The Public Role of the Church in Contemporary Ukrainian Society: The Contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to Peace and Reconciliation (Studien Zur Friedensethik) 3848722100, 9783848722105

Table of contents :
Cover
Table of contents
General Introduction
Why reconciliation? Background of the problem
General characteristics of the analysed documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
The choice of the reference authors
Catholic approach of Robert Schreiter: spirituality of reconciliation
Evangelical approach of Miroslav Volf: radical forgiveness
Practice-oriented approach of John Paul Lederach: building communities of change
Research questions and content
A note on transliteration
Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research
Introduction
1.1 Religious pluralism in Ukraine
1.2 Religiosity of Ukrainians
1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches
1.3.1 Traditional Orthodox denominations
1.3.1.1 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church
In the shadow of the Moscow Patriarchate
Vectors of confrontations
1.3.1.2 The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church
At the rampart of Orthodox autocephaly in Ukraine
Vectors of confrontations
1.3.1.3 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate
On the way to a national Church
Vectors of confrontations
1.3.2 Traditional Catholic denominations
1.3.2.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
Survival in the Soviet underground
Vectors of confrontations
1.3.2.2 The Roman-Catholic Church
1.4 The interconfessional conflict in Ukraine as a conflict of identities
1.4.1 The issues of the self-identity of the Churches
1.4.1.1 Identity and Orthodox denominations
1.4.1.2 The doctrine of the Russkiy Mir
1.4.1.3 Identity and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
1.4.2 Identity, nationalism, Churches
1.5 Ukrainian post-atheism
1.5.1 Typical features of Ukrainian post-atheism
1.5.2 Church and state in Ukraine
1.5.2.1 Legal basis
1.5.2.2 Intrusion of the state
1.5.2.3 Cooperative attitude of the Churches
1.5.2.4 The idea of a national (state) Church in Ukraine
1.6 The role of the media in the interconfessional conflicts
Conclusion
Part I. The essence and challenges of reconciliation
Introduction to Part I
Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past
2.1 Poland and Ukraine – neighbours in peace?
2.1.1 Together but still separated
2.1.2 Historically embedded conflicts and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
Conflicts on the Cemetery of the Lviv Eaglets
The Volyn tragedy
The Operation Vistula
2.2 War has finished – war continues
2.2.1 Plurality of war memories
2.2.2 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: reinterpreting the established image of war
2.3 Divided Church – divided nation
The wound of division
The sin of pride
Intrusion of the state
The Union of Brest and the Church division
“No” to the Soviet methods of struggle
2.4 Difficult northern neighbour
2.4.1 Heavy load of historical burden
Contesting issues
Reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia
Legalisation and property conflicts
Moscow and the Lviv Pseudo-Synod
The Russian Orthodox Church as a victim
Current coexistence
2.4.2 Reconciliation between nations through reconciliation between Churches?
2.5 Struggle between two Ukraines
2.5.1 History, identity, language
History and identity
The answer of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
Language
2.5.2 The trauma of the Holodomor
Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation
3.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: reconciliation as the spiritual regeneration of the person
3.1.1 John Paul II as the advocate of reconciliation in Ukraine
3.1.2 The Greek-Catholic tradition of reconciliation
3.1.3 The human heart – the locus of reconciliation
The heart as the core of the human person
Where the changes are born
3.1.4 Reconciliation with the help of God
3.1.5 Reconciliation as a Christian obligation
3.1.6 Reconciliation as a spiritual testament and legacy of martyrs
3.2 Robert Schreiter: reconciliation as a healing
3.2.1 Horizontal and vertical dimensions of reconciliation
3.2.2 Practical theology of reconciliation
Principle 1. “God is the author of reconciliation”
Principle 2. “God begins with victims”
Principle 3. “God makes of the victim and the wrongdoer a ‘new creation”
Principle 4. Place the suffering of the victim in the story of the suffering of Christ
Principle 5. Eschatological completion of reconciliation
3.2.3 “Reconciliation is more a spirituality than a strategy”
3.2.4 Reconciliation as a metanoia
3.3 Miroslav Volf: Reconciliation as embrace
3.4 John Paul Lederach: reconciliation as the restoration of the fabric of community
Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation
4.1 On the demands for repentance
4.1.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: repentance as the individual conversion of the heart
4.1.2 Miroslav Volf: “To repent of what perpetrators do to our soul”
4.2 On the path to forgiveness
4.2.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “We forgive and ask for forgiveness”
Forgiveness as a feature of martyrs
Asking forgiveness for negligence and indignation
Formula of mutual forgiveness
When Churches or nations ask forgiveness
Forgiveness as the obligation of love
Accepting forgiveness means recognising faults
Asking forgiveness as an act of paying honour
Asking forgiveness as a readiness to assume responsibility
4.2.2 Miroslav Volf: the centrality of forgiveness
4.2.2.1 Forgiveness as a gift and an obligation
4.2.2.2 The dynamics of forgiveness
4.2.2.3 Making space for the other
4.2.3 Robert Schreiter: forgiveness as a grace to attend to the moral failures of the past
4.3 On the challenges of justice
4.3.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: on the deficit of justice
Which justice?
Bringing about changes in Ukrainian society
Some incitements for discussion
4.3.2 John Paul Lederach: conflicts originate from the lack of social justice
4.3.3 Robert Schreiter: overcoming structural injustices – soothing social tensions – advancing reconciliation
4.3.4 Miroslav Volf: genuine justice involves embrace
Conclusion to Part I
Part II. Memory and practical steps to reconciliation and Christian unity
Introduction to Part II
Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory
5.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: on history and memory
5.1.1 The duty to remember
5.1.2 “Leave the past to God and… to historians”
5.1.3 The purification of memory
The individual examination of the conscience
Learning the truth about the past
Drawing lessons from the past
5.1.4 The healing of memory: main issues
5.1.4.1 Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation
Reconciliation through prayer
What unites both nations
“The past through the prism of Christianity”
5.1.4.2 Healing the memories of World War II
Teaching: redefining victory in moral terms
What others say
The actions
5.1.4.3 Reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church
Recognition of historical faults
Destruction of Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine
The struggle for the patriarchal status of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
When will the Patriarchs meet?
5.1.4.4 The missing memory of Jews
Tony Judt. Why the memory of Jews is absent in Ukraine: the point of view of a historian
Omer Bartov. The guilt of Ukrainians from the point of view of a Jew
Myroslav Marynovych. Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation from the point of view of a Greek-Catholic
The controversy on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi
The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Jewish-Ukrainian relations
The actions
The Church documents
5.2 Robert Schreiter: on the moral truth of the past
5.2.1 Social healing of memories
5.2.2 Discovering the moral truth of the past
5.3 Miroslav Volf: how to treat the burdened memory
5.3.1 Rules of salutary remembering
1. Remember with love
2. Remember truthfully – fulfil the obligation of justice
3. See with the eyes of the other – “double vision”
4. Remember therapeutically – healing the identity
5. Remember so as to learn from the past
6. Remember in a redeeming way
5.3.2 Slipping into oblivion
Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation
6.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: how spiritual unity may advance social transformation
6.1.1 All-Ukrainian reconciliation for the transformation of the country
6.1.2 Reconciliation between the Churches – spiritual unification of Ukraine
6.1.2.1 The ecumenical significance of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
6.1.2.2 The united Kyivan Church
“Holiness of united people of God”
The inclusive Ukrainian/Kyivan Patriarchate
Not uniatism but communion
Practical project of communion
Unity in diversity
6.1.2.3 Practical steps towards Church unity in Ukraine
6.1.2.4 Unity of the Church – unity of the nation
6.2 John Paul Lederach: on moral imagination or how to promote social changes
6.2.1 The dynamics of moral imagination
6.2.2 The value of relationships
6.2.2.1 Feeling connected
6.2.2.2 The qualities of web-making
6.2.2.3 Language, narratives
6.2.2.4 Building the platforms of cooperation
6.2.3 The role of the Church in reconciliation: educate, empower, sanctify
6.3 Robert Schreiter: how to reach reconciliation
6.3.1 The dynamics of transition and challenges to reconciliation
6.3.2 Rituals and sacraments in the service of reconciliation
Conclusion to Part II
General conclusion. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church’s approach to reconciliation: The reappraisal
What is reconciliation needed for?
Present and missed dimensions of reconciliation
From words to strategy: develop and popularise
For ecumenism in practice: unity of diversities in common action
Bibliography
1. Primary sources
1.1 Chronological list of documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
1.2 John Paul Lederach
1.3 Miroslav Volf
1.4 Robert Schreiter
2. Books
3. Articles
4. Electronic sources
4.1 Sources on the Internet
4.1.1 Ecclesial documents (in chronological order)
4.1.2 Commentaries and articles of the Church hierarchs
4.1.3 Articles
4.1.4 Interviews
4.1.5 News
4.1.6 Other sources
4.2 Other digital sources
5. Unpublished works

Citation preview

Das Institut für Theologie und Frieden hat die Aufgabe, die ethischen Grundlagen menschlicher Friedensordnung zu erforschen und in den aktuellen friedenspolitischen Diskurs hineinzutragen. Mit den „Studien zur Friedensethik“ wird eine friedensethische Vertiefung der außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Debatte angestrebt. Dabei geht es letztlich um die Frage: Durch welche Politik wird den heute von Gewalt, Armut und Unfreiheit bedrohten Menschen am besten geholfen und zugleich der Errichtung einer zukünftigen friedlichen internationalen Ordnung gedient, in der Sicherheit, Wahrung der Gerechtigkeit und Achtung der Menschenrechte für alle gewährleistet werden?

Studien zur Friedensethik Studies on Peace Ethics edited by Prof. Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven Dr. Bernhard Koch

Volume 53

Myroslava Rap

The Public Role of the Church in Contemporary Ukrainian Society The Contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to Peace and Reconciliation

2.Auflage

Nomos

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de ISBN

HB (Nomos) 978-3-8487-2210-5 ePDF (Nomos) 978-3-8452-6305-2

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN

HB (Nomos) 978-3-8487-2210-5 ePDF (Nomos) 978-3-8452-6305-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rap, Myroslava The Public Role of the Church in Contemporary Ukrainian Society The Contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to Peace and Reconciliation Myroslava Rap 500 p. Includes bibliographic references. ISBN

HB (Nomos) 978-3-8487-2210-5 ePDF (Nomos) 978-3-8452-6305-2

ISBN 978-3402-11697-5 (Aschendorff Verlag, Münster) Die Schriftenreihen ‚Beiträge zur Friedensethik‘ und ‚Theologie und Frieden‘ sind jeweils bis Band 44 beim Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, erschienen.

1. Edition 2015 © Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2015. Printed and bound in Germany. This work is subject to copyright. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to “Verwertungs­gesellschaft Wort”, Munich. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Nomos or the author.

Foreword

This book addresses the issue of reconciliation in the Ukrainian context from the point of view of one of the most socially active religious communities in the country, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The research is very topical at least in the view of the current Ukrainian-Russian crisis. Analysing the relevant official documents of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church on reconciliation, the author traces how this Church comes to terms with the burdened pages of Ukrainian history and their repercussions for the current struggling of Ukraine on the way to its constitutionalisation as a true modern state. This monograph is a very new one and at the same time not completely up-to-date. The book captures the stance of Ukrainian society and the developments within the Ukrainian Churches till the end of the Revolution of Dignity. A number of important changes, defining the societal and ecclesial situation in Ukraine after March 2014, are not covered. Among them are, for instance, the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian relations that took place after the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula, the fluctuations within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate after in August 2014 she got a new Head, a pro-Moscow Metropolitan Onufrii, or the growing alienation between Ukrainians and Russians. However, the powerful waves of changes, which rolled over Ukraine in the last year, do not make the conclusions driven in the monograph untenable. This book has to be regarded as a background to better understand the current troubles of Ukraine and the new challenges of reconciliation. For instance, having read the paragraphs on the problems of reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches and the Moscow Patriarchate, the reader will develop a clearer picture of the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine and how it could escalate to that extent. It is also evident that not only drawing lessons from World War II, but also coming to terms with the legacy of the current Russian-Ukrainian confrontation will be a big task for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the future. After the developments of 2014 the Ukrainian Churches have to reassess their role in society and their reconciliation strategies. Obviously, this research has its limitations. I wrote this book as a Greek-Catholic. I may seem not to be critical enough with regard to my Church; however, I consider this monograph to be an important testimony 5

Foreword

to the stance of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, a testimony which sometimes fails. In a context where this Church is not always granted the right to express her position or when this position is ignored or silenced (as is evident in the dialogue between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican), it is important that those embedded in the Greek-Catholic tradition explain the concerns of their Church. This is what I have done in my research. This book came into life as a PhD thesis defended in September 2014 at the faculty of Theology and Religious Studies of the Leuven Catholic University in Belgium. Many people came along and were helpful in various ways in the course of working on this research project; this is a proper place to name some of them. The first words of gratitude I owe to both my supervisors. I am grateful to Prof. Dr Johan Verstraeten for his suggestions concerning the scientific part of my project, for challenging intellectual discussions, and for giving me the chance to scoop from his boundless knowledge. My fascination with the topic of reconciliation I developed during the lectures of Prof. Verstraeten, when I was a Master student in Theology at the Leuven Catholic University in 2004-2006. My heartfelt gratitude goes to my co-supervisor, Dr Lesia Kovalenko, for helping me learn theoretically and come in touch practically with the social dimension of the teaching and activities of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church. It is greatly her merit that I decided to engage in the adventure of that research project. I was fortunate that Dr Kovalenko was my employer at the Institute of Religion and Society in Lviv and taught me valuable organisational and analytical skills, which were of tremendous help during the work on my research project. The long journey of the unfolding of this research project began in the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv that assisted me in looking for a scholarship and trusted in my ability to successfully complete my doctoral studies in Leuven. I am grateful to the Porticus Foundation for providing the greater amount of financial assistance necessary to make possible my residence and studies in Belgium. I immensely appreciate Dr Jos Vanachter for his patient, punctual, committed, and precise way of correcting my English. My special gratefulness goes to Prof. Dr Justenhofen, one of the scientific correctors of my dissertation, for making possible the publication of this monograph. And finally, I owe thanks to my family both in Switzerland and Ukraine for their caring support and active interest in the progress of my research. Laufenburg, AG, January 1, 2015 6

Myroslava Rap

Table of contents

List of abbreviations and acronyms

13

List of diagrams

15

General Introduction

17

Chapter I.

Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

Introduction 1.1 Religious pluralism in Ukraine 1.2 Religiosity of Ukrainians 1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches 1.3.1 Traditional Orthodox denominations 1.3.1.1 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church In the shadow of the Moscow Patriarchate Vectors of confrontations 1.3.1.2 The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church At the rampart of Orthodox autocephaly in Ukraine Vectors of confrontations 1.3.1.3 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate On the way to a national Church Vectors of confrontations 1.3.2 Traditional Catholic denominations 1.3.2.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Survival in the Soviet underground Vectors of confrontations 1.3.2.2 The Roman-Catholic Church 1.4 The interconfessional conflict in Ukraine as a conflict of identities 1.4.1 The issues of the self-identity of the Churches 1.4.1.1 Identity and Orthodox denominations 1.4.1.2 The doctrine of the Russkiy Mir

37 37 38 45 50 52 52 52 54 59 59 60 63 63 65 69 69 69 71 77 78 80 80 85 7

Table of contents

1.4.1.3 Identity and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church 90 1.4.2 Identity, nationalism, Churches 91 1.5 Ukrainian post-atheism 95 1.5.1 Typical features of Ukrainian post-atheism 95 1.5.2 Church and state in Ukraine 96 1.5.2.1 Legal basis 96 1.5.2.2 Intrusion of the state 97 1.5.2.3 Cooperative attitude of the Churches 100 1.5.2.4 The idea of a national (state) Church in Ukraine 105 1.6 The role of the media in the interconfessional conflicts 109 Conclusion 114 Part I.

The essence and challenges of reconciliation

Introduction to Part I Chapter II.

Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

2.1 Poland and Ukraine – neighbours in peace? 2.1.1 Together but still separated 2.1.2 Historically embedded conflicts and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Conflicts on the Cemetery of the Lviv Eaglets The Volyn tragedy The Operation Vistula 2.2 War has finished – war continues 2.2.1 Plurality of war memories 2.2.2 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: reinterpreting the established image of war 2.3 Divided Church – divided nation The wound of division The sin of pride Intrusion of the state The Union of Brest and the Church division “No” to the Soviet methods of struggle 2.4 Difficult northern neighbour 2.4.1 Heavy load of historical burden Contesting issues Reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia Legalisation and property conflicts Moscow and the Lviv Pseudo-Synod 8

119 119 120 120 120 125 126 129 135 138 138 142 145 146 146 147 149 150 151 151 151 154 155 157

Table of contents

The Russian Orthodox Church as a victim Current coexistence 2.4.2 Reconciliation between nations through reconciliation between Churches? 2.5 Struggle between two Ukraines 2.5.1 History, identity, language History and identity The answer of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Language 2.5.2 The trauma of the Holodomor

159 162 163 170 170 170 174 177 179

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

184

3.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: reconciliation as the spiritual regeneration of the person 3.1.1 John Paul II as the advocate of reconciliation in Ukraine 3.1.2 The Greek-Catholic tradition of reconciliation 3.1.3 The human heart – the locus of reconciliation The heart as the core of the human person Where the changes are born 3.1.4 Reconciliation with the help of God 3.1.5 Reconciliation as a Christian obligation 3.1.6 Reconciliation as a spiritual testament and legacy of martyrs 3.2 Robert Schreiter: reconciliation as a healing 3.2.1 Horizontal and vertical dimensions of reconciliation 3.2.2 Practical theology of reconciliation Principle 1. “God is the author of reconciliation” Principle 2. “God begins with victims” Principle 3. “God makes of the victim and the wrongdoer a ‘new creation” Principle 4. Place the suffering of the victim in the story of the suffering of Christ Principle 5. Eschatological completion of reconciliation 3.2.3 “Reconciliation is more a spirituality than a strategy” 3.2.4 Reconciliation as a metanoia 3.3 Miroslav Volf: Reconciliation as embrace 3.4 John Paul Lederach: reconciliation as the restoration of the fabric of community

202 206 207 210 210 211

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

228

4.1 On the demands for repentance

228

184 184 188 192 192 194 197 200

211 212 214 215 217 218 222

9

Table of contents

4.1.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: repentance as the individual conversion of the heart 4.1.2 Miroslav Volf: “To repent of what perpetrators do to our soul” 4.2 On the path to forgiveness 4.2.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “We forgive and ask for forgiveness” 4.2.2 Miroslav Volf: the centrality of forgiveness 4.2.2.1 Forgiveness as a gift and an obligation 4.2.2.2 The dynamics of forgiveness 4.2.2.3 Making space for the other 4.2.3 Robert Schreiter: forgiveness as a grace to attend to the moral failures of the past 4.3 On the challenges of justice 4.3.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: on the deficit of justice Which justice? Bringing about changes in Ukrainian society Some incitements for discussion 4.3.2 John Paul Lederach: conflicts originate from the lack of social justice 4.3.3 Robert Schreiter: overcoming structural injustices – soothing social tensions – advancing reconciliation 4.3.4 Miroslav Volf: genuine justice involves embrace Conclusion to Part I Part II.

Memory and practical steps to reconciliation and Christian unity

228 231 234 234 243 243 245 248 250 252 252 252 257 263 269 270 273 278

281

Introduction to Part II

281

Chapter V.

283

Healing of the burdened memory

5.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: on history and memory 5.1.1 The duty to remember 5.1.2 “Leave the past to God and… to historians” 5.1.3 The purification of memory The individual examination of the conscience Learning the truth about the past Drawing lessons from the past 5.1.4 The healing of memory: main issues 10

283 283 286 289 290 292 294 296

Table of contents

5.1.4.1 Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation Reconciliation through prayer What unites both nations “The past through the prism of Christianity” 5.1.4.2 Healing the memories of World War II Teaching: redefining victory in moral terms What others say The actions 5.1.4.3 Reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church Recognition of historical faults Destruction of Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine The struggle for the patriarchal status of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church When will the Patriarchs meet? 5.1.4.4 The missing memory of Jews Tony Judt. Why the memory of Jews is absent in Ukraine: the point of view of a historian Omer Bartov. The guilt of Ukrainians from the point of view of a Jew Myroslav Marynovych. Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation from the point of view of a Greek-Catholic The controversy on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Jewish-Ukrainian relations 5.2 Robert Schreiter: on the moral truth of the past 5.2.1 Social healing of memories 5.2.2 Discovering the moral truth of the past 5.3 Miroslav Volf: how to treat the burdened memory 5.3.1 Rules of salutary remembering 5.3.2 Slipping into oblivion Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

296 296 299 301 305 305 311 315 317 317 322 324 327 331 331 336

339 344 350 356 356 360 362 362 372 374

6.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: how spiritual unity may advance social transformation 374 6.1.1 All-Ukrainian reconciliation for the transformation of the country 374 6.1.2 Reconciliation between the Churches – spiritual unification of Ukraine 379 11

Table of contents

6.1.2.1 The ecumenical significance of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church 6.1.2.2 The united Kyivan Church “Holiness of united people of God” The inclusive Ukrainian/Kyivan Patriarchate Not uniatism but communion Practical project of communion Unity in diversity 6.1.2.3 Practical steps towards Church unity in Ukraine 6.1.2.4 Unity of the Church – unity of the nation 6.2 John Paul Lederach: on moral imagination or how to promote social changes 6.2.1 The dynamics of moral imagination 6.2.2 The value of relationships 6.2.2.1 Feeling connected 6.2.2.2 The qualities of web-making 6.2.2.3 Language, narratives 6.2.2.4 Building the platforms of cooperation 6.2.3 The role of the Church in reconciliation: educate, empower, sanctify 6.3 Robert Schreiter: how to reach reconciliation 6.3.1 The dynamics of transition and challenges to reconciliation 6.3.2 Rituals and sacraments in the service of reconciliation

426 428

Conclusion to Part II

431

General conclusion. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church’s approach to reconciliation: The reappraisal

433

Bibliography

449

12

381 385 385 387 390 395 396 398 402 409 409 411 411 416 418 420 422 426

List of abbreviations and acronyms

Gulag

KGB OUN–UPA

ROC SVU UGCC UPA USSR

Glavnoye upravlyeniye ispravityelno-trudovykh lagyerey i koloniy, the Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps and Labour Settlements in the USSR Komityet gosudarstvyennoy byezopasnosti, the Committee for State Security of the USSR Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv – Ukrainska povstanska armiia, the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army The Russian Orthodox Church Spilka vyzvolennia Ukrainy, the League for the Liberation of Ukraine The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Ukrainska povstanska armiia, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

13

List of diagrams

Diagram 1: Diagram 2:

Denominational map of present-day Ukraine (number of communities in per cent as for January 1, 2014) The Churches of the Kyiv tradition (number of communities as for January 1, 2014)

40 44

15

General Introduction

Ukraine is confronted today with a political conflict which can’t adequately be understood without taking into account the religious component of it. One of the reasons why the tension between the European-centred and Russian-centred tendencies has become utterly complex, is the division between the Christian Churches. This book aims to clarify the historical background of the religious divisions as well as the need for a more profound understanding of both the theology of and the concrete ways to reconciliation. In order to do so I will mainly examine the official texts of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation and confront them with contemporary theologies of reconciliation. In this short introduction I will, first of all, clarify the choice of the topic of the research. Subsequently, I will define the criteria of the selection of the Church documents which will be analysed and I will describe their general characteristics. Thirdly, I will explain the choice of Miroslav Volf, Robert Schreiter, and John Paul Lederach as principal reference authors. Finally, I will conclude by explaining the methodology of getting the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in conversation with the texts of the chosen authors.

Why reconciliation? Background of the problem In 2012, the Ukrainian Churches strongly opposed the amendments to the law on the freedom of conscience and religious organisations and to the new law on the principles of the state politics on languages; the Churches repeatedly called for the release of the Ukrainian oppositional politician Yulia Tymoschenko from prison and supported the European integration of Ukraine.1 That the Churches in Ukraine are present in public life reveals their active participation in the EuroMaidan in the winter of 20132014. The Churches prayed with the protesters at the barricades, Churches ____________________ 1

Viktor Yelenskyi, “Solidarity of Churches against Government Attacks Is the Critically Important Component of Their Real Independence,” interview by Tetyana Mukhomorova, Risu.org.ua, http://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/ interview/55166 (accessed February 12, 2014).

17

General Introduction

helped practically by opening the doors of the sacral building for the protesters to get warm, they “condemned the use of force against peaceful protesters, demanded that the authorities punish those responsible for beating students, and called on the government to stop provocations against protesters.”2 Church leaders were invited by the TV channels to express their opinions on the events, the Church hierarchs blessed the leaders of the opposition before they went to negotiations with the state authorities. The Church is present in society. In this piece of research I will evaluate certain aspects of this public engagement of the Church, that is the discourse on reconciliation. The focus on the public elements of the Church’s activity makes my work interesting and tangible. This book was partly born out of my more than 2-year-long work as a co-editor of the collection of the documents of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church on social issues released after the Church began to exist officially after the decades of underground life and later in independent Ukraine. This book entitled Socially Oriented Documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008)3 collects 375 texts representing the official social teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Still during the research phase of the work on this book, while selecting among the rich material those texts in which social themes are considered, I have discovered many references to forgiveness and reconciliation, repentance and the purification of memory with regard to the Ukrainian-Polish relations, the all-Ukrainian national cohesion, and dealing with the memories of World War II or the Holodomor. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has a long tradition of reconciliation. Especially the 20th century was rich in that regard. The names of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi and the beatified martyr Emelian Kovch inspired and shaped the thinking of the contemporary Church leadership on reconciliation. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi (1865-1944) is without doubt the most prominent promoter of reconciliation in the history of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. He was working incessantly on the reestablishment of the Church unity in Ukraine that should lead to national ____________________ 2 3

18

Ibid. Lesia Kovalenko, ed., Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy (1989-2008) {Socially oriented documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008)} (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008).

General Introduction

reconciliation and further the overcoming of the division between the western and eastern Churches.4 The Metropolitan equally longed for the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation condemning the actions of the radical members of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists who during World War II exterminated Poles for the sake of the setting up of the independent Ukrainian state. The slogan “Nation above all” he counteracted with the commandment “You shall not kill!”5 Sheptytskyi condemned the bloody actions of the Ukrainians against the Poles in the Volyn, even though he was not heard by the predominantly Orthodox population of the region.6 Separate attention the great Metropolitan paid to the persecuted Jews organising a network for rescuing the Jewish children in the monasteries and trying to oppose the German extermination machine with his appeals. The pastoral letters and actions of Sheptytskyi constitute the tradition that has inspired a great many undertakings of the Greek-Catholic Church leadership until today. Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi (1892-1984) is famous for his efforts to sustain the persecuted Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the Soviet underground, the struggle for the patriarchal status of his martyr-Church as well as for his desire for the reconciliation with the Orthodox. In June 1976, he issued his well-known pastoral letter “On the Unity in Christ” pleading for spiritual unity which constitutes the foundation for the reconciliation between religions and peoples and national cohesion in Ukraine.7 In his “Testament” Slipyi maintained that the national regeneration of Ukrainians should start from the roots of their spirituality which originate in the ____________________ 4

5 6 7

Anna Veronika Wendland, „Der Metropolit. Ein Versuch über Andrei Scheptyc’kyj“, Yi 11 (1997), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n11texts/wendland-ger.html (accessed April 14, 2014). The ideas of the Church and national unity in Ukraine are unfolded in one of the most famous texts of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi, his theological-social treatise “How to Build a Native Home.” In that message the Metropolitan scrutinises the problems of the state-building in Ukraine and teaches how the Church can educate people in the spirit of Christian values so that they become responsible citizens. Hence, this document remains urgent also at the present stage of the existence of Ukraine as a state. See Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, Nasha derzhavnist. Yak buduvaty ridnu khatu {Our statehood. How to build a native home}, ed. Oksana Haiova (Lviv: Artos, 2010). Wendland, Metropolit. Tadeusz Andrzej Olszanski, “Polsko-ukrainskyi konflikt 1943-1947” {PolishUkrainian conflict in 1943-1947}, Yi 10 (1997): 43. See “Poslannia Patriarkha Yosyfa pro poiednannia u Khrysti” {Message of Patriarch Yosyf about the unity in Christ}, in Zapovit Patriarkha (Lviv: Lohos, 1995), 35-39.

19

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united Kyivan tradition, hence considering the issue of the reconciliation between the Churches of Ukraine to be of the utmost importance.8 The current ecumenical stance of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church rests upon the thoughts of Sheptytskyi and Slipyi. Emelian Kovch (1884-1944), a Greek-Catholic priest, was murdered on March 25, 1944 at Majdanek concentration camp for having saved around 600 Jews by helping them to get baptismal certificates.9 In Majdanek he continued to minister to the prisoners of every nation claiming that “With the exception of Heaven, this is the only place I wish to be. Here we are all the same: Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Russians. I am the only priest. When I celebrate the Liturgy, they pray for all, each one in his own language. Doesn’t God understand all languages?”10 In 2013, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church for the third time conferred a prize in memory of the beatified martyr Emelian Kovch for his outstanding contribution to the ecumenical dialogue, the reconciliation between religions and nations, and charity.11 The instruction, actions, and practical life examples of those famous Church leaders made the teaching on reconciliation an integral part of the modern theological thought of the official Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The Heads of that Church in independent Ukraine – Cardinals Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi, Liubomyr Husar, and Patriarch Sviatoslav Shevchuk in their texts repeatedly refer to the works of Sheptytskyi and Slipyi and the example of Kovch. Additionally, the own theological search of the models of reconciliation was enriched by the ideas of the western theological schools due to the education of many bishops and authors of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at universities in the West. In that way the concepts of social reconciliation were borrowed and transferred to ____________________ 8 9 10 11

20

See “Zapovit Blazhennishoho Patriarkha Yosyfa Slipoho” {Testament of His Beatitude Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi}, in Zapovit Patriarkha (Lviv: Lohos, 1995), 7-34. “Blessed Emilian Kovch,” http://saints.sqpn.com/blessed-emilian-kovch/ (accessed April 14, 2014). Ibid. “Lina Kostenko, Zenoviia Kushpeta, Shymon Redlich ta Spilnota sviatoho Ehidiia – tsiohorichni laureaty Vidznaky imeni blazennoho Emeliana Kovcha” {This year Lina Kostenko, Zenoviia Kushpeta, Shymon Redlich and Community of Sant’Egidio became the laureates of the Prize of the Beatified Emelian Kovch}, http://news.ugcc.org.ua/news/lіna_kostenko_zenya_kushpeta_shimon_redlih_ta_ spіlnota_svyatogo_egіdіya__tsogorіchnі_laureati_vіdznaki_іmenі_blazhennogo_ svyashchennomuchenika_omelyana_kovcha_68325.html (accessed April 14, 2014).

General Introduction

Ukraine. Hence, I consider it reasonable to evaluate the own achievements of the Greek-Catholic Church and determine her place in the Catholic scholarship on reconciliation. This investigation is the first attempt to evaluate the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Until now, no similar researches have been conducted. The majority of the publications in theology in Ukraine appears, for instance, in the areas of Church history or patristics. There are not enough investigations in the domain of the social teaching of the Church, although the interest in and demand for that kind of studies is present in society.12 The bulk of publications are translations which are a valuable contribution in itself because before starting to develop her own theology, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has to assure admission to the broader theological discourse of the present time as well as of the past.13 Due to objective reasons, during the communist times this access was denied. The situation of other traditional Ukrainian Churches is very much the same. Accordingly, I consider it important to locate the Greek-Catholic vision of reconciliation in the context of available theologies on the topic. ____________________ 12

13

For instance, see a precise evaluation of the current stance of social teaching of different Ukrainian Churches: Yurii Chornomorets, “Ideal khrystyianskoi Ukrainy yak vymoha sotsialnoho vchennia khrystyianskykh Tserkov” {The ideal of Christian Ukraine as a claim of the social teaching of Christian Churches}, http://bogoslov-club.org.ua/?p=3351 (accessed October 24, 2013). For instance, the Institute of Religion and Society of the Ukrainian Catholic University has issued a number of editions on the social teaching of the Church (selected books): Myroslav Marynovych, ed., Sotsialna doktryna Tserkvy. Zbirnyk statei {The social doctrine of the Church. Collection of articles} (Lviv: Svichado, 1998); Myroslav Marynovych, ed., Relihiina svoboda i prava liudyny. T. 1, Bohoslovski aspekty {Religious freedom and human rights. Vol. 1, Theological aspects} (Lviv: Svichado, 2000); Myroslav Marynovych, ed., Relihiina svoboda i prava liudyny. T. 2, Pravnychi aspekty {Religious freedom and human rights. Vol. 2, Legal aspects} (Lviv: Svichado, 2000); Ivan Havanio, ed., Joseph Cardinal Höffner. Khrystyianske suspilne vchennia {Joseph Cardinal Höffner. Christian social teaching} (Lviv: Svichado, 2002); Myroslav Marynovych and Lesia Kovalenko, eds., Relihiina svoboda i prava liudyny. T. 3, Misiia i prozelityzm {Religious freedom and human rights. Vol. 3, Mission and proselytism} (Lviv: Svichado, 2004); Mykhailo Perun, ed., Tserkva i sotsialna komunikatsiia: naiholovnishi dokumenty Katolytskoi Tserkvy pro presu, radio, telebachennia, internet ta inshi media {The Church and social communication. The main documents of the Catholic Church on the press, radio, television, the Internet and other media} (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2004); Kovalenko, Socially oriented documents.

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Notwithstanding initiatives of the Institute of Religion and Society (and the Ukrainian Catholic University in general), the Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on matters of Laity, her Justice and Peace Commission and the popularising work of Liubomyr Husar, the number of strictly scientific research contributions on the topic (Catholic social teaching) is rather modest.14 In recent years the Ukrainian Catholic University, in particular its Philosophy Department and the Institute of Religion and Society, has introduced a number of projects destined for the promotion of the Church’s social teaching, among them certified programmes or summer schools “Christian identity and present social challenges;” “Religion in public space: Christian experience and perspectives;” “Ethics and the public sphere;” “Elites and social service;” “The social thought of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and today’s situation;” “The social thought of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi. Rescuing Jews and modern humanitarian problems;” “The ethical dimension of a civic position. Action, fear, courage.” In 2013 the Institute of Ecumenical Studies of the Ukrainian Catholic University has already organised the Sixth Ecumenical Social Week15 in Lviv. The Justice and Peace Commission16 and the Commission for Promoting Christian Unity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church17 jointly organise the “Social Week of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.” The latter also prepares the Ecological “Day of Creator” while the former induces a number of initiatives for popularising the Church’s social teaching, for example, international summer schools “Ethical leadership in the public life of Ukraine” and “Democratic values in society,” the all-Ukrainian action “Memory Day” or the admittance of the World Day of Social Justice. Since 2009 the magazine “Khrystyianyn i svit” (“A Christian and the World”)18 has appeared, founded and edited by Viktor Zhukovskyi, a professor of the Faculty of Theology of the Ukrainian Catholic University. In May 2013 in Lviv, the ____________________ 14

15 16 17 18

22

Yurii Pidlisnyi, “Suspilne vchennia Katolytskoi Tserkvy i politychni realii ukrainskoho siohodennia” {Social teaching of the Catholic Church and political reality of present Ukraine}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/materials_confer ences/45476/ (accessed January 13, 2014). Translation from the original source. The official web-site of the initiative: http://esweek.org.ua/. The official web-site of the Commission of the UGCC on Justice and Peace: http://www.iupax-ugcc.org/. The official web-site of the Commission of the UGCC for Promoting Christian Unity: http://www.ecumenism.com.ua/. The official web-site of the magazine “Khrystyianyn i svit” {A Christian and the world}: http://xic.com.ua/.

General Introduction

Libertas Centre for Interconfessional and Interreligious Dialogue was inaugurated.19 Since 1997 Ukraine has been working in the international group “Reconciliation in Europe. The target of the Church in Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Germany.”20 Already this enumeration of projects and publications shows that there are a number of initiatives in which the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church refers to the social issues. At the same time, the social teaching of this Church is insufficiently scientifically reflected. Except for some translated materials, there are practically no original publications of Greek-Catholic theologians on the topic. Reconciliation is in a similar position. Despite some Church initiatives and many official pronouncements on reconciliation, which I will discuss later in this book, almost no scientific research on the issue was done.21 There are a few authors who demonstrate an interest in different aspects of reconciliation and sporadically produce materials in the form of short articles or blogs, for example, Myroslav Marynovych, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Antoine Arjakovsky, Mykhailo Dymyd.22 Some ____________________ 19 20 21

22

The official web-site of the centre http://www.libertas.infolviv.eu/. The official web-site of the group http://primirenie.in.ua/. Two international conferences for students and young scholars of the Institute of Religion and Society serve as examples of introducing the theme of reconciliation and the healing of memory into the scientific discourse in Ukraine: in 2009 “Conflicts and Reconciliation through the Prism of Faith” and in 2010 “Healing the Wounds of the Past through the Prism of Religious Experience.” See, for example: Antoine Arjakovsky, “Les lieux de réconciliation ukrainopolonais,” in En attendant le concile de l’Église Orthodoxe (Paris: Les éditions du CERF, 2011), 501-512; Antoine Arjakovsky, “I Can no Longer Remain Silent,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/monitoring/society_digest/54902/ (accessed January 14, 2014); Myroslav Marynovych, “Polshcha i Ukraina pislia medovoho misiatsia” {Poland and Ukraine after the honeymoon}, Krytyka 5-6 (2010): 2729; Myroslav Marynovych, “Ukrainsko-yevreiski stosunky u svitli konfliktolohii: pershe nablyzhennia” {Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the light of conflictology. Initial approach}, in Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 111-122; Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Holokost i Holodomor: vyklyky kolektyvnii pamiati” {The Holocaust and the Holodomor. Challenges to the collective memory}, in Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 251-260; Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Dvi Ukrainy” {Two Ukraines}, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 176-191; Mykhailo Dymyd, “Prymyrennia pamiati v Ukraini” {Reconciliation of memory in Ukraine}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/~Dymyd/35521/ (accessed January 22, 2014); Mykhailo Dymyd, “Prymyrennia” {Reconciliation}, http://risu.org.ua/ ua/index/blog/~Dymyd/38491/ (accessed January 23, 2014). I will consider these and more materials in the appropriate places throughout the book.

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more texts appear on the occasion of events which are at a certain period discussed in society, for example the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre. However, those scarce materials rather have a publicist character. Understandably, there is more literature on the reconciliation between Ukrainian Churches or the rapprochement between the Ukrainian Churches and the Moscow Patriarchate including that of a scientific character. For example, in 2008 Jaroslav Jaššo defended a dissertation entitled “The Reconciliation Process between the Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine through the Healing of Memories”23 at the Catholic Theological Union in Chicago under the guidance of Robert Schreiter. However, no one has tried to make a comprehensive analysis of the Greek-Catholic theology of reconciliation. This gap in knowledge I intend to cover in this investigation. I hope that the findings of the analysis of the reconciliation discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church reveal something about the approach of this Church to social teaching in general. In this way I can deliver some incitements for a broader study of the hermeneutics of GreekCatholic social teaching, which is still waiting for its researcher.

General characteristics of the analysed documents of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church It is essential to emphasise that not all 88 documents on reconciliation from our list treat the issue equally deeply. The texts can be divided into three groups according to their significance, that is how specifically they deal with the research topic. The first group comprises the documents that are completely dedicated to the subject. For instance, “Reconciliation between nations is possible,” a message of Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and Polish Catholic bishops on the occasion of the mutual forgiveness and reconciliation act of 2005 crowns the discourse on the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. Similarly, “One people of God dwells on the Kyiv hills,” a speech of Liubomyr Husar on the occasion of the transfer of his metro____________________ 23

24

Jaroslav Jaššo, “The Reconciliation Process between the Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine through the Healing of Memories” (PhD diss., Catholic Theological Union, 2008), www.vincentini.sk/data_web/edit or_data/file/jasso_disertation.doc (accessed February 28, 2014).

General Introduction

politan seat from Lviv to Kyiv in 2004, is among the leading texts on the re-establishment of the united Kyivan Church which is a Greek-Catholic project of the reconciliation between traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine. Secondly, there are documents that theoretically unveil the meaning of separate elements of reconciliation, for instance repentance or forgiveness, without tying them to concrete situations where reconciliation is needed. This group of texts could well be illustrated by the messages of Husar on the occasion of the celebration of the Day of Purification and Reconciliation in Lviv.24 Finally, there are texts that do not speak directly about reconciliation or its elements, but they are nevertheless valuable because they elucidate the Greek-Catholic attitude to problems, the solutions of which would contribute to reconciliation. For instance, “Open letter of the Heads of the Churches and religious organisations of Ukraine on the language issue,” signed also by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, points to the significance of the state law on languages for the allUkrainian reconciliation. Notwithstanding this variety of texts, I consider it important to include all of them because it helps to make a clearer picture of the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The general rule is that while analysing the documents, I will concentrate on the pronouncements that have to do with reconciliation and notions related to it, for instance, historical memory, social peace, or interethnic relations. I will consciously neglect the texts that mention the notion of peace in its general meaning. For example, the words of greetings of Cardinal Myroslav-Ivan Luibachivskyi pronounced upon his return to Lviv in March 1991 where he wishes peace and the spirit of unity and love to the Ukrainian state25 are not included. Many official statements issued on a variety of occasions contain calls to unity, respect, mutual understanding, love, etc. We consider that such words are of general application and that they neither add not clarify anything about the specifically Ukrainian situation. In this monograph I aim to deal with the reconcilia____________________ 24 25

See documents No. 99; No. 118; No. 346. “Tsiluiu tsiu zemliu, obnimaiu vsikh zhyteliv tsiiei zemli, nashoi Ukrainy.’ Slovo Blazhennishoho Patriarkha Myroslava-Ivana na letovyshchi u Lvovi” {“I Kiss this land, I embrace all people of this land, our Ukraine.’ Speech by MyroslavIvan Cardinal Liubachivskyi at the Lviv airport}, in Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (1989-2008), ed. Lesia Kovalenko (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008), 32-33.

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tion in the Ukrainian case and therefore, I will refer to the writings that explicitly treat that question. Interviews will not be listed among the official pronouncements because they cannot be called official documents in a proper meaning of the word. Additionally, there are simply too many of them in order to be elaborated in one book. But I will certainly refer to them where it is appropriate as an additional source. Besides, the most important ideas were transmitted in addresses, messages, open and pastoral letter, etc. Thoughts expressed in interviews only confirm, support, and explain what was or will be later mediated in official pronouncements. On some occasions, for instance, concerning the healing of memories of World War II, there appeared no documents for a long time, but the topic was sufficiently elucidated in a number of interviews. However, even in this case I confine the analysis only to the documents fully dedicated to war issues. Certain citations from interviews will be used only to better illustrate the leading ideas found in the examined texts. The absolute majority of the texts are available only in Ukrainian language and hence, they are not accessible to the western reader. This fact posed certain challenges in the course of work on this volume, first of all the difficulties of the translation of particular passages. My translations into English will be mentioned in footnotes with the remark “translation from the original source.” If a western reader had access to the texts in the original language, he/she would realise that the majority of the documents are by no means written in a formal style usually associated with official pronouncements. The texts of the type of “Memorandum of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the issue of the local Kyivan Church,” which in a strict manner point by point unfolds the current state, the concept and challenges of the creation of a united local Church in Ukraine, are not peculiar to the Greek-Catholic Church leadership. The language of the documents is rather poetic and often emotional; it includes Ukrainian proverbs, fragments of songs, references to national symbols, historical figures, manners, and customs, etc. All this makes those texts dearer, more understandable and impressive for Ukrainian readers. I included a number of speeches and sermons of the Heads of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi, as well as Liubomyr Husar instead of formal documents preferred directs contacts with the faithful. Accordingly, very often they presented their thoughts during sermons. It could be a sign of an Eastern Christian character of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church where documents like papal encyclicals are uncommon. Additionally, for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as an Eastern Church the li26

General Introduction

turgical dimension is very important.26 I believe this explains so many liturgical references, prayers, and elements of sermons in the official documents of this Church. An essential feature of the pronouncements of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is that the social issues are not elaborated theoretically. The social documents are always dedicated to the concrete problems that Ukrainian society faces. Hence, the argumentation in almost all the official pronouncements of the Church is built on the critical analysis of a certain problem.27 This is a typical feature of practically all the texts that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has published since her coming out of the underground in 1989. That equally applies to the documents on reconciliation that were issued when corresponding discussions were waged in society. The official documents are mostly authored by the Heads of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.28 In the studied period of November 1989 – March 2014 there were three of them: Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi (1989-12.2000), Liubomyr Husar (01.2001-02.2011), and Sviatoslav Shevchuk (since 03.2011). Additionally, there are official pronouncements of the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops and a document of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. I also included joint texts, for instance, messages issued by the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, or the documents on different topics which the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church prepared with other Christian Churches in Ukraine or as a member of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organi____________________ 26

27

28

Volodymyr Moroz, “Spetsyfika ukrainskoi identychnosti ta Ukrainska HrekoKatolytska Tserkva u suchasnyi period: sproba osmyslennia” {Peculiarity of the Ukrainian identity and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the present period. Attempt of reflection}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/materials_conferen ces/51332/ (accessed January 16, 2014). Myroslav Marynovych, “Moralni tsinnosti v pastyrskykh poslanniakh yerarkhii Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy, prysviachenykh suspilnym problemam” {Moral values in the pastoral addresses of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church dedicated to social problems}, in Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 420. Document No. 12 issued on June 25, 1990, was authored by the ruling primate of the Galician Metropolia Volodymyr Sterniuk who at the absence of MyroslavIvan Liubachivskyi in Ukraine was ruling the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Like the majority of Greek-Catholic bishops, during the Soviet times, Liubachivskyi resided in exile in Rome. He returned to Ukraine on March 31, 1991.

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General Introduction

sations. Such documents not only testify to the ecumenical openness of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, but also show that reconciliation concerns are familiar to other religious communities in Ukraine. The great majority of the analysed documents I have borrowed from the already mentioned collection Socially Oriented Documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008). Certain texts, especially those appeared after 2008, were consulted on the official web-sites of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and on some other Ukrainian and foreign Internet sources. In a few cases when the English translation of a document is available, I included both Ukrainian and English versions in the list.29 Accordingly, in the footnotes I refer to both versions by indicating first the Ukrainian text and then its translation in parentheses.30 The same approach is applied for those few documents which are originally available in Ukrainian and where I discovered a German translation in order to make it possible for the western European reader to be able to find at least some texts in the popular European languages.31 Two documents32 were discovered in the French language in a scientific journal “Istina” being issued in Paris by the centre of ecumenical studies under the same name. In this piece of research I will occasionally refer to corresponding Polish examples of dealing with the burdened past not only because my research treats the question of the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation but also because Poland is considered in Ukraine as an example to follow on the ____________________ 29

30 31 32

28

For example, No. 177 “Odyn Bozhyi narod u krai na kyivskykh horakh’: Slovo Blazhennoho Liubomyra, Mytropolyta Kyievo-Halytskoi Mytropolii Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy, z nahody zapochatkuvannia povernennia osidku mytropolyta do Kyieva” {One People of God Dwells on the Kyiv Hills. Speech of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Metropolitan of Kyiv-Halych, about the transfer of the metropolitan seat to Kyiv},” in Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (1989-2008), ed. Lesia Kovalenko (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008), 307-313. This document is available in English translation which is indicated in the study with No. 3000 “The Unique People of God. Discourse of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar, Metropolitan of Kyiv-Halych, Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, on the Occasion of the Beginning of the Return of the Metropolitan See to Kyiv,” in Conversations with Lubomyr Husar. Towards a Post-Confessional Christianity, ed. Antoine Arjakovsky (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2007), 128-138. For example, No. 177, 31 (No. 3000, 137). For example, No. 218, 364 (No. 4001, 191). No. 5000 and No. 5004.

General Introduction

path of social transformation and European integration. Equally the Russian examples will be occasionally considered as another case of the profound Soviet heritage, the memory of which has to be re-evaluated and purified. Additionally, I will consider the pronouncements and interviews of the leadership of other Churches of the Kyivan tradition. Keeping in mind that the unity of the Churches in Ukraine is one of the most important concerns of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, it is useful to detect the reaction of other Churches on the issues that I study in this research project. That allows to draws conclusions about the prospects of reconciliation between the Churches. The rapprochement can start from searching for commonalities and working on joint projects. The discourse of other Churches helps detect the points of possible cooperation. Finally, many conclusions of this investigation will be based on Internet blogs, articles and short commentaries to them. This is not scientific material in a proper meaning of the word; however, I believe that precisely those entries articulate which resonance the official pronouncements and acts of the Church have in today’s society.

The choice of the reference authors Except for analysing the proper approach of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to reconciliation, I will place it in the broader theological dialogue. In that way, I will acquaint the Ukrainian reader with the peculiarities of the theological discourse on reconciliation, a topic that is very poorly known33 and which I attempt to plant in the Ukrainian theological soil with this volume. At the outset, I deem important to clarify the choice of Robert Schreiter, Miroslav Volf, and John Paul Lederach as reference authors for the analysis of the pronouncements on reconciliation authored by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Volf, Lederach, and Schreiter focus on the relational aspect of reconciliation. This approach “is guided by a spatial metaphor of encounter, un understanding that suggests places for the estranged to meet, exchange, engage and even embrace; where they create ____________________ 33

As far as our three research authors are concerned, only the Russian translation of After Our Likeness: The Church as an Image of the Triune God by Miroslav Volf was published in Cherkasy, Ukraine in 2012.

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and re-create common ground in contested histories embedded in their social and physical geographies.”34 I will consciously make no systematic introduction to Schreiter, Volf, and Lederach; neither will I present an exhaustive review of the secondary literature to them, since my aim is to use their works as a lens and hermeneutical key for a critical evaluation of the official texts of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

Catholic approach of Robert Schreiter: spirituality of reconciliation If I had to name a scholar whose vision and approach to reconciliation corresponds best to that of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church I would certainly mention Robert Schreiter. On the occasion of granting Schreiter an Honorary Doctorate at the University of Luzern in 2001, the dean of the Faculty of Theology named his book Constructing Local Theologies35 one of the most important earliest books in that domain of theology, “a Bible of contextual theology.”36 The mission in the world today, the theology and practice of reconciliation, the influence of globalisation on local cultures and on the practice of religion are among the focus points of Schreiber’s research interests. Additionally, this scholar was practically involved in reconciliation as a theological consultant to Caritas International for the programmes in reconciliation and peacebuilding. Recently, he has given a serious of lectures on reconciliation and leadership. He is currently a professor of theology at the Catholic Theological Union. The author is interested in enculturation and in the place of reconciliation in the mission today.37 ____________________ 34

35 36

37

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John Paul Lederach and Angela Jill Lederach, When Blood and Bones Cry Out: Journeys through the Soundscape of Healing and Reconciliation (Oxford University Press, 2011), 4-5. Italics preserved from the original text. Robert Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985). Edmund Arens, „Ansprache des Dekans zur Verleihung der Ehrendoktorwürde an Robert Schreiter am Dies academicus, 21. November 2001, Universität Luzern“, http://www.unilu.ch/files/dies-ehredoktorwuerde-schreiter.pdf (accessed June 17, 2013). Reconciliation as a model of mission in the present-day epoch of globalisation is the most often recurring topic in the articles and presentations of Schreiter of the last 15 years. Here are several examples: “Globalization as a Challenge to the Churches,” http://www.usccb.net/conference/conference19/paper-Globalization-

General Introduction

The choice of Robert Schreiter as a reference author is not accidental. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is that her theology develops at the crossroads of the Western Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theological tradition. I originally planned to evaluate the GreekCatholic theology of reconciliation in the light of the authors from both traditions. However, to my surprise I have not discovered any Orthodox theologian who explicitly and systematically worked on the issues of forgiveness and reconciliation on the social level.38 My primary consideration is that Robert Schreiter is a Catholic theologian. There were mostly Protestant authors who wrote on different aspects of reconciliation as my two other reference authors, Miroslav Volf and John Paul Lederach. Schreiter is probably the best known Catholic theologian who dedicated his work to reconciliation. It seems logical for me to read the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church through the ideas of an author who works within the same tradition. Robert Schreiter developed a very concrete and practical understanding of the theology of reconciliation and of its constitutive elements. It is a great merit of this scholar that in addition to naming resources in Christian tradition on healing, forgiveness and reconciliation, he elaborates on concrete practices of rapprochement.39 It is my interest to deepen the under____________________

38

39

schreiter.pdf (accessed July 17, 2013); “The Future of Catholic Peacebuilding.’ Closing remarks at the Conference on the future of Catholic Peacebuilding, University of Notre Dame, April 15, 2008,” http://cpn.nd.edu/assets/14687/schreiter nd.pdf (accessed July 17, 2013); “Reconciliation and Healing as a Paradigm for Mission,” International Review of Mission 94 (2005): 74-83; “Globalisation and Reconciliation. Challenges to Mission,” in Mission in the Third Millennium, ed. Robert Schreiter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), 121-143; “Theology of Reconciliation and Peacemaking for Mission.’ 2003 Lectures for the British and Irish Association of Mission Studies. New College, University of Edinburgh, June 23-25, 2003,” http://preciousbloodspirituality.org/spirituality-and-theology/ theology-reconciliation-and-peacemaking-mission (accessed June 16, 2013); “Reconciliation as a Model of Mission,” New Theology Review 10 (1997): 6-15. I was interested in works such as, for instance, Stanley S. Harakas, “Forgiveness and Reconciliation. An Orthodox Perspective,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation, eds. Raymond Helmick and Rodney Petersen (n.p: Templeton, 2001), 51-78. In this article the author draws some repercussions of the Sacrament of Forgiveness for the promotion of reconciliation on broader levels than the merely ecclesial ones. Robert Schreiter, “A Practical Theology of Healing, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation,” in Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis, eds. Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Regard F. Powers (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 366.

31

General Introduction

standing of the Greek-Catholic theology of reconciliation by comparing it with the concerns of Schreiter. Due to many similarities between both theologies, they reinforce and complement each other. For example, the reference to Robert Schreiter helps understand better the value of divine reconciliation in Husar’s pronouncements.

Evangelical approach of Miroslav Volf: radical forgiveness One of the most readable scholars on the theology of reconciliation is Miroslav Volf, an American author of Croatian origin. Whereas Robert Schreiter helps understand better the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church since both teachings belong to the same tradition, the theology of Miroslav Volf prompts us to evaluate the GreekCatholic texts in the light of another, namely Protestant Evangelical tradition. How does Miroslav Volf inform the essentially Catholic thought of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church? Where do both theologies intersect and in which regards do they complement or elucidate each other? I discovered the ideas of Miroslav Volf during my Master studies at the Faculty of Theology of the Leuven Catholic University in 2004-2006. I was fascinated by the theology of reconciliation that opened up new horizons for me as a scholar coming from Eastern Europe where those theories were not widely known. I realised that there is a gap to be filled regarding reconciliation in the Ukrainian context. The needs were there and it was only the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church endeavouring to meet them. The project of that research, consisting of the evaluation of the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, was also incited by that first encounter with the writings of Miroslav Volf. In the years that followed I discovered other facets of that theologian. His scientific works are manifold. The scope of Volf’s work is larger than reconciliation and dealing with the troubled memory in the context of clashing identities. He works scientifically on the most acute problems of our epoch, for instance, on globalisation in his university course taught at Yale together with the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Volf’s theological works were in different times dedicated, for instance, to the theology of human work and economics,40 the vision of the local Church ____________________ 40

32

Miroslav Volf, Work in the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

General Introduction

in the context of Trinitarian theology,41 Christian faith, religious pluralism and political engagement in the public world,42 the repercussions of the image of God on the peaceful coexistence between Christian and Muslim cultures.43 In this study project I will focus on Volf’s works on the healing of memory, forgiveness, and reconciliation which probably constitutes the central theme in his scientific inheritance at least according to the number of books.44 The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, very pointedly characterised Volf’s style of research and writing: “He writes with enormous sensitivity to possible objections, to the ways in which he says may sound hollow or insensitive, and incorporates a real element of dialogue into his argument. In that sense, this is a book {Free of Charge} that engages its readers with great force and immediacy.”45 This characteristic equally applies to all other works of Volf. It is not possible to comment upon every single thought of Volf in the view of the manifold aspects of forgiveness and reconciliation that this scholar scrutinises. I will concentrate on the ideas which I find the most peculiar to that author and which intersect with the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. I hope that in that way I will make Miroslav Volf meaningful and thoughtprovoking to the leadership of the Church.

Practice-oriented approach of John Paul Lederach: building communities of change John Paul Lederach, who is first of all a practitioner in the sphere of peacebuilding, brings to the fore the creativity of that process. He concentrates on imagination, moments of haiku, enlightenment, serendipity, be____________________ 41 42 43 44

45

Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as an Image of the Triune God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998). Miroslav Volf, A Public Faith: How Followers of Christ Should Serve the Common Good (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2011). Miroslav Volf, Allah: A Christian Response (New York: HarperOne, 2011). Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006); Miroslav Volf, Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005); Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1996). Rowan Williams, foreword to Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace, by Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005), 9.

33

General Introduction

ing artist, aesthetics, and metaphor rather than on techniques and methodologies. He is of the opinion that the role of the mediator is to observe and figure out the moments of creativity. The real task of constructive social changes or reconciliation can be born and carried out only by the protagonists of the conflict themselves. It is due to his creative practical approach to reconciliation that I consider Lederach to be a valuable scholar to my research. On the basis of his more than 25 years of experience in peacebuilding and conflict transformation, the Mennonite and sociologist John Paul Lederach focuses both on the meaning of reconciliation, and the resources that promote it. He describes peace in terms of art and soul. It may seem that Lederach is not really relevant to the situation of Ukrainian society. The scholar focuses predominantly on the countries which are facing or have recently faced mass-scale violence, which has not been the case of Ukraine until 2014. Ukraine needs reconciliation of memories, so that politicians do not deepen the East-West division, so that the people elaborate a common vision of the future that can unite them (national unity), so that Ukraine overcomes the current lengthy crisis of development and recently also of separatism. Lederach’s vision of moral imagination will help define where to search the sources of reconciliation in Ukrainian society.

Research questions and content The principal research question of the investigation is the following: What are the essence, significance, and potential of the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and where are they to be located in the broader theological discourse on reconciliation (as shown in the examples of Schreiter, Volf, and Lederach)? Accordingly, my study consists of three parts. Chapter I. Background of the reconciliation discourse in Ukraine. What is the religious situation of contemporary Ukraine; the stance of the relations between traditional Ukrainian Churches and the reflection of identity differences within the country in the identity conflicts between the Churches; the present-day picture of the religiosity of Ukrainians? This analysis has to answer the following question: which obstacles and potentials are to be found within the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as an agent of reconciliation? 34

General Introduction

Part I. Which topics of the burdened memory does the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church address; how is reconciliation rendered in her theology; which elements/steps of reconciliation does this Church develop; how can those be enhanced by the reconciliation discourse of Volf, Schreiter, and Lederach? The principal question of this analysis is: which are the peculiarities of the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and how do they suit the broader discourse on the topic (as shown in the examples of the reference authors)? Part II. What is the goal of the purification of memory in Ukraine; how does the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church promote social changes like reconciliation; which insight can be gained from the texts of Volf, Schreiter, and Lederach for the practical embodiment of reconciliation? Analysing those matters, I strive to answer the following broader question: what is the potential of the theology and practice of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and how can it be strengthened? Finally, it is worth telling a few words about the structure of parts I and II. I suggest that it is reasonable to begin with the description of where the Greek-Catholic Church leadership envisions the sources of conflicts in contemporary Ukrainian society (chapter II). After that, I will elucidate the Greek-Catholic understanding of reconciliation which can be very precisely described as an endeavour for the sake of the spiritual regeneration of the person (chapter III). The point is to evaluate the Church’s vision of reconciliation through the lenses of the reference authors, where reconciliation is rendered as healing (Schreiter), embrace (Volf), and restoration of the fabric of society (Lederach). The concluding section of the second part (chapter IV) is dedicated to the elements of reconciliation. I will unveil the Greek-Catholic vision of repentance as the individual conversion of the heart, say a world on the Church’s underdeveloped teaching on justice, and evaluate her radical approach to forgiveness. Obviously, the reference authors will also get a voice here, for instance, Schreiter and Volf can unveil the centrality of the grace of forgiveness, Schreiter will warn against the destructive impact of social injustices, and Miroslav Volf will call to repent for the wounds in one’s soul caused by the perpetrator. In the third part, I will first refer to the Greek-Catholic way of dealing with the burdened historical memory both on a theoretical level and through practical examples, for instance, healing the memories of World War II or the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. Robert Schreiter and Miroslav Volf will help define the moral truth about the past and certain rules of salutary remembering (chapter V). As a final point, I will turn to the practical implementation of reconciliation (chapter VI). The Greek-Catholic 35

General Introduction

emphasis on reaching a spiritual unity for promoting development will be evaluated in the light of Schreiter’s and Lederach’s account of how to endorse social changes. In that way, I will elucidate the most original point of reconciliation according to the leadership of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, which is the moral regeneration of the person as a means of bringing about social changes.

A note on transliteration Understandably, I use many Ukrainian sources in this book, which obviously brings about the problem of transliteration. There are cases when I refer to the articles of the same author written in English and in Ukrainian. I adopted the following rule. In the case of the Ukrainian language source I will transliterate the name according to the transliterated system that I have chosen in order to remain consistent. If the article is written in English and the name of the author is already transliterated by the publisher I will leave it for the sake of the authenticity of the text. Hence, in my texts will appear both Liudmyla Fylypovych and Ludmila Philipovitch, Anatolii Kolodnyi and Anatoly Kolodny, Viktor Yelenskyi and Victor Yelensky. In this book I will apply the official governmental spelling of the names of places and persons in Ukraine rather than their Russian forms typically familiar to most westerners. Hence, the reader will encounter Kyiv instead of Kiev, Volodymyr in the place of Vladimir, Kharkiv instead of commonly known Kharkov. However, my approach by no means expresses an anti-Russian bias.

36

Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

Introduction In 1997, Ukrainian religious scholars Kolodny and Fhilipovitch spoke about the disintegrative role of the Churches in the processes of national revival because of the conflicts that those Churches are engaged in between themselves.1 At the same time, the issue of the reconciliation between the Churches occupies a lot of place in their social pronouncements. Hence, at the outset I consider it important to elaborate on the actual stance of the traditional Churches in Ukraine and determine the relations between them and existing lines of conflicts. This is important in view of the claim of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that the reconciliation between the Churches would facilitate the social cohesion in the country, which in its turn would promote the political, economic, and social transformation of Ukraine. Another aim of this first part of the study is to evaluate whether the Churches as institutions have sufficient resources to deliver their reconciling message. Furthermore, it is equally important to draw a picture of the religiosity of Ukrainians to determine how deep people are concerned with the ethical message of the Churches and if they do it at all. Interconfessional conflicts are mentioned in the concept of the National Security of Ukraine as a possible threat to the security of the state. Even though the present phase of this conflict is not particularly hazardous, its consequences are still noticeable since they among other things concern the identity division lines in society. Surprisingly enough, although the acute phase of the inter-Church conflicts is left back in the 1990s, according to the study published by the Razumkov Centre in February 2011, 12.5% of the respondents estimated that religion is a negative phenomenon because it divides the people into denominations and consequently ____________________ 1

Anatoly Kolodny and Ludmila Philipovitch, “The Non-Traditional Religiosity in the Context of the Spiritual Revival of Ukraine,” in New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Irena Borowik and Grzegorz Babinski (Krakow: Nomos, 1997), 303.

37

Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

provokes conflicts.2 In what follows in this chapter I will designate the main protagonists and the actual state of the conflict – traditional Ukrainian Christian Churches as well as paint out reasons and outcomes of the struggle between them. In other words, I will define the backdrop against which I will outline the prospects of reconciliation between the Churches in Ukraine in the next chapters. From the start it is necessary to elucidate the term “traditional Christian Churches” in Ukraine. Especially the word traditional demands further clarifications. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church are usually mentioned among the traditional Ukrainian Churches. The reason is the number of believers of those Churches and their common 1000-year-old historical roots.3 Due to her century-long presence on Ukrainian lands, also the Roman-Catholic Church belongs to the traditional denominations. However, it is not a Church of the Kyiv tradition as the four mentioned before: “To the Kyiv tradition belong the Churches that trace their origins back to Orthodox Christianity adopted by the medieval Kyivan Rus state of the Patriarchate of Constantinople as early as 988.”4

1.1 Religious pluralism in Ukraine Contemporary Ukraine is a country with a pluralistic society in many regards, including the sphere of religion. According to the results of the sociological research at the beginning of 2013, 67% of Ukrainians denoted themselves as believers and 8% atheists or agnostics.5 From the pie chart ____________________ 2

3

4 5

38

Razumkov Centre, “Riven i kharakter relihiinosti ukrainskoho suspilstva” {Level and character of the religiosity of Ukrainian society}, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn (Kyiv, 2011), 41, http://www.irs.in.ua/files/ publications/2011.02.08_centr_razumkova_dopovid.pdf (accessed February 13, 2014). Myroslava Rap, “The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine as a Conflict of Identities. Where to Search for the Prospects of Reconciliation? A Reflection in the Light of the Theories of Paul Ricoeur and John Paul Lederach,” Political Theology (forthcoming in 2015). Ibid. Razumkov Centre, “Relihiinist ukraintsiv: riven, kharakter, stavlennia do okremykh aspektiv tserkovno-relihiinoi sytuatsii i derzhavno-konfesiinykh vidnosyn” {Religiosity of Ukrainians. Level, character, attitude to particular aspects of the

1.1 Religious pluralism in Ukraine

below it is evident that although the majority of the population is Christian and Orthodox, other religions equally found their place in society. 71% of Ukrainians identify themselves with Orthodoxy, the dominant confession; the second biggest denomination is the Greek-Catholic with almost 6%.6 At the same time, a new clear tendency of the last decade is the growing number of communities of Protestant denominations, the quantity of which increases much faster than that of the traditional Churches.7 Evidently, this happens at the expense of Orthodox and Catholic believers. The network of religious organisations in Ukraine includes Roman Catholicism in western regions, Islam in the Crimean Peninsula, and different Protestant organisations throughout the country. Those data demonstrate pluralism in the religious sphere in the country, in the same way as the variety of political parties and ideologies prove that Ukrainian society is pluralistic also in other spheres.

____________________

6 7

Church-religious and Church-state relations}, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn (Kyiv, 2013), 23, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/ Przh_Religion_2013.pdf (accessed February 14, 2014). Ibid., 26. Razumkov Centre, “Relihiina merezha v Ukraini: stan i tendentsii rozvytku” {Religious networks in Ukraine. State and tendencies of development}, in Reliiia i vlada v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn (Kyiv, 2011), 5, http://www.irs.in .ua/files/publications/2011.02.08_centr_razumkova_dopovid.pdf (accessed February 13, 2014).

39

Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

Diagram 1: Denominational map of present-day Ukraine (number of communities in per cent as for January 1, 2014)8 What concerns the regional distribution of the religious network of Ukraine the following peculiarities were confirmed in 2011: the density of religious organisations varies in different regions, the majority of religious organisations are located in the west and the centre, there are no monoconfessional regions in Ukraine, even though a particular confession may predominate in a certain region, and finally, there is no confession that dominates in all the parts of the country.9 Among other interesting facts it is worth mentioning that we find the highest level of religious activity in the western part of Ukraine: at the end of the 1990s, 50% of all the parishes were registered in this region that counts only 20% of the population of the country.10 This can be explained by the shorter presence of the communist regime in this region, its mostly rural character with a strong na____________________ 8

9 10

40

The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, “The Network of Churches and Religious Organisations in Ukraine for 1.01.2014,” http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/statistics/ukr2014/55893/ (accessed September 9, 2014). Razumkov Centre, Religious networks, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2011), 28. Paul D’Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, Politics and Society in Ukraine, Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Repubics (Cambridge, MA: Westview, 1999), 76.

1.1 Religious pluralism in Ukraine

tional Ukrainian identity, and the presence there of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, which as a persecuted Church in the underground enjoyed the deep loyalty of the people. At the same time, according to recent tendencies, the centre of religious life in the country is not concentrated exclusively in the western regions but slowly begins to extend to the central parts.11 Comparing to the growth of the traditional Orthodox, Catholic denominations, or even old and new Protestant communities, the new religious movements (neo-Christian, Oriental, pagan or synthetic religions) demonstrated an explosive rise. In 1991-2001 their congregations increased by an average of 500%.12 However, the spread of the new religious movements is a regional and not a nationwide phenomenon: their communities appear most often in southern and eastern regions of Ukraine where traditional Churches are the worst positioned.13 Traditional Churches, the state, and society show resistance to the spread of the new religious movements and cultivate a negative image of them. For instance, those communities are regarded as hostile and strange organisations “spreading false faiths, destroying the true spirituality of the Ukrainian people,” “making zombies out of Ukrainian people,” being “a serious danger to Ukrainian society, to the health of the nation and state security.”14 Religious experts univocally mention that the growing number of Protestant communities remains “the most dynamic factor of changing the denominational situation in Ukraine.”15 The Ukrainian religious analyst Viktor Yelenskyi still in 1999 pointed to the fact that the success of new religious movements and protestant denominations can be explained by the unsatisfactory role of traditionally rural Orthodox or Greek-Catholic Churches in Ukrainian cities. This led to “the decomposition of the traditional forms of religious culture.”16 In addition to the increasing number of ____________________ 11 12

13 14 15

16

Razumkov Centre, Religious networks, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2011), 30. Ludmyla Filipovych, “Tendencies of Change and Growth of New Religious Movements in Ukraine,” in Religions, Churches and the Scientific Studies of Religion: Poland and Ukraine, ed. Irena Borowik (n. p.: Nomos, 2003), 131. Ibid., 132. Ibid., 144. Victor Yelensky, “Late’ Protestants in Post-Communist Ukraine,” in Religions, Churches and the Scientific Studies of Religion: Poland and Ukraine, ed. Irena Borowik (n. p.: Nomos, 2003), 73. Victor Yelensky, “Ukraine. Church and State in the Post-Communist Era,” in Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (n.p.: Nomos, 1999), 143.

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

Protestants, in recent years there has been a tendency to an “increase in the number of “plain Christians,” “plain Orthodox,” and “plain Protestants.”17 At the end it leads to the situation when “Ukraine impresses not so much with its number of new religious organisations and their members as with the new structure of religious life.”18 Commenting the present situation with the changes in the religious networks in Ukraine, Mykola Cherenkov maintained: “While statistics of interested missiological centers indicate a continuing Christian boom in Ukraine, more fundamental and far-reaching studies point to a traditionalist consensus and slowed growth of new confessions. According to Ukrainian analysts, slower growth rates have been replaced by a decrease in church membership and quantity of churches, a loss of confessional identity and the growth of “mere Christianity.”19

The statistical data that I mentioned above substantiate that statement. The bar chart below demonstrates the number of the officially registered communities of four Churches of the Kyiv tradition. However, when compared with the number of believers who claim their belonging to a particular Church, we get a different picture of the real size of the Churches. According to Kuzio, there are two main methods to measure the support of the Church: either by the number of religious communities or by the number of believers who identify themselves with a Church. Interestingly enough, those two parameters usually give significantly different results.20 Let us illustrate this by the example of the public opinion poll, conducted by the Razumkov Centre in 2013. When the subject was asked which Church among Orthodox denominations the respondent belonged to, the answers were the following: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate – 28%, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate – 26%, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church – 1.2%, and 41% claimed to be “simply Orthodox.”21 Evidently, these figures differ from the official ones that describe the networks of religious organisations in the country. In particular, the number of supporters of the ____________________ 17

18 19 20 21

42

Michael Cherevkov, “Christianity in Ukraine. Commentary on Statistics,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/authors_columns/mcherenkov_column /53398 (accessed January 17, 2014). Ibid. Ibid. D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 76. Razumkov Centre, Religiosity of Ukrainians, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2013), 26.

1.1 Religious pluralism in Ukraine

Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is almost the same as that of the Moscow Patriarchate even though the latter has a lot more registered communities. The possible explanation of this discrepancy might be that while claiming their belonging to the Kyiv Patriarchate, people express their support for the Church that has a clearly Ukrainian identity. As we will demonstrate later in this chapter, the national identity of a Church plays a very important role in the Ukrainian context. In Ukraine the main analytical category are the numbers of religious organisations and not the numbers of their members. Olexander Sagan gives some curious examples. For instance, when originally one community splits in two – that of the Orthodox Church of Moscow and of the Kyiv Patriarchate – two communities will be captured in the official statistics, however in reality not a single faithful more was added.22 There are also differences regarding the quantity of members of a particular community. In western Ukraine the parishes are big, mostly comprising between few hundreds and several thousands of faithful, while in eastern regions some parishes are of the size just necessary for registration, that is twelve people.23

____________________ 22

23

Olexander Sagan, “Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Twelve Years of Transformation (1990-2002),” in Religions, Churches and the Scientific Studies of Religion: Poland and Ukraine, ed. Irena Borowik (n. p.: Nomos, 2003), 25. Ibid.

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

Diagram 2: The Churches of the Kyiv tradition (number of communities as for January 1, 2014)24 Notwithstanding official numbers and the variety of confessions, there is no univocal position among the scholars regarding the consequences of religious pluralism in Ukraine. For example, Oleksii Shuba, who studied the role of religion in the ethno-political development of the country, came to the following conclusion: “With the sufficient level of democracy and tolerance the plurality of confessions as such will not harm Ukrainian national endeavour. In civilised societies characterised by the culture of interconfessional understanding and religious tolerance, religious pluralism is not only a negative feature, as it may seem from the first sight. Every religion brings into the national treasury its own part of the culture, enriching in this way the religious-cultural diversity of the country.”25

The author obviously praises the pluralism of denominations in Ukraine. However, there are also contradicting opinions. To those, doubting the positive contribution of religious pluralism belongs, for example, Serhii Zdioruk, who wonders whether we will have a sufficient level of democ____________________ 24 25

44

The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, Networks of Churches. Oleksii Shuba, Relihiia v etno-natsionalnomu rozvytku Ukrainy (politolohichnyi analiz) {Religion in the ethno-national development of Ukraine (analysis in politology)} (Kyiv, 1999), 253-254. Translation from the original source.

1.2 Religiosity of Ukrainians

racy in the country and whether it is reasonable to assert that in this case the pluralism of confessions will not endanger the development of the Ukrainian state anymore.26 Moreover, according to the same author, even in the contemporary world we encounter situations where religions play an important role in stirring conflicts just to mention Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia, Palestine and many other places. To reinforce his statement, Zdioruk emphasises the words of Shuba that “religious pluralism is not only negative,” which means in fact that even though there are also positive contributions, it remains predominantly a negative phenomenon.27 Accepting that the pluralism of religion can indeed contribute to escalating conflicts in cases when religion is manipulatively used by some political powers or groups in pursuing their interests, I believe that the peace message transmitted by the majority if not all faiths is still more important. Consequently, the statement that religious pluralism is an evil because it “brings about first latent and later open conflicts”28 seems to be at least an exaggeration. In any case, the variety of religious confessions is a presentday reality in Ukraine and this fact will become more and more evident in the future.

1.2 Religiosity of Ukrainians According to the research conducted in December 2013, the Church enjoys the highest rate of trust (64.3%) among social institutions of Ukraine followed by the mass media (58.4%).29 Another survey from March 2012 conducted in the central-eastern regions of Ukraine shows that 27% of respondents presuppose the existence of God, 51% claim to be believers, and from them 84% identify themselves as Orthodox. For 42% of Ukrainians the value of religion and the Church consists in a national tradition.30 ____________________ 26

27 28 29

30

Serhii Zdioruk, Suspilno-relihiini vidnosyny: vyklyky Ukrainy 21 stolittia {Socioreligious relations. The challenges of Ukraine in the 21st century} (Kyiv, 2005), 90. Ibid., 91. Ibid. Translation from the original source. “Naibilshe ukraintsi doviriaiut Tserkvi, a naimenshe – sudam i militsii” {Ukrainians trust the Church the most and the court and police the least}, http:// www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1316%3A1&ca tid=34%3Aua&Itemid=61&lang=uk (accessed February 11, 2014). “Obnarodovany novyye dannyye o ryeligioznoy samoidyentifikatsii ukraintsyev” {New data about the religious self-identification of Ukrainians were published},

45

Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

At the same time, certain sociologists speculate that the decade-long trust of Ukrainians to their Churches can be explained by the generally very high distrust and disappointment regarding all other state institutions. Seeing no alternatives people turned to the Churches.31 Hence, perhaps not the high moral authority of the Church but the lack of trust in other institutions of socio-political life make the Church the last resort where people find spiritual and mental comfort. Yurii Chornomorets claims that the number of religious organisations exploded during the years of Ukrainian independence. However, although people consider themselves to be religious, especially in the western regions of the country, this religiosity is only external and ritual. The Christian morals do not dictate the daily behaviour of the people, hence Chornomorets speaks about “the secularisation of the souls.” 32 Every village and town has a church or even several of them, however, very often those ritual buildings are half full during Sunday mass. The fact that in a country with 46 million inhabitants and a vast majority of Christians only 4.4 million took part in the Christmas mass33 in 2014 tells something about the real religiosity of Ukrainians, namely that it is mainly declared. There are many parishes but only a few communities where people indeed share the life of each other.34 Many commentators of the celebration of the 1025th anniversary of the baptism of the Kyivan Rus in 2013 pointed to the discrepancy between the visible and real religiosity of Ukrainians. On the one hand, this feast was fabulous: 8 Orthodox patriarchs gathered in Kyiv, speeches about the deep Christian character of the Holy Rus were pronounced, state representatives of the highest ranks were present. However, commenting on this visibly glorious triumph of the Orthodoxy, the experts pointed to the genuine spiritual state of the faithful and society, claiming that there is an enormous gap between the declared Christianity and the ____________________

31

32

33

34

46

http://www.religion.in.ua/news/vazhlivo/15283-obnarodovany-novye-dannye-oreligioznoj-samoidentifikacii-ukraincev.html (accessed January 22, 2014). Yevhen Stratiievskyi, “Pro osoblyvosti ukrainskoi doviry” {On peculiarities of the Ukrainian trust}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?pro_osoblivosti_ ukrayinskoyi_doviri&objectId=1288902 (accessed January 17, 2014). Yurii Chornomorets, “Dvadtsiat rokiv bez dukhovnoho Renesansu: shcho dali?” {20 years without spiritual renaissance. What now?}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/ expert_thought/open_theme/44006/ (accessed January 14, 2014). “Bohosluzhennia na Rizdvo vidvidaly ponad 4.4. miliony ukraintsiv” {4.4 million Ukrainians attended Church services on Christmas}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/ index/all_news/culture/religious_holidays/54863/ (accessed January 13, 2014). Chornomorets, 20 years.

1.2 Religiosity of Ukrainians

real life of the people.35 Indeed, although Ukraine statistically belongs to the most religious nations, the country is among the leaders in corruption, abortion, other social evils.36 The results of the sociological pool conducted in 2011 confirm that statement: in the list of the values that inform the life orientation of Ukrainians religiosity occupies the next to last place.37 This is so, despite the fact that 56% of Ukrainians recognise the moral authority of the Church. The 1990s are characterised by the exploding growth of networks of religious organisations and the striking increase of the number of believers from 5% of Ukrainians before the communist transition to 70% at the end of the 1990s.38 However, the Polish proverb “Poles are religious but not very moral” also describes the religiosity of the Ukrainians. The ritualistic side of religious life is more important to people than the appropriation of Christian moral values and their application in political and social life.39 Sociological data prove this conclusion. For example, a growing number of Ukrainians (61% in 2013 against 56% in 2010) is convinced that a person can be simply a believer without confessing a particular religion. Even 56% of those who consider themselves believers share that opinion.40 I have already mentioned elsewhere the generally low attendance at religious services, so I will add only two numbers here. 53% of Ukrainian be____________________ 35

36 37

38 39

40

See some critical reflections on the topic: Kateryna Shchotkina, “Kredyt na tysiacholittia” {Credit for millennium}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/ authors_columns/kshchotkina_column/53051/ (accessed January 20, 2014); Anatolii Babynskyi, “Rozdumy pid yuvilei” {Reflections over the jubilee}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/~anatolius/53132/ (accessed January 20, 2014); Yevhenii Bilonozhko, “Chy ye v Ukraini khrystyiany?” {Are there Christians in Ukraine?}, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/22691-chi-ye-v-ukray ini-xristiyani.html (accessed January 20, 2014); Taras Antoshevskyi, “Sviato dvoslavia” {The feast of double-doxy}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/~%D0% A2%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%96%D0%B9/53109/ (accessed January 17, 2014). Antoshevskyi, Feast of double-doxy. “Ukraintsi ne vvazhaiut relihiinist tsinnisnym oriientyrom u zhytti” {Ukrainians do not consider the religiosity as a value orientation in life}, http://www.uceps. org/ukr/expert.php?news_id=2596 (accessed January 21, 2014). Kolodny and Philipovitch, Non-Traditional Religiosity, in New Religious Phenomena, 301. Janusz Marianski, “Reconstruction or Desintegration of Moral Values in Poland. A Sociological Essay,” in Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (n.p.: Nomos, 1999), 368. Razumkov Centre, Religiosity of Ukrainians, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2013), 26.

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

lievers attend Church ceremonies only for big feasts.41 At the same time, 41% of the followers of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church are present at the services once per week which makes a significant difference with other traditional Christian Churches where the followers gather at the church mostly for big yearly celebrations.42 63% of Ukrainians consider religion to be an important value in life,43 however, 29% opine that religion does not answer the needs of the present-day person.44 Among the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church this number is 12%. Only for every second Ukrainian the Church is a moral authority in society and the number of those who agree with the opinion that religion is one of the most important means of the regeneration of national conscience and culture shows a tendency to drop (from 78% in 2010 to 64% in 2013).45 Finally, religion is only at the tenth place among the qualities that a child has to appropriate in the family.46 What concerns the essence of belief, it is rather ambiguous. For instance, in 2011, only 72% of believers gave a fully positive answer to the question if they believe in God, 50% of them agree that the immortal soul exists (an additional 30% answered “rather yes”) and as much as 40% (“yes” or “rather yes”) presuppose the reincarnation of the soul.47 The Ukrainian faithful demonstrate quite a deep belief in the miraculous work of the holy relics (crosses, icons, candles) – 75.5%.48 According to the same opinion poll, the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church are the most consecutive in their religious convictions and religious practices. Attachment to religious observances is one of the most typical features of the religiosity of Ukrainians. Anatolii Kolodnyi explains that “despite the shallow knowledge of Christian religious doctrine, they {Ukrainians} simultaneously strive to preserve the rites, considering them to be selfsufficient for their religiosity.”49 The observing of the same religious rites made it possible to preserve the awareness of their belonging to the ____________________ 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

48

Ibid., 28. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 31. Ibid. Ibid., 26. Razumkov Centre, Level and character, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2011), 3738. Ibid., 37. Anatolii Kolodnyi, Ukraina v yii relihiinykh vyiavakh {Ukraine in her religious exposures} (Lviv: Spolom, 2005), 43. Translation from the original source.

1.2 Religiosity of Ukrainians

Ukrainian nation in the situation when people were dispersed in different countries and continents.50 Among the other features of Ukrainian religiosity are, for example, their superstitiousness, the high value of the family in religious rituals, piety with respect to the Holy Mary and the saints, deep reverence to the Holy Scriptures despite a superficial knowledge, respect for the clergy and anticlericalism, non-acceptance of an abstract religiosity, a certain nonchalance about confessional differences and consequently religious pluralism, attachment to a poetic and solemn spirituality.51 The religiosity of the Ukrainians is very much connected to religious services and often does not go beyond the church’s doors. This type of religiosity corresponds to the typical features of the ethno-psychological and ethno-religious make-up of a Ukrainian, which according to Petro Bilaniuk combines “two contrasting elements: the heroic, chivalrous (or simply Cossack) ideal of life and the withdrawn, passive, private and asocial existence of the peasant.”52 Those considerations bring us to the similar conclusion as the one drawn by Katrien Hertog in her research about the religiosity of the Orthodox believers in Russia: the Ukrainian faithful demonstrate an eclecticism in their religious consciousness, they are often superstitious, not sufficiently familiar with and believing in the dogmas of their faith, not deeply practising, and “after a close look not much is left of the seemingly widespread religiosity.”53 It is in that regard that Mykhailo Dymyd asked that the big question of the contemporary ecclesial identity and mission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is “how far the belonging of the faithful to the Church is consonant with their Christian way of life in the private and public dimensions.”54 Myroslav Marynovych speaks about the ____________________ 50 51 52

53

54

Ibid. Ibid., 43-45. Petro Bilaniuk, “The Ukrainian Catholic Lay Movement 1945-1975. An Interpretation,” in The Ukrainian Catholic Church 1945-1975: A Symposium, eds. Miroslav Labunka and Leonid Rudnytzky (Philadelphia, PA: The St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics, 1976), 91. Katrien Hertog, “Religious Peacebuilding. Resources and Obstacles in the Russian Orthodox Church for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Chechnya” (PhD diss., Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit, 2008), 352-356. Mykhailo Dymyd, “Eklezialna identychnist ta ekumenichna misiia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy na pochatku III tysiacholittia” {Ecclesial identity and ecumenical mission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at the beginning of the IIIrd millennium}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/discussions/theme/51399/ (accessed February 19, 2014). Translation from the original source.

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

“evangelisation of hearts” as the big task of Ukrainian Churches.55 In the next chapters I will unfold the situation of those Churches.

1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches National security together with political and economic matters include a spiritual aspect. The latter is defined as “a complexity of cultural, religious, and worldview factors that influence the formation of the national unity, solidary, and the common historical destiny.”56 Religious revival and high respect for the Church in Ukraine is explained not only by the belief in her salvific mission, but also by tradition. The Church is an institution that has existed on the territory of Ukraine for more than thousand years, comparing to which current democratic bodies, for example, appear as nearly temporary. It is also important for local elites that contemporary European culture was born and developed in the midst of the Church tradition and even though it is nowadays a secularised culture, still it can be best understood in reference to its religious Christian background.57 This idea was clearly delivered by the Ukrainian Churches during the events of the EuroMaidan.58 One should not forget the difficult living conditions, the society crisis, the lack of a clear vision of the future and other problems of the transitional society in Ukraine that make people refer to Churches for spiritual support. In the period of the spiritual revival at the end of the 80s – beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, traditional Churches in Ukraine were developing in different ways. A variety of factors contributed to this religious revival, among them also the political changes in the country after the disso____________________ 55

56

57 58

50

Myroslav Marynovych, “Avtentyka skhidnoho khrystyianstva mozhe zbahatyty Zakhidnu Yevropu” {Authenticity of Eastern Christianity can enrich Western Europe}, interview by Anatolii Babynskyi, Risu.org.ua, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/ expert_thought/interview/54232 (accessed January 17, 2014). Anatolii Kolodnyi, ed., Istoriia relihii v Ukraini. T. 10, Relihiia i Tserkva rokiv nezalezhnosti Ukrainy {History of religion in Ukraine. Vol. 10, Religion and Church in independent Ukraine} (Kyiv, Drohobych, 2003), 324. Translation from the original source. Ibid., 329. Viktor Yelenskyi, “Dlia nynishnoi vlady zvernennia yerarkhiv – ne vartuiut nichoho” {For today’s Ukraine the addresses of the hierarchs matter nothing}, interview by Yurii Chornomorets, Risu.org.ua, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_ thought/interview/54827/ (accessed February 14, 2014).

1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches

lution of the Soviet Union and the gaining of independence. Characterised at first by a rising number of believers and church buildings, the development of the Churches later circled around the internal sense of Church activities. Currently the number of growth of religious communities was stabilised and in 2007-2009 consisted of 2% of new communities per year.59 After the Churches had significantly rebuilt their structures, they concentrated more on the deeper assessment of their role and place in society. The appearance or revival of the new Churches on the denominational map of Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s was accompanied by the growing number of interconfessional conflicts. Most of them at first circled around the redistribution of the Church property60 and then leaned more towards gaining the leading position among the Ukrainian Christians. As of 2007, the public opinion among the reasons for conflicts between the Churches pointed to the strife for power among the hierarchs of different denominations, struggle for property and places of worship, altered attitudes to the national question in Ukraine, adjacency of Churches and politics and attempts to prove the truthfulness of the own faith.61 According to a later sociological research from February 2012, still similar reasons fuel the interdenominational rivalry in Ukraine: political struggle, the fight for human and material resources, the impact of international politics, and finally the issues of faith.62 Let me illustrate this conclusion by providing a short analysis of the history of the traditional Ukrainian Churches after the country became independent. I will refer to this analysis later in the next chapters while attempting to assess the conflict potential of the Churches nowadays in the light of the idea of the unity of the Ukrainian Churches of the Kyiv tradition. ____________________ 59 60

61

62

Razumkov Centre, Religious networks, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2011), 3. For more information about the conflicts concerning the redistribution of parishes and places of worship at the beginning of the 1990s, see David Little, Ukraine. The Legacy of Intolerance (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 39-54. Liudmyla Shanhina, “Relihiinist ukrainskoho suspilstva: okremi tendentsii 20002007 rokiv” {The religiosity of the Ukrainian society. Some tendencies of the years 2000-2007}, Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona 8 (2007): 35. Anastasiia Horobets, “Ukraintsi vvazhaiut sebe viruiuchymy, ale buvaiut v khramakh, ‘koly dovedetsia” {Ukrainians consider themselves believers but attend the Church only occasionally}, http://religions.unian.net/ukr/detail/10499 (accessed February 8, 2014).

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

1.3.1 Traditional Orthodox denominations 1.3.1.1 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church In the shadow of the Moscow Patriarchate The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) is a former exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church with the status of administrative autonomy since 1990.63 The promulgation of the Ukrainian state independence in 1991 prompted the Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and her Head, the metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) to demand canonical autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate.64 There were several grounds for that request. First, it was stated that the situation of the Church in the new circumstances of the independent state and the growing Catholic and autocephalist movements demanded a new status for the Church. Additionally, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church satisfies all the requirements for autocephaly because the structure of the Church and the number of believers are more than sufficient. Finally, autocephaly is presented as desired by believers and clergy and therefore, autocephaly is “justified and historically inevitable.”65 The metropolitan Filaret got a strong support from the nationally oriented politicians and personally from the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk. However, the Moscow Patriarchate condemned the autocephalous initiative and forced the metropolitan Filaret to leave his post as Head of the Church. According to the official explanation of the repudiation of the request for autocephaly, the final decision on the issue is postponed until all the eparchies of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church unite around the claims of autocephaly.66 In the opinion of the Canadian scholar Frank Sysyn, the ____________________ 63

64 65 66

52

“Opryedyelyeniye Svyashchyennogo Yubilyeynogo Arkhiyeryeyskogo Sobora Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tsyerkvi ob Ukrainskoy Pravoslavnoy Tsyerkvi” {Definition of the Holy Jubilee Council of the Hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church}, http://old.risu.org.ua/ukr/ resourses/religdoc/uocmp_doc/roc_archcoun2000/definition/ (accessed February 15, 2014). Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk to Church: a Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (Oxford: Westview Press, 2003), 97. Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn, Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2003), 123. Davis, A Long Walk, 98.

1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches

response of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Ukrainian request for autocephaly and the forced resignation of the metropolitan Filaret “set the stage for the present religious turmoil in Ukraine.”67 The refusal from Moscow irrevocably put the metropolitan Filaret in an open opposition to his authorities, especially after he refused to resign. As a consequence, “accused of insubordination to the Church authorities, the creation of a Church schism, and of the brutal treatment of the bishops in his jurisdiction,”68 the metropolitan was deprived of all his ranks and lowered to the status of a simple monk69 and later in 1997 even anathematised.70 At the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in May 1992, the majority rejected their signatures in favour of autocephaly and removed Filaret; then the metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkask, Volodymyr (Sabodan) was elected to the office of the Head of the Church71 holding this post until recently. On February 24, 2014 the metropolitan of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna, Onufrii was appointed to the office of the locum tenens of the Kyivan Metropolitan See. On August 13, 2014, after the death of Volodymyr Sabodan, metropolitan Onufrii became the Head of the Church. The issue of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church remained a burning one also in the next years and continued to cause divisions among the faithful and the clergy of this confession and with other denominations. The policy of the Moscow Patriarchate consists in diminishing or neglecting the claims for granting autocephaly. In particular, at the end of 1996 the Holy Bishop’s Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate again withdrew the official application for the autocephalous status and in August 2000 the Moscow Patriarchate’s leadership rejected even the mere request to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church an autonomous status.72 The same tendencies prevailed ten years later until nowadays. Some ____________________ 67 68 69 70

71 72

Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and Nation, 127. Rap, The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches. Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and Nation, 132, 192. “Itogovyye dokumyenty Arkhiyeryeyskogo Sobora Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tsyerkvi. Moskva, 18-23 fyevralya 1997 goda. Akt ob otluchyenii ot Tsyerkvi monakha Filaryeta” {Concluding documents of the Council of the Hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Moscow, February 18-23. Bill of excommunication of the monk Filaret Denysenko}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/church_doc/ uocmp_doc/34695/ (accessed February 18, 2014). Davis, A Long Walk, 99. Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and Nation, 193.

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

commentators even speak about possible losses73 of the Russian Orthodox Church when the three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine unite “into an independent (autocephalous) Church because Kyiv would resume its historical leadership among eastern Slavs as the direct descendant of the Kyivan Rus and the Kyiv Metropolitanate (the city of Moscow was founded 600 years after Kyiv).”74 To date, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is the biggest Ukrainian Church of the Orthodox denomination with its 12,714 religious communities, which constitutes over 60% of all Orthodox parishes in the country. As for 2014, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has 10,456 priests, 214 monasteries, 14 mission centres, 20 educational institutions, 4,232 Sunday schools, and 109 periodicals.75 The majority of the parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are situated in the centre and the east of Ukraine.

Vectors of confrontations Analysing the relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with other denominations in Ukraine, it is important to note that they are marked by the specific connections of this Church with the Russian Orthodox Church.76 Although the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is proclaimed autonomous, the real limits of this autonomy have always been changing. The Ukrainian ____________________ 73

74 75 76

54

Using the data on religious communities in Ukraine and Russia as of 2000, Taras Kuzio maintained: “The ROC is also concerned about maintaining its influence. In the former USSR, two thirds of ROC parishes were in Ukraine; today half of ROC parishes remain within Ukraine's borders. According to the Oxford-based Keston College, the ROC has a greater number of parishes outside the Russian Federation and within the former USSR (more than 9,000) than within the Russian Federation itself (7,000). In Ukraine, whose population is three times smaller than Russia’s, there are two times as many Orthodox parishes as in the Russian Federation (14,000). This makes the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches potentially the largest Orthodox community of believers in the world.” (Taras Kuzio, “The Struggle to Establish the World’s Largest Orthodox Church,” http://old.risu.org. ua/eng/religion.and.society/interreligious.relations/orthodox.jurisdictions/ (accessed January 9, 2014)). Ibid. The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, Networks of Churches. Nataliia Bielikova, “Mizhkonfesiini konflikty v Ukraini ta poshuk shliakhiv yikh podolannia” {Interdenominational conflicts in Ukraine. Searching for ways to overcome them}, Nauka. Relihiia. Suspilstvo 2 (2000): 18.

1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches

Orthodox Church justifies its antagonism with other denominations by claiming that the whole of Ukraine used to be canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church, belonging now respectively to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Orthodox clergy and faithful who joined other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches are usually qualified and referred to as rozkolnyky – those who broke the unity of the Church.77 Non-Orthodox denominations are from time to time accused in proselytism. As the abovementioned Bielikova points out, the relations between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate seem to be the most painful wound of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the 1990s.78 The Hierarchical Council of the Russian Orthodox Church first removed the metropolitan Filaret from his office as Head of the Church, and then excommunicated him. The fact that the Ukrainian government supported Filaret made the situation even more complicated, thus involving also political elements in that conflict. Consequently, the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church concerning Patriarch Filaret is very clearly stated: rozkolnyks have to come back to the true Church through penance, and there can be no negotiations or furthermore unity without it.79 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church does not recognise the legal existence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, and consequently denies the status of her hierarchy and sometimes even doubts the validi____________________ 77

78 79

For instance, in October 2010, in his interview concerning the results of the meeting of the mixed Catholic-Orthodox commission in Vienna, Hilarion Alfeyev, the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, used only that notion (rozkolnyky) when referring to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Metropolitan of Volokolamsk Hilarion, “Hovoryty pro “vyznannia tainstv” rozkolnykiv nemozhlyvo” {It is impossible to speak about “the recognition of the sacraments” of rozkolnyky”}, interview, Patriarchia.ru, http://www. patriarchia.ru/ua/db/text/1291833.html (accessed January 23, 2014). Bielikova, Interdenominational conflicts, 18. “Because our Ukrainian Orthodox Church and only her in Ukraine corresponds to all the criteria of the local Church, there are no doubts that exclusively this Church is the genuine Local Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian state. One can talk only about the return to that Church of those who fall away from her in the schism (thus violating also the very principle of the local Church)…” (“Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva ta vyklyky suchasnosti” {The Ukrainian Orthodox Church and present challenges}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/theological_library/ theological_doc/confessional_doc/47505/ (accessed February 8, 2014). Translation from the original source).

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

ty of her sacraments.80 It is worth mentioning that the relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church are also complicated even though not to such a degree as with the Orthodox of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The reason for the tensions is that the present-day Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church includes a number of former parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The language of the religious services is another conflict-generating element in the practice of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This pretty conservative Church still conducts prayers mostly in the old Church-Slavonic language, which is hard to comprehend for an average contemporary Ukrainian but it is conceived by the Church as a unifying element for the eastern Slavs.81 Additionally, since many faithful of that Church are Russian-speaking, the issue of Ukrainian as the language of the Church services called little interest from the side of the Church hierarchy. By conducting services in Ukrainian the Church can contribute to popularising this language in the country. However, so far the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has demonstrated paucity in that regard. The use of Ukrainian is not prohibited; however there are no official liturgical books translated in that language. As a result, it was only in October 2010 that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church started to conduct Church services in the official state language in the capital of Ukraine.82 Moreover, the officials of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sometimes express a nega____________________ 80

81

82

56

Occasionally one finds in the media discussions about whether it is necessary to rebaptise those who were originally baptised in any of the non-canonical Orthodox Churches when such believers decide to join the canonical Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate later. For instance, there appeared an article about the practice of the rebaptism of heretics with reference to the contemporary situation in Ukrainian Orthodoxy on the official website of bishop Ionafan Yeletskykh of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (“Praktika pyeryekryeshchivaniya yeryetikov i raskolnikov v dryevnyey Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi” {The practice of the rebaptism of heretics and those who broke the unity of the Church in the ancient Orthodox Church}, http://www.vladyka-ionafan.ru/articles/511 (accessed February 18, 2014)). Svitlana Savoiska, “Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva i mizhtserkovni movnopolitychni konflikty” {Ukrainian Orthodox Church and inter-Church languagepolitical conflicts}, Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsionalnykh doslidzhen im. I. F. Franka NAN Ukraiiny 10 (2008): 201. “V stolychnomu khrami Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy pochaly pravyty ukrainskoiu” {They started to pray in Ukrainian in a parish of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the capital}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc/ 38665/ (accessed February 18, 2014).

1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches

tive attitude towards the Ukrainian language. Sometimes they also appeal to introduce Russian as the second state language. Only recently the language policy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has started to change. In February 2013, the metropolitan Antonii of Boryspil, the administrator of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, confirmed that in certain parishes of Kyiv and in the region of Volyn the Church services are already celebrated in Ukrainian. Because “the question of the choice of language of the service is not an issue of the Church conscience,” then “if two thirds of the parishioners prefer services in Ukrainian or another language, there will be no problem.”83 The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate use Ukrainian as language, which makes religious truths and the essence of religious services more understandable to believers. In that regard Svitlana Savoiska asserts that according to opinion surveys, the language of religious services, the sticking to Ukrainian traditions and the education of the spirit of patriotism are the second leading conflicting factor in the Orthodox milieu after the struggle for power and the sphere of influence.84 Furthermore, the language and political orientation of Ukrainian Orthodox denominations are such influential elements in the conflict that it is more reasonable nowadays not to speak of the unity of those Churches but only about them coming closer.85 Another dimension of antagonism is presented in the relations with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church still recognises the validity of the Lviv Pseudo-council of 1946, which abolished the Brest agreement of 1596 when the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was created. As a result of the Lviv Pseudo-Council, all GreekCatholic parishes were converted to Orthodoxy and forced to join the Russian Orthodox Church. However, in 1989 Greek-Catholics were legalised by the state and naturally claimed their ownership of the Church buildings that had belonged to them before 1946. Consequently, a typical accusation of the Moscow Patriarchate is the defeat of three Orthodox eparchies in western Ukraine by Greek-Catholics. In that regard, some scholars86 high____________________ 83

84 85 86

“Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate Prepared to Switch to Services in Ukrainian,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc/51223 (accessed January 22, 2014). Savoiska, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 197. Ibid., 203-204. Myroslav Marynovych, “Stvorennia kontseptsii ekumenichnoi pozytsii Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy: peredumovy i sponuky” {Creating the

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Chapter I. Religious context of Ukrainian society today – the background to research

light that, even though indeed at the beginning of the 1990s the majority of parishes abandoned the Russian Orthodox Church, not all of them joined the Ukrainian Creek-Catholic Church. Notwithstanding the popularity that the Greek-Catholic claim in the west of the country, a significant number of believers remained Orthodox changing their jurisdiction to autocephaly. Obviously, the fifty-year long presence of Orthodoxy in western Ukraine has left its traces. The following conclusions can be drawn concerning the conflicts between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and other denominations in Ukraine.87 There are historical reasons for conflicts, which are centred around the validity of the decisions of the Pseudo-Council of 1946 on the abolition of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. One can also suggest canonical reasons, those caused by the perception of Ukraine as Orthodox canonical territory, or arguments stemming from the split of Orthodoxy in Ukraine and the creation of several Orthodox denominations, or even clashes based on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church belonging to the wholeness of Orthodoxy through the Russian Orthodox Church. This in its turn is directly linked to the traditional opposition between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Additionally, a significant number of parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church turned to the new Orthodox denominations in Ukraine, which emerged in the 1990s. This is an obvious reason for hostility towards them from the side of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as the direct successor of the Russian Orthodox Church. Besides, we have to consider that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church remains important to the Moscow Patriarchate due to the number of believers, properties, finances as well as due to its historical and spiritual qualities. Therefore, Kuzio assumes that attempts to exempt that Church from the Moscow jurisdiction as it happened with the Estonian Orthodox Church in 1996 would lead to a new schism in the relations between Constantinople and Moscow.88 During that Estonian conflict, Patriarch Filaret appealed to the Ukrainian authorities to follow this example and proclaim the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the ground that Moscow is still preserving “the essence of an imperialist Church. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Church wants to keep a ____________________

87 88

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concept of the ecumenical position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Preconditions and motivations}, Bohoslovia 65 (2001): 69-94. Bielikova, Interdenominational conflicts, 16-22. D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 83-84.

1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches

Church empire in the form of the Moscow Patriarchate.”89 That is the typical rhetoric of the Patriarch in order to justify the need for the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

1.3.1.2 The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church At the rampart of Orthodox autocephaly in Ukraine The first parishes of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were already created in Lviv in August 1989 when the local parish priest Volodymyr Yarema abandoned the allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church and passed over to the autocephalists guided by one of the Russian Orthodox Church’s bishops Ioann (Bondarchuk). The Initiative Committee for the renewal of that Church, created in 1989, prompted the reestablishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in independent Ukraine,90 an idea that was supported in Ukraine and in the Ukrainian diaspora in the west in the situation of a conflict with the Moscow Patriarchate and the rivalry with the growing Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church.91 In 1990, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America, bishop Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), was elected Head of the Church

____________________ 89 90

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Quoted in ibid., 84. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded in 1921 and existed until 1930, when charged with collaboration with the underground “league for the liberation of Ukraine (SVU) the authorities staged in January 1930 the socalled “Extraordinary Sobor” which formally “dissolved” the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.” (Bohdan Bociurkiw, “The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1920-1930. A Case Study in Religious Modernisation,” in Ukrainian Churches under Soviet Rule. Two Case Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fond, 1984), 316-317). After the short revival of the Church under German occupation during World War II, it was suppressed again, and the Church hierarchy and part of the believers immigrated to North America. There they created the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, thus uniting some already existing Orthodox communities of the Ukrainian diaspora. It was those people that at the decline of the Soviet Union greatly supported the idea of an autocephalous Church in Ukraine. Oleh Turii, Relihiine zhyttia ta mizhkonfesiini vzaiemyny u nezalezhnii Ukraini {Religious life and interdenominational relations in independent Ukraine} (Lviv: Instytut Istorii Tserkvy UCU, 2007), 22.

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as the Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine.92 After the quick death of this aged Patriarch, his successor, Dymytrii (Yarema), led the Church until 2000. His successor, the metropolitan Mefodii (Kudriakov), had been ruling the Church until his death on February 24, 2015 in the status of administrator of the Patriarchate in accordance with the testament of Patriarch Dymytrii.93 On February 27, 2015 metropolitan Makarii of Lviv was elected to the office of the locum tenens of the primate of the Church. During her legal existence the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church significantly developed her structures, which now include 12 monasteries, 7 educational institutions, 294 Sunday schools, 7 mission centres. The Church activities are covered by 6 periodicals, and 1,185 parishes are served by 706 priests.94 The bulk of the parishes – almost 70% – is located in the western regions of Ukraine.95

Vectors of confrontations Turning now to the inter-confessional conflicts that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is involved in, it has to be stated that most of the confrontation exists in the relations to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. It is due to the history of the foundation of both Churches. According to Nataliia Bielikova, the first two Patriarchs Mstyslav and Dymytrii influenced the attitude of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church towards the Kyiv Patriarchate96 as they did not acknowledge the figure of Patriarch Filaret and consequently repudiated the idea of unity with his Church. In his testament, announced at the Church Council in 2002, Patriarch Dytmytrii warns his bishops against any attempts of unification with the Kyiv Patriarchate.97 ____________________ 92

93 94 95 96 97

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Oleh Turij, „Das religiöse Leben und die zwischenkonfessionellen Verhältnisse in der unabhängigen Ukraine“, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar, trans. and eds. Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 51. Ibid. The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, Networks of Churches. Razumkov Centre, Religious networks, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2011), 14. Bielikova, Interdenominational conflicts, 19. Ibid.

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Patriarch Dymytrii Yarema developed an own exclusionist ideology according to which a global war is being waged between Ukrainian Christianity and all the major Christian centres – Rome, Moscow, and Constantinople.98 Hence the prohibition of the reunion of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate as long as this community is being led by Patriarch Filaret, one of the leading figures among the evil forces, according to patriarch Dymytrii. Currently, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is oriented towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate believing that in the status of the Metropolinate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople she would be defended from the pressure of the Moscow Church imperialism.99 Two Ukrainian Orthodox denominations with unregulated status would perhaps get chances of recognition by the Constantinople Patriarchate if they would not time and again screw up the negotiations about union. In 2011 the negotiations were terminated because of the position of the metropolitan Mefodii Kudriakov who claimed that his Church would be ready for eventual unity with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate if Patriarch Filaret resigned100 and if Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was involved in the negotiations.101 Consequently, ____________________ 98

Yurii Chornomorets, “Ideolohichni viiny u pravoslavnii Ukraini. Chastyna II” {Ideological wars in Orthodox Ukraine. Part II}, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/ daycomment/2714-ideologichni-vijni-u-pravoslavnij-ukrayini-ch-ii.html (accessed January 10, 2014). 99 Ibid. 100 The anathema of Patriarch Filaret, the fact that the Ecumenical Patriarch has not blessed him to lead the united Church in Ukraine, the opposition of Filaret to the idea of Ukrainian autocephaly when he guided the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1987-1992, and his non-acceptance by the patriarchs, his predecessors are mentioned as reasons why the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church cannot accept Patriarch Filaret as the leader of the eventually united Ukrainian Orthodox Church (“Obstavyny ta chynnyky, shcho uskladniuiut obiednannia Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy ta Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu v yedynu tserkovnu strukturu (pid ehidoiu ta kerivnytstvom Patriarkha Filareta” {Circumstances and reasons that complicate the unification of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in one ecclesial structure (under the protection and guidance of Patriarch Filaret}, http://uaoc.net/2012/01/obstavyny_ta_chyn nyky/ (accessed January 14, 2014)). 101 Yurii Chornomorets, “Uroky provalu perehovoriv Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu i Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy” {Lessons of the failure of negotiations between the Ukrainian Orthodox

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the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate asked the interested parties of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to continue the dialogue for unification on the level of eparchies and parishes.102 The metropolitan Mefodii Kudriakov, officially only administrator of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, appeals to other Orthodox Church leaders to refuse the struggle for the guidance of the future united Ukrainian Orthodox Church.103 He believes that the head of such a Church has to be exempt from any accusations of contribution to the existing Orthodox conflict and, therefore, it has to be a new personality. While analysing the reasons for the disagreements between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and other confessions in Ukraine, Bielikova draws our attention to the fact that this Church did not manage to create its strong identity nowadays.104 In contrast to the Orthodox of the Kyiv Patriarchate, which developed a convincing ideology of national Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church builds its identity on its origin in the 1920s, which coincides with the short period of the existence of the independent Ukrainian state. However, this historical background cannot be fruitfully communicated in contemporary Ukrainian society. Whereas the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate pretends to be the national Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church presents itself as a nationalistic one that does not attract many believers. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church emphasises her Ukrainian identity, hence “nation, language, Ukrainisation, autocephaly,

____________________ Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/comments/46071/ (accessed January 10, 2014); see also “Zvernennia Sviashchennoho Synodu Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu do arkhiiereiv, dukhovenstva i viruiuchykh Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy shchodo obiednannia” {Message of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate to bishops, clergy, and faithful of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church concerning unification}, http://www.cerkva.info/en/holy-synod/ 2017-zvernennia-synodu-do-uapc.html (accessed January 11, 2014). 102 Message of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate to bishops, clergy, and faithful of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church concerning unification. 103 Mytropolyt Mefodii, “V ochikuvanni kanonichnoho vyznannia” {Waiting for the canonical recognition}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, January 24-30, 2009. 104 Bielikova, Interdenominational conflicts, 20.

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the local Orthodox Church in Ukraine, patriotism and “salvation of the Ukrainian people” are representative of the discourse of that Church.”105 Though there is less tension in the relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the latter does not recognise the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in canonical terms and considers it schismatic. All attempts of the autocephalous Orthodox to achieve canonical recognition from the Orthodox community only irritate the Moscow Patriarchate. Moscow continues to label the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church as schismatic and considers only one unification model, which is the return to the canonical mother-Church.

1.3.1.3 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate On the way to a national Church The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate was created on June 25, 1992 when a number of bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox united with the followers of the metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko)106 with the support of state authorities and nationally oriented politicians. This Church claimed to be the direct heir of the old Metropolinate of Kyiv established after the baptism of the Kyivan Rus by the Grand Prince Volodymyr in 988. 107 The very first act of the newly established Church council, that except for the Church leaders included the leading Ukrainian national democratic politicians of the time, “was the symbolical annulation of the act dated 1686 according to which the Kyivan Metropolinate was transferred to Moscow.”108 Those developments demonstrate ____________________ 105 Rap, The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches. Those ideas one encounters, for instance, in the reflections of Metropolitan Mefodii on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the Kyiv Patriarchate on the Local Council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church on June 5-6, 1990: Mefodii, Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine, “Proholoshennia Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu: zdobutky, pomylky ta shliakhy yikh podolannia” {Proclamation of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Achievements, mistakes and the ways to overcome them}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/theological_library/theological_doc/confessional_doc/ 38396/ (accessed February 16, 2014). 106 Davis, A Long Walk, 99. 107 D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 82. 108 Rap, The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches. Interestingly enough, at the same time Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of Rukh, a national-oriented

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the desire to justify the necessity of the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent from Moscow. Hence, one may logically infer that the autocephalous movement in Ukrainian Orthodoxy was based upon the practical considerations of refuting the Russian legacy in the newly created state. The current Orthodox division in Ukraine is indeed greatly provoked by the durable colonial status of the country and the absence of Ukrainian statehood.109 After the death of Patriarch Mstyslav in Canada in 1993, from October 1995 Filaret has been Head of the Church and has held the title of Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine. His controversial figure is perceived by many as one of the biggest obstacles on the way to the unity among the Ukrainian Orthodox. It is partly due to Filaret’s ambiguous past including his links to the KGB110 in Soviet times, to the organisation of a number of provocations against the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, and partly due to his ambitions as Patriarch. One should also mention dubious details of his personal life like that of living with his wife and children or his authoritative management of the Church. On the other hand, Patriarch Filaret is an example of the influence that a powerful personality can have ____________________ Ukrainian political party, also symbolically annulled the 1654 Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Pereiaslav that brought Ukraine under the rule of the Tsardom of Russia (D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 82). This Treaty signed between the Ukrainian Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the leader of the Cossacks Hetmanate state on the territory of Ukraine, and representatives of the Moscow tsar, had far-reaching consequences for Ukraine. It brought about the gradual domination of neighbouring Russia over Ukraine, intensive politics of Russification, infringements of the rights of the local Ukrainian administration, later the change of the allegiance of the Kyivan Metropolinate from Constantinople to Moscow in 1686. In fact, since the implementation of the Pereiaslav Treaty, most of the territory of Ukraine has remained under the control of Russia till 1991. In the view of nationally oriented Ukrainians, this treaty signifies the actual loss of Ukrainian independence that lasted for more than three centuries. An interesting fact to be mentioned in relation to the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty in 1954 is the transfer of the Crimea Peninsula from the Russian to the Ukrainian Republic of the Soviet Union. 109 Oleh Gerus, “In Search of a National Ukrainian Church: Ukrainian Orthodoxy in Canada and Ukraine,” in Society in Transition. Social Change in Ukraine in Western Perspectives, ed. Wsevolod Isajiw (Tontonto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2003), 181. 110 KGB – the Committee for State Security, a national security agency of the Soviet Union that included internal security, intelligence and a secret police. The established fact is the cooperation with that organ of a number of the clergy that caused great publicity in the early 1990s.

