Rumania under the Soviet yoke ( 1949 ) dedicated to Iuliu Maniu

Table of contents :
SUMARUL
Partidele politice - în slujba poporului? 9
Fascismul se dezlănțuie în România 27
Stalin și Hitler se reped asupra României 42
Jefuitorii se bat pentru pradă 56
România intră în război 68
luliu Maniu aduce servicii Aliaților 81
Regele Mihai îi alungă pe naziști 95
Comuniștii se pregătesc să pună mâna pe putere 110
Stalin își instaurează un guvern în România 123
Patru comuniști conduc România - și cum o mai conduc! . 142
Democrațiile occidentale abandonează România 162
Comuniștii își terorizează rivalii 178
Soldații ruși intervin cu armele 200
Aservirea sindicatelor 219
Distrugerea Partidului Socialist : 235
înrobirea țărănimii 251
Comuniștii distrug Partidul Național Țărănesc 272
Comuniștii acaparează armata 290
Pervertirea justiției 308
încătușarea gândirii (presă, radio, școli, biserică) 326
Confiscarea proprietății 353
Rusia devastează și jefuiește 371
încătușarea României 388
Transilvania în fierbere 401
Rusia pune stăpânire pe Dunăre 427
O nouă constituție 439
întunericul se preface în beznă - ultima seară a anului 1948 . 453
Nota editorului 456

" A existat apoi o poliție militară, ce-i avea sub control pe comisarii care, la rândul lor, controlau armata. Nu era subordonată ministrului de război, ci fără îndoială se afla deasupra lui, deoarece, în ochii acestei poliții, el însuși era un suspect. Fiindcă se alăturase doar de curând comuniștilor, asupra lui plana bănuiala că o făcuse din motive personale. Această poliție era, în mare parte, sub supravegherea directă a Rusiei. A fost numită Serviciul Special de Informații sau SSL Existase și în timpul regimului mareșalului Antonescu, dar a fost mult extinsă de Bodnăraș, care a reținut în cadrul ei mulți dintre foștii agenți fasciști. Unul dintre principalii săi colaboratori, L. Stupineanu, este un asemenea exemplu."

Citation preview

RUMANIA

AFTER FIRST WORLD WAR

949.8

hi 34.

*

V

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE By REUBEN H. MARKHAM

Second Printing

BOSTON MEADOR PUBLISHING COMPANY PUBLISHERS,

Copyright,

1949,

by Edward

K.

Meador

Printed in the United States of America

The Meador Press, Boston, Massachusetts

To JULIU MANIU One of the noblest democratic leaders of this generation

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2020 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/rumaniaundersoviOOOOunse

CONTENTS Chapter Page I. Preview . 11 II. The Rumanian People 18 III. IV.

The Rumanian Motherland. “The Toiling Masses”

38 46

V. Kings, Courtiers and Landlords. VI. Political Parties—Did They Serve the People? .

74

VII. Fascism Explodes in Rumania.

95

VIII. Hitler and Stalin Gang Up on Rumania IX. The Despoilers Fight Over the Spoils X. Rumania Enters the War. XI. Juliu Maniu Serves the Allies. XII. King Mihai Kicks Germany Out . . .

113 129 143 158 174

XIII. XIV.

191

Communists Prepare Power-Seizure. Stalin Sets Up a Rumanian Gov¬ ernment . XV. Four Communists Run Rumania— and How! . XVI. The Western Democracies Fail Ru¬ mania . XVII. The Communists Terro rize Their Rivals .

60

207 230 253 272

XVIII. Russian Soldiers Intervene with Guns 298 XIX. Enslavement of Labor. 322 XX. Extermination of the Socialist Party 342 XXI. Enslavement of the Peasantry. 361 XXII. Communists Exterminate the Peasant XXIII. XXIV.

Party . Communists Seize the Army Perversion of Justice 7

385 406 428

CONTENTS

8

XXV. XXVI. XXVII. XXVIII. XXIX. XXX. XXXI. XXXII.

Enchaining of Thought (Press, Radio, Schools, Churches) Confiscation of Property. Russia Ravages and Plunders Russia Handcuffs Rumania Transylvania Seethes . Russia Seizes the Danube A New Constitution Darkness Becomes Midnight

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Chapter I PREVIEW Rumania, a country in southeast Europe about the size of Oregon, has been subjugated by its neighbor, the Soviet Union. Although it still has a government of its own and retains the appearance of sovereignty, it is controlled from Moscow by Communist agents. Its four immediate masters—all Communists—were placed in power by the Russian Andrei J. Vishinsky, on the command of the Soviet Politburo, and as a result of direct Red Army intervention. The whole of Rumania and its capital, Bucharest, were in the hands of the Soviet troops at the time. These four Communists are supposed to represent the Rumanian people. The pretense is that they got their mandate from the Rumanian Communist Party, “a vanguard of the popular revolution.” In 1940, ac¬ cording to publicly announced Soviet data this party had 1,000 members. Of the 20,000,000 inhabitants of Rumania—now there are only 16,000,000—barely 1,000 were Communists! The Party was as insignifi¬ cant in influence as it was in numbers. When the present Communist government was put

11

12

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

in power by Russia, March 6, 1945, it did not replace a pro-Nazi or fascist or reactionary government. On the contrary, it suppressed a democratic, coalition gov¬ ernment that had brought Rumania out of the Axis onto the side of the Allies. This was a classic Bolshe¬ vist method of procedure. So far in history, Com¬ munists have never replaced czarist, Nazi, fascist, or imperialist regimes. They have always waylaid demo¬ cratic governments that had overthrown reactionary regimes. They have hijacked and crushed reform gov¬ ernments. Communist conspirators wait until moderate people’s blocs throw out oppressive regimes and in the ensuing confusion they stab the new people’s governments in the back. The Rumanian Communists rule through an or¬ ganization called the National Democratic Federation, nicknamed F.N.D. (pronounced Fehnehdeh). This is a typical Communist creation and is presented to the world as a people’s front. It is an exclusively Com¬ munist instrument, devised to deceive and coerce the unwilling Rumanian nation. It contains the Communist Party and a part of the former Socialist Party, merged in the Communist-run Workers’ Party. It also contains the Plowman’s Front, an artificial, Communist-created and Communist-led “peasant party.” Actually the Plowman’s Front, whose nominal head is nominal Prime Minister Petru Groza, is the rural facade of the Kremlin’s Court in Rumania. The Workers’ Party is the urban facade. F.N.D. also contains another little political group called the National Popular Party, which is composed of Communist-led “intellectuals.”

Thus, Moscow has

reproduced in Rumania its classic political concoction, “the toiling masses”: they are “the workers, peasants

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

13

and progressive intelligentsia,” all marching in lockstep as a people’s front. Outside the Front no political organization is al¬ lowed to function. The powerful National-Peasant Party was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned. The Socialist Party was smashed and its pieces were ab¬ sorbed by the Communists or suppressed. The Liberal Party was stifled—one tiny wing was left dragging out a base, shadowy existence in the pinkish limbo of obsequy. Political activity has been forced into almost as rigid and confining a groove in Rumania as in Russia. The Rumanian Monarchy was abolished in Decem¬ ber 1947. Like the political parties, it was discarded as an impediment to foreign domination and to Com¬ munist absolutism. A new constitution was proclaimed in the spring of 1948 amid the unanimous applause of a subservient Parliament, in which 405 of the 414 People’s Repre¬ sentatives belonged to the Communist Front and the other nine were yes-shouting fellow travelers. The democratic division of authority into three agencies—legislative, judicial, and executive—was pre¬ cipitously swept away and all power ostensibly placed in the Presidium, which actually means in the hands of the small Politburo, or of Moscow’s four Communist agents. Parliament is a group of well-favored cheer leaders paid to support the enslavers of the nation with enthusiasm and unanimity. All productive urban property is being taken over by the state, meaning the Communist Party, which is authorized, also, to control internal trade, foreign trade, industry and finances. The land, after having undergone a partial redistribution into small peasant holdings, is being reassembled in collective farms. All jobs throughout the country, whether in city or

14

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

village, are being drawn into the hands of the Com¬ munist Party, which is rapidly moving to a position of absolute control over the livelihood of every citizen. This control is being exercised through totalitarian administration and through state ownership of the means of production and distribution. Every industrial worker must belong to the General Federation of Labor Unions, run by the aggressive Communist George Apostol. Every teacher as well as every state and communal official must belong to the Communist Front and to the Federation. Every person following a free profession must belong to a Commu¬ nist guild. Village economic life is controlled by co¬ ercive Communist cooperatives. The press is in Communist hands and no opposition paper appears in the country. During many past centu¬ ries the subjugated Rumanian nation, having lost its Latin alphabet, wrote the Rumanian language in Rus¬ sian (Cyrillic) letters. Now the Rumanian papers write Russian thoughts and Russian commands in Rumanian (Latin) letters. Indeed, the Russians have not left that exclusively to their Rumanian agents and lackeys; they have had their own Rumanian-language papers in Bucharest. Over the Rumanian radio network no opposition voice is ever heard. Moscow tirades blare out day and night through the loud-speakers which the Communist Party has installed on every main square and in many villages. Furthermore, those blasts come not only from Rumanian transmitters but also from Soviet sta¬ tions beyond Rumania’s borders. Each Rumanian citi¬ zen is subjected to a crossfire of Communist propa¬ ganda that drowns out almost everything else. The books, which the nation reads—from fairy tales to theology—are written by Communist or pro-Com-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

15

munist authors, whose compositions pass through the multiple-wired sieve of Communist-led typesetters, Communist-controlled paper distributors, Communistthought police, Rumanian censors and Soviet censors. The schools, from nurseries to universities, are Com¬ munist-directed and teach Communism. Students’ and pupils’ organizations are Communist managed and used as Communist agencies. Boys and girls, along with their teachers, are led from their classes to parade up and down the streets, carrying Communist placards along with enormous pictures of Communist grandees. As they march they raise their fists and intone, “StalinGroza-Pauker,” as Communist cheer leaders direct them. Mrs. Pauker, whose unforgettable visage gazes from posters covering walls throughout the land, has con¬ strained all Rumanian women’s organizations into her own Communist-run National Women’s Federation. Rumanian youth are forced into a monolithic totali¬ tarian Communist Youth Federation, called “progres¬ sive” and “democratic.” The churches are under strict Communist supervi¬ sion; the clergy are told what they may and may not preach. Emissaries of Christ are ordered to serve as government electioneers and as barkers for Commu¬ nist Party projects. Religious schools are prohibited by the Constitution. The Concordat with the Vatican was annulled. The army, which has been converted into a school for defending the regime and for intimidating nonCommunists, is run by a former deserter, a former em¬ bezzler and a former spy, Emil Bodnaras. It is as the bodyguard of the Communist Party, protecting it from the indignation of the Rumanian people. Rumanian law courts from the first day after Com-

16

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

munist power-seizure have been in the hands of Com¬ munist Ministers. The first Minister of Justice was the veteran Communist, Lucretsiu Patrascanu, but he proved too mild. Consequently, he was replaced by Avram Bunaciu, a more furious Communist. The Rumanian courts function as a branch of the Rumanian Communist Party, and are used to crush non-Communists. The vastly enlarged police force, with agents in every factory, school, apartment house, government office and literary rendezvous, is run by Teohari Georgescu, one of Rumania’s chief Communists. Rumania’s foreign affairs are in the hands of Ana Pauker, a Rumanian-born Jewess, brought into Ruma¬ nia from Russia by the Red Army to serve as chief liaison with Moscow and as the Kremlin’s agent. This means that at every international gathering Rumania speaks in the Kremlin’s voice and that every vital deci¬ sion regarding Rumania’s alignment is taken by Mos¬ cow. The Rumanian nation actually has no Foreign Minister. Rumania’s finance, meaning its banks, credits, loans, savings, are in the hands of a Hungarian Communist, Vasile E. Luca, Minister of Finance. The economic dictator in Rumania is Communist Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. He is master of all produc¬ tion, all property, all trade. He controls the siphons that draw wealth from Rumania’s factories, mines, forests, fisheries, oil wells and fields. Through his pipe lines alone flow Rumania’s oil and corn and lumber and gold. The terminus of many of those lines is Russia. For several years much of Rumania’s resources, includ¬ ing railroad cars, ships, machinery, locomotives, have poured into the Soviet Union. Within 12 months after the Soviet Army entered

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

17

Bucharest on August 30, 1944, Rumania had delivered goods and services to Russia worth $610,000,000, which was equal to about 80% of that year’s total national income. This dictatorship was established “in the name of the Rumanian people.” As foreign agents, through the power of a foreign army, brought Rumania into the clutches of a foreign empire, this was called liberation. As a foreign capital makes all final decisions for the Rumanian State, this practice is extolled as an expres¬ sion of Rumanian sovereignty. It is lauded by press and radio as a felicitous illustration of sisterly co¬ operation between small and large states.

18

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter II THE RUMANIAN PEOPLE The Rumanian nation seems to me an ethnological miracle or wonder. Not because of unusual gifts or extraordinary virtues, but simply because of its exist¬ ence. The elemental fact that a contiguous mass of 15,000,000 Rumanians or more are to be found in southeast Europe seems to me remarkable. They might be called a prodigal nation; at least they have strayed far from the family home and settled permanently among strangers. The Rumanians are as a Latin colony in a mass of Slavs and Magyars. They are pressed by Slavs on the north, south and east, by Magyars on the west. Their nearest Latin cousins are the Italians, 500 miles away. This Latinity of the Rumanians is certainly a vital matter; yet the only indisputable mark of it that I can detect is the Rumanian language which is basically a Latin tongue and essentially uniform among all Ruma¬ nians. This uniformity shows that at a fairly remote period Romans gave birth to a new nation north of the lower Danube. How many Romans contributed to this ethnological creation and what kind of Romans they were may be disputed. But the character, unity and virility which they be¬ queathed were so strong that the Rumanians have been able to resist the most terrific pressure and most calami¬ tous vicissitudes for more than a millennium—indeed from Roman times.

During their whole modern his¬

tory the Rumanians have identified themselves with the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

19

Latins or “the west,” and maintained that relationship at all costs. And the bond drawing them to the other Latin nations has not been religious, because the main part of the Rumanian nation embraces the Eastern Orthodox Church, which has come to be largely Slavic. Nor was direct contact with the Roman world the force that preserved Rumanian Latinity because, when Eu¬ rope was divided among the Byzantines and Western¬ ers, Rumania fell to the Byzantines. Turks ruled it; Greek Phanariots administered it. The very alphabet of the Rumanians became Slav. But the nation remained Latin. For centuries all Rumanians were dominated by for¬ eign conquerors and many Rumanians have been under foreigners during practically their whole existence. Most became illiterate. The Rumanian stream of his¬ tory was submerged. Written records vanished. Decade after decade, as the chroniclers of history looked out upon the wildly flowing streams of Euro¬ pean peoples who were fighting and fleeing, conquering and being vanquished, who were erecting buildings and battering them down, raising banners and tearing them to shreds, these chroniclers failed to detect the Ruma¬ nian serfs and shepherds. In the diaries of many centu¬ ries, Rumanians went almost unnoticed. In the roll call of the nations, the word Rumania was often omit¬ ted. The Wallachian peasants, century in and century out, were not even given the recognition of being re¬ corded among the missing. And they weren’t really missing. There they were in person—and there they are, defying time and con¬ querors. That outpost of Rome survived even when Rome was overrun. Invading warriors and migrating hordes wiped out almost every living relic of Rome in areas nearer Italy. Latin words were swallowed up

20

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

by Slav in almost all the Danubian plains and valleys, but the forgotten Rumanian nation survived, praying and singing in the words of Virgil, of Hadrian and of Ovid. And they comprise a uniform, well integrated people. Neither Magyars, Germans, Russians nor Bul¬ garians could absorb them. As I travel through Bucovina in the extreme north, an area that was long detached from Rumania and is almost surrounded by Ukrainians, I find a Latin stock excellently preserved, with robust national feelings and a vivid national life. As I move down along the Dnies¬ ter where Turks and Russians fought for centuries, where Rumanian schools rarely existed and where Rumanian peasants were serfs of foreign masters, I find the same Latin people with the same national con¬ science. As I move from there into the northwest, traversing many tangles of mountains and valleys, to the distant border town of Sighet Maramuresh, I find the same Latins as at the mouth of the Danube. And as I wan¬ der southward through the environments of the beauti¬ ful Transylvanian city of Cluj, or the villages about Banatian Timisoara, or talk with the peasants near the Iron Gates where the Danube flows turbulently through the narrow passage that separates Serbia from Ruma¬ nia, I find everywhere the same Latin people. Although for a full millennium many of them had no sovereign government of their own, and though most of the time they were separated from one another, exploited by their feudal lords, deprived of schools, and ridiculed by their imperial masters as crude clodhoppers and shep¬ herds, they still survive and prosper, telling folk stories and singing sweet lullabies in a language similar to that of the Caesars. There are but few cases in history where a primitive

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

21

people has so successfully resisted assimilation by pow¬ erful masters. And this seems all the more remarkable because the very creation of the Rumanian nation was the result of a fairly rapid initial assimilation of na¬ tives by Roman soldiers or settlers. The native element consisted of Dacians, who stub¬ bornly fought against the Roman Empire until they were defeated and partially subjugated. Their uncon¬ querable leader, Decebal, committed suicide to avoid being led through Rome as a living trophy in a Caesa¬ rian triumph. He is considered by the Rumanians their greatest early hero. These two elements have been rounded out by a minor Slav strain added during long periods of Slav domination. The chief evidence of this is the presence of many Slavic words and some basic Slavic construc¬ tions in the Rumanian language. I shall not describe in detail the kind of human being that evolved during centuries of drab humiliation, with short turbulent interludes of independence. However, I shall mention a few outstanding Rumanian traits, one of which is patient, resilient, adaptation. In the course of time, the Rumanians learned to avoid head-on fights with more powerful neighbors. They found ways to adapt themselves to situations they could not avoid. They accepted invaders which they could not overcome, made outward concessions which they could not circum¬ vent and endured much humiliation, but they retained their own ways. While some other European peoples blindly fought and sadly perished during this long dark period, the Rumanians tempered their resistance with reasonable¬ ness and survived. They persisted longer in the face of greater difficulties and established a larger nation with

22

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

a more distinct personality than any other southeast European people. When the Russians mastered them, they hated the Russians, got along with them as well as they could without too much suffering, and victoriously clung to their Rumanian customs. They even used the Russian alphabet until comparatively modern times, but in that alphabet they wrote their Rumanian language. This does not mean pure Latin, but pure Rumanian, which has fewer basic dialects than most other European tongues. When under the Turks, the Rumanians accepted for¬ eign suzerainty, but obtained and maintained a larger degree of freedom than any other Balkan people; to a fairly large extent, they resisted Turkish cultural and moral influences. For a period, they were dominated by the Greeks who served as representatives of the Turks and gave the Turks a liberal cut-in. But instead of being swal¬ lowed up by the Greeks, they swallowed the Greeks up, making some of those old governing families leaders of Rumanian aristocracy. Even today, when Greek merchants or artisans or manufacturers settle in Ru¬ mania, which they have done by the thousands, they become Rumanians almost as quickly as their brothers and sisters become Americans in New York, Florida or Montana. In a word, Rumanian adaptability seems to have been a good trait; it was an expression of strength rather than of weakness. It saved the Rumanians alone among the Latin peoples of southeast Europe. As a result of this method of dealing with events, a rather tolerant character has evolved. The Ruma¬ nians themselves say they are a kind and gentle people —they use the word “moale.” They tend to be proud of this quality, and I think with much justification.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

23

The Rumanians are emotional, sentimental and, at least superficially, generous. They have seldom had revolutions or dramatic reformations and during the greater part of their history, did not stain their chron¬ icles with political assassinations. Until very recent times, they were largely impervious to Communism in its wildest forms, and the bulk of the nation resisted the baser forms of Naziism. To be sure, Rumanians like to flatter themselves when talking about them¬ selves, as most nations do, and tend to overdo their tolerance. But, during most of their history, they actu¬ ally have shown themselves milder and more friendly than many other European peoples, certainly than most of their immediate neighbors. This reasonableness and patience indicated no lack of heroism or daring in time of need. A Rumanian has good taste, dresses well and is very hospitable. He has an aptitude for writing, is gifted at painting and is an excellent actor, though without the ubiquitous histrionic passion of the Russians. He has a bright wit and a striking sense of humor, which is probably one of his most useful national assets. With patience, tobacco and jokes, he can endure almost any¬ thing. Whenever trouble comes, he sighs, complains and blusters, and says he can’t stand it more than a couple of days longer, but if necessary, he stands it a couple of decades more. His hospitality and sociability often lead him to live beyond his means. He prefers extravagance to fru¬ gality and finds much enjoyment in showing off. He is ashamed to be parsimonious—as a Bulgarian is ashamed to be lavish. On the whole, this holiday spirit helps the Ruma¬ nian endure his troubles—and the nation is always in trouble. Whatever happens, a Rumanian thinks he is

24

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

somebody and acts as though he were somebody—and that may help keep him going. He is never so low that he can’t spruce up, apply a drop of perfume, pay a compliment, and strike a pose. The motive behind this trait produces personal pride, personal esteem, and a desire for personal possessions, which is a basic and permanent Rumanian quality. I know very few people who are so strikingly resistant to regimentation as the Rumanians. This often leads to lawlessness of a petty nature and to lack of social dis¬ cipline. It often makes tickets for reserved seats worth¬ less. At football games the public in seeking seats some¬ times mauls one another as much as the players do. Going to a popular opera is sometimes a similar ordeal. But this personal vanity also inspires the Rumanian to scorn Communism and Naziism. He is an incorrigible bourgeois. In fact, almost every Rumanian would like to be an aristocrat—and none so much as most Ruma¬ nian Communists at the present moment. This lack of order and disregard for discipline, along with a tradition of adaptability, have bolstered a rather wide-spread belief that Rumanians are somewhat un¬ reliable and easily corruptible. But this is only partially true. Undeniably there is normally more graft in Ru¬ mania than in England, Switzerland or Finland. In places and at times there has been as much graft in Rumania as at times in Boston, Philadelphia or New York’s Tammany Hall. Fortunately good Rumanians regret and fight such practices, just as good Ameri¬ cans do. On the other hand the lack of Rumanian rigidity is not always a weakness. On occasions, a certain amount of elasticity has proven useful. Rumanians have learned how to parry blows for one another and for the nation

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

25

at critical times such as the one through which the world is now passing. In a society whose discipline is somewhat resilient, many things can be arranged. A “final settlement” may often turn out not to be final. Bureaucratic leniency or “slipping through the fingers” may facilitate the open¬ ing of prison doors. Soviet tyrants in Rumania and their local agents there have to work through Rumanians, to whom tradi¬ tions have given experience in frustrating the plans of Turks, Greeks, Magyars, and czarist Russians. As Moscow now tries to use a Rumanian administration to enslave Rumania, it finds apparent acquiescence but actual resistance all along the line. Many Rumanian officials on receiving orders from hated Soviet agents show more concern for the prospective victims than for their superiors. They tend to favor making ar¬ rangements designed to help the victims, the Rumanian nation—and themselves. It is notorious that even fanatical Nazis, furious Russian Communists and raging Fascists have made “arrangements” with bourgeois enemies. At the pres¬ ent moment, a large number of Rumanians, who are not by tradition as ragid as Prussians nor as fanatical as the first Cromwellians, are using a certain skill in evasiveness to serve as a cushion between the Kremlin and the Rumanian people. This Rumanian elasticity or accessibility or amena¬ bility has led to the belief, often expressed by outsiders with a smirk or sigh, that the Rumanian woman is light and non-resistant. I do not know how one could give an authoritative opinion on this. Most men visiting in most lands find the kind of women they seek. One can find “red light” districts in Bucharest—as in Charles¬ ton, West Virginia. One is—or was—occasionally ac-

26

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

costed on Bucharest’s Calea Victoriei, as on the boule¬ vards of Paris and Vienna. King Carol II had a mis¬ tress and a bad one—but other kings in other lands have had mistresses. I personally believe family life in Rumania resembles family life in other civilized lands. Certainly there is far less divorce than in America. A Rumanian news¬ stand is less “smutty” or “sexy” than those in American cities. The Rumanian book market is deluged by no such flood of lascivious books on sex delights as now flood American bookstores, which are selling them by the hundreds of thousands. Sad to say, one nation that can throw no stones at any other on the matter of loose morality is the U. S., in spite of its 77,000,000 Christians. My actual personal experience in the course of two full decades is that Rumanian women are good house¬ keepers, excellent hostesses, whether rich or poor, de¬ voted teachers, efficient social or philanthropic work¬ ers, earnest students, able farmers, charming friends. Even in villages and small towns they are clean. They have good taste. A fair proportion distinguish them¬ selves in intellectual pursuits; many are petite and shapely; they like love songs and love stories. Their pulchritude seems to me no more reason for reproach than feminine beauty in other lands and other ages. Rumania has its full Quota of the kind of good women described by Solomon. They were the chief factors in preserving the Ru¬ manian language, Rumanian traditions, and Rumanian national character through the ages of darkness. They, not warriors, have saved Rumania from extinction. They are and will continue to be leading factors in the present struggle for the restoration of freedom. Both Rumanian women and men are religious, at

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE least pious.

27

I have rarely lived among a people more

strongly attached to churches, or at least showing more attention to churches. This sentiment is due partly to superstition, but more to the yearning which all friendly people have for a supreme friendship. The Rumanians like to like people. They like companionship, entertain¬ ment, neighbors, children. Their affections are not al¬ ways stable, but they are usually warm. Rumanians resent being slighted or snubbed in their village or city or community—or in the universe. They like to feel that they “belong,” so they enjoy a faith in God, about which they are quite serious, although often quite simple. Childlikeness is an attribute of piety. But the fact that the Rumanians enjoy songs, pray¬ ers, chants, candles and stories of a celestial world doesn’t mean that they are impractical or supine or without energy, vigor and bravery. Actually they have much stamina and persistence, as their survival shows. It is true that Jews have conducted much of their business and banking, published some of their leading papers, played in their theatres, run many of their in¬ dustrial plants. It is equally true that Germans are among the best artisans in Rumania, that Greeks were once the chief administrators there and that Magyars were almost unrestricted masters in western areas. Consequently, Rumanians seemed inferior even in their own home land. But this appearance is not the whole story. Rumanians seem humble and passive as sheep hud¬ dled with their backs to a storm. But they survived the

storms! They persisted and multiplied. They clung to their plains and valleys—among the very richest in Europe—in the face of all imperial robbers. They outwaited every invader and remained masters of their fields.

Without schools they preserved their language

28

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and created a literature. They made, incontestably, the most exquisite folk embroidery in Europe. They became the largest nation in the Balkans, in spite of all vicissitudes, and are among the most prolific in the world. In the two World Wars they fought with much bravery. In business some Rumanians are very daring. The nation has restored war-damaged buildings with record speed. Their output of papers, magazines and books was first in the Balkans—at least in volume. Their industry and exports held first place. Their youth, both boys and girls, showed great persistence in study¬ ing and moving ahead. The Rumanians established all the institutions of democracy. I have sojourned long and intimately among the peoples of southeast Europe, observing their good and bad qualities, and am disinclined to overpraise any of them. I have seen among them sad spiritual relics from long centuries of oppression. Some of these people lived close to animals and slept with animals in com¬ mon huts, so were coarse. Most were serfs at one time or another so some of them were dull and crude—even craven. But they all preserved and developed admi¬ rable qualities during those ages of bondage. They cultivated their land well, sang songs as they sowed and sickled their wheat, played poignant melo¬ dies on homemade flutes as they tended sheep, wove cloth as delicate as gossamer webs on handmade looms in dingy one-room cabins, carried babies on their backs to distant fields, remained devoted to their families, cherished community pride, scorned oppression, de¬ spised traitors, prayed for freedom and believed that, although sleeping beside cows, they were children of “Grandpa God,” who loved them. Among the most persistent of these upward-plodding

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

29

Balkan peoples, groping in the darkness, pushing against native and foreign exploiters, were the Ruma¬ nian masses. In moving ahead, they had to storm a fortress of many walls, manned by Russians, Magyars, Germans and their own feudal lords. They were often an outcast people in their own home land. In large parts of Rumania they could not dwell in their own cities, but were legally and forcibly confined to the out¬ skirts. Their nationality was made synonymous with serf or shepherd or country Jake. Their homemade costumes were objects of ridicule. The name of Wallachian or Vlach was used as a term of reproach by barons, artisans, merchants and by people who could read and write. The Rumanians in places were as “a third nation” after German and Magyars; they were hewers of wood and carriers of water. And in all this repression, as they passed from gen¬ eration to generation illiterate, schoolless, undefended, some of their own land-holding fellow countrymen par¬ tially ganged up against them, siding with the ex¬ ploiters. But more than one hundred years ago Rumanian shepherds and plowmen, women spinning wool as they watched village herds, youth who had managed to at¬ tend foreign schools, began to struggle for liberty and for a place among the respected nations of the earth. They kept up their fight for a full century and, in spite of many mistakes, much false nationalism, some ex¬ cesses, not a little violence, they found themselves, after 1918, in sight of their ideals. That is the romance of the Rumanian people. Hold¬ ing the fort for freedom is the morning star of their millennial night, the song that echoes tremulously into the world from their woods and fields. It is the bright embroidery on their blouses, the flowers worn in the

30

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

hair of village maidens, the painted figures on little peasant wagons rattling along dusty roads, the red pep¬ pers festooned on the walls of village huts. Every holi¬ day song and religious hymn seemed to say: “a people is rising from the meadows and the woods and the stables; a people is moving into freedom.” With it all there was generated much nationalism. By the beginning of the present century the Rumanians became vividly conscious of themselves and of their na¬ tion. They felt a new birth of Latinity. They streamed to schools, wrote and read books, traveled and made new ties with the West. The bonds with Europe that the ancient Caesars wove were made strong and firm again. Rumania took her stand beside the Western Powers in the councils of the nations. With each pass¬ ing year it repudiated Muscovy more defiantly, re¬ jected Communism more resolutely and strove more ardently to add luster to true Latin culture. I am not intimating that the Rumanian nation suc¬ ceeded in all things or that it kept entirely free from the egregious aberrations that raged over Europe dur¬ ing the 1930’s, but I am saying that it spurned the horrible blight of Muscovy’s new red tyranny with greater unanimity than most nations in the world. Yet, upon these children of wild, freedom-loving Decebal and of triumphant Caesars has been thrust the double yoke of Imperial Russia and of nation-destroying Marx.

The Hungarians There are about one and a half million Hungarians in Rumania, most of whom live in the western half of the country, chiefly in Transylvania. For the greater part they are not found in one compact mass and no distinct geographical boundary separates them from

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

31

the Rumanians. One may say roughly, that in mixed areas Hungarians occupy the cities and Rumanians the villages, the Hungarians enjoy the best places in the center of towns, while the Rumanians have been re¬ stricted to the outskirts. Also, a large group of Hunga¬ rians is found in the very center of Rumania, with no ethnic corridor between it and the rest of the Hunga¬ rian nation. There is no solution of the problem caused by this ethnological mixing except brotherly love or a transfer of populations. The situation is made all the more difficult by the fact that for centuries the Hungarians have been on top and now the Rumanians are determined to get on top. The Hungarians during recent decades have been one of the most nationalistic nations in the world, with a strong, carefully cultivated feeling of racial supe¬ riority, and they look upon the Rumanians as inferior. They do not hesitate to express this feeling in their literature, churches, coffee houses, and at political meetings. Hungarians were long feudal masters of Rumanian peasants but Rumanian grandees almost never lorded it over Hungarian serfs. The Hungarians have never been able to free themselves from the selfexalting feeling that they can look down on Rumanians or Vlachs as “crude, weak, corrupt clodhoppers.” Dur¬ ing the centuries when Transylvania formed part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the dominant Hunga¬ rians there had almost the same attitude toward the Rumanians as Spaniards in Mexico have had toward the Indian peons. This state of affairs was changed after the First World War. The Hungarians were defeated and the Rumanians in Transylvania decided to separate that province from Hungary and join it to the Rumanian motherland. The former Hungarian masters fell into

32

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

as embarrassing a position as that of the Texans would be, if the Mexicans suddenly regained mastery of that state. The Second World War greatly accentu¬ ated friction between the two peoples. I am personally convinced much blood will flow and much suffering will be caused before an equilibrium is reached on this ques¬ tion. The Rumanians in the flush of an offensive na¬ tionalism meet the Hungarians who feel the despera¬ tion of a defensive nationalism and neither side is in¬ clined to give way. One national group fights for its place in the world after a millennium of humiliation, the other fights for its life. The Hungarian minority believes that physical existence of a million and a half men and women is at stake. They feel as Sudeten Germans felt in 1945.

The Jews The second most important nationality minority in Rumania are the Jews. To write about them and the problem created between them and the Rumanians is a delicate matter, especially at the present time, but to attempt to understand Rumanian political development without mentioning the Jews would be absurd. One would do a far greater disservice to the movement for world peace and international brotherhood by not men¬ tioning the Jews, than by frankly treating the problem created by relations between them and their neighbors. It was commonly said in Rumania before the out¬ break of the Second World War that there were a million Jews in the country. I personally surmised that this estimate was not very inaccurate. The official cen¬ sus of 1930 gave the number of Jews as 575,000. Dur¬ ing the following ten years,

that number increased

commensurate with the general rapid increase in the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

33

Rumanian population and, in addition, there was cer¬ tainly a considerable number of unregistered Jews who had come in clandestinely from other states. The World Jewish Congress says there were 850,000 Jews in Rumania in 1939. In other words, approximately 5% of the people in Rumania were Jews, which would have made the proportion appreciably greater than in America or any other European state except Poland and Hungary. An appreciable proportion of the Jews were grouped in a comparatively small number of cities, especially in the provinces of Moldavia, Bessarabia, northern Bucovina and northern Transylvania. I re¬ cently visited Moldavian cities in which the Jewish population was said by local Rumanians to comprise from one-half to three-quarters of the inhabitants. Before the war I frequently traveled through Bessa¬ rabia and in some cities the Rumanians said the Jewish population was over 50%. Balts, for example, seemed to be almost a Jewish town. In northern T ransylvania, also, one passed through many settlements almost en¬ tirely Jewish and through large, exclusively Jewish sec¬ tions of other towns. In certain parts of Rumania the most active city population was Jewish, while the peasants were Ruma¬ nians. The people who owned the stores, ran the little shops, directed the banks and conducted industry, such as it was, were Jews. While those who were obliged to buy ready-made products and borrow money were Rumanians. Every buyer in the world is inclined to consider himself beaten by the seller, and no moneyborrower likes a money-lender. In addition, the Jews, who in certain parts of the country had more or less of a monopoly on the trade in grain and farm products, were able to determine the prices paid for things pro¬ duced by the peasants.

Consequently, it was not un-

34

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

natural that the peasants felt—perhaps without justi¬ fication—that they were doubly gouged by the Jews; in the prices of the products they sold, and in the prices of the merchandise they bought. Another important matter was that Jews found it much easier to go to school than some Rumanians be¬ cause they lived in the cities, while the Rumanians were largely peasants. The world over, city people go to school more than farmers. Even to this day in certain times of the year, village boys and girls stay out of school to tend cattle, sheep or pigs, or even to work in the fields. It must also be mentioned that Jews tend to be more alert, ambitious and assiduous than the Rumanians. I don’t believe this to be a racial matter, but a result of traditions and conditions of life. The Jewish boy sell¬ ing goods in a store, or working in a bank, is “smarter” than the barefoot Rumanian boy tending a couple of cows on the side of a mountain or on the grassy strip along the road. It must be remembered, also, that the Jews even in the most obscure towns of the world have wide international connections, which means that they are much better informed about world affairs and tend to have wider interests, as well as higher personal ambi¬ tions than some others. A large proportion of the Jew¬ ish community in many parts of Rumania moved ahead faster and went further than the youth of the domi¬ nant nationality group, and this, of course, caused envy. It is, also, a sad fact that Christianity tended to arouse envy toward the Jews. Although the Church is based on love, preaches the brotherhood of man and in theory is dedicated to the task of making men and women neighbors, it often incites to hatred. One of the most deplorable traditions of the churches in parts of Europe is undue emphasis on the historical fact that

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

35

Jews crucified Christ. Some clergymen, moved by this tradition, do not fail to stress the statement of the Jewish mob which, when crying for Christ’s death, said, “Let his blood be upon our heads.” The Christian Church, therefore, has been a factor in the persecution of the Jews, and that has tended to be the case in Rumania during certain periods and in certain places. The very word “Christian” at certain times in certain parts of Rumania has meant antiJewish. I have regrettably noticed that some Jews in Rumania abhor the word “Christians.” The phrase “Christian life,” or a “Christian policy,” or “Christian ideals” arouses in their minds visions of beatings, rob¬ bery and pogroms. Anyone wishing to understand Rumanians must also bear in mind that nationalism has been running strong there during recent decades and that it is inextricably bound up with the National Church. To be a Ruma¬ nian, in the popular imagination, has been almost iden¬ tical with being an Orthodox Christian or a Greek Catholic Christian. To oppose the Church was almost the same, according to popular tradition, as opposing the national state. Thus, to a traditional Christian hos¬ tility toward the Jews, was added the force of militant Rumanian nationalism. In addition to this, the Jews played a rather impor¬ tant role in the development of the Rumanian press, and this provided fuel for anti-Semitism. For a great many years the outstanding nationalistic Rumanian daily paper, Universul, was Rumanian-owned and Ru¬ manian-conducted, while the freer, somewhat more “progressive” and more liberal press, was to a fairly large extent, Jewish. Also, a number of the smaller papers that sprang up were Jewish. Thus the profes¬ sional rivalry between the chief national paper and its

36

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

enterprising competitors became rivalry between Ruma¬ nians and Jews. The struggle also between conserva¬ tism and liberalism tended to be a fight between Ruma¬ nians and Jews. Certainly the struggle between the bourgeoisie and Marxism was considered predomi¬ nantly a Rumanian-Jewish duel. It is well to point out that the Jews have made a large contribution to Rumanian journalism, liberalism, industry and finance and that by their alertness, dili¬ gence and enterprise they deserved much of the success which they attained. Likewise, one should stress that most of the Jews in Rumania are poor, just as most Rumanians are poor. Nevertheless, there opened a sharp cleavage be¬ tween the upward-striving, nationalistically-inclined Ru¬ manians who, after centuries of oppression, were trying to create a free national state, on the one hand, and the Jews on the other. It is undeniable and natural that the Jews there were less nationalistic than the Ruma¬ nians and it was inevitable that they should dread ag¬ gressive Rumanian patriotism, tending toward disre¬ gard for minorities. Irrepressibly, some Rumanians came to look upon many Jews as aliens and upon some as enemies of the Rumanian State. These sentiments, nourished by narrow churchmen, unscrupulous dema¬ gogues and rapacious criminals, led to deep-rooted antiSemitism and the situation has continued to deterio¬ rate until it has now reached the point where most Jews in Rumania and most Rumanians tend to be bit¬ ter enemies of one another.

Other Groups Another prosperous and exceedingly well-established minority group, almost as large as that of the Jews,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

37

were the Germans, some of whom had long cooperated with Hungarians in humiliating Rumanians. A fairly large number of these Germans became Nazis, consti¬ tuted a state within the state, and were open enemies of Rumania. The war brought about their humiliation and partial liquidation so that they have ceased to be an important factor in Rumanian political or social development. Serbs, Bulgarians, a few French, a fairly large num¬ ber of Ukrainians and a small number of Russians gave still more variety to the ethnological mosaic which con¬ stituted Rumania. However, changes brought about by the war largely eliminated most of these minorities from the country’s present territory. Concluding this survey of the people in Rumania one may say that the Rumanians are passing through a period of acutely aggressive nationalism. After a very long period of national humiliation, they are in¬ clined to feel a rather militant intolerance toward na¬ tionality minorities, even though they are a neighborly people. They want, at all costs, to complete the process of making a free and completely-independent state. Of course, the Rumanians do not consider themselves in¬ tolerant. No nation does, not even white Americans in Mississippi.

38

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter III THE RUMANIAN MOTHERLAND At the beginning of World War Two disk-shaped Rumania was rich in resources, beautiful and varie¬ gated. It had often been called the America of Europe. It possessed wide level plains, splendid mountains, woods, mines, oil, some precious metals. Not many more attractive places for men to live in were to be found anywhere upon the globe. Many different nations had sought to live there. The first outstanding geographical characteristic of Rumania was its accessibility. Rumania is as an open garden on a highway. In a word, it lies on the Danube Basin and stretches for approximately 500 miles along that splendid river. The Danube is the gracious queen of Rumania; the Danube is as the cruel sorceress of Rumania. The Danube gives beautiful Rumania much of its beauty and bounteous Rumania much of its bounty. The Danube also causes sad Rumania much of its sadness. One is astounded to discover how much of Rumania’s history has been written by that river. One reason is that the Danube Valley is a wide and gentle Along reason it is a

passage through which Asia enters Europe. it the East marches into the West. Another is that the Danube Valley is a cluster of valleys; place where roads converge; Europe’s restless

tribes from north and west and south have pitched camp at the intersections. The camps have often been not only for a night, but for centuries; the travelers

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

39

have seen that the land is good and have wanted to settle there. Ever moving humanity has made Rumania’s Danube a favorite thoroughfare. Rumanian shepherds have been as dwellers beside European Route Number One with powerful automobiles ever swishing by; Ruma¬ nian shepherds have been as dwellers beside a shady woods in which travelers from afar constantly set up trailer camps. Many of these travelers came great distances, streaming tumultuously from the teeming plains of Asia, inexhaustibly fecund in human kind. Hardly a century has passed during which some hungry horde did not separate from its Asiatic home and push its ferocious way into the Danube Valley over the plains of Rumania. A gifted British writer, C. A. Macartney, has men¬ tioned as among the migrants from the East: “Scythi¬ ans, Sarmatians, Huns, Bulgars, Avars, West Turks, Magyars, Petchenegs, Uz, Cumans, Mongols, Osmanli Turks.” When the masses of the Red Army pressed into Rumania in 1944 they moved along a beaten path on which the dust of history has rarely had time to settle. Around the luscious garden of Rumania nature has built no fence. When fruit hangs heavy on the trees and grapes gleam purple in the vineyards no gates are locked, because there are no gates. The Rumania that came into being after the First World War had no natural boundaries. A large part of its more than 2,100 miles of frontier were as fragile as the equator and as imperceptible as the North Pole. Of these, 281 miles were the Black Sea coast; 372 fronted on Bul¬ garia; 358 on Yugoslavia; 265 on Hungary; 134 on Czechoslovakia; 214 on Poland and 514 on Russia. Rumania merged into Russia with only the sluggish

40

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

little Dniester River showing where one country ended and the other began. Rumania moved up pleasant val¬ leys into Poland, visited with Czechoslovakia across the thin and slow flowing Theiss (Tisza), and blended with the Hungarian plains as Kansas with Nebraska. A traveler could pass from Rumania into parts of Yugoslavia as a Wisconsin farmer goes from his field of oats to his field of alfalfa, while the Danube joined Rumania to other parts of Yugoslavia and to Bulgaria. Nature produced no Rumania; it just produced Ruma¬ nians. They are trying to make a Rumania, as they’ve been trying 2,000 years. The country which they had after the First World War and which they called “Romania Mare” or Greater Rumania was made up of many patches, one added here, another there. This was by no means a uniquely Rumanian phenomenon. All countries, includ¬ ing the United States, are of a similar nature. Such is France; such is Italy; such was Germany. The peoples of the earth, in their never-ceasing movements, fight over every valley and every hillside, let alone every province. There is hardly a major piece of territory on the main body of Europe’s continent that has not changed hands many times, that has not been repeatedly snatched or traded back and forth from empire to empire or from principality to principality. Centuries long, the peoples of Europe didn’t think of themselves as citizens of certain states but as dwellers in certain provinces; they called themselves, for ex¬ ample, Bosnians or Bavarians or Piedmontese or Epi¬ rotes or Bucovinians. These provinces were assembled into states as conquerors and historical circumstances dictated. The Rumanians had great difficulty assem¬ bling their pieces. Before the First World War Rumania resembled an

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

41

“L” facing backward. Without violating the imagina¬ tion too much one could picture Rumania as a woman sitting on the Danube, looking westward. Her bent back leaned against the Prut River, upon which pressed Russia with ever growing strength. In her lap she held rich and beautiful Transylvania, which formed a part of Austria-Hungary. As Rumania was squeezed be¬ tween these two mighty empires, Turkey pushed from the south, completing the terrific ring of pressure. Such was the Rumania of which the outside world thought, at the beginning of this century, if it thought about Rumania at all. This reversed “L” was called “Rumania proper” by outsiders, but the “Old Kingdom” or “Vechiul Regat” by the Rumanians, and was the size of Louisiana. It itself consisted of two parts or Princi¬ palities, a northern and a southern, called Moldavia and Wallachia by western scholars; Moldova and T (s)ara Romaneasca by Rumanians. Rumanians have never liked the word Wallachia, or Vlach, which was used by Rumania’s neighbors as a term of derision or deprecation. The Old Kingdom was a level land from the north¬ ern tip where it met Bucovina to its long southern base on the Danube. The northern part, Moldova, had been more directly under Russian domination than Wallachia; it seemed lonelier and flatter and more isolated, more nearly a part of the seemingly boundless Russian steppes, stretching from its border to Siberia. In the early XIX century it had but one settlement, Jassy, that could be called a city; no railroads and no roads. Most of its inhabitants had been serfs. The few intellectuals lived on estates, but spent much time in gayer places, far from their monotonous plains.

Some western enlight¬

enment came in through neighboring Poland—although

42

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Poland had long been partitioned—and by way of Russia, whose Czars now and then showed notable spurts of liberalism.

Rumania’s first university was

opened at Jassy. Wallachia, or Tara Romaneasca, in the south, was larger and more productive; since it lay on the Danube it was potentially nearer Europe. Actually, the dark fog of Sultanic Turkey rested heavily upon it, but in spite of that it felt the stirrings for freedom that drifted from Paris and Vienna and Germany into the Balkans. Along with Serbia and Greece Rumanians in Wallachia also began to fight for freedom. Their only settlement during the last century that could be called a city was Bucharest, lying in a wide level plain about 50 miles north of the Danube. In 1913 Rumanians added the new small province of southern Dobrudja to their kingdom. The government at Bucharest took advantage of a bitter quarrel among Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, which the year before had joined in a common war to drive Turkey from its last remaining hold in Europe. These small states along with still smaller Montenego achieved much success but then fell out when partitioning the liberated territory. Rumania stepped in as self appointed arbiter and forced hard pressed Bulgaria to give up a level, fruitful wheat land lying between the lower Danube and the Black Sea. It contained approximately 3,000 square miles. Five years later the World War freed Rumania from the imperial ring that had so long compressed her. Austria-Hungary’s collapse and Russia’s partial disintegration after its Bolshevik revolution created a new situation along the lower Danube. Bessarabia which had been a Russian province broke away from Muscovite domination and declared itself independent.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

43

A National Council representing all groups in the popu¬ lation decided March 27, .1918, to make Bessarabia a part of Rumania. This voluntary and local action from the people was immediately confirmed by Bucha¬ rest. Thus 17,000 square miles of level, productive agricultural land were added to the kingdom. Of the two million inhabitants more than 85 per cent worked the soil. Bucovina, a small province north of Rumania that had long been part of Austria, was declared indepen¬ dent by a similar National Council, which on Novem¬ ber 28, 1918, requested a merger with Rumania. It was, of course, accepted, and brought almost 4,000 ad¬ ditional square miles of richly wooded land to the kingdom. Transylvania, the greatest prize of all, was about to fall. It was a part of Hungary, which was then in the last throes of defeat. One of the leading representa¬ tives of the Transylvania Rumanians in the Parliament at Budapest rose on October 18, 1918, and declared that the Rumanians in Austria-Hungary demanded com¬ plete national freedom after centuries of suffering. This bold statement might have caused the author’s execution as a traitor to the Hapsburg king, but Hun¬ gary was too weak to do anything except promise that the Rumanians of Transylvania would be given liberty. A few days later Hungary broke away from Austria, after which the leaders of the Rumanians in Transyl¬ vania broke that famous, picturesque and bounteous province off from Hungary. Rumanians from every part of the new area were invited to gather and con¬ firm the decision. They convened at the city of Alba Julia, December 1, 1918, performing one of the most moving acts of Rumanian history. Alba Julia itself is very dear to Rumanian hearts.

44

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

It is situated not far from the region, whence Ruma¬ nians are taught their nation originated in pre-Roman times. Also, Alba Julia was the seat of one of the few displays of might and authority that the Transylvanian^ Rumanians had made during the long centuries of their humiliation. On the top of the steep hill which domi¬ nated the little city stood a castle that had reminded the Rumanian serfs in their darkest days that they were not always hewers of wood and carriers of water for aliens. More than 1,200 authentic delegates from Ruma¬ nian communities in every part of Transylvania accom¬ panied by more than 35,000 simple folk, gathered in Alba Julia’s square. Standing in the presence of priests, facing all the sad centuries that had passed and all the difficult years that were to come, conscious of the dig¬ nity that their heroic Rome-defying Decebal had given the area two millenniums earlier and aware of the sol¬ emn presence of eternal Carpathian peaks, a humble people proclaimed itself free. The Rumanians of Transylvania joined some 39,000 more square miles to Rumania. Subsequent peace treaties confirmed these acts of the Rumanian people in Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania. “Romania Mare” had taken into her arms splendid mountains, fertile plains, luscious valleys and rich mines, extensive forests and promising fisheries, becoming the sixth largest country on the main land of the European continent. It had several harbors on its 300 miles of sea coast, enjoyed a climate like that of New York state, had a good network of rivers flowing into one of Europe’s largest streams. More than 40 per cent of the land was suitable for agriculture, well over a fifth was covered with woods, nearly an eighth could be used as grazing land. Some

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

45

areas were especially suitable for vineyards and or¬ chards. Rumania’s oil deposits made her the chief European oil producer after Russia, and for a time one of the four or five main producers in the world. Its coal deposits were sufficient to supply local needs, salt was abundant, the extraction of silver and gold promised prosperity for several mountain communities; there were copper, bauxite and lead. The natural wealth in the country, along with favor¬ able land and water connections with the rest of the world, made Romania Mare an enviable setting for a good society.

46

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter IV “THE TOILING MASSES” Communists constantly boast that they serve as a vanguard of the workers in the struggle to prepare a better world for the toiling masses. They use that phrase more than most others. They insistently pro¬ claim that they have established a new social order in Rumania in order to predatory capitalism.

free

the toiling masses from

To evaluate the basis of such a claim one must cursorily glance at Rumania’s pre-war social structure to see who “the toiling masses” were and how many workers were among them. There were barely 302, 000 laborers in the whole country, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica. This estimate deserves more study, but shows at a flash what a very small propor¬ tion of the Rumanian nation was engaged in industry and how vain it is for anyone to pretend to serve Ru¬ mania’s toiling masses by freeing industrial workers. Most Rumanians never saw the inside of a factory. They don’t even live or slums.

in towns,

let alone

in cities

Rumania has only one large city, Bucharest, and it is comparatively new. Before the First World War it had 250,000 inhabitants; now over a million. Barely 20 per cent of Rumania’s population is urban; prac¬ tically 80 per cent lives from the soil. And actually the Rumanians are more rural than even those figures indicate because many of the urban inhabitants are peasants who recently migrated from

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

47

the country. Also, an incommensurately large propor¬ tion of Rumania’s city population has been non-Rouma¬ nian, namely, Teutonic, Hungarian and Jewish. This means the Rumanians themselves are more rural than the ratio for the whole country. The Rumanians are classic tillers of the soil. “The toiling masses’’ in Rumania are chiefly peasants. When one speaks of “the people’’ in Rumania, the proper meaning of the term is peasants. Whatever is characteristically Rumanian in the world comes largely from peasants. Rumanian wit, the distinctive aspects of Rumanian poetry, Rumanian ar¬ chitecture, Rumanian style are largely of peasant or¬ igin. And this phenomenon is not uniquely Rumanian. The language of Wycliffe, Luther’s Bible, the tradi¬ tions of the Czechs, the songs of Serbia are of peasant origin. Peasants have been one of the most persistent, stubborn and creative elements in human history. Ru¬ mania’s future depends upon them. If they survive, Rumania will again be free—sometime—and it will continue to be Rumanian. Rumanian peasants are engaged in much the same tasks as Iowans, but their way of life is different. Ruma¬ nians, as Iowans, produce corn and along with the corn, pigs, chickens, cattle. They cultivate fine black soil, milk cows, churn butter, gather eggs, feed hogs. The farm children go to school in winter; parents and children go to church the year around. They pray for rain during droughts and for dry weather during floods. They hate high taxes, high wages for workers, high prices for manufactured articles. They dislike city slickers, suspect lawyers and tend to consider most politicians crooks. They sing melodramatic ballads and swing in folk dances; they all like holidays and fairs and horse trading.

48

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE In other ways the Rumanian peasants differ from

Iowans, due chiefly to economic resources and geo¬ graphical location. Iowa has 34,453,000 acres under cultivation and a farm population of 1,454,037, while Rumania has 22,000,000 acres in fields and a farm population of over 12,000,000 persons. In Iowa there are 24 acres of farm land to support every member of the farm population, while in Rumania each peasant has to live on less than two acres. In addition, Iowa economy is well balanced; industry and trade are de¬ veloped. In Rumania, industry is fairly new, trade somewhat primitive. Due to machinery, education and good organization, an acre in Iowa produces 60 bushels of corn; an acre in Rumania 20 bushels. Each Iowa farmer could have over 1,000 bushels to provide him a livelihood while a Rumanian has to live from 40 bushels. All this affects—even determines—ways of life. The Rumanian peasant, until recent times, has been on the fringe of life. He never expected much and never got much. He was born poor and remained poor. He was rocked in a rather bare, homemade cradle and buried in a rather bare, homemade box. On his entry into the world he was wrapped in hand-woven swaddle; he made his exit in a hand-woven shirt. For centuries he worked on land apportioned to him by powerful masters and retained whatever products they assigned him. He and his family lived in a hut or half a hut, mingling with the animals by day and often by night. Mud encompassed him, snow bound him in, dust buf¬ feted him. His clothes were washed at the brook, winter and summer. As a rule he never left his valley —at any rate his country—his whole life through. For centuries he never saw a school or a book—except the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

49

Bible in church. His world was largely marked by the day’s horizon. His food was corn meal, with onions added in season, with cheese and fruit on holidays, with roast lamb or pig twice a year or so. Such life was meager and brutish, yet in this manner has lived most of the human race during most of the centuries. However, peasant life was not all brutish and not all barren. On the contrary, peasants have been creative, appreciative of good things and astoundingly tough in their capacity to endure or preserve. They worked out a variegated, praiseworthy life and maintained it in the face of all oppression. Peasants were often the only stable elements. Rumanians have been among the brightest and best of such peasants. Naturally, they are religious. They built their life about religion, measuring time and seasons by it, sowing and reaping by it. The principal person in many a village was the priest. The best building was the church and with it were connected all the most precious expe¬ riences of the people. Thither they went to baptize their babies, to be confirmed as children, to be married as youth. There they gathered for funerals to assuage their deepest sorrow._One of the main incentives of the women in making beautiful embroidery and in weav¬ ing exquisite cloth was that they might exhibit their handiwork at church. Religion inspired the artist’s finest pictures and the sculptor’s noblest statues, both in the form of eikons. For the church, the goldsmith and the silversmith did their best work and for the church the cabinet makers constructed their finest steeples or crosses or belfries or images. It was largely the church that made the serf feel he was more than the ox or the goat. It taught him the Psalms and the Gospels. It told him of prayers and of supermundane guidance. It took him to the ceme-

50

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

vtery on All-Souls Day and taught him that the departed were not destroyed, but that they and he were part of an eternal human procession passing through all the generations. It gave him a feeling of worth, of perma¬ nency and almost of power. He felt that, even though a neglected and oppressed clodhopper, he was not en¬ tirely deserted. He was constantly reminded that after every Golgotha there is a resurrection. Easter Day was very dear to him—the greatest of all his holidays. The Church with its Madonna and angels and saints took him out of the mud and dust and inspired him to be better. This means it was the chief foundation and guardian of morality. It taught the peasant “thou shalt” and “thou shalt not.” It gave him a pattern of life, aroused in him some personal and family pride. It gave the seal of approval to almost everything solid in the com¬ munity. Respectability was inseparably connected with it—as was duty-doing. If a peasant distinguished him¬ self among his fellows, or became a little brighter than the others, or acquired a little more stock, eventually even a little land, or won distinction for his wisdom and good advice, he tended to confirm his somewhat favored position by associating with the Church. Another characteristic of the Rumanian peasantry has been its struggle for land and for economic advance. This fight has been bitter, prolonged and even bloody, with more defeats than victory, but much progress has been made and great heroism displayed. Of Rumania’s modern heroes, prior to 1900, most were peasants or connected with the peasants. Five classic names stand out above the others, one from the so-called “Old Kingdom,”

the

other four

from Transylvania.

All

fought against feudal masters—one against the Turks,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

51

the other four against the Hungarians. Four met mar¬ tyr’s deaths. All are synonymous with revolution for the sake of the people and all have been elevated to the highest places in a self-constructed people’s pantheon covered by a mythical dome of love, adoration and hope.1 In the struggle for land and political rights, the Rumanian peasants achieved much success. Serfdom was partially wiped out during the eighteenth century and further restricted in 1848. In the course of 56 years there were three land reforms. By the end of the First World War the power of the old landlords was completely broken and their political party had vanished as a dominant force. By 1930 most of the people in Rumania, who worked land, owned it and the vast majority of those who owned land worked it. In a word, the Rumanian peasants, largely through their own efforts, had approached their goal of being masters of their own fields. Their struggle for political rights had, also, brought abounding results. The largest and in many respects the most powerful political organization or movement in the land was the National-Peasant Party. It consti¬ tuted part of a general eastern European peasant move¬ ment that took place largely after 1900. It was strong¬ est in Bulgaria and Croatia and reached large dimen¬ sions in Poland. It assumed another form in Serbia where the peasants exerted enormous political influence through the Radical Party and it found expression in iThe first three popular heroes of modern Rumania were Horia, Closca (pronounced Closhka) and Crisan (pronounced Crishan), three names inseparately linked. They lived in Transylvania and under the influence of the great struggles for freedom, that had swept from the American Revolution through the French Revolution into the east of Europe, dared to strike against serfdom. They headed a peasant revolt and succeeded in seizing fields and lands from many

52

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Austria in the Christian-Social Party. In Hungary it was weak and in Czechoslovakia strong, though mod¬ erate in its aims and methods. In Rumania it was grand, turbulent, inspiring and, in the end, thwarted. Hungarian feudal lords. They were caught the following year, 1785, and broken on the wheel. The bodies of two of them were quartered and the pieces exposed on pikes. The boldness of these men, their devotion to Rumania, their de¬ fense of peasants and the horror accompanying their execution gave rise to a cycle of glowing and well deserved legends. Horia, Closca and Crisan started a grand tradition of fighting for the advancement of Rumanian peasants. Four decades later when Europe and especially the Balkans wrere thrilled by daring but amateurish movements for the liberation of Greece from Turkey, some Rumanians were also affected. Among them was Tudor Vladimirescu, a peasant from Oltenia, who had been fortunate to get some education and some knowledge of the outside world. He was briefly an officer in the Russian army at a time when the Russian Czar was moved by liberal ideals. He also fought for a while with the Serb Black George against Turkish oppression. Tudor soon took up the cause of the Rumanian serfs, launched a tumultuous reform movement of his own, gathered a revolutionary army and in 1821 seized Bucharest, which was little more than a village. He was soon opposed by Russian and Turkish rulers, but did not give ground. Then his fellow Greek revolutionists turned against him and he was killed by treacherous associates. Being the most forceful, glamorous and eloquent of Rumania’s revo¬ lutionary leaders during an epoch of Balkan revolutions, Tudor left an almost magical name. Four generations of Rumanian youth, when yearning to perform heroic deeds for their people, have been inspired by daring Tudor Vladimirescu, the peasant boy who defied two em¬ pires and made himself ruler. At another revolutionary epoch, 18+8, when half Europe was struggling for more liberty and when the Hungarians following Louis Kossuth tried to throw off the yoke of the Hapsburgs, the Rumanians in Transylvania also rose. They had a number of leaders but most romantic and popular among them was Avram Iancu who on Mav 15 called 40,000 Rumanian peasants to a pasture beside the little ecclesiastical ctiy of Blaj and pledged them to work and fight for Rumanian liberty. The situation was extremely complicated and to attain Rumanian freedom Iancu and his revolutionary forces aided the Austrian em¬ peror against the Hungarian revolutionists. He felt sure if he helped Kossuth defeat the Hapsburgs the Hungarians would place the yoke of subjugation tighter than ever on the Rumanian peasants. He was undoubtedly right. He also feared that the Austrians would go back oti their promises to the Rumanians and push them back into subjuga¬ tion. They did exactly that, and Iancu died in deep sorrow. But his day on the “Field of Freedom at Blaj” and his subsequent action placed hipt in the pantheon of the most revered Rumanian heroes.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

53

After the First World War the Rumanian people under the leadership of the Peasant Party began the mightiest reform movement the nation had yet seen. Already most of the agricultural land had been dis¬ tributed. Foreign oppressors had been thrown off, the dynasty had been weakened and a bourgeois Liberal Party was in power. Schools were being erected in vil¬ lages throughout the country, an agricultural bank had been founded to aid the peasants with credit, a Parlia¬ ment fashioned according to Western models was func¬ tioning, and a fairly large, diversified press enjoyed much freedom. But still the peasants were far from satisfied. They continued to be the victims of many wrongs. They formed by far the largest element in the country and had insufficient influence over their government. They wanted a regime that would truly be of the people, by the people, for the people. The peasants were “the people”; therefore, they wanted a peasant government, which meant a government by the National-PeasantParty. They attained this in 1928. I personally watched this political struggle at close range as it moved to its climax. One of the most dra¬ matic scenes in the long conflict was staged in the city of Alba Julia as part of a gigantic drive to sweep the Liberal Party from power. In May 1928 a vast throng of Rumanian peasants gathered there from all parts of the country under the leadership of the NationalPeasant Party, raised their right hands and solemnly pledged that they would make Rumania free for the peasantry. I believe that anyone who saw that meeting saw Rumania. He beheld “the toiling masses” with all their problems, longings and frustrations, their inca¬ pacity, blindness and terrific power of resistance. Peasants had come in droves from all over the coun-

54

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

try—even though May is a busy month.

They had

traveled on foot, in horse-drawn wagons, in trains, bringing their food with them. They converged along all the roads, singing, sweating, uttering protests. You could tell where they were from by their costumes, manners and favorite words. Practically all were clothed in homespun. Most wore long white shirts with the tails out and tight-fitting white or gray breeches. On their feet were homemade moccasins; on their heads sheepskin caps. They carried home¬ made bags, hanging from homespun cords and in the bags was homemade dark bread or cornbread. No hotel or inn or barracks gave these throngs hospitality. No stables took them in. They slept upon the plains or commons or beside the fields and roads. And their number was increased by lines of peasant-miners brought to Alba Julia from a neighboring valley. Many of the peasants were unshaven; most were un¬ washed. The smell of the stable was on them. Their workday garments showed many patches. Their coun¬ tenances were grim, their songs were solemn, many ex¬ tolling revolutionaries. This multitude had come for serious business. They looked somewhat like a mob, more like a flock of sheep. They made me think of what the Russian intellectuals long called “the dark people.” As I watched them, crowded there together in Alba Julia’s vast central square, filling every bit of it and straining their eyes toward a high new platform at one end, I felt I saw the peasantry of all the nations through all the ages. I felt I saw the serfs and hired men, the pigherds and shepherds, the milkers of cows and handlers of dung assembled from the ends of the earth and from the beginning of history to demand a better life. Over them hovered the spirits of martyrs that had

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

55

been broken on wheels or hanged. In their ears sounded the cries of a myriad peasant babies through one hun¬ dred generations, whose lives had been snuffed out in crowded huts shared by humans and by animals. The silent fire in those dark Rumanian eyes uttered eloquent protest against millenniums of peasant illiteracy in all the lands upon the earth. Among them were priests who had bequeathed to them the highest that they knew. On the platform erected for the purpose were the peasants’ leaders, good and bad, noble and base, unselfish and ambitious. Four hundred miles away at Bucharest was the gov¬ ernment against which this peasant throng was pro¬ testing. It was from the Liberal Party and was led by a brilliant autocratic family, the Bratianus. Many members of the government were lawyers. Some were evil, others noble; most loved Rumania. A number of them had performed great services for the people. In¬ deed they had given the peasants land and opened schools in most villages. They had overthrown the old Conservative Party and were largely instrumental in ending feudal traditions. Actually many of the men in the Liberal government at Bucharest were not much different from many of the men on the improvised Alba Julia platform, promising to lead the peasants to a better life. But the venom and hatred of that throng were directed against the Liberals; the aim of that mass was to

crush

the

“Liberal dictatorship” and

smash the “yoke of the Bratianus.” Revolution was in the air. Men talked fervently of a “march on Bucharest.” Hot words were spoken about force and violence. Voices were heard which leaders said were the premonitory rumbling of revolt. Eloquent orations were delivered by Juliu Maniu, Ion Mihalache and other chiefs about “the rich land of

56

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Rumania inhabited by poor people” and each speech ended with a call for action. Ion G. Duca, Liberal Minister of the Interior in the government, against whose regime this revolt was staged, watched from the sideline but imposed no re¬ strictions on the demonstrations. He had learned from experience that porridge is never served as hot as it is cooked so was not excited. But Mr. Duca was only partly right. Although that porridge at Alba Julia was not served piping hot other bowls of Ruma¬ nian porridge were, resulting in the assassination of many of the best Rumanians, including Duca himself. As a climax to the meeting, two bright-robed priests rose upon the platform, one representing the Eastern Orthodox church predominantly of “Old Rumania” or the “Old Kingdom,” and the other representing the Greek Catholic church of western Rumania; in their presence the crowd raised right hands and “solemnly swore before God” they would not relinquish the struggle until they had established a “people’s govern¬ ment” and converted “Rumania into a true mother of all her children.” It seemed to me beautiful and momentous. Behold a nation was taking over its affairs and put¬ ting an end to injustice—I thought. I was thrilled at the vision of “democracy arising before my eyes.” As that forest of hard, dirty, callous peasant hands was raised toward heaven, I imagined they would reach to the very throne of God. But they didn’t. They merely reached to the throne of Bucharest, guarded by three Regents and occupied by a child. Six months later, partly as a result of the Alba Julia meeting, the Lib¬ erals were removed from power and the state was turned over to the peasants—for the first time in Ru¬ manian history.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

57

I regret to say the situation was not transformed, as I had expected, although notable reforms were at¬ tempted, and useful measures were adopted. Actually the massive meeting at Alba Julia turned out to be no more than an episode. Most of the great dates in peasant history are just episodes. Village life keeps going on through all the centuries. But it does go on. The peasant is usually half defeated, but rarely more than half. When he falls, he rises; and again moves forward. His half defeats are half victories; the Ru¬ manian peasant triumphs against the evils of the ages. Now he is in the grip of one of the most destructive evils he has ever faced, a Communist dictatorship. At this point I have only wished to point out the absurdity and effrontery of Rumanian Communists in pretending that they represent the “toiling masses” of Rumania. Peasants are Rumania’s toilers. They are attached to religion, crave private ownership however small, base their economic life on the family unit, estab¬ lish their own peasant parties, and to all of this the tiny Communist Party was completely alien. Probably no group in Rumania was so devoid of any right to speak for the peasantry as the Communist Party. In fact, it was and is the foremost enemy of peasants. In the Communist-peasant fight that has been joined one may not predict that the peasants will win. But one dares say they will not give up until the last church candle is extinguished, until the last church bell is si¬ lenced, until the sickle supplants the cross, until every folksong is replaced by hymns praising Lenin and huge pictures of Stalin are pasted over eikons. It took five hundred years for Roman Emperors to convert the last Roman peasant (pagan) : Lenin’s Rus¬ sian Bolsheviks may not have five hundred years to work on the peasants of Rumania. In the meantime,

58

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

a life and death struggle is raging; Communist commis¬ sars against tear-stained peasant mothers who sing hero songs to little peasant boys, whom they have christened with names of the apostles. *

*

*

As accomplices in this fight, the Rumanian Com¬ munists are trying to use the industrial workers, who are not an entirely negligible group. I often attended industrial fairs in Rumania prior to World War Two and found them far from unimpressive. I also visited factories and mills that revealed a growing industry. By 1939 Rumania was the foremost industrial state in the Balkans. In southeast Europe she was second, with Hungary first. The Moscow radio reported in May, 1948 that there were 300,000 industrial workers in Yugoslavia and 120,000 in Bulgaria. These figures are not entirely reliable since Moscow wished to pad the size of the Balkan “proletarian armies,” but the claims are within the zone of accuracy. Rumania’s industrial army was proportionately slightly larger. She actually had in the summer of 1948 a quarter of a million toilers in mine and factory; she had about 500,000 non-farm workers of all categories. The half million men and women working in the forests, textile mills, mines, flour mills and factories for machinery, at oil wells and in oil refineries, on rail¬ roads and bus lines, in shops, banks, offices and com¬ merce, constituted what Bolsheviks call the “prole¬ tariat.” They are supposed to be the “people”—with the poorer peasants thrown in. They are the “working class,” which rich and ruthless capitalists are said to exploit. The Bolsheviks say it is to free them that they are trying to turn the world upside down.

In view of

this it is well to re-emphasize that the “urban prole-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

59

tariat” constitutes but 8% of the Rumanian nation. If every worker in the country supported the Commu¬ nists, the group would still constitute a very small mi¬ nority. Rule by the proletariat in Rumania would be minority rule. A dictatorship of the proletariat, as Bolsheviks conceive it, would be a conspiracy of a clique against the nation. Whether or not the Rumanian workers wanted, or want, such a dictatorship is a matter deserving careful study. Whether or not any appreciable proportion of the workers benefited from the dictatorship which the Russians imposed deserves even more careful study.

60

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter V KINGS, COURTIERS AND LANDLORDS

j

It would be tempting at this moment to plunge di¬ rectly into the question of what the Communists have done and are doing to the Rumanians, but a few more glimpses at Rumanian social and political developments prior to World War Two will facilitate a study of that. Some persons in Western lands and especially in the United States like to say that the Communists freed Rumania from feudalism and fascism. Communists are pictured as delivering the Rumanian toiling masses from medieval exploiters. Henry Wallace and his fol¬ lowers especially insist on making such statements. If that were true, one might be inclined to condone Com¬ munist rule in spite of its excesses.

Let us see if it

is true. Up to the last week in December, 1947, Rumania was a kingdom. It had never been a republic. The Rumanians during the whole of their history had been led by chieftains, princes or kings. In this way they resembled practically all of tEe other nations in the world prior to the nineteenth century, especially all peasant nations. Modern Rumania was ruled by Hohenzollerns. The Rumanian branch of the dynasty was founded in 1866, when Prince Carol was brought to Rumania by local leaders desiring unity, stability and progress. King Mihai ended the dynasty, at least tem¬ porarily, about 24 hours before the 1948 New Year. He left the country, January 3, in an atmosphere of

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

61

great tension as his father, King Carol II, had left it eight years earlier. The Hohenzollerns presided over the unification and liberation of the Rumanian nation. I shall not discuss the question of how far they personally were respon¬ sible for this progress. Certainly, the Rumanian na¬ tion and Rumanian leaders made the chief contribu¬ tions. However, the fact remains that while Carol I found a small Rumania with four million inhabitants and with large adjoining Rumanian-inhabited areas un¬ der foreign domination, his successor, King Ferdinand I, enjoyed the glory of reigning over a united country with eighteen million inhabitants. Carol I found the nation largely illiterate, more than half of the arable land comprised in large holdings and most of the peas¬ ants landless. When he sneaked his way from Germany to Rumania in 1866 to become ruler, there were few schools, a meager literature, almost no industry, prac¬ tically no railroads and no city wiith 100,000 popula¬ tion. Before King Ferdinand’s reign ended most land was distributed among the peasants, schools had been erected in most villages, a majority of the youth could read and write, a largely uncensored. press was widely distributed, railroads crisscrossed the land and a splen¬ did Parliament building occupied the capital’s most imposing height. To be sure, the light which shone on Rumania by 1930 was not quite as bright nor as benign as the above words might lead one to believe; into many a rural hut and urban nians still burned kerosene lamps many never advanced to a stage

it still failed to reach hovel. Most Ruma¬ or tallow candles and where they could en¬

joy adequate, balanced diets. Nevertheless, the nation during that period reached the highest stage of unity,

62

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

freedom,

education,

prosperity,

self-confidence

and

hope in all its history. Then came the crash; and when Mihai was com¬ pelled to speed away, he left the nation in darkness and in slavery. He departed from a land on the road to a new serfdom and already under a new foreign domination. Perhaps as the young ex-king dolefully listened to the car wheels which were carrying him into exile, he heard them tell how often foreign conquerors had previously occupied his Rumania. If the hills and vales across which his train passed reported history correctly, they told of more than thirty occupations— indeed of full thirteen invasions by the Russians alone, subsequent to 1700. He re are some of the dates on which Russian armies entered Rumania, sometimes remaining for months, other times for many years: 1711, 1739, 1769—1774, 1788-1792, 1806-1812, 1828-1834, 1848-1851, 1853-1854, 1877, 1878, 1916, 1940, 1944. Almost every time Russia entered she claimed to have come as a friend and liberator. Often she was an ally. Some¬ times she brought Rumania real aid; usually she made heavy demands; always she sought and often seized Rumanian territory; not infrequently she stripped the country bare. For centuries, whether as a friend or foe, Russia has pushed on Rumania as a potential menace. Preservation from Russia has long been one of Rumania’s supreme problems. Rumania’s partial liberation and initial unification in the middle of the nineteenth century came as a by¬ product of a fight between Russia and western European powers. The struggle known as the Crimean War was followed by the Congress of Paris, which concluded the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856). Up until that time the conception of a free, united Rumania seemed

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

63

a vague and ridiculous fantasy to most foreigners who had heard of the nation. Indeed, the very name Ru¬ mania was not used, but instead the term “Principali¬ ties of Moldavia and Wallachia.” These were in¬ habited by a comparatively few great landlords, called boyars, and a large number of serf-like peasants; native princes ruled under foreign tutelage. Neither Princi¬ pality was free or had been free for centuries. And by the Treaty of Paris they did not gain full freedom; they continued to be “vassal states,” but under the European Powers instead of under Russia or Turkey, alone. This change of masters seemed an absurdly small gain, but it proved to be a vital step forward. Espe¬ cially important was the stipulation that no outside armed intervention was to be permitted without the auhorization of the European Powers. Also, local autonomy was assured and freedom of religion, legisla¬ tion, trade and navigation was promised. This formal convention had no more effective power than the Atlantic Charter has proved to have, but it released social and political forces that were potent. Inspired by Europe’s interest, leaders in the Principali¬ ties began to take matters into their own hands. They elected a single head, Prince Alexander Cuza, who in defiance of the Great Powers, joined the two areas in 1859. The word “Rumania” began to echo over Eu¬ rope. As is customary on such occasions, the leaders of the people and many of the people themselves were greatly excited. The word “liberty” and dreams of liberty filled the air; millions of Rumanians with griev¬ ances—and most nourished acute age-old grievances— had visions of total reforms all along the line. Beauti¬ ful words were then spoken and splendid vistas were thrown upon the screen of mass-imagination, as at the time of our World War Two.

Liberation was to in-

64

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

augurate utopia; all wrong was to vanish and no longer was anyone to be shoved around. The chief visible instrument of the lovely dreams was Prince Cuza, a dashing, romantic, superficial soldier. He loved his nation, enjoyed self-indulgence, was devoted to reform and ready to act. He liked to act alone and on his own. He had persuaded himself this was the best way. Some would call him a Musso¬ lini, others a Roosevelt. In any case, he got things done during the seventeen years before he was chased out by irate fellow countrymen who resented so much dictatorship and demanded—perhaps for personal rea¬ sons—a wider distribution of the privileges of power. During that brief, stormy period Cuza wrote his name in Rumanian history and in Rumanian hearts so deeply that it will never be erased, nor will its glow fade. He gave the peasants much more freedom, on paper, and told the toiling masses of the nation that hence¬ forth they could travel from farm to farm, from vilage to village, and from valley to valley as they wished. He inaugurated a sweeping land reform and promul¬ gated a law for public instruction (1864). Free and obligatory education was decreed, primary schools were ordered to open, two state universities were founded. Poor children of ability were to be given scholarships, church and monastery land comprising a “fifth of the country” was seized and “secularized,” which means distributed among peasants. Naturally, these radical changes, imposed in an au¬ tocratic manner, aroused bitter hostility. Cuza’s friends resented losing their sources of wealth and their ex¬ clusion from power. As was logical, they wanted to eliminate the bold prince whom they themselves had elevated.

But, in sharp contrast with customs which

prevailed eight decades later, “elimination” meant only

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

65

to depose him, not to kill him. These forceful Ruma¬ nians were just ordinary conspirators, not Nazis 01 Communists. Their plan succeeded and on the night of February 23, 1866, they carried out a Palace revolution, catch¬ ing Cuza in bed. As the whole nation suspected, Mr. Cuza’s bedroom was not shared by his wife. The prince was very profligate and unrestrained; he was often in¬ volved in salacious, personal intrigues, which facilitated the actions of his enemies. Having caught him, they courteously transported him beyond the frontier, leav¬ ing him to history and to his carnal indulgences. Shortly after that the Rumanian revolutionists who had boldly taken matters into "their hands brought a 27 year old German prince into Rumania to replace the deposed Cuza. It was Charles of Hohenzollei nSigmarin. He was smuggled in through Austria on the passport of a Swiss drummer, and was accompanied part of the way by a remarkable young Rumanian revo¬ lutionist, Ion Bratianu, who founded the Rumanian Liberal Party, and came to head one of Europe’s mightiest political dynasties.. That was May 10, 1866. Charles succeeded in changing the United Principali¬ ties to a kingdom, of which he became king as Carol I in 1881. He ruled until 1914. In spite of turbulence, continued social injustices and inadequacies—such as existed in many lands—the 48 years of his reign were probably the most felicitous and fruitful in Rumania’s entire history. His stiff, stately stature, austere counte¬ nance, long, carefully barbered beard, along with the rather effulgent pomposity, formal graciousness and plump propriety of his gifted wife, Carmen Sylva, symbolize his service to Rumania. He gravely and, for the most part, calmly survived the bitter and often furious attacks of powerful local politicians and the

66

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

constant pressure of outside empires; he avoided radi¬ cal reforms but encouraged steady advance and his final balance sheet of road and railroad construction, of production and trade, opening of schools, printing of books, founding of industries, advance in international prestige is probably unique in Rumanian annals. He helped his adopted land pass from what seemed the Middle Ages to what was called Modern Times. But he left many problems unsolved, chief of which was that of peasant progress. He didn’t master it nor has any one else in eastern Europe. Carol’s predeces¬ sor, Cuza, had emancipated the Rumanian peasantry a year after Abraham Lincoln emancipted the Ameri¬ can slaves. Every American knows that Lincoln’s act did not solve the “Negro Problem.” No formal “act” could do that. Neither could any “emancipation” bring immediate justice, prosperity, enlightenment, health and an adequate feeling of worth to recently released, long exploited peasants. The whole issue centered about land ownership and land utilization and assumed the form of a fight between a favored group, which de¬ rived wealth along with power from the land, and the masses who though working the land and producing much of the wealth, lived in political and economic im¬ potence. The boyars who owned the land in the form of large estates naturally organized themselves in a Conservative Party. For well over half a century prior to World War One the Conservatives played a vital role in Rumanian politics. As a rule, they were against reforms; some of their leaders were pro-German. An opposing force, which rapidly developed, were the men promoting in¬ dustry, trade and the professions. They called them¬ selves the Liberals. Both sides were led by brilliant chiefs.

Many intermediate political factions sprang

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

67

up, partly Liberal and partly Conservative, or NeoLiberal and Neo-Conservative, but they all gravitated about the two main camps.

A true peasant party had

not yet evolved. Rumanian Conservatism slowly and with many his¬ torical zigzags moved toward extermination, because it was a doomed.

party of landlords, and landlordism was Against it all the spears of all reformers

could be easily directed. The large holdings and the big manor houses were a visible emblem of social wrong. A boyar was considered the personification of injustice by every Rumanian who loved the common people—and most Rumanians did because they were common people. This does not mean that every Con¬ servative was reactionary and heartless. Much less does it mean that every Liberal was a noble reformer and a friend of the people. Actually many Conserva¬ tive leaders proved to be closer to the people than many Liberal leaders according to the historical rec¬ ord. They inaugurated and pushed many reforms. Nevertheless, the men in big manor houses, who also owned extensive fields worked by landless peasants, held back the world tide of social justice as it surged against the dikes of Rumania’s land system. The Conservative Party disappeared with the de¬ mise of King Carol I, not because it was bound to the throne, but because of a series of wars which brought vast reforms and swept the land out from under the feet of the boyars. With the land gone, the basis o the Conservative Party vanished. Though unaware of their demise, the Conservatives were buried with Ru¬ mania’s first modern King. The once revolutionary Liberals then became the party of power and privilege. Their party’s founder, Ion Bratianu, had been a contemporary of Lincoln,

68

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and his first speeches were more revolutionary than Lincoln’s—or Sam Adams’s—but by 1930 Bratianu’s party, still led by a Bratianu, was as “reactionary” as Franklin Roosevelt considered Hoover’s party to be. Carol’s nephew and successor, Ferdinand I, con¬ ducted Rumania through the Balkan Wars and World War I, and on October 15, 1922, was crowned king of united, liberated “Romania Mare” (Great Rumania). Charming, vivacious, volatile Queen Marie, a grand¬ daughter of the British Queen Victoria, was crowned by his side. They held sway over a larger, richer realm inhabited by more people than had ever before been the case in Rumanian history. From the time Trajan crossed the Lower Danube and laid the foundations of what became the Rumanian nation no Rumanian sov¬ ereign had been accorded the allegiance of so many subjects. And the sublimest aspect of that day, so re¬ splendent in Rumanian annals, was the fact that almost 15 million acres of farm land had been distributed among Rumanian peasants. At last the men and women who wielded the hoes and sickles owned most of Ru¬ mania’s fields. When the peasants sang “Mults(i) An(i) ” (for many years) to the king and queen of their Romania Mare, joy gave wings to their words. As free Rumanian peasants from the Dniester to the frontier of Yugoslavia danced “horas” in village squares for their sovereign, they hoped an era of peace, prosperity and unity was opening before them. The era lasted 18 years; most of it was turbulent and some of it was marked by the world’s most disas¬ trous economic crisis, that brought abject poverty to mdlions. The era ended in a Rumanian Armageddon, followed by total subjugation. It made the interlude of Romania Mare seem like a fairy tale, the reign of Carol I appear as a golden age and even the “years

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

69

of oppression” before Alexander Cuza seem almost a pleasant memory. Ferdinand I died in 1927. He should have been succeeded by his eldest son, Carol, who was robust, strong willed and well endowed, but morally inade¬ quate. Carol had no outstanding quality fitting him to be a ruler except will power, and that quality unac¬ companied by others always brings disaster. Carol’s record from his youth to the present day has been bad. In war and in peace he proved unworthy—in many cases even criminal. He was one of Rumania’s supreme misfortunes. His conduct was so pusillanimous during the First World War, and grew so much worse during subsequent years that the Rumanian leaders and the Royal family considered him unsuitable for the throne. December 1925, 32 year old Carol who had de¬ serted the country was asked to confirm that he had renounced the right of succession. So when Ferdinand passed on, Carol’s son, four-year-old Mihai, ascended the throne, to rule under a Council of Regents. Rarely had turbulent Rumania been in greater need of a strong, good king. Yet all it had was a child. Musso¬ lini dominated Italy, Hitler moved toward power in Germany, autocracy was tightening in Poland, Hun¬ garians badly wronged in the war were crying for re¬ venge, a group of conspirators had overthrown demo¬ cratic government in Bulgaria, Greece was moving from convulsion to convulsion, dictator Stalin, through sweeping purges, was preparing World Communism for a new onslaught—and the Rumanians, lying at the vortex of the world’s strife, had an infant ruler! But they didn’t have him long. Carol flew back to Rumania June 8, 1930, and placed himself on the throne, pushing Mihai off. He remained for 10 years and thus presided over Rumania’s destinies during the

70

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

most critical decade in the nation’s modern history, one of the most critical in world history. One can hardly conceive how any ruler could have done Ruma¬ nia more harm than Carol did. When he fled in Septem¬ ber 1940, crossing the border into Yugoslavia amid a hail of bullets, he left a wreck which no human power could immediately repair.

Five years later the wreck

sank into a red flood. It is ungracious for one to pour invectives upon a fellow human being who has been crushed, and I have no intention of doing it. Nor shall I endeavor to en¬ liven the lines of this somber narrative by relating sala¬ cious details of Carol’s romances or by describing scan¬ dalous cases of palace-sponsored graft. One must ad¬ mit that Carol faced an extremely difficult situation in which no ruler would have been likely to succeed—only a genius and a saint could have succeeded—however, few could have done worse than Carol did. Also, one should admit that Carol had much devotion to Ru¬ mania and showed fidelity to his permanent paramour, Magda Lupescu. Nevertheless, he degraded his office and debased his nation. When he put on the crown of Rumania, it shone with its greatest luster and when he took it off it was ready for the museum. Carol, 37 years old when he mounted the throne, was so flagrantly and ostentatiously immoral that he offended his people, making full loyalty almost impos¬ sible. He was looked upon as a symbol of indulgence, selfishness and irresponsibility. His conduct made a mockery of the Church and was a stumbling block for youth. At a time when Rumania needed moral stimulus and inspiration it got a ruler who was a daily reproach. Self-respecting politicians could not work with the king. They could not rally the nation around the throne. Their

very

association

with

the

crown left

them

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

71

with a feeling of being contaminated. All roads to power passed through the doors of the royal mistress. In that way, Prime Ministers were ap¬ pointed and cabinets formed. A despised and unworthy woman came to be the effective ruler of a state. She came to hold the fate of 20,000,000 people in her hands. Her sway was based on favoritism and whims and vindictiveness. She rewarded the corrupt and pun¬ ished the upright. She chose her courtiers on the basis of fawning and obsequiousness. Those who reproached the royal mistress were condemned, others who extolled her were given favors and power. Even a just man like the Liberal chief, Ion Duca, had to debase himself and permit a party colleague to ask Magda to lead him to the King. Every Rumanian statesman had to bow be¬ fore a courtesan. Naturally this led to economic corruption and favor¬ itism, almost beyond computation. Trade and industry in eastern Europe were closely connected with state machines. The ruler of Rumania exerted an enormous influence on finance, exports, imports, franchises, cred¬ its. He could place men in a position to win millions and to carry out transactions affecting men and women in whole provinces. Under Carol much of this power was usurped by Magda. In her hands, which all the courtiers had to kiss, were contained factories and forests and banks. In addition to favoritism in private undertakings, the vast business of the state tended to sink into a moral morass and into economic chaos. The state rail¬ roads, army supplies, state monopolies, road contracts, endowments for social service were largely under the control of the palace, which meant partially under the control of Magda. So, to favoritism was added inef¬ ficiency. The state machine creaked.

72

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

A large part of the moral force of the nation was dissipated. Every Rumanian who wanted to serve his country had to fight his conscience. Whatever he de¬ cided to do, he had to make a compromise. If he worked with Carol he felt debased; if he turned his force against Carol he felt he was weakening national unity at a critical moment. Millions of Rumanians finally came to feel that they should devote their main energies to getting rid of Carol. At a moment when rich and poor, peasant and industrialist, city man and peasant should have united tO' help Rumania weather the storm, many of the best and worst were uniting to fight their own king. King Carol outlawed all political parties. He put an end to struggling democracy. He introduced a royal variety of fascism, placing all state officials in uniform and sending the youth marching up and down the streets. He alienated the Western Powers, aroused Russia’s suspicions and failed to win Hitler. He was alternately anti-Semitic and pro-Semitic. Sometimes he subsidized the killers of Jews, again he killed Jewkillers. Eventually he fell into such confusion that he changed governments every few months—or weeks— and brought the state machine to a full stop. Finally he gave dictatorial power to his most implacable politi¬ cal enemies and their first act was to dethrone him. As Rumanian Nazis snatched his crown from him in 1940 Rumanian Communists smashed the crown en¬ tirely in 1947. Carol himself didn’t make all his difficulties but he greatly augmented those he had and added many new ones. He wasn’t the only ruler who failed. Many kings and presidents failed. Eduard Benes failed and so did Bulgaria’s Boris, Poland’s Mosicki and Yugo¬ slavia’s Peter, France’s Lebrun and Belgium’s Leopold.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

73

But some of them worked nobly to avert the catas¬ trophe. Carol hastened the catastrophe and robbed his nation’s government of dignity and respect and moral grandeur. Benes departed as a hero; Carol II, as a criminal. He was succeeded by his 19 year old son Mihai, who restored much prestige to the throne, became the ob¬ ject of his nation’s love, and the inspiration of its youth. He also brought heroism back to Rumania’s Palace. Mihai combined Cuza’s daring with the courtly propriety of Carol I. As one takes a parting glance at Rumania’s princes, kings, and courtiers, during the century from 1848 to 1948, he finds they followed a grand, apocalyptic circle from subjugation through full Rumanian liberation back to subjugation; from serfdom through emancipa¬ tion and land distribution back to serfdom. A majority of the rulers were competent, one was very unworthy, most presided over notable achieve¬ ments. They helped steer Rumania into the rhythm of contemporary developments, opening Parliaments, granting the franchise, aiding the formation of political parties, giving an impetus to cultural creation. And finally they were swept away by world storms, leaving a subjugated nation plowing its fields, sowing its grain, reaping its harvests in sweat and tears upon a thousand hillsides. And the tempest still rages.

74

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter VI POLITICAL PARTIES—DID THEY SERVE THE PEOLE? The Soviet Union and the Rumanian Communists have employed all propaganda channels to depict Ru¬ manian political organizations existing prior to the Communist power-seizure of March 6, 1945, as cor¬ rupt, oppressive and fascistic. And they not only blasted the “historical parties” with words but actually wiped them out—on the grounds they were “enemies of the people.” Were such parties any more enemies of the people than the Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States? When the Second World War began, Rumania had the same kinds of political parties or remnants of par¬ ties that were found in most other lands. They corre¬ sponded with the social categories, economic interests, historical traditions and totalitarian trends prevailing in the nation and in Europe. They were natural forma¬ tions, arising from the people themselves. Some of the parties were predominantly good; others predominantly bad. Most were partly good and partly bad, just as the Rumanian nation—and all nations. Most were popular instruments used by the people for attaining desired reforms; all were used by leaders and groups for win¬ ning or preserving special privileges—as all political parties everywhere are used. But most Rumanian parties were not mere personal agencies; they were not created exclusively by nor used predominantly for the aggrandizement of the chiefs.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Rumanian political movements were

75

deeper, wider,

stronger than any family or clique of families. For one to brush them off merely as instruments of power and privilege or as devices for enabling clever men to get rich is superficial. They were abused as parties in most lands are abused. But they helped the nation ad¬ vance. Experienced observers find that political parties everywhere are fairly bad but that the absence of par¬ ties is very much worse. As a rule most parties are as good and as bad as most people. As one might suppose, in view of the long, painful struggle for liberation in which the Rumanians are en¬ gaged, most of their parties have been nationalistic; the very word “National” formed part of many party titles. However, the political leaders and their sup¬ porters did not confine their activity merely to shout¬ ing “Hurrah for Rumania.” They promoted social, economic and political programs, resembling those of political parties in the United States. As a matter of fact, the political alignment in Rumania rather closely corresponded with that in America, although party al¬ legiance was somewhat less stable in Rumania than in the U. S. A. The “Grand Old Party” of Rumania, namely the National Liberals, roughly corresponded with the American Republican Party, while its main rival, known as the National-Peasant Party, was not unlike that of the Democrats. As the Republican Party in America was at first a very progressive organization, supplanting a political party that had been quite conservative, so the Liberals of Rumania entered the scene almost as revolutionists and sought support by carrying on popular campaigns against the old Conservative landowners. At the pres¬ ent moment, the National Liberals are decried by the Marxists as having been the quintessence of reaction

76

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and even of fascism, but they have a fairly good his¬ torical record. They were a major factor in breaking the remaining power of feudalism and greatly diluted the old aristocratic tradition. The chasm in Rumania between the boyars, or feudal masters, on the one hand, and the peasants—which basically means the Rumanian nation—on the other, had been deeper than in any other Balkan land, or in any Danubian land except Hungary. I have met well-situated Ruma¬ nians who talk of peasants as though they were an in¬ ferior sort of human beings. Such an outlook does not exist in Bulgaria, Serbia or Greece. This haughty atti¬ tude in Rumania was due to the fact that the aristo¬ crats had most of the wealth, which was in land, and the peasants did most of the work. It was a relic of serfdom and coincided with attitudes prevailing among Rumania’s neighbors, the Russians, Poles and Hun¬ garians. The National Liberal Party was largely re¬ sponsible for limiting the power of the old aristoc¬ racy and for narrowing the chasm between the men who toil with their hands and the men who live in nice houses. The Liberals introduced universal male suffrage, opened a large number of schools, made elementary education free and obligatory. They contributed toward bringing about very wide land distribution, created an industry, hastened the rise of Rumanian cities, invigorated Rumanian commerce and created a Rumanian bourgeoisie. They opened the roads from the lowliest position in the village to the highest post in the city.

Of course, not many poor people could

follow that road to the end but a certain number did and thereby ended the domination of the Rumanian aristocracy. A fair proportion of the prominent people in Rumania during the Liberal era came from simple,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

77

peasant homes and in many a fine Rumanian house one could see pictures of grandpas and grandmas wearing homespun. The difference between the actual state of affairs under the old Conservative landlords and that under the Liberal bourgeoisie was very great. This does not mean that the Liberals led the rather primitive Rumanians, of whom four-fifths were peas¬ ants with very limited education, into the beautiful realm of government of all the people, by all the people, for all the people. As a matter of fact, the Liberal Party itself was strongly influenced by a single family, that of the Bratianus, and at times exercised an onerous dictatorship over Rumania, conducting some bad elections and occasionally maintaining mar¬ tial law in times of peace. The party repressed Com¬ munism, restricted radical agitation among laborers, and at times took measures to intimidate the champions of civic freedom. Few things are easier than pointing out defects in the Liberal Party or than smearing for¬ mer Liberal leaders with bad names. One can even find them responsible for flagrant cases of anti-Sem¬ itism and of shocking persecution of reformers. The Liberal chief mainly responsible for these abuses was George Tatarescu, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rumania’s Communist cabinet, imposed by Russia to aid “the toiling masses.” However, as one reviews the last five decades of Rumanian history, one finds that the Liberals were responsible for basic reforms of the greatest impor¬ tance; and the freedom which they permitted, although somewhat limited, seems altogether utopian compared with conditions at the present moment. The worst the Liberals ever did seems a bagatelle when compared with present evils, while their achievements are matched by nothing that has been accomplished in the last four

78

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

years. In time they become moribund, somewhat pom¬ pous and tradition-ridden bearers of the old Conserva¬ tive tradition which they had once so boldly fought. But to the very end they uttered noble sentiments, propagated liberal ideals, carried banners of freedom and persistently fought against the worst excesses of Marxist despotism, though with considerable prudence and with somewhat restricted tenacity. Far more influential during the decades of the 1930’s and 1940’s than the old Liberal Party was the Na¬ tional-Peasant Party, under the leadership of Juliu Maniu and Ion Mihalache. This organization, as the Democratic Party in America, was composed of two sections that were once geographically separate. One was the National Party of Transylvania, devoted by tradition and spirit to fighting the Hungarians, and the other, the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom. After the freeing of Transylvania from Hungary in 1918, and the creation of Greater Rumania, the newlyliberated Rumanians of Transylvania and the organized peasants in the rest of the country combined forces to fight the well-entrenched G.O.P., or National Liberals. The combination was not one of mere expediency, but was logical and natural, because most of the Transyl¬ vania Rumanians were peasants and the fight of Maniu’s National Party really consisted of a struggle on the part of rather poor rural Rumanians against the powerful Hungarian bourgeoisie or feudal aristoc¬ racy. Actually, therefore, Maniu with his Nationalists, and Mihalache with his Peasants, had been leading the same kind of people in fighting against the same evils for the same purposes, namely, for democracy, popular education, civic freedom, better land distribution, and social opportunity, against domination by the few.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

79

The newly formed National-Peasant Party looked upon the well-entrenched Liberals as its main enemies and opposed them with all the vehemence which Rooseveltian Democrats used against Hoover.

They held

enormous mass meetings, took solemn oaths to smite privilege “wherever it raised its ugly head,” pledged themselves to end the regime which kept most of the people exceedingly poor in an unusually rich land, and promised “to make Rumania a mother of all her chil¬ dren.” Also, like Rooseveltian Democrats, they suc¬ ceeded in unseating the Liberals and in coming to power. Sad to say, the party did not make the con¬ tribution to Rumanian political development and to the struggle for democracy which had been expected. I have been closely associated with many men in the Na¬ tional-Peasant Party and have very high respect for some of them, but as I observed the conduct and ac¬ tivity of others, I could not help but feel that not a few slick, ambitious and very able intellectuals were using for personal advancement the prestige of Juliu Maniu, the devotion of Ion Mihalache and the bound¬ less yearning of long exploited peasants. All too often a young National-Peasant “intellectual” would follow the road of adaptability with revolting irresponsibility and make disastrous compromises to obtain personal power. Some of the most assiduous helpers of the worst Rumanian dictators were unworthy alumni of the National-Peasant Party. Nevertheless, the party remained the most prom¬ ising political organization in Rumania and, though suppressed, is still the principal democratic force in the face of foreign and native despotism. This con¬ tinued power is due largely to three facts:

One is

that in spite of defects, it has been more devoted to the uplift of Rumanian peasants and of all the common

80

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

people than any other political group in the country. The other two reasons are its two chiefs, Juliu Maniu and Ion Mihalache. Without at least a superficial knowledge of these men, one cannot understand pres¬ ent Rumanian political developments. what is best in the Rumanian nation.

They typify

Ion Mihalache, a peasant from Muntenia, began his public career as a village school teacher, at which time he married the daughter of a village priest. The experiences of his youth, as well as his contacts with his pupils and their parents, convinced him of Ruma¬ nia’s extreme need of peasant progress. He conse¬ crated his life to the fulfilling of that need and, though now in prison to which he has been condemned for life, he is still engaged in his self-chosen task. He is one of the soundest and wisest peasant leaders with whom I am acquainted. He has not the dash once shown by Bulgaria’s bold, impetuous Alexander Stambolisky, nor the erudition, versatilitv and charm of the Croatians’ beloved Stefan Radic. He has not the rigid Tolstoian frugality of Radic’s successor, Vladko Machek, nor the world knowledge of the present Polish peasant chief, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, with all of whom I am, or have been, personally acquainted. But in ef¬ ficiency, devotion to the peasants, reliability and no¬ bility, Mihalache is inferior to none of them. Of all the political leaders whom I have known, the peasant crusaders have seemed to me the most inspiring and none more than Mihalache. Though without a fluent knowledge of any foreign language, or extensive experience in foreign travel, he has a sound grasp of world affairs and especially of forces determining European development. He has a good practical knowledge of economics, is an excellent pedagogue and an able politician, is pious without being

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

81

blindly attached to the National Church, is firm in character and at the same time genial in personal con¬ duct. Though he has held high positions in the state, being Minister many times and even acting Prime Min¬ ister for a brief period, he remained a poor man and lived simply. By that, I mean he seemed to be about as well off as a Kansas farmer with a quarter-section of ordinary land and lived in a village house about as comfortable as an enterprising country school teacher’s in North Dakota. He had farm help to milk his cows and feed his pigs and a hired girl to help his wife in the house. I got the impression he treated the hired girl as we people in Kansas do when a neighbor’s daugh¬ ter comes to help us temporarily. He had no chauffeur because he had no automobile. When in Bucharest he sojourned in the home of a relative. I wish to stress Mihalache’s simplicity of living because, in a land fond of luxury, it shows both good taste and a fine character. Mihalache was free from demagogy, abstained from class hatred of a vulgar sort, did not incite the villagers against the white-collared people and refrained from such peasant slogans as calling the larger cities Sodoms and Gomorrahs. That used to be Stambolisky’s pet line. In addition, Mihalache was a mild nationalist, which is rather characteristic of peasant leaders, be¬ cause in every European country it is the peasants who, in difficult times, have preserved the national identity. This means that Mihalache does not want Rumania he either dominated or swallowed up by Russia. also means that he, as every true peasant leader, uncompromisingly opposed to Communism, which the instrument of a foreign power.

to It is is

These rather conventional and moderate attitudes do not mean that Mihalache was tame or soft on mat¬ ters of social reforms and peasant advancement.

He

82

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

has always advocated a further radical distribution of arable land, state help for cooperatives, liberal credit for peasants, popular dissemination of culture, public works for village improvements, educational advance¬ ment, lighting and water systems in the villages and exploitation of vital natural resources by the state. In fact, he was Rumania’s chief advocate of a “peasant state” by which he really meant a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Naturally it would be predominantly by and for the peasants, since they constitute four-fifths of the nation. Although a very insistent leader, Mihalache was the opposite of a dictator. His methods at political conferences were precisely those of a good chairman of a New England town meeting. He was tolerant and patient, gladly listened to the opinions of friends and rivals and was helpful at dissolving quarrels. He was one of the mellowest, most incorruptible, wisest and most fearless teachers of democracy whom I have watched at work. The most advanced American champion of true self-government would feel at home with him. As is characteristic of the Rumanians, he had a fine sense of humor, and was one of the best ora¬ tors in a land filled with good orators. No Rumanian party had a leader from the Old Kingdom embodying so many good qualities as Ion Mihalache, and no Old Kingdom politician has even begun to show the per¬ sistent, intelligent devotion to peasants that distin¬ guished him. As far as true anti-fascism goes, there are very few men in the world with as good a record as Mihalache’s.

His relations with minorities in the

country and- his attitude toward international coopera¬ tion could serve as examples for the best democrats in the most advanced land.

He sits today in the prison,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

83

to which the Communists have relegated him, because he is a democrat. .An even greater figure in Rumanian politics, and with greater prestige, is Juliu Maniu from the city of Blaj in Transylvania. Maniu has long reminded me of what I think Woodrow Wilson was. At an early age, after finishing the law school, he devoted himself to practicing church law in the most outstanding ecclesias¬ tical center of his Transylvania. As a lawyer, as church¬ man, and as the scion of a famous patriotic family, he became devoted to the humble, oppressed Rumanian people living under Hungarian domination in what was then a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and he consecrated his life unreservedly to helping them. What he wanted was their elevation and liberation. The chief instruments he used in his struggle were the school, the Church and politics. Establishing direct and indirect contact with the peasants in the Blaj area, as well as throughout Transylvania, he became their Parliamentary representative at Budapest and won dis¬ tinction as a fearless, though wise and gentlemanly champion of his lowly fellow-countrymen. In fact, he became at Budapest the chief leader of all the minority groups who were being oppressed by the race-proud Hungarians. The name and activity of Maniu became synony¬ mous with the Rumanian struggle for social advance¬ ment and nationality rights. He was the chief leader in the historical movement of December 1918 which joined Transylvania to the mother country and was a major factor in the creation of Greater Rumania. After that, in his new Greater Rumania, he continued to work unceasingly against privilege, against concentrated eco¬ nomic power and administrative caprice and in favor of the common people, especially the peasants.

