Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking: Case Studies from Italy and the United Kingdom (SpringerBriefs in Criminology) 3030427676, 9783030427672

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
About the Authors
Abbreviations
Chapter 1: Introduction
References
Chapter 2: The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Italy
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Human Smuggling
2.2.1 Recruitment
2.2.2 Transportation
2.3 Human Trafficking
2.3.1 Recruitment and Transportation
2.3.2 Exploitation
2.4 Concluding Remarks
References
Chapter 3: The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the UK
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Human Smuggling
3.2.1 Recruitment
3.2.2 Transportation
3.3 Human Trafficking
3.3.1 Recruitment
3.3.2 Transportation
3.3.3 Exploitation
3.3.3.1 Movement to or Within the UK
3.3.3.2 Analysis of the Profile Text
3.3.3.3 Reverse Image Searches of Profile Photographs
3.3.3.4 AdultWork Trafficked ‘Identity Laundering’
3.4 Concluding Remarks
References
Chapter 4: Conclusion: Human Smuggling, Human Trafficking and the Role of Communication Technologies
References
Index

Citation preview

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN CRIMINOLOGY

Georgios A. Antonopoulos  Gabriele Baratto · Andrea Di Nicola  Parisa Diba · Elisa Martini  Georgios Papanicolaou  Fiamma Terenghi

Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking Case Studies from Italy and the United Kingdom 123

SpringerBriefs in Criminology

SpringerBriefs in Criminology present concise summaries of cutting edge research across the fields of Criminology and Criminal Justice. It publishes small but impactful volumes of between 50-125 pages, with a clearly defined focus. The series covers a broad range of Criminology research from experimental design and methods, to brief reports and regional studies, to policy-related applications. The scope of the series spans the whole field of Criminology and Criminal Justice, with an aim to be on the leading edge and continue to advance research. The series will be international and cross-disciplinary, including a broad array of topics, including juvenile delinquency, policing, crime prevention, terrorism research, crime and place, quantitative methods, experimental research in criminology, research design and analysis, forensic science, crime prevention, victimology, criminal justice systems, psychology of law, and explanations for criminal behavior. SpringerBriefs in Criminology will be of interest to a broad range of researchers and practitioners working in Criminology and Criminal Justice Research and in related academic fields such as Sociology, Psychology, Public Health, Economics and Political Science. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10159

Georgios A. Antonopoulos Gabriele  Baratto  •  Andrea Di Nicola Parisa Diba • Elisa Martini Georgios Papanicolaou • Fiamma Terenghi

Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking Case Studies from Italy and the United Kingdom

Georgios A. Antonopoulos Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Teesside University Middlesbrough, UK

Gabriele Baratto Faculty of Law University of Trento Trento, Italy

Andrea Di Nicola Faculty of Law University of Trento Trento, Italy

Parisa Diba Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Teesside University Middlesbrough, UK

Elisa Martini Department of Sociology and Social Research University of Trento Trento, Italy

Georgios Papanicolaou Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Teesside University Middlesbrough, UK

Fiamma Terenghi Faculty of Law University of Trento Trento, Italy

ISSN 2192-8533     ISSN 2192-8541 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Criminology ISBN 978-3-030-42767-2    ISBN 978-3-030-42768-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42768-9 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

The study this Springer Criminology Brief is based upon was supported financially by the European Commission (Award Reference: HOME/2013/ISEC/AG/ THB/4000005855). The authors would like to thank the participants of this study for their time and valuable insights, as well as Valeria Ferrari and Martina Cicaloni who, as interns at eCrime (University of Trento), offered support during the study.

v

Contents

1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   7 2 The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Italy������������������������������������������������������������  11 2.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  11 2.2 Human Smuggling��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  13 2.2.1 Recruitment����������������������������������������������������������������������������  13 2.2.2 Transportation ������������������������������������������������������������������������  17 2.3 Human Trafficking ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  21 2.3.1 Recruitment and Transportation����������������������������������������������  22 2.3.2 Exploitation����������������������������������������������������������������������������  27 2.4 Concluding Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������  31 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  32 3 The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the UK��������������������������������������������������������  37 3.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  37 3.2 Human Smuggling��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  39 3.2.1 Recruitment����������������������������������������������������������������������������  39 3.2.2 Transportation ������������������������������������������������������������������������  41 3.3 Human Trafficking ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  44 3.3.1 Recruitment����������������������������������������������������������������������������  44 3.3.2 Transportation ������������������������������������������������������������������������  49 3.3.3 Exploitation����������������������������������������������������������������������������  53 3.4 Concluding Remarks����������������������������������������������������������������������������  66 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  66 4 Conclusion: Human Smuggling, Human Trafficking and the Role of Communication Technologies��������������������������������������������������������  69 References������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  72 Index��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  75 vii

About the Authors

Georgios  A.  Antonopoulos  is Professor of Criminology in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK. Gabriele Baratto  is Research Fellow in Criminology in the Faculty of Law at the University of Trento, Trento, Italy. Andrea Di Nicola  is Associate Professor in Criminology in the Faculty of Law at the University of Trento, Trento, Italy. Parisa  Diba  is Research Associate in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK. Elisa  Martini  is former Research Fellow in Criminology in the Department of Sociology and Social Research at the University of Trento, Italy. Georgios Papanicolaou  is Reader in Criminology in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Teesside University, Middlesbrough, UK. Fiamma Terenghi  is Research Fellow in Criminology in the Faculty of Law at the University of Trento, Trento, Italy.

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Abbreviations

ADS Advertisements CSE Child Sexual Exploitation Online CSEM Child Sexual Exploitation Material DNA Direzione Nazionale antimafia e antiterrorismo (National Antimafia and Antiterrorism Directorate) DDA Direzione Distrettuale antimafia (Antimafia District Directorate) EC European Commission EMSC European Migrant Smuggling Centre EU European Union FRONTEX European Border and Coast Guard Agency (from French: Frontières extérieures) GLOTiP Global Report on Trafficking in Persons ICTs Information and Communication Technologies IOCTA Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment IOM International Organization for Migration IP Internet Protocol LEA Law Enforcement Agency NGO Nongovernmental Organization THB Trafficking in human beings TIP Trafficking in persons TOCTA Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment TOR The Onion Router UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime VPN Virtual Private Network

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Human smuggling and trafficking are among the biggest issues of the post-Cold War era and justifiably continue to hold a place at the centre stage of public policy internationally. Increased awareness of their magnitude, alongside the recognition that they present major areas of activity for ‘transnational organised crime’ has led to a vigorous response from the international community, state authorities and civil society at the beginning of the twenty-first century. While irregular migration and exploitation are not, of course, new issues, their sheer extent, in combination with their contemporary association with organised crime in the minds of policy makers have led to a comprehensive new international prohibition regime built around the 2000 United Convention against Organised Crime (Nadelmann 1990; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Papanicolaou 2011). The Convention introduced two major international instruments, namely, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air. These protocols address explicitly the renewed connection of clandestine and forced population flows and the development of transnational illegal enterprises associated with the former. They have provided specific and authoritative definitions of human trafficking and smuggling1 which have since served as templates for regional instruments such as the 2005

1  According to Article 3 of the trafficking Protocol, trafficking in human beings is the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (United Nations 2000a: 2). While, Article 3 of the Protocol against human smuggling states that “smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (United Nations 2000b: 2).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. A. Antonopoulos et al., Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42768-9_1

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1 Introduction

Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and national legislations across the globe. Despite the mobilisation of the international community and national authorities, human smuggling and trafficking have continued to grow as issues reaching what are perceived as unprecedented levels (see Morrison 2002). A series of geopolitical changes and major events, such as war and the refugee crises of the 2010s have undoubtedly added impetus to the trend, and it is not uncommon for human smuggling and trafficking to be studied in light of such dramatic events. Less explosive but undoubtedly far reaching changes in the patterns of human life across the globe, such as the development, advancement and proliferation of digital technologies, may equally contribute to the growth of human smuggling and trafficking by opening up new and creative opportunities for individual criminals and groups of criminals (Di Nicola and Musumeci 2014; Hughes 2014; Latonero et al. 2012; Latonero et al. 2011; Sarkar 2015). Waking up to this possibility is only a fairly recent development, and currently the role of communication technologies in the business of human smuggling and trafficking is increasingly capturing the attention of research and policy. For example, in the EU context online interactions and encounters appear to facilitate several aspects of human trafficking such as “targeting of potential victims, access to personal data; arrangement of logistics and transportation; recruitment through social media, chat forums and other websites, advertisement of victims; their exploitation and surveillance” (Europol 2016a:12). Very recently UNODC has warned that “traffickers innovate and take advantage of new technologies to work in flexible ways, including extending their operations across borders. The use of Internet-based applications has eased the process of identifying and contacting victims, the logistics of transferring money, and the coordination between different groups. Moreover, the anonymity and use of many online services simplifies a transnational crime such as trafficking in persons” (2018: 39). While a series of institutional actors are now raising the alarm on the use of the Internet and social networks by organised crime groups (Europol 2016a, b; EuropolINTERPOL 2016; UNHCR 2016), and there is a body of criminological research concerned with the topic (e.g. Choo and Smith 2008; Brenner 2013; Leukfeldt et al. 2017; Lavorgna 2015), the fact remains that the evidence base on the relationship between the Internet and social media, and human smuggling and trafficking is far from robust. The role of social networks in THB has been addressed by Fraser (2016) in connection with the traffickers’ effort to recruit clients (or potential victims) and to communicate with them. Similarly, Sarkar (2015) has pointed out that the Internet and digital technologies, such as smartphones, have added a new dimension of human smuggling and trafficking, creating new ways and means of facilitation, as well as affecting various aspects of trafficking. Similar results were reached by the European Project FINOCA 2.0 on the financing of organised crime activities with reference to human trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation in selected EU countries (Shentov et al. 2018). The use by traffickers and further exploiters of ICTs and social networks emerges in all the stages of trafficking (i.e., recruitment, transportation and exploitation). For example, personal information available on social media and other websites support and facilitate the identification of potential targets

1 Introduction

3

with recruiters applying specific selection criteria such as physical attractiveness, psychological vulnerability and accessibility. While strategies to contact selected individuals can be “generic and impersonal approaches such as the posting of deceptive job offers to highly individualised plots, … recruiters essentially cast their net wide and wait until an unsuspecting target takes the bait” (Raets and Janssens 2018: 87). In some other cases, there may be no need to search and contact vulnerable targets as potential victims can themselves approach traffickers by finding online package deals to travel to Europe with job offers included (Antonopoulos et al. 2019). Clearly the Internet may facilitate the business of traffickers because it “can rapidly connect buyers of commercial sex with trafficking victims while simultaneously distancing the perpetrator from the criminal transaction” (Finklea et al. 2015: 2). As regards human smuggling, the relationship between ICTs and migration processes have been studied more on the side of migrants, as means to connect and communicate with family members, relatives and friends or to build new relations in the destination countries (Horst 2006; Horst and Taylor 2014; Panagakos and Horst 2006; Vertovec 2009). Other research has investigated the use of ICTs during the decision-making process of migrants (Gillespie et al. 2016; Dekker et al. 2018), and in particular on the use of social networks by migrants to obtain information on the journeys (Frouws et  al. 2016). This is in line with more recent research that has underlined that migrants frequently use Facebook, WhatsApp and Viber to share or search for news both on the migration routes and the most efficient transportations to reach Europe (Borkert et al. 2018). Although offering insights on how the Internet and social media are used in organised crime activities or within the migration process, these studies are exploratory in nature and do not specifically consider the relationships and interactions between smugglers or traffickers and migrants through ICTs. Today, despite advances in research (Di Nicola et al. 2013; Di Nicola et al. 2019; Antonopoulos et al. 2019; Latonero et al. 2011; Latonero et al. 2012, 2015; Raets and Janssens 2018; Ibanez and Suthers 2014, 2016; Hughes 2014; Boyd et al. 2011), there is still an acute need to analyse and understand the role played by the Internet and social media in the processes of human smuggling and trafficking or the particular ways in which the Internet has been used to shape the criminal strategies of smugglers and traffickers. This book investigates the role of digital technologies (the Internet and social networks) in the processes of people smuggling and THB in the context of two EU countries: Italy and the United Kingdom. It thus addresses the above knowledge gap while aiming to support a range of pertinent institutional actors—such as law enforcement, prosecutors, policy makers, and civil society—in their effort to address and combat these issues. The case studies in each country have relied on a range of methods for data collection on the role of the Internet and digital technologies in the processes of human smuggling and trafficking. These were intended to serve as complementary sources and namely they were: (a) a preliminary exploratory analysis of sources on the surface web and dark web; (b) virtual ethnography; (c) in-depth interviews with key knowledgeable actors (i.e., representatives of law enforcement and NGOs,

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1 Introduction

Table 1.1  Suggested list of keywords to identify web elements related to human smuggling Process and stages General process

Keywords People smuggling; Smuggling of migrants; Migrant smuggling; People smuggling; Illegal migration; Recruitment; Transport; Migrant; Migrant workers; Asylum seekers Recruitment and Movement of persons; Transfer; Transport; Move; Borders; Financial transportation stages gain; Money, Asylum seekers; Refugees; ID; VISA; Residence permit; Fee; Payment; Debt Exploitation stage Smuggler; Passenger; Migrant; Seasonal; Boat driver; Pontoon; Lorry; Truck; Cargo van; Airplane; Vehicle; Driver; Pilot; Sea; Land; Air; Borders; Transit; ID; VISA; Residence permit; Fee; Payment; Debt Table 1.2  Suggested list of keywords to identify web elements related to human trafficking Process and stages General process

Recruitment and transportation stages Exploitation stage

Keywords Human trafficking; Trafficking in human beings; Trafficking in persons; Sex trafficking; Labour trafficking; Sex market; Labour market; Trafficking process; Recruitment; Transport; Exploitation; Coercion; Fraud; Trafficker; Victim Job offer; Job agency; Travel agency; Temp agency; Foreign job; Advertising agency; Dating service; Matchmaking service; Dancer; Dancing-girl; Au-pair girl; Student; Model; Waiter; Bartender; Home assistant; In-home nurse; Caregiver; Wedding; Wife; Farmer; Bricklayer Sex; Sex tourism; Prostitute; Sex worker; Brothel; Massage parlour; Escort; Dancer; Dancing-girl; Au-pair girl; Model; Wedding; Wife; Worker; Waiter/bartender; Home assistant; In-home nurse; Caregiver

experts on cyber-crime, traffickers/smugglers, victims of trafficking/migrants). The exploratory analysis of the web was conducted through searches on Google and Torch,2 on social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and on web forums3 by using a list of keywords related to human smuggling (Table 1.1) and human trafficking (Table 1.2) retrieved by Council of Europe reports and research by Latonero et al. (2011). The information gathered during the preliminary exploratory phase was used to develop a research protocol to finetune data collection containing: (a) working definitions of human smuggling and trafficking; (b) a list of websites (per typology) and keywords to search relevant data on the web; and, (c) suggested methods to search data on the dark web (using Tor). The research protocol was used to investigate the

 Torch is the most popular search engine in the so-called “Dark Web”.  At this point, it should be noted that we present all excerpts gleaned from our forum research in exactly the same state as they were posted in the threads we were examining, and accordingly, we have not edited the spelling or grammar. However, we have highlighted any present spelling or grammatical errors, and have made additions to clarify and/or provide a brief explanation to any forum-specific acronyms or terms. 2 3

1 Introduction

5

surface and dark web as to collect a significant number of at-risk web contents and information on the use of the Internet in the processes of human smuggling and THB (from websites, forums, social media websites, etc.). National-based virtual ethnography was carried out to gather primary data on the role played by the Internet in the recruitment, transportation/entry into another country stages of the process of human smuggling and in the recruitment/transportation and exploitation stages of the process of human trafficking. As a research method, virtual ethnography extends the ethnographic field and situated observation from the examination of face-to-face researcher-informant interactions (Lenihan and Kelly-Holmes 2016) and “transfers the ethnographic tradition of the researcher as an embodied research instrument to the social spaces of the internet” (Hine 2008: 257). In this way, the virtual ethnographer immerses themselves in a virtual environment, observing and interacting using media relevant to that site for an extended period of time (Turney 2008). With regard to human smuggling, active virtual ethnography research was also conducted. Facebook accounts were created in order to observe pages, groups and individuals that were advertising smuggling services, such as ways and means of transportation and aiding one’s entry into another country.4 Part of the virtual ethnography was conducted on the dark web. In addition, the role of the Internet and digital technologies in facilitating THB for labour recruitment and exploitation of victims was examined by investigating popular online classified and employment websites that were advertising jobs in Italy and the United Kingdom. Finally, in order to integrate the information gathered from the exploration of the web, 35 semi-structured interviews were conducted in both countries (14 in Italy and 21  in the UK) with knowledgeable actors including law enforcement agents (LEAs), experts on cyber-crime, representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), smugglers and traffickers, and victims of trafficking/smuggled migrants (see Table 1.3). Table 1.3  Knowledgeable actors interviewed in Italy and the UK Type of interviewees Representatives of LEAs Representatives of NGOs Experts on cyber-crime Smugglers/traffickers Victims of trafficking/smuggled migrants

Country Italy 2 4 – 4 4

UK 9 4 4 2 2

Total 11 8 4 6 6

4  During this activity, researchers interacted directly with smugglers by using social media chats, web forums, as well as telephone services provided by mobile applications (i.e., Viber and WhatsApp).

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1 Introduction

The semi-structured interviews (face to face/telephone/skype) were conducted on the basis of an interview guide. To this aim, the definition adopted in Italy and the United Kingdom of smuggling of migrants/asylum seekers was the one contained in the EU Commission Fact Sheet on Smuggling of Migrants of 13 January 2015 and in article 3 of the Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. The definition of human trafficking follows Article 2 of the Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims. Some researchers have cited issues regarding authenticity, validity and reliability in online research methods (Davey et al. 2012; see also Hall and Antonopoulos 2016). Other researchers have criticised virtual ethnography for being based on a data gathering strategy in which informed consent is not always secured (Calvey 2013;  Davey et  al. 2012; Spicker 2011). Nevertheless, Hall and Antonopoulos (2016) highlight that data gathered from online web forums (as well as social media and web sites) can, in fact, produce rich empirical evidence from groups and communities that are normally hard to reach (in this case punters5), providing substantial insights into the ‘everyday life’ of these individuals and social groups. They further underline that while some information may be false and/or misleading, online data collection should not lead to a general disregard for the quality of the data. After all, the collection of data through offline methods does not always produce consistently valid findings. Face-to-face interactions may inhibit the expression of one’s true feelings, which in some cases, would be more likely to be revealed in an anonymous online realm. Many punters may not be willing to share their experiences with their offline friends, and so the powerful influence of online communities such as forums on the decision-making processes and ideas of punters cannot be ignored or dismissed abstractly (see also Cauduro et al. 2009). In light of such considerations, and as one acknowledges that some punters on the forums may have exaggerated or falsified their posts, our argument is that forums are a valuable source of information. Forums enable punters to make informed decisions about the purchase of sexual services, and punters have little to gain from giving inaccurate information (Blevins and Holt 2009). Furthermore, our experience of online fieldwork suggests that fellow punters are quick to notice, question and disparage posters that give, or are suspected to have given, deceitful information such as reviews. Sex workers on occasions join in discussions to dispute or clarify details of an encounter that took place. In turn, we found that punters who engaged in such behaviour would have their accounts banned by the owner of the forum, with their reviews being clearly marked as ‘fake’. Due to such measures being taken to diminish the likelihood of false posts, it is possible to assume that web contents posted by punters on the forums can be generally valid.

 In the UK this term is used for one who purchases sex.

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References

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References Andreas, P., & Nadelmann, E. A. (2006). Policing the globe: Criminalization and crime control in international relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Antonopoulos, G. A., Di Nicola, A., Rusev, A., & Terenghi, F. (2019). Human trafficking finances. Cham: Springer. Blevins, K.  R., & Holt, T.  J. (2009). Examining the virtual subculture of Johns. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 38(5), 619–648. Borkert, M., Fisher, K. E., & Yafi, E. (2018). The best, the worst, and the hardest to find: How people, mobiles, and social media connect migrants in(to) Europe. Social Media +Society, 4(1), 1–11. Boyd, D., Casteel, H., Thakor, M., & Johnson, R. (2011). Human trafficking and technology: A framework for understanding the role of technology in the commercial sexual exploitation of children in the U.S. Cambridge: Microsoft Research. Brenner, S. W. (2013). Cybercrime: Re-thinking crime control strategies. In Y. Jewkes (Ed.), Crime online (pp. 12–28). Portland: Willan. Calvey, D. (2013). Covert ethnography in criminology: A submerged yet creative tradition. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 25(1), 541–550. Cauduro, A., Di Nicola, A., Fonio, C., Nuvoloni, A., & Ruspini, P. (2009). Innocent when you dream: Clients and trafficked women in Italy. In A. Di Nicola, A. Cauduro, M. Lombardi, & P. Ruspini (Eds.), Prostitution and human trafficking: Focus on clients (pp. 31–66). New York: Springer. Choo, K.-K.  R., & Smith, G.  R. (2008). Criminal exploitation of online systems by organised crime groups. Asian Journal of Criminology, 3(1), 37–59. Davey, Z., Schifano, F., Corazza, O., & Deluca, P. (2012). E-Psychonauts: Conducting research in online drug forum communities. Journal of Mental Health, 21(4), 386–394. Dekker, R., Engbersen, G., Klaver, J., & Vonk, H. (2018). Smart refugees: How Syrian asylum migrants use social media information in migration decision-making. Social Media + Society, 4(1), 1–11. Di Nicola, A., Cauduro, A., & Falletta, V. (2013). From the sidewalk to the digital highway: A study on the Web as a source of information on prostitution and victims of human trafficking in Italy. Italian Journal of Criminology, 7(3), 219–228. Di Nicola, A., & Musumeci, G. (2014). Confessioni di un trafficante di uomini. Milano: Chiarelettere. Europol. (2016a). Migrant smuggling in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2016b). Trafficking of human beings in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol-INTERPOL. (2016). Migrant smuggling networks: Joint Europol-INITERPOL report. Available at: http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-europol-interpol-report.pdf. Finklea, K., Fernandes-Alcantara, A.L., & Siskin, A. (2015). Sex trafficking of children in the United States: Overview and issues for congress. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ R41878.pdf. Fraser, C. (2016). An analysis of the emerging role of social media in human trafficking: Examples from labour and human organ trading. International Journal of Development Issues, 15(2), 98–112. Frouws, B., Phillips, M., Hassan, A., & Twigt, M. (2016). RMMS briefing paper 2: Getting to Europe the ‘WhatsApp’ Way: The use of ICT in contemporary mixed migration flows to Europe. Danish Refugee Council and Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat. Available at: http://www. mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/015_getting-to-europe.pdf. Gillespie, M., Ampofo, L., Cheesman, M., Faith, B., Iliadou, E., Issa, A., & Skleparis, D. (2016). Mapping refugee media journeys. Smartphones and social media networks. Paris: The Open University/France Médias Monde. Hall, A., & Antonopoulos, G. A. (2016). Fake meds online: The internet and the transnational market in illicit pharmaceuticals. London: Palgrave.

