Regional Integration and Migration in Africa Lessons from Southern and West Africa (Africa Futures / Afrique Futurs, 1) 9004399925, 9789004399921

Table of contents :
Regional Integration and Migration in Africa: Lessons from Southern and West Africa
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of Figures
1 Introduction and Background
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Background and Context
1.3 Methodological Approach
1.4 Scope, Structure and Main Findings
1.5 Conclusion
2 Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Conclusion
3 Historical and Theoretical Issues
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives
3.3 Pan-African Identity and Regional Integration in Africa
4 Migration Policies in Africa
4.1 Introduction
4.2 From Abuja Treaty to the AU Migration Policy Frameworks for Africa
4.3 Regional Economic Communities and Migration Policies in Africa
4.4 Migration Policies in the Southern African Development Community
4.5 Migration Policies in the Economic Community of West African States
4.6 ecowas and sadc - Comparative Context
4.7 Challenges of Migration Policies in Africa
4.8 Conclusion
5 Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The History of Migration in West Africa
5.3 Regional Integration in ecowas
5.4 The Brief Profile of Nigerian Migrants in Ghana
5.5 A Brief Profile of Ghanaian Immigrants in Nigeria
5.6 Immigrants' Experiences of Migration
5.7 The Benefits of Regional Integration
5.8 Towards Regional Integration Perspectives from Below
5.9 History of Migration in Southern Africa
5.10 Towards Regional Integration Perspectives from the People
5.11 Conclusion
6 SADC and ECOWAS: Comparative Perspectives
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Migration A Historical Perspective
6.3 Migration in Colonial West and Southern Africa
6.4 Post-colonial Migration
6.5 The Profile of Migrants in Both Regions
6.6 Immigrants' Experience in Both Regions
6.7 Benefits of Regional Integration
6.8 Regional Economic Communities as Catalysts for Migration and Regional Integration
6.9 Fostering Regional Integration
6.10 Conclusion
7 Resilient Economy, Migration and Regional Integration
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Socio-financial Well-being of Migrants in SADC
7.3 Remittances in Fostering Regional Integration
7.4 Migration by Gender
8 Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Regional Integration and Migration in Africa

Africa Futures / Afrique Futurs Series Editor

Ibrahim Oanda, CODESRIA

volume 1

Published in association with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Africa Futures features cutting-edge research that critically reflects on some of the big questions relevant to ­imagining Africa’s future as a place. The series emerges out of CODESRIA’s strategic focus on futures and alternatives, showcasing rigorous scholarly interventions that engage constructively with African futures, and rooted in research that challenges orthodoxies associated with dominant, but often problematic discourses about the continent. Wide-ranging in its scope, Africa Futures encourages interdisciplinary thinking about Africa’s developmental challenges that are informed by history.

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/af

Regional Integration and Migration in Africa Lessons from Southern and West Africa By

Vusi Gumede Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba Serges Djoyou Kamga With

Dikeledi A. Mokoena Reason Beremauro Akhona Nkenkana

leiden | boston

This series is published in association with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). CODESRIA would like to express its gratitude to the Swedish International ­Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY), the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Open Society Foundations (OSFs), Oumou Dilly Foundation, Ford Foundation and the Government of Senegal for supporting its research, training and publication programmes. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Gumede, Vusi, author. | Oloruntoba, Samuel O. (Samuel Ojo), 1970- author. | Kamga, Serges Djoyou (Serges Alain Djoyou), author. Title: Regional integration and migration in Africa : lessons from southern and west Africa / by Vusi Gumede, Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba, Serges Djoyou Kamga with Dikeledi A. Mokoena, Reason Beremauro, Akhona Nkenkana. Other titles: Africa futures ; v. 1. 26660938 Identifiers: LCCN 2019042417 (print) | LCCN 2019042418 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004399921 (hardback) | ISBN 9782869788565 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004411227 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Regionalism--Africa, Southern. | Regionalism--Africa, West. | Africa, Southern--Emigration and immigration. | Africa, West--Emigration and immigration. | Africa, Southern--Economic integration. | Africa, West--Economic integration. Classification: LCC HC800 .G863 2020 (print) | LCC HC800 (ebook) | DDC 337.167--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019042417 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019042418

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2666-0938 ISBN 978-90-04-39992-1 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-41122-7 (e-book) ISBN 978-28-69-78856-5 (hardback) Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, and CODESRIA, Dakar, Senegal. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Acknowledgments  vii List of Figures  viii 1 Introduction and Background  1 1.1 Introduction  1 1.2 Background and Context  7 1.3 Methodological Approach  13 1.4 Scope, Structure and Main Findings  16 1.5 Conclusion  18 2 Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates  19 2.1 Introduction  19 2.2 Conclusion  49 3 Historical and Theoretical Issues  50 3.1 Introduction  50 3.2 Theoretical Perspectives  53 3.3 Pan-African Identity and Regional Integration in Africa  69 4 Migration Policies in Africa  77 4.1 Introduction  77 4.2 From Abuja Treaty to the AU Migration Policy Frameworks for Africa  79 4.3 Regional Economic Communities and Migration Policies in Africa  81 4.4 Migration Policies in the Southern African Development Community  82 4.5 Migration Policies in the Economic Community of West African States  86 4.6 ECOWAS and SADC – Comparative Context  88 4.7 Challenges of Migration Policies in Africa  90 4.8 Conclusion  93 5 Migration and Regional Integration: West Africa and Southern Africa  97 5.1 Introduction  97 5.2 The History of Migration in West Africa  97 5.3 Regional Integration in ECOWAS  103

vi

Contents

5.4 The Brief Profile of Nigerian Migrants in Ghana  104 5.5 A Brief Profile of Ghanaian Immigrants in Nigeria  105 5.6 Immigrants’ Experiences of Migration  107 5.7 The Benefits of Regional Integration  110 5.8 Towards Regional Integration: Perspectives from Below  114 5.9 History of Migration in Southern Africa  116 5.10 Towards Regional Integration: Perspectives from the People  135 5.11 Conclusion  144 6 SADC and ECOWAS: Comparative Perspectives  147 6.1 Introduction  147 6.2 Migration: A Historical Perspective  147 6.3 Migration in Colonial West and Southern Africa  149 6.4 Post-colonial Migration  150 6.5 The Profile of Migrants in Both Regions  152 6.6 Immigrants’ Experience in Both Regions  152 6.7 Benefits of Regional Integration  154 6.8 Regional Economic Communities as Catalysts for Migration and Regional Integration  154 6.9 Fostering Regional Integration  159 6.10 Conclusion  162 7 Resilient Economy, Migration and Regional Integration  163 7.1 Introduction  163 7.2 Socio-financial Well-being of Migrants in SADC  163 7.3 Remittances in Fostering Regional Integration  168 7.4 Migration by Gender  169 Conclusion  170 Bibliography  179 Index  192

Acknowledgments The authors would like to express their immense gratitude to codesria who generously provided funding for the project on Migration and Regional Integration in the sadc and ecowas regions. Without their support this manuscript would not have been a reality. We also appreciate the anonymous reviewers, whose inputs helped in improving the quality of the book. We are grateful to Divine Fuh (Head of Publications & Dissemination at codesria) for ensuring that the manuscript is published as a book and also thanks to the publisher. We owe a debt of gratitude to individuals who participated in the study and helped in various ways in study areas: communities in Alexander, Sunnyside and Midrand in South Africa and Mbare & Highfields in Zimbabwe as well as respondents in Accra in Ghana, Lagos in Nigeria and the border communities in Seme border. We are also grateful to many other respondents: Director of Movement of People at the Headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) in Abuja in Nigeria, Director of Social Affairs at the African Union Commission and those in the sadc Secretariat in Gaborone in Botswana and others in the African Union Commission as well as officials in International Organisation for Migration and government officials in Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ghana and Nigeria. We are deeply humbled that these participants took time from their hectic schedules to talk to the researchers and in many ways assisted researchers in talking to more participants. We would also like to thank research assistants that participated in the data collection exercise, namely Moorosi Leshoele and Nkanyezi Msimago. We are also grateful to the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute and the University of South Africa colleagues who helped with arranging travels to fieldwork and other administration support. And finally, we are grateful to Oluwole Durodulu for working on the index, Pieter van Roon for ensuring that we addressed errors and to Reason Beremauro who attended to queries and other suggested corrections.

Figures 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 7.1 7.2 7.3

Gender of Nigerian immigrants  104 Age of Nigerian immigrants  105 Educational levels of Ghanaian respondents  106 Gender of Ghanaian respondents  106 Age of Nigerian respondents  107 Employment status of Nigerian respondents  107 Gender of South African respondents  119 Age and marital status of South African respondents  120 Educational level of Zimbabwean immigrants  121 Employment status of South African respondents  121 Zimbabwean participants’ business ownership in home country  122 Gender of Mozambican immigrants  123 Age of Mozambican immigrants  123 Educational level of Mozambican respondents  123 Employment status of Mozambican immigrants  124 Reasons for migrating to Zimbabwe  124 Reasons for migrating to South Africa  124 Mozambican participants’ business ownership in home country  125 Zimbabwean participants’ level of satisfaction in host country  130 Zimbabwean participants’ ease of migration  133 Zimbabwean participants’ level of satisfaction in host country  138 Zimbabwean immigrants’ perceptions about living in South Africa  143 Participants’ frequency of remittances in SADC and ECOWAS  143 Zimbabwean participants’ level of satisfaction in host country  164 Mozambican participants’ level of satisfaction in host country  167 Zimbabwean participants’ frequency of remittances  168

Chapter 1

Introduction and Background 1.1 Introduction The post-colonial experiences of African countries have been marked by the search for various strategies and governance architectures that can drive the development process on the continent. Such efforts have been particularly informed by the structural challenges in the political economy as well as the organisation of the society. From various accounts (Mkandawire, 2005; Soludo, Chang & Osita, 2004; Ayittey, 2002; Ake, 1996, 1980), the development process in Africa has been affected by both internal and external dynamics, which manifest in the form of misuse of power by the political elite, undiversified economic structures, dependence on export of raw materials which are usually single commodities, low industrial and manufacturing bases, imposition of economic policy from outside which weakens the capacity of the state to formulate pertinent policies and low integration among the African nations. Although post-colonial African leaders have recognised the need for a more integrated continent both at the economic and political levels (Adedeji, 2012; Asante, 1995; Nkrumah, 1963), the decision, which was taken by the political leaders to retain the artificial and arbitrary boundaries created by the colonial masters have hindered the free flow of people and to a great extent, goods and services within the continent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013). That singular decision subverted the momentum of continental unity and the prospects of development that the Pan-Africanist movement, on which many of the countries rode to achieve political independence. As Ki-Zerbo (2005) argues, the partition of Africa by the imperialists undermined the prospects of building nation-states in Africa, because the structure of the pre-colonial society was distorted in such a way that members of the same ethnic group found themselves scattered across borders. This point was emphasised by Adebajo (2010:1) that “the deleterious impact of the European presence distorted African politics, economy, and society; damaged indigenous cultures; and retarded socio-economic development.” Despite the apparent benefits that the continent appears to have derived from colonialism in terms of education and technology, Adebayo argues that “this was done in a destructive and authoritarian manner that damaged rather than complemented indigenous systems” (Adebajo, 2010:2). Scholars have argued that the maintenance of these boundaries are informed by the imperative of domestic politics, where the individual © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_002

2

Chapter 1

interests of the political elites to maintain power is taken as paramount, as well as external pressures of the neo-colonialists who prefer a divided and fragmented Africa to a united one (Oloruntoba, 2016a; Ochonu, 2015; Adedeji, 2012). The maintenance of the status quo also has to do with lack of vision, imagination, ingenuity and discipline by many of the post-colonial political leaders to reverse the disruptive legacy of the partition. Migration of Africans from one part of the continent to another has lasted centuries. In fact, the Bantu migration from the Central African region through the East and Southern Africa was a significant milestone in this history of migration (Vansina, 1979). Although the experiences of slavery and colonialism have altered the pattern of migration of Africans, it continues today in a multidimensional form, which ranges from legal to illegal, tourism to business, human to material exchanges as well as official and unofficial. The struggle for survival by many Africans has led to the blossoming of the resilient sector of the various economies in Africa, in which m ­ arginalised ­sections of the society who are mostly outside the realm of the formal ­sector devise various means to adapt to the very challenging environments/­contexts both within and outside the borders of their countries – the resilient e­ conomy/­sector entails economic and livelihood activities which largely involve the informal sector and the type of economic activities that are considered survivalist even if an enterprise is registered (Gumede, 2016). The shrinking of the public sector as a result of the imposition of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s accelerated the progress of the resilient sector. Despite the barriers that national borders have come to constitute for the people in the resilient sector in terms of restricting their mobility, they have found different ways to negotiate these borders. While it may be relatively easier for the professional elite in Africa to cross the borders through possession of relevant immigration papers, the people in the resilient economy confront and generally have to navigate multiple difficulties. Notwithstanding various difficulties, this category of people continues to negotiate various hurdles to move in and out of the contiguous and noncontiguous countries on the continent, stopping at borders, crossing over and coming under what could pass for what Castells (1996, 1989) calls the network society. In other words, although officialdom in terms of stiff immigration rules might have constituted barriers to movement of persons in Africa, these barriers have not been successful in hindering the movement of people who are mostly concerned with plying their respective trades in different parts of the continent. To some degree, the tenacity with which this category of African citizens pursue their objectives of ensuring meaningful survival, at least economically, could provide a basis for advancing the thesis that African

Introduction and Background

3

c­ itizenship is a possibility – a possibility that has been thwarted by the contradictions of narrow nationalism, elite conspiracy, bondage of boundaries and the perpetuation of global imperial designs through coloniality (Adebajo, 2010; Adedeji, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). The continued preoccupation by African political elite to devise regional integration as a complementary governance architecture is borne out of many interrelated factors, which include the apparent failure of the Westphalian State structure to achieve developmental objectives, the near collapse of the multilateral trading system and the resurgence of regional trade agreements both at the vertical and horizontal levels. Since the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union (AU) launched in 2002, there have been various efforts geared toward fostering regional integration on the continent. For instance, eight regional economic communities (rec s) were recognised by the AU, which could serve as the building blocks for the formation of a continental integration, first economically and later politically (uneca, 2013). The AU Agenda 2063 also has as one of its objectives, the integration of Africa economically, politically and culturally by the year 2063 (AU Commission, 2015). Similarly, the African Development Bank Group has developed a Regional Integration Policy and Strategy 2014–2023 as a blueprint for fostering deeper levels of integration not only with regard to greater flow of goods and services and cross border movement of people, but pertaining to development of cross continental integration (AfDB, 2015). To monitor and track progress made on regional integration, the trio of African Union Commission, African Development Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa launched an Africa Regional Integration Index in early 2016 (African Union Commission, 2016; Olapade, Selormey & Gninafon, 2016). The eight rec s that have been so recognised by the AU include: Economic Community of West African States (ecowas), Southern Africa Development Community (sadc), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (comesa), Arab Mahgreb Union (amu), Economic Community of Central African States (ecca), East Africa Community (eac), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (igad) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. These rec s have developed protocols, treaties and agreements that govern their integration agenda. However, they differ in their levels of functionality, operations and results. These differences are reflections of the interests and commitments of the political and intellectual elite, the health of the economies, the stability of the member-states and the role of regional hegemons which have the requisite resources and willingness to underwrite the costs of integration. Concerns over movement of people and their status in countries

4

Chapter 1

other than their place of birth are common among the various rec s. Even though it remains a common aspiration that citizens of member states can live and work in other countries, the protocols that establish such have either not been put in place or they have not come into full operationalisation. In 2016, the African Union adopted the resolution to have a visa-free regime that will allow Africans to move freely within the continent. However, several challenges remain on the implementation of this resolution (D’Orsi, 2016). Over the past five decades, efforts at fostering integration in Africa have been defined by the contradictions of formalism, economism and elitism. To elaborate, these efforts have been driven by the political elite, who is mostly involved in promoting market access for goods and services through the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. Although Adedeji (2012) would disagree that integration efforts on the continent have been elite driven, the dominant scholarship in this sub-area of study has largely focused on state-led integration (Söderbaum, 2004). Despite the relevance of the new regionalism approach to the integration activities in Africa, it has not received much attention in literature, nor has integration on the continent in general been given adequate scholarly analysis in the Euro-America academy (Iheduru, 2012). Notwithstanding, there are ongoing processes of regionalisation outside the formal structures of regional economic communities, which merit scientific inquiry. One of these processes is the activities of operators in the resilient economy. As we found out, these groups of people are increasingly recreating transnational identities through inter-border migratory flows, defying the officialdom of artificial borders, expanding networks of interactions and fostering new dimensions in regional integration. Whereas the political elites continue to dilly-dally on the imperative and urgency of continental unity, operators in the resilient economy are perfecting the art of daily survival through engagement in different forms of economic activities in countries other than their places of birth and nationalities. While some are settled permanently, even if illegally, in their adopted countries in the sub-regions, others move regularly across the borders to buy and sell wares. Despite their various challenging experiences or perhaps despite these experiences, this category of Africans expressed preferences for a much more united continent, in which movement of people across borders will be much easier than what currently obtains. Notwithstanding such expectations, scarcity of resources and the shrinking opportunities for economic activities have led to serial contestations, antagonism and resistance by the supposed citizens of the host countries against the immigrants. Such resistances have manifested in the form of xenophobic attacks, mass deportations and policy of exclusions, sometimes with active connivance of the political

Introduction and Background

5

and intellectual elite, who because of political expediency construct rhetoric of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Nyamjoh, 2006; Prah, 2008). In what he calls Insiders and Outsiders, Nyamnjoh (2006) critiques the notion of citizenship of Africans in South Africa and Botswana within the context of the periphelisation of these countries in the neoliberal global economic order. He notes that given their socio-economic deprivations, the notion of citizenship is far-fetched. He considers it a paradox that those who are deprived by a system which is anchored on the logic of racial and class accumulation could turn out to seek the deprivation of others of their ilk. Nyamnjoh’s point underscores the crisis of identity that Africans have suffered since their encounter with other parts of the world. This crisis has been exacerbated by the politics of difference, which the elite have perfected to maintain domination, power and control within the artificially constructed nation-space (Anderson, 1983). The book, among other things, deals with the prospects and the challenges of this neglected area of interactions to regional integration in Africa. In other words, given the limitations and the challenges that confront formal attempts at integration, what are the possibilities and added value that people to people economic and cultural interactions posit for integration in Africa? Given the preferences of the people for an integrated continent, to what extent can evolving democratic projects in Africa be instrumentalised to actualise this expectation? Contrary to the observation of Fagbayibo (2015) that there are no surveys to monitor the degree of responsiveness of African peoples to integration, a recent study by Afrobarometer (2014) exploring a United States of America based organisation indicates different perceptions about the desirability of regional integration, knowledge about regional economic communities and the importance of national sovereignty. In this survey, Afrobarometer had asked citizens in 36 countries four relevant but interrelated questions, which include the following: whether they prefer free or restricted movement of people and goods; how easy or difficult cross-border movement currently is, whether governments should assume a regional role in protecting democracy and human rights or instead respect their neighbours’ sovereignty, and how helpful they think the AU and rec s are to their countries. In their summary of the survey, Olapade, Selormey and Gninafon (2016:1) observe that “findings of the survey suggest limited support for integration with wide variations by country and regions. On average across 36 countries, many Africans favour free cross border movements of people and goods.” They also note that while the majority of the citizens responded that the AU and the rec s are a bit useful to them, three in ten of the respondents did not know enough about the existence of these organisations to have an opinion. When considering the roles of the states or

6

Chapter 1

rec s in the promotion of human rights and protecting elections, many Africans expressed preference for national sovereignty. The Afrobarometer survey further underscores the essence of our book as it helps to throw light on the perception of Africans on regional integration. The small percentage of the citizens who know about the roles of African Union Commission and the rec s further necessitated a study we undertook, among other objectives, highlighting the importance of regional communities in deepening integration on the continent. The book focuses on two regional economic communities (rec s): The ­Economic Community of West African States and the Southern Africa Development Community. While the two rec s were initially established with the purpose of fostering economic integration, ecowas has gone further by putting in place various protocols and treaties which facilitate free movement of people within the sub-region. In eleven of the fifteen-member countries, there are no visa requirements by citizens of the member countries to enter other countries in the sub-region. Although the ecowas passport is still being issued at the national offices, there are plans to start issuing the passport under the supervision of the ecowas Commission. The Southern Africa Development Community also has various agreements and protocols which are geared towards ensuring free movement of people among the member countries, among other commitments. However, the protocols on either free movement of people or a common passport have not become operational. The resolution of African leaders to adopt an African passport at the 27th African Union Summit in Kigali, Rwanda in July 2016 signals a new prospect in advancing free movement of people on the continent from 2018. Although experience of history of such resolutions and the reality of strong reservations by members of the continental body provide little hope that this new resolution will be carried through, if the benefits of such moves are well communicated to the citizens, there may be some prospects of full implementation. As Dorsi (2016) argues there are insurmountable obstacles to the realisation of the ambitious goal of adopting an African Passport for all Africans by 2018. These obstacles range from the lack of infrastructure such as biometric machines in some countries to existing local problems such as high rate of unemployment, concerns over security and the need to change national legislation to accommodate the new initiative among others. Notwithstanding these challenges, the adoption of a new passport could help in stimulating a higher flow of people, goods and services across the continent, thus leading to higher level of economic development.