It was

84

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

very natural that in the year 1926 Maniu and Mihalache should join forces and that their parties should fuse into a single organization. It has often been said that Maniu was more of an oppositionist than practical constructive politician and I am inclined to think this charge is true. He is said to be very stubborn and there is no doubt about that. He is an incorrigible fighter and the enemies he com¬ bats are in all cases oppressors of the common people. He was against the Liberal Party and the Bratianu family, during the years when they exercised almost unlimited power in Rumania. He was furiously and irrepressibly opposed to Madame Lupescu, the mis¬ tress of King Carol, whose dominant position in Ru¬ mania he considered a political disaster and a moral disgrace. No Hebrew prophet ever opposed a Jezebel more persistently than Maniu did the royal mistress, Magda. He was, also, against King Carol whom he had earlier helped bring back to Rumania, because he looked upon Carol as an autocrat, pro-fascist and the father of authoritarianism in Rumania. One of Maniu’s chief passions came to be his desire to free Rumania of Carol and Carol’s mistress. He became convinced that democracy would never be advanced in Rumania as long as Carol remained monarch. During the war, he was devoted to the cause of the Allies, more especially to America and Britain—as de¬ voted as was the leader of any of the United Nations, even though Rumania was in the Axis camp. Maniu never refrained from expressing his anti-Nazi senti¬ ments, repeatedly told Dictator Ion Antonescu that he was making a catastrophic mistake in taking the Rumanian Army beyond the Dniester river into Russia and constantly urged him to make peace with the Allies. At that time his name had more weight with the out-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

85

side world, and certainly more weight in Rumania, than the names of all the rest of the politicians put together. The British established direct radio contact with him and early in 1944 they carried on negotiations at Cairo with his emissaries. The prestige of Maniu for years was so great and he was so universally recognized as the embodiment of Rumanian public opinion that, in spite of his bitter and open opposition to despotism, no despot presumed to put him in prison until Communist dictators seized power in Rumania. Their aim from the beginning was to wipe out him and his party. Every step that Maniu took for practically a decade prior to his condemnation to life imprisonment, as well as during a long time even previous to that, was fol¬ lowed by secret police. For no man in Rumania have the spies of various regimes and states including those of the Hungarians at Budapest, of the Nazis and of the Russians, made so many and such fat files for so long a time as for Maniu. Few men have carried such heavy popular responsibility and been under such con¬ stant strain, yet few in the world are so calm, balanced, genial and courteous. Maniu has been attacked by Communists in the press, over the radio and at public meetings beyond all limits and without any restraint. He has been pictured in caricatures as the vilest knave, the basest traitor, the most blood-thirsty criminal, the rankest reactionary, yet he never lost his dignity or self-control. In spite of all his stiffness and his firm attachment to principles, which are accompanied by much stuhborness, he is a very sentimental man. I saw a striking example of this at the trial of the war criminal, Ion Antonescu, before the People’s Court. As Maniu was leaving the court, after testifying on his feet for six and a half hours, he passed unavoidably close to the

86

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

box of the accused and suddenly, on the spur of the moment, shook hands with the two chief culprits, Ion and Mihai Antonescu. At that time of extreme tension, Russia was bringing terrific pressure to bear on Ru¬ mania and the Antonescus were pictured as embodying all that Moscow detested and was determined to eradi¬ cate. Maniu knew the Russians hated him far more than they did the Antonescus and he could not but real¬ ize that it was extremely rash for him to shake hands with the men who, at Moscow’s insistence, were about to be branded forever as war criminals.

Nevertheless,

Maniu shook their hands. This act instantly provoked a tempest of impreca¬ tions in the Communist-filled courtroom. I have rarely seen such livid, flaming hatred as those boys and girls, well-coached in Communist invectives, poured out upon him. Shaking their clenched fists, they shouted, “Down with the traitor, murderer and friend of war crimi¬ nals.” As Maniu, whose gait was somewhat impaired, walked slowly down the aisle, he had to press his way between two phalanxes of gesticulating, shrieking fu¬ ries, but he was as calm as though entering a church for an Easter service. I had an opportunity to talk with him alone shortly after that incident and asked him why he did such a rash and unnecessary thing. He answered that it was because he would have been ashamed of himself all the rest of his life if he hadn’t. I asked him what he thought the political consequences would be and he re¬ plied that it would be unworthy of him to consider such a thing.

He considered he had to act as a man and as

a Christian, regardless of consequences.

He said he

would have been a coward if he had done otherwise and he did not consider himself a coward. He saw two men, isolated, distraught, deserted, execrated by

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE the ruling clique and facing death.

87

He had a premoni¬

tion they would soon be shot, which they were; and as he momentarily passed before them for the last time, he felt he, a Christian, would be a hypocrite if he didn’t give them a good-bye handshake. A storm of abuse raged about Maniu’s head, or rather about his hand after that, and the Russians transformed his spontane¬ ous gesture into a political act of major importance, serious enough to disqualify him for further political activity. But Maniu never showed regret for having done what he thought, on the spur of the moment, was a Christian act. That act made it easier for the Com¬ munists to put Maniu in prison for life. He had always lived extremely simply.

He had a

small farm in Transylvania which he seldom had time to visit but from which he obtained a small income. When I last saw him, he occupied a very small room in a modest dwelling of a Bucharest friend on the fifth story of an unprepossessing apartment house. He had no automobile nor entourage of any kind. He wore his clothes until they were almost shiny, never dis¬ carded a pair of shoes until they had received at least second half-soles and clung to the same type of high white collar that was popular during the early days of “Life with Father.” He is always gracious, thoughtful of his friends, considerate of men who have done him wrong, extremely chaste in his language and devoted to the Church, though just the opposite of a bigot. He has never publicized either his kindness or his devo¬ tion to principle. He has no outstanding talents. He is not a moving orator, doesn’t have a commanding voice, is not a “good fellow” among people seeking slaps on the back from the high and mighty, and is rather bashfully stiff. He would not stoop to demagogy of any kind.

Also,

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I think he is a poor political tactician and has allowed in his entourage some men of inferior quality. Yet, in spite of these limitations, Maniu has long been the embodiment of the aspirations, convictions and aver¬ sions of practically the whole Rumanian nation. No living or historical Rumanian figure enjoys the prestige of this solemn, genial, slow-walking, frail, high-col¬ lared, incorruptible bachelor from the ecclesiastical city of Blaj.

His confinement to prison only increased the

nation’s love for him. It is often said, in fact it is shouted from the house¬ tops, that Maniu is an enemy of Russia. In that bold form the charge is untrue, as Maniu’s record shows. Nevertheless, he is a bitter enemy of Russian domina¬ tion over Rumania, as well as of Russian exploitation of Rumania. He is a Rumanian nationalist, as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were American na¬ tionalists. He is, and has always been, for the closest cooperation between Russia and Rumania as sovereign states. He was more responsible than any other Ruma¬ nian except King Mihai for bringing his country out of the Nazi camp onto the side of Russia. More than any other Rumanian statesman, he worked for good rela¬ tions with Russia during the period between the two World Wars. But he has never made a secret of the fact that he is opposed to Russia’s using Rumania as an instrument for its own security and to Russia’s tak¬ ing Rumanian territory. Of course, he is against Communism, openly and de¬ fiantly, even as a William Tell. Ipso facto any truly democratic leader is opposed to the Communist dicta¬ torship of the proletariat. Maniu is against concentra¬ tion camps, censorship, the suppression of civil liber¬ ties, the breaking up of political meetings by hooligans, the beating up of political offenders by hired ruffians.

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89

H e is for labor unions that freely elect their own chiefs and for a democratic peasantry that sends representa¬ tives to a Parliament that will defend its interests. The National Liberal and National-Peasant politi¬ cal organizations are now commonly known as the “historical” parties. During the last two decades, they have certainly represented the wishes of as large a proportion of the Rumanian people as the Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States represent the American people. A third political group, which deserves mention only in passing, was the former People’s Party of former Marshal Alexander Averescu. The Marshal, though of humblest peasant origin, rapidly rose in the Ruma¬ nian Army, showed himself an excellent soldier, gave glory and prestige to Rumania’s military record during the First World War, and attained the highest honor that can be bestowed in title-loving Rumania. By the end of 1918, when Rumanian soldiers were demobilized, the former peasant Averescu had won a reputation similar to that once enjoyed by General Ulysses S. Grant in America. He was made the head of a new political formation known as the People’s Party, which promised dissatisfied people, and especially returning soldiers, almost everything they wanted. A group of not very scrupulous politicians crowded around him and rode to power with him. He headed a cabinet from March 1920 to December 1921, and became Premier again in March 1926, after four intervening years of Liberal Party rule. He held phenomenally successful elections in May of that year, governed briefly and without distinction, enabled a number of greedy poli¬ ticians to feather their nests and soon passed with his People’s Party into obscurity.

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One of the unknown men who joined Marshal Averescu’s predaceous cohorts was Dr. Petru Groza, from the Transylvanian city of Deva. For a short time he was one of Averescu’s Ministers or Under Secretaries of State, and in that capacity succeeded in augmenting what was to prove the beginning of a very substantial fortune. After Averescu’s party petered out Dr. Groza floundered around in the gloomier fringes of political limbo, sinking ever deeper into oblivion. He tried to lift himself above the surface by founding a “peasant party” of his own in his home country of Hunedoara, but had little success. Ambitious politi¬ cal demagogues the world over are accustomed to use one of two methods for personal aggrandizement: they join an old party or form a new one. Groza tried both and failed at both. He had to wait for a fairy prince from Moscow to make his dreams come true. Dr. Groza named the new “peasant” group, on which he hoped to ride to power, the “Plowman’s Front” or “Frontul Plugarilor.” According to a large book pub¬ lished by Land,” a Minister pearance

Groza under the title of “The Revolt of the copy of which Mr. Stalin’s Rumanian Prime kindly gave me, the Front first made its ap¬ in the month of January 1933 at a meeting

of peasants in the Transylvania city of Deva. Ameri¬ cans will recall that during that period the question of farmers’ debts was an extremely vital matter every¬ where. In many countries during the early 30’s, farm¬ ers became alarmed at the mass foreclosing of mort¬ gages and began to take measures sometimes of a vio¬ lent character. Even such balanced, moderate areas as Iowa were not free from rabid political agitations. Rumanian peasants also were in a bitter mood. Indeed, the situation was so serious that the Bucharest gov¬ ernment passed a reconversion law designed to relieve

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE agrarian debtors and save their property.

91

Dr. Groza,

a very rich man with extensive farmlands, with one of the finest houses in Transylvania, large hotels, indus¬ trial enterprises and big banking interests, decided to take advantage of this peasant discontent. A number of other ambitious politicians had thought of the same idea—as such men have since the time of Absalom or earlier. Already several little dissident groups had broken off from Juliu Maniu’s National-Peasant Party and, using unbounding demagoguery, were seeking peas¬ ant support on their own. Each was trying to outbid the other, in promises and in imprecations. During the first year, Groza worked rather closely with Communists and used Communist slogans; he dis¬ played considerable activity and attained a little suc¬ cess. Perhaps many of his “Plowmen” were sincere, just as many of Hitler’s Nazis and Alba’s Inquisitionists were sincere. The old Rumanian parties had been unsatisfactory. The peasants were neglected, social conditions were regrettable and any earnest man would have been inclined to demand vigorous action. I could not help but feel an interest in the “Plowmen’s Front” when faint echoes of its activities came to my attention at the time. For a few months the movement produced the impression that it might develop into a political in¬ strument of some force. The New Deal had been launched in America and Hitlerism in Germany; the possibility did not seem excluded that in response to similar intense dissatisfaction Groza’s “Front” might play a role in turbulent Rumania. However, by the end of three years the movement expired without having sent a single man to Parliament or electing so much as a city mayor or county councillor. It was a tiny flash in one small part of the Rumanian pan and made no impression upon the country except

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for a short time in the single county of Hunedoara. Its activity was largely confined to propaganda meet¬ ings and the distribution of a small amount of party literature. It effected no reforms. It never took its place even among the minor peasant parties such as those led by Argetoianu, Iunian, Lupu and Goga. It looked a little like incipient Populism, but proved to be a fake. I think this failure was due, first to the fact that the Front was wholly a protest movement against a spe¬ cific and rather temporary evil and, secondly, to the feeling of the peasants that they had no special reason to expect help from Groza. Though very ambitious, the new “peasant chief” had made no mark in Ru¬ mania’s political life and was unknown except as a rather obscure Minister in the ephemeral cabinet of Marshal Averescu’s mushroom People’s Party. Groza had spent most of his energy and time in getting rich and the methods he had used were not dissimilar to those of the most venal people in Rumania. He had never been known unselfishly to champion any impor¬ tant social cause or make appreciable sacrifices for an oppressed group of his fellow men. He was an active and ostentatious churchman but not distinguished by high ideals in his private life. He was less Avorthy than millions of other ordinary people and differed from the baser of his fellow countrymen only in the success with which he accumulated money, houses and lands. The disappointed peasants, who had lost faith in the other parties and leaders, saw no social heroism or moral purity attracting them to Groza. He seemed phoney from the outset. By the time Hitler launched his World War, Groza’s “Plowmen’s Front” was practically de¬ funct and its founder was barely among the tenth-rate Rumanian politicians.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

93

Far more important, and with immeasurably more prestige, was the small Socialist Party. Socialism was an old, respected movement in Rumania with a cred¬ itable record of high ideals and unselfish service for poor people. It appeared at the end of the last century and in the course of time won the allegiance of a fairly large number of intellectuals, many of whom were nonRumanians. It created among bookish people and ar¬ tists a popular style of flowing neckties and long hair and generated much sympathy for the oppressed. It exerted a wholesome influence on public opinion, in¬ spired a number of first class personalities and provided one of the impulses for militant, progressive democ¬ racy. It took the lead in organizing workers and in giving advanced political enlightenment to the youth. Of all this the Socialist Party may well be proud. How¬ ever, it attained almost no importance as a political, party, at no time elected more than six deputies to the Rumanian Parliament—even then with outside help— and never succeeded in winning a strong popular fol¬ lowing. Ordinarily it enjoyed as much political free¬ dom as other opposition parties. In this list of Rumanian political groups the Com¬ munists deserve no place. Their tiny group was not a party but a conspiracy. It was not Rumanian but for¬ eign. It did not use political methods but violence and sought not to strengthen but to enslave the nation. Its base was not Rumania but Russia; its directives came not from Rumania’s “toiling masses” but from the Kremlin. In all it had 1000 adherents. It will be treated in the proper place as a plot against the people. Another type of political movements that began to play important roles in the 1930’s was anti-Semitism in various forms.

It found its most furious expression in

94

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the Iron Guards or Legionnaires. them requires a separate chapter.

A description of

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

95

Chapter VII

FASCISM EXPLODES IN RUMANIA Fascism came to Rumania in an especially vicious form. It began with violence and ended with vio¬ lence, bringing nothing but destruction, personal degradation and national disintegration. Though based on nationalism, it disgraced the name of Rumania more than any other movement in the country’s modern history and from the begin¬ ning seemed alien to the Rumanian character. Al¬ though it elicited much idealism and was supported by youth hoping for a better life, most of its overt acts were crimes of the most vulgar sort. The very founder of the movement, which exalted Rumanianism above all things, was not of Rumanian origin. I first came in personal touch with the Rumanian form of fascism in the early 30’s—it may have been in 1930. At that time I lived in Sofia but visited Rumania every month or so on news circuits around the Balkans. I was a journalistic circuit rider. While in Bucharest I usually stopped at “The Splendid,” a very modest hotel in the middle of the city. During one of my so¬ journs there the hotel clerk pointed to two tall, thin, long-faced men in the small lobby and said, in a mys¬ terious voice, “That is Codreanu and his father.” I already knew who Codreanu was. Almost every one in Rumania knew. He was the head of the “Iron Guards.” He was the captain—“Capitanul.” He had already killed a man “for the cause.” He had publicly mur¬ dered a police chief and been acquitted after a sensa-

96

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tional trial.

Some Rumanians looked upon him as the

“hero assassin,” “the avenger of the weak.” Corneliu Zelea Codrenau headed a movement that was designed to purify and transform Rumania, destroy graft, privilege and corruption, and the exploitation of man by man and give every under-privileged boy or girl, worker or peasant, an equal chance. The program sounded like Communism; its outlook was communistic and its methods were of the essence of Communism, but it was supposed to be just the opposite. Indeed, one of its aims was to exterminate Communism. “Capitanul” was wearing a white native costume when I saw him. It had been made by hand from handwoven cloth, as the native costumes worn by all the peasants, and gave him a striking appearance. Not that it was unusual to see such an outfit; indeed that is what one saw throughout the whole country, in every field and in every village church. Scores of men wear¬ ing exactly that type of costume were selling chickens, vegetables and fruit on the streets of Bucharest at that very moment. Other scores of little boys wearing the same kind of costume were rushing about selling news¬ papers, even in front of the hotel. But as a rule no member of the “intelligentsia” wore such native clothes; in fact, one of the reasons a Rumanian went through school was to acquire a diploma and get an education that would enable him to discard the homespun clothes of shepherds, clodhoppers and cornmeal-eaters. But here was tall, imposing, handsome Codreanu who had finished a school, and had enough money at his disposal to live in a hotel, yet by choice was wearing native homespun! That, at first, was the uniform and the symbol of the “Iron Guards,” who became Rumania’s ferocious fascists. The costume was not inappropriate, inasmuch as the

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leaders of the new movement called their followers back to ancestral customs, traditions and beliefs. At first they operated largely in villages and emphasized religion, especially of the Eastern Orthodox Church. They made a point of working with priests, of holding meetings under church auspices, of calling peasants to¬ gether by church bells, of arousing mass emotions by ecclesiastical imagery and Biblical references. The Gjuarcfists, all wearing white, came into villages in new, picturesquely-painted village wagons, drawn by wellgroomed white oxen. They also rode on white horses. All of this appealed to peasants and to the other com¬ mon people. The Iron Guardists unreservedly identi¬ fied themselves with the masses, made themselves part of the masses, promised to liberate them and set up a social order that would serve them. These promises, accompanied by church hymns and national hymns, were often uttered in the presence of priests whose bearing, beards and vestments seemed to put the seal of God upon the movement. The peasants could easily feel that angels were hovering over such meetings and that the saints were attending them. Indeed the Guard¬ ists often called themselves Legionnaires of Archangel Michael. i It is not an exaggeration to say that there were ele¬ ments in this Iron Guard movement, at the beginning, which might have resembled early Puritanism under Oliver Cromwell. Capitanul and his associates, all of whom had sworn allegiance to him even at the cost of death, called the nation to sacrifices and exalted austere living for the good of society. They were, also, fierce, as were the early Puritans and as the old Hebrews from whom the Puritans received their traditions.

The men of Crom¬

well were earnest and armed and determined to kill

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their men, if necessary, as Capitanul had already killed his first man. The young Rumanian fascists professed to scorn existing society as Sodom and Gomorrah and called for a new world, even though the transforma¬ tion entailed weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth. It did not seem to me strange then and it does not seem to me strange now that Codreanu attracted some idealists, along with many criminals eager for plunder. The very defects of the movement exerted a certain attraction and were accepted by some followers as in¬ dications of its validity. The movement was narrowly Christian and that blended with Rumanian nationalism. It was Orthodox in contrast with Roman Catholic Germans, Presbyterian Hungarians, atheistic Soviet Russians and in contrast with Jews. In other words, Codreanu could be looked upon as a Joshua, calling the Rumanians apart, to a special national life as opposed to that of their neighbors. Anti-Semitism was a major feature of the movement; in fact, to be an Iron Guard Christian meant to hate Jews.

Codreanu had received

his anti-Semitism from a notorious professor in the university at Jassy, A. C. Cuza, who had founded the National League for the Defense of Christians. Thus, at a time when Hitler was still obscure, a vigorous anti-Semitic movement was under way, allegedly for the transformation of Rumania and the deliverance of the oppressed. It attracted students, professors, young army officers, young priests and grew rapidly. In time it set up various headquarters throughout the country and established secret cells in almost every institution including the army, the police and the courts. It had its own papers among which was a vigorous daily, and received generous assistance of every kind from fellow travelers.

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99

My next vivid experience with the Iron Guards was at a crowded meeting in the Athenaeum, the largest au¬ ditorium in Bucharest. The building is a national in¬ stitution, built by voluntary contributions, and was used for cultural or patriotic meetings of a high order. The Iron Guardists, or “Legionnaires of Archangel Michael,” had attained such a well recognized place in the country that they were allowed to use the Athen¬ aeum. They filled it to overflowing. It made me think of a meeting of fascists in Italy or of Nazis in Ger¬ many. Most of the youth wore “Legion” uniforms, which by that time were not only white homespun cos¬ tumes, but also included military-like green shirts. One of the main speakers was Mihial Stelescu, a youth of extraordinary eloquence. He was audacious, wistful and very appealing. I think such boys as he might have induced hundreds of thousands of Europeans in the Middle Ages to leave their homes and go on the Crusades. His bearing was dramatic and his words seemed mysteriously ominous. He strode out upon the platform, lifted his arm in the fascist salute and sol¬ emnly said, “I come to you in the name of the Capitan.” The audience rose, cheered, saluted in return and sat down in awe as though they were about to receive a message from the Archangel himself. I myself fared rather badly at this meeting and, for an embarrassing moment, became a center of attention. One of the many Guards moving up and down the aisles began to suspect that I was not an Archangel man or even a Rumanian. I think he got this impression from the fact that I didn’t shout for the captain nor stick up my hand in the fascist salute. Otherwise I behaved in a perfectly decorous manner as is my cus¬ tom. One of the uniformed Iron Guardists came over to me in a menacing manner and asked me who I was.

100

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

His associates from all around turned their eyes toward me in anger. I explained that I was an American jour¬ nalist and showed them my credentials, after which the hubbub slowly subsided; they didn’t throw me out. I heard Stelescu make his eloquent appeal and watched the frenzy of his hearers. I felt then, as I had felt when I watched the Nazis celebrate their Partei Tag in Nuremberg, namely, that this movement would lead to a terrible eruption. Sometime after that Stelescu was murdered in a hospital by his own associates. One very cold day in December 1933, as all Rumania was covered deep with snow and its capitol was piled high with drifts, I went by train from Budapest to Bucharest, arriving late at night. In the third class coupe with me were six other persons, including a viva¬ cious, charming, brilliant and very bold young woman who disclosed her name as Mrs. Constantinescu. As is customary in most of Europe and especially in south¬ east Europe, the fellow passengers soon became friends and before long were engaged in heated conversation; as was not unnatural, the topic was politics. One of the men in the coupe was a devoted supporter of the Lib¬ eral Party. Another was a follower of Juliu Maniu, head of the National-Peasant party. There was even a man there who said he was a Socialist, though he may have done that just to fill out the cast. The other two were certainly genuine. After telling my companions who I was, I was allowed to sit quietly on my corner of the hard seat and observe the political tournament that was being waged. The young woman proved to be a fervent, rabid Iron Guardist and was very proud of her Capitan. She said she had just held an Iron Guard meeting and the secret police had watched her as she got on the train. She predicted they would be watching her in Bucharest

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

101

when she got off. She remarked, “In fact, I wouldn’t be a bit surprised if one of you were a secret police.” Perhaps one was. They argued back and forth, hot and heavy, with the girl against the field. On the whole, she got the best of the fight, as such extremists easily can, because she had nothing to do but criticize; there was much in Rumania at the end of 1933 to be criti¬ cized. She knew the records of the two chief Rumanian parties by heart and exposed their defects with scath¬ ing fury. When her exasperated opponents asked her what the Iron Guardists would do, she said, “Don’t say would. Say will. We will take action. We will clean Rumania up.” When they pressed her for more specific information, she merely said, “You’ll soon see. Remember what I’m telling you.” She tried to make her prediction or her threat sound ominous, but her traveling companions considered it a bluff. When we got off at the Bucharest station, at which I saw no secret police waiting, although there may have been half a dozen in the crowd, I asked Mrs. Constantinescu if any one was meeting her. When she said, “No,” I asked her if she didn’t want me to take her in my taxi through the snow-filled streets to her destination. I was hoping she didn’t live far away, for I didn’t have many lei. She consented and I took her to a large building in the middle of town not far from the hotel where I was going to stop. that was Iron Guard headquarters.

I asked her if She answered,

“Maybe.” I asked her if I couldn’t come down the next day and see Capitanul and she answered, “Maybe. I’ll phone you in the morning.” I parted from her hoping that she would. Mrs. Constantinescu seemed to me typical of all the yearning, fanatical, self-sacrificing crusaders through the ages.

She was certainly intelligent and informed;

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

she was capable and very brave; she seemed to feel she was in the midst of a terrific adventure which she had persuaded herself was for the good of the Ruma¬ nian people. She didn’t appear to be seeking anything for herself though perhaps she was, and she seemed ready to go to jail or be shot. She scorned officers of the law. Compared with the supporters of the two old parties, she seemed a bright and shining star. Actu¬ ally the old party adherents were better than she. I waited around the hotel the following morning for her call and was pleased to get it. She told me to come right down and see the Capitan, which I did. I found the meeting interesting but not surprising. Codreanu looked much as I had seen him in the hotel many months earlier. It was plain he served as an object of worship and gave commands as the head of a secret order. I was led in to him by devoted awe-filled acolytes as one might be brought before a high priest or an Archangel. He spoke in a solemn voice and his words were as or¬ acles. He was not unbending nor friendly, but polite. He presented a program resembling that of all ex¬ tremists. He wanted to “kick the rascals out” and make Rumania over. He wanted to end graft and corruption and nepotism. He wanted to wipe out the monarchy which he thought was bleeding the people and demoralizing the nation. He wanted to gather an organization of honest, incorruptible boys and girls around him, to bring the sources of wealth into the hands of the people, to provide abounding facilities for healing the sick, to redistribute land, open more schools, establish cheap restaurants for needy students. He believed that the main sources of misfortune were Jews, Masons, rich capitalists, the royal court and political parties.

He despised corrupt politicians.

He

wanted to appoint seventy-one stern, noble prefects for

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

103

the seventy-one prefectures (counties) and to author¬ ize them to root out all wrong, using guns and gal¬ lows if necessary. A popular hero for many Iron Guardists was an earlier Rumanian ruler called Vlad the Impaler (Vlad Tsepesh). The stake was as a stern and awful symbol for these sons and daughters of Archangel Michael. They were determined to im¬ pale Rumanian grafters, clear up to King Carol and his mistress, Magda. They didn’t care if the “crooks” writhed in agony every night. When I presumed to ask who was going to inspect the inspectors and keep the purifiers pure, Codreanu answered, as all blind fanatics do, “Iron Guardists are incorruptible.” As I left this “holy of holies” of Capitanul I had the feel¬ ing that the Iron Guardists were not bluffing. It seemed to me that many another beside the Capitan would try to “kill his man.” Not long after I had returned to my home in Vienna I read the startling news that the Rumanian Prime Minister, Ion G. Duca, a friend of mine whom I highly esteemed, had been assassinated. The murderer was the husband of Mrs. Constantinescu, my traveling compan¬ ion in the train. Young Mrs. Constantinescu had been right when she said there would be action. An imposing Hon Guard demonstration took place three years later in the heart of Bucharest which showed how the movement had grown. As Communists and pro-Communists from many countries flocked to Spain to fight in the International Brigade against Franco, anti-Communists went from a number of coun¬ tries to fight for Franco. Among them was a group of leading Rumanian Iron Guardists, two of whom were killed, Motsa and Marin. When, in time, their bodies were brought back and transported across Rumania, young colleagues gathered at every station to pay them

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

honor. During that tense winter of 36—37, when the future of many nations and especially Rumania had come to seem uncertain, the acts of Motsa and Marin seemed very impressive to some Rumanians. As the foundations of Europe crumbled, these boys had made a supreme sacrifice. They had showed that they be¬ lieved in something strongly enough to take every risk for it. As their remains were being transported to Bucha¬ rest, thousands of Rumanian youth half envied them; other thousands admired them. Their conduct and characters seemed to be a wonderful contrast to the corruption at the court, the immorality exemplified by Carol’s relations with Magda, the selfishness of indus¬ trial leaders sneaking in the back door of the Palace to make shady commercial deals and the sychophancy of many political leaders. As these two “martyrs” for a cause were carried by uniformed Legionnaires, fol¬ lowed by thousands of other Legionnaires, amid enor¬ mous throngs to a new Iron Guard shrine, all under the auspices of the highest church officials, many Ru¬ manians felt they were undergoing the greatest reli¬ gious-patriotic experience of their lives. It came closer to them than the coronation of a king or the installa¬ tion of a patriarch. To stand in the presence of two boys who had voluntarily given their lives for a cause, uplifted their admirers. The watchers may have recalled the Capitan’s words, given in his manual, “For the Legionnaires”: “What are the qualities of members of the Legion of Arch¬ angel Michael? Spiritual purity; the capacity for work and creation; courage; a hard life in the struggle against difficulties for the good of the nation; poverty which means the voluntary renunciation of wealth; be¬ lief in God; brotherly love.”

Perhaps they also re-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

105

membered that at the very beginning of his activity, the Capitan had written, “The movement is a spiritual school—one enters it as a simple individual and emerges from it as a hero. Don’t expect a reward from your people. No pay is more holy than the satis¬ faction of doing your duty. The glory of a Legion¬ naire is the glory of sacrifice.” The exaltation experienced by Rumanians on that winter day at the beginning of 1937 was based upon a delusion. The Iron Guard cause proved to be a ter¬ ribly bad one, founded on violence and deceit, moving toward plunder and massacre. Nevertheless, that im¬ pressive demonstration seemed to indicate that the “Children of the Archangel,” who had reinforced fascism with religion and love for Rumanians with hatred for Jews, had become a major political force in the country and would precipitate a brutal showdown. The showdown was not very long delayed. In December of 1937 King Carol, confident of his ability to intimidate the Rumanian people and coerce them into voting as he wished, ordered elections. To his surprise the opposition won a resounding victory— one of the most notable in Balkan annals—and the second strongest party in the opposition turned out to be the Iron Guards. Their strength showed that a militantly-subversive group, whose supreme loyalty was to the Axis and not to Rumania, might dominate Parlia¬ ment with their shouting, obstruction and fighting. And the group was far stronger even than its numbers indi¬ cated because they were backed by Hitler, who held Rumania in his hands. From that moment on, for al¬ most three years, the main political fight in Rumania was between the Iron Guards and the rest of the coun¬ try. At first it was a duel chiefly between King Carol and Codreanu’s Legionnaires.

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

One may have wondered why the autocratic mon¬ arch had not attempted long before to liquidate the Capitan and his fighters, especially in view of the fact that the humiliation of the throne was one of the prin¬ cipal objects of the Iron Guardists. The answer is that Carol rather approved of the general totalitarian pro¬ gram of the Legionnaires and hoped eventually to use them as an instrument for weakening Rumanian de¬ mocracy. Secondly, he had believed it was safer to re¬ strict and steer the Iron Guard movement than it would be to try to exterminate it. He was afraid that the remnants in their fury would find a way to kill his Jewish mistress, Magda. The King dismissed Parliament and set up a very weak government headed by a senile anti-Semitic poet. Soon after that he appointed the Patriarch as Prime Minister. Disorders steadily increased and the power of the Legionnaires grew, even though Codreanu and other leaders were kept in prison, to which the chief had been condemned for ten years. Toward the end of 1938, the King became enraged and had scores of the Iron Guard leaders, including the Capitan, mas¬ sacred. He announced that they were killed while try¬ ing to flee on being transferred from one prison to an¬ other. This by no means ended the movement nor de¬ prived it of its power. It only revealed the fact that Codreanu had followers throughout the whole country. Iron Guardists appeared on every side and they were backed by Nazi Germany. Rumania was hard pressed at that time by both Russia and the Axis; it felt deserted by France and England.

The nation was convinced that America

would do nothing for it in the crisis. In its desperation it turned more and more against the King and some Rumanians tended to sympathize with the Iron Guards

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107

as the only virile group in the country. The manner in which the King had liquidated helpless prisoners added to the popular antipathy against the throne and in¬ creased sympathy for the Legion. As confusion and bitterness mounted there seemed to be no one to stem the tide. Finally a former Na¬ tional-Peasant leader, Armand Calinescu, stepped into the breach, as the King’s Prime Minister and “strong man.” September 22, 1939, the Iron Guardists mur¬ dered him in the middle of the capital not far from the main police station. It was the most spectacular assassination modern Rumania had seen. Carol then made an army general Premier and had Guardists killed by the hundreds in a wholesale reprisal, but he didn’t succeed in liquidating the leader, Horia Sima, a vicious and ambitious lawyer who had succeeded Codreanu as head of the Legionnaires. It was believed on the basis of much evidence that Sima was behind the assassination of Calinescu but he was not brought to justice. He sneaked to Germany and Hitler saved him; Hitler also sent condolences to the government whose Premier the Iron Guards had murdered. Authority in Rumania was practically paralyzed. The government had become a laughing stock. The King floundered about as one demented, pressed by insur¬ rectionists from within and from predatory empires from without. In the hope of appeasing Hitler and the Iron Guards, Carol gave Horia Sima a cabinet post but not the Premiership. Thus murderers became rul¬ ers and the assassins of Premiers became the associates of Premiers. Matters only grew worse and as cabinet swiftly fol¬ lowed cabinet, the desperate King finally released one of his bitterest personal enemies from prison and ap¬ pointed him Premier.

It was Rumania’s toughest sol-

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

dier, General Ion Antonescu. The officer joining with Iron Guard leader Sima formed what was officially called a “National-Legionnaire regime.” The princi¬ pal element in it were the Guardists, although the domi¬ nating personality proved to be General Antonescu, whose main support came from the army and not from the Legion. The first act of the National-Legionnaire Govern¬ ment was to drive out King Carol II. The expulsion took place September 6, 1940. The Rumanian fascists had won a spectacular victory in their fight against the throne, although they had not yet gathered all power into their bloody hands. They had murdered two Prime Ministers, spread terror throughout the country, subverted a large part of the youth, partially undermined the army and the police and penetrated deeply into the National Church. They had committed mass brutalities against the Jews in every county and seized much Jewish property. They had betrayed every ideal that their chiefs had once pro¬ claimed and had failed to draw to their ranks one single leader of integrity or ability. In addition their two principal sponsors and protectors, Hitler and Musso¬ lini, had participated in the partitioning of Rumania, which the Archangel Michael had been pledged to pro¬ tect. Yet in spite of all that moral and political be¬ trayal, there stood the Legionnaires, sharing state power! After Carol fled, Horia Sima and his fascists tried to grab complete authority by ousting Marshal Antonescu who was Prime Minister and actual head of the state, with the title, “Conducatorul.” At first, Antonescu had been both weak and stupid in his handling of the Legion. He was afraid of Ger¬ many.

He had kept humoring Sima in order to win

Hitler’s good will.

He had appointed men to impor-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

109

tant positions in the army who served Sima rather than himself. He had let Legionnaires get hold of the state police. The Bucharest police headquarters, the most important in the country, was under Legion control. Many prefects throughout the country were in the serv¬ ice of the Iron Guards. Antonescu even allowed the armed Legion to function as a private political army. Legionnaires were in the post office and in the network of telegraph offices. Every order that Antonescu gave was transmitted by Legionnaires or known to them. Most of the top secret information coming to the Conducator from all sources found its way into Legionnaire files. Antonescu wavered between opposing them and identifying himself with them. At times he spoke as though he considered himself Legionnaire Number One. He pretended to make that the chief basis of his claim, for their support. He dreaded touching them for fear of offending Germany. He thought Rumania needed Germany, since it had no other “protector” left in the world. Antonescu feared that if he took drastic measures against the Iron Guard, Hitler, who had a fairly sub¬ stantial armed force in Rumania, would simply make Horia Sima Rumania’s Fuehrer. Conducatorul wanted to prevent that, both for personal reasons and as a patriot. Autocratic though he was, he felt an Iron Guard autocracy would be sheer disaster. He preferred to temporize rather than let the Legion completely take over the army, the courts, the schools and every other institution. So he let matters drift to a show¬ down, without acting. One day the Legionnaires in their capacity as policemen arrested the chief enemies that they had acquired during the preceding ten years and massacred a large number of them in cold blood; but still Antonescu temporized.

The Iron Guardists re-

110

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

peatedly said there were 100,000 Rumanians too many and committed murders in every part of the country to get rid of them. They assassinated ex-Prime Minis¬ ter, Nicolae Iorga, in a manner as brutal as that in which they had assassinated Premier Calinescu, and did away with one of the three chief figures in the NationalPeasant Party, Virgil Madgearu. They confiscated Jewish property right and left and distributed arms among their followers in great quantities. They car¬ ried out regular military drill in a barely concealed manner and by the beginning of 1941 held incendiary meetings in many of the principal cities of Rumania. Almost openly they began to accuse Antonescu of being a Mason and made it plain that they were intending to supersede him. Finally, Antonescu told Hitler in a private visit that, if things continued in such a manner, there would be civil war throughout the country. He also made it clear to the Nazi dictator that the Legionnaires were destroying the Rumanian Army, undermining the eco¬ nomic situation and arousing the anger of the nation. Hitler was already making his plans to attack Russia and wanted to use Rumania’s resources as well as its army; consequently he did not wish any further disin¬ tegration. In view of that, he seems to have given An¬ tonescu a free hand in dealing with the Legionnaire rebels. On the 20th of January, 1941, the armed fight be¬ gan. Antonescu ordered the removal of a number of Iron Guard prefects and high police officials, and the Legionnaires used that as the spark for setting off a revolt. They barricaded themselves in a number of public buildings, tried to take key government institu¬ tions and began pillaging on a lavish scale, burning many shops, carrying away Jewish goods by the truck-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

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load, killing Jews by the hundreds. For three days Bucharest resounded with shooting, bullets crashed through doors and windows, armed rebels raced up and down the boulevards, the fronts of Jewish stores along whole streets crashed in. But by the 23rd Antonescu and his army had crushed the rebel movement and gained control of the situation throughout the country. Legionnaires were expelled from the gov¬ ernment and the movement was outlawed. Archangel Michael retired to fairer fields. A National regime re¬ placed the National-Legionnaire regime. The movement that had been launched twenty years earlier by Corneliu Zela Codreanu, a Jew-hating stu¬ dent in Jassy, was smashed. What King Carol and his governments at the peak of their power in unabridged Greater Rumania had failed to do, Conductorul Antonescu accomplished in rump, distraught Rumania. The Iron Guardists were definitely liquidated as such and their movement brought to an end. It left behind an unalleviated record of robbery, murder and national debasement, all perpetrated in the name of nationalism and Christianity. Of course this does not mean that the way of think¬ ing embodied in Rumanian fascism had been wiped out. To a certain extent Antonescu himself continued the kind of regime that the Iron Guardists were trying to set up. Physically, a majority of the Iron Guardists still remained. Many of them looked back to Codreanu and Horia Sima with devotion and admiration. A very large number of them later passed into the camp of the Communists and are now active as agents of Stalin. Some of them entered the National-Peasant Party and continued to fight against the Communists. The idea, the brutal trend and the totalitarian tendency embodied in the Iron Guard movement are not dead.

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

These forces are not especially characteristic of Ru¬ mania; and they are by no means new. They are wide¬ spread in time and space. They have found supporters in almost every generation but have come to special prominence since the emergence of Marxism and espe¬ cially since the establishment of the Bolshevik dictator¬ ship in Russia. The basic ideas and methods of Com¬ munism, Fascism and Nazism are almost identical. They are an outgrowth of secularism and materialism, of the exaltation of the machine, of the elevation of the state, the degradation of the individual and the worship of mass man, as transmitted through Leninism-Stalinism. To class hatred Codreanu added hatred of Jews. To the exaltation of the proletariat he added the word, Rumanian, making it the exaltation of the Rumanian proletariat. He placed an ecclesiastical halo over the head of the mass-leader such as is still partially lacking among Communists. In other respects the Legion¬ naires were Communists with green shirts. The GermanSlav, Emil Bodnaras, has succeeded with Stalin’s help in imposing the same kind of a despotic regime upon the Rumanians which the German-Slav Corneliu Zelea Codreanu tried to do with Hitler’s help. What one sees now in Rumania is what one might have seen if Codreanu had succeeded. In both cases enslavement, national humiliation and personal debasement.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

113

Chapter VIII HITLER AND STALIN GANG UP ON RUMANIA As Rumania disintegrated from within it was torn to pieces from without. Russia pushed from the east; Germany and Hungary from the west.

As early as

1935 many responsible Rumanians perceived that Eu¬ rope was moving toward a cataclysm. And they fore¬ saw that their country would be directly involved. When Hitler and Stalin made their deal for partitioning Eu¬ rope August 23, 1939, the Rumanian leaders and most of the people understood their land was to be struck by lightning, because it was in the path of the storm. The Secret Additional Protocol attached to the Hitler-Stalin Pact preceding Hitler’s attack on Poland contained specific provisions for the partitioning of Rumania. It read: Secret Additional Protocol On the occasion of the signature of the Non-aggres¬ sion Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipoten¬ tiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Eu¬ rope. These conversations led to the following con¬ clusions : 1. In the event of a territorial and political rear¬ rangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of

114

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party. 2. In the event of a territorial and political rear¬ rangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.R.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San. The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of fur¬ ther political developments. In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement. 3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disin¬ terestedness in these areas. 4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret. Moscow, August 23, 1939. For the Government Plenipotentiary of the of the German Reich: v. Ribbentrop

Government of the U.S.S.R. V. Molotov

This meant very specifically that Stalin, with Hitler’s cooperation, was to seize parts of Rumania. It implied that Hitler was to give Hungary other parts, with Stalin’s cooperation. It was equally plain that if Ru¬ mania didn’t consent to being partitioned she would be attacked by the mighty Soviet Empire. In fact, the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union wrote that very explicitly in a letter to Berlin the following June. He said if Rumania didn’t give way “war would be

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE unavoidable.” tioned.

115

Rumania gave way—and was parti¬

For more than a year prior to the Hitler-Stalin Pact the Rumanians had been watching Hitler tear Europe to pieces and they knew he was approaching their land. They saw him coming through Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia; they saw his approach reflected in parades, demonstrations, private armies, salutes, songs, newspapers in Bucharest and other Rumanian cities; they observed his growing insolence in the bearing of official German representatives in Rumania. When Hitler’s troops swept into Vienna March 10, 1938, Rumanians knew those soldiers were headed toward Bucharest. When Britain, France and Nazi Germany signed the Munich accord on September 29, 1938, Rumanians knew the whole framework of Eu¬ ropean stability had been shattered and they foresaw that without that framework their situation was hope¬ less. They recognized the bomb that had been placed in Europe’s foundation and perceived the wreckage it would wreak. When Hitler tore Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia October 10, 1938, the Rumanians had a premonition he would soon be trying to tear pieces from Rumania. When his terrific army surged into Prague March 14, 1939, they wondered whether one year or two years would pass before foreign armies poured into Bucharest. And the Rumanians asked themselves whether they should meekly succumb, as President Benes had done, or fight. Should they go to Berlin and sign on the dotted line, as the Czech Emil Hacha had done, or defy Berlin? In considering this question they had to bear in mind they were between two fires and that every single de¬ fense agreement which they had arranged was useless. The system of mutual security which they and their

116

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

brilliant Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu had built in the course of 20 years was shattered. They were left alone in one of the most perilous spots on earth. Rumania had counted on the League of Nations but that had vanished, as far as effective help was con¬ cerned. Rumania had counted on direct American interven¬ tion in world affairs and an effective American guar¬ antee of world stability but the United States had osten¬ tatiously withdrawn into its shell and declared it would not permit an attacked state to so much as buy arms from America. Rumania had built up two regional systems of pro¬ tection, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, but both of those had crumbled, as children’s sand castles before a storm. As early as the summer of 1936 the Governments of both Yugoslavia and Turkey had pub¬ licly refused to participate in collective actions. With that measure both Ententes were practically invali¬ dated. The Little Entente was devised as a lightning rod in the face of a possible Hungarian thunderstorm. The Balkan Entente was a lightning rod against Bulgaria. How could those limited alliances cope with a world conflagration! The collapse of Czechoslovakia de¬ stroyed one of the three bastions of the Little Entente, and that was accompanied by another crash: Milan Stoyadinovitch, the pro-fascist Yugoslav Premier, went over to the Axis, leaving no more of the Little Entente and Balkan Entente than is left of a stick of dynamite after it explodes. As early as 1936, at a meeting of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia held in Bratislava, Stoyadino¬ vitch had refused to assume any general defense obli¬ gations. ' In January 1937

he signed a

“perpetual

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

117

friendship pact” with Bulgaria, and facilitated Ger¬ many’s sending arms to Bulgaria through Yugoslavia. Indeed, his Government arranged the delivery of Yugo¬ slav war material to Bulgaria. In March 1937 Stoyadinovitch signed a friendship pact with Italy. By 1938 he was officially visiting Italy and Germany, while Hitler’s emissaries were visiting Belgrade in their “swing around the Balkan Nazi circuit” of BelgradeSofia-Budapest. Stoyadinovitch succumbed to Hitler’s guile even before Benes succumbed to Hitler’s violence. After that, Rumania’s only line of defense was Brit¬ ain’s guarantee, which proved as worthless as Yugo¬ slavia’s had been. How could Britain help distant Ru¬ mania—any more than it was able to help Poland! The British Prime Minister on February 22, 1938 had said in the House of Commons: “We must not try to delude small weak nations into thinking they will be protected by the League (of Nations) against aggres¬ sion . . . when we know that nothing of the kind can be expected.” Mr. Chamberlain also refused a Soviet proposal for an international consultation. In December 1936 Goering had urged the Rumanian Government to make a deal with Nazi Germany such as Stoyadinovitch was making, but Bucharest had re¬ fused and kept urging Britain to take measures to im¬ plement her friendship with Rumania, her last ally in southeast Europe. In a formal note which the Ruma¬ nian Foreign Minister personally handed to Lord Hali¬ fax early in 1938, the Rumanian Government urged Britain to take economic measures to check the flood of goods Germany was sending to Rumania and to take measures to buy more Rumanian products. The Ruma¬ nians pointed out that Germany’s economic penetration would lead to political consequences and tend to draw the country into the German orbit. It was not neces-

118

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

sary for the Rumanian Minister to add that Rumania had to sell her wares some place in order to subsist. But Britain took no measures to loosen the economic net which Hitler was drawing about Rumania; indeed, it actually called off a visit which Sir Frederick Leith Ross, chief Economic Adviser to the British Govern¬ ment, was planning to make to Bucharest in February 1938. And Chamberlain did this precisely to avoid irritating Hitler. He wanted the Nazi dictator to real¬ ize that Britain had assigned him southeast Europe as his economic preserve. Eden had said as much in the House of Commons some six months earlier. By the end of 1938 honest Britishers saw that Ru¬ mania and all southeast Europe had been deserted. Winston Churchill, speaking in Parliament on October 5, 1938, said: “We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves to that. It must now be accepted that all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the triumphant Nazi power. The system of al¬ liances in central Europe, upon which France has re¬ lied for her safety, has been swept away, and I can see no means by which it can be reconstituted. The road down the Danube Valley to the Black Sea, the road which leads as far as Turkey, has been opened. . . There was always an enormous popular movement in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, which looked to the Western democracies and loathed the idea of having this arbitrary rule of the totalitarian system thrust upon them, and hoped that a stand would be made. All that has gone by the board.” It is true that in April 1939, as a result of Rumanian urging, Great Britain and France assured Rumania “of all assistance in their power,” in case of an aggression

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119

that might “threaten their independence” and which Rumania would consider it “vital to resist with her national forces.” A similar guarantee was given to Greece. A special British-Polish Pact was concluded about the same time. But by September 1939, as Hitler and Stalin were invading Poland, what was the effective value of such a guarantee? From the military point of view it was as worthless for Rumania as for Poland or Greece. On September 1, 1939, when Hitler’s mighty army moved into Poland, Rumania was as much alone as though Britain and France and America had not ex¬ isted—as far as military matters were concerned. When Poland after a few days of valiant fighting collapsed and highly-placed Polish fugitives began to stream across the border into Rumania the nation saw that Hitler’s war had reached their own land. When the Soviet Army pierced into Poland, helping the Nazi tyrant destroy that state, as it had often been destroyed before, the Rumanians got a vivid preview of what was going to happen to them. Most looked forward and not back, but still as the darkness thickened they could not but ask what they might have done to avert the impending catastrophe and had not done. As they reflected, they could not fail to recall that others—not Rumania—had shat¬ tered European cohesion. Others—not Rumania—had destroyed the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. Rumania had aggressively espoused and vigorously ap¬ plied measures for collective security against Mussolini when he invaded Abyssinia, thus incurring his bitterest enmity. As Hitler was plundering Czechoslovakia Ru¬ mania’s attitude toward its ally had been above re¬ proach. When Polish officers and state officials sought refuge, Rumania received and befriended them in spite

120

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

of furious protests from Hitler and Stalin. Also, Ru¬ mania through Titulescu, Maniu and many successive governments had tried to establish friendly relations with Russia. She had long rejected political deals with Hitler or Goering. But all had been futile and in the face of a double catastrophe Rumania had to act on its own. On the very day that the Nazi Army entered Poland the Nazi Government demanded a declaration of neutiality from Rumania, thus presenting the government with an inescapable moral issue. Poland was Ruma¬ nia’s ally, as were France and England which had for¬ mally gone to war. Romania Mare, since its creation in 1918, had been closely associated with those states and nations. She had actually come into being as a re¬ sult of a war won by the Western Powers. Germany was plainly her enemy. Russia had signed an agreement to partition her. Morally, Rumania had no choice but to take a stand on the side of her allies. But France and Britain weie not actually fighting. They were doing nothing of a practical nature to help Poland, as Poland was being swept from the map. And Rumania, if she had acted, would also have been smashed, leaving Hitler in control of all her wealth in grain and oil. By the middle of September the Wehrmacht and the Red Army would, have been converging on Bucharest and the Ploesti oil fields as they were about to converge on Warsaw. Rumania would have been overrun in 1939 as Yugoslavia was in 1941. At that moment as Rumania faced extreme peril from four, sides she did not prove more heroic_nor less heroic than Belgium or Norway had proven, than Britain was at Munich or than neutral Sweden. She did not go to Hitler’s aid, as Russia had done, and she took no active part in giving Hitler another nation’s terri-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE ritory, as some states had done.

121

But she did consider

neutrality. And King Carol was encouraged in this by a telephone message which the French Foreign Minis¬ ter, Georges Bonnet, on September 1, had sent to the French Ambassador in Warsaw, through Bucharest— the direct line Paris-Warsaw had been cut by Ger¬ many. In this message France urged Poland to accept Mussolini’s good offices and meet Germany to discuss peace. With France urgently seeking a second Munich and with the French Army hiding behind cement bunk¬ ers should Rumania hurl herself to destruction? That’s what the Bucharest Government asked. On September 4 it answered the question by pro¬ claiming the continuation of a “pacific attitude.” That was a soft, elastic word for neutrality. On September 5, Yugoslavia made an official declaration of neutrality, and on the next day King Carol, after consulting with a Crown Council, changed his pacifism to the strict ob¬ servance of “the rules of neutrality, as established by international conventions.” Rumania was officially out of the camp of her allies, but could still permit the trans¬ port of arms to Poland. And could continue to permit Polish soldiers, dressed in nondescript civilian garb, to move through Rumania to Allied lands. Among them were army pilots who later played a vital role in help¬ ing defend London from the Luftwaffe. As Rumanians were watching the remnants of a ruined army flee from a wrecked state and were won¬ dering when their turn would come they were startled by the assassination on September 22 of their Prime Minister in the center of the capital. The crime was the deed of Iron Guardists and was believed to have been organized in Germany by Legionnaire chieftain Horia Sima, who had been enjoying the protection of Hitler’s Government in Hitler’s land.

The murderers

122

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

temporarily seized the radio station and hoped to seize state-power. Horia Sima tried to terrorize the police¬ men sent to arrest him by saying he was to be made Prime Minister that very day. The Nazis had tried to capture Rumania without a war, but failed.* A few days later the Soviet Army occupied the Baltic States, after which many a Rumanian looked across the Prut River into Bessarabia and asked when the Russians would try to occupy that. The answer came soon. The date was to be December 6, 1939, according to authentic secret information. It was to occur after Fin¬ land “had accepted Soviet demands.” But Finland did not accept them. On the contrary, it put up a bitter re¬ sistance when attacked by the Red Army on November 30. Brave Finnish soldiers gave Rumania a brief breath¬ ing spell, but as Soviet conquerors moved into Finland in spite of all resistance, the Rumanians realized the same Red Army would attack their land. They could not but reflect that Russia had swallowed all or part of every state on its western border, excepting Rumania alone. And now it was Rumania’s turn. By April 1940 Molotov was officially complaining of alleged Rumanian incidents, after having announced that the “question of Bessarabia” awaited solution. In May the Nazi Ambassador in Bucharest told the Ruma¬ nian Foreign Minister that “Stalin had rendered the Fuehrer a great service,” which the Fuehrer would not forget. And the German added that the Russians con¬ sidered the Rumanian border too close to Odessa a remark which Soviet leaders had already made more than once. On June 26, 1940 the German Ambassador in Mos*This episode was described in the preceding chapter, page 107,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

123

cow sent Berlin a “very urgent” secret message, saying the Soviet Government planned to demand from Ruma¬ nia within the next few days that she cede Bessarabia and northern Bucovina to Russia, and in view of that the Reich Government was expected urgently to advise the Rumanian Government in Bucharest to comply, so as to avoid war. The time had come. That very night Molotov handed the Rumanian rep¬ resentative in Moscow a 24 hour ultimatum, saying: deliver or fight. The next morning, June 27, the German Foreign Office in Berlin telephoned “in plain” to the German Minister Fabrizius at Bucharest, ordering him to urge the Rumanian Government to accept the Soviet demand for the cession of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, so as to avoid war. Fabrizius immediately did. As the beautiful month of June drew to a close, and Rumanian peasants prepared to sickle their wheat in a myriad of little fields, the Wehrmacht and Red Army, serving the expansive Nazi Reich and the expansive Communist Empire, set about to divide a neighbor. The Bucharest Government had only 18 hours in which to accept, because the telegram from Moscow, bringing the ultimatum which Molotov had given to the Ruma¬ nian Ambassador, was delayed in transmission. It barely arrived at 6 A. M. and the period was to expire at mid¬ night. Not one power, big or little, offered to raise a finger to help Rumania. So it accepted and again sadly said: “Good-by, Bessarabia.” It also said, “Good-by, freedom.” When Molotov delivered the ultimatum he accom¬ panied his demand with a map of Rumania on a scale of 1/1,800,000 on which the new frontier was desig¬ nated by a thick pencil stroke. The mark itself repre¬ sented a zone seven miles wide and passed squarely

124

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

over a number of localities, leaving doubt as to whether they were to be seized by Russia or left in Rumania. Also, it passed over a part of old Rumania, slicing off an area that had never formed part of either Bessarabia or northern Bucovina. But as conquerors were shifting populations about by the millions and sending men and women fleeing across frontiers by the hundreds of thou¬ sands, what were a few villages or towns or counties! Most Rumanians wept. Even King Carol cried—per¬ haps for Rumania, perhaps for himself. But he saw that he was at the end of his reign. After 10 years of mis¬ rule he had lost his last foothold. The Ministers whom Carol had been setting up and knocking down as tenpins felt ashamed before history, but did not advise useless resistance. Officers and soldiers who for twenty years had prepared an army to defend Romania Mare began to deliver it to the enemy without firing a shot. Throngs of common Rumanian men and women snatched a few belongings to flee from areas being taken over by the Kremlin; still greater multitudes remained in fear and despair. Within four days a territory of 17,285 square miles, containing 3,000,000 inhabitants, was to be evac¬ uated. On withdrawing, the Rumanian soldiers were harangued, offended and physically molested by Rus¬ sian military agitators, but serious incidents were averted. Demoralized regiments returned to a dejected nation to discover that the humiliation of Rumania had barely begun. On July 2 the Rumanian Cabinet gathered and the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Constantine Argetoianu, read a statement, proclaiming a “new orienta¬ tion in the field of international policy” and renouncing the Franco-British guarantee of April 1939. Premier Tatarescu paid tribute in a radiocast to the new order built “on the ruins of yesterday’s Europe,” and on the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

125

ruins of his Rumania. Carol and some of his courtiers were still hoping to save themselves. As a proof before all the world that the Rumanian King and Premier had taken the road to Berchtesgaden, they announced that the Iron Guard chief and the as¬ sassin of Ministers, Horia Sima, was to become a mem¬ ber of the Cabinet, heading the Ministry of Religion.* Two days later the King formed a completely new gov¬ ernment, largely dominated by Iron Guards. As For¬ eign Minister he appointed Mihail Manoilescu, a scintilating shallow politician devoid of character and com¬ mon decency, a flaming nationalist, without elemental national loyalties. On July 15, Hitler wrote a long letter to Carol, de¬ manding that Rumania cede territory to both Hungary and Bulgaria. It was as hypocritical as only such a Fuehrer could write to such a King. As he proceeded to take the loot provided in his deal with Stalin, he told Carol that Rumania’s misfortunes were due to Ru¬ mania’s attachment to France and Britain. A few days later the new but aged Rumanian Premier Gigurta and his Foreign Minister went to see the Fuehrer at Berch¬ tesgaden and the first thing Hitler told them was that Rumania must Hungary.

make

a

territorial

concession

to

August 27, the Rumanian Foreign Minister was sum¬ moned to Vienna by the German Government, where he was to meet Mussolini’s Ciano and Hitler’s von Ribbentrop. They went and the next day Manoilescu sent the following telegram to the Rumanian Govern¬ ment from Vienna: “Today at 2:30 I had a talk with Ribbentrop and Count Ciano, which has just ended. *Mentioned in the preceding chapter, page 108.

126

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

“The situation is worse than bad. “They presented me with the decision of the Axis which demands that we accept an arbitration effected by Ribbentrop and Ciano, here in Vienna, this very evening and cede northern Transylvania by noon tomorrow. “All my attempts to change or attenuate this decision have been in vain. “The alternative with which they faced me is as fol¬ lows: We either accept the arbitration on this very day, or at the latest in the course of the coming night, so as to allow the decision to be given out tomorrow in which case we shall enjoy the absolute guarantee of the Axis Powers for our territorial integrity, even with regard to all, including the East; or else, if we do not accept, we shall be attacked by Hungary and by Russia, and that will be the end of Rumania. “This was repeated to me several times, in the most, determined manner.” An hour later Manoilescu added this telegram: “Ribbentrop told me categorically that we ought not to consider this thing as a bluff. The Fuehrer is not given to bluffing, and we should weigh this in all serious¬ ness. In case the King should be ill advised and fail to accept this arbitration, it would spell the end of Ruma¬ nia within a few days. “Both Ribbentrop and Ciano spoke of the conco¬ mitant Russian and Hungarian attacks as of a thing that has been agreed upon between the latter. Both re¬ iterated that it is not a question merely of a war beween Rumania and Hungary, but also of a war against the Russians, whose outcome would be the annihilation of Rumania. “Ciano added that failure to accept the arbitration would mean creating difficulties for the Axis and that

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE the latter would then consider us among its foes.

127 He

called in my presence for a confirmation of this state¬ ment, and Ribbentrop underscored it with the utmost firmness.” King Carol accepted. An area containing 19,300 square miles of territory and 2,370,000 inhabitants was taken from northwest Rumania and given to Hungary. A few days later Southern Dobrudja, an area of 2,693 square miles with 400,000 inhabitants, was taken from Rumania and given to Bulgaria. At the very time Hitler and Stalin were tearing Ru¬ mania to pieces, Hitler added a further insult by de¬ manding that he be invited immediately to send Ger¬ man soldiers into Rumania. The King complied July 16 and asked that a “German military mission come to Rumania to instruct the Rumanian Army in the newest weapons and in modern techniques of warfare.” Thus Hitler invaded Rumania by invitation! King Carol was not gaining many benefits from his new friend Hitler or from his new friend Stalin. The desperate King gave up and appointed a new AntonescuIron Guard government, September 5. The next day the new regime forced him to abdicate and get out. But that was not the end of the wreckage. To moralize about sad Rumania as Carol slunk away would be rather cheap and perhaps unworthy. The na¬ tion was not responsible for the fact that it was being torn to pieces by two ferocious neighboring Empires, though it was partly responsible for the internal disor¬ der. Conquerors were on the war path and no small state, whether well governed or badly governed, could have stopped them. They cared not whether a prospec¬ tive victim was an ally of Germany, of Britain or of Rus¬ sia. They smashed the well governed, democratic repub¬ lic of Finland; they wiped out the Slav, allied republic of

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Poland; they tore apart the ideal Slav Czechoslovak democracy; they ground to powder nationalistic Hun¬ gary. Friendly Slav Yugoslavia they first broke to smithereens and then enslaved by two successive tyran¬ nies. Two forces threatening all the world met in Rumania and for the moment that state was doomed. Its royal government added to the tragedy by meeting it ineptly and without honor. But even that govern¬ ment had betrayed none of Rumania’s friends or allies. At the last grim moment Rumania sank without glory and also without international treachery.

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129

Chapter IX THE DESPOILERS FIGHT OVER THE SPOILS Hitler and Stalin had hardly ganged up to partition Rumania before they began to fight over Rumania. They clashed there at the mouth of the Danube as at no other point on the map. Stalin was afraid of Hitler and Hitler was afraid of Stalin. As their soldiers came face to face with each other in Rumania and at the Delta of the Danube the dictators became more fearful of one another than they had been at any time since they signed their Pact. They immediately began to accuse, cajole and appease each other, and almost hysterically plotted against each other. Already on September 1, 1940 before the ink was well dried on the “Vienna Award,” the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, sent a “very urgent” wire to the German Foreign Of¬ fice in which he said: “Molotov, who was reserved, in contrast to his usual manner, expressed his thanks for the information (about the Award) and states as follows: “ ‘The Soviet Government was already informed re¬ garding the Vienna conversations by the press and the radio. He asked me to call the attention of the German Government to the fact that by its action it had vio¬ lated article 3 of the Non-aggression Pact, which pro¬ vided for consultation. The Soviet Government had been confronted with accomplished facts by the Ger¬ man Government; this violated existing agreements and conflicted with assurances the Soviet Government had

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

received from Germany regarding questions of common interest to both countries. The present case involved two of the Soviet Union’s neighbors, where she natu¬ rally had interests’.” (From: Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939—1941, The Department of State Ribbentrop and Schulenburg worked out a long writ¬ ten reply to the Soviet Union, which the German Am¬ bassador at Moscow handed to Russia September 10th. It stressed the following points: Germany is in¬ tensely, even vitally, interested in the oil and grain of Rumania, as the Soviet Government had already been informed. Germany did not admit “mutual interests” in Rumania and Hungary, outside of Bessarabia. Soviet pretensions in other parts of Rumania were “out of the question.” Also, the Soviet Union had deceived Germany in the partitioning of Lithuania and grabbed more than was coming to her. Stalin should recognize that Germany was doing a good deed in giving north¬ west Rumania to Hungary, because Germany thereby brought harmony to a vital area, which was gravely threatened by tensions whose assuagement required rapid action. And let Molotov not forget that Germany applied great pressure to induce Rumania to give up Bessarabia and Bucovina without a fight. Was that to go unrequited? Ribbentrop instructed his Ambassador to demon¬ strate to Molotov, “once and for all” that Germany had “predominant interests in Rumania.” Russia’s in¬ terests were not to be considered even “comparable with German interests in Rumania.” They were not to “be placed on the same level.” Molotov wasn’t happy about the German memoran¬ dum but seemed somewhat placated when Schulenburg told him that as compensation for “predominant Ger-

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131

man interests” in Rumania the Reich would “forego the cession of a strip to Lithuanian territory” by the Soviet Union to Germany, that had been agreed upon. Hitler was trying to trade a piece of Lithuania for a lien on Rumania. Molotov said he’d answer more fully in writing. He did on September 21, In “an exhaustive memorandum,” covering four printed pages. It was largely a confirmation of former claims and accusations, but contained four additional points: one was a complaint that Germany in connection with the Vienna Award had guaranteed the integrity of what was left of Rumania. Against whom was Germany de¬ fending rump Rumania? Against Germany’s partner Russia? Molotov assured Ribbentrop that Russia had no intention of making such an attack. Another point in Molotov’s exhaustive note was that Russia certainly didn’t recognize Germany’s “exclusive interest” in Ru¬ mania or in any other Danube matter. The Russian Foreign Minister also pointed out that the Soviet Gov¬ ernment was interested in taking southern Bucovina. In the final paragraph of his memorandum Molotov put a little diplomatic dynamite; he said that if Ger¬ many wanted to call off Article 3 of the Soviet-German Pact, which provided for mutual consultation, it would be okay with Moscow. In other words, on September 21, 1940, Stalin’s Minister warned Hitler’s Ambassador that from then on Stalin might go his own way. He added: When shall we talk it over? Schulenburg assured him Ger¬ many wanted to keep on playing ball with Russia. The ephemeral Rumanian Premier Gigurtu, as was noted in the preceding chapter, invited Germany to send Nazi military men to Rumania to instruct Rumanian troops, and naturally Hitler sent them without delay. Their presence in Bucharest could not be hidden, either

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from the Russians or British. In fact, the British press wrote of Rumania as a partially occupied land. Cer¬ tainly the Conducator Ion Antonescu was working as closely as he could with these German officers. He was doing everything possible to win their good will. And because of their presence he hesitated taking strong measures against the Nazi-favored Iron Guardists who were running wild and preparing to seize power. All this worried Russia, and on October 9 Ribbentrop had his Ambassador assure Molotov that it was a harmless matter; indeed Germany had complied with Rumania’s request for “a German Military Mission” only in order to maintain “quiet and order” in the Balkans in the face of subversive British action. Russia wasn’t sure the German troops were directed against England and found it hard to believe that the British were aggres¬ sively active in the Balkans at that time. Molotov “re¬ marked with a smile that England had other worries and ought to be glad to save her own life.” It took Rib¬ bentrop to get a smile from Molotov. October 13, Ribbentrop wrote a long, melliferous letter to Stalin, inviting him to send a representative to Berlin to cooperate with Germany, Italy and Japan in working out “a long range policy” and in delimiting mutual “interests on a world wide scale.” Stalin con¬ sented and Molotov arrived for a bi-lateral conference on November 12. He heard Hitler say that Germany’s interests in the Balkans were purely military and that only war necessities obliged him to perform the un¬ pleasant duty of keeping “a German military force” in Rumania. Hitler added that at all costs he would have to keep England from establishing air or naval bases in Greece, especially in Salonika. Plainly the German dictator was preparing for mili¬ tary action in the Balkans. He was trying on the one

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133

hand to placate Russia and on the other to obtain a larger share of loot. To obtain a better bargaining position, Molotov re¬ asserted Russia’s interest in southern Bucovina and re¬ proached Hitler to his face for guaranteeing “the entire territory of (rump) Rumania and completely disregard¬ ing Russia’s wishes regarding southern Bucovina.” Molotov’s bitter remarks seemed to show that if it had not been for Germany, Russia would have seized more Rumanian territory. On the 13th of November, as the conversations con¬ tinued, Hitler kept referring in a glowing manner to his grandiose plan for crushing England and dividing up the British Empire. Molotov said it was a fine plan, but he showed more interest in specific agreements re¬ garding Balkan questions. He said, for instance, that Russia was displeased with Germany’s interference in the Danube Question. Speaking “very bluntly” Molo¬ tov asked Germany to revoke its guarantee of rump Rumania. In other words, Moscow officially and in¬ sistently requested freedom for military action in Ru¬ mania. Hitler with equal truculence refused to “re¬ move the guarantee.” He said such a step “for a cer¬ tain time” was impossible. Molotov then proposed that the Soviet Union give a guarantee to Bulgaria, similar to the one Hitler had given to rump Rumania. It was a delicate subject and a very ludicrous situation, dripping with hypocrisy. At that moment Hitler largely controlled the Bulgarian Government and was daily tightening his hold upon it. He had prepared to send German soldiers through Ru¬ mania into Bulgaria within three months or so. But Molotov kept insisting that Russia take Bulgaria under her wing with a guarantee that would have meant send¬ ing Russian troops in and imposing a pro-Soviet Gov-

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

ernment. Naturally, Molotov promised not to inter¬ fere in Bulgarian internal affairs, “not by a hair’s breadth.” Hitler wasn’t persuaded. He told Molotov that he did not know of any Bulgarian request for a Soviet guarantee, while (rump) Rumania had asked for a German guarantee. Moscow hadn’t yet had time to impose a Bulgarian Government that would ask for a Moscow guarantee! Before leaving that point, Molo¬ tov said Russia would give Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean—through Greece. The conversation was continued after supper between Ribbentrop and Molotov. It lasted from 9 :45 till mid¬ night, when it was concluded. The two men went over the whole ground again, with Molotov laying stress upon the Straits at Istanbul, the Danube, Bulgaria and Rumania. He again asked for a free hand in Rumania and of approval for a Soviet guarantee of Bulgaria. Ribbentrop was vaguer than Hitler had been and urged Russia to work with Germany, “back to back, rather than breast to breast.” Both he and Hitler liked that expression. What Hitler actually wanted was Stalin’s cooperation in an all-out fight to destroy England. What Stalin wanted chiefly was a free hand in the Bal¬ kans. The two dictatorships reached no agreement. Already in mid-November 1940, Nazi Germany and Communist Russia stood “breast to breast” in Rumania —not shoulder to shoulder. November 26 the German Ambassador in Moscow sent a “very urgent,” “strictly secret” dispatch to Ribbentrop saying that the Soviet Government was insisting on a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria and bases within range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Stalin was trying to snatch Bul¬ garia away from Hitler. The demand and the events precipitating it seem to have convinced Hitler that continued cooperation with

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

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the Soviet Union was out of the question, and to have confirmed his opinion that he should prepare to attack Russia. On December 18, he and a few of his officers drew up a secret military plan, called Operation Barbarossa, for “crushing Soviet Russia in a quick campaign.” Preparations for the war were to be completed by May 15, 1941. The project provided for the “active partici¬ pation of Finland and Rumania.” Rumania with the German “forces concentrated there (was) to pin down the enemy facing her and render auxiliary services.” At that moment, Rumania’s Conducator Ion Antonescu was too busy fighting his own Iron Guard Legion¬ naires to give much attention to this “precautionary” project, even if he had known about it. As a matter of fact, Hitler seemed to be scheming to replace Antonescu with Horia Sima, so that a 100 per cent pro-Nazi Legionnaire government might take Rumania into the prospective war. Sensing this from increasing German pressure, General Antonescu pushed the matter to a showdown with Hitler, won his case, and got the Fueh¬ rer’s consent to smash the Iron Guards. Rapidly car¬ rying out the plan, Antonescu made himself unrestricted master and cleared the ground for whatever war action was to follow.* January 7, the German Government informed Japan that “rather strong German troop contingents (were) being transferred to Rumania,” for eventual action in Greece. Plainly they were to cross Russia’s Bulgaria— which they soon did. Japan was told, presumably, be¬ cause she was especially interested in any sending of troops to any Russian border. Rumors flew thick and fast in Moscow and Schulenburg wired Ribbentrop ask¬ ing what he should say about German soldiers in Ruma*Mentioned in chapter VIII, page 110.

136 nia.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Ribbentrop told him to say nothing unless pressed

and then to report the transfer of troops to Rumania as “exclusively a precautionary measure against England.” Russia did get excited and did press the matter. January 17 the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office at Berlin sent a secret wire “by fastest means” to Ribbentrop who was absent from the capital. The Secretary’s message told the German Foreign Minister of a memorandum which the Soviet Ambassador in Ber¬ lin had presented to the German Government; in it Moscow’s emissary had complained that “German troops in great numbers (were) in Rumania, preparing to march into Bulgaria toward Greece and the Straits.” “As a consequence, Turkey and England would turn Bulgaria into a theater of war,” Moscow complained. “In view of that the Soviet Government reminds Ger¬ many that the appearance of German forces in Bulgaria would be a violation of USSR security interests,” Rus¬ sia’s note said. To make the warning doubly effective Molotov made a similar complaint to the German Am¬ bassador in Moscow, which Schulenburg forwarded as “very urgent” the same day. Germany replied four days later, both in Berlin and Moscow, saying, “the German Army (would) march through Bulgarian territory, to oppose British action in Greece,” but without violating Soviet security inter¬ ests. After this communication Molotov seems to have cooled down. He gave an evasive, soft answer, which did not “turn away wrath,” but apparently encouraged increasingly provocative Nazi measures in the Balkans. February 22, at 6:25 A. M. the German Foreign Office sent the following wire to Ambassador Schulen¬ burg in Moscow: “Confidential material.

For chief of mission or his

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

137

representative personally. State secret. To be decoded personally. secret code.

Extremely secret.

Reply by courier or

“In Telegraphic Instruction No. 36 of January 7 the statement was made that, for the time being, vague¬ ness with regard to the strength of the German forces was desirable and that at a given time word would be given for publication of the full strength of the troops. That time has now come. “In Rumania there are 680,000 (six hundred eighty thousand) German troops in readiness. Among these troops there is an unusually high percentage of techni¬ cal troops with the most up-to-date military equipment, especially armored units. Behind these troops there are inexhaustible reserves in Germany, including the permanent units stationed at the German-Yugoslav border. “I request the members of the mission and any avail¬ able trusted persons (Vertrauensleute) to start, in suitable ways, to let this strength be known in an im¬ pressive manner—indicating that it is more than suf¬ ficient to meet any eventuality in the Balkans from any side whatsoever—and to do so not only in Govern¬ ment circles there but also in the foreign missions con¬ cerned. I leave it to your discretion not always to men¬ tion the exact figure given above. On the contrary, in¬ nuendo and circumlocution may also be used, as, for example, ‘almost 700,000,’ and the like.” (From Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939—1941, The Department of State.) This message speaks for itself. Hitler was trying to scare Stalin into making concessions. He succeeded to a fairly large extent, thus facilitating vital German operations in the Balkans during the next four months.

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March 1, German forces, carrying out a very care¬ fully prepared plan, crossed the Danube from Rumania into Bulgaria and began moving over the Balkan Moun¬ tains toward Greece. On the same day the Bulgarian Government signed the Three Power Pact, thus join¬ ing Italy, Germany and Japan. That same evening the German Ambassador in Moscow told Molotov what was happening. Molotov showed “great gravity” but was brief and fairly rnild. He wrote a reply on the spot, saying “the German Government must understand it cannot count on support from the USSR for its acts in Bulgaria.” Stalin and Hitler were officially at words’ points, though not yet at swords’ points. Hitler’s Balkan preparations for war against Russia proceeded with great rapidity and without a single im¬ portant setback almost until the end of March. Having placed Hungary, rump Rumania and Bulgaria in his pocket he even signed a favorable agreement with the Yugoslav Government, March 25. In fact, Yugoslavia accepted the Tripartite Pact. But then came a hitch, the most dramatic one in Hitler’s career up to that mo¬ ment. The Serbian people rose up and overthrew their Hitler-appeasing government. They defied Hitler, even personally offended his official and unofficial emissaries m ^ ugoslavia, especially in Belgrade. Hitler was espe¬ cially outraged at this uprising of Serbian peasants, be¬ cause it occurred when he was displaying his power to the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was making a tour through Germany. Hitler had subdued most of Europe, won predominance over most of the Balkans and held the USSR cowed. He wanted to per¬ suade Japan to join him in political or even military action against Russia. And in the midst of his carefully arranged power-display,

Serbian peasants destroyed

one section of Hitler’s scenery, deranged the whole

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139

stage setting and added a bit of comedy to the pompous spectacle. Most important of all, democratic little Serbia en¬ couraged the dictatorial regime of stupendous Russia to show a little boldness of its own; April 4 Molotov told Schulenburg that the USSR was signing a non¬ aggression pact with Yugoslavia. The German Ambas¬ sador protested in the name of his government, but Molotov ignored him. After having accepted many grave humiliations from Hitler in Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, Stalin at last answered back on the strength of encouragement he had received from independent, land-owning Serbian pig-raisers. Two days later Hitler began the action that blasted Yugoslavia to bits and that took the Wehrmacht into Athens. Molotov said he regretted Hitler had extended the war area, but he said it gently. The stupendous dis¬ play of German military might in the Balkans impressed Stalin and softened him up; Hitler tried to keep him soft for two months more. April 13, as Yugoslavia was expiring, Stalin publicly embraced the German Ambassador at the Moscow railroad station and exclaimed, “We must remain friends and do everything to that end !” He then sought a Nazi Military Attache on the platform and repeated, “We will remain friends—whatever happens.” Hitler had taken fearful vengeance on the Serbs, and Stalin ostentatiously deserted them. Stalin also speeded up the delivery of Soviet supplies to Germany. Grain poured across Russia toward Berlin in regular and spe¬ cial trains by the hundreds of thousands of tons. May 7, Stalin stepped out from his post behind the stage from which he had long directed Russia’s af¬ fairs and officially assumed the position of Head of the Government with the title “Chairman of the Council

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

of People’s Commissars.”

The German Ambassador

Schulenburg and other diplomats interpreted the steps as meaning that Stalin had decided openly to take over the reins of state in order to use his prestige and au¬ thority in the task of improving Soviet-German re¬ lations. The same day Schulenburg wired Berlin, “I am con¬ vinced that Stalin will use his new position (for) the maintenance and development of good relations between the Soviets and Germany.” May 12, the German Am¬ bassador wrote, “In my opinion Stalin has set himself a foreign political goal of overwhelming importance for the Soviet Union ... I firmly believe . . . Stalin has set himself the goal of preserving the Soviet Union from a conflict with Germany.” And Stalin’s first measures seemed to bear this out. For instance, Tass immediately denied that Soviet troops were being concentrated on Russia’s western border. Also the Legations of Belgium, Norway and Yugoslavia were informed they must leave Moscow. Though Hitler occupied all three countries and these diplomats couldn’t go home, Stalin ruthlessly drove them into the wilderness. Stalin had signed a mutual aid pact with Yugoslavia, April 4, yet kicked the Yugo¬ slav representatives out of the confines of the Soviet Union a month later, when Yugoslavia, smashed by Hitler’s Wehrmacht, desperately needed some mutual aid. By those acts Stalin gave practical recognition to Hitler’s seizure of two small western states and to the extermination of a Balkan state. May 12, Stalin gave recognition to the new, proHitler master of Iraq, Rashid Ali, who with Nazi en¬ couragement had overthrown a government favorable to Great Britain. Plainly, the Soviet Government had done and was

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doing much to appease Hitler and offend or injure Hit¬ ler’s only important active enemy, Great Britain. In¬ deed, so anxious was the Soviet Union to regain the Nazi dictator's good will that on the evening of June 21, Molotov summoned the German Ambassador at Moscow and asked why Germany was cross at the USSR. The German Ambassador said he didn’t know, but would ask. He sent the message as “very urgent.” Before it had arrived Hitler attacked Russia all along the line. And one of the allies beside him was Rumania, led by Conducatorul Antonescu. “Operation Barbarossa” of December 18 was being carried out. Tightly bound in the net of a dictator seeking world domination, the Rumanian people marched with the German people toward destruction. “The Rumanians got what was coming to them,” some outsiders may say. “They lay in the bed they had made,” others may add. Perhaps. Some German historians say the events of history are the judgments of history or the verdicts of history. In a sense that is true. In such a sense, every nation and every man gets what is coming to him—as every potato plant and oak forest does. But that is not the whole of history nor the whole of any situation. There is a right and wrong, a better and worse, loyalty to truth or freedom and betrayal of truth or freedom. There is a meaning in events and in decisions. The Rumanians went onto the wrong side. Could they have done otherwise? others in their place have done otherwise?

Would

It is easy for persons in Boston or Topeka or Tulsa or Seattle to judge after the event—or even in 1940 and 1941. But what would they have done if they had been Rumanians in Rumania? That was a very differ¬ ent matter than being Ohioans in Columbus. Rumania was wedged between two huge aggressive dictatorships

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

that were fighting without quarter.

All of Europe had

crashed down. Only great Britain had survived and she was pressed against a wall. Every continental state that had opposed Hitler had been wiped out. And Rumania had already been wiped out many times before during her history! She had constantly been compelled to struggle for mere existence. She faced that issue again in 1941. She was fighting to save the pieces that were left. She was fighting for a residue of national life. She lost it, but what would Americans have done in the same place? Indeed, what were the Americans in Pittsburgh and Albany and Austin and St. Paul do¬ ing in June 1941? Were they dying to save civiliza¬ tion ? And when did they begin to die for the right side ?

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143

Chapter X

RUMANIA ENTERS THE WAR June 22, 1941, Conducatorul Ion Antonescu, who was a brave General and a self-appointed Marshal, took Rumania into war against the Soviet Union. His nominal chief was young King Mihai, who succeeded to the throne when Antonescu chased Carol out in Sep¬ tember 1940, but Antonescu exercised unlimited state power and made the war decision on his own. Three years later the King arrested the Marshal and brought the war with Russia to an abrupt end. In the meantime, Rumania had lost 110,000 men in killed, suffered a series of disastrous military reverses and reached the brink of utter defeat. She had also incurred onerous moral opprobrium for fighting on the side of her former enemy that was trying.to annihilate Rumania’s former allies. Likewise, Rumania had fought against whatever democracy and hope for de¬ mocracy there was left in the world. Marshal Anto¬ nescu was eventually brought to trial as a war criminal and condemned to death for preparing, launching and conducting war against the Soviet Union and its Allies. A few days later he was shot. In spite of all the disasters which the Rumanians had suffered at the hands of Antonescu I think most of them sympathized with him when he was shot. His bold bearing at the trial was partially responsible, but the main reason was his defiance of Russia. As he did not cringe before Moscow in 1946, even when standing in the face of death, so he had not hesitated to order

144

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the Rumanian Army to fight Russian troops in Bessa¬ rabia in 1941. His attitude pleased the Rumanian na¬ tion on both occasions. In other words, I think most Rumanians were glad that Rumania attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, even though as an ally of Hitler. At that moment the Rumanians were not free to choose whether or not they were to be in the war. That had already been decided by mightier powers. The Red Army was actually in Rumania, as was the Nazi Army. Rumania, whatever it did, was to be a battle field in a world war. And the two chief contestants fighting on Rumanian soil were also fighting for Ruma¬ nian soil. Consequently, most Rumanians felt it would be preposterous for them not to take some part in a war fought in Rumania over Rumania. Their only question was whether to fight with Hitler or Stalin. If they had believed that by fighting with Stalin they could regain freedom and receive northern Transylvania they might have chosen Stalin, though with profound reluctance. But that seemed excluded. First, because the Rumanians knew from experience that a triumphant Russia would enslave them, and sec¬ ondly, because as of June 1941 they thought Russia couldn’t win. Their best chance to recover something seemed to lie in freeing Bessarabia and Bucovina from the Red Army. But the great issue on that June day appeared to be much more than recovering two provinces, however precious. It was to keep Russia from seizing more of Rumania, indeed, to prevent the disappearance of the State of Rumania from the map. That very threat— to wipe Rumania out—had been made during 1940 in ferocious words. The USSR was insistently claiming the right to seize

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all of Bucovina. It had urgently demanded that Hitler give it a free hand to operate in Rumania as it wished, in order to take what it wished. Heavily armed Rus¬ sian motorized troops were lined up on Rumanian ter¬ ritory from the Black Sea to the former border of Poland and were awaiting a command to seize more Rumanian territory. Also, Russia was urgently and frequently demanding that it be permitted to “guarantee” Bulgaria. In other words, it wanted to take over Bulgaria and extend it to the Aegean Sea. Such action would mean Russia’s subjugation of Turkey and Russia’s control of the Straits. Already Russia was putting its hands upon the Danube Delta and the lower course of the Danube River. This would inescapably have resulted in the geographical and political encirclement of Rumania. Besides this, Bolshevik Russia had repeatedly inter¬ vened in the internal affairs of Rumania, stirring up political strikes and violent insurrections against the state. Russia had actually made itself protector of Rumanian traitors and of conspirators against the gov¬ ernment. It had made such Rumanian traitors high of¬ ficials in conquered lands. That same Russia, the Rumanians were painfully aware, had discussed with Hitler a grandiose plan to divide the world and dispose of small nations as dust on the balance. “The British Empire was to be parti¬ tioned as a gigantic, world-wide estate in bankruptcy.” In the settlement Russia was to be richly rewarded. ITitl er offered her an outlet to the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Se*i and the Indian Ocean. He promised satis¬ faction for Soviet aspirations in British India. Molo¬ tov, pointing out that he spoke in the name of Stalin, said that Russia’s participation in such a plan appeared entirely acceptable in principle, provided Russia was to

146

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

participate as a partner.

Thus Russia, after helping

Hitler annihilate Poland and smash France, was con¬ ferring with the Fuehrer regarding the liquidation of England, the subjugation of Iran and Iraq, and the par¬ titioning of the world. It was to be accompanied by a monstrous war, involving a billion men and women; to press that war was the aim of the Tripartite Pact which Russia was ready to join. Such was the govern¬ ment and state that was wrapping its iron tentacles about Rumania. In these plans for destroying the world and dividing up the ruins Stalin was no worse than Hitler—indeed, Hitler had taken the initiative in the conspiracy. But Stalin was geographically closer to Rumania than was Hitler. He would have gotten much of Rumania in such a deal. If the Rumanian Army helped drive the Red Army back in a Hitler-Stalin war, at least Rumania might escape becoming Moscow’s booty in such a con¬ spiracy against the world. And certainly no Rumanian felt he had any moral obligation to refrain from attacking the Muscovite Empire that had conspired with Hitler to wipe a dozen states from the face of the earth. Nor could any Rumanian forget, by night or day, the havoc Russia had wrought when its army seized Ruma¬ nian provinces in 1940 and imposed a Soviet adminis¬ tration upon them. Many refugees had fled across the Prut River from Bessarabia to tell of wholesale prop¬ erty confiscation, mass arrests, the transportation of hundreds of Rumanians into the ominous, man-consum¬ ing recesses of the vast Soviet Union.

Each night

brought new tales of sorrow; each morning Bessarabia could be heard weeping anew. And to increase Ruma¬ nia’s grief, Moscow was constantly insisting that the

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very mention by a Rumanian of the word Bessarabia was an offense. Neither were Rumanians unaware of the social re¬ gime prevailing in Russia. Being neighbors of the Soviet Union they knew the story, in all details, at first hand. A large Rumanian minority lived from an¬ cient times across the Dniester on the Russian side; they had early been incorporated into one of the Soviet Re¬ publics and Rumanian fugitives from there had told their fellow Rumanians of stupendous slave camps, the confiscation of property, an ubiquitous secret police harassing Russians and non-Russians alike, of incred¬ ible famines, the bloody extermination of all the thrift¬ ier peasants called kulaks, and the degradation of work¬ ers under dictatorial bosses leading state labor unions. Stories of Siberia, people’s courts, the desecration of churches, the enchaining of thought, the turning of children against their parents—such stories emanating from the sixth of the earth bordering upon Rumania kept moaning their way and sobbing their way over every Rumanian valley and every Rumanian plain from Constantza to Sighet and from the Prut to Arad. Was it strange if the Rumanian people craved respite from that menace? And as they faced the ostensible choice of war or no war on that June day of 1941 were they deciding between democracy and totalitarianism? Where was democracy? All the democracy that was left uncrushed and militant was in England. Hitler and Stalin had stamped it into the dust throughout all the rest of Eu¬ rope, while America had elected a “peacemaker” as President precisely because he had promised again and again and again that he would not lead one mother’s son on a crusade for world democracy. As solemnly as any leader could say anything, Roosevelt had promised

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that no youth in the broad confines of the United States would be sent to defend freedom in Bucharest or Jassy or Craiova or Alba Julia. With the mightiest nation on earth rejecting a shooting war for democracy, where was there any freedom camp that Rumania in her ex¬ tremity might join? She could only decide between Hitler and Stalin; be¬ tween insolent Nazis and insolent Communists; between the Gestapo and the N.K.V.D.; between slave camps in Siberia and concentration camps as at Dachau. Ru¬ mania had to choose between a German boot and a Russian boot; and it chose the German, motivated by many considerations. To the Rumanians, Germany, even at its worst, meant order; Russia, disorder. Ger¬ many meant Europe; Russia, Asia. Germany meant good roads, clean villages, splendid new and old cities, unexcelled mechanical skill; Russia meant dilapidation, backwardness, dirt of the Orient. Germany meant a modicum of security for persons and property; Russia meant utter insecurity for both. Germany meant lim¬ ited ruthlessness; Russia unlimited ruthlessness. Though disliking both Russian and German occu¬ piers, a Rumanian reacted to them differently. German soldiers were in Bucharest during both World Wars, and were hated, but if a Rumanian, who found himself alone in a dark, obscure street at night, saw one or more German soldiers anywhere about, the Rumanian felt more secure. or Germans.

He was glad to walk near the German However, if a Rumanian in a similar

circumstance saw a Russian soldier, he fled precipitously away, preferring an encounter with any bandit or rob¬ ber. Russian soldiers repeatedly robbed and beat and shot Rumanian civilians. As guests, they sometimes attacked Rumanian hosts. They proved dangerous even to friends and allies.

No Rumanian ever hesitated to

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take out his watch and tell a German what time it was; no Rumanian ever dared do that for an unknown Rus¬ sian on a street at night. Nine out of ten Rumanians who had to choose between a German and a Russian yoke would choose the German. Such was the choice in 1941—that or an impossible neutrality while waiting for an eventual British-German-Russian stalemate. Concerning Soviet Communism, Winston Churchill has said: “. . . Communism is not only a creed. It is a plan of campaign. . . . The time-honored principles of Liberalism and Democracy are invoked. . . . Free speech, the right of public meeting, every form of law¬ ful political agitation and constitutional right are pa¬ raded and asserted. Alliance is sought with every popu¬ lar movement toward the left. . . . . . No faith need be, indeed, may be, kept with nonCommunists. Every fact of good-will, of tolerance, of conciliation, of mercy, of magnanimity on the part of governments or statesmen is to be utilized for their ruin. Then, when the time is ripe every force of lethal vio¬ lence, from mob revolt to private assassination must be used without compunction. The citadel will be stormed under the banners of Liberty and Democracy, and once the appartus of power is in the hands of the Brother¬ hood, all opposition, all contrary opinions must be ex¬ tinguished to death. Democracy is but a tool to be used and afterwards broken. Liberty is but a sentimental folly, unworthy of the logician. The absolute rule of a self-chosen priesthood, according to the dogma it has learned by rote, is to be imposed upon mankind, without mitigation, progressively, forever. All this, set out in textbooks, written also in blood in the his¬ tory of several powerful nations, is the Communist’s faith and purpose.” Premier Clement Attlee on May Day, 1948, said,

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“Russia in my young days was the supreme example of the police state, the land of fear and suppression, the land where free speech, free press and free thought were banned. “It is the same today as it was then, only with a dif¬ ferent set of rulers. “It was also the supreme example of imperialism; stretching out across Asia and ever seeking to extend. It is the same today. It employs new methods, but in effect the countries of eastern Europe have been brought within its imperialist sway.” British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, speaking to a Labor Party Conference, held at Scarborough, Eng¬ land, on May 20, 1948, said he would not “tolerate Communism being put over on a weakened Europe.” He added in referring to the Soviet Union that “Civil war as an instrument of foreign policy by an outside power is a dastardly act.... I call upon them to stop it!” Rumanians knew all those things perfectly already in June 1941. They had exactly those facts in mind when they went against Bolshevik Russia. Ernest Bevin threatened to fight Russia in 1948 “to preserve Eu¬ rope.” Clement Attlee in 1948 said Russia had im¬ posed “its imperial sway on Rumania.” He also said Russia was “a supreme example of a police state.” Rumania knew all that in 1941. It didn’t have to wait until 1948 to learn it. The Rumanian nation had had a chance to study Russian methods during more than a dozen Russian invasions. Is it strange that Rumania wanted to drive the Red Army from Bessarabia? The President of the United States at the beginning of 1947 launched a large scale economic and military action to preserve Greece from being seized by Rusrian-backed Communists. The project will eventually cost more than a billion dollars.

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The Premier of Great Britain ordered armed British action in Greece for a similar end in 1944 and continued it until America took over. These men, heading the two principal democracies left on earth, undertook to lead or support a war against Russian-inspired Com¬ munist forces trying to seize Greece, a land far from both London and Washington, inhabited by neither Britishers nor Americans. In 1941, the Rumanians felt they were doing for their land, for their own homes and children, what Great Britain and the United States did a few years later for Greece. The presence or ab¬ sence of war guilt is much the same in one case as in the other. Bevin has called Russia’s action in Greece “dastardly.” He ordered “stop.” Russian action in Rumania was dastardly in 1940 and 1941 ; the Ruma¬ nian Army said “stop.” Of course, the war decision did not come upon Ru¬ mania all at once. A number of the more important steps in the development of events have already been reported. Some may be recounted. The most vital was Russia’s ultimatum of June 26. 1940 and her seizure of Rumanian territory immediately following. In antici¬ pation of such an ultimatum Premier George Tatarescu, June 20, had informed the German Minister in Bucha¬ rest that Rumania was ready to begin collaboration with Germany in every domain. Since 1938 German trade was dominant in Rumania. July 2, 1940, Rumania’s Foreign Minister, Constan¬ tine Argetoianu, announced the renunciation of the Franco-British guarantee of Rumania and the inaugu¬ ration of a new Rumanian foreign policy. The same day Premier Tatarescu confirmed the “new orientation” in a radiocast and reported that “all neces¬ sary measures” were to be taken to carry it out.

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July 4, King Carol appointed a new cabinet with the mission of applying the new pro-German policy. July 14, Rumania withdrew from the League of Nations. July 16, the Prime Minister Gigurtu asked Germany to send a military mission to Rumania. August 30, Germany gave, and the Bucharest Gov¬ ernment accepted, a guarantee of the territorial in¬ tegrity of rump Rumania. D uring September 1940 air and armored units of the German Wehrmacht began to trickle into Bucha¬ rest. In time the trickle became a stream. October 11, President Roosevelt froze Rumanian funds in America on the grounds that Rumania was “an occupied country.” He added that the Rumanian people had submitted to the occupation “under duress.” Rumania joined the Tripartite Pact November 23, after Hungary had joined it November 20. At this time, Stalin also was considering joining it. Vishinsky assured the Rumanian Minister in Moscow, Grigore Gafencu, that the Soviet Union did not object to Ru¬ mania’s step. He may have been sincere. Russia and Germany at that moment appeared to be on very good terms. They were discussing how to divide up the world. December 31, 1940, Hitler wrote Mussolini that he expected no Soviet action against the Axis during Stalin’s lifetime. “Our relations are very good,” he said. During January they got even better. During February 1941, Great Britain broke off dip¬ lomatic relations with Rumania. Rumania’s dictator Antonescu was steadily moving toward an inseparable partnership with Hitler, but he also tried to preserve some of Rumania’s other ties. He had long been pro-British, but believed Great Brit-

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ain expected more resistance from Rumania than could be given. Antonescu refused to join Hitler in smashing Yugoslavia in April 1941, and though he did nothing effective to protect Rumania’s ally and associate in the Balkan Entente and Little Entente he observed digni¬ fied inaction. He didn’t join the pack that was tearing Yugoslavia to pieces, although Rumania had an ethno¬ logical excuse. Rumania’s attitude toward Yugoslavia during that tragic month was as proper as Churchill’s, and decidedly more worthy than Stalin’s. During the same month of April, Antonescu, after careful investi¬ gation of a clash between a local Rumanian military official and a Soviet Legation secretary in a provincial town, publicly apologized to the Soviet Government. Vishinsky told Rumanian Minister in Moscow Gafencu that “the Soviet Union had the best intentions toward Rumania and absolutely no claims against her,” al¬ though Molotov had been making vigorous efforts to induce Hitler to give Russia the green light to take more Rumanian territory. Those were the last flickers of even hypocritical cordiality between Rumania and Russia. Early in June Antonescu went to see Hitler in Germany and on re¬ turning to Rumania told his close associates that in a few days Hitler would attack Russia. The tentative date was believed to be June 14. The attack actually came eight days later, delayed, perhaps, by the very heavy rains. Up until June 21, only the highest Ruma¬ nian Army officers and members of the Cabinet knew that their country was on the eve of active participation in the greatest war in history. Early next morning German cannons thundered from the Baltics to the Balkans. And Antonescu issued a proclamation calling upon the Rumanian people to march forth and liberate the ravished portions of their sacred fatherland.

Al-

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most a million marched forth before the war was over, and many never returned. But most who were called on that June day were willing to go; they were pleased that action had started and that Conducatorul Antonescu had joined it on the side against Russia. By the end of August Bucovina and Bessarabia had been liberated. Of course, the question of being for or against America did not enter into consideration, because America was not at war and had been promised it would be kept out of the war. “America First” groups were winning followers throughout the country and peacemovements were active from coast to coast. It is certain the Rumanian soldiers didn’t relish fighting beside Germany, an expansive empire that was trying to destroy England. Rumanians also loved their Latin sister France and hated the power that had crushed her. They didn’t like the Nazi regimentation and detested Prussian military arrogance. They showed that in many ways. Also, they dreaded tackling the colossal Russian Empire, even beside Germany. They saw a monstrous future if Stalin triumphed, and a ter¬ rible future if Hitler triumphed. At best the future looked gray; at worst pitch black. Most Rumanians understood these eventualities quite clearly. They are an experienced and sharp eyed people. But in spite of it all they were relieved at having a chance to act in defense of Bessarabia. What most of them actually wanted was just a little bit of war. A small, localized piece of the war. They were as a distraught man in one room of a burning apartment house who wanted to put out the fire in his room and ignore the rest. They were as a man at one end of a leaking boat, who wanted to stop up the hole in his end and disregard the other leaks. Most Ruma-

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nians wanted to go along with Hitler until they got the Bolsheviks out of the Rumanian provinces and away from the Delta—then to stop, waiting for Hitler to finish the Armageddon. If he and Stalin badly mauled each other, and England got the upper hand that would be a perfect ending. Popular opposition to Rumania’s marching into Bes¬ sarabia and Bucovina and to Rumanian regiments shooting Soviet regiments out of those provinces was non-existent. The thought that Rumania at that mo¬ ment should take the side of Russia against Germany wasn’t entertained by one Rumanian in a thousand. Most wanted to march with Antonescu to the Dniester, Hitler or no Hitler. On that June- day as Nazi and Communist armies met, most Rumanians felt like most Britishers, though they were in opposite camps. Britishers though detest¬ ing Soviet aims and methods were happy when they learned that Hitler and Russia were fighting, because they thought that Russia would help save Britain. More hopefully they sang, “There’ll always be an England,” after June 22. For the time being the Britishers put Communist totalitarianism in the back of their minds. Likewise, Rumanians were happy when they heard Nazi cannons shooting Soviet divisions, because they thought Germany would help Rumania. Relegating Nazi totali¬ tarianism to the back of their minds, they sang their national hymn with more assurance. Both the Britishers and Rumanians were deceived— so far as present events go. There are prospects that some of the British will be saved in the end. If that turns out to be the case, some of Rumania will eventually be saved. England is in much the better situation. Moscow is farther from London than from Bucharest. As we leave the fateful June 22, we may add a post-

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script regarding the subsequent execution of the man who that day ordered the Rumanian soldiers to attack. In 1946 Ion Antonescu, who had been held by the Russians for almost two years, appeared in the room of a people’s court as a rat in a trap being prepared for drowning. The Rumanian nation felt he was being tried by Russia, whose army was occupying the country. They saw that the judges were dupes of Russia and that the two Communist prosecutors were fanatical agents of Russia. A large proportion of the journalists in the court room, most of whom were non-Rumanians, were militantly in the service of Russia and ostentatiously hostile to the helpless Marshal. They vociferously cheered when he was condemned to death by the Com¬ munist-led court responsible to Communist Minister Lucretsiu Patrascanu. Most Rumanians at that mo¬ ment felt they were in the Russian trap, along with the Marshal, and that it was they who were being tried, de¬ rided, condemned. Antonescu conducted himself calmly and with dig¬ nity; he looked Russia straight in the eye and refused to apologize for fighting against her. He even repeated that he had fought to win. Many Rumanians felt his bearing symbolized their self-respect, and were grateful for such a symbol. They couldn’t help but rejoice when they saw a Rumanian stand under a Russian gallows and calmly defy Russia. A hush fell upon much of Rumania when the war criminal was led to a death cell. The hush changed to consternation when news of how he was executed spread over the land. Naturally, he wanted to be shot, rather than hanged, as is custom¬ ary with condemned officers of all times and nationali¬ ties. And as he was being shot he wanted to face for¬ ward, unblindfolded. These requests were granted. And the Marshal himself gave the command to the squad

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of executioners to fire. They proved more nervous than he. For years Antonescu had been the most outstanding soldier in the land. He had a commanding mien and imperious gaze; he was known to be willful, hard, stern. As the boys, standing a few feet in front of him with their fingers on the triggers of their guns, looked into his flashing eyes they trembled a little. As they fired the General fell, but was neither killed nor unconscious. Partially rising on all four, he stretched out his right hand toward the executioners and shouted, “Shoot again, boys, shoot!” Well, they shot again and again and an officer finished him off with a revolver. As this account, with embellishments, spread from mouth to mouth and from city to city, Antonescu’s crimes were submerged in pity and in the underground of people’s thinking he became a hero. In the final legendary ver¬ sions of the execution, non-Rumanians were pictured as doing the shooting. No Rumanian could be found to kill “the General,” it was said. Down on hands and knees, covered with blood, open-eyed Antonescu was envisioned as upholding Rumania’s honor.

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Chapter XI JULIU MANIU SERVES THE ALLIES June 1941, Juliu Maniu was in favor of a little Ru¬ manian war. He might not agree with this statement, but I think it is fair and accurate. I have had the pleas¬ ure and honor of talking with him frequently and I heard all his testimony at the war-crimes trial of Ion Antonescu, where this matter was a main issue. When dictator Antonescu decided to lead the Ruma¬ nian Army into northern Bucovina and Bessarabia in order to recover lands which Maniu believed belong to Rumania, the chief of the National-Peasant Party was not displeased. Of course, he realized that Rumania was marching beside Hitler and against Russia. He knew also that Russia was with England at that mo¬ ment and that Germany was against England. Maniu certainly was with England, but he approved of Antonescu’s using the Rumanian Army and Rumanian guns to recover Rumanian territory. Maniu hoped that it would all come out right in the end both for England and for Rumania—but he was for Rumania first. He would probably have expressed his attitude in the following manner: As the two powerful dictators fought against one another for imperial gains and political ad¬ vantages little Rumania should have bargained in order to get maximum concessions from both. The Rumanian Government should have told Hitler that it would go with him as far as the Dniester River and no more. And that might have been done without fighting. Ru¬ mania should simply have given Russia the same kind of

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ultimatum which Russia had given Rumania a year earlier on another month of June. She should have said to Stalin, “Hitler has attacked you all along the line; if you evacuate Rumanian Bucovina and Rumanian Bes¬ sarabia in 24 hours, Rumania will occupy them and re¬ main neutral in the fight. Otherwise, Rumania will at¬ tack with all the forces at her disposal.” Then, if Stalin had refused, Rumania should have entered a limited war on its own, to free its stolen provinces. Thus Maniu argued. Such a policy might have been entirely chimerical; Hitler himself might have prevented its implementa¬ tion by marching straight through Rumania. Regard¬ ing such a contingency, Maniu would have answered, “But Hitler already had his hands sufficiently full and a long enough front to take care of; he would not have cared to add an additional battle line in Rumania. Hit¬ ler would have been satisfied with limited Rumanian help, even neutrality, if he couldn’t get any more.” Actually Hitler did direct most of his initial military attention to the center of his front against Russia and not to the Rumanian sector. All that, however, is theoretical and hypothetical. Maniu was not in power, nor even a counselor of the Conducator and such a plan for limited action was not seriously considered by the Rumanian Government. Antonescu plunged full tilt into the fighting beside Hitler and made Rumania an active member of the Axis. He was confident of success. Until the end of that summer Maniu offered no opposition to the Gen¬ eral or to his anti-Russian campaign. As long as Ruma¬ nian soldiers fought on Rumanian soil to free Ruma¬ nian men and women Maniu gave his approval and tacit support, even though thinking the end might possibly have been attained in another way.