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on the development of the situation both in the Church and the political milieu. At the same time, analytics believe that the figure of Patriarch Filaret is a stepping stone in all efforts towards Orthodox unity and it is even plausible to claim that the very idea of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly is controversial because it is associated with Filaret.111 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is the secondlargest Church in Ukraine according to the number of parishes (4,661). Her structure includes 3,132 priests, 60 monasteries, 28 mission centres, 18 education institutions and 1,461 Sunday schools, 35 periodicals.112 Both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate have no canonical recognition from other local Orthodox Churches. Nevertheless, according to the Ukrainian legislation both have legal status. I presume that the mere fact that the discussions in the Orthodox environment are centred around the issue of canonicity and that there are no differences in faith dogmas or rites can engineer the possible reconciliation in the future.

Vectors of confrontations The dominant cause of the conflicts that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is engaged in, derives from her relation to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church belonging to it. Therefore, this Church consistently substantiates her existence in bringing counterarguments to the accusations from Moscow. In the message of the Synod of Bishops from October 2010, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate justifies the validity of her sacraments and mentions that there is no canonically defined procedure of gaining autocephaly. The Church leadership substantiates the possibility of the existence of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine according to the principle “independent state – independent Church” since the political independence of

____________________ 111 Yurii Chornomorets, “Ideolohichni viiny u pravoslavnii Ukraini. Chastyna I” {Ideological wars in Orthodox Ukraine. Part I}, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/ analitica/2684-ideologichni-vijni-u-pravoslavnij-ukrayini-ch-i.html (accessed January 10, 2014). 112 The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, Networks of Churches.

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Ukraine is not fully realised under the spiritual allegiance to Moscow.113 The bishops claim that Ukrainian and Russian peoples stay close to each other but still they are two different nations. Finally, they present the Russkiy Mir114 theory of the Russian Orthodox Church as the example of the anti-ecclesiastical mentality of ethno-philetism. According to Patriarch Filaret, the Moscow Patriarchate is responsible for the division among Ukrainian Orthodox because it refuses to abandon the control over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.115 The Moscow plot in both the Ukrainian Church and state affairs appears in many official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate.116 In 2010 – early 2011 there were many discussions about the campaign of Patriarch Kirill to destroy the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate by using different unjust methods to make priests and ____________________ 113 Oleksandr Sahan and Serhii Zdioruk, “Pomisna Pravoslavna Tserkva: problemy i prohnozy konstytuiuvannia” {Local Orthodox Church. Problems and perspectives of creation}, in Ukraina relihiina: prohnozy relihiinoho zhyttia Ukrainy, eds. Anatolii Kolodnyi et al. (Kyiv, 2008), 139. 114 I will discuss the ideology of the Russkiy Mir in section 1.4.1.2 of the current part of the monograph. 115 Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine, “Zvernennia z nahody sviata torzhestva pravoslavia” {Address on the occasion of the Feast of the Triumph of Orthodoxy}, http://www.cerkva.info/ru/patrposlania/2220-patr-zvernennia-doupc-mp.html (accessed February 18, 2014). There are more pronouncements of Patriarch Filaret where the same thought is reiterated. For example, the very title of an interview with Patriarch Filaret from April 2012 testifies to that: Patriarch Filaret, “Moskva rozkolola ukrainsku Tserkvu i ne daie yii obiednatysia” {Moscow has divided the Ukrainian Church and does not allow it to unite}, interview by Liudmyla Tsybulko and Anton Shchehelskyi, Cerkva.info, http://www.cerkva. info/uk/intervju/2347-moskva-rozkol.html (accessed January 11, 2014). 116 For example, the following documents of Patriarch Filaret can be enumerated: Patriarch Filaret, “Address on the occasion of the Feast of the Triumph of Orthodoxy”; “Svyatyeyshiy Patriarkh Filaryet pozdravil Sobor Ukrainskoy Pravoslavnoy Tsyerkvi” {His Holiness Patriarch Filaret greeted the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church}, http://www.cerkva.info/ru/patrposlania/1717soboru-upc.html (accessed February 18, 2014); “Ukrainska Tservka ye i bude.’ Slovo Patriarkha Kyivskoho i vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta na urochystii Akademii v Natsionalnii operi Ukrainy z nahody yuvileiv 50-littia yoho rukopolozhennia na yepyskopa i 45-littia sluzhinnia na Kyivskii kafedri” {“The Ukrainian Church is and will endure.” Address of the Patriarch of Kyiv and All RusUkraine Filaret to the solemn academy in the National Opera of Ukraine on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his episcopal ordination and the 45th anniversary of his service on the Kyivan seat}, http://www.cerkva.info/ru/statjidoklady/ 2151-patr-slovo-na-akademii.html (accessed February 18, 2014).

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whole parishes join the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Obviously, the reaction of Patriarch Filaret and his bishops was lamenting and fierce.117 Further, because the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is only independent in administration and thus not of a completely independent or autonomous status, she is not a local Church properly speaking and she does not answer to the spiritual needs of the Ukrainian faithful.118 Consequently, “nationalistic and patriotic demands for the union of all Christians and Churches of the Byzantine-Ukrainian tradition in this selfproclaimed Patriarchate {of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate}”119 define the ecumenical horizon of the Church of Patriarch Filaret. Bielikova maintains that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate strives for holding the leading position among Ukrainian Christians.120 Patriarch Filaret aims at the recognition of his Church as the ____________________ 117 See, for instance, those interviews with Patriarch Filaret and Yevstratii Zoria, the secretary of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate: Patriarch Filaret, “Kyivskyi Patriarkhat znyshchyty nemozhlyvo” {They cannot destroy the Kyiv Patriarchate}, interview, Cerkva.info, http://www.cer kva.info/uk/intervju/1438-nemojlyvo.html (accessed January 11, 2014); Patriarch Filaret, “Koly zlo povertaietsia na dobro” {When evil turns to good}, interview by Olena Chekan, Cerkva.info, http://www.cerkva.info/uk/intervju/1283-intut.html (accessed January 11, 2014); Patriarch Filaret, “I v skladnykh umovakh treba rozbudovuvaty Tserkvy” {We have to develop the Church also in difficult circumstances}, interview by Andrii Hanus, Cerkva.info, http://www.cerkva.info/ uk/intervju/1222-patr-int-express.html (accessed January 11, 2014); Yevstratii Zoria, “Moskva ne hoche, shchob Ukraina bula nezalezhnoiu i mala yedynu Pomisnu Tserkvu” {Moscow does not want that Ukraine is independent and that it has one local Church}, interview by Oksana Klymonchuk, Cerkva.info, http://www.cerkva.info/uk/publications/intervju/1230-int-unian.html (accessed January 11, 2014); Yevstratii Zoria, “Ruinuiuchy Kyivskyi Patriarkhat, hochut zruinuvaty nezalezhnist Ukrainy” {Destroying the Kyiv Patriarchate they want to destroy Ukrainian independence}, interview by Yurii Chornomorets, Cerkva.info, http://www.cerkva.info/uk/publications/intervju/1228-epevstraty.html (accessed January 11, 2014). 118 “Istoryko-kanonichna deklaratsiia Arkhyiereiskoho Soboru Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu ‘Kyivskyi Patriarkhat – pomisna Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva” {Historical-canonical declaration of the Council of the Hierarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate “Kyiv Patriarchate – Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church”}, http://www.cerkva.info/ru/ icd.html (accessed February 15, 2014). 119 Oleh Turii, Greek-Catholics, Latins and Orthodox in Ukraine: Who’s Who? (Lviv: Institute of Church History, n. d.), 9. 120 Bielikova, Interdenominational conflicts, 17.

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local Orthodox one, at least inside the country, thus moving to the complete independence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. That complicates his relations with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, which also demonstrate leadership ambitions. Additionally, there was the hard period of the redistribution of Church buildings between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Nevertheless, the former positions itself as a national Church and emphasises that the existence of an independent Orthodox Church, that it pretends to be, strengthens the existence of young independent Ukraine; that it is canonically justified and historically inevitable.121 Recently, indications have appeared of a shift in the identification of Ukrainians with various Orthodox Churches. Since 2008 the number of those who recognise themselves as belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate began to grow in comparison with the declared supporters of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate.122 The results of the sociological surveys conducted before 2008 repetitively gave an opposite picture. The Ukrainian religious scholar Viktor Yelenskyi has two explanations for that phenomenon. First, new parishes of the Orthodox Church appear mostly in the east and south of Ukraine because in the western regions the parish network is already saturated; hence it is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate that establishes new communities. Additionally, the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate did not manage to attract new believers by the quality of her theology and pastoral work. However, such results do not mean that the Russian identity begins to dominate because in the same public opinion pool only 0.7% of respondents claimed their belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church.123 Still, despite the new correlation between the sympathisers with the Orthodox Church of the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates, identity plays a significant role in the identification of the Ukrainian faithful with a particular Church.

____________________ 121 Davis, A Long Walk, 97. 122 Viktor Yelenskyi, “Religion of the 00s: A Summary of the Decade,” http://risu. org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/analytic/40964 (accessed February 17, 2014). 123 Ibid.

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1.3.2 Traditional Catholic denominations 1.3.2.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Survival in the Soviet underground Catholics in Ukraine are represented by two Churches. The Catholics of the eastern right or, as they are sometimes referred to, “uniates” trace their origins back to 1596 when the Brest Union agreement was signed between a number of bishops of the Kyiv Church and the Roman See.124 Thus, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was founded.125 After the incorporation of the western territories of Ukraine into the Soviet Union at the end of Second World War, the Soviet authorities in cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church defeated the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at the Synod of Lviv of 1946. Without the presence of bishops and with the help of a few former Greek-Catholic clergymen this Synod voted for the annulation of the Brest statutes and the “return” of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church with all the faithful and property to the Moscow Patriarchate.126 ____________________ 124 See the ground-breaking research about the circumstances and reasons of the establishment of the Union of Brest in Borys Gudziak, Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolinate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2001). In 2002, the foundation PRO ORIENTE launched a project that aims at the scientific examination of the controversial circumstances of the Union of Brest and its consequences for the Churches in Ukraine, Poland, and Russia and for the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue as a whole. For more information about the project see „Union von Brest“, http://www.prooriente.at/?site=pr20050202150708 (accessed September 10, 2014). 125 The term “Greek-Catholics” was introduced in 1774 by the decree of the Empress Maria Theresa after the territory of today’s western Ukraine with the majority of adherents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was included into the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The name of the Church derives from the Eastern Greek rite and the canonical belonging to the jurisdiction of the Catholic Pope (Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 34). 126 Little, Ukraine, 19. There are a number of studies on the issue. See, for instance, the following texts: Antoine Arjakovsky, “Les mémoire du (pseudo)-synod de Lvov/Lviv,” in En attendant le concile de l’Église Orthodoxe (Paris: Les éditions du CERF, 2011), 489-500; Ivan Bilas, “The Moscow Patriarchate, the Penal Organs of the USSR, and the Attempted Destruction of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church during the 1940s,” Logos. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 38, nos. 1-4 (1997): 41-92; Bohdan Bociurkiw, The Ukrainian Greek Catholic

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The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, “the silent Church”127 during several decades of the underground, survived the persecution and with the politics of liberalisation, introduced in the last years of the existence of the Soviet Union, her faithful used the chance to re-establish their Church. The campaign for the recognition, and return of her former sacral buildings was led by the Committee for the Defence of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church.128 Finally, on November 28, 1989 the Greek-Catholics obtained the right of the official registration and this initiated a rapid revival of the Church.129 In 1991, Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Liubachivskyi, the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, returned to Ukraine. In the following years new seminaries were opened, the number of parishes and clergy continued to increase steadily, and religious educational institutions were established. However, most of the parishes in western Ukraine came under the control of the Greek-Catholics during the events of a large-scale interconfessional rivalry, which was often accompanied by violent clashes of the faithful often provoked by their religious and political leadership.130 When at the beginning of 1992 the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church had communities only in half of the regions of Ukraine, nowadays her parishes can be found in the whole country. In 2004, the seat of the Greek-Catholic Major Archbishop was moved from Lviv to Kyiv and the construction of the main Greek-Catholic cathedral of Christ’s Resurrection was initiated. Both events point to the expansion of this Church: “The UGCC’s decision-making, principle and contemporary voice in complex and critical is____________________

127

128 129

130

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Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950) (Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1996); Bohdan Bociurkiw, “The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine. A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy,” in Ukrainian Churches under Soviet Rule. Two Case Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fond, 1984), 89-113; Bohdan Bociurkiw, “Le synode de Lviv (8-10 mars 1946),” Istina 34 (1989): 266-289; Bernard Dupuy, “La dissolution de l’Église gréco-catholique en 1945 par le régime soviétique dans les territoires conquis, ” Istina 34 (1989): 290-305. The term borrowed from John Mowatt, “The Vatican and the Silent Church,” in The Ukrainian Catholic Church 1945-1975. A Symposium, eds. Miroslav Labunka and Leonid Rudnytzky (Philadelphia, PA: The St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics, 1976), 70-89. Davis, A Long Walk, 74. Andriy Mykhaleyko, „Geschichte und Gegenwart der Ukrainischen GriechischKatholischen Kirche“, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 11-12 (2013): 13. Davis, A Long Walk, 75.

1.3 Religious revival and the traditional Ukrainian Churches

sues of Ukrainian public life as well as a decision made to transfer the UGCC’s headquarters to Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, are the most evident features of UGCC’s gradual development.”131 After the death of Cardinal Liubachivskyi, from 2001 until February 2011, Cardinal Liubomyr Husar was leading the Church. On March 27, 2011, his successor, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the youngest bishop of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, aged 41, was inthronised. Currently the Church has between 3 and 5 million supporters in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has 3,765 parishes, 2,625 priests, 120 monasteries, 16 educational institutions and 23 mission centres. The number of the Church periodicals reaches 28.132 As of 2011, 93% of Greek-Catholic communities were located in the western regions of Ukraine.133

Vectors of confrontations The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has a special status among the Ukrainian Churches, insofar as for her believers the strife for independence, national idea and religion is closely intermingled not only on the level of slogans and pronouncements. Those elements belong essentially to the heart of the Church – the people, who after 40 years of Soviet regime and Church existence in the underground perceive categories of nation and religion as inseparable. Consequently, it is not surprising that the revival of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the western part of Ukraine caused such a negative reaction from the Russian Orthodox Church (later the Ukrainian Orthodox Church). In fact, the restoration of traditional confession, typical of that region, made locals leave the Russian Orthodox Church and join the Church of their ancestors, which was a big loss for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.134 Unlike those with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has better contacts with the two canonically un____________________ 131 Olha Nedavnya, “Transformations of Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic Churches in Ukraine (1990s – early 21st Century),” in Religions, Churches and the Scientific Studies of Religion: Poland and Ukraine, ed. Irena Borowik (n. p.: Nomos, 2003), 63. 132 The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, Networks of Churches. 133 Razumkov Centre, Religious networks, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2011), 15. 134 Bielikova, Interdenominational conflicts, 21.

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recognised Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. This can be partly explained by their unregulated status, which puts those three Churches in a similar position from the point of view of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, there remain traditional Orthodox-Catholic arguments for rivalry starting from the birth of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church out of the Orthodox confession. The next stages of the conflict are also connected with the question of the very existence of this Church – the liquidation of the Brest Union in 1946 and the re-emergence of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1989. The radical opponents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church deny her right to exist, while the more moderate critics would confine her activity only to western Ukraine. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church positions herself as a national Church with strong anti-communist claims (she has the status of a repressed Church), is connected with western European civilisation because of her Catholicity, and represents at the same time the Kyiv tradition because she was born out of Kyiv Orthodoxy.135 Still nowadays, in the opinion of certain radical Orthodox the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was established in 1596 and regenerated in 1989 because of the intrigues of the Vatican. For example, the idea of the existence of this Church as a result of the exclusivist Vatican ecclesiology is extensively treated in the doctoral dissertation of Avhustyn Markevych, archbishop of Lviv of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, published in 2010 under the title Uniatism. Theological Aspects.136 In that research project the political and polemical approach prevails over the theological one.137 The author sustains the established collections of beliefs about the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church from the Soviet times. For example, Avhustyn Markevych claims that GreekCatholics cooperated with the German occupiers during World War II138 and this caused the destruction of this Church by Stalin. The events con____________________ 135 Ibid. 136 Avhustyn Markevych, Uniatstvo. Bohoslovski aspekty {Uniatism. Theological aspects} (Kyiv-Lviv, 2010), http://orthodox.lviv.ua/books/EAUniats.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014). 137 Myron Bendyk, “Vidhuk na doslidzhennia arkchyiepyskopa Avhustyna (Markevycha) ‘Uniatstvo. Bohoslovski aspekty” {Response to the study of Archbishop Avhustyn Markevych “Uniatism. Theological Aspects”}, http://dds.edu. ua/en/publications/publications/miscellaneous/770-vidhuk-na-uniatstvo-mark evycha.html (accessed January 10, 2014). 138 Markevych, Uniatism, 149.

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nected to the Lviv Pseudo-synod are not treated in all their historical truth. As his critics suggest, Archbishop Avhustyn does not allow the thought that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has regenerated in the beginning of the 1990s because of her faithful who wanted to live and practise their faith in that particular Church.139 Instead Archbishop Avhustyn claims that the identity crisis in the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church can be solved in the future either by her return to the Orthodox Church or by complete incorporation into the Roman Catholic Church, thus ceasing to play the game of a bridge between East and West; there is no third way for the “theologically infertile uniatism.”140 We cannot discard the fact that a particular source of the tensions between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate relates to the issue of the Patriarchate.141 The Catholics of the Orthodox right in Ukraine have not yet got their recognition as a Patriarchal Church from the Vatican. The main reason for that is the position of the Moscow Patriarchate that unanimously opposes the creation of one more Patriarchate on its canonical territory where Ukraine belongs and the Vatican does not want to engage into a new spiral of conflict with Moscow. On October 11, 1963, addressing the fathers of the Second Vatican Council, Yosyf Slipyi, the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, in a strong hope expressed the request for the Patriarchal dignity for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church142 and in 1975 proclaimed himself Patriarch of Kyiv and Halych. However, the Vatican postponed the confirmation explaining that the Patriarchate could not be created in exile and it is necessary to wait until the Church returns to Ukraine.143 On the other ____________________ 139 Anatolii Babynskyi, “Uniatstvo.’ Dumky na poliakh” {“Uniatism.” Thoughts on the margins}, http://risu.org.ua/ru/index/blog/~anatolius/37683/ (accessed January 10, 2014). 140 Markevych, Uniatism, 206. Translation from the original source. 141 An elaborated article about the history of the perturbations between Rome and Moscow for the recognition of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church until mid-1990s: Serhii Plokhy, “Between Moscow and Rome: Struggle for the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine,” Journal of Church and State 37 (1995): 849-867. 142 Jaroslav Pelikan, Confessor between East and West. A Portrait of Ukrainian Cardinal Josyf Slipyi (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 204-205. 143 The refusal of the Vatican to grant such a status was among other things dictated by the fact that since the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church cannot legally exist in Ukraine because of the repressive politics of the Soviet authorities, Patriarch

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hand, the positive attitude towards the Patriarchal status of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by the Vatican was demonstrated when in 1980 the Pope recognised the Synod of Ukrainian Bishops created by Slipyi as a legitimate organ of the Patriarchal structure, which caused a negative reaction from the Moscow Patriarchate.144 Nevertheless, after Ukrainian independence and the re-establishment of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine, the Vatican still postpones the granting of the Patriarchal status simply by claiming that it is not the right time yet.145 Even after the Lviv Synod of the Church in 1992, where the main bodies of the Patriarchate were created and it was requested simply to recognise the existing Patriarchal structure of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the Vatican refused to satisfy that appeal. Similar complications concerned the creation of the additional Greek-Catholic eparchies in central and eastern Ukraine – at first the Vatican also refused to sanction this. Even later in 2001, during the visit of Pope John Paul II in Ukraine, expectations thrived that finally this martyrdom Church would be elevated to the Patriarchal rank and they failed again. This reflects a significant hostility from the side of certain circles of clergy towards the Moscow Patriarchate and consequently towards its local branch, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Without going deeper into that question, it is plausible to say that the nonrecognition of the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate nowadays is considered by some observers as the continuation of the Vatican Ostpolitik from 19601980, which is “too “pro-Moscow” to be strictly ecumenical.”146 In November–December 2011, according to the decision of the Synod of Bishops, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church established three new archeparchies (archdioceses) in western Ukraine. This step was differently appreciated by the Orthodox denominations. While the Moscow Patriarchate rejected that Greek-Catholics create new structures on presumably Orthodox canonical territory, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate spoke about the right of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church ____________________ Slipyi is not able to exercise his canonical power over his hierarchy or faithful (Yevhen Nebesniak, “Patriarkh Yosyf v konteksti “Ostpolitik” Vatykanu” {Patriarch Yosyf in the context of the Ostpolitik of the Vatican}, Patriarkhat 1 (2011): 18). 144 Plokhy, Between Moscow and Rome, 850. 145 D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 79. 146 Myroslav Marynovych, “Obstacles on the Road to Ecumenism in Present-Day Ukraine. A Psycho-Sociological Analysis,” http://old.risu.org.ua/eng/religion. and.society/interreligious.relations/analysis/ (accessed January 9, 2014).

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to develop her structures as she found it necessary according to her internal law.147 So far the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was accused of defeating Orthodox eparchies in western Ukraine. The new phenomena of the last years are reproaches with the proselytism in the eastern regions of the country which flow from the transfer of the seat of the Greek-Catholic Major Archbishop to the capital of Ukraine and from the establishment of the new eparchies in this part of the country.148 Commenting upon the negative reaction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the transfer of his Metropolitan seat to Lviv, Cardinal Husar noted that it does not go about transfer but about the return of his Church to Kyiv as one of the heirs of the currently divided Kyivan Metropolinate with the pastoral aim to minister the faithful of that Church in the eastern regions of the country.149 Interestingly enough, a certain criticism was heard from the Greek-Catholic side as well. Mykola Krokosh is convinced that instead of enlarging her structures in eastern Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should better engage in common pastoral and social projects with the Orthodox in those regions.150 Further, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was criticised for her decision to cooperate more closely with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. For example, it was the case with the statement of Sviatoslav Shevchuk from November 1, 2012 in which his Church recog____________________ 147 “The Bishop of the Kyivan Patriarchate Comments on the Establishment of New Greek Catholic Metropolitanates,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confes sional/interchurch_relations/45431 (accessed February 18, 2014). 148 “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate not Happy about the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church’s Pastoral Care in Eastern Ukraine,” http:// risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/interchurch_relations/52633 (accessed January 15, 2014). 149 Liubomyr Husar, “Treba zrozumity vsim nam, shcho dlia toho, aby buty spravzhnimy khrystyianamy, maiemo buty obiednanymy” {We have to understand that in order to be genuine Christians we have to be united}, interview by Yuliana Lavrysh, Ugcc.org.ua, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2425.0.html (accessed January 14, 2014). 150 Mykola Krokosh, “Holos volaiuchoho v ekumenichnii pusteli, abo Moi “piat kopiiok” do dyskusii pro prozelityzm Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy na Skhidnii Ukraini” {The voice crying out in the ecumenical wilderness or my two cents to the discussion about the proselytism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Eastern Ukraine}, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/analitica/18193golos-volayuchogo-v-ekumenichnij-pusteli-abo-moyi-pyat-kopijok-do-diskusiyipro-prozelitizm-ugkc-na-sxidnij-ukrayini.html (accessed January 22, 2014).

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nised baptism administered in the Church of Patriarch Filaret.151 The Metropolitan Volodymyr maintained that with this recognition the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church violates the current principles of ecumenical dialogue according to which the Churches should not establish official contacts with religious groups that are not legally acknowledged.152 Furthermore, certain observers named this step of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as not wise because in this way the biggest Ukrainian Church, that is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, was left aside.153 In part II of the book I will analyse the original ecumenical project of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that presupposes the reestablishment of the ancient Kyivan Metropolinate. We will see in which way and for which purpose the Greek-Catholics aim at the reunion of the current Churches of the Kyivan tradition into a united Ukrainian Patriarchate.154

____________________ 151 “Vykladeno pozytsiiu Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy shchodo diisnosti Tainstva Khreshchennia v Ukrainskii Pravoslavnii Tserkvi Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu” {The position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the validity of the sacrament of baptism in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate}, http://www.cerkva.info/uk/publications/articles/2824-baptugcc.html (accessed January 16, 2014). 152 “Doklad Mitropolita Kiyevskogo i vsyeya Ukrainy Vladimira na Arkhiyeryeyskom Soborye Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi” {Report of the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine Volodymyr on the Synod of Hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/church_doc/uocmp_doc/ 51163/ (accessed January 16, 2014). 153 Yurii Chornomorets, “Yubilyey kryeshchyeniya Rusi: sostoyaniye Tserkvyey” {Jubilee of the baptism of Kyivan Rus. Situation of the Churches}, interview by Syergyey Shtyeynikov, Religion.in.ua, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycom ment/22130-yubilej-kreshheniya-rusi-sostoyanie-cerkvej.html (accessed January 15, 2014). 154 Among the Greek-Catholic theologians who popularise the project of the united Ukrainian Patriarchate it is worth considering Myroslav Marynovych, An Ecumenist Analyses the History and Prospects of Religion in Ukraine (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2004); Myroslav Marynovych, Vybrane. T. 6, Ukrainska ideia i khrystyianstvo {Selected works. Vol. 6, The Ukrainian idea and Christianity} (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010).

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1.3.2.2 The Roman-Catholic Church The Roman-Catholic Church (or Catholic Church) eparchies were spread in Ukraine on those territories that belonged to neighbouring Catholic countries. After those regions were annexed by the Soviet Union, their Catholic eparchies were abolished and a considerable part of clergy and faithful were repressed. Only some hundred eparchies were functioning under strict state control.155 On the wave of the religious revival and the emergence of the independent Ukrainian state, the hierarchical structure of the Roman-Catholic Church was renewed in 1991. To date, this denomination has 942 communities, 612 priests (a significant number of them are foreigners – 267, unlike in any other traditional Ukrainian Church), 108 monasteries, 40 mission centres, 9 educational institutions, 483 Sunday schools, and it publishes 9 periodicals.156 The image of the Roman Catholic Church began to change after Ukraine became independent and after this Church “has begun to open itself to the adoption of a Ukrainian identity.”157 “In the past, Roman Catholicism was invariably perceived as a strictly foreign, usually Polish, phenomenon, although Hungarian and German Roman Catholics were and still are to be found in Ukraine. This fact derives from the Polish political domination (part of the Polish Kingdom in the 14th-18th centuries) and the interwar years of the 20th century (1918-1939), when the confessional divide between Ukrainians and Poles coincided with the national division.”158

By virtue of successful enculturation in the Ukrainian context of the originally mostly Polish-oriented Church, her modern evangelisation methods and theology, the Roman-Catholic Church became an attractive option for Ukrainians tired of the sometimes rigid ritual character of other Churches.159 Still, some misunderstandings appear occasionally between the ____________________ 155 Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 54. 156 The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, Networks of Churches. 157 Iwan Dacko, “The Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic Churches of Ukraine,” http://old.risu.org.ua/eng/religion.and.society/interreligious.relations/catholic.chu rches/ (accessed January 9, 2014). 158 Ibid. 159 Olha Nedavnia, “Fenomen ukraintsiv v Rymo-Katolytskii Tserkvi: zdobutky, problemy, potentsii” {Phenomenon of Ukrainians in the Roman-Catholic Church. Achievements, problems, potentials}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/studies_ of_religions/40902/ (accessed January 22, 2014).

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Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Roman Catholic Church including property conflicts.160

1.4 The interconfessional conflict in Ukraine as a conflict of identities Let us try to draw some preliminary conclusions about what the interconfessional situation in present-day Ukraine looks like. It is plausible to claim that the religious revival and deep engagement of people in the life of the Church at the beginning of the 1990s can be explained by the previous historical experience of Ukrainians who were deprived of the right to freely profess the religion they wanted. Petro Kosuha, the renowned Ukrainian specialist in religious studies, describes the situation like this: “Religion, and first of all Christian tradition, during the years of atheism gained both the unique experience of survival in the extreme circumstances under the pressure, and the experience of searching for ways to human hearts and souls. Rebellious consciousness that desired, strived for, and looked for the genuine spiritual-moral values willingly accepted contemporary calls for love, good, unity, and other all-human values.”161

However, as the previous short analyses of the establishment and conflict lines of the traditional Churches showed, the religious revival of Ukraine was anything but unobstructed. Among the positive factors contributing to the normalisation of the relations between Ukrainian Churches belongs the solution to the problem of the places of worship in the case of the struggle of two confessions for one Church building, the absence of doctrinal differences in the case of the Orthodox (cultural and liturgical ones are still preserved), the growing understanding of the need for dialogue. Finally, as disturbing elements remain ____________________ 160 See two reactions to the claims that the Archbishop of Lviv Mokrzycki expressed during a radio interview in September 2011 that Greek-Catholics have stolen the Roman Catholic cathedral in Lviv: Myron Bendyk, “Vrazhennia hreko-katolyka pislia oznaiomlennia z interviu Lvivskoho rymo-katolytskoho mytropolyta” {Impressions of a Greek-Catholic after the interview of the Roman Catholic Metropolitan of Lviv}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/monitoring/society_digest/44730/ (accessed February 18, 2014); Kateryna Novikova, “Etnorelihiina pastka” {Ethno-religious trap}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/open_theme/45112/ (accessed January 22, 2014). 161 Petro Kosukha, ed., Suchasna relihiina sytuatsia v Ukraini: stan, tendentsii, prohnozy {Contemporary religious situation in Ukraine. State, tendencies, prognoses} (Kyiv, 1994), 34. Translation from the original source.

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the interconnectedness of Church and political life, the ambitions of Church leaders, often still the old Soviet mentality about the way the Church functions in society, and the search for identity which characterises Ukraine as a typically post-communist country in transition. This religious revival was accompanied by the search for the selfidentity of the Churches as they were striving to find their place on the spiritual map of Ukraine. Novychenko identified two aspects of interconfessional conflicts in the 1990s. The first is the Orthodox-Catholic dimension, the rivalry between all branches of Orthodoxy on the one side and Roman-Catholics and Greek-Catholics on the other side. Another conflict dimension concerns the relations between the Orthodox themselves.162 According to the Ukrainian Church historian Oleh Turii, the underlying reason for those conflicts is the absence of a positive and clear answer to the question “who we are.” Because the Churches did not manage to establish and claim their identities in a positive way, they are inclined to formulate it through emphasising the differences between them. The formula becomes, therefore, “we, not they” or even a more radical one “only we but not they.”163 I cannot disagree with that conclusion because the identity element essentially clarifies the complicated set of disagreements that the Ukrainian Churches have not been able to solve so far. The religious division in Ukraine reflects the disunity in the rest of society and politics. According to Oleh Turii, the split on the basis of identity is the real division line in Ukrainian Christianity.164 Viktor Yelenskyi, a prominent scholar and President of the Ukrainian Association of Religious Freedom, characterises the inter-Church conflict in Ukraine “as the most coherent and institutionalised conflict of identities,” which in the absence of other open conflicts seems to be so menacing.165 On another place Yelenskyi characterised the conflict between the Orthodox in Ukraine as a “more or less adequate reflection of the social, political, and cultural contradictions of Ukrainian society, as well as of the distinctions in the levels ____________________ 162 Mykola Novychenko, “Mizhkonfesiini konflikty v Ukraini: prychyny i naslidky” {Interconfessional conflicts in Ukraine. Reasons and effects}, Liudyna i svit 9 (1995): 17. 163 Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 63. 164 Ibid. 165 Viktor Yelenskyi, “Protystoiannia v ukrainskomu pravoslavi yak konflikt identychnostei” {The struggle in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy as a conflict of identities}, Liudyna i svit 6 (2000): 2-10.

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of the national self-realisation.”166 Therefore, it would be reasonable to explore that issue more in detail. Oleh Turii distinguishes the identity problem of the Ukrainian Churches on three levels: governmental, national, and ecclesial and derives them from the present instability in Ukrainian society.167 I will single out the main points of that scholar as I believe them to be illustrative of what actually happens in contemporary Ukrainian Christianity. In this subchapter I will define and summarise the most visible factors of the opposition between the Churches as a struggle of identities within and between the Churches.

1.4.1 The issues of the self-identity of the Churches 1.4.1.1 Identity and Orthodox denominations An identity problem is most evident in the case of Orthodox denominations primarily due to the problem of schism. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was created partly because of the desire to reestablish this Church after two forced dissimilations in the 20th century and partly because of the internal crisis within the Russian Orthodox Church. In the opinion of Oleh Turii, the collaboration of the latter with the atheistic regime, the cultural Russification of the Ukrainian Orthodox tradition, and the growth of the national movement fostered the creation of this branch of Ukrainian Christianity.168 The expression of the internal crisis of post-Soviet Orthodoxy was the development of the autonomous and autocephalous tendencies, articulated best by Patriarch Filaret in the creation mainly by his efforts of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate.169 The internal conflict in Ukrainian Orthodoxy reflects the entire spectrum of different contradictions which exist in contemporary Ukrainian society. For some Orthodox it is evident that the city of Kyiv is 600 years older than Moscow. ____________________ 166 Viktor Yelensky, “Orthodoxy and Post-Communist Changes. The Case of Ukraine,” in Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe, eds. Jonathan Sutton and Wil van den Bercken (Leuven-Paris-Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2003), 550. 167 Turii, Greek-Catholics, 8. 168 Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 64-65. 169 Ibid., 65-66.

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Those believers are aware of the fact that the Kyiv Metropolinate was illegally transferred to the Moscow jurisdiction by the Russian tsars in 1686. Consequently, they ask themselves the question why the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should be governed from Moscow and legitimate in that way the creation of the autocephalous Orthodox confession. Therefore, Taras Kuzio is right when he claims that “although rooted in religion, there are notions with important political consequences. An understanding of confessional politics in Ukraine is therefore necessary for an understanding of politics more broadly.”170 The patriotic and nationalistic claims together with the appeals to create a single national Church appear in the rhetoric of that confession. Even now the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is criticised for her inability to connect the national and universal Orthodox aspect in her social teaching.171 As a consequence, this Church produces a kind of alternative to the Russian Church nationalism172 with the mere difference that Moscow covers her practical nationalism by emphasising the universal character of Christianity in words only. The most conservative branch of Ukrainian Orthodoxy – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has first of all to clarify for itself what her very name means.173 Despite attempts at Ukrainisation and self-identification in the new circumstances of the independent Ukrainian state, the Orthodox Church under Moscow jurisdiction still remains for many a living sign of the Russian presence in the country. Although it is the only canonically recognised denomination, its separatist and schismatic rhetoric and its fear of introducing changes can hardly contribute to becoming a Church capable of uniting all the Orthodox believers in the country.174 However, the position of the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is not univocal. There are different ideological groups among the hierarchs of this Church.175 The radical ____________________ 170 171 172 173 174 175

D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 73-74. Chornomorets, Ideological wars. Part I. Ibid. Turii, Greek-Catholics, 9. Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 66. Andrii Yurash, “Ukrainskaya missiya “pavnoapostolnogo” Kirilla: missiya nyevypolnima” {Ukrainian mission of “Equal of the Apostles” Kirill. Mission impossible}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/analytic/43952/ (accessed January 13, 2014).

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wing represented by the Metropolitan of Odesa and Izmail, Ahafanhel, sustains the close political, cultural, and religious ties with Russia. Consequently, this group refuses any discussions about the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. For the representatives of this milieu the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate is a merely political organisation that cannot be properly called a Church.176 The opposition between two camps inside the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for assuming the leading position sharpened in the winter of 2012 when the Metropolitan Volodymyr was seriously ill. At the same time, during the last years of the rule of Metropolitan Volodymyr official broader discourse of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has been evolving towards a deepening orientation towards the Ukrainian faithful. Myroslav Marynovych mentions that after the Orange Revolution several groupings became evident in the before unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church which represent a different ecclesial mentality. There are more and more indications that certain circles of that Church begin to think in Ukrainian categories, which means that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not simply a voice of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine anymore; she has become the voice of Ukraine in the Moscow Patriarchate.177 A number of cautious pro-Ukrainian pronouncements of the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan in recent years has substantiated this conclusion.178 The metropolitan positions his Church as “the authentic Church of the Ukrainian people that treats with the due respect national history and traditions of our land, this land where we live and conduct our ministry and whose organic part we are.”179 Volodymyr Sabodan speaks about the potential of his Church as a ____________________ 176 “Namisnyk Lavry: Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu nemaie” {The Vicar of the Monastery of the Caves. The Kyiv Patriarchate does not exist}, http://www.pravda.com.ua/ news/2012/03/7/6960258/ (accessed January 10, 2014). 177 “Myroslav Marynovych: “Maidan – tse vyniatkovo ukrainska istoriia, shcho vzhe ne ye spilnoiu z Rosiieiu” {Myroslav Marynovych: “Maidan is an exclusively Ukrainian history that is not common to Russia anymore”}, in Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 399. 178 Chornomorets, Ideological wars. Part II. 179 Metropolitan Volodymyr, “Ukrainske Pravoslavia na rubezhi epokh. Vyklyky suchasnosti, tendentsii rozvytku” {Ukrainian Orthodoxy on the bounds of times. Present challenges, tendencies of development}, http://orthodox.org.ua/http%3A/

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Ukrainian one to unite the culturally different east and west of the country.180 Although two Ukraines are different, they are united by language, history and culture and what is most important by the Christian faith that originated in those lands from the baptism of the Great Prince Volodymyr in the 10th century. The identity of Ukraine is then built on the interplay between eastern and western civilisations represented by different regions of the country. Furthermore, according to the metropolitan Volodymyr, his Church does not want to intervene in the discussions concerning the civilisational choice of Ukraine because the Church as a Eucharistic community has a universal character181 and it would provoke divisions among the faithful when a Church sustains a particular geopolitical choice of Ukraine.182 Notwithstanding this position of neutrality, in 2013 the representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church also visited the European institutions in Brussels and signed the declaration of the European civilisational choice of Ukraine in November 2013. In that text the Heads of nine Churches of Ukraine express confidence that “the future of Ukraine is naturally predefined by our historical roots namely to be an independent state in a circle of free European peoples.”183 Furthermore, the Church leaders “believe that this is not and cannot be viewed as an opposition of Ukraine to our historical neighbour – Russia.”184 Hence, it seems that the metropolitan, more a man of prayer than an administrator185 has adopted ____________________

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%252Forthodox.org.ua/uk/node/3165 (accessed January 10, 2014). Translation from the original source. Metropolitan Volodymyr, Ukrainian Orthodoxy; The Ukrainian Orthodox Church and present challenges. See also Yevhenii Shelevii, “Ukrainske pravoslavia i suchasnyi stan natsionalnoi yednosti Ukrainy” {Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the present state of the national unity of Ukraine}, http://www. religion.in.ua/main/11982-ukrayinske-pravoslavya-i-suchasnij-stan-nacionalnoyiyednosti-ukrayini.html (accessed January 13, 2014). “Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva: siohodennia i perspektyvy” {Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Present times and perspectives}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/index/ resourses/church_doc/uocmp_doc/34747/ (accessed January 10, 2014). Metropolitan Volodymyr, Ukrainian Orthodoxy. “Address of the Churches and Religious Organisations to the Ukrainian People on the EU Integration of Ukraine,” http://www.irf.in.ua/eng/index.php?option= com_content&view=article&id=385:1&catid=34:ua&Itemid=61 (accessed January 13, 2014). Ibid. Kateryna Shchotkina, “What Happens after Metropolitan Volodymyr?” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/authors_columns/kshchotkina_column/ 39142 (accessed January 22, 2014).

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the politics of quietly stressing the Ukrainian character of his Church instead of the opposition to Moscow.186 After the joint declaration on the European integration some analysts began to speculate about the appearance of new chances for a reunion between the three Orthodox denominations in Ukraine.187 On the other hand, the support of the European vector of the Ukrainian development put the metropolitan Volodymyr in a difficult situation with the outset of the EuroMaidan because the differences between the groups in his Church deepened again. Another issue concerns the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. As it was already stated, before the summer of 2010 there existed a compromise position concerning autocephaly, which can briefly be described as follows: autocephaly has to be proclaimed only in the canonical way and must serve the good of the Church; it has to be univocally supported by all the members of the Church; as long as there are considerable disagreements concerning autocephaly and it can bring about the disunity of the Church, the final decision concerning this issue has to be postponed. Such a position was a compromise and even though it did not satisfy everyone, it was accepted. The religious fragmentation in Ukrainian Orthodoxy is believed to be a factor that precludes the national consolidation and the construction of a new Ukrainian identity.188 The practical implication of that idea is that it is advantageous for Ukraine when one local Orthodox Church is established. That should “benefit Ukrainian politics, state building, and civil society by forming a broader consensus in society.”189 As we will see later, this preoccupation underlies the ecumenical initiatives of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church.

____________________ 186 Rap, The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches. 187 See, for example, Kateryna Shchotkina, “Patriarkh Kyrylo ta yevrointehratsiia: ataka chy vychikuvannia?” {Patriarch Kirill and European integration. Attack or waiting?}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, October 4-11, 2013. 188 D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 72. There are more authors supporting that point of view, for instance, Myroslav Marynovych. 189 Ibid.

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1.4.1.2 The doctrine of the Russkiy Mir The introduction of the doctrine of the Russkiy Mir190 by the Moscow Patriarchate prompts both the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to reconsider their identities. The new doctrine was presented by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia on November 3, 2009 at the Third Russian World Assembly191 in Moscow. This speech is the rigid and logical continuation of the softer version of the Russkiy Mir offered in 2004 during the Seventh World Russian Council “Russia and the Orthodox World.”192 According to Patriarch Kirill, Russkiy Mir can be defined as “the common civilisational space founded on three pillars: Orthodoxy, Russian culture and especially the language and the common historical memory and connected with its common vision on the further social development.”193 The Russkiy Mir unites present-day Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia, and even Moldova. Concluding his presentation, Patriarch Kirill put it clearly: “The independent states that exist on the territory of the historical Rus and are aware of their common civilisational heritage can continue building together the Rus World and interpret it as a mutual above-national project… This would mean that a state belongs to the Russkiy Mir when the Russian language is used there as the language of international communication, when the Russian culture is developed, the common historical memory and the common values for the development of society are preserved.”194

____________________ 190 I will use both terms “Russkiy Mir” and “Russian World” in the text. Russkiy Mir can be translated as Russian World or Rus World (invoking the common origins of Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian people in the ancient state of Kyivan Rus). The notion “Russian World” will appear if it is found in the originally quoted text. In other cases “Russkiy Mir” will be used. 191 The forum traditionally coincides with the celebration on November 4 of the Day of the People’s Unity and is intended to provide a discussion platform for the issues of Russian language, history and culture. 192 See the speech Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, “Rossiya i pravoslavnyy mir” {Russia and the Orthodox world}, Tsyerkov i vryemya 1 (2004): 5-16. 193 Rap, The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches. See also the speech Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Kirill, “Russkiy Mir – puti ukryeplyeniya i razvitiya” {Russkiy Mir – the ways of reinforcement and development}, Tsyerkov i vryemya 4 (2009): 5-16. 194 Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Kirill, Russkiy Mir, 14. Translation from the original source.

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The adjective “Russkiy” is quite dubious since it can refer to both the old Slav state Kyivan Rus and the present great Russia. Thus, it seems that with his new doctrine Patriarch Kirill addresses the geopolitical issues and current state ambitions of Russia. However, the task of bringing about the all-Slavs unity does not correspond to the Church’s pastoral mission. Reacting to the new teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church, a number of Ukrainian religious observers claimed that Ukraine’s participation in this above-national project would endanger its existence as an independent state.195 The doctrine of the Russkiy Mir which is to be deciphered in the context of the post-colonial Russian discourse196 was described as “a mixture of Russian utopism and anti-western attitudes, nationalism and imperialism.”197 For many the idea of Russkiy Mir is “a complex political technology of the Kremlin aiming at establishing control over the postcommunist space not only through administrative-political influence but also with the help of social-psychological and spiritual-cultural speculations.198 The idea of the Russkiy Mir oscillates between two extreme poles: the vision from the tsarist times according to which Ukrainians are not a separate nation and the more moderate position that calls to maintain the close ties between the Slavic people of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.199 The most recent practical manifestation of this attitude were the efforts of Russia to preclude the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union that was supposed to take place in November 2013. Such an agreement would indicate the drift of Ukraine away from the common civilisational space. Instead Moscow wanted to have Ukraine integrated into the Customs Union which automatically means the preser____________________ 195 See, for example, Hryhorii Druzenko, “Heopolityka vid Patriarkha: tsarstvo nebesne vs Russkyi Svit” {The geopolitics of the Patriarch. The heavenly kingdom vs Russkiy Mir}, Relihiina panorama 6 (2010): 47. 196 Nazar Zatorsky, „Die „Russische Welt“ aus ukrainischer Perspektive“, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 2 (2012): 23. 197 Chornomorets, Ideological wars. Part I. Translation from the original source. 198 Yevhen Sereda, “Shcho take “russkii mir” naspravdi i yak vin rozkoliuie Ukrainu. Pryklady ostannikh podii” {What is in fact “Russkiy Mir” and how it divides Ukraine. On the examples of recent events}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingle News.do?shho_take_ruskiy_mir_naspravdi_i_yak_vin_rozkolyuye_ukrayinu_pri kladi_ostannih_podiy&objectId=1247741 (accessed January 9, 2014). Translation from the original source. 199 Katja Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church. Politics, Culture and Greater Russia (n. p.: Routledge, 2012), 102-103.

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vation of Ukraine within the Russian economic, political, and civilisational bounds. Kateryna Shchotkina argues that when Ukraine would decisively step on the road of European integration, the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into an autocephalous ecclesial body would be only a matter of time.200 This poses a danger to the encompassing idea of the common civilisational space of Russkiy Mir. In case of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow would lose its declared direct succession to the Kyivan Rus and would have to content itself with the own origins from the middle of the 15th century or even from 1589 when the Moscow Patriarchate got canonical recognition, which denotes it as a relatively young Church.201 Such considerations mean that “with the help of the idea of the Russkiy Mir the Moscow Patriarchate reflects the contemporary neo-tsarist agenda of the Russian government and at the same time pursues its own interests to become the most powerful player in the Orthodox world.202 The discourse of the Russkiy Mir brings new developments regarding autocephaly. Viktor Yelenskyi, renowned Ukrainian religious expert, argues that granting autocephaly is not postponed but completely excluded. Ukraine as part of the common civilisational project of the Russkiy Mir should not have an independent Church. On the contrary, it has to integrate and consolidate even more with the Moscow Patriarchate.203 Such a position represents the views of a certain part of believers, however, it completely excludes alternative opinions. Instead of an although weak but still existing compromise with those who strived for autocephaly, the division line is getting even deeper because the aspirations of the other part of the faithful are neglected. At the same time, there are also positive visions of the present politics of excluding the issue of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the agenda of the Moscow Patriarchate. For instance, Viktor ____________________ 200 Kateryna Shchotkina, “Chas frikiv” {The time of freaks}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/ index/expert_thought/authors_columns/kshchotkina_column/55164/ (accessed February 12, 2014). 201 Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church, 101. 202 Rap, The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches. 203 Viktor Yelenskyi, “Patriarkh dav ukrainskomu suspilstvu odyn z naipotuzhnishykh intehratsiinykh posyliv za vsiu istoriiu nezalezhnoi Ukrainy” {The Patriarch gave Ukrainian society one of the most powerful reintegration impulses in all the history of independent Ukraine}, interview by Taras Antoshevskyi, Relihiina panorama 6 (2010): 51.

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Yelenskyi believes that the doctrine of the Russkiy Mir which is endorsed by Patriarch Kirill during his many visits to Ukraine can consolidate the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and promote the cooperation between them, “not only between these who put Ukrainian patriotism in the first place but also between those who remember that Orthodoxy is primary Christianity and not a philosophy of civilisational rivalry, who like Church history, Byzantine studies and theology.”204 The negative sides of the Russkiy Mir and the refusal of Moscow to speak about the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church may contribute to her internal revival. Despite its significance for the Moscow Patriarchate, the idea of the Russkiy Mir does not evoke great sympathies in Ukraine and is not widely known either. According to the public opinion poll released by the Razumkov Centre in March 2013, only 18.7% of Ukrainians know something about the Russkiy Mir doctrine where “in the west, the doctrine is associated with the restoration of the Russian Empire and in the south with the unification of brotherly peoples.”205 Interestingly enough, the notion Russkiy Mir is better known in western Ukraine (36.3%) where the majority of the faithful are Greek-Catholics than in traditionally Orthodox eastern regions (12.9%).206 Public, political, and media interest in the visits of Patriarch Kirill where he promotes the doctrine of the Russkiy Mir has considerably diminished between 2009 and 2011.207 Political background is often ascribed to pastoral visits of the Moscow Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine. The concept of Russkiy Mir legitimises “the neo-imperialist politics of the Kremlin”208 or in the words of Sviatoslav Shevchuk it is “a barren flower of Russian ideology, which has nothing to do with the ____________________ 204 Ibid, 52. Translation from the original source. 205 “Over 80% of Ukrainians Do not Know about the Doctrine of the Russian World,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/community/social_questioning/521 42 (accessed January 15, 2014). 206 “The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: ‘Russian World’ Has Nothing to Do with the Church,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/community/ religion_and_policy/53748 (accessed January 17, 2014). 207 During the pastoral visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in the summer of 2011, the President of Ukraine as well as leading politicians were absent during the official events, media coverage and the presence of ordinary faithful were critically low. Just consider the fact that at the same time as Patriarch Kirill served the liturgy at the Monastery of the Caves in the presence of 2,000-3,000 faithful, Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate organised the way of the cross attended by 10,000-20,000 people (according to different information sources). (Yurash, Ukrainian mission). 208 Arjakovsky, I Can no Longer Remain Silent.

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church or history… This pseudo-scientific platform is now being reanimated as the imperialistic idea of the renewal of the Soviet Union.”209 Concerning the visit of patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in July 2012, political scientist Oleksii Haran has claimed that “the efforts of the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church to establish Russkiy Mir in Ukraine are equal to the attempts of Putin to entangle Ukraine into the Customs Union.”210 Also for Patriarch Filaret Russkiy Mir “is the idea and propaganda of the new imperium. Ukrainians reject this propaganda because we have already lived in an imperium and we want to live in freedom.”211 The spiritual unity between Ukraine and Russia is repeatedly emphasised by the Patriarch Kirill, for instance in his letter to the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko in August 2009. In this document, the Moscow Patriarch reminds him of the common struggle against Nazism, the most awful evil of the 20th century, Christian faith, speaks about the family of the Slavic states united by faith, culture, and history, where Ukraine belongs and where she together with Russia has the noble task of helping Europe to overcome its spiritual, economic, and moral crisis.212 That text shows that the Moscow Patriarch pursues the unity of both countries and builds it on the common civilisational attributes of Ukraine and Russia. This interpretation of the doctrine may be too extreme, however it certainly makes many conscious Ukrainian Orthodox reconsider their allegiance to the Ukrainian Orthodox ____________________ 209 “Patriarch Sviatoslav: “Russian World’ Is Barren Flower of Soviet Ideology,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/community/religion_and_policy/51378 (accessed January 16, 2014). 210 Yevheniia Kovalenko, “Namahannia hlavy Rosiiskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy vstanovyty v Ukraini “Russkii mir” rivnotsinni sprobam Putina vtiahnuty Ukrainu v Mytnyi soiuz” {The efforts of the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church to establish Russkiy Mir in Ukraine are equal to the attempts of Putin to entangle Ukraine into the Customs Union}, http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/ 2113/116/75289/ (accessed January 14, 2014). Translation from the original source. 211 “Slovo Sviatiishoho Patriarkha Kyivskoho i vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta pislia Bozhestvennoi liturhii z nahody 16-i richnytsi yoho intronizatsii (23 zhovtnia 2011 roku)” {Sermon of His Holiness Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and All RusUkraine after the Holy liturgy on the occasion of the 16th anniversary of his enthronisation (October 23, 2011)}, http://www.cerkva.info/uk/propovidi/1921slovo-introniz-16.html (accessed January 11, 2014). Translation from the original source. 212 “Svyatyeyshiy Patriarkh Kirill napravil poslaniye Pryezidyentu Ukrainy V.A. Yushchyenko” {His Holiness Patriarch Kirill sent a letter to the President of Ukraine V.A. Yushchenko}, https://mospat.ru/ru/2009/08/11/news4494/ (accessed January 23, 2014).

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Church. The loyalty of the Ukrainians with a strong national identity to their state is not compatible with their loyalty to the Church that questions the existence of an independent Ukraine.

1.4.1.3 Identity and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church The antagonism in the Catholic milieu, that is between the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, does not reach such a high level of tension and can be rightly defined as a strategic competition between the two local Churches of different rites. Nevertheless, this rivalry has already lasted for centuries and is inseparably connected with the legacy of Polish-Ukrainian historical tensions and mutual accusations of nationalism.213 This competition is aggravated by the change of the historical roles of Catholic Churches after the Second Vatican Council with its renewal of ecclesiology as well as by specific demographical processes in Ukraine and the changes that happened after the country gained independence. As the largest banned Church in the world and the largest structure of resistance to the Communist regime that survived the underground, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not have problems with her civil and national identification.214 However, emerging as the result of the Orthodox entering in union with the Roman See, sometimes Greek-Catholics encounter the problem of not being accepted by others. Greek-Catholics are now and again regarded as a historical mistake and an obstacle to the success of world ecumenism. Additionally, there is the opinion that overemphasising civil and political matters by part of the clergy and believers undermined to some extent the trust that this Church enjoyed after her coming out of the underground in 1989.215 The reasons for that could be the subject of a separate interesting discussion. There are different visions of the identity of Greek-Catholics between the veterans of the underground and the new converts as well as between the diaspora branch of the Church and the one existing on Ukrainian territory. There are also other internal problematic tensions, for instance concerning the possibilities of reconciliation among the Christians in Ukraine, the balance between the ____________________ 213 Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 78. 214 Turii, Greek-Catholics, 10. 215 Ibid.

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eastern tradition and belonging to the Catholic Church, or the self-image of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as a local Church in the universal Catholic community, the dispute between the return to the purely eastern tradition and the adherence to the “westernisation” of the Church.216 As we will see later, even the transfer of the Metropolitan seat to Kyiv was not univocally greeted by different circles of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

1.4.2 Identity, nationalism, Churches The above-mentioned identity problem of Ukrainian Churches allows the conclusion that present-day conflicts exist more inside particular confessions than between them. The antagonism between canonical and noncanonical Orthodox believers is in fact a rivalry between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian identities. The Orthodox cannot reconcile themselves to the mere fact of the existence of parallel Orthodox structures. Contrary to mainly property tensions with Greek-Catholics primarily located in the west of the country, an inter-Orthodox conflict can evolve into an allUkrainian one. The conflict potential of inter-Orthodox disagreements in Ukraine is aggravated by the involvement of political and state factors both inside and outside the country. Additionally, this conflict, when intentionally guided, can evolve into the inter-ethnic (between Ukrainians and the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine) and interstate conflicts (with Russia for which the defence of Russians abroad is one of the priorities of external politics and the instrument to spread its influence to the former Soviet territories).217 Even though an inter-ethnic conflict is rather quite unrealistic because of the high level of tolerance among Ukrainians, the interstate tensions indeed have grounds as the current RussianUkrainian conflict shows. No wonder then that those internal identification problems in particular Churches hinder them in entering into a fruitful dialogue and elaborating an inclusive vision of the union. While engaging into a dialogue, the dialogue partner must have a strong own identity in order to be able to ____________________ 216 Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 69-70. 217 Oleh Turii, “Tradytsiini Tserkvy v nezalezhnii Ukraini: problema identychnosti” {The traditional Churches in independent Ukraine. The problem of identity}, Yi 22 (2001): 130.

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acknowledge compromises from the other side. Without knowing who they are, individual Churches will long to impose their point of view while neglecting other opinions which Miroslav Volf described as a lack of the “double vision.” That hinders all-Christian reconciliation in Ukraine. Dialogue, genuine listening to the partner while being aware of one’s identity are essential initial steps on the road to reconciliation. The importance of the identity of the interconfessional conflict derives even from the mere sociological fact that the number of those who declared their adherence to the Orthodox or Catholic denomination exceeds the number of those who identified themselves as Christians. This is a typical development for many post-Communist countries including Ukraine. In the opinion of Yelenskyi, it signifies that for many people not religiosity itself with its higher ideals plays a significant role but belonging to a particular group that can also be identified with a religious denomination.218 People who during the communist times did not doubt their identity as Soviet people have suddenly lost it and felt the need to acquire a new one. Religion seemed to be an attractive option as persecuted by the previous regime, promising and solid at the same time. This does not mean that those people became deeply religious. Referring again to the sociological data, it is interesting to note that when in Russia in 1991 only 6% of faithful attended mass once a month or more regularly, in 1997 this figure remained practically the same – 7%.219 The Ukrainian one is not much better: according to the data from 2013, 17% of believers attend religious services once per week, and 18% – once per month.220 It means that religion became not so much a matter of deep personal spiritual revival as more of a personal and later political identification. The case of Ukraine shows that religion can be a powerful factor for national, political, and cultural mobilisation.221 According to Viktor Yelensky, “We can speak about the presence of a quite definite correlation between a declaration of belonging to this or that church and political preference and political behavior.”222 The regions with the highest national con____________________ 218 Viktor Yelenskyi, “Relihia pislia komunizmu – napriamky zmin” {Religion after communism – vectors of changes}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, August 19-September 1, 2000. 219 Ibid. 220 Razumkov Centre, Religiosity of Ukrainians, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2013), 28. 221 Yelensky, Orthodoxy and Post-Communist Changes, 552. 222 Ibid.

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sciousness and the highest Ukrainian language proficiency equally boast the biggest number of believers.223 The obvious reason for this close connection between religion and national identity in Ukraine is the centurylong absence of statehood. That means that belonging to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church automatically distinguished a Ukrainian from the western regions of the country from a Catholic Pole or an Orthodox Russian. That fact explains the huge resistant potential of that Church against the communist regime. Grzegorz Babinski proves that it is not language, economic status, or culture, but mainly religion that influenced the construction of identity in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland.224 The close link between religion and identity in Ukraine makes me think about civil religion, a term generally used to describe that linkage introduced first by the French philosopher Rousseau and popularised by the American sociologist Robert Bellah. This author opines that civil religion is the best form of any religion contrary to the religion of the priest, the religion of man, and the religion of the citizen.225 The religion of the priest, among which there are also traditional Churches, including those in Ukraine that we discuss, is harmful to society. It puts the citizen in a situation of double loyalty, both to the state and to the Church, which brings about conflicts and thus we cannot speak of loyal citizens in that case.226 If we consider, for example, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, we will clearly observe her double loyalty to the Holy See and the country Ukraine and the assertions of both can differ. Civil religion is fundamentally about the functionalistic use of religion as a means by the sovereign of creating “sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be either a good citizen or a faithful subject.”227 In his criticism of the theory of Rousseau, Jose Casanova affirms that such civil religion is normatively undesirable.228 Casanova shares a similar opinion with Robert Bellah who also criticises the functionalism regarding religion on the grounds that it ____________________ 223 D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, Politics and Society, 71. 224 Grzegorz Babinski, “Borderland Identity, Religious ad National Identification in the Polish-Ukrainian Borderland,” in New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Irena Borowik and Grzegorz Babinski (Krakow: Nomos, 1997), 93-111. 225 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 59. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid., 60. 228 Ibid.

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cannot only be an integrative but also a critical factor and that the primary loyalty of the religious community is to God and only then to the state.229 In the light of those theories, we may question the attempts of some politicians in Ukraine to use the Church for their political games. In the longterm perspective this would be harmful. There are some hints to think that, because religion plays an important role in the collective identity of Ukrainians, at least of the Ukrainians from the west, we encounter religious nationalism. When the nationalistic movement and its particular leaders rely on the assistance of religious leaders or institutions to promote its cause230 we may speak of religious nationalism. For people from the west of the country, to be Ukrainian means to be Greek-Catholic which was understandable in the situation when people without their own state had to express their otherness from Polish Catholics or Russian Orthodox. Thus religion got an important place in the nation-building process. Why exactly do religion and language turn out to be the strongest identification points for western Ukrainians? Recently there have been voices in Ukraine that disperse the idea that when the Ukrainian Churches unite, these will create the basis for an all-national unity, a common bond between people. The struggle for the creation of a united Orthodox Church in Ukraine can also be regarded as a sign of religious nationalism. Ukrainian Orthodox who want to have an independent Church are accused of religious nationalism by the Moscow Patriarchate. However, it is a discussible question to which extent we may speak of religious nationalism in Ukraine, since the Church is separated from the state and does not exercise a strong influence on political matters. On the one hand, politicians try to associate themselves with the Church to get support from the population. But at the same time politicians do not really support religious claims for politics. Abortion has not been banned, even though from time to time the Churches speak up for it231 and the majority of the politicians associate themselves with the Church. ____________________ 229 Bobert Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1992), 181182. 230 Philip Barker, Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe (n.p: Routledge, 2008), 13. 231 The last joint call of the Catholic and Greek-Catholic hierarchy of Ukraine to the authorities to legally forbid abortion was issued on February 9, 2012: “Zvernennia katolytskoho yepyskopaty Ukrainy: Synodu Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ta Konferentsii Rymo-Katolytskoi Tserkvy v Ukraini (pro zaboronu abortiv)” {Message of the Catholic hierarchy of Ukraine: the Synod of the

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1.5 Ukrainian post-atheism 1.5.1 Typical features of Ukrainian post-atheism The Church boasts the highest level of trust among the social institutions in Ukraine. This fact proves to be truthful in all the surveys conducted from the very proclamation of independent Ukraine. It is especially striking in comparison with the constantly falling level of trust in the other political and social institutions. For example, according to the public opinion poll at the end of the year 2008 the Church is the only public institution that enjoys the positive balance of trust – complete trust index – 26%, complete distrust index – 11%.232 In general, the dynamics of the trust in the Church in the years 2000-2013 is positive. Even though the number of those who trust the Church completely has dropped from 30.6% in December 2000 to 22.6% in December 2013, there are more people who claim that they rather trust the Church – 33.8% in 2000 and 41.9% in 2013.233 Obviously, the balance of absolute trust is not as high as it could have been expected, however, one can explain it by the social mission that the Church has to carry out. Keeping in mind the falling level of spirituality and morals, the commercialisation of human relations, corruption, violence, criminality and cynicism, it is no wonder that the respondents demonstrated a relatively low figure of trust in their answers. In spite of the comparatively high positive balance of trust, it is important to note that people answering the questions of surveys have a different understanding of what the Church means. This is explained by the peculiarities of the religious situation in the country. Ukraine belongs to typically post-atheistic and post-communistic countries and shares the common characteristics of such societies. Serhii Zdioruk developed a three-feature model that describes Ukraine as a post-communist country in ____________________ Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Conference of the Roman-Catholic Church in Ukraine (on the prohibition of abortions}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/ 2230.0.html (accessed February 19, 2014). 232 Liudmyla Shanhina, “U kraini – novyi rik abo Youllupukki, abo ne za stolom khai bude skazano” {In the country comes the New Year or Youllupukki or Let us not tell it at the table}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, December 27, 2008-January 16, 2009. 233 Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Chy doviriaiete Vy tserkvi?” {Sociological poll. Do you trust the Church?}, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/ poll.php?poll_id=83 (accessed February 14, 2014).

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regard to religious life. The first of them is religion-outside-Church.234 That means that practicing Christians preserved their belonging to the Church while the newly converted in search of the sense of life turned their sights mostly to traditional Protestant denominations. The second feature of Ukrainian post-atheism is the fashion for the Church.235 This fashion is embodied in church attendance only during the big religious feasts, mainly Christmas and Easter. As for 2010, Ukrainians attended Church services 1-2 times per year on average and 7.9% of them never appear in church.236 Furthermore, the fashion for a Church is closely connected with ideology. Unchurched people pay great attention to which Church they will go to for Christmas. While choosing a particular Church they select an ideology associated with this Church and in this way also identity, a political and social circle. This is especially evident in the case of politicians. Their support of this or that Church demonstrates their social position and speaks for itself. Relations of Church and state and the closeness of Churches and politics is the last typical feature of post-communist societies.237 By attending Church services, politicians declare both their ideological orientation and unity with the people. This is especially evident during the services on the occasion of big feasts when on television the services of the traditional Churches are demonstrated with special emphasis on state officials attending those celebrations.

1.5.2 Church and state in Ukraine 1.5.2.1 Legal basis The foundation of the Church-state relations in Ukraine is defined by article 25 of the Ukrainian Constitution which postulates that “Everyone shall have right to freedom of beliefs and religion. This right shall include the freedom to profess any religion or profess no religion, to freely practice

____________________ 234 Zdioruk, Socio-religious relations, 303. 235 Ibid., 304. 236 Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Yak chasto Vy vidviduiete tserkovni sluzhby chy zibrannia?” {Sociological poll. How often do you attend Church services and meetings?}, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php? poll_id=302 (accessed April 7, 2014). 237 Zdioruk, Socio-religious relations, 304.

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1.5 Ukrainian post-atheism religious rites and ceremonial rituals, alone or collectively, and to pursue religious activities… The Church and religious organisations in Ukraine shall be separated from the State, and school shall be separated from the Church. No religion shall be recognised by the State as mandatory.”238

Additional practical provisions of the Church-state relations are outlined by the “Law of Ukraine on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations.”239 The State Committee on Nationalities and Religions is responsible for the coordination of the relations between religious organisations and the state authorities. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations240 is a consulting and recommending body that unites representatives of 18 organisations. At the same time, despite the official separation of state and Church, occasionally intrusions of both of them happen into the domain of each other, which are not allowed by the law.241 The practical implementation of the above-mentioned laws as well as their shortcomings show certain irregularities which I would like to illustrate more in detail now.

1.5.2.2 Intrusion of the state Political reasons play an important role in the balance of power among the Ukrainian Churches. For instance, the election of Viktor Yanukovych as President of Ukraine in 2010 brought about the favouring of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Metropolitan Volodymyr ____________________ 238 “Constitution of Ukraine,” art. 35, http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/consti tution.html (accessed February 14, 2014). 239 “Zakon Ukrainy pro svobodu sovisti ta relihiini orhanizatsii” {The Law of Ukraine on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations}, http:// zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/987-12?test=4/UMfPEGznhhrRp.ZisDPcS6HI4 Sws80msh8Ie6 (accessed February 14, 2014). See also a detailed article about the legal provisions of the Church-state relations in Ukraine: Lesia Kovalenko, “Church and State in Ukraine,” in Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe, eds. Silvio Ferrari, W. Cole Durham, and Elizabeth A. Sewell (Leuven-ParisDudley, MA: Peeters, 2003), 355-382. 240 Official website of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations: http://vrciro.org.ua/. 241 Myroslava Rap, „Einige rechtliche Aspekte der Beziehung zwischen Staat und Kirche in der Ukraine und ihre praktische Umsetzung“. Paper presented at the summer university “Auctoritas und Potestas in West und Ost”, organized by the Institute of Ecumenical Studies, Fribourg University, Switzerland, Istanbul/Halki, September, 2013.

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(Sabodan) of that Church blessed the newly elected President during a prayer that took place a few days before his official inauguration on February 25, 2010. Subsequently, Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church arrived in Ukraine for the inauguration ceremony and also granted a blessing to Viktor Yanukovych which became part of the official festivities of the takeover of the Presidential post. Many religious commentators interpreted that fact as the empowerment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.242 Until that the newly elected President was blessed by the Heads of all the main denominations in the country. Thus, one observed the preference of the canonical Russian-oriented part of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The state has powerful tools to influence the positions of Ukrainian Churches. According to Zdioruk, among the tools are the absence of the unity among Churches and the question of the restitution of Church property.243 While choosing to whom to return the former property expropriated by the Soviet authorities, to grant a ground for the construction of new sacral buildings, or to help with the registration of the religious community can be a powerful means of influencing a particular Church.244 There is the declaration of the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, from June 11, 1999 to promote the overcoming of the consequences of totalitarian politics regarding the Church245; however it did not resolve the issue. There is no law in Ukraine that regulates the restitution of Church property by establishing the binding legal criteria, and thus, “The state and local authorities continue to utilise optional restitution as a means of gaining religious organisations’ allegiance or direct support and to in fact discriminate against wrong religious denominations.”246 For a particular Church the price of such property is very high because while politically supporting one part of society, the Church is opposing the other. Indeed, a

____________________ 242 Myroslav Marynovych, “Pro shcho syhnalizuie nam inavhuratsiia Prezydenta Yanukovycha?” {What does the inauguration of President Yanukovych signalise to us?}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/34595/ (accessed February 17, 2014). 243 Zdioruk, Socio-religious relations, 305. 244 Turij, Das religiöse Leben, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 48. 245 “Zaiava Prezydenta Ukrainy {pro moralno-politychnu reabilitatsiiu Tserkov, shcho postrazhdaly vid totalitarnoho rezhymu” {Message of the President of Ukraine {on the moral-political rehabilitation of the Churches which suffered under the totalitarian regime}, Liudyna i svit 6 (1999): 23-28. 246 Gennadiy Druzenko, “Religion and the Secular State in Ukraine,” 731, http://icl rs.org/content/blurb/files/Ukraine.1.pdf (accessed February 14, 2014).

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Church “can get a building for her “favours” and the next day no one would want to enter this Church.”247 The interference of politics in the ecclesial affairs is equally evident in a very sensible issue of the settlement of the Orthodox fragmentation in Ukraine.248 Elsewhere above I have already discussed the role of politics in the emergence and the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate by the first President of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994). The second President, Leonid Kuchma (19942005), was not particularly active on the religious field, however he also met the Ecumenical Patriarch in 2000 in Istanbul in order to discuss the possibilities of the creation of the united Orthodox Church and sent a telegram to the Moscow Patriarch concerning the autonomous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Most active in the domain of reuniting the Orthodox was the third Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko (20052010), who considered one local Orthodox Church as the basis for the Ukrainian national identity and spirituality. However, all his efforts were also in vain. In that regard, it is worth mentioning the serious tension in interOrthodox relations which arose in July 2008 when Ukraine celebrated the 1020th anniversary of the Christianisation of Kyivan Rus, the medieval state of the eastern Slavs with the capital in Kyiv. It is an important feast not only in Ukraine, and its essence is the baptism of the whole country in 988 by the decision of the ruler Volodymyr the Great who according to the legend among different denominations chose the Orthodoxy of the Constantinople Patriarchate to become the state religion. At the invitation of the President of the country Viktor Yushchenko the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew took part in the celebrations. This provoked discussions and fears concerning the possible changes of the status of the two canonically unrecognised Orthodox Churches. Among the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate there were suspicions that during the celebration ceremonies the Ecumenical Patriarch would announce the joining of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to his jurisdiction. However, this did not happen. The celebrations attracted a lot of attention in Ukraine and abroad and emphasised once more the problem of the disunity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but at the ____________________ 247 Zdioruk, Socio-religious relations, 306. Translation from the original source. 248 Druzenko, Religion and the Secular State, 728-730.

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end the existing balance of powers was preserved and the issue of the reconciliation between different denominations of Ukrainian Orthodox did not advance.249 It was proved that the efforts to bring about the unity of Orthodoxy by means of power and political pressure cannot succeed. Thus, one of the most important projects of the former President Viktor Yushchenko in the sphere of the spiritual revival of the country was not realised. The evil of the intrusion of political forces in Church life was steadily repeated by the number of the highest Church officials. At the beginning of 2009, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate Patriarch Volodymyr in his interview explicitly substantiated his negative attitude on the issue: “As long as the question of the status of the Ukrainian Church will be discussed in a political dimension as an additional mechanism of the independence or political unity, there will be no consensus concerning that status… They have to realise the obvious thing that the Church cannot and should not be an instrument of political or ideological influence. Her nature is different.”250

That position differs from the one of the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate who is always calling upon the state authorities to solve the problem of Orthodox rivalry in Ukraine. This point leads us to the next element of discussion, that is to say the cooperative attitude of Ukrainian Churches regarding politics.

1.5.2.3 Cooperative attitude of the Churches From a practical point of view, the cooperative attitude of certain Churches is understandable: “For the reason of the low level of religious consciousness, the weakness of laity movements and the civil society as a whole, it is almost impossible for Church hierarchy and ordinary priests to refuse “mutually beneficial compromises.’”251 The other expert in reli____________________ 249 P. M. Bondarchuk et al., eds., Relihiina polityka v Ukraini u 1960-1980 rokakh i suchasna praktyka mizhkonfesiinykh vidnosyn {Religious politics in Ukraine in the 1960s-1980s and the contemporary practice of interconfessional relations} (Kyiv, 2010), 143. 250 Mytropolyt Volodymyr, “Povernutysia u vertykalne polozhennia” {Back into the vertical position}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, December 27, 2008-January 16, 2009. Translation from the original source. 251 Zdioruk, Socio-religious relations, 306. Translation from the original source.

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gious developments in Ukraine, Kateryna Shchotkina, draws our attention to the fact that the reason why a Church often fails to resist the arbitrary acts of state authorities is the weakness that Churches share with “little Ukrainians”, namely the psychology of survival.252 In practice it means that it is sometimes more important for Churches to get a new sacral building or a permission to build one rather than by the refusal to do so to show that a Church will not fulfil the desires of local officials. There may never be a second request because it is easier to refer to another Church in the neighbourhood. We can anticipate such situations, not only on the level of the religious community of a local village or town, but also on the higher level of hierarchs and whole Churches. As a consequence, so argues Shchotkina, Churches that pretended to be centres of spiritual revival, state-building, and ideology are getting tired of playing these unusual roles for them.253 The reason is not that such roles are not proper to Churches but that the state in post-communist societies is still treating Churches as one of its departments, which presumes direct interference and benefits trading. State authorities have such apparent tools for influencing property or the right to allow or forbid religious denominations to access particular state institutions. In many cases the agreements about the pastoral care in military units, prisons, and other institutions terminate with the rotation of the superior authorities with which a particular Church has signed a corresponding arrangement.254 The experience of some election campaigns show that, there were successful attempts to gain the people’s votes by direct appeals to the believers by the priests during liturgies or private conversations with parishioners or by including the representatives of the clergy to the election lists. Regarding the local elections of 2010, Kateryna Shchotkina maintains that in the course of that year Ukrainian society was coming back to the transitory methods of interconfessional rivalry, which appeared to be to a great extent already overcome. Instead of managing to influence believers by the evangelical message and proper example, certain Churches again directly engage in politics and sustain ideological claims of certain political

____________________ 252 Kateryna Shchotkina, “Operatsia “Kooperatsiia’: mizh svobodoiu ta mainom” {Operation “Cooperation.” Between freedom and property}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, May 24-30, 2003. 253 Ibid. 254 Rap, Einige rechtliche Aspekte.

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parties.255 For example, the Metropolitan of Cherkasy and Kaniv Sofronii, who belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, was included into the main list of candidates for the local elections of the pro-state Party of Regions. The leading position according to the highest number of clergy involved in the elections struggle is the southern Ukrainian city Odesa. Interestingly, all those candidates belong to the Orthodox Church under Moscow jurisdiction. Agafangel Savvin, the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, in 1990-1994 was a deputy in the Ukrainian Parliament and then for years the deputy in the regional council of Odesa.256 As a matter of fact, it should be mentioned that also some bishops of that Church refused to play a part in the political struggle and forbade the priests from their eparchies from doing so. A similar situation, though not to the same degree, existed with regard to the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. They also participated in the local elections of 2010 but supported other political powers, “democratic” in their own words and radical nationalistic ones. Of course, it is not for the first time that this Church endorses right-wing parties in the political spectrum of Ukraine, however, the mere fact of the increasing involvement of the Orthodox clergy into politics reveals perturbing tendencies. As Shchotkina continues, in Ukraine it is still bad practice to solve religious problems by political means.257 It seems, however, that recently we have more and more been facing contradicting developments. Some Churches on behalf of the highest hierarchs do not express the direct support of any political party or politician, proposing instead only the criteria according to which believers should make their choices. In his article “Thoughts in the Time before Elections” (to the local regional councils in 2010) the Head of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church Cardinal Liubomyr Husar argues that participation in elections is the responsibility of every citizen. Voters are obliged to get to know candidates and their programmes and on the basis of that to make a choice dictated by their consciences.258 This appeal of the Head of the Church was very well received as a wise and respectful position giving an ____________________ 255 Kateryna Shchotkina, “Bratiia u spyskakh” {Brothers on the lists}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, October 16-22, 2010. 256 Druzenko, Religion and the Secular State, 731. 257 Shchotkina, Brothers on the lists. 258 Liubomyr Husar, “Rozdumy u peredvyborchyi chas” {Thoughts in the time before elections}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, October 9-15, 2010.

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answer to the current sentiments in society. People felt disappointed after the Presidential elections in January 2010 and the coming to power of political forces that were gradually suppressing the achievements of the Orange Revolution of 2005 including the recent changes to the Constitution of the State in October 2010, which gives the fullness of power in the hands of the President. Liubomyr Husar is concerned about the growing social apathy, the level of which was traditionally high in Ukrainian society, and shares his thoughts and gives guidelines and spiritual support to his flock before the elections for the local regional councils, held on October 31, 2010. With such an approach the functions pertinent to the Church are not distorted and the Church can exercise her positive influence on the development of a mature democracy in society. This tendency became even stronger during the EuroMaidan in the winter of 2013-2014. During those pro-European and later anti-Presidential and anti-governmental demonstrations resulting from the refusal of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013 and the subsequent use of power against the peaceful protesters, also the Ukrainian Orthodox Church showed a more reasonable stance and appealed for the ceasefire and negotiations between authorities and the opposition. Even though there were the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the highest rank who expressed their support to the Presidential course of action,259 the official stance of this Church differs radically form that during the Orange Revolution in 2004-2005 when this Church offered an open support to the Presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych, even after it became evident that he falsified the elections.260 Interestingly enough, in 2007 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate condemned the tendency to engage into the political struggle. The bishops, gathered at the Synod held on December 21, 2007, discussed the problems of the internal life of the Church and condemned ____________________ 259 The most famous of them is the Metropolitan Pavlo Lebed, the vicar of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves. Yekatyerina Shchyetkina, “Amvon na nyeytralnoy polosye” {Ambo on the neutral lane}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, January 24, 2014. 260 See a study about the stance of Ukrainian Churches during the political crisis caused by the falsified Presidential elections of 2004 and the subsequent Orange Revolution: Igor Gordyi, Ukrainische Kirchen und die Orange Revolution. Haltung der ukrainischen Kirchen in den gesellschaftspolitischen Prozessen in der Ukraine im Jahr 2004 (Südwestdeutscher Verlag für Hochschulschriften, 2009).

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so-called “political Orthodoxy:”261 “On the bitter experience of the last years we learned that politics divides us… We emphasise that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is beyond politics. Our Church gives its followers the freedom to support any political views but we cannot allow the political slogans to penetrate into the Church milieu.”262 This decision was impelled among other things by the accusations of this Church of political engagement during the famous Presidential elections at the end of 2004, followed by the Orange Revolution. That practice was reconsidered by the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and openly condemned on the highest level. Commenting upon the decisions of the Synod of Bishops Serhii Hovorun, the Head of the Department of the External Relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, stated that political Orthodoxy indicates the support of certain political views or programmes on the basis of religious claims. In fact, religious views are used to support the given system of political visions, and the religious component is subordinated to the political one.263 Hovorun continues that the Synod made it clear that the Church is interested in such relations with political leaders, which are based on the law and not on personal sympathies. That is an important statement because it situates the Church-state relations in Ukraine in legal frames, thus bringing about stability and invariability concerning any political power at a given historical moment.264 The instrumental use of religion denies the very essence of it and can cause the discreditation of religion. Church officials knowing the real situation should be careful and not let the Church be merely used by politicians as a means of gaining people’s support or votes before elections. The Church runs the risk of losing her authority among believers as a result of the unconditional support of certain political powers. The already mentioned Zdioruk was certainly right maintaining that “in real life because of the internal weakness, disunity, and the absence of clear laws, discipline and the proper culture of the implementation of law, Churches engage into ____________________ 261 Petro Zuiev, “Politychne pravoslavia vidokremyly vid Tserkvy” {“Political Orthodoxy” detached from the Church}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, January 12-18, 2008. 262 “Zvernennia Soboru Yepyskopiv Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy do yii virnykh chad” {The address of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to her faithful}, http://www.zaistinu.ru/articles/?aid=1736 (accessed February 18, 2014). Translation from the original source. 263 Zuiev, Political Orthodoxy. 264 Ibid.

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the cooperation and even competition for the support of state authorities.”265 Therefore, the change in the attitude of the Churches to politics that becomes evident nowadays is only to be greeted because indeed benefits trading and manipulation happened all too often in the Ukrainian Church-politics sphere.

1.5.2.4 The idea of a national (state) Church in Ukraine In the course of the existence of an independent Ukraine the idea of the creation of a national unified Ukrainian Church has time and again come to the surface of political and social life in the country. In her broader meaning a national Church signifies “absolutisation of the role of the Church in the creation of the Ukrainian nation (as an ethnic community) and the Ukrainian state (as a state of the titular nation).266 The idea behind this is that the unified Church will underwrite harmony in society. Except for this radical position there are far more moderate and realistic ones. For example, according to the diaspora historian Myroslav Labunka, the creation of a national Church is a bizarre and fantastic idea, which would stimulate religious indifference rather than spiritual and national unity.267 The proper answer in his opinion can be a just one – tolerance, mutual respect, and cooperation between different Churches. There were attempts to review the established model of the Churchstate relations in Ukraine and to secure a special place for the traditional denominations on the grounds that they played a particular role in the formation of Christianity and culture; that they were weakened by the communist regime and need help in order to be able to resist the pressure of foreign missions which may cause the loss of Ukrainian authenticity; that religions enjoy the high level of confidence among the population and therefore, those Churches that support the establishment of the Ukrainian state should be sustained in contrast to denominations with the spiritual centres abroad.268 ____________________ 265 Zdioruk, Socio-religious relations, 305. Translation from the original source. 266 “Tserkva i suspilstvo v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn” {Church and society in Ukraine. Problems of mutual relations}, Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona 10 (2000): 34. Translation from the original source. 267 Myroslav Labunka, “My vsi – ukraintsi...” {We are all Ukrainians…}, Liudyna i svit 3 (1992): 5-6. 268 Yelensky, Ukraine. Church and State, in Church-State Relations, 149-150.

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In the 1990s there were several attempts from the side of the authorities of the country to establish the Orthodox Church as a state Church. This idea is connected to the popular view at that time that there should be an independent Church in the independent state. This trend is especially evident in the state-Church politics conducted by the first President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, in particular his practical support for the Metropolitan Filaret in his struggle to gain autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. After the defeat of this idea, the politics of the President's administration did not change. It comes back again to the stage after the death of Patriarch Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in 1993. The government conducted a strong campaign for the unification of the three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches under the Patriarch of Kyiv.269 Although the state was again defeated in its attempts to unite the Orthodox, it only proves the fact that the idea of the creation of a de facto state religion was still alive. The situation changed after the elections in 1994, when the rival leftist candidate Leonid Kuchma was elected to the office of President. Backed by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate during the election campaign, he as President introduced the new policy of noninterference in the inter-Orthodox and inter-Church conflict. The decisive change came after the events of the so-called “Black Tuesday” held on July 18, 1995 when the police beatings of participants at the funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate took place.270 It was revealed at first in the President’s patronage over the project to give the burial site of Patriarch Volodymyr a proper appearance and a gravestone. For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine the way of reconciliation, non-interference, and dialogue with the leading confessions was favoured.271 Patriarch Filaret also changed his confrontational tone with the state authorities in the spirit of civil peace and religious tolerance.272 Furthermore, in 1996 the Ukrainian Constitution was ____________________ 269 Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and Nation, 141. 270 Shortly, the conflict burst out because of the desire of the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate to bury their deceased Patriarch Volodymyr on the grounds of Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, thus claiming the right of this Church to retain this great symbol of Kyiv Christianity. 271 Plokhy and Sysyn, Religion and Nation, 182. 272 Ibid.

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adopted that outlined the separation of state and Church and the prohibition to establish any confession as a state religion. The important point to be made from this illustration is that though at the beginning of the existence of Ukraine as an independent state there was an explicit desire of the state to favour and back one confession, later on this policy underwent a change. Since 1996 we cannot talk anymore about any attempts to proclaim “the leading faith” in the country. It became even possible for Pope John Paul II to visit Ukraine in June 2001 regardless of the protests of the Moscow Patriarchate. Even though Leonid Kuchma’s successor, President Virtor Yushchenko, made efforts to unite the Orthodox confessions in Ukraine, he never talked about favouring Orthodoxy at the expense of other denominations. Even President Viktor Yanukovych, despite his explicit backing of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, did not have on his agenda the project of elevating this confession to the rank of national religion. Therefore, we may claim that the idea of a national religion is completely abandoned among the highest Ukrainian political circles. It is definitely a positive development because it sets the stage for a possible reconciliation among the conflicting confessions. In addition to the theoretical and historical analyses, it is also interesting to discuss the results of the public opinion poll concerning the question.273 In spite of the cautious estimations of the scholars, opinion polls ____________________ 273 It is important to draw a clarification concerning the statistics of the support for the state Church in Ukraine. For instance, according to the survey of Razumkov Centre, while in 2002 17.4% of respondents were positive about the creation of the local unified Church in Ukraine, in 2007 this figure reaches 20.7%. At the same time, the number of the opponents to the idea remained almost the same – 21.7% in 2002 and 22.6% in 2007. Significantly the number of those, who do not know what a local unified Church means, diminished from 49.7% to 39.6%. See the results of the survey Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Chy vvazhaiete Vy neobhidnym stvorennia yedynoi pomisnoi ukrainskoi tserkvy?” {Sociological poll. Do you consider it necessary to create the united local Ukrainian Church?}, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=445 (accessed February 18, 2014). However, it seems important for us to note that there often exists confusion between a national Church in Ukraine and the creation of the local unified Church. Those are two different notions. The former means that a particular Church becomes a state Church. The latter refers to the establishment of the unity between the three Orthodox Churches. However, this does not mean that such a unified Church would be a state Church. It seems plausible that in the public opinion those two notions sometimes mean the same, namely the creation

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show quite a different picture – many Ukrainians used to support the idea of a unified national Church. However, in comparison with the 1990s the number of supporters of the national state Church drastically dropped: when in 1991 32.5% and in 1998 41.8% of respondents sustained the idea,274 in 2000 and 2013 correspondingly only 20% and 9% expressed the positive opinion.275 . Serhii Zdioruk argues that one should avoid the temptation to misuse the term national Church. According to his definition, the notion of a national Church includes certain parameters that allow one to speak of the identification of a Church as national. Those parameters are historical, geographical, ethno-cultural, political and demographical. On the basis of those Zdioruk suggests the following definition of a national Church: this is a Church of any confession which functions at any given historical period on the basis of her tradition and on the given territory, having acquired her ethno-confessional specificities, this Church promotes the ethnic culture, the self-conscious and state-oriented mentality of a particular nation and is widely spread among the population of a certain region.276 The author emphasises many times that a national Church does not mean “the only” one for the whole nation and cannot be a sort of nation state religion.277 Therefore, a nation can have several necessary religious confessions or Churches that would contribute to its protection and advance. Although the idea of a national Church found some support according to the public opinion polls, its propaganda is forbidden due to the freedom of conscience principle, and chances for it to be truly implemented in the real Ukrainian circumstances are vague. On the contrary, we witness precisely the contradictory situation among Ukrainian believers. Oleksii Onyshchenko prophetically claimed back in 1991 that the real perspective of Ukraine is not the creation of a unified religion, but the growth of religious pluralism and a pluralist society.278 Obviously, in the course of its ____________________

274 275 276

277 278

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of one national Orthodox Church and granting it the legal status of a state religion. Adapted from Kolodnyi, A history of religion, 421. Razumkov Centre, Religiosity of Ukrainians, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2013), 33. See Serhii Zdioruk, Ethnokonfesiina sytuatsiia v Ukraini ta mizhtserkovni konflikty {Ethno-confessional situation in Ukraine and inter-Church conflicts} (Kyiv, 1993), 9-32. Ibid., 12. Quoted in Kolodnyi, A History of religion, 424.

1.6 The role of the media in the interconfessional conflicts

history, Ukraine encountered the eastern and western Christian traditions and these are so organically built in the life of the nation that we cannot imagine the situation that any of them would be eliminated from the spiritual sphere of the country. Various modern religious traditions that are constantly spreading their influence should not be forgotten since they do not want to lose their impact on the spiritual domain. Taken together, those findings suggest that the creation of a national Church would be impossible and not desirable. Additionally, there is a theological reason as an obstacle to a national Church, namely the Catholic vision of the universality of the Church. Ukraine is a country that, apart from the Orthodox, has a great number of Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, Jews, and other religious believers. The establishment of a national Church would contradict the implementation of the principle of religious freedom and the building of a tolerant civil state. Our conclusions in this subchapter support the idea that the fragmentation among Ukrainian religions indeed reflects the broader fragmentation on the level of society and the regional diversity that precludes the establishment of a political consensus. Therefore, in the 1990s there was evidently a tendency among certain political elites including the first President of Ukraine to strive for the creation of a national Church. However, this policy was abandoned later due to the appreciation of the religious diversity of Ukraine and the understanding that the establishment of a national Church would not foster the unity in the country, but would instead cause new divisions. Religious pluralism was reflected in the Ukrainian Constitution and since then the question of a national Church in Ukraine has been out of political consideration. Although the Ukrainian authorities continue to support the unification of the three branches of Orthodoxy into one autocephalous Church, they have abandoned any claims about the Orthodoxy to become a state religion. That signifies that, despite the merits or weaknesses of religious pluralism in Ukraine, this is established as the official state policy and is out of discussion.

1.6 The role of the media in the interconfessional conflicts It is also important to reflect at this place the influence of the media, primarily of the press, on the promotion of interconfessional tolerance. Obviously, it is to a great extent the media that inform the people’s picture of religious life, inter-Church, and inter-confessional relations. In this subchapter I will consider the main messages present in the leading confes109

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sional editions concerning the issue of tolerance towards other religions communities. In Ukraine we have the declaration of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In practice it also means the free existence and functioning of secular and religious editions. Churches and religious communities similarly have access to radio and television and are more and more present on the Internet. Turning now to the figures, the statistics of the periodicals published by the leading Ukrainian Churches in 2014 is the following: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate – 109, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate – 35, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church – 6, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church – 28, and the Roman-Catholic Church – 9 periodicals.279 I do not aim here to analyse completely the content of those periodicals. I will only describe the main tendencies that hamper the advance of religious tolerance and reconciliation in Ukraine. Liudmyla Fylypovych and Anatolii Kolodnyi identified several of the following trends.280 First of all, traditional Churches often endeavour to confine the freedom of conscience only with regard to their own activities. There were several attempts to demand from the state the restriction of the spread in the country of new religious movements and even Protestant communities and, consequently, their periodicals. Additionally, large numbers of articles are characterised by critical and biased information about the history, doctrine, rites, the way of life and activities of other confessions and Churches. Finally, we often witness the explicit longing for presenting the own confession as the only truthful one with the subsequent criticism of other denominations. Consequently, one encounters a lack of understanding and practical implementation of the principle of the freedom of conscience in the Ukrainian context. Another problem is the lack of journalists specialised in the field of religious studies and able to treat religious issues professionally.281 This absence of experts is particularly acute among the secular editions. The con____________________ 279 The State Committee of Ukraine on Nationalities and Religions, Networks of Churches. 280 Anatolii Kolodnyi and Liudmyla Fylypovych, eds., Tolerantnist v sferi mizhkonfesiinykh vidnosyn. Relihiieznavchyi analiz {Tolerance in the sphere of interconfessional relations. Analysis in religious studies} (Kyiv, 2004), 98-99. 281 Myroslaw Marynowytsch, Ökumenische Prozesse in der Ukraine (Lwiw: Sonderdruck. Institut für Religion und Gesellschaft an der Ukrainischen GriechischKatholischen Theologischen Akademie, 1999), 28.

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tent analysis of their publications proves that religious issues are treated narrowly and are aimed to draw attention to some sensation. Often in their inputs on the events of religious life journalists spread partial false information that points to the demand of the qualitative media critics of Ukraine.282 Religion mostly becomes a matter of publication before the main religious feasts, in connection with the visit of an important Church official or concerning some scandalous events in the life of a particular Church or community. Presented without the context, such events are communicated as typical of the religious group and contribute to the creation among readers of negative images and prejudices. Under those conditions it is no wonder that the secular periodicals sometimes significantly contribute to the escalation of the tension between different Churches. The freedom of conscience presupposes tolerance in the interconfessional relations, which belongs to the factor of social understanding and reconciliation. The question arises logically, whether the contemporary Ukrainian religious and secular press contributes to that tolerance. Above I mentioned problems with secular periodicals. It would be interesting to scrutinise how tolerant the religious press is in comparison with the secular editions. A similar study was presented by Liudmyla Fylypovych and Anatolii Kolodnyi,283 in which the authors examine the main publications of different traditional Ukrainian Churches for the first half of the year 2004. One of the most significant findings to emerge from this study is that religious periodicals can also fuel interconfessional conflicts and foster intolerance. Even though those results are a bit outdated, I rely upon them because according to recent surveys the situation with the Ukrainian religious periodicals has not really changed. The new trends in the confessional media concern the growing figure of Internet editions. However, I am more interested in the content of the articles than merely in different technological devices. Therefore, as an example I would like to examine the publications of Orthodox Churches that covered the visit of the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill to Ukraine in July 2010. This was a prominent event in the religious and political life of the country in the year 2010 and obviously drew great attention of the media. ____________________ 282 Taras Antoshevskyi, “Deshcho pro vyklyky pered Tserkvoiu v epokhu informatsiinykh tekhnolohii” {Something on the challenges of the Churches in the time of informational technologies}, Patriarkhat 6 (2010): 6-7. 283 Kolodnyi and Fylypovych, Tolerance, 97-111.

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This study will be confined only to the official editions of Orthodox denominations in Ukraine. At the beginning, it is plausible to claim that also many nonconfessional editions are often not neutral in describing the events of Church life. For instance, in the introduction to the special theme of the visit of Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine in “Relihiina panorama” (“Religious Panorama”), the editor-in-chief, Anatolii Kolodnyi, the head of the Association of religious experts, comments in a negative way about the Patriarch. He denotes him as a threat to an independent Ukraine and its national-oriented Churches, calls non-Ukrainians those who support the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, and speaks of the attempts to resuscitate the Soviet Union with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church.284 The author uses words like naizd (invasion) or names Kirill mordvyn (Mordovian), which refers to the Mongols and Tatars invasions in Ukraine in the 13th-14th centuries. Interestingly enough, “Religious Panorama” enjoys the explicit support of Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Turning now to the official newspapers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, I can summarise that in general they were written in an elevated praising tone without any deeper evaluation or any traces of criticism concerning the visit of the Moscow Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine. The official “Lyetopis pravoslaviya” (“Chronicle of Orthodoxy”) presents a detailed account of the Patriarchal visit, publishes excerpts of his speeches, and gives the list of his meetings with different state officials and visits to educational establishments. The titles of the articles are neutral, for instance, “The Most Holy Patriarch Kirill in Odesa,” “The Most Holy Patriarch Kirill in Dnipropetrovsk” or again “The Most Holy Patriarch Kirill in Kyiv”285 are typical titles. The lack of a reasonable evaluation of the messages of Patriarch Kirill is perhaps the biggest weakness of the official publications of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Understandably, the official editions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate have a totally different style. They highly criticise the politics of the Moscow Patriarchate concerning Ukraine and express this directly, not caring too much about the words used. In order to determine that, I have analysed several editions of the “Holos pravoslavia” (“The Voice of Orthodoxy”) in 2010, one of the several official publica____________________ 284 Anatolii Kolodnyi, “Shcho ne mozhe Putin, te tvoryt Kyrylo” {What Putin cannot do Kirill is doing}, Relihiina panorama 6 (2010): 41-42. 285 See Lyetopis pravoslaviya, July 2010.

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tions of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The general trend after the visit of Patriarch Kirill in 2010 is the growth of the confrontation between the Orthodox of Kyiv and the Moscow Patriarchate. What is interesting is that the main vector of the struggle is directed against the Moscow Patriarchate itself and not against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is under the jurisdiction of this Patriarchate. That tendency is expressed in the official Church media. For example, in his appeal to the media Patriarch Filaret speaks of the aggravation of the conflicts related to the campaign that the Moscow Patriarchate is waging among the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate to make them change their allegiance and join Moscow. Patriarch Filaret calls this “the realisation of the Moscow plan for the destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate” and the violation of the rights of the faithful.286 In an interview connected with the visit of the Head of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, Patriarch Filaret states that the visit of Patriarch Kirill is a purely political action, namely the expansion of the Russkiy Mir doctrine that serves the state policy of Russia. That is the justification of the necessity of the independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine.287 In addition to the statements of Patriarch Filaret, there are articles of other authors, which are written in a similar militant spirit. For example, Serhii Yarmoliuk in his article speaks of the websites of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate that are full of materials about the rozkolnyky who support Filaret.288 In the opinion of the author those remind one of the news from battlefields. Thus, this Church is more a political organisation than a Church that has to preach love towards the neighbours. Evidently, the style and the very titles of the articles are confrontational. I have obtained rather striking results after the reading of the official editions of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. In “Uspenska vezha” (“The Uspenska Tower”) the visit of Patriarch Kirill was not men____________________ 286 “Pro plan znyshchennia Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu. Zaiava Patriarkha Kyivskoho i Vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta dlia zasobiv masovoi informatsii” {About the plan of the destruction of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Statement of the Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine Filaret to the media}, Holos pravoslavia, January 15, 2011. Translation from the original source. 287 Patriarch Filaret, “Vidstoiuiuchy ukrainske pravoslavia” {Defending Ukrainian Orthodoxy}, interview, Holos pravoslavia, July 15, 2010. 288 Serhii Yarmoliuk, “Kontseptsiia “Ruskoho Mira” Patriarkha Kirila yak osnovna perepona rozvytku pravoslavnoho khrystyianstva v Ukraini” {Concept of the “Russkiy Mir” of Patriarch Kirill as the main obstacle for the development of the Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine}, Holos pravoslavia, September 15, 2010.

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tioned at all. In another edition “Nasha vira” (“Our Faith”) there appeared only one article concerning the event. In this commentary the author, a famous Ukrainian dissident Yevhen Sverstiuk, denounces the politics of Patriarch Kirill towards Ukraine in the context of the visit of the Head of the Moscow Patriarchate.289 The article preserves, however, a tolerant style. What follows from this short analysis of the official press is that the intolerant style of writing is often pertinent to the Churches when they speak of their mutual conflicts. It concerns especially the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of the Moscow and the Kyiv Patriarchates. The strife that exists between the Churches is embodied in the newspaper pages and is, thus, transferred to the readers and faithful, together with the low quality of the secular publications on religious matters, which creates a miserable picture of the elucidation of Church-related events in Ukraine. It is, therefore, plausible to affirm that “there is still not enough space in the Ukrainian information field to propagate ecumenism or at least allnational reconciliation”290 due to “insufficient religious and theological formation of Ukrainian journalists, as well as considerable nonprofessionalism of the monitoring of religious processes in Ukraine.”291 As a result the information flow in the Ukrainian media about religious affairs is often either non-objective or incomplete. On this basis Churches can easily propagate their discriminative ideas with regard to other confessions – the level of religious journalism, recently with few exceptions, was not sufficient in order to oppose attempts of manipulation.292

Conclusion In this part of the monograph I analysed inter-Church conflicts in Ukraine. They have origins in the historical and cultural peculiarities of transitional ____________________ 289 Yevhen Sverstiuk, “Misioner v Odeskii operi” {A missionary in the Odessa Opera}, Nasha vira, August 2010. 290 Marynovych, An Ecumenist Analyses, 7. 291 Ibid. 292 In 2012, the first Ukrainian manual for Church press services and journalists was published that gives practical advice for the successful communication with the secular mass media: Svitlana Babynska, Yulia Zavadska, Mariana Karapinka, and Olena Kulyhina, Tserkva i media: sim krokiv do porozuminnia {The Church and media. Seven steps to understanding} (Ezdra, 2012).

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society. Unlike other post-socialist countries, there is no dominant Church in Ukraine. Society is highly pluralistic. Despite all the difficulties connected to that, scholars consider pluralism as a positive development for the establishment of democracy in the country.293 The four Churches of the Kyivan tradition were engaged into the interconfessional rivalry in the early 1990s striving to establish their position in society, develop their structures, and gain followers.294 The most violent fighting for the sacral buildings reached the highest point in 1993 after which the intensity of the conflict began to drop due to the construction of new sacral buildings and giving over of the Church property expropriated by the Soviet regime.295 It does not, however, mean that nowadays Ukraine can boast interconfessional peace. I would describe the situation as a struggle to ensure the leading position in Ukrainian Christianity and to define who will become the basic Church for a future unity. Additionally, by gaining insight into the conditions and circumstances of the functioning of the traditional Churches in an independent Ukraine, it is plausible to affirm that the main causes of conflicts at their initial stage were the emergence of noncanonical Churches, the struggle for the redistribution of the Church property and the practice to use the state authorities to gain influence over a particular territory. Today the most contentious issues in addition to the problem of the non-canonical status of some of the Churches are the different visions of the future of Ukraine, the support of certain geopolitical ____________________ 293 Jose Casanova studied the influence of religious pluralism in Ukraine for the establishment of civil society and concluded that the absence of religious unity “may turn out to be a blessing in disguise, in so far as it may be conductive to the formation of a culturally pluralistic, religiously tolerant, and democratic Ukraine” (Jose Casanova, “Ethno-Linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in Ukraine,” in Post-Soviet Political Order. Conflict and State Building, eds. Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (London: Routledge, 1998), 96). Interestingly enough, Casanova even believes that the unlikely unification of Catholic and Orthodox denominations in Ukraine is beneficial to the Ukrainian-Russian relations because “the emergence of a single Ukrainian national Church confronting the imperial claims of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine could only serve to exacerbate Ukrainian-Russian conflicts and to jeopardise not only democratic politics in Ukraine but even national independence.” (Ibid., 97). 294 Oleh Kyseliov, “Ekumenichna sytuatsia v Ukraini u konteksti Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Yevropy” {The ecumenical situation in Ukraine in the context of Central and Eastern Europe}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/studies_of_religions/ 12060/ (accessed February 18, 2014). 295 Ibid.

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orientations of the country, the language used in the Church services, the ambitions of particular representatives of the highest Church leadership, and finally the mutual intrusion of Church and politics into each other’s affairs. The recent months of the EuroMaidan movement for the European choice of Ukraine and political reform of the country have drawn the Churches closer in protecting human dignity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the existing system of values and identities was dismissed and individuals as well as newly established Churches were striving to find their new characters. This is also one of the causes of interconfessional conflicts in Ukraine. David Little perceived it correctly that tensions between the Churches at the beginning of the 1990s were not “generated by religious or confessional differences. The conflict at the bottom is about “patriotism and national self-identity,” about “what it means to be Ukrainian.”296 Embodying the regional differences (EastWest identity struggle) Churches can contribute to the hampering of the stability of society. Additionally, Church-state as well as inter-Church relations are pretty politicised. Belonging to a particular Church signifies the political orientation of a person in the same way as the identity of a Church is revealed by her support for particular political parties or politicians during elections times. This contributes to the polarisation in society. Furthermore, the Churches often identify themselves with particular political powers, become vulnerable to criticism of supporting the policies that do not always contribute to the democratisation of Ukraine. The backing by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Presidential candidate who falsified the results of the elections in 2004 is just one example of that trend. The national character of the Churches is also revealed through their understanding of the responsibility for the future of the country. However, the way they see this future is different and often provoked conflicts as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church rather sticks to the ideal of the Russkiy Mir and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church sustains the western orientation of Ukraine. We cannot exclude religion from participating in the debates about the development of the country. Such debates are rather desirable. At the same time, religious statements about nation building should not be used for the manipulation of certain political groupings in order to pursue their aims. It seems that this idea becomes clearer to the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine. Especially the recent events of the EuroMaidan ____________________ 296 Little, Ukraine, 74.

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showed that from supporting political groupings the Churches turned to the promotion of the key values of civil society – the rule of law, justice, and human dignity. As a means of impeding among other things the spread of nontraditional religious movements, the idea of a unified national Church was suggested. That is a Church that brings together major Christian denominations in Ukraine, which sustain the distinctly Ukrainian national idea in the country. In that way, the proponents of that idea aimed at the spiritual unity of the country and the strengthening of the national-oriented wing of Ukrainian Christianity. It is only positive that this idea was abandoned in practice because in such an ethnically and linguistically diverse country as Ukraine, a national Church would not gain considerable support. In that regard the situation with the Church is the religious side of the debate about the essence of the Ukrainian nation, namely whether it is ethnical or civil. Existing interconfessional tensions in Ukraine have negative consequences in the psychological sphere, in public consciousness.297 Obvious examples are negative stereotypes of uniates (followers of the Ukrainian Greek-catholic Church), rozkolnyky – those who broke the unity of the Church (believers of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate), moskali – an ethnic slur that derives from the name Moscow and consequently suits those favouring the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Such stereotypes of the believers of the other Church can get stuck in the public consciousness longer than even political ones. The situation when followers of the other confessions are perceived not as fellow Christians but as unrepented sinners excludes a tolerant attitude towards them. Furthermore, the methods of the inter-Church struggle that one witnesses, the ways of polemic, and the provocative messages of certain religious leaders can play a destabilising role for the actual believers and those who are sympathetic to the Church. It prompts people to leave the Church or even worse to become cynic and frustrated by religious messages. Understandably, all this does not allow one to speak of the spiritual unity of Ukrainians and raises doubts concerning the possible reaching of this unity in an observable future.298 ____________________ 297 Kolodnyi, History of religion, 330. 298 Ibid.

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As it follows from the analysis of the religious context of Ukraine, the religious situation in the country is a reflection of the social-political condition. The connection of different Churches in different periods with certain political powers in pursuing common goals also contributed to the failure by the former of their authority among believers. It was also proved above that the division among Ukrainian Churches runs along ethnocultural lines and connected to it socio-political rather than purely religious lines. It means that the attitude towards Ukrainian statehood, language, national consolidation and so on is more important than purely religious salvific messages. Therefore, while looking for possible ways of reconciliation among the Churches and the consolidation of society, the question of the role of the ethno-cultural identity must be considered in the generation of conflict. The reconciliation of clashing identities is reflected in the works of Myroslav Volf and it will be considered later in this book. Because the religiosity of Ukraine is rather perfunctory, it is important that the Churches do more on the pastoral and educational levels to deliver their message. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has such a potential in that regard as we have seen in the results of public opinion surveys and the statistical data. Pluralism demands the ability to transform in a creative way the varieties of views and beliefs into a source of enrichment instead of conflict.299 The future of the interconfessional relations in Ukraine will depend on whether the Churches manage to develop that capability. Finalising this analysis, some questions arise. How significant is the influence of traditional Ukrainian Churches on the development of the democratic attitudes in the country, the idea sustained by Casanova? Do the Churches have enough power to generate changes in the hearts and minds of the people? Are reconciliation and national unity something that Churches can contribute to if they have not been able so far to solve conflicts between them? Finally, how do the Churches understand reconciliation in Ukrainian society and in what regard do they speak of it? Those research questions will be treated in the following parts of this volume.

____________________ 299 Viktor Yelenskyi, “Tsentralno-Skhidna Yevropa: relihiini zminy ta relihiinyi pliuralizm” {Central-Eastern Europe. Religious changes and religious pluralism}, http://old.risu.org.ua/ukr/study/research_conference/pluralism/ (accessed February 19, 2014).

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The essence and challenges of reconciliation

Introduction to Part I In the previous chapter I have analysed the religious situation of Ukraine, the identities and relations between the traditional Ukrainian Churches and the religiosity of Ukrainians. In the current part I will turn to the immediate subject of this research, that is to say the reconciliation discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. I have divided this part into three logical steps and dedicated a chapter to each of them. The reading of the documents of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church shows that the leadership of that Church repeatedly refers to particular spheres of conflicts which I will examine at first. All the analysed official pronouncements unfold reconciliation in several thematic groups: the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, the Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation, the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches, the allUkrainian or Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation and dealing with the competing memories of World War II. Therefore, at the start I will determine where the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church envisions the reasons for conflicts in those spheres. For instance, the text will give answers to the question whom the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers guilty in the Polish-Ukrainian conflicts. Besides extracting and emphasising the key ideas of the Church discourse the official point of view will be deepened with the relevant historical information in a concise form. Having spoken about the alleged victims and perpetrators I will proceed to the notion and elements of reconciliation. The understanding of reconciliation, its source and protagonists will be clarified and then critically engaged with the thoughts of John Paul Lederach, Robert Schreiter and Miroslav Volf. It is for the first time in the book that those reference authors come on stage. The final task of this part concerns the elements of reconciliation – repentance, forgiveness and justice – which will be analysed using the same methodology of bringing the theology of the Church in conversation with the works of the reference authors. The overall task of part I is to figure out what the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church strives for with her reconciliation theology.

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Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past 2.1

Poland and Ukraine – neighbours in peace?

