceptualizations, including as an emotion (e.g., Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Kerr et al., 2015), as an affective trait (e.g., Watkins et al., 2003), as a disposition (e.g., Killen & Macaskill, 2015), and occasionally as a virtue (e.g., Morgan et al., 2017). Although there is significant overlap in these concepts, there are also important distinctions and neither the similarities nor the differences are typically discussed. Investigators have mostly relied on intuitive understandings of gratitude or offered a brief definition of gratitude based on “previous research.” A second form of confusion is that although the tools used to assess gratitude have been useful in advancing knowledge on this characteristic, the measures are also limited, which constrains our understanding of gratitude and its components. The two most popular measures of gratitude are the six-item Gratitude Questionnaire (GQ6; McCullough et al., 2002) and the forty-four-item GRAT (Watkins et al., 2003). The GRAT has three components – sense of abundance, simple appreciation, and appreciation of others – all of which are primarily emotionally focused.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

272

The Four Components of Virtue

Although these scales make it possible to measure some forms of gratitude, these measures have limited scope. For example, the GQ6 (McCullough et  al., 2002) is one of the most commonly used measures for gratitude. McCullough and his colleagues developed the scale to measure an “affective trait” of gratitude. They defined an affective trait as “a disposition … a tendency to recognize and respond with grateful emotion to the roles of other people’s benevolence.” (McCullough et al., 2002, p. 112). These authors discuss “facets” of gratitude such as “intensity” and “frequency,” but they do not frame the trait in virtue terms. Their psychometric evaluation demonstrated good scale structure, reliability, and moderate, positive correlations with reasonable criterion measures (e.g., life satisfaction, happiness) and notably included a positive correlation between the GQ6 and informant ratings of a target individual’s gratitude. The scale has been used successfully many times. Although the second popular measure of gratitude, the GRAT, was initially framed in virtue terms (Watkins et  al., 2003), the virtue terminology was dropped rather quickly. It was ultimately designed to assess an “affective trait” which they defined as “a predisposition to experience gratitude” (Watkins et al., 2003, p. 432, emphasis in original). The GRAT tends to focus on a generalized conception of gratitude: “Oftentimes I have been overwhelmed by the beauty of nature” (Watkins et al., 2003). They reported reasonable scale structure and reliability for the entire scale and found moderate, positive relationships between the GRAT and life satisfaction, positive emotions, and religiosity. It has also been used successfully many times, but the independent status of the three components is less clear and less often used. Some authors have also promoted the concept of appreciation as a superordinate category that includes gratitude (e.g., Gordon et al., 2012). They portrayed appreciation as an affective trait that has positive consequences for individuals and relationships. These measures have not been widely used. Although some have seen appreciation as a superordinate category, Wood, Maltby, Stewart, and Joseph (2008) conducted two studies that indicated that the existing gratitude and appreciation measures loaded on a single factor. Given that appreciation has not been studied frequently, and not at all as a virtue, we do not discuss it further here. There has been widespread interest in gratitude interventions because they are easy, quick, and enjoyable. The early enthusiasm for brief gratitude interventions led to dozens of studies on this approach to improving well-being. This enthusiasm has been tempered by several meta-analyses of these studies that indicate very modest effects (e.g., Davis et al., 2016;

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Multidimensional Virtue-Like Characteristics

273

Dickens, 2017). Gratitude interventions seem to have mild positive effects on life satisfaction, happiness, and well-being, but Dickens (2017) concluded that these effects are “not necessarily unique in their positive outcomes and should not necessarily be promoted above other types of positive interventions” (p. 204). Davis and colleagues (2016) suggested that “longer, more-powerful interventions” (p. 29) may be needed to fulfill the hopes of gratitude enthusiasts. They suggest that the benefit of gratitude may require “developing habits of sharing gratitude with benefactors” (p. 28). We concur with this assessment and suggest that the real value of gratitude is likely to be found in processes similar to the more extensive cultivation of gratitude as a virtue. Morgan et  al. (2017) noticed that many measures of gratitude did not address it as a virtue. They noted that “[t]he majority of the items in existing gratitude measures aim to assess grateful emotions only” (p. 180). Consequently, they developed a philosophically and psychologically grounded measure of gratitude as a virtue that also assessed its components. They identified the items for their MCGM through an exploratory factor analysis and a confirmatory factor analysis in two large cross-sectional studies in the United Kingdom. They found that the MCGM captures four components of gratitude: emotional, conative/attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral. These four components of virtue incrementally predicted relevant criteria with the addition of each component adding strength to the prediction. This suggests the potential value of multicomponent virtue research. Their components map well onto our suggestion for virtue knowledge, grateful emotions, and cognitive understanding of gratitude. Morgan and colleagues’ emotion, attitude, and behavior components were positively correlated with existing measures of gratitude and well-being. Interestingly, the emotions component had a high correlation with the GQ6 (0.71), suggesting the GQ6 is particularly connected to an emotional component of virtue that likely fails to adequately capture the multiple components of gratitude as a virtue. Participants who scored above average on all four components of gratitude reported the highest satisfaction with life, subjective happiness, and positive affect. Scoring above average on each component resulted in incrementally increasing their scores for these outcomes. In contrast to the MCGM, the majority of gratitude measures focus on gratitude almost exclusively as an emotional trait. Such a conceptualization fits easily within the common disengaged observer perspective in psychology. However, when Morgan and colleagues (2017) took the idea of gratitude as a virtue seriously, they developed a much more nuanced

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

274

The Four Components of Virtue

concept of gratitude that incorporated but also transcended the common focus on emotion. Moreover, their components amounted to a stronger set of predictors for well-being. This study exemplifies the approach we are recommending in this book, to take the concept of virtue seriously, measure it assiduously, define and assess the components of the virtue, and examine whether a virtue conception improves upon predictions with more standard psychological conceptions. This kind of research is needed to assess the value of the virtue conception in general and the STRIVE-4 Model in particular.

Virtue Behavior The behavioral expression of virtue is central in the STRIVE-4 Model, which is consistent with other neo-Aristotelians (Kristjánsson, 2018; Morgan et  al., 2017; Russell, 2009). In addition to being observable through lay perceptions, a key test for virtues is that they are manifested in behavior that is observable by researchers. We therefore hypothesize (hypothesis 11-13) that virtue behavior can be observed in observational or experimental studies. Hypothesis 11-14 also predicts that self-reported virtue behavior will be related to relevant criterion variables (e.g., well-being). For example, Morgan and colleagues (2017) found that their gratitude behavior measure was positively correlated with satisfaction with life, subjective happiness, and positive affect. This was the case even after accounting for knowledge, emotion/motivation, and disposition. Their measure of gratitude behavior was self-report, as were their assessments of well-being. This is valuable evidence for the importance of virtue-related behavior, but observed behavior provides more compelling evidence for most scholars. In the best case, we offer hypothesis 11-15: that virtue behavior (observed or self-reported) will add incremental validity over relevant psychological constructs to predict virtue-related criteria. There is a smattering of research that examines relationships between virtue traits or virtue-relevant traits and various observed behaviors. We have cited some of these studies already, but they are important indicators of how observed behavior can be studied in relation to virtue traits. The Justice Sensitivity scales assess some aspects of the emotional component of justice, and several researchers have reported that those scales are associated with relevant behavioral criterion variables (Edele et al., 2013; Gollwitzer et  al., 2009; Lotz et  al., 2011, 2013). Honesty-Humility was related to economic game behavior in expected ways (Hilbig & Zettler,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Behavior

275

2009; Hilbig et al., 2012). Simpson and Willer (2008) related “prosocial orientation” (an inclination to share resources equally) with more equal giving in economic games. Süssenbach and colleagues (2019) found that people who prioritized the harm and fairness moral principles were more behaviorally engaged with instances of suffering than those who emphasized in-group moral principles. The available evidence is consistent with hypotheses 11-13 to 11-15, but there is no observed behavioral evidence for many virtues. For others, there may be only a single study. The only potential exception to this so far is Justice Sensitivity, but the jury is still out on whether those scales assess the emotional aspects of a justice virtue or simply emotional reactions to injustice. As we have noted, most virtue research uses global self-report, singletimepoint studies of virtues. This approach weakly assesses the behavioral expression of virtues. It remains questionable how far global self-report questionnaires can accurately summarize a respondent’s behavior. Intensive longitudinal methods can help allay worries about the veracity of global self-report because these studies include multiple assessments of relatively short time periods. In one example, Fowers, Lang, and colleagues (2019) found that behavioral aspects of trait kindness and trait fairness each comprised a latent variable that was distinct from and related to virtue-related disposition and motivation. Bleidorn and Denissen (2015) also captured multiple self-reports of virtuous behavior over ten days with a German sample. Participants reported on behavioral wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. The respondents reported on how they behaved during the last hour based on adjective pairs drawn from the VIA. Bleidorn and Denissen found that their virtue measures related, as expected, to the criterion variables of social role (job, parenting) and positive and negative affect. Meindl and colleagues (2013) conducted a set of experience-sampling studies and found that reports of virtue-related behaviors were consistent and not strongly influenced by social desirability. Although these studies did not include behavioral or criterion measures, the short, recent periods covered by the self-reports generally seem more closely related to behavior than global self-reports. Another avenue for increasing self-report veracity is having informants report on the person’s virtue behavior (as previously highlighted in Chapter 7) to bypass self-report biases. For example, informant reports are particularly valuable in relationship research because partners have ample observation opportunities and a significant stake in their partner’s behavior. Veldorale-Brogan and colleagues (2012) asked one partner to report on the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

276

The Four Components of Virtue

other’s virtuous behavior (e.g., “my partner is forgiving of my mistakes”), and these informant reports were associated with the criterion measure of relationship quality, even when controlling for individual adjustment and negative communication. Park and colleagues (2019) asked one partner to report on the other partner’s gratitude behavior. Informant reports of the other’s gratitude behavior buffered the influence of insecure attachment on the criterion measures of relationship satisfaction and commitment. Intensive longitudinal and informant report studies provide more compelling evidence of virtue-related behaviors than self-report surveys. Yet all three forms of data still rely on lay perceptions of another person or oneself. They also include substantial uncontrolled variation. An additional method to counter these limitations is experimental research, as it manages these potential issues through experimenter observation of participant behavior and experimental control of the conditions. Observations of virtue-related behavior have been reported in experimental studies. One example is a study focused on kindness (Lefevor & Fowers, 2016). After having positive, neutral, and negative moods experimentally induced via false feedback from a bogus intelligence test, pencils were “accidentally” spilled and researchers observed how many pencils the participants picked up, a proxy for behavioral kindness. The kindness virtue measure was positively related to the helping behavior. Fowers, Lane, and colleagues (2022) found that a self-reported interpersonal fairness virtue trait was positively related to fairness behavior in a public goods game. Justice Sensitivity researchers have conducted economic game studies in which Justice Sensitivity scores were related to behavioral outcomes. In these studies, behavioral justice has been observed through behavioral outcomes such as offering an equal division of resources (Edele et al., 2013; Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Lotz et al., 2011, 2013). Although Justice Sensitivity research does not directly assess virtuous behavior, future studies could include a behavioral component of the virtue of justice. Courage is another trait that has been demonstrated behaviorally. Participants reported on their fears of spiders (Norton & Weiss, 2009). They were then shown a display of four taxidermied tarantulas and asked to move their hand as close to the spiders as they felt comfortable doing. After accounting for measures of spider fears, courage scores were significantly correlated with approach distance to spiders, meaning that participants who reported more courage moved their hands closer to the stuffed spiders, a direct observation of behavioral courage. The evidence regarding the virtues of kindness, fairness, and courage is consistent with hypothesis 11-15, but it is quite sparse, so many more studies need to be conducted.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Knowledge

277

Observational research could also be conducted without experimental manipulations to better understand virtue behavior. Of course, designing observational measures of virtue may be unpalatable to some researchers because they may thereby become involved in defining virtues (an evaluation bullet-biting endeavor). Based on the published studies, researchers adopt a mix of bullet-biting and disengaged observation stances. Many researchers clearly identify and define virtues (Fowers et al., 2019; Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022; Morgan et al., 2017) and Justice Sensitivity researchers identify that characteristic as a moral trait (but not as a virtue). A disengaged describer position remains a viable option, and some researchers prefer that.

Virtue Knowledge Behavior alone is not sufficient to ascribe virtue to a person. The STRIVE-4 Model emphasizes that virtuous behavior must be based on a correct understanding of the reasons relevant to a virtue and must be intentional. Behaviors that incidentally, accidentally, or through ignorance seem virtuous do not qualify as expressions of virtue. For example, gift-giving requires understanding proper occasions for gift-giving, recognizing the kind of gift appropriate to a situation, and understanding how the relationship with the recipient guides the appropriateness of the gift and the giving. To give two examples, buying a weeklong cruise in the Caribbean for a spouse of twenty-five years would be a fine gift, but this would be inappropriate for a third date. Another example is the virtue of forgiveness, which requires an understanding that forgiveness and trust are not necessarily the same thing. We therefore suggest the general hypothesis (11-16) that virtuerelated knowledge can be assessed as a distinct component of any virtue. This suggests hypothesis (11–17): that virtue-related knowledge should add incremental validity to the prediction of virtue-related criteria. To our knowledge, only a few studies have attempted to investigate virtue knowledge. One of the clearest examples of testing virtue knowledge comes from a vignette study in the UK (Gulliford & Morgan, 2016). In response to these vignettes, participants indicated whether they would be grateful to a person who nominated them for an award and the degree of gratitude they would experience. The vignettes included material on the possible ulterior motives of the giver, cost to the benefactor, nonrealized benefit, and malicious intent. In comparing lay British public and expert views on gratitude, the authors found considerable agreement. Cost or effort on the part of the benefactor seemed to enhance gratitude

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

278

The Four Components of Virtue

experience, while the presence of nonbenevolent intentions or nonrealized benefits appeared to undermine the gratitude experience. Overall, this supports the idea that although a benefit is not required to be costly, valuable, or well-intended, these factors can amplify the gratitude experience. We suggest that these features, taken together, inform potential recipients about the benefactor’s intentions, which are important to knowing that gratitude is fitting. These findings were corroborated by Morgan and colleagues (2017) in another sample of UK participants. Once again, gratitude experience was reduced in response to nonbenevolent intentions (ulterior or malicious motives), while it was amplified in response to an increased cost to the benefactor. The researchers extended the previous findings by reporting that knowledge of gratitude incrementally predicted criterion variables when assessed simultaneously with gratitude attitude, emotion, and behavior. Virtue knowledge is one of the least studied components of virtue, so there are many opportunities for testing knowledge of additional virtues. For example, knowledge of forgiveness could be tested by asking participants something like: “To what extent do you agree that trusting an offender is required to forgive?” Hypotheses 11-16 and 11-17 suggest that lower agreement would be a potential indicator of correctly understanding forgiveness. Of course, defining virtue knowledge in this way is a bulletbiting activity because the idea of virtue knowledge is that people vary in the correctness of their knowledge about various virtues. And, as explained in Chapter 2, to responsibly pursue this option, we think that virtue scientists should investigate philosophic debates about the relevant virtue concepts (e.g., Hughes & Warmke, 2022) and discussions of what reasons are relevant to a virtue (e.g., Hills, 2015).

Virtue Emotion/Motivation Fully virtuous action is also partly constituted by concordant emotion and proper motivation. When one acts virtuously, one does so for good reasons. Those reasons also inform the desire to act in a positive way. Knowledge of the reasons relevant to a virtue contributes to good reasons for acting in a particular way, but knowledge is not enough. Virtue theory suggests that in order for behavior to express full virtue, one must be appropriately motivated. Additionally, emotional concordance with one’s behavior means that someone’s desire to act virtuously is not burdened with ambivalence. Acting virtuously is not generally considered to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue Emotion/Motivation

279

involve conflict between duty and desire. In other words, it should be a matter of genuinely “wanting to” rather than “having to” (cf. Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024, for a more nuanced view). On some views, understanding the virtue is itself motivating because it increases one’s desires to act on the reasons that are relevant to the virtue. For example, when one gives a gift, the virtuous motivation is to benefit another person, rather than to obligate or appease them. Even if someone buys a spouse of twenty-five years a weeklong cruise in the Caribbean and knows this is appropriate for the circumstance, one can still buy the tickets begrudgingly or obligatorily. Similarly, someone can behave in an apparently loyal way and know the appropriate circumstances for displaying that loyalty, but motivations may vary from conformity to the promotion and maintenance of a valued relationship or group for personal gain. In a famous and dark example, Shakespeare’s character Iago knowledgably behaves in loyal-seeming ways to exploit Othello’s trust. Iago knows the appropriate ways to act as if he were loyal to Othello. In doing so, Iago gains Othello’s trust, only to undermine and manipulate Othello’s faith in his wife Desdemona, leading to her murder. This example illustrates how behavior and knowledge do not fully constitute a virtue. The appropriate intentions, motivation, and emotions are necessary. We therefore offer the general hypothesis (11-18) that virtue-related motivation can be assessed as a distinct component of any virtue and will add incrementally to predicting virtue-related criteria (general hypothesis 11-19). To be complete, we also offer parallel hypotheses that address emotion directly: general hypothesis 11-10 asserts that virtue-related emotion can be assessed as a distinct component of any virtue and will add incrementally to predicting virtue-related criteria (general hypothesis 11-11). Emotion/motivation is one of the more commonly studied components of moral behavior. While we cannot exhaustively report all the studies that have assessed virtue in this manner, we give some illustrative examples. Morgan and colleagues’ (2017) study successfully measured gratituderelated emotion. Item examples include: “There are so many people that I feel grateful towards” and “I feel grateful for the people in my life.” Like the other components addressed in their study, gratitude emotion added uniquely to the ability to account for satisfaction with life, subjective happiness, and positive affect. The emotional component of gratitude was also highly correlated with existing gratitude scales (especially the GQ6) and was correlated with the behavioral, attitudinal, and conceptual components of gratitude.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

280

The Four Components of Virtue

Rye and colleagues (2001) also studied an emotional component of forgiveness. Example items included: “I feel resentful toward the person who wronged me” and “I have been able to let go of my anger toward the person who wronged me.” The emotions of anger, resentment, and affective peace are included in many forgiveness measures (Berry et al., 2005; Brown, 2003; McCullough et al., 2002; Rye et al., 2001; Thompson et al., 2005). The Justice Sensitivity scales were designed to assess emotional responses to injustice (although some items can be seen in cognitive terms). An example from the Justice Sensitivity Beneficiary scale is: “I feel guilty when I receive better treatment than others.” An example from the Justice Sensitivity Observer scale is: “I am upset when someone is undeservingly worse off than others.” Extensive research documents the relationships among these scales and a variety of relevant constructs, such as solidarity with disadvantaged others (Gollwitzer et  al., 2005), perceived procedural injustice, anger, political protest against injustice, well-being, prosocial behavior (Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Lotz et al., 2013; Rothmund et al., 2014; Stavrova & Schlösser, 2015), and behavioral outcomes in economic games (Edele et al., 2013; Lotz et al., 2011). Although each of these subscales assesses an overall emotional response to witnessing injustices, it should be noted that they differ in important ways. For example, although three of the scales tend to be related to desirable characteristics, the Victim scale tends to be related to less salutary characteristics (Machiavellianism, jealousy, Neuroticism [Schmitt et  al., 2005]) and unrelated to desirable features (e.g., political engagement [Rothmund et al., 2014] and altruism [Edele et al., 2013]).

Practical Wisdom The fourth component of virtue is that they are guided by practical wisdom. As noted earlier, this section was included in the STRIVE-4 Model partly on the suggestion of Wright and colleagues (2021), who reasonably called for a lengthier discussion of practical wisdom than we provided in our earlier presentation (Fowers et al., 2021). We offer general hypothesis 11–12: that virtue scales will be consistently related to measures of practical wisdom. We give a brief description of the recently proposed Aristotelian Phronesis Model (APM) (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Kristjánsson et al., 2021; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024). More complete treatments can be found in those publications. Practical wisdom is a complex, multidimensional characteristic that is typically treated as

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Practical Wisdom

281

distinct from any given virtue.1 We include practical wisdom here because mature or complete virtue requires the exercise of practical wisdom according to many neo-Aristotelians (Kristjánsson et  al., 2021; Wright et al., 2021). The four key functions in the APM are to: (1) detect what is most relevant in a situation, (2) integrate the various concerns relevant to the situation, (3) integrate one’s emotional and cognitive (reasoning) responses, and (4) determine how best to act in view of one’s understanding of an overall good life. The first function can be termed moral sensitivity, and it involves being able to recognize the ethically salient aspects of a situation, as well as the best response to it. It is a kind of “reading” of a situation to see what is most important or central. Psychologists refer to this as cognitive and affective appraisal and we hypothesize (11–13) that the practically wise person engages in excellent appraisal, which leads to virtuous action. The second function is essential due to the complexities of life. This function arises when there is more than one ethically important consideration at play. The practically wise person uses a process of checks and balances to integrate the appropriate virtues (e.g., compassionate honesty or just forgiveness). It can also happen that one virtue may supersede another because one virtue has some overriding claim (e.g., a compassionate white lie). We hypothesize (11-14) that the adjudication among appropriate virtues for a situation can be assessed as a component of practical wisdom. We also hypothesize (11-15) that the proper adjudication among appropriate virtues for a situation will be positively related with indicators of virtue. The third function is the person’s global understanding of what conduces to a flourishing life. This has been called the “blueprint function” (Darnell et al., 2022). In psychological terms, this can include the actor’s moral identity (i.e., one’s commitment to moral standards and aspirations). It is a general understanding of good living that motivates and guides the actor rather than a precise or detailed formulation of how to live. Aristotle (1999) had several such general ethical ends in mind (e.g., justice, social harmony), and a blueprint for life incorporates such ends. This is a very controversial topic, and more detailed discussions of a good life can be found in Fowers (2005a, 2012, 2022). We, the authors, believe that science should investigate hypothesis 11-16 (that a blueprint for life can be assessed as a component of practical wisdom) and hypothesis 11-17 (that a blueprint for life is likely to be positively related to indicators of virtue). 1

It is worth noting that De Caro and Vaccarezza (2021) see virtues as expressions of practical wisdom, and therefore the two are not distinct in their approach.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

282

The Four Components of Virtue

The fourth function is the ability to integrate one’s emotions and reason, which helps to shape one’s emotional responses in the best way. It is easy to see that a poor situational appraisal can lead to an emotional response that is inappropriate to the situation. This fourth function helps one to reappraise the situation and therein alter one’s emotions so that they are more conducive to virtuous action. In other words, one guides one’s emotional response with reason. In the APM, this is not a top-down strategy to control or suppress one’s emotions. Rather, integrating emotions and reason helps to harmonize one’s emotions with one’s understanding of good living. We suggest hypothesis 11-18 (that the integration of emotion and cognition can be assessed) and hypothesis 11-19 (that this integration is positively related to virtuous action). Harmonizing emotion and reason is about responding to the situation in the best way. There have been a few studies of this integration that indicate that moral exemplars evidence the integration of agency and communion (Dunlop et al., 2013; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Frimer et al., 2011, 2012). These results do not confirm our specific hypotheses, but they are promising indications that our hypotheses can be supported. Practical wisdom is what constitutes good decisions rather than causing them. Although there has been a good deal of research on wisdom in general, the neo-Aristotelian model of wisdom has only recently been assessed in a “proof-of-concept” study that affirmed the four-function approach with a second-order confirmatory factor analysis (Darnell et al., 2022). The second-order latent variable of practical wisdom was strongly related to a measure of prosocial tendencies as a criterion measure. These results are encouraging for the ongoing research on practical wisdom.

Interventions to Increase Virtue-Related Behavior If we are correct that virtues are desirable characteristics that develop over time, then interventions may help encourage virtue development, which we predicted in hypothesis 4–18. Because we just discussed practical wisdom, we add that practical wisdom, as a metavirtue, is expected to develop over time as well. In this section, we wish to discuss the efficacy of structured interventions for cultivating virtues. We offer the general hypothesis (11-20) that adults and children can cultivate traits of virtue through structured, welldesigned interventions in the workplace, school, family, and other settings. Berkowitz and Bier (2007) reviewed sixty-four studies, in addition to five meta-analyses and literature reviews on character education efficacy. At that time, they expressed concern about how little was known about the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Interventions to Increase Virtue-Related Behavior

283

effects, if any, of character education in K-12 (kindergarten through 12th grade) schools: “Most of what is implemented and/or prescribed is based on intuition, marketing, or chance. Scientific research is unfortunately not currently a primary basis for designing and/or selecting character education implementation strategies” (p. 30). Despite their concerns about the broad, untested implementation of character education programs, they reported that research up to that point showed encouraging signs. The authors identified thirty-three effective programs for character education, which was 88 percent of the programs assessed. Among the seventy-three studies they examined, the authors tallied the number of significant effects for various outcomes. Their results indicated that there were positive outcomes for the majority of interventions on sociomoral cognition (82/111), academic achievement (31/52), character knowledge (13/15), and problemsolving skills (54/84). In addition, 10/11 reduced risky sexual behavior. In a meta-analysis, Johnson and colleagues (2023) found moderate effect sizes for character education programs. Defining character education broadly, another meta-analysis (Brown et al., 2023) assessed 214 character education studies with 307,512 participants. These studies included K-12 students and had control groups. The authors reported “a small but significant effect” indicating that character education was beneficial. They identified two important modifiers. The first is that shorter-termed interventions had more positive effects than longer-termed interventions. Second, programs that included mentors were more effective than programs without mentors. Although some of these results seem promising, all three studies suggested that less than rigorous methods are often used to study the effectiveness of character education. Effectiveness has been assessed to an extent, but to understand virtue acquisition via character education, a good deal of rigorous research is needed. This means that future studies are needed that include a well-articulated model of virtues and virtue acquisition, strong measurement of virtues and virtue change, and some experimental control. We also offer the general hypothesis (11-21) that virtue-related behavior can be increased with simple, short-term interventions. Many experimental studies with short-term interventions have had beneficial outcomes (discussed earlier regarding gratitude and forgiveness) (Davis et al., 2016; Dickens, 2017; Lee & Enright, 2019). These short-duration studies often focus on eliciting a limited set of behaviors, in contrast to the acquired traits we describe as virtues. They are not designed to encourage the development of fully formed virtues. Still, the studies are of interest, as they seem to suggest that mild, short-term interventions can alter virtue-related behavior.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

284

The Four Components of Virtue

Generosity is an illustrative virtue that has been studied by multiple investigators. Dunn and colleagues (2008) conducted a generosity intervention by giving participants a small endowment and instructed half the participants to spend the money on themselves and half to spend it on someone else. Participants instructed to spend endowed money on others reported greater happiness. Aknin and colleagues (2013) also randomly assigned Canadian and South African participants to conditions in which they were given the opportunity to spend money on themselves or on another person. People instructed to spend the endowed money on others had greater positive affect than those in the self-benefiting condition. A one-week daily kindness intervention in Japan showed a main effect for paying attention to one’s kind behaviors on happiness one month after the intervention (Otake et al., 2006). Nelson and colleagues (2016) found that a four-week kindness intervention improved positive affect and a measure of psychological flourishing at post-test. The effects of the intervention declined slightly at the two-week followup assessment. Schnitker and colleagues (2012) investigated whether they could increase adolescents’ patience and well-being with a 10–14-day educational intervention. They found that all participants in the study experienced increases in patience, life satisfaction, and positive emotion, even the control group. One interesting finding from this study was that the ease and enjoyability of the interventions were more closely related to the outcomes than the content of the interventions. Finally, Oveis and colleagues (2010) were able to induce compassion with a slide presentation in two studies. This set of studies suggests that short-term, virtue-related interventions induce beneficial outcomes. These results are promising and raise the possibility of cultivating fully formed virtues with more extensive and systematic interventions, keeping in mind Brown and colleagues’ (2023) finding that shorter interventions were more effective than longer ones. The available research is encouraging in its consistency with a virtue development conceptualization, but there has only been a smattering of research conducted, with no clear tests of whether a virtue development framework is valuable. We hope to see more research in this area.

Virtue and Neurophysiology The role of neurophysiology is another area where research has been sparse up to this point. Due to that scarcity, we have relatively little to say about the relationship between neurophysiology and virtue. Despite

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Virtue and Neurophysiology

285

this sparseness, we want to touch on this relationship briefly because of its potential importance. As with any human phenomenon, neurophysiology is undoubtedly involved in virtue expression, but whether the roles of neurophysiology in virtues can be delineated remains to be seen. There are a few suggestive studies, however. Han (2016) has suggested that the habitual activities that virtue expression entails should be connected to individuals’ neurophysiology. If so, it is reasonable to expect differential neurophysiological substrates based on the relative strength of habitual virtuous behavior. We therefore offer general hypotheses that those with weak virtue traits should differ from those with strong virtue traits in neural structure (hypothesis 11-22) and processes (hypothesis 11-23). To be clear, neuroscientists typically do not identify their research with virtue. Yet it is interesting to evaluate available neurophysiological evidence to assess how it relates to STRIVE-4 Model predictions. We examine some relevant evidence, without claiming the authors of these studies endorse our model or virtue theory. Neuroscience can be informative because studies can test whether habitual virtuous actions are connected to brain structures such as the striatum or to cortical thickness, as well as neural activations. If character is as persistent and pervasive as suggested by virtue theory, habituation is likely to be manifest in enhanced structural features and neural activity. One way this can be captured is by researchers measuring reaction time, which is a potential proxy for automatic or chronic behavior. Generally, virtuous individuals should be more likely to quickly act morally (general hypothesis 11-24). In addition, we offer hypothesis 11-25: that indicators of virtues will be negatively correlated with control system involvement in moral responses. Two neuroscientific studies on honesty provide interesting examples. Greene and Paxton (2009) gave participants the opportunity to cheat to gain money by retrospectively “predicting” coin toss results. They found that honest participants reported retrospective coin toss “predictions” quickly and did not engage neural control structures. Interestingly, dishonest individuals also reported predictions quickly and without activating control structures when their reports led to monetary gain. When dishonest participants reported predictions that led to no gain, their reaction time for these responses was longer and involved control structure activation. The authors did not interpret their results as indications of a virtue of honesty, but the findings follow the two key predictions of virtue theory: apparently habitual honesty and dishonesty are evident in the absence of control structure activity, and responses are generally quick.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

286

The Four Components of Virtue

Abe and Greene (2014) replicated the reaction time and control structure results and found that nucleus accumbens (reward anticipation) activation was positively associated with dishonest behavior. In another example, Kogan et al. (2014) reported that moderate vagal nerve activity (the degree to which the vagus nerve exerts parasympathetic control of heart rate) was associated with good relations with others and with Agreeableness, although not with general positive emotions (joy or pride). They found relationships among perceived trustworthiness, compassion, and kindness and the vagal activity both in self-reported emotion and in emotions attributed to an observed person, with effect sizes ranging from mild to moderate. The authors cite Aristotle’s emphasis on moderation in affect and behavior, which encouraged them to hypothesize and find a curvilinear relationship between vagal nerve activity and prosociality. Simon-Thomas et  al. (2012) reported that viewing slides of suffering people elicited the emotion of compassion, which was associated with activation in the periaqueductal gray, generally seen as part of an “empathy network.” Compassion is often paired with empathy, a basic human capacity that seems to involve the human mirror neuron system (Carr et al., 2003). When one observes the emotional responses of others, neural activity tends to mirror the other’s affect, underwriting understanding and empathy. Although this result is consonant with virtue theory, these evocations fall short of virtue because the study did not assess compassionate behavior. Van den Bos and colleagues (2009) assessed prosocial disposition (prosocial vs. pro-self), reciprocity, and neural activity in a trust game. They found that dispositionally prosocial individuals reciprocated more than pro-self individuals. They reported activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex when individuals defected in the trust game. Activation in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) was stronger when the participant acted contrary to tendency (e.g., a pro-self individual reciprocating). Ventral striatum (reward) activity was higher for prosocials when reciprocating and higher for pro-self individuals when defecting. This suggests that neural activity is important in reciprocity and that reciprocation and defection are associated with differential neural activity in this reward center. Yoder and Decety (2014a) found that Justice Sensitivity was associated with neural activations in the rTPJ, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex when making judgments about benefits and harms. Yoder and Decety (2014b) also studied the relationship between dispositional empathy

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Summary

287

and the timing of neural activation as participants made moral judgments about benefits and harms in pictorial presentations of actions. Dispositional empathy was only related to slower neural responses (>300 milliseconds) and localized in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This suggests that empathy was less automatic and more deliberative as contrasted to rapid automatic judgments. There are some studies indicating that generous behavior is associated with reward structure activity as well (Harbaugh et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2006; Park et al., 2017). These studies examined discrete, induced behaviors rather than a pattern of action, leaving it unclear if more characteristically generous individuals experienced pleasure in giving, as predicted by virtue theory and found in the self-report studies discussed earlier. Although neuropsychological research related to virtue is sparse and scattered, it is consistent with the STRIVE-4 Model as far as it goes.