Maniu had spent

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a lifetime struggling for Rumanian liberation and was happy to see Bessarabia being freed from Russia. But during the fall and winter of 1941, as Antonescu led the Rumanian Army deeply into Russia to help Hit¬ ler “smash the Red Army” and “crush Bolshevism” Maniu parted company with him. By 1942 he was opposing him with all the power at his disposal. He did not throw bombs, but entered into direct communication with England. The Rumanian Army after freeing Bessarabia con¬ tinued to fight the Russians beyond the Dniester on Russian soil and the battles were very bitter. By the beginning of October, 1941, the Rumanians had cap¬ tured the Russian port and stronghold of Odessa, a few miles beyond the Rumanian border. At night one could see the lights of Odessa from Rumanian cities, as I have more than once. Antonescu celebrated this success with a triumphant procession in Bucharest and most Rumanians sincerely rejoiced with him. They were glad their army had won and that the enemy’s army had lost. They were pleased to have turned the tables on the gigantic Empire that a year earlier had seized their land; they were relieved to feel a little safer and to be able to hope that Rumania’s part in the killing—or being killed—appeared almost over. More Rumanians came nearer to being hopeful during Octo¬ ber 1941 than during many preceding months or than during any of the succeeding years. At the beginning of September the Rumanian Gov¬ ernment had officially informed America of its libera¬ tion of Rumanian territories from Russian occupation and had received no official indication of America’s dis¬ approval ; but when Antonescu’s representative in Washington told Secretary Hull of further Rumanian fight¬ ing in Russia he was reminded that America considered

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Hitler the major world danger. This was a warning to Rumania to get out of the war, but went unheeded. Great Britain, being at war with Germany, gave Ru¬ mania an ultimatum, demanding that she cease fighting, and upon Rumania’s refusal, declared war upon her (November 30, 1941). During the winter, as Rumanian forces pierced deeper and deeper into Russia, Rumanian public opin¬ ion split, with most political leaders and some military men opposing the Marshal-dictator. A Rumanian Gen¬ eral, Nicolae Radescu, was sent to a concentration camp for a blistering and almost public criticism of German official arrogance. Much more important than Radescu’s bold but rather minor onslaught was the reasoned, persistent opposition of Juliu Maniu and his friends in and out of the National-Peasant Party. They urged Antonescu to get out of the war, because they didn’t want Rumania to be tied up with Germany, and be¬ cause they didn’t want Britain to be defeated. After Pearl Harbor they were all the more insistent. But Conducatorul Antonescu, in the Hush of Nazi vic¬ tories, ignored this opposition. Then he went further and silenced a number of the oppositionists by putting them in concentration camps. German officials, and es¬ pecially the aggressive Nazi Ambassador at Bucharest, Baron von Killinger, complained to Antonescu against Maniu’s growing anti-Nazism agitation. To assure Germany against increasing Rumanian resistance to Nazi pressure, the Marshal declared war on America (December 12, 1941). Antonescu’s autocratic acts, the steady increase in the number of men he was sending into Russia, never to return, and the constant growth in Russia’s ability to resist, increased Rumanian opposition. This was fed by the daily broadcasts of the British

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Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and by the Voice of America, though this voice was still weak. When the anti-Nazi Rumanians heard the echoes of Roosevelt’s message of December 9, in which the President of the United States said that “the sources of international brutality wherever they exist must be absolutely and finally broken,” Maniu and his friends; were much en¬ couraged. America’s President had just been elevated to a grand, transfiguring height of moral consecration by Pearl Harbor and many nations believed he would re-direct the course of history. The words he spoke were as oracles from the God of Hosts. “All sources of international brutality were to be absolutely broken!” To the Rumanians “all sources” included Stalin as well as Hitler. Why should the Rumanians fight any more? Juliu Maniu became bolder and bolder in his actions. Through portable radio transmissions sets supplied by the British he increased his messages to the British Government and later with the Allied Armies in Africa, urging them to help him devise a way for getting Ru¬ mania out of Hitler’s camp into that of the Allies. In addition to this, Maniu sent letters and warnings direct to dictator Antonescu, kept in contact with democi atic elements in all parts of Rumania and circulated mimeographed appeals throughout the land. Much of this activity was not hidden from the Marshal, though the messages to and from General Maitland Wilson, whose headquarters were at Cairo, as well as the pres¬ ence of British agents in Rumania was concealed—as far as possible. One Britisher was discovered and arrested, but because of the leniency of the Antonescu Govern¬ ment and the tactics of the pro-British Courts, he was not executed.

Rumanian

One of Maniu’s ablest Rumanian helpers, Rica Georgescu, was seized by the Rumanian police along

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with unmistakable evidence that he had been “working with the enemy.” That was in the fall of 1941. Maniu saved Georgescu by telling General Antonescu that Maniu assumed all responsibility and would insist on being tried as the chief conspirator.

As a result there

was no trial. One day toward the end of 1943, the MarshalConducator sent a message to Maniu, ordering him to stop his activity and warning him that the Germans were demanding his arrest. The National-Peasant chief answered in writing, but instead of promising to desist, he chided Antonescu for maintaining a dictatorship and boldly pointed out the errors in the dictator’s foreign policy. He wrote, “I find it unjust for you to engage the people in a death struggle without their consent. It is wrong for you to throw the possessions, homes, health and lives of the masses into this conflict without gaining their adherence. “After the recovery of Bessarabia and Bucovina you had no right to engage Rumania on the side of the Axis in an ideological war against Russia. You com¬ mitted a crime by engaging the Rumanian Army in a war on Russian soil.” As Maniu was writing such things, the Nazi Am¬ bassador in Bucharest was indignantly saying in speeches, “We will close his mouth, if necessary with our fists.” Since Maniu’s only immovable possessions were an ancestral farm in Transylvania and he had no home in Bucharest, he lived modestly in rented quarters. His suite in a one story dwelling consisted of a small vesti¬ bule, a bedroom of the same size and an “office.” Secret police had established themselves in two houses across the street from Maniu; Hitler’s Gestapo was in one, Antonescu’s “Sigurantsa” in the other.

Of course,

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Maniu’s telephone wires were tapped—by the Ruma¬ nian Government, not by the Germans. In spite of all this police supervision, people in large numbers came to see the National-Peasant leader. Actually Maniu has lived many years of his life un¬ der such circumstances—in small flats beneath the eyes of secret police. At the beginning he was hounded by the police of the autocratic Hapsburgs and reactionary Hungarian feudal lords. Then he was watched by the police of absolutist King Carol and his swiftly changing reactionary regimes. Later he found himself in ex¬ treme danger from the Iron Guards and after March 6, (1945) was trailed night and day by totalitarian Russia and Rumanian Communist agents. It seems to me. as I look back over two decades, that only during brief intervals was I able to visit Juliu Maniu without being watched and inscribed by totalitarian secret police, serving enemies of democracy. But none of the regimes, native or foreign, prior to 1945, was as cruel to Maniu as that of the Communists, who eventually imprisoned him for life. This fact typifies the “new democracy.” Not for 100 turbulent years of boyars, Princes, Kings, Conducators, and Legionnaires have so many Rumanian men and women been arrested, tor¬ tured and dispossessed as by the Communists. It is easy for the critics of Mianiu and of Rumania to point out that neither Maniu nor any other leader of the Rumanian opposition carried on sabotage or operated as armed Partisans. They blew up no bridges and killed no Germans. They didn’t even murder vil¬ lage mayors, as Communist Partisans in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were doing. They didn’t ravage whole valleys as the Communist “Liberators” in Greece were doing. true.

They “just talked.”

That charge is partially

Maniu would be proud of it.

All the effective

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opposition in Rumania was carried on by Maniu and by his friends in the National-Feasant, Liberal and So¬ cialist Parties, but it was not designed to ruin Rumania or to kill Rumanians or to demoralize the state and army. Least of all was it designed to open the way for Communist power-seizure in Rumania. Its aim was to bring Rumania into the camp of the United Na¬ tions which were fighting Hitler, and to prepare for Rumania’s cooperation in a peaceful post-war world of which Russia also would be a loyal, law-abiding mem¬ ber. Maniu was trying to help Rumania play her part in building the kind of a world that President Roosevelt said he wanted. Maniu came nearer to preparing that than was the case with any other Axis satellite. Some Italians tried to bring Italy on to the side of the Allies in October 1943 and failed. They could not deliver their country. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the leaders of the “resist¬ ance” used that movement wholly to destroy both states, to mangle democracy in them, to mobilize them against the West and to draw them into the World Communist conspiracy. In Greece the resistance movement turned out to be no better than Tito’s or that of the Bulgarian Bolsheviks, whose aim was to seize power. Juliu Maniu’s resistance movement achieved something entirely dif¬ ferent. On the day it succeeded, August 23, 1944, it delivered a state, a nation, and an army intact to the Allies. In the course of Maniu’s long struggle before and during the war the Nazi Iron Guard was suppressed, auto¬ cratic King Carol was removed, a very promising young sovereign was placed upon the throne, ties with Nazi Germany were broken, the Constitution restored and roads opened toward advance of government by the people, and for the people. Over and above this, the

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Nazi occupiers were driven from Rumania by Ruma¬ nian forces, with the Rumanian nation and army unani¬ mously cooperating. There was no split, no factions. And Rumania cleared the Germans from Rumanian soil before the Germans were chased from Italy, Yugo¬ slavia, Bulgaria or Greece! Neither Tito, Badoglio, Bulgarian “resisters,” or Czechs or Hungarians achieved any such result. Most of this was due to Juliu Maniu, along with his devoted political associates and King Mihai. And the action was begun long before the defection of any Axis satellite or member. In no other European land did the Allies negotiate with a leader who was so completely authorized to speak for his people as was the simple citizen Maniu, head of Rumania’s outlawed National-Peasant Party. He and his friends, working illegally, were as a state within a state. The Allies recognized that he spoke for the Rumanian nation and found that in the final crucial moment the whole nation unreservedly accepted the de¬ cision which he had prepared. Of course, Maniu couldn’t arrange everything by sending coded messages over small clandestine radio transmitters.^ Although daring British agents in Ruma¬ nia and Maniu’s equally daring colleagues slipped from town to town and house to house under the very nose of the Germans, conferring with Maniu, carrying radio equipment, sending dispatches to the Allies and receiv¬ ing messages from the Allies, the time eventually came for more decisive action and more direct personal con¬ tact. Maniu wanted to know exactly how the Allied High Command wanted the Rumanian Army to oper¬ ate and what political regime was to be established for Rumania and in Rumania when the nation turned all its forces against Hitler. Maniu wanted to know how

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Rumania could best join the Allies and how she would be treated when she did. To carry on such negotiations, Maniu saw he must have his own emissary in the outside world. Conse¬ quently, he got in touch with Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu who by that time was seeking a way to ex¬ tricate Rumania from the Axis, and they agreed to send a career diplomat, Alexander Cretzianu, former Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Ankara. He went as Rumanian Ambassador to Turkey. In appear¬ ance, he represented dictator Antonescu and the proNazi regime. But actually he was authorized “to rep¬ resent the Rumanian nation.” He was to be permitted to maintain contact with Maniu. And on leaving, in September 1943, he took instructions from Maniu rather than from the government. The whole arrange¬ ment was made and put into effect with the knowledge and approval of King Mihai. Dictator Antonescu realized

that

his policy had

failed and was willing to have Maniu seek an egress for Rumania, behind the back of Hitler. Naturally, Ru¬ mania wanted at all costs to escape such a fate as befell Italy after Badoglio’s action in October of the same year. War Ambassador Cretzianu had one of the strangest diplomatic missions in history; he was osten¬ sibly to represent a pro-Nazi dictator but actually was to help a pro-Allied opposition group that was trying to overthrow the dictator—which it eventually did. One of the most active and fearless participants in this striking diplomatic conspiracy was Grigore Niculescu-Buzeti, an official in the Rumanian Foreign Of¬ fice, a confidant of the King and a close friend of Maniu. He supplied Cretzianu with a special secret code, dif¬ ferent from that used by the foreign ministry. King Mihai, Maniu, Constantine Bratianu and the other au-

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thentic representatives of the Rumanian nation were ready to take decisive action, but not without an under¬ standing with the Allies. Crezianu soon made contact with British representa¬ tives in Turkey and inquired about the possibility of Rumania’s cooperating with the Allies. A communica¬ tion regarding this approach was sent to London, and in November “His Majesty’s Government’’ replied that any Rumanian contact with the Allies must take the form of an offer by a government emissary to accept “unconditional surrender to the three Principal Allies.’’ “No other arrangement is of any interest.” His Majes¬ ty’s Government said. As Cretzianu returned to Bucharest from Turkey to report to the King and Maniu, the whole venture ap¬ peared to have failed. Rumania had been informed, in effect, that nothing but unconditional surrender to Stalin was acceptable. It was to be a bi-lateral arrangement— or rather no arrangement at all. The Rumanian Gov¬ ernment was simply to invite Russia to occupy the coun¬ try. Even if conversations with the three Principal Allies were, arranged they would only mean that America and Britain were to look on as Rumania ac¬ cepted Russian occupation. It actually meant that as far as Rumania was concerned, the appearance of Al¬ lied cooperation was a lie, and the fine words of the Atlantic Charter a snare. This proved to be precisely the case, down to the last detail; but in November 1943 the Rumanian people could not bring themselves to be¬ lieve that America had delivered such a gigantic portion of the world to the Kremlin. The disillusionment of Rumania’s democratic leaders was increased when they learned of a conversation of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden with the Turk¬ ish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu at Cairo

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169

about the same time. Eden assured the Turk that the Soviet leaders had radically changed their natures, that they had gone democratic and could now be trusted, in consequence of which Great Britain was not opposed to Russian penetration into the Balkans. As far as Rumania went, the Turkish Minister got the impres¬ sion that Eden considered her licked. Mr. Eden expressed these glowing sentiments imme¬ diately after the conference of the three Principal Al¬ lies in Moscow (October 19—30, 1943), and if the Turks or Rumanians had heard the radiant reports which the U. S. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs brought back from that Conference they would have experienced still greater consternation. I was working in Washington, D. C., at the time in a responsible post close to the State Department and saw the elation which swept over our highest government officials after the meeting at Moscow. Our Office of War Information began exuberantly to whoop it up for Russia and to point out “the innocent nature” of Communism. We underwrote the whole Communist world and urged our distraught Allies, such as Poland or Yugoslavia and our satellite-enemies to have no fear of Russia. doubts that let him read some of the O. W. I. ganda directives during those months. Mr. memoirs show that he had been won over by

If one propa¬ Hull’s Stalin.

He was taken in as badly as Eden. The subsequent conferences at Cairo and Teheran only increased Russia’s overpowering diplomatic posi¬ tion. They strengthened Turkey’s reluctance to enter the war and made it still plainer that Russia was to have a free hand in Eastern Europe. The delivery of Poland and Yugoslavia to Moscow by America during those months was an added indication that any effort on Rumania’s part to join the Allies except on the condi-

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tions of unrestricted Russian occupation was useless. Nevertheless, Rumania persisted in trying to open conversations with the Allies—indeed, through three channels. One passed through Madrid, another through Cairo and a third through Stockholm. By means of the first route, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Mihai Antonescu, made approaches to the American Ambas¬ sador in Spain, Carlton Hayes, proposing to surrender unconditionally if Turkey entered the war and the Western Allies attempted a landing in the Balkans. Maniu used the channel from Bucharest through An¬ kara and Cairo and he also requested military action in the Balkans by England and America. Through Stockholm via Switzerland the Rumanian dictator approached the Red Army behind the backs of America and Britain. Both the Rumanian Government and op¬ position saw by spring 1944 that Rumania’s military situation was becoming desperate. Eventually Maniu had an emissary in Cairo, Barbu Stirbey, a tall, slender, austere appearing aristocrat from an old princely family. He was wealthy, refined in his tastes, genteel in his bearing and above partisan politics. Indeed, he had never played much of a political role and for a decade and a half none whatsoever. He had been opposed to King Carol and had taken no part in Rumania’s swing toward totalitarianism or in her joining the Axis. At an age that raises men above pas¬ sions and personal ambitions, Prince Stirbey accepted a role similar to that of the early Roman prelate who went out to meet conquering barbarians from the East and plead for his people. Pope Leo I with Attila.

But he had less success than

The dispatch of Stirbey to Cairo had been long de¬ layed. The British had at first suggested that Maniu’s emissary go to London for talks. And this had pleased

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Maniu because Stirbey had a son-in-law and grandson in England, both serving in the British armed forces. Also, he had often been in London for long periods and had many devoted friends there. But it soon became plain to the British Government that such a visit by such a Rumanian to London on such a mission would offend the Russians and February 1, 1944 a British Lieutenant Colonel called on Cretzianu in Ankara to inform him in intimate conversations that Stirbey might go to meet representatives of the Three Allies at Cairo. Plainly the conversations between the emissary of the Rumanian nation and the Allies, includ¬ ing Russia, were to take place under conditions that would arouse the least Soviet suspicions. However, the British Colonel, after consulting London anew, did as¬ sure Cretzianu that the Rumanian spokesman would not be required merely to sign on the dotted line and thus deliver Rumania unconditionally to Russia. Stirbey arrived in Istanbul early in March. He left soon on a British military plane for Cairo. Events proved he had been sent on a futile mission. But he re¬ fused to believe it; he still retained some hope. He started conversations with the British Lord Moyne, the American Lincoln MacVeagh, and the Rus¬ sian Nikolai Novikov, March 17, but it was simply shadow boxing. The Russians wanted no agreement with a representative of the Rumanian people, but with the Rumanian Army and Rumanian State. And with¬ out Russian approval conversations between the British and Stirbey over Rumania’s future situation were as useless as conversations between Bing Crosby and Bob Hope about Rumania would have been. As this tragic little farce was being enacted in Cairo, the Allied Middle East High Command sent word to Bucharest through Cretzianu in Ankara (March 22 and

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29) to surrender forthwith to Russia, to re-form the surrendered army units and lead them against Hitler’s Wehrmacht. Antonescu refused, because of his fierce and narrow sense of “a soldier’s honor.” He usually spoke of himself in the third person as “General An¬ tonescu,” and one of the many things he couldn’t con¬ ceive of “General Antonescu’s” doing was suddenly to turn against a military ally. Antonescu kept on fighting beside the Nazis. Russia’s vehement and at first suc¬ cessful drive into Rumania slowed down. The pressure on the Rumanian Army was relieved. The Soviet spring offensive in that sector seemed spent. In fact, the Soviet Union adopted different tactics. It seemed to invite Rumanian negotiations, instead of demanding stark, unconditional surrender. Molotov announced, on April 2 : “The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Ru¬ manian territory or of changing the existing social or¬ der in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation of resist¬ ance by the enemy forces.” As a preliminary he had reasserted the USSR’s right to northern Bucovina and Bessarabia. April 3 Cordell Hull announced at a press confer¬ ence in Washington that: “the political assurances which the (Soviet) statement contains should help the Rumanians to see that their ultimate interests require that German forces be driven from their own country.” On the same day Premier Churchill reported to the House of Commons that “the Soviet Government has had the kindness to send us beforehand the text of the declaration, and we have expressed our admiration. This text has become public, and I am certain that it will be a great help to the common cause.”

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173

The Allies expected immediate action from the Ru¬ manian Government, and to prod Antonescu along, the Americans began a series of air attacks on the Ploesti oil centers. Apparently this was designed to scare the Marshal and to let the Rumanians know that talks with the Americans and Britishers were vain. The Ruma¬ nians were to surrender at once to Russia. But Antonescu refused, and on April 12, the Allied Middle East High Command at Cairo through Stirbey ordered Maniu, or the government, to join the Allies, turn the two disputed provinces over to Russia, prepare for the eventual payment of reparations, and free all Allied prisoners. In that case the Soviet Gov¬ ernment would not demand that Rumanian territory be occupied by Soviet troops during the armistice, though the Russians were to be allowed to operate there. Also, the Vienna Award that had given north¬ west Rumania to Hungary was to be annulled. After an exchange of messages Maniu informed the Allies that he was prepared to sign an armistice on the basis of their proposals. But these conversations faded out.

Moscow became

disinterested. It didn’t want to conclude an armistice with true representatives of the Rumanian nation, espe¬ cially not at Cairo with America and Britain participat¬ ing on a basis of at least formal equality.

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Chapter XII KING MIHAI KICKS GERMANY OUT The summer of 1944 was the gloomiest in Rumania’s modern history—so far. The Rumanian people were paying for the grave moral and political mistake which their government had made by taking Rumania into the World War on the side of Hitler. Neither America nor England seemed deeply concerned; France was helpless, as well as unconcerned. This was disastrous for Rumania and also disastrous for the United States. The period from September 1943, when Rumania began publicly and on a large scale to seek a way to the Allied camp, until September 12, 1944, when she signed the Armistice with Russia in Moscow, was filled with crushing defeats for Ameri¬ can diplomacy. Rumania was making extreme efforts to withdraw from the war in a way that would have brought benefit to America, but was repeatedly and brutally rebuffed by the American Government. We did everything in our power to help entrench Russia in Rumania and to strengthen the Kremlin in its world drive against us. Our extreme ineptness was due partly to military weakness, partly to an egregious misunder standing of Soviet aims. By 1948, indeed by 1947, most American statesmen and a large part of the American nation had come to realize that world Communism, led by Moscow, was trying to set up a global Union of Communist Repub¬ lics, one unit in which was to be an American Soviet. They also say that Russia had advanced a long way

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE toward

achieving

such

global

power-seizure.

175 And

Americans became equally aware that Russia was work¬ ing in the United States itself. But all that could have been foreseen in 1944, when the United States Govern¬ ment was helping the Soviet Union carry out its plans for world mastery. Communist activity and Communist advance as of 1948 was in no respect new. It was all taking place according to a detailed world plan that had been writ¬ ten in books, broadcast from radio stations, sung in revolutionary hymns and proclaimed by Communist Parties in 50 lands. Not one Communist act had been perpetrated by 1948 that wasn’t prepared and in mo¬ tion in 1943 and 1944. Yet at that time the American Government enthusiastically helped Russia promote its world conspiracy against America. I was in Cairo when the Rumanian emissary, Barbu Stirbey, arrived and recall what expectations were ex¬ pressed in high American circles. Persons partially re¬ sponsible for America’s future allowed themselves to believe that Russia, Britain and the United States would work together in a fair, friendly way and enable Ru¬ mania, after acquiring a new regime, to move forward with us toward freedom, national sovereignty and de¬ mocracy. But within the aura of those bright hopes and to the accompaniment of these splendid words we were helping Russia seize Rumania and all Eastern Europe, in a drive toward the U. S. A. Winston Churchill declared in September 1943 that “satellite states, suborned or over-awed, may perhaps, if they can help shorten the war, be allowed to work their passage home.” That beautiful though rather ar¬ rogant expression was radiocast to Rumania and the other satellites times without number. The ether waves became tremulous with that refrain. Morning, noon

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and night the Voice of America and BBC appealed to the Rumanians and others to arise, turn their guns against Hitler, drive the totalitarians out and “work their passage home.” It was all utterly official. Noth¬ ing could be much more official. We, the Allies, openly declared that although the satellites had been sinners they could work out their salvation and again be re¬ ceived “at home.” There was to be no salvation by grace and no welcoming of the prodigals with fatted calves, but if the nation that had been overawed or suborned were courageous enough to turn around and help us fight Germans, it would not be cast into outer darkness, on the day of judgment. As the Axis goats were separated from the Axis sheep those who had “worked their passage” would be given a parole. They could hope eventually to join the One World as mem¬ bers in good standing. Those words were designed especially for Rumania. Since she was in a vital position and had vital resources we most urgently wanted her to hit the sawdust trail. A thousand times we extended her the altar call and at last she arose to shake off her evd associates and “work her passage home”—only to find that every road but one was closed and that road led to a dungeon. Although Maniu’s conversations with the Allies through Stirbey and through an additional emissary, Constantine Vishoianu, who reached Cairo from Bucha¬ rest May 26, 1944, had bogged down, Maniu kept per¬ sistently trying. He knew that Stalin and Antonescu were scheming to conclude a deal of their own, disre¬ garding the Western Allies and the true representa¬ tives of the Rumanian nation, but that only made Maniu work all the harder. He doubted that Antonescu would succeed and feared if he did he might deliver Rumania to Moscow as he had once delivered it to Berlin. Maniu

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wanted Britain and America to play a leading part in the arrangement, wanted it to be concluded with Ru¬ manian democrats and not with dictator Antonescu, and he wanted the prospective armistice to be signed in Cairo or any other city outside the USSR, but not in Moscow. This last point didn’t mean much since the Allied Teheran Agreement had proved no better than the Allied Moscow Agreement, but still Maniu thought Rumania had a better chance if she talked in Cairo than if she talked in Russia. Maniu and his friends, in order to have a semi¬ constitutional organization that could serve as a basis for taking over power, founded a Democratic Bloc in June. It consisted mainly of the National-Peasant and Liberal Parties, whose adherents constituted 75% of the Rumania nation. The Socialists also were invited to join since they were a worthy though very small ele¬ ment. And the Communists were not excluded, though they constituted a tiny and unreliable element. The other groups had no illusions about the Communists, when inviting them to join. They knew the Communists would cause them difficulties from the beginning and were perfectly aware that the Communists followed a policy of extreme reaction and exclusive loyalty to the Kremlin. But since Rumania had to deal with Russian Bolsheviks, the Bloc trying to arrange the armistice could hardly exclude from participation the Rumanian Bolsheviks—what few these were. Having formed this body in whose name a new govvernment was to be set up, Maniu sent a special courier to Ankara on June 20, bearing a letter that contained specific and detailed plans for enabling Rumania to pass from the Axis to the side of the United Nations. Of course, it was all a very precarious undertaking. Most of Rumania’s divisions were at the front, far

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

from the Rumanian capital. Maniu and his associates had so few Rumanian troops at their immediate dis¬ posal that after seizing the Government they might all be captured by the Germans, in which case the whole adventure would be a fiasco, worse even than had hap¬ pened in Italy. In view of that Maniu asked Russia to start a vigorous drive into Rumania and he urged the three Principal Allies to send three airborn brigades to vital points around Bucharest. Maniu assured the Al¬ lies that Antonescu was only stringing Russia along with his “negotiations” and he pressed for an immediate signing of an armistice in Cairo. This message was de¬ livered to the Allies by Stirbey and Vishoianu June 29. But the Allies ignored it. Week after week the Ru¬ manian emissaries and Cretzianu pressed for some word, in order to end the doubt and confusion in Bucha¬ rest and especially in the ranks of the Democratic Bloc, but they were laconically told that the proposal had been forwarded to the three governments. Actually, Moscow was carrying on its own negotiations with An¬ tonescu through Carol’s former dictatorial Prime Min¬ ister, George Tatarescu, who was in Switzerland. After seven weeks waiting, Maniu’s emissaries in Cairo addressed a letter to the representatives of the three Principal Powers (August 19), urging them to act. The Rumanians again pointed out that the antiNazi Bloc was definitely planning to overthrow Anto¬ nescu and once more urged that the Allies cooperate with military action. The letter ended with the words: “We take the lib¬ erty of addressing to the Allied representatives the re¬ quest that they examine the situations in the light of the above considerations, and enable us to transmit to Mr. Maniu and to the United Democratic Opposition

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179

some useful indication with regard to the envisaged action.” Maniu and the King had decided to attempt a coup, without waiting for an Allied answer. They feared that if they delayed any longer the Germans might seize all the opposition leaders, including the King. August 26 was set as the date for the action. It was to take place in the Royal Palace in Bucharest. The main prob¬ lem was to devise a way to get Marshal Antonescu and his chief political helper Mihai Antonescu into the Palace. The Conducator had long been very suspicious and might hesitate to walk into such a trap, if he and his chief associates received a formal invitation. Each side was afraid of being arrested by the other and both by the Germans. This crucial problem solved itself as by magic on August 22, when the dictator’s Foreign Minister, Mihai Antonescu, called on the King of his own accord, to discuss the question of an armistice. Mihai Antonescu had long been convinced that Hitler was doomed and had made proposals to the Allies through Madrid and Stockholm. He went to the Palace to see if he couldn’t bring the matter to a conclusion and work out a definite plans for immediate action. King Mihai told Minister Antonescu that the best thing would be for the Marshal himself to come and talk the matter over. The Foreign Minister said the Conducatorul was reluctant to come for fear of provoking the Germans, but innocently promised to do his best to bring him the next day. In view of that King Mihai advanced the prospective date for the execution of his plan from Saturday to Wednesday, the 23rd, and advised his intimates accordingly. Since Marshal Antonescu’s coming was still a mat¬ ter of conjecture, many hours of uncertainty followed,

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

but shortly after the noon hour on Wednesday, the King received word that the audience would definitely take place at 4 P. M. When the Marshal arrived, the King and General Constantine Sanatescu awaited him. In adjoining rooms were two other Generals and the customary small military unit guarding the Palace. More important than any of these persons were Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti, the mainspring of the conspiracy, and the King’s young secretary, Mircea Ionitsiu. They were to he the King’s principal helpers that afternoon. For the whole plan Maniu had been much more impor¬ tant than anyone except the King, but for that specific operation, Buzesti was the key civilian figure. Already word of impending events had been secretly cabled to Istanbul for transmission to the Allied armies. As the worried, domineering Marshal and the pre¬ tentious, eagle-visaged diplomat—both Antonescus though unrelated—entered the Palace they saw nothing to arouse suspicion. The Russian drive had already been resumed and the urgent need of an armistice was recognized by every Rumanian, including Conducatorul. The King greeted the hard, greying, unrelaxing soldier who had shorn the throne of all power and told him flatly that Rumania must immediately withdraw from the Axis and conclude an armistice with the Allies. Antonescu did not refuse categorically, but said he would not act without the knowledge and acquiesence of the Germans. He pointed out that the Rumanian home garrisons were extremely weak and that German forces might swallow up the country. He also stressed the need of “playing fair with comrades at arms.” He insisted that the Germans should have a chance to ex¬ tricate their forces from the Rumanian front. Antonescu’s bearing, though harsh, was not without dignity. He said an officer couldn’t suddenly turn against a

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181

fellow officer, beside whom he had been fighting, and try to kill him. He endeavored to persuade the King that such dishonor could not aid Rumania’s national cause. The King, who is himself a soldier, was not unmoved. He saw the cogency of both arguments, but stuck to his position. He realized that matters had gone so far action was imperative. He perceived that if Antonescu left that room he would tell the German General Staff something was on foot and would try to lead some of his fellow Rumanian officers against those who would support the King in declaring war on the Axis. Conse¬ quently, the King called the palace guard, which was waiting for action. Buzesti entered the room with a major and several non-commissioned officers. “What is this?” asked the dictator. “You are all arrested,” answered the King. An¬ tonescu and his Minister acquiesced. There was no skirmish and no shots were fired. As the soldiers searched Rumania’s toughest and most overbearing of¬ ficer for weapons, the captured man told them “General Antonescu does not carry side-arms. His authority does not rest on guns.” When the young men led him away, Antonescu turned to the group of conspirators and shouted, “Tomorrow I will have you all shot for this.” Before long he was delivered to men as hard and tough as he. The cus¬ todians with whom he left the Palace were Communists. Rumania’s most ferocious foe of Communists was in Communist hands. That was almost their only respon¬ sible part in the coup; they acted as jailers. This role had been assigned to them with much fore¬ thought and for weighty considerations. The conspira¬ tors did not know what the next hours would bring forth.

Perhaps the Germans would take Bucharest.

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Perhaps some small Army units would make a stand for the deposed chief. Maybe the King would be seized or killed. And under such circumstances Antonescu might try to stage a comeback. He might overawe or bribe his jailers. He might induce his guards to join him in a prison conspiracy. Ion Antonescu had a way with soldiers. There might be a momentary return of Ru¬ mania’s Napoleon from Elba. To prevent all that he was given to the Communists. They would not be awed or cajoled or intimidated. They cared nothing for Rumanian nationalism. Patriotic appeal would not move them. They detested the “Conducator” for fight¬ ing their Russia. In case of general confusion they could liquidate their man without a tremor. That little detail in the coup was arranged by a Communist mys¬ tery man called “Spataru,” about whom the conspira¬ tors learned more later—much more. He was a de¬ serter from the Rumanian Army and had been sent to Bucharest by Moscow. He became War Minster under the name of Bodnaras. Ion Antonescu was taken from the Palace to the outside of Bucharest and thence to Russia.

In time he was brought back to Bucharest

to be shot. The coup was completely successful. As the Marshal laid down power General Sanatescu took it up—from patriotism, not from ambition. He didn’t want the job. He didn’t want his name attached forever to the re¬ cession of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia. He didn’t want to head the government that would have to. accept a humiliating armistice. He didn’t relish turning on the Germans, who were still strong and who had been his allies. He dreaded the prospects of accepting orders from Soviet masters and shuddered to reflect^ how he would be compelled impotently to watch Soviet regiments plunder Rumania, arresting Rumanian citi-

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zens and taking off Rumanian soldiers to Russia by the scores of thousands, but he did accept—as had been planned. He immediately took the oath and formed a military government. The transfer of power took place without a single hitch, as far as Rumanian unity was concerned. As soon as the most urgent tasks were completed the King appeared at the microphone and radiocast to the world: “From this moment all fighting and hostile act against the Soviet Union ceases, as does the state of war with Great Britain and the United States. Receive the soldiers of the Soviet Army with trust. The United Nations have guaranteed us the independence of our country and non-interference in our internal affairs.” This announcement revealed to the Germans the predicament in which that sector of their front was placed and they undertook to crush the royal revolt. They tried to hold Rumania as they had tried to hold Italy. They immediately bombed Bucharest from the air, aiming their missiles at the Palace, parts of which they repeatedly hit. Their ground forces tried to seize key positions in and about the city, with prospects of success. For two days the situation was precarious, because the number of trained Rumanian troops in the capital was smalh But the new government mobilized every available man. A new spirit made itself felt in the nation. The boldness of the young King, the reappear¬ ance of Maniu on the scene, prospects of an armistice, Rumania’s return to its association with the Western Powers aroused the highest bravery; well-led Rumanian boys stopped every German attack and smashed all Ger¬ man resistance. The Rumanian fighters were ably helped at very crucial moments by American airmen who flew up from Italy and dropped their bombs with much pre¬ cision at carefully designated points. Without the help

184

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

of a single Russian soldier the Rumanians cleared the city and firmly established their Government. American aviators immediately flew in from Italy and evacuated all American war prisoners, to keep them out of Russian hands. These prisoners were pilots who had been shot down earlier while bombing the Ploesti oil fields. In a rapid shuttle traffic suddenly arranged between Bucharest and Foggia (Italy) in August 1944 the American deliverers received enthusiastic help from Rumanians and especially from Rumanian airmen. This evacuation was one of the most brilliantly executed minor operations in America’s war operations. The Red Army moved into Bucharest the last day of August, largely in American lend-lease vehicles of many varieties; they found American newsmen and in¬ telligence officers there to observe the spectacle. The Russians entered a city as free from German forces and as peaceful as New York. But that night the Soviet High Command issued a glowing war communique, telling how the Red Army had liberated Bucharest. And for that “liberation” a Russian General was made a Marshal. For nearly a week Rumania had been actually and formally at war with Germany. Within the next few days they cleared all Rumania of German forces, prac¬ tically without Soviet aid. The new government, naturally, devoted its chief attention to military matters and to relations with the Allies, but took time to restore the former democratic Constitution, open all concentration camps, re-establish civil rights, proclaim freedom of speech, including the press, and prepare a new birth of freedom, such as the nation hadn’t enjoyed for 15 years. But these matters, important as they were in the minds of Rumanians, yielded precedence to Rumania’s

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

185

concern over the armistice. On the day after the coup, the Rumanian spokesmen in Cairo informed the Allies that they were empowered to sign the armistice imme¬ diately. They were quite hopeful, since the Kremlin had publicly repeated its offer of April 2, specifically adding that it had no intention “of restricting in any way the independence of Rumania.” Also, the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara had told the Rumanian Ambas¬ sador there that Russia would scrupulously fulfil its promise to respect Rumanian independence. The only vital supplementary clause that Rumania wanted in¬ cluded in the Armistice was that Rumania be assured a “free zone” in which no Russian troops should install themselves. They wanted as much as Hitler had given conquered France. The Kremlin had already promised Antonescu that concession in negotiations carried on at Stockholm. But having won complete power, the Russians now refused the request and even insisted that the armistice be signed in Moscow. Cairo was ruled out; dealing with Rumania was to be a purely Russian affair. It has been that ever since. Rumanian plenipotentiaries hastened from Cairo and from Bucharest to Moscow and after waiting two weeks signed on the dotted line, as ordered, September 12. The Americans and British didn’t sign at all; a Russian signed for them. The carrying out of the Armistice was left to the Soviet Army; authority was designated by the official written formula, “the Soviet (Allied) High Command.” The Allies were in brackets. They never got out of the brackets. Indeed, all this writing down of words and solemnly signing them up proved quite superfluous. Bolsheviks use words and signatures only to deceive. The Russians had already occupied much of Rumania by September 12 and were on the way

186

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

to occupy the rest; they were in a position to do just what they wished and take what they considered appro¬ priate. They did just that. Here are some of the salient points in the armistice: 1. From 4 P. M. August 24, 1944, Rumania has completely ceased military operations against the U.S.R.R. in all theatres of war, ceased war against the Allied nations, broken relations with Germany and her satellites, entered the war and will wage war on the side of the Allied powers against Germany and Hungary with the aim of restoring her independence and sover¬ eignty, for which purpose she will put in the field not fewer than twelve infantry divisions, with relative re¬ plenishments. Military operations of the Rumanian armed forces, including the navy and the air force, against Germany and Hungary will be conducted under the general direction of the (Allied) Soviet High Command. 3. The Government and the High Command of Rumania will insure for Soviet and other Allied troops means of free movements on Rumanian territory in any direction should this be required by military conditions. In doing so the Government and the High Command of Rumania will provide every kind of assistance to this movement by their means of communication at their own expense, on land, on sea and in the air. (See appendix to Paragraph 3.) 10. The Rumanian Government will be obliged to pay regularly sums of money in Rumanian currency re¬ quired by the (Allied) Soviet High Command in order to carry out its functions and will also secure in case of need use on Rumanian territory of industrial and transport enterprises, means of communication, power stations, public utility enterprises and institutions, stocks of fuel, food products and other materials and

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

187

personal services in accordance with instructions issued by the (Allied) Soviet High Command. Rumanian merchant ships that are either in Rumanian or in foreigh waters are subject to operative control of the (Allied) Soviet High Command for their use in the common interests of the Allies. Paragraph 10.)

(See

appendix to

14. The Government and the High Command of Rumania undertake to collaborate with the (Allied) Soviet High Command in the task of detention of per¬ sons accused of war crimes and in trial of such persons. 15. The Rumanian Government undertakes imme¬ diately to disband all pro-Hitlerite political, military, militarized and other organizations of fascist type on Rumanian territory who are conducting propaganda hostile to the Allied nations, in particular to the Soviet Union, and not to tolerate the existence of such organi¬ zations in the future. 16. Publication, import and distribution in Rumania of periodical and non-periodical literature, production of theatre plays and films, and the work of the radio stations, of the post, telegraph and telephone are to be carried out in accordance with an agreement with the (Allied) Soviet High Command. (See appendix to Paragraph 16.) 18. An Allied Control Commission will be set up that, up to the time of conclusion of peace, will assume the regulating and control of the execution of the pres¬ ent terms under the general guidance of, and according to instructions of, the (Allied) Soviet High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied powers. (See appendix to Paragraph 18.) 20. The present terms come into force from the moment of their signature. Made in Moscow in four copies, each of them in the

188

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Russian, English and Rumanian languages, the texts in Russian and English languages being authentic, on September 12, 1944. Signed by the authority of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States: Malinovsky. Signed by the authority of the Government and the High Command of Rumania: Patrascanu, Damacianu, Stirbey, Popp. This armistice delivered Rumania bound hand and foot to the Soviet Union. It showed that America and Great Britain had capitulated. America officially, for¬ mally and effectively authorized Russia to occupy, ad¬ minister and control Rumania in the name of the Allies. “Soviet” was made synonymous with “Allied” as far as Rumania was concerned. The result of the coup by the King and Maniu was officially and actually to make Rumania a Soviet subsidiary. That was the “home” to which Rumania was “working its passage.” That was what Roosevelt’s beautiful words about freedom actu¬ ally meant. Russia officially had received power to control every paper, every show and every meeting in Rumania; to suspend the activity of every organization, order the arrest of any Rumanian as a war criminal, a fascist or an enemy of the Allies. Russia had the right to collect any sum it wished “for war expenses,” to seize almost any object as war booty and finally to take $300,000,000-—in a way to inflate the 300,000,000 to 3,000,000.000 if it wished. America’s Ambassador at Mos¬ cow not only assented to all this, but urged Rumania to accept it—as Hitler’s Ambassador in 1940 had urged Rumania to hand over Bessarabia to Russia. If this violation and debasing of America’s pro¬ claimed peace aims seemed deplorable in 1944, it be-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

189

came execrable in 1948 when Cordell Hull published his memoirs. As Maniu, the King and their emissaries were trying to arrange an armistice with the Allies and to join the Allies in the war, they had been put off for a full year. During a period of intense strain in the early summer of 1944, when immediate action regarding Rumania would have been to the advantage of all, conversations had completely bogged down. The Allies simply ig¬ nored the Rumanians. And Hull tells why—it was be¬ cause Russia and her Allies were dickering over Ru¬ mania, somewhat as Molotov and Ribbentrop had dick¬ ered. For example, the British Ambassador in Wash¬ ington, Lord Halifax, on May 30, asked Hull in the name of the British Government to agree, in the name of the American Government, to turn Rumania pre¬ dominantly over to Russia in return for which Britain was to get Greece. This request was made in writing and presented as urgent. Hull turned it down. The next day Premier Churchill sent President Roosevelt a telegram containing the same urgent re¬ quest. June 8, Churchill sent still another urgent wire. America again refused. June 11, Churchill came back, urging more strongly than ever that Rumania be turned over to Russia. June 12, Roosevelt accepted, not telling Hull, who was away that day. June 26, Hull learned about it from the British diplo¬ mats in Cairo who incidentally told the U. S. Ambassa¬ dor MacVeagh about it; the British and MacVeagh were at that time giving the run around to the Ruma¬ nian emissary, Stirbey, who was trying to get Rumania out of Hitler’s camp. The humiliating scene might be pictured as follows:

190

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Stirbey implores the Allies for the twentieth time: “Please help us arrange an armistice and get Rumania onto your side.” MacVeagh says warily, “Okay, let’s do something, we Americans are for doing something.’ Lord Moyne, the Britisher, leans over and whispers in MacVeagh’s ear, “No, you aren’t; the U. S. has given Rumania to Stalin.” “It has not,” MacVeagh replies. “See what Hull says! He’s against slicing up the world as a swag for conquerors.” “Yes, but see what Roosevelt says!” Moyne whispers back and produces a copy of a telegram. Then Lincoln MacVeagh in the name of the Atlantic Charter tells Stirbey he’ll have to stick around a little longer. During that summer Cordell Hull may have re¬ called with shame that on the 18th of the preceding November he had assured a special joint session of Congress: “There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or for any other of the special arrangements through which the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.” No more special arrangements, of course, but “Mr. Stalin, help yourself to Rumania !”

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

191

Chapter XIII

COMMMUNISTS PREPARE POWER-SEIZURE Most Rumanians were almost happy on the morning of August 24, 1944. Their impulsive young King, their wise old Maniu and a few bold associates had performed an apparent miracle. They had brought a long desired change and apparently without bloodshed. The eve¬ ning before young Ionitsiu had rushed from the Palace to the Headquarters of the Bucharest Garrison, told Col. Dimitru Damaceanu of Antonescu’s arrest and instructed the Colonel to do his part, as it had already been defined in detail. Within a few moments every military unit in the capital had joined the King’s new regime without hesitation. At the same time General Sanastecu had hastened to the High Command of the Army and presented a letter from the King, telling of Antonescu’s arrest and ordering all regiments on the front to cease fighting and begin moving back from be¬ fore the advancing Russians. without reluctance or delay.

This order was obeyed

The Western Allies seemed pleased; Moscow ex¬ pressed understanding and promised good will. In the meantime the Rumanian political prisoners were re¬ leased from Antonescu’s prisons, new newspapers were appearing, new voices were being heard over the radio; the rods of the Rumanian dictator had been broken and a long harassed people was entering the camp of de¬ mocracy. Truly the Allied policy was justifying itself; Mr. Roosevelt’s benign smile was bringing radiance to Moldavian fields and Carpathian forests.

192

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

But all that was for a day only! The Moscow-directed front of world Communism was determined to seize Rumania as its vassal and im¬ mediately began to put its plans into operation. The Kremlin foresaw that the war was moving toward a close and was determined to take Rumania over before peace came. High American officers were beginning to say Germany might collapse by Christmas, and though that prediction seemed too optimistic, the Bolsheviks wished to leave nothing to chance. From then on, Russia’s main campaign in Rumania and the Balkans was to be directed, not against the Germans, but against the Allies. Fighting Germans had become incidental, even though much still remained. The chief objects of Russian attacks in Rumania were to be Rumanians. And the strategy was to be twofold; Communists in the Kremlin and in Rumania were to fight both the new Rumanian Government which had been set up and the Western Allies whose widely proclaimed democratic ideals had inspired the creation of this government. From the beginning of September the campaign was carried out by the Kremlin with a vigor that bordered on fury and with a persistence that resembled an ob¬ session. The government which King Mihai appointed Au¬ gust 23 was largely military because its main task was to help the Allies, especially Russia, win the war. Most of the cabinet members were Generals, with a civilian, Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti, serving as Foreign Minister, and with the chiefs of the four political groups that had backed the coup serving as Ministers of State without portfolios. These were Juliu Maniu (NationalPeasant),

Constance

Bratianu

(Liberal),

Titel

Pe-

trescu (Socialist), Lucretsiu Patrascanu (Communist). The last named was also Minister of Justice ad interim.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

193

This government placed 15 Rumanian divisions in action and rapidly cleared Rumania of Germans; these divisions were kept at the front in Hungary and Czecnoslovakia till the end of the war. Also, it put at the disposal of the Allies, meaning Russia, all its resources, to hasten the common victory. And Rumanian officers who had fought against Russia, now fought against Hitler with especial daring, in order to make amends for past errors and personally to “work their passage home.” As these 15 Rumanian divisions were fighting on the common front in distant mountains amid the snows of winter, at the end of long lines of communications, one might have thought the Russians would temporarily abstain from provoking political upheavals at home. During the winter months of 1944, also, American and British forces were subjected to a vehement German attack (Battle of the Bulge), which threatened to af¬ fect the global war action. During such a period of extreme tension on battlefields extending around the world, Russia out of common loyalty might not un¬ reasonably have been expected to delay her Communist drive against Rumania. But instead of that she pressed it, with steadily growing vehemence. By October 7, she succeeded in paralyzing the first Sanatescu govern¬ ment. Overthrowing Sanatescu was part of a Russian campaign that was no less important for the Kremlin than overthrowing Hitler. Beating the Allies in Ru¬ mania, even during the war, was as important as beat¬ ing Nazis. For the Russians to find excuses—even reasons—for opposing the Rumanian Government was easy. Very large Russian forces were in Rumania and RussianRumanian clashes broke out at every step. Rumanians didn’t like Russian conquerors and that caused irrita-

194

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

tion. Rumanians wanted to preserve property which Russians were seizing on an enormous scale and that provoked the Russians. The Rumanians started new papers which wrote of freedom; they held meetings about democracy, they objected to unrestricted requisi¬ tioning by the Russian Army and to reparation demands which surpassed the requirements of the Armistice, they protested the mass kidnapping by Russians of Ruma¬ nian citizens and were cautious about arresting and turning over war criminals; they thought the term “war criminal” too elastic. All these developments gave Russia and the Communists grounds for counteraction. Russia had its own paper in Bucharest “for the Soviet Army.” It was called “Graiul Nou,” which means “the new language” and was plainly not a Rus¬ sian expression. The paper was written wholly in Ru¬ manian for Rumanians. “The New Language” was inspired by Moscow and might be interpreted as the new tune or the new music, Communism. “Graiul Nou” loosed barrage after barrage against the Sanatescu government. “Scanteia,” the daily of the Bucharest Communists, jointed the attack. “Izvestia,” “Red Star” and “Pravda” at Moscow added their stupendous ar¬ tillery, echoes from which the Soviet radio sent rever¬ berating around the world. “Sanatescu is sabotaging the Allied war effort,” the chorus shouted. “He is not paying reparations. He is holding back war supplies. He is protecting war crimi¬ nals. He is favoring fascists. Sanatescu is stirring up hatred against Russia.” That message was drummed into the ears of the Rumanians every day, all day. As Russians took Rumanian grain, houses, furniture, cash, machinery, and ships, as a large Russian army lived off Rumania and as Russian armies operated from Ru¬ mania against enemy forces in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

195

Hungary, the Rumanians were daily told in furious language they were sabotaging the war effort. If a Rumanian endeavored to prevent a Russian from steal¬ ing his cow he was denounced as an enemy of the Allies. And the gigantic global instrument for Communist propaganda declared that behind all this “sabotage” were Juliu Maniu and his National-Peasant Party, in¬ deed both the “historical parties.” The purpose of the Communist drive was to compromise everything tradi¬ tional in Rumania, that is everything Rumanian. It was to liquidate true Rumanians and destroy Rumania. The best way to achieve this, the Russians believed, was to attack the historical parties and Maniu. If these were crushed, no rallying point would be left in the country, it was argued. And that was true. Therefore, all Communist and Soviet propaganda guns were turned against Maniu. He was pictured as standing behind the Sanatescu government, directing resistance to Rus¬ sia. That he was behind the Sanatescu government was true; he was the main factor in bringing it to power. That he opposed Russia’s effort to annihilate Rumania through conquest, robbery and Bolshevization was also true. But Maniu was not against Rumanian cooperation with the Allies in the war effort; he was not against Rumania’s 100% fulfillment of the Armistice terms; he only opposed their fulfillment ten times over. He objected to Russia’s scrapping of the Armistice Agree¬ ment and taking whatever it wished. And Maniu did his objecting openly. He appealed to the Allies and to Russia in writing. He re-affirmed Rumania’s desire “to comply with all obligations” and to work with Russia in a neighborly spirit, but he protested against Russian interference in every phase of Rumanian life. For example, during November 1944, Maniu sent Vishinsky a memorandum in which he said: “. . . the

196

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

desire of the Rumanian people to maintain relations of sincere friendship with the Soviet Union was always present as a powerful reality. ... It is certain that Rumania’s desire can only be for a policy of understand¬ ing with the Soviet Union, because any other attitude for our country would be tantamount to suicide. But a policy imposed by necessity can never produce for the Soviet Union the fruits which could result from a true, deep and spontaneous friendship between the two peoples.” Not only did this prove futile but it made the Rus¬ sians all the more determined to eliminate Maniu and his party. Consequently, Maniu was attacked by every Communist and Communist agent who was able to write a line, make a speech, carry a placard or break a head. The chief local instrument through which the Krem¬ lin worked was an incipient “left bloc,” a nucleus of which had been formed in the spring of 1944. When the Rumanians through Maniu approached the Allies, even in 1943, in order to prepare a way for Rumania to leave the Axis, the Kremlin had already undertaken to create its own Rumanian Communist bloc for seizing the reins of power. It had sent its agents into the land in the spring of 1944 to carry out the plan; one was Emil Bodnaras working under two revolutionary names. The agents had tried to organize cells consisting of Communists, Socialists, peasants and intellectuals. They had improvised a largely fictitious, exclusively Com¬ munist-led People’s Front, to which were affiliated Petru Groza’s obscure “Plowman’s Front,” and a little group of discredited intellectuals “The Patrtiots’ Union.”

calling themselves

Immediately after the coup the Communist bloc be¬ gan to work against all their associates in the Sanates-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

197

cu’s coalition cabinet, in order to prepare the way for power-seizure. They were the Kremlin’s time bomb in the Sanatescu regime. Following directions from Com¬ munist headquarters they joined the attack on Maniu and the historical parties, denounced them as fascist, reactionary, treasonable, and demanded a new govern¬ ment. Arranging many meetings and street demon¬ strations, they filled Rumania with the cry, “Down with the Generals; up with a people’s government!” Russia through its Control Commission, which eventu¬ ally controlled the Allies as well as the Rumanians, told Sanatescu that the “voice of the people must be heeded.” As the result of pressure, Sanatescu’s cabinet col¬ lapsed and the State machine stalled at the moment it was most urgently needed. By November 4 Sanatescu got it going again with his second government, in which six Ministries went to the Communist-led “Democratic Front.” The Communists had succeeded in getting their long sought “political government.” They didn’t yet have enough strength to run it; but enough to ruin it. Foreign Affairs were in the hands of Constantine Vishoianu and the police in the hands of Nicolae Penescu, both Maniu men; one strong, one weak. Com¬ munists were approaching the moment for the final as¬ sault. Resistance was disintegrating, Rumania was crumbling. The tempo of change had been enormously accelerated. The first Sanatescu government lasted altogether about 10 uneasy weeks; the second lasted one wild month. That shows how rapidly Communist power was being imposed. And the Western Allies greatly aided the Rumanian Communists in their global drive against the Western Allies. In October Churchill and Eden hurriedly flew to Moscow to urge Stalin to take Rumania for Russia and leave them Greece. Exactly

198

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

four years earlier Molotov and Hitler had been dicker¬ ing over the division of the Balkans. They had pro¬ ceeded in a manner devoid of all sentiment, in a pros¬ pective robbers’ deal regarding Balkan spoils. But they couldn’t agree on terms. Now the Premier of the British Empire, after a four years war in defense of liberty, had begged the Kremlin for permission to fly personally to Moscow; and on arriving he stood, hat in hand, before Stalin and Molotov, offering them Ru¬ mania. Cordell Hull has described the deal in his Memoirs. He wrote: “When Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secre¬ tary Eden went to Moscow in October, 1944, to see Stalin and Molotov, they extended the partition ar¬ rangement still further, even reducing to percentages the relative degree of influence which Britain and Rus¬ sia individually should have in specified Balkan coun¬ tries. Cables from our Embassies in Moscow and An¬ kara mentioned that Russia would have a 75-25 or 80-20 predominance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Ru¬ mania, while Britain and Russia would share influence in Yugoslavia, 50—50. Later the Russians took it for granted that Britain and the United States had assigned them a certain portion of the Balkans including Ruma¬ nia and Bulgaria, as their sphere of influence.” (From “The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,” Times, February 28, 1948.)

The New York

Churchill had good and urgent reasons for hurrying to Moscow. Great Britain and the United States were being very hard pressed at that time—not only by the Axis, but more especially by their Ally, the Soviet Union. Our armies were stalled and subjected to fierce fighting in Italy. We were far from having completed our stupendous drive in France. There was no end in sight to our island hopping against Japan. Stalin’s Tito,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

199

who was Britain’s implacable enemy, was making him¬ self master of Yugoslavia. Russia, through the Com¬ munist-led Bulgarian Fatherland Front and a mightv section

of

the

Red

Army,

exercised

control

over

Bulgaria. To make matters worse, Russia in violation of the Armistice which the Allies had concluded with Bulgaria, was encouraging Bulgaria in keeping its troops in Greece. The very same Bulgarian troops that a few weeks earlier had been crushing and plundering north¬ ern G'reece in cooperation with “Nazi beasts,” as Stalin loved to call Hitler’s soldiers, were still holding large portions of northern Greece in cooperation with Stalin. The Bulgarians were retaining their hold on the Aegean coast and were collaborating with Tito’s partisans throughout Macedonia. Not too long a time previously Molotov had repeatedly told Hitler that Russia wanted to bring Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea. What the Krem¬ lin wanted to do in 1941, but couldn’t, it was doing in 1944 at the expense of our ally, Greece. Stalin’s Bul¬ garian soldiers were wading in Churchill’s Eastern Mediterranean, as the Generalissimo said “Bravo.” That’s why Churchill rushed into Stalin’s office; he felt he must give Russia a new title to Rumania in order to get her out of Greece. The deal didn’t really get Stalin out of Greece, but made it easier for him to establish himself in his Rumanian domain. Driving ever harder and harder, Stalin sent Sanatescu flying, bag and bag¬ gage, second government and all, December 4, and had Vishinsky fly to Rumania in order personally to over¬ see the installation of a new one. But even now the Kremlin did not impose an exclu¬ sively Communist government. Gen. Sanatescu was re¬ placed December 7 by another General, Nicolae Radescu, who had long enjoyed fame as an opponent of

200

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Nazi Germany. Shortly after Antonescu had taken Rumania into the war on the side of Hitler in 1941, General Radescu became enraged at the arrogance of the German Ambassador in Bucharest, Baron Killinger, and especially at a speech of Killinger’s that was repro¬ duced in a German language paper, the “Bukarester Tagblatt.” Radescu, the army because of capricious absolutism, “open letter” which in

who had earlier resigned from his opposition to King Carol’s sharply replied to Killinger in an spite of the censorship was widely

distributed. For that he was put in a concentration camp. Inasmuch as Radescu had defied both Carol and Hitler, Vishinsky considered him not altogether unsuit¬ able as the head of another transitory Rumanian gov¬ ernment. Neither side had any illusions about cordial relations when Radescu was made Premier. The General had served as chief of the Rumanian General Staff under Sanatescu and had had many clashes with the Soviet Army over regulations. However Vishinsky considered him a suitable figure for a temporary role, so he in¬ structed the Rumanian Communists to accept him. The preparations for complete power-seizure had not been quite perfected yet; a little more time was required. “The people” had not yet made enough noisy demon¬ strations of the “popular will.” More hullabaloo and more blood were needed. The Communists did not delay in providing them both. Not long after Radescu became Premier and Minis¬ ter of the Interior, the General Secretary of the Ruma¬ nian Communist Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej who was also Minister of Communications, made a trip to Moscow ostensibly to discuss matters pertaining to the railroads. While there he was instructed to conduct a final

campaign

for

Communist power-seizure.

The

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

201

Communist-led “Democratic Front” was ordered to keep up an intensified country-wide agitation for radical land distribution, for smearing Maniu, for provoking violence and disorder and for paralyzing the Radescu Government. Mass fights were to be arranged that would provide killed and wounded. Radescu was to be made to appear as a dunce, a friend of landlords, an enemy of Russia and a butcher. The Communist press was to howl; every other voice was to be silenced. This was by no means a new program, but it was to be carried out with a new fury and on a new scale for the supreme assault. The campaign proceeded as planned. Local Communist groups began to take pos¬ session of administrative centers in various towns and cities. Many of them had been trained and armed by special units of the occupying Red Army. Indeed, Ra¬ descu himself had earlier been urged by the Russians to form and head a Communist militia of 100,000 mem¬ bers, but had refused. Such a compact, nationwide Communist militia had not been formed, but a network of aggresive local shock troopers, mostly under the control of Communist “labor leaders,” and consisting largely of ruffians called “workers,” had begun to func¬ tion. They were able to seize town halls, court houses, police stations and other seats of authority, inasmuch as the Rumanian Home Army had been almost dis¬ banded and the local police largely dismissed. Com¬ munist-led raids were called “demonstrations by the people” and efforts to preserve order were denounced as “fascist violence.” School teachers were humiliated, factory bosses were removed, Communist shop commit¬ tees were installed, newspaper offices were taken over, and efforts at resistance were brutally smashed. Some property was grabbed. Disorder spread according to a carefully arranged

202

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

plan and when the government tried to stop it, clashes occurred. In consequence, Communists throughout Ru¬ mania began to denounce Radescu for not preserving order. The Communists perpetrated violence and furi¬ ously excoriated Radescu for permitting it. They kept shrieking for a government that could maintain the internal tranquility necessary for the successful prose¬ cution of the war. But actually the Rumanian Commu¬ nists were largely disinterested in the war. They left that to others as they fought for power-seizure. In this Moscow backed their subversive campaign. The Red Army paper in Rumania began to urge “surgical intervention” and then demanded a new government such as the Soviet Union could approve. At the begin¬ ning of February Pravda, the official Communist paper in Moscow, called for “the total victory of democracy.” February 10, the Moscow radio announced that im¬ portant events were impending in Rumania. The Mos¬ cow “New Times” issued a broadside against Radescu. This cry was taken up by Communist-arranged meetings in Bucharest and the larger Rumanian cities, where crowds that had been coercively conducted from factory and shop were led in cheering, “Down with Radescu!” Moscow transmitters beamed radiocasts to Rumania in the Rumanian language, reporting the anti-Radescu meetings and playing them up as expressions of the popular will. The Rumanian Government was split wide open, with the Communist members fighting all the others. The Kremlin was carrying out its strategy of smashing Rumania’s administrative machine. A Russian-backed and Russian-provoked civil war was on Lenin’s principle that every war must be turned into a civil war was being applied. As a climax, Communist Fmdei Secretaiies of State in the government violently criticized their non-Communist superiors in public and

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

203

refused to carry out the Premier’s orders. To put an end to this, Radescu abolished several Under Secretary¬ ships, but the fired Communist incumbents moved over to Communist Headquarters and telegraphed instruc¬ tions throughout the land, calling for acts of rebellion. The Premier dismissed his own Under Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, the Communist Teohari Georgescu, but Georgescu refused to depart. He defied the Head of the Government and the Head of the Minis¬ try, Radescu, and barricaded himself in his office. The desired chaos had come. But not quite the end. That was hastened by an event of world-wide and century-long importance; the Conference of the Big Three at Yalta. This meeting had a direct bearing on Rumania and upon the harassed Premier trying to pre¬ serve a residue of democracy in the face of the Russian Empire. He soon found he was facing not only the Soviet Union but also its two main Allies, the United States and Great Britain. The Heads of the Governments of those three states had met at a town in South Russia to apportion world power. The conference resembled Napoleon’s meeting with Russia’s Czar at Tilsit in 1807, and Hitler’s meet¬ ing with Russia’s Molotov in Berlin, November 1940. Public protocols and secret protocols resulted, as usual. Most of the continents came into review, seizure of booty from both friend and foe, from former ally and former enemy was confirmed or endorsed. There was no direct mention made of Rumania, but she was plainly included in the “Declaration on Liberated Europe.” According to it, the three powers agreed to assist the people of the former Axis satellite states to solve their pressing political problems. The last vestiges of fascism were “to be destroyed.” The satellite nations, which of course included Rumania, were to be assisted to

204

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

form interim governmental authorities representing all democratic elements and pledged to early elections. There were other high sounding words as always, but the essence of the pact was that the last vestiges of fascism were to be exterminated—which for Russians meant every movement opposed to Communism or Rus¬ sian domination. And Rumania was to be assisted politically by Russia—Vishinsky was fairly aching to assist. A regime of broad democratic elements was to be installed from abroad—Russia had already con¬ cocted the “broad democratic elements.” She had them tailored to order, the National Democratic Front of “workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals.” For nearly six months these had been shrieking for power. In June 1944, Roosevelt had accepted Churchill’s plan to turn Rumania over to Russia. In October of the same year Churchill had rushed to Moscow and assured Stalin personally he could have Rumania. February 1 1, 1945, Roosevelt very solemnly and with fine words about liberation confirmed the arrangement by agreeing that the Big Three were to set up a Ruma¬ nian government. In that land, as repeated many times in the Armistice, the Big Three meant Russia. What the little Rumanians were doing to promote democracy in the little cities of their land was only a farce in the eyes of the Great Ones, because all had been pre¬ arranged. But it wasn’t considered a farce by Premier Radescu, nor by the men and women who were being beaten and robbed. Radescu hadn’t a single newspaper in which he could express his views as he was being maligned night and day, nor did the Russians allow the loyal Ruma¬ nians to hold public meetings, though the Communists demonstrated constantly, but Radescu didn’t give up. As a counter measure, he personally arranged^ meet-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

205

ing in a Bucharest theater, hoping the Russians wouldn’t stop a Rumanian Premier. But long before time to be¬ gin, the hall was filled with Communists, wildly clamor¬ ing for Radescu’s removal or death. By a clever maneu¬ ver the General suddenly andvquietly shifted the meeting place and was able to refute the Communist calumnies with a forceful speech. The Communists sought to precipitate an irreparable clash, by staging a series of simultaneous mass demon¬ strations against Radescu, February 24. The one in Bucharest was designed to “storm the throne” in a propaganda sense. Communist-led throngs milled through the streets and surged before the Palace, shout¬ ing imprecations, but the effort seemed about to petei out, when shots were fired, killing eight people. Were they killed by soldiers or by agent-provocateurs? Ra¬ descu asserted that the Communists had shot their own demonstrators. He had an autopsy performed on one of the victims and found that death was caused by bul¬ lets of Russian manufacture and caliber, such as neither the Rumanian police nor army was using. That night Radescu ignored the Russian censorship and spoke to his nation over the radio in the most blis¬ tering speech that had been uttered by any Rumanian patriot for a decade. He called the Communists mur¬ ders, excoriated by name the Rumanians who were serving as agents for a foreign power, and declared: “This nation of ours has always known in the past how to defend its existence. It will not now allow itself to be brought to its knees by a handful of scoundrels. Under the mask of democracy—a democracy upon which they trample at every step—these fearful hyenas hope to lord it over this country of ours. ... As one man we must arise and oppose this peril. The army

206

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and I shall do our duty to the end. be in readiness at your posts.”

Let all of you, too,

Radescu had accepted a fight to the finish. Whose finish soon became plain. The Communists had the bloodshed, which they had sought. They arranged the grandiose funeral they had planned; they marched through the streets shrieking, “Death to the murderer! Death to Butcher Radescu!” Soviet papers echoed the cries. The Rumania in Communist reached the

Soviet radio disseminated them all over its Rumanian language broadcasts. The plot for power-seizure in Rumania had pay-off, just 185 days after King Mihai

had joined the camp of the Allies and entered the grand portals of the Atlantic Charter, guaranteeing the right of all peoples to choose their form of government, un¬ coerced by aggressive states.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

207

Chapter XIV STALIN SETS UP A RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT Stalin was ready for the final step in the process of power-seizure in Rumania. Everything had been pre¬ pared both within and without. Rumania itself was hopelessly demoralized; Russia’s Western Allies had been intimidated into helplessness. The stage was set for the kill. The intimate internal stage setting was as effective as the grand external decorations. Against the magnifi¬ cent background of Yalta, against the stupendous fig¬ ures of Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, against the sono¬ rous sounding boards of the Atlantic Charter and One World, were drawn in sharper, cruder detail and in gaudier colors the Red Army, Communist-led mobs, shrieking youth, rumbling Soviet tanks, heavily-armed police, stinking prisons, firing squads. In the center of the stage stood peasant Rumania; towards the stage flew Andrei Y. Vishinsky, straight from Moscow. It was the 27th of February.

The Yalta Agreement had

been signed on the 11th. Vishinsky, received at the airport with pomp appro¬ priate to a victorious Russia and to a vanquished Ru¬ mania, was driven to the Palace of the King in the cen¬ ter of the city. Stalin’s emissary did not stop to consult with the American Military Mission nor with the Amer¬ ican Political Mission. He did not stop to consult with the British Military Mission nor the British Political Mission.

Neither Washington nor London had been

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advised of the visit. Stalin was carrying out his plan to deal directly with helpless Rumania. In the armistice the Allies had officially delivered Rumania to the Krem¬ lin and the Kremlin had no intention of sharing its spoils. At Yalta the Allies had sealed the deal. Vishinsky was received by young King Mihai and his Minister of Foreign Affairs. The scene has been recorded in much detail and with complete authenticity. Rumania’s century-old enemy had come to seize the country and take a penultimate step toward exterminat¬ ing the dynasty. The King had provided witnesses for the crime. Russia’s spokesman was cold and ruthless but not discourteous. The King and his counselor were helpless but not servile. They behaved in a way of which the Rumanian nation may always he proud. As Rumanian poets and artists portray this lugubrious scene for coming generations, they will find little in it for which to apologize. to weep.

They will find much for which I ■ |

There is a pleasant, simply-adorned room with a table near one end. On one side of the table sits the youthful monarch, with advisers on his right and left. In front of him, on the other side of the table sits robust, gray¬ ing, strong-jawed Vishinsky with his interpreter. Vishinsky is the prosecutor who, without one visible twinge of conscience or one merciful word, had sent hundreds of his own colleagues to destruction. Behind him is the mightiest land army on earth. Fie represents world Communism, striving to set up a World Union of Soviet Republics. He acts for the revolutionary movement pledged to seize power in every land on earth. The youthful King across from him is backed by nothing except his hopes, dignity and self respect. Without any preliminaries or the exchange of cus¬ tomary banalities, Vishinsky demanded an immediate

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209

change of government. He excoriated the Radescu regime as disloyal and incompetent and reeled off the names of some of the men whom he wanted to replace it. He called for deeds and spurned argument. Moscow was attempting to set up its own government in Ru¬ mania as clearly and unmistakably as it sets up govern¬ ments in the sixteen Soviet Republics. King Mihai did not acquiesce. He neither bent his knee nor bowed his head, and he did not raise his voice. He recalled that Rumania was a Constitutional Mon¬ archy and that the Allies had pledged themselves to promote democracy in his land. He stated, therefore, that he must proceed in a constitutional manner follow¬ ing Parliamentary practices. He said he would take the requests of the Russian emissary into consideration, consult with important Rumanian political factors and, upon the basis of their advice, decide what to do. Natu¬ rally he was playing for time. This bearing of a boy King, representing a crushed state and defeated nation, offended the representative of All-Russia stretching across two continents from Budapest to the Pacific Ocean, but Vishinsky did not fly into a tantrum. He arose, ordered quick action, and stamped out, saying he would soon return for the answer. The impression of emptiness in the room was almost tangible. The feel¬ ing of emptiness in the hearts of the Rumanians weighed still heavier. Although the King was more mature than his years might indicate and although Hohenzollern traditions as well as Rumania’s millennial actualities had freed him from all naivety, he still allowed himself to expect some aid from the Allies. He was not yet ready to ac¬ knowledge that Yalta was merely a hypocritical formula for betraying democracy. He did not have many illu¬ sions about the power of Britain but he believed America

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was a mighty force and conscious of its might. He thought President Roosevelt would resent having Stalin slap him so publicly and viciously in the face almost be¬ fore he had returned to America from the city in which Stalin had genially patted him on the back. Mihai hoped that if he held Moscow off for a few days in con¬ sultations with Rumanian political leaders, Washington would find a way to intervene. Therefore, the King let it be known that he was working out a plan for a new Rumanian government that would embody certain concessions to Moscow but would still prevent the Kremlin and its Communist agents from exercising complete control. In the meantime the American Political Mission in Bucharest, headed by Burton Y. Berry, an excellent diplomat, hard-working, extremely well-informed about Communist strategy and thoroughly devoted to democ¬ racy, tried to get in touch with Vishinsky. The Ameri¬ cans endeavored to arrange a conference among the powers that had been represented at Yalta, hoping thereby to prevent Russia from setting up its own ex¬ clusive regime in Rumania. But the American Mission completely failed in its attempt. Vishinsky ignored it as though America were Luxembourg or a defeated enemy. He let the world know that Rumania was “Rus¬ sia’s pigeon.’’ He also let the King understand he’d better act. Without any delay Vishinsky and his Communist agents began to apply pressure on the Palace. The Soviet radios were set screaming. The Soviet press was set screeching. Communist broadcasters and editors in every land in which papers and radio stations were available, denounced the King as an agent of fascism and an enemy of the people. New Communist-led demonstrations were arranged throughout the country

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211

and especially in Bucharest. Russian-trained Commu¬ nist leaders, acting through the police force of which they had both official and actual control, brought workers, clerks and civil servants from shops, factories and offices and led them through the streets to the great square in front of the palace. There, with uplifted fists, the throngs hurled out the imprecation, “Death to Radescu.” “Death” shouted from posters, pasted upon walls. Death growled from placards attached to the street cars as they left the car barns. In Bucharest itself there were no armed units of the Rumanian Army; they had been disarmed. Rumania’s capital was occupied by the Red Army. Rumania, to be sure, had an army but it was hundreds of miles away on the front in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, fighting against Hitler’s Nazis. Heavy Russian tanks paraded through the boulevards, lingering near the Palace. Rus¬ sian soldiers seized several key buildings. A heavily armed Red battalion, in full accoutrement, and led by martial music, marched in the square before the Palace. Tension reached the point of explosion and Vishinsky again visited King Mihai. He was more brutal than before. He told the King he would wait no longer. He again named the men whom he insisted must be given places in the new cabinet, and demanded that action be taken before another sunset. He emphasized his command by bringing his hand down upon the table, and on leaving the room slammed the door so hard that bits of plaster fell from around the casing. At that same moment the door of Rumania’s prison was slammed shut with sixteen million people inside. The nation had again passed into foreign bondage as definite and ruthless as when Turks or Magyars or Germans or Czarist Russians in earlier centuries swept over the land.

All hope of immediate liberation vanished.

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The King acted.

He dismissed the

government.

Premier Radescu fled for refuge to the British Military Mission. A few days later, March 6, after further demonstrations, a new regime was installed. By that act Soviet Russia, with the acquiescence of the United States, delivered Rumania into the hands of four Com¬ munists, three of whom had been brought from Russia and only one of whom was of Rumanian-Latin origin. All were agents of the Kremlin. Not one of them in any sense was authorized to speak for the Rumanian “toiling masses.” Not one embodied a Rumanian tradi¬ tion. Not one had a spark of feeling for Rumania’s aspirations toward national liberation. That sixth of March 1945 will remain forever as one of the darkest days in Rumanian annals. I do not know when Rumania’s dungeon door will be opened. When the Czechs were thrust into bondage at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, they were des¬ tined to remain in chains for three centuries. I do not know whether Rumania’s present bondage will last that long or not. When the Bulgarians were subjugated by the Turks their bondage lasted five hundred years. I do not know whether Rumania is to stay that long in prison or not. But whatever happens I think the rem¬ nants of the nation will survive as Rumanians and as long as the language is spoken, shepherds, priests and mothers in their homes will sing of the “black Sixth of March.” To be sure, on that day the King, beloved by his na¬ tion, was not hurled from the throne, but a course of action was initiated that made his removal inevitable. The nation’s greatest leader of modern times, Juliu Maniu, was not executed nor thrown into a prison cell on that day but a state of affairs was established which made his liquidation inevitable.

It was not very long

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE delayed.

213

Not all property was immediately confiscated

on that day but a group of conspirators were given the possibility of seizing every source of livelihood in the land. The seizure is not being long delayed. On that day the Juggernaut of Communist education did not roll over all youth and children, but blue-prints for the Juggernaut were made and it is rolling now, smashing all personalities. On that day chains were not wrapped around every mind in the land, but the chains were then forged and are now being clamped on every individual. On that day the hierarchy of the Rumanian Orthodox church did not kiss Vishinsky’s feet but plans were then perfected for appointing a hierarchy that would grovel in the dust and they are now kissing Stalin’s feet so obsequiously that the smacks are heard around the world. When the new cabinet was announced, it did not seem so very formidable to the uninitiated. In fact, most of the four Communists, into whose hands Ru¬ mania had been delivered, were not given high official posts. They still remained behind the scenes. In con¬ trast with this, some of the Communists receiving posi¬ tions were of secondary importance while one of them, Lucretsiu Patrascanu, Minister of Justice, was reputed to be a mild man with remnants of character and of attachment to Rumania'. He was considered a “good Communist.” He had even wept on signing the armis¬ tice at Moscow six months earlier. His presence at that ministry was said to be a guarantee that ruthless meas¬ ures would not be taken. Later Patrascanu was elimi¬ nated and arrested. Moscow has no place for a “good Communist” at home or any place else. The composition of the March Cabinet seemed rather bewildering to a casual observer.

It appeared to be a

haphazard group of men, assembled without any stand-

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ard of qualifications or definite political pattern. Among them were anti-Semites and Jews, Communists and rag¬ ing anti-Communists, atheists and priests, pro-Nazis and anti-Nazis, pro-Russians and anti-Russians. How¬ ever, a closer examination showed that the strange as¬ sortment was collected with great care, for a single purpose, which was to serve the Kremlin and world Communism. Some non-Communists served for re¬ ward; others, in order to escape punishment as war criminals. The cabinet included trained Bolsheviks, working for Stalin with the same fanatical devotion with which Omar fought for Mohammed, and nonCommunists who resembled members of a criminal gang who had to go along to save themselves from jail. But all served Moscow. The head of the cabinet, Dr. Petru Groza, was a simple stooge. He was not a Communist but was given the Premiership by Communists in order to deceive Rumanians and the rest of the world. He had some ability as a political actor, considerable personal charm, a rather kind heart, some good intentions, vast ambi¬ tions and an inexhaustible store of dirty stories. He had no political nor moral prestige, no record of social service or of patriotism in time of war, not the slightest authority of any kind. He was in the doubly disgraceful position of being the stooge of stooges. He was work¬ ing for Communists who were working for Russia. Not only is he not master of his own government but not even of his own office. He cannot protect even his own best friends from the clutches of the police. Sometimes he has moments of doubt because he is not buoyed up by Communist fanaticism, and his life span is approaching its end. But the exhilaration and glow surrounding even a sham Prime Minister are usually enough to bring him out of the dumps. There can be little doubt

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215

that he will go down in Rumanian history as first among the Rumanian Benedict Arnolds, yet the dazzling joy which this sychophant of sychophants feels at being called “Dommul Prim Ministru” may blind his eyes to that black future. One reason why Groza was chosen as Premier and has been kept in the job was that he is one of the rich¬ est men in the country. How could the world believe that the Rumanian government was trying to impose Communism when it was headed by one of the wealthi¬ est, vainest and most luxury-loving of all Rumanians! Besides that, Groza, in the early 1930’s, had founded a small ephemeral peasant party. Since most Rumanians are peasants and since the Bolsheviks knew they would have to win or crush the peasants, they were delighted to use as their dummy the founder of the Plowman’s Front, one of the finest party titles in Rumanian politi¬ cal history. In addition to this, Groza had had a few meager con¬ nections with the Communists during the war. This does not mean that he did anything heroic to oppose the Nazis and Marshal Antonescu’s pro-Nazi regime. On the contrary he benefited from it. He is known to have gone more than once from his home city of Deva to Budapest, only three hundred miles away, and it is certain that no man could have made such journeys without enjoying the confidence of the Nazis. It is equally certain that he derived large personal economic advantages from the persecution of the Jews and from the “Rumanianization of Jewish property.” He got a larger share of the gravy than most of the wildest Iron Guardists and he has managed to keep most of that former Jewish property. Nevertheless, as founder of the Plowmen’s Front before the war and as an indi¬ vidual during the war, he had some tenuous connections

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with the Communists in Rumania, a large proportion of whom were Hungarians. Communists had met in his house, he had gathered with Communists in at least one of their dangerous rendezvous and at one time during the war he was even kept in jail for a whole month. He was liberated due to the intervention of Maniu, whom Groza’s govern¬ ment later threw in jail for life. Groza had no more to do with the anti-Nazi revolution on the twenty-third of August 1944 than did the mayor of Kalamazoo. But there was a faintly ping aura around his beautiful man¬ sion, his hotel, his prosperous bank, his lucrative liquor factory taken from the Jews and his extensive textile mills obtained in the same way. Also he is obsequious and devoid of personal honor. All this made him a valuable tool for the Kremlin and for the Rumanian sector of world Communism. After he became Premier he was invited to Russia where he was honored by the highest Soviet officials, including Generalissimo Stalin. He was greatly im¬ pressed and, on returning, began to talk of the Com¬ munistic wave of the future even more fervently than some Americans once wrote about Hitler’s wave of the future. He pretended to believe that collective dyna¬ mism is to “sweep away the effete, corrupt democra¬ cies”—which makes one think of the strange things Mussolini used to say. In any case, Groza declared more than once that no one will get him out of the Prime Minister’s chair unless they carry him out feet first. And he concluded that dramatic statement by saying Russia won’t let such a thing happen. Groza thinks that as long as Stalin dominates Rumania, he will grace “the Presidentzia.” He may be right. Groza has a deep, broad love for the Hungarians and is

sincerely

trying to

create

better Rumanian-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Hungarian relations.

217

He is a limitless joiner and plays

games with noisy gusto; he loves to attend parties until extremely late at night, sitting among beautiful women and clever men where he is the center of attention, and then to arise early next morning to play tennis with the public looking on, which again makes him the center of attention. Groza serves Stalin as though he had been made to order in some special Soviet factory. One of the Premier’s closest friends and principal confidant was Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March Cabinet and for a time Second Vice-President in Groza’s Plowman’s Front. Ralea is not a Communist, hut an ambitious time-server and position-seeker. He began his political career as a member of Juliu Maniu’s National-Peasant Party and, because of outstanding ability, rapidly advanced. He became editor of the party paper, a member of the highest party councils and one of the main policy-formers. Already in his thirties, he had won a brilliant place in Rumanian life and rejoiced in the brightest prospects. But when Maniu, because of his abhorrence of King Carol’s dic¬ tatorial cabinets, was put in the doghouse Ralea lined up with Carol. On the morning of the very day on which he made the flop to dictatorship, he had published a signed article in Maniu’s paper praising democracy. Most Hoppers have better timing. When that dictatorial government fell, Ralea joined another, and kept on serving the autocratic King even after Carol began to cooperate with the bloody Iron Guardists. In fact, he served as Minister under George Tatarescu after Rumania had gone completely into the Nazi camp and after rank anti-Semitism had become a prevailing governmental practice. During the war against Soviet Russia, Ralea did not distinguish him¬ self by any resistance activity of any sort. He has never

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showed himself a courageous champion of the under¬ privileged, though he once made good speeches about them. As he had been glad to forego what were earlier be¬ lieved to be his principles in order to serve in dictatorial royal cabinets which suppressed civil liberties and pro¬ moted Nazi authoritarianism, he showed himself equally eager to serve in Groza’s dictatorial cabinet that suppressed civil liberties and took commands from Communist authoritarians. This sad record of political disintegration is made all the sadder by the fact that Ralea in his youth was a leading member of Rumania’s “Society for the Rights of Man and Citizens.” Indeed, he wrote one of the best books in the Rumanian lan¬ guage about freedom of thought and religion. A graphic portrayal of Ralea’s moral decline and fall would be the juxtaposition of his early photograph, as a youthful disciple of Ion Mihalache, beside the glossy pictures taken of him in Hitler’s Germany as he proudly ran around with Nazi war criminal Robert Ley, saluting the swastika with uplifted hand in good fascist style. He was brought into the March Cabinet because of his personal ability, complete lack of prin¬ ciples and willingness to serve anybody. Late in 1946, he was rewarded by being made Stalin’s Rumanian Am¬ bassador to the United States. He was one of the best representatives of Rumania’s political lackeys. the most perfect.

But not

That distinction falls to George Tatarescu, former pro-Nazi Prime Minister of Rumania and Minister for Foreign Affairs in Vishinsky’s March Cabinet. A strong, able, aggressive personality, Tatarescu is surely one of the wickedest men in the country and that quality, along with his capacity as a political horse-trader, seems to be the main reason why Vishinsky made him Foreign

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Minister.

219

Another reason is that Tatarescu had always

been a formal Liberal and was secretary general of that party in the hey-day of its power. Since the Liber¬ als were the embodiment of Rumanian capitalism and were supposed to constitute the bulwark of Rumanian conservatism, the Kremlin thought Tatarescu would be an excellent mask with which to kid the world into be¬ lieving that Russia had not the slightest intention of so much as touching the hem of the capitalistic system in Rumania. Tatarescu, during much of his political career, has served as a front for camouflaged tyranny. Being a bright man with a strong will, iron hand and much ora¬ torical ability, he early won a high place in the Liberal organization, while it was still directed by the gifted political family, the Bratianus. More than two decades ago, he was made Under Secretary of State in the Min¬ istry of Interior and as such had charge of the police. During that period he distinguished himself by flagrant anti-Semitism and by ferocious persecution of actual and alleged Communists. One may recall that, immediately after the first World War, Communism made much progress in Eu¬ rope and provoked the rise of repressive counter-move¬ ments in many countries, including the United States, where the “Reds” on a number of occasions were sup¬ pressed. During this counteraction Mussolini grabbed power in Italy, the peasant Prime Minister of Bulgaria was assassinated and the Communist Party there was outlawed. King Alexander of Yugoslavia sternly put down the Communists, a white counter-revolution flourished in Hungary and a conservative course was imposed in Poland. Young Tatarescu, taking advan¬ tage of that trend, took the lead in restricting civil liberties in the newly-created Greater Rumania. He

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was the foremost advocate of political terrorism. He fostered violence and encouraged anti-Semitism—as a member of a Rumanian cabinet. He was responsible for one case of mass police cruelty against peasants that attracted the attention of Europe; the notorious trial following it, in the Bessarabian town of Tatar Bunar, placed an ineradicable stain upon the courts of the enlarged Rumanian State. Under his regime the “shooting of political prisoners in flight” became a common practice. He and his police used it to dispose of radicals without due process of law. During those tense days when Rumanian Jews were struggling for elementary security, were protesting against being thrown bodily out of rapidly-moving trains and were trying to arouse strong enough world sentiments to prevent their synagogues from being looted, power¬ holding Tatarescu was never known to take the side of the persecuted. In fact, he instigated pogroms. And he rejected all appeals made in the Rumanian Parlia¬ ment to prevent political terror. Later, after the return of King Carol and the in¬ auguration of a “personal regime,” Tatarescu’s record became blacker and blacker. Following the assassination of Tatarescu’s chief, Liberal Premier Ion Duca, the authoritative Liberal leader, Dr. Constantine Angheleccu, was made Premier, but he was too honest, honor¬ able and slow-moving to serve as a suitable instrument for a royal dictator. Consequently, Carol broke the unity of the Liberal Party as he had already broken that of the National-Peasant party, and personally invited Tatarescu to become Premier over the head of his supe¬ rior. The unscrupulous young man jumped at the chance and leapt into the dizzying position of the King’s chief favorite—chief after Magda Lupescu. The new Premier, holding that office for the first

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time, summoned the Rumanian press and in grand sten¬ torian tones declared that he was going to avenge the Iron Guards’ assassination of his dear defunct leader, Ion Duca. He movingly pledged himself to put an end to the illegal acts of that conspirational movement. The nation, horrified by the brazen cruelty of the band which for the first time in Rumanian history had assassinated a Minister, hoped that Tatarescu would keep his word. They didn’t expect much of him but, since he had shown ruthlessness toward Communists, they thought he might at least do as much toward Fascist assassins. They have a proverb—it takes a wedge to drive out a wedge. But they discovered to their chagrin that Tatarescu was no wedge; he wielded a hard hand only against weak, de¬ fenseless people. Instead of suppressing the Iron Guards, he began to cooperate with them, even to en¬ courage them, thus giving a boost to anti-Semitism. He heralded this new course of action as the wonderful policy of appeasement. In addition to these offenses against elemental decency, he won first place in Ru¬ mania as a “rigger of elections.” Prior to Ion Antonescu’s pro-Nazi government, no one had done more than Tatarescu to prevent the Rumanian people from expressing their will at election time. Later he plunged into the realm of foreign affairs and dismissed the famous Rumanian Foreign Minister, Nicolae Titulescu, causing a British journalist to write that Carol “gave Rumania tat for tit.” Tatarescu was replaced at the end of 1937 and called back to the helm in 1940 to deliver Rumania completely into the hands of the Axis. It was he who definitely tied Rumanian economy to Hitler’s war chariot and pro¬ claimed that Rumania’s ties with the Western Allies were liquidated. During the war against Russia, Tataresu did nothing to embarrass Nazi Germany or to

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aid the cause of the Allies. Such was the man whom Vishinsky made Foreign Minister in the March Cabinet. He had encouraged anti-Semitism, handicapped Rumania’s struggle toward democracy, fostered political violence, facilitated the suppression of a free press, incited to chauvinism, per¬ secuted non-Rumanian minorities, checked Rumania’s efforts to establish good relations with Russia, hastened Rumania’s alignment with Nazi Germany and furthered royal despotism. And he had never shown himself a champion of the under-privileged nor a friend of the “toiling masses.” He was useful to the Russians and to the Rumanian Communists because he was cruel and unscrupulous and because his record was so completely black that if he did not carry out their orders, they could put him in prison. The Rumanian Communists shouted about unfair past elections made by the “historical parties”—no one had conducted so many unjust elections as their cabinetcomrade Tatarescu. Communists shrieked against the massacre of peasants in Tatar Bunar—that was the work of their cabinet-comrade Tatarescu. Communists raged against the anti-Semitism of past regimes—at the forefront of Rumanian anti-Semitism once stood their cabinet-comrade Tatarescu. Communists vitu¬ perated the anti-democratic regime of King Carol— King Carol’s most devoted and obsequious servant for the longest period was their cabinet-comrade Tatarescu. Communists filled the skies and burdened the ether waves with praise of Russia—their Foreign Minister, appointed to carry out their pro-Russian policy, was the politician who swung Rumania away from Russia toward Germany. The Communists’ activities in Ru¬ mania show they will use any one and do anything to

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE seize power.

223

Tatarescu remained in their cabinet for

three full years. Next among the non-Communist statesmen in the March Cabinet imposed by Mr. Vishinsky one might mention the priest Father Burducea, who was Minister of Cults from March 6, 1945, until April 1946. The Reverend Burducea, before flopping into the Commu¬ nist ranks, had been one of the most notorious Iron Guardists; he was one of the leading anti-Semitic Le¬ gionnaires who had hoped to transform Rumania through the Codreanu movement. He had incited his countrymen to persecute Jews in the name of Christ. In the sign of the cross he had urged his parishioners to rob their brothers and sisters of a different religion. The movement which he helped to lead was wholly in the international camp of the Nazis, was furiously antiRussian, vigorously anti-democratic and criminal. Few recent acts have so stained the vestments of the Church as the active anti-Semitism of the Reverend Burducea and his fellow “followers of the Archangel Mihail.” Yet this man was allowed quickly to change his green uniform for a red one and to pose as a champion of “the new democracy.” I once asked the Prime Minis¬ ter about him and got the response that Burducea was a democrat. One of the very good measures of the March Government was a drive for equality of sects. The chief leader of the campaign was Groza himself. One of the things on which the Premier had set his heart was to free from special persecution the small Protestant sects, chiefly the Baptists and Adventists. For months Burducea frustrated Groza’s efforts, even resorting to the ordinary criminal practices of taking documents out of the files and preventing their presenta¬ tion to the King or Ministers. Yet he served in the Communist government for fourteen months. Moscow

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hoped, through this clerical renegade guilty of a double apostacy, to lure Rumanian Orthodox Christians into the Communist fold and Iron Guardists into the Com¬ munist camp. Vishinsky also placed several Socialists in the March Cabinet, chief among whom were Stefan Voitec, Minis¬ ter of Education, Lothar Radaceanu, Minister of La¬ bor, and Tudor Ionescu, Minister of Mines. They had deserted the Rumanian people as well as Socialist tradi¬ tion and placed themselves wholly in the service of Russia. Strongest among the Socialist renegades was Lothar Radaceanu, who was born in Bucovina when it was still part of Austria; he is of German parentage (Herr Wurzel). His political record prior to the Antonescu pro-Nazi regime was not bad. He was general secretary of his party and was felt to have served it faithfully. The articles and pamphlets which he wrote were con¬ sistent with Socialist ideals the world over. But when the war came he slipped. He became a leading partici¬ pant in a firm for selling watches and in that capacity is known to have made many trips to Nazi Germany. The passports issued to him are known by date and number as well as the German visas upon them. It has been precisely established that he made his fre¬ quent journeys into Hitler’s Reich at a time when Hitler was destroying Russian towns and cities. And it is not even disputed by Radaceanu’s friends that he went into Julius Streicher’s anti-Jewish land in order to procure merchandise and make money. He made no pretense at serving democracy and was glad to win profit from goods produced by men and women whom the Russians were calling “Nazi beasts.” It is notoriously true, and disputed by no one, that during those years when the Gestapo raged in Germany

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225

and the Gestapo along with the Rumanian secret police exercised control over travel out of Rumania, no one would think of taking a trip to Germany, much less of making frequent trips thither, unless he was known by the Nazis as a reliable person. Plainly Radaceanu en¬ joyed Nazi good will. Hitler’s confidence in him may have been increased by flaming articles that Radaceanu had written against the Soviet dictator. He probably showed them to German officials when requesting visas. This Rumanian Socialist expressed sentiments about the Soviet system which were very similar to anti-Communist broadsides written by Winston Churchill both before and after World War Two. For example, comrade Radaceanu wrote the follow¬ ing during the spring of 1938 in the Rumanian Socialist periodical “Gandul Vremii” under the title “Socialism and Dictatorship” : “That which horrifies the democrats and Socialists of the West is the fact that precisely in Russia, that is in a country in which power is exercised in the name of a sublime ideal, things are happening similar to events (in Italy). Mussolini’s dictatorship has weighed upon Italy for almost twenty years but it has produced no such opposition as has been raised up against the Rus¬ sian dictatorship. Fascist leaders have not been deci¬ mated by the bullets of executioners. To be sure, Italian Fascism came to power through a sea of blood and tears, just as Bolshevism did. And exactly like Bol¬ shevism, it stifled any other center power. But once hecatombs of its

with violence every attempt to form of political will except the party in established, it did not need to sacrifice own partisans to maintain itself at

the helm.” Radacenau then went on to intimate that Stalin’s

226

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regime continued to perpetrate more cruelty than Mus¬ solini’s or even than Hitler’s after the suppression of Roehm. He wrote: “What is taking place in Russia is the natural result of a dictatorship that established itself in the name of Socialism and that in a fatal manner had to reach the total contradiction of Socialism. . . . Stalin has achieved the miracles of miracles, namely a Marxist party with¬ out liberty, without currents of public opinion, without ideological struggles. “The results show how low a Socialist dictatorship can fall, when it is determined to hold power by tram¬ pling upon the basic principles of Socialism. Socialism is incompatible with tyranny, so it is not surprising that (Stalin’s) tyranny commended deeds that make all true Socialists blush in repugnance. “Therefore, the liquidation of the personal dictator¬ ship is a problem of life and death for Russia. Other¬ wise, tyranny itself will be transformed into a counter¬ revolution as it has indeed begun to be transformed. “A Socialist movement which tries to govern with dictatorial methods has only one future before it, namely, its own destruction, because in murdering lib¬ erty, Socialism destroys its moral foundations and finally takes its own life.” So wrote Radaceanu regarding Stalin.

And his ac¬

tions during the war seemed rather consistent. showed no aversion to Hitler’s destroying Stalin.

He He

led in no resistance action, sat in no jail or concentra¬ tion camp, participated in no written protests against Antonescu’s despotism. Rather he sold watches and even did what he could to help the watch-selling frater¬ nity keep Jews out of the business. That part at least of Streicher’s program seemed to please him. Yet he became a leading member of Stalin’s Rumanian “gov-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

227

ernment of large democratic concentration” that pre¬ tended to crush anti-Semitism and to give all people in Rumania liberty and equality. Less needs to be said of the other two Socialist Min¬ isters in the March Cabinet. Regarding Tudor Ionescu, Minister of Mines, it is sufficient to point out that he was responsible for one of the rankest cases of docu¬ ment forging in Rumania’s political history. At a So¬ cialist congress held in Bucharest during 1946, he read a “letter” allegedly written by chiefs of the “reaction¬ ary” National-Peasant and Liberal parties in which they allegedly promised support to the Socialist leader, Titel Petrescu, on condition that he enter the elections on a separate ticket rather than in a common front with the Communists and other Soviet agents. This clumsily concocted document, containing a num¬ ber of orthographic absurdities, was never shown to any person outside the clique in what was purported to be the original. Naturally it created a sensation in the Rumanian political and juridicial world and was im¬ mediately denounced as a forgery. The interested par¬ ties brought suit against Ionescu at once and the Social¬ ist Minister was saved from the embarrassment of be¬ ing convicted as a vulgar forger by a special amnesty law promulgated by the Communist Minister of Justice. Ionescu was removed from the government in 1948, but not because he was a scoundrel—rather because he was also a fool. Stefan Voitec,

Socialist Minister of Education in

Vishinsky’s March Cabinet, distinguished himself by no outstanding democratic activity before the war and by no active resistance during the war on the side of Hitler. On the contrary, he became a military “re¬ porter” or morale booster in dictator Antonescu’s army,

228

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

which was fighting beside Hitler against the Soviets and was trying to take Stalingrad. Antonescu’s officers, in their official records, gave the Socialist anti-Stalin morale booster an excellent mark, which ended with the phrase “good for every¬ thing.” Apparently he is, because after faithfully serv¬ ing the Axis he entered the service of Moscow to work with no less devotion. Voitec energetically terrorized the teachers and professors who did not agree with him and brutally punished school youth who dared show loyalty to king and country. He Marxized school in¬ struction and assiduously censored the past history of Rumania by pasting black strips over obstreperous truths in the text books. This pasting, of course, was a mere emergency measure; diligent Stefan Voitec soon made arrangements to have Rumania’s history com¬ pletely re-written according to instructions from Moscow. The remainder of the Vishinsky cabinet consisted of obscure factotums with no convictions, or of Commu¬ nists. The force and authority of the regime resided in four Communists unconditionally in the service of Moscow and under the direction of the Kremlin. Everything non-Communist was froth, window-dressing or temporary expediency. The act of March 6 was one of history’s most glaring cases of violent power-seizure. It was a classic Bolshe¬ vik procedure. It was not a revolution and not a people’s uprising. It was not brought about by repre¬ sentatives of the Rumanian people nor led by men who had distinguished themselves by heroic crusades for common and women. On the contrary, the regime contained anti-Semites, pro-Nazis, totalitarians, Iron Guardists, clerical de¬ generates, Socialist apostates and a number of common

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

229

criminals. The Communist Party, which directed it “in the name of the people” had enrolled only 1,000 members out 1939. The man’s Front sented in the

of 20,000,000 inhabitants of Rumania in Communists, Socialists, Groza’s Plow¬ and the splinter peasant parties repre¬ March Cabinet never had attracted, even

during the freest elections, more than two percent of the Rumanian voters—all put together. And this little fragment of a tiny fringe of the Ru¬ manian people was placed in power by a foreign state beneath the glitter of the bayonets of a foreign army. It was imposed upon Rumania contrary to the wishes of practically the whole nation, as Soviet tanks rumbled through the streets and as Red soldiers occupied key government buildings in the Rumanian capital. That is the essence of Communist power-seizure—and the nature of the “new democracy.”

230

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XV FOUR

COMMUNISTS RULE AND HOW!

RUMANIA—

On March 6, 1945 four Communists were given power over the Rumanian nation. They were Georghe Gheorghiu-Dej, a Rumanian from the city of Dej in Transylvania; Luca Laszlo (Vasile Luca), a Hun¬ garian; Ana Pauker, a Jewess; and Emil Bodnaras, a German-Ukrainian. Two had been brought into Ru¬ mania by the Red Army; one had entered as a Soviet agent. One of them was certainly a Soviet subject— perhaps three were. All four had distinguished them¬ selves by unconditional loyalty to the Kremlin and by unreserved hostility toward Rumania. At least three were traitors by every meaning of the word. Their task was to destroy Rumania, root and branch, and impose a new nation and new state upon the ruins. The new structure was to serve Russia, as an actual subsidiary of Russia. Karl Marx wrote in the last grandiloquent para¬ graph of his “Communist Manifesto” of 1848: “The Communists openly declare that their ends can be at¬ tained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.” The mission of the four Commu¬ nists, whom Vishinsky placed in power for Stalin, was to destroy “all existing social conditions” in Rumania. And this project was neither vague, amorphous nor of a general nature. It was as specific as an army operation, like the American landing in Normandy; it was as detailed as plans for building an airplane. It

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

231

was all based on blueprints that had been carefully worked out, perfected by practice, and adapted speci¬ fically to Rumanian conditions. Three of the four Com¬ munist masters had studied the blueprints in Moscow. In fact, they had spent days and weeks poring over them. All that was left for them to do after March 6 was to apply the detailed directions. One can imagine Luca, Bodnaras, Gheorghiu-Dej and Mrs. Pauker gathering on the seventh of March with a secret representative of the Kremlin and discussing their plans of operation. The matters they considered then and at succeeding conferences contained such points as the following: how to bring into disrepute and eventually to liquidate the main leaders of the Rumanian nation; how to de¬ stroy all established political parties; how to remove the Monarchy; how to annihilate every independent rural element (first the farmers still holding fifty acres of land or more) ; how to uproot peasant traditions and peasant organizations; turn urban workers into shock troops for the Communist state; take over the whole press and the writing of books; organize Ruma¬ nian youth and Rumanian women; lay hands on all the schools and churches. As matters of special immediate importance the four Communist dictators studied the portions of their blueprints dealing with the quickest and most effective measures for taking over the army, the police and the law courts. They also set plans in operation for the strengthening of the Communist militia. Closely related with this were plans for estab¬ lishing Communist control in factories, mines, govern¬ ment offices, and in the transportation network includ¬ ing railroads, bus lines, the commercial fleet, the tele¬ phone, telegraph and postal systems. The control was to be exercised through militant “action committees.”

232

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

However, the Communists sought a firmer grip on economic activities than mere police control; they wanted actual ownership of all instruments of produc¬ tion and distribution. This was part of the well estab¬ lished Marxian plan for destroying “all social institu¬ tions.” Urban property was to be seized by a species of robbery called “the nationalization of industry and commerce.” This would make Communists effective owners of every factory, mine, shop and store in the country. It would make them absolute masters of everything except farming. And the fields, too, were to be taken over—all of them—according to a well devised plan. This was es¬ pecially important since most Rumanians live from the land. The Communist blueprint, which the four Mos¬ cow-installed Communist tyrants of Rumania had be¬ fore them, demanded a classic agricultural strategy, which might be called “Operation A.” It was: Destroy the larger farmers by taking away their lands and stock. Destroy village unity by inciting the shiftless or unfortu¬ nate or less endowed peasants, owning very little or no land, against the more substantial and frugal peasants. Call every peasant landowner with a decent home and a self respecting family a “kulak.” Make kulak a smear word. Spread the conviction throughout the country that the poorest have a right to rob all who are not so poor. Then, after all rural stability has been anni¬ hilated through land distribution and class hatred, take land away from everybody and put all peasants into “kolkhozi” or collective farms, run by Communists. Thereby the peasants, as well as the city people, will be made dependent upon the Communist Party for their livelihood, and the drive toward holding absolute power over every family will be completed. To make this assassination of Rumania seem less

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

233

painful and less monstrous both in the eyes of the vic¬ tims and in the eyes of the western world, the four Communists preparing the crime gave special attention to propaganda. They devised methods to present the demise of Rumania as its re-birth. Robbery was to he portrayed as a favor to the robbed; imprisonment, as liberation; chaining of the mind, as enlightenment. At the same time measures were to be taken to exclude all true enlightenment and all real information. To achieve this, history was to be re-written; national holi¬ days transformed; streets re-named; old heroes smeared or Bolshevized; new heroes exalted. A new content was to be given to traditions; the conception of national independence and patriotism was to be completely disguised. March 6 was to be heralded through every propa¬ ganda channel as the beginning of a new Rumanian epoch. Everything before that was to be pictured as feudalism. From March 6 on, service to a foreign conqueror and disdain for everything Rumanian were to be considered supreme nationalism. The Rumanian element was to be weakened and the power of minorities increased. Rumanian resentment against this was to be pronounced a crime. Rumanian patriots were to be denounced as hooli¬ gans. Any Rumanian daring publicly to recall the old struggle against the Hungarians was to be smeared as a chauvinist or war-monger. Any one who dared even to mention the word. Bessarabia, was to be considered a criminal and smashed under an avalanche of attacks. Any one who suggested the Jews were playing a promi¬ nent part in the new regime, holding many important police offices and shoving Rumanians around, was to be smothered as a fascist. As Communists extolled the manner in which minorities were treated in “the new

234

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

democracy,” any Rumanian who hinted that the Ruma¬ nian nation had become a “minority” in their own land was to be flattened by a political steam roller. Andrei Vishinsky himself instructed the Rumanian Communists whom he had placed in power to picture their regime as a completely new historical era. He attended a meeting of his Rumanian Ministerial Coun¬ cil on March 13 to receive the thanks of his lackeys and to give them a vision of their glorious mission. He congratulated them on their brilliant victory over the historical parties and felicitated them on the opportu¬ nity they had of bringing to a benighted nation “the greatest gift the human race had yet devised, LeninismStalinism.” Before that, Vishinsky had addressed a meeting of leading Rumanians in the auditorium of the splendid Officers’ Club in Bucharest at which he said, “A new page has been turned in Rumanian history, a page on which is inscribed with golden letters the friendship of Rumania toward the great Soviet Union and toward Marshal Stalin.” He also took occasion to ridicule the “historical parties” and to denounce their leaders. He referred to them as “chattering sparrows” who from then on would be ignored by the Rumanian na¬ tion. He said the “historical parties” would be put in the archives. Later he went to Transylvania where he spoke to Hungarians. Again he made fun of the “historical parties” and poured out his scorn upon their leaders, especially Juliu Maniu. He stressed that the Soviet Union and the new Rumanian Government had de¬ livered the Hungarians in Rumania from Rumanian terrorism. He emphasized that a new day had come, that “a new democracy had dawned,” that freedom would prevail, prosperity abound and brotherhood

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

235

reign. The period of fear was over, he said, and his listeners were assured that from then on Hungarians and Rumanians would live in peace. Vishinsky returned to Moscow as a conqueror, leav¬ ing the Rumanian nation crushed and the American and British Missions in Bucharest the laughing stock of the world. The Communist agents he had installed set out energetically to fulfill their mandate. In time, the four chief ones received top official posi¬ tions as Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Af¬ fairs, Minister of Finances, and Minister of National Economy. But for a while they were instructed to work behind the scenes. Deception was to hold an equal place with violence. Efforts were to' be made to per¬ suade the world that this was government of the people by the people. To carry out such a conspiracy of de¬ ception the National Democratic Front was given great prominence. Eerything was done in its name. The workers, peasant and “progressive intelligentsia” were pictured as sitting on the throne directing the affairs of the nation. As every genuine peasant institution was wiped out, the phoney peasant puppets in the Front were extolled. As true peasant leaders were killed or imprisoned, false “peasant leaders” in the Front made ringing declara¬ tions about peasant loyalty to “the new order.” As violence and terrorism were perpetrated against promi¬ nent peasants in half the villages of the land, quisling “peasant chiefs” in the Front uttered pompous impreca¬ tions against these victims of Communist terror, calling the true peasant representatives “enemies of Rumanian peasantry.” Into the National Democratic Front also were drawn false labor leaders who pretended that the work¬ ers of Rumania were behind the regime that Vishinsky

236

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

had imposed. In the name of the Front, hired and wellpaid labor shock-troops broke up genuine workers’ meetings, beat and killed non-Communist labor leaders, controlled elections in mines and factories. In the name of the Front, armed bands of “workers” seized prop¬ erty on the charge the owners were fascists, stopped the printing and distribution of papers, terrorized nonCommunist political leaders in their homes or in the factories or on the road. In the name of the Democratic Front, writers poured out pamphlets and books exalting “the new Soviet man” and extolling the “new democratic order.” Un¬ der the auspices of the Front, pro-Russian meetings were held throughout the land; parades were arranged in which throngs, largely of coerced participants, marched up and down the streets shrieking, “Death to Maniu” and “Long Live Groza,” as well as “Long Live Stalin” and “Long Live Soviet-Rumanian Friend¬ ship.” In the name of the Front visitors from Western lands, such as members of the British Parliament or French leaders or American “pinks,” were invited to go and see the well-staged parades showing that “the whole nation was behind the Groza regime.” Not a few Britishers returned home from such demonstra¬ tions to assure their fellow countrymen that all Ruma¬ nia, “with the exception of a few fascists,” supported the National Democratic Front and its “government of large democratic concentration.” Speeches to this effect were made in Parliament at London, while ar¬ ticles expressing this view filled columns in the British press, where the shortage of newsprint greatly limited the amount of space for ordinary foreign news. On many an occasion this kind of stuff crowded out truthful dispatches.