2.1.1 Together but still separated An extensive block of the official documents of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church on reconciliation concerns the Ukrainian-Polish relations. The reasons for the actual hostilities between the Polish and Ukrainian nations can be traced back to the 16th century and the tensions have noch ceased, notwithstanding the declarations of reconciliation signed by the Presidents of both countries in 1997 and 2003. “Any discussion of the post-communist Polish-Ukrainian cooperation has to be set against this background of the past – a past which continues to resonate profoundly in this part of Europe. In fact, cooperative relations at the state level camouflage disquiet within the wider society, where the past still shapes relations.”1

This phrase describes very precisely what one encountered when trying to map the Ukrainian-Polish relations at the turn of the millennium. To the difficult moments nowadays belong a certain alienation after Poland joined the EU and reinforced its eastern border,2 the disparity of the living ____________________ 1

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Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine. A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 29. This question had already been posed in 1998 by the working group of the interChurch dialogue on reconciliation including representatives of the Churches of Poland, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Germany. (See a report about one of the conferences of that working group from 2001: Rheiner Rinne, „Versöhnung in Europa – auch in der Ukraine“, http://www.ekd.de/international/berichte/2001/reader_ 2001_24.html (accessed September 10, 2014)). In particular, they asked what would happen when Poland’s border with Ukraine and Byelorussia became a border with the EU, whether the strengthening of this border according to the Schengen agreement would influence the reopening of the old wounds between the nations. A legitimate presupposition was expressed that the widening gap between the social and economic development of Poland as a member of the EU and its neighbours could aggravate old disputes, which we are indeed witnessing now some 10 years later. (“Primryeniye v Yevropye. Zadacha Tsyerkvyey v Ukrainye, Byelarusi, Polshye i Gyermanii” {Reconciliation in Europe. A task of Churches in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland and Germany}, in Dyeyatyelnost rabochyey grupy myezhtsyerkovnogo dialoga “Rol Tsyerkvyey v primiryenii narodov

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

conditions in both countries, the hardening of the visa regime for Ukrainians after Poland joined the Schengen agreement in 2007, the drifting of Ukraine towards the Russian zone of influence with the election of Viktor Yanukovych as President of Ukraine in 2010, and Poland's tiredness of being a vehicle that pushes Ukraine into Europe. Typical mass contacts between Ukrainians and Poles occur between scholars, journalists, representatives of the NGOs. Much more interactions between ordinary citizens happen through the cross-border trade or temporary employment of Ukrainians in Poland. Ukrainian gangsters and prostitutes cause the negative attitude of Poles to the ordinary Ukrainians.3 This type of contacts adds to the Ukrainian image in Poland as a poor worker which does not presuppose big respect. For Poland, Ukraine is a county which cannot overcome its institutional pathologies and constantly has problems with democracy.4 Ukraine created an image of the country that is not able to transform its economics successfully and with the developments of recent years this image has only been intensified. At the same time, there were several distinctive attempts to normalise the relations between Poland and Ukraine on the official level. With the contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Polish Roman-Catholic Church the reconciliation between both nations was declared in the presence of the Presidents of both countries during the opening of the Lviv Eaglets Cemetery and the memorial to the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen on June 24, 2005.5 Two days later, the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops solemnly celebrated the liturgical reconciliation act. To a great extent this rapprochement became possible due to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine which took place few months before. Poland played a great mediatory role in the settlement of the conflict between the two po____________________

3

4

5

Tsyentralno-Vostochnoy Yevropy” v 1996-1999 godakh (Minsk: OrthoPress, 1999), 19). David R. Marples, Heroes and Villains. Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2007), 231. Bogumila Berdychowska, “Polshcha-Ukraina. Duzhe vazhke dozrivannia” {Poland-Ukraine. A very difficult maturation}, Yi 74 (2013), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/ n74texts/Berdyhovska_Pol_Ukr_vazhke_dozrivannya.htm (accessed April 11, 2014). Ihor Iliushyn, “Aktualni problemy metodolohii ta istoriohrafii ukrainskopolskykh vidnosyn 20 stolittia” {Actual problems of methodology and historiography of the Ukrainian-Polish relations in the 20th century}, Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky 16, no.1 (2007): 5.

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litical camps revolving around the falsification of the presidential elections and social upheavals that followed. This Polish engagement and the election in the repeated second round of Viktor Yushchenko facilitated the negotiations for the opening of the Polish war memorial on Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv. In 2006 the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine met in the Polish village Pavlokoma to commemorate Ukrainians killed during the attack of the Polish nationalist underground Armia Krajowa in 1945.6 Besides, in 2003 Ukraine and Poland memorialised the 60th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy of Poles when a compromise concerning commemoration activities was reached and a joint parliamentary agreement signed.7 Still before those events in 1997, the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine signed a joint statement about agreement and reconciliation.8 The efforts to bring about the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation after the communist turn in the early 1990s was among other things greatly inspired by Jerzy Giedroyc (1906-2000), a Polish diaspora intellectual and editor of the émigré journal “Kultura” (“Culture”) in Paris where he was the first to introduce the revision of the Polish-Ukrainian relations.9 Giedroyc was interested in the theme of the neighbours of Poland and announced a breakthrough in the Polish attitude to Ukraine which in the 1950s was marked by the absence of cooperation between the official institutions of the Polish and Ukrainian emigration because of the disagreements concerning the issue of the new borders.10 In that regard Giedroyc went against the common opinion of the time and in 1952 in his journal ____________________ 6 7 8

9

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Ibid., 5. Ibid., 1. Consult the text of the agreement: “Sovmyestnoye zayavlyeniye Pryezidyentov Polshi i Ukrainy o soglasii i sblizhyenii” {Joint statement of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine on agreement and rapprochement}, in Dyeyatyelnost rabochyey grupy myezhtsyerkovnogo dialoga “Rol Tsyerkvyey v primiryenii narodov Tsyentralno-Vostochnoy Yevropy” v 1996-1999 godakh (Minsk: OrthoPress, 1999), 102-104. More about the role of Jerzy Giedroyc and his journal “Kultura” on setting the foundation for the contemporary Polish-Ukrainia relation, see Myroslav Popovych, “Kultura’ s ukrainskoy tochki zyeniya” {“Kultura” from the Ukrainian point of view}, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/digest/2010/10/18/580/ (accessed January 15, 2014). Khrystyna Chushak, Nemaie vilnoi Polshchi bez vilnoi Ukrainy: Ukraina ta ukraintsi u politychnii dumtsi polskoi opozytsii (1976-1989) {There is no free Poland without free Ukraine. Ukraine and Ukrainians in the political thought of the Polish opposition (1976-1989)} (Lviv: Pais, 2011), 82.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

“Kultura” published a series of materials on the Ukrainian problem dedicated to the contestable topics in the Ukrainian-Polish relations such as new after-war borders or the history of the division Halychyna.11 In addition to the problem of the borders and the revision of the past, Giedroyc elucidated the leading developments of the time in Ukraine and possibilities to influence them, made efforts to bring the Ukrainian question on the international level as well as presented Ukrainian culture on the pages of “Kultura.”12 The widely known ideas of Jerzy Giedroyc were later embodied in postcommunist Poland. The core claim of Giedroyc is that “There cannot be an independent Poland without an independent Ukraine.” This argument derives from the presupposition that the continued conflict between Poland and Ukraine ultimately runs against the national interests of both countries. In the opinion of Giedroyc this implies the normalisation of the relations with the Polish eastern neighbour even if Poland has to reconcile itself to the fact of losing its eastern territories.13 This vision introduced by “Kultura” defined the geopolitical stand of Poland after 1989 and its eastern politics, which practically means regarding Ukraine as an ally of Poland and helping this state on its way to democratisation. Indeed, postcommunist Poland embarked rather successfully on that mission especially during and after the Orange Revolution of 2005 in Ukraine. Commenting on the results of the empirical studies on the common sentiments between Poles and Ukrainians conducted in 1997, Yaroslav Hrytsak points to the fact that it is mostly Poles who express more a negative attitude towards Ukrainians than vice versa.14 Generally speaking, Hrytsak claims that with the end of World War II the age-old conflict between Ukrainians and Poles was resolved by the change of the status of ____________________ 11

12 13 14

Bogumila Berdychowska, ed., Jerzy Giedroyc ta ukrainska emihratsiia. Lystuvannia 1950-1982 rokiv {Jerzy Giedroyc and the Ukrainian emigration. Correspondence of 1950-1982} (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2008), 27. Division Halychyna (Galicia) is a Ukrainian military unit consisting of Ukrainians from the western region Galicia that in 1943-1945 belonged to German military troops. This division is the most used argument for the accusation of Ukrainians of collaboration with the Nazis. Ibid., 28. Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 36. Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Jeszcze raz o stosunku ukraincow do polakow (z Rosja w tle)” {Once more about the attitude of Ukrainians towards Poles (with Russia in the background)}, Wiez 473, no. 3 (1998): 27.

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Ukraine.15 For the first time in history all Ukrainian lands were united within the borders of one state and especially western Ukraine got a new urgent political task to perform – to build its relations with Russia. The official politics of the Soviet Union aimed at erasing any memory of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict loaded with the threat of nationalism. Because of the Iron Curtain there were just a few contacts between the two peoples possible.16 From what has been said above it logically flows that in the second half of the 20th century generations grew up mostly ignorant about the events of the wartime years. It was the independence of Ukraine that reopened the whole tragic history of the relations between the neighbouring nations and thus stirred the challenge of reconciliation. At the same time, the memory of the past has always been alive in the case of Poland that has therefore more grounds to express its anti-Ukrainian views. To put it in another way, there is no wonder that a common Ukrainian sees Poland as a nation that has made an extremely successful economic jump and integrated into the EU and NATO, and for a common Pole Ukraine is now an underdeveloped country with violent nationalist bandits from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the history. Until recently, these have been old historical conflicts concerning the events in Volyn in 1943-1944 and the Operation Vistula of 1947 that were evoked, which was especially evident with regard to Stepan Bandera’s proclamation as a hero of Ukraine by President Yushchenko in January 2010.17 The Polish side reacted with a strong condemnation of that title (the fact that it happened without any prior consultations with the Polish side was received with indignation)18 because of the accusation of Bandera of Nazism and the extermination of the Polish population during the Second World War by the nationalist insurgents under the guidance of Bandera.19

____________________ 15 16 17 18

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Ibid., 29-30. Ibid., 30. “Stepan Bandera Becomes Ukrainian Hero,” http://www.kyivpost.com/news/ nation/detail/57781/ (accessed February 24, 2014). Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Perezavantazhennia chy prodovzhennia – 2” {To reload or to continue – 2}, http://zaxid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?perezavantazhennnya_chi_ prodovzhennya__2&objectId=1112675 (accessed January 25, 2014). “U Polshchi orzanizovuiut pikety proty Bandery ta Yushchenka” {They organise pickets in Poland against Bandera and Yushchenko}, http://www.credoua.org/2010/02/13962 (accessed February 24, 2014).

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

2.1.2 Historically embedded conflicts and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Apparently, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has many reasons to lead the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement from the Ukrainian side.20 It is a Catholic Church and as such she can more easily find a common language with Catholic Poland. The majority of the Greek-Catholic faithful reside in western Ukraine, work or have family relations in neighbouring Poland and that intensified contacts between both nations. In their common declaration of the Volyn anniversary the Catholic Churches of Poland and Ukraine maintain that Ukrainians and Poles need good neighbourly relations everywhere they meet or cooperate.21 In the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation three main topics can be distinguished. First, the majority of the documents concern the struggle about the opening of the Polish military memorial on the Lychakiv Cemetery in the early 2000s. The perturbations of that struggle brought to the daylight the existing problems of the Polish-Ukrainian relations and pointed at the need of reconciliation. Second, the climax of the movement towards rapprochement after the Pope’s visit to Ukraine in 2001 and the Orange Revolution was reached in 2005 with the act of reconciliation between the Catholic bishops of Poland and Ukraine. Third, the newest developments in the Ukrainian-Polish relations concerning the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre admitted in 2013, which was also reflected in the documents of the Catholic and Greek-Catholic Bishops’ Conferences, revealed that the reconciliation between both nations has not been completely realised. The majority of the texts appeared in the years 2002-2006, and they are primarily dedicated to the disputes about the Lychakiv Cemetery memorials and to the accomplishment of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in 2005. Those official pronouncements elucidate the position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as well as the Polish Bishops’ Conference on the issue and can serve as an example of how the Church can contribute to political reconciliation. Hence, her doctrine of the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church developed amidst that ____________________ 20

21

Mykola Krokosh, “Prymyrennia: vazhkyi dialoh” {Reconciliation. A difficult dialogue}, interview by Serhii Shteinikov, Religion.in.ua, http://www.religion.in. ua/main/daycomment/22581-primirennya-vazhkij-pochatok.html (accessed January 20, 2014). No. 2019.

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very concrete struggle. The most important document of that group is certainly “Reconciliation between nations is possible,” a message of the Catholic Bishops of Ukraine and Poland on the occasion of a mutual forgiveness and reconciliation act, which was the highlight of reconciliation between both nations on the Church level. It is striking that in the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Polish-Ukrainian relations the topic of guilt and blame for concrete historical injustices is not addressed at all. The Church leadership adopts the following approach: there was a lot of struggle in the past, but Poles and Ukrainians are neighbours, they have common interests and are united by the common Christian faith, hence, let them leave history to the past and reconcile for the sake of their common peaceful future. The references to the sources of the conflicts and their current stages are not manifold in the documents. The bishops indeed concentrate more on what can unite the two nations and search the ground for reconciliation. There are no demands or pleas to recognise concrete faults of the past as in the case of the relations between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Church. There Greek-Catholics would be ready to reconcile with their Orthodox brothers on the condition that those recognise the evil that they were involved in or committed against this uniate Church.22 Obviously, this stance is dictated by the attitude of the Polish Church that recognised the faults of the Polish nation against Ukrainians which is not the case for the Russian Orthodox Church. Therefore, in the circumstances of the Polish-Ukrainian relations the language is different. Although Greek-Catholics acknowledge that there was a lot of violence in the past between Poles and Ukrainians and both nations are guilty of it, there are no calls to examine that past and make a detailed list of crimes that one nation inflicted upon another. Let us illustrate that by concrete examples of the painful heritage of the Polish-Ukrainian past.

Conflicts on the Cemetery of the Lviv Eaglets At the end of World War I, both Ukrainians and Poles got a chance to establish their independent states, the boundaries of which were overlapping in the western region of Ukraine called Galicia with the centre in Lviv. These aspirations resulted in the war that began on November 1, 1918 be____________________ 22

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See, for instance, No. 217, 362.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

tween the recently proclaimed Western Ukrainian People’s Republic and Poland.23 The victims of that war from both sides are buried on the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv. The war memorial was destroyed under Soviet rule and the Poles aimed at its restoration in independent Ukraine in its pre-war condition. The renewal of the graves of Polish soldiers and the reopening of the war memorial on the Cemetery of the Lviv Eaglets were accompanied by burning discussions in both countries, thus bringing the past back into the present-day relations between the neighbouring lands.24 This Polish-Ukrainian conflict is little known in Ukraine except in its western regions and the central Ukrainian government showed little interest in it. Therefore, when Kyiv decided to advance the issue of reconciliation between the two countries, the local Lviv authorities and intellectuals felt dominated by politicians ignorant of the Polish-Ukrainian controversies and boycotted the process.25 This conflict was waged around the details of the memorial’s design and the wording of the inscription. The Poles wanted to engrave on the plaque of the military monument “Here lie the soldiers who defended South-Eastern Poland” which was perceived by the Ukrainian side as a symbol of Polish militarism and the Polish claim for the city.26 Consequently, the planned meeting of the Polish and Ukrainian Presidents in 2002 for the official inauguration of the monument was cancelled.27 ____________________ 23 24 25

26 27

More on the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918-1919, see Orest Subtelny, Ukraine. A History, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000), 367-370. Bohdan Osadchuk, Polshcha, Ukraina, svit {Poland, Ukraine, world} (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2001), 312. Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “Memory Wars and Reconciliation in the Ukrainian-Polish Borderlands. Geopolitics of Memory from a Local Perspective,” in History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p., Palgrave, 2013), 181-182. Ibid., 182. The struggle over memorials to the Polish or Ukrainian victims of the common conflicts was waged on other memory sites too. One of the conditions of the settlement of the conflict on the Eaglets Cemetery was the erection of the memorials for Ukrainians, victims of the massacre of the Polish nationalists in the Polish village Pawlokoma. The memorial was inaugurated on May 13, 2006. The inscription on the Ukrainian memorial draws attention with its blurred expression as dedicated to the victims who “tragically lost their lives in the village of Pawlokoma on 1-3 March 1945.” At the same time, on the cross for the local Polish victims the following inscription was engraved: “To the memory of the Poles, residents of the village Pawlokoma, who in 1939-1945 suffered death from Ukrainian nationalists.” The second half of the inscription was intentionally cov-

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The breakthrough was initiated by a small circle of Lviv intellectuals and the Church. On 1 November 2002, the Ukrainian dissident Myroslav Marynovych, the historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, the editor of the cultural magazine “Yi” Taras Vozniak and some others invited a group of the Polish intelligentsia for a meeting in the Ukrainian Catholic University that was concluded by a joint prayer on the graves of the Polish soldiers with the participation of the Heads of the Roman Catholic and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.28 This tradition of prayer is still taking place every November 1. It significantly contributed to the agreement on military memorials in Lviv. The joint document of Liubomyr Husar and his Polish colleague Marian Jaworski, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lviv, issued in July 2002 during the aggravation of the crisis concerning the Polish military memorials, illustrates well that the search for the guilty was not the leading element of discussions between the Churches. In their message both Church officials expressed the mutual agreement for the restoration of the monuments to the Polish soldiers – the Cemetery of the Lviv Eagles. Cardinal Husar and Archbishop Jaworski argued that the inauguration of the Polish war memorial and the memorial to the Ukrainian Galician Army would be a means to end the conflict and would become a symbol of reunion between the two nations. Reconciliation in this case should be built on the understanding that “everyone who sheds blood defending the interests of one’s homeland deserves a due homage.”29 There is no sense in judging who was right or wrong, the only thing to be done is to honour the perished and appeal to consent. The two bishops laid aside any truth claims and called instead to pay homage to the soldiers. The same attitude to the past was adopted in June 2005 in the reconciliation act between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Polish Catholic bishops expressed in “Reconciliation between nations is possible.”

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28 29

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ered during the official inauguration ceremony by the Polish national flag. (See ibid., 186-188). Ibid., 183-184. No. 275, 458. Translation from the original source.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

The Volyn tragedy The massacre of Poles in the Volyn regions of Ukraine in 1943 appeared to be even a greater obstacle to the Polish-Ukrainian relations than the conflict about the Lviv Eaglets Cemetery.30 This event continues to mutilate the Ukrainian-Polish relations. In the words of historian David Marples, “Volyn is something of a stumbling block to what would otherwise be a complete friendship.”31 The fate of the Polish population of the Volyn region occupies a very important place in the Polish memory of World War II, while in Ukraine this is a marginal and widely unknown theme.32 It deals with the mass liquidation of Polish civilians mainly by the forces of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1943. In the period between the two world wars western Ukraine remained under Polish rule whose authorities introduced a cruel anti-Ukrainian assimilation politics of pacification.33 In the midst of World War II, Poles and Ukrainians tried to obtain control over the territory of Galicia with the aspiration to include this region into their respective countries after the war was finished and they presumably got independence. The Poles aspired to regain independence in the desired borders and the Ukrainians hoped to finally establish their state. In this light one understands the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (a military wing of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists) between 1943-1944 when according to different estimations they killed ____________________ 30

31 32

33

In view of the importance of this theme for the Ukrainian-Polish relations the independent cultural journal “Yi” dedicated a special edition to the topic in 2003 and 2013, on the occasion of the 60th and 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre (see numbers 28 (2003) and 74 (2013)). Both volumes present the most recent scientific and public discussions on the Ukrainian-Polish struggle of 1943 in the two neighbouring countries. The journal “Yi” is probably the leading edition in Ukraine that unites intellectuals and publishes targeted articles examining the Ukrainian relations with Poles, Russians, and Jews. Marples, Heroes and Villains, 222. Andrii Portnov, “Ukrainski interpretatsii Volynskoi rizanyny” {Ukrainian interpretations of the Volyn massacre}, Yi 74 (2013), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n74texts/ Portnov_Ukrainski_interpretacii.htm (accessed April 11, 2014). The newest research about the process of the Polish “pacification” in western Ukraine in the 1930s and its consequences for the further Polish-Ukrainian relations, see Roman Skakun, “Patsyfikatsiia.” Polski represii 1930 roku v Halychyni {Pacification. Polish repressions of 1930 in Galicia} (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2012).

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between 60,000 and 100,000 Poles in the region of Volyn.34 The aim of this cleansing was to provoke the Polish population to abandon the territory.35 Killings were committed brutally and sometimes also with the help of Ukrainian peasants from neighbouring villages. Hence, there is no wonder that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army remained in the Polish common memory as brutal bandits.36 Responding to the actions of the Ukrainian ____________________ 34

35 36

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Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 33. See also the article of Bogumiła Berdychowska, “Ukraińcy wobec Wołynia” {Ukrainians in the face of Volyn}, http://www.timeandspace.lviv.ua/index.php?module=academic§ion=session &id=46 (accessed January 26, 2014). The author, a Polish writer and journalist, describes the most important trends of the Ukrainian discussion concerning the admittance of the 60th anniversary of the Volyn events in 2003. In this article the author surveys the Ukrainian publications on the topic and investigates whom Ukrainians consider guilty of the Volyn massacre and which character this event had. The variety of interpretations strikes. For Myroslav Popovych the ideology of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army accounts for the extermination of Poles. Yaroslav Hrytsak believes that not so much the ideology as the politics of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists and its military wing has caused the massacre. Discrimination politics of Poland on its eastern territories is mentioned by Yaroslav Isaievych and Volodymyr Viatrovych (the latter has written an article explaining his misunderstanding why Ukrainians have to ask forgiveness for the Volyn massacres. For him it would be as if Ukrainians ask forgiveness for that they did not let themselves be killed on their own lands and that they recognise as a crime their defence of the fatherland as soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Volodymyr Viatrovych, “Vybachennia za..?” {Asking forgiveness for..?}, http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/dyskusija/volyn/zayavaOUN.htm (accessed January 26, 2014)). Yaroslav Dashkevych accused the anti-Ukrainian ideology of Poles, the Nazis, and Soviets. Yaroslav Isaievych additionally considered the Volyn tragedy as the result of the Soviet and the Nazi provocations. It seems, opines Bogumiła Berdychowska, that such a difference in explanation points at the fact that the authors try to find justifications for the Ukrainians for the tragedy. Olszanski, Polish-Ukrainian conflict, 49. In a certain way this is the continuation of the image of Ukrainians as that produced in the 19th century by the outstanding Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz in his novel Ogniem i mieczem (With Fire and Sword) where the Ukrainian Cossacks are laughed at as stupid, primitive, uneducated, and extremely cruel betrayers in comparison to noble, merciful, culturally superior Polish soldiers and aristocrats during the Ukrainian-Polish wars of 1648-1654 (Henryk Sienkiewicz, With Fire and Sword, trans. Jeremiah Curtin (n. p.: Wildside Press, 2010). See also Danuta Sosnovska, “Stereotyp Ukrainy i ukraintsia v polskii literaturi” {Stereotype of Ukraine and Ukrainians in Polish literature}, Yi 10 (1997): 88-96; Andrij Pawlyschyn, „Studien zur Entstehung polnisch-ukrainischer Konflikte im 20. Jahrhundert“, Yi 11 (1997), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n11texts/pavlyshyn-ger.html (accessed April 11, 2014)).

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

nationalists Poles exterminated approximately 15,000 to 20,000 Ukrainians.37 The fears of Poles and Ukrainians from the times of war were conserved by the Soviet propaganda which promoted the image of Ukrainians as nationalistic collaborationists of the Nazis.38 The recent discussions from 2010 about the hero title for Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists, reflects this image still present in the Polish mind when “the majority of Poles are convinced that the UPA39 are murderers, arsonists, rapists, and Nazi collaborators, and Ukrainian nationalists belong in the “garbage bin of history.”40 On April 11, 2013, at the time of the preparation to the admittance of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre, a group of Polish parliamentarians registered the draft resolution that recognises the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) guilty of the crime of genocide against the Polish population in 1939-1947 and accuses them of being in the service of the Nazis.41 Interestingly, this initiative found support from the Ukrainian side: 148 Ukrainian deputies from the presidential Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine sent an address to the Polish Sejm reporting about the growing anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and neo-Nazi sympathies in Ukraine and asking to condemn the organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists for the genocide of Poles in Volyn.42 Łukasz Kamiński, the director of the Polish Institute

____________________ 37 38

39 40 41

42

Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 34. “Ukrainian patriotism was thus reduced to a kind of mindless collaborationism with fascism, which fitted an older Polish prejudice of believing the Ukrainians to be something less than a nation.” (Timothy Snyder, “Memory of Sovereignty and Sovereignty over Memory. Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939-1999,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Present of the Past, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (n. p.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 51-52). The UPA – abbreviation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (in Ukrainian – Ukrainska povstanska armiia). Marples, Heroes and Villains, 231. “Polskyi Sejm hotuietsia zasudyty Ukrainsku Povstansku Armiiu za henotsyd” {Polish Sejm gets ready to condemn the Ukrainian Insurgent Army for genocide}, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2013/04/19/121271/ (accessed January 15, 2014). “Patsyfikatsiia po-novomu” {Pacisifation in a new way}, http://nastupna.com/ news/volyn (accessed January 17, 2014); Borys Tarasiuk, “Suchasni uroky Volynskoi trahedii” {Today’s lessons of the Volyn tragedy}, http://blogs.pravda. com.ua/authors/tarasyuk/51e56c43dec8a/ (accessed January 17, 2014).

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of National Remembrance43 plainly ascribed the fault for the massacres of Poles to the Ukrainian nationalists repudiating the alternative vision of the events according to which also the Polish side exterminated Ukrainian civilians in mutual actions of ethnic killings.44 According to the public opinion polls conducted after the commemoration celebrations of the Volyn massacres in 2013, the majority of Poles (64%) believe in the possibility of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation when the entire truth about the tragedy is revealed.45 At the same time around half the population of today’s Poland is ignorant of the Volyn events. The anniversaries of the historical events like the Volyn massacre stir up discussions in the mass media and challenge the relations between Poland and Ukraine. This happened both in 2003 and 2013. On the one hand, this conflict reflects the reluctance of those Ukrainians proud of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to recognise also the less glorious deeds of their heroes. On the other hand, the Poles are unwilling to admit the high estimation of Ukrainian nationalists as fighters for the independence of the land that was for centuries ruled by external aggressors. The Ukrainian historian Myroslav Popovych argues that the attitude of the Ukrainians to Volyn derives from their totalitarian past because communism deprived people of the culture of responsibility:46 “In the reappraisal of the Volyn events from 60 years ago appeared in the first place the inability of our society to review critically the communist heritage. And it is the easiest to think as if they are guilty of everything and not we.”47 The Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak and his Polish colleague Leszek Kolakowski call ____________________ 43

44

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46

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About the structure, role, and vision in the self-presentation of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, see the article Marta Kurkowska-Budzan, “Power, Knowledge and Faith Discourse. The Institute of National Remembrance,” in The Post-Communist Condition: Public and Private Discourses of Transformation, eds. Aleksandra Galasinska and Dariusz Galasinski (Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 167-187. “Polskyi chynovnyk ne hovoryv pro ‘obopilni etnichni chystky” {Polish official did not speak about “the mutual ethnic cleansings”}, http://www.istpravda.com. ua/short/2013/01/14/108124/ (accessed January 15, 2014). “Bilshist poliakiv viriat u polsko-ukrainske prymyrennia (opytuvannia)” {The majority of Poles believes in the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation (opinion poll)}, http://www.unian.ua/news/584669-bilshist-polyakiv-viryat-u-polsko-ukrajinskeprimirennya-opituvannya.html (accessed January 17, 2014). Myroslav Popovych, “Volyn: nashe i ne nashe hore” {Volyn. Our and not our grief}, http://www.kritiki.net/2003/05/02/volin-nashe-i-ne-nashe-gore (accessed January 20, 2014). Ibid. Translation from the original source.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

to the collective moral responsibility about events like the Volyn tragedy. Hrytsak maintains that such a responsibility is very important in the social sphere where people are part of the bigger national or state groups. Consequently, when they feel proud of the achievements of their predecessors, they should equally carry a moral responsibility for their wrongdoings.48 Similarly, Kolakowski indicates that if we speak about the spiritual and moral unity of the nation which endures the generations and preserves its sameness, it is reasonable to accept the collective moral responsibility for the faults of the past.49 The challenges of dealing with the Volyn issue did not go unnoticed equally on the level of the Churches. In 2013, the Polish Roman Catholic bishops in Ukraine refused to work on a joint message with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as they could not arrive at an agreement concerning perpetrators50 ascribing the entire guilt for the Volyn crimes to the Ukrainian nationalists. On June 24, 2013, the Ukrainian Roman-Catholic bishops issued a separate letter explaining their position. Although Polish bishops indeed mention that also Ukrainians fell prey to Poles, this happened in the course of self-defence and revenge strikes. In any case, the Polish actions “were not proportional either in the number of victims of evildoings or in barbarian methods that they were committed by.”51 The authors talk about the personal responsibility of the executors of the massacres and emphasise that justifications on the ground of ideology, party leaders and the like are not acceptable. Purification of the historical memory as the realisation and confession of guilt is the only way to reconciliation. This recent text differs from the message of John Paul II at the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Volyn massacre in which this Polish Pope declares the principles of the proper Christian treatment of those events.52 At the same time, on April 23, 3013, the regional Volyn ____________________ 48

49 50

51 52

Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Nashe i duzhe nashe hore” {Our and very much our grief}, http://kritiki.net/2003/07/01/nashe-i-duzhe-nashe-gore (accessed January 20, 2014). Leszek Kolakowski, “Pro kolektyvnu vidpovidalnist” {About collective responsibility}, Yi 10 (1997): 17. “Pastyrskyi lyst rymsko-katolytskykh yepyskopiv Ukrainy z pryvodu 70-i richnytsi Volynskoi trahedii” {Pastoral letter of the Roman-Catholic bishops of Ukraine on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy}, http://galinfo.com. ua/news/136407.html (accessed January 20, 2014). Ibid. Translation from the original source. “Poslannia Papy Rymskoho Ivana Pavla II do uchasnykiv urochystostei z nahody vshanuvannia pamiati zhertv ukrainsko-polskoho konfliktu na Volyni ta v

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Council of Churches including the representatives of Orthodox, Catholic, and Greek-Catholic local bishops issued their joint message which is in stark contrast to the one prepared by the Roman-Catholic bishops of Ukraine.53 The message written in the spirit of “we forgive and ask for forgiveness” does not condemn any side but warns against the misuse of this anniversary to make mischief between both nations. So at first, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church failed to convince the Polish bishops to issue a joint document on the occasion of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Volyn in 2013.54 In the message authored only by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the authors plea to consider the Volyn events from a Christian point of view condemning every sort of violence that happened between the two nations.55 From the Ukrainian side, the mass killings of the Polish population were to a considerable extent caused by the repressive politics of Poland during those more than 20 years that the Ukrainian Volyn region was part of the Polish state. Hence, the Greek-Catholic bishops raised a plea to condemn both the Polish politics and the Ukrainian liquidation actions. From the Polish side, Archbishop Mieczyslaw Mokrzycki did not accept such a view of history and demanded the explicit recognition of the fault of the Ukrainian side.56 As an ____________________

53

54

55 56

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Halychyni u 1943-1944 rokakh”{Message of Pope John Paul II to the participants of the festivities on the occasion of the commemoration of the memory of the victims of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict in Volyn and in Galicia in 19431944}, http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/3_4_03_2.htm (accessed January 20, 2014). “Zvernennia Volynskoi rady Tserkov shchodo 70-littia Volynskoi trahedii” {Message of the Volyn Council of Churches on the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy}, http://www.pravoslavia.volyn.ua/dokumenty/dokument/?news id=3162 (accessed January 20, 2014). “Reaktsiia Mytropolyta Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy na Volynsku trahediiu” {The reaction of the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan on the Volyn tragedy}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2689.0.html (accessed April 5, 2013). No. 2018. “Trudna wspólna ocena” {Difficult common assessment}, http://ekai.pl/wydar zenia/x64377/trudna-wspolna-ocena/ (accessed February 24, 2014). This stance of the Archbishop encountered criticism from the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. See for instance, Mykola Khmilovskyi, “Povtornyi kazus Arkhiiepyskopa Mechyslava Mokshytskoho” {Repeated extraordinary case with Mieczyslaw Mokrzycki}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/~Nicolaus/52008/ (accessed January 20, 2014). Some Polish intellectuals also deplored the position of the Catholic Archbishop of Lviv, for instance, Adam Michnik, “Ne sperechaimosia pro te, khto bilshe zavynyv” {Let us not argue about who is more guilty}, Yi 74 (2013), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n74texts/Michnik_Ne_sperechajmos ya.htm (accessed April 11, 2014).

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

alternative, Liubomyr Husar maintained that if both countries decided to concentrate on whose fault was bigger instead of striving to forgiveness it would be difficult to reconcile because the long history of the PolishUkrainian relations is full of misconducts from both sides.57 Only after Poland and Ukraine place forgiveness in the foreground, will they be able to discuss effectively their common history.58 Thus Volyn remains a durable obstacle in the Polish-Ukrainian relations where the issue of victimsperpetrators plays a decisive role.

The Operation Vistula The key terms to describe the happenings of the 1940s in the UkrainianPolish relations are the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the events in Volyn, and the Operation Vistula.59 Surprisingly, there are no official texts of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church where the Operation Vistula is mentioned although this event significantly shaped the Polish-Ukrainian relation in the aftermath of World War II. Attempting to finally resolve the Ukrainian question in 1947, the Polish government undertook a forcible deportation of Ukrainians from the border territories to western and northern regions of Poland, which the country had acquired from Germany.60 ____________________ 57

58 59

60

Liubomyr Husar, “Musymo vyrishyty, chy hochemo pochaty z proshchennia, chy zh z vyznachennia toho, khto bilshe zhrishyv” {We must decide if we want to begin from forgiveness or from determining who sinned more}, interview, 112.org.ua, http://1-12.org.ua/2013/05/23/1937 (accessed February 5, 2014). Ibid. A good balanced outline of those events one finds in the article of Grzegorz Motyka, “Od Wolynia do Akcji ‘Wisla” {From Volyn until the Operation Vistula}, Wiez 473, no. 3 (1998): 109-133. An excellent overview and assessment of the recent historical discussions on the Ukrainian-Polish conflict are presented in Marples, Heroes and Villains, 203-237. In that book the author dwells on the contemporary creation of the national history of Ukraine and how historical tensions are treated by different scholars and schools both in Ukraine and abroad. This is an excellent exhaustive monograph on the historical events of the 20th century that are constitutive to the creation of Ukrainian history in times of independence. A substantial part of this book is dedicated to the Ukrainian-Polish relations from a historical perspective. For a detailed account of the fate of Ukrainians in Poland in the 1940s, see Timothy Snyder, “To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and for All. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 2 (1999): 86-120.

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Those events are known in history as the Operation Vistula. In addition to the elimination of the support for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army by local Ukrainian population,61 another underlying reason for the Operation Vistula was the anticipated assimilation of the Ukrainians in the new lands and thus the resolution of the problem of Ukrainian nationalists forever. This intention is proved by the restrictions that Ukrainians faced in their new settlements regarding the possibilities of free movement, maintaining their culture and creating communities. The fact that the estimation of the Operation Vistula represents an equally dividing point for the Polish-Ukrainian relations demonstrates the escalation of the debate during the historical seminars and deliberations initiated by the World Union of the Soldiers of the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) and the Union of Ukrainians in Poland. 12 seminars were conducted in 1996-2006, each of them dedicated to a certain aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II. The whole project got temporarily stuck when it came to the discussions about the Operation Vistula. The Union of Ukrainians in Poland decided to withdraw its support in organising the 9th seminar62 protesting against the Polish appraisal of the Operation Vistula when the Poles strived to make Ukrainians recognise the mass killings in Volyn without reconsidering the own Polish views on the mass resettlements of Ukrainians.63 The closing communiqué ____________________ 61 62

63

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Yaroslav Dashkevych, “Podzvinne operatsii ‘Visla” {The echo of the Operation Vistula}, Yi 10 (1997): 56. Ukraina – Polshcha: vazhki pytannia: Materialy VIII mizhnarodnoho naukovoho seminary “Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny pid chas Druhoi svitovoi viiny,” 6-8 lystopada, 2000, Warshawa {Ukraine – Poland. Difficult questions. The materials of the international scientific seminar “Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II,” November 6-8, 2000, Warsaw}, vol. 8 (Lutsk: Volynska Oblasna Drukarnia, 2008), 336. Without attempting to delve deeper into the seminar discussion, it is worth mentioning that contrary to the Ukrainian historians who regarded the Operation Vistula as a deportation and even as a genocide action against the Ukrainian population in Poland, Polish scholars voiced the following arguments: the Operation Vistula was a necessary undertaking in order to fight the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that functioned because of the great support of the population; the Operation Vistula was a legitimate result of the Volyn tragedy of Poles inflicted by Ukrainians in 1943-1944; as a result of the Operation Vistula Ukrainian peasants got much better living conditions in the west and north of Poland, so it was profitable for them (for more information about the 8th seminar papers and discussions about the Operation Vistula issue, see ibid., 117-267). As a matter of fact, the media iterest in the joint conferences of the Ukrainian and Polish historians of the initiative “Poland-Ukraine: Difficult Questions” in 1997-2001 was much

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

of the 8th seminar contained agreements on the reasons for and the implementation of the resettlement programmes of Ukrainians from Poland and Poles from Ukraine in 1944-1946, recognising the communist authorities largely responsible for the undertaking.64 However, there was no agreement about the origins and the execution of the Operation Vistula and political, economic, and demographic effects of this event because of the above-mentioned reasons. Consequently, those controversial topics were postponed until the 9th seminar where corresponding agreements and disagreements were to be formulated.65 Experts claim that the violent past will not obfuscate the present pragmatic relations between Poland and Ukraine.66 Poland is interested in good partnership relations with Ukraine that has to become a democratic country with a developed market economy.67 Indeed, during the EuroMaidan in 2013-2014 and the Orange Revolution nine years ago Poland was the first to offer different kinds of support to Ukraine. For Yaroslav Hrytsak the reconciliation between those two countries has an outstanding value: “In the all-European context the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation after the fall of communism has the same significance as the French-German one of the 1950s. Similarly as the latter laid the foundation of the united Europe, the former created a chance to spread this Europe to the East.”68 Hence, the ____________________

64 65 66

67 68

bigger in Poland being translated by the leading TV channels and radio stations than in Ukraine where it was only locally covered in Volyn (Andrzej Paczkowski, “Polshcha i Ukraina: vazhki pytannia, skladni vidpovi” {Poland and Ukraine. Difficult questions and complex answers}, in Yevropa ta yii bolisni mynuvshyny, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, trans. Yevhen Marichev (Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2009), 151). Ukraine – Poland. Difficult questions, 337-338. Ibid., 338. In his research on the repercussions of the past on contemporary neighbouring relations between Poland and Ukraine, Nathaniel Copsey maintained that except some radical circles in both countries the historical injustices do not and will not weigh down upon contemporary pragmatic politics in the near future: “It argues that despite sporadic appearances to the contrary, the past is much less important to most political parties than might be assumed.” (Nathaniel Copsey, “Echoes of the Past in Contemporary Politics. The Case of Polish-Ukrainian Relations,” SEI Working Paper, 87 (Sussex European Institute, 2006), 1, 19, https://www.sussex. ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-87.pdf&site=266 (accessed April 4, 2014)). Marples, Heroes and Villains, 231. Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Perezavantazhennia chy prodovzhennia – 1” {To reload or to continue – 1}, http://zaxid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?perezavantazhennnya_chi_

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major task of the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation is transferring the western ideas of cooperation to the East. One of the initiatives in that regard is the European days of good neighbourly relations for strengthening the cross-boarding cooperation which has been held on the Ukrainian-Polish border since 2004 organised by different NGOs of the two countries.69 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not speak about the Operation Vistula. Only once Liubomyr Husar claimed that it belongs to the bigest crimes of the communist dictatorship in Ukraine staying in one line with the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the Holodomor, and the deportation of the Crimean Tatars during World War II.70 A possible ground for the absence of more detailed discussions is that the Church leadership does not want to stir the contest for the Poles’ question of the Ukrainian nationalism during World War II. Additionally, there are no broad discussions on the Operation Vistula in Ukrainian society and hence the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church also leaves that issue aside. I consider that when the Catholic Churches of Poland and Ukraine wage a discussion about the painful historical heritage, every page of that history has to be revealed and the Operation Vistula has to be discussed together with the Volyn massacres. The full truth about the past must be discovered. This is the case when only general references to the mutual crimes do not suffice.

2.2

War has finished – war continues

2.2.1 Plurality of war memories Notwithstanding 20 years of independence, a great part of Ukrainian society still demonstrates an ideological connection to the Soviet and now Russian cultural space. That results in the explosive reaction when part of the Ukrainians who feel connected to the old ideology strives to preserve it and the other part obstinately tries to abandon it.71 The cleft becomes ____________________

69 70 71

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prodovzhennya__1&objectId=1112540 (accessed January 25, 2014). Translation from the original source. The website of the initiative explaining the idea behind the history and the programme of the event: http://www.kordony.net/ (accessed January 26, 2014). No. 213, 354-355. Maryna Dovzhenko, “Mizhetnichna ta relihiina tolerantnist v ukrainskykh zasobakh masovoi informatsii: Ne vse tak pohano” {Interethnic and religious toler-

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

especially evident when Ukraine officially admits the feasts that are embedded in the Soviet past. One of such anniversaries is the Victory Day over Nazism admitted on May 9. The contesting views in this case are represented, for instance, by the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Viatrovych who believes that the celebration of Victory Day with its ideology of the winner means that Ukraine lives according to the Moscow ideological system72 and the editors of the newspaper “Podrobnosti” who claim that Victory Day is a big feast for the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (82%).73 The representatives of the first group underscore the fact that the Russian President Volodymyr Putin in May 2013 claimed that World War II was won by Russia with her own industrial resources and this would have happened even when Ukraine had not been part of the Soviet Union; Russia won because it is a country of winners.74 In contemporary Ukraine there is a plurality of memories of World War II and no consensus concerning a unified narrative of those bloody events of about 70 years ago. The real war finished a long time ago, but the disputes about its meaning continue still nowadays. The principal question is what the defeat of the Nazis signified for Ukraine. Was this a real liberation for Ukraine? How shall the winner, the Soviet Union of Stalin’s epoch, be estimated? It indeed defeated Nazi Germany but in the years after the termination of the war the Ukrainian nationalistic underground was dispersed together with the dreams about an independent Ukraine. The historian Andrii Portnov identified several clusters of the narrative memory of World War II. The dominant cluster is a typically Soviet set of stories where the war is called the Great Patriotic War, it started on June ____________________

72

73

74

ance in the Ukrainian mass media. Not everything is so bad}, http://risu.org.ua/ ua/index/projects/tolerance/52682/ (accessed January 15, 2014). Volodymyr Viatrovych, “Maskovskaye vryemya” {The Moscow time}, http://za xid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?maskovskaye_vremya&objectId=1284703 (accessed January 15, 2014); “Istoryk {Volodymyr Viatrovych}: ‘9 travnia vvazhaiut sviatom lyshe krainy, shcho perebuvaiut pid vplyvom Rosii” {Historian {Volodymyr Viatrovych}: ‘The 9th of May is considered a holiday only in those countries which are under the Russian influence”}, http://tyzhden.ua/News/79163 (accessed January 15, 2014). “Prazdnovat Dyen Pobyedy namyeryeny 75% ukraintsyev – isslyedovaniye” {75% of Ukrainians plan to celebrate Victory Day – study}, http://podrob nosti.ua/society/2013/05/07/903638.html (accessed January 15, 2014). “Rosiia peremohla b u Druhii svitovii viini i bez Ukrainy” {Russia would have won the Second World War even without Ukraine}, http://www.istpravda. com.ua/short/2010/12/16/9142/ (accessed January 15, 2014).

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22, 1941, and it is believed that due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the united Ukrainian state appeared.75 Another aspect is represented by the Ukrainian nationalistic underground during the war that is associated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Finally, although less explicitly, the memory of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the Holocaust builds a separate cluster that completes a picture of World War II in Ukraine.76 The attitudes of the population of Ukraine in different regions significantly vary with regard to World War II. According to the public opinion survey performed by the Razumkov Centre in 2005, the term Second World War seems to be more appropriate for 31% of the citizens while 56.9% of Ukrainians still support the name Great Patriotic War.77 However, one gets an interesting picture while considering the regional distribution of the answers. If citizens of western Ukraine are more reluctant to call the events of 1939-1945 the Great Patriotic War – 36.1% only, 63.9% and 64.1% eastern and southern Ukrainians respectively on the contrary show a high support for this term.78 With regard to the name Second World War, the results are the following: 41.2% for the west, 27.9% for the south, and 28.9% for the east in favour.79 Those numbers not only illustrate the existing difference in the interpretation of the historical events of the 20th century, but also help determine the worldview of Ukrainians from different regions of the country. Among the most contesting issues of World War II is the role of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Since 1991 the entire discussion has been cen____________________ 75

76 77

78 79

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Andrii Portnov, “Ukrainski obrazy Druhoi svitovoi viiny” {Ukrainian images of World War II}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?ukrayinski_obrazi_ drugoyi_svitovoyi_viyni&objectId=1235328 {accessed August 29, 2012}. This vision is promoted by Dmytro Tabachnyk, Ukrainian Minister of Education and Science in 2010-2014. He argues that the victory in World War II lies at the basis of the Ukrainian national memory because it was a war for the defence of their common fatherland, the Soviet Union. The Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists should be condemned similarly to the Nazis because they used to fight against the Soviet Red Army (Oleksandr Zaitsev, “Viina mitiv pro viinu v suchasnii Ukraini” {The war of myths about the war in contemporary Ukraine}, Krytyka, 3-4 (2010): 16). Portnov, Ukrainian images. Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Z yakoiu nazvoiu viiny proty fashyzmu Vy bilsh zhodni?” {Sociological poll. Which name of the war against fascism do you agree more with?}, http://www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_ id=286 (accessed February 24, 2014). Ibid. Ibid.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

tred on whether these military groups have to be recognised as combatants in the war. The positive decision has always been strongly opposed by the communists who continue to portray the insurgents as Nazi collaborationalists. In western Ukraine where the insurgents were in fact active, they are perceived as fighters for independence. Some regional councils in the west of the country issued a decision to grant them privileges for public transport and communication fees, supplements to pension etc., similar to those that the soldiers of the Red Army enjoy.80 However, to spread the western views of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to the whole country is complicated because the main attitude towards them in other regions is either ambivalence or condemnation. Mykola Riabchuk holds that in that question history stands in the centre of the ideological battle that has little chances to be finished peacefully: “The debate on any historical problem fairly easily turns into a kind of “cold domestic war,” into a mere propaganda campaign, in which academic arguments do not have much substance, and in which all nuances are lost; there is no middle ground and only black and white exist.”81 Obviously, that has an influence on the work of historians because “in such a context, not much scope is left for academic discussion; in particular within one’s own ideological camp. Any doubt or “revisionism” in such a polarised environment is perceived as treason, as defection to the other, “hostile” side of the ideological barricade – for “who is not with us is against us.”82 The Ukrainian narratives of the war contradict each other, they are often exclusive, and one of the tasks of healing the memory of war consists in dealing with them in a way that reconciles people who are bearers of different identities. This is also one of the principal tasks that the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church undertakes.

____________________ 80

81 82

“Naibilshi pilhy veterany Ukrainskoi povstanskoi armii maiut v IvanoFrankivsku, Lvovi ta Ternopoli” {The biggest privileges the veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil}, http://tyzhden.ua/News/39514 (accessed February 25, 2014). Quoted in Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 41. Ibid.

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2.2.2 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: reinterpreting the established image of war The discourse on World War II in Ukraine that is among other things promoted by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is part and parcel of the process of transition. Similar to the Polish case, “Victory Day is an event that encompasses several dilemmas of the transitional period: the construction of new collective identities, re-definition of “us” and “them,” the selection of national history repertoire as well as harmonising it with the repertoires of the new ally – Europe.”83 Although Europe is not yet a complete ally of Ukraine contrary to the case of Poland, a member of the European Union, the new approach to the commemoration of the end of the Second World War shows that at least part of the Ukrainians are oriented towards western values. At the same time – again contrary to the Polish case – the memory of World War II in Ukraine is not homogenous. This is evident both in the official state commemoration ceremonies and in the discourses and actions of Ukrainian Churches. There are not many documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church completely dedicated to the theme of the healing of memories of World War II. Additionally, having studied those documents, it became evident that this topic has not been explicitly touched by the leadership of the Church until the late years of the ministry of Liubomyr Husar. The first of the addresses was released in March 2005, and was followed a month later by the statement of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the commemoration service in the village Potelych and the subsequent round table on war and reconciliation. The Greek-Catholic faithful had to wait another five years until in 2010 the next text of Husar appeared, and in 2011 Sviatoslav Shevchuk also published his thoughts on the topic of war. For this study I will also refer to some of the most interesting ideas from the available interviews of the Church leadership in which the subject is evoked. Whereas Liubomyr Husar waited a long time before officially articulating his position on World War II, the present Patriarch Sviatoslav Shevchuk already among his first official documents prepared “Call of His ____________________ 83

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Anna Horolets, “Collective Memory in Transition. Commemorating the End of the Second World War in Poland,” in The Post-Communist Condition: Public and Private Discourses of Transformation, eds. Aleksandra Galasinska and Dariusz Galasinski (Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 48.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

Beatitude Sviatoslav to the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church and all people of good will to prayer on the Commemoration Day of June 22, 2011.” Still, Husar significantly contributed to the reevaluation of the legacy of war by supporting and blessing the commemorative activities of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. I will include an account of actions and one address of that Commission in the analysis. The question arises why Liubomyr Husar did not dare to prepare an explicit statement on the clashing memories of war in Ukraine earlier regardless his powerful reconciliation discourse on many topics. It is easy to speak about perpetrators in the context of World War II. However, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church puts another emphasis on the feast where the contemporary Ukrainian state praises the Soviet Red Army for defeating the Nazis. The Church leadership attempts to find out what World War II meant for Ukrainians then and now. In 2010 Ukraine admitted Days of Prayer on May 9 and May 16. Whereas the former is official Victory Day in Ukraine, the latter is the Day of the commemoration of the victims of the communist repressions. In his address on the occasion of the Days of Prayer in 2010, Husar interconnects both events.84 The author avoids a typical term of reference to World War II during the Soviet times, that is the Great Patriotic War. Instead, he links the celebration of Victory Day with the less glorious fact of the Soviet history – numerous victims of the communist regime. In this way Husar sets different accents on the celebration of the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. The novelty of Husar’s interpretation consists in the fact that he portrays World War II as yet another evil for Ukraine which finally did not bring the desired liberation from the external enemy, but merely signified a shift from one totalitarian regime to another. Furthermore, Liubomyr Husar significantly contributed to the discussion on the interpretation of World War II by unfolding a moral lesson of the war for today’s Ukraine. Husar links the events of 1941-1945 to the outcomes of World War I of 1914-1918. Because of the economic, political and especially moral crisis caused by World War I, the foundation for the spread of the totalitarian ideologies of Leninism, Stalinism, and later Nazism was laid. Those regimes dominated so many events of the 20th century. Additionally, “they differed but also had a lot in common. Both were marked by struggling against Christian moral rules, attempted to de____________________ 84

No. 2005.

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stroy human dignity, were extremely brutal in the extermination of their opponents without trial through executions and in concentration camps, through the organisation of artificial famines etc.”85 Furthermore, the kinship of those totalitarian regimes was revealed in 1939 when they allied and started the war that has cost millions of lives until the downfall of Nazi Germany in 1945. The importance of the kinship of both totalitarian regimes is revealed further in the text when the author unfolds his notion of the real victory. Husar underlines that the victory over Nazism was only a partial one. Notwithstanding the joy of success, “there is no feeling that as an outcome of that victory there came a genuine deep and lasting peace because almost the whole second half of the 20th century for Ukrainians and other neighbouring people signified a period of new resistance and severe trials.”86 The author comes to such a conclusion because after the defeat of Nazi Germany the allies ended up in Cold War and in the countries, where communist regimes were established, people suffered under repressions. Sviatoslav Shevchuk argues along similar lines. He denotes the war of 1941-1945 as a “fatal collision of two misanthropic ideologies – Nazism and communism” and “bloody time of unrest.”87 The adjectives fatal and bloody refer to the gravity and tragedy of the events and the nouns collision and time of unrest describe this struggle as evil. Furthermore, the author names the conflicting parties that started the warfare – the followers of Nazism and communism. By mentioning them directly one next to the other Patriarch Sviatoslav does not make any difference between the two ideologies and condemns both of them.88 Therefore, in this interpretation one cannot speak about communism as the triumpher over Nazism because both those ideologies brought about endless sufferings. Thus the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church attempts to rethink the meaning of communism and Nazism in the history of Europe contradicting the belief that while Nazism is unilaterally recognised as the pure embodiment of

____________________ 85 86 87 88

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No. 199, 337. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. No. 2009. Translation from the original source. A similar condemnation of both ideologies of Nazism and Stalinism is found in No. 2017.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

evil in Western thought, the Soviet communism is rather perceived as “a good idea that turned out badly” and is submitted to collective amnesia.89 This reconsideration of the meaning of victory over Nazism and the equalising of both totalitarian systems which marked the historical way of Ukraine in the 20th century is the principal contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the dispute on the historical memory of World War II. Both systems were evil, but not only that matters. Everybody who allowed the evil of fear, separation, and hatred to take roots in one’s heart is guilty as well. That remarkable evaluation will have implications on how to heal the memory of war that I will elucidate in the next part of the monograph. The most important conclusion at that stage is that not only objective historical evil like Nazism or communism account for human suffering, but the evil inclinations in one’s heart are destructive as well. The problem is to be placed in the domain of the human spirit. The position of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church coincides with what Wacław Hryniewicz noted concerning the Katyn massacre where on Stalin’s order around 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia were killed in the spring of 1940. For decades this communist crime has been silenced by the Soviet Union and later by Russia. Hryniewicz is convinced that equally Ukraine has to purify its war memory from the false idealisation and heroic discourse of the ideology of the winner.90

2.3

Divided Church – divided nation

The issue of reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches understandably receives most attention in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. This question immediately touches upon the life of the Church and her mission of evangelisation. There is a variety of documents that treats the topic of the inter-Church relations in Ukraine. I will endeavour now to identify how the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek____________________ 89

90

Alain Besançon, A Century of Horrors. Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Shoah, trans. Ralph Hancock and Nathaniel Hancock (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007), ix. Wacław Hryniewicz, “Katynskyi rozstril ta yoho peredvistia: chy vzhe nastav chas “perehornuty” tsi storinky istorii?” {Katyn execution and its portent. Is it time to “turn” those pages of history?}, http://gazeta.dt.ua/SOCIETY/katinskiy_ rozstril_ta_yogo_peredvistya_chi_vzhe_nastav_chas_peregornuti_tsi_storinki_ist oriyi.html (accessed January 13, 2014).

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Catholics evaluates the division between the Churches and whom they deem responsible for that state of affairs. This analysis should help us understand the suggested reconciliation models of that Church.

The wound of division Similar to other Ukrainian Churches, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church describes the split of Ukrainian Christianity as the unhealed wound of division in the body of the Ukrainian nation.91 This notion is applied by all four traditional Churches and the efforts or means towards rapprochement are often introduced by the term healing/curing the division. By presenting the split among the Christians as a wound, the Ukrainian Church leaders univocally point at the imperative of unity. If the wound is not healed, a person dies. Similar, if the division between the Churches is not cured, Christianity in Ukraine will fail in its mission of evangelisation.

The sin of pride The discourse on the guilt of the division between the Churches acquires different accents. Sometimes the Churches are accused of instigating that division, in other texts Christians themselves are reproached with the inability to unite whereas none of the Churches is accused of being the sole protagonist of the split.92 Already in his presentation during the special Synod of the Bishops of Europe in 1991, Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi brought to the fore the reasons behind the split among the Christians in Ukraine. At that time the problem of the redistribution of the sacral buildings was causing unrest. As a solution the usage of the same sacral building in turns was implemented, however, this practice was not successful everywhere. Liubachivskyi contended that mutual distrust and fear, unsubstantiated accusations of each other, the national element as well as the lack of the sense of religious pluralism among Ukrainians complicate the develop____________________ 91 92

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For instance, see No. 40; No. 2010; No. 5003 (No. 4000). No. 40, 74.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

ment of genuine ecumenism.93 However, the principal reason for the struggle between the Churches nowadays is the sin of pride that dominates in their relations. Sin belongs to the domain of the spirit; hence the healing must also be of a spiritual nature. Notwithstanding the glorious firmness of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the epoch of persecution, the disunity and struggle between the Churches started again as soon as difficult times passed into history. The analysis of the period of the Soviet attempts to eradicate religion reveals that people survived because they supported each other and demonstrated their Christian love through the readiness for sacrifice. One can indeed speak about the “ecumenism of the Gulag” that united people of different religions, denominations and nations “into one Body by the cross of Christ; their solidarity came from their common suffering.”94 At the same time, the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church realised that human solidarity against the common enemy alone cannot assure genuine unity.95 After the fall of the Soviet Union, Churches returned to mutual struggle considering each other adversaries instead of the enemy that disappeared. The Greek-Catholics are aware that they also share responsibility and guilt for the present state of affairs.96 Therefore, they must investigate the situation in order to contribute to the restoration of the original unity of the Church. In the opinion of the Greek-Catholic bishops, it is the sin of pride manifested in political interests, human ambitions and the spirit of rivalry between the Churches that is the key reason for separation nowadays.97

Intrusion of the state The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church leadership is convinced that the false intrusion of the state authorities into the Church affairs can destabilise the ecclesiastical situation in the country. As a possible threat to the interconfessional relations in Ukraine, Liubomyr Husar considers the transfer of the Saint Sophia Cathedral from the state jurisdiction to the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves that belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church ____________________ 93 94 95 96 97

No. 32, 59. No. 219, 371 (No. 3003, 154). Ibid. No. 219, 371 (No. 3003, 153). No. 219, 372 (No. 3003, 155).

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of the Moscow Patriarchate. The possibility of such a transfer was studied by the state authorities in 2010 under President Victor Yanukovych who was openly favouring the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Cardinal Husar warns that entrusting the cathedral that represents the spiritual heritage of the whole Ukrainian people and of the entire Kyivan Church only to one denomination could become a stepping stone in the interconfessional relations.98 Equally, it is important that at the 1000th anniversary of the Saint Sophia Cathedral all four branches of the Kyivan Church are present and that this event becomes a step towards the Church unity in Ukraine. For that aim the criteria of canonicity, truthful Orthodoxy (that according to certain opinions can be fulfilled in Ukraine only by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) and the like should not be decisive for the invitation of the Churches to take part in the celebrations.99 Not only the mission of salvation of the Church is endangered by the Church division. The division between the Churches is often presented as the biggest tragedy of the Ukrainian people. It is especially typical of Cardinal Husar. In his opinion, a number of other problems originated from the split between the Churches that the Ukrainians have been suffering from for centuries.100 The Cardinal postulates that everyone who cares about the fate of the Ukrainian nation cannot remain indifferent to the tragedy of the Church division101 because it is a manifestation of the social polarisation in Ukrainian society. In a number of documents the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church emphasises the need to restore the Church unity as it would contribute to the societal cohesion. According to the evaluation of the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops: “The next in turn tragedy of our nation is the Church division that was conceived not in our lands. It arrived to us from different sides; we accepted this evil into our hearts and keep up this fire till now. Our fault lies precisely here because religious and confessional fanaticism is the worst form of division among the people. It became the real damnation of our people.”102

According to this text, the Ukrainians themselves are not guilty of the Church division in their country; it was caused by external forces. However, the fault of the Ukrainians themselves consists in their readiness to accept evil and cherish it. It is not completely clear whom the Greek____________________ 98 99 100 101 102

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No. 2006. Ibid. No. 83, 152. Ibid. No. 98, 182. Translation from the original source.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

Catholic leadership blames for the Church division, whether it is the split between western and eastern Church in the 11th century, the Roman Pontiffs who received the Kyiv Metropolia into the union with Rome on the basis of Latin exclusivism in 1596, or the political games of the Moscow Patriarchate that eventually contributed to the split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy at the beginning of the 1990s. The bishops only conclude that the Church division in Ukraine is a real tragedy of the nation.

The Union of Brest and the Church division The studied texts confer that none of the Ukrainian Churches can consider herself innocent of the division of the Kyivan Christianity. Therefore, every Church has to recognise her guilt, repent and return to the original unity.103 This equally concerns the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church herself. In their “Conception of the Ecumenical Position,” the Greek-Catholic bishops recognise that the way of the creation of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church by entering into the union with Rome in 1596 has partly contributed to the split in the ancient Kyivan Church. This particular way of the emergence of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has to be regarded in connection with the crisis of Christianity in the epoch of the Reformation and with the Muslim invasion.104 Still, this does not level the partial responsibility of the initiators of the union with Rome for the situation in Ukrainian Christianity. The unacceptance of the union by a part of the bishops of the Kyivan Metropolia, who stressed their adherence to Constantinople, amounted into the creation of a parallel Orthodox hierarchy in 1620. Notwithstanding several attempts at the reunion in the centuries that followed, “the wounds of division on the body of the Kyivan Church remained unhealed.”105 In his analysis of the new Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church “Christ is Our Passover,” Mykola Krokosh reproached the leadership of this Church for the missed opportunity to recognise their fault of signing the Union of Brest which was a sin against the unity of the

____________________ 103 No. 2006. 104 No. 5003, 52 (No. 4000, 116). 105 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

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Ukrainian Church.106 So far this theme has not been elaborated enough in the official discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

“No” to the Soviet methods of struggle In the letter to the leaders of the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, Husar warns them not to use the methods that the Soviet state applied in order to destroy the Church. Unfortunately, nowadays the Churches refer to such means themselves in order to diminish the influence of a rival denomination by political, administrative or other forms of pressure.107 As Myroslav Marynovych explained, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as well as the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches with the unrecognised canonical status have to “learn successfully how to overcome all the dangerous syndromes of the recent past – the “martyr complex,” the “conquerors of Communism” complex and also tendencies in the direction of nationalism, excessive politicisation and so on.”108 That reality has to be recognised by every denomination that originated in the ancient Kyivan Church. Summarising this analysis, the following elements are worth repeating. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church longs to put a diagnosis to the contemporary situation of the Ukrainian Churches. The analysed texts reveal that Greek-Catholics do not want to interfere into the internal affairs of the Orthodox Churches by commenting on their canonical status. Still, both Orthodox denominations and the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church share the responsibility for the division. The GreekCatholics occasionally indicate that the way the Union of Brest was concluded also contributed to the split of Christianity in Ukraine. However, this theme does not sound loud enough. This does not mean that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers this step as a wrong one; it rather goes about the false way of reaching the union. Such a recognition is ____________________ 106 Mykola Krokosh, “Katekhyzm Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy’ v ekumenichnii perspektyvi: krok vpered, dva nazad” {“Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church” in ecumenical perspective. One step forward, two steps backward}, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/12797-katexizm-ugkcv-ekumenichnij-perspektivi-krok-vpered-dva-nazad.html (accessed January 22, 2014). 107 No. 216, 359. 108 Marynovych, Obstacles on the Road.

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potentially valuable for the restoration of the Church unity in Ukraine. Occasionally, external forces and historical circumstances are rendered guilty of the Church division in Ukraine. But it is rather an exception. The leading idea of the Greek-Catholic leadership is that the Churches themselves caused and deepened the division guided by political or nonecclesial worldly considerations. Ultimately, it is sin of pride that fuels human ambitions and causes divisions. The split among the Churches is seen from the spiritual perspective as a deficiency of the human condition and it should be cured by spiritual methods as well. The Greek-Catholic Church leadership emphasises that the disunity among the Churches in Ukraine contributed to the East-West regional division and to the social polarisation in the country. Bishops do not believe in human solidarity without spiritual foundation. Because of that Liubomyr Husar promoted the idea of the united Kyivan Patriarchate that would symbolise the unity of the Church in Ukraine bearing potential to consolidate the Ukrainian nation.

2.4

Difficult northern neighbour

2.4.1 Heavy load of historical burden Contesting issues In his critical article on January 13, 2014, Antoine Arjakovsky makes a quintessence of what the Russian Orthodox Church owes to Ukraine: “The Moscow Patriarchate suffers for not having repented, for not having been purified of the long years of compromise with the Soviet power. As demonstrated more and more by Russian Church specialists in France (K. Rousselet) and Russia (N. Mitrokhin), this Church has no sense of history, and does not grasp the new issues in the present time of globalisation… The Moscow Patriarchate continued to accuse Greek Catholic Christians of being traitors, when they should have been starting by repenting for having organised a false council in 1946 in Lviv under pressure from Stalin… The Moscow Patriarchate failed to vigorously condemn the Stalinist power for its act of genocide against the Ukrainian people in 1932-1933: the famous Holodomor which resulted in the deaths of around five million people.”109

____________________ 109 Arjakovsky, I Can no Longer Remain Silent.

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On December 26, 2013 the Moscow Patriarchate condemned the Ukrainian EuroMaidan calling the protesting groups to cease “civil tensions and revolution which cannot result in anything positive for the people” thus overlooking the desire of the still peaceful protesters “to belong to the great family of European nations that, in spite of all their weaknesses, base their laws on the defence of the dignity of every human person.”110 Evidently, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church suspects that the pro-European aspirations of the Ukrainian people are dictated by external forces because the Moscow Patriarchate warns that Ukrainian choice “should be precisely people’s choice, free and based on the awareness of all the pros and cons, not dictated by any external will.”111 Mykola Krokosh, a Greek-Catholic theologian, criticises some antiecumenical steps of the leadership of his Church. He calls in question the planned transfer of the relics of Metropolitan Isidore (defender of the union between the western and eastern Church at the Council of Florence and a contesting figure for the Orthodox112) to Kyiv that Sviatoslav Shevchuk announced in 2013.113 Further criticism concerns the official Greek-Catholic recognition of the baptism administered in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate as such that destroys the trust of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The announced extension of the pastoral activities of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church in the eastern traditionally Orthodox regions of Ukraine, the promoted cult of Yosafat Kuntsevych, the saint and martyr for faith in the Catholic Church (perceived by the Orthodox as a persecutor) also belong to the anti-ecumenical gestures of the Greek-Catholics in 2013.114 Myron Bendyk, the rector of the Greek-Catholic seminary in Drohobych, argues that it is not correct to speak about the defeat of the ____________________ 110 Ibid. 111 “Statement on the Events in Ukraine by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church,” https://mospat.ru/en/2013/12/26/news96336/ (accessed January 14, 2014). 112 “Plany Hlavy Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy perepokhovaty mytropolyta Isydora v Kyievi vyklykaly zdyvuvannia” {The plans of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to rebury Metropolitan Isidore in Kyiv has provoked wonderment}, http://www.religion.in.ua/zmi/ukrainian_zmi/22982-plani-glaviugkc-perepoxovati-mitr-isidora-v-kiyevi-viklikali-zdivuvannya.html (accessed January 17, 2014). 113 Mykola Krokosh, “Vse stabilno?” {Is everything stable?}, http://www.religion. in.ua/main/daycomment/23302-vse-stabilno.html (accessed January 17, 2014). 114 Ibid.

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Orthodox eparchies in western Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s; it did not happen by force.115 The initiative came from the people who in the situation of freedom decided to come back to the Church because they still felt a member of her, even though they perhaps used to attend liturgies at the churches of the Moscow Patriarchate. Thus the faithful simply legalised their faith. After the Catholic-Orthodox meeting in Vienna in September 2010 Hlib Kovalenko from the Centre of Religious Monitoring wrote: “The fascination with Moscow is passing. We hope that Rome will turn its attention to a few realities of Russia and Ukraine. On the territory of Russia there are close to 13 thousand Orthodox parishes. On the territory of Ukraine there are close to 17 thousand. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church also exists in Ukraine with over 4 thousand parishes. It seems that the voice of these communities does not matter for Rome or for Moscow. At the same time Kyiv, and not Moscow, is the centre of the eastern-Orthodox civilisation, if such a thing exists. From Kyiv, not from Moscow, one can expect new theological ideas and conceptions, which will be needed by the Church in the 21st century.”116

Those four authors – Arjakovsky, Krokosh, Bendyk, and Kovalenko – bring to the fore the most contesting points in the relations between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Church. Arjakovsky points at the need of repentance from the side of Moscow for the Lviv Synod of 1946 and the interference of Moscow in the Ukrainian ecclesial and political affairs. Myron Bendyk contests the accusations in the destruction of the Orthodox parishes in western Ukraine. Mykola Krokosh mentions those gestures of the Greek-Catholics which complicates their relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Finally, Hlib Kovalenko argues that the voice of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should be heard in the ecumenical dialogue because this Church can produce new ideas for the promotion of the interconfessional peace. Keeping in mind this complicated picture, let us see ____________________ 115 Myron Bendyk, “Lvivskyi psevdosobor 1946 roku i “katolytsko-pravoslavna” problema v dobu vidrodzhennia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy na pochatku 90-kh rokiv 20 stolittia” {Lviv Pseudo-Synod of 1946 and “the Catholic-Orthodox” problem at the time of the revival of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the 1990s}, http://www.dds.edu.ua/en/home/117-interesting/474pseudosobor.html (accessed January 14, 2014). 116 Hlib Kovalenko, “On the Difficulties of the Dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholics. The Inconsolable Results of the Vienna Discussions,” http://risu.org. ua/en/index/expert_thought/comments/38322 (accessed January 20, 2014).

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what the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church maintains in her relations with the Moscow Patriarchate.

Reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia The very first official document on our list, dated 22 November 1987, concerns the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Cardinal Liubachivskyi follows the tradition of the well-known mutual letters of reconciliation between the Polish and German Catholic bishops in 1965117 that laid the foundation for the German-Polish rapprochement.118 His “Declaration on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians”119 is a very important document in at least three regards. First, this declaration proves that still during the Soviet rule the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was aware of the necessity to address the common wounds of history. On the eve of the rebirth of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, her leaders realised that the future relations between both Churches will greatly depend upon the ability of each of them to redress the burdened past, especially the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946 with the assistance of the Moscow Patriarchate. Second, this declaration will be occasionally revoked by the leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the next decades as a tradition and a basis on which this Church grounds her reconciliation efforts towards the Russian Orthodox Church. Finally, the very title of ____________________ 117 The full text of the pastoral letters of the Polish and then German Catholic bishops on mutual forgiveness and reconciliation can be consulted on “Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an ihre deutschen Amtsbrüder vom 18. November 1965 und die Antwort der deutschen Bischöfe vom 5. Dezember 1965”, http://www. berlin.polemb.net/index.php?document=312 (accessed August 22, 2012). 118 To learn more about the circumstances, peculiarities and outcomes of the Letters of the Polish and German bishops on reconciliation, see Basil Kerski, Thomas Kycia, and Robert Zurek, „Wir vergeben und bitten um Vergebungv“. Der Briefwechsel der polnischen und deutschen Bischöfe 1965 und seine Wirkung (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2006). 119 The declaration was received with incomprehension by the Ukrainian diaspora that could not understand how the Cardinal can ask forgiveness from Russia and the Moscow Patriarchate after all that Ukraine and her Churches experienced from this neighbour country. To those reproaches Liubachivskyi is reported to have answered: “We have to ask their forgiveness for the very simple reason that we do not love them” (“Nous devons leur demander pardon tout simplement parce que nous ne les aimons pas.” Quoted in Arjakovsky, En attendant, 508).

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“Declaration on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” draws attention. Cardinal Liubachivskyi explicitly speaks about the reconciliation between Ukrainians and Russians. It does not strictly concern only relations between the Greek-Catholics and the Russian Orthodox Church but goes beyond that to the relations between the nations. Antoine Arjakovsky claims that the issue of the Pseudo-Synod of Lviv is much broader than merely one more crime of the Soviet regime. It is about the establishment of the national states in the region, first of all Ukraine and Russia, the all-Orthodox unity, and the future of the ecumenical movement.120 Here we encounter the idea that the reconciliation between the Churches is closely related with the reconciliation between peoples. The principal message of the declaration of Cardinal Liubachivskyi is a call to Christian forgiveness between Ukrainians and Russians, brothers in Christ. However, this is not merely a plea for rapprochement. In the commentary to that text that he issued answering the negative reactions to his declaration from Ukrainians in diaspora, Liubachivskyi claimed that very often Ukrainians usually fell victims to their more powerful neighbour.121 Those injustices, moral and material losses, the blood spilled cannot be simply forgotten or silenced because the Christian duties of truth and justice must be fulfilled.122

Legalisation and property conflicts The early documents on the relations with the Russian Orthodox Church are almost exclusively dedicated to the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the registration of her parishes, and the property conflicts.123 The Russian Orthodox Church repeatedly accused Greek____________________ 120 121 122 123

Ibid., 499. No. 5000, 438. Ibid. See two master’s theses on the issue of the early conflicts between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: Mariia Kokhanovska, “Peredumovy ta rozhortannia konfliktiv mizh Ukrainskoiu HrekoKatolytskoiu ta Ukrainskoiu Pravoslavnoiu Tserkvamy na Lvivshchyni u 19872007 rokakh” {Reasons and development of the conflicts between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the Lviv region in 19872007)} (master’s thesis, Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008); Iryna Panchyshyn, “Mizhkonfesiini konflikty na Zakhidnii Ukraini v 90-kh rokakh 20 stolittia (na prykladi Ternopilskoi oblasti)” {Interdenominational conflicts in western

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Catholics of using violence against her clergy and faithful during the process of registration. Media war, court suits, appeals to the local and state government were the daily reality of that epoch. For some readers it may seem strange that I still pay attention to the official pronouncements that treat the property conflicts of the early 1990s. Such property conflicts have almost entirely disappeared by now from the current agenda of the relations between both Churches. However, by analysing the documents that deal with that issue I aim at revealing the logic of the arguments of the Churches. Perhaps we will come across ideas that could contribute to solving contemporary Orthodox – Greek-Catholic misunderstandings. For instance, in August 1990, Cardinal Liubachivskyi addressed the Moscow Patriarchate explaining the legitimacy of the claims of his Church to be legalised. He clearly emphasised that the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church has greatly suffered under the Soviet government and the “brothers-Christians of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church.”124 The author of the statement greets the recognition of religious freedom in the Soviet Union both by the state and the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, Cardinal Liubachivskyi bemoans the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate hinders the application of the principle of religious freedom on the territory of Ukraine. On December 17, 2013, Kurt Koch, the President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, mentioned to the journalists that both Orthodox and Greek-Catholics have to work for a solution to the conflict in western Ukraine. Both sides are suffering and also the Orthodox have something to repent of. In that way Cardinal Koch answered to the accusation of Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev that the Orthodox were expelled from western Ukraine: “I agree with Metropolitan Hilarion: the situation in Ukraine is very serious. But from my point of view, it has two sides, and Metropolitan Hilarion willingly speaks only of one. I have visited many parishes in western Ukraine and saw the suffering on both sides. If the blame for what happened just lay on the Greek Catholics, we would have a lot of influence.”125

____________________ Ukraine in the 1990s (by the example of the Ternopil region)} (master’s thesis, Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008). 124 No. 15, 26. Translation from the original source. 125 “The Vatican Believes the Russian Orthodox Church Should Recognise Her Own Guilt in Addition to Accusing Greek-Catholics in Western Ukraine,” http://risu. org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/interchurch_relations/54667 (accessed January 16, 2014).

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Therefore, the guilt should be revealed for reconciliation to take place.

Moscow and the Lviv Pseudo-Synod The evaluation of the Lviv Pseudo-Council of 1946 is among the stepping stones in the relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Basically, two attitudes were adopted by the Greek-Catholic leadership. First, the Moscow Patriarchate has consciously collaborated with the Soviet Union in the liquidation of another Church because of the century-old hostility towards Greek-Catholics. Second, although the Moscow Patriarchate indeed assisted the communist government in the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, no religious organisation at that time could function completely freely; therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church was herself a victim of the Stalin regime and was forced to collaborate under the circumstances of the epoch. Let us give several examples of both approaches. Liubachivskyi maintains that both worldly and Church authorities were guilty of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.126 The pain of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the cooperation of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Soviet regime in her liquidation was expressed by Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi in his “Letter to Cardinal Cassidy.” In this text the author praises the Balamand Agreement but also expresses his disappointment with paragraphs 10 and 11 of the document. Paragraph 10 refers to the phenomenon of anti-uniatism when eastern Catholics were reunited by force with the Orthodox Churches. The text implies that the guilt for such anti-uniatism bears the Catholic Church herself because she provoked the Orthodox to develop her own salvational exclusivism. Paragraph 11 even more releases the Orthodox from the guilt of the suppression of the eastern Catholics because it claims that “certain civil authorities made attempts to bring back Oriental Catholics to the Church of their Fathers. To achieve this end they did not hesitate, when the occasion was given, to use unacceptable means.”127 In those lines ____________________ 126 No. 21, 35. 127 Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Church, “Uniatism, Method of Union of the Past, and the Present Search for Full Communion,” http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_19930624_ lebanon_en.html (accessed February 25, 2014).

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Liubachivskyi envisions the inability or unwillingness of the Orthodox to acknowledge at least their partial role in particular cases of the liquidation of eastern Catholic communities.128 The author points at the example of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the suppression of which was passively accepted by the Orthodox side. The Russian Orthodox Church is meant here, even though it is not directly mentioned. Liubachivskyi reminds one of his declaration of forgiveness to the Russian people and the Moscow Patriarchate from 1987 and expresses his sorrow that he has never received an answer from the Orthodox Church which is not capable of dealing with her past. The Moscow Patriarchate follows the easiest way by placing the blame on the communist state authorities and considering themselves victims. Until the Orthodox Church is ready to revise her past, she will “continue to see herself as a victim and will resist the process of internal healing, which is necessary for her to respond positively to the call of preaching the Gospel of Our Lord, and indeed to act as a fair and equal partner in ecumenical dialogue at various levels.”129 Thus, we observe that for Liubachivskyi it is very important to undergo the process of the revision of the past and to honestly recognise committed faults. This would release a guilty party from the unhelpful victimhood feeling. Victimhood concerns all the Churches who have not purified their consciences, including the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that “had emerged from years of victimisation, both political and ecclesial, and is undergoing her own difficult healing process.”130 This is a remarkable evolution in comparison with the “Declaration of Cardinal Liubachivskyi on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” from 1987 where the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church only humbly and unconditionally offered forgiveness to the Russian Orthodox Church. In his “Letter to Cardinal Cassidy” Liubachivskyi goes further and claims that the Moscow Patriarchate has to examine its conscience regarding the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and release itself from the circles of victimisation. It is a more dynamic vision of forgiveness and demands mutual efforts from the conflicting parties. The interpretation of the common past between the two Churches in moral terms is necessary for their future and for the future of Ukraine and ____________________ 128 No. 5001, 420. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid.

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Russia. Sviatoslav Shevchuk greeted the declaration on reconciliation131 signed on August 17, 2012 between the Russian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church in Warsaw even though the text does not define what both Churches apologise for.132 Still the Head of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church hopes that a similar agreement is signed between his Church and the Moscow Patriarchate because the healing of memory through reconciliation should open new opportunities for the constructive relations between the Ukrainian and Russian nations. The fact that Moscow negotiates and signs a declaration with a national Catholic Church instead of solving common misunderstandings exclusively via the Vatican gives hope for Greek-Catholics. Shevchuk maintains that the inability to recognise one’s faults, in particular that the structures of the Moscow Patriarchate were misused by the communist regime for the liquidation of another Church at the Lviv Pseudo-Synod is the tangible obstacle to the development of the relationships between the Greek-Catholic and the Russian Orthodox Church.133

The Russian Orthodox Church as a victim Sometimes the accusations of the organisation of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod of 1945 are first of all directed to the Soviet state. The Russian Orthodox ____________________ 131 “Sovmyestnoye poslaniye narodam Rossii i Polshi Pryedstoyatyelya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vsyeya Rusi Kirilla i Pryedsyedatyelya Yepiskopskoy Konfyeryentsii Polshi Arkhiyepiskopa Yuzefa Mikhalika, mitropolita Pyeryemyshlskogo” {Joint message to the nations of Russia and Poland of the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Kirill and the President of the Polish Episcopal Conference Archbishop Jozef Michalik, metropolitan of Przemyśl}, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 2411498.html (accessed January 14, 2014). 132 “Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Ready for Dialogue with Moscow Patriarchate,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/interchurch_relations/ 49248 (accessed January 14, 2014). See also a short analysis of the PolishRussian declaration on reconciliation: Oliver Hinz, „Kirchlicher Aufruf zur polnisch-russischen Versöhnung“, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 1 (2013): 17-19. 133 Sviatoslav Shevchuk, “Tserkva povynna vyity za mezhi ‘ohorozh svoikh khramiv” {The Church has to step out of “the fences around her churches”}, interview by Viktoriia Skuba, Day.kiev.ua, http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/ akciya-dnya/blazhenniyshiy-svyatoslav-shevchuk-cerkva-povinna-viyti-zamezhi-ogorozh-svoyih (accessed January 14, 2014).

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Church in such cases is portrayed as an executor of the decisions taken by the government, thus she is not immediately guilty of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.134 In the “Declaration of Annulment of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod” only godless worldly authorities are recognised guilty of the act that cannot be legally called a Synod because of the absence of the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.135 In their letter to the Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko, the bishops claim that all the material and human resources of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church were amalgamated into the Russian Orthodox Church which has implications on the current relations between those Churches.136 However, nowhere in the text is the Moscow Patriarchate accused of the collaboration with the communist regime. Similarly, addressing the Greek-Catholic faithful on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, Liubomyr Husar makes no references to the complicity of the Russian Orthodox Church. Comparing to the very straightforward demands of the letter of Cardinal Husar to the Patriarch of Moscow,137 the present address mentions the Russian Orthodox Church only once saying that a number of Greek-Catholic priests were forced to join the Moscow Patriarchate on the order of Stalin.138 This might be an intentional step of Husar who wanted to avoid negative expressions concerning the other Church. At the same time, such attitude could mean that Husar intends the anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod to be a feast of gratitude for the grace of God leaving aside the discussions about historical truth and guilt. In their turn, the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church blame the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church for the absence of any gratitude for their care for the Greek-Catholic faithful and priesthood after 1946.139 ____________________ 134 135 136 137 138 139

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For instance, this idea is to be found in document No. 23, 42. No. 35, 63. No. 213, 354 See No. 217. No. 218, 364 (No. 4001, 191). This idea was emotionally expressed by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in her address on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Synod of 1946 (by the way, described as the return of Greek-Catholics to the Orthodox Church). The authors of the message claim the Orthodox Church herself has suffered a lot under the Soviet regime. Further, Greek-Catholics nowadays activate efforts to depict the Lviv Pseudo-Synod as “an action of the atheistic regime for the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia with assistance of the Orthodox. Uniates are portrayed as innocent victims and

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

The texts where the Moscow Patriarchate is not considered directly guilty of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church reveal some nuances. Sometimes, the Russian Orthodox Church is described as but another victim of the Soviet government. For instance, in a letter to the leaders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches Husar portrays the Lviv Pseudo-Synod as the act of “the liquidation of one of the heirs of the baptism of Saint Volodymyr, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.”140 This tragic event in the history of Ukrainian Christianity was caused on the initiative of the atheistic Soviet government in its attempt to finally solve the question of the uniates. However, not only the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church fell victim to the Soviet regime. Liubomyr Husar indicates that also other Churches in Ukraine were persecuted. The Orthodox under the Moscow Patriarchate experienced sufferings at the very beginning of the Soviet dictatorship in Ukraine.141 The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was forced to self-liquidation by the regime at the end of the 1920s. Husar believes that this was the first trial of the model of the selfliquidation of a Church that was later applied to the Ukrainian GreekCatholics in 1946. Concerning the Moscow Patriarchate, it was misused by the Soviet regime in the process of the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The text emphasises that it is the tragedy of the Russian Orthodox Church that she was used by the Soviet regime for its inhuman acts. The incorporation of the Greek-Catholic parishes into the Russian Orthodox Church is described as an act of proselytism or uniatism that was condemned by the Balamand Agreement. In Husar’s opinion the Moscow Patriarchate played a double role at the Lviv Synod. On the one hand, ____________________ Orthodox as co-operators and tools of the godless authorities. Artificially the situation is created whereby Orthodox are placed in the position of those who are forced to justify themselves for the crimes that they have not committed.” (“Zvernennia Sviashchennoho Synodu Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy do pastvy y ukrainskoho narodu z nahody 60-richchia povernennia hreko-katolykiv u lono Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy”{Address of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the faithful and the Ukrainian people on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the return of Greek-Catholics to the Orthodox Church}, http://archiv.orthodox.org.ua/page-2149.html (accessed March 2, 2013). Translation from the original source). 140 No. 216, 258. Translation from the original source. 141 It is not completely clear what this passage means. Perhaps Cardinal Husar refers to the early politics of the Soviet government towards the Church in 1917-1920. This question has to be studied more in detail.

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Moscow evidently benefited from the destruction of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church because after the Lviv Synod millions of faithful, clergy, and church property ended up in the possession of the Russian Orthodox Church. Liubomyr Husar applies in this context the term proselytism and alludes to the document of the Joint working group of the Roman Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches, a member of which is the Moscow Patriarchate. This document articulates that proselytism includes actions like physical violence, moral or psychological pressure, and application of political, social or economic factors in order to make people change their allegiance from one Church to another.142 Exactly this happened to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church during and after the Lviv Pseudo-Synod. Thus, Cardinal Husar beats the Moscow Patriarch with his own weapon since the letter repeatedly speaks about the proselytism from the side of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church when she opens new dioceses in the east and south of Ukraine. On the other hand, the Head of the Greek-Catholics recognises that during the communist dictatorship in the former Soviet Union there were no possibilities to act independently for any ethnic, cultural, or religious group including the Moscow Patriarchate. Notwithstanding her privileged position, the Russian Orthodox Church was also oppressed and persecuted.143

Current coexistence Also the current coexistence of both Churches is sometimes problematic. For instance, the Synod of the Greek-Catholic Bishops considers the present-day situation of the faithful of their Church in Russia in the light of the historical experiences of Greek-Catholic parishes in diaspora. Those who migrated to western Europe, the Americas, or Australia and could freely express their faith, were the voice of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the open world. However, those who happened to live in the eastern territories of the Soviet Union in Siberia or the Far East under the totalitarian regime could not enjoy such freedom and remained often without the spiritual support of a Greek-Catholic priest. Nevertheless, even in those territories there are Greek-Catholic parishes nowadays and the Church leadership hopes that it would be able to offer them spiritual ____________________ 142 No. 217, 362. 143 Ibid.

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care. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church can put this desire into practice only when the right of religious freedom would be applied in the territories of the former Soviet Union.144 Obviously, here the Russian Orthodox Church is implied because she does not allow the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church to register her parishes on the Russian territories regarding such actions as proselytism. Summarising this historical section, the Greek-Catholic bishops claim that they have made this recourse in the past not to reproach someone, but to draw lessons for the future.145 From the very beginning of her legal existence the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church realised the significance of good relations with the Moscow Patriarchate for both the young Ukrainian state and the Churches. Sometimes this latter is portrayed as a victim of the Soviet regime. The Russian Orthodox Church was forced to accept the conditions of the Stalin government in order to secure her own existence. Her cooperation in the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church happened under the pressure of circumstances. However, both approaches to the role of the Moscow Patriarchate in the destruction of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church presuppose that the Russian Orthodox Church admits her voluntary or involuntary cooperation and asks forgiveness.

2.4.2 Reconciliation between nations through reconciliation between Churches? There are numerous official texts on the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time it is remarkable that the Greek-Catholic leadership does not explicitly develop the topic of the Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation except in the “Declaration on the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” from 1987. In that text Cardinal Liubachivskyi in the name of the Greek-Catholics reaches out “the hand of forgiveness, reconciliation and love to the Russian people and the Moscow Patriarchate.” 146 Cardinal di____________________ 144 No. 219, 367. 145 Ibid., 368. 146 «Marchant dans les pas de l’Esprit du Christ, nous tendons la main du pardon, de la réconciliation et de l’amour au peuple russe et au Patriarcat de Moscou. Comme dans notre réconciliation avec le peuple polonais, nous répétons les paroles du Christ: «Pardonnez comme nous pardonnons». (Mt 6,12). Nous sommes tous frères en Christ» (No. 5000, 438).

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rected his plea for reconciliation to both the people and the Church in Russia. Such an approach is justifiable. The Churches share the fate of their people and injustices that the nations suffered automatically affect the relation between the Churches. The Polish-German reconciliation started from the letter of the Polish bishops to their German counterparts. The reconciliation act between Poles and Ukrainians also took part due to the efforts of the Catholic hierarchies of both countries. In August 2013, commenting upon the Polish-Russian declaration of reconciliation, Sviatoslav Shevchuk expressed his hope for a similar document to be signed between his Church and the Moscow Patriarchate. Here again, the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation comes on stage. Therefore, it would be legitimate to claim that while searching for the rapprochement with the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church leadership is longing for the reconciliation between the countries. One notices obvious similarities between the treatment of Ukraine by its northern neighbour and the attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate towards the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. Neither the Russian state nor the Russian Orthodox Church is ready to let their Ukrainian counterparts wage an independent political and religious life. The Ukrainian historian Andrii Portnov has recently written that Russian politics in Ukraine is among other things dictated by the stereotype that both those nations make one people147 and hence the difficulties to accept the independence of Ukraine. The Moscow Patriarchate does not grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian Federation with the help of the initiatives like the Customs Union that excludes for Ukraine all the other possibilities of economic integration except the Russian one148 or the ____________________ 147 Andrij Portnov, „Die Ukrainische „Eurorevolution“: Einige Überlegungen“, in Majdan! Ukraine, Europa, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 37. 148 Oleksandr Sushko, “Yakoi Ukrainy hoche Rosiia abo “rosiiskyi” proekt” {What Russia wants of Ukraine or a “Russian” project}, Yi 31 (2004): 37. Mykhailo Mishchenko considers that the efforts of Russia to make Ukraine participate in the Customs Union is the expression of the contemporary ideology of Russian nationalism that Mykhailo Mishchenko among other things understands in terms of the creation of the union of the post-Soviet countries which are formally independent but economically contingent on and politically ruled from Moscow. (Mykhailo Mishchenko, “Mesiianizm i natsionalizm u formuvanni suchasnoi rosiiskoi natsionalnoi idei” {Messianism and nationalism in the formulation of the contemporary Russian national idea}, Yi 31 (2004): 170).

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manipulations of the gas prices tries to preserve Ukraine within the sphere of the political and economic influence of its northern neighbour. All this is blessed by the doctrine of the Russkiy Mir which should ensure that the drift of both countries from each other becomes impossible on the spiritual level. Hence, the truthfulness of the words of Mykola Riabchuk that it is a pity that Russia has not got its own Jerzy Giedroyc as it was the case in Poland. The figure of this intellectual and spiritual dimension could help normalise the relations between Ukraine and Russia.149 This settlement of the historical debts between Ukraine and Russia is highly desirable and has not lost its urgency after the 23 years that passed since both countries have begun their independent histories. At the same time, due to different geopolitical reasons this reconciliation is highly complicated. The Crimean question has been a factor of instability in the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine. In fact, the Crimean problem should be considered in the context of the transfer of this peninsula as a gift to Ukraine in 1954. However, this issue emerged as a problem only after the independence of Ukraine, partly because Crimea is still a region with a predominantly Russian population.150 Against such a background it is rather natural that autonomist and separatist movements in Crimea grew up. The insecure situation that emerged in February-March of 2014 after the downturn of President Yanukovych as a result of the EuroMaidan gave Russia the opportunity to enter its military forces on the Crimea under the pretext of the protection of Russian citizens residing on the peninsula. That step, aimed among other things at preventing Ukraine from drifting out of the Russian sphere of interests, put both countries at the threshold of war. In the midst of those events, on March 2, 2014, Ukrainian Churches issued an appeal calling the Russian state authorities “to come to senses and stop its aggression against Ukraine, and immediately pull out Russian troops from the Ukrainian land. All the responsibility before God and mankind for irreparable consequences fully falls on the leadership of ____________________ 149 Mykola Riabchuk advocates the model of Giedroyc as the way of the RussianUkrainian reconciliation that the Russian elites failed to produce (Wolczuk and Wolczuk, Poland and Ukraine, 36). 150 Frank Umbach, Russia and the Problems of Ukraine’s Cohesion. Results of a Fact-Finding Mission, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 13 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1994), 35.

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Russia.”151 Ukrainian Churches refute the Russian accusations of intolerance and aggression towards the Russians residing in Ukraine or its Russian-speaking citizens and denounce them as propaganda: “There is no oppression by the language, nation and denomination in our country. Therefore we witness that all the efforts of the Russian propaganda to represent all the events in Ukraine as “fascist coup d'état” and “extremists’ victory” do not correspond to reality absolutely.”152 The economic factors equally play a great role in the Russian-Ukrainian relations. All too often the government in Moscow uses the energy dependence of Ukraine for securing national Russian interests. Every year gas negotiations are still part of the political and economic life of Ukraine. The situation in the winter of 2008-2009 became especially critical in that regard when as a result of the unsettled agreements about the gas transmission on the territory of Ukraine there were stoppages in supply to European consumers. A more recent example is the new highly criticised agreement between Russia and Ukraine signed in 2010 according to which Russia gets the permission to keep its Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042 in return for lower prices of the Russian gas for Ukraine.153 According to the previous agreement on this question signed in 1997, Russia was obliged to withdraw its fleet until 2017. For the majority of observers this agreement, allowing the presence of the Russian fleet in Crimea for the next decades, would mean continuous influence of the northern neighbour on Ukrainian politics. The fact of the factual seizure of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated that those fears were justified. The reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia is needed for the internal cohesion in Ukraine that was called by Samuel Huntington “a cleft county.”154 Among other things this points at the present East-West division within the state. The eastern boundary of Western civilisation runs in Ukraine which consequently represents two distinct cultures.155 There is a civilisational clash between the western part of the country which historically underwent strong Western-European cultural and religious influ____________________ 151 No. 2025. 152 Ibid. 153 Luke Harding, “Ukraine Extends Lease for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,” http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/21/ukraine-black-sea-fleet-russia (accessed February 25, 2014). 154 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (London: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 166. 155 Ibid., 158-160.

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ences and eastern Ukraine being predominantly Orthodox and a satellite of the Russian empire for centuries. Ukraine not only shares with Russia the same Slavic ethnicity. In modern times Ukraine was part of a political unit with the centre in Moscow. The decisive turn happened in 1654 when Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the leader of the Cossacks’ revolt against the Poles, assumed the allegiance of the Moscow tsar in return for help against the Poles. From this event begins the period of Ukrainian history when it was politically controlled from Moscow. This difference between two Ukraines, “between Europeanized Slavs in western Ukraine and the Russo-Slav vision of what Ukraine should be,”156 is manifested nowadays in the attitudes of the people, in the way they vote, which political parties they support, and how they see the future of the state. Occasionally the separatist tendencies in eastern and southern Ukraine revive threatening with the split of Ukraine and merging of some of its territories with Russia. In the early 1990s, except for a socio-economic destabilisation, Ukraine was challenged by the ongoing regionalism and separatist tendencies as well as the threat of the political and cultural division between the proEuropean Catholic West and the pro-Russian Orthodox East and South of the country. However, those threats were successfully overcome which is a sign of the successful ethnic policy of the authorities. On the other hand, the situation is not so peaceful. Even though there were no violent clashes between nationalities, western and eastern Ukrainians, there remains an internal distrust among them and one can certainly not speak of the unity of the nation. Old conflicts, different worldviews, heroes,157 language, views ____________________ 156 Ibid., 166. 157 One of the particularly interesting and provocative figures for the UkrainianRussian relations is Ivan Mazepa. A Cossacks’ hetman Mazepa during the Battle of Poltava in 1709, fighting for the Russian tsar Peter I’s army, unexpectedly joined the side of the enemy, the Swedish king Charles XII. Being a good friend and enjoying the support of Peter I, Mazepa negotiated with the Swedish king because he considered him a possible ally in getting independence for left-bank Ukraine from the Russian empire. The Russian Orthodox Church anathemised Mazepa in the 18th century and keeps the anathema until the present day. Ivan Mazepa is considered in Russia as a traitor. An interesting fact is that in the summer of 2010 the Mazepa Street in Kyiv was renamed. Some observers believe that this was done on the request of the Moscow Patriarch Kirill (see, for instance, Iryna Shtorhin, “Chomu v Kyievi pereimenuvaly vulytsiu Ivana Mazepy” {Why the Ivan Mazepa Street in Kyiv was renamed}, http://www.radio svoboda.org/content/article/2099001.html (accessed July 13, 2010)). The Monastery of the Caves is situated in Mazepa Street. During his trips to Ukraine Patri-

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of the future, continue to divide the country and were very successfully used by the politicians in their strife for electorate. A country that is divided cannot really oppose the ruling oligarchic class. Some rapprochement between different regions of Ukraine one could observe during the Orange Revolution, but the subsequent acts of the authorities shattered this union from developing. Viktor Yushchenko, the former President of Ukraine, argued that the very complicated history of the Ukrainian-Russian relations has to be reinterpreted. Every nation has its own history. The Russian and Ukrainian histories do not have to coincide, and hence Ukraine has a right to its national heroes even if those heroes are not accepted as such in Russia, for instance, the figure of Ivan Mazepa, viewed as a traitor by the northern neighbour. The politics of memory is so important because “it is not a projection in the past, but a projection in the future!”158 “Finally, Russia has to understand that Ukraine does not have any other claim for Russia except one… that evil has to be named evil. We have to come to reconciliation.”159 The former President of Ukraine believes that Russia is not able to ask for forgiveness because of the historical sacralisation of worldly authorities which did not develop a feeling of guilt and consequently a need of repentance. Commenting upon the possible common Ukrainian-Russian manual of history, Yaroslav Hrytsak maintains that the work on that project is complicated in several aspects. First, Russia still speaks about being one people with the Ukrainians which finds support with a certain part of the Ukrainian population. Additionally, there are no Russian historians or politicians (except some liberal but marginal persons) who would openly say that the principle “We forgive and ask for forgiveness” should be applied to the Ukrainian-Russian relations. Russia is not ready to revise its

____________________ arch Kirill has to drive down this street all the time when he is visiting the monastery that belongs nowadays to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Therefore, instead of Mazepa Street we have Lavrska Street, that is the Street of the Monastery of the Caves. 158 Viktor Yushchenko, “Rozmovy iz Putinym pro ukrainsku identychnist, Holodomor ta vzaiemne prymyrennia” {Conversations with Putin about Ukrainian identity, the Holodomor, and mutual reconciliation}, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/ columns/2013/11/21/139795/ (accessed January 16, 2014). Translation from the original source. 159 Ibid. Translation from the original source.

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own history and does not let the neighbouring nations do that.160 As already stated in the declaration of Cardinal Liubachivskyi of the mutual pardon between both nations, reconciliation can happen when demands for truth and justice are fulfilled. I think Liubachivskyi would agree that the reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine means that they recognise each other as independent countries and give each other the freedom to choose the own way of development condemning the violence that took place in the past and unfortunately happens in different forms nowadays. The idea of the Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation is not primarily about the agreement on the acceptable vision of their common history but about “working out the directions for the development of community, defining esthetical criteria and social values, asserting behavioural models and moral norms.”161 In the message on the military aggression of Russia in Crimea, on March 2, 2014, Sviatoslav Shevchuk together with other Ukrainian Churches maintained: “The Ukrainian people have only friendly, fraternal feelings toward the Russian people. Do not believe the propaganda that enflames hostility between us. We want and we will continue to build friendly and fraternal relations with Russia but only as a sovereign and independent state.”162 As the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation showed, the redefinition of the relations between the states on such a basis leads to a mutually beneficial co-existence and only such an attitude of Russia would guarantee peace in that part of the world.

____________________ 160 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Rosiia sama boitsia vidverto hlianuty u vlasnu istoriiu” {Russia is herself afraid to have a frank look on her history}, interview by Pavlo Hud, Istpravda.com.ua, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2010/12/24/10687/ (accessed January 15, 2014). 161 Vitalii Ponomariov, “Mizh “zachystkoiu” i spokutoiu” {Between “cleansing” and atonement}, Yi 31 (2004): 216. Translation from the original source. 162 No. 2025.

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2.5

Struggle between two Ukraines163

2.5.1 History, identity, language History and identity In his reflections on the testament of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and Patriarch Yosyf at the Third Social Week of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Myron Bendyk spoke about internal and external reasons for the absence of social cohesion among Ukrainians. Atheisation and sovietisation have caused internal spiritual disunity, whereas the century-long occupation of Ukraine by different neighbouring lands has contributed to competing visions of its political future.164 This equally accounts for the Church division. The Ukrainian historian Vitalii Nachmanovych speaks about two nations in Ukraine: the Ukrainian European in the West and Ukrainian Soviet in the East. The triangle between Ukrainians, Russians, and other national minorities also contributes to the tensions inside the country.165 Additionally, what Tony Judt maintained about the crisis of memory in the eastern territories of Europe equally applies to Ukraine. Judt points at the fact of mistrust in social, cultural, and personal encounters which complicates the unfolding of civil society.166 In view of the social-political crisis after the EuroMaidan, expressed among other things in the separatist movements in Ukraine, some observers maintained that the country will break apart unless its foreign policy, the orientation of the European or Eurasian Union, is decided by Ukrainian themselves in a refer-

____________________ 163 The title is borrowed from the essay of Hrytsak, Two Ukraines, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 176-191. 164 “Prymyrennia yak dar Bozhyi’ – v Kyievi startuvav Suspilnyi tyzhden” {“Reconciliation as a gift of God” – Social Week started in Kyiv}, http://old.risu.org.ua/ ukr/news/reportage/article%3b32594 (accessed January 23, 2014). 165 Vitaliy Nachmanovich, “Etnonatsionalnyye problyemy i gosudarstvo – ryealnost i pyerspyektivy” {Ethno-national problems and the state – reality and perspectives}, Forum natsii, December, 2006, http://www.forumn.kiev.ua/12-55-06/557.html (accessed September 15, 2013). 166 Tony Judt, “The Past Is another Country. Myth and Memory in Post-War Europe,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Present of the Past, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (n. p.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 173.

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endum.167 The coexistence of different mutually contradicting versions of history also contributes to the societal division. The official version of Ukrainian history favouring the nationaloriented or the old Soviet vision often depends upon political forces at power. For instance, the authorities under President Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) intensified a nation-building politics. Opening monuments and museums, the President wearing the traditional Ukrainian folk shirt vyshyvanka, underlying on every occasion the distinct character of the Ukrainian nation as dissimilar from the Russian ethnos, opening the secret Soviet archives, efforts to unite the Orthodox and to create the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church as well as to spread the use of the Ukrainian language were the signs of the fashion for all Ukrainians in the political milieu of the country. The biggest success of President Yushchenko was the international recognition of the famine of 1932-1933 as a genocide of the Ukrainian nation which became a national symbol for Ukrainians.168 As no one before, Yushchenko managed to draw attention to that page of Ukrainian history and made it to a significant degree acceptable also in the eastern and southern parts of the country. The same President Yushchenko is criticised for his inability to reconcile Ukrainians despite his best intentions. It is indeed difficult to bring together different approaches to the Ukrainians history. The results of the public opinion polls verify that statement. For instance, the respondents were asked to choose the best way of dealing with the memory of the bloody events of the 20th century when Ukrainians from different camps murdered each other (e.g., during political repressions, World War I and World War II). The answers made it clear: 65% in 2003 and only 46% in 2009 highlighted the need of reconciliation without looking on who was right and who was wrong. Instead 20% in 2003 and 36% in 2009 were of the opinion that the guilty have to be found and condemned.169 Yaroslav ____________________ 167 Orlando Figes, „Die Ukraine gibt es nicht“, in Majdan! Ukraine, Europa, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 71. 168 Georgij Kasjanov, „Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine“, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 1 (2013): 17. 169 Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Protiahom 20 stolittia v istorii Ukrainy bulo bahato podii, koly ukraintsi masovo znyshchuvaly odyn odnoho: tse I i II svitovi viiny, hromadianski viiny, politychni represii. Yakyi z navedenykh shliakhiv rishennia vzaiemnykh obraz ye krashchym?” {Sociological poll. During the 20th century in the history of Ukraine there were a lot of events when Ukrainians en masse exterminated each other: World War I and World War II, civil wars, political repressions. Which of the given ways of solving mutual of-

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Hrytsak explains the diminished interest in letting the past go without trial by the wrong historical politics of the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko who overemphasised the western Ukrainian element of the national memory.170 Further developments confirmed that conclusion. Nevertheless, this politics of an intensive Ukrainisation proved to be too harsh for the eastern and southern population of the country with still a predominantly Soviet mentality. Combined with the failures of President Yushchenko in the economic sphere and the subsequent financial crisis of 2009, the Ukrainisation politics was interrupted under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. By declaring a new approach to history, appointing Valerii Soldatenko, a Soviet historian and a current member of the Communist Party of Ukraine, for the office of director of the Institute of the National Memory, and naming Dmytro Tabachnyk with his anti-Ukrainian sentiments171 for the office of Minister of Education and Science, Yanukovych strengthened those political forces in Ukraine whose mentality is ____________________ fences is the best?}, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=454 (accessed January 21, 2014). 170 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Novi povoroty v ukrainskii politytsi pamiati” {Recent turns in Ukrainian politics of memory}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do? novi_povoroti_v_ukrayinskiy_polititsi_pamyati&objectId=1117515 (accessed January 21, 2014). 171 Dmytro Tabachnyk, “Opozdavshiye na 200 lyet” {200 years too late}, http:// www.partyofregions.org.ua/digest/4a648cef77d22 (accessed February 11, 2011). This is a remarkable article of him published on the official website of the Party of Regions in 2009 when Tabachnyk was still a deputy. This work can be considered as a summary of his main ideas concerning Ukrainian history. The core of the article is the criticism of Ukrainian nationalism and its identification with fascism. Additionally, the author strongly denies that the Holodomor is a genocide against the Ukrainian nation. He continues the old rhetoric of Ukraine as one of the winners of World War II and the legitimacy of calling it the Great Patriotic War. The article finishes by drawing a line between the “Rome-union-Galician and Russian-Orthodox ethnos” in Ukraine which are in a state of permanent conflict. It is on the basis of this distinction that Tabachnyk considered not to recognise western Ukrainians as part of the Ukrainian nation. Furthermore, by calling Ukrainians “little Russians” (a historical name of Ukrainians under the rule of the Moscow tsars) he seems to discard the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nation at all. Even though his warning against pure nationalism is plausible, Tabachnyk’s anti-Ukrainian ideas contribute to widening the division gap between the two parts of Ukraine. See also the analysis of the views of Tabachnyk: Vasyl Rasevych, “Pro “henetychnu pamiat,” abo Tvortsi pamiati – 2” {On “genetic memory” or creators of memory – 2}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews. do?pro_genetichnu_pamyat_abo_tvortsi_pamyati__2&objectId=1106539 (accessed January 21, 2014).

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far from the construction of particular Ukrainian identity. Analysing the achievements of the first year of the presidency of Yanukovych, Volodymyr Viatrovych acknowledged the exploitation of history for political aims and its fine-tuning in accordance with the political conjuncture, in that case with the biggest strategic partner of Ukraine, the Russian Federation.172 To the peculiarities of the Ukrainian memory politics belongs the treatment of the state archives which were not cleared up still 15 years after the independence. Appointed in 2006 as Secretary General of the State Archives Committee (from 2010 the Head of the State Archive Service), the Communist Party member Olga Ginzburg forbade access to the files that concern possible communist crimes.173 Regional divisions exist among Ukrainians concerning the geopolitical orientation of their country on the EU, NATO, or Russia. As for December 2013, 46% of respondents saw benefits from the EU membership of Ukraine, and almost 36% wanted to join the Customs Union with Russia, Bielarus, and Kazakhstan.174 In 1997, the majority of the population favoured joining the EU and rejected the membership of NATO: 55% of the residents supported the EU-membership and 30% of the Ukrainians believed that the country should join NATO.175 The reason for the diminished attractiveness of the EU in 2013 is connected to the internal economic-political crisis of that organisation and by the disappointment of Ukrainians to ever join the EU. Distinct regional differences were revealed. The most enthusiasts of NATO live in western Ukraine – 42%, whereas in the East there are just 29% of them and in the South even less – 25%.176 Instead those regions saw the guarantees of the security in the ____________________ 172 Volodymyr Viatrovych, “Prezydent ta istorychni torhy” {The President and the trade of history}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, February 4-11, 2011. See also Georgij Kasjanov, „Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine“, 18-19. 173 Georges Mink, “Institutions of National Memory in Post-Communist Europe. From Transitional Justice to Political Uses of Biographies (1989-2010),” in History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Memory Games, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p., Palgrave, 2013), 162. 174 Razumkov Centre, “Sociological Poll. Which Community Should Be Priority for Ukraine to Enter?” http://www.uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll_id=919 (accessed February 25, 2014). 175 Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, Die Ukraine nach der Unabhängigkeit. Nationsbildung zwischen Ost und West, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 5 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1999), 19-20. 176 Ibid., 20.

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rapprochement with Russia – 65% in the East, 52% in the South and only 17% in the western part of the country. This shows that in general many Ukrainians have not only an incoherent, but also a contradicting picture of their future. They support the EU membership and the union with Russia at the same time, which obviously do not go along with each other. The events of the EuroMaidan in November 2013 – February 2014 showed that the division in present-day Ukraine does not run so much along the ideological regional line but along the line of values. Here there are no differences between the East, South, and West of the country. The small existing middle class demanded the reorganisation of the country on the principles that permit the people’s self-realisation and not only the satisfaction of the basic needs.177 Mykola Riabchuk believes that in the coming years not the regional division based on identity but the differences between the old-minded Soviet-nostalgic Ukrainians and the young proEuropean citizens will be crucial for Ukraine.178 I consider it to be the big challenging task for the Ukrainian Churches to sustain this movement from identities to values since it is the only chance for that postcommunist country.

The answer of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church During the existence of independent Ukraine, the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church often addressed the division between the east and the west of the country and subsequently the need of the all-Ukrainian reconciliation. Ukraine needs a societal cohesion. This was emphasised already in the greeting telegram of Cardinal Liubachivskyi to the newly elected President of Ukraine in 1994. The roots for the East-West division (equally manifested on the Church level) were to be found centuries ago and they were amplified by the Soviet repressions and the politics of Rus____________________ 177 Yaroslav Hrytsak, „Revolution der Würde“, in Majdan! Ukraine, Europa, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 75. See also the interview with the same author: Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukraina – yak litak, yakyi zakhopyly terorysty” {Ukraine is like an aeroplane taken hostage}, interview by Iryna Slavinska, Life.pravda.com.ua, http://life.pravda.com.ua/ person/2013/12/30/147591/ (accessed January 16, 2014). 178 Mykola Rjabtschuk, „Zerstörte Illusionen“, in Majdan! Ukraine, Europa, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 106.

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sification.179 Cardinal Liubachivskyi calls the President to include into his administration the representatives of political circles from different regions of Ukraine to earn trust from the citizens.180 The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church often emphasises the fact that notwithstanding attempts to stir up misunderstandings between religious, regional, and ethnic groups, independent Ukraine has not witnessed a real outburst of violence in those spheres.181 However, there are forces and groups in society that occasionally attempt to destroy the public peace. More precisely, even the state authorities themselves are accused by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church of being the source of the problem. Certain political forces are fuelling internal Ukrainian struggles, awaking the phantoms of the past and impeding the all-national rapprochement. For instance, this happened during the commemoration of the victims of World War II in Lviv in 2011, when street clashes took place during the parade of the veterans of the Soviet Red Army and the nationalistically oriented political groups. On that occasion the Greek-Catholic bishops very clearly claimed: “They {politicians} deceive themselves when they hope to pull away attention of the own people from the difficult economic situation by bringing to the daylight those topics and symbols which do not promote the consolidation of society but, on the contrary, deepen divisions and opposition.”182 The Days of commemoration and reconciliation should unite people in prayer for the victims of the war and for those who laid their lives for the independence of Ukraine; instead, it became a day of struggle between the groups that interpret the past of their country differently. The Greek-Catholic bishops primarily make Ukrainian authorities responsible for stirring up social tensions by misusing the existing latent lines of division in society. That fact is also apparent to other religious communities in Ukraine. In the address on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations warned against those who try to divide society along religious, national, or political lines.183 The regional, cultural, linguistic, national, or

____________________ 179 180 181 182 183

No. 53, 100. Ibid. No. 2008. Ibid. Translation from the original source. No. 2012.