Summary The available research on the four components of virtue (behavior, knowledge, motivation/emotion, and practical wisdom) is limited, yet it is generally consistent with STRIVE-4 Model predictions. The model’s hypotheses can guide the additional research needed to assess and understand the four virtue components. Observed behavior has a larger body of research (particularly for justice) than the other virtue components. For virtue knowledge, we are only aware of two studies (Gulliford & Morgan, 2016; Morgan et al., 2017) that have successfully documented gratitude knowledge. There is a moderate amount of research on virtue-related motivation/emotion, and several studies on gratitude, justice, and kindness have provided evidence that virtue-related motivation/emotion is distinct from the other virtue components and relates to relevant, predicted constructs (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Kerr et  al., 2015; McCullough et  al., 2002; Rye et al., 2001; Subkoviak et al., 1995; Thompson et al., 2005; Watkins et al., 2003). For Aristotelian practical wisdom, only one study has been conducted (Darnell et al., 2022). Overall, these studies are starting points to understanding the four virtue components in the STRIVE-4 Model. Like other areas of virtue scholarship, these four components are often studied in isolation, preventing a holistic understanding. It may be impractical for researchers to include all four components of different virtues for any given study, though we suggest that such omissions should be noted and findings

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

288

The Four Components of Virtue

failing to account for these components should be interpreted within the context of such omissions. Similarly, the research on the relationships between neural structures and processes and virtue-related behavior have been scattered and not typically conceptualized in virtue terms. In general, we hope that the recent development of conceptual resources for virtue science, such as the STRIVE-4 Model and the recent book by Wright and colleagues (2021), can organize and encourage more empirical research on virtue.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.015 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Part IV

The Science and Practice of Virtue

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.016 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.016 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 12

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

Up to now we have been focusing on the STRIVE-4 Model and the way it can be used to advance virtue science. We want to now step back and say something about the nature of this emerging subdiscipline, which we think can and should develop into a genuinely interdisciplinary field that ideally brings together philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and others. In Chapter 2, we discussed some ways in which philosophy can contribute to virtue science, and in this chapter, we want to tackle the question from the other direction – we want to consider how virtue science should contribute to or inform moral philosophy. Here are our guiding questions: 1. What distinguishes virtue science from philosophic work on normative ethics? 2. Should moral philosophers proceed with attention (or deference) to the results of virtue science? 3. How can virtue science enrich moral philosophy?

Virtue Science as an Interdisciplinary Subarea of Moral Philosophy Virtue science is an emerging interdisciplinary domain that includes social scientists and philosophers but does not fit neatly into current academic categories. It targets questions that are certainly philosophic in a broad sense, but that are not at the center of contemporary moral philosophy. While it certainly produces work that is a part of empirical psychology, its focus on morality and value-laden virtue traits puts it somewhat outside the mainstream in psychology, too. In Chapter 13, we discuss virtue science as it relates to psychology as a whole. In this chapter, our focus is on its place in moral philosophy. To begin with, consider a stereotypical characterization of virtue science that this book has tried to bring into focus: 291

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

292

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy Virtue science addresses conceptual and empirical questions that can help to explain and predict the sources of, and roadblocks to, moral progress; questions about how individuals and institutions can morally educate the young and rehabilitate people lacking in moral virtue; questions about how we as individuals can become more moral if we want to; and questions about how strengthening or weakening various moral virtue traits will benefit or harm people (e.g. affect their personal and relational well-being).

Philosophers as diverse as Plato, Confucius, Rousseau, Rawls, Du Bois, and Nussbaum have tackled some or all of these questions. So, virtue science is certainly a part of moral philosophy in a broad, historical sense. In the contemporary academic context, however, research is increasingly divided into subareas and the questions of virtue science are not, for the most part, treated as central to moral philosophy. Instead, contemporary academic moral philosophy tends to focus more on questions of normative ethics and metaethics: Normative ethics addresses general conceptual questions about what is truly and ideally good and bad, right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, and beneficial and harmful. It also addresses what it is to fall into these categories, and about what makes things fall under them or not. It addresses more specific moral and evaluative questions such as those about the morality of abortion and about whether virtual experiences are as good for us as nonvirtual ones. It addresses questions about whether and why we have especially compelling reasons to care about being moral, and whether and why we can justifiably hold people accountable for their moral shortcomings. Metaethics addresses how moral standards, moral language, and moral judgments fit into a larger, usually naturalistic, worldview. It addresses questions about the sense in which morality is or is not objective and the nature of moral language, beliefs, emotions, judgments, knowledge, and practical reasoning. Because the core questions of normative ethics, metaethics, and virtue science are so different, it is no surprise that only a subset of contemporary moral philosophers take an interest in the questions of virtue science. And because one needs different skills and bodies of knowledge to pursue normative ethics, metaethics, and virtue science, it is also unsurprising that advanced training in moral philosophy does not typically include the study of virtue science. Nor does it include training in how to fruitfully join and contribute to that emerging interdisciplinary subarea. By extension, it can

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Imagining Ideal Virtue Science

293

seem risky for young moral philosophers to focus on empirically oriented interdisciplinary subareas such as virtue science. To pull this off, they, in effect, need training in more than one academic field (e.g., philosophy and psychology) and their work may seem somewhat marginal to philosophers on hiring committees who plausibly think of moral philosophy as centrally addressing the questions of normative ethics and metaethics.1 Of course, even if there are good sociological explanations for the division of labor and lack of interdisciplinary work on morality, one might worry that this will inhibit the growth of knowledge. We can understand why individuals and groups of researchers focus on the questions of virtue science or questions of normative ethics and metaethics, but is this division of labor and inquiry rational? Or will it inhibit progress on both sets of questions? In what follows, we focus on these questions as they pertain to virtue science and its bearing on normative ethics. We do this because philosophic work on the virtues and the virtue ethics movement in moral philosophy are both associated primarily with work on normative ethics, and because we think that the conclusions we defend in this case look like they apply in the case of metaethics as well. In short, after saying a bit more about virtue science and what it would look like in its mature or ideal form in the next section, we distinguish two strong opposing views that one could take toward virtue science’s relevance to normative ethics. At one end of the spectrum, it could be irrelevant to normative ethics, or, at the other end, it could have the authority to constrain responsible normative ethics. It is also possible to defend a “constructive mean” position, according to which normative ethicists should study virtue science because it can offer them enticing benefits. That is the position we defend.

Imagining Ideal Virtue Science To think about how virtue science relates to normative ethics, we can usefully start by imagining that we are at the ideal “end point” of virtue scientific inquiry. Virtue science is emerging, and we hope our book contributes to its development and that it continues to grow to fruition. If it does, we can imagine that, in the future, scientists will reach significant degrees of consensus on the questions about what facilitates and hinders the development and expression of a wide variety of virtues and vices. 1

Thankfully, it seems that virtue science is becoming recognized as a relatively distinct but valuable subarea of philosophy, so we are hopeful.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

294

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

Consensus may also be reached on what facilitates and hinders people from doing what is morally right and wrong. Research into the psychological factors that matter for virtue and vice development and expression will ideally be integrated with sociological, economic, political, and anthropological work. This can help us understand how various social, political, economic, and cultural factors impact those effects as well. And virtue science will also have reached conclusions about how moral and ethical progress of these various sorts tends to promote or detract from individual, social, and relational well-being. Importantly, these results of ideal virtue science will not be premised on unacknowledged, parochial assumptions about morality or virtues and vices. Instead, because philosophers and social scientists from various other fields will have contributed to virtue science, the results will present us with a rich and varied picture of morality and virtue, as it is understood and developed in various cultures, with different conceptions of morality and virtue embedded in them. Scientists will have avoided the tendency to unthinkingly stick with their own culturally or philosophically idiosyncratic assumptions about the virtues and vices. Instead, they will have worked with philosophers, historians, anthropologists, and others to map out different virtues and vices and ways of understanding or enacting those in different contexts and cultures. They will have clarified any contingent cultural or conceptual assumptions that they are making in their research. Similarly, scientists will have studied whether and why people fulfill impersonal moral obligations, understood in various ways. They will have also investigated the special kinds of moral demands and permissions that obtain between family members, friends, co-citizens, and others with whom we share substantive, often identity-related, relationships and bonds. Throughout this research, scientists will be aware that there are deeply different ways of understanding these obligations and demands. Therefore, the scientific study of moral action will have registered the fact of this variation in order to increase the odds that measures are validly designed and that the results can be accurately interpreted and integrated. This work will lead to philosophical, cultural, and psychological variation in how virtues manifest: Philosophic variation. For example, some scientists studying justice in the United States will have chosen to study a trait conceptualized as libertarian justice – which centrally involves respect for liberty and rights. Others will have studied a trait conceptualized as egalitarian justice – which centrally involves the promotion of equal outcomes,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Imagining Ideal Virtue Science

295

opportunities, or relationships. To study these traits, each set of scientists will have worked with philosophers to distinguish the relevant conceptions of justice and to develop measures and constructs specific to the conceptualization they have adopted to make the conceptualization empirically tractable. Cultural variation. In addition to noting the various philosophic ideas or conceptions that can underlie different ways of thinking about and embodying virtues, scientists across the globe will have studied cultural variations in virtues and vices, cultural differences in the ways of understanding them, and the developmental trajectories for them in various cultural contexts. For example, scientists will have built on Eberhardt’s (2006) work on moral virtues and their development in rural Thai villages, which highlights the way that a cultural or metaphysical background – in this case belief in reincarnation and karma – can shape people’s ways of thinking about different stages of life and the virtues and vices that one needs to fulfill various social roles. This also means that to study the virtues and vices (e.g., compassion and justice), virtue scientists will have designed measures and scales that fit local conceptions of the virtues and how their demands are shaped by roles, relationships, and life stages. Psychological variation. Third, encouraged by philosophers such as Flanagan (1991, 2017), virtue scientists will also have taken into account the different ways of enacting or expressing emotions and of the various ways in which emotional norms and scripts are built into different conceptions of the virtues and their development. For example, on some conceptions the trait of justice involves feeling anger that involves a disposition to verbally complain or confront, while on other conceptions there is no assumption that being just involves a disposition to get angry, or angry in that way, at injustice. Similarly, on some conceptions, moral virtue is taken to involve rational phenomena such as deliberation and conceptual articulation. On others, those are taken to be inessential, with emotions and processes such as empathy taken to be essential. In light of the fact that moral and ethical standards and conceptions of virtues and vices are culturally, psychologically, and philosophically differentiated, virtue scientists, at their collective best, will conduct studies that explicitly shed light on all these differences. Brought together, this research will give us an understanding of morality and virtue in all its

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

296

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

rich human variation. To do that, researchers need to explicitly register the assumptions they build into the moral norms or virtue and vice traits that they target. At the ideal end of the inquiry, virtue science, as a whole, would be a cross-cultural and perhaps even cross-historical field that would provide us with a picture of the various forms of virtue and vice and various moral norms with embedded beliefs about obligations and permissions around the globe. We would have empirical evidence about what helps and hinders various forms of moral and virtue development in various contexts and evidence of how progress relative to various norms and standards influences well-being or quality of life. So, given some view on which moral norms or standards are true, or best, or most rational (again, topics that requires work in normative ethics and political philosophy), virtue science could help us to understand, predict, and ideally further progress. And given some view about the kinds of well-being that we can and should try to promote, virtue science could also help us understand what kinds of moral progress we should and should not aim for to foster that goal. So, while virtue science will not have established a single version of what the truest, best, or most rational moral ideals or standards are, it could tell us why and how people live up to various standards and how moral improvement, variously understood, influences human quality of life.

Is Virtue Science Relevant to Normative Ethics? Now that we have imagined how virtue science might look at the end of the inquiry – in fully emerged and grown form – we can approach the question of its bearing on normative ethics. We see virtue science as being able to offer both conceptual and empirical answers to questions about which moral standards or norms are the truest, best, or most rational. We think there are important questions that are primarily conceptual and cannot be adequately answered with data (e.g., what do we mean by justice?), that there are primarily empirical questions that are best answered with data (e.g., is justice related to compassion?), and that some questions require both conceptual and empirical resources (e.g., how is justice related to a good human life?). This is why we think virtue science must be multidisciplinary. By pursuing answers to these questions, we can better understand what the relevant moral standards are, answer predictive and explanatory questions about why people do or do not live up to various standards, and understand how living up to various moral standards impacts well-being of various sorts.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Is Virtue Science Relevant to Normative Ethics?

297

Strong Division Position Based on this contrast, some might be tempted to endorse a relatively strong division of labor between moral philosophers working on normative ethics and virtue scientists, which we call this the Strong Division position. Normative ethicists are the ones who are trained to clarify and answer (or endlessly argue about how to answer) questions about which moral standards or ideals are the truest or most rational to endorse. Some are focused on general theories of right and wrong, well-being, and so forth and questions about how strong our reasons for being moral are when compared with other kinds of reasons, such as reasons of self-interest or narrow group interest. Others are focused on specific issues, such as the morality of abortion or eating meat, or questions about what makes actions honest and what it takes to be an honest person. But in all these cases, the philosophers are working to answer normative questions about which moral and ethical standards are true, best, or rational, and typically not answerable with data about if and why people are likely to live up to those standards. So, while normative ethicists might naturally be curious about the results of virtue science, they might also think that those results are simply irrelevant to their normative ethical inquiries. Some might even doubt that virtue science is really a part of philosophy – they might argue that it is an extra-philosophic part of science because, ultimately, most virtue scientists are committed to developing views that are at least partially answerable to data, which may bracket the core questions of normative ethics. For example, consider a normative ethicist who works on normative questions about whether a late-term abortion to save the mother’s life is morally permissible. This philosopher would presumably grant that there are interesting questions about how people in different demographics tend to view the morality of abortion and about why women do or do not decide to get an abortion under various circumstances. But he might still maintain that the answers to such predictive and explanatory questions have no direct bearing on the questions about the normative considerations regarding abortion. Or consider a person who is deliberating about what would be moral to do in an actual abortion dilemma. She might be weighing the arguments for and against various normative views about what would be morally permissible or compassionate and just to do. And while she might be abstractly interested in facts about how most other people tend to decide or think about the issue, those non-normative facts do not tell her how she should think or what she sees as the moral truth of the matter.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

298

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

The deliberating person we are picturing in this case wants to understand what morality requires in the relevant situation, regardless of whether most people can be predicted to do the moral thing. Moreover, when we are trying to settle questions about the moral permissibility or impermissibility of abortion, or engaged in other normative inquiries, it is often useful to bracket empirical questions about what people in general are likely to do or think. So, reflection on these kinds of cases might lead one to conclude that the Strong Division position – in which there is a strict division of labor between people working in normative ethics and those working in virtue science – is rational, not just understandable. Or one might go further and hold that virtue science should not even be considered as a part of moral philosophy and that it is a good thing that virtue science is not a default part of philosophic training. Arguments against Strong Division Although these arguments for normative ethicists ignoring virtue science can seem initially compelling, they fail for several reasons. First and most obviously, any claims that virtue science is not a part of philosophy or “not really philosophy” are unsustainable given the historical and contemporary interest that recognized philosophers have had in the guiding questions of virtue science. Moreover, in many other areas of philosophy there are subareas in which empirical questions are pursued along with more conceptual ones. For example, work on philosophy of memory and other areas are unproblematically associated with the label “cognitive science.” So, even if some normative ethicists can safely ignore virtue science and its results, that would not support the claim that philosophers, in general, should not contribute to and pursue virtue science or that people working in virtue science are not engaged in philosophic inquiry. Of course, it may serve some people’s interests on search committees, tenure and promotion committees, or editorial boards to “boundary police” what gets called philosophy. Such disciplinary policing may enable people to shape the flow of social (and material) capital and professional opportunities to support their personal interests or their vision of the discipline. But when it comes to questions about what will advance knowledge and understanding, there is no obvious reason to think that narrow-minded thinking about the boundaries of philosophy is defensible. Having rejected the narrow-minded view that virtue science is not really a subarea of philosophy, one might still think that virtue science and normative ethics can and should be pursued relatively independently.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Is Virtue Science Relevant to Normative Ethics?

299

But, on reflection, that position is also indefensible. Virtue science focuses on questions about what is meant by morality, on how moral people are and why, and on the psychological traits and phenomena that are involved in moral action and its opposite. And the results of this sort of work can often broaden the scope of normative inquiry by suggesting new normative questions to address. For example, imagine that, as some critics of abortion rights speculate, virtue science were to show that many or most women who get abortions suffer from guilt or regret later. This would clearly invite us to ask whether those facts would provide us with reasons to think that abortion is immoral or, as Greasley (2012) argues, to reject regret as a yardstick for the morality of abortion. This example also highlights a second way in which virtue science can contribute to normative ethics. In addition to highlighting new normative questions to tackle, it can provide solid evidence for empirical assumptions that are important in various normative arguments. The results of virtue science will not, on their own, tell us whether the degree of guilt or regret following an abortion would be a good reason to think that abortions are immoral, but it can, ideally, tell us how often and to what degree women do experience guilt or regret and whether that guilt or regret is related to virtues or vices. Moreover, qualitative studies can help us to understand the guilt or regret from the woman’s point of view, which Greasely argues is very important. And both results can help determine what normative conclusions are justifiable in our contingent empirical circumstances. Therefore, normative ethicists can both broaden their thinking about the range of normative arguments to consider and reach more sound conclusions about the normative facts in the actual world by attending to, instead of ignoring, virtue science. Finally, there is a third reason to doubt that normative ethicists can and should simply ignore virtue science: Ignoring it blocks an appealing and valuable path to practical relevance. Many, though not all, normative ethicists are interested in answering theoretical questions about what is right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, and so forth, but many are also interested in providing answers that can shape practical reasoning and action. Insofar as a normative ethicist wants to improve not just scholarly understanding but also ethical thought and practice outside the academy, the results of virtue science are clearly important and relevant. Even if a scholar only wants to improve people’s thinking about ethics and not their actual traits and actions, virtue science is vital as it can help them to understand how people think about moral and ethical issues “in the wild.” Virtue science can also help philosophers gain a more realistic view about how far from the ordinary their careful and nuanced thinking can be. If one participates

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

300

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

in virtue science or takes time looking at its results and thinks about how they should be interpreted, one becomes acutely aware that not all academics, let alone participants in research, make use of the fine-grained conceptual distinctions that loom large in normative ethical argument. So, insofar as normative ethicists hope to have an impact on large-scale ethical practice and thought, they need to come to terms with the rough and imprecise nature of the practices and modes of thought that they hope to improve or shape. This can help them to second-guess any attempts to inject their fine-grained conceptual distinctions (and arguments using those) into general circulation.

Should Virtue Science Constrain Normative Ethics? We have just considered and rejected the suggestions that virtue science is not philosophical and that normative ethicists can and should ignore virtue science. However, some want to go further than we have and argue that virtue science is vital for normative ethics in some much stronger sense. Virtue Science as a Constraint for Normative Ethics For example, consider the following remarks by Alistair MacIntyre, which are approvingly quoted by Flanagan (2017): [C]ontemporary academic moral philosophy turns out to be seriously defective as a form of rational inquiry. How so? First, the study of moral philosophy has become divorced from the study of morality or rather of moralities and by so doing has distanced itself from practice. We do not expect serious work in the philosophy of physics from students who have never studied physics or on the philosophy of law from students who have never studied law. But there is not even a hint of a suggestion that courses in social and cultural anthropology and in certain areas of sociology and psychology should be a prerequisite for graduate work in moral philosophy. Yet without such courses no adequate sense of the varieties of moral possibility can be acquired. One remains imprisoned by one’s upbringing. (MacIntyre, 2013, p. 31)

Put in our terms, MacIntyre seems to argue that moral philosophy will be defective unless training in that discipline includes learning about virtue science and related anthropological and sociological work on moralities understood as actual concrete social-psychological practices, institutions, or systems. In support of this, he contends that without awareness of this sort of empirical work, one is likely unaware of the varieties of moral

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Should Virtue Science Constrain Normative Ethics?

301

possibility, which presumably means that one is not aware of the various possible moral standards and practices that one, or someone, might adopt. As a result, one’s attempt to normatively assess which standards and practices would be ideal is curtailed, and one’s conclusions about which standards and practices are best or true will not be rationally justified. To drive this point home, we can also note that Flanagan (2017) has helpfully shown us what it would look like if we took this worry seriously and aimed to map out some of the different moral standards and practices that we find in different cultures. He has also helped draw attention to the different ways in which people(s) have experienced, enacted, and evaluated emotions, including morally relevant ones such as anger and shame (Flanagan, 2021). Without awareness of the range of moral possibilities that such virtue science brings into view, normative ethicists cannot be confident that their arguments are responding to all the rationally available options. Or so some might argue. In addition, some philosophers, such as James Griffin (2015), invoke an “ought entails can” or “obligation entails can” principle in a way that suggests that normative ethics is in principle constrained by the results of virtue science. To see the idea, take a normative ethical argument for the conclusion that abortion is never permissible, even if the mother’s life is at risk. This might be taken to entail that all women ought to refrain from having abortions. Taken together with the principle that ought implies can, however, that view would commit us to thinking that it is possible that all women will refrain from having abortions from this day forward, which might seem to depend on a predictive claim about what all women will in fact do – one that would pretty clearly be falsified by ideal virtue science. Generalizing, one might argue that because normative ethicists aim to answer questions about right and wrong, virtue and vice, and other kinds of normative facts that entail claims about what people ought to do or are obligated to do, they should study and not ignore the empirical results of virtue science. This would entail realizing that their conclusions about the normative facts should be constrained by the empirical ones provided by virtue science. The predictive outcomes about how people will act, think, and feel, would on this view tell us what people are actually capable of doing, thinking, and feeling. Finally, some, such as Harman (2009) and Doris (2002), have suggested that some specific research programs in normative ethics depend on empirical assumptions about humans and their psychology and that to assess them we must turn to the results of virtue science. For example, Doris (2002) suggests that many virtue ethicists assume that human

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

302

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

beings have robust character traits and that social-psychological results show those assumptions to be false. More recently, Doris (2015) has targeted assumptions about human agency that he takes to be embedded in Kantian normative theories and to be debunked by contemporary science. Generalizing, one might argue that all normative theories make contentious empirical assumptions about human psychology and that for this reason normative ethicists should study virtue science and admit that their theories are constrained by its results. Although we do not agree with the specific conclusions that Doris and Harman draw, their arguments for how virtue science might constrain normative ethics are valuable for that reason. Arguments against Virtue Science as a Constraint To some, these points in favor of virtue science constraining, and being necessary for responsible work in normative ethics, may seem initially compelling, but as it turns out, these views are overly strong, just as the pervious “normative ethics should ignore virtue science” ones were. We offer three reasons to recognize that this claim is excessive. First, although virtue science, especially in the ideal, broad, cross-cultural sense, will indeed enlarge our thinking about the possible moralities that humans can and do adopt, an awareness of those is simply not necessary for all normative ethical inquiries. For example, consider cross-cultural work on abortion and euthanasia such as that done by LaFleur (1994). An awareness of the variety of ways of thinking about the morality of abortion, and an awareness of the variety of ways that people understand and express emotions such as regret, guilt, and sadness, could no doubt enrich our thinking about the normative questions we can address. As Flanagan and others emphasize, it can enrich our thinking about what is right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, because it can broaden our grasp of available alternatives and possibilities. These are heuristic roles for virtue science to play, and for this reason we think that virtue science can be quite beneficial for normative ethics. But there is no reason to think that when normative ethicists are interested in specific problems and they use their imaginations to canvas the relevant moral possibilities, they will necessarily end up with rationally defective arguments or conclusions. So, the claim that training in virtue science or awareness of its results is rationally required for normative ethicists in general is likely an overstatement. Second, consider the arguments appealing to “ought entails can” or “obligation entails can.” The first thing to note is that those principles

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Should Virtue Science Constrain Normative Ethics?

303

themselves are matters of persistent controversy.2 So, any argument for virtue science’s relevance that hinges on them is already based on a contentious philosophic claim. Moreover, even if we grant that some such principle is valid, it will not support a general claim about virtue science constraining normative ethics. In the first place, it is simply an inference ticket. That is, some normative ethicists will take it to license a move from their initial conclusions about what people ought to do or have an obligation to do, to claims about what people can do. Nagel (1970) and Korsgaard (1986) each endorse this line of argument, which Nagel calls a philosophic “rebellion against psychology.” Roughly, they think that if philosophers provide sound rational arguments for the claim that you ought to do something, then if you grasp those arguments you can act on that awareness and do what you ought. So, on this view, normative ethical arguments can ground claims about what human beings can in fact do. Now this view, like any views on “ought implies can” principles, is itself philosophically contentious, but it is also not a view that can be rejected out of hand by those arguing for virtue science’s constraining role on normative ethics. It shows that the argument depending on “ought implies can” that was mentioned earlier was much too quick to be sound. This is relatively easy to see when considering one’s own shortcomings and desire to overcome them, whether that is a characteristic impatience or distractibility. It is easy to see that one would be a better person if one were more patient or focused (or, even stronger, recognizing an obligation to be more patient or focused), but that is very difficult and perhaps impossible to achieve. Imperfection is an ineliminable part of our humanity. In addition, the rebellion against psychology highlights a crucial slide that was made in the initial argument given earlier, namely the slide between indeterminate claims about what people can do and general predictive claims about what human beings tend to do. Virtue science might, for example, establish that, no matter what the normative facts are and no matter how well they are grasped by people on the street, it is predictable that when their lives are at risk some women will choose to have abortions and others will not. The latter, predictive results can establish what will likely happen given past tendencies, but it cannot establish with certainty 2

See Cokelet (2017) for doubts about Griffin’s lexical case for his “ought implies can” principle. For a sense of the current philosophic and empirical debates see Vranas (2007) and Henne et al (2016). For historical debates about “obligation entails can,” including the debate between Luther and Erasmus, see Martin (2009).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

304

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

what is possible or impossible (in a psychological, physical, or metaphysical sense). Of course, the women who do not have abortions at the risk of their own lives demonstrate that this action is possible. In addition, in most cases virtue science does not establish universal predictive generalizations about what each and every person will do. Instead, it often establishes predictive claims about what the people as an aggregate are likely to do. Establishing the probability of one action or another does nothing to establish what is or is not permissible for people to do. If individuals act in multiple ways, this demonstrates multiple possibilities, but it does not determine what one ought to do. Third, the “ought implies can” and “obligation implies can” arguments rely on a background assumption that normative ethics is solely concerned with claims that ground ought and obligation claims. This is simply not true. Debates about how to understand virtue and vice terms and the traits to which they often refer, for example, do not have simple implications for ought and obligation claims. For many, ought and obligation claims have no place in virtue ethics because virtue ethics is based on making good choices about how to live rather than on imperatives. I may discover that I am not as compassionate as I would like to be, or should be, for example, and that does not right away entail that I am obligated to change. After all, if “obligation claims” entail “can claims” and I cannot transform myself into a more compassionate person at will, then it may be false that I am obligated to become compassionate. Perhaps it would be appropriate if I feel somewhat bad about my current flawed character, but if emotions and emotional dispositions are not entirely under my direct voluntary control, some proponents of the “ought implies can” principle resist the claim that I ought to feel bad if I do not. More generally, there are plausible philosophic views on which many normative facts that we have good reason to investigate do not entail ought and obligation claims, and normative ethicists working on those topics can surely reject the “ought implies can” argument for virtue ethics constraining normative ethics. Of course, as we argued in the previous section, many moral philosophers are not just interested in conclusions about what it would be right and wrong, or virtuous or vicious, for individual people to do – many are also interested in thinking about how to contribute to, and improve, the concrete ethical thought and practice that they find around them. So, while some philosophers interested in compassion might be interested in what it takes to be compassionate or not in the abstract, some are also interested in how thinking about those normative facts can inform or shape our current morality. For example, Nussbaum (2013) is interested

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Should Virtue Science Constrain Normative Ethics?

305

in understanding the nature of compassion and in figuring out how to promote compassion in real, nonideal societies in order to better realize justice. And philosophers involved with that sort of nonideal practically engaged work have reason to be interested in what most human beings can be predicted to do and be like. So that subgroup of moral philosophers has compelling reasons to pay attention to virtue science. This brings us to the third argument mentioned earlier, which holds that all normative ethicists depend on background empirical assumptions about human beings – assumptions that must be tested by virtue science. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, we think that this claim is an overstatement. Simply put, not all normative ethicists rely on contentious empirical assumptions in their research – assumptions that would compel them to attend or defer to virtue science. For example, a normative ethicist might be centrally interested in the highly abstract and general question of whether the distinction between killing someone and letting them die is of deep moral importance and why (a view that shapes the Catholic Church view on abortion, for example). Work on that topic does not depend on contentious assumptions of the sort that are investigated by virtue science. So moral philosophers interested only in such issues can safely ignore virtue science. But still, as mentioned, some moral philosophers are interested in questions about both normative ethics and virtue science, and many of those philosophers are interested in thinking about how to make moral philosophy practically relevant – they want their work in moral philosophy to, in Griffin’s (2015) words, contribute to ethics, where “ethics” refers to the various concrete forms of ethical thought and practice that are embodied in different cultural and social environments. Philosophers who care about that kind of practical relevance have good reason to follow or contribute to virtue science, even if some of their work in normative ethics and metaethics can proceed independently. Against that backdrop, we might take the influential arguments that Doris (2002) and other work in the same vein have made as targeting just this kind of nonideal moral philosophy which aims at practical impact or relevance. The idea would be that while not all normative ethicists are constrained by virtue science, there is a subset of them that are. These philosophers, who Doris takes to include many virtue ethicists and Kantians, do make assumptions that fall within the purview of virtue science, and, for this reason, they should attend to that science and perhaps help contribute to it. We think that this narrowed down view about the relevance of virtue science to moral philosophy and normative ethics is very plausible. And as

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

306

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

fans of nonideal moral theory that aims at practical relevance, we do not view this narrowed down view as in any way uninteresting or unimportant. With that said, we also think it is good to emphasize how hard it is to establish virtue scientific results that can feed into and benefit the work that practically engages moral philosophers. Doris (2002), for example, did narrow his target to a specific group of virtue ethicists who he took to be relying on claims about certain kinds of traits that human beings have. Roughly, he attacked the presumed virtue ethical position that human beings have virtue traits that should explain behavior in virtually any situation and context. But in attacking those claims, he relied on a view of traits that is thoroughly outdated. Therefore, his discussion of the evidence of the absence for that kind of trait in social-psychological research is an attack on a straw person. He did not adequately canvas competing interpretations of the relevant data (as was later made clear in the consensus among psychologists that Webster [2009] described) and address the fact that many classical virtue ethicists would be unsurprised that most people in contemporary Western secular capitalist societies lack reliably good character traits. In sum, although Doris’ skeptical arguments are no doubt valuable in fostering philosophic engagement with virtue science, we worry that skeptical arguments like his may, in the end, generate more heat than light. Put positively, we suspect that although skeptical arguments that draw on virtue science to cast doubt on one normative theory or another can spur philosophic interest in virtue science, it is more fruitful for philosophers with an interest in practical impact, and hence virtue science, to proceed with more constructive plans. For example, they can work with virtue scientists to understand what sorts of conclusions are well supported by the relevant conceptual and empirical work in virtue science. This will aid them in thinking about how to better bring normative ethics into constructive interaction with our concrete moral practices, considering what virtue science tells us about those practices. In this way, virtue science will not so much constrain normative ethics as pave its path to practical relevance and impact.