For

months

the

National

Democratic

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Front

received

the

friendliest

reception

in

237

certain

American circles and was praised by some journalists, commentators and lecturers. Such Americans pictured is as a “rising of the people against feudal oppressors.” The falsity of that Front was evident to anyone who cared to view the scene with the eyes of common sense. It was as a “Front of the American People” would be if composed of American Communists, a renegade splinter of the American Socialists, a section of the Townsendites, the Communist-led Youth for Democ¬ racy, a few Communist-led labor unions and the Com¬ munist-led groups of American writers, with the Com¬ munist-led Hollywood intellectuals thrown in. How much of America would such a “front” represent, es¬ pecially if it deliberately and ferociously excluded all the “historical parties” that have existed since Jeffer¬ son and Lincoln? It would be a tiny, largely foreign fringe of American tradition, of the American spirit and of American life. Such a “front” would be a little cabal of American misfits. Such was and such is the Rumanian Democratic Front which Kremlin-imposed, Communist dictators use as a grinning mask. It is the only political organization allowed in the country. In its name elections are held and a new con¬ stitution was proclaimed; under its wings are gathered the organized youth and organized women; in its ranks march professors and students, artists and writers. In its name greetings are sent to the governments of the world, and under its auspices aid is collected for the Communist rebels in Greece. Its delegates rush to Communist arranged conferences throughout the world, its spokesmen hurl flaming protests against the Western democracies and hourly decry “American im¬ perialism,” which it calls “the successor of Hitler and Mussolini.” In every case this fictitious “Front,” con-

238

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

cocted in deceit and recruited by coercion, is a mask for the Rumanian Communist Party manipulated by the Soviet Union. Its voice is the voice of the Kremlin; its acts the acts of Moscow. Its throngs of formal members are the helpless tools of Communists; they are human automatons moving across the Rumanian stage as mechanical tin soldiers wound up by their owners. And who are the owners? What are the Rumanian Communists? They are a tiny group of daring and forceful plotters. Do they all operate wholly for selfish ends? To assert that would be rash. A few of them have taken great risks and endured bitter hardships; and they did this during years when personal rewards and collective success seemed doubtful. A few risked their future and even their lives for what had long seemed a lost cause. In other words, these few were professional revolu¬ tionists, like Lenin and his comrades. They wanted to further a world upheaval—perhaps for what they con¬ sidered the common good. Some may have been altruis¬ tically sincere, as would be indicated by their sufferings. That they worked in Rumania was a geographical ac¬ cident. They Rumania.

had

practically

no

attachment

to

Almost none of them ever performed positive, social acts. Only one of them ever wrote a treatise deserving attention, and he has been relegated from the political scene by the Communists themselves. None of them has made any appreciable contribution to literature or art or social organization or theory of government. They have exerted no appreciable influence upon Ru¬ manian thought. They have been plotters and destroy¬ ers.

But this does not mean the Rumanian Communist

chiefs have not been strong personalities, with hard

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE characters and steel wills.

239

Several of them are ex¬

tremely hard and very ruthless, but no more ruthless than the average run of Communist conspirators every¬ where. As one observes their present Communist plan to destroy Rumania, one is reminded of the cataclysm that swept over Russia between 1917 and 1935. People there were killed by the hundreds of thousands; men, women and children died by the millions. Savagery knew almost no limit; plunder, no bounds. Hunger re¬ duced human beings to cannibalism. Mothers and their children wandered in droves for weeks until they dropped in exhaustion, never to rise again. Certain areas were largely depopulated. Railroads almost ceased to function, agricultural production dwindled, many—in places, most—factory wheels stopped. A gi¬ gantic crusade was carried out to exterminate or crush all prosperous peasants in the world’s chief peasant land. Hungry boys and girls ran wild as packs of homeless dogs scavenging for food. Revolution fol¬ lowed revolution; sweeping failure followed sweeping failure. To cap the climax, leading Communists liq¬ uidated one another by the thousands. Yet in this cataclysm of apocalyptic proportions, Communist hearts did not quail nor did Communist wills wilt. Crashing worlds did not faze them. No calamity and no cruelty deterred them. Soviet Communists stand out as among the hardest men and women of the ages. Their leading proteges in all lands where they have been tested are similar, as are the chief half-dozen Communists of Rumania. An example of Rumanian Communist violence was a bomb outrage in the Parliament at Bucharest during December 1920.

Among the killed were the Minister

of Justice, Dimiter Greciano, and Bishop Radu. World

240

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Communism was hoping to “storm the planet” during that decade. The Yugoslav Minister of Justice, Draskovitch, was assassinated by a Communist in 1921, and Communists attempted to kill the whole Bulgarian Cabinet along with King Boris by blowing up a Sofia cathedral in 1926. Assassination, however, was not the chief type of Communist conspirational activity in Rumania. The Party there, as everywhere, stressed mass demonstra¬ tions, mass upheavals and the wholesale disruption of economic life. A dramatic illustration of their acts and ideals was a violent railroad strike in 1933, described in a recent Communist booklet of 96 pages entitled, “Luptele din Februarie 1933” (The February Fights). The attractively prepared volume carries a preface by George Gheorghiu-Dej, one of Rumania’s four Com¬ munist dictators; its co-authors are Chivu Stoica and Ch. Vasilichi, two of the foremost officials in the Com¬ munist controlled General Confederation of Labor. Not all the data in this publication are accurate, but they show what the Communists want to make the world believe they did in “bourgeois” Rumania. At that time the Third International, operating from Moscow throughout the world, was especially active in Rumania; it kept a constant stream of its agents moving across the narrow Dniester River into the country to direct Communist activity. It must be remembered that Russia insistently claimed large pieces of Ruma¬ nian territory, which it eventually took. Rumanian Communists were agents of a power that insisted on seizing Rumanian land and which had repeatedly hu¬ miliated Rumania, even to the extent of trying to sup¬ press its national independence. It is not difficult to understand that Rumanian authorities and the Ruma-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

241

nian nation were disturbed by the growing activity of Communist agents from across the border. Russia was trying to create a small army of revolu¬ tionary shock troops in the heart of Rumania. In con¬ formity with well-tried Communist strategy it was en¬ deavoring to install Communist cells or “action com¬ mittees” among the workers at important points in vital industries. The most promising material for such con¬ spiratorial activity were the employees of the Ruma¬ nian State Railways, working both in the shops at Bucha¬ rest and in other towns nearer the Russian border. As described in the book mentioned above, the Rumanian Communists took advantage of the terrible world eco¬ nomic crisis prevailing in the early thirties to prepare railroad workers for revolution. They used the wretch¬ edness of wretched men to weaken Rumania and serve Russia. The Communists set out to demoralize exist¬ ing unions, drive out Socialist leaders, put in leaders of their own, incite the men to irresponsible hatred, and lead them to mass action. One of the main tactics which they chose were sit-down strikes. Another was to in¬ timidate the state authorities by surrounding the head¬ quarters of the Railroad Administration with masses of angry vociferating workers. Adopting the practices of American Indians, the Ru¬ manian Communists tried to terrify the enemy by war; dances and noise. They loved to use sirens, hells and mass slogans. They liked to stop work, collect the laborers in crowds, make interminable speeches, fill the streets, defy the authorities and provoke bloody clashes. They wanted clamor, alarm, blows, blood, trampled women, wounded children, corpses. They sought any disorder that would give ruffians and mobs an advan¬ tage over calm, reasonable citizens.

Taking full advan¬

tage

markets,

of

unemployment,

stagnant

lowered

242

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

wages, precipitously declining tax receipts, empty rail¬ road tills because of the fall in travel, they called the more daring workers to daring acts. During the whole of 1932 they tried to keep Rumanian laborers in a state of uneasiness. Their ultimate aim was power-seizure. Russia watched and directed operators from across the river. According to the main actors in the struggle, they chose the railroads as the center of opposition because the railroads represented the most important sector in the proletarian front, but the Communists didn’t neglect the workers in other enterprises. “The Central Com¬ mittee of the Communist Party in Rumania in April 1932 gave a series of new directives and showed the party as well as the whole laboring class the political and organizational lines that were to be followed in approaching struggles. And the Action Committee forming a small but very vigorous minority among the organized workers, prepared concrete measures for forcing their demands upon the government.” As the main instigators point out in their booklet, they acted in accordance with international plans worked out by the Third International at a conference in Berlin of the Communist leaders responsible for de¬ velopments in the Balkans. The Rumanian Communists acted against their country as part of an international conspiracy under the control of Moscow’s Balkan Sec¬ tion. Two Rumanian Communist leaders attended that conference and came back to put its plan into operation. On reaching home they called a meeting of their more extreme comrades and told them what to do “for the defense of the proletarian masses in the near future.” As an introductory test, they induced 300 workers in the Bucharest factory, called Saturn, to launch a sit-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

243

down strike, locally called a “Polish strike.” This was in January 1933. The following day the strikers were driven out of the building by the police who used tear gas. However, this failure in a preliminary battle did not discourage the courageous Communist leaders. They tried to draw the requisite lessons from defeat and immediately laid down the battle order for a great railroad strike. It contained the following points : Pick out a strategic building which cannot be easily attacked from the street, and seize it. Get hold of the siren, place a guard about it and keep it shrieking. Train groups of defense troops and place them at all the entrances. Don’t commit acts of sabotage without provocation. Summon workers in other factories to launch sympathetic strikes. Do not resort to a hunger strike—that would only weaken re¬ sistance and play into the hands of the enemies. Choose a large strike committee from the workers themselves. Let no workers’ delegation go to the Ministry of Rail¬ roads but force the Ministry to send emissaries to the strikers. Launch good popular slogans. Establish close connections with the workers outside. Leave a number of the leading Communists unimplicated so as to be ready for any eventuality. On the eve of the strike the Communist leaders should not sleep at home. The workers should not be told of the strike until the very moment on which it is to begin. All these carefully established plans, which came to Bucharest through the Third International, were car¬ ried out under the leadership of men in the closest touch with Moscow by 7000 workers, only a small proportion of whom were Communists. At the ap¬ pointed hour on February 2nd, the siren blew. Workers left their jobs, agitators jumped up on tables and be¬ gan to make fiery speeches, not only demanding eco-

244

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

nomic benefits but basic political action. For example, they talked about helping frustrate the capitalistic war that was being prepared against Russia, and praised the situation of the workers in Russia. Men who had been planted at the proper places in the crowd cried, “Long Live the Communist Party! Long live the struggle for liberty and democracy! Long live work¬ ers’ solidarity!

Down with preparations for an anti-

Soviet war!” To make the action seem even more impressive and pathetic, workers suffering from tuberculosis mounted tables and pled with their comrades to carry on the fight against capitalistic enemies to the bitter end. They choked, coughed, rested a moment as their fellow work¬ ers looked on in sympathy and, expending their last energy, again called for heroic action. No means were neglected for stirring up the people. As had been care¬ fully planned, word was sent to other factories in the vicinity and other strikes occurred. Also feverish ef¬ forts were made to collect food and money. The help was widely advertised as “Red Aid” and brought to the railroad yards by women and children. A revolutionary struggle had been launched against the State of Rumania by a little group of Russianinspired Communists leading 7000 workers of whose real grivances they had taken advantage. A little cell of bold Rumanian conspirators joined an international action against their state and country, occupying state property, defying governmental orders, paralyzing the most important single enterprise in the land, and block¬ ing national as well as international traffic. The brave, fanatical, able Rumanian Communists revelled in the joy of battle. They exulted in the thrill of having ac¬ tively joined the struggle for establishing the world dictatorship of the proletariat.

At first they had special

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

245

reasons for happiness, because their plans, perfected by the best revolutionists of the ages, were succeeding. As the sirens incessantly blew, they seemed not only to summon to battle but to proclaim a triumph—and that appearance was no illusion. The government soon gave way and the Council of Ministers, according to the Communist booklet I have cited, granted the desires of the workers in order to prevent the spreading of the strike throughout the country. A delegation of strikers who had been sent to talk with the government returned with the report that the following points had been won: An increase of wages by 25 % The re-introduction of supplements for rent and a rise in the cost of living The elimination of the system for disqualify¬ ing workers Free passes and The recognition by the government of a workers’ committee in the railroad work¬ shops. So, after 18 hours of sitting down, the strike was called off. But that did not end the struggle. Both the govern¬ ment and the nation were chagrined at being forced to capitulate to 7000 railroad workers led by a handful of Communists carrying out the instruction of the Third International. The instigators of that act wrote that the cabinet was worried and they were undoubtedly right. The thought that Russian agents could cross the Dniester, pass the flat lands of Bessarabia and, with a few cells of Communist agents, bring the whole Ruma¬ nian Government to heel naturally caused consterna¬ tion. A Rumanian didn’t need to be very astute to see that this was primarily a political action, not designed

246

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to benefit workers, but to use the workers for advanc¬ ing a foreign cause. The government, feeling that no state could long survive if a couple of labor leaders after returning from an International Congress were able to tie up its railroads, began drastic action. It declared military law, forbade the activity of “revolu¬ tionary bodies,” meaning the Communist Party, and set out to arrest the main Communist agitators. The Communists responded to this by launching a new sitdown strike 13 days after the first one. “The 7000 railroad workers again found themselves in the first line of battle.” Their slogans were: imme¬ diate liberation of the arrested leaders, and suspension of martial law. The siren was again seized and called all the workers from their machines. The defense troops who had been successfully prepared again oc¬ cupied all the doors and gates. Agitators again mounted tables and called for courage. They spelled one an¬ other through the whole day and night, all describing the motives lying behind the government’s measures. The enemies of Rumanian workers were going to an¬ swer the workers’ demands for work and for bread with bullets, the agitators shouted. Once more the workers were told a world war had been planned against the Soviet Union. Once more they were assured that the reactionary government in outlawing the Commu¬ nists was striking at the vanguard of the working class. The second shift of railroad workers came and joined the strikers. The workers of Bucharest’s largest bakery sent a thousand loaves of bread. Communist meetings were held in other industrial enterprises protesting against martial law, the dissolving of the Communist Party and the arrest of the Communist leaders. In every speech Rumanians were urged to oppose the world’s preparation of a capitalist war against the

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Soviet Union. Even the employees at the City Water Works left their posts and seized the plant. Out on the street workers w'ere crying: “Restore the revolu¬ tionary organization ! Down with the anti-Soviet war ! Down with martial law! Long live the Communist Party! Long live the United Labor Front! We want wrork and bread!” The railroad siren never stopped and its strident shriek was joined by others from other factories. Work¬ ers also entered churches and began to ring the bells. Wave after wave of noise reverberated over the city, creating the impression of some terrible, impending event. A few hundred men leading a few thousand others tried to fill the hearts of a nation’s capital with the premonition of terror, horror, bloodshed and civil war. They were carrying out the action for which they had long been trained. They rejected councils of mod¬ eration, scorned established labor organizations, worked exclusively through hot-headed men, chosen with raucous acclamation by the impassioned and in¬ timidated workers. Following well-established practices, they had women and children assembled before the gates of the railroad shops, so as to lend pathos to the revolt and make drastic action by the government more difficult. The Army appeared and Communist agitators immediately, insistently, eloquently tried to persuade it not to act. Some soldiers were reported to have joined the Com¬ munists. One even mounted a table and in the best Communist fashion began to address his fellow-soldiers, urging them not to oppose the workers. This regiment, the Communists leaders write, was withdrawn and more reliable soldiers replaced it with orders to act. All night they waited on guard and early the next morning began to clear the place with bullets and bayonets. They

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went from workshop to workshop as an invading army might clear a resisting city, fighting without mercy all who opposed them. By that stage the soldiers were in a position where they felt they had to kill or be killed, and most preferred the former. Within a few hours every workshop had been occu¬ pied by the authorities, the premises had been cleared, the leaders arrested and the wounded taken to hospi¬ tals. According to the Communist report, more than 2000 workers were arrested, 400 were killed and sev¬ eral hundred wounded. During the whole of the fol¬ lowing night, the Communists write, the dead were se¬ cretly carried away in trucks and burned at the crema¬ torium. According to a sober, half-official non-Communist report and according to the consensus of all nonCommunist opinion which I heard at the time and since, the number of killed were not 400 but eight, including one policeman. The leaders were tried and condemned. Among those sentenced to more than 15 years in prison were comrades George Gheorghiu-Dej and Vasile Luca. What these few Communists failed to do in 1933, they are now accomplishing. Then they were working under Russian orders, as they are today. The Ruma¬ nian Communists surreptitiously passed from Russia over the Rumanian border; now they pass openly, with pomp and fanfare. In 1933 the Rumanian Commu¬ nists, accepting instructions from Moscow and the Third International, considered the radroad workers their most promising instruments and they still use them as the main weapon for terrorizing the country. This workers’ rebellion, as described by the Com¬ munists themselves after they came to power, shows the character and aims of Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej, one of Rumania’s present Big Four.

It was he who led the

rebellion and was its chief organizer.

He was a rail-

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249

road worker and a union leader from the city of Dej in Transylvania. As the action shows, he was fearless, ruthless, daring, disdainful of sacrifices, careless of hu¬ man life. He was hard—to the bitter end. He did not quail at the sight of blood. He threw women and chil¬ dren, the ill and infirm into battle. Through the din and noise, the clash of steel, the shrieks of children he showed himself utterly loyal to the “great Communist Motherland, the U.S.S.R.” He passed his test! While serving his time in prison, where he lived as badly and as well as Hitler had lived in prison, the Russian Government urged that he be freed and ex¬ changed for a Rumanian held by the Soviet Union. The Kremlin thus openly claimed Gheorghiu-Dej as its own. The Russians tried to dicker with the Rumanian Gov¬ ernment regarding the adoption of a Rumanian citizen. The deal was not concluded. But in time this Russian agent was released and made a ruler of Rumania—by Russia. Gheorghiu-Dej is attractive in appearance; he has a long face, high forehead, large mouth, clear eyes. One of his comrades in the workers’ rebellion was a Hungarian, Luca Laszlo or Vasile Luca. Very little was known of him prior to 1940, as was the case with Tito. He has spent some time in Russia under Com¬ munist training. He actively served Russia in northern Bucovina after the Red Army seized it in 1940. He is stolid, hard, secretive, tough in appearance. He is con¬ sidered a good organizer, unsentimental, rather quiet, ruthless. As a non-Rumanian, he is an especially valu¬ able Russian tool. A third and especially sinister member of the quar¬ tet of Communists is the Ukrainian-German, Emil Bodnariuk, commonly called Bodnaras (pronounced Bodnarash). He was born and spent his early childhood in Southern Bucovina, which at the time was Austrian

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as it had been for centuries. The picturesque, wooded, fruitful province was inhabited by Rumanians, Ger¬ mans, Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and Jews. Rumanians lived on the land; non-Rumanians in towns. Emil was born in the town of Campulung of a Slav father and Teuton mother. Rumania annexed the area in 1918 and Emil went to a Rumanian military academy after which he became an officer, working up to the position of captain. But he never used his position to serve Rumania, rather to serve Russia. He embezzled army funds, then deserted from the army and fled to Russia. Later he returned from Russia to Rumania as a Soviet spy. He was recog¬ nized in spite of his disguise and caught. He again escaped and fled to the Soviet Union from which he re¬ turned in the spring of 1944 to establish Communist cells. After a year of subversive work he was made one of the country’s four masters. At the end of 1947 this alien, criminal traitor was placed in charge of all of Rumania’s armed forces. The Red Army brought to Rumania, in the uniform of a Soviet Army General, the Rumanian-born Soviet citizen Ana Pauker. She served as the main liaison agent between the Kremlin and the conquered land and became the most powerful figure of non-Russian origin in the land. Later she shared her solitary preeminence with three others. Mrs. Ana Pauker is large, heavy and unpreposses¬ sing, with no spark of attraction in her ugly features. Her manners add to her coarse exterior. She seems to want to appear tough. She has debased plainness to re¬ pulsiveness. Her lips protrude from her broad face; her hair hangs down in strings, which she keeps brush¬ ing back from her low forehead. Ana Pauker looks dull and brazen, but she is not.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE She is extremely bright and brazen.

251

Among all the

famous contemporary Communist women she should be placed first. Daughter of Rabbi Rabinsohn, whose family had lived in flat, monotonous, austere Moldavia, Ana was able to get a good education in Rumanian schools, and became a teacher. Russia, first Czarist then Soviet, lay just across the frontier and revolutionary agents moved stealthily through the area spreading a warm glow among the ardent or discontented. In a world of blasted hopes and inequalities, Moldavia had more than its share of discontented, many of them strident and odorif¬ erous. Over them all, anti-Semitism brooded as a storm cloud, and the rabbi’s daughter went Communist. She married a young Jew from a prosperous family of publishers and quit teaching. The wide world called her; she shook the dust of Moldavia from her feet and went to Paris, then to Moscow where she joined the ranks of those making a “new world” by force and deceit. She and her

son survived the various Bolshevik

purges, but Domnul Pauker did not. He was executed as a Trotskyist. Ana is said to have caused the execu¬ tion, but for this I have seen no convincing evidence. In many a storm the husband is taken and the wife left; such may have been the storm that liquidated comrade Pauker. In any case, Ana soon dried whatever tears she cared to shed, and showed more devotion to Communism than ever; the execution of a husband was of little impor¬ tance. And she showed her mettle by working in the hot¬ test places—for example, in Rumania. She was one of the many agents crossing the Dniester, indeed chief among them. She, like Gheorghiu-Dej, worked for the

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world revolution. She was arrested, tried, convicted, jailed—and eventually freed. She was exchanged for Mr. Codreanu—not the Iron Guardist, but a loyal and beloved Bessarabian Rumanian whom the Russians had seized. Departing from her native land, Rumania, she joyfully returned to the “motherland of all Commu¬ nists” and prepared for a greater mission. The Red Army brought her back to Bucharest in 1944 in the livery of world revolution and on March Sixth Vishinsky placed her “on the throne.” As this is being writ¬ ten she is Minister of Foreign Affairs. These are the four! Moscow took them in its hands and gave them power over Rumania: a Jewess who served Moscow against Rumania, a Hungarian brought from Russia, a German-Slav who deserted Rumania for Russia, a Rumanian who, after launching a “workers’ rebellion” for Russia against the Rumanian state, wanted to be adopted by Russia and leave his own land. These typify Rumania’s “new democracy.” They typify world Communism.

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253

Chapter XVI THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES FAIL RUMANIA After the Yalta Conference of February 1945 America lost prestige in Rumania and official American representatives there were placed in an ambiguous, em¬ barrassing position. Communists realizing the Ameri¬ cans’ impotency scorned and openly insulted them, while Rumanian democrats pitied them as well-intentioned but helpless friends who could only cause trouble. Such Rumanians wanted to keep in contact with Americans but were haunted by the fear that such contacts might prove fatal, which they did. The King cautiously but urgently asked the American Missions for advice. The masses of the people, though puzzled and baffled by American vacillation, continued to expect some noble act of liberation. The general feeling was apocalyp¬ tic and simple Rumanians found difficulty in believing that America was not in a position to deliver them. Whenever an American entered a village in a car with American insignia he was practically stormed by ad¬ mirers and suppliants. During the summer of 1945, after five months of Communist rule America gave some hope to its Ruma¬ nian friends by its action at the Potsdam Conference, (July 27-August 2, 1945). To be sure, nothing sub¬ stantial happened at the capital of former Prussian monarchs, but some good principles were proclaimed there, and some excellent speeches were made by Ameri¬ can officials after the Conference.

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Among the agreements signed, August 2, by “J. Y. Stalin, Harry S. Truman and C. R. Attlee,” was one regarding Poland which called for “the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible ... in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part.” It was also agreed that Allied correspondents would have “full freedom to report to the world upon developments.” Persons acquainted with Communist strategy and Communist methods immediately saw that this part of the Agreement was vague and elastic, but it sounded good and gave courage—even to responsible Ruma¬ nians, who had often been victims of Communist per¬ fidy. After all, the expression “free and unfettered elections” was splendid. And the promise that “all democratic parties” could participate in them was en¬ couraging, while the picture of American correspondents “reporting to the world” was almost thrilling. To be sure, this clause referred to Poland and not directly to Rumania but wasn’t Rumania in the same boat? If the “world” was to rescue Poland would it not also rescue Rumania? Besides, there was a spe¬ cific word about Rumania. The three masters of the earth had agreed that peace treaties would be concluded “with a recognized democratic government in Ru¬ mania,” whereafter an application would be enter¬ tained for Rumania’s entrance into the United Nations. That seemed to offer a definite way out for Rumania. Could anyone conceive that the United States would consider the Communist regime, personally imposed upon Rumania by Vishinsky, a “democratic govern¬ ment!” Even the Rumanian Communists were a little worried. To be sure, they couldn’t believe that Stalin would let them down, but still he had signed, black on white, that Rumania was to have a recognized demo-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE cratic

government.

The blindest

and

deafest

255 and

dumbest Communist in Rumania knew that Ana Pauker’s regime didn’t correspond to the will of the Ru¬ manian nation. Then on August 19 there came over the ether waves a voice as from heaven. It was the “Voice of America,” expressed by the President of the United States who said: “At Yalta it was agreed that the three govern¬ ments would assume a common responsibility in helping to re-establish in the liberated and satellite nations of Europe governments broadly representative of demo¬ cratic elements in the population. That responsibility still stands. We will recognize it as a joint responsi¬ bility of the three governments. “It was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration on Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. These nations are not to be the spheres of influence of any one Power.” Rumania was not going to be reduced to a Bolshevik “sphere of influence.” This sounded too good to be true. Had not President Roosevelt earlier given Ru¬ mania to Russia? Was that not well known, and did not all facts bear it out? Perhaps, but now America had a new President, a plain man from Missouri. Would lie stand up and solemnly say before all history that Rumania was not to he Russia’s prey, if it were a lie! The Rumanians wanted to believe he wouldn’t, and felt more satisfaction August 19, 1945, than they had felt for many months. It was increased the next day when the British For¬ eign Minister, Ernest Bevin, said the Rumanian Gov¬ ernment did not represent a majority in the country. And Mr. Bevin added that he believed “one kind of totalitarianism was being replaced by another.” Could there be any other interpretation of that except that the British Government didn’t “recognize” Petru

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Groza? Weren’t things beginning to move? And wasn’t it now Rumania’s turn to act? Young King Mihai thought so and acted. He did it, however, not only on the basis of speeches heard over the air, but in response to formal informa¬ tion received from representatives of the United States and British Governments, who were serving on the Allied Control Commission. According to this official information, contained in a note, Washington and London refused to recognize the Groza regime and said they could not re-establish diplomatic relations with it nor invite it to the forthcoming peace confer¬ ence in Paris. This was interpreted as an AngloAmerican invitation to the King to establish a new government. One can hardly see how any other inter¬ pretation was possible. King Mihai immediately took measures to carry out what he thought were the wishes of the Western Allies. He invited to the Palace the leaders of the four main political groups in Rumania, which were also the par¬ ties that had participated in the action for the over¬ throw of Antonescu’s pro-Nazi government August 23, 1944. The royal consultants were Juliu Maniu, Dinu Bratianu, Titel Petrescu and Lucretsiu Patrascanu, representing the National-Peasant, Liberal, So¬ cialist and Communist Parties. All but the Commu¬ nists agreed that a new democratic government should be set up. A heroic moment seemed to have dawned. Dreams were coming true. Promises were being kept. America, Britain and Rumanian democracy were implementing the Atlantic Charter! The same day the King summoned Prime Minister Groza and asked him to resign. The man whom the Kremlin had placed in power requested time for con-

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sideration and immediately went to see his master and supporter, General I. Z. Susaikov, head of the Soviet Military Mission, and the effective ruler of Rumania. The Russian General told Groza not to budge and not to fear. The Central Committee of the Communistdirected National Democratic Front met and instructed Groza to ignore both the King’s order and the AngloAmerican note. Moscow’s puppet gladly obeyed his master and defied the United States. On August 21 the King invited the heads of the Military and Political Missions of Russia, America and Britain to the Palace, told the six men of his dif¬ ficulties, emphasized his desire to form a representa¬ tive, democratic government and asked the three Great Powers for their advice. The next day in the evening the Voice of America radiocast a statement of the U. S. State Department, according to which the American Government had ex¬ pressed its willingness to aid the Rumanian King. The State Department proposed an international discussion of the matter and urged the Allied Governments not to take any steps that would make the situation more in¬ volved. The United States Government had boldly moved to a showdown with Moscow. President Tru¬ man had seemed to defy the Kremlin. And not only in Rumania but also in Bulgaria, where the United State’s excellent representative, Maynard Barnes, had induced the Soviet representative in Bulgaria to con¬ sent to the postponement of elections. Barnes’ sensa¬ tional victory was the greatest diplomatic success the United States has yet had in its global struggle with Soviet imperialism. But it was very brief. In a few weeks it became a vague and thrilling memory, as an adventurous fairy tale.

By October it was hard for

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any one in the world to believe that America had really stood up to the Kremlin dictators. The Americans in Bulgaria were soon reduced to im¬ potence and their audacious action in Bucharest was frustrated. Groza’s Foreign Minister Tatarescu de¬ clared, August 24, 1945, that Rumania continued to “face eastward.’’ He spit in America’s eye on Stalin’s orders as five years earlier the same Tatarescu had spit in America’s eye on Hitler’s orders. The Socialists in the Communist Cabinet disavowed their chief Petrescu and announced their intention of clinging to power. The government officially announced that it had the full support of the Soviet Union and would not resign. On the contrary, all who spread such rumors would be punished, the police declared. On September 4, Groza, Gheorghiu-Dej, Tatarescu and other leading Rumanian puppets of the Kremlin flew off to Moscow as the guests of Stalin. The King had lost his game. America’s brave words were reduced to blah-blah. The beautiful senti¬ ments in the Potsdam Agreement proved to be empty platitudes. Actually this all played into Stalin’s hands. Of course, he would back Groza and Russia’s other puppets, but for that favor he wanted new contribu¬ tions and new long term obligations from Rumania. The grateful Rumanian Communists granted them, profusely thanked their Soviet master and returned to Bucharest in triumph. A multitude of workers were brought from the factories and shops to welcome them and to shout, “Gro-za-Gro-za-Gro-za,” as the agents of their enslavers motored from the airport. Groza spoke of Stalin in terms that were nothing less than ecstatic. “We talked as a small pupil to an old teacher,” the wealthy Rumanian “peasant leader” said. And the “old teacher” had assured his pupil “that as long as

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Stalin remained in the Kremlin Groza could remain in power over Rumania.” Tension continued after that and the nation still re¬ sisted, but democratic hopes waned. The King refused to sign any government papers or confirm any new ap¬ pointments, but the cabinet continued to govern with¬ out him. Having the army, police, courts, tax collect¬ ing apparatus, it easily carried on its work by decrees. The King was ignored and the Americans held up to ridicule. The people remained overwhelmingly behind their sovereign, but with no effective authority. The army was 95% loyal to their royal chief, but helpless in the face of the Soviet Army. Working together, the people and army made a magnificent demonstration in favor of the King and of the opposition at the beginning of November, but to no avail. Men and women, children and grandparents, workers and employees gathered be¬ fore the Royal Palace in Bucharest to acclaim their state and ruler and nation, to sing national songs, wave national flags and swear nation-wide allegiance to na¬ tional ideals. They defied police and shock troops, im¬ prisonment and bullets. They spontaneously took all risks and enthusiastically displayed the national will, even though it resulted in bringing hundreds to prison, caused scores to be savagely beaten, sent several to their graves and provoked the virtual outlawing of the Rumanian people in Rumania. But in spite of its gran¬ deur, this spontaneous Rumanian defiance of the mighti¬ est land empire in modern history before the very ma¬ chine guns of that empire was little more than a bold declaration by a hero on the scaffold. From that day, November 8, 1945, the noose was tightened about the neck of the Rumanian nation. And the outside world helped tighten it, with America

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doing its share. To be sure, Mr. James Byrnes along with Mr. Bevin stood firm at the conference with the Soviets in London. Though the meeting ended in failure Washington and London continued to refuse recognition to- Soviet-imposed puppet governments, in¬ cluding the one in Rumania. However, a switch then came in America’s attitude. The United States State Department took the road to another Munich. One of the first unequivocal announcements of the change was made by Byrnes on October 31, in New York City at the Herald Tribune Forum. There the American Secretary of State said: “Far from opposing, we have sympathised with the effort of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly associa¬ tion with her Central and Eastern European neighbors. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries and we have recognized those interests in the arrangements made for the occupation and con¬ trol of former enemy states.” Plainly this was an effort to mollify the Soviet Union. It was an unmistakable retreat from the policy which the American Government had followed right after Potsdam. And people the world over have asked why the “flip-flop?” They have even accused Washington of deliberately “selling eastern Europe down the river.” But was that actually the case? think so.

Personally, I do not.

The “firm policy” had not succeeded. After one phenomenal success in Bulgaria, it had brought no visible benefits of any kind anywhere. Moscow in a brutal, unilateral manner was entrenching itself in al¬ most the whole of eastern Europe. The conflict had reached a stalemate and America did not seem to have prospects of winning the stalemate. One way out of the situation would have been war, but that was ex-

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eluded. The only two alternatives left were to continue the “clinch,” or to try discussions with Stalin. A continuation of the stalemate at that moment was unacceptable both to the American Government and the American people. During that first autumn after the war the American nation believed in the possibility of an understanding with Russia. Any other alternative was rather brusquely rejected. American soldiers were pouring back from the front; the army was disintegrat¬ ing; educators and churchmen wanted peace. Wives reunited with their husbands and parents having re¬ ceived back their sons called for an understanding with Stalin. To many Americans any other course seemed ab¬ surd. With vast interests at stake on every continent, with dangers pressing upon America from many points —such as China, Greece, Persia, Korea, Italy—most Americans in Byrnes’ place would have said, “Let’s snap out of this clinch and do something.” It is plain that “doing something” meant “appease¬ ment.” But much of the history of peace and progress has consisted of “talking it over and coming to an un¬ derstanding.” Britain prospered on that policy; democ¬ racy usually uses it. In other words, “appeasement” is sometimes good, although sometimes awfully bad. It may be the way out of a road block; it may start things moving. i It did not work at Munich, but “talking it over” had worked more than once in relieving clashes between the British and French, even between the British and Germans. Neither had appeasement worked at Yalta. President Roosevelt’s efforts to satisfy Moscow there were extremely costly. They helped bring America into the most difficult position in American history. But that wasn’t known in the autumn of 1945—at least by

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the general public. The Polish, Yugoslav, Greek, Czechoslovak catastrophes were not yet completed. The train bearing those catastrophes was on its way, having been speeded on its course by Yalta, but it had not gone into the abyss and most Americans hotly re¬ sented the prediction that it was headed for an abyss. Millions of Americans liked that train—in 1945. They called it the train of peace. Consequently, many “practical” Americans believed their Secretary of State should try to “talk it over” with Stalin. As a preliminary act, Byrnes sent a gifted editor and publisher, Mark Ethridge, to the Balkans—Bulgaria and Rumania—to study conditions at first hand and report. Since Byrnes had decided to try to get out of the jam, this was a wise step and Ethridge was an ex¬ cellent choice. The whole adventure was quite “Ameri¬ can.” The nation wanted to “do something.” That was the first move toward doing something. Maynard Barnes had made categorical—and completely accurate —reports from Sofia. Berry had done the same, in a slightly milder form, from Bucharest. They pictured Soviet policy and action as black and vicious—and they were entirely right, as events have proved. But on the basis of such reports America couldn’t get out of the jam. So Byrnes sent a special reporter, hoping that perhaps Ethridge could find some way to get the stalled locomotive off dead center. The charge is often made, and naturally, that Byrnes told Ethridge to give a loaded report, that he instructed the Kentucky publisher to find what Byrnes wanted found. I see no evidence of that—rather of exactly the opposite. I closely watched Ethridge’s Balkan activity from beginning to end and I think he worked in an ideal manner. I suppose he went to Bulgaria—I was there at the time—with the feeling that he would achieve

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263

something. I had the impression that he felt—in a typi¬ cal American way—that he’d get the ball rolling. I had the impression that Ethridge thought the Balkan Com¬ munists might prove to be diamonds in the rough, like “old Andy Jackson.” If so, “he’d kid ’em along a bit”/ and get them, at least partially, onto our team. For one who knew the Bulgarian Communists, such an atti¬ tude—whether Ethridge had it or not—seemed ex¬ tremely dangerous. But it was not wrong for Byrnes and Ethridge to try to start the stalled diplomatic motor. Ethridge deserved the highest praise for what he did in Bulgaria. He discovered in Bulgaria that Maynard Barnes had been right in his sweeping reports regarding Soviet and Communist tyranny. He saw that the Soviet-imposed Bulgarian Communists had established a dictatorial regime against the desire and wishes of the Bulgarian nation. Such a confirmation of the truth was beneficial. Then on November 13, 1945, Ethridge went from Sofia to Moscow to see spokesmen for the Kremlin and “talk it over” with them. That was taking a big chance. I think he should have gone to Rumania first. Plainly, if he failed at Moscow his subsequent trip to Rumania would be a futile anti-climax, just a sight-seeing tour at Uncle Sam’s expense. On the other hand, if he succeeded at Moscow he would have performed a magnificent service for the United States and the world. In that case, a trip to Rumania would hardly have been necessary—except for graciously “laying down the law” to Petru Groza. Well, Ethridge utterly failed in Moscow, in my opinion. He went as a guest of the Kremlin, in a special plane, but practically had to thumb his way back, eating black bread sandwiches. He saw no top men, had no vital conferences, reached no positive results.

But his efforts

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

did show that the Kremlin was adamant and relentless on the Balkans. By the day Ethridge started back from Moscow in December 1945, huddled in an old com¬ mercial plane, the scroll of future Balkan developments had been opened. It was then plain to all persons ac¬ quainted with Bolshevism and world Communism that Stalin and his Politburo were absolutely determined to lay hands on the whole of eastern Europe—and the rest of the world, if possible. To the initiated there was then revealed every development that has since trans¬ pired. But the initiated are few in number. The Ameri¬ can nation could not know—and would not have wished to acknowledge—that the Kremlin had plunged into a struggle to “level free enterprise to the ground and set up a World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Other lessons were necessary in our political education, to prepare us for accepting that truth. One came very soon in the conference between America, Britain and the Soviet Union held in Moscow during December 1945. It was another step in appease¬ ment by the Western democracies, as far as Rumania was concerned, although the Kremlin made certain con¬ cessions in form. America wanted to confirm its posi¬ tion in Japan and in return gave the U.S.S.R. almost a free hand in the Balkans. However, Stalin did agree to let two “opposition ministers” enter Groza’s cabinet and consented to the restoration of certain civil liberties in Rumania. The, clauses concerning Rumania, as con¬ tained in the official communique, were as follows: “The Three Governments are prepared to give King Michael the advice for which he asked in his letter of August 21, 1945, on the broadening of the Rumanian Government.

The King should be advised that one

member of the National-Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the govern-

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265

ment. The commission referred to below shall satisfy itself that: (a) They are truly representative mem¬ bers of the parties not represented in the Government; (b) they are suitable and will work loyally with the Government. “The Three Governments take note that the Ruma¬ nian Government thus reorganized should declare that free and unfettered elections will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot. All democratic and anti-fascist parties should have the right to take part in these elections and to put forward candi¬ dates. The reorganized government should give as¬ surances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion and association. “A. Y. Vishinsky, Ambassador Averell Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to proceed to Bucharest immediately to consult with King Michael and members of the present government with a view to the execution of the above mentioned tasks. ! “As soon as these tasks are accomplished and the required assurances have been received, the Govern¬ ment of Rumania, with which the Soviet Government maintains diplomatic relations, will be recognized by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom.” This has often been called a basely hypocritical docu¬ ment. Critics have said it was a pleasant sounding sen¬ tence of death upon what was left of Rumania free¬ dom. They point out that two lone opposition minis¬ ters in a Moscow-controlled Rumanian Communist cabinet would inevitably be powerless; they assert that press freedom was necessarily illusory and that elec¬ tions under a Communist Police Minister in a Sovietoccupied land could only be a farce. Such critics say

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that Washington had decided upon “a dirty deal of which the recognition of Groza’s government was a part, and they charge that sanctimonious America signed the nice words about free and unfettered elec¬ tions in order to save its Christian face when recogniz¬ ing a tyrannical regime that had been imposed to ter¬ rorize and rob the Rumanian nation. Such observers say that at Moscow the Americans and British deliber¬ ately gave their sanction to all that Russia had done in Rumania. This judgment seems to me too harsh. What hap¬ pened at Moscow was, indeed, very pathetic. Rumania was led to the slaughter with America’s and Britain’s approval. But what else could America do? The United States at least tried, though in a ridiculously tragic manner, to safeguard freedom. It couldn’t go to war at that time to achieve it; I don’t think it could have achieved it without threatening war. The Ameri¬ can nation would have repudiated such a threat. No bluff was adequate. An unprepared, vacillating America had bluffed in August and it ended in a sad fiasco with Rumania holding the bag and Rumanian youth getting knocked over the head. In any case, the Committee which had been agreed upon arrived in Rumania on the last day of the year and worked with the Rumanians for a week. A Na¬ tional-Peasant, Emil Hatsieganu, and a Liberal, Mihai Romniceanu, were added to Groza’s government which contained 33 Communist and pro-Communist members. On February 4, the Governments of the United States and Great Britain recognized the Groza government with the two helpless appendices that had been tacked on. Of course the two Ministers were to be persistently ignored by Groza and lopped off at the first opportunity. On the face of it, such recognition of a government that

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a few months earlier both America and Britain had de¬ nounced as unrepresentative seemed absurd. But before the recognition, namely, on January 8, a United States representative in Bucharest had been assured that Premier Groza had officially informed his cabinet that all the liberties demanded by the American Government were guaranteed. The Rumanian Government formally and officially had granted America everything it had re¬ quested as a condition of recognition. The United States Department of State, in February 1946, made the following announcement: “In accordance with the agreement in regard to Rumania reached by the Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States at their meeting in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945, a commission com¬ prised of A. Y. Vishinsky, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, and Sir Archibald John Kerr Clark Kerr has consulted with King Michael and members of the pres¬ ent government of Rumania in Bucharest. As a result of these discussions, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Moscow agreement, (1) representatives of the National-Peasant party and the Liberal party have been included in the Rumanian Government; (2) the gov¬ ernment thus reorganized has declared that free and unfettered elections, in which all democrats and anti¬ fascist parties will have the right to take part and put forward candidates, will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot, and (3) the government has also given assurances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion and association. “In the circumstances, the United States Political Representative in Rumania, acting under instructions of the Secretary of State, on February 4, 1946, trans-

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mitted to the President of the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian Government the following note: “The Government of the United States of America has taken note of the communication of January 8, 1946, addressed to Ambassador William Averell Harriman by the President of the Council of Ministers, Dr. Petru Groza, enclosing a declaration of the Rumanian Government, made at a meeting of the Council of Min¬ isters on January 8. According to this declaration the Council of Ministers considered it indispensable that: “1. General elections should be held in the short¬ est time possible. “2. The freedom of these elections shall be as¬ sured. They shall be held on the basis of universal suf¬ frage and secret ballot with the participation of all democratic and anti-fascist parties, which shall have the right to present candidates. “3. Freedom of the press, speech, religion and as¬ sembly shall be assured. “The Government of the United States has been ad¬ vised of the conversation which took place on January 9 between the President of the Council of Ministers, and the American and British ambassadors. It has taken note of the oral explanation of the aforemen¬ tioned declaration, which the President of the Council of Ministers made to the American and British ambas¬ sadors in this conversation to the effect that: “1. All political parties represented in the Ruma¬ nian Government shall have the right to participate in the elections and to put forward candidates. “2. The examination of the balloting procedure and counting of the ballots shall take place in the presence of representatives of all the political parties represented in the government. “3.

All political parties represented in the govern-

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ment shall be accorded equitable broadcasting facilities for the presentation of their political views. “4. All political parties represented in the govern¬ ment shall have equal rights to print, publish and dis¬ tribute their own newspapers and political publications. Newsprint shall be distributed to them on a fair and equitable basis. “5. All political parties represented in the govern¬ ment shall have the right to organize associations and hold meetings. They shall be allowed premises for this purpose. I “6. The Council of Ministers will consult with the representatives of the political parties in order to reach agreement concerning the grant of freedom of the press and speech, as well as on questions relating to the draft¬ ing of the electoral law and the conduct of the elections. “The Government of the United States has taken note of the statements contained in the declaration of the Rumanian Government that the Ministers of In¬ terior, Justice, Culture and Propaganda will be charged with the implementation of the decisions contained in the declaration. It understands from the statement of the President of the Council that these Ministries will not act on their own responsibility, but under the close control of the Government as a whole. Although these Ministries will be charged with the technical imple¬ mentation of these decisions, the Rumanian Govern¬ ment as reconstituted will bear the primary responsi¬ bility for their fulfillment and for safeguarding the interests of all the parties. “As for the decision to hold elections in the shortest time possible, the Government of the United States confidently expects that arrangements will be under¬ taken with dispatch and would hope that it may be pos-

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sible to hold the elections at the end of April or early in May of this year (1946). “On the basis of the assurances contained in the dec¬ laration of the Rumanian Government, and on the un¬ derstanding that the oral statement of the President of the Council of Ministers as set forth above reflects the intentions of the Rumanian Government, the Govern¬ ment of the United States is prepared to recognize the Government of Rumania.” Was all that just a dirty game? Did President Tru¬ man and Secretary Byrnes, and Ambassador Harriman know they were signing away the liberty of a nation? Was it just another horse trade such as conquerors have arranged since the time of the Pharaohs? I do not think it was quite as base as that. It turned out to be a catastrophe for Rumania and a disaster for America but I, who am neither naive nor indulgent in matters pertaining to freedom, believe that American states¬ men, facing a diplomatic Dunkirk, with no more re¬ sources than the British had at Dunkirk, did the best they could. In any case, during that February a sort of a chance seemed to be opened up to Rumania. Perhaps one chance in a hundred, but that’s about all the Balkan people usually get, I am distressed to say. And it was all America could bring about. As a result of the Agree¬ ment opposition papers were founded, meetings were planned, party organizations were revived and long dormant hopes felt the movement of life. Spring is beautiful in Rumania. During a thousand sad years spring has brought some cheer even to en¬ slaved, illiterate Rumanian shepherds.

The spring of

1946 which came after the Moscow Conference, after America’s intervention, after sonorous United States Government declarations and after grand “reports to

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the world,” brought some Rumanians some hope that in spite of the vast Muscovite glacier pressing on the land flowers of freedom would bloom and government of the people would spring up. But did flowers of freedom spring up? Let us see.

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Chapter XVII THE COMMMUNISTS TERRORIZE THEIR RIVALS As was natural, open anti-Communist political ac¬ tivity revived in the spring of 1946. The outward form of the Moscow Agreement and the solemn pledges re¬ garding political freedom, which the Rumanian Com¬ munist Government had made in connection with it, plainly implied that opposition agitation would be pos¬ sible. Indeed, that was the whole meaning of the Agreement. If opposition was not to be permitted the whole thing was a farce—as indeed it proved to be. Elections in Rumania had been provided for in the Agreement and elections have no meaning unless various parties present themselves to the electors. One such party—indeed the principal one—was that of the National-Peasants, led by Juliu Maniu and Ion Mihalache. Maniu was ill and so most of the burden of the election campaign fell on Mihalache. One of his first ventures was a trip into Moldavia and Bucovina where he intended to speak at small organizational meetings or conferences. I decided to go along as a re¬ porter to study Vishinsky’s “new democracy” at first hand. As an American, I wished to see whether America’s signature to a document promising civil free¬ dom had any significance.

I also- wanted to see how

far Moscow and its Rumanian Communist agents would go in violating pledges. I found out. Most of Mihalache’s gatherings were held in private houses or small party clubs as preliminary steps in the

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reorganization of a political organization that had not been allowed to function for eight years. During that time Rumania had engaged in two wars, lost much ter¬ ritory and regained some, had been subjected to terrible fascist dictatorships causing grave dissensions and some serious defections in the party. Eventually the country had passed under the control of an occupation army that tried “men’s souls.” Party differences and quarrels had arisen which had to be ironed out. Mihalache’s trip was part of a great attempt to help bring a dis¬ tressed and somewhat demoralized nation out of the wrecks of war, of despotism, of brutal mass aberra¬ tions and lead it toward democracy. It was a mission¬ ary tour. Naturally, in order to lay the basis for a democratic advance, Mihalache had to restore, in each city he visited, the local, fairly democratic party or¬ ganizations that had once existed. And to serve as a true teacher of democratic ways he had to do this in a democratic manner. From beginning to end he proved to be one of the most democratic party leaders I have observed. But the trip turned out to be an exciting and even dangerous venture. I have heard many presumably wise Americans, at conferences and in broadcasts, express the sentiment that since there “never has been much democracy in Rumania,” we might as well turn it over to the Soviet tyrants. If Mr. Vishinsky has employed dictatorial methods in his treatment of Rumanians, or Poles, or Bulgarians, “that’s all these people deserve anyhow because its as good as they ever had,” such Americans say. “Among good fellows like us Americans, British¬ ers and Russians, what are a few more degrees of des¬ potism and a few additional jails or concentration camps for benighted Balkan nations!” the flippant ex¬ claim. Such an attitude seems to me perfidious, because

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from long and intimate experience, I have found more heroic devotion to the struggle for democracy among many men and women in the Balkan states than among those of any other- land, and I can conceive of few things more unworthy of loyal Americans than to cast slurs on our democratic friends in Rumania, who are trying to do for that long oppressed people what our greatest American and British leaders have done for our nations. I am not pretending that all the rather furious ef¬ forts made by eastern European politicians in their fight against reaction have been wise or even that some political chiefs with noble intentions and beautiful pro¬ grams have not shown themselves autocratic or corrupt. But so have some bosses in America, and even in Eng¬ land. The long suffering nations in eastern Europe, which after having borne the yokes of foreign empires and of domestic tyranny for centuries have begun a magnificent struggle for government by the people, of the people, for the people, deserve America’s sympathy rather than sneers. And they never deserved that sym¬ pathy more than now, when they are fighting against a corroding, terrorizing absolutism, backed by a gigan¬ tic and aggressive empire. Mihalache’s little party consisted of eight men in¬ cluding the drivers of our two cars. In one car, which was a very modest Bucharest taxi, were Mihalache, another National-Peasant leader, the conscientious chauffeur-owner, and myself. I found the Peasant Party chief and myself occupying the rather spacious •back seat of an American Chevrolet, 1939 model. The grating in front of the radiator was completely gone, which gave the machine the appearance of an openmouthed hound with all the teeth removed.

At first I

thought it was in a state of general dilapidation and

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anticipated all sorts of trouble before we had bounded over the bad roads leading up into Bucovina and back, but my opinion was unjustified. A fancy grating seems to have nothing to do with the efficiency of a car in Rumania. The tires proved excellent though old, and the motor efficient though noisy. The driver looked after everything with the affection and care of the owner of a race horse. This was his only source of in¬ come and seemed to be a pretty good one. In a smaller, private automobile behind us was the chief of a local party organization in Suceava, Bucovina, where the first meeting was to be held. He had two amiable political cronies with him besides his personal chauffeur. We left Bucharest at 6 o’clock in the morning and I slept for two or three hours at the beginning, which was not difficult since we travelled for a time over a section of Rumania’s one excellently paved trunk road. As I woke up from time to time I found my distinguished seat-mate, ex-Minister and President of the NationalPeasant party, also nodding. We stopped at midday on the roadside for an excellent lunch consisting of white, homemade bread, fresh crumbly country cheese which looked a little bit like dry Dutch cheese such as midwestern pioneer women used to make—maybe their daughters still do—and home boiled ham which had not yet entirely cooled. All had come apparently from Mihalache’s peasant home. My friends and newly made acquaintances were in good humor. Mihalache related some political reminiscences of which he has a vast store, and no one would imagine from the prevailing joviality that we were in an occupied country, suffering from cruel political persecution, and moving toward a dictatorship of the proletariat. Neither would one sur¬ mise, as jokes were exchanged arousing hearty laughter, what peril we were about to meet.

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Proceeding from our picnic lunch we drove straight on to the northeast corner of Rumania, passing Russian soldiers in the various cities and towns and seeing one very substantial park of big Russian tanks. We were often stopped by Rumanian road patrols, but after showing our papers, had no difficulty. At the city of Bacau, which is found in the northern part of Moldavia, we stopped for early afternoon refreshments and met half a dozen local leaders of the National-Peasant or¬ ganization. *We even made a brief visit to the modest National-Peasant Club consisting of two or three rooms, one of which was equipped with benches, a platform and a table and could accommodate an audience of 150 people. After that we replenished our supply of gas and hurried on toward Suceava where we hoped to spend the night. We arrived just after dark and were conducted by townsmen, who had been waiting for us at a street corner, to the home of a local political chief. The household seemed to be fairly large and the clean, pleasant house rather small, but we were generously entertained by a gracious hostess who did everything she could to make us comfortable and happy. It all made me think of a gospel team or a circuit rider and his staff touring some rural area. Our supper, which was the sort of menu that a good Rumanian hostess always serves, was somewhat as fol¬ lows : before we sat down at the table a tray was passed among us containing small pieces of bread, small slices of cheese, little chunks of crisp bacon and tiny meat balls. All of these were impaled with upstanding tooth¬ picks which might make one think that a porcupine was being circulated. On another tray were tiny glasses filled with a local alcoholic drink called tsuica.

Being

quite abstentious by tradition and conviction, I didn’t go in for the tsuica, but rather over-indulged in the

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cheese, meat-balls and bacon slabs, lured on by the acrobatic adventure of transferring them with the flimsy toothpicks from the trays to my mouth. By the time one gets through this first course of a Rumanian dinner, he hasn’t much room for the real meal which usually proves to be a whopper. If I remem¬ ber rightly, our company in that pleasant crowded dining-room at Suceava had soup, fish, pork chops, potatoes, peas, pickles, pears, apples and a marvelous cake, all topped off with little cups of Turkish coffee. I well understand why decades of political circuit riding have deprived Mihalache of litheness. After the banquet of which the chauffeur had his equal share, though in the kitchen, our company was distributed in various rooms for the night. I had the honor of sharing with Mihalache and his political com¬ rade what I’m sure was the main bedroom and which was equipped with two good beds and a sofa. In an adjoining room four members of the family slept. Early the next morning I went into the kitchen to wash and there a peasant maiden, serving as the hired girl, poured water from a pitcher over my hands into a basin. Also she offered me a big piece of home-made soap and in the end handed me a clean, white, nicely embroidered, homespun towel. I rather enjoy such attentions and since I was operating before a number of spectators, took special pains to wash my neck and ears. I realized I was representing America and wanted to do credit to my country. After that I sat down on a kitchen chair and was shaved by a young barber whom our gracious host had called in. This luxury was not provided especially for my benefit. I merely took advantage of a service which had been arranged to honor a former Rumanian Minis¬ ter and a beloved political chief. I think Mihalache

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well deserves whatever consideration he may be given. In the end the barber, as I observed, was given fifty cents for shaving the whole lot of us and he seemed to be pleased with that unexpected windfall coming before he’d begun his day’s work. The host wasn’t set back very much and the guests were delighted, so everybody seemed to be satisfied with the matinal tonsorial treat. After that we had a conventional and palatable Ru¬ manian breakfast which consisted of a large cup of coffee-and-milk for each person, white cheese and very edible light coffee-cake called cozonac. I have had many such breakfasts and never fail to enjoy them, but al¬ ways marvel that the Rumanian host, lavish as he is, seldom offers you a second cup of coffee-and-milk. Though at noon and in the evening he urges upon you extra helpings of everything until he has you completely incapacitated, it seems to be an unwritten Rumanian law that one morning cup is enough. After breakfast I went out with a local acquaintance to visit the striking churches and monasteries of the attractive little city of Suceava, and was impressed to learn what an important historical Rumanian center it had been. On a magnificent hill were the ruins of a Rumanian castle, centuries old; and scattered through the town were the religious institutions that had nour¬ ished the Rumanian spirit and strengthened Rumanian pride for scores of decades. I observed well-dressed peasants, good farm utensils, high-grade stock, and as I heard the town and country people speaking Ruma¬ nian, I marvelled for the hundredth time to behold the demonstration of the fact that in some mysterious way Roman soldiers from Macedonia and Roman mer¬ chants from Asia once created, way up there, amid rest¬ less roaming barbarian tribes, a Latin nation. Slavs to the right of them, Slavs to the left of them, Slavs in

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front of them, Slavs behind them have volleyed and thundered, but there those Latins have remained. They are subjected at this moment to the greatest pressure in all their modern history but are facing it with a Latin re¬ sistance equalling that of their classic days when Ruma¬ nian conquerors built Bucovian castles and churches. Mihalache’s organizational meeting was to be held in the largest hall in town beginning at eleven. Peasant delegates were to come from all the surrounding vil¬ lages. During the hour preceding the time fixed for the beginning of the meeting, I wandered around town with a local newly-made friend, visiting the theological seminary and market places. I also saw big Communist propaganda signs put up on large bill-boards near the main square. They portrayed happy workmen living in lovely houses beside booming factories; healthy welldressed peasants reaping bounteous harvests with joy¬ ous smiles; noble white-collared intellectuals joining hands with these two kind of toilers and all marching towards an earthly paradise. I could not but reflect that similar pictures adorn all eastern Europe, from Warsaw to Bulgaria’s Rhodope Mountains from which one can look across Greece to the Aegean Sea. The inspirers of those signs are very eager to pierce beyond the Rhodope Range and bring that paradise to Greece also. However, everything on the bill-boards was not quite so idyllic because a large handwritten “wall news¬ paper,” characteristic of the Communist world, had just been pasted up, in which some of the leaders of the meeting that was planned for that day, were furi¬ ously maligned as fascists, oppressors, exploiters and persecutors of workers. I got the feeling that trouble was brewing and did not have to wait long to have my impression confirmed. Not wishing to attend the meeting in the company of

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the politicians, I didn’t return to our host’s house but went straight to the hall, in the center of which I took a seat. Being from out of town I attracted some atten¬ tion and in some mysterious way which I cannot under¬ stand, made the impression even before opening my mouth that I was a non-Rumanian. Consequently the peasant delegates, sitting nearby, pressed toward me and began to ask questions. Learning that I was an American, some, who had been in America, talked very bad English to me, while others asked questions in their native tongue to which I responded in rather bad Ruma¬ nian. Such conversations constitute the pleasantest part of my journalistic work and I was glad to learn from direct contact what this section of the Rumanian people thought about the situation. I got the impression from extensive, varied and frank conversation that they felt about the same way as my neighbors in Kansas, or my brother’s neighbors in Wisconsin would have felt, un¬ der the circumstances. They complained of coercion by the occupying Russians and by the Rumanian Govern¬ ment. They spoke of imposed mayors terrorizing their villages, of bad economic arrangements, discrimination, favoritism, brutality. They were against Communism which they thought would take away their lands and make them all part of a rigidly controlled mass-group, subject to the orders of a capricious official. They were not vague or stupid or timid. They knew exactly what they didn’t want and made their protests without beating about the bush. What they didn’t want was the government. They also knew at least one thing they did want and that was freedom—probably freedom from ail troubles, including poor crops and high prices, but especially freedom from Dr. Groza’s government. They hadn’t acquired those ideas as a result of propa¬ ganda because they had heard nothing but government

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281

That was the first oppositional political

meeting they had attended in eight years. Over their radios, in their newspapers, from occasional speakers and from their own village officials, they had heard nothing but wonderful things about Dr. Groza and his cabinet. But they hated the regime. This scene seemed to me elemental and classic, al¬ most Biblical. The hard-handed, poor, plainly dressed men who had walked miles to attend that meeting, com¬ ing from drudgery and returning to drudgery, were cer¬ tainly perfect examples of common people. They made me think of an Amos leaving his herds on the rather bare and stormy heights of Judea to walk up to Bethel, half a day’s journey, and tell the big shots there, in¬ cluding the high priest, that the regime was repugnant to the people and offensive to God, who, Amos said, wanted justice to roll down as waters, and goodness as a mighty stream. That’s what these peasants wanted, too. They were tired of lies and pretentions; they de¬ tested the coercion and injustice practiced upon them by a little group of their unworthy brothers seeking personal advantages in the service of a foreign empire. I was very much surprised when three State police¬ men or gendarmes, sitting two seats back of me, joined in the conversation. Since they were employees of the Groza government, they opposed the statements of these peasants who represented the opposition. The main police debator was a rather affable youth, whose comments were free from bitterness or threats. He did not tell the peasants that he would send them all to jail, but tried to convince them, and especially me, that they were wrong. He rather apologized for being there, since he seemed to feel that I might think he was inter¬ fering in a political meeting, thus violating the Moscow Convention. He said he was merely there as a Ruma-

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nian citizen. Telling rather frankly of his past history, he confessed he was a Communist from the city of Galatz, said he had been dismissed from High School as a Communist agitator and intimated that he was devoting his life to the Communist cause. However, he added rather cynically and naively that he was mainly trying to make a living and asserted that nobody anywhere was really moved by any other mo¬ tive. His intervention, and especially that last bald state¬ ment, aroused indignant comments. The peasants as¬ sured him that he was all wet, and that the only purpose of this meeting was to promote democracy, not to fur¬ ther the aims of any political boss. The reader himself may judge, probably according to his own philosophy, whether the crude peasants or the slick half-educated city-reared cop was the naiver. In any case I was rather pleased to see the farmers, by their moral ardor, put to rout—argumentatively—an armed gendarme who could have had anyone of them arrested and thrust in jail indefinitely. Perhaps he did later. The time for the meeting to begin had long since passed. Eleven o’clock had given way to half past eleven, and twelve was approaching, but no speakers appeared. The people, sensing that something was up, grew restless and I became curious. In fact, I was about to get up and go out to see why Mihalache hadn’t turned up, in his white peasant costume, when a youth jumped onto the platform and began to berate “the gentlemen from Bucharest.” This seemed to be a pre-arranged signal, and bedlam immediately broke loose in the hall. Boys and girls, scattered throughout the assembly, but massed chiefly behind the three gendarmes, mounted the benches and began to shout: “Long live Petru Groza. Down with Juliu Maniu. Down with Ion Mi¬ halache. Down with the Peasant Party. Down with

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the feudal landowners. Long live Stalin. Long live our Soviet liberators.” Four or five of the youths proved especially effective in whistling, as each put two fingers in his mouth. A young lady also caused much vocal devastation by shrieking and gesticulating. Plainly this was a carefully prepared action. The disturbers had been sent to the hall by the Communist Party for the purpose of breaking up Mihalache’s meet¬ ing. Mihalache had gotten wind of this and for that reason did not appear. I myself had not anticipated such an outbreak because most of the people I saw there were genuine peasants. But it takes only a very small minority to frustrate a meeting. I counted rather care¬ fully and it seemed to me that fewer than one in ten of the five hundred present were in the service of the Groza dictatorship. I hadn’t spotted them at first because many of them were disguised in peasant clothes. I was rather excited when the hooliganism began and won¬ dered how the real farmers would react. They became indignant and at first shouted back—some indeed seemed to be inclined for a moment to throw out the ruffians. But sound advice dissuaded them and after a period, first of bewilderment, then of disgust, they began to empty the hall. It had been a pathetic and dramatic demonstration of how the “new order” was being introduced. Those savage youths, camouflaged as peasants, whistling through their fingers, breaking up a meeting guaranteed by an international agreement, all with the unreserved approval and protection of the Groza Government and according to a prearranged conspiracy, were samples of the “new man.” City girls trained in a “progres¬ sive” club, shrieking out imprecations upon earnest, hard-working peasants, defying restraint, scorning traditions, stirring up hatred, were samples of the “new

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woman.” As the peasants angrily filed out, they mut¬ tered to one another. “What has Groza brought upon us”—but their mutterings were drowned by shrieks of “Long live Stalin.” Their meeting, whose freedom had been solemnly guaranteed over the signature of Molo¬ tov at Moscow, was being broken up in the very name of Stalin. The peasants, on leaving the hall, assembled outside in an adjacent square where a number of students, in hot speeches, denounced the dictatorial methods of Vishinsky’s Rumanian Government “of large demo¬ cratic concentration.” They were whistled down by Dr. Groza’s hooligans and even pushed from the chairs upon which they had mounted. In time the crowd dis¬ persed and though there had been no violence, the police —a number of whom had participated actively and vociferously in the rowdy demonstration—arrested a group of pro-Maniu students. Not one of the ruffians who carried out the conspiracy against law and order, who broke the peace and suppressed civil liberty, was in any way molested. They were the heroes of the police, of the government and of “democracy.” Some of them found special joy in shouting, before me, “Down with the reactionary Americans.” Once more, in a dramatic manner I saw a basic principle of Groza’s government’s policy, namely: Long live Stalin—Down with the reactionary Americans. Aftei lunch, which tasted rather insipid to me because of that flagrant act of rowdyism, a hundred of the peasant delegates packed themselves into a small room and Mihalache gave them a rousing speech. It was a poor substitute for the meeting that had been planned and I am sure the peasants went home dejected and rather intimidated. After that small, anti-climacteric conference, the group of touring politicians, accompa-

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nied by an American correspondent, left for the Ruma¬ nian city of Radautz, 40 or 50 miles to the northwest. We jolted along rather poor roads through a dusk that was turning into darkness, toward an ancient settlement lying on the border of an empire which after spanning a sixth of the earth reached eastward to within a few miles of Alaska. It was late and dark when we drove into Radautz and I felt that we had reached the edge of something; the next morning I saw what it was. In attractive Radautz which seems to have been an even more important center of Rumanianism during a distant classical period than Suceava and contains the most highly cherished monastery in the whole kingdom, we were as bountifully entertained as the day before. Though barging in on a rather unprepared family after 9 o’clock in the evening, we were given without much delay an ample and excellent supper, after which we were shown to comfortable beds. I have long prided myself on having a resourceful wife, able to meet emer¬ gencies, but I wonder if she could so successfully take care of half a dozen ravenous guests who arrived after all the stores were closed. And not only did we enjoy the gracious care of a rather unusually beautiful Ru¬ manian hostess, but on the following day I was shown drawings by her four and six year old daughters and permitted to hear their declamations. They even con¬ sented to give me a couple of their choicest pictures to send to my grandchildren in Boston. I dread to think of the future of those little girls! Early on my first morning, after my single large cup of coffee and delicious coffee cake, I strolled out alone to look at the town. I was surprised to discover that the main Communist club was situated next to the home of my host, and I was astonished to see enter the yard of the club, a half dozen or more of the very youth

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who had played the principal roles in breaking up Mihalache’s meeting at Suceava the day before. They had come in government-provided trucks during the night and seemed to be preparing to carry out the same opera¬ tions as at the previous congress. When I first saw them enter the Communists’ yard, they were dressed in or¬ dinary city clothes. Plainly they were city boys, having no more connection with farming than Joe Louis with watch-making. They seemed to choose their clothes ac¬ cording to the conspirational role they are paid to play. Sure enough they did appear later in village homespuns and high sheepskin caps. But neither they nor their local Communist comrades succeeded in breaking up the Radautz meeting because it was better organized and also because the Prefect of Radautz, being a former Liberal, still retained rem¬ nants of respect for elemental decency and of loyalty to Rumania. Well chosen and robust peasant guards stood outside the Radautz meeting place and permit¬ ted only bona fide National-Peasant delegates to enter. Ruffians were excluded. And the guard was strong enough to defeat the hooligans if they had tried to crash the gate. The medium sized hall was closely packed with delegates from the surrounding villages and after the local president had presented the distin¬ guished guest, Ion Mihalache, there followed one of the most democratic political meetings I ever attended. At the conclusion of Mihalache’s speech, which was well received, the meeting proceeded with the election of the officers that were to head the county organizations during the coming year. Two candidates wished to be elected president, one a devoted, highly respected older man, the other a more dynamic and perhaps slightly less reliable young man. The older man, who had long held the presidency and wanted to be re-elected, accused

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his rival in a passionate speech of slipperiness and ex¬ cessive adaptability. Indeed the words he used were closer to traitor and renegade. The younger man in turn, without calling anybody names, told the audience that if they wanted him as president he would be glad to lead them, but if not he would serve beside them as an ordinary soldier. Mihalache tried to assuage the rather excited passions but without success. He tried to get the two men to shake hands but again failed. The elder candidate had made a moral issue of the matter and did not want to be contaminated by a tainted hand¬ shake. Many of the peasant delegates spoke, all in favor of reconciliation but with plain preference for the more youthful candidate. Finally, when all had spoken their pieces and the public sentiment had become quite clear, the matter was put to a vote which the younger candidate won by an overwhelming majority. After that the elder rival gave way and moved to make the vote unanimous. When that was done, he shook hands with his successful rival to the joy of all the peasants. As we left the meeting and went to lunch, in which a score of the local big shots eager to spend an hour or so in the glow of Mihalache were to participate, we passed the ruffians who had been brought to break up the meet¬ ing. They hissed out imprecations and shouted “Long live Stalin” and “Down with Maniu,” but didn’t care to undertake any physical action. As I walked slowly back to the home of my host, peasants from different villages gathered around me to urge me, as an Ameri¬ can, to do what I could to have their land freed from foreign occupation. So many pressed upon me to ex¬ press their desires and opinions that our conversation assumed the proportions of a street meeting and a num¬ ber of well armed cops rudely ordered us to move on, since street meetings weren’t permitted.

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Unfortunately I had to separate from these substan¬ tially dressed, self-confident, well-informed Bucovian peasants on the border of Russia, before I had gathered all the information they were eager to give me. I got the impression that in a peaceful world they would move steadily forward to as much democracy at least as one finds in France. I do not believe they are politically much behind the Danish farmers of the late nineteenth century. After an adult lifetime in Europe, I realize that progress moves on a zigzag path and I am aware that the establishment of true democracy will be ex¬ tremely difficult because of the lack of enough personal character and because of extreme partisan animosity in such lands as Spain, Poland, Hungary and the Balkans. But I am convinced that democracy is not a matter of racial predilections. As I have watched Rumanian town meetings I have found them not dissimilar from those in New England. From the excellent meeting at Radautz we went to the noi them Mioldavian city of Falticeni where we spent the night, and there I came face to face with Rumania’s Jewish problem. The Rumanians Vith whom I talked said that three-fourths of the town’s population were Jews. Naturally Jews dominated the place, controlling local politics as well as business, and most were said to be staunch supporters of the Groza government, which sei ves as an agent of IVfoscow and helps Russia oppress Rumanians. The government party there was unusually vigorous in vituperating the opposition, which means that Jews were especially active in shouting “Long live Stalin,” the foreigner, and “Down with Maniu,” the Rumanian. Thus a situation existed in which the Jews of Falticeni seemed to be at war with the Rumanian nation. I later found this was a rather typical situation. The

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Jews of Rumania, as throughout eastern Europe, feel grateful to Stalin for saving them from the clutches of Hitler. Although the Jews in most parts of Rumania suffered less under Antonescu than in any other Nazioccupied land, many have suffered. Also their future security is bound up with the permanent diminution of anti-Semitism, against which many Jews believe Russia is fighting more militantly than any other nation in the world. In addition, the prosaic fact should be pointed out that any merchant or manufacturer can make more money by playing ball with the big shots than by oppos¬ ing them, and the big shots in Rumania came to be Rus¬ sians or their agents. For these reasons the Rumanian Jews cooperated with Russia and with the Russian regime in Rumania. They had acquired a dispropor¬ tionate share of power in every social, business or political organiaztion in the land,—as far as such an organization depends upon the government. Conse¬ quently in business, in the police, in the National Demo¬ cratic Front, in the newspaper world, in practically the whole administration, in student bodies, labor syndi¬ cates, propaganda activity, administration of the newly formed “economats” providing the people with cheap goods, in the delivery of reparations, and the reorgani¬ zation of industry, Jews played and play a role far out of proportion to their numbers in the country. Probably no one will dissent from the opinion that the Jews are human beings, in consequence of which they have human weaknesses. One such weakness is ven¬ geance ; another is abuse of power. I am not intimating that the Jews are worse or even as bad in these respects as their Christian brothers, but they show similar weak¬ nesses. They have used their enormous, newly acquired

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power in Rumania, backed by the mighty Soviet State, to make amends for some past grievances and to recoup past losses. In the past a certain number of Rumanians hated the Jews. I don’t know how great the number was but I am humiliated, as a human being, to be forced to believe it was large. As a reaction to this, some Jews used to hate the Rumanians, although the bulk felt loyal to the state. Now I am obliged to say that most Jews with whom I have talked in Rumania not only hate but fear the Rumanian nation. Jews have repeatedly told me that their people have no future in a free Rumania and that all of them would have to get out. I repeat this is not my appraisal but a prevalent Jewish appraisal. A very large part of the Jews do not feel at home there and hestitate to bind their future with that of the Ruma¬ nians. In view of this it must be plain that the Russians and Communists, by giving disproportionate power and authority to Jews, increase disunity among the inhabi¬ tants of this land. Can anyone believe that Rumanians who were ar¬ rested and beaten up by Jewish policemen will soon for¬ get it and can one suppose that Rumanian students who have been expelled “forever” from Rumanian schools because of the vindictive activity of an imposed Jewishdominated committee will forget that? And is it not clear that Rumanians who daily see a Jewish press be¬ smear all the most beloved Rumanian leaders as fascists and traitors will long bear a grudge against the Jews! All Rumanian Jews with whom I am acquainted, except those blinded by Communism, agree that anti-Semitism is growing in the country. And I have come upon not a few Jews who in their desperation have actually ex¬ pressed the hope that the Red Army will remain there for a long period in order to protect the Jews from the Rumanians.

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291

How many Jews there are in the country I do not know. The Jews themselves place the present number below half a million. If half a million people urge a foreign army to continue its occupation of a land in order to exercise control over the fourteen million people constituting the principal race, is it not certain that most of those fourteen million will long cherish a furious hatred for the small minority which in their hearts wished to continue the humiliation of the ma¬ jority! The enmity which the Russians and Commu¬ nists have provoked between Rumanians and Jews in the name of brotherhood, and accompanied by thunder¬ ous speeches about democracy, exceeds that created by Hitler and it will weaken the Rumanian nation for many years because no population can be strong when one part of it cherishes murderous feelings against an¬ other part of it. And this dangerous situation will give Russia constant excuses for intervening. Communists see advantages in this. Now to resume our tour: From Falticeni we proceeded toward

Bucharest,

planning to lunch in Roman and spend the night in Bacau, where we had briefly stopped four days earlier. At Roman, Mihalache met a number of the local National-Peasant chiefs in a private house. As was ap¬ propriate, they gave him lunch and as is customary, his colleagues made a lot of speeches after he had repeated his inspiring piece. It was a pleasant occasion, not dis¬ similar to an evening meeting of a bunch of American Elks or a group of enthusiasm Democrats at a Jackson Day Dinner. Wine was used rather lavishly, which rendered one of the diners cleverly and obnoxiously ir¬ repressible. Sitting around the edge of the crowd, eat¬ ing not much more than the crumbs of our delicious con¬ fections, were a few dirt-peasants wearing village

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clothes. One made a good speech—most of the rest were quiet. Somebody subsequently reported to the Russian secret police that I had conversed about kolkhozi with one of the peasants at that luncheon. I may have. Certainly I would not have been fulfilling my reportorial duty if I had let the opportunity pass with¬ out asking about conditions in the villages, the effects upon the peasants of Groza’s land reform and prevail¬ ing political sentiment. This luncheon was politically useful for the local National-Peasant Party, because several acute differences were ironed out and somewhat isolated provincial men had a chance to meet their wise, moderate and fearless chief. Every lunch or dinner lasts longer than it ought and no circuit rider or political campaigner gets away on schedule. Consequently the March evening was turning to night as we entered the city of Bacau. We put up at the best local hotel after which Mihalache immedi¬ ately made contact with the local National-Peasant leaders. And he was surprised to hear what they had to say. They told him that four days earlier after he had left Bacau on the way north, the local Communists thinking he was preparing to hold a mass meeting, had broken into the party club with police support, held it for some time, and caused considerable damage. They had also beaten up a number of local party members and spread a good deal of terror. All appeals to local administrative and police au¬ thorities had proven fruitless. Persons responsible for order had passively looked on or even participated as the party club was being damaged and party members mauled. This was the most terrifying example the people of Bacau had yet seen of the terroristic con¬ spiracy between armed Communists and government authonties. Law had been set aside, judicial author!-

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ties defied, all possibility of redress removed and the city delivered into the hands of bullies. To make the situation of Mihalache still more embarrassing, he was informed by local henchmen that Communist toughs were even then walking up and down the street in front of his hotel, preparing, it was believed, to commit acts of violence. Mihalache was quite skeptical but his hosts were scared. They felt it was no small matter to be responsible for the life of one of the two most vital political leaders in Rumania. After taking copious notes from local oppositionists on the hooligan acts of four days previous, I decided to go out for supper, even though the local National-Peasant big shots advised against it. The move proved unwise. Before leaving the hotel, I knocked at Mihalache’s door to tell him where I was going; he said he was go¬ ing, too. So, scorning the advice of the people who pre¬ dicted danger, we went to a restaurant on the same side of the street about fifty yards away. About ten of us including local friends sat down in a modest eating house to a modest meal. The most striking figure of the company was a large, elderly, robust, straight¬ standing reserve colonel dressed in civilian clothes. He seemed cheerful and confident and I felt quite secure beside him, believing that he alone would be able to dispose of a fair number of fanatical youthful Stalinites. But I was wrong. He may indeed have succeeded in handling three or four, but that wasn’t enough. The meal proceeded quite pleasantly until we reached the coffee, after having disposed of excellent pork chops. By that time the restaurant had filled up with ordinary hungry people, others who seemed just curious, and a few who looked to me rather tough. At a little table near us were two men from the Secret Police. The atmosphere seemed to be a bit strained—at least my

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atmosphere was—and just as the coffee was brought to the table, a band attacked the restaurant from out¬ side, meeting resistance from a number of Mihalache’s young supporters whom the local party chief had called for that very purpose. Window panes crashed, doors went smashing down, bottles flew through the air, chairs took the place of maces, and confusion mounted, as the attackers appeared to be pressing toward Miha¬ lache’s table which was in the back of the room. Not much time was necessary for us to rise from our sup¬ per and take action. Mihalache, closely surrounded by his loyal henchmen, moved towards the back door, and I decided to follow. For one heroic moment I had thought of remaining in the restaurant to see what the attacking ruffians would actually do but journalistic prudence persuaded me to go along with the man who was the chief object of the attack in order to see what happened to him. Of course I cannot swear that this journalistic prudence was not accompanied by a rather vivid personal desire not to have my head busted. As I saw those chairs fly¬ ing about and bottles crashing down on other people’s pates, I’m sure I felt relieved that my own head was still intact. In any case, when Mr. Mihalache and his bodyguards passing through the rear door of the restaurant, trav¬ ersed an alley way, and reached the back door of the yard, I was not far behind. And I fully shared his dis¬ comfort upon discovering that the backdoor was al¬ ready blocked by Communist ruffians. They had plotted well and surrounded the whole building. But we had good local strategists well acquainted with the terrain. They led us over a very high fence, up a narrow creak¬ ing stairway along an outside corridor, over a high and rather

formidable

masonry

partition

between

two

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houses, onto another corridor into a stranger’s apart¬ ment. As we entered, without asking anybody, the noise increased without, the fight raged below in the restaurant and a shot was heard. We quickly extin¬ guished all lights, kept deep silence and awaited events. We had to wait a long time but were greatly relieved— at least I was—that the attackers did not find their way to our hiding place. We had a fairly good view from large front win¬ dows and hour after hour I saw the angry Communist besiegers moving up and down in front of our building. Midnight came and went but they continued their vigil. We faced the pleasant prospect that on the next day, which was Sunday, all the Communist workers would be free to come and finish the task which a few score of their comrades had so nobly begun. It was quite plain that phoning to the police chief or public prose¬ cutor or mayor was utterly useless for they seemed to have instigated the attack. Any official who had wanted to preserve order would have known by that time what was going on even if he had been at a drunken brawl, because the hubbub filled the center of town. However, before morning the street grew quiet. We sent out scouts as Noah his doves, and discovered that the red waters had receded. The scouts found our chauffeur and I went to the hotel for my baggage. We also collected Mihalache’s baggage and in about a quar¬ ter of an hour, as dawn was approaching, proceeded on our way to a place called Focshani which we hoped would be more comfortable—as it proved to be. Later in the day after Mihalache had held a conference with a dozen local supporters in a private house, we ate a hasty but bounteous lunch and proceeded to Ramnicul Sarat, where he held what was to me the most interest¬ ing conference of the whole tour.

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Local delegates who had been invited to attend as¬ sembled in the small club of the National-Peasant party to see if, in Mihalache’s presence, they couldn’t iron out differences between two rival groups. They couldn’t. Everyone spoke his piece, each side expressed its views without restraint and without vituperation. The pro¬ ceeding was as orderly as it was democratic and no one pounded on the table. Mihalache gave much wise ad¬ vice, and others did, too—elders as well as youth—but it went unheeded. The peasant chief departed from this meeting sad and with the promise to return later in order to take definite action. The holding of such a controversial conference before a foreign correspon¬ dent, without apology and without attempts to mini¬ mize unpleasant facts, seemed to me a demonstration of political candor and of government by the people. It wasn’t very good government yet, but at least Mi¬ halache was training his associates in democratic meth¬ ods. We reached Bucharest late that evening with a rather bounteous gift of cheese which had been given Mihalache by one of his peasant admirers. On parting, he shared it equitably among himself, a political asso¬ ciate, the taxi-driver and me. Before I told him good-bye at the house of one of his Bucharest friends where he was spending the night, he informed me that word had come from Bacau that the hefty, jovial colonel who partook of our unfinished supper with us and who, because of a feeling of military honor did not care to retreat through back-yards, was so badly beaten by the Communist attackers that he was then in a hospital. The reader will probably not be sur¬ prised when I say the thought occurred to me that I might have been there beside him—if not in a morgue. As I shook hands with the peasant chief, telling him good-bye, I realized what the mob of well-trained Com-

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munist ruffians were after. They had wanted to beat him up in order to remove him from the election fight. I had witnessed a horrible demonstration of deceit and treachery. After the acceptance by Dr. Groza of the Moscow Agreement demanding political liberty in Ru¬ mania, after the express promise of the Groza govern¬ ment before an American Ambassador that political liberty would be guaranteed, government officials and hooligans organized by the principal government party deliberately tried to eliminate from political activity one of the foremost champions of democracy in the land. And at that moment Mihalache’s party actually had a representative of ministerial rank in the Groza cabinet as had been required by the Moscow Agreement. To make the matter worse, during succeeding days the press and radio at Moscow as well as the organ of the Red Army in Bucharest expressed approval of such “lessons” given “to Rumanian fascists.” A number of days after my return to Bucharest I learned that hooligans, armed with rifles, revolvers and light machine guns had broken into the home of my host at Suceava and murdered him in his bedroom in the presence of his family. I suppose the blood spattered over the bed on which I had slept. No one was ever arrested for the crime. It is difficult not to believe that the murderers were the government-paid, police-di¬ rected ruffians whom I had seen at Suceava and Radautz. They were the shock troops of the “new de¬ mocracy.” My host’s name was Trajan Tsaranu. And that was barely the beginning of Communist violence.

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Chapter XVIII RUSSIAN SOLDIERS INTERVENE WITH GUNS Long accounts of terror, torture, slave camps and murder are tedious. They tend to blunt perception. By irritating a listener or reader, they may actually arouse sympathy for or tolerance toward terror-using tyrants. Nevertheless, one cannot comprehend the Communist regime in Rumania or Communism in general unless he comes to realize that Communism is based on vio¬ lence and lies. A person living in unbroken safety far from scenes of broken heads or bleeding corpses does not easily appreciate what a Bolshevik regime is. To understand the essence of Communism, one must get an actual picture of armed Communist bands killing Mr. Jones, or breaking the bones of John Smith, or charging a meeting arranged by Neighbor Adams and attended by the family across the street. In view of that I shall devote one more chapter to Communist violence. And I choose cases which oc¬ curred during an election campaign soon after the sign¬ ing of an international agreement, according to which the U. S. pledged there would be political freedom in Rumania. Opposition meetings at that time should have been as free from government violence as the meetings of Mr. Stassen or Mr. Dewey held in Oregon during May 1948, as free as the Republican National Convention held in Philadelphia during June. On a Saturday morning I went by train to the city of Constantza on the Black Sea to report a congress of

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the National-Peasant Party which was to be held on the following day. Arriving a little after noon, I sought lodging and hospitality in the home of one of the party members, since the hotels were occupied by Russians. My first task was to present myself to the authorities. After a pleasant visit with the mayor, formally a So¬ cialist but then in the service of the Communist Party, I stopped for a moment at the office of the prefect, who was not in. He was reputed to be the real master of the district and I observed that the opposition there was afraid of him. Although formerly belonging to the National-Peasant Party, he had entered the service of the Soviet Union. And his activity was of unusual value at that key point. Constantza lies on the way from Moscow to the Dardanelles and the Mediterra¬ nean, in consequence of which it was of extreme impor¬ tance. It is a pivot of Russian imperialism and already had the appearance of a Soviet stronghold. The gen¬ eral situation there seemed to me even more interesting than the party congress which was to be held next day. Thanks to the kindness of a friend, who had an au¬ tomobile at his disposal, I was able to get a quick view of the city and its environs. The harbor, which is Ru¬ mania’s only good sea port, was completely in Russian hands. Many American boats came and went, but while in harbor were unreservedly under Russian control and could refuel, load or unload only in accordance with Russian orders carried out under direct Russian super¬ vision. The captains of many American ships there were subjected to much inconvenience, even actual hu¬ miliation, in spite of the fact that they visited Con¬ stantza exclusively to bring aid to Russia or to eastern European countries dominated by Russia. As I went from the harbor through the city, 1 saw a greater con¬ centration of Russian soldiers than I had observed

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anywhere else in the Balkans. Not only had most build¬ ings been taken over by them, wholly or in part, but a large section of the town had been cleared of Ruma¬ nians on Russian orders and placed at the exclusive dis¬ posal of the Soviet occupiers. Constantza was the place to which an ancient Roman government exiled the rather gifted Latin poet, Ovid. At the time, it must have been a very wretched little Greek port, and the letters Ovid wrote back home show he was lonely and unhappy. But his statue in Constantza seemed still lonelier on the day of my visit, for it had gone into a new exile among the Russians. As bronze Ovid watched the snappy Soviet traffic cop in front of him directing a whirlpool of Russian automobiles, trucks and motorcycles hither and thither he may have thought of ancient Caesarian war chariots racing through Rome. Practically all the other traffic police¬ men in the whole of Constantza at that time were Russian, too. I learned at first hand of a misfortune which had hap¬ pened to one of the finest homes in that once favored quarter of the city, looking out over the Black Sea. It had been requisitioned by a Soviet Admiral along with furniture, carpets, pictures, dishes and library. The Rumanian owner who had great pride in his luxurious dwelling and who had observed the damage often done to homes occupied by the Red Army called upon the Admiral and in a polite way suggested that the Russian would not be needing all the pictures, statuary, rugs and things which the owner had collected in his nice house. The proprietor also went on in a humane and friendly way to ask the Admiral if he would resent the removal of these objects to the temporary dwelling which the Rumanian owner had been compelled to rent. The Admiral was very courteous in his answer and capi-

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vated the suspicious Rumanian by assuring him he was free to remove anything he wished—if perchance he presumed to believe that a Soviet Admiral would not take care of even the best furniture or was not accus¬ tomed to luxurious surroundings. The Rumanian felt ashamed of himself for having been so rude, left all the articles there and told his friends how fortunate he was that his house had been taken over by a nice cultured Admiral. But six months later he was not so happy because, when the Russian was transferred to a new post, his boat sailed away from Constantza with all the nice -furniture in that house, including the rugs and the deco¬ rative bric-a-brac. Yet even at that the Rumanian was lucky inasmuch as the building was left intact. I dis¬ covered on driving along the seashore that a great many fine buildings in that area had been almost ruined. They stood as sad, blind wrecks, with windows broken, doors smashed, electric light fixtures stolen and bathroom equipments taken away. Even the floors in some cases were ripped up. That was strikingly true in the case of the best sum¬ mer hotel to be found in Rumania and one of the best in the whole lower Danube area. It had been built only a year or so before the Second World War by the Ru¬ manian State Railways, which hoped to profit from tourists wishing to enjoy a vacation on the sea during the hot summer months. It was modern in every re¬ spect, picturesquely situated, equipped with porches, terraces, a roof garden, and supplied with attractive furniture. The German Army occupied it for a while but left it whole. Later the Russian Army took it over _and devastated it. Moscow may have considered it war booty.

Perhaps other villas in the same vicinity

were war booty, too; at least they were partially ruined.

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Most of the buildings, institutions and amusement places that had made Constantza the pleasantest Black Sea summer resort—outside of Russia—seemed to me dilapidated, wrecked and repellent. The reason for the presence of such large Russian military forces in Constantza was plain; even the brief¬ est sojourn by the most casual observer dramatically revealed Russia’s imperial interest in that part of the world. Not far to the north is the many-channeled Delta of the Danube River, the chief source of com¬ munication for central and southeast Europe. Any state holding the Delta has in its hands a key for much of the commerce of the continent. And Russia has long been determined to hold the key. It took and retains physical possession of the north bank of the Delta and of islands exercising direct control over its outlets. By its heavy occupation of the strip of land lying between the Lower Danube and the Black Sea, which is known as Dobrudja, it also obtained control over the south bank. A bird could hardly fly over the Danube Delta without Russian knowledge and of course no ship of any kind could move there without Soviet clearance. Russia, through an agreement between Moscow and its subsidiary Bucharest government, created a naviga¬ tion society called “Sovromtransport,” through which it placed its hands on all of Rumania’s Danubian com¬ merce. This makes the control of the Delta by the Russian Army and Navy all the more advantageous. Another reason why the Dobrudja is especially im¬ portant for Russia is that it is one of the historical lanes between that empire and the Aegean Sea.

Through

that lane have passed armies and tribes coming down from Asia and through it also have marched conquering armies

coming tip

from

Turkey

and

from

Rome.

Through it have fled Bulgarian refugees before Turk-

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ish conquerors and across it have passed eastern Eu¬ ropean nations seeking an outlet on the Black Sea. The control of this wide, level corridor, and eespecially of its chief port, would be very helpful for Russian forces planning to move south. Naturally, neither Russia nor the Communist Gov¬ ernment which it imposed on Rumania desired opposi¬ tional political activity there. Constantza early became an object of Communist plotting and was seized in a revolutionary manner by the Communist Party before any other city in Rumania, even previous to the installa¬ tion by Vishinsky of the present Communist regime. After that the Constantza Communists exercised the rigidest political and administrative dictatorship over the region and over the port, in closest cooperation with the occupying troops. They had suppressed the activity of all rival parties. And they had not indicated that they would tolerate a meeting of peasants. Con¬ sequently my Constantza hosts were troubled. In view of the fact that Constantza had a fair num¬ ber of dock workers, whom the prefect and his Com¬ munist colleagues had organized in shock brigades well supplied with arms, the National-Peasant Party lead¬ ers carefully screened the persons entering the movie hall to attend their Sunday congress. They stationed a little band of volunteer guards at the door and out¬ side the building on the street, who required all pro¬ spective participants to show party credentials. These guards refused admittance to persons whom they sus¬ pected or whom they knew were Communists. Also, to prevent Communists from occupying the hall in ad¬ vance, as Communists had done in many cities and on many such occasions, National-Peasant Party dele¬ gates assembling from two score Dobrudjan villages oc¬ cupied the hall long before the time set for the opening

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of the meeting, which was ten A. M. My own plans were first to attend a government meeting which was to be held the same Sunday morning in another movie not far away and at which the Minister of Propaganda, Peter Constantinescu-Jasi, who had come down from Bucha¬ rest, was to speak. After that I planned to visit the National-Peasant congress. At nine o’clock we received word at the home where I had spent the night and where I was breakfasting, that everything in the National-Peasant hall was quiet but that there was an ominous feeling of tension in the air. In fact, Communists had tried to push into the hall by force and had been kept out by the volunteer guards. A little later as I was getting ready to go out to see what was happening, a messenger rushed into our dining room saying that a large group of armed Communists had broken into the hall, beaten the peas¬ ants there, smashed tables and chairs and torn down the pictures. I rushed to the place which was not far away and found a group of dark-complexioned, dour appearing, grim-faced men armed with clubs in tbe street outside the movie, whose windows had been broken. On entering the empty hall, accompanied by Rumanian acquaintances, I saw the demolished tables, broken chairs and ruined party emblems. Two fierce-looking men in civilian clothes held guard over the deserted hall. One of them, who was tall and lean and very earnest, ordered me to get out. When T inquired who he was, he said, “from the Secret Police” and showing his card, repeated that if I didn’t get out there’d be trouble. I presumed to ask him what had happened and he said in a surly manner that the work¬ ers had driven out the peasants. He added that if the peasants wanted to hold a meeting, they could go to Maniu’s town and hold it in his house, which inciden-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE tally was about 500 miles away.

305

He also said with

much vehemence and through his teeth that “peasants couldn’t come here and beat up workers.” He also told me once more to get out, which I did, trying to prevent my feet from revealing the alacrity that my heart coun¬ selled. On leaving I saw, as I had seen on entering, that the dark-visioned youths outside on the street were burning piles of National-Peasant papers and periodi¬ cals, which had been assembled for distribution at the congress. After watching these ardent agents of Groza’s “dem¬ ocratic government” violently take benighted peasants out of the realm of darkness in true Hitlerian fashion, I went back to the house of my host to see if I could get in touch with the men who had been beaten up. I found plenty of them. I interviewed peasants, teachers, doc¬ tors, newspaper men, workers, small merchants, one at a time, and with no party boss to coach them. No one had an opportunity to prompt the other or to tell me a composite story. I saw persons who had been sta¬ tioned outside the meeting place as guards, others who had been in the vestibule as guards, and many who had fled from the hall as helpless victims. Later, I visited a very badly beaten boy in his own home whither his weeping mother had conducted me. I also visited the chief of police and his helper who spoke to me rather freely. The story which I got from the testimonies of no fewer than 20 people was that a band of more than 200 men armed with clubs and iron rods had marched in thick ranks from Communist Headquarters to the movie, sweeping away resistance, breaking into the vestibule, savagely beating the few guards inside who tried to hold them back. Having beaten their way into

306

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the hall they made a general attack on the audience, which precipitously fled through a rear and side en¬ trance. Many of the participants in the meeting were beaten before they were able to leave and a fairly large number after they had left, by Communists waiting for them at the exits. Some were knocked down on the street and kicked as they lay prostrate; with each blow or kick they were told, “There’s a Maniu for you,” or, “Take that Maniu.” When a well known local National-Peasant leader fell into Communist hands, they cried, “Kill him, kill him.” However, no one was killed. Arrests immediately followed—not of the Com¬ munist attackers—but of the victims. Remnants of the meeting assembled at the home of the National-Peasant leader and held a hasty business meeting which passed for the official organizational part of the congress. I noticed as this small meeting was going on in densely packed room that the ringleaders of the Communists waited in small groups outside. At one time they tried to enter the house, but were repulsed and made no further attempts. After finishing my conversations with the victims of this bloody attack, I visited the government meeting which had not yet ended and learned that Professor Constantinescu-Jasi, Minister of Propaganda, had been in a street not far from the place where the beating, destruction and burning of peasant literature were tak¬ ing place. An eye-witness and ear-witness told me that he had heard the Minister congratulate one of his local supporters for the successful manner in which they had broken up an opposition meeting. The prefect was seen to pass by the scene of the attack, while the ruffians were still burning the papers. The chief-of-police ad¬ mitted that a large column of “citizens” had broken into the. hall and attacked the meeting.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

307

As I entered his office, I noticed a large, lurid election poster on the wall condemning the opposition party as fascists, and urging the people to vote against such “enemies of the people.” The very police who were paid by the nation to protect civil liberties and preserve order were being officially incited by the government to take sides in the election struggle and to suppress civil liberty. On returning to Bucharest I learned of a political meeting that had been broken up by Russian soldiers on the same day. The outrage had occurred in the little city of Rosiori de Vede, about 50 miles from the capi¬ tal. The following morning I visited it, arriving well before noon. I went in a car bearing an official Ameri¬ can flag and with me was an interpreter connected with the American Mission. We made our first calls on the mayor, the chief-of-police and the town clerk. In the office also was another prominent government sup¬ porter, so we got the official local government opinion. The officials treated me courteously and conversed frankly. They admitted that the meeting had been broken up by Russians but asserted that feelings were extremely tense in town because of the “fascist ac¬ tivity” of the National-Peasant Party, and insisted that Russian intervention had prevented bloodshed. We went from the mayor’s officee to find some of the local National-Peasants.

At first we could find nobody

because they were in hiding for the purpose of evading arrest. The Rumanians have learned from bitter expe¬ rience that after a clash it is always the victims that are arrested and not the aggressors, in consequence of which prominent oppositionists in city, town or village do not stay at home during days and nights of excite¬ ment. However, the sight of our American flag aroused the courage of bystanders on the streets who saw us

308

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

passing back and forth in our search, and soon a youth volunteered to put us in touch with some of the men we were hunting. We went under his guidance to the local club of the National-Peasant Party, which consisted of three rooms, and there in the smallest of the rooms I took my place, along with the interpreter, behind a long table. Soon ten or fifteen people had collected in the larger hall and I invited them to come in, one at a time. Each new arrival sat down in a chair before us and in answer to my questions told what he had seen. Be¬ fore the examination ended I had talked with youth and bearded elders, workers, dirt-peasants and well-todo merchants, lawyers and teachers, Jews and Gentiles. Some were so indignant that they could not tell a coher¬ ent story; others were too simple and still others too sophisticated to describe plainly and clearly what had happened. But some were excellent witnesses. The majority had seen only a small portion of what had taken place and from a limited vantage point. Two or three had gained an overall picture which seemed quite accurate. Piecing everything together, and checking it all with what the government official had said, I es¬ tablished the following facts: Fairly early on the morning of the meeting one of the Russians in town, not of Slavic origin, told a local Rumanian, not of Latin origin, that he had better not attend the projected gathering. He didn’t go into de¬ tails but from the serious tone in which the laconic warning had been given, the local Rumanian felt that something serious was going to happen.

By ten o’clock

the hall of the small building, which normally consti¬ tutes the only movie in town, was filled with peasant delegates and the little gallery also was packed.

The

spacious yard between the movie and the street was

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

309

well filled, too, where an overflow crowd had gathered to hear the speeches, which were fo be transmitted through loud-speakers that had been set up without government permission. The meeting itself was legal in every respect and I saw the letter in which the au¬ thorities had granted permission for the convocation. But under the Groza government, official acts are often quite deceptive. Even before the meeting had begun, two Soviet sol¬ diers went up into the humble gallery, looked down at the crowd and said to one another in the hearing of a local Rumanian who understood Russian, “They are all fascists.” The soldiers seemed very indignant—per¬ haps they were aroused by the King’s picture occupying a prominent place on the wall at the back of the stage, or by pictures of the two chief opposition leaders, Maniu and Mihalache. A Rumanian there strongly protested against the presence of the two Russian soldiers who formed part of the small garrison whose headquarters were close to the movie. And the Russians eventually left, going down into the yard, before the meeting had begun. Shortly after the congress was opened, a disturbance was caused by a participant who had come from a^neighboring city and who kept interrupting by yelling, Tong live Stalin.” This exclamation is a favorite device of the Communists who want to break up oppposition meet¬ ings, because if repeated loud enough even by a few obstructionists, it completely drowns out what the speakers are trying to say and makes them seem silly. If, on the other hand, the crowd begins to boo the hooli¬ gans crying “Long live Stalin” or attempts to throw them out. it is immediately accused of insulting the Soviet empire. However, in spite of this embarrassment the people in the little hall at Rosiori-de-Vede did throw

310

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the interrupter out.

As he was precipitated from the

hall, an armed Russian who was standing in the yard by the door fired into the air, apparently to intimidate the crowd. However, no more excitement occurred, no panic followed and neither the hall nor the yard were evacuated. The meeting continued peacefully as the expelled interrupter went through the yard into the street. However, he soon returned with a man and his wife, school teachers, who were reputed to be the most ruth¬ less and fanatical of all the local Communists and who were said to carry arms. The situation still was not considered serious for there were far too few Commu¬ nists in the town to risk a fight with the assembled peasants who were in no mood to accept Communist insults and who would have been aided by sympathetic townspeople. On arriving at the open door of the little movie hall, packed with listeners, these two Commu¬ nists began loudly to protest and directly to challenge the speakers on the stage nearby. Naturally they were answered by the audience inside, only a few feet away, and a battle of words followed, which was soon accen¬ tuated by repeated volleys fired by at least four Russian soldiers standing in the doorway and at large open windows. The movie was a very primitive, diminutive theater with doors and windows opening directly into the yard. Consequently the people in the packed hall were only a few feet from the Russians standing out¬ side. The National-Peasant audience and the Soviet soldiers were almost as close to one another as people standing in the same aisle. The Russians, emptying cartridge after cartridge, fired over the heads of the people, toward the stage and in all directions.