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religious diversity reflects the true picture of one Ukrainian people and those playing on such differences do evil.184 One of the most emotional addresses focusing on the internal divisions in contemporary Ukraine is authored by Liubomyr Husar and appeared in January 2011 aiming to explain the absence of the official representatives of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at the festivities dedicated to the Ukrainian Unity Day (Den Sobornosti) in Kyiv. Husar questions the liability of this feast when members of different political parties and organisations are not able to celebrate on the same square in Kyiv.185 The Unity Day is deprived of its internal meaning: “The word “sobornist” (spiritual community) means “unity.” Can we celebrate unity if we are not united?186 Among other things “sobornist” means “the ability to respect the dignity of every person.”187 Thus except for “cultural, civilisational, and spiritual unity of Ukrainians as an European nation,”188 “sobornist” equally has a material dimension of practical solidarity in society. Furthermore, Cardinal Husar rhetorically asks what contemporary Ukrainians are ready to sacrifice for the unity of their country, thus emphasising the significance of this question. While speaking of sacrifice, it usually is about an issue of paramount importance. Finally, Husar draws a link between the all-Ukrainian unity and the unity of the Ukrainian Church: “The word sobornist comes from the word “sobor” (council), that is the Church to which all people come, despite differences that may separate them. Wouldn’t it be good to become one sobor on Ukrainian Unity Day?”189 Those words reveal another connotation of unity for Husar, namely the unity between Ukrainian Churches that should be a manifestation of the unity of the Ukrainian nation and of the Ukrainian state. Conversely, the unity of the Church in Ukraine would lead to the consolidation of society. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church not only investigates external political circumstances that fuel dividing attitudes among Ukrainians, they also attempt to examine the consciousness of Ukrainians themselves. In the address on the occasion of the Great Jubilee Year, the Greek-Catholic bishops endeavour to correct a common prevalent percep____________________ 184 185 186 187 188 189

176

Ibid. No. 2007. Ibid. No. 2024. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. No. 2007.

Chapter II. Who are victims? Who is guilty? Moral diagnosis of the Ukrainian past

tion of Ukrainians of themselves as victims who used to suffer during their history from all their neighbours. Instead, the authors maintain that it would be mistaken to claim that Ukrainians have always suffered but never offended any other nation. Furthermore, although Ukrainians have not committed so many crimes against other peoples as their neighbours, they have often fought the co-citizens starting from the earliest history of the Kyivan Rus. Even nowadays this results in the polarisation of society.190 Thus, the Synod of Bishops points at the internal Ukrainian enmity during its history, a feature that is often overlooked. One cannot undo history, but the past should be remembered in order that those who feel guilty may confess their faults to God and their neighbours and make a strong decision not to repeat the sins of the past.191

Language It is presumed that one of the most persistent division lines in Ukrainian society runs along the language issue. In chapter I, I have already written on the issue of languages in different Ukrainian Churches. The language question belongs to the most contestable and the best manipulated issues by politicians. It supports also the thesis about the regional differences in the country and is evident in the election programmes of presidential candidates and political parties. Ukrainian is the only state language in the country, with Russian widely used. While Ukrainian is mostly spoken in the west, Kyiv and the centre of the country, the eastern and southern regions are predominantly Russian-speaking. Consequently, political parties based in the former regions demand the intensification of the efforts for the fostering of the positions of Ukrainian in all the spheres of social life, while candidates of the opposite camp promise the elevation of the status of Russian as a second state language. In the absence of coherent and concrete programmes of political, economic and social reforms, those are questions of language, history that are used to get the votes of the population. The language is a sensible issue for Ukrainian citizens and the manipulations in this sphere give politicians a powerful means to attain their aims. ____________________ 190 No. 98, 182. 191 Ibid.

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In the survey conducted by Razumkov Centre in 2005, the regional differences concerning the status of languages in Ukraine were confirmed.192 Almost 79% of the population in the west of the country believes that Ukrainian should be the only state language with Russian used as a language of the national minority. At the same time, the south (55%) and the east of the country (58%) find it more reasonable that both Ukrainian and Russian languages are officially established as state languages. If we indicate the numbers in the country in general, then 35% of the citizens back Ukrainian as the only state language and 37% of them would grant such a status to both Ukrainian and Russian. One more significant group of respondents (20%) finds the solution by claiming Ukrainian as a state language and Russian as an official language in certain regions of the country where this is a predominant language of everyday use. Those results demonstrate the actual split of the country along the lines of language and identity. This fact by itself is not dangerous and Ukraine is certainly not the only country with big language groups. However, the way those differences are treated by the state authorities and how they are reflected in the state language politics give us grounds to speak about language as an evidently dividing factor in society. What is even more important, this factor is to a great extent artificially fired up. Critical voices claim that it may seem that the issues of socio-economic and political transition are much more urgent for Ukraine for the moment, however, for a post-genocide and post-colonial country language is not of minor importance; it is all about self-identification and development.193 In the opinion of national-democratic political forces in Ukraine, the Ukrainian language should remain the only state language because it is a basis for the state-building and a means to consolidate the country. According to that view, the language is thus a symbol of the independent state and a proof of the existence of the separate Ukrainian nation as dis-

____________________ 192 Razumkov Centre, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia: Yakym chynom povynni spivisnuvaty ukrainska i rosiiska movy v Ukraini?” {Sociological poll. In which way do Ukrainian and Russian languages have to coexist in Ukraine?}, http:// www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=289 (accessed February 25, 2014). 193 Serhii Hrabovskyi, “Mova – vlada – Tserkva: vyklyky siohodennia” {Language – power – Church. Present challenges}, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycom ment/13683-mova-vlada-cerkva-vikliki-sogodennya.html (accessed January 11, 2014).

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tinct from Russian.194 Ukrainians have many things in common with Russians, that is they both are Slavs, mostly Orthodox and share a common history, and it is only the language that distinguishes them from the northern neighbour. Therefore, this distinctive feature should by all means be supported. Together with the other Heads of Churches and religious organisations Sviatoslav Shevchuk expresses the awareness of the divisive power of language in the Ukrainian context. After the adoption of the new law on languages in Ukraine in 2012,195 they issued an open letter asking the President to have the law reviewed. The state authorities have to avoid any political speculation on the issue of languages and prepare a new legislation that would preserve the balance between Ukrainian as the only state language and the languages of minorities.196 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate did not join the authors of the message because her leadership holds the opinion that the Church should comment on state laws only when they concern matters of religion and morals.197 The question of languages does not belong to them.

2.5.2 The trauma of the Holodomor The absence of the societal cohesion is evident in the attitude towards the Holodomor. Widely recognised in the western part of Ukraine as Stalin’s genocide against the Ukrainian people this radical definition gets less support in the Ukrainian East and South. According to the public opinion poll ____________________ 194 Margrethe B. Sovik, “Language Practices and the Language Situation in Kharkiv. Examining the Concept of Legitimate Language in Relation to Identification and Utility,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 201 (2010): 7. 195 On June 3, 2010, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the changes to the Ukrainian constitution according to which the regions of Ukraine with 10% and more of ethnic minorities can use their native language as a second state language. This law was at first cancelled at the result of the EuroMaidan on February 23, 2014, thus returning to the sole state language in Ukraine (“Rada Cancels Language Law,” http://zik.ua/en/news/2014/02/23/rada_cancels_language_law_463972 (accessed February 25, 2014)). However, because of separatist tendencies in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea, the old version of the language law was re-established. 196 No. 2016. 197 “Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate Consciously Reluctant to Comment on Language Law,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/state/national_ religious_question/49050 (accessed January 14, 2014).

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conducted in 2010-2012, “80% of western, central and northern Ukrainians and over 50% of southern Ukrainians, one third of eastern Ukrainians and one in four residents of Donbass believe it was a genocide. This statement is believed by people of all ages.”198 The merit of this high recognition belongs to the efforts of President Yushchenko. While President Yushchenko invested all this efforts to have the Holodomor recognised as a genocide on the international level, his follower, President Yanukovych portrays the tragedy as a crime of Stalin against his people but not as a genocide against the Ukrainian nation. In this way the President is following the official Russian interpretation where the Holodomor is viewed in the context of the massive forced collectivisation campaign of Stalin. Because Ukrainian farmers were strongly opposing collectivisation, Stalin had to implement stronger measures in order to achieve his aim of controlling the agricultural production and industrialising the country.199 In this view Stalin was a successful manager and mass deportations and extermination of not only Ukrainians but also Crimean Tatars, Russians, Kazakhs, Kalmyks, and Caucasian nationalities were necessary a means of making the Soviet Union a thriving industrialised country. The Ukrainian society was impressed when on the inauguration day of the new President Yanukovych on February 28, 2010, all the materials dedicated to the theme of the Holodomor were removed from the official website of the President.200 Even though later under public pressure those materials were restored, the fact of the change in the historical policy was more than evident. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is of the opinion that the recognition of the great famine as a tragedy for all Ukrainian people will contribute to the national unity in the country: “This tragic page remains to be an unhealed wound in the history of our nation. This memory is actively promoting social harmony and understanding between people with common pain of the past and hope for the future.”201 Consequently, the Church condemns those who inhibit that possibility of unity. For instance, in his letter to the Prime-Minister of Ukraine, Liubomyr Husar does not speak about those guilty of the Holodomor but instead re____________________ 198 “Majority of Ukrainians Consider Holodomor Genocide,” http://risu.org.ua/en/ index/all_news/state/national_religious_question/50309 (accessed January 16, 2014). 199 Tabachnyk, 200 years. 200 Viatrovych, President. 201 No. 2022.

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proaches the state authorities with the very humble commemoration ceremony in 2003. The organisers are guilty because they “failed to understand the significance and meaning of the event”202 that could play a great nation-building role in Ukraine. Obviously, it is easy to name the perpetrators in case of the Holodomor, the man-made famine that took place in Ukraine in the winter of 19321933. All the pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the topic accuse the totalitarian regime of Stalin of the organisation of this tragedy. The Holodomor was directly ordered from Moscow; 7-10 million people died of hunger after the Soviet authorities expropriated food products in the autumn of 1932; hence, the Holodomor is an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people and a crime against humanity.203 The Holodomor is a “terrible crime of the Soviet regime against Ukrainian people.”204 Additionally, the totalitarian regime attempted to erase any memory of the tragedy.205 It is guilty of keeping silence about the tragedy of the famine by trying “to eradicate the remembrance of the Holodomor even among the eyewitnesses and denying its existence.”206 It is worth noting that the opinions of the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine concerning the evaluation of the Holodomor do not completely coincide. Among the joint addresses on the topic of the great famine, only the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate signed the texts where the Holodomor was denoted as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.207 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church as well as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church did not author such official pronouncements. The only text signed by all four Churches of the Kyivan tradition is “Address of the AllUkrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations on the 75th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine” that does mention the word genocide for the assessment of the Holodomor but does not accentuate that idea. The artificial famine of 1932-1933 is rendered as one of the biggest tragedies of the history of Ukraine and of the entire world. The text recognised that the Holodomor was deliberately organised by Stalin and was si____________________ 202 203 204 205 206 207

No. 172, 300. No. 277, 460; No. 303, 502; No. 319, 520; No. 2003. No. 155, 274. Ibid., 275; No. 319, 521; No. 2003. No. 155, 275. Translation from the original source. No. 2003; No. 2022.

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lenced afterwards in the Soviet history.208 I suppose that this address is a compromise variant intentionally avoiding the dividing language in order to unite all the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine around the message of national unity on the basis of the commemoration of the Holodomor. It seems that the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church tell more in their messages on the commemoration of the Holodomor than just call to national unity and accuse the communist regime of the massive death of people. In the spirit of all the texts on dealing with the burdened memory, I am inclined to postulate that in the example of the great famine, the Church points at the destructive influence of communism on both the physical and spiritual dimension of the person. Hence, the Holodomor has to be considered in the broader context of healing human souls from the communist distortions to the human spirit. Myroslav Marynovych has identified the problem in such a way: the communist ideas were present not only on the political or economic level; they affected the very centre of the human being, the soul. Consequently, paraphrasing Konrad Adenauer, Marynovych postulates that communism cannot be defeated in an economic, cultural, or military way; Christian expertise is absolutely necessary.209 It is plausible to speak about both the crime and sin of communism.210 The Holodomor is the example of the former, whilst the moral decadence in private and political life in contemporary Ukraine reveals the latter. The crime of communism concerns only certain people, but the sin of communism is committed by every person who lives according to the destructive rules of the system still nowadays.211 This conclusion is even more plausible given the fact that Ukraine together with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary constitute a group of countries which demonstrate a controversial interpretation of com____________________ 208 No. 319, 520-521. 209 Myroslav Marynovych, “Spokutuvannia komunizmu” {Purging communism}, in Vybrane. T. 1, Avtobiohrafichni ta ranni tvory. Lysty (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 247. 210 Ibid., 245-246. Therefore, in his other presentation on the topic, Marynovych calls to condemn communism as the crime against humanity on the legal level. On the moral level, the former communist countries have to repent commonly of their devotion to the communist doctrine (see Myroslav Marynovych, “Istorychna pamiat i moralni vyklyky suchasnosti” {Historical memory and moral challenges of the present times}, http://maidanua.org/static/mai/1306170491.html (accessed January 21, 2014). 211 Marynovych, Purging communism, 246-247.

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munism.212 That totalitarian past exercises a decaying influence on the path to a democratic transition: “The authoritarianism latent in post-Soviet power structures reveals the extent to which an unaddressed criminal past undermines democratic development.”213 Those considerations explain why the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is that much faithful to her major preoccupation about the repercussions of the past on the present stance of Ukrainian society. In all the texts, the tragedies of the past, the current crisis, and its future solution are of a spiritual nature. The former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko argued that the reconciliation in society, the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation, is necessary for the development of national unity and then trust. In its turn, trust is necessary for the functioning of society, its economics, and all its institutions. Yushchenko emphasises that in the crime of the Holodomor it is important to remember those who organised it or helped realise it.214 It was made by the Moscow communist authorities with the help of Ukrainian collaborators. Ukraine has never had either a trail or a public condemnation of communism, which would be beneficial for the UkrainianUkrainian reconciliation. Contemporary Ukrainians do not bear juridical responsibility for the past. However, they can decide upon whether evil will be spread around either by choice or by indifference. We will see later that the thought of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church goes in the same direction – the personal purification from evil as the responsibility of everyone.

____________________ 212 Claus Leggewie, “Seven Circles of European Memory,” http://www.eurozine. com/articles/2010-12-20-leggewie-en.html (accessed October 30, 2013). 213 Ibid. 214 Yushchenko, Conversations.

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Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation 3.1

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: reconciliation as the spiritual regeneration of the person

3.1.1 John Paul II as the advocate of reconciliation in Ukraine In 2011 Ukraine celebrated the 10th anniversary of the visit of Pope John Paul II that took place on June 23-27 in the capital of Ukraine Kyiv and in the city of Lviv, at that time the seat of the Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. This event evoked enormous interest throughout the country. Only in the liturgy in the Byzantine rite in Lviv participated one and a half million people. The Pope’s visit was welcomed with a great enthusiasm and was described in the words of superlatives: “Among the great surprises of this visit we “came in touch” with heaven. In those days we once again came across an unfamiliar tranquility, noble dignity, ideals of life, and we remembered that we are naturally called to our created image and likeness of God.”1 Coming closer to our research it is important to remember that forgiveness was the great topic that Pope John Paul II put at the centre of the celebration of the Jubilee of 2000. On March 12, 2000 the Pope apologised for seven types of sins committed by the Roman Catholic Church. The apology before the Jews for the sufferings committed by Christians was another gesture.2 A year before, in 1999, the Vatican issued a document under the title “Memory and Reconciliation. The Church and the Faults of the Past”3 and Incarnationis Mysterium,4 the Bull of Indiction of ____________________ 1

2

3

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Michael Dymyd, “What Happens after the Bishop of Rome’s Visit to Ukraine?” http://old.risu.org.ua/eng/religion.and.society/papa.visit/ugcc/ (accessed January 9, 2014). Anthony Bash, Forgiveness and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 113. See a well-analysed account of the Sunday of the purification of memory and its theological meaning in Isabelle Aumont, La “purification de la mémoire” selon Jean-Paul II (Paris: Parole et silence, 2008), 15-52. See also a recent research on the official Catholic theology of repentance and the purification of memory around the Great Jubilee of 2000 in Claire Reggio, Repentances catholiques: L’Église face à l’histoire (1990-2010) (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2013). International Theological Commission, “Memory and Reconciliation. The Church and the Faults of the Past,” http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/cong

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000. Both of them address the question of the forgiveness by a group or institution. In fact, John Paul II officially asked forgiveness in the name of the Church more than 30 times.5 The Pope addressed specific issues of forgiveness and reconciliation in the Ukrainian context in particular during his visit to the country. One of the leading themes of this trip was the rapprochement between the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine. The Orthodox reacted in different ways to that appeal; however moderate voices of hope were heard also from their side. For example, John Paul II was welcomed by the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate who hoped that the Pope would help the unrecognised Orthodox Churches in Ukraine to come out of international isolation.6 John Paul II mentioned ecumenical questions in several addresses. For instance, the Roman Pontiff called the Ukrainian Christians to the establishment of the full communion between them: “Ecumenical dialogue must therefore be an indispensable priority for believers and for the Churches in Ukraine. The division of Christians into different confessions represents one of the greatest challenges of our time. We have a long way to go to reach full reconciliation and visible communion among Christ’s disciples.”7

Communion between Christians of different rites can be restored due to the memory of one baptism that eliminates obstacles caused by the diversity of traditions.8 The purification of the burdened memory and mutual forgiveness between Catholics and Orthodox is needed on the way to reconciliation: ____________________

4

5 6 7

8

regations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000307_memory-reconcitc_en.html (accessed February 1, 2014). Ioannes Paulus II, “Incarnationis Mysterium. Bull of Indiction of the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000,” http://www.vatican.va/jubilee_2000/docs/documents/ hf_jp-ii_doc_30111998_bolla-jubilee_en.html (accessed February 1, 2014). Aumont, La “purification de la mémoire”, 39. “Filaret Thinks Pope Will Bring Ukraine Closer to the West,” http://old.risu.org. ua/eng/news/article;1215 (accessed January 9, 2014). “Meeting and Lunch with the Members of the Ukrainian Catholic Episcopate. Address of the Holy Father. Apostolic Nunciature, Kyiv. Sunday, 14 June 2001,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2001/documents/hf_jpii_spe_20010624_ucraina-meeting-episc_en.html (accessed December 5, 2012). “Holy Mass Celebrated in Latin Rite. Homily of the Holy Father. Sunday, 24 June 2001. Kyiv, Chaika Airport,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_ paul_ii/homilies/2001/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_20010624_ucraina_en.html (accessed December 5, 2012).

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Part I. The essence and challenges of reconciliation “Unfortunately, there have also been sad times, when the image of Christ’s love has been obscured: bowing before our one Lord, let us recognise our faults. As we ask forgiveness for the errors committed in both the distant and recent past, let us in turn offer forgiveness for the wrongs endured. The most fervent wish that rises from my heart is that the errors of times past will not be repeated in the future. May their memory not be a hindrance on the way to mutual knowledge, the source of brotherhood and cooperation.”9

The reconciliation between Christian denominations in Ukraine in communion is indispensable because “there is no authentic evangelisation without full fraternal communion.”10 In his pronouncements John Paul II also addressed the need of the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. In particular, in his homily during the Eucharist celebration on June 26, 2001, the Roman Pontiff called the Ukrainian and Polish people “to build the communion which remains threatened by the memory of past experiences and by the prejudices stirred up by nationalism… It is time to leave behind the sorrowful past… May pardon given and received spread like a healing balm in every heart. May the purification of historical memories lead everyone to work for the triumph of what unites over what divides, in order to build together a future of mutual respect, fraternal cooperation and true solidarity.”11

It was a favourable moment for that sort of plea because those words were pronounced during the liturgy in the Latin rite with the participation of the clergy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and numerous faithful of both Ukrainian and Polish roots. In his letter to Liubomyr Husar and Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the Head of the Catholic Church of Poland, on July 8, 2003 John Paul II wrote: “Considering the past events in a new perspective and taking on the responsibility to build a better future for all, let the

____________________ 9

10

11

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“Arrival Ceremony. Address of the Holy Father. Kyiv International Airport. Saturday, 23 June 2001,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/ 2001/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010623_ucraina-arrival_en.html (accessed December 5, 2012). Italics preserved from the original text. “Divine Liturgy in Byzantine (Greek-Catholic) Rite. Homily of the Holy Father. Kyiv, Chaika Airport. Monday, 25 June, 2001,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_ father/john_paul_ii/homilies/2001/documents/hf_jpii_hom_20010625_ucraina_en.html (accessed December 5, 2012). “Eucharistic Celebration in the Latin Rite and Beatifications. Homily of the Holy Father. Tuesday, 26 June 2001, Lviv,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_ paul_ii/homilies/2001/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_20010626_ucraina-beat_en.html (accessed December 5, 2012).

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two nations look at each other with an eye for reconciliation.”12 The words of the Polish Pope are in the epigraph to the joint message of the Catholic bishops of Poland and Ukraine on forgiveness and reconciliation on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Volyn massacre: “May through the purification of historical memory everybody becomes ready to put higher what unites and not what divides us.”13 Already this short account of the reconciliation discourse of John Paul II proves that the topic belonged to his main concerns. Practically in every official speech the Pope referred at least in a few words to the need of reconciliation between peoples and religious denominations in Ukraine. The Pope’s visit was a powerful thrust to the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to promote the theme of reconciliation. Intensive work on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation began after John Paul II’s pilgrimage. This Pope is described as the Apostle of peace and reconciliation and his message should stimulate the reflection on the need and meaning of reconciliation in Ukraine. This spiritual testament of reconciliation revealed itself in the course of the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. In the sermon during the liturgy on the occasion of the reconciliation act between the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops, Liubomyr Husar reminded one that this event took place four years after the visit of John Paul II to Ukraine. The Pope’s appeal to live in unity, peace and love, was uttered at the same square where the bishops now declare their will to rapprochement that left a profound impact in the hearts of the people. In the light of this testament of the Pope, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and of the Roman Catholic Church of Poland accomplished the reconciliation act and called believers to follow it.14 Therefore, I find it justifiable to place the references to the reconciliation message of John Paul II among the distinctive features of Greek-Catholic theology.

____________________ 12

13 14

“The Pope Calls for Volyn Reconciliation,” https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ ukraine/pope-calls-for-volyn-reconciliation-16896.html (accessed February 27, 2014). No. 2019. Translation from the original source. No. 368, 611.

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3.1.2 The Greek-Catholic tradition of reconciliation It seems important for the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to occasionally remind their faithful of the reconciliation initiatives that took place in the past. It concerns the Polish-Ukrainian relations as well as the initiatives of Cardinal Liubachivskyi aimed at the rapprochement between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarchate. Additionally, Liubachivskyi strived to make his faithful acquainted with the true history of the ecumenical movement, in particular with the ideas and efforts of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi on the unity of the Church. The following analysis will focus on those references more in detail. In particular, allusions to the history of mutual attempts at reconciliation draw attention in the texts dedicated to the reconciliation between the Ukrainian and Polish nation whether they were written by Liubomyr Husar, the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops, or in the joint documents of the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy.15 In his sermon on the occasion of the Polish-Ukrainian pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia in August 2004, Liubomyr Husar revoked the history of the Polish-Ukrainian efforts to rapprochement. He reminded one of the fact that in 1987 in Rome the leaders of the Polish Catholics and of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics exchanged their declarations of forgiveness. Because of the political situation of that time the practical implementation of the reconciliation programme was impossible and, hence, this Church initiative remained practically unknown. In the spirit of the declarations of 1987, the contemporary Church leaders of Poland and Ukraine should feel obliged not to repeat the mistakes of the past and stand openly for reconciliation: “We cannot return the past but we want to forgive each other and reconcile.”16 In Husar’s opinion, this initiative should be embodied nowadays when the times became more favourable. Similarly, the mutual declarations of 1987

____________________ 15

16

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Also Cardinal Liubachivskyi mentioned the declarations of forgiveness that his Church exchanged with the Heads of the Polish Catholic Church Józef Glemp and Stefan Wyszynski in 1965 and 1987. See „Ansprache von Kardinal Myroslav Ivan Liubachivskyi am 6. November 1987 aus Anlass der 40-Jahr-Feier von „Kirche in Not/ Ostpriesterhilfe“ in Rom“, in Die Ukrainische Katholische Kirche (Königstein: Kirche in Not/Ostpriesterhilfe, 1990), 56. No. 362, 602. Translation from the original source.

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are reminded of in the message of the Greek-Catholic bishops to the Polish and Ukrainian nations in May 2003.17 In their joint message on the occasion of the mutual forgiveness and reconciliation act “Reconciliation between Nations is Possible,” the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops underscored this tradition more extensively.18 In particular, the bishops mentioned two meetings between the Ukrainian and Polish Catholic hierarchies that took place in Rome on May 22, 1945 and on October 8 and October 17, 1987. Jubilee celebrations of the baptism of the Kyivan Rus in Rome in 1988 and the later celebration by the Roman-Catholic and the Greek-Catholic hierarchs in Polish Czestochowa were among those first steps to mutual rapprochement. The next meetings took place after both countries became independent from the communist rule. The years 2000 and 2001 are of special importance. The Millennium festivities of 2000 drew the Catholics in Poland and Ukraine closer, and the pilgrimage of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine in 2001 gave a new impulse to the search for understanding between the two neighbouring countries. In my opinion, this broad reference to the history of reconciliation attempts between Poland and Ukraine has a twofold meaning. First, in this way the authors of the text want to present the mutual forgiveness and reconciliation act of the year 2005 as a natural development in the relationships between the two states. This reconciliation act is not something that appeared all of the sudden, but it has its history and is a logical result of the sequence of events. Secondly, a careful reader notes that all the events of the mutual rapprochement that are mentioned in the text always have a reference to the Church, be it meetings between the Catholic hierarchies, the celebration of thousand years of Christianity in Ukraine, or the Pope’s pilgrimage to Ukraine. Even the commemoration of the Volyn tragedy of Poland in 2003 is depicted as being made possible due to the spiritual atmosphere of the Pope’s visit to Ukraine in 2001. As a matter of fact, the “Joint statement of Presidents of Poland and Ukraine on agreement and rapprochement” from 1997 is not mentioned in the text, perhaps partly because of its exclusively secular nature. The impact of the Orange Revolution on the reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine simply could not be neglected due to the successful mediating role of Poland and because of the engagement of the Churches in Ukraine in the peaceful de____________________ 17 18

No. 162, 283. No. 289, 481.

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velopment of the revolution. One may conclude that the authors of the text wanted to emphasise the Church’s contribution to the reconciliation between both countries and the importance of its spiritual dimension. Husar’s predecessor, Cardinal Liubachivskyi, equally showed respect for the Greek-Catholic tradition of reconciliation, especially regarding the rapprochement between the Russian and Ukrainian nations. He was not the first Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church who demonstrated a benevolent attitude towards Russians.19 Both his precursors, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and Yosyf Slipyi, in their difficult circumstances expressed the desire for the peaceful mutual coexistence of the two nations. Sheptytskyi himself was imprisoned by the tsar for his efforts for the good of the Russian people,20 and Slipyi declared readiness to recognise all the rights of the Russian Orthodox Church when she respects the rights of the Greek-Catholics.21 Consequently, following example of those famous forerunners, on the eve of the celebration of the millennium of the baptism of the Kyivan Rus, Liubachivskyi again addresses to the Russian people his willingness to forgive. Additionally, Liubachivskyi reminds one of the German-Polish and German-French reconciliation as examples for the Ukrainian-Russian rapprochement. Commenting on paragraph 21 of the Balamand Agreement about the preparation of the full communion between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi maintains that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has already begun to make her contribution under the guidance of two forerunners of Liubachivskyi in the 20th century, Andrei Sheptytskyi and later Yosyf Slipyi. In particular, Cardinal Liubachivskyi claims that many of the practical postulates of the Balamand Agreement were mentioned in the ecumenical writings of Sheptytskyi. His thoughts were developed by Yosyf Slipyi who in communistruled Ukraine spoke about the need of unity between the Churches as a necessary means to oppose the Soviet regime and the best method of evangelisation.22 Having this deep understanding of the significance of the ____________________ 19 20

21 22

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No. 5000, 439. It is unclear what Liubachivskyi means by the good of the Russian people. Perhaps the author refers to the efforts of Sheptytskyi to establish the Russian GreekCatholic Church. No. 5000, 439. “Poslannia Patriarkha Yosyfa pro poiednannia u Khrysti (3.VI.1977)” {Pastoral letter of Patriarch Yosyf on uniting in Christ (3.VI.1977)}, in Znaky chasu, eds. Zynovii Antoniuk and Myroslav Marynovych (Kyiv: Sfera, 1999), 143-145.

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Church unity and keeping the tradition of his predecessors, Cardinal Liubachivskyi in the name of the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church promises to follow the practical rules of the Balamand Agreement listed in paragraphs 21-33, which should promote the peaceful OrthodoxCatholic dialogue and fraternal relations between the Churches. The ideas of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi are later referred to by his successors at the head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. One is reminded occasionally of his gesture of asking forgiveness from the Moscow Patriarchate in 1987 and confirming his openness towards the Orthodox brothers.23 For instance, the “Conception of the Ecumenical Position” tells the Moscow Patriarchate that still in 1987 the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at that time Cardinal Liubachivskyi expressed his will for reconciliation with the Russian people and the Church. Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi also contributed to the correction of the negative vision of ecumenism typical of his times. He was aware of the lack of knowledge that Ukrainian Christianity experienced at the early 1990s concerning the initiatives towards the unity between the Churches. Hence, he attempted to fill that gap by publishing an extensive pastoral letter “On the unity of the Holy Churches.” The text unfolds the history of the ecumenical movement of the 20th century, especially the relations between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. The aim of Cardinal Liubachivskyi was to make Greek-Catholics acquainted with that history, and moreover, make them realise the role of their Church in the ecumenical movement. In particular, the author unfolds the meaning of the notion Sister-Churches, depicts the special attention of the Pope to the Orthodox Churches beginning from the 1980s, and extensively dwells upon the repercussions of the Balamand Agreement for the future activities of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Liubachivskyi considered it important to make his Church informed about the stance of the ecumenical movement and to encourage the faithful to work on the rapprochement between the Churches: “In the past we used to complain sometimes because we had an impression that in the ecumenical dialogue they “spoke about us” but “without us”… We cannot complain anymore because our presence is desirable and we are welcomed on all the levels.”24 All that proves that the tradition of reconciliation is very much cherished by the leadership of the ____________________ 23 24

See, for instance, No. 32, 59. No. 5002, 161. Translation from the original source.

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Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church who makes efforts to familiarise the faithful with it for the success of the initiatives of reconciliation.

3.1.3 The human heart – the locus of reconciliation The heart as the core of the human person Commenting on the paragraph on “War and peace” of the “Basis of the Social Concept” of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexander Vasyutin expressed a thought that equally characterises the official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “…A sociopolitical strategy and an ecclesial document, any ecclesial document, are intended rather for individuals in order to facilitate for them their personal choice for good, than for social groups and decision-making bodies. Otherwise any concept would turn to be impersonal, totally ignoring the moral dimension of human life, whereas the Church is called on to address exactly this sphere of human existence and not any other sphere.”25

Placing emphasis on the individual, appealing to the concrete person, the Greek-Catholic Church leadership addresses that domain of human existence where the Church establishes a particular expertise. This approach is especially evident when the Church names the human heart the locus of reconciliation and the source of changes in general. Already Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church contains a section “The heart – the core of the human person.”26 It is in the heart where all the feelings arise, it is a source of will and desires, there the person communicates with God and the conscience makes decisions about good and evil, the heart is the spring force of the human’s being.27 Evil inclinations and passions may transform the human heart into “a source of

____________________ 25

26

27

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Alexander Vasyutin, “Understanding the Concept of Just Peace in the Contemporary Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church,” in Just Peace: Orthodox Perspectives, eds. Semegnish Asfaw, Alexios Chehadeh, and Marian Gh. Simion (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2012), 270. Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Katekhyzm Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy “Khrystos – nasha Paskha” {Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church “Christ is our Passover”} (Lviv: Svichado, 2011), 234. Translation from the original source. Ibid., 234-235.

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

iniquity and injustice which stains all the dimensions of life: personal, family, social, cultural, economic, and political.”28 There are just a few addresses of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church where the topic of reconciliation is approached from the theoretical side. Most of them were issued on the occasion of the Days of Purification and Reconciliation, initiated by Liubomyr Husar and admitted in the city of Lviv in 2000 and 2001. The teaching in those pronouncements can be applied to practically any case of reconciliation. The core message consists in the idea that reconciliation happens in the heart of a person and is connected to the transformation of the whole person. Let us substantiate that conclusion by several references to the texts. The address on the Reconciliation Day in 2001 of Cardinal Husar begins with the reflections on the terrorist attacks in the USA of September 11, 2001. He claims that hatred is the source of what happened. The first question to be asked is whether one bears animosity towards others in the heart. The way to reconciliation begins from the heart of every particular individual, “the first step happens in my own heart.”29 In that context reconciliation means purification and forgiveness as it is the only correct answer to the challenges of the contemporary world. While accentuating that reconciliation begins in the heart, Husar can be reproached with the omission of the relationality of reconciliation. It seems that the other is not necessary for reconciliation as it takes place in the heart of a person; it does not presuppose the rebuilding of the relationships that necessarily belongs to the essence of the process. Indeed, Liubomyr Husar notes: “When we speak about reconciliation, we usually (and that is correct) think about two or several people that have to reconcile. However, the way to reconciliation has as its prerequisite making order in one’s own heart. When unwillingness, malice, hatred to other person (or persons) rule in my heart, it is even not possible to speak about a possibility of reconciliation with them; the first step has to happen in one’s own heart.”30

This impression of the confinement of reconciliation to the internal work of the spirit, which has not a lot to do with the people around, is corrected in Husar’s sermon during the liturgy on the occasion of the beginning of the Jubilee Year on December 25, 1999. The author maintains here that ____________________ 28 29 30

No. 2020. Translation from the original source. No. 118, 221. Ibid. Translation from the original source.

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the reconciliation between people means openness to each other, the ability to look in each other’s eyes after having forgiven the neighbour.31 This openness to the other is one of the features of reconciliation that has already happened, a fruit of reconciliation. Consequently, Liubomyr Husar indeed points here at the relationality of reconciliation. It is always directed to the reshaping of the relations with the other. And nevertheless, the beginning of that process happens deep inside of the human heart.

Where the changes are born Having analysed Husar’s pronouncements on the Reconciliation Day’s celebration, one notices that his steps to reconciliation are inspired by the canonical discipline of the sacrament of penance. It is easily retraceable when one considers the core elements of that sacrament. According to the Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, a legitimate sacrament of penance presumes five components: examination of the conscience, contrition (sorrow for having offended God), resolution to amend (avoid the sin in the future), confession of the sins to the priest, and doing penance.32 The sacrament of penance signifies the reconciliation with God and the Church and its important condition is the reconciliation with the fellow men.33 The comparison of some elements of the sacrament of penance with Husar’s vision of reconciliation brings interesting results. The purification of memory as an attempt to learn the truth about the evil committed corresponds to the examination of the conscience. A decision not to repeat the past offences is nothing else than the decision to amend. Additionally, the emphasis on a personal reconciliation with God and the neighbour only reinforces the similarities. It is not accidental that Husar invites his audience to crown reconciliation with the holy sacraments of penance and communion.34 Therefore, he depicts reconciliation as a personal and private act that has first of all the task to rebuild the relationship with God and only after that with the neighbour. The teaching of Husar on reconciliation can be more precisely described as a personal spiritual transformation and ____________________ 31 32 33 34

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No. 332, 554. Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Catechism, 150-151. Ibid., 151. No. 118, 222.

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only after that as a tool of the rebuilding of the relations on the societal level. Liubomyr Husar often refers to that conclusion in his texts on concrete cases of reconciliation. For instance, he is of the opinion that the Church unity cannot be reached through political manoeuvres, negotiations, or compromises. The way to a genuine and lasting Church unity consists in the purification of the heart from sin and prejudices, releasing oneself from hatred and pride, changing the attitude towards the fellow men.35 The split between the Churches is an opportunity to work towards unity, to come closer to one’s neighbour and through him to Christ.36 Striving for unity is a way to show love to God and fellow Christians. Husar claims that during the Soviet persecutions people could well reveal their internal disposition towards God and other people. Nowadays, in peaceful times, a person proves his/her love by searching for rapprochement.37 The years of working on memorandums or developing different initiatives aiming at the unity between the Churches have not been successful. Cardinal Husar is convinced that interdenominational conflicts are nourished by hatred that reigns in the hearts of people. In that case there is no connection with Christ and no peace.38 Therefore, Church unity will be reached after a deep internal change of every human being because the whole person is needed for unity.39 It means: “We stand ourselves in the way of unity until we have not overcome the unwillingness in our hearts towards the neighbours.”40 The core of this change is to see in another person an equal human being.41 Prayer, fasting, or charity are often ostentatious sings of Christians practices which do not always touch upon the internal disposition of the person and it is precisely this one that has to be transformed. This spiritual and deeply personal way of dealing with worldly affairs is a peculiarity of Husar’s thought. Concrete persons and not projects are in his focus of attention. The human being is an engine of the changes in the world around us; therefore, it is there, in the human heart, that the order has to be established before any project of the transformation of reality can succeed. The legitimate question arises whether this personal conver____________________ 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

No. 98, 182. No. 83, 153. Ibid. Ibid., 154. Ibid., 153. Ibid., 154. Translation from the original source. Ibid.

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sion is sufficient for a sustainable change of the attitude of institutions. I will scrutinise Husar’s approach further in paragraph 4.3 where I deal with the challenges of justice in transformation. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine, on December 1, 2011, the Heads of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate issued a joint message. In that text the Church leaders dwell upon the reasons for the crisis in the contemporary Ukrainian state and society and on their inability to introduce and realise reforms necessary for the development of the country. In the opinion of the authors, the fostering of the economic development will not help to overcome the present societal crisis on all the levels of Ukrainian society. Again we notice an approach focused on the individual because the main ground for the current poor state of affairs is the crisis of the human person herself: “The human being is first of all a spiritual being. His outer successes or defeats are the results of a good or wrong spiritual life. The same holds for the whole society. Therefore, let us not look for the guilty ones outside – the main reason for the troubles is hidden in us, in the spiritual crisis that cankers our society.”42

Consequently, the Church leaders plead to introduce the state reforms on the basis of justice, love, and solidarity. This message prompted 11 famous Ukrainian intellectuals and public figures to ground the Initiative 1st December that envisions its mission of the formation of the active civic position of Ukrainian citizens on the basis of spiritual values proclaimed in the original message of the Ukrainian Churches.43 It is important to keep in mind, while reading this book, that the quite unilateral focus on the individual dimension penetrates and defines the understanding of forgiveness, justice, the way of making changes, and fi-

____________________ 42

43

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“Zvernennia tradytsiinykh Ukrainskykh Tserkov do virnykh ta do vsikh liudei dobroi voli z nahody dvadtsiatylittia referendumu na pidtverdzhennia Aktu proholoshennia nezalezhnosti Ukrainy” {Message of the traditional Ukrainian Churches to the faithful and all people of good will on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the referendum for the confirmation of the Act of the proclamation of independence of Ukraine}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2077.0.html (accessed February 27, 2014). Translation from the original source. See the programme document of the initiative issued on December 1, 2012: The 1st December Initiative, “Ukrainian Charter of the Free Person,” http://1-12.org. ua/ukrainian-charter-of-the-free-person (accessed May 3, 2014).

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

nally the very essence of the whole message of reconciliation in the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

3.1.4 Reconciliation with the help of God The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church claims that reconciliation cannot happen all of a sudden because it is a long process, whether it is about the reconciliation between nations or the interreligious rapprochement. The word “process” is used deliberately because not many people are ready to say all at once “I forgive and ask for forgiveness.” For example, according to the Greek-Catholic documents, the PolishUkrainian reconciliation is a process that needs sufficient time and a comprehensive strategy that has to be developed by the state authorities, Churches, and religious organisations.44 Being aware of the practical difficulties of rapprochement, what do the hierarchs of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church suggest? Where to look for hope that our good intentions will be embodied? The answer is easy and is strongly grounded in faith: God’s help is the key factor of success. Cardinal Husar himself constantly endeavours to put an end to the doubts about whether radical forgiveness and reconciliation are possible. He agrees that they are especially difficult for the people who themselves fell victims to injustices: “It is easy to talk about all that, but how can one accomplish such an act after the centuries of hostility?”45 The answer is that one needs God’s help on the way to reconciliation. To those who hesitate, Cardinal Husar addresses the following words: “Do not rely only upon yourself thinking that you can accomplish everything by yourself. Rely upon God because the faith unites us with Him.”46 The way to reconciliation leads through fasting and prayer because through prayer one entrusts the self to God and through fasting one expresses the hope in God.47 Cardinal Husar doesn’t present any concrete programme of how to overcome the painful inheritance of the past but he calls to purely spiritual Christian means. Numerous official pronouncements of Husar are concluded by ap-

____________________ 44 45 46 47

No. 162, 284. No. 362, 602. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. Ibid.

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peals to the help of God, His Holy Mother and all the saints to help on the road to reconciliation. In Husar’s opinion, every Christian gets from Christ the power to long for forgiveness, for instance, through participation in the sacraments: “Having witnessed God’s coming to us and having experienced His presence among us, His visiting our hearts under the signs of bread and wine, we will be able to do an act of God’s love, thanksgiving to God – the readiness to forgive and to be forgiven. All this will not only become possible but also self-evident if we open our hearts to Jesus who came to us.”48

Christ’s presence in His gift of Himself in the Holy Eucharist reveals the love of God to his people and makes them ready to forgive and be forgiven. One just has to open one’s heart towards Christ. In order to underline the importance of the reliance upon God for the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, the hierarchs of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church quote the Gospel story of Jesus at the lake of Gennesaret49 when he ordered Peter to go fishing again after this disciple has caught nothing during the whole night. At first, Peter does not believe the words of Jesus but then he does obey and indeed gets his nets full of fish. This story should help overcome the skepticism that often arises when the issue of reconciliation is addressed. It seems to be too difficult, too overwhelming, and simply practically impossible. But one should always recall the words of the Gospel that “The things which are impossible with men are possible with God” (Lk 18,27). Leaving reconciliation entirely in the hands of God with trust in His power to make even the most uncertain projects come true also characterises the theology of forgiveness of Cardinal Liubachivskyi. In his declaration of pardon to the Moscow Patriarchate, the author shows the benefits of reconciliation and its embeddedness in the tradition of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Ultimately, he entrusts that endeavour in the hands of God. Liubachivskyi strongly believed that only when people have God in their hearts, will they be able to find power to forgive; neither political, diplomatic, nor scientific methods or a sheer force will make such a step possible.50 It is a prayerful, obedient, and humble attitude that I assume to be typical of the Eastern Christian tradition. Often we do not find in those texts concrete plans, strategies or demands from the oppo____________________ 48 49 50

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No. 368, 611. Translation from the original source. See Lk 5,1-6. No. 5000, 439.

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

nent. This declaration of Liubachivskyi rather proclaims the openness to receive the other. All the graces in the life of individual Christians or in the entire Church are to be considered as God’s blessing. Even the elevation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the patriarchal status will happen under the action of the Holy Spirit. In this way Husar answered to those faithful who felt confused because of the non-recognition of the patriarchate of their Church by the Vatican until now. Husar comforts and encourages the Greek-Catholic faithful that the elevation of the Church to the patriarchal dignity will happen in due time when this gift ripens in the heart of the people. Liubomyr Husar calls for humbleness as it is not about the personal consent or discord of the Pope but it is a matter of God’s blessing.51 In the letter to the Heads of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine from February 14, 2006, Husar wrote that while commemorating the Lviv Pseudo-Synod as a wrong method of bringing the unity of Christianity, the Churches have to be open to the work of the Holy Spirit who alone can inspire the creative search of unity in diversity.52 This is the responsibility of the Churches before God and Ukraine. The unity between Churches is a difficult task and cannot be achieved without the grace of God. But before the Churches arrive at the agreement about the institutional form of reunion, they have to concentrate on what is possible now, that is on the formation of the spirit of peace and accord.53 No particular institutional form of unity is presented in this text but the author expresses his belief that with the help of God it will be reached in the future. Hence, we may draw the conclusion that the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church constantly expresses its trust in the help of God on the way to national or inter-Church reconciliation. One may wonder whether this means the lack of concrete projects of rapprochement. I am rather inclined to believe that it is the expression of the eastern character of that Church with its emphasis on prayer and spirituality rather than on human constructs.

____________________ 51 52 53

No. 2000 (No. 3001, 152). No. 216, 360. Ibid.

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3.1.5 Reconciliation as a Christian obligation The next peculiarity of the Greek-Catholic texts on reconciliation is the discourse on duty. Reconciliation as a Christian obligation is best expressed in the documents on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation and on the unity of the Churches in Ukraine. Church unity as the will of God in his commandment “May all be one,” reconciliation as a Christian duty and a logical step of the commandment of love are profoundly elaborated in the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The following examples prove that the Church leadership adopts a radical approach to reconciliation. Husar justifies his commitment to the ideal of forgiveness by reference to God’s commandment of love. Loving God and the neighbour will bring prosperity to the people: “In the foundation of people’s flourishing can be laid only those bricks which are baked in the fire of love to God and fellow man.”54 The distinctive element of the mutual reconciliation and forgiveness act of the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops consists in the understanding of reconciliation as a Christian duty. It is a radical meaning that derives from the Christian character of both nations. Reconciliation as the fulfilment of the spiritual testament of the new beatified martyrs of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church reinforces the radical vision of rapprochement which finally becomes an act of prayer of forgiveness and reconciliation. The fundamental text that portrays reconciliation as the obligation of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples is the document “Reconciliation between nations is possible.” Historical or political circumstances, Church rites, or even nationality vanish before the claim “Let us remember first and foremost that we are God’s children.”55 The duty of unity as an offering to God is connected to the Gospel citation about the obligation to reconcile with one’s enemy before one brings the altar donation.56 Additionally, this duty to reconciliation derives from “the eternal perspective of human destiny”57 which is again connected to the common Christian background of ____________________ 54 55 56

57

200

No. 139, 251. Translation from the original source. No. 3002; No. 289, 482. „If you are bringing your offering to the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your offering there before the altar, go and be reconciled with your opponent there and then come back and present your offering” (Mt 5,23-24). No. 3002; No. 289, 482.

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

the Polish and Ukrainian peoples. In that sense the message of the mutual forgiveness and reconciliation act is composed in the spirit of the radical rapprochement of Liubomyr Husar. For a theological substantiation of the duty of Poles and Ukrainians to reconcile Liubomyr Husar refers to the notion of the Mystical Body of Christ. In his sermon during the liturgy on the occasion of the reconciliation act between the Greek-Catholic and Roman Catholic bishops, Husar claims that the principal reason for such a celebration is the presence of Christ among his people gathered for the Divine Liturgy. This theological beginning of the sermon is not accidental. Cardinal Husar maintains that the liturgical gathering in the name of Christ is the manifestation of God’s love towards his people making community in one body and one Church.58 The obligation and possibility of reconciliation flow from that liturgical nature of unity between the Polish and Ukrainian peoples. Remarkably, in the same sermon Husar extends the duty of forgiveness from the Polish to other neighbouring nations of Ukraine so that in this part of the world peace and harmony could flourish. 59 The most complicated case is without doubt that of Russia where only a few steps were made towards overcoming the heavily burdened common history. Unlike Liubachivskyi, in his official pronouncements Husar has never openly spoken of the Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation. However, in that sermon he indirectly points at it. In a sermon on the occasion of the opening of the Jubilee Year, Cardinal Husar explained that the meaning of reconciliation signifies a true accord and harmony between people, when they forgive with a pure heart and become open for the other.60 The key prerequisite to reconciliation is the awareness of God’s love to the people. This element is often omitted in common piety where God is first of all portrayed as a just judge. Husar corrects such an image of God and emphasises that only when people realise that God is love would they acquire courage to reconcile with Him and subsequently with the fellow people.61 Additionally, the realisation that God loves everybody means that one cannot hate the fellow man because he/she is also loved and accepted by God. ____________________ 58 59 60 61

No. 368, 610. Ibid., 611. No. 332, 554. Ibid.

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The unity of Churches in Ukraine as an obligation is articulated in a similar way. In his lecture “Reconciliation as a gift from God and a source of new life,” Liubomyr Husar speaks about the unity of Christian Churches in Ukraine as the will of God, believing that it will contribute to peace and the well-being of the country.62 In “Conception of the Ecumenical Position,” the Greek-Catholic hierarchy recognises that the relations of its Church with Orthodox denominations are marked by both historical and modern conflicts, but the Gospel imperative of love and reconciliation should be a stimulus to strive for the improvement of the situation.63 The very title of the message of Liubomyr Husar on the occasion of the transfer of his seat to Kyiv “The Unique People of God” points at the imperative of the unity of the branches of ancient Kyivan Christianity. In his call for the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches of the Kyivan tradition, Sviatoslav Shevchuk speaks of the responsibility before God and the own people. The search for reconciliation is the fulfilment of God’s commandment “May all be one” that has to be embodied through prayer, the openness to dialogue, and the readiness to forgiveness and reconciliation.64 In that excerpt Shevchuk does not mention the commandment of love but nevertheless portrays the unity of the Churches as the will and order of God that his faithful have to follow.

3.1.6 Reconciliation as a spiritual testament and legacy of martyrs In the thought of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, which understands herself as a martyr Church,65 the duty of reconciliation between the Churches and nations is depicted as the spiritual testament of the martyrs of the 20th century. In the letter on the occasion of the reconciliation act between the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy, the bishops write ____________________ 62 63 64 65

202

No. 92, 172. No. 5003, 60 (No. 4000, 128). No. 2010. No. 2020; “Welcome Speech of His Beatitude Sviatoslav (Shevchuk), the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, for the Participants of the Symposium Devoted to the 390th Anniversary of the Death of Saint Josaphat ‘What Does It Mean to Be a Christian Today? The Experience of the Martyrdom of Eastern Churches,” http://news.ugcc.org.ua/en/articles/welcome_speech_of_his_beatitude _sviatoslav_shevchuk__the_head_of_the_ugcc__for_the_participants_of_the_sy mposium_devoted_to_the_390th_anniversary_of_st_josaphat_the_death_68 155.html (accessed February 10, 2014).

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

that martyrs proved their faith by shedding blood for Christ and thus encouraging contemporaries “to love our friends and enemies and call: “Make peace with one another!”66 The reference to the martyrs of the communist repressions reminds one of John Paul II’s proclamation of the 28 beatific martyrs of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church during his visit to Ukraine in 2001.67 The common martyrdom of Poles and Ukrainians under the communist rule should contribute to the rapprochement between their countries. Her martyrdom under the communists is so highly estimated that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church speaks about the gift of martyrdom. Even the meaning of the liquidation of the Church in 1946 is interpreted as such. The Church leadership teaches that the martyrdom for the unity of all, demonstrated to the world, is the most precious contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to ecumenism. In their address on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, the Greek-Catholic bishops unfold the meaning of martyrdom more in detail. This letter is an all-encompassing attempt to provide a profound answer about the meaning of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church for her future nowadays. In the introductory part of the document, its authors remind one of “the gift of martyrdom for the unity of all”68 as the fate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the 20th century. This tragic way began already in the 19th century with the liquidation of the union with Rome on right-bank Ukraine and Belorussia (1839) and later in Kholmshcnyna and Pidliashshia (1875). Hence, the Lviv Synod in 1946 was the continuation of the tradition of the destruction of the Greek-Catholic Church, this time in the territories of eastern Galicia. The aim of the current letter is to stimulate reflections, discussions, scholarly investigations, and theological discourse on those both tragic and heroic events which should eventually contribute to the healing of the wounds of history and to a successful Christian witnessing in the future.69 The very survival of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church happened thanks to the readiness of her faithful for martyrdom. What does that high____________________ 66 67

68

No. 3002; No. 289, 482. The list and short biographies of those beatified by John Paul II can be consulted on the website created to cover the Pope’s visit to Ukraine: “Biographies of Those to Be Beatified by the Holy Father while He Is in Ukraine,” http://papal visit.org.ua/eng/martyrsbio.php (accessed May 6, 2014). No. 219, 365.

69 Ibid., 366. 203

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ly-praised term mean? According to the texts, it can be interpreted in two ways – as martyrdom for the unity with the Holy See and martyrdom for the unity of the Churches in Ukraine. The two components are interconnected in the ecumenical position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The communion with Rome is part of the identity of the Kyivan Church from where the traditional Ukrainian Churches originate. Only the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church preserved that communion, and therefore she has the task to restore this essential feature of the Kyivan Church in the re-united local Ukrainian Church. For that Ukrainian GreekCatholics paid the price of martyrdom and this is perhaps the biggest gift that they offered to the ecumenical Church.70 Greek-Catholic bishops call to search the solution to the division of the Kyivan Church in the past, namely in the example of the martyrs for the faith. The deep belief and hope that God will not abandon a person even in the most difficult life circumstances grants courage to live, suffer, and even die with Christ.71 Being in such a close unity with God amounted into martyrdom for the unity of the Churches which is the key for the search for solutions in the present situation. Naturally, the pursuit of the unity with God does not have to end up in martyrdom. Recognising one’s faults and forgiving those who committed evil against us72 is the form of martyrdom accessible to ordinary people. The teaching on martyrdom in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor confers a similar understanding of it as the mirror of truth and morality. Martyrdom is “an outstanding sign of the holiness of the Church.”73 “By their eloquent and attractive example of a life completely transfigured by the splendour of moral truth, the martyrs and, in general, all the Church’s Saints, light up every period of history by reawakening its moral sense.”74 Thus the common martyrdom of the Ukrainian Churches puts a moral demand to each of them to re-evaluate their relations in the light of the message of truth delivered by the martyrs. In that sense the common martyrdom of the Churches carries the imperative of unity. ____________________ 70 71 72 73

74

204

Ibid. No. 219, 372 (No. 3003, 155). No. 219, 372 (No. 3003, 156). Ioannes Paulus II, “Veritatis Splendor,” http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_ paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_ en.html (accessed March 3, 2014). Italics preserved from the original text. Ibid.

Chapter III. Understanding of reconciliation

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church speaks not only of the martyrs to the faith. Sviatoslav Shevchuk calls the faithful of his Church to remember especially “the sacrifice of the martyrs of the “Heavenly Legion” – those that gave their lives for the victory of good over evil and of truth over injustice.”75 “Heavenly Legion” or “Heavenly Hundred” is a name given to those more than 100 persons who were killed by snipers during the protests against the Ukrainian government on the EuroMaidan. The sacrifice of those martyrs makes Ukrainians responsible “for our own household, our village or city, and for our country – remembering that every citizen must not demand from oneself any less than he/she would demand from others.”76 The moral testament of the “Heavenly Legion” is similar to that of the Church martyrs in Veritatis Splendor. Except for the Greek-Catholic sacrifices for the unity of Churches, the Church leadership also speaks about the joint martyrdom of all the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine under the Soviet regime. In addition to their common origins in the ancient Kyivan Church, this time of suffering is another feature that brings the Churches together. 77 Therefore, the joint history of the traditional Churches in Ukraine did not end in the distant past after the creation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church or after the incorporation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the Moscow Patriarchate, but continued in the 20th century that united the Churches in suffering for Christ. And thus the Ukrainian Churches should not regard their past only as a series of conflicts but they can embark on the way to reconciliation on the basis of that joint experience of martyrdom.78 According to the words of Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the unity of the Churches of the Kyivan tradition would be the embodiment of the evangelical ideal of the Church unity that the martyrs of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church for centuries had laid their lives for.79 Keeping that in mind helps understand the statement of Mykhailo Dymyd that the Pope’s proclamation of new 28 beatified martyrs of the ____________________ 75 76 77 78

79

No. 2026. Ibid. No. 216, 359. Andriy Mykhaleyko, „Kommentar,“ in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar, trans. and eds. Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 258. No. 2010.

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Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church can be acknowledged as a sign of Christian unity in Ukraine: “An important step towards the unity of the Churches established by Saint Vladimir was the beatification of the Christian martyrs who belong to the Greek Catholic Church, both Russian and Ukrainian, amongst them, professors Andrew Yischak, Nicholas Konrad and the Archpriest Leonid Fiodorov. These saints now in heaven are creating one community of Kyivan-Rus together with their brothers and sisters of the Russian Orthodox Church. They all died under the same atheistic regime, for the one Christ of the Gospels!”80

In that regard Didier Rance spoke about the “ecumenism of martyrs” that obliges the Churches to commemorate jointly their martyrs even those who are not considered as such by the Christians of another denomination, for instance, as it is the case for Saint Yosafat Kuntsevych of Polotsk for the Orthodox.81 Consequently, the theology of the reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is also a theology of martyrdom. Martyrdom is possible because of the special unity of a person with God, which prepares oneself to self-sacrifice. The way to the unity with God begins with the act of repentance and forgiveness. When people make efforts to come closer to God, they would come closer to other Christians because they have to forgive injustices committed against them. Shortly, the readiness to repent and forgive the other is a way to imitate martyrs nowadays.

3.2

Robert Schreiter: reconciliation as a healing

Robert Schreiter explicitly mentions Ukraine when he writes about the contexts of reconciliation in today’s world in his book Reconciliation. Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order published in 1992. Schreiter points at the difficulties of the reconciliation between Orthodox and Greek-Catholics coming out of the underground.82 Nowadays, the period of the interconfessional struggle on the level of parishes has passed. History has proved that the faithful of both confessions found ways to coexist peacefully after a few years of struggle for the sacral buildings or for ____________________ 80 81 82

206

Dymyd, “What Happens after the Bishop of Rome’s Visit to Ukraine?” See the article of Didier Rance, “The Forgiveness of Martyrs. The Seeds of Unity,” Logos. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 47, nos. 1-2 (2006): 229-235. Robert Schreiter, Reconciliation. Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order (Maryknoll, NY: Obris Books, 1992), 13.

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the confessional belonging of a parish. However, the way to the renewal of the united Kyivan Church is still long. In what follows I will articulate Schreiter’s discourse on reconciliation and confront it with Greek-Catholic theology.

3.2.1 Horizontal and vertical dimensions of reconciliation Robert Schreiter unfolds the meaning of reconciliation through the themes of truth-telling, justice, memory, healing, and forgiveness. In the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church similar elements are elaborated. However, comparing both theologies, one discovers certain differences or, to be more precise, specifications in the case of Schreiter. For instance, he clearly distinguishes between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of reconciliation, a difference that is somehow blurred in the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The vertical dimension refers to the reconciliation of a sinner with God while the horizontal reconciliation denotes the rapprochement between individuals, societies, or groups within societies.83 In the messages on the occasion of the Reconciliation Day in Lviv, Husar emphasised the need for repentance and personal reconciliation with God that should in turn promote the reconciliation in society and prevent the violent past from happening again. However, Husar does not elaborate on how both elements are connected. In this regard, Robert Schreiter is of great help. Explaining the biblical foundation of horizontal reconciliation on the basis of 2 Cor 5,17-20 and Eph 2,12-20, Schreiter notes that the narrative of the new creation by God through Christ and the overcoming of the division between Gentiles and Jewish Christians are images of reconciliation on the human level.84 They point at the interconnectedness of people through their relationships with God. In the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church it is difficult to draw the link between the reconciliation of an individual with God and social reconciliation. Robert Schreiter digs deeper into that question and offers an answer. Personal reconciliation is about the restoration of damaged humanity, whilst the social one aims at the reconstruction of a juster

____________________ 83 84

Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 369. Ibid., 369-370.

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and safer society.85 Both types of reconciliation have a different goal. However, social reconciliation would best be realised by individuals whose humanity and moral feeling of justice and good are restored. Reconciliation on the national or social level has to be interiorised, personally embedded, and lived through in order to be successful. Reconciliation in society starts from the reconciliation with God: “The faithful regard reconciliation as both a gift and a task. Reconciliation in society is based on reconciliation between a person and God, between himself and others.”86 Schreiter unfolds the meaning of the concept of reconciliation in three dimensions: a source, a process, and a vision or goal. Reconciliation as a source is very close to the vision of Husar which means that reconciliation is manifested in the work of God who draws back the alienated humanity through the redeeming death of Jesus Christ. Christians experience that work of God through the sacraments of baptism, reconciliation, and the Eucharist. During the celebration of the Days of Purification and Reconciliation in Lviv, Liubomyr Husar emphasised this meaning by calling the faithful to participate in the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist. Both Schreiter and Husar are of the opinion that reconciliation as overcoming the offences against God will contribute to the cause of social reconciliation.87 However, Schreiter resonates with my criticism of the attitude of Husar that the link between personal reconciliation with God and social reconciliation is not sufficiently elaborated in the Church tradition.88 The sacraments of reconciliation and the Eucharist do not suffice in order to establish social justice. Schreiter articulates this meaningfully: “It is as if the Church’s principal contribution to talking about reconciliation lies in the cleansing of individual human hearts. It would appear to be a vision that, once human hearts are cleansed the rest of the problems of the world will take care of themselves. But our experience seems to speak other____________________ 85 86

87

88

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Robert Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation. Spirituality and Strategies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998), 65. Lesia Kovalenko, “Those Who Forget the Past are Condemned to Repeat It,” Den, September 25, 2007, http://www.day.kiev.ua/en/article/day-after-day/thosewho-forget-past-are-condemned-repeat-it (accessed January 9, 2014). Robert Schreiter, “Justice and Reconciliation” (Paper Presented at the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network General Assembly (AEFJN) - Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation Commission (JPIC) of the Union of Superiors General and International Union of Superiors General (USIG) Rome, November 30, 2009),” http://www.aefjn.org/index.php/news-reader/items/justice-and-peace-con ference-by-robert-schreiter-cpps.html (accessed June 17, 2013). Ibid.

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wise.”89 Therefore, the correct way to understand reconciliation with God is that through participation in the sacraments we build up a communion with God that inspires to see the happenings in the world through ethical lenses and work more efficaciously on social reconciliation.90 The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should help her faithful grasp the connection between their personal spirituality and social changes that are expected in the process of reconciliation. Both Robert Schreiter and Cardinal Husar emphasise that reconciliation is an ongoing process. Schreiter considers reconciliation as an overarching concept where a process and a goal have to be distinguished. However, both elements are equally important when one does not want to end up in despair: “While reconciliation must be seen as a goal or horizon for a different kind of world, it is equally important to concentrate on it as a process with distinctive tasks and steps to be taken.”91 The points above have to be kept in mind when considering reconciliation as a goal: we have to remind ourselves that “God is the author and the endpoint of reconciliation,” that “we must celebrate the small victories along the way,” and we must “attend especially to what is happening with the next generation.”92 All those elements are about maintaining hope in the commitment to reconciliation. In the words of Schreiter, it is about “discerning the traces of God in our midst. Discovering them reminds us not only of the nearness of God in places where God can seem completely absent; it also reminds us that perhaps the most important things happening are not done by us, but are part of a larger reality in which we participate.”93 That is more relevant for the process of reconciliation between the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine or between the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church: without hope people tend to give up their efforts. Robert Schreiter claims, moreover, that it is God who takes the initiative of reconciliation; we discover reconciliation rather than achieve it by our efforts.94 This confidence in God’s grace runs as a red thread through all the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Schreiter considers the eastern metaphor of healing very suitable for the essence of the process of reconciliation. That pre____________________ 89 90 91 92 93 94

Ibid. Ibid. Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 367. Schreiter, Justice and Reconciliation. Ibid. Schreiter, Reconciliation. Mission and Ministry, 44.

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supposes an attitude of waiting because “healing takes its own time. It requires that the patient attends to matters of health.”95 Hope helps us to sustain in the most difficult, seemingly helpless moments. Reconciliation is about “entering a mysterion.”96

3.2.2 Practical theology of reconciliation Before proceeding with the components of reconciliation, Robert Schreiter wants to make clear that he develops a practical theology of reconciliation. The principles of his practical theology emerged from the interaction of the experience of reconciliation with the available resources of Christian tradition, were proved in practice, and have analogues within the larger discourse on reconciliation.97 Schreiter elucidates the implications of each principle on the dynamics of reconciliation, thus making his five principles indeed very applicable.

Principle 1. “God is the author of reconciliation” Schreiter’s principal postulation is “Reconciliation is the work of God, who invites and completes in us reconciliation through Christ.”98 This most important principle says that the reconciliation is ultimately a gift of God who is working through us. Schreiter calls for humbleness and hope when the desired reconciliation does not happen according to our plans because hope “is a reminder that peace and reconciliation are not things we create, but are gifts from God we learn to recognise and make our own.” 99 This is also a concern of Cardinal Husar. Additionally, Husar (and Schreiter, even though not so eloquent) calls for prayer for reconciliation, placing in this way the whole endeavour in God’s hands. According to Schreiter, contemplative prayer teaches us “to wait on God in silence… ____________________ 95 96 97 98 99

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Ibid., 71. Ibid., 58. Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 366-367. Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 14. Robert Schreiter, “Grassroots Artisans of Peace. A Theological Afterword,” in Artisans of Peace. Grassroots Peacemaking among Christian Communities, eds. Mary Ann Cejka and Thomas Bamat (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2003), 300.

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and enhances our capacity to listen and to discern small, barely noticeable movements in the process of healing.”100 Prayer grants hope and optimism. In every pronouncement of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the topic the authors call for prayer and assure that reconciliation can be reached with God’s help. Reconciliation is a grace.

Principle 2. “God begins with victims” The second principle claims that God begins his reconciling work with the victim.101 At first glance, it may sound paradoxically, but Schreiter gives a plausible experience-based explanation. As the practice shows, often the perpetrators are not ready to show their remorse or even to recognise their guiltiness. It is the victim that by granting forgiveness restores humanity to the perpetrator. The reconciliation on a national basis must follow the logical process of repentance-forgiveness-reconciliation.102 On a more personal level, however, the process is all the way around: the victim often offers forgiveness and that leads to the repentance of the wrongdoer and reconciliation. By forgiving and showing that the perpetrator failed as a human being, the victim could prompt the wrongdoer to change his attitude from resentment to remorse. This scenario may sound unrealistic and often turns to be like that in practice, but we cannot forget that the German-Polish reconciliation was initiated by the initiative of the Polish side who was clearly the victim of the Nazi deeds during World War II. It seems that it was in that spirit that the leaders of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church asked forgiveness from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian people in 1989 and similarly from the Polish people in 1987.

Principle 3. “God makes of the victim and the wrongdoer a ‘new creation” The third principle of the practical theology of reconciliation of Schreiter says that in the course of reconciliation both victim and wrongdoer are ____________________ 100 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 371. 101 Ibid., 371. 102 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 64.

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made by God into a new creation.103 This statement means that in the process of reconciliation both sides are not coming back to the previous status quo but build a new reality of their co-existence. The element of grace and surprise is implied by Schreiter as this new reality, which comes unexpectedly for both parties and for those working for reconciliation. The awareness of this moment of surprise is most present in the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the reconciliation between the Churches. Even in the pronouncements which describe the project of the future united Kyivan Patriarchate, the Greek-Catholic Church leadership does not forget to mention that it is only a project and the ultimate reality is in the hands of God. The Churches should make efforts to prepare reconciliation, they should pray for it, and what is very important, they should be ready to accept the vision of reconciliation that will once emerge. One should be open to a future in such a difficult endeavour as reconciliation which is for Christians “evidence of God’s graced action in the world.”104

Principle 4. Place the suffering of the victim in the story of the suffering of Christ According to the fourth principle, Christians should place their story of suffering in the narrative of the suffering and death of Christ: “…The process of reconciliation that creates the new humanity is to be found in the story of the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.”105 Robert Schreiter indirectly turns here to the problem of evil and looks for a reality that surpasses the suffering of every concrete person. For Christians it is logically the narrative of the suffering and death of Christ. The fourth element touches upon overcoming the destructive memories of the past and transforming them into redemptive ones. The way of change leading through the sufferings of Christ amounts into “a transformation that takes us to a new and unexpected place in ways we only partially understand.”106 This emphasis on the mystery and grace of reconciliation points at the unpredictable reality of that phenomenon that leaves space for imag____________________ 103 104 105 106

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Ibid., 17. Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 373. Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 18. Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 374.

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ination. In that regard Robert Schreiter stays very close to John Paul Lederach with his moral imagination in the matters of peace. Incidentally, Schreiter occasionally refers to the ideas of Lederach and shows a particular appreciation of his model. Applying this fourth principle of Schreiter to the theology of the reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, we notice that there are almost no references to the redeeming sufferings and death of Christ in the official documents. It is an eastern Church that focuses in her theology on the events of the Resurrection rather than on those of Good Friday. However, also suffering as an image of reconciliation finds place in the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, in particular in the texts on the Holodomor that should become a symbol and an imperative of unity for Ukrainians. The sufferings of martyrs for faith that the Ukrainian history of the 20th century can boast of in abundance and the sufferings of the victims of the Holodomor convey the idea of the moral regeneration of society. In the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church forgiving the neighbour is explained as a duty of a Christian. This claim is substantiated by evoking the prayer (“And forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us”), turning to the Gospel imperative of love to one’s neighbour, or pointing at the commandment “May all be one.” We do not find the emphasis on the duty of forgiveness or reconciliation in the theology of Robert Schreiter. It is a more comprehensive approach. Both Schreiter and Husar are convinced of the benefits of reconciliation, however, the latter renders it as necessity, a duty, while the former looks for ways to envision the seeds of a better future in the experience of suffered wrongs. Schreiter draws an analogy with the suffering and death of Christ which lead to resurrection. The approach of Schreiter seems to be more victim-oriented and takes seriously what they went through. Husar seems to be more future-oriented, he leaves the experience of the past aside, and tries to convince the faithful that whatever may have happened, now is the time to forgive and reconcile. At the same time, the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church also appreciates suffering by referring to the legacy of martyrs. Suffering and death become ways of the moral regeneration of society; they deliver a lesson and are hence worth remembering. The victims, whether Ukrainians as victims of Russians or Poles, the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgence Army against those of the Soviet Red Army, or the Greek-Catholic faithful who had to endure the destruction of their Church, must perceive that it is through their suffering that the grace of reconciliation will be poured upon them. Sufferings and deaths are not 213

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forgotten – this motive is paid attention to in the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

Principle 5. Eschatological completion of reconciliation Robert Schreiter considers the ultimate reconciliation as a cosmic event. The daily work for reconciliation shows that it will always remain uncompleted; we can hardy control that process.107 Complete reconciliation will happen at the end of times when all things will be reconciled in Christ: “…the process of reconciliation will be fulfilled only with the complete consummation of the world by God in Christ.”108 Until then, hope streams from “discerning the hand of God gently changing things.”109 Hence, the key terms of the fifth principle are hope, God as the source of reconciliation, and patience. In this way, principle number 5 is directly connected with principle number 1, thus reiterating the main idea of Schreiter that the spring of reconciliation lies outside people, it starts from God, is effectuated by the work of God through victims, bears in the sufferings and death of Christ, and will be ultimately completed in the eschatological cosmic event. Miroslav Volf arrived at a similar idea elaborating on the slipping of the burdened memory into oblivion at the end of times. This latter feature would be a favourable completion to the theology of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The Church leadership greatly emphasises that reconciliation can be achieved only with the help of God, however it does not pay so much attention to its eschatological dimension. It seems that the current Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church endeavours full rapprochement in uncertain worldly conditions. Reminding one of the eschatological character of reconciliation could be a plausible answer to the sceptics.

____________________ 107 Ibid., 374-375. 108 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 19. 109 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 375.

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3.2.3 “Reconciliation is more a spirituality than a strategy”110 In the view of Robert Schreiter it is inappropriate to reduce reconciliation to a technical rationality, “a skill that can be taught to deal with a problem that can be managed.”111 Instead, Schreiter conceives reconciliation as “a stance assumed before a broken world rather than a tool to repair the world.”112 This corresponds to the approach of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, especially that of Liubomyr Husar. Schreiter is aware that the strategies grounded on Western technical rationality cannot be successfully applied in the entire world. The difficulties of planting Western democracy in the Ukrainian soil have proved that idea. The same holds for different understandings of reconciliation by the western and eastern Church. The latter has developed metaphors of healing and medicine rather than legal metaphors which is typical of the western Church.113 Remember, that all the traditional Ukrainian Churches speak about the wound of division on the Church body and about the necessity of healing. Prayer or liturgy stays closer to the Ukrainian faithful than a concrete step-by-step programme of rapprochement. Robert Schreiter does not only suggest a strong theological basis for his theory of reconciliation, he also deals with the very practical issues of the whole process. Reconciliation is spirituality; however, it is also a strategy. Only in a combination of both elements the reconciliation endeavour has a chance to move forward. Schreiter is against the purely technical approach to reconciliation. As we have seen above, for this Catholic author rapprochement flows from the personal cultivation of a relationship with God which expresses itself “in spiritual practices that create space for truth, for justice, for healing, and for new possibilities.”114 By maintaining the relationship with God people learn to build relationships with fellow human beings and extend their reconciling attitude to the world. The Church is a valuable actor in the reconciliation process because of her ministry of reconciliation. Through her spiritual practices the Church creates communities of memory providing space “to explore and untangle a painful past, and the cultivation of truth-telling to overcome the lies of injustice and wrongdoing. They lead also to creating communities of hope, ____________________ 110 111 112 113 114

Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 16. Schreiter, Reconciliation. Mission and Ministry, 26. Ibid. Ibid., 49. Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 16.

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where a new future might be imagined and celebrated.”115 That was among other things the highly appreciated mission of the chaplains of different confessions on the EuroMaidan who offered spiritual support to the demonstrators for almost 3 months.116 The liturgical reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians in 2005 or the celebration of the Days of Reconciliation and Purification in 2000 and 2001, which were initiated and organised by the Church, are other examples of those spiritual strategies in the service of reconciliation. The yearly common prayers on the graves of Polish and Ukrainian soldiers in Lviv on November 1 contributed to the creation of communities of memory and hope. In those cases the spirituality of reconciliation prompted the search for alternatives to the ruling narratives of the dominative power in order to transform the situation.117 When the state authorities were trying to settle a conflict concerning allowing or not the Poles to open a cemetery for their diseased soldiers, Liubomyr Husar suggested an alternative – a joint prayer at the graves. Official dialogues, petitions, but also those short prayers changed the attitude to the Polish graves, soothed the minds, and finally led to reconciliation. And so, reconciliation is about providing alternative ways of thinking. As the title of his book shows, for Schreiter reconciliation demands both spirituality and strategy. Reconciliation entails a certain spiritual orientation, it is a way of living, and hence, it would be wrong to confine it to a kind of technical rationality.118 Probably this attention to spirituality is the biggest similarity between Schreiter’s vision of reconciliation and that of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Liubomyr Husar reminds one of God’s love, calls for prayer for reconciliation, considers the success of reconciliation activities to be entirely in God’s hands, describes reconciliation as a spiritual testament of martyrs and as a Christian obligation, and finally, points at the human heart as the precise locus of reconciliation. Already this short enumeration proves that Liubomyr Husar appeals more to spirituality that develops a plan of reconciliation activities. ____________________ 115 Ibid. 116 Olha Nedavnia, “Tserkovno-relihiinyi faktor Yevromaidanu v otsinkakh yoho uchasnykiv ta pryhylnykiv” {The Church-religious factor of the EuroMaidan in the estimation of its participants and sympathisers}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/ studios/studies_of_religions/55245/ (accessed March 3, 2014). 117 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 29. 118 Ibid., vi.

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Because reconciliation is a spirituality, it comes in moments of grace. No one knows when redemptive narratives will be born out of the story of injustices. Therefore, there is so much hope in the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the reconciliation with the Orthodox denominations in Ukraine and on the revival of the united Kyivan Church. Especially in those pronouncements we encounter the elements of hope most often: “When we read carefully proposals of His Beatitude Liubomyr, we realise that they are more spiritual and Evangelical. It is difficult to place them in certain juridical frames.”119 The moment of grace is not there yet but in Schreiter’s words, the Churches must await with hope when “a new meaning is found, and a pathway appears, leading out of the deep tangles of memories, emotions, and stories of death.”120

3.2.4 Reconciliation as a metanoia How does reconciliation touch upon common Ukrainians? Is that necessary at all from their point of view? Do they not have more acute tasks than, for example, thinking about historical hostilities between Poles and Ukrainians? Perhaps the most important contribution of Schreiter to the discourse on reconciliation in the Ukrainian context is that this author explains why reconciliation is needed at all. Often the documents on reconciliation seem to be superfluous in the perspective of common people who are dealing with more urgent problems of daily existence. Often while reading the Church pronouncements on reconciliation one gets the impression that those texts are produced in vain, that the questions of social justice, economic development are much more important for the Ukrainian society in transition. To speak about reconciliation seems to be a waste of time and of the Church resources. Opinion polls on the state of knowledge about the Volyn tragedy have shown that 31% of Poles do not even know that this event has taken place and 47% of those who heard something do

____________________ 119 Andrii Mykhaleiko, “Blazhennishyi Liubomyr Husar pro yednist khrystyianskykh Tserkov v Ukraini” {His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar on the unity of Christian Churches in Ukraine}, webinar, n.d., http://theology.in.ua/article_print.php? id=40901&name=interchurch_relations&_lang=ua& (accessed February 27, 2014). Translation from the original source. 120 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 46.

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not know who were victims and who perpetrators.121 I suppose that in Ukraine the situation is similar. To what end then all those papers on forgiveness, repentance, truth, and healing of memories? Robert Schreiter helps find the answer. Reconciliation is needed for the restoration of the moral order in society which in its turn will influence the dynamics of transition. Schreiter postulates that it is very important to define who needs reconciliation, what it should look like, and which fruits it should bring. Perhaps this element demands better elucidation in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The evil of the past must be revealed and the wrongdoers have to be named, which helps establish a correct ethical platform for society: “Seeking the truth establishes a pattern of truthfulness upon which a new society can be built.”122 Additionally, truth is so important in reconciliation because in many cases no justice whatsoever can be done anymore.123 Social reconciliation is about the purification of the collective consciousness of the nation when “groups or peoples at enmity with one another review their own history and in a leap of faith redefine their path into the future.”124 Gregory Baum maintained that on the threshold of the new period of its existence society needs metanoia, “confession, a change of mind and heart.”125 This must be emphasised in order to explain to the people the aim of the reconciliation discourse of the Church.

3.3

Miroslav Volf: Reconciliation as embrace

According to Volf, forgiveness does not mean reconciliation itself; it is a state between enmity and friendship, between exclusion and embrace.126 Forgiveness is only a crucial stage on the way to “the embrace of former enemies in a community of love.”127 The reconciliation described by this ____________________ 121 “Tretyna poliakiv nichoho ne znaie pro Volynsku trahediiu” {A third of Poles knows nothing about the Volyn tragedy}, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/ 2013/07/8/129412/ (accessed February 27, 2014). 122 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 119. 123 Ibid., 120. 124 Gregory Baum, “A Theological Afterword,” in The Reconciliation of Peoples: Challenge to the Churches, eds. Gregory Baum and Harold Wells (Geneva: WCC, 1997), 189. 125 Ibid. 126 Volf, The End of Memory, 188. 127 Ibid., 189.

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metaphor refers to shaping one’s identity in relation to the other. Volf’s theology of embrace is primarily built upon the Bible story of the prodigal son and its social significance. The father giving himself to his son and the father receiving the son back to the family are two key features of the story that unfolds the reconstitution of identities after the restoration of the relationship.128 Embrace signifies to Volf the openness to the other, desire to include the other in one’s own word, and the freedom to let the other follow his or her way. Embrace has to do with changing the identity of those who ask and accept it. The notion of embrace is dialectically connected to that of exclusion. In today’s world with its struggle of identities, exclusion takes place not only on the economic or political level, but only on the symbolic one. Exclusion can acquire different forms in exclusive practices, emotions and language and it happens through abandoning, dominating, assimilating or even eliminating.129 Exclusion is interpreted by Volf in a unique manner as a sin and is further situated in the greater framework of the universality of sin. No one can consider oneself free from sin. Projected on the relations between people, the universality of sin means that there are no absolute victims or perpetrators.130 Caught in the system of exclusion, “people behave according to its perverted logic.”131 Each side, whether the perpetrator or victim, can open up the arms, which alludes to Schreiter’s claims that reconciliation often begins from the suffered part. The metaphor of embrace unfolds in four steps. First, embrace begins by opening the arms. This gesture means a desire to welcome the other, to create space for letting the other approach; it is an invitation to come, and even a small knock on the heart of the other. In sum, “The desire to enter the space of the other has been signalled by the very same act by which the self has opened itself up for the other to come in.”132 ____________________ 128 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (1996), 156. 129 Miroslav Volf, “From Exclusion to Embrace,” Concilium 2 (1999): 95. 130 Volf elaborated on that issue of identity and otherness in the example of the ethnic cleansing between Croats and Serbs. For instance, he mentions that even in his native town there were Croatians destroying the houses or shops of the emigrated Serbs, hence in the conflict environment the strict line between victims and perpetrators blurs. (See Miroslav Volf, “Exclusion and Embrace. Theological Reflections in the Wake of Ethnic Cleansing,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 2 (1992): 242). 131 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (1996), 87. 132 Ibid., 142.

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The next element of the drama of embrace is waiting. This simple step also demonstrates a profound meaning essential for the correct understanding of the phenomenology of reconciliation. Waiting points at the fact that two sides are needed for embrace. It begins when one side opens up the arms and invites the other. In the process of waiting, the inviting side gives the opponent time to reflect upon the willingness or unwillingness to enter into contact. Waiting means the absence of compulsion. Reconciliation always remains a free act. Waiting reveals also the risky side of the embrace: it is not possible to determine what the answer of the opponent will be and there is no guarantee for success. Volf describes that with a beautiful quotation from Lewis Smedes, “Embrace is grace, and “Grace is gamble, always.”133 Reconciliation cannot be forced, it is a grace. The third act of the drama of embrace is closing the arms. This signifies the embrace itself, the most intimate element of the whole movement. Again, it points at the reciprocity of embrace-reconciliation. Additionally, embrace means only a soft touch; employing power to assimilate or destroy the identity of the other is forbidden, neither does it presuppose the dissolution of the boundaries of the own self.134 The identities of both sides are preserved. Finally, the act of embrace is completed by opening the arms again. I have mentioned above that a genuine embrace presupposes the preservation of the own identity. Exactly this happens, when changed by the encounter with the other in the moment of embrace, two parties open the arms in order to depart in the expectation of the next embrace. Thus, embrace is not a single act, it is a constant movement back and forth, a circular movement when “the actions and reactions of the self and the other condition each other and give the movement both meaning and energy.”135 This meaningful metaphor of embrace should be worth appearing in the Church documents on national unity or the all-Ukrainian reconciliation. It tells something about identity and how one can be enriched through the encounter with the other precisely due to different cultural backgrounds and lifestyles. According to the Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, the so often claimed clear-cut division in Ukraine does not exist in reality and there are enough resources to establish national consensus. Not the history and language play the leading role in bringing about national unity. ____________________ 133 Ibid., 147. 134 Ibid., 143. 135 Ibid., 145.

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Hrytsak believes that the common values and common daily way of life with its similar problems bear a potential to consolidate Ukrainians.136 Embrace reminds one of the enrichment that the encounter with the other gives, thus making the difference a blessing rather than a curse. Its multiplicity of cultures is a great benefit of Ukraine which is occasionally underlined in the Greek-Catholic documents. Differences should not cause division but, in Volf’s words, “As a metaphor, embrace implies that the self and the other belong together in their mutual alterity.”137 Finally, the Easter Matins contain a much known verse that literally employs the metaphor of embrace: “This is the day of resurrection. Let us be illuminated by the feast. Let us embrace each other. Let us call “Brothers” even those that hate us, And forgive all by the resurrection.”138

Remarkably, this quotation has never been mentioned in the official Greek-Catholic pronouncements on reconciliation.139 Present in the tradition as part of the Eastern Matins, this interesting idea is all too much unarticulated in the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The reference to that verse enlightened by Volf’s explanation of embrace would be an eloquent tool to convey the meaning of reconciliation to the faithful.

____________________ 136 “Skhid i Zakhid yednaie spilne pochuttia strakhu ta prahnennia bezpeky, – Yaroslav Hrytsak” {West and East are united by the common feeling of fear and desire of safety – Yaroslav Hrytsak}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/news_single.0.html ?&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=5040&cHash=8908b1b60afeba0f6d034e9245e33e 55 (accessed January 21, 2014). 137 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (1996), 146. 138 Quoted in ibid., 130. 139 This verse was used by Liubomyr Husar in his interview to Radio Svoboda on the topic of the unity of Churches in Ukraine. The Cardinal spoke about the longlasting unwillingness to work for unity, the lack of the spirit of sacrifice, the predominance of one’s own interests. In that context he mentioned the Canon of Easter Matins as an imperative to follow (Liubomyr Husar, “Khrystyianstvo v Ukraini. Chy mozhlyva yednist?” {Christianity in Ukraine. Is unity possible?}, interview by Inna Kuznetsova, Credo-ua.org, http://www.credo-ua.org/2011/07/ 48418 (accessed January 13, 2014)).

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3.4

John Paul Lederach: reconciliation as the restoration of the fabric of community

In his works John Paul Lederach demonstrates the passage from conflict resolution through conflict management to conflict transformation.140 The very approach of Lederach to dealing with conflicts has to be understood in the light of this change of perspectives. Conflict resolution views the conflict as something negative and destructive that should be avoided. On the contrary, the conflict transformation upholds the ongoing nature of the conflict, its positive understanding as a reality that already contains potential and chances for the conflicting parties to realise their interests, move on and grow:141 conflict becomes as a motor of change.142 The central claim here is the “proactive bias toward seeing conflict as a potential catalyst for growth.”143 I will focus here on this more fundamental vision of the conflict in the works of Lederach that gives incentives for both the understanding of what reconciliation is and how it should be fostered. What does John Paul Lederach, our last reference author, teach us about reconciliation? First, like Robert Schreiter, Lederach opines that the pursuing of constructive social change or reconciliation144 should not be reduced to the search for the appropriate technique. Reconciliation is not about the third party developing a strategy that can be successfully implemented by conflicting sides. Lederach emphasises that it is impossible to create a pattern of peace-building applicable to all the situations of con____________________ 140 Why conflict transformation is the most appropriate term to approach conflicts is brilliantly substantiated in John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2003). 141 John Paul Lederach, “Defining Conflict Transformation,” http://www.restorative justice.org/10fulltext/lederach (accessed April 14, 2014). 142 Lederach, The Little Book, 5. 143 Lederach, Defining Conflict. 144 I am in favour of putting a sign of equality between those two terms, constructive social change and reconciliation, drawing upon the definition of the former by Lederach himself: “Constructive change. The pursuit of shifting relationships from those defined by fear, mutual recrimination, and violence towards those characterised by love, mutual respect, and proactive engagement. Constructive social change seeks to move the flow of the interaction in human conflict from cycles of destructive relational patterns towards cycles of relational dignity and respectful engagement” (John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination. The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 181). Relational dignity and respectful engagement are excellent indications of the ongoing reconciliation.

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flict. Every conflict is unique and therefore, a unique solution is to be elaborated. Colin Knox and Padraic Quikr corroborate that conclusion by proving that there is no single model of conflict-resolution for the apparently similar situations of the ethno-national struggles in Northern Ireland, Israel, and South Africa.145 Rather, Lederach is very clear that the process of reconciliation should be owned by the protagonists of the conflict themselves. Based on his practical experience, the author speaks about five qualities of the process of reconciliation from the point of view of the mediator. First, reconciliation is centred on relationship which means that its aim is simply to “engage the sides of the conflict with each other as humansin-relationship.”146 This process, called social healing “represents the capacity of communities and their respective individuals to survive, locate voice and resiliently innovate spaces of interaction and nurture meaningful conversation and purposeful action in the midst and aftermath of escalated and structural conflicts.”147 Thus, shortly, it is about developing the capacity to live and act together. One of the major practical implications of this is that reconciliation is about the building of trust which consequently means that the best protagonists of reconciliation are not external mediators but conflicting parties themselves. Since reconciliation is about building direct relationships with the opponent, people who enjoy the trust of the contesting sides are the best mediators. According to that logic, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is a proper voice that calls for reconciliation because it constitutes a part of the Ukrainian society and feels the lines of division in her own body. The high degree of trust in the Church declared by Ukrainian citizens also speaks in her favour as a protagonist of reconciliation. Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi maintained that those who follow the path of reconciliation will not be helped by politics, diplomacy or an external force: “It is only when we have God in our hearts, that we will find the strength for mutual forgiveness.”148 The Church can help a lot ____________________ 145 See Colin Knox and Padraic Quirk, Peace-Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa. Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 196-197. 146 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: Unites States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 26. 147 Lederach and Lederach, When Blood, 208. Italics preserved from the original text. 148 «C’est seulement quand nous aurons Dieu dans notre cœur que nous trouverons la force pour le pardon mutuel.» (No. 5000, 439).

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with her preaching of humble virtues of forgiveness and love which would be a better inspiration for reconciliation than any external force. Reconciliation is about the encounter between the people who have faced conflicts with each other; in that way reconciliation makes it possible for the people who interpret the past in different ways to come together. The acknowledgement of the past belongs to the core elements of a successful reconciliation: “Reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious circle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past.”149 In reconciliation past, present and future meet to bring to life a new reality: “Reconciliation-as-encounter suggests that space for the acknowledgement of the past and envisioning of the future is a necessary ingredient for reframing the present.”150 Second, “reconciliation is both a place, as in destination, and a journey. It provides a horizon, within sight yet beyond reach.”151 The mediators of the conflict should understand themselves as accompaniers, those standing alongside the people on their journey to reconciliation. Hence, reconciliation is not brought from above but is a process, often measured by decades, that is created by the parties themselves. The mediators have to help “to seek innovative ways to create a time, and a place, within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate, and embrace the painful past and the necessary shared future as a means of dealing with the present.”152 Third, reconciliation demands the stance of humility which Lederach brings in connection with the truth and truth-telling. Humility is the opposite of arrogance which pretends to be in possession of the whole truth. Instead, humility refuses to give definite answers. It rather suggests “a need to learn and accompany the building of process that is both rooted and responsive to the context and people.”153 In other words, “Humility requires the sharing of one’s self and ideas, but not the imposition of them.”154 Here John Paul Lederach points at his idea of moral imagination when he ____________________ 149 Lederach, Building Peace, 26. 150 Ibid., 27. 151 John Paul Lederach, “Five Qualities of Practice in Support of the Reconciliation Process,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation, eds. Raymond Helmick and Rodney Petersen (n.p: Templeton, 2001), 197. 152 Lederach, Building Peace, 35. 153 Lederach, Five Qualities, 199. 154 Ibid.

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mentions that among other things “humility suggests a lifelong commitment to learning and an ever-regenerated spirit of creativity.”155 Fourth, Lederach defines reconciliation in terms of the restoration of the fabric of community where the building of trust plays a great role. The restoration of the community fabric includes reconciliation on the interpersonal and community level which can be achieved through truth, justice, and mercy. Lederach defines truth as the element that refers to the past, justice shapes the present, and mercy (love) and peace tell something about the future coexistence. Truth defines the past inasmuch as it is about what and how to remember in the conflicting situation.156 Justice deals with the present because it aims at the establishing a basis on which the relations get a chance to be reconstructed. Love and peace constitute a horizon of the transformed future coexistence. Concerning memory in the process of the restoration of the fabric of community, Lederach postulated: “The challenge of reconciliation is not how to create the place where one can “forgive and forget.” It is about the far more challenging adventure into the space where individuals and whole communities can remember and change.”157 Finally, Lederach describes reconciliation with the biblical metaphor of the desert. It points both at the timing and the challenges of reconciliation. Commenting upon timing, Lederach realistically prefers to talk about reconciliation as a process that lasts for decades or longer than months or years.158 Concerning the essence this thinker maintains that the metaphor of the desert underlines the experience of wandering, waiting, and looking for the right way.159 How does Lederach inform the reconciliation discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church? First, he explains the essence of reconciliation: it is about building trust and restoring the fabric of society which remains essentially divided after the communist times. It is a vital problem for generally very individualistic and passive Ukrainians. The allUkrainian reconciliation, the discussions about the national unity are directed to the establishment of trust. The reconciliation between the Churches demands building trust between them as well. Here the inter____________________ 155 156 157 158 159

Ibid. Ibid., 200. Ibid., 201. Ibid., 202. Ibid.

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Church programs of cooperation can contribute to the dialogue which first happens around the very concrete practical issues and then, when certain trust is there, helps settle the principal differences. Reconciliation demands humility which points at the need of listening to the other. When the Church presents her truth as the only one eligible, she excludes other Churches from the dialogue. When the Moscow Patriarchate considers the creation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to be a historical mistake, it makes the fruitful dialogue impossible from the very beginning. Listening to the truth of the other is important since it reveals something about the identity of the other. Interestingly enough, Lederach underlines the reality of memory in reconciliation by claiming that reconciliation is about remembering and changing. He is an absolute opponent of forgetting. For him social amnesia hinders social changes even though some kind of it might be justified by political pragmatism. Since Lederach pays so much attention to the reality of relationships where identity matters, he denies social forgetting because it weakens communities by depriving them of the true identities and genuine relationships.160 Applying Lederach’s concept of claiming would help define the aim of the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation. Claiming emphasises that “meaningful conversation creates the space for choice and responsibility.”161 The image of claiming “fosters a sense of place and the rebuilding of belonging capable of generating shared purpose.”162 Thus social healing is about “building mutual respect in a shared space while still living with conflicting narratives of memory and hope, and that this can translate into choice and responsibility for and by individuals and collectives on behalf of their own and a wider common good.”163 Social healing in the Ukrainian context means reaching such a state of cooperation between the people of different memories and identities that makes it possible for them to work together for a commonly defined purpose and this purpose should long for the good of everybody and of the whole community. Instead of emphasising the differences between the eastern and western parts of their country, Ukrainians must define the common practical aim, the joint project of the transformation of the country that surpasses regional differences. The Eu____________________ 160 161 162 163

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Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 62. Lederach and Lederach, When Blood, 212. Ibid., 213. Italics preserved from the original text. Ibid.

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roMaidan managed to bring together people from all over Ukraine to stand not so much for the European idea as for human dignity against the criminal state.164 In the process of the painful transition that is slowly getting underway this core idea of the protesters has to be delivered to the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine which would sew the social fabric in the country. Leaving identity differences aside, the country can unite around the common purpose and plan of making Ukraine a truly democratic country, thus working together for the common good. At the present stage of its development Ukraine urgently needs social cohesion around a meaningful goal which bears the promise of leaving behind the problem of real or exaggerated clashing identities. I have unfolded here Lederach’s understanding of reconciliation. In chapter VI of the book I will return to Lederach in order to define the practical ramifications of his idea of moral imagination for promoting reconciliation and social changes in Ukraine. His thoughts on the elements of imagination, the critical yeast that sustains changes, the positive sides of every conflict as already containing its solution, etc., will be helpful for suggesting practical ways of how the Church can contribute to social transformation.

____________________ 164 Tanja Maljartschuk, „Der Tod sitzt auf dem goldenen Thron“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 21, 2014.

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Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation 4.1

On the demands for repentance

4.1.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: repentance as the individual conversion of the heart From the very beginning it is worth admitting that there are not many references to repentance in the analysed texts of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church. A distinguished feature of the documents is that the authors speak about personal repentance. For instance, Liubomyr Husar dwells upon the common guilt of Ukrainians against other nations but suggests personal conversion. The same concerns the reconciliation between the Churches – communion. Also communion is to be reached through individual repentance and conversion of the heart. In the section about the sacrament of confession, Catechism of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church shortly mentions that one of the important conditions of this sacrament is the reconciliation with the neighbour.1 However, this topic is not developed further. In his presentation at the synod of the German Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Ukraine in 2010, Mykhailo Dymyd, a Greek-Catholic theologian, argued that personal repentance is a prerequisite to reconciliation. Only God knows all the truth about sins in the souls. The repentance before God is necessary because a sinful person spreads evil around: “The real reconciliation is not reconciliation de jure, however reconciliation in the heart, in the soul.”2 The repenting person gets the grace to evaluate other people in the light of God’s love and mercy. Perhaps such an individualisation of forgiveness and reconciliation needs correction. Not only personal sins but common prejudices, images of the evil and stereotypes3 have to be worked out by the whole Church instead of being abandoned to every individual. ____________________ 1 2 3

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Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Catechism, 151. Dymyd, Reconciliation. Translation from the original source. Mykhailo Dymyd has prepared a list of typical stereotypes of certain GreekCatholics (theological-canonical, ideological-ethnical, denominational, and moral) that they developed during history. Among them is for instance the belief that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the agent of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine or that one can disregard the Church or the State law. The author is of the opinion that reconciliation means overcoming those stereotypes that would contribute to social and ecclesial unity. (See

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

According to Husar, repentance is a necessary step towards rapprochement between the Ukrainian Churches. The contribution of Christians in Ukraine to the unity of the Church consists in the recognition of their limitedness and imperfection as Christians. The Church is divided by human sins; therefore genuine repentance is the starting point of the change of attitude towards other people and confessions. One has to examine one’s conscience and understand whether there is a sincere desire to be united or whether one considers oneself better than other people.4 The first means towards repentance is a prayer of atonement that every single Christian and every community must perform. Such personal repentance will be the first step for the new beginning here and now without waiting for the establishment of the external conjuncture favourable for the Church unity. Surprisingly, repentance is also mentioned in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the healing of the memory of the Holodomor. Criticising the communist regime for its violent efforts to build a paradise without God, together with other Heads of the Christian Churches in Ukraine, Husar claims that the development of the country does not depend so much upon suggested reforms but is grounded on the internal transfiguration of every person.5 The authors do not directly mention the word repentance but they emphasise that everyone has to change what one can not condemning the other but eradicating one’s own sins.6 Being aware of their own sins, people can do everything possible that the tragedies of the level of the Holodomor never occur again. In a society that for so many years has been under the communist dictatorship people have lost the understanding of their human dignity. Ihor Isichenko, a bishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, similarly underlined the significance of repentance for the regeneration of society: “Without the aptitude to say “I am sorry” we will never establish

____________________

4 5 6

Mykhailo Dymyd, “Stereotypy hreko-katolykiv abo Naslidky ran mynuloho na suchasnyi sposib dumannia deiakykh hreko-katolykiv” {Greek-Catholic stereotypes or consequences of the wounds of the past on the contemporary way of thinking of certain Greek-Catholics}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/blog/~Dymyd/ 35381/ (accessed January 23, 2014)). No. 319, 173. No. 277, 461. Ibid.

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neither civil society, not the peace in our soul.”7 Bohdan Dziurakh, a Greek-Catholic bishop, in connection with the impending challenges in Ukrainian society after the EuroMaidan, similarly claimed that Ukraine needs both personal and all-national repentance. Every individual is responsible not only for the own affairs but for the developments in the entire society and hence “the process of the purification of society has to begin from the purification of the heart of each of us.”8 Repentance equally means that the evildoer takes a strong stance of not repeating his wrongdoings again. This element appears very rarely in the studied official texts of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Eventually, the Church leadership is convinced that it is self-evident that repentance presupposes a decision of changing one’s attitude and conduct in the future. In his address to the parish priests of the city of Lviv for the preparation of the Purification and Reconciliation Day from August 2000, Husar holds that the guilt for the tragic history of that city in the last century rests also on the Lviv citizens themselves; therefore, if the next century is to be more peaceful and less violent, the personal attitude of everyone has to undergo a process of profound change. People should not commit again offences against justice and love to the fellow men or even against themselves.9 Having released oneself from the burden of the past through repentance and forgiveness, one should take the firm decision not to return to the same faults.10 A similar reference to this element of reconciliation we encounter in Husar’s sermon during the liturgy on the Reconciliation Day. After the purification of memory, having realised what indeed happened, one has to ____________________ 7

8

9 10

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Ihor Isichenko, “Life Histories in the Framework of the Project ‘Ukraina aktyvna – 2010: zahoiennia mynuloho” {Active Ukraine – 2010: healing of the past}, interview, Religion.in.ua, http://www.religion.in.ua/zmi/ukrainian_zmi/18339-inter vyu-arxiyepiskopa-igorya-isichenka-istoriyi-zhittya-v-ramkax-proektu-ukrayinaaktivna-2010-zagoyennya-minulogo.html (accessed January 13, 2014). Translation from the original source. Bohdan Dziurakh, “Ukraintsiam potriben osobystyi i zahalnonatsionalnyi ispyt sumlinnia” {Ukrainians need a personal and all-national examination of their conscience}, interview by Oksana Klymonchuk, Ugcc.org.ua, http://news.ugcc. org.ua/articles/vladika_bogdan_dzyurah_naperedodnі_40dennogo_postu_ukraint syam_potrіben_osobistiy_і_zagalnonatsіonalniy_іspit_sumlіnnya_69445.html (accessed March 5, 2014). Translation from the original source. No. 99, 185. Ibid.

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

make the strong decision not to repeat the evil caused in the past because “without that intention to reform there is no reconciliation, no hope for the better future.”11 Further Liubomyr Husar explains that “to reform means not to repeat consciously and voluntarily anything that could offend the individual person, a group of people, or the whole nation.”12 It is an interesting element in the theology of the reconciliation of Husar which is usually not mentioned in other common reconciliation theories. Still, repentance is not only a personal affair; it equally applies to the Churches as institutions. Commenting upon the achievements of Ukrainian Christianity in independent Ukraine, Mykhailo Cherenkov, a Protestant Ukrainian theologian, argued that repentance is what all of the Ukrainian Churches have to complete in order to conduct a plausible evangelisation: “The Church has to overcome certain Soviet stereotypes, experiences, schemes that derived from the Soviet past inside the Church. This point the Churches should have intertwined in their messages on the occasion of the 1025th anniversary of the baptism of the Kyivan Rus. The Church has to repent of and condemn different forms of cooperation and coexistence with the regime which compromise the Church.”13

Summarising what has been said above, two related leading trends are evident in the thinking of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. First, reconciliation and its elements are considered as the personal task of every individual. Second, as the conversion of the individual, repentance brings about changes on the level of society because the renewed person builds relations with the world around in a new transfigured way. However, the criticism that more attention should be paid to the repentance of structural sin is indispensable.

4.1.2 Miroslav Volf: “To repent of what perpetrators do to our soul” Even though Volf defends the duty of the unconditional forgiveness with regard to every person as we will see it later, repentance also plays a significant role in his theology. Forgiveness is a social affair because it happens in the heart and mind of a person and is offered as a gift to a concrete ____________________ 11 12 13

No. 346, 579; No. 128, 240. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. Mykhailo Cherenkov, interview by Taras Antoshevskyi, Youtube.com, http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=ydUDACvl--8 (accessed January 17, 2014). Translation from the original source.

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wrongdoer.14 Repentance is needed not only after the mass violation of human rights, it is also a means to eradicate evil values and practices that dominate in society, such as envy or enmity: “To repent means to resist the seductiveness of the sinful values and practices and to let the new order of God’s reign be established in one’s heart.”15 Not only wrongdoers but also victims should repent. The latter should do it in order “not to allow the oppressors to determine the terms under which social conflict is carried out, the values around which the conflict is raging, and the means by which it is fought.”16 Victims “need to repent of what the perpetrators do to our soul,”17 for mirroring the behaviour of the wrongdoers and for denying responsibility for the existing state of affairs. Here the position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church coincides with Volf, as it follows from the documents on the memory of the Holodomor and the healing of the memories of war. The overcoming of the communist evil is not only about, for instance, getting rid of the old Soviet symbols18 around the country19 and replacing them by national-oriented and Christian names ____________________ 14 15 16 17 18

19

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Volf, Free of Charge, 181. Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (1996), 116. Ibid. Ibid., 117. Nazar Kovalchuk, “Reklama Ukrainy bez Lenina” {Promoting Ukraine without Lenin}, http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/2306373.html (accessed February 12, 2011). An interesting fact is that the authors of the promo video of Ukraine, a co-organiser of the European Football Championship in 2012, have “cut” from the film the monument of Lenin still standing on the Freedom Square of an eastern Ukrainian city and the first capital of the country until 1934, Kharkiv. The public opinion poll concerning the absence of the monument of Lenin in the promo video of Ukraine demonstrates contradicting positions. Some respondents support the removal of this monument not only from the video, but also from the Freedom Square itself where it currently stands. They see it as a remainder of the Soviet symbols that have nothing to do in contemporary Ukraine. The opposite opinion says that the monument has to be preserved because it is part of the history of the city and it has to be known to the coming generations. This example with the Lenin monument opens up a floor for the interesting discussion about the role of such symbols in the building of the nation. Ernst Lüdemann, Die Auseinandersetzung mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit in der Ukraine, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 39 (Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1997), 21-24. It took the form of removing the monuments of the Soviet era heroes and state leaders, first of all Stalin and Lenin, renaming Soviet-bound places (e.g., streets, towns or villages), changing the military symbolism.

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

and images.20 Both Miroslav Volf and the Greek-Catholic bishops emphasise that the overcoming of the past equally demands repentance for disseminating the seeds of enmity, indifference, envy, and irresponsibility. Forgiveness should not only be granted, but also received by the offender, which presumes the acceptance of the accusation and the release from debt. Repentance is then a necessary consequence of the offered forgiveness and not its prerequisite. Repentance is essential because when we refuse to confess, we reject the offered forgiveness. In the words of Volf, “By confessing, I recognise myself as the one who needs forgiveness and who can appropriately receive it. By failing to confess, I declare that I am in no need of forgiveness. To me, in that case, forgiveness isn’t a gift; it’s an insult, a declaration that I’ve done the wrong I claim not to have done.”21 Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi underlined the same idea regarding the refusal of the Moscow Patriarchate to accept the forgiveness of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Cardinal Liubachivskyi noted that the acceptance of that forgiveness would mean that the Moscow Patriarchate recognises its fault of the cooperation with the communist regime in the liquidation of the Greek-Catholic Church. The Russian Orthodox Church is not so far. Consequently, Miroslav Volf is convinced that repentance is not a prerequisite to forgiveness but its consequence. Both Volf and the Ukrainians bishops speak about personal repentance. For the Greek-Catholic Church leadership, repentance is the initial step to reconciliation, the recognition of one’s imperfection as a Christian. Realising one’s own sinfulness and working for the eradication of sins is the starting point for rapprochement. Moreover, even the victim has to repent of the hatred towards the wrongdoer. Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi told that Ukrainians must ask the forgiveness of the Russian people and the Church because of their lack of love. Exactly that what Volf implies by claiming that the victim must repent of what the perpetrator did to his or her soul.

____________________ 20

21

The images on the new currency hryvna introduced in 1996 illustrate this idea well. The names of the ancient Kyiv princes Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav the Wise, the headman of the Cossacks Ivan Mazepa, and the first President of independent Ukraine in 1917 Mykhailo Hrushevskyi were depicted on the new currency bills. Volf, Free of Charge, 153.

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4.2

On the path to forgiveness

4.2.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “We forgive and ask for forgiveness” In my reading, forgiveness – an element that is usually mentioned together with reconciliation – is not often emphasised in the studied documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. For instance, in the sermon delivered during the liturgy on the Reconciliation Day in 2001, Liubomyr Husar does not mention forgiveness at all. He highlights the purification of memory and the decision not to repeat the evil deeds but completely omits the need for asking and granting forgiveness.22 This fact is remarkable, keeping in mind that this sermon was the only official address to all the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the city of Lviv on the occasion of the Reconciliation Day, which means that it was mainly there that the faithful could learn Husar’s vision of reconciliation. The reader notes that in his early texts Husar focused on personal forgivenessn that is asking forgiveness from God for committed sins. Instead, the significance of forgiveness on the broader societal level was at first not elucidated. In what follows in that section I will unfold different facets of forgiveness in the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

Forgiveness as a feature of martyrs In his address to the clergy on the Purification and Reconciliation Day, Husar dedicated a separate section to the theme of forgiveness. Remarkably, the meaning of forgiveness is explained in the example of martyrs which is particularly eloquent for the Greek-Catholic faithful. The essence of martyrdom and suffering consists not in the mere fact of experiencing pain but in the ability to forgive and bless the wrongdoer. The one who died cursing the tormentor is not a genuine martyr.23 As a conclusion to this document, emphasising once more the meaning of the Reconciliation Day, Cardinal Husar postulates that the essence of the celebration is to release oneself from the burden of offences through repentance, forgiveness, ____________________ 22 23

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See No. 346. No. 99, 185.

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and the promise not to repeat the past.24 Reconciliation as a purification of the heart through forgiveness rejuvenates the relations between people: “The Reconciliation Day has to be for us the day of purification, the day of forgiveness because only in that way can we become free and restore the balance in our communication with the fellow men.”25

Asking forgiveness for negligence and indignation Asking forgiveness does not apply exclusively to the situations when people are directly guilty of certain evil deeds. As the pronouncements on the healing of wounds of the Holodomor show, people have to repent and ask forgiveness also for the results of evil in one’s heart. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church teaches that the Holodomor had destructive influences on the human spirit, and it is for that sort of evil that the people have to ask forgiveness from God: “Instructed by the bitter experience of the past, let us say thanks to the Creator for his kindness and let us ask forgiveness for our indignity and negligence.”26 Forgiveness is a cure from the sin of indignation and distrust. In his pastoral letter on the Great Fast of 2014, Sviatoslav Shevchuk considers this as an important element of the regeneration of present-day Ukrainian society especially what concerns hatred and distrust against those “who have been entrusted with the helm of the nation. It is difficult for us to trust the new leadership today, because we have experienced authorities that enslave, humiliate and kill. Thus, it will take a great effort to overcome this sin. The first step in this direction must be forgiveness. A good opportunity for this is “Forgiveness Sunday” which opens the way to reconciliation with God and the neighbour.”27

Further, Ukrainians must not only eradicate their distrust in the new government but share with it the responsibility for the future of the country. Unfortunately, this statement of Shevchuk does not concern appeals to the new state powers themselves that they do not dare follow the sinful steps of their predecessors.

____________________ 24 25 26 27

Ibid. No. 118, 221. Translation from the original source. No. 155, 276. Translation from the original source. No. 2026.

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Formula of mutual forgiveness While reading his pronouncements, one easily identifies the clear reconciliation formula of Liubomyr Husar “We forgive and ask for forgiveness.” It is beyond doubt this principle that was promoted by the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the course of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. Already in his earliest address concerning the homage to the Polish military graves on Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv, Cardinal Husar claims that the redeeming way out of mutual accusations in violence, wrongdoings, and stereotypes is “to forget the past, to ask and grant forgiveness for the committed and suffered offences.”28 In his sermon on the occasion of the reconciliation act between the Ukrainian and Polish Catholic bishops, Husar calls “to forgive each other all the trespasses of the past, to ask forgiveness for what we have done and to forgive all the harms done against us.”29 Both Poles and Ukrainians have inflicted injustices on each other, hence it would be correct when both recognise their faults.30 Looking for victims and perpetrators will not help because they are on both sides, hence the formula “We forgive and ask for forgiveness.” Both nations possess their vision of the tragic past events, however both have to honestly ask themselves with which eyes they see the past and how they want to see the future.31 This unconditional vision of forgiveness is pertinent to all the social pronouncements of Cardinal Husar. The most solemn example of granting and asking forgiveness Husar demonstrates during the visit of John Paul II to Ukraine. As already mentioned above the Greek-Catholic discourse on forgiveness was greatly inspired by the message of John Paul II. In his greeting address upon his arrival at Kyiv International Airport on June 23, 2001, the Pope pronounced distinctive words: “As we ask forgiveness for the errors committed in both the distant and recent past, let us in turn offer forgiveness for the wrongs ____________________ 28 29 30

31

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No. 139, 250. Translation from the original source. No. 368, 611. Translation from the original source. Liubomyr Husar, “Zacząć od przebaczenia, czy rozliczeń?” {To begin from forgiveness or making charges?}, interview by Marcin Przeciszewski and Krzysztof Tomasik, Ekai.pl, http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/temat_dnia/x66836/zaczac-od-przeb aczenia-czy-rozliczen/?page=1 (accessed January 15, 2014). Liubomyr Husar, “Chy naspravdi my bazhaiemo ‘yedynospasaiemoho” prymyrennia?” {Do we really want “saving-in-unity” reconciliation?}, http:// www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2013/05/15/6989805/ (accessed January 15, 2014).

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

endured.”32 This formula of forgiveness was answered by Cardinal Liubomyr Husar during the liturgy according to Byzantine rite in Lviv held on June 27, 2001. Husar greeted John Paul in Ukraine, expressed the appreciation of the Pope’s concern about the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, and then pronounced those words: “Most unfortunately certain sons and daughters of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church consciously and voluntarily did evil things to their neighbours, both to their own people and to others. For all of them, in your presence, Most Holy Father, in the name of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, I ask forgiveness from the Lord, the Creator and Father of us all, and also from those whom we, sons and daughters of this Church, may have wronged in any way. So that the horrible past may not weigh down upon us, and not poison our lives, for our past with all our hearts we forgive those who in any way have wronged us.”33

In that quotation Cardinal Husar asked forgiveness from all who were in some way harmed by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church during history and expressed forgiveness for injustices inflicted upon his Church, thus accentuating the importance of that item on the social agenda of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

When Churches or nations ask forgiveness Remarkably Liubomyr Husar does not ask personal forgiveness but forgiveness on behalf of a group – the faithful of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church. Further, he asks and offers forgiveness only in the name of his Church. He does not evoke, for instance, the whole Ukrainian nation. However, the fact that Liubomyr Husar asks forgiveness on behalf of a certain group distinguishes this text from the documents on the Reconciliation Day in Lviv. In these pronouncements asking and granting forgiveness was an assignment of every individual and, hence, personal repentance and reconciliation were emphasised. Here the rhetoric changes, and the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic speaks about the common fault and the need to repent commonly “so that the horrible past may not weigh down upon us, and not poison our lives.” The author postulates that the faithful of his Church committed evil to their neighbours from the own

____________________ 32 33

Arrival Ceremony. Address of the Holy Father. No. 113, 212. Translation from the original source.