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Hine, C. (2008). Virtual ethnography: Modes, varieties, affordances. In N. G. Fielding, R. M. Lee, & G. Blank (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of online research methods (pp. 257–270). London: Sage. Horst, H. A. (2006). The blessings and burdens of communication: Cell phones in Jamaican transnational social fields. Global Networks, 6(2), 143–159. Horst, H. A., & Taylor, E. B. (2014). The role of mobile phones in the mediation of border crossings: A study of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 25(2), 155–170. Hughes, D. M. (2014). Trafficking in human beings in the European Union: Gender, sexual exploitation, and digital communication technologies. SAGE Open, 4(4), 1–8. Ibanez, M., & Suthers, D.  D. (2014). Detection of domestic human trafficking indicators and movement trends using content available on open internet sources. In 2014 47th Hawaii international conference on system sciences (pp. 1556–1565). IEEE. Ibanez, M., & Suthers, D. D. (2016). Detecting covert sex trafficking networks in virtual markets. In Advances in social networks analysis and mining (ASONAM), 2016 IEEE/ACM international conference (pp. 876–879). IEEE. Latonero, M., Wex, B., & Dank, M. (2015). Technology and labor trafficking in a network society. General overview, emerging innovations and Philippines case study. Los Angeles: Annenberg Centre on Communication Leadership & Policy, University of Southern California. Latonero, M., Musto, J., Boyd, Z., Boyle, E., Bissel, A., Gibson, K., & Kim, J. (2012). The rise of mobile and the diffusion of technology-facilitated trafficking. Los Angeles: Annenberg Centre on Communication Leadership & Policy, University of Southern California. Latonero, M., Musto, J., Boyd, Z., Boyle, E., Bissel, A., Gibson, K., & Kim, J. (2011). Human trafficking online: The role of social networking sites and online classifieds. Los Angeles: Annenberg Centre on Communication Leadership & Policy, University of Southern California. Lavorgna, A. (2015). Organised crime goes online: Realities and challenges. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 18(2), 153–168. Lenihan, A., & Kelly-Holmes, H. (2016). Virtual ethnography. In Z. Hua (Ed.), Research methods in intercultural communication: A practical guide (pp. 255–267). London: Wiley. Leukfeldt, E. R., Lavorgna, A., & Kleemans, E. R. (2017). Organised cybercrime or cybercrime that is organised? An assessment of the conceptualisation of financial cybercrime as organised crime. European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 23(3), 287–300. Morrison, J. (2002). FMO research guide: Human smuggling and trafficking. Forced Migration Online, 2(12), 1–14. Nadelmann, E.  A. (1990). Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society. International Organization, 44(4), 479–526. Panagakos, A. N., & Horst, H. A. (2006). Return to Cyberia: Technology and the social worlds of transnational migrants. Global Networks, 6(2), 109–124. Papanicolaou, G. (2011). Transnational policing and sex trafficking in Southeast Europe: Policing the imperialist chain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Raets, S., & Janssens, J. (2018). The economics of human trafficking in the digital age. In O. Shentov, A. Rusev, & A. G. Antonopoulos (Eds.), Financing of organised crime. Human trafficking in focus (pp. 85–94). Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy. Sarkar, S. (2015). Use of technology in human trafficking networks and sexual exploitation: A cross-sectional multi-country study. Transnational Social Review, 5(1), 55–68. Shentov, O., Rusev, A., & Antonopoulos, G.  A. (Eds.). (2018). Financing of organised crime: Human trafficking in focus. Sofia: Centre for the Study of Democracy. Spicker, P. (2011). Ethical covert research. Sociology, 45(1), 118–133. Turney, M. (2008). Virtual ethnography. In L. M. Given (Ed.), The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods (pp. 921–926). London: Sage. UNHCR  – The UN Refugee Agency. (2016). From a refugee perspective: Discourse of Arabic speaking and Afghan refugees and migrants on social media from March to December 2016. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/5909af4d4/from-a-refugee-perspective.html.

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United Nations. (2000a). Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime: Annex III. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20 Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. United Nations. (2000b). Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime: Annex II. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/ UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf. UNODC  – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2018). Global report on trafficking in persons. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/ GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small.pdf. Vertovec, S. (2009). Transnationalism. New York: Routledge.

Chapter 2

The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Italy

2.1  Introduction Italy is at the forefront of consistent migration flows due to its geographical position between Europe and the countries of origin of most migrants. Although it is difficult to produce precise estimations of the extent of this phenomenon, is it certain that a part of the migrant population is smuggled or trafficked and further exploited in the sex market or other economic sectors (see Antonopoulos et al. 2019). In this chapter, we refer to trafficking for sexual exploitation mainly as to forced prostitution, including pornography, while forced labour follows the definition of Article 2 of the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 39), namely meaning “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself.” Labour exploitation seems to be on the increase due to the widespread demand of services at low cost by producers and consumers. Compared to sexual exploitation, it remains under-­recorded due to different factors such as the investigative priorities of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors, the lack of specific national laws, the isolation of victims and their low level of awareness of being exploited (Terenghi and Di Nicola 2018). In order to prevent and fight human smuggling and trafficking, Italy has enacted specific legislation addressing the issue.1 One legal instrument regulating immigration, titled “Testo Unico sull’immigrazione” (Legislative Decree n.286/1998) modified and integrated during the years, contains legislative provisions has aimed at both regulating the residence of foreign citizens in Italy and fighting irregular immigration. Art. 12  in particular deals with who “promotes, 1  Although this chapter is the result of the joint efforts of the authors, authorship can be attributed as follows: Andrea Di Nicola: Sect. 2.2; Sect. 2.2.1. Elisa Martini: Sect. 2.3.1. Gabriele Baratto: Sect. 2.2.2, Sect. 2.4. Fiamma Terenghi: Sect. 2.1, Sect. 2.3, Sect. 2.3.2.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. A. Antonopoulos et al., Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42768-9_2

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manage, finance or carry out the transportation of foreigners in the State territory, or performs other acts to procure the illegal entry in the territory of the State where the person is not a citizen or does not have the right for a permanent residence”. The prescribed sentences range from 1 to 5  years of imprisonment and a fine of 15,000 euros. Sections (c) and (d) of the same article also specify some other conditions of smuggling with reference to a criminal association (three or more persons) that uses counterfeit documents or illegally obtained documents, and the availability of weapons or explosives respectively. The Italian legislation pertaining to human trafficking prohibits the exploitation in human beings in different ways, including prostitution and other forms of abuse of persons that are in situations of vulnerability. Italy is party to international treaties and bound by EU directives, among which the United Nations Convention against Organized Crime and its Protocols (ratified by Law No. 146/2006). As a result, the Italian Criminal Code incorporates specific provisions punishing conducts related to trafficking and smuggling. In particular, Law No. 228/2003, enacted before the ratification of the United Nations Protocols, had already introduced/ modified the provisions against trafficking in human beings enacting crimes such as Art. 600 “Reducing or holding a person in a condition of slavery or servitude”; Art. 601 c.c. “Trafficking in persons”; Art. 602 c.c. “Trade of slaves”. Paragraph 6 was also introduced to Art. 416 of the Criminal Code, which refers to the “Participation in a criminal organisation” that includes increased penalties if there is an association that commits crimes under the aforementioned articles on trafficking and smuggling in human beings (Spiezia 2008). Art. 416 bis c.c. “Mafia-type associations, including foreign ones” allows, together with Art. 601 c.c. and/or Art. 602 c.c., to prosecute organised crime groups involved in trafficking in human beings. When Art. 416 bis is charged to foreign OCGs, it is possible to seize and confiscate (i.e., final stage of proceedings) cash and assets that represent the proceeds of crime. Preventive seizure as well as confiscation (ex Art. 240 c.c.) are enacted under paragraph 6 of the same law and regards all predicate crimes, similar to money laundering punished under Art. 648 bis. In general, Law 146/2006 is particularly important since it: (a) extends the comprehensive anti-mafia legislation to trafficking in human beings including the potential benefits to collaborating witnesses; (b) identifies and punishes all the activities through which trafficking and smuggling can start and develop; (c) balances the repressive and social approaches (i.e., protection of victims); and finally (d) assigns to the DDAs (Anti-mafia District Directorates) the power to investigate and prosecute trafficking and smuggling that are considered to be organised criminal activities (Spiezia 2008). After big cases and scandals reported by the mass media on forced labour of both Italians and migrants in agriculture, and a huge protest in 2011 of daily labourers in the farmlands of Nardò (town in the region of Apulia), a specific legislative provision was introduced, the so called gangmaster provision. Art. 603 bis, c.c. refers to the illicit intermediation and work exploitation on countering undeclared work and labour exploitation in the agricultural sector, was introduced in the Italian Penal Code in very recent times by Law n. 199/2016 in very recent times (Santoni 2018).

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Finally, investigations on trafficking in human beings for sexual and labour exploitation are jointly carried out by the State Police, Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza (the Fiscal Police) depending on the case, whereas dedicated magistrates are based in each DDA (Anti-Mafia District Directorate), and are coordinated by the central DNA (National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate) that also coordinates police forces (Spiezia 2008). Overall, therefore, Italy possesses a comprehensive framework against human smuggling and trafficking.

2.2  Human Smuggling Social networks facilitate contacts among members of criminal organisations allowing them to find and acquire specific expertise outside the group if and when needed. In human smuggling, actors tend to be organised into fluid criminal networks with restricted nodes of affiliates/members based on ethnic, familial, kinship and friendship bonds. If needed, they recruit individuals with specific skills from other countries as well as from other criminal groups. Social media facilitate not only contacts among criminal entrepreneurs within networks but also the collaboration among different groups of smugglers, and allow for higher mobility and adaptation within illegal markets. The ability to contact many potential clients through social media results in a lesser need to deploy active recruiters in the countries and local territories of origin of migrants. In order to satisfy a dynamic demand of services (i.e., transportation, documents) groups of smuggles are more likely to search for the collaboration of other criminal groups or actors (Di Nicola et al. 2019). Since we deal with international criminal organisations, it becomes difficult to refer them to the classic mafia-type model (as we commonly intend). They are networks in terms of different groups (especially in Africa) interconnected in different countries. There is a group active in the countries of Central Africa, there is another one in Sudan who arranges the passage through the desert to Libya, and here there is another one or more depending on the local areas. There are different groups receiving migrants leaving from Sudan, the place that connects Central African migrants towards Libya. Then, with members of different nationalities (mainly Africans), this network extends at the EU level, in Italy and Northern Europe. It is not possible to speak and reason in terms of individual organisations but in terms of networks. (Interview with LEA representative 1)

The role of social networks in connecting criminal entrepreneurs and expertise seems paramount. Consistently, the same tools appear of great importance when smugglers need to reach potential clients and to promote transportation services.

2.2.1  Recruitment The use of the Internet and social networks in human smuggling has undergone an exponential increase in recent years. In 2016, different EU Member States (e.g., Finland, United Kingdom, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania,

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Spain) have reported that social media platforms are used by smugglers to advertise smuggling services, to offer information on migration routes and to facilitate communication with both other smugglers and migrants (European Commission 2016; Europol-Interpol 2016). As explained in the European Commission information document of 2016, FRONTEX underlines how this increasing use of social media by smugglers and migrants is having a huge impact on irregular migration since it fosters the aggregation of migrants, which in turn, produces faster dynamics at the external border of the EU.  The more social media support for easier and faster access to updated information, the more smugglers are capable to modify their routes in response to law enforcement activity and security measures in transit countries. These online platforms exercise a key role not only in increasing the number of smuggled individuals, but also in augmenting the efficiency of smuggling operations, rendering investigation and prosecution particularly challenging (Europol-EMSC 2019; European Commission 2016). Usually, Internet is really the starting point […] Internet does facilitate the travel; it facilitates the departure and the recruitment. (Interview with Smuggler 1)

In one of the most recent investigative cases we came across, internet discussion groups on travels were detected to move huge numbers of irregular migrants towards Schengen states, the so-called “Convoys/Caravans of Hope. One of the group’s initial objective was to facilitate the movement of Syrians in Turkey and towards Greece and onwards. Later, more such channels and groups in messaging services and on the social media platform Facebook had been set up” (Europol-EMSC 2019: 2). Specifically on Facebook, there are several pages of smugglers and a wide array of related services easily accessible and with full contact phone numbers. Licit and illicit offers are mixed and smugglers may advertise services as a legitimate travel agency. All the existing accounts reveal the presence of a stable and established industry. The main pages, with posts of new weekly opportunities or previous posts of offers with stable prices, are always online and refer to interconnected smugglers (i.e., online friends) who have been active for many years (UNHCR 2016). The use of social media by migrants depends on nationality, country of origin, availability of the Internet and level of education. For example, Dari speakers from Afghanistan and Syrians are more likely to rely on social networks and other online platforms (e.g., Twitter, Google, YouTube, Plus, Skype, Viber) for communication and recruitment compared to Eritreans and Somalis. The volatility of pages on Facebook, also removed temporarily or permanently, undermine precise estimations of the numbers. Despite this, they display recurrent characteristics (see UNHCR 2016): • the majority of offers are apparently linked to large providers, counted around one hundred at any given time; • hundreds of users randomly post advertisements with offers and modify their identities; • several Facebook pages offer short term accommodation in transit countries;

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• many financial agents are active on Facebook, functioning as intermediaries between smugglers and migrants in collecting payments for smuggling and managing financial transfers; • many consultants promote services to offer advices on asylum claims and fake details and proofs of persecution; • in some cases, users appear as satisfied clients and post messages or photos on the pages of smugglers to express gratitude and thanks. This is usually followed by posts of other clients affirming the opposite (i.e., irresponsibility and cruelty of smugglers); • different accounts offer and promise student visas for European and extra European countries; • several accounts exploit original logos of international organisations or fake ones. Many such instances were found during the study. Numerous profiles, pages and posts on social networks (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter) are published by smugglers to advertise their services, resembling legal ones. While the web content on Instagram and Twitter is based on images and texts, the pages, groups and profiles on Facebook are explicitly dedicated to illegal migration to Europe. These web pages may either be public (anyone can access and interact) or closed with users/ clients subjected to the permission of administrators. Some appeared to be active for many years with hundreds or thousands of members and/or followers, while others seeming more recent and with a less systematic and structured use.2 Smugglers are highly informed on visa requirements and procedures for asylum requests, and this expertise allows them to exploit weaknesses and gaps in international and national regulations. Among 46 identified web pages, the most common words for attracting migrants are ‘visa’ and ‘Schengen’; followed by ‘asylum’, ‘interview’, ‘Finland’, ‘Greece’, ‘office’. On Facebook, messages and posts provide specific information about the procedure for asylum request; they also offer Visas to enter the Schengen countries or other documents (IDs, passports, driving licences) and travel options, together with a phone number (call-now icon) to reach administrators. This additional service demonstrates the high level of efficiency and expertise of smugglers online aimed at recruiting more and more new migrants. What it is offered represents a modern, efficient and practical way of communication and contact, facilitated as underlined by Europol-EMSC (2019: 2) by the availability of “burner apps that ease the use of virtual phone numbers, thus complicating the investigation of the suspects behind such numbers”.3 2  Although the link of the web contents to illegal migration was evident in most cases, specific elements revealed to be particularly significant: (1) Specific images such as European flag, visa; (2) The word “visa Schengen” in the name or title of the page/profile/post; (3) Offer of documents to purchase; (4) Offer of travels to Europe; (5) Explicit contents related to specific routes or destinations; (6) Request from advertisers to be contacted through the social network or mobile applications. 3  A Burner phone app provides a temporary phone number to be utilised when calling or massaging instead of the actual phone numbers of users.

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The majority of posts on Facebook are in Arabic or Urdu, although English is the other most common language. Texts and messages are accompanied by idealised and deceiving images of transportation services (i.e., luxury boats, cruise ships, yachts and airplanes), complemented by details on departure locations, dimensions of the particular means of transport, duration of the journeys, final destinations (although in some cases in generic terms such as Europe or European Union), prices of services (different depending on the means of transport or routes), and, finally, telephone numbers to be called via Viber and WhatsApp to ask for more information. On some of the Facebook pages, there were also live videos showing smugglers available to answer in real time the various questions and issues of potential clients, providing information and recommendation on the aspects of illegal migration to Europe or to Italy. In this way, it is possible for migrants to contact directly the supplier and arrange the travel, agree on prices and methods of transportation. Although with limited images and texts, similar web contents are found on Instagram and the dark web. On the former web application, images of airplanes and visa documents contain contact information (i.e., phone numbers) advertising the possibility to purchase specific falsified documents. Consistently, websites in the dark web promote the sale of false documents to travel not only to Europe and Italy, but also to United States and Canada. Using the search engine Torch, many such documents can be retrieved with advertisements dedicated to the production and sale of forged Italian passports and electronic IDs. Fake visas and stolen passports are regularly sold online, with the names and pictures of the original owners being visible. There are limited-time offers for real visas from different embassies and consulates, as for example visas for Schengen/ specific Member states, and non-EU countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, Canada and USA (see UNHCR 2016). In some cases, offers include details on the type of document issued and “bizarre specifications such as visa for marriage, visa and residency, visa for investment, or visa for buying property” (UNHCR 2016: 22). In the recruitment stage, the Internet and social networks represent efficient tools for smugglers to reach an increasing demand which appears more complex to intercept and fragmented, being located in different areas of the world. Thus, the potentiality of the businesses of smugglers is amplified and their capacity to ‘catch’ a globalised market grows continually. On these pages, smugglers post pictures and video of ‘successful’ trips, both during the journey and after the arrival in the countries of destination. Coupled with the possibility to directly contact suppliers (via Viber, WhatsApp) they are capable of earning the trust of potential clients (Di Nicola et al. 2019). Trust is crucial within illicit markets, especially when smugglers offer different services (von Lampe and Johansen 2004). As far as the migrants as concerned, choosing a reliable smuggler means a great difference between a safe or risky trip. The availability of dedicated and constant communication channels with smugglers as well as the offer to travel on safe airplanes or ships have a reassuring effect on potential clients. The use of the Internet and social networks in the recruitment stage does not exclude offline strategies. There are smugglers that can reach clients thanks to family, kinship, friendship ties, and this usually occurs when

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migrants know people who in turn know smugglers in virtue of proximity (e.g., community relations) or previous experiences in travelling.

2.2.2  Transportation Many smugglers describe themselves as ‘travel agencies’ offering journeys to Europe, and, eventually, the necessary documents to this end. They advertise themselves as real travel agencies. Clients get informed about single departures, organisation and travels (Interview with LEA 2)

The advertisements posted in the Internet and social networks (e.g., Facebook) contain words related to recurrent geographical areas. The most significant keywords are for example ‘Turkey’, ‘Greece’, ‘Europe’, ‘Italy’ which refer respectively to the transit and destination countries within migration flows, while other key words are related to travel, such as ‘flights’ and ‘cruise’. Online advertising is based on images presenting various means of transport for travels, related prices and phone numbers to contact smugglers. For example, a Facebook profile was found promoting two different journey options leaving from Turkey and arriving to Greece. Potential clients could choose between a car or a yacht, at a price respectively of 1700 euros and 2200 euros. Another example refers to a group on Facebook dedicated to illegal migration, with a picture related to a journey posted by the smuggler. The smuggler also lists the possible methods and prices to reach different European countries. The published message reports: Non-stop travel from Turkey to Greece $350. As soon as the island is reached, assurance to be able to use Kharitya in Athens after two days, everything is guaranteed on the island of Kos, $650. Afterwards, by plane from Athens to Germany for 2,500 euros, if we agree on 3,500 euros there is the assurance of having a place to sleep. There is a path by land from Turkey to Greece for 3,500 euros. There is a commercial boat from Turkey to Italy for 3,800 euros. There is a flight from Turkey to European countries for 6,500 euros. Visa is guaranteed from Lebanon to Turkey for $2,300. To contact me [phone number] WhatsApp.

Many of the identified web contents were related to routes and travels to Italy with different options: from Egypt to the Italian peninsula, travelling by sea two times a week with safe and organised arrangements, or from Turkey to Italy on a ship carrying wheat. The duration of the travel reported was estimated in 4–6 days and food and accommodation were provided. In all these cases, phone numbers were provided with the explicit request to contact suppliers via Viber and WhatsApp. Smugglers are particularly responsive when promoting their services. Through a fake profile on Facebook it was possible to post requests of information for travel to Italy in public profiles related to human trafficking. The responses arrived within a few hours, and not only from smugglers but also from other users claiming to be lawyers or international law experts able to support in finding forged documents to travel to Europe. A selected number of smugglers were then contacted via Viber/ WhatsApp. The pretext was the need of information and details on travels and prices.

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2  The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling… Researcher: I would like to take my Moroccan brother from Turkey to Italy. He lost all the documents and he is in Turkey illegally. What can he do? Smuggler: You have three different options. The first directly from Turkey to Italy, travelling in a 20-meter tourist yacht, 60/70 people. Price: 7000 euros. We will leave your brother on a safe beach, 20 minutes far away from a train station. The second: from Turkey to Greece and then from Greece to Italy. Price: 6200 euros. And the third, which is from Turkey to Greece and then from Greece to Austria by land: 800 euros. Researcher: Are the travels safe? Which guarantees can you give me? Smuggler: The travel is safe. in šā’ Allāh [if God wills it]. I do my best, God does the rest. Many people arrived safe and in good conditions in Europe thanks to my work: this is my guarantee. Call your brother and let me know. [After a long conversation about the details of the travels a0nd after kind regards from both of the speakers, the conversation is interrupted. After 5 minutes, the smuggler calls back]. Smuggler: Dear friend, I forgot to tell you that there is a problem. Your brother is Moroccan and if he is caught by the Italian or Greek police he will be repatriated. But I have a solution. [The smuggler offers another service: to create a false Syrian Quaid – an official document with the personal information – and a false Syrian driving license]. Smuggler: With these documents, he will be able to go to the Syrian embassy in Turkey, pretend to be Syrian and request a new passport. We are doing like this with Lebanese people. Your brother has to speak in standard Arabic language. If they notice a strange, he has to say that he has Syrian parents but was grown in Morocco. […] With the Syrian passport, he will be able to apply for political asylum when he arrives. […] 800 euros for the documents, 200/300 for myself, as a fee. I am solving you a big problem. Take your time, speak with your brother and when you decided call me back. I will take care of your requests. If he does not wish to travel but just needs documents, no problems. I will be of service anyway.

Digital technologies and social networks allow smugglers to offer services tailored to clients, and their needs and financial abilities. The characteristics of the offers, the prices together with the methods in which messages are posted, automatically identify specific categories of clients. Smugglers are principally able to set and constantly modify the prices of services. Tariffs take into account the following aspects: the kilometric distance, the type of mean of transportation, the urgency of departure of migrants, and the presence of children (for whom discounts are usually provided). If someone wants to leave with a boat in 30/40 persons can go, pay little money and go. You can pay even a thousand of euros. (Interview with Smuggler 2) For the prices: from Libya tariffs range from 1,000 to 4,000 dollars per person. A mother with children always have a discount, 1,700 – 2,000. A person bringing 5/7 people can even travel for free. (Interview with Smuggler 2)

Services may also be promoted to specific groups of clients. For example, to wealthy persons able to sustain expensive costs of travelling or, conversely, migrants that have less availability of money but are, for different reasons, in need of travelling as soon as possible. In this case, makeshift means of transport are offered with the consequence that journeys are at high level of risk.

