The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract: Lesson from France (Studies in the History of Law and Justice, 27) 3031376404, 9783031376405

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Sources
1.2 Methodology
1.3 Chapters Outline
Case Law
Statutory Provisions
References
Books
Articles
Part I: Idea and Role of Consent in the Development of a Taxonomy of Contract in Ancient Law
Chapter 2: Consensualism in Roman Law
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Roman Formal ``Contracts´´ and Consent
2.2.1 Formalism and Consent
2.2.2 Ritualism and Consent
2.2.3 Roman Quasi-Informal and Informal Contracts, and Form
2.2.4 Stipulatio and the Erosion of Form
2.2.5 Adaptation of the Roman Contractual Forms
2.2.6 Procedural Reform and Primacy of Consent
2.3 Conclusion
Statutory Provisions
References
Books
Articles
Chapter 3: Consensualism in mos gallicus and iuris Franco-Gallici
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Germanic Law and Formalism
3.3 Customary Law and Consensualism
3.4 Conclusion
Statutory Provisions
Canon Law
References
Books
Articles
Chapter 4: Consensualism in Modern Law
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Canon Law and Roman Gloss
4.3 Natural Law and the Rise of the Ius Commune
4.4 Conclusion
Statutory Provisions
Roman Law
Canon Law
References
Books
Articles
Part II: Reception, Relevance, Evolution, and Implications in the Civil Code of France: De Lege Lata
Chapter 5: Article 1101 and the Systematisation of Consent as a General Principle of Contract
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Reconstructing Conventio
5.2.1 Conventio as Mutual Consent: Consensual Approach
5.2.2 Conventio as Unilateral Consent: Voluntarist Approach
5.2.3 Consolidation of Consensualism and Voluntarism as False Opposites
5.3 Practical Consequences
5.3.1 Offer and Acceptance: Premise
5.3.2 Implication in the Civil Code
5.3.3 Developments Since Codification
5.3.4 Significance
5.4 Conclusion
Statutory Provisions
Roman Law
Case Law
Case Reports
References
Books
Articles
Chapter 6: Article 1108 et seq. and the Specification of the Consensual Doctrine
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Defects in Consent and the Vindication of the Consensual Doctrine
6.3 Cause: An Agency of the Efficacy of Consent
6.3.1 Meaning and Implications
6.3.1.1 Reconstruction of the Meaning of Causa in the Civil Code
6.3.1.2 Judicial Specification
6.3.1.3 Jurisprudential Developments
Causa as a Lawful and Equitable Object
Causa as a Requirement for Consideration
Causa as an Instrument of Social Control
Chronopost and the Implication of Causa as a Tool of Business Efficacy and Sufficient Consideration
6.3.1.4 Implications
6.3.2 Doctrinaire Reconsiderations of Causation as an Agency of Consent: Pro-Causalism -v- Anti-Causalism
6.3.2.1 Pro-Causalism and the Extension and Vindication of Causa
6.3.2.2 Anti-Causalism and the Dismissal of Causa as a Useless Doctrine
6.3.2.3 Critique
6.3.3 Ordinance n2016-131 of 10 February 2016 and the Rejection of Causa from French Contract Law: Seeming Victory of Anti-Cau...
6.3.3.1 Background
6.3.3.2 Underlying Permanency of Causa in French Law
6.3.3.3 Overview of the Rise and Fall of Causa in Scots Law (16th-18th century)
Acknowledgment of Causa in Scots Law in the 16th to 18th Century
Continued Relevance of Causa
Significance
6.4 Conclusion
Statutory Provisions
Roman Law
Case Law
Case Reports
References
Books
Articles
Other
Part III: Rethinking the French Perspectives on Consensualism: De Lege Ferenda
Chapter 7: Articles 1109 and 1172, and the Classification of Contracts: Problems and Perspective
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Inadequacy of the taxonomy: Consent -v- Form
7.3 Role of Form and Instability of the Taxonomy
7.4 Conclusion
Statutory Provisions
Case Law
References
Books
Articles
Other
Chapter 8: Reconsidering Consensualism and the Role of Consent in Contract
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Normativism and Consent
8.3 Implications
8.4 Conclusion
Statutory Provisions
Case Law
References
Books
Articles
Other
Chapter 9: Conclusion
9.1 What Are the Underpinnings of Consensualism?
9.2 What Are the Implications of Consensualism?
9.3 What Relationship Does Consensualism Entertain with Formalism and How Can They Be Made to Exist in Harmony Despite Differe...
9.4 How Can Ideas of Consensualism be Consolidated to Posit a Single, More Precise Definition and Reveal It in the Full Extent...
Table of Authorities
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources

Citation preview

Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27 Series Editors: Mortimer Sellers · Georges Martyn

Kane Abry

The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract Lesson from France

Studies in the History of Law and Justice Volume 27

Series Editors Mortimer Sellers, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, USA Georges Martyn, Law Faculty, University of Ghent, Ghent, Belgium Editorial Board Members António Pedro Barbas Homem, Faculty of Law, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal Emmanuele Conte, Facolta di Giurisprudenza, Università degli Studi Roma Tre, Roma, Italy Maria Gigliola di Renzo Villata, Law & Legal History, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milano, Italy Markus Dirk Dubber, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada William Ewald, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, PA, USA Igor Filippov, Faculty of History, Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia Amalia Kessler, Stanford Law School Crown Quad, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA Mia Korpiola, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Helsinki, Finland Aniceto Masferrer, Faculty of Law, Universidad de Valencia, Valencia, Spain Yasutomo Morigiwa, Nagoya University Graduate School of Law, Tokyo, Japan Ulrike Müßig, Universität Passau, Passau, Germany Sylvain Soleil, Faculté de Droit et de Science Politique, Université de Rennes, Rennes, France James Q. Whitman, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, USA

The purpose of this book series is to publish high quality volumes on the history of law and justice. Legal history can be a deeply provocative and influential field, as illustrated by the growth of the European universities and the Ius Commune, the French Revolution, the American Revolution, and indeed all the great movements for national liberation through law. The study of history gives scholars and reformers the models and courage to question entrenched injustices, by demonstrating the contingency of law and other social arrangements. Yet legal history today finds itself diminished in the universities and legal academy. Too often scholarship betrays no knowledge of what went before, or why legal institutions took the shape that they did.This series seeks to remedy that deficiency. Studies in the History of Law and Justice will be theoretical and reflective. Volumes will address the history of law and justice from a critical and comparative viewpoint. The studies in this series will be strong bold narratives of the development of law and justice. Some will be suitable for a very broad readership. Contributions to this series will come from scholars on every continent and in every legal system. Volumes will promote international comparisons and dialogue. The purpose will be to provide the next generation of lawyers with the models and narratives needed to understand and improve the law and justice of their own era. The series includes monographs focusing on a specific topic, as well as collections of articles covering a theme or collections of article by one author.

Kane Abry

The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract Lesson from France

Kane Abry London, UK

ISSN 2198-9850 (electronic) ISSN 2198-9842 Studies in the History of Law and Justice ISBN 978-3-031-37640-5 ISBN 978-3-031-37641-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

To my family and friends. With special thanks to Dr Lorna MacFarlane, Thomas Taylor de Timberley, Pauline Alfort, and Marion Quenot.

Preface

While the French jurist and Professor of Law François Gény was the first to coin the expression consensualism, ideas whereby agreements arising from consent can be contracts sprouted and were discussed in the jus commune and jus civile long before their enshrinement in French law. Ideas, whereby agreements arising from consent can be contracts in European legal thought, can be traced back to classical Rome (i.e., Republican Rome, 509-27 BCE) and the post-classical Roman era (i.e., Imperial Rome, 27 BCE-476 AD). They mark a shift in Roman jurisprudence. It aimed to sanction lawful agreements that could not otherwise be enforced. It coincides with the time when Rome transitioned from a City-state to a continental and global superpower. It heralded, in turn, transformational jurisprudential changes enabling not only contractual abstraction through rationalisation but also the simplification of the procedures to form a consensual obligation. These consensual agreements (e.g., promissio, pacta, and consensual contracts) arose from the concern of peregrine praetors (i.e., elected magistrates administering and discharging justice) for pragmaticism. It enabled lawful agreements between Romans and peregrines (i.e., foreigners) to be enforced. Doing so, successive praetors developed Roman law (jus gentium), through Roman legal procedure, to enable it to meet the challenges of its time. After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD, this doctrine influenced several important thinkers throughout the Middle Ages, and the early modern and modern periods, especially following the rediscovery of Roman law in Western Europe in the thirteenth century AD. The evolution of the doctrine in mediaeval law and in early modern and modern law, since its piecemeal occurrences in Roman law, shows many similarities between doctrinal and canon lawyers in and across Europe. The development of this idea was not, however, without fit and start. In Katherine Hepburn’s words, it must not be construed as ‘an unbroken line of juristic thought from Rome to the modern day, whereby the proverbial “torch of learning” was passed from one school of jurists to the next’ as this book demonstrates (see Hepburn, Nicolas Bohier vii

viii

Preface

(1469–1539) and the ius commune: A study in sixteenth-century French legal practice (2016) p. 1). Rather than claiming to establish the filiation of consensual ideas and provide a total and exhaustive discussion of consensual ideas in European legal thought, this book focuses on the reception of Roman law in French law before codification (especially in French medieval and modern law) and its evolution since codification to this day. Instead of providing an unfocused and general history of abstraction and thoughts, the book focuses strictly on the construction of consensual ideas in French law considering its direct sources. It assesses the influence they have had on the elaboration of the French Civil Code, including their evolution since codification, thereby reconstructing a comprehensive meaning of consensualism as far as French law is concerned. Namely, the book focuses on the reception and transformation of the Roman blueprint in French law while demonstrating that the French developments are not insulated from developments in other jurisdictions across time. Howbeit, instead of entering the fray of pan-European exegesis and dispute, this book uses European legal history as a philosophical, theological, and scientific method to showcase how consensual ideas in the jus commune were coherently, cogently, specifically, selectively, and articulately interpreted by French legal thinkers to elaborate a distinct French history of thought informed by its past, thus shedding new light on the import and role of consent in French contract law. Put differently, this book reveals that a French history of thought exists in and of itself and regards consensualism, not as an assembly of events and persistent thought that existed across time and places as a process with different stages that was successively improved. Differently, it regards it as a doctrine that takes on a different character across time and space to deliver specific juristic and societal changes according to the aspirations and values of a particular society. Far from advocating for consensualism to become a universal norm, this book discusses (i) the reasons that have coaxed the French lawmaker into adopting and sanctioning a consensual system of contracts as a model to others, and (ii) the evolution of this jurisprudence in French law since codification. Consequently, what this book does is twofold. First, it analyses and critiques the evolution of consensualism in French law since codification (see Chaps. 4 and 5) considering its immediate sources (see Chaps. 1 to 3). Second, regard being had to its different constructions amongst scholars across time, this book establishes a new, comprehensive definition of consensualism in French law (see Chaps. 6 and 7) drawing together the different strands of the doctrine, thereby positing a single, comprehensive definition of the principle as it should be construed in French law today (see Conclusion). In so doing, this book argues that consensualism is much more than the opposition between form and consent and, even where formalities are required, they prop up rather than negate consent. Put differently, the book presents consensualism in a new light as a principle or doctrine that instrumentalises the role of form in French

Preface

ix

contract law. It shows a concern, shared in times past, for instance, for legal certainty over freedom of contract, so as not to disrupt the social body or to limit litigation while enabling form to act if not as a moral value, at least as a societal value. The originality of this book lies, first, in the critique of a re-enacted past as a base for critiquing the present and, second, in the interrogation of the future of consensualism in French law as a general principle of contract. It reviews its otherwise overlooked implications, thereby departing from its conventional opposition to formalism. There is no other scholarly work written in English that uses these sources in this manner. Nor is there any mainstream scholarship that puts forward an analysis of French contract law in this manner. This book makes an evident contribution to the field by (i) offering an original interpretation of several provisions in the Code Civil which relate to the law of contract; (ii) reflecting on the past, present, and future of consensualism in French law; but also, perhaps more significantly, by (iii) reflecting on what light contingent events and evolutions shed on its understanding in French law as a beacon of reflection. London, UK

Kane Abry

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Chapters Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part I 2

3

1 10 16 21 22 22 23 23 27

Idea and Role of Consent in the Development of a Taxonomy of Contract in Ancient Law

Consensualism in Roman Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Roman Formal “Contracts” and Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Formalism and Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Ritualism and Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Roman Quasi-Informal and Informal Contracts, and Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.4 Stipulatio and the Erosion of Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.5 Adaptation of the Roman Contractual Forms . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.6 Procedural Reform and Primacy of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31 31 33 34 38 41 44 46 49 53 54 58 58 61

Consensualism in mos gallicus and iuris Franco-Gallici . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Germanic Law and Formalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 63 64 xi

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4

Contents

3.3 Customary Law and Consensualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Canon Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68 71 71 72 72 72 73

Consensualism in Modern Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Canon Law and Roman Gloss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Natural Law and the Rise of the Ius Commune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roman Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Canon Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75 75 76 90 107 109 109 109 110 110 112

Part II 5

Reception, Relevance, Evolution, and Implications in the Civil Code of France: De Lege Lata

Article 1101 and the Systematisation of Consent as a General Principle of Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Reconstructing Conventio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Conventio as Mutual Consent: Consensual Approach . . . . . 5.2.2 Conventio as Unilateral Consent: Voluntarist Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Consolidation of Consensualism and Voluntarism as False Opposites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Practical Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Offer and Acceptance: Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Implication in the Civil Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Developments Since Codification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roman Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115 115 118 118 120 121 123 124 124 125 126 128 129 129 129 131 131 131 133

Contents

6

Article 1108 et seq. and the Specification of the Consensual Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Defects in Consent and the Vindication of the Consensual Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Cause: An Agency of the Efficacy of Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Meaning and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Doctrinaire Reconsiderations of Causation as an Agency of Consent: Pro-Causalism -v- Anti-Causalism . . . 6.3.3 Ordinance n°2016-131 of 10 February 2016 and the Rejection of Causa from French Contract Law: Seeming Victory of Anti-Causalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roman Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part III 7

8

xiii

135 135 137 142 142 152

157 169 170 171 171 175 175 175 177 178

Rethinking the French Perspectives on Consensualism: De Lege Ferenda

Articles 1109 and 1172, and the Classification of Contracts: Problems and Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Inadequacy of the taxonomy: Consent -v- Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Role of Form and Instability of the Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

181 181 184 190 193 194 194 197 197 198 199

Reconsidering Consensualism and the Role of Consent in Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Normativism and Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statutory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

201 201 203 207 209 209

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Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

210 210 210 211 212

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 What Are the Underpinnings of Consensualism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 What Are the Implications of Consensualism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 What Relationship Does Consensualism Entertain with Formalism and How Can They Be Made to Exist in Harmony Despite Different Ideologies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 How Can Ideas of Consensualism be Consolidated to Posit a Single, More Precise Definition and Reveal It in the Full Extent of Its Properties? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

213 213 214

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Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Secondary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Chapter 1

Introduction

This monograph is concerned with the historical origins of the principle of consensualism in contract. It is presently based on three sets of provisions in the Civil Code of France. It concerns Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172. These provisions govern one of the basic rules underpinning French contract law. Article 1101 posits a general rule since its introduction into the Civil Code of 1804 by which a contract is a concordance of the will of two or more persons purporting to create legal relations.1 Article 1109 was introduced in the Civil Code following the reform of the French law of obligations in 2016. It articulates a well-known civilian rule by which contracts are executed by the mere consent of parties.2 Finally, Article 1172—also introduced in the Civil Code following the reform in 2016—provides that, in principle, contracts only require the consent of the parties to be binding.3 However, French Civil Code, Article 1101: ‘Le contrat est un accord de volontés entre deux ou plusieurs personnes destiné à créer, modifier, transmettre ou éteindre des obligation’. Formerly, ‘Le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes s'obligent, envers une ou plusieurs autres, à donner, à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose’. 2 Together French Civil Code, Article 1101 (former and present cited above); French Civil Code, ex-Article 1134 now 1103 and 1104, and now French Civil Code, Articles 1109 and 1172 which provide respectively: ‘Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise. Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi’ [emphasis added]; ‘Le contrat est consensuel lorsqu'il se forme par le seul échange des consentements quel qu'en soit le mode d'expression. Le contrat est solennel lorsque sa validité est subordonnée à des formes déterminées par la loi. Le contrat est réel lorsque sa formation est subordonnée à la remise d'une chose’; ‘Les contrats sont par principe consensuels. Par exception, la validité des contrats solennels est subordonnée à l'observation de formes déterminées par la loi à défaut de laquelle le contrat est nul, sauf possible régularisation. En outre, la loi subordonne la formation de certains contrats à la remise d'une chose’. 3 French Civil Code, Article 1172: ‘Les contrats sont par principe consensuels. Par exception, la validité des contrats solennels est subordonnée à l'observation de formes déterminées par la loi à défaut de laquelle le contrat est nul, sauf possible régularisation. En outre, la loi subordonne la formation de certains contrats à la remise d'une chose’. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_1

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Introduction

their enforceability depends further on them being lawful,4 possible,5 and underpinned6 by the continuous consent of the parties.7 The effect of these three articles when read together is that contractual obligations in French law arise from consent alone. However, the idea that every contract arises only from consent conveys only one aspect of French contract law. By way of exception, Articles 1109 and 1172 provide that some contracts still require the fulfilment of formalities in addition to consent. It concerns two types of contracts. These whose validity is contingent on the fulfilment of formalities set by legislation, usually an element of writing (solemn contracts),8 and those whose validity is contingent on the preliminary delivery of a thing in addition to consent (real contracts). While the insertion of Articles 1109 and 1172 into the Civil Code is recent, French scholarship had long since acknowledged the civilian principle by which contracts in French law are consensual and, by exception, solemn or real. This view relied on Article 1101 and the distinctions already present in the Civil Code of 1804 between the rules applicable to simple contracts and the rules applicable to special contracts (e.g., loan, prêt à usage (commodatum), and contrat de cautionnement (pignus)).9 Thus, far from revolutionary, Articles 1109 and 1172 merely enshrine what had been, hitherto, a purely philosophical classification of contracts according to their method of formation. This taxonomy of contracts stems from Roman law, especially from the classification that the Roman jurist Gaius10 introduced in his Institutes as reinterpreted and developed in the early modern period by writers such as Hugues Doneau (1527–1591).11 His work continues to be authoritative in French law. Although Roman law famously lacked a general principle of contract and operated on a principle of individual transactions governed by specific actions,12 the growth of contract in French law before codification, which was based on European legal scholarship, led to the development of a general principle of contract by which

4

French Civil Code, Article 1108 now French Civil Code, Article 1128. French Civil Code, Article 1163 formerly French Civil Code, ex-Article 1129 and French Civil Code, ex-Article 1130, °1. 6 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1108 now 1128, French Civil Code, Article 1109 now 1130, and 1134 now 1103, 1104, and 1193. 7 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1134 now 1103 (cited above). See also Saidani (2017), pp. 1–350. 8 French Civil Code, Articles 1109 and 1172. 9 French Civil Code, Articles 1915 et seq., 1875 et seq., 893 et seq.; Page (de) (1964), p. 424, at [455]; Didier, P in Répertoire du Notariat Defrénois (1979), p. 139; Mirbeau-Gauvin, JR in Répertoire Civile Dalloz (Mirbeau-Gauvin 2020); Najjar, I in Répertoire Civile Dalloz (2020); Guillouard (1890) at [205]; Baudry-Lacantinerie and Saignat (1901) at [286]; Planiol (1907) at [1148]; Lyon-Caen and Renault (1889) at [107]; Escarra et al. (1953) at [229]; Goré (1947), p. 162. 10 Institutes of Gaius, 3.89–90. 11 Doneau (1828) 16.12; Stein (1988), pp. 73–82; Arnaud (1969), p. 121. 12 Watson (1984), pp. 1–20; Prichard (1964), p. 433; Institutes of Gaius 4.30; Gellius (1927) 16.10.8, 229–233; Lex Iulia iudiciorum privatorum (AD 17); Institutes of Justinian, 4, 30-31. 5

1

Introduction

3

every agreement arising from consent can be a contract. This jurisprudence was coined as consensualism in the twentieth century.13 This notion has a long and complex history. It is an accumulation of different strands of thinking about contracts. They stem from multiple sources including Roman law, canon law, and natural law.14 It culminated in a view c. 165015 by which contracts are consensual and there is freedom regarding the ways of externalising consent unless otherwise provided for by law. This idea had a tremendous impact on French writers in the period before codification including Antoine Loysel (1536–1617), Jean Domat (1625–1696), and Robert-Joseph Pothier (1699–1772). They discussed this notion in their works respectively entitled Institutes Coustumières, ou Manuel de plusieurs et diverses reigles, sentences & proverbes, tant anciens que modernes, du droict coustumier & plus ordinaire de la France (1607, Edme-Martin, Martin: 1679),16 Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel: Le Droit Public, Et Legum Delectus (1689, Rémy: 1828),17 and Traité des obligations, selon les règles tant du for de la conscience, que de for extérieur (1761, Halpérin: 2011).18 Loysel, Domat, Pothier, and, after them, the drafters of the Civil Code19 departed from a formal Roman-law system that restricted the notion of contract to categories of undertakings characterised by particular rules of enforceability. They substituted for it a system where obligations could generally arise from consent without any requirement for form unless otherwise provided for. This shift is indicative of a change in the conception of contracts more generally. In a formalist system such as Roman law, the law does not conceive of contract abstractly.20 There is no such thing as a general theory of contract. Instead, the law provides for classes of obligations such as sale, hire, loan, and suchlike. By contrast, in a system where the word given (parole donnée) is ascendant, contract is defined abstractly and objectively as a meeting of minds without it being necessary to refer to the obligations it creates.21

13

Gény (1921) n°204. Brett (2002), pp. 31–51; Fenet (1968), p. 228. 15 Nanz (1985), pp. 46–79; Loysel (1679) 1.3.1.357 Pr; Maran (1741), pp. 97–99; Zimmermann (1992), pp. 1689–1710, specially 1689–1694; Pufendorf (von) (1759) 3.5.9; 3.4; 3.4.2; 4.2.8; 3.5.9. See, also, Grotius (1773) 2.700–1 (RWP) and 2.11.13 (IBP); Molhuysen (1943) no325. 16 Loysel (1679) Book 3, Title 1, Maxim 2. 17 Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, pp. 121 et seq. 18 Pothier (2011) Article Préliminaire, 3. 19 These were Félix-Julien-Jean Bigot de Préameneu (1747–1825), Jacques de Maleville (1741–1824), François-Denis Tronchet (1723–1806), Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis (1746–1807), and Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès (1753–1824). 20 Lassard (2019), p. 1; Rampelberg (2000), p. 56; Thomas (1976), p. 226; Watson (1984), p. 19; Fiori, R in McGinn (2012), p. 65; Kunderewicz (1995), p. 130; Thomas, PJ in Sondel et al. (2003), p. 174. 21 Pothier (2011) Article Préliminaire, p. 3. 14

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Introduction

The practical consequence of this shift in meaning is that consent becomes paramount in contract formation, and it is incumbent on the courts, in cases of litigation, to ensure that a promise had been made with the intention that it would be binding. In turn, its acceptance enables them to coerce a party to have deference for their word. Guillaume de Lamoignon de Blancmesnil (1617–1677), Premier Président of the sovereign Paris Cour des Aides,22 had already asserted this point in his compendium of landmark cases according to consent and the concept of cause.23 This is more generally known as pacta sunt servanda. The layout of the conditions of validity of contracts in the Civil Code24 and the imposition of a writing ad probationem25 follow from this requirement. They afford the protection of consent, but also, from a social perspective, the upholding of public order. The party who has truly consented is alone bound to their promise, provided their agreement complies with a legal cause regardless of whether it is expressed or not, and so long as it is not contrary to morality and accepted standards of behaviour, Pothier averred.26 In this respect, the notion of cause is polysemic. In French law, it denotes simultaneously the lawfulness of the purpose of the obligation, a legitimate event giving rise to the obligation (e.g., the mutual consent of the parties regarding contracts and a causal link between a wrongful act and the damage sustained by one of the parties regarding tort), a counterpart to the obligation of the one party, the lawfulness of the motives that coaxed the parties into contracting, and suchlike. In that way, the notion of cause, which has a complex history, is put to different use to support consent and enable it to create legal relations in whatever form that it is expressed.27 This jurisprudence is sometimes referred to as contractual autonomism,28 contractual liberalism29 or contractual voluntarism.30 It is in keeping with the traditional narrative of French contract law. It is historically based on the disputed theory of the

22 The Court of Aids was a sovereign court. It primarily dealt with matters relating to customs and public finances. Its Premier President had a role comparable to that of the Exchequer of Normandy and HM Exchequer in England and Wales. 23 Lamoignon de Malesherbes (de) (1768), pp. 22, 127, 189–190, 204, 209, 232, 282, 380–381, 420. See also Pothier (2011) §42 et seq, p. 21 et seq. 24 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1108 now 1128. 25 Chamoux (1981) 1981, I, 3008; French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1341 and 1343 now 1359. 26 Pothier (2011) §42 et seq., p. 21 et seq; Gazzaniga (1990), p. 38. 27 See, for instance, Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 12 July 1989, Bull. civ. I, n°293; GAJC, 11th edition, n°155; JCP 1990.II.21546, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé; Defrénois, 1990, p 358, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1990, p 468, obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 16 February 1999, Bull. civ. I, n°55; D. Affaires, 1999, p 514, obs. J F; Contrats. Conc. Consom., 1999, n°70, obs. L Leveneur. 28 Lacroix (2015), pp. 38ff. 29 Bouthinon-Dumas (2001), pp. 339–373. 30 Tabi Tabi (2012), pp. 577–622.

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Introduction

5

autonomy of the will31 by which moral principles and obligations, and the legitimacy of political authority, must be grounded in self-governing individuals, considered apart from various contingencies of place, culture, and social relations. It supports the idea that contract is a compromise by which each party is bound to fulfil their obligation and its form must be free. Consistently, the formation of contract must remain at the discretion or the parties.32 This jurisprudence posits that all terms of a contract are binding on the parties because they chose them for themselves absent any requirement for form. The category of consensual contract that stems from the dissociation of form from substance is its system node. As a result, the mutual conveyance of consent is all that is required for a contract to arise absent any need for formality. It entails that any externalisation of consent whether by word or gestures suffices to make a contract granted it is sufficiently tangible. Not surprisingly, most authors contend that consensualism relies only on the regulae juris pacta sunt servanda and reject form from the definition of contract. They relegate it to specific instances where the law requires it for special contracts, usually solemn or real contracts. Hence, Jacques Ghestin (1931-) explains that consensualism denotes the principle by which the conveyance of consent is indifferent and free. The contract is formed as soon as the will of the parties meet absent any need for the parties to formalise their consent.33 It underpins and is the essential element to the formation of contract absent any additional requirement for form.34 Not surprisingly, Jacques Mestre (1952-) contends that: Chacun sait, à cet égard, en schématisant quelque peu les choses, que le Code civil de 1804, sensible à une philosophie individualiste et à une doctrine économique libérale avait raisonné à partir d’un principe d’autonomie de la volonté. L’individu, libre par essence, ne pouvait s’obliger que de sa propre initiative et, c’est donc cette volonté humaine qui, tout à la fois, créait le contrat et le façonnait en déterminant librement son contenu.35

Consequently, the consensual principle that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 underpin is foremost an instrument for the classification of contracts according to their type. However, this taxonomy is open to criticism. It leads French scholars to discuss consensualism only in terms of its opposition to formalism as if these two concepts were antithetical and consensualism had no purpose other than to establish a scheme of classification of contracts.

31

Carbonnier (2000) at [16]. Compare to Page (de) (1934) at [464]; Ripert and Boulanger (1952) at [43] and [93]. 32 Lequette (2008), p. 247; Demogue (1923) at [3]. 33 Ghestin (2000) at [912], p. 680. 34 Ghestin et al. (2013) at [195]. 35 Mestre (1985) in Cadiet (1986), p. 41. [My own translation]: ‘In this respect, it is well-known to everyone, in loose terms, that the Civil Code of 1804 was attuned to individualism and a liberal economic jurisprudence, and its elaboration relied on the doctrine of the autonomy of the will. Consequently, individuals can only be bound by their consent the conveyance of which not only makes the contract but also decides on its terms’.

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Introduction

Hence, to Jean Carbonnier (1908–2003), one of the most authoritative French jurists of the twentieth century: Le contrat a une existence juridique par la seule force de la volonté sans que celle-ci ait besoin d’être revêtue de quelque empreinte qui lui serait conférée d’en haut. . .Le consentement, non point la forme, est une condition essentielle pour la validité du contrat. D’où le nom de consensualisme que l’on donne à cet aspect de l’autonomie de la volonté: en principe, tous les contrats sont consensuels et le formalisme apparaît comme une exception, sinon comme une aberration.36

This assertion is typical of the traditional narrative on consensualism in French law. It is inadequate because it denies the principle’s positivity. Borrowed from French positivité, the term positivity, stems from the adjective positive. It refers to positive laws; that is, the human-made laws that oblige or specify an action and establish specific rights for an individual or group. It is used in French law to denote the enshrinement of a doctrine, notion, or principle in positive law.37 The discussion of consensualism only in terms of its ideological opposition to formalism—which is generally construed in civil law as the necessary, rigid, and inflexible performance of a formality or solemnity of a legitimating nature upon which the validity and enforceability of a contract depends38—seems to presume that consensualism has no legal seat in the Civil Code but instead stems from a purely philosophical conception of contract. It denies the existence of consensualism as an autonomous legal principle sanctioned by law. It is not defined in and of itself according to law but only abstractly and in opposition to what seems to be its antithesis when it is not defined only through the lens of other principles that transcend it such as the autonomy of the will or good faith. The latter denotes in its French understanding duties of loyalty and cooperation between contracting parties depending on the circumstances of their agreement but also a heterogeneous ensemble of shortcomings protecting the consent of the parties according to a

36

Carbonnier (2000) [16]: [My own translation] the will of the parties makes the contract alone without it being necessary that it is clad with any form bestowed from above. . .Consent, not the form, is an essential condition for the validity of a contract. Hence the name consensualism given to this aspect of the autonomy of the will: in principle, all contracts are consensual, and formalism appears to be the exception or an aberration. 37 Bonnechère (2002), pp. 484–485; Zaccaï and Missa (2000), p. 130; Havard (2016) note 914, p. 179; Cornu (2018), p. 778. 38 Notably, François Gény, a leading French jurist in the 19th-20th century and trailblazer for free scientific research, jusphilosophy, and jurisprudence of values which, together, require from legal interpreters that they set their demonstrations against scientific evidence based on sociology, economics, linguistics, philosophy, or theology, defined formalism in law as: ‘a formal requirement whose non-performance precludes a legal act from having any effect’ (‘pour qu’il s’agisse de formes juridiques, à proprement parler, il faut que les manifestations envisagées soient requises à peine d’inefficacité juridique’). This definition remains relevant today. See Gény (1915), p. 98 and Charpentier (2002), p. 277. Regarding free scientific research, jusphilosophy, jurisprudence of values, and an overview of Gény’s approach, see Halpérin (2012) at [122].

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Introduction

7

casuistic, fluid, and plastic reflection on what is acceptable contract behaviour depending on the facts of the case.39 Hence, Terré, Simler, and Lequette argue that consensualism conquers good faith.40 While consensualism is distinct from good faith, the combination of Terré et al.’s jurisprudence with Ripert and Mestre’s approach to good faith, which the reform of the French law of obligation has now systematised,41 has the effect of connoting richer and deeper structures to consensualism. It appears to be more than just a procedural principle of contract determining how contracts are formed or facilitating the formation of contract according to consent supposedly without form. It establishes standards of conduct by which parties must abide for their agreement to have any effect. Incidentally, the opposition between formalism and consensualism disregards the fact that consensualism exerts a considerable influence on the formal elements of contract and is indissociable from form. The liberté de la forme (freedom of form), the fact that the externalisation of consent is free, does not mean that consensual contracts need not be expressed in words or action (absence de forme). Formalism purports to clarify the consent of the parties, make it public, and demonstrate the existence of an obligation. It draws the attention of the parties to the law that they are making for themselves and induces them into ‘particular kinds of independent and critical reflexivity’ based on reason and best practice as to how they should protect their interests and assert their rights. Consequently, the opposition between consensualism and formalism reveals only partly the features of consensualism. To understand the principle’s importance, it is necessary to go beyond the identification of the method of forming contracts and examine how consent compels observance of or compliance with one’s word and how its efficacy is guaranteed irrespective of whether agreements arise only from consent or consent paired with a formality. It is more so since the assertion by which a mere concordance of will suffices to create a contract is misleading and misrepresents French positive law as it stands. In fact, despite the systematisation of consent as a general principle of contract, formalism still plays a key role in modern law. New literature on the topic— including Elise Charpentier’s Un paradoxe de la théorie du contrat: l'opposition formalisme/consensualisme (2002) and Vincent Forray’s unfocused, meandering, and methodologically flawed42 Le consensualisme dans la théorie générale du contrat (2007)—departs from the orthodox construction of consensualism in terms of its opposition to formalism and suggests that far from being in contrast with each 39

Ripert (2013) at [157]; Mestre (2009) at [58], p. 9. Terré et al. (2002) at [129]: ‘Le consensualisme apparaît comme une conquête de la bonne foi’. 41 Bertier-Lestrade (de) (2021) in Le Gallou (2021), pp. 141–160. 42 In following the traditional scourge featuring French legal-historical research, Forray merely compiles a summary of what earlier scholars have said and makes a series of unverified claims against the backdrop of what other modern or contemporary authors have said without actually engaging with the primary sources. The issue with such a textbook narrative is that none can engage with their writing critically as opinion is presented as fact. 40

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Introduction

other, consensualism and formalism contribute extra features to each other. Consensualism assigns a new function to form. It is no longer a condition of validity of undertakings but an evidentiary implement absent which undertakings may not be enforced, although assent to the terms may have been given. The paradigmatic example is the mechanism of preuve parfaite (perfect proof) that Décret n°80-533 du 15 juillet 1980 pris pour l’application de l’article 1341 du code civil introduced. It provides that a legal act relating to a sum of money or value in excess of €1500 must be proven by evidence in writing, whether privately signed or authenticated, regardless of whether the undertaking is consensual, solemn or real. Otherwise, the act is unenforceable excepting the cases of physical or moral impossibility of the written evidence being obtained if it is customary not to establish written evidence or where the written evidence has been lost as a result of force majeure. While an oath or testimony is admissible, it can only supplement writing, not substitute for it.43 Thus, by adopting a narrow understanding of formalism merely as antithetical to consensualism, the traditional narrative of French law ignores that, in many respects, formalism supplements consensualism. The opposition between the two notions is put into a historical perspective where formalism, at first ascendant, gradually made way for consensualism until it receded completely. It leads authoritative French writers including Georges Ripert (1880–1958),44 Jacques Flour (1907–1979),45 François Terré (1930-) and Philippe Simler (1940-),46 to cite but a few, to consider that the modes of formation of contracts evolved in the same way across societies and culminated in the rejection of formalism. Thereby, French scholars traditionally regard formalism as a striking feature of ‘primitive societies’ that is incompatible with consensualism while consensualism is discussed as the hallmark of advanced societies.47 To them, consensualism is characteristic of those societies that comply both with moral rules and principles of freedom since it sanctions the parole donnée, it favours freedom of action for individuals over collective or state control, and it enshrines the ascendancy of the will and consent as sources of obligations according to reason—that is, according to what is fair, common sense, and good judgement—without any rigid observance of convention or form. It relies on the concept of natural equity, namely the concept by

43

French Civil Code, ex-Article 1341, now 1358 et seq. Ripert and Boulanger (1952) at [45]: ‘L’histoire prouve que le consensualisme dans les contrats est le résultat d’un progrès constant’. 45 Flour et al. (2004) at [301]: ‘Que le consensualisme soit moralement supérieur au formalisme paraît, de prime abord évident’. [My own translation]: ‘It goes without saying that consenualism is morally superior to formalism’. 46 Terré et al. (2002) at [129]: ‘Le consensualisme apparaît comme une conquête de la bonne foi’. [My own translation]: ‘Consensualism conquers good faith]’. 47 Maine (1906), pp. 278–279; Carbonnier (1959), pp. 115ff; Jhering (von) (1880), pp. 189ff. This idea of evolutionary sociology of societies is now widely discredited. See, for instance, Piedelièvre (1959), pp. 130ff; Graveson (1941), pp. 262–272; Schmidt (2017), p. 145; Cocks (1988), pp. 247–257; Maitland (1965) I, 279. 44

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Introduction

9

which natural justice is instinctive and based on the acknowledgement and sanction of the rights that individuals derive from the laws that they have chosen for themselves even if there is no appropriate or conclusive statute providing for the situation created between them. This evolutionary jurisprudence describes the belief that ideas of contract improved themselves through progressive inherited change.48 However, it is excessively simplistic. It denies the contingency of consensualism. It ignores both the role of the will and consent in those societies where the law constituted a system where the whole of the norms applicable to society could only proceed from legislation without any external considerations such as morality. It also overlooks the evidentiary role that formalism necessarily plays in systems where contracts arise from consent in light of the requirements for legal certainty, fairness, and justice. It ignores that form supports consent and is a guarantee of its enforceability even if consent is paramount. It also reveals the absence of standards of absolute and universal application of consensualism given that the principle, as it is currently construed, faces many exceptions in practice that are more numerous than its theoretical applications.49 They challenge the idea that the historical shift from a form-heavy to a consensual system in modern law purported to establish a system where form is directly opposed to consent and has no meaning. Against this background, this monograph discusses the history and influence of consensualism in contract in French law, namely, the historical heritage behind Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172. It presents consensualism under a different light and reveals its distinctive features which are currently hidden behind its erroneous opposition to formalism. It elucidates how consensualism currently operates in French contract law while accounting for its historical spectrum. It provides a clearer, historically informed, more precise, more consistent, and actual definition of the principle transcending its parochial opposition to formalism and revealing it in the full extent of its properties. In so doing, this monograph suggests a novel approach to the interpretation of consensualism based on the current operation of French law as a general, polymorphic, and interpretive principle of contract, thereby discussing the otherwise overlooked properties that it may have and halting its parochial opposition to formalism. There are many general surveys dedicated to consensualism.50 They discuss it traditionally in passing in terms of its relation to good faith,51 the autonomy of the will,52 equity, the will theory, and the like without explaining it. While it is true that

48

Carbonnier (1959), pp. 115fff. French Civil Code, Article 1359; Zaki Magdi (1986), pp. 1043–1096. 50 Including Vincent Forray’s unfocussed and meandering Le consensualisme dans la théorie générale du contrat (2007) which concerns itself with retracing the history of consensualism but fails to engage with the primary sources of French law. 51 Terré et al. (2002) at [129]: ‘Le consensualisme apparaît comme une conquête de la bonne foi’. [My own translation]: ‘Consensualism conquers good faith’. 52 Carbonnier (2000) at [16]. 49

10

1

Introduction

discussions about consent are rarely directly about consent for the concept needs substantiated before any discussion about it is possible, this monograph does not conflate consensualism with tangent doctrines such as the will theory of contract which are featuring components of the larger discussion of this topic. Instead, it focuses on the study of the influence of consensualism on the formation of contract, its implications, its meaning, and its underlying historical foundations. Put differently, it studies consensualism from the past and puts it into its political, cultural, intellectual, and social context. It explains it so that it may be grasped more cogently independently of the distinct doctrines with which it is usually combined. The period covered by this research is the period running from ca. 1650 when the idea of consensualism appeared for the first time in modern law on the basis of Roman law, canon law and natural law, to 1804 when it was finally incorporated into the Civil Code implicitly under Article 1101. It permits a comparative discussion of the consequences and implications of Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 in modern and contemporary law, and enables the exploration of the alternatives to the opposition between consensualism and formalism, thereby highlighting different dimensions of the principle.

1.1

Sources

The study of the sources and implications of Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 of the French Civil Code involves a reconsideration of their historical heritage. It entails a review of the doctrines that underpin them as consolidated in French law before codification (c. 1650–1804). The relevant sources for this study are legislation and semi-legislative and jurisprudential works on contract. This period is the institutional period of French law. It is when French law acquired its definite structure. It has remained unaltered since. It was a period dominated by heightened reflections on natural law,53 citizenship,54 freedom, and self-determination. It was the period of the emergence of the first trial and error about the limitation of absolutism,55 the establishment of a national constitution,56 and the implementation of constitutional review mechanisms57 spurred by the revolutionaries. It culminated in the codification of the whole of the local customs about the law of persons and property that applied within the Kingdom of France. It concluded the movement that the Ordinance of Montillès-Tours instigated in 1453. It culminated also in the consolidation of the sources of French law and the summary of the array of customs that found to apply based on

53

Hobbes (1651); Locke (1690); Rousseau (2001). Quastana, F in Ganzin (2004), pp. 197–228. 55 Montesquieu (1721) Lettre XXIV; Montesquieu (1748) 11.6. 56 Suratteau (1989), pp. 982–986. 57 Pichot (2010) no28. 54

1.1

Sources

11

four prominent pieces of legislation. First, Louis XIV’s Edit de Saint-Germain-enLaye (1679). Second, the National Legislative Assembly’s Code Pénal (1791). Third, the National Convention’s Code des délits et des peines (1795). Finally, Napoleon I’s Code Civil (1804); the overall structure of which has remained the same with only minor amendments. When it comes to legislation, the main source is the Napoleonic Code. It was promulgated on 21 March 1804.58 It was subsequently amended and renamed Civil Code during the Bourbon Restoration. It is the fruit of a long-term endeavour initiated by Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès (1753–1824) during the French Revolution to end the confusion and contradictions of the feudal and royal laws applicable in 18th-century France, to unify French law under a single set of laws, to repeal the array of local customs that had sometimes been officially compiled in coutumiers (customals) and had bounded territorial applications, and to abolish the last remnants of feudalism according to the principles arising from the French Revolution. Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès, appointed second consul of France by Napoleon I, devised the structure of the Civil Code according to the structure of the Institutes of Justinian. He relied on the contribution of the four most prominent jurists of his time; that is, Félix-Julien-Jean Bigot de Préameneu, Jacques de Maleville, François-Denis Tronchet, and Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis. In other respects, he departed from it and incorporated not only previous legislation, but also all kind of earlier rules and customs.59 The Civil Code is, thus, a comprehensive and rational synoptic rewrite of earlier rules instead of a collection of edited excerpts. It was a milestone in civilian legal practice. It made the laws clearer and more accessible. It simultaneously halted the conflict between the legislative powers of the monarch and the objections of judges who ruled cases according to their privileges and social class. For this research, detailed attention is paid to the Travaux Préparatoires du Code Civil. They are seminal to the understanding of the rationale that instigated the establishment of the principle that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 underpin. The secondary sources are the treatises and textbooks elucidating their meaning and discussing their application as drafted by various leading French scholars including Gabriel Baudry-Lacantinerie’s (1837–1913) and Louis-Joseph Barde’s (1852–1932) Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil. Les obligations (1897), Raymond Saleilles’ (1855–1912) La théorie générale de l’obligation d’après le premier projet de Code civil pour l’Empire allemand (1925); René Demogue’s (1872–1938) Traité des obligations en général. Source des obligations (1923); Jean Gaudemet’s (1908–2001) Théorie générale des obligations (1937); Pierre Mazeaud’s (1929-), Henri Mazeaud’s (1900–1993), and Denis Mazeaud’s (1956-) Leçons de droit civil. Obligations, théorie générale (1998); Jean Carbonnier’s (1908–2003) Droit civil.

58

Holtman (1981), pp. 1ff. Halpérin (1969), p. 219; Halpérin (2004), pp. 47–49; Dard (1805); Halpérin (1996), pp. 17–18; Foqué, R in Stevens (2000), pp. 114–115; Portalis, JEM in Ewald (1989), pp. 36–39, 51–52. 59

12

1

Introduction

Les obligations (2000); Jacques Flour’s (1907–1979), Jean-Luc Aubert’s (1939–2008), and Eric Savaux’s (1957-) Droit civil. Les obligations (2004); François Terré’s (1930-), Phillipe Simler’s (1940-), and Yves Lequette’s (1946-) Droit civil. Les obligations (2002); Alain Sériaux’s (1954-) Droit des obligations (1998); Christian Larroumet’s (1939-) Traité de Droit civil (1998); Alain Bénabent’s (1946-) Droit civil. Les contrats spéciaux civils et commerciaux (2001); Muriel Fabre-Magnan’s (1964-) Les obligations (2004), Charles Beudant’s (1829–1895) and Paul Lerebours-Pigeonnière’s (1874–1954) Cours de droit civil français (1936), Jacques Ghestin’s (1931-) Traité de droit civil. La formation du contrat (1993), and François Chénédé’s (1974-) Le nouveau droit des obligations et des contrats 2019/ 2020 (2018). The reason for focusing on these works is that they are still the daily resort of French practitioners, and their authority is still accorded the highest respect in legal studies. The reason is also that consensualism is generally only mentioned in passing and is assigned distinct functions depending on how one interprets it. Therefore, the study of these works affords the possibility to think differently and discuss the implications of the principle that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 enshrine beyond the opposition between formalism and consensualism which is only the tip of the iceberg. When it comes to semi-legislative and doctrinal works, the primary sources are fivefold. First, the Institutes of Justinian (533, Birks: 1987) given it is the underpinning of the Civil Code. Attention is paid especially to Gaius’ Institutes which had the force of law60 and replaced ‘the [previous] elementary works, so that the raw intelligence of the student, nourished by a simple diet, may proceed more easily to advanced legal studies’.61 Second, Jean Domat’s Lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel (1689, Moetjens: 1703). It is one of the landmarks of French civil law. It initiated the summarising of local customs. It culminated in the promulgation of the Napoleonic Code. Before Domat, the articulation of Roman law and customary law as sources of French law was presented in chaotic and contradictory terms. Domat rationalised the practice of law by drawing on Roman law which he deemed a rational system.62 He held Roman law as a set of immutable laws consistent with the Christian moral concepts that Thomas Aquinas developed in his Summa Theologiae (1265–1274). He simultaneously considered Roman law to be a set of arbitrary laws inconsistent with the Christian principles of justice. Nonetheless, he was successful in organising and articulating in a single comprehensive brief the variations of customary law and Roman law to devise an effective and rational jurisprudence that influenced the codification of French law two centuries later. Domat’s theoretical introduction to law is a masterwork of jurisprudence and political science. It foreshadowed LouisGabriel-Ambroise, Viscount of Bonald’s (1754–1840) Législation primitive (1802),

60

Jolowicz and Nicholas (1972), p. 492. Honoré (1978), p. 187. 62 Goyard-Fabre, S in Ferreyrolles (1996), pp. 187–207. 61

1.1

Sources

13

Carl Schmitt’s (1888–1985) Politische Theologie (1922), and Charles de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu’s (1689–1755) De L’Esprit des Lois (1748). They relied on it for the elaboration of their political and social theories. Fascinating and authoritative, Domat’s Lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel is seminal to the construction of Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172. It ensues from historical, political, and social orientations about contract and cannot be overlooked. Third, Robert-Joseph Pothier’s Traité des obligations (1761, Halpérin: 2011). Pothier was a pivotal actor for the codification of French law and the systematisation of consensus as a general principle of contract. His compilation occurred at a particular and propitious time. It was facilitated by France’s Chancellor’s (i.e., Henri François d'Aguesseau (1668–1751)) introduction of various regulations for the improvement of the forms of procedure, the ascertainment of the limits of jurisdictions, and the operation of a greater uniformity in the execution of the laws throughout France. It was also facilitated by the synoptic works that Domat, Bourjon, and other great jurists had accomplished in the late medieval and early modern periods.63 The broadness and diversity of Pothier’s sources make the Traité a seminal work. It is more than a simple compilation and restatement of the law. It is a comprehensive reflection on law, especially the sources of French law. It influenced the drafters and content of the Civil Code and 18th-century American legal thinkers. It also played a significant role in the development of Scottish and English laws of contract.64 Therefore, its examination has a prominent place in this research. In fourth place is Hugo Grotius’ (1583–1645) De iure belli ac pacis (1625, Barbeyrac: 1773).65 Grotius had a tremendous influence on Pothier, and the drafters of the Civil Code led by Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis.66 His influence on the Civil Code can be traced in the rationale that enticed Pothier and the codifiers to enshrine a general principle whereby every agreement can be a contract. It is based on a will theory of contract by which the laws are conceived as the individual rights of individuals.67 He established a general duty to repair whatsoever harm caused to another. Pothier relied on it to repeal even the requirement for the infringement of a specific right in the law of delict.68 The Civil Code carried this forward using the concept of dommage, which is nondescript.69 Grotius’ jurisprudence is an important first step towards the general formulation of delict in the Civil Code. However, for

63

Arnaud (1969), p. 218. MacMillan (2015), pp. 104–106; Ibbetson (1999), pp. 221ff; Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487, per Lord Haldane at [501]; Sowler v Potter [1940] 1 K.B. 271. Compare to Lewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198, per Lord Denning, at [206]. See, also, MacQueen (2013), p. 7. 65 Feenstra (1990), pp. 66–68. 66 Beignier (1988), pp. 77–101; Brakel (van), MS in Ripert (1939), pp. 865ff. 67 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1135 (now 1194). Compare to Grotius (1773) 2.17.1; Sampson (2017), pp. 5ff; Bussani and Sebok (2015), pp. 192ff. 68 Pothier (2011) §118, pp. 53–54. 69 Descheemaeker (2009), pp. 118ff. 64

14

1

Introduction

this research, the focus will be the influence of his natural law theory on the codifiers, and the establishment of a general rule by which every agreement can be a contract because the parties choose it for themselves. Finally, Samuel Pufendorf’s (1632–1694) De iure naturæ et gentium (Barbeyrac, Mascovius: 1759) given that Pothier and subsequent legal scholars continually refer to natural law, especially to Grotius and Pufendorf, to justify the consensual contractual jurisprudence that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 underpin.70 For reasons of scope and given the admitted focus on France, the history, evolution, and contemporaneity of consensual ideas in the French law of obligations, this book leaves aside wider discussions that have not underpinned French codification and French legal thought even though they show some similarities of thought. It is particularly so of the remarkable work of the late scholastics or School of Salamanca at the beginning of the sixteenth century AD of which Wim Decock provides a well-rounded discussion.71 The reason for leaving these materials aside is that they had no direct influence on the French “institutional writers” (i.e., those writers who crystallised French law into its last state before codification and who inspired the drafters of the Civil Code). Nor did they have a direct or insidious influence on the drafters of the Civil Code and subsequent French legal scholars after codification. It is tempting to see similarities between the works of the late scholastics and the jurisprudence of Domat, Pothier, the drafters of the French Civil Code, and subsequent French writers who were probably aware of the Iberian jurisprudence. Albeit it is important to note that: (i) the book does not claim that the doctrine of commutative justice requiring an exchange of performance of equal value on fair terms, let alone consensual contractual ideas, are peculiar to the development of French contract law. Rather, it discusses them as far as they have directly influenced the specific development of consensual ideas in French law; (ii) similarities between authors in other jurisdictions, whether past or present, does not mean unified development; and (iii) while it may be tempting to think that the Iberian scholastics have had an influence, even indirect, on the sources used by French scholarship to develop consensualism, there is no evidence that they have had any such influence. Indeed, Pothier makes no explicit mention of them (e.g., Molina, Soto, Comitoli, Oñate. . .) in his Traité des obligations (Halpérin: 2011). Even though Gordley, relying on Feenstra, claims that they had a direct influence on Grotius

70

Toullier (1824) 3.41-46; Duranton (1834) 4.202-03. See Decock (2013). However, Decok failed to appreciate fully the context surrounding Pothier’s work claiming, for instance, that he negated the ‘profound roots [of] the pluralist legal culture of the ancien régime’ whereas Pothier’s ambition and method, without negating the said profound roots, purported instead to summarise French law as it stood considering its immediate sources instead of using history as nothing but the raw material of law as if it were impossible to grasp the principles of French law without studying over a thousand years of general contract history. 71

1.1

Sources

15

or, rather, that he borrowed their ideas,72 none of the relevant passages of De jure belli ac paci (1625, Barbeyrac, 1773) focusing on promise/contract (which had a direct influence on French contract law and were relied upon heavily by Pothier and other French writers) mention them explicitly. Put differently, similarity does not mean identity. There is a temptation to believe that similarity in the work of later writers denotes either their mere summarising of earlier work or their being influenced by these works. While it may be true in some instances, Grotius’ De jure (op. cit.) and Pothier’s Traité des obligations (op. cit.) do not merely compile a summary of what earlier scholars have said, thereby making a series of unverified claims against the backdrop of what other modern or contemporary authors have said. Instead, they engage directly with the primary sources. Therefore, instead of considering the similarities between the works of the late Scholastics and those writers that directly influenced the enshrinement of consensualism in French law, or seeing in the works of the former the embryo of the jurisprudence of the latter, such similarities should instead be construed at best either as shared thought or as possible acquis. Put another way, any similarities there may be point to accepted truth or knowledge; that is, accepted ideas agreed on by most writers to be correct or reasonable. Otherwise, it would be denying mind independence and objectivity in discussing the features of consensual ideas in French law while reducing consensualism to what it is not; that is, a generic amalgamation of ideas incapable of individuation that was improved successively by different schools of thought. That notwithstanding, these similarities point at least to the wider role of consensual contractual ideas in European legal thought outside of France. They show an internal relation between consensual theories and shared properties capable of informing a general theory of consent that is not unique to any one thinker, school of thought, or jurisdiction. While it has merit, it is beyond the scope of this book which is more modest, puts the doctrine into context, and focuses on a specific development rather than on the development of a general theory in the jus commune. It is an inquiry into the construction, sources, and implications of consensualism in French law. Hence, it is legitimate to focus on the French treatment of the principle and set aside similar or radically different wider discussions that have not directly influenced its development. Ultimately, consensualism is a legal construct. It is not something that can be sensed. It can only be defined usefully if its concrete practical implications are put into context. This is discussed further below.

72

Gordley (2002) Vol. 50, No. 4 (FALL 2002), pp. 657–670, p. 666, fn. 47.

16

1.2

1

Introduction

Methodology

The study of the construction, sources, implications, and limitations of Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 of the French Civil Code does not lend itself to a theoretical study involving observing or compiling data to posit a contemplative and rational abstract thinking of an object of inquiry based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained. It is due to the vagueness,73 polysemy,74 and shallowness75 of the definitions of the principle of consensualism that they underpin.76 Rather, a philosophical study of the history of contract is required, examining the construction of a general theory by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract. Such a study provides valuable insight into the purview and influence of consensualism on the formation of contract. It also helps define it positively, while avoiding the ahistorical mistake of presenting it only in terms of its opposition to formalism.77 The consequence of this view is that it dismisses the necessary relation that consensualism maintains with form and the éléments substantiels of contract, namely, consent, reciprocity, and the principle of respect for the word (pacta sunt servanda). This, in turn, may explain the unsettled interrogations about the specific role that consensualism plays in contract formation. This position is no longer tenable. Therefore, this monograph adopts a different approach. It examines the law in context.78 It thinks outside the traditional doctrinal box79 and provides ‘a critical conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and case law to reveal a statement of the law relevant to the matter under investigation’.80

73 Flour et al. (2004) at [301]: ‘Que le consensualisme soit moralement supérieur au formalisme paraît, de prime abord évident’; Mestre (1985), pp 41ff: ‘Piliers du régime juridique contractuel’. 74 Flour et al. (2004) at [301]; Terré et al. (2002) at [129]; Sériaux (1998) at [38]. 75 Jeanclos, Y in Centre d'histoire du droit (Nice) (1987), pp. 333ff, 335: ‘Le consensualisme est certainement une des plus belles constructions de l’esprit humain’. 76 Atias (2002) at [118] et seq. 77 Ripert and Boulanger (1952) at [36]. 78 ‘Vorrede’ (Foreword) in Ehrlich (1967): Idea of “Lebendes Recht” (living law, law in action). 79 Magdelain (1959), p. 1: ‘L’espoir a toujours été déçu de capter l’essence du consensualisme grâce à l’étude d’un ou de tous les contrats consensuels. La structure d’un type contractuel ne renseigne que sur elle-même [. . .] Le consensualisme ne se confond pas avec le total de ses manifestations. Il convient d’abandonner la méthode purement arithmétique de l’addition pour faire appel à un instrument de travail beaucoup plus efficace, l’ensemble.’ [My own translation] ‘the hope of jurists to capture the essence of consensualism through the study of one of or all the consensual contracts has always been shattered. The structure of a type of contract only informs one of the functioning of this type of contract without it being generalisable [. . .] Consensualism is distinct from all its manifestations. There is a need to abandon the purely arithmetical method of analysis reliant on the addition of every single manifestation of a principle and call on, instead, a much more effective work tool, the whole’. 80 Hutchinson (2014) at [584].

1.2

Methodology

17

Barbara Britton Wenner and Paul D Halliday argue that this perspective helps enlighten and even enliven the involved depth81 of the construction of a concept, here consensualism under Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172. Taking this long historical view avoids the continuation of the mistake consisting in construing the articulation of Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 as proceeding from an evolutionary trend82 as if there had been ‘an unbroken line of juristic thought from Rome to the modern day, whereby the proverbial “torch of learning” was passed from one school of jurists to the next’.83 The consequence of this evolutionary view is that formalism is discussed as characteristic of ‘primitive societies’ while consensualism is discussed as peculiar to so-called advanced societies as if every legal culture followed the same pattern of development and reached a Weltrecht, as Josef Kohler put it,84 where formalism no longer has a role to play, although the advent of consensualism has not, in any way, challenged the role of form in contract.85 Rather, it assigns it a different function necessary for the protection of consent and for purposes of legal certainty and publicity. This method helps demonstrate how today’s erroneous construction of the consensual principle that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 embody in terms of its opposition to formalism86 is simplistic and the fruit of ‘historically uninformed past practices’.87 To understand how it occurred, it is necessary to ‘understand the tides’ that have motivated it if any valid alternative definition is to be suggested.88 This is only possible through a historical inquiry. It allows the reconstruction of past thought to: find the place where disparate objects unite in a single analytic field, a place where seemingly contrary things might be drawn together into a synoptic vision revealing multiple trajectories entwined across time as it flows across human experience in all its dimension, [thus permitting the perception of the past, present, and future in an instant].89

It is particularly so, as Robin George Collingwood (1889–1943) propounds: because the present [undoubtedly] contains the past itself, the present is not determined by the past as something external to it, a cause of which it is the effect; the present is a free and living activity which embraces and sustains its own past by its own act.90

81

Britton Wenner, B in Halliday, PD in Dubber”and Tomlins (2006), p. 324. Ripert and Boulanger (1952) at [45]: ‘L’histoire prouve que le consensualisme dans les contrats est le résultat d’un progrès constant’. 83 Hepburn (2016), p. 1. 84 Dölemeyer, B in Wadle (1993), pp. 139–150. 85 Mazeaud et al. (1998) at [66]. 86 Ripert and Boulanger (1952) at [36]. 87 Halliday, PD in Hutson (2017), pp. 591ff. See also Gorla (1955) V–IX; Castro (1968), pp. 51ff; Rouhette (1965), p. 598. 88 Braudel (1980), p. 3. 89 Halliday, PD in Dubber andTomlins (2016), p. 326. 90 Collingwood (1994), pp. 187, 218. 82

18

1

Introduction

In pursuing the historical and philosophical foundations of the traditional narrative of French law, the originality of this monograph lies, first, in the critique of a re-enacted past as a base for critiquing the present and, second, in the interrogation of the future of consensualism as a general principle of contract. It reviews its otherwise overlooked implications, thereby departing from its conventional opposition to formalism.91 By seeing the objects created by [French] past legal authorities within the flows of human experience that generated them, [one] can think more clearly about how much [consensualism. . .] might be read with greater probity and thereby revealed to have other properties than at first sight.92

It would mean seeing the consensual principle that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 underpin as having a before and after; that is, being ‘situated in the course of time’ and contingent.93 It is notably so since the principle wanes94 and waxes, evermore,95 under many exceptions96 contradicting its apparent principled value by which, in essence, every undertaking arising from consent can be a contract97 except in certain restricted cases98 which have become standard practice. As Maksymilian del Mar observes: [the] creation of objects in historical inquiry involves not only constructing them as existing, but as persisting through time and thus existing across time and places [as processes] with distinct stages, while treating [them] as something that takes on a different character in different times and places.99

Rather than taking the principle as given, constant or timeless, or deducing it from other legal principles as is too often the case, historical analysis helps ‘illustrate the genealogy of a conception as constitutive of a particular legal-political project of governance [. . .while it expands. . .] the scope of critical analysis beyond parochial limits’100 as essentially contextual. Hence, it is the method of choice for this 91

Ripert and Boulanger (1952) at [36]; Marty and Raynaud (1962) at [35]; Ghestin (1993) at [48]; Terré et al. (2002) at [127]; Flour et al. (2004) at [300]; Malaurie et al. (2004) at [455]; FabreMagnan (2004) at [82]. 92 Halliday, PD in Dubber and Tomlins (2016), p. 328. 93 Del Mar, M in Dubber and Tomlins (2016), p. 7. See also Lagarde (1999) I.170; Flour (2000), pp. 15–16. 94 Grynbaum, L in Mazeaud et al. (2004), pp. 427ff; Josserand (1932), pp. 73ff; Lalou (1933), p. 33. 95 For manuals discussing the resurge of formalism in French contract law and its eclipsing of consensualism, see, for instance: Moeneclaey (1914); Rouxel (1934); Piedelièvre (1959); Abdelrahim Abdalla (1974); Cunha (2002). 96 Flour, J in Dainow (1950), pp. 93ff, at [1]: ‘Longtemps, la doctrine a célébré “le triomphe du consensualisme” comme une victoire des droits modernes sur le matérialisme archaïque des législations primitives. Mais “la renaissance du formalisme” est devenue, depuis le début du siècle, un thème non moins banal’. 97 French Civil Code, Article 1359; Zaki Magdi (1986), pp. 1043–1096. 98 Gautier (2005), pp. 592ff. 99 Del Mar, M in Dubber and Tomlins (2016), p. 8. 100 Dubber, MD in Dubber and Tomlins (2016), pp. 113–114.