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people and other nations. The text does not give more details about the evil that was done and who the victims were. Husar is convinced that there is no reconciliation without forgiveness; no brotherly relations are possible when one carries in one’s heart a burden of harms inflicted upon him or her. This is where forgiveness comes on stage. Forgiveness is a very personal process that makes peace possible between both individuals and groups of people. In the speech on the occasion of the opening of the monument in Pavlokoma, dedicated to the Ukrainians killed by the Polish paramilitary troops in 1945, Husar claims that there are neither individuals nor entire nations that have never acted wrongly with regard to the other. Even the Church as a partly human institution had to recognise that she has sinned and committed faults.34 That brings us back to the idea of Mykhailo Cherenkov that Ukrainian Churches as institutions should rework their communist past instead of being blinded by the triumphalist Christianity of their nominal faithful.35 Forgiveness and reconciliation as the obligation on personal level and on the level of the entire nation according to the principle “We forgive and ask for forgiveness” should govern the relations between the people. Echoing Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and the Balamand Agreement, Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi postulates mutual forgiveness and love as necessary prerequisites towards the dialogue for the unity of the Churches.36 Forgiveness and reconciliation between the Churches appear in the considered public pronouncements of all the Heads of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church. Forgiveness and the spiritual side of reconciliation is mentioned alongside the practical actions, for instance dialogue, respect for each other, ceasing of the media wars, etc. A genuine mutual forgiveness is needed for it will free Churches-opponents from constantly experiencing the historical pain of injustices that took place between them.37

____________________ 34 35 36 37

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No. 227, 381. See paragraph 4.1.1 of the book. No. 5002, 161. No. 5003, 59 (No. 4000, 128).

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Forgiveness as the obligation of love Husar’s predecessor, Cardinal Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi, connected forgiveness with love. In his theology love goes beyond justice and truth and paves the way towards forgiveness. Liubachivskyi thinks along the following lines. Christian love is among other things communicated in concrete acts of forgiveness. The well-known Franco-German and especially Polish-German reconciliations illustrate that opinion. Liubachivskyi was convinced that Ukrainians and Russians have to follow that example. For that purpose, in November 1987, he sent a letter to the Moscow Patriarchate that contained this paragraph: “Following the steps of the Spirit of Christ we reach out the hand of forgiveness, reconciliation and love to the Russian people and the Moscow Patriarchate. As in the case of our reconciliation with the Polish people, we repeat the words of Christ: “And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors” (Mt 6,12). We are all brothers in Christ. Let us respect each other. Let us learn to live together being aware that the same faith of our Saviour unites us.”38

To the opponents of the Russian-Ukrainian rapprochement Liubachivskyi explicitly says that the Polish episcopate managed to forgive the Germans who during World War II endeavoured to destroy both the state and the ecclesiastical leadership of the Polish nation.39 Obviously, one draws here parallels with the Ukrainian situation when Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union after World War II, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was destroyed in 1946, and the country suffered for decades under the communist yoke. In that way Cardinal Liubachivskyi emphasises that the Ukrainian-Russian reconciliation is possible and necessary.

____________________ 38

39

“Marchant dans les pas de l’Esprit du Christ, nous tendons la main du pardon, de la réconciliation et de l’amour au peuple russe et au Patriarcat de Moscou. Comme dans notre réconciliation avec le peuple polonais, nous répétons les paroles du Christ: «Pardonnez comme nous pardonnons». (Mt 6,12). Nous sommes tous frères en Christ. Respectons-nous les uns les autres. Apprenons à vivre ensemble, conscients que nous unit la même foi de notre Sauveur.” (No. 5000, 438). Ibid., 439.

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Accepting forgiveness means recognising faults Liubachivskyi was aware of the difficulties of the venture of forgiveness. He reckons that one is able to accept the offered forgiveness only when he/she recognises his/her faults. Commenting on paragraph 20 of the Balamand Agreement on the will to pardon among the Churches and referring to the unanswered declaration on pardon with regard to the Russians from 1987, Cardinal Liubachivskyi explains why his offer of forgiveness was not accepted by the Russian Orthodox Church. To accept forgiveness means to recognise oneself guilty. Without the profession of one’s faults the offered forgiveness is offending: “If you forgive someone who is not asking forgiveness, you could, in fact, be offending him, by accusing him of something for which he feels no guilt or responsibility. It is therefore not enough to pardon.”40 Consequently, before asking forgiveness the parties concerned have to recognise their faults and only then “seek forgiveness and ask to be pardoned for whatever wrongs have been done, wilful or unwilling.”41

Asking forgiveness as an act of paying honour In the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church asking forgiveness is an act of paying honour. In “Conception of the Ecumenical Position,” the Greek-Catholic bishops hold that the lasting reconciliation can be reached only through voluntary decisions, considering the interests of all the Churches, and looking for the solutions that would honour the dignity of every denomination.42 This is an important remark, since it presupposes that Churches have to refrain from actions that put their opponents in a negative light because this hampers reconciliation. Moreover, the reference to the dignity of a Church also means the readiness to ask forgiveness because while recognising one’s own faults against the opponent one shows respect and pays honour.

____________________ 40 41 42

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No. 5001, 422. Ibid. No. 5003, 55-56 (No. 4000, 121).

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Asking forgiveness as a readiness to assume responsibility Asking forgiveness presupposes the willingness to assume responsibility. The regeneration of the Kyivan Church through the reunion of the traditional Ukrainian Churches in one Kyivan Patriarchate would be possible only after the Churches assume responsibility for their wrongdoings in the past and ask forgiveness. The failure of all the previous attempts of the Churches of the Kyivan tradition to come together proves that without the spiritual element of forgiveness not any project of Church unity can successfully be implemented. For that reason, transferring the Metropolitan seat of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church from Lviv to Kyiv, Husar reiterated the plea of asking and offering forgiveness with regard to other branches of the Kyivan Church.43 Moreover, the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church offered forgiveness to the Orthodox on several occasions. On June 18, 1993 when the Greek-Catholics were impeded by a group of Orthodox faithful to celebrate a liturgy at the Saint Kirill church in Kyiv on the occasion of the solemn blessing of the ground where the future Greek-Catholic cathedral in the capital of Ukraine was to be erected. In the statement that appeared a day after those events, the Greek-Catholic leadership pointed at the violation of human rights by the group of Orthodox and simultaneously, according to God’s commandment offered them forgiveness.44 As sons and daughters of Saint Volodymyr’s baptism, both the Orthodox and Greek-Catholics in Ukraine have to learn to live maturely in peace in the spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation.45 The issue of forgiveness between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarchate seems to be a bit more complicated. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has at least twice openly asked forgiveness from the Russian Orthodox Church for the burdened past between the two Churches. The first event took place in 1987 in a letter of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi declaring the will to rapprochement with the Russian people. The second explicit official declaration of forgiveness and reconciliation was pronounced on June 27, 2001 in Lviv during the Byzantine-rite liturgy with Pope John Paul II when Liubomyr Husar apologised for the faults of sons and daughters of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Having themselves offered forgiveness to the Russian Orthodox ____________________ 43 44 45

No. 177, 312 (No. 3000, 137). No. 45, 84. Ibid., 84-85.

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Church, the Greek-Catholic leadership expected the same step from the Moscow Patriarchate after the establishment of religious freedom in the former Soviet Union.46 However, the Russian Orthodox Church has never expressed her sorrow or asked pardon for her “acts of the sinful subjugation to the totalitarian regime that traumatises the very nature of the Church.”47 The message is clear: the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not demand from the Russian Orthodox Church something that she has not fulfilled herself. As the Greek-Catholics have asked for pardon, they expect similar steps from the Moscow Patriarchate. In my reading, the problem with her forgiveness with regard to the Moscow Patriarchate consists in the fact that the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church does not specify for what exactly she asks forgiveness from the Russian Orthodox Church. Perhaps Greek-Catholics apologise for the interconfessional property conflicts. However, the letter of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi to the Patriarch of Moscow in 1987 was composed before the property struggle began. It would be appropriate for the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to be more specific concerning the faults that it recognises with regard to the Moscow Patriarchate. Without such a specification the declaration of forgiveness seems arrogant concerning the opponent and looks like an attempt to depict one’s own higher moral disposition. Perhaps because of that some experts48 say that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church must apologise for the Brest Union and the violent redistribution of the sacral buildings that also contributed to the split in Kyivan Christianity. Such an apology should help normalise the relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Let us now consider this variety of references to forgiveness through the prism of Miroslav Volf and Robert Schreiter.

____________________ 46 47 48

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No. 217, 362. Ibid. Translation from the original source. See Dymyd, Reconciliation; Krokosh, Catechism; Arjakovsky, En attendant, 500.

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4.2.2 Miroslav Volf: the centrality of forgiveness 4.2.2.1 Forgiveness as a gift and an obligation Miroslav Volf explored the topic of forgiveness and reconciliation in different ways in his two books Exclusion and Embrace and Free of Charge. Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace. In the former, the author referred to philosophers and theologians in order to defend his vision. In the latter, he approached forgiveness in a popular style that would be understandable also for non-believers. The combination of the two approaches unfolds a persuasive theology of forgiveness. According to Miroslav Volf, the contemporary world falsely ascribes to God features according to which a consumerist individualistic society treats its members. People tend to imagine God as a negotiator or Santa Claus, the former points at the exchange mentality, the latter at the mentality of the satisfaction of all, even the most infantile desires. Liubomyr Husar unmasks another false image of God that precludes repentance, that is God the Implacable Judge. Volf aims to deploy common false images of God which negatively influence Christian practices, including forgiveness. In Volf’s opinion, the appropriate image of God is God the Giver. That correlates with the New Testament teaching saying that forgiveness is not a moral obligation but a gift, “the demonstration of divine grace and imitative of the love and grace of God towards humanity.”49 Drawing upon that image Volf suggests analogies with the giving by human beings.50 God’s giving obliges people to faith, gratitude, participation, the availability to become givers themselves, and to granting the most special gift of forgiveness. When people get gifts from God in order to pass them on to others, when they receive God’s forgiveness, they are obliged to forgive in their turn. Therefore Miroslav Volf highly praises the book of Brian Zahnd Unconditional, which promotes the “argent summon to conversion,” “the call of Jesus to radical unconditional forgiveness,” “to give up

____________________ 49 50

Bash, Forgiveness, 104. A short article demonstrating Volf’s approach of drawing parallels between human and divine giving that derives from the nature of the Triune God: Miroslav Volf, “Being as God Is. Trinity and Generosity,” in God’s Life in Trinity, eds. Miroslav Volf and Michael Welker (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006), 312.

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our consumerism and hostility to those who differ from us and practise generous and forgiving grace.” 51 Volf’s ideas are strongly grounded on the theology of the Apostle Paul. He reiterates Saint Paul’s emphasis on becoming one community after having received the body and blood of Christ: by receiving bread and wine, we receive Christ, and with Christ, we receive ourselves as one body of Christ. The Apostle wrote, explicating the relation between receiving Christ and becoming a community, “Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread” (1 Cor 10,17).”52 The same element is repeatedly reiterated by Liubomyr Husar and the liturgical act of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is a practical embodiment of that approach. Through his theology of the cross and resurrection Volf gives us hope that all the efforts of giving and ultimately forgiving are not futile: “… Our gifts and other benefits are not related as causes and effects. They are related as the cross and the resurrection.”53 The passion of Christ was crowned with the resurrection although it seemed to be a complete failure on the cross. In a similar way, our efforts at giving and forgiving may seem in vain, however, the hope and trust in the Holy Spirit, in his work in the world should support us even in the most desperate moments. Forgiveness is a way of life, it is a gift. As God has forgiven humanity, people must respond to this act through faith, repentance, and extending forgiveness to others. Thus, similarly to Husar, Volf portrays forgiveness as the obligation of a Christian deriving from God’s forgiveness. Who is to be forgiven? Which offences can be forgiven? In Volf’s radical interpretation, forgiveness is due to every person and has no limits. Every person deserves forgiveness because of the indiscriminate nature of God’s forgiveness. As God forgives every sin to every person, so we should pass on that gift: “Because Christ died for all, we are called to forgive everyone who offends us, without distinctions and without conditions. That hard work of indiscriminate forgiveness is what those who’ve been made in the likeness of the forgiving God should do.”54 The GreekCatholic justification of forgiveness is based on a similar premise. ____________________ 51 52 53 54

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Miroslav Volf, introduction to Unconditional? The Call of Jesus to Radical Forgiveness {CD-ROM}, by Brian Zahnd (n. p.: Oasis Audio, 2010). Volf, Free of Charge, 86. Ibid., 118. Ibid., 180.

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In the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the theology of forgiveness as a gift is absent. However, the leadership of this Church is not far from such a vision since it postulates that reconciliation is a grace, something freely granted by God or in other words a gift. Consequently, we may plausibly claim that the visions of both the Protestant Volf and the Greek-Catholics are similar. An additional similarity consists in the substantiation of forgiveness through the reference to the mystical body of Christ: all the people, and especially those gathered around the Eucharistic meal, constitute the mystical body of Christ; consequently, they are called to forgiveness as Christ forgives everyone. Forgiveness is a very special gift that people must offer imitating God. Hence, forgiveness is the obligation of a Christian. The theology of Volf with his core idea of imitating God in giving is helpful to substantiate more plausibly the Greek-Catholic obligation of forgiveness.

4.2.2.2 The dynamics of forgiveness In Volf’s understanding, forgiveness means two things: naming and condemning the wrongdoing and granting the wrongdoer a gift of not counting the offences against him or her. However, it is more difficult to forgive than to give because “We give when we delight in others or others are in need; by giving, we enhance their joy or make up for their lack. We forgive when others have wronged us; by forgiving, we release them from the burden of their wrongdoing. The difference lies in the violation suffered, in the burden of wrongdoing, offence, transgression, debt.”55

Therefore, the Christian forgiving could successfully happen only in the triangle between the offender, the wronged, and God. Otherwise, “Take God away, and the foundations of forgiveness become unsteady and may even crumble.”56 Volf is very clear on the account that when we forgive, we condemn. Forgiveness means that the victim names the offence, condemns it and after that decides not to count that offence against the wrongdoer. Moreover, “… There’s no way to give the gift or forgiveness without the sting of condemnation. We accuse when we forgive, and in doing that, we affirm ____________________ 55 56

Ibid., 130. Ibid., 131.

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the rightful claims of justice.”57 It is because this element of blame that it is so difficult to accept forgiveness. When in their message regarding the 70th anniversary of Volyn the Greek-Catholic bishops pronounced that they forgive and ask forgiveness, the Polish Catholic bishops refused to accept such a formula because the acceptance would mean the recognition of the blame of the Polish side in the mutual hostilities between the two nations. Condemnation should be performed in a correct way, which means condemning the evil deed but not the doer. Precisely in that way the Moscow Patriarchate is judged regarding its cooperation in the defeat of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946. Although the Greek-Catholic Church leadership occasionally admits that the Russian Orthodox Church has acted under the pressure of the circumstances, they still consider this Church to be absolutely worthy of rebuilding friendly relations with. The condemnation, however, does not constitute the core of forgiveness. There are three more elements to it: release from punishment, release from guilt, and slipping the memory of guilt into oblivion. The last point will be treated more in detail in the paragraph on the healing of memory. The release from punishment is for Volf the heart of forgiveness meaning not to press charges against the wrongdoer and forgoing the demand for retribution:58 “To forgive is to blame, not to punish.”59 This does not mean that no disciplinary or reforming action can be applied against the wrongdoer. Finally, forgiving presupposes the release of the wrongdoer from guilt as God did with sinful humanity. Forgiveness means lifting the burden of guilt and granting innocence to the wrongdoer. Miroslav Volf scrutinises both what forgiveness is and how it happens. He offers the whole chapter of his Free of Charge to that issue. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, especially Liubomyr Husar, poses the same question of how it is possible to forgive and to reconcile. The bishops answer by pointing at the grace of God and at the necessity of prayer for the success of reconciliation. Volf scrutinises the issue of the possibility of forgiveness in more nuances, for instance, regarding the power to forgive, by comparing God’s and human forgiveness, or by listing the reasons why people cannot forgive. For example, Volf claims that communities which foster the culture of forgiveness and which ____________________ 57 58 59

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Ibid., 169. Ibid. Ibid., 170.

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make it meaningful prompt their members to forgive. Is Ukrainian society nowadays but another example of the unforgiving culture in which it does not make sense to forgive?60 Our difficulty to identify ourselves with the real context of the Christian faith, the hollow Christianity, the Christianity of the outer observance, our holding “onto a godliness emptied of substance, to a faith that dribbled away as it was passed on to us,”61 all account for the unforgiving culture of our times including the perception of the faith. Moreover, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should add the element of the eschatological completion of forgiveness to her official teaching. The Church leadership has always emphasised that reconciliation and forgiveness happen with God’s help trying to encourage the faithful to step on the road to forgiveness. However, forgiveness does not simply happen by the grace of God; it will be completed only in the world to come, as Volf postulates. This is a good argument against the sceptics of forgiveness. We have both the right and power to forgive through the presence of Christ in our souls who has already forgiven us.62 This union with God, also mentioned by Cardinal Husar, helps surmount the inner resistance to forgiveness and reconciliation. Thus, both authors share the opinion that forgiveness is ultimately the work of God, expressing a great reliance on God’s grace. This leads to the posture of humbleness in forgiveness. People only echo God’s forgiveness. It is God, who knows the real extent of the wrongdoing, but he still forgives “and we join God in forgiving. The consequence for us should be humility – willingness to admit that we may have gotten the wrongdoing wrong, willingness to revise our judgement, willingness to retract it.”63 Miroslav Volf is more concrete about forgiveness than the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. They often use forgiveness and reconciliation interchanged while for Volf forgiveness is clearly only a step to reconciliation. Additionally, the core of reconciliation for Volf consists in forgiveness; he dedicates most of his attention to that issue as well as to the question of memory. The picture of forgiveness in the case of the Greek-Catholic Church is somehow blurred. Hence, it would be de____________________ 60 61 62 63

Ibid., 211. Ibid., 224. Ibid., 200. Ibid., 211.

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sirable for the leadership of that Church to make their teaching on forgiveness more transparent and definite. The Greek-Catholic bishops derive the duty of forgiveness from the love of God. Volf puts a somewhat different accent. The obligation of forgiveness derives from God’s forgiveness of people and the subsequent duty to pass forgiveness on to one’s neighbours. The two stances are commensurable because ultimately God’s forgiveness is grounded on His love to people. Both Greek-Catholic bishops and Miroslav Volf emphasise the individual asking for forgiveness. The social reconciliation is not so much elaborated by Volf. It is remarkable that Volf does not write about a nation apologising to another nation, although his interest in forgiveness flows from his experience of the identity-driven Balkan wars. He cares about individual forgiveness, about personal relations, and the purification of memory. Because only a concrete person can forgive in Volf’s interpretation, this author is interested in the individual personal growth, in the unfolding of the relation between God and the individual and consequently between individuals themselves. For Greek-Catholics individual forgiveness leads to a reconciled society. Even the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation is considered to be a matter of every individual repenting of his faults and asking forgiveness. In principle, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not draw a distinction between individual and social reconciliation: reconciliation is a matter of the spiritual transfiguration of every single person. A reconstructed society will be born from the renewed person. Miroslav Volf does not mention a reciprocal forgiveness formula “We forgive and ask for forgiveness.” Instead, both theologies are clear concerning the need to accept the offered forgiveness. It must be accepted through the recognition of the faults by the wrongdoer and the willingness to assume responsibility for the evil deeds, which is equally emphasised in both theologies.

4.2.2.3 Making space for the other This element Miroslav Volf places between forgiveness and reconciliation. Only forgiveness does not suffice for reconciliation because although it heals the wounds, it still leaves a distance between the estranged sides. Forgiveness means reaching the stance of neutrality or disinterest for the other whereas reconciliation entails relationship. When we think about the all-Ukrainian reconciliation, the national unity, we cannot remain on the 248

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level of the purification of memory or forgiveness. When a people should function as a nation, in unity, and contribute to the flourishing of the state, they must learn to accommodate each other. Sheer indifference hinders that aim. Volf unfolds three images – Christ on the cross, the Trinity, and the Eucharist – which illustrate the meaning and significance of making space for the other. The image of the crucified Christ with his arms open on the cross manifests God’s creating a space for sinful humanity to come in. The divine reality of the Trinity (remember that Volf draws implications of the relations of the Divine Persons in the Trinity for how human beings should encounter each other) is often presented as giving of the self and receiving of the other in perichoresis or “mutual interiority.”64 Finally, the symbol of the Eucharist is perhaps the most meaningful image to describe the space for the other. In Volf’s words, “Having been embraced by God, we must make space for others in ourselves and invite them in – even our enemies. This is what we enact as we celebrate the Eucharist.”65 And further, “In the Eucharist we celebrate the giving of the self to the other and the receiving of the other into the self that the triune God has undertaken in the passion of Christ and that we are called and empowered to live such giving and receiving out in a conflict-ridden world.”66 In the eschatological new creation, people will be gathered in a perfect embrace. Before that, however, it is in the Eucharist that this eschatological reality is expressed the best. Thus, space for the other signifies the openness, the desire to embrace each other as members of the mystical body of Christ. This powerful image is often referred to in the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and on that point that both theologies correspond. In his speech at the meeting of the international group “Reconciliation in Europe” on October 6, 2012, Bohdan Dziurakh, the bishop of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, in the terms of Miroslav Volf argued that reconciliation is the fruit of love that includes three elements: to see the other as one’s neighbour, to repent oneself instead of demanding forgiveness from the other, and to think about how to change the future instead of the past.67 At this conference two remarkable projects were pre____________________ 64 65 66 67

Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (1996), 127-128. Ibid., 129. Ibid., 130. “6.10.2012 roku Bozhoho. Konferentsiia “Mystetstvo spivinsnuvannia khrystyian. Uroky istorii i vyklyky siohodennia” {6.10.2012. Conference “The art of coexistence between Christians. Lessons of history and present challenges”}, http://

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sented: the joint Ukrainian martyrology and the idea of the creation of a joint commission that would develop an ecumenical manual that would reinterpret contesting pages of the history of Christianity in Ukraine. Such projects testify the readiness to welcome the other and to redefine the own identity in a way that gives space for the different other.

4.2.3 Robert Schreiter: forgiveness as a grace to attend to the moral failures of the past After truth-telling and justice, the last element of the process of coming to terms with the past is forgiveness. Schreiter points out that forgiveness is divine and human. The former is the expression of God’s love and the latter “is a decision by a victim to no longer be controlled by the effects of past deeds done, and to choose freely for a different kind of future.”68 Forgiveness changes the attitude to the past which is not forgotten but remembered in a different way. From a Christian perspective forgiveness is considered in a horizon of the infinite love of God. Liubomyr Husar reminds one of that when he calls the faithful to change the picture of God from a vindictive Judge to a merciful loving Father. When God as a Father forgives, people should extend their forgiveness to the other: “When human beings accept God’s love, they are able to experience this greater union {with God} and also come to see the extent of their wrongdoing. They are able to come to repentance.”69 For Schreiter forgiveness is not an emotion but a conscious act, a decision for a different future. Forgiveness is also a process aiming at freeing oneself from the power of the past.70 The decision to forgive is the point where divine and human forgiveness intersect: “The ability to decide to forgive comes from the restoration of humanity that is the grace of reconciliation.”71 Having experienced the grace of reconciliation with God, people offer their forgiveness to the fellow human beings as an extension ____________________

68 69 70 71

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ugcc-yalta.org.ua/2012/10/05/6102012-r-b-konferentsiya-mystetstvo-spivisnu vannya-hrystyyan-uroky-istoriji-i-vyklyky-sohodennya/ (accessed January 16, 2014). Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 124. Ibid., 57. Ibid., 58. Ibid., 61.

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of the grace received by them. Ultimately, only God is the source of forgiveness and only He can forgive sins.72 Similarly to individual forgiveness, social forgiveness has to do with “giving up resentment and repairing, in some measures, relationship… Forgiveness is about the transformation of relationships.”73 Robert Schreiter emphasises that society as such cannot forgive. For him forgiveness is a moral-ethical category that touches upon only a concrete person, forgiveness is a personal act. Hence, he criticises the ideas of political forgiveness of Donald Shriver by claiming that as societies cannot be empathetic, they cannot forgive either.74 Consequently, this scholar accepts only pardon or amnesty on the societal level. Survivors or future generations who have not immediately experienced evil can forgive only in the sense “that they decide to come free of the effect that another’s killing has on them, but they cannot forgive on another’s behalf.”75 In that way we may explain the meaning of the plea for forgiveness expressed by the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on behalf of the faithful to other nations, peoples, or Churches. When Husar asked for forgiveness from the Polish nation, he apologised for the resentment that Ukrainians may feel towards Poles. But Husar could not ask pardon for the killing of Poles in Volyn because contemporary Ukrainians did not commit them. That gesture of asking forgiveness is a means of setting moral standards on which the relations between both nations have to be constructed in the future. Of particular interest for our research is Schreiter’s understanding of social forgiveness. When the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church apologised before Poles, Russians or when she asked forgiveness from every nation, community, or Church for any wrongdoings committed by her faithful, this Church demonstrated examples of social forgiveness. What is the essence of such acts? Forgiveness between groups consists of three stages: acknowledgement, apology, and atonement. Acknowledgement is the recognition of the responsibility of a state, its predecessor, or a group for an act of violence. Through the ritual act of apology, a group aims at reframing the past in order to make the new relationship possible.76 Apol____________________ 72 73 74 75 76

Ibid., 62. Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 392. Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 124. Ibid., 59. Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 392.

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ogy can be engraved by erecting monuments or the yearly observation of memorial rituals. The final element, atonement, does not necessarily presuppose a legal liability for the past, but it recognises “a moral liability in that it attests to the moral failure in the past.”77 The thought of Schreiter intersects here with the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The studied texts on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation show that the bishops of that Church reconsidered the past between both nations in moral terms in order to determine where people failed as Christians.

4.3

On the challenges of justice

4.3.1 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: on the deficit of justice Which justice? There are no theories of reconciliation that do not mention justice. In this paragraph I will elaborate on the meaning of justice as it appears in the analysed official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. How often is justice mentioned? What place does it have in the process of reconciliation? And finally, what kind of justice is that? The first impression that arises after having read the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is that justice is not elaborated well, its meaning is not unilateral, and in the majority of the documents this term does not appear at all. For instance, we read: “The peaceful life can be secured only through justice, the orientation of every individual not to do evil, to love one’s neighbour.”78 This fits well into Husar’s spiritual way to reconciliation. For him, justice understood in legal terms seems to be extraneous to the process of the purification of one’s heart. Husar’s vision of justice is future-oriented, derives from love for one’s neighbour, and means avoiding doing evil. The issue of the retribution or determination of the punishment for the evil committed in the past is not addressed. In many texts, the term justice is not followed by any further elaboration. In a number of the studied pronouncements the Greek-Catholic leadership pleads for historical justice. Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi does not mention that term in his statement on the legalisation of his Church and ____________________ 77 78

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Ibid. No. 346, 579; No. 128, 240. Translation from the original source.

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the perturbations of the return of the Saint George Cathedral in Lviv to the Greek-Catholics. However, he is convinced that the claims of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Saint George Cathedral as well as 4,000 other sacral buildings are justified because those were illegally given over to the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946.79 Recently legalised, the GreekCatholics raised demands for their former property including the cathedral. The return of sacral buildings is considered by Cardinal Liubachivskyi to be the establishment of historical justice. It could be painful for the Russian Orthodox Church but it is necessary for the peaceful coexistence of both Churches in Ukraine. In the opinion of her leadership, another demand for historical justice is the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that was asked in 2006 in a letter of the Synod of Bishops to the President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko. In that message, the Soviet regime is accused of the forced liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that was “one of the last strongholds of resistance to the communist tyranny and the preservation of the Ukrainian national consciousness.”80 The fate of the Greek-Catholics is compared with the cruellest crimes of the communist regime. Among them are the Holodomor of 1932-1933, the deportation of Crimean Tatars in 1944, or the forced resettlement of Ukrainians from their ethnic lands at the result of the Operation Vistula of 1947.81 This comparison is certainly eloquent because in the history of Ukraine the above-listed events belong to the most tragic ones and the demands for historical justice sound especially loud. Liubomyr Husar warns that sometimes searching justice can lead to retaliation. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv PseudoSynod, he wrote that the memory of the liquidation of the Greek-Catholic Church teaches some lessons about the way to unity in the future. One of them makes it obvious that the unity between the Churches cannot be reached by means of force.82 The side that has suffered searches for justice and is prone to fall prey to the desire of retaliation whereas the wrongdoers who do not want to recognise their fault cannot realise the truth and purify their consciences.83 Husar warns of falling prey to vengeance in the ____________________ 79 80 81 82 83

No. 15, 26. No. 213, 354. Translation from the original source. Ibid., 354-355. No. 219, 368-369. Ibid., 369.

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search for justice as well as of searching the unity of the Church by means of force. Another dimension of justice is connected with memory as it was the case in the Great Famine of 1932-1933. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church greatly advocated the recognition of the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people because among other things, such an act would be “the just evaluation of the events of the past.” Thus, justice means the disclosure and acknowledgment of the truth. The recognition of the Holodomor as an act of genocide is a way of telling the truth about the past. God’s order of peace is grounded on truth, justice, freedom, and love.84 Justice plays a particularly important role. Justice does not have to be vindictive, but open to and oriented towards forgiveness because “as peace is not possible without justice, so is justice not possible without reconciliation and forgiveness.”85 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic bishops refer here to what is known as restorative justice in the understanding of Miroslav Volf. Speaking about justice in case of dealing with the memories of World War II, the bishops call to pay homage to all its victims, whether the soldiers of the Red Army or the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and to strive for national reconciliation by praying for all those who fought for the independence of Ukraine.86 The hints at social justice are equally present in the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Cardinal Husar is convinced that all too often we talk about peace but neglect justice, human rights and human dignity.87 He suggests counteracting such tendencies with the programme of “the holy peace,” a notion opposed to “the holy war.” “The holy peace” practically means the preservation of the dignity of every human being that begins in the hearts of individuals to be later extended to families and the whole society. The evil has to be fought with the good.88 The notion of the “holy peace” contains the seeds of the encompassing vision of justice, yet its embodiment is again placed on the personal level. In his address on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine, Sviatoslav Shevchuk elaborated on state and social jus____________________ 84 85 86 87 88

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No. 2008. Ibid. Translation from the original source. Ibid. No. 128, 239. Ibid.

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tice. This message is interesting for my research because it belongs to those rather rare texts on reconciliation which convey the vision of social justice. Shevchuk postulates that justice being born from love demands respect for another person notwithstanding his or her origin, political convictions or religion which consequently means that “justice calls us to the non-acceptance of extremism, violence, and disregard of social peace.”89 Then Shevchuk gives examples of what justice practically means. It is about the task of the state authorities to ensure the promotion of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine, in particular the right to education and social security, the right to work and health care.90 The state has to ensure favourable conditions for the private initiative and economic entrepreneurship of its citizens, an impartial election law and political activity. The right to religious freedom and an equally just attitude of the state authorities to all the Churches and religious organisations officially registered on the Ukrainian territory also belong to the promotion of justice.91 The idea of justice as a precondition of social peace bears consequences for the practical success of reconciliation. Reconciliation cannot be mistakenly perceived merely as a programme of spiritual renewal. It should have a pragmatic basis where among other things economic interests and the well-being of conflicting parties are essential. The rivalling Ukrainian political parties try to draw the attention of the citizens away from their failed economic politics to the debate on historically controversial figures like Stepan Bandera and so on. The governing Party of the Regions couldnot boast any significant and successful project of the modernisation of Ukraine. However, before the parliamentary elections of 2012 it managed to pass a new law on the state languages in Ukraine that created a perfect ground for the outburst of the inter-state tensions between the east and west of Ukraine. People lacking perspectives in the future will easily fall prey to the manipulative manoeuvres of the political class. Sviatoslav Shevchuk claims that justice includes the right to freely develop the Ukrainian language and culture, the restoration of historical truth, and the counteraction of Ukrainophobia.92 It evokes a question about the kind of justice that should be implemented in a concrete moment of ____________________ 89 90 91 92

No. 2011. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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history. When it is about the practical realisation of that statement of Shevchuk, several problems may occur. To develop the Ukrainian language is a demand for justice, but will that also bring about the reconciliation between the east and west of the country where different languages predominate in the daily use? Similarly, the renewal of the historical memory of the Ukrainian nation can also bring about new divisions. In modern Ukrainian society such questions as language and historical memory should always be treated keeping in mind the need of social cohesion in the country. The strong Ukrainisation politics of President Viktor Yushchenko in 2005-2010 caused polarisation in Ukrainian society93 as it was not accepted by the citizens of the country whose identity is constructed on the basis of the Soviet past and the closeness to contemporary Russia. The election of Viktor Yanukovych in 2010 to the office of President of Ukraine signalled a turn in the opposite direction. Because identities indeed significantly vary in Ukraine, it is evident that the efforts to adduce a particular set of national narratives by force will fail. In that regard, Yaroslav Hrytsak’s appeals to introduce a ban on historical discussions on the political level in present-day Ukraine is a justifiable solution.94 Looking for purely historical justice can even complicate the situation. It seems to be more plausible to abandon historical discussions for the moment and to concentrate on something else, to attempt to unite the nation not on the basis of history but around, for instance, the way of a successful future modernisation of Ukraine. The Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation also points at that demand for sensibility to the issues of justice. In the letter on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation between the Catholic Churches of Ukraine and Poland in 2005 reconciliation was emphasised, whilst in the joint letter on the Volyn anniversary in 2013 the issue of historical justice took prevalence. In 2005 the bishops underlined the Christian duty of Poles and Ukrainians to reconcile. In 2013 the Polish episcopate longed to gain the recognition of the guilt of the Ukrainian side in the mass killings of Poles in 1943 to the extent that they were ready to break off the reconciliation process between

____________________ 93 94

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Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Pamiat i natsiia” {Memory and nation}, in Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 270-271. Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Pamiat” {Memory}, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 77; Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Nil Desperandum,” in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 233.

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

both peoples. Therefore, it is essential to constantly identify what reconciliation is and which justice is expected at that given moment. Concluding, having studied the documents I observe that in general justice does not appear often in the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation. In the texts where it does appear, three principal meanings are rendered to that term. First, the texts speak about historical justice as the establishment of the historical truth and the rehabilitation of victims. Second, justice derives from love for one’s neighbour and means avoiding doing evil. And finally, social justice as a precondition for social peace is addressed even though not further expounded. The importance of this assignment I will illustrate next.

Bringing about changes in Ukrainian society Myroslav Marynovych has once characterised Cardinal Husar as a person “that precedes his time and suggests to Ukrainians the formulas which they only prepare themselves to perceive.”95 Liubomyr Husar sometimes brings very personal and unexpected receipts for making changes in the world. For instance, he suggests that remnants of communism can be overcome with a smile, when one helps one’s neighbour and grants him/her a smile because communism made people unable to laugh.96 Big changes can be accomplished when people start from small daily steps. The Polish “Gazeta Wyborcza” called Liubomyr Husar “the hierarch of reconciliation.”97 One of such proposals is Husar’s approach to the Church contribution towards the completion of the democratic transition in Ukraine. What I have written so far proves that reconciliation must be considered in this framework: the requirement of social reconciliation in Ukraine is coupled ____________________ 95

96

97

Myroslav Marynovych, “Vstupne slovo do interviu z Blazhennishym Liubomyrom” {The word of introduction to the interview with His Beatitude Liubomyr}, in Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 96. Translation from the original source. “Blazhennishyi Liubomyr Husar vvazhaie, shcho komunizm mozhna podolaty usmishkoiu” {His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar believes that communism can be defeated by a smile}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/news_single.0.html?&tx_ttnews%5 btt_news%5d=6792&cHash=06394c5e294baf9a6724b9a952541c77 (accessed January 11, 2014). Andrzej M. Eliasz, “Daleko vid Moskvy” {Far from Moscow}, http://zgroup. com.ua/article.php?articleid=4693 (accessed January 22, 2014).

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with fostering the development of the country. Hence, I consider that the Greek-Catholic discourse on reconciliation could objectively be placed in the major project of the transformation of society. Additional to fulfilling the Gospel commandment “May all be one,” the aim of the reconciliation between the Churches in Ukraine or of the all-Ukrainian reconciliation consists in nurturing the modernisation and transformation of the country. Based on those considerations, in that place when we speak about justice I consider it appropriate to delineate briefly the dynamics of the social transformation of Ukraine in the opinion of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The most illustrative ideas come from the former Head of the Church, Cardinal Husar. Even after his demission in February 2011, Husar continues to be actively engaged in the public discourse in Ukraine, having produced at that time, for instance, several audio-books98 on where to search for Christian solutions to contemporary problems of Ukrainian society. My particular interest concerns the sources of the transformation of the country. A Mennonite Lederach and a Greek-Catholic Husar share a lot about the centrality of relationships and grounding social changes on the basic and mid-level. I will verify this claim in what follows. Husar is strongly convinced that the key to any social transformation is to be found in the transfiguration of the human person which echoes the argument of Arnold Toynbee and Victor Yelenskyi that “the Churches accomplish social transformation through the ‘progress of individual human souls.”99 On January 24, 2014, commenting on the scene of the humiliation of one of the protesters on the EuroMaidan, Liubomyr Husar said that during the last years there were a lot of discussions about politics, economics, and the organisation of social life. The same attention should be ____________________ 98

99

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The trilogy Three Roads: Liubomyr Husar, Doroha do sebe {Road to oneself} {CD-ROM} ( Lviv: Svichado, 2009); Liubomyr Husar, Doroha do blyzhnoho {Road to one’s neighbour} {CD-ROM} (Lviv: Svichado, 2010); Liubomyr Husar, Doroha do Boha {Road to God} {CD-ROM} (Lviv: Svichado, 2011). The trilogy Society: Liubomyr Husar, Suspilstvo i vlada {Society and authority} {CD-ROM} (Lviv: Svichado, 2011); Liubomyr Husar, Suspilstvo i biznes {Society and business} {CD-ROM} (Lviv: Svichado, 2011); Liubomyr Husar, Suspilstvo i zakon {Society and law} {CD-ROM} (Lviv: Svichado, 2013). Yelensky, Ukraine. Church and State, in Church-State Relations, 146.

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

paid to the domain of personal and public morality, especially to the very low public morality of the state officials.100 Similarly, commenting on the situation of the EuroMaidan in January 2014, the Greek-Catholic bishops warned the Ukrainian government of the implementation of violence and called people “to keep God’s commandments, do none evil, remain in peace and goodness. We ask you to continue praying together in communities (parishes, monasteries, families) and individually for Ukraine. And we announce a period of fasting in all our eparchies and exarchates in Ukraine.”101 Sviatoslav Shevchuk claims that God’s commandments suggest a solution to the contemporary Ukrainian crisis: “If you live in an environment where everyone tells lies, speak the truth and your words will be revolutionary! If you live in a country, where people steal, do not steal, even if it means that it leads you to some material discomfort! In such a way you will lay a treasure for your own life and the life of your environment, which is not measured in money equivalents.”102 In short, according to the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the transformation in society begins by changing the ethical values of its individuals. The person can be influenced by education. For instance, in Husar’s opinion, one cannot eradicate corruption in Ukraine merely by administrative means or by the reform of law. In order to fight that problem, the new generation has to be brought up on a solid moral basis; young people have to interiorise certain moral values.103 The concentration of the state reforms on economics will not improve the situation when irresponsible politicians hold power.104 Husar is convinced that the excessive belief in ____________________ 100 Liubomyr Husar, “Do choho my dokotylysia?” {Where have we ended up?}, http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2014/01/24/7011184/ (accessed January 25, 2014). 101 “An Appeal from Greek-Catholic Bishops in Ukraine concerning the SocioPolitical Situation in the Country,” http://news.ugcc.org.ua/en/news/an_appeal_ from_greekcatholic_bishops_in_ukraine_concerning_the_sociopolitical_situation _in_the_country_69090.html (accessed February 10, 2014). 102 “The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: ‘In Order to Overcome an Opponent in a Peaceful Manner, It Is Necessary to Be Spiritually and Morally Higher Than Him,” http://news.ugcc.org.ua/en/news/in_order_to_overcome_an_ opponent_in_a_peaceful_manner_it_is_necessary_to_be_spiritually_and_moral ly_higher_than_him_ugcc_head_69058.html (accessed February 10, 2014). 103 Kateryna Shchotkina, ed., Try dorohy: besidy Blazhennishoho Liubomyra Husara z zhurnalistamy {Three roads. Conversations of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar with journalists} (Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2013), 15. 104 For a good analysis of the ethics of responsibility of Liubomyr Husar on the basis of his audio-books Society and Business and Society and Politics, see Yurii

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the saving power of economics cannot be a solution to the current crisis in the country.105 Fighting corruption is a spiritual programme and not a question of economic reforms.106 Concerning the 1025th anniversary of the baptism of the Kyivan Rus in 2013, Liubomyr Husar plainly stated that the essence of the celebration is not the official ostentatious feats but the decision to behave in personal, family, and social life according to the Christian principles.107 As usual, Cardinal Husar distinguishes the personal element of Christianity for social changes. As an illustration of this spiritual approach to social changes serves a letter “On Bribery in Our Country and How to Fight It.” Lent address of the Bishops of the Major Archbishopric of Kyiv-Halych of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the faithful.” The authors write that the first step to overcoming bribery leads through the establishment of priorities in one’s life. External juridical or any other changes will be of little help if people do not change their hearts. To clean one’s own heart from the love for money is a difficult process; the aim can be reached with the help of God.108 The erasure of the border between good and evil, the truth and the lie, and the general moral decline account for the current state of crisis in all the spheres of social life.109 The problems deriving from the cultural differences between the east and west of Ukraine also originate in the deplorable moral state of society. Husar believes that the suspicion between the east and the west is fuelled by politicians themselves in order to serve their narrow interests. In his opinion, everyone who lives in Ukraine, claims belonging to the country, and wishes it well, is welcomed, notwithstanding ____________________

105 106 107

108

109

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Chornomorets, “Sotsialne vchennia Patriarkha Liubomyra Husara” {Social teaching of Patriarch Liubomyr Husar}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/theologia/practical/ social/47049/ (accessed January 14, 2014). Shchotkina, Three roads, 16. Ibid. Liubomyr Husar, “Yak vidznachyty Khreshchennia Kyivskoi Rusi?” {How to celebrate the baptism of the Kyivan Rus?}, http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/ 2013/07/23/6994757/ (accessed January 20, 2014). “Pro yavyshche khabarnytstva v nashii kraini ta yak yoho poboriuvaty:’ Zvernennia do virnykh na Velykyi pist yepyskopiv Kyievo-Halytskoho Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopstva Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {“On bribery in our country and how to fight it.” Lent address of the Bishops of the Major Archbishopric of Kyiv-Halych of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the faithful}, in Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (1989-2008), ed. Lesia Kovalenko (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008, 445. Ibid., 38.

Chapter IV. Elements of reconciliation

his or her origins.110 Russians, Crimea Tatars, Poles, and other nationalities are worthy citizens of Ukraine. In other words, Liubomyr Husar envisions the modernisation of Ukrainian society first of all in the transformation of the person and not in the reforms of institutions. The second will happen only after the first has taken place. This approach concerns every sphere of human life, private as well as social. Cardinal Husar is convinced that Ukrainian society is sick nowadays,111 and because the roots of the problems of the development of the country are of a moral nature, the cure should be spiritual as well. Only education understood in the broader sense is a cure against every social disease.112 Husar’s approach to reconciliation is but another expression of his vision of the spiritual transformation of the world. At the same time, I give credit to the idea of Yurii Chornomorets that although Husar favours changing the world by the power of the transformed human soul, his approach cannot be called purely down-to-the-top as it is the case with Myroslav Marynovych. Only new technologies like a civil society without leaders, the renewal of the entire political establishment or the cessation of giving bribes will not change the society.113 Liubomyr Husar places a particular responsibility on politicians because they can perform more than a regular Ukrainian.114 The moral choice of every citizen does not only bear upon his personal fate but on the fate of the entire nation,115 however, the repercussions of the choices made by immoral politicians can have grave consequences for the well-being of the whole state. Husar is realistic concerning the time necessary for the real transformation of Ukraine. Reminding one of the 40-year period of the Israeli people wandering with Moses in the desert, the author thinks that the whole generation of contemporary Ukrainians will have to pass away before the positive changes take place.116 That new generation will be capable of bringing about changes because they will manage to avoid the influence of their parents and grandparents with their dysfunctional patterns ____________________ 110 111 112 113 114 115 116

Shchotkina, Three roads, 70. Ibid., 18. Ibid., 44. Chornomorets, The ideal of Christian Ukraine. Chornomorets, Social teaching. Ibid. Shchotkina, Three roads, 32.

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of social life. Reconciliation in society takes time as well; it is a long-term complicated project. Husar pays so much attention to the preservation and popularisation of the memory of the Holodomor because he believes that “the identity of the nation is built on failures, defeats.”117 The occupants who reigned in Ukraine during the last centuries endeavoured to eradicate the real Ukrainian identity; therefore, it is very important to regenerate it now in independent Ukraine. The gravest moral harm suffered by Ukrainians under the foreign rule is the loss of the sense of responsibility.118 The venture of reconciliation and forgiveness aims at assuming an obligation for the past and in this way helps restore that lost capability of Ukrainians. The rhetoric of Liubomyr Husar is reiterated in the pronouncements of the current Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. At the end of 2013, which brought the mass demonstrations in favour of the proEuropean future of Ukraine, Sviatoslav Shevchuk argued that people have to change themselves before they can change their country: “We have to feel personal responsibility for the fate of our nation and its country, to feel in a new way our own dignity and strength, because the renewal of our nation can happen only through the renewal of every Ukrainian by our efforts and by the grace of the Holy Spirit. The renewed respect for the dignity of the human person, respect for everyone as a free human being, created in the image and likeness of God is the foundation on which the country that is worthy of this person is built.”119

Interestingly enough, the ethics of responsibility for the future of the country, the ethical responsibility of everyone in his or her place, are also present in Orthodox thought in Ukraine. For instance, the Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate corroborates that corruption (“the biggest evil that destroys all the achievements of Ukraine”)120 begins in the head. Therefore, if corrupted politicians do not detect this evil in their hearts and society will not learn to discern its dif____________________ 117 Ibid., 33. Translation from the original source. 118 Ibid., 36. 119 “Slovo Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava na zavershennia 2013 roku” {Word of His Beatitude Sviatoslav for the end of 2013}, http://www.cerkiew.olsztyn.pl/2014/ 01/slovo-blazhennishogo-svyatoslava-na-zavershennya-2013-roku/ (accessed January 16, 2014). Translation from the original source. 120 “Poslannia Patriarkha Filareta Prezydentu Ukrainy Viktoru Yanukovychu ‘Ukraini potribne porozuminnia!” {Message of Patriarch Filaret to the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych “Ukraine needs reconciliation!”}, http://www. cerkva.info/en/messages/1819-lyst-presidentu.html (accessed January 11, 2014).

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ferent forms, even the best code of laws will not help.121 Social transformation in the thought of both Liubomyr Husar and the Patriarch Filaret almost literally correspond to the words of Gennadios Limouris concerning the character of the Orthodox peacebuilding: justice and peace are “much more a question of an inner approach in the mode of sanctification and uplifting of the human person upon which any social, political or cultural changes depends.”122 In her presentation during the 5th Ecumenical Social Week in Ukraine, Heleen Zorgdrager concluded that the best contribution of the Church to social progress consisted in encouraging the faithful to act as “free, responsible, moral subjects.”123 The desired changes in the country will only then take place, when the human person regenerates in her dignity. Hence, indeed the human heart is the locus of reconciliation and any other social change. In that sense, the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church pursues a very spiritual approach to reconciliation with its emphasis on the spiritual regeneration of the individual that will become the source of the transformation of the world: “There is an understanding that through spirituality and personal transformation the individual can attain that inner peace which will bring peace in the world.”124 That feature is one of the core ideas of Greek-Catholic theology in general, including the issue of reconciliation.

Some incitements for discussion For every country in transition the demands for justice are of paramount importance. The Ukrainian situation equally demonstrates the high priority of the issues of justice and transformation. Mykhailo Dymyd argued that “society that lives in want does not have a need for the higher values of ____________________ 121 Ibid. 122 Vassilios Giultsis, “An Ethical Approach to Justice and Peace,” in Justice and Peace and the Integrity of Creation. Insights from Orthodoxy, ed. Gennadios Limouris (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1990), 57. 123 Heleen Zorgdrager, “Moralnyi opikun chy kenotychnyi sluha? Teolohichnyi pohliad na rol Tserkov u pidtrymtsi hromadianskoho suspilstva v Ukraini” {Moral custodian or kenotic servant? Theological vision on the role of the Churches in the promotion of civil society in Ukraine}, http://esweek.org.ua/ index.php/en/ekumenichnij-cotsialnij-tizhden/5-est/dopovidi/405-dr-gelen-zorg drager.html (accessed October 29, 2013). 124 Hertog, Religious Peacebuilding, 471.

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peace” 125 bringing about the example of the community of Sant’Egidio that “started its activities from distributing food to the most needy.”126 The needs of daily existence have to be satisfied before the interest in the narratives of reconciliation can be awakened. The industrialisation process of the Soviet Union brought Ukraine stability and relative prosperity. Although the country witnessed the lack of products of daily use, especially in the last years of its existence as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, its economy was developed and the level of unemployment was very low. The situation changed dramatically after the demise of the Soviet state in 1991. The existing economic interconnections with other former Soviet countries were dissolved and the country faced a grave economic crisis, stagnation and harsh unemployment especially in the early 1990s. Nowadays Ukraine is a highly corrupted country (in 2012 ranked on place 144 among 176 countries and territories),127 with a significant level of joblessness and one of the lowest wages in Europe,128 a country that underwent the lack of transparency in the privatisation process, with the urgent need to introduce reasonable reforms in the health care system and the pension reform, etc. Of significance to the frustrating outcomes of reforms in a divided postCommunist society is the complex bureaucratic administrative structure. The old-new elite that emerged after the privatisation of the 1990s got the power with their primary goal being the security of the own businesses. At the same time uncontrolled corruption, unemployment, low living standards, bureaucracy of the state institutions, difficulties in establishing and running business, unstable political situation obstruct economic reforms. Back in 1994 Frank Umbach in his review of the Ukrainian-Russian relations and the all-Ukrainian unity concluded that peace and security in Ukraine will largely depend upon whether Ukraine would be able to “stabilise its own economy – the prerequisite for the cohesion of this multinational state, its society and independence.”129 What comes first – coming ____________________ 125 Dymyd, Reconciliation. Translation from the original source. 126 Ibid. 127 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,” http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/ results (accessed February 28, 2014). 128 Since I have not found another source on the European salaries which illustrates the situation in Ukraine I refer to the following article on Wikipedia: “List of European Countries by Average Wage,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ European_countries_by_average_wage (accessed April 7, 2014). 129 Umbach, Russia, 39.

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to terms with the past, national reconciliation, and then the construction of the developed democratic country or would things rather better work vice versa? It means that by boosting the economic development, a country can achieve a necessary peaceful atmosphere in order to discuss the dividing elements of its history and identity. Vince Gamberale who studied the role of the economic development for the reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, concluded that economic reforms are a powerful neutral force for the promotion of cooperation across a divided society because they provide “an opportunity to put aside differences in order to pursue needs.”130 The author is convinced that economic and business development initiatives encourage tolerance, mutual confidence and cooperation across the ethnic divides. In his opinion, even though tolerance is not yet reconciliation, however it is a foundation on which the process can take root over the long term.131 After all, even the European Project started in 1951 with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community that was established to promote economic development but extended to provide an environment of tolerance and cooperation between previously warring nations.132 Although the overall situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is significantly different from that of Ukraine, both countries face the need of the modernisation of the economy and both have a divided society though to a different degree. The deficit of justice has many faces in contemporary Ukraine, among them, for instance, failing reforms in the sphere of education. Here the Ukrainian state must also catch up. In 2002 a reform was implemented which presumed a twelve-year school education instead of the existing eleven. Additionally, in 2008, instead of passing the admission exams for university, which implied great corruption practices, a compulsory external independent evaluation of the quality of knowledge was introduced for those wishing to enter university. This practice, even though connected to some inconveniences and a certain non-objectivity, has the great advantage of the almost compete exclusion of corruption while entering university. The system allowed talented children from poor and simple families to get access to education. However, in 2010 the government of Presi____________________ 130 Vince Gamberale, “The Role of Economic Development in Reconciliation. An Experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Pathways to Reconciliation. Between Theory and Practice, eds. Philipa Rothfield, Cleo Fleming, and Paul A. Komesaroff (n.p.: Ashgate, 2008), 155. 131 Ibid., 157. 132 Ibid.

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dent Yanukovych introduced two major changes in that reform. Firstly, there was a comeback to the eleven-year school education which in practice meant the development of new manuals with all the financial and material costs connected with it. Secondly and more importantly, although the external independent evaluation of the quality of knowledge was not cancelled, in order to be admitted to university, school graduates have to additionally present their school certificates indicating grades. This opens up ways of manipulation and corruption because parents can “buy” a necessary school certificate with sufficiently high grades. The value of the external evaluation certificate is then mitigated. Thus, this educational reform is an example of inconsistency and even of contradiction with regard to reforms. This case should illustrate that transformation and reconciliation cannot only be a spiritual programme; it must entail addressing concrete demands for justice. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church functions at the intersection of eastern and western Christian traditions. The comparison of her approach to justice with the Orthodox one reveals interesting similarities. The Orthodox attitude to justice and peace centres on “the ontological renewal of the human person,”133 “the true revolution of the human person,”134 the need to free the human person from sin, “the main cause of injustice (absence of justice) and hostility (absence of peace).”135 Justice and peace is “a question of an inner approach in the mode of sanctification and uplifting of the human person upon which any social, political or cultural changes depends.”136 Hence, the Orthodox Church emphasises that the regeneration of the human person and not the “mere acceptance of social rules designed to secure the order of society” will bring about the social change and thriving of justice. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church adopts a very similar approach. Contrary to the Orthodox approach, the discussion on justice in the texts representing Catholic social teaching starts from concrete situations of human existence: “Understanding of justice is shaped by the specific eras and events to which it is responding.”137 Subsequently, the social nature of the human person is emphasised: “Human interdependence pro____________________ 133 134 135 136 137

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vides a foundation for an understanding of justice as participation.”138 Because “participatory and mutual relationships enhance political, social, and economic life,”139 they have direct implication for reconciliation. The reasoning of the encyclical Pacem in Terris is illustrative. This text presented a new theological method of moral discernment when instead of deduction from moral law it introduced the consideration of concrete living experiences of people, the “see, judge, act” approach that prompted the concept of “signs of the times.”140 Revisioning and criticising the concept of justice of John Rawls and promoting the capability approach, Amartya Sen calls to abandon the vision of justice as an abstract ideal. Instead, he develops a bottom-up approach according to which the analysis of the basic reality of people’s existence helps make society more just: “The focus on actual lives in the assessment of justice has many farreaching implications for the nature and reach of the idea of justice.”141 Raymond Aina’s dissertation arguing against the romanticising of the restorative justice in the thought of Desmond Tutu, is a plea against the abstract, unbelievable, void of realism concept of justice in social ethics.142 The reflection of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on social questions should start from looking at the daily reality of people’s experiences. In her official pronouncements, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church addressed certain elements of justice, for example, not paying salaries or the eradication of corruption.143 Sometimes the Church leadership calls the ____________________ 138 Ibid., 107. 139 Ibid. 140 Johan Verstraeten, “Pacem in Terris in Contemporary Theological Reflection,” in Il concetto di pace. Attualità della Pacem in Terris nel 50 anniversario (19632013), ed. Vittorio V. Alberti (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2013), 83. 141 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (n.p.: Penguin Books, 2010), xi. 142 Raymond Aina, “Overcoming “Toxic” Emotions and the Role of Restorative Justice. A Christian Ethical Reflection on Restorative Justice’s Promises, Ambiguities and Inspirations towards Peacebuilding in Nigeria” (PhD diss., Leuven Catholic University, 2010), 304. 143 Few examples of the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church dedicated to different social issues in Ukraine (borrowed from Lesia Kovalenko, ed., Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (19892008) {Socially oriented documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008)} (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008)): “Zvernennia Yepyskopiv Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do virnykh ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli pro zavdannia khrystyianyna v suchasnomu suspilstvi” {Address of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Bishops to the faithful and all people of good will

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wealthy to charity as a way of executing their responsibility for the neighbour, for instance, through granting microcredits or micro investing.144 However, the Church leadership did not develop the comprehensive theory of justice that “concerns itself with the functioning of the whole socioeconomic order in its interactive parts, rather than with the various relationships between the parts.”145 Such a theory of justice presupposes the correction of the systemic injustices and the creation of the circumstances for participation. Hence, it is insufficient to call every particular person to fight corruption, to convert, to change oneself hoping to reach in that way the transformation of the entire corruptive system. Pacem in Terris shows that merely moral exhortations do not suffice because they cannot be “translated in a moral law for the state.”146 A person-centred approach to social transformation has to be completed by attention to the institutional dimension. This element of justice is present in the tradition of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Just consider the “holy peace” notion of Liubomyr Husar or the references to social justice of Sviatoslav Shevchuk. However, the impact of social justice on reconciliation has to be amplified ____________________ about the mission of the Christian in modern society}, 12.03.1999; “Khrystyiany i nevyplata zarplatni.’ Zvernennia Synodu Yepyskopiv Kyievo-Halytskoi Mytropolii Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do dukhovenstva i myrian ta usikh liudei dobroi voli” {“Christians and wage arrears.” Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Metropolia of Kyiv-Halych to the clergy, the laity and all people of good will}, 10.10.2000; “Zvernennia Synodu Yepyskopiv Kyievo-Halytskoi Mytropolii Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do virnykh ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli shchodo sotsialno-politychnoi sytuatsii v Ukraini” {Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Metropolia of Kyiv-Halych to the faithful and all the people of good will about the social and political situation in Ukraine}, 28.01.2004; “Pro yavyshche habarnytstva v nashii kraini ta yak yoho poboriuvaty.’ Zvernennia do virnykh na Velykyi pist Yepyskopiv Kyievo-Halytskoho Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopstva Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {“On bribery in our country and how to fight it.” Lent address of the Bishops of the Major Archbishopric of Kyiv-Halych of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the faithful}, 05.03.2008. 144 “Pastyrske poslannia Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava do virnykh Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolyktskoi Tserkvy na Velykyi pist 2013 roku” {Pastoral letter of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Great Lent of 2013}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2695.0.html (accessed February 10, 2014). 145 Elsbernd and Bieringer, When Love Is not Enough, 107. 146 Verstraeten, Pacem in Terris, 82.

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in the Church’s teaching. The example of the recent EuroMaidan in Ukraine illustrates my point. Similar to the Orange Revolution, mass demonstrations and the subsequent regime overturn were realised by people who could not anymore put up with the misuses of the corruptive criminal state. The position of the individuals with an alternative way of hiking played its role. However, it is only an initiative step. For the transformation to get embedded the new state authorities must generate reforms on the institutional level that would make the overindulgence of power impossible, for instance through the elaboration of the appropriate anticorruption legal basis. The documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church show that this element is underdeveloped in the social ethics of that Church.

4.3.2 John Paul Lederach: conflicts originate from the lack of social justice John Paul Lederach renders the final goal of conflict transformation as the justpeace which points at the fact that the establishment of social and economic justice is an essential element of the constructive change.147 The justpeace “requires the redress of legitimate grievances and the establishment of new relations characterised by equality and fairness according to the dictates of human dignity and the common good.”148 Protracted conflicts emerge as the result of an enduring experience of marginalisation, poverty, economic struggle, and political exclusion.149 As long as those exist in a society, sources of conflicts will remain. In that regard, contemporary Ukraine with its marginalisation of different groups, economic underdevelopment, lawlessness, and high-handedness of the state authorities will preserve its conflicting potential. The recent EuroMaidan in Ukraine broke out because of such structural injustices: the primary motivation of the people to go on the was not getting closer to Eu____________________ 147 John Paul Lederach and Scott Appleby, “Strategic Peacebuilding. An Overview,” in Strategies of Peace. Transforming Conflict in a Violent World, eds. Dan Philpott and Gerald Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23. 148 Ibid., 24. 149 John Paul Lederach, “The Long Journey Back to Humanity. Catholic Peacebuilding with Armed Actors,” in Peacebuilding. Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis, eds. Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Regard F. Powers (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 28.

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rope but the demand for a fundamental change of the structures of power in the country and the establishment of new democratic institutions.150 Lederach points at the fact that it is essential for the Churches to address the issue of justice in their pastoral letters, public statements or national campaigns. Ukrainian Churches have to make up a leeway here.

4.3.3 Robert Schreiter: overcoming structural injustices – soothing social tensions – advancing reconciliation Robert Schreiter equally postulates that the question of justice in the context of reconciliation is complicated and very important in circumstances similar to the Ukrainian nowadays. The thinker opines that at the basis of every conflict are injustices as root causes and “Without addressing the root causes of conflict, there is little hope of overcoming it in the future.”151 The analysis above proves that the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not pay sufficient attention to justice in its reconciliation pronouncements. The studied texts demonstrate a variety of references to justice: historical justice as the establishment of the truth about the past, warning that seeking justice can cause retribution, justice as a right to freely pursue one’s identity and language, justice as an inevitable counterpart of “the holy peace” and of the preservation of the dignity of every human being that stays close to social justice – precondition of peace, denoting respect for every individual and, consequently, the exclusion of extremism and violence because of the otherness of the other. Sometimes justice is neglected as extraneous to the process of the purification of the heart. There are indeed texts on certain aspects of justice, for instance, holding back salaries or corruption are rendered as a violation of the demands for justice. Justice occupies even less space in the pronouncements dedicated to reconciliation. Robert Schreiter singles out three types of justice that are relevant to the process of reconciliation: punitive, restorative, and structural justice. On February 24, 2014 the Ukrainian Parliament charged a number of Ukrainian state functionaries of the highest rank including the President Viktor Yanukovych with the deliberate killing of protesters in Kyiv during No____________________ 150 Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek, Vorwort to Majdan! Ukraine, Europa, eds. Claudia Dathe and Andreas Rostek (Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014), 13. 151 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 388.

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vember 2013 – February 2014.152 As a matter of fact, dealing with the past through lustration has never been performed in Ukraine although it was reasonable at the time of the democratic turn in 1991, then after the Orange Revolution in 2005, and recently in 2014 in the view of the crimes of the regime of President Yanukovych. Corresponding demands were expressed on February 25, 2014 by the activists of the EuroMaidan concerning the creation of the new transition government.153 Volodymyr Klychko with Oleh Tiahnybok, the leaders of the opposition parties “Udar” and “Svoboda,” equally expressed themselves in favour of a broader lustration in the country.154 The latter additionally sustains the adoption of a bill that would ban the Communist Party and communist ideology in Ukraine. Perhaps the lustration should be expanded onto the state functionaries of the lowest local level as well. According to Schreiter, restorative justice is about the equal distribution of societal goods, reparations, the restoration of the dignity of victims, and the rehabilitation of wrongdoers.155 Sometimes the restoration of the dignity of the victim means his or her rehabilitation from being commonly portrayed as a wrongdoer. The latter is underway in Ukraine, for example, with the current campaign for the official rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army through its recognition as belligerent in World War II. This causes protests from the adherents of the Soviet version of the history where Ukrainian nationalists were perceived as a threat and whose memory had been silenced for years.156 The plea of the Ukrainian Greek____________________ 152 “Ukraine Charges Former President Yanukovych with Mass Murder,” http:// www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2014/0224/Ukr aine-charges-former-President-Yanukovych-with-mass-murder-video (accessed February 27, 2014). 153 In particular, the activists demand that as ministers of the transitional government of the people’s trust cannot be elected persons from the list of the first hundred richest Ukrainians, functionaries of the presidential administration or executive authorities who occupied those posts since 2010 when Viktor Yanukovych became President of Ukraine; additionally, the candidates cannot be implicated in human rights violations or possess a corruption dossier (“Maidanivtsi vysunuly vymohy do uriadu narodnoi doviry” {Activists of the EuroMaidan put forward demands to the government of the people’s trust}, http://www.pravda.com.ua/ news/2014/02/25/7016162/ (accessed February 27, 2014). 154 “Klitschko, Tyahnibok Favor Lustration in Ukraine,” http://www.interfax.com/ newsinf.asp?id=483460 (accessed February 27, 2014). 155 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 389. 156 For the supporters of this version of history, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army belongs to the nationalistic military formations which supported the Nazis and

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Catholic Church for her official rehabilitation in connection with the Pseudo-Synod of 1946 shows another challenge of restorative justice. The merit of restorative justice in that case consists in the restoration of dignity through telling the truth about the past of certain persons or groups. The reparations to the victims of the EuroMaidan shot by the snipers on the order of President Yanukovych also fulfil demands for restorative justice. Schreiter names economic inequities, discrimination, or the lack of equal access to the societal goods as examples of structural injustices. Structural justice deals with the social structures of a society in the midst of which conflicts arise.157 Existing injustices are criticised very generally; for instance, corruption is often named one of the biggest evils of presentday Ukraine. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has chosen a way of educating the faithful and motivating them to spiritual regeneration waging a morally good life. However, can that change a system when a little Ukrainian feels helpless in front of the powerful state machine? Structural injustices are producing new sources of tensions in Ukrainian society. I aver that the somehow reserved attitude to Jews in Ukraine is connected to the fact that a significant number of the persons of Jewish origin are occupying leading positions among the state authorities and are among the owners of the biggest enterprises in the country.158 Ukrainians, who are suffering under the consequences of the inability of the state leaders to conduct successful structural reforms, tend to blame those at power in their miseries. Similarly, the cultural tensions between the west and the east of Ukraine are aggravated by politicians who manipulate historical, linguistic, and national sentiments in order to cover their incompetence and to provide for their own well-being. The realisation of a successful plan of structural reforms in the country would help lower the level of current societal tensions. As Robert Schreiter points out, pursuing struc____________________ which consequently cannot be rehabilitated. The correspondent project of law was registered in the Ukrainian Parliament in May 2013. About the details and grounds behind the new draft law, read the blog of one of its initiators: Vadym Kolesnichenko, “Reabilitatsiia ta heroizatsiia usikh, khto borovsia proty antyhitlerivskoi koalitsii bude zaboronena v Ukraini (zakonoproekt)” {Rehabilitation and hero making of all those who struggled against the anti-Hitler coalition will be prohibited in Ukraine (law draft)}, http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/koles nichenko/518a35535beb4/ (accessed October 28, 2013). 157 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 389. 158 For details see paragraph 5.1.4.4 “The missing memory of Jews.”

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tural justice is not a project of several years and takes much more time than punitive or distributive justice. However, it is an endeavour which is crucially important if the existing sources of conflicts in society are to be soothed. The Church does not have means to bring about structural justice in a direct way but it can become a voice to discover, name, and dismantle social structures that sustain injustices.159 A practical contribution of the Ukrainian Churches to the promotion of structural changes could be the creation of the environment where people can learn to get engaged in a public discourse or to express their disagreements as citizens with the politics of the state; all that contributes to sewing together the fabric of civil society.160 That is a great need for the generally passive, disappointed, and very individualistic Ukrainian consciousness. The goal can be achieved by granting the parishioners more self-determination in community life where the course of affairs is still mostly taken care of by the parish priest because of unwilling or passive faithful. Special attention has to be paid to the young generation. As part of the admittance of May 8, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church involved the young people into the cleaning of the graves of the German prisoners on the Lviv Yaniv Cemetery. It is an example of how to make the young generation be actively involved in public life.

4.3.4 Miroslav Volf: genuine justice involves embrace Is reconciliation possible without justice? If not, then what is the place of justice in reconciliation? Where does Volf put emphasis on justice? How does it help to inform the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation? “Between the complete disregard of justice and the relentless pursuit of justice lies forgiveness.”161 The demands for justice are acceptable only in the context of reconciliation. Those words describe most pointedly the practical side of Volf’s approach to justice after violence has taken place. For Miroslav Volf it is important to clarify that forgiveness does not cancel justice. The very reminder of the satisfactory death of Christ on the ____________________ 159 Schreiter, Justice and Reconciliation. 160 Schreiter, Theology of Reconciliation. 161 Volf, The End of Memory, 111.

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Cross means that even God demanded justice to accomplish the reconciliation of the world. As claimed above, justice is involved in the very act of forgiveness because while forgiving we accuse and call for justice in that way. Volf harshly criticises the principal contemporary approaches to justice, be it the universalistic vision of justice (either based on the idea of God or on the capacity of the human reason to discern justice), a postmodern plurality of justices (grounded on radical difference), or justice within the tradition (communitarian approach).162 Neither justice deriving from the concept of God, nor justice as a product of human reason can make a ground for a universal agreement on justice because the human capacity to learn what is just will always be limited. The merit of the postmodern plurality of justices consists in their appreciation of the concrete person; however, since postmodernism does not have a strong concept of identity, the question what is just for a particular individual will remain unanswered. Finally, the communitarians’ claim that justice is grounded in the tradition does not lead to an agreement of what justice is because of the conflicts between different traditions. Following those criticisms, Volf unfolds his vision of justice that rests on two key premises. First, justice is brought in connection with the will to reconciliation: “… Agreement on justice depends on the will to embrace the other and… justice itself will be unjust as long as it does not become a mutual embrace.”163 The second reveals the intention of the author “not so much to specify what justice is as to propose how we should go about seeking and pursuing justice in the context of plurality and enmity.”164 This brings us back to Amartya Sen with his vision of justice that derives from listening to the people’s idea of what a just life means. The search for justice becomes one of the indicators of whether there is a genuine desire for reconciliation. The claims of justice cannot be left unaddressed. It equally applies to the cases of the egregious human rights abuses and to the situation in contemporary Ukraine where the nation for more than 20 years has been searching for a way to rebuild its social coexistence. In contemporary Ukraine justice is about the principles of the development of society in transition. Which laws should the country adopt? Which economic freedoms or social care politics? What should happen in ____________________ 162 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (1996), 197-207. 163 Ibid., 197. 164 Ibid.

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the sphere of education and international relations? Which Church-state relations should be pursued? Where are the rights of all sorts of minorities and immigrants? All those issues are directly connected to the issues of structural justice. In Volf’s opinion, the only proper way of looking for justice is not losing sight of the reconciliation-embrace as the final aim of the whole endeavour. Reconciliation will not succeed if the demands for justice are abandoned. However, the link between justice and reconciliation can be apprehended in a false way. Two such untenable approaches which Volf criticises are first pursing justice – then awaiting reconciliation and completely abandoning the claims of justice.165 In Volf’s opinion, neither will succeed. In the first case reconciliation will fail because strict justice after gross violence is in principle impossible and even undesirable and the estranged parties remain distanced from each other. Additionally, the theological notion of forgiveness as an unconditional free gift will be hollowed. Cheap reconciliation as abandoning the demands for justice obviously precludes reconciliation and denies the Christian message of fighting against economic, political and any other sort of oppression. For Volf, the core of the relationship between reconciliation and justice consists in the unconditional and indiscriminate love of God. The immediate consequence of that love of God is the will to embrace – love by human beings which is the most fundamental obligation of every Christian: “The will to give ourselves to others and to welcome them, to readjust our identities to make space for them, is prior to any judgement about others, except that of identifying them in their humanity. The will to embrace precedes any “truth” about others and any reading of their action with respect to justice. This will is absolutely indiscriminate and strictly immutable; it transcends the moral mapping of the social world into “good” and “evil.”166

The author is aware of the radicalism of his approach; furthermore, he believes that precisely in this radicalism consists the social significance of embrace-reconciliation. Even this obligation of the will to embrace does not eliminate the pursuit of justice. Embrace belongs to the definition of justice. On the basis of the theology of the cross, justice demands that space is made for the other, that the perspective of the other is included ____________________ 165 Miroslav Volf, “Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Justice. A Christian Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Environment,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation, eds. Raymond Helmick and Rodney Petersen (n.p: Templeton, 2001), 34-39. 166 Ibid., 42.

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through “double vision.167” Miroslav Volf emphasises that the will to embrace is unconditional but not the embrace itself: “The will to embrace includes in itself the will to determine what is just and to name wrong as wrong… the will to rectify the wrongs that have been done… the will to reshape the relationships to correspond to justice.”168 The will to embrace is so important because without it the opponents will cling to their vision of justice with minimum chances to finish the strife. Indeed, this scenario is reiterated in the relationship between the Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church or in the Volyn issue between Poles and Ukrainians. For Volf, justice means searching the truth and naming evil, and then guided by the will to embrace, that is love, create a community where differences are recognised, accepted and given a space to flourish. The goal of reconciliation is primarily “the integration of citizens into a political unity as the creation of a community in which each recognises and is recognised by all and in which all mutually give themselves to each other in love.”169 Does not that elucidate the essence of the all-Ukrainian reconciliation, sometimes described as national unity? According to Volf’s model, the goal of the all-Ukrainian reconciliation should consist in the creation of a community where the rights of everybody are indiscriminately sustained notwithstanding religious or national adherence, economic or political status. Such a project is directly linked to pursuing justice. Thus, reconciliation – and justice coupled with it – should become a way of living. Volf does not elaborate on concrete ways of bringing about justice. However, the value of this contribution consists in underlying the Christian element of justice – love. In that way, Volf’s radical understanding of reconciliation implies the radical understanding of justice. And thus the legitimate conclusion is that all three reference authors help fill the gap in the Greek-Catholic teaching on justice. While Schreiter and Lederach corroborate the need to address structural injustices for the advancement of reconciliation, Miroslav Volf postulates that genuine prescripts of justice are based on embrace, the will to welcome the different other in his or her humanity. Those considerations enrich the vision of justice of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In particular, the notion of the “holy peace,” shortly mentioned by Liubomyr Husar, contains the elements of compre____________________ 167 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (1996), 220. 168 Volf, Forgiveness, 43. 169 Ibid., 45.

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hensive peace through the denouncement of structural injustices. This places the preservation of the human dignity in the centre of any social construct and should be further developed in the social teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church because it correlates with the aim of reconciliation as a step towards the transformation of Ukrainian society.

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Conclusion to Part I This part of the monograph highlighted different dimensions of reconciliation in the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The analysed examples in the Church documents plunged into the historical background prove that reconciliation is by all means a significant issue in present-day Ukraine. In some cases, as for example, the recent developments in contemporary Ukrainian-Russian relations, which resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia, demonstrate that neither historical wounds nor contemporary claims have been settled, continuing to influence the lives of the people in both countries. Notwithstanding their historical roots, reasons for the conflicts in society are still present, they are manifold and complex. Ukraine nowadays, being at the wave of transition manifests all the wounds that it acquired in past centuries and proves the need to heal them. Among the particularly interesting insights of chapter II is that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is convinced that the reconciliation of Ukraine with Poland, Russia or the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation can be strongly influenced by the rapprochement between the Churches of those countries. It is especially evident in the Polish-Ukrainian example when a crisis that emerged in 2013 concerning the anniversary of the Volyn massacre was settled due to the engagement of the Churches in Poland and Ukraine. The present-day relations of the Ukrainian Churches with the Moscow Patriarchate are built on similar patterns of control and pressure as the relations between Ukraine and Russia. The creation of the united Kyivan Patriarchate of the traditional Christian denominations in Ukraine is considered a spiritual cure that will help attain spiritual unity in Ukraine, which is necessary for the transformation of the country. Chapter III presents an overview of the contents and qualities of reconciliation in the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and their critical appraisal in the light of Lederach, Volf, and Schreiter. Reconciliation is referred to as the obligation of every Christian. In view of the difficulties of reconciliation the great accent is placed on divine help and prayer that is mentioned in practically every analysed document. The Church leadership cherishes its tradition of reconciliation and deeply appreciates the example of Pope John Paul II. The two most original features of Greek-Catholic theology concern its focus on the individual element of reconciliation expressed in the rhetoric of the metanoia of the heart and deriving the duty of reconciliation from the theology of martyrdom.

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The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church gives no definition of reconciliation in her official pronouncements unfolding its essence through the elements: repentance, forgiveness, and justice (chapter IV). Repentance from evil in one’s heart serves the individual conversion which lies at the foundation of the changes on the broader level of society. Mutual forgiveness which is possible after the truth has been established is a step to the other and a grace to realise and condemn the wrong moral patterns of the past in order to build a transformed future. The value of social justice is somewhat underestimated in the theology of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and is overshadowed by appeals to personal spiritual change as a way of the transformation of the entire society. The essence of reconciliation in the Church documents consists in bringing about the progress of Ukraine through the re-evaluation of the past in moral terms which becomes possible through the metanoia of every individual. This brings us to the next part of the investigation where I will deepen the already available insights by focusing on the theology of the healing of memory, challenge the argument that the rapprochement between the Churches can prompt social cohesion in Ukraine and look for the most fruitful ways and actors in order to advance the transformation of the country.

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Part II.

Memory and practical steps to reconciliation and Christian unity

Introduction to Part II There is quite a lack of healthy discussions on memory in the Ukrainian context. People are reminded of it “from anniversary to anniversary, so to speak. We are used to going from one extreme to another: we either keep a diffident silence about our conflicts or bend over backwards to prove that things are bad here. Regularly rethinking Ukraine’s post-totalitarian and post-colonial experience is still the preserve of a handful of intellectuals. Most of us took Vynnychenko’s observation1 quite literally and, having taken an overdose of ideological, propagandistic, or myth- laden bromide, are in a state of sheer bliss.”2

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not shrink from that challenging task. Ukrainian national reconciliation can happen through raising awareness “vis-a-vis our own history – recognition of the Holodomor, debates on the Ukrainian experience in World War II, Babyn Yar, the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, ecumenical initiatives, and interfaith cooperation.”3 As already demonstrated, most of those topics are treated in the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In the previous part of the book I analysed the vision of reconciliation and its elements in the official Church pronouncements. An essential component of reconciliation is dealing with the burdened memory, and it is to this theme that I will dedicate the entire chapter V of the book. In Ukraine such a work on memory is necessary because of the decade-long presence of communism. Archimandrite Kyrylo Hovorun of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church justifiably claimed: “In Western Europe, the crimes of Nazism, including the Holocaust, forced the Christian Churches to radically reconsider their relationship with state and society.

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Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a Ukrainian writer and politician, claimed that one cannot read Ukrainian history without taking a dose of bromide (Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Shchodennyk. T. 1, 1911-1920 {Dairy. Vol. 1, 1911-1920}, ed. Hryhorii Kostiuk (Edmonton-New York: KIUS, UVAN, 1980), 285. Kovalenko, Those Who Forget. Ibid.

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Part II. Memory and practical steps to reconciliation and Christian unity A distinct discipline of political theology was born as a reaction to the Nazis’ totalitarianism and the atrocities of World War II. In Ukraine, however, neither the persecutions of the Church by the Bolsheviks, nor the Holodomor, nor Stalin’s purges, nor the war, nor persecutions under Khruschev, nor the liberation of the Church from the atheist pressure and its immediate splitting into warring religious groups have led to similar consequences.”4

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church dares undertake that task in her documents and in chapter V we will follow how the Church does that. Except for the general approach to the purification of memory I will show specific ways of dealing with the memory of the past in Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Russian relations, dividing memories of war or missing memories of Jews. Chapter VI will be dedicated to the search for all-Ukrainian reconciliation in the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Official texts of that Church show that the point of national cohesion among Ukrainians of different identities is to be found in their spiritual unity which will arise when the Churches of the Kyiv tradition unite in a single Kyiv Patriarchate. I will unfold and challenge the practical feasibility of that vision. The final research question of the volume will be dedicated to the issue of bringing about social transformation in Ukraine and reaching reconciliation. The specific spiritual bottom-up approach of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church will be elucidated in the light of our reference authors.

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Cyril Hovorun, “On Maidan,” http://sainteliaschurch.blogspot.it/2013/12/onmaidan-archimandrite-cyril-hovorun.html (accessed January 20, 2014).

Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory

Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory 5.1

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: on history and memory

5.1.1 The duty to remember The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has adopted a twofold approach to historical memory. On the one hand, she emphasises the duty to remember the past and its victims. On the other hand, however, she pleads to forget the past where it is necessary for reconciliation. How to reconcile those two ideas? In this paragraph I will elaborate on the duty to remember as it appears in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In his “Declaration of the mutual pardon between Ukrainians and Russians” Cardinal Liubachivskyi emphasised the need to remember. In the course of history Ukraine has repeatedly been a victim of the northern neighbour and suffered countless material and spiritual damages. Those sufferings should not be silenced; neither should they pass into oblivion.1 Christian love presupposes justice and truth which means that the deeds of the past should not be forgotten. However, at the same time love goes beyond justice and truth and it opens up the road for forgiveness. This is the theological basis for pardon and reconciliation of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi. In the message on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance of the victims of World War II the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church suggests three notions that should characterise the attitude towards the history of war – memory, responsibility, reconciliation.2 Everyone who perished during the warfare, regardless of nationality, religion or worldview, has a right to be prayed for and to be remembered. It is a strong expression because the authors of the text use the term right. The right to be prayed for and to be remembered implies the obligation of the contemporaries to do this, namely to remember all the victims of the war in prayers. Everyone has to be remembered regardless of where he or she lost his or her life during the war, whether in battle, in death or labour camp or whether he or she fell victim as a civilian. ____________________ 1 2

No. 5000, 438. No. 2001.

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The idea of the duty to remember is coupled with the benefices of remembrance. In a number of pronouncements the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church points at the service that the memory of the past can render to contemporaries. In particular, this opinion is emphasised in the texts on the commemoration of the Holodomor in Ukraine of 1932-1933. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Soviet regime to eliminate the memories of this organized famine from the collective conscience of Ukrainians, it survived, and people pray nowadays that such a disaster will never be repeated.3 One of the founders of the Memorial Society in Russia, Catherine Merridale, claims: “While humankind survives… it must preserve the memory of its forbearers… to remain human and to avoid becoming… people without memory, whom it is easier to make slaves.”4 In the light of the Greek-Catholic teaching on memory those words mean that while remembering the past, people are able to reconsider it and single out those actions which were against human dignity. Remembering makes the purification of memory possible. However, not only that aspect deserves remembering. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is convinced that the memory of the Holodomor helps contemporary Ukrainians discover the causes of the current problems in their society and respectively look for ways to solve them: “Do we not have to look for the sources of our current difficulties – the inability to organise social, political and economic life – in the calamities of the past century, a notable place among which the Holodomor occupies?”5 In that regard the Initiative 1st December pointedly noticed: “To be the masters of our destiny is to uproot the vestiges of Soviet thinking which makes people who have been humiliated and robbed by the state, expect this state to provide some social benefits; Soviet-style thinking prevents one from taking part in the life of the community.”6 Besides the physical extermination of the population, in particular of the Ukrainian farmers, this artificial famine gravely affected the spirituality of Ukrainians. The entrepreneur’s spirit of the Ukrainian farmer was destroyed through the subsequent organisations of the kolkhoz (collective farm). Other disasters of the 20th century, such as forced resettlements of the ____________________ 3 4

5 6

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No. 155, 275. Catherine Merridale, “War, Death, and Remembrance in Soviet Russia,” in War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, eds. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (n. p.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 83. Ibid. Translation from the original source. The 1st December Initiative, Ukrainian Charter.

Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory

population or the Gulag, the Russification contributed towards the further “destruction of the person.”7 Additionally, alcoholism, drug habit, abortions, and suicides prove that the elimination of the Ukrainian population continues. In that sense the Greek-Catholic bishops are right. It suffices just to mention that between 1991 and 2012 the population of Ukraine diminished by 6 million people. Therefore, the duty to remember means the ability to see the current situation in Ukraine through the prism of the past. The expression a duty to remember is not directly mentioned in the Church message regarding the 70th anniversary of the Holodomor, but the reader understands that the past mirrors the present and closing the eyes for the past deprives one of the opportunities to work for a better future. The duty to remember means that the past should be uncovered and evil should be named: “The memory of the perished appeals to the conscience of the living and the evil cannot be overcome until it is recognised as evil and condemned.”8 This idea appears in all the official addresses that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church issued together with other Church leaders on the topic of the Holodomor. For instance, together with the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Head of the Conference of the Roman-Catholic Bishops of Ukraine, Liubomyr Husar emphasises that the memory of the Holodomor makes us responsible to name evil as such. Only upon discerning and naming evil can we discover and overcome it. A year later this idea was reiterated in the address of the All-Ukrainian Council for Churches and Religious Organisations: “The evil has to be named evil and the crime has to be named crime… The truth about the terrible genocide against Ukrainian people has to sound loudly because the people who do not remember their past are doomed to wander in the search of the future.”9 Only after having properly evaluated the past and having understood it can a nation discern its way in the future.10 In 2008 Ukrainian Churches claim once more that “the evil committed by Stalinism has to be named evil and has to be condemned.”11 Remembering, telling the truth about the evil of the past and grounding the national unity on the tragedy of the great famine are among the key insights of the texts on the Holodomor. ____________________ 7 8 9 10 11

Merridale, War, Death, and Remembrance. No. 303, 502. Translation from the original source. No. 319, 521. Translation from the original source. Ibid. No. 2003.

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5.1.2 “Leave the past to God and… to historians” In her discourse on the purification of memory the official Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church often suggests leaving the past/history to historians or to God. This idea appears in different sorts of documents on the reconciliation between Ukrainians and Poles, the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches or while dealing with the memories of World War II. At first sight, it may seem that the authors advocate a sort of forgetting the past and that they merely concentrate on the present tasks. In what follows I will analyse these documents and try to decipher their underlying meaning To begin with, on the occasion of the opening of the Polish military memorial on Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv, the Greek-Catholic bishops recognise that during the long history of mutual coexistence Poles and Ukrainians have developed distinctive views of the past including a different vision of mutual conflicts. The Polish pacification campaign in western Ukraine in the 1930s and the forced resettlements of Poles and Ukrainians during and after World War II remain in the historical memory of both nations. This history cannot be denied or changed. In the absence of real war, nowadays the memory weighs upon both peoples and it is manifested on different levels in disinformation, unwarranted accusations and pseudo-historical manipulative views of the past. Consequently, the bishops believe that the best Christians can do is to leave the history “before the altar of God’s grace and leave it to historians”12 because there are no alternatives to continuing the mutual coexistence and foster the development of democratic civil societies. In other words, the bishops call to abandon for the moment any historical discussions on the public level allowing them only to professional researches. The same approach can be observed regarding the memories of World War II. Liubomyr Husar does not want to judge the past. He believes that the events of wartime must be studied by historians. Calling people to realise the genuine meaning of the victory over the Nazis for Ukraine, Husar seeks to put an end to historical discussions and manipulations and make people concentrate on their presence.The task of the Church is to evaluate and to address the impact of the past on the souls of contemporaries13 which was explained by Volodymyr Volkovskyi in the following way: ____________________ 12 13

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No. 162, 283. Translation from the original source. No. 2005.

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“The Church distinguishes between the moral aspect of the past, the condemnation of any injustice that has taken place, and the historical science that has to study and reveal the facts of the past.14 Similarly, Cardinal Liubachivskyi does not want to judge the liquidation of his Church in 1946, even though he mentions the guilty secular and Church authorities (that is the Soviet government and the Russian Orthodox Church): “Here, on earth, the evaluation of all the events I leave for the judgment of history and its honest researchers. And there, in heaven, the just and merciful Judge, the Creator of the universe, will pass a judgement.”15 On the occasion of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod Husar sent the Moscow Patriarch a letter written “with the desire to leave to God’s grace what happened and to step in the future prepared to look for the common ways.”16 Calling the Patriarch of Moscow to revise the attitude to the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, Husar aims at the establishment of the truth about the past, then leaving it behind and focusing on the present coexistence. Similarly, in “Conception of the Ecumenical Position of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church” the authors write that both Churches must recognise their historical faults in order to eliminate the psychological burden and to leave history to God.17 Obviously, here the truth must be revealed and articulated before the past slides into the hands of God. Concerning the memories of the conflicts between the Ukrainian Churches, the approach of leaving the past aside slightly varies. The authors of the analysed texts, first of all Liubomyr Husar, propose to all the branches of the once united Kyivan Metropolia to create their common history together. After her foundation, the Kyivan Church was open to the then not yet divided centres of Christianity, Rome and Constantinople. The further complicated history of the development of the Church on the hills of Kyiv is differently viewed by the traditional Ukrainian Churches. Liubomyr Husar believes that those Churches should avoid writing their own confessional history of the Kyivan Church because even historians themselves have not yet come to a joint conclusion about how to evaluate ____________________ 14

15 16 17

Volodymyr Volkovskyi, “Poliaky ta ukraintsi: mozhlyvosti prymyrennia ta dialohu” {Poles and Ukrainians. Possibilities of reconciliation and dialogue}, http://www.religion.in.ua/main/analitica/22702-polyaki-ta-ukrayinci-mozhlivostiprimirennya-ta-dialogu.html (accessed January 17, 2014). No. 21, 35. Translation from the original source. No. 217, 364. Translation from the original source. No. 5003, 59 (No. 4000, 126).

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it. For that reason Husar claims: “We therefore leave the past to God in the hope that in the future, Ukrainian Christians may reach a common view of their ecclesial history.”18 This quotation contains an important idea: the Ukrainian Churches should not forget the past but strive to revise it and prepare the common history of their mutual relations that excludes any strictly confessional viewpoint. History is to be dealt with but only by the joint efforts of the Churches. The present moment is not the best to start the review of Church history because it will provoke further tensions and destroy the thin feeling of trust that was established. It is a project for the future, and as for now, history should be left to the grace of God. In some cases one can leave the past to God only after the truth has been revealed, such as in the case of the Holodomor. In the address on the occasion of its 75th anniversary Cardinal Husar, together with other representatives of the Ukrainian Churches and religious organisations, calls to leave the past crimes for God’s trial as both victims and perpetrators do not exist anymore.19 However, contemporary Ukrainians are obliged to learn the truth about the great famine as the foundation of their national unity. The learning of historical truth would prevent the spread of the misinterpretations of history, division and conflicts.20 Thus, we came to the last element of leaving the past to God, that is not condemning or searching the guilty but looking for what unites the opponents. The reconciliation with the past comes through learning the truth and leaving it to the grace of God. Only in that way can Ukrainians build their future in solidarity.21 This circumstance plays a tremendously important role in the allUkrainian rapprochement as it was mentioned in the address of the GreekCatholic bishops on the preservation of public peace. Concluding, we can discern four scenarios of leaving the past to God and to historians: • •

Reveal the truth about the past and leave it to God, do not revenge (healing the memories of the Holodomor). For the moment, leave the established confessional versions of the past to historians and write a joint vision of history together in the future (inter-Church relations).

____________________ 18 19 20 21

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No. 177, 307-308 (No. 3000, 129). No. 319, 521. No. 2008. Ibid.

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• •

Leave the history to historians and create a new future (healing the memories of World War II). Learn the truth about the past, deliver it in the hands of God, and work for a common future (relations of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church).

In all the cases, the truth has to be scrutinized. The difference consists in the moment when the truth has to be studied and in the way this examination of the past should take place. In some cases this enterprise would better be postponed. Yaroslav Hrytsak opines that in the Ukrainian situation it would be best to introduce the politics of national amnesia in order to leave the dividing narratives behind during this initiative stage of the development of the state.22 Practically that means that using history for political purposes should be forbidden. However, since it is practically impossible, the politics of the all-encompassing consensus that includes different and even sometimes exclusive patterns of memory seems to be more realistic.23 Instead of misusing politics for their interests, Ukrainian politicians must promote a responsible politics of memory for the sake of the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation.24 Leaving the past to God does not mean forgetting or acting as if evil never happened. It rather is about the establishment of the truth about the past, so that every party realises its guilt. Eventually then the past could be left in peace.

5.1.3 The purification of memory It is undeniable that in the thought of Liubomyr Husar, reconciliation starts from the purification of memory.25 It appears already in the earliest ____________________ 22 23

24

25

Hrytsak, Memory, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 77; Hrytsak, Nil Desperandum, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 233. Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Klopoty z pamiattiu” {Troubles with memory}, http://zaxid. net/home/showSingleNews.do?klopoti_z_pamyattyu&objectId=1097756 (accessed January 21, 2014). Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Historical Memory Needs to Be Accountable,” interview by Mariana Karapinka, Risu.org.ua, http://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/inter view/39241 (accessed January 21, 2014). I have chosen to translate the Ukrainian expression ochyshchennia pamtiati as purification of memory in English. The term has different smaller nuances which I explain in my research, however, the core meaning of purification as discerning

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messages dedicated to the Days of Purification and Reconciliation in Lviv. This element is inherently present in all the documents. The purification of memory is inseparably combined with history. History burdened with violence demands the closest attention because “history is memory”26 be it individual, collective history, or the history of the Church. Memory is often not objective and very vulnerable to misuses and manipulations provoking the desire of vengeance and divisions among people. Husar does not call to investigate the history in order to determine who is guilty. This task should be left to professional historians. The Church has another assignment, namely to prevent the past from becoming an obstacle for the future.27 This should be the aim of the process of the purification of memory and in this paragraph I will decipher this term in the official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

The individual examination of the conscience How should the purification of memory be practically conducted keeping in mind that the past cannot be erased or totally forgotten? According to Liubomyr Husar, in order to build a new future one should both maintain the memory of the good and deal with the negative and painful remembrances. The problem arises when one realises that there are different groups of believers and non-believers, people of diverse nationalities and various cultural backgrounds. Therefore, there cannot be a single way towards the purification of memory. The Church may apologise for the behaviour of her children. A particular group can ask pardon. However, taking into account the diversity of people, the best method of the purification of memory leads through the individual examination of one’s own conscience.28 The process of the purification of memory means that every individual truly evaluates his or her past without trying to justify what one has done. One needs to discern the personal participation in the evil committed to one’s city, community, parish or family.29 ____________________

26 27 28 29

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between positive and negative aspects of memory of the past is preserved in practically every document. No. 99, 184. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory

A message issued by the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 2005 on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance of the victims of World War II argues that the purification of memory starts from discerning the personal participation in evil. All the Churches are called to witness justice and peace. Peace is the fruit of truth and justice. Christians have to foster the culture of reconciliation through the recognition of one’s own faults by being ready to listen to and forgive the other. Therefore, “in order to avoid the repetition of the destructive events in the future… we call everyone to say a prayer at the graves of the victims of World War II for the souls of the diseased.”30 This prayer that involves faithful of different confessions will signify the recognition of the responsibility of contemporaries. We are obliged to remember the victims of World War II in our prayers for two reasons: the tragic events should not be repeated and we must always remain aware of our responsibility. Responsibility concerns the direct or indirect support of or the silencing of the evil committed under the communist or Nazi regimes. Those regimes not only started and waged World War II, they also account for the destruction of human values and evils which happened in the Soviet Union after the war. Contemporaries have to recognise that they are also affected by the evil in their hearts. The responsibility for the past remains even if a person was not directly involved in committing evil. In her message about the memory of World War II and responsibility, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church reminded one that the hatred of warfare is always manifested through a concrete person as Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi maintained in his pastoral letter “Do not kill: “A person who sheds innocent blood, even that of an enemy or political opponent, is equal to a murderer who kills for the sake of robbery.”31 Both powers, Nazism and communism, brought about the destruction of the human person and society. Everyone who at least partly supported any of those ideologies carries responsibility for the destructions and has to clean his or her heart through prayer.32 Thus, the responsibility of our contemporaries does not arise out of a personal contribution to the extermination of people during the war, but it is connected with the direct or indirect support of the ideologies that caused those human sufferings. When one ____________________ 30 31 32

No. 346, 579. Translation from the original source. No. 2001. Translation from the original source. Ibid.

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recognises evil in one’s own heart, one will be more eager and willing to forgive the wrongdoings of the other.

Learning the truth about the past In his sermon during the divine service on the Reconciliation Day in 2001 in Lviv, Husar linked this celebration with the terrorist attacks of September 11 and with the war in Afghanistan. In this atmosphere of fear, the Cardinal postulates that the citizens of Lviv also faced injuries committed against themselves or their families. The memory of these grievances continues in the hearts of people. Hence, it is necessary to purify the burdened memory. This process is placed at the beginning of every change of attitude that leads to reconciliation. The purification of memory has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, “We have to strive to evaluate sincerely and objectively how big the suffered injuries were, to understand what happened in order not to burden memory with the untruth.”33 Therefore, in its primary sense, the purification of memory refers to learning the truth objectively. On the other hand, Cardinal Husar emphasises an additional dimension of the purification of memory, namely, the need to envisage something good in every painful and unjust situation. As an explicit example of this statement, referring to the terrorist attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001, the author mentions that, except for terrorists, there were also fire-fighters and police people who strolled into the collapsed Twin Towers in New York in order to save the people buried under the ruins. In Husar’s opinion, the awareness of the positive side of every event is necessary for not letting one’s heart fall into despair and not starting to hate the people around oneself.34 It seems that the attitude to history and memory slightly differs in the teaching of Husar. He calls for abandoning history to historians and at the same time encourages clarifying the past in order to discover the truth. Husar calls for the individual purification of memory, for discerning personal evil and abandoning the collective evil of history to professionals. This approach is determined by the diversity of people and the impossibility to assume a single unified way of the purification of memory. However, one may object that history is not only a matter of individual but also ____________________ 33 34

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No. 346, 578; No. 128, 240. Translation from the original source. No. 346, 579.

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of collective memory, and that the examination of the collective memory should become an essential part of the reconciliation process. People act as members of a certain group and the group identity often determines their actions. Therefore, the insufficient emphasis on the significance of collective memory and identity is a significant shortcoming of Husar’s approach. This observation does not diminish the value of Husar’s suggestion that one should not only objectively unveil the truth but also find the good amidst the sufferings of the past. Essential for the healing of the wounds of a victim is the recognition of his/her suffering. Even when the immediate perpetrator is not able anymore to express sorrow for what was done, it remains important to name the evil that took place. In the address on the occasion of the return to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church of the documents of Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi that were confiscated at his arrest in 1945, Cardinal Liubachivskyi said: “One cannot always expect in this life the complete justice and the compensation for the harm that was done. However, it is already an important step for the victim to hear avowal that what happened was really wrong.”35 Consequently, the return of the documents that belonged to Yosyf Slipyi meant to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the recognition of the injustice of this act that was one of the stages of the liquidation of the Church in 1946. As it follows from the analysed texts, the purification of memory requires learning of the truth about the past. It is obviously essential to figure out what indeed happened for a successful rapprochement in the case of the clashing memories of World War II, in the common PolishUkrainian history or even during the centuries of the coexistence of Ukrainians from the east and west of the country: “For being able to rejoice a genuine and lasting peace we have to long for truth, in particular historical, because everywhere where lie and falsehood are being spread, inevitably appears a threat of divisions and conflicts.”36 However, the Greek-Catholic bishops warn against studying the past with the aim to discover one more stone to be thrown to the enemy. The quest for the historical truth must be genuine and at the same time it has to lead to reconciliation.

____________________ 35 36

No. 33, 59-60. Translation from the original source. No. 2008. Translation from the original source.

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Drawing lessons from the past For contemporaries the healing of memory means that they have to name evil as evil, not to accuse perpetrators but to understand the roots of evil. The essence of the process of the healing of memory of World War II does not consist in detecting and accusing the guilty ones (veterans of the Soviet Red Army or the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), in calling the war Great Patriotic War or World War II, admitting Victory Day on the 9th of May or commemorating the victims of the war on the 8th of May. The purification of memory consists in the realisation that killing and war is evil as such, which also means the recognition that the communist regime was no better than the Nazi one. The memory of the victims of war must unites Ukrainians regardless of which party they belonged to, whether they were soldiers of the Red Army, of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or even German soldiers. Ultimately, what is at stake is the peaceful future development of the country and the ability to evaluate and detect evil existing nowadays. In that sense the Greek-Catholic documents on World War II are future-oriented. The pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the commemoration of the Holodomor unfold another dimension of the purification and the healing of memory. Crucial here is the memory of the Holodomor, the discernment of its ramifications for the spiritual state of contemporary Ukrainians and the search for the ways to initiate changes in society. In the light of the spiritual legacy of the Holodomor, contemporary Ukrainians have to work on what they were deprived of. The consequences of the Holodomor and Stalinism in general determine many weak features of Ukraine in the present: indifference, inertia, the lack of initiative and responsibility, the habit to rely upon others and first of all on the state.37 According to the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, “This realisation has to penetrate the national conscience in order to heal the terrible wound of the past and of the present.”38 Reconciliation in that case defined as healing of the wounds of the past can take place provided that the past is remembered: “We remember the Holodomor victims in order to cure our memory, to heal the wounds of the past, to counteract the repetition of similar crimes in the future and

____________________ 37 38

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Oksana Hrabovych, “Kolonialna spadshchyna v siohodnishnii Ukraini” {Colonial heritage in present-day Ukraine}, Patriarkhat 6 (2011): 19. No. 155, 275. Translation from the original source.

Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory to free the contemporary person from the dangers of a people-hating ideology… to protect the dignity of every human being, to build on the foundation of God’s lifegiving commandments a more just society.”39

It means that contemporary Ukrainians have to repent of the evil fruits of the Holodomor that they allowed to ripen in their souls. The Holodomor is considered by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as part of the bigger problem of healing the wounds of communism. Here the Church leadership thinks in line with the French philosopher Alain Besançon who spoke about the communist distortion of human hearts. Besançon distinguishes between the material, political, and moral evil of communism where the moral one means that “honest, rational souls became criminal, insane, and stupid.”40 Communism, like fascism, caused “the perversion of souls and minds”41 and it “set out to change something more fundamental than mores – that is, the very rule of morality, of our sense of good and evil.”42 The purification of memory has to become a healing from this moral destruction. The task is difficult as “Nothing is so problematic after the dissolution of a totalitarian regime as the reconstruction of the people’s normal moral conscience and intellectual capacity.”43 That task points at a new mutual project for the traditional Ukrainian Churches. According to Oleh Hirnyk, a Greek-Catholic theologian, the Ukrainian Churches should not only celebrate the Holodomor commemoration services together, but also initiate a joint theological reinterpretation of this tragedy.44 Moreover, the Churches should resist the modern genocide of Ukrainians as a result of social injustices, general poverty, abortion, euthanasia, human trafficking.45 One finds a clear reference to the ____________________ 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

No. 2023. Besançon, A Century of Horrors, xxi. Ibid., 96. Ibid., 36. Ibid., 101. Oleh Hirnyk, “20-littia vyhodu z pidpillia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy – buttia mizh ‘post’ i ‘proto” {20th anniversary of the coming out of the underground of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church – existence between “post” and “proto”}, Patriarkhat 5 (2009): 5. Ibid., 6. Oleh Hirnyk opines that the theological reinterpretation of the Holodomor as the experience of the silence of God (meonthology of evil) and of the whole Christian world could be a particular contribution of Ukrainian theology to evangelisation. Such a theology of the Holodomor can serve as a key for the denunciation of the modern evils of liberal economics in the globalised world when despite the surplus of production whole nations are suffering from hunger. (Oleh Hirnyk, “Ukrainian theology: Vid novoi yevanhelizatsii do kontekstualnoi teolo-

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idea of a modern genocide of the Ukrainian people in the thought of Liubomyr Husar. Summarising, it is evident that according to the official Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the core of the idea of the purification of memory consists in discovering the truth about the past with the aim of naming evil as evil. Only in that way the contemporaries can assume their responsibility for the past. Liubomyr Husar maintained that “If we desire to change substantially the direction of the development of our society we have to change the system of values.”46 That is exactly what Liubomyr Husar tries to change with his promotion of reconciliation – to purify memory, see what was wrong, to define the wrong patterns and start living according to genuine Christian values. Speaking about the ways to the purification of memory, Liubomyr Husar emphasises a personal examination of one’s consciousness. Even the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation that was officially crowned with the mutual solemn Eucharistic celebration is proclaimed to be built upon the efforts of every individual to long for rapprochement. Hence, Husar’s approach remains very personal and spiritual. It does not suffice to express the words “We forgive and ask forgiveness” when no profound internal work on the purification of memory has taken place previously and when one does not sufficiently acknowledge the collective aspects of the purification of memory. In the following paragraph I will focus on the Greek-Catholic approach to concrete cases of the healing of memory.

5.1.4 The healing of memory: main issues 5.1.4.1 Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation Reconciliation through prayer In the history of independent Ukraine one of the most problematic PolishUkrainian conflicts concerns the opening of the Polish military memorial on the Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv in the early 2000s. That conflict ____________________

46

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hii” {Ukrainian theology. From new evangelisation to contextual theology}, Patriarkhat 6 (2011): 6-7). Liubomyr Husar, “Dukhovni tsinnosti” {Spiritual values}, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, August 22, 2012. Translation from the original source.

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showed that neither contemporary Poland, nor Ukraine can boast nowadays authoritative figures of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation like Jerzy Giedroyc.47 In the absence of the respected politicians who would work for the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement, the initiatives of the Churches are especially important. From the very beginning, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has been actively involved in settling the issue. Cardinal Husar gave a favourable opinion for the opening of the Polish military memorial and suggested a platform for the peaceful solution of the conflict by elucidating the meaning of the monuments in construction. In Husar’s vision, the military memorial is a sign of love to one’s homeland because both Polish and Ukrainian soldiers buried at the cemetery died for those ideals. The love for the own people and the readiness to lay down one’s life for them is a virtue blessed by the Church and cherished by every state.48 Poles have a right to pay homage to their soldiers. Lychakiv memorials also remind of the deficiency of the human condition that results in mutual hatred and violence.49 Consequently, people have to praise their heroes and at the same time pray for the forgiveness of their own sins. The same vision of the role of the monuments was reiterated by Husar during the ceremony of the opening of the Polish war memorial and the cemetery of the Ukrainian Galician Army soldiers in May 2005. Cardinal Husar referred to Ukrainians and Poles gathered at the cemetery and called them to prayer for the soldiers, notwithstanding their national origins. Moreover, Husar calls the leaders of Poland and Ukraine to transmit to the young people the awareness that “everyone must have a certain ideal and stand for it, has to be ready if necessary to lay one’s life for it.”50 It makes no sense to discuss who was guilty or who suffered more. The task of the present generations is to have their own ideals and remember in prayers those who died for their country years ago. The Church reconciliation initiative at the Lychakiv memorial was successful because it was an approach of prayer and delivering a meaning to the monument for the diseased soldiers. Perhaps such concrete steps of suggesting alternatives ra____________________ 47

48 49 50

Petro Kraliuk, “Polsko-ukrainski vidnosyny: u poloni stereotypiv i vzaiemnykh obraz” {Polish-Ukrainian relations. Captured in stereotypes and mutual offences}, http://gazeta.dt.ua/SOCIETY/polsko-ukrayinski_vidnosini_u_poloni_stereo tipiv_i_vzaemnih_obraz.html (accessed January 11, 2014). No. 139, 251. Ibid., 252. No. 202, 342. Translation from the original source.

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ther than general appeals to forgiveness and purification of memory are needed for the resolution of controversial questions. The emphasis on the Christian roots of the Polish and Ukrainian cultures helps us understand the way of reconciliation that was accepted by the Catholic bishops of both countries, which is the way of mutual prayer and personal forgiveness. As we have observed above, the novelty of the approach of Husar to the problem of the Polish military memorials in Lviv was that he granted them a new meaning – that of the space for prayer. The adversaries of the opening of that memorial accentuated that there should be no place on the Lviv cemetery for Poles who were invaders and combatted Ukrainians in their own city. Instead, with his initiative of the yearly mutual Polish-Ukrainian prayers on the graves Husar showed that enemies can pray together and purify in that way their common violent historical memory.51 The prayerful attitude is very peculiar to the thought of Liubomyr Husar. On many diverse occasions he calls for prayer. A good example is the action of the non-stop prayer during the Orange Revolution. Another example is the call for prayer found in the extensive address of the Synod of Bishops about the role of Christians in the modern world. Having described the basis of the social engagement of a Christian and having elaborated on the concrete aspects of social life, the bishops conclude that the strength to lead such a virtuous life is to be found in God’s help: “A Christian citizen must be a man or a woman of prayer.”52 During the joint Polish-Ukrainian prayer in November 2005, Liubomyr Husar clarified that people come together on the cemetery in order to honour and recall the memory not what divides but what unites them and they do it in prayer, notwithstanding differences in culture, religion, or origin.53 This is the central message of his speech. Soldiers, whom the people pay homage to, used to fight each other, but the Poles and Ukrainians attending the event are united in a joint prayer of the memory. Contrary to poli____________________ 51 52

53

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No. 139, 252. “Zvernennia Yepyskopiv Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do virnykh ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli pro zavdannia khrystyianyna v suchasnomu suspilstvi”{Address of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Bishops to the faithful and all people of good will about the mission of the Christian in modern society}, in Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (19892008), ed. Lesia Kovalenko (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008), 162. Translation from the original source. No. 208, 350.

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ticians who spoke about the obstacles to having a Polish military memorial on Lychakiv Cemetery, the Church initiative of a joint prayer and homage to the soldiers proved that it is possible to approach the issue from a different side. Instead of accusations and searching for the guilty ones, people could pray together. Finally, the act of reconciliation between Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops was a liturgical act. The document “Reconciliation between nations is possible” culminates in prayer: striving to fulfil the words of the prayer “Holy Father”: “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us,” by the intercession of the Mother of God, “being aware of the historical past of one’s own nation and the state of one’s soul, we ask forgiveness from our brothers and sisters Poles/Ukrainians and forgive them from all our hearts all their transgressions against us.”54

What unites both nations The initiative of the joint prayer on the graves of Polish and Ukrainians soldiers culminated in 2005 in the act of mutual forgiveness and reconciliation between the Catholic bishops of Ukraine and Poland, which was celebrated first in Warsaw on June 19, 2005 and subsequently in Lviv on June 26, 2005. On that occasion the bishops issued a joint document “Reconciliation between nations is possible.” For the Polish side this document was the continuation of its tradition of reconciliation with the Polish neighbours that started from the Polish-German rapprochement in the 1960s. The most recent initiative of that type, the declaration of the Russian-Polish reconciliation, was signed on August 17, 2012 by Patriarch Kirill, the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Józef Michalik, the President of the Polish Episcopal Conference. Those three letters differ in length, scope, and the interpretation of a painful historical past. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian-Polish act of reconciliation consists in the fact that the bishops put an emphasis on what both nations have in common instead of returning to the historical grievances that both peoples inflicted upon each other. The common history of sufferings under the communist rule, the mutual pain of the disasters of the 20th century, the spiritual testament of John Paul II who promoted reconciliation between the countries, are under____________________ 54

No. 289, 483. Translation from the original source.

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standable and dear to both Poles and Ukrainians. However, in the opinion of the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic bishops, the most evident element that both nations have in common is their Christian faith through baptism. Ukrainians adopted Christianity of the Byzantine rite, Poles that of the Latin rite. Throughout time, this fact led to disagreements and conflicts, however, it was Christianity that helped both peoples endure all the predicaments of history. Especially tragic was the 20th century with its wars, political terror, and the suppression of the Church by communist authorities. However, the end of the 20th century was marked by joyful events of the fall of communism, the obtaining of religious freedom, the rebirth of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the unification of Europe. On the threshold of the new century, Polish and Ukrainian peoples have to overcome their hatred, forgive mutual offences and purify their historical memory for the sake of further peaceful and trusty relationships.55 The idea that the shared Christian faith is a ground for reconciliation was expressed by the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in their letter to “Ukrainian and Polish peoples, brothers in Christ”56 issued in May 2003. In that document, the bishops emphasised that it is important that the reconciliation between Poland and Ukraine takes place on the level of Churches and not only on a political one.57 After having named the benefits of the neighbouring geopolitical situation of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, the Greek-Catholic bishops highlight that both nations share the Christian faith. Therefore, not just the solidarity between Poles and Ukrainians as neighbours but the Christian tradition and the commandment of the love of God and neighbours must govern their relations. The bishops evoke the words of Jesus’ prayer “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us,” which, when applied to the Ukrainian-Polish relations, mean that the truth is that both peoples have offended each other, therefore, both must forgive.58 According to Shevchuk, the steps that have to be taken by the Church to address the possible worsening of the Polish-Ukrainian relations include Christian forgiveness that can heal the wounds in the relations between people and looking for what the two countries have in common: “I think that both Polish and Ukrainian people have to look for such topics that ____________________ 55 56 57 58

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No. 289, 481; No. 3002. No. 162, 282. Ibid., 284. Ibid., 283.