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Brother, my method is the ‘nickel’ method [that is the most perfect method], mine is safe, and safety has its price, am I right? (Interview with Smuggler 2) Then it depends. Those who come from the starting point have time to bargain. Those who come from far away are in a hurry, for instance those who come from Iran, Pakistan, etc. have no time to lose, they just want to leave as soon as possible. (Interview with Smuggler 1)

As UNHCR (2016) notes, the smuggling enterprise follows market logic and trends. The movement of large numbers of persons results in the normalisation of routes on the side of smugglers. Offers are promoted together with departure spots and countries of arrival and accompanied by vague information on the types of border crossing (i.e., generic land, sea, air). This information is situated next to the prices of travel, which fluctuate considerably on a seasonal basis: when the demand for services is low (e.g., hostile weather in winter) prices tend to lower. Promotional offers and discounts for families and children are also advertised. When the demand rises (e.g., peak seasons in summer, more stringent border controls), prices thereby increase. For example, UNHCR (2016) reports how prices for journeys from Turkey to Austria by land vary with prices relatively stable between May up to July 2016 and then peaking in August, followed by a significant drop in September. This sudden decrease may be explained by the opening of a new land route through Bulgaria. The possibility to move many migrants through this region has probably impacted on prices, since smuggles were able to move larger groups. Consistent to the recruitment stage, social networks and mobile applications appear to be crucial also during transportation. Smugglers can remain in contact with migrants and provide information on possible accommodation and venues to recharge their mobile phones. UNHCR (2016) points to the fact that the smuggling industry extends also to the real estate market. The housing offers managed by smugglers has two purposes. On one side, to provide accommodation during the journey, as it emerged from the study, and, second, to obtain apparently legal means to secure residency within the EU. For example, they promote houses or apartments located in countries with lower property value, such as Slovakia, Hungary, Spain. The strategy is to claim that acquiring properties through their estate agencies guarantee the permanent residency to buyers. Social networks serve to arrange the methods of payment for travel, once migrants reach the final destination. The pattern is for migrants (or their families) to pay upfront 50 percent of the total amount. This is needed and used to pay all the actors involved in the organisation of travels before the departure. The remaining part of the payment is settled at the arrival points through intermediaries, usually trusted and well-known individuals within local communities who, in turn, pay smugglers. The possibility to use encrypted messaging services enhances the privacy of the exchange of information on travels and appears to be the main reason why both smugglers and potential migrants rely on mobile applications. For the former it is significant that these ICT tools allow them to communicate and use the same profile even when discharging telephones or SIM. For these to work, only an Internet connection is needed. It is also possible to rapidly change the name of the page/group/

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profile as to avoid law enforcement investigation activity and the monitoring of Internet service providers. They use the most advanced technology tools such as social networks, Internet, WhatsApp also among themselves, with the aim of establishing encrypted and hardly traceable forms of communications. (Interview with LEA 1) If you change phone number or SIM card, WhatsApp allows to keep the [old] profile. I always know who they are even if they change phone numbers. I receive messages from the persons who arrived even if they have a different phone number. (Interview with Smuggler 2). It is a form of communication that is ‘free’: so the migrant, let’s say, who has a mobile connected to any Wi-Fi can be immediately reached – something that may not be possible with a ‘normal’ phone line. (Interview with LEA 1).

Friends, family members, acquaintances or other clients having arrived in the countries of destination are an important point of reference for emotional support and information on possible routes and risks that can be easily gained through social networks and mobile applications. Do I board on whichever boat, or do I [try to] understand in which conditions to leave? Do I try to understand which is the most appropriate moment relying on weather forecasts? Do I try to know what is happening on the Greek coast rather than on the Italian one? Well, let’s hear what my friends in Catania tell me? (Interview with Smuggler 2). Those who left first give the number to another, saying that everything went alright and this way they spread the word to new customers, when the smuggler or an intermediary have a reputation, that they are fair, etc. Usually, who have travelled suggest same suppliers. (Interview with Smuggler 1)

On the pages of social networks, the professionalism of smugglers is commented upon and rated, helping to build either a good or bad reputation. The most popular and active profiles contain posts denouncing unreliable smugglers, and they include the details on names, nationalities, countries or cities of operation, photos, and descriptions on how clients were cheated. In a reinforcing social media process, other clients comment on these posts to confirm the fraudulent behaviours. During our study, a case of a Tunisian smuggler was frequently reported. Apparently, this smuggler had abandoned eight persons on the Serbian-Hungarian borders and disappeared with the money. Detailing the story, the message states: “Warning! You have to be careful with Tunisian thief, his nickname is [nickname]. He took 5,000 euros from eight people to bring them to Budapest, but he left them on the Serbian-­ Hungarian border. Then run away”. Similarly, one transportation service named ‘Jet Boat’ was negatively rated, since it allegedly caused the death of many migrants, among which children and a woman, close to the Turkish coast. Smugglers and smuggled persons seem to belong to the same communication network, “a sort of TripAdvisor of illegal migration” (Di Nicola et al. 2019: 60), but this does not exclude direct encounters. At the end, real-world interaction still represents the highest guarantee. After the online exchange of information, a meeting in person is often required to finalise agreements on travel practicalities.

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First, I have to establish that he is not from the police. As I told you, I talk to him, I leave him time to ask, do some research, and I have my own mechanisms to know whether if he is from the State or whether he is a serious person who wants to travel. We are not joking. I meet him for a coffee far away from my place [of work]. (Interview with Smuggler 2)

2.3  Human Trafficking Similarly to human smuggling, in the case of human trafficking fluid criminal networks are also active, although the type of structures and the levels of organisation are variable depending on the situation, scale of the trafficking operations, and the specific country. There can be solo entrepreneurs in charge of recruitment, transportation and exploitation of one or two victims in the same city or region. Conversely, there can be highly sophisticated organised crime groups moving large numbers of victims through different countries, and who are also involved in the arrangement of recruitment, travels, production of forged documents, as well as exploitation of victims in the countries of arrival (UNODC 2014; Shelley 2010; Di Nicola 2014; Aronowitz 2001, 2003; Antonopoulos et al. 2019). More recent research (Terenghi and Di Nicola 2018) underline three main categories of actors involved in human trafficking both at the European and national level. The first is made up of solo entrepreneurs with a low profile, who manage the trafficking operations from recruitment to exploitation on short distances (e.g., between two European countries). They may groom potential victims by establishing a relationship or they may be husbands or partners of the victims. The second is composed of small-medium (family-based) criminal groups that organise small/ medium large-scale trafficking operations (among two/three European countries) and are based on ethnic, familial, kinship bonds (e.g., Albanians and Romanians). The third category includes large organised and loose criminal networks that control the entire trafficking chain from active recruitment, issuing documents if needed, as well as transportation and corruptive practices, exploitation (e.g., Chinese, Nigerians). They are structured “into flexible, horizontal and decentralised networks made of a large number of affiliates, divided into sub-units and run trafficking operations on a global scale (Terenghi and Di Nicola 2018: 41). Contrary to the other categories, the members of these networks may be or not linked by ethnic, familial and kinship ties, and perform specific roles and duties that are not interchangeable (Campana 2016; DNA 2017). In general, the reasons that push migrants to leave their countries of origin are related to different factors that may range from a lack of educational and employment opportunities, to political and social instability, and discrimination and violence against women, children, ethnic minorities (Brå 2008; Aronowitz et al. 2010). Furthermore, there are cases in which potential victims consciously decide to move to other foreign countries seeking “adventure, opportunities and independence” (Oude Breuil et al. 2011: 40). Some potential victims may be aware of the type of job to be performed in the destination countries but not of the severe exploitative

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conditions. Others may not be aware being deceived by traffickers (Europol 2016c; Cho 2015; Jac-Kucharski 2012; Siegel and Yesilgoz 2003). The widespread presence, availability and usage of digital technologies and social networking platforms have created new opportunities for both victims and traffickers, the former being further motivated by the easy access to different opportunities of employment in Europe.

2.3.1  Recruitment and Transportation Nowadays, the recruitment of potential victims for sexual and labour exploitation is expanding and constantly evolving both as regards the means through which it is displayed (i.e., the use of the Internet and social networks) and the categories of potential victims affected, as there is an increase in the number of children involved (Save the Children 2017; Terre des Hommes 2016; UNICRI-Parsec 2010; Aronowitz et al. 2010). In most parts of the world, recruitment for sexual exploitation is carried out offline, through informal channels and friends, family, acquaintances networks. Despite cultural factors and social practices, one main reason is related to the fact that many trafficked victims come from rural areas or have low levels of education. As a consequence, the Internet is rarely used, if at all (IOM 2017, UNODC 2010; Antonopoulos et al. 2019; Carchedi 2016). Recruitment forms vary for the different nationalities, because often it [the recruitment] occurs in the countries of origin. (Interview with NGO 1) We had many economic problems because of my father’s death, and one day a neighbour proposed to my mum to help me, because she had relatives in Europe who needed someone to work as a babysitter. I was taken to Italy to the madam’s home. In this place, there were other women. I discovered I was supposed to work as a prostitute, no child to take care of. (Interview with Victim 4)

These informal practices are increasingly coupled with the use of the Internet and social media for the same purposes, allowing traffickers to expand their target group to younger victims and individuals of different nationalities (Terenghi and Di Nicola 2018; Palmisano 2017; Aronowitz et al. 2010; Europol 2019). Children are particularly at risk due to their vulnerability, and their involvement in online exploitation is growing gradually. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children based in the United States points out an 846% increase in reporting of alleged child sex trafficking between 2010 and 2015, which appears related to the use of the Internet to sell children for sex (ICAT 2019). Besides the key role of families, Europol (2018b) found an increasing role of the Internet in the recruitment of orphans and minors in Vietnam, living in poor social economic conditions or afflicted by political prosecution. Subsequently, websites are used in the United States to advertise trafficked women, while in the Netherlands pimps contact and recruit their victims using popular websites such as ‘Hyves’ and ‘Sugarbabes’ (see Aronowitz et  al.

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2010).4 Traffickers attempting to approach potential victims via the Internet are also active in Nigeria, especially in the cybercafés of major cities. Through initial and apparently harmless relationships established in chatrooms or via unsolicited emails they make offers to study and work abroad that in many cases are fake (Maltzahn 2006). The spread of digital technologies entails a lesser need for clients to pay for newspapers and for traffickers to acquire advertisement spaces offline. The websites used by recruiters/exploiters are various and can be: “marriage agency; escort services sites; dating clubs; employment sites seeking home helpers, waitresses/bartenders, au pairs/carers, models, dancers/hostesses, people to work in the building trade/factories/agriculture, people to take educational courses, people to work in tourism; sex workers” (Sykiotou 2007: 31). Compared to other social networks and web platforms, Facebook and Instagram revealed a higher number of pages, links and images aimed at recruiting potential victims. The advertisements offer all-inclusive packages with jobs, travels and documents. Entering the keywords ‘job contract Europe’ enabled the detection of posts in the Arabic language, which include jobs and employment contracts, visas, and residences in Europe. On one closed (not publicly accessible) Facebook page, the readable message reports: “Visa, residence, work contracts and travel organisation for Gulf States, Europe, Turkey”. Characteristics such as the name of the group, the cover image and the services advertised suggest a possible link with human trafficking. Another example is the promotion of job opportunities in Europe and Italy on an Instagram personal profile, containing vague and brief information on the needed skills of potential employees, places of work, and salaries. Transportation services bring potential victims to a specific place and work location. In some cases, advertisement involve itinerant jobs, especially in the tourism sector, linked to long periods of mobility through different European countries.5 The strategies used to reach clients may range from passive techniques, such as simply posting and advertising deceptive job offers, to attempts at directly contacting potential victims (Yu 2014; Aronowitz et al. 2010). I was contacted by a man who used false information and the picture of his brother profile. Through this Facebook profile, he used to contact many girls thus he found me by chance. He told me he was the owner of a radio taxi, that he worked as a taxi driver and that he has been living in Turin for many years. I started to date this guy, then he asked me money saying he would have taken care of me, finding me a job as a nurse. (Interview with Victim 3)

4  The most famous example is the online web community ‘Craigslist’ in the dark web. With millions of users with the possibility to buy different legitimate commercial products, a specific ‘Erotic’ section (hidden to the majority of users) was exploited by traffickers to post and advertise children and women for sale. In 2010 this web community removed its adult services section placing the link ‘censored’ (IOM 2007; Thakor and Boyd 2013). 5  The exploration of the web revealed that travel offers (potentially related to human trafficking) were in all cases linked to job opportunities. For this reason, the transportation stage of human trafficking has been included within the recruitment stage.

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The typical scheme (i.e., lover boy method) is a grooming process to gain the confidence of victims with the aim to build trust, which, once earned, can be abused (Latonero et al. 2011; Bullens and van Horn 2002). In practice, the traffickers or the persons linked with the criminal organisation attract potential targets online, mainly using social networks. After having gained the confidence and trust of the potential victim, a relationship is established based on false promises and expectations of a better life. This may extend to planning weddings and travels and sending presents and/or money to persuade the potential victims to leave their countries. For example, in many cases children end up in human trafficking through abduction, social coercion, blackmail, or similar unsolicited behaviours. The recruitment process can last years, and traffickers use social networks to identify potential victims and start deploying their grooming and manipulative strategies (Boyd et al. 2011). Although more frequent in sexual exploitation, this method can be also used in recruiting for the purpose of labour exploitation. As underlined by Europol (2018b), in one case of forced labour of a young girl in the agricultural sector, the Internet was the first tool for contacting her. This young girl married the man (i.e., recruiter) and moved with him to another country. There she found herself exploited in a farmland managed by the family of her husband. Besides posting deceiving job offers, traffickers exploit personal information available on the Internet and social networks (e.g., personal inclinations, daily activities, etc.) as to create ad hoc online profiles (tailored to the characteristics of potential victims) which facilitate the recruitment stage (Lavorgna 2015; Raets and Janssens 2018). Social networks facilitate the recruitment stage since traffickers have the possibility to easily and constantly access as well as monitor personal contents of individuals (e.g., pictures, videos, posts) when privacy settings are not configured. In this way the characteristics of potential victims can be observed, allowing a preliminary evaluation and selection process that ends through contacts via Messenger or other messaging applications. Thanks to social networks, traffickers see that these girls are still very young and ‘juicy’, and therefore they enter in contact with them through social media. (Interview with NHO 1) The old methods are sponsors who arrive in Nigeria, see the girls and after a vow (magic rites) they take them out. They look at their body to check whether they will be able or not to work and then they take them out. These are some of the old methods used to send someone to Europe, but in these days there are new inventions. (Interview with Trafficker 1)

The so-called e-recruitment (i.e., through computer and Internet related tools) (Sykiotou 2007; Brå 2008) is an important and productive form of ‘hiring’ potential victims, especially for sexual exploitation. As far as the latter is concerned, traffickers can be grouped into three main interconnected categories in respect to their organisation and modus operandi, that is set up and use of websites (Sykiotou 2007): • traffickers who create websites in the countries of origin and languages of the potential victims tailored to the intended markets. The first website usually creates others in order to build national recruitment networks, spread services and obtain subscriptions from potential clients.

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• traffickers who exploit the sex services set up on the Internet by other traffickers or intermediaries so as to recruit and further exploit victims; • traffickers who recruit victims as models or escorts with direct exploitation through online booking with clients. A difference exists between traffickers who set up websites and traffickers who exploit the expertise of professionals operating online in the crime-as-a-service arena. These individuals play a similar and important role in human trafficking, possessing the technical skills and know-how not only to create websites to be used by traffickers but also in providing ICT assets to facilitate and hide their exploitative activities (e.g., personal data, IP addresses, etc.), (Sykiotou 2007). The methods and strategies of traffickers are different when victims are recruited through pornographic websites or through marriage, escort, dating or job websites. The former strategies are particularly present within the dark web and can be related to the specific characteristics of pornographic websites that are “harder to manage and [expose] traffickers to greater risks, e.g. the risk that a girl will be stopped at the border, and that border officials may need bribing. This partly explains why this type of trafficking seems mainly to attract organised criminal groups” (Sykiotou 2007: 30). During the study, posts and online conversations were identified, posted by users and alleged experts regarding information on who and where to find minors and girls. In online child sexual exploitation (CSE) “dedicated bulletin boards on the darknet are increasingly popular among offenders as a channel for the distribution of CSEM [child sexual exploitation materials. […] In many cases offenders use encryption and install software to cover their IP address and prevent identification, such as Virtual Private Networks – VPNs – and TOR” (Europol 2019: 31). As the number of very young persons using the Internet and social media grows, so does the number of potential victims. The modus operandi of traffickers and/or recruiters is based at first on the use of the (surface) web to contact minors via social platforms (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, games applications) as to build confidence and trust. Further interactions and communications are then displayed in encrypted messaging tools (WhatsApp, Viber). The initial and voluntary exchange of sexual images and videos can either form the basis for subsequent coercion and extortion, or a collection of materials that can be sold on online marketplaces (Europol 2018a, 2019). According to IPSOS (2016), the use of the Internet, social networks and digital tools is increasingly common among Italian minors. Their higher vulnerability, determined by age and inexperience, coupled with the heedless use of these means result in the exposure to potential abuses and exploitation starting online, especially when child pornography is considered. Consistently, in-depth interviews carried out with NGOs underlined the widespread practice to threaten vulnerable underage persons due to the availability of personal and sexually explicit photos or videos that can be disseminated to peers, friends, acquaintances, unless the victims satisfy the requests of exploiters.

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2  The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling… To tell the truth, the majority of foreign unaccompanied minors who are in Italy use more frequently Facebook than WhatsApp and other mobile applications. (Interview with NGO 1) Girls, among whom are also of Italian nationality, end up in the business of pornography, or anyway, there is the risk that something virtual turns into real. (Interview with NGO 2) We have witnessed minor unaccompanied migrants … many acting an unaware use of the Internet for two main reasons. On one side they are alone, on the other they are not supported by parents or other significant and trusted adults. Thus, these minors do not know how to make the best use of [the Internet], they do not have computer related knowledge as to select in a proper and informed way (Interview with NGO 1)

In order to exploit potential victims, traffickers need to arrange transportation. In most cases they rely on digital technologies for a smooth and efficient organisation, and for example to facilitate the procurement of forged documents and travel tickets (Choo and Grabosky 2014; Lavorgna 2015; Europol 2014). The need to be connected to the different nodes of the trafficking chain is facilitated by ICTs as well, and criminal networks benefit from the opportunities to communicate online as the risks of interception are reduced (Raets and Janssens 2018). The movement of victims is then linked to exploitation in the sex market or in other labour sectors (Antonopoulos et al. 2019). Contrary to labour exploitation that occurs mainly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, sexual exploitation affects mainly Africa, United States, South America, Europe and Central Asia displaying as outdoor, indoor/ online prostitution (UNODC 2014). In the latter case, traffickers need to promote the sexual services of victims and the use of ICTs to this purpose has modified the ways in which victims are marketed (Hughes 2014; Di Nicola et al. 2013; Latonero et al. 2011; Ibanez and Suthers 2014). Online platforms hosting advertisements of sexual services provide traffickers the opportunity to attract clients, while the access to and the convenience of online soliciting encourage virtual ‘journeys’ where users can safely and privately make their choice (ICAT 2019; Raets and Janssens 2018). The Internet offers a catalogue of girls and women with the possibility to access numerous ads and reviews to support the purchasing of a provider aligned with the preferences of clients. Compared to the offline context, the browsing activity through the profiles of providers allow clients to collect information on services and performance ratings, safeguarding their anonymity and identity from possible interception by law enforcement (Ibanez and Suthers 2014). As stated by Hughes (2014: 5) “mobile devices and technologies create a more fluid environment for traffickers, victims, and sex buyers”. The study proved the difficulty to conclusively link the researched web contents to cases of (potential) labour exploitation, the results through in-depth interviews with knowledgeable actors were the selected analysed data. On the contrary, a high number of web contents related to sexual exploitation were registered. This allowed to confirm that sex trafficking is increasingly becoming e-trafficking (Di Nicola et al. 2013; Hughes 2014; Latonero et al. 2012; Maltzahn 2006).

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2.3.2  Exploitation Since the ‘90s, the sex industry has found on the Internet a new setting where the demand can meet the supply of sex-related services (Selmi 2009). Human trafficking for the scope of sexual exploitation partly develops as a response to the growing demand of sexual-related contents in online environments. With the advent of the Internet, human trafficking has modified, and consistently advertisements for indoor prostitution. (Interview with NGO 2)

The Internet represents an efficient tool to advertise offline sexual services and allows for the spread of sex-related materials and services that can be shared via chats, webcams, smart phones, etc. Advertising online platforms are diverse, from websites in the surface web to underground web environments and platforms. The market of trafficked and exploited victims is displayed through social media, online classifieds, dating websites, dedicated websites that contain forums for clients to review the sex workers they have visited, niche platforms addressed to persons with specific (sexual) preferences, and dark web markets used by a restricted number of users (Finn and Stalans 2017; Europol 2016a; Raets and Janssens 2018). When compared to women and girls exploited in outdoor prostitution, sexual exploitation online presents the challenge of the near-impossibility to intercept victims. In real-life prostitution, NGO operators are able to get in contact and provide legal, psychological and medical aid. As Boyd et  al. (2011: 2) remark about the exploitation of children online, “there are serious differences between foreign-born 8-year-olds who have been abducted and are sold in the U.S. by “pimps” and 16-year-olds who advertise their own sexual services and claim the identity of prostitute”. This is valid for all the individuals involved in sexual services online and reflects the dynamic and differentiated nature of the sex market in terms of demand and supply. As a result, during this research a case by case analysis was applied as to identify specific indicators of the link between human trafficking and sexual exploitation based, firstly, on the consistency between the information provided by the same individual when promoted on multiple websites. When an individual advertises related sex services on many websites providing the same setting description, pictures and phone number, it is possible to assume a voluntary element. In turn, when there are evident discrepancies among photos, descriptions, locations and phone numbers relating to the same individual or when the latter is advertised by a third party, and especially in the case of minors, it is reasonable to assume an involuntary dimension. In both cases, human trafficking and exploitation processes are more likely to occur. As reported by our interviewees, the main channels used by traffickers to advertise the services of victims are social networks, and specifically Facebook. Facebook contacts are used by the girls we meet and approach on the streets and who are trafficking victims. The spread of this type of contacts helps to hook girls much faster. (Interview with NGO 3).

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On the basis of the identified indicators, a total of fifty-five elements were classified in the web contents analysed. The term ‘massaggio’ (i.e., massage) revealed to be the most used word, followed by other words describing the characteristics of victims in regard to their physical appearance (sexy, bellissima, giovane), nationality (cinese) and behavioural qualities (vogliose, passione).6 The majority of these words were in Italian, although containing grammar mistakes, and indicating the foreign nationality of the administrators as well as a possible link with an exploitative condition. Other elements were also observed as indicating the presence of sex forced activities, in particular: • use of images of very young females; • advertisement of sexual services from third parties; • presence of the same phone number in ads, websites, posts related to different persons; • presence of the same photo/photos on different websites/social networks linked to ads providing inconsistent information such as for example phone number, services offered, prices in regard to the person showed in the picture; • presence of ads on many websites/social networks referred to the same individual providing inconsistent information (e.g., prices, names, services offered); • inconsistency between the description of the person provided in the ad and the person showed in the picture (e.g., age, nationality) or inconsistencies within the text of posts. In some cases, the sale of trafficked victims is accompanied by other forms of sex work advertisements, such as escort or dancing services. Much of what occurs online is encoded through the use by traffickers of code words such as for example “200 roses as a code for price, new in town as a code for someone who is underage” (Boyd et al. 2011: 5). On the surface web, the existence of many dedicated websites or ads on blogs together with other online platforms, i.e., ‘tuttoannunci.org’, ‘bakeka.it’, vivastreet.com’, have been identified, promoting fictitious jobs in the escort, dancing, message, and beauty-care economic sectors. Many others promote explicitly sexual services. Advertisements on the Internet are thousands. In addition, there are websites that change continuously. It is not even necessary that someone discovers them. (Interview with NGO 3).

An example is one image accompanied by text that advertise sexual services provided by third parties on Twitter. The picture shows a naked body of a woman for the purpose to grab the attention of users, and the text informs of the availability of more girls in the following days. This content was found applying the keyword ‘escort’ and demonstrates the ease of finding such advertisements. Promotional websites and pages on social networks serve the purpose to both attract potential buyers and define encounters “In a few well-organised trafficking networks, this type of customer interaction can take the form of online platforms set

 The translations of the Italian words are respectively: beautiful, young, Chinese, horny, passion.