Many of their bullets perforated

the picture of the King; others pierced the ceiling. They

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

311

ripped to smithereens the wooden framewoik at the front of the stage. While this was going on, one 01 two other Russian soldiers from the garrison on the other side of the building entered a small side room used for the dressing quarters of actors when local talent plays were given, and from there also shot into the wall behind the stage. It was a cross-fire. Naturally a panic broke out, people fled with all possible haste and the meeting was permanently broken up. The yard also was cleared. Everybody got away safely and no one suffered any more serious personal injury than bruises received in the stampede to elude the Russians. After the hall was emptied, Communists entered, broke up some of the benches, smashed a table or two and tore the King’s picture to pieces, as well as the picture of Maniu. Later, police officials appeared and confis¬ cated the electric and sound apparatus of the movie proprietor. . I found no disagreement among the witnesses on the main points, whether on the side of the government or of the opposition. Some emphatically insisted that tie Russian soldiers had entered the little hall and fired from the inside. That they poked their rifles through the door and windows seems certain. Others asserted tht Communists also had fired revolvers. Government witnesses asserted that one of the speakers had made a disagreeable remark about the Communist leader, Ana Pauker, and it was reported that somebody in the audience cried, “Down with the Communists. I he opposition declared in unanimity that no one made any insulting remark of any kind about any government leader and that no reflection of any kind was made upon Russia or the Red Army. In view of the extremely tense feeling even before the meeting, I myself did not find it hard to believe that some indignant oppositionist

312

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

did veil, “Down with Ana Pauker.” She certainly is the most hated woman in Rumania and I am under the impression that the Rumanians do not always have the restraint required to abstain from expressing their feelings about people they so detest. Judging on the basis of my experience in Rumania at opposition meet¬ ings, I believe that no one in that congress—either from the stage or from the hall—made any public derogatory exclamation against Russia or the Red Army. And even if someone had denounced Dr. Groza or Ana Pauker or Bodnaras, the Moscow Agreement, in pro¬ viding for political liberty, guaranteed that very right. During this investigation, I visited the movie which had been the scene of the trouble, saw the damage, and talked with the distressed proprietor who had watched everything, and I considered it established beyond all doubt that Russian soldiers deliberately broke up a Rumanian political meeting by the use of rifles. And not only did the local people confirm these facts as be¬ yond question, but Bucharest party leaders who spoke at the meeting and came from Rosiori-de-Vede that very night made the same report. I think the most im¬ portant aspect of the investigation was that not one of the local officials denied that armed Russians had broken up the meeting. And no one in town, whether friend or foe of Dr. Groza and of Ana Pauker, suggested even by the faintest hint that there was no Russian garrison there. On the contrary they showed us exactly where the garrison was and told us the exact number of sol¬ diers in it. An additional confirmation of the report that Russian soldiers had intervened is the fact that a few days later the offending garrison was replaced. Yet General I. Z. Susaikov, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Bucharest, looked an American officer straight in the eye and emphatically, almost furiously,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

313

declared: “This report is all a lie, for there was not one Russian soldier station in that town.” After such a performance on the part of a General, the reader may judge for himself as to the value of an official Russian statement. What happened in that little Rumanian town on that Sunday morning was somewhat more flagrant than the customary Russian intervention up to that time, but throughout the country large and small members of the Russian Control Commission constantly terrorized the people and threatened members of the historical par¬ ties with dire punishment. Rumanian editors were re¬ peatedly called by Russian officers and menaced with retribution. Printers were warned not to print opposi¬ tion material. The Rumanian police sent printed sum¬ mons to opposition youth informing them that if they did not comply with certain orders, they would be handed over to the Russians. The number of Ruma¬ nian citizens of Bessarabian, Hungarian, German and even Greek origin that were seized in their homes, both men and women, and sent off to forced labor in Russia, mounted into the scores of thousands. However, most Soviet intervention was not so direct. A majority of the political persecutions in Rumania were carried on by Rumanian citizens, trained in the school of Russian Bolsheviks and acting as Russian agents un¬ der Russian orders. An attack by such Russian agents occurred on a June Sunday early in the morning when a group of leading members of the opposition National Liberal Party left the city of Craiova, situated in southcentral Rumania near the bank of the Danube river, in a bus to go to the little town of Plenitza where they were to hold a political meeting. Craiova, like Constantza and a few other Danubian cities, vital for communica¬ tions from Russia into the Balkans, was filled with

314

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Russian soldiers. And, as in all such places, where armed Russians are complete masters, the local Com¬ munist organization was extremely aggressive. Com¬ munist shock troops constantly rushed about in state trucks at state expense, terrorizing opponents. Yet, in spite of that, the Liberal leaders dared to set out in an unprotected bus for a meeting several miles away. Chief among the oppositionists was the lawyer Ion Plessia, who for years had occupied a high position in the party and was a member of the Rumanian Peace Delegation at Paris in 1918. When the autobus reached the woods at Bucovats, eight miles from Craiova, Com¬ munists who had been transported there by two trucks belonging to the Rumanian State Railways, shot at the Liberals with machine guns, gravely wounding a num¬ ber and of course causing their car to stop. After that the attacked passengers were robbed of their money and their watches, taken into the nearby woods and savagely beaten. The bus was overturned and was so severely damaged that it could not go forward or re¬ turn. In time the two state trucks which the Commu¬ nist Party was using for its own aims disappeared with the armed Communists whose hands were bloody and whose pockets were filled with loot. Shortly there¬ after the prefect of the locality, a renegade priest who was a former supporter of the Fascist Legionnaires but is now an active Communist, “accidently” passed by. He feigned surprise and indignation “at this attack by bandits” and took one of the most severely wounded men back to town. That the attackers were not bandits was immediately established by the fact that some of the men who were robbed, beaten and shot recognized a number of them as fellow Craiova citizens. One of the most severely wounded Liberals was the leader of the group, Dr. Plessia, whose face was cov-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

315

ered with blood from a shot in the head. When the prefect presumed to express his sympathy for the wounded man, Plessia passed his hands over his own wounds and struck the prefect in his face, saying, “My blood is upon your head.” I heard this account from friends of the victims and, in addition, received a de¬ tailed personal report from an American friend of mine who had long lived in Rumania, whose veracity is be¬ yond question, and who visited Plessia in the hospital the day after he was shot. This friend, who was making a tour through the provinces for non-political reasons, had gotten the names of a number of prominent Ruma¬ nians from his friends in the capital. He reached Craiova all unaware of what had happened and on hunting Plessia, whose name was among those given him, was horrified to find that the Liberal leader had been shot by political ruffians, trained and armed by the government. Some weeks before this, Minister Mihail Rommceanu, a representative of the Liberal Party in the Groza cabinet, which he entered in January in accord¬ ance with the Moscow Agreement, was traveling in a private automobile in eastern Rumania for the purpose of attending a political meeting. His automobile was stopped by a band of Communist shock troops riding in a state truck and one of Romnicenau’s companions was severely beaten. After that the Minister was forced by the Communist ruffians to turn back and fol¬ low them toward the city of Galatz. Romnicenau’s pro¬ tests were unavailing and his oft-repeated statement that such treatment of a Cabinet Minister was scanda¬ lous only evoked ridicule. Rumania’s Communist dicta¬ tors said that they “knew what to do with fascist ^The^Liberal

^ hig ser;ousiy wounded col-

316

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

league followed the truck back toward one of the most notorious terroristic Communist headquarters in Ru¬ mania. However, as they were passing an intermediary town in which a hospital was situated, the chauffeur managed to drive the car hastily into the hospital yard and the gates were closed before the Communist bullies were able to get in. Native hospital personnel gathered and kept them out until enough help arrived from town to prevent an assault by force. However, the Commu¬ nist aggressors besieged the place until late in the eve¬ ning when they were finally called off by high authorities. After the armed assault upon the Liberals near Craiova, made in state-owned vehicles, not one culprit was arrested; after the attack on Cabinet Minister Romniceanu, no amends of any kind were made. No redress was possible under the Rumanian Communist Government. In many cases to ask authorities for help was worse than futile. It was actually dangerous, be¬ cause the authorities themselves participated in the plots. They were fellow-conspirators. Policemen are paid and trained to attack Rumanian citizens. On practically the same day on which Cabinet Minis¬ ter Romniceanu, who represented the Liberal Party, was forcibly prevented by Communists from attending a political meeting, Cabinet Minister Emil Hatieganu, representing the National-Peasant Party, was held up by a band of Communist ruffans in another part of the country near the Transylvanian city of Dej as he was crossing a river on a small improvised ferry to go to his home village from where he expected later to depart for a National-Peasant meeting. The government not only made no amends whatsoever, but accused the Minister of having provoked the ruffians who stopped him.

In that case also a state railway truck was used

by the attackers.

A few days later, in the same city of

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

317

Dej, an ex-minister, Ghitza Pop, who was distinguished for his moderation, accompanied by Anton Muresanu, a somewhat more vehement National-Peasant leader, was attacked and his automobile was set afire. The two opposition leaders had to rush into a woods and flee under cover of darkness in order to save their lives. Such cases of conspirational Communist assaults, made upon the opposition under the protection of gov¬ ernment officials, usually occurred in provincial places or along lonely roads far from the observation of the world, but now and then they took place in the middle of Bucharest. On the 15th of May, for example, Com¬ munists in the capital launched an attack on the largest hall in the city, which was situated just across the square from the Royal Palace and was in sight of the guests, mostly foreigners, in Rumania’s best hotel, Athenee Palace. The hubbub lasted for more than an hour within a few rods of the Ministry of Interior, within the sight of Rumanian policemen and Russian soldiers, and practically within earshot of the heavily staffed Russian Control Commission. It did not stop until two American officers intervened. On that day I was attending a political meeting held by Dr. Groza in the Transylvania city of Blaj, so was not an eye-witness, but I got the story direct from Americans and Ruma¬ nians who had observed it and some of whom had been the victims. The meeting that caused the Communist attack was the annual commemoration of the anniversary of a Rumanian

uprising

against

Hungarian

domination

launched at Blaj during the fateful year of 1848. Nor¬ mally the date is celebrated as a Rumanian Fourth of July. But it happens that Blaj, where the 1848 upris¬ ing took place, is the city of Juliu Maniu, the main op¬ position leader. Also one of the principal and most

318

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

highly esteemed figures in that revolution was the uncle of Juliu Maniu. And the main vehicle in the struggle for Rumanian liberation was the National Party of Transylvania of which Maniu has been leader for dec¬ ades and which joined with Mihalache’s Peasant Party after the first World War. Thus Rumanian national¬ ism is historically bound up with Maniu and his party. Consequently, the celebration in Bucharest of the Blaj uprising tended to draw the attention of the nation to the historical activity of the Transylvania Rumanians, the overwhelming majority of whom support Maniu. Naturally that was displeasing to the Communists whose leadership for the most part is not Rumanian and most of whose members are more loyal to the Soviet Union than to Rumania. The Bucharest Com¬ munists chose the Rumanian Fourth of July as an occa¬ sion on which to make a brutal attack against Rumanian patriotism. The hall in an imposing building known as the Atheneum, where the commemoration was held, was well filled before the hour set for the speeches. The audience was plainly non-Communistic and prospects for an imposing and peaceful celebration seemed good, even though no important non-government meeting had yet been held in Bucharest, without interruption at the hands of Communist bullies. Everything appeared so well ar¬ ranged and promising that Maniu himself was urged to attend and consented.

In the audience also were

other leaders of the National-Peasant Party as well as former Premier General Nicolae Radescu, whom the Communists forced out of power on the eve of the 6th of March, 1945, and who saved his life at that time by appealing to the British Political Mission where he was given refuge. The main speaker was Minister Emil Hatieganu who is a historian; in his address he

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE devoted himself to history rather than politics.

319

Maniu

was naturally applauded by the crowd, as was Radescu. Hatieganu’s address likewise aroused hearty cheers. It was a typical patriotic meeting such as might be held in any American town on the Fourth of July. The sponsors and participants were especially pleased that everything had gone oft so quietly but were shocked when, on beginning to leave the building, they were attacked by Communist hooligans stationed at every entrance. With the help of a strong body¬ guard, which made a compact “center rush,” Maniu was able to make his way to an automobile that was waiting for him and arrived home without injury. Radescu’s attempts to leave the building were twice frustrated, and in his struggle he received bloody blows on his bald head. He finally escaped with the help of American officers who came to prevent innocent people who had attended a traditional patriotic meeting on one of the best established Rumanian holidays from being beaten by ruffians. Even as it was, not a few women and children were mishandled, clothes were torn,

heads were

bruised, valuables were snatched.

One of the men suffering the most, whom I myself visited as he lay at home wounded, was Mr. Pan Halipa,

a prominent Bessarabian, who had

a minister in a National-Peasant cabinet.

once been Tiying to

escape through a back entrance, he was seized by a band of shock troops, bloodily beaten on the head and so cruelly kicked on the hips and legs after he had been thrown to the ground that he could hardly walk.

He

beo-ged to be allowed to go to the home of a friend nearby but his captors refused his request. Instead of that they decided to take him to the Communist-run Central Labor Syndicate where, it appears, the attack originated.

As he limped along between his cruel and

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

heartless escorts, he passed a Rumanian policeman and begged for aid, whereupon the boys struck him even more relentlessly over the face and head. Proceeding further on his bloody involuntary march, he met some Russian soldiers, which is not strange since one of the barracks of Russian soldiers was sta¬ tioned not 10 yards from the place where the meeting was held. As the elderly ex-minister appealed to repre¬ sentatives of the Red Army, who two years earlier took Mr. Halipa’s Bessarabia from Rumania, they shrugged their shoulders and Halipa was again beaten by the young shock troops whom the Russians have made mas¬ ters of Rumania. Finally they got him to the Labor Union Headquar¬ ters, which is one of Rumania’s principal nests of vio¬ lence, and took him into an office where he saw other people, mostly youths, sitting wounded and bloody on the floor, as their persecutors tried to force them to join the Communist Party. After being forced to stand some time and after being subjected to many insults, Halipa appeared to have won the sympathy of a young man who offered to take him home in an automobile. Since more than one Rumanian during recent years has been taken out to a horrible death in woods beside the city by youths in automobiles, Halipa was reluctant to accept the kind offer. However, he thought it wouldn’t be any worse to be done to death in the woods than in that house of inquisition, so he consented, and limped out to the car. He actually was taken to an address which he had given near to his own home and lived to tell me the tale. I also heard the story of the Atheneum assault direct from the Americans who had seen the raging Commu¬ nist mob and were the chief factors in dispersing it. In fact, these Americans got a little favorable action

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

321

even from the Communist Minister of Interior, who sent a car to save a prospective victim of the Minister’s own fanatical comrades. This unprovoked attack in the middle of the city before the eyes of the world was so outrageous that even the Communist press for the first and only time refrained from praising its shock troopers. These acts of violence, committed against unknown people thousands of miles away, may seem unimportant to Americans. All the accounts are tedious, some are banal. But they are not without importance, because they reveal the nature of world Communism. Each one of these acts of conspirational brutality was both a lie and a physical outrage. They all occurred at the very time the Communist government was promising before the world that it would grant political freedom and a fair election. The violence was perpetrated before the eyes of official American representatives to whom the Rumanian Communists had given the promise they would grant civil freedom. The Groza government launched its campaign of violence in order to destroy all opposition and impose complete subjugation. The volume and vehemence of terror increased month by month and continued until every vestige of Rumanian freedom or independence disappeared.

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XIX ENSLAVEMENT OF LABOR The Communist regime in Rumania claims to have liberated the nation and especially the workers. Actu¬ ally it has turned the workers into an instrument of power, by means of which it dominates them and the rest of the nation. It uses laborers as troops, by which it subjugates “the toiling masses” and every one else. The regime is a pyramid standing on its peak. The point of the pyramid on which it rests is the small pro¬ portion of Rumanian labor that has been brought into the Communist Party. The total number of Rumanians in 1946 engaged in non-agricultural work was reported to be 701,500, of which 219,400 were owners or managers of enterprises and only 417,100 wage-earners. In addition, 8,000 family members did “auxiliary work.” Of these labor¬ ers and artisans, 84% were men and 16% women. In a word, the total number of urban wage-earners or la¬ borers in Rumania does not reach 500,000 out of a population of 16,000,000. Of this half a million a ma¬ jority work in small shops, in fairly intimate relations with the boss, some earning almost as much as he does. The number of “mass workers” streaming into great factories or daily losing themselves in the darkness of mines, doesn’t reach even a quarter of a million. Inasmuch as Moscow’s army of Rumanian shock troops, helping the Soviets maintain their despotic regime there, is largely recruited from the personnel of the Rumanian State Railroads, one should bear in mind

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

323

that the number of railway employees, including all the clerks and engineers, is 108,148. The railroad work¬ ers number only 42,548. A small fraction of that small number of workers provide a majority of the leading Communist terrorists in Rumania. The total number of state officials is 372,000 which cipher would be considerably increased if the commu¬ nal civil servants were added. Altogether, the wage and salary earners belonging to the Rumanian General Con¬ federation of Labor Unions numbers about 1,600,000, of which fewer than a fourth are industrial laborers. It is upon this “proletariat” that Groza’s Russianimposed government claims to be based. In whatsoever manner one may figure out the num¬ ber of adult males in Dr. Groza’s industrial proletariat, they do not constitute even 3% of the Rumanian popu¬ lation.

If their wives and children are added, the pro¬

portion might rise to 8% or 9%. But of this small proportion of the nation the Rumanian puppet govern¬ ment enjoys the voluntary support certainly of not more than 25 %. The Rumanian Statistical Year Book of 1939/1940 reports that in 1930, the number of skilled laborers in all enterprises was 151,645; of unskilled 248,846; a total of 400,491.

In industry alone—including every

kind—346,555 skilled and unskilled workers were en¬ gaged.

In addition, there were 112,000 learners or

apprentices. Workers were distributed according to industrial branches as follows: Mining . Textiles

.

Metallurgy Food

48,000 32,000

.

53,000

.

58,000

324

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Wood and Lumber.

58,000

Construction Materials.

25,000

Chemicals

.

18,000

.

10,000

Hides and Leather.

8,000

Glass

4,000

Paper

.

There is the basis of Dr. Groza’s “wide democratic concentration.”

A minority of that minority dominates

Rumania by terror—helped by the Soviet Army. The fact that Rumania’s Communist government uses the workers of Rumania for political purposes rather than aiding and protecting them does not mean they have not needed and do not need protection.

They

have been poor, neglected, exploited; and still are.

I

have seen them coming from their mines and they were a sad sight—as most miners are.

I have watched them

leaving their railway shops at night and they seemed to be living on the thin margin of life. Their work ap¬ peared dull and their existence drab. Their life was without much sparkle except for the fact that a Ruma¬ nian can generate considerable sparkle from almost nothing. Visitors in Rumania have noticed that every service or article depending on labor was cheap. A shave or hair-do or shoe-shine or the tailoring of a new suit or repair work or anything else requiring only labor and no material was inexpensive; nothing appeared cheaper than toil. Working people beyond all doubt were poorly paid. In addition, they weren’t adequately pro¬ tected. They were subjected to the caprice of powerful bosses. In connection with hiring, firing, sick leaves, vacations, emergency relief, wage payments, working hours and working conditions, Rumanian laborers have often gotten a bad deal.

One of the reasons was that

Rumania has been a land of slack discipline, or arbitrari-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

325

ness. Rules weren’t always kept, the administration was often weak, law enforcers sometimes didn’t enforce laws very rigidly, order preservers didn’t preserve it on many occasions, tax collectors sometimes under-col¬ lected or over-collected. Strong, clever men were able to “get away with” a good many irregularities and in¬ dustrialists were usually both strong and clever. So they often abused workers. In lands where “pull” counts, those who have the least pull are the most abused—they are the workers. Also, industry is new in Rumania and when hard, ambitious entrepreneurs establish industry for the first time in any primitive or agricultural country, they tend to be ruthless. The whole history of Western industry shows this. They were ruthless in England and far from gentle in the U. S. A. Consequently, Rumanian workers have had many grounds for complaint and any one truly serving the workers’ interests there has de¬ served the approbation of good men everywhere. Natu¬ rally, too, any one promising to serve them readily at¬ tracted their attention and won their allegiance—at least temporarily. It has not been difficult for ambi¬ tious Rumanian politicians to gain quite a following by playing up the hardship of the workers. Sad to say, many parties there have used laborers as political in¬ struments. Politicians do in other lands. That is one side of the picture and a very vital one. But there is another side which one must briefly de¬ scribe, as a help toward understanding the real political situation. Rumanian workers, in spite of all their wretchedness, are better off than many other Ruma¬ nians. The very fact that they migrate to the city and stay in the city proves this. Most Rumanians are peas¬ ants and inhabit humble villages where they dwell in modest houses and during most of the year eat unap-

326

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

petizing food. In ordinary times, they seldom see much money, are often in debt and, as a rule, sell the greater part of the best things which they produce in order to pay taxes or buy a few store goods. Villages have little sport and not many amusements except dances on the village square and occasional parties, in winter. Rare is a village with a movie and still rarer with a theater— or even reading room. Only the church and school— both of which abound—offer much relief from the monotony of life. Rumanian villagers seldom starve but many of them have lived half submerged, seldom rising to the level of a good life. And with the population rapidly grow¬ ing, the amount of land available for each newly-formed family has steadily diminished. For such reasons peas¬ ants go to the city seeking work, and whatever they find seems to many of them better than what they had back home. They often migrate without their families, live in poor crowded quarters and reduce their expendi¬ tures to the barest minimum, partly because of the meagerness of their incomes but, also, because they hope to save enough to enable them to go back to the village and buy land. In view of all this, one must com¬ pare the pay of workers with the incomes of the rest of the population before passing sweeping judgment on labor conditions in Rumania. When one does that he finds that laborers are a little better off than many of their fellows. It is also quite plain that the situation of the work¬ ing class cannot be radically improved until the general level of life is raised, because as soon as a worker is offered a little better pay, half a dozen poor peasants press around and beg to do the job for less.

The supply

of labor is very elastic and if a peasant has an acre of land with a little house, the wages he gets in an in-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

327

dustrial enterprise do not make up his whole living. They seem to him something extra and for that reason he consents to work cheaply. Consequently every Ru¬ manian starting an industrial enterprise is able to find cheap labor and no one could expect a workshop owner to pay $2.00 for a task which someone else is eager to do for $1.50. The common picture therefore of “heart¬ less capitalists exploiting Rumanian workers without pity and without limit” is not accurate. Those work¬ ers came in from the village begging for even low wages and if Mr. Ionescu, out of the goodness of his heart, paid the men in his shoe shop $5.00 a week each, Mr. Popescu would open a shoe-shop for which he could get plenty of laborers for $4.00 each. Under those circum¬ stances it is not difficult to foresee that Domnul Ionescu would soon go broke. Fortunately, the situation in Rumania became some¬ what better than in some other countries because their was a growth in industry and because Rumania has been more affected in certain respects by Western ex¬ amples. A number of foreign capitalists went there and, although neither missionaries nor philanthropists, tended to introduce standards approaching those in the West. Not far from the hotel in which I usually stayed in Bucharest was a Ford factory which in appearance would do credit to any American town. Also the girls working in the splendid telephone building put up by an American telephone company enjoyed conditions not dissimilar to those in Western Europe. Anyone creating a successful industrial enterprise in Rumania performed a service for the nation and espe¬ cially for the landless peasants. Therefore, enterpris¬ ing men who took the risk of opening new shops should not be summarily condemned, even though the men and women for whom they provided a living still found the

328

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living skimpy.

I am not endeavoring to sing the praises

of capitalists nor to condone in any degree employers who exploit their fellow men. But to understand Ruma¬ nian development one must realize that a radical im¬ provement in the living condition of any group is not easy and cannot possibly be achieved by fiat or without a general betterment. In spite of all these difficulties, the State of Rumania officially accepted and endeavored to attain the labor standards established by the International Labor Of¬ fice in Geneva. As one observed developments and read the official records of past decades, he found that much was accomplished. Social insurance was provided on a large scale, as in the more advanced lands. Labor unions were protected by law. Collective bargaining was practiced in most enterprises. Strikes were permit¬ ted and common. In section 7 of the British Beveridge Plan, which was distinguished by its advanced social ideas, Rumania was mentioned more than once as an example of a country which had already put into practice some of the meas¬ ures of social security suggested in the Plan. On page 146, the Plan recorded that “the countries where the International Labor Office found a medical service more developed than the one existing in Great Britain are: Germany, Denmark, Hungary, New Zealand, Nor¬ way, Rumania, and Soviet Russia.” In addition to the social measures mentioned in the Beveridge Plan, a number of other reforms were gradually put into ef¬ fect, designed to protect labor and increase the social welfare of Rumania. In 1921 a bill was passed making trade unions legal. A number of measures passed in 1921-29 put into practice the principles of the Wash¬ ington Convention concerning public and union employ-

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329

ment agencies, as well as the convention concerning the 48-hour week. The recommendations of the International Conven¬ tion regulating the work and pay of women employees during pregnancy were enacted in Rumania. A law passed in 1938 completed an old measure dating from 1894, concerning working conditions for women, for children under 14, and for those between 14 and 18. Numerous county inspectors assured the enforcement of laws regarding labor unions and an act of 1933 es¬ tablished labor tribunals. A statistical table drawn by the International Labor Office showed Rumania as one of the ten countries in which legislation concerning professional disablement was in force; it also cited Rumania as one of the coun¬ tries that had introduced legislation concerning non¬ professional disablement and compulsory insurance against illness. It further showed that in Rumania old age pensions were already in existence. In other words, during most of the existence of Greater Rumania workers had some security, were given some protection, could freely organize, freely bargain and freely strike to attain their aims. Labor organizations regularly held meetings, issued periodi¬ cals, published reports, planned strategy and circulated considerable literature. Also these unions during most of the time were allowed to pursue political ends, even Marxist ends, under the leadership of the Social Demo¬ cratic Party. One finds abundant evidence of all this in official an¬ nual labor union and Socialist Party reports, examples of which I have on my table. One is issued by the Gen¬ eral Confederation of Labor in Rumania, was neatly printed in a cooperative workers’ “tipografia” and bears the title “The Moral and Material Report Given to the

330

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

General Syndical Congress Held at Bucharest Between the 28th and 30th of October, 1934.” Its 60 pages contain exactly the same kind of material that one would find in a report of American labor unions, at that time. I would not like to create the impression that every¬ thing was easy sailing for labor or labor unions, because it wasn’t easy sailing very long for any political or pro¬ fessional organization. After the year 1923 Europe became an arena for the Fascist-Communist struggle. This was reflected in Rumania. In fact, both move¬ ments operated there. That country was between the upper and nether millstones of two social aberrations, used by powerful and ambitious states for imperial ends. But labor unions didn’t suffer much more than other organizations, all of which were eventually taken over by King Carol’s dictatorships. However, for sev¬ enteen years from 1921 until 1938 labor unions in Ru¬ mania functioned on the basis of fairly liberal laws. Not until then were they taken over by the state and completely controlled, as in Fascist and Communist lands. In 1923 there were 37,000 members of labor unions; 10 years later, 42,000; in 1936, 57,584. By January 1945, they had suddenly become 519,000. In the course of two more years of Communist rule that number had tripled. The number of organized railway workers never surpassed 7,000 prior to the inauguration of the present regime. The greatest number of persons to be inscribed in the state system of social insurance were 670,000, of which most were not industrial workers. The Communists have taken advantage of the diffi¬ cult situation of labor for the purpose of setting up their dictatorship. They shouted through all media of propa¬ ganda that workers needed protection, and in that statement they were right.

They said management

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331

should be more considerate and scrupulous and in that they told the truth—a fairly universal truth. They added that they would “liberate” labor and bring the deserved improvements. But that promise was false; they have only used labor, bringing just enough im¬ provement to labor favorites to make them effective and faithful tools. Labor chiefs are the Communists’ armored knights; labor shock troopers are their re¬ tainers. Immediately after obtaining power the Communists organized a united labor front and established it by a government decree. By the spring of 1945, according to an official report, this front had 12 main unions con¬ sisting of 513 syndicates with a total of 519,000 mem¬ bers. By the summer of 1946 there were 15 main unions with a total membership of 1,400,000 manual and mental laborers. By 1948 there were 1,600,000. For all practical purposes membership is compulsory for anyone receiving a wage or salary. The most numerous organizations in the United Labor Front are the local syndicates. They are com¬ bined in national syndicates, each of which embraces all organized workers doing the same kind of work. These are united in the General Confederation of Labor which runs the movement as a general staff runs an army. It works through four regional secretariats. Also, as a vital and dynamic part of this rigidly con¬ trolled organization, factory committees are created in every enterprise having 50 employees, whether work¬ ers or clerks. In theory this is an ideal kind of an or¬ ganization for protecting the workers. It presents a solid labor front “to the enemies of labor,” enabling a powerful centralized organization to bring all of its force to bear upon any individual factory owner. The general secretary of this Federation daily and nightly

332

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

surveys the whole field and when he sees any boss or owner needing special attention can immediately send trucks of agitators and automobiles of expert negotia¬ tors to help bring the recalcitrant capitalist to terms. They also try to bring every one else to terms. In many cases armed labor groups under the direc¬ tion of the Federation have seized factories and “laid down the law” to the owners. They have taken stateowned trucks, rushed to the homes of factory directors or managers, whisked these off to meetings of labor bosses and made them sign on the dotted line. They have compelled printers to stop presses, forced or¬ ganizations to desist from distributing books or pe¬ riodicals, burnt newspapers on the street, terrorized courts, torn down posters and broken up meetings with¬ out number. For this they are paid from company or state money. They use company or state time and com¬ pany or state material to make weapons—I saw vicious looking billies made in railroad shops. It goes without saying that the all powerful, statebacked labor bosses with such shock troops and rifles and machine guns at their disposal terrorize workers as much as they do any one else. In fact, workers are the first objects of terror, because if workers didn’t obey the regime would fall apart. Workers are captives of their own United Labor Front. The individual workers or groups of workers have no say about the management of their organizations. That is deter¬ mined by little groups of Communists serving half a dozen Communist masters in Bucharest. Hundreds of thousands of Rumanian men and women, a majority of whom aren’t “laborers,” are forced into a labor army which they detest and are compelled to follow leaders whom they loathe. Here is a little example of the methods of the Front

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333

as found in the official report of the “Debates of the First Free General Congress of United Syndicates of Rumania.” Comrade Minister Gheorghiu-Dej, one of the four persons who run Rumania for Russia, said, in one of his speeches: “A little while ago a fellow called Margulius made certain unfounded statements regard¬ ing the actual political, economic and military situation. What he said could be characterized as a provocation hurled at the congress. How this fellow got in here to speak at the tribune I don’t know. Without doubt that was due to some weakness on the part of our presidium. I must tell you that this Margulius is an old opportunist. He tried to direct our discussions into another path than that of the fight against fascism. He even succeeded in winning applause for his theoretical nonsense. For that reason, comrades, I urge you to in¬ crease your political vigilance to keep such elements from penetrating info our syndicates.” In other words anyone not agreeing with the allpowerful leaders was to be kept out of the organization, and exposed to starvation. Indeed, there is a special clause in the Law for Syndicates providing not only that they shall work against fascists but exclude fascists from all their ranks. A thousand cases have shown that anyone in Rumania regardless of his past who opposes the Communist leaders is considered a fascist. All true democrats are ipso facto fascists. No basic criticism is allowed at any labor meeting or in any labor periodical or in any Communist newspaper. The obedience re¬ quired is as blind as that which Hitler constantly and insolently demanded from his Nazis. Furthermore, every member of the syndicate is re¬ quired to buy the party literature. He’s not asked about it; the money is simply taken from his pay. He may not like Communist literature, indeed all his life

334

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

he may have opposed the Communists, but now he is compelled to support them through subscriptions to their periodicals and papers. The syndicate dues, which he must pay, go to support that party. The Labor Front has placed every Rumanian who receives a wage or salary in the hands of the Communists and exposes him to the bitterly resented humiliation of being com¬ pelled to hear the Communists boast each day as Mos¬ cow takes up the refrain, that more than a million and a half Rumanian workers loyally support the Groza government. Actually most of this million and a half are as heartily opposed to Groza’s government as Molo¬ tov is to Franco. Besides all this, workers are constantly forced to go out on the street and participate in tiring, repellent demonstrations. There is nothing a fascist or Commu¬ nist loves so much as to get masses of people out on the street shrieking slogans—usually slogans of hate. Very often even slogans of death. Communists delight in shrieking for the death of their enemy. Constantly Rumanian men and women are ordered from factories, workshops, stores and offices to march up and down the streets in rain or shine yelling “down” with somebody. If they don’t do that they’ll lose their jobs. In those actions they are as strictly controlled as a soldier in an army barracks. The factory committee and its bosses control hiring and firing. If a worker doesn’t keep in step he will find his family starving and himself excluded from every factory in the land. Moreover, these factory commit¬ tees are not elected by the workers. Secret voting has been forbidden by the headquarters of the General Con¬ federation. The bosses found from experience that at secret elections practically no Communists were sent to the factory committees. Throughout the whole country

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335

factory employees began to elect anti-Communist mem¬ bers with ardent and vehement ostentation. In a num¬ ber of cases the labor generals have had to send armed shock labor troops from headquarters to intimidate anti-Communist majorities who wanted to get rid of labor tyrants. As a result, factory committees in most of the larger enterprises are imposed by Communist Party headquarters and all the local workers have to do with the matter is meekly to assemble and loudly to applaud. An example of a partially free choosing of a factory committee was provided by elections held at the “Malaxa Works” in February 1945. In spite of extreme pressure and the presence of the Russian Army, the Communists received only 700 votes out of 4000. The elections were declared invalid the next day by the Gen¬ eral Confederation of Labor on the orders of Minister Gheorghiu-Dej and Communist shock troops were sent to impose a new factory committee. Shooting followed and a number of people were wounded, including sev¬ eral leading Communists. Apparently the Communists were wounded by their own guns. The members of the truly representative factory committee were arrested and put in prison. A striking case of Communist persecution of workers that came personally to my notice was that of a young man named Vasile Bleanca who worked in the textile factory Dacia in Bucharest, and who presumed to op¬ pose the Communist labor leaders there during the elec¬ tion of a new factory committee. The Communists, as always, presented a list of candidates and asked all those who approved to raise their hands. As the list was read, Communist key men and women who had been stationed among the workers in such a way as to make it appear they were speaking for all parts of the

336

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

crowd shouted their approval.

But before any voting

could take place, Bleanca went up to the speaker’s table and said he wanted secret voting. The Communist chiefs refused to permit that and the majority of the workers encouraged by Bleanca audibly showed their resentment of the Communist steamroller. The meeting’s chairman then thundered out impreca¬ tions against fascist reactionary elements, whereupon Bleanca, holding his ground, invited all the workers agreeing with him to move toward one corner of the hall and the rest to move in another direction. This gave the Dacia workers, most of whom were women, a chance to make a long desired demonstration and prac¬ tically all of them showed their approval of Bleanca’s action, moving in the direction he had indicated. There¬ upon the Communists summoned shock troops from outside and Bleanca was arrested. But practically the whole personnel of the factory then went on strike and made such a vehement protest that the young anti-Communist was released. That same night three men entered his home, took him from his bed, separated him from his weepingfamily, conducted him forcibly through the yard into the street, put him into an automobile and took him for a ride. In an open space beyond the edge of town they alighted from the automobile, shot him in the head with a pistol and fled, leaving him dead upon the ground— as they supposed.

Aroused by the shooting, a person

who happened to be not too far away came to the spot, found that Bleanca was not dead and took him to a hospital. I saw the young textile worker not long after and heard the story from him as well as from some of his comrades in the factory. This is one typical case of Communist terror exercised over workers. Such tyranny

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337

sometimes leads to out-and-out clashes on a large scale but as a rule only to minor beatings and more frequently not even to that. The workers take it lying down. They say: “What else can we do since the Communists are backed by the Rumanian police, have the Rumanian Army under their control, and receive the unreserved approval of the cabinet which is supported by the Red Army.” Many workers add: “If the Red Army weren’t here, we would take care of these few Communists within a few days.” Whether they would or not I don’t know. But it is not only the workers themselves who suffer from the United Labor Front; it is the whole Ruma¬ nian nation. The Labor Front is directed against the nation. An example of this was provided by a popular demonstration of affection for King Mihai on his name day on the 8th of November, 1945. Scores of thou¬ sands of men and women spontaneously gathered in the square in front of the Palace to shout, “Long live the King!” They were unarmed and unorganized and did not direct their demonstrations specifically against the Groza government. It was, rather, for the King. They carried the King’s picture, sang the King’s song and shouted, “Long live the King,” “The King and the Army,” “For King and Country.” However, the Gov¬ ernment saw that this voluminous and multitudinous display of affection for Mihai was actually a dramatic display of the common people’s opposition to the gov¬ ernment. Consequently action was required. The General Confederation of Labor hastily ordered out trucks, filled them with armed Communist shock troops and sent them circulating through the crowd. I watched the whole procedure, part of the time in the midst of the crowd and the rest of the time from a nearby balcony. The trucks did not actually charge

338

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

into the masses but moved against them, endangering lives. Before long the crowd got so angry that it over¬ turned a couple of trucks and set them on fire, after which the workers withdrew and the policemen from the adjacent Ministry of Interior fired toward the men and women who had come to shout, “Long live the King!” This provoked resistance from students in the crowd, altercations followed and a number of persons were killed. During the following spring organized, Communistled workers made a furious attack on students in the city of Cluj. On the tenth of May, which was a na¬ tional Rumanian holiday, Rumanian flags filled the city and Rumanian songs reverberated through the streets and squares. Rumanian peasants dressed in festive cos¬ tumes gathered from many villages, thus intensifying the appearance of Rumanian ascendancy in a former Hungarian stronghold. At about the same time West¬ ern European radio stations disseminated the news that the Paris Conference had decided to leave within the boundaries of Rumania the whole of Transylvania. After days of anguished waiting the Rumanians were thrilled by this news. They poured onto the streets of Cluj in large numbers, staged an enthusiastic but or¬ derly parade, sang Rumanian songs and revelled in the satisfaction that came from an important Rumanian victory in the international field. This increased Hun¬ garian bitterness and created a very tense atmosphere. On the fifteenth of May, which was the anniversary of a famous Rumanian uprising against Hungarian op¬ pressors, Rumanian demonstrations were strictly for¬ bidden by the government but the Hungarian workers and salary earners, organized in the United Labor Front, were permitted to parade

in large numbers

through Rumanian streets, shouting for the death of

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339

Juliu Maniu, dearly beloved by all the Rumanians in Transylvania. This anti-Rumanian demonstration on a special Rumanian holiday in a Rumanian city caused great bitterness in Rumanian hearts. An additional cause of resentment was the fact that the Cluj Com¬ munist chief of police, who was a Rumanian, had been replaced by a Hungarian Communist from a neighbor¬ ing city, who was known for his ruthless treatment of Rumanians. A number of students gathered to protest against this and made considerable noise on one of the main squares. It is not certain who arranged this demonstra¬ tion but in any case it was not called by any responsible student organization. It caused some excitement in the nervous city but the students dispersed without causing any clashes and without doing any damage whatsoever. But as they went to their homes, the siren in the largest Cluj factory, Dermata, whose Hungarian work¬ ers provide most of Cluj’s ferocious Communist shock troops, began to blow, and kept it up for more than an hour without interruption. That was a Communist signal for mobilization, and workers hastily assembled at a number of gathering places where they found trucks waiting for them. Springing into the trucks, Dermata workers along with some Communist railway workers, charged into the middle of the town where to their surprise and bitter disappointment, they found no students to whack on the head. Therefore, they decided to go to the principal university dormitory a few blocks away. By the time they reached there, the students had got¬ ten wind of the impending assault and gathered in the upper stories, the single entrance to which they blocked by lowering an iron door and piling beds against it. That provided a useful iron curtain. The Hungarian

340

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

workmen, thousands in number, surged into the base¬ ment and first story, destroying everything. They broke the furniture into small pieces, smashed the radiators, demolished kitchen utensils, completely tore up the lin¬ en, yanked down curtains, broke windows and even poured kerosene over the food supplies, making them unusable. Rarely has an invading army committed such depredations. They banged at the iron door but couldn’t get in; so they held the building in siege, shot through the windows and hurled furious imprecations against the Rumanians, including “We want Rumanian blood, we want Rumanian blood.” They kept this up for more than an hour. The army remained in its barracks and policemen idly watched the mob of armed, trained Com¬ munist workers trying to shed the bloocl of Rumanian students. The attack was not stopped until two Russian officers nearby intervened. The next day it was the students who were arrested wholesale while the Communist attackers with but few exceptions went stark free. When students protested to the Prime Minister, he accused them of being the guilty ones and refused to take any measures against the attackers. “My Government is based on the prole¬ tariat,” he said. As a counter-balance to these grave abuses have not the Communists done something to aid workers? Here are some of their claims: They reputedly improved factory conditions,

de¬

creased speculation, forced the government to pass anti-fascist “purge” laws, did some purging of their own, brought about the arrest of several hundred war criminals, organized festivals and conferences, put through “agrarian reforms,” effected the removal of undesirable prefects and mayors, compelled the gov-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

341

ernment to carry out the Armistice Agreement in Rus¬ sia’s favor. They also forced some factories to open nurseries for workers’ children and to construct rest rooms. They imposed a stricter application of laws affecting labor, and have given certain workers the feeling of being big shots. In addition they have terrorized, frightened and humiliated the bosses, which perhaps can be con¬ sidered an achievement. In contrast with this, the purchasing power of work¬ ers’ wages and the living conditions of working fami¬ lies are certainly the lowest in the modern history of Rumania. At no time in the memory of Rumanians have workers and salaried people lived in such want as now. Most workers with whom I have come into contact feel that whopper meetings, giant street parades and propaganda lectures are no compensation for the tyranny to which they are subjected by a few Commu¬ nists operating in the headquarters of the General Confederation of Labor.

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XX

EXTERMINATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY As the Communists strove for absolute control over the Rumanian workers they found it would be necessary to eliminate all rivals for leadership. This meant, first of all, that they would have to liquidate the Socialists. And they did it. Within three years after the powerseizure of March 6, every Socialist voice had been si¬ lenced and every Socialist leader subverted, subdued or suppressed. The process was not very difficult, for the Rumanian Socialist Party was weak and small. The process was not very dramatic either—not much more than drown¬ ing an unwanted kitten, or firing a superfluous office boy would be. But it was important, as a new illustra¬ tion of absolute Communist tyranny. Communists everywhere fight Socialists with special fury. That is as much a part of Communism as fighting sin was a part of early Methodism. The very name of the world’s chief Communist Party comes from its mortal fight against Socialists. It is called the C.P.S.U. (B) or Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). And the name is always written in that form; the (B) or (Bolsheviks) is never omitted in the official desig¬ nation. The word Bolshevik indicates majority and arose when a majority of extremists split off from a minority of more moderate comrades in a conference of 43 Marxists held at Brussels in July 1903. From then on the extremists or purists or “narrow sect” or

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“true believers” were considered “Communists” and the other Marxists were considered “Socialists.” The ap¬ pellatives which Lenin and his followers preferred and which Communists still prefer are: Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Communists have few more de¬ lectable or sulphuric smear words than Menshevik; it is in a class with “imperialist,” “capitalist,” “Trotskyite,” and “Wall Street.” Lenin’s first great task was to wipe out the Russian Mensheviks, and he did it. One of the most important official Communist pub¬ lications is “The History of the C.P.S.U. (B).” Its “short course” of 1939 (latest American edition) con¬ tains 364 pages and 200 of them are devoted to the fight against the Socialists (Mensheviks). The struggle lasted in Russia or among Russians for more than 20 years. In fact, the “last remnants of Menshevism” were not exterminated until Stalin’s sweeping purge of the Trotskyites. The “short course” describes this act with a good deal of gusto in Chapter Twelve, using the following expressions among others: “the fiendish crimes of the Bukharin-Trotsky gang,” “these dregs of humanity,” “these Whiteguard pigmies,” “these Whiteguard in¬ sects,” “these contemptible lackeys of the fascists . . . so much useless rubbish,” “The Soviet Court sentenced the Bukharin-Trotsky fiends to be shot. The People’s Commissiariat of Internal Affairs caried out the sen¬ tence. The Soviet people approved the annihilation of the Buhkarin-Trotsky gang.” Stalin himself has formulated Communist policy re¬ garding toleration of rivals, in the following words: “You want to know what the Communist Party de¬ mands? Well, listen: ‘1) The Party will not tolerate a minority going into the highways and byways talking of a Party crisis.

344 ‘2)

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE The Party will not tolerate the mobilization of

dissatisfied elements. ‘3) The Party will not tolerate slander of its lead¬ ership. ‘4) The Party will not tolerate the exploitation of difficulties. ‘5) The Party will not tolerate a demagogic demand for an increase in wages. *6) The Party will not tolerate a continuance of opposition propaganda among peasants. ‘7) If democracy is understood to mean the right to twaddle without limit, we need no such democracy’.” Instead Stalin demanded “centralized democracy.” To maintain it the Party leaders were obligated to sup¬ press “opposition gangs.” To achieve that they had to train and maintain a force to do the suppressing. This force turned out to be the most ruthless secret police in history. The same system was introduced into Rumania. The four Communists whom Moscow had placed in control there had to suppress “the Titel Petrescu gang” of Socialists and all other rivals. To accomplish it they formed a police network which not only used physical violence but seized control of most sources of livelihood and engaged in intricate political plots. The Communist Party of Rumania was not able to seize the state police at the beginning. In the first Sanatescu government, the Ministry of Interior, which controls the police, was given to General Aurel Aldea who was against the Communists; in the second Sana¬ tescu government, to National-Peasant leader Nicolae Penescu; and in General Radescu’s government, to the Premier himself. Thus the Communists were tempo¬ rarily prevented from using the police as a Party in¬ strument.

The Rumanians were unique among eastern

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European nations in rejecting Stalin’s demands that Moscow’s agents immediately be given charge over the police. At that time the Kremlin still wanted to main¬ tain the pretense that Rumanians were masters in their own house, so made a temporary concession. However, Radescu had to make a concession also; he appointed Communists as department heads in his Ministry. One such was Teohari Georgescu. And on March 6, 1945, Georgescu became Minister of the In¬ terior. As such he was both nominal and actual head of Rumania’s police. The Communists had their Gestapo. At first it was a very complicated organization, be¬ cause the Communists were not well organized and didn’t trust each other. Actually, there were a number of police forces, all run by Communists. The best of them and the most deadly was set up at the Presidentsia or in the Office of the Prime Minister. It was directed by the strong man behind the scenes, Emil Bodnaras, and its special purpose was to control Premier Groza along with Foreign Minister George Tatarescu. It had supervision over the rest of the cabinet, too, and over Communists. It held the Party chiefs in line. Groza couldn’t appoint even minor civil servants without the approval of Bodnaras’s police and no one could accept a diplomatic post abroad without its clearance. Every one who left Rumania, from a Minister to a humble Adventist preacher, had to be passed by this police. And it was more dreaded by Communists than by any one else. Then there was a military police, controlling the commissars that controlled the army. It was not under the War Minister, but rather over him, for he, too, was suspect. He was a newcomer and was believed to have joined up for personal consideration. This police

346

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

was largely under direct Russian supervision—even more so than other branches of Rumania’s Gestapo. It was called Special Service of Information or S.S. It had also existed under pro-Nazi Marshal Antonescu, but was greatly enlarged by Bodnaras, who retained many of the old fascists. One of his main helpers, R. Stupineanu, was of this sort. In addition to these police units were the political police, the economic police and the criminal police, all under Georgescu. The most formidable, in the eyes of the nation, was the political police or Sigurantsa, whose sinister reputation far antedated the Communist re¬ gime. It had reached a peak of repressive brutality years before under King Carol’s George Tatarescu, who after March 6 became Vishinsky’s Rumanian For¬ eign Minister. Most ruthless, vigorous and able of the police of¬ ficials under Bodnaras and Georgescu was Avram Bunaciu, who soon became known as a rising Communist star. Stupineanu’s name was almost equally dreaded. Before long one of these two was promoted to the post of Minister of Justice and the other thrust into outer darkness to associate with the victims he had helped suppress. The Rumanian Communist police has not been as sadistic as the Communist police in neighboring lands, because the Rumanians tend to be less brutal than some other peoples, but it is very vigilant and repressive. It has been especially active in two fields: plundering and conspiring. The Communist economic police has functioned as a legalized network of robbers, sometimes subtile, always effective. Enjoying and greatly overstepping the right to

inspect account books, business

transactions

and

stocks, these police agents were able to learn the trade

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

347

secrets of every establishment. Thus they were in a position, not only to use unlimited blackmail, but to confiscate any merchandise they wished, or even to take over stores and shops. They had many ways to legalize their racketeering. They could accuse their victims of black market transactions, of income tax evasions, of violating sanitary laws, of being economic saboteurs, enemies of the people, remnants of fascism, foes of Russia, exploiters of labor, agents of America or spies. The economic police, operating hand in hand with the Communist-directed courts, could ruin any business in the land, and get rich at doing it. Working closely with the tax collectors and assessors, they could tax any es¬ tablishment out of existence. They held both private business and state business under their control and could bring any anti-Communist in either realm to heel. No one working for the state or for himself could survive without the good will of the Communist eco¬ nomic police. No one could get a license to operate a shop or receive a job, such as that of teacher or civil servant or village clerk, without the approval of this police. Intellectuals, as well as business people, were in its hands. For 40 years Rumania had been turning out high school and university graduates who estab¬ lished themselves in white collar jobs. Youth had flocked into the cities from villages and little towns to earn diplomas, don white collars and procure the right to “put their shirt tails in.” These youth, practically without exception, had sought posts in business or as civil servants or in professions, which means they had entered a net that the Communist economic police could close almost without effort. The Communists held the intelligentsia in their grip. The conspiratorial activity of the Rumanian political police was also well developed; it affected fewer persons

348

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

than other police activities, but was of great impor¬ tance. Most Rumanians are profoundly dissatisfied with Communist absolutism and with Soviet domina¬ tion. They detest Soviet favoritism and corruption. Many Rumanians, from street sweepers to generals, feel half-desperate. Naturally, in such a mood many Rumanians “grouch,” saying bitter things they mean and other things they don’t quite mean. Some say they’re “going to the mountains”; others that they “will fly the coop”; still others that the Soviets are about to annex Rumania. Such persons when opportunity arises consort with Britishers, Americans, French; they some¬ times predict a war against Russia. All of this brings them into the hands of Communist agent provocateurs, or fake Communist “fellow in¬ surgents.” Communist police agents provoke rebellious statements, take the lead in seditious conversations, participate in underground plots, help organize at¬ tempts at flight, carry on subversive correspondence with gullible anti-Communists. In this way Communists helped prepare the attempted flight of Peasant leader Ion Mihalache, which resulted in the outlawing of the National-Peasant Party. Mihalache fell into a Com¬ munist police plot. Communist conspirators were in the anti-Communist underground network of General Aldea and were able to land its leaders in jail. They get professors fired, officers disgraced, priests demoted. And no group has been more vulnerable to police pressure than the Socialists, partly because they were intimately associated with the Communists, but mainly because they were “intellectuals” or professionals hold¬ ing jobs that the Communist government controlled. Most Socialists dangled over an economic abyss at the ends of threads which the Communists could cut at any

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

349

moment. The Socialists had no reserve and no retreat, such as many individual peasants tended to enjoy. A peasant could salt down pork and hide wheat, thus post¬ poning his destruction, but a Socialist teacher could be starved out by a stroke of a Communist pen. In addition, the moral position of the Rumanian So¬ cialists was weak. They were in “no man’s land,” squarely caught in the middle. If they were all-out against capitalism and the bourgeoise and private en¬ terprise, why didn’t they all join the Communists? But if they were against state control of everything, against the dictatorship of the proletariat, Russian domina¬ tion, “centralized democracy,” a one-party system, why didn’t they join the other camp, that is the “historical parties” and western democracy? This dilemna undermined Socialist strength. And the impotence caused by moral confusion was increased by police terror, economic pressures and corroding per¬ sonal ambitions. The Rumanian Socialists entered the present political Armageddon without moral armor and without battle plans. Their struggle was fairly short. The renegade rump of the Socialist Party was formally submerged by the Communists in February 1948 amid much fanfare. By that act Socialism disappeared from the surface of Ru¬ manian life, since the genuine Socialists had been si¬ lenced even earlier. The vacillating Socialist antitotalitarian crusade of four years duration ended in a party holocaust. It had been accomplished by many good intentions, some heroic acts and much baseness. The chronicles of the Socialist debacle may be re¬ corded as follows: During the war, as Rumania was serving on the side of Hitler, the Socialists distin¬ guished themselves by no significant organized action against the pro-Nazi Antonescu Government. On the

350

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

contrary, some leading Socialists faithfully served the dictator, usually in secondary posts. Most had shown no capacity to hold higher ones. Toward the end of the war, when it became plain that Hitler was going to lose and that the Soviet Army would overrun Rumania, the Socialists joined those Ru¬ manians that under Juliu Maniu had been trying to bring Rumania onto the side of the Allies. But as they sought to cooperate with Maniu, they also worked closely with the Communists. They thus adopted a midde role that proved both treacherous and fatal. Under the strange illusion that Communists are “leftists,” although they use almost every evil practice of fascists, the Rumanian Socialists tried to gang up with them in a “left bloc” or “people’s front.” This “left” group represented so little in Rumania, had made such a poor record in opposing the Nazis and was so palpably a Moscow creation that Maniu refused to have anything to do with it, as an entity. However, he did accept the Socialists into the coalition that was plan¬ ning the coup of August 23, 1944. Maniu accepted them because the Rumanian So¬ cialists had preached noble ideas, had shown devotion to workers, and might serve to counterbalance the Com¬ munists. An even more important reason was that world Socialism had much influence in Allied circles and as Maniu was trying to get Rumania out of the Nazi net onto the side of the western powers he considered cooperation with Rumanian Socialists wise and logical. In addition, the Rumanian Socialist chief, Titel Petrescu, was a truly democratic man deserving Maniu’s good will. After the royal coup and the setting up of a proAllied military government the Socialists accepted nomi¬ nal and equal participation: Titel Petrescu became

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

351

Minister of State without portfolio, just as the chiefs of the National-Peasant and Liberal Parties did. But from that moment the Socialists actively operated with the Communists ^and with a phoney Communist-led “peasant group” in a plot to undermine and destroy their own pro-Allied Rumanian Government. In this conspiracy they were serving Moscow and playing into Communist hands. They were preparing their own de¬ struction. Many of the most aggressive Socialist par¬ ticipants in this Communist plot sought personal advan¬ tages—they wanted to be Ministers—but others were just naive idealists. Since the pro-Allied government against which they were conspiring was not very inspir¬ ing or liberal and was largely military, reformers easily fell into the Communist trap of demanding “a political regime representing the people.” When General Sanatescu was replaced by General Radescu as Premier, a “political government” was formed and Socialist leaders got a number of enviable posts. But still they continued with vigor and vehemence to work with the Communists against the government of which they formed a part, in order to help Moscow im¬ pose a “leftist” regime. They joined in political sabo¬ tage, lawlessness and street demonstrations, matching the Communists in demagogic clamor. They served the Kremlin as assiduously and blatantly as Ana Pauker, and when Vishinsky, on March 6, 1945, placed Ru¬ mania in the hands of four Communists, the Rumanian Socialists applauded. They also participated in the government established by foreigners to enslave Ru¬ mania. They took three Ministers: those of Labor, Education and Mines, as well as other high administra¬ tive posts and seemed happy to serve the alien occupier. They published two government-subsidized papers, accepted every government favor that was proffered

352

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and asked for more. They joined their raucous shouts to the Moscow-directed outcry for destruction of the “historical parties.” Many of the Socialists lagged not a step behind the Communists in suppressing civil lib¬ erty, terrorizing peasants and crushing dissenting So¬ cialists. Fortunately for Socialist honor, there were dis¬ senters; among them the official chief, Titel Petrescu. He refused to take an office in Groza’s Kremlin-imposed cabinet. But he and his genuinely democratic comrades found themselves engaged in a hopeless battle; they had already delivered the Socialist fort to the Com¬ munists. In August 1945, King Mihai consulted with all the party chiefs, including Socialist Titel Petrescu, regard¬ ing the advisability of dismissing Groza’s Communistdominated cabinet and the appointing of a representa¬ tive, democratic government. This action was taken on America’s suggestion and with America’s encourage¬ ment. All the political leaders at the conference, except Communist Chief Patrascanu, approved the ousting of Groza. At that vital meeting the Socialist chief was with Maniu and against the Communists. He took an un¬ equivocal stand against Kremlin-imposed autocracy and agreed to participate in a new, democratic, anti-Communist regime. In other words he repudiated the “left bloc” or Communist-led front which he had helped create three years earlier. But most of the other So¬ cialist leaders repudiated Petrescu. However, he did not allow himself to be intimidated and from then on tried to conduct a bold crusade for saving Socialism. He was aided by many faithful So¬ cialist associates and their final campaign was as heroic as Custer’s Last Fight. As they passed from defeat to defeat they kept their battered heads unbowed. Ef-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

353

femlnate appearing, soft-voiced Titel (Little Connie) with flowing black tie took a place among Europe’s bravest champions of the people. He defied smear words, enticement, terror and prison. During March 1946, the genuine Socialists follow¬ ing Petrescu tried to regain control of the party through a party congress that met in Bucharest. It was the first even partially representative Socialist congress that had been held for years and authentic delegates came from all parts of the country—along with many phoney ones brought by the renegade Socialists serving the Com¬ munist regime. The general sentiment seemed to favor Petrescu and Socialist integrity in spite of the efforts of the Communist-serving Socialists to pack the gather¬ ing. For a few hours the Rumanian Socialists, alone among those of eastern Europe, seemed to be on the point of vindicating Socialist honor as a party and not merely in the persons of a few heroic martyrs. But at a crucial moment of intense excitement, a Communist-serving Socialist, Tudor Ionescu, sprang a copy of a fake document, purporting to show that the independent Socialists were receiving money from the bourgeois parties. That, of course, was considered a cardinal sin for Marxists and the renegade leaders won a slight majority of the votes in the ensuing confusion. Thus Rumania’s sad, weak, little Socialist Party, suc¬ cumbing to a hoax perpetrated by Socialist apostates, voted to cooperate with the power that was pledged to exterminate it. That day the impotency and stu¬ pidity and moral inadequacy of Rumanian Socialism echoed up and down the streets of Bucharest. Living there on the edge of the Bolshevik Empire, the Ruma¬ nian Socialists knew that the Kremlin hated Socialists as “fiends” and “villains” and “murderers” and “lack-

354

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

eys” and “dung,” yet voted to accept the domination of the Kremlin’s agents. After that the genuine Socialists intensified their struggle but without a chance to succeed. Petrescu tried to start a daily or weekly paper but was prevented by Communist-led printers, by the Communist government and by his renegade Socialist comrades. He tried to hold a Socialist congress of his own, but the police dis¬ persed it. He called meetings but the Communist¬ serving Socialists broke them up. |He tried to get state¬ ments published in other papers, but Communist print¬ ers refused to let them be set up. Even worse than all that, Socialists who dared side with Titel Petrescu were subjected to starvation. A great majority had state or municipal jobs. Many were teachers, others civil servants. The Minister of Education was a renegade Socialist and could have every teacher fired. The Minister of Labor was an¬ other renegade Socialist and could starve every non¬ conformist worker. Rumanian Socialists did Moscow’s dirty work in suppressing Rumanian Socialists. And they did it largely by invisible terror, which filled the Social victims with special detestation of themselves. A teacher on deserting his cause to preserve his job felt baser and more demoralized than if he had suc¬ cumbed at sight of a gallows or firing squad. Such So¬ cialists just dried up as a Kansas cornfield before hot winds. However, there were* cases of defiant heroism, espe¬ cially from Petrescu, but also from others. For ex¬ ample Ion Burca, who had held a high position in Teohari Georgescu’s police network resigned in a dramatic manner during August 1947. His Socialist comrades in the government, that is the renegades who were work¬ ing for the Communists, raised a rumpus at one of

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

355

Burca’s anti-Communist statements and publicly repri¬ manded him, hoping thereby to make a grand display of their own loyalty to the Kremlin. But the Commu¬ nists would not let it go at that. They ordered the captive Socialists to stage a political auto-da-fe of their comrade. These immediately complied. They held a meeting, excoriated Burca, expelled him, and gave much prominence to their performance in their Com¬ munist-controlled paper, Libertatea. What they wrote may be summarized as follows: 1. The Rumanian Socialist Party is a left-wing party unreservedly supporting “the new democracy” and unconditionally loyal to the Soviet Union. 2. The Socialists are all-out for the United Workers Front and plan to remove all obstacles to it. 3. Complete Socialist unanimity is essential. All deviators have been punished—and will be punished. Deviators will not be tolerated. 4. Since the Communists in their daily paper, Scanteia, call Ion Burca a deviator he is a deviator and is hereby kicked out of the Socialist Party. The Communist newspaper announced on August 23, 1947, “On instructions from the political bureau (politburo) of the Socialist-Democratic Party, Ion Burca, member of the party’s political bureau, has resigned from his position of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior.” With Burca, two other anti-Communist Socialists, Mora Mironescu and George Silviu, were expelled from the party and from high posts in the government. The end was at hand. The last formality was the merging of Socialists and Communists in a United Workers Party. That meant Socialist self-immolation and the Communists wanted to make the sacrificial pyre burn with great brilliance

356

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

throughout Rumania.

They wanted to have Socialists

sing and dance at their own public lynching. And some Rumanian Socialists were so depraved that they gladly did it. They made the destruction of their party part of a people’s holiday. Throughout eastern Europe Socialist Parties were going up in flames and the rene¬ gade Rumanian Socialists wanted to make the crema¬ tion of their party one of the grandest spectacles of all. The Rumanian and Russian press gave much atten¬ tion to the matter. The Bucharest radio on January 12, 1948, announced : “After long preparatory meetings at which members of the Communist and Socialist Par¬ ties debated the necessity of ideological and organiza¬ tional unity, the realization of a single Workers Party has become a reality.” Two days later Communist chief, Gheorghe Georghiu-Dej, wrote, “A new factor for consolidating democ¬ racy will be the coming establishment of a single Work¬ ers Party.” The “coming establishment” happened to fall on George Washington’s birthday, and was described as follows in the Rumanian press: “The Capital city of Rumania is preparing to wit¬ ness an event whose importance is far greater than political, and which can be said to be a great national occasion. We are speaking of the Rumanian Workers Party congress which is to meet and consecrate forever the idealogical, political and administrative unity of the Rumanian working class. “The atmosphere prevailing in Bucharest is proof of the feverishness with which this historic occasion is being prepared. Calea Victoriei, Bucharest’s main thoroughfare, is changing its aspect, as steel scaffold¬ ings specially built to carry flags and slogans, appear here and there. Public buildings are beginnng to ap-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

357

pear draped in the red color of the victorious working class. The Atheneum building, where the congress is to meet, is almost hidden in flags. In factories, plants and offices working people are increasing their output. Provincial delegations are leaving for Bucharest, ac¬ companied to their stations of departure by workers with flags and bands. “The event is of international importance, because at the moment when the western countries, caught in the dollar net and in that of imperialist plans and treaties, and when right-wing Social Democrats are do¬ ing useful work for their bosses by trying to split the working class, our workers are passing a test and set¬ ting a magnificent example of political maturity. The participation of foreign delegates shows the interna¬ tional interest taken in the profound changes taking place in the Rumanian People’s Republic. Yesterday there arrived in Bucharest a French Communist leader, Charles Tillon, member of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party, also two delegates of the heroic Greek people. “Bucharest and the whole Rumanian Popular Re¬ public saluted today the opening of the First Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party. The Capital is deco¬ rated with flags and banners with quotations from the works of the teachers of Socialism: Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Representatives include delegations from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, France, Czecho¬ slovakia, Greece, Spain, Poland, Italy, Austria, and Palestine. The workers’ press of Rumania and foreign countries is represented by some of its most distin¬ guished contributors. The work of the congress opened at 9 A. M. this morning. The Rumanian Ministers Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and others were present.

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

“The debates were opened by Mr. Stefan Voitec, member of the Presidium of the Rumanian Popular Republic, who welcomed the foreign delegates. Tre¬ mendous applause especially greeted the Greek and Spanish delegates. Gheorghe Florescu, deupty of Bu¬ charest and Secretary General of the Rumanian Work¬ ers Union, proposed a Presidium including 36 leaders of the Rumanian workers. This proposal was approved by acclamation from the deputies.” Of the places in the Central Committe of the new party the Socialists received a proportion of one out of four; the Communists the other three. All the authori¬ tative leaders were Communists. Before the eyes of the world, as trumpets blared and soldiers paraded, the Rumanian Socialist stooges celebrated their party’s suicide. On the concluding day, February 24, the Socialists mockingly voted for a program containing the follow¬ ing points, all expressed in the Communist lingo: “The working class in Rumania, headed by its van¬ guard, the Rumanian Workers Party, tied in close al¬ liance with the working peasantry, and having by its side the progressive intelligentsia, marches forward to fulfill its new tasks which are to insure continuous strengthening and deepening of popular democracy and swift development of national economy. “More than ever, complete unity of action and will of the working class is necessary. The proletariat in Rumania needs a single general staff, guided by the dogma of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, a staff strong through its interior cohesion. This general staff is the Rumanian Workers Party which as from today is the party of the working class in Rumania. “In the domain of internal policy the democratic classes headed by workers have the task of giving the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

359

country a new constitution, a real democratic constitu¬ tion, a constitution of the Rumanian Popular Republic. This constitution will have to embody our democratic victories and economic and social changes in Rumania. “A democratic administrative reform will have to replace the obsolete forms of local administration, and through local organs of popular power, popular coun¬ cils (Soviets) elected by the masses of people, which will have wide powers in running the affairs of the community. “The reform of justice will be applied in practice. It will lead to deep democratization of judicial in¬ stances through introduction of People’s Courts. “A profound reform of teaching will also have to be carried out with the view to democratizing (Communizing) the schools of all degrees. The Rumanian Workers Party will devote special attention to the crea¬ tion of favorable conditions for development of arts and culture, put into the service of people, and will show its full solicitude to servants of science and arts. “In the domain of foreign policy the congress recog¬ nizes the absolute correctness of the viewpoint that two opposed tendencies are manifest in the international arena, that of the imperialist anti-democratic camp headed by American imperialism and that of the anti¬ imperialist and democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union. Anglo-American imperialists actively supported by traitors from the ranks of right-wing Social Demo¬ crats aim at removing the sovereignty of other people, starting another war, conquering, world domination. Therefore, the Rumanian Workers Party will most ac¬ tively support the policy of peace of the Rumanian Gov¬ ernment, policy pursued to secure general peace, our security and national independence. “The Congress stresses the particular importance of

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, bulwark of peace of the whole world and defenders of sovereignty and in¬ dependence of peoples.” Every word was written in Moscow.

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Chapter XXI ENSLAVEMENT OF THE PEASANTRY One of the hardest problems which Russian Bolshe¬ viks faced was how to enable a small number of work¬ ers and a few members of the “intelligentsia” to exer¬ cise a dictatorship over a vastly greater number of peasants. In theA2 volumes of Lenin’s Selected Works this subject is repeatedly treated; indeed, it is men¬ tioned more than 1,000 times. Mark, Trotsky, Stalin and other Communist leaders devoted equal attention to it. The foremost Communist revolutionists realized they could not establish a Communist dictatorship without liquidating peasant independence. Conse¬ quently, they worked out a strategy for maneuvering peasants into a new type of Communist-led feudalism. As an esential part of the strategy the peasants were deceived into destroying one another. As an in¬ itial step in Russia they were induced to seize all larger estates, which constituted about 30% of Russia’s agri¬ cultural land. In the land-snatching melee that ensued respect for property rights was lost, a flood of anarchy was released, a lust for plunder was aroused. There was practically no force left to restrain this, since the stable though conservative landlord element was anni¬ hilated. After that, the poorer peasants were incited to de¬ vour their slightly less poor neighbors, called “kulaks.” With these exterminated and with the last element of rural stability eradicated, the state, which meant the Communist Party, seized all land, thus robbing all

362

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

peasants. The favored villagers, who had recently ac¬ quired small holdings of their own by plundering land¬ lords and kulaks, were themselves plundered. Without leaders, organizations or traditions to defend them, the peasants could offer no effective resistance to the Bolshevik conspiracy and were easily forced into “kol¬ khozi” or collective farms. In such kolkhozi each peas¬ ant became a member of a work brigade under a Com¬ munist boss and was obliged to work as told, where told, when told. That was the beginning of a new period of total peasant subjugation. The plot suc¬ ceeded completely in Russia but required a terribly bloody 15 year fight, accompanied by starvation on a huge scale. Two million city Communists thereby won control over 120,000,000 peasants. That same process is being repeated in Rumania now. Whether or not its completion will require 15 years (1945—1960) I shall not predict. There are in¬ dications that the period will be much shorter. Already the first step of land confiscation has been partially carried out and all genuine peasant organizations have been annihilated. More than one member of the Communist govern¬ ment or Communist Party has expressed himself in writing as favoring the ultimate collectivization of land. Groza, himself, for example, told the Plowman’s Front on September 18, 1945, as reported in the Bucharest press of September 30, that Stalin had advised him not to impose kolkhozi until the requisite preliminary steps had been taken. His whole statement showed that the Rumanian Communist Party planned the elimination of private property in the villages. But the government wanted to sneak up on the peasants after their power of resistance was destroyed. In 1942, Mr. Focsaneanu, who later became a Com-

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363

munist member of Rumania’s Communist Parliament, wrote in “Revista Fundatiilor Regale,” “We may say that independent peasants’ small holdings can only be a transitory stage in the evolution of our agrarian struc¬ ture. They will be successively superseded by coopera¬ tives for supply in common, then for production in com¬ mon, and finally by collective administration.” In July 1948, Minister Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej spoke even more insistently of collectivization. By autumn cries for extermination of the kulaks echoed from almost every major Communist gathering, and by the end of the year land collectivization was well under way. To understand the significance of what the Ruma¬ nian Communists have done and are doing, one should examine the distribution of agricultural land in Ru¬ mania prior to March 6, 1945, when the Communist regime was imposed. In Greater Rumania at the be¬ ginning of World War Two there were 23,000,000 acres of arable land including fields, meadows, and or¬ chards. Size of property in hectares 0-5

They were distributed as follows: Per cent of total arable land 35.00

Number of owners 1,733,439

Total areas in hectares 3,225,000

381,144 132,411 4,891

2,585,000 2,001,000 263,000

4,865

1,132,000

12.3

2,257,050

9,211,000

100.00

Average size 2.8

5-10 10-50 50-100

15

28.0 21.8 2.9

145 above 100 Total

N. B.: One hectare equals about 2J4 acres.

This distribution of land had been achieved as the result of a long struggle on the part of Rumanian peas¬ ants and their leaders. One climax of this fight was reached in the early 1800’s and another in 1848. There

364

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

were land reforms in 1864, in 1878 and in 1907, by which time half of Rumania’s agricultural area was in holdings under 50 hectares (124 acres). A sweeping reform in 1921 redistributed 14,361,024 acres reducing the amount of land left in holdings of 124 acres or more to 19.5% of the whole. By 1941 that had been further reduced to 15.2%. And about a third of this 15.2% consisted of communal or state holdings. It will be immediately observed that long before the Red Army turned Rumania over to the Communists the agricultural land had been comparatively well dis¬ tributed. There was a smaller percentage of large hold¬ ings in Rumania, for example, than in Oklahoma, Kan¬ sas, Iowa or Ohio. An appreciably greater proportion of Rumania’s farm land was distributed among small owners than was the case in most other European coun¬ tries. This does not mean the land problem was solved there, but that the principal work of land distribution had been achieved, and in a bold manner. Land distribution in itself is not enough. If every Rumanian peasant family were to receive exactly as much as every other family, with not one acre left over, the general economic and social situation of the peas¬ antry and of the nation would not be appreciably im¬ proved. American history plainly shows that land dis¬ tribution is inadequate to assure rural prosperity. I myself was born on a homstead in Kansas. That state, as well as most of Oklahoma, was divided into quarter sections of 160 acres each. Most of the farmers in both states started at scratch and equal. This is not theory but visible, tangible fact and today I could point out those original quarter sections in my township in Smith County, Kansas. I could tell of the Kissels, Sealocks, Markhams, Halberts, Gledhills, Angels, Hewitts who lived on them. We were among the favored families of

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

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the ages, starting free and equal—as pioneers in sod houses. The situation is quite different now. There is equality only in our graveyard—and not even there, since some stones are bigger than others. The land distribution in my township and county has become very unequal, with a far greater proportion of large holdings than in Rumania. And if the area were all redistrib¬ uted tomorrow, as it was in 1880, that measure would bring no basic, permanent improvement to the popula¬ tion. This does not mean that inequality of land ownership is good or that land distribution is unimportant; it means that mere land distribution in a crowded agricul¬ tural country does not even begin to solve the farm problem or peasant problem. For the most part, it has become a fetish used by demagogues to deceive the naive —especially naive Americans. Let us look for a moment at the Rumanian peasant of the 1940’s in his relation to his land and his village. In a typical village there may be one large house in¬ habited by the heirs of the former feudal lord. As a rule it resembles an ordinary farm house in Illinois. Scattered throughout the country one sees a few well kept old manors, even castles, but they are rare. There are also a number of good peasant houses and yards in each village and many small peasant cabins. In almost every village there are a church and a school. In west¬ ern Rumania, which was under European influence, the village setup is better than in eastern Rumania, and especially better than in Moldavia where Turkish in¬ fluence and Russian influence were dominant. Let us visit a typical Rumanian village in Transyl¬ vania.

It is called Castle, getting its name apparently

from an old manor, the remnants of which are still to be seen surrounded by a neglected cemetery. Castle’s

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

past was uneventful, as far as I could learn from the priest, teacher and village elders with whom I talked, and its future appears to be without any glorious pros¬ pects. I spent two successive holidays at Castle, during which I had an excellent opportunity to come into close touch with the people. On both mornings I went to church, attending services that were ritualistic but rever¬ ential and democratic, revealing deep-seated traditions and rather rigid community standards. A well educated priest officiated while dirt farmers, wearing homespun clothes, along with peasant intellectuals in “German” suits, participated in the responsive reading and respon¬ sive singing. A choir of peasant youth sang in the bal¬ cony and was led by a distinguished former Member of Parliament, who was then visiting his home town. Every stratum of village society took part in the services on the basis of equality. The sermon resembled those preached during the same week in thousands of American churches; it con¬ tained many platitudes, much wholesome advice, a few grand, uplifting truths. The audience for the most part was very attentive. Everything was done in a dignified, neighborly manner. Age was honored, youth was re¬ spected, children were welcomed—but also admonished by their grandmas not to whisper. It seemed to me that the service of worship, in spite of the ritualism and some superstitions connected with it, gave the people of the village a sense of moral renewal, bound them together as brothers and tended to encourage them to be a little nobler during the coming week. When it was finished I took the liberty of calling on several families, first visiting the priest who was married and lived in a parsonage resembling those of many American small town pastors.

He was happy to tell

me of his church, his village, his children, the hard times through which they were passing. From the par-

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sonage I went to the home of Domnul Virgil Ionescu, a peasant with 15 acres of land. In his large grasscovered yard I saw two big sows with large litters of recently born pigs, a yoke of oxen, a cow with a calf, big and little chickens galore, and two boisterously pre¬ tentious geese, officiously moving about to protect their yellow goslings—from what I don’t know. Everything was clean and well kept, plainly the ob¬ ject of loving care and the source of personal pride. The Ionescu home had a vestibule and two rooms, one of which was a parlor-bedroom and the other a kitchenbedroom. All sparkled in bright, holiday cleanliness. On the walls of the parlor were pictures of Jesus, King Mihai and Juliu Maniu. Embroidered, homespun cur¬ tains adorned the windows, numerous dainty handwoven, elaborately embroidered towels hung upon the wall, or were suspended from the ceiling. A much used loom stood in the kitchen. The daughter of the family had a large wooden chest packed with homespun linen towels, table cloths and garments. This home wasn’t as substantial or comfortable or beautiful as those in New England villages a century ago, but it was a pleasant hearth of self-reliant, self-respecting, honest and free people. Bolsheviks call such a peasant with 15 acres even of mountainous land a kulak. We lunched bountifully, agreeably and noisily in an¬ other peasant home and spent the early afternoon visit¬ ing still other farmers, some poorer than the lonescus; a few richer. Very few had as much as 30 acres of land, many less than five, none were propertyless. Class dis¬ tinctions were absent as well as class hatred, though I discovered the trace of a social gap between village in¬ tellectuals wearing store clothes and dirt farmers in white homespun, in spite of the fact that the latter had the better incomes. I was struck by the joy with which

368

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the poorest of the village welcomed into their homes the richer as holiday callers. There was a fine com¬ munity solidarity. The village had a small cooperative, two Jewishowned stores, one Rumanian-owned store, a Hungarian barber, a Hungarian cobbler, four simple mills run by water power, a blacksmith shop, good schools and a bank, but no light or water system. In the whole place there were only 10 radios; only a few copies of news¬ papers were received, all of which were governmental since others were not allowed. Nevertheless, the people seemed fairly well informed about world affairs. I was a guest for the night at the only large farm, a place with 68 acres of land and a pleasant house un¬ der splendid trees, though without any modern con¬ veniences except home-made electricity, produced by water power. During the first afternoon I watched the village children play ball on a large grass-covered vil¬ lage common. Youth strolled about, girls and boys sepa¬ rately for the most part, as their elders gathered in groups to discuss politics, Groza’s government, high prices, the Russian Army and world affairs. Venturing to ask some of them about their opinions, I soon found myself the center of a large, friendly, curi¬ ous crowd. Several of the peasants had been in America, others wanted to go there. Practically all seemed to be supporters of Maniu, even the mayor, who was for¬ mally a member of Groza’s party, the Plowman’s Front. He said he had accepted this post with the approval of his Maniu-supporting neighbors, who wanted to prevent it from getting into the hands of a bad, incompetent man. The women didn’t hesitate to express their opin¬ ions, though they let their men do most of the talking. The peasants agreed, in answering my question, that

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there were 12 Communists in the village, most of whom were not Rumanians. During the second day of my visit at Castle, I at¬ tended a creditable home talent play, prepared under the direction of the teachers and given in a school house. In the evening I looked in on a village ball where the youth indulged in folk dances with much vehemence and some grace. Most of the girls were pretty and dressed in becoming native homespun. Life in Castle was agreeable; it had been secure, democratic and rather patriarchal. Every one from the shepherd to the mayor had had a chance to win pre-eminence of place. Authority and influence seemed due to age, to wisdom and to success. The overwhelming majority of the members of the community seemed to hold a basic theory that an industrious, thrifty man could work his way to the top. Practically all boys and girls went to school, a few youth to the University in Cluj or Bucha¬ rest and most parents cherished the hope that their children would advance into the store-clothes class. All sources of wealth were fairly equitably distributed and no extraneous group or person dominated the com¬ munity. Of course there was much room for improvements and many reforms are needed but Castle seemed to me a good basis for a decent society of free men living above humiliation, want or servility. Most Rumanian villages resemble it; some in Ardeal and Bucovina are better; many in the Old Kingdom are dirtier and more backward. In other words, 80% of the Rumanians in 1940 lived, worked, played, thought and dreamed as the Castle peasants. As a matter of fact, most of the hundred million men and women in eastern Europe, from Athens and Cavalla in Greece, through Petrich in Bulgaria and Podgroitza in Yugoslavia, clear to the

370

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

northern tip of Finland have lived as the men and women, who for two days were my hosts and neighbors in Castle. And they have been led along the road of progress by peasant parties under heroic peasant leaders. What I have written about Castle is not an attempt to gloss over the wrongs in Rumanian society and espe¬ cially in Rumanian villages. As there are glaring de¬ fects in Boston, Topeka, Chicago, Atlanta and Los Angeles there have been egregious defects in Rumanian villages, but the general picture was one of progress. I regret that health conditions in many Rumanian villages were bad. Epidemics caused ravages, while tuberculosis and venereal diseases were common. An unbalanced diet was prevalent in some provinces caus¬ ing chronic defects. Many of the little houses were over-crowded in bedrooms and kitchens. Rumania is very hot in summer and quite cold in winter, and to these extremes the peasant hasn’t adapted his clothing. Often he lacked enough warm garments and I have seen women and children barefoot in the snow. Farm implements were insufficient, farm animals too few and not always of the best variety. The peasants cultivated the soil inadequately. The State’s credit arrangements were defective, interest rates remained too high. These are common world-wide agricultural inade¬ quacies which the Rumanians were striving to remove, along with all other nations. Their progress was not as rapid as progress in Denmark or Utah and they had further to go. But the journey had aspects of bright¬ ness and cheer; as the nation looked back decade by decade it found many signs of advance and considerable cause for encouragement, even pride. The Rumanian peasant wasn’t very frugal but he had the knack of enjoying his little extravagances. When

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the Rumanian peasant killed a sheep and made a hat of its skin he produced one that he hoped would knock his neighbor’s eye out. Perhaps it was he who set the fashion for ministerial stovepipe hats. He covered his sheepskin coat with elaborate colored figures. His peas¬ ant wife embroidered his clothes, and in a beautiful manner. The peasant also painted his little house. He didn’t build it as hygienically as he should but insisted on covering it—and his wagon—with fancy figures, re¬ vealing much artistic understanding. Though the house inside was stuffy it was decorated with frilled curtains, embroidered towels and an occasional picture. It may have had a few pieces of rather attractive rural furni¬ ture, and was clean. In other words, however much the Rumanian peas¬ ant may have come to “resemble a gypsy” in the color of his skin and in his poverty, he has tended not to live as a gypsy. As a rule he is not shabby. He almost al¬ ways has holiday clothes and reveals much family pride. Because of such characteristics he is irrevocably op¬ posed to collectivization. He wants something special for his own and has a knack for making it, as well as a flair for using it. He cherishes a strong antipathy to being swallowed up in a human mass. During a long life among European peasants I have found no group more individualistic than the Rumanians—not even the Greeks. One finds this rather dramatically revealed in the midst of Bucharest. Strange as it may seem, the princi¬ pal metropolis of Rumania contains many peasants. Some are workers, others servants and still others curbmerchants. One finds that in a city where Jews are be¬ lieved to dominate the market, peasant merchants suc¬ cessfully compete with them. One cannot walk a hun¬ dred rods from Hotel Athenee Palace, which is reputed

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

to be the most aristocratic hostelry in the Balkans, and is in the center of Bucharest beside the Royal Palace, without meeting genuine peasants who have come in from the country to sell things. Each morning peasants go through the streets crying out their wares. Some sell chickens, others fruit, still others vegetables, and they usually transport their wares in large flat baskets suspended from a yoke over their shoulders. They work extremely hard and very long hours in order to earn a little money to take back to their villages. Plainly they are not stupid serfs, tied to their drab little peasant communities. Any one dealing with them finds them sharp and alert, but courteous. They show persistence, initiative, ingenuity, kindness. When one goes into the outskirts of any provincial Rumanian city he sees little settlements of peasantworkers. They have come into town to get humble jobs in industrial enterprises and rejoice at the chance to earn a little extra money. But they intend to invest that on the land; they still dream of land. In the city they feel as strangers. They aspire to become big shots back in the village. I have observed that attitude among the waiters, chambermaids and porters of the best Ruma¬ nian hotels. I think 90% of them are peasants and although they are now organized in Communist labor unions, they talk like capitalists. Their hearts are back home with their parents and relatives. They earn all they possibly can, but do it in hopes of preparing a good future in their villages. When their hours of daily work have ended and they step out with well-polished shoes, neat clothes, canes in hands, one could hardly tell them from the hotel guests. They seem to have an aversion to mass-man. Also, they bear little enmity toward richer people, and show much consideration for persons in authority. This re-

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spect for the social hierarchy is not due primarily to feelings of obsequiousness but to an appreciation of a social ladder upon which every enterprising man may climb. They are trying to climb themselves. And they have a lively interest in world affairs. Constantly they asked me how international conferences and other im¬ portant gatherings were getting along. They hoped Russian aggression would be stopped. In their hearts they daily fight the battle of world freedom. 1 hey ap¬ pear to abhor nothing more than the thought of being a helpless member of a boss-directed proletariat. The Russians understand perfectly well that Ruma¬ nian independence has been preserved for nearly two millenniums and is being preserved largely by peasants. They know that the Rumanian intellectual classes were once so completely wiped out that for whole centuries nothing was written about even the existence of the Rumanian nation. But still, the peasants preserved the nation and eventually produced scholars to describe their language in grammars and write about Rumania in books. It has been proved that one can’t destroy Rumania without destroying the peasants. And never was that as true as today. Rumanian intellectuals have flopped to Russia by the scores. Some politicians have rushed so impetuously to Russia, they trampled one an¬ other in their haste. Merchants shined up to the Rus¬ sians and signed up in the Communist Party so as to do business. Industrialists adapted their plants to Russian requirements and some professors changed their text¬ books to suit Russian whims. But the peasants still re¬ main as the fortress of the Rumanian spirit, Rumanian honor and Rumanian independence. Therefore, Russia and their agents there have set out to take that fortress. And one of their weapons was “land reform” or a redistribution of fields. The Communists from 1944

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made that their main slogan as they fought for powerseizure. They promised to snatch land from those who had it and gave it to those who had not. They even en¬ couraged peasant mobs to seize land, farm houses, ani¬ mals, grain. They promised to make all peasants inde¬ pendent farmers. In spite of the fact that if all arable land in Rumania, including hay land, meadows and pas¬ tures were equally distributed among the peasants, they would receive less than a hectare (two and a half acres) each! Plainly this Communist-directed confiscation of Ru¬ mania’s land was devised to serve political purposes. And it was forced upon the country directly by the Kremlin. In view of that was it not absurd for anyone to believe that the Rumania peasants were being given land to keep as their very own? Was it conceivable that the masters of a country in which there is no private agricultural property were bent upon giving private land to all the peasants in neighboring Rumania? Can one forget that in the one typically Communized country, the USSR, land dis¬ tribution among peasants was the preparation for land collectivization, meaning total land confiscation? Anyone truly interested in land reform in Rumania should keep in mind that it was brought about by Com¬ munists living in cities and not by peasant leaders, in¬ terested in the welfare of the rural population. Why were the Communist leaders of teamsters, launderers, miners, street car conductors and railroad engineers so interested in giving land to the Rumanian peasants? Why did ten men in the distant Kremlin order land con¬ fiscated in the villages of the Banat, Oltenia, Transyl¬ vania? Not for the sake of Rumanian peasants! Dr. Groza one day held a propaganda meeting in the classical revolutionary Transylvania city of Blaj, to

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which he brought his own audience in special state trucks bearing large Communistic posters and in seven special trains emblazoning the slogan, “Workers of the World Unite.” They wore peasant costumes as actors on a stage. I was present and saw practically no local peasants although the region is exclusively agricultural. It was a Communist show, held on a site as famous for Rumanian peasants as Bunker Hill for American pa¬ triots, at the foot of a statue honoring a peasant revolu¬ tionary hero, as much beloved as Patrick Henry, and it was designed to intimidate or lure peasants into Groza’s Communist Plowmen’s Front. The Premier naturally lauded the efforts of the Ru¬ manian revolutionist, Avram Iancu, who on the grasscovered meadow 98 years earlier had launched an up¬ rising for liberating Rumanians from Magyar feudal landlords, and the Prime Minister pointed out that one of Iancu’s main aims was a better system of land owner¬ ship such as would enable the people working the land to enjoy its fruits. Iancu, as well as all other Rumanian peasant revolutionists, definitely demanded a fair land distribution. Dr. Groza, after stressing this fact and extolling the heroic sacrifices of earlier Transylvanian peasant martyrs, exclaimed that at last the peasants, after vainly waiting a full century, had received land from his government. Groza pictured himself as having completed Iancu’s fight, and thereupon ostentatiously handed out a few new deeds to confiscated fields. Such an assertion in that place was as though Frank¬ lin Roosevelt had brought a group of WPA workers onto George Washington’s lawn at Mt. Vernon and brazenly shouted, “Now at last, after fifteen painful decades of corrupt government, I give you for the first time the blessings of which Jefferson wrote and for which George Washington fought.”

376

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Groza’s statement showed the mentality of the Com¬ munists who pushed through the land reform. They were seeking political capital. Actually, Groza’s gov¬ ernment didn’t distribute so much as 2,000,000 acres of plow land, appreciably less than 10 per cent of the arable surface of Rumania. Six times more land was distributed among the peasants by the political parties which the Communists hourly excoriate as fascists! In fact, there was a comparatively small amount of farm land to be distributed. As a result of the land reforms after the First World War, when about 2,000,000 new peasant families were given land, ap¬ proximately 87 per cent of the arable surface of Ruma¬ nia was in the hands of 3,500,000 peasant families. In 1940, nearly two thirds of Rumania’s farm land was in holdings smaller than 25 acres each, with a further fifth in properties of from 25 to 124 acres each. In few other countries of the world did so large a propor¬ tion of the people own so large a proportion of the fields. I am not suggesting that an ideal situation had there¬ by been established. Actually most peasants were still poor, because there wasn’t enough land to go around. Four fifths of the peasant families owned less than six acres each; nine tenths of these had less than five acres each. And even after Groza’s reform, hundreds of thou¬ sands of peasant families remained landless. By the end of another decade they will surpass a million, for whom there will be no land even if every farm in the country is re-divided. And the finer the fields are par¬ celled up, the less effectively they are worked, the less produce they yield and the poorer the peasants become. Groza’s Communists solved no economic problem with their land reform. Appreciably fewer than a mil-

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lion Rumanians received plots of land from Groza’s largess and a fairly large proportion of those dwarf plots were not taken from big farms. In many cases fields were taken from peasant Ion and given to peasant Trajan. Some of the fields distributed by Groza to his newly won followers were taken from German peasants who had cultivated them excellently. And they were given to third rate non-German peasants who had an aversion to hard work but eagerly signed up in the Communist Party—or at least made the sign X if they couldn’t write. From the above analysis I would not like to give the impression of defending rich Rumanian landowners. My sympathy is on the side of the Rumanian peasants, many of whom have remained landless, and 2,750,000 of whom own an average of less than five acres each. I have frequently talked with Rumanian “moshiers” or landowners and find that not a few have a rather haughty attitude toward peasants. To say the very least, they are patronizing. I am unreservedly for common people, who in Rumania are peasants, and I often have felt grieved on hearing sleek Rumanians in fine houses, at sumptuous tables, sneer at bare-footed peasants. I consider the villagers among the best of the Rumanians and if it would basically solve any vital eco¬ nomic or social problem I’d favor taking all land from the “moshiers.” But merely handing richer people’s land out to the peasants in microscopic pieces would bring them

no

permanent

relief;

indeed,

just

the

opposite. In one respect Groza’s reform was just; namely, in that it reduced absentee landlordism. Socially, politi¬ cally and morally, it was wrong for hundreds of peas¬ ants in a village to live in wretchedness and misery while an absentee landlord, enjoying an idle city life,

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possessed a disproportionate amount of land, which he farmed through hired agents. In such cases, which were not more than a few thousand in Rumania, there was required a change of ownership that would make the produce of such farms available to the whole vil¬ lage. Rumanian democracy required an agrarian re¬ form that would increase the productivity of the land and place the increased yield at the disposal of all thrifty peasants. But that was not what Moscow or its Rumanian servants accomplished by their land re¬ form—nor is it what they sought. What they were after was to gain control of the Rumanian peasantry, and they used land confiscation as one of the best means. By transferring land titles they undermined the sense of authority and respect for thrift. By rewarding the shiftless and irresponsible, they turned village standards and traditions upside down. I am not intimating that every poor man in a Rumanian village, or any place else, is individually re¬ sponsible for his plight. A bad system of tariffs or taxa¬ tion or marketing or land ownership might keep even the best villagers poor, and doom their children to perpetual misery. There is no question but that society is partially responsible for the incidence of poverty. On the other hand, it was perfectly plain to almost all Rumanian peasants that those who were the soberest, thriftiest and most diligent got ahead, while those who drank too much, carelessly mortgaged their possessions or shunned hard work, remained wretched. In every village there was a process of rather natural screening or promotion, and it was quite just. As a rule those people enjoyed respect and authority who de¬ served it. People who worked hard, planned carefully and had ambitions were able to send their children to primary school, then on to high school. They often ex-

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perienced the joy of seeing members of their family rise to respectable positions beyond the narrow village con¬ fines. In practically every village in Rumania a fairly large amount of land was continually changing hands and as a rule it tended to get into the hands of the worthiest, most diligent and most useful peasants, from the point of view of Rumania and of the world. Year by year such peasants whittled down the largest estates by purchase. Through Groza’s land reform and political changes accompanying it, the more shiftless element suddenly seized authority and grabbed property, thus destroying standards and violating basic judicial conceptions. When the land of a village was to be distributed Com¬ munists appeared from the nearest city, called together the landless or those with holdings under 12 acres and formed a committee by general acclaim, which pro¬ ceeded to parcel out the available land. In other words, the all -powerful city Communist and the Committee, which he ordered the landless of the village to set up, simply invited the poorest peasants to grab what they wished. Naturally in this scramble there was confusion. And the quarrels were settled, not by regular authori¬ ties but by this self-chosen Committee under the direc¬ tion of the city delegate. The mayor also would be in on the deal; in practically every case he was a Com¬ munist of recent allegiance, appointed by the Commu¬ nist Minister of the Interior. Thus, the gypsies, the gypsy-like villagers, the more unreliable, lawless, vio¬ lent, and politically perfidious suddenly became lords of other people’s property. In theory, they worked ac¬ cording to a government decree and there were certain categories of people who had more right to land than others, but actually, in most cases, the re-distribution was simple land grabbing.

And the less solid elements

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

in each village seized not only land, but also animals, grain, machinery, and even buildings. Not one cent was paid for this newly seized property and the whole process was accompanied by a great amount of bribery. The peasants, if they were able, bribed the land committees and the landlords resorted to bribery in their desperate efforts to save from the wreckage at least as much as the government decree had provided. In addition to the bribery and the ex¬ treme insolence which the new masters displayed, there was terrible waste. The finest machinery was soon de¬ stroyed by its new, incompetent owners. Tractors stalled in the middle of fields, never to start again. The best seed grain was sold for flour; the finest farm ani¬ mals were used for meat. The villages were left with¬ out good breeding animals and without a source of superior seeds or examples of scientific agriculture. However, serious as was this blow to scientific farming in a land where almost the only fields with a good yield were those in larger holdings, the moral damage was the greatest. Village morale was degraded, individual integrity weakened and respect for sound enterprise undermined. A premium was placed on lawlessness and shiftlessness. The peasants saw it was easier to grab than laboriously to produce. It became more profitable to loaf under the protection of the government than painfully to economize in order to buy things. And no property remained safe. The people with newly acquired au¬ thority who seized farm land, farm animals and farm machinery would soon be tempted to seize city land, city houses and industrial machines. The more reliable and solid people of the villages were rendered helpless; they were obliged impotently to watch the least reliable come to power and pass out stolen goods as rewards to

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the covetous. Village discipline, restraint, and authority that had been very laboriously built up through centu¬ ries were shaken and the village hierarchy, enabling each worthy family to advance, was shattered. Basic honesty was corrupted. Every day in prac¬ tically every village peasants were offered land if they would sign up as Communists. They weren’t Commu¬ nists and knew they weren’t Communists, and all their neighbors knew they weren’t Communists. But natu¬ rally they wanted land, so they asked their friends what to do and in many cases the sympathetic friends said “What’se the diff—sign up! Get your title to the land and then rejoin the old parties.” So men degraded themselves, accepted baseness and bowed their heads to lawless demagogues, as they snatched other people’s property. And what will be the end of all this? Most of the poor villagers who seized the land of their neighbors had few tools and fewer animals. The state had no adequate system for providing them with seed. The community could not place at their disposal good breed¬ ing animals. There was no place from which they could learn good farming methods or find out how to intro¬ duce more profitable crops, get fertilizers, overcome droughts, or market their products. So the village produced less than ever before. The total income de¬ creased, and the low standard sank still lower. Ru¬ mania’s grain export dropped. The amount of Hour sent to the hungry cities diminished. Now, if this economic deterioration brought moral improvement, enabled the new land-owning families to feel more self-respecting, and increased the pride and happiness of the whole village, the material price in diminished grain production might not be too high. What’s a bushel of wheat compared to a soul! But, un-

382

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

fortunately, the economic and material loss was accom¬ panied by an even greater loss in community morale, hopefulness, faith and elemental self-respect. What does it profit a village to lose both its corn bread and its soul! Before long a sweeping measure of total peasant dis¬ possession will take place. Indeed, a ponderous system of coercive peasant cooperatives has already been in¬ stalled and government agents have been sent swarm¬ ing into the villages to control every aspect of peasant life. The cooperatives constitute the final prepara¬ tion for the establishing of total collective feudalism. From now on events may be expected to develop somewhat as follows: Government agents in the vil¬ lages will greatly intensify class warfare, inciting peas¬ ant to hate peasant. They will try to direct torrents of hatred against the more solid and thrifty villagers. They will denounce every one who wants to retain his property as a fascist, traitor, imperialist agent, kulak and will set up a police apparatus to eliminate them. Committees of the most brutal elements will be formed to carry out the requisite terror and seize the fields. They will collect the animals and farm machinery and grain, putting them all in a single pool. They will collect the peasant families, men, women and children, into work gangs or brigades and send them out to plow under all landmarks, separating one field from another. From then on every villager will work as ordered by Communist bosses. During this brutal mass liquidation there will be vigorous mass protests from the victims and many bloody clashes. Much property will be destroyed in the fight, production will fall, heads will be broken, shots will be fired. But in the end the peasants will probably be forced to acquiesce—unless in the meantime the

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power of world Communism is broken. Dare one ex¬ pect Rumanian peasants, in spite of their persistence during past centuries, to resist where Russian peasants failed? Will they be able to stem the Muscovite Bol¬ shevik torrent which Russian peasants couldn’t with¬ stand? Already, through the land reform and other measures, their bulwarks have been undermined. In the meantime, general peasant demoralization is being rapidly increased by the administrative system which the Groza government has set up in the villages. Already by the end of 1945 Communists had taken over the countryside. The vehicle for this rural powerseizure was called the Plowman’s Front, but that really meant the Communist Party. A Plowman’s Front mayor was appointed in each village, who on instructions from Communists in the countryseat or even in the capital began to “purify” local authorities. He brought great pressure to bear on the teacher, village clerk and others to join the Front or one of its Communist-dominated affiliations. An official investigation was made and each village in¬ habitant performing any official function was asked how he stood politically. He was then told he’d better get right with Groza. And it was not done in a subtle way. The persons investigated were given circulars plainly stating that if they didn’t sign up they’d have to sign out. They received ultimatums. Likewise, the villagers were told that if they wanted essential and scarce com¬ modities, such as are distributed by the state they had to become members of the Front. If they wanted kero¬ sene, salt, sugar, soap, shoes or credit, or to have their promissory notes prolonged, or to receive consideration in tax payments, they had to join up. Hard times be¬ came doubly hard for those who dared refuse. Besides all this, the Communists set up a new system

384

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

for selling city products to the villagers (peasants) and buying farm products from the villagers. It was a monopoly. Only persons appointed by the state could carry on such commerce. If a peasant wanted to buy anything or sell anything he had to work with that Communist organization which was graft-ridden and riddled with favoritism. The monopoly didn’t help many peasants but ruined all who remained outside, especially if they tried to fight it. The Plowman’s Front and the governmental groups associated with it are a state conspiracy directed against the peasants; they have used every coercive device for breaking peasant morale, from the distribution of land and kerosene through the control over village officials and school teachers to physical terror and large scale arrests. They have also confiscated the peasants’ money!

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385

Chapter XXII COMMUNISTS EXTERMINATE THE PEASANT PARTY During the summer of 1946 I had the honor of being invited by a number of leaders of the National-Peasant Party to a luncheon. I had been ordered by the Red Army to leave Rumania and these Rumanian friends gathered to bid me farewell. For most it turned out to be an adieu—and forever. They presented me with a nicely bound book of folk art and on the fly leaf in¬ scribed their names. They may have had a premoni¬ tion; at any rate, I did. Of the men represented by those 26 names almost every one was soon to be in exile, in prison, in hiding or killed. The National-Peasant Party which they represented was wiped out, and with its suppression all independent political activity was ended. The road to this extermination of Rumania’s main people’s movement was marked by the following events: When the National-Peasant Party chief, Juliu Maniu, endeavored from the autumn of 1943 to cooperate with England and America in finding a way by which the Allies could facilitate Rumania’s extrication from the Axis and its re-alignment with the Western Democra¬ cies, his efforts were rebuffed.

England and America

felt they had to desert him to Russia. When Maniu endeavored to conclude an agreement with Russia,

whereby Rumania could join the Red

Army in a fight against Germany, Russia strung him along in hopes of making a deal with other Rumanians

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who did not represent the peasant nation. The Kremlin would even have preferred to work with pro-Nazi dicta¬ tor Antonescu. After the coup of August 23, 1944 which was ar¬ ranged largely by Maniu though executed by the King, the Russians from the first day found themselves face to face with the peasant leader. They wanted to1 strip Rumania and subjugate the Rumanian people, to which Maniu objected, thereby enraging the Kremlin. Power¬ ful and implacable Muscovy branded him as Rumanian enemy No. 1, and resolved to get him. During the six months from the coup until March 6, 1945, when Russia put the Rumanian Communists in power, the Moscow-directed Communist drive was directed chiefly against Maniu and the National< Peasant Party. The Kremlin overthrew the regimes of Sanatescu and Radescu primarily in order to destroy Maniu, his associates and his party. Moscow and the Communist-directed Groza govern¬ ment mobilized and incited the Magyar population of Rumania against Maniu and the Peasant Party. This was a strong element and in many parts of Rumania was able to exert extreme physical pressure upon local peasant leaders. Also, this bitter Magyar hatred toward Maniu placed him in an embarrassing moral position. The Groza government professed to be for Magyar-Rumanian friendship, which was a mask be¬ hind which the government used Magyars to promote Communism and strengthen its own hold on power. By opposing this scheme Maniu placed himself in a position that enabled Moscow to shout to the world that he was a fascist reactionary, fomenting hatred of minorities. On this question of Magyar-Rumanian rela¬ tions the peasant leader was in an inescapable dilemma. The Communists and Moscow also incited the Jews

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against Maniu, placing him in the predicament of ap¬ pearing to be anti-Semitic, although his record on that matter has always been excellent. Many Rumanian Jews are Communists, and they came into constant conflict with the National-Peasant anti-Communists. In every such clash the Communists shouted, “Maniu’s bands are fighting Jews,” although Maniu had no bands. Many Rumanian Jews were and are favorable to the Soviet Union and are against Rumanian national¬ ism. Maniu is for Rumanian independence and against the oppression exercised by Soviet Russia.

This again

brought him into conflict with Jews. The Armistice, the Yalta Agreement, the Rumanian Peace Treaty all oblige Rumania to extirpate “the last vestiges of fascism.” That was interpreted to mean the extirpation of Maniu and the Peasant Party. Communist shock troopers suppressed with terror and violence all non-Communist organizations among workers. Formerly a fair proportion of Rumania’s workers were with Maniu in National-Peasant unions. This Communist action among workers directly cut off support from Maniu. The government, Communist-led printers and Com¬ munist shock troopers prevented the printing and dis¬ tribution of National-Peasant Party papers almost from the beginning. Almost from the day the Russians en¬ tered Bucharest in 1944, the National-Peasant Party was also excluded from the radio. In August 1945, as a result of American and British encouragement, King Mihai asked the Communist-led Groza government to resign. The principal local force behind this move was the National-Peasant Party. When the attempt failed, because of Russia’s attitude, the King was humiliated, and the National-Peasant Party suffered a serious setback.

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The nation staged a very impressive, largely sponta¬ neous demonstration for the King and for Rumania, November 8, 1945. The principal outburst of affection was in Bucharest and the main force behind it was the National-Peasant Party, because it had come to per¬ sonify Rumanian independence. The Communists, in spite of extreme efforts, failed to disperse or intimidate the crowds; but after the celebration ended the Com¬ munist police arrested hundreds of National-Peasant leaders, including many youths. Communist brutality in Bucharest was part of country-wide terror. The government hunted down National-Peasant leaders, as farmers once rounded up wolves, thus weakening Maniu. This police violence naturally provoked a desire to resist, which again played into Communist hands. Here was the problem: If the patriotic Rumanians accepted foreign oppression lying down, they would be licked from the very beginning—and ignominiously. But if they fought back they provoked brutality from vastly superior forces. They couldn’t possibly hope to drive out Russia or overthrow the Russian-protected Com¬ munist government. If all male Rumanian adults had been William Tells in 1945 they couldn’t have pre¬ vented Russian’s domination. And most didn’t even have bows and arrows. Thus if Maniu’s men resisted, the Communists shouted, “See, they are conspirators! They must be arrested.” If Maniu’s men didn’t resist, Communists cried, “See, they are all with our ‘people’s regime’!” Groza flooded the world with both kinds of propaganda. Actually some Rumanians did resist—largely out of exasperation or desperation. Rumania had—and has_ some Patrick Henrys. Rumanians clung to it.

Life was not so sweet that all Some were willing to take any

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risk, just to do something. They despised themselves for inactivity and submission and supineness. They de¬ tested the sychophants on every side and wanted to strike a blow for Rumania’s honor. Consequently, there were a few “bands.” One such was led by distin¬ guished, fiery General Aurel Aldea, who had helped the King overthrow Antonescu, and had been Minister of the Interior. And there were others. These rebels weren’t led by Maniu nor Mihalache. They got neither money, instructions nor arms from the Peasant Party as such. But many were inspired by the Peasant Party and by Maniu. Every patriot was inspired by Maniu. They loved him as Americans love Washington’s memory and example. Some of the band members were also Peasant Party members. Others made contacts with local party leaders or members. Some were relatives of party officials. All this was be¬ yond conjecture. How could it be otherwise! With Patrick Henrys and William Tells praised by all gener¬ ations and with World War II Partisans lauded to the skies for defying tyrant Hitler, is it conceivable that some Rumanians would not take to the woods and pre¬ pare to “break the yoke” of Muscovy’s double tyranny? But this hopeless activity of Rumanian rebels inspired by the stand of the National-Peasant Party and by the character of its leaders only helped the oppressors forge chains for Maniu and for the party. That is the tragedy which always faces the oppressed. When Russia and its Communists charged that Maniu’s followers were conspirators there was a grain of truth in the charge. So the coils tightened. Again, the relations of Maniu and of his NationalPeasant associates with the Americans in Bucharest created a very serious problem. For Maniu and other Rumanian leaders to fignore or shun Americans would

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have been a dramatic public confession that they were with Russia and that they were too craven even to seek liberation. Of course they associated with Americans, as flowers with the sun. America may not actually be a sun, but there was no other light visible in Rumania’s dark firmament. So Maniu’s men were constantly with Americans, both official and unofficial Americans. Most Americans in Bucharest cherished and promoted that connection. Beyond all dispute, this association was directed against Moscow-supported, Communist des¬ potism. The American Government officially and repeatedly complained against the Communist regime in Rumania and it got data for the complaints from oppositionists, mainly from National-Peasants. This procedure un¬ avoidably exposed the Peasant Party and Maniu to the charge of aiding the enemy, of divulging State secrets, of conspiring. This can’t be glossed over nor denied. The Americans in 1945 wanted to oust Groza, and the National-Peasants along with most other Rumanians ardently supported America. Thus they worked against their government and its Moscow sponsor. It is no crime in an ordinary land to attempt to get rid of a specific government, but in Rumania where Communists rule as tyrants it is made a crime.