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unite us, and not to search for what dissociates. In particular, keeping in mind that Ukrainian people long to integrate into Europe.”59

“The past through the prism of Christianity” Sviatoslav Shevchuk was right in his fears. On the occasion of the approaching celebration of the 70 anniversary of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the Volyn territories, on March 11, 2013, the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church issued an address explaining its position concerning this event. That address was not signed by the Polish Catholic bishops in Ukraine. The Greek-Catholic bishops recognise that Ukrainians and Poles will always have distinct views and a different collective memory of what happened.60 Therefore, the Synod of Bishops suggested evaluating the Volyn events as well as other tragedies that took place between Ukrainians and Poles from a Christian point of view. It means that they condemn both the policies that deprived Ukrainians of the right of self-determination on their lands and the violence against the Poles in Volyn.61 From the Christian perspective, both the Volyn tragedy and any other crimes in the Polish-Ukrainian relations that preceded or followed it must be condemned. The Greek-Catholic bishops believe that in the light of the commandment “Do not kill,” both nations should be able to find a reconciling vision of the past. The reality proves to be more complicated. The message was signed only by the Greek-Catholic bishops, although the Polish Catholic bishops in Ukraine were consulted as well. However, they refused to approve of the final version of the document because in their opinion it contained a number of postulations that Poles cannot agree with. In particular, in the words of the Polish Archbishop of Lviv, Mieczysław Mokrzycki, the Ukrainian side has to recognise that the ethnic cleansing of the Polish population in ____________________ 59

60 61

Rostyslav Kramar, “Predstoiatel Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy Sviatoslav Shevchuk: Istorychnu pamiat ukraintsiv i poliakiv ozdorovyt vzaiemne proshchennia” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Sviatoslav Shevchuk: Historical memory of Ukrainians and Poles will be healed by mutual forgiveness}, http://nslowo.pl/content/view/2378/73/ (accessed December 30, 2012). Translation from the original source. No. 2018. Ibid.

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the Volyn territories in 1943 was committed by Ukrainian nationalists.62 Additionally, Mokrzycki reproaches the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic bishops for the relativisation of the Volyn tragedy and he calls this a typical way of reasoning of the nationalistically oriented Ukrainians.63 The Polish Catholic bishops could not accept the reconciliation formula proposed in the current message of the Greek-Catholic Church “We forgive and ask for forgiveness.” In their opinion, the correct approach of Ukrainians should rather be the opposite – “We ask forgiveness and forgive.”64 Poles expected from Ukrainians the recognition of their responsibility for the mass killings of the Polish population. Instead, the Ukrainian GreekCatholic bishops claim that Ukrainian nationalism in the Volyn territories, which belonged to Poland until World War II, was caused by Polish oppressive policies. Hence, at some point, the disagreement about the principal elements of the message made it impossible to reach a rapprochement between Poles and Ukrainians on that issue. This controversy proves that reconciliation between the nations is a durable process that needs constant verification and assessment of every historical event that burdens their mutual memory. The role of learning truth about the past is emphasised in “Declaration of Catholic Churches of Ukraine and Poland on forgiveness and reconciliation” that was finally issued on June 28, 2013. There is a call to remember the agreeable pages of the common Polish-Ukrainian history, the common Christian faith (the text mentions the 1025th anniversary of baptism in Ukraine and the upcoming 1050th of Polish baptism), the references to the Churches of Poland and Ukraine as martyr Churches during the communist dictatorship. The bishops call to make a Christian evaluation of the Volyn massacres and condemn crimes committed under political, economic, or religious considerations. Equally, the atheistic totalitarian regime is mentioned as the ideology that caused millions of deaths in the 20th century.65 The declaration does not contain the notion genocide that was speculated about in the context of the Volyn anniversary in 2013. Sviato____________________ 62 63

64 65

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The difficult common assessment. Ibid. For a thorough analysis of the document of the pastoral letter of the Ukrainian Roman Catholic bishops concerning the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy and commentaries of Archbishop Mokrzycki, see Volkovskyi, Poles and Ukrainians. The difficult common assessment. No. 2019.

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slav Shevchuk reminds one of the declaration of forgiveness that Cardinal Husar made during the Pope’s visit to Ukraine and asks himself forgiveness from his Polish brothers. Józef Michalik, the President of the Polish Episcopal Conference in his turn asked for forgiveness for the Poles who answered violence by violence towards the Ukrainians.66 Those words indirectly indicate that the Polish side believes that the Volyn massacres are the fault of the Ukrainians and the Poles only answered the violence committed against them. Thus the current declaration contains certain concessions to please the Polish side. The text indirectly refers to the stance of Jerzy Giedroyc that without a free Ukraine there cannot be a free Poland: “The cooperation of the free Ukraine and the free Poland is necessary for the peace to reign in this part of Europe.”67 Besides, the Churches of both countries have a task to bear witness to the Christian roots of Europe. The message concludes with the greetings to the Orthodox of both countries as those should equally be involved in the process of reconciliation. This joint message was welcomed by a number of Ukrainian intellectuals. Myroslav Marynovych argued that one has to christianise history in order to stop the endless spiral of mutual accusations of the opponent and justification for one’s own wrongdoings.68 The principle of mutual forgiveness is the expression of this approach. Additionally, the openness for the painful and heroic histories of each other is needed. For instance, the Poles have to acknowledge that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is glorified in Ukraine not because of its participation in the Volyn exterminations but because of its struggle against the Nazi and especially Soviet regime. Marynovych believes that the Polish side has to realise that difference and stop fighting against the distinctive status that the Insurgent Army has in Ukraine. There is no sense in trying to impose one’s own version of history upon the opponent.69 In the light of those events Marcin Wojciechowski diagnoses that the problem lies in the desire of one side to perform the role of victim and focusing on the own sorrows without granting such a right to the opponents. Moreover, he stresses that it is absurd to measure who suffered more and ____________________ 66 67 68 69

Ibid. Ibid. Translation from the original source. Marynovych, Poland and Ukraine, 28. Ibid., 28.

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who started first, as it will only swirl the spiral of hatred.70 He calls for understanding and explains that the glorification of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Ukraine is not at all connected with the resurgence and appraisal of fascism. For Ukrainians this military group is a symbol of the fight for independence against all possible enemies of their country, first of all against the Soviet empire, having nothing to do with honouring the methods that insurgents used. Consequently, when the Ukrainian Insurgent Army would be rehabilitated in Ukraine for their struggle against the sovietisation of the country during and after World War II, it does not mean the rehabilitation of fascism.71 In their turn Ukrainians have problems with explicitly recognising the murders inflicted by the insurgents and not only against Poles, but also Jewish and even Ukrainians who refused to help them, the facts known in Ukraine as “the black legend of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army” and not often openly mentioned.72 There will be no reconciliation when the historical truth is not recognised. The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches equally expressed themselves on the Volyn anniversary. In particular, Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate issued a statement concerning the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre.73 The author reminded one of what unites Poles and Ukrainians: the history of coexistence in one state, the common struggle against the oppressor, totalitarian communist and imperial regimes, and Christian faith. In the name of his Church, the Patriarch appealed to Poles for forgiving and asking for forgiveness. Filaret pleaded to leave the history of the confrontation between both nations to historians and concentrate on peaceful relations in the future. Hence, the stance of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate contains similar elements as the reconciliation appeals of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: references to the common heroic history, religion, the mutual forgiveness formula and the appeal to abandon the history to historians. ____________________ 70 71 72 73

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Marcin Wojciechowski, “Manowce ‘Manowcow pojednania” {Wrong ways of the “wrong ways of reconciliation”}, Wiez 618, no. 4 (2010): 100. Ibid., 101. Ibid., 100. “Zvernennia Patriarkha Kyivskoho i Vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta z nahody 70kh rokovyn masovykh vbyvstv na Volyni” {Message of the Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine Filaret on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn massacre}, http://www.cerkva.info/en/messages/3267-zvernennya-patriarha-2703-2013.html (accessed January 20, 2014).

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Equally, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate expressed herself on the topic. In his message Metropolitan Volodymyr74 maintains that the fault of this tragedy lies on both people who mutually exterminated each other. While the assignment of historians is to reveal the truth about the events, the task of the Church is to deliver a moral estimation of the Volyn tragedy.75 The Orthodox Church condemns the interethnic struggle and Christian patriotism combined with violent means. Metropolitan Volodymyr warns politicians against misusing the Volyn anniversary and calls both peoples up to forgiveness and reconciliation. Mykola Krokosh, a Greek-Catholic theologian, observes that an important element is missing in the healing of the memory of Volyn. He claimed that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should have issued a joint message on the occasion of the Volyn anniversary with the Orthodox Ukrainian denominations.76 The Ukrainian Orthodox of the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchate officially announced their positions in the corresponding messages. However, the majority of Ukrainians in general and of those residing in the Volyn are declared Orthodox. A joint message of the Orthodox and Greek-Catholics would be a logical step if it really is about reconciliation between the entire nations. I can only add that working jointly on reconciliation with the Poles would serve to the rapprochement between the Ukrainian Churches themselves.

5.1.4.2 Healing the memories of World War II Teaching: redefining victory in moral terms The challenge of the healing of the memories of World War II has to do with the reconciliation of different visions of war. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian situation derives from the fact that, generally speaking, half of its citizens praise the Soviet victory over fascism whilst another half emphasises the heroic actions of the Ukrainian nationalist underground troops who fought against Soviets, Poles, and Nazis together. Some observers do ____________________ 74

75 76

“Zvernennia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy z pryvody 70-richchia Volynskoi trahedii” {Message of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/church_doc/uocmp_doc/ 52772/ (accessed January 20, 2014). Ibid. Krokosh, Reconciliation. A difficult dialogue.

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not believe in the possibility of reconciliation between the veterans of the Red Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army because it is about two completely different ideologies, views of the past and visions of Ukraine’s future. Consequently, one should abandon the attempts at reconciling the differences and better help the still living veterans of both armies in terms of establishing historical justice and ensuring better social security of those people.77 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church undertakes the task of healing the memories of World War II by defining the meaning of the war and victory, naming the winners, and drawing lessons from the biggest war in the 20th century. At first, the Greek-Catholic Church leadership confers a new sense to World War II by presenting an alternative meaning to the official Victory Day in Ukraine, admitted on May 9th. The very title of “Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the clergy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Metropolia of Kyiv-Halych on the 60th anniversary of the arrest of Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi and the victory over Nazism”78 proves that the end of war did not bring the desired defeat of evil. Husar reminded one of the fact that Yosyf Slipyi’s arrest by the Soviet authorities on April 11, 1945 signified for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the first step in the process of her liquidation, which was accomplished at the Lviv Synod in 1946. The arrest of Slipyi happened only a few weeks before the official termination of World War II. Hence, the end of the war and the defeat of the Germans signified for Ukraine only a change of regimes – from the Nazi to the Soviet one. The celebration of the anniversary of the victory over Nazism was defined by Cardinal Husar as “wholly justifiable because the German Nazi regime posed a serious danger for the whole Europe including Ukraine.”79 Still, the celebration of the victory has a negative connotation as well. It should be rather admitted as a day of prayer and sorrow over the perished in that war than as a day of triumph. Therefore, Husar claims that for Ukrainians World War II “was a struggle on two fronts because our people and our Church as though found themselves in the jaws of two totalitarians systems. The victory over Nazism did not bring the end to the suf____________________ 77

78 79

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Bohdan Chervak, “Chy potribne ‘prymyrennia?” {Is “reconciliation” necessary?}, http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2013/05/8/6989371/ (accessed January 15, 2014). See No. 199. Ibid., 336. Translation from the original source.

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ferings of our people.”80 The Nazi Germany was not yet overcome when Stalin’s regime demonstrated its true face a month before the end of World War II by arresting the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In light of what is said above, the 9th of May, which some celebrate with a feeling of joy, symbolises for Ukrainians the beginning of one more period of persecutions. Liubomyr Husar could legitimately repeat the questions like “Has Ukraine indeed become a free independent country after 1945 and got the opportunity to define her own fate without the Moscow supervision? Did democracy and freedom of speech begin to reign on her territories, did the guaranties of human rights appear, and were the possibilities of a normal development of Ukrainian identity created?”81

Consequently, with her discourse the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church tries to make Ukrainians realise that the Soviet period of their history can be compared to the occupation, a tragedy that obviously shows the celebration of the 9th of May in a different light.82 It is not about neglecting the heroic deeds of those who defeated the Nazi totalitarian regime that wanted to conquer Europe and Ukraine on the basis of its racist ideology, however, the war victory did not eliminate the totalitarian regime in Ukraine.83 This fact should find its place in the picture of Victory Day. In the opinion of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, behind the celebration of Victory Day should stay both a deep feeling of gratitude to those who contributed to the triumph over the Nazis and commemoration of those who were persecuted by the Soviet regime.84 Similarly, on that day Ukrainians should think of their liberation from the communist rule in 1991. Ultimately, both Victory Day and the anniversary ____________________ 80 81

82 83

84

Ibid, 337. Translation from the original source. Ihor Losiev, “Zaruchnyky velykoi nepravdy. Chomu lidery “Batkivshchyny” i UDARu sviatkuiut ukrainsku trahediiu?” {Hostages of the great lie. Why do the leaders of {Ukrainian political parties} “Batkivshchyna” {Fatherland} and UDAR {Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms} celebrate Ukrainian tragedy?}, http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/79664 (accessed January 15, 2014). Translation from the original source. Ibid. Liubomyr Husar, “Den pamiati zhertv politychnykh represii. Utrachena nahoda buty razom” {The Day of the remembrance of the victims of political repressions. Lost opportunity to be together}, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/ 2013/05/31/125040/ (accessed January 15, 2014). No. 199, 337.

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of independence call for prayer and work to finally overcome the consequences of the tragic past and to think about the current needs of the Ukrainian people. The last observation is remarkable. Husar is aware of the fact that different visions of World War II split Ukraine and those attitudes are often misused by the ruling political elite. Thus, by calling people to realise the genuine meaning of the victory over fascism, Husar seeks to put an end to the historical discussions and manipulations and make people concentrate on their present. “Leave the past to God and do what you have to at present” could be another description of this attitude of Husar. Drawing upon such considerations, Husar redefines the meaning of victory. He claims that historians have to study what exactly happened during and after World War II. The author focuses on what happened in the souls of people at that time and which repercussions that has for our contemporaries. Husar considers such an analysis important because “we feel the influence of the past on our presence that is not always positive and beneficial. Therefore, we pray to God that he helps us see the past with the eyes of faith and build our future on this basis.”85 Further, Liubomyr Husar divides the participants or eyewitnesses of the war into four categories according to how they behaved during those tragic events. To the first group belong the people who had enough means to prevent the war but have not done that. To the second category belong those who also executed some authority but because of fear used to serve evil. The third, the most numerous group, consists of the people who were frightened by the powerful evil of this world and who only tried to rescue. Finally, we have to be grateful to God for those from the fourth group – people who were strong enough to oppose evil, who even in the hard circumstances of war made the choice for justice and truth. Only they are worth being called the real winners of the war because “they preserved their human dignity and their faith in God and truth.”86 Hence, Husar defines victory in moral terms. Winners are the people who sustain the truth in all their life circumstances and in that way reveal their human dignity. It is an alternative way to talk about Victory Day where those are usually praised as victors who contributed to the downfall of the Nazi regime. What is the impact of this analysis on modern Ukraine? Liubomyr Husar believes that we can think of a better future only after the faults of the ____________________ 85 86

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Ibid. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source.

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past are overcome. It is necessary to purify the souls from totalitarian heritage and only then can Ukrainians celebrate a real victory. The evil cannot be tamed by means of arms and weapons but by defeating the internal enemy of fear, hate, and desire of vengeance or violence: “One can change the world by respecting dignity of every single person, by treating everyone as equal to oneself, as a creature of God that is endowed with the same of God’s graces.”87 The whole concept of the genuine victory is best expressed in those words of Husar: “The real ultimate victory will become possible when all of us in the strict sense of the word behave in a human way. All other victories are only partial or imaginary and will never bring the real peace.”88 The reinterpretation of World War II, its significance, and its lessons for contemporary Ukrainians is equally to be found in the thought of Sviatoslav Shevchuk. In particular he emphasises that every anniversary of war should be an occasion for the nation to come together in prayer for the victims. Shevchuk denotes June 22, the date of the beginning of war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as a day of sorrow for those perished in the brutal bloodshed. The 70th anniversary of this event has to become a Day of Remembrance and Prayer for Ukrainians who suffered terrible human losses during World War II.89 Next, the author defines who should be remembered on that day. First of all, he mentions Ukrainians and people of other nationalities who perished in Stalin’s camps of death. Then, the Patriarch speaks of the soldiers of the Red Army who were the first to confront the Nazi troops and who lost their lives often left in lurch by their military superiors. Another group of the perished constitute countless civil victims of the Nazi invaders. As a separate group Patriarch Sviatoslav mentions all those who despite exposing their lives to the danger of being executed, managed to rescue fellow human beings, first and foremost persecuted Jews. The name of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi is explicitly mentioned in the first place because his contribution to saving Jews under the Nazi regime was indeed remarkable. Sviatoslav Shevchuk claims that the Jewish rescue actions were not exceptional but elements of a wellorganised plan under the guidance of the great Metropolitan. Last but not least, the criminals from the Nazi and Soviet camps are mentioned. Patriarch Sviatoslav asks for prayers for them who caused so much suffering to ____________________ 87 88 89

Ibid. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. No. 2009.

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Ukraine. “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do” (Lk 23,34) is the prayer that is mentioned in regard to perpetrators. The author of the document calls all the people in Ukraine regardless of their confession to unite their hearts in prayer for the victims of World War II so that the day of June 22 becomes a Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation in prayer and that God saves Ukraine from a similar tragedy in the future.90 Obviously, pointing at the variety of victims and their common sufferings, Sviatoslav Shevchuk desires to draw the entire picture of war instead of its fragmented images that predominate in Ukraine. In a similar way, Yaroslav Hrytsak maintains that instead of solidarity with the heroes of war, Ukrainians should better hold together with its victims or with those heroes who used to save the lives of the victims because ultimately World War II in Ukrainian territories was simply a war between two hostile empires.91 Shevchuk is aware of the competing visions of the war in Ukraine and attempts to suggest a ground for reconciliation. In particular, the war of 1939-1945 and its period dated 1941-1945 – the Soviet-Nazi struggle – is not given any name in “Call of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and all people of good will to prayer on the Commemoration Day of June 22, 2011.” What in the European historiography is called World War II, in Ukraine is referred to with another name of the Great Patriotic War that defines the struggle of 1941-1945. The name applied to the war still causes disputes between the citizens of different parts of Ukraine. In western Ukraine people speak more often about World War II and settle in this way the events of the war in the context of the struggle of nations against the Nazis. At the same time, this title incorporates the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, thus ascribing the fault for the beginning of the war also to the Soviet Union. In the eastern regions of Ukraine the term Great Patriotic War is preferred focusing on the special contribution of the Soviet Union into defeating the Nazis. In this interpretation one omits the guilt of the Soviet state for the outburst of the war in 1939. We presume that Sviatoslav Shevchuk intentionally does not mention any of the common names of the war in order to prevent tensions among Ukrainians who support competing visions. The Patriarch wanted to make his call sound peacefully ____________________ 90 91

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Ibid. Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Viina” {War}, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 138.

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and increase its acceptance by avoiding conflicting elements. His primary message is to describe the war as an event that uselessly deprived people of their lives and where finally all are losers, notwithstanding the camp that the victims might have belonged to. Contrary to the victory rhetoric, the war is labelled a tragedy. In Shevchuk’s opinion, the homage to all the victims of the war and the prayer for the forgiveness of their trespasses must constitute a basis for the reconciliation of the competing interpretations of World War II. According to Shevchuk, what unites the adherents of the different visions of the history of World War II is the memory of its numerous victims. Our contemporaries have to recognise that soldiers of the Red Army, Jews who died in Nazis camps, Ukrainians who perished in Soviet camps, and millions of innocent civilians of any nations who lost their lives during the warfare must be remembered in prayer. The pain of the witnesses still alive should be a unifying factor instead of instigating people to continue the war nowadays.92 The day of June 22 has to become a Day of Reconciliation that will be the best memory of World War II. The accomplishment of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the memories of war can be precisely described by the words of Oksana Smerechanska: “It is necessary to shift accents from victory to memory that opens up ways to reconciliation (it concerns especially national reconciliation of Ukrainian society for the common future).”93 The purification of memory by passing from the discourse of victory to that of memory is one of the most valuable contributions of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church to the discussions on the legacy of World War II.

What others say The interpretation of war by Sviatoslav Shevchuk significantly coincides with the leading ideas of the document called “Historical memory of World War II and spiritual unity of Ukraine” edited by the initiative group “Memory without Aggression.” That document appeared shortly after the ____________________ 92 93

No. 2009. Oksana Smerechanska, “Istorychna pamiat pro Druhu svitovu viinu ta formuvannia ukrainskoi identychnosti u suchasnii Ukraini” {Historical memory of the Second World War and the formation of national identity in present-day Ukraine}, Naukovi zapysky. Seriia kulturolohiia 7 (2011): 198. Translation from the original source.

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already mentioned street riots in Lviv connected with the celebration of Victory Day on May 9th, 2011. In their text the authors, a group of Lviv intellectuals, attempted to define a platform for national reconciliation in Ukraine concerning the memory of war. Their proposal sounds very similar to that of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “We acknowledge that it is not possible to unify forcibly the present memories of Ukrainians on World War II. However, we remain of the conviction that these memories can and should be reconciled by honouring our common victims. One cannot emphasise the pain of some victims and silence the pain of others.”94

Recognising that the commemoration of the victims of war can bring people together, the authors of the address propose to construct on it a platform for national reconciliation: “Our destiny from God and our moral duty before the common victims is to build a shrine of unity and reconciliation on their innocent blood. The spiritual unity of Ukraine is possible and achievable when we respect the pain of each other and entrust ourselves to the God of love and mercy.”95 According to Shevchuk, the memory of all victims of war should unite contemporaries. Thus, the thinking of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church coincided with particular tendencies in society. It is interesting to compare the teaching of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church on the 9th of May with that of the other traditional Christian Churches. In the interview on the topic Dymytrii Rudiuk, Metropolitan of Lviv and Sokal of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, suggested that the most important thing in the memory of World War II is prayer and paying honour to all its victims – soldiers of the Red Army and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, millions of civilians, those who perished in the Nazi and Soviet concentration camps.96 The tragedy of war should be in the foreground of the war memory. Strong Soviet archetypes are still present in the consciousness of many Ukraini____________________ 94

95 96

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Myroslav Marynovych, “Platforma dlia natsionalnoho porozuminnia” {Platform for national reconciliation}, http://zaxid.net/blogs/showBlog.do?platforma_dlya_ natsionalnogo_porozuminnya&objectId=1131824 {accessed August 29, 2012}. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. Dymytrii Rudiuk, “Prymyrennia veteraniv stalo b naivazhlyvishym znakom zavershennia Druhoi svitovoi viiny v Ukraini” {Reconciliation of the veterans would be the most important sign of the termination of World War II in Ukraine}, interview by Oksana Smerechanska, Cerkva.info, http://www.cerkva. info/uk/publications/intervju/1671-vijna.html (accessed January 11, 2014).

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ans and they do not allow people to accept the plurality of the national identifications of the people.97 Metropolitan Rudiuk leaves aside the discourse on victorious Soviet people but defines victory in moral terms: every person has won if he/she has discovered his/her responsibility for the evil created. Very similar messages on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the end of war are conferred by Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The truth must be said about war and its heroes. Both Nazism and Bolshevism are built on the basis of hate towards the human person; the crimes of Stalinism and Nazism have equally to be condemned.98 Patriarch Filaret also defines the moral lesson of war: evil has to be first of all discovered in one’s own soul as everybody carries responsibility for the injustices that happened around. Hence, the real victory means the vanquishing of individual evil: “We will only then overcome evil when we recognise that hate and aggression are our common enemy and when we defeat them in mutual forgiveness.”99 On the contrary, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate focuses on an alternative set of narratives of World War II. Her Head, Metropolitan Volodymyr, speaks about the “Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945,” expresses the confidence that this “feast of the heroes who defeated fascism will live on,” mentions that also the Church “calls to commemorate the heroes and victims of war,” and pleads for special attention to the veterans.100 Thus, not only historians and politicians but also the traditional Ukrainian Churches demonstrate alternative attitudes in their estimation of World War II.101 The Greek-Catholic vision of World War II is very similar to the one being promoted in contemporary Poland. The condemnation of communism and of the Soviet domination is one of the strongest themes in the ____________________ 97 98

Ibid. “Zvernennia Patriarkha Kyivskoho i vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta z nahody 65-i richnytsi peremohy nad hitleryzmom” {Message of Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of victory over Hitlerism}, http://www.cerkva.info/uk/documents/13-documents/319-peremoha.html (accessed January 11, 2014). 99 Ibid. Translation from the original source. 100 “Message of the Holy Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the 65th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/ resourses/church_doc/uocmp_doc/35505/ (accessed January 16, 2014). 101 Bohdan Chervak, “Tserkva i viina” {The Church and the war}, http://www. pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/05/20/5058776/ (accessed January 21, 2014).

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Polish redefinition of the Victory Day celebration after 1989. The 9th of May is currently admitted as Europe Day whilst the termination of war is admitted on the 8th of May. Elzbieta Halas explains that for the presentday Poles the old Soviet Victory Day is “referring collective memory to the end of the Second World War in an inadequate manner – exclusively as a fight against Hitlerism and Fascism, while the end of war with Germany was at the same time the beginning of the communist slavery.”102 The Polish President Kwasniewski expressed himself in a similar way: “But Victory Day was not only rosy for Poland, it did not bring liberation and hope. It was the same for other countries in the region.”103 Exactly this is the key idea of the official messages of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the theme of World War II. Finally, the Greek-Catholic position is different from that of Russia where “the Church has reconciled the Russian attachment to the Soviet state (which is synonymous with victorious power during the Second World War) with the memory of those who died for their faith).”104 Whilst the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church speaks about the crimes of communism as equal to that of fascism, the memory of the victims of Stalin’s repressions in Russia is perpetuated leaving behind the element of crime or criminals: “There are victims of a tragedy whose origin and significance is beyond the reach of public opinion.”105 This comparison of the approach of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the war memory with other actors in Ukraine and abroad confirms that the Greek-Catholics have adopted the western narrative of war that is however not shared by all Ukrainians. Equalising Nazism and communism contributes to spreading the truth about war, and prayers for all the victims and soldiers of both armies should advance the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation.

____________________ 102 Quoted in Horolets, Collective Memory, in The Post-Communist Condition, 51. 103 Quoted in ibid., 59. 104 Kathy Rousselet, “The Russian Orthodox Church and Reconciliation with the Soviet Past,” in History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p., Palgrave, 2013), 50. 105 Ibid., 51.

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The actions The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church not only issued official pronouncements on reconciliation but also organised some activities in order to disperse and promote that idea. This claim is particularly plausible concerning the purification of the memories of World War II. I will briefly sketch some of the activities here to be able to follow how the practical actions inspire, accompany, or elucidate the reconciliation messages of the Church hierarchy. Among its declared tasks the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church indicates the “assisting in the process of reconciliation and peaceful cooperation among people, nations and Churches.”106 By steadily pursuing its initiative “Day of Memory,” the members of the Commission strive to spread “the idea of the need to remember the victims of World War II, and all other wars in Ukrainian history, conducting symbolic actions, ecumenical prayer services, seminars and meetings.”107 The international ecumenical commemoration of the victims of World War II in 2005 was one of the most known initiatives of the Commission. On May 8, 2005 Ukraine admitted the 60th anniversary of the termination of the war. On that day, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church together with the independent cultural journal “Yi” arranged a common ecumenical prayer of the Ukrainian and German bishops for the victims of the warfare at the soldiers’ graves in the village of Potelych. Later the same day, in the Ukrainian Catholic University the Commission organised a round table on the topic “Memory. Responsibility. Reconciliation.” On the occasion of those celebrations with the blessing of the Head of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, Patriarch Liubomyr, the Commission issued the “Open Letter of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church to the Christian Churches of Ukraine on the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of World War II.”108 In 2008-2011, every May 8, the Commission undertook the cleaning of the graves of civilians and German war prisoners at the Yanivskyi cemetery in Lviv thus practically emphasising the element of memory instead ____________________ 106 “Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Justice and Peace,” http:// www.ugcc.org.ua/39.0.html?&L=2 (accessed February 14, 2012). 107 Ibid. 108 No. 2001.

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of victory. 109 The tidying of the abandoned graves was followed by an ecumenical prayer. At the General Assembly of the European Conference of the Justice and Peace Commission held in Kyiv in 2007, the topic of healing the burdened memory in Ukraine, including the memory of war, was addressed during the workshop “Unity in precarious diversity.” A particularly important issue for the Commission remains searching ways to reconciliation between the veterans of the Red Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Liubomyr Husar underscored the core of the problems with veterans in such a way: “The Soviet Army veterans have been for years repeated that the Ukrainian national conscience, a desire of Ukrainians to have their state and those who used to fight for it are enemies. Therefore, they cannot imagine the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as companions in arms.”110 Accordingly, Husar claims the necessity of the state programme that would make it clear that everyone who defended the rights and dignity of Ukrainians are their heroes and veterans.111 Responding to that challenge, on May 7, 2012 the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in cooperation with the Union of Officers of Ukraine conducted a round table “Models of reconciliation and attitude to the past.” The aim of that event consisted in the development of a philosophy of reconciliation and construction of a shared vision of the participation of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Soviet Red Army in World War II. The address to the state authorities was signed where participants called to initiate a peaceful public discussion concerning the reconciliation between Ukrainians who in the absence of their own state used to take different sides during the war.112 Concluding the round table veterans from the opposing ____________________ 109 “Ne Den peremohy, a Den pamiati” {Not Victory Day, but Memory Day}, http:// www.ugcc.org.ua/news_single.0.html?&tx_ttnews%5bpS%5d=1268292152&tx_ ttnews%5btt_news%5d=2826&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=1&cHash=71729e5e 4c (accessed January 21, 2014). 110 Liubomyr Husar, “Viina uviishla v moie zhyttia 1 veresnia 1939 roku, koly na Lviv upaly pershi bomby” {The war came into my life on September 1, 1939 when the first bombs fell on Lviv}, interview by Oksana Smerechanska, Istpravda.com.ua, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2011/05/8/38076/ (accessed August 30, 2012). 111 Ibid. 112 For more details about the round table and the text of the address, consult the website of the Union of Officers of Ukraine: “Uchasnyky kruhloho stolu “Modeli prymyrennia ta vidnoshennia do mynuloho” pidpysaly zvernennia” {Participants of the round table “Models of Reconciliation and Attitude to the Past” signed an

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sides symbolically shook hands as a sign of future reconciliation. By describing those initiatives I intend to confer the importance of symbolic actions for the sensible issue of the healing of memory. Unlike words, actions demand deeper participation and visualise the meaning.

5.1.4.3 Reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church The relations between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarchate, her difficult northern neighbour, are problematic. When reading the official pronouncements of those Churches, it becomes clear that both Churches struggle because of seemingly irreconcilable visions of their joint past and are fighting to divide their spheres of influence in today’s Ukraine. This struggle mirrors the relations between the Ukrainian and Russian states. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church advocates her formula of dealing with the burdened memory in the relations between both Churches. The encyclical Ut Unum Sint suggests that in the process of the purification of memory the Churches must sort out mutual misunderstandings and prejudices, the insufficient knowledge of one another, complacency and indifference, re-examine the common painful past and acquire a truthful vision of things.113 In this paragraph I will elucidate the platform of rapprochement with the Moscow Patriarchate that the GreekCatholic leadership proposes.

Recognition of historical faults The contemporary troubles between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church began at the end of the 1980s during and after the campaign for the registration of the Greek-Catholic parishes. Greek-Catholics demanded the establishment of religious freedom in the Soviet Union and consequently, the official recognition of their existence. The Moscow Patriarchate opposed the transfer of its parishes in western ____________________ address}, http://uoun.wordpress.com/tag/%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC %D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F/ (accessed August 28, 2012). 113 Ioannes Paulus II, “Ut Unum Sint. On Commitment to Ecumenism,” http://www. vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_250519 95_ut-unum-sint_en.html (accessed February 1, 2014).

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Ukraine to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The interconfessional struggle was in full swing. That period of the relations between the two Churches was reflected in the language of their official pronouncements. In comparison with later texts, at the beginning of the 1990s the tone of the official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was more demanding, concrete and straightforward. In particular, this is typical of the style of Cardinal Liubachivskyi. The struggle for the rights of GreekCatholics in the Soviet Union received wide support among the faithful and was elucidated in the mass media. The 100,000 participants at the demonstration in Lviv for the return of the Saint George Cathedral proved that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church had the power to put forward demands. This spirit is reflected in the statements of the hierarchy of the Church. With the weakening of the open interconfessional struggle the language of the official statements became less peremptory, more tolerant and sustained. The definite turn in the language and character of the official documents came in the pastoral letter of Cardinal Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi “About the Unity of the Holy Churches” issued in August 1994. From this message on begins the active promotion of the unity of Churches in Ukraine and the reconciliation with the Moscow Patriarchate. Until that time, the leading topics of the documents had been property conflicts and the strengthening of the identity of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church. The calls towards forgiveness, love, and reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church were a distinctive part of the official statements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church even amidst the most acute struggle. For instance, expressing his great appreciation of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachov and Pope John Paul II on 1 December 1989 that signified the definite turning point in favour of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi assured the importance of “forgiveness, reconciliation and honour to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church.”114 In several messages Liubachivskyi expressed his desire to solve the conflicts between both Churches in the spirit of love, forgiveness and reconciliation115 according to the principle “We forgive and we ask forgiveness.”116 At the same time, the Moscow ____________________ 114 No. 1, 3. Translation from the original source. See also, No. 15, 26; No. 32, 59; No. 5001, 420. 115 See, for instance, No. 3, 5; No. 4, 5; No. 9, 12. 116 No. 6, 7.

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Patriarchate is accused of helping the Stalin regime to liquidate the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946.117 The Lviv Pseudo-Synod is considered a joint action of the communist government and the Russian Orthodox Church and this fact has to be irrevocably recognised.118 GreekCatholics have suffered a lot during the years of underground existence from the Soviet authorities and their brothers in Christ, the Moscow Patriarchate.119 Hence, it is no wonder, that along with offering forgiveness, Liubachivskyi wishes that the Russian Orthodox Church reveals the same respect, love, and reconciliation in the spirit of the Gospel and justice with regard to Greek-Catholics.120 Finally, one should not forget the message of Liubachivskyi from 6 November 1987 where he asked and offered forgiveness to the Moscow Patriarchate and the whole Russian people. This text appeared still before the introduction of religious freedom in the Soviet Union and it was a courageous and forward-looking gesture of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi. However, whilst the forgiveness text of 1987 is a humble plea to reshape the relations between the Churches, the documents issued after the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church put forward demands that the Russian Orthodox Church should recognise her historical faults. At first, Liubachivskyi justifies the return of a great number of faithful to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church from a legal and moral point of view. In particular, the author states that “The reregistration of the Russian Orthodox parishes as the Ukrainian Catholic is not the expulsion of one group of parishioners from their Church by the other, but the confirmation of the fidelity of a particular group of parishioners to the UkrainianCatholic Church.”121 The word reregistration here implies the return of the Greek-Catholic faithful to their roots and to their Church. This should explain to the Russian Orthodox Church that the Greek-Catholics did not appear all of the sudden but that this Church survived the underground and ____________________ 117 118 119 120 121

See, for instance, No. 12, 20. Ibid., 21. No. 15, 26. No. 1, 3. No. 3, 4. Translation from the original source. It is worth noting that in the documents issued in the 1990s the term Ukrainian Catholic Church was used instead of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Such a name was commonly applied by the Church hierarchy in the diaspora. Myroslav-Ivan Cardinal Liubachivskyi returned to Ukraine on March 30, 1991.

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aspires now to get back what their ancestors possessed in terms of both faith and property. On the accusation of the Russian Orthodox Church that the registration of the Greek-Catholic parishes is an intrusion of the state in religious affairs, Liubachivskyi answers by claiming that it is rather the question of exercising the right of religious freedom.122 At the end, the Moscow Patriarchate itself used the Soviet law to register the Greek-Catholic parishes as Russian Orthodox in 1946; Moscow has tolerated and welcomed the interference of the state authorities to regulate the religious affairs until recent times.123 Liubachivskyi reproaches the opponent with an unfriendly and unjust attitude to the Greek-Catholics. The language is strict and straightforward. The Russian Orthodox Church has to recognise that GreekCatholics can exercise their right to religious freedom. It means that there can be no alternative to the official registration of the Greek-Catholic parishes and the relations between the two Churches have to be regulated in mutual dialogue. For the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the fact of the participation of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Lviv Pseudo-Synod remains an impediment to the reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church. The GreekCatholics are still waiting that someone will assume responsibility for the consequences of the liquidation of their Church.124 As we have seen above, the Church leadership does not always emphasise that collaboration; however, coming to terms with this wound of the past is always implied in the analysed documents. ____________________ 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid., 5. 124 Ivan Dacko, “U Yosyfa Slipoho bula dalekohliadnist Andreia Sheptytskoho” {Yosyf Slipyi possessed the foresight of Andrei Sheptytskyi}, interview by Sophia Kochmar, Day.kiev.ua, http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/cuspilstvo/uyosifa-slipogo-bula-dalekoglyadnist-andreya-sheptickogo (accessed January 11, 2014). A strong plea to the Orthodox to recognise their faults regarding the uniate Churches including the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, see in the article Robert Taft, “The Problem of “Uniatism” and the “Healing of Memories.” Anamnesis, not Amnesia,” Logos. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 41-42 (20002001): 155-196. The author reproaches the Orthodox for not having purified their conscience for the destruction of the uniate Churches in an active or passive way during 1946-1950 and for their opposition to the re-emergence of those oppressed Churches when the existence of the Soviet Block was coming to an end. Taft opines that those failures of the Orthodox to reconsider their past “continue to render real ecumenical progress impossible.” (Ibid., 192).

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In the letter to the Patriarch of Moscow on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod Husar is asking the Russian Orthodox Church to reassess her participation in this event. With full confidence Husar claims that the Moscow Patriarchate was acting under the difficult circumstances of the time and was to a certain degree forced to cooperate in the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities. The analysis of the degree of participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in those events should be conducted by the Orthodox themselves.125 Still, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has been waiting for the Moscow Patriarchate to apologise for its sinful subjugation to the totalitarian regime that traumatised the very nature of the Church.126 By claiming that both Churches fell a pray to the communist dictatorship, Cardinal Husar tried to get out of the circle of mutual accusations and found an honourable basis for rapprochement. The letter contains some practical steps to rapprochement as well. Among them is the recognition of the historical mistakes, asking forgiveness and granting pardon, the avoidance of unfriendly actions, looking for the platforms of trust and cooperation on the inter-Church level.127 Ultimately, attaining reconciliation and healing the wounds of the past is possible only through the good will of both Churches. The concise description of the state and perspectives of the GreekCatholic and Russian Orthodox relations one finds in “Conception of Ecumenical Position.” Greek-Catholic hierarchs dedicate a separate paragraph to the relations with the Russian Orthodox Church as those influence the state of the inter-Church relations in Eastern Europe and in the whole Christian world.128 The Lviv Pseudo-Synod burdens the attitude of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Moscow Patriarchate. According to conception, for the fruitful reconciliation dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church several conditions have to be fulfilled.129 First, both sides have to recognise their historical faults in order to eliminate the psychological burden and to leave history to God. Second, a genuine mutual forgiveness is needed for it will free the Churches-opponents from the perpetual reawakening of historical pain. Third, both Churches have to ____________________ 125 126 127 128 129

No. 217, 362. Ibid. Ibid., 363. No. 5003, 58 (No. 4000, 126). Ibid., 59 (No. 4000, 126).

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avoid hostile rhetoric and actions because they contribute to the growth of mutual prejudices and lead to distrust. Finally, both Churches have to look for possible areas of cooperation concerning the pastoral care of the Greek-Catholic faithful in Russia and the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine.

Destruction of Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine In the years that followed the violent phase of the interdenominational conflicts, the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church paid a lot of attention trying to disclose to the world the hollowness of the Moscow accusations that the Greek-Catholics destroyed three dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church in western Ukraine. Until now, the Moscow Patriarchate has declined contacts with Greek-Catholics on the official level under the pretext that those destroyed Orthodoxy in western Ukraine and continue to persecute the Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate in those territories. The card of the sufferings of the Orthodox in western Ukraine has been used in the ecumenical contacts with the Vatican until today. Therefore, in several messages the leadership of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church endeavours to answer those reproaches. For instance, in 2001, Liubomyr Husar published a statement concerning the interview of the Moscow Patriarch Alexius II published in an Italian newspaper answering the accusations that I mentioned above. “We long for unity and love” is the title of this statement of the position of Husar where he explains in detail the history of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Westerners who are not familiar with that Church and who cannot truthfully assess the Moscow rhetoric. Cardinal Husar acknowledges that the Russian Orthodox Church indeed experienced great losses in western Ukraine with the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. From more than 1000 parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Lviv Archdiocese during the Soviet times, at the time of the publication of that text, remained only 47.130 Human and material losses were combined with the negative images that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church131 has because of her allegiance to Moscow that has ____________________ 130 No. 107, 205. 131 Husar speaks about the situation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. She is part of the Moscow Patriarchate and the letter speaks on behalf it its counterpart in Ukraine.

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cooperated with the authorities during Soviet rule. However – and Husar states that explicitly – one cannot speak of the persecution of the Orthodox in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate. The attitude of the local population towards the Russian Orthodox Church nowadays may contain some malevolence; however there are no acts of violence.132 The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not share that attitude, criticises it, and fights against it as much as it can. At this place in plain language Cardinal Husar claims that the hostility of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Greek-Catholics is explained not by its desire to settle the problem of particular cases of interdenominational conflicts but by the longing to renew its lost positions in western Ukraine. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church has always used only general accusations without any concrete facts or has referred to already solved conflicts.133 According to Husar, the strategy of his Church in solving property conflicts consists in the promotion of dialogue between the opponents (sometimes with the assistance of the local state authorities).134 Many conflict situations were settled by sharing one sacral building by the communities of different confessions in turns. Finally, in order to clarify the accusations, Husar invites the Patriarch of Moscow to present his vision of possible solutions to the problem of the interdenominational conflicts with the Greek-Catholics. He calls for the exchange of truthful, non-biased, and by the third side confirmed information about the cases of conflicts on the local level. Husar believes that those solitary cases of conflicts do not have to be brought on the international level because this ultimately harms both Churches. The Christian world is divided not into Catholics or Orthodox but into those who long for unity and those who oppose it.135 As a matter of fact, the Moscow Patriarchate has never answered that or any similar invitation. Still, as some critics from the Greek-Catholic milieu maintain, the issues of the Orthodox parishes in western Ukraine demand a more delicate ____________________ 132 No. 107, 205. 133 Ibid., 206. 134 Ibid. 204. It has to be mentioned that the intrusion of local state authorities in looking for solutions to the interdenominational conflicts has always been contestable and there were indeed cases when the decision was made in favour of the Greek-Catholic community because of the Ukrainian national sympathies of the local authorities. However, those have never been predominant but rather solitary instances. 135 Ibid., 206.

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approach from the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Only Church documents are not enough for a successful promotion of reconciliation; one has to turn from words to action.136 Mykhailo Dymyd upholds that except for the appeals to reconciliation his Church has not yet made concrete gestures that would show her sorrow for the period of the violent redistribution of sacral buildings. Similarly, Antoine Arjakovsky contends that from the side of the Greek-Catholics it would be reasonable to shed light on the violence that took place during their overtaking of sacral buildings in 1989-1992.137 The question must be addressed. During his official visit to Poland in June 2010, Hilarion Alfeyev, the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, claimed that the Russian Orthodox Church recognises the illegitimacy of the defeat of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946,138 but believes that it would have been better to restore this Church at the beginning of the 1990s in a more peaceful way than just taking over the Church buildings.139 The issue of the Orthodox parishes must be addressed in one package with the apology of the Russian Orthodox Church for the Lviv Pseudo-Synod.

The struggle for the patriarchal status of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is challenged by the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate has a stronger lobby and much more possibilities on the international level to promote its own vision of the ecclesial situation ____________________ 136 Dymyd, Reconciliation. 137 Arjakovsky, En attendant, 500. 138 This statement of Hilarion Alfeyev where he practically called unjust the defeat of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was welcomed by a number of GreekCatholic theologians, for instance, Mykola Krokosh and Mykhailo Dymyd, as a first step towards the reappraisal by the Russian Orthodox Church of her role in the fate of Greek-Catholics in the 20th century (“Rosiiska Pravoslavna Tserkva – Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva – nova faza vidnosyn?” {Russian Orthodox Church-Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church – a new phase of relationships?}, Patriarkhat 4 (2010): 24-25). 139 “Mitropolit Ilarion: ‘My dolzhny byt soyuznikami, chtoby truditsya vmyestye na yedinom missionyerskom polye” {Metropolitan Hilarion: “We have to be allies in order to work together on the single missionary field”}, https://mospat.ru/ru/ 2010/06/24/news20890/ (accessed January 23, 2014).

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in Ukraine. This was proved again in the early 2000 when the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church declared her development towards the patriarchal status and the Seat of Metropolitan was transferred from Lviv to Kyiv. The Moscow Patriarchate managed to organise the all-Orthodox opposition to this plan of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Vatican, threatening the latter with the cessation of the ecumenical dialogue.140 The ____________________ 140 February 16-22, 2004 Cardinal Walter Kasper, the President of the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of Christian Unity visited Moscow and met Patriarch Alexis II. Before the visit Cardinal Kasper sent a memorandum where he expressed his vision in favour of the creation of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. The memorandum was negatively received by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church that answered accusing Rome of Catholic proselytism and unfriendly attitude, and threatened to hamper the ecumenical dialogue. Furthermore, during the meeting with Cardinal Walter Kasper the Moscow Patriarch Alexis II accused Greek-Catholics of the lack of gratitude for the spiritual care that they received from the Russian Orthodox Church in the aftermath of the Synod of Lviv in 1946. Subsequently, Patriarch Alexis II traditionally reproached Greek-Catholics with the destruction of three Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine instead of thankfulness. Nowadays, Greek-Catholics are supported by Rome in their desire to be elevated to the patriarchal level which is an absurd idea for Patriarch Alexis II: “Why do they attempt so fervently to transfer the seat of the head of the uniate Church in Ukraine from Lviv to Kyiv and to create a patriarchate? The foundation of the patriarchate will for years put an end to our relations… Sometimes we are told that this {Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church} is an independent Church. No. It is a part of the Roman-Catholic Church that to the full bears responsibility for the actions of the uniates” (“Kommyunikye o vstryechye Svyatyeyshyego Patriarkha Alyeksyeya II s kardinalom Valtyerom Kaspyerom” {Communiqué about the meeting between His Holiness Patriarch Alexis II and Cardinal Walter Kasper}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/ 214.0.html (accessed August 30, 2012). Translation from the original source). A few months before the visit of Cardinal Kasper to Moscow, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew sent a letter to Pope John Paul II conveying his concerns regarding the project of the foundation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Patriarchate (“Lettre du Patriarche œcuménique Bartholomé au Pape Jean-Paul II concernant le projet de fondation d’un patriarcat uniate en Ukraine,” Istina 51 (2006): 200-206). Equally the leaders of other Orthodox Churches univocally expressed their disturbance concerning the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine. The extracts of those responses that deny the idea of the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church appeared on the official website of the Russian Orthodox Church www.mospat.ru. They can also be consulted on the official page of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “Vsye Pravoslavnyye Tsyerkvi nyegativno otsyenivayut pyerspyektivy sozdaniya gryeko-katolichyeskogo Patriarkhata na Ukraine” {All the Orthodox Churches negatively evaluate perspectives of the creation of the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate in Ukraine}, http://www.ugcc.org.ua/211.0.html (accessed August 30, 2012).

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Vatican’s stance towards Moscow provokes a certain suspicion of Ukrainians regarding ecumenism: “Therefore the ecumenical position of the Vatican was criticised not only by Orthodox but even by Ukrainians who were generally pro-Catholic (especially in the diaspora). This was because the so-called Ostpolitik of the Vatican, which lay at the basis of its ecumenical initiatives, was, in the eyes of these Ukrainians, too “pro-Moscow” to be strictly ecumenical.”141

The Moscow Patriarchate does not recognise the ecclesial autonomy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considering her only a constituent of the Roman Catholic Church.142 Consequently, Moscow tries to solve the contesting issues between the two Churches via the Vatican without appealing directly to the Church leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics. In the letter on the occasion of the visit of Cardinal Kasper to Moscow in February 2004, the Greek-Catholic bishops expressed their indignation about the fact that the discussions about such an important development in the life of their Church as a patriarchate were taken not in Ukraine or in Rome but in Moscow without any representative of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church. The authors of the document with confidence claim that they will not turn away from the chosen path to a patriarchate: “Negotiations in Moscow will not obliterate at all this general process of the development of patriarchate that derives from the decisions of the Synod of Bishops of our Church. We chose this course long before and it represents the clear will of the people of God of our Church.”143 This passage answers to the Moscow Patriarch Alexis II who postulated that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is only part of the Roman-Catholic Church and cannot decide herself about the changes of her status. We read in the text: “According to canon law, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is a Church sui iuris and not a constituent of any other Church and, hence, it develops according to its ecclesial nature.”144 Moreover, the GreekCatholic bishops claim that responses of the Orthodox Churches contain expressions that are inadmissible in the ecumenical dialogue, for instance, ____________________ 141 Marynovych, Obstacles on the Road. 142 Anatolii Babynskyi, “Za pretenziiamy z boku Rosiiskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy do ukrainskykh hreko-katolykiv stoiat zovsim inshi prychyny” {Completely different reasons stay behind the claims of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/open_theme/44 340/ (accessed January 13, 2014). 143 No. 5004, 207. 144 Ibid., 208.

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the statement that the Roman-Catholic Church has to diminish step by step the presence of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.145 The threatening of the Vatican with the cessation of the contacts with the Orthodox Churches can be directly regarded as blackmail and a personal insult of the Pope.146 In general, the Greek-Catholic leadership is very disappointed at such a critical reaction because it proves the inability of the Orthodox Churches to solve historical contradictions taking into account the interests of all sides.147 The Russian Orthodox Church opposes the creation of the GreekCatholic Patriarchate considering Ukraine her canonical territory. Interestingly, in his “Unique people of God” where he justifies the creation of a united Ukrainian Patriarchate, Cardinal Husar does not employ the term canonical territory speaking instead about the spheres of influence: interChurch relations “are marked by an inertia associated with schemes and models of the past, which delineated “spheres of influence.”148 It can be averred that Husar consciously desires to make his listeners comprehend that the language of ultimatums in the inter-Church relations has to be changed by a dialogue of partners that presupposes the openness of Churches for the needs of each other. Ultimately, the relations between Churches are also subjected to the natural processes of historical development: “Ecumenical dialogue also supposes that all the participants share one and the same values. In the case under consideration, there is at least one value, religious freedom, which the two sides evaluate in often radically different ways. So the Moscow Patriarchate treats the revival of the Ukrainian Greek- Catholic Church in Ukraine exclusively as a consequence of Catholic proselytism and the interference of the government, giving no consideration to the right of Ukrainian citizens freely to choose their religious affiliation.”149

When will the Patriarchs meet? Contrary to the opposition of the Russian Orthodox and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the pilgrimage of John Paul II to Ukraine in 2001, Car____________________ 145 146 147 148 149

Ibid., 209. Ibid. Ibid. No. 177, 311 (No. 3000, 136). Marynovych, Obstacles on the Road.

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dinal Husar was in favour of a visit of the Patriarch of Moscow Alexis II to Ukraine. In the address that expresses his positive attitude towards it, Husar claims that this occasion could be a chance for the Heads of both Churches to try to solve a number of burning issues. Among them is the peaceful coexistence of Orthodox and Greek-Catholics in Ukraine, the reevaluation of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod of 1946, the settlement of the property claims, or finding solutions to the legal situation of Greek-Catholics in the Russian Federation.150 It is worth mentioning that not a single meeting between the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarch took place even though Greek-Catholics have many a times expressed this wish. Moscow constantly declines invitations, traditionally accusing Greek-Catholics of the defeat of Orthodox dioceses in western Ukraine. Equally Sviatoslav Shevchuk several times expressed his wish to meet Patriarch Kirill, however he has not yet got an answer. In Shevchuk’s opinion, there are many topics to be discussed between the Heads of both Churches, among them also the liquidation of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church.151 As a reaction to this message, Patriarch Kirill benevolently claimed that even though the conflicts between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics have not been solved yet, the relations between both Churches have improved in the last years.152 Shevchuk opines that the Churches should cooperate in view of the challenges of globalisation, liberal secularisation, family crisis, and the decline of traditional morality: “We are certain that we will be able to find ways to heal the wounds of the past by forgiving and asking for forgiveness… We are convinced that the way of reconciliation between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox

____________________ 150 No. 156, 277. 151 “Patriarkh Kyryl ne vidpovidaie Hlavi Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {Patriarch Kirill does not answer the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church}, http://www.unian.ua/news/467225-patriarh-kiril-ne-vidpovidae-glaviugkts.html (accessed January 11, 2014). 152 “Kyrylo: ‘Vidnosyny mizh pravoslavnymy i hreko-katolykamy v Ukraini polipshuiutsia” {Kirill: “Relations between the Orthodox and Greek-Catholics in Ukraine improve”}, http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/11/11/6747624/ (accessed January 11, 2014).

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Chapter V. Healing of the burdened memory Church on the basis of historic and pastoral realism is an effective way of renewal of the dialogue and the formation of a new model of the ecumenical relations.”153

Hence, for the moment the relations of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Moscow Patriarchate remain tense. In fact, not a big progress has been achieved in the last 20 years. Although there are some steps that point at a bigger openness of Moscow to the dialogue with GreekCatholics,154 the general atmosphere of distrust and the accusation of proselytism prevails. The suspicion of Moscow to the canonical plans of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church expressed in the desire to create a patriarchate, the extension of the activity of that Church in the east and south of Ukraine, her good contacts and recognition of the two non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Churches are indicated by the Russian Orthodox Church as obstacles to a possible reconciliation.155 The burden of the historical relations between both Churches weighs down upon them and foments present conflicts. The plan of the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula that was realised by Russia did not evoke any protests from the side of the Russian Orthodox Church and of Patriarch Kirill except his statement on March 2, 2014 that accentuates the closeness of the three fraternal nations of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and appeals not to destroy that prox____________________ 153 “Patriarch Sviatoslav Stresses Priority of Ecumenical Dialogue,” http://risu.org. ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/interchurch_relations/50238/ (accessed January 17, 2014). 154 Some positive changes happened after the enthronisation of Sviatoslav Shevchuk. Among those is the private visit of Shevchuk to Metropolitan Volodymyr, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the positive attitude towards the improvement of the relations with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church expressed by Hilarion Alfeyev, the chairman of the External Church relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. Shevchuk several times expressed his readiness for the reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church according to the example of the Polish and Russian Church in August 2012 (“Sviatoslav Shevchuk: ‘Duzhe b khotiv, shchob Hlava Rosiiskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy pidpysav uhodu pro prymyrennia z Ukrainskoiu Hreko-Katolytskoiu Tserkvoiu” {Sviatoslav Shevchuk: “I would like very much the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church to sign the agreement about the reconciliation with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church”}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/17897-svyatoslavshevchuk-duzhe-b-xotiv-shhob-glava-rpc-pidpisav-ugodu-pro-primirennya-i-zugkc.html (accessed March 28, 2013). 155 “Rosiiska Pravoslavna Tserkva i Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva: Mytropolyt Ilarion (Alfieiev) rozpoviv pro vidnosyny dvokh Tserkov” {The Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) told about the relations of both Churches}, http://religions.unian. net/ukr/detail/8648 (accessed March 28, 2013).

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imity because of different present moment interests.156 Patriarch Kirill did not oppose the politics of the Kremlin of the interference in the internal affairs of the independent neighbouring country. Similarly, the Moscow Patriarchate continues to influence the ecclesial politics of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church through the Vatican. The Russian Orthodox Church needs a thorough examination of her conscience. Still, the Orthodox theologian Andrii Yurash highly praises the GreekCatholic politics of reconciliation: “In Ukraine the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church has demonstrated many gestures of the goodwill to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, that is to the Church that contributed to her liquidation. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has shown the models of reconciliation and understanding that were not known in Ukraine until now. In that way, she testified the high level of Christian virtues and longing for a non-hypocritical peace. For instance, Cardinal Husar a number of times appealed to the Lviv authorities with the plea to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church a building terrain for the erection of a cathedral.”157 The willingness of Moscow and the readiness for forgiveness are needed for the continuation of the dialogue.

____________________ 156 “Obrashchyeniye Svyatyeyshyego Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vsyeya Rusi Kirilla k myestoblyustityelyu Kiyevskoi mitropolichyey kafyedry mitropolitu Chyernovitskomu i Bukovinskomu Onufriyu, arkhipastyryam, pastyryam i vsyem vyernym chadam Ukrainskoy Pravoslavnoy Tsyerkvi v svyazi s situatsiyey na Ukrainye, 2 marta 2014 goda” {Message of His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus Kirill to the locum tenens of the Kyiv metropolitan see, Metropolitan of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna Onufrii, archpriests, priests and all the faithful children of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church regarding the situation in Ukraine, March 2, 2014}, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3588256.html (accessed March 13, 2014). 157 Andrii Yurash, “Tserkovne zhyttia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ye duzhe intensyvnym” {The ecclesial life of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is very intense}, interview, Risu.org.ua, http://risu.org.ua/article_print.php?id=34 648&name=society_digest&_lang=ua& (accessed January 22, 2014). Translation from the original source.

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5.1.4.4 The missing memory of Jews Tony Judt. Why the memory of Jews is absent in Ukraine: the point of view of a historian Ernest Renan has once said: “The essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things.”158 That describes very pointedly the situation concerning the memory of the Jewish presence in Ukrainian territories before World War II. It is not accidental that I quote Renan from the book of Tony Judt. In the epilogue to his masterpiece Post-War. A History of Europe since 1945, this scholar investigates the modern European memory and claims that it was designated around the Holocaust. He helps map specifically the Ukrainian situation within the greater framework of the European history of dealing with the memory of the mass destruction of European Jews in the 20th century. Upon reading Judt, one becomes aware of the complexities of that history and why Ukraine handles the Jewish issue as it does. Judt makes it clear why the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church pronounces herself so little on the Holocaust. Finally, the “Epilogue” to Tony Judt’s Post-War helps us understand why the Churches have to tell more. According to Tony Judt, it is the memory of the Holocaust that builds the common European narrative: “Today the pertinent European reference is not baptism. It is extermination. Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket.”159 In other words, the memory of the Jewish dead constitutes one of the strongest pillars of the shared European history and identity. The European adventures of memory are interesting and ambiguous: from deliberate forgetting in the post-war times (“Forgetting as a way of life”160) to the surplus of memory since 1989 (“institutionalised public remembering as the very foundation of collective identity”161). The construction of that memory “has become the very definition and guarantee of the continent’s restored humanity.”162 Guy Verhofstadt, the former Belgian Prime Minister, expressed himself in a similar way maintaining that the tragedies of the two world wars of the 20th century and the Holo____________________ 158 Tony Judt, Post-War. A History of Europe since 1945 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), 803. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid., 829. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid., 804.

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caust bestowed upon Europe generosity and considerateness.163 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church also tries to come to terms with the memory of war, however contrary to Western European history, the Jewish tragedy does not occupy a great place in Ukraine. The emergence of the Jewish question in the social and political arena in post-war Europe is a long and painful history of total repression until even obsession with that question. In Germany the situation began to change in the 1950s with the trials against the former Nazi officials. Konrad Adenauer’s decision to introduce in the schools the course about the German history of 1933-1945 was dictated by the practical consideration that “The health of German democracy now required that Nazism be remembered rather than forgotten.”164 In general, the history of the emerging awareness of Europeans of their contribution to the Jewish fate during the war times has lasted for years taking even four to five decades until the wide masses have recognised their complicity in the Holocaust. For example, in France until the 1990s, the collaboration of the citizens in the extermination of Jews has been depicted as the exclusive affair of the Vichy regime that does not touch upon the whole French nation.165 The country has waited until 1995 when President Jacque Chirac broke the silence and acknowledged his country’s guilt of collaboration in the Nazis’ plans concerning Jews.166 Before there was no collective French responsibility and no need to work on this page of history on the official level. The situation with the Jewish memory in Eastern Europe differs. This region demonstrates the absence of deep interest in the issue until the 2000s. According to Judt, there are several reasons for that. On the one ____________________ 163 Valerie Rosoux, “Yevropeiska pamiat chy yevropeiski pamiati? Obmezhennia sterylizovanoho i zastyhloho mynuloho” {European memory or European memories? Limits of a sterilised and frozen past}, in Yevropa ta yii bolisni mynuvshyny, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, trans. Yevhen Marichev (Kyiv: NikaTsentr, 2009), 224. 164 Judt, Post-War, 810. 165 Susan Rubin Suleiman speaks about the conscious post-war “Gaullist “hijacking of memory” (as Rousso calls it) in favour of the Resistance during the 1950s and 1960s” in France. This conscious forgetting caused a shock in the 1970s when the truth about the Vichy regime collaboration with the Nazis came out. (Susan Rubin Suleiman, “Amnesia and Amnesty. Reflections on Forgetting and Forgiving,” in Crisis of Memory and the Second World War, ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 222). 166 Judt, Post-War, 819.

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hand, in those countries the extermination of Jews was erased from the historical discourse during the Soviet era, being intentionally dissolved in the suffering of the Soviet people in general without distinguishing any national, ethnic, or religious groups.167 It simply did not officially exist. Consequently, any reflections failed. Still nowadays Soviet historical narratives continue to prevail, the most evident ones in Russia. In that country World War II is the Great Patriotic War, Soviet soldiers and civilians are recognised as the biggest victims of the war, the Red Army is the liberator of European territories, all in all the myths of the great deliverance from German rule still occupy the minds of the Russians.168 On the other hand, “Eastern Europe after 1946 had much more than Western Europe to remember – and to forget.”169 There were many more Jews killed in that part of the world and perhaps many more people collaborated. The war history was permanently present in the public consciousness and emphasised in political discourse, but the fate of the Jews was exempt from that history and silenced.170 For example, under the communist regime the concentration camp in Auschwitz in Poland was rendered as a death camp for different nationalities without mentioning that Jews constituted the biggest part of those gassed. Additionally, for Poles the fate of Jews was competitive with the discourse of their own sufferings under the Nazi occupation: “Three million (non-Jewish) Poles died in World War II; proportionally lower than the death rate in parts of Ukraine or among Jews, but a terrible figure notwithstanding.”171 The third reason for the lacking interest in the Jewish plight during Soviet rule is that communist authorities themselves imposed enough suffering on their subjects which facilitated forgetting the Jewish issue during wartime. According to Sarah Fainberg “In Ukraine, as in other Eastern European countries, this phenomenon has tended to dilute the distinction between perpetrators, victims and bystanders, has empha-

____________________ 167 Judt, The Past Is another Country, in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe, 165. 168 Judt, Post-War, 824-825. 169 Ibid., 821. 170 See the chapter “Stalinist Anti-Semitism” in Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin (n. p.: Basic Books, 2010), 339-377. 171 Judt, Post-War, 823.

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The attitude of the Ukrainian presidents also varies. During the commemoration ceremony of the 50th anniversary of Babi Yar, the first president, Leonid Kravchuk, asked forgiveness for those Ukrainians who share the guilt of the destruction of Jews.173 Viktor Yushchenko acknowledged the Jewish tragic history as part of the Ukrainian one and in his inauguration speech in 2005 he placed the victims of the Holocaust alongside the victims of the Holodomor and the Soviet and Nazi camps.174 However, Yushchenko did not emphasise the particular character of the Jewish destruction and did not initiate the discussion about the Ukrainian collaboration. Finally, president Viktor Yanukovych emphasised the general meaning of the Holocaust in Ukraine for the entire humanity without stressing its particular place in Ukrainian history. Hence, despite the clear tendencies to adopt the western models of the attitude towards the tragedy of the Jews, Ukraine has not established yet its clear-cut norm of the interpretation of the Shoah. Commenting on the specific situation of the marginal interest in the public memory of the Holocaust in western Ukraine Yaroslav Hrytsak makes two additional points. First, “the absence of the memory about Galician Jews is a consequence of the disappearance of this very group.”175 In addition to the extermination of Jews during the war, a great number of them left Ukraine immediately before and in the first decade of the independence of the country. According to the census, the number of Jews in Ukraine between 1989 and 2001 diminished by 21 times.176 Those rare Jews living in Galicia nowadays are descendants of the Jews arriving from eastern Ukraine and Russia after the end of the war. They do not retain the memory of the Galician Jews before World War II. Second, having gained independence, Ukrainians began to regenerate their national memory which they were deprived of during the Soviet era, for instance, the ____________________ 172 Sarah Fainberg, “Memory at the Margins. The Shoah in Ukraine (1991-2011),” in History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer (n. p.: Palgrave, 2013), 99. 173 Ibid., 92. 174 Ibid., 92-93. 175 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Holokost poprostu” {Simply Holocaust}, in Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 246. Translation from the original source. 176 Ibid.

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memory of Stalin’s repressions or of the defeated Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church.177 The memory of Jews is simply not the most important item on the agenda. The unwillingness of Ukrainians to speak about Jews in particular derives from the fact that they have suffered immensely under the Stalin and Nazi regimes.178 Similar attitudes of emphasising the own miseries were typical directly after the end of the war and in the 1950s among other European nations, for instance, Tony Judt points at the example of the Italians.179 Yaroslav Hrytsak shares the opinion of Istvan Deak that Europe has managed to integrate the memory of the Holocaust in its collective narrative, however, the memory of the victims of Stalinism are still excluded as something that could have taken place in an uncivilised Eastern Europe.180 The clear tendency of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to equalise the evil of the Nazi and Stalin regimes to Ukraine proves the double victimisation of the nation. The Church has good reasons for that because for millions the Nazi oppression became the post-war Soviet oppression with labour camps, deportations, imprisonment, and the absolute caesura with the past. In Judt’s opinion, the Church’s equation of both regimes is typical of the eastern European treatment of that issue: “With this post-Communist reordering of memory in Eastern Europe… politicians and scholars started to insist upon such comparisons… Communism was… an all too successful local application of the criminal pathologies of twentieth-century authoritarianism and should be remembered thus.”181 In some eastern European countries the rediscovery of the Jewish memory provoked a shock in society. It happened in Poland in 2002 when Jan Thomas Gross issued his Neighbours,182 a book that describes the extermination of a group of 1500 Jews in a Polish town Jedwabne by Polish citizens under Nazi surveillance in 1941. This book was followed by ____________________ 177 Ibid., 247. 178 The region of Galicia faced the unprecedented extermination of the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish population under Stalin’s and Hitler’s rule. Timothy Snyder estimated the number of civilians who were gassed, shot, and starved in Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, and the Baltic states at around 14 million people. (Snyder, Bloodlands, 379). 179 Judt, Post-War, 807. 180 Hrytsak, Holocaust and Holodomor, in Strasti za natsionalizmom, 259. 181 Judt, Post-War, 826. 182 Jan Gross, Neighbours. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (London: Arrow Books, 2003).

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Gross’ Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz183 that reconstructs and analyses the pogrom of Jews after the end of the war in a Polish town Kielce on July 4, 1946. The fact of the Polish cooperation in the destruction of Jews perhaps evoked the biggest historical discussion that has ever taken place in independent Poland.184 This stirred discussion challenged the hitherto existing paradigm of the national conscience of Poles built on heroism, pride, sufferings under the Nazi and communist regimes, and the struggle for independence. The fact that certain Poles were not only victims but also wrongdoers shattered the existing vision of national history. Paweł Machcewicz, contemporary Polish historian, noted that the most important question that the book of Jan Gross posed was whether the Poles will be able to remember that next to their own history of struggle and sufferings they caused pain to people of another nationality and religion.185 The debate in Poland is completed whereas Ukraine is still waiting for its Jan Gross.

Omer Bartov. The guilt of Ukrainians from the point of view of a Jew The book that in recent years stirred discussions on the fate of Ukrainian Jews was authored by Omer Bartov, one of the leading Holocaust scholars, under the title Erased. Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in PresentDay Ukraine.186 The author represents this group of Jewish historians who emphasise the fault of Ukrainians in the destruction of Jews in cooperation with the Nazi regime. As it follows from the very title of the book, Bartov is of the opinion that the Jewish legacy in the western region of Ukraine, Galicia, has vanished. Ukrainians failed to preserve adequately their historical heritage and continue to lose the last traces of one of the biggest Jewish communi____________________ 183 Jan Gross, Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). 184 Paweł Machcewicz, “Rizanyna v Jedwabne 1941 roku. Dyskusiia pro yevreiskopolskyi konflikt na pivnichnomu skhodi Polshchi za nimetskoi okupatsii” {Massacre in Jedwabne in 1941. Discussion on the Jewish-Polish conflict in NorthEast Poland during the German occupation}, in Yevropa ta yii bolisni mynuvshyny, eds. Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, trans. Yevhen Marichev (Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2009), 165. 185 Ibid., 157. 186 Omer Bartov, Erased. Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

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ties in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Bartov, who in 20032004 travelled across Galicia and visited 20 urban centres in the region, the places that before World War II manifested the Jewish presence are falling into decay. Jewish cemeteries are abandoned and difficult to find because very often they are not marked at all, the same fate concerns the places of mass killings of Jews. Jews are not mentioned on a monument erected on the place of the Yaniv concentration camp in Lviv, and many synagogues are not being restored. At the same time, Omer Bartov reproaches Ukrainians for emphasising the memory of the nationalistic Ukrainian Insurgent Army to the detriment of the memory of other nationalities that inhabited western Ukraine before the war. Bartov claims that Ukrainians care more about the preservation of the public memory of their sufferings under the Soviet and Nazi regimes and forget or diminish those of Jews and Poles. Moreover – and this is perhaps the most important thought in his book – the author postulates that one of the reasons of this disregard of the Jewish issue consists in the fact that Ukrainians were involved in the destruction of Jews during the Holocaust and desire to hide this page of their history. Erased posed a challenge to the Ukrainian historians of Jewish and Ukrainian origins who reacted in different ways to the book. I find it important to mention here some of the commentators of Bartov because already those point at the complexity of the issue that cannot be interpreted in white-black terms. The Israeli-American historian Tarik Cyril Amar agrees with Bartov’s questioning of the Jewish-Ukrainian history during the war mentioning that such a discussion would be very important for contemporary Ukraine.187 Another historian, Christian Ganzer, indicates the shortcomings of the research of Bartov, for instance, the fact that sometimes his extreme one-sided interpretations are connected with his insufficient knowledge of contemporary Ukrainian realities.188 In other words, Bartov visited the sights and museums but did not care a lot about communication with the local people in order to clarify why the Jewish exhibition in a particular museum is being organised in this particular

____________________ 187 Tarik Cyril Amar, “Potribna knyzhka” {A necessary book}, Ukraina Moderna 4 (2009): 288. 188 Christian Ganzer, “Nezvychaini pryhody pana Bartova v kraini…” {Mr Bartov’s extraordinary adventures in the country of…}, Ukraina Moderna 4 (2009): 292293.

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way. Still, Ganzer appreciates the book and believes that after being reworked it can influence a lot the culture of memory in western Ukraine.189 Myroslav Shkandrii, Canadian professor of Slavic Studies, is very critical of Erased, accusing its authors of assuming a traditional Russian, Polish, and Soviet interpretation of the history of the Ukrainian nationalistic movement190 where Ukrainian nationalists are considered as allies of the Nazis in the extermination of other peoples. Bartov “degrades the national dimension of Ukrainian history and fails to see the positive side of Ukrainian-Jewish relations,”191 portrays Ukrainians as inherently hostile towards Jews, does not care about the broader historical context of the region. Still, also Shkandrii agrees that the research of Bartov stimulates the necessary discussion about the Ukrainian involvement in the extermination of Jews during World War II. Finally, I consider the commentary on Erased of the historian Anna Veronika Wendland the most instructive for the attitude that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should adopt concerning the purification of Jews. The author believes that Ukrainians need time in order to come to terms with their collective historical traumas, silencing certain facts, and the unwillingness to talk about crimes that they might have committed during their difficult history.192 Their task at the present moment should consist in “taking an interest in the state of Jewish memorials and discussing this question with Jewish communities in the region.”193 The regulation of the Ukrainian-Jewish relations demands that both sides learn to talk about certain taboos. Ukrainians should become open to discussions like that initiated by Omer Bartov in his book. Yaroslav Hrytsak, one of the most prominent contemporary Ukrainian historians and a promoter of the purification of the national historical memory, is convinced that Ukrainians should recognise that a certain part of their society, for instance, members of the police, indeed cooperated with the Na-

____________________ 189 Ibid., 295. 190 Myroslav Shkandrii, “U poshukakh mynuloho” {Searching for the past}, Ukraina Moderna 4 (2009): 301. 191 Ibid., 310. 192 Anna Veronika Wendland, “Ukrainske movchannia” {Ukrainian silence}, Ukraina Moderna 4 (2009): 317. 193 Ibid., 318.

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zis in the organisation of the executions of the Jewish population.194 The rescuing actions like that of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi were rather seldom and therefore have to be appreciated even more. As a general rule, Ukrainians did not dare help Jews although they were compassionate to them.195 On the other hand, the immediate accusations of anti-Semitism that follow when someone dares talk about Jewish communists do not serve reconciliation.196 Finally, both the Ukrainian collaboration in the destruction of Jews and the Jewish cooperation with the Soviet communists have indeed taken place. Tony Judt and his essay on the European memory demonstrate that a nation cannot become a real member of the European community without having examined its national conscience. For Yaroslav Hrytsak this means that Europe has not yet heard from Ukraine those key words which would confirm that Ukraine is a truly European country, namely words of apology for the contribution to the Holocaust.197 In which way can the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church help overcome this challenge?

Myroslav Marynovych. Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation from the point of view of a Greek-Catholic The fact is that Ukrainians protected, rescued, and helped Jews during the final solution as well as betrayed them to the Nazi police.198 In the circumstances of war, extreme violence, and total decadence of moral values, people demonstrated both the most genuine examples of love to the suffer____________________ 194 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukraintsi v antyievreiskykh aktsiiakh u roky Druhoi svitovoi viiny” {Ukrainians in anti-Jewish actions in the years of World War II}, in Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 95. 195 Ibid., 99. 196 Isabella Hruslinska and Petro Tyma, Dialohy porozuminnia. Ukrainsko-yevreiski vzaiemyny {Dialogues of mutual understanding. Ukrainian-Jewish relations} (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2011), 55. 197 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Movchannia ne po-yevropeisky” {The non-European-like silence}, in Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011), 237. 198 A well-researched article about the different factors and history of the participation of Ukrainians in the Holocaust: John-Paul Himka, “Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during World War II. Sorting out the LongTerm and Conjunctural Factors,” http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje16/text11 .htm (accessed January 24, 2014).

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ing neighbour and the deepest instincts leading to destruction.199 In the opinion of a number of scholars, this would be a balanced vision of Jewish-Ukrainian history in the years of World War II. One of these scholars is an outstanding contemporary Ukrainians philosopher and theologian, Myroslav Marynovych. The issue of the regeneration of the Jewish memory in Ukraine has received attention from a number of scholars; from the Ukrainian side, the most important for this study are Myroslav Marynovych and Yaroslav Hrytsak. The former is one of the most eloquent proponents of reconciliation in Ukraine. He wrote extensively on the reconciliation with Russians, Poles, Jews, and the reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches. The purification of the national memory of Ukrainians is one of his biggest concerns. Additionally, this Greek-Catholic author is perhaps the most consistent promoter of the Ukrainian-Jewish reconciliation. For his contribution to the Ukrainian-Jewish reconciliation Myroslav Marynovych received a prize from the International Society “UkraineIsrael,” a medal “For the Reconciliation between Nations.” He cultivates a friendship with many supporters of the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement, delivered a number of lectures and speeches on the topic, and, as the director of the Institute of Religion and Society, Marynovych organised the first Judeo-Christian seminar in independent Ukraine “The State of the Judeo-Christian Dialogue in the World and in Ukraine” in 1999. His interest in the Jewish-Christian relations is dictated among other things by his desire to help Ukrainians overcome the non-Christian stereotypes in their history because still nowadays many people believe that the current developmental crisis in Ukraine is the fault of Jews.200 The author refers here to the popular belief that Ukraine is in a crisis because there are many persons of Jewish origin in the leading positions of Ukrainian politics and ____________________ 199 Zhanna Kovba has splendidly illustrated this point in the examples of 150 interviews, memoirs, and archive material describing the relations of Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles in western Ukraine during the Nazi extermination of the local Jewish population: Zhanna Kovba, Liudianist u bezodni pekla. Povedinka mistsevoho naselennia Skhidnoi Halychyny v roky “Ostatochnoho rozviazannia yevreiskoho pytannia” {Humanity in the abyss of hell. Behaviour of the local population of eastern Galicia in the years of the “Final solution of the Jewish question”} (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2009). 200 Myroslav Marynovych, “Shchob podolaty stereotyp yudofobii” {To overcome the stereotype of anti-Semitism}, in Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 274.

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economics who exploit the resources of the country and hinder its development.201 His concern over the truth about the Jewish fate in Ukraine flows from his conviction that human civilisation is built on truth, compassion, and sacrifice.202 It is therefore extremely important to discover the truth about the dark pages of the own history in order to develop empathy with those who suffered and the ability to show love to one’s neighbour in need. According to Marynovych, the two biggest crimes that Ukraine faced in the 20th century are the Holodomor of 1932-1933 that aimed at the destruction of the class of Ukrainian peasants and the Jewish tragedy during World War II.203 The truth about both has to be discovered. I may add that while the history of the Holodomor has already occupied its place in Ukrainian historiography and national mentality, the return of the Jewish story in that country has only recently begun. Telling the truth about the Jewish presence in Ukraine during wartime should help develop empathy to them and praise those who put their lives and the lives of their families in danger in order to save a Jewish neighbour. Consequently, Marynovych welcomes the educational projects of the Jewish charity foundation “Hesed-Arieh” in the schools in Lviv where they present the history and culture of Jews in order to regenerate the Jewish memory in this multinational and multicultural city. Marynovych understands that the pointed awareness of their own historical misfortunes hinders Ukrainians from recognising in an appropriate

____________________ 201 Several Jewish and Ukrainians observers pointed at this image of Jews for contemporary Ukrainians, for instance, Yosyp Zisels, Semen Hluzman, Mykola Riabchuk, Vahtang Kipiani (Hruslinska and Tyma, Dialogues, 146,174, 217-218, 269-273). More about this and other typical stereotypes of Jews in the Ukrainian and general East-European consciousness (for instance, the Jewish crucifixion of Christ, the Jewish rule of the world, the economic exploitation of non-Jews by Jews), read in Leonid Finberh, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations. Mythology Substituting for Reality,” Yi 11 (1997), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n11texts/finberg-eng.html (accessed April 11, 2014). 202 Myroslav Marynovych, “Blahodiinytstvo “Khesed-Arie” ta yoho liudynoliubni proiekty. Peredmova do broshury ‘Vidkrytyi dim. Ruka v rutsi” {Charity “HesedArieh” and its philanthropic projects. Introduction to the brochure “Open House. Hand in hand”}, in Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 92. 203 Ibid.

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way the genocide of Jews in Ukrainian territories.204 Self-perception as the greatest victim of history is typical of many nations. I have already emphasised in this book that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church occasionally refers to the feeling of victimisation, which is very distinguishing for Ukrainians. Marynovych equally warns against extolling the sufferings of the own nation above the tragedies of others. The philosopher calls for the sensibility for the tragedy of every nation, because quoting Alain Besançon “The temptation to judge one death as innately more terrible than another must be resisted: no death can be seen from the inside. No one can know what a child experienced while inhaling Zyklon B gas or while starving to death in a Ukrainian isba.”205 Marynovych explains in an interesting way a certain daily antiSemitism in Ukraine expressed in a form of suspicion of the Jews. Among Ukrainians the conviction of Judeo-bolshevism (Judeo-communism)206 was strong. Historically Ukrainians have always believed that Jews allied with the enemies of the Ukrainian nation thus holding an anti-Ukrainian position. Additionally, Jews were depicted as exploiters of the Ukrainian people due to their specific occupations. A number of contemporary ____________________ 204 Myroslav Marynovych, “Tse potribne zhyvym!” {Those living need it!}, in Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 235. 205 Besançon, A Century of Horrors, 10. 206 Judeo-communism in the Polish example which equally reflects the Ukrainian reality confers the belief that “Jews en masse supported Communism in Poland before the war and made up a vast majority of its adherents, while after the war they enjoyed a privileged position in the regime and benefited from it while imposing it on everybody else” (Gross, Fear, 192).The accusations of Jews in Judeo-communism are very typical of Eastern Europe. The conflict around the planned Carmelite convent and a cross erected by the fence of Auschwitz in Poland in 1998-1999 has one more time showed this in the Polish example. The big cross and many small crosses around it raised during the debate evoked protests from Jewish organisations and accusations of the attempt of the Christianisation of Auschwitz. During the debate where the Church, the state, Jewish organisations, and regular Poles were involved, the mutual Polish-Jewish accusations were repeated including that of Judeo-communism oppressing the Poles. For instance, a banner was hung by the fence of Auschwitz with the inscription “Polish Holocaust by Jews (1945-1956)” (more about the conflict of the crosses, see in the article by Imke Hansen, “In the Name of the Truth One Has to Say…’ AntiSemitic Statements in the Memorial Discourse about the Crosses in Auschwitz,” in The Post-Communist Condition. Public and Private Discourses of Transformation, eds. Aleksandra Galasinska and Dariusz Galasinski (Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 67-87).

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Ukrainian oligarchs of Jewish origin serve for many as the modern embodiment of Jewish evil.207 Instead, Jews typically perceived the Ukrainians as a nation casing pogroms and believed the Ukrainians to be organic anti-Semites. Hence, Marynovych explains the Ukrainian animosity to Jews by different models of the historical survival of the two peoples.208 Throughout history, Ukrainians used to suffer from occupants on their native lands. Jews as dispersed people learned to survive by making alliance with the stronger side on particular territory; hence, they used to support also the foreign forces that ruled in Ukraine. That explains the animosity of Ukrainians to Jews that in the course of history even acquired the form of pogroms. Additionally the current latent anti-Semitism was hastened during World War II by the deliberate anti-Jewish politics of Stalin. This helps us realise the complexities of the Ukrainian-Jewish reconciliation. Being aware of those challenges should help the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church speak plausibly about the purification of historical memory with regard to Jews. Concerning the troubled and seemingly irreconcilable memories of both nations Marynovych shares the idea of “the double vision” of Miroslav Volf and Robert Schreiter. Marynovych substantiates the revelation of the historical truth and at the same time goes further than that: he calls the Jewish and Ukrainian nations to see themselves with the eyes of the other. Perhaps that strategy would help reconcile the exclusive versions of the common history.209 Both nations “have survived terrible catastrophes, and ____________________ 207 Hruslinska and Tyma, Dialogues, 217-218. 208 “Rozmova z Myroslavom Marynovychem pro ukrainsko-yevreiski stosunky” {Conversation with Myroslav Marynovych on the Ukrainian-Jewish relations}, in Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 436. 209 How difficult it is to draw conclusions about the people’s actions and how important it is to see the world with the eyes of the other, the enemy, shows the film “Three Stories of Galicia” produced in 2010. In the film people of different nationalities and religions in western Ukrainian region Galicia are shown in their disastrous situation: “A Jewish man whose family chose to save the life of its worst enemy. A Ukrainian woman who endured the theft of her children to save her country. A Polish priest who risked everything to end the sectarian hatred that tore at his parish… In their quest to rule the world, those two empires {the Soviet and the Nazi} made use of the ethnic jealousies between Ukrainians, Jews and Poles, and fueled some of modern history’s worst ethnic conflicts. But in the midst of evil, where trust had lost its meaning and human life had no value, there were those who were willing to risk what little they had left to do what was right

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the shrivelled corpses of Auschwitz are not more dreadful than the shrivelled corpses of the times of the Holodomor (and vice versa). And the scales to compare the national harms are in the hands of God but not in those of the crowd blinded by rage.”210 Myroslav Marynovych calls to abandon the struggle against anti-Semitism in Ukraine as it is often perceived by Ukrainians as being against their national interests and historical pain. This position may seem strange given the essentially undiscovered history of the Jewish presence in the Ukrainian territories before World War II. Still, the author does not call for historical amnesia. After all, it is Myroslav Marynovych who is a well-welcomed speaker, attendant, and organiser of the joint Ukrainian-Jewish events, the editor of a number of books on the Jewish-Christian dialogue whose appreciation of the Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement originates in his dissident past in the camps of the Gulag. Marynovych only claims that the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and the reassessment of its history will help overcome the negative stereotypes of the Jews. However, the Jews have to perform the same work with regard to Ukrainians, since reconciliation is a mutual process. Seeing only the guilt of the other while remaining sure of one’s own innocence will make reconciliation void.

The controversy on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi The figure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, his actions for rescuing Jews during the Nazi persecution, and the issue of his recognition as a Righteous one among the Nations occupies a particular place in the GreekCatholic stance on the Jewish issue. The great Metropolitan managed to organise a network for rescuing Jews in the monasteries of his Church, in particular on the basis of the Studite monastery of the Holy Transfiguration under the supervision of Klyment Sheptytskyi, the brother of the Metropolitan. Jewish children were concealed in the monasteries by nuns and monks and thus got a chance to survive. Several of those rescuers were recognised by the Jewish community as the Righteous among the Nations ____________________ instead of what was easy.” (“Synopsis of Three Stories of Galicia,” http:// www.threestoriesofgalicia.com/synopsis/ (accessed January 23, 2014)). 210 Marynovych, Ukrainian-Jewish relations, in Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi, 115. Translation from the original source.

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which is however not the case of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi who himself hid 150 Jewish children and 15 adults in his metropolitan palace in Lviv.211 The Jewish community explains the unwillingness to grant Sheptytskyi that title by his welcoming address directed to the Nazi troops as they entered the city of Lviv in the summer of 1941.212 The accusation of the collaboration of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi with the Nazi invaders weighs upon this person still nowadays overshadowing otherwise one of the greatest leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Leonid Finberg, the Head of the Centre for Studies of History and Culture of East European Jews in Kyiv, characterised the great Metropolitan with the following words: “Society has not yet appreciated enough his intellectual heritage and his organisational talent as the leader of the nation. Equally, we have not yet paid enough tribute to the readiness for sacrifice of the Metropolitan and his nearest entourage for rescuing Jews during World War II.”213 His beatification process has been running since 1955. Several Greek-Catholic and Jewish scholars as well as Jewish survivers have attempted to correct the indiscriminate vision of the biography of Sheptytskyi.214 A number of contemporary Ukrainian and Jewish intel____________________ 211 Hrytsak, Ukrainians in anti-Jewish actions, in Strasti za natsionalizmom, 99. 212 Shimon Redlich, one of the rescued Jews, defends the case of Sheptytskyi before Yad Vashem and defeats this and other arguments against the non-recognition of the Metropolitan. According to Redlich, Sheptytskyi is reproached for the following: he supported the Ukrainian division “Galicia” that used to fight on the Nazi side; as the leader of the nation at the time of war, Sheptytskyi is responsible for crimes committed by Ukrainians; although he rescued certain Jews, those actions were only second-rate for him; additionally, he was not personally in danger while helping Jews; Sheptytskyi has never spoken publicly in defence of Jews; the Metropolitan also sometimes expressed anti-Semitic sentiments; Sheptytskyi has not stopped the crowd in Lviv from the destruction of Jews at the first days of the arrival of the Nazis; the Metropolitan was an ideological ally of Hitler; and finally, Sheptytskyi hated the Soviets and they used to rescue Jews. (Shimon Redlich, “Moralnnyye printsypy v povsyednyevnoy dyeystvityelnosti: mitropolit Andrey Shyeptitskiy i yevryei v pyeriod Holokosta” {Moral principles in daily life. The Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and the Jews in the period of the Holocaust}, http://www.jcrelations.net/Сторона.3180.0.html?L=7 (accessed November 3, 2013)). 213 Leonid Finberg, “Danyna nashoi poshany” {Tribute of our reverence}, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 1941-1944, eds. Zhanna Kovba and Andrii Krawchuk (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2003), 313. Translation from the original source. 214 The following authors are worth mentioning: Kurt Lewin, A Journey through Illusions (n. p.: Fithian Pr, 1997); Shimon Redlich (in a number of articles and in-

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lectuals (Myroslav Marynovych, Zhanna Kovba, Leonid Finberg, Andrii Kravchuk, Shimon Redlich) plea for the recognition of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi by Yad Vashem as the Righteous among the Nations. Equally, Sheptytskyi deserves to be beatified by the Vatican in order to serve as an example of practical love for one’s neighbours and for the sake of the establishment of the historical truth. Even the Ukrainian state itself has not yet officially admitted the particular role of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi in rescuing Jews. The issue remains politicised too much even though a solid basis of witnesses has been gathered that confirms the solicitousness of Sheptytskyi in the fate of the Jews. It seems that the recognition of the merits of the Metropolitan towards the Jews will influence the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Therefore, I will briefly sketch here several phases of the Metropolitan’s attitude towards the Nazis in order to shed light on this controversial page of his life. The story of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi shows that even persons of this moral value can get lost in the cruel perturbations of history. The attitude of Sheptytskyi towards the Nazis confirms that conclusion. In particular, official pronouncements and attitudes of the Metropolitan prove that he underwent a change in his attitude towards the German invaders. In 19391941, Galicia in the west of contemporary Ukraine was submitted to the ____________________ terviews, for instance: Shimon Redlich, “Sheptytskyi zaperechuvav rasystske myslennia” {Sheptytskyi denied racist thinking}, interview, Istpravda.com.ua, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2011/03/3/28812/ (accessed October 8, 2013)); Zhanna Kovba (in numerous articles and interviews, for instance: Zhanna Kovba, “Sheptytskyi faktychno ocholyv yedynu v Yevropi orhanizovanu aktsiiu riatuvannia yevreiv” {Sheptytskyi practically led the only organised European action of rescuing Jews}, interview by Tetiana Lutsyk, Risu.org.ua, http://risu. org.ua/ua/index/ideas/interview/32551/ (accessed October 8, 2013)); Myroslav Marynovych (in a number of articles and presentations, for instance: Myroslav Marynovych, “Postat Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptytskoho u neliniinomu prostori istorychnoho chasu” {The figure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi in the nonlinear space of historical time}, in Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 410-417); Julian Bussgang, Mytropolyt Sheptytskyi. Shche odyn pohliad na zhyttia i diialnist {Metropolitan Sheptytskyi. One more view on his life and actions}, trans. Roman Skakun (Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2009); Andrii Krawchuk, “Sotsialne vchennia ta diialnist Andreia Sheptytskoho pid chas nimetskoi okupatsii” {Social teaching and action of Andrei Sheptytskyi during the German occupation}, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 1941-1944, eds., Zhanna Kovba and Andrii Krawchuk (Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2003), 224-281.

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Soviet occupation. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi, residing in the city of Lviv, at the centre of the crimes of the new power, was deeply impressed by this cruel atheistic rule and hence the arrival of the German troops in July 1941 was appreciated as a liberation. Only later did Metropolitan Andrei realise the horror of the Nazi rule, and his criticism of certain aspects of this regime evolved into his complete opposition to it.215 The evolution of the attitude of Andrei Sheptytskyi towards the German occupants is evident in his pastoral letters, decrees, and letters to the Vatican. It is instructive to refer to some of them more in detail. As already mentioned, with the arrival of the Nazi troops in Lviv in July 1941, Metropolitan Andrei issued two important letters; one of them encumbers his recognition as a Righteous one among the Nations. On June 1, 1941, Sheptytskyi greeted the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian state216 which became possible at the withdrawal of the Soviet army.217 A few days later, on June 5, 1941, the Metropolitan issued a letter that welcomed the Germans in Lviv: “We greet the victorious German army that has already occupied almost the whole land with joy and gratitude for the liberation from the enemy.”218 However, it is worth noting that the new authorities were accepted by Sheptytskyi under the condition that their rule was just and did not contradict the Gospel. The Metropolitan ____________________ 215 Krawchuk, Social teaching and action, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 232. 216 As a proof that Sheptytskyi aspired and supported the establishment of a statelike organisational body for the Ukrainians (for instance, political autonomy) serves his pastoral letter issued in December 1941 where the Metropolitan elucidates the Christian principles of the independent state: “Pastyrske poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do dukhovenstva ta narodu Nasha derzhavnist (Idealom nashoho natsionalnoho zhyttia…)” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to the clergy and nation “Our Statehood” (The ideal of our national life…}, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn et al. (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 131-158. 217 “Pastyrske poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do virnykh z nahody proholoshennia Ukrainskoi derzhavy” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the faithful on the occasion of the proclamation of the Ukrainian state}, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn et al. (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 114-115. 218 “Pastyrske poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do dukhovenstva i virnykh iz pryvodu vyzvolennia Halychyny z-pid radianskoi okupatsii” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the clergy and faithful on the occasion of the liberation of Galicia from the Soviet occupation}, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn et al. (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 116. Translation from the original source.

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called the people to obey the new state authorities as long as their orders corresponded to the law of God.219 However, already after a few weeks of the Nazi rule, it became clear that the German authorities had nothing to do with the just and wise order. The Ukrainian dream of political autonomy was destroyed when Galicia became part of the General Government and the amplitude of violence was only growing. At that period Sheptytskyi released two pastoral letters in which he indirectly criticised the new state powers and addressed the issue of the duty to defend human life. In the pastoral letter “On mercy” (May 1942) the author did not only refer to mercy as charity, but also spoke about the pain of the father whose son sheds innocent blood220 (a reference among other things to those who cooperated with the Nazis in mass killings), taught that the love for one’s neighbour does not stop even before giving one’s life for him,221 or warned against the crime of murder.222 In November 1942, there appeared a pastoral letter and later a decree under the title “You should not kill”223 in which Sheptytskyi openly defended the sanctity of human life and condemned different sorts of killings, including political murder exercised by the Nazis. This document was allowed for publication after being censured by the Nazi authorities. Finally, Sheptytskyi came to the conclusion that the German rule in its scale of destruction and extermination was even worse than the Soviet one. In his letter to Pope Pius XII, the Metropolitan called the Nazis a diabolical system of “lie, deceit, injustice, robbery, distortion of all the ideas of civilisation and order… It cannot be anything other than the degeneration of humanity that has never ever happened in history.”224 Furthermore, ____________________ 219 Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the faithful on the occasion of the proclamation of the Ukrainian state, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 114. 220 “Pastyrske poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia do dukhovenstva ta virnykh pro myloserdia” {Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei to the clergy and faithful on mercy}, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn et al. (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 208. 221 Ibid., 209, 220. 222 Ibid., 220. 223 “Dekret Mytropolyta Andreia ‘Ne ubyi” {Decree of Metropolitan Andrei “You shall not kill”}, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944, eds. Mykhail Hrynchyshyn et al. (Lviv: Artos, 2010), 541-550. 224 The letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to Pope Pius XII, August 29-31, 1942, quoted in Krawchuk, Social teaching and action, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 235. Translation from the original source.

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Sheptytskyi even desired the return of the Soviet rule which he announced in his letter to Cardinal Tisserant in March 1944: “Maybe the arrival of the Bolsheviks will be useful in this sense that it will terminate the anarchy that rules now in all the land.”225 This criticism of the Nazi authorities was coupled with the organisation of the networks for rescuing Jews among the clergy and in particular in the monasteries of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church.226 There are also testimonies that Sheptytskyi sent a personal letter to Heinrich Himmler directly protesting against the destruction of Jews and the involvement of the Ukrainian police in such actions.227 Yaroslav Hrytsak opines that Metropolitan Sheptytskyi was the only Church leader of this rank at that time who dared openly stand for the rescue of Jews.228 His appeal failed, and therefore letters and reports to the Vatican for help, the secret rescuing of Jews,229 and the plea to the Ukrainians to abstain from the extermination was all that remained at his disposal. The facts above should reveal why the recognition of the contribution of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to the rescue of Jews is so important for the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. It is about the Church heritage that is still underestimated. That brings us closer to the final point of interest in the discourse on the Jewish question and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. I will now present those scarce appeals to the theme of JewishUkrainian relations that are to be found in contemporary Church documents. ____________________ 225 The letter of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to Cardinal Tisserant “L’approche des bolchéviques,” March 23, 1944, quoted in Krawchuk, Social teaching and action, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 235. Translation from the original source. 226 Ibid., 256-258. 227 Krawchuk, Social teaching and action, in Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy, 251. There are no copies of this letter preserved. Kurt Lewin, a Jew rescued by Sheptytskyi, has testified to have seen the letter to Himmler in the archives of the Metropolitan in 1943-1944. (Ibid., 275-276). 228 Hrytsak, Ukrainians in the anti-Jewish actions, in Strasti za natsionalizmom, 101. 229 Probably the most valuable and enlightening testimony of this rescuing campaign of Sheptytskyi comes from the son of the Lviv Rabbi, Kurt Lewin, who survived because he was saved by the Metropolitan in his palace. Lewin elucidates the details in his biographical book: Kurt Lewin, A Journey through Illusions (n. p.: Fithian Pr, 1997). Ukrainian translation: Kurt Lewin, Mandrivka kriz iliuzii {A journey through illusions}, eds., Zhanna Kovba, Leonid Finberg, and Myroslav Marynovych (Lviv: Svichado, 2007).

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The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Jewish-Ukrainian relations The actions Even though the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has not pronounced a lot on the Jewish issue, she introduced and supported a number of initiatives directed at the re-emergence of the discussion on the UkrainianJewish relations. Zhanna Kovba, contemporary Ukrainian historian, highly estimates the contribution of the Ukrainian Catholic University, the most important educational and scientific establishment of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, to the promotion of the Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue.230 It is worth mentioning some initiatives at that place. At first, the Institute of Religion and Society of the Ukrainian Catholic University issued a number of publications in order to steer a discussion on the controversial Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Myroslav Marynovych, the director of the Institute, cooperated in the Ukrainian translation of Kurt Lewin’s A Journey through Illusions, which among other things describes Lewin’s rescuing by Metropolitan Sheptytskyi in his metropolitan palace and later in the Studite monasteries. Still in 1999, the Institute of Religion and Society organised the first Judeo-Christian seminar in Ukraine where the Jewish community was represented at the highest level by the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Yaakov Bleich and the Ukrainian delegation was headed by Liubomyr Husar.231 The Ukrainian Catholic University cooperates with the leading Jewish organisations such as the Tkuma Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies232 in Dnipropetrovsk and “Hesed-Arieh”233 in Lviv. In particular, the researchers of the Ukrainian Catholic University together with the Liubomyr Husar participated in the international scientific conference of the “Tkuma” Centre “Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi: the dilemma of the humanistic choice in conditions of totalitarian regimes.”234 ____________________ 230 Hruslinska andTyma, Dialogues, 54. 231 In the aftermath of the seminar a booklet was published containing the speeches of the participants and the most interesting issues of the discussions: Myroslav Marynovych and Leonid Finberg, eds., Yudeo-khrystyianskyi dialoh v Ukraini (stenohrama seminaru 19-20 kvitnia 1999 roku. Lviv, Lvivska Bohoslovska Akademiia) {Judeo-Christian dialogue in Ukraine (shorthand record of the seminar 1920 April, 1999. Lviv, Ukrainian Theological Academy} (Lviv-Kyiv, 2000). 232 Tkuma Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies: http://tkuma.dp.ua/. 233 Jewish Home “Hesed-Arieh”: http://www.hesed.lviv.ua/. 234 Some materials of the conference can be consulted in “Materialy mizhnarodnoi naukovoi konferentsii Tsentru “Tkuma” ‘Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi: dylema

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Additionally, the “Tkuma” Centre and the Ukrainian Catholic University belong to the organisers of the international Polish-Jewish-Ukrainian youth seminar “Kovcheh” (“The Arc”) that aims at the reconciliation between those three nations and was held for the eighth time in 2013. Another project aiming at the education against xenophobia is the yearly all-Ukrainian international children’s camp “The Sources of Tolerance” directed by Josef Zisels, a Jewish public leader, under the support of the Ukrainian Catholic University. The deeds are there, however the question remains why the Jewish issue is almost absent in the Greek-Catholic official pronouncements. What does the Church say?

The Church documents For Primo Levi only individual guilt matters, because public guilt is no guilt at all. The author is against the Churches asking for forgiveness for the anti-Semitism in the name of the whole people. That makes Giorgio Agamben criticise the Churches for showing not enough enthusiasm in disclosing how her own priests contributed to the fuelling of anti-Jews sentiments among the people.235 The absence of the criticism of Pope Pius XII who failed to defend the Jews is a sign of the inability of the Catholic Church in dealing with her past. According to Levi, it is a lie when the perpetrators say that they have not seen the pain and death that they have caused to the Jews.236 The demands of the survivors of the Holocaust are understandably high. How should the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church react in view of this accusation in her own context? The references to Jews and the Ukrainian-Jewish relations are very rare in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In the analysed texts I discovered only 6 such allusions. In 2002, speaking about the innocent blood that during history was shed on the streets of the ____________________ humanistychnoho vyboru v umovakh totalitarnykh rezhymiv” {Materials of the international scientific conference of the “Tkuma” Centre “Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi: dilemma of the humanistic choice in conditions of a totalitarian regime”}, Problemy istorii Holokostu 4 (2006): 76-151, http://tkuma.dp.ua/images/ stories/jurnal/z4.pdf (accessed October 8, 2013). 235 Giorgio Agamben, Was von Auschwitz bleibt. Das Archiv und der Zeuge, trans. Stefan Monhardt, 5th ed. (n. p.: Suhrkamp, 2013), 82. 236 Primo Levi, I sommersi e i salvati (Torino: Einaudi, 2003), 16.

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city of Lviv, along the victims of the Soviet occupation and the PolishUkrainian resistance Cardinal Husar mentions Jews as victims of the Holocaust.237 Consequently, Husar calls for purification and reconciliation. In 2005, commenting on the importance of the reconciliation act between the Catholic bishops of Ukraine and Poland, the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops emphasises that the Ukrainian people should begin to work for reconciliation with their other historical neighbours: Russians, Hungarians, Byelorussians, Crimean Tatars, Rumanians, and among others, Jews.238 Husar warns against committing violent acts against other peoples, and in case the others offend Ukrainians, those latter should abstain from answering in an equally unjust way. Finally, the past should not poison the present, and one’s own rights cannot be sustained to the detriment of the rights of another nation. In the address on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, the Greek-Catholic Synod of Bishops reminded one of the “ecumenism of the Gulag” as a symbol of spiritual unity between different nations including the Jews that should lay at the foundation of the presentday relations between peoples.239 Finally, Jews are mentioned twice in the context of the rescuing actions of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi. The Metropolitan is a courageous leader who “protected the holiness of human life, appealing with letters to the leaders of Nazi Germany and organising an action to rescue Jews.”240 In another text, already Sviatoslav Shevchuk calls to remember those who despite danger saved their neighbours including Jews; such heroic actions were not solitary, but part of the separate rescue campaign initiated and realised by Metropolitan Andrei.241 The only document in which the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church explicitly speaks about the Jewish memory is “Declaration of the AllUkrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations “Knowledge of the past – way to the future” from 2012. Together with other denominations the Greek-Catholics call to study the tragic pages of the Ukrainian history of the 20th century including the Holodomor, Stalin’s repressions, the Holocaust and other crimes of the Nazi occupational regime, and the forced deportations.242 It is remarkable that in this text the extermination ____________________ 237 238 239 240 241 242

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of the Jews is portrayed as part of Ukrainian history. However, the declaration ascribes the fault to the Nazi regime and does not mention anything about the cooperation of Ukrainians themselves. Still, the very call to study the Holocaust is a positive distinctive development. The declaration also mentions and praises the contribution of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and other heroes in rescuing the Jews.243 The Orthodox Churches in Ukraine also demonstrate only scarce references to the issue of the Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Interestingly enough, in 2012, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate maintained that it would be reasonable to remove the character of the Jew, zhyd, from the traditional Ukrainian Christmas puppet and theatre play called vertep where Jews are represented as liars who strive to deceit simple Ukrainian farmers:244 “The use of a grotesque offensive image of the “Jew” in Nativity plays is incongruous in the context of the UkrainianJewish dialogue.”245 In 2011, an almost identical initiative came from the side of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In the time before Christmas, this university issued a message calling to find out a new personified embodiment of usury, corruption, love for money, perfidy in the Christmas vertep instead of the traditional figure of the Jew.246 Hence, those two messages are the first Church appeals to change the stereotypic Ukrainian image of Jews. Earlier, in September 2010, Bishop Ionafan Yeletskykh of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate appealed to the Ukrainian people that they should make an apology to the Jews for pogroms committed during the rebellion against the Polish rule under the guidance of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648-1654.247 In his message, Bishop Ionafan compared those pogroms with the Holocaust. ____________________ 243 Ibid. 244 “Patriarkh Filaret vvazhaie nedorechnym vykorystannia u postanovtsi rizdvianykh vertepiv obrazu ‘zhyda” {Patriarch Filaret considers it inopportune to use the character of “Zhyd” in the staging of Christmas verteps}, http://risu.org.ua/ ua/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc_kp/49455/ (accessed November 3, 2013). 245 “Patriarch Filaret to Visit Lviv Eparchy,” http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/ orthodox/uoc_kp/49455 (accessed January 24, 2014). 246 Borys Gudziak, Yurii Shchurko, and Myroslav Marynovych, “U nashu khatu znovu uvirvetsia vertepnyi zhyd” {The Jew from vertep will burst again into our homes}, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2011/12/19/65501/ (accessed November 3, 2013). 247 “Vladyka Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy zaklykav pastvu do pokaiannia za ‘masovyi etnotsyd yevreiv chasiv hetmana Bohdana Khmelnytskoho” {The Bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church called his flock for an apology “for the

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It is plausible to claim that the words of asking and offering forgiveness to any nation offended by Ukrainians, pronounced by Liubomyr Husar during the Pope’s visit to Ukraine in 2001, are also directed to the Jews. On the other hand, this message is too general to be perceived as a particular apology for the Ukrainian wrongdoings against Jewish people. Still, especially the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has the mission to address the issue. It is her Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi who in the circumstances of his time attempted to save Jews. In that sense, GreekCatholics have a tradition to continue. Besides, this Church is the leading denomination in western Ukraine, a territory greatly populated by Jews before the war whose memory has been predominantly lost. Because the Church endeavours to establish the moral truth of the past considering this as a key to changing the future, she cannot leave the Jewish memory aside. I opine that this topic could be organically intertwined with the discourse on the purification of the memory of World War II. As the Church calls for prayer for the victims of war, she could ask for prayer for those who committed crimes with regard to their neighbours during the perturbations of war, mentioning among others also Ukrainians involved in the destruction of Jews. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church would contribute in a double way to the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement: first, by integrating the memory of Jews into the historical memory of Ukrainians; second, by telling the truth about the past and eventually apologising for committed wrongdoings. The discourse on the purification of memory in Ukraine would remain incomplete if the Jewish question is not touched upon. Contemporary Ukrainians do not carry juridical responsibility for the destruction of Jews, but assuming the moral responsibility would only be beneficial to society: “Finally, reflections on the issues of guilt on the individual level begin from the sense of personal responsibility for every word and every act… And the universal meaning of the lesson of the Holocaust one can feel everyday: in our attitude towards the people of other skin colour, other denomination, other sexual orientation, other political views.”248

____________________ mass ethnocide of Jews during the times of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi”}, http://risu. org.ua/ua/index/all_news/state/national_religious_question/38053/ (accessed November 3, 2013). 248 Andrii Portnov, “Pro moralni ta politychni smylsy vybachennia za istorychni provyny” {On the moral and political sense of apology for historical faults}, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews.do?pro_moralni_ta_politichni_smisli_vib

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Jan Gross asked in Neighbours, “Can we arbitrarily select from a national heritage what we like, and proclaim it as patrimony to the exclusion of everything else?”249 And he answers: “And even if selectivity in the process of forging national identity is unavoidable…, the boundaries of a collective identity so constructed – in order to remain authentic – would have to remain open forever. Anyone must be at any time empowered to challenge such a construct by asking how some episodes, or series of episodes, or an epoch from ancestral history, fits into the proposed self-image of a nation.”250

Every nation has its glorious and darker sides and the purification of the national memory consists in the recognition of those latter which in the Ukrainian case concerns the regeneration of the Jewish memory on a national level as part of the own Ukrainian history.251 The Church should look for the traces of anti-Semitism in her official teaching and theological tradition.252 This echoes the words of Mykola Krokosh who claims that Ukrainians must realise that they also committed faults in history and apologise for the German collaborators among them who actively participated in the mass destruction of the Jews.253 However, the genuine Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation will only then take place when also the Jewish attitude changes. That means that Jews have to overcome the stereotyping of Ukrainians as organic anti-Semites. The Jewish change of attitude towards Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi would also contribute to the Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement. Finally, both nations have to speak with each other, not about each other. Considering the existing initiatives of cooperation between both peoples, including those on the side of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the hope remains that rapprochement will indeed once take place.

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249 250 251 252 253

achennya_za_istorichni_provini&objectId=1240606 (accessed January 24, 2014). Translation from the original source. Gross, Neighbours, 135. Ibid., 135-136. Heleen Zorgdrager, „Das Ringen um das Gedächtnis des Holocaust in der Ukraine“, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 2 (2012): 15. Ibid. Mykola Krokosh, “Neveseli dumky bohoslova pro novitniu propahandu stareznoho hrikha {Sad thoughts of a theologian about the modern propaganda of the aged sin}, Patriarkhat 2 (2009): 24.

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5.2

Robert Schreiter: on the moral truth of the past

5.2.1 Social healing of memories According to Schreiter, dealing with the past incudes the healing of memory, truth-telling, and the pursuit of justice. Dealing with the past on a broader society level, contrary to individual healing, can be otherwise called social healing, which pursues a triple task: “To take into account the lingering, toxic presence of the past in society; it must diagnose and mobilise the energies of the present; it must sketch out a vision for the future.”254 Dealing with the past necessarily means dealing with the memory of the past. Since this is a paragraph on memory, at the beginning it must be clearly stated that Robert Schreiter does not support the attitude “Forgive and forget.” First, this approach is unrealistic and, second, it is even undesirable for the relations in society. A certain forgetting is indeed important if the energy of society is to be directed to the future instead of dwelling on the past.255 However, notwithstanding the Christian mandate to forgive, we are not obliged to forget. Forgiveness in the reconciliation process is about reframing the narrative of the past rather than about forgetting past suffering. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church holds on to a similar approach. For example, Cardinal Liubachivskyi was teaching that the past should be remembered with love for one’s neighbours. Remembering the past is even postulated to be a duty, for example, the duty to remember the victims of the Holodomor or the victims of World War II including the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian confrontations. The memory of the past is beneficial to contemporaries and this coincides with the Schreiter’s belief that forgetting could be dangerous both for individuals and societies. Finally, the past should be remembered so that the lesson of evil is not erased from the collective memory of the people. The most obvious example is that of the Holodomor. Even Miroslav Volf, a proponent of the “Forgive and forget” approach, does not contest the educative side of the past which will be discussed later in this chapter. Schreiter believes that dealing with the past is often the most important part of social healing. The past is present through memories, hence, deal____________________ 254 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 377. 255 Ibid., 393.