Introduction and Background

1.2

7

Background and Context

The book is an outcome of a study on how the migration of people in the resilient sector of the economy either fosters or hinders integration in the two regional economic communities. Resilience is an all-encompassing concept centered “on the ability not only to resist and recover from adverse shocks, but also to ‘bounce back’ stronger than before, and to learn from the experience” (oecd, 2014; Michie & Tyler, 2010; Kathryn et al., 2010). In other words, the concept is grounded on the capacity of a specific person or group of people to adapt to socio-economic challenges (Lester & Nguyen, 2013:7). Therefore, resilience is multidimensional, including a range of interconnected factors and conditions. So, discussing the resilient economy in the context of migration and regional integration in sadc and ecowas entails addressing the adaptability of non-professional or semi-skilled categories of cross-border migrants seeking better livelihood opportunities in the regions studied. The field study took place in four countries, namely, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Apart from the analysis of data from the field study, we attempt to generate a theory of a people-centred regional integration in Africa. In other words, contrary to the supposed sacrosanctity of what Anderson (1991) calls ‘Imagined Community’ in the form of the appropriation of power by political elites through the maintenance of artificial borders and the politics of difference that have defined African peoples based on territoriality and spatial nationality, this study seeks to lay a foundation for further studies on African citizenship and people-to-people integration. The thesis regarding African citizenship is premised on the imperative of creating an African identity within the context of racial hierarchy, power and privileges that define our contemporary world. Although Africa is made up of people from various racial and tribal/ethnic backgrounds, and does not constitute a monolithic ethnic group, the person who is identified as an African citizen owes allegiance and belonging to the continent and shares in the struggles and aspirations of the people so defined. Citizenship in this regard is not only interpreted in terms of constitutionality, but in terms of spirituality, ancestry, respect and identification with the people so defined as Africans (Gumede, 2016). The study we undertook is different from other studies on migration and regional integration, because it is not only focused on the resilient sector of the economy and their experiences with migration within the identified African countries; it takes a rather pragmatic approach to regional integration by moving from the conventional idea of economic integration to a more nuanced discussion of integration which is based on the construction of transnational

8

Chapter 1

identity and African citizenship. It builds on the New Regionalism Approach, which, according to Hettne (2004:xii): is a multisocietal process that takes shape in a very different, increasingly multipolar world order, in which also a variety of non-state actors are operating at several levels of the global system … a voluntary process coming from within the emerging regions, where the constituent states experience the imperative of cooperation in order to tackle global challenges. The focus on people as against government actors or even non-state actors is a defining feature of the citizenship approach to integration, which is the focus of this book. Whereas other perspectives on regionalism or integration are focused on government structures and institutions or the involvement of non-state actors such as civil society groups and the private sector, the citizenship approach connotes integration based on push and pull factors that underpin migration as a response to the dynamic economic realities at the sending countries and rediscovery of the self within a group of people of different nationalities, having a shared identity. Identity in this respect connotes a sense of belonging among Africans in the form of history, shared past and contemporary experiences like slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, internal schism and constant struggles against both external and internal forces for relevance and meaning. Within the context of constructing a new theory of regional integration, we transcend the limitations of the existing theories and perspectives on the analysis of this important area of study. As Söderbaum (2004:1) argues, the study of regionalism suffers from three partly overlapping weaknesses. These include, the overwhelming dominance of rationalist and mainstream theories of regionalism, a field that is dominated by empirical focus on Europe, North America and more recently the Asia-Pacific region and a general neglect of the study of the dynamics of regionalism, region-building and integration in Africa. Although previous studies on regionalism and integration in Africa have been modelled after those of the EU (Draper, 2013, 2011) the integration processes on the continent manifest some distinct characteristics that make it merit deeper interrogation. For instance, regional integration elsewhere is particularly based on formal institutions and activities, informality in the form of cross-border trade, networks and exchanges are key drivers of integration in Africa. Besides, the neglect of regionalisation processes in Africa in mainstream studies constitute a ‘discursive hegemony’, which this book is out to correct. This neglect, as can be seen from the works of leading scholars such as Mansfield and Milner (1997) and Fawcett and Hurrell (1995), among others,

Introduction and Background

9

is borne out of the overconcentration on regionalism in Europe as the standard case against which other regionalisation processes must be measured. Söderbaum (2004:27) points out the problem with this simplistic assumption thus: Apart from the narrow empirical selection, the problem is, generally speaking, that the same underlying assumptions and conceptualisations that stem from a particular reading of European integration influence the description and prescription of regionalism in the rest of the world. The discursive hegemony is maintained through critical and reflectivist approaches being regarded as ‘non-scientific’ and speculative … or simply ignored as if these perspectives do not exist. The deliberate neglect of the study of regionalisation processes in Africa is both a misreading of the uniqueness of these processes and the attempt to interrogate all forms of regionalism from the prism of European Union as well as the global politics of knowledge production (Iheduru, 2012). As we shall see later, regionalism in Africa differs from the European experience due to the differences in the history of state formation, historical patterns of interactions among the various nationalities, levels of economic development and state capacity as well as the prevailing existential conditions of majority of Africans (Draper, 2013; Oloruntoba, 2017a). Despite the neglect of the study of integration processes in Africa by leading scholars in the field, political elite on the continent has unwittingly followed the European model. As Gibb (2009) argues, the market integration model or the European integration model has been the dominant paradigm for understanding integration processes in ­Africa. However, due to the differences highlighted above, the result has been markedly different from expectations. The rationalist and neorealist approach of many scholars, in which strong states that are in pursuit of maximising power and interests within a regional arrangement are considered worthy of study and also underlie the neglect of the study of regionalism in Africa by mainstream scholars (Buzan, 1991; Söderbaum, 2004). As such, our study combines empiricism with theory building, in a dynamic continuum in which the process of theory building is flexible and allows for reformulation as new evidence becomes available. Rather than getting trapped in existing theories, the uniqueness of the case study approach that we adopted for this research ensures that we go beyond inductiveness to allow for new contribution of the proposed theory. Consequently, a deliberate attempt was made to build a new theory that speaks to the divergent forms of interactions that are occurring outside the radar of officialdom, interactions,

10

Chapter 1

which challenge the dominant narratives on integration and regionalisation on the continent. Apart from engaging with the conceptual aspect of regionalism and regional integration, the book interrogates the historical experiences of migration and regional integration and the basis for its contemporary forms, theory of regionalism with emphasis on African citizenship, migration and regional integration in West Africa and in Southern Africa, a comparison of integration experiences of migrant workers in West and Southern Africa, the resilient economy/sectors, as well as harnessing migration and integration for Africa’s development – then a Conclusion. We start with a brief discussion of the historical account of migration and regional integration as well as the similarities or differences in the current forms of migration. Contrary to the suffocating effects of the artificial boundaries that the colonialists imposed on the continent, we argue that there were movements of people across the various regions that presently constitute Africa in pre-colonial times. Although this may not have been termed integration, the movement of people, the cultural exchanges, inter-marriages among different ethnic groups or nationalities and other forms of interactions foster an integrated relationship that transcended economic considerations. While we acknowledge that there were conflict and even wars among different groups of people in Africa during the pre-colonial times, these were not enough reasons to hinder the people from relating based on mutual benefits and advantages. The book also highlights different types of economic activities that Africans were engaged in before the colonial intrusions and the delineation of boundaries orchestrated by the imperialists. Following Ochonu (2015), for example, we trace how regional integration was fostered in West Africa through the activities of the Wangara people who built intra-regional trade networks as well as investment in the sub-region. Contrary to the hyperbolic fears of ultra-nationalist leaders and elite that the removal of the artificial borders will see an over-influx of migrants from one part of Africa to the other, there is no evidence in history that everyone will want to migrate to a region. The most likely option will be increased agglomeration both in terms of economic and cultural diffusions across the various parts of the continent. This book shows that the differences between migration and regional integration in the past and the present in Africa are directly linked to the devastating effects of colonialism, its distortion of the political economy of Africa and perpetuation of coloniality by the majority of post-colonial leaders and elite whose educational grounding and psychological grooming predisposed to maintenance of the imperial bifurcation of the continent both mentally and physically (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Akokpari, 2012; Ake, 1980; Rodney,

Introduction and Background

11

1981). ­Although there are no data to substantiate, intra-African regional trade in ­pre-colonial periods was significantly higher than the paltry 15% of the contemporary times (uneca, 2016; Zeleza, 1993). We also discuss theories of migration and regionalism as well as regional integration. After an analysis of the various conceptual and theoretical angles from which these concepts have been studied, we attempt a theory of integration on the basis of Pan African identity and citizenship. This is done as a way of emphasising the imperative of going beyond preoccupation with economic consideration and underscoring identity as a basis of interaction among the people of Africa. Following in the constructivist theoretical tradition, the subjectivity of the people as against state actors occupies a central locus of disquisition in this manuscript. Furthermore, the book undertakes empirical analysis of migration and integration in both West Africa and Southern Africa, examining the institutional architectures of the regional economic communities in terms of the treaties and laws that regulate the movements of people and how these affect the operators in the resilient sectors of the economy. We emphasise that the regional economic communities are particularly important as drivers of integration especially in the context where the state appear to be lukewarm and ambivalent on integration issues. And as Kaplan (2006) argues, the high level of corruption in the bureaucracies of national governments necessitates building the capacity of the rec s to hasten the integration process in Africa. He argues rather forcefully, that because of the envisaged loss of unrestricted access to state resources, which a regional governance architecture may throw up, bureaucrats at the national levels have no compelling reason to actively support integration efforts in Africa. He suggests that international development agencies like the World Bank should fill this gap by building capacity for regional integration. While there may be merit in this argument, empirical evidence shows that the promotion of regional integration by these institutions is generally geared toward the creation of market access for big corporations. In supporting regional integration, these multilateral institutions do prioritize people to people interactions and, cross border movement of people in the resilient economy (See World Bank, 2012). The political economy of the two regions in terms of historical and contemporary interactions among the states and how these contribute to the differences in the degree of integration in the two regions are highlighted. States in the two regions manifest different capacities in terms of resources, population, skills and infrastructures. These differences are rooted in the colonial design as well as the logic of accumulation that defined the imperial enterprise at the time when the states were created. It is paradoxical that they have

12

Chapter 1

remained so since independence. Given these differences, the experience has been to see movement of people from regions of lower economic opportunities to areas of higher economic opportunities. Although such movements are dated to pre-colonial times, especially in the Southern Africa region, they have come to be met with resistance and antagonism in the form of xenophobic attacks after independence (Nyamnjoh, 2006). The role of the two regional hegemons in the two sub-regions, Nigeria and South Africa have also been markedly different in actively promoting and supporting regional integration, especially after independence. Whereas Nigeria took the lead (after the civil war) in 1970 to bring the countries in the subregion together under a wide umbrella such as the Economic Community of West A ­ frica States (Bach, 2007; Adedeji, 1970), the solidarity of Southern A ­ frican states against apartheid in South Africa did not translate into higher levels of integration after independence in 1994. While differences in the racial character of the two countries might have been a contributory factor, the dynamism of political actors in terms of their foreign policy priorities, the consciousness of their African identity and commitment to Pan-Africanism are also strong determinants of the levels of their engagement with supporting integration in the two sub-regions and Africa in its entirety. We also compare the two regions to demonstrate areas of similarities and differences in migration policies and the degree of regional integration. In other words, what are the differences and similarities in the degree to which it is easier for operators in the resilient economy to move freely in both regions? Are there official barriers or are there policies in place to encourage the movement of people? What are the historical or contemporary factors that either hinder or foster the movement of people? What is the role of language and or culture in determining the survival of the actors in the resilient economy in the two regions? We interrogate existing scholarship on migration and regional integration in a seamless flow which enhance a balanced reading and understanding of the study. The second to the last chapter relates to how to harmonise the resilient economy with the migration policies in order to foster regional integration not only in the two regions but also in Africa as a whole. This becomes pertinent in view of the high rate of what is generally referred to as the informal activities in Africa. We locate this chapter in an ongoing search for an appropriate development strategy in Africa and recreation of African identity in the global system. Whereas cross-border trade constitutes a significant portion of African economy, many Africans will want to trade and mix with one another for mutually beneficial purposes. However, the colonially constructed boundaries and their maintenance by post-colonial elite is constraining the full realisation of the informal sectors and the resilient economy on the continent.

Introduction and Background

13

In his assessment of the defunct Organisation of African Unity, now (African Union), and its inability to foster integration and development on the continent, Ki-Zerbo (2005:87) argues that the oau achieved only partial unity, because it committed the original sin of maintaining colonial borders, supposedly to prevent conflicts. Yet, these borders are in flames as they are structurally prone to conflict. They make every African a foreigner to at least 80 per cent of the other Africans. He emphasises that: African borders are instruments of vivisection of people and have, since their establishment, caused untold human sacrifice in the form of fratricidal holocausts, merely out of respect for boundary lines already marked in blood by colonial conquest; such arbitrary and at times, imaginary parallel and longitudinal lines are too mathematical to be human. We argue that the future development of Africa lies squarely in its capacity to extricate herself from the bondage of boundaries, create an African identity, where differences based on nationality will matter less for an integrated continent. We conclude by offering recommendations on how a Pan-African identity and citizenship, grounded in a continental sense of nationalism can be constructed. Despite the wideheld scepticism among the citizens and the ambivalence of the political and some intellectual elite to the realisation of this objective the evidence of history and the undeniable role of the ­Pan-Africanism movement in the political decolonisation of the continent, give hope that with the appropriate engagement of the critical mass of the intellectuals and the people, an African nation that is underpinned by the force of renaissance can be born. The resilience that Africans who work across the borders has demonstrated in the face of official harassment and the role that the informal sector plays in stimulating economic growth reinforce the core argument of this study. The differences and similarities that we found in the operations of the resilient economy in West Africa and Southern Africa provide opportunities for learning, adaptation and increased commitment to the project of integration in Africa. 1.3

Methodological Approach

This comparative study was conducted in four countries, namely Nigeria and Ghana in the ecowas region as well as South Africa and Zimbabwe from the sadc region. The study utilised a multi-methodological approach or mixed methodology. Creswell et al. (2003) define mixed methodology as “integrating quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis in a single study or a

14

Chapter 1

program of enquiry.” Clark and Ivankova (2016) concur and they state that a “mixed method is at its essence the intentional integration of quantitative and qualitative research approaches to best address a research problem.” There are many reasons for the adoption of mixed methodological approaches and in this study the adoption of such an eclectic approach was predicated on the assumption that no single method of inquiry is sacrosanct. The utilization of mixed methods allows for a better understanding of a research problem and leads to a variation in the data collection. Stange et al. (2006) argue that this leads to greater validity of the data (see also Creswell et al., 2003). Qualitative methods enabled the researchers to solicit rich and detailed data relevant to answering the research questions whilst a quantitative approach, on the other hand, allowed the research team to speak to the selected number of individuals whilst making room for the comparison of the two regions. A survey questionnaire comprising both closed-ended and open-ended questions was the main data-gathering tool. The questionnaire data was complimented by material gathered from Focus Group Discussions (fgd s), Key Informant Interviews and documentary analysis. These data collection methods are discussed in greater detail in the section below and in subsequent sections we discuss the challenges and limitations encountered in conducting the study. The main data gathering tool was a semi-structured survey questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered in the four selected countries to a total of hundred (100) individuals who were selected randomly. Twenty-five (25) participants were selected in each of the four countries. In Nigeria, the study was conducted in Lagos and the researchers interviewed Ghanaian immigrants living and working in the Nigerian commercial capital. Similarly, in Ghana, the research team interviewed Nigerian immigrants based in Accra. In South Africa the research team interviewed Zimbabwean immigrants within the Gauteng region in Pretoria and Johannesburg. Specifically, these were individuals working or living in Sunnyside, Midrand and Alexandra Township. In Harare the research team interviewed immigrants living and working in the high-density townships of Mbare and Highfields. Apart from soliciting demographic information such as the participants’ age, educational level, migration history, livelihoods, and other related questions such as the frequency they remitted money or goods and their living conditions in the places they have settled the questionnaire also posed other questions regarding participants’ views about regional integration and how it could be attained within the continent. The researchers also sought to probe the participants about the factors that have historically impeded regional and continent integration processes. The questionnaire was administered to

Introduction and Background

15

i­ ndividuals working or operating within the resilient economy as hairdressers, artisans, vendors, domestic workers and so on. The questionnaire data were was complemented by in-depth interviews that were conducted with stakeholders, which included government officials at the national levels, officials at the headquarters of the two regional economic communities (sadc and ecowas) as well as the officials at international organisations such the International Organisation of Migration (iom) in Pretoria and officials at the African Union. In these interviews the researchers sought to find out how the different institutions perceived migration in terms of the opportunities they presented and the ways through which they fostered integration within regional economies. In addition, the researchers sought to find out the challenges that states often encountered in managing migration and how such challenges militated against inclusive policies and integration efforts. Of particular salience, the researchers solicited informants’ views on how regional countries could foster integration. In addition to the key informant interviews and individual questionnaires, focus group discussions were conducted with selected individuals along border towns. A minimum of two focus group discussions were conducted in each region. Each fgd comprised 6–8 individuals. The fgds were conducted at the border towns, in Southern Africa this was in Musina (a border town on the South African side of the border with Zimbabwe) and in Beitbridge (the Zimbabwean border town with South Africa). In West Africa, the fgds were conducted in Seme, a border town between Nigeria and Benin Republic and in Aflao, a border town between Ghana and Togo. These border towns were selected, because they are the busiest in the sub-region and cross border traders from Nigeria and Ghana transact their business in the locations. Although Nigeria and Ghana have no contiguous borders, there is a huge flow of people from the two countries across the borders on a daily basis. In the fgds which were facilitated by the researchers, participants shared their perspectives regarding regional integration, borders and boundaries in Africa and the resilient economy drawing from their experiences from living in border towns. Warren and Karner (2015) argue that “focus groups offer a data collection strategy that allows for the involvement of a larger sample in a shorter amount of time.” fgds allowed the researchers to discuss issues pertinent to the study with a cross section of individuals, but all involved in the resilient economy. The data gathered through fgds complimented the material collected through the survey instruments and from key informants. The data collected through the fgds and from key informants were transcribed and analysed thematically. Thematic content analysis involves identifying common or recurring themes within data sets and these themes are