The

dilemma was inescapable: if Maniu’s men did not asso¬ ciate with Americans, they thereby capitulated to Com¬ munism; if they did associate, they entered a trap and could be condemned as traitors. The trap closed. They were condemned. This predicament weighed upon the Peasant Party during all of 1946, eventually crushing it. The Moscow Agreement (December 1945) which brought one lone National-Peasant leader into the Groza cabinet was de¬ vised by America principally to enable Maniu and his

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE party to carry on, political activity.

391

The Americans

openly, before the world, took Maniu’s part, spread their wings over him, prepared “unfettered” elections for him. They made Maniu their man and the NationalPeasant Party their instrument for promoting democ¬ racy in Rumania. Consequently, the Kremlin in its determination to crush American influence in Rumania set out first of all to crush Maniu. Nevertheless, the National-Peasant Party accepted the challenge and on January 7, 1946, put a lone minister in the Groza cabinet—as the Agree¬ ment had provided. From that moment events developed in a catastrophic manner. In the first place, Groza inaugurated the year with a fluke. Though pretending to accept the Moscow Agreement, he actually squirmed out of it by failing to put his signature and seal on the acceptance. When the time for signing came, the Rumanian Premier and his Communists swindled the United States. Not for a single hour did they show any intention of keeping the Agreement, and didn’t keep it. Organized Communist violence, much of which I saw personally, raged from one end of Rumania to the other. Armed Russian soldiers helped break up Na¬ tional-Peasant meetings. Every Maniu supporter who dared write an article or call a conference or go from city to city electioneering risked his life. The Commu¬ nists maintained this terror campaign under the eyes of the American Mission and laughed at the American Government when it protested. An election law was decreed which disfranchised a considerable part of the electorate and made effective control of the balloting very difficult. And eventually this law was disregarded by the Communists in order that they might free themselves even from their own

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mild regulations. Also, the elections were repeatedly postponed to give the Communists and their Russian masters time to “prepare” the Rumanian people as well as time to prepare election machinery that would pre¬ vent the people from expressing their will. As Rumania approached election day, November 19, 1946, the government was in a virtual state of war against the people. Not one National-Peasant voice had been allowed at radio transmitters. In the whole land only one National-Peasant paper was printed, and that under a triple censorship. Its distribution was rigidly curtailed by Communist shock troopers. Jails had long been crowded with National-Peasant leaders, big and small, national and local. And on the eve of voting a large part of those who remained free were gathered up by the Communist police. The men in town and village who would have encouraged the nation in daring to vote as its conscience dictated were in jail. The men who should have controlled the Communists in counting the votes had been put away by the Com¬ munists. The road for final intimidation and fraud was wide open. The British Government, in the person of Hector McNeil, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Af¬ fairs, publicly stated on October 23 that Rumania was “subject to a reign of terror exercised by the govern¬ ment-controlled militia and that the opposition enjoyed none of the liberties characteristic of a democratic state. . . Three days later the American Government made a strong protest against the “major impediments and violent obstructions which the Groza government placed in the way of the opposition. Maniu and his associates well knew that he, his party and his nation were going to their doom amid the faint

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and fatuous salvoes of U. S. Government notes, but they went unflinchingly and kept their flags flying. As they succumbed, they had the satisfaction of knowing that a majority of the people had voted for them. Rarely had the peasants and common people of Ruma¬ nia been braver than on that November 19, 1946. They gave the opposition and especially the National-Peasant Party their emphatic support. But the government, after a five day delay used to manipulate the figures, announced that 4,766,630 voters had cast their ballots for the Communist front and 1,201,761 for the opposi¬ tion. Hungarians affiliated with the government polled more than half a million. The government was credited with 366 seats in Parliament; the opposition with 66, of which 32 were for the National-Peasants. Almost as soon as the Groza government announced the falsified returns the U. S. Government (November 26) made an official declaration, in which it said: “The Rumanian Government held elections on No¬ vember 19. The Department of State has now received extensive reports concerning the conduct of those elec¬ tions, and the information contained therein makes it abundantly clear that, as a result of manipulation of the electoral registers, the procedures followed in conduct¬ ing the balloting and the counting of votes, as well as by intimidation through terrorism of large democratic elements of the electorate, the franchise was on that occasion effectively denied to important sections of the population. Consequently, the United States Govern¬ ment cannot regard those elections as a compliance by the Rumanian Government with the assurances it gave the United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Governments in implementa¬ tion of the Moscow decision.” A week later the British Government officially said:

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. . the elections were neither free nor fair. During the election campaign, parties other than those com¬ prising the Government ‘bloc’ did not enjoy full free¬ dom of speech or association. The arrangements on polling day itself were, moreover, such as to permit wholesale falsification of the results, and full advantage, was taken of this by the Government authorities. In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government con¬ siders that the results of the Rumanian elections do not truly represent the opinion of the Rumanian people.” Maniu and his associates characterize the Commu¬ nist deceit, terror and fraud connected with that elec¬ tion as follows: “An electoral law was” decreed “whose manifest purpose was to allow the government to falsify the re¬ sults of the polls, yet even it was set aside. Electoral registers were not drawn up.” Instead, “loose lists were made, no more than fifteen days before the ex¬ piration of the two months’ term provided by the law. . . . They contained the names of such voters as seemed favorable to the regime. Most were either not posted at all, or were posted piece-meal. “Subsequently, the number of voters was still further reduced by Government election agents. . . . “Every voting regulation was violated during elec¬ tion operations. In many districts the delegates and observers of the opposition parties were arrested a few days before the actual polling. Others who re¬ mained at large were prevented from entering the polling stations, while some who by various subterfuges did succeed in gaining access, found the commissions constituted before the legal hour fixed for the begin¬ ning of the voting. “In some cases ballot boxes were found sealed and filled with completed ballots, even before voting began.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

395

“Persons serving the government voted several times each.

Chairmen of the voting commissions also put

previously filled ballots into the urns. “But all this was not enough to assure government success. Most of the opposition delegates and observ¬ ers were seized and ejected from the polling stations, before the votes were counted.” Then the district electoral commissions were given two days to concoct fictitious returns from the various electoral wards or villages and to make up district totals that would correspond to government demands. But this didn’t satisfy some of the Communist bosses at Bucharest and further changes had to be made. Elec¬ toral results, that had already been announced, were denied. Fraudulent minutes of fraudulent election com¬ missions were destroyed and replaced by other fraudu¬ lent minutes, more to the liking of the Communist Party and the Kremlin. Three days were required for the government to complete all the falsification and pre¬ pare the fraudulent protocols.

Then the results were

announced. Is that appraisal of the opposition to be accepted as accurate? One may say it was largely confirmed by official and unofficial foreign observers. It is also worthy of note that for nearly eleven months the Groza gov¬ ernment had persistently and openly violated practically every obligation in the Moscow Agreement. Such an unbroken record of lies and violence does not arouse confidence in government reports. Eye witness testi¬ mony given by competent persons from hundreds of polling places indicated that the government was de¬ cisively defeated. It was this sensational defeat that induced the Communists finally to liquidate all oppo¬ sition. The Moscow Agreement concluded by United States

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Secretary of State, James Byrnes, expired at the end of the year amid a tempest of Communist derision and of Rumanian sobs. The Bolshevik world had made a monkey of America. In addition, it had filled Ruma¬ nian jails, driven desperate Rumanian patriots to the woods, dug many a fresh Rumanian grave, robbed a people of its independence, destroyed the hopes of its common men and women and was placing fetters on a nation’s property, mind and spirit. All that could have been foreseen as Byrnes signed the Moscow Protocol a year earlier. I am not blaming our Secretary of State for making that desperate attempt at an agreement with Stalin. He had to take some step in order further to prepare American public opinion and to establish America’s place before history in view of increasing storms. He couldn’t just wring his hands and await events. But I think the man who was steering America’s ship of state in the global storm showed that he failed to understand the main element in the storm, namely Bolshevism, when he allowed himself to pat himself on the back for signing the Moscow Agreement. On a tragic Christ¬ mas Day amid Russian snows he threw America’s friends and wards out of the sleigh to Bolshevik wolves, in order to help other passengers escape. He couldn’t help that, I think. But does one pat oneself on the back for such an act! Doesn’t one go into a church and ask God’s mercy for having felt obliged to throw a child to wolves! Does he pretend to believe he thought the wolves would take care of it, as though every year produced a Romulus! And is it not sad that in 1948 Byrnes was still en¬ joying Cordell Hull’s pat on the back? Hull is quoted in “Speaking Frankly” as having written: “My dear Jim: My heartiest congratulations on the splendid prog-

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397

ress made at the Moscow Conference. Understanding, confidence, friendliness, and the whole spirit of inter¬ national cooperation have been greatly improved by the w7ork of this conference.” Can an American free himself from sadness on re¬ flecting that the man who had led America’s foreign policies for 11 years understood so little of world forces that he could write such a note on December 29, 1945 ? Surely not, as one gazed upon the Rumanian wreckage of December 1946. From then on, the road of Maniu and of the National-Peasant Party to final political liquidation was short and stony. The new Parliament met on the first day of December. The question was intensely and bitterly debated whether or not the King should open it, since he would thereby give his sanction to the fraudu¬ lent election that had taken place. He decided to open it. His only choice was that or abdication. The Com¬ munist world was about through with him and Mihai knew it. The Kremlin had used him for all he was worth and was ready to discard him. Mihai had earlier tried resistance to> Communist tyranny in hopes of American support, but had only exposed himself to de¬ feat and ridicule. Every Rumanian who had dared count on America in opposing Communist domination had met defeat and humiliation. King Mihai and his advisers considered he would do the Rumanian nation more good by staying in the country and postponing expulsion. So he opened Parliament. He was kicked out a year later. But the National-Peasant Party took a different line. It repudiated the Agreement and withdrew its lone minister from Groza’s cabinet, after having endured eleven months of uninterrupted horror, perpetrated under the wing of the American eagle at the expense

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of American prestige. America skidded to dishonor, taking Maniu into an abyss from which there is no re¬ turning for him. In addition, the National-Peasants denounced Parlia¬ ment and refused to participate in it. They called it a creation of the Communist-led government, concocted in defiance of the boldly expressed will of the people. And they again asserted that the nation had decisively voted against the regime. Maniu, supported by heroic associates, was moving toward a last official stand against Russian-imposed tyranny and doing it as boldly as a John Huss or Martin Luther. Naturally he aroused increasing Communist fury. About three months later he, together with Dinu Bratianu, head of the Liberal Party, and Titel Petrescu, head of the Independent Socialists, sent a note to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, who were then conferring in Moscow. In it the authentic leaders of the Rumanian nation described the arrests that the Communists were making from one end of Rumania to the other and asked for help. This enraged Groza who answered in the Bucharest press, saying that cooperation with the opposition was impossible and intimating another course would be adopted. The British Government was moved—to strong words, and in June 1947, made a vehement verbal protest, saying: “. . . during recent months the Rumanian Govern¬ ment have proceeded arbitrarily with indiscriminate ar¬ rests of those who are regarded as political opponents. The arrested include old men, priests, professors, stu¬ dents, and others who in many cases have no political affiliations and are simply deprived of their freedom in¬ definitely, by or with the acquiescence of the Rumanian

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399

authorities, on suspicion of being involved in subversive activities. . . . “This campaign of intimidation has caused untold suffering, not only among those at present languishing in prison, but also among the families over whose heads hangs the threat of arrest on account of their honest political convictions.” The United States also recorded its condolences in the chronicles of history. Maniu then urged the western powers to quit writing letters and act. He urged something bold, such as breaking relations with the Groza government. And without waiting for another American note Maniu acted—he authorized Mihalache and other NationalPeasant leaders to leave the country. They tried and were caught at the airfield, July 14. Then a Communist block-buster fell; the National-Peasant Party was out¬ lawed. One might ask why did Vice-President Mihalache and Secretary-General Nicolae Penescu and Ilie Lazar take the risk of trying to flee? Why did Maniu advise such a precarious step? As one seeks an answer he will probably recall that many—perhaps most—national heroes at desperate moments have chosen flight rather than liquidation. Kossuth and Garibaldi, Karl Marx and Mazzini, Pashitch, Botiev and Lenin, even Moses, all went abroad to carry on their activity—as did every prominent Communist chief now operating in Europe, including three of Rumania’s Big Four Bolsheviks. The classic maxim of the millenniums is that at a moment of impending liquidation, the leaders of an oppressed na¬ tion may achieve more by withdrawing than by submit¬ ting to extermination. Maniu followed that maxim with courage and wis-

400 dom.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE He divided the roles.

He told Mihalache to

leave, as he himself remained in the Bear’s den. It goes without saying that Mihalache was leaving in order to devote all his energies to opposing the Com¬ munist regime in Rumania. The flight was not well arranged; the Mihalache group was discovered and arrested. One of The Communists for, indeed, what National-Peasant

the plotters was a Communist agent. had exactly what they were waiting they had contrived. They had caught chiefs trying to go to America. The

next day, July 15, the Communists seized Maniu, who was in a sanatorium. And two weeks later the NationalPeasant Party was outlawed by the following decree: “The Council of Ministers, deliberating upon the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, by virtue of Article 107 of the Constitution, has decided: “Article I. The National-Peasant Party under the presidency of Mr. Juliu Maniu is dissolved as of the date of the publication of the present notice in the Of¬ ficial Gazette (Monitorul official). “This decision of dissolution also includes all coun¬ try, district and communal organizations of the abovementioned party, the military, feminine and youth or¬ ganizations or associations led by this party. “Article II. The seats and any other meeting places of this party shall be closed and the archives, together with any correspondence, will be seized by the authori¬ ties in charge wherever they are found. “Article III. The entire property of this party will be liquidated according to law. “Article IV. The Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice are charged with the enforcement of the present juornal.” (July 29, 1947) That the Communists had planned to suppress the

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401

Peasant Party regardless of specific acts of specific leaders was shown by the fact that two days after Maniu’s arrest, Communist Minister Gheorghiu-Dej, who had just returned from a visit to dictator George Dimitrov in Sofia, said, in a speech: “We decided in Sofia to intensify our fight against the enemies of democracy and for the liquidation of the remnants of fascism and of reactionary forces. . . . Inspired by the combative spirit of the popular Bul¬ garian democracy, we shall also strike unsparingly at all those who conspired inside the country, hand in hand with those outside the frontiers, to undermine the unity of labor and struggle of the Rumanian people. It is not sufficient to arrest Maniu. . . . The NationalPeasant Party led by the traitor Maniu, must be dis¬ solved. . . The next day Parliamentary immunity was taken from Maniu and he was publicly accused by the Com¬ munist Police Minister Teohari Georgescu of leading a conspiracy to “overthrow the democratic regime in Rumania.” Characteristically on that very same day, there was published in Paris a written declaration of Maniu, Bratianu and Titel Petrescu, in which they ex¬ pressed emphatic approval of the Marshall Plan and urged that it be extended to Rumania. As 75 year old Maniu sat in jail awaiting the supreme verdict, he dared declare before all the world his solidarity with the western powers. The Rumanian Communists and their Soviet masters immediately loosed a frantic campaign of vituperation against Maniu, but they had very little to go on. All they could do was heap smear upon smear. They called him a traitor and spy and renegade and knave and fas¬ cist and Nazi and anti-Semite and Magyar-hater and American-lover, but in the end it was very ineffective.

402

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

The torrent of tirades became a national joke. And the more the Communists tried to prove the case, the weaker they got They went back 50 years, digging in the archives to find something on him. And sure enough, they found he had been in the Hungarian Parliament in 1907. A sure sign of treason; Maniu a member of the Hungarian Parliament! Actually, Maniu’s province was then a part of Austria-Hungary, as it had been for centuries, and Maniu went to Parliament as the heroic champion of Rumanian peasants in the face of Hun¬ garian feudal landowners. Then they called him a traitor, because when he played the leading role in joining Transylvania with the “Old Kingdom” (Rumania), on December 1, 1918, he had taken precautions against delivering that new province directly into the hands of a political clique which was suspected of narrow, partisan aims. He was also accused of sabotaging the Armistice of 1944, though he had not held a single office; of favoring the Marshall Plan; of having shot railroad strikers in 1933, though at that time he was not even in Rumania. On such charges Russia’s Communist agents were to con¬ demn Maniu to life imprisonment plus 40 years. Such was the evidence for the charge that the “NationalPeasant Party had conspired with a foreign imperialist power to impair the sovereignty of Rumania,”—of that “sovereign” Rumania which was a mere annex of the Soviet Union. This evidence was too thin even for the Communists and they kept postponing the trial in hopes of concoct¬ ing a better case. They made hundreds of arrests and exposed each new victim to terrific pressure for the pur¬ pose of terrorizing some into agreeing on a story that would prove Maniu’s treason. They failed to uncover a single treasonable act on Maniu’s part but by October

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

403

29—after 100 days of inventing and perfecting testi¬ mony—they had a case that did the work. It was based chiefly on the known facts that there was some underground anti-Communist activity in the country and that Maniu did have contacts with the Americans, especially with those in the two Missions at Bucharest. In addition to this, a fairly well-to-do, personally disorganized, heavily-drinking friend of Maniu, Mr. Vasile Serdici, testified against his chief. This, man, who had long served the National-Peasant Party, became as wax in Communists hands. He was not exactly a renegade. Indeed, he had been decidedly courageous and taken risks. But he had a weak charac¬ ter. And it crumbled when squeezed in the mighty pin¬ cers of the Soviet Union. He bitterly denounced Maniu in court, vociferously accused the Peasant Party leader of having misled him, and solemnly swore that Maniu through him had asked the American Mission if the U. S. Government advised anti-Groza underground ac¬ tion, to which the Mission allegedly replied, after con¬ sulting Washington, “not yet.” That was as near as Maniu—and Mr. Truman—were brought to conspiracy even by an alcoholic. Then there was another point. As a result of the many arrests and of the treatment to which the victims were exposed the police got on the track of Rumanians who had talked with two U. S. Army officers belonging to the American Military Mission, Major Thomas Hall and Lt. James Hamilton. These Rumanians and Americans were alleged to have worked out a plan for organizing a big network of clandestine activity and for establishing air bases for America against Russia. The Americans were said to have promised money and arms on a lavish scale.

An unsigned memorandum re-

404

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garding it all was produced in court. It may have been genuine. Actually there had been conversations between Ru¬ manians and American officers. Certainly serious mat¬ ters were discussed. Perhaps officers in the U. S. Army did try to sound out the possibility of eventual armed activity in Rumania, if such should be required. Con¬ ceivably there were American officers who considered such action imminent in 1946. And one cannot dispute that at times American cloak and dagger men have been rash. Also it was established that certain Rumanians who admired Maniu had given information from govern¬ ment files to Americans in Bucharest. But neither in the conversations with American officers nor in the giving of confidential information to Americans was Maniu involved by any testimony. However, the sem¬ blance of a case was established and the leadership of the National-Peasant Party was put away for good. The 12 day trial ended November 11, 1947. The Presiding Judge, who pronounced sentence upon Juliu Maniu and his associates, had served pro-Nazi Germany when it was master of Rumania and sent his fellow citizens to jail for Hitler. Now he was serving Stalin with equal ability and treachery. It was he who pronounced Maniu a traitor. And as he uttered the sentence, the audience cheered. A few were Rumanians; they cheered the enslavers of Rumania. Maniu, after a half century of unbroken service for the weary and heavy laden of Rumania, ended his active mission in a series of heroic deeds that did honor to human kind. Helpless before a gigantic oppressor, con¬ scious that he and his nation had been delivered to tyranny by the world’s democracies, aware that all of America’s notes were written on sand, clearly perceiving

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405

that his every word increased the anger of the power that was to crush him, he had moved unfaltering against tyranny and deceit and brutality. As the Communists closed the prison doors on him that November day they blotted out the last defense of the peasantry of Rumania. The sun which went down on Maniu that Tuesday evening, went down on Rumania. Maniu was condemned to life enslavement; probably Rumania’s enslavement will not be for life.

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Chapter XXIII COMMUNISTS SEIZE THE ARMY The Rumanians got an extraordinary Christmas pres¬ ent for 1947. The government officially announced, December 24, that the King had elevated a deserter from the Rumanian Army and a former Soviet spy to the position of Minister of War. It was Emil Bodnaras; he immediately took personal charge of all the armed forces of the state. Thus a man of non-Rumanian origin, who had long been an agent of the Kremlin and done everything in his power to aid a traditional enemy of Rumania in humiliating Rumania, assumed control of the institution that had been designed to protect Rumania. It goes without saying that he completed the process that had long been under way of making it a section of the Red Army. One of Bodnaras’ early acts was to increase the length of service “for all arms” from 18 months to two years. “The time needed to acquire modern military tech¬ nique and knowledge of all its advanced equipment was insufficient,” Minister Bodnaras said. And he added, “The lengthening of the period of service is also moti¬ vated by the fact that our Army, which has become a people’s institution, needs education,” by which he meant he would give it more Communist propaganda. The organ of the army, Glasul Armatei, wrote: “This measure is bound to strengthen the Army of the Ruma¬ nian Popular Republic, the Army whose duty is to de¬ fend the achievements of the working people, won through continuous pain and struggle.

Workers are

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE today freed from slavery.

407

To safeguard this road of

light and prosperity, the people need a strong shield guaranteeing peace and peaceful work. The shield must be constituted by a strong well-trained army.” And not only has the length of service for recruits been lengthened, in order that they may be better Bolshevized, but a new method has been instituted for establishing a Bolshevized officers’ corps. From now on officers are to be picked on the basis of their loyalty to the Communist Party. Glasul Armatei wrote in the spring of 1948: Divisional General Leonte Parnilescu has announced that “there will be no more promotions according to ranks. That’s gone forever. Any candidate from any rank can be given any position—even the high¬ est—if he meets requirements. “This decree will stimulate all who want progress in the Rumanian Army.” It is hardly necessary to add that “requirements” mean a good record in Communist activity and that “progress” means Communization. Both the training and the weapons which the People’s Army is to receive come from Moscow. Rumania’s armed forces have become a Communist tool. This taking over of national armies is one of the most basic and best planned aspects of Communist power-seizure. The action normally has three phases; Communist infiltration into the National Army, demo¬ lition of the National Army, building a new Bolshevik Army from old fragments—and from new “cadres.” In Russia these three steps were followed with much precision and complete success. But in Rumania a fourth stage was added, because Russia and the Allies wanted temporarily to use Ruma¬ nia’s National Army against Hitler. Consequently, the process there was: Communist infiltration into the

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National Army, temporary preservation of the Na¬ tional Army, its subsequent demolition, and the building of a new Rumanian Bolshevik Army. All four steps were completed before the end of 1948. Bodnaras played a role in each stage, though he didn’t do any appreciable fighting with the Rumanian Army against Hitler, after August 23, 1944. This is not because he is not brave, inasmuch as he is among the bravest of brave Bolsheviks, but because the main task of Ruma¬ nian Communists during the 12 months before V.E. Day was not to fight Hitler, but to fight non-Communist Rumanians. The Rumanian Army emerged from the war which it had waged against Russia a fairly strong military force. General Sanatescu took over from Marshal Antonescu one of the best armies in Europe, in spite of all the the the the

losses it had suffered. It was probably fourth on continent, coming immediately after the armies of Soviet Union, Germany and Great Britain. During three years of fighting against the Red Army, Ru¬

mania had lost more than 100,000 in killed as well as 180,000 in prisoners of war. This last figure included deportees from Bucovina and Bessarabia. The Rumanian Army after August 23, 1944, did more front line fighting against Germany than any con¬ tinental army except Russia’s; it maintained more com¬ bat divisions on the European Front than any former Axis satellite or than any continental Ally, except the USSR. Rumanian soldiers drove the Germans from Bucharest, largely freed the rest of Rumania, and from then on figured in the main battles in the southerncentral sector of Russia’s front. In the course of eight days fighting in Rumania, practically unaided, the Ru¬ manians killed about 5,000 Nazi soldiers and captured

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53,000 prisoners including 14 Generals and 1224 officers. They succeeded in preserving the Rumanian trans¬ portation system intact and placed it immediately at the disposal of the Red Army. They prevented the Germans from destroying what was left of the oil in¬ stallations. Fighting their way forward, they advanced 600 miles during the next eight months. During the last winter of the war Rumanian soldiers fought deep in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Hungary they par¬ ticipated in the battles around Debrecen and Solnok, on the Tisza River and in Budapest. In Czechoslovakia they took part in some of the most critical actions, as at Rojniava, Szina-Torna, Zvolen, Banska-Bistritsa. They made their way over six rivers and through nine mountain ranges, freeing 56 cities, 196 towns and 3,624 villages. They took 46,000 prisoners, in addition to the Germans captured in Rumania during the first eight days of fighting. They participated with 337,000 officers and men and suffered about 50% casualties, in¬ cluding 10,000 officers and non-commissioned officers. Most of their fighting was done in winter and much of it under unfavorable topographical conditions. The number of killed and wounded alone amounted to 111,379. Nine times they were cited by Stalin in the Gen¬ eralissimo’s order of the day. Rumanians point out that the action of their King and army suddenly and completely changed the military situation in southeast Europe, appreciably shortening the war. Not only did it facilitate the Red Army in seizing almost without fighting more than a third of a million German prisoners in Moldavia and Bessarabia, but it enabled the Russians with Bulgarian aid and a little help from Tito’s Partisans to force German forces

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out of the lower and eastern Balkans within the course of two months. The Rumanian Army fought against Hitler prac¬ tically without a defection, even during the tragic months when the Soviet Army was giving the Commu¬ nists power in Rumania and putting an end to the inde¬ pendent Rumanian state. Many Rumanian officers foresaw that at the end of the war they would return to a Bolshevized homeland to undergo humiliation, dismissal and perhaps imprisonment, but they fought with unflagging loyalty against Hitler. Then they went home to find everything for which they had fought in ruins. Rumanian veterans marching back to their home cities were sometimes booed and assaulted by Commu¬ nists and Communist-serving Hungarians. Also, Soviet military authorities disbanded the Rumanian home army, leaving only three skeleton divisions of 3,000 men each. Simultaneously with this disintegration, the Com¬ munist drive for infiltration, which had begun earlier, was intensified. One phase of this activity was the taking of Rumanian prisoners, conveying them in masses to Russia and subjecting them to Communist pressure. After the cessation of Rumanian hostilities against Russia in August 1944, and contrary to the principles of international law, the Russians seized 130,000 more Rumanians as prisoners and refused to release them even after the Rumanian Army began to fight Hitler. They were sent to join the 180,000 al¬ ready in Russia, to be used as factory fodder, hostages and recruits for Rumania’s prospective Bolshevik Army. In addition, 40,000 Rumanian civilians were kidnapped from Moldavia and Transylvania; 72,000 Rumanian citizens of German origin were seized and 20,000 Ru-

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manians from northern Transylvania, a province which for six months was administered by the Soviet Army. Germany and Hungary took 36,000 Rumanian war prisoners in the fighting that occurred subsequent to August 24; 20,000 of these passed into Russian hands on V.E. Day and were added to the mass of Ruma¬ nians held by the Soviet Union. By the end of 1946 fewer than 100,000 Rumanians had been repatriated from Russia. These men and women in Russia were placed in con¬ ditions resembling slavery. Whether or not they lived much differently than Russian citizens need not be dis¬ cussed. And whether or not Russians were especially cruel to them individually is beside the point. In any case, this mass of Rumanians were outside the law; they were beyond or beneath it. They had no protec¬ tors of any kind. They were hungry, ragged, homeless, helpless. None had prospects of a decent, not to men¬ tion happy, future. They were driven to hard, disagree¬ able work in mines or factories with unrelenting ruth¬ lessness and left in the direst personal crisis without care or sympathy. They were a colony of deserted wreckage, apparently forgotten by the cosmos. The letters from them that from time to time filtered back to Rumania are among the most moving pages ever written. These men provided excellent material for Russian propaganda and pressure. Expert Soviet agents sought out the more promising among the youth and officers and drew beautiful pictures of life back in “transformed Rumania” now blessed or about to be blessed with a “new people’s democracy.” Everything back there was to be for the people. Wouldn’t some Rumanians like to go back home and help establish the “new Rumania ?” As a special inducement those who volunteered to go

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back as champions of a new regime were relieved from slave labor, given better food, decent clothes and more tolerable living quarters, that is, first choice at the better barracks. And fabulous promotions were as¬ sured. Everybody was to become a Big Shot. With such inducements, under such pressure, was it to be ex¬ pected that none would succumb? One of the persons doing the recruiting among the Rumanian prisoners was the experienced, forceful and gifted Rumanian Communist Ana Pauker. She painted lurid portraits of Rumanian corruption in the past which were not without some basis of truth, and pre¬ sented beautiful scenes of the People’s Rumania that was coming into being. To remove prejudices she stressed that America and Britain were backing the new order. It was called an outcome of the Atlantic Charter, a fruit of the common efforts of the United Nations. And let no one fear Communism, she said: democracy, not Marxism, was what the Rumanian vol¬ unteers were to establish. It sounded good. One of the persons who heard Ana’s luring words and heeded them, was Lieut.-Col. Nicolae Cambrea from Brasov, who had made a good record in the Rumanian Army. He had more than once talked with Maniu during Antonescu’s regime, and was known to have opposed the alliance with Nazi Germany. Eventu¬ ally, he went through the fighting at Stalingrad on the side of Hitler and saw many Rumanian regiments smashed in vain. Cambrea himself was captured there. The prospects of advancement, of returning home and of playing a leading role, which Ana Pauker spread before him, were appealing. He accepted Bolshevik blandishments and undertook to form a Rumanian Com¬ munist division, to bear the name Tudor Vladimirescu. That was a magical Rumanian name, entirely discon-

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nected from world Communism; such a unit was as a Lincoln Division or Cromwell Division or Gustavus Adolfus Division would have been for Americans. It is not strange that many Rumanian war prisoners volun¬ teered to become little Tudor Vladimirescus. They gave an oath of allegiance to the “new order,” not to the Rumanian King. In due time Cambrea led them home, first to fight on the central European front, and then to become instruments of terror, violence, subjuga¬ tion and intimidation in their own land. They did a large part of the dirty work for the Russians and the Communists; they oppressed their fellow countrymen as few foreigners had done. Division Commander Cambrea not only became a General but Assistant Chief of Staff. There was only one thing in common between the original Tudor Vladimirescu and Nicolae Cambrea; one worked for a time with Czarist Russia, the other for Bolshevik Russia. One proved to be a naive pa¬ triot; was the other just a venal traitor? Let each reader judge. In 1944/45 when Cambrea signed up, Churchill and Roosevelt were working with Stalin full tilt. They or their emissaries were rushing from con¬ ference to conference, giving Stalin what he wanted and urging the world to have full confidence in him. They were handing him Rumania and islands of the sea, along with Anglo-American blessings. Both were plug¬ ging for Tito. They were insisting on bringing Stalin into the heart of Europe and proclaiming that the Kremlin had renounced Communism. All this was to prove extremely injurious to both America and Britain. But if a President and a Prime Minister with all the facts in the world at their disposal, were so disastrously gullible, who dares blame Cambrea, cooped up in a

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Russian camp for war prisoners? Maybe he was just as conscientious as Harry Hopkins. In April 1944, as Rumanian emissaries were warn¬ ing the United States and Great Britain that the Soviet Union might impose a foreign Communist regime on Rumania, the Political Adviser to Lord Moyne, Mem¬ ber of the British Cabinet for the Middle East, wrote to Rumanian Ambassador Cretzianu, condescendingly, “You are still living in cloud cuckoo-land.” He chided him for fearing Communism. Is it strange that in such an atmosphere, when Britishers vied with Americans in crying down fear of Communism, the Rumanian Cambrea was also taken in? The formation of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division was only a beginning. Subsequently, a similar though less formidable pro-Communist division of former war prisoners was formed under the name of Horia, Closca and Crisan, other Rumanian patriots. It never proved very effective. Much more important was the defection caused by Communists among high officers in Rumania. To sort out and work on unreliable bourgeois elements is one of the highest of the Kremlin’s conspiratorial arts. Its agents try to find men who are over ambitious, weak, compromised, or disgruntled, or who have close con¬ nections with persons connected with Communists. Ana Pauker and her Comrades found such elements in Ru¬ mania. If Soviet agents could induce the son of a Colonel in the U. S. Army, Corporal Jimmie McMil¬ lan. who was working at a vital position in the U. S. Embassy at Moscow, to desert to the USSR in May 1948, is it strange that the same USSR, by exercising tremendous pressure, found traitors in Bucharest three years earlier? The most notorious batch of such traitors, consisting

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of eleven generals and colonels, joined Stalin in one action. After being carefully prepared and “briefed” by agents of the Red Army they demonstratively marched into the Bolshevik camp during the hectic days of February 1945, when the Communists under Mos¬ cow’s direction were trying to force General Radescu from power. During the fury of this struggle, it may be recalled, Radescu made a scathing speech over the radio against foreign domination and local Communists who were “foreign to the country and nation.” Imme¬ diately after that the eleven high Rumanian officers signed a manifest denouncing Radescu and expressing appreciative sentiments regarding the Soviet Union. That was sheer defiance of army authority and an open hid for positions of power. They were saying to Mos¬ cow “here we are; use us.” Russia was glad to do so. The next day the Superior Council of the Rumanian Army fired them but Vishinsky, speaking for the Soviet Union, ordered their restoration. A few days later the Kremlin put Groza in power in Bucharest and the eleven were immediately given positions of the highest responsibility. Chief among the insurgent officers was General Vasiliu Rascanu, Commander of an Army Corps; Groza made him Minister of War. Another rebel, General Dimitru Damaceanu, who had been Deputy Comman¬ der of Bucharest and helped in the coup of August 23. 1944, was made Under-Secretary of State for War. A third, General Septimiu Pretorian, became Chief of Staff; a Major Popescu-Argetoia, formerly militant Rumanian Nazi, was promoted in rank and placed at the head of the Secret Police. The remainder were well rewarded for their defection. The appointments had been arranged in advance. Insurrectionists thus took over Rumania’s armed forces and made common

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cause with General Cambrea, whose Red Division was soon incorporated into Rumania’s new Red Army. General Vasiliu Rascanu, leader of the rebel officers, had served in the war against Russia as chief of the Military Police, that is, as head M.P. He helped proHitler Antonescu so assiduously that he got a high decoration. But he helped himself still better. He en¬ gaged heavily in the black market, made a pile, was caught with his hands full and sent home, where he was given the tame assignment of heading the Vth Army Corps at Ploesti. Restless and unreliable, he made contact with Communists when he saw the tide turning. During the stormy December days of 1944 when General Radescu was made Premier to succeed Sanatescu, the Communists backed Rascanu as a candi¬ date for War Minister, but he was rejected, largely on National-Peasant insistence. Even before Rascanu was placed in power and before the war ended, the transformation of the army was well under way; the new Minister greatly hastened the process. Within a few months 10,000 officers were removed, while others were demoted, and Communist officers were promoted in masses. Even dismissed of¬ ficers on joining the Communist Party or a subsidiary group were re-appointed. Non-commissioned officers who had given proof of their devotion to Communism were given high ranks. One such, for example, Con¬ stantin Petrescu, a railroad worker, after a training in Russia, rapidly worked his way to a generalship, was made head of the army’s indoctrination service and given one of the main roles in the armed forces. He might be called Political Commissar Number One. A law was promulgated incorporating all “anti¬ fascist fighters’’ into the army in a bloc. This simply meant an influx of trained, disciplined Communists.

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417

Actually, the number of Partisans operating in Ruma¬ nia during the war against Germany had been infinitesi¬ mal. The “anti-fascist fighters” were organized chiefly after the overturn, under the leadership of Russian or Russian-trained Bolsheviks. By this law regarding “anti-fascists,” the leading Communists, such as Emil Bodnaras, Vasile Luca, George Vasilichi became Gen¬ erals; Ana Pauker is a Major General. Other tried and true Communists got correspondingly attractive ranks. By these promotions non-Rumanians were given some of the most responsible army posts. A striking example of how the new officers corps was made was the promotion of Colonel Victor Precup, who in 1930 had been instrumental in bringing Carol II back to Rumania and the throne. Four years later Precup was condemned to prison for leading a con¬ spiracy to assassinate the King. The Communists took him from prison, restored him to the army, promoted him two ranks, made him Inspector General for Educa¬ tion and gave him powers exceeding those of most of the higher generals. By the beginning of 1946 the Rumanian Army had largely become a foreign agent serving a power that had robbed the country of its independence. Many old officers and still more young officers declared in their indignation or desperation that they would endure the humiliation no longer, but they did endure it. A few went to the mountains, more went to prison or con¬ centration camps, but most simply succumbed. On cer¬ tain holidays they proudly marched in honor of the King, singing royal songs, on a few occasions bearing royal banners; but that soon petered out. During the last months of Mihai’s reign a display of attachment to him was treated by the government as treason to Rumania.

History has repeatedly shown that but few

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things are easier than arresting, killing and humiliating the officers of a demoralized captive army. In all ages, the ruins of armies have easily been rebuilt into other armies, serving other purposes and other chiefs. By unceasing purges, by mass appointments of new officers and by constant indoctrination, Rumania’s armed forces have been thoroughly subverted. Descriptions of the return to Rumania of 500 Rumanian officers from prison camps in Russia, which received much prominence in the Bucharest Communist papers, show how Communist pressure was applied. This batch of 500 were squeezed from more than a third of a million helpless Rumanians being held in the Soviet Union. These repatriates did not form a separate Communistdirected army unit, but, nevertheless, were required to make a resounding demonstration of their loyalty to the Groza government. On the train in which they returned were huge pictures of Stalin, Groza and King Mihai—the King had not yet been kicked out. At the place of arrival on Rumanian soil red flegs outglowed the Rumanian tricolor. The long delayed release of this handful of Rumanians was played up as a gracious favor from magnanimous Russia and a triumph for the Groza regime. When Rumanian officers came home, more than a year after all hostilities had ceased and nearly two years after Rumania had actively joined the Allies, the home coming was pictured not as a basic human right, such as has long prevailed among civilized peoples, but as a favor bestowed by the “Father of Russia,” upon his puppet in Bucharest. The Rumanian Groza did not blush with shame for abjectly serving a master that was holding at least 5,000 Rumanian of¬ ficers and 250,000 Rumanian soldiers in bondage, but rather shouted from the housetops that good, kind

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Stalin had done Groza the personal favor of sending 500 of Groza’s fellow citizens back home. And the Communist commission which met them at the border wasn’t interested in hearing of the joy which these Rumanians felt at stepping once more on “Ruma¬ nia’s sacred soil” after two or three or four years ab¬ sence, but in hearing their testimonies of allegiance to the Groza government. Those sad sons of Rumania were made to feel not that they had finally returned to their motherland, but to Petru Groza and his regime ! “Arriving home, we placed all our forces in the serv¬ ice of the Groza Government, which saved the coun¬ try,” declared Col. Victor Draganescu, who was the leader of the group; and he added, “We, the Rumanian officers who were prisoners of war in Russia, followed the Government’s achievements with special sympathy.” Thus wrote the Bucharest Communist paper Scanteia in a three-column front page spread. And the reporter continued, “The returned officers in warm words expressed their impressions of Soviet Russia and their sincere desire to fight against reaction at home. Col. Draganescu said, ‘Having returned from captivity we express our gratitude toward Gen¬ eralissimo Stalin, because of his large understanding granted the Rumanian Government in allowing Ruma¬ nian prisoners to return even before the conclusion of peace.’ ” (Peace was concluded February 10, 1948.) And then, as reported in big letters, “We express our gratitude for the treatment we got in camp and on the way home. Also, to the Government of Dr. Petru Groza, which obtained our repatriation, though certain propagandists said we were dead.” After that in huge black letters, “The Soviet Union provides Rumanian war prisoners with bread, sanitary aid and special care, and today gives us back to our families, healthy and full

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of confidence. . . . We place our work, our energy in the service of the people in the fight against the rem¬ nants of fascism. . . . We’ll fight for a regime of large democracy and shall try to strengthen our ties with Soviet Russia!” They had learned every one of those phrases in Soviet prison camps. The colonels were followed by the majors.

One of

them, Stefan Balamace, “beaming with infectious hap¬ piness,” sought out the Communist reporter—the re¬ porter said—and declared: “We all left with beautiful sentiments for Soviet Russia and with admiration for the Soviet people as well as with gratitude for the good treatment during our captivity. We are grateful to the Soviet Government, which was so understanding, which bent its ear to the request of the Groza government and let us come home. “I’m happy to be in free and independent Rumania, of which I’ve dreamed. ... I’d be still happier, if the whole Rumanian people supported the Groza govern¬ ment.” Well, they eventually learned they’d have to support it or lose their livelihood. Second lieutenant Radu Popeanu outdid his superiors in obsequiousness. “With special confidence,” he de¬ clared, “I arrived in Rumania with the firm resolution devotedly to support the Groza government. Our sup¬ port will be work, which we learned in Russia. Thanks to the Groza government the Rumanian people have wiped out the shame to which the demagogic politics of the past drove them. The news of Antonescu’s ex¬ ecution gave us special satisfaction.” That is the kind of Rumanian officers which Russia liberated from its prisoners of war camps. Bowing their heads before Stalin, bending their knees before Groza, they were magnamimously allowed to return home. One may hope they got good jobs for their declarations,

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that they did not go unrewarded for so eloquently pic¬ turing Generalissimo Stalin bending his fatherly ear to Dr. Groza, “who saved Rumania,” although actually on the day when Rumania decided to defy Germany and join the Allies, Groza was taking a business trip on a railroad train. One thinks not only of these poor 500 officers who bought their way home by obsequious promises, but of the ten times as many who remained, along with the 500 times as many Rumanian soldiers. Throughout the vast confines of Soviet Russia toiled millions of sad, lonely German boys and girls. They had no hope for release because peace was far away. And beside these wretched, ragged, hungry members of Hitler’s nation, worked Rumanian prisoners of war, protected by no Geneva convention or any other pact. They slaved in mine and field and factory to piece out Soviet man power, in order that Russia might send its men to hold Rumania in bonds. Those boys from Rumanian villages pined in distant Russian prison camps or mines, as Rus¬ sian boys were sent at Rumania’s expense to lord it over Rumanian villages and plunder Rumanian homes. Yet a Russian-imposed Rumanian Government and a few released Rumanian officers debased themselves into singing praises to the magnamimous Stalin. Another device through which the Russians and their agents in Rumania are trying to convert the Rumanian army into an auxiliary of the Red Army is through Communist indoctrination of recruits. It is carried on by political commissars or auxiliary commanders in army units and in pre-military training courses. Every Rumanian soldier and officer is required to be not only a warrior for his country but a Communist propagan¬ dist. That indeed is his main function. He is a pro¬ tector of the “new order,” imposed by Russia through

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the instrumentality of a small minority of the nation. The Communists begin working on the young soldiers even before they leave home. A Rumanian Communist paper, Scanteia, describes the process in an almost rap¬ turous manner. It writes in large black letters that when the new recruits are mustered in they are to be illuminated by the vivid light of the new democratic regime. The mustering in is almost a religious conse¬ cration. The army is to be presented not as a prison or camp but as a great crusade, the Communists write. The incorporation or confirmation is to take place in three stages, all under the direction of the E.C.P., meaning the “General Inspectorat de Educatsie, Cultura si (and) Propaganda.” In simple words, educa¬ tion, culture and propaganda mean Communist indoc¬ trination, carried on by Communist Commissars. Al¬ ready before mustering the recruits in—“much before” according to this paper—E.C.P. officers go into the various communities where they make “contact with the local youth, with mass organizations, with military units and with official institutions.” The results of these propaganda missions, it is reported, are excellent. The youths are infused with an appreciation of their new calling. After that they are sent off at the railroad stations by patriotic (Communistic) organizations. Naturally, if an opposition organization appeared, its members would get their heads broken. Flowers are lavishly displayed and strewed about, joyful music is played, inspiring songs sung. Then comes another nice, easy stage before the real grind of military drill and study. The recruits go to the movies, to hear lectures, to be “acclimated.” It doesn’t take much foresight or knowledge for one to guess that they don’t see Walt Disney fantasies nor

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American documentaries. They are shown Red Army films, learn Communist songs, hear lectures about the wonderful Soviet wave of the future and the new Soviet man. They are repeatedly assured that Rumanian his¬ tory began on March 6, 1945—when Andrei Vishinsky imposed Groza upon Rumania. The boys from the farms sit helplessly in large meetings with an apocalyptic stage setting, while well trained Communist propagan¬ dists pour out hate against the bourgeoisie and shout imprecations against non-Communists in all lands. Then they join in songs as fantastical and arrogant as Hit¬ ler’s “world-conquering” youth once sang. By then the new red missionary knights are ready for the regular training and indoctrination. The Voice of the Army which is the organ of the E.C.P. (Propa¬ ganda) tells what that political indoctrination is. It lasts three months. The recruits are to be infused with the new spirit “of true democracy” as personified by the Groza regime. “The recruit must become a conscientious citizen in order to be in a position to preserve what the people have won with such sacrifices.” In plain words, the army is to preserve the Groza regime. It is to serve Communism. It is to fight against the Rumanian na¬ tion in defense of an oppressive government imposed upon Rumania by Russia. For that “the soldier is to be given solid civil preparation.” He is to be a Prae¬ torian Guard, called a member of a “People’s Army,” a warrior for “the new, true democracy.” Of course, he is to be taught how to vote and naturally he will vote as the E.C.P. officer commands—if he knows what is good for him. That voting by command is a sign of “the large, new democracy.” A leading article in the army’s propaganda paper

says,. “One of the main tasks of the new soldiers is to

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protect the rights gained by the workers,” that is, by the Groza regime which is based on a fraction of a fraction of the Rumanian people. “High army offi¬ cers,” the paper continues, “hand in hand with mass democratic organizations (meaning Communist Par¬ ty), are taking measures for completely informing our future soldiers about the democratic (Communist) character of our army. In this way the bonds between the army and the people (Communist Party) are be¬ coming stronger.” E.C.P. officers stage plays for future recruits in the cities and take “travelling movies” to the villages. Naturally old officers have been indoctrinated as well as the new. Here the process of education has been much more drastic and painful, because patriotic cap¬ tains, majors and colonels are not so easily taught as recruits. But the Russian-directed commissars in the Rumanian Army have had an effective device for add¬ ing conviction to indoctrination. It is the purge. The number of Rumanian officers was reduced for various reasons. Also, the number of importunate Commun¬ ist candidates to become officers has been enormous. Naturally, those officers were first fired who showed indifference or hostility to the Groza regime. Those remained who showed loyalty to it. Those were pro¬ moted who outdid their fellows in displaying ardor in degrading Rumanian nationalism. One may picture the Rumanian officers corps as it was being put through its paces in regular classes. Soviet Russia is extolled by Rumanian and Russian speakers. The Soviets are praised as having won the war. The new social order prevailing there is lauded as the liberation of mankind. The “new man” is por¬ trayed as the greatest creation of the ages. Commu¬ nist domination of the world is predicted as certain.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE America and Great Britain are played down.

425 Deca¬

dent, capitalist democracy is attacked almost in the words used by Mussolini and Hitler. The common people of America are presented as exploited and en¬ slaved. Great Britain is said to be on the way out— and soon,—while America is reported as on the verge of a Communist revolution, which will be followed by the Communization of the world; and the officers are warned not to listen to British and American radios. All history, including Rumanian history, is revised and purified for the officers. Russia’s relations to Ru¬ mania are presented in an entirely new light. Moscow is held up as the liberator and champion of Rumania during the ages, and Russia’s history is divided into two eras: one intensely black and the other, which be¬ gan with the revolution of 1917, completely white. Likewise, Rumania prior to March 6, 1945, is said to have been an oppressive, dictatorial, corrupt fascist state, but since then a model of popular democracy. The old political parties of Rumania are called traitor¬ ous and oppressive; the Communists, the Socialists, and the Plowman’s Front are called democratic. Examinations are given on all these points and of¬ ficers who do not debase themselves into giving the answers Moscow wants, find themselves outsiders. How many officers eventually consented to sign up, I cannot say. Most under the rank of General hate Premier Groza, detest the Russian Bolsheviks and loathe the native Communists. An example of their attitude was the refusal of most officers in the army and navy to sign petitions calling for the death of the condemned war criminal, Ion Antonescu, in 1946. In fact, the spirit of the army was so strong and aggres¬ sive that the government did not dare have soldiers execute the Marshal. He was clumsily shot to death

426

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

by nervous, badly aiming policemen. But these ges¬ tures of independence were largely futile. During the years and months when the Rumanian nation still had faith or at least hope that it would be delivered from the Soviet Yoke, the army, even though run by traitorous generals, was dearly loved by the common people. Any one could observe that fact on national holidays. The helpless Rumanians still con¬ sidered it an emblem and guarantee of independence, a shield against alien oppression. They looked upon it as American colonists once looked upon Washing¬ ton’s soldiers. That love naturally encouraged the officers to hold out and retain their honor. Many re¬ mained true to the end—until they were thrown onto the street or imprisoned. But as far as immediate success was conceived the efforts of the loyal officers achieved no more than those of Juliu Maniu and his National-Peasant Party. What they have succeeded in doing was to preserve Ruma¬ nia’s national honor and a spark of self respect in the subjugated nation. They could not prevent the ulti¬ mate shame, the “abomination of desolation,” namely the appointment of a deserter and traitor as the official commander of them all. War Minister Bodnaras could introduce no revolu¬ tionary charges, because none was left to be introduced. He merely perfected the purges, stepped up new ap¬ pointments and intensified indoctrination. His main innovation was to purge the purgers and debase the debasers, a classic Communist practice. He fired, ar¬ rested or demoted most of the insurrectionary Generals who went over to Stalin bag and baggage, as the Groza dictatorship was being set up. That purge caught War Minister Vasiliu Rascanu, as well as Damaceanu, P'retorian and even Cambrea. Naturally these men were

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

427

condemned on pretexts that had nothing to do with Communism. They were indicted and put away as com¬ mon crooks. For example, on July 29, 1948 the gov¬ ernment released the following communication to the Rumanian press: “Section One of the Bucharest Military Tribunal passed sentence today on a group of elements who had stolen public property. Lieutenant General Pretorian, former Secretary General of the National Defense Ministry, was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment and 40,000 lei fine for having taken bribes and having caused damage to public property.” As the Communist Juggernaut rolls implacably over the land it is dragging the army in its trail. The Jug¬ gernaut and the army are becoming one—both a part of the vast Moscow-directed machine of world Com¬ munism.

428

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XXIV PERVERSION OF JUSTICE The Rumanian Communists completed their seizure of the main lethal instruments of coercion by taking over the institution for interpreting the laws, namely, the Ministry of Justice. They brought all prosecutors and judges under their control and converted the courts into people’s courts. Jurisprudence was reduced to a function of the Communist Party and was used to strengthen the Communist dictatorship. The subversion of justice was sensationally drama¬ tized in Bucharest, February 24, 1948. On that day the Communists flaunted before the world the fact that they had made the courts a section of the Communist Party and had inextricably tied them up with the Com¬ munist police. The Communist and renegade Socialist leaders were holding a widely advertised congress to celebrate the absorption of the Socialists by the Com¬ munists and the inauguration of a monolithic Workers Party. The place of meeting was the Athenaeum, the largest hall in Bucharest. Leading members of the Government were present; the city was flaming with Rumanian and Soviet flags; delegations of Communists and renegate Socialists had come from many foreign lands; Soviet emissaries presided, like guardian angels, over the scene. The Communist world was hurling jubilant imprecations at the “western imperialists.” To symbolize the “union of the Rumanian Commu¬ nists and Socialists in one Workers Party which was to be a bulwark of the new democracy,” Socialist lead-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

429

ers came from their box onto the platform, as the chair¬ man called their names, and Communist leaders also came from their box. They dramatically mingled there on the platform, Socialist and Communist comrades, one and indivisible forever. The crowd cheered, cam¬ eras clicked; a triumphant song reverberated into the streets. And the effect of the lavish spectacle was height¬ ened by a surprise that was both intriguing and terrify¬ ing. There in the Communist box remained one lone figure, who had not been called to the platform and who was not participating in the wedding feast. It was Lucretsiu Patrascanu, long chief of the Rumanian Com¬ munist Party, the only Rumanian Communist who had ever written a Marxian work of distinction, a leading figure (head) in King Mihai’s August coup, and the Minister of Justice. There before the world the Com¬ munist Minister of Justice was apparently being thrown to the wolves. The crowd wondered about it—but not for long. Patrascanu’s closest comrade, Police Minister Teohari Georgescu, stepped to the rostrum. These two had been the only Rumanians among the foremost Com¬ munist leaders. A third, Gheorghiu-Dej, to be sure, was of Rumanian birth, but had once openly sought the protection of the Russian state against Rumanian laws and the Rumanian state. He had wanted to settle in Russia. In contrast, it had long been believed that Georgescu, head of the Gestapo, and Patrascanu, head of the Gestapo-serving courts, had retained some traces of national feeling and were opposed to the Kremlin’s treating Rumania as a colony. In spite of their ex¬ cesses, these two men were considered among the mod¬ erates, that is, among the slightly moderate. But now, as Georgescu began his speech he revealed that he was against his old friend Patrascanu. He

430

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

vituperated him with all the epithets in the Communist dictionary, and announced that Patrascanu was re¬ moved not only from his Ministerial post but from the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Georgescu excoriated his comrade of yesterday as unfaithful, lax, treasonable. He said Patrascanu had befriended war criminals, protected imperialists, allowed capitalists to escape, showed Menshevik tendencies, broken Party discipline. This scene was the nearest approach to a Moscow purge trial that Rumania had yet seen. The carefully staged, typically Bolshevik Punch and Judy show fulfilled a double function: it liquidated Patrascanu, the soft-hearted, and humiliated the some¬ what suspected Georgescu to such a degree that he could never again show even a hint of “deviation.” Patrascanu was known to have wept when he signed the armistice in Moscow, September 12, 1944. He had considered the Soviet terms too crushing; he had felt sorry for his country. For that type of heresy and bourgeois sentimentality he was being liquidated politi¬ cally. He was immediately replaced by Avram Bunaciu and later arrested. Bunaciu, a relentless police chief, a merciless prosecutor of war criminals, an intimate of the former deserter Bodnaras, combined in his per¬ son and in his post the Gestapo and the “Courts of Justice.” That Patrascanu “got what was coming to him” would be disputed by no true Bolshevik. He had had an extraordinary chance to set a terrifying example of “the new democracy,” but had not measured up. To be sure, he had used the Ministry of Justice as an in¬ strument of the Communist Party, but not to the ex¬ tent he might have. He first became Justice Minister on August 23, 1944, immediately after the royal coup, and was thus the first

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

431

Rumanian Communist to hold a ministerial position. The same day he freed all the political prisoners from pro-Nazi Antonescu’s concentration camps. formed that first act with 100% efficiency.

He per¬ Then he

went to Moscow to sign the Armistice. While there his non-Communist colleagues in the new Rumanian Government removed him from his post, but not from the cabinet. This act of bourgeois precaution enraged both the Communists and Patrascanu and a few weeks later he was restored. He held the position for more than three years, writing most of the Communist edicts which transformed Rumanian society. He dismissed the highest judges, appointed a completely new per¬ sonnel for the Ministry of Justice, turned judicial in¬ vestigation over to a special Communist commission that was set up in his office, reduced the age for retiring judges, removed their immutability and promulgated laws for liquidating war criminals. He also set up some “people’s courts” of a drumhead variety. Under his administration Ion Antonescu and his proNazi associates were executed, the National-Peasant Party was wiped out, Maniu and most National-Peas¬ ant leaders were jailed, every independent newspaper was liquidated, and all lawyers were disbarred at a single stroke. Under him the Liberal and Socialist Parties were destroyed, the Monarchy extirpated, the Communist Republic set up, a heinous election held and votes stolen by the scores of thousands for the Com¬ munists. Property was confiscated in city and town under him, the Russians were allowed to pillage Ru¬ mania at will, and a new Bolshevik Constitution was prepared. Besides this, Patrascanu more than once in¬ tervened directly in cases before the courts, brutally punishing both judges and prosecutors for not obtain¬ ing verdicts which the Communists wished.

432

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

The most notorious case of this sort was the sensa¬ tional dismissal of a whole panel of judges in 1946 be¬ cause they refused to condemn a Bucharest shoe manu¬ facturer as the Communist Party and Communist press had demanded. His name was Nellu Mihailescu and with rather typical Rumanian energy he had developed an extensive trade in luxury shoes, working up from the position of simple apprentice to that of a leading Bu¬ charest merchant. The Communists directed attacks against him as “a capitalistic profiteer” and sent their economic brigades to search his store; they found con¬ siderable quantities of leather consisting largely of the rare skins of crocodiles, snakes, lizards and deer, and said to be worth $50,000. They immediately arrested him and then issued an indictment, accusing him of breaking economic laws. It goes without saying that his shop was closed and his stock confiscated, not ex¬ actly by the state but by certain Communists who ap¬ parently used most of the proceeds for the Party—and for themselves. In any case, some of the luxurious leather turned up in small shops belonging to people close to leading Communists. The state didn’t get much. The disconsolate shoemaker was sentenced to 18 years in prison but, still having more faith in the courts than in making deals with members of the Com¬ munist economic brigade, he appealed the case and was acquitted. The judges found that he was not guilty of violating any law and ordered his liberation, which naturally would have brought with it the restoration of the confiscated property. The decision was not only a blow to Communist pres¬ tige, a grief to Communist editors and a shock to Com¬ munist economic inspectors, but a disaster for the per¬ sons who helped themselves to Domnul Mihailescu’s crocodile hides. The tears they began to shed were

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

433

not crocodile tears. Consequently, great pressure was brought to bear upon Mr. Patrascanu who declared with indignation even before he had had time to study the evidence that the court had made an unjust decision. He suspended the five judges who had pronounced the acquittal, along with the prosecutor who had not pushed the case with sufficient brutality. That blitz firing of a whole panel of magistrates by the Minister of Jus¬ tice cast gloom over the nation and made every judge, who gathered that evening around the supper table with his children, seriously consider what sentences he would have to pronounce to preserve his $30.00 a month salary. The Communist Party exerted special pressure upon the courts in the matter of land distribution. Com¬ munist committees in various countries called upon judges and warned them to keep their hands off cases of land confiscation, although no government measure had been so scandalously abused as this dealing out of land. Government partisans had been favored in most cases of apportioning fields and frequently property had been seized in direct violation of the stipulations of the de¬ cree. Landowners protested to the Minister President, to the Minister of Agriculture and to other high gov¬ ernment officials, and because of the indisputable justice of their appeals, occasionally were given written orders that a proper amount of land should be restored. But when they appeared on their farms and tried to enter their houses, local self-appointed Communist grandees drove them away, laughing in their faces. The per¬ sons who had seized land, animals, machines and build¬ ings, contrary to law, continued to use them. The only possible recourse was to the highest courts but Com¬ munist Party chiefs warned the judges not to mix in such cases.

The land-grabbers were left with their

434 spoils.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Also, formal instructions went out from the

Ministry of Justice to certain courts not to consider cases connected with contested arrests. This was to be left to the police. As a result of such intimidation, of the frequent direct intervention of thugs, and of the offering of re¬ wards by Communist plunderers, many judges were both terrorized and corrupted. Courts and prosecutors became accomplices of criminals. Here is one of the cases of this kind that came to my attention: During the spring of 1946 four Communists seized the store of a defenseless Rumanian citizen, threw the owner out and ran the place for their own advantages. The unfortunate citizen appealed to the authorities. The prosecutor, whom I had the honor of knowing personally, had them arrested, indicted, and turned over to the judges for trial. It was a plain criminal case of considerable importance, and a sentence of a fairly long prison term seemed certain. After appeals to high Party members had failed, 60 Communist com¬ rades of the four indicted men called upon the prosecu¬ tor and threatened him with violence if he didn’t re¬ lease their friends. The prosecutor told them that the case had passed beyond his jurisdiction and added that even if it hadn’t he wouldn’t release men who stole an¬ other man’s store. He also refused to intervene before the judges. Thereupon, the group of protestors went to the judges and repeated the same threats in an even more menacing manner. Their comrades were released to enjoy the profits of whatever business was left in that store; the legal owner remained helpless, and was sub¬ sequently arrested. Another illustration of Communist Minister Patrascanu’s juridicial practices was the treatment accorded a political oppositionist, Barbu Niculescu, who had

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

435

been the private secretary of General Radescu and who at one time had distributed clandestine, pro-democratic leaflets. Mr. Niculescu was arrested by Communist police during 1945 and was at first confined in the prison of the “General Security” erala) or Gestapo.

(Sigurantsa

Gen-

On the basis of the treatment to which he was sub¬ jected in various prisons and concentration camps, and from what he saw in such places he gave the following characterization of Communist juridicial practices in Rumania: “Arrests are made without warrants; agents appear at three in the morning, entering the house by force and threatening the occupants with revolvers. The prisoner is taken to one of the cells situated in the base¬ ment or sub-basement of the Sigurantsa. The cells are provided only with a cement table and a cement bed without bed clothing or mattress. In the first days after arrest the prisoner does not receive any food. He is made to fast before he is interrogated. If during the examination he shows himself somewhat amenable he- receives a few spoonsful of boiled water with vege¬ tables and a piece of bread or cornmeal twice a day. The cells lack sanitary facilities. With no medical care, the prisoners live like cattle on a primitive farm. If the arrested person does not acknowledge all the in¬ famous accusations with which he is charged, such as treason, undermining the security of the state, espionage in the service of a foreign state, sabotage, he is beaten and subjected to torture. His skin and flesh are burned with red-hot irons, hot boiled eggs are placed under his arm-pits, the soles of his bare feet are beaten with a rod, and, if the case proves dangerous from the Com¬ munist point of view, the prisoner is killed (they call

436

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

this an ‘administrative measure’).

The body is cre¬

mated without notice to the relatives. “During examination the prisoner is kept isolated, day after day, in an individual cell. “In the underground prison quarters of the Sigurantsa I was confined from July 5, 1945, until Septem¬ ber 9, 1945, when I was removed to the concentration camp of Caracal. I was taken to the station in a Rus¬ sian type prison van and locked in a cattle car with other political prisoners. We arrived at Caracal after four days; during this time we had received no food. The Caracal concentration camp had a reputation of its own, being known at the Ministry of Interior as the ‘extermination camp.’ About 2,500 prisoners were liv¬ ing there when we arrived. “The beds, in three tiers, were made of wood and were not provided with any bed clothing or mattresses. There were no sanitary facilities in the rooms and we had no medical care. We were given the same food every day; a few spoonsful of boiled water with vege¬ tables and a piece of moldy cornmeal mush. Under the escort of the Communist ‘patriotic guards’ we were allowed to bring in a barrel of water from a spot near the camp. The water we got in this manner was insuf¬ ficient for 2,500 prisoners. The barracks were alive with vermin from which we were able to obtain relief only by sleeping on the bare ground in the courtyard. Instead of sanitary installations the prisoners had dug holes outside the camp which had no covers and were thus a cause of humiliation as well as a source of con¬ tamination. “Throughout my stay in the Camp the prisoners were continually maltreated by the ‘patriotic guards,’ or by the Communist commanding officer. The Russian soldiers who passed on their way to their quarters,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

437

situated in the neighborhood, frequently discharged their automatic weapons toward the camp. “On November 4, 1945, we were Caracal to the concentration camp of journey, in bitter cold, lasted ten days. I was again removed to Bucharest and

removed from Slobozia. The From Slobozia confined as for¬

merly in the Sigurantsa prison quarters. From here I was transferred to the custody of the Bucharest Tri¬ bunal in order to be tried for the offense of having criti¬ cized in the clandestine press the policy of the govern¬ ment. The Tribunal custody quarters were in a de¬ plorable state. The floor was covered with water mixed with urine. “Since the offense with which I was charged could not be based on any existing penal article, the Com¬ munist Minister of Justice, Patrascanu, ordered the transfer of my case to the jurisdiction of the CourtMartial. As a result I was removed to the custody of the Prefecture of Bucharest and confined with common criminals, including thieves. Next day I was sent to this court with a dossier of fabricated accusations contain¬ ing no element of truth. The prison quarters of the Court-Martial did not differ from the prisons in which I was previously confined. The same beds without any bed clothing or mattresses, the same layer of water on the floor, the same broken windows, to which should be added the severity of full winter. After my trial had been continually postponed, I was temporarily released with the threat of being re-arrested at any moment. I then managed to escape from Rumania. “During my stay in the various prisons and concen¬ tration camps I observed that the security and police officials were under the orders of the N.K.V.D. In every case there seemed to be a Russian official dictat¬ ing in the background. In the concentration camps the

438

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Russian agents discarded all subterfuge and came openly among the prisoners, abusing them and threatening them with deportation.” In view of such acts that violated basic principles of sound jurisprudence why were Russia and the Ruma¬ nian Communists dissatisfied with Communist chief Patrascanu? For the simple reason that though cruel he was not cruel enough. He filled jails but not enough jails; he maintained concentration camps, but not enough concentration camps. He executed war crimi¬ nals, but not enough war criminals. He suppressed all civil liberties, but not with enough brutality. He re¬ moved many judges, but not enough. Patrascanu suf¬ fered the fate of most old Bolsheviks; he had imagined that Communism would help humanity by helping hu¬ man beings, but discovered that in allegedly serving humanity Communists smashed human beings. Patras¬ canu was a trilie slow in catching on and so got smashed. Most important of all, he failed to realize that in a Communist regime the very concept of Justice and of Right is scorned. He had not read Lenin with suf¬ ficient care, or had forgotten Lenin’s acts, or had al¬ lowed himself to believe that Lenin’s precepts and prac¬ tices weren’t required in Rumania. Lenin repeatedly said that the Bolshevik state didn’t pretend to establish justice for all. Lenin insisted that Communists wanted to use the state to crush all who opposed the Communist regime. “The proletariat needs state power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence,” Lenin said in his State and Revolution (page 23). “The dictatorship of the proletariat ... is not de¬ mocracy for the rich, (it) produces restrictions for the capitalists. We must crush them . . . their resistance must be broken by force; it is clear .. . there is violence,

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

439

there is no liberty. . . . The proletariat needs the state . . . not in the interest of freedom, but to crush its an¬ tagonists,” Lenin said (page 73). These teachings of Lenin are being rigidly applied all over the Communist world, especially in “people’s courts.” An example of this was provided by the de¬ cree of Greek Communist leader “General” Markos Vafiades, who set up such courts in “the liberated areas” of Greece in August 1947. Actually Markos didn’t put more than a dozen of them into operation, and all those in small mountain villages, but they illus¬ trated Communist justice as well as though they had been established throughout the land from the Supreme Court down. Decree Two of the Greek Democratic Army Head¬ quarters reads: Article 1. The dispensing of justice is in the people’s hands and is practiced as follows: Article 2. Every town or village will have its own people’s court consisting of three judges. There must also be a prosecutor and a clerk to keep the minutes. In towns of over 3,000 inhabitants there may be more than one court. Article 3. The judges and the prosecutor will be elected yearly. Article 4. All men and women over 18 may vote and may be elected. The People’s Council will manage the election. Convicted enemies of the people may not vote or be elected. . . . Article 7. The three judges will choose one of their number as President of the Court. . . Article 10. The people’s judges will pronounce sen¬ tences according to their consciences and without con¬ fining themselves to substantive or other provisions of procedure.

The people’s judges must bear in mind

440

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

above all the people’s conception (of justice), and will punish acts which the people consider worthy of pun¬ ishment. The people’s judges will allow any member of the audience to speak. Any citizen who wishes may express an opinion or give information during the trial. . . . Article 13. People’s judges will always endeavor to establish the substance of justice without confining themselves to the proofs presented. . . . Article 18. Sentences will be executed immediately. Signed: General Markos. That is a perfect picture of a people’s court! A Com¬ munist band seizes a village. It sets up a Communist people’s council. The people’s council calls the inhabi¬ tants into a church or school or the village square to elect a people’s court. Grim men with tommy guns stand about. The leading anti-Communists have al¬ ready been liquidated. Every one is terrified. The Com¬ munist spokesman nominates two Communist Partisan men aged 31 and 23 and a 19 year old Partisan girl. All three are filled with bitterness and a desire for vengeance; they also want to display power and show they are big shots. They convene the court to try, for example, the ma¬ yor. The Communist prosecutor accuses him of being an agent of American gangsters and British murderers. The crowd of Communists applaud. Communists in the audience make furious speeches. “Down with the mayor,’’ they cry. “Kill the fascist fiend!” they shriek. No evidence is required. Not one of the judges ever saw a law book. They have heard the “sentiment of the people,” which the Communist people’s council and Communist guards concocted. The mayor is con¬ demned; the sentence is immediately executed. That is a description of people’s courts, as Communist Markos

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

441

established them by a widely radiocast decree of Au¬ gust 18, 1947. And they functioned not only in “free Greece,” until it was wiped out, but throughout the Communist world. Such were the people’s courts in Bulgaria that liqui¬ dated 10,000 prominent defendants within a few months. To prepare the atmosphere for them, Bul¬ garian Communists conducted crowds up and down the streets and led them in intoning the imprecation, “deathdeath-death” (smurt-smurt-smurt). Later the defend¬ ants were taken through the streets in chains, as welldrilled Communist fanatics shrieked, “traitor,” “fiend,” “monster.” Bands of “black widows” were hired and conducted through the streets intoning, “smurt-smurtsmurt.” They marched about the court rooms at the time of trials, shrieking “smurt.” The radio, hour after hour, screamed “death.” A special newspaper called “People’s Court” was published with every sort of hideous, hate-inciting picture and with articles calling for vengeance. In Rumania some of the trials were of a similar na¬ ture, though as a rule more decorous. But the Ruma¬ nian Communists worked out one refinement in juridicial terror which the Bulgarians missed; they organ¬ ized Communist demonstrators and instructed them to march around the court room outside during trials and poke miniature gallows in through the windows, so judges, defendants and witnesses might see them. Occa¬ sionally, also, the court room audiences broke into a bedlam of imprecations. One must not believe that this method of dispensing justice is peculiar to Balkan Communists or due to “wild” Balkan traditions. It flows directly from the basic nature of the Communist State.

It came to “the

wild Balkans” from the Moscow of Lenin and from

442

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the London dwelling where Karl Marx, the Prussian, prepared his “Kapital.” Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Stalin’s foremost prosecutor and legal authority, wrote a book on “The Theory of Court Evidence in Soviet Legisla¬ tion,” which received the Stalin Prize in 1947. In this book Vishinsky was reported by “Comrade Vladimi¬ rov” of Moscow on August 12, 1947, to have “made a profound study of the peculiarities of court evidence in Soviet legislation.” “Soviet judges,” according to Vi¬ shinsky, “do not make automatic deductions from court evidence. . . . Their ideological and political principles check their consciousness of what is right. . . . The court serves the interests of the working people in their task of building a Socialist society.” The judge acts “in conformity with the interests of Socialist society,” Vishinsky says. Markos’s lynch courts and the savage Bulgarian People’s Courts were plainly modelled on concepts of the cruel Public Prosecutor, who helped liquidate all of Stalin’s rivals and whose books on the peculiarities of Soviet jurisprudence got a Stalin Prize. The British Broadcasting Corporation criticized Soviet courts for allowing the audience to stage demon¬ strations in court rooms during trials. And the Soviet Government, through Moscow broadcasts, retorted, “To whom are the BBC liars trying to peddle their wares? Ttie advocates of bourgeois law shed tears over the fate of Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Polish fas¬ cists who found themselves facing people’s justice. The British commentators were shocked that persons in the Slav court rooms during trials were allowed to display their feelings and express their disgust. I'hey thought persons who had lost dear ones shouldn’t freely express their feelings about fascist hangmen and Chetnik ban¬ dits. The Britishers are just trying to protect murder¬ ers from the just sentence of the people.”

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

443

The Kremlin plainly approves such lynch trials. This type of “justice” is being imposed throughout Rumania. Already “people’s courts” have been set up in villages, towns and counties, corresponding to the models decreed by the Greek Communist, “General” Markos. Rural courts which serve about four fifths of the nation have become exclusively political in character. Each court has three judges who perform the function of the 12 jurors in America. They also conduct the trial and pronounce the sentence. One of these three judges in Rumania is required to have a universe^ diploma and a certain standing before the bar. In other words, he is a professional. But he is, also, a Commu¬ nist or pro-Communist, because all Rumanian Cham¬ bers of Lawyers have been “purified” : only the “politi¬ cally reliable” have retained the right to practice. The two associates of the professional judge are “chosen from a panel of trustworhty democrats.” These are the “people” giving visible reality to a “people’s court.” All “trustworthy democrats” in Rumania are Commu¬ nists. The candidates for the local judgeships in each community are recommended by the local Communist Party and appointed by the Communist government. The three judges in each court decide each case “accord¬ ing to their Communist consciences” and for the “best interests of the Party.” The statute setting up the “people’s courts” provides “that the judges must defend the interests of the toiling masses, proect the new democracy and punish enemies of the people.” It also warns that the judges are not to let legal intricacies stand in the way of rapid and direct decisions. The law places the “people’s” judges above law. In dispensing “justice” they are to dispense with justice. The lower “Urban Courts,” in town and city, are

444

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

identical with those in the villages, and “County Courts” are the same. Courts of Appeal are formed on the same model but are somewhat larger; they have five judges instead of three. Two of them must be lawyers. Therefore, in these courts, as in the lower ones, the “people’s” magis¬ trates can outvote the professionals. The Supreme Court is made up of professional judges, but their power is decidedly limited. They cannot reverse a lower court decision. They have the right only to point out errors in law interpretation and ask the lower courts to review such cases. This means that every vital case in city and village is in the hands of “people’s judges.” There is one type of exception, namely, suits based on civil or commercial law. If a peasant quarrelled with his brother over his grandpa’s house, or if a city doc¬ tor sued his landlord for faulty plumbing, the case might come before professional judges. But this would not be certain. The landlord might be indicted as a “remnant of fascism” and the peasant as an “agent of American imperialism,” in which case, they would be dealt with by “people’s judges.” The enormous power of such “popular” courts is greatly increased by “popular” laws and decrees. For example, certain properties are subject to confiscation. The expression of many kinds of sentiments brings ar¬ rest and punishment. The sale of many kinds of goods is prohibited. The possession of certain books or pe¬ riodicals is forbidden. Holding certain types of meet¬ ings is illegal. Traveling for certain people is limited. Police and ordinary party members are urged to inter¬ vene in such cases; and intervention often brings legal or illegal rewards. This gives Communist cops work¬ ing with Communist judges in people’s courts enor-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE mous power.

445

A little group of local Communists play¬

ing both sides of the street can make themselves lords of every town. The cops could arrest a storekeeper on the charge of selling in the black market. They would seize his store and confiscate his stock of goods, distributing much of it among themselves and then giving a residue to the state or the Party. In time they would bring the case before the “people’s judges,” who would belong to the same Communist Party and who would have been in on the plot—as well as on the swag. These judges would legalize the seizure of the store and the confisca¬ tion of the goods and would sentence the merchant to prison as an economic sabateur. If the victim dared appeal, he would again find himself in a Communistdominated “People’s Appelate Court.” And that would be the end. Perhaps Comrade Penescu, who lives in a small town, covets Mr. Ionescu’s nice house. He concocts a case against owner Ionescu, whom he accuses of having been friendly with “western imperialists.” He finds witnesses to testify that Ionescu often listened to “the Voice of America,” had surreptitiously talked to neighbors about Byrnes’s “Speaking Frankly,” and had received three letters from Detroit. The sly and covet¬ ous Communist makes a deal with a Communist cop after which house-owner Ionescu is arrested. He is condemned by Communist “people’s judges” and his property forfeited. Penescu finds himself enjoying Ionescu’s house, rugs, furniture and all, even to fur coats. One can more easily understand the terror exercised by a “people’s police” working with “people’s judges” if he recalls how the Soviet press and radio whooped it up for the Russian Cheka or Gestapo during Decern-

446

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

ber 1947, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of that organization. For example, “Pravda” on De¬ cember 20 wrote a long editorial of praise about the Cheka which was radiocast over the world. It told how the Soviet people loved the vigilant secret police, how all good Bolsheviks cooperated with it, and how “capitalistic snoopers (were) trying to find individuals still inclined towards bourgeois and property-owning ideology.” Of course, such bourgeois individuals were denounced as black traitors. “The Party ceaselessly educates the people in Com¬ munist vigilance to defend the interests of the Socialist State against the enemy,” Pravda wrote. “The Cheka is intimately linked with the people and inseparable from them. It always receives the aid and support of all the people.” In other words, all citizens were to be denunciators and political spies. They were to hunt down and expose every person with a “bourgeois ideology.” Many Ru¬ manian Communists were all the more eager to do this, since by such denunciation, however false, they would be praised and might be rewarded. Such activity has filled Rumania’s prisons. Each night as this writer retires, he sadly recalls that a Rumanian citizen, Unghvary Sandor, is confined in a narrow, stinking Bucharest jail cell on a five year sentence because he once came to see “spy Markham” and talk with him about the ethnological composition of the Rumanian city of Cluj! (Later Mr. Unghvary succeeded in escaping from prison and from Rumania.) Communist police and Communist informers, work¬ ing with Communist “people’s judges,” operate as gangsters, and for that “deserve well of the Party.” And there are no prospects of effective restraint. Minis¬ ter Patrascanu imposed a little—very little—restraint

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE and therefore was dismissed, disgraced, arrested.

447 His

debasement was a new summons to Communists or proCommunists or pseudo-Communists to destroy the bourgeoisie. The Communist motto is: “Steal from the stealer; plunder the plunderer.” The slogan rests on the assumption that every person who has anything stole it. Consequently, the Communist is duty bound to “steal it back.” They are doing it under the cover of “people’s courts,” and “people’s laws.” Courts, like tommy-guns and “brass knuckles,” are a device for helping Communists smash their enemies. And if one should express the hope that perhaps Rumania’s jurisprudential traditions or law schools or bodies of trained lawyers will serve as a check to such legalized lawlessness, he should recall that all Ruma¬ nian lawyers were disbarred during the spring of 1948 and only those approved by Communist-dominated commissions were re-established. The Rumanian bar was abolished and Communist-run “colleges of lawyers” replaced it. In Bucharest the number of lawyers was reduced from about 12,000 to 2,100. And these 2,100 who survived are not only Communists or pro-Communists, but they must practice before Communist Courts in the presence of Communist police.

To win

their cases, they naturally seek Communist good will, and to avoid suspicion they naturally prefer not to defend “economic saboteurs,” "enemies of the people” and “agents of American imperialists.” As far as Rumania’s traditions of justice go and the teaching of its universities is concerned, all hope is vain. Communists run the universities and indoctrinate law students wth Lenin’s and Vishinsky’s doctrines suborning justice. Also they are trying to extirpate every high Rumanian tradition, calling it a lawyer’s

448

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

prejudice.

Traditions

of justice

are

“remnants

of

fascism.” Day by day the legal vise is being scewed tighter in Rumania. Travel is being restricted. Passports are more frequently required in town and village. Dwell¬ ings, factories, offices are more vigilantly watched. A new census has more accurately ascertained the status of every inhabitant. More guards watch the roads passing into and out of towns and more detectives walk up and down the corridors of trains. With ever increasing precision Rumanians are being told where they may and may not establish their abode, what they may eat and own and how they may spend their money—if any. In moments of special oppression and exploitation during the past millennium prophets and poets have dreamed of a magistrate, who would not judge after the sight of his eyes, nor pronounce sentence according to orders whispered in his ears, but would decide cases involving the poor with righteousness and give just verdicts for the rumble. They have hoped “that jus¬ tice would run down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream.” Never has a nation more ardently yearned for that than the Communist-ruled Rumanians, in whose country Communist Ministers make the laws, a rubber stamp Communist Parliament promulgates them, Communist policemen enforce them and Communist “people’s judges,” obeying Communist chiefs, back the Commu¬ nist policemen. The whole system is directed against the life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of 16,000,000 men and women.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

449

Chapter XXV ENCHAINING OF THOUGHT (Press, Radio, Schools, Churches) Communist dictators are forcing the spiritual life of all Rumanians into a mold as rigid as steel. Almost every day and twice on holidays, spokesmen for the CPSU (B) and for other Communist Parties throughout the world proclaim that Leninism-Stalinism is the highest creation of the human mind. Such claims are especially thunderous on the First of May and dur¬ ing similar red celebrations. Here is a sample of an ordinary week day claim, as it appeared in the Moscow Izvestia, July 5, 1947. “The Soviet people . .. are in the vanguard of science and art; the eyes and hopes of all progressive mankind are turned toward us. . . . Far behind are the days when capitalist culture could produce living words. It has nothing more to give the world. . . . “Our culture far surpasses bourgeois culture.

It re¬

flects a system much higher than any bourgeois demo¬ cratic system. Our literature, our art and our philoso¬ phy have the right to show others a new universal hu¬ man moral code, new feelings, a new attitude to the world. ... “Our greatest pride is our Soviet ideology. Leninism —the greatest achievement of Russian and world cul¬ ture illumines our road. This fighting ideology, irrec¬ oncilable and merciless to our foes, has always been our well-tried weapon in the struggle for the triumph of Communism.

A man who stands on the foundation

450

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

of Marxism and Leninism stands head and shoulders above any bourgeois scientist with all his idealistic ravings. . . . “Our pride—the pride of the Soviet people—is born of the firm confidence that what we are doing under the leadership of the Party of Lenin and Stalin is the greatest and most sacred deed in the world.” Communists everywhere, including those in Ruma¬ nia, are striving to perform “the most sacred deed in the world” and impose the ideology of Leninism-Stalinism. In addition to using guns, they employ propa¬ ganda. The main channels through which indoctrina¬ tion is poured are the radio, the press, books, the schools, theaters, the church, sport, women’s and youth’s clubs. All of these channels are equipped with a double system of valves and pumps. They keep Com¬ munistic propaganda flowing in at high pressure and shut other ideas or information out. The Rumanian Communists apply the system to the full. Enslaving of the mind is one of their main enterprises. The world’s chief Communist paper, Pravda,

on

June 29, 1948, urged an intensification of scientific Communist propaganda. “Much more must be done by our educational and cultural institutions for the dis¬ semination of political knowledge,” it said. What “political knowledge” means for Communists, Pravda made very clear in such statements as the fol¬ lowing: “Every word of Bolshevik propaganda must be per¬ meated with the spirit of irreconcilability in relation to bourgeois ideology. By pointing out the immeasurable supremacy of the Soviet system of culture over the bourgeois system the propagandist will contribute to forming the new Soviet man. “The Central Committee of the Party stresses that

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

451

the main content of propaganda must be the materialis¬ tic interpretation of natural phenomena. The Party seeks a Soviet man with a scientific, materialistic point of view. “The Party is carrying on an active campaign against every kind of religious superstition, because the Party is for science, while religions are against science.” “The potentials for the unfolding of scientific educa¬ tional propaganda are great,” Pravda continued. “We have many millions of intellectuals who are striving to make their knowledge the property of the masses of the people. We have thousands of lecturers, hundreds of thousands of schools, palaces of culture, reading rooms, libraries. Hundreds and thousands of journals are be¬ ing published. The cinema and the radio are function¬ ing. If the Party organization will use this mighty power wisely, it will insure the further upswing of the propaganda of scientific knowledge.” Rumanian Communists, emulating their Soviet mas¬ ters, are working for an “upswing of propaganda.” One of their chief instruments is the radio network, which is used exclusively by spokesmen for Communism. Every other voice is shut out. Not since the winter of 1945 has an opposition or independent voice been heard over Rumanian ether waves, except the few heard from out¬ side. General Radescu, as Rumanian Premier, made a vehement anti-Communist speech over the radio, Febru¬ ary 24, and it proved to be his last—indeed, the only one. Moscow then grabbed Rumania’s radio transmit¬ ters in one hand and Radescu in the other. Radescu de¬ parted and the Communists have had control of the radio ever since. They have added new transmission stations, greatly increased the number of individual and group receivers and put up public loud speakers in vil¬ lages, towns and city squares all over the land. In moun-

452

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

tain hamlets of Bucovina and Transylvania, as in the chief squares of Bucharest and Cluj, state-provided loud speakers pour out Communist propaganda night and day. April 15, 1948, the Ministerial Council by a decree authorized the Rumanian Broadcasting Com¬ pany to contract a loan of 350,000,000 lei to extend the system. The Finance Ministry guaranteed its repay¬ ment in ten years. From time to time, the Communist leaders of Ruma¬ nia labor unions convene the broadcasting personnel to give them propaganda talks. For example, the Bucha¬ rest press reported that, “on the afternoon of June 23 (1948) Trian Stoica, Trade Union President, speak¬ ing in the great studio, urged the radio workers to find new forms of propaganda, to increase vigilance against the class enemy and to mobilize the popular masses for disseminating the Rumanian Workers Party’s ideology among the people.” A few weeks earlier, “the Directors of the Rumanian Broadcasting Company called a press conference and Director-General Matei Socor made important state¬ ments in connection with the opening of a new broad¬ casting station, Bucharest Two.” “The press conference was also attended by a delega¬ tion of Bulgarian broadcasters, including the director of programs and the head of political information, who had come to perfect the Rumano-Bulgarian radiophonic agreement. Socor stressed that soon a large number of radio sets imported from the Soviet Union and other sets made from spare parts which were in the country would be put at the disposal of the masses. “To increase radio listening in the countryside, a con¬ test had been proclaimed with prizes for inventors building sets with a battery and loudspeaker. Three types had been presented and the broadcasting com-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

453

pany had given prizes to the inventors to reward their efforts. “Socor also reported that on May 1, a five-kilowatt station, Bucharest Two, had been opened and would broadcast over 285 meters. “Then the Bulgarian program director spoke and among other things stressed that since February, 1945, Bulgarian radio stations have broadcast also in Ru¬ manian. “He reported that Bulgarian technicians, with their own means had succeeded in building a new radio sta¬ tion of 15 kilowatts. “The new Rumanian Station Bucharest Two was opened” with considerable fanfare. From such official reports and much other informa¬ tion, it is plain that both Rumania and Bulgaria are having difficulty in finding material to make transmit¬ ters and receivers, but by expending large sums and much energy they hope to enable every home to receive “political education.” There is not one emission on any subject without a Communist slant. There are children’s songs and domestic instruction for women, there are news reports and programs for peasants, there are workers’ hours and popular drama, all serving to lure or drive each mind into a Communist trap. Youth give concerts, children sing; professors lecture, priests even are invited to talk; peasants appeal to peasants, work¬ ers to workers—and all are as puppets repeating words prepared by Moscow. From early morning far into the night, on Sundays and work days, in factories and homes, loud speakers pour out streams of praise for Russia, glowing pictures of the “Soviet man,” torrents of hatred for America, inprecations against all that is not Communistic, exhortations to extirpate the “last

454

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

remnants of fascism” and appeals to report the “agents of dollar imperialism.” Almost all is coarse, arrogant, boastful. It glitters with slogans, bristles with threats. Most is dull or stupifying; some is insolently terrifying. There is al¬ most no gentleness or tenderness, no objectivity or breadth, but bluster, like the everlasting beating of drums or the blowing of trumpets. *

The press is similar.

*

*

*

Throughout the land not one

independent or opposition paper appears. Every peri¬ odical publication, whether daily, weekly or monthly is Communist or pro-Communist. From the Prut River to the border of Hungary not one printing shop sets up a word against Bolshevist tyranny. No old fashioned country printer, picking type from badly worn upper and lower cases, can form them into words which would mean liberty of mind or of heart or of the nation. And no modern typographer nimbly fingering a linotype ma¬ chine in the splendid newspaper offices of Bucharest would dare extract from his keyboard a word of praise for the open mind or noble heart or high morality or to extol spirit as the Creator of all things. In the eyes of the 16,000,000 men and women in Rumania a statue to Gutenberg would be an offense. The printing presses, to which his invention led, daily grind out black chains to bind the people’s minds. Every news-stand is a cave whence blow the winds of hatred. The printed page brings not light, but darkness. It opens not the heart, but closes it. It leads the Ruma¬ nians not in the broad vistas of world thought and world inspiration, but is as a veil over every window, or as refuse crammed into every crack through which light might enter. The cry of the newsboy is as a taunt.

“Spark”

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE (Scanteia),

he

shouts;

“Free Rumania,”

he

455 cries;

“Libertatea,” he yells; “Truth” (Adevarul), he re¬ peats as he races up and down the streets, with papers under his arms and all sound as bitter derision or base buffoonery. Every paper is as Moscow’s “Pravda” or “The Daily Worker” of New York, each one devoted to Communist propaganda. A rather vivid picture of the situation of the press in Rumania has been given by Mihail Farcasanu, an editor who managed to escape from Rumania. Fie has reported some of his personal experiences after August 23, 1944 as follows: “As one of the leaders of the National Liberal Party in Rumania, I edited ‘Viitorul’, its main news newspaper, which was published in Bucharest, the printing-shop be¬ ing ‘Independentza’. During my editorship, the press was subjected to censorship under the ultimate control of the Soviet Armistice Control Commission (A.C.C.). I endeavored to defend liberal principles and oppose Communist measures, but found the position of a liberal journalist beset with dangers. “During September 1944 the newspaper ‘Democatul,’ also published by the Liberal Party, was sup¬ pressed and its editor arrested because it had expressed surprise that Soviet war communiques kept announcing the ‘liberation’ by the Red Army of the Rumanian ter¬ ritory that had already been freed by Rumanians. “On September 20 I published in Viitorul an article entitled, ‘The Popular Front and Production’ which provoked a violent attack in the Communist press, es¬ pecially in Scanteia, the official paper of the Commu¬ nist Party. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet A.C.C. or¬ dered the suspension for three days of Viitroul. “During October I received the visit of a representa¬ tive of the Soviet Army’s Rumanian language news-

456

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

paper, Graiul Nou, which was continually interfering in Rumanian internal affairs. He gave me several dark hints and slightly veiled menaces. “Such warnings were openly published in the Com¬ munist press. For instance, on October 20 the Commu¬ nist paper Rumania Libera threatened the NationalPeasant and National-Liberal newspapermen with raids, either at their office or at home. “When I published a translation of Hemingway’s ‘For Whom the Bell Tolls,’ the Communist Press accused me of fascism and Hemingway was represented as a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing (Rumania Libera)’. “On November 19, 1944, as leader of the National Liberal youth organization, I presided over a meeting in Bucharest, at which I criticized the attitude of the Rumanian Communist leader and Soviet citizen, Ana Pauker. It was the first public criticism directed against her, and immediately afterwards, in a violent series of attacks in the Communist press, which lasted three days, I was accused of being ‘Goebbel’s agent,’ ‘enemy of the people and of the workers,’ ‘opponent of the agrarian reform,’ ‘saboteur of production and of relations with the Soviet Union and the United Nations.’ “At that time, I met Mr. Dangulov, Secretary of the Soviet Legation at a reception and he accused me of having an ‘anti-Soviet’ attitude. “As a result, the Soviet Armistice Control Commis¬ sion ordered a four day suspension of Viitorul. “In the meantime, the Communist grip upon the printers was tightening. Two of the best workers of Independentza, the printing plant where Viitorul was printed, asked me for a secret interview and told me that they were compelled to carry out orders given by the Communists. They said that they were threatened with deportation to Russia and with starvation, since

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

457

the cooperatives, from which they were getting; food, were controlled by Communists. Under such conditions work in the printing plant slackened considerably. The workers were frequently taken away from their work in order to join street demonstrations organized by the Communist Party. Within the plant, the workers be¬ longing to the Communist-appointed ‘workshop com¬ mittee’ were too busy with propaganda to work. “On November 1, 1944, the Communists resorted to direct action, by stopping the publication of an article about the Workers Unions. From then on, such inter¬ ference increased every day. In order to gain a free hand in the management of the plant, they expelled from the premises our foreman, Cristescu, an old man, who faithfully performed his duties. Cristescu was thrown from a staircase and seriously injured. I tried to have the culprits brought to justice, or at least to get rid of them, but the police were afraid to intervene. “On November 13, the Workers Union forbade the publication of a joint communique issued by the National-Liberal and National-Peasant Parties, be¬ cause it criticized the F.N.D. (Communist Democratic Front). The Communist workshop committee stated that it had the order from ‘comrade’ Georgescu, who was Undersecretary of State of the Ministry of Interior. “With other representatives of the two parties, I immediately protested to Georgescu, who solemnly promised us that there would be no more interference and that the freedom of the press would be respected. The workers, on being informed of this decision, did not believe it. They asked me to speak with ‘comrade’ Teohari Georgescu. So we rang him up and requested him to confirm to the workers what he had just told us. The telephone conversation took place in my presence

458

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and I overheard Georgescu directing the ‘committee’ representative to proceed as ‘they knew.’ They did. “The National Liberal Party was compelled to have a communique of February 7, 1945, printed clandes¬ tinely, because the workers in the Independentza plant refused to set it up. “About this time, Prime Minister Radescu announced he would speak at Scala Hall in Bucharest on February 11. The night before the meeting was to be held the Communists occupied the hall by force, but General Radescu delivered his speech in another place. The Prime Minister was acclaimed by thousands of citizens, including myself and other friends. “The Printers Union published a communique brand¬ ing General Radescu and those who took part in the manifestation as ‘fascists.’ On February 22, the Ruma¬ nian Communist press quoted an article from Pravda, in which the ‘historical parties’ and ‘Farcasanu’s gang’ were accused of having organized the demonstration for General Radescu. “To avoid Communist censorship, exercised through the Printers Union, the owners of Independentza in¬ vited members of the National Liberal Youth Organi¬ zation to print Viitorul. For a short period it appeared in this way and was sold by the youth, since newspaper vendors were cowed and refused to distribute it. “The Communist press again attacked me violently and the Printers Union demanded my arrest. The Com¬ munist papers wrote that freedom of the press should not be granted to the ‘reactionary clique.’ On Febru¬ ary 17/18, at two o’clock after midnight, Viitorul was formally suppressed by the Soviet A.C.C. “The following day we asked for the reasons and were told that certain suspicious abbreviations had ap¬ peared in the paper, such as J. instead of John. I went

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

459

to inquire at the Soviet Legation, where I was received by Secretary Feodorov. He likewise told me that we used suspicious abbreviations and showed me a copy of the paper in which a note of the British Military Mission had been published. It referred to a reception given by Vice-Air Marshal Stevenson. Feodorov pointed out that the expression ‘Vice-Airmarshal Stev¬ enson, C.B.E.; D.S.O.; M.C.’ was highly suspicious, since he never saw a name accompanied by so many initials.’ “My protest to the Armistice Control Commission and to the U.S.A. and U.K. representatives in Rumania received no answer. “The Communist campaign against me soon reached its climax. Bucharest was covered with posters demand¬ ing my arrest. In provincial towns, posters demanded my death, and at Communist meetings shouts demand¬ ing my death became part of the routine. “After the Radescu Government was ousted (March 6), my one-room flat was raided and searched by Com¬ munist agents. Consequently, I had to live in hiding. When the Communists searched my flat they declared they were looking for American and British gold. Shortly before, Mr. Dangulo, Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Bucharest, had told a representative of the Liberal Party that I was an American and British agent. In the end, my room was requisitioned. Since the police continued to search for me at the homes of my relatives and friends, I was compelled to live an underground life. I eventually escaped from the country.” Another account of the press regime in Communistruled Rumania has been prepared by Emil Ghilezan, one of the leaders of the National-Peasant Party, and formerly an administrator of its publications. Some

460

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

of its more salient parts may be summarized as follows : For a very short period after the royal coup of Au¬ gust 23, 1944, the Rumanian press enjoyed complete liberty. But restrictions were imposed as soon as Soviet troops occupied Bucharest. The first blow was the arrest of a democratic Rumanian editor whom the Germans had long held in a concentration camp. The Russians punished him for writing the truth about the liberation of Rumanian cities from the Germans. The Red Army felt offended that all the credit was not given to Russia. The most popular daily during those first weeks after the overthrow of pro-Nazi Antonescu, was “Curierul” of the National-Peasant Party. It was soon being circulated in 350,000 copies. Its tone was thoroughly democratic. That provoked the disapproval of the Soviet occupiers, who took measures to repress the paper. First, they seized the printing office. Then the Communist Party, in defiance of Curierul’s editors, in¬ serted its own articles in the paper. After that, the editors of the Communist “Scanteia” and of the Red Army’s “Graiul Nou” set up their offices in the paper’s printing plant, taking over almost the whole establishment. But “Curierul” continued in spite of these difficulties, until it was formally sup¬ pressed, January 10, 1945. A month earlier the Print¬ ers Union had refused to work on it. Rumania’s largest daily, “Universul,” noted for its nationalistic tendencies, was seized by the Communists, along with its plant, which was perhaps the best in the Balkans. But the paper was not suppressed. On the contrary, it continued to appear as a Communist organ in exactly the same format and with the same type. That was a rather subtile fraud, such as Hitler prac¬ ticed with the Vienna papers when he seized Austria.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

461

When the Groza government was installed March 6, 1945, it took over the task of purging the press and within a few days liquidated practically all the nonCommunist papers, inaugurating a press regime far more drastic than that of the pro-Nazi dictatorship. Among the suppressed papers was “Gazeta Transylvanei,” the most famous Rumanian publication in that province. It had appeared for nearly 70 years under Magyar rule in spite of all difficulties—finally to be stopped by Rumanians. In all, more than 50 papers were wiped out. One of them was “Ardealul” of Anton Muresanu, a militant anti-Communist daily with a large reading pub¬ lic. One day it made an uncomplimentary and not very veiled remark about a Jewish Communist. An avalanche of Communist abuse was hurled against it, completely and immediately burying it. In time the editor was arrested. At the beginning of 1946, as a result of the Moscow Agreement, three opposition dailies were allowed to re¬ appear; they were “Dreptatea” of the National-Peasant Party, “Liberalul” of the National Liberal Party, both in Bucharest, and the National-Peasant “Patria” in Cluj. “Patria” succumbed to Communist violence after a few turbulent weeks of heroic resistance; its at¬ tackers were largely Hungarians, and their weapon was brute force. Its editor is in jail. Soon after the dis¬ appearance of “Patria,” all opposition political activity in Transylvania was violently suppressed. Groza’s re¬ gime repressed the Rumanians in his own Transylvania more furiously than the Hungarian feudal grandees had done. The National-Peasant “Dreptatea,” after 15 months of heroic resistance that would have done honor to a William Lloyd Garrison or Elijah Lovejoy, was sup-

462

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

pressed in July 1947. The Liberals, finding further activity futile and the possibility of free expression re¬ duced practically to zero, stopped their “Liberalul” about the same time. An excellent, independent daily “Journalul de Dimineatsa” was suppressed by the Communist Government during the spring of 1947. By the end of that summer every independent pen in the land had been broken. A worthy account of the efforts of Rumanian news¬ paper men to preserve a free press during the three years following August 1944 would be one of the no¬ blest and most heroic chapters in the history of world journalism. The pro-democratic journalists and print¬ ers faced every obstacle, including violence of the most vicious sort. Every independent newspaper man had to leap at least six hurdles: the Russian censors, the Com¬ munist censors, the syndicate of journalists, the Print¬ ers Union, Communist shock troopers, and prison. These obstacles faced him every day! Newsprint, for example, was distributed by a Com¬ munist-controlled commission, which made great pre¬ tensions of impartiality and practiced flagrant partiality. It dried up the supply of paper for “Dreptatea” and “Jurnalul.” Many a day these dailies weren’t accorded enough newsprint to provide copies for the readers in Bucharest alone. Sometimes the papers were so eagerly sought that a copy brought 50 times the normal price. On at least one occasion newsprint that had been as¬ signed to “Dreptatea” was diverted to a Communist paper in Bulgaria. Regularly, the quotas of paper for the three independent or opposition dailies were given almost entirely to Bucharest Communist dailies, not for their use since they didn’t need it, but to force the nonCommunist papers to buy it back at enormous black market prices. One such Communist paper, “Victoria”

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

463

survived for months and prospered by selling newsprint “underground” to the non-Communist dailies. When these were suppressed, “Victoria’s” journalistic mission ended. More serious than this, though no more cynically immoral, were attacks by organized and paid Commu¬ nist gangs on newspaper distributors. These gangs kept opposition papers out of whole provinces. Owners of news-stands in many places dared not display or even receive them. Newsboys, in many places, dared not sell them. Even post office officials prevented them from reaching individual subscribers. Occasionally bundles of opposition newspapers were publicly burned by Communist-led hooligans. Such a spectacle was a not unimpressive sight. It resembled a Ku Klux Klan cross burning on a dark night in a county tense with fear. Communist ruffians seized bundles of papers at the stations, carried them to the city squares, and ap¬ plied torches to them as Communist-led crowds stood around intoning Communist slogans. Flames from burning newspapers leapt upward and seemed to lend venom to the brutal grimaces of hate-filled faces from whose mouths issued the rhythmic curse, “Death to Maniu—death to Maniu!” The charred paper, the clenched fists, death, the obsessed crowd, all amid stretching away to distant Siberia,

fire, the whiffs of the anathema of boundless darkness left the impression

that an inferno was approaching. News writers and printers were

placed

in

even

greater danger than news venders. Printing offices were attacked, machines were wrecked, premises were devastated, workers were beaten. Type-setters who dared defy Communist labor leaders disappeared. Members of newspaper staffs were repeatedly arrested. The printing of a paper was a daily adventure. Every

464

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

time a conscientious Rumanian journalist finished an article he had to reflect that it might be his last; at the very least he knew it might bring him extreme unpleas¬ antness. He thought of his colleagues who would be implicated, of the men who would print his article, of the boys who would sell his paper, of his family—and his pen sometimes faltered. The final suppression of “Jurnalul” is symbolic of the Communist press regime in Rumania. As a small item in a column of minor news about the outside world, reference was made to the celebration by Rumanians in China, of Rumania’s national holiday, May 10. And the reference added that the participants originated from all Rumanian provinces, such as Transylvania, Bucovina, Dobrudja, Bessarabia. The unimportant chronicle about Rumanians from Bessarabia, had been taken from an American paper and had been passed by the Rumanian censor, but it provoked such Soviet dis¬ pleasure that “Jurnalul” was permanently stopped. Such is the sword hanging over the country. For the moment, it is mightier than the pen. ★

5)5

5k

The writing and publishing of books is subject to the same control as the publication of newspapers. Anti-Communist books never appear. They are as un¬ thinkable as an anti-Communist meeting. No unfavor¬ able book on Russia or on any “new democracy” would be allowed, neither would a book favorable to America. This control is very simple; five unbreakable bands re¬ strict the writer. There are no free publishers, no free distributors, no non-Communist printers, no non-Communist source of paper, and only Communist officials are empowered to authorize the appearance of a book.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

465

No Rumanian writer knows how to emerge from that constricting ring. In contrast with the restraints imposed upon nonCommunist writers, lures are offered those serving the Party.

For example,

Czechoslovakia’s Communist-

edited “New Central European Observer” of June 26, 1948, described a “writers’ house in Rumania.” It was a confiscated palace in beautiful mountains, which the state had placed at the disposal of “half a dozen” ob¬ sequious authors. Its inauguration was dramatic. “Hundreds of peasants attended the opening ceremony. They marched up the drive singing the Internationale, a few local priests chanting with them. It was a decorous procession, colorful with banners and local costumes.” Communists care for even the pleasure of their writers. A majority of the books now appearing in Rumania are published by a Russian concern called Cartea Rusa and by a state establishment, called Editura de Stat. Before the war more books were published in Ru¬ mania than in any other Balkan land. They were dis¬ tributed by some of the largest bookstores in southeast Europe. According to official data, well over 5,000 titles appeared annually. For example, 5,435 were recorded in 1940. During the war the number de¬ creased, as was natural. In 1941, there were recorded 4,581 titles; 4,656 in 1942; 4,990 in 1943; 2,536 in 1944, and 2,893 in 1945. These are only approximate figures because a few small printing establishments failed to send exemplars of their publications to the State Statistical Bureau. About 95 per cent of the books appearing were original Rumanian works. And they could be classified approximately as follows, according to subject matter: general works such as dictionaries and reference books, 19 per cent; philosophical works, 2.5 per cent; on theol-

466

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

ogy, 4.8; on the social sciences, 23; on philology, 3.8; on pure science, 9.2; on applied sciences, 19; books on art, three per cent; literary productions, 15 per cent. Such was the classification of original Rumanian books appearing in 1944. The largest category of sales was between 2,000 and 5,000 copies per book. far exceeded this.