1.2

Methodology

19

monograph since ‘it makes no sense to critique an aspect of law without appreciating its conception and operation’. It entails a ‘thorough and imaginative analysis of its [historical] doctrinal design and context’.101 Thus, legal history is used as one tool of critical analysis of the principle embedded in Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172. Besides, a description of how legal materials may be used for historical research and a suggestion of some of the problems that the historian may encounter in handling them is necessary. Modern and contemporary textbooks and treatises on the history of the law of obligations in France use the present legal categories that the Civil Code provides as the framework of legal history.102 Since codification, their rationale has continually been to present history as nothing but the raw material of law as if it were impossible to grasp the principles of French law without studying their history.103 They, thereby, merge the past, present, and future of the law of obligations into a single object of contemplation where history only serves to distil the legal principles that they discuss. The convenience of using present legal categories as the framework of legal history has had obvious practical advantages. It has permitted the emphasis of the permanence of certain legal categories, the simplification of legal history, and the drawing of symmetry between historical works comparable to the simplicity and symmetry which early legal thinkers found in dividing their materials according to the categories of Roman law.104 The consequence is that the discussion of the development of law is confined to the framework of contemporary legal vocabulary, thus assigning a more conservative utility to the study of legal history than it may otherwise have had. Undoubtedly, this method for writing creates an illusion of simplicity. It has led French historians to think they could evade the pitfalls of historical method and address history only as an element of law with the past as a light to illuminate the principles of French law and demonstrate how advanced it has become. David Deroussin (1971-), established professor of French law, provides the most significative illustration of the traditional method of French legal history. The plan of his monumental Histoire du droit des obligations (2007, 2012) is divided into two books.105 The first is dedicated to contracts and is divided into three parts containing respectively two, three, and two chapters. The second is dedicated to delict and includes two parts each containing two chapters. The first book is a thorough discussion of the development of contract. Each of the sections is dedicated to common themes such as Formalisme, réalisme, et consensualisme, and Classification et réglementation. Each theme explores the history of contract according to historical periods: Roman law, medieval law, and modern law. This structure gives his work, overall, a certain attractive symmetry in the internal arrangement of the

101

Dubber and Tomlins (2016), p. 114. See, for instance, Deroussin (2007, 2012). 103 Dubber and Tomlins (2016), p. 114. 104 Le Douaren (1544); Budé (1508); Maran (1741). 105 Deroussin (2007), pp. 891–916; Deroussin (2012), pp. 900–919. 102

20

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Introduction

materials whose ostensible rationale is the use of history only to explain or interpret the principles of French law for the convenience and cultivation of the practising lawyer. The structure of his work is characteristic of the traditional approach of French legal historians. They do no more than search for the rudimentary forms of an advanced legal system. Thereby, the whole past of the nation seems to culminate in its present and the forms of legal institutions are presumed as incapable of having been otherwise.106 French authors are less concerned with reviewing the appropriateness of ancient legal devices to the peculiar social needs of their time than with the extent to which ancient notions are similar to those with which the modern lawyer is familiar and how modern law has mitigated these functional analogues and conceptual similarities to devise a fully-grown and adequate legal system. They are, thus, being incapable of finding ancient legal categories as rich as their own and perceive the evolvement of law merely as a progressive evolution of societies from ‘Status to Contract’.107 Much of the writing on the history of obligations from Roman to modern law shows the ease with which history is used only to emphasise the uses to which the law of contract is put today. History is used merely to describe the genesis of the concepts used for a modern purpose or to demonstrate what devices were used to serve similar purposes long ago and their circumscription or extension in contradistinction to modern law.108 The inevitable consequence is their failure to reflect on the changing role of legal and social control in the life of individuals. Hence, French scholars traditionally perceive consensualism only as antithetical to formalism given their preference for a will-based theory of contract,109 thus denying the maintenance and change in the role of form that consensualism operates. Consequently, the secondary literature treated in this monograph is only used to reveal the historical nuts and bolts of consensualism for a fuller understanding of the principle rather than to reveal its embryology. It will prevent the reiteration of the traditional approach of finding in the past the embryos of current legal principles and presuming that they have been improved. Otherwise, the mistake of visualising consensualism only in terms of its opposition to formalism will be repeated given the change from a formalistic society to a liberal society that has preferred to base its law of contracts on a will theory rather than on formalistic guideposts. As Daniel J Boorstin put it: If there is a single change in attitude which, more than any other, would enlarge the possibilities of legal history, it would be a shift away from that which makes legal history

106 Savigny (von) (1814), p. 6. Compare to Jhering (von) (1818–1892) in Mecke (2018), p. 46; Dubouchet (1998), p. 163. 107 Maine (1906), pp. 278ff; Ripert and Boulanger (1952) at [45]; Carbonnier (1959), p. 115ff; Jhering (von) (1880), p. 189ff; Durkheim (1950), p. 208. 108 Dubber and Tomlins (2016), p. 114. 109 Carbonnier (2000) at [16], Zaki Magdi (1986), p. 1050; Stancu (2015), pp. 3ff; Gounot (1912), p. 196ff; Perrot (2010) n°6, p. 14; Gény (1921) n°207-208 and n°213, p. 174.

1.3

Chapters Outline

21

merely the handmaiden of [natural law]. So long as history is considered mainly as the raw material from which legal principles are distilled, the approach to legal history is bound to be narrowed; legal historians will be interested in tracing legal principles to their present culmination [instead of using the materials to reveal the ins and outs and essence of the doctrines they discuss].110

1.3

Chapters Outline

This monograph provides a more precise and more complete definition of the consensual principle that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 underpin by acknowledging its historical spectrum and departing from the traditional narrative consisting in opposing it to formalism. It shows that the principle has other properties than first thought. It critiques the traditional narrative of French law through the discussion of the implications of consensualism and the questioning of its foundations. Following this introductory chapter, Part 1. ‘Idea and role of consent in the development of a taxonomy of contract in ancient law’ studies thinkers and ideas on consensualism in diverse transnational geographical settings. It consists of Chap. 2. ‘Roman law’, Chap. 3. ‘Mos Gallicus and Iuris Franco-Gallici’, and Chap. 4. ‘Modern law’. They explore the historical sources and rationale behind the sanction of the jurisprudence by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract unless otherwise provided for. They examine the scope, underpinnings, and the variety of approaches to the consensual doctrine in Roman law, the municipal medieval French laws, the ius commune, and modern French law to understand the historical foundations and evolution of the principle that French contract law came to embody by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract. Part 2. ‘Reception, relevance, evolution, and implications in the Civil Code of France: de lege lata’ explores the reception of the consensual doctrine in French law at the time of codification and its evolution since codification. It consists of Chap. 5. ‘Article 1101 and the systematisation of consent as a general principle of contract’ and Chap. 6. ‘Article 1108 and the specification of the consensual doctrine’. It examines the incorporation of the consensual doctrine in the Civil Code of France and its evolution since. Together, chapters four and five highlight the legacy of the consensual doctrine, they explore the problems that its sanction in the Civil Code of France have raised in modern and contemporary legal practice and examine its features and implications in French law as it exists; which features the opposition between consensualism and formalism whereas these doctrines proceed from the same continuum and complement each other. Part 3. ‘Rethinking the French perspectives on consensualism: de lege ferenda’ studies the prospect of redefining the consensual doctrine to make it clearer in light of the doctrinal quibble that its interpretation and various treatments by both ancient and modern authors have caused. It examines the alternatives to the arguable

110

Boorstin (1941), pp. 433–434.

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1 Introduction

opposition between form and consent, the role of consent in contract, and investigates how form and consent can be combined into a more effective, coherent whole. It consists of Chap. 7. ‘Articles 1109 and 1172 and the classification of contract: Problems and perspective’ and Chap. 8. ‘Reconsidering consensualism and the role of consent in contract’. The lessons of Part 1 and Part 2 are used to posit a new definition of consensualism capturing its essence and evolution to give a fuller picture of its role in contract. Finally, the overall conclusion (Chap. 9) summarises the findings of this monograph and answers its four main research questions: (i) what the underpinnings of consensualism are, (ii) what its implications are, (iii) what relationship consensualism entertains with formalism and how they can be made to exist in harmony despite different ideologies, and (iv) how ideas of consensualism ‘within the flows of the human experience that generated them’ can be combined into a single more effective or coherent whole to posit a clear definition of consensualism so that the principle can be grasped with greater probity and revealed in the full extent of its properties.

Case Law Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 12 July 1989, Bull. civ. I, n°293; GAJC, 11th edition, n°155; JCP 1990.II.21546, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé; Defrénois, 1990, p 358, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1990, p 468, obs. J Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 16 February 1999, Bull. civ. I, n°55; D. Affaires, 1999, p 514, obs. J F; Contrats. Conc. Consom., 1999, n°70, obs. L Leveneur. Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487. Lewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198. Sowler v Potter [1940] 1 K.B. 271.

Statutory Provisions French Civil Code: • • • • • • • •

Article 893 et seq.. Article 1101. Article 1108 now French Civil Code, Article 1128. Article 1109 now 1130, and 1134 now 1103, 1104, and 1193. Article 1163 formerly ex-Article 1129 and ex-Article 1130, °1. Article 1172. Article 1359. Article 1875 et seq..

References

• • • • • • •

23

Article 1915 et seq.. ex-Article 1108 now 1128. ex-Article 1134 now 1103 and 1104 now Articles 1109 and 1172. ex-Article 1134 now 1103. ex-Article 1135 (now 1194). ex-Article 1341 now 1358 et seq.. ex-Article 1343 now 1359.

Institutes of Gaius: • 3.89–90. • 4.30. Institutes of Justinian: • 4, 30-31. Lex Iulia iudiciorum privatorum.

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Gordley J (2002) Why Look Backward. 50:657–670. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41616733 Goré F (1947) Le moment du transfert de propriété dans les ventes à livrer. 4:161ff Graveson RH (1941) The Movement from Status to Contract. 4:262–272. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/1089830. Hutchinson T (2014) Valé Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries and Legal Research in the Post-Internet Era. 106:579–592. https://www.aallnet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Vol106-no-4-2014-32.pdf Lalou H (1933) La “solennisation” des actes sous seing privé ou des exigences du bon pour. 1933: 33ff MacQueen H (2013) The Law of Obligations in Scots Law. 2013/42:1–30. https://doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.2345274. Mestre J (2009) Pour un principe de bonne foi mieux précisé. 58:9ff Mirbeau-Gauvin JR (2020) ‘Prêt’. In: Dalloz (2020) Répertoire Civile. Dalloz, Paris Perrot, X (2010) Le geste, la parole et le partage. Abattage rituel et droit à Rome. 2: 275–289 Pichot P (2010) L'histoire du contrôle de constitutionnalité. https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/ nouveaux-cahiers-du-conseil-constitutionnel/penser-le-controle-a-priori-1789-1870. Rampelberg, RM (2000) L’obligation romaine, perspective sur une évolution. 44:51–68 Schmidt KI (2017) Henry Maine’s “Modern Law”: From Status to Contract and Back Again?. 65: 145–186. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avx022 Tabi Tabi G (2012) Ajustement nécessaire du volontarisme contractuel. 53:71–125. https://www. usherbrooke.ca/droit/fileadmin/sites/droit/documents/RDUS/Volume_44/44-1-TabiTabi.pdf Zaki Magdi MS (1986) Le formalisme conventionnel: illustration de la notion de contrat-cadre. 38: 1043–1096. https://www.persee.fr/doc/ridc_0035-3337_1986_num_38_4_2546 Zimmermann R (1992) Roman-Dutch jurisprudence and its contribution to European private law. 66:1689–1710. https://www.tulanelawreview.org/pub/volume66/issue6/roman-dutch-jurispru dence-and-its-contribution-to-european-private-law

Part I

Idea and Role of Consent in the Development of a Taxonomy of Contract in Ancient Law

Chapter 2

Consensualism in Roman Law

2.1

Introduction

The Scottish jurist Henry James Sumner Maine (1822–1888) and French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) argued in their works Ancient Law (1851)1 and Leçons de sociologie. Physique des mœurs et du droit (1950)2 that contract is the hallmark of advanced, individualistic societies. They claim that contract ends the dependency of men on their families and the social body, the only units that those archaic civilisations such as Rome noticed. They claimed that only advanced societies acknowledge that agreements can arise from consent because the parties chose them for themselves. By contrast, relationships in antiquarian societies such as Rome consisted, to them, only in the relations of family and restricted conventional relationships requiring the intervention of the City. Maine and Durkheim faced heavy criticism for their scholastic approach from the French anthropologist Norbert Rouland (1948-), Carbonnier, and the French professor of law François Terré (1930-).3 They argue amongst many4 that while Roman law lacked any concept of contract, contractual relations existed well and truly even in archaic Rome. They relied on an informal system where specific actions, rigid rules of conduct, and an institutionalised system of coercion governed classes of

1

Maine (1906), pp. 278–279. Durkheim (1950), p. 208. 3 Rouland (1995) at [159] Carbonnier (2013), p. 308; Terré (1968) at [13], p. 76 and footnotes. 4 Lassard (2019), p. 1; Rampelberg (2000), p. 56; Thomas (1976), p. 226; Watson (1984), p. 19; Fiori, R in McGinn (2012), p. 65; Kunderewicz (1995), p. 130; Thomas, PJ in Sondel et al. (2003), p. 174. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_2

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obligations according to morality, law (ius: usages and customs)5 and religion ( fas).6 They were social drivers.7 It means that while conventional obligations in archaic Roman law may not have arisen from the individual will and consent of the parties, they arose at least from social situations. They concerned voluntary, factual situations; a behaviour adopted by parties to create legal relations (contrahere). It is plausible on the face of the Digest. It outlines four classes of obligations corresponding to the taxonomy that Gaius sanctioned in his Institutes. They concern obligations formed by the delivery of a thing, by word, by writing, and by consent.8 The classes of obligations embodied in the taxonomy that the Digest and Gai Institutiones established expose some similarities between classes of obligations. Their study reveals a dichotomy between formal agreements, informal agreements, and quasi-formal or quasi-informal undertakings. The development of these classes of obligations coincides with three distinct periods of Roman law. First, an archaic period characterised by an excessive abidance by prescribed forms (i.e., archaic Rome, 753-509 BCE). Second, a classical period characterised by changes in attitude and minds, and the erosion of forms (i.e., Republican Rome, 509-27 BCE). Finally, a postclassical period endorsing this evolution (i.e., Imperial Rome, 27 BCE-476 AD). The practice of formal agreements is characteristic of the former while the practice of quasi-informal and informal undertakings is characteristic of the latter two. The formal Roman undertakings denoted two types of parole agreements, nexum and sponsio. They stood out by their excessive formalism. Consent was subsidiary.9 The provisions of the Digest regarding these contracts suggest that while consent was an essential feature of contract, it was insufficient to create legal relations.10 Rather, the fulfilment of the required formality, i.e., how consent had been externalised, made the contract. It consisted in a given conduct (e.g., formulaic utterances, transfer of a thing) usually performed in the presence of witnesses.11 The fulfilment of the formalities made the undertaking regardless of the intention of the parties for want of any reference to it in the Digest.12 The provisions of the Digest on sponsio,13 the primitive form of stipulatio,14 and nexum illustrate this. Form, not consent, was the determinant for contracting.

5

Mathisen (2006), p. 1033; Mousourakis (2003), pp. 22–24. Bujuklic (1999), pp. 123–163; Schiavone (2008), pp. 83–84; Mousourakis (2003), p. 2; Lesaffer (2012), pp. 75–76; Mostert (1987), pp. 108ff; Mousourakis (2003), p. 3. See also Szmodis (2005). 7 Köhn, J in Centre d'histoire du droit (Nice) (1987), pp. 358–359 and the footnotes. 8 Institutes of Gaius, 3.136. 9 Smith et al. (1890); Watson (1967), pp. 19–20; Fiori, R in Plessis (du) et al. (2016), pp. 583–584. 10 Digest, 5.2.2, 45.1.1. Pr, 50.16.7. See. also Institutes of Justinian, 2.14.5, 2.18, 3.12. Pr, 19.2; Institutes of Gaius,1.119, 2.27, 3.93, 97. 11 Digest, 50.16.19; Digest, 46.3.80. 12 Labeo in Digest 50.16.19. 13 Girard (1929), pp. 515ff, 517; Lepointe and Monier (1954), pp. 59ff. 14 Gaudemet (2000), p. 264. 6

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By contrast, the Roman semi-informal undertakings denoted a plethora of agreements either formed by simple delivery of a thing (in rem), in writing (litterae), or by part-performance. They stand out from the formal contracts by their questioning of the excessive Roman adherence to excessive forms. They marked the beginning of the rationalisation and simplification of forms. They are characterised by their emphasis on consent as a source of obligations. They highlighted form and consent as completive15 doctrines capable of being combined in such a way as to emphasise conventio as a general principle of contract. Their emergence coincided with the discovery of causa,16 synallagma,17 and good faith18 spurred by the praetor.19 They contributed to the advent of the final class of obligations that Gaius sanctioned in his Institutes, consensual obligations. They concerned four informal contracts also sanctioned in the Digest: emptio-venditio (sale), locatio-conductio (hire), mandatum (agency), and societas (copartnery). They were the culmination of the simplification or erosion of forms in Roman law. They stand out by their distinct lack of form given that the sections that ‘Justinian’ and Gaius dedicated to them in their Institutes do not mention it. They only settled for emphasising consent as a source of obligation absent form.20 This chapter examines how consensualism, the doctrine by which agreements arising from consent can be contracts, emerged; that is, whether it emerged as a means of simplifying how agreements are formed or shunning form from contract as the development of consensual and quasi-informal contracts suggests. Likewise, it explores the relationship between form and consent and how it fits in the wider narrative on consensualism by which formalism is a shameful exception and obligations should be grounded on subjective facts considered apart from various contingencies of form.

2.2

Roman Formal “Contracts” and Consent

Two formal “contracts” stand out in the Digest: nexum and sponsio, discussed further below. They appeared when Rome was an archaic kingdom. Discussions on their formation suggest their formation relied on prescribed forms, accepted social practices sometimes influenced by religion. It begs the question of what the 15

The noun completive denotes a word or morpheme which adds a sense of completeness to a word or phrase. In this context, it means that form and consent complement each other and are not mutually exclusive as the rest of the sentence suggests. This point is discussed further below through the thesis. 16 Digest, 2.14.7. 17 Schiavone (1971), p. 166; Digest, 50.16.19. 18 Léon and Mazeaud (1956), pp. 6–28. 19 Campbell (1892), p. 117; Mousourakis (2003), pp. 34–35; Fiori, in Plessis (du) et al. (2016), pp. 585ff; Cardilli, R in Cardilli et al. (2006), pp. 19ff; Cardilli (2004), pp. 42ff, 53ff, 68ff. 20 Institutes of Justinian, 3.22.1-3; Sohm (2011), p. 404.

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purpose of formalism and ritualism was in Roman law and how form interacted with consent to shape a law inherently reticent to self-agency. Likewise, the excessive formalism featuring these undertakings raises questions about whether ritualism originated the need for new, less formal contracts redounding to the development of a taxonomy pandering more to phenomenal will—the ability for individuals to make laws for themselves—and how, or whether the development of the taxonomy was essentially contingent or inevitable. These questions are presently discussed in turn.

2.2.1

Formalism and Consent

Formalism denotes four things. First, an excessive abidance by unchanging prescribed forms. Second, a concern, even excessive, with form and technique rather than content and abstraction in contract formation. Third, the use of forms of worship irrespective of their inner significance. Finally, the grounding of law and the binding force of contract on moralistic divine law regardless of the intention of the parties and the consequences for them. In addition to these four strands, as Lon Luvois Fuller (1902–1978) rightly put it, formalism plays another three roles. First, an evidentiary function whereby form regulates the conduct of transacting parties and offers them protection by providing them with certain evidence of the terms of their agreement.21 Second, formalism plays a cautionary role whereby it induces parties not to take lightly the law that they are making for themselves. It warns them as to the consequences of the law that they are making for themselves and impresses upon them the sanction, often coercive, that would befall them should they not perform their obligation. Thereby, formalism and the forms that it embodies is a deterrent to ‘inconsiderate action’.22 Finally, formalism plays a channelling role, that is, the fulfilment of the forms required has the effect of providing long-lasting material evidence of the existence of the obligation, thus allowing its enforcement, even if the obligation has not yet been performed or is not yet due for performance.23 More so when witnesses attended the formation of the undertaking. Consistently, formalism, through its seven strands, guarantees the legal efficacy of an undertaking as one way of ensuring that transacting parties have entered into a contract, thus transforming a mere legal fact (negotium) into a legal act (instrumentum). In that way, formalism protects the parties against themselves and makes ‘apparent to [them], the consequences of [their] action’.24 Nexum and sponsio are not immune to these definitions. G.1.119, 2.27 sanction nexum as a form of mancipatio, a solemn Roman parole agreement by which

Fuller (1941) §2, p. 800. Fuller (1941) §3, p. 800. 23 Fuller (1941) §4, p. 801. 24 Fuller (1941) §5, p. 803. 21 22

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ownership of certain staple commodities, goods, or properties (e.g., cattle, slaves, horses) could be transferred (res mancipi). Mancipatio was a standard procedure by which wills could be drawn, children emancipated, people adopted, and suchlike.25 The Roman scholar Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 BCE) defined it as ‘omnes quod per aes et libram geritur, in quo sunt mancipia’, i.e., any transaction (contract) effected per aes et libram (with bronze and balance) with the object of creating an obligation.26 It echoes in G.1.119, 2.27; Lex (Rubria) de Gallia Cisalpina, and the Law of the Twelve Tables (Duodecim Tabulae), a legislation seminal to Roman law adopted in the 5th century BCE following the considerable agitation caused by the plebeians who had threatened to cause Rome to grind to a halt as a result of their exclusion from the higher benefits of the Roman Republic (510-27 BCE).27 Together they suggest that nexum was in the form of a sale agreement and an interest-bearing loan28 by which a defaulting debtor could enter human bondage.29 Its formation relied on strict material formalities. It required the gathering of at least five witnesses besides the parties,30 and a scale-bearer (libripens). The creditor had to convey a bronze ingot to the debtor (nexus). He had to pronounce a formulaic oath imposing upon the debtor the duty to repay the loan (damnatio). Philipp Eduard Huschke (1801-1886) suggests it took the form: quod ego tibi mille asses hoc aere aeneaque libra nexos dedi, eos tu mihi post annum cum fenore unciario dare damnas esto.31

The fulfilment of the formality made the contract. The lack of references to consent suggests that the Romans in the archaic era only concerned themselves with form and technique. The obligation originated in obligatory social practices sanctioned by law rather than private norms that parties could choose for themselves (consent).32 The lack of references to consent or the intention of the parties in the Twelve Tables indicates that form was the determinant of contract irrespective of the

25

Institutes of Gaius, I.115, 123, 134 et seq.; Forsythe (1996), p. 241. Titus Livius et al. (1962) VII.105. 27 Crawford, MH in Hornblower et al. (2012); Prichard (1964), p. 308; Lex Poetelia; Cairns and Plessis du (2010), p. 5. 28 Muirhead (2009), pp. 139ff. 29 Institutes of Gaius, I.115, 123, and 134 et seq.; Hasselt (van) (1824), pp. 60ff; Gellius (1927) 20.1.45 et seq.; Titus Livius et al. (1962) VIII.28; Lex Gall. Cisalp. 21, 22. See also Institutes of Justinian, 2.14.5, 2.18; Digest, 5.2.2; Biscardi (1992), pp. 187ff; Girard (1929), pp. 465, 510; Lepointe and Monier (1954), p. 47; Abdelrahim Abdalla (1974) 37; Buckland and Stein (1966), p. 619; Wenger (1955), p. 227. See also Senn (1905). 30 Institutes of Gaius, I.119. 31 Huschke (2018) 1.846, [my own translation]: ‘I have loaned a thousand asses to my debtor who is bound by the bronze and scale to repay them to me within a year with interests’. 32 Fiori, R in McGinn (2012), p. 40, note 1. 26

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intention of the parties.33 Hence, defects of consent had presumably no effect on the validity of the undertaking if the formalities had been fulfilled.34 This excessive adherence to form and technique also underlies sponsio sanctioned under G.3.93, 97; I. 3.15. Pr; I. 3.19.2; D.45.1.1. Pr, 50.16.7. They define it as a bilateral promise by which each party undertakes to perform an obligation. Like nexum, its formation relied on the meticulous performance of a strict formality: the utterance of unchanging, specific words. Otherwise, no obligation could arise.35 It is clear from I.3.15.1, which provides that only promises following certain words and their declensions were habitually sanctioned: spondeo (swear), promitto (promise), fideipromitto (pledge), dabo (warrant), and faciam (do or forbear).36 The fulfilment of the formality, i.e., a question-and-answer formed on the pattern dabis? Dabo (do you convey, I convey), made the contract.37 While the particular formality of sponsio is more straightforward than that of nexum, it was as strict as the latter to such an extent that the deaf and mute (and distant parties)38 could not use it to create legal relations given their mutism or deafness.39 D.3.15.1 provides the reason: the question-and-answer had to match exactly when superimposed. More, the parties had to be able to understand each other. Though, the phraseology of D.3.15.1 indicates that until the adoption of the Constitutio of Leo, there was no requirement for the parties to agree on the same thing. All that mattered was that the agreement was expressed materially in a form prescribed by law. For nexum, the intention of the parties was irrelevant if the required formality had been performed. Hence, the Romans’ fondness for form and technique was irrational and inauspicious of an informal system where every agreement arising from consent could be a contract because the parties chose it for themselves.40 It does not mean that the forms and techniques on which nexum and sponsio relied were completely devoid of sense. Au contraire, several commendable qualities can be attributed to them. First, regarding nexum, G.1.122 provides that the reason for a bronze ingot and weighing scales is that bronze was the only metal used in the ancient currency. Nexum consisting in a loan agreement, the use of weighing scales and bronze strike as (possible) material totems of the conditions going to the very root of the contract breach of which entitled the creditor to seek judicial redress. It is telling of the

33

Rosini (1685), p. 594. Litvinoff (1989), p. 7. 35 Institutes of Gaius, 3.93, 179. 36 Institutes of Justinian, 3.15.1. 37 Institutes of Gaius, 3.92. Compare to Codex, 8.37.10; Digest 19.2.54 Pr; Digest, 45.1.38.24 contra Digest, 45.1.2. 38 Girard (1929), p. 519. 39 Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.7. 40 Karlowa (1885), pp. 363–381; Guimarães Taborda (2001), pp. 165ff; Jhering (von) (1880), p. 154. 34

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inability of archaic Roman law to abstract the terms and conditions of contract.41 It may explain why the creditor further had to strike the scales with the bronze ingot according to G.1.119, perhaps to ascertain its purity, while claiming the subjectmatter of the agreement as their property in the form: hunc ego hominem ex iure quiritium meum esse aio isque mihi emptus esto hoc aere aeneaque libra.42

Hence the fulfilment of the formality made the contract. It was, undoubtedly, the public assertion of a right. It captured all the significant and relevant aspects of the undertaking: mutual assent to the terms, the amount of interest to be paid, performance, and termination according to the same process effectuated this time in reverse by the debtor during a ceremony known as nuncupatio.43 Accordingly, the conveyancing of the subject-matter of the undertaking or a token thing accompanied by damnatio resembled a plight of troth by oath. It made the contract. Unquestionably, these cumbersome formalities had no purpose other than to guarantee legal certainty and find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of an obligation and sanction it, thus drawing the attention of the parties to the seriousness of the law that they wished to make for themselves.44 It explains the requirement for at least five witnesses representing the whole populus to be present during the formation of the undertaking. French legal sociologists provide another explanation by which community-centric societies—such as archaic Rome where obligations arose out of social life—observed sociolegal conventions rigidly because properties and the subject-matter of undertakings were communalized and bore the imprint of the polity.45 So much is illustrated by D.50.16, 115, 181 where Ulpian and Javolenus explain that ‘property’ in Roman law has a broader meaning than that of ‘money’. It entails things which one owns although they are not embraced in their patrimony.46 Thus, the intervention of third parties in the contracting process highlights further that the formal Roman contracts did not derive their binding force from consent, but from the mechanism responsible for creating an obligation: the fulfilment of stringent formalities. However, it does not mean that consent was utterly irrelevant. It is clear from I.3.19.19 and D.2.14.1.3. They provide that a person may only undertake engagements for themselves if they assent to the terms.47 At most, it means that while consent was an essential feature of contract,48 it was insufficient to complete it 41

Buckler (1895), p. 22; Speake (1994), pp. 392, 436; MacCormack (1969a), pp. 439–468. Institutes of Gaius, 1.119, [my own translation] ‘In accordance with the law of the Quirites which applies to me: I declare that this man belongs to me by my right as a Roman citizen and let him be purchased by me with this piece of bronze and scale’; Varro, L.163 (raudusculo libram ferito). 43 Duodecim Tabulae, 6.1; Liv. 8,9,8; Varro (1938) 6.60 and 7.8. 44 Mousourakis (2015), p. 30. 45 Meulders-Klein (1993), p. 165; Magdelain, A in École Française de Rome (1990), pp. 739ff. 46 Digest, 50.16.5 together with Digest, 50.16.115 and 181. 47 Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.19; Digest, 2.14.1.3 contra Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.20; Digest, 45.1.38.17 and Digest, 45.1.38.20; Institutes of Justinian, 2.9.5; Plessis (du) (2005), p. 267. 48 Institutes of Gaius, 3.93; Digest, 45.1.16 Pr. 42

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according to the rule nudum pactum actio non oritur (nulla nascitur actio) contained in the Digest.49 It emphasises further that the performance of the formalities was not tantamount to expressing an intention to create legal relations—a vital characteristic of the consensual system.50 Rather, their fulfilment was the final cause of undertakings: the reason a party was under obligation. In addition to the material forms discussed above, the enforceability of ‘contract’ in ancient Rome seems to have depended further on the fulfilment of consonant, unnecessary formalities to affirm its binding force: religion and magic. It suggests that while the material form made the contract, its enforceability relied on something other transcending it. It means that formation and enforceability were disjunct. Put differently, the fact that a contract is formed does not presume that it is enforceable. Foedus, a treaty or compact that ancient Rome contracted with one or more allied states to establish permanent friendly relations, illustrates so much.51 Liv.1.24 and Lex de imperio Vespasiani suggest that it took the form of sponsio, an agreement between parties under the protection of the gods as their witness.52 It is indicative of the religious origin of sponsio whose enforceability often depended additionally on the completion of a ritual or sacrifice, Cicero averred.53 The import of this ritualism must be studied in turn, especially in light of its interaction with consent.

2.2.2

Ritualism and Consent

Many authors, both ancient54 and modern55, have hinted at the Romans’ regular and excessive observance and practice of religious rituals, especially without regard to their function (e.g., formulaic oaths, sacrifices, and suchlike). Cicero (106-43 BCE), for instance, relates the occurrence of sacrifice in connection with sponsio; 49

Paul (2020) 2.14.1 and Ulpian in Digest, 2.14.7.4. Piedelièvre (1959), p. 132. 51 Digest, 49.15.7.1. 52 Livy (2012) 1.24: ‘“Audi” inquit, “Iuppiter; audi, pater patrate populi Albani; audi tu, populus Albanus. Ut illa palam prima postrema ex illis tabulis cerave recitata sunt sine dolo malo, utique ea hic hodie rectissime intellecta sunt, illis legibus populus Romanus prior non deficiet. Si prior defexit publico consilio dolo malo, tum ille Diespiter populum Romanum sic ferito ut ego hunc porcum hic hodie feriam; tantoque magis ferito quanto magis potes pollesque”’ [emphasis added]; Lex de imperio Vespasiani in Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, VI.930: ‘Utique quaecumque ex usu rei publicae maiestate divinarum, humanarum, publicarum privatarumque rerum esse censebit, ei agere facere ius potestasque sit, ita ut Divo Augusto, Tiberio Iulio Caesari Augusto, Tiberioque Claudio Caesari Augusto Germanico fuit’ [emphasis added]. 53 Cicero (2021) II.30. 54 Cicero (2021) 2.30; Livy (2012) 1.13; Aen (ad), S (1471) VII/710; Cicero (2021) 11.7.13; Frezza (1938), pp. 386ff; Westrup (1947), p. 14; Aboucaya (1959), p. 277. 55 Fargues (1913), pp. 255–270; Rouland (1995) at [164], pp. 275–276; Perrot (2010), p. 283; Mauss (2007), p. 151; Humbert (1993), p. 40. See also Buckland, WW in Kaser et al. (1939), pp. 16–28; Weber (1922), p. 429. 50

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something the Roman emperor Trajan Decius (c. 249-251 AD) later performed in Caudium during the war against the Samnites to ensure the victory of Rome.56 So too did Livy (BCE 59-17 AD) in Ab Urbe Condita where he relates the performance of such practices and the influence of religio on the law.57 It prompted the Romans to observe the traditional cultus scrupulously, strictly. It imparted them with moral duties to keep their word, whether in a secular or mundane context without care for the function of the ritual. The performance of the ritual assigned binding force to the obligation like magic.58 Hence, many modern and contemporary writers argue that religion made formal Roman contracts have the desired effect. Whether it is Elizabeth A Meyer (19-),59 Max Kaser (1906–1997),60 August von Bechmann (1849-1945),61 Wolfgang Stintzing (1856–1921),62 or Axel Hägerström (1868–1939),63 to cite but a few, all concur that legal institutions in archaic Rome were steeped in ritualism and ceremonialism. It had supernatural features enabling acts arising out of social life to have the desired legal effect. Consequently, the contracting process transformed into a fictitious play-act whereby unrevealed forces were set in motion to give legal effect to a written or spoken agreement, especially one concerning the transfer of real rights.64 Plutarch (ca. 46-127 AD) even asserted in his jurisprudentia that while the Romans were averse to human sacrifice, which they deemed barbarous and ungodly, they, nevertheless, performed it sometimes to appease the gods in connection with legal obligations.65 Thus, consent did not make the contract. The performance of the required material formality coupled with religion made it. However, despite the occurrences of ritualism and ceremonialism in foedus and sponsio, there is no evidence in the Corpus Iuris Civilis and Gai Institutiones to assert that ritualism occurred as regularly or generally as some modern and contemporary writers have suggested. The section of Justinian’s Institutes dedicated to verbal obligations does not refer to ritualism or ceremonialism.66 Neither does

56

Cicero (2021) II.30, 91; Cuenot (1893), p. 326; Halm, FH in Rüpke (2007), pp. 241–242. Livy, 9.5.4. 58 Livy, 8.9.5-14. Compare to Alleau and Bastide (2001). 59 Meyer (2004), pp. 10ff. 60 Kaser (1971), pp. 27, 36–41, 45. See also Bretone (1991), p. 90; Watson (1995), p. 33; Wieacker (1892), p. 316. 61 Bechmann (von) (1876), pp. 47–48. 62 Stintzing (1904), p. 3–5. 63 Hägerström (1927), pp. 35–41. 64 Institutes of Gaius, 3.87. Compare to Jhering (von) (1880), pp. 533, 537–538; Wieacker (1892), pp. 326–335. 65 Plutarch (1936) 83 [283f-84c]). 66 Institutes of Justinian, 3.15. 57

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G.3.92 et seq.67 Likewise, G.1.119, 2.14a-22 regarding mancipatio or nexum.68 It suggests that the practice of rituals to make contracts binding was piecemeal and that the influence of religion on the law was stemmed or controlled. It is especially true since Gaius distinguishes between law and religion in his Institutes. Notably, in the book dedicated to the law of persons, he argues that Roman law distinguishes between things that are subject to religion (i.e., things consecrated to the gods above)69 and things subject to private dominion (i.e., all other things).70 It means that the role of religion was limited. Likewise, it mitigates the assertions of the critics of the influence of religion on the law in archaic Rome foremost amongst whom are Alan Watson (1933–2018),71 Geoffrey MacCormack (1937),72 and Karl Olivercrona (1897–1980)73 to cite but a few. To them, religion did not influence law whatsoever. However, judging by the narratives of the Roman chroniclers of the time, there is no doubt on the influence that religion sometimes had on the determination of the binding force of a legal act. Though, against the Corpus Iuris Civilis and Gai Institutiones, there is evidence to suggest that this influence was unusual and has been overemphasised.74 Thus, what made the contract was not so much the fulfilment of whatever ceremony or ritual, but truly the fulfilment of the material formalities discussed above, whatever the intention of the parties. It seems they were the only thing assimilable to a norm perhaps not because they were desirable, but because they were the only thing capable of justifying the legal bond in the mind of Roman jurists. Consequently, consent alone was insufficient to make or justify the enforceability of a contract. Hence, the emergence of less formal or informal contracts was contingent. That consent could make and justify the enforceability of a contract was not obvious. Therefore, an extraneous element or combination of factors must have caused it. Judging by I.3.15.1 in fine, something happened around the time of the adoption of the Constitutio of Leo. Its wording suggests that since then, Roman law allowed parties to depart from the strict formalism characteristic of sponsio and employ whatever word they wished to contract while imposing on the parties a duty to ensure that they understand each other.75 It suggests that the context surrounding the 67

Institutes of Gaius, 3.92 et seq. Institutes of Gaius, 1.119 and Institutes of Gaius, 1.119.2.14a-22. 69 Institutes of Gaius, 2.4. 70 Institutes of Gaius, 2.1. 71 Watson (1975), pp. 6ff and the authorities cited. Compare to Watson (1992), pp. 21–29 and the references cited. 72 MacCormack (1969a), pp. 452–453. See also MacCormack (1969b), pp. 153–167. 73 Olivercrona (1938), p. 1. 74 Kunkel (1929), pp. 479–490. See also Thormann (1943), pp. 52–54; Lübtow (von) (1936), p. 249; Macqueron (1971), pp. 39, 68ff; Forsythe and Connelly (2005), p. 215; Patault (1989), pp. 199–215; Ourliac and Malafosse (de) (1957), pp. 30–31; Jansen and Zimmermann (1952), p. 290; Sohm et al. (2011), p. 26; Lévy-Bruhl (1947), p. 123; Humbert (1993), p. 41; Forray (2007), pp. 30 et seq. 75 Institutes of Justinian, 3.15.1. 68

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Constitutio of Leo was the breeding ground for the development of new, informal contracts, and the development of a spontaneous taxonomy of contract distinguishing between agreements completed by consent and agreements completed by form. It is explored in turn.

2.2.3

Roman Quasi-Informal and Informal Contracts, and Form

Undeniably, the emergence of quasi-informal and informal contracts in Rome occurred around the time of the adoption of the Constitutio of Leo VI (468 AD). I.3.15.1 provides that following the enactment of Leo VI’s constitution, Roman law no longer required from parties that they adhered to the strict forms featuring sponsio. By contrast, it allowed them to make laws for themselves by use of any word whatsoever. It then goes on to outline stipulatio, an informal contract relying on the mechanism of question-and-answer characteristic of sponsio. It suggests that the Constitutio of Leo established stipulatio as the catalyst through which Roman law became less formal and transformed form into a mere vehicle or support of consent while establishing consent as the determinant for contracting. But what was the Constitutio of Leo? The Constitutio of Leo and Anthemius was an imperial edict adopted by emperors Leo VI and Anthemius in 468 AD when the Western Roman Empire was already on the verge of collapse (see Fig. 2.1). It provided for general and permanent rules applicable throughout the Roman Empire. It occurred at a time when Rome had accomplished great military conquests. It had extended its political sphere around the Mediterranean following its victory against the Hellenes at the battle of Pydna in 168 BCE (see Fig. 2.2).76 From then on, Rome took over Alexander the Great’s legacy, thus shifting from a modest city-state to an intercontinental superpower. Thenceforth, the Roman led a different existence. Until Pydna, they had been the archetypical tough and intimidating people that gave itself little leisure and stood out by its discipline thanks to which it triumphed on the battlefields.77 Its victories against Carthage and the Antigonids exposed a new people. Rome discovered richness, opulence, decadence, different decors, gold, silver, and suchlike.78 It met 76

Forsythe (2005), pp. 369–370; Mommsen (1985), pp. 237ff; Matyszak (2004), p. 13; Oakley (1998), pp. 352–353; Seymour Conway (1897), pp. 289–299; Harmand (1993), p. 66; Décret (1977), pp. 174–175, 178; Combet Farnoux (1962), p. 56; Le Bohec (2001), p. 116; Dunbar Chaplin (2000), p. 66; Astbury Brunt (1971), p. 54; Davis (1999), p. 5. 77 Adkins and Adkins (1998), pp. 62ff, 79ff, 105ff, 252: ‘Virtue, Victory, Discipline and Fortune’, 281, and 347. For additional manuals on life in Ancient Rome see: Casson (1998); Harvey (2016); Dillon and Garland (2005). 78 Callataÿ (de) (2005), pp. 361–372; Scheidel and Friesen (2006), pp. 62–63; Bang (2009), pp. 194–206.

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Fig. 2.1 The Western Roman Empire under the regin of Emperor Majorian (The image was created by Tataryn and is sourced at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MajorianEmpire.png under the following licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en)

civilisations whose way of life it had ignored hitherto. It discovered the legacy that the conquered Hellenistic kingdoms of Alexander the Great had bequeathed to the world. It discovered virtues unknown to it heretofore,79 especially universalism and cosmopolitanism (see Fig. 2.3).80

79 80

Vernon Arnold (1911), pp. 3ff. Plessis (du) (2013), pp. 73ff.

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Fig. 2.2 Les États autour de la Méditerranée en 168 av. J.C. après la bataille de Pydna (The image was created by Moi934 and is sourced at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:La_ méditerranée_en_-168_après_Pydna.jpg under the following licence: https://creativecommons. org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en)

The emergence of stipulatio in this context means that even only through its conquests, Rome opened to the world and had to break out the cycle of ignorance and obscurantism, and seek to develop a new and more ambitious law transcending the law of the City81 hitherto only applicable to Roman citizens.82 It is, therefore, essential to examine in light of this how the context surrounding the emergence of stipulatio induced the erosion of form, contributed to the emergence of new means of contracting, and how or by whom this change occurred.

Lex Aebutia de formulis (150 BCE); Lex de Gallia Cisalpina (BCE 49 – 42) Caput XXII, 31; Lex Irnitana (AD 51–96) LXXIX, 50; LXXXIII,48; Lex Iulia iudiciorum privatorum (AD 17); Lex Poetelia (326 BCE); Hawk (2015), p. 143. 82 Digest, 1.1. Compare to Chevreau, E in Dubouloz et al. (2014), pp. 305–320. 81

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Fig. 2.3 The territory controlled by the Western Roman Imperial court following the nominal division of the Roman Empire after the death of Emperor Theodosius I in A.D. 395 (The image was created by Ichthyovenator and is sourced at https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Roman_ Empire#/media/File:Western_Roman_Empire_395_Tribes.png under the following licence: https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)

2.2.4

Stipulatio and the Erosion of Form

I.3.15.2 provides that stipulatio was an act inter praesentes adaptable to every situation by which parties could organise social and economic relations.83 It came in the form of a question-and-answer such as ‘quinque aureos dare spondes’? It also provides that unlike sponsio, the performance of the obligation could be postponed, and the obligation could be pure and perfect, or conditional. It destroyed the Roman

83

Codex, 8.37.14; Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.12.

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abidance by unreasoning forms. It deemphasised form over consent, trust, and reliance by enabling parties to employ whatever word they pleased so long as they understood each other and agreed into the same.84 It establishes agreement as the determinant for contracting so long as it is expressed in a form recognised by law. The wording of I.3.15.1-2 suggests that stipulatio truly motivated the substitution of a consensual system for a system where the alienation of defecting individuals through injurious sanctions was paramount (formalism). It was the harbinger of the penetration of good faith into Roman law as it inaugurated the sanction of defects in consent by requiring that parties ensure that they agree into the same and act in good faith.85 Consequently, stipulatio was countercurrent to the formal Roman contracts discussed above. It did not require the presence of witnesses or the fulfilment of any material formality, two safeguards to legal certainty. By contrast, it only required the performance of an immaterial, intangible formality: conventio (agreement into the same).86 That is not counting on the correlative return of the Romans to their old habits. Indeed, while I.3.15 suggests that stipulatio was adaptable to every situation and required only conventio, an immaterial formality requiring only that the parties understand each other and agree into the same, D.2.14.7.12, D.45.1.30, D.45.2.11.1, and G.3.1.34 suggest that by 140 AD, the Romans had returned to their old demons and brought back the fulfilment of material formalities to the fore.87 Modern and contemporary authors such as Peter Birks (1941–2004) suggest that they mark the degeneration of stipulatio into a written contract.88 However, their jurisprudence is inconsistent with the letter of I.3.15 et seq. It provides that stipulatio was a purely oral contract requiring only the performance of an immaterial formality: agreement into the same in the form of a question-and-answer. Consequently, the resort to writing that D.14.7.12, D.45.1.30, D.45.2.11.1, and G.3.1.34 underlie appears to have been nothing more than a practical, rational formality fulfilling only an evidentiary purpose. G.3.134 supports this. It provides that a promise can be evidenced by writing (cautio). Put differently, writing is extraordinarily compelling evidence of stipulatio, but it does not make the contract. It means two things. First, it translates a rapprochement between Roman law and Greek law which only acknowledged written obligations and from which Gaius transplanted the words chirografis and syngraphis used to refer to the use of writing, 84

Institutes of Gaius, 4.17a; (Ulpian) Digest, 45.1.1. Digest, 4.3.1.2 and 44.4.4.33; Digest, 4.2.3.1, 4.2.5-6, and 44.4.4.33. 86 Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.7; Digest, 45.1; Codex, 8.37.10; Institutes of Gaius, 3.93, 103, 113, and 179. 87 See also Cicero (1987–1988) 2.1; Codex, 8.37.10; Institutes of Justinian, 3.15.1; Constitutio Leo, 3.15; Cicero (1983) 26.96. Compare to Lévy and Castaldo (2002), pp. 664; Institutes of Gaius, 3.131-132, 134. 88 Zimmermann (1996), pp. 79–93; Birks and Descheemaeker (2014), pp. 30ff, 38ff; 52ff; Cardilli (1995), pp. 135ff; Fiori, R in Plessis (du) et al. (2016), pp. 587ff; Cicero (1987–1988) 2.1; Cicero (1983) 26.96. Compare to Lévy and Castaldo (2002), p. 664. 85

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especially between peregrines (i.e., foreigners, non-Romans).89 Second, it bears witness of the ability of form and consent to exist in harmony despite different ideologies. It further suggests that the emergence of the idea by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract did not stem from the opposition between form and consent or the rejection of form. Rather, it arose from the transformation of the forms of Roman law and their adaptation to the needs of the time. It also means that form and consent are not mutually exclusive. They can contribute extra features to each other. The material form is a pledge of legal certainty. It ensures the enforceability of consent.90 By contrast, the immaterial form, conventio, makes consent the determinant for contracting. It contributes to the minimisation of the form so that contract is based on the identification of consent in whatever form that it may be expressed rather than on the identification of a preliminary formality. Thus, stipulatio motivated the adaptation of the Roman strict forms while introducing ideas of good faith in contract. It introduced pragmatism, flexibility, and adaptability. It helped move Roman law away from a form-heavy system to a formlight one. However, it did not forgo the general requirement for consent to be externalised in a tangible form. It only accommodated with the archaic forms and adapted them. It highlights a summa divisio by which contracts are either extremely formal91 or informal without questioning the need for form. Hence, however light, form in classical Roman law was simultaneously a condition of validity and enforceability of contracts. A contract, in the Roman sense, was primarily a convention concluded according to a particular form required or acknowledged by law. Otherwise, it could not produce the desired legal effects.92 There is a need to examine what the adaptation of form meant and implied vis-à-vis the other types of contracts that Roman law acknowledged besides nexum, sponsio, and stipulatio.

2.2.5

Adaptation of the Roman Contractual Forms

The Roman real contracts are another telltale of the adaptation of form in Roman law and its transformation into an agency of consent. They concern four types of contracts or contrahere, i.e., mutuum, fiducia and pignus, depositum, and 89

Institutes of Gaius, 3.134. Weinrib (1988), p. 956; Bechmann (von) (1876), p. 54. See also Duodecim Tabulae, 6.1: ‘cum faciet nexum mancipumque, uti lingua nuncupassit, ita esto’; Duodecim Tabulae, 3.6; Gellius (1927) 20.1.48–52; Institutes of Gaius, 4.12–29; Institutes of Gaius 4.21. 91 For instance, Nexum (Muirhead 2009, pp. 139ff); Mancipatio (Berger 1991, p. 678); Acts per aes et libram (Prichard 1964, p. 316); Sponsio (Birks and Descheemaeker (2014), pp. 53ff: ‘[. . .] “dari spondes?” “Spondeo” (Do you warrant to convey? I do warrant). “Dabis?” “Dabo” (Will you convey? I will convey) [. . .]’); Gestures (McGinn 2015, pp. 253ff). 92 Descheemaeker (2009), pp. 51–52 contra Prévost (2015), p. 143; Esmein (1880), p. 659; Alibert et al. (1842), p. 273; Lepointe and Monier (1954), p. 231; Deroussin (2007), p. 135. 90

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commodatum. Mutuum was a loan agreement sanctioned under G.3.90.93 Fiducia was a sale contract sanctioned under G.2.60 in the form of mancipatio. It was paired with a promise that the purchaser should sell the property back upon the fulfilment of the terms.94 Depositum was a deposit for safekeeping sanctioned under I.3.14(15).95 Pignus was a pledge sanctioned under D.50.16.238. It was used as a form of real security which transferred possession but not ownership. Finally, commodatum was a loan for use sanctioned under G.4.47, D.13.6, and I.3.14.2. The decisive element of the obligation in each instance was the transfer of the thing. It made the contract whether it was a token thing or the subject-matter of the obligation. While form remained strict, the fact is that, unlike nexum, the form of the aforementioned real contracts was considerably mitigated. The provisions governing them only require the transfer of a thing without any need for additional formalities such as a need to gather witnesses, a scale-bearer, weighing scales, a bronze ingot, and the need to strike the scales with the ingot.96 Gaius justified the requisite of scales regarding nexum by the fact that the value of the subject-matter was measured by weight and not by tale.97 The development of Roman coinage in the third century BCE and its circulation at tale might explain why the formality of weighing the subject-matter also became quaint, especially since the nominal value of the subjectmatter could be expressed directly in coins of the realm.98 It suggests that something radical happened in Roman law already in the third century BCE even before the Constitutio of Leo. It means that the requisite of form was adapted successively since at least the third century BCE to meet rational, pragmatic, utilitarian needs rather than being dictated by unreasoning behaviours and excessive adherence to prescribed forms irrespective of their inner significance. The following rationalisation of form, perhaps enticed by successive conquests and expansions, was, undeniably, another blow to the strict and excessive forms of nexum and sponsio. Simultaneously, form became a means of identifying the intention of the parties to create legal relations. It was the cause of the obligation but no longer a condition precedent. Put differently, the transfer of the thing was the reason the debtor had to make restitution, but the contract was formed as soon as the parties agreed. D.12.1.2 suggests this. The use of the Latin indicative present by which ‘mutuum damus receptum non eandem speciem quam dedimus’99 suggests that the contract was formed as soon as the parties agreed, albeit the thing had not yet been transferred.

93

See also Institutes of Justinian, 3.14; Digest, 12.1. De rebus creditis; and Codex, 4.1. See also Institutes of Gaius, 3.201. 95 See also Codex, 4.34; Digest, 16.3; Cicero (1990) 1.10 and 13.3. 96 Institutes of Gaius, 1.119. 97 In economics, the word tale denotes public acceptance of money for its face value. Money is said to be debased and to circulate at tale when its value no longer depends on its content of fine gold or silver but depends instead on its face value. 98 Buttrey (1961), pp. 40–45. 99 Digest, 12.1.2. 94

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In such a case, the rights of the parties relied on the good faith of the other, their assent to a thing.100 The same is true of fiducia, depositum, pignus, and commodatum for which consent only became actionable once the transfer of the thing occurred but was theoretically enough to form a contract once given judging by the wording of the provisions governing them.101 The mention of good faith in the Digest to sanction these undertakings highlights the primacy or ascendancy of consent over form.102 It entailed not only the coercion of a party to fulfil their undertaking once they had agreed to do something such as return a deposit in exchange for something, but also the sanction of defects in consent which rendered the undertaking null and void.103 A similar rationalisation and simplification of form can be observed regarding another unparalleled contract, expensilatio. Expensilatio was the only instance of contract formed by writing referred to in Gaius’ taxonomy.104 G.3.131 provides that it was an actual money loan recorded in a codex (ledger). It required the consent of the party under obligation undoubtedly to prevent a person from becoming a creditor on their own initiative. The record of the fictitious capital flow allowed three things. First, the transformation of existing debt into a new debt either by substitution or novation of a new debtor (transcriptitia a persona in personam).105 Second, the novation of the cause of an obligation (transcriptitia a re in personam).106 Finally, the recording of new debt.107 Cicero and Seneca suggest that what made the contract was the recording of the debt in the ledger.108 However, their jurisprudence must be dismissed in the light of G.3.131. It provides very clearly that expensilatio was formed re, not litteris. The simplicity of its formation and the evidentiary role of writing109 further attest to the adaptation of forms, their simplification, and rationalisation alike the Roman real contracts.

100

Digest, 12.1.1. Institutes of Gaius, 2.60; Digest 12.1 et seq., Digest, 13.7 et seq.; Institutes of Gaius, 4.47; Digest, 13.6; Institutes of Justinian, 3.14.2. 102 Digest, 12.1. 103 See, for instance, Digest, 41.1.35 (Ulp 7 disp); ‘Si procurator meus vel tutor pupilli rem suam quasi meam vel pupilli alii tradiderit, non recessit ab eis dominium et nulla est alienatio, quia nemo errans rem suam amittit’ [emphasis added]. Compare to Digest, 41.1.36; Digest, 18.1.41.1: ‘Mensam argento coopertam mihi ignoranti pro solida vendidisti imprudens: nulla est emptio pecuniaque eo nomine data condicetur’ [emphasis added]. See also Digest, 18.1.57 Pr; Digest, 2.14.7.7. See also, Digest, 12.5.3; Digest, 12.6.1.1; Digest, 12.6.26.9; Digest, 24.1.39.10-11; Digest, 24.1.5.18; Digest, 4.2; Digest, 4.3.1.1; Cicero (ca. 44 BCE, London:1990) 3.24.92. 104 Institutes of Gaius, 3.89. 105 Institutes of Gaius, 3.30. 106 Institutes of Gaius, 3.129. 107 Institutes of Gaius, 2.127-30; Digest, 46.2.11. 108 Cicero (2021) 1.36, 92; 39.102; Seneca (1935) 3.15. 109 Cicero (48 BCE, Zelk: 1983) 26.96; Jolowicz and Nicholas (1972), pp. 414ff; Kaser (1960), pp. 230ff, 71–89, 414; Zweigert et al. (1996), pp. 53ff; Windscheid and Kipp (1887) §372; Joubert (1981) no293. 101

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Incidentally, Ulpian’s assertion in the Digest by which mutuum relied on the praetor’s insertion of good faith into Roman procedure further suggests that the adaptation of forms and their simplification was the praetor’s work. It emphasises the role of good faith and implies a procedural change by which consent could be a source of obligation if it were expressed in a tangible form recognised by law. This procedural change is explored in turn.

2.2.6

Procedural Reform and Primacy of Consent

The introduction of good faith in Roman procedure was a momentous change in Roman law in the light of D.12.1.1. It provides that the praetor reformed Roman procedure to allow the sanction of consent and the phenomenal will of parties, i.e., their ability to make laws for themselves freely without government intervention. Besides the five real contracts discussed above, I.4.6.28 et seq. and D.2.14 provide that the insertion of good faith through a condictio ex fide bona concerned the four consensual contracts previously mentioned above but also innominate contracts and pacts. I.4.6 and D.2.14 provide that the insertion of good faith by the praetor in Roman procedure helped reinforce the terms of these contracts. They provide that the praetor had the broadest discretion to assign legal effects to factual situations according to natural equity and justice (bonum et aequum).110 It featured the praetor’s effort to democratise Roman law and allow Roman and non-Roman citizens alike to rely on it to exercise their rights, thus protecting the reasonable expectation of parties to a contract whatever their status.111 The strong emphasis on good faith in the Digest about these contracts seems to stem from their nature. They are all synallagmatic, commutative contracts.112 Put differently, each party obliged themselves to undertake a conduct or action considered to be equivalent to what was transferred to them or what was done for them regardless of whether the equivalent was a chance of gain or loss depending on an uncertain event.113 The obligations of the parties were causes for each other. However, all these contracts were not subject to the same degree of informality. Let us start by looking at pacta. D.2.14.2-3 define them as an agreement, i.e., the consent of two or more people to undertake a conduct or act. It relies on conventio which Pedius defined as a requirement for agreement so general that there is no undertaking that does not 110

Digest, 2.14.1.1 and 7.2, Institutes of Justinian, 4.6, especially 20 but also Digest, 4.4.24.1 and Digest, 4.5.8. 111 Digest, 1.1.7.1: ‘[ius] praetorium est, quod praetores introduxerunt adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis gratia propter utilitatem publicam. Quod et honorarium dicitur ad honorem praetorum sic nominatum’. 112 Digest, 2.14.7; Digest, 13.5.1; Saxoferrato (de) (1577): ‘Ex contractu ultro citroque obligatorio non potest effectualiter agi nisi ab eo qui totum contractum ex parte sua impleverit’. 113 Institutes of Justinian.3.22 et seq.; Digest, 19.5.5.

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include it whether it has a name of its own or none.114 The praetor sanctioned them with an exceptio conventi according to good faith.115 Its specificity lies in the fact that the praetor focussed on identifying consent and its expression whatever its form. D.2.14 defines two kinds of pacta. First, pacta legitima enforced by statute or decree of the senate.116 Second, pacta praetoria, i.e., those that the praetor chose to enforce.117 They are the most interesting. They concerned four types of agreements. First, pacta adiecta.118 Second, promissory pacts.119 Third, pacta constituta.120 Finally, recepta.121 Pacta adiecta were in the form of a conventio by which contracting parties could change the effects of an existing obligation of good faith. D.2.14.7.14 et seq. provide that they consisted either in the supplementation of a previous undertaking (ad augendam obligationem) or the reduction of the scope of an existing obligation of good faith (ad minuendam obligationem).122 D.2.14.7 further adds that their validity depended on their concomitance (in continenti) or non-concurrency (ex intervallo) with the conclusion of the prior engagement of good faith that supported them.123 D.2.17.7.5 is clear that no action can be fixed on a nudum pactum. Thus, pacta could only be sanctioned by an exceptio; that is, the defendant could only raise them as a defence. It suggests that good faith in Roman law was not an active or creative instrument of rights. However, merely a defence allowing the unravelling of agreements that were either negotiated, formed, or performed in a way that fell afoul of accepted standards of morality and equity. It further shows that the insertion of good faith in contract by the praetor did not contradict the Roman principle that Paul’s Sententiae 2.14.1 and D.2.14.7.4 embodied by which ‘ex nudo pacto inter cives Romanus actio non nascitur’ or ‘nuda obligationem non parit’. Still, although an exceptio sanctioned pacta, their praetorian sanction was tantamount to sanctioning the nudum pactum directly as if it were a contract. It is even more justified since the praetor decided under D.2.14.7.7 that pacta conventa servabo. It is not only indicative of the ability of the praetor to shape and develop Roman law but also of a general regression of formalism in favour of the sanction of conventio provided it is caused (i.e., justified by the commutative nature of the undertaking and underpinned by good faith). The same is true of the other types of

114

Compare to Digest, 2.14.1.3. Digest, 2.14.2, 5, 6, and 10. 116 Digest, 2.14.6. 117 Digest, 2.13.1, Digest 2.14.14. 118 (Ulpianus) Digest, 2.14.5. 119 Digest, 2.14.16. 120 Digest, 2.14.7. 121 Digest, 4.8.13.2; Digest, 15.5; Codex, 4.18. 122 Digest, 2.14.7.5–7; Codex, 2.3.24; Digest, 2.14.5, (Tit. XIX De Pactis, XXXIX). 123 Digest, 2.14.7.5. 115

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pacta mentioned above.124 The consequence of this procedural change initiated by the praetor is that while the principle remained that ex nudo pacto nulla nascitur actio, the praetor opened the rift for the sanction of factual situations, thus highlighting conventio as a possible cause for the enforcement of obligations arising from consent. Though, the sanction of these classes of contract by an exceptio indicates that the sanction of consent as a source of obligations was marginal. This specificity of Roman law re the reflection of the praetor on the cause of the obligation and the mitigation of the strict formalism of Roman law can also be sensed in the sanction of quasi-contracts, innominate contracts, and consensual contracts. Gaius defined quasi-contracts as obligations arising neither from contract nor from delict.125 It concerns obligations arising from other causes by operation of law (variae causarum figurae).126 I.3.27 presents them as negotiorum gestio (intervention into another’s affairs), tutela (guardianship), fiducia (trust), and communio incidens (involuntary common ownership). They are all subject to further precisions and clarifications in the Digest.127 I.3.27 provides that they were systematically in the form of a party undertaking an action or receiving something for another— without agreement between them and that other person—with the right for them to hold that other person under obligation to compensate them for their loss according to good faith.128 Alike, I.3.27 provides that these quasi-contracts arose from social life and were informal while being involuntary.129 About them, D.44.7.1.1 says that the obligation arose from words or by consent. It does not mention any need for form so that agreement is enough to action the obligation. Nonetheless, D.44.7.1.2 et seq. specifies that the identification of contract is to be made according to the characterisation of the facts surrounding the case (in factum) whose enforceability depends on good faith, equity, and intention. It is clear from D.44.7.3.1. It provides that in the case of an agreement akin to a loan agreement, the obligation is not merely contracted because the money was transferred, but more so provided it had been transferred and received with the intention that it would be binding. Thus, formalism was undercut while consent and intention became prevalent. It means that the sanction of quasi-contracts relied on the analogy between a factual situation and existing categories of contract, although there was no contract.130

124

Digest, 12.2.2 (iusiurandum voluntarium); Digest, 15.5 - (Ulpianus) Digest, 4.8.13.2 - (Paulus) Digest, 4.8.19.1 – Digest, 13.5; Codex, 4.18; Digest, 4.8; Digest, 9.4.3.1 (pacta constituta); Novella, 8 and Codex, 5.11.6 (pacta legitima). 125 Institutes of Gaius, 3.88-91; Digest, 44.7.1 Pr. 126 Digest, 44.7.1. 127 Digest, 3.5 et seq.; Digest, 2.6 et seq.; Digest, 17.1.39 et seq.; Digest, 4. 4.3 Pr). 128 Digest, 50.17.206. 129 Digest, 44.7.5 Pr, 3. 130 Institutes of Justinian, 3.27.

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While the obligation was involuntary and consistently negative, the sanction of quasi-contracts reveals two things. First, the disintegration of the strict Roman forms and the transition to a system where form is minimised, even inexistent. Second, their sanction outlines some thoughts on the cause of the obligation, the reason a negotium antecedens can be binding: good faith, commutativity, and natural equity. The same is true of innominate contracts. D.19.5 defines them as a situation on which existing and common actions cannot lie for it does not have a name already sanctioned by law. The Roman jurist Julius Paulus Prudentissimus (Paul) (160–230 AD) contends that for this, the Romans readily had recourse to an actio in factum, allowing the characterisation of a legal fact and its transformation into a legal act.131 It suggests that in the case of innominate contracts, what made the contract was the identification of facts evidencing the existence of a contract and its terms (adminicles). The finding of contract relied, therefore, on pragmatism, empiricism. D.19.5 even suggests that another action could effectuate this: de praescriptis verbis. Like actio in factum, de praescriptis verbis was a Roman form of action sanctioning usage, precedent, or part-performance. It is another sign of the erosion of forms and the transition to a system where every agreement arising from consent could be a contract, and there is freedom regarding its externalisation. Paul justified this jurisprudence in his discussion of commutative justice. He explained that the obligation of the promisor is always objectively preceded by what the promisee had to undertake whether the obligation is to give, do or forbear.132 It implies two things. First, contract always suggests a quid pro quo, a counterpart whose identification lends weight to its enforceability. Second, the enforceability of consent or a factual situation relies on the identification of the cause of the obligation; that is, the reason the parties are under obligations. D.19.5.5 suggests that these reasons are always objective and consist invariably in finding why each party acted in the way that they did according to facts or part-performance. Thus, D.19.5 inaugurated a category of contract under which every agreement arising from consent could be a contract whether they had a name or lacked a specific denomination. Hence, form was mitigated. It does not mean that it became useless, however. D.19.5 provides clearly that the characterisation of the undertaking is to be made in factum or according to praescriptis verbis. It implies that consent or agreement had to be externalised in such a way that it could be grasped tangibly. Nonetheless, the procedural change that the praetor initiated to sanction innominate contracts broke away from the excessively rigid formalism of nexum or sponsio. It marks the acknowledgement of the import of consent as a principle of contract and the ability for the parties to externalise it in whatever form they wished. Its effect was not general, however. Together, the wording of D.19.5.1 and D.2.14 make clear that these piecemeal consensual solutions were exceptional and only applied when a contract did not fall within the existing classes of nominate contracts. It reduced the remit of the consensual jurisprudence considerably.

131 132

Digest, 19.5.3-4. Digest, 19.5.5.

2.3

Conclusion

53

Notwithstanding that, D.2.14 and D.19.5 are a telltale of the progressive erosion of form and its transformation through procedure and the doctrines of good faith and cause to ensure the enforceability of agreements arising from consent. Undeniably, this jurisprudence culminated in the four consensual contracts sanctioned under D.3.22 et seq. D.3.22 defines them as obligations contracted by mere consent and actionable only by consent without need for writing, delivery of a thing, or even the presence of the parties at the same place and time, unlike sponsio and stipulatio.133 G.3.137 provides that the consensual contracts all relied on good faith. G.3.137 further justifies their enforceability by emphasising their commutative and causal aspects. It suggests that commutative justice and causa were the vehicles through which the shift from a formal to a consensual system occurred in Roman law on the spur of the praetor and his introduction of the subversive doctrine of good faith into Roman procedure. This procedural change can only be explained by the correlative expansion of Rome, trade, and commerce, and the latter two’s need for pragmatism and adaptability. More so since the strict and rigid ius civile was only applicable to Roman citizens as opposed to the ius gentium developed by the praetor which allowed for more flexibility and applied to all indiscriminately.134 This significant procedural change is informative in two respects. First, it inaugurated the acknowledgement of a subversive principle by which agreements arising from consent could be contracts based on good faith and commutative justice. It substituted consent for formalism and worked a distinction between types of business (negotium) and conventio. Second, it induced a setback for form allowed by the procedural and doctrinaire reflection on commutative justice, cause, good faith, and the adaptation of form to meet the needs of a ‘world-economy’.