16

Chapter 1

essential in addressing specific research questions. There were two processes involved in capturing and analysing the data from the survey instrument. The coded responses on the first part of the questionnaire were captured in excel and collectively this data provides and describes key trends such as gender, educational level, remittances and so forth. Much of this data is presented graphically and it supports some of the claims and arguments made in different parts of the book. The second part of the questionnaire was transcribed and analysed thematically. 1.4

Scope, Structure and Main Findings

This book consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction, that details the main arguments we make and outlines the methodological approach used in collecting data for the study. Chapter 2 focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of migration and regional integration. It situates the two concepts within the larger body of scholarly and policy dimensions both in Africa and in the world in general. The chapter uses secondary material to also discuss contemporary debates on migration and regional integration. The chapter analyses some of the barriers to regional integration such as multiple memberships to regional groupings by African countries as well as complexities and failures to frame a Pan African identity and citizenship for Africans citizens. In such a context, the chapter also examines the barriers to movement for individuals between countries on the continent and collectively how they navigate such barriers through illegal border crossings and residence within wealthier or more stable countries. In Chapter 3 the book focuses on the historical antecedents of migration as well as some of the theoretical constructs that have been used to analyse and understand regional integration. The chapter makes the point that the African continent was historically characterised by forms of mobility and displacement as a result of war and conflict as well as labour migration. These forms of mobility and migration have persisted in the contemporary context as individuals and communities continue to flee conflict as well as economic decline and fragmentation throughout the African continent. The chapter looks at the dominant theories on regional integration such as neo-realism, functionalism and institutionalism, regional economic integration and new regionalism. In Chapter 4 the book examines Migration Policies in Africa. The chapter examines arguments that have been put forward to discourage the m ­ ovement

Introduction and Background

17

and migration of people within the continent. The chapter provides an overview of migration policies in both the ecowas and the sadc region. The ­chapter also provides a comparative analysis of the two regional groupings’ migration policies. A key point that emerges out of the chapter is that whilst some of the policies act as a barrier to movement, individuals often find way to navigate and manoeuvre such barriers in efforts to pursue livelihood options and in a quest for security. The findings of the study are presented in Chapter 5. The chapter provides findings on migration and regional integration in West Africa and Southern Africa. The chapter details the history of migration and mobility within both regions and presents a profile of the migrants who were interviewed for this study highlighting the gendered nature of migration, the socio-economic status of the participants as well as their experiences in the host countries. The chapter makes the point that in both regions the migration of individuals has a long history and in order to understand contemporary patterns of movement and the clamour for integration we have to understand the historical antecedents of mobility. In Chapter 6 a comparative analysis of the research material is given. The chapter highlights the patterns of migration in the pre-colonial and colonial eras as well as contemporary configurations of migration in the two regionsWest and Southern Africa. The chapter also examines how mobility is acted upon by the two regional bodies – sadc and ecowas. The main argument we present here is that historical patterns of migration are not dissimilar in the two regions. Equally, contemporary migration as well as the factors that give such mobility impetus are in many ways the same in the two regions. However, the manner in which the two regional institutions manage migration and attempt to foster integration while comparable in certain respects also differ in significant ways that demand careful consideration. Chapter 7 gives the final analysis, overall discussion and conclusion. Broadly, the book focuses integration policies and initiatives in both the ecowas and sadc regions. It examines the progress made towards integration and the promotion of free movement of persons. The book interrogates the failures and challenges of these integration efforts in both regions. On the other hand and using empirical evidence the book shows the ways through which individuals challenge, negotiate and manoeuvre restrictive integration and migration policies in order to move and pursue livelihood options within different countries. The book is about the resilience and agency of individuals amidst contexts of economic fragmentation and political upheavals and their quest to create a borderless region even in the face of resistance by political elites.

18

Chapter 1

1.5 Conclusion In the conclusion, we provided a summary of the main arguments of the book and set research agenda for the future in the interrelated areas of regional integration and migration in Africa This chapter provided the layout of the book and introduced the main research questions and objectives of the study. The rationale was also shared as well as the background to the study. The mixed-methods approach was explained and a brief overview of the research instruments as well as participants were also covered. The next chapter deals with the literature consulted to inform the study.

Chapter 2

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates 2.1 Introduction This chapter examines the conceptual underpinnings of migration and regional integration. It situates the two concepts within the larger body of scholarly and policy dimensions both in Africa and in the world in general. As we mentioned in the introductory chapter, the two concepts have become very important considering the pull and push factors of economics, change in climatic conditions, civil wars and conflict as well as the faltering regime of open trade and multilateralism. Migration and regionalisation manifest in various forms and dimensions both in the global north and south. They form crucial parts of the changing dynamics of the globalised society in terms of flows of goods and services as well as transnationalism. The two concepts form part of the search for answers to the challenges of meeting personal, national and international needs. At the individual level, people migrate to seek better opportunities in education, security and in their careers. Governments of countries embrace regionalisation and integration as a means of either advancing economic, political and security objectives or acting to mitigate the negative effects of the globalisation processes (Fawcett, 2005). At the international level, the increasing flow of people from regions with economic and political crises to relatively prosperous and stable regions and the attendant risks that these flows involve have generated serious concerns and actions by international bodies and institutions such as the International Organisation for Migration (iom), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (unhcr) and the European Union, among others. Similarly, the failure of the World Trade Organisation to successfully conclude negotiations on the Doha Development Round has spurred a resort to both horizontal and vertical integration arrangements. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1998), amongst others, explores the nexus between trade liberalization and migration. It also examines the extent to which the free circulation of persons is an objective to be realised only when economic convergence has improved significantly in a region. While the report may be sufficient analysis for North America, it does not sufficiently capture the intersection between migration © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_003

20

Chapter 2

and integration experiences in Africa. The history of migration in Africa does not lend itself to meeting any condition in terms of reaching a certain level of economic convergence before people can move. In our view, free movement of people within the context of an identity driven integration can facilitate economic growth and convergence. Hamdy (2011) examines regional integration in Africa in the context of the conditions and challenges of bridging the divides between sub-Saharan and North Africa. With special attention to countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, perceived as non-African generally, the historical and political features of these countries still ensure their connectedness to the continent. However, our intended project has a different focus, which is to look at regional integration in ecowas and sadc. Notwithstanding, the book is important to the extent that it raises the pertinent issue of identity formation in Africa. Our conceptualisation of African identity as a necessary condition for development on the continent merit further interrogation in the context of the debates around who is an African. While Pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah had a continental and Diasporic focus to the construction of African identity, (Nkrumah, 1963), scholars like Prah (2013, 2008) and Chinweizu (2011) conceive only the blacks in Africa as the subject of integration. While the position of the former was based on continentalism, those of the latter was based on race. For instance, Chinweizu (2011) argues that given the havoc that the Arabs have wreaked in Africa in the form of trans-Saharan slave trade for centuries, the genocide against the blacks in Sudan by the Al-Bashir-led Government, the disdain with which the Arabs treat Africans and the closer allegiance that Arab Africans have with their counterparts in the Middle East, they cannot be considered to carry the Pan-African identity that is shared by the blacks. While there is merit in this argument, other scholars have argued that the current day North African countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and to a certain extent, Algeria were originally inhabited by the Berbers and other black Africans. They argue that the Arabisation of North Africa was akin to settler colonialism that happened in countries, like South Africa and Kenya, with cultural and religious assimilation at the forefront, through the force of violence (Ochonu, 2015, 2016). From the above narrative, it is obvious that there are inherent complexities in framing a Pan African identity and citizenship. Hence, two options remain open for consideration. The first is to follow a constitutional approach to the construction of African identity in which anyone who lives on the continent and identifies with the aspirations and struggles, regardless of race or colour is considered an African. This is in line with what the Freedom Charter in South

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

21

Africa and its eventual post-apartheid Constitution of 1996 adopted (Gumede, 2016). While this approach could demonstrate the cosmopolitanism of Africans and the refinement of their thoughts in relations to members of other races, who inhabited the continent, the evidence of history under which racism was used as a tool for domination and imperial control and the realities of the continued racial profiling in the arrangement of the global capitalist order, in which the so-called whites continue to occupy position of privileges, cause this approach to be problematic. Moreover, it would appear that the ease with which the Europeans were able to penetrate and subdue Africans and other parts of the world was not only because of the development of weapons of destruction such as guns, but their proclivity toward the pursuit of power and profit. As scholars like Diop (1999) and Asante (2008) have argued, Africa was the cradle of human civilization with early discovery of mathematics and other forms of scientific exploits as proofs. However, these Africans related with the rest of the world on peaceful terms without any intention for imperialism. The value of Ubuntu, which is widely shared across the continent, especially in relation to strangers was responsible for this pacific orientation to life. On the contrary, the other parts of the world, particularly Europe and the Arabs, appear to interpret the world differently as the realist notions of power, domination and self-interest dictate their relations with Africans and other global territories. The second option is to limit the construction of African citizenship to the Blacks irrespective of their locations in the world. As Zeleza (2008) and Falola (2013) argue, there are blacks in virtually all regions of the world such as Europe, Asia, Caribbean, Latin America and even the Arctic region, in sizable proportions. Although these Africans migrated under different conditions and at different periods, they remain connected in one form or the other to the motherland. Falola (2013:12) contends that “Diasporic identity can be part of the ‘condition’ of living and surviving in other people’s lands.” The increasing level of identification of many Africans in Diaspora with African traditional religions and the maintenance of dress codes in the host countries further establish the continuity of identity consciousness of Africans. The contention of scholars like Apiah that the forefathers of Africans on the continent were responsible for selling Africans to the Europeans has not been sufficient for keeping many both first and second-generation Africans in the Diaspora from identifying with the homeland. The construction of a Pan-African identity and citizenship, which is one of the foci of this study is particularly compelling in the light of the rising wave of racist and nationalist politics across the world.

22

Chapter 2

Adepoju (2008) interrogates international migration and probes national development from the standpoint of the sending countries. He also assesses trends in policy-making and seeks ways to reduce negative impact while enhancing developmental impact. This work addresses a very important aspect of the ongoing debates on migration, especially in relation to the sending countries. The neoclassical perspective on this issue, which has been promoted by development institutions such as the World Bank is that migrants contribute to economic development in the sending countries through remittances. In large countries like Nigeria, Kenya and to a certain extent Ghana, remittances amount to billions of dollars per annum (World Bank, 2012). In view of the macroeconomic challenges that have confronted these countries for years in terms of lack of state capacity to deliver public goods, remittances have contributed significantly to poverty reduction. Newland (2013) centers the debates around the links between migration and development, especially as they relate to the countries of origin in a proper perspective. She argues that contrary to the widely-held belief among scholars on the negative implications of migration on the countries of origin, various studies have confirmed that, as it happened in South Asia countries such as Taiwan, China as well as African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and so on, migration has actually contributed to development of the countries of origin through remittances, skill transfers and fostering trade relationship between sending and host countries. However, the net effects on investment and building small scale businesses remain suspicious as a higher percentage of the remittances are usually spent on eating and buying dresses, rather than investment. A policy towards investment of remittances can lead to higher multiplier effects on the economies of the sending countries. Notwithstanding, these positive notes on migration, Gopalkrishna and Oloruntoba (2012) show how the educational sector in Nigeria has suffered from the loss of qualified and experienced manpower due to the exodus of academics from this sector from the 1980s to the present time. Although many of these academics are involved in circular migration, in which they go back and forth between the country and their countries of residences, and indeed make some contributions in form of remittances and fostering institutional linkages, their long-term absence has negatively affected the sector. The same condition applies to the health sector where the mass exodus of doctors and nurses to better working environments has created a manpower crisis in the health sector. Given the focus of this research, migration of skilled professionals to other parts of Africa could contribute to shortfall in available skills in those countries. However, brain drain to other parts of the world will continue to constitute a strong barrier to socio-economic development in ­Africa even for operators in the resilient economy, migrant workers have

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

23

brought specific skills on retail trades to a country like South Africa where this was lacking in the past. Nagar (2012) addresses regionalism from various perspectives including political, socio-economic and security challenges facing the Southern Africa Development Community. These authors discuss hiv/aids, land-grabbing and climate change; and the role of the main external players involved with the region, comprising the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and China. It also touches on issues of migration and xenophobia and their impact on regional integration in sadc. It is important to emphasise that xenophobia has represented one of the major obstacles to regional integration in the sub-region. Whereas virtually all the countries in the sub-region supported the struggle against apartheid, they remain disappointed that many of their citizens have been attacked at various intervals in South Africa in the past. Similarly, parts of West Africa, especially Nigeria and Ghana have witnessed xenophobic attacks against one another in the past. Given the flurry of activities that are currently going on in Africa, it would appear that there is high momentum on issues of regional integration. However, the emphasis has been focused on the promotion of market access for goods and services. With the case of Southern Africa, South African companies have been making serious in-roads to other countries in the sub-region But concerns exist as to how equitable are the activities of such companies in relation to the development aspirations of the host countries. Increasingly, scholars are suggesting that South Africa is acting as a sub-imperial actor in the rest of Africa (Adebajo, 2017; Alden & Soko, 2005). These concerns are borne out of the manner in which South African companies operate in the rest of the continent as a regional hegemon. Typical of multinational corporations from the West, many of these companies exploit workers, undermine backward integration efforts through importation of their raw materials (as against investment in the host communities) and subversion of extant regulations of the host countries. With respect to the latter for instance, the Nigerian Government imposed a fine of over $2 billion on mtn in 2016 for failing to adhere to the instruction of the national regulatory body – the Nigerian Communication Commission. Although the matter was eventually resolved and the fine significantly reduced, such actions showed the scant regard that South African companies have for the authority of their host countries (Ayodele, 2017). Despite the progress that has been made regarding regional integration in West Africa, significant parts of these efforts have been invested in promoting higher economic integration. But for obvious reasons, those efforts only benefit the upper classes in the society such as bankers, shareholders and chief executives of multinational companies, while the lower classes are generally

24

Chapter 2

excluded. What is lacking in the integration efforts of the two sub-regions is people-to-people integration. The general neglect that the people in the resilient economy has suffered on the continent is a fall out of the overconcentration of attention of formal integration. Yet, various studies have shown clearly that the informal sector contributes a very high percentage to the livelihoods of Africans (World Bank, 2013). Beyond economic integration is the salience of recognition of the importance of identity as central part of cultural integration. During 6–7 August 2008, the Institute for Global Dialogue hosted the Fifth Southern African Forum on Trade (saft) in Pretoria. The proceedings of this conference “Liberalising trade in Southern Africa – Implementation challenges for the 2008 sadc fta and beyond” contributes to the discourse on regional integration in sadc. It covers issues of tariff and non-tariff barriers, preferential rule of origin, regional infrastructure and trade facilitation, trade in service of sadc, the impact of epas in sadc, the role of China and India and the custom union in the region. Fundamentally, regional integration is centred on trade and nothing else. Regional integration in this sense is more or less exclusively focused on formal economic activities, at the expense of the resilient economy. Hartzenberg, Erasmus, McCarthy, Sandrey, Pearson, Hans, Cronje, Fundira, Kruger, Viljoen, and Woolfrey (2012) made a great contribution to the discourse on regional integration in Africa. The authors focus on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (tfta), which was agreed upon by three main leading regional economic communities in June 2015. These regional economic communities include, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (comesa), Southern African Development Community and East Africa Economic Community as a way of creating a large market. The tfta is anchored on three pillars namely, explicitly the traditional market integration pillar, infrastructure development and industrialization. As Leshoele (2018) argues, the tfta has a great potential to foster higher levels of integration in Africa, especially through free movement of people. However, there are challenges with the possible implementation of the tfta. Apart from the possible lack of enough financial capacity to finance different aspects of the programmes, issues of political commitment are critical. For instance, most of the countries that make up the tfta are having serious macro-economic challenges. In such circumstances, the first priority will be to address the domestic challenges before making any serious commitment to such ambitious regional initiative. Also, the history of implementation of regional integration agreements in the sub-region provides little cause for optimism that the tfta will meet its objectives, at least in the short term. Virtually all the three regional economic communities that make up the tfta have existing protocols and treaties that are yet to be implemented.

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

25

Beside the domestic factors that may limit the possibility of achieving the objectives are concerns over the involvement of foreign governments and corporations, which may wish to either scuttle the process or take advantage of the large market that the tfta will provide. In relation to the prospects of frustrating the process for instance, Adedeji (2012, 2002) argues that virtually all the previous efforts made by African leaders to chart an autonomous path to development have been frustrated by external bodies and institutions. For instance, at the time that African governments adopted the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos in 1980 to serve as a blueprint for socio-economic development through industrialisation, backward integration and promotion of intra-African trade, the World Bank adopted the Berg report which was more or less a negation of the former. Similarly, despite the prospects that the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for SocioEconomic Recovery and Transformation (aaf-sap), which was designed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa holds for the economic diversification and development of the continent, the imf and the World Bank ensured that they imposed the market-oriented form of Structural Adjustment Programme on the continent. The possibility that foreign multinational companies may take advantage of the large market that the tfta provides is also well-founded especially against the backdrop of very limited capacity for capital mobilization by domestic companies. There is also a very high prospect that the informal sector of the economies of the integrating countries will be alienated thereby excluding ­substantial part of the population. It is in this context that the current r­ esearch is very pertinent, as it focuses extensively on trade for regional integration within the resilient economy. In this context besides looking at trade, the study assesses how regional integration can be enhanced in borderless sadc and ecowas. Anton Bösl et al. (2008) offer vital information on the status and development of regional integration in the sadc sub-region. Issues of trade integration, regional transport challenges, adopting a well-adjusted framework for foreign direct investment, ensuring the enforceability of sadc treaties and protocols at the national levels and the analysis of the sadc tribunal among others are covered. The issues covered in this book have bearing for the overall agenda of migration and regional integration in Africa. From the 1970s, there have been a plethora of agreements and protocols that regional economic communities in Africa have yet to enforce. Integration in Africa has also been bogged down by lack of quality infrastructure, such as roads, airlines, rail lines and so on that can link the continent together. Compared to other regions,

26

Chapter 2

sadc member countries have made significant effort in building strong road networks, especially through the Maputo corridor. The Africa Yearbook (2009) examines the nature of relations between the AU regional economic integration in Africa, examining aid and trade in sadc external relations, trade remedies in Southern and Eastern Africa, measuring the benefits from currency union in sadc, the implication of trade agreement in the region, the status of Economic Partnership Agreements and other trade agreements amongst others. The gap in this book is the lack of analysis of regional integration that includes the free movement of people that goes beyond free trade. This gap will be closed by our study which examines regional integration in capturing not only trade, through cross border trade activities, but also looking at migration as a key driver for regional integration. Similarly, Bösl et al. (2011) examine the multifaceted elements of regional interaction which revolve around regional trade and market integration, peace and security and market-related questions. Amongst other challenges for regional integration in sadc, the 2010 Yearbook demonstrates that the lack of implementation of treaties, the challenges linked to regional governance which led to the collapse of the sadc tribunal and the principle of state sovereignty which stands firm in front of sub-regional institutions and mechanism hinder regional integration in sadc. This research is of interest to the proposed research which supplements it by looking at the situation in ecowas. More importantly, it will add more aspects on the discourse by looking at resilient economies with special attention to cross border trade and domestic workers and their livelihood in sadc as well as in ecowas. Andre et al. (2012) cover the drivers of regional integration which include the emergence and influence of China in sadc, the cooperation between mercusor and sacu, the role of the legislature in the integration process. Looking beyond sadc, the book examines the role of transport, energy and the contribution of the judiciary in the Eastern Africa region. In “The political economy of new regionalisms” Marchand et al. (1999) establish the link between globalisation and regionalism. The aim of the edited volume was to reach a better understanding of “regionalisation processes in the context of globalisation, in particular the diversity of these processes, as well as to look critically at existing theories about regionalization” (Marchand et al., 1999:897–898). They interrogate the global political economy taking into account terms such as “globalisation, globalism, globality, regionalisation, regionalism and regionality/region-ness.” Ozkul et al. (2013) argue that temporary migrants are those that are allowed to enter and leave in a country for a specific purpose. This phenomenon known as ‘circular migration’ often entails migrants moving ‘back and forth between countries of origin and destination