Some novels and text books

A few of these books were excellent, many were good, most were mediocre—as in most lands; a few were bad. In Bucharest bookstores one found a large and variegated collection of books in all the leading Western languages, translations in the Rumanian lan¬ guage and works of every kind by Rumanian writers. Any Rumanian—or foreigner—whatever his tastes could procure in Bucharest the best and newest works in literature, science, philosophy, political thought. Now, under the Communists that is changed. Every book printed anywhere in the confines of Rumania and on any subject bears upon it the imprint of Moscow and exhales the devastating breath of Communism. A self-appointed Rumanian Communist literary critic, Radu Lupan, described the “new literature” in an English language article during the summer of 1948. He began by saying: “There is a qualitative change taking place in Rumanian literature. The newly re¬ leased basic social forces are the decisive influence in the creation of a new culture, springing from life itself.” Then after 600 words of pompous mumbling, comrade Lupan concluded by saying, “From this point of view the novels that have appeared since August 23, 1944, (since the Communists have ruled) have not been truly successful.” The Rumanian nation agrees. So far the “new litera¬ ture” is oppressive, flamboyant sloganeering.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE *

*

*

467

*

The school is a faithful reflection of the press and of the whole printed word, but control there is not so easy. Of course, text books are as ruthlessly supervised as other Rumanian publications and school manage¬ ment at the top is as aggressively Communist as the leadership of labor unions or of the army. Rumanian schools are designed to be propaganda agencies of the Communist Party, just as much as the radio and press. Such is Communist theory and Communist practice. But practice is not yet perfected in all Rumanian schools. The 58,000 teachers and 2,000,000 pupils have not been as rigidly regimented as the army or police or courts, and still show sparks of independence. How¬ ever, they are rapidly being brought to heel. The Communist ideal of education has been formu¬ lated by Lenin in a classic writing called “The Tasks of the Youth Leagues.” It was a “speech delivered at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, October 2, 1920.” Among other things, Lenin said, “You must train yourselves to become Communists. The whole object of the training, education and tuition of youth should be to imbue them with Communist ethics. . . . We, of course, say that we do not believe in God. We repudiate the ethics presented as God’s Com¬ mandments. We know perfectly well that the clergy spoke of God in order to promote their exploiters’ in¬ terest ... or they deduced ethics from idealistic phrases. “We repudiate all morality outside of class con¬ cepts.” All such morality “is a fraud clogging the minds of workers and peasants.” . . . “Our morality is entirely subordinated to the inter¬ ests of the class struggle. ... It is deduced from the class struggle, (to) abolishing the capitalistic class.

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“Morality is that which serves to destroy the old ex¬ ploiting society and to create a new Communist society. “Morality is whatever serves this struggle. Morality consists entirely of compact, united discipline and con¬ scious mass struggle against exploiters. We do not believe in eternal morality. We expose all fables about morality. “Youth must subordinate every step in its studies, education, and training to this (class) struggle. At the basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the consummation of Communism. That is also the basis of Communist training, education and tuition.” Such is education in Communist-ruled lands; it is to prepare Communist leaders. And that is not an anti¬ quated idea; it is the prevalent, officially applied cur¬ rent Communist ideal. The principal Communist paper in the world, “Pravda,” wrote an editorial, June 28, 1948, regarding “Further Improvement of the Soviet Schools.” Among other things it said: “The Soviet people are grateful to the teachers for educating builders of a Communist society and fighters for that society. But the Bolsheviks want greater ef¬ forts. . . . The ideological level of teaching is not high enough. The development of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook is not sufficiently stressed. “The rural school is not brought close enough to life (Communism). It is time it were! “The Komsomol (Communist Youth) must play a great part in improving school work. He must be the first assistant of the school director and of the teacher in educating yuoth in the spirit of flaming love for their Socialist fatherland.” In plain words, Communist education is to prepare fighters for Communism, with the Marxist-Leninist outlook and with flaming love for the Union of Soviet

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Socialist Republics.

469

And the Communist Party is or¬

dered to keep commissars at the elbow of all teachers and directors, even in the most remote village, to see that they follow that ideal. Such an educational aim is followed by the Commu¬ nists whom Moscow placed in power in Rumania. They have made the school system a departure of the Com¬ munist Party and are preparing Communist commissars for every school in the land. The man who at first di¬ rected the Bolshevization of Rumanian schools is a rene¬ gate Socialist, Stefan Voitec, who joined with the Com¬ munists early in 1944. He became Minister of Educa¬ tion during the autumn of that year under General Sanatescu, and continued in the Communist Govern¬ ment of March 6, 1945. His Communist fervor has increased month by month. Apostate Voitec, whose highest achievement in private life was to hold a third rate technical job in a newspaper office, was given a double mission by the Kremlin, namely, to bring the Socialists and the schools into the Communist trap. The first job he completed with the help of other renegade comrades and is progressing rapidly with the second. The instruments he is using for Bolshevizing the schools are : materialistic-scientific pedagogy, purges of teachers, new pro-Communist text books, privileges for Communist students, intimidation of truly demo¬ cratic students, pro-Communist demonstrations and the organizing of youth. These are stock Communist meth¬ ods, practiced in all Communist-run lands. They are supplemented by the intensive indoctrination applied during the two years of army training to which each youth must submit. The new Marxist-materialistic curriculum has not been entirely effective, because there were not enough Communist teachers to apply it. The circulars fre-

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RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

quently issued regarding “naturalistic explanations for all natural and social phenomena” were long unheeded. Also materialistic, anti-religious text books were lack¬ ing. Even when teachers expounded Marxist mate¬ rialism Rumanian youth tended to scorn it because of the Kremlin trademark which it bore. Every theory presented in a red package was repulsive. For many months all Rumanian schools from the eighth grade up were centers of anti-Communism, even under the pro-Communist Minister of Education. Chil¬ dren and students on national holidays left the class room en masse to sing national songs. Boys and girls spurned Communist youth societies and came to despise the very words “democratic” and “progressive,” be¬ cause those words meant Communistic, in actual prac¬ tice. The two or three “progressive” boys and girls in each class or grade or school were at first derided and rebuffed. Rumanian youth from every social origin began to take pleasure in calling themselves “fascist” and “reactionary.” They even boasted of being “last remnants of fascism,” in their desire to show detesta¬ tion of the “progressivists” (Communists). But little by little that attitude of exuberant, puerile resistance was crushed. Directors and principals were changed, pro-Communist rectors were placed over every university, teachers and professors were purged, com¬ missars multiplied, children were kept in schools on national holidays, parents were punished for the acts of their offspring. Many a Rumanian home was filled with worry when a son or daughter failed to show up at the end of the school day and many a Rumanian girl was distressed when a father was arrested because of her defiance of Communist commissars in schools. The Communists arranged massive counter-demon¬ strations, forcing most students to participate, chang-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

471

ing the national holidays to red holidays, and little by little, introduced Moscow-prepared text books. Or¬ ganized Communist organizations made up of real or phoney students denounced teachers and professors who had been designated as “un-progressive.” After Com¬ munist press attacks on such professors student gangs would turn their class rooms into bedlam. Altercations would follow and the non-Communists would be ar¬ rested. The teachers in question would be dismissed as incompetent. An even more effective measure was to give Com¬ munist students control over student messes and can¬ teens; Communists headed all student societies and re¬ ceived power to determine who should get state privi¬ leges in tuition reduction and in free text books. Com¬ munists could thus determine what Rumanian boys and girls from poor families could study and most Ruma¬ nian youth are from poor families. Communists held in their hands the keys of knowledge for scores of thou¬ sands of young people. And when altruistic, democratic citizens tried to circumvent this red control by setting up free canteens of their own for non-Communist stu¬ dents they were prevented either by the state or by Communist storm troopers. Thus, Communist educa¬ tion was placed in a red groove. A new geography is being taught, which shows that Rumania is completely dependent upon Russia for its economic prosperity; the Danube is shown to be within the Soviet system; Bessarabia is pictured as an integral and inviolable part of Russia; all Rumanians are pic¬ tured as free and united. Rumanian history, too, has been rewritten, with new heroes, new dates, new mean¬ ings.

Its pivotal event was March 6, 1945, when Mos¬

cow imposed its Communist yoke upon Bucharest. That is called liberation and the beginning of a new era.

472

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Everything before that is painted as dark, feudalistic, fascistic; everything after that is bright and hopeful. Past notables are either liquidated or turned into Com¬ munists; current traitors and apostates are called libera¬ tors; Russia is portrayed as Rumania’s age-old protec¬ tor and benefactor; the political parties that created modern Rumania, freeing it from foreign rule and dis¬ tributing its land among peasants, are called vultures, hyenas, blood suckers; America and Western Europe are pictured as the enslavers of helpless nations. One such radiant history written and printed before the summer of 1947, described the liquidation of Juliu Maniu and the National-Peasant Party, wThich did not take place until after the book appeared! Communist chroniclers of history, by hanging about Party head¬ quarters, can write their chronicles even before the events come to pass—just as Communist chiefs know what judges are going to decide even before a case is called. Literature is as drastically purged as history and geography—of course not only current productions but the most classic works of the past. Histories of Ruma¬ nian and world literature, as well as standard books on literary criticism, are brought into line or replaced. Many libraries have undergone purges. Poems that Rumanians have recited for decades are under the ban. Russian literature floods the country’s book stores and is featured in the libraries. The old literary periodicals have passed under Communist direction and new ones have been launched by Communists. The most noted contemporary Rumanian novelist, Mihai Sadoveanu, has been in the service of the Communist regime from the beginning—as he was in the service of the Nazis. He has lured many colleagues into the red fold with him.

A Communist-run Writers Federation has been

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

473

established, and for a writer outside that ghetto of thought to get his productions published is impossible. If he’s inside the ghetto, he can write nothing worth publishing. Minister Stefan Voitec, though unreservedly faithful to the Kremlin, was not considered quite energetic enough in subverting the schools, so much of the work was passed into the hands of a fanatical Communist, Gheorghe Vasilichi, a veteran fighter in Spain. It is not difficult to foresee that a Rumanian who risked his life to serve world Communism in distant Spain will employ every measure designed to hasten the Commu¬ nist enslavement of Rumanian education. And he is not only boss of Rumanian education, but in addition is a General, raised to that rank by an edict exalting all “Communist Partisans.” By another law most Com¬ munist chiefs were made university professors. In some lands the highest members of the intelligentsia are “Herr Doktors.” But the road to even such a banal title is long and laborious. Communist Rumania did away with the necessity of such toil for good Commu¬ nists; as it confiscated land and plundered factories, it also dished out titles. A Communist partisan who sud¬ denly found himself in a stolen mansion might also ap¬ propriate a professorship and a generalship. General Vasilichi has an extra reward, he is the boss of pro¬ fessors. And not only are professors chosen according to the General’s requirements, but students are, too. Commu¬ nist Rumania has the most ruthless numerous clauses in history; 70% of its students must be “workers,” mean¬ ing Communists. Entrance requirements are not certifi¬ cates from preparatory schools, but from preparatory Communist clubs. And many professors are not chosen through competition and the presentation of academic

474

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

dissertations, but are appointed according to the excel¬ lence of harangues on Leninism-Stalinism. Such men have seized the responsibility of forming the Rumanian mind from the kindergarten up. And no one dares openly oppose them. They take the child from the spiritual care of the parents and snatch adults from the realms of reason. The new school imbues the nation with the new ethics, namely, that whatever pro¬ motes Communism is moral, and whatever hinders it is criminal. And there is no escape, because private schools are forbidden by the new constitution. At the beginning of August 1948, the Rumanian Communist Government announced: “All foreign schools were ordered closed as of today by the gov¬ ernment. “At the same time the State has taken over all con¬ fessional schools, including Catholic and Jewish insti¬ tutions. “Resistance to government acquisition of the school will be considered sabotage. “Russian will be taught from the fifth grade upwards. However, only the first four primary grades are com¬ pulsory. “Foreign schools to be closed include kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, and also university lectures, no matter what language is used. “The category of foreign schools includes: those founded or subsidized by any other country, and institu¬ tions belonging to other countries or by communities or associations.” *

*

*

*

Communists have a persistent and unequivocal atti¬ tude toward religion: they are against it. Marx called religion an opiate; Lenin said, repeatedly, “of course,

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475

we do not believe in God,” Earl Browder wrote that Communists consider all religions bad. Bolsheviks never tire in repeating that the church in all lands has served as a bulwark of the exploiting capitalistic class. Com¬ munists have directed almost as much venom toward religion as toward fascism, Trotskyism or Socialism— all mortal enemies. However, they have given up the attempt to extirpate the church immediately. They have adopted the strategy of using the church, as Machiavellian absolutists have used religious bodies in all ages. Communists do this by weakening, compromising, and humiliating the strong churches, by inciting one church against another, and by dominating them all. The Rumanian Commu¬ nists are using these methods with success. The hier¬ archy of the Rumanian Eastern Orthodox Church has become an agent of the Kremlin; the small Roman Catholic Church is largely quiescent; the Greek Catho¬ lic is being forcibly devoured by the Orthodox since September 1948 ; the little Protestant sects of recent or¬ igin were at first given considerable freedom to carry on sectarian attacks against the dominant churches. Under the appearance of religious freedom, one church was set against another. Some Baptists actively supported Communists in their most brutal actions, hoping thereby to injure the Orthodox Church. But by the autumn of 1948 all had been enslaved. The Communists gave Rumania a new Patriarch. To call him red would not be inappropriate. He en¬ tered the Communist camp, arm in arm with the rich capitalist, Groza, and the renegade Socialist, Voitec. As Ana Pauker inveigled the Rumanian Army officer, Nicolae Cambrea, into organizing a Rumanian Com¬ munist division to serve the Kremlin, so Mrs. Pauker attracted a priest, Marina Justinian, into the service of

476

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the Communist dictatorship. As she elevated Cambrea from a colonelcy to a generalship, she facilitated Jus¬ tinian’s promotion to the highest ecclesiastical post, that of Patriarch of the Rumanian Church. In the course of a few years, he was raised from the status of priest in the little town of Romnicu-Valcea to the status of a Metropolitan in Moldavia. From there he hurried to Bucharest to replace the aged Patriarch, Nicodim, who soon retired to a monastery to eke out the last few months of a rather gray and uninspiring career. On Nicodim’s eagerly awaited demise, young Jus¬ tinian took his place, with the approbation and applause of Moscow. Russian prelates came to lend their au¬ thority at the pompous installation of Mrs. Pauker’s churchman, and not long after that Justinian betook himself with bejewelled cross and golden vestments to a grand world celebration of the Holy Eastern Ortho¬ dox Church at the capital of the USSR, where he was the guest of the Patriarch of the All-Russian Eastern Orthodox Church, Alexei. During'this exciting political journey, from priest to Patriarch, Justinian lost a wife —Patriarchs aren’t supposed to have wives. Justinian has justified the confidence of his red mas¬ ters; indeed, he faithfully followed the line which the Communist Party laid down, even before his installa¬ tion. He paid in advance. For example, November 19, 1947, Minister Stanciu Stoian in the name of the government convened a National Ecclesiastical Con¬ gress in Bucharest. Premier Groza and the government were present. Groza made a speech and told the prel¬ ates why the government had summoned them; he pointed out that the Ministers had wanted “to delineate the spiritual role of the church under the sign of the new times.” The churches, he said, were to try to outdo the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

477

popular movements (meaning Communism). The Min¬ ister of Religion spoke a number of times, giving eccle¬ siastical directives, according to the official government report. The hierarchy saluted and took its orders from Groza, who took his order from Bodnaras who took his orders from Stalin. The Bucharest Communist press described the new Patriarch’s election on May 24, 1948, as follows: “The Grand National Assembly of the Great Church met to elect a Patriarch. The President of the Republic, Dr. Constantin Parhon, the Government headed by Premier Groza and (Communist) Deputy Minister Gheorghiu-Dej were present. “Stanciu Stoian, Minister of Religion, led off (as usual) and stressed the importance of the election of the first Patriarch of the Rumanian People’s Republic. He emphasized the necessity of the Rumanian Orthodox Church being closely connected with the state and serv¬ ing as the church of the people. He recalled that in the western lands of reaction the churches were against the people. The Minister stressed that in the new democra¬ cies (Communist-ruled lands) the church sided with the people. “Then the election took place, with members of the Holy Synod, of the Cabinet and of the Grand National Assembly voting. When the result was announced Jus¬ tinian was proclaimed elected amid general applause. “The Patriarch Justinian made a speech in which he pledged the church to work against the enslavement of the world and against the exploitation of the people. Premier Groza pledged the church the government’s unconditioned support and Minister Stoian decreed the session ended.” Such is the Communist report of the election of the red Patriarch. The Communist Cabinet and the Com-

478

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

munist Assembly and the Communist Presidium openly and demonstratively imposed him. The new Patriarch, using Communist lingo, pledged the church to aid the new regime and the Communists assured their ecclesias¬ tical instrument of their support. Have Emperors ever displayed their control of churches in a more unmis¬ takable manner? Two weeks later, according to the Bucharest press, “His Highness Justinian Marina was invested as Patri¬ arch in the presence of the Presidium of the Grand Na¬ tional Assembly, members of the government, foreign diplomats, foreign church delegations, officials and pub¬ lic. The Minister of Religion, Stoian, read the decree of the government, confirming the election of the head of the Rumanian Orthodox Church.” The Communist atheists, who “of course do not believe in God” and are “against all religion” harnessed the Rumanian Ortho¬ dox hierarchy to their red chariot, Church bells rang and priests chanted prayers for God’s blessing on Ana Pauker’s people’s regime. Blasphemy was added to baseness; treason strutted down cathedral aisles in sacerdotal robes. And not only in church aisles—it went into the high¬ ways and market places to do the Kremlin’s bidding. Justinian and his fellow prelates publicly swore al¬ legiance to the Groza government, according to the Communist press, and pledged their support, saying: “We assure the government of our full support; we will collaborate with the new authority. We wish suc¬ cess for the whole government program, on the basis of which our nation has chosen its leaders. We wish success in consolidating the People’s Republic and the Constitution. May God Almighty help you!” After the most humiliating Parliamentary election in Rumanian history the head of the Orthodox Church

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

479

defended the Communist regime, its Communist gov¬ ernment and its Communist constitution in the same terms used by Communist agitators throughout the land. A few days before the election of March 28, 1948, the Orthodox clergy had adopted a resolution in which they undertook to make stump speeches for the gov¬ ernment from their pulpits and to fight against “reac¬ tionary intrigues.” This resolution, reported in the Bucharest press, meant that the Orthodox clergy of¬ ficially joined “the speakers’ bureaus” of the Commu¬ nist Party. Along with that, Justinian as a preliminary payment on the price he had agreed to pay for his sub¬ sequent installation “appealed to the people to support the F.N.D. (Communist Front)” and said “the Front is laying foundations for the new order.” The Ortho¬ dox Church urged the people outright to support Com¬ munism. Groza and his Communist comrades were apprecia¬ tive of the work of their ecclesiastical agents and told them so. According to the Rumanian press, the Prime Minister said: “In the name of the Government I thank the clergy of the Rumanian Orthodox Church for their attitude during the elections. What we have witnessed on this occasion constitutes a further guarantee of close collaboration between state and Church!” In conclu¬ sion, Premier Groza again thanked the clergy for “the positive attitude they adopted during the elections.” Some of the other churches pledged allegiance, too, and “assured the government of the devotion of their flocks,” the Communist press reported with gloating. The Communist Party moved into Rumania’s pulpits, lighted ecclesiastial candles and replaced the gospel with “Leninism-Stalinism, the highest human culture.” However, the Roman Catholic Church refused to capitulate and was punished by a revocation of the Con-

480

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cordat. Concerning this act, the Bucharest Communist paper, Scanteia, wrote July 7, 1948: “The Government’s decision will be heartily approved by the Rumanian people and by the national groups re¬ siding in the Rumanian People’s Republic. It will also be welcomed by broad sections of Catholics who do not want to listen to the fables disseminated by the agents of American imperialism in the guise of priests. “The heads of the Catholic Church in the country engage in reactionary and spying activities. Bishop Marton of Alba Julia was impudent enough to issue a special circular letter forbidding Catholics to engage in any political activity. . . . Catholic bishops threatened believers with ‘God’s wrath,’ urging them not to take part in the elections. . . . Catholic schools poisoned the minds of Rumanian children with the venom of impe¬ rialist propaganda, thus bringing up terrorists, enemies of democratic Rumania. . . . Catholic Church bulletins extolled Truman’s notorious letter to Pope Pius in which he attacked the new democracies and the Soviet Union. “By revoking the law on the Concordat the govern¬ ment intends to prevent any interference by the impe¬ rialists in the domestic affairs of the Rumanian people and to consolidate further the independence and sover¬ eignty of the Rumanian People’s Republic.” *

*

*

*

If youth left the schools that had been debased and the churches that had been profaned to find some re¬ lease for their energies in sport, there also they found that every athletic organization or club or society was under Communist control. Everyone has been forced into the O.S.P. “Organization of Sport for the People,” which is run by one of the top Communists, Emelian Angheliu.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

481

If a Rumanian seeks solace in song, he finds the Com¬ munists have tried to usurp the people’s age-old sover¬ eignty over folk songs by organizing a Communist Fed¬ eration, called “Songs for the People.” If he wants a youth society, he finds that all are forbidden except af¬ filiates of the Communist-run “Progressive Youth Union.” And if a woman tries to find respite from in¬ cessant Communist propaganda in some quiet woman’s club, she discovers that no woman’s club is allowed in the land, except the branches of Communist Ana Pauker’s aggressively brazen “Federation of Democratic Rumanian Women.” The Rumanian Communists have tried to lock every door through which the Rumanians might escape from spiritual enslavement.

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Chapter XXVI CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY A key link in the chain of enslavement which Com¬ munists have forged about the Rumanian nation is the confiscation of private property. This completes the mechanism of subjugation, making it total. To a Com¬ munist army, Communist police, Communist courts, Communist schools and a Communist-run church is added individual economic helplessness. The Commu¬ nists seized control of the pocket-book, including the bread basket, milk bottle, domestic loom and dwelling, as they had seized control of the body, mind and con¬ science. Rumanians not only have to ask what to think, but what they may make, eat and wear. The seizure of property took place by degrees and as a result of several devices; it was not carried out so rapidly and brutally in Rumania as in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but no less relentlessly. Rumanians operate somewhat more obliquely than their Slav neighbors and tend to employ more subterfuge. Moreover, the Com¬ munist Party was weaker there than in some other lands which the Russians seized. Consequently, slightly dif¬ ferent tactics were required and the Rumanians were allowed to enjoy the appearance of private enterprise somewhat longer than the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs. But from the day the Red Army entered Bucharest in August 1944—and even before—the Bolsheviks had worked out a plan to rob the Rumanian nation of every private means of livelihood. They carried out their plan with such success that by

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

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the summer of 1948, most sources of income, aside from the soil, had been grabbed by the Communists in the form of nationalization. During the month of June the law for “the nationalization of industrial, banking, in¬ surance, mining and transport enterprises” was passed, and all the main industrial and commercial enterprises were seized—those that had not already passed into Communist hands. This was actually a “mopping up” operation. June 11, 1948, the Rumanian Government radiocast the following message: “Hear ye! Hear ye! We shall broadcast a communique of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers Party, a communique of the Council of Ministers, a reportage on today’s session of the Grand National Assembly and the bill for nation¬ alization of industrial, banking, insurance, mining, and transport enterprises. You will further hear a list of the names of nationalized industries. “The Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers Party (Communists) decided to propose to the Gov¬ ernment of the Rumanian Popular Republic to proceed forthwith with the nationalization of industrial, bank¬ ing, insurance, mining, and transport enterprises. The plenary session elected a body headed by Comrade Teohari Georgescu to elaborate the resolution. . . .” The government broadcaster continued, “Today a session of the Council of Ministers occurred from 10:30 to 11 A.M. In the name of the Rumanian Work¬ ers Party, the First Vice President of the Council of Ministers, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, presented the bill of nationalization of industrial, mining, banking, in¬ surance, and transport enterprises. The Council of Ministers, approving the bill, submitted it for discus¬ sion to the Grand National Assembly. Having in view the necessity of safeguarding the property of enterprises

484

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

inscribed in the bill against any sort of damage or de¬ ception, the Council of Ministers decided to authorize the termination of Parliamentary debates. “This communique was approved by the Grand Na¬ tional Assembly.” Thus the Ministerial Council adopted the sweeping measure in half an hour and the Grand National As¬ sembly of Communist yes-men voted almost immedi¬ ately to make the bill a law. The project was under consideration barely from 11 to 3—or rather it wasn’t under consideration at all. Only enough time elapsed for the government to read the bill and make various flamboyant speeches about it. When this ended the 414 members voted by acclamation for the sweeping over¬ turn of Rumania’s social order. The Communists laid hands on a nation’s economic system without one Parlia¬ mentary voice being raised against the act of wholesale confiscation. During these four Parliament were locked so that no The Presidium was present with Ministerial Council participated

hours the doors of one could leave. its 19 members. The with 29 member's.

Later the Patriarch added his blessing to this robbery of the Rumanian people by foreign dictators. More than 1000 major enterprises were seized. Among them were 25 oil companies and 20 metallurgical companies. Foreigners were dispossessed along with natives. The only exceptions were companies and establishments which the Red Army and Soviet Government had earlier taken for the USSR. And it all happened in the at¬ mosphere of a carnival or country fair. Here is how the Rumanian Government described the festive occasion: “The Grand National Assembly met this morning. The session proceeded in an atmosphere of great en¬ thusiasm.

Members of the Presidium of the Grand

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

485

National Assembly, and members of the Government were welcomed with prolonged cheers. . . . “Then Petru Groza took the floor submitting the bill for nationalizing industry. The historic moment of the submission of the bill was marked with endless cheers lasting long minutes. The Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Secretary General of the Rumanian Workers Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej then took the floor among cheers.” Emphasizing the political changes which the Com¬ munists had brought about, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej went on to say: “Following these changes a structural reconstruction has become necessary in the domain of national economy with the view of harnessing all the country s productive forces for raising the political, economic and cultural level. “This structural change includes the passing of the people’s common riches into the hands of the state. . . . “The main means of production must pass into the hands of the state because these economic weapons grow rusty in private hands. “Leaving the tools of production in such hands would mean a permission granted to the bourgeoisie to remove people from political leadership and to continue its policy of disorganizing our economic life in order to compromise the regime in the eyes of the people. It would mean to permit them to continue to use these tools as means for political maneuvering.” “But if a government representing the interests of the people takes these economic weapons it can enlarge its successes in the political field,” Communist Minister Gheorghiu-Dej said. And he concluded on that fateful day with the words, “By putting this revolutionary act into effect, we shall

486

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

be able to stimulate all creative energies of the people in the frame of conscious and wise work. Through con¬ solidation of economic power of the Rumanian Popular Republic, we will secure an increased rhythm in the economic and social development of our Popular Republic.” No one could have made it plainer that the Commu¬ nists wished to use Rumania’s banks, industry, mines and transport as “economic weapons” in the fight for “political successes.” A Planning Commission endowed by law with ab¬ solute power was established to direct the confiscated plants and exercise control over every aspect of eco¬ nomic life. Peasants and agricultural land were soon to be brought into the economic net, along with everything else. The first article of the nationalization law listed the kinds of enterprises that were to be confiscated. Com¬ prised under 75 heads, they began with plants making metal products and went through those producing coal, precious metals, oil, gas, construction material, electric power, machinery, and glass, to factories for practically every other vital product. The timber, furniture, paper and building industries were included in their entirety. The textile industry in all its branches, from cotton through silk, was seized. Plants for preparing leather and all leather products were on the list. Every variety of chemical product, including plastics, cosmetics and medicine, was specified. Beverage factories, plants for preparing food, including bakeries, canneries, flour mills, slaughter houses and dairies were confiscated. Every type of transportation and of communication was seized. In short, the food one ate, the beverages one drank, the clothes one wore, the house in which one dwelt, the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

487

machine in which he rode, the purse in which one car¬ ried his money, if any—all passed into Communist hands. The Party through the state and through com¬ munal administrative bodies took them all over within a period of 10 days. Every owner was kicked out, some with no indemnity, others with prospects of receiving doubtful bonds. Article two of the first chapter provided that every enterprise associated with a confiscated industry was to be confiscated. As an illustration, if a slaughter house were taken over, independent firms printing wrap¬ pers for canned beef or preparing cases for shipping bologna were also confiscated. When a garage for re¬ pairing trucks was seized, the independent little shop across the street that painted the trucks was also con¬ fiscated. Article three provided that if one factory owned by a company was subject to confiscation, the whole com¬ pany was to be seized. Article five exempted companies belonging to the Soviet Union. Chapter three, with three articles, described how the new directors were to take over and warned that for¬ mer owners would be held responsible for any losses in the transfer of property. Chapter four, with five articles, provided that if the confiscated enterprises yielded a profit the Council of Ministers might pay some of the former owners sums which the government might consider proper. The Finance Minister, the Hungarian Communist Luca Laszlo, was to supervise the bonding transaction. This chapter provided loop holes through which could flow limitless graft for firms which were willing to share the indemnity with individual Communists. Chapter five, with three articles, consisted of threats

488

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

for saboteurs and provided punishment for irregulari¬ ties or alleged irregularities. It gave the Communists not only the right to seize a man’s property, with no indemnity, but to put the man in jail on such charges as that he had failed to deliver a steam engine’s spare parts, or held back a bale of cloth. The Communists naturally enveloped this massive seizure of property and similar economic measures with an aura of idealism. They promised the people that everything was going to belong to them, that poverty would disappear and plenty prevail. The beautiful old Communist bait was used that “everyone was to work according to his ability and be rewarded according to his needs.” The government press and radio repeatedly gave the people such assurances as the following: “We shall export textiles for the steel, iron, pig iron, machines and tractors imported from the Soviet Union. In the same way we shall pay Czechoslovakia for the tractors and industrial machines she sends us, and Po¬ land for its metal. We shall pay for leather brought from Argentina with our building materials. Rumania will export less grain in the future. Instead of a colonial country exporting raw materials, Rumania is gradually becoming an industrial country exporting finished and half-finished articles. “The national independence of Rumania is demon¬ strated by the rising living standard of our people. While formerly Rumania was a well-known exporter of grain, oil and timber, the majority of its population had to eat bread made of maize and use poor oil lamps to light their houses. In the future, Rumanian peasants will eat wheat bread and light their houses with elec¬ tricity or gasoline lamps. “Rumania is no longer interested in importing ex-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE pensive luxury goods.

489

There will be no luxury cars in

the streets of Rumanian towns but smoke will rise out of all our factory chimneys, new railways will be laid, new houses will be built, and agriculture will be mecha¬ nized. Trucks and bicycles will be seen in our streets, and the shop windows will be filled with clothes and food articles. We have no luxury clothes, everybody is dressed plainly; we have no need of American tinned goods and low quality condensed milk—the most char¬ acteristic goods of U. S. export in the framework of the Marshall Plan; but our population is able to buy unrationed wheat bread, to eat fresh meat and milk. There are no unemployed in the streets of our towns. Prices are falling.” It was a moving picture and the Communist promise to level the chasm between certain displays of luxury in Bucharest and the poverty in surrounding villages was based on sound idealism. But the promise was false. In the first place, general penury in Rumania under Com¬ munist rule is unprecedented, exploitation of the village passes all previous bounds and the luxury automobiles, along with the fine houses and fine clothes, have been taken over by Communist grandees. Extravagance has not been reduced. The display of wealth has not dimin¬ ished. The only difference is that the Russians and their agents now display it. No Rumanian Premier has been more extravagant and more lavishly cynical than Petru Groza, and no Rumanian Minister in the U. S. has lived in grander style than the Minister of Rumania’s Peoples Republic. The Rumanians saw as many nabobs disporting in princely palaces in 1948 as in 1938. An illustration of the cynicism with which the Ruma¬ nian Government has lied to the world and to its own people is found in a letter written to the New York Times by the Rumanian Minister in Washington, D. C.,

490

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

on March 12, 1947. At that time reports were being printed that the Rumanian Government was drawing all Rumanian industry under its control.

The report

was completely accurate and based on a law passed by the Rumanian Parliament. But the Rumnian Legation asked the Times “kindly to publish” such statements as the following: “In Rumania private enterprise enjoys freedom of action. . . . . . unfettered freedom is granted private enter¬ prise in Rumania. Moreover, I shall add that the eco¬ nomic section of the platform adopted by the ‘Bloc of Democratic Parties,’ to which the members of the coali¬ tion government headed by Dr. Petru Groza belong, states that one of its main purposes is ‘the fostering of private initiative.’ ” Three months after that letter was written, all bank¬ notes in Rumania were seized and ten months later practically all industry was confiscated while private enterprise was largely obliterated. It was all being planned in March and indeed was being implemented in March when Minister Mihail Ralea wrote that let¬ ter. Such deception characterizes every action of the Rumanian Communists. Immediately subsequent to the sweeping property confiscation, the Rumanian press began to report ar¬ rests for economic sabotage. One former factory owner after another was seized and hauled off to prison. For example, the Bucharest paper “Libertatea,” as well as the Moscow radio reported the following at the begin¬ ning of July: “A decree of the Presidium of the Rumanian Grand National Assembly has been published providing for extension of the law on punishment for economic sabo¬ tage, in view of acts of sabotage which have lately in-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

491

creased at mills and factories transferred to public own¬ ership. A big lire broke out at a brick kiln in the town of Jimbola. This act of arson was committed by the former owner, Fritz, with the assistance of the man¬ ager and a group of fascist-minded employees. The damage from the fire runs into approximately a million lei. The same Fritz attempted to conceal some of the kiln s products, to the value of eleven million lei, from nationalization. The economic control agencies are daily disclosing illegal acts committed by former own¬ ers of nationalized enterprises and their paid agents.” The same week, Premier Groza’s paper, “Frontul Plugarilor,” carried a brutal article about the necessity of dealing severely with the “former owners of na¬ tionalized factories.” The paper berated authorities who had shown some mercy toward their dispossessed fellow citizens. It revealed that “a number of former owners (of confiscated plants) had asked to be allowed to live on, in some corner of their former property.” And in certain cases this vTas allowed. But that was a mistake, Groza’s paper said. “It was a great and unpardonable mistake,” Frontul Plugarilor wrote, “on the part of the Nationalization Commission and of the administrative authorities. The interest of former mill owners is that the plants should decrease production and go bankrupt.” “We could mention a series of examples,” the paper went on, “but shall quote only one to show how badly the authorities have acted in this matter. In the village of Prahova the former owners of nationalized (flour) mills were engaged as mechanics. Three days later the engines began to break down, transmission belts disap¬ peared, and account books failed to balance. This is why the new administrators must immediately remove all former owners,” the paper insisted, “even with the

492

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

help of the police.

We must have no mercy upon ex¬

ploiters of the working classes!” Naturally not, because the aim of Communists is “to wipe the bourgeoisie from the face of the earth!” A few weeks after the wholesale seizure of industrial property, just as the peasants were finishing their har¬ vesting, the government decreed nation-wide seizure of the new grain, in the following words: “Article one of the decree provides that in order to supply the necessary food-stuffs to the working popula¬ tion from towns, peasants are obliged to give the state its share of the harvest. “The decree authorizes the State Commission for Collection of Cereals to set quotas which must be given by various categories of agricultural producers, pro¬ portionately with the latter’s output and economic strength. “A district plan for collection will be drafted for every district and for every village and commune. “The Commission for Collecting Cereals will hand every agricultural producer an official report stating the quantity to be surrendered of each kind of grain. , . . The collection will be made at the threshing machine. . . . Producers are compelled to transport by their own means these quantities of cereals from the place where they have been threshed to the nearest collection center. “The commission has the right to requisition the means of storing grain and transporting it. “Failure to surrender quotas set up by communal commissions are infractions of the law for suppression of illicit speculation and of economic sabotage and will be punished in accordance with the dispositions of the law. . . . “The State Commission for Collection of Cereals is authorized to take any measure it may find necessary in

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

493

connection with the furthering of all these operations.” The Communists thus laid hands on “the state’s part of the grain” produced by every peasant cultivating as much as two and a half acres. Such a peasant had to take his wheat straight from the threshers to the Col¬ lection Center. Also, the thresher had to thresh the state’s portion free. The price was set by the Collection Commission, as was the amount of grain to be taken. This grain-seizure in 1948 was merely a continuation of the general Communist plan for plundering peasants, a plan that was tragically illustrated by the confiscation of banknotes during 1947, about the same time of year. August 15 the government announced its plan for the immediate exchange of old lei for new lei at the rate of 20,000 to one. And the amounts one was allowed to exchange depended upon the economic class to which he belonged. The new lei had a fiat value of 150 to a dol¬ lar. A peasant could convert 5,000,000 old lei into 250 new; a worker could exchange 3,000,000 old for 150 new; other persons 1,500,000 each for 75. That is, a peasant could get $1.67 worth of new money, a worker a dollar’s worth and a banker 67 cents worth. But that was only the nominal value; actually, on the open or rather secret market, the 250 lei brought $1.25; the 50 brought 75 cents and the 75 brought 37 cents. And that was all the cash a person could have! This measure was called stabilization, and was said to be designed to check inflation which had astronomical heights. The old money had lost its value and become an extremely cumbersome of exchange. However, as the measure was

reached most of medium actually

conceived and carried out by the Communists it amounted to the wholesale confiscation of wealth. Every thrifty person in Rumania, whether peasant, artisan or physician, was robbed of a large part of his savings.

494

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

The measure was called by the people, not stabilization, but“ Stalinization.” They saw it as a further attempt to exterminate the “bourgeoisie” and the independent peasantry. Within three days after the stabilization was im¬ posed no Rumanian was allowed to have more than $1.67 and many persons not even a dollar each. No one dared keep his old money, for it would lose all value, but when he turned it over to the banks, all he got was a receipt. The new money remained in the bank vaults,—with the exception of $1.67—bearing no interest and not serving as credit. The persons hardest hit were not the rich or the speculators, for they kept no money on hand, but the peasants who had their money at home. And this robbery of peasants was all the more flagrant inasmuch as the state had just forced them to sell their new wheat. Billions of lei had flowed into peasant stockings or pillows or mattresses and when the last bushel of grain was delivered the Communists seized all that money, leaving each peasant $1.67, the value of less than a bushel of wheat. And not only did all Rumanians lose their cash, but the cost of living was drastically increased by the new measure. On the first of August, 1947, a dollar bought 14 kilograms (about 31 pounds) of meat in Bucharest, while on the last of August it bought only four. A com¬ parison of prices before and after stabilization, as con¬ tained in the following table, shows that the cost of living increased by from 300 to 500 per cent.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

495

The new prices: 1. Poststabiliza¬ tion price in new lei 5.60 1 Kgr. wheat . 40.— 1 Kgr. meat . 1 Kgr. milk . 8.— 1 meter cloth . 1,000.— 1 pair shoes . 2,000.— Tramway fare . 7.— 1 liter petrol . 28.— 1 ton wood fuel . 1,400.— Telephone subscription per month, S conver sations per day .... 1,440.— Bucha rest-Const anza Railway fares, 1st class, 240 km... 2,000.—

2. Post-stabili¬ zation price in old lei 1:20,000

3. 4. Prices % prior to increase stabiliza¬ of (2) in tion relation in old lei to (3)

112,000 800,000 160,000 20,000,000 40,000,000 140,000 560,000 28,000,000

40,000 300,000 80,000 12,000,000 15,000,000 12,000 23,000 1,000,000

280 260 200 160 270 1,180 2,400 2,800

28,400,000

3,500,000

800

40,000,000

1,000,000

4,000

Railway fares and other public services increased at a stroke from 10 to 40 times. At the time of the imposi¬ tion of these rates many who were traveling in the country were not able to get back since they had ob¬ tained in exchange for their old lei no more than 75 or 100 new lei and an ordinary third class ticket over a distance of 150 miles would cost 850 lei. The cost of transporting a kilogram (2.2 lb.) of wheat over a dis¬ tance of 20 miles was 7 lei, while the selling price of the same kilogram was 5.60 lei. The price of agricultural products was fixed at a low level, for example, one bushel of wheat at one dollar, when the actual world price was $3.19. Industrial goods, on the other hand, were priced at a high level, for example, one pair of shoes $12 or the equivalent of 12 bushels of wheat, while in the U. S. A. the price of a pair of shoes amounted to the value of three or four bushels.

In view of the low prices fixed by the govern¬

ment the peasants refused to send food to the towns.

496

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

As a result the town population was threatened with general hunger and within one month after the stabili¬ zation, the government was obliged to abolish the of¬ ficial prices of agricultural products as well as to reduce freight rates. Prices soon jumped from eight to ten times the previous official rates, yet even then the peas¬ ants persisted in their reluctance to sell. In connection with the stabiliaztion, a new taxation rate had to be worked out for the current fiscal year. If one had paid his taxes in old lei, would that stand or would he have to pay more in new lei? And if one had paid part, how would that part be deducted in terms of new lei? Well, the ratio of old lei to new was far different for the tax gatherer than for the citizen having his money converted. For the citizen surrendering his savings it was 20,000 to one, but for the tax gatherer it was reck¬ oned at 3,000 to one—more or less—according to the economic class to which the citizen belonged. For ex¬ ample, a lawyer got the disadvantageous rate of one to 2,500; a grocer, one to 3,000; and a peasant, one to 4,500. Workers were given special tax advantages. Here is how it worked out in the case of a certain Bucha¬ rest physician: his income tax had been fixed at 100,000,000 lei, which was about $120, a fairly small sum, but it must he remembered that the doctor charged only a dollar, where an ordinary American physician would charge five or more. For $TD I got an excellent dental job done in Bucharest that would have cost $100 in Boston, Mass. In any case, the Bucharest tax paying doctor applied the new rate of one leu to 2,500 and found he had to pay 40,000 new lei or $270.

His rate at mid-year was

more than doubled. He had already paid 50,000,000 taxes in old lei, foi the half year, which was reckoned

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

497

at one to 20,000 and came to 2,500 new lei. In other words, according to the new reckoning, instead of hav¬ ing paid half of his taxes, as he had supposed, he had actually paid only one sixteenth of them. If, in the meantime, he had scurried around and joined the Com¬ munist Party and started carrying banners up and down the street, bearing the imprecation, “Death to Maniu!” he might have got some Communist big shot to classify him as a “worker” and thus reduce his tax rate, espe¬ cially since Communists recognize the need of doctors. If he’d been a lawyer even such self-defilement wouldn’t have worked, because the Communists were even then plotting to liquidate most of the lawyers.

The purge

soon followed. Rents also were revised after the stabilization. The building owners were given up to a fourth of the rent which the tenant paid and the rest went to the state. Actually, the home owner got at best half as much as before the war, paid twice as much for upkeep and lepair and enjoyed no tax reduction. He was plainly marked for liquidation and it was not long delayed. With him the whole bourgeois class was economically destroyed. The industrial worker was somewhat favored by the stabilization, in comparison with the rest of the popula¬ tion. His new wages were fixed at from $17 to $94 a month. And he received small favors in the matter of rent and taxes. Also, he got some reduction at state stores. Now and then a worker got cheese and meat. The peasants’ grain was seized for the worker. But even at that, production dropped so radically, housing was so overcrowded, clothes were so scarce, travel so expensive and civil rights so extremely limited that the bulk of Rumania’s industrial workers felt more wretched and more repressed than at any other time in Rumania’s

498

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

modern history.

An illustration of the way in which the

Communist Party felt itself obliged to work on its pro¬ letarian victims was found in the Bucharest Communist press a month after stabilization. The official Commu¬ nist daily “Scanteia” wrote, “Workers must show so¬ briety and economy in using the stabilized leu. We should buy only what is absolutely necessary and reason well on doing so.

We must put money in the savings

bank. That will ensure the worker’s future and help stabilization.” One should recall that some workers were asked to do their saving on $17 a month! At that time, also, the Communists closed their “economic bureaus” or “econo¬ mats,” which had been selling goods to workers at spe¬ cial prices; they thereby wiped out one favor the work¬ ers had enjoyed. The government had forced factory owners and the heads of enterprises to maintain such “economats,” regardless of the losses incurred by the firms. After the stabilization, by which the proprietors were robbed and impoverished they could no longer con¬ tinue the “economats.” The government couldn’t either. It had too many other losses already. So it announced : “In order, to complete stabilization, the authorities will close all ‘economic bureaus’; they are superfluous since there is no longer any difference between prices and wages” (at $17 a month). “The credits formerly given to the economats will be available for production work” (not for proletarian stomachs). The government also announced a sweeping purge of civil servants. Once purged, they could creep back on their hands and knees as. Communists—or could be enrolled in forced-labor brigades. At the same time, the daily Timpul,” admitted that the stabilization was going badly but urged patience. It wrote, “Nobody can expect a transition from economic

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE chaos to order in a month.

499

Those who planned the

stabilization were skillful and agile; now we must snap out of our panic and show we can be calm, sober, con¬ fident.” The Communist used far more than soft words and glowing newspaper articles to arouse calm and confi¬ dence; they sent men with guns throughout the country. Here is how the Communists described such “calming” operations in their own press: “Action for repressing all kinds of speculation is continuing vigilantly throughout Bucharest.. Specific police squads were busy identifying and arresting specu¬ lators. All persons discovered buying old lei or specu¬ lating in gold and foreign currencies were arrested on the spot and brought to the Police Prefecture. The same treatment was applied to green grocers, bread dis¬ tributors, and food merchants who tried tO' revive the old practice of overcharging or hiding goods. Arrested speculators are sent to the Baneasa Detention Camp where their daily diet consists of 100 grams of cornmeal and a cup of water.” And persons were not only arrested but some were summarily shot. One such was Basil Gheorghe, a butcher who was caught buying old lei; another was Isaiah Weinstein, who gave false declarations and a third was Alexander Gruia, who sold bread too high. They were shot on the way from the Police Station to the Concen¬ tration Camp. And with no apologies. “The Secretary General of the Police Prefecture told the press that together with the entire police personnel he will continue the campaign for eliminating specula¬ tors,” the government announced. The vigilant police chief urged “the entire Bucharest population to help him.” But still things went badly.

Soon the Communists

500

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

announced that the nationalized Rumanian National Bank had set up “a special currency police” to run specu¬ lators down. They were to search houses and offices. At a critical moment the economic dictator Commu¬ nist chief Gheorghe Gheorgihu-Dej urged “discipline and moderation, SO' as to insure the balance between wages and prices.” He said private initiative was still encouraged but added that anyone using it might be arrested for sabo¬ tage. And he comforted the Rumanians by assuring them that if some of them were having a hard time things were worse in the U S. A. and many European countries. In spite of all this there wasn’t enough severity to suit the Communists, and their press reported: “The Minister of Justice recently sent a circular to the judicial authorities ordering special severity and vigilance in dealing with cases of speculation or at¬ tempts to undermine the currency reform measures. Severer measures were threatened against judicial au¬ thorities who displayed negligence or leniency towards persons punishable under the economic laws. “ This step has already borne fruit.

Severe sentences

were passed on a number of speculators. Sentences from five to ten years of corrective imprisonment have been imposed on merchants charging more than official prices.” A week later the government was fiercer than ever: its press reported. “In connection with the measures for economic re¬ habilitation and the consolidation of the monetary re¬ form, the hunt against the gold hyenas which has started in Bucharest is to spread all over the country; already the economic police have searched 100 homes. “The currency and gold black marketeers who during

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

501

the inflation caused so much suffering to the people through their speculations, were not capable of parting from their gold and dollars hoping that they would still be able to cheat the law and satisfy their insatiable ap¬ petite at the expense of the people Although given a final extension of a week to enable them to keep within the law, these men thought that they would be able to continue to cheat the authorities. The vigorous action of the police proved, however, that the government will safeguard the new law with all its vigor and strength. Ten days later the Communists cried over their radio and in their papers: “A series of attacks was launched by speculators in the black market, by fascists and Manuists against the stabilized leu. They tried to undermine confidence in the new currency. These attempts consisted in hiding goods, refusing to sell products under various pretexts, in camouflaged raises in prices, in attempts to transfer gold and hard currency abroad. But the people and authorities are vigilant; no maneuvers to sabotage monetary reforms will be tolerated. All the guilty must and will be unmasked, arrested and referred to courts of justice which will apply the heavy punishment fore¬ seen by law, ranging from five years to 25 years at forced labor. These sentences will be fully deserved be¬ cause those who obstruct national efforts of economic recovery must not be spared.” The seizure of grain, the wholesale devaluation of money, the confiscation of practically all industrial prop¬ erty and the many repressive acts connected with such measures illustrate the unceasing war which the Sovietled and Soviet-backed Rumanian Communists from September 1944 waged against every family in Rumania that was engaged in private enterprise. They deliber¬ ately set out to demolish Rumania’s economic system,

502

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and succeeded.

Every thrifty man or woman in the

country who had built a house or set up a shop or opened a store or erected a mill was hunted as a wild animal —and finally liquidated. From the autumn of 1944 the Communists filled the land with the cry for the confiscation of farms. They demanded higher wages, seized factories, laid hands on stores, kidnapped plant owners, appropriated scores of buildings for Party clubs, sent thousands of merchants and manufacturers to prison as saboteurs. They forced factory owners to maintain company stores or company restaurants (economats) for favored workers at mini¬ mum prices and when the owners bought produce for the economats arrested them as “black marketeers.” Communist storm troopers demanded large sums for protection and punished the capitalists both for com¬ plying and for not complying. Property owners were taxed into bankruptcy, terrorized for breaking sanitary decrees, ruined for borrowing too much, wiped out for having stock on hand, punished for not having stock on hand, daily intimidated as saboteurs and enemies of the new order. No Communist hooligan was too base—or too exalted—not to be heeded when he denounced a respectable member of society. Every family of self re¬ spect and standing in town and village was helpless be¬ fore the attacks of Communist papers, Communist meetings, Communist shock troopers, policemen, judges, inspectors, assessors. To every Rumanian man or woman who had helped Rumania advance the Red State ap¬ peared as a rapacious behemoth backed by an even more insatiable leviathan. And whatever the Rumania “bourgeois” did he couldn’t win. If he planted or harvested, if he raised sheep or cabbages, if he produced chairs or baked bread, if he butchered pigs or made shoes, whether buying or

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

503

selling, practicing law or writing history, he stood help¬ less before the Communist masters whom Moscow had imposed. Marx said Communists were pledged to an¬ nihilate all but the industrial proletariat; Communists did that in Rumania in four short and terrible years.

504

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XVII RUSSIA RAVAGES AND PLUNDERS In the despoiling of Rumania the local Communists were aided by the Soviet Army and the Soviet Empire. One must admit the USSR had some accounts to settle. Rumanian soldiers had helped the Nazis wreak devasta¬ tion upon Russian areas during the war, and individual Rumanians undoubtedly had stolen valuable objects from individual Russian establishments or homes. When the Soviet Army came into rich Rumania it was hungry, ragged and eager for vengeance: might have been expected.

excesses

But its conduct was terrifying beyond belief. And even more terrifying is the fact that some American “Liberals” condone such rapine. They think “the Ru¬ manians got what was coming to them.” They seem to attribute a certain virtue to despoilation by Marxists, but consider despoilation by “reactionaries” reprehen¬ sible. The desolation perpetrated by the Nazis and their Rumanian satellites in Soviet Russia was a moral outrage, and the depredations perpetrated month after month by the Russians in Rumania were more outra¬ geous from the moral point of view, because the Nazis were recognized as reprobates, while the Russians be¬ longed to a group of nations that were supposed to be establishing a good new world of free men. And the heinousness of Russian rapine was increased by the fact that Rumania had joined our side. Whether or not we were morally justified in urging a satellite of Hitler to join us in fighting against Hitler

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

505

may be debated. Whether our invitation to Rumania to help our cause was a sign of moral obfuscation and opportunistic cynicism on our part may be questioned. But that is our problem, not Rumania’s. Day after day with all possible insistence, through every available channel, our government had urged Rumania to join us, mend her ways and “work her pas¬ sage home.” And we had offered her considerations for doing it. We had also promised her, most solemnly and repeatedly, that her social and economic system would not be changed. Eventually, she heeded our call, changed her ways and joined up, showing fruits of re¬ pentance in the form of more than a dozen good army divisions. Whether her motives were noble is another matter—we didn’t discuss motives in our propaganda. That she feared defeat and tried to avert a crushing military disaster is plain. But we laid down no stipula¬ tions about a pure heart. We asked her to join, and she did—as we had asked her. We used her divisions and resources to a far greater decree than we were able to use those of Bulgaria or of Italy or of Hungary. And in return, our Ally pillaged, ravaged and terrorized Ru¬ mania as though she had continued to be our enemy. This devastation was of at least 10 main varieties: The Soviet Army plundered as an army and as indi¬ viduals, stealing from the Rumanian State and from private citizens; the Russians took war booty; used Rumanian resources almost without limit for prosecutino of the war; used vast sums of Rumanian money; took property in Rumania on the pretext it belonged to “Axis nationals”; took large quantities of material from Rumania allegedly for the war but actually for consumption in Russia; seized thousands of established Rumanian citizens and other thousands of Rumanians who had fled to Rumania from Soviet-occupied Buco-

506

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

vina and Bessarabia; collected enormous sums as reparations; imposed commercial agreements which amounted to a permanent lien on Rumanian resources and bound Rumania hand and foot in a series of inter¬ national pacts. Rumania as a collection of individuals, as a nation, as a state, as an economic unit, as the em¬ bodiment of traditions and ideals was—and is—rav¬ aged by the Soviet Union. This is in addition to the ravages wrought by the Rumanian Communists, though it is not disassociated from them. The present chapter will deal with the less massive and less permanent forms of rapine; the next with the more formal, “legal,” en¬ during types of plunder. One should first mention the elemental crimes against persons and property caused by the invading army. How many Soviet soldiers entered Rumania during the four years after August 23, 1944 only the Soviet High Com¬ mand knows. They occcupied Rumania, passed through Rumania to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia; they re-crossed Rumania coming from those countries. Their total number far exceeded a mil¬ lion. Indeed, the number of Soviet soldiers in Rumania at one time approached a million. And during the first twelve months many of those soldiers were plunderers. How many women they raped I shall not attempt to say; but the number of well attested cases was large. Soviet soldiers went from house to house raping; they raped on the sidewalks; they seized women on the streets and took them into stores to rape them; they raped members of honorable families entertaining them as guests. Even of Communist families! For twelve months the Rumanians in towns and villages through which Soviet soldiers passed kept watch night and day, in order to send their women into hiding when Russians approached or when banging was heard on the door.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

507

The women frequently hid themselves in corn fields and woods. Naturally, some of the rape was accompanied by shooting. Rumania had seen no such torrent of ele¬ mental savagery for more than a century. Mass rape—or any rape—is the low point of law¬ lessness. Men who so disregard basic obligations, that they openly and repeatedly violate other men’s daugh¬ ters, wives and mothers, may be expected to ignore every other moral restraint. And the Soviet soldiers did ignore every restraint. They gave Rumania a demon¬ stration of what Lenin called “Communist ethics” and of what Stalin extolls as “the new Soviet man.” They went from town to town sacking houses—month after month. They stole food in enormous quantities, rifling cellars throughout the land. They plunged into the “caves” of village homes and drank themselves drunk; they broke open the remaining casks of wine, flooding many a basement, and then gave themselves up to drunken orgies, leaving many a habitation as a shambles. They stole horses from the pastures, pigs from the pens, chickens from the coops; they took cattle where they found them and sheep in flocks. They stripped the land of private automobiles. Many a horse and wagon or team and buggy was seized on the road and the peasant or farmer driving it was left stranded; if he protested he was shot. Soviet soldiers repeatedly looted passengers in trains; they stripped everything of value from many railway coaches, including leather uphol¬ stery. They held up busses. Some of them, perhaps deserters, operated in gangs as highwaymen. For a vear and a half travel in Rumania was very precarious. The number of watches, clocks and other portable valu¬ able stolen was enormous. And the Russians demolished more than they stole. As they passed back and forth across Rumania they

508

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

left trails of destruction behind.

The wreckage could

still be seen four years later. At first, they wrecked for the wanton joy of it, as a boy-vandal breaks a street light, or a savage destroys a rich man’s mansion. An¬ other reason they indulged in devastation was that as Bolsheviks they had been taught to exterminate the bourgeoisie, to “rob from the robbers.” Every nice house or pretty piece of furniture was as a sign of capi¬ talistic sin. They destroyed it in “the zeal of the lord,” feeling they were performing a good proletarian deed. When they demolished an attractive new dwelling or shot a horse or smashed a chiffonier, they believed they were laying up treasures in the Communist heaven. Later, the motive for demolition somewhat changed. About eight months after the Russians entered Bucha¬ rest, the war in Europe ended, in consequence of which many Soviet soldiers began to pass through Rumania eastward on the way home. For those migrants mere destruction gave way to pillage. They wanted to take something home, such as rugs, jewelry, fine clothes, money; consequently many of them plundered as they passed. After V. E. Day, also, hundreds of thousands of Russians settled in Rumania; they occupied the land and almost completely took over certain localities. Naturally, they wanted to make themselves comfort¬ able and some of them increased their comforts by ma¬ rauding. From time to time the occupying soldiers went home on furlough, others returned home to be de¬ mobilized and all tried to take as much as possible back with them, including the Soviet W. A. C.’s. Still others kept sending packages home from Rumania. Every day caravans of loaded trucks left Rumania for Russia and no small part of the loads consisted of goods looted from individual Rumanians. During this long period of terror and plunder, the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE Soviet robbers were beyond the law.

509

No Rumanian

could effectively defend himself. If he resisted when attacked on the train or along the road, or in the street or in his home, he was subject to punishment. If a vil¬ lage defended itself when being raided by Russian sol¬ diers, its inhabitants were arrested as insurrectionists against the Soviet Union. Premier Nicolae Radescu has personally portrayed how helpless the Rumanian nation was in the face of individual Soviet plundering. He said: “During the extremely trying three months of my Premiership, Soviet troops were looting and killing at random. Every morning I received reports of the robberies and assassinations perpetrated during the pre¬ ceding 24 hours. Neither the Soviet members of the Allied Control Commission, nor the Soviet diplomatic representatives ever gave serious consideration to my complaints; no action, whatsoever, was taken by the Russians or their Allies to put an end to the terror ex¬ ercised by the Soviet soldiers. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities demanded that the Minister of the Interior should order that any Rumanian who dared defend himself when attacked by Russian soldiers should be immediately shot.” The Red Army held Rumania helpless, as Red Army soldiers looted her. Yet at this very time, when I as a journalist referred to the “occupying army,” the Ruma¬ nian Propaganda Minister vigorously reprimanded me for not writing of Russian soldiers as “liberators.” All this refers to individuals looting individuals, not to what the Soviet State took from Rumania. Another no less painful, though less extensive, variety of Soviet terror was the kidnapping of individual men and women. The victims of this Imperial man-hunt were of four kinds: Rumanians who had escaped from

510

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Soviet-seized Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, Hun¬ garians living in Rumania, Germans living in Rumania, and occasonal Rumanians who had offended the Soviet Union or provoked individual Russians. I think the conscience of mankind, during future cen¬ turies, will brand Russia’s tracking down of escaped Bessarabians as an especially heinous outrage. 7 he question of Bessarabia’s ethnological composition is not involved here. Whether 40% or 60% of the Bessa¬ rabians were Rumanians is immaterial. The important thing is that some of the inhabitants of Bessarabia were Rumanians and when the Russian Army re-occupied it in 1944 many of these Rumanians fled to Rumania. They didn’t want to live in a province that had passed under the Soviet yoke, and were determined not to live there. They based their decisions on personal expe¬ riences. The Red Army had seized Bessarabia during 1940, in consequence of the Hitler-Staiin agreement for the partitioning of Europe, and remained there until June 1941, when Hitler attacked Stalin and invaded Russia. During that year of Soviett occupation the Ru¬ manians in Bessarabia had a good taste of Soviet rule and most didn’t like it. Consequently, when the Red Army again invaded Bessarabia in the spring of 1944, Bessarabians fled in throngs to Rumania. Later, even after the Russians sealed Bessarabia off, many Rumanians managed to filter across the Prut River into Rumania. They preRussia. During that year of Soviet occupation the Ru¬ mania to living in the Soviet Union. They fled in fami¬ lies and individually, in horse carts, automobiles, on the last trains, afoot. Children left parents; husbands whom the swift Russian advance caught away from home de¬ parted for Rumania without wives; Bessarabian fathers who had been working in Rumania could not go back

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

511

across the Prut to get their children. Rumanians fled from northern Bucovina under similar circumstances. These men and women, or boys and girls, were among the most wretched of Europe’s displaced millions. And to make their situation worse, the USSR, after its army had occupied all of Rumania, demanded that those hopeless Rumanians be rounded up and sent back to Soviet servitude. The situation was similar to that of slaves who fled from the South to the North before the American Civil War, some of whom were returned to their masters in chains. As America in 1944 and 1945 was still pressing the war against Germany and Japan to establish world freedom, the Soviet Union spent much energy trying to catch Rumanians and take them bound to Russia. And it was not a secret opera¬ tion. Moscow considered their return a condition of peace. The Soviet Government declared in the Red Army paper, published in Bucharest, and over the Soviet radio that these Rumanians must be delivered. It repeatedly made such demands upon the Rumanian Government; indeed, one of the grounds upon which the USSR insisted on the overthrow of one Rumanian government after another was that these hunted men and women weren’t being rounded up. Naturally, the refugees from Bessarabia and Buco¬ vina enjoyed the sympathy of the Rumanian nation. Many of them were relatives and more were personal acquaintances of persons in Rumania, since passing from Bessarabia to the rest of Rumania was like pass¬ ing from New England to New York. All the hunted men and women were Rumanian co-nationals of exactly the same blood and speaking the same language as the rest of the nation. So, is it strange that Rumania was outraged by such a man-hunt! The people tried to con¬ ceal the refugees; they preserved the secret of ten thou-

512

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

sand hiding places, gave gaunt men and women shelter, guided boys and girls to the woods, provided food for the pursued. Soviet police and soldiers searched Ru¬ manian houses, grabbed people on the street, snatched them from the trains, arrested residents of a dozen Rumanian cities to force them to disclose the hiding places of relatives who had left Bessarabia, but the man-hunters rarely found cooperation. Not a few of the hunted were caught, torn from the company of friends or relatives, forced into automo¬ biles or trucks or freight cars and taken away under Soviet guard to vast Russian expanses from which there would be no returning. As the wails of the seized vic¬ tims sounded in the ears of onlookers, they seemed to say: “Siberia, coal mines, slave camps, slow extermina¬ tion.” Such scenes so affected some Rumanians that they had difficulty in understanding the Voice of America as it daily lauded the freedom which the Allies were establishing. Here is an illustration of another type of Soviet ter¬ ror : One day a young woman came to see me in Bucha¬ rest. She was a Rumanian subject of foreign extraction, as was her father. Between her sobs she told me her father had been kidnapped on a Bucharest street and that he had not been seen from the time two Russians clapped him into their automobile. After a period, a note was found in Grivitsa Street near Bucharest’s cen¬ tral station, addressed to the girl who subsequently visited me. It was from her father, who said he had been taken to Russia where he was brought before a Soviet court, the members of which had no idea why he had been arrested. The note urged the enterprising daugh¬ ter to hunt him up. She did and found him in a Bucha¬ rest prison; he had been brought back, but she couldn’t get him freed.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

513

She had run to every Rumanian authority, standing days in antechambers, waiting, weeping, pleading. She had gone to the Russian Control Commission and to the American Control Commission; finally she tried me. It all seemed utterly hopeless. A girl’s father, a woman’s husband, a sixty-year old man was left in a dungeon, forgotten. The Americans shrugged their shoulders, the Russians shrugged their shoulders, the Rumanians shrugged their shoulders; I sighed and Papa Theokostas went on wasting away. A number of much more important personalities were arrested, deported or attacked by Russians. For example, a Yugoslav official in Rumania, Pantovich, was taken to Russia in the autumn of 1944 and kept for more than a year. General Avramescu, Commander of the Fourth Army, was seized along with his wife, daughter and grandchild. A member of his staff. Gen¬ eral Dragomir, was also kidnapped. Three professors of the Technical High School near Bucharest’s North Station were attacked in a single week; one, Doru Demetrescu, was killed. More moving than such individual cases were the stories of a category of forlorn women, who came to see me singly and on one occasion, collectively. They were Hungarians, or Rumanians married to Hun¬ garians, but all were Rumanian subjects. Their hus¬ bands had been seized by the Red Army in Rumania and taken to Russia for forced labor. Now and then word was brought back from them by returning war prisoners. Letters even turned up at long intervals— letters of despair, usually in the form of “a final mes¬ sage.” Here is a sample: “My dear wife: “Embrace my son for me.

514

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE “I have given up hope of seeing you again.

I

drag myself from the barracks to the mine, from the mine back to the barracks. “My clothes are in shreds—they are the same I wore the day they seized me. I have no soap to wash them, no thread to mend them. “I am always hungry. Every one here is hungry. “Your letter finally came. You had hopes. I have no hope anymore. I see I am forgotten; we’re all forgotten. You can’t do anything; nobody can do anything. “Give little Geza my fiddle. I suppose he’s getting big now. Save my black shoes for him. Tell him of his father. Don’t forget me. Pray for me in church. “This will be my last letter. Your Geza.” Most Hungarians in Rumania weren’t seized. But some were and were being kept as virtual slave-laborers. I was a personal witness of this. The Rumanian Gov¬ ernment was unable to have them released, even if it had wished; it couldn’t even get scores of thousands of Rumanian war prisoners released from slave camps, four years after the Armistice! Far more numerous than the kidnapped Hungarians were the kidnapped Rumanian citizens of German origin. Before the war more than two thirds of a mil¬ lion Germans lived in Rumania. Somewhat more than half were Swabians, the rest Saxons, whose fathers had settled in the Carpathian mountains long before the time of Luther. Unfortunately, they had retained a vigorous nationalistic spirit during the centuries, stub¬ bornly resisting assimilation. Their group record before and during the war was bad. Many became aggressive Nazis; as a community they defied the Rumanian au-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

515

thorities, set up a state within a state, professed alle¬ giance to Hitler and tried to hasten a Nazi triumph. Many of them participated in the devastation of Rus¬ sia. After Rumania joined the Allies retribution caught up with them. But to most Rumanians it seemed an in¬ human retribution. Strange to say, these Germans, who for centuries considered the Rumanians a third rate people and joined the Hungarians in humiliating and exploiting them, won Rumanian sympathy—or rather their widows and orphans did. The Red Army treated helpless women and children so savagely that many Ru¬ manians began to feel sorry for their old German op¬ pressors. That, indeed, came to be the prevailing Ru¬ manian sentiment. The Germans of Rumania were handled as wild ani¬ mals. Punishment was not confined to Nazi leaders or army officers or active Bund-members, but imposed upon a whole people. Such mass debasing of human kind, in times of peace, horrified Rumanians. It symbolized what Russia was doing to every one. Most Rumanians pictured themselves in the same helpless position as the Rumanian Germans. They envisaged themselves re¬ duced to the same slavery. When Rumanians beheld a destitute Saxon widow who was mourning because her half-starved, young daughters were toiling in distant Soviet mines, the rumbling of Soviet tanks along Ru¬ manian roads seemed still more sinister. When a lonely Saxon wife read to her Rumanian sister a brief pathetic letter from her long-absent husband near Stalingrad or Moscow, the Rumanian woman thought of her own ab¬ sent son, still a war prisoner in that same area, perform¬ ing the same kind of forced labor. Sometimes Germans came back from bondage, but never whole or intact. Only wasted, broken men or women drifted in; people from whom the last drop of

516

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

toil had been extracted. The returned wrecks cautiously told how they had lived, and it was a withering tale. They frequently spoke without passion or bitterness— as automatons or gramophone records. They were as men resigned to fate, who had ceased to expect anything and had no strength even for vindictiveness. Life had washed them out. In Russia they had worked long hours as machines. Their food was thin soup, watery stew, insufficient bread. They were clad in dirty rags. They lived in hovels or barren, uninviting barracks. Every act was circumscribed. They were as men in a cage or in a line weaving backward and forward. They were not sub¬ jected to special cruelties but simply neglected as weeds in a famished field. They suffered as all Russians suf¬ fered. Working conditions were bad, the mines were often half filled with water. The men were always hungry. In winter they were cold. The future was drab, the present gray and empty. They had been hunted as criminals, packed into freight cars, taken off as casually as hogs to a slaughter house, returned as old rags for a rug. The German nation, as such, was certainly very guil¬ ty, but should individual men be treated like that, Ru¬ manians asked. Is that what Russia brings? This sight of ragged, lifeless, emaciated human ruins brooded over Rumania like a specter. A monstrosity seems to be stalking over the land, strangling men and women. Besides this, the wanton plunder of German property horrified many Rumanians. The Germans were among the most efficient people in the land. They had set the pace in agriculture, business, artisanry, home building. They had inspired admiration along with hatred. They served as teachers by their very manner of life and work. But all they had created was thrown to the winds.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

517

Their fields were snatched, their homes seized, their stores stolen. And indiscriminately, in a wild, furious scramble. The most shiftless, brutal and incompetent Rumanians, despised by their own countrymen, declared themselves Communists, jumped onto the Groza band wagon and raided German property. Buildings were left to deteriorate, fields grew up in weeds; machinery was broken, the best animals were killed. “Gypsies,” said the Rumanians, “lord it over respectable people.” The whole tradition of ownership and hard work was undermined and violence was rewarded. That seemed the essence of the new system, Russia’s contribu¬ tion to Europe. The Rumanians wondered if it was a symbol and harbinger of what was going to happen to them all. Caprice, lawlessness, violence seemed to have set up their rule in every former German community and appeared ready to conquer the land. Destruction became the official order of the day and Rumanians asked, “If a gypsy seizes a Saxon’s house today, on the ground that the victim was a Nazi, will he not seize a Rumanian’s tomorrow, on the pretext he is a fascist?” The sight of barren, grainless Saxon fields that for twenty full generations bore Rumania’s best crops brought anxiety to Rumanian neighbors who had once hated and envied the Saxons. At the beginning of 1945 about 60,000 German men between 17 and 45 and women between 18 and 30 were rounded up and sent off to Russia. They were arrested at schools, seized in the streets, dragged from their homes, taken in their fields. Towns and villages wept as children were driven toward the railroad stations and carried to distant destinations. Church pews re¬ mained half empty, streets became silent, schools were closed, dust gathered in plundered work shops. Prac¬ tically all German families were permanently affected.

518

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

The Rumanians had a premonition that the Bolshviks were preparing to do that to the whole country. Another effective Soviet method for breaking up Ru¬ manian social stability was to destroy the value of money by unlimited inflation. To hasten this process the Rus¬ sians flooded the country with rubles. One of the first acts of the Red Army, after entering Bucharest, was to post large announcements in the Rumanian language, ordering the nation to cooperate with the occupying force and to accept Soviet banknotes in any quantities offered. This meant the Soviet State, the Red Army and every soldier could buy anything they wished any¬ where they wished with rubles. The Rumanian State was obliged to redeem all the rubles without compensa¬ tion and the Russians seemed to have unlimited quanti¬ ties of them. As the army moved from east to west it emptied many of the stores. Perhaps they sent some of the merchandise back home; a part of it they consumed; much of it found its way into Rumania’s “black mar¬ kets.” In an extremely easy manner Moscow attained a double aim: at Rumania’s expense they enabled their forces to procure articles of which they had long been deprived and by throwing huge sums of rubles on the market, they soon doubled the amount of Rumanian paper money in circulation. This was the beginning of a spiral that within three years brought the worth of a dollar to 10,000,000 lei, or rather made the Ruma¬ nian leu worthless. This facilitated the obliteration of the “bourgeoisie,” the reducing of every Rumanian to penury. And the Rumanian Government had not the slightest control over such inflation. Week after week, the Russians moving back and forth over Rumania or settling in Rumania spent rubles at will, and the Ruma¬ nian National Bank paid for them on presentation. Even more important than this, the Rumanians, on

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

519

signing the Armistice, September 12, 1944, assumed the obligation of supplying Russian forces in Rumania practically anything they wished. This turned out to be a monstrous engagement, because the Red Army as well as a host of Russian civilians settled there with an ap¬ pearance of permanency, and they lived as masters. Within eight months after the Russians entered Bucha¬ rest Germany capitulated and fighting ceased, but the Russians remained—by the hundreds of thousands. And they claimed the right to demand almost anything they saw or to order the production of anything they wished. The Rumanian pantry, granary, clothes closet were at their disposal. Every door was open. The Russians took oil, wheat, corn, trucks, automobiles, boats, horses as they wished. They exported Rumanian oil and collected the profits; they sent Rumanian grain to hungry Yugoslavs and received credit. They ordered enough costumes, shoes, leather goods, hospital aprons to supply an army of millions, and Rumanians could not reject the orders. Long after the fighting was over, the Russians in Rumania continued to requisition milk, meat, bread, fats, sugar for a huge military force and no Rumanian Minister dared tell the Russian commanders that they were taking supplies for more soldiers than were sta¬ tion in the country. That would have indicated the Rumanians were spying and it also would have sounded like an insinuation that Red Army commanders were lying. It would have constituted a charge that Russians were taking things out of Rumania, while the Soviet and Rumanian radio stations—all run by Bolsheviks— were daily shouting that the Soviet Union was sending gifts to Rumania. No Rumanian Communist Minister cared to commit such heinous crimes against the Krem¬ lin so they gave what was demanded, in consequence of

520

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

which Rumanian resources streamed out of the country over every road, by train or truck. So obsequious were leading Rumanian Communists that they vied with each other in robbing the country for Mother Russia. Dr. Oeriu, chief Commissioner for the Execution of the Armistice, eloquently declared on more than one occasion that however much the Ruma¬ nians contributed they could not pay the Soviet Union what they owed her. In view of this readiness to give, Russians never lost their appetite for taking and some of the things they most imperiously demanded v/ere mansions, villas, houses on the beaches, swimming pools, splendid cars and luxurious furniture. Soviet officers, established in Rumania by the thousands, including colonels, generals and even a Marshal, ordered the Rumanian government to give them the grandest dwellings and to supply them with the best rugs, pictures, pianos, draperies and sofas. The Russians shut off whole reserves on the beaches and in the mountains for themselves. And when the Red Army departed from a mansion or hotel or office build¬ ing or mountain villa they left it in a state of dilapida¬ tion, devastation and filth. This fact became notorious throughout the whole Balkans. The smell of a Russianoccupied hotel or the sight of a building the Russians had requisitioned became a by-word and a source of proverbs. When the Red Army left a house, bath rooms were in ruins, plumbing fixtures were torn out, electric appliances removed, windows broken, doors battered down, and the refuse of’days was piled in heaps. Gutted buildings from Bucovina to Thrace stood as grim, un¬ erring witnesses of such Bolshevik culture. Among the supplies which Rumania was obliged to place at Russia’s disposal were all transportation facili¬ ties. Moscow took over the railroads, running them as

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

521

it wished for many months, and it confiscated the Ruma¬ nian Navy outright. In September 1945, Russia re¬ turned seven small, partially stripped, largely dilapi¬ dated naval vessels. The Soviet Union also seized most of Rumania’s commercial fleet, leaving two sea-going ships, 32 tugs and 322 barges. But of the ships which were left, 125 barges, seven tugs and the two large ships were kept exclusively in Russia’s service, as well as all the docks and harbors. The Russian Army caused enormous damage to the Rumanian railroads, putting 50% of the cars out of circulation in the course of two years and an even larger percentage of the locomotives. Of the 50,000 cars the Rumanian State Railway had in 1944, 23,000 cars or coaches and 227 locomotives were actually removed from the country. Subsequently, a small number were returned. Most of the coaches still running were in a deplorable condition. The roadbed suffered almost as much as the rolling stock. Most air planes, trucks, busses and automobiles were seized. This demolition of Rumania’s transportation system was not due to “enemy action,” but almost exclusively to the occupying Soviet Army. Another device for official pillaging on a massive scale was Russia’s taking of war booty. This stipula¬ tion of the Armistice was applied in such a way as to assist the Soviet Union in seizing assets that did not belong to Germany at all, and in laying hands upon so large a part of Rumania’s resources as to jeopardize her economic independence. German firms had certain enterprises in Rumania; in addition, Hitler took over many Allied undertakings and properties in Rumania belonging to the nationals of such states as Belgium, Holland, France; finally, Rumania had much machinery which it had bought from Germany and paid for. This

522

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

belonged to Rumanian firms or the Rumanian State. It no more belonged to Germany than a German-made camera owned by a man in Los Angeles would. But Russia grabbed everything of this sort it could place its hands on, largely regardless of whether it belonged to the Rumanian State, individual Rumanians or the Allies. Allies were plundered as well as enemies. Under the heading “war booty,” Russia took almost anything it wanted. The main exceptions were oil properties, which Nazi Germany had seized from American firms. The Americans took back most of these—temporarily. Later they were seized by the Rumanian State. War booty at best is an elastic word; Russia stretched it as it had rarely been stretched before. A large part of this “booty” was half wrecked or dilapidated, such as worn out automobiles or discarded trucks or broken machinery or damaged installations in German-owned plants. According to the Armistice Convention Rumania had to deliver this booty to Rus¬ sia “in good condition.” Thus Rumanian factories had to repair it. Although Rumania had a very limited number of trucks, many of the few it had were seized by the Russians. Those left at Rumania’s disposal were in urgent need of repair, yet the Rumanian factories had to devote their time, energy, skill, precious materials and spare parts to repairing German trucks and Ger¬ man machines for Russia. Rumania was obligated to return to the Soviet Union all property which the Rumanian Army had taken from Russia during the invasion—if such property could be found. And it was obliged to restore such objects “in good condition.” This stipulation gave the Russians a right to enter every house in the land in search of goods taken from Russia. In this way they could claim any desirable thing they found and make Rumania “repair”

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE it any way they wished.

523

Rumania was forced to spend

large sums repairing objects her army had actually or allegedly taken from the Soviet Union. A fairly large part of Rumania’s plants for metal and wood products and many of her skilled workers were employed exclu¬ sively in repairing booty taken by Russians from the re¬ treating German Army and from Rumanians—all free of charge and for the benefit of Russia. A still larger sum went as indemnity for objects al¬ legedly taken from Russia that could not be repaired or restored. The largest single item on this account was for grain and other commodities, which the Rumanian State had bought from individual producers or mer¬ chants in Bessarabia and northern Bucovina from June 22, 1941, to the spring of 1944. During that period these two provinces were an integral part of Rumania. The state bought army provisions there from individuals as in other parts of the country. Yet when the Soviet Union re-conquered these areas, it forced Rumania to pay Moscow for grain for which it had already paid Rumanian citizens in those provinces. In addition, Rumania was saddled with a lump sum of reparations amounting to $300,000,000. Actually, through all these channels, the Soviet Union took from Rumania in the course of about four years, almost $2,000,000,000. In addition, it achieved the ruination of Rumania’s economy, engineered the whole¬ sale confiscation of its property and exercised unceasing terrorization over the nation.

524

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XVIII RUSSIA HANDCUFFS RUMANIA The Soviet Union fixed Rumania’s “reparations” at $300,000,000 and magnanimously declared it didn’t wish to overburden a neighbor, in spite of that neigh¬ bor’s depredations in Russia. Actually, however, the USSR extorted from Rumania in one year goods and money worth $610,000,000; during four years goods and money worth $1,785,000,000. Furthermore, the Communist Government has obligated Rumania to keep on paying vast sums for at least six years more. Not one official reparation figure as announced by Rus¬ sia is accurate or binding. They are used to confuse and deceive. Moscow has ignored them all and is taking from Rumania all the traffic will bear, regardless of agreements. In addition, the Kremlin has tied up prac¬ tically all of Rumania’s resources through commercial or economic pacts imposed by force. On top of this it has imposed a network of political pacts that bind Ru¬ mania with a dozen steel bands. To cap the climax, the Moscow press and the Rumanian Communist press constantly report that the Soviet Union is giving gener¬ ous economic aid to the Rumanian nation—“far beyond Rumania’s deserts.” According to statements made by Premier General Nicolae Radescu, one of which appeared as a letter in the New York Times of July 18, 1948, Rumania, since the beginning of the Russian occupation, has been com¬ pelled to send the Soviet Union 63 per cent of its na¬ tional income.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

525

Already by the end of the summer of 1946 Rumania had paid in reparations of various kind $1,050,000,000 according to a statement which the American delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard L. Thorp, made September 23, of that year. Mr. Thorp estimated that $950,000,000 remained to be paid. General Radescu says that already within 18 months Russia had taken $735,000,000 and had prepared to keep the torrent of reparations flowing. These gigantic sums were extorted by Russia from total annual national incomes of the fol¬ lowing amounts: in 1945, $686 million; 1946, about ,$600 million; in 1947, approximately 800 and in 1948 about the same. If Russia took $735 million in about 18 months, as General Radescu points out, that would constitute not far from two thirds of the total amount which the Rumanians earned during that period. They were allowed to keep appreciably less than two fifths of their earnings for taxes and all other purposes. A Rumanian diplomat intimately familiar with Ru¬ manian conditions places the proportion of the Ruma¬ nian national income going to Soviet Russia at 80% or slightly above. He does not think the national in¬ come has averaged above $550,000,000 per year since 1944. He says that between August 30, 1944, and December 31, 1947, the Rumanians earned a total of about $1,950,000,000 and the Russians took more than $1,650,000,000. Perhaps the lower percentage of two thirds mentioned in the paragraph above is more ac¬ curate. In any case for a nation to give such a large propor¬ tion of current earnings to a foreign power is plainly impossible, which means that Russia has taken not only from Rumania’s yearly earnings, but from her capital, such as farm stock, farm machinery, vehicles, trains, re¬ fining plants, ships.

Rumanians are shorn, not only of

526

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

their earnings but of a part of the machinery or re¬ sources through which they were able to earn. The hen is taken along with the golden egg. In one year alone Russia took 16 percent of Rumania’s movable property. One of Russia’s major abuses in extracting the “repa¬ rations proper”—as well as all other indemnities—is that Rumania pays in kind and the value of goods is fixed by Russia on the basis of 1938 prices, which were far lower than current world prices. Rumania agreed to pay $300,000,000 as “reparations proper,” in grain, machinery, timber, coal, oil, and other commodities. But when Rumania delivers these products it actually has to give almost twice as much as would be required by current prices. It is as though a farmer in 1948 paid a 1948 note in wheat, according to prices of 1938. Ac¬ tually, the nominal $300,000,000 of reparations repre¬ sents at least $525,000,000, and that is by far the small¬ est part of the wealth that is being extorted. By the early summer of 1948 Rumania had paid $332 million on the account of “reparations proper” and $1,453 million on other accounts. On the accounts of war booty, restoring stolen goods, repairing war booty and repairing stolen goods, on the accounts of feeding the Red Army, transporting the Red Army, paying for supplies taken from Bessarabia and Buco¬ vina, the Russians took goods from Rumania worth very much more than the “reparations.” For example, the Rumanian State included in its budget for 1948/49 a sum of $172,000,000 for “reparations.” Since the in¬ stallment due on official reparations that year was $34,000,000, Rumania even during the fourth year after the close of the war, was paying Russia $138,000,000 on accounts that had nothing to do with reparations. Of this total of $172,000,000 Russia graciously con¬ sented amid great ballyhoo to forego $16,500,000 (or

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

527

as paid in kind $29,000,000) during the summer of 1948. The articles officially delivered to the Red Army, from September, 1944, to December 31, 1945, show what an enormous stream of goods flowed out of Ru¬ mania. The following list, which had nothing to do with reparations, presents a part of the picture:

Supplies Delivered to the Red Army Through 1945 Wheat.tons. Barley, Corn Flour Meat

Oats.“ .“ .“ .“

. . . .

Sugar

.“

.

Salt .“ Fat, oil.“ Alcohol (rectif.) .“ Milk and by-products . . . . “

. . . .

Fish .“ . Colonial goods. Eggs .pieces.

118,000 56,000 39,000 117,000 39,000

12,000 14,000 4,600 1,400 5,000 5,000 400

2,000,000

Tobacco .u . Cigarettes .pieces Matches .boxes. Fodder .tons

3,000 4,000 650,000,000 41,000,000 94,000

Petrol and by-products. . . . “ . Wood.cubic meters

629,000 144,000

Oven—alive

Soap

.tons.

Sheep

“

“

.

193,000 349,000

Hogs

“

“

.

116,000

.heads

In addition, the Russian Army seized, unofficially,

528

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

during that period, 80,000 tons of wheat, 43,000 tons of barley, 39,000 of corn and 7,000 of the scarce prod¬ uct sugar. The Red Army also seized unofficially 290,000 tons of fodder, 82,000 tons of oil, 137,000 oxen, 538,000 sheep, 121,000 hogs and 131,000 horses. Bed¬ ding, harnesses, shoes and clothing worth 72 billion lei or about $18,000,000 were delivered during this period. On the account of restitution—and having no con¬ nection with reparations as such—Rumania from Sep¬ tember 1941 to December 1945 delivered to Russia oil, grain, timber or timber products, horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, machinery, locomotives, railroad cars, ships worth $70,000,000. ing table.

This is in addition to the forego¬

Rumanian economists and statisticians after careful study estimated that from September 1944 through December 1945 Russia took from Rumania, beyond all obligations in the Armistice Agreement, goods worth $536,000,000. Among the main items were: robbery and demolition, $312 million; ships and naval stores, $45 million ; goods found in custom houses, $20 million; railroad material and unauthorized rail traffic, $60 mil¬ lion; unofficial seizure of army supplies, $60 million. These goods, when added to supplies taken or work required more or less legally on the basis of regular Armistice stipulations, made a sum five times more than a normal yearly state budget and almost equal to the current national income during those months. Of these losses and seizures the state bore somewhat over 60 per cent, individuals, about 40. It is to be remembered that extortions of this kind continued through 1948, with prospects of going on in¬ definitely. Russia has already ear-marked $800,000,000 to be extracted by 1954. Not less than 98 per cent of all the merchandise sent

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

529

out of Rumania during 1945 and 90 per cent in 1947 went to Russia, most of it free. And not only is Russia using reparations, restitutions, army upkeep as chan¬ nels for syphoning these enormous quantities of goods out of Rumania, but has laid hands on a large part of the

industrial,

commercial

and

financial

enterprises

within Rumania. By intrigue and pressure, at a moment when the Red Army exercised absolute domination over Rumania, Moscow seized 30% of the stock of “Resitsa,” by far the largest iron and steel works and in¬ deed the largest manufacturing concern of any kind in the country. This gives the Soviet Union control over Rumania’s metallurgical industry. It also took 66 per cent of the shares of the Petrosani Coal Mines, which are situated in Rumania, but were formerly in Hun¬ garian hands. Likewise, by taking over all interests of the Germans and Italians in Rumania, Russia got con¬ trol of about 30% of the major industrial, financial, and insurance concerns. In this way, the USSR seized ownership of about 30% of Rumania’s sugar produc¬ tion, 70% of its insurance business, 15% of its banking, 20% of its oil production and 12% of its timber re¬ sources. This was in addition to the coal mines and steel plants, which Russia had taken over. Yet all this was only a beginning; through cleverly contrived Russian-Rumanian corporations, called “Sovroms,” Moscow laid hands on much of the rest of Ru¬ mania’s economic life. Not only is Rumania’s foreign trade swallowed up by Russia, but almost every major economic transaction in the land serves Russia and is controlled by her. Each of the six Sovrom companies belongs to Rumania and the Soviet Union on a theoreti¬ cal 50/50 basis; but practically all the capital was con¬ tributed by Rumania. The management is Russian, in¬ asmuch as the general manager in each case is a Rus-

530

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

sian, as are most of the key executives. The chairman of the Board of Directors of each Sovrom is a Ru¬ manian. The six Sovroms functioning by the beginning of 1947 were established in accordance with a pact con¬ cluded May 8, 1945, between the Kremlin and the Ru¬ manian Communist Government. The nature and work¬ ings of the Sovroms have been described by the former Rumanian Charge d’Affaires in Washington, Brutus Coste, as follows: “SOVROM PETROL controls 30 percent of the oil industry and has practically a monopoly of new oil fields. “The Soviet participation consists of the former German and Italian controlled companies, as well as of the French and Belgian interests which Germany had acquired while France and Belgium were under Nazi occupation. “The Rumanian share consists of all Rumanian oil companies, of all government owned oil fields, as well as of the royalties due to the Rumanian Government. “As in all cases where Rumanian private enterprises were called to join the Sovroms, the Rumanian Govern¬ ment signed on their behalf without consulting them, and upon the refusal of the directors to recognize the validity of the agreement providing for their inclusion in the Sovrom, the government simply replaced them by its own appointees. “Sovrom Petrol was the only oil company authorized to import machinery and drilling equipment against oil exports. “SOVROM TRANSPORT leased all Rumanian harbors and acquired full ownership of all port installa¬ tions, dock, elevators, cranes, ship-building yards, etc. These were the property of the Rumanian State. Ruma^

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

531

nian participation also consisted of all sea and Danube ships formerly owned by the state, as well as of 220 ships and lighters belonging to private owners which had been requisitioned by the Rumanian Government for the special purpose of making them available to Sovrom Transport. “Russia contributed only a few ships—all of them seized from Rumania in disregard of the Armistice terms. “Although its so-called participation constituted less than five percent of the assets of this Sovrom, the Soviet Union now holds 51.2 per cent of the shares. “Harbors, sea and river transportation have been almost entirely government-owned and operated since the creation of modern Rumania; now a Communist government has turned this property of the Rumanian nation over to a foreign state. “SOVROM LEMN is responsible for 50 per cent of Rumania’s present output of timber and lumber. “Rumania’s participation in this joint company con¬ sisted of all state forests and of all forests belonging to public bodies (that is, of over eight million acres, or about 60 per cent of all Rumanian forests), together with the respective saw mills, small gauge railways, etc. “The Soviet contribution, for which the Soviet Union got 50 per cent of the joint company’s capital stock and its management, was confined to machinery and indus¬ trial installations. The Soviet contribution was much less than one tenth of the Rumanian. Even at that, the machinery and equipment contributed by the Soviet Union (captured as war booty in different European countries) was superfluous, since the timber and lumber industries were suffering from over-investment in rela¬ tion to the reserves of the Rumanian forests. As a re¬ sult of the excessive cutting of forests between 1940 and

532

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

1946 over 60 per cent of the saw mills, etc., are idle and will stay idle for the next ten years. This means that Rumania ceded to the Soviet Union 50 per cent of the capital stock of a joint company which controls half of the country’s timber and lumber industries without any real counterpart.

“SOVROM BANK controls over 40 per cent of the capital invested in banking, handles almost 90 per cent of all export business, and finances over 75 per cent of important transactions. “The Rumanian participation consisted of several Rumanian commercial banks and of a capital subscrip¬ tion on the part of the Rumanian Government, while the Soviet Union contributed the German shares of several large Rumanian banks (for instance, Banca Commerciala Romana, Banca Commerciala RomanoItaliana). “Inasmuch as all Rumanian banks were later taken over by the government, they will probably be merged with Sovrom Bank, giving Russia control of Rumanian financial activity in its entirety. “T.A.R.S.—the Sovrom Air-Ways, holds the monop¬ oly of air transportation in Rumania and operates sev¬ eral international lines in Eastern Europe. “Rumania has contributed to the capital of this com¬ pany her air ports, complete with all ground installa¬ tions, repair facilities, etc., as well as the air craft and property of the Government owned L.A.R.E.S. (Ru¬ mania’s only air transportation concern). The Soviet Union supplied most of the air liners. “On the basis of the agreement, setting up this Sov¬ rom, the Soviet Union has obtained full control of all airports and air navigation. “Sovrom for Highway Public Transportation has the monopoly of public transportation on highways.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

533

“In return for a few scores of motor coaches, the Soviet Union gained a 50 per cent interest. The Ruma¬ nian 50 per cent share consists of all assets of the State Railway’s motor coach transportation system, of all as¬ sets of scores of smaller motor coach transportation enterprises and of the free use of the state highways.” In addition to all this, the Soviet Union, taking ad¬ vantage of the enormous pressure it was able to apply bought up shares in many of the Rumanian enterprises that were still free. It used money extracted from Rumania to get control of Rumanian plants—and it used more forceful arguments than money. When this process was well advanced, the Rumanian Communist Government nationalized industry and seized all the chief enterprises. But Russia’s ownership was in no way affected—she was exempted from the working of the law. Rumanians were dispossessed by the Ruma¬ nian Government, but not Russians in Rumania. This means the Kremlin exercises a triple control over Rumanian industry: through Sovroms, through the direct ownership of large properties, through Mos¬ cow’s control over the Rumanian Communist Party that now runs Rumania’s nationalized industry. And the peasants are not left out of the orbit of Mos¬ cow’s attentions. The Rumanian Agricultural Institute has officially become a subsidiary of the Moscow Insti¬ tute of Agriculture. The ostensible purpose is noble : to facilitate Moscow in teaching poor Rumanian peas¬ ants better agricultural methods. The actual purpose of the measure is to enable Soviet Bolsheviks to mo¬ bilize a set of Rumanian rural workers to collectivize Rumanian land. Young Rumanian agronomists, now being trained in Russian “kolkhoz” practices, will get the key positions when the Communist Party seizes Ru¬ mania’s fields as they seized Rumanian factories in June

534

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

1948. Also, as a result of the Soviet’s control of Ru¬ manian trade and Rumanian production the Rumanian peasantry, in as far as it uses machinery, has been made exclusively dependent upon Russia. As Russia for four years has been syphoning out Rumanian farm produce it will soon begin to skim off profits from the tractors and plows and reapers it will send to the collectivized Rumanian peasantry. A comparison of Rumania’s exports for 1947 with those of 1938, the last prewar year, shows the catas¬ trophic effect which Russia’s occupation of Rumania, its seizure of Rumania’s wealth and its syphoning off of Rumania’s products have had upon that country’s eco¬ nomic situation. While in 1938 Rumania exported goods worth $143,000,000, in 1947 her exports amounted to only $13,900,000. Of them, about three fourths went to the Soviet Union. The exports were as follows, according to categories of commodities: oil, 30.42 per cent; timber, 27.46 per cent; salt and cement, 7.75 per cent; miscellaneous, 18.49 per cent and labor, 15.88 per cent. This labor was the work applied by Rumanian employees in textile mills making cloth for Russians from Russian cotton. Actually, Rumania exported only $11,900,000 worth of raw material and manufactured goods in 1947. The total volume was probably about 750,000 tons as com¬ pared with 7,409,000 in 1938 and 3,652,000 in 1943. The average price Rumania got from her exports per ton was about $17 as compared with $18 in 1938, which means that in spite of the great price rise on the world market, the price of Rumanian goods dropped. She not only sold a much smaller quantity of goods but got less for them per ton. Also, in spite of all the boasting of the Rumanian Communists about establishing an indus¬ try and selling finished goods, what Rumania actually

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

535

sold was principally oil and timber. Rumania, accord¬ ing to official data, got $19 per cubic meter for timber delivered to the USSR, although she was offered almost twice as much for other countries. For the timber de¬ livered on the “reparation” account, Rumania was cred¬ ited with $11 per cubic meter. Here is a detailed comparison of the 1947 exports with those of 1943 and 1938: Rumanian exports 1947 1943 % Million $ % Oil . 30.42 $ 4.4 66. Timber & lumber 27.46 3.9 6.3 Grains & seeds. .... 14.6 Cattle & animal products. .... 9.5 Salt & cement. . . . 7.75 1.0 0.4 Miscellaneous . . . 18.49 2.6 3.2 Re-export (labor) 15.88 2.0 . Totals

. 100.00

$13.9

100.00

Million $ $ 78.5 7.4 17.3

1938. % 43.2 11.2 29.4

11.3 0.5 3.8 ...

10.6 0.9 4.7 ...

$118.5

100.00

Million $ $ 62 16 42.3 15.1 0.6 7.0

$143

There were no agricultural products for export in 1947 partly because of a drought and partly because Rumania had been stripped by Russia. There wasn’t even enough agricultural produce for the Rumanian people—nowhere near enough. Somewhat more salt was sold than before the war, but much less of every¬ thing else. Apparently more Rumanians are working in salt mines, an outstanding illustration of Communist industrialization. Rumania’s imports show an even sadder tale. Most of them have been coming from Russia, which before the war providecTonly one per cent of what Rumanians bought from abroad. The volume of Rumania’s im¬ ports since September 1944 seems to be almost as much as before the war, but now half of what Rumania buys

536

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

from abroad consists of food, while Before the advent of Communism, Rumania sold food in large quantities; food was usually the second export item, immediately after oil. During 1946 and 1947 Rumania imported, if one may judge from few and carefully juggled of¬ ficial figures, about 150,000 tons of industrial raw ma¬ terials, semi-finished goods, finished goods and machin¬ ery. But in 1938, 700,000 tons of such merchandise were bought from abroad. They constituted 85 per cent of the total volume of imports. Some of these finished products were American automobiles, German spec¬ tacles, cameras, French perfumes and other luxuries— if spectacles, cameras, Fords, Chevrolets and Buicks can be called luxuries. However, most of the merchan¬ dise in this category consisted of coal, pig iron, chemi¬ cals, cotton, hides, steel, machinery, trucks, other ma¬ chinery for agriculture and for factories. In a word, most of it was not consumer goods but material for in¬ creasing Rumania’s production of consumer goods. Yet in 1946 and 1947, when Rumania was in far greater need of machinery, steel, cotton, hides, trucks, to keep its factories going and its economy half way balanced, it was able to Buy from abroad only a fourth as much as formerly. In 1938 Rumania bought from abroad 454,000 tons of raw material for its heavy industry, but during the three years of 1945, 1946, 1947, it got only 413,000 tons from Russia, and almost nothing from other sources. During 1947 Rumania got only $3,000,000 worth of trucks, motors, machinery and automobiles—all from the Soviet Union—while in 1938 it bought $38,000,000 worth and at prices one fourth or one half as high as Rumania is now paying Russia. During three years ending in October 1947, Rumania’s total imports from

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

537

Russia—most came from Russia—amounted to $38,000,000 but in 1938 her importation of machinery alone, at far lower prices, came to the same sum. Rumania received $17 per ton for what she sold the Soviet Union and paid $ 150 per ton for what she bought from the Soviet Union. Although the government subjected the nation to far greater privations than it has suffered at any other time during the recent past, Rumania could export only one fourth as much as it exported before the war. Al¬ though the people were in far greater need of all com¬ modities than for almost a century, its resources were so low, its credit so limited and its government so dis¬ loyal that hardly a fourth as much productive material could be imported as during 1938, when the Rumanian masses needed it far less. Hungrier, colder, more poorly clothed, more inadequately housed, far more restricted in travel than for two generations, the Rumanian com¬ mon people are producing far less than formerly and are receiving far less from abroad to enable them to restore their producing capacity. That is the plight to which continued Soviet depredations and a Communist government dominated by foreigners reduced the nation. Within two years after Vishinsky placed Rumania in Communist hands, production fell to 45% of what it was in 1938; the national income dropped from $1,300,000,000 to less than $600,000,000; the cost of living increased 24,670 per cent; banknote circulation jumped from 211 billion lei to 3,025 billion; and com¬ mercial exports practically ceased. That’s what the Kremlin gave Rumania’s “toiling masses.”