Virtue Science as a Beneficial Catalyst for Moral Philosophy In the previous sections we have discussed and rejected two extreme claims about virtue science and its relevance to normative ethics. Virtue science is relevant to normative ethics, but it does not strongly constrain all normative ethicists. We have already more than tipped our hand that we see the truth lying between these two extreme views. In this last section, we want

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A Beneficial Catalyst for Moral Philosophy

307

to sum up and emphasize the positive ways in which virtue science, and engagement with virtue science, can catalyze moral philosophy and help those who want to make moral philosophy more practically beneficial and relevant. Although we have touched on these points already, we want to emphasize these exciting, positive possibilities. First, virtue science can broaden the scope and evidential base for normative ethics. For example, consider Flanagan’s (2017) recent book on emotion. In effect, he draws on virtue science to enrich our knowledge of how emotions, their modes of psychological expression, and their roles in people’s lives vary across cultures. He further notes that this empirical variability raises new normative questions about what kinds of emotions – what modes of psychological expression – are best for us to (attempt to) cultivate in our individual and group lives. Flanagan himself argues that extant normative ethical discussions of anger and shame tend to be inadequate because they make empirically and culturally contingent assumptions about these emotions and the way they can and do work. Even if one disagrees with what Flanagan says about these specific emotions, his point about the general methods of normative ethical work on the emotions is sound. His point also generalizes to other areas of normative ethics that focus on the evaluation of human psychological phenomena and relationships. There is a good chance that, in many areas, extant philosophical work may be constrained because researchers assume that there must be psychological or sociological uniformity. In doing so, they may illicitly assume that things everywhere must be as they typically are in the researchers’ home cultures or domains of experience. In addition to opening up the range of normative questions that philosophers can tackle, virtue science will also provide useful information about how various interventions, policies, and actions influence states of affairs that people care about (e.g., relationships and well-being). Utilitarians and other consequentialists think that the moral status of policies, actions, and even character traits centrally depend on their actual or likely impact on the world, so they naturally have reason to care about the empirical facts in those topics. But virtually all normative ethicists have reason to recognize the importance of empirical facts of that sort because they think that empirical consequences matter to some extent. When working out the actual world applications of their normative views, all moral philosophers have reason to care about and recognize the value of virtue science. There is also a growing group of philosophers in the conceptual engineering movement, and they have strong reasons to study, and draw on, virtue science. Philosophers in this movement aim to interpret and rationally

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

308

Virtue Science and Moral Philosophy

assess various concepts that people use in ordinary life and to then propose ways of reengineering or replacing the concepts so that they are better. See Machery (2017) and Chalmers (in press) for overviews. All stages of this operation could be usefully informed by virtue science. The tools that virtue scientists use could almost certainly help conceptual engineers to better study the extant concepts that people use in various populations, help them chart out possible variations in concepts and their modes of embodiment in individuals and cultures, and think realistically about how to change people’s concepts and measure the effects of doing so. This brings us to the second main way that virtue science can catalyze normative ethics: It can help moral philosophy to become more practically relevant. Of course, moral philosophy that advances expert debate, knowledge, and understanding is valuable in its own right. And normative ethical theories and arguments already do have practical impact because they influence debates and views in large social-political institutions (e.g., law, medicine, and legislative politics), and the views of students and interested lay people. But this sort of impact can be greatly catalyzed as virtue science comes into its own. Philosophers and scientists can work together to focus attention on various kinds of moral improvement and degradation, to determine empirically the sort of interventions and policies that can enable human beings to become more moral, and to find evidence-supported ways of combating factors that impede moral progress or that fuel morally bad effects. Even in the domain of philosophic pedagogy, virtue science promises to catalyze practical impact. Once we know more about various epistemic, civic, and moral virtues and vices and what leads to their development or decline, we can better conceptualize and rigorously test pedagogical interventions aimed at promoting better thinkers, citizens, and people. Of course, on all these fronts there are tough normative questions to raise about the degree of paternalism that is acceptable when imposing interventions on others. Virtue ethical conceptual and empirical resources may be especially helpful in the question of paternalism. We suspect, for example, that it will be better in various domains to draw on virtue science to help individuals become more reflective about their own virtues and vices and their own ways of understanding and evaluating them. It can also offer them access to evidence-supported interventions that will enable them to autonomously embody their own reflective values better over time. The third reason that philosophers should engage with virtue science is that it can help break down interdisciplinary barriers and build an exciting interdisciplinary field whose value is apparent to lay people, funders, and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A Beneficial Catalyst for Moral Philosophy

309

politicians. In our current cultural moment, critics of higher education, and those worried about its future viability, are increasingly emphasizing the need for “impact” and “outputs” outside academia. Although we do not endorse this push and the related focus on the bottom line, it is worth noting that virtue science as an emerging interdisciplinary field promises to offer a way to establish the practical importance of moral philosophy. As virtue science develops and comes into its own, it can help make philosophy more practically relevant and make its value more apparent to those who seek real-world value beyond the more abstract and nonempirical work that is done by metaethicists and normative ethics. In sum, we believe that virtue science has much to offer moral philosophy without becoming a dominant or overweening influence. There will likely continue to be normative ethicists who can safely ignore virtue science as less than relevant to their work. However, there are many philosophers who would be wise to attend to the conceptual and empirical work that is increasingly available and strongly interdisciplinary.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.017 Published online by Cambridge University Press

chapter 13

Virtue Science and Psychology

In this final chapter, we sum up the results of our examination of virtue science and discuss how virtue science can productively contribute to moral philosophy (Chapter 12) and psychology (this chapter). Overall, the science of virtue has had a good beginning, but significant work remains to make it a cohesive, cumulative science. We briefly review how that beginning sets the stage for the next phase of virtue science, empirically and conceptually. Then we proceed to discuss four concrete areas on which the science of virtue can productively focus: interdisciplinarity, conceptualization, study design, and exploring possible connections between virtues and flourishing. We suggest that one promising direction for building a science of virtue is to incorporate the best of virtue philosophy and the best elements of the science of psychology. We begin with the beginning.

A Good Beginning Empirical Tractability The most encouraging aspect of virtue research so far is its empirical tractability, with over a hundred studies of virtue-related concepts spanning many virtues, including courage, humility, generosity, kindness, fairness, forgiveness, and gratitude. This research has demonstrated that virtues can be meaningfully measured with psychometrically supported instruments. Moreover, these virtue scales are related to meaningful criterion measures, virtue-related behavior can be increased with short-term interventions, and virtues appear to add to our empirical understandings of people’s lives beyond standard personality variables. In addition, intensive longitudinal studies using the density distribution approach to traits have enhanced our understanding of virtues as traits. In short, the available research is quite consistent with seeing virtues as scalar, acquired traits. Much more research is needed, especially regarding the role features of virtues and the 310

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A Good Beginning

311

interaction of virtues and situations, and exploring how values and eudaimonia may be linked to virtues. Early Conceptual Work In general, empirical research on virtues has outstripped the conceptual resources psychologists bring to bear. The development of conceptual resources for virtue research has begun to turn the corner, however. Although virtue scholars have not even begun to reach a consensus on a conceptual model of virtue, a few candidate frameworks have been written for psychologists, and these frameworks can structure and guide future research. For example, Wright and her colleagues’ (2021) recent book focuses on conceptualizing and measuring virtues. This volume is noteworthy in many respects, but, most importantly, it provides a strong conceptual framework for understanding and studying virtues that includes high-quality empirical and philosophical resources. We have some disagreements with Wright and her colleagues (see Chapters 2 and 12), but we see their book as providing clear, correct, and mostly uncontentious guidance. They have crafted an impressive framework for empirical investigations with a neo-Aristotelian theory of virtue. Their collaboration produces a clear conception of moral virtues as realistic features that actual human beings can cultivate. One example of what we found valuable in their views is their helpful distinction between three functional aspects of virtue traits: patterns of input uptake, characteristic social-cognitive processing of inputs, and outputs in the form of trait-relevant responses. We encourage virtue researchers to make use of Wright and her colleagues’ framework in their research. The first author of this book continues to write about how to appropriate Aristotle’s philosophy in psychology (e.g., Cokelet & Fowers, 2019; Darnell et al., 2022; Fowers, 2001, 2005a, 2012, 2014, 2016; Fowers et al., 2010; Fowers, Novak, Calder, & Sommer, 2022; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2022, 2024). These works have applied a neo-Aristotelian framework to understanding virtues conceptually and to using empirical methods to study them. This body of work suggests that virtues are best studied as value-imbued concepts that are available to virtually anyone and aimed at living well. This work has integrated empirical methods and conceptual resources from the beginning, providing examples of how to study virtues in survey, structural equation modeling, intensive longitudinal, and experimental research. Of course, Fowers’ work only scratches the surface of research on virtues, but it is an unusually unified, systematic,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

312

Virtue Science and Psychology

and longstanding research program that attempts to integrate philosophical conceptualizations and empirical methods. This integration and systematicity stands in contrast to the frequently intuitive and colloquial approaches to virtue that we have critiqued in this book. This book is an attempt to integrate and systematize virtue science in an even more focused way than that available in Fowers’ oeuvre, drawing on philosophical insights from Aristotle, Confucius, and many contemporary philosophers and on cutting-edge psychological research methods. Our fondest hope is that this book will help virtue researchers to conceptualize their research more thoroughly and to integrate it with the cumulating knowledge of virtue. We think this focus and integration are necessary to build a science of virtue. Questioning the Fact–Value Dichotomy A major obstacle to virtue research has been the perpetuation, in psychology, of a dichotomy of facts and values. Some psychologists are skeptical of the domain of virtue research because they believe it violates this dictum, although their worries are generally implicit and unjustified rather than explicitly argued. We suggested, in Chapter 6, that the fact–value dichotomy has not fared well. Many theoretical refutations of the dichotomy exist (Alexandrova, 2017; Brinkmann, 2011; Cushman, 2019; Fowers, 2005a, 2015, 2022; Putnam, 2004; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1985), and we could cite many more. The supporters of the dichotomy have seldom, if ever, responded to these critiques (see Betz [2013] and Kendler [2002] for exceptions). Therefore, the fact–value dichotomy is, at a minimum, so thoroughly contested that it cannot be reasonably be taken for granted or appealed to as an assumption. Another reading of this critical literature suggests that the dichotomy has been refuted. As explained in Chapter 6, we recognize a legitimate distinction between facts and values, wherein it is reasonable to approach them somewhat distinctly, but we also think it wise to examine the interpenetrability of facts and values, as recommended by Alexandrova (2017). Many scientists have disregarded the dichotomy without notable difficulties. Virtue researchers are among them (e.g., Kim & Enright, 2016; Schnitker, 2012), but many other empirical researchers have done so as well (e.g., Lee et al., 2021; Ryan & Deci, 2017). The results have been illuminating, with researcher-endorsed value commitments demonstrating empirical tractability and expected relations with reasonable criterion variables, all without dichotomizing facts and values.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Interdisciplinarity

313

We advocate a bullet-biting approach to values in psychological research generally because we believe that many, if not most, variables in psychological science entail value commitments (Brinkmann, 2011; Cushman, 2019; Richardson et al., 1999), and many variables are both facts and values (physical health, longevity, high school graduation rates). Arbitrarily separating such facts and values does violence to both and obscures more than it illuminates. We recognize, however, that this bullet-biting approach is too extreme for some psychologists who nevertheless want to study valueimbued topics. Some of these psychologists choose to study values as the subjective features of their research participants. Although we think this falls short of a full accounting of the value dimension, we can still learn much from this approach to research. We called this group of researchers “disengaged describers” (Chapter 6). The most important takeaway from this discussion is that the simple assumption of a dichotomy of facts and values is untenable. Without convincing arguments to support this dichotomy, it cannot be treated as a dictum. The arguments against the dichotomy are so many and varied that it is unlikely that they can all be effectively countered, so we see the perpetuation of the dichotomy as quite dubious. Given this beginning, we now turn to four areas of focus in psychology encouraged by virtue science.

Interdisciplinarity An exciting, yet difficult aspect of studying virtues is the obvious and powerful call for crossing the dominant disciplinary lines in social sciences, humanities, and professions. This interdisciplinarity is exciting because it opens many doors that are invisible within a specific discipline, such as the conceptual enrichment of philosophy, the empirical tools of psychology, and the cultural richness of anthropology. There is so much to learn in interdisciplinary research! Yet this is also very challenging because highly trained investigators must admit extensive ignorance of extra-disciplinary knowledge and cultivate the intellectual humility that facilitates learning and collaboration. Traditional disciplinary structures dominate the academy, publication processes, and prestige attainment, and they mitigate strongly against interdisciplinary scholarship. The departmental structure of graduate schools and universities is an obvious impediment. Beyond those structures, every discipline is rife with disciplinary guardians, who see their role as policing the discipline, sorting out what to include and exclude in the discipline, maintaining its unique position, and defining what is and is

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

314

Virtue Science and Psychology

not prestigious. Disciplinary guardians sometimes seem to play beneficial roles, given the complexity of academia, but the powerful dynamics of maintaining firm disciplinary boundaries mitigate against interdisciplinary work and make it costly to cross those boundaries. Nevertheless, there have been multiple groups of collaborators that have persistently and productively worked across disciplinary lines, and we describe some of those collaborations in the following subsections. It is instructive to recognize the many contemporary collaborations between philosophers and psychologists that have recently emerged. We have referred to these collaborations throughout this book (and this book itself is one such collaboration), but here we wish to highlight these joint activities as a topic in its own right. One of the aspects of virtue that is immediately apparent is that the topic has a history in both disciplines, and it is of current interest in both disciplines. Scholars have rediscovered the potential complementarity of the two disciplines and have begun to work together in earnest. These collaborations sometimes include other social scientists, others from the humanities, and are practitioners of the professions, but a very productive concentration of interdisciplinary work on virtues includes philosophers and psychologists. We discuss a few such collaborations here, but there are so many emerging now that we cannot discuss them all. As we discussed in Chapter 12, Flanagan (1991) arguably kicked off the contemporary collaboration of philosophers and psychologists by arguing that philosophers must render their moral concepts psychologically realistic. This eminently sensible suggestion (especially from a psychological viewpoint) has been taken up in earnest and philosophers have pursued it in multiple ways. Most notably, many philosophers have delved deeply into psychological research, and some have arranged active collaborations with psychologists. It seems to us that philosophers have taken the lead on this interdisciplinarity, and psychologists have been slower to recognize the value of philosophical resources. This is changing apace, however, with psychologists increasingly recognizing the conceptual insufficiency of their approaches and turning to philosophers for illumination. Many philosophers have heeded Flanagan’s (1991) suggestion and have worked to develop psychologically realistic virtues. A notable example is Doris’ (2002) critique of virtue, given his reliance on the social psychology literature to question the role of virtues. Although we disagree with Doris based on what we see as solid arguments, his work exemplifies how a philosopher can take the call to psychological realism seriously. Ultimately, he thought realism meant that the concept of virtue was unrealistic. One of our rejoinders is that his rejection of virtues as unrealistic was based on his

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Interdisciplinarity

315

retention of an excessively demanding understanding (i.e., psychologically unrealistic) of virtue that could not be satisfied by ordinary mortals. A strongly contrasting example is provided by the works of James Arthur (2020) and Kristján Kristjánsson (2016, 2017, 2018, 2021), who have been leaders in interdisciplinarity in their work at the Jubilee Centre at the University of Birmingham. Arthur is an educator and Kristjánsson is a philosopher. Their grant-funded Jubilee Centre has been staffed by philosophers and social scientists for many years in a very productive arrangement. For example, one of the best examples of a study of virtue that is both conceptually well-defined and empirically focused is their work on gratitude (Morgan et al., 2017). They began with a well-articulated concept of gratitude as a virtue and assessed it through a multicomponent strategy, empirically demonstrating the importance of the components they identified. They have also studied friendship (Walker et al., 2015), online virtues (Morgan & Fowers, 2022), practical wisdom (Darnell et al., 2019, 2022; Kristjánsson et al., 2021; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024), and a prototype of virtues (Gulliford et al., 2021). In addition, the Jubilee Centre (2022) hosts an annual conference including professionals interested in studying virtue from many disciplines. This longstanding, extensive, and systematic set of collaborations has been literally world changing because the faculty of the Jubilee Centre are continuously sought out for guidance, collaborations, and keynote speeches around the globe (Jubilee Centre, 2022). A second significant group of collaborators was gathered by Nancy Snow (e.g., Snow & Narvaez, 2019), a philosopher who founded the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing and pursued multiple empirical projects with psychologists and educators. Snow also oversaw two large and noteworthy grants called Self, Motivation, and Virtue (SMV; with Darcia Narvaez, a developmental psychologist) and Virtue and Public Life. For our purposes, the signature element of these projects is that Snow and Narvaez invited teams to conduct empirical studies that were deeply interdisciplinary. The pioneering effort of the SMV project produced twenty interdisciplinary projects, many of which led to empirical publications (e.g., Bedford-Peterson et al., 2019; Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022; Spezio et al., 2019). Their recent book about the conceptualization and measurement of virtue is another important contribution (Wright et al., 2021). Snow has also edited a series of books that include authors on virtues from many disciplines, again fostering the cross-pollination of the disciplines. As mentioned earlier, the current book is one outcome of a long-term collaboration between Fowers and Cokelet (e.g., Cokelet & Fowers, 2019; Fowers & Cokelet, 2019; Fowers et al., 2021). This collaboration began with

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

316

Virtue Science and Psychology

of our shared interests while we were both at the University of Miami. While in Miami, Cokelet was a team member of the SMV project, which led to a series of studies. Cokelet’s influence on those psychological studies was deep in frequently calling for and assisting with better definitions of terms, more deeply theoretically informed hypotheses and methods, and acknowledgments of the various positions espoused by philosophers. This collaboration has continued through Cokelet’s move to the University of Kansas, the initial article on the emerging science of virtue (Fowers et al., 2021), and now this book. To give readers a peek behind the scenes of the book, this chapter and Chapter 12 were not part of the original book proposal. This will not be surprising to prolific authors, as many projects lead authors in unforeseen directions. The important point is that the nature of the final chapters changed substantially as our collaboration deepened. Both Fowers and Cokelet came to see philosophy and psychology differently as our work together continued, and this led us to try to envision how an interdisciplinary virtue science could change each discipline, hence the final two chapters. Indeed, we see the openness to such professionally altering understandings as both a key challenge to and benefit of interdisciplinary partnership. One of the most obvious ways that philosophers contribute to interdisciplinary work is by pressing for better definitions and theory. Psychologists and other social scientists are often content to cite a set of studies that can be narratively arranged to tell a story that renders their current research intelligible and even necessary. But this is frequently an ad hoc affair that is not well grounded in systematic theory, and it leads to just the kind of noncumulative and unsystematic knowledge that we critiqued in virtue research (Chapter 3) and have recently questioned in flourishing research (Fowers et al., 2023a; Novak et al., 2023). This noncumulative knowledge is a natural outcome of a truncated investigative process. Overcoming this ad hoc approach to study justification is one of the ways in which psychology and philosophy can be fruitfully complementary. Philosophers are trained to be much more careful in their conceptualizations, to pay close attention to other philosophers’ views, and to avoid making contested claims without strong arguments. This depth of conceptual knowledge and perspicacity can help to temper psychologists’ sometimes too easy and intuitive theorizing. But philosophical contributions can go further in illuminating distinctions and arguments of which psychologists tend to be unaware, thereby leading to enriched hypotheses and research directions, as we discussed in Chapter 2. Psychologists and other social scientists can also benefit from philosophers’ interest and capability in tackling metatheoretical questions that

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Conceptualization of Virtues in Psychology

317

can seldom be addressed straightforwardly by one or even a set of studies. This book has been preoccupied with many such topics, including the fact–value dichotomy, agency, and the possibility of a good life. To take one obvious example, the question of whether there is a reasonable dichotomy of facts and values cannot be a primarily empirical question because that would beg the question of what we mean by a fact. Empirical facts, no matter how well grounded, cannot provide the basis for what a fact is, or, for that matter, what a value is (Putnam, 2004). Of course, collaborations between social scientists and humanities scholars are bilateral, and humanities researchers can gain a great deal from social scientists, as we discussed in Chapter 12. The key to these partnerships is a mutual appreciation of the genuine knowledge and know-how that each discipline can bring to bear. A second element is the ability and persistence to creatively meld those backgrounds to facilitate better scholarship through teamwork. Our use of the term “teamwork” is fully intentional, as it is indispensable for highly trained professionals to transcend natural disciplinary parochiality and attain interdisciplinary progress. We now discuss how this interdisciplinary progress can help to improve psychological conceptions of virtue.

Improving the Conceptualization of Virtues in Psychology We argued, especially in Part I, that clearer, more systematic theory is necessary to build a genuine virtue science. Real virtue theory has been largely absent from empirical research on virtues, with a few exceptions (Fowers, 2005a, 2008; Fowers et al., 2021; Kim & Enright, 2016; Morgan et al., 2017; Tudge et al., 2018; Wright et al., 2021). The available theory in the social sciences has been largely neo-Aristotelian, but this emphasis is by no means necessary or inevitable. One of the ways that psychologists can learn from philosophers is about the other theoretical bases available for virtues. At the onset of the positive psychology movement, Peterson and Seligman (2004) acknowledged that this kind of theory was beyond their capacity, and little has changed in the last twenty years. It is time for psychologists to expect more from ourselves as theorists. The Necessity of Systematic Theory It is straightforward to see why coherent theoretical accounts are needed. It is, of course, necessary to understand something before one attempts to measure it. If one starts with a partial understanding, then one must

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

318

Virtue Science and Psychology

pause along the way to develop systematic theory about the subject matter. Pulling oneself up by one’s empirical bootstraps is as problematic as it sounds. In other words, we see theoretical validity as more important and fundamental than psychometric validity because psychometric results are dependent on the conceptualization of the topic being measured. We recognize, however, that neither can substitute for the other because questions can be formulated in both conceptual and empirical terms. Many virtue scholars will object to our call for greater theoretical coherence by correctly noting that many virtue measures have strong evidence in their favor, but we must recall that this evidence is primarily psychometric. A psychometric analysis has excellent value, but it cannot provide a substitute for systematic theoretical analysis of a construct (Fowers, 2001, 2008, 2014). Questions that are inherently theoretical (e.g., is there a unity of the virtues?) must be answered, at least partly, through conceptual analysis. Empirical evidence can help, but it cannot suffice to answer theoretical questions. As we noted in Chapter 12, some philosophical questions can be formulated as empirical hypotheses and tested, and we recommend that warmly. But some questions must remain conceptual, and empirical evidence cannot answer them. The distinction between empirical and conceptual questions is difficult for psychologists, but its recognition is one of the fruits of working across the philosophy–psychology disciplinary divide. We have taken a strongly hypothetical tone in this book to emphasize that there are many open questions in virtue research and we have focused primarily on questions that arise mainly from the STRIVE-4 Model, which clarifies its heuristic role. The value of this hypothetical approach is that we can state our premises as questions to be investigated rather than as assertions that lack empirical support. Unsystematic Theory Allows Ethnocentric Research A second reason to improve psychological theorizing is to work our way closer to theoretical coherence. Many virtue scholars have developed measures without adequate theoretical grounding. This makes sense in the current academic setting of psychology research, wherein grant deadlines, publication pressures, and expectations for quantification push researchers to quickly devise measurements and reduce the time necessary for systematic conceptualization. Social scientists must pause to better comprehend the virtues they want to study and recognize the importance of theory, rather than taking measurement as their primary goal. So far in this book, we have given only scant attention to one of the problems with

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Conceptualization of Virtues in Psychology

319

an atheoretical approach, which is the assumption that virtues are culturally universal. Although a great many virtue scholars seem to assume this universality, we are not aware of any argumentation for this assumption in psychology. We discuss the question of universality more in what follows. Of course, assuming a single understanding of the virtues begs the question of whether it is possible to conceptualize them universally. Some scholars believe that virtues are culturally and temporally relative, presenting notable cultural differences that dramatically challenge the possibility of universality (e.g., Duan et al., 2012; Heil, 2009; Yu & Xie, 2021). A quick examination of cultural and historical variation confirms this belief, which opens the question of whether we have (1) multiple incommensurable types of virtue or (2) variations in virtues that form family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 1953). We cannot resolve that question in this final chapter, but we think it is important as a hypothesis (12-11). The claims to virtue universality (whether implicit or explicit) are seldom theoretically examined or justified. Even if a virtue measure has been assessed across multiple societies, it does not address cultural differences because the cultural influences are never really examined. In other words, cultural validity is not the same as psychometric validity. These two forms of assessment are largely independent, and neither can answer questions proper to the other. If psychometric validity fails, other forms of validity are also rendered quite dubious, but even strong psychometric validity does not warrant a claim about a virtue measure being valid universally or valid theoretically. That is, theoretical, cultural, and psychometric validities are all necessary for a good science of virtue. It is worth noting, however, that virtue researchers generally have taken the paradoxical position of implicitly or explicitly claiming a universal approach to virtue, all the while creating their measures based on Western, and in many ways Christian, concepts. Virtue measures have been developed primarily in the USA and Europe, with only fleeting reference to non-Western concepts of good character. These researchers have not given theoretical arguments for or against the universality of their virtue measures. The question of whose virtue is being theorized or measured is essential. The alternative is to impose Western views on the rest of the world. This circumspection seems especially important where the moral implication of Western concepts may be imported into other cultures. This worry is further amplified when we recognize the significance of the imprimatur of science on any concept. The in-depth study of cultural views on virtue is indispensable. The tension between cultural relativity and universality leaves virtue researchers with a dilemma. On the one hand, claiming that virtue

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

320

Virtue Science and Psychology

measures are universal courts ethnocentrism. On the other hand, to the degree that the definitions, significance, and coherence of virtue concepts are culturally defined, this leaves the question open about whether culture A’s virtues are comparable to culture B’s virtues. This risks a debilitating cultural relativism. We believe that this stark dichotomy is unnecessary, and that a more nuanced and culturally sensitive approach to virtue research can be mounted, but that is a question for future scholarship. As we noted in Chapter 11, there are a few exceptions to the focus on North Atlantic populations, but most of the exceptions include a simple translation of measures developed in North Atlantic societies into another language without pausing to reflect on the appropriateness of the underlying concept of virtues for the recipient society. Tudge and his colleagues (2018) are the only clear exception to the acultural approach in that they began their research as a deeply cross-cultural endeavor and thought carefully about how gratitude might vary across cultural settings. Disciplinary (Not Topic-Related) Shortcomings It is important to recognize, however, that the shortcomings we have just identified in the virtue literature (e.g., its atheoretical tendencies, the lack of attention to significance of cultural influence) are not unique to virtue scholarship. Rather, these limitations are apparent in much social science (Gorski, 2013; Henrich et al., 2010; Mathews & Izquierdo, 2009; Michalski, 2022). Therefore, we do not suggest that there is anything especially problematic in virtue research. Virtue researchers have, for the most part, followed standard psychological research practices faithfully. Our criticism focuses mainly on those practices rather than on those who follow them. Nevertheless, there are serious consequences to adhering to those practices, especially if the research focus is as consequential as virtue and a good life are. We also acknowledge that much of the authors’ decades of work on virtue is subject to criticism for its universalist and Western leanings. Although many scholars understand the problem that cultural universality presents, few have any idea how to address it. Problematic Practices in Virtue Conceptualizations There are several primary sources of most conceptualizations of virtue. A common recourse for virtue scholars is to simply rely on their intuitions and folk wisdom about virtues. These researchers write as if everyone already knows what virtues are in general and that no definition or

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Conceptualization of Virtues in Psychology

321

conceptual analysis is needed. Yet everyone does not agree on the answers to these questions, and it seems obvious that intuitions and common wisdom are shot through with cultural bias and error. One example is the common mistake of considering self-control as a virtue (e.g., Baumeister & Exline, 1999; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). This is a common intuition, but it contradicts a great many virtue theorists who suggest that if one must control one’s impulses or desires, one is not exercising virtue at all (e.g., Kristjánsson, 2013; Woodruff, 2001). Successful control of undesirable motives is still a good thing, but it is considered to be continence rather than a virtue (Fowers, 2008). A second source of virtue conceptualization is to ground one’s conception in an existing empirical literature. This form of justification is a favored approach by empirically minded scholars, but such results must be cobbled together into a plausible narrative and are only as good as their problematic measurement, as we have noted. The narratives that investigators create leave it unclear whether the version one scholar presents about a virtue could be replicated by another researcher. The problem begins with a thin or even absent conceptualization of what a virtue is in general or even the specific virtue under consideration. Empirical virtue researchers have been resourceful in presenting many useful measures, but they have generally neglected the theoretical explanation or justification of their measures. Another drawback to drawing on existing psychological literatures for virtue conceptualization and measurement is that one inevitably incorporates the biases already endemic to those literatures. Unfortunately, it is a well-known fact that psychological research has powerful Western biases (Christopher & Hickenbottom, 2008; Henrich et al., 2010; Teo & Febbraro, 2003) that the unreflective will build into their measures and research. Of course, no one could have expected the early empirical scholars to have assembled a flawless approach to the then novel concept of investigating virtues. Unfortunately, the neglect of systematic virtue theorizing has persisted and remains quite evident in this growing literature. This suggests that subsequent scholars have simply followed the initial atheoretical lead. We suggest that the time has come to deal squarely with developing coherent, systematic virtue theory and models. This book has been one effort in that direction. A third source for understanding virtues has been to take a diagnostic approach to identifying and assessing them as Peterson and Seligman (2004) proposed. We discussed this flawed approach in Chapter 3, and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

322

Virtue Science and Psychology

there is no need to recapitulate that discussion here. Although these three sources of virtue conceptualizations lend some credence to some components of good actions, they all lack systematic theoretical argument for a basic understanding of virtue.

The STRIVE-4 Model and Formal Characteristics of Virtues Our suggestion for correcting the conceptual poverty of virtue science is the STRIVE-4 Model. This model is, of course, a formal one that does not specify the contents of virtue; nor does it state which characteristics should be considered as virtues or detail the specific contents of any given virtue. We believe that the formality of the model can make it more capacious for the historical and cultural variation that is undeniable. Yet the formal features included in the model put important constraints on what we think qualifies as a virtue. We suggest that virtues are Scalar, meaning that they are measurable, and that one can have a virtue in degrees. Indeed, we believe that no one has perfect virtue, and that the expectation of perfection is unrealistic, rendering virtues convoluted and implausible. We also suggest that virtues are acquired Traits. They differ from most conceptions of personality in that they are intentionally cultivated by agents because they are desirable. One can be bestowed with natural, virtue-like dispositions, but we agree with Aristotle that mature virtue must be intentionally cultivated and includes practical wisdom. We suggested that Roles influence virtue constitution and expression. Many virtues frequently accompany particular roles and adopting those roles may require a robust version of one or more virtues. We argued that virtues are also Interactive with situations because virtues are, by definition, appropriate responses to the specifics of the situation in which one finds oneself. Correctly reading situational specifics helps to constitute what a virtue is in those circumstances. We hypothesized that virtues are likely to aid individuals in realizing their personal Values and in developing a Eudaimonic life. Although some see virtues, values, and good living as independent concerns, we hypothesized that many may be intimately related (hypotheses 10-16, 10-14, 10-18 to 10-32). To qualify as a virtue, a characteristic must have the four features of virtuous action. First, it must be enacted consistently and appropriately in behavior. This behavioral expectation is not a matter of perfection, as no human behaves in virtue-like ways all the time. Second, the behavior must be accompanied by concordant motivation and emotion so that the agent is acting consistently with his inclination. Third, the behavioral and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Philosophical Debates in Virtue Science

323

affective elements of action are informed by good reasons for acting that way, based on the agent’s understanding of the reasons that are relevant to the virtue. Finally, practical wisdom guides virtuous activity so that it conduces well to the circumstances and, at least on most neo-Aristotelian accounts, to an overall good life. These behavioral, affective, cognitive, and wisdom elements need not be consciously directed. Ideally, they are habituated, so that they flow naturally in the course of life. Although these formal features do not specify which characteristics can be virtues, they place significant constraints on what can be considered a virtue. To give two examples, inconsistent, accidental, or improperly motivated behavior cannot be considered virtuous, and virtues must be intentionally cultivated because they are seen as worthwhile by the agent. We have not specified a canonical list of virtues because we are dubious about the possibility of deciding, once and for all, and for everyone, in all cultures and times, what is virtuous. We suggest that characteristics that fulfill these requirements can be considered virtues. This assertion will be and should be questioned both conceptually and empirically as virtue science develops. Each of these propositions can and should be tested with each candidate virtue to examine how the characteristic measures up against the model. Indeed, much of the content of the virtues must be worked out as each specific virtue is conceptualized and studied. The specific conceptualizations of virtues must take the philosophical debates about the virtue into account, and we turn to those debates presently.