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

27

according to market demands in both places.’ This phenomenon shows how in the economic sphere, capital has become more decentralised and flexible, while it is increasingly becoming difficult for labourers to migrate. The authors emphasise the need for the labourers to match the degree of speed, with which capital moves across borders. While this recommendation is important, the logic of accumulation that informs the construction of global capitalism as well as the imperial force that sustains it, makes little room for the actualisation, at least on a global scale. In other words, the neo-imperial forces that control global wealth have one motive: accumulation on the large scale (Amin 1974). Thus, capital in any form, which has come to define the essence of wealth has been given more premium above other factors of production. Scholars have argued that the post-Fordist regime of accumulation was designed to promote financialisation at the expense of production and manufacturing (Oloruntoba, 2015b; Robinson, 2010; Kotz, 2008). The development and innovation of various financial products such as stocks, bonds and derivatives, among others have contributed to the ease with which capital moves across borders to the degree that today trillions of dollars move across borders in seconds. Whereas capital receives all forms preferential and dignified treatment either in the form of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, labour has been subjected to all forms of discrimination. Whereas the nationality of capital matters little when crossing borders, it has remained a major issue when it comes to labour. Although it is even relatively easier for high skilled workers, they are not spared from the ordeals of labour issues which have become a factor all production has been subjected to all over the world. The conditions of workers in the resilient economy is even more dire and challenging whether in their countries of origin or in the host countries. undp (2011) examines how remittances are important for human development in the home country. This begs the question of how migrants obtain the money sent home in the form of remittances. Generally, migrants earn a ­living in the resilient economy which are at the centre of this study. As mentioned above, the socio-economic challenges that affect most of the countries in A ­ frica have intensified the movement of people from one part of the continent to the other. Although this is not an entirely a new phenomenon, it has increased in magnitudes and proportions in recent years. One of the hallmarks of this movement of people is the effects that it has on families. Thus, it is not uncommon to find husbands and wives living apart in two different countries. Apart from the immediate family members, migrant workers also have other extended family members who depend on them, in one way or another, for their survival and livelihood. Consequently, most of these workers send parts of their earnings back home to meet the needs of their family

28

Chapter 2

members. A ­ lthough most of the people that we interviewed for this study were reluctant to make full disclosures of the amount of money that they earn on a daily basis due to fear of harassment by government officials, their responses showed that they usually remit money to their countries of origin. As many of them may not be living legally in their host countries, it is generally difficult to transfer money through the banking channels. This leaves them with little or no option than to send money through unofficial channels, which is not often captured in official statistics. The relevance of this point to the discourse on migration and regional integration in Africa is the role that operators in the resilient economy play in cushioning the effects of the harsh socio-economic conditions that African citizens have been subjected to over the past decades. Indeed, without remittances, the existential conditions of the people could have been worse. This further explains why it has become compelling to create more opportunities for migrant workers to expand their economic activities. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga (2013) interrogate the effects of African borders as defined in Berlin in 1884 on African people. They call on African leaders to dismantle these borders so that it can enhance self-determination for the continent and its peoples. The arguments of these authors are informed by the logic of decolonisation. They contend that dismantling of the borders will pave the way for regional integration. Among others the authors examine migration and identity in Africa as well as the issues of territorial nationalism and pan-Africanism. Cast within the broad framework of identity and African citizenship, the current volume complements the above book as it examines migration and regional integration, as well as cross border trade. Importantly, it examines how regional integration can be strengthened if goods and people were allowed to cross borders freely in ecowas and sadc. Furthermore, it also looks at the current regional regulations and i­ nstitutions and examines their appropriateness for integration in the regions of study. Indeed, regardless of the new recourse to the rhetoric of ultra-nationalism in Europe and elsewhere, Africa cannot afford to maintain the colonially constructed artificial differences that are so epitomised by the bondage of boundaries. It must be emphasised that while migration constitutes one of the main planks of the new politics of neo-nationalism, the developed countries of the world, especially Europe are still adept at maintaining the unequal power relations that exist between its member countries and Africa (Tandon 2016). While Britain might have voted to exit the EU, this does not automatically signal a better deal for a fragmented Africa. If anything, it can further give Britain a new leeway to continue its plunder of the continent as it has done hundreds of years ago. Indeed, scholars have argued that integration is inevitable if Africa is to develop. For instance, Oloruntoba (2016a) argues that the nature and the

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

29

character of the state in Africa, broadly defined in the context of its origin, artificiality and location in the unequal international division of labour leaves it with little or no room for development. Most of these states lack capacity for capital mobilisation, policy formulation and implementation. Operating at the fringes of global capitalism, they are dependent on handouts in form of aid from the former colonialists, whose major goal is the continued exploitation of the resources of the poor countries. Thus, rather than follow the tide of the current relapse to ultra-nationalist and conservative politics in Europe and United States of America and seek to undermine the current integration efforts on the continent, it would be worthwhile to sustain the tempo and move towards an integrated community of peoples of Africa. Perhaps, the imminent disintegration of Europe provides a unique opportunity for Africa to teach the world the virtues of mutual engagement and integration, which is not based only on commodity exchange but on identity, shared origin, heritage and aspirations. The unesco-onu Chair on Regional Integration and Free Movement of People produced the Policy Brief (6/2012) on “Advancing Regional Social Integration, Social Protection and Free Movement of People in Southern Africa.” The objective of this brief was to examine the immigration challenges and explore solutions in the sadc area. Weak and inefficient institutions, pressing national issues over supra national ones are perceived as some difficulties facing integration in the sadc region. The solutions could be around the establishment of good regional framework comprising mechanism for development, avoiding overlapping membership and various other inconsistencies and effective collection of data related to migration in the region. The current study complements the findings of the policy brief by focusing on resilient economies and by bringing in the perspective from ecowas. Scheffran, Marmer and Sow (2012) also contribute to our analysis. However, while the issue of climate change is very important, it is not incorporated into the current research. Rather, it examines how migrant social networks can help to build social capital to increase the social resilience in the communities of origin and trigger innovations across regions by the transfer of knowledge, technology, remittances and other resources with special attention to ecowas and sadc regions. The UN System Task Team on the Post 2015 Agenda Development Agenda (2012) through a thematic piece on Migration and Human Mobility explores the question of whether migration impedes development, or can migration promote development? It also deals with the importance of labour migration, the significance of female migration which is also of interest for our research. It also proposes ways to insert migration into the global development agenda. The appropriateness of this model will be interrogated to examine the extent

30

Chapter 2

to which it may be applicable in sadc and ecowas. Migration is a structural issue that requires a multidimensional policy response both at domestic, regional and global levels in African Union frameworks for migration. Furthermore, Current issues and questions for the future by Klavert (2011) argues that Regional integration in relation to migration in Africa, i.e. promoting free movement and labour migration, could greatly improve the lives of the 16 million regular and irregular migrants estimated to be living in Africa. This point is particularly poignant and relevant since it is consistent with the view ­expressed by majority of our correspondents in this study. To elaborate, we concur that if the bottlenecks to the freedom of movements of people across Africans are removed, these have the potential to unlock huge economic and social interactions as well as opportunities that will help in improving the standard of living of Africans. One of the fears that have been expressed about opening borders is that foreigners are generally responsible for criminal behaviours in the host countries. Consequently, if borders are opened and people can move in and out without restriction, crime rates will increase. This argument lacks merit in that criminality is a universal phenomenon. Much as foreigners are involved in criminal behaviours, so also are the indigenes. What matters is the capacity of the state to set up relevant institutions which will not only have the capacity to gather intelligence on prospective criminal activities, but also have the will and resources to identify and prosecute those who are found to have committed crimes, regardless of their nationalities. It is also important to emphasise that in the context of building a Pan-African identity and African citizenship, high possibilities exist for putting in place a regional security architecture that will help the various countries in Africa to have a database of all citizens and their records of criminal activities. Such records will help security agencies in monitoring and apprehending people of questionable character and conduct. Kösler and Zimmek (2007) offer a collection of essays that cover regional integration such as in sadc and ecowas. Moreover, comesa, caricom and oecs in the Caribbean, mercosur, sica and can in Latin America and saarc and asean in Asia are also examined. These essays offer an interesting perspective from a comparative analysis. Furthermore, the benefits and difficulties of region-building and the role of the EU as a model and partner are investigated. Even though our study does not deal with the EU, this book provides an insight into the challenges of regionalisation in the EU, especially in the light of its pace-setting credentials on regional integration and how such lessons can be applied to integration processes in ecowas and sadc (Draper, 2013). Besides, the book also provides learning opportunities about the modalities of regional integration in other developing countries in Latin

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

31

America and Asia. In other words, whereas the EU perspectives to integration may be markedly different to that of Africa due to historical and contemporary reasons, the experiences of countries in Latin America and Asia, which share some similarities with African countries can provide useful lessons. To be sure, integration processes in Europe were informed by the logic of peace and security before economic considerations. The historical antecedents of integration in that part of the world are also different from what obtains in Asia, Latin America and Africa. In their review of regional integration in Southern Africa and comesa, Clapham, Mills, Morner and Sidiropoulos (2001) provide a comparative international experience with special attention to Latin America, the Association of South East Asian countries and the EU. Interestingly the book raises concerns that are significant for the study. For example, issues raised include the current process of regional integration in Southern Africa, the success and weaknesses and the relationship among regional bodies among others. While this is important, its focus was the formal approach to integration, which leaves out how the processes of integration affect those who operate in the resilient sector of the economy. Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014) examine the frameworks of labour migration in southern Africa and critique South Africa’s policy responses to the inflow of migrants from seven neighbouring countries. It shows that sadc migration governance is limited by various issues. First of all, the lack of subregional protocol on migration has led sadc member states to neglect African Union’s migration policy basic guidelines. Secondly, the authors show that South Africa uses bilateral agreement to manage the migration policy in the sub-region, and this approached has established labour migration that lowers the possibility of a strong migration policy. The authors also provide an historical context to the patterns of migration in Southern Africa as well as the anti-migration policy of post-apartheid South Africa detailing how more people have been deported since 1994 more than any time in the history of the country. They highlight the circular form of flows of people in the copperbelt region of Southern Africa both vertically and horizontally over a period of three hundred years. Rather than building on the historical ties that bind the people of the sub-region together in a circuit of circular exchange of labour manpower, post-apartheid South Africa has been more ardent in deporting people from the sadc countries. This article is particularly relevant to this study in that it shows the implications of government policies on our target group of study. As a regional hegemon, one would expect that South Africa will commit more to the project of integration not just in the sadc sub-region but Africa as a whole. This article also provides opportunity to examine how

32

Chapter 2

Nigeria has related with her neighbours in terms of migration. Although as a regional hegemon, Nigeria has taken so many initiatives to foster integration in the sub-region, it has also embarked on mass deportation of Ghanaians in 1983 (Afolayan, 1988). Even though the decision was informed by economic challenges as well as a diplomatic response to the actions of a Ghanaian’s military ruler a decade earlier, such actions cannot be justified as they did not flow well with the Pan-Africanist posturing of Nigeria’s government. Also focusing on immigration in the sadc region, John Mwaniki (n.d.) exam­ ines the effect of globalization in African countries with specific focus on those in Southern Africa. While considering the benefits of regional integration that can address globalization challenges, he underlines the need to undertake institutional reform to accommodate informal cross border trade which remains invisible despite the contribution it makes in the economy. This approach to understanding integration is particularly necessary and compelling to the extent that informal economy contributes a sizeable proportion of economic activities in Africa. The institutional reform, which Mwaniki mentions will include a deliberate effort by the government to incorporate the informal sector to the economic activities. Such reforms are also necessary to incorporate the welfare and contributions of migrants in the resilient economy to the overall health of the economies of the host countries. After a cursory analysis of the history and concept of regional integration, Christian Peters-Berries (2010) presents examples of successful regional integration experiments in EU, Asia and Latin America before analysing attempts at regional integration in Africa. The undp (2011) establishes a link between regional integration and human development. This study is of relevance to the current research for it recognizes that in spite of great efforts to achieve regional integration on the continent, the results are yet to be satisfactory. Initiatives such as the adoption of the Accra Declaration to accelerate the economic and political integration of the African continent and the establishment of regional economic communities have done to change the situation. The study critically assesses the way the contextual dynamics, common to many African countries, might affect the impact of regional integration on human development and experiences of other continents. The human development aspects of regional integration are pertinent to the study of the resilient economy. The conventional idea of regional integration or market integration is based on the logic of neoclassical economics, which is mostly concerned with the profitability of the firms. While creation of market access of the formal level can foster growth in Gross Domestic Product, those who operate at the fringes of global economy are usually left out. Whereas company executives have easy access to any country through the possession of valid travel documents, the

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

33

same cannot be said of the operators in the resilient economy. Indeed, as the present study shows, these categories of people are usually harassed at the borders, and harangued in their host countries, by law enforcement agencies. The deprivation that they suffer in a bid to eke out a living undermine their rights to development. In Amartya (2001) conceptualisation of development, many operators in the resilient sector lack freedom. Our findings show that ecowas is more tolerant of foreign nationals operating in this sector than sadc. These differences in the experiences of the operators in the two regions require appropriate policy responses to provide for social protection for the people in the resilient economy, while also protecting them from harassment. Most studies on regional integration pay little or no attention to the ­important issue of human development. Yet, regardless of the euphoria over economic growth measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product, the ultimate aspect in measuring the standard of living is the quality of human development. Due to the disparities in the levels of development in the study area of this research, migration of people from low economic opportunities to areas of high economic opportunities has engendered a higher form of human development through improvement in living standards of the migrants themselves and their dependants at home to whom many of them made regular remittances. Given the positive responses that we received from our respondents on the benefits of working in the resilient economy sector in their host countries, we pose the question: Should African leaders not rather encourage higher degree of flows and integration among these categories of workers? The fear usually expressed has been that movement of low skilled people from one parts of the continent to the other can fester social unrest as it may lead to displacement of locals. However, this is only one side of the argument. In a context in which migrants bring some unique skills in retail business to a particular country, what is important for governments is to formulate policies, which stipulate that migrants should train locals to participate in the relevant businesses. We argue that in the context of the construction of an African identity, the otherness of these migrants could become a secondary issue in the long run. Regional integration is at the centre of “Governing regionalism in Africa: Themes and debates” in a policy brief authored by Khadiagala (2008). It interrogates challenges to the integration of the continent from the oau era to the AU. Questions posed by the authors are relevant to this research as they seek to understand if regional integration can address the migration and developmental challenges in Africa with specific attention to integration in sadc and ecowas. A pertinent aspect of this policy brief is the need to strengthen the capacity of the regional economic communities as well as the African Union in such a way that they can effectively manage the integration processes.

34

Chapter 2

As ­various scholars have argued, the capacity of the regional economic communities as well as the African Union Commission to manage the integration process has been severely constrained through overlapping membership, inadequate human and financial resources as well as interference from outside donors (Fagbayibo 2015; Adedeji, 2012). Due to the half-hearted commitment of the political elite at the national levels to the project of integration, it is usually the case that they second low-ranking officers to these Secretariats, a situation that problematizes the execution for such officers and to exert the necessary pressure on the political officers to provide needed resources and support for the integration agenda. Effective governing of the integration process will require alignment of priorities of national governments with those of the regional organisations. For instance, due to the commitment of the former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to the integration project in West Africa and Africa as a whole, a special Ministry of Integration and Cooperation in Africa was established during his tenure from 1999–2007. However as soon as he left office, the Ministry was scrapped while its activities were integrated into another Ministry. Such reversals of policy underscore the importance of the commitment of political actors in governing integration processes in Africa. In this regard, it is important to emphasise that the continental focus of former leaders like Presidents Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, Abdoulaye Wade, Colonel Gaddafi and Abdelaziz Bouteflika which led to the formation of the New Partnership for African Development (nepad) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (aprm) appears to have been lost after many of them, especially the first two abandoned their offices. What has emerged in the relations among key actors in Africa has been the unfortunate resort to nationalistic posturing and pandering to the interests of neo-imperial powers in keeping the continent divided. It would also appear that where relationships exist at all among African leaders, such relationships are neither geared towards promotion of people-to-people integration nor greater unity on the continent. Rather such relationships are geared toward making markets available for companies from the respective countries. While it is worthwhile to create enough commercial exchanges as a way of fostering intra-African trade, more room exists for fostering people-to-people integration. In this regard, the regional economic communities have a role to play in communicating the benefits of integration to the people. However, their capacity to effectively do this will depend on the volume and quality of human and material resources that are available to them. Adedokun and Ogunyemi (2014) establish a link between the informal sector, market access and economic integration in West Africa. Accordingly, they argue that through the creation of market access for the informal sector, ­countries

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

35

would benefit in terms of growth, employment, poverty reduction, intra-regional trade and labour mobility [and] this will promote the drive for financial and monetary union of the sub-region. The findings from this study are very significant, because of the relationship that exists between the informal sector and the resilient economy on the one hand and the high importance of informal sector to the overall economic activities of the two areas of study on the other. While the informal economy is broadly classified as economic ­activities outside the formal sector, the resilient economy relates to economic activities that take place despite official restrictions and challenges. In the context of the migrant workers in West Africa and Southern Africa, despite the challenges that they are faced with in terms of getting approval to stay and harassment from security officers at the border towns, they have always managed to survive. On the other hand, despite the fixation with official statistics and Gross Domestic Product, the informal sector constitutes a significant economic sector in the two regions (African Development Bank, 2013). As we elucidate below, the contraction in the formal sector and the structure of the economy in these sub-regions have contributed to the growth and expansion of the informal sector over the past five decades. The huge contributions of the informal sector to the overall economic development in Africa necessitate a comprehensive policy framework both at the national and regional levels. Given the challenges that cross border migrants are faced with, a regional policy on mainstreaming informal sector to economic development will possibly provide more friendly policies, which will help to facilitate the expansion of this sector. Informal economy facilitates huge economic and non-economic flows, which help to foster regional integration in Africa. Although the focus of the various regional integration programmes in Africa has been on the formal economy, our findings show that the informal sector has a very high prospect of fostering integration on the continent through both economic and non-economic interactions. In view of the decline in the formal sector, a deliberate policy towards the promotion of integration through the informal sector will help to further unlock the economic possibilities that regional integration holds for the overall development of the continent. At the 33rd Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of ecowas, held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 18 January 2008, the ecowas Commission issued the ‘ecowas Common Approach on Migration’. This document is useful for providing the legal framework, the migration and development actions plans which are all important for our study The Common Approach to Migration in ecowas has facilitated higher flow of people across the subregion considerably. However, this cannot be said of sadc, where issues of the free movement of people has been very contentious.

36

Chapter 2

In 2006, the Sahel and West Africa Club produced a document which examines the socio-economic and regional context of West African migrations. After demonstrating the intensity of migration in West Africa, the authors argued that as a region relatively empty after independence, West Africa has gradually developed to an ‘island’ of settlements, which today are connected to each other to form a large group within which trade and movement are increasing. The innate character of what the above report calls West African regionality is different from Southern Africa in terms of latitude for mobility, residence and establishment of business enterprises. Although migration in West Africa as well as in Southern Africa has both historical and contemporary imports, the ecowas Commission has consistently sought to realise one of the basic objectives for the formation of the sub-regional body, which is regional integration. Despite the challenges of coping with the divide and rule tactics of France, ecowas leaders appear to understand the imperative of constructing a socioeconomic and political identity as a necessary condition for improving the living conditions of the majority of the citizens. However, the lofty objectives of the ecowas, domestic challenges and multiple memberships of the countries in other regional bodies have limited the degree of integration. The existence of a parallel regional organisations such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union, known as uemoa in French, presents a challenge to the effectiveness of ecowas. The eight-membered organisation of uemoa, which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo are also members of the ecowas. The undue integration of the economies of these countries as well as their political allegiance and loyalty to France has impeded the speed with which ecowas might want to move to foster integration in the sub-region. Deacon (2011a) clarifies the concept of migration and explores the linkages between social policy, migration policy, and regional social and migration policies. Besides some illustrations from the EU perspectives which can be useful in terms of comparative analysis, the paper also examines the questions mentioned above in the sadc region which is of interest for our study. The issues covered above are particularly salient in the context in which most of the migrant workers in the resilient sector are generally not documented or they have their visas expired. Although the elitist approach to migration tends to view these categories of people as undesirable elements (who merit instant deportation to their countries of origin), we provide a counter-narrative that regardless of the status of the migrant workers, social protection is a necessity. Social protection for citizens and residents in any geographical location is a responsibility of the state under international law.