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ing with the past means healing the memories of violence. According to Schreiter, the past should be remembered in a different way by drawing moral lessons: “The moral truths from why and how what happened serve as building blocks for a new and different kind of society.”256 That corresponds to the goal of reconciliation declared in the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Healing the memories by drawing moral lessons from the past is strongly present in the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. For instance, on the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation the Church leadership emphasises that history should be left to God and contemporaries have to recognise that killing neighbours for the sake of the advancement of a concrete political project (an independent Ukraine or an independent Poland) is wrong. The same concerns the expected apology from the Moscow Patriarchate concerning its role in the Pseudo-Synod of 1946. Whatever circumstances of the time might have inclined the Russian Orthodox Church to take part in the liquidation of another Church, the evil of that act has to be recognised. By telling that the immoral way of approaching problems is unacceptable people indirectly agree that such violent methods have to be omitted in the future. It is a way of acknowledging the truth about one’s own history and a way of setting moral priorities for the coming times. In that sense, the process is very pointedly called the purification/healing of memories. Social healing equally includes “assessing the energy available in the present and mobilising those energies for social change.”257 The task is to level those obstacles that hinder society from moving forwards or to heal the population from the social trauma. According to Schreiter, “social trauma manifests itself in how traumatised populations react to the role of the past in the present and in the future.”258 Schreiter does not dwell a lot on this question, however, John Paul Lederach and his emphasis on moral imagination is of great help here. It is relatively easy to find out what took place, who were guilty, and who the victims were, but the real challenge consists in finding resources that would be necessary to move away from the acquired patterns of reaction to a violent past. The mobilisation of the energies of the present for the sake of the future happens by turning the ruling narrative of violence into a redemptive nar____________________ 256 Ibid., 378. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid., 379.

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rative which results in stopping being driven by the sole version of the past.259 The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church assumes that task by providing platforms of reconciliation, for instance, regarding the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. A platform of reconciliation means breaking the existing narrative that fuels hatred and exchanging it for a story that promotes forgiveness and understanding. In the case of the reconciliation concerning the Polish military memorials on the Lychakiv Cemetery this narrative was to allow the Poles to honour their soldiers by means of a joint prayer with the Ukrainians. The reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church has to be built on the narrative of common suffering during the communist rule, and the unity between the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine is derived from their common Kyivan origin. Similarly, healing the memories of World War II means paying honour to the different parties of the war who fought for their ideals and condemning the evil that each of them committed during wartime. The common topic that unites all those cases is the narrative of the evil in human hearts that has to be discovered and repented of. The final point of the healing of memories is sketching out the vision of the future. The question should be answered what the coexistence of opponents should look like in the time to come. This vision is important as it unfolds the picture of what all the efforts of reconciliation with the enemy are directed at. Having a concrete vision supports one in difficult moments and gives imagination to develop actions towards reconciliation. It is a creative process, a horizon for all the efforts towards understanding. Liubomyr Husar means precisely that when he speaks about his vision of the united Kyivan Church as the soul of a united eastern and western Ukraine. A united Ukraine means the absence of a cultural gap between both Ukraines, when human dignity is cherished and everyone gets the chance to develop his or her humanity. Finally, all that should bring about social change and a successful transformation of the country in transition from its communist past. The Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation must account for the peaceful coexistence between those countries and their support of each other on the way to their successful integration into a united Europe. The most important value at stake in the process of reconciliation is the establishment of the moral order in society that was destroyed during the decades of the Soviet rule. Reconciliation, namely, presupposes that the ____________________ 259 Ibid., 378.

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evil is discovered and named. The forced collectivisation campaign undertaken in the time of Stalin, millions of Ukrainian farmers who died during the intentionally organised famine in 1932-1933, the imprisonment of the larger part of the intelligentsia and the hazardous nationalities policy are just a few examples which come to mind when speaking about the legacy of the communist rule in Ukraine. The same is true for the double morality, the common dissimulation, the inviolability of the oligarchic class at power, corruption, the weakening of the institutes of ethical education, which continue to haunt the country also nowadays. The roots of the growing number of crimes and violence can also be traced back to the communist police-controlled state that managed to preserve a seemingly external order. There are many things from the communist past which have to be recuperated. The healing of memories means witnessing and telling the story of what happened. Witnessing brings the memory to the public and demands telling the truth about the past. This process “is central to building a new, shared narrative of the community that moves from loss to redemption.”260 The essence and the biggest task of the purification of memory is that “the overcoming of evil begins from its recognition as evil. Then it loses its power and does not regenerate anymore.”261 The retelling of the story is not a simple reconstruction of what has taken place; it is simultaneously the process of the creation of a new narrative. Illustrative in that sense is the healing of memories of the Holodomor that the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church advocates. The Church leadership endeavours to establish the truth about the artificial famine as a genocide of the Ukrainian nation, to make it a nation-building identity element, to bring about social cohesion, and to detect the influence of the Holodomor on the current moral stance of the Ukrainians. By preserving the memories of the Holodomor, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church show the truth about it and demonstrate its consequences for the Ukrainian nation nowadays. That is the process of the healing of memory in the sense of Schreiter as witnessing the truth and drawing lessons from the past. In that sense, the

____________________ 260 Ibid., 381. 261 Oleksandr Zinchenko, “Volynska proshcha. U poshukakh prymyrennia” {The Volyn pilgrimage. Searching for reconciliation}, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/ articles/2013/07/11/130015/ (accessed July 16, 2013). Translation from the original source.

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memory of the Jewish presence in Ukraine must be regenerated as another essential step of the purification of memory.

5.2.2 Discovering the moral truth of the past In the previous paragraph I brought up the issue of the importance of truth-telling as a way of discovering the moral truth of the past. This idea occupies an important place in the process of the healing of memories according to Robert Schreiter. In this paragraph I will delve deeper into that question. A separate moment of the healing of memories is truth-telling. Schreiter even speaks about the theology of truth as the expression of the trustworthiness that we find in God and which in secular terms means the search for the culture of truth.262 Truth is presented by Schreiter as the antecedent of doing justice.263 Similarly, in the pronouncements on the healing of the memories of World War II or of the Holodomor Liubomyr Husar emphasises that already by telling the truth about the past we are doing justice. To say the whole truth about the man-made famine is to do justice to the memory of its victims. Moreover, Schreiter claims that the mere pronouncement of the truth can be healing for society, especially in cases where the victims were forced to conceal the truth for a long time under the oppressive regimes.264 The example of the survivors of the Holodomor is illustrative here. Among the different aspects of truth-telling Robert Schreiter distinguishes the breaking of the culture of silence. Very often the whole process of healing starts there. I consider that element important for the Ukrainian situation since some facts have already been discussed in the history of Ukraine that have not been spoken of until recent times. The most eloquent example are the vanished pages of the Jewish presence in Ukraine after World War II. This page of history was successfully erased by the communist rulers and the efforts to revive it are at a starting stage. Little is said about the participation of Ukrainians in the Shoah. Such a purification of the consciousness of the nation is necessary because, accord____________________ 262 Ibid., 388. 263 Ibid., 386. 264 Ibid.

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ing to Schreiter, the establishment of the truth about the past is a way towards the reconstruction of the moral order.265 The truth shall be revealed. Which kind of truth, however, should it be? When one says that the truth about the past should be made known, objective or forensic truth is usually meant. That is the description of what has taken place in the past. In addition to forensic truth Robert Schreiter indicates several other types of truth. There is a personal truth, an individual story of the events of the past which can be described as personal witnessing. Two other forms of truth – dialogical and restorative or moral truth – are especially important for the process of reconciliation. Dialogical truth endeavours to create a common narrative that includes separate distinctive narratives of victims and perpetrators.266 An example of the difficulties of discovering dialogical truth are the efforts to create the common narrative of the Polish-Ukrainian hostilities during the years of World War II that hinders the process of reconciliation still nowadays. The recent refusal of the Polish Archbishop of Lviv, Mieczysław Mokrzycki, to issue a common letter with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Volyn tragedy because of the different versions of what happened, demonstrates that the competing versions of the past are difficult to reconcile. Notwithstanding the years of work of a joint Polish-Ukrainian commission on that question, the misunderstandings remain evident. According to Schreiter, when the troubles of searching for dialogical truth are settled, the conflicting parties arrive at the restorative or moral truth, “the truth about a society that stands as a cautionary story intended to keep the conflicts of the past from even happening again.”267 The task of that story is obviously not only to prevent the past from repeating itself in similar circumstances but also to name the moral standards that a concrete society agrees to accept. For instance, remaining in the example of the Volyn tragedy, the possible common narrative is to look at those events from a Christian perspective, saying that killing is wrong, even killing because of national sentiments. Exactly this lesson appeared in the joint “Declaration of the Catholic Churches of Ukraine and Poland on forgiveness and reconciliation” that was finally adopted by both Churches in June 2013: ____________________ 265 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 119. 266 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 387. 267 Ibid.

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The moral lesson from the Volyn tragedy is that the solution of the conflict by violent methods accounts for more violence, perpetuates it. It equally says that the oppression of one nation by another will inevitably lead to violence at some point of their common history. Commenting on the present Polish-Ukrainian discussions around the Volyn events Myroslav Marynovych mentioned that those talks and actions show how deep people are dechristianised when each side speaks about its right to kill the opponent as a reaction to oppression. Following this line of argumentation, the moral burden of killing as such is lost.269 Hence, the quest for truth aims at the healing of society, delivering the message of the moral values which have to be placed at the foundation of the organisation and functioning of community.

5.3

Miroslav Volf: how to treat the burdened memory

5.3.1 Rules of salutary remembering The central element of reconciliation for Volf is memory and its healing. This theologian resolves the issue in terms of the salutary use of memory dedicating the whole book End of Memory. Remembering Rightly in a Violent World to that question. I am interested in Volf’s understanding of the purification of memory, in his concept and rules of the salutary use of memory, and, finally, in the sometimes controversial proceeding of forgiving and forgetting. As we have seen above, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church also dedicates a lot of space to the discussion on memory in her documents on reconciliation, but the question is whether it is sufficiently articulated. Although the theology of memory is a central element of rec____________________ 268 No. 2019. Translation from the original source. 269 “Dyskusii shchodo Volynskoi trahedii pokazaly, naskilky hlyboko my dekhrystyianizuvalysia,’ Myroslav Marynovych” {“Discussions on the Volyn tragedy have shown how deep we are dechristianised,” Myroslav Marynovych}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/community/religion_and_society/52867/ (accessed July 12, 2013).

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onciliation for that Church, much can still be learned from the more elaborated vision of Volf. Tony Judt is convinced that commemoration in contemporary times is much more complicated than ever because “we live in a growing fear that we shall forget the past, that it will somehow get misplaced among the bric-a-brac of the present.”270 Volf gives credit to that thought and supports the appeals to remember in a world marked by vanishing memory and a tendency towards quick forgetting. Modernity is characterised by the innovation and experimentation dictated by the progress and quick pace of life, and hence, people are not eager to look for the past in order to find a sense of identity.271 The appeals to remember the evil suffered arise either to pay honour to the victims or to protect the future generations, the nonremembering amounts into the failure to fulfil the obligation of justice.272 However, Volf warns against the ambiguities of memory since remembering in a wrong way only perpetuates violence and does not let the past perform its educating and warning role. Further, it is important to emphasise the public ramifications of someone’s individual memory. Which implications individual memory has on the wider social setting is equally of great interest for Volf. From the outset Volf argues that the whole discussion on memory is inseparably tied to the issue of identity. People have multiple identities, to avoid violence different identities should be taken into account. Memory has such a profound impact on people because it performs an identityshaping role both on the individual level and on the level of the whole of society: “History is primarily a matter of intellection and its vehicle is historiography; memory is primarily a matter of identification and its vehicles are commemorative rituals and liturgies.”273 Volf adds that not only are we shaped by our memory, but we shape memories ourselves. Consequently, it is important not only what we remember but also how we re____________________ 270 Tony Judt, Reappraisals. Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (London: Vintage Books, 2009), 197. 271 Miroslav Volf, “Love’s Memory. The Role of Memory in Contemporary Culture,” 60, http://www.ptsem.edu/uploadedFiles/School_of_Christian_Vocation_ and_Mission/Institute_for_Youth_Ministry/Princeton_Lectures/Volf-Role.pdf (accessed July 24, 2013). 272 Ibid., 59. 273 Miroslav Volf, “Love’s Memory. Redemptive Remembering,” 76, http://www. ptsem.edu/uploadedFiles/School_of_Christian_Vocation_and_Mission/Institute_f or_Youth_Ministry/Princeton_Lectures/Volf-Redemptive.pdf (accessed July 25, 2013).

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member. Hence, the Yale theologian developed certain rules for salutary remembering.274 Let us have a look at them in order to determine whether the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church applies those rules in her teaching.

1.

Remember with love

In the introduction to his book on memory, Miroslav Volf declared the task of this project dedicating it to the “memory of wrongdoing suffered by a person who desires neither to hate nor to disregard but to love the wrongdoer.”275 Evidently, the use of memory will be judged against the horizon of love: “What does it mean to remember well? It means to remember as the one who loves.”276 The author considers what it means to remember rightly in a Christian perspective trying to answer the fundamental question: “How do the parties whose common past contains offences and sufferings go about remembering so that their memories are a source of healing rather than of increased enmity?”277

2.

Remember truthfully – fulfil the obligation of justice

The primary feature of remembering rightly is to remember truthfully: “When we remember, we bear the moral obligation to pay to others the ____________________ 274 In fact Miroslav Volf elaborates four rules of salutary remembering, that is numbers 2, 4, 5 und 6. Items 1 “Remember with love” and 3 “See with the eyes of the other” are not determined by Volf as rules of remembering. However, on the basis of his vision of the purification of memory I am inclined to add those additional rules to his memory code. Remembering with love and seeing from the perspective of the double vision derive from Volf’s emphasis on the primacy of the will to embrace. Both additional rules of remembering point at the Volf’s fundamental claim that genuinely salutary memory is to be placed in the perspective of reconciliation and love. 275 Volf, The End of Memory, 9. Italics preserved from the original text. 276 Miroslav Volf, “Remembering Well in a Violent World,” in Mission und Einheit. Gemeinsames Zeugnis getrennter Kirchen? – Mission and Unity. Common Witness of Separated Churches? Proceedings of the 16th Academic Consultations of the Societas Oecumenica, Beihefte zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 91, eds. Peter De Mey, Andrew Pierce, and Oliver Schuegraf (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012), 60. 277 Volf, Love’s Memory. The Role of Memory, 60.

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debt of giving events their “due” by remembering them truthfully.”278 In that way telling the truth means doing justice. Truthful remembering is grounded on the moral commitment to truth. However, truthfulness is more than a moral obligation; it is equally a precondition to reconciliation. The obligation to remember truthfully is derived from the care about the relationships with the other. Volf is convinced that “our goal should be to remember as truthfully as possible, no matter what our perspectives and interests are… If we care about other people and our relations with them, we will feel obligated genuinely to seek the truth.”279 Seeking, telling, and doing truth are indispensable elements of the reconciliation-embrace that heals and helps build relationships of trust. Hence, the desire of reconciliation presupposes the commitment to truth: “There can be no truth between people without the will to embrace the other… Inversely, the will to embrace cannot be sustained and will not result in an actual embrace if the truth does not reign. If truth cannot do without the will to embrace, neither can embrace do without the will to truth.”280

3.

See with the eyes of the other – “double vision”

Miroslav Volf points at the complexities of remembering in the example of his interrogations by the Serbian police. Dwelling on his conversations with Capitan G., Volf tries to take into consideration the position of his interrogator, his motivations to become part of the system of evil. In that way the author aims at gaining understanding of the other side. His major concern is the Christian obligation to condemn the deed, but not the doer. As the documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church show, the difficulty of the reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians consists in the fact that both sides are not eager to recognise the painful truth of their mutual history. Instead, both sides have to take into account the complexity of their historical situation during World War II. The Greek-Catholic Church authorities emphasise that the sheer condemnation of Ukrainians as villains distorts the objective picture of their stance under the Polish rule in the 20th century and earlier. This does not mean that ethnic killings can be justified under any historical circumstances. However, keeping an ____________________ 278 Volf, The End of Memory, 53. 279 Volf, Love’s Memory. Redemptive Remembering, 73. 280 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace. A Theological Exploration, 258.

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eye on the broader context helps see the motivation and the driving forces of the opponent. It is about seeing history with the eyes of the other: “Realising that many conflicts generate from the perception of a common history by opponents as a unilateral set of injuries caused by the other side, it is helpful for conflicting parties to enter into the position of the enemy and try to understand it.”281 What I have described above is looking at the situation from the perspective of the “double vision.” For Volf this element is indispensable if we want to pave the way to reconciliation because no version of history is completely unbiased. Poles interpret the actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Volyn as a horrendous violence committed by the nationalistic-driven Ukrainian people, whereas Ukrainians conceive the mass killings of Poles as an attempt to restore the Ukrainian state and put an end to the Polish rule. This is a classic example of clashing memories. Equally, the Russian Orthodox Church considers the Lviv Pseudo-Synod as the reestablishment of historical justice because the creation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church at the Synod of Brest in 1589 is interpreted by Moscow as a betrayal of Orthodoxy. From here derives the non-desire of Moscow to ask forgiveness for her cooperation in the defeat of the GreekCatholic Church in Ukraine in 1946. Being aware of such attitudes, Miroslav Volf appeals to see history from the perspective of both parties: “Seekers of truth, as distinct from alleged possessors of truth, will employ “double vision” – they will give others the benefit of the doubt, they will inhabit imaginatively the world of others, and they will endeavour to view the events in question from the perspective of others, not just their own.”282 Perhaps the creation of common manuals on Polish-Ukrainian history or even on Ukrainian-Russian history could be a contribution to reconciliation applying the principle of the “double vision.” Liubomyr Husar seems to be aware of that when he promotes the project of a Church history in Ukraine jointly elaborated by all the traditional Christian denominations. For Cardinal Husar the healing of memory presupposes learning the truth about the past, determining the facts, and naming evil. Additionally, the healing of memory includes looking for the good sides of the story. ____________________ 281 Myroslava Rap, “Miroslav Volf’s Interpretation of Memory, Justice, and Reconciliation. A Constitutive Contribution to Peace Ethics” (master’s thesis, Leuven Catholic University, 2006), 73. 282 Volf, The End of Memory, 57.

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Husar is convinced that the past cannot only be atrocious. Miroslav Volf also draws attention to that fact asking to remember someone’s wrongdoings in the context of the whole life that might exhibit some virtues as well:283 “Should I not remember those moments of seeming goodness, however dubious they were?”284 In that regard the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church can express her appreciation to the Russian Orthodox Church for the preservation of her sacral buildings and the formation of her priests during communist rule. However, the truth about evil cannot be overshadowed by the elements of good, and the expectations of the recognition of the complicity of the Russian Orthodox Church are completely justified. The Polish-Ukrainian relations also illustrate that idea of the evaluation of wholeness. The Ukrainian side could express more appreciation for the efforts of the official Poland to promote the Ukrainian case at the European institutions. That helps envisage what unites both countries and nations, where they cooperate, and helps tune to the mode of reconciliation. Volf’s idea of the “double vision” has common points with Moyaert’s proposal of interreligious hospitality. Both presuppose the questioning of one’s identity in order to reveal the elements which hinder the final aim of genuine relationships with God and the neighbour. Both are directed at openness and welcoming the other, the stranger. And both are prescribed to the Churches and ordinary Christians in Ukraine so that they can find the basis of unity. Marianne Moyaert attempts to create a vigorous religious identity by referring to Ricoeur’s notions of idem and ipse. The idem describes the personal element of continuity and constancy while the ipse refers to becoming a self through the encounter with the otherness of persons or texts. Applied to religious identities, Moyaert claims that the idem encompasses religious norms, values, doctrines, texts, and behavioural prescriptions.285 The ipse focuses on “commitment with respect to the living God,”286 where the relationship to God is central. Religious identity arises at the interplay between the idem and ipse elements and that practically means that the attachment to rituals, doctrines, and behaviours is viewed in the light ____________________ 283 Ibid., 15. 284 Ibid., 16. 285 Marianne Moyaert, Fragile Identities. Towards a Theology of Interreligious Hospitality (Amsterdam – New York, NY: Rodopi, 2011), 254. 286 Ibid., 255.

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of the personal commitment to God. This posture grants openness to the other one who does not share the same religious tradition. Those reflections led Moyaert to suggest the theological hermeneutics of interreligious hospitality referring to the biblical virtue of hospitality as welcoming the stranger to one’s own home. The identity of everyone contains a certain strangeness, which means those elements that are not chosen but given one from birth (for instance, the body or contingency of existence).287 The awareness of the own strangeness makes one realise that the own identity is not complete and thus makes it possible to openly turn to the identity of the other. Also God appears as a stranger and “people can receive God in the stranger only when God is no longer fixed to the known and the familiar. This presupposes again acknowledging the strangeness in the familiar and thus not understanding religious identity exclusively in terms of the permanence of the idem pole.”288

4.

Remember therapeutically – healing the identity

Volf elaborates on both the personal and social healing of memory. The former he describes as the restoration of the narrative of one’s own life. Volf acknowledges that memories are not only a form of knowledge but also a form of doing. Drawing upon the two ways of remembering by Paul Ricoeur, Volf claims that there are memories that just happen and memories that are actively pursued. The memories of the wrongs suffered “envelop us in dark mists of melancholy, they hold us back so that we cannot project ourselves into the future and embark on new paths. They chain our identity to the injuries we have suffered and shape the way we react to others.”289 Inner healing is achieved through the integration of the painful memories in one’s life story. It has happened by granting a positive meaning to the past or at least by labelling the painful memories as senseless segments of life hoping for their redemption at the end of history.290 By naming the memories we tame them in a certain way and let life run its course. Ultimately, it is about recovering from the identity of the victim that is so peculiar in conflict settings. In his pronouncements, Liubomyr ____________________ 287 288 289 290

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Ibid., 263-264. Ibid., 264. Volf, The End of Memory, 69. Ibid., 76-78.

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Husar points at the narrative of victimisation, which is so typical of Ukrainians who consider themselves to be victims of history and of their more powerful neighbours. In the message on the Reconciliation Day in Lviv, Husar reminds his nation that they have also acted as perpetrators and must admit that fact, thus purifying their consciousness. Miroslav Volf adds a valuable supplement claiming that the identity of a Christian should not be primarily defined by what he or she has endured but by how God relates to them. It is an invitation to consider one’s own history in the perspective of God’s love for humanity. Also that aspect was admitted by Husar when he encouraged his faithful to perceive God as a loving Father rather than as a condemning Judge.

5.

Remember so as to learn from the past

The point here is to use memory in order to draw lessons for the future, which Volf calls the exemplary use of memory described by Tzvetan Todorov in the following way: “Exemplary use, by contrast, allows one to use the past in the light of the present, to make use of the lessons of injustice undergone in the past to fight injustices taking their course today, to leave the self in order to approach the other.”291 In other words, people should remember in order to draw parallels between situations of injustice that have once taken place in order to keep an eye on the signs that might indicate that evil could repeat itself. Liubomyr Husar’s reflections on the lessons of the Holodomor can also be considered an exemplary use of memory. Cardinal Husar claims that Ukrainians have to determine the influence of the Holodomor’s culture of death on the contemporary stance of Ukrainian society. For example, the failure to reform the economics is ascribed to the lost sprit of entrepreneurship because of the extermination of the class of farmers in 1932-1933. Thus, Husar not so much warns one of the repetition of the Holodomor nowadays, as elucidates the accompanying consequences of that tragedy. Notwithstanding this apparently useful feature of remembering, Volf is sceptical about that preventive function of memory: “The problem is not that people fail to draw lessons from memory but that they do so in a way that flames the fires of conflict rather than contributing to peace.”292 Even ____________________ 291 Quoted in Volf, Love’s Memory. Redemptive Remembering, 74. 292 Ibid., 76.

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realising evil as such, people might apply unjust methods to fight for justice. Additionally, it is difficult to determine the proper lessons of memory in new situations and people may simply draw divergent lessons from the same experience.293 In a protracted conflict it is even difficult to determine who is the victim and who the perpetrator. The Ukrainian-Polish relationships illustrate this thought well. Both nations accuse each other of an unjust treatment and both consider themselves victims.

6.

Remember in a redeeming way294

Giving credence to his rules of remembering, Volf is convinced that only they do not suffice to prohibit abuses of memory. For that aim a broader theological ethical framework is needed which Volf derives from the story of the Passion and Resurrection of Christ and from the memory of the Exodus from Egypt. The memories of those two events are sacred for Jews and Christians, they shape their identities, they constitute communal memories directed to the future, and finally, those are memories of God: “When the people of God remember wrongs suffered, they remember them out of a sense of identity and community, out of expectations and ultimate trust derived from the sacred memory of the Exodus and Passion.”295 The importance of the memories of Exodus and of Christ’s death on the cross is that they not only remind one of, but more importantly ritualise those events for Christians. People need to receive a true ethical in____________________ 293 Volf, The End of Memory, 89. 294 It seems that Miroslav Volf borrowed the notion “redemptive remembering” from Lewis Smedes’ masterpiece Forgive and Forget. Volf refers to Smedes in his Exclusion and Embrace when speaking on the issue of memory and forgetting. Smedes suggests redemptive remembering as a means to navigate “between the rock of risky forgetting and the hard place of futile remembering.” (Lewis Smedes, Forgive and Forget. Healing the Hearts We Don’t Deserve (n. p.: Harper One, 2007), 136). Smedes dwells upon the practical repercussion of the old Hebrews’ way of remembering their story of redemption from slavery in Egypt. For Smedes redemptive remembering is a healing way of remembering “the wrongs of our irreversible past, a way that can bring hope for the future along with our sorrow for the past. Redemptive remembering keeps a clear picture of the past, but it adds a new setting and shifts its focus.” (Ibid.) Miroslav Volf has borrowed and developed the notion of redemptive remembering in his theology by combining the Hebrew memory of the Exodus with the New Testament memory of Christ’s Passion. 295 Volf, The End of Memory, 102.

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struction in order to be able to draw correct lessons from the memory of the past. The Israelis’ memory of their deliverance by God is linked with their obedience to God. The memory of God delivering the Israelis from slavery should prompt them to treat their neighbours with justice. The four lessons from the Exodus are the imperative to remember and do it truthfully, the duty of solidarity with the oppressed, the imperative of the struggle against injustice (which means fighting injustice even with violent methods), and finally the realisation that it is God who ultimately delivers his people. The imperative of the struggle against injustice poses a problem because as the story of God’s killings of the Egyptians or of the destruction of the Amalekites demonstrates, the memory of Exodus allows the use of violence when it is necessary, thus perpetuating it. Hence, Volf emphasises that for genuinely salutary remembering the lessons from the story of Christ’s Passion, the principal memory narrative of the New Testament, are indispensable. The memory of the Death and Resurrection of Christ remind us of his ultimate delivery of humanity. Volf points to the following essential distinction of the Christ’s saving event: the Passion of Christ delivers the same lesson of solidarity and fighting for justice, however, the reconciliation message is dramatically opposite. The memory of the Christ’s sufferings obliges us to remember all those who suffer. At the same time, it goes not only about the memory of Death, but also about the memory of Resurrection. The story of suffering does not end there; there is the future of redemption, of hope. Thus, the memory of the Passion is open to a transformed future.296 Christ’s death on the cross as a universal redemptive event does not concern only the oppressed, but also the oppressors. Furthermore, Christ has not only reconciled both perpetrators and victims to God, he has also reconciled them between themselves: “But since he {Christ} also reconciled them in his own flesh on the cross, the Passion memory anticipates as well the formation of a reconciled community even out of deadly enemies.”297 This universal reconciliation of humanity is the last point that should inform the redemptive use of memory. As a reconciled community people should not lose sight of the promise of the ultimate reconciliation between them keeping in mind that all the offences that have happened are only landmarks on the way to an eschatological ____________________ 296 Volf, Love’s Memory. Redemptive Remembering, 80. 297 Volf, The End of Memory, 119. Italics preserved from the original text.

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reconciliation. The lessons of the Lord’s Supper validate the promulgation of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in 2005 as a liturgical celebration. The act of the Eucharist reminds one that both nations have already been reconciled in the flesh of Christ. Hence, they have the duty to reconcile on earth anticipating the eschatological reconciliation. From a theological point of view, the Eucharist is a very successful locus for the promotion of the understanding between peoples.

5.3.2 Slipping into oblivion Miroslav Volf is convinced that forgiveness is completed with the slipping of the offence into oblivion, a certain forgetting, when the right time is there. Not remembering the offence is part of the most early Christian and even Jewish belief, Volf notes. The debt must be remembered in order to be able to forgive, however, after having forgiven we must forget the offence. What does that mean: “forgiving and forgetting,” letting “slip into oblivion” or “non-remembering” the offence? It is about one of the most original contributions of Miroslav Volf to the theology of forgiveness. Volf explains non-remembrance as the endeavour of not letting evil be the last point: “Far from being a victory of evil, consigning forgiven wrongdoings to oblivion – done at the right time and in the right way – denies evil the honour and the glory of memory.”298 And still, Volf remains realistic and confesses that in many cases it would be dangerous to forget: “As long as there is potential for harm in a relationship, we should remember… Since the potential for harm is great in our sinful world, forgiveness will mostly remain incomplete.”299 Volf considers nonremembrance to be a gift from God to the wronged ones that will be received in the world to come: “… Memory of wrongs suffered – a particular example of the memory of sin – will not come to the minds of the citizens of the world to come because they will be fully immersed in the love that God is and that God will create among them.”300 This not-coming-tomind cannot be properly described as forgetting or the inability to recall, as the repression of memories or their fading. Volf is very clear that the not-coming-to-mind of the suffered wrongs will happen by God’s grace ____________________ 298 Ibid., 176. 299 Ibid. Italics preserved from the original text. 300 Ibid., 141-142.

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only at the end of times in the world of love created by God. Paraphrasing Derrida and similar to Volf, Anthony Bash maintains that interpersonal forgiveness as “a poor imitation of divine forgiveness” will be fulfilled at the end of times: “The extent that human forgiveness bears the imprint of its prototype is the extent to which human beings can glimpse at – and have a foretaste of it – the divine forgiveness that will have its consummation at the eschaton.”301 Only this eschatological meaning of slipping into oblivion correctly represents Volf’s position. Hence, I support the opinion that both the theology of Volf and of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church consider the remembering of repugnant events as beneficial and instructive in this world. In fact, Volf’s rules of salutary remembering emphasise the importance of preserving the memories of the past. Eschatological forgetting will once be granted by God, however, in the current world it makes sense to remember. The bishops of the Greek-Catholic Church elaborate well on the benefits of remembering, while Miroslav Volf considers certain rules of remembering in a redeeming rather than destroying way. In that way both theologies complement each other.

____________________ 301 Bash, Forgiveness, 178. Italics preserved from the original text.

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Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation 6.1

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: how spiritual unity may advance social transformation

6.1.1 All-Ukrainian reconciliation for the transformation of the country The previous findings of this inquiry prove that the aim of reconciliation in the Greek-Catholic documents is the transformation of Ukraine through the reassessment of the past in moral terms. In this last chapter I will show that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers the re-establishment of the unity of the Churches in Ukraine as a way to the rebirth of the nation and this is indeed a peculiarity of the reconciliation discourse of this Church. On the occasion of the pilgrimage of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church expressed their appreciation for the inspiration triggered by the Pope to build an open, tolerant and solidary society. The bishops accentuated that John Paul II encouraged the Ukrainian people to reconciliation and mutual forgiveness, to develop a responsible and mature consciousness1 and to heal the moral wounds.2 Only such a society can be free from violence and would render possible the promotion of human rights. The road to an open and tolerant society leads through unity and harmony between the people: “Only unity and harmony bring about genuine peace and stability of the social progress for Ukrainian people.”3 Similarly, “Unity of society around spiritual ideals, social self-organisation and mutual support is a good protection in the situation of political and economic crisis.”4 Myroslav Marynovych once mentioned that the modern Ukrainian nation is in the process of its formation, for the moment it is in the search of the idea that could bring people together.5 In ____________________ 1 2 3 4 5

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No. 114, 214. Ibid., 215. Ibid., 214. Translation from the original source. No. 2022. “Myroslav Marynovych: ‘Siohodni dolia Ukrainy vyrishuietsia ne v politychnii, a v dukhovnii ploshchyni” {Myroslav Marynovych: “Today the fate of Ukraine is being decided not in a political but in a spiritual dimension”}, in Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 262.

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

a number of official documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, her leaders are looking for the ways to overcome the challenges of the development of their country in transition in order to promote a better future for the Ukrainian people and their country. The motive of national consolidation or the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation regularly pops up here. This issue is so important for the leadership of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church that the development of spiritual practices which should contribute to the rapprochement between the East and West of Ukraine were put in 2013 on the list of the activities for the new evangelisation.6 Indeed, having studied the official discourse of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, it becomes evident that whether her bishops speak about the Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement, the renewal of the inclusive Kyivan patriarchate, or the reconciliation of different visions of World War II, their final aim is the flourishing of the Ukrainian nation and state. All the actions and pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church were written with that intension of the consolidation of the country in order to promote its development. I will deepen this conclusion in the next paragraph on the regeneration of the Kyivan Church as a way to national reconciliation. That case demonstrates best the Greek-Catholic vision of the all-Ukrainian rapprochement, since all the leaders of that Church in the 20th century believed that the unity of the Church will cause the spiritual revival and enthusiasm that would bring closer different regions of the country. It is believed that when people perceive that they are similar, that they have a common faith and a shared century-old spiritual background embodied in one united local Church, they could unite around the important issue of the transformation of their country. The historical memory occupies an important place in that endeavour. For years the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has struggled to find elements in the memory of Ukrainians that would contribute to national consolidation. The Church leadership attempted to revision the memories of World War II on the basis of the consent that all the parties – whether Ukrainians in the Red Army or those in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – used to fight for the well-being of the country. Beyond dispute, another historical element that in the opinion of the Greek-Catholic Church leaders could foster the national unity is the memory of the man-made famine in communist-ruled Ukraine in 1932-1933. Reproaching Viktor Yanukovych, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine, with the poor organisation of ____________________ 6

No. 2021.

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the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Holodomor in 2003, Liubomyr Husar points at the nation-building aspect of the event: “The memory of an event of the level of the Holodomor is a nation-building element, the emphasis of the fundamental value that consolidates society and that connects all of us with the past, without which it is not possible to form a unified state body neither today nor in the future.”7 The commemoration of the Holodomor that brings together as many people as possible is a unique opportunity to feel a single nation gathered in the face of a great tragedy. For our research it is important to single out that nation-building meaning of the memory of the Holodomor. In the opinion of Husar, memories bring people closer and constitute a core around which diverse groups of the Ukrainian population can consolidate. Consequently, it is understandable that the Greek-Catholics have always tried to promote the commemoration of the Holodomor on the state level, and they have often done it together with other religious denominations in Ukraine. Here it is worth noting that not all the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine agree that the Holodomor was an act of genocide committed by Stalin against the Ukrainian nation. However, all of them support the opinion that it was a big disaster that must be remembered. In its turn, this recognition brings the Churches themselves closer. The joint documents authored by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church with the Heads of other Churches or with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations testify to that observation. In December 2003, the Heads of the Christian Churches of Ukraine defined the Holodomor as “one of the most tragic pages of the history of our nation, the memory of which has to be preserved for the future generations and must become a factor of the unity of Ukrainian people.”8 The idea was reiterated in November 2007 by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations in the only address on the topic signed by the representatives of all the Churches of the Kyivan tradition: “The memory of the shared tragedy of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 unites us despite nationality, religion or political convictions.”9 The truth about the Holodomor can help Ukrainians to endure the difficult periods in history. Here again the all-Ukrainian reconciliation must be based on the common memory of the tragedy of the nation in 1932-1933. The commemoration ____________________ 7 8 9

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No. 172, 300. Translation from the original source. No. 277, 461. Translation from the original source. No. 319, 521. Translation from the original source.

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of the Holodomor, similar to the commemoration of the heroes and victims of World War II must become a Ukrainian-wide event.10 The vision is unambiguous – memory should unite people: “The memory of the past has to unite us for a better future.”11 At the same time, the fact is that this memory is different in different regions of Ukraine. Just note that we do not find the name of the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate among the undersigned of all the addresses on the topic that we studied. Surprisingly, the most vivid memory of the Holodomor is preserved in western Ukraine where the great famine of 1932-1933 was least tangible. Hence, the memory can divide as well. Even though we speak about national reconciliation, it must be noted that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church does not consider Ukrainians in narrow nationalistic terms. Ukrainians are all the people who inhabit the country, not only ethnic ones. The civil understanding of the nation stays in focus. For instance, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church together with several other Churches or religious organisations extends the meaning of the Holodomor to make it an event that concerns all the nationalities that inhabit Ukraine: the homage to the victims of the Holodomor must unite all the citizens of the country and not only ethnic Ukrainians because that extermination by hunger touched upon all the people who resided at that time in the south-eastern and central Ukraine. This is very pointedly stated by the following words of the Heads of several Christian Churches of Ukraine: “The death from hunger did not divide people according to nationality or religion. From the Holodomor suffered all those who considered Ukraine their motherland, all the peoples who inhabited that land. It is our common tragedy and our joint pain. It is our duty to remember those perished from the Holodomor notwithstanding their nationality and religion.”12

Except for looking for unifying elements, in recent years the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has made attempts to elaborate on the theological basis for the national unity of Ukraine. Among the most meaningful examples is the theological foundation of the peaceful social order and the Easter theology of reconciliation. In the message on the preservation of social peace, the bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church claim that the public peace is built on criteria of truth, justice, ____________________ 10 11 12

No. 277, 461. Ibid. Translation from the original source. No. 2003. Translation from the original source.

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freedom and love.13 Truth has to be discovered even if it is painful. Justice cannot be vindictive but open to forgiveness. Freedom means first of all responsibility but not high-handedness. Finally, the last pillar of the public peace is love that seeks truth and longs for reconciliation. Reiterating the thought of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi, the Greek-Catholic bishops claim that one never succeeds in fostering the development of society while neglecting God’s commandments and “no political, national or any other arguments should tempt you to break the law of God.”14 Truth, justice, freedom and love belong to the most important elements of God’s order. Additionally, the genuine change begins in the human heart and sometimes demands a personal sacrifice.15 For twenty years of the development of her social teaching, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has always highlighted that the locus of the changes is a person, a personal transformation being the point that the Church directed her efforts at. Neither political parties, nor any other external organisation can contribute to the development of Ukraine when an individual does not transform. The EuroMaidan and especially its phase after the victims had fallen was perceived as the sign of the moral purification of society. In our second example, the Easter message of Sviatoslav Shevchuk from 2012, this Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church developed an interesting theology of resurrection as the basis for the unity of the Ukrainian nation. Because the Risen Christ brings unity to the Ukrainian people, the genuine joy of Easter can be experienced only by giving up all divisions on a personal, national or political level: “The Risen Christ in his body overcame the opposition, disagreement, and conflict that threaten individuals, peoples, and all humanity. He seeks to bring peace and unification to our Ukrainian people… The entire visible and invisible world today teaches us that we cannot live the full joy of Easter by living in the captivity of our own division: personal, national, or even political.”16

That gift of unity from the resurrected Christ only has to be accepted which is described in the text with the metaphor of opening the hands to receive the gift: “To open our hands means: to do away with personal ambitions, selfishness, greed; to put the good of the people over personal interests or the interests of polit-

____________________ 13 14 15 16

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No. 2008. Ibid. Translation from the original source. Ibid. No. 2015.

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation ical parties; to be ready to meet neighbours where there is talk of the common good. In the torch of Christ’s resurrection the believer cannot look at another person through the prism of hatred or revenge; he is ready to forgive even the enemy and reconcile with him. Who is not capable of forgiveness, does not understand the great message that the Saviour brings us from the tomb – the message of unity and peace.”17

Forgiveness and reconciliation are the obligations of the people in the presence of the resurrected Christ. It is worth mentioning that this Easter message was issued in 2012, in a year of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine when politicians tried to exploit the current societal divisions in order to succeed. Sviatoslav Shevchuk desired to inspire the people not to undergo the manipulations aimed at deepening regional divisions in Ukraine by pointing at the gift of unity of the resurrected Christ. Reconciliation is therefore an important element of public peace.

6.1.2 Reconciliation between the Churches – spiritual unification of Ukraine The previous paragraph shows that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church considers the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation a constitutive element of the transformation of the country. Because of the generally divided memory it is not easy for the Church to find those elements of the Ukrainian past which can unite the people. Among them the Holodomor occupies the central place. Another means of unity is the theology of the peaceful social order that should prompt every individual to build social relations on the Ten Commandments. Finally, the biggest hope for the national cohesion of the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is envisaged in the creation of the united Kyivan Patriarchate that I will evaluate in the following paragraphs. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has elaborated a particular project of the reconciliation between traditional Ukrainian Churches which aims at the restoration of the unity of the Kyivan Church in an inclusive Kyivan or Ukrainian Patriarchate. Some observers consider this project to be an alternative to the vision of the Russkiy Mir of the Moscow Patriarchate.18 The project is based on the ideas and writings of the great Greek____________________ 17 18

Ibid. Konstantin Sigov and Jurij Vestel, „Die ukrainische Orthodoxie und die Vermittlung christlicher Werte“, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 2 (2012): 20.

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Catholic Church leaders, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi (1965-1944) and Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi (1892-1984).19 In the period that I study in my publication the idea of the Kyivan Patriarchate is to a certain degree present in practically all the texts that deal with the rapprochement between the Churches. Even though the topic is often referred to in a wide range of texts, there are six leading official pronouncements unveiling the GreekCatholic vision of the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate.20 On their basis I will attempt to depict the idea. My aim in that subchapter is to present this project, the principles of the creation of the united local Ukrainian Church, her broader ecumenical significance and finally, the practical steps to its embodiment. Before proceeding to the details, it is worth mentioning that the project of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the broader context should be regarded as a contribution to the productive dialogue between the Catholics and the Orthodox which demands that also the uniate Churches are represented there as its competent participants.21 The ecumenical project of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church promoted by her former Head Liubomyr Husar, the “Ukrainian Moses,”22 corresponds to the spirit of the Gospel, is bold, has a conciliating character23 and does not reflect the views of those who look for the rapprochement between the Churches through the overcoming of dogmatic, theological, or legal differences.24 Andrii Mykhaleiko argues that although the Greek-Catholic ecumenical position is not a ready-made answer to the challenges of the inter-Church ____________________ 19

20 21

22

23 24

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More about the idea of the unity of the Church in the works of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi: Yaroslav Moskalyk, “Ideia obiednannia Tserkvy za vchenniam Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptytskoho” {The idea of the Church unity according to the teaching of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi}, Bohoslovia 67 (2003): 84-95. Documents No. 2002 (No. 4002), No. 5005, No. 2004, No. 2000 (No. 3001), No. 177 (No. 3000), No. 5003 (No. 4000). Andrii Mykhaleiko, “Do dyskusii pro ekumenichni initsiatyvy i perspektyvy Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {To the discussion about the ecumenical initiatives and perspectives of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church}, http:// theology.in.ua/ua/bp/discussions/theme/39462/ (accessed January 31, 2014). Andreas Thiermeyer, introduction to Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar, eds. and trans. Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 11. Ibid., 15. Mykhaleyko, Kommentar, in Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe, 269.

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

relations, it should be appreciated as something new in the situation like the one today when the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue is in crisis.25

6.1.2.1 The ecumenical significance of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church The leading motive of that paragraph is the following: the recognition of the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is a step in the process of the establishment of the united Kyivan Patriarchate, which would bring together the Orthodox denominnations and Greek-Catholics. Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi declared the creation of the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in his programme speech after his return to Ukraine and claimed it the highest priority in the rebirth of this Church. His vision is based on the testament of Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi:26 “Concerning our immediate forerunner Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi, let the guideline for our work be his testament: the rebirth of our Church should culminate in the establishment of one Patriarchate of Kyiv-Halych and all Rus.”27 Later in the same programme speech, referring to the Apostolic Nuncio in Ukraine, Cardinal Liubachivskyi asks the Holy Father to recognise the patriarchal status of his Church: “There are no more canonical obstacle nowadays – the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is liberated and returned to her canonical territory and historical, juridical and pastoral concerns demand such culmination!”28 Already in his enthronement sermon “Let us embrace each other in faith, hope, and love” delivered on January 28, 2001 Liubomyr Husar pointed at the essence of his pastoral programme – the overcoming of the evil of division among the Christians in Ukraine.29 For Husar it is very important to portray the patriarchate of his Church in spiritual terms rather than in administrative ones. The patriarchate (rendered as the second biggest dream of Ukrainians after the proclamation of the independence of ____________________ 25 26

27 28 29

Mykhaleiko, To the discussion about the ecumenical initiatives. For a comprehensive study about the ecumenical vision including that of the united Kyivan Church of Yosyf Slipyi see Andriy Mykhaleyko, „Per aspera ad astra“. Der Einheitsgedanke im theologischen und pastoralen Werk von Josyf Slipyi (1892-1984) (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2009). No. 21, 37. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. No. 338, 566.

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the country!) should be reached in the spirit of love and peace because “despite the fact that we speak about the patriarchate in the categories of an ecclesial system, it is not just a structure. The patriarchate is a state of soul, the best expression of the Church’s essence and calling… For the patriarchate is a way.”30 The same opinion is shared by the current Head of the Church, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, in one of his recent interviews: “The whole issue of the patriarchate is not a political issue… It’s an issue of Church life. I would like to move this issue from the field of politics to the field of pastoral care. I think the most important thing is the growth of the Ukrainian Church, which is definitely growing towards patriarchal dignity.”31 Along with the pastoral needs of the patriarchate of their Church, the Greek-Catholic bishops in all the documents on the topic emphasise its significance for the future of the Kyivan Church. In the pastoral message “The Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church,” the bishops postulate the declared intention to develop a patriarchal Church as definitive and unanimous. Responding to the reproach that the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate might cause the disruption of the ecumenical dialogue between the Catholics and Orthodox, the Greek-Catholic bishops emphasise: “We believe that our patriarchate will be an important factor for the improvement of the relations between Christians and will not cause disunity. For the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is needed not only by our Church, but also by all particular Churches.”32 Further, “The establishment of our patriarchate is by no means designed to be a threat or intrigue against the Orthodox Churches and does not infringe their rights in anything.”33 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, which in a particularly difficult moment of history decided to enter into communion with Rome has profited from that choice notwithstanding negative outcomes. But the most important idea is that the specifically Ukrainian significance of the Greek-Catholic Patriarchate consists in the following fact: “Today, in the twenty-first century, our patriarchate is designed not to be an obsta-

____________________ 30 31

32 33

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No. 2000 (No. 3001, 149). “The New Ukrainian Prelate Speaks of Hope for the Church Unity. Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk Discusses His Role in Fostering ‘Unity of Action,” http:// www.ugcc.org.ua/2017.0.html?&L=2 (accessed March 11, 2014). No. 2000 (No. 3001, 146-147). No. 2000 (No. 3001, 147).

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

cle, but to be the path to a situation in which Ukraine has a single patriarch at the Saint Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv.”34 The decision of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to complete its structure with patriarchal dignity makes a valuable contribution to the modern communion model of the relations between the Churches.35 Liubomyr Husar emphasises the great importance of that development because by proposing a new understanding of the primate of the Roman Pontiff the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church not only returns to the authentic nature of the ancient Kyivan Church but also promotes a model that can preserve the ecclesial structure of the eastern Churches and contribute to the Catholic-Orthodox reconciliation.36 The patriarchal model of the Greek-Catholic Church would show the Orthodox (first of all, those in Ukraine) that it is possible to be in communion with Rome while preserving the typical eastern form of the existence of the Church thus contributing to the resolution of the contesting issue of the Pope’s primate. In the opinion of Husar, precisely here lies the ecumenical significance of the patriarchate of his Church. For the current leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church the issue of her patriarchate and the reestablishment of the unity of the Kyivan Church remain at the top of the agenda. Sviatoslav Shevchuk is convinced that the creation of one local Church in Ukraine cannot be a political project but should spring from the internal longings of the Churches.37 For him it is important that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church could celebrate the Eucharist together with other Churches as the manifestation of the highest unity between them.38 However, Sviatoslav Shevchuk puts a slightly different emphasis on what matters most on the way to the Church unity in Ukraine. He shares the conviction of Husar that the creation of the patriarchate of his Church will have an ecumenical dimension in Ukraine and it does not contradict the establishment of one local Ukrainian ____________________ 34 35 36 37

38

Ibid. No. 177, 308 (No. 3000, 131). Ibid. “Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy: Yedyna pomisna Tserkva v Ukraini ne mozhe buty politychnym proektom” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: a united local Church in Ukraine cannot be a political project}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/12483-glava-ugkc-yed ina-pomisna-cerkva-v-ukrayini-ne-mozhe-buti-politichnim-proektom.html (accessed September 14, 2012). Ibid.

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Church.39 However, for the moment, the Churches of the Kyivan tradition should not long for unity in one structure but rather for unity in action in order to testify the strength of Kyiv as a Christian centre.40 This unity in action would be the basis for the future local Kyivan Church. Concluding, it is evident that in all the analysed documents, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Patriarchate is regarded as a step to the creation of the united Kyivan Patriarchate as the embodiment of the Church unity in Ukraine. This vision has been univocally shared by all the leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church since her legalisation in 1989. The idea of the unity of the Churches of the Kyivan tradition became indeed an imperative in the teaching of the Greek-Catholics. Just consider the following statements of Liubomyr Husar: “In the times of prince Volodymyr there was one Church. Because of our human infirmity it exists today in four branches. However, I emphasise it is one Church”41 or “We say: three Orthodox Churches and one Greek-Catholic. It is not correct. There is one Church that was divided by us, people. And now we have to search a way to the ancient unity.”42 There are even stronger pronouncements of Husar, as for instance: “The return to the ancient unity of the Church is our duty.”43 Therefore, the patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should always be regarded in the light of those considerations, as a step towards the so much desired unity of the Kyivan Church. ____________________ 39

40

41

42 43

384

“Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy: Priamuvannia Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy do Patriarkhatu i prahnennia stvorennia yedynoi pomisnoi Tserkvy ne superechat odne odnomu” {The Head of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church: The movement of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church towards a Patriarchate and the aspiration for the creation of one local Church do not contradict each other}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/14011 -glava-ugkc-pryamuvannya-ugkc-do-patriarxatu-i-pragnennya-stvorennya-yedi noyi-pomisnoyi-cerkvi-ne-superechat-odne-odnomu.html (accessed September 9, 2012). “Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy rozkazav, z choho treba pochynaty stvoriuvaty yedynu pomisnu Tserkvu v Ukraini” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church told us where we have to begin to create the united local Church in Ukraine}, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/ 10877-glava-ugkc-rozkazav-z-chogo-treba-pochinati-stvoryuvati-yedinu-pomis nu-cerkvu-v-ukrayini.html (accessed September 13, 2012). Ihor Yatsiv, ed., Buty liudynoiu: Zbirnyk tsytat Blazhennishoho Liubomyra (Husara) {To be a person. Collection of the citations of His Beatitude Liubomyr (Husar)} (Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2011), 44. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Translation from the original source.

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

6.1.2.2 The united Kyivan Church “Holiness of united people of God” The new Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church speaks about the sin of the Church divisions that stains the communion of Churches.44 The ecumenical activities of this Church seek the communion in faith and sacraments between the divided Churches and the re-establishment of the internal unity of the Kyivan Metropolinate.45 Having declared the will for forgiveness on behalf of his Church during the liturgy with Pope John Paul II in 2001 in Lviv, Cardinal Husar succinctly announced the goal of the future pastoral activity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “For a better future in the new century we, bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, prepare the plan of pastoral work, the essence of which can be said in the following words: holiness of united people to the pilgrimage to Church communion, in order to carry out the will of Christ the Saviour.”46 In other words, the reconciliation between the Churches understood as communion is the clearly formulated task of the pastoral efforts of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church for the coming years. This idea was reiterated and elucidated more in detail in the synodal message of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 2009. There the bishops claimed that the task of searching communion between the Churches would be difficult because of the tragic past of the Ukrainian people in the 20th century: “We, the nation, spiritually wounded by the godless totalitarianism and ruined by eternal divisions, have to become a holy and united people, to sincerely strive for church communion with all Christians. Therefore let’s hold our spirit high, in order not to lose this large and deserving goal from the field of our vision – ‘holiness of the unified nation.”47

That citation means that for the Greek-Catholic bishops the principal task of the regeneration of Ukrainian society after the upheavals of the last century is inseparably combined with the consolidation of the nation in the united Kyivan Church. ____________________ 44 45 46 47

Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Catechism, 107. Ibid. No. 113, 213 (here quoted in the English translation in No. 2004). No. 2004.

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The very first sentence of the discourse of Liubomyr Husar on the occasion of the return of his Metropolitan seat to Kyiv in 2005 was the quotation from the Old Testament: “Take off your sandals, for the place where you are standing is holy ground” (Ex 3,5). Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine and the origin of four traditional Ukrainian Churches, is not only the administrative, but also the spiritual centre of the country. Husar recalls the ancient Kyivan chronic according to which the apostle Andrew visited the place where later the city of Kyiv arose, and blessed it foretelling it a glorious ecclesial future.48 The responsibility that Christians in Ukraine carry about the future of their Church derives from that understanding of the big task of the Church on the banks of the Dnipro river: “In Ukraine today among those who identify themselves as sharers in the ancient Kyivan tradition, there is a growing realisation that “on our land, finally, our own land,” the new brightness of God’s glory can and indeed should shine from a united Kyivan Church.”49 The baptism of the Kyivan Rus by the Great Prince Volodymyr and the foundation of the Kyivan Metropolinate create the rich spiritual basis from where four traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine originate. Nowadays, the once united Kyivan Church is divided among several confessions, however, until today the original historical unity has been binding them: “In the Church’s memory, the awareness of the deep unity of the ancient Church of Kyiv was never extinguished.”50 Consequently, Ukrainian Christians are destined to long for unity. The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church realises that great efforts have to be done in order to define “the ecclesial-theological, canonical-juridical, social-political, and spiritual-cultural foundations of a united Kyivan Church.”51 In the anticipation of such a consensus, the Church leadership unfolds its own vision of the underlying principles on which such a Church should be founded. In the subsequent paragraphs I will elucidate those principles.

____________________ 48 49 50 51

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No. 177, 307 (No. 3000, 128). No. 177, 307 (No. 3000, 129). No. 177, 308 (No. 3000, 130). No. 177, 307 (No. 3000, 129).

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

The inclusive Ukrainian/Kyivan Patriarchate Both great leaders of the Greek-Catholic Church in the 20th century, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi, unceasingly worked on bringing about rapprochement with the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. First of all, Sheptytskyi and Slipyi endeavoured to bring to light the dogmatic and cultural similarities between Greek-Catholics and Orthodox:52 “Metropolitan Andrey (Sheptytskyj): I do not see a contrast between the Catholics and the Orthodox... I only want to say that love for Catholics or the Orthodox works in the direction of unification, and all that which is on both sides hatred, shortage of love... works for the division… Patriarch Joseph (Slipyj): The most numerous Churches that we have are the Orthodox and Catholic, and, impartially speaking, there is no substantial dogmatic difference between us, as it is shown through theological studies and by history. Truthfully, the division and separation are supported only from outside, from those who knows that are weakening the Ukrainian Nation and Church...”53

In his “Testament” Slipyi postulated: “The nearest to us in faith and blood are our Orthodox brothers. We are connected by the tradition of our native Christianity, common Church and folk customs, common culture of two millennia! We are joined by the same struggle for originality of our native Church, for its Plenitude, the visible sign which will be the single Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Church!”54

Further, Metropolitan Sheptytskyi demonstrated his openness to look for different models of union between Orthodox and Greek-Catholics in Ukraine: “It is possible to talk about the different methods of understanding without pouring into one confession. It is possible to think about the connection of the Ortho-

____________________ 52

53 54

„Brief des Metropoliten Sheptytskyj an die orthodoxen Hierarchen in der Angelegenheit der Verständigung unter den Ukrainern verschiedener Glaubensbekenntnisse,“ in Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar, eds. and trans. Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 89-97; „Aus dem Vermächtnis Seiner Seligkeit Patriarch Josyf {Slipyj},“ in Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar, eds. and trans. Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012), 98-105. No. 2004. Italics preserved from the original text. Ibid.

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Part II. Memory and practical steps to reconciliation and Christian unity dox belief with the Greek-Catholic one... I wanted for adherents of different religious confessions to come together, preserve, obviously, their authenticity.”55

For this research it is important to emphasise that Yosyf Slipyi has always prompted the importance of spiritual unity of Ukraine for the sake of the flourishing of the state: “Let’s be ourselves! Let’s look at our spiritual good, at the salvation of our souls – and then there will be unity between us, first in the area of the Church, and then on the national and state levels!”56 The leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in independent Ukraine continue to follow the tradition of looking for the points of unity with the Orthodox. Among those is the common martyrdom of those Churches under the Soviet regime: “The white garments in which the martyrs appeared before God do not have denominational signs.”57 The Churches have to realise that they confess the same faith, share the same liturgical tradition and Holy Sacraments. At the result of the historical developments the Ukrainian Churches entered into communion with different Christian centres (Moscow, Rome and Constantinople) which partly caused the present situation of division. However, the longing for unity has always been present which was embodied in the project of the reestablishment of the Kyivan Metropolinate by two prominent figures of the 17th century – the Orthodox Metropolinate Petro Mohyla and the uniate Yosyf Rutskyi. The common efforts of those famous Church leaders also belong to the heritage of the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine.58 The idea of the one Kyivan Patriarchate is already present in the earliest addresses of Cardinal Liubachivskyi.59 Briefly, it can be described like this: the Kyivan Church of Saint Volodymyr’s baptism was one and undivided according to the principle “Orthodox in faith but Catholic in love;” the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church desires to return to that ancient state ____________________ 55 56 57 58 59

388

Ibid. Ibid. No. 216, 359. Translation from the original source. Ibid., 360. About Liubachivskyi’s ecclesiology of Sister-Churches, the unity of the Kyivan Church, the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and communion, see Myron Bendyk, “Ekleziolohiia Patriarkha Myroslava Ivana (Liubachivskoho)” {Ecclesiology of Patriarch Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi}, http://www.dds.edu.ua/ua/articles/2/rizne/949-lubachivsky-theology.html (accessed January 22, 2014).

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

of the Kyivan Church that was in the Eucharistic communion with Rome, Constantinople and all the local Churches; this Church deserves the status of the Patriarchate of Kyiv-Halych and all the Rus. 60 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church declares the aim of her ecumenical activities in the renewal of the Eucharistic communion with the Churches of the same liturgical, patristic and theological legacy, that is with the Churches of the Kyivan tradition.61 Hence, Liubachivskyi calls the Orthodox for unity, to pray and work together for the welfare of the Ukrainian people and the Church.62 The concrete historical embodiment of the re-established Kyivan Church in the Greek-Catholic perspective is the inclusive Kyivan or Ukrainian Patriarchate, the new ecclesial entity in communion with Rome and the Eastern Christian Churches.63 For the moment every branch of the Kyivan Church is moving to the patriarchal status, although in different ways: “When in 1991 Ukraine became an independent state, its movement to the patriarchate was renewed by Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Between the Orthodox Churches there is no one agreement in regards to the method of achieving patriarchal status: one has chosen the way of proclamation by themselves (for example the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1991), others prefer “the gift of autocephaly.” All the heirs of the historical Kyivan Church in Ukraine acknowledge that it is ready for patriarchal status. Practical embodiment of the patriarchal idea in both – the Greek-Catholic and Orthodox – branches of the Kyivan Church testifies that this idea has a beyond confessional nature. In this case even the smallest success of one of the branches becomes a success for all because step by step it lays the path to the ultimate goal – a single communion patriarchate.”64

The movement towards the patriarchate is considered to be a “process determined by the natural development of Ukrainians Churches.”65 The split in the Ukrainian Christianity can be overcome when the interests of every denomination are taken into account. The efforts that would bring benefits to only one Church are deemed to fail. And finally, the Greek-Catholic bishops point at the universal ecumenical dimension of the unified Ukrainian Patriarchate: ____________________ 60 61 62 63 64 65

No. 23, 44; No. 28, 50; No. 40, 74-75. No. 32, 59. No. 21, 36. No. 5003, 61 (No. 4000, 129). No. 2004. Ibid.

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Part II. Memory and practical steps to reconciliation and Christian unity “The civilised decision of the fate of the Kyivan Church can become the real “laboratory of ecumenism” (John Paul II), deprived of categoricalness and full of the spirit of cooperation and partnership. Harmonious, exclusive forms of community of the Kyivan Church (for example in the form of a unified Patriarchate – through the historical vision of Ukrainians from the 17th century) due to an unique communion openness could become a chance for the centres of Christianity to meet on terrain to finally find the new ecumenical models of understanding... (II.4).”66

Let us single out the principles on which such a patriarchate should be build.

Not uniatism but communion The question of the principles upon which the renewed Kyivan Church should be grounded received great attention from the Greek-Catholic Church leadership. As follows from the quotations above, the reconciliation between the currently divided entities of the previously one Kyivan Church should be some kind of a Church body where every denomination preserves its authentic character and is in Eucharistic communion with others. In 2008, in his letter to Metropolitan Volodymyr, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Husar unfolded the theological basis for the communion between the traditional Ukrainian Churches. He emphasises that one Church of Christ exists as the communion of local Churches; she is the icon of the Holy Trinity whose divine essence consists in the communion of separate and equal persons.67 A single person in the Holy Trinity does not constitute the whole Trinity; accordingly, none of the Churches of the Kyivan Tradition can represent the whole Kyivan Church or constitute her basis.68 Similarly, Sviatoslav Shevchuk describes the unity of the Church with the term koinonia. That term means “unity, harmony and common life. To be Church is to abide in the communion of the Holy Spirit, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of the God the Father. Thus, the unity of the Church is an icon of the unity of Persons of the Holy Trinity.”69 ____________________ 66 67 68 69

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Ibid. No. 2002 (No. 4002, 203). Ibid. No. 2013.

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

What defines the position of this Church in the ecumenical movement is her unity with the Holy See; this is one of the fundamentals of the identity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.70 At the same time, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholics grieve for the loss of Eucharistic communion with the ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Mother-Church of the Kyivan Christianity.71 The Greek-Catholics would like to renew this communion without losing the unity with Rome. The Church leadership has always accentuated that such a perspective was the historical reality of the ancient Kyivan Church and this is what contemporary divided branches of traditional Ukrainian Christianity have to aim at. In order to eliminate the fear that the re-establishment of the Kyivan Church would mean the dissolution and amalgamation of the Churches, Greek-Catholics emphasise that the communion model of unity excludes such a scenario: “Instead of the monopolistic domain of the Christian Ukraine, which was characteristic of past epochs, we propose the communion’s unity of today’s still divided Kyivan Church. However, this unity, in order to bring peace and understanding to Ukraine has to grow from within, in the bosom of every branch of the Kyivan Church.”72

Therefore, the ways to union as it was understood by the Roman See in 1596 or the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946 are in principle the wrong ways of reaching the rapprochement between the Churches. The false interpretation of the Union of Brest of 1596 caused the accusation of its protagonists in “the betrayal of Orthodoxy,” “forced Polonisation,” “Catholic proselytism”73 and finally resulted into the split in the Kyivan Metropolinate. Similarly, the Lviv Pseudo-Synod, that was justified by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet propaganda by the need to eliminate the consequences of the Union of Brest and by the return of the uniates to the Mother-Church, was but another example of uniatism.74 The present Greek-Catholic Church draws a sharp distinction between uniatism and the communion of the Sister-Churches as methods of unity. That task is inevitable if the narrow confessional model of the Kyivan Church comprising only Orthodox Churches is to be avoided: “Meanwhile, the suggestions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy are limited to ____________________ 70 71 72 73 74

No. 5003, 56 (No. 4000, 122); No. 2004. No. 5003, 58 (No. 4000, 124). No. 2004. No. 219, 369. Ibid.

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only creating a single national Ukrainian Orthodox Church. To the suggestion of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church which foresees the emergence from narrow confessional scopes, the Ukrainian Orthodox community stands carefully for they see the old model of “unionism.” This testifies to a serious necessity to understand the difference between “unionism” as a confessional subject and the “unionism” as confessional subordination and communion unity of equals in the dignity of the Churches.”75 Marynovych identified this non-denominational model of Eucharistic unity as evolutional because it overcomes the denominationalism that keeps the Ukrainian Churches apart.76 The confessional way of reaching the Church unity in Ukraine is not realistic because it presupposes the subjugation of the non-canonical Churches to the canonical one and does not envisage a place for the Greek-Catholics.77 The studied documents show that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church realises that her communion with Rome is regarded by the Orthodox as an obstacle to the acceptance of the Greek-Catholics as part of the future local Ukrainian Church. Already Liubachivskyi analysed that problem, for instance in his “Letter to Cardinal Cassidy,” where he promoted the search for such a model of communion of the Eastern Catholic Churches with Rome that could be accepted by the Orthodox. Liubachivskyi agreed that uniatism “as a means of Church union should be discarded as inappropriate.”78 However, he accentuates the distinction between method and model: “... method speaks of the means of unification, whereas “model of unity” refers to the end or result.”79 Whilst Liubachivskyi agrees that uniatism as a method of achieving the Church unity in the past should be discarded as inappropriate, he still believes that it is possible to change the model of the unity of the Eastern Catholic Churches with Rome. That ____________________ 75 76

77

78 79

392

No. 2004. Myroslav Marynovych, “My musymo vyity za mezhi konfesiinosti i zaproponuvaty svitovi ponadkonfesiinu model yevkharystiinoi yednosti” {We have to go beyond the limits of denominationalism and propose to the world the nondenominational model of Eucharistic unity}, interview by Yevheniia Syzontova, Dialogs.org.ua, http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/page140-2160.html (accessed January 14, 2014). Myron Bendyk, Yedyna pomisna Tserkva: konfesiina utopiia chy tserkovna realnist? {United local Church. Confessional utopia or ecclesial reality?} (Drohobych: Kolo, 2007), 6-8. No. 5001, 419. Ibid.

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

practically means the revision of the canonical relationship between the Holy See and the eastern Catholics. The idea of the “double unity” of the united Kyivan Patriarchate called forth criticism from the Orthodox side80 on the grounds that the communion between the Orthodox and Catholics would be possible only after the dogmatic differences are eliminated.81 The Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church cannot deviate from the dogmas which oblige the Catholic Church. Moreover, she cannot legitimately derive her project from the idea of the re-establishment of the Kyivan Church according to the plan of the Kyivan Orthodox Metropolitan Petro Mohyla from the 17th century, because since then new dogmas have been adopted (the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception (1854) or the papal infallibility (1870)). The issue of the status of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the universal Catholic Church must also be reconsidered. For the moment this status is unacceptable for the Orthodox since it presupposes at least a certain swallowing up by the Roman See. Some Greek-Catholics recognise the validity of this latter reproach insisting that “when the local model or the model of Sister-Churches replaces in the Catholic Church the uniate or paternalistic model, the ground for the suspicion from the side of the Orthodox will disappear.”82 Mykhailo Dymyd, the director of the Institute of ____________________ 80

81

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See, for isntance, Serhii Horbik, “Do pytannia idei Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy pro ‘podviinu yednist” {To the idea of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the “double unity”}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/discussions/theme/ 40823/ (accessed January 31, 2014); Mykolai Danylevych, “Suchasni tendentsii v uniatskomu bohoslovi: Ideia ‘podviinoi yednosti” {Contemporary tendencies in the Uniate theology. The idea of the “double unity”}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/bp/ discussions/theme/40235/ (accessed January 31, 2014). See also a criticism from the side of a Greek-Catholic theologian with similar arguments: Mykola Krokosh, “Staryi vovk uniatyzmu v novii ovechii shkuri ekumenizmy? Krytychnyi pohliad na ekumenichnu teoriiu Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {The old wolf of uniatism in the sheep’s clothing of ecumenism? Critical view of the ecumenical theory of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church}, http://theology.in. ua/ua/bp/discussions/critic/39201/ (accessed January 31, 2014). “V Ukrainskii Pravoslavnii Tserkvi Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu poiasnyly, chomu pry naiavnosti khoroshykh stosunkiv z Ukrainskoiu Hreko-Katolytskoiu Tserkvoiu ne mozhe buty yevkharystiinoho yednannia tsykh dvokh Tserkov” {The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate explained why there cannot be Eucharistic communion with the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church despite good relations}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/confessional/inter church_relations/42244/ (accessed January 22, 2014). Myron Bendyk, Pomisnist Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ta yii bachennia Patriarkhom Yosyfom Slipym {The particularity of the Ukrainian

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Canon Law of the Ukrainian Catholic University, is convinced that currently his Church is following the inauthentic way to the patriarchate83 which is articulated in the excessive dependence upon the Vatican. Because of that, today’s way of the communion with Rome that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church will bring into the united Kyivan Patriarchate is unacceptable for the Orthodox. Dymyd maintains that the relations of his Church with the Vatican as fixed in the current “Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches” do not reflect the genuine Eucharistic ecclesiology where the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church would be regarded as a Sister-Church,84 a theology that originated in the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church still in the pre-Vatican times in the thought of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi.85 This is a big challenge for Rome to reconsider its ecumenical engagement on the basis of the genuine communion model grounded on the relations between the Churches as Sister-Churches.86 Therefore, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has to work out a new model of the relationships with the Vatican in her local canon law and negotiate it with the Roman See with the final aim of “a full communion with the Roman-Catholic Church “in the matters faith and moral” and the full self-government (autocephaly) of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in internal issues.”87 Such a model would “testify to the purity of intensions of the Catholic side in the search of unity with the Orthodox Churches.”88 Because ultimately, it is not about the creation of a new powerful Church but about bringing about the peaceful coexistence of the Churches in Ukraine and through them – the whole Christian world: “We do not create some new totalitarian “empire” or confessional “civilisation” ____________________

83

84 85

86 87

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Greek-Catholic Church and its vision by Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi} (Lviv: Svichado, 1996), 50. Translation from the original source. “Kruhlyi stil: ‘Patriarkhat Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy. Shcho dali?” {Round table. “Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. What next?”}, Patriarkhat 6 (2010): 14. Mykhailo Dymyd, Khersoneske tainstvo svobody {Chersones sacrament of freedom} (Lviv: Svichado, 2007), 279. See the article Ihor George Kutash, “Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. A Pioneer of the Sister-Churches Model of Church Unity?” Logos. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 43-45 (2002-2004): 31-40. Andriy Mykhaleyko, “Dia katholischen Ostkirchen im ökumenischen Dialog”, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 11-12 (2013): 29. Myron Bendyk, Patriarkhat Ukrainskoi Tserkvy ta ukrainska natsionalna ideia {The Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian national idea} (Drohobych, 2004). Translation from the original source. No. 5001, 420. Translation from the original source.

Chapter VI. On the value of spiritual unity or how to promote reconciliation

which would play the role of the Fourth Rome. The feature of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church’s proposed vision of the Kyivan Church is the aspiration to finally live in peace with the neighbours.89

Practical project of communion In “Conception of the Ecumenical Position,” the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church considers her participation in the ecumenical movement in the light of the teaching about sobornost (communion). The foundation and goal of the sobornost of the Church is the sobornost of the Holy Trinity, so that the whole humanity through the Church can partake in the communion of the Trinity.90 The sobornost of the Church is manifested in the Eucharistic unity, the preaching of the Gospel, and in the common recognition of faith by bishops, priests and deacons.91 This illustrates the essence of the united Kyivan Patriarchate and would testify to the world its ecclesial maturity.92 The practical steps towards it were elaborated in detail in 2008 in a letter of Liubomyr Husar to Metropolitan Volodymyr, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. According to that document, the traditional Ukrainian Churches have to follow the subsequent steps towards the creation of a united Church:93 • • • •

The Churches of the Kyivan tradition recognise each other as SisterChurches. On the basis of the common Creed they recognise that all of them share the same faith of the first seven ecumenical councils. The Churches mutually recognise the validity of their sacraments and the legitimacy of their hierarchical structures. The names of the Heads of the Churches are inscribed in the diptychs of every Church and are mutually commemorated during the liturgy.94

____________________ 89 90 91 92 93

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No. 2004. No. 5003, 53 (No. 4000, 117). Ibid. (No. 4000, 118). Bendyk, United local Church, 9. Despite this concrete project, the commentators agree that the organisation of the Kyivan Patriarchate based on the communion is at first not important and will emerge in a definite form only in the process. (Ibid., 10). No. 2002 (No. 4002, 203-204).

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The common Eucharist as a visible sign of unity of the local Ukrainian Church would mean that four branches of the Kyivan Church could elect a common patriarch.95 He would be commemorated by all the branches of the Kyivan Church during the liturgy, would represent the local Ukrainian Church before the other Churches, and solve possible disputes. Even though that project needs further elaboration and coordination with the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine (that the Greek-Catholic Church leadership recognises), it is a first valuable account of the coexistence of those Churches in the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate.

Unity in diversity For the creators of the vision of the incisive Kyivan Patriarchate it is important that this project does not threaten the identity of local Churches. In the opinion of Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the Greek-Catholic venture of unity has good chances in the future because it is not exclusivist and it equally welcomes the gifts and richness, history, and experience of every Church.96 Practically it means that the Churches do not have to lose their contacts with the respective Church of their current jurisdiction after they have joined the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate. It is necessary to cherish the treasure of the communion with different Christian centres such as Moscow, Constantinople, and Rome: “Every confessional branch of the Kyivan Church, historically close to the one of the Christian centres, has not lost its blessed by time confessional connections. Today it is possible to convincingly assert that the demand to break those relations, which was so often heard in the history of Ukraine, has led to its insolvency. As it was already mentioned above, the replacement of the jurisdiction of subordination on the communion’s sisterhood would enable not only to save the valuable aspects of former relations but also enrich the general treasury of the Kyivan Church (II.2).”97

____________________ 95 96

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No. 2002 (No. 4002, 205). Sviatoslav Shevchuk, “Tserkva povynna vyity za mezhi ‘ohorozh svoikh khramiv” {The Church has to step out of “the fences around her churches”}, interview by Viktoriia Skuba, Day.kiev.ua, http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/ akciya-dnya/blazhenniyshiy-svyatoslav-shevchuk-cerkva-povinna-viyti-za-mez hi-ogorozh-svoyih (accessed May 6, 2014). No. 2004.

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The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church contributes to the common treasury of the Kyivan Church by bringing in the direct succession of the KyivHalych Metropolitan Seat. Additionally, that Church contributes her unique experience of the communion with the Latin Church and the openness to Christian Europe.98 Certain elements of the Kyivan Church are better preserved in the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. In particular, the input of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate consists among other things in the possibility to build relations of the Sister-Churches with the Russian Orthodox Church. Additionally, being for centuries a part of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had access to the wider theological and ecclesial context. The two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches with unregulated status embody an important idea of the autocephaly of the Kyivan Church that would help overcome the uniate-like way of thinking Notwithstanding the above clarifications, the practical canonicaljuridical principles of the united Kyivan Patriarchate have to be further elaborated. There is a whole range of questions to be answered. Who will be the Patriarch of Kyiv? How will he be elected? Should the Patriarch of Kyiv be only an honourable position? Which functions could he perform? Which domains will be given for the self-determination of every Church and what should be decided on the patriarchal level? How can the Kyivan Patriarchate be in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate when Rome and Moscow are not in communion themselves? On those questions we do not find answers in the official pronouncements of the Greek-Catholic leadership. It seems that for the time being the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church only wants to disseminate the vision of the united Kyivan Church and postpones the practical issues until the four branches of the Kyivan Church are ready to work on that proposal.99 It is too early to discuss the details when the project in general has not been accepted yet. Still, Antoine Arjakovsky argues that the transition from the institutional, sociological, and political definition of the Church to her Eucharistic, baptismal, and pastoral vision that is under way gives chances for the idea of the Kyivan Church as a model of reconciliation too.100 For example, the ambiguity of the notion of canonical territory nowadays represents this changing ecclesial mentality. However, at the present time the ____________________ 98 Shevchuk, “The Church has to step out.” 99 Mykhaleiko, His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar on the unity. 100 Arjakovsky, En attendant, 456.

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Ukrainian Churches can do most when they learn to cooperate with each other, for instance, in practical pastoral projects. Such a need is evident in society where, for example, the abortion rate remains very high and where people declare themselves Christians, however they are for the greater part not practising their religion. Churches should unite their efforts in handling the challenges of the present times practising the ecumenism of life.101

6.1.2.3 Practical steps towards Church unity in Ukraine In the words of Bert Groen, the Churches must adopt kenotic spirituality which means that “the Churches need the mentality of being ready not to absolutisise their own denominational identity and the disposition to make sacrifice for the sake of unity.”102 This explains Husar’s claims that the Ukrainian Churches are divided because they do not genuinely desire unity. On the other hand, Mykola Krokosh criticised the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church that her ecumenical initiatives are confined to the sporadic messages of the Head of the Church and some theologians without a well-structured plan of actions.103 I have already mentioned elsewhere that Sviatoslav Shevchuk considers the unity of action to be the way to the rapprochement between the Churches. The work on the common inter-Church projects in the social sphere should make the Churches understand each other better and learn their mutual concerns. First, the Greek-Catholic Church leadership calls the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine to reinterpret together the meaning of the crucial historical events that marked the relations between them. For instance, the ____________________ 101 Ibid., 462. 102 „Die Kirchen benötigen eine Mentalität der Bereitschaft, ihre eigene konfessionelle Identität zu verabsolutieren und eine Bereitschaft, Opfer für die Einheit zu bringen“ (Bert Groen, „Anders-sein und Ökumene. Einige persönliche Überlegungen zum Abschluss. Zum Andenken an Anton Houtepen (1940-2010)“, in Mission und Einheit: Gemeinsames Zeugnis getrennter Kirchen? – Mission and Unity: Common Witness of Separated Churches? Proceedings of the 16th Academic Consultations of the Societas Oecumenica, Beihefte zur Ökumenischen Rundschau, 91, eds. Peter De Mey, Andrew Pierce, and Oliver Schuegraf (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012), 242. 103 Mykola Krokosh, “Ekumenizm yak test na pomisnist” {Ecumenism as a test for the local Church}, http://www.credo-ua.org/2009/08/4603 (accessed January 22, 2014).

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60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod is an opportunity for the Churches of Kyivan origin to find a new meaning of this act of the destruction of the Greek-Catholic Church and to reflect how it can contribute nowadays to the flourishing of Ukrainian Christianity. One of the lessons of the Lviv Pseudo-Synod is that the Churches should not apply political, administrative, and the like methods for strengthening the own Church and weaken the concurrent.104 Equally, the amalgamation of one Church into another Church would not contribute to religious peace in Ukraine. Second, it is equally important to find appropriate protagonists of the ecumenical initiatives so that they touch upon the lives of the smallest members of the Church – ordinary believers. Already Metropolitan Sheptytskyi maintained that the previous initiatives of the Church unity failed because the advocates of the unity did not manage to explain its importance to the ordinary faithful.105 In “Conception of the Ecumenical Position” as the initial step to reconciliation the cultivation of the desire for unity in every Christian comes to the fore. 106 For that aim the culture of understanding and cooperation on the societal level must be promoted. This practically requires the involvement of the laity in the ecumenical initiatives because, notwithstanding several previous attempts at the rapprochement between the Churches, they predominantly took place on the level of hierarchy and finally did not materialise. Such an unsatisfiable result of the ecumenical initiatives of the Churches is understandable in the light of the allusion to Robert Schreiter who claimed that reconciliation can be successful only if realised on the mid-level and if it concerns the life of every individual. Liubomyr Husar realises the core of the problem and comes up with a solution that involves the faithful on the most basic level. Typical of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, the answer is of a spiritual nature: Husar maintains that every Christian should implement in his or her life the Gospel teaching of Christ that equally applies to the faithful of every denomination.107 Organising life on the basis of the Gospel would display the internal unity of the ____________________ 104 105 106 107

No. 216, 359. Marynowytsch, Ökumenische Prozesse, 11. No. 5003, 56 (No. 4000, 121). Liubomyr Husar, “Yakym by bulo nashe zhyttia, yakby kozhna viruiucha liudyna: sluzhbovets, uriadovets, pidpryiemets, robitnyk vykonuvyv svoi oboviazky yaknaikrashche” {What our life would look like when every faithful – employee, official, entrepreneur, worker – would fulfill the duties at one’s best}, http:// www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2013/10/8/6999483/ (accessed October 29, 2013).

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Christians and show them perpectives of the original unity. Sviatoslav Shevchuk similarly speaks about the strategic alliance of the Churches in Ukraine for the sake of the evangelisation of those Ukrainians who have not yet discovered or interiorised the message of the Gospel.108 It is equally important to mention that there is no consensus among the very clergy and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the ecumenical position of their Church. Anatolii Babynskyi points at different priorities in ecumenical activities where, for instance, some rely on the official Catholic-Orthodox dialogue, others more actively demand the search for the own Greek-Catholic way for reaching rapprochement and still others reject the very idea of the unity with the Orthodox.109 Therefore, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has to strive for her internal unity first in order to communicate the idea of the regeneration of the Kyivan Church on the broader Christian level in Ukraine. Usually this topic does not appear in the official Church pronouncements. Further, as a practical step towards Church unity in Ukraine the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church calls the representatives of all religious groups to stop accusations at the address of each other and the spreading of false information in the mass media.110 Instead, the Churches have to underscore those multiple elements that unite them.111 Here they touch upon the very important issue of media wars in Ukrainian Christianity, which is waged partly because of the incompetence of the journalists and partially because of the insufficient realisation of the consequences of such a behaviour. I have already illustrated that phenomenon in chapter I of the book. Finally, in his speech during the First Ukrainian Eucharistic Congress “Reconciliation as a Gift from God and a Source of New Life” Liubomyr Husar spoke about repentance, dialogue, recognition of the opponent as a son of God, non-acceptance of violence in interconfessional conflicts, and the appreciation of the otherness as effective resources towards the rap____________________ 108 “Hlava Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy poiasnyv, chomu yoho Tserkva ide na Skhid i prahne diievoi yednosti z pravoslavnymy” {The Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church explained why his Church goes to the East and desires unity in action with the Orthodox}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/ catholics/ugcc/53923/ (accessed October 29, 2013). 109 Anatolii Babynskyi, “Ekumenizm i vnutrishnia yednist” {Ecumenism and internal unity}, Patriarkhat 6 (2009): 26. 110 No. 28, 50; No. 40, 75. 111 Ibid.

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prochement between the Churches in Ukraine. However, the first means of Church unity is the prayer.112 This is probably the answer to the question why the practical methods towards the reconciliation between Christians in Ukraine do not occupy a lot of place in the official Greek-Catholic pronouncements. The approach that this Church applies is a spiritual regeneration of the person, the return to the core of Christianity – the unity with Christ that is among other things achieved through prayer. The statements of the type of “Memorandum of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the Issue of the Local Kyivan Church” are rather untypical. In that document the Greek-Catholic leadership lists the desired ways of the state contribution to the creation of the particular Ukrainian Church. Among them are mentioned the initiation of meetings between the traditional Ukrainian Churches, the support of those Churches in their relations with Rome, Constantinople, or Moscow, the state contribution to the popularisation of the principles of the united local Church in the mass media or the sustenance of NGOs which work on the unity of the Churches in Ukraine.113 Usually, in the majority of the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the spiritual, inward, personal side of reconciliation is emphasised. In my presentation at the international colloquium “The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church. Understanding the Challenges” in the Saint-Serge Institute in Paris, upon studying the key social pronouncements of three leading Orthodox denominations in Ukraine I contended that the way to reconciliation between those Churches can lead through the deeper appreciation of the shared social teaching, in particular on the responsibility for the fate of the Ukrainian state.114 The Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church expresses similar concerns, and hence this cooperation for the well-being of the Ukrainian society could be a point that can bring the struggling Churches closer. As clearly stated in “On the Spiritual Rebirth of Ukrainian Society in the Context of the Globalisation of the World” issued by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in 2004 “the accent of the ecumenical movement has to be placed there ____________________ 112 No. 92, 173. 113 No. 5005, 9. 114 Myroslava Rap, “Social Teaching of the Traditional Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. Ethics of Civil Responsibility as a Point of Rapprochement.” Paper presented at the international colloquium “The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church. Understanding the Challenges,” Institut Saint-Serge, Paris, October, 18-20, 2012.

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{development of one moral teaching}, and it would be more effective than efforts to reach organisational unity or unity of faith.”115 The proper and fruitful place of the Church in society would be that “of a public voice in civil society, combined with private piety, pastoral support and social action.”116 Precisely this element gives the Ukrainian Churches a chance to overcome their conflicts based on identity.

6.1.2.4 Unity of the Church – unity of the nation The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is looking forward to the “allOrthodox reconciliation in Ukraine and the joining of present branches of Orthodoxy into one Orthodox Church, considering that reconciliation and joining will become important factors for the spiritual revival of Ukraine.”117 The idea of one united local Ukrainian Church is one of the expressions of the quest for an ideology that would promote the unity of the divided Ukrainian society.118 The leading idea interwoven in the official pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation is the conviction that the unity of the Churches in Ukraine in the form of the inclusive Kyivan Patriarchate will bring about the consolidation of the divided Ukrainian nation through the establishment of spiritual unity. Myroslav Marynovych explains that such a unity does not presuppose religious or denominational uniformity; similarly religious pluralism does point at the spiritual disunity or division in the country. Spiritual uni-

____________________ 115 “Deklaratsiia Pomisnoho Soboru Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu ‘Pro dukhovne pidrodzhennia ukrainskoho suspilstva v umovakh hlobalizatsii svitu” {Declaration of the Local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate “On the spiritual rebirth of Ukrainian society in the context of the globalisation of the world”}, http://theology.in.ua/ua/index/ resourses/church_doc/uockp_doc/34100/ (accessed February 10, 2014). Translation from the original source. 116 David Herbert, “Habermas, Christianity and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (n.p.: Nomos, 1999), 98. 117 No. 2004. 118 Andrii Yurash, “Yedyna pomisna ukrainska Tserkva: vid mrii do realii” {United local Ukrainian Church. From dreams to realities}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/ studios/studies_of_religions/16863/ (accessed January 24, 2014).

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ty rather means harmonious relations with the other, or more precisely the existence of those relations.119 Here the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church refers to what Francis Fukuyama called social capital. In his lecture in Kyiv in 2006 this philosopher maintained that the failing social capital hinders the development of the former communist countries. This social capital is built in an informal way through common traumatic experience, ethnicity, or religion.120 One united Church as a way to the unity of the nation corresponds to Fukuyama’s belief that religion can contribute to the establishment of the social capital. That confidence was already expressed in the thought of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi.121 In the words of Slipyi, “[a unified] Kyivan Patriarchate has to be, and with definiteness would become the rescuer of Church unity in the Universal Christ’s Church and rescuer of our Ukrainian, Church, and national unity” (Testament).”122 The issues of the patriarchate “are concentrated questions not only about the structure of the Church, but also the unity of God’s nation and its holiness.”123 Metropolitan Sheptytskyi claimed: “Religious unity would be a mighty push towards the understanding of national unity.”124 The current leaders of the Greek-Catholic Church continue that line of thinking concerning the allUkrainian consolidation. For instance, in the letter to the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches from 2006, the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek____________________ 119 Myroslav Marynovych, “Relihiina svoboda: hlobalnyi vybir natsionalnoho imperatyvu” {Religious freedom. Global dimension of the national imperative}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/open_theme/42482/ (accessed January 22, 2014). 120 Francis Fukuyama, “Shcho take sotsialnyi capital?” {What is social capital?}, Den, October 27, 2006. 121 Within similar lines argued the Head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Patriarch Mstyslav Skrypnyk (1898-1993). However, he concentrated on the re-establishment of the united Orthodox Church in Ukraine and did not discuss the place of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the future united Ukrainian Church. See the comparison of the visions of Slipyi and Skrypnyk in the paragraph “Patriarchs Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) and Yosyf (Slipyi). Testaments of the unity of the Ukrainian people” in the following study: Anatolii Kolodnyi and Liudmyla Fylypovych, Relihiina dukhovnist ukraintsiv: vyiavy, postati, stan {Religious spirituality of Ukrainians. Exposures, figures, state} (Lviv: Lohos, 1996), 157-166. 122 No. 2004. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid.

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Catholic Church expresses the desire to intensify the dialogue because Greek-Catholics share with the Orthodox common problems of modern Ukrainian society. They claim that “the unity of the nation cannot be complete without the unity on the spiritual level.”125 In “Conception of the Ecumenical Position,” the Greek-Catholic leadership speaks about the urgency of reconciliation between the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine because it would be beneficial to the spiritual climate in the country.126 Many times the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church calls the own faithful and those of other Churches to look for the common elements that can bring them closer.127 Also the common efforts towards the creation of the united local Church in Ukraine “can become a powerful factor of social consolidation, a ground for the Ukrainian national idea.”128 According to Husar, the specific value of the unity of the Churches in Ukraine consists in its benefits for the country.129 Thus, the unity is not only the will of God for the Church but also the factor that will contribute to peace and harmony in the state. The struggle between the Churches in Ukraine hinders their evangelisation efforts. Cardinal Husar is convinced that it would be difficult to testify to Christ unless Christian Churches in Ukraine consider the evangelisation as their common task.130 Disunity and struggle among the Churches account for disbelief of so many Ukrainians because “by this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you love one another.”131 Christian Churches have to open themselves to the other, consider each other brothers, and recognise the dignity of the other because through the other God is speaking. Finally, Liubomyr Husar emphasises the importance of the common spiritual Christian values for the wellbeing of the country in addition to political and economic factors. Additionally, Ukrainians have to appreciate the multi-ethnicity of their state, the diversity of the cultures that inhabit it because this is also a gift of God.132 ____________________ 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

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No. 232, 392. Translation from the original source. No. 5003, 59-60 (No. 4000, 127). For instance see, No. 28, 50; No. 40, 75; No. 32, 59. No. 2002. Translation from the original source. (No. 4002, 205). No. 92, 172. Ibid. Jn 13,35. No. 92, 174.

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Liubomyr Husar popularises the idea that the normalisation of the relations between the historical Churches of the Kyivan tradition on the one hand and the normalisation of the relations between Church and state on the other hand “would also help consolidate the Ukrainian nation and facilitate the resolution of regional and ideological conflicts.”133 Further, “the above-mentioned normalisation of inter-church relations would prevent Ukraine from becoming an object of contest between influential powers, as has occurred so many times before.”134 Those ideas of Husar get support from a number of Ukrainian intellectuals, for instance, Myroslav Marynovych and Myron Bendyk. Even though he does not see the mechanism for its practical implementation, Oleh Kiseliov, a Ukrainian religious expert, appreciates the merits of the model of the united Kyivan Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church “in terms of establishing Ukrainian statehood, reviving Ukrainian culture, establishing national identity”.135 Ultimately, promoting the unity of the Church, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church pursues the same goal as in her texts on the healing of memory. Both aim at the moral regeneration after the totalitarian destruction of the person. Both seek ways to overcome the crisis of development in Ukraine. The purification of memory should bring to the fore the dignity of the person and establish a proper moral foundation. The unity of the Kyivan Church should ascertain the spiritual unity of the Ukrainians for the sake of a better future for their country. Myron Bendyk compares the multiple confessional orientations of the Ukrainian Churches with different political identities and makes conclusions on the benefits of the united local Church for political cohesion. For instance, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is oriented to the West which corresponds to the political orientation to the European integration. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church represents the pro-Moscow wing which suits the pro-Eastern bloc in Ukrainian politics (rapprochement with Russia and Belorussia). Two Orthodox Churches with an unregulated canonical status represent the idea of the independent Church that promotes the independent state and this corresponds to those advocating the neutral status of Ukraine in the international arena. Ukrainians of different confes____________________ 133 No. 177, 311 (No. 3000, 134). 134 No. 177, 311 (No. 3000, 134-135). 135 Oleh Kiseliov, “I Have Observed the Ecumenical Processes in Ukraine for a Few Years Now and Can Confidently Say That They Have Become More Intensive Each Year,” interview, Risu.org.ua, http://old.risu.org.ua/eng/religion.and. society/interview/article;27812/ (accessed January 9, 2014).

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sions view each other through the lenses of those ecclesial centres to which they belong.136 For instance, the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church often consider their Greek-Catholic co-citizens with the Moscow vision in the background. Myron Bendyk explains that the merit of the idea of the united local Ukrainian Church consists in its potential to integrate different cultural elements of the Ukrainian identity in “the internal communion.”137 It will give Ukrainians of different identities an example of living, acting together, and finding compromises. Consequently, this culturally mature Ukrainian nation will experience its self-sufficiency (which corresponds in theology to the local Church) and will enable Ukraine to build relations of partnership with the East and West.138 Spiritual unity can become a platform on which the process of the establishment of the shared values can start. Yurii Pidlisnyi criticises two obvious platforms for unity: the general political and the social. All the regions of Ukraine are equally affected by social-economic difficulties. However, as soon as basic needs are satisfied, the social source of unity would disappear. The same concerns political unity that would break as soon as the current state authorities are discharged. Hence, only values can build a genuine platform of unity for Ukrainian society. Those unifying values can be searched on a political (civil society, democracy), a national (language, culture), or on the level of religion.139 In this sense Pidlisnyi greatly appreciates the idea of the unity of the Churches of Saint Volodymyr’s baptism. Similarly Yaroslav Hrytsak speaks about values as a chance for the allUkrainian unity. This Ukrainian historian repeatedly argues that the country is slowly but constantly moving towards the Ukrainian-Ukrainian reconciliation because the values that people admit in western and eastern regions are similar: primary identity as a Ukrainian or a citizen of Ukraine, patriotism, and readiness to defend their country in case of external aggression,140 the high estimation that all Ukrainians pay to the value of se____________________ 136 137 138 139

Bendyk, United local Church, 6. Bendyk, The Patriarchate, 16. Ibid., 17. Yurii Pidlisnyi, “Ye potreba v povnomu perezasnuvanni krainy” {There is a need for the compete re-establishment of the country}, interview by Oleh K. Romanchuk and Volodymyr Dedyschyn, Universum.lviv.ua, http://www.universum.lviv. ua/journal/2011/6/pidlisn.htm (accessed January 13, 2014). 140 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “The Third Ukraine,” video-lecture, http://tedxtalks.ted.com/ video/TEDxLviv-8 (accessed January 9, 2014).

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curity.141 Despite regional differences, the majority of the Ukrainians considers this country as their fatherland and 50% of the Ukrainians are proud to belong to that nation.142 The problem of Ukraine is that the conviction of the regional division in Ukraine is consciously cultivated and misused. The idea of the Kyiv-centric Christianity in Ukraine is also present in the minds of the Orthodox in Ukraine. Thus, Oleksandr Drabynko, bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, agrees that the spiritual and cultural tradition of the Kyivan Rus with its universalism and openness can truly unite the Ukrainians.143 Yevstratii Zoria, bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, develops the vision of Kyiv as a “second Jerusalem” – a holy place, a spiritual centre even when it was politically destroyed, and a symbolic city to the whole Ukrainian nation.144 The common ground for the discussion on the unity of Ukrainian Christians around the ancient city of Kyiv is present among the Christian leaders and thus the idea of one united Kyiv Patriarchate is worth promoting. Still, some doubts arise about the reconciling power of the united Kyivan Patriarchate as a way to national cohesion. The findings about the religiosity of Ukrainians from chapter I of the book show that despite the high degree of trust in the Church Ukrainians are not concerned a lot about her message in their daily socio-political lives. The Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church should suggest additional factors for bringing about national cohesion in case of the clashing identities in Ukraine. I suggest the approach of Amartya Sen. The core idea of his Identity and Violence is that the problem of the clashing identities should not to be regarded as insurmountable. The problem rather consists in categorising the people “according to some singular and overarching system of partitioning”: “Indeed, the world is increasingly seen, if only implicitly, as a federation of religions or of civilisations, thereby ignoring all the other ways in which people see themselves.”145 ____________________ 141 See the essay of Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Bezpeka” {Security}, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 36-53. 142 Hrytsak, Two Ukraines, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 183-184. 143 Pyetr Zuyev and Yekatyerina Shchyetkina, “Kiyevskoye rasputye” {The Kyivan crossroads}, http://2010.orthodoxy.org.ua/node/5597 (accessed January 24, 2014). 144 Ibid. 145 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny (n. p.: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), xii. Italics preserved from the original text.

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For Amartya Sen the “the clash of civilisations” of Samuel Huntington is thus untenable.146 Ukrainians (and Ukrainian Churches) are ascribed clashing identities as well: this turned to Western Europe and that oriented towards the unity with the Russian world as a survival of the old Soviet identification. However, Amartya Sen claims that the story does not end here because people see themselves in many other ways according to their sex, education, work, hobbies, origins, positions towards environmental issues and other. Moreover, identities are not only alleged, they are also chosen.147 With that in mind it becomes possible to discover “other ways of classifying people, which can restrain the exploitation of a specifically aggressive use of one particular categorisation.”148 The repercussion of Sen for my analysis consists in its promise of a new basis for the allUkrainian reconciliation. Except being Ukrainian- or Russian-speaking oriented towards the EU or Russia, all Ukrainians have the shared hope to live in a prosperous and secure country. Ukrainian Churches have a great field for activities by proclaiming the ideal of the new Ukraine built on Christian ideals. The ways to peace lead through “the recognition of the plurality of our affiliations.”149 That means that inhabitants of western and eastern Ukraine may have different historical heroes, however they can be united in the evaluation of the current unsatisfactory economic situation of Ukraine and in the need for change. Precisely that happened on the EuroMaidan, which united people from different regions of Ukraine as the revolution of the middle class that demanded the preservation of human rights and human dignity. Yaroslav Hrytsak maintains that the most urgent issue for Ukraine is not that of national identity but the reconciliation of different Ukrainian regions around the economic interests which are shared by the citizens of the whole country.150 Perhaps a contextual Ukrainian liberation theology promoted by the Ukrainian Churches would be a better tool for the national cohesion in the country than the uplifted spiritual unity.

____________________ 146 147 148 149 150

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Ibid., 10-12. Ibid., 4-5. Ibid., 4. Ibid., xvii. Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukraina” {Ukraine}, in Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti, 3rd ed. (Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011), 168, 172-173.

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6.2

John Paul Lederach: on moral imagination or how to promote social changes

Until now, we have established that ultimately the reconciliation discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church attends to advance the spiritual regeneration of the country for the successful transformation in all spheres of social life. For that Church, the way to changes is intrinsically tied to the moral stance of society. In the concluding part of the monograph, I will trace where the reference authors look for the sources of changes. In the previous subchapters I attempted to answer the questions “why” and “for what” reconciliation is needed in Ukraine. The last research question deals with “how” to foster changes. John Paul Lederach with his interest in promoting social changes is the right authority here. The GreekCatholic vision will be immediately evaluated in the light of the ideas of Lederach and later Robert Schreiter.

6.2.1 The dynamics of moral imagination In the system of Lederach the vision of reconciliation in every concrete case is dictated by moral imagination. One of the deepest interests of John Paul Lederach consists in tracing the ways of how constructive social changes happen. His idea of moral imagination was born out of the reflection on how we can discover and prompt the turning point for change. Based on his experience of peacebuilding, Lederach arrived at the conclusion that even the most sophisticated plan of solving a particular conflict fails, when there is no moment of creativity in the process defined as moral imagination, “the capacity to imagine something rooted in the challenges of the real world yet capable of giving birth to that which does not yet exist.”151 Lederach maintains that the constructive social change is a creative process which has a lot to do “with the nature of imagination and the capacity to envision a canvas of human relationships.”152 Moral imagination presupposes attentiveness in order to discover more than what is immediately visible; imagination refers to the creative act and is about discerning the possibilities “that are not imaginable in current terms.”153 In ____________________ 151 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, ix. Italics preserved from the original text. 152 Ibid., x. 153 Ibid., 27.

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practice moral imagination means the capacity to produce visions and actions in a concrete conflict situation which are rooted in the daily experience of conflicting parties and which have a capacity to transform the situation. This delivers a positive vision of the conflicts since it positions the problems as such that they already contain the solution. The focus on moral imagination derives from Lederach’s observation of the failure of the patterns of the conflict resolution which were brought from outside, dictated by the expertise of the mediators, or suggested in the course of negotiations and signing agreements without considering the potential of the local resources. In contexts like Ukraine, people tend to distance themselves from political discourse, governing structures, and even pronouncements of the Church leadership. Hence, there is the need to define ways to social changes that would appeal to the people in their daily life situations. Based on her theological and pastoral resources and on her position in society the Church can also contribute to progressive social changes. Lederach begins his reflection from the very simple fact that people are not isolated islands, they live in a community and are then interconnected. Precisely this centrality of relationships provides resources for peace. The most effective visions of peace derive from “the capacity of individuals and communities to imagine themselves in a web of relationship even with their enemies.”154 Applying that postulation to the relations between the traditional Ukrainian Churches we may claim that the reconciliation between them depends upon their ability to abandon exclusivist rhetoric and to realise that the cooperation between them will contribute to the common evangelisation mission.155 However, for the moment, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church excludes the two unrecognised Orthodox denominations as long as they do not agree to come back. In their turn, the unrecognised Orthodox Churches do not see themselves in a union with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as long as she remains under the Moscow jurisdiction. Already this small example shows that the realisation of being in one boat very often fails in the inter-Church relations in Ukraine. The above example of exclusivism demonstrated by the Ukrainian Churches proves that they have not sufficiently appreciated the links which unite them. Consequently, “If there is no capacity to imagine the canvas of mutual relationships and situate oneself as part of that historic ____________________ 154 Ibid., 34. 155 Rap, The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches.

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and ever-evolving web, peacebuilding collapses.”156 In order to stop the exclusivist rhetoric and to question the existing fixed image of their enemies, the Churches need to refer to the logic of paradoxical curiosity. This logic demands the extension of the vision from the visible face value to the hidden heart value of the thing: “Paradoxical curiosity seeks something beyond what is visible, something that holds apparently contradictory and even violently opposed social energies together. By its very nature therefore this quality of perspective, this stance vis-à-vis others, even enemies, is built fundamentally on a capacity to mobilise the imagination.”157

The face value of things, the reality of their appearance, and the heart value, where the meaning is grounded and interpreted by people, build a paradox which give resources “that make possible things and understandings that do not yet exist.”158 The realisation of the mutual interconnectedness and the hidden interpretative value of things provide space for the creative act. Finally, to the essence of moral imagination belongs the willingness to take a risk, the readiness to step into the unknown without knowing the outcome. 159

6.2.2 The value of relationships 6.2.2.1 Feeling connected Lederach repeatedly claims that the central task of peacebuilding consists in the promotion of the quality of relationships.160 Lederach advises the practitioners on the field to start the new case from discovering and evaluating “the web of connections and relationships… and what the potential gaps are in supporting them towards constructive outcomes.”161 He explores the theology of peacebuilding as a theology of spaces (“God trans____________________ 156 157 158 159 160

Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 35. Ibid., 36. Ibid., 37. Ibid., 39. See, for instance, John Paul Lederach, “How Long Will It Take?” in A Handbook of International Peacebuilding. Into the Eye of the Storm, eds. John Paul Lederach and Janice Jenner (n. p.: Jossey Bass, 2002), 263. 161 John Paul Lederach, “Where Do I Fit In?” in A Handbook of International Peacebuilding. Into the Eye of the Storm, eds. John Paul Lederach and Janice Jenner (n. p.: Jossey Bass, 2002), 39.

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forms the world through the weak, the small, the foolish, and the local”),162 theology of time (theology of truth as referring to the past, justice – to the present, and mercy and hope – to the future),163 and theology of mystery (peacebuilding is “a journey into mystery… entry into a sacred land because it was a place not known”).164 Lederach emphasises that constructive social change should be built on the invisible web of relationships; consequently, when the relationships collapse, we face the breakdown of the foundation for social changes.165 This is very apparent in today’s Ukraine where the constructive transformation of society is hindered by historically developed, artificially preserved, and well-manipulated regional divisions in the country. Being aware of this, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church calls for unity and national cohesion. However, except appeals to unity the Church has to intervene practically in order to make her calls heard. How can the Church do it with the methods proper to her? Lederach contends that the Church has certain strong theological as well as practical resources to fulfil that task. The Church should aim at the education of civil society capable of producing social changes. From the theological point of view, believers, the people of God, are called to exercise their prophetic function and they can do it best on the level of civil society while denouncing the phenomena that contradict the moral order of the Gospel.166 According to Lederach, the Church has to direct her pronouncements and concentrate her practical actions on the level of certain regions, faith communities, or families, that is on the entities that share a strong identity. In plain language, reconciliation as any other social change is about fostering the quality and nature of relationships between people167 by focusing on social crossroads, connections, and the network of interdependences in ____________________ 162 John Paul Lederach, “The Mystery of Transformative Times and Spaces. Exploring a Theology of Grassroots Peacebuilding,” in Artisans of Peace. Grassroots Peacemaking among Christian Communities, eds. Mary Ann Cejka and Thomas Bamat (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2003), 260. 163 Ibid., 262. 164 Ibid., 264. 165 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 75. 166 I owe the elaboration of that idea to Dmitry Serov in his presentation “Das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat in Russland. Eine theologische Vision” during the summer university organised by the Institute of Ecumenical Studies of Fribourg University, Switzerland on the topic “Auctoritas und Potestas in West und Ost” that took place in Istanbul/Halki in September 2013. 167 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 76.

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society.168 Lederach compares that process with the way a spider makes its web. This presupposes not only finding those who share a common vision of changes but also (and maybe much more) uniting people who have different ideas and attitudes. The web-making means the construction of relational spaces there where they do not exist yet or strengthening them if they are too weak.169 Therefore, in the words of Lederach, I can summarise that the nature of social change consists in “creating platforms to generate creative responses more than creating the solution itself.”170 It is of crucial importance to determine who can ignite and carry on the changes, the element that Lederach describes as critical yeast and which derives from the metaphor of baking bread. It is the yeast, the smallest ingredient of the bread, that makes the whole mass grow. Contrary to the general belief that the changes will happen when a critical mass of people unite, Lederach maintains that it is the critical yeast – the quality of the relations within the platform – that enhances the transition: “The place where the critical mass and the critical yeast meet in reference to social change is not in the number of people involved but rather in creating the quality of the platform that makes exponential growth strong and possible, and then in finding ways to sustain that platform.”171 Those platforms can emerge in connection to schools, markets, hospitals, restaurants, public transportation services or any other space where people meet and communicate in a natural way. To emphasise the importance of the down-to-the-top approach to reconciliation Lederach has introduced the notion of “a preferential option for the local community” because it is on this level that a meaningful conversation can start.172 The actions for reconciliation on the national level remain for the local community rather symbolic but they do not touch upon their lives personally. Hence, according to the logic of Lederach, asking forgiveness from the Jews by a President of the country would have a lesser impact than the opening of a memory site on the local cemetery. Similarly, a pastoral letter or a message on World War II would be more accepted when they are followed by a local symbolic action. ____________________ 168 169 170 171 172

Ibid., 78. Ibid., 85. Ibid. Ibid., 93. Lederach and Lederach, When Blood and Bones, 210. Italics preserved from the original text.

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In order to involve people more closely in the process of social changes it is necessary to make them feel their connectedness to what is happening. Something taking place on the level of the parish or village community touches upon the lives of the people much more than the events on the national or even regional level. The distance between people and processes of change should be reduced to the point where both feel connected and where people can interiorise and influence the changes. To give an example from the life of the Church, the declaration of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation pronounced in Warsaw in 2005 would have remained distanced from the Ukrainians if it had not been read afterwards in every Ukrainian parish during the Sunday liturgy. By bringing the topic of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation as the leading theme of the all-Ukrainian pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia in 2005, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church made it even more familiar to the people. Similarly, if on July 11, 2013, the day of the admittance of the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy, in every church a prayer is said for the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian straggle, the mutual Polish-Ukrainian declaration on rapprochement would get a meaning for the believers. Even in a society marked by violence or by the strong contesting identities people are still connected on the purely functional basis. They interrelate in hospitals, pubic transports, by solving their daily problems, they work together and their children attend the same schools. Hence, precisely those places of interaction create the platforms where the meaningful changes can happen. When the reconciliation actions are not conducted in those natural interaction spaces, they will fail. Therefore, the pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on reconciliation are not enough for the success of her concerns. The considerable number of Ukrainians who believe that religion is very little accommodated to the realities of daily life173 indicates that the Churches are not sufficiently appealing to the needs of their followers. Pastoral letters or official statements of the Church must be supplemented by concrete actions on the level of the practical daily interaction of the people. This can be simply a meeting between the Roman-Catholic and Greek-Catholic parish where the historical events, for instance, the Volyn tragedy of the Poles are discussed. This could be a common tiding on the graves of the Polish and Ukrainians soldiers. The topic of historical misunderstandings can be dis____________________ 173 Razumkov Centre, Religiosity of Ukrainians, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2013), 31.

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cussed during the summer camps for youth which are organised by the Church and which unite both Ukrainian and Polish young people. Additionally, the Churches can make proposals that the issues of the PolishUkrainian relations can be treated attentively in the schools of western Ukraine in order to make young people acquainted with the details of historical tensions and Christian answers to them. As the experience of some active parishes of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church in the Lviv region shows, the parish initiatives for children and youth offer good ground for the promotion of the ideas of reconciliation and social change within the young generation. Thematic events can take place during the weekly meetings of the parish youth groups and organisations. Such initiatives which for the moment eventuate on the well-organised parishes in big cities are worth being introduced in the smaller communities in the regions. The youth organisation at the parishes of the Transfiguration of Our Lord Jesus Christ in Lviv,174 the youth Christian community at the cathedral of Saint George in Lviv,175 the youth community “Quo vadis”176 at the Redemptorists provincial house in Lviv, or the youth meetings organised at the parish of All Saints of Ukrainian people in the town of Stryi177 are exemplary here. Participants read the Bible, pray, spend their leisure time together, make trips to places of historical and religious importance, watch movies, make thematic discussions on the burning topics of social life, and take part in festivals. The aim of such meetings is the upbringing of responsible Christians and citizens. The issues of reconciliation, spreading awareness about the local dimensions of the burdened national memory, learning to take initiative should not fail on the list of activities of such youth groups. Appropriate courses should be introduced on the agenda of seminaries and theological faculties in ____________________ 174 “Spilnota Tavor parokhii Preobrazhennia Hospoda Nashoho Isusa Khrysta, misto Lviv” {Community of Tabor of the parish of the Transfiguration of Our Lord Jesus Christ in Lviv}, http://www.hramspasa.org.ua/tavor-molodizhna-spilnota. html (accessed April 9, 2014). 175 “Molodizhna khrystyianska spilnota pry Arkhykatedralnomu sobori Sviatoho Yura u Lvovi” {The youth Christian community at the cathedral of Saint George in Lviv}, http://sobor-svyura.lviv.ua/svyatoyurska-molod/ (accessed April 9, 2014). 176 “Molodizhna spilnota ‘Quo vadis” {The youth community “Quo vadis”}, http:// www.cssr.lviv.ua/Bibl-kurs/Molodz/quo-vadis/ (accessed April 9, 2014). 177 “Molodizhni zustrichi pry tserkvi Vsikh Sviatykh ukrainskoho narodu, misto Stryi” {Youth meetings at the parish of All Saints of Ukrainian people in Stryi}, http://vsun.org.ua/archives/107#more-107 (accessed April 9, 2014).

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Ukraine in order to raise the awareness of the future priests and make them capable of addressing such questions in their pastoral work. Additionally, appropriate commissions of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, first of all the Commission on Justice and Peace, the Commission on Matters of Youth, and the Commission on Matters of the Laity should not neglect their potential to extend their work with the young generation on the parish level.

6.2.2.2 The qualities of web-making Lederach postulates that the process of generating social platforms for change by analogy with web-making demands stillness, humility, and sensuous perception. The first of them, stillness, is dictated by a desire to understand how social transformation is happening. It demands a posture of observation and noticing the slightest movement in a certain direction. The official position of the Moscow Patriarchate concerning Ukrainian Churches might remain the same, however, in private conversations with the young generation of the possible future leaders of that Church occasionally thoughts are pronounced that the situation will and must alter, that the present stance of the Russian Orthodox Church of not letting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church become autocephalous will change as soon as the current generation of the Russian Orthodox officials retires.178 The posture of humility aims at the discovery of the soul of a place. Humility presupposes respect and connectedness in order to determine ourselves in relationship with the other and our place in the greater web.179 Humility means acknowledging the things as they are and a proper dealing with the truth. Here the essence of humility denotes the attitude of constant learning, questioning the own truth, and being open to the truth of the other. Finally, the posture of the sensuous perception simply points at the need of full engagement, to the work of all senses for the construction of the meaning of the process of social transformation.180 Summarising three qualities of the web-making, it is legitimate to maintain that the creation of changes is a matter of observation and imagination rather than technique. ____________________ 178 Ideas discussed with young theologians, doctoral students of the Russian Orthodox Church during the summer university “Auctoritas und Potestas in West und Ost” that took place in Istanbul/Halki in September 2013. 179 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 106-107. 180 Ibid., 110.