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up to handle clients or even entire organisational departments specialised in online promotion and web design” (Raets and Janssens 2018: 89). In most cases, phone numbers are provided and used to coordinate and arrange sales (Boyd et al. 2011). Phones are usually prepaid mobiles in order to avoid the link between a specific individual due to service contracts. Many advertisements placed on online platforms display phone numbers to be used by clients as to contact providers and agree on services. In this way, “Coordination of scheduling may be done through a central line, with phones linked to the provider via the trafficker or a decentralised manner, with providers maintaining individual numbers [1]. Customer reviews are often linked to phone numbers, indicating the importance of maintaining individual phone numbers for reputation development” (Ibanez and Suthers 2014: 1). Starting from the indicators of a possible link between human trafficking and sexual exploitation, different cases were found in the Internet, particularly within the surface web. In the surface web, it is also possible to find different websites referring to the same person but providing inconsistent information on prices, type of services, etc. The photo of the girl is the same within advertisements but displayed through different poses and settings. The name, the location and the phone number are the same, but the description of the girl and services differ. There are advertisements posted in different websites with one phone number for various sexual services provided by women located in one Italian city. The ads contain images of Asian women in the same location. This suggests that offers are linked to a fictitious wellness centre which provides sexual services of several women and girls. On the dark web, explicit cases of sexually exploited minors were identified. Many web contents referred to the online exchange of child pornographic materials and the purchase of offline sexual services for private meetings. In one case, a third party offered the possibility to obtain pictures and videos of a three years old child, together with the opportunity to meet in person in any location in Europe. On other dedicated websites and forums, pictures of minors in sexual positions, partially or totally naked and in some cases wearing sexy lingerie, were displayed. This trend and online illicit markets for sexual exploitation were confirmed by in-depth interviews carried out with NGOs, as well as their link with possible human trafficking. With reference to the dark web, the presence of girls declaring to be eighteen years old but actually younger was reported. Nowadays there is a significant number of very young girls who tell you they are adult, but who are clearly younger, maybe 16 or 17 years old. (Interview with NGO 2).

Mobile phones, similar to online platforms, have a prominent role within the process of trafficking as tools for communication and monitoring among criminal networks, traffickers and victims. The latter arrive to Italy equipped with a mobile phone or a telephone number to contact intermediaries or directly exploiters. (Antonopoulos et al. 2019; Raets and Janssens 2018). GPS software installed on smartphones can support pimps in tracking the movement of victims at work and on the streets (ICAT 2019). The use of these technological devices protects from the tracing of calls from law enforcement. Mobile phone distributors offer free or cheap

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phones to customers that sign up for their services, and traffickers may use these phones for a limited period of time and then dismiss them. Pre-paid phone cards allow anonymous use of line telephone systems (Hughes 2001). These girls once they reach Italy are contacted by exploiters via mobiles (Interview with NGO 2). Smart phones are used to monitor victims. When a street unit approaches a girl on the street her phone usually rings as indicating the presence of someone in any place around intimating to be fast and keep working. (Interview with NGO 3)

During the study, if on one hand it proved difficult to identify web contents and indicators decisively linked to labour exploitation, on the other, many online advertisements were found promoting jobs abroad that did not include information on salaries, the skills required for the role, the tasks to be performed, and the place of work. In most cases, the texts contained grammar or syntax errors. These elements suggest that websites and forums are used by traffickers to recruit victims for the purpose of labour exploitation. As Latonero et  al. (2015) have underlined, social networks play an important role in informal recruiting. Garnier (2007: 36) has also noticed that “people who meet on the Internet consider one another as friends and somehow they trust one another despite the fact they have never met and do not know each other”. The main nationalities exploited for forced labour in Italy which are Egyptian, especially minors (Save the Children 2017), Nigerians, and a growing number of victims from Eastern European countries (Antonopoulos et al. 2019). The employment sectors depend on gender: females of East and Central Africa are exploited for personal care and in the tertiary sector in employment such as housemaids, hairdressers, babysitters, etc. Male are more likely to be frequently exploited in the construction industry, agriculture, trading services, and on a seasonable basis. It depends on nationality, age, other factors. Egyptians are more at risk of labour exploitation since the reason behind migration is basically economic. Nigerians and East Europeans are more subjected to sexual exploitation. It depends on nationality, age, but also on the reasons behind the migration process. (Interview with NGO 2).

One of the interviewed NGO representatives reported the issue of work camps in Sicily (South of Italy). Romanian girls, besides being exploited in greenhouses, are sexually abused by their employers highlighting an overlap of sexual and labour exploitation. In my experience, in Sicily forced labour in greenhouses has undergone some transformations. First, there were Moroccan migrants; subsequently, after the accession of Romania in the European Union, nationals coming from this country, mainly women and girls also suffer from sexual abuses. Here, forms of exploitation are context-specific. Women from Romania live in shacks, work in greenhouses for many hours a day and are sexually exploited as well (Interview with NGO 1).

The main aspect related to labour exploitation is the inhumane living conditions of migrants which are common to all the economic sectors and crosses different regions in the country, from the North to the South, from agriculture to personal care

2.4  Concluding Remarks

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jobs. Marginalisation and isolation coupled with conditions of extreme vulnerability are common features of trafficked victims and children. The Internet, social networks and mobile applications do not seem to play a major role in labour exploitation. According to the interviewed experts, the main means to find a job for minors and migrants remains the word-of-mouth. One exception seems to be the agricultural sector, whose characteristics such as seasonality and the need of farmers of dynamic and able workers, make the use of the Internet and social networks more likely. These tools can reach a high number of potential victims thus speeding up the recruitment process. The use of online platforms as to offer all- inclusive packages (travel and job) has been documented (Antonopoulos et al. 2019). There is a significant number of persons migrating according to seasons and for job reasons, and this occurs via mobile phones and the Internet as well. The call cannot be by word of mouth if someone travels from Puglia [in the South] and Trentino [in the North] so to speak. These means are used and are further facilitated by the possibility to change the sim card (Interview with NGO 3).

2.4  Concluding Remarks The Internet and social media play a significant role both in human smuggling and trafficking, while the dark web appears to be more related to specific type of services and web contents (i.e., pornography and child sexual exploitation materials). In these illegal activities, online platforms and mobile apps facilitate contacts between smugglers/traffickers and potential clients/victims (Europol 2016b, c; ICAT 2019; UNHCR 2016; European Commission 2016; Hughes 2014; Raets and Janssens 2018, Latonero et al. 2015;), albeit with some differences. Smugglers promote journeys and documents on social networks pages (Facebook and Instagram), attracting many migrants who intend to leave their countries. Traffickers on the other hand appear to rely on informal contacts (word-of-mouth) within family, friendships, acquaintances, and community networks. Thus, the role of the Internet and social networks is more crucial in the exploitation stage. The promotion of sexual services through advertisements on the Internet (surface web) and social networks seems an established business strategy (Hughes 2014; Di Nicola et  al. 2013; Brå 2008). As for labour exploitation, the relation with trafficking proved to be more uncertain and difficult to detect. Websites and social networks also allow the formation of communities of users that may endorse these illicit markets. As migrants post feedback on the pages of smugglers expressing gratitude for the safety of the trips, so do clients post rankings and reviews of sexual services. Contacting suppliers is facilitated by the presence on the Internet (social media pages and websites) of phone numbers, whereas in the case of smuggling, the use of WhatsApp and Viber is explicitly requested. These tools, when set up and managed by smugglers and traffickers/exploiters are very effective and responsive. On Facebook pages, for example, a dedicated service is provided to certify the promptness of responses delivered to users. Accessibility, anonymity (protected by

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encryption) and constant connection seem the main characteristics of the Internet and social networks appreciated not only by smugglers and traffickers, but also potential clients and victims. As reported by the European Commission (2016), digital technologies and the Internet are impacting on the increasing number of persons smuggled, and the efficiency of smuggling operations, posing great challenges to investigation and prosecution. A similar effect can be supposed regarding human trafficking as well. Nowadays, there is still a scarcity of knowledge of the role played by the Internet and social media in human smuggling and trafficking, and especially if labour exploitation is considered. Consequently, interventions and policies seem to be driven more by intuition, speculation and information from mediated big cases or prominent scandals. The results acquired by the Italian study allows, together with the limited extant research, to start disentangling ICTs role in the different facets of human smuggling and trafficking. Only in this way, the possibility arises to foster better and informed approaches as well as practices among key stakeholders such as law enforcers, prosecutors, policy makers, and representatives of NGOs in their preventative and control activities.

References Antonopoulos, G. A., Di Nicola, A., Rusev, A., & Terenghi, F. (2019). Human trafficking finances. Cham: Springer. Aronowitz, A., Theuermann, G., & Tyurykanova, E. (2010). Analysing the business model of trafficking in human beings to better prevent the crime. Vienna: OSCE. Aronowitz, A. A. (2003). Trafficking in human beings: An international perspective. In D. Siegel, H. van de Bunt, & D.  Zaitch (Eds.), Global organized crime: Trends and developments (pp. 85–95). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher. Aronowitz, A. A. (2001). Smuggling and trafficking in human beings: The phenomenon, the markets that drive it and the organisations that promote it. European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 9(2), 163–195. Boyd, D., Casteel, H., Thakor, M., & Johnson, R. (2011). Human trafficking and technology: A framework for understanding the role of technology in the commercial sexual exploitation of children in the U.S. Cambridge: Microsoft Research. Brå. (2008). The organisation of human trafficking. In A study of criminal involvement in sexual exploitation in Sweden, Finland and Estonia. Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention. Bullens, R. A. R., & van Horn, J. E. (2002). Labour of love: Female juvenile prostitution in the Netherlands. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 8(3), 43–58. Campana, P. (2016). The structure of human trafficking: Lifting the bonnet on a Nigerian transnational network. British Journal of Criminology, 56(1), 68–86. Carchedi, F. (2016). La criminalità transnazionale nigeriana. Alcuni aspetti strutturali. In S. Becucci & F. Carchedi (Eds.), Mafie straniere in Italia. Come operano, come si contrastano (pp. 29–55). Milano: FrancoAngeli. Cho, S.-Y. (2015). Modelling for determinants of human trafficking: An empirical analysis. Social Inclusion, 3(1), 2–21. Choo, S.-Y., & Grabosky, P. (2014). Cybercrime. In L. Paoli (Ed.), The oxford handbook of organized crime (pp. 482–499). New York: Oxford University Press.

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European Commission. (2016). The use of social media in the fight against migrant smuggling. Brussels: European Commission – Migration & Home Affairs. Di Nicola, A., Martini, E., & Baratto, G. (2019). Social Smugglers: Come i social network stanno modificando il traffico di migranti. Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa, 1, 74–100. Di Nicola, A., Cauduro, A., & Falletta, V. (2013). From the sidewalk to the digital highway: A study on the web as a source of information on prostitution and victims of human trafficking in Italy. Italian Journal of Criminology, 7(3), 219–228. Di Nicola, A. (2014). Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. In P. Reichel & J. Albanese (Eds.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (Second ed., pp.  143–164). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication. DNA—Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo. (2017). Relazione annuale sulle attività svolte dal Procuratore nazionale e dalla Direzione nazionale antimafia e antiterrorismo nonché sulle dinamiche e strategie della criminalità organizzata di tipo mafioso nel periodo 1 luglio 2015–30 giugno 2016. Available at: https://www.avvisopubblico.it/home/wp-content/ uploads/2017/06/RELAZIONE-DNA-1.7.2015-30.6.2016.pdf. Europol-EMSC. (2019). Trends & Dynamics in migrant smuggling and human trafficking. EMPT No. 400/Special Edition. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/ digital-smuggling-and-labour-exploitation-latest-trends-reported-in-epmt-400. Europol. (2019). IOCTA: Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2018a). IOCTA: Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2018b). Situation Report: Criminal networks involved in the trafficking and exploitation of underage victims in the European Union. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2016a). Situation Report: Trafficking in human beings in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2016b). Migrant smuggling in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2016c). Trafficking of human beings in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2014). Trafficking in human beings and the internet. The Hague: Europol. Europol-INTERPOL. (2016). Migrant smuggling networks: Joint Europol-INITERPOL Report. Available at: http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-europol-interpol-report.pdf. Finn, M. A., & Stalans, L. J. (2017). Managers’ rules about sex workers’ health and safety in the illicit online sex market: Considering profits and risks. In A. Horning & J. Sriken (Eds.), Third party sex work and pimps in the age of anti-trafficking (pp. 89–110). Cham: Springer. Garnier, J. (2007). The role of the civil society in preventing and combating the misuse of the internet for the recruitment of victims of trafficking in human beings. In Council of Europe (Ed.), Misuse of the Internet for the recruitment of victims of trafficking in human beings. Seminar proceedings. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Hughes, D. M. (2014). Trafficking in human beings in the European Union: Gender, sexual exploitation, and digital communication technologies. SAGE Open, 4(4), 1–8. Hughes, D. M. (2001). The impact of the use of new communications and information technologies on trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation: A study of the users. Available at: https:// works.bepress.com/donna_hughes/19/. Ibanez, M., & Suthers, D.  D. (2014). Detection of domestic human trafficking indicators and movement trends using content available on open internet sources. In 2014 47th Hawaii international conference on system sciences (pp. 1556–1565). IEEE. ICAT  – Inter-agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in persons. (2019). Human trafficking and technology: trends, challenges and opportunities. Available at: https://www. un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/report/human-trafficking-andtechnology-trends-challenges-and-opportunities/Human-trafficking-and-technology-trendschallenges-and-opportunities-WEB…-1.pdf. IOM  – International Organization for Migration. (2007). Global Eye on Human Trafficking. Available at: https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/projects/showcase_pdf/global_eye_first_issue.pdf. IOM – International Organization for Migration. (2017). La tratta di esseri umani attraverso la rotta del mediterraneo centrale: dati, storie e informazioni raccolte dall’organizzazione inter-

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nazionale per le migrazioni. Available at: https://italy.iom.int/sites/default/files/documents/ OIM_Rapporto%20tratta_2017.pdf. Ipsos Public Affairs. (2016). Lo stile di vita dei bambini e dei ragazzi. Available at: https:// s3.savethechildren.it/public/files/uploads/pubblicazioni/lo-stile-di-vita-dei-bambini-e-dei-ragazzi_1.pdf. Jac-Kucharski, A. (2012). The determinants of human trafficking: A US case study. International Migration, 50(6), 150–165. Oude Breuil, B. C., Siegel, D., van Reenen, P., Beijer, A., & Roos, L. (2011). Human trafficking revisited: Legal, enforcement and ethnographic narratives on sex trafficking to Western Europe. Trends in Organized Crime, 14(1), 30–46. Latonero, M., Wex, B., & Dank, M. (2015). Technology and labor trafficking in a networks society: General overview, emerging innovations and Philippines study. Los Angeles: Annenberg Centre on Communication Leadership & Policy, University of Southern California. Latonero, M., Musto, J., Boyd, Z., Boyle, E., Bissel, A., Gibson, K., & Kim, J. (2012). The rise of mobile and the diffusion of technology-facilitated trafficking. Los Angeles: Annenberg Centre on Communication Leadership & Policy, University of Southern California. Latonero, M., Musto, J., Boyd, Z., Boyle, E., Bissel, A., Gibson, K., & Kim, J. (2011). Human trafficking online: The role of social networking sites and online classifieds. Los Angeles: Annenberg Centre on Communication Leadership & Policy, University of Southern California. Lavorgna, A. (2015). Organised crime Goes online: Realities and challenges. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 18(2), 153–168. Maltzahn, K. (2006). Digital dangers information & communication technologies and trafficking in women. Available at: https://www.genderit.org/sites/default/files/digital_dangers_EN_1_0.pdf. Palmisano, L. (2017). Mafia Caporale. Roma: Fandango Libri. Raets, S., & Janssens, J. (2018). The economics of human trafficking in the digital age. In O. Shentov, A. Rusev, & G. A. Antonopoulos (Eds.), Financing of organised crime. Human trafficking in focus (pp. 85–94). Center for the Study of Democracy: Sofia. Santoni, S. (2018, August 9). ‘Caporalato: cos’è e cosa prevede la legge Martina’. Available at: https://www.panorama.it/economia/lavoro/caporalato-significato-legge-martina/. Save the Children. (2017). Piccoli schiavi invisibili. I minori stranieri vittime di tratta e sfruttamento in Italia. Available at: https://www.savethechildren.it/sites/default/files/files/uploads/ pubblicazioni/piccoli-schiavi-invisibili-2017.pdf. Selmi, G. (2009). Vendere sesso con le parole: narrazioni, sessualità e tecnologie al lavoro (Scuola di Dottorato in «Sociologia e Ricerca e Sociale» – XXII ciclo Indirizzo: Information Systems and Organizations). Trento: Università degli studi di Trento. Shelley, L. (2010). Human trafficking. A global perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. Siegel, D., & Yesilgoz, Y. (2003). Natashas and Turkish men: New trends in women trafficking and prostitution. In D. Siegel, H. van de Bunt, & D. Zaitch (Eds.), Global organized crime: Trends and developments (pp. 73–84). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher. Sykiotou, A.  P. (2007). Trafficking in human beings: Internet recruitment. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Spiezia, F. (2008). La tratta di esseri umani: gli strumenti investigativi di cooperazione internazionale. Available at: http://briguglio.asgi.it/immigrazione-e-asilo/2009/agosto/art-spieziatraff-ess-um.pdf. Terenghi, F., & Di Nicola, A. (2018). Market structure and social organisation of trafficking in human beings in the EU. In O. Shentov, A. Rusev, & G. A. Antonopoulos (Eds.), Financing of organised crime. Human trafficking in focus (pp.  29–53). Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy. Terre des Hommes. (2016). Child Labour Report 2016. Available at: https://www.terredeshommes. org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Child-Labour-Report-2016-ENGLISH.pdf. Thakor, M., & Boyd, D. (2013). Networked trafficking: Reflections on technology and the anti-­ trafficking movement. Dialectical Anthropology, 37(2), 277–290.

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UNICRI- Parsec. (2010). Trafficking of Nigerian girls in Italy. The Data, the Stories, the Social Services. Available at: http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentation/publications/ unicri_series/trafficking_nigeria-italy.pdf. UNHCR  – The UN Refugee Agency. (2016). From a refugee perspective. Discourse of Arabic speaking and Afghan refugees and migrants on social media from March to December 2016. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/5909af4d4/from-a-refugee-perspective.html. UNODC  – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2014). Global report on trafficking in persons. New York: United Nations. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/ global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons_html/GLOTIP_2014_full_report.pdf. UNODC  – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). The globalization of crime. A transnational organized crime threat assessment. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/ bibliography/the-globalization-of-crime-a-transnational-organized-crime-threat-assessment_ html/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf. Von Lampe, K., & Johansen, P. O. (2004). Organized crime and trust: On the conceptualization and empirical relevance of trust in the contexts of criminal networks. Global Crime, 6(2), 159–184. Yu, S. (2014). Human trafficking and the internet. In M. J. Palmiotto (Ed.), Combating human trafficking. A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 61–73). Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Chapter 3

The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the UK

3.1  Introduction In the United Kingdom, human trafficking has been recently addressed by the Modern Slavery Act 2015. This legislation provides a definition (s.2) echoing the direction taken by the Palermo protocol, prescribing a sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence of human trafficking. Conversely, human smuggling, or the facilitation of illegal migration is governed by the Immigration Act 1971 according to which the related offences similarly prescribe a custodial sentence of up to 14 years. Exploitation in the sex and labour markets constitutes the core criminal activity in human trafficking cases (see Cockbain 2018). Other categories of exploitation, according to British authorities, include domestic servitude, organ harvesting, forced begging, forced marriage and illegal adoption. Human smuggling is often confused with human trafficking because of their common platform that is irregular migration; however, smuggling does not involve exploitation, and it is an offence against the legal framework of migration, and an offence against the public order, whereas trafficking is a crime against the person. Human smuggling and trafficking are not new phenomena (see Morrison 2002), yet there are clear indications that the development, advancement and proliferation of digital technologies provides them with a potentially significant boost (Hughes 2014; Latonero et al. 2011, 2012; Sarkar 2015). According to a recent Europol report regarding the trafficking in human beings (THB) in the European Union (EU), online interactions and encounters have been observed as facilitating “several aspects of human trafficking and exploitation: targeting of potential victims; access to personal data; arrangement of logistics and transportation; recruitment through social media, chat forums and other websites; advertisement of victims; their exploitation and surveillance” (Europol 2016a: 12; Europol

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. A. Antonopoulos et al., Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42768-9_3

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2016b). The increasing diffusion of digital communication technologies,1 affords new creative opportunities for criminal enterprise, allowing it to operate with greater efficiency and anonymity, and to expand its reach towards a larger potential clientele over extensive distances and across geographic boundaries (see Hughes 2014; Latonero et al. 2011; Mendel and Sharapov 2014; Sykiotou 2007; Sarkar 2015). At present, scholarly work investigating the role that digital technologies play in the processes of human smuggling and trafficking or the particular ways in which the Internet has been used to shape the criminal strategies of traffickers and smugglers is emerging at increasing pace (see, for example, Di Nicola et al. 2015; Latonero et  al. 2011, 2012). Researchers across several academic disciplines including Computer Science, Information Science, Sociology, Criminology and Law (Bach and Dohy 2015) are exploring the emerging field using a variety of methodologies and theoretical frameworks. Di Nicola et al. (2015) have explored the internet and social media for possible occurrences of human trafficking and sexual exploitation in Italy by conducting an analysis of a sample of prostitution advertisements placed on the most popular adult sites in Italy, as well as of those placed on Twitter pages for five of the most important adult portals. In turn, they developed a set of indicators that could suggest the presence of human trafficking, and by extension, victims. These were: (1) the nationality of the prostitutes, (2) the listing of a young age, (3) professional images featured of the women in the advertisements, and (4) surface misspellings in the text of the advertisement (Di Nicola et al. 2015). If an advertisement possessed these four indicators, it could strongly suggest that the featured woman in the advertisement was a victim of trafficking (Di Nicola et  al. 2015). Overall, Di Nicola et  al. (2015) have provided a useful starting point for the study of online sex trafficking, which has also been of import for the research reported in this chapter. Nevertheless, although, as Latonero et al. (2011) emphasise, identifying incidences of human trafficking on the Internet is not a straightforward task, and remains a challenge for researchers and law enforcement alike. As Sykiotou (2007) observes, researching websites for human trafficking can lead to no more than indications justifying suspicion (p. 32) as there is no evidence that the women featured in advertisements for sexual services are in fact trafficking victims. In light of such important considerations and issues, the present chapter presents an empirical account on the role of the Internet and digital technologies in the processes of human smuggling and trafficking in the United Kingdom. As noted earlier, we undertook an extensive examination into the function of the Internet and digital technologies in the facilitation of the recruitment and transportation/entry phases of people smuggling towards and/or into the UK, and the recruitment, transportation

1  Included also are Applications, or ‘Apps’ as they are popularly referred to, which are programmes that run on smart phones and other mobile devices such as tablets. Most popular are instant messaging and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communication apps such as WhatsApp, Viber, Skype as well as Facebook’s own Messenger application.

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and exploitation phases of the trafficking process in the UK sex and labour markets. Our results are presented in the above order.

3.2  Human Smuggling 3.2.1  Recruitment Most of our findings about how the Internet and digital technologies facilitate the processes of human smuggling to the UK emerged from researching social networking websites, in particular Facebook. Our virtual ethnographic research demonstrates that social networking sites are a key instrument for migrants and smugglers to broadcast information about travelling routes, the occurrence of border closures, transportation services and involved costs of arranging trips. We found a large number of active and highly popular smuggling-related pages and groups on Facebook advertising transportation services, the sale of counterfeit travel documents such as passports, visas and identification papers including driving licenses, as well as hosting general discussions of the navigation of paths into the UK and wider Europe. As one of our interviewed experts mentioned, communication and the broadcasting of important information, such as which countries are easy to enter, where borders are open to travel through and where they have been closed, play powerful roles in the recruitment of migrants to be smuggled and influence their decision-making processes: It [the Internet] would be spreading news, if it’s easy to get through the process of an asylum application, the news spreads very quickly, for example ‘it’s more relaxed in this country or the other country’, then people will plan destinations accordingly. Again, it’s communication, it’s how you spread the news (Interview with Expert 2).