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

37

Given the circumstances under which migrants in the resilient economies left their countries of origin, a sense of common identity will dictate a wellcrafted social policy to accommodate their needs. Although there is the fear that accommodating the migrants may further constitute a burden on the host countries, this is only a partial narrative. For instance, many of the workers in the resilient economy engage in circular migration in which they move in and out of the country of origin and host country. Many of them are also involved in cross border trade, with the result that they move in and out of their countries. In order to address the challenges of formulating and implementing social protection policies in such circumstances, it will be necessary for the regional economic communities to be involved in putting in appropriate policies. Non-governmental organisations can also take on these initiatives. In this regard the Southern African Trust is currently involved in a project that will ensure that mine workers from across Southern Africa receive the pensions that mining companies have deducted from their salaries over the years. It would be worthwhile to replicate this in the West and other parts of Africa. Indeed, a regional social protection policy is necessary which will see to the welfare of migrant workers, regardless of their categories. One of the ways in which this can be done is to ensure that they have access to banking services. This can provide an opportunity for the respective regional institutions to deduct pension money from their savings. An analysis of regional integration and migration in sadc would also entail an examination of laws and protocol that regulated and still regulate the issues. One of the ways through which the effectiveness of regional economic communities can be measured is the extent to which agreed protocols and treaties are implemented. Indeed, one of the drawbacks of regional economic communities in Africa is that many of the treaties that member countries of the rec s have signed, remain unimplemented. In this perspective, Solomon (1997) examined legal documents dealing with freedom of movement in sadc and identified some documents in connection with the movement of people in the sub-region. Some of these are the 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community (sadc) and the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community, which was signed in August 2005. Even though these protocols have been signed by some members, they are yet to come into force, because the requirement that nine of the fifteen-member states have to domesticate these laws have not been met. According to (Isaacs, 2015:2) “While nine countries have signed, only four have ratified domestically, far below the nine ratifications required for it to come into effect.” He also notes that South

38

Chapter 2

Africa, one of the ratifying states, has at least implemented visa waivers in line with the spirit of the agreement, with nationals of almost all 15 sadc countries able to visit South Africa visa-free. Yet, South Africa has embarked on a larger scale of deportation of African citizens more than any of the countries in the sub-region. Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014) emphasise this point when they argue that despite the existence of these Frameworks and that of the African Union on movement of persons, there have been massive deportations of citizens of the sub-region and other African countries from South Africa, since the return to majority rule in 1994. Paradoxically, other foreigners from developed countries in the West have not suffered the same fate at least on the same scale (Nyamnjoh, 2005). The experience with movement of persons in Southern Africa contrasts with what obtained in ecowas where free movement of persons is a lot easier. Isaacs (2015) explicates this when the author notes that in contrast with Southern Africa: ECOWAS is arguably the leading African REC where free movement is concerned. It got started earlier, adopting a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishsment as far back as 1979, 16 years before SADC’s draft protocol on the same. ECOWAS citizens can travel to member states visa-free, including using an ECOWAS passport, a key component of regional mobility and identity. Also contrary to the 90 days limit, which the current Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community allows for citizens of other sadc member countries to stay in another member country, both ecowas and eac have provisions for citizens to stay for longer periods of time. As Isaacs (2015) further notes, eac citizens can travel visa-free for up to six months at a time (they can stay longer as long as they notify immigrant authorities in their destination country) and can do so with only their national identity document. Nshimbi (2015) addresses issues relevant to this book. In this regard, the question of whether member states are occasionally keen on regionalism but withdraw at other times to focus on their sovereignty becomes very critical. The other question is whether the focus on domestic power by regional leaders does not hinder regional integration and what could be the benefit of the ­bottom-up approach to integration which entails the promotion of ­cross-border activities. Indeed, as Oloruntoba (2016a) argues, the nation state is an arena of power and the political class has always used the issue of migration to score

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

39

­ olitical advantage. It is usually the case that rhetoric about migration and p its over bloated negative effects on the economy always assume higher currency ­before elections. In other words, the instrumentalization of migration as a p ­ olitical capital by the elites have undermined the prospects of deliberate engagement of its costs and benefits, especially in Africa. Yet, the neglect of this necessary undertaking has both social-economic and political consequences for all countries involved. Writing on the imperative of having a borderless Southern Africa, Kitimbo (2014) posits that the stringent immigration requirements for getting work permit for skilled workers in South Africa and Namibia have led to acute skill shortages to the extent that in South Africa alone, there are over 400,000 positions that have not been filled due to lack of availability of local skills. Beyond the loss in productivity that such gaps have caused to the economy, political consequences of xenophobic attacks on foreigners in the form of loss of social capital and other forms of solidarities cannot even be quantified. Despite the political resistance and the acute concern over inflow of migrants to particular countries in Africa, historical accounts show that migration of workers across the region and the continent in general have cut across all countries as people have moved around to look for work or get hired to occupy positions that citizens may not be comfortable to occupy. As ­Kitimbo (2014:5–6) further explicates: The history of labour migration in Southern Africa illustrates that migration for work not only has a long past in the region, but also, notwithstanding the serious social issues that attended it, formed an economic backbone especially for host countries, such as South Africa, that have relied on low-skilled foreign workers for many decades. Furthermore, this history shows that systems of migration in Southern Africa are deeply rooted even though governments have tried to do away with them in recent years. As it is in Southern Africa, so it is in West Africa. As Charrière and Frésia (n.d.) note West Africa is a site for massive migration. Indeed, before the colonial intrusion upon which the current artificial and arbitrary borders are constructed, people have moved across the West African sub-region for centuries for trading, investment, hunting and other forms of engagements (Ochonu, 2015). Adeniran (2014) succinctly captures the migration flows of Yorubas in the Southwest part of Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire for centuries. In particular the Ejigbo people in the State of Osun in Nigeria have moved to settle and establish both economic and political structures through which they have been integrated into their host communities. In what can be regarded as an informal

40

Chapter 2

­ igration, these migrants have acquired both linguistic and cultural distincm tiveness that did not only help them to flow with this host communities but also afforded the preservation of economic activities and cultural practices. Until the political crisis broke out in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1990s and 2000s, these migrants have lived peacefully with their host communities for decades. The experiences of Ejigbo people in that country reinforced the central argument of this research that aside the political factors that have negatively affected the prospects of harnessing the benefits of migration, people to people integration is distinctively possible in Africa. Also, the exaggerated fear that everybody will want to migrate to a country where better economic opportunities exist is not substantiated by historical experiences of migrants across the continent. Rather, what surfaces is that while a few migrate the majority remain. Among those who migrate, many will at some point in the future return to their countries of origin as they usually maintain an unbroken tie through regular visits and other forms of exchanges (Falola, 2013). Adeniran also explores how various migration policies and multiple monetary zones have limited sustainable cross-border socio-economic interactions in West Africa. The differences in migration and monetary policies can be traceable to the legacies of colonialism in which the West Africa sub-region was colonised by France and Britain respectively. The differences have continued to manifest in the relationship that exists between the Anglophone and Francophone countries at linguistic, cultural, economic and political levels. Indeed, scholars have argued that France has continued to exert undue power over her past colonies in ways that suggest an unwillingness to allow closer interactions with the former British colonies (Adedeji, 2012; Bach, 2004). Thus, despite the close interactions that defined peoples of West Africa before the partition of the Africa, colonialism and its neo-colonial manifestations have continued to create a wedge to the benefits of the neo-imperial powers. It would appear that rather than supporting an integrated community of peoples in West Africa, France has continued to play a divisive role. The role of France during the Biafra War and the support that the country provided to the secessionists has been attributed to the fear that a united Nigeria could pose as a competitor to France over who controls the former territories (Bach, 2004). Indeed, the speed with which Nigeria accelerated the process of forming ecowas in 1975, almost immediately after the Civil War has been attributed to the imperative of building support and generating solidarity with neighbouring countries (Adetula, 2004). The International Organisation for Migration (iom) (2013) explores the well-being of cross-border migrants seeking better livelihood opportunities in South Africa, with an emphasis on health, gender and development. In

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

41

addition, it focuses on the link between migrants’ well-being and the social and economic development of the Southern African Development Community (sadc). One of the main reasons why migrants move across borders is to improve their living conditions. The majority of the respondents of this study confirmed that they moved from their countries of origin to their host countries because of the need to have access to higher standard of living. However, while many have seen some improvements in their living conditions, others observed that the challenges that they face with security agencies who always demand for money in exchange for immigration papers at the borders or during stop and search in cities and towns have compounded their situations. As we show later, there is a gender dimension to the issue of migration in the resilient economy in the two regions. While men and women were involved in cross border migration, the high proportion of women at the borders speaks to their struggle for existence, in the context in which a patriarchal social structure of accumulation excludes them from opportunities. Access to health facilities is critical for the well-being and productivity of migrants working in the resilient economy. However, given the requirements for valid permits, many of the respondents’ lack of access to governmental health facilities, leaving them with little or no alternative than to patronise private medical practitioners, whose costs of services are usually too prohibitive to access. As mentioned above, the need to take care of the well-being of migrants at this level calls for a regional governance architecture for migration, a point that Fioramonti (2013) has emphasised. This would include that irrespective of the status of migrants, among other things, facilities are made available for them to access health services. Deacon (2011b) examines the role of actors such as international organisations (Regional Development Banks, UN Social Agencies, UN Economic Commissions, World Bank) in shaping migration policies at regional and subregional levels in Africa. In view of the failures of the State to take issues of migration, (especially low-skilled migrants), these organisations have a role to play in supporting the reforms of domestic laws not only to conform with the relevant international treaties and charters on the protection of vulnerable people but also to conduct some form of impact assessment on the political economy of migration in the resilient economy. For instance, despite its rationalist and neo-classical economics orientations towards migration, the World Bank has recognised the importance of migration both to the host and sending countries. Although the World Bank studies focus more on highly skilled workers, the findings in terms of the benefits of remittances equally apply to migrants in the resilient economy.

42

Chapter 2

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa issued an “Outcome Statement of the Regional Experts’ Meeting on International Migration and Development in Africa in Preparation for the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.” This statement urged African countries to mainstream migration in development plans and strategies in the continent, to update migration policies in participation and consultation with all stakeholders, and with the engagement of the private sector and civil society organizations, harmonise and ensure coherence of legislation, policy and practice on the management of migration. These recommendations are instrumental as they will also inform the research on what needs to be done to address migration under our project. Similarly, the statement gives direction on dealing with labour mobility and development which is important for our project. Furthermore, it provides a basis for partnerships, cooperation and regional integration, for a rights-based approach in addressing the migration and development nexus by considering the specific needs of migrants, with a special attention on vulnerable groups including domestic workers which are central to this study. unctad (2013) emphasises how to strengthen the private sector to boost intra-African trade. This report shows that bosting intra-African trade entails creating more space for the private sector. This also begs the question of the “opportunities of cross border trade in Africa which is at the centre of the present study.” Indeed, as we mentioned above, the informal sector is one area where the dynamism of the private sector can be maximized for the overall development of the continent. Consequently, removing the various restrictions to the mobility of goods and services holds a vital key to unlocking the huge potential of intra-African trade. Apart from the issue of trade, other benefits that can be gained from removing these restrictions include cross-national learning, filling up gaps for activities that locals may not like to be engaged in or on which they do not have adequate skills and cultural diffusions. “Migrant spaza shops: Business lessons from Soweto” is a survey on the operations of spaza shops in Soweto. An examination of the result by Gumbo and (Bokolo, n.d.) unpacks migrants’ peculiar business strategies and resilience dynamics. After describing informal economic activities which existed prior to industrialisation, the authors show that migrants have business strategies that give them an edge over local vendors. These strategies include “locating their spaza shops in strategic areas, frequently buying a variety of stock in large quantities, adopting strict saving behaviours, offering lower prices, utilising aggressive marketing tactics and generating loyalty by giving credits.” The lessons provided by this study under reference are very instructive.

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

43

As we mentioned above, one of the key merits of migration is cultural diffusion and learning. Understandably, the operators of the spaza shops in Soweto, South Africa are from other African countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, and so on. In the Sunnyside part of South Africa there are also migrants from West Africa who are specialists in hair dressing both for men and women. The presence of these categories of migrants and the skills that they bring provide learning opportunities for locals in these trades. Thus, by providing these services and teaching interested local citizens, they help to inculcate new skills and generate employment. In order to avoid the recurrent incidences of attacks on these category of migrants, it is important for the government to design a policy that will not only integrate them into the society, but will ensure training and learning for locals in such a way that the latter will see the benefits of having the former in their communities. However, the effectiveness of such policies will be depending to a large extent on partnership with the media, which is charged with the responsibility of communicating the benefits to the host communities. Previous incidences of xenophobic or criminal attacks on the Spaza shops show that the media has been usually culpable of repeating the politically motivated narratives of ‘foreigners taking our jobs’ or ‘foreigners are the cause of insecurity’. Deacon, Marius, and Beremauro (2015) deal with the question of social security and social protection in sadc through the MiWORC Report No. 4, Social Security and Social Protection of Migrants in South Africa and sadc. This report examines the provision of forms of social protection mechanisms for people who travel across borders in search of better lives in South Africa and sadc. Interestingly, it addresses issues of migrant workers and cross-border trader access to social services in South Africa, as well as the informal social protection of domestic workers. According to the authors: Within the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a region with a rich history of labour migration and population movements, the report tackles the contested policy question of which institutions or regional authorities are responsible for meeting the social protection needs of migrants … While SADC has a limited role in terms of both migration and free movement policy within the region, aspirations exist in SADC to work towards the equal treatment of migrants and the rights of free movement. They argue that extending access to forms of social protection to migrants is key to real regional integration in the sub-region. In South Africa, which is the economic powerhouse of sadc, social protection policies and legal statutes

44

Chapter 2

exclude and therefore prevent non-nationals from accessing assistance and security, exacerbating the vulnerability of migrant workers (Deacon, Marius, & Beremauro, 2015:10). Despite the relatively higher level of integration in West Africa, the situation is similar to Southern Africa as there is no social protection for migrants. Indeed, the domestic situations in the two regional hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa, present two contrasting scenarios. Whereas South Africa implements that law that guarantees social protection and security in form of grants to its vulnerable citizens, Nigeria does not implement this law, even though it is contained in the constitution. The only exception is that some state governments pay out monthly stipends to old people. Deacon and Nita (2013) compare the role of social policy in enabling and preventing access to social entitlements by cross-border movers in Europe and Southern Africa through “Regional Integration and Free Movement across borders: the role of social policy in enabling and preventing access to social entitlements by cross border movers. Europe and Southern Africa compared.” The authors consider the role of access to social security, social assistance, health and education services in enabling free movement within regions. In this exercise, the authors differentiate between the movements of and social rights entitlements of citizens, migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. They demonstrate that in the EU and sadc, the non-portability and access to social benefits across borders limit regional integration. The afdb, oecd and undp (2014) in a study on “Trade policies and regional integration in Africa” examine how trade is determining African integration, hindrances to free movement of people and goods, and the significance of increasing Africa’s services sector to achieve development. Among other problems, the study argues that freedom of movement of persons is limited by the visa-related challenges. In perspective, while Central Africa is the most restrictive region, West Africa is the most flexible in terms of openness of the borders. This is interesting for our research as it has helped us look at how visa-free travel arrangements within both sadc and ecowas have managed to become the most liberal in visa issuing on the continent via the use of letters of consent. The International Organization for Migration (2013) produced some interesting insight on the well-being of economic migrants in South Africa for the 2013 World Migration Report. “The well-being of economic migrants in South Africa: Health, Gender and Development.” Focusing on the well-being of economic migrants, the report finds that in spite of conducive policies for the integration of well-being, the latter are not implemented, leading to the social and economic exclusion of migrants. Furthermore, the status of cross border migrants eases the challenges, yet aggravates the situation as the area of residence is determinant for access to basic services. However, these migrants still

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

45

afford to work and send remittances to their countries. The inability of the South African state to include non-nationals in getting access to social benefits is informed by the need to cater for many of the citizens who lack access to basic social services. It is against this backdrop that a regional approach to social protection and security of non-nationals, especially those in the resilient economy is very important. Rather than relying on the government of a country, which may likely face resistance from internal interest groups such as labour, a regional approach to social protection in which countries contribute to a fund to meet the needs of migrants is much more feasible. However, the success of such initiative will depend on the commitments of the various governments in the particular subregion. Given the differences in the economic resources of the countries in the two sub-regions under study, the role of the regional hegemons in underwriting some of the costs of integration cannot be over-emphasised. As Kaplan (2004) would argue, the donor community may also be able to measure the impact of their donations if they are focused on regional organisations in their interventions on social projects in African countries, where the bureaucracy is particularly very corrupt. Nyamnjoh (2006) shows how in a time of so called “globalization” inclusion of foreigners in South Africa and Botswana remains rhetorical. Nyamnjoh, focuses on the plight of illegal domestic workers in South Africa and in Botswana. This book is very relevant as it deals directly with domestic migrant domestic workers who are also at the centre of our study. Bhagwati (2003) examines the flow of migration in the world. He shows that migration is a global phenomenon. People depart for various raisons including economic reasons, fear or the need to settle elsewhere. He calls on world leaders to adopt progressive immigration policies and best practices to be spread and codified as nothing can be done without cutting migration. This article is important for demonstrating that the issues of migration are not new. More importantly it contributes to our understanding of migration and could compel ecowas and sadc officials to understand the need to adopt appropriate policies and share best practices in the realm of migration and regional integration. Gedaa and Kebret (2008) show that regional integration is curtailed by two main problems in comesa. They argue that challenges to regional integration in Africa include reluctance of governments to give up sovereignty of macroeconomic policy-making to a regional authority; to face possible consumption costs that may arise by importing from a high-cost member country; the idea is to accept unsatisfactory distribution of gains and losses that may follow an integration agreement at least in the short run and terminate current economic

46

Chapter 2

ties with non-members, as well as the absence of a strong and continued political commitment and macroeconomic instability. Nevertheless, they also argue that the multiplicity and strengthening of regional blocs across the world, the realization across Africa that their markets are not big enough, the liberalisation initiative which is generalized based on the continent through the Doha development agenda and the Economic Partnership Agreement have inspired African countries to keep working on their rec s. The paper argues that questions of implementation of the economic, political and institutional limitations are serious challenges to integration. In addition, the paper also shows that regional groupings had an irrelevant effect on the flow of bilateral trade in the region. The International Organization for Migration (iom) (2010) dwells on Free Movement of Persons in Regional Integration Processes. This book originated from a workshop organized by iom and unctad to examine the linkages between trade, development and migration. The book identifies the flows of goods, capital and services as the main contributing factors to increased migrations. It also explores the linkages between migration and development and found that the interactions between human mobility and trade liberalization are becoming increasingly relevant for the migration, trade and development communities. Furthermore, the book acknowledges the role of regional integration in enabling members to secure access to larger markets, to attract foreign direct investment and to establish cooperative mechanisms. As far as the sadc and ecowas are concerned, the book simply provides an overview of establishing documents as well as their objectives. The Sahel and West Africa Club/oecd Working Document “The Socioeconomic and regional context of West African migrations” (2006) links the migration phenomenon to the overcrowding of the continent, the rapid urban development in West A ­ frica, the youth of African people as well as the ageing of population in the developed countries which create opportunity for African migrants. The Working document shows that along the years ecowas mandate had evolved from being a tool for regional economic integration to accommodate issues of “monitoring of elections; poverty reduction; free movement of goods and people; promotion of social dialogue; education; culture and religion; human rights; women, children and youth.” These are core issues in our suggested research which will also focus on similar development in the sadc. Mengisteab and Bereketeab (2012) contribute to this debate in their edited volume entitled Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa. Contributors to this volume identify factors that can enhance regional integration, one of which is the adequate management of citizenship rights. Therefore, they proceed to examine how equitable citizenship rights