Philosophical Debates in Virtue Science We suggested one approach to greater conceptual clarity in Chapter 2, wherein empirical researchers can familiarize themselves with the most important positions taken by philosophers on questions of virtue. We do not suggest that empirical researchers should try to become philosophers or attempt to mimic them. We simply recommend that empirical researchers learn what the positions are. They can then describe them based on knowledge rather than bumbling through them ignorantly or making uninformed assertions about contested positions. We suggested that there are three types of philosophical questions, with an appropriate form of response to each for psychologists. First, some philosophical questions are very abstract, and need not concern empirical researchers. For example, we mentioned Driver’s (2001) thought experiment about a nonexistent species, the Mutors. This is part of Driver’s attempt to make her virtue theory universally applicable to all possible scenarios. Social scientists’ exclusive

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

324

Virtue Science and Psychology

interest in the phenomena of this world means that such questions have no place in empirical research. Second, there are many debates about various features of virtue in philosophy, and these debates are primarily conceptual questions, such as the unity of virtue question or questions about human nature. To the degree that the questions are conceptual, empirical research cannot answer them, but empirical research often requires that one take a position on these matters. It seems necessary and valuable to us for empirical researchers to simply mention the debate and explicitly state which position they are adopting, with no expectation of resolving the debate (e.g., the question of determinism vs. agency). Third, some philosophical questions lend themselves to empirical examination. These questions can be fruitfully transformed into research questions, the answers to which can shed light on the philosophical debate. This idea undergirds our hypothetical approach in this book. We have attempted to frame many philosophical questions in testable form. For example, Doris (2002) and Harman (2009) examined social psychology experiments on situation influence and concluded that virtue and character have little or no role to play. Subsequently, there has been a significant philosophical debate about how those experiments should be interpreted, with many authors making a conceptual case against Doris’ and Harmon’s positions. We suggest that this philosophical debate should be complemented by empirical research that actually tests whether there is room for the influence of character on behavior. In Chapter 9, we discussed the STRIVE-4 Model hypothesis (9-5) that situational features and character will interact to mutually influence behavior. Some research confirms this possibility (e.g., Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022; Lefevor et al., 2017), but much more research is needed to develop real confidence in this proposition. We have taken this hypothetical approach for two reasons. First, it has helped us to retain and demonstrate open minds about the questions that arise in virtue science. Some of the hypotheses we cited have been amply confirmed (e.g., that virtue is measurable). Other hypotheses have not been tested at all. We hope this book encourages and aids virtue researchers in looking for answers. Second, we believe that a hypothetical approach is one of the excellent ways in which philosophers and psychologists can work together. A rich interdisciplinary hypothesis testing can emerge within virtue science: Philosophers’ sensitivity to conceptual questions and debate can be combined with psychologists’ capacities to translate questions into empirically tractable terms and maintain a focus on the observable behavior of actual human beings.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Improving Study Designs

325

We want to add that the hypothetical approach and verification through data would be endorsed by Aristotle (1999) and has been endorsed by many neo-Aristotelian virtue scholars (e.g., Fowers, 2005a; Flanagan, 1991; Kristjánsson, 2020; Wright et al., 2021). These scholars are clear that a good theory of virtue must be answerable to empirical data. The quantification of virtues moves in this direction, but qualitative methods can also be helpful in gaining a deeper understanding of virtue. A focus on measurement has played to one of the strengths of psychologists, but we must not delude ourselves into thinking that measurement is all that really matters. In addition to assessing virtues, improvements in study designs can also foster virtue science in a methods-related way.

Improving Study Designs There is good news and bad news about empirical research on virtue. The good news is that contemporary virtue researchers have attentively studied the self-report measurement of virtue and the psychometric evaluations of those measures. This is one source of our confidence about the measurability of virtues. The bad news is that although psychologists have developed sophisticated methods for examining psychological phenomena, virtue research has been primarily limited to single-timepoint self-report survey designs (Fowers, 2014). A lot of ink has been spilled about the need to move beyond single-timepoint and subjective assessments of virtue, but this has been less frequently seen in research practices. We suggest that the maturation of virtue science requires that single-timepoint self-reports will be increasingly supplemented with longitudinal research and intersubjectively observable indicators of virtues. We believe that it is time to take this step forward, and we touch briefly on some alternatives to simple survey designs. Better Measurement When researchers do use self-report scales, it is vitally important to attend carefully to measurement quality. We noted that scales conceptually unrelated to virtues have been used as stand-ins for virtues (e.g., in gratitude research), but investigators should assess virtues in a way that is consistent with systematic virtue theory, such as the STRIVE-4 Model, or the approach recommended by Wright and colleagues (2021). Alternatively, the approach adopted by Morgan and colleagues (2017) is commendable, wherein they assessed four elements of gratitude and showed the utility of including all four.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

326

Virtue Science and Psychology

In addition, Ng and Tay (2020) tackled the problem of the “more is better” formulation of almost all virtue scales. Although neo-Aristotelians generally see each virtue as flanked by a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess, measures that actually capture this have not been forthcoming. Consequently, virtues tend to have a linear relationship to criterion measures, such as eudaimonic well-being or relationship satisfaction. One possible remedy may be in following the lead of agency and communion researchers, who have identified unmitigated agency and communion as extreme (and undesirable) forms of their primary constructs (e.g., Helgeson & Fritz, 1999). Longitudinal Designs The need for longitudinal research is clear, especially to investigate the development of virtue through the lifespan, but also to assess whether virtuous action contributes longitudinally to a flourishing life. Although longitudinal research frequently involves self-report, temporally extended research allows the study of the development, stability, and predictive relevance of virtues. One useful and important form of longitudinal research is to track phenomena over months, years, or even decades. More recently, intensive longitudinal research methods have emerged (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013; Mehl & Conner, 2012). We discussed this in Chapter 7 as the research method of choice for the density distribution approach to traits. By obtaining a daily sample of data points from each individual over a period of weeks, investigators can examine between-person elements of virtues, as is done with other survey designs. But researchers can also study within-person variation, which may or may not parallel relationships that occur at the between-person level. Most importantly, investigators can examine the stability over time that allows trait attributions, and they can look for systematic variance within persons in virtuous action that may be due to situational influence or role enactment. To our knowledge, there are only three intensive longitudinal studies explicitly designed to study virtues (Bleidorn & Dennissen, 2015; Fowers et al., 2019; Meindl et al., 2013), and the results of these studies, which are supportive of virtues as traits, are described in Chapter 7. Informant Reports There are two additional significant worries about self-report virtue measurement: social desirability and subjectivity. Many studies have reduced

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Improving Study Designs

327

our concerns about social desirability, as we discussed in Chapter 7. It appears to be a small factor, even when research participants are selfdescribing such highly desirable traits as virtues. Regardless of whether social desirability is in play, another worry is that virtue researchers have relied too much on subjective assessments of virtues. Neo-Aristotelians generally hold that virtues should show up in consistent behavior in the observable world, meaning that virtues transcend subjectivity. Informant reports can complement self-reports because informants (e.g., romantic partners, family members, work colleagues) are able to observe virtue or its absence in the target individual’s actions. A small number of such studies have been conducted with romantic partners (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2007; Veldorale et al., 2012) and friends (Helzer et al., 2014; Ruch et al., 2010) as informants. This research has found the expected moderate correlations of self-report and informant reports of virtue, confirming that virtues are not limited to subjective reports. It is widely recognized that self-reports and informant reports are rarely strongly correlated for any variable. Observational and Experimental Designs Another way to move beyond the subjectivity of self-report is for investigators to observe virtuous behavior directly. This can be done through purely observational studies or through experimental studies. The most common way to observe virtuous behavior (e.g., kindness, fairness) is with studies using economic games (e.g., dictator, ultimatum, or public goods games), and the participants’ behavior is the outcome of the games (e.g., Edele et al., 2013; Fowers, Lane, et al., 2022; Lefevor & Fowers, 2016; Lotz et al., 2011, 2013). The observation of behavior need not be limited to economic game studies, of course. The available evidence is both consistent with the STRIVE-4 Model and valuable because the behavior is intersubjectively observable. Neurophysiology Research on the intersections of virtues and neurophysiological processes and structures is a vast untapped research domain at this point. We cited a few potentially instructive studies in Chapter 11, and they are generally consistent with the STRIVE-4 Model. Nevertheless, this form of research has yet to be systematically pursued. We hope this book inspires researchers to look for ways in which virtues are detectable in neurophysiological processes and structures, as this approach can help researchers move away from simple self-report surveys.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

328

Virtue Science and Psychology

A Connection between Virtues and the Good Life? For many neo-Aristotelians, a connection between virtues and the good life is clear and immediate, but some have questioned this link. Due to this disagreement and to its empirical tractability, we have stated this connection as a set of hypotheses (10-11 to 10-33). So far, the evidence has favored a clear positive association between the two (e.g., Anderson & Fowers, 2020; Nelson et al., 2016; VanderWeele, 2017). Questions about this connection are not at all settled empirically, however, and any relationship between virtues and the good life depends ultimately on what we mean by those terms. One reason we think that a connection may be confirmed in research is that, for many neo-Aristotelians, both virtues and flourishing are activities rather than states of mind or settled achievements. One of the reasons that virtues are seen as traits is because a flourishing life is expected to be constituted by the ongoing, consistent activity of virtues. In Chapter 10 we discussed the view that flourishing as a human being amounts to living an excellent human life. Because Aristotelians see humans as relational, reasoning beings, they hold that an excellent life is likely to consist in a person’s life being imbued with meaning (hypothesis 10-11) and including loving, close personal relationships (hypotheses 10-15 and 10-23). A second reason that virtues may play an important role in good living is the necessity of having stable virtue traits to structure one’s life so that flourishing ensues. One can only flourish if one can respond well to life consistently. An Aristotelian virtue is, as Broadie (1991) noted, “nothing but a characteristic which makes the difference between functioning and functioning well” (p. 37). This reaffirms that virtues are not mysterious; they can be understood as a matter of acting excellently rather than in an ordinary way. What sorts of virtues might support the long-term engagement in meaning and close relationships? One that stands out is loyalty, which can support the kind of long-term fidelity to specific meanings, their sources, and to other persons and groups. (Readers will recall that loyalty is not an unconditional commitment to persons, groups, or life courses, but one that is appropriate to those relations. That is, one can come to see that fidelity as no longer appropriate and alter or end it.) Close relationships involve many virtues, but Aristotle focused particularly on a virtue that has been translated as friendship (philia), to which he devoted two of the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics. The virtue of friendship has many features, but among the most prominent are a deep commitment to the quality of one’s friend’s life, shared goals and activities, and mutual admiration.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A Cohesive, Cumulative Science

329

We recommend the investigation of the relationships between virtues and flourishing. It has been common for psychologists to study virtues independently of flourishing and vice versa. Of course, the choice of topics and relationships can vary, and we are not in a position to prescribe what researchers study. We do think this connection is important because many neo-Aristotelians see flourishing is the raison d’être of virtues: virtuous living is both the best pathway to flourishing and to harmonizing the good life and the moral life. These considerations suggest the importance of the connection between virtues and flourishing and we recommend serious research attention to evaluate these claims.

A Cohesive, Cumulative Science Our aim, in this book, has been to chart a course to developing a cohesive, cumulative science of virtue. As we have argued, virtue science is off to a good start, but it requires a framework for guiding future efforts to illuminate how multiple studies of many virtues can cohere and contribute to a cumulative form of knowledge. We documented the disjointed efforts in virtue research so far as a way to clarify the necessity of the conceptual resources we offer. In other words, we do not believe that we can simply “induct” our way to virtue science by piling on more and more studies that will somehow come together into a coherent body of knowledge. Coherence is seldom an incidental or accidental outcome. Rather, a conceptual framework, such as the STRIVE-4 Model, is needed to clarify how the individual parts of the virtue research enterprise fit together and form an illuminating overall picture. The available evidence supporting or undermining this model is quite varied and patchy. With the availability of the model, its premises can be more thoroughly tested with more virtues. The workable parts of the model can be retained and the parts that fail can be deleted or modified to be consistent with the evidence. We have offered dozens of hypotheses that can guide these evaluations, which clarifies the heuristic function of the model. As such, the model recommends scores of studies on the way to forging a science of virtue. Our primary contention is that it is necessary to know what it is we want to study before we embark on an investigation or design measures. This basic requirement has been frequently sidestepped in empirical virtue research. We well understand the pressures to quantify, publish, seek research funding, and provide opportunities for graduate students, as psychology is currently constituted. We recommend that empirical

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

330

Virtue Science and Psychology

researchers slow down and become more knowledgeable so that they can pursue these topics with greater conceptual sophistication. At a minimum, each study of a virtue should be based on a clear, explicit concept of what a virtue is and how the specific virtue under study fits that definition. We have been stunned by how frequently this basic form of knowledge was absent from empirical publications. Of course, there is disagreement about these conceptualizations. That is part of academic discourse, especially in a developing field of knowledge, but such conceptual disagreements can either be simply stated, with the investigator explicitly taking a position, or the disagreement can be reframed as hypotheses that can be assessed. The STRIVE-4 Model recommends the study of some specific premises of the emerging virtue landscape. We have made a set of general recommendations for empirical virtue research in this chapter, and we made another set of general recommendations for how philosophers can best contribute to the study of virtue in Chapter 12. To bring these many themes together, we want to close the book by reiterating some of the central premises of the STRIVE-4 Model that are unique to virtue research and are therefore important for putting this new domain of research on a solid footing. First, we believe that the question about the measurability of virtues has been answered in a confirming way. Of course, there are many improvements that can be made in virtue measurement, but we believe that these are enhancements rather than ways to cast doubt on the scalar quality of virtues. This scalar quality clarifies that individuals may have varying degrees of a virtue trait, but virtue traits are not a simple question of presence or absence. Moreover, no one is perfectly virtuous, and expecting perfection would be psychologically unrealistic. Rather than running away from human frailty and limitations, it is vital for virtue scholars to embrace that imperfection. Human imperfection is the reason that virtue development is a lifelong project. Moreover, it has been argued that virtues are one response to the inevitability of human limitations, roles, and situational constraints (Fowers et al., 2017). Second, the conceptual resources and evidence for virtue as an acquired trait support that view, but this support is too limited at present. Trait demonstrations, such as density distribution studies, are too few and scattered among a small number of virtues at this point. More research in this important area is needed. In a related point, there is some question about whether virtues are rightly seen as a facet of personality. We have suggested that such a conclusion would be at best premature, but the question of the relationships between virtues, personality dimensions, and personality

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

A Cohesive, Cumulative Science

331

writ large should be resolved. This will require both conceptual work (e.g., what is personality and how capacious is it?) and additional research to examine whether the special features of virtues we have identified (intentional acquisition, moral content, relationship to the good life, and guidance by practical wisdom) can fit within a personality conception. Another alternative we have suggested is that perhaps there is a genus–species type relationship, in that a trait is the genus and personality and virtue are two species within the genus. Partly due to Aristotle’s (1999) vagueness about how virtues develop, its developmental process is currently being formulated conceptually by neo-Aristotelians. This insufficiently formulated status is unfortunately rather common in moral development, given the unresolved debate about how morality develops in the psychological subfield of moral psychology (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). Virtue acquisition remains a promissory note, but one can relatively easily recognize the difference in examples of generosity or fairness among small children and more mature instances of these characteristics. Third, there is little research on the ways in which roles influence the expression of virtue, but we believe that this is an important feature of virtues. Far from being an explanation for behavior that provides an alternative interpretation, we suggest that roles may be important in the shaping and expression of virtues. These questions mostly await empirical investigation. Fourth, in contrast to those who think that situational influence obviates personality and virtue, we have recommended studying both situational factors and traits together and examining the ways they might interact. We followed a growing trend in personality research and proposed a set of hypotheses about these interactions that follow from virtue theory. This is also an important conceptual point, because abandoning the outmoded view that traits should express themselves regardless of the situational context is long overdue in virtue scholarship. Virtue theory suggests that one criterion of virtues is the expectation that virtue expression is responsive to the situation in which the agent finds herself. Fifth, we proposed many hypotheses about the relationships among virtues, value commitments, and the good life (eudaimonia). Some supportive evidence for these relationships exists, but it is still reasonable to argue that they are unrelated. One reason for the irresolution of these questions is that most studies on well-being have used hedonic measures of the good life (positive affect, life satisfaction), leaving the question open about eudaimonic indicators. A second open question regards the value of purely

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

332

Virtue Science and Psychology

subjective assessments of eudaimonia. Are subjective indicators sufficient in the face of the general neo-Aristotelian insistence that eudaimonia is observable? Eudaimonia may well be a much broader phenomenon than can be answered by subjective evaluation. Finally, we have argued that virtues are constituted as actions by virtue-related behavior, cognition, and emotion/motivation, and guided by practical wisdom. Few studies and even fewer measures are available to assess these components of virtue. This is important because these components are vital aspects of virtues and partly definitive of them. The relative absence of research on these components is a significant lacuna in virtue science at this point. Our fondest hope for this book is that it will excite and encourage virtue researchers to contribute to the development of virtue science. Ultimately, virtues are about becoming the best human being one can be through rendering excellent activity habitual and spontaneous. Few things can contribute as much to good individual and collective lives. Virtue science can improving our understanding of how virtues develop and operate. This science can also enhance our ability to encourage the development of virtue and thereby improve people’s lives. We see those goals as worthy of substantial effort.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.018 Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

Abe, N., & Greene, J. D. (2014). Response to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens predicts behavior in an independent test of honesty. The Journal of Neuroscience, 34(32), 10564–10572. Akhtar, S., & Barlow, J. (2018). Forgiveness therapy for the promotion of mental well-being: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 19(1), 107–122. Aknin, L. B., Barrington-Leigh, C. P., Dunn, E. W., Helliwell, J. F., Burns, J., Biswas-Diener, R., … Norton, M. I. (2013). Prosocial spending and wellbeing: Cross-cultural evidence for a psychological universal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 635–652. Aksan, N., & Kochanska, G. (2005). Conscience in childhood: Old questions, new answers. Developmental Psychology, 41, 506–516. Alexandrova, A. (2017). A philosophy for the science of well-being. Oxford University Press. Algoe, S. B., & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: The ‘otherpraising’ emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 4(2), 105–127. Allgaier, K., Zettler, I., Wagner, W., Püttmann, S., & Trautwein, U. (2015). Honesty–humility in school: Exploring main and interaction effects on secondary school students’ antisocial and prosocial behavior. Learning and Individual Differences, 43, 211–217. Allport, G. W. (1937). Personality: A psychological interpretation. Henry Holt. Almås, I., Cappelen, A. W., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B. (2010). Fairness and the development of inequality acceptance. Science, 328, 1176–1178. Anderson, A. R., & Fowers, B. J. (2020). An exploratory study of friendship characteristics and their relations with hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 37(1), 260–280. Angle, S. C., & Tiwald, J. (2017). Neo-Confucianism: A philosophical introduction. Polity Press. Anglim, J., Horwood, S., Smillie, L. D., Marrero, R. J., & Wood, J. K. (2020). Predicting psychological and subjective well-being from personality: A metaanalysis. Psychological Bulletin, 146(4), 279–323. Annas, J. (1993). The morality of happiness. Oxford University Press. 333

Published online by Cambridge University Press

334

References

Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent virtue. Oxford University Press. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33, 1–19. Appiah, K. A. (2011). The honor code: How moral revolutions happen. W. W. Norton. Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, I. I., Lim, V. K., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 123. Aristotle (1984a). The complete works of Aristotle (Vol. 1, J. Barnes, Ed.). Princeton University Press. Aristotle (1984b). The complete works of Aristotle (Vol. 2, J. Barnes, Ed.). Princeton University Press. Aristotle (1996). The politics and the Constitution of Athens (S. Everson, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. Aristotle (1999). Nicomachean ethics (M. Ostwald, Trans.) Prentice Hall. Arnhart, L. (1998). Darwinian natural right: The biological ethics of human nature. SUNY Press. Arthur, J. (2020). The formation of character in education: From Aristotle to the 21st century. Routledge. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2005). Honesty‐humility, the Big Five, and the Five‐ Factor Model. Journal of Personality, 75(3), 1321–1353. Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2020). Objections to the HEXACO model of personality structure – And why those objections fail. European Journal of Personality, 34(4), 492–510. Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & De Vries, R. E. (2014). The HEXACO honesty-humility, agreeableness, and emotionality factors: A review of research and theory. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(2), 139–152. Aureli, T., & Presaghi, F. (2010). Developmental trajectories for mother–infant coregulation in the second year of life. Infancy, 15, 557–585. Awaad, R., & Reicherter, D. (2016). Cultural perspectives in the context of Western psychological mind-sets: The need for cultural sensitivity in the mental health of immigrant youth. In S. Patel, & D. Reicherter (Eds.), Psychotherapy for immigrant youth (pp. 185–196). Springer International Publishing AG. Banker, C. C., & Leary, M. R. (2020). Hypo-egoic nonentitlement as a feature of humility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 46(5), 738–753. Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and control in social cognition. In R. J. Wyer, & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition: Basic processes; Applications (Vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., pp. 1–40). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chair, A., Barndollar, K., & Trotschel, R. (2001). The automated will: Non-conscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1014–1027. Barkley, R. A. (2012). Executive functions: What they are, how they work, and why they evolved. Guilford Press. Barry, C. M., & Wentzel, K. R. (2006). Friend influence on prosocial behavior: The role of motivational factors and friendship characteristics. Developmental Psychology, 42(1), 153–163. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.1.153

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

335

Bartlett, M. Y., & DeSteno, D. (2006). Gratitude and prosocial behavior: Helping when it costs you. Psychological Science, 17(4), 319–325. Bauer, J. J. (2022). Value and the good life story. Presented at the 3rd Annual Network for Research on Morality Conference. www.youtube.com/ watch?v=lnuVETJP-E0&t=7s Bauer, J. J., McAdams, D. P., & Sakaeda, A. (2005). Interpreting the good life: Growth memories in the lives of mature, happy people. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 203–217. Baumeister, R. F., & Exline, J. J. (1999). Virtue, personality, and social relations: Self-control as the moral muscle. Journal of Personality, 67, 1165–1194. Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., Aaker, J. L., & Garbinsky, E. N. (2013). Some key differences between a happy life and a meaningful life. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 8(6), 505–516. Baumert, A., Schmitt, M., Perugini, M., Johnson, W., Blum, G., Borkenau, P., Costantini, G., Denissen, J. J. A., Fleeson, W., Grafton, B., Jayawickreme, E., Kurzius, E., MacLeod, C., Miller, L. C., Read, S. J., Roberts, B., Robinson, M. D., Wood, D., & Wrzus, C. (2017). Integrating personality structure, personality process, and personality development. European Journal of Personality, 31(5), 503–528. Bedford-Petersen, C., DeYoung, C. G., Tiberius, V., & Syed, M. (2019). Integrating philosophical and psychological approaches to well-being: The role of success in personal projects. Journal of Moral Education, 48(1), 84–97. Begley, A. M. (2008). Truth-telling, honesty and compassion: A virtue-based exploration of a dilemma in practice. International Journal of Nursing Practice, 14(5), 336–341. Behne, T., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Unwilling versus unable: Infant’s understanding of intentional actions. Developmental Psychology, 41, 328–337. Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985). Habits of the heart. University of California Press. Bem, D. J., & Allen, A. (1974). On predicting some of the people some of the time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior. Psychological Review, 81, 506–520. Berkowitz, M. W., & Bier, M. C. (2007). What works in character education. Journal of Research in Character Education, 5, 29–48. Berry, J. W., Worthington, E. L., Jr., O’Connor, L. E., Parrott, L., III, & Wade, N. G. (2005). Forgivingness, vengeful rumination, and affective traits. Journal of Personality, 73(1), 183–225. Betz, G. (2013). In defence of the value free ideal. European Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 3, 207–220. Biswas-Diener, R., Kashdan, T. B., & King, L. A. (2009). Two traditions of happiness research, not two distinct types of happiness. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 208–211. Blackie, L. E. R., Roepke, A. M., Forgeard, M. J. C., Jayawickreme, E., & Fleeson, W. (2014). Act well to be well: The promise of changing personality states

Published online by Cambridge University Press

336

References

to promote well-being. In A. C. Parks, & S. M. Schueller (Eds.), The Wiley Blackwell handbook of positive psychological interventions. (pp. 462–474). Wiley. Blake, P. R., & McAuliffe, K. (2011). “I had so much it didn’t seem fair”: Eightyear-olds reject two forms of inequity. Cognition, 120, 215–224. Blasi, A., & Glodis, K. (1995). The development of identity. A critical analysis from the perspective of the self as subject. Developmental Review, 15, 404–433. https://doi.org/10.1006/drev.1995.1017 Bleidorn, W. (2009). Linking personality states, current social roles and major life goals. European Journal of Personality, 23(6), 509–530. Bleidorn, W. (2012). Hitting the road to adulthood: Short-term personality development during a major life transition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(12), 1594–1608. Bleidorn, W., & Denissen, J. J. (2015). Virtues in action – The new look of character traits. British Journal of Psychology, 104, 700–723. Bleidorn, W., Klimstra, T. A., Denissen, J. J., Rentfrow, P. J., Potter, J., & Gosling, S. D. (2013). Personality maturation around the world: A cross-cultural examination of social-investment theory. Psychological Science, 24(12), 2530–2540. Boehm, C. (2008). Moral origins: The evolution of virtue, altruism, and shame. Basic Books. Bolderdijk, J. W., Gorsira, M., Keizer, K., Steg, L. (2013). Values determine the (in)effectiveness of informational interventions in promoting pro-environmental behavior. PLoS ONE, 8(12), e83911. https://doi.org/10.1371/ journal.pone.0083911 Bolger, N., & Laurenceau, J.-P. (2013). Intensive longitudinal methods: An introduction to diary and experience sampling research. Guilford Press. Bommarito, N., (2018). Modesty and humility. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2018/entries/modesty-humility/ Bowlby, J. (1969/1982). Attachment and loss (2nd ed.). Basic Books. Brambilla, M., Rusconi, P., Sacchi, S., & Cherubini, P. (2011). Looking for honesty: The primary role of morality (vs. sociability and competence) in information gathering. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 135–143. Bredström, A. (2019). Culture and context in mental health diagnosing: Scrutinizing the DSM-5 revision. Journal of Medical Humanities, 40(3), 347–363. Breen, W. E., Kashdan, T. B., Lenser, M. L., & Fincham, F. D. (2010). Gratitude and forgiveness: Convergence and divergence on self-report and informant ratings. Personality and Individual Differences, 49(8), 932–937. Brennan, T. (2005). The Stoic life: Emotions, duties, and fate. Oxford University Press. Bretherton, I., & Beeghly, M. (1982). Talking about internal states: The acquisition of an explicit theory of mind. Developmental Psychology, 18, 906–921. Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 475–482. Brewer, T. (2009). The retrieval of ethics. Oxford University Press.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

337

Brinkmann, S. (2011). Psychology as a moral science: Perspectives on normativity. Springer. Broadie, S. (1991). Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford University Press. Brown, M., Blanchard, T., & McGrath, R. E. (2020). Differences in self-reported character strengths across adolescence. Journal of Adolescence, 79, 1–10. Brown, M., McGrath, R. E., Bier, M. C., Johnson, K., & Berkowitz, M. W. (2023). Journal of Moral Education, 52(2), 119–138. Brown, R. P. (2003). Measuring individual differences in the tendency to forgive: Construct validity and links with depression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 759–771. Brownell, C. A., Iesue, S. S., Nichols, S. R., & Svetlova, M. (2013). Yours or mine: Development of sharing in toddlers’ in relation to ownership knowledge. Child Development, 84(3), 906–920. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12009 Brownell, C. A., Ramani, G. B., & Zerwas, S. (2006). Becoming a social partner with peers: Cooperation and social understanding in one- and two-year-olds. Child Development, 77, 803–821. Brownell, C., Svetlova, M., & Nichols, S. (2009). To share or not to share: When do toddlers respond to another’s needs? Infancy, 14, 117–130. Burr, V. (2015). Social constructionism (3rd ed.). Routledge. Burton, R. V. (1963). Generality of honesty reconsidered. Psychological Review, 70, 481–499. Buss, D. M. (Ed.) (2016). The handbook of evolutionary psychology (Vol. 1). Wiley. Butler, L. P., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Two-and 3-year-olds integrate linguistic and pedagogical cues in guiding inductive generalization and exploration. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 145, 64–78. Butler, L. P., & Walton, G. (2013). The opportunity to collaborate increases preschoolers’ motivation for challenging tasks. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 116, 953–961. Cacioppo, J. T., & Cacioppo, S. (2014). Social relationships and health: The toxic effects of perceived social isolation. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8(2), 58–72. Cacioppo, J. T., & Patrick, W. (2008). Loneliness: Human nature and the need for social connection. W. W. Norton. Calder, A. J., Novak, L. F., & Fowers, B. J. (2022). Limits of the concept of altruism: Individualism, Batson’s theory of altruism, and a social realist alternative. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 42(2), 78–92. Carlo, G., Mestre, M. V., Samper, P., Tur, A., & Armenta, B. E. (2011). The longitudinal relations among dimensions of parenting styles, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning and prosocial behaviors. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 35, 116–124. Carpenter, M., Nagell, K., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Social cognition, joint attention, and communicative competence from 9 to 15 months of age. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 63 (4), 176. Carr, D., Arthur, J., & Kristjánsson, K. (Eds.). (2017). Varieties of virtue. Palgrave/ Macmillan.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

338

References

Carr, L., Iacoboni, M., Dubeau, M. C., Mazziotta, J. C., & Lenzi, G. L. (2003). Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: A relay from neural systems for imitation to limbic areas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100, 5497–5502. Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2008). Perspectives on personality (6th ed.). Pearson. Cervone, D., & Tripathi, R. (2009). The moral functioning of the person as a whole: On moral psychology and personality science. In D. Narvaez, & D. K. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology. (pp. 30–51). Cambridge University Press. Chalmers, D. (in press). What is conceptual engineering and what should it be? Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. Chirumbolo, A. (2015). The impact of job insecurity on counterproductive work behaviors: The moderating role of Honesty–Humility personality trait. The Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 149(6), 554–569. Christopher, J. C., & Hickinbottom, S. (2008). Positive psychology, ethnocentrism, and the disguised ideology of individualism. Theory & Psychology, 18(5), 563–589. Cohen, S. (2004). Social relationships and health. American Psychologist, 59, 676–684. Cokelet, B. (2015). Dispositions, character, and the value of acts. In C. Miller, R. M. Furr, A. Knobel, & W. Fleeson (Eds.), Character: New directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology (pp. 233–250). Oxford University Press. Cokelet, B. (2017). NDPR: What can philosophy contribute to ethics? (by James Griffin). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Cokelet, B., & Fowers, B. J. (2019). Realistic virtues and how to study them: Introducing the STRIVE-4 model. Journal of Moral Education, 48, 7–26. Cooke, P. J., Melchert, T. P., & Connor, K. (2016). Measuring well-being: A review of instruments. The Counseling Psychologist, 44(5), 730–757. Cooley, S., & Killen, M. (2015). Children’s evaluations of resource allocation in the context of group norms. Developmental Psychology, 51(4), 554–563. Cooper, J. (1998). The unity of virtue. Social Philosophy and Policy, 15(1), 233–274. Corkum, V., & Moore, C. (1998). The origins of joint visual attention in infants. Developmental Psychology, 34, 28–38. Cornell, A. H., & Frick, P. J. (2007). The moderating effects of parenting styles in the association between behavioral inhibition and parent-reported guilt and empathy in preschool children. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 36(3), 305–318. Corona, C. D., Van Orden, K. A., Wisco, B. E., & Pietrzak, R. H. (2019). Meaning in life moderates the association between morally injurious experiences and suicide ideation among US combat veterans: Results from the National Health and Resilience in Veterans Study. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 11(6), 614–620. Costa, P. T., Herbst, J. H., McCrae, R. R., & Siegler, I. C. (2000). Personality at midlife: Stability, intrinsic maturation, and response to life events. Assessment, 7, 365–378.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