In another typical site we encountered during our research, smugglers advertised services by highlighting danger and urging potential clients to connect via Viber app. As most of these pages and groups were private and unable to be freely accessed, we added these pages and groups as ‘friends’ in order to gain access to their full content (Facebook only allows “friends” to view one’s full timeline and posts), and also to receive notifications of new postings and updates relating to transportation journeys, the advertisement of new trips, usually dependent on suitable weather conditions, and the sale of passports or other such counterfeit documents. Due to the illicit nature of these pages, we noticed that the names would be changed constantly, possibly as a means of avoiding detection, or accounts closed altogether. As one of our interviewed smugglers remarked, human smugglers would continuously create and close pages on Facebook to evade possible law enforcement efforts: I closed them [Smuggling pages on Facebook] all. There are not there anymore. There is no point in having them. I had many because I used each page for a little bit and then I opened another one and so one. For protection, you know. You don’t want to be stable in this business, you need to ‘move’ again and again for protection (Interview with Smuggler 2).

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Our interviews with human smugglers revealed that the Internet was an important tool in their smuggling activities, in particular the recruitment phase to advertise their services, albeit at different levels of use: Yes [using the Internet] but not as much as you may think. Most of my business in the beginning [recruitment] happens by people [offline]. People know you, they know what you do, they know you are a kacakci [smuggler], and they come to you and tell you what they want. … I don’t trust the internet so much anyway because you never know who might be watching … My business partner in Kurdistan will send messages to friends, e-mails and ask “do you know anyone who wants to go to Europe? If you do, tell them to send me a message at so and so…” (Interview with Smuggler 1). Yes, I have used the internet many, many times! Internet along with mobile phones, of course, is the best to have business from a distance! I have been helping people to come to the UK since 2002. I enjoy being a kacakci [human smuggler]. […] I used Facebook before I come to England for a year, a year and a half. I had many pages in face book and advertised my services. Transportation, travel to Europe, good prices, best service (Interview with Smuggler 2).

Smuggler 1 emphasised that often recruitment took place offline, as people who knew of them either directly or indirectly, through friends or relatives, and of their occupation as a smuggler would initiate contact in person and make enquiries on how to travel to the UK for themselves or for their relatives. According to Sanchez (2017), those seeking to migrate explore potential smuggling options usually by taking advice from their friends and relatives who have made and undertaken successful smuggling journeys, often meeting with smugglers in person or chatting via telephone and may meet several smugglers until a suitable option is chosen. Moreover, a small number of smugglers manage to form a client base and positive reputation attesting to the reliability, degree of communication throughout the journey and the quality of the transportation, all of which contribute to the duration of a smuggling enterprise, enabling smugglers to generate and conduct business with prospective customers. A finding that requires close consideration is that some pages, particularly the ones that were more active and popular, would expose fraudulent smugglers who were advertising deceptive transportation services. These posts would often be very lengthy, detailing the unscrupulous smuggler’s name, nationality, the country and city they were operating in, how they had defrauded their victim or victims, particularly regarding payment. Often a photograph of the person was also attached to the post. Some people would comment on the post to confirm that they, too, had been deceived by the duplicitous smuggler and would strongly urge others to be aware and use caution. It is not unreasonable to assume that the pages routinely exposing deceptive smugglers act as a very effective form of benevolent recruitment. In these cases, by demonstrating that they were looking after and protecting potential migrants by raising awareness of dangerous swindlers masquerading as smugglers, smugglers would instil confidence in their services, and in turn encourage migrants to arranging trips using with these pages instead.

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3.2.2  Transportation A significant number of Facebook pages were actively advertising transportation services, including boat, yacht or flight trips and to a lesser extent, land routes where the journey would be made on foot, to various countries in Europe, with one popular method of travel being from Turkey, in particular the cities of Izmir and Mersin, to various islands in Greece, and then utilising various routes to and within an assortment of European countries to the destination of the UK. One of our interviewed smugglers mentioned that a relative of theirs would advertise the sale of European passports to facilitate transportation and entry to the UK: My cousin is in France and in his Facebook account has a post about European passports. With one of those you get to England with no problem. You just need the money, 800-1000 euros is OK. [On being showed the particular Facebook account, including the advert/post translated from Arabic to English] “Want to buy passport, ID, visa and driving license with no hassle? We make really high quality documents for travel to European countries. We sell only best documents. Guaranteed success. We make perfect passports for UK, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, USA, Canada. Very competitive prices. Discount available for families. The passport can be ready in 5 days. For more information, send an e-mail: [email protected] / tel. 0033 2 99xxxxxx” (Interview with Smuggler 2).

Typically, these pages would post photographs of the particular means of transport, usually of boats, cruise liners and yachts, providing information on its size and dimensions, and the duration of the journey. In addition, these posts would also outline the prices charged for the routes and journey, and include a contact number to make further enquiries. Moreover, by way of perhaps gaining the confidence and trust of potential customers and by extension migrants, we discovered that many of these pages extensively posted photographs and videos of “successful” trips made, both during the journey, and after the destination had been reached. A box was featured on many of these pages that attested to how quickly the persons behind these pages would reply to messages, with some of the pages marked as “very responsive”, as replying within an hour, and others as “extremely responsive”, responding to messages in minutes. Some pages would also post status updates of successful journeys made, alert potential migrants of adverse weather conditions and of new routes into Europe using screenshots of Google Maps to demonstrate these routes in terms of distance and how to travel through the route without discovery by border guards or officials. We came across numerous instances of the interplay between various forms of technology, in this instance between the Internet and mobile phone applications, WhatsApp and Viber being the most widely used. It appears that when used in this way by smugglers, Facebook operates as a gateway, in that it introduces potential migrants to services through advertisements. Then further communications, most likely to arrange transportation journeys and discuss payment take place through WhatsApp and Viber, usually through the telephone numbers listed in the post. This was the usual method used by our interviewed smugglers, in which initial questions would be answered through private chats in Facebook but would then take place via

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mobile phone to make further arrangements between the smugglers and the clients, or between smugglers working alongside other smugglers: This [private chats in Facebook] was very rare after they contacted me. Most of clients gave me a call; I offered a telephone number in the post, so they called me and made all arrangements. There are a few of, usually very young, people who will send messages in private chat in Facebook. Young boys who are online the whole time and are interested in going to Europe and they may want to ask something before the arrangements are made. You know to ask whether they can come with less money. Maybe because they don’t have a phone, I don’t know. Most of the people called me and I answer any questions they have. (Interview with Smuggler 2). I just use mobile phones to communicate with my partners in places like Istanbul and Izmir. This is how we take care of business. Once the people get to Greece, there are others who take care of them. I also talk to people I know about the travel and advise them what to do when in Istanbul because it is very big and people from my town find it difficult. (Interview with Smuggler 1).

When it comes to the smuggling of Asian and African migrants, all smuggling groups and/or individuals ‘cooperate’ (without even considering it) in an attempt to bring the bulk of migrants from Asia and Africa to the United Kingdom (as well as other countries of Western Europe). This takes place via a smuggler-to-smuggler approach that does not allow irregular migrants to be lost (see Içduygu and Toktas 2002). Smugglers often unwittingly collaborate with other smugglers, even though they are not known to one another and may live and operate in different villages, cities, regions, and countries (see, for example, Sanchez 2017). In the event of arrest of one of the smugglers, or if the chain is sometimes broken during the journey (e.g., due to policing operations), other individuals, groups and networks, who have no connection with the smugglers of the initial stage, take over in the smuggling migrants. Information and communication technologies are instrumental at this part. Smugglers and their clients rely on basic mobile phones for communication purposes, alongside social media and to recruit and guide clients. Still, as Sanchez (2017) points out, this usage is better understood as a reflection of the affordability and availability of mobile technology, rather than as a marker of the technological sophistication of smugglers. Significant sections of the communications that place between various smugglers working together take place through mobile technology, including phone calls, text messages (SMS), as well as WhatsApp and Viber and social media websites. These undertakings, when executed productively and in coordination, will guide clients to their final destination. As part of our work in the virtual field, we tried to contact some of the more popular smuggling Facebook pages, particularly those appearing more likely to respond swiftly to messages. The rationale for this approach was to try and find out whether there were particular pages or smugglers and ‘brokers’ that would be able to provide information on ways of transportation and routes taken to travel, specifically to the United Kingdom. We contacted these pages with a simple inquiry of how it would be possible to travel to the United Kingdom, from Syria as well as the costs involved as a lone traveller for the journey. As a means of initiating conversation, we used an online translation tool to translate text to Arabic, and then

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proceeded to send messages to the pages via Facebook’s web (and desktop)-based Messenger feature. Whilst some of these pages did indeed provide swift responses, the majority of the time the we were informed that further information could only be discussed through mobile phone applications such as WhatsApp and Viber, with contact numbers provided to do so. However, given that these conversations would be conducted entirely in Arabic, and with us possessing insufficient knowledge of the Arabic language, this, unfortunately, was an impossible, challenging task. Nevertheless, using a Facebook account yielded much data, in that we were able to gain more access and insight into previously inaccessible content, such as relevant smuggling groups and pages. The smugglers that we interviewed also remarked on the use of the Internet, in particular social media and mobile phones as being key mechanisms in the logistics of the transportation process, specifically keeping in contact with the clients during the transportation journey, as well as the arrival of their clients to the destination and, importantly, the arrangement of payment. Irregular migrants (or their families who very often see the facilitation of their migration as an investment) pay the full or at least 50% of the total smuggling fee in advance. This 50% is in most occasions used towards paying important actors of the journey before the actual journey starts. The rest of the fee is paid upon the migrants’ arrival in the destination country. Advance payments often are made to a middleman, a trusted and prominent member of the local community, who then forwards the payment to the organiser upon the end of the migrants’ facilitated journey: Once we have a customer, I have used Facebook and I have also been using e-mail in order to take care of details with regards to the details of the trip from Kurdistan to Istanbul and from Istanbul to Izmir, from Izmir into the Greek islands. Sometimes, especially when I know the person I helped to travel e-mails and Facebook are used to let me know that they have reached the destination and to sort out any outstanding money issues. We have to get paid too! You know, where to go and who to pay and so on. Sometimes there are problems any people are getting lost, they cannot find a place to stay, they cannot find someone to talk to, etc. etc. etc. the travel is full of problems and you cannot do this without e-mails, and phones (Interview with Smuggler 2).

As well as advertising transportation services, one of our interviewed smugglers would also provide information on available accommodation and where to charge phones during journeys for which the duration of the trip to the destination country was uncertain: In most of the places people have to stay [transit points], they need a house, a bed to sleep on. The best way for them to know what is there, cheap places to stay, is Facebook. You can find a hotel anywhere in Europe but the problem is that they are very expensive. When they travel for months or even years they want to spend as little money as possible. You never know how long the trip will last, and in some place they ask them for a lot of money, 5 euros for a bottle of water, 10 euros for a sandwich, and some people Greece, in Italy, in France, they ask you 20 euros to let you recharge your mobile battery. So in the internet, in Facebook, you can advertise accommodation for as little as 10 euros a night. When people travel, they are always on their mobiles to find the cheapest solutions to their everyday problems… my cousin does the same for cheap rooms. [On being showed a relevant post on Facebook on available accommodation in France] “Cheap rooms in Calais. 15 euros per night, TV included. Common toilet with shower. Clean. Available for families. Discount negotiable. For more information, tel. 0033 2 99xxxxxx”] (Interview with Smuggler 2).

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3.3  Human Trafficking 3.3.1  Recruitment The recruitment of victims is an integral aspect of the human trafficking process. A plethora of websites, including social networking and microblogging services such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as online classifieds, dating and international marriage agency sites (see Jones 2011), have been documented as recruiting people into trafficking and advertising the sale of their services, for the purposes of sexual or labour exploitation (see Hughes 2014; Latonero et  al. 2011, 2012; Mendel and Sharapov 2014; Sarkar 2015; Sykiotou 2007). According to one of the NGO representatives that we interviewed, the Internet, as well as social media sites such as Facebook have been reported as facilitating the recruitment of victims of human trafficking to the UK: If I constructed a poll of people [victims] that I’ve asked about how they learnt about jobs, yes, people would say they went on a website for instance and found a job. So yes, the tricky thing is how to quantify the balance between the human factors and the technological factors, because most people we work with tell us about people that were involved, and yet for me the interesting bit is how did they meet those people? It’s all very well saying ‘I met a friend’, which is pretty much what everybody tells you, ‘I was exploited by a friend’, ‘a friend introduced me’, etcetera, and I don’t think there’s a process or system yet where we ask the follow-on questions like ‘where did you meet that friend?’, ‘were you connected on Facebook?’, ‘did you use-’, I think the internet yes- social media- the internet yes in terms of recruiting job adverts and social media (Interview with NGO 3).

To attract and recruit potential victims online, traffickers frequently place spurious, promising advertisements on employment, dating and marriage websites for jobs including: administration, cleaning, home help, child care, waitressing, hostessing, pole dancing, transportation, the collection and delivery of charity bags, agricultural farming and construction roles, educational courses or work in the tourism sector (see also Europol 2014). Our online research revealed some distinct examples of potentially deceptive recruitment, in that we found advertisements of women selling sexual services on online classifieds that were written in very poor English, advertising women as working in several areas of the UK, such as in Birmingham, Oxford, Newcastle and London, under various aliases. In one instance, by means of performing a Google search of the number listed in the advertisements, it emerged that the same number was present on general employment sites in Lithuania, advertising and recruiting for jobs available in the UK. Such jobs listed were for charity collection and waitress work in the cities of Manchester and London for a high salary of £150–200 a day, in which accommodation and transportation to work were included. However, there was no mention of the company, organisation or the name of the person recruiting for work or the requirement of any qualifications, with the only other information available in the advertisement being the mobile phone number. In another occurrence, the mobile phone number connected to a dubious advertisement on an online classified website for a woman selling sexual services in London, was also present in the employment section of an online Romanian

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newspaper for available work in the UK. This particular listing was for “unskilled labour” and mentioned that “conversational English” was preferable. Again, the name of the company or the person posting the advertisement was not disclosed, and nor, more importantly, was the specific job role. In her extensive examination of the role of the Internet in the facilitation of the trafficking of human beings for labour exploitation in several EU Member States, such as the Czech Republic, Ireland, Romania and the UK, Muskat-Gorska (2014) identified the presence of several “red flags” that may indicate that a posted job offer was untrustworthy, and could lead to an unwitting candidate’s exploitation. Such common red flags include: the promise of an unrealistically high salary for an unqualified job, the particular advert possessing only a general description of the job, no address of the company or organisation and the associated contact details of the advertisement containing only a mobile phone number or a general e-mail address for further enquiries. Our findings align with these red flags, and we suspect that these adverts are spurious and act as a means to lure and traffic women to the UK for purposes of sexual and/ or labour exploitation. The mobile phone numbers may belong to a trafficking group or network based in the UK, who post bogus advertisements on online classified websites in their native countries and may also arrange the transportation and travel of their targeted victims to the UK. The production of such sites that are used to recruit and lure victims for sexual exploitation overseas possess a distinctive consistency to them. Websites are frequently created and organised by traffickers in the countries of origin and in the languages of potential victims, with these sites then fostering others, which build up to form national recruitment networks. As such, the content collected through the first website is then used on a second, the aim being to attract clients. Information on the victims that have been recruited is then translated into English, as well as the languages of other sex markets where the traffickers desire to trade. We came across a potential trafficking network operating between Bulgaria and Greece, recruiting for young women between the ages of 18–35 to work as escorts in the UK. To a lesser extent, advertisements were also posted in English, recruiting for women of any nationality and physical body shape to work in the Oxford area, predominantly on the adult jobs section of www.backpage.com/uk. Our analysis and translation into English of the content of the Bulgarian and Greek advertisements revealed that each of the listings, despite the differences in language, contained an extremely similar layout and written information, with the full text of one of the advertisements outlined below: Ad: Escort for England £200 – 500 tii (sic) a day attractive and sexy girls profesionaliski [sic] and not, at the age of 18 to ‘35 to work in England. knowledge of English is an advantage but not essential. We are looking only serious girls who want to make a lot of money in a short time. for more information, please send current pictures and write to that email address [email protected] City: Sofia, Bulgaria Tel: 004407596475xxx

A Google search of the e-mail address posted in the advertisement above revealed the presence of several more advertisements placed on both Bulgarian and Greek online classified and adult sex websites, which indicates that this e-mail address is

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accessed and used by criminal groups or individuals based and operating in Bulgaria and Greece, who respond to enquiries made by potential aspirants regarding the advertisements and may also organise travel and transportation from and between the two countries to the UK.  Although all of the advertisements are recruiting women for sex work in the UK as escorts, there is no disclosure of the recruiter, thus it is impossible to determine whether it is an agency, a company or an individual who posted the advertisement. Moreover, there is no description of the terms of the job role, nor the location of the place of work, as well as there being no mention of the daily working hours involved. In one of the other advertisements, we noted the advertisement offered “free accommodation”, yet there was no reference to the location of residence or the type of dwelling, nor whether the accommodation was tied to the workplace. As a report published by the National Crime Agency (NCA) affirms, victims exploited for labour originating from Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania stated that they were offered accommodation in the UK as well as transportation to the UK as part of an employment package (see National Crime Agency Strategic Assessment, 2015). We noted that the all advertisements of this nature emphasised that there was “no experience necessary” for the job, and although knowledge of the English language would be advantageous, it was not an essential factor, which would suggest perhaps that women recruited may be advertised as being new to the UK sex market and to working in the sex industry, with emphasis placed on their lack of experience as an escort to attract potential customers or clients. Furthermore, a salient aspect of these advertisements was the aim to recruit “serious women looking to make a lot of money in a short period of time”, with the promise of unrealistically high amounts of money – for an unqualified job and a basic grasp of English – to be earnt each day, ranging from £200–500, acting as an effective form of enticement. What is also highly remarkable about this assortment of Bulgarian and Greek advertisements is that all of them exhibit all of the red flags mentioned earlier. Further casting doubt and arousing our suspicions over the authenticity of these Bulgarian and Greek advertisements is that a Google search of the e-mail address, as well as the first half of the e-mail address, given its distinctive name and assortment of numbers, exposed the existence of several profiles of women on adult online classified websites in the UK, including www.backpage.com/uk, www.vivastreet. co.co.uk and www.punternet.com. We found that the profile descriptions for each particular woman all featured the same written information and style of writing, which signifies that these profiles have not been written by the women themselves. These profiles may have been created, penned and posted on several online classified websites by the same criminal group or individuals that also manage the aforementioned advertisements and by extension the women, for recruitment. All of the women in the profiles were advertised as working in Oxford under various mobile phone numbers, although each profile did also feature the same e-mail address as listed in the recruitment advertisements as another means of contact. A multitude of motivations may have influenced the decisions of these women to travel and perform sex work, by applying for escort jobs abroad. Much of the literature pertaining to migration for the purposes of performing sex work has highlighted

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that such decisions to migrate are often motivated by a desire for personal advancement, following friends who are perceived as being “successful” and wealthy abroad. Other reasons include supporting family members back in one’s country of origin, wanting to attain a degree of independence, being afforded opportunities to travel and see the world (see Siegel 2012, 2016), and that actively, many of the women were already working as prostitutes in their native countries. Women are recruited to socialise and mingle in clubs, pubs, night-time economy (NTE) establishments or in parties of the same ethnic groups (for example Romanian, Bulgarian, Czech, Russian), with traffickers browsing social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as digital mobile phone apps such as WhatsApp to locate other women who could work in the sex industry. Once potential victims are discovered, they are brought to the pimp or trafficker, who then introduces them to various sex industry venues throughout the country. At this stage, the women are usually aware of the type of work they are going to be introduced in. Petrunov (2014) notes that there has been an evolution in the trafficker-victim relationship concerning recruitment and relocation over the years, where “soft” methods are now most frequently used, rather than the coercion that was typical in the 1990s. In the majority of cases, the consent of the trafficked person is acquired, and the division of earnings is prenegotiated, with most individuals having been informed about the purpose of the trip, and the type of work they will be undertaking when they have arrived to the destination country. The main factor in the recruitment, is the promise of material gain, with coercion not usually taking place during the recruitment process. One of our interviewed experts recounted a discussion that had taken place with a sex worker who had travelled from her native country of Moldova to work in the sex industry abroad, wherein the woman was receptive of potential risks involved in regards to her personal safety and working environment, yet such dangers were seen as tolerable, as her performing sex work was an investment that would enhance her future trajectory: I was speaking to a sex worker who was Moldavian… she had some rough times, but the impression you got from talking with her was that all of this were acceptable risks, she was desperate to go out of her country, she was also desperate to send money back to her country, she got into some trouble with a bar owner, yes she was being exploited, but within those margins, she had managed to accomplish a plan that she initially came up with about her life trajectory, “yes I’ll leave my city, go to a different country, do some sex work, work in a bar” and there she was ten years after, and she was okay, or she sounded so, I have no reason to believe any different (Interview with Expert 2).

As some scholars such as Petrunov (2014) assert, one of the main reasons for working in the sex industry is the relatively large amount of earnings, compared with what these women would earn if they stayed in their home countries, accompanied with the ability to make a considerable amount of money in a shorter amount of time. However, in their research examining the recruitment and migration of women to Italy for sex work, Cauduro et al. (2009) ague that although the women understand that they will be working as prostitutes, this does mean that they do not undergo sexual exploitation by their traffickers or pimps, or that they exert their will in a completely autonomous manner. Petrunov (2014), who in interviewing over

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117 trafficking victims from the three largest ethnic groups in Bulgaria – Bulgarians, Roma and Turks, found that a sizeable number of respondents reported that they had experienced some coercion after they began working in the destination country, is also in qualified agreement. It is important to note, therefore, that whilst these recruited women may have applied to the advertisements listed on the Bulgarian and/or Greek websites with conscious awareness of what the work in the UK will entail, the possibility exists that these women may have underestimated the risks involved and they too, through coercion and threats, may be placed in exploitative situations by their pimps or traffickers. As some of the NGOs that we interviewed informed us, in their work, the “lover-­ boy” method is a common tactic in the recruitment of victims to the UK.  This involves a recruiter or trafficker, either operating alone or as part of a larger group, who feigns romantic interest in a girl or young woman and seduces her with promises of marriage and an auspicious future by travelling abroad from the country of origin. As the relationship develops further, the recruiter or trafficker manipulates or coerces the victim into sexual exploitation through prostitution: Generally, you’ve got ‘lover-boy’ situation, people falling in love, then “let’s go travelling, let’s go abroad” and then the other way was just the promise of a job, so an agent or someone in a village would come and offer work, playing on vulnerabilities of poverty, lack of education, etcetera, to try and offer people things that actually don’t really ever exist (Interview with NGO 3). A trafficker will identify a child in a local community and actually befriend their family or befriend the child, or, in some cases of sexual exploitation, a boyfriend will be actually be used to then traffic a girl into sexual exploitation abroad (Interview with NGO 2).