2.3

Conclusion

Roman law strikes by its pragmatism and inventiveness. While it lacked a general principle of contract by which agreements arising from consent could be contracts, the consensual doctrine pervaded it in many respects. It manifested itself the most obviously in the form of stipulatio and consensual contracts. It questioned the strict formalism of Roman law and introduced ideas of fairness, natural equity, and justice in contract. It is indicative of the adaptation of Roman procedure and the correlative simplification of forms. The erosion of form occurred in stages. The sanction of the Roman real contracts in the Digest suggests that it first occurred through the rationalisation of form and its transformation into a relevant agency of consent having an inner significance: the physical embodiment or externalisation of consent. Consequently, form and

133 134

Gaius, 3.136. Institutes of Gaius, 1. Compare to Institutes of Justinian.1.2.

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formalism were mitigated and rationalised. They underwent another significant transformation in the sanction of stipulatio, pacta, innominate contracts, and consensual contracts. They attest to the transformation of form into an immaterial instrument evidencing consent that could be externalised in any tangible fact at the discretion of the parties. Its erosion coincides with major social upheavals in Roman society. It coincides with the moment when Rome ceased to be a modest city-state and discovered itself an intercontinental ambition. This imperialistic ambition was truly transformational not only socially but also legally. It compelled the Romans to adapt their laws to the needs of a commercial, global society requiring adapted legal instruments. Hence, the transformation of forms was inevitable from the moment Rome decided to establish control over, settle among, and trade with foreigners. It means that consensualism is primarily born of pragmatism and the need to make the law more accessible in a ‘world economy’, not so much of philosophical or doctrinaire reasons.

Statutory Provisions Constitutio Leo, 3.15. Duodecim Tabulae, 3.6. Duodecim Tabulae, 6.1. Lex Aebutia de formulis (150 BCE). Lex de Gallia Cisalpina (BCE 49 – 42) Caput XXII, 31. Lex de imperio Vespasiani in Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, VI.930. Lex Gall. Cisalp. 21, 22. Lex Irnitana (AD 51–96) LXXIX, 50, and LXXXIII,48; Lex Iulia iudiciorum privatorum (AD 17). Lex Poetelia (326 BCE). Lex Poetelia. Novella, 8. Codex Justiniani: • • • • • • • • •

2.3.24. 4.1. 4.18. 4.34. 5.11.6 (pacta legitima). 8.37.10. 8.37.10. 8.37.10. 8.37.14.

Statutory Provisions

Digesta Justiniani: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1.1. 1.1.7.1. 2.13.1. 2.14.14. 2.14.1.1 and 7.2. 2.14.1.3. 2.14.16. 2.14.2, 5, 6, and 10. 2.14.5, (Tit. XIX De Pactis, XXXIX). 2.14.5. (Ulpianus) 2.14.6. 2.14.7. 2.14.7.4 2.14.7.5–7. 2.14.7.5. 2.14.7.7. 2.6 et seq.. 3.5 et seq.. 4.4.3 Pr. 4.2. 4.2.3.1 4.2.5-6. 4.3.1.1. 4.3.1.2. 4.4.24.1. 4.5.8. 4.8. 4.8.13.2 (Paulus). 4.8.13.2. 4.8.19.1. 5.2.2. 9.4.3.1 (pacta constituta). 12.1 et seq.. 12.1. 12.1.1. 12.1.2. 12.2.2 (iusiurandum voluntarium). 12.5.3. 12.6.1.1. 12.6.26.9. 13.5. 13.5.1. 13.6.

55

56

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

2

13.7 et seq.. 15.5 (Ulpianus). 15.5. 16.3. 17.1.39 et seq.. 18.1.41.1. 18.1.57 Pr. 19.2.54 Pr. 19.5.3-4. 19.5.5. 19.5.5. 24.1.39.10-11. 24.1.5.18. 44.4.4.33. 44.4.4.33. 41.1.35 (Ulp 7 disp). 41.1.36. 44.7.1 Pr. 44.7.1. 44.7.5 Pr, 3. 45.1. 45.1.1. (Ulpian) 45.1.1. Pr. 45.1.16 Pr. 45.1.2. 45.1.38.17. 45.1.38.20. 45.1.38.24. 46.2.11. 46.3.80. 49.15.7.1. 50.16.5. 50.16.7. 50.16.19 (Labeo). 50.16.115 and 181. 50.17.206.

Instituta Jusiniani: • • • • • • •

1.2. 2.14.5, 2.18. 3.12. Pr. 2.14.5. 2.18. 2.9.5. 3.14.

Consensualism in Roman Law

Statutory Provisions

• • • • • • • • • • •

3.14.2. 3.15. 3.15.1 3.19.7. 3.19.12. 3.19.19. 3.19.20. 3.22 et seq.. 3.22.1-3. 3.27. 4.6, especially 20.

Institutes of Gaius: • 1. • 1.115, 123, 134 et seq.. • 1.119. – – – – • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1.119 2.27 3.93 3.97

1.119.2.14a-22. 2.1. 2.4. 2.60. 2.127-30. 3.30. 3.87. 3.88-91. 3.89. 3.92 et seq. 3.93, 103, 113, and 179. 3.93. 3.129. 3.131-132, 134. 3.136. 3.201. 4.12–29. 4.17a. 4.21. 4.47.

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Fargues P (1913) La religion d’après M. Durkheim. 60:255–270. https://journals.openedition.org/ assr/24447 Frezza P (1938) Le forme federative e la struttura dei rapporti internazionali nell'antico diritto romano. 4:363–428 Fuller LL (1941) Consideration and form. 41:799–824. https://doi.org/10.2307/1117840 Guimarães Taborda M (2001) La jurisprudence classique romaine et la construction d’un droit des affaires fondÉ sur la fides. 48:151–183. http://local.droit.ulg.ac.be/sa/rida/file/2001/Guimaraes %20Taborda.pdf Humbert M (1993) Droit et religion dans la Rome antique. 38:35–47. http://www.philosophie-droit. asso.fr/APDpourweb/124.pdf Kunkel W (1929) Besprechung von Axel Hägerström: Der römische Obligationsbegriff. 49:479– 490 Léon H, Mazeaud J (1956) La cause en droit français. 3:6–28. https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/499300-mazeaud.pdf Litvinoff S (1989) Vices and consent, error, fraud, duress and an epilogue of lesion. 50:1–115. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/235289393.pdf Lübtow (von) U (1936) Das altrömische nexum als Geiselschaft. 56:239–255. https://doi.org/10. 7767/zrgra.1936.56.1.239 Mathisen RW (2006) Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire. 111:1011–1040. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr. 111.4.1011 Meulders-Klein MT (1993) Individualisme et communautarisme: l'individu, la famille et l'État en Europe occidentale. 23–24:163–197. https://www.persee.fr/doc/dreso_0769-3362_1993_ num_23_1_1215 Perrot X (2010) Le geste, la parole et le partage. Abattage rituel et droit à Rome. 2: 275–289 Prévost X (2015) 111n8 –– La réticence des humanistes envers le consensualisme. 111n8:140–144. https://www.labase-lextenso.fr/revue-des-contrats/RDC111n8 Rampelberg RM (2000) L’obligation romaine, perspective sur une évolution. 44:51–68 Scheidel W, Friesen SJ (2006) The Size of the Economy and the Distribution of Income in the Roman Empire. 99:61–91. https://doi.org/10.3815/007543509789745223. Terré F (1968) Sur la sociologie juridique du contrat. 1968:71–88 Weinrib EJ (1988) Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law. 97:949–1016. https:// digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7140&context=ylj

Chapter 3

Consensualism in mos gallicus and iuris Franco-Gallici

3.1

Introduction

The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD triggered a general regression of Roman law in Europe, especially in France.1 New peoples settled in Gaul, thus supplanting the Romans. They consist of the Visigoths in the southwest, the Burgundians in the southeast, the Salian and Ripuarian Franks in the north, and the Alemanni in the northeast.2 However, two distinct nations preserved their independence: the Celts in Brittany and the Gallo-Romans in the kingdom of Soissons in the northwest where what remained of Roman law in the fifth century kept applying.3 Consequently, Germanic law was substituted for Roman law over three-quarters of Gaul. This radical sociolegal shift means that Gaul was cleaved from the evolution that Roman law underwent in the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire. Germanic conquest also implies that Roman law was tossed over the garbage heap of history in favour of a distinctive source of law: Germanic law and custom. The digests subsisting from this period such as the laws of the Salian Franks and Goths reveal that the Germanic tribes that conquered Gaul had a profound

1

Carbasse (2015), pp. 33–72; Girard (1922), pp. 4–46; Gouron (1957), pp. 103–120. Lepointe and Monier (1954), p. 447. 3 For a map of 5th century Western Europe and the Eastern Roman Empire, please see Atlas Historique de Muir (1911), Europe in c. 476 CE, last accessed on 17 May 2023 and ourced at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:476eur.jpg. The figure has not been included in this book due to copyrights infringement concerns. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_3

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attachment to formalism, ritualism, and symbolism4 like the Romans before them.5 Sociological reflexes (customs) may have driven it as opposed to reason.6 However, the development of customary law on the cusp of the early modern period and the end of the Middle Ages reveals a change in mindset and the piecemeal emergence of consensual means of contracting independently of the rediscovery of Roman law.7 They are indicative of the erosion of form and the acknowledgement of consent as an autonomous source of obligation in Germanic law. Three questions arise from this. The first is what role form and consent played in Germanic law regarding the development of a formal taxonomy of contract by which contracts are either excessively formal or informal. The second is how Germanic law came to acknowledge that consent could create legal relations and what the underpinnings of this jurisprudence are. The third is what became of Roman law; that is, whether the development of Roman law in Byzantium influenced the acknowledgement of consent as a source of obligation in Germanic law or whether it was entirely contingent and peculiar.

3.2

Germanic Law and Formalism

The conquest of the Gallo-Roman kingdom of Soissons by the Salian Franks in 486 halted the application of Roman law in Gaul.8 The latter’s laws show a similar degree of formalism as Roman law at the same period. It had a similar appetite for stability, certainty, and publicity irrespective of the intention of the parties. This preference for stability, certainty, and publicity transpires from the types of contracts that Germanic law first acknowledged: those formed during a ceremony where a party had to pledge to perform an obligation based on an oral stipulatio ( fides facta), and those formed by the delivery of a thing (res praestita). It is clear from Lex Salica (c. 500)9 but also Lex Ripuaria (c. 650),10 and Lex Romana Visigothorum (506)11 to cite but a few. Notably, Lex Salica highlights the strict formalism governing the transfer of property. Capitulare, 7.10 requires that parties not only convey the subject-matter of the undertaking but also that the undertaking is put into writing. The promisor had to convey the writing to the promisee (traditio cartae, traditio per cartam).12

4

Ligeron and Petitjean (1983), pp. 283–293. See Chap. 2. 6 Batiffol (1966), pp. 34–35; Durkheim (1960), pp. 28–29, 64–75. 7 See for instance, Beaumanoir (de) (1842) discussed further below. 8 Tours (de) (1836) 2.41. 9 Lex Salica, 46 (ed. Boretius) p. 115. 10 Lex Ripuaria, 48, 59, and 77. 11 Lex Romana Visigothorum, 24.2.487. 12 See also Lex Salica, 7.1 and Extravangantia B, 3-4. 5

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Chilperic’s Edict of 574 also highlights the importance of symbolism. It ascertains Lex Salica, 1.11, 30.1 by which transfer of ownership must be made by conveyance of the subject-matter or a token thing. It either consisted in throwing or handing an object to the other party13 while uttering a formulaic oath in the form ‘dicat verbum de furtuna sua quantum voluerit totam factunam suam cui voluerit dare’.14 The use of the Latin word voluerit in the formula indicates that the conveyance of the thing was nothing but a means of externalising agreement or consent to undertake a particular action or conduct. The use of writing and traditio seems to fulfil a similar role probably because of a distorted vision of Roman law by which written stipulations are null if they are not made in writing.15 Therefore, to contract per cartam or festucam was to create an obligation according to a ritual. It required the accomplishment of certain gestures or the plight of one’s troth. The vestiges of Germanic law reveal that contract relied on a symbolism purporting to externalise one’s voluntas (will) to create legal relations. Roman law, undeniably, inspired these formalities. It is clear from Lex Ripuaria, 11 and Cartulaire de Lerins, 8 regarding obligatio per cartam and G.4.16 where Gaius said that ‘festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco, signo quodam iusta domini’.16 When read together, these texts suggest that the delivery of a thing captured the whole practice of contract in early medieval law as in archaic Rome. It is so irrespective of intention unless voluntas is read not only as meaning will (consent) but also intention given that these two words are synonyms. Be it as it may, a rigid ritual and formalism characterised Germanic law alike archaic Roman law. It supported every economic operation, especially sales operations and barter contracts. The transfer of a thing also truly appears to have been tantamount to an earnest. It proved the common will of the parties to create legal relations. It strikes the eye in Lex Romana Visigothorum and Lex Baiuvariorum, the law of the Bavarii in Bavaria. Leges Romana Visigothorum and Baiuvariorum highlight two types of sales corroborating the import of traditio and its evidentiary role. The first is a sale executed by writing or delivery of the subject-matter or token thing and the immediate payment of the price.17 The second is a sale executed by payment of an earnest

13 Chilperici Edictum (Behrend: 1873) 6, p. 106: ‘[similiter] convenit ut quicunque admallatus fuerit, et in veritatem testimonia non babuerit unde se aeducat, et necesse est ut mitium (= in mallo?) fidem faciant, et non babuerit simili modo qui pro eum fldem faciat, ut ipse in senextra manu fistncam teneat et dextera manu auferat’ (Behrend, Capitularia zur lex Salica). See also Cartulary of Marculfe, Appendix, 22 (168 de Lindenberg). 14 Lex Salica, 46, [my own translation]: ‘He must utter words however he pleases he who wishes to undertake something’. 15 Cartulaire de Lerins, 8. Compare to Cicero (1983) 26.96. 16 [My own translation]: ‘Placing one’s staff upon someone or something is a means of asserting one’s right’. This occurred in a context where a plaintiff and defender who brought a dispute to court had to seize the thing being disputed in turns until ordered to release it for adjudication. 17 Lex Visigothorum, 4.3; Lex Baiuvariorum, 16.2.

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(arrha).18 Both texts emphasise that the strict completion of the ritual made the contract partially formed, especially where the oral form was fulfilled. However, they also stress that it is the conveyance of the thing that made the contract actionable for it proved it. It is clearer still from the sanction of sale by arrha, a vestige of Roman law and an exception to G.3.139 by which sale is complete although the price has not been paid nor the thing been delivered. Lex Romana Visigothorum provides that ‘a qui arras pro quacumque acceperit, id cogatur impler’.19 In turn, Lex Baiuvariorum provides that ‘qui arras dederit pro qua cumque re pretium cogatur implere quod placuit emptori’.20 Together they suggest that arrha only provided evidence of a lawful agreement. It can be read as the debtor’s part-performance of the obligation to pay the full price. It is a means of identifying the intention of the parties to create legal relations and their agreement on the price and thing. Consequently, the ritual or form appears to be considerably mitigated to such an extent that the Germanic transfer by sale seems consensual. Arrha increases the effectiveness, power, or ability of consent externalised in a form recognised by law to create legal relations, although the full price has not yet been paid nor the thing been delivered. Thus, Leges Visigothorum and Baiuvariorum appear to have heralded the transformation of Germanic law from strict formalism to adapted formalism. It parallels the slow transition of Roman law from formalism to a quasi- or wholly informal legal tradition in Byzantium during the same period (see Chap. 2). However, the sanction of quasi-consensual contracts appears to have been unsystematic as in Rome. It concerned only special classes of contract. Nonetheless, the Germanic sale by arrha shows that the characterisation of a contract as formal (solemn or real) or informal (consensual) depends on the strictness or flexibility of the material form as the determinant for contracting. It shows the intricate relationship between form and consent and how they support each other. More so, this paradigm distinguishes between formation and enforceability. The contract is formed when the parties reach an agreement but is only actionable when it is externalised in a tangible form recognised by law, however strict. It is clear from Lex Salica about obligations formed by solemnity. It provides that besides the transfer of a thing (res praestita),21 contract also could arise from consent externalised in any form recognised by law ( fides facta).22 It shows just how much tangible forms justify the enforceability of a nudum pactum a causa.

18

Lex Visigothorum, 4.4; Lex Baiuvariorum, 16.10. [My own translation]: ‘He who has accepted a pledge can compel the promisee to fulfil their obligation’. 20 Lex Visigothorum, 4.224; Lex Baiuvariorum, 16.10, [my own translation]: ‘He who made a pledge can only be released by fulfilling their obligation and can be coerced to do so’.. 21 Lex Salica, 52. 22 Lex Salica, 50.1. 19

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67

In this regard, Title I of Lex Salica presents the different tangible forms that consent could take to be actionable even though the undertaking arose immediately from the plight of one’s troth. Not only did it require the conveyance of a thing, but also the engagement of the parties in a particular conduct such as the utterance of a sacramental formula in the form: tu, Grafio, homo ille qui mihi fidem ficit, quem legitime abio iactibus aut admallatum in hoc, quod Lex Salica abit et continet, ego super me et super furtunam meam pono, quod tu sccurus mitte in furtuna suam manom.23

It could also consist in the simple conveyance of a token thing symbolising the pledge conceded (wadium) as per Lex Salica Extravaganza B, 1 and 2.24 Otherwise, it could consist in the pledge of an earnest unto God by which a party delivered a coin to another (denier à Dieu)25 or a handshake accompanied by a formulaic oath (paumée).26 Except for paumée, the distinction that Lex Sal.50 introduced between fides facta and res praestita seems inapposite since, as in nexum discussed in Chapter 2, fides facta and res praestita required both traditio and stipulatio. They were the decisive acts of procedure that made the contract regardless of intention for want of any mention of it. Besides, fides facta in the form of denier à Dieu is indicative of the limited influence of religion on the law as in Roman law. However, it also is a telltale of the similar and parallel development of the medieval French municipal laws and Roman law in Byzantium. A kindred rigidity of the forms can be observed. It hindered the acknowledgement of consensus as a general source of obligations, whether in Germanic positive or customary law. Though, some customary texts reveal that piecemeal consensual solutions existed by which consent was enough to create a contract besides Lex. Vis.4.4. and Lex. Bai.16.10 on sell by arrha. They concern Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet and Philippe de Beaumanoir’s Coustumes de Clermont-en-Beauvaisis. These are presently discussed in turn.

Lex Salica, 50.3. In the translation of Fischer Drew (1991), p. 114: ‘Count, that is the man who gave a pledge to me and whom I have legally called to court as the Salic law provides; I place myself and my fortune in your hands that they may be held secure [i.e., I place myself and my fortune in your hands as security for the property you are being asked to seize]’. 24 See also Lex Salica, 1.2. 25 Statuta sive leges municipales Arelatis, Article 192; Coutume d’Avignon, Article 121. 26 Coutume de Montpellier, 100; Statuta Massiliae, 3.6; Coutume de Bayonne, 118.1; Coutume de Charaux, 14.40; Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, 2.16.3. 23

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Consensualism in mos gallicus and iuris Franco-Gallici

Customary Law and Consensualism

Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet (c. 1260) is a medieval French legal compendium compiled by the postglossators in the middle of the thirteenth century. It is the first significant French medieval text to sanction consensual obligations generally besides the formal obligations discussed above. It suggests that from the thirteenth century onwards, customary medieval law enshrined piecemeal solutions sanctioning consent (voluntas, will) as a source of obligation. It provides that ‘convenances accordées par bonne mors font le marchie, non la paumée, et li cuers doit suivre la parole’.27 Thus, it questioned the necessity to fulfil often irrelevant strict formalities, such as paumée, to create legal relations. It divided contract from form and ritual. Liv. Jos.1.2.1 even provides that the parties are not required to pronounce any formulaic oath as long as they agree on the terms and act in good faith. It appeals to their honour to enforce the undertaking. Thus, it enshrines a procedural evolution from formalism to consensualism in the same way as Roman law in the third century BCE and beyond. It is not surprising regarding its sources: The Digest of Justinian whose structure it emulated, but also canon law and French customary law. Hence, it is probable that Roman law inspired, directly, the consensual contracts that Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet sanctioned. The jurisprudence of the royal courts may also have influenced their development directly; notably through the former’s fortuitous discovery and reflection on the cause of obligations. It allowed the sanction of consensual deposits in factum. It follows from the Vedastum Fordin case fought in 1270 before the royal court of Ham in northern France and Parlement de Paris, the premier court of final appeal of the French judicial system in Ancien Régime (see Fig. 3.1).28 The case concerned Vedastum Fordin and his wife. They deposited their money with the aldermen and jurors of Ham for safekeeping. The deposit entailed the constitution of a chirograph sealed by the city ( fides publica) and the conveyancing of a remittance to the depositor (obligatio per cartam). Following a domestic argument, Vedastum’s wife deserted the marital home and took the remittance evidencing the deposit with the intention of claiming the money for herself. Vedastum sought judicial remedy on the grounds that as the male head of the household, this money belonged and should be paid to him. The aldermen and jurors of Ham dismissed Vedastum’s claim in the first instance on the ground that he could not convey the remittance evidencing the deposit. Their ratio decidendi was that the transfer of the remittance to another, in this instance his wife, was tantamount to a debt release entitling her to claim the money. Another reason is that, without the remittance, the court had no guarantee that Vedastum Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, 1.2.7, [my own translation]: ‘Conventions underpinned by good faith make the contract, not paumée; and one must be faithful to their word’. 28 Parlement de Paris was mainly concerned with the recording of royal edicts and judicial review and only exceptionally acted as a final court of appeal (cassation). 27

3.3

Customary Law and Consensualism

69

Fig. 3.1 Territories assigned to the parliaments and sovereign councils of France until 1789 (The image was created by Paris91 and is sourced at https://fr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Parliaments_ and_Sovereign_Councils_of_the_Kingdom_of_France_in_1789_(fr).png under the following licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.fr.)

would not come again to claim the repayment of the deposit, although it had already been repaid. Vedastum appealed to the Parlement de Paris. It settled the dispute in 1270. It ruled that the deposit had to be paid back to Vedastum even though he was unable to convey the remittance, provided he pledged not to submit another claim for the same deposit in future. The reason, it seems, was the depositee’s own record of the deposit. It was extraordinarily compelling evidence of the existence of an obligation, depositum. Thus, the Vedastum Fordin case mitigated the symbolism of writing and the necessity to convey a remittance to end a deposit. Also, it emphasised the possibility

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for consent to create legal relations without formality so long as it is externalised and tangible, whatever its form (cf. adminicle). More so if the parties act in good faith.29 Another two texts support the sanction of consensual agreements requiring only consent to be completed in the Middle Ages. First, de Beaumanoir’s Coustumes de Clermont-en-Beauvaisis (c. 1280). Second, Philippe de Fontaines’ Le conseil à un ami (1253). They provide that consent alone could create and make legal relations actionable absent any other formality.30 It means that the practice of informal contracts was common in some parts of France for some classes of contracts in the thirteenth century, that is, on the cusp of the early modern period. They are major turning points in medieval (intellectual) history. They can be construed as a sign of freedom, the premiss of systematic sanction of agreements lawfully entered into, and the harbinger of the coercion of parties to have deference for their word (pacta sunt servanda). Their enactment coincides with the publication of a profusion of texts in the early modern period written by prominent jurists such as Azo of Bologna. They provided a new, structured interpretation of the law and obligations. It justified and fostered the systematic sanction of informal agreements in factum unsupported by a material cause or consideration but supported only by an immaterial one (see Chap. 4).31 Similarly, the practice of informal contracts highlights that contract has two strands.32 First, a factual element assimilable to conventio consisting in a plight of troth or an exchange of promise. Second, a tangible evidentiary element giving it consistency and affording its enforceability whether it is left to the discretion of the parties (in factum) or imposed by law.33 In such a case, for instance, it took the form either of a requirement for a particular conduct such as the delivery of a thing (res praestita) or even a kiss of peace (osculum pacis).34

29

Vedastum Fordin case in Beugnot (1839–1848), p. 800. Beaumanoir (de) (1842) n°1066, 1073, 1092; Fontaines (de) (1846) 15.6 and 17 contra Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, 1.2.7. See also Yver (1952), p. 57. 31 Bologna (da) (1533) Lib. II, Rubrica De Pactis, 15; Bologna (da) (1627); Vaccari (1956), pp. 233ff; Riccobono et al. (1975), p. 10; Nanz (1985), pp. 65ff; Molinaeus (1681) note 31, pp. 108ff. 32 Beaumanoir (de) (1842), p. 35. 33 Vedastum Fordin case in Beugnot (1839–1848), p. 800; Beaumanoir (de) (1842) n°1066, 1073, 1092; Fontaines (de) (1846) 15.6 and 17; Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, 1.2.7; Yver (1952) p. 57. Compare to Molière’s verses in Le Dépit amoureux (1659) describe this idea perfectly in its Act 4, scene 4: ‘Pour couper tout chemin à nous rapatrier. . .Il faut rompre la paille: une paille rompue. . .Rend, entre gens d’honneur, une affaire conclue. . .Romps: voilà le moyen de s’en dédire’; Pactus Legis Salicae, 50-3, pp. 192–195; Chilperici Edictum, c. 8 in Capitularia regum Francorum (1883) MGH Legum sectio. II, 9; Pactus Legis Salicae, 56, pp. 210–214. 34 Champeval (1901) note 370, pp. 217–220. 30

Statutory Provisions

3.4

71

Conclusion

Medieval law shows the same features as the development of Roman law. Both legal traditions stand out by their excessive adherence to prescribed forms, symbolism, technique, and the stemmed use of forms of worship irrespective of their inner significance to complete a contract. However, both also appear to have sanctioned piecemeal consensual solutions affording the acknowledgement of consent as a source of obligation including through judicial reflection on the concepts of cause and good faith. Though, like Roman law, medieval law never achieved the systematisation of consent as a general principle of contract. Nonetheless, while both traditions developed in the same way, the causes for their development are fundamentally removed. While the expansion of Rome seems to have been the cause for the introduction of new mechanisms adapting Roman law and making it more pragmatic, the slow but smoother development of Germanic law towards consensualism seems to be more due to its rediscovery of Roman law and its intellectual and doctrinal influence on populations that it used to govern than the fruit of its own thought. It is clear from the language and terminology of certain notions used in leges barbarorum and Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, that is, for instance, the use of Latin or the outline of sales per arrha or festucam, and suchlike. However, aspersions should not be cast on mos gallicus and its ability to accommodate informal, pragmatic, and rational means of contracting independently of a rediscovered Roman law. Beaumanoir’s Coutumes de Clermont and the Vedastum Fordin case illustrate so much. It is difficult to generalise their remit and the sanction of consent absent form as a general principle of contract, however, given their mention only of specific classes of consensual contracts and obligations; especially sale and transfer of property. It remains that medieval law, like Roman law, laid the groundwork for the sanction of consent as a source of obligations and its justification according to good faith and the doctrine of causation.

Statutory Provisions Chilperici Edictum (Behrend: 1873) 6, p 106. Chilperici Edictum, c. 8 in Capitularia regum Francorum (1883) MGH Legum sectio. II, 9. Coutume d’Avignon, Article 121. Coutume de Bayonne, 118.1. Coutume de Charaux, 14.40. Coutume de Montpellier, 100. Extravangantia B, 3-4. Lex Baiuvariorum:

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• 16.2. • 16.10. Lex Ripuaria • 48 • 59 • 77 Lex Romana Visigothorum, 24.2.487. Lex Salica (ed. Boretius): • • • • • • • •

1.2. 7.1. 46, p 115. 46. 50.1. 50.3. 52. 56.

Lex Visigothorum: • 4.3. • 4.4. • 4.224. Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, 2.16.3. Statuta Massiliae, 3.6. Statuta sive leges municipales Arelatis, Article 192.

Canon Law Cartulary of Marculfe, Appendix, 22 (168 de Lindenberg). Cartulaire de Lerins, 8.

References Books Batiffol H (1966) La Philosophie du droit. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Beaumanoir (de) P (1842) Coutumes de Clermont-en-Beauvaisis. Comte Beugnot, Paris Bologna (da) A (1533) Summa Codicis. Lyon Bologna (da) A (1627) Glossa Ordinaria. Lyon.

References

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Carbasse JM (2015) Histoire du droit. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Champeval JB (1901) Cartulaire de l’abbaye d’Uzerche (corrège). Avec tables, identifications, notes historiques du Xe au XIVe siècle. A. Picard et fils, Paris Cicero (1983) Topica. Meiner, Hamburg Durkheim E (1960) De la division du travail social, 7th edn. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Fischer Drew K (1991) The laws of the Salian Franks. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia Fontaines (de) P (1846) Le conseil à un ami. Durand et Joubert, Paris Lepointe G, Monier R (1954) Les obligations en droit romain et dans l’ancien droit français. Sirey, Paris Molinaeus C (1681) Opera Omnia, vol 3. Folio, Paris Nanz KP (1985) Die Entstehung des allgemeinen Vertragsbegriffs im 16. Bis 18. Jahrhundert. Peter Hanstein Verlag GmbH, Cologne Poquelin (Molière) JB (1951) Le Dépit amoureux. Les belles lettres, Paris Riccobono S, Kerr Wylie J, Beinart B (1975) Stipulation and the theory of contract, 2nd edn. Balkema, Amsterdam Tours (de) G (1836) Histoire des Francs. Renouard, Paris Yver J (1952) Les caractères originaux de la coutume de Normandie. Le Tendre, R. Bigot, Caen

Articles Girard PF (1922) Les préliminaires de la renaissance du droit romain. 1:4–46. https://www.jstor. org/stable/43846826 Gouron A (1957) Les étapes de la pénétration du droit romain au XIIe siècle dans l'ancienne Septimanie. 69:103–120. https://www.persee.fr/doc/anami_0003-4398_1957_num_69_38_61 52 Ligeron L, Petitjean M (1983) La coutume en rites: quelques exemples de symbolisme juridique. 40:11–17. (Print only) Vaccari P (1956) Pactum vestitur contractus cohaerentia. La concezione dei patti aggiunti nella dottrina dei glossatori. 17:217–239. (Print)

Chapter 4

Consensualism in Modern Law

4.1

Introduction

Modern law is the institutional period of French law. It is when it acquired its final structure before codification. It consists of three periods. First, the early modern period. It spans from the rediscovery of Roman law in Europe in the middle of the 13th century to c. 1650. Second, the modern period properly speaking. It spans from c. 1650 to 1815; that is, the end of the Napoleonic wars and the collapse of Premier Empire. Finally, the late modern period. It spans from 1816 to c. 1945; that is, the end of the Second World War. This chapter focuses on the former two periods. They are characterised by acute scientific, legal developments including philosophical ones.1 They occurred through the works and reflections of initiates (i.e., professional jurists, jurisconsults, law experts and specialists)2 and their ability to formulate general, systematic, legal rules based on canon law, a reinterpreted Roman law (‘Roman gloss’), and natural law.3 The combination of canon law and Roman law formed the basis for a common European legal framework known as ius commune.4 Two questions arise from this. First, what role the rediscovery of Roman law and its gloss by the canonists in the early modern period played in the development of contract and the systematisation of consent as a general principle of contract. Second, what the contribution of natural law was to the enshrinement of the doctrine and what became of it in modern French law before codification, especially

1

Ibbetson (2001), p. 20; Eberhard (2011), p. 86. Cornu (2018), p. 946; ‘Learned Law’ in Colin Gow (2015). 3 Letto-Vanamo, P in Letto-Vanamo and Smits (2012), p. 152; ‘Learned Law’ in Colin Gow (2015); Waelkens (2012), pp. 311–327. 4 Cairns and Plessis (du) (2010), p. 1 et seq. 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_4

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regarding the sanction of consent and its role in the elaboration of a taxonomy by which all contracts are consensual and only exceptionally formal.

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Obligations and engagements proceeded from ritual and the plight of one’s troth in the medieval era. Not only is this obvious from leges barbarorum discussed above (see Chap. 3), but also from the plethora of customs that plagued the kingdom of France. It is clearer still from: (i) Chartres de l’Abbaye de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (818) by which: ipsas res secundum legem per suum wadium ipsus Nerlongo revestire debet. . .5 per festucam. . .easdem res. . .legaliter guarpiverunt. . .quo peracto ante altare. . .6 ad proprium concedimus. . .atque de nostro jure in jus et dominationem ac potestatem ejus solempni donatione tradimus atque transfundimus;7

(ii) Cartulaire de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon (815) by which: donavit et per vuadium tradidit. . .8 per festucam, per cultellum, per vuantonem, per vuasonem super sanctum altare posui;9

(iii) Cartulaire de l'Évêché de Poitiers ou Grand-Gauthier (839) by which contracts are formed ‘dono. . .et trado’;10 (iv) Cartulaire de Perrecy (982) by which: et ipse Fredelus taies testes de présente presentavit, quia ipsa vestitura viderunt;11

Charte de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (818, Autun) n°13, p. 30. [My own translation]: ‘According to the law, by these very circumstances, Nerlongo should retransfer the rod to complete the transaction’. 6 Ibid., n°30, p. 85. [My own translation]: ‘With the sprig. . .the same things. . .should be legally transferred. . .over the altar’. 7 Ibid., (836, Vouneuil) n°20, p. 48. [My own translation]: ‘A donor who conveys something to a donee must solemnly transfer and deliver the subject-matter of the donation to the donee on their own behalf according to our law, the right of ownership, and the power that one has to transfer their property’. 8 Cartulaire de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon (876, Pérard) 152. [My own translation]: ‘The concession of a pledge completes the donation’. 9 Ibid., n°301. [My own translation]: ‘The transfer of the sprig, knife, straw or a handful of dirt over the altar completes the transaction’. 10 Cartulaire de l'évêché de Poitiers ou Grand-Gauthier (839) n°21. 11 Cartulaire de Perrecy (821, Lichey) in Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (Paris: 1900) n°17, p. 38. [My own translation]: On Fredelus’ account, [the requirement of] witnesses to the transaction [was met]. 5

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(v) Chartes bourguignones (9–11th century) by which: dono et trado atque transfundo et per festucam propter peccata mea. . .verpisco episto Dei genitrici Marie;12 and

(vi) Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Saint-Etienne de Dijon (882) by which: per vuadio et vuasono et per ipsa epistola tradiderunt et Ergaudo vel Davido manu vestita fuerunt et qualiter illorum lex fuit per pilos vel festucas vuirpaverunt et se in omnibus exitum dixerunt et fecerunt his presentibus. . .13 per wadio, hoc est per suum cultellum et festucam et per hoc pergamentum, largitori venici, fraudanti anathema.14

However, Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, Beaumanoir’s Coustumes de Clermont, and Fontaines’ Le conseil à un ami discussed in Chap. 3 suggest that a change of thought occurred in the middle of the Middle Ages on the cusp of the early modern period. It allowed the sanction of consent as a source of obligations, though unsystematically. Nonetheless, the publication of these works in the thirteenth century suggests that the buds of the general sanction of consent as a source of obligations in modern law are to be found in the said century. It nurtured a more subtle reflection on the sources of obligation than Roman law and mos gallicus thanks to the general canonical aversion to formulaic oath and ritual. It follows from Matthew, 5 by which: 34. ego autem dico vobis non iurare omnino neque per caelum quia thronus Dei est 35. neque per terram quia scabillum est pedum eius neque per Hierosolymam quia civitas est magni Regis 36. neque per caput tuum iuraveris quia non potes unum capillum album facere aut nigrum 37. sit autem sermo vester est est non non quod autem his abundantius est a malo est.15 But also, James’ Epistle, 5 by which:

Garnier (1849) n°1. [My own translation]: ‘The sprig transforms my giving and transferring of a thing into a binding obligation, thus making up for my sins by the interception of the mother of our Lord the Virgin Mary’. 13 Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Saint-Etienne de Dijon (882, Courtoi), p. 13. [My own translation]: ‘The strict concession of a pledge and the transfer of a handful of dirt by the hand of Ergaudo to David are recognised by law; so much so that the transfer of lock of hair suffices to complete the transaction’. 14 Ibid., n°39, p. 60. [My own translation]: ‘Fraudsters who destroy a pledge conceded in the form of a parchment shall be excommunicated’. 15 [In the translation of Coogan et al. (2010), p. 1754: ‘34 But I say to you, Do not swear at all, either by heaven, for it is the throne of God, 35 or by the earth, for it is his footstool, or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36 And do not swear by your head, for you cannot make one hair white or black. 37 Let your word be ‘Yes, Yes’ or ‘No, No’; anything more than this comes from the evil one’. 12

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12. ante omnia autem fratres mei nolite iurare neque per caelum neque per terram neque aliud quodcumque iuramentum sit autem vestrum est est non non uti non sub iudicio decidatis.16 Both these scriptures enjoin Christians not to swear whether by Earth, heaven, or anything else for it would be a sin. Instead, Christians must have deference for their word. Notably, these texts require from Christians when creating obligations between them that their ‘yes’ be a ‘yes’ if they intend to engage themselves and their ‘nay’ a ‘nay’ if they have no such intention (‘sit autem sermo vester est est non non quod autem hus abundantius est a malo est; sit autem vestrum est est non non uti non sub iudicio decidatis’). It means that under canon law, consent sufficed to create legal relations. Some Christian moralists, mainly the early Church fathers, already had an extensive perception of perjury in the 3rd–4th century.17 Augustine of Hippo (354–430) argued that irrespective of whether a promise is paired with an oath, parties must have deference for their word. Otherwise, they would be sinning and perjuring whether the action of giving a false or misleading account of one’s intention to create legal relations is intentional or omissive.18 Decretum Gratiani seems to have continued this jurisprudence. It features an apocrypha attributed to the Archbishop of Constantinople, John Chrysostom (c. 347-407) by which: Quinto, si constituent illud servandum esse, an episcopus sit reus periurii, qui contra iuramentum archiadiaconum suum ire conpellit?19

It suggests that canon law might have placed promise and oath on an equal footing, thus acknowledging that agreement could arise from consent and that it is enough to create and enforce legal relations according to Christian morality. It is uncertain given that the codification of the apocrypha attributed to Chrysostom does not provide affirmatively that agreements arising from consent could be contracts. It

[In the translation of Coogan et al. (2010), p. 2124]: ‘12 Above all, my beloved, do not swear, either by heaven or by earth or by any other oath, but let your “Yes” be yes and your “No” be no, so that you may not fall under condemnation’. 17 Aquinas (1953) quest 88, 23, quest 111, notes explicatives relatives à la question 88, art. 3, p. 377, quest. 88, art. 3, p. 21; Chrysostom (1879) ad Causa XXII.1.12; Innocent IV (348) ad X.1.35.1: nisi pacta servet, excommunicabitur. 18 Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae, Pars Tertia, Section Secunda, Articulus 2, §2152: ‘Qui, sub iureiurando, promissionem facit, de cuius impletione intentionem non habet, vel qui postquam sub iureiurando promiserit, promissionem non tenet, periurus est. Periurium gravem constituit observantiae culpam erga Dominum omnis verbi. Se ad opus malum iureiurando obligare contrarium est sanctitati Nominis divini’ [A person commits perjury when he makes a promise under oath with no intention of keeping it, or when after promising on oath he does not keep it. Perjury is a grave lack of respect for the Lord of all speech. Pledging oneself by oath to commit an evil deed is contrary to the holiness of the divine name]. 19 Decretum Gratiani, Causa XXII, Qu. V, Canon 12. [My own translation]: ‘Fifth, supposing a bishop who has pledged to let an archdeacon go eat perjured themselves, is the archdeacon who has sworn him loyalty entitled to rescind their pledge?’. 16

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merely ponders whether agreements must be kept where one promises to undertake a conduct or action even without uttering a formulaic oath. In fact, the fragment questions the validity of oaths generally: Quidam episcopus iurauit falsum quod putabat uerum, quo conperto archidiaconus eius iurauit se numquam prestaturum ei obedientiam. Conpellitur archidiaconus ab episcopo ad exhibendum sibi consuetam reuerentiam; accusatur episcopus de dupplici periurio, et de eo, quod falsum iurauit, et quia archidiaconum ad peierandum conpellit. (Qu. I.) Primum queritur, an iuramentum sit prestandum, uel non? (Qu. II.) Secundo, si sit periurus qui iurat falsum quod putat uerum? (Qu. III.) Tertio, si licuit archidiacono denegare episcopo consuetam obedientiam? (Qu. IV.) Quarto, si constiterit esse illicitum quod iurauit archidiaconus, an sit seruandum? (Qu. V.) Quinto, si constiterit illud seruandum esse, an episcopus sit reus periurii, qui contra iuramentum archidiaconum suum ire conpellit?20

Through the hypothetical question (casus) of whether an archdeacon who swore not to obey a bishop who affirmed something he knew to be untrue under oath would violate his promise to obey the Church and serve his direct superior, Causa XXII highlights the subversiveness of oath. It seems it seeks to discredit oath to reinforce the necessity to respect one’s word so as not to hamper the functioning of a whole institution and, by extension, destroy the right of all parties to receive the benefits of an agreement. The interpreters of Decretum Gratiani provided some answers to the questions supposedly asked to push to its extreme the necessity to coerce parties to have deference for their prior engagements, especially in light of the political consequences that perjury might have. The Italian canon lawyer Rufinus (ca. 1130–1192) argued in his Summa Decretorum (1168) that: In novissima questione superioris cause dictum est de contumacia clericorum, qui relinquentes episcopos suos ad iudices seculares confugiunt. Quia vero non numquam clerici in tantam contra episcopum contumaciam ascendunt, ut non obedire episcopo suo iuramento etiam firmare non metuant, ideo convenienter alium tractatum, de iuramento scil., copulat ostendens, quomodo reus sit periurii archidiaconus, eo quod iuravit se suo episcopo non obediturum.21

20 ibid. [My own translation]: ‘Suppose a bishop pledged something he knew to be untrue merely to compel respect from his archdeacon, and the disgruntled archdeacon decides to break their fealty by oath. At this stage, the bishop will accuse the archdeacon of double perjury. First, for breaking his pledge. Second, because archdeacons are required to pledge a meal when taking office. (Qu. I.) The first question to answer is whether the pledge of fealty took place between distant parties or not. (Qu. II.) The second question is whether the archdeacon perjured themselves by making an oath contravening his initial pledge. (Qu. III.) The third question is whether the bishop is entitled to the respect of his archdeacon if it is determined that the archdeacon is permitted to denounce the pledge he made initially. (Qu. IV) The fourth question is how the unlawfulness of the archdeacon’s oath to disobey the bishop who affirmed something he knew to be untrue can be established. (Qu. V.) Provided the bishop is guilty of perjury, the fifth question is whether there are reasons that may excuse the contravention of his pledge to let the archdeacon eat?’. 21 Rufinus (1902), p. 388. [My own translation]: ‘The very last question of the previous case study questioned the hubris of clergymen who, abandoning their bishop, seek the succour of secular judges. Given that, in all truth, some clergymen dare reach such a level of hubris to the detriment of

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It recalls the political necessity to compel parties to abide by their words and prevent insubordination and the questioning of political and canonical authority, especially by oath, irrespective of whether the norm by which agreements must be kept is a moral or legal one. Another decretist, Paucapalea added that: Dictum est superius, quia nulli clericorum licet, proprium episcopum relinquere et ad secularem iudicem suffugere. Verum quia praelatorum insolentia sive subditorum in tantum est obstinata quandoque malitia, ut alter alteri iuramento firmavit, se non praestaturum ei obedientiam (Hic aliquid deesse, v. g. ponit casum vel simile, planum est). Cuius thema tale est: Episc. quid. iur. fals. etc.22

It further reinforces the diffidence of canon law towards oaths and the necessity to contain their doing. Thus, the interpretation and contextualisation of Causa XXII speculate not only on the lawfulness of oaths but also on whether the inobservance of a promissory oath is tantamount to perjury. Paucapalea and Rufinus’ answers suggest that the promissory oath was unlawful, and its inobservance was not tantamount to perjury to compel the archdeacon to abide by his prior agreement and, generally, to deny the rogue the possibility to elude liability. The unlawfulness of the promissory oath is only due to the existence of a prior engagement or promise made even without an oath. It means two things. First, that a prior and bare engagement cannot be terminated as a party sees fit according to a whim of fickle and arbitrary nature. It is binding without formality and must be kept. Second, it means that in all other instances, promissory oaths are binding if they do not contravene an existing obligation or if they create a new obligation between parties in circumvention of Matthew, 5 and James, 5 which impose a blanket prohibition of oaths. Therefore, Rufinus and Paucapalea half-hearted responses to the casus elaborated under Causa XXII suggest that while the Nova Vulgata prohibits promissory oaths, the Church might have accommodated them. Otherwise, it would have contradicted its own fiats by which agreements arising from consent must be kept for Matthew, 5 and James, 5 read that a ‘yes’ must be a ‘yes’ and a ‘nay’ a ‘nay’ in whatever form that it is expressed for none should deliberately or omissively misrepresent others be they king or common man; so as not to destroy the right of others to obtain the benefit or counterpart of an undertaking. Hence, Gratian (367-383) contended that:

their bishop, even to the point of not fearing to swear an oath of disobedience, it is only proper to complement the previous developments with a treatise on oath demonstrating how the archdeacon is guilty of perjury in that he swore an oath to disobey his bishop’. 22 Paucapalea (1890), p. 96. [My own translation]: ‘A higher norm commands that a clergyman cannot abandon their bishop and seek refuge with the secular courts. Some accounts relate the wrongheadedness that some clergymen show in disobeying their bishop out of sheer malice in spite of their pledge of allegiance. (The [previous] case study illustrates so much). It is discussed in the following works: Episc. quid. iur. fals. etc’.

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Sed aliud est ad iurandum sponte accedere, aliud vel ad asserendam innocentiam suam, vel ad federea pacis confirmanda vel ad persuadendum auditoribus quando pigri sunt credere quod eis utile est, iuramentum offerre.23

Besides, Hebrew, 6:16; Genesis, 9, 24:2-3; Psalm, 15:4; Exodus, 22:11; Isaiah, 45: 24; Ecclesiastes, 8:2; and Matthew, 14:9 all provide instances where it is possible to promise by oath and reinforce the moralistic duty that one has to observe that promise. Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) acknowledged himself the possibility for priests to swear an oath.24 It is without counting on Rufinus who admits the possibility for a defender and pursuer to swear by God (‘sic me deus adjubet’; ‘per deum juro’) to buttress the credibility of their pleas.25 Thus, the prohibition of Matthew, 5 and James, 5 was wholly undercut or mitigated.26 Consequently, the decretists elaborated a general promise theory by which every agreement arising from consent could be a contract. It made irrelevant the distinction between nominate, innominate, formal, and informal contract. Instead, it enshrined an autonomic and infinitesimal category of innominate contracts by which every agreement arising from consent could be a contract—whether it has a name of its own or lacks a specific denomination—provided it is lawful, possible, and underpinned by the consent of the party under obligation. Simultaneously, the canonists ascertained a general promise theory requiring neither acceptance nor form to be binding, but only the consent of the party under obligation. The legal value of what was originally a moral rule is confirmed in Bernardus Papiensis’ (c. 1145–1213) Compilatio Prima Antiqua (Breviarium extravagantium) (1187–1191) and Huggucio’s (c. 1140–1210) Summa Decreti Gratiani, XIII, 2.2. They argue that all conventions or promises must be interpreted in good faith by identifying the mutual assent of the parties to the terms and their intention to create legal relations. The first official compilation to sanction their jurisprudence is Decretales Gregorii IX (1234) in the form ‘pacta quantumcunque nuda servanda sunt’ (pacts, however naked, must be kept).27 Another is Sinibaldo Fieschi’s (1195–1254) (later Pope Innocent IV) glossa magna on Decretum Gratiani by which solus consensus obligat even if consent is obtained by violence.28 However, while all agreed that consent could create legal relations, the import of religion and the Christian moralistic duty to keep one’s word suggest that the engagement did not follow from the consent of the parties or their will but from God unto whom the engagement was taken. Matthew, 5 and James, 5 suggest that

23 Decretum Gratiani, Causa XXII, Qu. I, Canon 1. [My own translation]: ‘It is one thing to swear spontaneously [to undertake something]. It is another to swear an oath to affirm one’s innocence, peace treaties, or convince one’s audience when one is wary of [protecting what is] profitable to them’. 24 Maître Roland (1874), p. 81. 25 Rufinus, op. cit, 389 compare to Lex Salica, 58.21, 65.1. 26 See also Decretales Gregorii IX, 2.24; Liber Sextus Decretalium Bonifatius, 2.2. 27 Decretales Gregorii IX, 1.35.1.2 (Edict de pactis, 35). 28 Fieschi (1570), p. 8; Innocent IV (348) ad X.1.35.1 in Fieschi (1570).

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the promise had no intrinsic value. Instead, it is Christian morality that compelled parties to keep their word under penalty of sanction. It is the cause of the obligation: the reason one is under obligation to do, give or forbear. Not only does it forgo the need for material forms, but it also established the consent of the party under obligation as an autonomic condition. It affords the compelling of a party to keep their word under penalty of a religious sanction such as excommunication, Innocent IV ruling that ‘nisi pacta servet, excommunicabitur’.29 Thus, canon law appealed to the honour of the parties and their ability to do what is right and their duty to avoid what is evil. These commandments formed the basis for enforcing agreements arising from consent, and they asserted what acceptable contract behaviour is and what penalty a person would befall if they acted inconsistently. However, it would be wrong to believe that the canonical jurisprudence taken so generally as it is expressed above was unanimously accepted. Notably, the Romanists and interpreters of Roman law were coy about attacking the general Roman principle by which nudum pactum nulla nascitur actio. Indeed, the Italian jurist Bartolus de Sassoferrato (1314–1357) sought in Roman law the solutions to the problems arising in mos italicus, the Italian municipal laws. He concerned himself with the issue of freedom of consent to protect people who are presumed to be ignorant either due to their gender, age, or other reasons, thereby reintroducing form and limiting the scope of the consensual doctrine. He returned to classical Roman law which he sought to adapt to modern contractual practice. With his student Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400), he reintroduced the Roman taxonomy and flouted the general Christian consensual doctrine, thus being rational and faithful to the classical Roman rule by which consensualism is the exception and formalism the rule, pace the canonists.30 François Olivier-Martin and Klaus-Peter Nanz argue that in so doing, Bartolus and Baldus closed the gap between Roman law and canon law first by recognising the freedom of merchants to contract between them absent any form,31 and second by distinguishing between vestituren iure gentium and ius civile to allow private parties to contract freely absent any form only in certain circumstances.32 Christian Karsten claims that Bartolus and Baldus initiated, thereby, a pacta vestita theory allowing the sanction of nudum pactum according to the doctrine of cause (a causa).33

29

Innocent IV (348) ad X.1.35.1 in Fieschi (1570): nisi pacta servet, excommunicabitur. [My own translation]: ‘The non-performance of an agreement shall lead to excommunication’. 30 Segoloni (1962). See also Baldus (1577) and (1585); Mayno (de) (1585) ad D. 2.14.7.4. See also Horn (1968), pp. 187ff. 31 Olivier-Martin (1948) n°324, pp. 428–430. 32 Nanz (1985), p. 35. 33 Karsten (1967), pp. 113, 135.

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Olivier-Martin and Vincent Forray34 claim that Bartolus and Baldus’ jurisprudence contributed directly to the sanction of consent as a principle of contract in the ius commune and, beyond, in French law. It is impossible to tell whether their assertions are true given that, in following the traditional scourge featuring French legal-historical research, Forray and Olivier-Martin merely compile a summary of what earlier scholars have said and make a series of unverified claims against the backdrop of what other modern or contemporary authors have said without actually engaging with the primary sources. The issue with such a narrative is that none can engage with their writing critically and one can only take their word for it. It begs the question of how Bartolus’ jurisprudence was incorporated in French law if at all and what it concretely meant. First things first, what does it entail? Azo of Bologna (1190–1225) gives us some indications of what the pacta vestita theory covers. He argues that: . . .vestitur autem pactum sex modis: re, verbis, consensu, litteris, contractus cohaerentia, rei interventu. . .35

From this, it follows that it concerns, inter alia, the Roman consensual, oral, and real contracts. Chapter 2 demonstrated that they are those that engendered the erosion of form in Roman law and the sanction of consent as a source of obligation whose enforceability relied on the identification of the cause of the obligation (i.e., consent in whatever lawful form that it may be expressed). Azo’s fragment implies that pacta vestita is closely intertwined with the concept of cause which implied honestas, fidelitas, and the duty to have deference for one’s word. On this, Aquinas and Cicero argued in Summa Theologiae and De Officiis that: [Mendacium] est si quis non impleat quod promisit. Sed non omnia promissa sunt implenda, dicit enim Isidorus, in malis promissis rescinde fidem. Ergo non omne mendacium est vitandum.36 Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, is est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.37

Nevertheless, it is Accorso di Bagnolo also known as Accursius (1182–1263) who dedicated the most methodical development to it in his Glossa Ordinaria, better known as Glossa Magna (1220–1250). He argues that: Sed videtur quòd nullum pactum sit nudum: cùm quodlibet habeat in se consensum: unde vestiri consensu videtur: ut s.eod.l.j.§j. Respond, elegans, & tenuis vestis est consensus, quae

34

Forray (2007), pp. 56 et seq. Bologna (da) (1557, Reprinted 1968) C.2.3.1.15. [My own translation]: ‘Pacts take on their vestments in six ways: by way of a thing, by words, by writing, by consent, by conjunction, [or] by the transfer of a thing’. 36 Aquinas (1952) II-II, qu. 110, a.3, ad.5, pp. 725–726. [My own translation]: ‘It is a lie not to fulfil what one has promised. Albeit one is not bound to keep all their promises: for Isidore says that he who ill-promised can rescind his promise. Therefore, not every lie is a sin’. 37 Cicero (1990) 1.7.23 and 3.15.61, pp. 24, 330. [My own translation]: ‘The fundament of law and justice is the scrupulous and sincere observance of the promises that parties make for themselves’. 35

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datur nisi certis contractibus enumeratis: ut infit. De oblig. Ex consensu in princ. qui cùm sint favorabiles, & pingues, & calidi, levi veste vestitur. Sed quidam dicunt non vestin nisi rei interventu, cùm alia vestita nascentur. Sed contra eos est, quod dicit lob, Pelle, & carnibus vestisti me, &c.38

Accursius uses an allegory by which certain pacts are by nature sensitive to cold and suppose a beautiful, light, and warm garment to be actionable. By contrast, others, consensual obligations, are lush and warm by nature. It takes almost nothing to clothe and make them enforceable (‘elegans et tenuis vestis est consens, quae non datur nisi certis contractibus enumeratis. . .qui cùm sint favorabiles et pingues et calidi, levi veste vestitur’). Azo added that ‘si quidem pactum fuerit nudum propter nimiam frigiditatem, parere actionem non potest’39 and ‘nudum pactum parens actionem tale sit, ac si prorsus sterilis mulies generatet, vel virgo pareret’.40 Though it is madness, there is a method in Accursius and Azo's metaphors. Through pacta vestimenta, they meant to hinge the enforceability of contract on something other than consent which is needed either to flesh it out or justify its enforceability. It is the causa obligationis, the reason for conferring a claim on a contract vested with the promisee. The Italian jurist Raffaele Raimondi il Cumano (1357–1427) supported this jurisprudence in his Commentaria (1554). He asserted that: Secundum iusgentium qualibet conventio sive pactum, sive verbis, sive alio modo de consensu, sufficiebat at obligationem. . .haec autem obligatio iuregentium appellatur generalis. Unde sequitur vulgarites, quod pactum vel conventio expressa sive tacita naturaliter de iuregentium.41

It means that consent creates a natural obligation sanctioned by ius gentium by which parties must have deference for their word if it is expressed in a form recognised by law. But the principle is only applicable to obligations sanctioned under ius gentium and has, therefore, a limited scope. It means that in narrowing the gap between canon Accursius (1627), p. 178. [My own translation]: ‘An agreement made without consideration is not legally enforceable. The consent of the parties cannot be bare and requires a vestment. Consent takes on its vestment by way of a response, and elegant and refined add-ons that clothe and make it enforceable unless otherwise provided for. Consent is by nature sensitive to cold and supposes a beautiful, light, and warm garment to be actionable. By contrast, some obligations, are lush and warm by nature and do not require the intercession of anything to arise and be enforceable. This jurisprudence contrasts with the contention in the Book of Job by which obligation arise from the knitting together of skin and flesh with bones and sinews’. 39 Bologna (da) (1557, Reprinted 1968) C.2.3, n°14. [My own translation]: ‘Naked pactions are frail and frigid. They cannot, therefore, give rise to an action’. 40 Bologna (da) (1627). [My own translation]: ‘A naked paction can give rise to an action in exactly the same way as parthenogenesis in a neutered mule’. 41 Cumano (il) (1554) D.45.1, rubr., n. 2-4 in Nanz (1985), p. 42. [My own translation]: ‘According to the law of nations, agreement, pact, the utterance of words, or other means of consenting suffice to create an obligation. . .These are generally known as natural obligations. Hence the common expression: agreements, whether express or tacit, follow naturally all the consequences that natural law imposes upon them’. 38

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law and Roman law, the commentators of Roman law rejected the general sanction of consent as a source of obligation and limited it, instead, to specific classes of contract characterised by particular badges of enforceability. They are identified as nudum pactum a causa, contracta verbis, contracta re, consensual contracts, and innominate contracts (‘vestitur autem pactum sex modis: re, verbis, consensu, litteris, contractus cohaerentia, rei interventu’). Nonetheless, the requirement for a vestment supposes that it is not consent that makes the contract actionable but the vestment itself. It is prior, in the order of nature and supposition, to the validity of consent. Put differently, the finding of the cause of the obligation (i.e., the vestment) puts liability first, and the implication is made, subsequently, to justify the decision already arrived at: solus consensus obligat and pacta sunt servanda. Consent is nothing more than the formal and efficient cause of the undertaking, i.e., the thing apart from which there would be no obligation. By contrast, ‘pactum vel conventio expressa sive tacita’ (i.e., the vestment) is the material and final cause of the undertaking; that is, the tangible thing for the sake of which the undertaking would not be enforceable. The question is then to know how the commentators of Roman law construed causa and whether their interpretation thereof is consistent with the Roman sources from which it derives. From the outset, the fragments cited do not provide the answer to this question. They do no more than emphasising the question of why a contract is enforceable without explaining what features causa must have. Their phraseology only points out that vestita is a reasonable ground (cause) to give effect to consent without further elaboration. Therefore, one can only surmise what features vestita might have had to make contract actionable by examining first-hand how the classes of contract that it concerned operated (see Chap. 2). The classes of contract to which pacta vestita applied (i.e., pacta, contracta verbis, contracta re, contracta litterae, consensual contracts, and innominate contracts) all supposed, as Paul put it, that a party did, gave or forbore to do something in exchange for what the other party undertook or promised to do, give, or forbear.42 Therefore, it is my submission that the pacta vestita theory implied that the enforceability of undertakings and the effectiveness of the rule pacta sunt servanda relies on the identification of mutuality, reciprocity, consideration, or the counterpart of the undertaking. Consequently, causa has a dual role. It is first an objective body of facts or information showing whether the parties have agreed to modify, transfer, or extinguish a reciprocal obligation. Second, it is a subjective implement allowing the identification of the content of obligation subjectively. On this, Aquinas said that:

42

Digest, 19.5.5.

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Dicit ergo primo quod multoties contingit quod tres causae concurrurit in unam, ita quod causa formalis et finalis sint una secundum numerum.43 Ex quo possumus accipere quod sic se habet materia ad formam, sicut forma ad usum. Sed usus est cuius causa fit artificiatum: ergo et forma est cuius causa est materia artificialibus. Et sicut in his quae sunt, secundum artem, nos facimus materiam propter opus artis, quod est artificiatum; ita in naturalibus materia inest a natura non a nobis facta, nihilominus eundem habens ordinem ad formam, scilicet quod est propter formam.44

Altogether, it means that form (i.e., conventio expressa, causa) is the reason a party is under obligation. Causa finalis is the end and beginning of the undertaking. However, while Accursius rationalised causa, Aquinas sacralised it. He considered that God is the cause of every right so that undertakings do not derive their binding force from a natural obligation but from the obediential duty that men owe to God: Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum.45 The result is the same whether causa is religious or profane. Agreements must be kept. The question is then what happens if a rogue reneges or tries to elude liability. This question has already been partially answered regarding ius canonici. Under ius gentium, good faith can be raised as a defence to compel a promisor to observe their undertaking (see Chap. 2). The same is true under ius canonici. The holy scriptures discussed above affirm that one must not promise idly and foolishly and what is promised must be honoured under penalty of perjury.46 Innocent IV even recommended that the renegade be excommunicated.47 The real question is then to know what role morality and good faith played in the sanction of consent as a source of obligation and what their utility was when it was already admitted that consideration or divine law were good reasons underpinning the enforceability of conventio.48 The Digest provides some instances of how judicial interpretation could be used to compel parties to respect their promise and vindicate the consensual doctrine. D.2.14 reads that: Aquinas (1884) II.1.11, n°2, p. 88. [In the translation of Blackwell et al. (1963) §242]: ‘He says, therefore, first that it often happens that three of the causes combine into one, such that the formal cause and the final cause are one in number’. 44 Ibid., II.1.4, n.8, p. 66. [In the translation of Blackwell et al. (1963) §173]: ‘From this, then, we can conclude that matter is related to form as form is related to use. But use is that for the sake of which the artifact comes to be. Therefore, form also is that for the sake of which matter is in artificial things. And so as in those things which are according to art we make matter for the sake of the work of art, which is the artifact itself, likewise matter is in natural things from nature, and not made by us; nevertheless, it has the same ordination to form, i.e., it is for the sake of form. Hence it follows that it belongs to the same natural science to consider the matter and the form’. 45 Aquinas (1953) I. q. 6, a.3. §6. [In the translation of Barnes (2014), p. 358]: ‘God is ordered to nothing as to an end but rather is the ultimate end of all things’. 46 Sirach, 8:13; Matthew, 5:34-37; James, 5:12. 47 Aquinas (1952) II-II, qu.110, a.3, ad 5, pp. 725-26 and II.29.58. A 1 c and 2.9.62, q.1; Aristotle (1934) 5.5. 48 Aquinas (1953) I. Qu.5, a.4. 43

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Pr. Huius edicti aequitas naturalis est. Quid enim tam congruum fidei humanae, quam ea quae inter eos placuerunt servare? 1.1. Pactum autem a pactione dicitur (inde etiam pacis nomen appellatum est) 1.2. Et est pactio duorum pluriumve in idem placitum et consensus 1.3. Conventionis verbum generale est ad omnia pertinens, de quibus negotii contrahendi transigendique causa consentiunt qui inter se agunt: nam sicuti convenire dicuntur qui ex diversis locis in unum locum colliguntur et veniunt, ita et qui ex diversis animi motibus in unum consentiunt, id est in unam sententiam decurrunt. Adeo autem conventionis nomen generale est, ut eleganter dicat pedius nullum esse contractum, nullam obligationem, quae non habeat in se conventionem, sive re sive verbis fiat: nam et stipulatio, quae verbis fit, nisi habeat consensum, nulla est. [. . .] 2. Pr. Labeo ait convenire posse vel re: vel per epistulam vel per nuntium inter absentes quoque posse. Sed etiam tacite consensu convenire intellegitur. [. . .] 3. Postquam pignus vero debitori reddatur, si pecunia soluta non fuerit, debitum peti posse dubium non est, nisi specialiter contrarium actum esse probetur. [. . .] 4. [. . .] conventiones etiam tacite valent [. . .].49 Consequently, the implication of contract relied on the identification of conventio, that is, an agreement between parties. It was reinforced by natural equity of which Ulpian says, in a rhetorical question (‘huius edicti aequitas naturalis est. Quid enim tam congruum fidei humanae, quam ea quae inter eos placuerunt servare?’), that it is only consistent with human faith that what men have decided to do amongst themselves must be observed. Thus, in returning to Roman law, the post-glossators reinforced the binding force of consent through good faith like the Romans. It embodies an elementary and universally accepted principle fundamental to all undertakings by which conventions that are legally made must be performed according to justice and natural equity. Hence, D.2.14.7 reads that:

[My own translation]: ‘Justice underpins this Edict. It relies on natural equity, that is, everything consistent with good faith for what is more normal than a party observing those things upon which they have agreed? 1.1. The term pact is derived from pactio. Ditto for the word pax (peace). 1.2. An agreement denotes the consent of two or more persons to the same effect. 1.3. The term “conventio” is a general one. It refers to everything to which persons who have transactions with one another agree on to undertake or to settle a dispute. The same word applies to those who, in spite of their differences, reach an agreement on the same thing, in the same terms. Pedius defined “conventio” as a requirement for agreement so general that there is no undertaking that does not include it whether it has a name of its own or lacks any specific denomination; whether the agreement arises from the delivery of a thing or by word. Indeed, even stipulatio, which is verbally formed, is void if consent was not conveyed. 2. Labeo asserts that an agreement can arise from the delivery of a thing, the delivery of a letter, or by messenger. It can also be concluded between absent parties, and it is accepted that an agreement can arise from tacit consent. 3. However, after a pledge has been returned to a debtor, it is accepted that what is owed can be claimed if the money has not been paid. It is different if there is evidence to the contrary.4. [. . .] even tacit agreements are valid’. 49

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4. Sed cum nulla subest causa, propter conventionem hic constat non posse constitui obligationem: igitur nuda pactio obligationem non parit, sed parit exceptionem.50 5. Quin immo interdum format ipsam actionem, ut in bonae fidei iudiciis [. . .].51 It means that good faith and morality were a premiss to compel parties to abide by their words, especially where agreement could be implied by their conduct (‘item quia conventiones etiam tacite valent’). Consequently, natural equity or good faith even predated law, consent. They were the set of ideas, devices, and motives that justified and formed the basis for the enforcement of promises, not consent. It suffices to read D.2.14.7 to be convinced. It reads that: 9. Dolo malo ait praetor pactum se non servaturum. Dolus malus fit calliditate et fallacia: et ut ait Pedius, dolo malo pactum fit, quotiens circumscribendi alterius causa aliud agitur et aliud agi simulatur.52 10. Sed si fraudandi causa pactum factum dicatur, nihil praetor adicit: sed eleganter Labeo ait hoc aut iniquum esse, aut supervacuum. Iniquum, si quod semel remisit creditor debitori suo bona fide, iterum hoc conetur destruere: supervacuum, si deceptus hoc fecerit, inest enim dolo et fraus.53 11. Sive autem ab initio dolo malo pactum factum est sive post pactum dolo malo aliquid factum est, nocebit exceptio propter haec verba edicti “neque fiat”.54 It means that good faith and natural equity have no regard for the place of individuals in society. They mean only to establish a set of reasons or a logical basis for the sanction of consent. Hence, agreements reached by error, obtained by violence, or induced by malice (dolus) could not be enforced (‘dolo malo ait praetor pactum se non servaturum’).