339

Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (2008). The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R). In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews, & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of personality theory and assessment, Vol 2: Personality measurement and testing (pp. 179–198). Sage Publications, Inc. Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (2010). Bridging the gap with the five-factor model. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 1(2), 127–130. Cottrell, C. A., Neuberg, S. L., & Li, N. P. (2007). What do people desire in others? A sociofunctional perspective on the importance of different valued characteristics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 208–231. Cox, K. S. (2010). Elevation predicts domain-specific volunteerism 3 months later. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 5(5), 333–341. Crisp, R. (2015). The cosmos of duty: Henry Sidgwick’s methods of ethics. Oxford University Press. Crocker, J., Canevello, A., & Brown, A. A. (2017). Social motivation: Costs and benefits of selfishness and otherishness. Annual Review of Psychology, 68, 299–325. Crocker, J., Canevello, A., Breines, J. G., Flynn, H. (2010). Interpersonal goals and change in anxiety and dysphoria in first-semester college students. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(6), 1009–1024. Csibra, G., Biro, S., Koos, O., & Gergeley, G. (2003). One-year-old infants use teleological representations of actions productively. Cognitive Science, 27, 111–133. Csibra, G., & Gergely, C. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 148–153. Curzer, H. J. (2015). Aristotle and the virtues. Oxford University Press. Cushman, P. (2019). Travels with the self: Interpreting psychology as cultural history. Routledge. Damian, R. I., Spengler, M., Sutu, A., & Roberts, B. W. (2019). Sixteen going on sixty-six: A longitudinal study of personality stability and change across 50 years. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 117(3), 674–695. Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge University Press. Darnell, C., Fowers, B. J., & Kristjánsson, K. (2022). A multi-function approach to assessing Aristotelian phronesis (practical wisdom). Personality and Individual Differences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2022.111684 Darnell, C., Gulliford, L., Kristjánsson, K., & Panos, P. (2019). Phronesis and the knowledge–action gap in moral psychology and moral education: A new synthesis? Human Development, 62(3), 101–129. Darwin, C. (1871/1981). The descent of man. Princeton University Press. Daum, M. M., & Gredebäck, G. (2011). The development of grasping comprehension in infancy: Covert shifts of attention caused by referential actions. Experimental Brain Research, 208(2), 297–307. Davis, D. E., Choe, E., Meyers, J., Wade, N., Varjas, K., Gifford, A., Quinn, A., Hook, J. N., Van Tongeren, D. R., Griffin, B. J., & Worthington, E. L., Jr. (2016). Thankful for the little things: A meta-analysis of gratitude interventions. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 63(1), 20–31.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

340

References

Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington Jr, E. L., Van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings II, D. J., & Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93(3), 225–234. De Caro, M., & Vaccarezza, M. S. (Eds.). (2021). Practical wisdom: Philosophical and psychological perspectives. Taylor & Francis. Decety, J., & Chaminade, T. (2003). When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 577–596. Decety, J., Michalska, K. J., & Kinzler, K. D. (2012). The contribution of emotion and cognition to moral sensitivity: A neurodevelopmental study. Cerebral Cortex, 22, 209–220. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), 627–668. Deigh, J. (2010). An introduction to ethics. Cambridge University Press. Del Castillo, F. A. (2021). Virtues in public health: Easing the impact of the COVID19 pandemic. Journal of Public Health (Oxford, England), 43(2), e277–e278. Demir, M., & Özdemir, M. (2010). Friendship, need satisfaction and happiness. Journal of Happiness Studies, 11, 243–259. Denissen, J. J. A., van Aken, M. A. G., Penke, L., & Wood, D. (2013). Selfregulation underlies temperament and personality: An integrative developmental framework. Child Development Perspectives, 7, 255–260. DeSteno, D., Duong, F., Lim, D., & Kates, S. (2019). The grateful don’t cheat: Gratitude as a fount of virtue. Psychological Science, 30(7), 979–988. de Waal, F. B. M. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals. Harvard University Press. Dew, J., & Wilcox, W. B. (2013). Generosity and the maintenance of marital quality. Journal of Marriage and Family, 75(5), 1218–1228. Dewey, J. (1926). Experience and nature. Open Court. Dickens, L. R. (2017). Using gratitude to promote positive change: A series of meta-analyses investigating the effectiveness of gratitude interventions. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 39(4), 193–208. Diener, E. (2012). New findings and future directions for subjective well-being research. American Psychologist, 67, 590–597. Doris, J. M. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge University Press. Doris, J. M. (2015). Talking to ourselves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. Oxford University Press. Driver, J. (2001). Uneasy virtue. Cambridge University Press. Duan, W., Ho, S. M. Y., Yu, B., Tang, X., Zhang, Y., Li, T., & Yuen, T. (2012). Factor structure of the Chinese virtues questionnaire. Research on Social Work Practice, 22(6), 680–688. Duckworth, A. L., Weir, D., Tsukayama, E., & Kwok, D. (2012). Who does well in life? Conscientious adults excel in both objective and subjective success. Frontiers in Psychology, 3. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00356

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

341

Dunfield, K. A., & Kuhlmeier, V. A. (2013). Classifying prosocial behavior: Children’s responses to instrumental need, emotional distress, and material desire. Child Development, 84, 1766–1776. Dunlop, W. L., Walker, L. J., & Matsuba, M. K. (2013). The development of moral motivation across the adult lifespan. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 10(2), 285–300. Dunn, E. W., Aknin, L. B., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Spending money on others promotes happiness. Science, 319(5870), 1687–1688. Dunne, J. (1993). Back to the rough ground: Practical judgment and the lure of technique. Notre Dame University Press. Durlak, J. A., Weissberg, R. P., Dymkicki, A. B., Schellinger, K. B., & Taylor, R. D. (2011). The impact of enhancing students’ social and emotional learning: A meta-analysis of school-based interventions. Child Development, 82, 405–432. Eberhardt, N. (2006). Imagining the course of life: Self-transformation in a Shan Buddhist community. University of Hawaii Press. Edele, A., Dziobek, I., & Keller, M. (2013). Explaining altruistic sharing in the dictator game: The role of affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and justice sensitivity. Learning and Individual Differences, 24, 96–102. Eisenberg, N., Carlo, G., Murphy, B., & Van Court, P. (1995). Prosocial development in late adolescence: A longitudinal study. Child Development, 66, 1179–1197. Eisenberg, N., Cumberland, A., Guthrie, I. K., Murphy, B. C., & Shepard, S. A. (2005). Age changes in prosocial responding and moral reasoning in adolescence and early adulthood. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 15, 235–260. Eisenberg, N., & Fabes, R. A. (1998). Prosocial development. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), Social, emotional, and personality development (5th ed., pp. 701–778). Wiley. Eisenberg, N., Guthrie, I. K., Murphy, B. C., Shepard, S. A., Cumberland, A., & Carlo, G. (1999). Consistency and development of prosocial dispositions: A longitudinal study. Child Development, 70, 1360–1372. Eisenberg, N., Hofer, C., Sulik, M. J., & Liew, J. (2013). The development of prosocial moral reasoning and a prosocial orientation in young adulthood: Concurrent and longitudinal correlates. Developmental Psychology, 50(1), 58–70. Eisenberg, N., Spinrad, T. L., & Knafo-Noam, A. (2015). Prosocial development. In M. E. Lamb, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology and developmental science: Socioemotional processes (Vol. 3, 7th ed., pp. 610–656). John Wiley & Sons. Eisenberg-Berg, N., & Geisheker, E. (1979). Content of preachings and power of the model/preacher: The effect on children’s generosity. Developmental Psychology, 15(2), 168–175. Emmons, R. A., & McCullough, M. E. (2003). Counting blessings versus burdens: An experimental investigation of gratitude and subjective well-being in daily life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(2), 377–389. Englander, Z. A., Haidt, J., & Morris, J. P. (2012). Neural basis of moral elevation demonstrated through inter-subject synchronization of cortical activity during free-viewing. Plos ONE, 7(6), e39384.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

342

References

Enright, R., Rique, J., Lustosa, R., Song, J. Y., Komoski, M. C., Batool, I., Bolt, D., Sung, H., Huang, S. T. T., Park, Y., Leer-Salvesen, P. E., Andrade, T., Naeem, A., Viray, J., & Costuna, E. (2022). Validating the Enright Forgiveness Inventory – 30 (EFI-30): International studies. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 38(2), 113–123. Epstein, S. (1979). The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of the people much of the time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1097–1126. Epstein, S., & O’Brien, E. J. (1985). The person-situation debate in historical and current perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 98, 513–537. Feher, A., & Vernon, P. A. (2020). Looking beyond the big five: A selective review of alternatives to the big five model of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 169. http://dx.doi.org.access.library.miami.edu/10.1016/j​ .paid.2020.110002 Feldman, R. (2007). Parent-infant synchrony: Biological foundations and developmental outcomes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 340–345. Feldman, R., Masalha, S., & Alony, D. (2006). Micro-regulatory patterns of family interactions: Cultural pathways to toddlers’ self-regulation. Journal of Family Psychology, 20, 614–623. Fernández-Ríos, L., & Novo, M. (2012). Positive Psychology: Zeigeist (or spirit of the times) or ignorance (or disinformation) of history? International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology, 12(13), 333–344. Fernyhough, C. (2010). Vygotsky, Luria, and the social brain. In J. Carpendale, G. Iarocci, U. Müller, B. Sokol, & A. Young (Eds.), Self- and social-regulation: Exploring the relations between social interaction, social cognition, and the development of executive functions (pp. 56–79). Oxford University Press. Ferragut, M., Blanca, M. J., & Ortiz-Tallo, M. (2014). Psychological virtues during adolescence: A longitudinal study of gender differences. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 11, 521–531. Fischer, P., Krueger, J. I., Greitemeyer, T., Vogrincic, C., Kastenmüller, A., Frey, D., … Kainbacher, M. (2011). The bystander-effect: A meta-analytic review on bystander intervention in dangerous and non-dangerous emergencies. Psychological Bulletin, 137(4), 517–537. Flack, J. C., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2000). “Any animal whatever”: Darwinian building blocks of morality in monkeys and apes. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 1–29. Flanagan, O. (1991). Varieties of moral personality: Ethics and psychological realism. Harvard University Press. Flanagan, O. (2014). Moral sprouts and natural teleologies: 21st century moral psychology meets classical Chinese philosophy. Marquette University Press. Flanagan, O. (2017). The geography of morals: Varieties of moral possibility. Oxford University Press. Flanagan, O. (2021). How to do things with emotions: The morality of anger and shame across cultures. Princeton University Press. Flanagan, O., LeDoux, J., Bingle, B., Haybron, D., Moody-Adams, M., Mesquita, B., Ren, S., Sun, A. X., & Wilson, Y. (2023). The happiness agenda: Why happiness is not the answer. Columbia University Press.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

343

Fleeson, W. (2001). Toward a structure- and process-integrated view of personality: Traits as density distributions of states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 1011–1027. Fleeson, W. (2007). Situation-based contingencies underlying trait-content manifestation in behavior. Journal of Personality, 75, 825–861. Fleeson, W. (2021). Personal communication. Fleeson, W., Furr, R. M., Jayawickreme, E., Meindl, P., & Helzer, E. G. (2014). Character: The prospects for a personality-based perspective on morality. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8, 178–191. Fleeson, W., & Gallagher, P. (2009). The implications of big-five standing for the distribution of trait manifestation in behavior: Fifteen experience-sampling studies and a meta- analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97, 1097–1114. Fleeson, W., & Jayawickreme, E. (2015). Whole Trait Theory. Journal of Research in Personality, 56, 82–92. Fleeson, W., & Law, M. K. (2015). Trait enactments as density distributions: The role of actors, situations, and observers in explaining stability and variability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(6), 1090–1104. Fletcher, G., Warneken, F, & Tomasello, M. (2012). Differences in cognitive processes underlying the collaborative activities of children and chimpanzees. Cognitive Development, 27(2), 136–153. Forman, D. R., Aksan, N., & Kochanska, G. (2004). Toddlers’ responsive imitation predicts preschool-age conscience. Psychological Science, 15, 699–704. Fowers, B. J. (2000). Beyond the myth of marital happiness. Jossey-Bass. Fowers, B. J. (2001). The limits of a technical concept of a good marriage: Examining the role of virtues in communication skills. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 27, 327–340. Fowers, B. J. (2003). Reason and human finitude: In praise of practical wisdom. American Behavioral Scientist, 47, 415–426. Fowers, B. J. (2005a). Virtue and psychology: Pursuing excellence in ordinary practices. APA Press. Fowers, B. J. (2005b). Psychotherapy, character, and the good life. In B. Slife, J. Reber, & F. C. Richardson (Eds.), Critical thinking about psychology: Hidden assumptions and plausible alternatives (pp. 39–59). APA Press. Fowers, B. J. (2008). From continence to virtue: Recovering goodness, character unity, and character types for positive psychology. Theory & Psychology, 18, 629–653. Fowers, B. J. (2010). Instrumentalism and psychology: Beyond using and being used. Theory & Psychology, 20, 1–23. Fowers, B. J. (2012). An Aristotelian framework for the human good. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 32(1), 10–23. Fowers, B. J. (2014). Toward programmatic research on virtue assessment: Challenges and prospects. Theory and Research in Education, 12, 309–328. Fowers, B. J. (2015). The evolution of ethics: Human sociality and the emergence of ethical mindedness. Palgrave/Macmillan. Fowers, B. J. (2016). Aristotle on eudaimonia: On the virtue of returning to the source. In J. Vittersø (Ed.), The handbook of eudaimonic well-being (pp. 67–83). Springer.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

344

References

Fowers, B. J. (2019). Is there a plausible moral psychology for civic friendship? In J. Arthur (Ed.), Virtues in the public sphere: Citizenship, civic friendship, and duty (pp. 79–91). Routledge. Fowers, B. J. (2022). Social science as an inherently moral endeavor. Journal of Moral Education, 51(1), 35–46. Fowers, B. J., & Anderson, A. R. (2018). Aristotelian philia, contemporary friendship, and some resources for studying close relationships. In T. Harrison, & D. I. Walker (Eds.), The theory and practice of virtue education (pp. 184–196). Routledge. Fowers, B. J., Carroll, J. S., Leonhardt, N., & Cokelet, B. (2021). The emerging science of virtue. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16(1), 118–147. Fowers, B. J., & Cokelet, B. (2019). The virtues of interdisciplinary research: Psychological and philosophical inquire into self, motivation, and virtue. In N. Snow, & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Self, motivation, and virtue: New findings from philosophy and the human sciences (pp. 43–61). Routledge. Fowers, B. J., & Davidov, B. J. (2006). The virtue of multiculturalism: Personal transformation, character, and openness to the other. American Psychologist, 61, 581–594. Fowers, B. J., Lane, A. A., Abbamonte, J. M., Lang, S. F., Cokelet, B., Anderson, A. R., & Cioffi, K. (2022). Does trait interpersonal fairness moderate situational influence on fairness behavior? Personality and Individual Differences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2022.111615 Fowers, B. J., Lang, S. F., Anderson, A. R., Lane, A. A., Cioffi, K., & Cokelet, B. (2019). An experience sampling study of trait justice and kindness. Unpublished manuscript. Fowers, B. J., Lang, S. F., Behairy, S., & Anderson, A. R. (2020). A narrative exploration of kindness and fairness. Unpublished data. Fowers, B. J., Laurenceau, J-P., Penfield, R. D., Cohen, L. M., Lang, S. F., Owenz, M. B., & Pasipandoya, E. (2016). Enhancing relationship quality measurement: The development of the Relationship Flourishing Scale. Journal of Family Psychology, 30, 997–1007. Fowers, B. J., & Lefevor, G. T. (2015). The inescapability of intersubjectivity in meaning. American Psychologist, 70, 573–574. Fowers, B. J., Mollica, C. O., & Procacci, E. N. (2010). Constitutive and instrumental goal orientations and their relations with eudaimonic and hedonic wellbeing. Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 139–153. Fowers, B. J., Novak, L. F., Calder, A. J., & Sommer, R. K. (2022). Beyond an abstract and technical conception of psychotherapy: The indispensable role of practical wisdom. Theory & Psychology. Fowers, B. J., Novak, L. F., Kiknadze, N. C., & Calder, A. J. (2023). Questioning contemporary universalist approaches to human flourishing. Review of General Psychology, 23(2), 121–134. Fowers, B. J., Novak, L. F., Kiknadze, N. C., & Calder, A. J. (2023b). Can a theory of human flourishing be formulated? Toward a science of flourishing. Manuscript in preparation.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

345

Fowers, B. J., Novak, L. F., Kiknadze, N. C., & Calder, A. J. (in press). Progress, challenges, and promise in understanding, measuring, and educating character. In M. D. Matthews, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Multidisciplinary handbook of character development. Fowers, B. J., & Owenz, M. B. (2010). A eudaimonic theory of marital quality. Journal of Family Theory and Review, 2, 334–352. Fowers, B. J., & Richardson, F. C. (1993). Individualism and aggression: A hermeneutic analysis of Huesman and Eron’s cognitive theory of aggression. Theory & Psychology, 3, 353–377. Fowers, B. J., Richardson, F. C., & Slife, B. D. (2017). Frailty, suffering, and vice: Flourishing in the face of human limitations. APA Books. Fowers, B. J., & Winakur, E. (2014). Key virtues of the psychotherapist: A eudaimonic view. In S. van Hooft (Ed.), The handbook of virtue ethics (pp. 386–396). Acumen. Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2008). Dynamic spread of happiness in a large social network: Longitudinal analysis over 20 years in the Framingham Heart Study. British Medical Journal, 337, 2338–2347. Frankl, V. E., Batthyány, A., & Hallowell, D. (2010). The feeling of meaninglessness: A challenge to psychotherapy and philosophy (A. Batthyány (Ed.), Vol. 60). Marquette University Press. Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56(3), 218–226. Fredrickson, B. L., Grewen, K. M., Coffey, K. A., Algoe, S. B., Firestine, A. M., Arevalo, J. G., … Cole, S. W. (2013). A functional genomic perspective on human well-being. PNAS, 110(33), 13684–13689. Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical model of moral centrality development. Developmental Psychology, 45(6), 1669–1681. Frimer, J. A., Walker, L. J., Dunlop, W. L., Lee, B. H., & Riches, A. (2011). The integration of agency and communion in moral personality: Evidence of enlightened self-interest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(1), 149–163. Frimer, J. A., Walker, L. J., Lee, B. H., Riches, A., & Dunlop, W. L. (2012). Hierarchical integration of agency and communion: A study of influential moral figures: Influential moral figures. Journal of Personality, 80(4), 1117–1145. Furr, R. M., & Funder, D. C. (2021). Persons, situations, and person–situation interactions. In O. P. John, & R. W. Robins (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (4th ed., pp. 667–685). Guilford Press. Gable, S. L., & Haidt, J. (2005). What (and why) is positive psychology? Review of General Psychology, 9(2), 103–110. Galdiolo, S., & Roskam, I. (2014). Development of personality traits in response to childbirth: A longitudinal dyadic perspective. Personality and Individual Differences, 69, 223–230.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

346

References

Gao, F., Li, Y., & Bai, X. (2022). Forgiveness and subjective well-being: A metaanalysis review. Personality and Individual Differences, 186(Part B). https://doi​ .org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111350 Garcia, J. L. A. (2020). Virtues and principles in biomedical ethics. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 45(4–5), 471–503. Garon, N., Bryson, S. E., & Smith, I. M. (2008). Executive function in preschoolers: A review using an integrative framework. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 31–60. Gaughan, E. T., Miller, J. D., & Lynam, D. R. (2012). Examining the utility of general models of personality in the study of psychopathy: A comparison of the HEXACO-PI-R and NEO PI-R. Journal of Personality Disorders, 26(4), 513–523. Geraci, A., & Surian, L. (2011). The developmental roots of fairness: Infants’ reactions to equal and unequal distributions of resources. Developmental Science, 14, 1012–1020. Gergely, G, Bekkering, H., & Kiraly, I. (2002). Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature, 415, 755. Gergen, K. J. (2009). An invitation to social construction (2nd ed.). Sage. Gillham, J., Adams-Deutsch, Z., Werner, J., Reivich, K., Coulter-Heindl, V., Linkins, M., Winder, B., Peterson, C., Park, N., Abenavoli, R., Contero, A., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2011). Character strengths predict subjective well-being during adolescence. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 6(1), 31–44. Giuntoli, L., Condini, F., Ceccarini, F., Huta, V., & Vidotto, G. (2021). The different roles of hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities in predicting functioning and well-being experiences. Journal of Happiness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Subjective Well-Being, 22(4), 1657–1671. Glaw, X., Kable, A., Hazelton, M., & Inder, K. (2017). Meaning in life and meaning of life in mental health care: An integrative literature review. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 38(3), 243–252. Glover, J. (2012). Humanity: A moral history of the 20th century. Yale University Press. Göckeritz, S., Schmidt, M., & Tomasello, M. (2014). Young children’s creation and transmission of social norms. Cognitive Development, 30, 81–95. Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P. (2014). Moral character predominates in person perception and evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 148–168. Gollwitzer, M., Rothmund, T., Pfeiffer, A., & Ensenbach, C. (2009). Why and when justice sensitivity leads to pro- and antisocial behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 999–1005. Gollwitzer, M., Schmitt, M., Schalke, R., Maes, J., & Baer, A. (2005). Asymmetrical Effects of Justice Sensitivity Perspectives on Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior. Social Justice Research, 18(2), 183–201. Gordon, A. M., Impett, E. A., Kogan, A., Oveis, C., & Keltner, D. (2012). To have and to hold: Gratitude promotes relationship maintenance in intimate bonds. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(2), 257–274.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

347

Gordon, C. L., Arnette, R. A. M., & Smith, R. E. (2011). Have you thanked your spouse today?: Felt and expressed gratitude among married couples. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(3), 339–343. Gorski, P. S. (2013). Beyond the fact/value distinction: Ethical naturalism and the social sciences. Society, 50(6), 543–553. Gorsuch, R. L., & Hao, J. Y. (1993). Forgiveness: An exploratory factor analysis and its relationships to religious variables. Review of Religious Research, 34(4), 333–347. Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37(6), 504–528. Gräfenhain, M., Behne, T., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Young children’s understanding of joint commitments. Developmental Psychology, 45, 1430–1443. Gräfenhain, M., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Three-year-olds’ understanding of the consequences of joint commitments. PLoS One, 8, e73039. Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366–385. Greasley, K. (2012). Abortion and regret. Journal of Medical Ethics, 38(12), 705–711. Green, L., Myerson, J., Lichtman, D., Rosen, S., & Fry, A. (1996). Temporal discounting in choice between delayed rewards: The role of age and income. Psychology and Aging, 11(1), 79–84. Greene, J. D., & Paxton, J. M. (2009). Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions. PNAS, 106, 12506–12511. Griffin, J. (2015). What can philosophy contribute to ethics? Oxford University Press. Grossmann, I., Weststrate, N. M., Ardelt, M., Brienza, J. P., Dong, M., Ferrari, M., Fournier, M. A., Hu, C. S., Nusbaum, H. C., & Vervaeke, J. (2020). The science of wisdom in a polarized world: Knowns and unknowns. Psychological Inquiry, 31(2), 103–133. Gulliford, L., & Morgan, B. (2016). An empirical exploration of the normative dimensions of gratitude. In D. Carr (Ed.), Perspectives on gratitude: An interdisciplinary approach (pp. 199–214). Routledge. Gulliford, L., Morgan, B., & Jordan, K. (2021). A prototype analysis of virtue. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 16(4), 536–550. Guthrie, R. V. (2004). Even the rat was white: A historical view of psychology (2nd ed.). Pearson Education. Haack, S. (1996). Science as social – Yes and no. In L0. H. Nelson, & J. Nelson (Eds.), Feminism, science, and the philosophy of science (pp. 79–93). Kluwer. Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and human interests. Beacon. Haidt, J. (2013). Moral psychology for the twenty-first century. Journal of Moral Education, 42, 281–297. Hamaker, E. L. (2011). Why researchers should think “within person”: A paradigmatic rationale. In M. R. Mehl, & T. S. Conner (Eds.), Handbook of research methods for studying daily life (pp. 43–61). Guilford Press.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

348

References

Hamann, K., Warneken, F., Greenberg, J. R., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Collaboration encourages equal sharing in children but not in chimpanzees. Nature, 476, 328–331. Hamann, K., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Children’s developing commitments to joint goals. Child Development, 83, 137–145. Hamlin, J. K. (2013). Moral judgment and action in preverbal infants and toddlers: Evidence for an innate moral core. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(3), 186–193. Hammond, S. I., Mϋller, U., Carpendale, J. I. M., Bibok, M. B., & LiebermanFirestone, D. P. (2012). The effects of parental scaffolding on preschoolers’ executive function. Developmental Psychology, 48, 271–281. Hampson, P. J., Hulsey, T. L., & McGarry, P. P. (2021). Moral affordance, moral expertise, and virtue. Theory & Psychology, 31(4), 513–532. Han, H. (2016). How can neuroscience contribute to moral philosophy, psychology and education based on Aristotelian virtue ethics? International Journal of Ethics Education, 1, 201–217. Harbaugh, W. T., Mayr, U., Burghart, D. R. (2007). Neural responses to taxation and voluntary giving reveal motives for charitable donations. Science, 316, 1622–1625. Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2005). Identity as a source of moral motivation. Human Development, 48(4), 232–256. Hardy, S., Walker, L. J., Olsen, J., Woodbury, R. D., & Hickman, J. R. (2014). Moral identity as moral ideal self: Links to adolescent outcomes. Developmental Psychology, 50, 45–57. Hardy, S., Walker, L. J., Rackham, D. D., & Olsen, J. A. (2012). Religiosity and adolescent empathy and aggression: The mediating role of moral identity. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 4, 237–248. Hare, B. (2017). Survival of the friendliest: Homo sapiens evolved via selection for prosociality. Annual Review of Psychology, 68, 155–186. Harman, G. (2009). Skepticism about character traits. Journal of Ethics, 13, 235–242. Hart, D. (2005). Adding identity to the moral domain. Human Development, 48(4), 257–261. Hart, D., Atkins, R., & Ford, D. (1998). Prosocial behavior and caring in adolescence: Relations to self-understanding and social judgment. Child Development, 66, 1346–1359. Hart, D., & Fegley, S. (1995). Prosocial behavior and caring in adolescence: Relations to self-understanding and social judgment. Child Development, 66(5), 1346–1359. Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1928). Studies in the nature of character. Vol. 1: Studies in deceit. Macmillan. Hartshorne, H., May, M. A., & Maller, J. B. (1929). Studies in the nature of character. Vol. 2: Studies in service and self-control. Macmillan. Hartshorne, H., May, M. A., & Shuttleworth, F. K. (1930). Studies in the nature of character. Vol. 3: Studies in the organization of character. Macmillan.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

349

Hastings, P. D., McShane, K. E., Parker, R., & Ladha, F. (2007). Ready to make nice: Parental socialization of young sons’ and daughters’ prosocial behaviors with peers. The Journal of Genetic Psychology: Research and Theory on Human Development, 168(2), 177–200. Hawking, M., Curlin, F. A., & Yoon, J. D. (2017). Courage and compassion: Virtues in caring for so-called “difficult” patients. AMA Journal of Ethics, 19(4), 357–363. Hawkins, A. J., Fowers, B. J., Carroll, J. S., & Yang, C. (2007). Conceptualizing and measuring marital virtues. In S. Hofferth, & L. Casper (Eds.), Handbook of measurement issues in family research (pp. 67–83). Erlbaum. Haybron, D. M. (2013). Happiness: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. Heil, D. (2009). Embodied selves and social selves: Aboriginal well-being in rural New South Wales, Australia. In G. Mathews, & C. Izquierdo (Eds.), Pursuits of happiness: Well-being in anthropological perspective (pp. 88–108). Berghahn books. Heintzelman, S. J., & King, L. A. (2014). Life is pretty meaningful. American Psychologist, 69, 561–574. Held, B. (2005). The “virtues” of positive psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 25, 1–34. Helgeson, V. S., & Fritz, H. L. (1999). Unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion: Distinctions from agency and communion. Journal of Research in Personality, 33, 131–158. Heller, D., Perunovic, W. Q. E., & Reichman, D. (2009). The future of personsituation integration in the interface between traits and goals: A bottom-up framework. Journal of Research in Personality, 43(2), 171–178. Heller, D., Watson, D., Komar, J., Min, J.-A., & Perunovic, W. Q. E. (2007). Contextualized personality: Traditional and new assessment procedures. Journal of Personality, 75(6), 1229–1254. Helzer, E. G., Furr, R. M., Hawkins, A., Barranti, M., Blackie, L. E. R., & Fleeson, W. (2014). Agreement on the perception of moral character. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(12), 1698–1710. Hempel, C. G. (1961). Introduction to problems of taxonomy. In J. Zubin (Ed.), Field studies in the mental disorders (pp. 3–22). Grune & Stratton. Hendriks, T., Warren, M. A., Schotanus-Dijkstra, M., Hassankhan, A., Graafsma, T., Bohlmeijer, E., & de Jong, J. (2019). How WEIRD are positive psychology interventions? A bibliometric analysis of randomized controlled trials on the science of well-being. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 14(4), 489–501. Henne, P., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2016). An empirical refutation of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Analysis, 76(3), 283–290. Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2–3), 61–83. Hepach, R., Haberl, K., Lambert, S., & Tomasello, M. (2017). Toddlers help anonymously. Infancy, 22(1), 130–145.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

350

References

Hepach, R., Vaish, A., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Young children sympathize less in response to unjustified emotional distress. Developmental Psychology, 49(6), 1132–1138. Herman, B. (1997). Moral literacy. Tanner Lecture Library, The University of Utah. Hertz, S. G., & Krettenauer, T. (2016). Does moral identity effectively predict moral behavior? A meta-analysis. Review of General Psychology, 20(2), 129–140. Hilbig, B. E., & Zettler, I. (2009). Pillars of cooperation: Honesty-humility, social value orientations, and economic behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 43(3), 516–519. Hilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., & Heydasch, T. (2012). Personality, punishment, and public goods: Strategic shifts toward cooperation as a matter of dispositional Honesty-Humility. European Journal of Personality, 26, 245–254. Hills, A. (2015). The intellectuals and the virtues. Ethics, 126(1), 7–36. Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T. B., Baker, M., Harris, T., & Stephenson, D. (2015). Loneliness and social isolation as risk factors for mortality: A meta-analytic review. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(2), 227–237. Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T. B., & Layton, J. B. (2010). Social relationships and mortality risk: A meta-analytic review. PLOS Medicine, 7, 1–20. Huang, S., Yan, X., Zhang, J., Zhang, X., Miao, D., & Wu, S. (2020). Does meaning in life mediate the relationship between proactive personality and well-being? Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 48(12), 1–9. Hudson, N. W., & Fraley, R. C. (2015). Volitional personality trait change: Can people choose to change their personality traits? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(3), 490–507. Hudson, N. W., & Roberts, B. W. (2016). Social investment in work reliably predicts change in conscientiousness and agreeableness: A direct replication and extension of Hudson, Roberts, and Lodi-Smith (2012). Journal of Research in Personality, 60, 12–23. Hudson, N. W., Roberts, B. W., & Lodi-Smith, J. (2012). Personality trait development and social investment in work. Journal of Research in Personality, 46(3), 334–344. Huesmann, L. R. (1993). Cognition and aggression: A reply to Fowers and Richardson. Theory & Psychology, 3(3), 375–379. Hughes, P. M., & Warmke, B. (2022). Forgiveness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/spr2022/entries/forgiveness/ Hurley, S., & Chater, N. (Eds.) (2005). Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science (Vol. 1). MIT Press. Hunter, J. D. (2001). The death of character: Moral education in an age without good or evil. Basic Books. Hursthouse, R. (2006). The central doctrine of the mean. In R. Kraut (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics (pp. 96–115). Blackwell.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