In addition, direct contact is also initiated with victims in chat rooms or via social networking sites, where traffickers pose as friends or lovers to recruit victims, often exchanging e-mails, messages, photographs and videos with their victims to build a relationship and gain their trust and confidence. NGO 3 stated that in the grooming and recruitment of children for the purposes of sexual exploitation, instead of initial physical contact with the victim, the Internet has enabled similar manifestations to the “lover-boy” tactic to take place online, on a range of social media websites and digital applications: The more generalised ones, so obviously Twitter, Facebook. We look at sites where there’s more chatting going on, so Facebook, where Facebook groups are set up, you’re looking at Snapchat, you’re looking at WhatsApp, you’re looking at those types of apps that traffickers use to access children. If you’re looking at Facebook for recruitment purposes, you’re seeing traffickers targeting children online, inviting them to chat, and posing as children themselves. So a trafficker will pose as a child to gain a level of trust over a certain period of time, offer gifts, maybe arrange a meeting and in that context, then the child might have already been groomed, but then groomed further into sexual exploitation and commercial or organised sexual exploitation. Obviously, these websites and applications maybe have different purposes and they function in slightly differently, but historically, you’re looking at similar forms of grooming just using different technologies and different approaches (Interview with NGO 2).

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Another interesting point raised by NGO 3 concerns the usage of social media applications by traffickers to determine how close in proximity, a potential victim is to them, in terms of a nearby town or city, or even within the same locality, thus enabling them to easily track, meet and build up a relationship to gain their targeted victim’s trust: I think probably ID’ing [identifying] locations, so if someone [victim] is using Facebook and had their location on, it’s very easy for someone [trafficker] to start assessing whether or not they are local to them, so do they invite them for a coffee or do they invite them to meet them and their friends, so I think social media is used like that, something we’ve observed is that lots of people we’ve worked with aren’t particularly internet savvy, which means they don’t have security settings on correctly (Interview with NGO 3).

Many electronic devices such as mobile phones and tablets have, within their settings, built-in location services functions that enable any third-party applications and websites to use information based on the user’s current location, to provide numerous location-based services, such as finding nearby amenities that include parks and restaurants. On this point, if a user has enabled location services, knowingly or unknowingly on their device, then such action would allow social media applications, such as Facebook, and/or Twitter to gain access to and publicly display the user’s location to their ‘friends’, through the user’s status updates, uploading of photographs and messages sent via Facebook’s Messenger feature, or depending on the user’s privacy settings, whoever is able to view their profile. Consequently, the visibility of one’s location to others can have negative implications for the user and possess much benefit for a trafficker searching for women to recruit. NGO representatives interviewed mentioned that many of the victims they had worked with were not shrewd in their use of the Internet and were neglectful in checking their location services settings on their mobile phones. Thus, an imperative aspect of NGO 3’s work in supporting victims of trafficking was to spend time educating them on the importance of Internet safety, ensuring that the victims understood the data they were sharing and who could see it, in the hope that doing so would act as prevention of the occurrence of re-trafficking.

3.3.2  Transportation Thus far, research undertaken into the scale and nature of human trafficking activity has indicated that the UK is primarily a dominant destination country for trafficking victims rather than a transit country in trafficking routes (see, for example, Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2006). In 2006, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which maintains a Trafficking Database of research reports by inter-governmental, governmental and non-governmental sources on human trafficking trends, reported that within Europe, the UK ranked “high” as a destination country for the trafficking of human beings. Moreover, the UNODC (2006) report noted that the UK is one of the main destinations for children and adults who are trafficked from: Central and South Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of

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Independent States (CIS); Africa; Asia; Latin America; and the Caribbean. Such findings from the UNODC (2006) report are supported by our interviewed LEAs and NGOs. The Internet has been recognised in facilitating the transportation of trafficking victims, who are normally recruited in their own countries. NGO interviewees in particular outlined how social media sites have been used to aid the transportation process by among other facilitating the booking of tickets and obtaining travel documentation in several types of transportation: The Internet and social media sites such as Facebook have enabled young people to contact individuals in neighbouring countries, arranging to meet people they think are friends who have been suggested to help facilitate the transportation of young people into countries when attempting to seek asylum. On arrival and/or through transportation to the destination country, young people have been exploited through labour means (Interview with NGO 1). I would say yes, because- well I’m sure they facilitate it, in the sense of things like cheap airlines, megabus, all the cheap transport systems, it’s really easy for a recruiter to then be booking people on to- it’s a faceless booking process isn’t it, I think that the Internet does then facilitate the movement of people, by the fact that you can book and then hand tickets out to people (Interview with NGO 3).

Tickets are purchased online by traffickers often by using compromised credit card data, in order to conceal their identities and thereby add another layer of anonymity and distance to their criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the use of stolen credit card information beneficially ensures that the tickets nor the victims are able to be easily linked back to the traffickers. Various methods of conveyance are utilised in the trafficking of victims, such as travelling from the origin country by air direct to the UK via budget airlines, or transport by road through international bus, coach, minibus services (National Crime Agency Strategic Assessment, 2015), or by truck and private car, which has been noted as offering more flexibility than air or train (see Dimitrova 2006). Furthermore, routes and entry procedures also differ, contingent on the country of origin, the modus operandi of the traffickers, and the personal circumstances of the victim. An account of the logistics involved in the transportation of children to the UK for purposes of exploitation was provided to us by NGO 2: Oftentimes, children will be brought in directly through ports, for example airports, Dover, you’ll notice that the largest number of children identified in a London local authority will be in Kent, and the largest number of children going missing from a local authority have also been in Kent, so that’s predominantly because the port there. So you’ll see a disproportionate number of children actually in areas where there are ports, so children are brought through either on false passports, or on their own passports, unaccompanied or accompanied and not identified by border staff. So you do have a lot of issues surrounding ­identification and you also see children, particularly those recruited for criminal activities rather than illegally enter on lorries, the back of lorries. There was a case recently where there were four or five children were identified in Kent, and then subsequently went missing in 24 hours (Interview with NGO 2).

It is salient to acknowledge that transportation to the destination is frequently executed legally, as during the transportation phase, the victims move voluntarily and

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co-operate with the traffickers, as they believe that they are going to work at a legitimate job. In particular, for countries in Europe that are part of the EU, the principle of freedom of movement within them has granted a legal possibility for nationals of EU member states to enter and cross the border of transit and destination countries legally, with their own travel documents, which has resulted in difficulties in prevention within the transportation stage (see also Savona et al. 2013). After the accession of former Eastern Bloc countries in the EU, female nationals from Eastern Europe could freely and legally travel to the UK - among other countries – to study at the university or work in various sectors of the economy. These opportunities, which obliged traffickers to alter their approach since their potential victims were empowered to approach the authorities, since the possibility of deportation was not present. This has been the case with the rise of the Internet and mobile phones, which gave more freedom to sex workers to work independently, but at the same time, also gave criminals more opportunities for control by for instance, allowing pimps to communicate directly with clients as well as giving them the capacity to regularly control the women. An ICT-related issue associated with the transportation process is forged documents. We identified much evidence of forged documents as a possible means of facilitating the transportation of trafficking victims to the UK, through conducting part of our virtual ethnography on the deep web. Using the Tor web-browser and search engines such as ‘Grams’, ‘TorSearch’ and ‘TORCH’, in the same manner as we would with the surface web, we found a deluge of darknet markets, such as ‘Fake ID’, ‘Forgery Store’, ‘Onion Identity Services’ and ‘Valhalla’, that were selling counterfeit travel documents, such as passports, as well as markets that were advertising the sale of identity papers, including drivers’ licenses, identity (ID) cards and birth certificates that were available for all nationalities. Aside from being able to cross borders under legal pretences, such documentation is highly useful for acquiring bank accounts, applying for loans or being to rent property, particularly in the destination country once arrival has been made to the intended location. Although such contraband items are also obtainable to purchase on the surface web, the assurance of anonymity and the protection of the users’ identities, resulting in a lower risk of detection from law enforcement within the infrastructure of the dark web, is of high appeal to potential buyers and marketplace sellers who partake in illicit (or licit) web transactions and/or communication exchanges. As one of our interviewed experts on cybercrime trenchantly asserted, in such online endeavours, there may be a broad range of criminal actors involved, spanning from those with rudimentary experience of the Internet, to those who possess much technological adeptness (see also Treadwell 2012), such as accessing the dark web to engage in illicit trade: So then I suppose the other thing to look at is how much do you need to be technically-savvy or not in this trade to be able to use the technology… It’s probably anywhere from a really tech-savvy person through to a person using Facebook and not really knowing that much else about technology. Most of the time you find it all runs on a continuum, from really highly skilled IT people through to your average everyday person (Interview with Expert 1).

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Traffickers may be connected to criminal networks that are highly-organised that may also be linked to domestic networks, or, they may operate locally on a very small level (see also Sarkar 2015). In this instance, “buyers” may include members of a criminal organisation, such as a trafficking gang, or a lone trafficker purchasing documentation on behalf of their recruited victims. Or conversely, such members may be buying documentation for themselves to accompany their recruited victims, as a way of obscuring their real identities when travelling abroad. We noted that, depending on the particular vendor, the means of payment for the purchase of such documentation was through traditional forms of currency such as the Euro (€), or via Bitcoin (Ƀ),2 a decentralised peer-to-peer payments network and a virtual currency that essentially functions as online cash (see Brito and Castillo 2013). Many of the counterfeit documents for sale on various darknet markets were claimed by the sellers to possess very high levels of authenticity, with some stating that their documents had been “tested and working fine all around the world”, enabling one to travel freely and unproblematically without triggering suspicion, as well as passing standard cursory inspection procedures at post offices and for person-to-person payment transfer services in which money can be sent or received, such as MoneyGram and Western Union. Similarly, some sellers of passports available to purchase stated that there were no issues with travelling and entering another country, as the passports could also, for extra money, be affixed with visa stamps as well as being registered within official government databases of the destination country to avert suspicions and discovery. Technological capabilities have enabled further counterfeiting to take place, because not only can better fakes be developed at reduced prices, but advancements in ICT links dispersed locations in global trade relations, which makes the formation of networks of buyers and sellers and the exchange of money relatively straightforward. This has become especially discernible since the Internet and e-commerce by producers and consumers became widespread, with the Internet acting as a “time/space compressor, on the one hand connecting sellers with large numbers of consumers in dispersed locations and on the other offering the formation of transient relationships between (cyber)criminal entrepreneurs” (Hall and Antonopoulos 2016: 23). A key feature of transnational trafficking is the complexity in its undertaking, in which to successfully transport a person to a country or across a continent, there is the requirement of valid, or purported to be valid and genuine passports, visas or other documentation that allows entry into the destination country. Alongside travel documentation, there is also the necessity of international transportation, local transportation in both the country of origin and the destination country, the supervision of the victim, or victims, during the travel, and a way to collect and 2  Since its inception in 2008, the usage of Bitcoin has grown to such an extent that it is now able to be used as a form of payment for the purchase of sexual services, as evidenced by one UK-based escort agency in the city of Birmingham, Passion VIP, accepting payments in bitcoin as an alternative and discreet payment method, in what has been termed as “the world’s first bitcoin brothel” (Blue 2013), signifying possible future trends in the interplay between innovative technologies and the sex industry.

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control the victim upon arrival at the intended destination, before the exploitation begins, which are strategies that often involve a group of people to varying extents. In this respect, the organisation of such a transregional trafficking operation, where the transportation of victims internationally is a key feature that is frequently necessitated by more skills and capital rather than the establishment of a more geographically confined venture. The investments made by traffickers into the trafficking process – especially the transportation phase – are related to the anticipated profits as the traffickers aim to maximise their return, analogous to any other business.

3.3.3  Exploitation In 2016, the most common type of human trafficking recorded for both adult and child (minor) victims in the UK was trafficking for the purposes of labour exploitation (National Crime Agency 2017). Labour traffickers operate across the UK and exploit workers in low-skilled areas of work such as car washes, cleaning services, nail bars, restaurants as well as seasonal agricultural work, such as the cultivation of cannabis plants. In addition, the wages of these victims, alongside any state benefits that have been fraudulently claimed in their names are frequently paid into bank accounts that are controlled and managed by traffickers (National Crime Agency 2016). From our interview data, some of the LEAs and NGOs also attested to labour trafficking and exploitation commonly occurring in these sectors of work and establishments: There have also been cases where members of the Eastern European community, and the Middle-East, some Kurdish men have been paid very low wages working in car washes or in fast food establishments. But, the wages paid to them on behalf of the gang they’re working for, who provide the tied accommodation they’re living in, the wages are never actually seen and are instead used to pay for the accommodation, and then the accommodation is so overcrowded and cold, and without running water, you’re basically living in a shit-hole, and then you work all day for nothing (Interview with LEA 2). There’s a wide range of different manifestations… some of it are people who are being used for benefit fraud and some of it is helping organised criminals in terms of cannabis farms, and some of it can even extend into domestic servitude, where people are recruited in other countries, to come and work for professional people and be paid next to nothing and work seven days a week… there’s also things like car washes, tanning salons, sunbed places, nail bars, massage parlours, there’s a whole range of casual services that victims are recruited for… People are often used and brought over for benefit fraud, I know a friend who used to volunteer at the Citizen’s Advice Bureau, and he said that quite often, people would turn up with disreputable looking characters accompanying them, and they would be seeking to get advice and register for benefits (Interview with LEA 1).

In instances where children have been trafficked to the UK, one NGO asserted that there was a striking degree of convergence and overlap within the types of exploitation that child victims have experienced:

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3  The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling… The most common forms of exploitation would sit within two broad categories. So child trafficking for sexual exploitation, and child trafficking for labour exploitation. Now you can break that down in many different ways, and you can also see intersectionality within forms of exploitation… where you see domestic servitude, you might also see sexual exploitation, where you see a male who has been trafficked to the UK under the guise of football, for football purposes, you might then be exploited sexually. Or a child who is exploited for criminal activity, who is maybe into street crime, pick pocketing things like that, [they] might also be exploited sexually, so intersectionality… we’ve even seen a case of organ harvesting (Interview with NGO 2).

From the virtual ethnography, we identified a multitude of advertisements recruiting for work in the UK, placed on numerous online classified websites and Facebook pages in numerous languages that were consistent with the red flags as outlined earlier, in an array of fields, such as construction, agriculture, health and beauty. In some circumstances, we found that the mobile phone number listed in the advertisements was, when searched for on Google, connected to profiles of women in the UK that were selling sexual services, either on online classified websites or adult entertainment sites, with the original advertisement making no mention of sex work and being in a completely different job sector. It is important to state that, despite widespread use of the Internet and digital technologies, not all victims of trafficking would have been recruited and exploited through the use of these mediums, given that informal ‘offline’ forms of recruitment, such as word-of-mouth, or through friends and relatives is still a very pervasive and efficient method of trafficking individuals into situations of exploitation. This type of recruitment is still extensive in rural areas or among particular communities such as Roma or other minority ethnic communities or within peer groups, with traffickers often going to the families of victims directly. One interviewed NGOs stated that such tactics were deployed by traffickers recruiting and transporting targeted victims to the UK for labour exploitation: In our experience in Nigeria, you’ll have someone who befriends a family, offers the opportunity of education and employment abroad… so it could be a male person or someone not directly related to the criminal organisation that is paid to befriend the family and offer these opportunities and then smuggle them into the UK for purposes of exploitation… (Interview with NGO 2).

One interviewed LEA mentioned that Vietnamese minors were frequently trafficked to the UK for purposes of labour exploitation to work on farms and coastlines to cultivate plants and cockles, with traffickers, as part of an organised crime syndicate, visiting impoverished families to recruit young victims, and exploiting sociocultural factors of family honour and providing for one’s family through working as potent forms of debt-bondage: When you look at a lot of the other places in the country, where you’ve got cockle farms in Cumbria to your big fruit farms in Kent, there seems to be a predominance there. Cleveland is a small area. So that was across a number of reasons, some relating to sexual exploitation where some were trafficked, but the majority were Vietnamese minors who had been trafficked basically for labour exploitation, on cannabis farms. So there, the understanding is, Vietnam, poor family, organised criminals in Vietnam say ‘right, we’ll give you whatever [payment], this is your money, send so and so [the trafficked victim(s)] to the UK, they’re

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now going to pay off the debt’. What that means for us is that we’ve now got a safeguarding issue because they’re a child, a child who won’t comply, because generally, a child from Vietnam, they’re much more streetwise than our kids, you’ve got a child who feels it is an honour to pay back the family debt, you’ve got a child who feels that their family will be seriously harmed or murdered if they don’t pay off the debt, and you’ve a child who probably still think that their life is still better here than it was in Vietnam. So, with those issues, you’ve got a non-compliant victim, and non-compliant adult. The ages we are talking about are 13-14 years old… because of- certainly in Vietnam and it isn’t much different in Eastern Europe is that money ties you in coercion, because you have always be in fear of your family, so is the debt ever paid? It’s quite depressing really (Interview with LEA 2).

Discussing trafficking for purposes of labour exploitation, one NGO asserted that this type of trafficking possessed a distinctly offline dimension, where it was most likely to be shrouded in secrecy, most probably due to the illegal status of some trafficked victims: But I cannot believe, because we are a reception centre, it would make sense if you were coming through Tees port to be integrated quite easily without anyone knowing, unless the UKBA find out. There have been police raids on some restaurants, where illegal immigrants have been working in those restaurants, not saying they were trafficked necessarily, but they were illegals, so there was that illegality going on. Because it tends to be in houses, it’s either domestic slavery or farms… we don’t have the farmlands that they have in the South-­ East where I know there’s more trafficking into farm labour. Barnardo’s have engaged in work where they have uncovered young boys being exploited to carry drugs to another part of the area, internal trafficking it might be for drugs. There’s lots going on, some we’re aware of and that’s published, and some we’re not aware of… If everybody keeps quietly, and its quietly done in somebody’s house and nothing’s being said, you know if they’re out on the criminality side of things, in terms of not being seen… you know brothels, who’s going to look at that unless somebody’s been in there that’s purchasing? Who’s going to look cannabis farms, kept quiet because it’s about providing drugs, supply and demand. And labour for domestic servitude, where you know, nobody’s going to say that their maid has been brought over illegally or trafficked are they? (Interview with NGO 4).

The Internet has also augmented the nature of sex work from a predominantly physical environment to an increasingly virtual landscape to such an extent that most prostitution is currently advertised and solicited online (see also Ibanez and Suthers 2014; Finn and Stalans 2016), in what has been referred to in the literature as “virtual red light districts” (Cauduro et al. 2009: 59; Ibanez and Suthers 2014; Perer 2012). Correspondingly, there has been a significant shift in human trafficking activity for the purposes of sexual exploitation to the virtual sphere, with both the supply and demand side having benefitted from the use of the Internet and digital technologies, with trafficked victims often being advertised online. The majority of our findings gleaned from the virtual ethnography pertain to human trafficking concerning sexual exploitation, in particular the exploitation of young women. We noted that typically, each advertisement of a woman posted on the online classified and adult sex websites we were researching included: a title, the name or alias of the listed woman, a textual profile description which would often include information on the physical attributes of the woman, such as her height, weight and breast size, photographs of the featured woman, the location of the town or city she was based as working in, and a mobile phone number for contact purposes. More

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infrequently, we also noted that some advertisements contained videos of the advertised woman dancing or posing in a provocative manner, stated nationality and/or ethnicity of the woman, the woman’s age, and whether the woman was listed with another woman in the advertisement, for example as a “duo”, sometimes with corresponding photographs of the two to demonstrate this was the case, and the inclusion of an e-mail address as another means of contact, alongside the mobile phone number. On this specific issue, it has been emphasised by researchers such as Konrad et al. (2016: 6) that great difficulty lies in “discerning whether the [suspected] victim is in any capacity a willing participant rather than a victim of fraud, threat, or coercion through posted advertisements and personal encounters”, and remains to be an assignment that is fraught with complications. As we could not be entirely sure of whether the women featured in such advertisements and websites were actual victims of human trafficking, we were careful to use cautionary descriptions, such as “potential”, “possible” or “suspected” victims. Moreover, our findings demonstrate a wide assortment of nationalities, including Hungarian, Czech, Spanish, Moldavian, Ukrainian, Brazilian, Italian, Chinese, Japanese and Romanian3 women. However, it is important to note that whilst these women are listed under these nationalities, in reality, this may not be a true representation. We will now discuss the most salient patterns and themes that emerged from this specific aspect of the virtual ethnography. Predictably, the first themes is the very visibility of online sexual exploitation as part of the trafficking process: It [the Internet] has certainly facilitated the sexual exploitation of children, it’s certainly facilitated the exploitation of women in the sex industry and men that actually… the necessity to be on a street corner anymore is less because they can be accessed in a different way, and that’s the same for children. So, there will be sites or ways of communicating on the internet, and it may not be Twitter or Facebook, it may be other models [websites and applications] that we don’t even know. We are having a situation now where young men and women are being groomed online for, maybe joining ISIS or involved in terrorist groups. So if that can be done, then don’t say to me that the Internet can’t facilitate also putting people together who are quite willing to exploit others, for all sorts of different reasons (Interview with NGO 4). People are purchasing sexual services, and the Internet is a really easy place to use that, mobile phones- so you’re in a new city for work, you log onto your phone, download an app and say ‘oh yep, I can visit X, Y and Z’, so I think there is definitely technology being used to facilitate the supply and demand. Yes, for labour, because of the recruitment sites, but I think the sexual exploitation is more apparent, because there are actual pictures of women online that someone purchasing a service can make a decision on, so that’s using the technology (Interview with NGO 3). Definitely in terms of online sexual exploitation, live-streaming of child sexual abuse has become a new phenomenon, and it has definitely fuelled more child trafficking and more sexual abuse, whether done by family members or organised crime networks, it’s something we’ve seen contribute to a rise in sexual exploitation. But we have also seen a rise in identification and prosecution of offenders (Interview with NGO 2). 3  Romania has consistently been reported as being the most prevalent country of origin for potential victims of trafficking in the UK, with more than half of victims being exploited for sexual purposes (National Crime Agency Strategic Assessment, 2015).