[My own translation]: ‘Likewise, given that tacit agreements are valid, it is settled that the presence of the personal movable properties of a tenant in a rented property are to be regarded as a pledge to the property owner even though nothing is expressly agreed’. 51 [My own translation]: ‘Sometimes, it gives rise to an action, as in the case of good faith actions’. 52 [My own translation]: ‘The praetor says that he will not enforce agreements arising from malice or fraud. Scheming and deceit are constitutive of malice or fraud. As Pedius says, a contract is vitiated whenever there is an intended attempt to disguise the true nature of the undertaking and cheat another’. 53 [My own translation]: ‘The praetor adds nothing regarding agreements entered into for the purpose of defrauding. Albeit Labeo aptly ascertains that this would be either unjust or superfluous. It is unjust if the creditor who has given a prior release of good faith to his debtor should later be able to renege. It is superfluous if the creditor was deceived when he made the release for fraud entails deceit’. 54 [My own translation]: ‘Where a contract has been concluded out of malice or deceit ab initio, including where a fraudulent act has been committed after its formation, such a contract can be denounced according to the following formula contained in the Edict: “neque fiat” (nor let anything be done)’. 50

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It means that the efficacy of the material and efficient cause, conventio or consent, depends on the formal and final cause: good faith and natural equity. They support or strengthen the covenant of trust or promise through judicial discretion. Accursius even asserted that: Causa id est datio, vel factum, ex quo vestiatur contractus innominatus do ut des [. . .autem] promifit ex ea falsa cause, quae non suberat: quo casu non valet promissio. . . .55

Likewise, he established a moral order by which nudum pactum actio oritur only provided that the cause of the obligation is not false (‘falsa causa’), i.e., provided the undertaking is lawful. Differently, the canonists relied on natural law and religion to assert pacta sunt servanda, thereby bridging the gap between Roman and canon law.56 Henrique de Segusio, better known as Hostiensis (c. 1200–1271), argued in his Lectura (thirteenth century) that: Caveat ergo sibi is qui consentit, quia pacta, quantumcunque etiam nuda, secundum veritatem evangeli sunt servanda.57

It implies that the effectiveness of the solus consensus obligat doctrine depends on the self-righteousness that Christian morality imposes as opposed to the profane doctrine of good faith. It suggests that the validity and enforceability of nuda pacta a causa depended on the obediential duty that men owe to God and not so much on trust or reliance. It justified, in turn, the sanction of the apostasy and perjury of the tortfeasor or non-performing party. It is implied in Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae where he argues that: Deus autem est primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma.58

It means that God is the first efficient cause of anything on Earth. Aquinas added that: Praeterea, dicit Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., quod quia Deus bonus est, nos sumus. Sed ex Deo sumus sicut ex causa efficiente. Ergo bonum importat rationem causae efficientis.59

Accursius (1627) 1, p. 224. [My own translation]: ‘Causa denotes a counterpart or a circumstance that clothes an innominate contract and makes it enforceable such as doing something in exchange for something else [. . .however] a promise with a false cause cannot have any effect’. 56 Decretales Gregorii IX, 1.35.1.2 (Edict de pactis 35). 57 Hostiensis (1581) I, de arbitris 9.6. [In the translation of Hyland (1993) 416]: ‘Therefore, care must be taken by whoever consents, because pacts, however naked, according to the Scriptures, must be kept’. 58 Aquinas (1953) I. Qu. 3, a2. [In the translation of Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1947) Part I, Question 3, Article 2]: ‘Now God is the first agent since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form’. 59 Aquinas (1953) I. Qu. 5, a4. [In the translation of Shapcote (Fr) (1864–1947): ‘Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that we exist because God is good. But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore, goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause’. 55

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So, according to Augustine, because God is good and the efficient cause of our existence, goodness—understand rightfulness and lawfulness—especially God’s righteousness should determine what actions can be enforced. More so given that there is nothing voluntary in human acts (‘videtur quod in humanis actibus non inveniatur voluntarium’).60 Aquinas’ assertion implies that to him, the sanction of human actions is justified by the fact that everything is either a duty to or a sin unto God. It is the point Aquinas was making when he said ‘dicendum quod unumquodque habet speciem. . .’.61 It means that the promise escaped its author once it was made to become the property of the promisee who, in turn, could compel the promisor to perform their obligation. Hence, one had to refrain from promising idly or foolishly.62 The validity of the undertaking relied on reason. It decided what was right and what was wrong and urged men to know and do what is morally right. D.2.14 and Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 19, a15 when read together even suggest that this quality of knowing and doing what is morally right does not depend on the innermost conviction of the parties but on objective standards determining what is right and what is wrong. It concerns good faith and natural equity for the Romanists, and morality for the canonists. Either way, it means that it is in natural law that one must seek the denouement of the sanction and justification of consent as a source of obligation.

4.3

Natural Law and the Rise of the Ius Commune

As seen, the intellectual efforts of the canonists and Romanists allowed the advent of the rule solus consensus obligat under the guise of morality, good faith, and natural equity. While the canonists systematised the rule, the Romanists limited it to select categories of undertakings characterised by particular badges of enforceability. To Charles Dumoulin (1500–1566), the rule was observed ‘tant au for laïque qu’au for ecclésiastique’.63 It means that however limited its scope, canonists like laic Romanists acknowledged that agreements could arise from consent absent form unless otherwise required by exception. The evidence can be found in Charles Loyseau’s (1564–1627) Du droit des offices (1701) where he argues that: Néanmoins, il faut tenir que le Seau n’est pas nécessaire absolument à la perfection des Sentences ou Contrats d’autant que. . .le Contrat est parfait dès lors qu’il est signé des parties et du notaire : même l’escriture n’est pas absolument nécessaire à l’estre des Sentences et

60

Aquinas (1953) II. Qu. 6, a1. Aquinas (1953) I-II. Qu. 82, a3. See also Aquinas (1953) Prolegomena 85 and 9.85. [In the translation of Shapcote (Fr) (1864–1947)]: ‘Everything takes its species from its form’. 62 Sirach, 8:13; Aquinas (1953) 5.110. 63 Dumoulin (1562) rubr. n°42 and Loi 1, § si quis ita, n°7. 61

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Contracts, mais elle n’est requise que pour la preuve seulement, fors ès cas où la preuve literale est précisement requise, vulg. 1. Contrahitur, D., de pignoribus.64

Besides, Antoine Loysel’s Institutes coustumieres: Ou manuel de plusieurs & diverses reigles, sentences, & Proverbes tant anciens que modernes du Droict Coustumier & plus ordinaire de la France (1607) further attest to the enshrinement of Innocent IV’s jurisprudence in secular law. Pacta sunt servanda even though the plight of one’s troth was insincere or obtained by violence so that the eventual disorder that perjury might cause could always be sanctioned whether the aggrieved party or promisee incurred any direct loss. It follows from Loysel’s metaphoric assertion in his Institutes coustumieres by which ‘on lie les bœufs par les cornes et les hommes par les paroles, et autant vaut une simple promesse de convenance que les stipulations du droit romain’.65 In saying that ‘autant vaut une simple promesse de convenance que les stipulations du droit romain’, Loysel consolidated the canonical and Romanist jurisprudence. He sanctioned consent as a general principle of contract, thus halting the distinction between nominate, innominate, formal, and informal contracts. He enshrined the concept of binding unilateral promise requiring neither form nor acceptance to be enforced as if it were a contract. His jurisprudence relates to the general principle of accepted standards of conduct and morality pacta sunt servanda by which parties, in their interaction, must be, if not sincere, at least honest and not prevent either one of them from receiving the benefit expected of the contract. The phrase ‘on lie les bœufs par les cornes et les hommes par les paroles’66 further suggests that good faith is the underpinning of the sanction of consent as a general principle of contract. Consequently, Loysel reversed the Roman taxonomy to assert that contracts are by nature consensual. Does it mean that French law only recognised informal, innominate contracts from the sixteenth century onward and that the Roman taxonomy became irrelevant? It is a safe bet that real contracts, literal contracts, and solemn contracts still existed, and consent was not merely enough to create all forms of legal relations. Jean-Baptiste Poquelin (1622–1673), i.e., Molière, said in his kōmōidía Le dépit amoureux (‘Scorned Love’) (1656): Gros-René.

Pour couper tout chemin à nous rapatrier Il faut rompre la paille ; une paille rompue Rend, entre gens d’honneur, une affaire conclue ;

In Loyseau (1701) 2.4.32, 110. [My own translation]: ‘Nevertheless, it must be noted that a seal is not absolutely necessary for judgments or contracts to have effect, especially since. . .a contract is perfect as soon as the parties and notary public [witnessing the act] sign it: even writing is not absolutely necessary for judgments and contracts to have effect. It is merely required for an evidentiary purpose in the instances where the law imposes it as per vulg, 2. Contrahitur, D., de pignoribus’. 65 Loysel (1679) §357. [My own translation]: ‘One binds oxen by the horns, and men by words. The same applies as much to simple promises of convenience as to stipulations under Roman law’. 66 Loysel (1679) §357. [My own translation]: ‘One binds oxen by the horns, and men by words’. 64

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Ne fais point les doux yeux ; je veux être fâché.67 He wrote in L’amour médecin (‘Dr. Cupid’) (1665): Sganaelle.

Lucinde.

Oui, Monsieur, il faut faire un contrat pour ces deux personnes-là. Ecrivez (le notaire écrit). Voilà le contrat qu’on fait. Je lui donne vingt mille écus en mariage. Ecrivez. Non, non, je veux avoir le contrat entre mes mains.68

He added in L’Avare (‘The Miser’) (1668): Frosine.

Vous moquez-vous ? Vous ne l'épousez qu'aux conditions de vous laisser veuve bientôt ; et ce doit être là un des articles du contrat. Il serait bien impertinent de ne pas mourir dans trois mois ! Le voici en propre personne.69

It is unmistakable evidence that the acknowledgement of solus consensus obligat in canon law, the Romanist jurisprudence, Dumoulin and Loysel’s jurisprudence under the guise of morality, good faith, and natural equity did not stem the practice of formal contracts. They concern contracts that are only actioned by the performance of a given formality such as traditio of a token thing (e.g., a straw, rod, or sprig ( festuca)) or the constitution of writing supposedly for evidentiary purposes or perhaps due to a misguided vision of contract deeply embedded in cultural mores by which obligations and stipulations are only binding if they are put in writing.70 The frequency with which Molière refers to formal contracts in his plays— especially of nuptial agreements, donations, and inheritance—suggests, that spontaneous and reasoned formalities were entrenched in modern French cultural mores and represented a significant portion of agreements. It cannot be a coincidence. It indicates that even if ius canonici, ius gentium, and the Romanist jurisprudence sanctioned promises as contracts, the general sanction of consent as a source of obligations without form was not acquis in the modern period and did not halt the

Molière (1656) Acte IV, Scene 1. [My own translation]: Gros-René: ‘The straw must be broken; for a broken straw - Between people of honour, seals the deal; Make not sheep’s eyes at me; upset I wish to be’. 68 Molière (1665) Acte III, Scene 3. [My own translation]: ‘Sganarelle: Aye, Sir, a contract must be drawn between these two people. Write (the notary writes). Here are the terms of the agreement. I give her twenty thousand crowns in marriage. Lucinde: Nay, nay, I want to have the contract in my hands’. 69 Molière (1668) Acte III, Scene 4. [My own translation]: ‘Frosine. You are jesting, are you not? You will only marry him provided he makes you a widow soon; and this shall be a term of the contract. It would be much impertinent of him not to die in the next three months! There he is in the flesh’. 70 Cartulaire de Lerins, 8; Cartulaire de Marculfe, 2.5.3 (stipulatione subnixa): ‘Verum truncata et mutilata iis locis verba, notariorum more, constat, qui prœcipua etmagis solemnia adhibere solili, cœ- tera quœ subaudiri debent ultro prœtereunt, tanquam minus necessaria, cum brevilati nimium quant par est student’; Feudrix de Bréquigny (1791), p. 386: ‘haec chartula donationis omni tempore maneat roboratione subnixa’. 67

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practice of formal contracts. It can be seen in the works of the so-called legal humanists. André Alciat (1492–1550) belongs to the generation of the first proponents of legal humanism, a movement overfond of authority and accuracy of interpretation of the Corpus Iuris Civilis in the sixteenth century. He criticised the canonists, glossators, and post-glossators in his Digestorum titulos aliquot commentaria: In Codicis Iustinianei titulos aliquot commentaria (1560) for their overindulgence in indistinct, dogmatic constructions unconcerned with their consistency with the Roman sources on which they glossed. Instead, he advocated for a return to the Roman distinctions in his commentary on De pactis (C.J. II.3), thus rejecting the pacta vestita theory which he deemed inconsistent with the latter.71 He criticised the interpolations, extensions, and systematisation that the glossators made and asserted that there is no such thing as a pactum vestitum. Rather, he claimed that pacts and contracts are either made for a real or false cause in which case the action sanctioning the paction is one of good faith. It means that while the canonists and Romanists expended the consensual doctrine to afford the sanction of consent as a general principle of contract, the humanists, foremost amongst whom was Alciat, restricted it by remaining faithful to the classical Roman distinctions. Thus, they rejected anything they found at odds with it, especially the pacta vestita theory. François (Le) Douaren replicates forcefully Alciat’s jurisprudence in his Commentarius de pactis (1544). He claims that: Pactum non parit actionem. Intellige fisolum, ac nudum. Nam si pacto accesserit stipulatio vel traditio, aliaue iusta causa, actio dabitur. Causa cesante, nulla competit actio, nisi lege confirmarum sit pactum, vel post contractum bonae fidei statim interpositum fit. Quod adéo verum est, ut & si certis annis quod nudo pacto convenerat, datum fuerit, nihilo magis competit actio. Ex nudo pacto licet actio non nascitur tamen exceptio.72

It means that as in Roman law, the humanists considered that no action could arise from a naked paction but only an exception. It defeats the pacta vestita theory and its general purview and acknowledges instead that consent can be a source of obligations but only in limited circumstances. It is where the obligation is one of good faith and has a cause externalised in a particular form except for the four Roman

71

Alciati (1560), pp. 71 et seq, especially ad rubricam, nos 4, 6, 10 et 11. Douaren (Le) (1544) Cap. VI. De effectus, & potestate pactorum, In tit. De Pactis, 75. [My own translation]: ‘A naked pact cannot give grounds for an action unless the terms of the stipulation are complemented with the transfer of a thing or supported by another lawful cause. Neither can the failure of the condition whereunder a benefit was conferred, including the failure of a legal or factual situation, give grounds for an action; unless the agreement is supplemented with updated terms in good faith. It is so also of contracts that are rightfully terminated following the performance of all the obligations due under them. There would be no appropriate action. Albeit an exception may arise from a contractual action’. 72

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consensual contracts which bear their own cause in the form of synallagma; including the Roman real contracts.73 Hence, while the humanists such as Alciat and Douaren rejected the systematisation of solus consensus obligat and, therefore, the pacta vestita allegory that Accursius developed, they agreed that some agreements can arise from consent only provided they have a cause. Thus, Xavier Prévost’s assertion typical of the traditional scourge of French law by which in rejecting the pacta vestita theory and the canonical solutions the humanists rejected consensualism fair and square does not hold.74 The humanists upheld the consensual doctrine, which they read not as a general principle of contract but only as a special principle that had a limited remit. To give just one example, Jacques Cujas (1522–1590)—whom Prévost cites to say that the humanists were reticent towards the consensual doctrine—never said nor wrote that he is against the consensual doctrine. At most, his writing suggests that he did not construe it as generally as it came to be understood in the modern period. He wrote for instance in his monumental Opera Omnia (Prati:1837): ‘pactum nudum non parit actionem’.75 He added in his Paratitla in libros quinquaginta Digestorum seu Pandectorum Imperatoris Iustiniani (1570, Lyon, 1587): ex pacto autem datur exceptio vel replicatio formatur actio contractus sed non datur vel tolitur actio, nisi lege confirmatum sit.76

These statements do not presuppose any reticence towards the consensual doctrine. In limiting the scope of consensualism, Cujas only meant to restore the original meaning of pactum and specify how consent can exceptionally be a source of obligations, why, and according to what through the concept of cause. Thus, instead of speaking of the reticence of the humanists towards the consensual doctrine, it is more exact to speak of their conservatism and limitation of the scope of the doctrine. It says nothing of any opposition or reticence to it overall. However, there is evidence that Alciat and Douaren’s contemporaries did not care for the Historical school that they embodied and strived instead towards the systematisation of the consensual doctrine in keeping with the canonists and Romanists before them. They used Roman law selectively and cast aside the solutions they simply found at odds with modern society. Hence, Jean Domat (1625–1696) argued, for instance, that:

73

Ibid., pp. 16 et seq. Prévost (2015), pp. 140–150. 75 Cujas (1837) ad titulum de pactis, in Lib. X. Quest, Papin, 936. [My own translation]: ‘No action arises from a naked paction’. 76 Cujas (1587) ad Digesta, 2.14, p. 25. [My own translation]: ‘Naked pactions give grounds for an exception against the wrongdoer, as opposed to an action, as provided by law’. 74

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Les conventions sont les engagements qui se forment par le consentement mutuel de deux ou plusieurs personnes qui se font entre elles une loi d’exécuter ce qu'ils promettent.77

Note the lexical slip from promise to convention. Domat’s assertion implies that conventio, by which he meant contract, entails the reciprocal agreement of the parties to create legal relations as opposed to the consent of only one of them (i.e., promise). It also implies that following the humanists, the institutional writers of French law rejected the containment of the consensual doctrine to special classes of obligations characterised by particular badges of enforceability. Instead, they systematised it, thereby settling the dispute between canonists, Romanists, and humanists. This idea can also be found in Loysel’s statement by which ‘toutes les actions sont de bonne foi’.78 It implies that good faith and natural law are the underpinnings of this jurisprudence. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) defined precisely the procedure for interpreting and enforcing conventions in his masterpiece of legal theory, international law, and politics De iure belli ac pacis (1625, Barbeyrac: 1773) to enforce peace and regulate war.79 Book II is dedicated to agreements, promises, and contract (conventio) of which Grotius says that they are governed by ius gentium.80 It encompasses the rules beneficial not to every association of men, however congregated (i.e., ius civile), but to the vast amalgamation of every association of men.81 Accordingly, Grotius argued that: eodem modo dicitur, nihil esse tam congruum fidei humanae, quam ea quae inter eos placuerunt servare. Sic edictum de pecunia constituta, ubi nulla in constituent debendi causa praecesserit praetor consensum, favere dicitur naturali aequali.82

It means that Grotius considered that it is only consistent with natural law and equity that one should be faithful to their engagements not to defeat the right of another to receive the benefit of a contract. Consequently, Grotius considered that there is nothing more compliant to nature than the existence of means amongst men of obliging themselves absent any form. The underpinning of this promise theory is natural law and reason. Otherwise,

Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, p. 121. [My own translation]: ‘Conventions are those undertakings that are formed by the mutual consent of two or more persons who create between them a law by which they will fulfil their promises’. 78 Loysel (1679) §690. 79 Grotius (1773) Liber I and III. 80 Grotius (1773) Libri III, Caput XVII, 952. 81 Institutes of Gaius, 1.1. 82 Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, 394. [My own translation]: ‘Likewise, it is said that there is nothing more consistent with human faith than performing what one has pledged to undertake. As stated by the Edictum perpetuum under the rubric De pecunia constituta, where no cause precedes the obligation of the debtor, it is appropriate for the praetor to favour and decide according to natural equity’. 77

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Sequitur inde inter reges & populos diversos, pactorum, quamdiu nihil ex iis praestitum est, vim ene nullam praesertim iis, in locis, ubi nulla certa forma foederum aut sponsiorum reperta est. Tum vero ratio nulla reperiri potest, cur leges, quae qua si pactum commune sunt populi atque hocnomine vocatitur ab Aristotele & Demosthene, obligationem pactis passint addere; voluntas autem cujusque, hoc omni modo agentis ut se obligat idem non possit, praecipue ubi civili, impedimentum non affert.83

It means that to avoid that contract is defeated, especially where there are no set forms of contract or treaty, Grotius elaborated a promise theory requiring neither acceptance nor form but only consent (‘voluntate sufficienter’) for agreements to arise and be actionable. Not only does his theory conflate promise and contract, but also it removes form from the definition of contract. It means that to Grotius, contract is nothing more than a reasonable promise between parties as opposed to a reciprocal promise expressed in a particular form left to the discretion of the parties or imposed by statute; for instance, to maintain legal certainty or protect the parties. The references to divine law throughout De iure suggest that Grotius might have been influenced if not by the canonical developments on promise, at least by the moralistic Christian doctrine which enjoins Christians to have deference for their word lest they perjure themselves.84 Either way, Grotius considered the undesirable consequences of formalism which would deny the general and systematic binding force of promises, contracts, and pactions unsupported by consideration and freely entered into in the state of nature. It would, he said, nullify all extra-state or interstate treaties, especially in places where there exists no set form of treaty (‘sequitur inde inter reges & populos diversos, pactorum, quamdiu nihil ex iis praestitum est, vim ene nullam praesertim iis, in locis, ubi nulla certa forma foederum aut sponsiorum reperta est’).85 Hence, unlike Pedius who established conventio as an underlying principle of contract, Grotius systematised the consensus of the person under obligation as an essential and paramount principle of contract. He established it simultaneously as the material, formal, efficient, and final cause of obligations; that is, the reason for conferring a claim on a contract vested with the promisee according to divine law, natural law, and reason. While Grotius claimed to explain ius gentium and leave ius civile aside, he combined, in fact, the canonical and Romanist promise theories into a single coherent theory. It transcends the dichotomy between public and private law, strict law, and good faith. It justifies not only the binding force of public pactions but also Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, p. 393. [In the translation of Campbell (2001), p. 115]: ‘For in the first place, it immediately follows from thence, that there is no force in treaties between kings and different nations, till some part of them be carried into execution, especially in those places, where no certain form of treaties or compacts has been established. But no just reason can be found, why laws, which are a kind of general agreement among a people, and indeed are called so by Aristotle, and Demosthenes, should be able to give the force of obligation to compacts, and why the will of an individual, doing everything to bind himself, should not have the same power; especially where the civil law creates no impediment to it’. 84 Grotius (1773), pp. 9, 12–13, 17, 19, 21, 23, et seq. 62 references to ‘divine law’ overall. 85 Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput. XI, §1, p. 393. 83

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that of private pactions which must both observe the rule that the canonists formulated in the 13th century: pacta sunt servanda. However, if as Grotius says, ‘voluntate sufficienter’, the question arises of what becomes of form and legal certainty. Put differently, how can one assert with certainty that there is a lawful undertaking binding between the parties if it is not evidenced in a tangible form? The mention of natural equity and justice as the underpinning of Grotius’ theory suggests that, as in Roman law regarding pacta and innominate contracts, the determination of contract is to be made in factum.86 Grotius’ use of the word ‘causa’ to assert that it is only compliant with nature that agreements must be kept suggests that causa might have been another means of finding an obligation. In his jurisprudence, it takes the form of the identification of the reason(s) a party is under obligation following the factual determination of the intended meaning of the parties.87 It means that Grotius considered contract not in relation to its form but generally in relation to its substance, thus generalising the idea that every agreement arising from consent could be a contract and making irrelevant the taxonomy of yore by which agreements are either consensual or formal, nominate or innominate. The emphasis on consensus also appears in the works of his contemporaries and followers. Domat asserted in his turn that ‘le consentement fait. . .la convention’.88 It means that like Grotius, Domat who claimed to place the civil laws in their natural order construed contract only through its conventional element, thereby correlating consent with obligatio.89 Likewise, Samuel Pufendorf (1638–1694) contended that: Si quae autem inter homines ineuntur pacta, illa sancta observanda esse, sociabilis natura hominis requirit.90

To Pufendorf, pacta sunt servanda and solus consensus obligat only because sociability requires from men when they agree that they are faithful to their agreement according to natural law. It is one of the most inviolable maxims of natural law and the rule on which the whole order, the beauty, and all the agreeableness of human life depend. It shows that the canonical jurisprudence became mainstream in the sixteenth–seventeenth century. It also attests to the sanction of the consensual ideas contained in mos germanicus and mos gallicus, especially Beaumanoir’s jurisprudence by which:

Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, p. 394. Grotius (1773) Libri II, Caput XI, §1, p. 394. 88 Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec I, §10, p. 126. 89 Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, p. 121. 90 Pufendorf (von) (1759) 3.4.2 and 3.5.9. [My own translation]: ‘Human nature and sociability requires from men that they observe the agreements that they make between them’. 86 87

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“Convenances loi vaint” exceptées les convenances qui sont fetes par malveses causes.91

Like Grotius and Domat, references to form are absent from Pufendorf’s definition of contract. It is as if it had become inessential. Pufendorf argues that promises must be kept and do not need a constitutive formality other than consent. However, his mention of sociability and natural law (‘sociabilis natura hominis’) implies that consent is only enforceable so long as it is lawful. It means that the cause of the obligation must be appropriate. Consequently, ideas of consensualism in contract always revolve around the idea of a legitimate cause, whether it is construed as consideration or reason for contracting or enforcing a contract. It justifies and forms the basis for the enforcement of consent. More so since Pufendorf referred in the third chapter of De iure (1688) explicitly to passages of the Digest and Cicero’s De Officiis relating to the idea of cause to justify the binding force of consent.92 This jurisprudence also echoes in Robert-Joseph Pothier’s Traité des obligations (1761, Halpérin, 2011). Pothier begins his discussion by saying that: Un contrat est une espèce de convention. Pour savoir ce que c’est qu’un contrat, il est donc préalable de savoir ce que c’est qu’une convention. Une convention ou un pacte (car ce sont termes synonymes) est le consentement de deux ou plusieurs personnes, ou pour former entr’elles quelque engagement, ou pour en résoudre un précédent, ou pour le modifier.93

The phrase ‘un contrat est une espèce de convention’ suggests from the outset that unlike Grotius and Domat, Pothier did not conflate contract and conventio which he defined as a pact or the mutual consent of two or more people. Following, Pothier went on to specify the requirement that conventio must meet to become a contract. After he mentioned the need for an intention to create legal relations,94 pollicitatio which he defines as an offer that has not yet been accepted by the one to whom it is made,95 and acceptance, he developed the requirement for cause on which the enforceability of contract depends. It begs the question of what relationship consent and cause entertain and what role the cause of the obligation plays concretely in the determination of the binding force of consent. Grotius specified what cause might entail and how it must operate to support consent and make it binding. He writes in his chapter on promises: 4. Accedit his sapientum consensus: nam quomodo dicitur a jurisconsultis, nihil esse tam naturale, quam voluntatem domini volentis ren suam in alium transfere

Beaumanoir (de) (1842) 34.2, p. 2: [my translation] ‘agreement conquers law unless it is made for a wrongful cause’. For a similar opinion, see Pufendorf (von) (1759) 3.4.2. 92 Pufendorf (von) (1759) 3.4.2 and 3.5.9 with reference to Cicero, op. cit., 1.7. 93 Pothier (2011) §3, p. 5. [My own translation]: ‘A contract is a kind of convention. To know what a contract is, it is necessary to determine what a convention is in the first place. A convention or a paction (for they are synonyms) is the consent of two or more persons purporting either to create, terminate, or modify an obligation’. 94 Pothier (2011) §3 in fine, p. 5. 95 Pothier (2011) §4, p. 6. 91

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fidei humanae, quam ea quae inter eos placuerunt servare. Sic edictum de pecunia constituta, ubi nulla in constituent debendi causa praecesserit praetor jurisconsultus eum ait natura debere, quem jure gentium dare oportet, cujus fidem secuti sumus quo in locoprimum vox, oportet, necessitate quandam morale significat, neque vero admittendum est, quod ait Connanus, fidem secutas nos conseri, ubi res integra esse desiit: agebat enim eo loco Paulus de condictione indebiti: quae cessat si ex quali cunque pacta solutum qui fit, quia jam ante, re adhuc integra, naturae ac gentium jure dari oportebit etiam si lex civilis ad praescindendas citium occasiones auxilium suum non praestabat. 5. M autem Tullius in officiis tantam promissis vim tribuit, ut fundamentum justitiae fidem appellet, quam & justitiae sororem dixit Horatius; & Platonici saepe justiciam vocant υπóσχεση, quod fidelitatem trastuidit Apulgus; Ac Simondes justitiam definiebat, non modo acceptum reddere, sed & verum dicere.96 These passages mean three things. First, that those who have promised to undertake something must keep their word and are bound to do so their word escaping them once expressed to belong to the promisee (‘translatio iuris’). Second, that the bindingness of consent does not rely on consent itself, but on what Grotius calls ‘fundamentum justitiae fidem. . .naturali aequitati. . .[ac]. . .morales’, i.e., justice, natural equity, and morality. They compel those who have ensnared themselves with their word to observe what they have deliberately promised (‘Paulus quoque juris consultus eum ait natura debere, quem jure gentium are oportet, cujus fidem secuti sumus: quo in loco primum vox oportet, morale significat: neque vero admittendum est’).97

Grotius (1773) XI.4, p. 394. [In the transalation of Campbell (2001), pp. 115–116]: ‘4. This is an opinion confirmed by the wisdom of all ages. For as it is said by legal authorities, that since nothing is so consonant to natural justice, as for the will of an owner, freely transferring his property to another, to be confirmed, so nothing is more conducive to good faith among men, than a strict adherence to the engagements they have made with each other. Thus, a legal decision for the payment of money, where no debt has been incurred, except by the verbal consent of the party promising, is thought conformable to natural justice. Paulus the Lawyer also says that the law of nature and the law of nations agree in compelling a person, who has received credit, to payment. In this place the word, compelling, signifies a moral obligation. Nor can what Connanus says be admitted, which is, that we are supposed to have credit for a full performance of a promise, where the engagement has been in part fulfilled. For Paulus in this place is treating of an action where nothing is due; which action is entirely void, if money has been paid, in any way, whether according to the manner expressly stipulated, or any other. For the civil law, in order to discourage frequent causes of litigation, does not interfere with those agreements which are enforced by the law of nature and of nations. 5.Tully, in the first book of his Offices, assigns such force to the obligation of promises, that he calls fidelity the foundation of justice, which Horace also styles the sister of justice, and the Platonists often call justice, truth, which Apuleius has translated fidelity, and Simonides has defined justice to be not only returning what one has received, but also speaking the truth’. 97 Ibidem., p. 394. 96

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Consequently, Grotius incorporated consent as part of a factual structure, especially social and moral. He developed causa by preterition,98 not as a means of giving effect to the internal will of the parties, that is, the individual and personal reasons justifying the action of each of them (causa proxima), but as an instrument of social control. It affords: (i) the vindication of consent as a source of obligation without formality, (ii) the identification of the underpinning of the consensual doctrine, and (iii) the general control of the consistency of agreements with a system of values and principles of conduct recognised by law (causa remota). Another thing that justifies the bindingness of consent is the nature of the agreement. Grotius’ reference to Plato and υπóσχεση (yposcheseos) which entails συνάλλαγμα (synállagma) suggests that the causa obligationis, the reason for conferring a claim on the promise vested with the promisee is the commutative nature of the undertaking. The reference to Aristotle and Demosthenes in the preceding paragraph confirms this.99 It means that beyond morality and lawfulness, the binding force of engagements resides in the identification of the counterpart of the undertaking. However, the requirement for counterpart seems to be only an ablative condition given the emphasis on ‘fidei humanae’, ‘naturali aequitati’, and ‘jure gentium’. Or it was a cumulative condition given Grotius’ reference to Paulus and the Roman condictio indebiti. It implies that all agreements must have a counterpart. Otherwise, they cannot produce the desired legal effects. Be it as it may, Grotius assigned implicitly three roles to causa to determine the binding force of consent. First, it is an objective implement that hinges the enforceability of consent on what is fair and equitable contractual and social behaviour. Second, it is an instrument of social control protecting the parties through the requirement for deliberateness. Hence, Grotius denies the ability of ignorant and intellectually limited people to contract.100 Third, he wielded causa as a requirement for counterpart denoting either failure of a condition whereunder a benefit was conferred or the failure of a legal or factual situation (condictio causa data causa non secuta). Either way, a condictio indebiti—a Roman action sanctioning unjustified enrichment and affording the annulment of contracts sine causa—sanctions the situation created. Hence, consent is binding even without acceptance or form if it is given informedly and expressly. In turn, good faith or natural equity and justice prevent the rogue from eluding liability and contending there was no contract. It means that the consensual doctrine in Grotian jurisprudence relies generally on reason in the form of a value determination.

98

By preterition means that causa was mentioned in passing while Grotius professed to omit it. Ibidem., p. 394. 100 Grotius (1773) XI.5, p. 394. 99

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The role of causa in the determination of the binding force of consent also echoes in Pufendorf’s De iure. He writes in his second chapter on the general regime of conventions: §1. Consequens est, ut videamus de contractibus, qui sine dominio rerum, earundemque pretio non intelliguntur. Ubi ab initio inquirendum in discrimen, quod esse putatur inter pacta simplicia, & contractus. Hobbesio de Cive c. 2. §9. contractus vocatur actio duorum aut plurium mutuo sua jura transferentium. Sed cum in omni contracta vel uterque statim praestet id, de quo est conventum, ita ut alter alteri nihil credat; vel alter praestat, alteri credatur; vel denique neuter statim praestet, sed uterque alteri fidem invicem habeat: pioris classis contractus solo generis nomine contentos esse jubet; illos autem, ubi vel alteri, vel utrique creditur, & ubi is, cui creditur, promittit se praestitum postea, pactorum nomine insigniendos putat. Enimvero isthæe [sic] differentia non concernit ipsam contractum & pactorum indolem in se, sed corundem dumtaxat exsecutionem. Et a commui usu abhorret, illam quidem, verbi gratia, emptionem, quæ Græca fide peragitur, contractum; hanc autem, ubi in præsens quidem merx præslatur, pretium autem deinceps solvendum promittitur, pactum vocare.101 Pufendorf does two things. First, he distinguishes between contract and promise, according to Thomas Hobbes’ (1588–1679) jurisprudence. He asserts that a contract denotes two reciprocal obligations performed simultaneously. It is obvious when one knows the meaning of contract from Latin contractus, which means to draw together. It implies that each party does something to be bound and drawn to the other. By contrast, a promise or simple convention (i.e., pactum) is only the agreement of the party under obligation. Second, Pufendorf explains what causes the undertaking, what underpins it. Regarding contract, it is the reciprocity and simultaneous performance of the respective obligations of the parties. It can also consist of two reciprocal promises whose performance is postponed or an engagement that is partly performed only by one of the parties who, in turn, relies on the promise of the other to perform their side of the obligation. It makes moot the distinction that Pufendorf endeavoured to make

Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, p. 217 [emphasis added]. [My own translation]: ‘We come now to treat of those contracts relating to property and price. Hobbes defines contract generally as the action of two, or more, persons who mutually transfer something to one another. But he adds that in every contract, each party performs their part of the obligation according to what is agreed and relies on the good faith of the other; or that neither party performs anything immediately but only pledges to do something in future. To the first of these situations, Hobbes gives the name of contract. But if one of the parties or both are compelled to rely on the word of the other and rely simultaneously on the good faith of the other to oblige themselves in turn, then, according to Hobbes, we are dealing with a simple promise. This distinction, as can be seen, does not concern the intrinsic nature of simple promises or contracts but only regards their execution. Besides, common sense prevents us from giving the name of contract to the sale that is completed by the immediate delivery of the goods and payment of the price. Likewise, common sense only allows us to consider credit sales as simple promises’. 101

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between contract and promise since he ended up saying that a contract is that very thing from which it is supposed to be distinct. Nonetheless, Pufendorf’s sanction of the Hobbesian contractual jurisprudence asserts that the consensual doctrine by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract relies on the concept of cause understood as consideration. His general construction of cause is more straightforward than Grotius’. He understands it to mean commutative justice or good faith regarding contract (i.e., quid pro quo) and only good faith regarding promises. Hence, real contracts derive their binding force from the transfer of the thing and consensual contracts from externalised consent or reliance102 provided the obligation is onerous.103 By contrast, where the obligation is gratuitous, the cause of the obligation is the benevolence of the promisee who, Pufendorf says, can only be compelled to undertake what they promised absent judicial discretion, thus denying judicial interpretation based on good faith.104 This argument is problematic in many respects. First, gratuitous obligations do not require a counterpart and only one party is under obligation, so they cannot be contracts. It reveals that although Pufendorf strived to distinguish promise from contract, he conflated and commixed them, and understood contract only in terms of promises. Second, the use of good faith to buttress the binding force of consent regarding onerous contracts makes even more moot the distinction between the cause of contract (i.e., reciprocity) and promise (i.e., good faith). The reason is Pufendorf later acknowledged that either way, good faith can also be used to identify the rationale behind the contract and enforce it. Third, while he implied at the beginning of his chapter on contracts or conventions in general that good faith underpins only the binding force of promises, he later said that when the obligation is gratuitous, that is, when the obligation is a simple promise under which only one of the parties is under obligation, good faith cannot be used to determine the obligation of the party who ensnared themselves by their word, thus curbing judicial discretion. So, it is unclear how good faith can simultaneously underpin promise and be incompatible with its finding. However, based on Pufendorf’s inapposite and maladroit distinctions characteristic of the doctrinal quibble affecting causa and the distinction between contract and promise, unlike Grotius, he asserted more overtly the role of causa in the determination of the enforceability of all undertakings whether it is construed as good faith, reciprocity, consideration, or reason; simultaneously or exclusively. Though, good faith only applies where a party can legitimately expect something from the other such as when they acted in reliance on what the other party promised to do or undertake; without it being possible for judges to exercise discretion and create obligations other than those the party under obligation specifically chose for themselves if the obligation is gratuitous. It does not affect the binding force of the

102

Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, para 1, p. 220. Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, para 9, p. 223. 104 Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.2, para 8, p. 223. 103

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simple promise, which is binding either way as soon as it is made. Its cause resides, in turn, either in the intention of the donor to perform an act of benevolence (animus contrahendi) or in the exchange of something for something else. By and large, it means that the effectivity of the consensual doctrine does not always rely on what the other party undertakes but generally on reason which, like the Grotian promise theory discussed above, imparts its binding force on undertakings be they contracts or promises. It enhances the primacy of consent over form in contract formation. It affords the sanction of a contract whether it has a name of its own or lacks a specific denomination irrespective of its form according to Roman and natural law.105 It begs the question of whether the definitive sanction of consent as a general principle of contract in modern French law relied on the same underpinnings and understanding or whether its justification differed. Domat wrote: L’usage des conventions est une suite naturelle de l’ordre de la société civile et les liaisons que Dieu forme entre les hommes.106

It means that less secular than Pufendorf, Domat construed causa obligationis as natural equity and justice (‘suite naturelle de l’ordre de la société civile’) but also as referring to obediential duty to God or Christian morality like Grotius (‘L’usage des conventions est une suite. . .[des]. . .liaisons que Dieu forme entre les hommes’). He added: Les conventions devant être proportionnées aux besoins où elles se rapportent, elles sont arbitraires et telles qu’on veut ; et toutes personnes peuvent faire toutes sortes de conventions, pourvu seulement que la personne ne soit pas incapable de contracter, et que la convention n’ait rien de contraire aux lois et aux bonnes mœurs.107

It means that while Domat construed consent as the material and formal cause of contract, contract in his theory derives its binding force not so much from consent but either from (Christian) morality, reason, lawfulness, or consideration which he construed as an adequate counterpart. Hence, he said: Les conventions étant des engagements volontaires, qui se forment par le consentement, elles doivent être faites avec connaissance et avec liberté et si elles manquent de l’un ou de l’autre de ces caractères, comme si elles sont faites par erreur, ou par force, elles sont nulles, suivant les règles qui seront expliquées dans la section V. . .les conventions doivent être proportionnées aux besoins où elles se rapportent. . .et. . . pourvu seulement que la personne

105

Pufendorf (von) (1759) 5.3, p. 227 and 5.7, pp. 316–317. Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, p. 121. [My own translation]: ‘The making of conventions follows from the natural order of civil society and the connections that God creates between men’. 107 Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec II, §1, p. 128. [My own translation]: ‘Conventions must be proportionate between the parties whatever their subject-matter. They are arbitrary and can relate to anything the parties want granted each of them is capable of contracting and the convention is not contrary to good mores and the law’. 106

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ne soit pas incapable de contracter, et que la convention n’ait rien de contraire aux lois et aux bonnes mœurs.108

Together, reason, morality, and causa are the efficient and final cause of the obligation. They determine whether it is enforceable and justify the coercion of a party to keep their agreement, especially morality and reason which foist fairness as a fundamental unit in all agreements Domat saying: Les conventions étant formées, tout ce qui a été convenu tient lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites, et elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement commun, ou par les autres voies qui sont expliquées dans la section VI.109

The Domatian consensual doctrine moved French law further away from the subjective determination of the internal will of the parties (voluntas) to the objective determination of whether an undertaking is conscionable and whether the values exchanged are substantially equal or not. It means that consent must meet specific rules and conditions serving as its cause to generate obligations. They are prior, in the order of nature and supposition, to the occurrence of the obligation and underpin it once consent is found. Pothier confirms this theory. After he defined contract as a kind of convention and pact, Pothier specified the requirements that consent must meet to be actionable. He began by outlining a requirement for intention and how consent should be identified by developing the concept of pollicitatio (offer) and acceptance. It means that from the outset, consent in modern French law was not the reason a contract could be enforced but the deliberateness and freedom with which it was given as opposed to the Grotian jurisprudence. They are what make it efficient, the thing apart from which consent could not be enforced. Regarding its final cause, the things for the sake of which it is binding, Pothier gives several justifications. He says: 42. Tout engagement doit avoir une cause honnête [et] dans les contrats intéressés, la cause de l’engagement que contracte l’une des parties est ce que l’autre partie lui donne, ou s’engage à lui donner [tandis que] dans les contrats de Bienfaisance, la libéralité que l’une des parties veut exercer envers l’autre, est une cause suffisante de l’engagement qu’elle contracte envers elle [sinon] l’engagement est nul [y compris si la cause est fausse].110

Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec II, §1, p. 129. [My own translation]: ‘Conventions are voluntary obligations arising from consent. They must be created intently and freely. Should they lack either/ or, or arise from defects in consent such as error and duress, they are void according to the rules laid down under section V. . .agreements must be proportionate between the parties whatever their subject-matter. . .and. . .require capacity to contract as well as consistency with the law and good mores’. 109 Domat (1828) ibidem., §7, p. 130. [My own translation]: ‘Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those who have made them. They may be revoked only by mutual consent or for causes discussed under section VI’. 110 Pothier (2011), pp. 21–22 [emphasis added]. [My own translation]: ‘Every undertaking must have an honest cause [and] in pecuniary contracts, the cause of the obligation of one of the parties is 108

4.3

Natural Law and the Rise of the Ius Commune

105

It echoes in what he said at the beginning of his discussion in his Traité: 3. . . .dans notre droit on ne doit point définir le contrat comme le définissent les interprètes du droit romain, Conventio nomen habeans à jure civili, vel causam; mais qu’on le doit définir, une convention par laquelle les deux parties réciproquement, ou seulement l’une des deux, promettent et s’engagent envers l’autre à lui donner quelque chose, ou à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose. . .Il n’y a que les promesses que nous faisons avec l’intention de nous engager, & d’accorder à celui à qui nous les faisons, le droit de nous contraindre à les accomplir, qui forment un contrat & une convention. . .de bonne foi & avec la volonté actuelle de les accomplir.111 It means that before codification, the French institutional writers hinged the efficiency of consent on consideration. Pothier explained it is a requirement for counterpart that need not be pecuniary regarding onerous contracts. It also denotes a purely selfless and benevolent act regarding gratuitous obligations; that is, simple promises which he wrongly calls gratuitous contracts. Either way, the party under obligation must act in good faith and have had an intention to create legal relations. Otherwise, consent cannot produce the desired legal effects. It means that an agreement made for a vitiated cause or a false cause or without a cause is null. However, the cause of the obligation need not be expressed, Pothier added. It begs the question of what becomes of form. The development of causa paired with good faith, natural equity, and justice suggests that form becomes completely unnecessary. Causa substitutes the interpretation and supplementation of legal facts for the identification of the form in which contract was expressed. It makes unnecessary the need for form. It is a technical, rational, and objective instrument affording the determination of the enforceability of undertakings according to good faith whether they are nominate or innominate. It means that the development of causa by the ius-naturalists and institutional writers of French law in the modern period made the identification of contract contingent on the assessment of the validity of the grounds for contracting according to ethics and appropriate contract behaviour absent form. Objective, the cause of the obligation is absolute, fluid, and plastic. It does not depend on the consciousness of the perceiver, one’s feelings, wishes or whims by way of good faith or what Pothier calls honesty. Causa is, thus, a permanent feature of consent and the consensual doctrine. Hence, the effectiveness of the consensual doctrine in natural law in the modern

that the other pledges to give to or do something for them [whereas] in gratuitous contracts, the [intended] benevolence of one of the parties is a sufficient cause for the obligation [otherwise] the obligation is void [including where the cause of the obligation is false]’. 111 Pothier (2011), p. 5. [My own translation]: ‘. . .in our law, contract must not be defined as the interpreters of Roman law did; that is, Conventio nomen habeans à jure civili, vel causam; but it must be defined as an agreement by which two parties mutually promise, or merely of them, to undertake something for the other consisting in giving, doing or forbearing. . .Only promises that are made intently can be contracts. . .according to good faith and an intention to be bound’.

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period relied on the duality of causa which not only afforded the identification of the object of the undertaking, but also justified the binding force of nuda pacta. Consequently, form, if there were any, was left to the discretion of the parties and played only an evidentiary role limiting judicial discretion. Pothier notes an exception, however. It is where: 10. Il est nécessaire qu’il intervienne quelque chose d’autre que le consentement.112 In such a case and by exception, something other than consent is needed for the creation of legal relations such as a formality in the form of the transfer of a thing. It concerns real contracts. Another exception is where the parties require a solemnity chosen by themselves, usually writing, in which case the undertaking cannot take effect until after the solemnity has been performed,113 including where the lawmaker imposes it. In this regard, Pothier cites Ordonnances de Moulins (1566) by which a contract of value over 100 Tours pounds (livre tournois) had to be put into writing whether privately signed or authenticated unless there was a physical or moral impossibility of written evidence being obtained, especially if it was customary not to establish written evidence or where the written evidence has been lost as a result of force majeure.114 It means that on top of sanctioning consent as a general principle of contract according to the doctrines of cause and good faith, Pothier also enshrined a taxonomy by which agreements are consensual and do not require a form. However, the idea that contract arises only from consent conveys only one aspect of modern French law. By exception, some contracts still required a formality to arise: real and solemn contracts. Nonetheless, they did not escape the requirement for cause and honesty given the generality of Pothier’s assertion by which ‘tout engagement doit avoir une cause honnête’.115 What does honesty entail concretely? Pothier does not provide a direct answer to that question. However, his discussion of cause follows that of defects or vices of or in consent. It implies that beyond cause and good faith, the effectiveness of the consensual doctrine relies further on social and ethical standards prescribing how consent can be given and obtained. Thus, Pothier conditioned the effectiveness of the consensual doctrine on the rectitude or depravity of the line of conduct of a party, thus being less radical than some ancient writers, especially Innocent IV who considered that pacta sunt servanda even if consent is insincere or obtained by violence. It is clearer still from the following extract:

112 Pothier (2011), p. 10. [My own translation]: ‘It is necessary that something other than consent intervenes’. 113 Pothier (2011) §11, p. 10. 114 Pothier (2011) §785, pp. 385–386; Ordonnances de Moulins, Article 54. 115 Pothier (2011) §42, p. 21.

4.4

Conclusion

107

21. Le consentement qui forme les conventions doit être libre, si le consentement de quelqu’un des contractants a été extorqué par la violence, le contrat est vicieux ; au reste comme le consentement quoiqu’extorqué par violence est un consentement tel que voluntas, coacta est voluntas (gloss. Ad. L. 21. §5. ff. quod met. caus.). On ne peut pas dire comme dans le cas de l’erreur, qu’il n’y a point eu absolument de contrat ; il y en a un, mais il est vicieux, & celui dont le consentement a été extorqué par violence, ou bien ses héritiers ou cessionnaires peuvent le faire annuler & rescinder, en obtenant pour cet effet des lettres de rescision.116 It means that there is no contract where consent was given only by error and contract is voidable where it was extorted by duress or obtained by deception. Thus, with Pothier, the consensual doctrine did not only denote pacta sunt servanda in modern French law before codification. By contrast, it also denoted a means of regulating the conduct of parties and protecting them from arbitrary use of freedom for freedom without guidance leads only to ruin. In turn, breach must be sanctioned by law even without any penalty incurred by the aggrieved party.

4.4

Conclusion

Much can be learnt from the study of the idea and role of consent in the development of a taxonomy of contract and elaboration of a general theory of contract by which every agreement arising from consent could be a contract in the modern period; unless otherwise provided for by exception. This chapter shows that consensualism and ideas of consensual contracts were not developed without fits and starts and improved through progressive inherited change. By contrast, the development of a general contractual jurisprudence based on consensus relied on an interplay of ideas, chaos of opinions, an embroilment of political and religious interests clashing with one another as if the world would fall into disrepair in a dreadful cataclysm. Nonetheless, canon law, the selective and incomplete interpretation of Roman law by the glossators and postglossators, and natural law show just how much the human mind took off in the modern period; a period featuring pragmatism, adaptation, newness, and change. In turn, it fed a debate on how men should engage themselves, how men could engage themselves more efficaciously, and how they could be coerced to keep their word and why.

R Pothier (2011) §21, p. 15. [My own translation]: ‘The consent underpinning the obligation must be free. If the consent of any of the party was extorted by duress, the contract is vitiated; albeit consent extorted by duress is a form of consent consistent with the adage voluntas, coacta est voluntas (gloss. Ad. L. 21. §5. ff. quod met. caus.). It cannot be said, as in the case of error, that there has not been any contract at all; there is one, but it is vitiated and the party whose consent has been extorted by duress, or their heirs or assignees can request its rescission and obtain, to these effects, rescission orders’.

116

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Reflections on good faith, natural equity, justice, cause, morality, and reason helped and underpinned this development. They became a substantial reason for enforcing a contract. They undermined the requirement for a form to focus the determination of contract on the identification of its content according to sense, moderation, understanding, and propriety. They constituted the truism, dictum, epigram, and, to borrow Immanuel Kant’s expression, the ‘categorical imperative’ of social life.117 They caused growing consensus in canon law justifying the regulae juris pacta sunt servanda derived from the Roman regulae pacta conventa servabo.118 It was a special formulation of the general dictum that one must have deference for their word. It ensued from philosophical, political, and social thoughts infused with natural equity and justice. It established (Christian) morality as a superior norm underpinning the binding force of consent. It was a principle which few controverted. Hence, the stumbling block regarding its scope between canonists, Romanists, and humanists never detracted from the fact that the legal value of engagements in the ius commune and their degree of formality depends on the emphasis that jurists put on the parole or promise of parties and their concern for establishing strict or flexible procedures or behaviours for their enforcement. The conversion of the consensual trial and error in natural law and modern French law is a good indication that the character of the consensual doctrine is its fondness for fairness and justice and its appeal to honour, morals, and ethics as embodied by the polysemic doctrine of causation. It cast doubt on the utility of form. Consequently, consensualism in the modern period was generally construed as a doctrine affording only the acknowledgement in positive law of the consequences of morality in the form of a value determination of what is acceptable contract behaviour. Its effect is to interweave law and morality and make formal contracts the exception while imposing a duty on parties to be faithful to their word. It is a moral requirement transcending even religion. It stems from the sanction of breach of faith ( fides) and perjury (wilful misrepresentation). Its development in the modern period reveals a subversive doctrine which, when it is pushed to its extreme, attacks the very idea of formalism and authority and touts the import of freedom but with guidance. It is reminiscent of the literary and artistic Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns in the seventeenth century during which self-proclaimed classic and ancient authors supported the emulation of the standards and taste of classical Antiquity in their art like the humanists. On the other hand, self-proclaimed modern authors—like the Romanists and ius-naturalists—asserted that antiquarian art was outdated and creative writing—a fortiori creative legal thinking—entails progress and innovation through technique. The victory of the latter jurisprudence over the former had for its consequence that it was reason that came to underpin the binding force of contract in modern law, not consent itself. It foreshadowed law and the formation of the undertaking. It

117 118

Kant (1993), pp. 30, 36. Digest, 2.14.7.7.

Canon Law

109

concludes the development of consensual contractual ideas in ancient law on the cusp of the late modern period before codification.

Statutory Provisions Lex Salica • 58.21. • 65.1.

Roman Law Digest • 2.14.7.7. • 19.5.5. Institutes of Gaius, 1.1.

Canon Law Cartulaire de l'évêché de Poitiers ou Grand-Gauthier (839) n°21. Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Saint-Etienne de Dijon (882, Courtoi). • 13. • n°39, 60. Cartulaire de Lerins, 8. Cartulaire de Marculfe, 2.5.3 (stipulatione subnixa). Cartulaire de Perrecy (821, Lichey) in Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de SaintBenoît-sur-Loire (Paris: 1900) n°17, 38. Cartulaire de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon (876, Pérard). • 152. • n°301. Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae, Pars Tertia, Section Secunda, Articulus 2, § 2152. Accessed on 12 August 2020, available at https://www.vatican.va/archive/ catechism_lt/p3s2c1a2_lt.htm#ARTICULUS%202%C2%A0%20SECUNDUM% 20PRAECEPTUM (LA) and http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/cate chism/p3s2c1a2.htm(EN). Charte de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire

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• (818, Autun) n°13, 30. • (818, Autun) n°30, 85. • (836, Vouneuil) n°20, 48. Decretales Gregorii IX • 1.35.1.2 (Edict de pactis 35). • 2.24. Decretum Gratiani • Causa XXII, Qu. I, Canon 1. • Causa XXII, Qu. V, Canon 12. Innocent IV., ‘Canon XII of the Council of Carthage’ (348) ad X.1.35.1 in Fieschi, S (1570) Apparatus in quinque libros decretalium. Moenum, Frankfurt. James, 5:12. Liber Sextus Decretalium Bonifatius, 2.2. Matthew, 5:34-37. Sirach, 8:13119

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Part II

Reception, Relevance, Evolution, and Implications in the Civil Code of France: De Lege Lata

Chapter 5

Article 1101 and the Systematisation of Consent as a General Principle of Contract

5.1

Introduction

Félix-Julien-Jean, Count Bigot de Préameneu drafted the section of the Civil Code of France on contracts and conventional obligations. It is based on a selected and reinterpreted Roman law.1 The articles he drafted were incorporated literatim in the Civil Code in 1804 without controversy. They remained largely unaltered until 2016. Bigot de Préameneu’s contractual jurisprudence appears to be entirely based on Pothier’s Traité des obligations. It is a faithful account of the last state of French law before codification. It was itself based on selective incorporation and adaptation of Roman law, French customary law, and natural law. The evidence is the proximity in Pothier and Bigot de Préameneu’s expression. On the one hand, Pothier argued that: 2. Un contrat est une espèce de convention. . .Une convention ou un pacte (car ce sont termes synonymes) est le consentement de deux ou. . .plusieurs personnes, ou pour former entr’elles quelque engagement, ou pour en résoudre un précédent, ou pour le modifier. . .dans notre Droit, on. . .doit. . .définir le contrat comme. . .une convention par laquelle les deux parties réciproquement, ou seulement l’une des deux, promettent et s’engagent envers l’autre à lui donner quelque chose, ou à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose.2

1 Fenet (1968), p. 46: ‘M. Bigot de Préameneu dit que les dispositions du titre qu’il présente sont puisées en entier dans le droit romain, en écartant cependant quelques subtilités qui le déparent’. 2 Pothier (2011), p. 5. [My own translation]: ‘A contract is a kind of convention. . . A convention or a paction (for they are synonyms) is the consent of two or. . .more persons purporting either to create, terminate, or modify an obligation. . .. . .in our law, contract must. . .be defined as. . .an agreement by which two parties mutually promise, or merely one of them, to undertake something for the other consisting in giving, doing or forbearing’.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_5

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Article 1101 and the Systematisation of Consent as a General Principle. . .

On the other hand, Bigot de Préameneu worded Article 1101 as such: Le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes s’obligent, envers une ou plusieurs personnes à donner, à faire, ou ne pas faire quelque chose.3

Thus, Bigot de Préameneu only summarised Pothier’s jurisprudence. He established conventio as a general principle of contract under Article 1101 et seq. It refers to any kind of transaction between persons consisting in doing, giving, or forbearing. So, while Ulpian sanctioned conventio as an underlying principle of contract when he introduced it in the Digest for the first time, Bigot de Préameneu systematised it as what makes the contract. He created, in turn, an autonomic and infinitesimal category of innominate contracts enforceable only by consent.4 Nonetheless, while Bigot de Préameneu established conventio simultaneously as what makes the contract and the outcome of the contract, he did not find it useful to define conventio precisely in the Civil Code. He refused to identify clearly and definitely how conventio must be conveyed to create a contract or what it entails. Put differently, he did not supply any method for identifying consent and decide when an agreement is formed, thus refusing to enshrine for the last time the procedural features of consensualism. However, the subsequent jurisprudence has shown that the lack of definition is problematic. In turn, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861) held the drafters of the Civil Code in contempt. He opined that the lack of general, clear definitions of legal concepts in the Civil Code gives a glimpse of its rushed, superficial (i.e., unscientific), confused, and premature elaboration and promulgation. He believed that its adoption was motivated only by shallow political enthusiasm and commitments. It could only have benefited from more maturity and reflection. Thus, Savigny warned German jurists not to emulate the method of the French codifiers. Instead, he urged them to be more pandectic, systematic, and dogmatic during the travaux préparatoires of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.5 Nonetheless, most people would accept that the Civil Code of France is one of the most successful codifications in Europe, if not in the world. It has maintained itself for over two hundred years without any major alteration or controversy. It has also

3 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1101. [My own translation]: ‘A contract is an agreement by which one or several persons oblige themselves to one or several others to give, to do, or not to do something’. Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1101 (current): ‘Le contrat est un accord de volontés entre deux ou plusieurs personnes destiné à créer, modifier, transmettre ou éteindre des obligations’. [My own translation]: ‘A contract is a concordance of wills whreby two or more persons intend to create, modify, transfer or extinguish an obligation’. 4 Article 1107 supported this view. French Civil Code, ex-Article 1107 contra French Civil Code, Article 1107 (current): ‘Les contrats, soit qu'ils aient une dénomination propre, soit qu'ils n'en aient pas, sont soumis à des règles générales, qui sont l'objet du présent titre. Les règles particulières à certains contrats sont établies sous les titres relatifs à chacun d'eux; et les règles particulières aux transactions commerciales sont établies par les lois relatives au commerce’. See also Digest, 2.14.1.3. 5 Savigny (von) (1814), pp. 60 et seq. See also Forrester et al. (1975), p. 12; Merryman et al. (1994), pp. 476–479; Reimann (1989), pp. 97–98; Ryan (1962), pp. 29–30.

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influenced the law of many countries. It was adopted by much of the world in a way the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch has never done. Perhaps, part of the success of the French Civil Code is that it does lack definitions. Therefore, the lack of definition of conventio and what it entails must not be seen as a failure, pace Savigny. Au contraire, it is worth noticing that though the concise elaboration of the Civil Code of France was madness to Savigny, there was a method in the choice of the drafters of the Civil Code not to provide for everything and let the courts make the clarification appropriate for practice. It underlies Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis’ (1746–1807) introductory discourse on the adoption of the Civil Code and his posthumous jurisprudence on lois bavardes.6 He said that ‘a bold novelty is often nothing more than a brilliant mistake whose sudden flash resembles that of a thunderbolt which strikes the very spot it illuminates’.7 Hence, it is appropriate to let the courts and scholarship develop and present the policies that the Civil Code outlines in further detail and adapt them according to the circumstances and evolution of human society and thought. So, the drafters of the Civil Code were partial to a natural-law approach. They only established some well-defined, circumspect provisions governing some protected areas lest they became hostages to fortune. In turn, they rejected the positivistic or pandectist-approach that later influenced the drafting of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1900) by which shrewdness manifests itself in the ability of the lawmaker to define legal terms, simplify the law, and provide for everything. This chapter explores how the jurisprudence has developed conventio in French law since codification in the absence of a clear statutory definition. It discusses how this development supports the idea by which consensus is sufficient to create legal relations absent form. Finally, it examines its implications regarding the formation of

6 They concern the laws that take away and alter the nature of the law and establish it as a supposed remedy to all human fears and modern human desires and the vehicle for politics. 7 Portalis (1844), p. 95: ‘A l’ouverture de nos conférences nous avons été frappés de l’opinion, si généralement répandue, que, dans la rédaction d’un code civil, quelques textes bien précis sur chaque matière peuvent suffire, et que le grand art est de tout simplifier en prévoyant tout. . .Tout prévoir est un but qu’il est impossible d’atteindre. Nous nous sommes également préservés de la dangereuse ambition de vouloir tout régler et tout prévoir. Qui pourrait penser que ce sont ceux mêmes auxquels un code paraît toujours trop volumineux, qui osent prescrire impérieusement au législateur la terrible tâche de ne rien abandonner à la décision du juge ? [. . .] ne nous y trompons pas, citoyens législateurs, une nouveauté hardie n’est souvent qu’une erreur brillante dont l’éclat subit ressemble à celui de la foudre qui frappe le lieu qu’elle éclaire’ in the translation of Herman (1971), p. 25: ‘At the opening of our debates, we have been struck by the opinion, so generally widespread, that, for the elaboration of a civil code, some well-defined provisions governing every protected area may suffice, and that shrewdness manifests itself in the capacity that we have to simplify and provide for everything. . .To provide for everything is an unattainable goal. We have also guarded against the dangerous ambition to regulate and provide for everything. Who would have thought that it is those who argue that codification is a much too colossal task who would dare to mandate the lawmaker so imperiously with the difficult task to leave nothing to the discretion of the courts? [. . .] let us not be mistaken, citizen-lawmakers, a bold novelty is often nothing more than a brilliant mistake whose sudden flash resembles that of a thunderbolt which strikes the very spot it illuminates’.