351

Huta, V. (2015). The complementary roles of eudaimonia and hedonia and how they can be pursued in practice. In S. Joseph (Ed.), Positive psychology in practice: Promoting human flourishing in work (pp. 159–182). Wiley. Hutton, E. L. (2021). On ritual and legislation. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13(2), 45–64. Irerra, E. (2005). Between advantage and virtue: Aristotle’s political theory of friendship. History of Political Thought, 26, 565–585. Ivanhoe, P. J. (2013). Confucian reflections: Ancient wisdom for modern times. Routledge. Jablensky, A. (2012). The disease entity in psychiatry: Fact or fiction? Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences, 21(3), 255–264. Jayawickreme, E. (2021). Personal communication. Jayawickreme, E., & Fleeson, W. (2017a). Does whole trait theory work for the virtues? In W. Sinnott-Armstrong, & C. B. Miller (Eds.), Moral psychology: Virtue and character (Vol. 5, pp. 75–103). MIT Press. Jayawickreme, E., & Fleeson, W. (2017b). Whole trait theory can explain virtues. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong, & C. B. Miller (Eds.), Moral psychology: Virtue and character (Vol. 5, pp. 121–129). MIT Press. Jayawickreme, E., Meindl, P., Helzer, E. G., Furr, R. M., & Fleeson, W. (2014). Virtuous states and virtuous traits: How the empirical evidence regarding the existence of broad traits does not undermine virtue ethics. Theory and Research in Education, 12, 283–308. Jayawickreme, E., Zachry, C. E., & Fleeson, W. (2019). Whole Trait Theory: An integrative approach to examining personality structure and process. Personality and Individual Differences, 136, 2–11. John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., & Soto, C. J. (2008). Paradigm shift to the integrative Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and conceptual issues. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 114–158). Guilford Press. John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin, & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 102–138). Guilford Press. Johnson, K., McGrath, R. E., Bier, M. C., Brown, M., & Berkowitz, M. W. (2023). A meta-analysis of what works in character education. Journal of Character Education, 18(1), 87–99. Johnson, R. C., Danko, G. P., Darvill, T. J., Bochner, S., Bowers, J. K., Huang, Y., Park, J. Y., Pecjak, V., Rahim, A. R. A., & Pennington, D. (1989). Crosscultural assessment of altruism and its correlates. Personality and Individual Differences, 10(8), 855–868. Jon, S. (2021). Objectivity in science. Cambridge University Press. Jubilee Centre. (2022). www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/ Kashdan, T. B., Blalock, D. V., Young, K. C., Machell, K. A., Monfort, S. S., McKnight, P. E., & Ferssizidis, P. (2018). Personality strengths in romantic

Published online by Cambridge University Press

352

References

relationships: Measuring perceptions of benefits and costs and their impact on personal and relational well-being. Psychological Assessment, 30(2), 241–258. Keller, M., Gummerum M., Wang X. T., Lindsey S. (2004). Understanding perspectives and emotions in contract violation: Development of deontic and moral reasoning. Child Development, 75, 614–635. Keltner, D., Kogan, A., Piff, P. K., & Saturn, S. R. (2014). The sociocultural appraisals, values, and emotions (SAVE) framework of prosociality: Core processes from gene to meme. Annual Review of Psychology, 65, 425–460. Kendler, H. H. (2002). Psychology and ethics: Interactions and conflicts. Philosophical Psychology, 15, 489–508. Kenward, B. (2012). Over-imitating preschoolers believe that unnecessary actions are normative and enforce their performance by a third party. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 112, 195–227. Keown, D. (2016). The nature of Buddhist ethics. Palgrave Macmillan. Kerr, S. L., O’Donovan, A., & Pepping, C. A. (2015). Can gratitude and kindness interventions enhance well-being in a clinical sample? Journal of Happiness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Subjective Well-Being, 16(1), 17–36. Keyes, C. L. M. (2002). The mental health continuum: From languishing to flourishing in life. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 43(2), 207–222. Kiang, L., & Ip, E. (2018). Longitudinal profiles of eudaimonic well-being in Asian American adolescents. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 24(1), 62–74. Kiknadze, N. C., & Fowers, B. J. (2023). Cultural variation in flourishing. Journal of Happiness Studies. Killen, A., & Macaskill, A. (2015). Using a gratitude intervention to enhance wellbeing in older adults. Journal of Happiness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Subjective Well-Being, 16(4), 947–964. Killen, M., Rutland, A., Abrams, D., Mulvey, K. L., & Hitti, A. (2013). Development of intra- and intergroup judgments in the context of moral and social-conventional norms. Child Development, 84, 1063–1080. Killen, M., & Smetana, J. G. (2015). Origins and development of morality. In M. E. Lamb, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology and developmental science: Socioemotional processes (Vol. 3, 7th ed., pp. 701–749). John Wiley & Sons Inc. Kim, J. J., & Enright, R. D. (2016). State and trait forgiveness: A philosophical analysis and implications for psychotherapy. Spirituality in Clinical Practice, 3(1), 32–44. Kim, R. (2016). Early Confucianism and contemporary moral psychology. Philosophy Compass, 11(9), 473–485. Kim, R. (2020). Confucianism and the philosophy of well-being. Routledge. King, L. A., & Hicks, J. A. (2021). The science of meaning in life. Annual Review of Psychology, 72, 561–584. King, L. A., Hicks, J. A., Krull, J. L., & Del Gaiso, A. K. (2006). Positive affect and the experience of meaning in life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(1), 179–196.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

353

Kingsford, J. M., Hawes, D. J., & de Rosnay, M. (2018). The moral self and moral identity: Developmental questions and conceptual challenges. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 36(4), 652–666. Klimstra, T. A., Luyckx, K., Branje, S., Teppers, E., Goossens, L., & Meeus, W. H. J. (2013). Personality traits, interpersonal identity, and relationship stability: Longitudinal linkages in late adolescence and young adulthood. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 42(11), 1661–1673. Knafo, A., Israel, S., Darvasi, A., Bachner-Melman, R., Uzefovsky, F., Cohen, L., … Ebstein, R. P. (2008). Individual differences in allocation of funds in the Dictator Game and postmortem hippocampal mRNA levels are correlated with length of the arginine vasopressin 1a receptor (AVPR1a) RS3 promoter-region repeat. Genes, Brain and Behavior, 7, 266–275. Kochanska, G. (2002a). Committed compliance, moral self, and internalization: A mediational model. Developmental Psychology, 38, 339–351. Kochanska, G. (2002b). Mutually responsive orientation between mothers and their young children: A context for the early development of conscience. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 191–195. Kochanska, G., Gross, J. N., Lin, M-H., Nichols, K. E. (2002). Guilt in young children: Development, determinants, and relations with a broader system of standards. Child Development, 73, 461–482. Kochanska, G., Koenig, J. L., Barry, R. A., Kim, S., & Yoon, J. E. (2010). Children’s conscience during toddler and preschool years, moral self, and a competent, adaptive developmental trajectory. Developmental Psychology, 46(5), 1320–1332. Kogan, A., Oveis, C., Carr, E. W., Gruber, J., Mauss, I. B., Shallcross, A., Impett, E. A., Lowe, I. V., Cheng, C., & Keltner, D. (2014). Vagal activity is quadratically related to prosocial traits, prosocial emotions, and observer perceptions of prosociality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107(6), 1051–1063. Kohlberg, L. (1963). Moral development and identification. In H. W. Stevenson (Ed.), Child psychology: 62nd yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (pp. 277–332). University of Chicago Press. Korsgaard, C. M. (1986). Skepticism about practical reason. Journal of Philosophy, 83(1), 5–25. Köymen, B., L. Rosenbaum, & M. Tomasello. (2014). Reasoning during joint decision-making by preschool peers. Cognitive Development, 32, 74–85. Krause, N. (2010). Religious involvement, humility, and self-rated health. Social Indicators Research, 98, 23–39. Krause, N., & Hayward, R. D. (2015). Humility, compassion, and gratitude to God: Assessing the relationships among key religious virtues. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 7(3), 192–204. Kruse, E., Chancellor, J., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2017). State humility: Measurement, conceptual validation, and intrapersonal processes. Self and Identity, 16(4), 399–438. Krettenauer, T. (2011). The dual moral self: Moral centrality and internal moral motivation. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 172, 309–328.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

354

References

Krettenauer, T., Asendorpf, J. B., & Nunner-Winkler, G. (2013). Moral emotion attributions and personality traits as long-term predictors of antisocial conduct in early adulthood: Findings from a 20-year longitudinal study. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 37(3), 192–201. Krettenauer, T., & Casey, V. (2015). Moral identity development and positive moral emotions: Differences involving authentic and hubristic pride. Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, 15(3), 173–187. Krettenauer, T., Colasante, T., Buchmann, M., & Malti, T. (2014). The development of moral emotions and decision-making from adolescence to early adulthood: A 6-year longitudinal study. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 43(4), 583–596. Krettenauer, T., & Hertz, S. (2015). What develops in moral identities? A critical review. Human Development, 58(3), 137–153. Kristjánsson, K. (2013). Virtues and vices in positive psychology: A philosophical critique. Cambridge University Press. Kristjánsson, K. (2016). Teaching character and virtue in schools: Citizenship, character and values education. Routledge. Kristjánsson, K. (2017). Aristotelian character education. Routledge. Kristjánsson, K. (2018). Virtue from the perspective of psychology. In N. Snow (Ed.), Oxford handbook of virtue (pp. 546–569). Oxford University Press. Kristjánsson, K. (2020). Aristotelian character friendship as a method of moral education. Studies in Philosophy and Education. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11217-020-09717-w Kristjánsson, K. (2021). Flourishing as the aim of education: Routledge international studies in the philosophy of education. Routledge. Kristjánsson, K., & Fowers, B. J. (2022). Phronesis as moral decathlon: Contesting the redundancy thesis about phronesis. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/09515089.2022.2055537 Kristjánsson, K., & Fowers, B. J. (2024). Phronesis: Retrieving practical wisdom in psychology, philosophy, and education. Oxford University Press. Kristjánsson, K., Fowers, B. J., Darnell, C., & Pollard, D. (2021). Phronesis (practical wisdom) as a type of contextual integrative thinking. Review of General Psychology, 25(3), 239–257. Kruger, D. J., & Nesse, R. M. (2007). Economic transition, male competition, and sex differences in mortality rates. Evolutionary Psychology, 5, 411–427. Kuhlmeier, V., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2003). Attribution of dispositional states by 12-month-olds. Psychological Science, 14(5), 402–408. LaFleur, W. R. (1994). Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan. Princeton University Press. Lagattuta, K. H. (2005). When you shouldn’t do what you want to do: Young children’s understanding of desires, rules, and emotions. Child Development, 76, 713–733. Lahat, A., Helwig, C. C., & Zelazo, P. (2012). Age-related changes in cognitive processing of moral and social-conventional violations. Cognitive Development, 27, 181–194.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

355

Laible, D., Eye, J., & Carlo, G. (2008). Dimensions of conscience development in mid-adolescence. Links with temperament and parenting. Journal of Youth & Adolescence, 37, 875–887. Lambert, L., Lomas, T., van de Weijer, M. P., Passmore, H. A., Joshanloo, M., Harter, J., … Diener, E. (2020). Towards a greater global understanding of wellbeing: A proposal for a more inclusive measure. International Journal of Wellbeing, 10(2), 1–18. Lambert, N. M., Clark, M. S., Durtschi, J., Fincham, F. D., & Graham, S. M. (2010). Benefits of expressing gratitude: Expressing gratitude to a partner changes one’s view of the relationship. Psychological Science, 21, 574–580. Landry, S. H., Miller-Loncar, C. L., Smith, K. E., & Swank, P. R. (2002). The role of early parenting in children’s development of executive processes. Developmental Neuropsychology, 21, 15–41. Lane, J., & Anderson, N. H. (1976). Integration of intention and outcome in moral judgment. Memory & Cognition, 4(1), 1–5. Lapsley, D. K., & Power, F. C. (Eds.). (2005). Character psychology and character education. Notre Dame University Press. Lazer, D. M. J., Baum, M. A., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A. J., Greenhill, K. M., Menczer, F., … Zittrain, J. L. (2018). The science of fake news. Science, 359(6380), 1094–1096. Le, B. M., Impett, E. A., Kogan, A., Webster, G. D., Cheng, C. (2013). The personal and interpersonal rewards of communal orientation. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 30, 694–710. Le, B. M., Impett, E. A., Lemay, E. P., Jr., Muise, A., & Tskhay, K. O. (2018). Communal motivation and well-being in interpersonal relationships: An integrative review and meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 144(1), 1–25. Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Wiltshire, J., Bourdage, J. S., Visser, B. A., & Gallucci, A. (2013). Sex, power, and money: Prediction from the Dark Triad and Honesty– Humility. European Journal of Personality, 27(2), 169–184. Lee, K. S., & Ono, H. (2012). Marriage, cohabitation, and happiness: A crossnational analysis of 27 countries. Journal of Marriage and Family, 74(5), 953–972. Lee, M. T., Kubzansky, L. D., & Vanderweele, T. J. (Eds.). (2021). Measuring well-being: Interdisciplinary perspectives from the social sciences and humanities. Oxford University Press. Lee, Y.-R., & Enright, R. D. (2019). A meta-analysis of the association between forgiveness of others and physical health. Psychology & Health, 34(5), 626–643. Lefevor, G. T., & Fowers, B. J. (2016). Traits, situational factors, and their interactions as explanations of helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Individual Differences, 92, 159–163. Lefevor, G. T., Fowers, B. J., Ahn, S., Lang, S. F., & Cohen, L. M. (2017). To what degree do situational influences explain spontaneous helping behaviour? A meta-analysis. European Review of Social Psychology, 28, 227–256. Lehnart, J., Neyer, F. J., & Eccles, J. (2010). Long-term effects of social investment: The case of partnering in young adulthood. Journal of Personality, 78(2), 639–670.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

356

References

Leikas, S., Lönnqvist, J.-E., & Verkasalo, M. (2012). Persons, situations, and behaviors: Consistency and variability of different behaviors in four interpersonal situations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(6), 1007–1022. Leiter, B. (1997). Nietzsche and the morality critics. Ethics, 107(2), 250–285. Lewis, M., & Ramsay, D. (2004). Development of self-recognition, personal pronoun use, and pretend play during the 2nd year. Child Development, 75, 1821–1831. Liebermann, O., Levenson, E., & Caldwell, T. (2022). Navy petty officer who helped disarm Colorado nightclub shooter speaks out for first time. Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2022/11/27/us/colorado-springs-nightclub-shooting-armyveteran-community Liew, J., Eisenberg, N., Spinrad, T. L., Eggum, N. D., Haugen, R. G., Kupfer, A., … Baham, M. E. (2011). Physiological regulation and fearfulness as predictors of young children’s empathy-related reactions. Social Development, 20(1), 111–134. Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Pointing out new news, old news, and absent referents at 12 months of age. Developmental Science, 10(2), F1–F7. Liu, H. (2009). Till death do us part: Marital status and U.S. mortality trends, 1986–2000. Journal of Marriage and Family, 71, 1158–1173. Lodi-Smith, J., & Roberts, B. W. (2007). Social investment and personality: A meta-analysis of the relationship of personality traits to investment in work, family, religion, and volunteerism. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 68–86. Lomas, T. (2018). The roots of virtue: A cross-cultural lexical analysis. Journal of Happiness Studies, 20(4), 1259–1279. Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton University Press. Lo Presti, P. (2020). Persons and affordances. Ecological Psychology, 32(1), 25–40. Lotz, S., Baumert, A., Schlösser, T., Gresser, F., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011). Individual differences in third-party interventions: How justice sensitivity shapes altruistic punishment. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 4, 297–313. Lotz, S., Schlösser, T., Cain, D. M., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2013). The (in)stability of social preferences: Using justice sensitivity to predict when altruism collapses. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 141–148. Lüdtke, O., Roberts, B. W., Trautwein, U., & Nagy, G. (2011). A random walk down university avenue: Life paths, life events, and personality trait change at the transition to university life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(3), 620. Lyons, M. (2019). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy in everyday life. Elsevier Academic Press. Ma, L. K., Tunney, R. J., & Ferguson, E. (2017). Does gratitude enhance prosociality? A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 143(6), 601–635. Macdonald, C., Bore, M., & Munro, D. (2008). Values in action scale and the Big 5: An empirical indication of structure. Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 787–799.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

357

Machery, E. (2017). Philosophy within its proper bounds. Oxford University Press. MacIntyre, A. C. (1981). After virtue: A study in moral theory. University of Notre Dame Press. MacIntyre, A. C. (2013). On having survived the academic moral philosophy of the twentieth century. In F. OʼRourke (Ed.), What happened in and to moral philosophy in the twentieth century? Philosophical essays in honor of Alasdair MacIntyre (pp. 17–34). University of Notre Dame Press. Malti, T., & Krettenauer, T. (2013). The relation of moral emotion attributions to prosocial and antisocial behavior: A meta-analysis. Child Development, 84(2), 397–412. Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–337. Martin, J., & Gillespie, A. (2010). A neo-Meadian approach to human agency: Relating the social and the psychological in the ontogenesis of perspective-coordinating persons. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 44, 252–272. Martin, J., & Sugarman, J. (1999). The psychology of human possibility and constraint. State University of New York Press. Martin, W. (2009). Ought but cannot. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2), 103–128. Mathews, G., & Izquierdo, C. (2009). Pursuits of happiness: Well-being in anthropological perspective. Berghahn books. Matsumoto, D. (2007). Culture, context, and behavior. Journal of Personality, 75(6), 1285–1320. McAdams, D. P. (1996). Personality, modernity, and the storied self: A contemporary framework for studying persons. Psychological Inquiry, 7(4), 295–321. McAdams, D. P. (2006). The role of narrative in personality psychology today. Narrative Inquiry, 16(1), 11–18. McAdams, D. P. (2009). The moral personality. In D. Narvaez, & D. K. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 11–29). Oxford University Press. McAdams, D. P. (2012). Exploring psychological themes through life-narrative accounts. In J. A. Holstein, & J. F. Gubrium (Eds.), Varieties of narrative analysis (pp. 15–32). Sage. McAdams, D. P. (2015). Psychological science and the Nicomachean Ethics: Virtuous actors, agents, and authors. In N. E. Snow (Ed.), Cultivating virtue: Perspectives from philosophy, theology, and psychology (pp. 307–336). Oxford University Press. McAdams, D. P. (2021). Personal communication. McCabe, K. O., & Fleeson, W. (2016). Are traits useful? Explaining trait manifestations as tools in the pursuit of goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110(2), 287–301. McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1986). Clinical assessment can benefit from recent advances in personality psychology. American Psychologist, 41, 1001–1003. McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1997). Personality structure as a human universal. American Psychologist, 52(5), 509–516.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

358

References

McCrae, R. R., & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its applications. Journal of Personality, 60, 175–215. McCrae, R. R., & Terracciano, A. (2005). Universal features of personality traits from the observer’s perspective: Data from 50 cultures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 547–561. McCullough, M. E. (2008). Beyond revenge: The evolution of the forgiveness instinct. Jossey-Bass. McCullough, M. E., Emmons, R. A., & Tsang, J.-A. (2002). The grateful disposition: A conceptual and empirical topography. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(1), 112–127. McCullough, M. E., & Witvliet, C. V. (2002). The psychology of forgiveness. In C. R. Snyder, & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 446–458). AbeBooks. McDermott, J. M., Troller-Renfree, S., Vanderwert, R., Nelson, C. A., Zeanah, C. H., & Fox, N. A. (2012). Psychosocial deprivation, executive functions, and the emergence of socio-emotional behavior problems. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 1–11. McGrath, R. E. (2014). Scale- and item-level factor analysis of the VIA inventory of strengths. Assessment, 21, 4–14. McGrath, R. E. (2015). Integrating psychological and cultural perspectives on virtue: The hierarchical structure of character strengths. Journal of Positive Psychology, 10, 406–424. McGrath, R. E., Hall-Simmonds, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2017). Are measures of character and personality distinct? Evidence from observed-score and truescore analyses. Assessment, 27, 117–135. McGregor, I., & Little, B. R. (1998). Personal projects, happiness, and meaning: On doing well and being yourself. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 494–512. McNulty, J. K. (2010). Forgiveness increases the likelihood of subsequent partner transgressions in marriage. Journal of Family Psychology, 24(6), 787–790. McNulty, J. K., & Fincham, F. D. (2012). The pitfalls of valenced labels and the benefits of properly calibrated psychological flexibility. American Psychologist, 67(7), 576–577. McNulty, J. K., & Russell, V. M. (2016). Forgive and forget, or forgive and regret? Whether forgiveness leads to less or more offending depends on offender agreeableness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(5), 616–631. McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Brashears, M. E. (2006).Social isolation in America: Changes in core discussion networks over two decades. American Sociological Review, 71, 353–375. Meara, N. M., & Day, J. D. (2003). Possibilities and challenges for academic psychology: Uncertain science, interpretative conversation, and virtuous community. American Behavioral Scientist, 47, 459–478. Mehl, M. R., & Connor, T. S. (Eds.). (2012). Handbook of research methods for studying daily life. Guilford Press. Meindl, P., Jayawickreme, E., Furr, R. M., & Fleeson, W. (2013). A foundation beam for studying morality from a personological point of view: Are individual

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

359

differences in moral behaviors and thoughts consistent? Journal of Research in Personality, 59, 81–92. Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31, 838–850. Mercier, H., Bernard, S., & Clément, F. (2014). Early sensitivity to arguments: How preschoolers weight circular arguments. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 125, 102–109. Michalski, J. (2022). The sociological determinants of scientific bias. Journal of Moral Education, 51(1), 47–60. Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2010). Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature. American Psychological Association Press. Miller, C. (2014). Character and moral psychology. Oxford University Press. Miller, C., Furr, R. M., Knobel, A., & Fleeson, W. (2015). Character: New directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology. Oxford University Press. Miller, R. B., Hoillist, C. S., Olsen, J., & Law, D. (2013). Marital quality and health over 20 years: A growth curve analysis. Journal of Marriage and Family, 73, 667–680. Mills, P. J., Redwine, L., Wilson, K., Pung, M. A., Chinh, K., Greenberg, B. H., … Chopra, D. (2015). The role of gratitude in spiritual well-being in asymptomatic heart failure patients. Spirituality in Clinical Practice, 2, 5–17. Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. Psychological Review, 80, 252–283. Mischel, W. (1977). On the future of personality measurement. American Psychologist, 32, 246–254. Mischel, W. (2004). Toward an integrative science of the person. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 1–22. Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review, 102, 246–268. Mofidi, T., El-Alayli, A., & Brown, A. A. (2014). Trait gratitude and grateful coping as they relate to college student persistence, success, and integration in school. Journal of College Student Retention: Research, Theory and Practice, 16(3), 325–349. Moll, H., Richter, N., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Fourteen-montholds know what “we” have shared in a special way. Infancy, 13(1), 90–101. Moll, J., Krueger, F., Zahn, R., Pardini, M., De Oliveira-Souza, R., Grafman, J. (2006). Human fronto-mesolimbic networks guide decisions about charitable donation. PNAS, 103(42), 15623–15628. Moore, C. (2009). Fairness in children’s resource allocation depends on the recipient. Psychological Science, 20, 944–948. Morgan, B., & Fowers, B. J. (2022). Empathy and authenticity online: The roles of moral identity, moral disengagement and parenting style. Journal of Personality, 90(2), 183–202. Morgan, B., Gulliford, L., & Kristjánsson, K. (2017). A new approach to measuring moral virtues: The multi-component gratitude measure. Personality and Individual Differences, 107, 179–189.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

360

References

Morse, P. J., Sauerberger, K. S., Todd, E., & Funder, D. C. (2015). Relationships among personality, situational construal, and social outcomes. European Journal of Personality, 29, 97–106. Morse, P. J., Sweeny, K., & Legg, A. (2015). A situational construal approach to healthcare experiences. Social Science and Medicine, 138, 170–178. Moussaoui, L. S., Desrichard, O., & Milfont, T. L. (2020). Do environmental prompts work the same for everyone? A test of environmental attitudes as a moderator. Frontiers in Psychology, 10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.03057 Mower, D. S. (2013). Situationism and Confucian virtue ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16(1), 113–137. Muise, A., Bergeron, S., Impett, E. A., & Rosen, N. O. (2017). The costs and benefits of sexual communal motivation for couples coping with vulvodynia. Health Psychology, 36(8), 819–827. Nagel, T. (1970). The possibility of altruism. Oxford Clarendon Press. Nelson, S. K., Layous, K., Cole, S. W., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2016). Do unto others or treat yourself? The effects of prosocial and self-focused behavior on psychological flourishing. Emotion, 16(6), 850–861. Neyer, F. J., & Lehnart, J. (2007). Relationships matter in personality development: Evidence from an 8‐year longitudinal study across young adulthood. Journal of Personality, 75(3), 535–568. Nezlek, J. B., Newman, D. B., & Thrash, T. M. (2017). A daily diary study of relationships between feelings of gratitude and well-being. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 12(4), 323–332. Nicolas, M., Fowers, B. J., Novak, L. F., Louder, C., Kiknadze, N. C., & Calder, A. J. (2023). A qualitative study of global perceptions of flourishing. Manuscript in preparation. Nichols, S. R., Svetlova, M., & Brownell, C. A. (2009). The role of social understanding and empathic disposition in young children’s responsiveness to distress in parents and peers. Cognition, Brain, Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 13(4), 449–478. Nicholson, I. A. M. (1998). Gordon Allport, character, and the “culture of personality,” 1897–1937. History of Psychology, 1, 52–68. Ng, V., & Tay, L. (2020). Lost in translation: The construct representation of character virtues. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 15(2), 309–326. Nobes, G., Panagiotaki, G., & Bartholomew, K. J. (2016). The influence of intention, outcome and question wording on children’s and adults’ moral judgments. Cognition, 157, 190–204. Noftle, E. E., & Robins, R. W. (2007). Personality predictors of academic outcomes: Big Five correlates of GPA and SAT scores. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(1), 116–130. Norton, P. J., & Weiss, B. J. (2009). The role of courage on behavioral approach in a fear-eliciting situation: A proof-of-concept pilot study. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 23, 212–217. Novak, J. R., Smith, H. M., Larson, J. H., & Crane, D. R. (2018). Commitment, forgiveness, and relationship self‐regulation: An actor partner interdependence

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

361

model of relationship virtues and relationship effort in couple relationships. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 44(2), 353–365. Novak, L. F., Fowers, B. J., Kiknadze, N. C., & Calder, A. J. (2023). A closer analysis of flourishing measures. Manuscript in preparation. Nucci, L. P. (1984). Evaluating teachers as social agents: Students’ ratings of domain appropriate and domain inappropriate teacher responses to transgressions. American Educational Research Journal, 21, 367–378. Nunner-Winkler, G. (2009). Moral motivation from childhood to early adulthood. In W. Schneider, & M. Bullock (Eds.), Human development from early childhood to early adulthood: Findings from a 20 year longitudinal study (pp. 91– 118). Psychology Press. Nussbaum, M. C. (2013). Political emotions: Why love matters for justice. Harvard University Press. O’Brien, L., Mendonça, S. E., & Price, U. S. (2018). The development of gratitude in the United States. Cross-Cultural Research: The Journal of Comparative Social Science, 52(1), 58–72. O’Connor, B. P. (2002). A quantitative review of the comprehensiveness of the five-factor model in relation to popular personality inventories. Assessment, 9(2), 188–203. Odling-Smee, F. J., Laland, K. N., & Feldman, M. W. (2003). Niche construction: The neglected process in evolution. Princeton University Press. Oishi, S., & Diener, E. (2014). Residents of poor nations have a greater sense of meaning in life than residents of wealthy nations. Psychological Science, 25(2), 422–430. Olberding, A. (2016). Etiquette: A Confucian contribution to moral philosophy. Ethics, 126(2), 422–446. Olson, K. R., & Spelke, E. S. (2008). Foundations of cooperation in young children. Cognition, 108, 222–231. O’Meara, M. S., & South, S. C. (2019). Big Five personality domains and relationship satisfaction: Direct effects and correlated change over time. Journal of Personality, 87, 1206–1220. Orth, U., Robins, R. W., & Soto, C. J. (2010). Tracking the trajectory of shame, guilt, and pride across the life span. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(6), 1061–1071. Otake, K., Shimai, S., Tanaka-Matsumi, J., Otsui, K., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2006). Happy people become happier through kindness: A counting kindnesses intervention. Journal of Happiness Studies, 7, 361–375. Oveis, C., Horberg, E. J., & Keltner, D. (2010). Compassion, pride, and social intuitions of self-other similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 618–630. Padilla-Walker, L. M., & Carlo, G. (Eds.). (2014). Prosocial development: A multidimensional approach. Oxford University Press. Pancheva, M. G., & Vásquez, A. (2022). Close to others – closer to happiness? An empirical assessment of the social determinants of wellbeing. International Journal of Wellbeing, 12(2), 206–232.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

362

References

Park, N., & Peterson, C. (2006). Moral competence and character strengths among adolescents: The development and validation of the values in action inventory of strengths for youth. Journal of Adolescence, 29(6), 891–909. Park, S. Q., Kahnt, T., Dogan, A., Strang, S., Fehr, E., & Tobler, P. N. (2017). A neural link between generosity and happiness. Nature Communications, 8(15964), 1–10. Park, Y., Impett, E. A., MacDonald, G., & Lemay, E. P., Jr. (2019). Saying “thank you”: Partners’ expressions of gratitude protect relationship satisfaction and commitment from the harmful effects of attachment insecurity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 117(4), 773–806. Patall, E. A., Cooper, H., & Robinson, J. C. (2008). The effects of choice on intrinsic motivation and related outcomes: A meta-analysis of research findings. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 270–300. Paulhus, D. L. (1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of social psychological attitudes (Vol. 1, pp. 17–59). Academic Press. Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2003). Character strengths before and after September 11. Psychological Science, 14(4), 381–384. Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification. American Psychological Association. Pew Research Center. (2017). Public trust in government remains near historic lows as Partisan attitudes shift. Retrieved from www.people-press.org/2017/05/03/ public-trust-in-government-remainsnear-historic-lows-as-partisan-attitudesshift/ Piper, W. T., Saslow, L. R., & Saturn, S. R. (2015). Autonomic and prefrontal events during moral elevation. Biological Psychology, 108, 51–55. Plötner, M., Over, H., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2015). The effects of collaboration and minimal-group membership on children’s prosocial behavior, liking, affiliation, and trust. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 139, 161–173. Pratt, M. W., Hunsberger, B., Pancer, S. M., & Alisat, S. (2003). A longitudinal analysis of personal values socialization: Correlates of a moral self-ideal in late adolescence. Social Development, 12, 563–585. Pury, C. L., & Kowalski, R. M. (2007). Human strengths, courageous actions, and general and personal courage. Journal of Positive Psychology, 2, 120–128. Putnam, H. (2004). The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Harvard University Press. Quine, W. V. (1953). From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press. Rapp, H., Wang Xu, J., & Enright, R. D. (2022). A meta‐analysis of forgiveness education interventions’ effects on forgiveness and anger in children and adolescents. Child Development. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13771 Rauthmann, J. F., Sherman, R. A., & Funder, D. C. (2015). Principles of situation research: Towards a better understanding of psychological situations. European Journal of Personality, 29, 363–381.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