538

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XXIX TRANSYLVANIA SEETHES Transylvania, with Maramuresh in the north and the Banat in the south, is a nationality mosaic. Ruma¬ nians constitute the most numerous nationality group, after which come Magyars (Hungarians), Germans and Jews, with a few Slavs in the extreme north and in the extreme southwest. These groups dislike one an¬ other and the Communists use the disunity to increase Communist power. They weaken their enemies by pro¬ voking them to fight one another. This seems easier than ever before in Transylvania, because since 1940 nationality passions there have been furiously exacerbated. Much blood has flowed, in a literal sense, between Hungarians and Rumanians. One may say, indeed, that ever since 1918 these groups have been abnormally hostile to each other—that was the date when the Rumanians freed Transylvania from Hungary and made it part of Rumania. In 1940 Hitler took the northern part of Transylvania away from Ru¬ mania and returned it to Hungary. In 1944 Rumanian armies, Soviet armies and the Allies restored northern Transylvania to Rumania. In these transactions, as empire fought empire for power and as members of one nation killed members of another nation for freedom, for national ideals and for a place in the world, the personal security of at least 4,000,000 Transylvanians was involved, as were the deepest personal sentiments of 30,000,000 Rumanians and Hungarians. The involvement was of the kind that

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

539

often caused death and, in turn, aroused a passion for supreme personal or national vengeance. This overpowering fact determined the attitude of the two groups toward the Rumanian Communist Gov¬ ernment. The Rumanians in Transylvania were against the Groza government and against Soviet Russia with almost complete unanimity. Because of this the Hun¬ garians of Transylvania were for the Groza govern¬ ment and for Soviet Russia. The vociferous support which the Hungarians gave Groza made his predominantly foreign regime seem all the more foreign. Actually the Hungarians, and especially those of Transylvania, were one of the main local forces keeping Communists in power. This fact increased the bitter enmity which many Rumanians felt toward them. To study this situation at first hand I often visited Transylvania during my last sojourn in Rumania and shall now describe some of my experiences in that province. One of my tasks there was to attend political meetings, including some held by Ilie Lazar, who was a Transylvanian of Rumanian origin, one of the most militant supporters of Juliu Maniu and an aggressive Rumanian nationalist. He was tall, eloquent and dar¬ ing, with a theatrical flair, which his enemies called demagogic. He sang well, led group singing skillfully and was beloved by the masses whom he rather easily swayed. He was especially effective in speaking to peas¬ ants and workers. He was one of the best political “agitators” I have known and had an air of mystery about him that produced the impression he might have been a conspirator. Ilie Lazar had some of the qualities of a Patrick Henry and a Sam Adams, was sincerely though perhaps not deeply religious, and as completely devoted to democracy as a militant political agitator

540

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

can be. His record during the war was of the very best. He had been arrested because of his devotion to the Allied cause, and had repeatedly taken risks that might have resulted in his execution. His special mission in the National-Peasant Party was to work among labor¬ ers, both in Transylvania and the rest of the country. The first of Lazar’s post-war meetings that I at¬ tended was in a workers’ quarter of Bucharest. A Ru¬ manian colleague who was reporting for a number of British papers and who, during the war, had been in the same concentration camp with Lazar told me of the workers’ rally and I gladly went with him to report it. When we alighted from our taxi at the meeting place and passed through a crowded yard into a still more crowded hall, we were received with thunderous shouts of “Long live America,” “Long live England.” On pressing up to the front of the room, amid unceasing cheers for America, I took my place on the front row of chairs facing the speaker’s table. The speaking was suspended for several minutes as the chairman poured out praise upon America with the crowd vociferously applauding. It was not a pre-arranged demonstration, and the long noisy cheering of the Bucharest workers was not due to propaganda about America. Neither had it been rehearsed in advance. The men and women had not been instructed what to do on my arrival. They shouted and clapped because they loved America, wanted America’s help, and were thrilled to see even a very modest American in their midst. The chairman insisted that I stand up beside the speaker’s table so the crowd could see me, but I refused. After two or three men had made short talks, con¬ stantly interrupted by lusty applause, Lazar rose amid tumultuous cheers from his admirers. His fierce words were directed against what he called the tyrannical

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

541

Groza government and were designed to encourage the common people in their determination to resist Com¬ munism. Lazar permitted himself not a few personal remarks about his opponents and, in an eloquent sarcas¬ tic way, pointed out the fascistic tendencies of many members of Groza’s cabinet “of large democratic con¬ centration.” He also stressed that Premier Groza had acquired considerable property with the help of dictator Antonescu’s anti-Semitic laws and also by taking advan¬ tage of his close friendship with the family of Octavian Goga, one of the most ruthless anti-Semitic nationalists in Rumania’s recent history. On ending his talk, Lazar invited the rather excited audience to rise and join with him in singing a classic Rumanian revolutionary song originally directed against Hungarian oppressors and beginning with the exclama¬ tion “Awake, Oh ye Rumanians.” It was such a meeting as might have been held in any country in the world during the last 4,000 years by people struggling for liberation from foreign or domestic tyrants. 1 thought Tom Paine, Paul Revere, Thomas E. Jefferson or Wil¬ liam Lloyd Garrison would have felt at home there. I had to leave before the rally adjourned because of an overdue previous engagement, and as I departed America was again vigorously cheered. That experience showed that the emotions of Rumanian audiences and the almost frantic attachment of the Rumanian masses to the United States would make it difficult for an American correspondent unobtrusively to report meet¬ ings of the National-Peasant Party. One could foresee complications. Nevertheless, I felt convinced that at such a vital moment in world history an American news¬ paper man should not avoid contact with Rumanian peasants and workers merely because they had an ex¬ uberant affection for his country. Historical events had

542

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

led them to believe that America was closely involved in their struggle. Consequently, I decided to attend some of Lazar’s meetings in his own stamping grounds of Transylvania. The first such Transylvania peasant rally at which I was present was held in the city of Orastie near Deva, the home town of Prime Minister Groza. Lazar seemed to lay special store on it since he wanted to make an overwhelming anti-Communist demonstration in the onlv district of Rumania where Groza’s Plowman’s Front had ever had any appreciable voluntary support. I went to Orastie, which is somewhat more than 300 miles from Bucharest, in an ordinary taxi I had engaged through my hotel porter. The rally was attended by well over 10,000 peasants dressed in native holiday costumes, and assembled from the whole district, some coming on horesback, others in wagons, many on foot, not a few carrying national flags and party emblems. They were thrilled to see the fiery Lazar, rejoiced in the exuberance that comes from a holiday celebration, felt exhilarated from wearing Sunday clothes, noisily cheered the speaker, even more vociferously cried “Long live America.” They solemnly chanted a national prayer and defiantly sang old national songs. They were so numerous, well-organized and strong that the few Com¬ munists of Orastie dared not attack them. But after the meeting, as the celebrators and National-Peasant delegates were going home in small groups, a truck of Communist factory workers from an industrial area not far away shot into a cluster of pedestrians, seriously wounding two. One of the wounded was immediately brought back to a local hospital where I saw him. In the room with him was a doctor, a few friends who had witnessed the attack and a policeman who had already made the preliminary investigation. The policeman

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

543

without any hesitation confirmed the report that the man had been shot by Communist workers who had come from outside in a truck for the purpose of ter¬ rorizing the meeting. They were the government’s typical shock troops. On the following morning I left Orastie and during succeeding days visited many of the most important centers in central Transylvania accompanied by no one but a local Rumanian Transylvanian, not actively en¬ gaged in party politics. On returning to Bucharest I stopped briefly in the city of Sibiu where I visited Juliu Maniu, then recuperating in a local hospital. Leaving Sibiu early in the afternoon I picked up Ilie Lazar who wanted a ride back to the capital. We stopped for an hour in one of the larger villages along the road, where I met a number of peasants who had spent years in America and some of whom still spoke English fairly well. From there we proceeded on our way and late that evening as we entered the outskirts of the city of Brasov where we had planned to spend the night, my taxi was stopped and we were all arrested. The gen¬ darmes carefully looked at the license plate, then at the number they had in their little books and said: “This is the right car.” Two rifle-carrying policemen mounted our running boards, one on each side, and told our chauffeur to drive to the police station. As we made our way in the dark through silent, empty streets of a city that had become notorious for the lawlessness of the occupying army and the brutality of Communist terrorists, I was not happy, and I saw that Lazar was worried. On reaching our unchosen destination we were taken out of the car, conducted into the office of the chief gendarme and asked to wait while one of the function¬ aries there, who seemed a bit bewildered, phoned up

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“the Party.” Throughout Eastern Europe the Party means the Communists. Strange to say nobody seemed to know exactly what he was expected to do with us. In fact the policemen there appeared as embarrassed as Lazar was worried and as I was peeved. After a few minutes we were both liberated, and went to a pleasant hotel where we had reserved rooms in advance. After washing up, we walked to a restaurant not very far away where I met a number of prominent local people. We exchanged questions and information, as waiters avidly listened and perhaps the secret police also. Prob¬ ably the waiters were secret police. I was later called to account by the Red Army for what I had allegedly said there in conversations. Being tired we went back to the hotel at an early hour. As we walked along the streets, we saw we were closely followed by detectives. Early the next morning we proceeded on our way to Bucharest. At the edge of the city we were stopped and subjected to a vigorous questioning at the hands of a competent, curt and unfriendly police official, who finally let us pass. I think the Brasov Communists had received instructions from the Bucharest Communists to1 arrest Ilie Lazar and I have the impression that at the last minute they decided not to jail him in the pres¬ ence of an American correspondent, whose papers were in perfect order. At that time, March 1946, the Ruma¬ nian Government still had some vestiges of respect for America and had not yet given up all hopes of being able to deceive American public opinion. Consequently, the most dynamic opposition leader was given a few more weeks in which to work. During the last week in April he planned a speaking tour in north Transylvania and since that part of Eu¬ rope is interesting from many points of view, I decided to cover the tour. I succeeded in finding a heavy old

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545

Chrysler which had been assembled long before the worid had dreamt of streamlining or of baggage com¬ partments. Unpainted and somewhat dilapidated, it seemed on the point of collapsing, but had one reassur¬ ing feature, namely four enormous tires as big as those used on ordinary trucks and apparently as strong. After giving it a little preliminary try-out on one of the hills of Bucharest, which it successfully took, I signed a de¬ tailed contract with the owner, promising to pay his price if his chauffeur succeeded in carting me through Rumania’s northwestern mountains in the stately old buggy. It proved an excellent choice and carried us for a thousand miles without mishap. Its spaciousness was a welcome feature, enabling the chauffeur to take his pretty wife along on a delightful spring outing and to give many people lifts whom we passed along the road. When we entered Cluj, the capital of Transylvania, we were stopped at a police post and two uniformed gendarmes, after a brief conversation with the chauf¬ feur, hopped onto the running boards to ride into town with us. For a moment I thought we were arrested again, but almost immediately was relieved to learn that our uniformed comrades were merely hitch-hikers. Their presence enabled us to drive up to hotel New York on the main square of Cluj with considerable pomp. The New York proved as capacious and ancient as our Chrysler. Also as serviceable, reliable and friendly. Cluj, undemolished by the war, impressively well built and filled with a rare springtime beauty, still seemed to me one of the saddest of all sad cities in the world, because I saw two nations clashing there as al¬ most no place else on the continent of Europe—the Rumanians bringing to a climax their century-old struggle for liberation from Hungary and the local

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Hungarians desperately fighting to escape being domi¬ nated by the Rumanian men and women who yesterday were their coachmen and housemaids. The majority of the people in Cluj were Hungarians while a majority of those in the surrounding villages were Rumanians. Cluj’s large square, lavish architecture and solid, sub¬ stantial streets were Hungarian in appearance, as were most of the shops. A majority of the factories, the greater part of the workers in them, the main churches and the best school buildings were Hungarian. The language one most frequently heard was Hungarian— the most self-confident, aggressive people one met, the predominant costumes, the type of womanly beauty, the food in the restaurants, the chief of police, the munic¬ ipal functionaries, all cab-drivers, and one of the two universities were Hungarian. The Cathedral in the center of the main square was Hungarian and most of the excellently housed, finely equipped party clubs dis¬ tributed through the central part of the city were Hun¬ garian-controlled. They were also Communist or com¬ munistic. Most of the Rumanians lived on the outskirts in rather poorly built little houses on crooked unpaved streets, especially in a suburb called Manasturi which was almost the only completely Rumanian section of the city. It looked more or less like a long village and was inhabited largely by peasant-workers who spent some of their time in factories and workshops, the rest culti¬ vating little fields. There were also a few Rumanian houses in better parts of the town. I have referred to this city as Cluj, and if you look on any Rumanian map made by Rumanians, you will see it designated as such. However, most of the people living there do not call it Cluj but Koloszvar, which is the Hungarian name and is as dear to the majority of

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the inhabitants as is the Hungarian tricolor or jaunty Hungarian hats or flowing Hungarian cloaks with many bars of braid stretching horizontally across the breast. Very few cities in the whole Danube valley are more precious to the Hungarians than Koloszvar. Not only has it furnished a number of leaders who became great in Hungarian history, making the kingdom powerful and famous through fleeting periods, but it was one of the chief centers of Hungarian might, culture and domi¬ nation. It was considered a visible proof of the great¬ ness of Hungary, a beautiful and solid evidence of Hungary’s right to lord it over neighboring peoples. Koloszvar seemed to justify the Hungarian’s belief that he was a member of a master race. For these reasons local Hungarians as well as those in the Hungarian motherland cling to it with a desperate affection, that often finds expression in cruel and murderous fury. As I wandered through the city I saw but few out¬ ward indications that Transylvania is inhabited pre¬ dominantly by Rumanians, and no sign that this is one of the chief objects of the Rumanians’ long, heroic struggle for liberation from Hungarians A casual visitor would hardly imagine that he is in the heart of the State of Rumania. As he walked around the squares and through the main streets, he would see anti-Ru¬ manian signs and most of all, the words “Down with Maniu” scrawled on every wall. At almost every step were horrible caricatures of the man loved and followed by more than 90% of Transylvanian Rumanians. Ap¬ pearance would lead one to believe that the people in the capitol of Transylvania scorn and despise the living emblem of Rumanianism. Of course, all that appear¬ ance was created by Hungarians who actually did hate him. Maniu’s people were not allowed a single party club

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nor a single daily newspaper. There was, to be sure, one paper in the Rumanian language, but not written by or for Rumanian-feeling Rumanians. It was a gov¬ ernment-serving organ edited by a non-Rumanian.

In

contrast with this, Cluj newspaper stands abounded in papers written by Hungarians for Hungarians. Hun¬ garians marched through the city shouting “Down with Maniu” never “Down with Horthy.” They arranged big demonstrations and called frequent meetings de¬ voted chiefly to debasing Maniu and everything Ruma¬ nian. while Rumanian nationalists were not allowed to hold a single rally or party congress, and Rumanian students were favorite objects of police persecution. This anti-Rumanian movement was carried on by the Communist Party in the name of democracy. Its chief sponsor, or perhaps chief figurehead, was the Rumanian Prime Minister, Dr. Petru Groza, hated by most Ruma¬ nians in Transylvania and supported by most Hun¬ garians. It was often said facetiously, though not alto¬ gether inaccurately, that the Hungarians had two Prime Ministers, Zoltan Tildy in Budapest and Dr. Groza in Bucharest. (Tildy later became President of Hungary from which post he was removed during July 1948.) While in Rumania I received a letter from a young Hungarian friend of mine living in a Hungarian village not far from Cluj who said: “All of us here are deeply grateful to Groza. I can’t tell you how much we de¬ pend on him.” Naturally such a sentiment made the Rumanian opposition against the Rumanian Premier of the Rumanian State all the more furious. It also in¬ creased Rumanian detestation of Groza’s misuse of words for he called discrimination against the Ruma¬ nian majority in favor of a Hungarian minority “democ¬ racy.” In the purely Rumanian sections of Cluj the common people had come to loathe the very sound or

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sight of the word “democracy.” Nothing seemed more hateful than Groza’s democracy as applied by the Hun¬ garian Communists. As I left Cluj to attend Ilie Lazar’s political rallies in northern Transylvania, I clearly saw what the issue would be. It would be: the country, inhabited largely by Rumanians, against the cities dominated by Hun¬ garians. It would be: the peasants, a majority of whom are Rumanians, against the Communists, a majority of whom in Transylvania are Hungarians. It would be: the opposition, led by Juliu Maniu the living symbol of Rumanianism, against the Groza government supported almost exclusively by the Hungarians who for almost a millenium had persecuted the Rumanians. Plainly the leading appeals would be similar to those of Wil¬ liam Tell, Giuseppe Garibaldi and Thomas Masaryk, who won their places in history by their fights for na¬ tional liberty. It seemed to me probable also that Lazar would urge his peasant hearers to direct their resistance at least indirectly beyond the Transylvanian Hungarians to the power which supported them, Soviet Russia. It was not difficult for one to foresee that the spoken and unspoken message of Lazar would be, “Arise, O Ru¬ manians, rally round Juliu Maniu and free yourself from the yokes of the Hungarian oppressors, the Com¬ munist Party which supports them, and Soviet Russia which uses them.” We drove north through the city of Dej, where I ob¬ served exactly the same outward evidences of Hun¬ garian-Communistic domination as in Cluj. Smeared over most of the walls were ugly caricatures of Maniu and imprecations of “Down with Maniu.” Also “Long live the Communist Party and the Groza government,” a narrow river on a crude, picturesque little ferry and “Long live Russia and Liberator Stalin.” We crossed

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during this involuntary delay, I had a chance to tal with a number of Dej people of Rumanian origin, who informed me that the Communists, most of whom were Hungarians, so completely dominated the place and used so much violence that opposition meetings were unthinkable. The Hungarian Communists there en¬ joyed special support from Bucharest and the Groza government, because the Minister of Railroads, one of the four chief Communist Ministers in the cabinet, was from Dej. He began his career there as a railroad worker and by attaching the name of the city to his own name, became Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. Most of the murderous shock troops serving the Groza govern¬ ment in Rumania are recruited from this Minister’s railroad workers. Russians personally ran the Ruma¬ nian railroad for many months and helped train the shock troops. Naturally the Minister would not want the opposition to dominate his own home town. He and his violent Hungarian comrades have prevented any such possibility Travelling two hours north from Dej to the very picturesque city of Baie Mare, which means Big Mine, where Ilie Lazar was to hold a congress, I found a similar condition existing. The Hungarians dominated there also. Visiting the mayor’s office, I found myself in the presence of a Hungarian official, and the gentle¬ man who received me at the headquarters of the police was also a Hungarian. Throughout the city, smeared over the pavements, sidewalks and walls of buildings in paint that was still wet, were huge signs, “Down with Maniu.” In addition to this rather crude government propaganda against Lazar’s rally, Groza’s people had planned a countermeeting in the choice central square of the city, while the National-Peasants had been rele¬ gated to the sport arena on the edge of town. Judging

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from past experiences I expected a clash and feared that before the day ended blood would flow. The city officials also appeared worried but assured me that if the opposition behaved, the government forces wouldn’t start anything. On the way into Baie Mare, as I rumbled over hill and through dale, in my grand and stately machine, I noticed many well-dressed peasants along the road, most walking but some in wagons and on horseback. I was surprised at the number of vehicles because the peasants had been warned by Communists, sent through¬ out the villages, that if they went to the opposition congress in carts, their teams would be immediately requisitioned They had ignored this warning and at¬ tended the congress in large enough numbers to over¬ come lawlessness on the part of Communists. My Ru¬ manian companion in the auto waved at the peasants in a friendly manner as we passed them, but got no response because they had grown accustomed to believe that anyone who rides in an automobile, especially in one as grand as my lumbering taxi, must be a government supporter. On reaching town, we parked Old Chrys in a yard and wandered about to see the converging crowds. Soon there arrived along every highway, long columns of singing, gaily dressed peasants, six or eight abreast, carrying national flags and party banners. At the head of most of the columns were men on horseback, with broad ribbons representing Rumania’s red, blue and yellow, tied over one shoulder and under the other. They were singing the royal hymn, the national anthem and popular old revolutionary songs calling the nation to liberate itself from foreign oppressors. Moving through the principal street past the square, where the government was to hold its meeting, the peasants as-

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sembled at the large imposing Cathedral. It was soon packed with banner-bearing worshippers; a vastly larger number waited outside. The Greek Catholic Bishop sat alone and impressive in the Bishop’s chair, almost a throne, as his associates read mass and his leading priest delivered a short non¬ political sermon. The Greek Catholic (or uniate) church has a strong influence in northern Transylvania in contrast with the Eastern Orthodox Church which enjoys the allegiance of most Rumanians in the Old Kingdom. For more than a century Greek Catholic priests have been among the principal leaders of Tran¬ sylvanian Rumanians in their struggles against imperial Hungarian oppression. After the peasants had filed out of the Cathedral at the conclusion of mass, they marched in long wide columns along the edge of the city to the football arena, avoiding the direct road through the central square. On the fence around the sport field, in fresh whitewash, were scrawled in enor¬ mous letters the words “Tong live Groza,” “Down with Maniu.” That was the reception which the Hun¬ garians of Baie Mare had prepared for the Rumanians. I went from the Cathedral to the government meet¬ ing in the central square and listened to the addresses that were being given from the balcony of an adjoining building.

Not more than 400 people were present and

only a minority of them wore peasant clothes. They didn’t show a great deal of enthusiasm and only a minimum of interest in the tridaes of the speakers, though they occasionally shouted “Down with Maniu.” None of these peasants had come in their own vehicles; none had walked in. Most of them had come in govern¬ ment vehicles. In contrast with this the vast majority of the peas¬ ants throughout the whole countryside had spurned the

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trucks which the government had sent to all the vil¬ lages to bring them into town. Likewise the govern¬ ment imposed mayors and village clerks who had been ordered to conduct as many peasants as possible to the government’s counter-rally had found very little favor¬ able response. Going from the government meeting to the sport arena I found a very different situation. Many thou¬ sands of peasants were pressing around a flimsy speak¬ er’s platform. A semi-circle of horse-guards surrounded the crowd ostensibly to drive away Communist maraunders, but actually to lend color and flair to the occa¬ sion. I doubt if a few score of gaily dressed men, how¬ ever brave, on untrained farm horses would stand much chance against fierce Communist shock troopers. However, there were enough hard-handed, grim peas¬ ants not on horseback to dispose of any ordinary at¬ tack. The Communists seemed to realize that and let the meeting pass without interference. Girls in native costumes sat on the grass about the edges of the sport field. The list of speakers was far too long for the taste of a weary and somewhat jaded journalist who had grown tired of hearing politicians repeat the same tirades. But the peasants hadn’t grown tired since they hadn’t had a chance to attend opposition political meetings for many years and they rarely got a chance to see their hero, Ilie Lazar. Consequently, they were willing to endure an almost endless string of preliminary minor orators and finally when he sailed in they seemed eager to listen to him for hours. Fortunately he didn’t put them to a test. Through long experience and due to much ingenuity, he knew how to captivate a peasant crowd.

He had been

born in that vicinity in a village home, and that fact created a bond of fraternity and solidarity. In addition,

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he was handsome, vivacious, romantic-appearing. He was known to come and go in unexpected ways, and was always able to tell his listeners about the months he had spent in jail. This gave him the aura of a hero, which indeed he was. In addition, he had a stock of whole¬ some jokes and knew many favorite songs. Likewise, he had a very simple way of seeming to carry on a con¬ versation with the crowd so that his hearers felt they were sitting around a table with him. Peasants seem to like that. I suppose most people like to feel they are sitting around a table talking as equals with a famous hero. At such meetings, Lazar usually began by using his own first name, saying, “Ilie wants to make a little con¬ tract with the people. If they’ll let him do the talking without interrupting with too much applause, he’ll let them do the talking some other time.” Liking this, they promised to be quiet and Lazar waded in, attack¬ ing evil in all its forms, but especially in those forms ex¬ emplified bv the policies of the Groza government. He never attacked Russia. On the contrary he called up a good deal of past evidence to show that the NationalPeasant Party had always been a friend of Russia, which assertion was well founded, but he also added quite unequivocally that Rumania wanted to be a friend and not a slave. Naturally he spent considerable time assuring his Rumanian listeners that the Rumanians in Rumania don’t want to be slaves of the Hungarians either, to which his admirers vociferously shouted “amen.” Then he said that Groza was using the Hun¬ garians as instruments for oppressing Rumanians which produced an even greater volume of even more thunder¬ ous “amens.” The people who had come to hear Lazar seemed to know why they came, many walking for miles

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555

over stony roads, carrying their shoes in their hands so as not to wear them out. The main reason was that they wanted to hear good words about Juliu Maniu and bad words about Petru Groza. No less—perhaps even more—they enjoyed words in praise of American democracy and American good-will toward Rumania. Whenever an opposition speaker found his audience getting lethargic, all he needed to do was to say “America” which aroused them again. One of the most dramatic and indignant moments of the meeting was when Lazar read a telegram announc¬ ing that National-Peasant Minister Emil Hatieganu couldn’t come on scheduled time because Communist ruffians of non-Rumanian origin had stopped him at Dej. After the long series of speeches had ended with rousing songs, the peasants marched peacefully through the streets carrying their banners and shouting “Long live Maniu,” “Long live Ilie Lazar.” Eventually they returned to their distant villages apparently well satis¬ fied. The most impressive political meeting I had seen in Communist ruled Rumania ended without clashes and made the counter-attraction which the government had arranged seem a sad political blunder. It demon¬ strated the overwhelming numerical strength of the opposition and the unmistakable feeling of the Ruma¬ nian peasantry. I had arrived at that meeting on the football field late, because of my visit to the government rally in town. As I entered the arena and took my place at the edge of the crowd one of the villagers said “the American correspondent!” The word spread like a prairie fire that an American was present and the meeting was in¬ terrupted by the multitude’s shouting “Traiasca America !” (Long live America). After that had con-

556

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

tinued for quite a while, the peasants began to say in unison, “We want to see the American! We want to see the American!” My efforts to remain inconspicuous had failed and since I was causing more disturbance by remaining in the crowd than by going to the rostrum I made my way through the multitude, climbed on to the platform and sat down at the press table amid cheers, after which the oratory was resumed. Among my news¬ paper colleagues on the platform were two Russian cor¬ respondents. After the peasant meeting ended I was invited to lunch with local National-Peasant celebrities and lis¬ tened to several toasts to America. At their conclusion, Ilie Lazar suddenly disappeared in his customary fashion and I drove to the border city of Satu Mare, 40 miles away for a quick visit. I spent the evening and most of the next day there studying relations between the Hungarians and the Rumanians in a place whose return to Hungary was urgently being demanded by the whole Hungarian nation. I visited judges, churchmen of all denominations and both nationalities, Jews, work¬ ers, teachers, officers, many government officials and journalists. Rarely have I been in a city of greater ten¬ sion. It is built around a large pleasant park in the midst of which stands a fine new Russian monument in honor of Red Army soldiers who fell for the fatherland. About the square and in neighboring streets are im¬ posing churches, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Pres¬ byterian, Eastern Orthodox. New buildings abound, a broad, well-paved, newly built avenue leads away from the park towards the edge of the city. The steady, spacious, uncomfortable old hotel in which I stayed was a reminder of Magyar feudal splen¬ dor, the market places were fragrant with all sorts of good things to eat, spring flowers filled the yards, and

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Satu Mare presented the outward appearance of a pros¬ perous, happy community. But that appearance was completely deceptive. In reality the Satu-Mareans were worried, angry and frightened. Jews before the Second World War formed a fairly large part of the popula¬ tion, but most of them had been exterminated by the Hungarian Nazis, and the few who remained, along with others who had settled there after the war, told me of militant Rumanian anti-Semitism. Only the night before there had been a bloody clash between Ruma¬ nians on the one hand and Jews along with Hungarians, on the other. Some of the wounded were then in the hospital. A Jew in the hotel assured me that they had sent to a Russian garrison in a nearby city for protec¬ tion. I am not sure the statement was true but the Jew believed it and approved it. He wanted the Rus¬ sian occupying army to remain in that part of Rumania as long as possible in order to force the Rumanians to be good to Jews. All the local Rumanians with whom I talked, whether in the government or opposition, were united in bitter opposition to the Hungarians, and unanimously insisted that Satu Mare should remain part of Rumania. The number of Rumanians support¬ ing the Groza government there seemed infinitesimal. A few weeks later, the Allies announced that the city was to remain in Rumania. The most interesting of my conversations took place in the office of the editors of the local Hungarian Com¬ munist newspaper which that very day had carried a fierce front page attack against me, because of dis¬ patches of mine the Voice of America had broadcast to Rumania. However, in spite of this long hostile edi¬ torial, the editor on seeing me at the prefect’s office had urged me to come and visit him. When I reached his editorial office I found both him and his colleagues

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courteous, though very earnest.

They protested the

awful strain existing between Rumanians and Hun¬ garians, assured me that the Rumanian nationalists around Maniu were as cruel as fascists, and told me that daily clashes occurred throughout the countryside on account of which the lives and property of all local Hungarians were in the greatest danger. They tried to convince me that nothing could bring harmony to Transylvania, including Satu-Mare, but a continuation of the Groza government and the “democracy” which it had established. They accused me personally of hav¬ ing made the bad situation worse by not playing up Groza and urged me for the sake of the Hungarians to change my attitude. The editor added without equivocation that the Hun¬ garians’ only hope was the fact that Satu Mare was not far from the new Russian border which would make it possible in case of future persecutions, even after peace and formal evacuation, for that army to inter¬ vene and prevent Rumanian fascists from massacring Hungarian democrats. I made no comment but it seemed to me that such Hungarian tactics were disastrous. Some day, after months or maybe years of Russian oc¬ cupation, the Rumanians will again be masters in Tran¬ sylvania, which is part of their country, and they will not forget the Hungarians who worked with foreign oppressors for Rumanian humiliation. I could not but feel warm sympathy for the Hungarians in Satu Mare as well as in all other Transylvanian cities, but their future is hopeless unless on their own initiative they find a way to live at peace with their Rumanian neigh¬ bors who inescapably constitute the “dominant factor Attractive little Satu Mare resembles scores of other Transylvanian cities in that it is a modern Babylon of hate.

The Hungarians there urgently besought me to

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help save them by winning America’s support for the Groza government, while the Rumanians with equal ardor urged that I induce America to save them by opposing the Groza government. Many of the Hun¬ garians there detested the Communist Party, practically all of whose members were Hungarians, but supported it because it was aided by the Rumanian State in perse¬ cuting Rumanians. The Rumanian aversion for Hun¬ garians attained the pitch of a murderous passion. The Rumanian Jews detest the Hungarian Jews and viceversa, while 95% of the Rumanians could hardly find words to express their hostility to the occupying Rus¬ sians. Strange to say, while the Hungarians in Satu Mare clung to the Russians as saviors, most of the Hungarians fifteen miles distant, across the border in the Magyar motherland, opposed the Russians even more vigorously than the Rumanian nation did. As a result of all this hatred, Hungarians constantly feared their windows would be broken or their church doors smashed by Rumanians, and the Rumanians feared vicious attacks by Hungarian Communists. Feelings in Transylvania ran so high and Rumanian hostility toward the Communist-dominated govern¬ ment at Bucharest was so furious that if any American in any car bearing an American flag toured any part of the province the population of every Rumanian vil¬ lage flocked about him and, defying all detectives, loudly implored him to have America help free Ru¬ mania. Transylvanian Rumanians crowded about an American as hungry chickens about a woman with corn —they were hungry for elemental civic decency and security. From Satu Mare I returned to Baie Mare where I spent the night with the Greek Catholic Bishop in a comfortable bishopric overlooking a beautiful court-

560

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yard in full spring bloom. Although I’m a Protestant from a rather fanatical family of Protestant preachers and am warmly attached to the Protestant cause, I felt at home with Transylvania Catholics, whether Greek or Roman. My ancestors taught me that Rome was the harlot of Babylon and I thought there was much truth in what they said but Pve discovered so many other Babylons that are now worse that I don’t gather up my skirts when passing a Catholic as I used to. My passion for individual freedom and personal worth was never so strong as now, because of which I condone none of the totalitarianism that has been fostered by the Roman Catholic Church. But I have come to see that all Christians are my allies in lighting against imperial despotism and I need allies. Hitlerism and Communism scorn the whole basis of Christianity and human decency. They use lies, violence and personal degradation as their main instruments. They fill all lands they dominate with fear and crime and falsehood. They impose spiritual debasement and cultural sterility. They destroy the best that men and women have created through the ages. Having ob¬ served their activities at first hand for many years, I know that their totalitarianism if triumphant would turn the world into a dungeon and I belong to the host of humble people who are against that. Fortunately, the Catholics are also against it. That draws me to cooperate with them. Regrettably, humanity has been forced into a single major fight: for and against imperial Communist tyranny. If the Communists should win, the Protestant Church would be temporarily done for; consequently, from the narrow Protestant point of view I welcome Catholic allies in this fight. Also, if Communist tyranny won, humankind would be done for, so from the broader

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point of view I welcome Catholic allies. In addition, I recall that in Austria and Hungary, where I spent many years during Nazi ascendancy, my fellow Protestants made a worse record in opposing Naziism than the Catholics. Both records were pretty bad, but ours was the worst. Consequently I find that I feel at home with Greek, or even Roman, Catholic churchmen. Some may be rather warped and narrow but so are some of my beloved Protestant brethren. I find I greatly prefer a church of any kind to a Nazi club or a Communist headquarters, whence truck-loads of ferocious armed bruisers constantly sally forth to kill their neighbors. I like to listen to the reading of the Gospels in any language by any clergy and am pleased to hear a bless¬ ing said at meal even by a Catholic Christian. I like to see pictures of Jesus, on whatever wall they may be hung, prefer a prayer to a Communist imprecation and choose reverence for God and eternal things rather than the cynical exaltation of animal indulgence by atheists that presume to scorn the cosmos. In view of all this, I enjoyed association with Ruma¬ nian Catholics, though not to the exclusion of others. One of my half dozen closest friends in Rumania was a Seventh Day Adventist preacher. I preferred his simple suit to a priest’s vestments. I also enjoyed his phrase¬ ology, though I don’t use it. I rejoiced to see him carry his Bible wherever he went and admired the unshakable faith that determined all his actions. He, too, dissemi¬ nated some errors just as the priest did, but on the grand basic issues, he was grandly right and nobly courageous. I’d be glad to walk and fight beside the priest, the Adventist fundamentalist and all my Chris¬ tian brethren. With such thoughts in my mind and such feelings in my heart, I enjoyed an ample dinner,

562

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

a refreshing breakfast and long conversations in Baie Mare’s hospitable Greek Catholic Bishopric. The following morning Old Chrys took me over a series of splendid mountain ranges to the village of Ocna Shugatag near the Russian border, in the district of Maramuresh where Ilie Lazar was to hold a National-Peasant congress. The logical place for the meeting would have been in the city of Sighet, the ad¬ ministrative center of the district, but besides being ac¬ tually on the border it is one of the principal Red Army centers in Rumania, in view of which Lazar preferred to hold his rally in a village fifteen miles distant. As we approached the meeting place, passing one village after another, I noticed no signs on the walls and fences except “Long live Juliu Maniu,” which seemed to be written everywhere. That indicated we were in a purely Rumanian area. The proportion of Transylvanian Rumanians who would write “jos (down with) Maniu” on a wall is about as small as the proportion of Ameri¬ cans that would write “jos George Washington.” In a number of villages we passed under newly erected arches with words of welcome to Ilie Lazar and on reaching our destination found the meeting in full swing. The audience was composed entirely of peasants, clothed in rather badly frayed homespun white clothes. Both the men and women seemed poor and backward. I got the impression that life in that isolated mountain area was meager and hard. The participants had come from thin-soiled fields on sterile mountain sides and had left small plows pulled by underfed oxen to come and hear about politics. For people enclosed in a mountainencircled retreat at the end of the world and who had little to eat except cornmeal, with even insufficient quan¬ tities of that, they appeared strangely interested in na¬ tional and international affairs. They carried Rumanian

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

563

flags, sang Rumanian songs and gave their closest atten¬ tion to speeches about Rumanian independence. I won¬ dered what it all meant to men many of whom could hardly read and had nothing to read, even if they could. I discovered the reason after the congress, when I vis¬ ited the city of Sighet, which was then serving as a depot for war prisoners coming from Russia and going to Russia. Sighet used to be the last Rumanian station on the railroad line from Bucharest to Prague. As the train waited for baggage and passport inspection one could look across the narrow Tisza River to “Subcarpathian Ruthenia,” which then formed the tip end of Czecho¬ slovakia. Now as one looks across the river he sees Russia, because the Soviets took that Czechoslovak province from their allies, the Czechs. In fact, they have no neighbor in Eastern Europe from which they didn’t take territory. Of course the pretext for the an¬ nexation of the small mountainous district inhabited largely by Ukranians was that the local Ukranians wanted to become part of great Ukraine, one of the chief Soviet republics. Maybe they did. In any case, under Red Army occupation it wasn’t difficult for enter¬ prising Russian Bolsheviks to create a local committee and induce it in the name of democracy and the Atlantic Charter to transfer that Czechoslovakian territory to Russia. Prague, occupied by the Red Army, found wis¬ dom in acquiescence and said it didn’t want the district anyhow, way out there at the end of Europe. But the Ukranian Communists were not satisfied with one such deal and aspired to acquire a piece of Rumania also, that is, an additional piece, since Russia had already taken Bessarabia, part of Bucovina and even a little slice of the old Rumanian kingdom. The extra portion that the Ukranians wanted was the area

564

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

about Sighet, which is called Maramuresh and contains a few Ukranians—perhaps one in five of the inhabi¬ tants. They didn’t plan an outright annexation, as the first step, but rather the setting up of an autonomous Ukranian administration. It was not difficult for them to bring that about, since the area was entirely cut off from the world because of broken rail lines and the high snow in the mountain roads; in addition, it was crowded with Russian troops. Of course, it was under martial law. The Red Army was unreservedly in control. Taking advantage of the situation energetic local Ukranians, during February 1945, while the war against Germany was still raging and Rumania was doing its best to help the Allies, held two secret meet¬ ings, one in the city of Sighet and the other in an Ukranian village, at which it was voted, by Ukranians summoned for the purpose, that they should convert Rumanian Maramuresh into an autonomous province with an Ukranian administration. And no sooner said than done. Ukranians seized the mayoralty, prefecture and other government offices, both of the city and dis¬ trict, and placed in them their national partisans. Bu¬ charest was too far away to act and was too weak to do anything anyhow. Besides, it was occupied by Russians. However, the local peasants themselves reacted. They pulled a Lexington. First, in order to establish the historical fact that the people of the area didn’t want an autonomus Ukrain¬ ian administration, they signed protests against the coup, which was a very dangerous thing to do. To pro¬ test even orally against the acts of a dictatorial regime is always perilous, to do it in wartime is doubly so, and to sign such a protest, black on white, is a triple risk. Yet practically the whole Rumanian population of the area signed up. The action had to be carried out very

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

565

rapidly, before the men who circulated the protests, mostly Greek Catholic priests, could be arrested. The peasants realized this and when the lists appeared in the villages, pressed around to sign them. The Ruma¬ nian initiators of the action were subsequently seized and sent into Russia, at least taken out of Rumania. Rut that wasn’t the end of the action. A few weeks later a large number of peasants assembled from all parts of the mountainous region and marched on Sighet to recapture the administration buildings. Most were unarmed but they managed to get hold of a cannon that had been left by some army in a fortress on one of the hills. It was probably quite useless but its seizure showed that the peasants meant business. As the unorganized multitude of moccasin-shod farmers, wearing white sheepskin caps, baggy-legged, white pants, and long white shirts, with the tails hanging out, surged toward town to defy the Red Army at the height of its power, they presented a spectacle much more magnificent than ludicrous. The world’s capitals have been filled with lies about “people’s governments” in Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan and other places. Some people with college diplomas daily debase their knowledge in order to de¬ ceive the simple about such things. But here were a mass of very simple people who looked truth straight in the eye and risked their lives for it. The plain folks of Sighet didn’t want a phony “people’s government” such as have been set up all over eastern Europe; and they tried to depose an incipient one. Of course, they were easily stopped, after a little bloodshed. The local gendarmerie, reinforced by Red Army soldiers wearing civilian clothes, was sent to the city entrance and the autonomous Ukranian adminis¬ tration was saved. A number of the revolutionary Ru¬ manian leaders were arrested and others fled.

The de-

566

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

feated peasants returned home in distress.

They looked

from their hills across the narrow river separating them from the vast Bolshevik empire, and wondered if they too were soon to be swallowed up and turned into help¬ less mass men, working under the daily orders of bosses in kolkhozi. Poor as they were, they loathed such pros¬ pects. Fortunately their dramatic protest was heard and a regular Rumanian administration was restored to Maramuresh. It was certainly not a good adminis¬ tration; indeed it was not even Rumanian, because it had been created by Dr. Groza’s Communist Cabinet, which favored non-Rumanians. But in any case, Mara¬ muresh remained as an inalienable part of the Ruma¬ nian kingdom. And that was what the people wanted above all. As my old Chrys, taking us back to Cluj, strode nobly and noisily over the mountains and through the valleys, we observed in the various towns and villages, what seemed to me numberless deserted houses; Jews had once lived in them. The former occupants had been wiped out by Hungarian Nazis. These windowless, doorless, wind-swept wrecks which were once the cozy homes of happy families stood as sinister symbols of the terrible hatreds which rock Rumania. Unfortu¬ nately the Groza government, in spite of all its fine words, has only intensified the striving for retribution and vengeance. As I left the village of Ocna Shugatag near Sighet, where I had attended Ilie Lazar’s animated peasant congress, I saw him speed away toward the south in his automobile accompanied by about five people serving as bodyguard. I hoped he would escape arrest by the Russians or their subservient Rumanian agents and in¬ deed he did.

Shortly after returning to Bucharest, I

saw him in Hotel Athenee Palace, so knew that he was

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

567

safe. But a few days after he had arrived, Communist policemen appeared in his modest apartment and took him off to jail. He was later condemned to a long prison term. He is not among the ablest Rumanian politicians and does not pretend to be a great statesman. His views may be as narrow as his devotions are flaming. His only pretention was to help establish government of, by and for the Rumanian people. He was happy to pursue that aim under the direction of Juliu Maniu who is Ru¬ mania’s greatest statesman and to whom Lazar was unreservedly devoted. As I betake myself each night to a comfortable bed and arise free and unrestricted, each morning, I am sad¬ dened to think of Ilie Lazar pining away in a tiny cell only because he has critized Communist tyrants as he once criticized Nazi despots. After that journalistic tour, conditions in Transyl¬ vania grew steadily worse. All opposition meetings were soon forbidden, the National-Peasant Party was outlawed, its chief leaders were arrested and all Ruma¬ nians in the country were subjected to an unconditional Communist dictatorship. Rarely has the question of Rumanian-Hungarian relations in Transylvania been so far from solved. Bolshevik tyranny has only made them worse as it has accentuated national rivalries throughout the Balkans.

568

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XXX RUSSIA SEIZES THE DANUBE Moscow, in order to add an extra chain to the bonds with which it binds Rumania, has seized the Danube, trunk, tributaries and Delta. To be sure, desultory consultations have taken place between Russia and the Western Powers on this mater, but not in a nature seriously to weaken Muscovy’s control. Stalin has a hold on the waterways of southeast Europe, such as no Russian Czar ever approached. For more than a century a struggle’ has been going on between Europe and Russia over the use of the con¬ tinent’s greatest river system. Prior to World War II Europe had won. It had kept Russia from hogging the Danube, and had used the river for every nation’s good. However, in 1941 Russia laid hands upon it and Gen¬ eralissimo Stalin now dictates to the Danube almost as unconditionally as to his own splendid Volga. Abraham Lincoln once said that for the peace and prosperity of the United States the Mississippi River must flow unhindered to the sea. That was one of the reasons he didn’t want the Union divided. He didn’t want one state controlling the delta of a river that serves a dozen states. But Russia for a century has striven to seize the delta of a river directly serving seven states, not including Russia. The Danube hardly serves Russia at all—not much more th'ari the Missis¬ sippi serves Georgia. In the Middle Ages enterprising robber knights, whose grim castles can still be seen by the dozens, used

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

569

to seize vital points along the Danube and hold up all passing ships for toll. The lucrative racket acquired a certain amount of respectability, as royal rackets often do. Exploited humanity has the sad habit of accepting and half way approving crimes which it can’t prevent. Now Russia has followed the examples of those pic¬ turesque old extortioners and placed itself at the Danube’s mouth with Red Army, Red Fleet and Red diplomats. The waters of the mighty Danube, pouring from a grand network of 60 navigable tributaries, which with the mother stream fructify 300,000 square miles, and serve a larger number of states than any other stream in the world, are discharged into the Black Sea through a fan-like estuary that has three main channels, called St. George, Sulina and Kilia. Farmers, merchants, manufacturers, oil producers and timber raisers from Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslo¬ vakia, Austria and even Germany send grain, wool, oil, lumber, toys, pottery and other exports out to the world through those three channels and, in turn, half as many Europeans as there are inhabitants in the United States receive foreign imports through them. And the Delta plays no direct role in Russian foreign trade, certainly far less of a role than it does in the commerce of more distant lands. However, Russia has seized the Danubian outlet. And holds it as a carefully guarded treasure. The Russians have incorporated the northern bank and all its hinterland into the Soviet Union. Likewise, they hold all the Delta islands. By occupying Rumania they also exercise complete control over the Delta’s southern bank. In a word, they guard every channel of the estuary. And they have converted Dobrudja south of the Delta into a special Russian province, more rig-

570

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

idly controlled than the rest of Rumania. In 1944, the Red Army and Red Navy placed its hands on Dobrudja’s principal Black Sea port, Constantza and soon gave it the appearance of a Russian city. Its public buildings, hotels, and most of its private houses were partially or totally occupied by Russian soldiers, sailors, and civilians. For years after the end of the war the traffic of Constantza continued to be regulated by Rus¬ sian soldiers, many of them buxom Soviet W.A.C.’s. Harbor traffic was unreservedly in Russian hands. Many of the cottages and vacation hotels along the seacoast were taken by Russians—excepting those build¬ ings which they had wrecked or dismantled. Constantza and the surrounding area was the first district to be seized by Rumanian Communist revolu¬ tionists. Long before Vishinksy imposed Groza’s Com¬ munist government upon Rumania as a whole, a group of Rumanian Bolshevists in the presence of Red sol¬ diers seized Constantza’s administration buildings, ousted the local representatives of the pro-Allied coali¬ tion government functioning in Bucharest, and set up their own regime. Red Rumanians, carrying the same flag that flew from the Prut River eastward to the Kam¬ chatka Peninsula near Japan, turned Dobrudja into a temporary soviet. Its shore and harbor, river coast and sea coast installations, railroads and ships were placed at the service of Muscovy. Flaming red slogans urging the

workers

of

the

world to unite, glowed from public places, and sturdy dock workers were converted into Communist shock troops, seeking non-Communist heads to bash in. Thus Russia had a solid red path from re-annexed Bessarabia over the

Delta,

through

Communist-controlled

Do¬

brudja to Communist-governed Bulgaria. Russian tanks rumbled over the Danube’s pontoon bridges above the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

571

Delta, Russians drove most of the American-made au¬ tomobiles that were accustomed to float across on the ferries. Russian soldiers packed the trains rolling into Constantza and Russian-seized, Rumanian war-booty filled the freight cars waiting in long lines to be un¬ loaded at Constantza harbor into Russian-confiscated ships. Also, Rumania’s two other chief Delta cities, Braila and Galatz, were among the most heavily Russian-occu¬ pied places in the country. And being, centers of trade and industry both had brigades of the toughest Com¬ munist troopers in all Rumania. Into the Delta area itself no American was allowed to penetrate. We had a small naval mission at Con¬ stantza and a modest, pleasant mission house. But the activity of the Americans who worked there—usually one or two in number—was restricted to the routine duties of helping American ships load, unload and take on fuel. That, indeed, absorbed all their energies. They suffered so much humiliation at the hands of Constantza’s Russian masters that they scrupulously avoided adding new difficulties by appearing to scrutinize what was going on outside the harbor. The Delta was as completely closed to them as though it were a thousand, instead of fifty, miles away. Americans may recall that the mouth of the Danube is in Rumania, in which state we should have had as much right of supervision as the Russians. We lost many men fighting Rumania, we had substantial busi¬ ness interests there, we played a vital role in bringing Rumania out of Hitler’s camp into that of the Allies. But in spite of it all we could visit only the places which Russia condescended to open to us. The Delta was as rigidly forbidden as a Moscow bomb factory. No American boat could sail up its channels. No car carry-

572

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

ing an American Mission flag could travel along its roads. No American plane could fly through Delta skies and no American picnicker could eat sandwiches on the Delta islands. Over the wide stagnant marshes reigned silence. Through the broad wilderness of waving reeds sneaked mystery. The muffled paddles of the fisher folk said “keep away.” And the stolid peasants looked not to right nor left. The humiliations of many cramped generations had taught them out there on the margin of life that those suffer least who, though having eyes see not, and having ears hear not. There in the quiet marshes were watching the stern sentinels of a vast and expanding Red empire. In 1944 Muscovy pressed in its hands the prize toward which all of her great ones had grasped from before the time of the American Revolutionary War. It had cost much blood but the acquisition of it assured the bitterness that had accu¬ mulated from repeated humiliation. And Russia’s mas¬ ter would not relinquish it now! Act after act of Russia’s millennial drama has moved across that bleak geographical stage and at the end of every previous struggle she had been driven from the Delta. Grand, imperial armies have marched and fought and conquered there. Long columns of booted counts and sandaled serfs, of brassy generals and dullvisaged workers have swept over the plains of Bes¬ sarabia, Rumania, Dobrudja, Bulgaria, through valleys and across mountain ranges to victory and to glory, yet every time Europe had pushed Russia back from the Delta and the Danube. But now that has changed. Europe has disappeared. Great Britain is hard pressed on every front. France is distraught. And Russia is left triumphant beyond her wildest dreams along the Danube’s coveted shores.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

573

Why does she so cherish that waterway? Because it takes her into the heart of Europe. It’s a road to the mastery of a continent. It carries its master to the gates of seven states. It bestows economic power and military might. Possession of it gives Russia the gates to her neighbors’ yards. Russia sits at the toll gate of a highway into Europe and dictates terms for its use to Britain, France, Italy, the U. S. A. Russia sees her¬ self sending gunboats up to hear Strauss’s Blue Danube waltzes at Vienna, with not one sentinel daring to ask her, “Who goes there?” The Danube personifies the continent of Europe. It and its tributaries are as Europe’s main tree of life. Upon these branches are food and flowers, are shade and fragrance for Teuton, Latin, Magyar, Slav. A dozen nations bathe in its waters. It hears dirges and serenades in a score of tongues. Its waters traverse a labyrinth of borders and fructify the fields of a whole Babylon of peasants, wearing boots or moccasins or sandals, with shirt tails in and shirt tails out, with breeches tight as gloves or so prodigal of homespun cloth that each leg resembles a wide, pleated skirt. The Danube is a father to all these people. And in periods of peace when men work together, going to their fields with song or joyfully listening to the “clunking” of mill wheels, the Danube is a family stream, regulated by all the peoples for all the people. Such it has been for a hundred years. Without a free Danube, Europe couldn’t be free, and without a free Europe, the Danube couldn’t be free. The Danube sang songs of freedom to the Balkan peoples during all their days of slavery. It glowed in their revolutionary hymns. It played a role in their revolutionary exploits. So near was the Danube to them that echoes from its waves comforted them in dungeons,

574

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

and melodies from its currents lingering along the shores were as music for their holidays. Many genera¬ tions of shepherds, peasants and artisans’ sons gazing on the Danube’s waters heard them tell of a world of freedom over beyond the mountains whence the waters had come. Every bright spring after every dark win¬ ter the Balkan peoples renewed their rendezvous with the Danube and it was a rendezvous with hope. The most persistent struggle in the Danube area has been that of Europe against Russia. In 1812 Russia pushed its way to the Delta and established itself on its northern bank, but because of a continued conflict with Turkey did not become complete master. After Napoleon’s defeat central and eastern Europe attained a large degree of unity, with a single dynasty, the Hapsburgs, regulating the affairs of most of the small peoples there and playing a major role in controlling the Danube River. It contributed toward the establishment of a healthy Danubian tradition. But Russia became steadily stronger, grew conscious of its might, penetrated into Rumania, increased its domination over large parts of eastern Europe and step by step moved up the Danube Valley. At that point, Europe under British leadership reacted, drove Russia back, in the Crimean War (1853-1855), freed the mouth of the Danube and set up an European Commission to protect that freedom. Russia, England, France, Italy, Germany all sat upon it. It was Europe guarding Europe’s river. It was Eu¬ rope guarding Europe. Europe declared Rumania free from Russian encroachment and undertook to guaran¬ tee that freedom. About twenty years later in 1877, Russia continuing its southwest aggression, again plunged into war, won a great victory, re-established itself upon the Danube and re-grasped the Delta. It wiped out the stain of the

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

575

Crimean War, broke down the dike Europe had set up and flowed over the Danubian plains. Europe naturally became alarmed, reasserted itself again, took a bold stand at Berlin and restored international control of the whole Danube. However, it left Russia on the Prut River and in control of 100 miles of the north bank of the Delta. Nevertheless, a stable condition was re¬ established, Europe still prevailed and still guarded the border beyond which the subjugating, absolutist power of Russia could not encroach. Then passed more than three of the happiest decades in modern European history, during which men travelled more freely, felt securer, had greater respect for one another and felt more united than at any other time since Luther. Europe was Europe, acknowledging a common Christian morality and striving toward scien¬ tific progress, social improvements, cultural enrichment. There were many defects, a good deal of Hapsburgian oppression, and continuing subjugation of Poland, but humanity was hopeful and Europe, for the most part, preserved a condition of equilibrium with Russia. Then an over-aggressive and over-impatient Ger¬ many plunged us into the First World War, as a result of which Russia might have pushed its way straight into central Europe, sweeping away all borders, making itself master of the Straits and of the lower Danube. Russia’s great moment seemed to have come. But be¬ cause of internal dissension it suffered a catastrophic defeat, even though its partners were triumphant and its enemy was crushed. Russia was again pushed away from the Delta, forced from the Prut, shoved behind the Dniester and not even given a place on the Eu¬ ropean Delta Commission. The Danube was still free, the eastern European peoples saved, an equilibrium re¬ established. But it was an uneasy equilibrium, soon

576

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

destroyed by Nazi madmen who wiped out Europe along with themselves—at least temporarily. Now with Europe destroyed as a political entity, and its eastern border obliterated, Russia has surged to Berlin, Vienna and Trieste, pushes vehemently upon northern Greece and threatens to move to the Aegean Sea. Also, it has swallowed up the Danube. For the first time in history, Europe’s grandest stream has been made a Russian river. I don’t mean that Russia has refused to consider the creation of an international Danubian commission. Such is not the case. She is willing to have the riparian states participating with her in controlling Danubian navigation, if participation is confined to them. And at first glance that may seem right to some observers. One may ask, why should outside powers butt in to tell the Danubian countries how to run their affairs? How¬ ever, the situation is not so simple as such a question might indicate. After the Treaty of Versailles, which followed World War I, there functioned two Danubian Commis¬ sions, one qualified by the name International, the other by the name European. The first was created after the First World War to prevent Germany from exercising disproportionate influence over the smaller Danubian states and had its headquarters in a central European Danubian port, first at Bratislava, then at Vienna, later at Belgrade. Its members were all the riparian states, except Rumania, plus Great Britain, France and Italy! It worked well and fulfilled its purpose of protecting the

interests of Austria,

Yugoslavia and Bulgaria power.

Czechoslovakia,

Hungary^,

from Germany’s resurgent

Naturally, its very existence was resented by the Nazis.

It humiliated many Germans to see Britishers

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

577

and Frenchmen play leading roles in controlling naviga¬ tion upon a river that was partially German and in any case hundreds of miles from French and British bor¬ ders. It was especially obnoxious as a Versailles crea¬ tion and thus as a reminder of German defeat. So, when Hitler won domination over central Europe by force of arms he destroyed that Commission. He threw it into the Versailles waste paper basket, and made the Danube predominantly a German river. As he de¬ stroyed Europe he destroyed the European character of the Danube. But for many months he was forced to allow the older European Commission sitting at Galatz, Rumania, to supervise the Delta. It contained representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Rumania, and eventually Germany, and was political as well as technical. A little partial League of Nations with a self-sustaining budget, it was one of the best established international bodies on the continent, enjoying much authority and prestige. It kept the Delta channels dredged and secure, provided equal navigation opportunities for all peoples far and near and exercised juridicial power. Inasmuch as the Delta then with all its channels, banks and islands was exclusively in Rumania, the Rumanians were not altogether happy about an international Commission managing a portion of their sovereign territory. The European Commission seemed to them a state within a state and its presence tended to offend their pride. Con¬ sequently, relations between Rumania and the European Commission were discussed from time to time and the main causes of friction softened. Since Rumania re¬ mained a neutral land for two years after Germany at¬ tacked Poland, Germans, Frenchmen and Britishers continued to sit together on the European Commission in Rumania’s Galatz.

578

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

It was a strange sight to see representatives of states that were furiously trying to destroy each other sit at the same council table. But a more immediate and vital menace to the Commission than Hitler’s war against Britain was German-Russian rivalry. Although Russia had signed a pact with Hitler in 1939 for dividing up Europe, even the world, the Nazi and Communist dic¬ tators both coveted the Danube Delta. Hitler, follow¬ ing imperialistic German trends, wanted to make the Danube a German river, while Stalin, following cen¬ tennial Russian aims, was determined to make it a Russian river. September 1940 Vishinsky emphatically told the German Ambassador in Moscow that Russia was in¬ terested in all Danubian questions, even to the regula¬ tion of traffic in central Europe. He didn’t want any Danubian Conference held any place about any matter without Russia’s participation. Molotov categorically stated in writing that he wanted both Danubian Com¬ missions wiped out and a single new one created, con¬ trolling the whole river from Austria to the sea, com¬ posed of German, Slovak, Hungarian, Yugoslav, Bul¬ garian, Rumanian and Russian representatives. Italy and all western powers were to be excluded. Such were Moscow’s aims in 1940, before Russia had won or even entered a war. Such were Russia’s views when talking to the mighty Third Reich at the height of German power. Today, in pressing up the Danube, Moscow faces not a triumphant Germany pushing hard upon its borders, but distant America and an impoverished Brit¬ ain. Russia’s appetite for Danube control is greater now than in 1940 and the obstacles she faces are far smaller than when Hitler dominated the continent and was hoping to win domination over the world. In October 1940 dynamic Hitler wished to prevent

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

579

a quarrel with Stalin, who was his very dynamic partner in breaking up Europe, so decided to stall on the Danubian question. He suggested a Danube conference at Bucharest. Rumania, most interested of all, and the land in which the Delta lay as well as the state of which Bucharest happened to be the capital, was not seriously consulted. Since Hitler and Stalin had already parti¬ tioned that country without its consent, why should they take the trouble to consult it on such a little matter as the Danube Delta? However, Rumania was allowed to attend the conference, watching itself being ground fine between two millstones. Naturally, Hitler agreed to have France and England kicked off the European Commission. He enjoyed joining with Stalin in kicking England around. Both dictators revelled in that sport. At the conference, which proved to be stormy and futile, Russia demanded that Italy also get off the Com¬ mission and insisted that the Delta be administered by Russia and Rumania alone, with the warships of all other nations excluded. Russia foresaw, of course, that Rumania would be a Russian puppet, leaving Moscow absolute master of the entrance to the Danube. Hitler’s tough emissaries saw that, too, as they heard Molotov unconditionally proclaim Russia’s intentions of wiping out a century’s humiliation and taking over the keys to one of the chief fates of the European fortress. Conse¬ quently they rejected Russia’s demands. The conference failed and was postponed, but not until it had provided Russia with an excellent occasion to vent its anger against Great Britain. During the Bucharest negotiations from which England was absent, the British Ambassador at Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, protested against the suppression of the Eu¬ ropean Commission and Vishinsky showed in a sharp note that he found much pleasure in excluding Britain

580

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

from a Commission from which Britain had been largely instrumental in excluding Russia a fifth of a century earlier. The Bucharest Delta Conference held in the fall of 1940 was resumed in Paris in the summer of 1946, with Bevin and Byrnes taking Hitler’s place. Molotov was as adamant as ever and made the same proposal for one Danube Commission, consisting of Russia and the six riparian states of Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria. Since five of them are Russian puppets Moscow’s proposal for an inter¬ national commission was merely a plan for turning the whole Danube over to the Soviet Union. Great Britain and the United States of America re¬ jected Molotov’s demands and reasserted that true in¬ ternational control over the Danube is for the best in¬ terests of all the Danubian states, as well as for world peace. They said all commercial powers have a para¬ mount interest in keeping the Delta open, and opposed Russia’s closing the gates. But that had no practical effect; Russia slammed the gates and with a bang. Again, at the end of July 1948 an eleven-state Dan¬ ube Conference convened in Belgrade. The three Western Powers participated along with Russia and her satellites. Austria sat in as a subdued observer. The Soviet’s chief delegate was Andrei Vishinsky and he had a field day. Controlling seven votes out of ten, he was able to do anything he wished and he wished to do a lot. Directing a chorus of seven voices he was able to shout down the Western States and he did it— with gusto. Rarely has Muscovy had a chance to revel in such an overwhelming diplomatic triumph. Vishinsky called the Westerners imperialistic, and all his satellites ap¬ plauded. He declared the Westerners could no longer

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

581

exploit the poor little Danubian states and again the satellites cheered. In language worthy of a Calhoun or Clay he extolled state’s rights and each little satellite got up to repeat the phrase. Every sentence was false because Russia never gives state’s rights and every pro¬ posal was deceptive, for Russia allows no international control anywhere. But it was a gorgeous Muscovite show. Little Bulgaria and little Hungary stood up be¬ side Mother Russia and boldly told America “it could take it or leave it.” And that was actually the case. Russia did command the fortresses of Central Europe. Not relishing being ordered about by Ana Pauker, Sir Charles Peake speaking for Great Britain blustered, but it was only bluster. France uttered big words, but they only revealed French impotence. America solemnly proposed a counterplan, but it might just as well have been a plan to order the Danube to flow over the Alps. It was a waste of time and of nice words, as useless as Henry Ford’s peace ship. Russia presented a plan and imposed it. It exalted the “sovereign right” of every riparian state to prevent any non-red ship from entering its waters or from stop¬ ping at its docks or picking up so much as an ear of corn or sack of wool. It placed Moscow (and Rumania) in charge of the Delta; Moscow through Yugoslavia and Rumania in charge of the Iron Gates; Moscow through its Commercial Pacts or Sovroms in charge of every Danubian bill of lading. A century of history has been rolled back. Muscovy has

stormed the

Dardanelles ?

Danube.

Will

it now storm the

582

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Chapter XXXI A NEW CONSTITUTION Soviet Russia bolted the door of Rumania’s prison with a new Bolshevik constitution and added exterior bolts in the form of military pacts. The constitution was modelled on that of the USSR, and was rushed through a Communist Parliament in the course of a few hours. A measure revolutionizing Rumania’s whole social order received practically no discussion and was adopted without a dissenting vote. A document symbo¬ lizing the reversal of a thousand years of Rumanian history and overturning the traditions of more than fifty generations was as lightly and jubilantly acclaimed by alleged “Representatives of Rumania” as though it were the announcement of a victory in a college foot¬ ball game. Such was the state of general helplessness to which the Kremlin and the Red Army had reduced the Rumanian nation during the period from August 1944 to March 1948. This does not mean that the constitution is actually a binding set of basic laws or that the Rumanian Com¬ munist regime may be expected to observe its own basic stipulations. The “people’s rights” which it enumerates have not been implemented for a single day; and the restrictions it pretended to place on the power of the state were ignored from the beginning. Leading Com¬ munists have repeatedly proclaimed that a Bolshevik state, embodying “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” is designated to exterminate the bourgeoisie, “down to the last remnants,” and in view of that how can a con-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

583

stitution pretending to give civic rights of any kind be anything but hyprocisy? Every Bolshevist constitution that has yet been promulgated has proved to be an in¬ strument of deception. Nevertheless the Rumanian constitution has significance in that it reveals some of the chief aims of the Communist dictators. That the document was based on the Soviet constitu¬ tion was made abundantly clear by its framers. For in¬ stance, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, one of Rumania’s top four Communists, Secretary General of the Communist Party and “reporter of the constitution to the As¬ sembly,’’ declared that the “constitution promises new civic rights, proclaimed and guaranteed in no other con¬ stitution save that of the USSR and those of the new democracies modelled after it: the right to work, to education, to leisure, and to social security.” What the Soviet constitution aimed to do and did for the Soviet social order has been made clear by many Communist leaders. Each summer the promulgation of the Soviet constitution is celebrated in glowing speeches and articles. During the summer of 1948 the Bolshevik paper, “Pravda,” had this to say: “The Constitution is based on the thesis that society consists of two groups: workers and peasants, along with a people’s intelligentsia. The Constitution pre¬ supposes that the Communist Party is the vanguard of the workers in their struggle for the Socialist system and the nucleus of all proletarian organizations, official or unofficial. “On the basis of the

Constitution the

Bolshevik

Party guided the peoples of the USSR to great victories. The relation of class forces was completely changed. A new Socialist industry was created. The kulaks were abolished. The collective farm system was achieved.” This indicates that the Bolshevik constitution insured

584

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

the domination of a single group and brought about the seizure of all productive property, including peasant holdings. Exactly that is the aim of the Rumanian constitution. Minister Gheorghiu-Dej after boasting of the source of Rumania’s new constitution went on to point out that “it confirmed the abolition of archaic and reac¬ tionary institutions such as the Senate and that it pro¬ claimed the Grand National Assembly the sole author¬ ity in the State.” In a facetious manner he lauded the one-party system that was to be installed, using such words as: “From overseas might come the reproach that Rumania had not adopted a constitution according to which two po¬ litical cliques equally alien to the interests of the work¬ ing people succeeded one another at the helm. She might be reproached for not making room in her Parlia¬ ment for the trusted agents of the millionaires, the steel, oil, and canned-meat kings. It would not be sur¬ prising if De Gasperi were to cast doubt on Rumania’s democracy because she too did not send to all parts of the country 300,000 policemen armed with American machine guns.” Then the animated Communist Minis¬ ter exclaimed: “We are indifferent to the criticism and anger of the imperialists and their spokesmen. What matters is the people’s opinion.” As’there was no room for doubt regarding the nature of the constitution which the Soviet Union was about to foist upon the Rumanian people, there was no doubt about the nature of the Parliament. Communist chief Gheorghiu-Dej said: “The Grand National Assembly of the Rumanian People’s Republic is as different from the old Parliaments of the reactionary regimes and from those of the bourgeois democracies as heaven from earth. The Grand National Assembly consists of

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

585

hundreds of workers and peasants, members of the armed forces of all ranks, women, young persons, small traders, authentic representatives of the people.” Gheorghiu-Dej drew special attention to the presence of representatives of the army. “How could the Army remain indifferent to public affairs while it was itself the whole people’s concern!” he exclaimed. After that the Minister described in a decidedly in¬ criminatory manner, how the newly elected Parliament was to function. “The Grand National Assembly,” he said, “would differ profoundly from the old Parlia¬ ments in its method of work. The new deputies would cooperate in the preparation of political, social and economical measures and return to their own preoccupa¬ tions to watch how the decisions were applied.” When this flamboyant speech is subjected to prosaic observation two sinister aspects stand out among others. One is that the function of the members of the Assembly was to shout “Hurrah” (or Traiasca!), to applaud, to vote by acclamation and then return home “to their preoccupations.” They were rubber stamps in a rubberstamp legislature even as described by the man who was to use them. More characteristic than this were the members of the army sitting in the Assembly; they symbolized the army at the polls, the army functioning as a Party tool. All the soldiers and officers had voted. And they had voted openly as their chief, the Com¬ munist Minister of War Emil Bodnaras, had ordered them to vote. They had not dared do otherwise. They were actually functioning as Soviet Russia in Rumanian election booths; they aided Soviet Russia in sending “Representatives of Rumania” to a Rumanian Grand Assembly where they were to acclaim a constitution dispossessing the Rumanian people. Watch the Rumanian soldiers as they vote!

For

586

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

more than three years Soviet agents had been purging the army. For 37 full months the army had been under the control of traitors, who were in the service of four alien-minded Communists imposed by a foreign power. Thousands of officers had been fired, even more thou¬ sands had been dishonored, not a few were arrested. The Red Army occupied their land, Soviet officers had infiltrated into every Rumanian military organization, Communist political commissars were busy in every army unit, a massive campaign for Communist indoc¬ trination was being carried on night and day—even be¬ fore recruits were mustered in. In addition, promotions were being made on the basis of Communist ardor; at¬ tachment to Russia was a chief mark of army loyalty; Western democracies were being decried as fiendish; the “historical parties” were portrayed in every barrack and in every officers’ club as the personification of trea¬ son. In the face of such terror and pressure could sol¬ diers and officers, under the sharp eyes of Communist commissars, cast their ballots contrary to the orders of their commanders! Such were the elections that “chose” that Grand Na¬ tional Assembly. That was why the Assembly was so “different from bourgeois Parliaments.” In it sat, or stood, or shouted 414 members, of which 405 belonged to the One-Party Bloc. And the other nine members were affiliated with the Government Front. Seven of the nine were renegade “Liberals” that had split off from a renegade “Liberal” splinter, which the Com¬ munists had chucked into the political garbage can after using it 30 months. The other two non-government deputees were apostate “Democratic Peasant Party” acrobats who had earlier sprung out of Juliu Maniu’s Peasant Party and leapt onto the tail end of the gov¬ ernment band wagon without managing to get inside.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

587

The Communist government tolerated both the apos¬ tate “Liberal” and apostate “Peasant” residues in or¬ der to be able to tell the world that there was an oppo¬ sition. Actually the opposition shouted their acclama¬ tion of every Communist proposal as vociferously as the Communists themselves. Of the 405 government deputies in the Grand Na¬ tional Assembly 200 were outright Communists, 125 were camouflaged “Peasant” Communists belonging to Groza’s Plowman’s Front, and 45 were camouflaged “intellectual” Communists belonging to the National Popular Party. The rest were Hungarian deputies serving Groza, Communism, and the Kremlin. The Hungarians were happy to cooperate with Rumanian Groza in destroying Rumania. In the elections creating the Grand National Assembly, the one-party ticket was reported to have received 7,117,267 votes out of the 7,732,652 cast. Everything worked as smoothly as a good stone crusher; the Rumanian nation was rapidly propelled through the machine and its votes were poured into proper piles without one stone remaining uncrushed or one tooth of the Moscow-made crusher being broken. By March 28, 1948, the Rumanian nation had been brought to a situation where it could not help but provide what the government demanded. Whether or not more than 7,000,000 persons actually voted for the regime on that sinister March day is un¬ certain. No check of the polling or of the ballots was possible. The Communists could announce any figures they wished. They reported 4,000,000 more at the polls than had been recorded in the elections of Novem¬ ber 1946. Some Rumanian anti-Communists were of the opinion that not half as many as the 7,732,652 votes appearing in the official announcement had actu-

588

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

ally been cast, but they have no positive evidence to support their view. I myself believe that an oppressed nation frequently reaches a point of discouragement where open resistance is avoided. Russia was powerful, aggressive and physi¬ cally present at the election, while America was distant and passive. The leadership of the largest Rumanian church had succumbed, as had the army and much of the intelligentsia. The main people’s party was smashed and its leaders arrested, the only other national party was quiescent. Many peasants had suffered from re¬ sistance to Communists and the workers were regi¬ mented in a Communist controlled labor federation. In view of all this I am inclined to think that most of the humble Mr. and Mrs. Ionescus in ten thousand towns and villages voted as they were told. The Communists had the Assembly they sought. And it accepted the Communist constitution, which places power perpetually in the hands of the Communist Politburo, as is the case in the Soviet Union. The gov¬ ernment draft was submitted to Parliament on April 8, two days after the Parliament’s first meeting, and was unanimously adopted on April 13, with no funda¬ mental changes. Its 110 articles were reduced to 105 as a result of some streamlining. In many of its provisions and in most of its language the constitution appears to be democratic. The word “people” is repeatedly used and often in an eloquent manner. But in all cases democracy and people mean Communist dictatorship. The second article says: “The Rumanian Popular Republic has been created by the struggle of the Ruma¬ nian people headed by the working class against fascism, reaction and imperialism.” Those are the exact words Communists use to de-

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

589

scribe their movement. The words “against fascism, reaction and imperialism” mean in actuality that the Rumanian People’s Republic is directed against every¬ thing that is non-Communistic. Chapter two deals with “the economic-social struc¬ ture” of the Republic and its second article states: “The country’s wealth, mineral resources, waters and rivers, sources of natural energy, railways, land, water and air communication lines, posts, telegraphs, telephones and radio belong to the state as the people’s common possessions.” The next article reads: “The common property of the people constitutes the material founda¬ tion of economic progress and national independence of the Rumanian Popular Republic. Defense and develop¬ ment of the common property of the people is the duty of each citizen.” “Internal and foreign trade is regulated and con¬ trolled by the state.” It may also be carried on by the state. “When general interest demands, industrial means of production possessed by private persons may become state property.” “The state supports all who work.

Every citizen

is obliged to work.” “Citizens also have the right tO' rest. This rest is assured through organization of working hours, paid annual leaves in conformity with law, establishment of rest and health houses, clubs, public parks and special institutions.” “Land belongs to those who work. The state pro¬ tects the right of work of the peasants. It encourages and supports village cooperation. In order to stimulate development of agriculture, the state can create agri¬ cultural enterprises owned by the state.” “The state guides and plans national economy with a

590

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

view to developing the economic power of the country, to secure the well-being of the people and guarantee national independence.” This part of the constitution enabled the state not only to control every economic activity but also to lay hands on every sort of property including peasants’ fields. And the Communist government immediately set out to apply that right, namely to dispossess the na¬ tion “for the common good.” Such property confisca¬ tion was the essence of the constitution, the basic aim toward which the Communists had been working from the day they took power. Education received appropriate attention and the minorities were well provided for. Manifestation of race hatred was made punishable by law. The state undertook to support the development of art and science and to organize institutes for research, libraries, edi¬ torial offices, theaters, conservatories of music. Under this same general heading came the family, which was “to enjoy the protection of the state.” “Parents have the same obligation toward children born out of wed¬ lock as toward those born in wedlock.” All this was to be secularized; the church was to be reduced to liturgies and services of worship. The ar¬ ticle regulating this said: “Liberty of conscience and religious creed are guar¬ anteed by the State. Religious communities are free to organize themselves so long as their rites and practices are not unconstitutional or against public security or morals. No religious congregation or group can open or keep schools with general education. Only special schools where the performing of cults is (taught) are allowed and these must be under state control.” Then came a clause saying that the “individual lib¬ erty of citizens is guaranteed. No one can be arrested

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

591

and detained more than 24 hours without a warrant.” Another article stated that “freedom of press, speech, meeting, marching in processions and demonstrations are guaranteed.” What this “freedom” means was de¬ fined in the sentence immediately following which reads: “Possibilities to exercise these rights are guaranteed by the fact that the means of printing and place of meeting are at the disposal of those who work.” “Citizens also have the right to enter associations and organize themselves.” But there are qualifications. The right is conditioned on “the aim pursued.” It must not be “against the democratic order established by the Constitution. Any association of a fascist or anti¬ democratic character is forbidden and punished by law.” Plainly, freedom of speech, meetings, and organiza¬ tions is guaranteed only to Communists, and forbidden to anyone else. All such promises illustrate the cynicism of the constitution. According to basic Communist doctrine, as preached and practiced by all Communist regimes, the purpose of the Communist state is to ex¬ tirpate the bourgeoisie, yet the Rumanian constitution pretended to guarantee liberty to individual citizens. Characteristically at the moment that article was being unanimously and enthusiastically acclaimed by the As¬ sembly jails were filled with Rumanian citizens who didn’t even know why they were arrested and against whom no formal charge had been lodged. The clauses in the constitution regarding the source of authority are excellent, as far as mere words go. “The Grand National Assembly is the supreme organ of state power.” And, in theory, it is elected by the people. It is the only legislative organ. To it, in theory, everv state authority is responsible. It is headed by a Presidium of 19 members whose President serves as President of the People’s Republic. The Presidium ap-

592

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

pears to be the highest authority in the land, and is elected by a body that is elected by the people. It issues decrees with the force of laws, signs laws, interprets laws through decrees with binding force, and when the Assembly is not in session can do anything up through declaring war and concluding treaties. At any time it can ratify or denounce a treaty. The day-by-day work of the Assembly is not to be directed by the Presidium but by a Bureau consisting of a President, two Vice-Presidents and a Secretary. This establishing of a Grand National Assembly Bureau was a device enabling Communists to honor and reward vain intellectuals, whose prestige they sought, or to kick troublesome or ineffective Communists upstairs. first incumbents were of both categories.

The

The supreme Executive and Administrative Organ is the Ministerial Council or Government. “Its task is that of administrative leadership of the state; it co¬ ordinates and issues general directives to the respective ministries, guides and plans national economy, realizes the state budget, assures public order and security of state. The government leads the general policy of the state in the domain of foreign relations. It organizes and supplies forces of the army.” It is accountable to the Assembly for its activity and gives its oaths before the Presidium. Ministers may be members of the As¬ sembly or non-members. Ministers may be sued or con¬ demned for their acts. The Presidium may cancel a ministerial decision on grounds of unconstitutionality. All this appears very democratic and the arrange¬ ment for local government is equally ideal, as far as words go. It seems to be a long step in advance of previous Rumanian practices and appears to assure local self-government.

The country is divided into

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

593

regions, districts, sub-districts, communities. Local or¬ gans of authority are soviets or “People’s Councils.” They are “elected for four year terms by universal, direct, equal, secret voting,” and are responsible to the people. The people’s councils elect executive committees from their members to supervise the activities entrusted to them. And these duties are manifold. “The councils guide and run local economic social and cultural activity according to laws and dispositions of superior adminis¬ trative organs. They elaborate and execute the eco¬ nomic plan and local budget, keeping in mind the gen¬ eral national plan and general state budget, care for administration of local property and enterprises, main¬ tenance of public order, defense of the rights of inhabi¬ tants, respect and application of laws, and take imme¬ diate measures for the smooth running of local econ¬ omy.” The community soviets are designed to be sov¬ ereign masters in each community, but since they are elected by the people, are not the people masters? Only in appearance! The Supreme Court is responsible for the dispensing of justice throughout the country. “It supervises the whole activity of judicial organs.” Associated with it are the General Prosecutor and Assistant Prosecutors. “They pursue and punish crimes against the democratic order, the people’s liberty and national independence.” Under the Supreme Court is the network of “People’s Courts, which in all cases aside from those brought be¬ fore the Supreme Court dispense justice.” The phrase “people’s judges” sounds fine. It evokes a picture of hard handed men and women in town and village arrang¬ ing their disputes by reason and common sense without the intervention of slick city lawyers or learned judges

594

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

trying to seek loop holes in intricate paragraphs of mas¬ sive law books. Indeed most of the constitution sounds good with its constant references to people’s power, people’s rights and the responsibility of all authorities to the people. But, in actuality, the constitution merely confirms the seizure of absolute state power by a small group of persons at the head of the Communist Party. The con¬ stitution didn’t deliver that power to the Communists because it has no actual authority and the Communists already had put their hands on power. But it provides the Communists with legal justification for every abuse. It covers Communists chains with pretty red ribbons. Here is a picture o’f Rumania’s actual government system: Supreme power resides in the Soviet Union, which occupied Rumania militantly and politically in the autumn of 1944. It continued to keep a large army there through 1948 and, in addition, settled colonies of Russian civilians in many key places. Indeed, during July 1948 the Rumanian Government decreed that “citizenship can be granted with or without previous sojourn in the country to one who has rendered impor¬ tant services to the Rumanian People’s Republic.” So, if the Soviet Union wished it could settle any number of Russians in Rumania as Rumanian citizens. The Soviet Union, for the most part, exercises its supreme authority through the very small Politburo of the small Rumanian Communist Party. This body of men and women control the army, police, courts, and every other instrument of power. It directs every chan¬ nel of public expression and has suppressed all inde¬ pendent organizations or movements. Through the agency of the Communist Party the Politburo sets up local soviets or councils in every community, county and

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

595

district. These soviets are formally “elected” or con¬ firmed by the people who are allowed to vote only for Party appointees. The soviets are empowered to con¬ trol all economic activities and even to seize property if the Communist Party decrees. In addition, a Parliament or Great National As¬ sembly is set up by the Communist Party. Every four years it is “elected” or confirmed by the people who are not allowed to agitate for or vote for any one not a Communist appointee. From the 414 member As¬ sembly the Communist Party creates a 19 member Presidium which according to the constitution has enor¬ mous power. Actually the power of the Presidium is wielded by the Communist Politburo. There is also a Government or Cabinet which is the main vehicle of power. It is created by the Communist Party from any sources the Party may choose and is managed by half a dozen—or four—top Communists. There is no force in the state, from the smallest soviet in the last mountain village up to the Presidium, that in actuality can change any government decision or pre¬ vent any government measure. The constitution made by the Communist Party legalizes all this and formal¬ izes the exercise of absolute power by the Communist Party over life, liberty, property, thought expression, and the pursuance of happiness. Above all this is the Communist Party in Moscow. To strengthen this extremely powerful hold, the Soviet Union imposed a military pact upon Rumania during February 1948. In actuality, the pact has little signifi¬ cance, because even without it the Soviet Union was using Rumania as Moscow wished, but it gave formal sanction to any future military action the USSR might undertake in Rumania. Also, it provided an opportunity

596

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

for much Soviet-Rumanian Communist ballyhoo. The pact contained six clauses and obligated Rumania to help Russia with all means at its disposal in joint action for the removal of any threat of aggression by Ger¬ many or by any state that may have joined Germany “in any manner.” That included everything. Even a pro-German speech by an American in Kalamazoo could be called an American threat against Soviet security re¬ quiring joint Rumanian-Soviet action. Mr. Vyacheslav M. Molotov explained the meaning of the pact in these words: “The conclusion of this treaty, which is directed towards safeguarding of peace and peaceful cooperation between two neighboring states as well as towards the safeguarding of the peace and security of nations, acquires special significance at the present time when the instigators of the new war from the imperialist camp are making attempts to knock together military and political blocks directed against democratic states and to prevent the development of peaceful cooperation between nations.” The Rumanian Premier, who took an impressive Rumanian delegation to Moscow for the signing, was no less effusive. On leaving Moscow he said to the Di¬ rector of the Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union: “Do tell Stalin, the great leader of the Soviet people, that the Rumanian people will never forget the generosity which made it easier for us to go on the road of reconstruction, the road of independence, the road which gave the Rumanian people the possibility to become master in its country. “Tell Stalin that we return home to greet the People’s Government of Rumania, Rumanian fighters, the work¬ ing class people, and the peasantry led by the working class. We shall take care that the treaty we have signed

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

597

here be enforced and that it consolidate friendship and close collaboration for the reconstruction of our coun¬ try.

I conclude exclaiming: ‘Long live the people of

the Soviet Union! Long live the Government of the Soviet Union! Long live the great leader of the Soviet Union Generalissimo Stalin!” Thus spoke Rumania’s opulent Premier who has survived all the Communist confiscations in Rumania with his estates and factories intact. Stalin’s “Pravda” devoted an exuberant editorial, February 6, to the Treaty saying: “Millions of workers in all lands will hail it with great satisfaction. “The history of the Soviet Union’s relations with Rumania after the war is replete with examples of the selfless policy of the USSR. “The gallant Soviet Army put an end to the trials of the Rumanian people, who had long suffered under the yoke of Rumanian and foreign capitalists. As a result of the rout of German fascism the workers of Rumania were given the opportunity to build their lives in accordance with their own desires. Rumania joined the ranks of the democratic states.” This was just one strand in the formal network of military treaties binding Rumania to Russia and to Russia’s satellite states. And most of the strands in the intricate net of steel pass over Rumania. Russia is tied to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugo¬ slavia, Albania; most of them are tied to one another, and most are tied to Rumania. Every helpless Ruma¬ nian citizen being deprived of his land, or his shop, or his freedom, being forced into a kolkhoz, or driven to obligatory labor, finds in addition that he stands in the cross fire of half a dozen Communist-ruled states and Communist-led Red Armies.

598

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

Military treaties, a totalitarian constitution, com¬ mercial corporations, dimensionless reparations, Com¬ munist agents, civilian colonists, and an occupying army are the bonds by which Soviet Russia, extending vast and impenetrable from the Prut to the Pacific, holds the Rumanian nation inextricably bound.

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

599

Chapter XXXII DARKNESS BECOMES MIDNIGHT The last evening of 1948. Rumania’s church bells are pealing in dense gloom. They record the ending of the most dismal year in Rumania’s modern history and announce the beginning of a still more dismal one. In the Bolshevik midnight, settling upon eastern Europe, no ray of immediate hope can be seen. The drive against every form of religion is being in¬ tensified. For example, every Protestant school in Bul¬ garia has been closed. Sunday schools, also, are wiped out. More than a tenth of the Protestant preachers there have been arrested. Some are doing forced labor in mines. Many Protestant laymen have been seized and sent into exile to starve. The head of the Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Church, Exarch Stephen, has been forced out of his post; the clergymen who have been left free are reduced to the status of Bolshevik agents. In Rumania the whole Greek Catholic Church has been liquidated and its property confiscated by a Com¬ munist decree. This act of persecution affected more Christians than would the summary liquidation of the Congregational Church in the U. S. Lutheran leaders, including the chief Bishop, have been jailed in Hungary; Baptist pastors, arrested in Slovakia and their churches closed. The Communist drive against Roman Catholics has

600

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

been raised to a pitch of blind fury in Poland, Czecho¬ slovakia and Rumania. Brave Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty has been arrested in Hungary. Tito’s chief com¬ rade, Eduard Kardelj, has proclaimed new persecution of the Catholics in Slovenia. All this is accompanied by a rapid—almost hysteri¬ cal—intensification of Bolshevik indoctrination. The Communist world is being subjected to an almost ghastly Leninism-Stalinism revival campaign. Every person has got to get right with the Moloch of ma¬ terialism. The “pure Kremlin doctrine” is shrieked from Communist radios, papers, books, schools, phi¬ losophers’ clubs, biologists’ laboratories, poets’ retreats, iron mines, tractor factories. One-party absolutism has been tightened up all along the line. During December, 1948, the Bulgarian Com¬ munist Party, in an unusually pompous celebration at¬ tended by Bolshevik grandees from 20 lands, pro¬ claimed a series of new persecutions against all remain¬ ing vestiges of independence. During the same month, the Polish Communists swallowed up the Polish So¬ cialists after drastic purges. Communist persecution of all minorities has in¬ creased. The Rumanian Communists have just issued a blast against Jews, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Serbs in Rumania and categorically forbidden them to form nationality units. They are ordered to disappear in the proletarian mass. Bulgarian-Serb strife, Czech-Slovak enmity, Albanian-Yugoslav hatred are moving toward new peaks of fury. The Macedonian Question has come to resemble chain-lightning. All this friction has filled Bolshevik leaders with a frenzy of hope and fear. They foresee a global explo¬ sion that may blast open the way to world power. They

RUMANIA UNDER THE SOVIET YOKE

601

also see bourgeois conspiracies on every side filling them with terror and causing them to step up their terror in continent-wide purges. To perfect their global apparatus for universal power seizure, Communist governments in all eastern Europe are hastening the extermination of the remain¬ ing independent peasants and increasing pressure to force them in kolkhozi. The Communists are launch¬ ing a drive that will make 1949 the most terrible year in modern history for eastern European tillers of the soil. In Bulgaria, for example, more than half the peasants are to lose all their land within four years. And along with this wholesale liquidation of peasant independence the last remnants of private initiative in the cities is being rapidly stifled, according to publicized Bolshevik plans. Groza’s Communist government forms part of this global conspiracy for robbery and massacre. It is step¬ ping up its drive against 16,000,000 men and women in town and village. That is why the bells announcing 1949 tolled sadly over Rumania’s plains and moun¬ tains today. They tolled for every Rumanian family.

INDEX A Adevarul, 445 Adventists, 223 Alba Julia, 43-44, 53-57, 480 Aldea, Gen. Aurel, 344, 348, 389 Allies, 12, 84, 165-179, 184-5, 18893, 196-7, 199, 203, 207-8, 221-2, 256, 350, 421, 509, 512, 515, 522, 538, 557, 564 Allied Control Com., 187, 256, 509 American Mission, 207, 210, 235, 253, 307, 391, 403, 513, 572 Anghelescu, Dr. Constantine, 220 Angheliu, 480 Ankara, 167, 171, 177, 185, 198 Antonescu, Ion, 84—6, 108-11, 132, 135, 141, 143, 152-7, 160-3, 167, 172-3, 176-9, 182, 185, 195, 200, 215, 256, 289, 346, 349, 389, 408, 412, 416, 420, 425, 431, 460, 541 Antonescu, Mihai, 86, 167, 170, 179 Apostol, George, 14 Arad, 147 Ardeal, 369 Ardealul, 461 Argetoianu, Constantine, 92, 124, 151 Armistice, 174, 185-6, 199, 204, 341, 387, 402, 430-1, 514, 51922, 528 Atheneum, 318, 320, 357, 428 Atlantic Charter, 168, 206-7, 256, 412, 563 Attlee, Clement, 149, 150, 254 August 23, 1944, 165, 386, 415, 460, 466, 506 Averescu, Marshal Alexander, 89 Avramescu, Gen., 513 Axis, 170, 176-7, 181, 196, 198, 203, 221 B Bacau, Moldavia, 276, 291-2, 296 Badoglio, 167 Baie Mare, 550-2, 559, 562

Balamace, Stefan, 420 Balkan Entente, 116, 119 Balkans, 169-70, 242, 300, 441, 520, 567 Banat, 374, 538 Baneasa Detention Camp, 499 Banska-Bistritsa, 409 Baptists, 223, 475, 599 Barnes, Maynard, 257, 262-3 B. B. C., 162, 176, 442 Berchtesgaden, 125 Berry, Burton Y., 210, 262 Bessarabia, 42, 124, 130, 144, 146, 154, 158-163, 172, 182, 188, 245, 408-9, 464, 471, 506, 510-12, 523, 526, 563, 570 Bevin, Ernest, 150-1, 255, 260, 580 Blaj (Transylvania), 317 Bleanca, Vasile, 335-6 Bodnaras, Emil, 15, 112, 182, 196, 230-1, 249, 345-6, 406-8, 417, 426, 430, 477, 585 Bonnet, Georges, 121 Braila, 571 Brasov, 412, 544 Bratianus, 55, 84, 219 Bratianu, Constantine, 167, 192 Bratianu, Dinu, 256, 398 Bratianu, Ion, 65, 67 Britain, 169, 173, 175, 177, 198, 209, 256, 412-3, 573 British, 85, 145, 155, 162, 189, 198, 207, 212, 235, 256, 318, 392-3, 398, 459 British Beveridge Plan, Sec. 7, 328 British-Polish Pact, 119 Browder, Earl, 475 Brussels, 342 Bucovina, 20, 43, 124, 130, 133, 149, 154, 158-9, 163, 172, 182, 224, 249, 272, 275, 369, 408, 452, 464, 506, 510-11, 520, 523, 526, 563 Bulgaria, 127, 134, 136, 138-9, 145, 165, 198-9, 219, 255-62,

602

603

INDEX 357, 369, 409, 441-2, 453, 462, 482, 505-6, 572, 576, 597, 601 Bunaciu, Avram, 16, 346, 430 Burca, Ion, 354-5 Burducea, Father, 223 Byrnes, James, 260-2, 270, 396, 580 C Cairo, 85, 168-71, 173, 175-7, 185, 189 Calinescu, Armand, 107, 110 Cambrea, Lt. Col. Nicolae, 412, 414, 416, 426, 475-6 Campulung, 250 Capitanul, 95-6, 101 Caracal, 436 Carmen Sylva, 65 Carol I, 61, 65-8 Carol II, 69-72, 84, 103, 105, 108, 111 Catholics, 480, 560-1, 600 Castle, Transylvania, 365, 369-70 Chamberlin, 117-8 Charles of HohenzollernSigmarin, 65 Cheka 445—6 Churchill, Winston, 118, 149, 153, 172, 175, 189, 197-9, 204, 207, 224, 413 Ciano, 125-6, 162 Closca and Crisan, 414 Cluj, 20, 338-9, 369, 446, 452, 461, 545-6, 548, 566 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 96-7,

111-2 Communist Manifesto of 1848, 230 Concordat, 480 Congress of Paris, 62 Conservative Party, 55, 66-7 Constantinescu-Jasi, Peter, 304, 306 Constantinescu, Mrs. 100-1, 103 Constantza, 147, 298-303, 570-1 Constitution, 13, 15, 165, 184, 431 Coste, Brutus, 530 C P S U (B), 342, 449 Craiova, 313, 315 Cretzianu, Alexandre, 167-8, 171, 178, 414 Crimean War, 62, 574-5 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 579 Cristescu, 457

Curierul, 460 Cuza, A. C., 98 Czechoslovakia, 211, 262, 357, 409, 488, 506, 563, 576, 597, 600 D Dacians, 21 Dacia Textile Factory, 335 Damaceanu, Dimitru, 188, 191, 415, 426 Dangulov, 456, 459 Danube River, 18, 20, 38, 41, 129, 134, 145, 302, 471, Ch. XXX Dardanelles, 134, 299, 581 Debrecen, 409 Decebal, 21, 44 December 29, 1945, 397 Dej, Transylvania, 316-7, 549-50, 555 Delta, 568-81 Democratic Bloc, 177-8 Democratic Front, 201 Democratic Peasant Party, 586 Demetrescu, Doru, 513 Democratul, 455 Dermata Factory, 339 Deva, Transylvania, 90, 542 Dimitrov, George, 401 Distribution of Agricultural Land, 363 Dniester River, 40, 84, 147, 155, 158, 160, 240, 251, 575 Dobrudja, 42, 127, 302, 464, 569572 Draganescu, Col. Victor, 419 Dragomir, Gen., 513 Draskovitch, 240 Dreptatea, 461-2 Duca, Ion G., 56, 71, 103, 220-1 E Eastern Orthodox Church, 19, 97, 475, 476, 552, 556, 599 Ecclesiastical Congress, Nat’l, 476 E.C.P., 422-4 Eden, 118, 168-9, 197-8 Education, 468 England, 132-4, 146, 154-5, 158, 160, 170, 174 Ethridge, Mark, 262-4 F Fabrizius, German Minister, 123

INDEX

604

Falticeni (Moldavia), 288, 291 Farcasanu, Mihail, 455, 458 Feb. 11, 1945, 204 Feb. 10, 1948, (Peace Concluded), 419 Federation of Dem. Rum. Women, 481 Feodorov, Sec., 459 Ferdinand I, 68-9 Florescu, Gheorghe, 358 F.N.D., 457, 479 Focsaneanu^ 362 Focshani, 295 Foreign Schools, 474 France, 154, 174, 185, 198, 357, 572-4', 576 Frontul Plugarilor. 491 G Gafencu, 152-3 Galatz, 315, 571, 577 Gazeta Transylvanie, 461 Georgescu, Rica, 162-3 Georgescu, Teohari, 16, 203, 345-6, 354, 401, 429-30, 457, 483 Germans (in Rumania), 510, 514-17, 538 Gestapo, 224-5, 429-30, 435, 445 Geza (Letter from), 514 Gheorghe, Basil, 499 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 16, 200, 230-1, 240, 248-9, 251, 258, 333, 356-7, 363, 401, 477, 483, 485, 500, 550, 583-5 Ghilezan, Emil, 459 Gigurta, Premier, 125, 131, 152 Glasul, Armatei, 406-7 God, 467, 478, 561 Goering, 117, 120 Goga, 92 Graiul Nou, 194, 456, 460 Grand National Assembly, 591-2, 595 Grandul Vremii, 225 Great Britain, 140-1, 152, 161, 169, 183, 188, 198, 203, 398, 408, 414, 425, 572, 576 Greciano, Dimiter, 239 Greece, 134-8, 150-1, 161, 169, 189, 197, 199, 262, 279, 357, 439, 441 Greek Catholic Church, 56, 475,

552, 556, 599 Greek Democratic Army Headouarters, 439 Groza, Dr. Petru, 12, 90-2, 196, 214-7, 223, 256-8, 263-6, 281-4, 297, 321, 334, 345, 352, 362, 368, 374^-9, 383, 386^-03, 415, 418-26, 461, 475-9, 485, 489-91, 517i 539-42, 548-59, 566, 587, 601 Gruia, Alexander, 499 H Hacha, Emil, 115 Halifax, Lord, 117, 189 Halipa, Pan, 319-20 Hall, Major Thomas, 403 Hamilton, Lt. James, 403 Hapsburgs, 164, 574 Harriman, Averell, 265, 270 Hatsieganu, Emil, 266, 316, 318-9, 555 Hayes, Carlton, 170 Hitler, 107, 109-13, 120, 125, 12932, 137-42, 146, 161, 198-203. 224-27, 289, 404, 407-12, 421, 425, 510, 515, 521, 538, 577-9 Hitler-Stalin Pact, 113 Hohenzollerns, 60-1, 209 Horia, Sima, 107-11, 121-2, 125, 135 Hull, Secretary, 160, 169, 172, 189-90, 198, 396 Hunedoara, 90, 92 Hungarians, 30, 166, 216, 234, 393, 410, 461, 513-5, 538-9, 54550, 556-600 Hungary, 128, 130, 138-9, 198, 211, 255, 357, 409, 411, 454, 505-6, 538, 547, 576, 597, 599

I Iancu, Avram, 375 Independentza, 455-6, 458 Ionescu, Tudor, 224, 227, 353 Ionescu, Virgil, 367 Ionitsiu, Mircea, 180, 191 Iorga, Nicolae, 110 Iron Guards, 94-105, 121, 125, 127, 132, 135, 164, 221, 223-4, 228 Istanbul, 171, 180

605

INDEX Italy, 261, 357, 505, 573-4, 576 Iunian, 92 Izvestia, 144, 449

J Jan. 7, 1946, 391 Jan. 12, 1948 (Workers Party founded), 356 Japan, 135, 138, 198, 264, 511 Jassy, 41, 111 Jews, 32, 102, 214, 220, 223, 226, 288-90, 371, 386-7, 538, 556-7, 559, 566, 600 Timbolia, 491 June 11, 1948 (Bill), 483 Jurnalul de Dimineatsa, 462, 464 Justinian, Marina, 475-9 K Kardelj, Eduard, 600 Kerr, Sir A. Clark, 265 Kilia, 569 King Alexander, 219 King Boris, 240 King Carol II, 26, 61, 121, 124-5, 127, 143, 152, 164-5, 170, 178, 200, 217, 220-2, 346 King Ferdinand I, 61 King Mihai, 62, 143, 166-7, Ch. 12, 179, 183, 188-9, 191-2, 206, 264-5, 337, 352, 367, 386-9, 397, 406, 417-8, 429 Koloszvar, 546-7 Komsomol, 468 L Labor Unions, 330 Latinity, 18, 19 Lazar, Ilie, 399, 539-44, 549-50, 553-56, 562, 566-7 Legionnaires, 94, 97, 104, 108-10, 223 314 Lenin’, 202, 238, 357, 361, 399, 438-9, 441, 447, 467, 474, 507 Leninism, 449-50 Ley, Robert, 218 Liberal Party, 13, 55, 65, 67, 76-7, 84 89, 100, 165, 177, 219-20, 227 256, 264, 266, 286, 314-5, 351, 431, 455, 459, 462 Liberalul, 461-2 Libertatea, 355* 455, 490 Little Entente, 116, 119

Luca, Laszlo, 16, 230-1, 248-9, 357, 417, 487 Lupan, Radu, 466 Lupescu, Magda, 70-1, 84, 103, 106, 220 Lupu, 92 Lutheran Leaders, 599 M Macartney, C. A., 39 Mac Veagh, Lincoln, 171, 189-190 Madgearu, Virgil, 110 Madrid, 170, 179 Malaxa Works, 335 Malinovsky, 188 Manasturi, 546 Maniu, Juliu, 55, 78-100, 120, 158-173, 176-9, 183, 188-201, 212, 216-7, 234, 256, 272, 282, 306, 317-9, 339, 350-2, 367-8, 385-94, 397-405, 426, 431, 463, 472, 497, 539, 543, 547-52, 555, 558, 562, 567, 586 Manoilescu, Mihail, 125-6 Maramuresh, 538, 562, 564, 566 March 6, 1945, 12, 212, 223, 230, 386, 423, 425, 461, 469, 471 March 28, 1948, 587 Margulius, 333 Marin, 103-4 Markos Vafiades, Gen., 439-40, 442—3 Marshall Plan, 401—2, 489 Marton, Bishop, 480 McMillan, Corporal Jimmie, 414 McNeil, Hector, 392 Menemencioglu, Numan, 168 Mihailescu, Nellu, 432 Mihalache, Ion, 55, 78-82, 218 Mironescu, Mora, 355 Moldavia, 63, 251, 272, 409-10, 476 Molotov, 114, 122-3, 129-34, 138139, 145, 153, 172, 189, 198-9, 203, 284, 578, 580, 596 Moscow, 11-13, 16, 185, 187, 191, 197-204, 209-10, 223, 231, 238243, 248, 257-63, 270, 284, 299, 360, 378, 386, 398, 407, 414-5, 425, 427, 430, 441-2, 451-3, 466, 469, 471, 476, 490, 503, 511, 515, 518, 520, 523-4, 529, 533, 568, 578, 581, 595-6

INDEX

606

Moscow Agreement, 297, 312, 315, 390-7, 461 Motsa and Marin, 103-4 Moyne, Lord, 171, 190, 414 Munich, Second, 121, 260-1 Muresanu, Anton, 317, 461 Mussolini, 119, 121, 152, 225-6, 425 N National Democratic Federation (F.N.D.), 12 National Dem. Front, 204, 235-7, 257, 289 National-Legionnaire Gov., 108, 111 National Liberals, 75-6, 89, 313, 455-6, 458, 461 National-Peasant Party, 13, 51 53, 75, 78, 89, 91, 100, 110, 158, 161, 165-6, 177, 220, 224, 226228, 256, 264, 266, 272, 274, 276, 286, 291-2, 299, 303, 305-7, 316, 318-9, 385-9, 391, 397-404, 416, 426, 431, 456, 459-61, 472, 540541, 554, 556, 562, 567 National Popular Party, 12, 587 New Central European Observer, 465 Niculescu, Barbu, 434-5 Niculescu-Buzeti, Grigore, 167, 180-1, 192 Nicodim, Patriarch, 476 New Prices, 495 N. K. V. D., 437 Nov. 8, 1945, 388 Nov. 19, 1946, 392-3 Nov. 11, 1947, 404 Novikov, Nikolai, 171

O Ocna Shugatag, 562, 566 Oeriu, Dr., 520 Old Kingdom, 41, 56, 369, 402, 552 Oltenia, 374 Operation A, 232 Operation Barbarossa, 135, 141 Orastie, 542 O. S.P., 480 Ovid, 300 P Pantovich, 513

Parhon, Dr. Constantin, 477 Parnilescu, Gen. Leonte, 407 Patrascanu, Lucretsiu, 16, 156, 188, 192, 213, 256, 352, 429-31, 433, 437-8, 446 Patria, 461 Pauker, Ana, 15-6, 230-1, 250-1, 351, 357, 412, 414, 417, 456, 475, 476, 481, 581 Peake, Sir Charles, 581 Penescu, Nicolae, 197, 344, 399 People’s Court, 441, 443, 593 Peode’s Party, 89 Petrescu, Titel, 192, 227, 256, 258, 344, 350, 352-4, 398, 401 Petrosani Coal Mines, 529 Plenitza, 313 Plessia, Ion, 314-5 Ploesti Oil Fields, 120, 173, 184, 416 Plowman’s Front, 12, 90, 92, 196, 215, 217, 229, 362, 368, 375, 383—4, 425, 542, 587 Poland, 169, 219, 254, 262, 357, 575, 597, 600 Polish Strike, 243 Politburo, 11, 264, 588, 594 Pop, Ghitza, 317 Popeanu, Radu, 420 Popescu-Argetoia, Major, 415 Popp, 188 Potsdam Conference and Agree¬ ment, 253-260 Prahova, 491 Pravda, 194, 202, 446, 450-1, 455, 468, 583, 597 Precup, Col. Victor, 417 Pretorian, Gen. Septimiu, 415, 426-7 Prince Alexander Cuza, 63—65, 69 Prince Carol (1866), 60 Protestants, 223, 475, 560-1, 599 Prut River, 41, 122, 146-7, 454, 510-511, 570, 575, 598

Q Queen Marie, 68 R Rabbi Rabinsohn, 250 Radaceanu, Lothar, 224-6 Radautz, 285, 288, 297 Radescu, Nicolae, 161, 199-206,

INDEX 209, 211-12, 318-19, 344-5, 351, 386, 415-6, 435, 451, 458-9, 509, 524-5 Radu, Bishop, 239 Ralea, Mihail, 217-8, 490 Ramnicul Sarat, 295 Rascanu, Gen. Vasiliu, 415, 416, 426 Rashid, Ali, 140 Red Army, 16, 39, 211, 230, 249252, 290, 320, 385, 408-9, 415-6, 421, 423, 455, 460, 482, 484, 509-10, 513, 515, 518-20, 526-9, 544, 556, 562-4, 569-70, 582, 597 Red Army Paper, 202, 511 Red Star, 194 Red Fleet, 569-70 Reparations, 524 Resitsa, 529 Revista Fundatiilor Regale, 363 Rojniava, 409 Roman, 291 Roman Catholic Church, 475, 479, 556, 599 Romania Mare, 40, 44, 68, 120, 124 Romniceanu, Mihai, 266, 315 Romnicu-Valcea, 476 Roosevelt, 147, 152, 162, 165, 188191, 204, 207, 210, 255, 261, 375 413 ' - 1 1 Rosiori de Vede, 307, 309, 312 Ross, Sir Frederick Leith, 118 Rumanian Communists (Descrip¬ tion), Ch. I Rumanian Language, 18 Rumania Libera, 456 Rumanian National Bank, 500, 518 Rumanian Orthodox Church, 213, 475, 477-9 Rumanian Exports, 535 Rumanian Statistical Year Book, 1939-1940, 323 Ruthenians, 600 S Sadoveanu, Mihai, 472 Sandor, Unghvary, 446 Sanatescu, 180, 182, 191, 193-4, 197, 199, 200, 344, 351, 386, 408, 416, 469 Satu Mare, 556-9

607

Saturn (Factory), 242 Scala Hall, 458 Scanteia, 194, 419, 422, 455, 460, 480, 498 Schulenburg, Count von der, 129— 31, 135-6, 139-40 Secret Additional Protocol, 113 September 12, 1944, 188, 519 SerdicT, Vasile, 403 Seventh Day Adventist, 561 Sibiu, 543 Sigurantsa, 346 Sighet [Maramuresh], 20, 147, 562-4, 566 Silviu, George, 355 Slobozia, 437 Socialist, Socialism, Socialist Party, 12, 13, 100, 165, 177, 196, 224-9, 256, 258, 299, Ch. XX, 425, 428-9 St. George, 569 Socor, Matei, 452 Solnok, 409 Soviet Armistice Control Com., 455-7 Sovrom Companies (6), 529-31 Sovromtransport, 302 Spataru, 182 Stalin, 113, 127, 129, 134, 137-40, 146, 153, 176, 197, 199, 207, 230, 254, 259, 264, 283-4, 343, 345, 362, 396, 418, 420-1, 426, 442, 450, 507, 510, 568, 578-9, 596-7 State Com. of Collection of Ce¬ reals, 492 State Statistical Bureau, 465 Stelescu, Mihail, 99, 100 Stephen, Exarch, 599 Stevenson, Vice Air Marshal, 459 C.B.E.; D.S.O.; M.C. Stirbey, Barbu, 170-1, 175-8, 188190 Stockholm, 170, 179, 185 Stoian, Stanciu, 476, 477-8 Stoica^ Chivu, 240 Stoica, Trian. 452 Stoyadinovitch, Milan, 116, 117 Stupineanu, 346 Suceava, Bucovina, 275-7, 285, 297 Sulina, 569

INDEX

608 Supreme Court, 444, 593 Supplies to Red Army, 527 Susaikov, Gen. I. Z., 257, 312 Szina-Torna, 409 T

Tatar Bunar, 220, 222 Tatarescu, George, 77, 124, 151, 178, 218-22, 258, 345-6 The February Fights, 240 Theokostas, Papa, 513 The Patriots’ Union, 196 The Tasks of the Youth Leagues, 467 Third International, 240, 242-3, 248 Thorp, Willard L., 525 Tildy, Zoltan, 548 Tillon, Charles, 357 Tilsit, 203 Timisoara, 20 Timpul, 498 Tisza River, 409, 563 Tito, 165-6, 198-9, 249, 409, 413, 600 Titulescu, Nicolae, 116, 120, 221 Tsaranu Trajan, 297 Transylvania, 43-4, 78, 83, 126, 144, 234, 365, 374v, 402, 410-11, 452, 461, 464, 538-9, 542-9, 558-9, 562 Treaty of Paris (Mar. 30, 1856), 62-63 Tripartite Pact, 146, 152 Truman, Harry S., 254, 257, 270, 403, 480 Truth (Adevarul), 455 Turkey, 170, 574 U Ukrainians, 563-4 United Kingdom, 188, 265, 459 United Labor Front, 337-8 United Nations, 165, 177, 254, 456 Universul, 35, 460 United States, 174-5, 183, 190, 198, 203, 218, 256-7, 265, 270, 391, 393, 398-9, 414, 459, 500, 541, 573

Urban Courts, 443 U. S. Dept, of State (Announce¬ ment), 267 U. S.S.R., 504, 511, 524, 529, 582583, 595, 597 V Vasilichi, Ch, 240 Vasilichi, George, 417, 473 V. E. Day, 411, 508 Victoria, 462-3 Vienna Award, 129, 131, 173 Viitorul, 455, 458 Vishinsky, Andrei J., 11, 152-3, 195, 199-200, 204, 207-8, 210211, 213, 218, 222-4, 227-8, 230, 234-5, 252, 254, 265, 272-3, 303, 346, 351, 415, 423, 442, 447, 537, 570, 578-80 Vishoianu, Constantine, 176, 178, 197 Vladimirescu, Tudor, 412-^1 Vladimirov, Comrade, 442 Vlad, the Impaler, 103 Voice of America, 162, 176, 255 257, 512, 557 Voice of the Army, 423 Voitec, Stefan, 224, 227-8, 358, 469, 473, 475 Von Killinger, Baron, 160, 200 Von Ribbentrop, 125-6, 130, 132, 134-6, 189 W W’allachia, 63 Weinstein, Isaiah, 499 Wilson, Gen. Maitland, 162 Workers’ Party, 12, 356-9, 428, 483

393,

Y

183,

Yalta, 203, 207-10, 253, 255, 261, 387 Yugoslavia, 128, 138-40, 153, 165, 169, 198-9, 219, 357, 369, 519, 576, 597

188, 263, 403,

Z Zvolen, 409

9U9-8 M3U

J