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contract, thus unwinding conventio and exposing the procedural features of consensualism.

5.2 5.2.1

Reconstructing Conventio Conventio as Mutual Consent: Consensual Approach

The subsequent interpreters of the Civil Code, generally known in French as exégètes, made constructive contributions regarding how conventio should be construed in French law. By extension, they established procedural rules to determine the validity of a contract under Article 1101. They propounded that conventio denotes the mutual consent of the parties. It makes and determines the scope of the contract. More so, they explained that conventio designates a bilateral, voluntary mental faculty of purpose or desire to undertake something in exchange for something else. It is known as conation. Hence, the French professor of law Marcel Planiol (1853–1931) explained that: Toutes les obligations dérivent de deux sources seulement, le contrat et la loi. Dans le contrat, la volonté des parties forme l’obligation ; c’est elle qui est la force créatrice et qui détermine à la fois l’objet et l’étendue de l’obligation. Le législateur n’intervient que pour sanctionner l’œuvre des parties en leur donnant une action et pour les surveiller en établissant des limites à leur liberté, au moyen de prohibitions et de nullités. En l’absence d’un contrat, la naissance d’une obligation ne peut avoir d’autre cause que la loi. . .8

Consequently, the subsequent interpreters of the Civil Code considered the concordance of the will of the parties to be the characteristic feature of conventio in French law. It is a procedural requirement. It establishes the mutual conation of the parties, i.e., their mental faculty of purpose, desire, or will to undertake a conduct or action as what makes the contract absent form. Semantically, one cannot help but notice the exegetic emphasis on the mutual will of the parties (‘la volonté des parties forme l’obligation’) as opposed to the mutual consent of the parties (‘le consentement des parties forme la base des obligations conventionnelles’) to explain conventio and determine how it makes the contract. The idea of voluntas also underpinned the canonical and ius-naturalist consensual jurisprudence (see Chap. 4). It denotes the express, commutative consent, intent of

8

Planiol, M in Tiberghien (2008), p. 20 [emphasis added]. See also Planiol et al. (1960) n°36, p. 15: ‘le contrat se forme par le concours de deux volontés’. [My own translation]: ‘All obligations arise either from contract or the law. The will of the parties makes the contract; that is, it is the thing that actions the contract. It determines both its object and scope. The lawmaker only intervenes to sanction the will of the parties by giving them an action to assert their right; but also, to ensure that agreements are formed freely and are within the confines of the law by means of provisions determining the circumstances in which an agreement is null and void. In the absence of a contract, an obligation can only arise from the law’.

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each party to undertake something in exchange for something else. Hence, the legal definition of consent (‘consentement’) in French law is ‘la volonté d’engager sa personne ou ses biens, ou les deux à la fois’; that is, the will (i.e., desire) to oblige oneself or one’s property or both.9 Therefore, intentionality and the mutual conation of the parties are distinctive characteristics of conventio. They distinguish conventional agreements from other types of agreements which, although freely formed, cannot be contracts for want of meeting the procedural requirement for intentionality that conventio entails. This consensual reading of conventio is the commonly heard opinion.10 It portrays consensualism as a procedural doctrine requiring a mutual expression of willingness to contract on certain terms. The lawmaker incorporated it in the Civil Code in the new iteration of Article 1101 following the reform of the French law of obligations in 2016.11 By extension, it dismisses the voluntarist jurisprudence that Emmanuel Gounot (1885–1960), Michel Villey (1914–1988),12 Eric Savaux (1957),13 and Louis Josserand (1868–1941)14 supported in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—to cite but a few.15 It is presently discussed in turn.

‘Consentement’ in Braudo (2019). Girard (1911), p. 458; Demolombe and Durand (1868) n°12; Larombière (1885), p. 283: ‘tout contrat n’a de valeur morale et légale que comme expression des consentements qui l’ont créé par leur concours’; Beudant (1906) n°49, p. 28: ‘le contrat est dit consensuel quand le seul consentement des parties suffit à la former, quand le contrat existe par cela seul, qu’il y a concours de volonté’; Capitant and Colin (1959) n°12, p. 10. See also Colin et al. (1959), pp. 323–414; Weill and Terré (1970) n°24, p. 25: ‘le trait essentiel du contrat est qu'il est un accord de volontés’; ‘Convention’ in Cornu (2018) 270; Malaurie and Aynès (2018), p. 263; Terré et al. (2002), p. 25; Ghestin (1980) n°5: ‘le contrat est un accord de volonté en vue de produire des effets de droit’. See also Ghestin (1980) n°5: ‘le contrat est un accord de volontés en vue de produire des effets de droit’; Bénabent (2018), p. 27; Bellisent (2001), pp. 374–375; Fages (2018), pp. 23 et seq.; Starck et al. (1998), p. 1. See also Starck (1972) n°1008, p. 339: ‘nous connaissons la définition du contrat. Rappelons d'un mot qu'on appelle ainsi les accords de volonté’; Fabre-Magnan (2004), p. 1. 11 French Civil Code, Article 1101 (current): ‘Le contrat est un accord de volontés entre deux ou plusieurs personnes destiné à créer, modifier, transmettre ou éteindre des obligations’. 12 Villey (1962), pp. 271ff, 274. 13 Savaux (1997), p. 167. 14 Chazal (2003), pp. 325ff; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 6 December 1932, D. 1933, 1, p 137, note Josserand; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 24 May 1933, D. 1933, 1, p.137, note Josserand. 15 Aubry and Rau (1942) para 340ff. See also Toullier (1824); Duranton (1844); Demolombe and Durand (1868); Acollas (1874); Larombière (1885). 9

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Conventio as Unilateral Consent: Voluntarist Approach

Gounot et al. construed convention, i.e., contract, as denoting only the unilateral will of a party to undertake something as opposed to the mutual will of the parties to undertake something in exchange for something else, pace Planiol. Notably, Josserand emphasised individualism and contract as something eminently private, thus objecting to the growing legislative formalisation of contracts. He opined that the parties should be masters of their own destiny, thus empowering the individual will of parties to create legal relations.16 Their opinion was likely due to the conflation that Article 1101 articulated between contract and promise requiring neither acceptance nor form to be binding. It read that a convention (i.e., contract) is an agreement by which one or several persons obligate themselves to another or several others to give, do, or forebear. More credibly, Josserand’s jurisprudence betrays a classical construction of contract as an obligation in its Roman sense. It denotes ‘a tie of law, a legal relationship between two persons whereby one is constrained by the other to do or refrain from doing something’.17 It does not deny that the mutual will of the parties is required to create legal relations where the obligation is synallagmatic. It only emphasises that the party under obligation must have consented to it unilaterally. Hence, Josserand argued that: [Le contrat désigne], par définition même, le produit, la fusion de deux volontés qui en constituent l'âme et l'essence mêmes [selon le] grand principe de l'autonomie de la volonté.18

It means that the party under obligation must always express their desire or will to undertake something consciously and intentionally. A fortiori both parties if their obligations are reciprocal and causes for each other. Thus, the voluntarists focused only on the second limb of Article 1101 by which a convention denotes an agreement whereby one person obligates themselves to another who is not necessarily obliged to perform anything in return. Put differently, they assimilated contract to obligatio, thus dismissing the Roman distinction between synallagmatic and unilateral contracts that Article 1101 inherited. They altered and transcended the blueprint inherited from Rome by basing contract on the principle of the autonomy of the will or the will theory of contract. It conceives of contract and conventio only as the individual rights of parties. Not surprisingly, Gounot contended that:

16

Chazal (2003), pp. 326–328. Ibbetson, D in Plessis (du) et al. (2016), p. 1. 18 Chazal (2003), p. 326 [emphasis added]. [My own translation]: ‘[Contract denotes], by definition, the fusion of two wills. They constitute its soul and essence [according to] the overarching principle of the autonomy of the will’. 17

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Reconstructing Conventio

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L’essence de l’acte juridique, c’est uniquement la volonté ; elle seule en constitue la substance ; tout le reste est secondaire, accidentel, sans valeur.19

In turn, Mohamed Mahouachi argued that: L’autonomie de la volonté désigne la possibilité qu’a l’être humain de se déterminer librement dans la création d’actes juridiques, pouvoir qu’il détient en raison du pouvoir normatif de sa volonté.20

Thus, a contract, to the voluntarists, required only the consent of the party under obligation to be formed and enforced. Article 1108°1 supported this view. It provided that a contract requires only the consent of the party under obligation to produce the desired legal effects besides capacity, a possible object, and a lawful cause, not the mutual consent of the parties. Nonetheless, it did not contradict the consensual jurisprudence by which the mutual consent of the parties is required to form a contract if each party is under obligation and not only one of them. On that account, the Civil Code sanctioned both consensualism and voluntarism, pace Forray. It combined the doctrine or principle by which agreements arising from the mutual consent of the parties can be contracts subject to conditions, and the doctrine by which free will is the source of obligations. They are grounded in selfgoverning individuals, considered apart from various contingencies of place, culture, and social relations. However, the incorporation of these two doctrines in the Civil Code did not show clearly how consensualism and voluntarism cohere, thus prefiguring the doctrinal quibble between consensualism and voluntarism. Put differently, in presenting contract simultaneously as the mutual will of the parties or the will of only one of them to undertake a particular conduct or action under Article 1101, Bigot de Préameneu enshrined an illogical contractual jurisprudence. That notwithstanding, while voluntarism has been widely discredited in jurisprudence as discussed above—already even before the reform in 201621—it would be wrong to dismiss it as entirely misguided or delusive.

5.2.3

Consolidation of Consensualism and Voluntarism as False Opposites

The distinct contractual jurisprudence that Planiol and Josserand embody are not mutually exclusive despite the rejection of voluntarism and the autonomy of the will Gounot (1912), p. 5. [My own translation]: ‘The essence of a juridical act is the will and only the will. It constitutes its substance. All else is superfluous, incidental, valueless’. 20 Mahouachi (2001), p. 40. [My own translation]: ‘The autonomy of the will denotes the ability of human beings to decide freely for themselves and create legal relations. This power is bestowed upon them by the normative power of their will’. 21 Terré et al. (2002), p. 24; Chénédé (2012), pp. 155–181; Ranouil (1980), p. 53; Tabi Tabi (2012a), pp. 71–125; Tabi Tabi (2012b), pp. 577–622. 19

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in French law and the jurisprudence. They proceed from the same continuum. They provide extra features to each other. They suggest, when read together, that conventio in French law denotes an approach by which the legitimacy and enforceability of agreements lie in what the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770–1831) would have called subjektiver Wille.22 It denotes a profusion of individual will construed as deliberate, mutual consent. It portrays deliberateness and mutuality as the features of conventio. They establish the converging unilateral conation of the parties as what makes the contract. In their most potent form, intentionality and concordant wills confer a finite right on parties to enforce any agreement. So, if a contract is subject to a universal and objective cause, that cause must encompass each party’s assent. Hence, conventio is arbitrary. It refers to everything to which parties agree on to do, give, or forbear. Also, it denotes the confluence of unilateral and seemingly autonomous acts of volition as to something arbitrary. It is something Domat had already highlighted in his Lois civiles. He ventured that: Comme les conventions sont arbitraires, et se diversifient selon les besoins, on peut en toutes sortes de conventions, de contrats et de traités, ajouter toutes sortes de pactes, conditions, restrictions, réserves, quittances générales, et autres, pourvu qu’il n’y ait rien de contraire aux lois et aux bonnes mœurs.23

Hence, conventio is eine Laune, a whim of fickle and arbitrary nature. It requires only that the lawful, unilateral intentions of the parties to undertake something converge in whatever form that they may be expressed. Otherwise, the intended situation cannot arise.24 Hence, consensualism in the Civil Code appears to denote simultaneously the unilateral yet reciprocal consent of two or more people to create legal relations as opposed to the consent of only one of them. This commutative or bilateral feature made a significant contribution to the determination of what types of consensual agreements could be contracts. It sketched implicitly the procedural features that consent must have to create a contract. Namely, each party must pledge to undertake something on their own volition when their obligations are causes for each other. Whence, Planiol and Josserand’s jurisprudence are not mutually exclusive, and Josserand’s jurisprudence is not utterly wrong. Otherwise, it would also be denying that not all obligations arise from converging unilateral acts of volition to undertake something in exchange for something else. Still, some arise only from the unilateral will of a person to undertake something for

Hegel (1821) §103: ‘die Forderung eines Willens, der als besonderer subjektiver Wille das Allgemeine als solches wille’. 23 Domat (1828) Liv 1, Sec IV, §1, 140: ‘Conventions are arbitrary and transmute according to the mutual will and needs of the parties. Therefore, parties can complement any type of convention, contract, and treaty with any sort of pact, condition, restriction, warranty, general release provision, and suchlike; provided they are not contrary to the law or good mores’. 24 Hegel (1830) III. a.a.O. (Anm. 3), p. 10, para 377. 22

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one or more persons who are not obliged to anything in return. It is what Article 1103, now Article 1106, called ‘unilateral contracts’.25 Hence, Article 1101 underpinned both consensualism and voluntarism. Voluntarism subjected the validity of simple promises or unilateral obligations (i.e., the so-called ‘unilateral contracts’) to the expression of the unilateral will of a party to undertake a particular conduct or action. By contrast, consensualism was a more advanced form of voluntarism. It determined the validity of synallagmatic contracts. It required the mutual or convergent unilateral promise of each party to undertake something in exchange for something else. Otherwise, the contract could not produce the intended legal effects. Thus, voluntarism was to stipulatio what consensualism was to conventio in their respective Roman senses (see Chap. 2). They both underpinned the principle by which agreements arising from consent have the force of law for those who have made them. Their binding force was not subject to any formality but only to a procedural requirement for consent to be conveyed in words or actions (declaratio voluntatis). What of its practical implications?

5.3

Practical Consequences

Article 1101 was terse. It suggests in its original wording that unlike promises or unilateral obligations, the preserve of contract is that it entails a mutual, voluntary decision made in the inner will and expressed deliberately to create legal relations.26 Practically, it implies that consent must take the form of a tangible expression of willingness to contract on certain terms (i.e., offer). It must be made with the intention that it shall become binding as soon as it is accepted by the person to whom it is addressed. It is clearer still in the current wording of Article 1101.27 More so since the insertion of the requirement for offer and acceptance in the Civil Code following the reform of the French law of obligations in 2016.28 It relies on the distinctions that had long since been acknowledged in French jurisprudence before codification. What of its development?

French Civil Code, ex-Article 1103 contra French Civil Code, Article 1106, °2 (current): ‘Le contrat. . .est unilatéral lorsqu’une ou plusieurs personnes s’obligent envers une ou plusieurs autres sans qu’il y ait d’engagement réciproque de celles–ci’. 26 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1101: ‘Le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes s’obligent, envers une ou plusieurs autres, à donner, à faire, ou à ne pas faire quelque chose’ [emphasis added]. 27 French Civil Code, Article 1101 (current): ‘Le contrat est un accord de volontés entre deux ou plusieurs personnes destiné à créer, modifier, transmettre ou éteindre des obligations’ [emphasis added]. 28 French Civil Code, Articles 1113 to 1122 (current). 25

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Offer and Acceptance: Premise

Prior to codification, Pothier was the first to establish a practical pattern to identify conventio and find that there is a contract in French law. He explained that it is settled in French law that a contract requires an expression of willingness on the part of the promisor to undertake something on certain terms. It must still be intended that it would be binding as soon as it is accepted by the promisee.29 Hence, he called the promisor’s expression of willingness pollicitatio. He defined it as a deliberate promise which has not yet been accepted by the person to whom it is made.30 It becomes binding as soon as it meets the converging unilateral will of the promisee in the form of acceptance.31 Consequently, Pothier affirmed offer and acceptance as the practical consequence of conventio. Alike the Roman sponsio and stipulatio, Pothier argued that the efficacy of the offer and acceptance depends on the perfect congruence between the unilateral declaration of will or intention of the offeror and its acceptance by the offeree.32 The import and potency of Pothier’s jurisprudence can be measured in view of its influence on eighteenth-century American legal thinkers and the development of Scottish and English laws of contract. Not only does it underpin the English and Scottish requirements for offer and acceptance, but it also became the basis for the requirement for offer and acceptance in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808.33 In this respect, the Louisiana codification appears to have been more ‘pandectic’ or ‘positivistic’ than the Civil Code of France. More so, it makes it possible to systematise conventio as denoting the requirement for consent to be conveyed, procedurally, through offer and acceptance. Still, it must be intended to create legal relations.

5.3.2

Implication in the Civil Code

While Bigot de Préameneu did not sanction Pothier’s jurisprudence overtly in the Civil Code, it underlay it implicitly, especially at Articles 1101 and 1102. The latter read that a contract is synallagmatic or bilateral when the parties obligate themselves to each other reciprocally.34 It reinforces the idea that contract relies on Pothier (2011) §3, p. 5. Pothier (2011) §4, p. 6. 31 Pothier (2011) §4, p. 6 citing Grotius (1773) 1.2., cap. II V. 3. 32 Pothier (2011) §§3 and 4, 5-6. See also Pothier (1762) § 31 et seq. 33 Zimmermann (1990), pp. 575–576; Simpson (1975), pp. 247, 259; Litvinoff (1967), pp. 1–80; Litvinoff (1968), pp. 153–210. 34 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1102: ‘Le contrat est synallagmatique ou bilatéral lorsque les contractants s'obligent réciproquement les uns envers les autres’ contra French Civil Code, Article 29 30

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commutativity. There must be on each part an express and deliberate desire or will to undertake a particular conduct or action. The doctrine crystalised this jurisprudence in its turn, thus paving the way for its statutory sanction in the newly reformed Civil Code.

5.3.3

Developments Since Codification

Pothier’s jurisprudence remained unaltered after codification. Sometimes assimilated to the German Willenserklärung in jurisprudence,35 all modern and contemporary writers chime with the idea that conventio in contract denotes an offer or pollicitation.36 It is a practical requirement for a unilateral expression of willingness to contract on specified terms. It becomes binding when it is accepted by the person to whom it is addressed. Still, the declaration of will of each party must be intended to create legal effects. The phrase ‘par laquelle’ contained in Article 1101 betrayed it. It induced an implicit requirement for intentionality and deliberateness. They are both synonyms for volonté in the French language.37 The jurisprudence of the French courts supports this view.38

1106, °1 (current): ‘Le contrat est synallagmatique lorsque les contractants s'obligent réciproquement les uns envers les autres’. 35 Bügerliches Gesetzbuch, para 145: ‘Wer einem anderen die Schließung eines Vertrags anträgt, ist an den Antrag gebunden, es sei denn, dass er die Gebundenheit ausgeschlossen hat’. Compare to Demogue (2001), pp. 295–296 and Durma (1930); Chabas (1931) (cited in Demogue). 36 Beudant et al. (1906) at [73]; Colin et al. (1935) at [28]; Planiol (1912) at [964] et seq., [970] et seq., and [985] to [987]; Aubert (1970) at [422]; Desbois and Gaudemet (1937), p. 34; Aubert (1970) at [423]. See also ‘L’existence de consentement’ in Rémy-Corlay and Fenouillet (2003), pp. 28ff and the references cited; Colin et al. (1948) n°42; Gazzaniga (1992), p. 195; Ranouil (1980), pp. 16ff, 97ff, and 136; Halpérin (2012), p. 197; Halpérin, JL in Kervégan (1999), p. 345, note 89; Meynial (1902), p. 570; Bonnecase (1924) 480, n°401; Lerebours-Pigeonnière, P in Beudant et al. (1914), p. 433. See also Demogue (2001), pp. 295–296. 37 ‘Intention’ in Centre Nationale de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales (2020). 38 Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 December 2018, n°17-22532; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 21 December 2017, n°16-25665; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 May 2013, n°12-19325; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 September 2013, n°12-23197, Bulletin 2013, I, n°177; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 May 1997, n°95-15.319, Bull. 1997, I, n° 136; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 September 2007, n°06-18.199, Bull. 2007, II, n° 215; Cour de cassation, Sections Réunies, 2 February 1808: G.A.J.C, n°160; Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 22 November 1865: DP 1866.1.108, S.1866.1.23, concl. Fabre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 10 May 1948: Gaz. Palinéa 1948.2.41; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 April 2012, Bull. IV, n°80, D.2012.1123; RDC 2012.755, obs. T Genicon; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, n°144–145, RTD Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, n°79-13499; Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 11 July 2002, n°00-44197; Grynbaum (2003), p. 1706.

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Article 1101 and the Systematisation of Consent as a General Principle. . .

The reform of the French law of obligations in 2016 has only consolidated this view. The clearer, more cogent wording of Article 1101 in its current form evidences this. The same is true of the insertion of Articles 1113 to 1122 (current) on the requirement for offer and acceptance.

5.3.4

Significance

Consensualism in contemporary contract law appears as the principle by which every deliberate agreement arising from consent can be a contract. Put differently, consensualism in contemporary contract law denotes the principle by which agreements arising from consent that are done consciously and intently can be contracts. It is in stark relief to the canon and natural law jurisprudence by which consensualism denoted the principle by which every agreement arising from consent could merely be a contract (see Chap. 4). The process of making an offer and providing unqualified acceptance characterise deliberateness in turn. Undeniably, the requirement for deliberateness defeats unfairness. It prevents the coercion of a party to perform obligations they have not thoughtfully chosen for themselves. It also implies that good faith underpins consensualism. It prevents unfairness in contract. Otherwise, the whole purpose of Article 1101 would be defeated. So too would be the rules of equity if an obligation could randomly be imposed on a party regardless of intention. Moreover, the Cour de cassation has had the opportunity to reiterate the requirement for deliberateness oft-times in its case law on offer and acceptance.39 It implies that consensualism in the Civil Code since codification denotes a slow and careful movement or thought by which parties reach a consensus and each is simultaneously a promisor and promisee. It vindicates consent as a source of obligation according to intention. Practically, it means that a party, the offeror, must first make an explicit proposal to contract. It becomes binding when it meets the offeree’s will in the form of assent to the terms of the offer. So, each party must make a unilateral promise. It only

39

Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 2 February 1932; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 21 December 1960, D., 1961, jurisp., p 417, n. P Malaurie; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, n°144–145 II; RTC Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 2 February 1932; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 21 December 1960, D., 1961, jurisp., p 417, n. P Malaurie; Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 28 February 1870; Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes 27 June 1894; Report of the Cour de cassation on Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 6 March 1990, Bull. civ. IV, n°74; R., p 361; JCP 1990.II.21583, n. B Gross, RTD Civ., 1990, p 462, obs. J Mestre; D., 1991, somm., p 317, n. J-L Aubert; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 17 December 1958, D., 1959, jurisp, p 33; RTD Civ., 1959, p 336, obs. Carbonnier; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 May 1968, Bull. civ. III, n°209; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 May 1972, Bull. civ. III, n°297; RTD Civ., 1972, p 773, obs. Y Loussouarn; Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 22 March 1972, Bull. civ. V, n°243. See also, Orléans, 26 June 1885;

5.3

Practical Consequences

127

becomes enforceable provided the offeror’s promise remains extant and meets the acceptance of the promisee whether acceptance is implied by legislation or conduct. In this regard, Planiol explained that each party must make a promise. They are immediately binding on their originator when they are made. A fortiori, when they meet.40 The validity of the exchange of promises is, however, contingent on the observance of objective requirements for informedness, morality, honesty, sincerity, and honour as components of natural equity, the Cour de cassation added.41 So, the mutual promises must be free, unequivocal, and absolute (unadulterated). Otherwise, the parties enter into a battle of the forms. The incongruence of their respective promises hampers consent. Hence, the parties can withdraw their engagement.42 Put differently, the promisee’s qualified acceptance is tantamount to a new offer. It defeats the promisor’s initial offer. Consequently, the promisor can withdraw their engagement. So too can the promisee. However, only after a reasonable period at risk of incurring liability.43 It suggests that consent is believed to be lacking or deficient where offer and acceptance do not coincide exactly when superimposed. Likewise, when they are deemed to be or were conveyed in a way that falls foul of law, good faith, or reason. Hence, Article 1108 et seq. provided further direction to identify and enforce consent through the theories of defects in contract and causation (see Chap. 5).

40

Planiol (1912) at [977]. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, n°144–145, II; RTD Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 June 1993, Bull. civ. IV, n°271; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 9 November 1983, Bull. civ. III, n°222; Defrénois, 1984, p 1011, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1985, p 154, obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 December 1997, Bull. civ. III, n °223; Defrénois, 1998, p 336, obs. D Mazeaud; D., 1999, somm., p 9, obs. P Brun; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 9 November 1983, Bull. civ. III, n°222; Defrénois, 1984, p 1011, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1985, p 154, obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 December 1997, Bull. civ. III, n°223; Defrénois, 1998, p 336, obs. D Mazeaud; D., 1999, somm., p 9, obs. P Brun; Aubert (1970) at [241]; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, n°144–145, RTD Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas. 42 Mirabail (1997), p. 94. 43 Flour et al. (2012) no139ff; Antippas (2013), p. 27; Frison-Roche (1995), p. 573; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 7 May 2008, n°07-11690, Bull. civ. III, n°79; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 20 May 2009, n°08-13230, Bull. civ. III, n° 118 contra Malinvaud et al. (2014); French Town Planning Code, Article L 213.2; Périnet-Marquet (1998), p. 25; Conseil d’Etat, 24 July 2009, n°316158, Société Finadev, L'Actualité juridique droit immobilier 2009, p. 1467; RD imm. 2009, p. 667, obs. P. Soler-Couteaux; Borel (2014), p. 333; Kenfack (2005) JCP.N.2005: 1972; Leveneur (2006) JCP.N.2006:1205; Fabre-Magnan (2004), pp. 227–228; Conseil d’Etat, 22 February 1995, n°123-421; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 7 November 2012, n°1122907; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 16 June 1982, n°80-70432; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 9 February 2011, n°10-10759; Malaurie et al. (2012) n°153; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 22 June 2005, n°03-20473, JCP N 2005, n°27.1332. 41

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5.4

5

Article 1101 and the Systematisation of Consent as a General Principle. . .

Conclusion

The choice that Bigot de Préameneu made to present contract as a convention suggests that contract in French law was intended to denote a meeting of minds. It suffices to create a contract absent form. It also denotes the immediate aim that the parties seek to fulfil: to give, do or forbear. Conventio is, thus, a structuring element of contract. It is a legal fact whose absence precludes the formation of the contract. However, the wording of Article 1101 was ambiguous. It equivocated about whether consensualism or voluntarism underpins French contract law. Put differently, it obfuscated whether the mutual assent of the parties or only the consent of one of them to undertake a particular conduct or action make the contract. It begot an antagonism between two false opposites: consensualism and voluntarism. The onus was on the French courts and French scholarship to clarify the law. They acknowledged that what makes the contract is the reciprocal promises of the parties to undertake something in exchange for something else absent formality. They developed in turn the requirement for offer and acceptance, thus rejecting voluntarism underpinned by Article 1108(1). Like the English mirror-image rule, offer and acceptance must coincide exactly when superimposed. It suggests that the effectiveness of consensualism further depended on evidence that the parties intended the agreement to be a law for themselves according to mutually-agreed-terms. It prevented arbitrariness in contract. It also indicates that since the promulgation of the Civil Code of France, consensualism denotes variously the mental faculty of purpose, desire, or will to undertake a particular conduct or action. It is irrelevant whether the obligations of the parties are perfectly or imperfectly synallagmatic. The effectiveness of such an act depends, however, on its deliberateness. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of Article 1101 in jurisprudence did not deny that an obligation could arise only from the promise of a party. Still, it could arise from the unilateral act of will of a person to undertake something for another who was not obliged to perform anything in return. In such a case, the undertaking was a unilateral engagement or unilateral obligation, the so-called unilateral contracts. Hence, Article 1101 combined the mutual expression of willingness of the parties (i.e., declaratio voluntatis) and the unilateral declaration of will of a party to undertake something into a single whole, albeit ineptly. Put differently, it attempted to bridge conventio (i.e., pollicitatio + acceptatio) and stipulatio, and establish them as what makes the contract. However, the reform of the French law of obligations in 2016 undermined this jurisprudence. Article 1101 now provides a general rule by which all undertakings in French law, be they synallagmatic or unilateral, require the concordant wills of the parties to produce the intended legal effects. It lessens the power and ability of the unilateral will of a party to create legal relations. Though, it does not jeopardise the effectiveness of unilateral obligations. At most, it means that even where one or more persons undertake obligations in favour of one or more persons without there

Case Law

129

being any reciprocal obligation on the part of the latter, the latter must still accept the obligation being performed to them. Thus, the new iteration of Article 1101 pulls the rug from under the supporters of voluntarism. It vindicates consensualism as the only pillar of French contract law. It is the doctrine by which every deliberate agreement can be a contract whether it has a name of its own or lacks any specific denomination. Nonetheless, the apparent dismissal of voluntarism must be taken lightly given the requirement for the individual will of the parties to converge. It assigns a predominant role to the free will of each party to create legal relations. So, consensualism encompasses if not all, at least some aspects of voluntarism. It is the sum or fusion of two unilateral will to undertake something whether reciprocally or unilaterally. The two doctrines are, therefore, not mutually exclusive.

Statutory Provisions Bügerliches Gesetzbuch, para 145. French Civil Code • • • • • • • • • •

Article 1101 (current). Article 1106, °1 (current). Article 1106, °2 (current). Article 1107 (current). Articles 1113 to 1122 (current). ex-Article 1101. ex-Article 1101. ex-Article 1102. ex-Article 1103. ex-Article 1107.

French Town Planning Code, Article L 213.2.

Roman Law Digest, 2.14.1.3.

Case Law Conseil d’Etat, 22 February 1995, n°123-421.

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Conseil d’Etat, 24 July 2009, n°316158, Société Finadev, L'Actualité juridique droit immobilier 2009, p 1467; RD imm. 2009, p. 667, obs. P. Soler-Couteaux; Borel, JP (2014) 333. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 22 November 1865: DP 1866.1.108, S.1866.1.23, concl. Fabre. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 28 February 1870; Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes 27 June 1894. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 2 February 1932. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 6 December 1932, D. 1933, 1, p 137, note Josserand. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 24 May 1933, D. 1933, 1, p.137, note Josserand. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 10 May 1948: Gaz. Palinéa 1948.2.41. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 17 December 1958, D., 1959, jurisp, p 33; RTD Civ., 1959, p 336, obs. Carbonnier. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 21 December 1960, D., 1961, jurisp., p 417, n. P Malaurie. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 May 1968, Bull. civ. III, n°209. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 22 March 1972, Bull. civ. V, n°243. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 May 1972, Bull. civ. III, n°297; RTD Civ., 1972, p 773, obs. Y Loussouarn. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, n°144–145, RTD Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, n°144–145, RTD Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, n°79-13499. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 16 June 1982, n°80-70432. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 9 November 1983, Bull. civ. III, n°222; Defrénois, 1984, p 1011, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1985, p 154, obs. J Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 June 1993, Bull. civ. IV, n°271. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 May 1997, n°95-15.319, Bull. 1997, I, n ° 136. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 December 1997, Bull. civ. III, n°223; Defrénois, 1998, p 336, obs. D Mazeaud; D., 1999, somm., p 9, obs. P Brun. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 11 July 2002, n°00-44197; Grynbaum, L (2003), p. 1706. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 22 June 2005, n°03-20473, JCP N 2005, n° 27.1332. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 September 2007, n°06-18.199, Bull. 2007, II, n° 215. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 7 May 2008, n°07-11690, Bull. civ. III, n° 79.

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Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 20 May 2009, n°08-13230, Bull. civ. III, n ° 118. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 9 February 2011, n°10-10759. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 April 2012, Bull. IV, n°80, D.2012.1123; RDC 2012.755, obs. T Genicon. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 7 November 2012, n°11-22907. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 May 2013, n°12-19325. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 September 2013, n°12-23197, Bulletin 2013, I, n°177. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 21 December 2017, n°16-25665. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 December 2018, n°17-22532. Cour de cassation, Sections Réunies, 2 February 1808: G.A.J.C, n°160. Orléans, 26 June 1885.

Case Reports Report of the Cour de cassation on Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 6 March 1990, Bull. civ. IV, n°74; R., p 361; JCP 1990.II.21583, n. B Gross, RTD Civ., 1990, p 462, obs. J Mestre; D., 1991, somm., p 317, n. J-L Aubert.

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Articles Antippas J (2013) De la bonne foi précontractuelle comme fondement de l’obligation de maintien de l’offre durant le délai indiqué. 1:27–45 Braudo S (2019) Dictionnaire du droit privé. https://www.dictionnaire-juridique.com. Accessed 25 August 2020 Centre Nationale de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales (2020) ‘Intention’. https://www.cnrtl.fr/ definition/intention Chazal JP (2003) L. Josserand et le nouvel ordre contractuel. 1:325ff. https://www.labase-lextenso. fr/revue-des-contrats/RDCO2003-1-068 Chénédé F (2012) De l’autonomie de la volonté et la justice commutative: Du mythe à la réalité. 4: 155–181. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01071905/document Frison-Roche MA (1995) Remarques sur la distinction de la volonté et du consentement en droit des contrats. 3:573–578. http://mafrisonroche.phpnet.org/IMG/pdf/2-2.3_volont_consentement_1 995.pdf Herman MS (1971) Excerpts from a Discourse on the Code Napoleon by Portalis and Case Law and Doctrine by A Esmein. 18:23–37. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/loyolr18& i=33 Kenfack H (2005) Conséquences de l’annulation de la décision de préemption et condition suspensive. 2005:1468ff Leveneur L (2006) Annulation de la préemption: la condition suspensive de non-préemption ne défaille plus!. JCP-N-2006:1205ff Litvinoff S (1967) Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative Analysis: Part 1 – Offer. 28:1–80. https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3508&con text=lalrev Litvinoff S (1968) Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative Analysis: Part 2 – Acceptance. 28:153–210. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/235279298.pdf Meynial E (1902) La déclaration de la volonté. 26:639–641. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43893380 Périnet-Marquet H (1998) Droit de préemption et formation du contrat. 1:25ff Planiol M in Tiberghien, F (2008) La loi et le contrat. 3:19–23. https://www.cairn.info/revue-apresdemain-2008-3-page-19.htm Portalis JEM (1844) Discours préliminaire présenté le 1er pluviôse an IX par la Commission nommée par le gouvernement consulaire. https://criminocorpus.org/fr/reperes/legislation/codecivil/documents-annexes/discours-preliminaire-de-portalis/

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Chapter 6

Article 1108 et seq. and the Specification of the Consensual Doctrine

6.1

Introduction

Article 1108 et seq. introduced substantive requirements for consent to produce the intended legal effects. Notably, Article 1108 prefaced the section of the Civil Code on the validity of contract. It read: Quatre conditions sont essentielles pour la validité d'une convention: 1° Le consentement de la partie qui s'oblige; 2° Sa capacité de contracter; 3° Un objet certain qui forme la matière de l'engagement; 4° Une cause licite dans l'obligation.1

The phrase ‘le consentement de la partie qui s’oblige’ attests to the conflation that French law operated between contract and promise until the reform in 2016. It supposes that a contract requires only the consent of one party under obligation. By contrast, a contract requires, by definition, a concordance of will. Incidentally, Article 1108 explained that, besides consent, under the essential conditions of obligations are also capacity, an object, and a lawful cause. It outlines the two usual underpinnings of consensualism; that is, consent and cause. Four sections followed Article 1108. They explained each of the requirements that it outlined in detail.2 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1108. [My own translation]: ‘1° The consent of the party who obliges themselves; 2° That party’s capacity to contract; 3° A definite object that forms the subjectmatter of the obligation; 4° A lawful cause for the obligation’. Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1128 (current): ‘Sont nécessaires à la validité d’un contrat: 1° Le consentement des parties; 2° Leur capacité de contracter; 3° Un contenu licite et certain’. [My own translation]: ‘The following are required for the validity of a contract: 1° The consent of the parties; 2° Their capacity to contract; 3° A lawful and certain content’. 2 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1109-1122 contra French Civil Code, Articles 1129-1144 (current) on consent; French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1123-1125-1 contra French Civil Code, Articles 11451

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_6

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Thus, Articles 1101 and 1108 established consent simultaneously as a substantive and procedural requirement for contracting. It is not enough to assent to the terms of an obligation in the form of offer and acceptance. Still, consent must be given and obtained appropriately. Otherwise, no obligation can arise or be sustained. Accordingly, Article 1108 et seq. specified the substantive properties that consent must have to produce the intended legal effects. By contrast, Article 1101 only indicated the procedural rules that consent must satisfy. Moreover, the mention of a lawful cause under Article 1108 as the last essential condition for contracting suggests that the drafters of the Civil Code thought of causa legitima as an instrument of social control. It affords the assessment of the consistency of undertakings with all the requirements that law, morality, and natural equity impose on an obligation according to its nature. It supplies additional substantive requirements influencing the validity and enforceability of consent. It is distinct from the motives wherefore the parties obliged themselves and according to which their rights are constituted and ordered (‘un objet certain qui forme la matière de l’engagement’). It was intended to be a condition precedent. It was required before a contract could arise. It was simultaneously a subversive objective instrument. It could invalidate contractual duties even after they arose if consent were deemed improper retrospectively. Hence, the incorporation of Article 1108 et seq. in the Civil Code implies that the consensual doctrine has other features than just allowing parties to exercise freedom of contract. It is also a substantive contractual rule. It covers all aspects of contractual relationships from formation to termination. It determines what acceptable consent is and the situations in which consent can or cannot produce the desired legal effects. It incorporates consent in a structure. It decides, in turn, on the scope and nature of the legal effects it can have. Not surprisingly, Article 1109 read: Il n'y a point de consentement valable si le consentement n'a été donné que par erreur ou s'il a été extorqué par violence ou surpris par dol.3

In turn, Article 1131 provided:

1161 on capacity; French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1126-1130 contra French Civil Code, Articles 1162-1171 (current) on the object (i.e., content) of the contract; French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1131-1133 contra French Civil Code, Article 1163 (current) on cause. 3 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1109. [My own translation]: ‘There is no valid consent if consent was given only by error, or if it was obtained by violence or induced by dol’. Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1130 (current): L’erreur, le dol et la violence vicient le consentement lorsqu’ils sont de telle nature que, sans eux, l’une des parties n’aurait pas contracté ou aurait contracté à des conditions substantiellement différentes. Leur caractère déterminant s’apprécie eu égard aux personnes et aux circonstances dans lesquelles le consentement a été donné’.[My own translation]: ‘Mistake, fraud, and duress vitiate consent where they are of such a nature that, without them, one of the parties would not have contracted or would have contracted on substantially different terms’.

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L'obligation sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause illicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet.4

Together, they suggest that the substantive features of consent are to be found in the theory of defects in consent (contract). Also, in the determination of whether the cause for consent is acceptable. They embody the qualities or properties that consent must have to produce the intended legal effects. It begs the question of how the theory of defects in consent supports the substantive features that consent must have to create a contract. It also broaches the question of how the doctrine of lawful causation was developed after codification. It interrogates what it entails. Finally, it questions how causa warrants consensualism as a procedural and substantive rule determining what acceptable contractual behaviour is. These interrogations are presently discussed in turn.

6.2

Defects in Consent and the Vindication of the Consensual Doctrine

Articles 1109 to 1122 followed Article 1108. Together, they identify clearly and definitely the meaning of consent in French law and the substantive qualities that it must have to create legal relations. They establish the theory of defects in consent as the underpinning of consensualism. They explained how consensualism could be defeated on the ground of error, violence, undue influence, duress, and inadequate consideration. Likewise, they determined when it is admissible to stipulate for oneself or another regarding unilateral engagements. In turn, these articles, when read together, establish that consent must be given informedly to produce the desired legal effects. Informedness denotes the ability that one has to understand the facts or show knowledge of a situation. It entails that the party who gives consent must be capable. Consequently, the establishment of capacity as a stand-alone requirement distinct from consent under Article 1108 had no vested interest. Incidentally, these articles explain successively that the efficacy of consent depends on socioeconomic bias to a disadvantaged party. It underpins consensualism. Consequently, the disadvantaged party may be able to obtain the rescission of an undertaking whether it is affected by issues of capacity, dol (fraud, undue influence), error, violence (duress), and lésion (inadequate consideration). Likewise, if the undertaking consists in an unlawful stipulation for the benefit or on behalf of another. As a result, in incorporating these articles into the Civil Code, Bigot de Préameneu established good faith as the underpinning of consensualism. It influences the affirmation or voidance of a contract. It reveals consensualism to have 4 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1131. [My own translation]: ‘An obligation without a cause, with a false cause, or with an unlawful cause is null and void’.

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other features. It provides a standard moralistic system. It determines the binding force of consent. It is a protective instrument. It prevents unfairness and inequity in contract. Hence, consensualism divides the efficacy of contract from consent. Instead, it makes the efficacy of contract rely on morality. It provides a universal code of conduct. It makes the obligation so strong that any breach of the engagement taken leads to sanctioning or invalidating it if it proceeds from malice, a usurpatory intention, threats, or constraint. It is a standard behavioural norm. It fulfils a social, even political aim. It is an opportunity for extensive interpretation to ensure that none can reverse an already established position and annul a contract. Likewise, it assures that none can release themselves from a lawful engagement. Simultaneously, it is a means of ensuring that none can benefit from an advantage obtained unlawfully. Hence, Terré, Simler, and Lequette argued that ‘le consensualisme apparaît comme une conquête de la bonne foi’ (consensualism conquers good faith).5 It is only consistent with the spirit of the Civil Code. It provided explicitly that: ex-Article 1134.

ex-Article 1135.

Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise. Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi.6 Les conventions obligent non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, mais encore à toutes les suites que l'équité, l'usage ou la loi donnent à l'obligation d'après sa nature.7

It means that the consensual procedure that Article 1101 embodied supposed that for a contract to be enforceable, the parties deal with each other fairly and honestly. It also supposes that the enforcement of conventions is consistent with fairness and justice. They reinforce the express covenants or promises of the contract. They give grounds to their enforceability according to reason as maintained by Article 1108 et seq. In that respect, the principle of consensualism that Bigot de Préameneu enshrined in the Civil Code by preterition did not differ from its appreciation in

Terré et al. (2002) at [129]: ‘Le consensualisme apparaît comme une conquête de la bonne foi’. [Emphasis added][My own translation]: ‘Agreements lawfully entered into have the force of law for those who have made them. They may only be revoked by the mutual consent of the parties, or for the causes allowed by law. They must be performed in good faith’. Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1103 (current): ‘Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits’; French Civil Code, Article 1193 (current): ‘Les contrats ne peuvent être modifiés ou révoqués que du consentement mutuel des parties, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise’; French Civil Code, Article 1104 (current): ‘Les contrats doivent être négociés, formés et exécutés de bonne foi. Cette disposition est d’ordre public’. 7 [Emphasis added][My own translation]: ‘Agreements bind the parties not only as to what is therein expressed, but also as to all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose upon the obligation according to its nature’. Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1194 (current): ‘Les contrats obligent non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, mais encore à toutes les suites que leur donnent l’équité, l’usage ou la loi’. 5 6

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canon and natural law (see Chap. 4). It has endured in the Civil Code since its promulgation. However, consensualism in the Civil Code has had the effect of skewing the method for interpreting contract towards a finite goal. It concerns the determination of the intent of the parties on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the coercion of the parties to keep their promise. It is contingent on the consistency of the agreement with good faith, natural equity, and reason. A massive body of case law illustrates this.8 They are the reason consent can be a source of obligation. Consequently, consensualism limits the power that the parties have over their agreement. It curtails arbitrariness, inequity, and injustice in contract. Thus, consensualism is a principle of an explanatory and legitimating nature. It is a safeguard to public order and legal certainty. It imposes a duty on parties to deal with each other honestly, fairly, and equitably. Hence, Articles 1109 and 1117 provided that an agreement entered into by error, violence, or undue influence is null in the cases provided in Articles 1111 to 1116 and section VII of Chapter V on the termination of obligations. In such cases, consent is deemed never to have been given. It invalidates the undertaking that it supports. It must be unravelled in turn.9 However, this jurisprudence is open to revision. It is essential to understand that in nearly all the instances where consent is defective, the undertaking is not unravelled because consent is lacking or was not conveyed. Instead, the undertaking is upset a posteriori at the behest of an aggrieved party because how consent was given is deemed substantively unacceptable. It is inconsistent with law or morality. Hence, the contract is voidable (‘résiliable’). It is clear that the idea by which there is absolutely no consent if there is an error, violence, or dol is due to Pothier and how Bigot de Préameneu construed his jurisprudence. Pothier argued that 21. Le consentement qui forme les conventions doit être libre; si le consentement de quelqu’un des contractants a été extorqué par la violence, le contrat est vicieux; au reste comme le consentement quoiqu’extorqué par violence est un

8 See, for instance, Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 14 September 2005: Bull. Civ. III, n°166; D.2006. 761, note D. Mazeaud; JCP 2005. II.10173, note Loiseau; JCP E 2005. 1867, note Binctin; Defrénois 2005, 19122. Noote Dagorne-Labbe; ibid, 2006. 248, note Techendjou; CCC 2006, n°1, note Leveneur; LPA, 1st December 2005, note Messai-Bahri, RDC 2006. 811, obs. Viney; RTD cv. 2005. 776, obs. Mestre et Fage; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 18 May 2011; Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 7 May 2008: Bull. Civ. V, n°99; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 26 November 1996: Bull. Civ. I, n°415; Cour de cassation, Assemblée Plénière, 1 December 1995: Bull. Civ. N°7 (2 arrêts); ibid, n°8; R, p. 290, GAJC, 11 éd, n°151-154; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 3 November 1992: JCP 1993. II.27164, note Virassamy, Defrénois 1993. 1377, obs. Aubert; RTD Civ. 1993. 124, obs. Mestre. 9 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1117: ‘La convention contractée par erreur, violence ou dol, n'est point nulle de plein droit ; elle donne seulement lieu à une action en nullité ou en rescision, dans les cas et de la manière expliqués à la section VII du chapitre V du présent titre’.

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consentement tel que voluntas coacta est voluntas. . .on ne peut pas dire comme dans le cas de l’erreur, qu’il n’y ait point eu absolument de contrat; il y en a un, mais il est vicieux, et celui dont le consentement a été extorqué par violence ou bien ses héritiers ou cessionnaires, peuvent le faire annuler et rescinder, en obtenant pour cet effet des lettres de rescision.10 It means that Pothier considered that there is no contract only where consent was given in error. In all the other instances of defects, consent is given but only out of fear or reverence. In such cases, there is a contract. However, it is voidable (‘résiliable’) given the dishonesty and insincerity of intention. However, Pothier’s jurisprudence does not stand up to any scrutiny either. Alike Bigot de Préameneu, Pothier failed to understand that in all the cases where rescission (‘nullité’) is obtained, consent is duly given whether only by error, violence or dol ('voluntas coacta est voluntas’). Unless the error is manifestly gross in which case the mutual will of the parties cannot be deemed to have converged and there is no contract, the aggrieved party who seeks rescission usually merely attempts to find a legal way to terminate their obligation without incurring liability in all other instances of defect.11 The ground for the claim is that how consent was given is merely inconsistent with all the consequences that law, usage, or morality impose on an obligation according to its nature. Hence, there is generally a contract whether consent was given in error, obtained by violence, or induced by fraud. However, the contract is voidable (‘résiliable’) because the way in which it was formed is deemed unacceptable. Consequently, the theory of defects in consent mitigates the libertarian jurisprudence that Article 1101 underpins. It provides ways to rescind an unlawful agreement. It is not tantamount to saying that there was absolutely no consent ab initio. Therefore, it is illogical of the Cour de cassation to unravel undertakings on the ground that consent was not conveyed ab initio while observing that it was indeed given but only improperly. It is the effect of nullity. Put differently, it is unconvincing to resolve disputes by observing first that consent was given improperly and [My own translation]: ‘Consent must be free; if the consent of any of the parties was extorted by violence, the contract is vitiated; albeit consent extorted by duress is a form of consent consisting with the adage voluntas, coacta est voluntas. . .it cannot be said, as in the case of error, that there has not been any contract at all; there is one, but it is vitiated and the party whose consent has been extorted by duress, or their heirs or assignees can request its rescission and obtain, to this effect, rescission orders’. 11 I submit that unless the error is substantive (e.g., A thought he agreed to buy a Rolls Royce Phantom VIII from B when B believed he agreed only to sell a Rolls Royce Phantom VIII figurine to A) it is impromper to argue that there is absolutely no consent when consent was given by any other form of excusable or material mistake. The reason is that in all other instances of mistake, the parties agreed into the same subject-matter and object of performance but would only have incorporated substantially different terms had something been known to one or each of them. Compare to Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 1, 22 February 1978, 76-11.551 (Affaire Poussin); Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 27 February 2007, 02-13.420 03-21.179; Cour d'appel de Versailles, 12 January 2000, 1998-2334. It is consistent with the newly incorporated Article 1132 of the Civil Code of France. 10

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upset contracts by asserting that defect is tantamount not to have given consent at all. It would be more logical to resile a party from an undertaking, terminate it for the future (‘résilier’) when the defect in consent is found (ipso tempore), or order compensation as appropriate to restore the economics of the contract instead of rescinding it (‘résoudre’). It is notably so since the aggrieved party would have usually still contracted. Albeit, only on substantially different terms. Thus, it is missing the point to say that there is no consent and decide that it is the reason there is no contract. Consent alone does not make the contract. Its enforceability always depends on factors external to it such as good faith, reason, or lawfulness, pace Henri Capitant for whom consent is the raison d’être of contract. All the rest is subsidiary.12 Hence, Article 1109 should have read that there is no contract or, better, contract is voidable if assent to the terms of an obligation was conveyed by error or obtained by duress or undue influence instead of reading that there is no consent. The result is the same. The contract is unenforceable unless the aggrieved party affirms it. In fact, the case law on mistake and undue influence shows that the legal relationship is usually intended. So, what is wrong is not the contract. It is the way in which consent was conveyed. It suffers from qualitative, substantive deficiencies. They prevent its enforcement. Articles 1109 to 1122 suggest that these are un-informedness, unfairness, and inequity. They have the faculty of holding the contract in check as higher social, legal values. A contrario, it means that the quality of being given and obtained informedly, fairly, and equitably determines the validity of consent. They underpin consensualism. These qualities are additional requirements to the procedural rule laid down under Article 1101. They remedy an unfair situation that law would not otherwise address given that its premier purpose is to establish standards, maintain order, resolve disputes, protect liberties and rights according to established rules, not according to imprecise principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and evil. It is the point Terré et al. were making when they argued that ‘le consensualisme apparaît comme une conquête de la bonne foi’.13 It does put into context how the incorporation of the theory of defects in consent in the Civil Code buffers freedom of contract. It reveals consensualism to have other features than the debatable opposition between form and consent. The effect of the theory of defects in consent is to single out classes of undertakings that cannot be enforced. It restricts the cases in which agreements arising from consent can be contracts. It also mitigates the illusion of absolute freedom and lawlessness that Article 1101 implied. Thus, the theory of defect that consensualism underpins protects the parties against themselves. It substantiates the qualitative features that consent must have to create legal relations. It contributed to the establishment of consent as a general principle of contract. It arranges and makes consent operate according to an

12 13

Colin et al. (1935) at [35]. Terré et al. (2002) at [129]: ‘Le consensualisme apparaît comme une conquête de la bonne foi’.

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organised system. It sets out a heterogeneous ensemble of shortcomings. They influence the validity of contracts. Accordingly, the theory of defects in consent in the Civil Code vindicates consensualism as the doctrine by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract. However, it must be consistent with reason, natural equity, and justice. Altogether, they suppose consideration of the personal feelings of the aggrieved party according to objective standards. They culminate in the theory of causation.

6.3 6.3.1

Cause: An Agency of the Efficacy of Consent Meaning and Implications

Causa is a recurring historical theme re the discovery and systematisation of solus consensus obligat. Its basic outline was already discussed in Roman law through commutativity. It stemmed from Paul’s definition of innominate contracts as agreements arising from consent. They are enforceable only by consent due to the reciprocal nature of the obligations of the parties. They are causes for each other (see Chap. 2). The canonists and Romanists developed Paul’s jurisprudence further in the early modern period variously as a requirement for counterpart or an appeal to reason. They employed it to justify the binding force of agreements arising from consent without formality, primarily through the pacta vestita theory (see Chap. 4). Likewise, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Domat dedicated developments to it. In his turn, Pothier systematised it as a substantive requirement underpinning the binding force of contract (see Chap. 4). Its reception in the Civil Code is undeniable. Article 1108 provided that amongst the essential requirements for contracting and for consensualism to operate are: (i) the assent of the parties to the terms of the obligation (ii) in full control of their faculties (iii) to undertake a particular conduct or action (iv) that is lawfully caused. Hence, Article 1131 read: L’obligation sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause illicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet.14

In turn, Article 1132 provided: La convention n’en est pas moins valable, quoique la cause n’en soit pas exprimée.15

Finally, Article 1133 determined that:

[My own translation]: ‘An obligation without a cause, with a false cause, or with an unlawful cause is null and void’. Contra French Civil Code, Article 1162 (current). 15 [My own translation]: ‘The agreement of the parties is nevertheless valid, although the cause is not expressed’. This article has no equivalent in the Civil Code since the reform of 2016. 14

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La cause est illicite, quand elle est prohibée par la loi, quand elle est contraire aux bonnes mœurs ou à l’ordre public.16

So clearly, the fundamental instrument vindicating the binding force of consent under Article 1108 is indeed causa. It denotes further substantive requirements that consent must satisfy to be a source of law. It must be lawful, explicit, or implicit. It must also consist with all the consequences that legislation, morality, or usage impose on an obligation according to its nature. There too, good faith, natural equity, or justice underpin causa and consensualism. However, the Civil Code did not define causa for the reasons already discussed in Chap. 5. Although, it is possible to surmise what causa entailed in the Civil Code based on the distinctions already present in it even before looking at its development in jurisprudence.

6.3.1.1

Reconstruction of the Meaning of Causa in the Civil Code

The distinction of the cause of the obligation from its object under Article 1108 implies that causa was not to be conflated with the motives wherefore the parties obliged themselves. It was something else, something objective underpinning contract. What else could it be? Article 1101 defined contract as an agreement by which one or several people promise to undertake a particular conduct or action.17 Article 1102 read that a contract is synallagmatic or bilateral when the parties oblige themselves to each other reciprocally.18 Article 1103 read that a contract is unilateral when one or more persons are obliged to one or several others who are not obliged to the former in return.19 Article 1104 read that a contract is commutative when each party obligates themselves to transfer or do a thing that is considered equivalent to what is transferred to them or what is done for them. It is aleatory when the equivalent consists in a chance of gain or loss for each party that depends upon an uncertain event.20 Article 1105 read that a charitable contract is one in which one of the parties procures a purely gratuitous advantage to the other.21 Finally, Article 1106 determined that an onerous contract is one that obliges each party to give or do something.22 Together, these provisions imply that the cause in the Civil Code did not denote the motives of the parties. However, it was evidence of a particular conduct that the

[My own translation]: ‘The cause of the obligation is unlawful when it is prohibited by law, and when it is contrary to social mores or public order’. Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1162 (current). 17 Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1101 (current). 18 Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1106, °1 (current). 19 Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1106, °2 (current). 20 Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1108 (current). 21 Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1107, °1 (current). 22 Compare to French Civil Code, Article 1107, °2 (current). 16

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parties need have adopted. It consisted in undertaking something in exchange for something else. Otherwise, it denoted the procurement of an advantage to another selflessly and benevolently regarding gratuitous obligations or simple promises, the so-called unilateral contracts as these are called in French law. Either way, the thing undertaken, in other words consent, had to be lawful. It suggests that the action or conduct that consent underpinned could not be something proscribed by legislation or usage. Neither could it be contrary to public order. In addition, the act of benevolence must be truthful. It must not have been obtained or induced by fraud, or constraint. It was only consistent with Articles 1134 and 1135. Thus, causa in the Civil Code foreshadowed commutative justice and natural equity as the tenets of French contract law. It involved an equitable substitution, exchange or donation. Therefore, when the agreement required consideration, that cause must have been sufficient, although inadequate. In turn, the reliance that a party instilled in another underpinned their coercion to keep their word. It purported to prevent unjustified enrichment. Likewise, if the condition whereunder a benefit was conferred or a factual or legal situation did not materialise or subsist. In such a case, the agreement could be unravelled for lack of consideration as in English law.23

6.3.1.2

Judicial Specification

The Cour de cassation has been earnest in utilising causa as an instrument for natural equity and economic equality. Causation in the Civil Code supplied the breeding ground for the assertion that every agreement can be a contract. However, consent must be justified and consistent with equity in all its forms. Otherwise, it cannot produce legal effects. Put differently, causa in the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation determined that agreements arising from consent can be contracts if there is a valid reason or cause, in fact or law, for the transfer of a right. Otherwise, the undertaking would be without a cause (nudum pactum). The Court’s jurisprudence relied on Article 1131. It deemed causeless undertakings void. It was paired with an action for the restitution of something to the party who unjustly impoverished themselves (condictio ob turpem vel ex injustam causam, ob rem dati). It was only consistent with natural equity that none should profit pecuniarily by the injury of another. It relied on the adage nemo locupletari potest aliena iactura or nemo locupletari debet cum aliena iactura. It is the point the Cour de cassation was making when it said that: Mais attendu que l’arrêt relève, tant par motifs propres qu’adoptés, que la cession des parts avait été librement acceptée par le cédant sans la moindre clause de réévaluation par quel que motif que ce soit, que M. X. . .avait fait expressément abandon de toute créance, que les stipulations de la convention n’avaient prévu aucun remboursement des sommes dues à

23

Chappell v Nestlés [1960] AC 87; Boots Co Plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 609.

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145

M. X. . .à raison d’opérations de la coopérative antérieures au 31 décembre 1979, que le bilan faisait apparaître une perte telle que, même en prenant en considération toutes les sommes réclamées par M. X. . ., le bilan aurait fait apparaître une perte si importante qu’elle n’aurait pas permis d’attribuer aux parts cédées une valeur autre que symbolique, ce dont il résulte que l’enrichissement sans cause allégué n’était pas établi.24

But also, more straightforwardly when it said: Dès lors que les sommes versées n’étaient pas dues, le solvens est en droit, sans être tenu à aucune autre preuve, d’en obtenir la restitution.25 L’action de in rem verso est recevable, dès lors que celui qui l’intente allègue l'avantage qu'il aurait procuré à celui contre lequel il agit.26

So, causa in the Civil Code served to correct unfairness when the benefits of agreements were unfairly divided or unjustified. It allowed the rescission of a right obtained unfairly and the recovery of what was undue. It was notably so where the consent of accipiens was extorted. Likewise, where the cause of the undertaking was reprovable or immoral. Consequently, causa in the Civil Code protected consent ex-ante but also ex-post. Put differently, it justified the unravelling of an agreement that fell afoul of equity even after it was formed. Simultaneously, it voided an obligation ab initio if the condition on which it was contingent failed to subsist or materialise (causa non secuta est).

24 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 19 February 1991, n°89-18498 (a contrario). [My own translation]: ‘The decision appealed against highlights that the grantor agreed on the transfer of shares freely and the contract did not incorporate any term for the reconsideration of their price for any reason. Consequently, Mr X. . .expressly waived any claim for price adaptation. Given that the terms of the contract did not provide for any reimbursement for sums owed to Mr X. . .caused by the operational running of the activities of the cooperative prior to 31 December 1979, that the balance sheets of the cooperative showed a shortfall so huge that, even accounting for the sums claimed by Mr X. . ., the balance sheet would have still shown a shortfall so big that it would not have been possible to assign any value to the shares transferred other than a symbolic one, the claimant’s claim for unjust enrichment cannot be sustained’. 25 Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière, 2 April 1993: Bull. Civ. N°9, R., p 326; GAJC, 11e éd., n° 226; D. 1993. 373, concl. Jéol; D. 1993. Somm. 273., obs. Prétot; D. 1994, Somm. 14, obs. Aubert; JCP 1993. II.22051, cincl. Jéol; Gaz. Pal. 1993.2.560, concl. Jéol; RTD Civ. 1993. 820, obs. Mestre, Sériaux, D. 1993. Chron. 229. [My own translation]: ‘Since the monies paid were not due, solvens was entitled to restitution without a need to prove it’. See also Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 20 January 1998: Bull. Civ. I, n°18; D. 1999. 500, note D. R. Martin (1re esp.); JCP 1999. I. 137, n°7, obs. Rullmann contra Digest, 12.6.14; Digest, 16.2.10.1; Digest, 50.17.206; and French Civil Code, Article 1302-2 (current). 26 Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 January 1965: Gaz. Pal. 1965. 1. 198; French Civil Code, Article 1303 (current). [My own translation]: ‘The action of in rem verso (i.e., unjust enrichment) can be sustained from the moment that the party who relies on it contends that they have procured an undue advantage to the defendant’.

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Jurisprudential Developments

Causa as a Lawful and Equitable Object Differently, the subsequent interpreters of the Civil Code—foremost amongst whom was Capitant—explained that causa designates the requirement for a lawful and equitable object, not necessarily a pecuniary quid pro quo between the parties. Hence, Capitant argued that: Une obligation n’est valable qu’autant que le but visé est, d’une part, susceptible d’être atteint et, d’autre part, licite, c’est-à-dire n’est ni interdit par la loi, ni contraire à l’ordre public ou aux bonnes mœurs.27 L’obligation ne peut vivre qu’autant qu’elle reste appuyée sur sa cause. Par-là, la cause se sépare des deux autres conditions qui doivent exister chez le débiteur pour la validité du contrat; le consentement et la capacité.28

However, the word ‘but’ (i.e., the object of the obligation) does not denote the thing which is agreed on by the party who receives the consideration to do or not to do.29 It refers instead to the permissions that parties have by law or another rule to agree, for instance, on something such as subjecting the elements and products of their body to a patrimonial right which Article 16-1 proscribes.30 Although ‘but’ is distinct from ‘objet’, Capitant does put into perspective how irrelevant the distinction that Article 1108 outlined between object and cause is. It is typically so because the reflection on the cause of the obligation induces naturally the identification of whether the thing which is subject to a legal transaction between parties may be subject to an agreement by law, usage, or morality. Hence, the reflection on the cause of the obligation induces the appraisal of the lawfulness and possibility of its object. The reflection on the cause of the obligation had, therefore, little, even no practical relevance other than to clutter the mind of the practising lawyer with superfluous knowledge, and oversubtle and meaningless distinctions.

27 Capitant (1927) §6, °2, p. 28. [My own translation]: ‘An obligation is only valid to the extent that its goal is, on the one hand, likely to be reached and, on the other, lawful; that is, that its goal is neither proscribed by law nor contrary to public order or good mores’. 28 Capitant (1927) pp. 28–29. [My own translation]: ‘The obligation can only be sustained provided it relies on a cause. In this regard, the cause of the obligation is distinct from the other requirements that the debtor of the obligation must fulfil for the contract to be valid; that is, the conveyance of consent and their capacity to contract’. 29 Capitant (1927), p. 113. 30 French Civil Code, Article 16-1: ‘Chacun a droit au respect de son corps. Le corps humain est inviolable. Le corps humain, ses éléments et ses produits ne peuvent faire l'objet d'un droit patrimonial’.