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

47

can lead to a better integration model that will lead to a good management of conflict and enhance regional economy. Although this book is of interest to us, its focus is on the Greater Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, citizenship rights are a contested political matter across the continent. The experiences of migrants in terms of their exclusion from social benefits, access to economic opportunities and so are defined in terms of their status as non-citizens. The conflict over citizenship rights and inclusion of foreigners in having access to some opportunities is particularly intensified through shortage of economic resources. One of the main assumptions of the book is that movements of commodities and capital almost always give rise to movements of people. Thus, in the wake of the technology-inspired globalisation processes, migration has been a very important element of the flows of the factors of production. Although it has not assumed the same quantum as that of goods and services, the rate of migration has increased in recent times more that any time in history (World Bank, 2014). As noted above, the challenges of meeting economic needs have contributed to the movement of people across spaces. The rise of neonationalism in different parts of the world has worsened the conditions under which migrants operate. While it may be relatively easier for highly skilled people to migrate and work in countries of their choice, the same cannot be said about operators in the resilient economy, who always have to cross many hurdles in order to arrive at their chosen destinations. The promise that globalisation processes will foster greater economic opportunities across the world appear to have been unfulfilled because of the differences in the capacity of countries to embrace the process. In actual fact, the structure of the global economy has ensured that finance, represented by mobile money moves more freely across countries than labour. Despite the Mode 4 of the General Agreements on Trade in Services, which provides for mobility of people, more attention has been paid to liberalisation of investment and financial regimes than that of labour. Findings from this study show that liberalisation of the laws that regulate labour movement, can create better opportunities for low-skilled migrant workers who trade across borders. In a paper titled “Operationalising the ecowas Protocol on Free Movement of Persons: Prospects for Sub-Regional Trade and Development” Adepoju (2011) discusses the development of the ecowas ‘free movement’ Protocol. ­Accordingly, he examines the main texts that led to the adoption of the Protocol aiming to create a borderless ecowas. Nevertheless, he also underlines the challenges of ecowas which revolve around weak political support and ­rivalry along language lines (Francophone versus Anglophone), poor funding by member states and the non-ratification and non-implementation of

48

Chapter 2

­ rotocols. The main achievement of ecowas is free movement of persons p without visa within the sub-region. Adepoju (2012) also shows that intra-regional trade remains weak in the ecowas region and calls for the harmonization of travel documents to coordinate migration and to implement the protocol on Establishment and Residence, explicitly recognised in the 1992 amongst other initiatives. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “economic development in Africa Report 2009, “Strengthening regional economic integration for Africa’s development” is an interesting report. It argues that reinforced intra-African integration is indispensable for development. With special attention to economic flows, it explores the movements of trade in goods to include developing questions such as trade in services, investment, and migration within regional integration arrangements amongst other. Although this report is relevant for the suggested research, it is broad for covering issues of regional integration on the continent in general. Adepoju (2008) provides a broad account on migration in sub-Saharan ­Africa. He shows that due to economy pressures and tensions from the transformation of the global economy and the ageing of population in the developed countries, the needs for migrants had grown. Adepoju presents a global report on migration with insight on the African Union’s strategic framework for a policy on migration. He also looks into ecowas and the principal countries of emigration, which include Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo and Ghana. As for Southern Africa, Adepoju argues that the main migrant labour arrangement in Southern Africa has been from neighbouring countries to meet South Africa’s labour necessities. Adebusuyi Adeniran (2014) presents the Origin of ecowas and its challenges. It was originally established to secure the free movement of good and persons in the West Africa region. So far, besides the citizens’ permission to move without a visa in the sub-region, prioritizing national interests over broader regional interests by ecowas member states is the highest hindrance to migration and socioeconomic integration in West Africa. Although the foundational objectives, which underpinned the establishment of sadc may be different, free movement of people has also continued to be negatively affected by national laws and policies. This chapter has summarised the various perspectives on migration and regional integration in Africa. What has emerged is that the Westphalia state structure has undermined the effectiveness of putting in place appropriate mechanisms for fostering regional integration. Although the state structure was an imposition on Africa, the political leaders have continued to keep the borders. Rather than devising policies to accommodate from

Conceptual Underpinnings and Contemporary Debates

49

neighbouring countries, they have been largely excluded, to the ignorance of the shared identity of Africans, but also for political expediency. 2.2 Conclusion This chapter focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of migration and regional integration. It situates the two concepts within the larger body of scholarly and policy dimensions both in Africa and in the world in general. The chapter uses secondary material to underscore contemporary debates on migration and regional integration. The chapter analyses some of the barriers to regional integration such as multiple memberships to regional groupings by African countries as well as complexities and failures to frame a Pan-African identity and citizenship for Africans citizens. In such a context, the chapter also examines the barriers to movement for individuals between countries on the continent and collectively how they navigate such barriers through illegal border crossings and residence within wealthier or more stable countries.

Chapter 3

Historical and Theoretical Issues 3.1 Introduction The history of migration in Africa possesses both vertical and horizontal characteristics, in which people move both southward, eastward and northward. While the reasons for such migration can be said to be driven by economic imperatives (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014), change in climatic conditions, wars and conflict were also accountable. The Bantu migration from Central Africa to Southern Africa was one of the most episodic cases of migration in African history. As Ochonu (2015) and Zeleza (1993) remind us, there were a great deal of inter-African relations on the basis of trade and general economic activities in early (i.e. pre-colonial) Africa. For instance, Moses Ochonu narrates how the Wangara people of West Africa ply their trade from their base in Senegal to different parts of the sub-region. While the movement was a form of circular migration, in which the traders moved around with their products and returned to their base to plan another journey, these activities fostered a form of regional integration both to trade and investment (Ochonu, 2015). There were also movements from places far afield in West Africa to Sudan, Addis Ababa and between closer neighbours like Yoruba people of present day Nigeria to Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (Adebusuyi, 2014). Implicit in the movement of Muslims from the Northern parts of West Africa to Saudi Arabia was also economic exchanges along the way. Even before Islamic conquests of that part of the continent, records show that Africans have migrated to the Indian or properly so called African Oceans and the Middle East (Jayasuriya, 2008; Bathiley, 1994). As Bathily (ibid.) argues, in pre-colonial Africa, wealthy rulers from Mali Empire and Songhai empire moved in large caravans of entourage and displayed their wealth in the most sophisticated manner, discerned as outlandish manners. Thus, contrary to the modern day irregular migration in which desperate young Africans undertake a perilous journey through the desert and the sea to reach new destinations, migration in pre-colonial Africa, in most parts were not borne of desperation or frustration. Apart from cross-national migrations, there were also country migration within, especially during the colonial rule. Ake (1980) shows how the colonial policies of urbanisation and taxation forced people to move from the rural areas to urban areas in search of wage labour. This pattern of movements was reproduced in the 1960s to 1990s as economic opportunities and social © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_004

Historical and Theoretical Issues

51

a­ menities began to shrink in the rural areas. Following on the Lewis dual economic model, which posits that over supply of labour from the rural areas can feed to industrial development in the cities, most African leaders concentrated on building industrial clusters and centres in the urban areas. These attracted young school leavers who were in search of jobs. The implementation of the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s to the 1990s further exacerbated the economic challenges of moist African states. More than any time in the history of post-independent Africa, this economic challenge has forced people to move in different direction of Africa, with Nigeria (in the 1970s), Libya (up till 2011), and South Africa (since 1994) as prime destinations for African migrants. In contemporary times, there have been high incidences of migration especially from zones of conflict and economic hardship to zones of relative peace and economic livelihood. Due to the oil boom that Nigeria experienced in the 1970s, as an example, the country was home to millions of migrants from ­different parts of Africa. When the crisis broke out in neighbouring countries like Liberia and Ivory Coast, hundreds of thousands more fled to Nigeria. Postapartheid South Africa has also witnessed an influx of other Africans from different parts of Africa who come in search of greener pastures. Although both regional hegemons (e.g. Nigeria and South Africa) had at different periods resorted to massive deportation of foreign nationals, there have been some positive indications on how such movements facilitate regional integration. Apart from the positive effects of official migrants who facilitate filling skill gaps in various sectors, integration from below has happened in cases of marriages, establishment of businesses in the resilient sectors and adaptation in cultures. Despite these developments, migration and regional integration have been negatively affected by coloniality of borders, laws and mental orientation of political and some intellectual elites, who see fellow Africans as the other (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013) In virtually all countries in Africa, it is paradoxical that citizens of former colonial masters receive better treatment than those from African countries. It is in the context of this contradiction that a new paradigm of Pan-African identity and African citizenship becomes imperative in explaining migration and regional integration as against citizenship on the basis of tribalism, ethnicity or nationalism which are the classifications that the colonialists adopted in dividing, defining and ruling Africa in their own interest (Mamdani, 1996, 2012). Ki-Zerbo (2005) argues that given the contradictions that define the post-colonial African experiences, a Pan-African identity, rather than the current fixation with the micro-nations that the colonialists created out of the pre-colonial mega nations is the only reliable and dependable basis for transformation and development in Africa.

52

Chapter 3

The perennial challenges that Africa faces in meeting the needs of her teeming population necessitates a holistic approach in the form of integration as this could lead to pooling resources and skills necessary to drive development. Resistance to this initiative from political and intellectual elites that are ensconced in coloniality can only be defeated through mobilisation of people from the grass-roots level and this will have to be done through proper communication of the benefits of integration – Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007), cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:332), explains coloniality as: … different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to longstanding patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day. With regards to Southern Africa in particular, as captured in Gumede (2015), the pre-colonial era (i.e. early Africa) was one that did not have clearly identifiable borders, and societies were categorised into kingdoms (e.g. Zulu, Sotho, Venda and others) and smaller hunter (San) or gatherer (Khoi-Khoi) communities. It is important to note that the African communities in that period did have some interactions with non-African communities such as the Portuguese, Dutch and sometimes Arab traders and ship merchants as well as Asians. It is also important to note that there is no single history of African communities and kingdoms. Rather, it is a series of histories of different communities who could be divided into different ethnic or language groups such as San and Khoi-Khoi; Nguni; and Sotho-Tswana and other communities. Lastly, the political landscape of the early (so-called pre-colonial) Southern Africa can be said to have been one that was characterised by the rule of kings or, more precisely, regional kingdoms. It needs to be mentioned that the power dynamics and political system of that time were more complex than has previously been presented, and that the community, especially elders, had significant influence on how respective kings, and on occasion queens, ruled their people. To simply characterise the rule of kings and queens as genetic or divine right-rule would fail to capture the complexity and nuances that ­characterised

Historical and Theoretical Issues

53

how African communities in the most southern tip of the continent functioned or were organised. It is important to highlight that one of the biggest political ruptures or events to define early Southern Africa had to do with the activities of Inkosi Shaka Zulu. The event referred to came to be known as Mfecane, which was the expansion of the Zulu Kingdom from its coastal areas to the inland areas of the then Southern Africa. It was during this period that numerous African communities fled to other parts of southern Africa and that resulted in the creation of newer political formations and communities, such as the Shona and Ndebele. The Mfecane greatly reshaped the political landscape of Southern Africa, as old ruling community structures were either dealt away with or new ones came into existence or the free movements of people accentuated. Therefore, Africans have been moving across the breadth and depth of the African continent from time immemorial. Changes in climatic conditions, wars and conflicts as well as economic imperatives made people move around the continent. As indicated earlier, the great Bantu migration from Central A ­ frica to Southern Africa was one of the most episodic cases of migration in ­African history. Trade and general economic activities in early (i.e. pre-colonial) A ­ frica fostered inter-African relations as Zeleza (1993) explains. In contemporary times though, people have moved around largely to eschew conflict and economic hardship to zones perceived to be of relative peace and economic livelihood. 3.2

Theoretical Perspectives

Migration and regional integration are two closely related concepts and social constructs. They are however different in terms of agency, actors, procedures, structures, processes and motives. The two issues have also been interrogated using various theories and approaches. We examine these theories and establishes a link between them. Theoretical reflections are important as they help to provide a comprehensive and deep understanding of the issues under study. Theory serves as the interface between abstraction and the reality of social events. Cox (1995:31) expatiates on this point arguing that: There is no theory in itself, no theory independent of a concrete historical context. Theory thus follows reality in the sense that it is shaped by the world of experience. But it also precedes the making of reality in that it orients the minds of those who by their actions reproduce or change that reality.

54

Chapter 3

From the foregoing, it would appear that the dominant theories of regional integration that we examine below have shaped the policy direction of political elites both in Africa and elsewhere. Given the limitations of their approaches and the continued relevance and preponderances of formal and informal regional integration arrangements, it becomes pertinent to develop theories that speak to the reality and the experiences of integrative projects, especially in the resilient sectors of the economy in Africa. Besides, we build on the various theories as well as empirical result of our fieldwork to develop a theory of African citizenship and identity. Although theories around regional integration have been traditionally focused on state actors and non-state actors and have been considered essentially within the contours of formal structures, we include informal regionalism as evidenced in cross border flows across different parts of Africa. In this first part of the section, we lay out the theories of regional integration while the theories of migration in relation to integration are discussed in the next part. The third part elaborates on the first two parts to build the theory of African citizenship and identity. Interests in the study of regionalism, regionalisation and integration have been borne out of the various exigencies of time and spaces on what could constitute a functional national, supra-national or inter-governmental arrangement or governance architecture that is capable of delivering public goods such as peace and security, political order, economic growth and development. As Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal (2001:6) argue, “regional cooperation and integration have often been seen as instruments to enhance welfare, stability and the creation of increased understanding and peaceful co-existence within regions as well as in the world more generally.” Despite the optimism that has informed regional governance arrangements, these scholars also admit that “increased interaction and integration can also give rise to conflict, exploitation, dominance, misallocation of resources and other negative effects” (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001:7). The study of regionalism has been divided into both old and new forms, with one emphasising the statecentric orientation of the processes and structures of integration, while the others bring to light the multi-stakeholder and multidimensional approach to its study (Söderbaum, 2004). Regional integration has been a subject of different and sometimes overlapping theoretical interpretations and investigations. Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal (2001) group theories of regional integration into three areas, which include, neo-realism; functionalism and institutionalism; and regional economic integration. These three categories can be amplified to reflect the core themes of liberal internationalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism and

Historical and Theoretical Issues

55

market integration theories. In his review of the theoretical landscape that have defined regionalism, Söderbaum (2004) identifies two main distinctions to the theoretical approaches, with each of them further subdivided into different strands. The two main sub-divisions are: ‘rationalist’ and ‘reflectivist’ approaches. Smith (1997) argues that rationalist theory can be located under neo-realism and neoliberalism. These are based on rational choice principles which are anchored on the interests, ideas and identities of actors, especially the stronger ones. The reflectivist approach on the other hand, refers to a wide and diverse perspective like postmodernism, feminism, normative theory, critical theory and historical sociology. This approach also covers the World Order Approach, the New Regionalism Approach and the new regionalism approach Weave-world (Söderbaum, 2004:15). We expatiate on these theories below. 3.2.1 Neorealism This theoretical position flows from the pursuit of national interest, power and domination by powerful states in the international community. In this regard, integration or regionalism as a goal is pursued for security purposes. As an offshoot of realist perspective to understanding interstate relations, neorealism sees projection of power by sovereign states as a legitimate objective. Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal (2001:8) note that “the neo-realist approach strongly emphasises the role of states, state interests, and their motivation in the process of regionalisation (and entry into regionalist projects) is subject to relative-gain considerations.” It can be argued that apart from the economic consideration, security imperative and the pursuit of peace contributed to the formation of the European Economic Community. The need for balance of power between Germany and France played a significant role in the project of integration in the sub-region. In this regard, Draper, (2013:69) notes that: “… the European integration regime was constructed based on three ideological foundations designed to promote pacification: democracy or ‘republican liberalism’; commerce and trade or commercial liberalism and institutions or regulatory liberalism.” Cooperation among states was seen as a deterrent to conflict and war that emanated from mercantilism and protectionism that preceded both the First and Second World War. Nye (1984) asserts that hegemonic stability theory further emphasises the importance of strong states in underwriting the costs of peace within an international or regional institutional setting. As Hammerstad (2005) cited in Draper (2013) argues, Regional Economic Communities have been playing some roles in the promotion of security rather than just leaving such role to a regional hegemon. Of course, as the case

56

Chapter 3

of the ecowas Peace Keeping Force (ecomog) demonstrates, a strong and well-resourced member of the rec is still needed to play a leading role. In the case of ecowas, Nigeria played this role by contributing both men and materials which ensured the successful prosecution of the role of bringing peace to both Liberia and Sierra Leone. The foregoing argument of the neorealists have been faulted on various grounds. For instance, Grieco (1997) cited in Söderbaum (2004:19) contends that a regional hegemon is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the development of regional economic institutions, noting that when there is relative stability of capabilities (which depends in part on the relative gains from regional cooperation and the expectation of a continuation of such stability) then there is a likelihood of deeper institutionalisation of economic relations. However, instability of relative capabilities limits the possibility of regional institutionalisation. In summing up this theory, we agree with Söderbaum (2004) that neorealism and security complex theory, are based on certain foundations, which make them more applicable to some parts of the world rather than the others. While they may be very applicable in parts of Europe where the Westphalian state-building prevails, they are less applicable in Africa, where state building is a caricature of the Westphalian model. 3.2.2 Functionalism and Institutionalism The second theoretical strands through which regionalism and integration have been studied are functionalism, neofunctionalism and institutionalism. Scholars like Mitrany (1966) and among others saw the possibility of cooperation in the international system. Rather than the power-centric and state oriented international system, in which the interests of the strong states prevails over the weaker ones under the realist approach, functionalist theories and neo-functionalists advocate the establishment of international organisations that are capable of bringing order into the international system. In his attempt to integrate the various integrative theories, Gethring (1996) notes that functionalist and neo-functionalist theories drew attention to the distinction between power issues (‘high politics’) and welfare issues ‘(low politics’) and argue that the latter in contrast to the former bore the potential for the collective pursuit of common interests. The role of spill over effects as an outcome of the progressive integration process was also emphasised, while also highlighting the importance of subnational actors. Although the European Community was used as a case study for much of the discourses on this approach, its universal application has been called into question (Gethring, 1996). According to Söderbaum (2004:20), the