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This characteristic feature of Lederach is also peculiar to the writings of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In their discourse the leadership of that Church does not primarily focus on action but rather on prayer, on the inner world of the people, on the reflection about one’s own shortcomings. The attitude of attentiveness and observation is there. However, the focus of the activities of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is sometimes too much concentrated on the inner life of a person. The Church leadership renders reconciliation as a private affair, as a way of the purification of one’s own consciousness. Often there is too little said about the collective origin of evil. Therefore, the stance of attentiveness to the world outside has to be strengthened both in the theology and the pastoral practice of the Church. Given this complicated nature of social webs, John Paul Lederach notes that the social changes cannot be assessed by the project–evaluation approach, where the changes are perceived as a liner and the results must be visible and verifiable.181 The correct evaluation criterion is rather questioning the own theory of change, seeing its modification, envisaging how the original proposal has changed. Hence, the evaluation of social change is a learning process and not the measuring of results. Here too, we are dealing with the process of moral imagination, “the ability to pose the problems existing in a setting and let people interact, discover what they know, and innovate responses, seeing themselves as actors, part of the context of change.”182 The criterion of the evaluation of a process like reconciliation should be the transformation of the self-perception of people, their understanding of the conflict but not reaching for the solution in the first place. Applying that principle in practice, we may contend that although there are still three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, the conflicts on the parish level almost completely disappeared in the course of the last decade. Despite the continuing struggle on the level of the Church leadership, among the people the attitude towards their Orthodox co-citizens has significantly changed, which means that the issue of the reconciliation among the Orthodox Churches is moving in the right direction. Lederach is helpful for the search of the resources to national cohesion in Ukraine. As it follows from her official pronouncements, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church envisages that basis in the common struggle for the spiritual transformation of the country as a path to the elimination of ____________________ 181 Ibid., 125. 182 Ibid., 124.

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structural injustices. According to Lederach’s principle of the centrality of relationships, the well-being and transformation of Ukraine depends on the ability of its citizens to imagine themselves as a community sharing the same space, problems, and aspirations. It is important that the Ukrainian Churches suggest an alternative and appeal to that basic interrelatedness of Ukrainians since all of them have to deal with the similar daily-life problems of the country in transition. Realising that despite historical, cultural, or language differences all Ukrainians are interested in the successful project of the modernisation of their country and the improvement of their level of life can be a point of unity for the nation in the current situation. I consider that it is of the utmost importance that the Ukrainian Churches jointly deliver that message to their believers.

6.2.2.3 Language, narratives On the basis of his experience as mediator Lederach is convinced that the models of handling the conflicts are to be found in the cultural knowledge of the people.183 Lederach turns to language, metaphor, and stories to find inspiration for the conflict-resolution models.184 In fact, for him the best solutions in peacebuilding come like haiku moments, a piece of Japan poetry, that covers complexity through simplicity by intuition. The technical aspects should not be overemphasised for the constructive social changes because those encumber “the art of giving birth and keeping a process creatively alive.”185 The haiku verse, containing eight words or less that pointedly presents a synthesis of a problem, describes a methodology of looking for the sources of social changes. In that regard, Lederach calls to pay attention to the metaphors used by the conflicting sides because they “are like living museum of conflict resources.”186 In his recent book When Blood and Bones Cry Out. Journeys through the Soundscape of Healing and Reconciliation Lederach explores the dynamics and challenges of social reconciliation through the metaphor____________________ 183 John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 10. 184 See the paragraph “Language and Metaphor as Natural Resources in Conflict Training” in Lederach, Preparing for Peace, 73-83. 185 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 70. 186 Ibid., 72.

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phenomena: sound, music, poetry, and mothering.187 Lederach’s deep interest in metaphors as a means of providing social change is explained by the specific nature of metaphors “as archetypical spatial understandings that touch aspects of human experience not easily understood through paradigms that focus on change and which are attached to logical progression and analytically defined categories.”188 For instance the metaphor of reconciliation as a sound “suggests the need for constant nurturing, circling engagement, mixing and remixing of voices and the repeated deepening of meaningful conversation.”189 Incidentally, also Robert Schreiter refers to the language of metaphors. He suggests making an analysis of the potentials of social changes in a culture by looking at the metaphors which are used for tension, its resolution, and change.190 The issue of language is connected to the narratives. The group identity is built on its members’ memory about the past, including the memory of injustices. History is remembered in narratives which unfold who particular people are. Therefore, in order to understand better the particular interconnectedness of the people, it is important to pay attention to their narratives “as long history, the location of whole peoples’ place in local, national, global history and as part and parcel of collecting healing and the building of justice.”191 For those looking for reconciliation this means that narratives should find their place in learning the network and art of the interconnection between the people. Furthermore, the reconciliation does not mean that the memories of the past should be let gone. The task rather consists in employing the energies contained in the narratives of the past for the constructive interaction in the present. Among the Greek-Catholic intellectuals dominates the thought that the situation of traditional Ukrainian Churches remaining divided is unnatural and must be changed. Most pointedly this was expressed by Myroslav Marynovych who believes that in Ukraine the western model of the tolerant coexistence of different Churches is hardly probable.192 Not the peaceful cohabitation of different denominations, but the split and rivalry be____________________ 187 188 189 190 191 192

Lederach and Lederach, When Blood and Bones, 12. Ibid., 14. Ibid., 206. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies, 72. Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 147. Myroslav Marynovych, “Rozdumy odnoho myrianyna nad problemoiu ekumenizmu” {Reflections of a layman on the problem of ecumenism}, in Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 187.

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tween the branches of the once united Kyivan Church constitutes the core of the problem; the memory of this ancient unity has survived in the national Ukrainian conscience.193 In the official Greek-Catholic documents an almost identical idea can be traced: for instance, “In the Church’s memory, an awareness of the deep unity of the ancient Church of Kyiv was never extinguished.”194 Here the very narrative of their joint past in the Kyivan Church should be a powerful source of searching ways to Eucharistic unity between the traditional Ukrainian denominations. It is worth studying the narratives of Christian unity in Ukraine of other Churches and promoting them as tools for rapprochement.195

6.2.2.4 Building the platforms of cooperation Lederach argues that transformation always happens on both personal and systemic levels. Social change is about embracing the “challenge of personal transformation, of pursuing awareness, growth, and commitment to change at a personal level.”196 Liubomyr Husar equally focuses on the person; it is the conversion and purification of memory of every single individual that brings about social reconciliation. In Lederach’s words, “At its purest micro-level, healing is always a journey faced by and unfolding before the individual. A person heals.”197 At the same time, systemic transformation and the promotion of justice is not less important. Lederach ascribes a great meaning to a person who can create a social echo by her/his actions. Here Lederach is close to Robert Schreiter who also maintained that the actions on the micro-level would accumulate and produce the necessary effect on a broader social level. It is in that sense that Lederach compares social change with the “phase-based progression” that is “akin to the physics and dynamics of sound in space.”198 This progressive ____________________ 193 Ibid. 194 No. 177, 308 (No. 3000, 130). 195 In my article “The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine as a Conflict of Identities. Where to Search for the Prospects of Reconciliation?” I apply the theory of Paul Ricoeur for the analysis of the conflicting narratives of the Ukrainian Churches. Based on those findings I sustain the idea that the “traditional Ukrainian Churches should abandon endless circles of melancholia about their losses and create new identities through the process of mourning.” 196 Lederach, Preparing for Peace, 19-20. 197 Lederach and Lederach, When Blood and Bones, 207. 198 Ibid., 224.

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movement to the changes starts from an individual but is accomplished by the community. Therefore, John Paul Lederach pays enough attention to the platform of cooperation. The usual approach to solving conflicts consists in negotiations and reaching for an agreement. Lederach is very clear that merely this method will not ensure the enduring peace because the relational aspect is lacking. Instead, where this relational context is present, there are better chances for success. The example of holding religious services in turn in the same sacral building that was introduced in Ukraine in the mid-1990s can be one of such successful solutions. There parishioners from conflicting communities were brought into contact with each other having to learn to satisfy their spiritual needs taking into account the necessities of the other side. It was not possible anymore to ignore the opposite party, and thus people started contacting and discovering each other. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations that currently consists of 18 bodies including all the traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine illustrates another idea of Lederach: when the negotiations on the principal fundamental issues fail, the conflicting parties should concentrate on the construction of “a context-based, permanent, and dynamic platform capable of non-violently generating solutions to ongoing episodes of conflict, which they will experience in the ebb and flow of their social, political, and economic lives.”199 In other words, when the traditional Ukrainian Churches are not able to solve their fundamental differences for the moment, they can concentrate on their common concerns of the daily existence. The Churches may not agree on the transfer of the Seat of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church from Lviv to Kyiv or on the principles of healing the division among the Orthodox, but they can nevertheless successfully cooperate on the issues like protesting against the new state “Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organisations.”200 The cooperation within the framework of the All-Ukrainian ____________________ 199 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, 47. 200 The new “Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organisations” was adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in 2012. Many provisions of that new legislation sufficiently reinforce the state control over religious organisations, introduce the procedure of the double registration, discriminate against foreign religious ministers, etc. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations expressed their protest against this law (see “Zvernennia hlav konfesii do Prezydenta Ukrainy shchodo vetuvannia zmin do Zakonu pro svobodu sovisti” {Address of the Heads of confessions to the President of Ukraine on vetoing the

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Council of Churches and Religious Organisation offers the Churches a ground for making contacts and learning about each other. In terms of Lederach, it is this way of building a network and establishing relationships which bring the Churches closer.

6.2.3 The role of the Church in reconciliation: educate, empower, sanctify Defining the context of reconciliation and discovering the web of relationships in society give possibilities to figure out resources that can contribute to social change. Those resources should be activated on the mid-level since reputedly the efforts at reconciliation bring most fruits in such a setting.201 The mid-range leaders usually have good connections to both toplevel actors and the grassroots and have more possibilities to transfer ideas to the masses than the national leaders. In Lederach’s opinion, the most valuable are socioeconomic and sociocultural resources. I am particularly interested in the latter within the framework of my study as the Church domain belongs there. Sociocultural resources are represented by people and culture. As an organisation represented on all the levels of society and enjoying enough trust from the people, the Church must have a special potential to contribute to social changes. John Paul Lederach is persuaded that the Catholic Church has great prospects as the actor of reconciliation due to her ubiquitous presence in society,202 her ecclesiology, and hierarchy.203 Where other actors fail, the Church can still intervene because she unites different categories of people from the competing camps. Given the general passivity and cautiousness of Ukrainians, their concentration on personal affairs, the Church can use her resources to educate people in active decision-making. Through the activities of empowering, the Church can help mobilise people for the development of the state. Although in the opinion of Francis Fukuyama only grassroots mobilisation is not enough because institutions matter, if people assemble to produce an

____________________ “Law on Religious Freedom”}, http://vrciro.org.ua/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=186&Itemid=31 (accessed September 10, 2013)). 201 Lederach, Building Peace, 94. 202 Lederach, The Long Journey, 27. 203 Ibid., 31.

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institutional change their efforts would be more durable.204 As a matter of fact, the change of the regime of Yanukovych in 2014 by the efforts of the civil protests is an example of the assembled individuals producing changes. The Church can call people not to give bribes; however, the question remains if that would change the system. Personal sacrifice has always been highly praised by the Church, but still, success will be reached rather than when people demand the transformation of the entire corrupt and criminal system and connections.205 For the moment Ukrainians need to realise that they are agents capable of making decisions and exercise control.206 The Church can make her contribution to educate young people who would later be able to stand up for change. This corresponds to Lederach’s vision of the role of interconnectedness and the efficacy of the activities on the middle-level and on the grassroots. The Church can opt for the increasing involvement of parishioners in taking decisions in the daily life of their parish, by determining upon financing and developing a plan of the yearly activities in a particular community. The same aim can be attained by providing training for the children and the youth who are participating in different pastoral and recreational events of the parish. Liubomyr Husar has always emphasised that the proper education and upbringing of the youth, giving them good examples to follow, will contribute to the better future of the whole country.207 The aim is to show to young people that they can indeed change something and do good things, to empower them to act at least on the most basic level. All sorts of activities are useful for that aim depending of the imagination and desire of the local minister. One can involve the young people into the organisation of the common Christmas dinner with elderly lonely people; another can organise a film review on the historical moments of the Polish-Ukrainian relations with a subsequent discussion. In order to make that training of the youth appropriate, it should not focus ____________________ 204 “Meeting with Francis Fukuyama at the Institute of Journalism of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, September 10, 2013,” video-lecture, http://betv.com.ua/online/francis_fukuyama/ (accessed September 13, 2013). 205 Myroslav Marynovych, “Revoliutsiia dukhu suproty evoliutsii zneviry” {Revolution of the spirit against the evolution of despair}, in Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010), 32. 206 Meeting with Francis Fukuyama. 207 See, for instance, Liubomyr Husar, “Rodiuchyi grunt dlia novoho pokolinnia” {Generous soil for the new generation}, http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/ 2013/09/6/6997436/ (accessed September 13, 2013).

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so much on the transfer of the content but on searching a solution to a given problem through relationships building.208 A typical feature of Ukrainians is that in case of a problem they will endeavour to solve it by themselves without recourse to external help. Relatives or friends will be involved only when personal efforts are not successful. As a last resort people will take recourse to bribery. However, they will only rarely unite with others experiencing the same problem because the majority of Ukrainians in principle do not believe that they can change anything. In the worst case, people just do nothing and try to organise their private lives as comfortable as possible. There is no wonder then that people remain distanced from the means that they can apply on the level of civil society, since they have not learned and do not believe in the power of community. Neither do people believe that their problems can be settled without the recourse to bribery. Here the Church has a great potential to educate people, show them alternatives, and empower them. Such activities naturally flow from the understanding of reconciliation as the purification of memory from evil and setting standards for social transformation. Lederach is persuaded that Churches can contribute to reconciliation through their symbolical, ritual, and liturgical elements. The centrality of the Eucharist and sacramental nature of the Church present a distinctive contribution of the Church to reconciliation.209 The sacrament of the Eucharist is about a unique encounter and reconciliation with God that “creates moments pregnant with potential to mobilise both the sacramental and the moral imagination in reference to reconciliation, restoring the broken community, and taking personal and corporate responsibility for the suffering of others.”210 A particular value of the Eucharist is based on its community-building role: “Because the Lord’s supper is the sacrament which builds up community, all kinds of injustice, racism, estrangement, and lack of freedom are radically challenged when we share in the body

____________________ 208 Lederach, Building Peace, 109-110. Even though John Paul Lederach speaks here about the conflict transformation, I believe that we can apply his method to any situation that aims at transformation and social change. The focus on the relationship between people as a resource is crucial to any social change. 209 Lederach, The Long Journey, 51. 210 Ibid.

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and blood of Christ.”211 The written theology of the Church should also testify to the value of the community in Christ. This liturgical vision of reconciliation also peculiar to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is very different from the anti-liturgical mentality of reconciliation in the West212 which is perhaps linked to the lack of the capacity to recognise the unity of things.213 And still the “liturgy is a fundamental moment in the reconciliation process. Liturgy works… ”214 In the liturgical act of the Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, in the speeches and prayers during the Divine Liturgy the unity of both peoples was constantly emphasised. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should learn to articulate better the Eucharistic message of reconciliation. A good training of the priests can help improve the existing poor quality of the homilies during the liturgy. The Church leadership is aware of this weakness of the clergy.215 Too often homilies demonstrate no connection whatsoever between the message of Gospel and the daily lives of the people. A good homily can explain the meaning and the command of reconciliation. Pronounced at the appropriate moment, for instance, during the liturgy on the day of the commemoration of the beginning of World War II, such a homily would confer a new practical meaning of the Eucharist as a call for the examination of one’s consciousness and reconciliation. The practice shows, however, that often the most a local priest does, is to read the message of the Head of the Church on a particular occasion if it is explicitly demanded. There are splendid homilies of the Greek-Catholic Church leadership ____________________ 211 World Council of Churches, Participating in God’s Mission of Reconciliation. A Resources for Churches in Situations of Conflict (World Council of Churches: Geneva, 2006), 43. 212 Yves de Maeseneer, “Can Liturgy Save the World? Dialoguing with David Pratt,” in Reconciliation in Interfaith Perspective. Jewish, Christian and Muslim Voices, eds. Rheimund Bieringer and David Bolton (Leuven – Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2011), 205. 213 Ibid., 207. 214 Ibid., 206. 215 For instance, during his meeting with the students of Lviv Polytechnic University on September 12, 2013 Sviatoslav Shevchuk called people to demand from their parish priests a sufficient quality of homilies. (“Blazhennishyi Sviatoslav: ‘Sviashchenyky povynni bilshe chytaty. Vymahaite vid nykh yakisnykh propovidei” {His Beatitude Sviatoslav: “Priests have to read more. Demand from them homilies of good quality”}, http://news.ugcc.org.ua/articles/blazhennіshiy_svyatoslav_ svyashcheniki_povinnі_bіlshe_chitati_vimagayte_vіd_nih_yakіsnih_propovіdey _67373.html (accessed September 13, 2013)).

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where also socially-oriented issues are addressed.216 The task of the Church is to assure a sufficiently good level of preaching among the regular clergy. Parish priests represent a middle-range Church leadership which by its example and pastoral activity should efficiently transfer the ideas of the highest leadership to the grassroots, ordinary believers. Through the discourse on reconciliation the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church postulates that the successful transformation of Ukraine should be grounded on a sound moral basis. What the Church still has to do, is to improve her mechanisms to make people appropriate that vision. The Church must learn to make people get engaged as communities “in the process of looking towards the horizon of reconciliation, towards that place where they can envisage living in an independent and commonly defined future.”217 Precisely that is the task of the all-Ukrainian reconciliation.

6.3

Robert Schreiter: how to reach reconciliation

6.3.1 The dynamics of transition and challenges to reconciliation In his works, Schreiter describes a spectrum of practical scenarios of reconciliation. In my opinion, to the Ukrainian situation suits best the case when former conflicting parties cooperate in order to create a joint narrative that overcomes divisions of the past.218 Since reconciliation is a dynamic process, it is essential to understand its progression. Three stages of the process of transition correspond to three periods of reconciliation. Contemporary Ukraine has already passed the genesis and transformation stages of transition and is now in the third readjustment phase. According to Schreiter’s description, at the final stage the actual reconciliation projects are carried on which signifies the ongoing reconstruction of society.219 In Ukraine, that process has lasted for more than 20 years demonstrating typical difficulties of the turnaround from a totalitarian to democratic order. Indeed, “it seems as though everything has to be ____________________ 216 Selected homilies of the Head of the Church on the social issues gathered in Chapter IV of Socially Oriented Documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008) prove the richness of the homiletic tradition of that Church. 217 Lederach, Building Peace, 116-117. 218 Schreiter, A Practical Theology, 393. 219 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 8, 11.

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done at once, often with very few human and economic resources,”220 and this elicits disappointment and frustration among the people. After the period of great hopes for a better future, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and later after the Orange Revolution people have lost the illusion of the short transition and the establishment of a society of well-being in the next future. Consequently, frustration turns people away from the challenges of the state-building and makes them concentrate on the pursuit of their private interests leaving aside public affairs.221 In this atmosphere people endeavour to forget the past or at least to distance themselves from it.222 Although Robert Schreiter described it very generally, the above picture is typical of a society in transition and very pointedly applies to Ukraine in its current state. For the reconciliation programmes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church this situation has a double consequence. First, it seems that the majority of the Ukrainians do not realise the significance of the reconciliation projects and consider them second-ranked in view of the much more acute problems of, for instance, economic nature. Robert Schreiter claims that at the stage where the Ukrainians are now, people “lose interest in reconciliation programmes and become cynical about the possibility of ever reaching their goal.”223 It would be interesting in the first place to study how many Ukrainians are aware of the reconciliation initiatives and discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. In the readjustment phase of transition the reconciliation ideas are much more difficult “to sell” because of the resignation in large parts of society. In addition to the general disinterest of the people in the topic of reconciliation, there comes the difficulty of rendering reconciliation as a spiritual endeavour which is obviously done by the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. A common Ukrainian is much more interested in the possibility to more easily acquire a Polish Schengen visa than in the discourse on the common Christian faith of Poles and Ukrainians that should lead them to heal the wounds of history. The reconciliation in that case ends in front of the present iron curtain of the European Union which Ukrainians encounter at the Polish border. Those issues were clarified more in detail in the analysis of justice and reconciliation. ____________________ 220 221 222 223

Ibid., 9. Ibid., 10. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 12.

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Still, it is in this stage of transition that “an articulated spirituality to sustain the reconciliation process becomes ever more important.”224 Liubomyr Husar would be the first to sign under those words. Both Husar and Schreiter recognise and constantly reiterate that ultimately reconciliation is a work and a gift of God. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church stays before the immense task of bringing the significance of reconciliation closer to the common Ukrainian.

6.3.2 Rituals and sacraments in the service of reconciliation Recently, Robert Schreiter has referred to the works of Lederach and has also emphasised the importance of social imagery for peacebuilding and, hence, reconciliation.225 For Schreiter three elements of Catholic social imagery that can contribute most to peacebuilding (and reconciliation) are ritual, sacrament, and spirituality. Robert Schreiter pays great attention to the specific contribution of the Church to the process of reconciliation. He is of the opinion that her power of sacraments and rituals, the spirituality that flows from the Christian message concerning forgiving, remembering, doing and telling the truth are powerful resources of reconciliation. The immediate active role of the Church depends upon concrete circumstances. And here the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is well-positioned due to the trust that the Church enjoys among Ukrainian citizens and her past history as an organisation that was not involved in the cooperation with the communist regime. Schreiter estimates that a great playground to work on the national scale opens for a Church of this number of faithful and with such a history of Church-state relations.226 Schreiter emphasises the importance of ritual acts that give a sense of belonging and unity which cannot be granted by an individual action.227 The rituals of the art of cleaning the graves of the German soldiers at the Yaniv cemetery in Lviv are valuable resources for the healing of memory. ____________________ 224 Ibid. 225 See, for instance, Robert Schreiter, “The Catholic Social Imaginary and Peacebuilding. Ritual, Sacrament and Spirituality,” in Peacebuilding. Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis, eds. Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Regard F. Powers (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 221-239. 226 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 129. 227 Schreiter, The Catholic Social Imaginary, 225.

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The sacramental act of reconciliation between the Ukrainian and Polish nations proclaimed during joint liturgies in Warsaw and Lviv also serves that aim. It has a deeper impact than a mere proclamation and publication of “Reconciliation between peoples is possible.” Ukrainians participate eagerly in the common actions of religious nature. This resource to confer a message of reconciliation should not be underestimated. Schreiter is convinced that rituals, such as a commemoration of the dead, electing monuments, or ritual reconciliation acts create a new reality: “Observing leaders sign a peace accord or embrace each other brings with it a sense of being part of something greater than oneself. The rules that govern such encounters are part of a ritual apparatus that creates solidarity and new forms of social cohesion.”228 The great value of rituals consists in their ability to anticipate the future and to imagine it in a new way. Those considerations elucidate the great significance that the Ukrainian GreekCatholics dedicated to the commemoration of the Holodomor on the level of the state as a unifying factor in Ukraine. In Schreiter’s opinion, the importance of rituals seems to be underestimated by the secular peacebuilding literature and practice.229 Encounter is necessary. Again in that sense, a common Orthodox – Greek-Catholic summer camp for children, Polish-Ukrainian youth meetings, for instance, during a joint bike tour, bring about communication and establish contacts that are necessary for breaking biases and enhancing the positive image of the other. Indeed, “The experience and memories of being together, rather than being divided in conflict, can be a powerful resource for peacebuilding.”230 Here the Churches have an immense field for activities as well as many possibilities. For Schreiter the most important expression of Catholic social imagination are rituals due to the different ritual practices peculiar to religions in general and to Orthodoxy and Catholicism in particular. Rituals should play an important role during the reconstruction of society as they help to come to terms with the past. Enacting memorials and introducing commemoration days help preserve the past and keep alive the important events from history. In the Ukrainian context, the Churches could initiate the Day of Remembrance of the victims of Holocaust in connection with the celebrations of the anniversary of the death of Metropolitan She____________________ 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid., 226. 230 Ibid., 227.

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ptytskyi. It would help regain the large presence of the Jews in the Ukrainian history that went lost after World War II. In that way, Ukraine could learn the truth about the past. Except for helping to come to terms with the past, rituals draw ways to the future. Of particular importance are the rituals of forgiveness because they say that “there is an intention to live differently in the future, and that the resentment about what happened in the past will not be allowed to dominate the future.”231 Schreiter points at the fact that the Catholic sacrament of penance as the reconciliation of a sinner with God and with the Church community omits the necessary dimension of reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators. On the contrary, the joint liturgical act of reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians in 2005 united the victims and wrongdoers in common forgiveness. Schreiter points at the great reconciling role that the Church as a reconciled community can play in society.232 Does not that remind one of the motto “Unity of the Church – unity of the nation” of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church? All the Heads of that Church are firmly convinced that the united Ukrainian Church, the Kyivan Church, could be a great promoter of reconciliation on different levels of society. In that way the Church would demonstrate the plausibility of her own appeals by healing the wounds of division in her own body and thus paving the way to the all-Ukrainian reconciliation. Robert Schreiter points at the difficulty of the issue: “Because the Church mirrors society, it may find that the lines dividing society run right through the centre of the Church.”233 That corresponds to the Ukrainian situation with its division among the Churches along identity lines. At the same time, Schreiter gives credibility to the Creek-Catholic Church leadership that when those divisions among the Churches are eliminated, there will be more hope for the all-Ukrainian reconciliation.

____________________ 231 Ibid. 232 Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation, 129. 233 Schreiter, Reconciliation. Mission and Ministry, 67.

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Conclusion to Part II

Conclusion to Part II In part II, I have examined the Greek-Catholic theology and practice of the purification of memory, then unfolded and evaluated the ecumenical project of the united Kyivan Patriarchate, and finally dwelled upon the ways and actors of promoting social changes and reconciliation that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church suggests. Dealing with a troubled memory occupies the bulk of room in the official Greek-Catholic texts. Similarly, the equally important and often treated theme is the re-establishment of the unity of the traditional Ukrainian Churches. In view of the importance of both issues in the Church reconciliation discourse I have discussed them in this concluding last part of the monograph. However, it is not the only reason. Both the purification of memory and the unity of the Churches in Ukraine follow the aim of spiritual transformation and social cohesion in Ukrainian society and hence it is logical that I analysed them in the same chapter. Besides, the very project of the united Kyivan Patriarchate can be considered as the healing of the memory of the Church division in Ukraine. Because the burden of memory weights upon the Ukrainian present, the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church suggests certain platforms for its healing, for example in the case of the relations with the Poles, Russians and the Orthodox or among Ukrainians themselves touching the dividing topic of the memories of World War II. Certainly, the approaches are tailored to the concrete case, however several common characteristics can be outlined. First, the Church emphasises the need to remember in order to draw lessons and pay honour. Second, the Church leadership invites one to the joint examination of the past in order to accommodate contradicting histories. Third, the purification of memory should be crowned with the recognition of the faults and repentance. And finally, the past should be approached from a Christian point of view when not the graveness of offences is being weighed but the generosity of love and readiness to forgive and ask forgiveness prevails. Robert Schreiter’s and Miroslav Volf’s contributions to dealing with memory highlight two points of the Greek-Catholic approach to the issue. First, for Schreiter the healing of memory means driving moral lessons from the past, a task that is equally declared in the theology of reconciliation of the Church. In fact, the Greek-Catholic leadership considers the reappraisal of the past in a Christian perspective and the spiritual rebirth of the person as the key factors to the transformation of the post-communist Ukrainian society in crisis. Second, probably the most important role of 431

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the salutary remembering of Miroslav Volf is that of seeing from the perspective of the “double vision.” It is this advice that is often applied in the Church’s platforms of reconciliation, for example, the Greek-Catholic reference to the Russian Orthodox Church as not only a perpetrator co-guilty of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church but also as another victim of the communist regime. This opens the ways to rapprochement. Another object of the research in part II of the book was the promotion of reconciliation and social changes in Ukraine. The Greek-Catholic tradition clearly envisages the source of the social cohesion in society in the reestablishment of the unity of the branches of the once united Kyivan Metropolia in some form of the one Kyivan Patriarchate. That should promote the spiritual unity and reconciliation of the Christian denominations which currently often demonstrate enmity and drive their flocks away from each other. With this research I have shown that the realisation of this in its essence evangelical project of unity should currently focus on the more practical basis where the Churches learn to cooperate and accept each other in their differences. Finally, as a logical continuation of the reconciliation discourse I pay attention to how social changes should be promoted. According to the Greek-Catholic documents, the changes begin from the transformation in the heart of every person and then spread around like a wave. Appreciating greatly this empowering approach to the person I opine that the merely individual approach does not suffice for changing institutions. Consequently, with the help of Lederach and Schreiter I suggest some ways of how the Churches can educate people to stand up for changes on a broader social level. The cooperation of the Ukrainian Churches for the evangelisation and transformation of society towards Christian values will finally contribute to the rapprochement between those Churches. I perceive this to be not an alternative to, but a practical realisation of the idea of the united Kyivan Patriarchate that shows that difference can accommodate each other in Christian love and brotherly cooperation. The general conclusion will present my evaluation of the merits, shortcomings, and possible ways of enhancing the theology and practice of reconciliation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.

432

General conclusion. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church’s approach to reconciliation: The reappraisal

This book is about the Greek-Catholic Church’s contribution to understanding and resolving the current conflicts in Ukraine. The key words of my research are forgiveness, memory, and reconciliation. But ultimately it is the transformation and development of Ukraine as an independent nation state that stays behind those crucial notions. The final version of my text was written during the months when conscious citizens of my country were protesting and being killed by snipers during the EuroMaidan. Later on the country was even put at the threshold of war. That gave new impulses to my study and made me realise once more the significance of the topic. It was tantalising to work on issues that are moving people emotionally in a context of uncertainty after the EuroMaidan, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the danger of the Russian-Ukrainian war, all of which are directly connected with the problem of reconciliation. My analysis of the Church documents is quite original since there are no systematic historical-ethical studies available on the Greek-Catholic documents about reconciliation as a whole. There were partial attempts to evaluate some texts on reconciliation between the Churches or some concrete pronouncements, such as, for instance, about the Polish-Ukrainian relations. However a comprehensive and systematic study of the GreekCatholic theology of reconciliation on the basis of a critical confrontation between the official texts and the insights of three prominent theologians of reconciliation is now realised for the first time. As it was argued in the introduction, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has a long tradition of reconciliation. This tradition was actualised and further developed after the Church emerged from the underground after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Consequently, my analysis focuses on the central themes of the social teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church of both the past and presence. In what follows I will identify the fundamental findings of the monograph.

433

General Conclusion

What is reconciliation needed for? An economically and socially underdeveloped, substantially secularised or not-enough-evangelised Ukrainian society has for a long time not managed to improve social life by way of a political decision-making process capable of realising a just social order. The EuroMaidan revolt was the strongest voice of the Ukrainian civil society for the construction of a new social, political, and economic order based on genuine values. In my opinion it is precisely in such a context of transition that one can grasp the real meaning and significance of the Greek-Catholic discourse on reconciliation. By re-evaluating the past through the lenses of Christianity and the process of the purification of memory the Church shows a path to the “return of the Christian moral and ethical element in all the spheres of social life.”1 The significance of the texts dealing with the memories of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict or the memories of World War II consists in the fact that they show the deficiencies of the human condition, point at the personal responsibility for evil, the responsibility to reorganise social life, and to exclude killing, injustice, and discrimination. What Myroslav Marynovych concluded concerning the attitude towards the memory of the extermination of the Jews, describes succinctly the genuine aim of the reconciliation messages of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: “We need a vertical dimension that is directed to God – we need an ethical dimension.”2 The documents about the past are oriented towards the future. They also teach to scrutinise the current sources of injustices in society. With her discourse on reconciliation the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church pursues one of the leading tasks of the Ukrainian Churches in the 21th century, “the actualisation of Christian social teaching for the sake of a

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2

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Yurii Chornomorets, “Ukrainske ta rosiiske pravoslavia: neobhidnist ‘perezavantazhennia” {Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy. Necessity of “redownloading”}, http://risu.org.ua/page.php?_lang=ua&path=expert_thought/& name=open_theme&id=45421&alias=&#_ftnref3 (accessed January 13, 2014). Translation from the original source. Myroslav Marynovych, “Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi ta yevrei: Etychnoistorychnyi analiz” {Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi and the Jews. Ethicalhistorical analysis}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/materials_conferences/ 47948/ (accessed January 14, 2014). Translation from the original source.

General Conclusion

civilised way of the modernisation of the Ukrainian society, state, culture that is necessary today.”3 This idea runs as a red thread through the analysed pronouncements of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. All three Heads of the Church in independent Ukraine – Liubachivskyi, Husar, and Shevchuk – considered the healing of memory among the crucial tasks that the Ukrainian society of transition has to perform. As the variety and number of official documents on reconciliation proves that the hierarchs consistently referred to that objective. The approaches of Liubachivskyi, Husar, and Shevchuk on reconciliation essentially coincide; some nuances were dictated by the very particular situations that they had to master. Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi acted in the time of the emergence of his Church from the underground; hence, the majority of his documents are dedicated to the healing of memory of the relations between his Church and the Moscow Patriarchate and the issue of national cohesion in the young Ukrainian state. Liubomyr Husar equally extensively worked on the topic of the inter-Church relations and the existing vision of the united Kyivan Patriarchate is a product of mainly his efforts. Additionally, Husar referred to the broader picture of the Ukrainian past, appealing to reconsider the Holodomor and the communist past of the Ukrainian-Polish relations. The issue of how the social changes are made equally belonged to the key concerns of Cardinal Husar. Sviatoslav Shevchuk follows the line of his predecessor but emphasises that the rapprochement between the Churches at this stage should be searched in practical cooperation in social issues rather than in the theoretical elaboration of the ideas of unity. In the view of the current Ukrainian-Russian conflict it is obvious that both the past and present-day relations between those countries will be among the leading objectives for Shevchuk in the coming years.

Present and missed dimensions of reconciliation This study of the documents in the light of the texts of Lederach, Schreiter, and Volf has demonstrated that the pronouncements of the Church leadership are sufficiently based on a sound theological underpinning: the ideas of the purification of memory, repentance, forgiveness, and ____________________ 3

Ibid. Translation from the original source.

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justice present in the texts greatly correlate with those of the reference authors. For example, the Greek-Catholic idea of personal repentance and reconciliation with God that will bear upon the reconciliation between people corresponds with Schreiter’s vision of vertical and horizontal reconciliation. Both Schreiter and the Church’s leadership primarily understood reconciliation as a metanoia needed for the restoration of the moral order of the person and of the whole society. Both agree that the reconciliation with God will promote social reconciliation. Both speak first of all of reconciliation as a process. While talking about reconciliation as a goal both theologies show a great hope in God as the One who initiates and promotes reconciliation. The biggest correlation between Schreiter and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church consists in their common focus on spirituality as the principal source of rapprochement. One can equally list similarities between the thoughts of Miroslav Volf and the Church. The theology of Volf contains some elements which are not articulated well in the Greek-Catholic texts, however they are still present in the Church’s tradition, for instance, the vision of reconciliation as an embrace and a gift. On the contrary, the idea that also victims have to repent for mirroring the behaviour of perpetrators is eloquently present in the texts of Volf and of the Greek-Catholic leadership. The duty to forgive the other because of the common participation in the mystical body of Christ is another correlating element. Volf’s greatest contribution to the theology of reconciliation, which is his discourse on the purification of memory, reveals some more similarities with the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Among them is the obligation to remember and to do it truthfully, seeing the past with the eyes of the enemy, which is called “double vision” by Volf, or drawing lessons from the past. The texts of John Paul Lederach highlight the two important features of reconciliation for the Ukrainian context, which is building trust and looking for justice as inexorable elements of the restoration of the fabric of community and social healing. However, the particular value of Lederach for the analysis of the Church documents consists in the fact that this author points at the missing practical dimensions of the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and helps define strategies for promoting reconciliation. The critical remarks concerning the practice of enhancing social changes which will follow further are also based mainly on the works of Lederach. The analysis of the teaching of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has identified the following substantial dimensions of reconciliation: reconciliation as longing for the unity of the Church, reconciliation between 436

General Conclusion

nations and peoples (Poland and Russia), reconciliation between clashing identities (the Ukrainian-Ukrainian rapprochement or the purification of the memory of war), and reconciliation as the pursuit of social justice. I have equally identified that the purification of the burdened historical memory will not be completed without addressing the question of the Ukrainian participation in the extermination of the Jews during World War II. To be authentic, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should not abrade the contestable or inconvenient pages of history. However high the appreciation of the efforts for the independence of Ukraine might be, it should not mean that the anti-Jewish and anti-Polish attitudes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army should be blurred or silenced. The purification of memory means telling the truth about the past. In recent years more and more observers and in particular the authors of one of the leading Greek-Catholic journals “Patriarkhat” (“Patriarchate”) have indicated that their Church must proceed from words to actions and assume her role as an actor in Ukrainian civil society. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church started to elaborate on her vision of genuine democracy built on respect for human dignity already in the times of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi.4 The importance of this contribution has been preserved in the theology of this Church until now and is revealed in her support of the “revolution of dignity” during the winter of 2013-2014. Taras Antoshevskyi maintains that the high degree of trust that Ukrainians grant to the Church obliges active lay persons or representatives of the clergy to denounce injustices in society, for instance, the facts of corruption and bribery, attempts at destroying the historical heritage or the unfair taxation.5 The Ukrainian Orthodox religious scholar Yurii Chornomorets is even more radical postulating that not only the future of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, but also of Ukraine as a whole and her people depends upon the ability of that Church to enhance her activities in civil society in several ways, such as by defending the Ukrainian identity and preserving the Christian Kyivan tradition,6 and suggesting an alternative pro____________________ 4

5 6

Sviatoslav Kyiak, Identychnist ukrainskoho katolytsyzmu: henezys, problemy, perspektyvy {Identity of the Ukrainian Catholicism. Genesis, problems, perspectives} (Ivano-Frankivsk: Nova Zoria, 2006), 430. Taras Antoshevskyi, “2010: Rik velykykh peremin i vtrat?” {2010. A year of big changes and losses?}, Patriarkhat 1 (2011): 8. Yurii Chornomorets, “Patriarkh Liubomyr – 10 rokiv predstoiatelstva” {Patriarch Liubomyr – ruling the Church for 10 years}, Patriarkhat 1 (2011): 14.

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General Conclusion

gramme for the development of the state, society, family, economics, politics, and culture.7 It has been argued that the Greek-Catholic approach to justice contains some flaws and needs further elaboration. Emphasising reconciliation as healing which is typical of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church as an eastern Church, the Church documents do not play sufficient attention to the dimension of justice more relevant to the juridical tradition of western Christianity. However, the change of social structures is needed because only efforts of individuals, merely the ontological renewal of the whole person does not mean yet the change of the whole structures. Moral claims cannot be directly transformed into state laws. This brings us to the next practical lesson of the investigation.

From words to strategy: develop and popularise According to all the sociological surveys in the 23 years of Ukrainian independence people have shown a high level of trust and credit in the Church. Her public presence is huge. This resource obliges the Churches to become even more active in the public sphere. At the same time, there is an eloquent need to improve the quality of the action of the Ukrainian Churches which is also evidenced by the results of the opinion surveys I have quoted in chapter I. There is still much left to be done and improved when we consider the following evidences: people claim that they do not place religiosity high enough on the list of values for the education of their children; there is a significant number of those who believe that the Church does not play any explicitly positive or sufficiently remarkable role in society; two thirds do not believe that religion suits the needs of contemporary people; people agree that the Church sustains the rights of the well-off and powerful rather than the poor and unfortunate; the number of those who recognise the Church as a moral authority is smaller than the number of those who express their trust in that institution, and only every fourth Ukrainian believes that the representatives of the clergy demon-

____________________ 7

438

Yurii Chornomorets, “Bohoslovia v Ukrainskii Hreko-Katolytskii Tserkvi: nevykonani zavdannia” {Theology in the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Nonaccomplished tasks}, Patriarkhat 6 (2011): 10.

General Conclusion

strate a high level of morals and spirituality.8 As far as the main research issue of this book is concerned, in addition to issuing numerous messages the Churches should engage more in society because they have something to contribute to the so much desired social changes in Ukraine. Viktor Zhukovskyi, a Greek-Catholic theologian and the editor-in-chief of the journal “Khrystyianyn i svit” (“A Christian and the World”), criticises his Church for the lack of a well-developed strategy, systematic approach, and responsibility on all the levels with regard to the accomplishment of the Church’s mission: “Christian social principles of subsidiarity, respect to the person, solidarity, and common good should be present not only in the Church documents but also in her actual concrete life.”9 Only Church documents, seminars or small local projects do not suffice and notwithstanding 20 years since she came out of the underground, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church still remains behind the church fences.10 Another Greek-Catholic theologian Oleh Hirnyk even speaks of the failure of spiritual revival in Ukraine. He opines that what was and is rendered as national and spiritual renewal in the country is simply a “construction hysteria” that is expressed in the huge number of new sacral buildings and nominal parishes, however, without the real regeneration of the person in Christ.11 The way political struggle is waged, economic reforms are introduced, and social relations function in contemporary Ukraine, prove that. Therefore, it makes me think that the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church together with other traditional Ukrainian denominations have to reflect not only upon the purification of the memory of World War II or the Polish-Ukrainian relations but they must also reinterpret their own activities during the 20 years of Ukrainian independence and repent of their own omissions. A similar idea was expressed by the Ukrainian religious scholar Mykhailo Cherenkov in 2013 on the occasion of admitting the anniversary of the baptism of the Kyivan Rus where ____________________ 8

9

10 11

All the data have already been discussed in part I and are borrowed from the Razumkov Centre, Religiosity of Ukrainians, in Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini (2013), 23-47. Viktor Zhukovskyi, “Suspilstvo zavzhdy, a osoblyvo teper, potrebuie slova Tserkvy” {Society always, and especially now, needs the word of the Church}, interview by Anatolii Babynskyi, Patriarkhat 3 (2010): 15. Translation from the original source. Ibid. Oleh Hirnyk, “Ecclesia Irredenta: kryza i reformy” {Ecclesia Irredenta. Crisis and reforms}, Patriarkhat 2 (2009): 18-19.

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the author suggested that instead of praising the long Christian tradition in Ukraine, the Churches should make a honest analysis of whether this tradition is still alive and if a genuine Christianisation of people has really taken place.12 The experts write13 that it is difficult to find in Ukraine people whether from the Church milieu or lay persons who can professionally comment on social issues in the light of the Church’s teaching. The most recent events of the EuroMaidan and the active supportive role of the Churches show that such a comprehensive theology of change has to be developed. Applying the logic of Robert Schreiter to our case, it is clear that the new social relationships and circumstances that emerged after 1991 demand first-hand answers to what it means to be a good Christian in this epoch and which models of behaviour are compatible with Christian ethics.14 The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church attempted to cover the actual issues and the collection of Socially Oriented Documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008) presents some answers. However, this book is only the basic material that is neither further researched nor popularised. Oleh Hirnyk pointedly maintained that the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and many priests are not familiar with her social doctrine.15 Hence this Church has the huge task to perform in developing her social doctrine and popularising it among the people who both declare their Church affiliation and remain in practice mostly secularised.16 Concerning the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, Hlib Kovalenko maintains that “None of them {Ukrainian Churches} managed to present to so____________________ 12 13 14 15

16

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Mykhailo Cherenkov, interview by Taras Antoshevskyi, Youtube.com, http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=ydUDACvl--8 (accessed January 17, 2014). Antoshevskyi, Something on the challenges, 7. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies, 44. Oleh Hirnyk, “Hreko-katolytskyi vybir pislia vyboriv: sotsialna doktryna chy politychna teolohiia?” {The Greek-Catholic choice after the elections. Social doctrine or political theology?}, http://theology.in.ua/article_print.php?id=39189 &name=society_digest&_lang=ua& (accessed January 24, 2014). There are single attempts to speculate about certain elements of the social doctrine of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. For instance, Yurii Chornomorets and Oksana Sheremeta reflect on the ideology of Christian democracy for contemporary Ukraine on the basis of the works of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi: Oksana Sheremeta and Yurii Chornomorets, “Khrystyianskyi solidaryzm Andreia Sheptytskoho” {Christian solidarism of Andrei Sheptytskyi}, http://risu.org.ua/ ua/index/studios/studies_of_religions/35426/ (accessed January 24, 2014).

General Conclusion

ciety a clear and understandable social teaching about the necessity of the order of law as a demand of Christian morality.”17 Except for several documents, the Churches do not make sufficient efforts to acquaint people with their social teaching. The situation with the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church is better, however also this Church is very unsystematic in disseminating her social teaching that (additionally or consequently) does not wake any great interest in society.18 Hlib Kovalenko wonders why the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church only calls politicians to be good Christians and follow democratic principles instead of promoting a well-elaborated concept of social doctrine that reflects the current Ukrainian situation.19 The task posed before the Ukrainian Catholic University – “to suggest Christian solutions to the present moral problems of the healthcare, promotion of human rights, public service, securing social justice, ecology and environmental protection, psychological health, informational technologies, mass media, political culture and practice and other spheres of human life”20 – remains one of the most demanding for the whole Church. Fundamental research projects such as “Social teaching and the ethics of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church: from Andrei Sheptytskyi to the Patriarch Sviatoslav” 21 suggested by the Orthodox the____________________ 17

18 19

20

21

Hlib Kovalenko, “Tserkva i vybory-2010: klerykalizatsiia bez moralizatsii” {Church and elections-2010. Clericalisation without moralisation}, http://risu. org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/comments/38649/ (accessed January 23, 2014). Translation from the original source. Yurii Chornomorets expressed the same thought concerning all the traditional Ukrainian Churches: Yurii Chornomorets, “Relihiinyi faktor v ukrainskomu hromadianskomu protystoianni” {Religious factor in the civil struggle in society}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/ analytic/35414/ (accessed January 24, 2014). Kovalenko, Church and elections-2010. Hlib Kovalenko, “Vybory v Ukraini ta sotsialne vchennia Tserkov: vypadok Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {Elections in Ukraine and the social teaching of the Churches. The case of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church}, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/monitoring/society_digest/38955/ (accessed January 24, 2014). “Poslannia Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava z nahody 50-richchia zasnuvannia Ukrainskoho katolytskoho universytetu” {Message of His Beatitude Sviatoslav on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Ukrainian Catholic University}, http://news.ugcc.org.ua/articles/poslannya_blazhennіshogo_svyat oslava_z_nagodi_50rіchchya_zasnuvannya_ukrainskogo_katolitskogo_unіversite tu_68458.html (accessed February 10, 2014). Yurii Chornomorets, “Mozhlyvosti dlia rozvytku teolohii v Ukrainskomu katolytskomu universyteti: propushchenyi shans” {Possibilities of the development of

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ologian Yurii Chornomorets should find their place in the research agendas of the Greek-Catholic theologians. My inquiry proves the need of studies in that domain. In addition to research activities, the Church should familiarise her faithful better with her social pronouncements. During my work on Socially Oriented Documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (19892008) as well as on this book I was surprised by having discovered so many official texts on the topic. But the Church pronouncements mostly remain unknown and improvements are indispensable in this sphere. At the same time, it is not easy to awake an interest for social teaching. I have experienced this while promoting the above-mentioned collection of the Church documents at the presentations on the level of dioceses, seminaries, and universities. For most people the practical value of those documents is vague because the Church is regarded as a source of private piety and psychological refuge from the problems of daily life and not as the vanguard of social changes. The Church suggesting the programme of social transition is often encountered by a common Christian with an indulgent smile or more often with indifference. The Church leadership must make great educational efforts in order to change that attitude of scepticism and non-understanding. The Church has to promote her teaching in the Church media. In recent years a progress has appeared with the growing presence of the Church on the Internet. Every diocese and the biggest parishes have launched their websites. Notwithstanding the sometimes unsatisfying quality of those resources, they contain links to the official Church’s documents and make them accessible in that way. However, this is not enough. For the older population and the faithful in smaller towns and village areas the most effective way to get acquainted with the opinion of the Church on social and any other issues is effective preaching. The Church leadership should pay attention to how the Sunday homilies are made since they can be a workable instrument to deliver the essence of the Church’s pronouncements to the faithful. For the moment, in the majority of the parishes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, familiarising with the Church pronouncements happens twice per year, that is when the parish priests read the Eastern or Christmas greeting of the Head of the Church or the local bishop. The parish clergy should be encouraged to include the pronounce____________________ theology in the Ukrainian Catholic University. A missed chance}, http://risu.org. ua/ua/index/blog/~chernomorets/46063/ (accessed February 28, 2014).

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ments of the Head of the Church or of the Synod of Bishops in their Sunday homilies. For that aim the practical training of the future priests should be improved as I have suggested in the book. The Church can preach and educate. She can introduce programmes to instruct believers to take initiative and become responsible citizens. The Commission on Justice and Peace of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church has launched a number of activities that pursue that objective. For instance, a new project of the Commission entitled “Active citizen” aims at familiarising and tutoring the young generations with the methods of social-political activity based on the principles of Catholic social teaching.22 The regular parish encounters pursue the goal to spread the knowledge of the social teaching of the Church among the faithful and sustain their active position on the level of their religious community and civil society.23 The all-Ukrainian project “Democratic values in society” longs for the political, economic, and social education of first of all active young people through a series of meetings, schoolings, and lectures.24 The Commission on Matters of Youth and the Commission on Matters of the Laity equally attempt to work for a similar purpose. The work with the youth should build the cornerstone of the educative and pastoral programmes. I have listed some successful examples of the work with children and youth in the parishes in paragraph 6.2 of chapter VI based on the recommendations of John Paul Lederach and Robert Schreiter to concentrate the activities for changes on the local community, to build local platforms for collaboration. The Church should stop being merely a provider of religious rituals and should become an actor that transforms and ignites people to stand up for changes. ____________________ 22

23

24

The Commission on Justice and Peace of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, “Rozpochynaietsia vseukrainska aktsiia ‘Aktyvnyi hromadianyn” {Begins the all-Ukrainian action “Active citizen”}, http://www.iupax-ugcc.org/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=223:rozpochynaietsia-vseukrainskaaktsiia-aktyvnyi-hromadianyn&catid=11&Itemid=166 (April 17, 2014). The Commission on Justice and Peace of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, “Parafiialni zustrichi” {Parish encounters}, http://www.iupax-ugcc.org/index.php ?option=com_content&view=article&id=17:parafiialni-zustrichi-lystopad-hruden &catid=2:bez-katehorii (accessed April 17, 2014). The Commission on Justice and Peace of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, “Demokratychni tsinnosti v suspilstvi” {Democratic values in society}, http://www.iupax-ugcc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 21:universytetski-dialohy-demokratychni-tsinnosti-studentskoi-molodi&catid= 2:bez-katehorii (accessed April 17, 2014).

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Corresponding measures must be introduced in the education of priests and pastoral workers. For instance, modules on reconciliation and the purification of memory and on the Church’s social teaching in general should find a solid place on the educational agenda of the future priests and theologians. Greek-Catholic priests, mostly born and educated in the seminaries in western Ukraine, who go to work in the east-southern regions of the country, should be equipped with knowledge about dealing with the past differently perceived by people of various backgrounds and identities. Such knowledge would make the future clergy able to interact with the differences in a more professional way than the older generation of priests. Active work with the future priests is needed to promote the ideas contained in the Church documents on reconciliation.

For ecumenism in practice: unity of diversities in common action The leadership of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church promotes the idea that reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches in one united Kyivan Patriarchate will bring about social cohesion in the country. This durable tradition in the 20th century took its origins in the works of the Metropolitan Sheptytskyi, was developed by Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi, and is sustained by the current Head of the Church, Sviatoslav Shevchuk. The findings of this book question the feasibility of that project. Despite the highly declared rate of believers among Ukrainians and the deep trust in the Church of over 60%, the religiosity of the people often remains traditional, being part of the cultural heritage rather than a personally cultivated spirituality when often no deep convictions stay behind the outer observance. Hence, the chance is small that the unity of the Kyivan Church will significantly contribute to social change. The EuroMaidan of the winter of 2013-2014 has shown that the divisions are preserved in society although in the years of the independence of Ukraine the line has moved from a clear-cut east-west identity split to the division between the generations on the basis of values. The EuroMaidan was the revolution of the middle-class, the representatives of which can be found in different regions of the country. However, the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea has proved that even if the people do not genuinely support the Russian expansive politics, they have not found enough mobilisation power to oppose it. The great majority of the people remained passive. In this sphere the Ukrainian Churches have to do some-

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thing in order to promote social changes. Some practical tips can be found in the thoughts of Schreiter and Lederach. In contemporary Ukrainian society the priority should not be the search for spiritual unity. Remaining important as it is in the light of the commandment “May all be one,” instead of longing for the creation of the Kyivan Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church should be present for the people were she is needed and should help people practically sustain social changes. Viktor Zhukovskyi argues that the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church should focus on the transformation of society by bringing there the dynamics of Christian life instead of demanding the patriarchal status.25 The common activities of the traditional Ukrainian Churches make a chance for rapprochement as bishop Yevstratii Zoria of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate contends: “From the search for the organisational or Eucharistic unity which still remains little fruitful we should turn to the ecumenism in practice – to the common witness about Christ before the face of the secular society.”26 The reconciliation between the Ukrainian Churches is underway through the cooperation in social and pastoral issues. The Churches already work together in the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations, where they join efforts in lobbying for or against state laws which define the framework of the functioning of religious communities in the country. However, the Churches can do more than that because such a cooperation should be strengthened in other domains. They can extend their activities beyond the religious sphere and even beyond some initiatives in the humanitarian domain as, for instance, the opposition against the new law on languages. The Churches can express themselves in support of the anti-corruption legislation. This could be a practical concretisation of the spiritual message of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to repent and stop giving bribes. Other laws, which concern the issues of social justice, should equally not evade the attention of religious organisations in Ukraine. Perhaps the very conflicting relationship between the traditional Ukrainian Churches and the failure of all the attempts to solve it by ad____________________ 25 26

Viktor Zhukovskyi, “Termopily’ nashoho bohoslovia” {“Thermopylae” of our theology}, interview by Anatolii Babynskyi, Patriarkhat 6 (2010): 16. Yevstratii Zoriia, “Ekumenizm – ale bez ‘podviinoho dna” {Ecumenism – however without “the double bottom”}, Patriarkhat 4 (2009): 24. Translation from the original source.

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ministrative, political means, and negotiations should be regarded as “the instruction of the Providence regarding the perspective of conciliarity and the necessity to accept each other as different.”27 Hence the relevance of Lederach’s understanding of conflict according to which every conflict already contains hints for its solution. If the Churches did not manage to merge during those two decades of struggle, perhaps they should learn to accept their differences and cooperate. The potential for mutual projects is evident and it is precisely there that the Ukrainian Churches should look for prospects of rapprochement. The Churches are already united in the mystical body of Christ and share the task of promoting human dignity. In those questions the potential for Church unity should be searched for. As it follows from the work of John Paul Lederach, the constant lesson from all this is that the conflict is not primarily about the problem but about opportunities to rebuild the relations between individuals and groups in a more constructive and fulfilling way. The cooperation between the Churches could lead to the insight that despite the differences between the three Orthodox denominations on the one hand and the Greek-Catholics and Orthodox on the other hand, there remains a space for joint efforts for the sake of the Ukrainian state and its citizens. If they follow the suggestions made by Lederach, the Churches would demonstrate an example of how people, who differ in their identities, can still peacefully coexist and pursue common aims. Miroslav Volf, who is especially attentive to the interaction with the different other, and Lederach who pays great attention to language and metaphors, teach that the very rhetoric about the other must be changed in order that it contributes to reconciliation. For the Churches it means that the unfriendly accusing rhetoric that distorts the true facts must be banned. It is difficult to engage into dialogue with someone who is denoted as rozkolnyky. It is equally practically impossible to relate in a friendly way to someone who is described as fascist or moskal (this is how western Ukrainians denote Russians and sometimes Russian-speaking citizens of the country). The double vision, the attentiveness, is necessary in order to understand that the position of the other has an equal right to exist. What is said above captures one of the most important findings of this piece of research, namely that the discourse of the Ukrainian Greek____________________ 27

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Bohdan Ohulchanskyi, “Ukrainska Pravoslavna Tserkva v zmahanni identychnostei” {The Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the struggle of identities}, Patriarkhat 6 (2011): 13.

General Conclusion

Catholic Church on reconciliation has to be complemented with a corresponding strategy. The initiatives above illustrate several concrete examples of such strategic undertakings. The current Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, thinks in that direction when he maintains that the establishment of the fruitful practical cooperation is among the priorities of the ecumenical stance of his Church. The last lesson of this book is about hope. Lewis Smedes, a Catholic thinker, who was a great source of inspiration for Miroslav Volf claimed that “forgiveness and hope are vitally linked to each other”28 because “forgiveness begins with reconciliation. Hope creates the moral energy to pursue it.”29 The poem of Seamus Heaney expresses it even more pointedly: “History says, don’t hope On this side of the grave But then, once in a lifetime The longed-for tidal wave Of justice can rise up, And hope and history rhyme.”30

Hope is sustained and deepened through prayer. In that sense, the hope for reconciliation with God’s help as one of the core messages of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church preserves the horizon of the visible unity of Ukrainian Christianity. The further deeper studies of the issue of the reestablishment of the Kyivan Church conducted together with the Orthodox theologians will help unveil the potential of the Greek-Catholic ecumenical position.

____________________ 28

29 30

Lewis Smedes, “Stations on the Journey from Forgiveness to Hope,” in Dimensions of Forgiveness. Psychological Research and Theological Perspectives, ed. Everett Worthington (Philadelphia and London, Templeton Foundation Press, 1998), 341. Ibid., 353. Quoted in Sen, The Idea of Justice, 27.

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Bibliography

1.

Primary sources

1.1

Chronological list of documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church

Since the documents come from different sources, I have used the following numbering: • The documents with the numbers under 1000 were borrowed from and correspond to their original numbering in Kovalenko, Lesia, ed. Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy {Socially oriented documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008)}. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008. All the documents are available in Ukrainian. Here their titles are given in English translation. • The documents numbered 2000-2026 were borrowed from different Internet sources. • The documents numbered 3000-3003 indicate the available English translations of the Ukrainian texts. • The documents numbered 4000-4002 indicate the available German translations of the Ukrainian texts. • The documents numbered 5000-5005 were borrowed from printed sources other than Socially Oriented Documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008). No. 5000. “Pour un pardon mutuel entre Russes et Ukrainiens” (06.11.1987). Istina 34 (1989): 438-440. No. 1. Statement of His Beatitude Myroslav-Ivan Cardinal Liubachivskyi regarding a meeting between Pope John Paul II and Mikhail Gorbachov on December 1, 1989 (01.12.1989). No. 3. Statement of Patriarch Myroslav-Ivan on the registration of parishes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (12.1989). No. 4. Address of His Beatitude Myroslav-Ivan to his faithful in Ukraine about the registration of Ukrainian Greek-Catholic communities (21.12.1989). No. 6. Rulings and Resolutions of the Sobor of Bishops, Clergy and representatives of Laity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, held in Lviv on January 23, 1990 (23.01.1990).

449

Bibliography No. 9. Statement of the position by the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic clergy in Ukraine regarding the work of a Quadrilateral Commission for the normalisation of the relations between the Orthodox and the Eastern Catholics (Greek-Catholics) in western Ukraine (19.03.1990). No. 12. Statement of the Ruling Primate of the Galician Metropolia Volodymyr Sterniuk during the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Rome about the current state of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (25.06.1990). No. 15. Statement of His Beatitude Myroslav-Ivan Cardinal Liubachivskyi in response to the Russian Orthodox denial of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (23.08.1990). No. 21. “Let Patriarch Yosyf’s Testament be Our Guideline. The Rebirth of Our Church Should Culminate in the Establishment of a Patriarchate.” Speech of Patriarch Myroslav-Ivan in front of the Lviv Opera House (31.03.1991). No. 23. Address of Patriarch Myroslav-Ivan to the members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (23.05.1991). No. 28. Address of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Bishops to the heads, the clergy, and the faithful of all Ukrainian denominations about the unity of the Churches in Ukraine (08.11.1991). No. 32. “That they all may be one.” Speech of Patriarch Myroslav-Ivan to the First Special Assembly of the European Synod of Bishops, Vatican City, November 28 – December 14, 1991 (December 1991). No. 33. Address of His Beatitude Myroslav-Ivan to the public authorities delivered at the Saint George’s Cathedral in Lviv (21.05.1992). No. 35. Declaration of the annulment of the Lviv Pseudo-Council of 1946 (29.05.1992). No 40. “That they all may be one.” Conciliar Christmas message of the hierarchy of the local Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, AD 1993 (21.11.1992). No. 45. Statement of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the events in Kyiv on July 18, 1993 (19.07.1993). No. 5001. “Letter {of Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi} to Cardinal Cassidy” (03.08.1993). Logos. A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 35, nos. 1-4 (1994): 417-424. No. 5002. “Pastyrske zvernennia Hlavy Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopa Lvivskoho Kardynala Myroslava-Ivana Liubachivskoho pro poiednannia Sviatykh Tserkov” {Pastoral Address of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Major Archbishop of Lviv Cardinal Myroslav-Ivan Liubachivskyi about the unity of the holy Churches} (25.0307.04.1994). In Znaky chasu, edited by Antoniuk, Z. and M. Marynovych, 146-164. Kyiv: Sfera, 1999. No. 53. Greeting telegram of His Beatitude Myroslav-Ivan Cardinal Liubachivskyi to Leonid Kuchma, the newly elected President of Ukraine (14.07.1994). No. 83. New Year’s Address of His Grace Liubomyr Husar, an auxiliary bishop to the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, AD 1999.

450

Bibliography No. 92. Lecture of His Grace Liubomyr Husar, an auxiliary bishop to the Head of the UGCC, during the First Ukrainian Eucharistic Congress “Reconciliation as a Gift from God and a Source of New Life” (23.09.1999). No. 332. Sermon of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during a pontifical service at the Saint George Cathedral expressing solidarity with the Holy Father at the beginning of the Jubilee Year (25. 12.1999). No. 95. “Merry Christmas!” Christmas address of His Grace Liubomyr Husar to the faithful in parishes where interdenominational conflicts occurred (30.12.1999). No. 98. Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church on the occasion of the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000 and an All-Ukrainian pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia (23.07.2000). No. 99. Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the parish priests of Lviv on Purification and Reconciliation Day (18.08.2000). No. 5003. “Kontseptsiia ekumenichnoi pozytsii Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {The conception of the ecumenical position of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church} (14.10.2000). Bohoslovia 65 (2001): 52-68. German translation: No. 4000. „Die Konzeption der ökumenischen Position der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche“. In Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar, edited and translated by Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer, 115-141. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012. No. 107. “We Long for Unity and Love.” Statement of the position of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar regarding an interview of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexius II published by Corriere della Sera newspaper. No. 274. Pastoral letter of two Catholic Bishops in Ukraine to the clergy and the faithful at the end of the Great Jubilee Year 2000 and in anticipation of the Holy Father John Paul II’s visit to Ukraine (13.12.2000). No. 338. “Let us embrace each other in faith, hope, and love.” Enthronement sermon of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar delivered on January 28, 2001 (28.01.2001). No. 113. Greeting Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr at the Liturgy in the Byzantine Rite in Lviv during the visit of His Holiness John Paul II to Ukraine (27.06.2001). No. 114. Address of the UGCC Bishops to the faithful sons and daughters of the Ukrainian nation on the occasion of the Synodal Consultations and the Holy Father John-Paul II’s pilgrimage to Ukraine (05.07.2001). No. 118. Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the parish clergy of Lviv in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the USA and Reconciliation Day in Lviv (11.10.2001). No. 346. Sermon of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during a divine service on Reconciliation Day (11.11.2001). No. 125. Speech of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during the consecration of water near the statue of the Virgin Mary on Freedom Avenue in Lviv (19.01.2002).

451

Bibliography No. 128. “The Son of man is not come to destroy men’s lives, but to save them.” Reflections of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar on the pressing problems of modern times. No. 139. Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the UGCC faithful and all people of good will concerning the homage to the military graves on Lychakiv Cemetery in Lviv (18.06.2002). No. 275. Address of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Liubomyr Cardinal Husar and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lviv Marian Jaworski to all people of good will (04.07.2002). No. 155. Address of the Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Metropolia of KyivHalych to the faithful and all people of good will on the 70th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine (08.11.2002). No. 156. Statement of the Head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church concerning the possible visit of the Moscow Patriarch to Ukraine (25.11.2002). No. 162. Message of the Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Metropolia of KyivHalych to the Ukrainian and Polish peoples, brothers in Christ (05.05.2003). No. 172. Letter of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the Prime Minister of Ukraine regarding the observation of the 70th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine (24.11.2003). No. 277. Address of the Heads of the Ukrainian Christian Churches on the 70th anniversary of the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (29.12.2003). No. 5004. “Adresse du Synode des évêques de la Métropolie de Kiev et de Galicie au clergé, aux moines et aux fidèles de l’Eglise gréco-catholique ukrainienne à l’occasion de la visite à Moscou du cardinal Walter Kasper.” Istina LI (2006): 2072010. No. 177. “One People of God Dwells on the Kyiv Hills.” Speech of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Metropolitan of Kyiv-Halych, about the transfer of the Metropolitan Seat to Kyiv (13.04.2004). English translation: No. 3000. “The Unique People of God. Discourse of His Beatitude Lubomyr Husar, Metropolitan of Kyiv-Halych, Head of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church, on the occasion of the beginning of the return of the Metropolitan See to Kyiv.” In Conversations with Lubomyr Husar. Towards a Post-Confessional Christianity, edited by Antoine Arjakovsky, 128-138. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2007. No. 362. Sermon of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during a divine service on the occasion of an All-Ukrainian pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia (08.08.2004). No. 2000. “Pro utverdzhennia patriarshoho ustroiu Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy” {On the strengthening of the patriarchal order of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church} (06.09.2004). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/51.0.html (accessed April 3, 2013). English translation: No. 3001. “The Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Pastoral message.” In Conversations with Lubomyr Husar. Towards a Post-Confessional Christianity, edited by Antoine Arjakovsky, 139-152. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2007.

452

Bibliography No. 199. Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the clergy of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Metropolia of Kyiv-Halych on the 60th anniversary of the arrest of Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyi and the victory over Nazism (23.03.2005). No. 2001. Vidkrytyi lyst Komisii spravedlyvist i myr Kyievo-Halytskoi Mytropolii Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do khrystyianskykh Tserkov Ukrainy z nahody Dnia pamiati zhertv Druhoi svitovoi viiny {Open Letter of the Justice and Peace Commission of Kyiv-Halych Metropolia of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Christian Churches of Ukraine on the Day of Remembrance of the victims of World War II}, (08.05.2005). http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/seminary/ 2005/sem08-05.htm#1 (accessed February 14, 2012). No. 202. Speech of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during the solemn opening and consecration of a Polish war memorial and a cemetery of the Ukrainian Galician Army soldiers in Lviv (24.05.2005). No. 205. Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church about the grounds of hope for a better future for the Ukrainian people (31.08.2005). No. 289. “Reconciliation between Nations in Possible.” Message of the Catholic Bishops of Ukraine and Poland on the occasion of a mutual forgiveness and reconciliation act (19.06.2005). Partly in English translation: No. 3002. “Letter of the Bishops of Poland and Ukraine on Reconciliation.” http://www.zenit.org/article-13842?l=english (accessed December 21, 2012). No. 368. Sermon of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during a divine service on the occasion of the All-Ukrainian Eucharistic Council and a reconciliation act between the UGCC Bishops and the Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland (26.06.2005). No. 208. Speech of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during a memorial service on the graves of Ukrainian and Polish soldiers (01.11.2005). No. 213. Letter of the Synod of Bishops of the Major Archbishopric of Kyiv-Halych to the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko asking to rehabilitate the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church which was illegally liquidated in the 1940s (16.01.2006). No. 216. Letter of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the leaders of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine on the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Council (14.02.2006). No. 217. Letter of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Alexius II on the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Council (14.02.2006). No. 218. Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar to the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Council (07.03.2006). German translation: No. 4001. „Wort Seiner Seligkeit Lubomyr an die Gläubigen der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche anlässlich des 60. Jahrestages der Lviver Pseudosynode“. In Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen Griechisch-Katholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit

453

Bibliography Kommentar, edited and translated by Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer, 191-193. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012. No. 232. Letter of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (07.03.2006). No. 219. Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Major Archbishopric of Kyiv-Halych to the clergy, the religious, the faithful, and all people of good will on the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Council of 1946 (07.03.2006). Partly in English translation: No. 3003: “Address of the Synod of Bishops of the KyivHalych Metropolinate to the clergy, religious, and laity of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church and to all people of good will on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Lviv Pseudo-Council of 1946.” In Conversations with Lubomyr Husar. Towards a Post-Confessional Christianity, edited by Antoine Arjakovsky, 153-156. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2007. No. 227. Speech of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar during the opening of a memorial monument to the Ukrainians murdered by the Poles in 1945 (13.05.2006). No. 303. Address of the Ukrainian Churches to the Verkhovna Rada concerning the need to acknowledge the Great Famine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people (16.11.2006). No. 319. Address of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations on the 75th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine (23.11.2007). No. 5005. Memorandum Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy shchodo pytannia pomisnosti Kyivskoi Tserkvy (protsesu tvorennia yedynoi pomisnoi Tserkvy) {Memorandum of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the issue of the local Kyivan Church (the process of the creation of the united local Church} (21.01.2008). Visnyk Kyievo-Halytskoho Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopstva 5 (2008): 7-9. No. 2002. Lyst Blazhennishoho Liubomyra do Blazhennishoho Mytropolyta Volodymyra, Predstoiatelia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy {Letter of His Beatitude Liubomyr to His Beatitude Metropolitan Volodymyr, the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church} (26.04.2008). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/293.0.html (accessed April 23, 2013). German translation: No. 4002. „Brief Seiner Seligkeit Lubomyr an Seine Seligkeit Metropolit Volodymyr, den Vorsteher der Ukrainischen Orthodoxen Kirche“. In Einheit. Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen GriechischKatholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar, edited and translated by Andriy Mykhaleyko, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer, 202-207. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012. No. 2003. Zvernennia kerivnykiv khrystyianskykh Tserkov Ukrainy z pryvodu vshanuvannia zhertv Holodomoru 1932-1933 rokiv {Address of the Heads of the Ukrainian Churches on the homage to the victims of the Great Famine of 19321933} (21.11.2008). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/402.0.html (accessed February 11, 2013). No. 2004. The Synod’s message for the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the 65th anniversary of the death of

454

Bibliography Metropolitan Andrew (Sheptytskyj), and the 25th anniversary of the death of Patriarch Joseph (Slipyj) (08.12.2009). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/985.0.html?&L=2 (accessed February 19, 2013). No. 2005. Zvernennia Blazhennishoho Liubomyra do virnykh Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli z nahody dniv molytov 9 ta 19 travnia 2010 roku {Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr to the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and all people of good will on the occasion of the Days of Prayer on May 9 and May 16, 2010} (05.05.2010). http://www.ugcc.org. ua/1212.0.html (accessed August 27, 2012). No. 2006. Vidkrytyi lyst Prezydentovi Ukrainy shchodo soboru Sofii Kyivskoi {Open letter to the President of Ukraine concerning the Saint Sophia Cathedral} (31.12.2010). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/1594.0.html (accessed February 16, 2013). No. 2007. Address of His Beatitude Liubomyr, Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Halych of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church {on the occasion of the Ukrainian Unity Day} (21.01.2011). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/1621.0.html?&L=2 (accessed February 18, 2013). No. 2008. Zvernennia Synodu Yepyskopiv Kyievo-Halytskoho Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopstva Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do dukhovenstva i virnykh Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli pro zberezhennia suspilnoho myru {Address of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Major Archbishopric of Kyiv-Halych to the clergy, the faithful and all people of good will about the preservation of public peace} (30.05.2011). http:// www.ugcc.org.ua/1813.0.html (accessed February 16, 2013). No. 2009. Zaklyk Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava do dukhovenstva ta virnykh Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli do molytvy u Den pamiati 22 chervnia 2011 roku Bozhoho {Call of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and all people of good will for prayer on the Commemoration Day of June 22, 2011} (09.06.2011). http://www. ugcc.org.ua/1837.0.html (accessed April 27, 2012). No. 2010. Zvernennia Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava, Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopa Kyievo-Halytskoho Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy z nahody dnia Sviatoho Rivnoapostolnoho Velykoho Kniazia Volodymyra ta vidnovlennia khresnykh obitiv {Address of His Beatitude Sviatoslav, Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Halych of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, on the occasion of the Day of the Holy and Equal-to-the-Apostles Great Prince Volodymyr and of the renewal of the baptismal vows} (20.07.2011). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/1901.0.html (accessed February 18, 2013). No. 2011. Zvernennia Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava, Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopa Kyievo-Halytskoho Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy, z nahody 20-litnoho yuvileiu Nezalezhnosti Ukrainy {Address of His Beatitude Sviatoslav, Major Archbishop of Kyiv-Halych of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Independence of Ukraine} (20.08.2011). http://www. ugcc.org.ua/1936.0.html (accessed February 18, 2013). No. 2012. Zvernennia Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov i relihiinykh orhanizatsii z nahody 20-richchia vidnovlennia derzhavnoi nezalezhnosti Ukrainy {Address of the All-

455

Bibliography Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the renewal of the State Independence of Ukraine} (22.09.2011). http://vrciro.org.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 160&Itemid=1 (accessed February 18, 2013). No. 2013. Pastoral letter of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the clergy, religious and all the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church “The Vibrant Parish – a place to encounter the living Christ” (02.12.2011). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2089.0.html?& L=2#c5422 (accessed February 18, 2013). No. 2014. Pastyrske Poslannia Synodu Yepyskopiv Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy do virnykh z nahody 120-litnoho yuvileiu Patriarkha Yosyfa Slipoho {Pastoral letter of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the faithful on the occasion of the 120th jubilee of Patriarch Joseph (Slipyj)} (09.02.2012.). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2187.0.html (accessed February 19, 2013). No. 2015. Easter Message of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the reverend clergy and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (07.04.2012). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/ 2267.0.html?&L=2 (accessed February 19, 2013). No. 2016. Vidkrytyi lyst Hlav Tserkov i relihiinykh orhanizatsii Ukrainy shchodo movnoho pytannia {Open letter of the Heads of the Churches and religious organisations of Ukraine on the language issue} (04.07.2012). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/ 2391.0.html (accessed February 19, 2013). No. 2017. Deklaratsiia Vseukrainskoi Rady Tserkov i relihiinykh orhanizatsii “Znannia mynuloho – shliakh do maibutnoho” {Declaration of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations “Knowledge of the past – way to the future”} (03.10.2012). http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=1124%3A1&catid=50%3Azv&Itemid=78&lang=ru (accessed January 13, 2014). No. 2018. An appeal of the Synod of Bishops of Kyiv-Halych Major Archbishopric of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to the faithful and all people of good will on the 70th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy (11.03.2013). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/ 2687.0.html (accessed March 26, 2013). No. 2019. Deklaratsiia katolytskykh Tserkov Ukrainy i Polshchi pro proshchennia i prymyrennia {Declaration of the Catholic Churches of Ukraine and Poland on forgiveness and reconciliation} (28.06.2013). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2768.0.html (accessed January 20, 2014). No. 2020. Poslannia Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava do virnykh Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli z nahody vidznachennia Tysiachodvadtsiatypiatyrichchia Khreshchennia Rusi-Ukrainy {Message of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and all people of good will on the occasion of the 1025th anniversary of the baptism of Rus-Ukraine} (22.07.2013). http://www.ugcc.org.ua/2777.0.html (accessed February 10, 2014). No. 2021. Synod Yepyskopiv Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy 2013 roku “Napriamky novoi yevanhelizatsii v Ukrainskii Hreko-Katolytskii Tserkvi” {Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 2013 “Directions of the new evangelisation in the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church”} (12.08.2013). http:// www.ugcc.org.ua/2781.0.html (accessed February 10, 2014).

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Bibliography No. 2022. Address of the traditional Ukrainian Churches to the faithful and all people of good will on the eve of the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Famine (October 2013). http://news.ugcc.org.ua/en/articles/address_of_traditional_ukrain ian_churches_to_the_faithful_and_all_people_of_good_will_on_the_eve_of_celebr ation_of_the_80th_anniversary_of_the_famine_67981.html (accessed February 10, 2014). No. 2023. His Beatitude Sviatoslav appeals to the faithful of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the Holodomor [Great Famine] of 1932-33 (18.11.2013). http://news.ugcc.org.ua/en/articles/his_beati tude_sviatoslav_appeals_to_ugcc_faithful_on_the_occasion_of_the_80th_anniversa ry_of_holodomor_great_famine_of_193233_68218.html (accessed February 10, 2014). No. 2024. Zvernennia Blazhennishoho Sviatoslava do virnykh Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy ta vsikh liudei dobroi voli z nahody Dnia Sobornosti Ukrainy {Message of His Beatitude Sviatoslav to the faithful of the Ukrainian GreekCatholic Church and all people of good will on the occasion of the Ukrainian Unity Day} (20.01.2014). http://news.ugcc.org.ua/articles/zvernennya_blazhennіshogo_ svyatoslava_do_vіrnih_ugkts_ta_vsіh_lyudey_dobroi_volі_z_nagodi_dnya_soborn ostі_ukraini_68894.html (accessed February 10, 2014). No. 2025. Appeal of the Ukrainian Churches on the occasion of Foreign Aggression (02.03.2014). http://news.ugcc.org.ua/en/articles/appeal_of_the_ukrainian_church es_on_the_occasion_of_the_foreign_aggression_69430.html (accessed March 5, 2014). No. 2026. Pastoral letter of His Beatitude Sviatoslav and the Permanent Synod on the occasion of the Great Fast 2014 (02.03.2014). http://news.ugcc.org.ua/en/ articles/pastoral_letter_of_his_beatitude_sviatoslav_and_the_permanent_synod_of_ the_ocassion_of_the_great_fast_2014_69432.html (accessed March 5, 2014).

1.2

John Paul Lederach

Lederach, John Paul. Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995. _____. “Five Qualities of Practice in Support of the Reconciliation Process.” In Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation, edited by Raymond Helmick and Rodney Petersen, 193-204. n.p: Templeton, 2001. _____. “How Long Will It Take?” In A Handbook of International Peacebuilding. Into the Eye of the Storm, edited by John Paul Lederach and Janice Jenner, 261-270. n. p.: Jossey Bass, 2002. _____. “Where Do I Fit In?” In A Handbook of International Peacebuilding. Into the Eye of the Storm, edited by John Paul Lederach and Janice Jenner, 37-46. n. p.: Jossey Bass, 2002. _____. The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2003.

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1.3

Miroslav Volf

Volf, Miroslav. Work in the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. _____. “Exclusion and Embrace. Theological Reflections in the Wake of Ethnic Cleansing.” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 2 (1992): 230-248. _____. Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation. Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1996. _____. After Our Likeness: The Church as an Image of the Triune God. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998. _____. “Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Justice. A Christian Contribution to a More Peaceful Social Environment.” In Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation, edited by Raymond Helmick and Rodney Petersen, 27-49. n.p: Templeton, 2001. _____. “Love’s Memory. The Role of Memory in Contemporary Culture.” 57-70. http://www.ptsem.edu/uploadedFiles/School_of_Christian_Vocation_and_Mission/ Institute_for_Youth_Ministry/Princeton_Lectures/Volf-Role.pdf (accessed July 24, 2013). _____. “Love’s Memory. Redemptive Remembering.” 71-82. http://www.ptsem. edu/uploadedFiles/School_of_Christian_Vocation_and_Mission/Institute_for_Yout h_Ministry/Princeton_Lectures/Volf-Redemptive.pdf (accessed July 25, 2013). _____. Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005. _____. “Being as God Is. Trinity and Generosity.” In God’s Life in Trinity, edited by Miroslav Volf and Michael Welker, 3-12. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006.

458

Bibliography _____. The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006. _____. Introduction to Unconditional? The Call of Jesus to Radical Forgiveness {CDROM}. By Brian Zahnd. n. p.: Oasis Audio, 2010. _____. A Public Faith: How Followers of Christ Should Serve the Common Good. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2011. _____. Allah: A Christian Response. New York: HarperOne, 2011. _____. “Remembering Well in a Violent World.” In Mission und Einheit. Gemeinsames Zeugnis getrennter Kirchen? – Mission and Unity. Common Witness of Separated Churches? Proceedings of the 16th Academic Consultations of the Societas Oecumenica, Beihefte zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 91, edited by Peter De Mey, Andrew Pierce, and Oliver Schuegraf, 51-60. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012.

1.4

Robert Schreiter

Schreiter, Robert. Constructing Local Theologies. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985. _____. Reconciliation. Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order. Maryknoll, NY: Obris Books, 1992. _____. “Reconciliation as a Model of Mission.” New Theology Review 10 (1997): 615. _____. The Ministry of Reconciliation. Spirituality and Strategies. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998. _____. “Globalisation and Reconciliation. Challenges to Mission.” In Mission in the Third Millennium, edited by Robert Schreiter, 121-143. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001. _____. “Theology of Reconciliation and Peacemaking for Mission.’ 2003 Lectures for the British and Irish Association of Mission Studies. New College, University of Edinburgh, June 23-25, 2003.” http://preciousbloodspirituality.org/spirituality-andtheology/theology-reconciliation-and-peacemaking-mission (accessed June 16, 2013). _____. “Grassroots Artisans of Peace. A Theological Afterword.” In Artisans of Peace. Grassroots Peacemaking among Christian Communities, edited by Mary Ann Cejka and Thomas Bamat, 287-300. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2003. _____. “Globalization as a Challenge to the Churches.” http://www.usccb.net/conf erence/conference19/paper-Globalization-schreiter.pdf (accessed July 17, 2013). _____. “Reconciliation and Healing as a Paradigm for Mission.” International Review of Mission 94 (2005): 74-83. _____. “The Future of Catholic Peacebuilding.’ Closing remarks at the Conference on the future of Catholic Peacebuilding, University of Notre Dame, April 15, 2008.” http://cpn.nd.edu/assets/14687/schreiternd.pdf (accessed July 17, 2013).

459

Bibliography _____. “Justice and Reconciliation” (Paper Presented at the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network General Assembly (AEFJN) - Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation Commission (JPIC) of the Union of Superiors General and International Union of Superiors General (USIG) Rome, November 30, 2009).” http:// www.aefjn.org/index.php/news-reader/items/justice-and-peace-conference-byrobert-schreiter-cpps.html (accessed June 17, 2013). _____. “A Practical Theology of Healing, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation.” In Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis, edited by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Regard F. Powers, 366-397. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010. _____. “The Catholic Social Imaginary and Peacebuilding. Ritual, Sacrament and Spirituality.” In Peacebuilding. Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis, edited by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Regard F. Powers, 221-239. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010.

2.

Books

Dyeyatyelnost rabochyey grupy myezhtsyerkovnogo dialoga “Rol Tsyerkvyey v primiryenii narodov Tsyentralno-Vostochnoy Yevropy” v 1996-1999 godakh {Activities of the working group of the inter-Church dialogue “Role of Churches in reconciliation of the nations of the Central-Eastern Europe” in 1996-1999}. Minsk: OrthoPress, 1999. Ukraina – Polshcha: vazhki pytannia: Materialy VIII mizhnarodnoho naukovoho seminary “Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny pid chas Druhoi svitovoi viiny,” 6-8 lystopada, 2000, Warshawa {Ukraine – Poland. Difficult questions. The materials of the international scientific seminar “Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II,” November 6-8, 2000, Warsaw}. Vol. 8. Lutsk: Volynska Oblasna Drukarnia, 2008. Zapovit Patriarkha {Testament of the Patriarch}. Lviv: Lohos, 1995. Agamben, Giorgio. Was von Auschwitz bleibt. Das Archiv und der Zeuge. Translated by Stefan Monhardt. 5th ed. n. p.: Suhrkamp, 2013. Arjakovsky, Antoine, ed. Conversations with Lubomyr Husar. Towards a PostConfessional Christianity. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2007. _____. En attendant le concile de l’Église Orthodoxe. Paris: Les éditions du CERF, 2011. Aumont, Isabelle. La “purification de la mémoire” selon Jean-Paul II. Paris: Parole et silence, 2008. Babynska, Svitlana, Yulia Zavadska, Mariana Karapinka, and Olena Kulyhina. Tserkva i media: sim krokiv do porozuminnia {The Church and media. Seven steps to understanding}. n.p.: Ezdra, 2012. Bartov, Omer. Erased. Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. Bash, Anthony. Forgiveness and Christian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

460

Bibliography Bendyk, Myron. Patriarkhat Ukrainskoi Tserkvy ta ukrainska natsionalna ideia {The Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian national idea}. Drohobych, 2004. _____. Pomisnist Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy ta yii bachennia Patriarkhom Yosyfom Slipym {The particularity of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and its vision by Patriarch Yosyf Slipyi}. Lviv: Svichado, 1996. _____. Yedyna pomisna Tserkva: konfesiina utopiia chy tserkovna realnist? {United local Church. Confessional utopia or ecclesial reality?}. Drohobych: Kolo, 2007. Berdychowska, Bogumila, ed. Jerzy Giedroyc ta ukrainska emihratsiia. Lystuvannia 1950-1982 rokiv {Jerzy Giedroyc and the Ukrainian emigration. Correspondence of 1950-1982}. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2008. Besançon, Alain. A Century of Horrors. Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Shoah. Translated by Ralph Hancock and Nathaniel Hancock. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007. Bociurkiw, Bohdan. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (19391950). Edmonton, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1996. _____. Ukrainian Churches under Soviet Rule. Two Case Studies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fond, 1984. Bondarchuk, P. M. et al., eds. Relihiina polityka v Ukraini u 1960-1980 rokakh i suchasna praktyka mizhkonfesiinykh vidnosyn {Religious politics in Ukraine in the 1960s-1980s and the contemporary practice of interconfessional relations}. Kyiv, 2010. Borowik, Irena, and Grzegorz Babinski, eds. New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow: Nomos, 1997. Borowik, Irena, ed. Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. n.p.: Nomos, 1999. _____, ed. Religions, Churches and the Scientific Studies of Religion: Poland and Ukraine. n. p.: Nomos, 2003. Bussgang, Julian. Mytropolyt Sheptytskyi. Shche odyn pohliad na zhyttia i diialnist {Metropolitan Sheptytskyi. One more view on his life and actions}. Translated by Roman Skakun. Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2009. Chushak, Khrystyna. Nemaie vilnoi Polshchi bez vilnoi Ukrainy: Ukraina ta ukraintsi u politychnii dumtsi polskoi opozytsii (1976-1989) {There is no free Poland without free Ukraine. Ukraine and Ukrainians in the political thought of the Polish opposition (1976-1989)}. Lviv: Pais, 2011. D’Anieri, Paul, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio. Politics and Society in Ukraine, Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Repubics. Cambridge, MA: Westview, 1999. Dathe, Claudia, and Andreas Rostek, eds. Majdan! Ukraine, Europa. Berlin: Edition.foto TAPETA, 2014. Davis, Nathaniel. A Long Walk to Church: a Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy. Oxford: Westview Press, 2003. Dymyd, Mykhailo. Khersoneske tainstvo svobody {Chersones sacrament of freedom}. Lviv: Svichado, 2007.

461

Bibliography Galasinska, Aleksandra, and Dariusz Galasinski, eds. The Post-Communist Condition. Public and Private Discourses of Transformation. Amsterdam – Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010. Gordyi, Igor. Ukrainische Kirchen und die Orange Revolution. Haltung der ukrainischen Kirchen in den gesellschaftspolitischen Prozessen in der Ukraine im Jahr 2004. Südwestdeutscher Verlag für Hochschulschriften, 2009. Gross, Jan. Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006. _____. Neighbours. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. London: Arrow Books, 2003. Gudziak, Borys. Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolinate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2001. Havanio, Ivan, ed. Joseph Cardinal Höffner. Khrystyianske suspilne vchennia {Joseph Cardinal Höffner. Christian social teaching}. Lviv: Svichado, 2002. Hruslinska, Isabella, and Petro Tyma. Dialohy porozuminnia. Ukrainsko-yevreiski vzaiemyny {Dialogues of mutual understanding. Ukrainian-Jewish relations}. Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2011. Hrynchyshyn, Mykhail et al., eds. Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. T. 3, Pastyrski poslannia, 1939-1944 {Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi. Vol. 3, Pastoral letters}. Lviv: Artos, 2010. Hrytsak, Yaroslav. Strasti za natsionalizmom: stara istoriia na novyi lad {Passions around nationalism. Old history in a new manner}. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2011. _____. Zhyttia, smert ta inshi nepryiemnosti {Life, death, and other troubles}. 3rd ed. Kyiv: Hrani-T, 2011. Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. London: Simon and Schuster, 2002. Judt, Tony. Post-War. A History of Europe since 1945. London: Vintage Books, 2010. _____. Reappraisals. Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century. London: Vintage Books, 2009. Kerski, Basil, Thomas Kycia, and Robert Zurek. „Wir vergeben und bitten um Vergebung“. Der Briefwechsel der polnischen und deutschen Bischöfe 1965 und seine Wirkung. Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2006. Knox, Colin, and Padraic Quirk. Peace-Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa. Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Kolodnyi, Anatolii, and Liudmyla Fylypovych, eds. Tolerantnist v sferi mizhkonfesiinykh vidnosyn. Relihiieznavchyi analiz {Tolerance in the sphere of interconfessional relations. Analysis in religious studies}. Kyiv, 2004. _____. Relihiina dukhovnist ukraintsiv: vyiavy, postati, stan {Religious spirituality of Ukrainians. Exposures, figures, state}. Lviv: Lohos, 1996.

462

Bibliography Kolodnyi, Anatolii, ed. Istoriia relihii v Ukraini. T. 10, Relihiia i Tserkva rokiv nezalezhnosti Ukrainy {History of religion in Ukraine. Vol. 10, Religion and Church in independent Ukraine}. Kyiv, Drohobych, 2003. _____. Ukraina v yii relihiinykh vyiavakh {Ukraine in her religious exposures}. Lviv: Spolom, 2005. Kosukha, Petro, ed. Suchasna relihiina sytuatsia v Ukraini: stan, tendentsii, prohnozy {Contemporary religious situation in Ukraine. State, tendencies, prognoses}. Kyiv, 1994. Kovalenko, Lesia, ed. Sotsialno zoriientovani dokumenty Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy (1989-2008) {Socially oriented documents of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (1989-2008)}. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008. Kovba, Zhanna, and Andrii Krawchuk, eds. Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi. Dokumenty i materialy 1941-1944 {Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi. Documents and materials. 1941-1944}. Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2003. Kovba, Zhanna. Liudianist u bezodni pekla. Povedinka mistsevoho naselennia Skhidnoi Halychyny v roky “Ostatochnoho rozviazannia yevreiskoho pytannia” {Humanity in the abyss of hell. Behaviour of the local population of eastern Galicia in the years of the “Final solution of the Jewish question”}. Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2009. Kyiak, Sviatoslav. Identychnist ukrainskoho katolytsyzmu: henezys, problemy, perspektyvy {Identity of the Ukrainian Catholicism. Genesis, problems, perspectives}. Ivano-Frankivsk: Nova Zoria, 2006. Labunka, Miroslav, and Leonid Rudnytzky, eds. The Ukrainian Catholic Church 1945-1975. A Symposium. Philadelphia, PA: The St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics, 1976. Levi, Primo. I sommersi e i salvati. Torino: Einaudi, 2003. Lewin, Kurt. A Journey through Illusions. n. p.: Fithian Pr, 1997. _____. Mandrivka kriz iliuzii {A journey through illusions}. Edited by Zhanna Kovba, Leonid Finberg, and Myroslav Marynovych. Lviv: Svichado, 2007. Little, David. Ukraine. The Legacy of Intolerance. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991. Lüdemann, Ernst. Die Auseinandersetzung mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit in der Ukraine, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 39. Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1997. Markevych, Avhustyn. Uniatstvo. Bohoslovski aspekty {Uniatism. Theological aspects}. Kyiv-Lviv, 2010. http://orthodox.lviv.ua/books/EAUniats.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014). Marples, David R. Heroes and Villains. Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2007. Marynovych, Myroslav, and Leonid Finberg, eds. Yudeo-khrystyianskyi dialoh v Ukraini (stenohrama seminaru 19-20 kvitnia 1999 roku. Lviv, Lvivska Bohoslovska Akademiia) {Judeo-Christian dialogue in Ukraine (shorthand record of the seminar 19-20 April, 1999. Lviv, Ukrainian Theological Academy}. Lviv-Kyiv, 2000.

463

Bibliography Marynovych, Myroslav, and Lesia Kovalenko, eds. Relihiina svoboda i prava liudyny. T. 3, Misiia i prozelityzm {Religious freedom and human rights. Vol. 3, Mission and proselytism}. Lviv: Svichado, 2004. Marynovych, Myroslav. An Ecumenist Analyses the History and Prospects of Religion in Ukraine. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2004. _____, ed. Relihiina svoboda i prava liudyny. T. 1, Bohoslovski aspekty {Religious freedom and human rights. Vol. 1, Theological aspects}. Lviv: Svichado, 2000. _____, ed. Relihiina svoboda i prava liudyny. T. 2, Pravnychi aspekty {Religious freedom and human rights. Vol. 2, Legal aspects}. Lviv: Svichado, 2000. _____, ed. Sotsialna doktryna Tserkvy. Zbirnyk statei {The social doctrine of the Church. Collection of articles}. Lviv: Svichado, 1998. _____. Vybrane. T. 4, Naukovi pratsi {Selected works. Vol. 4, Scientific works}. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010. _____. Vybrane. T. 5, Peredmovy ta retsenzii. Vystupy y interviu {Selected works. Vol. 5, Introductions and reviews. Presentations and interviews}. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010. _____. Vybrane. T. 6, Ukrainska ideia i khrystyianstvo {Selected works. Vol. 6, The Ukrainian idea and Christianity}. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2010. Marynowytsch, Myroslaw. Ökumenische Prozesse in der Ukraine. Lwiw: Sonderdruck. Institut für Religion und Gesellschaft an der Ukrainischen GriechischKatholischen Theologischen Akademie, 1999. Mink, Georges, and Laure Neumayer, eds. History, Memory and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Memory Games. n. p., Palgrave, 2013. _____, eds. Yevropa ta yii bolisni mynuvshyny {Europe and her painful pasts}. Translated by Yevhen Marichev. Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2009. Moyaert, Marianne. Fragile Identities. Towards a Theology of Interreligious Hospitality. Amsterdam – New York, NY: Rodopi, 2011. Müller, Jan-Werner, ed. Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Present of the Past. n. p.: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Münz, Rainer, and Rainer Ohliger. Die Ukraine nach der Unabhängigkeit. Nationsbildung zwischen Ost und West, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 5. Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1999. Mykhaleyko, Andriy, Oleksandr Petrynko, and Andreas-A. Thiermeyer, trans. and eds. Einheit: Auftrag und Erbe. Anthologie von Texten der Ukrainischen GriechischKatholischen Kirche zu Fragen der Kircheneinheit mit Kommentar. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012. Mykhaleyko, Andriy. „Per aspera ad astra“. Der Einheitsgedanke im theologischen und pastoralen Werk von Josyf Slipyi (1892-1984). Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2009. Osadchuk, Bohdan. Polshcha, Ukraina, svit {Poland, Ukraine, world}. Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2001. Pelikan, Jaroslav. Confessor between East and West. A Portrait of Ukrainian Cardinal Josyf Slipyi. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990.

464

Bibliography Perun, Mykhailo, ed. Tserkva i sotsialna komunikatsiia: naiholovnishi dokumenty Katolytskoi Tserkvy pro presu, radio, telebachennia, internet ta inshi media {The Church and social communication. The main documents of the Catholic Church on the press, radio, television, the Internet and other media}. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2004. Plokhy, Serhii, and Frank E. Sysyn. Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2003. Razumkov Centre. Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn {Religion and authorities in Ukraine. Problems of mutual relations} (Kyiv, 2011). http://www. irs.in.ua/files/publications/2011.02.08_centr_razumkova_dopovid.pdf (accessed February 13, 2014). _____. Relihiia i vlada v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn {Religion and authorities in Ukraine. Problems of mutual relations} (Kyiv, 2013). http://www.razumkov. org.ua/upload/Przh_Religion_2013.pdf (accessed February 14, 2014). Reggio, Claire. Repentances catholiques: L’Église face à l’histoire (1990-2010). Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2013. Richters, Katja. The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church. Politics, Culture and Greater Russia. n. p.: Routledge, 2012. Sen, Amartya. Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny. n. p.: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007. _____. The Idea of Justice. n.p.: Penguin Books, 2010. Shchotkina, Kateryna, ed. Try dorohy: besidy Blazhennishoho Liubomyra Husara z zhurnalistamy {Three roads. Conversations of His Beatitude Liubomyr Husar with journalists}. Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2013. Sheptytskyi, Andrei, Metropolitan. Nasha derzhavnist. Yak buduvaty ridnu khatu {Our statehood. How to build a native home}. Edited by Oksana Haiova. Lviv: Artos, 2010. Shuba, Oleksii. Relihiia v etno-natsionalnomu rozvytku Ukrainy (politolohichnyi analiz) {Religion in the ethno-national development of Ukraine (analysis in politology)}. Kyiv, 1999. Sienkiewicz, Henryk. With Fire and Sword. Translated by Jeremiah Curtin. n. p.: Wildside Press, 2010. Skakun, Roman. “Patsyfikatsiia.” Polski represii 1930 roku v Halychyni {Pacification. Polish repressions of 1930 in Galicia}. Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University, 2012. Smedes, Lewis. Forgive and Forget. Healing the Hearts We Don’t Deserve. n. p.: Harper One, 2007. Snyder, Timothy. Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin. n. p.: Basic Books, 2010. Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine. A History. 3rd ed. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000. Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Katekhyzm Ukrainskoi HrekoKatolytskoi Tserkvy “Khrystos – nasha Paskha” {Catechism of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church “Christ is our Passover”}. Lviv: Svichado, 2011.

465

Bibliography Turii, Oleh. Greek-Catholics, Latins and Orthodox in Ukraine: Who’s Who? Lviv: Institute of Church History, n. d. _____. Relihiine zhyttia ta mizhkonfesiini vzaiemyny u nezalezhnii Ukraini {Religious life and interdenominational relations in independent Ukraine}. Lviv: Instytut Istorii Tserkvy UCU, 2007. Umbach, Frank. Russia and the Problems of Ukraine’s Cohesion. Results of a FactFinding Mission, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 13. Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1994. Vynnychenko, Volodymyr. Shchodennyk. T. 1, 1911-1920 {Dairy. Vol. 1, 19111920}. Edited by Hryhorii Kostiuk. Edmonton-New York: KIUS, UVAN, 1980. Wolczuk, Kataryna, and Roman Wolczuk. Poland and Ukraine. A Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe? London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002. World Council of Churches. Participating in God’s Mission of Reconciliation. A Resources for Churches in Situations of Conflict. World Council of Churches: Geneva, 2006. Yatsiv, Ihor, ed. Buty liudynoiu: Zbirnyk tsytat Blazhennishoho Liubomyra (Husara) {To be a person. Collection of the citations of His Beatitude Liubomyr (Husar)}. Lviv: Drukarski Kunshty, 2011. Zdioruk, Serhii. Ethnokonfesiina sytuatsiia v Ukraini ta mizhtserkovni konflikty {Ethno-confessional situation in Ukraine and inter-Church conflicts}. Kyiv, 1993. _____. Suspilno-relihiini vidnosyny: vyklyky Ukrainy 21 stolittia {Socio-religious relations. The challenges of Ukraine in the 21st century}. Kyiv, 2005.

3.

Articles

“Kruhlyi stil: ‘Patriarkhat Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy. Shcho dali?” {Round table. “Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. What next?”}. Patriarkhat 6 (2010): 14-15. “Lettre du Patriarche œcuménique Bartholomé au Pape Jean-Paul II concernant le projet de fondation d’un patriarcat uniate en Ukraine.” Istina 51 (2006): 200-206. “Materialy mizhnarodnoi naukovoi konferentsii Tsentru “Tkuma” ‘Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi: dylema humanistychnoho vyboru v umovakh totalitarnykh rezhymiv” {Materials of the international scientific conference of the “Tkuma” Centre “Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi: dilemma of the humanistic choice in conditions of a totalitarian regime”}. Problemy istorii Holokostu 4 (2006): 76-151. http://tkuma.dp. ua/images/stories/jurnal/z4.pdf (accessed October 8, 2013). “Poslannia Patriarkha Yosyfa pro poiednannia u Khrysti (3.VI.1977)” {Pastoral letter of Patriarch Yosyf on uniting in Christ (3.VI.1977)}. In Znaky chasu, edited by Zynovii Antoniuk and Myroslav Marynovych, 143-145. Kyiv: Sfera, 1999. “Pro plan znyshchennia Kyivskoho Patriarkhatu. Zaiava Patriarkha Kyivskoho i Vsiiei Rusy-Ukrainy Filareta dlia zasobiv masovoi informatsii” {About the plan of the de-

466

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4.

Electronic sources

4.1

Sources on the Internet

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4.1.4 Interviews Cherenkov, Mykhailo. Interview by Taras Antoshevskyi. Youtube.com. http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=ydUDACvl--8 (accessed January 17, 2014). Chornomorets, Yurii. “Yubilyey kryeshchyeniya Rusi: sostoyaniye Tserkvyey” {Jubilee of the baptism of Kyivan Rus. Situation of the Churches}. Interview by Syergyey Shtyeynikov. Religion.in.ua. http://www.religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/2213 0-yubilej-kreshheniya-rusi-sostoyanie-cerkvej.html (accessed January 15, 2014). Dacko, Ivan. “U Yosyfa Slipoho bula dalekohliadnist Andreia Sheptytskoho” {Yosyf Slipyi possessed the foresight of Andrei Sheptytskyi}. Interview by Sophia Kochmar. Day.kiev.ua. http://www.day.kiev.ua/uk/article/cuspilstvo/u-yosifa-slip ogo-bula-dalekoglyadnist-andreya-sheptickogo (accessed January 11, 2014). Dziurakh, Bohdan. “Ukraintsiam potriben osobystyi i zahalnonatsionalnyi ispyt sumlinnia” {Ukrainians need a personal and all-national examination of their conscience}. Interview by Oksana Klymonchuk. Ugcc.org.ua. http://news.ugcc.org.ua/ articles/vladika_bogdan_dzyurah_naperedodnі_40dennogo_postu_ukraintsyam_pot rіben_osobistiy_і_zagalnonatsіonalniy_іspit_sumlіnnya_69445.html (accessed March 5, 2014). Filaret, Patriarch. “I v skladnykh umovakh treba rozbudovuvaty Tserkvy” {We have to develop the Church also in difficult circumstances}. Interview by Andrii Hanus. Cerkva.info. http://www.cerkva.info/uk/intervju/1222-patr-int-express.html (accessed January 11, 2014). _____. “Koly zlo povertaietsia na dobro” {When evil turns to good}. Interview by Olena Chekan. Cerkva.info. http://www.cerkva.info/uk/intervju/1283-int-ut.html (accessed January 11, 2014). _____. “Kyivskyi Patriarkhat znyshchyty nemozhlyvo” {They cannot destroy the Kyiv Patriarchate}. Interview. Cerkva.info. http://www.cerkva.info/uk/intervju/1438nemojlyvo.html (accessed January 11, 2014). _____. “Moskva rozkolola ukrainsku Tserkvu i ne daie yii obiednatysia” {Moscow has divided the Ukrainian Church and does not allow it to unite}. Interview by Liudmyla Tsybulko and Anton Shchehelskyi. Cerkva.info. http://www.cerkva.info/uk/ intervju/2347-moskva-rozkol.html (accessed January 11, 2014). Hilarion, Metropolitan of Volokolamsk. “Hovoryty pro “vyznannia tainstv” rozkolnykiv nemozhlyvo” {It is impossible to speak about “the recognition of the sacraments” of rozkolnyky”}. Interview. Patriarchia.ru. http://www.patriarchia.ru/ua/ db/text/1291833.html (accessed January 23, 2014).

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4.1.6 Other sources “Biographies of Those to Be Beatified by the Holy Father while He Is in Ukraine.” http://papalvisit.org.ua/eng/martyrsbio.php (accessed May 6, 2014). “Blessed Emilian Kovch.” http://saints.sqpn.com/blessed-emilian-kovch/ (accessed April 14, 2014). “Commission of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church Justice and Peace.” http:// www.ugcc.org.ua/39.0.html?&L=2 (accessed February 14, 2012). “Constitution of Ukraine.” http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/constitution.html (accessed February 14, 2014). “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012.” http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (accessed February 28, 2014). Hrytsak, Yaroslav. “The Third Ukraine.” Video-lecture. http://tedxtalks.ted.com/video/ TEDxLviv-8 (accessed January 9, 2014). “List of European Countries by Average Wage.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ European_countries_by_average_wage (accessed April 7, 2014).

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4.2

Other digital sources

Husar, Lubomyr. Doroha do sebe {Road to oneself} {CD-ROM}. Lviv: Svichado, 2009. _____. Doroha do blyzhnoho {Road to one’s neighbor} {CD-ROM}. Lviv: Svichado, 2010. _____. Doroha do Boha {Road to God} {CD-ROM}. Lviv: Svichado, 2011. _____. Suspilstvo i biznes {Society and business} {CD-ROM}. Lviv: Svichado, 2011. _____. Suspilstvo i vlada {Society and authority} {CD-ROM}. Lviv: Svichado, 2011. _____. Suspilstvo i zakon {Society and law} {CD-ROM}. Lviv: Svichado, 2013.

499

Bibliography

5.

Unpublished works

Aina, Raymond. “Overcoming “Toxic” Emotions and the Role of Restorative Justice. A Christian Ethical Reflection on Restorative Justice’s Promises, Ambiguities and Inspirations towards Peacebuilding in Nigeria.” PhD diss., Leuven Catholic University, 2010. Hertog, Katrien. “Religious Peacebuilding: Resources and Obstacles in the Russian Orthodox Church for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Chechnya.” PhD diss., Leuven Catholic University, 2008. Jaššo, Jaroslav. “The Reconciliation Process between the Greek-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine through the Healing of Memories.” PhD diss., Catholic Theological Union, 2008. www.vincentini.sk/data_web/editor_data/ file/jasso_disertation.doc (accessed February 28, 2014). Kokhanovska, Mariia. “Peredumovy ta rozhortannia konfliktiv mizh Ukrainskoiu Hreko-Katolytskoiu ta Ukrainskoiu Pravoslavnoiu Tserkvamy na Lvivshchyni u 1987-2007 rokakh” {Reasons and development of the conflicts between the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic and the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the Lviv region in 1987-2007)}. Master’s thesis, Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008. Panchyshyn, Iryna. “Mizhkonfesiini konflikty na Zakhidnii Ukraini v 90-kh rokakh 20 stolittia (na prykladi Ternopilskoi oblasti)” {Interdenominational conflicts in western Ukraine in the 1990s (by the example of Ternopil region)}. Master’s thesis, Ukrainian Catholic University, 2008. Rap, Myroslava. „Einige rechtliche Aspekte der Beziehung zwischen Staat und Kirche in der Ukraine und ihre praktische Umsetzung“. Paper presented at the summer university “Auctoritas und Potestas in West und Ost”, organized by the Institute of Ecumenical Studies, Fribourg University, Switzerland, Istanbul/Halki, September, 2013. Rap, Myroslava. “Miroslav Volf’s Interpretation of Memory, Justice, and Reconciliation: A Constitutive Contribution to the Peace Ethics.” Master’s thesis, Leuven Catholic University, 2006. Rap, Myroslava. “Social Teaching of the Traditional Orthodox Churches in Ukraine: Ethics of Civil Responsibility as a Point of Rapprochement.” Paper presented at the international colloquium “The Forthcoming Council of the Orthodox Church: Understanding the Challenges,” Institut Saint-Serge, Paris, October, 18-20, 2012. Rap, Myroslava. “The Conflict between Traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine as a Conflict of Identities: Where to Search for the Prospects of Reconciliation? A Reflection in the Light of the Theories of Paul Ricoeur and John Paul Lederach.” Political Theology, forthcoming in 2015. Serov, Dmitry. „Das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat in Russland. Eine theologische Vision”. Paper presented at the summer university “Auctoritas und Potestas in West und Ost”, organized by the Institute of Ecumenical Studies, Fribourg University, Switzerland, Istanbul/Halki, September, 2013.

500

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Theologie und Frieden Band 23

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Gerhard Beestermöller Hans-Richard Reuter (Hrsg.) Politik der Versöhnung Eine philosophischtheologische Begleitung zu Expeditionen in ein wenig vermessenes Land 2002. 264 Seiten, gebunden, € 29,ISBN 3-17-017348-0

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Band 24 Gerhard Beestermöller (Hrsg.) Die humanitäre Intervention – Imperativ der Menschenrechtsidee? Rechtsethische Reflexionen am Beispiel des KosovoKrieges 2003. 176 Seiten, gebunden, vergriffen Band 25 Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven Rolf Schumacher (Hrsg.) „Gerechter Friede“ – Weltgemeinschaft in der Verantwortung Zur Debatte um die Friedensschrift der deutschen Bischöfe 2003. 256 Seiten, gebunden, vergriffen Band 26 Norbert Brieskorn Markus Riedenauer (Hrsg.) Suche nach Frieden: Politische Ethik in der Frühen Neuzeit III 2003. 448 Seiten, gebunden, ISBN 3-17-018154-8

Band 30 Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit Ethische Norm und Rechtswirklichkeit 2006. 302 Seiten gebunden, € 29,80 ISBN 3-17-019529-8

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Band 34 Volker Stümke Das Friedensverständnis Martin Luthers Grundlagen und Anwendungsbereiche seiner politischen Ethik 2007. 533 Seiten, gebunden, vergriffen ISBN 3170199706

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Stephanie van de Loo Versöhnungsarbeit Kriterien – theologischer Rahmen – Praxisperspektiven 2009. 418 Seiten, gebunden, € 39,ISBN 3-17-020717-2

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Band 44 Jörg Lüer Die katholische Kirche und die „Zeichen der Zeit“ Die Deutsche Kommission Justitia et Pax nach 1989 2013. 340 Seiten, gebunden, € 39,90 ISBN 3-17-023029-3

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Beiträge zur Friedensethik Band 39

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Hans-Georg Ehrhart Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven (Hrsg.) Intervention im Kongo Eine kritische Analyse der Befriedungspolitik von UN und EU 2008. 217 Seiten. Kart. € 24,ISBN 3-17-020781-3

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Band 43 Dirk Ansorge (Hrsg.) Der Nahostkonflikt Politische, religiöse und theologische Dimensionen Stuttgart 2010,332 Seiten. Kart. € 29,80 ISBN 3-17-021500-9

Studien zur Friedensethik Band 46

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Gerhard Beestermöller (Hrsg.) Friedensethik im Frühmittelalter Münster 2014, 327 Seiten, gebunden, € 56,ISBN 978-3-402-11690-6

Matthias Gillner Volker Stümke (Hrsg.) Kollateralopfer Die Tötung von Unschuldigen als rechtliches und moralisches Problem Münster 2014, 258 Seiten, gebunden, € 46,ISBN 978-3-402-11693-7

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Band 47 Bernhard Koch (Hrsg.) Den Gegner schützen? Zu einer aktuellen Kontroverse in der Ethik des bewaffneten Konflikts Baden-Baden 2014, 293 Seiten, gebunden, € 64,ISBN 978-3-8487-0784-3 Band 48 Gerhard Beestermöller (Hrsg.) Libyen: Missbrauch der Responsibility to Protect? Baden-Baden 2014, 139 Seiten, gebunden, € 26,ISBN 978-3-8487-0763-8

Band 50 Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven Claus Kreß Mary Ellen O’Connell (Hrsg.) Peace through Law: Can Humanity Overcome War? in Vorbereitung Band 51 Veronika Bock Johannes J. Frühbauer Arnd Küppers Cornelius Sturm (Hrsg.) Christliche Friedensethik vor den Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts Münster 2015, 265 Seiten, gebunden, € 46,ISBN 978-3-402-11695-1

Band 53 Myroslava Rap The public role of the Church in contemporary Ukrainian society The contribution of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church to peace and reconciliation Baden-Baden 2015, 500 Seiten, gebunden, € 89,ISBN 978-3-8487-2210-5