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Causa as a Requirement for Consideration Unlike Capitant, Villey, Aubry, and Rau discussed causa only as a requirement for counterpart. Villey said it need have been pecuniary.31 Otherwise, the undertaking was void consistently with the adage nemo locupletari potest aliena iactura or nemo locupletari debet cum aliena iactura. So, while part of French scholarship argued that causa denoted a lawful object, another, supported by the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation, construed it as a requirement for counterpart. Its failure allowed the courts to return parties to a status quo ante for consent was given improperly. However, this opinion of Villey taken so generally as he expressed it cannot be consistent. It would, thence, follow that promises and gratuitous unilateral agreements were of no force, especially since they are unsupported by a pecuniary cause moving from the promisee. It would deny the binding force of what the Civil Code termed unilateral contracts. It suggests that causa did not necessarily entail pecuniary consideration, reimbursement, indemnification, or reparation for benefits derived from, or for loss or injury caused to another if so-called ‘unilateral contracts’ were to have legal effects. Hence, the Cour de cassation ruled that the cause of the unilateral obligation lies in a factual and legal situation between the debtor and a third party. Examples include the free will to confer an advantage to a third party, the quality of being thankful, the readiness to show appreciation to someone for or return kindness, and a condition or situation under which a benefit is conferred.32 Consequently, where it entailed pecuniary interest, causa fulfilled a sociopolitical aim. It promoted economic equity between the parties over proportional equality. By and large, it shifted the identification of legal relations from consensus to focus on the appraisal of the acceptableness of the prevailing effect of the obligation. It concerns the (economic) aim envisaged by one or two people and its raison d’être. Accordingly, good faith, natural equity, and morality underpinned it. Causa was, thus, an external means of social control. It was imbued with economic equity. It mitigated the power of the will and consent in contract. It subjected them to an acceptable standard: lawfulness and reason.

31

Villey (1962), pp. 23ff, 33; Aubry and Rau (1897–1923) n°578. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 11 December 1900, DP 1901. 1. 257 – 30 mars 1943, DC 1944. 13, note L.P – Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 30 April 1947, JCP 1947. IV. 97. See also Paris, 3 March 1898; Paris, 23 July 1926, DH 1926. 568; Tribunal Civil de Marseille, 17 March 1927; Aix-en-Provence, 29 November 1927, JCP 1928. 11, 177; Chevallier (1933) at [257]; Najjar, I in Dalloz, Répertoire de droit civil (2020b online, last updated: 2011). 32

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Causa as an Instrument of Social Control Articles 1674 and 1118 further supported the potency of causa as an instrument for the social control of conventions and consensus.33 They provide that in synallagmatic contracts, a lack of equivalence in the acts of performance of the parties is not a cause for nullity of the contract. It is notably so where a seller has not suffered a loss greater than seven-twelfths of the price of an immovable property. It is different if legislation provides otherwise. Thus, Articles 1674 and 1118 suggest that causa might have even been a means of controlling the sufficiency of the consideration provided as in English law.34 Incidentally, several decisions of the Cour de cassation show that the court also acknowledged that causa entails the necessity to compensate an advantage received from another unsupported by sufficient consideration. Notably, if the undertaking is manifestly imbalanced or resulted from the exploitation of the predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgement of another. More so, if the undertaking resulted from the considerable weakness of will of another that caused the one party, or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to be promised or granted pecuniary advantages that are disproportionate to the performance. Otherwise, good faith and equity could be used to unravel the undertaking and prevent unjust enrichment as established in jurisprudence constante.35 So, causa was a premiss for the control of the consistency of undertakings with the motives wherefore the parties obliged themselves. It was an implied term to give

33 French Civil Code, Article 1168 (current): ‘Dans les contrats synallagmatiques, le défaut d’équivalence des prestations n’est pas une cause de nullité du contrat, à moins que la loi n’en dispose autrement’; French Civil Code, Article 1674: ‘Si le vendeur a été lésé de plus de sept douzièmes dans le prix d'un immeuble, il a le droit de demander la rescision de la vente, quand même il aurait expressément renoncé dans le contrat à la faculté de demander cette rescision, et qu'il aurait déclaré donner la plus-value’. 34 Wilmot-Smith (2013), pp. 414–436; Barnes v Eastenders [2014] UKSC 26, [2014] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 461; Jaffey (2003), pp. 284–293; Chappell v Nestlés [1960] AC 87; Boots Co Plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 609. 35 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 15 June 1892, DP 92. 1. 596, S. 93. 1. 281, note Labbé; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 January 1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965 1 p. 198; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1 March 1989 Bull. civ. III, n° 49, p 29; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 26 August 1962, JCP 1983 II 19992, not Ph Terri; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 10 October 2000, D 2000 AJ, p 409, obs Avena-Robarde; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 June 1997, n°95-13.568; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 19 May 1998, n° 96-16.393; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 January 1953, D 1953, p 234; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 15 June 1994, Bull. civ. I, n°215; Defrénois, 1994, p 1113, obs. P Delebecque; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 22 October 1996, D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux; D., 1997, chron., p 145, n°3, n. C Larroumet; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 18 July 2001, Bull. civ. n°101; D., 2002, p 680, n. C Castets; somm., p 390, obs. G Paisant; Defrénois, 2001, p 1421, obs. E Savaux; Contrats, conc., conso. 2001., n°171, n. L Leveneur; Droit et patrimoine, December 2001, p 98, obs. P Chauvel; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 September 2004, Bull. civ. IV, n°167; D., 2005, p 302, n. M-A Rakotovahini; JCP 2005.I.107, p 147, obs. M Cabrillac.

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business efficacy to agreements. Also, it was a premise for the control of the sufficiency of the consideration provided. Altogether, they are featuring substantive components of consent. They determine its enforceability. It makes even more moot the distinction that Article 1108 embodied between cause and object. The paradigmatic example and test case is Chronopost I (1996).36

Chronopost and the Implication of Causa as a Tool of Business Efficacy and Sufficient Consideration Chronopost caused a great stir in French legal practice. It is set against a backdrop of going beyond the identification of the counterpart of the obligation. It characterises a judicial movement beginning in the 1990s consisting in moving away from the identification of whether something of value was given by each party as a quid pro quo to support their side of the obligation. By contrast, it highlighted the necessity of prohibiting the causes undermining the essential nature of the obligations that parties acknowledged within the framework of their contract, thus undermining the main purpose of the contract (i.e., primary obligation). Chronopost established a precedent or rather jurisprudence constante that not even the reform of the French law of obligation in 2016 dared to challenge. It is considered as authority for deciding subsequent cases whether they involve identical or similar facts, issues. It elicited, in turn, a massive body of case law on causa.37 In casu, the litigation regarded business-to-business liability, especially limitation of liability clauses. It concerned a firm of architects. It had responded to an invitation to bid. The terms of the invitation to tender specified that the tender had to be submitted by post by 12-noon on a given date to the Master of the Works. So, the architectural practice called on the French express shipping and delivery service company Chronopost to deliver its bid by noon the following day to comply with the deadline.

36

Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 22 October 1996, Bull. civ. IV, n°261, GAJC, 11th ed., n°156; D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux; somm., p 175, obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 1997, p 333, obs. D Mazeaud; JCP 1997.II.22881, n. D Cohen; I.4002, n°1, obs. M Fabre-Magnan; I.4027, n°17, n. G Viney; Contrats, conc. Conso., 1997, n°24, obs. L Leveneur; Gaz. Pal., 1997.2.519, n. R Martin ; RTD Civ. 1997, p 418, obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 April 2005, Bull. civ., n°231; Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 May 2005, Bull. civ., n°232. 37 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 9 July 2002, Chronopost II, n° 99-12554, Bulletin 2002 IV N° 121, p 129; Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 April 2005, Chronopost III, n° 03-14112, Bulletin 2005 Mixt. N° 4, p 10; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 30 May 2006, Chronopost IV, n° 04-14974, Bulletin 2006 IV N° 132, p 134; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 13 June 2006, Chronopost V, n°05-12619, Bulletin 2006 IV N° 143, p 152; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 13 February 2007, Faurecia I, n° 05-17407, Bulletin 2007, IV, N°43; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 June 2010, Faurecia II, n° 09-11841, Bulletin 2010, IV, n° 115.

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However, due to an internal blunder, Chronopost was not able to deliver the mail until a day after the submission was due, thereby breaching its obligation and injuring the architectural practice whose submission was rejected. Consequently, it sued Chronopost for loss of business according to the terms and conditions of the delivery agreement. It incorporated compensation for delayed delivery. In turn, Chronopost fought the claim because the terms limited its liability to delayed delivery only, the compensation for which was confined to a refund of the price paid. The architects could not challenge the term on the grounds of unfairness and abusiveness, given that they did not meet the consumer criterion.38 However, their lawyers cleverly based their petition on Chronopost’s negligence, gross misconduct (i.e., faute lourde). The commercial division of the Cour de cassation acceded to their claim. It ignored the abusive character of the term. It ruled that the appellate court of Rennes violated Article 1131 by failing to compel the person by whose fault another incurred a loss to compensate them for it. Put differently, the Chambre commerciale decided that as an express shipping and delivery service specialist, Chronopost was bound to guarantee the celerity of its service within the time prescribed. The limitation of liability clause defeated not only the reliance of its users but also the cause of the agreement: a guaranteed delivery by a given time and date. Hence, the Chambre commerciale considered that the clause was non écrite (i.e., unincorporated, unlawful) and ordered the appellate court of Caen to reconsider the case and uphold the claim of the firm of architects. Thus, causa gave the broadest discretion to judges to restore the coherence of undertakings by redacting their restrictive terms. It is notably so when the terms fall foul of the spirit of the undertaking, including between professionals. Put differently, the Cour de cassation ruled that if a term undermines the primary obligation of an agreement, that clause must be redacted. Otherwise, the obligation of one of the parties would be devoid of a counterpart which the law cannot admit. So, causa became an instrument affording the identification of the obligation essentielle in a contract. Even so, if it means dismissing contractual terms believed to be objectively objectionable, incoherent, or unsuitable so that the purpose of the engagement and the reliance of the creditor are not defeated. As a result, causa served to correct the qualitative deficiencies from which a contract could suffer and supplement it to make sense of consensus. It allowed the clear and definite identification of what consent covers to ensure that lawful agreements are kept and not jeopardised. It was, thus, also a commutative implement

38 Loi (Hamon) 2014-344 du 17-3-2014 relative à la consommation; Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance; Ordonnance 2016-301 du 14-3-2016 relative à la partie législative du Code de la consommation; Loi 2017-203 du 21-2-2017 ratifiant [notamment] l’ordonnance 2016-301 du 14-3-2016 relative à la partie législative du Code de la consommation; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 March 2017, n°16-10007 and n°15-26766.

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supplementing consent. It allowed the remediation of contractual or conventional imbalance (i.e., unequitable consent) while preserving the legality of a contract. Thus, what made the agreement was not so much consent as the first limb of article 1101 suggested (‘le contrat est une convention’). Instead, it was its commutative character, economic equity as its second limb implied (‘par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes s'obligent, envers une ou plusieurs autres, à donner, à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose’).

6.3.1.4

Implications

Chronopost and the subsequent judicial consideration that it elicited suggest that (economic) equity is the shaft on which the effectivity of contractual or conventional obligations depends, not just consent.39 Consequently, the development of causa in French law truly substantiated the additional properties that consent must have to produce the desired effect. It reveals consensualism to have more features than just establishing a procedural rule by which mutual consent can be a source of obligations without formality. In addition, causa in French law established a rule by which the obligations of the parties arise from the necessity to compensate the impoverishment that one party may suffer because of an unreciprocated or insufficient consideration given to another. It includes indemnifying the loss that the promisee may incur because of the neglect (culpa levissima), negligence (culpa levis), or gross negligence (culpa lata) of the promisor. It was the natural counterpart to Articles 113440 and 1135.41 They provided that obligations must be performed in good faith. They oblige not only to what is therein expressed but also to all the consequences that equity, usage or law impose upon an obligation according to its nature. It supports the idea that consensualism has other features than just allowing parties to contract without formality. It is also a substantive rule. It foists fairness as a fundamental unit in all agreements. It determines the binding force of an agreement. It justifies the coercion of a party to perform whatever action that would make sense of an undertaking.

39

Cour de cassation, 22 October 1996, Bull. civ. IV, n°261, GAJC, 11th ed., n°156; D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 15 February 2000, Bull. civ. IV, n°29; D., 2000, somm., p 364 obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 2000, p 1118, obs. D Mazeaud; Petites Affiches, 29 December 2000, p 12, n. G Meilhac-Redon and J Marmoz; RTD Civ., 2000, p 325, obs. J Mestre and B Fages; Houtcieff (2001) at [502] to [503]; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 December 1990, Bull. civ. I, n°303; R., p 372; JCP 1991.II.21656, n. J Bigot; RTD Civ., 1991, obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 15 February 2000, Bull. civ. IV, n° 29; D., 2000, somm., p 364 obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 2000, p 1118, obs. D Mazeaud; Petites Affiches, 29 December 2000, p 12, n. G Meilhac-Redon and J Marmoz; RTD Civ., 2000, p 325, obs. J Mestre and B Fages, D Mazeaud. 40 Contra French Civil Code, Articles 1103, 1104, and 1193 (current). 41 Contra French Civil Code, Article 1194 (current).

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Put differently, the development of causa in French jurisprudence suggests that consensualism is also an objective norm. It determines what acceptable contract behaviour is. Like Kantian ethics, it provides a rule by which every rational being must so act not to cause harm to another.42 While it is doubtful that Kant’s philosophy influenced the drafters of the Civil Code and French practitioners directly, his jurisprudence and, generally, philosophy of law, help explain how reason may underpin consensualism. Its effect through causa has been to allow the enforceability of agreements arising from consent in the light of Articles 1101 and 1131 et seq. It has also been to allow the determination of the consistency of agreements with social and moral standards in view of Chronopost I and the jurisprudence it instigated. It means that what makes the contract is utility (i.e., the economic profitability of undertakings) and fairness. It is not naked consent. It is essential but does not create nor form the basis for the enforcement of undertakings alone. Instead, their efficacy depends on an external body of norms. It is drawn from reason and morality. It enables conventional agreements to produce the desired legal effects. It is like a vestment required to clothe consent and enable it to have legal meaning. It substantiates it through the doctrine of causation. It operates alike Accursius’ pacta vestita theory. It begs the question of whether the doctrinal assertion of naked consent as what makes the contract does not overemphasise the role of consent in contract (see Chap. 8).43 That notwithstanding, causa has not built a unanimous consensus amongst French scholars. Many moved up to the front to deny its utility to determine that agreements arising from consent can be contracts. It broaches the question of what the denouement of this doctrinal quibble has been and what its relevance for the present is.

6.3.2

Doctrinaire Reconsiderations of Causation as an Agency of Consent: Pro-Causalism -v- Anti-Causalism

Causa has been heavily debated among French doctrinal scholars. It has been the subject of many articles, theses, commentaries, textbooks, cases, case notes, and suchlike on its meaning, opportunity, and utility.44 They point to a clash between 42

Bourgeois (1992), pp. 17ff; Douailler and Vermeren (1993), pp. 40ff; Azouvi (1993), pp. 46ff; Niort (1965) at [333] et seq, pp. 557–560. 43 Beaumanoir (de) (1842) 34.2, p. 2; Loysel (1679) §357; Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec II, §1, p. 128; Pothier (2011) §3 et seq.; Carbonnier (2000) at [16]. 44 Boyer (1947) at [103]; Ionasco (1931), pp. 29ff; Duguit (1927), p. 319; Josserand (1928) at [122] et seq., pp. 165, 158, and 169 contra Carbonnier (2000) at [64]; Capitant (1923) at [4], p. 11, [294] and [295]; Fenouillet (1996), pp. 27ff; Rampelberg (2003), pp. 19ff; Mazeaud (2003), pp. 81ff; Chauvel (1990), p. 93ff; Pimont (2004) at [135]; Terré (1956) at [274], [276] et seq.; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 12 July 1989, Bull. civ. I, n°293; GAJC, 11th edition, n°155; JCP

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two clans. On the one hand, the pro-causalists whose bellwethers were Capitant and Jacques Maury (1889–1981). On the other, the anti-causalists foremost amongst whom was Planiol. The former argued for the conservation and extension of causa in French law. By contrast, the latter argued for its repudiation as a useless, convoluted doctrine. This is presently discussed in turn.

6.3.2.1

Pro-Causalism and the Extension and Vindication of Causa

The pro-causalists advocated for the conservation and subjectivation of causa in French law. Beyond the objective theory of causation that commutative justice epitomises, the pro-causalists pleaded for the development of causa as a moral instrument. It aimed to control the behaviour of parties. It purported to ensure that each is conscious that it is foul of good faith to prevent another from enjoying the benefits of a contract.45 Consequently, judges should be vested with the power to figure out what the impulsive and determining cause of the obligation is. Put differently, they are vested with the power to determine what the reasons that enticed the parties to behave as they did are and whether they are acceptable and consistent with public order. Thus, causa to the pro-causalists was a means of dividing consent from form. It organised consent as a general principle of contract. It enables judges to gain deep insight into the conspicuous and inconspicuous drivers that coaxed the parties to act as they did. It is a means of determining the acceptableness of consent and undertakings. Moreover, the pro-causalists portrayed causa as a means of ensuring that the parties do not agree on to undertake a legal transaction that only constitutes a device, cloak, or sham; that is, an attempt to disguise the nature of the undertaking to deceive third parties or the courts. It is notably so when the two parties are complicit of a remote unlawful action. An example is when the parties agree on the sale-purchase of a house that is not intended to be used for the establishment of the buyer’s family but to become a massage parlour, a bawdy house. Hence, Capitant argued that: La plupart des arrêts insistent sur cette circonstance, et déclarent que les parties ont participé à l'immoralité de cette fin subjective. Celle-ci a joué un rôle principal dans la conclusion du contrat ; elle est entrée à titre d'élément déterminant dans leur double manifestation de volonté ; elle s'y est véritablement incorporée. Le but économique poursuivi s'est trouvé ainsi rattaché à l'opération juridique. Séparer l'une de l'autre serait donc tronquer la volonté des contractants. Quand une personne donne à bail un immeuble, ou prête de l'argent, et qu'il est bien convenu entre les parties que ce contrat a pour but l'installation ou l'acquisition d'une

1990.II.21546, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé; Defrénois, 1990, p 358, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1990, p 468, obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 16 February 1999, Bull. civ. I, n°55; D. Affaires, 1999, p 514, obs. J F; Contrats. Conc. Consom., 1999, n°70, obs. L Leveneur. 45 Ripert (1949) at [35]; Maury (1912) in Répertoire Civil Dalloz, at [45]. See also Marty and Raynaud (1972) n°212, p. 21; Mazeaud, D in Collectif Paris II (2004), p. 458.

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maison publique, peut-on nier que les deux parties commettent l'une et l'autre un acte contraire aux bonnes mœurs, et n'est-ce pas juger en aveugle que d'assimiler ces opérations à un bail d'immeubles, à un prêt d'argent ordinaires ? Dans la volonté des contractants, nous le répétons, la fin économique poursuivie a été si étroitement associée au but juridique lui-même, qu'il n'est pas possible de les distinguer. On méconnaît la réalité des faits, quand on soutient qu'en annulant ces conventions la jurisprudence sacrifie la liberté des conventions à de vagues et insuffisantes raisons de moralité. Il serait fort regrettable d'imposer aux magistrats l'obligation de respecter et de sanctionner, malgré leur répugnance justifiée, de semblables transactions. Telles sont, à notre avis, les considérations qui expliquent et justifient l'extension de l'article 1131 à ces hypothèses. Nous disons qu'elles les justifient. Et, en effet, les parties qui contractent peuvent introduire dans le cercle de leur accord telle ou telle considération, qui en devient alors un élément constitutif, et notamment, elles peuvent au but juridique poursuivie par chaque contractant, c'est-à-dire à la cause, adjoindre la poursuite d'une fin commune d'ordre économique. Et, quand il en est ainsi, il faut nécessairement faire entrer cet élément nouveau dans l'appréciation de l'opération juridique.46

So, Capitant suggests that the utility of causa is that it helps obviate indecency, gross inequity, or unlawfulness. He and his followers substituted social ethos for naked consent. They based the validity of contract on mores.47 They are the vestment required for nudum consensum (consensus sine causa) to transmute into consensus vestite (consensus a causa) and produce the desired effect(s). Accordingly, Ripert added that the opportunity of the doctrine of causation is its capacity to warranty the judicial sanction of undertakings that are neither unlawful

46 Capitant (1923), p. 244. [My own translation]: ‘Most court decisions emphasise that fact and rule that all parties are considered to have contributed to the fulfilment of an immoral and subjective goal [when by its terms or purpose, a contract derogates to public order]. The latter goal played a seminal role in the formation of the contract; it was necessarily incorporated in the contract as a factor determining the mutual expression of will of the parties. The expected economic goal underpinned the legal transaction. Separating them would be tantamount to having only a partial view of the will of the parties. [For example], when someone leases a building, or loans money to another, and that it is agreed between the parties that the contract purports to the establishment or purchase of a bawdy house, can it really be denied that the contracting parties both undertake an act that is contrary to good mores, and is not it getting the wrong end of the stick than to assimilate this operation to a regular leasing operation or loan? Again, the expected economic goal features the will of the parties and is so intricately linked to the legal purpose of the undertaking that it cannot be distinguished from it. It is to overlook the facts [surrounding the formation of the undertaking] to contend that in annulling the agreement, the courts sacrifice freedom of contract according to vague and inadequate rules of morality. It would be more regrettable to require from judges that they uphold and sanction such legal operations in spite of their justified repugnance. Such are, we think, the reasons that underpin the expansion of Article 1131 [to encompass and sanction] these hypotheses. It is justified because contracting parties can incorporate whatever consideration in their agreement. It becomes, ipso facto, a constitutive element of the contract. Notably, contracting parties can associate the fulfilment of a [reprehensible] mutual economic aim to the goal that their undertaking fulfils, that is the [final] cause of the obligation. When it is the case, this new element must be considered in the determination of the validity of the undertaking. 47 Carbonnier (2000) at [61]; Malaurie et al. (2004) at [618]; Fabre-Magnan (2004) at [140]; Maury (1920) pp. 35ff; Capitant (1923) at [3] and [4], pp. 7ff, 11ff, 12-13, 15ff, 30–31; Babert (2002) at [384]; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 December 1956, Bull. civ. I, n°439; JCP 1957. II.10008, note J Mazeaud, Bull. civ. I, n°439; JCP 1957.II.10008, note J Mazeaud.

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nor immoral on the face of it but foreshadow an unlawful act.48 In turn, it spurred the rise of a powerful and subversive anti-causalist movement disputing the utility and opportunity of causa to reach these aims.

6.3.2.2

Anti-Causalism and the Dismissal of Causa as a Useless Doctrine

Planiol castigated the utility and opportunity of causa. He criticised the advocates of causa for portraying contract only through the economic operation that it supports. It consists in identifying the counterpart of the contract through a casuistic penetration into the will and consent of the parties to find an identical, lawful act of volition. Planiol contended that this jurisprudence did not stand up to scrutiny because, from a purely logical perspective, the reciprocal obligations of the parties cannot be causes for each other. Put differently, he argued that each obligation is the effect of the conduct of the other party. So, they cannot be causes for each other. Likewise, he argued regarding real contracts that the delivery of the thing is not the cause of the obligation of the borrower to make restitution. However, it is what generates the loan agreement. Put differently, Planiol argued that the transfer of the thing is not the event for the sake of which the debtor must make restitution. It is the contract itself. Finally, he contended regarding unilateral undertakings that the animus donandi contributes only to the characterisation of the undertaking as a gratuitous one. Hence, the doctrine of causation is shallow and empty rhetoric. It is notably so given that all its finalities can be achieved more deftly by reasoning on the

48

Ripert (1949) at [36]; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Bull. civ. I, n°235; D., 1997, somm., p 171, obs. R Libchaber; Contrats, conc. Consom., 1997, p 3, obs. L Leveneur; RTD Civ., 1997, p 116, obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 7 October 1998, Bull. civ. I, n°285; GAJC, 11th ed., n°157; D., 1998, p 563, concl. J Sainte-Rose; D., 1999, somm., p 110, obs. P Delebecque; D., 1999, ‘L’influence du motif illicite ou immoral sur la validité du contrat’, chron., p 237, O Tournafond; D. Affaires, 1998, p 1772, obs. J F; Defrénois, 1998, p 1408, obs. D Mazeaud; 1999, p 602, obs. V Chariot; JCP 1998.II.10202, note M H Maleville ; JCP 1999. I.114, n°1, obs. C Jamin; Gaz. Pal. 2000.1.643, note F Chabas; Contrats, conc. Consom., 1999, n°1, obs. L Leveneur, Petites Affiches, 5 March 1999, note S Prieur; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, n°321; Paris, 1 April 1895, Gaz. Pal. 1895.2.158; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 19 November 1932, D., 1933.1.26; Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 1 April 1895, DP, 1895.1.263; Demogue (1923) at [773]; Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 4 January 1897, D. 1897.1.126; Report on Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, n°321 contra Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 February 1999, Bull. civ. I, n°43 and Cour de cassation, Assemblée Plénière, 29 October 2004, Bull. civ. A P., n°12. See also Hauser, J observation under Cour de cassation, Assemblée Plénière, 29 October 2004, RTD Civ., 2005, pp 104ff; Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 3 June 1969, D., 1970, p 136; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 23 April 1898, D., 1998.1.415; Paris, 19 April 1858, S., 1858.2.366; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile., 5 February 1902, S., 1902.1.389; DP, 1902.1.158; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 1 May 1855, S., 1855.1.337; Liège, Tribunal, 14 November 1896. Compare to Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 11 Novembre 1890, S., 1891.1.319; DP, 1891.1.484; Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 8 January 1964, D. 1964.267.

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lawfulness and possibility of the object of the undertaking regarding onerous contracts. The same is true if one proceeds to identify whether something was transferred regarding real contracts. Otherwise, there is no contract. So, there is nothing to unravel, and it is pointless to speculate on the supposed cause of the obligation or whether the promisor had an animus donandi and consented to the undertaking.49 Consequently, causa to Planiol was a falsehood and useless doctrine. It is additionally open to more than one interpretation. It obfuscates its supposed meaning.50

6.3.2.3

Critique

Planiol’s jurisprudence does not stand up to any scrutiny. First, he conflates the final and efficient cause of contract regarding real contracts. As Aristotle put it in his Physica, or Naturales Auscultationes51 and Metaphysica,52 causa is plural. It is material when it denotes something of which something else is made, e.g., the ivory of the natural, sharp, and flat keys of a piano. It is formal when it denotes the form or pattern of a thing, e.g., the grand and upright piano. It is efficient when it refers to the thing that originates a change of state in something else, e.g., pressure on the key of a piano causes the piano hammer to strike a chord and produce a sound. Finally, it is final when it refers to the end or goal of a thing; that is, the thing for the sake of which something else is done, e.g., pressure on the keys of a piano produces a tune. Accordingly, the transfer of a thing regarding real contracts is truly the efficient cause of the undertaking. It is what transforms a legal fact (i.e., negotium) into a legal act (i.e., instrumentum). It is distinct from the thing which is agreed on the part of the promisor receiving the consideration. Hence, causa remains useful. It helps distinguish the reason a claim on a contract is vested with a promisee from the object of the undertaking. It helps explain that the obligation of a party relies on the obligation of the other. It is something a reflection only on the object of the contract, consent, or capacity cannot achieve. Hence, Planiol’s discussion of causa as a falsehood or useless doctrine does not hold. Incidentally, Planiol erred on the side of the conflation of the cause and object of the obligation when he argued that in synallagmatic contracts, the reciprocal obligations of the parties cannot be causes for each other. The reason he advanced is that in casuistry, an effect is necessarily posterior to its cause and cannot precede or help explain it, let alone be its own cause. It is tantamount to saying that there cannot be any smoke without fire and smoke is not the reason there is a fire. However, the cause of the respective obligations of the parties is not the operative event of the contract. Put differently, the obliging event is not offer and acceptance.

49

Planiol (1931), pp. 396–397. Planiol (1912), p. 1039. 51 Aristotle (1936) II.3. 52 Aristotle (1837) V.2. 50

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It is instead the reliance that they instil together regarding the fulfilment of the desired outcome. Accordingly, causa does not just overlap with the object of the undertaking. It has stand-alone utility in contract. The jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation in the debauchery cases cited above shows just how much causa has a practical purpose. It enables judges to control the admissibility of consent. It specifies the other features that it must have to produce the intended legal effects. It justifies the nullity of contracts whose object may be valid for one party but invalid or lacking for another. The paradigmatic example is where solvens agrees on to sell their house to make money and settle their debt while accipiens agrees on to buy it only to open a house of ill repute. Likewise, where accipiens agrees on to buy solvens’ house whose abode is sold for no reason, thus procuring an unjustified, unforced advantage to accipiens. In such a case, nothing but causa and its commutative character can justify the rescission of the undertaking to sanction a lawful contract that is made without a valid reason. Ditto, where a contract is lawful, but its unassuming aim is contrary to good mores or public order while its immediate object and goal may be valid. Thus, the utility of causa is amply demonstrated. It affords the sanction of agreements that neither arose from defects in consent nor underpinned an unlawful object. It is necessary to ensure that agreements follow all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose upon them according to their nature, pace Planiol. It portrays consensualism as the doctrine underpinned by reason by which every deliberate agreement arising from consent can be a contract provided its operative event and finality are lawful. They are the reason consent can be a source of obligations. They are also its substantive features. Yet, the reform of the French law of obligations in 2016 proves Planiol right. The reformers decided the dispute between pro- and anti-causalists. They rejected causa out of French contract law. Nonetheless, the outward rejection of causa is only a sham as it continues to underpin French contract law implicitly. It begs the question of what motivated the repeal of Article 1108 of the Law of 17 February 1804 incorporating causa in and establishing the Civil Code of France. It also broaches the question of whether the removal of causa was done with good judgement and sense and what has been substituted for it, if anything, to underpin the binding force of consent.

6.3.3

Ordinance n°2016-131 of 10 February 2016 and the Rejection of Causa from French Contract Law: Seeming Victory of Anti-Causalism

6.3.3.1

Background

Ordinance no2016-131 results from a political will to reform the French law of obligations. It aimed to provide practitioners with a clearer law suited to the

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post-modern global economy.53 Another one of its aim was to equip France with a system of rules enabling it to be competitive with the London courts and bring businesses to France.54 It was a temporary statutory instrument adopted by the French government in 2016.55 The French National Assembly ratified it in 2018.56 It was issued by the Ayrault government in an area of law normally reserved for statutory legislation. It is the epilogue of a reform started in 2004 on the bicentenary of the adoption of the Napoleonic Code on the spur of then-President Jacques René Chirac (1932–2019).57 It was initially supervised by the former Keeper of the Seals and Justice Secretary Pierre Catala (1930–2012) and the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. It brought together prominent legal thinkers, including Terré. It was completed under the ministership of Christiane Taubira (1952-) in 201658 with the contribution of Conseil d’Etat. It is a constitutional body that acts both as legal advisor to the government and supreme court for administrative justice. It raises issues of impartiality and good separation of powers.59 If until the reform French law had been a benchmark of civilian legal practice, it owed this position much less to its statutory law—which stood out by its convolution and inaccessibleness—than to the ability of its scholars to market it concisely, articulately, intelligibly, and intelligently. By contrast, the reform clarified the law. It offered a succinct and more coherent overview of the French law of obligations. Out of about 154 articles on contracts or conventional obligations in general, ca. 107 are clearer rewrites of earlier rules already present in the Civil Code since 1804. By contrast, c. 47 articles statutorily sanction rules that the courts developed after codification.60 Thus, the reform clarified the current state of French contract law. However, it did not make a clean break with the past. It acknowledged the historical spectrum of the Civil Code. Hence, the Civil Code of France now outlines a tripartite structure on obligations. It corresponds to three titles. The first title concerns the sources of obligations. The subparts go from the most to the least important. They now reflect a logic by which contract is addressed chronologically through its various stages. Formation is discussed first, and non-performance last. The second title outlines the general regime of obligations. These general rules apply to all obligations. They cover all aspects of contractual relations, including performance and termination. Finally, the third title addresses proof of obligations. Before the reform, evidence of obligations was only a subpart of the section on contracts or conventional

53

Casu (2015). Sénat (2019). 55 French Constitution, Article 38. 56 Loi n° 2018-287 du 20 avril 2018 ratifiant l'ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations. 57 Chirac (2004) Gaz. Pal., 25ff. 58 Chantepie and Latina (2016), p. 6. 59 Quiriny (2006), pp. 375–400. 60 See Table des articles 1100 à 1386-1 au JO du 11/02/2016 (ancienne / nouvelle référence). 54

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obligations in general. Therefore, the lawmaker has given greater importance to evidence since the reform by dedicating a full title to it. Thus, the outline of obligations in the Civil Code is more logical, more coherent, and more straightforward. It gives a quick overview of the French law of obligations and simplifies research and access to the law. While the ordinance kept most of the solutions that were already sanctioned in the Civil Code of France and merely adapted them, it introduced some unwonted newness. It includes a quasi-proverbial writing style. It sometimes obfuscates the understanding of the legal concepts that it outlines. It also removed references to ‘bonnes mœurs’ (good mores). It now falls under ‘ordre public’.61 Likewise, it removed the references to ‘un bon père de famille’. It substituted a gender-neutral officious bystander test for it.62 More importantly, the ordinance removed the requirement for lawful cause under Article 1128. It now only requires the mutual consent of the parties as opposed to the consent of the party under obligation. It puts an end to the conflation between promises and contracts. It still requires capacity. It now requires a content that is both lawful and certain as opposed to a definite object which forms the subjectmatter of the undertaking. Ex-Article 1108 Quatre conditions sont essentielles pour la validité d'une convention: Le consentement de la partie qui s'oblige;Sa capacité de contracter;Un objet certain qui forme la matière de l'engagement; Une cause licite dans l'obligation.63

6.3.3.2

Article 1128 Sont nécessaires à la validité d’un contrat: 1° Le consentement des parties;2° Leur capacité de contracter;3° Un contenu licite et certain.64

Underlying Permanency of Causa in French Law

The reformers of the Civil Code denied causa as an allegorical figure of French contract law and a legal fiction that helps determine when a contract is formed, why it is enforceable or void, and why a claim on a promise can be vested with a promisee. The unassuming aim was to remove any ambiguity as to what causa truly means, given its polysemy, multipurpose character, and the doctrinal quibble that it has caused since its incorporation in French law. Another aim was to clarify Chantepie and Latina (2016) at [85] in fine. Loi n° 2014-873 du 4 août 2014 pour l’égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes contra French Civil Code, ex-Article 1107 cited above; Kaigl (2017). 63 [My own translation]: ‘Four requirements are essential for the validity of an agreement: The consent of the party who obliges themselves; That party’s capacity to contract; A definite object that forms the subject-matter of the obligation; A lawful cause for the obligation’. 64 [My own translation]: ‘The following are required for the validity of a contract: 1° The consent of the parties; 2° Their capacity to contract; 3° A lawful and certain content’. 61 62

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French contract law and make it more accessible so that the substantial properties required of consent for it to create legal relations can be grasped more readily and deftly. So, French law appears to be more dynamic. In turn, the rejection of causa has brought French law more in line with other European legal systems, especially in an aim to attract more businesses to France and entice them to choose French law as the law of the forum–thereby cutting the ground from under the London courts. However, in rejecting causa out of French law, the reformers of the Civil Code have, in fact, only made a fool of an unenlightened audience. It may infer from the removal of the word ‘cause’ from Article 1128 that agreements in French law no longer require a lawful, explicit, or implicit cause to produce legal effects. Though, the correspondence table of the old and reformed articles of the Civil Code of France shows that the provisions on causa in the Civil Code have only been reworded without any use of the word ‘cause’. It purported to end the highly charged debate that it fed amongst doctrinal scholars previously, including the multiple interpretations that it abetted. Old Articles ex-Article 1131. L'obligation sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause illicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet.65 ex-Article 1133. La cause est illicite, quand elle est prohibée par la loi, quand elle est contraire aux bonnes moeurs ou à l'ordre public.66

Corresponding Article since the reform Article 1162. Le contrat ne peut déroger à l'ordre public ni par ses stipulations, ni par son but, que ce dernier ait été connu ou non par toutes les parties.67

Thus, the outward rejection of causa out of French contract law is more apparent than real. Another evidence is that the case law underneath Article 1162 espouses completely the whole of the decisions that the French Courts had adopted on causa. It includes the case law attending to the prohibition of immoral or unlawful remote aims whether the other party knew them before the contract was formed. It also includes the subsequent judicial considerations that the decisions of the Cour de cassation in Chronopost and Point Club Vidéos spurred.68 Hence, the removal of causa from the Civil Code is only a pretence attempted to disguise its utility and conservation in French contractual jurisprudence to an inexperienced or uninformed audience. Therefore, the professed dismissal of causa from the Civil Code has no vested interest. It only substitutes misnomers

65 [My own translation]: ‘An obligation without a cause, with a false cause, or with an unlawful cause is null and void’. 66 [My own translation]: ‘The cause of the obligation is unlawful when it is prohibited by law, and when it is contrary to social mores or public order’. 67 [My own translation]: ‘A contract cannot derogate from public policy neither by its stipulations nor by its purpose, whether or not this was known by all the parties’. 68 Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 July 1996, pourvoi no 94-14800, Bull. Civ. I. n°286 p 200, D. 30 octobre 1997, n°38, p 500, note P. Reigne, Juris-Classeur périodique 96. IV. 1998, 97, I,4015, obs. Labarthe.

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fulfilling the same aim. It does not contradict the requirement for counterpart, economic equity, morality, and lawfulness that causa embodied erstwhile. They remain substantive requirements conditioning the enforceability of consent. Consequently, if the reformers of the Civil Code found causa confusing, they should have strived to clarify and define it more precisely and comprehensively instead of passing over in silence, therefore suggesting that it is a useless doctrine. It is notably so since its functions and the additional properties that it required of consent for it to create legal relations have remained unaltered under different monikers, especially given the recent decision of the First Civil Division of the Cour de cassation of 30 November 2022 (n°21-11507) which relied on the doctrine of causation to decide on the legality of an agreement. There is here a tenuous parallel between French and Scots law whereby causa can be seen to justify the sanction and enforcement of agreements arising from consent in Scots law, even if not necessarily manifest or obvious, given the latter’s rejection of the doctrine of causation.

6.3.3.3

Overview of the Rise and Fall of Causa in Scots Law (16th–18th century)

Modern and contemporary Scottish scholars all agree that contractual obligations in Scots law do not require a valuable, lawful, or sufficient cause or consideration to be enforced. Alike Planiol in French law, discussions on causa, also pragmatically known as consideration, in Scots law culminated in a view in the 17th–18th century by which contracts in Scots law do not require consideration or cause to produce legal effects.69 Thus, they claim that Scots law has never had the doctrine of consideration, and neither promises nor contracts require a preceding cause to have legal effects. However, their jurisprudence contrasts manifestly with the historical development of Scots law. The jurisprudence of the Court of Session (i.e., the supreme civil court of Scotland) and the works of the institutional writers of Scots law, whose writing had an authority ‘approximately equal to that of a decision by a Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session’,70 reveal that causa did take hold in Scots law in the 16th to 18th century and did contribute to the enforcement of agreements arising from consent. Moreover, although causa has been widely rejected from Scots law and Scottish lawyers no longer reflect on the cause of the obligation to determine whether an obligation can be a contract, it is still possible to sense its relevance regarding the enforcement of contractual obligations as an unacknowledged principle of a justificatory and explanatory nature.

69 70

Walker (1995), p. 43. Smith (1962) p. 32.

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Against this background, this section provides an overview of the role that causa played in Scots law in the 16th to 18th century and demonstrates that although causa may be dead, it can still be put to use to ascertain the validity of obligations and decide on their enforceability based on its indirect practical manifestations.

Acknowledgment of Causa in Scots Law in the 16th to 18th Century The coexistence of many possible meanings for causa in Scots law is no different from its various constructions by legal interpreters in French law, natural law, or medieval law. The discussion of causa in Scots law did not escape controversial debates and disputes as to its meaning and function. While discussions of causa varied from authors to authors, it would, however, be wrong to think that the different interpretations of the doctrine mark a rupture with its previous interpretations and the development of a new doctrine. More credibly, as in French law, each indicates several aspects of the same principle. Their construction on a large scale reveals a certain homogeneity and isotropy. Put differently, they act uniformly and do not have for their effect to cancel each other out. If anything, they bring substance to causa and make it a full-bodied doctrine that serves several functions casuistically. In this respect, Andrew MacDouall, later Lord Bankton (1685–1760), was amongst the first to argue that, unlike promises,71 contracts require a cause or ‘valuable consideration, to exist; either already given, or to be given or performed to the other party, or a third party’.72 Likewise, James Dalrymple, later Viscount of Stair (1619–1695), propounded that agreements arising from consent could be contracts according to Aristotelian commutative justice and ‘the inclination to give every man his right’, thereby adopting a saliently purposive construction of causa.73 Hence, he established equity as the efficient cause of the rights of men (i.e., the reason a convention is binding).74 In turn, he also established positive law as the final cause or ends (i.e., the motives wherefore consent is sanctioned in law and the attending rights constituted and ordered).75 Thus, Stair elaborated an objective causation theory. Unlike the counterpart theories of Paul and Domat incorporated in French law, Stair’s discussion of causa did not purport to clothe the voluntas of the parties to make it enforceable. 71 MacDouall (Lord Bankton) (1993–1995), p. 323. He argued that promises are engagements ‘by which one obliges himself to another, without any mutual obligation or valuable consideration’. Compare to Bell (2010), p. 4. See also Forbes (2012), p. 161. 72 MacDouall (Lord Bankton) (1993–1995), p. 325. 73 Dalrymple (Viscount of Stair) (1981), pp. 74, 91. See also Bankton, 1.1.10; Hume (1739) 3.2.1.17 contra Home (Lord Kames) (2006) Book 3, Sketch 8: ‘Liberty and necessity considered with respect to morality’; Home (Lord Kames) (2012) especially 24ff and 120ff. See also p 113: ‘Liberty and necessity considered with respect to morality’. 74 Dalrymple (Viscount of Stair) (1981), p. 91. 75 Same as above.

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By contrast, it only aimed to allow the sanction of reliance (i.e., faith) objectively to avoid that the right of a party to receive the benefits of a contract is destroyed. Differently, Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh (1636/1638–1691)76 noted that the Accursian causation theory by which agreements arising from consent require a cause to vest a naked, cold paction and make it enforceable, was widely known and accepted in Scotland before Stair. It was notably so regarding donations.77 It permitted the control of the economic equilibrium of conventions and their legality. It prevented unjustified enrichment. Mackenzie referred to the jurisprudence of the Court of Session. He highlighted that in 1533, the Court ruled in Abbot that: all assignation or contracts not containing a title onerous or lucrative, were of no avail, force effect by way of exception.78

He also highlighted that the Court asserted in Anon that: all pactions, contracts, assignations or disposition made by any person containing no title neque onerosum, neque lucrativum, were [deemed] simulate, feigned and null, or at least should be decerned null and of no avail.79

Thus, Mackenzie demonstrated the correlation of consent, paction or conventio with cause.80 It helps explain that the obligation of a party is underpinned by the obligation of the other regarding synallagmatic contracts. It also helps explain that if a contract has no object or an unlawful one, it must be voided for lack of cause and reciprocity.81 Mackenzie Stuart even added that: One is entitled to draw the inference that the law regarded any conveyance for which no reason [i.e., cause] was given with the gravest suspicion; the underlying assumption being that no one is his senses gives something for nothing – if he appears to do so it is for some unlawful reason which he wishes to conceal and which the law is reluctant to enforce.82

Stair, Mackenzie, and Bankton’s jurisprudence when read together suggests that the objective cause of liberalities is necessarily the animus donandi of the party under obligation. In turn, its non-existence enables judges to consider the motives since the cause of the obligation is presumed to be either unlawful or contrary to morality, equity, or public order. Hence, William Forbes (1714–1745/46) asserted that all obligations are either made for a valuable cause or consideration in which case they are onerous (i.e.,

76

Mackenzie (1970–1979) 3.3. Mackenzie (1970–1979), p. 203: ‘For, he who voluntarily and gratuitously promises to give any Thing, is thereby obliged to deliver the same’. 78 The Abbot of Kilwinning v Andro Auchinleck [1533] Mor 827. 79 Anon (1533) in Walker (1995), p. 704. 80 Mackenzie Stuart, AJ in Campbell and Paton (1958), p. 251. 81 Lord Hope of Craighall (1726) 2.1.3 and 2.2.6. Compare to Lundie in Craig 2.3.15. 82 Mackenzie Stuart, AJ in Campbell and Paton (1958), p. 251. 77

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contracts), or for a lucrative cause out of love or favour for the benefit of the recipient in which case they are gratuitous (i.e., promises).83 Alike, James Balfour, later Lord Pittendreich (1525–1584), argued that is binding the undertaking that is made ‘for buying, selling, lending, borrowing or any uther ressonbil cause’,84 thus leaving uncertain what the established practice regarding gratuitous undertakings (i.e., promises) was; that is, whether they required a ‘profitable’ or ‘lucrative’ cause.85 Either way, causa appeared to be an agency of consent, that is, a tool that simultaneously helped consent produce the desired or intended result, but also had the potency to hold it in check like an indirect formality. However different its interpretations, it appears to have played the same role as in French law, that is, it specified the other properties that consent must have had to produce legal effects. To Bankton, it meant that each party had to agree to undertake something in exchange for something else. To Stair, it appeared to designate reason; that is, it is only consistent with logic to enforce an agreement that parties have chosen for themselves according to commutative justice. To Pittendreich, it meant a valid reason for contracting. Mackenzie and Forbes’ jurisprudence above gives a sense that these different constructions of causa were not mutually exclusive. Together and individually, they each portray causa as a doctrine that reinforces consent. It can be seen to facilitate its identification according to commutative justice, and its enforcement according to economic equity or reason, variously or together, as fundamental units in all agreements and exchanges.86 Judging by the jurisprudence of the authors mentioned above, it seems that causa or consideration in Scots law required only that the respective obligations of the parties are adequate, not sufficient unlike the English and French understanding thereof.87 Nonetheless, as in French law, causa in Scots law seems to have afforded at least only doctrinally at a time, the control of the motives of contracting parties. It allowed the protection of consent. It also prevented parties who were inexperienced and careless in handling their affairs from entering into unconscionable or foolish agreements or being abused. Hence, it also prevented unjustified enrichment (condictio causa data causa non secuta), thus contributing to ‘the maintenance, flourishing, and peace of society, the security of property, and the freedom of commerce’.88 83

Forbes (2012), pp. 162ff, 163ff. Balfour (Lord Pittendreich) (1962), p. 149. 85 Mackenzie Stuart, AJ in Campbell and Paton (1958), p. 251. 86 Bell (2010), p. 32. 87 Bell (2010), p. 31, 33 contra De la Bere v Pearson [1908] 1 KB 280; Chappell v Nestlés [1960] AC 87; North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai Construction (The Atlantic Baron) [1979] QB 705, White v Bluett [1853] 23 LJ Ex 3; Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153; Blackstone (Sir) (1765), pp. 217ff; Stanhope Kenny (1922), pp. 121ff, 176ff; Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec I, §5-6, pp. 122–124 and Sec V, §§13-14, p. 151; Pothier (2011) §3, p. 5; Villey (1962), p. 23ff, 33; Aubry and Rau (1897–1923) n°578. 88 Dalrymple (Viscount of Stair) (1981) at [169]. 84

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However, even then, causa was the object of attacks on all sides, especially gradually and insidiously, as to its utility in Scottish contract law. Notably, the ruling of the Court of Session in Kintore (1623) set the pace for its dismissal in Scots law as an unnecessary doctrine given that the Court of Session found a promise to be obligatory, although nudum pactum;89 thereby extending the range of enforceable promises to all agreements whatever their nature in keeping with Drummond and Sharp.90 Put differently, The lack of a specified cause was no longer a valid ground to contend the rescission of a contract. Even Mackenzie admitted that it was settled since 1663 that a promise to pay is actionable under Scots law without any preceding cause or consideration;91 which may explain why their Lordships later dismissed causa or consideration in Deuchar,92 Clackmannan,93 and Wood,94 thereby recognising that ‘a promise for whatever cause, is valid and obligatory’95 and it is a ‘general consequence. . .pracktik for the future’.96 Hence, the Court of Session held that: all promises and obligations are, with us, effectual, and if there be no onerous cause, it is always interpreted as gratuitous and donative.97

Thence it follows that the removal of causa from Scots law was due to practical reasons certainly due to its polemical, plastic, and polysemic character.98 Hence, the need for causa or consideration and its specification fell into desuetude, and it is still contended that Scots law does not know a doctrine of consideration or causa. Even if it is the case, it remains possible to distinguish some aspects of causa in Scots law even to this day.

Continued Relevance of Causa In light of the foregoing, recent Scottish writers naturally all concur that Scots law does not require causa as a tenet of Scottish contract law whether as a condition of validity or enforcement of contracts. William Murray Gloag (1865–1934), Hector

89

Kintore v Sinclair [1623] Mor 94252. Drummond v Bisset [1551] Mor 12381; Sharp v Sharp (1631) Mor 4299. 91 Mackenzie 10, p. 252. Compare to Craw v Culbertson (1663) Mor 12384. 92 Deuchar v Brown (1672) Mor 9425. 93 The Laird of Clackmannan v Sir William Nisbet (1624) Spottiswoode 248. 94 Wood v Robertson (1672) Mor 12225. 95 Gosford’s report at [12388]. 96 Stair 1.10.10. 97 Lundie v Douglas (1681) 2 Brown’s Supp 265; Bankton 1.11.9. 98 Erskine 3.1.16; Bell, GJ (2010) para 66; Erskine 3.3.88 and also 3.2.1. Compare to Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153. 90

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MacQueen (1956-), and Gillian Black, to cite but a few, rightly argue that Scots law merely requires the seriousness of an intention to create legal relations.99 Yet, although causa no longer plays any role in Scots contract law, some of the functions that it used to serve can still be discerned in some aspects of Scots legal practice. It is notably so in the sphere of unjustified enrichment where the Court of Session continually unravels undertakings made without adequate consideration when ordering restitution.100 It is a clear indication that if causa or consideration do not have a prominent place in post-modern Scots law manuscripts, it remains a relevant doctrine that helps explain what kind of agreements can be contracts and what agreements cannot. It also suggests that the preserve of contract is that it entails a necessary consideration or quid pro quo given, suffered, or undertaken by one party in exchange for the other’s promise or action, even though causa and consideration have been rejected from Scots law. The reasoning may be different, but the result is the same. A party cannot profit at the expense of another without legal justification. Otherwise, there would be no contract and that party would be compelled to compensate the other party for their undue benefit. There is precisely no contract because no adequate consideration moved from the promisee and there is no justification for the promisor’s impoverishment.101 In addition, the case of Shilliday v Smith (1998) shows that although causa has no seat in Scots contract law anymore, it could still be a relevant doctrine to justify why agreements arising from consent can be contracts while (i) ensuring that a promise even made without consideration can still be enforced when the promisee relied on

99 Gloag (1914), pp. 58ff; McBryde (1987), pp. 7, 13ff; MacQueen and Thomson (2012), p. 39; Black (2011), pp. 97–119. 100 Wilmot-Smith (2013), pp. 414–436 contra Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd [2001] HCA 68, High Court, 2001) 208 CLR 516; Barnes v Eastenders [2014] UKSC 26, [2014] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 461; Shilliday v Smith 1998 S.C. 725; Watson & Co v Shankland (1871) 10 M. 142; Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding Co 1923 S.C. (H.L.) 105; Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York vs Lothian Regional Council 1995 SLT 299; Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1992 SC (HL) 104; MacQueen, H, The Right Hon Lord Eassie (2017), pp. 623ff; Bell (2010), pp. 206ff; Forbes (2012), p. 221ff. Compare to Barnes v Eastenders [2014] UKSC 26, [2014] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 461, per Lord Toulson; Virgo (2015); Burrows (2011); Mitchell et al. (2011); Degeling and Edelman (2005); Rover International v Cannon [1989] 1 WLR 912 (failure of consideration must be total); Stocznia Gdanska v Latvian Shipping [1989] 1 WLR 574 (the defendant must not have commenced rendering performance). See also Giedo van der Garde BV v Force India Formula One Team [2010] EWHC 2373 (QB). 101 Shilliday v Smith 1998 S.C. 725; Watson & Co v Shankland (1871) 10 M. 142; Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding Co 1923 S.C. (H.L.) 105; Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York vs Lothian Regional Council 1995 S.L.T. 299; Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1992 SC (HL) 104; MacQueen, H, The Right Hon Lord Eassie (2017), p. 623ff; Bell (2010), p. 206ff; Forbes (2012), p. 221ff contra Barnes v Eastenders [2014] UKSC 26, [2014] Lloyd’s Rep. F.C. 461, per Lord Toulson; Virgo (2015); Burrows (2011); Mitchell et al. (2011); Degeling and Edelman (2005). Rover International v Cannon [1989] 1 WLR 912 (failure of consideration must be total); Stocznia Gdanska v Latvian Shipping [1989] 1 WLR 574 (the defendant must not have commenced rendering performance). See also Giedo van der Garde BV v Force India Formula One Team [2010] EWHC 2373 (QB).

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the promise to their detriment,102 (ii) affording the recovery of a thing for failure of a condition or a legal or factual situation under which a benefit was conferred (condictio causa data causa non secuta, condictio ob causam datorum),103 and moderating the undesired effects of unbalanced, unfair, and unlawful undertakings.104 It contrasts with Walker’s contention by which: Definitions of contracts which refer to valuable consideration are inaccurate, usually by reference to whether or not any payment is made, [although] onerosity or consideration may consist in acting or refraining as well as in paying or not exacting money.105

Consideration or causa do not prevent non-pecuniary engagements materialised by forbearance or the non-exaction of money as Walker and Martin Hogg (1969-) contend. Notably, the latter propounds that ‘in jurisdictions where the doctrine of consideration applies, all contracts are onerous’106 while the opposite has long since been established in English law regarding agency.107 The same is true of French law. It sanctions gratuitous consideration as unilateral contracts. They are made without expecting or receiving anything in return. However, consideration remains valuable as made out of love, kindness, or appreciation.108 In such a case, valuable consideration denotes the quality of being thankful, the readiness to show appreciation to someone for or to return kindness. It designates the reward of the promisee for their earlier, commendable conduct; whether through an action or forbearance, the exaction of money or none. Invariably, it subjects the validity of contract to acceptability and fairness. It is something that can be observed in the formula that contracting parties in Scotland often incorporate in conveyancing contracts for the sale and purchase of property by which a grantor expresses their love, favour, and affection as the reason for transferring ownership of a property to another.109 Thus, while Scots law animadverts the doctrine of causa or consideration and recent writers all argue that Scots law does not know the doctrine consideration or causa, the examples above show that causa is still appropriate to explain certain 102

Shilliday v Smith 1998 S.C. 725. Wilmot-Smith (2013), pp. 414–436; Shilliday v Smith 1998 S.C. 725, per Lord Rodger; Union Totaliser Co Ltd v Scott 1951 SLT (Notes) 5; Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham [1956] 3 W.L.R. 37 contra Accarias (1873), p. 36, note 1. 104 Home (Lord Kames) (2006), p. 117 contra Hume (1739) 3.2.1.17, p. 311; Home (Lord Kames) (1767), pp. 12 et seq.; MacCormick (1982), pp. 190–211; MacCormick (2007) paras 7.2 and 13.5. 105 Walker (1995), p. 148 referring to Stair I, 10.12; Ersk III, 2,1 and 3, 38; Bell Prin §63 Normand (1939) 55 L.Q.R.358. 106 Hogg (2011), p. 178. 107 Wilkinson v Coverdale (1793) 1 Esp. 75; Wallace v Telfair 2 T.R.188; Massey v Banner (1820) 4 Madd. R. 416; Donaldson v Haldane (1840) 7 C1. & Fin. 762; Turnbull v Garden [1860] 9 Bar R. P., at [21.9]. 108 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1105 and 1106 contra French Civil Code, Article 1107 (current) and the case law underneath. See also Najjar (2020a) in Répertoire Civile Dalloz (online). 109 Andrew Jack v Isobel Jack [2016] CSIH 75, at [4]: ‘“for the love, favour and affection which I have and bear toward my son Andrew Jack, Junior, residing at Torbanehill Mains Farm”’. 103

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situations and decide on what undertakings can be contracts even in Scots law. It is an area for further research. Though, it is beyond the remit of this monograph which focuses on French law. That notwithstanding, the brief overview of causa or consideration in a mixed system such as Scots law and its relevance to French law is that although it is dead, causa is still a useful doctrine that can help explain what agreements arising from consent can be contracts. It requires that agreements have a valid reason and can help explicate certain legal concepts.

Significance Even when causa or consideration is not explicitly mentioned or is dismissed, the functions that were assigned to them in medieval and modern law can still be discerned in contemporary legal practice (see Chap. 4). They continue to underpin consensualism in French law and contract law generally through piecemeal solutions. They are embodied in a plethora of monikers and misnomers. They concern unjustified enrichment or enrichissement sans cause (‘causeless enrichment’), good faith, equity, commutative justice, ordre public, and suchlike. They incorporate consent in a structure outside of which it cannot produce the desired effects. They impose that it is given fairly per legislation, morality, and equity. More so, that consent is given carefully, intently, and intentionally without any ulterior, unlawful motives. Moreover, the discussion on causa in French and Scots law highlights the shared heritage between legal traditions that are often presented as antinomic. It also shows that the French scholarly reflection on causa was not an isolated one. Like the French doctrine, the Scottish reflection on causa in the modern period accentuates the inconsistency of the current anti-causalist and anti-consideration jurisprudence. It emphasises an issue of terminology. Notably, the apparent rejection of causa, especially in French and Scots law as a stand-alone principle and the substitution of various monikers and misnomers for it has only abetted unnecessary complications in French law while causa or consideration were not problematic in and of themselves. Currently, it sanctions only secondrate principles and doctrines that it has substituted for it. Instead of reflecting on one principle, causa or consideration, one now needs to undertake a necessary and tedious metamorphic collision between the specific doctrines, principles, and notions that have been substituted for causa to determine whether an agreement can be a contract. Together, they continue to fulfil the functions that causa embodied erstwhile in French law while their operation in Scots law shows very remote ties with the doctrine of causation. There is, however, a method in partitioning causa into multiple seemingly independent doctrines in that it is preferable to a single moniker under which various aspects of a principle are crystallised in a hodgepodge. Though, it is simultaneously wrong to dismiss causa altogether as a falsehood and useless doctrine.

6.4

6.4

Conclusion

169

Conclusion

Causa is a polysemic doctrine. It fulfils two main aims. In its objective form, it helps protect the consent of the parties and ensure that none is deprived of the benefits expected of a contract or taken advantage of. In its subjective form, it redounds to the protection of social order and economic equity. It supports good faith and reason in contract. They are the fundamental and underlying doctrines that inform the binding force of consent as a source of obligations. Simultaneously, causa incorporates consent in a structure that decides on its enforceability. Thus, it specifies the substantive features consent must have to produce the desired legal effects. Whether it is construed as a requirement for counterpart, honesty, equity, or propriety, it is an instrument of social control. It helps explain, through commutative justice, why an agreement arising from consent can or cannot be a contract. Its main functions are to explain that the reason a synallagmatic contract is binding is the reciprocal obligations of the parties and the reliance it instils. It is distinct from the object of a contract. It helps control the motives of undertakings, even remote. It ensures conformity to conventionally accepted standards of conduct. It makes moot the arguments put forward by some by which it is a useless doctrine or a falsehood. Otherwise, it would be denying its historical role in the development of the principle by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract as far as French law is concerned (see Chaps. 2 and 4). In addition, research shows that even when causa is not mentioned, the doctrines and rules that it once embodied continue to determine the enforceability of undertakings. They concern morality, commutative justice, and propriety. It is an objective compound of delictual and contractual liability. It strengthens and justifies the legal value of consent along the doctrine of defects in consent. It shows that the transformation from the Roman system of discrete contracts to an objective general principle of contract retaining species of contracts that do not require a counterpart has been problematic and has never been entirely successful in the civil law tradition. It continues to be a significant basis of contracts with its tensions and inconsistencies even if it is not necessarily manifest or obvious. It subjects the validity of contracts to universal conditions; namely, consent and the undertaking that it underpins must be lawful, possible, and reasonable. It must be bilateral regarding contracts. In all cases, consent must be unvitiated and acceptable. These are all aims that causa used to fulfil, thereby enabling consent to be a source of law. Thus, it suggests that the efficacy of consent depends on a higher norm. It not only imposes respect for the word but also that parties behave in a way that is consistent with social ethos. Incidentally, the development of causa in French law since codification was not isolated from developments in other jurisdictions. Altogether, they portray consensualism as the doctrine by which agreements arising from consent can be contracts provided they consist with all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose upon them according to their nature. It is not simply the principle by which every agreement arising from naked consent can merely be a contract.

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Put differently, contract does not draw its force from consent. Instead, it draws its force from a superior, reasonable, and moralistic norm external to it: reason. It underpins its efficacy as a vestment clothing what would otherwise be a nudum pactum or mere negotium; that is, an unenforceable agreement arising from nudum consensum or consensus sine causa. In turn, it calls for a general reconsideration of the French perspectives on consensualism by which naked consent is what makes the contract. Likewise, it raises questions about the role of consent in contract more generally (see Part III).

Statutory Provisions Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance. Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC. French Civil Code: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Article 16-1 (current). Article 1101 (current). Article 1103 (current). Article 1104 (current). Article 1106, °1 (current). Article 1106, °2 (current). Article 1107 (current). Article 1107, °1 (current). Article 1107, °2 (current). 1108 (current). Article 1129–1144 (current). Article 1132 (current). Articles 1145–1161 (current). Article 1162 (current). Articles 1162–1171 (current). Article 1163 (current). Article 1168 (current). Article 1193 (current). Article 1194 (current). Article 1303 (current). Article 1302-2 (current). ex-Articles 1105 and 1106. ex-Articles 1109–1122. ex-Article 1107. ex-Article 1108.

Case Law

• • • • • •

171

ex-Article 1109. ex-Article 1117. ex-Articles 1123–1125-1. ex-Articles 1126–1130. ex-Article 1131. ex-Articles 1131–1133. French Constitution, Article 38. Ordonnance 2016-301 du 14-3-2016 relative à la partie législative du Code de la consommation. Loi (Hamon) 2014-344 du 17-3-2014 relative à la consommation. Loi 2017-203 du 21-2-2017 ratifiant [notamment] l’ordonnance 2016-301 du 14-3-2016 relative à la partie législative du Code de la consommation. Loi n° 2014-873 du 4 août 2014 pour l’égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes. Loi n° 2018-287 du 20 avril 2018 ratifiant l'ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations.

Roman Law Digest, 50.17.206.

Case Law Aix-en-Provence, 29 November 1927, JCP 1928. 11, 177. Andrew Jack v Isobel Jack [2016] CSIH 75. Anon (1533) in Walker, DM (1988). Barnes v Eastenders [2014] UKSC 26, [2014] Lloyd’s Rep. F.C. 461. Boots Co Plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 609. Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding Co 1923 S.C. (H.L.) 105. Chappell v Nestlés [1960] AC 87. Cour d'appel de Versailles, 12 January 2000, 1998–2334. Cour de cassation, 22 October 1996, Bull. civ. IV, n°261, GAJC, 11th ed., n°156; D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux. Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière, 1 December 1995: Bull. Civ. N°7 (2 arrêts); ibid, n°8; R, p. 290, GAJC, 11 éd, n°151-154. Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière, 2 April 1993: Bull. Civ. N°9, R., p 326; GAJC, 11e éd., n°226; D. 1993. 373, concl. Jéol; D. 1993. Somm. 273., obs. Prétot; D. 1994, Somm. 14, obs. Aubert; JCP 1993. II.22051, cincl. Jéol; Gaz. Pal. 1993.2.560, concl. Jéol; RTD Civ. 1993. 820, obs. Mestre, Sériaux, D. 1993. Chron. 229.