363

Recchia, H. E., & Howe, N. (2008). Family talk about internal states and children’s relative appraisals of self and sibling. Social Development, 17, 776–794. Reimer, K. S., DeWitt Goudelock, B. M., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Developing conceptions of moral maturity: Traits and identity in adolescent personality. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 4(5), 372–388. Reimer, L. C., & Reimer, K. S. (2015). Maturity is coherent: Structural and content-specific coherence in adolescent moral identity. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 10(6), 543–552. Reis, H. T., Maniaci, M. R., & Rogge, R. D. (2014). The expression of compassionate love in everyday compassionate acts. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 31(5), 651–676. Reis, H. T., Maniaci, M. R., & Rogge, R. D. (2017). Compassionate acts and everyday emotional well-being among newlyweds. Emotion, 17(4), 751–763. Rekers, Y., Haun, D. B. M., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Children, but not chimpanzees, prefer to collaborate. Current Biology, 21(20), 1756–1758. Richardson, F. C., Fowers, B. J., & Guignon, C. (1999). Re-envisioning psychology: Moral dimensions of theory and practice. Jossey-Bass. Richardson, F. C., & Guignon, C. (2008). Positive psychology and philosophy of social science. Theory & Psychology, 18, 605–627. Rietveld, E., & Kiverstein, J. (2014). A rich landscape of affordances. Ecological Psychology, 26(4), 325–352. Roberts, B. W. (1997). Plaster or plasticity: Are work experiences associated with personality change in women? Journal of Personality, 65, 205–232. Roberts, B. W. (2007). Contextualizing personality psychology. Journal of Personality, 75(6), 1071–1082. Roberts, B. W., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. (2003). Work experiences and personality development in young adulthood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 582–593. Roberts, B. W., & Damian, R. I. (2019). The principles of personality development and their relation to psychopathology. In D. B. Samuel, & D. R. Lynam (Eds.), Using basic personality research to inform personality pathology (pp. 153–168). Oxford University Press. Roberts, B. W., & DelVecchio, W. F. (2000). The rank-order consistency of personality from childhood to old age: A quantitative review of longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 3–25. Roberts, B. W., O’Donnell, M., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Goal and personality trait development in emerging adulthood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(4), 541–550. Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E., & Viechtbauer, W. (2006). Patterns of mean-level change in personality traits across the life course: A meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. Psychological Bulletin, 132(1), 1–25. Roberts, B. W., Wood, D., & Smith, J. L. (2005). Evaluating Five Factor Theory and social investment perspectives on personality trait development. Journal of Research in Personality, 39(1), 166–184.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

364

References

Robins, R. W., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. (2002). It’s not just who you’re with, it’s who you are: Personality and relationship experiences across multiple relationships. Journal of Personality, 70, 925–964. Robles, T. F., Slatcher, R. B., Trombello, J. M., & McGinn, M. M. (2014). Marital quality and health: A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin, 140(1), 140–187. Roessler, J., & Perner, J. (2013). Teleology: Belief as perspective. In S. BaronCohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, & M. V. Lombardo (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from developmental social neuroscience (3rd ed., pp. 35–50). Oxford University Press. Romero-Canyas, R., Anderson, V. T., Reddy, K. S., & Downey, G. (2009). Rejection sensitivity. In M. Leary, & R. Hoyle (Eds.), Handbook of individual differences in social behavior (pp. 466–479). Guilford Press. Rothmund, T., Baumert, A., & Zinkernagel, A. (2014). The German ‘Wutbürger’: How justice sensitivity accounts for individual differences in political engagement. Social Justice Research, 27, 24–44. Ruch, W., Proyer, R. T., Harzer, C., Park, N., Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2010). Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS): Adaptation and validation of the German version and the development of a peer rating form. Journal of Individual Differences, 31, 138–149. Rushton, J-P. (1984). The altruistic personality. In E. Straub, D. BarTal, J. Karylowski, & J. Reykowski (Eds.), Development and maintenance of prosocial behavior (pp. 271–290). Praeger. Russell, D. (2009). Practical intelligence and the virtues. Oxford University Press. Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2017). Self-determination theory: Basic psychological needs in motivation, development, and wellness. Guilford Press. Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2020). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from a self-determination theory perspective: Definitions, theory, practices, and future directions. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j​ .cedpsych.2020.101860 Ryan, R. M., Huta, V., & Deci, E. L. (2008). Living well: A Self-Determination Theory perspective on eudaimonia. Journal of Happiness Studies, 9, 139–170. Rye, M. S., Loiacono, D. M., Folck, C. D., Olszewski, B. T., Heim, T. A., & Madia, B. P. (2001). Evaluation of the psychometric properties of two forgiveness scales. Current Psychology, 20, 260–277. Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 1069–1081. Sally, D. F. (1996). Sympathy and reason [ProQuest Information & Learning]. In  Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences (Vol. 56, Issue 12–A, p. 4892). Schache, K., Consedine, N., Hofman, P., & Serlachius, A. (2019). Gratitude – more than just a platitude? The science behind gratitude and health. British Journal of Health Psychology, 24(1), 1–9.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

365

Schmidt, M., Hardecker, S., & Tomasello, M. (2016a). Preschoolers understand the normativity of cooperatively structured competition. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 143, 34–47. Schmidt, M., Hardecker, S., & Tomasello, M. (2016b). Young children see a single action and infer a social norm. Psychological Science, 27, 1360–1370. Schmidt, M., Rakoczy, H., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Young children attribute normativity to novel actions without pedagogy or normative language. Developmental Science, 14(3), 530–539. Schmitt, M., Baumert, A., Gollwitzer, M., & Maes, J. (2010). The Justice Sensitivity Inventory: Factorial validity, location in the personality facet space, demographic pattern, and normative data. Social Justice Research, 23, 211–238. Schmitt, M., Gollwitzer, M., Maes, J., & Arbach, D. (2005). Justice sensitivity: Assessment and location in the personality space. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 21, 202–211. Schnall, S., Roper, J., & Fessler, D. M. (2010). Elevation leads to altruistic behavior. Psychological Science, 21(3), 315–320. Schnitker, S. (2012). An examination of patience and well-being. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 7(4), 263–280. Schwartz, B. (2022). Science, scholarship, and intellectual virtues: A guide to what higher education should be like. Journal of Moral Education, 51(1), 61–72. Schwartz, B., & Sharpe, K. (2010). Practical wisdom: The right way to do the right thing. Riverhead Books. Schwartz, N. (2011). Why researchers should think “real time”: A cognitive rationale. In M. R. Mehl, & T. S. Conner (Eds.), Handbook of research methods for studying daily life (pp. 22–42). Guilford Press. Sekerka, L. E., Bagozzi, R. P., & Charnigo, R. (2009). Facing ethical challenges in the workplace: Conceptualizing and measuring professional moral courage. Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 565–579. Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist, 55, 5–14. Shaw, A., & Olson, K. R. (2012). Children discard a resource to avoid inequity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 382–395. Sherman, R. A., Rauthmann, J. F., Brown, N. A., Serfass, D. G., & Jones, A. B. (2015). The independent effects of personality and situations on real-time expressions of behavior and emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(5), 872–888. Shiota, M. N., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. (2006). Positive emotion dispositions differentially associated with Big Five personality and attachment style. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1(2), 61–71. Shor, E., Roelfs, D. J., & Yogev, T. (2013). The strength of family ties: A metaanalysis and meta-regression of self-reported social support and mortality. Social Networks, 35, 626–638. Shoshani, A., & Slone, M. (2013). Middle school transition from the strengths perspective: Young adolescents’ character strengths, subjective well-being, and

Published online by Cambridge University Press

366

References

school adjustment. Journal of Happiness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Subjective Well-Being, 14(4), 1163–1181. Shryack, J., Steger, M. F., Krueger, R. F., & Kallie, C. S. (2010). The structure of virtue: An empirical investigation of the dimensionality of the virtues in action inventory of strengths. Personality and Individual Differences, 48, 714–719. Shubert, J., Ratchford, J. L., Houltberg, B. J., & Schnitker, S. A. (2021). Disentangling character strengths from developmental competencies: The virtue of patience and self-regulatory competencies. The Journal of Positive Psychology. Shubert, J., Wray, L. L., Syvertsen, A. K., & Metzger, A. (2019). Examining character structure and function across childhood and adolescence. Child Development, 90(4), e505–e524. https://doi-org.access.library.miami.edu/10.1111/cdev.13035 Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The “big three” of morality (autonomy, community, and divinity) and the “big three” explanations of suffering. In A. Brandt, & P. Roz in (Eds.), Morality and health (pp. 119–169). Stanford University Press. Silfver, M., Helkama, K., Lonnqvist, J., & Verkasalo, M. (2008). The relation between value priorities and proneness to guilt, shame, and empathy. Motivation and Emotion, 32(2), 69–80. Simons, M., Lataster, J., Peeters, S., Reijnders, J., Janssens, M., & Jacobs, N. (2019). Sense of abundance is associated with momentary positive and negative affect: An experience sampling study of trait gratitude in daily life. Journal of Happiness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Subjective Well-Being, 21(6), 2229–2236. Simon-Thomas, E. R., Godzik, J., Castle, Antonenko, O., Ponz, A., Kogan, A., & Keltner, D. J. (2012). An fMRI study of caring vs self-focus during induced compassion and pride. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(6), 635–648. Simpson, B., & Willer, R. (2008). Altruism and indirect reciprocity: The interaction of person and situation in prosocial behavior. Social Psychology Quarterly, 71(1), 37–52. Slife, B. D., & Williams, R. (1995). What’s behind the research? Discovering hidden assumptions in the behavioral sciences. Sage. Slote, M. (2010). Moral sentimentalism. Oxford University Press. Smetana, J. G., & Braeges, J. L. (1990). The development of toddler’s moral and conventional judgments. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 36, 329–346. Smith, C. (2015). To flourish or destruct: A personalist theory of human goods, motivations, failure, and evil. University of Chicago Press. Snow, N. E. (2010). Virtue as social intelligence: An empirically grounded theory. Routledge. Snow, N. E. (2015). Notes toward an empirical psychology of virtue: Exploring the personality scaffolding of virtue. In J. Peters (Ed.), Aristotelian ethics in contemporary perspective (pp. 130–144). Routledge. Snow, N., & Narvaez, D. (Eds.) (2019). Self, motivation, and virtue: New findings from philosophy and the human sciences. Routledge.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

367

Snow, N. Wright, J. C., & Warren, M. T. (2021). Phronesis and Whole Trait Theory. In M. De Caro, & M. S. Vaccarezza (Eds.), Practical wisdom: Philosophical and psychological perspectives (pp. 70–95). Routledge. Sokol, B. W., Hammond, S. I., Kuebli, J., & Sweetman, L. (2015). The development of agency. In W. F. Overton, P. C. M. Molenaar, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology and developmental science: Theory and method (Vol. 1, 7th ed., pp. 284–322). John Wiley & Sons. Soto, C. J., & Tackett, J. L. (2015). Personality traits in childhood and adolescence: Structure, development, and outcomes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 358–362. Specht, J., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2011). Stability and change of personality across the life course: The impact of age and major life events on meanlevel and rank-order stability of the Big Five. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 862–882. Spezio, M., Peterson, G., & Roberts, R. C. (2019). Humility as openness to others: Interactive humility in the context of l’Arche. Journal of Moral Education, 48(1), 27–46. Stavrova, O., & Schlösser, T. (2015). Solidarity and social justice: Effect of individual differences in Justice Sensitivity on solidarity behaviour. European Journal of Personality, 29, 2–16. Steger, M. F. (2021). Meaning in life: A unified model. In C. R. Snyder, S. J. Lopez, L. M. Edwards, & S. C. Marques (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of positive psychology (3rd ed., pp. 959–967). Oxford University Press. Steger, M. F., Frazier, P., Oishi, S., & Kaler, M. (2006). The meaning in life questionnaire: Assessing the presence of and search for meaning in life. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 53(1), 80–93. Steger, M. F., & Kashdan, T. B. (2007). Stability and specificity of meaning in life and life satisfaction over one year. Journal of Happiness Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum on Subjective Well-Being, 8(2), 161–179. Steger, M. F., & Kashdan, T. B. (2013). The unbearable lightness of meaning: Well-being and unstable meaning in life. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 8(2), 103–115. Stellar, J. E., Gordon, A., Anderson, C. L., Piff, P. K., McNeil, G. D., & Keltner, D. (2018). Awe and humility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(2), 258–269. Steptoe, A., Shankar, A., Demakakos, P., & Wardle, J. (2013). Social isolation, loneliness, and all-cause mortality in older men and women. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 110(15), 5797–5801. Stevenson, L., Haberman, D. L., Wright, P. M., & Witt, C. (2017). Thirteen theories of human nature (7th ed.). Oxford University Press. Stichter, M. (2018). The skillfulness of virtue. Cambridge University Press. Stipek, D. J., Gralinski, J. H., & Kopp, C. B. (1990). Self-concept development in the toddler years. Developmental Psychology, 26, 972. Stryker, S. (2007). Identity theory and personality theory: Mutual relevance. Journal of Personality, 75(6), 1083–1102.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

368

References

Subkoviak, M. J., Enright, R. D., Wu, C.-R., & Gassin, E. A. (1995). Measuring interpersonal forgiveness in late adolescence and middle adulthood. Journal of Adolescence, 18(6), 641–655. Süssenbach, P., Rees, J., & Gollwitzer, M. (2019). When the going gets tough, individualizers get going: On the relationship between moral foundations and prosociality. Personality and Individual Differences, 136, 122–131. Sussman, W. I. (1973). Culture as history. Pantheon. Svetlova, M., Nichols, S. R., & Brownell, C. A. (2010). Toddlers’ prosocial behavior: From instrumental to empathic to altruistic helping. Child Development, 81(6), 1814–1827. Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories. Cambridge University Press. Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19(1), 70–82. Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophy and the human sciences: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. Harvard University Press. Teo, T., & Febbraro, A. R. (2003). Ethnocentrism as a form of intuition in psychology. Theory & Psychology, 13(5), 673–694. Tessman, L. (2005). Burdened virtues: Virtue ethics for liberatory struggles. Oxford University Press. Thalmayer, A. G., Toscanelli, C., & Arnett, J. J. (2021). The neglected 95% revisited: Is American psychology becoming less American? American Psychologist, 76(1), 116–129. Thielmann, I., Akrami, N., Babarović, T., Belloch, A., Bergh, R., Chirumbolo, A., Čolović, P., de Vries, R. E., Dostál, D., Egorova, M., Gnisci, A., Heydasch, T., Hilbig, B. E., Hsu, K.-Y., Izdebski, P., Leone, L., Marcus, B., Međedović, J., Nagy, J., … Lee, K. (2020). The HEXACO–100 across 16 languages: A largescale test of measurement invariance. Journal of Personality Assessment, 102(5), 714–726. Thoma, S. J., Derryberry, W. P., & Crowson, H. M. (2013). Describing and testing an intermediate concept measure of adolescent thinking. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 10(2), 239–252. Thoma, S. J., Walker, D. I., Chen, Y.-H., Frichand, A., Moulin-Stożek, D., & Kristjánsson, K. (2019). Adolescents’ application of the virtues across five cultural contexts. Developmental Psychology, 55(10), 2181–2192. Thompson, L. Y., Snyder, C. R., Hoffman, L., Michael, S. T., Rasmussen, H. N., Billings, L. S., Heinze, L., Neufeld, J. E., Shorey, H. S., Roberts, J. C., & Roberts, D. J. (2005). Dispositional forgiveness of self, others, and situations. Journal of Personality, 73(2), 313–359. Thomson, A. L., & Siegel, J. T. (2017). Elevation: A review of scholarship on a moral and other-praising emotion. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 12(6), 628–638. Thorsteinsen, K., & Vittersø, J. (2020). Now you see it, now you don’t: Solid and subtle differences between Hedonic and Eudaimonic Wellbeing. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 15(4), 519–530.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

369

Timmons, L., & Ekas, N. V. (2018). Giving thanks: Findings from a gratitude intervention with mothers of children with autism spectrum disorder. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 49, 13–24. Tjeltveit, A. C. (2003). Implicit virtues, divergent goods, multiple communities: Explicitly addressing virtues in the behavioral sciences. American Behavioral Scientist, 47, 395–414. To, S., & Sung, W. (2017). Presence of meaning, sources of meaning, and subjective well-being in emerging adulthood: A sample of Hong Kong community college students. Emerging Adulthood, 5(1), 69–74. Todd, E., & Funder, D. (2012, January). Personality correlates of unique perceptions of brief film situations. Poster, Society for Personality and Social Psychology. Todorov, A., Pakrashi, M., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2009). Evaluating faces on trustworthiness after minimal time exposure. Social Cognition, 27, 813–833. Tomasello, M. (2014). The ultra-social animal. European Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 187–194. Tomasello, M. (2019). Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. University of Harvard Press. Tomasello, M., Hare, B., Lehmann, H., & Call, J. (2007). Reliance on head versus eyes in gaze following of great apes and human infants: The cooperative eye hypothesis. Journal of Human Evolution, 52, 314–20. Toner, E., Haslam, N., Robinson, J., & Williams, P. (2012). Character strengths and wellbeing in adolescence: Structure and correlates of the values in action inventory of strengths for children. Personality and Individual Differences, 52(5), 637–642. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture (pp. 19–136). Oxford University Press. Tracy, J. L., Robins, R. W., & Sherman, J. W. (2009). The practice of psychological science: Searching for Cronbach’s two streams in social-personality psychology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 1206–1225. Tracy, J. L., Shariff, A. F., & Cheng, J. T. (2010). A naturalist’s view of pride. Emotion Review, 2, 163–177. Trevarthen, C., & Aitken, K. J. (2001). Infant intersubjectivity: Research, theory, and clinical applications. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 3–48. Tudge, J. R. H., Freitas, L. B. L., O’Brien, L., & Mokrova, I. L. (2018). Methods for studying the virtue of gratitude cross-culturally. Cross-Cultural Research: The Journal of Comparative Social Science, 52(1), 19–30. Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge University Press. Turiel, E. (2006). The development of morality. In N. Eisenberg, W. Damon, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Social, emotional, and personality development (Vol. 3, 6th ed., pp. 789–857). John Wiley & Sons Inc. Vaish, A., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Sympathy through affective perspective taking and its relation to prosocial behavior in toddlers. Developmental Psychology, 45(2), 534–543.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

370

References

Vaish, A., Missana, M., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Three-year-old children intervene in third-party moral transgressions. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 29, 124–130. van den Bos, W., van Dijk, E., Westenberg, M., Rombouts, S. B., & Crone, E. A. (2009). What motivates repayment? Neural correlates of reciprocity in the trust game. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 4(3), 294–304. VanderWeele, T. J. (2017). On the promotion of human flourishing. PNAS, 114(31), 8148–8156. van Scheppingen, M. A., Jackson, J. J., Specht, J., Hutteman, R., Denissen, J. J. A., & Bleidorn, W. (2016). Personality trait development during the transition to parenthood: A test of social investment theory. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(5), 452–462. van Zyl, L. (2018). Virtue ethics: A contemporary introduction. Routledge. Veldorale-Brogan, A., Bradford, K., & Vail, A. (2009). Marital virtues and their relationship to individual functioning, communication, and relationship adjustment. Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 281–293. Veldorale-Brogan, A., Lambert, N. M., Fincham, F. D., & DeWall, C. N. (2012). The virtue of problem-solving: Perceived partner virtues as predictors of problem-solving efficacy. Personal Relationships, 20, 511–523. Vera, A. (2022). ‘Everybody in that building experienced combat that night.’ Army veteran Richard Fierro describes the moment he took down the Colorado nightclub gunman. Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2022/11/22/us/richardfierro-colorado-springs-club-q-shooting/index.html Visserman, M. L., Impett, E. A., Righetti, F., Muise, A., Keltner, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2019). To “see” is to feel grateful? A quasi-signal detection analysis of romantic partners’ sacrifices. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10(3), 317–325. Vittersø, J. (2016). The handbook of eudaimonic well-being. Springer. Vranas, P. B. M. (2007). I ought, therefore I can. Philosophical Studies, 136(2), 167–216. Wagner, J., Becker, M., Lüdtke, O., & Trautwein, U. (2015). The first partnership experience and personality development: A propensity score matching study in young adulthood. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(4), 455–463. Walker, D. F., & Gorsuch, R. L. (2004). Dimensions underlying sixteen models of forgiveness and reconciliation. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 32(1), 1–25. Walker, D. I. (2022). Sociological contributions for researching morality and cultivating states of moral character. Journal of Moral Education, 51(1), 24–34. Walker, D. I., Curren, R., & Jones, C. (2015). Good friendships among children: A theoretical and empirical investigation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 46, 286–308. Walker, D. I., Thoma, S. J., Jones, C., & Kristjánsson, K. (2017). Adolescent moral judgement: A study of UK secondary school pupils. British Educational Research Journal, 43(3), 588–607. Walker, L. J. (2014). Prosocial exemplarity in adolescence and adulthood. In L. Padilla-Walker, & G. Carlo (Eds.), The multidimensionality of prosocial

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

371

behavior: Biological, socialization, and contextual perspectives (pp. 433–453). Oxford University Press. Walker, L. J., & Frimer, J. A. (2011). The science of moral development. In M. K. Underwood, & L. H. Rosen (Eds.), Social development: Relationships in infancy, childhood, and adolescence (pp. 235–262). Guilford Press. Walker, L. J., Frimer, J. A., & Dunlop, W. L. (2010). Varieties of moral personality: Beyond the banality of heroism. Journal of Personality, 78(3), 907–942. Wang, J., Hilliard, L. J., Hershberg, R. M., Bowers, E. P., Chase, P. A., Champine, R. B., … Lerner, R. M. (2015). Character in childhood and early adolescence: Models and measurement. Journal of Moral Education, 44(2), 165–197. Warneken, F. (2013). Young children proactively remedy unnoticed accidents. Cognition, 126(1), 101–108. Warneken, F., Chen, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Cooperative activities in young children and chimpanzees. Child Development, 77, 640–663. Warneken, F., Gräfenhain, M., & Tomasello, M. (2012). Collaborative partner or social tool? New evidence for young children’s understanding of joint intentions in collaborative activities. Developmental Science, 15(1), 54–61. Warneken, F., Lohse, K., Melis, A. P., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Young children share the spoils after collaboration. Psychological Science, 22, 267–273. Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young chimpanzees. Science, 311, 1301–1303. Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Extrinsic rewards undermine altruistic tendencies in 20-month-olds. Developmental Psychology, 44(6), 1785–1788. Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Varieties of altruism in children and chimpanzees. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(9), 397. Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2013). The emergence of contingent responsivity in young children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 116, 338–350. Waterman, A. S. (1993). Two conceptions of happiness: Contrasts of personal expressiveness (eudaimonia) and hedonic enjoyment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 678–691. Watkins, P. C., Woodward, K., Stone, T., & Kolts, R. L. (2003). Gratitude and happiness: Development of a measure of gratitude and relationships with subjective well-being. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 31(5), 431–452. Watters, E. (2010). Crazy like us: The globalization of the American psyche. Free Press. Weber, M., Ruch, W., Littman-Ovadia, H., Lavy, S., & Gai, O. (2013). Relationships among higher-order strengths factors, subjective well-being, and general self-efficacy – The case of Israeli adolescents. Personality and Individual Differences, 55(3), 322–327. Webster, G. D. (2009). The person-situation interaction is increasingly outpacing the person-situation debate in the scientific literature: A 30-year analysis of publication trends, 1978–2007. Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 278–279. Wee, C. (2014). Filial obligations: A comparative study. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13(1), 83–97.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

372

References

Weller, D., & Lagattuta, K. H. (2013). Helping the ingroup feels better: Children’s judgments and emotion attributions in response to prosocial dilemmas. Child Development, 84(1), 253–268. Weller, J. A., & Thulin, E. W. (2012). Do honest people take fewer risks? Personality correlates of risk-taking to achieve gains and avoid losses in the HEXACO space. Personality and Individual Differences, 53, 923–926. West, R. (2018). Virtue ethics is empirically adequate: A defense of the CAPS response to situationism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99(1), 79–111. We¸ziak-Białowolska, D., McNeely, E., & VanderWeele, T. J. (2019). Human flourishing in cross cultural settings: Evidence from the United States, China, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and Mexico. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 1269. https://doi​ .org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01269 Wilcox, W. B., & Dew, J. (2016). The social and cultural predictors of generosity in marriage: Gender egalitarianism, religiosity, and familism. Journal of Family Issues, 37(1), 97–118. Williams, B. (1981). Persons, character, and morality. In Moral luck: Philosophical papers, 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press. Williams, B. (2006). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Taylor & Francis. Williamson, R. A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Markman, A. N. (2008). Prior experiences and perceived efficacy influence 3-year-olds’ imitation. Developmental Psychology, 44, 275–285. Winsler, A. (2009). Still talking to ourselves after all these years: A review of current research on private speech. In A. Winsler, C. Fernyhough, & I. Montero (Eds.), Private speech, executive functioning, and the development of verbal selfregulation (pp. 3–41). Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Blackwell Publishing. Witvliet, C. vanOyen, Ludwig, T. E., & Vander Laan, K. L. (2001). Granting forgiveness or harboring grudges: Implications for emotion, physiology, and health. Psychological Science, 12(2), 117–123. Wolf, S. (1982). Moral saints. Journal of Philosophy, 79(8), 419–439. Wolf, S. (2007). Moral psychology and the unity of the virtues. Ratio 20(2), 145–167. Wood, A. M., Joseph, S., Lloyd, J., & Atkins, S. (2009). Gratitude influences sleep through the mechanism of pre-sleep cognitions. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 66(1), 43–48. Wood, A. M., Joseph, S., & Maltby, J. (2008). Gratitude uniquely predicts satisfaction with life: Incremental validity above the domains and facets of the five factor model. Personality and Individual Differences, 45(1), 49–54. Wood, A. M., Joseph, S., & Maltby, J. (2009). Gratitude predicts psychological well-being above the Big Five facets. Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 443–447. Wood, A. M., Maltby, J., Stewart, N., & Joseph, S. (2008). Conceptualizing gratitude and appreciation as a unitary personality trait. Personality and Individual Differences, 44(3), 621–632.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

References

373

Wood, D., & Roberts, B. W. (2006). Cross-sectional and longitudinal tests of the personality and role identity structural model (PRISM). Journal of Personality, 74(3), 779–809. Wood, L. A., Kendal, R. A., & Flynn, E. G. (2013). Copy me or copy you? The effect of prior experience on social learning. Cognition, 127, 203–213. Woodard, C. R. (2004). Hardiness and the concept of courage. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 56, 173–185. Woodard, C. R., & Pury, C. L. S. (2007). The construct of courage: Categorization and measurement. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 59, 135–147. Woodruff, P. (2001). Reverence: Renewing a forgotten virtue. Oxford University Press. Wright, J. C., & Bartsch, K. (2008). Portraits of early moral sensibility in two children’s everyday conversation. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 54, 56–85. Wright, J. C., Warren, & Snow, N. (2021). Understanding virtue: Theory and measurement. Oxford University Press. Wrzus, C., Wagner, G. G., & Riediger, M. (2016). Personality-situation transactions from adolescence to old age. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110, 782–799. Yao, Q., & Moskowitz, D. S. (2015). Trait agreeableness and social status moderate behavioral responsiveness to communal behavior. Journal of Personality, 83, 191–201. Yau, J., & Smetana, J. G. (2003). Conceptions of moral, social-conventional, and personal events among Chinese preschoolers in Hong Kong. Child Development, 74, 647–658. Yoder, K. J., & Decety, J. (2014a). Spatiotemporal neural dynamics of moral judgment: A high-density ERP study. Neuropsychologia, 60, 39–45. Yoder, K. J., & Decety, J. (2014b). The good, the bad, and the just: Justice sensitivity predicts neural response during moral evaluation of actions performed by others. Journal of Neuroscience, 34(12), 4161–4166. Yu, L., & Xie, D. (2021). Measuring virtues in Chinese culture: Development of a Chinese moral character questionnaire. Applied Research in Quality of Life, 16(1), 51–69. Zettler, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2010). Honesty-humility and a person-situation interaction at work. European Journal of Personality, 24(7), 569–582. Zettler, I., Hilbig, B. E., & Heydasch, T. (2013). Two sides of one coin: HonestyHumility and social factors mutually shape social dilemma decision making. Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 286–295.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index

Abe, N., 286 acquired traits, 4–6, 29, 32–35, 191, 322 of children, 14 action vs. behavior, 27, 266–267 activities, Aristotle on, 247–248 adolescence character strength, 117–118 honesty, 117 moral emotions, 115 moral exemplars, 116 moral identity, 113, 114 morality, 96 practical wisdom, 121 self-control, 117 affective trait, 268, 272 affordances, 236 age differences character strength, 117 collective intentionality, 102–104 cooperation and helping, 111 equal reward distribution, 107 fairness, 110, 111 giving reasons for actions, 107 joint attention, 99 joint commitments, 107 moral conversations, 99 moral emotions, 116 moral identity, 113 normative sensibility, 107, 108 practical wisdom, 121 prereflective agency, 98 prosocial behaviors, 109–110, 119 self-recognition, 100 agency, 135, 149, 168, 205 moral development, 97–98, 100 committed compliance, 99 executive functions, 100 joint attention, 99, 103 moral expectations, 99–100 parent-infant synchrony, 98–99 prereflective agency, 98

self-direction, 100–101 self-recognition, 100 social structuring of, 98 personality and, 126, 131, 136, 141, 144, 146, 149 WTT, 144 aggregation, 75 aggression, 156 Aknin, L. B., 166, 183, 284 Alexandrova, A., 152, 162, 163, 165, 173, 312 Algoe, S. B., 240 Allen, A., 229 Allgaier, K., 232 Allport, G. W., 73, 76, 77, 125, 137, 141 altruism, 165, 183, 233 ancient Greeks, 15, 26, 50, 245 Anderson, A. R., 246 Anscombe, G. E. M., 73 APM. See Aristotelian Phronesis Model (APM) Appreciation of Others, 91 Aquino, K., 112, 234 Aristotelian Phronesis Model (APM), 63, 64, 280–282 Aristotelian tradition, 27, 49 moral virtue development, 61 practical wisdom and virtue development, 62–65 Aristotelian virtue theory, 27 Aristotle, 28, 29, 32, 42, 48, 50, 81, 88, 120, 126, 179, 246, 247, 267, 281, 325, 331 on action and choice, 158–160 on activities, 247–248 character friendship, 246 on CPRs, 260–261 de Anima, 248 on emotion, 43 ethics, 44 eudaimonia. See eudaimonia golden mean, 198–199 group belonging, 259 meaning and purpose, 261–264

374

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index nature–nurture dichotomy, dismissal of, 32 Nicomachean Ethics, 44, 49, 80, 246, 247, 260 Politics, 246, 260 soul, degrees of, 248 virtue and welfare connection, 49 on virtue traits, 191 Arthur, J., 315 articulate knowledge, 60–61 Ashton, M. C., 128, 184 automaticity, 34, 118, 132 Bargh, J.A., 118 Barkley, R. A., 100, 114 Bartsch, K., 99 Baumert, A., 124, 132 behavior, 274–277, 322 action vs., 27, 266–267 causal factors in, 110 egoism, 233–234 interventions to virtue-related, 282–283 observed, 274–275 prosocial, 109–110, 167–169 self-reported, 274–276 situations influence on, 224–225 Bellah, R. N., 154, 155 Bem, D. J., 229 Berkowitz, M. W., 282 between-person variability, 192 Betz, G., 150 Bier, M. C., 282 Big 5 model, 125, 127–129, 133, 135, 185–187, 226, 228, 238 Bleidorn, W., 195, 208, 209, 214, 239, 275 blueprint function, 45, 281–282 Bolderdijk, J. W., 235 bourgeois virtues, 200, 201 Bowlby, J., 98 Breen, W. E., 89, 91, 186, 189 Brewer, M. B., 101 Brief Humility Scale, 184 Brinkmann, S., 157, 158 Broadie, S., 50, 328 Brown, M., 284 Brown, R. P., 184, 186, 189 bullet-biting approach, 151–153, 313 burdened virtues, 67 Burton, R. V., 75 Calder, A. J., 243 CAPS. See Cognitive-Affective Processing System (CAPS) Carver, C. S., 31, 192, 230 categorical diagnosis, 83 Cervone, D., 124 Chaminade, T., 102