Historical and Theoretical Issues

57

functionalist and institutionalist theories share some common traits, such as actor rationalism, pluralist assumptions, a similar liberal view of the state, and the regulating influence of institutional frameworks. While the sovereignty of the nation-state is preserved, at least for the time being, the functionalists believe that with more cooperation among actors and key experts, there will be a shift in loyalty from the national to the regional cum international ­levels  of  ­authority. While the functionalist theory held sway for some time, neo-functionalists argue that power is not and cannot be concentrated in the hands of state actors alone, rather, non-state actors such as interest groups and civil society actors are necessary in the use and protection of regional institutions and supranational bodies (Haas & Schmitter, 1964). As Gilpin (2001) observes, Haas, who was one of the key chief theorists of functionalism, eventually revised himself on some of the assumptions that he made about the functionalist approach to regional integration. The reversal was occasioned by new developments in inter-state relations and emergence of new actors outside the realm of the state. The continued influence of powerful states in the conduct of international affairs both at the multilateral and regional levels limits the expectations that international institutions can promote peace and deliver public goods. 3.2.3 Regional Economic Integration This is one of the most prominent theoretical strands through which regional integration has been explained. Its salience, relevance and dominance as a theoretical framework of analysis cannot be explained without consciously locating it within the processes of globalisation, transnationalism and universalisation. Although globalisation is not entirely a new phenomenon, it has become particularly virulent and penetrating in the last four decades as the search for markets for finished products and raw materials for industrial enterprises reached a crescendo. As a fall-out of the Industrial revolution in Europe and a product of the triumph of liberal capitalism over communism, globalisation has been described as the ‘march of capital all over the world in search of consumers and markets’ (Ake cited in Nabudere, 2000). Ajulu (2010:15) sees globalisation “as the process of opening up the world market to the powerful global players, a project inevitably driven by the most powerful, namely the core states and the big multinational corporations.” It is the integration of the global production chains, the intensification and deepening of financialisation through the development of new financial products (Oloruntoba, 2015). It is this contradictory process that has led to profit, growth and development in one part of the world, while leading to immiseration,

58

Chapter 3

­ overty and exclusion in the other. This contradictory process has both expanp sionary and reductionist features as they seek to force integration of various regions of the world through the adoption of common rules on trade, investment and even labour. As an imperialist project, it fosters accumulation on a large scale in a continuum that is sustained through military power, the latest being the dronisation of spaces, especially Africa and the Middle East, in the name of fighting terrorism. The emergence of China as a strong world power has further intensified the subtle spatial contest over Africa between the traditional superpowers, mostly the United States of America and the European Union and the rising power. The pursuit of economic benefits and cultivation of political alliances have defined the design of the global capitalist order for centuries. Despite the recent lull in the promotion of multilateralism of trade, regional integration, both at the horizontal and vertical levels continue to inform the formation of mega trading agreements across the world. While aid continues to be used as an instrument of control, the international financial institutions and privately aligned organisations such as the credit rating agencies continue to exercise strong influence and control over the policy-making processes of countries at the margin of global capitalism. Although these countries are integrated into the global circuit of production, this was not done on their own terms. According to Ajulu (2010:15), globalisation should be seen as a process that is propelled by contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, economic globalisation has unleashed productive forces throughout the world leading to the expansion of markets, the insertion of technology in the processes of production, and hence the improvement of productive capacities, as well as a massive increase in profits for multinational corporations. On the other hand, it also manifests a tendency to fragment, differentiate and marginalise social forces and countries incapable of catching up with its processes. Uneven development long associated with capitalist expansion is probably the most visible trademark of globalisation in its contemporary forms. It is the context of the strong force of globalisation, its rush for uniformity in processes and rules and its exclusivity that regional integration arrangements have emerged both as a response and a reaction. As a response, integration arrangements can provide a pooling effect for weak states to negotiate their space in the globalisation processes. In other words, where the state fails to derive enough benefits from the globalisation processes, they can enter into regional arrangements to negotiate better terms and conditions of relationship with other regions of the world. As a reaction though, states enter into regional agreements to minimise losses and exploitation under profit-seeking global capitalist system. In this connection, Farrell (2005:4) argues that,

Historical and Theoretical Issues

59

Since the world has been unable to construct a truly global governance system, one that is comprehensive in scope and with the capacity to manage and regulate (including the possession of a legal enforcement capability underpinned by political legitimacy), the states have turned to other forms of cooperation at the regional level in order to deal with common problems and shared interests. It is under this new turn in the economic arrangement of various states both in the global north and south that the regional economic integration theory is discussed below. According to Gibb (2009), regional integration in Africa has been constructed under three main economic integration approaches, which include; market integration, regional cooperation and development integration. Market Integration approach is encapsulated under the free market mantra and open regionalism, in which the market as a self-regulating agency optimizes resources and bring about efficiency. It is an approach that is underpinned by neo-classical economic theory, which posits that market should drive the integration process (Ajulu 2010). It is based on the theory of customs union, which was developed by Jacob Viner in 1933 and elaborated by Ballasa (1962). In his formulation of this theory, Viner argues that the “regional exchange of goods and services was beneficial to all parties within a customs union as long as it created trade. This exchange enables the most efficient producers to take a major share of the market and to replace the less efficient one” (Ajulu 2010:19). The removal of inefficiency leads to trade creation which will ultimately reduce unit costs, thus allowing consumers to buy at cheaper prices. In contrast to the trade creation effect of enabling efficient producers is trade diversion, which results from an attempt at protecting less efficient producers within a customs area. The market integration theory identifies six successive stages, which indicate the intensity of integration and synchronization of process. These include: Preferential Trade Area (pta), Free Trade Area (fta), Customs Union (CU), Common market, Economic Union and Political Union (Ballasa 1962). The first stage, a preferential trade area, is characterized by partial removal of internal quotas and tariff among members of the economic region. The second stage, the free trade area or association, is characterized by full removal of internal quotas and tariff. Customs union is the third stage. The associated feature of this stage is complete removal of internal quotas and tariffs and the adoption of a common external customs tariff against third world countries. The common market is another stage in the hierarchy. This is characterized by the removal of internal quotas, common external customs tariffs, and mobility.

60

Chapter 3

The stages of economic union have the characteristics of common market. But in addition to this, it entails harmonization of economic policies and the development of supranational institutions. The last and the highest stage is the political union, which contains the previous features together with unification of political and powerful supranational institutions (Oloruntoba, 2015a). Although the European model of integration has been the dominant model and theory in the discourses on regional integration, it is a social construction with global appeal, an appeal that has become even more poignant with the near collapse of multilateralism, at least on the issue of trade in the last one decade. With regard to Africa, where studies of regional integration have not received sufficient attention from the mainstream scholars on the subject, the European model has been particularly dominant. Draper (2013:68) notes that the influence of the European model on (Southern) African thinking is discernible in at least two areas: the political and the institutional. At the political level, the underlying rationale is rooted in the ‘liberal peace hypothesis’, which asserts that closer economic integration constitutes the ‘ties that bind’ which act to restrain member states from engaging in hostile military actions against each other; at the institutional level, African regional economic communities (rec s) tend to mimic European Union forms, particularly in their predilection for custom unions. 3.2.4 Developmental Integration This approach to regional integration exemplifies the possibility of fostering development, through cooperation in the third world countries (Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001:11). Development cooperation integrationists claim that the rationale of regional cooperation and integration among lessdeveloped countries is not to be found in marginal change and economic efficiency within the existing structure, particularly not in a comparison between trade creation and trade diversion, but in the fostering of ‘structural transformation’ and the stimulation of productive capacities, investment and trading opportunities. Within the context of the structuralist explanations of the economic positions of the third world countries, especially in their relations with the advanced capitalist economies, development cooperation was deemed to be necessary and better approach than market integration. It goes beyond the creation of market access to concerns and plans geared toward manufacturing, productivity and expansion in the infrastructural base of the cooperating member countries. This model also favours vertical integration (among developing countries) as against horizontal integration (between developing countries and developed countries).

Historical and Theoretical Issues

61

The rationale for this type of cooperation is that while developed countries always try to relate with developing countries based on unequal power and exploitation, there are tendencies that when developing countries relate with one another, it could be mutually beneficial. This assumption itself is fraught with various problems, not least the salience of national interests and the pursuit of national objectives by sovereign states. The disproportionality in benefits that may arise due to the divergence in the economic power of the cooperating states can also be a challenge. One of the arguments of the new economic geography thesis is that when developing countries enter into regional cooperation, there is the likelihood that relatively prosperous countries will derive higher benefits from the group, thus leading to unhealthy competition and conflict (Collier & Venables, 2008; World Bank, 2000). According to Draper (2013:76), the new economic geography expresses preference for northsouth as against south-economic integration. He notes that: … the theory predicts that whilst all countries in such schemes have a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing relative to the global economy, there will be one with les of a disadvantage than the others (i.e. the regional growth pole). Hence industrial activity will tend to relocate to the relatively advantaged economy at the expense of the others. The effect will be aggravated by agglomeration economics, whereby industrial concentration in the relatively advantaged country (consider South Africa and Kenya in Southern and Eastern Africa, respectively) will be promoted at the expense of its neighbours. While there may be some merit in this argument, it glosses the history of unequal relations that have defined north-south relations both at the economic and political levels. The political tension and conflict that are envisaged might not necessarily happen if the regional hegemons in the sub-region take their roles of redistributing the gains of integration very evenly (Oloruntoba & Gumede, 2016 and Gumede & Oloruntoba, 2017). The experience of integration in Europe shows that regional hegemons like Germany and France, but especially the former played very significant roles of both bearing the costs and mobilising for integration. Also, Collier and Venable’s argument that African markets are small is only partially correct. While the markets for some countries are certainly small, it cannot be said that the totality of African market, that is estimated at over one billion people with about three hundred million middle class is insignificant. What is needed is a clear policy on how gains of integration will be distributed across the integrating countries and regions. Besides, if integration is based on identity in addition to economic consideration, the

62

Chapter 3

differentiation effects of national sovereignty will be minimised as the pains and the gains of the processes will be jointly shared and owned. Development cooperation theorists also argue that there will be a more equitable distribution of costs and benefits. It makes use of two sets of distributive instruments, which are: compensatory (transfer tax system, budgetary transfers, preferential tariffs) and corrective mechanisms (planned industrial strategy, regional development banks or funds, common investment code) (Haarlev, 1988, cited in Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001:11). According to Ajulu (2010:22), development cooperation requires the following conditions to be successful: – A similar level of industrial development among member countries; – Harmonised national macroeconomic stability; – Regional political stability; – Significant intra-regional trade; – Complementary industrial development among member countries; – Significant differences among countries’ factor endowments; – Significant distribution of the benefits of integration; and – A political willingness to share some level of sovereignty. The operationalisation of development cooperation depends on the state as a key actor as well as strong political commitments from political elites. The Southern African Customs Union and the Southern African Development Community is a classic example of how the development cooperation approach has been instrumentalised in Africa. With a common revenue pool of fund for member countries, the former scheme has worked with some degree of success over several decades, despite the reservations from some member countries. Concerns exist that South Africa as the regional hegemon in the subregion has not done enough to distribute the gains of integration. Rather, due to its relatively more developed infrastructures and deep financial resources, the country has concentrated on exploiting the resources and the markets of the countries in the sub-region in a fashion that reinforces its sub-imperial status (Alden & Soko, 2005). 3.2.5 New Economic Geography Theory The contribution of this theory to the issue of regional integration is premised on the prediction that while all countries in South-South cooperation have a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing relative to the global economy, there will be one with less of a disadvantage than the others (i.e., the regional growth pole) (Draper, 2010). This will result in industrial activities being relocated to the country that is relatively advantaged at the expense of others.

Historical and Theoretical Issues

63

As Draper (2010) argues, due to reduction in tariff in the regional economic community, countries that suffer from relocation of industries will experience trade diversion. The overall effects of these could include generation of political tensions, loss of economies of scale and retrogression in regional integration (Collier & Venables, 2008). The summary of this theory is that rather than encourage horizontal integration, that is, among South-South countries, the underlying political friction and the loss of economic benefits to weaker members of Regional Economic Cooperation (rcc) will undermine economies of scale. African countries that are so characterized by integral weaknesses and structural problems are encouraged to focus on forming vertical integration, that is, with advanced capitalist economies of the North. Interestingly, regardless of the benefits or loss to African countries from regional integration, political elites on the continent have been more inclined to follow the prescription of this theory. 3.2.6 New Regionalism Approach New regionalism as theoretical construct seeks to improve understanding about the dynamics of regional integration and regionalism. It responds to the changes in the global configuration of geopolitical realignment of forces and actors, especially at the regional levels. It is essentially “designed to capture the heterogeneous and multidimensional processes of emerging regions and regionalisation from an historical and interdisciplinary perspective” (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001:12). Simultaneously, it is an improvement on the prevailing theories of regional integration that we have examined above. In connection to its sophistication and refinement over existing theories of regionalism, Mittelman (1999 cited in Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001:12) notes that: The new regionalism approach (NRA) is an important advance on the different versions of integration theory (trade or market integration, functionalism and neofunctionalism, institutionalism, and so on). All of them are deficient in as much as they understate power relations and fail to offer an explanation of structural transformations. In some ways, a break with this tradition, the NRA explores contemporary forms of transitional cooperation and cross-border flows through comparative, historical and multilevel perspectives. The distinctiveness of this theory is the recognition that regional integration and regionalism are not limited to the formal top-down and state-centric

64

Chapter 3

­ henomenon. Rather it encompasses both state and non-state actors, cut p across formal interactions between sovereign states to include informal flows and activities across specific borders. Also, rather than fixated with the European model of integration, nra recognises the pluralism and the multidimensionality of integration processes in different parts of the world. The nra approach also goes beyond the narrow consideration for economic efficiency and creation of market access to incorporate issues of security, peace, culture environment, and unofficial flows. Scholars of the nra such as Bøås, Hettne, Söderbaum and so on all agree that “regions and regionalisation must be understood in a global perspective, as well as that the interrelated global-regional-national-local levels cannot easily be analytically separated in advance of research” (Schulz, Söderbaum & Öjendal, 2001:13; Hurrel, 1995; Bøås, Marchand & Shaw, 1999). The nra accepts the inscrutable nature of globalisation in its full essence and the overbearing impact of market fundamentalism. Recognising the limits of the economic globalisation, it advocates a revisit of the embeddedness of the market in the society through some form of political control over market processes at least at the regional level. Similarly, given the weaknesses of the state structure to withstand the globalisation processes, the intransigence of the political elites to hold to power, nra recognises the importance of civil society actors as well as private sector in regionalisation processes. To some extent, it would appear that the nra incorporates activities of operators in the informal sector of the economy or even those at the resilient sector, which is the focus of this study. However, it falls short of the essence of the thesis of transnational or ­Pan-African identity and African citizenship. 3.2.7 On Theory of Migration Migration has been part of human history since time immemorial as indicated above. It has increased in recent times on account of the globalisation processes as social-economic and political conditions propel people to move from one region of the world to others. As at 2010, there are about 214 million international migrants in the world (UN, 2010). Although this makes just three percent of the global population, it is still a significant number. However, when compared with the flow of other factors of production, movement of people has been particularly minimal due to various factors which range from institutional, political, to cultural, restraints. As King (2012) notes, it is one of the ironies of globalisation that whilst goods, capital, knowledge, entrepreneurship and the media are free to flow across borders, labour, that other crucial factor of production, is not. In fact, on the whole people are less free to migrate

Historical and Theoretical Issues

65

now than they were in the past. The open world system which globalisation promises is limited to capital, commodity and services. The increasing rise of ultra-nationalist and conservative political parties in Europe and elsewhere in the world has been underpinned by anti-immigrant rhetoric. The ambivalence of many European countries to the humanitarian crisis that the Syria war has spurred on in the form of huge flows of refugees, attests to the crisis of migration in our contemporary times. Apart from Germany which has offered asylum to the war-fleeing Arabs from Syria and other countries in the Middle East, many European countries have acted below the basic standard of civilisation on which they have traditionally claimed ownership. More than any time in modern history, countries in Europe have been building high walls to ward off the endangered refugees who are fleeing wars. Despite the pressure from the European Union Commission, European countries remain adamant in helping to absorb the refugees from the war-torn zones. The decision of the European countries to shut off refugees essentially stems from the twin factors of shrinking economic opportunities and terrorism. Despite the resistance and increasing level of policing at the European borders, irregular migration continues to take place as desperate people continue to troop in hundreds of thousands through both the sea and the desert to reach Europe. The circular movements of people from one region of the world to the other have been explained from various theoretical standpoints, namely, pushpull or neo-classical economic theory, migration as development transition, historical-structural and political economy models, the role of systems and networks, the new economics of migration and the transnational turn in migration studies, dual labour theory and the World System theory. The neo-classical theory explains migration from the perspective of demand for and supply of labour. It posits that labour tends to flow where there is a shortage thereof and higher wages. According to De Haas (2008:5) at the macro-level, neo-classical economic theory explains migration by geographical differences in the supply and demand for labour. The resulting differentials in wages cause workers to move from low-wage, labour-surplus regions to high-wage, labour scarce regions. Migration will cause labour to become less scarce at the destination and scarcer at the sending end at the micro-level, ­neo-classical migration theory views migrants as individual, rational actors, who decide to move on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Assuming free choice and full access to information, they are expected to go where they can be the most productive, that is, where they are able to earn the highest w ­ ages. This capacity obviously depends on the specific skills a person possesses and the specific structure of labour markets. In other words, the neo-classical

66

Chapter 3

e­ conomic theory of migration sees migration in the light of the modernisation theory where development is conceived as a uni-linear process of moving from one state to the other (De Haas, 2008). Long before De Haas’ explanation above, Ravenstein (1885 and 1889) had proposed what he called the ‘laws of migration’ in which economic considerations were seen as the main determinant of migrations. As King (2012) explains, Ravenstein identifies the following as the laws of migration: – Migrants move mainly over short distances since those going longer distances head for the great centres of industry and commerce; – Most migration is from agricultural to industrial areas; – Large towns grow more by migration than by natural causes and increases along with the development of industry, commerce and transport; – Each migration stream produces a counter-stream; – Females are more migratory than males, at least over shorter distances and males are in the majority in international migration; and – The major causes of migration are economic. The push-pull model as a variant of the neoclassical economic theory is based on principles of utility maximisation, rational choice, factor-price differentials between regions and countries, and labour mobility (King, 2012). The neo-classical theory of migration has been criticised both for being ­Eurocentric and ahistorical as the factors that propel people to move from rural areas to urban areas in developing countries in contemporary times are different from what was obtained in Europe in the past (De Haas, 2009; Skeldon, 1997). According to Arango (2004), cited in King (2012:14), the Achilles heel of neoclassical theory was its failure to explain, firstly, why so few people actually migrate, despite the apparent incentives to do so; and secondly, why some countries have high rates of out-migration whilst others, with the same structural economic conditions, have very low rates. The dual labour theory assumes that the two types of economies of the socalled advanced countries require different kinds of workers, with the primary sector requiring highly skilled workers that are available in the developed countries and the other sector requiring low skilled workers that only migrant labour from less developed countries are suitable to do. The World System theory on the other hand sees a continuation in the division of the world economy into centre and the periphery, where the developed economies are naturally more attractive to workers from the periphery regions of the world. The migration and development transition was advanced under Wilbur Zelinsky’s ‘hypothesis of the mobility transition’ (1971), in which he links m ­ igration and mobility behaviour to the Rostow’s stages of economic growth. In his formulation, there is a corollary between demographic transition and the stages

Historical and Theoretical Issues

67

of growth model. According to King (2012:15), the key statement undergirding Zelinsky’s model is that “there are definite patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process” (Zelinsky, 1971:221–222). He explains the migration and mobility patterns through a five-stage model that is based on the experience of Europe, thus: – Pre-modern traditional society: very limited migration, only local movements related, e.g. to marriage or to marketing agricultural produce; – Early transitional society: mass rural-urban migration which involves emigration to attractive foreign destinations for settlement and colonization; – Late transitional society: slackening of both rural-urban migration and emigration; growth in various kinds of circulation, e.g. commuting; – Advanced society: rural-urban replaced by inter-urban migration, mass immigration of low-skilled workers from less developed countries; international circulation of high-skilled migrants and professionals; intense internal circulation, both economic and pleasure related; and – Future super advanced society: better communication and delivery systems may lead to a decline in some forms of human circulation; internal migration is inter- or intra-urban; continued immigration of low-skilled labour from less developed countries with the possibility of strict control over immigration. Like any other Eurocentric theory, this theory is also limited in application as historical trajectories of countries and societies differ. While some societies, such as Africa faced a series of invasions that forced millions of people to move (not captured in Zelinsky’s stages), some societies were spared from this type of ordeal. Disruption to the evolution of societies through wars and conflict can also force them to follow a different path from the one outlined above. The author later revised this theory and its fixation with modernisation theory and attributed migration to the economic situation in the host countries as well as the activities of multinational corporations (King, 2012; Zelinsky, 1983). Contemporary patterns of migration show that people move from areas of low economic opportunities to areas of high economic opportunities in the form of higher wages and security of employment. Despite the relevance of these theories to the explanation of migration, their relevance must be qualified. For instance, the fact that workers move and change jobs within developed countries limits the application of these theories. The theories also focused excessively on economic considerations, whereas, as explained above, there are other non-economic factors that cause migration. De Haas (2008) notes that there have been various shifts in the theoretical approach to understanding migration and its links to development over that past half of a century. Such

68

Chapter 3

changes are general reflections of the paradigm shift in social theory and the process of social change. While the developmentalists see a positive correlation between migration and development, the structuralists and neo-Marxists conceive the relationship as structurally and class determined. 3.2.8 Systems and Networks Theory This theory is an attempt at a scientific explanation of the factors, forces, patterns, linkages and process of migration. King (2012) locates the scientific usefulness of the theory in the context of the various dimensions in which it can be applied to migration studies, which include the following: village migration systems; inter-urban migration; the European labour migration system; the global migration system and the world systems theory (Mabogunje, 1970; Poot, 1986; White & Woods, 1980; Kritz et al., 1992; Wallerstein, 1979). For instance, in his application of systems and networks theory to the pattern of migration in West Africa, Mabogunje (1970) cited in King (2012) identifies five elements namely: – The environmental setting: economic conditions, government policy, social and community values, and the availability of transport and com­munications; – The migrant: the energy travelling through the system; – Control subsystems, which determine, for instance, who goes and who stays; – Adjustment mechanisms reacting to the departure and arrival of migrants, both in the village and in the urban context; – Feedback loops, such as return visits, which calibrate the system either to continue and expand (positive feedback) or to diminish and close down (negative feedback). This approach to migration clearly explains the trajectory of migration and regional integration in the two African sub-regions that were covered in this study as migrants move in and out in a form of circular flow to ply their trade and return. This applies especially to those who are at the border-posts. There are also control mechanisms through which families determine who goes or who stays. In the context of the resilient workers from Zimbabwe in South Africa, for instance, most of the people that we interviewed were women who had to relocate, if temporarily to fend for the family that they left behind in their country of origin. Apart from the above, migration has also been explained theoretically within the prism of transnational identity through Social action theory and Transnational field theory.