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Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière, 29 October 2004, Bull. civ. A P., n°12. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1 March 1989 Bull. civ. III, n° 49, p 29. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Bull. civ. I, n°235; D., 1997, somm., p 171, obs. R Libchaber; Contrats, conc. Consom., 1997, p 3, obs. L Leveneur; RTD Civ., 1997, p 116, obs. J Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 10 October 2000, D 2000 AJ, p 409, obs Avena-Robarde. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 12 July 1989, Bull. civ. I, n°293; GAJC, 11th edition, n°155; JCP 1990.II.21546, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé; Defrénois, 1990, p 358, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1990, p 468, obs. J Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 15 June 1994, Bull. civ. I, n°215; Defrénois, 1994, p 1113, obs. P Delebecque. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 16 February 1999, Bull. civ. I, n°55; D. Affaires, 1999, p 514, obs. J F; Contrats. Conc. Consom., 1999, n°70, obs. L Leveneur. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 December 1990, Bull. civ. I, n°303; R., p 372; JCP 1991.II.21656, n. J Bigot; RTD Civ., 1991, obs. J Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 January 1953, D 1953, p 234. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 20 January 1998: Bull. Civ. I, n°18; D. 1999. 500, note D. R. Martin (1re esp.); JCP 1999. I. 137, n°7, obs. Rullmann contra Digest, 12.6.14; Digest, 16.2.10.1. Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 1, 22 February 1978, 76-11.551 (Affaire Poussin). Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 January 1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965 1 p. 198. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 January 1965: Gaz. Pal. 1965. 1. 198. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 26 August 1962, JCP 1983 II 19992, not Ph Terri. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 26 November 1996: Bull. Civ. I, n°415. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 27 February 2007, 02-13.420 03-21.179. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 March 2017, n°16-10007 and n°1526766. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 February 1999, Bull. civ. I, n°43. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 July 1996, pourvoi no 94-14800, Bull. Civ. I. n°286 p 200, D. 30 octobre 1997, n°38, p 500, note P. Reigne, Juris-Classeur périodique 96. IV. 1998, 97,I,4015, obs. Labarthe. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 June 1997, n°95-13.568. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 December 1956, Bull. civ. I, n°439; JCP 1957.II.10008, note J Mazeaud, Bull. civ. I, n°439; JCP 1957.II.10008, note J Mazeaud. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 7 October 1998, Bull. civ. I, n°285; GAJC, 11th ed., n°157; D., 1998, p 563, concl. J Sainte-Rose; D., 1999, somm., p 110, obs. P Delebecque; D., 1999, ‘L’influence du motif illicite ou immoral sur la validité du contrat’, chron., p 237, O Tournafond; D. Affaires, 1998, p 1772, obs. J F; Defrénois, 1998, p 1408, obs. D Mazeaud; 1999, p 602, obs. V Chariot; JCP 1998.II.10202, note M H Maleville ; JCP 1999.I.114, n°1, obs. C Jamin; Gaz. Pal. 2000.1.643, note

Case Law

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F Chabas; Contrats, conc. Consom., 1999, n°1, obs. L Leveneur, Petites Affiches, 5 March 1999, note S Prieur. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, n°321; Paris, 1 April 1895, Gaz. Pal. 1895.2.158. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 14 September 2005: Bull. Civ. III, n°166; D.2006. 761, note D. Mazeaud; JCP 2005. II.10173, note Loiseau; JCP E 2005. 1867, note Binctin; Defrénois 2005, 19122. Noote Dagorne-Labbe; ibid, 2006. 248, note Techendjou; CCC 2006, n°1, note Leveneur; LPA, 1st December 2005, note Messai-Bahri, RDC 2006. 811, obs. Viney; RTD cv. 2005. 776, obs. Mestre et Fage. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 18 July 2001, Bull. civ. n°101; D., 2002, p 680, n. C Castets; somm., p 390, obs. G Paisant; Defrénois, 2001, p 1421, obs. E Savaux; Contrats, conc., conso. 2001., n°171, n. L Leveneur; Droit et patrimoine, December 2001, p 98, obs. P Chauvel. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 18 May 2011. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 1 May 1855, S., 1855.1.337. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 11 December 1900, DP 1901. 1. 257 – 30 mars 1943, DC 1944. 13, note L.P. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 19 November 1932, D., 1933.1.26. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 23 April 1898, D., 1998.1.415. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 30 April 1947, JCP 1947. IV. 97. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 13 February 2007, Faurecia I, n° 05-17407, Bulletin 2007, IV, N°43. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 13 June 2006, Chronopost V, n°0512619, Bulletin 2006 IV N°143, p 152. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 15 February 2000, Bull. civ. IV, n°29; D., 2000, somm., p 364 obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 2000, p 1118, obs. D Mazeaud; Petites Affiches, 29 December 2000, p 12, n. G Meilhac-Redon and J Marmoz; RTD Civ., 2000, p 325, obs. J Mestre and B Fages. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 15 February 2000, Bull. civ. IV, n°29; D., 2000, somm., p 364 obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 2000, p 1118, obs. D Mazeaud; Petites Affiches, 29 December 2000, p 12, n. G Meilhac-Redon and J Marmoz; RTD Civ., 2000, p 325, obs. J Mestre and B Fages, D Mazeaud. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 19 February 1991, n°89-18498. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 19 May 1998, n°96-16.393. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 22 October 1996, Bull. civ. IV, n°261, GAJC, 11th ed., n°156; D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux; somm., p 175, obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 1997, p 333, obs. D Mazeaud; JCP 1997.II.22881, n. D Cohen; I.4002, n°1, obs. M Fabre-Magnan; I.4027, n°17, n. G Viney; Contrats, conc. Conso., 1997, n°24, obs. L Leveneur; Gaz. Pal., 1997.2.519, n. R Martin ; RTD Civ. 1997, p 418, obs. J Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 22 October 1996, D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux; D., 1997, chron., p 145, n°3, n. C Larroumet.

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Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 September 2004, Bull. civ. IV, n° 167; D., 2005, p 302, n. M-A Rakotovahini; JCP 2005.I.107, p 147, obs. M Cabrillac. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 June 2010, Faurecia II, n° 09-11841, Bulletin 2010, IV, n°115. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 3 November 1992: JCP 1993. II.27164, note Virassamy, Defrénois 1993. 1377, obs. Aubert; RTD Civ. 1993. 124, obs. Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 30 May 2006, Chronopost IV, n° 04-14974, Bulletin 2006 IV N°132, p 134. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 9 July 2002, Chronopost II, n° 99-12554, Bulletin 2002 IV N°121, p 129. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 1 April 1895, DP, 1895.1.263. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 11 Novembre 1890, S., 1891.1.319; DP, 1891.1.484. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 15 June 1892, DP 92. 1. 596, S. 93. 1. 281, note Labbé. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 4 January 1897, D. 1897.1.126. Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 April 2005, Bull. civ., n°231; Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 May 2005, Bull. civ., n°232. Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 April 2005, Chronopost III, n° 03-14112, Bulletin 2005 Mixt. N° 4, p 10. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 7 May 2008: Bull. Civ. V, n°99. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 8 January 1964, D. 1964.267. Craw v Culbertson (1663) Mor 12384. Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153. Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham [1956] 3 W.L.R. 37. De la Bere v Pearson [1908] 1 KB 280. Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1992 SC (HL) 104. Donaldson v Haldane (1840) 7 C1. & Fin. 762. Drummond v Bisset [1551] Mor 12381. Deuchar v Brown (1672) Mor 9425. Giedo van der Garde BV v Force India Formula One Team [2010] EWHC 2373 (QB). Kintore v Sinclair [1623] Mor 94252. Liège, Tribunal, 14 November 1896. Lundie v Douglas (1681) 2 Brown’s Supp 265. Massey v Banner (1820) 4 Madd. R. 416. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York vs Lothian Regional Council 1995 S.L.T. 299. North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai Construction (The Atlantic Baron) [1979] QB 705. Paris, 19 April 1858, S., 1858.2.366. Paris, 23 July 1926, DH 1926. 568. Paris, 3 March 1898.

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Bell GJ (2010) Principles of the law of Scotland, 4th edn. Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, Edinburgh Blackstone (Sir) W (1765) Commentaries on the laws of England, vol 1. Legal Classics Library, New York Boyer L (1947) La notion de transaction. Contribution à l’étude des concepts de cause et d’acte déclaratif. Sirey, Paris Burrows A (2011) Law of restitution, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford Capitant H (1923) De la cause des obligations (contrats, engagements unilatéraux, legs), 1st edn. Dalloz, Paris Capitant H (1927) De la cause des obligations (contrats, engagements unilatéraux, legs), 3rd edn. Dalloz, Paris Carbonnier J (2000) Droit civil. Les obligations, 22nd edn. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Chantepie G, Latina M (2016) La réforme du droit des obligations, Commentaire théorique et pratique dans l'ordre du Code civil. Dalloz, Paris. Colin A, Capitant H, Julliot de la Morandière L (1935) Cours élémentaire de droit civil français, 8th edn. Dalloz, Paris Collectif Paris II (2004) Le Code civil. Un passé, un présent, un avenir. Dalloz, Paris Dalrymple (Viscount of Stair) J (1981) The institutions of the law of Scotland: deduced from its originals, and collated with the civil, canon and feudal laws, and with the customs of neighbouring nations in iv books, 2nd edn. University Presses of Edinburgh and Glasgow, Edinburgh Degeling S, Edelman J (2005) Equity in commercial law. Lawbook Co., Cop., Pyrmont Demogue R (1923) Traité des obligations en général. Sources des obligations, vol 1, 1st edn. Rousseau, Paris. Domat J (1828) Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel. Firmin Didot Père et Fils, Paris Duguit L (1927) Traité de droit constitutionnel, vol 1, 3rd edn. Cujas, Paris Fabre-Magnan M (2004) Les Obligations. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Forbes W (2012) The Institutes of the law of Scotland. Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, Edinburgh Gloag WM (1914) The law of contract: a treatise on the principle of contract in the law of Scotland. W. Green, Edinburgh Hogg M (2011) Promises and contract law: comparative perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Home (Lord Kames) H (1767) Principles of equity. Printed for A. Millar, London, and A. Kincaid & J. Bell, Edinburgh Home (Lord Kames) H (2006) Sketches, vol 4, 1st edn. Liberty Fund, Incorporated, Indianapolis Home (Lord Kames) H (2012) Essays on the principles of morality and natural religion. Liberty Fund, Incorporated, Indianapolis Hope (Lord of Craighall) T (1726) Prakticks. Thomas Ruddiman, Edinburgh Houtcieff D (2001) Le principe de cohérence en matière contractuelle. LGDJ, Paris Hume D (1739) Treatise of human nature. Longmans, Green & Co., London Josserand L (1928) Les mobiles dans les actes juridiques du droit privé. Dalloz, Paris Loysel A (1679) Institutes coutumières ou Manuel de plusieurs et diverses règles, sentences et proverbes, tant anciens que modernes, du droit coutumier et plus ordinaire de la France. EdmeMartin, Martin, Paris MacCormick N (1982) Legal right and social democracy. Clarendon Press, Oxford MacCormick N (2007) Institutions of law. Oxford Scholarship Online, Cary MacDouall (Lord Bankton) A (1993–1995) Institutes of the law of Scotland, 1st edn.. The Stair Society, Edinburgh. Mackenzie G (1970–1979) Institutions of the law of Scotland. Printed by John Reid, Edinburgh Mackenzie Stuart AJ (1947) Contract and Quasi contract. In: Campbell G, Paton H (1958) An introduction to Scottish legal history, vol 20. Stair Society, Edinburgh

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MacQueen H, Lord Eassie, The Right Hon (2017) Henderson and Gloag – the law of Scotland, 14th edn. W. Green, Edinburgh MacQueen H, Thomson J (2012) Contract law in Scotland, 3rd edn. Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath. Malaurie P, Aynès L, Stoffel-Munck P (2004) Droit civil. Les obligations. LGDJ, Paris Marty G, Raynaud P (1972) Droit civil. Introduction générale à l'étude du droit. Sirey, Paris Maury J (1920) Essai sur le rôle de la notion d’équivalence en droit civil français. Jouve, Paris Mazeaud D (2003) La matière du contrat. In: Rémy-Corlay P et al (2003) Les concepts contractuels français à l'heure des principes du droit européen des contrats: actes du colloque, 30 et 31 janvier 2003. Dalloz, Paris McBryde WW (1987) The law of contract in Scotland, 1st edn. Thomson-Green, Edinburgh Mitchell C et al (2011) Goff & Jones law of unjust enrichment, 8th edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London Niort JF (1965) Homo civilis. L'auteur, Paris Pimont S (2004) L’économie du contrat. Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence Planiol M (1912) Traité élémentaire de droit civil, 6th edn. LGDJ, Paris Planiol M (1931) La cause du contrat. LGDJ, Paris Pothier RJ (2011) Traité des obligations. Dalloz, Paris Rampelberg RM (2003) Le contrat et sa cause: aperçu historique et comparatif sur un couple controversé. In: Rémy-Corlay P, Fenouillet D (2003) Les concepts contractuels français à l'heure des principes du droit européen des contrats. Actes du colloque organisé les 30 et 31 janvier 2003 par l’Institut Charles Dumoulin de la Faculté Jean Monnet, Paris XI. Dalloz, Paris Ripert G (1949) La règle morale dans les obligations civiles, 4th edn. LGDJ, Paris Smith T (1962) A short commentary on the law of Scotland. The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Stanhope Kenny C (1922) A selection of cases illustrative of the law of contract (based on the collection of G B Finch). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Terré F (1956) L’influence de la volonté individuelle sur les qualifications. LGDJ, Paris Terré F, Simler P, Lequette Y (2002) Droit civil, Les obligations, 8th edn. Dalloz, Paris Villey M (1962) Leçons d’histoire de la philosophie du droit. La philosophie grecque classique et le droit romain. Dalloz, Paris Virgo G (2015) Principles of the law of restitution, 3rd edn. Clarendon, Oxford Walker DM (1995) The law of contracts and related obligations in Scotland, 3rd edn. Butterworths, London

Articles Azouvi F (1993) Achever la Révolution française?. 1993:40ff Black G (2011) Formation of Contract: The Role of Contractual Intention and Email Disclaimers. 2011:97–119. https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/15115827/Black_2011_Forma tion_of_contract.pdf Bourgeois B (1992) Kant en France. 2:17–38 Casu G (2015) Le projet d’ordonnance portant réforme du droit des contrats. https://univ-droit.fr/lagazette-juridique/18286-le-projet-d-ordonnance-portant-reforme-du-droit-des-contrats Chauvel P (1990) Erreur substantielle, cause et équilibre des prestations dans les contrats synallagmatiques 12:93–106. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/erreursubstantielle-cause-et-équilibre-des/docview/1294925655/se-2?accountid=10673 Chevallier J (1933) De la révocation pour cause d’incertitude des libertés entre époux et entre futures époux. 257–280. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k62550545/f262.item

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Chirac J (2004) Code civil, célébration du bicentenaire, discours de Jacques Chirac, président de la République. https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/148887-discours-de-m-jacques-chirac-presi dent-de-la-republique-sur-le-code-c Douailler S, Vermeren P (1993) Le passage du Rhin. De Madame de Staël à Victor Cousin et Edgar Quinet, les grandes étapes de la réception de la pensée kantienne en France. 309:46–55 Fenouillet D (1996) Etienne Louis Josserand (1868–1941). 17:27–46 Ionasco TR (1931) Les récentes destinées de la théorie de la cause dans les obligations. 1:29ff. Jaffey P (2003) Failure of Consideration: Roxborough v Rothmans. 66:284–293. https://www.jstor. org/stable/1097629 Kaigl P (2017) Variations lexicales et grammaticales autour de la réforme du droit des obligations. https://www.petitesaffiches.fr/actualites,069/droit,044/variations-lexicales-et,8756.html. Accessed 01/01/2020 Maury J (1912) La cause in Répertoire Civil Dalloz. 2012:45 Najjar I (2020a) Disposition à titre gratuit. In: Dalloz (2020) Répertoire Civile. Dalloz, Paris Najjar I (2020b) Libéralités: conditions et charges. In: Dalloz (2020) Répertoire de droit civil. Dalloz, Paris Quiriny B (2006) Actualité du principe général d'impartialité administrative 2:375–400. https:// www.labase-lextenso.fr/revue-du-droit-public/RDP2006-2-006 Wilmot-Smith F (2013) Reconsidering “Total” Failure. 72:414–436. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/24694014

Other Sénat (2019) Projet de loi ratifiant l'ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations. https://www.senat.fr/rap/l1 7-022/l17-022.html Table des articles 1100 à 1386-1 au JO du 11/02/2016 (ancienne / nouvelle référence), accessed on 2 September 2020., available at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/contenu/menu/autour-de-la-loi/ codification/tables-de-concordance/code-civil

Part III

Rethinking the French Perspectives on Consensualism: De Lege Ferenda

Chapter 7

Articles 1109 and 1172, and the Classification of Contracts: Problems and Perspective

7.1

Introduction

Ordinance n°2016-131 of 10 February 2016 introduced Articles 1109 and 1172 in the newly reformed Civil Code of France. They read: Article 1109

Article 1172

Le contrat est consensuel lorsqu’il se forme par le seul échange des consentements quel qu’en soit le mode d’expression. Le contrat est solennel lorsque sa validité est subordonnée à des formes déterminées par la loi. Le contrat est réel lorsque sa formation est subordonnée à la remise d’une chose.1 Les contrats sont par principe consensuels. Par exception, la validité des contrats solennels est subordonnée à l’observation de formes déterminées par la loi à défaut de laquelle le contrat est nul, sauf possible régularisation. En outre, la loi subordonne la formation de certains contrats à la remise d’une chose.2

The effect of these provisions when read together is that the idea that every contract arises only from consent conveys only one aspect of French contract law. By way of exception, some contracts still require the fulfilment of formalities. It 1 [My own translation]: ‘The contract is consensual where it is formed by the mere exchange of consent, in whatever way it may be expressed. It is solemn where its validity is subject to a form prescribed by legislation. It is real where its formation is subject to the delivery of a thing’. 2 [My own translation]: ‘In principle, contracts require only the consent of the parties to be formed. By way of exception, the validity of a solemn contract is subject to the fulfilment of formalities set by legislation. Their non-performance voids the contract except in the cases where the irregularity can be remedied. Notwithstanding that, the law may subject the formation of certain contracts to the delivery of a thing’.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_7

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concerns two types of contracts. On the one hand, these whose validity is contingent on the fulfilment of formalities set by legislation, usually an element of writing (i.e., solemn contracts). On the other, those whose validity depends on the preliminary delivery of a thing (i.e., real contracts). While the insertion of Articles 1109 and 1172 is recent, it relies on the distinctions that were already present in the Civil Code since 1804.3 They were only consistent with former Article 1107, now Article 1105, by which contracts, whether they have a name or lack a specific denomination are subject to the general rules that are laid down under Article 1101 et seq., unless otherwise provided for in the section relating to each of them. Consequently, the general rules were applied subject to these special rules according to the adage specialia generalibus derogant. However, the taxonomy that Articles 1109 and 1172 present is open to revision. It presumes that consensual agreements do not require a form to be enforceable whereas, as the English lawyer Patrick Selim Atiyah (1931–2018) put it: [t]he idea that contracts are based [only] on agreement [absent any requirement for consent to be externalised in words or action is], in an enormous number of cases. . .true only in a very restricted sense. While it remained true that in most cases, the actual creation of a contract (and hence the essential terms) required the agreement of the parties, it [is] in many circumstances no longer true (if indeed it ever was), that the detailed terms of a contract depended [solely] on [consent]. One reason for this [is] the development of the standardform contract.4

Further, the taxonomy even contradicts the rules of evidence incorporated in the Civil Code in 1804 and successively amended. They provide that agreements, whatever their nature, must be evidenced in a tangible form. So, it overemphasises the generality of the consensual doctrine that Article 1101 underpins and opposes it directly to formalism. Thus, it contradicts Article 1194, formerly Article 1135, by which the efficacy of consent in contract depends on the conditions that equity, usage, or legislation impose on an obligation according to its nature. It suggests that consensualism and formalism are mutually exclusive and denies that formalism (i.e., additional formal requirements imposed by usage or legislation or freely chosen) may contribute extra features to consensualism and underpin its efficacy. Finally, the taxonomy that Articles 1109 and 1172 outline suggests that consent does not make the real and solemn contracts but that they arise instead from formality. Not only does it contradict Article 1101 by which a contract is only a concordance of will of two or more people intended to create, modify, transfer or extinguish obligations, but it also contradicts Article 1128(1), formerly 1108(1), by which the consent of the parties is the essential feature of all contracts, not form. They cannot exist without it whatever their nature and it is the thing that makes the contract, not form.

3 French Civil Code, Article 1892; French Civil Code, Article 1915; French Civil Code, Article 2333 et seq. 4 Atiyah (1961), p. 18.

7.1

Introduction

183

Hence, the taxonomy suggests that consensualism trumps formalism. It also implies that formalism is the exception and is directly opposed to and mutually incompatible with consensualism. Not surprisingly, Flour, Aubert, and Savaux propound that: Que le consensualisme soit moralement supérieur au formalisme paraît, de prime abord évident.5

Similarly, Carbonnier argued that: Le contrat a une existence juridique par la seule force de la volonté sans que celle-ci ait besoin d’être revêtue de quelque empreinte qui lui serait conférée d’en haut. . .Le consentement, non point la forme, est une condition essentielle pour la validité du contrat. D’où le nom de consensualisme que l’on donne à cet aspect de l’autonomie de la volonté: en principe, tous les contrats sont consensuels et le formalisme apparaît comme une exception, sinon comme une aberration.6

From the outset, Carbonnier conflates several doctrines and concepts. First, consensualism and consensual contracts. Second, consensualism and the theory of the autonomy of the will. Finally, he contrasts consensualism (i.e., the consensual contract) with formalism (i.e., the real and solemn contracts). It translates the questionable idea by which consensualism was developed in opposition to formalism and has no utility other than to justify the validity of the consensual contract and deny the need for a form for a contract to exist. Therefore, Carbonnier et al.’s jurisprudence does not stand up to scrutiny. It ignores that form, as an evidentiary instrument, supports consent and strengthens its binding force even where a contract is said to be consensual. It also overlooks the essentiality of consent in the formation of real and solemn contracts. Finally, it fails to observe that consent alone does not make the contract. It is only enforceable provided it is consistent with natural equity (hereinafter ‘equity’), usage, public order, or law. They set up a framework outside of which it cannot produce legal effects and remains a mere negotium devoid of legal effects. They clothe it like a vestment and are the things that make it enforceable. In turn, it calls for the reconsideration of the French perspectives on consensualism since codification. It begs the question of what relationship form entertains with consent in the determination of the enforceability and formation of a contract be it consensual, solemn, or real. Likewise, it raises the question of whether consensualism and formalism are truly antagonistic doctrines incapable of existing in harmony despite different ideologies or interests. Finally, it calls for the study of the role of consent in contract. It begs the question of whether consent really forms

Flour et al. (2004) at [301]: ‘that consensualism is morally superior to formalism goes without saying’. 6 Carbonnier (2000) at [16]: [My own translation] the will of the parties makes the contract alone without it being necessary that it is clad with any form bestowed from above. . .Consent, not the form, is an essential condition for the validity of a contract. Hence the name consensualism given to this aspect of the autonomy of the will: in principle, all contracts are consensual, and formalism appears to be the exception or an aberration. 5

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the underlying basis for the enforceability of contract or whether the legitimacy and enforceability of contract rely on something else that transcends it.

7.2

Inadequacy of the taxonomy: Consent -v- Form

The outline of contract laid down under Article 1101 is problematic. It leaves form outside the definition of contract and overemphasises the role of consent in contract. In contrast, a contract is only actionable provided it is externalised in a tangible form. It is clear from Article 1353, formerly Article 1315, and the newly incorporated Article 1358. They provide that a person who demands the performance of an obligation must prove its existence. Likewise, a person who claims to be released from an obligation must prove the payment or the fact that caused the extinction of the obligation.7 However, apart from the cases for which legislation provides otherwise, proof may be established by any means.8 It means that consensualism does not culminate in lack of forms. It denotes instead the freedom that the parties have in externalising their agreement in whatever form unless otherwise provided for per legislation by exception. Otherwise, the contract cannot produce legal effects. Consequently, consensualism does not contradict formalism. Formalism is only reasonable in a consensual system where it is admitted that agreements arising from consent can be contracts. It is a feature of legal certainty. It ensures that agreements that are lawfully made are kept and that none can be deprived of the benefits of a contract. It also ensures that none can be coerced to undertake a particular conduct or action to which they have not expressly consented. Consequently, the assumption that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172(1) create by which consensual contracts can exist without any form is misleading. Hence, Carbonnier, Flour, Savaux, and Aubert’s jurisprudence is highly questionable. It leads one to believe that consent is self-sufficient and need not be expressed in a particular conduct or action for a contract to arise. Statutory law shows just how much this jurisprudence is misconceived. It shows the interdependence of formalism (i.e., the doctrine by which the efficacy of contract relies on form and technique rather than a pure abstraction) and consensualism (i.e., the doctrine by which consent can create legal relations so long as it is consistent with all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose on an obligation according to its nature). It is clear from the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation. It acknowledges that while form does not make the contract, it is nonetheless necessary to make it actionable. Its French Civil Code, ex-Article 1315: ‘Celui qui réclame l'exécution d'une obligation doit la prouver. Réciproquement, celui qui se prétend libéré doit justifier le paiement ou le fait qui a produit l'extinction de son obligation’ contra French Civil Code, Article 1353 (current): ‘Celui qui réclame l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver. Réciproquement, celui qui se prétend libéré doit justifier le paiement ou le fait qui a produit l’extinction de son obligation’. 8 French Civil Code, Article 1358 (current): ‘Hors les cas où la loi en dispose autrement, la preuve peut être apportée par tout moyen’. 7

7.2

Inadequacy of the taxonomy: Consent -v- Form

185

externalisation is, however, left to the discretion of the parties unless the form is imposed by legislation.9 So consensualism is not superior to formalism. Neither is formalism a shameful exception or an aberration, pace Carbonnier, Savaux et al. The rejection of form from the definition of contract and formalism hides the functional role that form plays even in a system where it is granted that consent can create legal relations without excessive reliance on form and technique. To deny form and formalism completely is to ignore that the peculiarity of consensualism is only to instrumentalise form and transform it into an agency of and safeguard to consent. It mitigates the bold and boundless implication by which agreements arising from consent can be contracts even though their existence is intangible. It is only consistent with the requirement for natural equity and good faith that underpin it. Hence, the Civil Code provides since 1804 for a blanket requirement for a form to support the existence of contracts, especially consensual contracts. The sale contract illustrates so much. Articles 1582 and 1583 define it since 1804 as a contract by which a person obliges themselves to deliver a thing and another to pay its price. It is perfect between the parties and ownership is acquired as of right by the buyer with regard to the seller as soon as they have agreed on the thing and price, although the thing has not yet been delivered nor the price been paid.10 The phrase ‘elle peut être faite par acte authentique ou sous seing privé’ contained in Article 1582 is already a clear indication that although sale is a consensual contract, it can be put into writing whether privately signed or sealed by a notary public to guarantee its enforceability. It contradicts the alleged superiority of consensualism over formalism and their antinomy, pace Carbonnier and Savaux et al. Moreover, Article 1589-2 reads: Est nulle et de nul effet toute promesse unilatérale de vente afférente à un immeuble, à un droit immobilier, à un fonds de commerce, à un droit à un bail portant sur tout ou partie d'un immeuble ou aux titres des sociétés visées aux articles 728 et 1655 ter du code général des impôts, si elle n'est pas constatée par un acte authentique ou par un acte sous seing privé enregistré dans le délai de dix jours à compter de la date de son acceptation par le bénéficiaire. Il en est de même de toute cession portant sur lesdites promesses qui n'a pas

9

Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 December 2018, n°17-22532; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 21 December 2017, n°16-25665; Cour de cassation, Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 May 2013, n°12-19325; Cour de cassation, Chambre civil 1, 25 September 2013, n °12-23197, Bulletin 2013, I, n°177 contra Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 May 1997, n° 95-15.319, Bull. 1997, I, n° 136; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 September 2007, n° 06-18.199, Bull. 2007, II, n° 215; Cour de cassation, Chambre Civile 1, 6 April 1994, Bull. civ. I, n° 136; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 19 May 1958, D., 1959, p 294, n. H Aberkane. Contra Sériaux, A (1998) note 4; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 27 March 1928, spec. II, p 146, note G Ripert, D., 1928.145; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2003, Bull. civ. I, n°13; JCP E, 2003.II.763, n. F-X Lucas. 10 French Civil Code, Article 1582: ‘La vente est une convention par laquelle l'un s'oblige à livrer une chose, et l'autre à la payer. Elle peut être faite par acte authentique ou sous seing privé’; French Civil Code, Article 1583: ‘Elle est parfaite entre les parties, et la propriété est acquise de droit à l'acheteur à l'égard du vendeur, dès qu'on est convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique la chose n'ait pas encore été livrée ni le prix payé’.

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fait l'objet d'un acte authentique ou d'un acte sous seing privé enregistré dans les dix jours de sa date.

It means that although sale is a consensual contract, the sale of immovable properties or shares in companies referred to at Articles 728 and 1655 of the General Code on Taxation that is not evidenced by deed or an act under private signature registered within ten days from the date of its acceptance by the beneficiary is null. The same rule applies to any transfer of rights in rem by promises. It shows just how much formalism contributes extra features to consent. It does not defeat its essence in contract but vindicates it. It establishes a framework outside of which consent alone cannot be enforced presumably to protect legal certainty. It is only consistent with Article 1194, formerly 1135, by which a contract can only produce legal effects if it is consistent with equity, usage, or legislation, and all the consequences that they impose on obligations according to their nature. Thus, consensualism does not denote absolute freedom. Consent must be given in an enlightened way and agreements must consist with various moral, social, and legal rules. Hence, consensualism cannot make light of the law and the evidentiary forms that it requires. They necessarily influence and determine the formation of contracts. They induce parties into ‘particular kinds of independent and critical reflexivity’ based on reason and best practice as to how they should protect their interests to prevent chicanery, disputes. Thus, Article 1341 introduced in the Civil Code by the law n°1804-02-07 promulgating the Civil Code amended in July 1980 and October 2016, now Article 1359, provided that a contract, even consensual relating to a sum of money or value over an amount set by decree must be put in writing whether privately signed or authenticated. Otherwise, it cannot be enforced excepting the cases of physical or immoral impossibility of the written evidence being obtained if it is customary not to establish written evidence or where the written evidence has been lost because of force majeure. While an oath is admissible, it can only supplement writing, not substitute for it.11 Consequently, it is silly to contend that formalism and consensualism are antinomic and present consensual contracts as those contracts that are formed only by consent without any form as opposed to formal contracts. The reason is that the efficacy of the consensual contract relies more often than not on the forms characteristic of those contracts of which it is alleged to be distinct, especially solemn contracts. It could even take the form of the delivery of a thing if it is how the parties have decided to externalise their agreement. Another instance of the inadequacy of the taxonomy of contracts and the antagonism that Articles 1109 and 1172 embody concerns consumer credit contracts. Article 1892 defines them as contracts formed re by the delivery of a certain quantity of things which are consumed by use on condition that the latter shall be returned to

11

Compare to Denisart (1766), p. 283.

7.2

Inadequacy of the taxonomy: Consent -v- Form

187

the lender in the same kind and quality.12 However, the Cour de cassation has ruled that the contract is consensual between a professional and a consumer and is formed as soon as it is agreed on although nothing has been transferred to the borrower.13 More so, the blanket requirement for writing under Article 1359, formerly 1341, makes it a solemn contract completed by writing whenever it relates to a sum of money equal to or above €1500. Thus, the category of real contracts is wholly undercut if writing or mere consent allegedly unsupported by form can be substituted for the transfer of a thing. Altogether, these examples show two things. First, the consensual contract is never actionable only by consent. In addition to the substantive requirements laid down under Article 1108 et seq. (see Chap. 6), it requires a form whether it is imposed by legislation or left to the discretion of the parties. It usually borrows the form of the operative element of solemn contracts: writing. Second, the examples above undermine the appropriateness of the taxonomy. They show the ease with which the characterisation of a contract can oscillate from one category to another. Alike, they showcase how inconsistent the assertion by which consensualism shuns formalism or that these two doctrines are mutually exclusive is. In any event, these examples show that the enforceability of a contract always depends on the externalisation of consent in words and actions for consent given abstractly and unsupported by a tangible form such as part-performance is insufficient to assert any personal rights against a party. The Cour de cassation even admits that the externalisation of consent is what makes the contract actionable and enables it to produce the desired effects whether it is left to the discretion of the parties or imposed by legislation. In such a case, consent coincides with the procedural form that the lawmaker required for contracting.14 French Civil Code, Article 1892: ‘Le prêt de consommation est un contrat par lequel l'une des parties livre à l'autre une certaine quantité de choses qui se consomment par l'usage, à la charge par cette dernière de lui en rendre autant de même espèce et qualité’. 13 Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2010, 08-13.160; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2010, 08-18.581 contra Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 October 2009, D. 2010. Jur. 128., obs. Rebeyrol; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 June 2008, D. 2008. AJ 1827, obs. Delpech; ibid. 2008. Chron. C. cass. 2363, n° 5, obs. Creton; ibid. Jur. 2555, note Chénedé ; RTD com. 2008. 603, obs. Legeais; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 7 April 2009, D. 2009. AJ 1203, obs. Avena-Robardet; ibid. 2080, note Ghestin; JCP 2009, n° 27, p. 27, note Lasserre-Capdeville; RLDC 2009, n° 3449, obs. Maugeri; Banque et Droit 126/2009, p. 18, obs. Bonneau ; Defrénois 2009. 1942, note François; Cour de cassation, chambre civile 1, 27 June 2006, D. 2007. Pan. 753, obs. Martin ; CCC 2006, n° 221, note Leveneur. 14 Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 2 February 2000, Bull. civ. III, n°23; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 16 April 1969, Bull. civ. III, n°287; Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 14 February 1963, Bull. iv. I, n°165; Sériaux (1998), pp. 299ff; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 26 February 1971, Bull. civ. III, n°147; RTD Civ., 1971, p 867, obs. G Cornu; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 5 January 1978, Bull. civ. III, n°10; Rouen, 3 February 1989, Bull. Joly, 1989, p 438; Nancy, 5 October 1989, JCP E 1990, 15784, obs. A Viandier and J-J Caussain; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 20 January 1987, JCP 1988, II, 20987, n. G Goubeaux; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 18 December 1990, Bull. Joly, 1991, p 326, n. B Saintourens; 12

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Consequently, consensualism is not antithetical to formalism. Its efficacy is contingent on the externalisation of consent. It underpins the validity of contracts whatever their nature. By contrast, consent alone does not presume of the enforceability of contracts if it is not given external existence or form. It means that consensualism does not denote lack of form. Instead, it designates the incorporation of consent in a formal structure, especially social and legal. It results from a concern for legal certainty. Otherwise, contracts, even consensual, cannot be enforced for it would be deserving condemnation a system of laws that so foolishly sanctioned obligations on uncertain and erratic grounds. Accordingly, the rigid taxonomy that Articles 1109 and 1172 outline by which agreements generally arise solely from consent absent form and the presentation of the consensual, solemn, and real contracts as impermeable and directly opposed categories is inapposite. It overlooks form as a universal and structuring legal device necessary for the formation of all contracts, whether consensual, real, or solemn. In fact, if a contract always needs a form to be enforced, that form must logically be incorporated in the definition of contract or the outline of its essential features since its effectuation is necessary at the time of formation. So, the rigid taxonomy laid down under Articles 1109 and 1172, the definition of contract that Article 1101 outlines and the essential conditions of contract that Article 1128, formerly 1108, puts forward overlooks the fundamental role that form plays in contract. It is the thing without which a contract, even consensual, cannot have any existence ( forma dat esse rei). It indicates whether a contract is appropriately formed. The role of consensualism is to minimise and transform it into an available body of fact or information giving a definite structure or shape to consent. Simultaneously, it helps control the consent of the parties and ensure that consent was given lawfully, and the undertaking has a lawful cause. Thus, formalism and consensualism check and balance each other. Therefore, the opinion of Carbonnier, Etienne Louis Josserand (1868–1941), Michelle Gobert (1929-), Marie-Antoinette Guerriero, and Marie-Anne Frison-Roche (1959-) by which obligations arise only from consent without form must be rejected.15

Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 July 1977, Bull. civ. IV, n°202; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Dr. Sociétés, n°225, obs. T Bonneau; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 24 September 2003, D., 2004, p 1305, note G Kessler; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 27 May 1959, JCP 1959.II.11187, n. P Esmein; D., 1959, jurisp., p 524, n. Savatier; RTD Civ. 1959, p 735 obs. H and L Mazeaud; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 8 May 1978, Bull. civ. IV, n°129; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 July 1988, Bull. civ. I, n°248, RTD Civ., 1989, p 310, obs. J Mestre; D., 1989, somm., p 313, obs. J Penneau; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 18 May 1898, S. 1898, 1, p 433, note Lyon-Caen, DP 1900, 1, p 481, note Sarrut; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 January 1994, Bull. civ. I, n° 4; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 28 March 2000, n°97-214422, Bull. civ. I, n°105; D.2000.482, note S Piedelièvre; somm. 358, obs. P Delebecque, D.2001.1615, obs. M-N Jobard-Bachelier; JCP G 2000.II.10296, concl. J Sainte-Rose. 15 Josserand (1939) at [154]; Guerriero (1975), p. 125; Gobert, M in Aubert (2000) Article 37208, p. 878; Frison-Roche, MA in Jamin and Mazeaud (1999), p. 21. See also Terré et al. (2002) at [134].

7.2

Inadequacy of the taxonomy: Consent -v- Form

189

While there is a method in saying that ‘idem est non esse aut non probari’ as Guerriero contends16—i.e., the existence of a right is conditioned by the ability of a party to prove it, but it is created upstream the constitution of evidence—it makes little to no sense to posit that a contract requires only consent to be formed and to refuse to enforce it simultaneously for intangibility. If consent alone suffices to create obligations, then it cannot be simultaneously insufficient to determine their enforceability. Hence, the distinction between consent and form is certainly over-subtle and purposeless. If the rules of evidence are predetermined, then the formation of contract depends on the fulfilment of the required formality ab initio. Put differently, the rules of evidence establish form as an agency of the enforceability of contract.17 Therefore, form is prior in the order of nature and supposition to the formation of contract. It means that without form, there can be no contract whatever its nature. So, consent and form are inextricable as shown in the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation.18 It means three things. First, form and consent, and a fortiori formalism and consensualism, are capable of existing at the same time in harmony despite different ideologies or interests. Second, form supports consent and is a pledge of security and

16

Guerriero (1975), p. 169. Limbach (2004) at [4]; Mainguy (2001) at [1]; Seube, A in Université Paul Cézanne – Faculté de droit et de science politique (1974) pp. 625ff; Malinverni (1978) at [228] et seq.; Labarthe (1994) at [541] et seq., [542], note 31, [374]; French Commercial Code, Article L 441-3; Savatier (1973), pp. 1ff; French Commercial Code, Article L 110-3. 18 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 17 July 1929, DP, 1929.1.143, rapport Bricout; Planiol, M (1912) at [715]; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 January 1991, Bull. civ., n°48; RTD Civ., 1991.331, n. J. Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 27 April 2004, Bull. civ. I, n °121, Contrats conc. cons. July 2004, n°7, p 22, obs. L Leveneur, RTD Civ., 2004, p 510, obs. J Mestre and B Fages; Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 4 August 1896; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 December 1974, Bull. civ. I, n°322; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 February 1991, Bull. civ. I, n°71; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 January 1991, Bull. civ. IV, n°48; RTD Civ., 1991.531 obs. J Mestre; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 17 February 1998, Bull. civ. I, n°64; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 12 December 1995, Bull. civ. IV, n°294, Contrats conc. Cons., 1996, n°36, obs. L Leveneur; D., 1996, somm., p 333, obs. D Mazeaud; RTD Civ., 1996.617 obs. J Mestre; Petites Affiches, 24 January 1997, n. E Courtier; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, n°317; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 17 February 1998; Bull. civ. I, n°63, Gaz. Pal., 1999, 1, somm., p 122, obs. S Piedelièvre; RTD Civ., 1998.659, n. J Hauser, p 967, obs. Vareille; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 November 2002, Bull. civ. I, n°125; D., 2002.3290, n. C Barberot; D., 2003, somm., p 1401, obs. G Taormina; JCP 2003.1.111, n°10, obs. P Simler; Defrénois, 2003.547, obs G Champernois; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 June 1996, Bull. civ. I, n°235; French Civil Code, Article 1630; French Civil Code, Article 1643; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 27 November 1990, Bull. civ. III, n°255; RTD Civ., 1991.315, n. J Mestre; D., 1992, somm., p 195, obs. G Paisant; JCP N, 1993, n°12, p 107, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 11 April 1918, DP, 1921.1.224; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 1 July 1998, Bull. civ. III, n°155, D., 1999, somm., p 13, obs. G Paisant; D. Affaires, 1998, p 1563, obs. J S; JCP E, 1999.171, obs. Vialla; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 24 November 1954, GAJC, 11 ed., n° 250; JCP 1955.II.8565, n. H B; Decree n°78-464 of 24 March 1978. 17

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legal certainty. It allows the identification of contract and its content. Finally, form is an essential condition of contract featuring its formation. The phrase ‘le contrat est consensuel lorsqu’il se forme par le seul échange des consentements quel qu’en soit le mode d’expression’19 featured in Article 1109(1) is a clear indication that consensualism is compatible with form. It denotes only the ample freedom that parties have in expressing their agreement in words or actions without government intervention, including where the interest of a party is legally protected. In such a case, consent must be externalised in the form that the lawmaker has designed therefor, and freedom is restricted. So, in inserting Article 1109(1) into the Civil Code, the lawmaker has opted for the combination of form and consent into a single, more effective, and coherent whole, thus dismissing the false dichotomy deeply embedded in French legal thought by which consensualism and formalism are mutually exclusive or that the former trumps the latter. The choice that the lawmaker has now made to define the consensual contract as the contract that is formed by the mere exchange of consent in whatever way that they may be expressed is tantamount to saying that consent is never enough or sufficient. Agreements arising from consent need be expressed in words or actions recognised or imposed by law. Otherwise, they cannot be enforced. It controverts further the traditional narrative by which the function of consensualism in French law is to reject form from contract. It calls for the reconsideration of the role of form in French contract law altogether.

7.3

Role of Form and Instability of the Taxonomy

As discussed above, form is a universal and structuring legal device needed to enforce contracts whatever their nature. It fulfils a dual role. On the one hand, it fulfils an evidentiary, disclosure aim. On the other, it underpins the enforcement of contract by making agreements tangible. The rules of evidence provided under Article 1353 et seq., formerly 1315 et seq., overlay the role of form in contract formation. Thus, form pervades all aspects of French contract law. Its universal character subverts the taxonomy by which consensual contracts are enforceable without a form as opposed to solemn and real contracts. It undermines the established idea by which formalism and consensualism are fundamentally removed and antithetical as if they could not exist in harmony despite different ideologies and interests. The bias for a system where the modes of proof are legal and restricted, not moral and free, that the Civil Code incorporates highlights that consent is alone never sufficient to justify the enforcement of agreements. By contrast, agreements need a material catalyst to be enforced whether it is imposed by usage or legislation or left

[My own translation]: ‘The contract is consensual where it is formed by the mere exchange of consent, in whatever way it may be expressed’.

19

7.3

Role of Form and Instability of the Taxonomy

191

to the discretion of the parties. It is an additional procedural requirement. In turn, failure to observe it prevents consent from producing the desired legal effects. The reason is that the modes of evidence are hierarchised and predetermined in the Civil Code in a way that the parties must have necessarily externalised their consent at the stage of formation in tangible words or actions. Otherwise, consent is held in check.20 Hence, the definition of contract that Article 1101 provides and the outline of the essential conditions of contract as consent, capacity, and a certain and lawful content under Article 1128, formerly 1108, is incomplete. If the rules of evidence require a tangible form for a contract to produce the desired legal effects, then the forms play a fundamental role at the stage of formation. They logically enjoin to parties that they formalise or externalise their consent at that stage should they wish their undertaking to produce the desired effect. Consequently, form has a twofold function. It establishes a system of perfect proof (preuve parfaite),21 thus protecting legal certainty.22 Second, it forms the basis for the enforcement of contract. It constitutes the system node of consensualism, especially written evidence whether manuscript or digital.23 It mitigates the scope of Article 1101 and 1172. It rejects the traditional narrative of French law by which consensualism is incompatible with formality. It also rejects the jurisprudence by which the will or consent of the parties is alone sufficient to create legal relations. Thus, form has several advantages. Not only does it set a presumption by which consent was given informedly, but also it makes irrelevant any debate regarding the

20

Gautier (2000) at [1]. Terré (2000) at [481]; Lagarde (1994) at [173]; Mouralis (2002) at [1326]. 22 Boujeka (2002), p. 224, at [3]; Vasseur (2001) at [842] et seq.; Aynès (2003), p. 29; Houtcieff (2003) at [6] and [17]; Legeais (2003), pp. 1433 et seq.; Tricot-Chamard (2004) I.112; Bergel (2012) n°269; French Insurance Code, Article L 112-3; French Consumer Code, Article 311-8; French Labour Code, Article L 122-3-1; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 28 October 2003, Bull. civ. I, n°216; P Ancel note under Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 23 February 1999, D. 1999, jur. p 411, ‘Formalisme et consentement dans le contrat de cautionnement: évolution de la jurisprudence’, D. 2002, chron., p 2787; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 February 2000, Bull. civ. I, n°68; JCP 2000.II.10382, n. J Casey; I.257, obs. P Simler; JCP E, 2000, p 801, n. D Legeais; D. 2000, somm., p 342, obs. V Bremond; D 2001, somm. p 691, obs. L Aynès; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 October 2002, Bull. civ. I, n. 250; R., p 443; D. 2002, p 3071, n. J Djoudi; somm., p 3334, obs. L Aynès; JCP 2002.II.10187, n. D Legeais; 2003.I.124, n°1, obs. P Simler; Defrénois, 2ƒ003, p 229, n. S Piedelièvre; RTD Civ., 2003, p 122, obs. P Crocq; Conseil Constitutionnel, 31 July 2003, n°2003-477 DC, JO 5 August 2003, p 13464. 23 Catala, P in Aubert (2000) Article 37210, p. 897; Gamet (2001-2) at [2]; Directive 1999/93/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market; French Consumer Code, Article L 121-16 et seq; Décret n°2001-272 du 30 mars 2001 pris pour l'application de l'article 1316-4 du code civil et relatif à la signature électronique; Penneau (2002), p. 2065; Lucas de Leyssac (1996), p. 5; Raynouard (2000) Article 37174, at [13] et seq. 21

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existence of an obligation before its merits are discussed.24 Consequently, it provides scope for the limitation of judicial discretion.25 It objectifies the identification of the intention of the parties to create legal relations unless the obligation arises from a quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict, or when one of the parties did not have the opportunity or possibility to obtain written proof of the act, or has lost the instrument that they intended to use as proof due to force majeure.26 In such a case, the identification of the intention of the parties to create legal relations and its validity are determined in factum.27 Likewise, if a party or custodian has not preserved the original title and presents a copy which is both faithful and longlasting.28 Consequently, consensualism instrumentalises formalism to ensure that agreements are kept, lawful, equitable, and consistent with public order. It means that the effect of consensualism is to divide contract from excessive adherence to form. It establishes instead a rational form-light system. It vindicates the binding force of consent irrespective of whether the form of contract is imposed or not. As a result, the divide between each category of contract fades, and the distinction between consensual, real, and solemn contracts becomes inapposite. It is notably so since the increasing governance of evidence by statute means that the externalisation of consent is finite and must obey the diktat of writing or tangible conduct in most instances even if the undertaking is characterised as consensual. As Marc Nicod (1961-) notes, consent is not absolute.29 Form does correct the otherwise unfair situation that would follow from the imposition of a penalty on a party, absent certainty as to its existence. It also participates of the control of the consistency of agreements with all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose on an obligation according to its nature. Formalism mitigates, thereby, the jurisprudence maintained by some authors by which consensualism denotes consent without form, and it is oppugnant of

24

Lévy-Bruhl (1963), pp. 21ff; Geouffre de la Pradelle (de) (1990) n°575; Bergel (2012) n°269; Aubry and Rau (1922) para 749, note 2 bis; Ghestin et al. (1994) n°563; Vignal (1998), pp. 99ff, 117ff. 25 Cour de cassation (2012) Livre 3: Etude, La preuve, Partie 1: Objet de la preuve, Titre 2: Preuve du fait et étendue du contrôle de la cour de cassation, Chapitre 1; Fenet (1968), p. 136. 26 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1348 now French Civil Code, Article 1360. See also, French Civil Code, ex-Article 1347 now French Civil Code, Article 1362. 27 Malaurie et al. (2004) n°649; Collart-Dutilleul and Delebecque (2002) at [632]; Laude (1992), pp. 299ff; Ripert and Roblot (2002) at [1056-39]; Vacrate (2003) at [218] and [586]; Guyon (2003), p. 737; Ancel (2004), pp. 1087ff; Becque (2002) at [147] et seq.; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 20 January 1987, JCP 1988, II, 20987, n. G Goubeaux; Cour de cassation, Chambre Commerciale, 18 December 1990, Bull. Joly, 1991, pp 326, n. B Saintourens; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 July 1977, Bull. civ. IV, no202; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Dr. Sociétés, no225, obs. T Bonneau; Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 24 September 2003, D., 2004, pp 1305, note G Kessler. 28 French Civil Code, Article 1348. 29 Nicod (2000) n°63 et seq.

Conclusion

193

formalism.30 It is notably so since failure to perform the evidentiary formality required for the enforcement of a contract, even consensual, at the stage of formation results in its retrospective voidance for material inconsistency. It tells so much about the essentiality of form. It makes moot the taxonomy that Articles 1109 and 1172 embody. It dismisses it as irrelevant and mistaken consensualism denoting a functional equilibrium between form and consent rather than the outright rejection of forms in contract. Article 1109(1) supports this view.

7.4

Conclusion

Although it relies on jurisprudential distinctions that were already present in the Civil Code since 1804, the taxonomy of contract that Articles 1109 and 1172 embody does not belong in the Civil Code as rigidly as it is outlined. It conveys the impression that consensual contracts are abhorrent of form and that form, not consent, makes the real and solemn contracts. By contrast and at all events, it is consent, however externalised, that makes the contract according to the substantive rules and all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose upon it. Thus, form and consent are consubstantial. It challenges the idea so deeply embedded in French legal thought by which consensualism denotes the rejection of form or is antithetical to form. On the other hand, it reveals that consent is not absolute. It is its incorporation as part of a formal structure based on freedom of contract and the necessity to create, control, and reproduce standard sociolegal relations that determine the validity and enforceability of a contract without giving primacy either to structure (i.e., form) or agency (i.e., consent). Consequently, consensualism denotes the doctrine by which the validity of all contracts, whatever the situation that they create and govern, depends on the rational and pragmatic intersection of sociolegal structures and agency, as opposed to selfagency alone. Simultaneously, it means that consent is not what makes the contract. Instead, it is its normativisation as an intangible, metaphorical, and interpretive principle, or method of contract. It justifies why human activity can be demiurge of rights, thus giving legal meaning to conduct and signs. It calls for the reconsideration of consent as what makes the contract.

30 Ancel et al. (2020) at [437]; Nacoulma (2017–2018), p. 18; Direction générale Bibliothèque, Recherche et Documentation (2016), pp. 26–51; Forray (2007), pp. 169, 239 et seq., 283 et seq., 286–287; Carbonnier (2000) at [21]; Beudant (1906) n°49, p. 28. Compare to Nicod (2000), pp. 16, 27–28; Charpentier (2002), p. 296; Denisart (1766), p. 284.

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Statutory Provisions Décret n°2001-272 du 30 mars 2001 pris pour l'application de l'article 1316-4 du code civil et relatif à la signature électronique. Directive 1999/93/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market; French Consumer Code, Article L 121-16 et seq.. French Civil Code: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Article 1348. Article 1353 (current). Article 1358 (current). Article 1360. Article 1362. Article 1582. Article 1630. Article 1643. Article 1892. Article 1915. Article 2333 et seq.. ex-Article 1315. ex-Article 1347. ex-Article 1348.

French Commercial Code • Article L 110-3. • Article L 441-3. French Consumer Code, Article 311-8. French Insurance Code, Article L 112-3. French Labour Code, Article L 122-3-1.

Case Law Conseil Constitutionnel, 31 July 2003, n°2003-477 DC, JO 5 August 2003, p 13464. Cour de cassation (2012) Livre 3: Etude, La preuve, Partie 1: Objet de la preuve, Titre 2: Preuve du fait et étendue du contrôle de la cour de cassation, Chapitre 1. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 September 2013, n°12-23197, Bulletin 2013, I, n°177. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Dr. Sociétés, n°225, obs. T Bonneau.

Case Law

195

Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Dr. Sociétés, no225, obs. T Bonneau. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2003, Bull. civ. I, n°13; JCP E, 2003.II.763, n. F-X Lucas. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2010, 08-13.160. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2010, 08-18.581. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 17 February 1998, Bull. civ. I, n°64. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 February 1991, Bull. civ. I, n°71. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 June 2008, D. 2008. AJ 1827, obs. Delpech; ibid. 2008. Chron. C. cass. 2363, n° 5, obs. Creton; ibid. Jur. 2555, note Chénedé; RTD com. 2008. 603, obs. Legeais. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 November 2002, Bull. civ. I, n°125; D., 2002.3290, n. C Barberot; D., 2003, somm., p 1401, obs. G Taormina; JCP 2003.1.111, n°10, obs. P Simler; Defrénois, 2003.547, obs G Champernois. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 27 April 2004, Bull. civ. I, n°121, Contrats conc. cons. July 2004, n°7, p 22, obs. L Leveneur, RTD Civ., 2004, p 510, obs. J Mestre and B Fages. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 28 March 2000, n°97-214422, Bull. civ. I, n °105; D.2000.482, note S Piedelièvre; somm. 358, obs. P Delebecque, D.2001.1615, obs. M-N Jobard-Bachelier; JCP G 2000.II.10296, concl. J Sainte-Rose. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 28 October 2003, Bull. civ. I, n°216; P Ancel note under Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 23 February 1999, D. 1999, jur. p 411, ‘Formalisme et consentement dans le contrat de cautionnement: évolution de la jurisprudence’, D. 2002, chron., p 2787. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 February 2000, Bull. civ. I, n°68; JCP 2000.II.10382, n. J Casey; I.257, obs. P Simler; JCP E, 2000, p 801, n. D Legeais; D. 2000, somm., p 342, obs. V Bremond; D 2001, somm. p 691, obs. L Aynès. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 October 2002, Bull. civ. I, n. 250; R., p 443; D. 2002, p 3071, n. J Djoudi; somm., p 3334, obs. L Aynès; JCP 2002.II.10187, n. D Legeais; 2003.I.124, n°1, obs. P Simler; Defrénois, 2ƒ003, p 229, n. S Piedelièvre; RTD Civ., 2003, p 122, obs. P Crocq. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 December 1974, Bull. civ. I, n°322. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 June 1996, Bull. civ. I, n°235. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, n°317; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 17 February 1998; Bull. civ. I, n°63, Gaz. Pal., 1999, 1, somm., p 122, obs. S Piedelièvre; RTD Civ., 1998.659, n. J Hauser, p 967, obs. Vareille. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 April 1994, Bull. civ. I, n°136. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 May 1997, n°95-15.319, Bull. 1997, I, n ° 136. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 7 April 2009, D. 2009. AJ 1203, obs. Avena-Robardet; ibid. 2080, note Ghestin; JCP 2009, n° 27, p. 27, note LasserreCapdeville; RLDC 2009, n° 3449, obs. Maugeri; Banque et Droit 126/2009, p. 18, obs. Bonneau; Defrénois 2009. 1942, note François; Cour de cassation, chambre

196

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civile 1, 27 June 2006, D. 2007. Pan. 753, obs. Martin; CCC 2006, n° 221, note Leveneur. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 October 2009, D. 2010. Jur. 128., obs. Rebeyrol. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 December 2018, n°17-22532. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 September 2007, n°06-18.199, Bull. 2007, II, n° 215. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 1 July 1998, Bull. civ. III, n°155, D., 1999, somm., p 13, obs. G Paisant; D. Affaires, 1998, p 1563, obs. J S; JCP E, 1999.171, obs. Vialla; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 24 November 1954, GAJC, 11 ed., n°250; JCP 1955.II.8565, n. H B; Decree n°78-464 of 24 March 1978. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 16 April 1969, Bull. civ. III, n°287. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 2 February 2000, Bull. civ. III, n°23. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 21 December 2017, n°16-25665; Cour de cassation. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 26 February 1971, Bull. civ. III, n°147; RTD Civ., 1971, p 867, obs. G Cornu. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 27 November 1990, Bull. civ. III, n°255; RTD Civ., 1991.315, n. J Mestre; D., 1992, somm., p 195, obs. G Paisant; JCP N, 1993, n°12, p 107, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 11 April 1918, DP, 1921.1.224. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 5 January 1978, Bull. civ. III, n°10; Rouen, 3 February 1989, Bull. Joly, 1989, p 438; Nancy, 5 October 1989, JCP E 1990, 15784, obs. A Viandier and J-J Caussain. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 18 May 1898, S. 1898, 1, p 433, note LyonCaen, DP 1900, 1, p 481, note Sarrut; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 January 1994, Bull. civ. I, n° 4. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 19 May 1958, D., 1959, p 294, n. H Aberkane. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 27 March 1928, spec. II, p 146, note G Ripert, D., 1928.145. Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 27 May 1959, JCP 1959.II.11187, n. P Esmein; D., 1959, jurisp., p 524, n. Savatier; RTD Civ. 1959, p 735 obs. H and L Mazeaud. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 July 1977, Bull. civ. IV, n°202. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 12 December 1995, Bull. civ. IV, n° 294, Contrats conc. Cons., 1996, n°36, obs. L Leveneur; D., 1996, somm., p 333, obs. D Mazeaud; RTD Civ., 1996.617 obs. J Mestre; Petites Affiches, 24 January 1997, n. E Courtier. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 18 December 1990, Bull. Joly, 1991, p 326, n. B Saintourens. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 20 January 1987, JCP 1988, II, 20987, n. G Goubeaux. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 24 September 2003, D., 2004, p 1305, note G Kessler.

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Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 May 2013, n°12-19325. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 January 1991, Bull. civ., n°48; RTD Civ., 1991.331, n. J. Mestre. Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 8 May 1978, Bull. civ. IV, n°129; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 July 1988, Bull. civ. I, n°248, RTD Civ., 1989, p 310, obs. J Mestre; D., 1989, somm., p 313, obs. J Penneau. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 17 July 1929, DP, 1929.1.143, rapport Bricout. Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 4 August 1896. Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 14 February 1963, Bull. iv. I, n°165.

References Books Ancel ME, Deumier P, Laazouzi M (2020) Droit des contrats internationaux, 2nd edn. Sirey, Paris Atiyah PS (1961) An introduction to the law of contract (1961), 1st edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford Aubry C, Rau CF (1922) Cours de droit civil français, 5th edn. Imprimerie et Librairie Générale de Jurisprudence, Paris Bergel JL (2012) Théorie générale du droit, 5th edn. LGDJ, Paris Beudant R (1906) Cours de droit civil français, 3rd edn. Arthur Rousseau, Paris Carbonnier J (2000) Droit civil. Les obligations, 22nd edn.. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Catala P (2000) Le formalisme et les nouvelles technologies. In: Aubert JL (2000) Rapport de synthèse de la journée Jacques Flour consacrée au formalisme. 15–16:897–910. Defrénois, Paris Collart-Dutilleul F, Delebecque P (2002) Contrats civils et commerciaux, 6th edn. Dalloz, Paris Denisart JB (1766) Collection de decisions nouvelles et de notions relatives à la jurisprudence actuelle, vol 1. Desaint, Paris Fenet PA (1968) Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du Code Civil, vol 1-15. Zeller, Osnabrück Flour J, Aubert JL, Savaux E (2004) Droit civil. Les obligations, 11th edn. Sirey, Paris Forray V (2007) Le consensualisme dans la théorie générale du contrat. LGDJ, Paris Frison-Roche MA (1999) Unilatéralité et consentement. In: Jamin C, Mazeaud D (1999) L’unilatéralisme et le droit des obligations. Économica, Paris Geouffre de la Pradelle G (de) (1990) Essai d’introduction au droit français. Erasme, Namur. Ghestin J, Goubeaux G, Fabre-Magnan M (1994) Introduction générale, Traité de droit civil, 4th edn. LGDJ, Paris Guerriero MA (1975) L’acte juridique solennel. LGDJ, Paris Guyon I (2003) Aspects actuels du droit des affaires. Mélanges en l’honneur de Yves Guyon, Dalloz, Paris Josserand L (1939) Cours de droit civil positif français. Sirey, Paris. Labarthe, F (1994) Lagarde X (1994) Réflexion critique sur le droit de la preuve. LGDJ, Paris Laude A (1992) La reconnaissance par le juge de l’existence d’un contrat. Aix- Lévy-Bruhl, H (1963) La prevue judiciaire – Etude de sociologie juridique. Marcel Rivière, Paris Limbach F (2004) Le consentement contractuel à l’épreuve des conditions générales. De l’utilité du concept de la déclaration de volonté. LGDJ, LGDJ, Paris Malaurie P, Aynès L, Stoffel-Munck P (2004) Droit civil. Les obligations. LGDJ, Paris

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Malinverni P (1978) Les conditions générales de vente et les contrats types de chambres syndicales. LGDJ, Paris Mouralis JL (2002) Preuve. Répertoire civil Dalloz. Nicod M (2000) Le formalisme en droit des libéralités. Imprimerie la mouette, La Baule Ripert G, Roblot R (2002) Traité de droit commercial, Vol 1, Part 2, 18th edn. LGDJ, Paris Sériaux A (1998) Droit des obligations, 2nd edn. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Seube, A Les conditions générales des contrats in Université Paul Cézanne – Faculté de droit et de science politique (1974) Etudes offertes à A Jauffret. Faculté de droit et de Science politique d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence Terré F (2000) Introduction générale au droit, 5th edn. Dalloz, Paris Terré F, Simler P, Lequette Y (2002) Droit civil, Les obligations, 8th edn. Dalloz, Paris Vacrate, S (2003) La société créée de fait. Essai de théorisation. Atelier national de reproduction des thèses, Lille Vasseur M (2001) Droit civil. Les contrats spéciaux civils et commerciaux. 5th edn.. LGDJ, Paris

Articles Ancel P (2004) Contrat de fait et comportements sociaux typiques. 4:1087ff. https://www.labaselextenso.fr/revue-des-contrats/RDCO2004-4-044 Aynès L (2003) La réforme du cautionnement de la loi Dutreil. 113:28–33 Becque S (2002) Le parallélisme des formes en droit privé. LGDJ, Paris Boujeka A (2002) La conversion par réduction: contribution à l’étude des nullités des actes juridiques formels. 35:223–244. Charpentier E (2002) Un paradoxe de la théorie du contrat: l'opposition formalisme/ consensualisme. 43:275–297. https://doi.org/10.7202/043708ar Gamet L (2001) L’écrit électronique et le droit français de la preuve. 1: 535–549 Gautier PY (2000) Le bouleversement du droit de la preuve: vers un mode alternatif de conclusion des conventions. 9:14. https://www.labase-lextenso.fr/petites-affiches/PA200009002 Gobert M (2000) Evocation de Jacques Flour. In: Aubert, JL (2000) Le formalisme, journée. Rapport de synthèse de la journée Jacques Flour consacrée au formalisme. 15–16:870–879. https://www.labase-lextenso.fr/defrenois/AD2000DEF931N1 Houtcieff D (2003) Les dispositions applicables au cautionnement issues de la loi pour l’initiative économique. I.161 Legeais D (2003) Le Code de la consommation siège d’un nouveau droit commun du cautionnement. JCP-E-2003:1433ff Lucas de Leyssac C (1996) Le droit fondamental de la prevue, l’informatique et la télématique. 65: 3–6. https://www.labase-lextenso.fr/petites-affiches/PA199606501 Mainguy D (2001) Conditions générales de vente et contrats-types. 60:23 Penneau A (2002) La certification des produits et systèmes permettant la réalisation des actes et signatures électroniques. 535:2065–2068 Raynouard A (2000) Adaptation du droit de la preuve aux technologies de l’information et à la signature électronique. Observations critiques. 10:593. https://www.labase-lextenso.fr/ defrenois/AD2000DEF593N1 Savatier R (1973) La facture et la polyvalence de ses rôles juridiques en droit contemporain. 26:1– 25 Tricot-Chamard I (2004) Les vicissitudes de la mention manuscrite dans le cautionnement: suite ou fin?. JCP.I.112.