375

character, 32, 43, 66, 125 culture of, 75 devaluation, 76, 77 friendship, 246 to personality, 75–77 unity of, 83 character education, 15 effectiveness, 282–283 character strengths, 78–79, 84 atheoretical approach, 80–81 development, 117–119 diagnostic scheme for, 82–85 children acquired traits, 14 honesty and dishonesty, 74–75 moral behavior, 14 moral development. See moral development, children speech development, 35 Chirumbolo, A., 232 choices and actions, 34 cleverness vs. practical wisdom, 45 close personal relationships (CPRs), 260–261 Cognitive-Affective Processing System (CAPS), 130–131, 139 Cokelet, B., 303, 315 collective identity, children, 101–102 collective intentionality, children, 102–105 committed compliance, 240–241 communion, 199 compassion, 55, 62, 189, 286 of healers, 218–219 in parenting role, 215–216 of psychotherapy, 218–219 self-reported, 183–184 Compassion scale, 183–184 components, virtues, 177, 322–323, 332. See also specific components behavior, 39–40, 274–277 emotion and motivation, 42–43, 278–280 forgiveness, 268–271 gratitude, 271–274 knowledge, 40–42, 277–278 practical wisdom, 43–45, 280–282 and role enactment, 211–212 conceptual engineering, 307–308 Confucian tradition, 27, 29, 209 moral virtue development, 61 Confucius, 43, 44, 48, 120 constitutive function, practical wisdom, 45–47 construct validity, scale, 180 core psychological process, 184 Costa, P. T., Jr., 127 counterproductive work behavior (CWB), 231–232

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

376 Index courage, 29–30, 33, 34, 38, 39, 42, 85, 181, 187, 203, 263, 276–277 in police officer role, 216–217 self-reported, 180–181 valuableness and, 46 CPRs. See close personal relationships (CPRs) Crocker, J., 166 cross-cultural virtue traits, 39 Csibra, G., 114 cultural ideals, 37 cultural norms, 38 cultural relativity, 14, 36, 37, 39 culture(s), 37, 206 of character, 75 and children’s collective intentionality, 104–105 ethnocentrism in flourishing assessment, 256–258 and meaning/purpose, 262–263 of personality, 75, 76, 136, 208 and virtues, 5, 14, 35–39, 295, 318–320 CWB. See counterproductive work behavior (CWB) Damian, R. I., 131, 132 Dark Triad, 199 Darnell, C., 45, 121 Davis, D. E., 189, 273 De Caro, M., 281 de Waal, F. B. M., 259 Decety, J., 102, 286 deliberation, 46–48, 60–61 deliberative practical wisdom, 63 DelVecchio, W. F., 131 Denissen, J. J., 195, 214, 239, 275 density distribution approach, 193, 194, 231 DeSteno, D., 82, 91 developmental science, 95 Dewey, J., 154 diagnostic scheme, 82–85 Dickens, L. R., 273 ‘dimensional’ approach, 31 dimensional diagnosis, 83 disengaged describers, 151–152, 313 disguised ideology, 155–156 disposition, 44 dispositional empathy, 286 Dispositional Positive Emotion Scales, 183 Doris, J. M., 301, 302, 305, 306, 314, 324 Driver, J., 58, 60, 323 Dunn, E. W., 183, 284 Eberhardt, N., 295 Eisenberg, N., 110, 119 embodied value, 242

Emmons, R. A., 89 emotion–action harmony, 43 emotional regulation, 45 emotions, 42–43, 183, 273–274, 278–280, 322 APM, 282 forgiveness, 279–280 gratitude, 279–280 injustice, 280 moral emotions, 115–116 normative ethics, 307 positive, 81 empirical virtue research conceptual resources, 311–312, 330–331 conceptualization of virtues, 317–322 contemporary collaborations, 314–317 early disappointments and reinterpretation, 74–75 flexibility, 310–311 functional aspects of virtue traits, 62 general recommendations, 330–332 informant reports, 326–327 interdisciplinarity, 313–317 observational and experimental designs, 327 reasons for, 2–16 good life, virtues as pathway to, 15–16 humans as moral creatures, 2–4 moral behavior and acquired traits, 4–6 moral education, value of, 7–15 psychologically realistic virtues, 6–7 study designs, 325–328 systematic theory, 317–318 theoretical guidance for, lack of, 16–17 unsystematic theory, 318–320 virtue measurement, 325–326, 330 Enright, R. D., 118, 269, 270 epistemic virtues, 1 Epstein, S., 75 ethical values, 157 ethics, 50, 305 Aristotle’s, 44 metaethics, 55–56, 292–293 normative, 55, 292–293, 296–297 eudaimonia, 3, 20, 49–51, 79, 120, 140, 147, 153, 171, 243–247, 322, 332. See also good life; goods, human; value(s) activities and, 248 assessment, challenges in, 253 disagreement about content, 254–255 existence of, 253–254 measurement, 255–256 universality, lack of argument for, 255 CPRs for, 260–261 definition, 247 degrees of soul, 248 ethnocentrism in assessment, 256–258

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index group belonging for, 259–260 human goods and, 259–264 meaning and, 261–264 mid-level goods and, 248–249 multidimensionality, 254–255 nature-fulfillment perspective, 244–245 sociality, human, 245–247 subjective and intersubjective elements, 259 euphemisms, 164 evaluation bullet-biters, 152, 173 experience-sampling, 188, 193–195, 214, 227, 239 explicit knowledge, 41 externalism, virtue, 58 fact(s). See also fact–value dichotomy about virtue science, 153–154 objective, 157, 158 fact–value dichotomy, 19, 73, 85, 150–151, 171–173, 312–313 critiques, 154 communitarian, 154–155 interdefinition of facts and values, 156–157 neo-Aristotelian, 158–160 psychology as moral science, 157–158 disengaged describers, 151–152 disguised ideology, 155–156 evaluation bullet-biters, 152, 173 fact–value linkages in psychology, 160–169 health and mortality, 160–169 logical positivism and, 156–157 objective facts and value, 157, 158 objectivity–subjectivity divide, 169 ontological individualism, 154–155 prosocial behavior and, 167–169 rejection of, 151 resolution of, 152–153 robust, 151 scientific valuing, productive, 170–171 value commitment, 155, 162–164, 172–173 value-free ideal, 150, 162 value inclusion, 156, 160–162 value judgement, 162, 163 value position, 152, 155–157 values and variation, 162–165 virtue science, facts about, 153–154 well-being, 162, 173 fairness, 30, 35, 38, 110–112, 188, 215, 217, 235, 271, 276 Fegley, S., 114 Feldman, R., 98 Fernyhough, C., 100 filial piety, 209–210 Fischer, P., 224 Flack, J. C., 259 Flanagan, O., 295, 300, 301, 307, 314

377

Fleeson, W., 75, 133, 134, 139, 141–144, 149, 193, 194, 227 flourishing, 3, 4, 15, 28, 49–51, 54, 55, 81, 140, 153, 161, 168, 242, 243, 247, 253–255, 328, 329. See also eudaimonia CPRs for, 260–261 ethnocentrism in assessment, 256–258 group belonging for, 259–260 human goods and, 259–264 meaning and, 261–264 self-report assessments, 255–256 single timepoint assessment, 256 well-being and, 258 forgiveness, 38, 186, 189, 260 Christian component, 268–269 dispositional, 268, 270 emotions, 279–280 Enright Forgiveness Inventory, 269, 270 measurement, 268–271 mental health and, 269–270 practical wisdom and, 271 self-reported, 184 and vicious traits, 198 virtue assessment, 268–271 Fowers, B. J., 51, 156, 158, 167, 182, 195, 200, 211, 214, 235, 238, 239, 243, 246, 248, 275, 276, 281, 315 Fredrickson, B. L., 81 Frimer, J. A., 95 Funder, D. C., 223, 225, 228–230 Furr, R. M., 223, 225, 228–230 Gallagher, P., 194 Gao, F., 269 generosity, 31–34, 179, 189, 202, 287 intervention, 284 knowledge of, 40–41 marital, 183 self-reported, 183 Gergely, C., 114 golden mean, 198–199 good life, 3, 15–16, 28, 30, 49–51, 76, 331. See also eudaimonia; goods, human; value(s) activities and, 247–248 constituents of, 247–249 formal characteristics, 247 and morality, 3–4 nature-fulfillment perspective, 244 and WTT, 142 goods, human CPRs, 260–261 goals and virtues, relations between, 249–252 group belonging, 259–260 meaning and, 261–264 mid-level goods and eudaimonia, 248–249

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

378 Index goods, human (cont.) social belonging, 260 values, 161–162, 243, 244 and well-being, 259–264 Gorsuch, R. L., 268 GQ-6. See Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6) GRAT. See Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test (GRAT) gratitude, 39, 62, 82, 87, 186–189 affective trait, 272 age and, 117 appreciation, 272 conceptualization, 89 emotions, 279–280 GQ-6, 90, 182, 186, 271, 272 GRAT, 90, 182, 271, 272 interventions, 272–273 knowledge and, 277–278 MCGM, 90, 182, 273 measurement of, 89–91 self-reported, 182–183 STRIVE-4 Model, 90–93 within-person variability, 196 Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test (GRAT), 90, 182, 271, 272 Gratitude Questionnaire-6 (GQ-6), 90, 182, 186, 271, 272 Greasley, K., 299 Greene, J. D., 285, 286 Griffin, J., 301, 305 Grossmann, I., 121

Honesty-Humility, 127, 128, 184, 226, 231–233, 238, 274 honor culture, 36 Hudson, N. W., 208 Huesman, L. R., 153 human nature, 244, 245, 252–253 humans as moral creatures, 2–4, 16, 137 humility, 68–69, 189 self-reported, 184–185 within-person variability, 196 Hunter, J. D., 197

habit-formation model, 33, 34 habituation, 32, 33, 46, 133, 285 Haidt, J., 240 Hampson, P. J., 237 Han, H., 285 Hao, J. Y., 268 Hardy, S., 113 Hare, B., 166 Harman, G., 301, 324 Hart, D., 114, 234 Hartshorne, H., 74, 75 Haybron, D. M., 165, 243, 253 Hayward, R. D., 82, 91 healing professionals, 217–220 Heartland Forgiveness Scale, 186 Heller, D., 209 Hempel, C., 178 Henne, P., 303 Henrich, J., 256 Hertz, S. G., 113 HEXACO model, 128–129, 133, 185, 226, 228, 238 Hilbig, B. E., 231, 232 honesty, 74–75, 117, 219–220, 250–252, 285–286

Jablensky, A., 83 Jayawickreme, E., 125, 133–135, 139, 141–144, 149 John, O. P., 127, 128 Johnson, K., 283 Johnson, R. C., 183 Jon, S., 156, 173 Joseph, S., 187, 272 justice, 27, 55, 64, 259–264 self-reported, 181–182, 187 Justice Sensitivity, 181–182, 186, 235, 274–276, 280, 286

ideal virtue science, 293–296 ideal virtues, 26, 27, 56–57 Identity Theory, 203, 207, 208 ideology, 155–156 incremental validity, virtues, 90, 126, 129, 137, 138, 179, 186, 187 individualism, 154–156 informant reports, 180, 188–190, 275–276, 326–327 inner virtues, 39, 40 instrumentalism, 155–156 integrative function, practical wisdom, 45, 47–49 intelligence, 28–30, 34, 41, 60, 62 intentional habituation, 32, 33 intentional virtue, 40–42 development, 33, 34 interdisciplinary research, 313–317 Interpersonal Fairness Scale, 182, 187 intrinsic motivation, 113–115 Ip, E., 120

Kant, I., 44, 67, 120 Keltner, D., 166 Kendler, H. H., 153 Kiang, L., 120 Kiknadze, N. C., 243 Killen, M., 95 Kim, J. J., 118 kindness, 30, 118, 166, 188, 276 self-reported, 183, 187 Kiverstein, J., 236 Klimstra, T. A., 207

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index knowledge, virtues, 40–42, 277–278, 323 knowledge acquisition, 250 Kochanska, G., 99, 100, 240 Kogan, A., 286 Kohlberg, L., 95, 97 Korsgaard, C. M., 303 Kowalski, R. M., 181 Krause, N., 82, 91, 185 Krettenauer, T., 113, 115 Kristjánsson, K., 63, 151, 200, 211, 315 Kruse, E., 184 LaFleur, W. R., 302 Lane, A. A., 182, 235, 238, 275, 276 Law, M. K., 194, 227 Lee, K., 128, 184 Lee, Y.-R., 269 Lefevor, G. T., 224, 235 Leikas, S., 233 Li, 36, 37 living well, 3, 15, 16, 147 Lo Presti, P., 236 logical positivism, 156–157 Longino, H. E., 172, 173 longitudinal research, 326 loyalty, 30, 41, 42, 171, 250–251 group belonging, 260 in parenting role, 215 in teaching role, 216 Ma, L. K., 182 MacIntyre, A. C., 158, 300 Maltby, J., 187, 272 Martin, W., 303 mature personality, 76 maturity principle, 207 McAdams, D. P., 125, 135–137, 145–147, 240 McCabe, K. O., 134 McCrae, R. R., 127 McCullough, M. E., 89, 186, 188, 189, 268, 272 McDermott, J. M, 212 MCGM. See Multi-Component Gratitude Measure (MCGM) McGrath, R. E., 125, 185 McNulty, J. K., 198 means-end activities, 248 Meindl, 195 Meindl, P., 194, 275 metacognition, 120 metaethics, 55–56, 292–293 Mischel, W., 130, 131, 226, 229 modesty, 68–69 moral aspirations, 120 moral behavior, 2, 16, 96, 110, 119, 126, 279 and acquired traits, 4–6

379

of children, 14 moral identity and, 112–113 personality and, 126 moral commitments, 113 moral creatures, humans as, 2–4, 16, 137 moral development, 20, 61–66, 95–97. See also moral development, children behaviors in, 109–112, 119 eudaimonia, 120 practical wisdom, 120–122 preconditions for, 97–109 role adoption, 119 scalar assessment, 109 situational factors, 119 traits in, 112–119 moral development, children, 108–109 agency in, 97–98, 100 committed compliance, 99 executive functions, 100 joint attention, 99, 103 moral expectations, 99–100 parent-infant synchrony, 98–99 prereflective agency, 98 self-direction, 100–101 self-recognition, 100 social structuring of, 98 behavior, 109–110 collective identity, 101–102, 105 collective intentionality, 102–105 collective welfare, 101–105 cooperation and helping, 111–112 fairness, 110–111 individual identity development, 101–102 intersubjective perspective, recognition of, 104–105, 114 joint intentionality, 103–104 normativity, 105–106, 108 equal reward distribution, 107–108 giving reasons for actions, 107 high-fidelity imitation, 106 joint commitments, 107 maturational and experiential elements, 108 norm enforcement, 107 of obligation, 107 social cognitive domain theory, 108 prosocial behavior, 109–110 social-cognitive capacities, 102–103 value internalization, 113–114 “we”, recognition of, 104 moral education, 16 value of, 7–15 moral emotions, 115–116 moral exemplars, 116–117 Moral Foundations Theory, 234, 238

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

380 Index moral identity, 112, 234 age and, 113 definition, 112 intrinsic motivation, 113–115 and moral behavior, 112–113 moral commitment/values and, 113 moral intentionality, 113–115 moral intentionality, 113–115 moral motivation, 3 moral normativity, 157 moral philosophy, 55–60, 323–325 articulate knowledge, 60–61 conceptual analysis, 68–69 contentious theoretical assumptions, 60–64, 66, 68 maximally general philosophic accounts, 57–59 metaethics, 55–56, 292–293 normative ethics, 55, 292–293, 296–297 ordinary thought and practice, 56–57, 64, 178 rational deliberation, 60–61 reason, emotion, and developmental pathways, 60–66 revisionary ideal virtue, 56–57 theoretical assumptions, 55 virtue science as interdisciplinary domain of, 291–309 moral sprouts, 32 moral virtues, 1, 3, 4, 15, 25–28, 55, 295, 311 articulate knowledge, 60–61 conceptual analysis of, 68–69 development, 61–66 and personal good, 66–68 rational deliberation, 60–61 reason, emotion, and developmental pathways to, 60–66 morality, 1, 2, 56, 67, 95, 96, 105, 108, 112, 137 and good life, 3–4 and personality, 140–144, 146, 148 “rail guard” formulation, 3 right and wrong actions, 3 and WTT, 141–143 “more is better” approach, 171, 199, 325–328 Morgan, B., 62, 89–91, 182, 273, 278, 279, 325 Moskowitz, D. S., 227 motivation, virtues, 42–43, 267, 278–280, 322 Moussaoui, L. S., 234 multi-component gratitude measure (MCGM), 90, 182, 273 Nagel, T., 303 Narvaez, D., 315 nature-nurture dichotomy, 32 Nelson, S. K., 284 neurophysiology, 284–287, 327–328 Ng, V., 199, 326

Nicholson, I. A. M., 76 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 44, 49, 80, 246, 247, 260 Nietzsche, 67 non-deliberative practical wisdom, 63 normative claims, 19 normative ethicists, 297, 302 contentious empirical assumptions, 305 normative questions, 297–298 virtue science, reason for ignoring, 298–300 normative ethics, 55, 292–293, 296–297, 306–309 emotions, 307 “ought entails can”/“obligation entails can” principle, 301–304 rebellion against psychology, 303 Strong Division position, 297–300 virtue science as constraint for, 292–293 normative questions, 297–299, 307 normative sensibility, children, 105–106, 108 equal reward distribution, 107–108 giving reasons for actions, 107 high fidelity imitation, 106 joint commitments, 107 maturational and experiential elements, 108 norm enforcement, 107 of obligation, 107 Social Cognitive Domain Theory, 108 Norton, P. J., 181 Novak, L. F., 243, 254 Nunner-Winkler, G., 115 Nussbaum, M. C., 292, 304 O’Brien, E. J., 75 obedience, 38 observable behavior, 39 ontological individualism, 154–155 ordinary virtues, 26, 201 Orth, U., 115 Otake, K., 183 other-benefiting, 41, 109, 165, 168, 170, 180, 240, 268 Oveis, C., 184, 284 parenting role, 212–216 Park, N., 118 Park, Y., 189 Paxton, J. M., 285 performance virtues, 1 personal good, 56, 66–68 personality, 32, 34, 75–77, 124–125, 179 accretion, 135, 144 agency and, 126, 131, 136, 141, 144, 146, 149 Agreeableness, 127, 128, 132, 186, 187, 207, 209, 226, 227, 233, 238, 286 architecture, 124

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index Big 5 model, 125, 127–129, 133, 135, 185–187, 226, 228, 238 CAPS, 130–131, 134, 139 classical, 231–233 Conscientiousness, 127, 128, 132, 186, 187, 207–209, 226, 233, 238 as contextualized dispositions, 226–227 cumulative continuity principle, 131 density distribution, 133 distinctiveness of virtues and, 125–129, 140, 185 eudaimonia and, 140, 147 Extraversion, 127, 128, 132, 134, 142, 186, 187, 209, 226, 228, 233 HEXACO model, 128–129, 133, 185, 226, 228, 238 Honesty-Humility, 127, 128, 184, 226, 231–233, 238, 274 integrative approaches, 133–137 intentional cultivation of virtue and, 143–145 longitudinal stability and change in, 131–133 maturity principle, 132 morality and, 140–144, 146, 148 Neuroticism, 127, 128, 132, 186, 226, 228, 233 Openness to Experience, 127, 128, 187, 209, 226, 233 practical wisdom and, 140, 143–145, 148 and roles, 207–210 scalar measurement, 185–187 self-narratives and, 136–137, 146–147 situational factors, 134 social cognitive processes, 124, 130–132, 134, 139, 144, 226 structural approach, 124, 127–130, 135, 138–139 subsumption of virtues in, 137–138 TTFP, 135–138, 145–147 WTT vs., 146 within-person variability, 134, 193–194, 231 WTT, 133–135, 139, 140, 149 agency in, 144 good life and, 142 intentional cultivation of virtue and, 143–145 modified model, 140 morality of virtue and, 141–144 practical wisdom and, 143–145, 148 reinterpretation of, 144–145 STRIVE-4 Model and, 140 TTFP vs., 146 person-situation interactions, 225–226, 322 individual influence, 227–228 selection of situations, 228–229 situation evocation, 229 situation perception, 229–230 personality as contextualized dispositions, 226–227

381

situational demands/opportunities, recognition of, 235–238 trait, 230–231 broad person characteristic, 233–234 classical personality traits, 231–233 moral characteristic, 234–235 and virtue science, 238–241 Peterson, C., 53, 78–85, 88, 89, 118, 125, 317, 321 philosophic debates/work. See moral philosophy philosophic pedagogy, 308 phronimos, 238 Plato, 50 Politics (Aristotle), 246 positive psychology, 77–79, 86–87, 117, 317 atheoretical approach, 80–82 diagnostic scheme, 82–85 empirically-oriented virtue theorization, 87–88 insufficiency of virtue theory, 80–82, 87–88 problems in, 79–88 simultaneously examining multiple virtues, 88 sources of research fragmentation, 79–86 practical wisdom, 28, 43–45, 57, 126, 139–141, 143, 171, 219, 267, 280–282, 323 APM, 63, 64, 280–282 cleverness vs., 45 constitutive function, 45–47 deliberative, 63 and forgiveness, 271 integrative function, 45, 47–49 moral development, 120–122 moral perception, 45 neo-Aristotelian theory of, 45–49 non-deliberative, 63 and personality, 140, 143–145, 148 role in virtue development, 62–65 skills expertise vs., 44 and WTT, 143–145 Pratt, M. W., 113 prescriptive psychology, 173 pride, 184 prosocial behavior, 109–110 and fact/value dichotomy, 167–169 prosociality, 35, 107, 165, 167, 182, 275, 286 Psychological Well-Being, 263 psychologically realistic virtues, 6–7, 16, 18, 32 psychologically unrealistic virtue, 6 psychology, virtues in, 73 character, reinterpretation of, 74–75 from character to personality, 75–77 gratitude, 88–93 honesty, 74–75 positive. See positive psychology re-emergence of virtue in, 77–79 psychology as moral science, 157–158 purpose, 261

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

382 Index Purpose in Life scale, 263 Pury, C. L. S., 181 Putnam, H., 156, 157 quantitative science of virtue, 178, 179 Quine, W. V., 156 Rapp, H., 269 rational deliberation, 60–61 realistic ordinary virtue, 26 realistic virtues, 6–7, 16, 18, 26, 32, 56, 62, 178, 314 redemptive persons, 240 Reimer, K. S., 116, 117 Reimer, L. C., 116 Reis, H. T., 196 relationship(s), 14, 63, 132, 204–205 Aristotle on, 246 Big 5 and situation selection, 228 close, 165, 328 CPRs, 260–261 fairness in, 30 HEXACO model and situation selection, 228 personality and, 207–209 traits and, 206–207 reliability, scale, 180 Richardson, F. C., 155, 156, 166 Rietveld, E., 236 Roberts, B. W., 131, 132, 202, 204, 208, 210, 212 robust virtue, 33, 38 role(s), 202–203, 322 commitment, 206–207 and repetitive actions, 212 definition, 203 enactments, 211–212 of healers, 217–220 identities, 203, 206–211 parenting, 212–216 personality and, 207–210 police officer, 216–217 practical wisdom and, 211 and science of virtue, 220–221 as shapers of virtues, 212–214 SIT, 207–208, 212 and situations, 205–206 social roles, 205–206, 208, 214 social structure, 203–206, 211 sociological approach to, 203–207 teaching, 216 traits and, 206–207 and virtues, 210–211 Ruch, W., 188 Rushton, J-P., 75 Russell, D., 26 Rye, M. S., 280 Ryff, C. D., 263

scalar virtues, 178, 179, 190–191, 322 informant reports, 188–190 personality, 185–187 self-reported, 180, 187, 192 compassion, 183–184 courage, 180–181 forgiveness, 184 generosity, 183 gratitude, 182–183 humility, 184–185 justice, 181–182 kindness, 183 vs. observer report, 188–189 vs. partner reports, 189–190 Scheier, M. F., 31, 192, 230 Schmitt, M., 181, 186 Schnitker, S., 284 Schubert, 117 scientific objectivity, 18–19, 150, 156 SDT. See Self-Determination Theory (SDT) Sekerka, L. E., 181 self-control, 117, 321 Self-Determination Theory (SDT), 114–115 self-reported virtues, 179, 180, 187, 192 behavior, 274–276 compassion, 183–184 courage, 180–181 forgiveness, 184 generosity, 183 gratitude, 182–183 humility, 184–185 justice, 181–182, 187 kindness, 183, 187 vs. observer report, 188–189 vs. partner reports, 189–190 Seligman, M. E. P., 53, 78–85, 88, 89, 125, 317, 321 Sense of Abundance, 91 Sherman, R. A., 194, 228, 231, 239 Shoda, Y., 130, 226 Sidgwick, 68 Siegel, J. T., 240 signature strengths, virtues, 78 Simon-Thomas, E. R., 286 Simple Appreciation, 91 Simpson, B., 233, 275 single diagnosis, 83 SIT. See Social Investment Theory (SIT) situation interactions, STRIVE-4 Model. See person-situation interactions situational factors. See also person-situation interactions and helping behavior, 224–225 personality, 134, 139 virtue and, 74, 75 situational influences, 224–225, 331

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Index skills expertise vs. practical wisdom, 44 Slote, M., 60, 61 Smetana, J. G., 95 Snow, N. E., 26, 87, 139, 142–145, 148, 315 social desirability, 179–180, 327 experience sampling and, 195 Social Intuition Model, 48 Social Investment Theory (SIT), 207–208, 212 social situations, 237, 239 Social Value Orientation (SVO), 233 Sokol, B. W., 97, 98 Shoshani, A., 117 specific virtues, 25–27, 30, 51, 53, 59, 63, 68, 86, 117, 220, 240, 250, 321, 323, 330 stability, virtues, 29 Steger, M. F., 263 Stellar, J. E., 189, 196 Stewart, N., 272 Stichter, M., 44 Stoics, 179 STRIVE-4 Model, 7, 20, 21, 44, 53, 85, 87, 177, 239, 277, 280, 322–324, 329, 330. See also person-situation interactions; role(s); scalar virtues; virtue traits gratitude, 90–93 MCGM and, 90 WTT and, 140 Strong Division position, 297–300 strong situations, 225 Stryker, S., 203, 206, 207, 210, 221 Süssenbach, P., 234, 275 Sussman, W., 75 SVO. See Social Value Orientation (SVO) Tajfel, H., 101 Tay, L., 199, 326 Tendency to Forgive scale, 184 Tessman, L., 67, 200, 201 Thoma, S. J., 117 Thomson, A. L., 240 Three-Tiered Framework of Personality (TTFP), 135–138, 145–147 WTT vs., 146 Todd, E., 229 Tomasello, M., 102, 103, 106–108, 114, 166 Toner, E., 118 traits. See virtue traits trait-situation interactions, 230–231 broad person characteristic, 233–234 classical personality traits, 231–233 moral characteristic, 234–235 Tripathi, R., 124 trustworthiness, healing professionals, 219 TTFP. See Three-Tiered Framework of Personality (TTFP)

383

Tudge, J. R. H., 39, 117, 320 Turiel, E., 108 ultrasocial creatures, human as, 2, 246, 259 ultrasociality, 246 unity of character, 83 unity of virtues, 48, 56, 57 unmitigated communion, 199 unrealistic virtues, 6, 314 Vaccarezza, M. S., 281 Vaish, A., 111 value(s), 242–243, 322. See also eudaimonia; fact/ value dichotomy; good life; goods, human commitment, 155, 162–164, 169, 172–173, 331 free ideal, 150, 162 human goods and, 161–162, 243, 244 inclusion, 156, 160–162 judgement, 162, 163 objective, 157, 158 position, 155–157, 163 scientific valuing, productive, 170–171 subjective, 160–161 value-neutrality, 85, 93, 152, 155, 172 van den Bos, W., 286 van Scheppingen, M. A., 209 van Zyl, L., 59 VIA, 53, 78, 88, 181, 185 VIA-IS, 185, 188 VIA-Youth, 117–118 vices, 59, 197–199, 293–295 vicious traits, 33, 197–199 virtue science, 6, 15, 16, 150 challenges, 16 empirically oriented virtue theory, absence of, 16–17 simple survey designs, overreliance on, 17–18 virtue skeptics, 18–19 facts about, 153–154 history of, 73–79 ideal, 293–296 interdisciplinarity, 313–317 as interdisciplinary domain of moral philosophy, 291–309 normative ethics and. See normative ethics prosociality vs., 168 scientific objectivity of, 18–19 viability of, 18 virtue theory, 6, 16–17, 25 Aristotelian, 27 positive psychology, insufficiency of, 80–82 realistic, 26 robust, 25 Western, 27

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press

384 Index virtue traits, 3–5, 203 acquired. See acquired traits aspects of, 29–31 as causal forces, 29–30 definition, 191–192 functional aspects of, 62 intentional cultivation of, 30, 191 moral development, 112–119 moral traits, 27, 55, 57, 67, 117, 119, 141–144, 181, 182, 201 morally desirable, 33, 36–38 ordinary, 7 personality, 32 personally desirable, 30 positive inner attitudes, 57 responsiveness to situations/roles, 31 situation-based variability, 193–194 skepticism, 139, 191, 194 within-person consistency, 31, 192–195 within-person variability, 31–32, 195–196 virtue-good life connection, 28, 142, 328–329 virtue(s), 38, 142 as acquired traits, 5, 29, 32–35 acquisition of, 5, 34, 331 components. See components, virtues conceptualization of, 317–322 cultivation, 5, 15, 21, 33, 46, 48, 65, 125, 126, 133, 140, 143–146, 168, 170, 282 cultural context, 35–39 DSM style classification, 78 ethics, 25 importance of, 28 realistic, 6–7, 16, 18, 26, 32, 56, 62, 178 ruling-out, 84 scalar traits. See scalar virtues signature strengths, 78, 84 skeptics, 18–19, 29, 67–68 as traits, 29–31 universality, 318–320 unrealistic, 6 virtue-situational interaction, 235 virtue-wisdom connection, 28 Vittersø, J., 243 Vranas, P. B. M., 303 Walker, D. F., 268 Walker, L. J., 95 Wang, J., 118

Wang Yangming, 65 Warren, M. T., 144–145 weak situations, 225 Wee, C., 209 Weiss, B. J., 181 well-being, 15, 27, 28, 54, 55, 62, 67, 88, 118, 120, 142, 161, 162, 170, 183, 253–254 close relationships and, 31 CPRs and, 260–261 egocentricity and, 165–166 group belonging and, 259–260 human goods and, 259–264 meaning and, 261–264 otherish motivation and, 166–167 social networks and, 165 value commitment, avoiding, 163–165 value judgments, 162–163 Whole-Trait Theory (WTT), 133–135, 139, 140, 149 agency in, 144 good life and, 142 intentional cultivation of virtue and, 143–145 modified model, 140 morality of virtue and, 141–144 practical wisdom and, 143–145, 148 reinterpretation of, 144–145 STRIVE-4 Model and, 140 TTFP vs., 146 Willer, R., 233, 275 Williams, 67 wisdom. See practical wisdom within-person consistency, 31, 192–195 within-person variability, 31–32, 134, 193–196, 226, 231, 239 Wolf, S., 67 Wood, A. M., 187, 272 Wood, D., 202 Woodard, C. R., 181, 187 Wright, J. C., 62–65, 87, 99, 125, 139–141, 144–145, 147, 148, 243, 280, 288, 311, 325 Wrzus, C., 228 WTT. See Whole-Trait Theory (WTT) Yao, Q., 227 Yoder, K. J., 286 Zettler, I., 231, 232 Zhu Xi, 65

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779968.019 Published online by Cambridge University Press