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Our virtual ethnographic research regarding human trafficking and exploitation in the UK sex markets revealed the importance of the mobile phone number listed within advertisements on online classifieds, for several key reasons. Firstly, the mobile phone number serves as the nexus between the virtual and real-world physical environments, as it enables a prospective purchaser of sex browsing online to connect to a potential seller of sex and plan an offline (and almost certainly sexual) encounter. Secondly, we detected in several advertisements that the listed mobile phone number, when searched for on Google and also by using the search function available on various online classifieds, revealed the existence of several more women also advertised as selling sexual services, frequently in various cities across the UK as well some women also working in the same locality. Thirdly, in many instances, a Google search of the mobile phone number also demonstrated that the same woman had multiple other profiles on various online classifieds and sex sites, in which she was listed under numerous aliases, ages and, in her earlier profiles, as working and based in various cities in the UK. As such, the mobile phone number listed in such advertisements can serve as an important indicator of potential human trafficking activity. The advertisement of several women under one number, either within the same city or multiple cities, suggests a “shared management” situation, in which the women do not work as independent escorts, and may be under the control of a trafficking gang or network or a pimp, who control their profiles, are in charge of the mobile phone as well as subsequent bookings made. Likewise, a Google search of the phone number of a sole woman advertised is also useful to discern whether the woman has been previously advertised in different locations in the UK, indicative of frequent movement to various locations across the UK, which can signify that the woman may be a victim of trafficking. Further highlighting the significance of mobile phone numbers in our virtual ethnography was our use of a digital app and corresponding website called ‘Truecaller’4 which allows mobile phone numbers to be searched for in a database of over two billion mobile phone numbers, to see name of the person that the phone is registered to, as well as the location of the phone and the mobile phone carrier that the phone is connected to. Whereas our Google search of the number listed in advertisements revealed the presence of other advertisements of women who are listed under the same number, we were able use Truecaller to search for the mobile phone numbers we had highlighted in our research as being linked to suspicious advertisements, and discovered that frequently, the number was registered to a person that was not listed in the advertisements, and in many instances the name of the person was male. This discrepancy between the name or names of the women in the advertisements where the number is listed as a point of contact, to the number being registered in the name of another, male person, strongly suggests that the person may be a trafficker or pimp who manages and controls the women, and may arrange bookings for them. Although we stress that using Truecaller did not result in all of the highlighted numbers being registered in another person’s name, or even

 See www.truecaller.com

4

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registered at all, we did find that many of the numbers were listed under the Lycamobile phone operator, a large and popular ‘Pay-as-you-go’ network. The possession of ‘pay-as-you-go’ phones has been observed as being used by criminal networks such as traffickers and/or smugglers for operational and coordination purposes, as well as to maintain constant contact with their victims to facilitate their exploitation, where mobile phones are often prepaid, or ‘Pay-as-you-go’, so that they are unable to be connected to a specific individual through a service contract (see also Ibanez and Gazan 2016a, b). 3.3.3.1  Movement to or Within the UK Due to the extremely large number and volume of posts featured on the various online classified websites and social networking sites that we were studying, it would have been impossible to try to conduct meaningful analyses on all of the advertisements. Therefore, we made the decision to primarily focus our investigations on advertisements that possessed transient language indicative of movement to the UK or within the UK, given that a key feature of trafficking is the rapid rotation and movement of women from city to city. Such search terms used for this purpose were: “new”, “new in town”, “new for you”, “new in/to your city”, “fresh”, “just arrived”, etc. We discovered several women listed under these various terms, with Google searches of the connected mobile phone numbers in some of their advertisements revealing that they were listed alongside other “new in town” women. In one striking example, we found the presence of a potentially widespread trafficking ring operating in several areas of London, in which several Eastern European women were listed as being “hot new girls”, “sexy girls”, new VIP party girls”, or “new girls in London” under the same set of mobile phone numbers, and with all profiles exhibiting the same writing style. All of these points would strongly suggest that the advertised women had recently been moved to the UK for purposes of sex work. Furthermore, we were also able to identify how dynamic these types of profiles delineated as “new” or “new in town” were. A frequent pattern that emerged was the set-up of several profiles of women all listed as “new girls” or “new in town”, who were typically advertised together, sometimes within the same advertisement, offering “duo services”, with photographs of some of these women demonstrating that they were working in the same residence. In these particular profiles, the written profile descriptions for many women being written in an extremely similar style in regard to grammar, syntax and spelling, as well as these women also being listed under the same mobile phone number. Sometimes the exact same profile information was copied and pasted to each profile, except for the aliases. After a few weeks, all of these profiles were removed and the women would “disappear”. However, following a brief period of time, new profiles would be created, either in the same locality or a new area, in which the same woman or a group of women, were once again extensively advertised under new aliases and listed as being “new in town”.

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This may be due to the women being moved onto another city in the UK by a trafficking gang or network or pimp to perform sex work, and to evade detection by removing the older profiles and creating new aliases to be advertised under. A key feature of trafficking that has been consistently noted is that women are frequently moved from city to city and area to area, the purpose being to disorientate the victims in order to keep them isolated and prevent them from developing friendships that can function as social support systems, and gaining familiarity with their surroundings (see, for example, Dimitrova 2006). Concurrently, this advantageously prevents detection by law enforcement and intelligence gathering activities. The transportation of women between cities and countries is an important part, not just of the trafficking process, but also for the sex market. Traffickers are aware that clients constantly desire new women to purchase sex from. Through frequent movement in and out of various cities, they make sure that victims are constantly circulated to entice sex purchasers, ensuring a continuous supply of a new stream of women who are often advertised as being “new”, “new in town” or “new in the UK” (Hagstedt et  al. 2009) to meet demand. In the online context, Konrad et al. (2016: 3) have termed this method as “dynamic adaptation”, citing the modus operandi of some sex trafficking rings that advertise victims on particular websites, often altering some small details associated with the advertised name of the victim, or the featured phone number as a way to evade law enforcement. As Konrad et al. (2016) argue, making such adjustments results in difficulties for rudimentary pattern-­matching tools to track repeated advertisements. In the case of a potentially trafficked young woman we came across under the alias of “Shaila”, we found that she was subject to a review on www.ukpunting.com that raised interesting points: …Shaila’s profile says she’s Persian, which attracted me. When I got there, she said she was Pakistani. When I asked where in Pakistan she was from, she said it’s not important. I suspect she’s actually Eastern European from her looks, accent, how good her English is (pretty good) and how she confused Persia with Pakistan.

The above excerpt is telling in that the poster remarks that “Shaila” refers to herself as being of Pakistani ethnicity and not Iranian/Persian as she has been advertised under extensively on various online classified websites. This signifies a prominent discrepancy in her advertised and verbally self-reported ethnicity, in that it signifies that “Shaila” may not be aware that her multiple profiles list her as being Iranian/ Persian, which would indicate that her profiles may have been written and controlled by another party. The punter posting their review on the forum suspects that based on her physical appearance and accent, in actuality, “Shaila” may be of Eastern European nationality. It may be that “Shaila” has been told to describe her ethnicity as being Pakistani to enquiring clients, perhaps as a way of sounding more ‘exotic’, as it has been noted that ‘trying something new’, in regards to nationality and aesthetic physical features considered to be ‘exotic’, is a strong motivator for some clients to experience and purchase sex with a sex worker (see, for example, Cauduro et al. 2009).

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3.3.3.2  Analysis of the Profile Text Analysing the written profile texts of women within advertisements revealed several compelling insights. Firstly, we found that many of the profiles, particularly those listed as “new” or “new in town” were written in very poor English, and were replete with several grammatical errors, deficient syntax and several spelling and punctuation mistakes. From our virtual ethnographic analysis of forums, we found that some punters were even able to state specific examples of browsed profiles that they thought were highly dubious, in numerous threads: I do not know if it applies nationwide but in our area Vivastreet advertisements almost all begin with NEW GIRL IN TOWN and have the most nonsensical profile descriptions; every girl possesses every possible virtue and will give you the best experience of your life! It reads like some moron has copied out a few thesaurus entries combined with erotica’s most overused cliches. Nothing useful regarding actual services is usually given and the site has no review system. Clearly written by a pimp and very unlikely the girls even know what is written about them. [Placebo88, 2016]

In a particularly illuminating post, one poster discussed his observances of a large group of Romanian women working in his home town, all of whom possessed identically written profiles and were working in the same residence, which was previously used by a group of Eastern European women who have since moved on: This is getting stupid. I’ve mentioned these before but the number of similar profiles grows. All of these profiles have almost identical wording. If they are all genuine then it may be a "super-brothel"… Basingstoke is not really awash with options so to have 6 such similar profiles really leaps out. Most likely both Romanian as 3 of the other 4 admit. The pictures are different enough that they are not obviously duplicate profiles. Has anyone seen any/ several of them? I think they are all using in the same house as another batch of mainly EU girls who seemed to show up just before Christmas and stay for around 3 months, then get replaced by this lot [mh, 2013]

Secondly, we discovered that several women, especially those who were listed under the same mobile phone number, all possessed extremely similar written profile information (see also Nagpal et  al. 2015), in regard to the writing style and services offered, with only the aliases of the women being different. Some profiles, although they were not connected by a common mobile phone number, had the inclusion of special characters in the titles and text, such as hearts, stars, flowers and the inclusion of Emojis,5 which were arranged in such an uncommon way that it would indicate that the profiles were written by the same individual or group. Exploring the demand for trafficked prostitution in Sweden and factors that endorse or inhibit the business of trafficking, Hagstedt et al. (2009) found that in terms of advertisements, the same style or layout being used in numerous adverts can act as a sign of an ‘organised’ sex trade. Thirdly, on some profiles, several excerpts of the woman’s profile description were found to have been copied and pasted from other escort profiles in the UK. Moreover, some of the women’s profiles 5  Emojis are ideograms that are used in electronic messages and web pages. They encompass facial expressions, types of weather, common objects, places and animals.

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contained very little information and instead made references to specific sexual acts either in the title post or actual profile text, such as, “OWO” (oral sex without condom) “CIM” (ejaculation in mouth), “ANAL” (anal sex), “no unlimited times” (being able to orgasm as many times as wanted or as physically capable in one session), and “full services” (all oral, vaginal and anal sexual services and acts available), all-inclusive for around £70–80 an hour. Disturbingly, many of the featured women were seen to be advertising unprotected sex for the same price. As a useful comparator, we spent some time examining the profiles of established escort women based and working in the UK, and also visited online forums6 connected to websites that provide support and advice to sex workers in the UK. In these particular profiles, the profile descriptions were composed in an idiosyncratic writing style in which it was quite evident that the content was written by the women themselves, as they featured unique phrases, wording (we also copied and pasted some excerpts on Google to see if they were present elsewhere) as well as services offered. We also found that ‘standard’ penetrative sex with condom was offered for £100, and ‘extras’, such as performing oral sex without a condom or for anal sex with condom were advertised as available for a further £10–20. On forums, we also discovered similar, impassioned sentiments towards unprotected sex without a condom in several threads, entitled ‘bareback’ and ‘Bareback for 50 [£]’: Bareback? Not even for all the gold of this world!!! My health is very important! Some clients are really stupid [Pearl, 2012] iv been looking at aw [adultwork website] and other website and im shocked how many will do bareback i dont understand why would girls will do it some charge extra 20 or 30 [£] some dont charge any more sorry if any one reading this that does bb [bareback sex] im not beening [sic] nasty but once you get aids theres no going back no cure just a slow painful death saying all that most that do bb are fully booked the money rolling in and just about paying bills but hey i no whats right and whats not NO one should do bb an escort or not who agrees [miss caroline, 2010] I can’t imagine having unprotected sex with a client, I really really can’t. Even if I stretch my imagination to it’s furthest lengths I can’t see myself saying ‘go on, just do it’. I imagine some girls see sex work as an extension of their personal sexual experiences, which is sad really. I guess if you are willing to fuck strangers unprotected, it’s not a huge leap to do it for money as well. Personally I think I’d be devastated to discover that chlamydia had been twisting up my insides, or warts were turning my vagina into a mass of road bumps while I was happily putting my faith in unfaithful men. But then that’s me expressing my opinion while squicking out [EvaBeeva, 2012] I despise clients who seek BB [bareback sex] as this behaviour kills people and puts pressure on some escorts to offer riskier services… When some slimeball [client] asks me for BB he is inviting me to sign up to a shortened life with a debilitating illness, a collage of very unpleasant drugs and an early grave. [JodieTs, 2010]

The comments above indicate clearly how the practice of unprotected sex is treated with resolute anger by established sex workers in the UK. Similar sentiments are 6  See www.saafe.info, a dedicated website and forum offering support and advice for sex workers in the UK.

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echoed in the comments by sex workers interviewed by Siegel (2016), who disparagingly asserted that Eastern European women, particularly those from Bulgaria and Romania, had ruined the business because they charged less than the prices agreed by Western European sex workers, resulting in the undercutting of prices of the more established, local women, having sex with clients without a condom, and generally lacking ‘civilized’ manners, resulting in the whole sector acquiring a bad reputation. The new girls are from Bulgaria, and many from Romania, and no, we don’t have any contact with them. Actually, we don’t even want to, because they have ruined the business with their low prices… A Dutch or a German woman, or any classy foreign woman, would never work for less than 50 euros. Some ladies, especially these foreigners, will work without a condom, and they have simply ruined everything, because we would never do that (Quoted in Siegel, 2016: 75).

A possible indicator of human trafficking is the disparity in prices between non-­ native and native women, in that foreign women advertise sexual services for cheaper prices than native women (see Hagstedt et  al. 2009). Alongside lower prices, another possible indicator could arguably be the advertisement of unprotected sex without a condom, due to its hazardous nature to both the seller of sex and the purchaser. Indeed, some punters also attested that the sale of bareback sex by an advertised woman was alarming and a possible indicator that the woman’s profile had been written by a trafficker and pimp, who control the profile and what sexual services for sale are offered: Most Romanian profiles display BB and unprotected sex, as normal. Quite often, it is the pimp who has written the profile and the WG is unaware of the services offered. If the pimp is also answering the mobile/replying the texts, he can quite often lie about these services, in order to entice the punter in [Cooltiger, 2016]. You will find that most of the profiles that list bareback are written by pimps. Most of the girls do not possess the minimal English grammar to construct profiles like the ones we see for the many Romanian girls [sesalovesdarlo, 2015].

Fourthly, some of the advertised women also had multiple other active profiles on various sex sites in the UK, as well on social network sites, in particular Twitter pages for online classifieds, possibly as a means of gaining more exposure. An interesting aspect however, was some of the women’s various profiles demonstrated notable profile discrepancies, such as the name or alias, age listed, working location and nationality. Indeed, on the latter point, we found that many women, especially those from Romania, would describe themselves as being ‘Latina’ or Italian, or Argentinian or Spanish, concealing their nationality as a reverse ethnic reputation manipulation (see Bovenkerk et al. 2003 for an account on ethnic reputation manipulation). We were able in some instances to cross-reference this particular discrepancy through inspecting the women’s profiles on the ‘AdultWork’7 site, in which 7  A very interesting observation that we made came from reading the list of the Terms of Use outlined on the AdultWork sex website, in which it stipulates that a to a large amount of nationals from certain countries of Albania, Latvia, Romania and Russia are deliberately trying to defraud the

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verification of one’s profile and being able to join the site is through submitting identification proof of nationality, such as a passport8 or driver’s license. In one of the many cases we came across, a sex workers was stated as Italian in a website (www.sexolondon.com), yet her AdultWork profile, where proof of nationality must be submitted for the profile to gain verified status, states that she is Romanian, representing a prominent discrepancy and concealment of original nationality. Similarly to Di Nicola et al.’s (2015) discussion, the poor use of the language of the country in the profile text – in our case English – regarding spelling, grammatical and punctuation errors can point to two robust indications of trafficking. Firstly, the presence of spelling mistakes, poor usage of grammar as well as punctuation errors in the profile text signifies a very limited knowledge of English by the featured woman, and/or secondly, it may indicate that the profile itself has been written by a trafficker, who may be from the same country of origin as the featured woman, and is a non-native English speaker who also possesses a limited grasp of the language. As such, we can speculate that these profiles, as well as the profiles that list multiple women and are written extremely similarly, may be composed and posted by another party, who create, write and control these suspicious profiles. As we mentioned earlier, we found many instances where women, particularly those from Romania, would conceal their identity and instead be advertised under various nationalities including Italian, ‘Latina’ or Argentinian or Spanish. We found several threads that were able to shed light on some of the reasons for this, with most pointing to the negative reputation of Romanians in the UK, including: ‘Working girls misrepresenting their nationality’ ‘Why do so many Romanian girls to bareback sex’, ‘Beware Romanian girls on AdultWork’, ‘Are all Romanians best avoided’, ‘Vivastreet ‘New Girl In Town’ Wolverhampton THE WORST SIDE OF THIS BUSINESS’, “Romanians (Yep) Another Romanian Post” and ‘Trafficking of women’. One poster outlined phases of the trafficking processes, specifically recruitment and exploitation as an explanation of how Romanian women were transported to the UK, and discussed their refusal to visit Romanian women for health reasons, given the propensity of Romanian sex workers to engage in unprotected sex, where the woman may be forced to offer the sale of unprotected sex by a pimp or trafficker, who possess a lack of concern for health or well-being of the victim:

website and its membership. As a consequence, nationals from these countries are subject to higher levels of additional verification and proof of identity, before being allowed to offer services on the website. This may be a compelling reason why criminal groups may use the dark web to purchase counterfeit documentation, as means to join and acquire membership by passing the relevant security procedures on the website. 8  Although it cannot be ruled out that such documentation may be in the possession of a trafficking gang, network or a pimp.

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3  The Role of the Internet and Digital Technologies in Human Smuggling… A significant number of these Romanian girls are brought over here under false pretence’s (PA [personal assistant], modelling… job). When they get here they have their passport taken and are told they owe the pimp £x,000 and need to start paying back and the only job is prostitution, they are then subjected to violence to ensure their compliance. Now Sergie [name assigned to any archetypal pimp of Eastern-European origin] doesn’t give a shit about the girl as he will move her on in a few weeks anyway so just like a hire car he wants to thrash the crap out of her in the time he has her. For him BB [bareback] is a way to get more clients and thus more money from the girl so he tells the girl that she is now offering BB. The girl is probably ignorant to the risks but quite frankly the risks of saying no to Sergie are significantly more life threatening and immediate that the risks of having 1000 high viral load HIV+ guys… This is why I don’t see Romanian girls, I don’t want to fuck a girl who is not doing the job on their own free will [rolf32313, 2014]. The influx of UK based Romanians have destroyed the previous good reputation of EE WGs (Polish/Czech/Hungarian) due to their bad attitude and rubbish service, coupled with their pimps’ encouragement to rip off the punter. Yet guys still pay to see them because they are cheap. Avoid Romanians, they all lie and cheat you out of your money. Trust me, they asked me for more money after 10 minutes, for you to cum again.. Also they lie about their nationality, they would say Brazilian, to Italian, to Spanish… etc… they all are deceitful. They dont look like their profile pictures either. [Taggart, 2016]

The above would support the concept of “ethnic reputation manipulation”, as posited by Bovenkerk et al. (2003), which we find is most pertinent and useful to refer to here. Bovenkerk et al. state that individuals and groups, as they engage in criminal activity, manipulate their ethnicity and ethnic reputation, either through emphasis or concealment. In doing so, these individuals and groups can acquire a foothold, status and power in a new country, and address an assortment of audiences that include insiders, outsiders and the law. As Bovenkerk et al. (2003) further expound about the salient nature of reputations: Reputations are judgements about vices, virtues, strengths and weaknesses that communities accumulate, process and reprocess about their members. The circulation of reputational information seems essential to all social interaction, whether conducting a business, achieving information or identifying reliable others… Reputations go beyond more personal impressions made on others: they are built up over time, involve a great deal of indirect evidence and often include social representations of entire groups (collective reputations) (Bovenkerk et al., 2003: 27).

Moreover, reputations can frequently have indirect and distant consequences. Given that reputations often circulate in conversations within groups, as we have observed with punters on web forums, it can be most challenging to create, cultivate or elude a particular reputation. Furthermore, Bovenkerk et al. (2003) assert that whilst ethnic reputations can be difficult for individuals to alter depending on the social context – in this case Romanian sex workers in the UK – they can play a positive or a negative role for them. Thus, the management of ethnic reputations often consists of playing with already extant reputations, either by masking one’s ethnic ascription or embellishing stereotyped images. Our findings concerning the misrepresentation of nationality on their advertised profiles by predominantly Romanian sex workers in the UK online, most likely due to a perceived very poor reputation by punters, align with Bovenkerk et al.’s (2003) treatise, and to which we can argue is most likely a strategic

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mechanism to attract prospective customers, protect against the loss of visits by sex purchasers and by extension, business earnings made during these encounters. 3.3.3.3  Reverse Image Searches of Profile Photographs A further significant aspect of our research was from a method we used to inspect the photographs of some of the woman featured in adverts we had marked to be dubious. We employed reverse image searching, a technique in which photographs can be searched for using a search engine such as Google, to ascertain whether the same photograph is present on other websites and to locate, if possible, the source of a photograph. To do so, we would simply right click the photograph of the woman in question, select the ‘search Google for image’ option, and then see if the woman’s photograph was present elsewhere. We also used a dedicated search engine specifically designed for this use, called ‘TinEye’. We found this method to very effective in identifying that the photographs of some of the women were featured on other profiles, under various aliases, and in different locations in the UK, indicating constant, continuous movement within the UK. Moreover, this method also revealed that some of the women advertised were also featured on European sex sites, such as those based in Poland and Romania, which suggests that the photographs of the women in the listings have been stolen from other sites, or that these women have been moved to the UK for sex work. 3.3.3.4  AdultWork Trafficked ‘Identity Laundering’ A further interesting finding emerged from our analysis of women who we had identified as possible trafficked victims. Assessing their profiles on AdultWork, we noted a phenomenon of where one young woman in the profile had been replaced by another, and then subsequently replaced by another woman after a few weeks. Consistent within these changes was the profile itself, as well as the descriptive text of the profile. In many of these instances, we noted that the women advertised possessed a very long, comprehensive list of sexual services, for the low, inclusive price of £80, in which unprotected ‘bareback’ sex was also listed. We suspect this ‘profile swapping’, taking place on the AdultWork website as the main platform, may be a method used by traffickers to bypass ID checks to gain profile verification, and to engage in identity laundering of victims. This would advantageously enable traffickers to capitalise on an already verified AdultWork profile, with little effort in replacing photographs, or creating new profiles and written profile descriptions for the listed woman. This tactic has not gone unnoticed by punters: Profile selling is rife, genuine people get them verified and sell them on! if Sergei gets a new girl he can simply use an existing profile for her [Jimmyredcab, 2015]. there is some profile swapping going on which is not, sadly, that unusual with some EE [Eastern-European] girls where Pimps control the profiles. Any good FB [feedback] can then be transferred to a completely different girl [Jacob, 2011].

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3.4  Concluding Remarks This chapter has presented and analysed qualitative data about the use of the internet and other digital technologies in the process of human smuggling and trafficking in the UK. Similarly to the findings of studies regarding other contexts, our findings strongly suggest that such technologies open up a virtual world which does not merely mirror offline context in which the various phases of both human smuggling and trafficking take place. Rather the case is that the internet, social networking sites as well as the use of the various information and communication technologies amplify and expand the potential of human smugglers and traffickers to attract and identify clients as well as to lure victims into their trade. An important implication of our findings, which is specific to the UK context, regards a possible reappraisal of the prevalence of smuggling and human trafficking. There is no doubt that the extent of public awareness and the prioritisation of these issues for both policy makers and law enforcement in the UK is significant (NCA 2016; 2017). Nevertheless, particularly as regards trafficking for sexual exploitation, the virtualisation of sex markets may have the consequence that a great deal of illicit activity, exploitation and victimisation may remain undetected. While our virtual ethnography approach has produced a series of indicators that could be used for the development of tools for the prevention, detection and suppression of criminal activity, there is clearly need for a larger scale research effort targeting specifically these online sex markets.

References Bach, J., & Dohy, J. (2015). Ethical and legal considerations for crafting rigorous online sex trafficking research methodology. Sexuality research and social policy, 12(4), 317–322. Blue, V. (2013). The world’s first bitcoin escort agency. Available at: http://www.zdnet.com/article/ the-worlds-first-bitcoin-escort-agency/. Bovenkerk, F., Siegel, D., & Zaitch, D. (2003). Organized crime and ethnic reputation manipulation. Crime, Law and Social Change, 39(1), 23–38. Brito, J., & Castillo, A. (2013). Bitcoin: A primer for policymakers. Washington, DC: Mercatus Center, George Mason University. Cauduro, A., Di Nicola, A., Fonio, C., Nuvoloni, A., & Ruspini, P. (2009). Innocent when you dream: Clients and trafficked women in Italy. In A. Di Nicola, A. Cauduro, M. Lombardi, & P. Ruspini (Eds.), Prostitution and human trafficking: Focus on clients (pp. 31–66). New York: Springer. Cockbain, E. (2018). Offender and victim networks in human trafficking. London: Routledge. Dimitrova, N. (2006). Combatting human trafficking in the context of European security  – Interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral anti-trafficking policies in South-East Europe. In N. Narli (Ed.), Trafficking in persons in South East Europe (pp. 39–67). Vienna: Reprocentre. Di Nicola, A., Cauduro, A., & Falletta, V. (2015). From the sidewalk to the digital highway: A study on the web as a source of information on prostitution and victims of human trafficking in Italy. Italian Journal of Criminology, 7(3), 219–228. Europol. (2016a). Migrant smuggling in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2016b). Trafficking of human beings in the EU. The Hague: Europol.