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Chapter 8

Reconsidering Consensualism and the Role of Consent in Contract

8.1

Introduction

The jurisprudence that Articles 1101, 1109, and 1172 embody by which consent makes the contract unless otherwise provided for by legislation by exception is open to revision. The rules of evidence discussed above, natural equity, and compliance with public order are many signs that consent is not self-expressive and does not make the contract alone (see Chaps. 6 and 7). They show the import of incorporating value judgements such as commercial good sense, good faith, natural equity, and public order in the interpretation and enforceability of contracts. They wrap consent in a broader narrative. It decides on its efficacy. Consequently, consent alone does not make the contract. By contrast, it is its interaction with external, established principles and the consequences that they impose upon it that determine its ability to produce the desired, intended effect. They are a vestment needed to make it enforceable. Consensualism groups the basic units, structuring elements of contract and assigns them weight without giving more emphasis to any of them. They normativise consent. They make it a subordinate principle that is not insulated from social, political, and legal concerns. It means that while consent (volonté) is a prominent figure of French contract law as evidenced by Article 1101 and French scholarship,1 its efficacy relies on the perpetual search for legitimation. Law and morality provide this legitimation by establishing strategies of societal governance. They are the formants of contract. They present consent as a rational sociolegal activity. It can only produce the desired legal effects provided it is 1 Pothier (2011) §3, p. 5; Gounot (1912), p. 5; Josserand (1939) at [154]; Guerriero (1975), p. 125; Gobert (2000) Article 37208, p. 878; Frison-Roche, MA in Jamin and Mazeaud (1999), p. 21; Mahouachi (2001), p. 40; Terré, F, Simler, P, Lequette, Y (2002) at [134]. See also, French Civil Code, ex-Article 1101 contra French Civil Code, Article 1101 (current); French Civil Code, ex-Article 1108, °1 contra French Civil Code, Article 1128, °1.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_8

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consistent with all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose on an obligation according to its nature. Hence, consensualism must not be read as the doctrine that sanctions consent as an autonomous, independent source of obligation in and of itself. By contrast, the multitude of doctrines that underpin it imply that it is necessary to deconstruct contract and consent to reach their working level (cog), thus departing from the traditional narrative by which consent alone makes the contract and is antithetical to form. The reason is that consensualism embodies a plethora of doctrines such as good faith, commutative justice, reason, and natural equity and justice. They portray contract rationally as a series of motivated, structured, justified, and collective choices as to the terms and content of a specific social activity as opposed to the mere consent of the parties. These value judgements legitimise and authorise, in turn, the recognition of consent as a source of obligation, however expressed. They are indeed what makes the contract. Together, they establish a particular system predating the formation of the contract of authorising, unifying, interpreting, and enforcing an undertaking. They act as a legitimating, systematic theory. It hinges the validity of a contract on the answer to the following questions: what relationship did consent create, what are the sociolegal effects of this relationship, and is the relationship and the situation created acceptable – not merely can consent be a source of obligation, what have the parties agreed on, and what are the consequences of the agreement for each of them? In essence, these features of consensualism reveal that whatever the fact that precipitates the creation of legal relations (i.e., consent expressed in words or actions), the enforceability and validity of contract does not rely merely on consent. Instead, it depends on an amalgamation of legal and moral rules. They transcend and normativise it. They are the cause of the obligation. Put differently, they are the agency of the enforceability of contract whatever the transaction that it organises, excepting the cases where it is unlawful, immoral, or contrary to public order. Consequently, consensualism appears to have another function than just legitimating the binding force of consent. It checks and balances the power of consent. It incorporates it as part of a formal structure, especially social and legal. It determines the binding force and enforceability of a contract. So, undertakings do not draw their force from naked consent but from an objective, superior legal and moral norm. It provides standard conditions for contracting and rules regarding what appropriate contract behaviour is and what types of conventions can be contracts. It legitimises the binding force of lawful and equitable ‘consensual’ agreements.2 It calls in turn for the reconsideration of the relationship that consent entertains with obligation given that it plays only a subsidiary role in the determination of the enforceability of a contract, pace the traditional narrative of French law that Article 1101 supports.

2

French Civil Code, ex-Article 1134 contra French Civil Code, Articles 1103, 1104, and 1193 (current); French Civil Code, ex-Article 1135 contra French Civil Code, Article 1194 (current).

8.2

Normativism and Consent

203

It is important, therefore, that the normativisation of consent that consensualism underpins is studied, especially how it forms the basis for the enforcement of contract as opposed to mere consent. It leads to consider how consensualism prescribes a standard to which consent must conform to have legal effects. Also, it calls for the exploration of how consensualism contributes to the regulation of the actions and consent of the parties in law. Finally, it requires the examination of its implications regarding the sanction of undertakings. These are presently discussed in turn.

8.2

Normativism and Consent

Many scholars, both ancient and modern, have overemphasised the role of consent or volonté in contract. Whether it is Loysel and his postulate by which the sworn declaration of the parties or one of them makes the contract,3 Pothier’s definition of contract,4 or more recently Terré, Simler, and Lequette’s definition,5 to cite but a few,6 all concur that consent or volonté makes the contract. While it is true, as Nooman Gomaa contends, that consent, when it is lawfully given, commits one to a prescribed action,7 it is seriously misguided to assert that it is consent that makes the contract actionable. Although consent is an essential feature of contracts and promises, it is the elevation of the declaratio voluntatis of the parties to the rank of an objective norm and the consequences that reason, good faith, justice, natural equity, and morality attach to it that make the contract actionable even before any legal predetermination. What makes the contract is truly the confidence ( fides) and reliance (confiance légitime) that the mutual declaration of intention of the parties instilled in each of them. It is the underlying rationale behind the enforcement of agreements arising from consent. It implies strict liability absent from any legal predetermination according to reason, good faith, justice, natural equity, and morality whenever the undertaking is lawfully made. By contrast, reason, good faith, justice, natural equity, and morality throw a spanner in the works and prevent an undertaking from producing legal effects when it is unlawfully made. The evidence is Articles 1103, 1104, 1193 (altogether formerly Article 1134), Article 1194 (formerly Article 1135), and Articles 1130 to 3 Loysel (1679), p. 357: ‘on lie les bœufs par les cornes et les hommes par les paroles, et autant vaut une simple promesse de convenance que les stipulations du droit romain’. [My own translation]: ‘One binds oxen by the horns, and men by words. The same applies as much to simple promises of convenience as to stipulations under Roman law’. 4 Pothier (2011) §3, p. 5. 5 Terré et al. (2019), p. 88. 6 See also, Schmidt-Szalewski (1989), pp. 11–36; Ghestin (1980), pp. 3–4; Terré, F, Simler, P, Lequette, Y (2002), pp. 57; Bénabent (2014), pp. 13-12; Larroumet (2003), pp. 65ff; Colin et al. (1959), pp. 307ff. 7 Gomaa (1968) at [17] et seq.

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1144 (formerly 1109 to 1122). They provide that only lawful agreements can be contracts. They must be formed and performed in good faith. They oblige not only to what is therein expressed but also to all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose on an obligation according to its nature. When read together, these articles imply that engagements do not draw their force from consent but instead, from the injunctions of our conscience to do what is right and avoid what is evil according to morality and law.8 It transpires in the jurisprudence of the French courts. While they acknowledge that consent or volonté are an essential feature of contracts and promises, they recognise that they are not a law unto themselves. Instead, the French courts note that undertakings derive their binding force from the duty of conscience that parties must keep their word.9 It is what makes the contract. It is a superior norm. It gives structure to contract and consent. It even predates the law. Consequently, the determinant of the enforceability of contracts is not just expressed consent, which is merely essential, but value judgements such as morality. It is never enough to observe that the parties have given assent to the terms of the contract in words or actions. Still, consent must be consistent with the rules of correct conduct that morality, reason, or law impose on the parties to a contract. They are the reason a party or both parties can action an obligation, not consent. They are truly the cause, explanation, and justification for the actionability of contract. They create an environment propitious to fair and equitable legal transactions in which the conduct of the parties is regulated ex-ante. Put differently, they establish a system in which agreements arising from consent can be contracts only to the extent that one shows a duty of conscience based on a legitimate expectation or covenant of trust. In turn, the debtor’s promise draws its objective legal force from an external moral norm: reasonable expectation. Yves-Marie Laithier (1972-)’s Etude comparative des sanctions de l’inexécution du contrat demonstrates the parallelism between the French perspectives on confiance légitime (reasonable expectation) and the German doctrine of Vertrauen.10 Similarly, reasonable expectation in French law allows the coercion of a party to observe and comply with their agreement. Like the common law doctrine of reliance, it also allows the award of damages11 to compensate a creditor for the damage they may have sustained because of non-execution.

8

Gnassounou (2019), pp. 421–423; Le Bideau (2015), pp. 154ff; Ripert (1928), pp. 24ff, 39. French Civil Code, ex-Article 1135 and the case law underneath contra French Civil Code, Article 1194; Colmar, 2 May 1855, D.P., 1856.2.9; Lyon, 18 April 1856, D. 1856.2.200; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 8 June 1857, S.1858.1.305; Montpellier, 16 July 1866, S.1867.2.115; Paris, 3 December 1871, D.1873.2.185; French Civil Code, ex-Article 1134, section 3 contra French Civil Code, Article 1104 and the case law underneath. See also Lévy (1899), pp. 361ff; Lévy (1910), pp. 700, 717ff. 10 Laithier (2004) at [119]. 11 Fuller and Perdue (1936) at [52], pp. 373ff contra French Civil Code, ex-Article 1142 and the case law underneath at °3. 9

8.2

Normativism and Consent

205

Consequently, as Hervé Lécuyer (1966-) put it, it is truly the legitimate expectation of a creditor (i.e., morality and reason) that makes the contract, not just consent which is an imperfect and overly simplistic token of what makes a contract actionable.12 Incidentally, reasonable or legitimate expectation also translates a need to account for the inner mind of the debtor to determine the binding force and actionability of an undertaking. Put differently, it underpins the uncompromising sanction of an undertaking. Here arises the proximity between confiance légitime and the common law doctrine of reliance and legitimate expectation. However, they are not directly equivalent given that reliance in English law does not purport to justify the binding force of undertakings but only to sanction economic harm.13 Differently, French law uses reliance or confiance légitime variously to justify the enforcement of undertakings or unravel them and compensate the promisee for the economic harm they may sustain because of the voidance of the contract.14 Either way, reliance in its French understanding not only justifies the binding force of undertakings and normativises consent but also it is a mechanism for compensating a party acting in good faith for the harm they may sustain because of the wrongful act of another. Likewise, it justifies the coercion of a party to perform a specific action, such as to complete performance of the contract. Consequently, it is reason (i.e., reliance, good faith, and morality) that makes the contract a priori. They (i.e., reliance, good faith, and morality) are the reason a promisor is bound to fulfil their declaration to give, do, or forbear. They somehow put liability first, and the implication of consent is made a posteriori to justify the decision already arrived at; that is, lawful agreements arising from consent have the force of law for those who have made them. So, it is reason, as a higher norm, that makes the contract actionable, not merely consent. It entails good faith, justice, natural equity, and morality. It imposes respect for the word and prevents consent from producing legal effects whenever it is given inconsistently. It justifies or forms the basis for the coercion of a debtor to honour their conation even before the law gets involved. This care for reason as what makes the contract not only underlies French law but also there is growing attention paid to reliance (legitimate trust) in a vast majority of

12

Lecuyer (1998) at [54], pp. 44ff. Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex Rep 850; Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola Challenger Shipping Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 2026 (Comm), [2010] 2 C.L.C. 194; Surrey CC and Mole DC v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 3 All E.R. 705; Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1321; Hooper v Oates [2013] EWCA Civ 91, [2013] 1 P. & C.R. DG22; McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission [1951] HCA 79, (1951) 84 CLR 377, High Court (Australia); Commonwealth v Amann Aviation [1991] HCA 54, (1991) 174 CLR [64], High Court (Australia). 14 Ripert (1936), pp. 57ff; Jamin (1997) at [598] and [60]; Ancel (1998) at [60], pp. 88ff. 13

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mixed and common law jurisdictions such as the United States of America,15 Canada,16 and Australia17 to justify the binding force of undertakings according to good faith and reason. The same is true of English law which has historically focused only on the identification of whether consideration was given to enforce an act rather than on whether parties must adhere to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing and faithfulness to the common purpose of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties.18 However, where others use good faith to sanction legitimate reliance as what makes the contract actionable, English law only uses good faith as an incident of specific contracts to ensure that parties to a contract do not conduct themselves in a way that falls foul of the objectives of the undertaking.19 By and large, the renewed interest in trust, reliance, and good faith as components of reason in other jurisdictions make it possible to assert that consent does not generally make the contract. It is instead, all the consequences that reason (i.e., natural equity, justice, morality, good faith) and law apply to it that do make it enforceable. They clothe it like a vestment and are the things that make it produce the desired legal effects. It is especially true since naked consent, that is, consent provided in a way that is inconsistent with good faith, reason, or public order can never produce the intended legal effects. Hence, the traditional narrative of French law by which consensualism denotes the doctrine by which consent alone makes the contract does not stand up to any scrutiny. It calls in turn for the examination of what the concrete, practical implications of law and reason are regarding the sanction of lawful agreements arising from consent.

15

Fuller and Perdue (1936), p. 52. Compare to Barnett (1996), p. 534 contra pp. 518–519ff; Graham-Suit v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2013); Bocksel v. DG3 North America, Inc., 2016 WL 873138, (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2016) at *10. 16 Waddams (1993), pp. 183–210, 8, 109ff, 513. 17 Robertson (2000). 18 Consideration is the practical cause, counterpart or technical element structuring of contracts in common law. It structures contract around the economic exchange that it underpins similarly to commutativity in Roman law regarding innominate contracts. This idea also echoed in French law under Domat’s pen regarding causa. See Atiyah (1989), p. 124. Compare to Domat (1828) Liv I, Tit I, Sec I, §5-6, p. 122-124 and Sec V, § 13-14, p 151, Liv I, Tit VI, p 236. 19 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex Rep 850; Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola Challenger Shipping Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 2026 (Comm), [2010] 2 C.L.C. 194; Surrey CC and Mole DC v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 3 All E.R. 705; Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1321; Hooper v Oates [2013] EWCA Civ 91, [2013] 1 P. & C.R. DG22; McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission [1951] HCA 79, (1951) 84 CLR 377, High Court (Australia); Commonwealth v Amann Aviation [1991] HCA 54, (1991) 174 CLR [64], High Court (Australia).

8.3

8.3

Implications

207

Implications

Once it is admitted that it is reason in all its guises (i.e., commercial good sense, good faith, justice, natural equity, and morality) that make the contract enforceable and not merely consent since it is they that decide on what legal effects consent can have, the question arises of what practical consequences the law assigns to them to ensure that none is deprived of the benefits of a contract. Articles 1103, 1104, 1193 (altogether formerly Articles 1134), Article 1194 (formerly Article 1135), and Articles 1130 to 1144 (formerly Articles 1109 to 1122) imply that morality and reason are an objective, equitable relief. They require the material completion of a previously established transaction, thus protecting the interest of the innocent party to a contract. Consequently, the adequate form of sanction is specific performance as it is closest to what was promised. By contrast, compensation defeats prima facie the provision of Articles 1103, 1104, and 1194 (altogether formerly Articles 1134 and 1135) by which lawful agreements oblige to what is therein expressed. Compensation of an innocent party implies that a non-performing party shall not be ordered to complete performance of the contract, but only to indemnify the reliance of a wronged party, thus hindering material performance. It begs the question of whether the delictual and quasi-contractual principle by which any act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges the one by whose fault it occurred to compensate for it20 is adequate to sanction liability for failure or refusal to perform or fulfil a lawful condition, promise, or contract. Put differently, the sanction of promise or contract by damages instead of specific performance begs the question of whether pecuniary compensation for non-performance is consistent with the rule that Articles 1103 and 1104 establish by which conventions lawfully entered into must be performed in good faith. It is not unless one reads the requirement for performance as meaning any performance, including performance in kind and by equivalence—not merely material performance. It was the rule under Article 114221 and is now the exception under Article 1221 specific performance being, again, closest to what was promised in the contract. It is only just and proper since reason prescribes that lawful agreements are performed materially. However, it is understandable that the discontinuity of consent on the part of the promisor results in compensation and indemnification instead of specific performance when morality and law establish the continuous consent of the parties as the support of obligations. It means that while reason may curtail freedom of contract

French Civil Code, ex-Article 1382: ‘Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer’ contra French Civil Code, Article 1240 (current): ‘Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer’. 21 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1142: ‘Toute obligation de faire ou de ne pas faire se résout en dommages et intérêts en cas d'inexécution de la part du débiteur’. 20

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and compel a party to undertake something they had previously promised, it does not hinder the sanction of a non-performing party only to compensate the innocent party when they no longer wish to fulfil a previously established legal relation materially. It is consistent with the requirement for natural equity that Article 1194 (formerly 1135) underpins. Hence, value judgements such as good faith, natural equity, and justice might be read not only as a duty to recompense a promisee for the steps they have taken in reliance on a promise but also as a means of compelling the material performance of a previously established transaction. There is a caveat, however. Such performance must not be impossible or manifestly disproportionate between its cost to the debtor and its interest for the creditor as per Article 1221.22 As a number of French scholars highlight, it means that compensation for reliance loss should not be the last resort, but an equal means of sanctioning those who perjured themselves and did not fulfil their obligation.23 It is only consistent with equity. It imposes the quality of being fair as what makes the contract with complete impartiality for, they who seek equity must do equity. It is consistent with the jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation. It acknowledges that one cannot remedy harm by causing harm to another.24 Thus, the reasonable and equitable doctrines that consensualism underlies establish both specific implement and reliance loss as a middle ground allowing the sanction of promise according to what is fair. It controverts the idea that specific performance is solely consistent with the sanction of contracts or promises. It also means that specific performance which has now become the rule in French law as in other European jurisdictions25 and reliance loss proceed from the same continuum. They both contribute to the sanction of the apostasy of a promisor according to commutative justice. It imposes a rule by which a promisor is either bound to perform their obligation materially where it is possible or settle the debt owed to the promisee in kind or equivalence through an order of reparation for a contractual breach so that the other party is not worse off. Hence, consensualism hinges the efficacy of Article 1101 on the adequacy of the undertaking with social and economic norms. They are truly the formants of the enforceability of contracts. Altogether, it translates the proximity between French contract law and Scots26 and English27 contract law whose preference for damages 22 French Civil Code, Article 1221 (current): ‘Le créancier d'une obligation peut, après mise en demeure, en poursuivre l'exécution en nature sauf si cette exécution est impossible ou s'il existe une disproportion manifeste entre son coût pour le débiteur de bonne foi et son intérêt pour le créancier’. 23 Toullier (1824) at [217]; Duranton (1844) at [108] et seq.; Larombière (1885) at [2]; Page (de) (1934) at [93]. 24 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1142 and the case law underneath contra French Civil Code, Article 1221 and the case law underneath. 25 Herman, S in Blanc-Jouvan (2005), pp. 521ff, 522; Meyvis et al. (2019) w-012-2852; Smits et al. (2008), pp. 31–46; Italian Civil Code, Article 1453. 26 MacQueen and Thomson (2016), pp. 251ff, especially 252. 27 Eisenberg and Miller (2013), pp. 1ff; Chitty on contracts (2018) 27-015 et seq., pp. 1190ff.

Statutory Provisions

209

over specific performance (implement), despite the loophole that Beswick v Beswick introduced,28 attests to the import of the economic value of the contract in the determination of its enforceability.29 As a result, the effect of consensualism is to establish utilitarianism, economic coherency, good faith, and equity as what makes the contract (enforceable), not (ever) merely consent.

8.4

Conclusion

Consensualism can reasonably be seen to establish value judgements such as commercial good sense, good faith, morality, natural equity, justice, and public order as what truly makes a contract enforceable, not merely consent. Altogether, they normativise consent and set up standards of conduct. They lead to consider the economic value of a contract in the determination of its enforceability. Not only do they legitimise the binding force of consent, but they also mitigate and incorporate consent as part of a formal structure, especially social, economic, and legal. It decides on what effects consent can have under the guise of commutative justice. Therefore, consent alone does not make the contract. Its enforcement depends on its possibility and manifest proportionality between its cost to the debtor and its interest for the creditor. It translates an idea by which far from just establishing consent as what makes the contract, consensualism mostly instates a system of values. It predates the formation of undertakings. It legitimises their value according to whether the benefits of a contract are legitimately expectable.

Statutory Provisions French Civil Code • • • • • • • • • 28

Article 1101 (current). Article 1103. Article 1104. Article 1128, °1. Article 1193 (current). Article 1194. Article 1221 (current). Article 1240 (current). ex-Article 1101.

Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, [1967] All ER 1197. Tallon (1994) at [21] et seq.; Herman, S in Blanc-Jouvan, X (Société de Législation Comparée) (2005), pp. 521ff, 527; Eisenberg and Miller (2013), pp. 1ff; Chitty on contracts (2018) 27-015 et seq., pp. 1190ff.

29

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• • • • •

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ex-Article 1134, section 3. ex-Article 1134. ex-Article 1135. ex-Article 1142. ex-Article 1382.

Italian Civil Code, Article 1453.

Case Law Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, [1967] All ER 1197. Bocksel v. DG3 North America, Inc., 2016 WL 873138, (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2016) at *10. Colmar, 2 May 1855, D.P., 1856.2.9. Commonwealth v Amann Aviation [1991] HCA 54, (1991) 174 CLR [64], High Court (Australia). Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 8 June 1857, S.1858.1.305. Graham-Suit v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2013). Hooper v Oates [2013] EWCA Civ 91, [2013] 1 P. & C.R. DG22. Lyon, 18 April 1856, D. 1856.2.200. McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission [1951] HCA 79, (1951) 84 CLR 377, High Court (Australia). Montpellier, 16 July 1866, S.1867.2.115. Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola Challenger Shipping Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 2026 (Comm), [2010] 2 C.L.C. 194. Paris, 3 December 1871, D.1873.2.185. Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex Rep 850. Surrey CC and Mole DC v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 3 All E.R. 705. Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1321.

References Books Atiyah PS (1989) An introduction to the law of contract, 6th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford Bénabent A (2014) Droit des obligations, 14th edn. LGDJ, Paris Blanc-Jouvan, X (Société de Législation Comparée) (2005) De tous horizons. Mélanges en l’honneur de Xavier Blanc-Jouvan. Société Législation Comparée, Paris Burrows A et al (2018) Chitty on contracts, vol 1, 33rd edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London Colin A, Capitant H, Julliot de la Morandière L (1959) Traité de droit civil, vol 2. Dalloz, Paris Domat J (1828) Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel. Firmin Didot Père et Fils, Paris

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Duranton A (1844) Cours de droit civil français suivant le Code civil, vol 10, 4th edn. Thorel & Guilbert, Paris Frison-Roche MA (1999) Unilatéralité et consentement. In: Jamin C, Mazeaud D (1999) L’unilatéralisme et le droit des obligations. Économica, Paris Ghestin J (1980) Traité de droit civil. Les obligations. Le contrat, 1st edn.. LGDJ, Paris. Gnassounou B (2019) La Parole donnée. Le contrat comme représentation collective. Classiques Garnier, Paris. Gomaa NK (1968) Théorie des sources de l’obligation. LGDJ, Paris Gounot E (1912) Le principe de l'autonomie de la volonté en droit privé. Contribution à l'Étude critique de l'individualisme juridique. Rousseau, Paris Guerriero MA (1975) L’acte juridique solennel. LGDJ, Paris Josserand L (1939) Cours de droit civil positif français. Sirey, Paris Laithier YM (2004) Etude comparative des sanctions de l’inexécution du contrat. LGDJ, Paris Larombière LVLJ (1885) Théorie et pratique des obligations, vol 1, 7th edn. A. Durand et PedoneLauriel, Paris Larroumet C (2003) Droit civil, Les obligations. Le contrat, Vol 3, 5th edn. Economica, Paris Le Bideau C (2015) Engagement et désengagement contractuel. Etude de droit de la consommation et de droit civil. UniversitÉ Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble Loysel A (1679) Institutes coutumières ou Manuel de plusieurs et diverses règles, sentences et proverbes, tant anciens que modernes, du droit coutumier et plus ordinaire de la France. EdmeMartin, Martin, Paris MacQueen H, Thomson J (2016) Contract law in Scotland, 4th edn. Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath. Mahouachi M (2001) La liberté contractuelle des collectivités territoriales. Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence Page (de) H (1934) Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge. Principes, doctrine, jurisprudence. Les incapables. Les obligations, 1st edn.. Bruylant, Brussels Pothier RJ (2011) Traité des obligations. Dalloz, Paris Ripert G (1928) Le Socialisme juridique d'Emmanuel Lévy: À propos de La vision socialiste du droit. LGDJ, Paris Schmidt-Szalewski J (1989) Jurisprudence française–Droit des contrats. Litec, Paris Smits JM, Haas D, Hesen G (2008) Specific performance in contract law; (GO TO THE LINE) Terré, F, Simler, P, Lequette, Y (2002) Droit civil, Les obligations, 8th edn.. Dalloz, Paris. [There are two distinct references here. Please separate them] Terré F, Simler P, Lequette Y (2019) Droit civil, Les obligations, 12th edn. Dalloz, Paris Toullier CBM (1824) Le droit civil français suivant l’ordre du Code civil, 4th edn. Warée, Paris Waddams SM (1993) The law of contracts, 3rd edn. Thomson Reuters, Toronto

Articles Ancel P (1998) Droit au recouvrement de sa créance ou droit de ne pas payer des dettes?. 60:89ff Barnett RE (1996) The death of reliance. 46:518–536. https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/ facpub/1245 Eisenberg T, Miller GP (2013) Damages versus Specific Performance: Lessons from Commercial Contracts. 12:29–69. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1688/ Fuller LL, Perdue WR (1936) The reliance interest in contract damages. 46:52–96. https:// digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3828&context=ylj Gobert M (2000) Evocation de Jacques Flour in Aubert, JL (2000) Le formalisme, journée. Rapport de synthèse de la journée Jacques Flour consacrée au formalisme. 15–16:870–879. https://www. labase-lextenso.fr/defrenois/AD2000DEF931N1 Jamin C (1997) Que reste-t-il de l’intangibilité du contrat. 58:29ff

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Lecuyer H (1998) Redéfinir la force obligatoire du contrat. 54:44ff. https://www.labase-lextenso.fr/ petites-affiches/PA199805415 Lévy E (1899) Responsabilité et contrat. 28:361–398. Lévy E (1910) La confiance légitime. 9:700–722 Robertson A (2000) Protecting Reliance: The Emergent Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel by Michael Spence; Reliance, Conscience and the New Equitable Estoppel. 24:1-144. A review of M Spence (1999) Protecting reliance: The emergent doctrine of equitable estoppel. http://classic. austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2000/7.html

Other Meyvis Y, Berneman S, Engelen L, Aerts PJ (2019) Sale and storage of goods in Belgium: overview. https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-012-2852?originationContext= knowHow&transitionType=KnowHowItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&comp=pluk Ripert G (1936) Le droit de ne pas payer ses dettes. 1936: 57ff Tallon D (1994) L’inexécution du contrat: pour une autre présentation. https://www.degruyter.com/ database/IBZ/entry/ibz.ID842008127/html

Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1

What Are the Underpinnings of Consensualism?

Consensualism denotes an accumulation of different strands of thinking about contract. It designates the ability of individuals considered apart from various contingencies of place, culture, and social relations to have power over their life and create obligations between them freely without government intervention. It embodies several doctrines that underpin it. The first is natural equity. The second is natural justice. The third is good faith. Finally, the fourth is reason. The potency of natural equity translates in the legitimation that it provides to judges in the determination of the validity and enforceability of agreements arising from consent absent excessive adherence to form and technique. It is so, even if there is no appropriate or conclusive statute providing for the situation brought before them. Natural equity portrays consensualism as a pragmatic doctrine. It ensures that a party is not deprived of the benefits of a lawful contract. It echoes in the other principle underpinning consensualism: good faith. Good faith not only creates a general presumption by which the parties to a contract must deal with each other fairly, honestly, and in good faith not to destroy the right of the other party to receive the benefits expected under a contract, but also it precludes a person from asserting something contrary to what is implied by their previous action, conduct or statement, or by a previous judicial determination. It portrays consensualism as the doctrine by which pacta quantumcunque nuda servanda sunt. They can only be revoked by the mutual consent of the parties, or the causes authorised by law when they are lawfully made. In that respect, good faith contains, embodies the principle by which every party, especially aggrieved parties, must be allowed an adequate opportunity to present their grievance where their interest or right may be adversely affected by the decision of another to withhold performance.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2_9

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Conclusion

So, judges must decide cases without favouritism or discrimination according to what is fair, thus ensuring that the sanction of a right is not impossible or manifestly disproportionate between its cost to the debtor and its interest for the creditor. Hence, natural justice portrays consensualism as the doctrine preventing a party from taking unfair advantage of another when by their conduct or action, they have induced another to act or behave in a specific manner which resulted in them sustaining harm. Simultaneously, it ensures that the sanction of the rights of the aggrieved party is not manifestly disproportionate in light of its cost to the debtor. Consequently, reason or natural law underpin consensualism. Their potency is betrayed by the inclination that the courts have to give every man their right according to accepted standards of morality or conduct, shared norms, social values, or customs whether conjunct or disjunct from religion, based on nature and rational causes, explanations, and justification. Thus, consensualism appears to be far more complex than the opposition between form and consent. However, consent is not self-expressive. Natural equity, natural justice, good faith, and natural law or reason wrap it in a narrative. It decides on the circumstances in which agreements arising from consent can be contracts. They are the cause of the obligation; that is, they underpin its validity and determine its efficacy, enforceability even before the law gets involved. Therefore, the meaning and effects of consensualism depend heavily on how these doctrines are construed and the scope they are given.

9.2

What Are the Implications of Consensualism?

Natural equity, natural justice, good faith, and natural law or reason—as the cause of obligations—depict consensualism as the doctrine that foists fairness and good sense as fundamental units in all agreements. It determines the validity and enforceability of contracts as a procedural and substantive rule for contracting. It also justifies the coercion of a party to perform whatever action that would make sense of a lawful undertaking. It provides strategies of societal governance, legitimises and authorises the binding force of consent according to what is fair and equitable. As such, consensualism is not insulated from social, political, and economic concerns as to what types of agreements can be contracts and how they should be enforced. Hence, it makes it possible to treat the binding force of consent rationally as the embodiment of a series of motivated, structured choices as to what terms of social life can be enforced and how.

9.4

9.3

How Can Ideas of Consensualism be Consolidated to Posit a Single,. . .

215

What Relationship Does Consensualism Entertain with Formalism and How Can They Be Made to Exist in Harmony Despite Different Ideologies?

Consensualism is the product of ungrounded intellectual flux, long-standing reasoned discourses on how consent can be a source of obligation. It mitigates excessive adherence to prescribed forms. It puts an end to the use of forms of worship without regard to their inner significance. It bases ethics on the forms of the moral law with regard to intentionality and its consequences. Finally, it substitutes pragmatism for concern, sometimes excessive, with form and technique. History reveals that far from embodying the debatable opposition between form and consent, consensualism is the fruit of a historically situated and prudent common reasonableness as to how agreements arise. It was developed as a means of adapting, simplifying the rigid forms of yore, and transforming them into an evidentiary vehicle of consent, not as a contradiction to formalism, pace the traditional narrative of French law. Hence, the study of the development of consensualism in past eras avoids misunderstandings as to the context of its development. It reveals it not to be mutually exclusive to formalism. Consequently, formalism and consensualism are capable of existing in harmony despite different ideologies or interests. They contribute extra features to each other. It appears most overtly in the formation and proof of obligations. Consensualism since the modern period hinges the formation of contract on consent in whatever form that it may be expressed at the discretion of the parties or according to the forms that legislation requires for legal certainty. It defeats the otherwise restrictive aspect of formalism by which excessive, often irrational, forms are what makes the contract. Therefore, consensualism lends more weight to the phenomenal will of the parties in the determination of the existence of an obligation and its enforceability. Correlatively, its development caused the forms to evolve into an agency of consent and become lighter. Their only purpose became to evidence, tangibly, a lawful obligation. Hence, the import of consensualism depends on a subtle and skilful blend of formality and self-agency as regards the determinants and requisites essential for the validity and enforceability of contracts.

9.4

How Can Ideas of Consensualism be Consolidated to Posit a Single, More Precise Definition and Reveal It in the Full Extent of Its Properties?

The lesson that can be learnt from the development of consensualism ‘within the flows of the human experience that generated’ it is that it denotes, through its multiple strands, the principle by which every agreement arising from consent can be a contract.

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However, their validity and enforceability rely on several conditions: (1) the expression of consent in words or actions recognised by law; (2) the consistency of consent with all the consequences that equity, usage, or law impose on an obligation according to its nature; (3) the economic profitability of undertakings to each of the parties and the balance between their cost to the debtor and their interest for the creditor; (4) the absence of mechanisms forming a device, cloak, or sham attempted to disguise the true nature of an undertaking to deceive third parties or the courts as to a remote unlawful aim; (5) the lawfulness of the motives wherefore the parties or one of them obliged themselves; and (6) the consistency of agreements with the natural, good order of society. It not only requires that parties keep their word but also that they behave per accepted standards of conduct and are protected by law when their rights are violated.

Table of Authorities

Canon Law • Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae, Pars Tertia, Section Secunda, Articulus 2, § 2152 • Decretales Gregorii IX, 1.35.1.2 • Decretales Gregorii IX, 2.24 • Decretum Gratiani, Causa XXII, Qu. I, Canon 1 • Decretum Gratiani, Causa XXII, Qu. V, Canon 12 • Ecclesiastes, 8:2 • Exodus, 22:11 • Genesis, 9, 24:2-3 • Hebrew, 6:16 • Innocent IV, Canon XII of the Council of Carthage (348) ad X.1.35.1 • Isaiah, 45:24 • James, 5:12 • James’ Epistle, 5 • Liber Sextus Decretalium Bonifatius, 2.2 • Matthew, 14:9 • Matthew, 5 • Matthew, 5:34-37 • Psalm, 15:4 • Sirach, 8:13 Roman Statutory Provisions • Codex, 2.3.24 • Codex, 4.1 • Codex, 4.18 • Codex, 4.34 • Codex, 5.11.6

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 K. Abry, The Construction, Sources, and Implications of Consensualism in Contract, Studies in the History of Law and Justice 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37641-2

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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Codex, 8.37.10 Constitutio de Leo, 3.15 Digest 12.1 et seq Digest 19.2.54 Pr Digest 2.14.14 Digest 50.16.19 Digest, 1.1 Digest, 1.1.7.1 Digest, 1.7.1 Digest, 12.1; 87; 88 Digest, 12.1.1 Digest, 12.1.2 Digest, 12.2.2 Digest, 12.5.3 Digest, 12.6.1.1 Digest, 12.6.14 Digest, 12.6.26.9 Digest, 13.5 Digest, 13.5.1 Digest, 13.7 et seq. Digest, 15.5 Digest, 16.2.10.1 Digest, 16.3 Digest, 17.1.39 et seq. Digest, 18.1.41.1 Digest, 18.1.57 Pr Digest, 19.5.3-4 Digest, 19.5.5 Digest, 2.13.1 Digest, 2.14.1.1, 7.2 Digest, 2.14.1.3 Digest, 2.14.16 Digest, 2.14.2, 5, 6, and 10 Digest, 2.14.5 Digest, 2.14.6 Digest, 2.14.7 Digest, 2.14.7.4 Digest, 2.14.7.5 Digest, 2.14.7.7 Digest, 2.6 et seq. Digest, 24.1.39.10-11 Digest, 24.1.5.18 Digest, 3.5 et seq. Digest, 4. 4.3 Pr Digest, 4.2

Table of Authorities

Table of Authorities

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Digest, 4.2.3.1, 4.2.5-6, and 44.4.4.33 Digest, 4.3.1.1 Digest, 4.3.1.2 and 44.4.4.33 Digest, 4.4.24.1 Digest, 4.5.8 Digest, 4.8 Digest, 4.8.13.2 Digest, 4.8.19.1 Digest, 41.1.35 (Ulp 7 disp) Digest, 41.1.36 Digest, 44.7.1 Digest, 44.7.1 Pr Digest, 44.7.5 Pr, 3 Digest, 45.1 Digest, 45.1.16 Pr Digest, 45.1.2 Digest, 45.1.38.17 Digest, 45.1.38.20 Digest, 45.1.38.24 Digest, 46.2.11 Digest, 49.15.7.1 Digest, 50.16.115 and 181 Digest, 50.16.5 Digest, 50.17.206 Digest, 9.4.3.1 Duodecim Tabulae, 3.6 Duodecim Tabulae, 6.1 Edict de pactis, 35 Institutes of Gaius 4.21 Institutes of Gaius 4.30 Institutes of Gaius, 1 Institutes of Gaius, 1.119 Institutes of Gaius, 1.119.2.14a-22 Institutes of Gaius, 2.1 Institutes of Gaius, 2.127-30 Institutes of Gaius, 2.4 Institutes of Gaius, 2.60 Institutes of Gaius, 3.129 Institutes of Gaius, 3.131-132, 134 Institutes of Gaius, 3.134 Institutes of Gaius, 3.136 Institutes of Gaius, 3.201 Institutes of Gaius, 3.30 Institutes of Gaius, 3.87 Institutes of Gaius, 3.88

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Table of Authorities

Institutes of Gaius, 3.88-91 Institutes of Gaius, 3.89 Institutes of Gaius, 3.89–90 Institutes of Gaius, 3.92 Institutes of Gaius, 3.92 et seq Institutes of Gaius, 3.93, 103, 113, and 179 Institutes of Gaius, 3.93, 179 Institutes of Gaius, 4.12–29 Institutes of Gaius, 4.17a Institutes of Gaius, 4.47 Institutes of Justinian, 2.14.5, 2.18 Institutes of Justinian, 2.9.5 Institutes of Justinian, 3.14 Institutes of Justinian, 3.14.2 Institutes of Justinian, 3.15 Institutes of Justinian, 3.15.1 Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.12 Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.19 Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.20 Institutes of Justinian, 3.19.7 Institutes of Justinian, 3.22.1-3 Institutes of Justinian, 3.25.1 Institutes of Justinian, 3.27 Institutes of Justinian, 4, 30-31 Institutes of Justinian, 4.6, especially 20 Institutes of Justinian.1.2 Institutes of Justinian.3.22 et seq. Lex Aebutia de formulis (150 BCE) Lex de Gallia Cisalpina (BC 49 – 42) Caput XXII, 31 Lex de imperio Vespasiani in Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, VI.930 Lex Irnitana (AD 51–96) LXXIX, 50; LXXXIII,48 Lex Iulia iudiciorum privatorum (AD 17) Lex Poetelia (326 BCE) Novella, 8

French Statutory Provisions • Cartulaire de l'évêché de Poitiers ou Grand-Gauthier (839) nº21 • Cartulaire de l’Abbaye de Saint-Etienne de Dijon (882, Courtoi) 5th edition • Cartulaire de Lerins, 8; 133 • Cartulaire de Marculfe, 2.5.3 • Cartulaire de Perrecy (821, Lichey) in Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de SaintBenoît-sur-Loire (Paris: 1900) n°17, p 38 • Cartulaire de Saint-Bénigne de Dijon (876, Pérard) p 152 • Charte de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire (818, Autun) n°13 • Chartes bourguignones inédites des IXe, Xe, et XIes (1849) nº1

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• Chilperici Edictum (Behrend: 1873) 6, p 106 • Chilperici Edictum, c. 8 in Capitularia regum Francorum (Hanover: 1883) Vol 1, MGH Legum sectio. II, p 9 • Coutume d’Avignon, Article 121 • Coutume de Bayonne, 118.1 • Coutume de Charaux, 14.40 • Coutume de Montpellier, 100 • Décret n°2001-272 du 30 mars 2001 pris pour l'application de l'article 1316-4 du code civil et relatif à la signature électronique • Extravangantia B, 3-4 • French Civil Code, Article 1101 • French Civil Code, Article 1103 • French Civil Code, Article 1106, º1; 190 • French Civil Code, Article 1106, º2; 190 • French Civil Code, Article 1107 • French Civil Code, Article 1107, º1 • French Civil Code, Article 1107, º2 • French Civil Code, Article 1108 • French Civil Code, Article 1109 • French Civil Code, Article 1128 • French Civil Code, Article 1128, º1 • French Civil Code, Article 1130 • French Civil Code, Article 1162 • French Civil Code, Article 1163 • French Civil Code, Article 1172 • French Civil Code, Article 1221 • French Civil Code, Article 1240 • French Civil Code, Article 1302-2 • French Civil Code, Article 1303 • French Civil Code, Article 1348 • French Civil Code, Article 1358 • French Civil Code, Article 1359 • French Civil Code, Article 1582 • French Civil Code, Article 1583 • French Civil Code, Article 16-1 • French Civil Code, Article 1630 • French Civil Code, Article 1674 • French Civil Code, Article 1892 • French Civil Code, Article 1915 • French Civil Code, Articles 1103, 1104, and 1193 • French Civil Code, Articles 1109 and 1172 • French Civil Code, Articles 1113 to 1122 • French Civil Code, Articles 1129-1144 • French Civil Code, Articles 1145-1161 • French Civil Code, Articles 1162-1171

222

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French Civil Code, Articles 1915 et seq., 1875 et seq., 893 et seq. French Civil Code, ex-Article 1101 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1102 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1103 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1107 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1108, º1 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1109 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1117 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1129 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1130, º1 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1131 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1134 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1142 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1315 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1341 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1348 French Civil Code, ex-Article 1382 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1105 and 1106 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1109-1122 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1123-1125-1 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1126-1130 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1131-1133 French Civil Code, ex-Articles 1341 and 1343 French Commercial Code, Article L 110-3 French Commercial Code, Article L 441-3 French Constitution, Article 38 French Consumer Code, Article 311-8 French Consumer Code, Article L 121-16 et seq French Insurance Code, Article L 112-3 French Labour Code, Article L 122-3-1 French Town Planning Code, Article L 213.2 Lex Ripuaria, 48, 59, and 77 Lex Romana Visigothorum, 24.2.487 Lex Salica, 1.2 Lex Salica, 46 Lex Salica, 50.1 Lex Salica, 50.3 Lex Salica, 52 Lex Salica, 58.21, 65.1 Lex Salica, 7.1 Lex Visigothorum, 4.224 Lex Visigothorum, 4.3 Lex Visigothorum, 4.4 Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, 1.2.7 Li Livres de Jostice et de Plet, 2.16.3

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223

• Loi (Hamon) 2014-344 du 17-3-2014 relative à la consommation • Loi 2017-203 du 21-2-2017 ratifiant [notamment] l’ordonnance 2016-301 du 14-3-2016 relative à la partie législative du Code de la consommation • Loi n° 2014-873 du 4 août 2014 pour l’égalité réelle entre les femmes et les hommes • Loi n° 2018-287 du 20 avril 2018 ratifiant l'ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations • Ordonnance 2016-301 du 14-3-2016 relative à la partie législative du Code de la consommation • Ordonnances de Moulins, Article 54 • Pactus Legis Salicae, 50-3 • Pactus Legis Salicae, 56 • Statuta Massiliae, 3.6 • Statuta sive leges municipales Arelatis, Article 192 • Table des articles 1100 à 1386-1 au JO du 11/02/2016 (ancienne / nouvelle référence) Other Statutory Provisions • Bügerliches Gesetzbuch, para 145 • Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance • Directive 1999/93/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures • Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market • Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC • Italian Civil Code, Article 1453 • Lex Baiuvariorum, 16.10 • Lex Baiuvariorum, 16.2 Case Law France • Aix-en-Provence, 29 November 1927, JCP 1928. 11, 177 • Chambre civile 1, 25 September 2013, nº12-23197, Bulletin 2013, I, nº177 • Conseil Constitutionnel, 31 July 2003, nº2003-477 DC, JO 5 August 2003, p 13464 • Conseil d’Etat, 22 February 1995, n°123-421 • Cour d'appel de Versailles, 12 January 2000, 1998-2334 • Cour de cassation, 22 October 1996, Bull. civ. IV, nº261, GAJC, 11th ed., nº156; D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux • Cour de cassation, Assemblée Plénière, 1 December 1995: Bull. Civ. Nº7 (2 arrêts); ibid, nº8; R, p. 290, GAJC, 11 éd, nº151-154

224

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• Cour de cassation, Assemblée Plénière, 2 April 1993: Bull. Civ. Nº9, R., p 326; GAJC, 11e éd., nº226; D. 1993. 373, concl. Jéol; D. 1993. Somm. 273., obs. Prétot; D. 1994, Somm. 14, obs. Aubert; JCP 1993. II.22051, cincl. Jéol; Gaz. Pal. 1993.2.560, concl. Jéol; RTD Civ. 1993. 820, obs. Mestre, Sériaux, D. 1993. Chron. 229 • Cour de cassation, Assemblée Plénière, 29 October 2004, Bull. civ. A P., nº12 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 September 2013, nº12-23197, Bulletin 2013, I, nº177 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1 March 1989 Bull. civ. III, nº 49, p 29 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Bull. civ. I, nº235; D., 1997, somm., p 171, obs. R Libchaber; Contrats, conc. Consom., 1997, p 3, obs. L Leveneur; RTD Civ., 1997, p 116, obs. J Mestre • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Dr. Sociétés, nº225, obs. T Bonneau • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 10 October 2000, D 2000 AJ, p 409, obs Avena-Robarde • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 12 July 1989, Bull. civ. I, nº293; GAJC, 11th edition, nº155; JCP 1990.II.21546, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé; Defrénois, 1990, p 358, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1990, p 468, obs. J Mestre • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2010, 08-13.160 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 14 January 2010, 08-18.581 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 15 June 1994, Bull. civ. I, nº215; Defrénois, 1994, p 1113, obs. P Delebecque • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 17 February 1998, Bull. civ. I, nº64 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 December 1990, Bull. civ. I, nº303; R., p 372; JCP 1991.II.21656, n. J Bigot; RTD Civ., 1991, obs. J Mestre • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 February 1991, Bull. civ. I, nº71 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 January 1953, D 1953, p 234 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 July 1988, Bull. civ. I, nº248, RTD Civ., 1989, p 310, obs. J Mestre; D., 1989, somm., p 313, obs. J Penneau • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 June 2008, D. 2008. AJ 1827, obs. Delpech; ibid. 2008. Chron. C. cass. 2363, n° 5, obs. Creton; ibid. Jur. 2555, note Chénedé ; RTD com. 2008. 603, obs. Legeais • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 19 November 2002, Bull. civ. I, nº125; D., 2002.3290, n. C Barberot; D., 2003, somm., p 1401, obs. G Taormina; JCP 2003.1.111, nº10, obs. P Simler; Defrénois, 2003.547, obs G Champernois • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 20 January 1998: Bull. Civ. I, nº18; D. 1999. 500, note D. R. Martin (1re esp.); JCP 1999. I. 137, nº7, obs. Rullmann • Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 1, 22 February 1978, 76-11.551 (Affaire Poussin) • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 23 February 1999, D. 1999, jur. p 411 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 24 November 1954, GAJC, 11 ed., nº250; JCP 1955.II.8565, n. H B; Decree nº78-464 of 24 March 1978 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 January 1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965 1 p. 198 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 25 January 1965: Gaz. Pal. 1965. 1. 198

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225

• Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 26 August 1962, JCP 1983 II 19992, not Ph Terri • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 26 November 1996: Bull. Civ. I, nº415 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 27 April 2004, Bull. civ. I, nº121, Contrats conc. cons. July 2004, nº7, p 22, obs. L Leveneur, RTD Civ., 2004, p 510, obs. J Mestre and B Fages • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 27 February 2007, 02-13.420 03-21.179 • Cour de cassation, chambre civile 1, 27 June 2006, D. 2007. Pan. 753, obs. Martin ; CCC 2006, n° 221, note Leveneur • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 28 October 2003, Bull. civ. I, nº216 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 February 2000, Bull. civ. I, nº68; JCP 2000.II.10382, n. J Casey; I.257, obs. P Simler; JCP E, 2000, p 801, n. D Legeais; D. 2000, somm., p 342, obs. V Bremond; D 2001, somm. p 691, obs. L Aynès • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 March 2017, n°16-10007 and n°1526766 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 October 2002, Bull. civ. I, n. 250; R., p 443; D. 2002, p 3071, n. J Djoudi; somm., p 3334, obs. L Aynès; JCP 2002. II.10187, n. D Legeais; 2003.I.124, nº1, obs. P Simler; Defrénois, 2ƒ003, p 229, n. S Piedelièvre; RTD Civ., 2003, p 122, obs. P Crocq • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 December 1974, Bull. civ. I, nº322 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 February 1999, Bull. civ. I, nº43 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 July 1996, pourvoi no 94-14800, Bull. Civ. I. nº286 p 200, D. 30 octobre 1997, nº38, p 500, note P. Reigne, JurisClasseur périodique 96. IV. 1998, 97,I,4015, obs. Labarthe • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 3 June 1997, n°95-13.568 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 December 1956, Bull. civ. I, nº439; JCP 1957.II.10008, note J Mazeaud, Bull. civ. I, nº439; JCP 1957.II.10008, note J Mazeaud • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 June 1996, Bull. civ. I, nº235 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 4 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, nº317; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 17 February 1998; Bull. civ. I, nº63, Gaz. Pal., 1999, 1, somm., p 122, obs. S Piedelièvre; RTD Civ., 1998.659, n. J Hauser, p 967, obs. Vareille • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 January 1994, Bull. civ. I, n° 4 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 6 May 1997, n°95-15.319, Bull. 1997, I, n° 136 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 7 April 2009, D. 2009. AJ 1203, obs. Avena-Robardet; ibid. 2080, note Ghestin; JCP 2009, n° 27, p. 27, note Lasserre-Capdeville; RLDC 2009, n° 3449, obs. Maugeri; Banque et Droit 126/2009, p. 18, obs. Bonneau ; Defrénois 2009. 1942, note François • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 October 2009, D. 2010. Jur. 128., obs. Rebeyrol • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 9 February 2011, n°10-10759 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 December 2018, nº17-22532

226

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• Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 2, 13 September 2007, n°06-18.199, Bull. 2007, II, n° 215 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 1 July 1998, Bull. civ. III, nº155, D., 1999, somm., p 13, obs. G Paisant; D. Affaires, 1998, p 1563, obs. J S; JCP E, 1999.171, obs. Vialla • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 December 1997, Bull. civ. III, nº223; Defrénois, 1998, p 336, obs. D Mazeaud; D., 1999, somm., p 9, obs. P Brun • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 May 1968, Bull. civ. III, nº209 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 10 May 1972, Bull. civ. III, nº297; RTD Civ., 1972, p 773, obs. Y Loussouarn • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 14 September 2005: Bull. Civ. III, nº166; D.2006. 761, note D. Mazeaud; JCP 2005. II.10173, note Loiseau; JCP E 2005. 1867, note Binctin; Defrénois 2005, 19122. Noote Dagorne-Labbe; ibid, 2006. 248, note Techendjou; CCC 2006, nº1, note Leveneur; LPA, 1st December 2005, note Messai-Bahri, RDC 2006. 811, obs. Viney; RTD cv. 2005. 776, obs. Mestre et Fage • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 16 June 1982, n°80-70432 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 18 July 2001, Bull. civ. nº101; D., 2002, p 680, n. C Castets; somm., p 390, obs. G Paisant; Defrénois, 2001, p 1421, obs. E Savaux; Contrats, conc., conso. 2001., nº171, n. L Leveneur; Droit et patrimoine, December 2001, p 98, obs. P Chauvel • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 18 May 2011 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 20 May 2009, n°08-13230, Bull. civ. III, n° 118 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 21 December 2017, nº16-25665 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 22 June 2005, n°03-20473, JCP N 2005, n° 27.1332 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 26 February 1971, Bull. civ. III, nº147; RTD Civ., 1971, p 867, obs. G Cornu • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 27 November 1990, Bull. civ. III, nº255; RTD Civ., 1991.315, n. J Mestre; D., 1992, somm., p 195, obs. G Paisant; JCP N, 1993, nº12, p 107, n. Y Dagorne-Labbé • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 5 January 1978, Bull. civ. III, nº10 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 7 May 2008, n°07-11690, Bull. civ. III, n° 79 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 7 November 2012, n°11-22907 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 9 November 1983, Bull. civ. III, nº222; Defrénois, 1984, p 1011, obs. J-L Aubert; RTD Civ., 1985, p 154, obs. J Mestre • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 10 May 1948: Gaz. Palinéa 1948.2.41 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 11 April 1918, DP, 1921.1.224 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 11 December 1900, DP 1901. 1. 257 – 30 mars 1943, DC 1944. 13, note L.P – Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 30 April 1947, JCP 1947. IV. 97 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 17 December 1958, D., 1959, jurisp, p 33; RTD Civ., 1959, p 336, obs. Carbonnier

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227

• Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 18 May 1898, S. 1898, 1, p 433, note LyonCaen, DP 1900, 1, p 481, note Sarrut • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 2 February 1932 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 21 December 1960, D., 1961, jurisp., p 417, n. P Malaurie • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 23 April 1898, D., 1998.1.415 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 24 May 1933, D. 1933, 1, p.137, note Josserand • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 27 May 1959, JCP 1959.II.11187, n. P Esmein; D., 1959, jurisp., p 524, n. Savatier; RTD Civ. 1959, p 735 obs. H and L Mazeaud • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 6 December 1932, D. 1933, 1, p 137, note Josserand • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile., 5 February 1902, S., 1902.1.389; DP, 1902.1.158 • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 30 November 2022, n°21-11507 • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 April 2012, Bull. IV, n°80, D.2012.1123; RDC 2012.755, obs. T Genicon • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 July 1977, Bull. civ. IV, no202 • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 11 July 1977, Bull. civ. IV, nº202 • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 12 December 1995, Bull. civ. IV, nº294, Contrats conc. Cons., 1996, nº36, obs. L Leveneur; D., 1996, somm., p 333, obs. D Mazeaud; RTD Civ., 1996.617 obs. J Mestre; Petites Affiches, 24 January 1997, n. E Courtier • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 13 February 2007, Faurecia I, nº 05-17407, Bulletin 2007, IV, N°43 • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 13 June 2006, Chronopost V, nº0512619, Bulletin 2006 IV N° 143, p 152 • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 15 February 2000, Bull. civ. IV, nº29; D., 2000, somm., p 364 obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 2000, p 1118, obs. D Mazeaud; Petites Affiches, 29 December 2000, p 12, n. G Meilhac-Redon and J Marmoz; RTD Civ., 2000, p 325, obs. J Mestre and B Fages • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 18 December 1990, Bull. Joly, 1991, p 326, n. B Saintourens • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 19 February 1991, nº89-18498 • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 19 May 1998, n°96-16.393 • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 2 December 1997, Bull. civ. IV, nº315; JCP E 1998, p 178, n. T Bonneau; D., 1998, jurisp., p 192, n. D-R Martin; RTD Com. 1998, p 119, obs. R Cabrillac; Droit et patrimoine, nº67, January 1999, p 88, obs. E Caprioli • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 20 January 1987, JCP 1988, II, 20987, n. G Goubeaux • Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 22 October 1996, Bull. civ. IV, nº261, GAJC, 11th ed., nº156; D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux; somm., p 175, obs. P Delebecque; Defrénois, 1997, p 333, obs. D Mazeaud; JCP 1997.II.22881, n. D

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Cohen; I.4002, nº1, obs. M Fabre-Magnan; I.4027, nº17, n. G Viney; Contrats, conc. Conso., 1997, nº24, obs. L Leveneur; Gaz. Pal., 1997.2.519, n. R Martin ; RTD Civ. 1997, p 418, obs. J Mestre Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 22 October 1996, D., 1997, jurisp., p 121, n. A Sériaux; D., 1997, chron., p 145, nº3, n. C Larroumet Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 May 2013, nº12-19325 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 September 2004, Bull. civ. IV, nº167; D., 2005, p 302, n. M-A Rakotovahini; JCP 2005.I.107, p 147, obs. M Cabrillac Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 January 1991, Bull. civ. IV, nº48; RTD Civ., 1991.531 obs. J Mestre Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 January 1991, Bull. civ., nº48; RTD Civ., 1991.331, n. J. Mestre Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 June 1993, Bull. civ. IV, nº271 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 29 June 2010, Faurecia II, nº 09-11841, Bulletin 2010, IV, n° 115 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 3 November 1992: JCP 1993. II.27164, note Virassamy, Defrénois 1993. 1377, obs. Aubert; RTD Civ. 1993. 124, obs. Mestre Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 30 May 2006, Chronopost IV, nº 04-14974, Bulletin 2006 IV N° 132, p 134 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, nº144–145 II; RTC Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, nº144–145, II; RTD Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile, 11th edition, nº144–145, RTD Civ., 1981, p 849, obs. F Chabas Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 7 January 1981, n°79-13499 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 8 May 1978, Bull. civ. IV, nº129 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 9 July 2002, Chronopost II, nº 99-12554, Bulletin 2002 IV N° 121, p 129 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes 27 June 1894 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 1 April 1895, DP, 1895.1.263 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 11 Novembre 1890, S., 1891.1.319; DP, 1891.1.484 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 15 June 1892, DP 92. 1. 596, S. 93. 1. 281, note Labbé Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 22 November 1865: DP 1866.1.108, S.1866.1.23, concl. Fabre Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 28 February 1870 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 4 August 1896 Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 4 January 1897, D. 1897.1.126

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229

• Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 April 2005, Bull. civ., nº231 • Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 April 2005, Chronopost III, nº 03-14112, Bulletin 2005 Mixt. N° 4, p 10 • Cour de cassation, Chambre Mixte, 22 May 2005, Bull. civ., nº232 • Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 11 July 2002, n°00-44197 • Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 22 March 1972, Bull. civ. V, nº243 • Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 7 May 2008: Bull. Civ. V, nº99 • Cour de cassation, Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 28 May 2013, nº1219325 • Cour de cassation, Sections Réunies, 2 February 1808: G.A.J.C, n°160 • Orléans, 26 June 1885 • Paris, 1 April 1895, Gaz. Pal. 1895.2.158; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile, 19 November 1932, D., 1933.1.26 • Paris, 19 April 1858, S., 1858.2.366 • Paris, 23 July 1926, DH 1926. 568 • Paris, 3 March 1898 • Tribunal Civil de Marseille, 17 March 1927 • Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 3 June 1969, D., 1970, p 136 • Vedastum Fordin case in A-A Beugnot, Les Olim, ou Registres des arrêts rendus par la Cour du Roi : sous les règnes de Saint Louis, de Philippe Le Hardi, de Philippe Le Bel, de Louis Le Hutin et de Philippe Le Long (1839–1848) Vol 1, p 800 Other Case Law • Andrew Jack v Isobel Jack [2016] CSIH 75 • Barnes v Eastenders [2014] UKSC 26, [2014] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 461 • Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, [1967] All ER 1197 • Bocksel v. DG3 North America, Inc., 2016 WL 873138, (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2016) • Boots Co Plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 609 • Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding Co 1923 S.C. (H.L.) 105 • Chappell v Nestlés [1960] AC 87 • Commonwealth v Amann Aviation [1991] HCA 54, (1991) 174 CLR [64], High Court (Australia) • Craw v Culbertson (1663) Mor 12384 • Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 • Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham [1956] 3 W.L.R. 37 • De la Bere v Pearson [1908] 1 KB 280 • Deuchar v Brown (1672) Mor 9425 • Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1992 SC (HL) 104 • Donaldson v Haldane (1840) 7 C1. & Fin. 762 • Giedo van der Garde BV v Force India Formula One Team [2010] EWHC 2373 (QB) • Graham-Suit v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2013) • Hooper v Oates [2013] EWCA Civ 91, [2013] 1 P. & C.R. DG22 • Lake v Simmons [1927] AC 487

230

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Lewis v Averay [1972] 1 QB 198 Liège, Tribunal, 14 November 1896 Lundie v Douglas (1681) 2 Brown’s Supp 265 Massey v Banner (1820) 4 Madd. R. 416 McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission [1951] HCA 79, (1951) 84 CLR 377, High Court (Australia) Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York vs Lothian Regional Council 1995 S.L.T. 299 North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai Construction (The Atlantic Baron) [1979] QB 705 Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola Challenger Shipping Co Ltd [2010] EWHC 2026 (Comm), [2010] 2 C.L.C. 194 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex Rep 850 Rover International v Cannon [1989] 1 WLR 912 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd [2001] HCA 68, High Court, 2001) 208 CLR 516 Sharp v Sharp (1631) Mor 4299 Shilliday v Smith 1998 S.C. 725 Sowler v Potter [1940] 1 K.B. 271 Stocznia Gdanska v Latvian Shipping [1989] 1 WLR 574 Surrey CC and Mole DC v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 3 All E.R. 705 The Laird of Clackmannan v Sir William Nisbet (1624) Spottiswoode 248 Turnbull v Garden [1860] 9 Bar R.P. Union Totaliser Co Ltd v Scott 1951 SLT (Notes) 5 Wallace v Telfair 2 T.R.188 Watson & Co v Shankland (1871) 10 M. 142 White v Bluett [1853] 23 LJ Ex 3 Wilkinson v Coverdale (1793) 1 Esp. 75 Wood v Robertson (1672) Mor 12225 Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1321

Commentary on Judgments • Conseil d’Etat, 24 July 2009, n°316158, Société Finadev, L'Actualité juridique droit immobilier 2009, p 1467; RD imm. 2009, p. 667, obs. P. Soler-Couteaux • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 1 October 1996, Dr. Sociétés, nº225, obs. T Bonneau • Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 7 October 1998, Bull. civ. I, nº285; GAJC, 11th ed., nº157; D., 1998, p 563, concl. J Sainte-Rose; D., 1999, somm., p 110, obs. P Delebecque; D., 1999, ‘L’influence du motif illicite ou immoral sur la validité du contrat’, chron., p 237, O Tournafond; D. Affaires, 1998, p 1772, obs. J F; Defrénois, 1998, p 1408, obs. D Mazeaud; 1999, p 602, obs. V Chariot; JCP 1998.II.10202, note M H Maleville ; JCP 1999.I.114, nº1, obs. C Jamin; Gaz. Pal. 2000.1.643, note F Chabas; Contrats, conc. Consom., 1999, nº1, obs. L

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231

Leveneur, Petites Affiches, 5 March 1999, note S Prieur; Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, nº321 Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 18 December 1990, Bull. Joly, 1991, pp 326, n. B Saintourens Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 20 January 1987, JCP 1988, II, 20987, n. G Goubeaux Cour de cassation, Chambre des requêtes, 17 July 1929, DP, 1929.1.143, rapport Bricout Gosford’s report at [12388] P Ancel note under Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 23 February 1999, D. 1999, jur. p 411 Report of the Cour de cassation on Cour de cassation, Chambre commerciale, 6 March 1990, Bull. civ. IV, nº74; R., p 361; JCP 1990.II.21583, n. B Gross, RTD Civ., 1990, p 462, obs. J Mestre; D., 1991, somm., p 317, n. J-L Aubert Report on Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 8 November 1982, Bull. civ. I, nº321

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