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Europol. (2014). Trafficking in human beings and the internet. The Hague: Europol. Finn, M. A., & Stalans, L. J. (2016). How targeted enforcement shapes marketing decisions of pimps: Evidence of displacement and innovation. Victims & Offenders, 11(4), 578–599. Hall, A., & Antonopoulos, G. A. (2016). Fake meds online: The internet and the transnational market in illicit pharmaceuticals. London: Palgrave. Hagstedt, J., Korsell, L., & Skagerö, A. (2009). In the land of prohibition? In A.  Di Nicola, A. Cauduro, M. Lombardi, & P. Ruspini (Eds.), Prostitution and human trafficking: Focus on clients (pp. 163–202). New York: Springer. House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights. (2006). Human trafficking: Twenty-sixth report of session, 2005–2006, HL Paper 245–I HC 1127–I. Hughes, D. M. (2014). Trafficking in human beings in the European Union. SAGE Open, 4(4), 1–8. Ibanez, M., & Gazan, R. (2016a). Virtual indicators of sex trafficking to identify potential victims in online advertisements. In Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), 2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference (pp. 818–824). IEEE. Ibanez, M., & Gazan, R. (2016b). Detecting sex trafficking circuits in the US through analysis of online escort advertisements. In Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), 2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference (pp. 892–895). IEEE. Ibanez, M., & Suthers, D.  D. (2014). Detection of domestic human trafficking indicators and movement trends using content available on open internet sources. In 2014 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 1556–1565). IEEE. Içduygu, A., & Toktas, S. (2002). How do smuggling and trafficking operate via irregular border crossings in the middle-east? International Migration, 40(6), 25–54. Jones, J. (2011). Trafficking internet brides. Information & Communications Technology Law, 20(1), 19–33. Konrad, R. A., Trapp, A. C., Palmbach, T. M., & Blom, J. S. (2016). Overcoming human trafficking via operations research and analytics: Opportunities for methods, models, and applications. European Journal of Operational Research, 1–30. Latonero, M., Musto, J., Boyd, Z., Boyle, E., Bissel, A., Gibson, K., & Kim, J. (2012). The rise of mobile and the diffusion of technology-facilitated trafficking. Los Angeles: Centre on Communication Leadership & Policy. Latonero, M., Musto, J., Boyd, Z., Boyle, E., Bissel, A., Gibson, K. & Kim, J. (2011). ‘Human trafficking online: The role of social networking sites and online classifieds’. Available at https:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2045851. Mendel, J., & Sharapov, K. (2014). Human trafficking and online networks: Policy Briefing. Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, Central European University. Morrison, J. (2002). FMO research guide: Human smuggling and trafficking. Forced Migration Online, 2(12), 09. Muskat-Gorska. (2014). Fine tune project report: Trafficking for labour exploitation – The role of the internet. Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/internet_and_labour_trafficking.pdf. Nagpal, C., Miller, K., Boecking, B., & Dubrawski, A. (2015). An entity resolution approach to isolate instances of human trafficking online. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.06659. National Crime Agency (NCA). (2017). Human trafficking: National referral mechanism statistics  – July to September 2016. Available online at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/ publications/national-referral-mechanism-statistics/2016-nrm-statistics/782-human-trafficking-national-referral-mechanism-statistics-july-to-september-2016/file. National Crime Agency (NCA). (2016). National strategic assessment of serious and organised crime 2016. Available online at: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/ publications/731-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-organised-crime-2016/file. National Crime Agency Strategic Assessment. (2015). National strategic assessment of serious and organised crime. London: National Crime Agency. Perer, A. R. (2012). Policing the virtual red light district. Brooklyn Law Review, 77(2), 823–859. Petrunov, G. (2014). Human trafficking in Eastern Europe: The case of Bulgaria. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 653(1), 162–182.

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Sanchez, G. (2017). Critical perspectives on clandestine migration facilitation: An overview of migrant smuggling research. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 5(1), 9–27. Sarkar, S. (2015). Use of technology in human trafficking networks and sexual exploitation: A cross-sectional multi-country study. Transnational Social Review, 5(1), 55–68. Savona, E., Giommoni, L., & Mancuso, M. (2013). Human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Italy. In B. Leclerc & R. Wortley (Eds.), Cognition and crime: Offender decision making and script analyses (pp. 140–163). London: Routledge. Siegel, D. (2012). Mobility of sex workers in European cities. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 18(3), 255–268. Siegel, D. (2016). Ethnicity, crime and sex work: A triple taboo. In D. Siegel & R. De Wildt (Eds.), Ethical concerns in research on human trafficking (Vol. 13, pp. 71–83). New York: Springer. Sykiotou, A. (2007). Trafficking in human beings: Internet recruitment: Misuse of the internet for the recruitment of victims of trafficking in human beings. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Treadwell, J. (2012). From the car boot to booting it up? eBay, online counterfeit crime and the transformation of the criminal marketplace. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 12(2), 175–191. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2006). Trafficking in persons: Global patterns. Vienna: UNODC.

Chapter 4

Conclusion: Human Smuggling, Human Trafficking and the Role of Communication Technologies

The two case studies from Italy and the UK presented in this book offer compelling evidence about the nature and the extent of the use of ICT in the business of human smuggling and trafficking. As such, these findings should be hardly surprising as, twenty years into the twenty-first century, the use of technologies such as mobile phones and smartphones, the internet and the social web is ubiquitous in the everyday life across the globe. It is inevitable that the people involved in the business of human smuggling and trafficking tap into the potential of these technologies—there is really no reason to assume that illegal entrepreneurs will not take recourse to the means that every other entrepreneur in every other business sector uses, just as their clients will use the very same technologies as a matter of course. In fact, what is surprising is the relatively slow ignition of academic research into this aspect of the business, to such an extent that our effort addresses a knowledge gap that, in 2019, is still glaring. Our findings reveal a reality that is fairly uniform across the two contexts that we have investigated: the use of ICT is extensive across all the phases of the processes of human smuggling and trafficking respectively, recruitment, transportation, and, in the case of human trafficking, exploitation. Smugglers and traffickers in search of potential clientele, and victims, use ICT to cast their net as widely as possible. Communication technology drastically expands reach since it effectively removes the time and space constraints that have separated the local and the global in previous stages of human civilisation. In the virtual space that ICT has opened up, migrants use the latter to seek information about service providers, routes and the conditions prevailing in them, as well as information about the services that the smugglers make available to facilitate the journey. Equally, smugglers take advantage of the speed and directness of the medium, whether Internet accessed via smartphones or more conventional mobile telephony in order to advertise their business, reach a larger number of potential customers and possibly gain an advantage over the competition. Similarly, traffickers use these technologies to lure their © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. A. Antonopoulos et al., Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42768-9_4

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potential victims, aided by the anonymity that these media facilitate. Equally, virtual spaces open up new innovative ways for traffickers to present their human merchandise to their clientele, and capitalise not only on existing markets but also, particularly in the sex industry, expand and consolidate markets that have existed at the margins of ‘traditional’ prostitution. This general outlook unremarkably mirrors the patterns of merchant and consumer online strategies and behaviour in the licit sectors of the economy. Communication technology, of course, contributes to time-space compression (Harvey 1990) but does not render either time or space irrelevant. At those critical points where geography and timing become of the essence, ICT serves as an important tool not only in the conduct of illicit business as such but also in the protection of the illicit nature of it. In the cases of both Italy and the UK, the conduct of human smuggling is tied to particular locations and routes—the accumulation of populations on the move in the context of the surge of migrant and refugee flows towards Europe in the past decade offers overwhelming evidence of this connection. Communication technologies offer the possibility of organising and coordinating journeys not only by allowing smugglers to benefit from real-time information sharing but also from using the technologies that are routinely made available such as GPS, online maps and so on. Equally, as findings of the online ethnography deployed in this study in both Italy and the United Kingdom clearly show, these technologies can be of use to traffickers in the exploitation phase of the process, as they are able to move victims between different locations depending on demand and market opportunities. It can thus be argued with reason that the added flexibility stemming from the use of ICT allows exploiters not merely to grow their business but also to intensify the exploitation of their victims. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that while the use of technology is important, in many respects its integration in the processes of smuggling and trafficking only serves to reaffirm the need for real-world interaction throughout all phases of recruitment, transportation and, in the case of trafficking, exploitation. Much of what this enterprise involves, crucially relies on trust, trust-building and personal reassurance, all of which are the products of real-world, ‘flesh and bone’ human contact and interaction. To wit, ICT cannot displace the human element in smuggling and trafficking. Overall, the findings presented in this study robustly document the pivotal role that communication technologies (have come to) play in the processes of human smuggling and trafficking. In this respect, this study corroborates in a systematic way the indications offered by the several recent official reports raising the alarm about the use of communication technologies by illegal entrepreneurs and organised crime groups and networks, and the heightened risk that such use entails for victims (Europol 2015; 2016a, b; Europol-INTERPOL 2016; UNHCR 2016). The confirmation that the use of ICT is taking place, and the documentation of the patterns in which it does so, very much serve to underscore the mundane and pragmatic, this-­ worldly nature of illegal entrepreneurship (van Duyne 1996) as at the very least the extent and patterns of the use of ICT resemble those found in licit entrepreneurship.

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What is less certain is whether the use of ICT leads to a mutation of human smuggling and trafficking into an altogether new criminal activity and threat rather than it exacerbates an existing one. The findings presented in this study lend themselves better to the latter idea, even though the fusion of rapidly evolving technologies with human trafficking, particularly sex trafficking, and the possibility of the virtualisation of sexual exploitation all but exclude the emergence of new and unprecedented patterns of criminal activity in the not so distant future. The two case studies presented here offer an accurate and rich representation of the practices of the actors involved in the two processes, and have captured, particularly through the use of online ethnography, the online behaviours and interactions of smugglers and migrants as well of the traffickers and their victims to some extent. The identification of new threats emerging from the two respective circuits of criminal enterprise, however, will crucially depend on demographic and other information regarding the backgrounds and social composition of the populations that participate in the online universe of these enterprises. While our data reveal trends, for example, regarding the risk amplification engendered by the increasing ease of access to and diffusion of use of ICT by minors, future research should address the gap that remains with regard to the knowledge of those populations. In stricter methodological terms, a limitation of the virtual ethnography deployed in this research is that it can only capture the behaviours of those who are in fact able to access the Internet and social media, or even have access to the mobile technologies that mediate that access. As shown in the previous two chapters, however, the use of the internet, whether the surface or the dark web, is but a facet of the role communication technologies plays in human smuggling and trafficking. Furthermore, one important question concerns the patterns of the diffusion of ICT and the access to it among those involved in the human smuggling and trafficking business. Access to ICT is not ubiquitous in the sending countries, and Internet diffusion continues to be low in the developing countries (World Bank 2016) from which the majority of vulnerable populations originates. It is not unreasonable to assume that important barriers to ICT access are found in the disadvantaged backgrounds of these populations in these already digitally disadvantaged countries (Sanchez 2017). The same reality is likely to influence the practices of smugglers and traffickers, since their ability to integrate ICT will depend on the extent to which they can access it, and on other limitations having to do with the extent of their involvement in the business, the scale of their operation, and also the consideration of the risk of detection by the authorities (see, for example, Moore 2007). Depending on the above it is not unreasonable to assume, on the basis of the data presented here, that criminal entrepreneurs are likely to take a pragmatic view of technology and its usefulness as a means depending on the context of their business, and less likely to perceive and engage with ICT as a core element of that business. The above would suggest that, even though the transformative effect of ICT on contemporary life cannot be understated, the ongoing debates regarding whether it engenders new types of criminal activity or facilitates old ones (see, for example, McCusker 2006; Levi 2001; Savona and Mignone 2004) cannot be resolved abstractly but requires further, data-driven examination to establish the extent to

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which ordinary criminal activity is adaptive to technological change and, conversely, the extent to which the latter has a transformative effect on the former (Naylor 2000; see also Hall and Antonopoulos 2015). There are also some good news emerging from our study, allowing a concluding reflection on a more positive note. While the diffusion of the use of ICT among vulnerable populations and potential victims results in amplified risks, it also provides for a new protective layer that emerges from the more active information-­ seeking that it enables. ICT makes much less tenable the assumption that either the migrants relying on the services of criminal entrepreneurs or the potential victims of traffickers are passive actors in the two respective processes. Clearly in the case of human smuggling, ICT enabled information-seeking results in a whole new universe of online communities and interactions, which the online ethnography of this study has documented across the contexts we investigated. Equally, the internet makes available to those populations vulnerable to trafficking a wealth of information about risks, and facilitates the effort of authorities and of a large number of organisations reaching out to vulnerable populations. Thus, the question of vulnerability cannot be decided abstractly, nor ICT can be conceptualised as an unqualified new threat. The use of ICT may indeed be an enabling factor (see, e.g. McAuliffe 2016), but it also empowers users, in so far as the patterns of the more active and timely information-seeking that it enables and the pooling of information that occurs in cyberspace potentially protects them from predatory activity of smugglers and traffickers. Even though systematic knowledge in this area has only recently begun to emerge and a more concentrated effort is required to establish how and to what extent the use of ICT has this effect, this is a positive development, especially for the younger generations of ICT users for whom cyberspace, the internet, social media and other online platforms is increasingly a habitat as natural as the real world.

References Europol. (2016a). Migrant smuggling in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2016b). Trafficking of human beings in the EU. The Hague: Europol. Europol. (2015). Trafficking in human beings and the internet. The Hague: Europol. Europol-INTERPOL. (2016). Migrant smuggling networks: Joint Europol-INITERPOL Report.. Available at: http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-europol-interpol-report.pdf. Hall, A., & Antonopoulos, G. A. (2015). License to pill: Illegal entrepreneurs’ tactics in the online trade of medicines. In P. C. van Duyne, A. Maljevic, G. A. Antonopoulos, J. Harvey, & K. von Lampe (Eds.), The relativity of wrongdoing: corruption, organised crime, fraud and money laundering in perspective (pp. 229–252). Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. Harvey, D. (1990). The condition of postmodernity. London: Blackwell Publishers. Levi, M. (2001). Between the risk and the reality falls the shadow: Evidence and urban legends in computer fraud. In D. Wall (Ed.), Crime and the internet (pp. 44–58). Abingdon: Routledge. McAuliffe, M. (2016). The appification of migration: A million migrants? There are apps for that. Policy Forum. Retrieved from https://www.policyforum.net/theappification-of-migration/. McCusker, R. (2006). Transnational organised cyber-crime: Distinguishing threat from reality. Crime, Law & Social Change, 46, 257–273.

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Moore, R. (2007). The role of computer forensics in criminal investigations. In Y. Jewkes (Ed.), Crime online (pp. 81–94). Willan: Cullompton. Naylor, R.  T. (2000). Economic and organised crime: Challenges for criminal justice. Ottawa: Research and Statistics Division. Sanchez G. (2017). ‘Critical Perspectives on Clandestine Migration Facilitation: An Overview of Migrant Smuggling Research’. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 5(1), 9–27. Savona, E. U., & Mignone, M. (2004). The fox and the hunter: How ICT changes the crime race. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 10, 3–26. UNHCR  – The UN Refugee Agency. (2016). From a refugee perspective. Discourse of Arabic speaking and Afghan refugees and migrants on social media from March to, (December 2016). Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/5909af4d4/from-a-refugee-perspective.html. van Duyne, P. (1996). The phantom and threat of organised crime. Crime, Law and Social Change, 24, 341–377. World Bank. (2016). Digital dividends overview: World development report 2016. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

Index

A AdultWork, 62, 63 Asylum seekers, 15, 18 C Child sexual exploitation (CSE), 25 Communication technologies, 69–71 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 1–2 Criminal activity, 71 Criminal enterprise, 71 Criminal entrepreneurs, 71 D Digital technologies, 2, 3, 5 E e-recruitment, 24 European Commission, 14 H Human smuggling data collection, 3, 4 decision-making process, 3 digital technologies, 2, 5 face-to-face interactions, 6 geopolitical changes and major events, 2 ICTs, 3

international instruments, 1 Internet, 2, 3, 5 irregular migration and exploitation, 1 Italy and UK, 5 migration processes, 3 mobilisation, 2 national-based virtual ethnography, 5 online communities, 6 online web forums, 6 public policy internationally, 1 regional instruments, 1 research protocol, 4 reviews, 6 role of communication technologies, 2 role of digital technologies, 3 semi-structured interviews, 5, 6 sexual services, 6 sex workers, 6 social media, 3 social networking sites, 4 social networks, 2, 3 web elements, 4 Human smuggling, Italy criminal groups/actors, 13 criminal organisations, 13 recruitment characteristics, 14 dark web, 16 EU Member States, 13 European Commission, 14 Europol-EMSC (2019: 2), 15 Facebook, 14–16 Instagram, 16

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 G. A. Antonopoulos et al., Technology in Human Smuggling and Trafficking, SpringerBriefs in Criminology, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42768-9

75

76 Human smuggling, Italy (cont.) international and national regulations, 15 Internet, 13, 16 licit and illicit offers, 14 messages and posts, 15 social media, 14 social networks, 13, 15, 16 transportation services, 16 social media, 13 transportation characteristics, offers, 18 communication network, 20 cruise, 17 digital technologies, 18 European countries, 17 facebook profile, 17 fake profile, Facebook, 17 flights, 17 housing offers, 19 Internet, 17, 19 market logic and trends, 19 mobile applications, 19, 20 online advertising, 17 online exchange of information, 20 popular and active profiles, 20 services, 18 social networks, 17–20 tariffs, 18 travel agencies, 17 travels and prices, 17, 18 vague information, 19 Viber, 17 web contents, 17 WhatsApp, 17 Human smuggling, UK recruitment benevolent recruitment, 40 counterfeit documents, 39 decision-making processes, 39 digital technologies, 39 driving licenses, 39 Internet, 39, 40 interviewed experts, 39 law enforcement efforts, 39 virtual ethnographic research, 39 transportation advertising transportation services, 43 Asian and African migrants, 42 Facebook, 41 information and communication technologies, 42 Internet, 43 interplay, 41

Index local community, 43 post photographs, 41 smuggler-to-smuggler approach, 42 Viber, 41–43 WhatsApp, 41–43 Human trafficking, Italy categories of actors, 21 criminal networks, 21 exploitation advertising online platforms, 27 agricultural sector, 31 children online, 27 dark web, 29 elements, 30 employment sectors, 30 Facebook, 27 forced labour, 30 GPS software, 29 in-depth interviews, 29 marginalisation and isolation, 31 market, 27 mobile phones, 29 online advertisements, 30 online environments, 27 online platforms, 31 sex forced activities, 28 sex industry, 27 sex-related materials and services, 27 sexual and labour, 30 sexual services, 28, 29 sex work advertisements, 28 social networks, 28 surface web, 29 factors, 21 recruitment and transportation advertisements, 23 characteristics, 23 confidence of victims, 24 crime-as-a-service arena, 25 criminal organisation, 24 CSE, 25 cultural factors, 22 digital technologies, 23, 26 e-recruitment, 24 grooming and manipulative strategies, 24 in-depth interviews, 25 interconnected categories, 24 Internet, 22–24 job opportunities, 23 labour exploitation, 22, 26 labour sectors, 26 law enforcement, 26 methods and strategies, 25

Index potential victims, characteristics, 24 recruiters/exploiters, 23 role of families, 22 sex market, 26 sexual exploitation, 22, 24, 26 sexual images and videos, 25 sexual services, 26 social media, 22 social networks, 24 social practices, 22 strategies, 23 use of ICTs, 26 websites, 22 Human trafficking, UK exploitation AdultWork, 65 advertisements, 56 array of fields, 54 child victims, 53 debt-bondage, 54, 55 digital technologies, 54 dynamic adaptation, 59 Eastern European women, 60 ethnic reputation manipulation, 64 feature, 59 Google search, 57 identity laundering, 65 illegal status, 55 Internet, 54, 55 interview data, 53 Iranian/Persian, 59 labour exploitation, 53, 54 law enforcement and intelligence gathering activities, 59 non-native and native women, 62 online classified and adult sex websites, 55 online sexual, 56 organised sex trade, 60 pay-as-you-go network, 58 practice of unprotected sex, 61 profile texts, 60 reputations, 64 reverse ethnic reputation manipulation, 62 reverse image searches, 65 Romanian sex workers, 63, 64 selling sexual services, 57 services offered, 61 sex markets, 57 sexual, 55 sexual services, 62 sex work, 58 sex workers, 61, 62

77 social context, 64 social networking, 58, 62 special characters, 60 threads, 61 traffickers, 53 Truecaller, 57 type of recruitment, 54 Vietnamese minors, 54 virtual and real-world physical environments, 57 virtual ethnographic analysis, 60 virtual ethnography, 54–56 virtual red light districts, 55 websites, 56, 58 Western European sex workers, 62 recruitment advertisements, 45 chat rooms, 48 conversational English, 45 digital mobile phone apps, 47 electronic devices, 49 employment package, 46 factor, 47 Google search, 46 Internet, 44, 45 job role, 46 labour exploitation, 44, 45 “lover-boy method, 48 microblogging services, 44 and migration, 47 mobile phones, 49 multitude of motivations, 46 negative implications, 49 numerous location-based services, 49 online research, 44 production, 45 sex industry, 46, 47 sex markets, 45, 46 sexual exploitation, 44, 45, 48 sexual services, 44 sex work, 46 social media applications, 49 social networking, 44, 48 tourism sector, 44 unskilled labour, 45 websites, 45 transportation adults, 49 children, 49, 50 communication exchanges, 51 criminal organisation, 52 criminal proceedings, 50 e-commerce, 52 freedom of movement, 51

Index

78 Human trafficking, UK (cont.) ICT-related issue, 51 illicit/licit web transactions, 51 Internet, 52 investments, 53 online cash, 52 person-to-person payment transfer services, 52 post offices, 52 search engines, 51 technological capabilities, 52 Tor web-browser, 51 traffickers, 52 trafficking of victims, 50 transnational trafficking, 52 transregional trafficking, 53 types, 50 I Illegal entrepreneurship, 70 Immigration Act 1971, 37 Information-seeking, 72 Instagram, 15 Internet, 2, 3, 5, 69 Internet and digital technologies Italy confiscation, 12 economic sectors, 11 EU directives, 12 gangmaster provision, 12 human beings, 12 human smuggling (see Human smuggling) human trafficking (see Human trafficking) labour exploitation, 13 Law 146/2006, 12 legal instrument, 11 legislation, 12 sex market, 11 sexual exploitation, 11, 13 UK (see United Kingdom (UK)) Italian Criminal Code, 12 Italian Penal Code, 12 M Mobile phones, 69 Modern Slavery Act 2015, 37

N National Crime Agency (NCA) affirms, 46 National Crime Agency Strategic Assessment, 2015, 50 O Online ethnography, 71 Oral sex without condom (OWO), 61 P Participation in a criminal organisation, 12 Post-Cold War, 1 R Real-world interaction, 70 S Smartphones, 69 Smugglers, 3–5 Social media, 2, 3, 5, 6, 71, 72 Social networks, 2, 3 Surface and dark web, 5 T Traditional prostitution, 70 Traffickers, 2–5, 69 Trafficking Database, 49 Trafficking in human beings (THB), 37 Transformative effect, 71 Truecaller, 57 Twitter, 15 U United Kingdom (UK) academic disciplines, 38 advertisement, 38 categories of exploitation, 37 criminal strategies, 38 digital communication technologies, 38 digital technologies, 37, 38 human smuggling (see Human smuggling, UK) human trafficking (see Human trafficking, UK) Internet, 38 legal framework, 37

Index legislation, 37 set of indicators, 38 sex and labour markets, 37 United Nations Convention against Organized Crime and its Protocols, 12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 49 United Nations Protocols, 12

79 V Viber, 17 Virtual spaces, 70 W WhatsApp, 17