Historical and Theoretical Issues

3.3

69

Pan-African Identity and Regional Integration in Africa

The various theories of regional integration and regionalism as well as integration that we have considered above reveal some interlocking connections between state institutions, the political elites and to a less extent, the people of the continent. They show that regional arrangements either in form of Customs Union, Free Trade Area or Common Markets are designed for economic purposes and the returns that this brings in form of revenue or profit to either the Government or the corporations. This concern over the pursuit of corporate or national interest is largely responsible for the barriers to migration as well as the slow efforts toward implementation of various integration related protocols and treaties that African leaders have signed over the years. Although the New Regionalism approach recognises the plurality of actors and agencies in the process of integration, it falls short of making a case for a transnational identity as a necessary complement to integration. It is in the context of the limited understanding that the various theoretical approaches offer to the explanation of migration and regional integration in Africa that we are proposing a thesis on Pan-African Identity as a framework of analysis. More than an abstraction of reality, this is a constitutive approach, which will help us to untangle the lived experiences of migrants and would-be migrants under a socioeconomic and political milieu that is suffused with struggle for survival. The constitutive approach to explaining social realities diverge from the rationalist positions of utilitarianism, which sees the world from the perspective of accumulation and efficiency of the firm (Söderbaum, 2004). In this connection, Wendt (1999) cited in Söderbaum (2004:38) argues that: The ‘independent/dependent variable’ talk that informs causal theorizing … makes no sense in constitutive theorizing … the bias of mainstreaming social science against ‘mere’ description of history is unfortunate … constitutive theories are theories (emphasis in the original). They involve inferences from observable events to broader patterns, and inferences always involve a theoretical leap … data [do not] speak for t­hemselves … Constitutive claims concern how social kinds are put together rather than the relation between independent and dependent variables, but they are no less theoretical than that. Contrary to the dominant positivist paradigm of establishing causal inferences, objectivity and value-free facts as pre-conditions for recognition of a body of knowledge as theories, we agree with Cox (1995:31) that:

70

Chapter 3

There is no theory independent of a concrete historical context … Theory thus follows reality in the sense that it is shaped by the world of experience. But it also precedes the making of reality in that it orients the minds of those who by their actions reproduce or change that reality. Our view is that Pan-African identity best explains the prospects for the full realisation of the aspirations of Africans, especially those in the lower rungs of the ladder in society, who constitute the bulk of the workers in the resilient economy on the continent. While it is rooted in the history of migration on the continent, Pan-African identity relates to the theory of transnational identity, which seeks to explain the opportunities and freedom that exist beyond the confinement of nation-states or racial or ethnic divides. Even though there is connotation of similarities between them, national and transnational identities are not always the same. According to Fagbayibo (2015), the relationship between national and transnational identities is not always an easy one, as it could both be conflictive and/or complementary. Theorists of transnational identity such as Duchesne (2012) and argue that the existence of exclusive national identity is antithetical to transnational identity. Scholars have attributed several factors as determinants of crafting transnational identity. For instance, the formation of transnational identity in Europe has been affected by such issues as national histories, division among elites, feelings of superiority of national groups (xenophobia), and a low socio-economic status, and collectively these shape the negative approach to transnational identity (Fagbayibo, 2015). On the other hand, inclusive national identity can be fostered by factors such as age, political orientation, and social belonging; informing inclusive national identity. While a liberal political orientation is much more conducive to a diversified and plural society, conservative political adherents tend to be preoccupied with neo-nationalism and feeling of exclusion for those considered as the others. One of the challenges to the formation of a Pan-African identity, which is capable of fostering integration and removing the current bottlenecks to migration is the agency of the Africa elites in the construction of P ­ an-Africanism. In this connection, Nye (1966:9) notes that, The choice between them – between tribalism and Pan-Africanism – was not made by any popular plebiscite, but by the educated elite, who have generally opted for Pan-Africanism because of their views about size and power in world politics. They believe that tribal nations would be divided and ruled from outside, whereas a Pan-African nation would mean world power and dignity.

Historical and Theoretical Issues

71

Despite the recognition of the importance of African unity and oneness as a necessary condition for increasing relevance in the global affairs, the political elite and, to a certain extent, the intellectual elite (Prah, 1984) have constantly fuelled the embers of xenophobic attacks in their respective national spaces. The acts of self-negation and abrogation, which the exclusion of other Africans, on the basis of artificial and arbitrary boundaries promote, are due to lack of knowledge of the historical, geographical and geopolitical factors that support a Pan-African identity of Africans as a group of people. On various global issues, Africans are treated with disdain and marginalisation. They are also separate from non-Africans in their placement in the global hierarchical order of power, privileges and positions. In the discourses on transnational identity, scholars have made distinctions between two types of identity. Friedman & Thiel (2012) cited in Fagbayibo (2015:5) make two broad classifications: Performative-discursive and Processual dimensions of transnational identity. Performative-discursive aspect of transnational identity implies the “cultural expressions and attitudes that transcend borders [and] have the potential to create a sense of transnational belonging.” Examples of identity performance include wearing of certain clothes, listening to certain kinds of music or drinking similar beverages (Gaggio, 2012 in Fagbayibo, 2015:5). The Processual aspect on the other hand is temporal and relational, dependent on shifting and changing variable. In this respect, transnational identity is neither static nor given, it adapts to socio-political and economic realities (Fagbayibo, 2015). The construction of a Pan-African identity fits into the Performative-discursive aspect of transnational identity. Contrary to the artificial wall of separation and the politics of difference which majority of African political and intellectual elites play against Africans from other countries, there is a form of natural and cultural integration from below in form of shared interests and similarities in music, culture, names, food and dress. Integration from below also continues apace in form of intermarriages (which is not in all conditions tied to getting immigration papers), a high consciousness among the youth for a Pan-African identity, musical narrative for reconstruction of African personality and sports. In the context of music and youth culture for instance, Fagbayibo (2011) indicates that The narrative of music as an essential catalyst for unity is better understood within the context of the proliferation of satellite music television channels in recent years. These music channels serve as a platform for showcasing African talents to millions of viewers across the continent, a factor which has a number of implications. The first is that it has created

72

Chapter 3

a new generation of pan-African stars who, in the mould of American and European superstars, generate considerable influence among their fans across the continent. Capitalising on the star-power of these artistes, these music channels give them the opportunity – through individual interviews, documentaries and award shows – to articulate their opinions on the essence of unity. The second is the increasing number of collaborations amongst these musicians, a measure which often highlights the idea of unity. The third relates to the primary audience of these music channels – youth. Africa has the largest global youthful population, a reality which makes their inclusion in the process of unity crucial. Transnational identity confers both economic and social benefits. Some of the benefits that can accrue to citizens include ease of mobility, removal or relaxation of rigid travel documentations, free trade across borders and the ease of communication with citizens from other member states. Added to the above is the increased pride that comes from being a member of an African community that can hold its own in the comity of nations, rather than the current sense of victim hood and vulnerability. As a continent that is located in a global system, where neorealism still hold sway, Pan-African identity will necessarily impel the building of military capability and arsenal both for protection and expression of power (Fagbayibo, 2015; Chinweizu, 2011). Given the preceding discussion, this study makes a strong case for regional integration from below. The undertaken research supports the theoretical perspective that we are advancing; that regional integration, because of migration that is taking place in Africa, is and has been happening naturally. Policies and legislation pertaining to migration and or regional integration in Africa has not played a significant role with regards to migration and or regional integration. Africans are finding ways, which are quite natural, to connect and co-exist, no matter what their respective nationalities, ethnicities and races are said to be. There is a nuanced gender perspective to the thesis on transnational identity and regional integration from below. Females are playing a critical role in regional integration from below. Across Africa, and in particular, the regions covered in this study, women are moving around the continent to fend for their families, to marry across nationalities, to undertake business activities and so on and so forth. The resilience sector is predominantly characterized by women, at least as the Southern Africa case study shows, substantiating the view that females are indeed driving regional integration from below. Arguably, women espouse the Pan-African identity we are arguing far more than men. This has major implications for the transformation of societies in Africa and for strengthening regional integration and continental unity. Put concisely, the

Historical and Theoretical Issues

73

transformation of gender and the role of women in particular have an important place in ensuring that regional integration becomes reality. Scholars have also developed other theoretical frameworks for understanding the phenomenon of migrations, especially in the context of transnationalism. They argue against the preponderance of limiting the study of the society to the confines of nation-state. In this regard, Levitt & Schiller (2004) argue that central to the project of transnational migration studies and to scholarship on other transnational phenomena is a reformulation of the concept of society. Rather than confining analysis of migrants to the nation state, these scholars argue that it is imperative to broaden discourse on migration and transnational identity, because migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited transnational social fields, encompassing those who move and those who stay behind. Given this pattern of interactions, basic assumptions about social institutions such as the family, citizenship and the nation-states need to be revisited. In order to properly grasp the multidimensionality of agents, actors, institutions and the spatial transactional interactions that happen among migrants, Levitt & Schiller (2004) develop a social field approach to migration, which distinguishes ways of being and belonging in the field. Levitt & Schiller (2004:188) define, social field as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed. Social fields are multidimensional, encompassing structured interactions of differing forms, depth, and breadth that are differentiated in social theory by the terms organization, institution, and social movement. These scholars made a distinction between what they call National boundaries and National social fields. They note that National social fields are those that stay within national boundaries while transnational social fields connect actors through direct and indirect relations across borders. In this formulation, they see the concept of social fields as a powerful tool for conceptualizing the potential array of social relations linking those who move and those who stay behind. This approach takes us beyond the direct experience of migration into domains of interaction where individuals who do not move themselves maintain social relations across borders through various forms of communication. The social field approach lends credence to the constant interactions among migrants both in their countries of origin and host communities. These flows allow for inter-cultural learning and penetration as well as dissemination of

74

Chapter 3

economic opportunities in forms of remittances. As in any socially constructed phenomenon, interactions and relations among Africans who move from their countries of origin to other parts of the continent have been very dynamic and complex. The most common narratives of these experiences have been largely negative with cases of xenophobic attacks, discriminatory policies of employment and application of labour rights, categorisation of nationals from particular countries of origin as criminals, highhandedness of law enforcement agents through indiscriminate searching of cars and houses for immigration papers, extortion of foreigners by the same law enforcement agents, discrimination on right to lease or own properties and so on (Nyamnjoh, 2006). Paradoxically, these acts of alienation of the supposed others have usually been targeted at fellow Africans. Notwithstanding, there have also been ­positive aspects of cross-national flows among Africans. Examples of such positive cross-national flows include, cross national marriages, increased understanding of the cultures of other Africans (through appreciation of language or speaking patterns, foods, dress and music) from other parts of the continent. On music for instance, it is not uncommon to hear radio stations in South ­Africa blaring songs of Nigerian artists like Di-Banj, Fela Kuti and a host of others. There has also been an increasing wave of religious exchanges between Nigeria and South Africa, for example, with many branches of Nigerians churches getting established in South Africa and many elites and even low-income group people from South Africa seeking for spiritual solutions to their problems in a particular church in Nigeria. Although the positive sides of peopleto-people flow do not receive as much media coverage as much as the negative ones, they provide a template upon which policies could be framed to facilitate more people-to-people interactions and integration on the continent. At the policy level, the drive to people to people integration fits well with the overall goal of Agenda 2063 of the African Union, in which economic and political integration were considered imperative for building a well-developed and prosperous continent. As the case of the Association of South East Asian Nations (asean) has shown, community building among various nationalities is desirable but challenging. Collins (2015) shows how the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 served as an impetus to create a community in the sub-region. He also notes the divergent views of key political leaders in countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia among others, on the inclusion of civil society organisations in designing the appropriate framework for building the community. The asean example provides some lessons for Africa in its search for a higher degree of integration on the continent. First, the marginal position

Historical and Theoretical Issues

75

of African countries in the global capitalist system makes the people various economies to be vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of the system. This vulnerability makes it particularly imperative to accept these fellow Africans and develop support for operators in the resilient economy through which their activities could add more value to the overall economies of their host countries. We elaborate more on this point. Since independence from the late 1950s, several African countries have had their share of the global economic crises with famine, poverty and extreme hunger to the fore. As we noted above, these crises have forced people to seek for better opportunities in other countries. Countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, Ghana or Nigeria that were once thought to be relatively comfortable economically, have had their share of ­macro-economic instability. This implies that no country is particularly immune from the inherent destabilising nature of global capitalism. Economic crisis is an equal opportunity employer, especially in African countries where structure of the economies is yet to be diversified. Thus, rather than subjecting fellow Africans to scorn, exploitation, denigration and discrimination, they should be given a sense of belonging through creatively engaging their skills to meet any shortfall in local economies. As our findings in this study have shown, locals are not usually interested or motivated enough to engage in the resilient economy in their home countries. In South Africa for instance, most of the people who engage in domestic work and salon business are migrant workers from countries such as Zimbabwe and Ghana. The possibility that locals in a relatively comfortable country today can find themselves in economic or other crisis that can force them to cross the artificial borders to another countries, particularly necessitate a more humane and pragmatic approach to relating with migrant workers in the resilient economy. It also makes it even more compelling to fast-track the process of building an African community of people, who will not have the current restriction to labour mobility and settlement. As the case of ecowas has shown, this is a distinct possibility for the whole continent. Another lesson from the asean experience is the role of the Civil Society Organisations (cso s) in fostering a sense of community and people to people interaction in the region. Although many of the political leaders view csos with suspicion, they play very important roles in engaging with the former to achieve the objectives of more integrated region. csos in Africa should learn from this example and present a more common front for integration on the continent. As Oloruntoba (2016a) argues, African leaders and a cross section of the elites have no incentive to integrate, because the nation-space provides them with opportunity for accumulation and control. The much flurry of ­activities and summits on regional integration is mere rhetoric, without

76

Chapter 3

genuine commitment to translate the various resolutions to pragmatic actions. Thus, the onus lies on the cso s to communicate the benefits of integration to the people at the lower echelons of the society, who are usually manipulated to attack so called foreigners. Lastly, as indicated earlier, the movement of people, the cultural exchanges, inter-marriages among different ethnic groups or nationalities and other forms of interactions are fostering regional integration in Africa. And, as highlighted above, the history of the African continent, as demonstrated by the Southern Africa discussion, support the view that Africans have spurred regional integration from below, since time immemorial. Therefore, it might very well be that policies and legislation pertaining to migration and or regional i­ ntegration should be about strengthening the African identity – as against what appears to be the securitization of migration and economization of regional integration. Our theoretical formulation of African citizenship challenges what Levitt & Schiller (2004) call methodological nationalism, which is seen as the tendency to accept the nation-state and its boundaries as a given in social analysis. As mentioned above, the historical trajectories of African countries show that the current boundaries were externally designed to serve imperial purposes. They obliterate and distort the pre-colonial patterns of interaction and exchanges among the peoples of the continent, the consequences of which has been incessant wars and conflicts over the artificial and arbitrary borders constructed by the colonialists. Given the drawbacks and the obvious limitations that these colonially designed boundaries pose to integration and development in Africa, it has become imperative to revisit, challenge and change this methodological nationalism.

Chapter 4

Migration Policies in Africa 4.1 Introduction The journey of Africa’s migration policy that captures a reflection of the idea of a liberated Africa can be traced in the Abuja Treaty that was signed in 1991. The Abuja Treaty commits African countries progressively to bring about the free movement of persons, and to ensure that Community nationals enjoy the right of residence and right of establishment. Furthermore, the Treaty puts forward six subsequent stages of integration, within a maximum period of 34 years. The free movement of people and their right of residence and ­establishment (along with the movement of goods, capital and services) is part of stage six, in line with the consolidation of the African Common Market, which is to have been created during stage five. The complete free movement of persons in the regions and their partial free movement between the regions is one of the objectives of the first phase (2009–2012) of the AU’s Minimum Integration Programme agreed with the regional economic communities African Union Commission (2010). From the perspective of the African Union, the free movement of people is generally regarded as a key element of regional integration. Much like the free trade in goods and services, the free movement of people is expected to lead to increased economic prosperity and poverty reduction. Voluntary migration can promote political integration by stimulating intraregional trade and closer social interaction between countries. This should have a positive effect on economic development, provided that it goes hand in hand with the opening of markets. Free movement and the right of residence and establishment also demonstrate the benefits of regional integration to ordinary people. This assumption is also bound up in the Abuja Treaty and the Minimum Integration Programme, which stipulate that the free movement of people should be achieved in parallel with the free movement of goods, services and capital. As the building blocks of integration on the continent, the AU’s regional economic communities are responsible for promoting free movement in conjunction with intra-regional trade, which has reached very different levels in different regions. The African Union’s role is to coordinate, monitor and evaluate. Furthermore, the AU has adopted several legal and policy instruments intended to regulate voluntary and forced migration on the continent. These frameworks are informed by the vision of African economic integration o­ utlined © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_005

78

chapter 4

in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), which came into force in 1994, and has been ratified by at least 48 AU member states. The Abuja Treaty commits member states, individually, bilaterally, or through regional groups, to taking, ‘the necessary measures, in order to achieve progressively the free movement of persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and the right of establishment by their nationals within the established and integrated African community. Migration crosses both national and regional boundaries. It is an issue that affects all policy areas’ economics, politics, social policy and security. It embodies a strong international relations dimension. For these reasons, it should ideally be addressed at a regional or continental level. However, the results and impact will depend on the degree of engagement, implementation and enforcement at a national level. While it remains vital for the African Union to propose frameworks and set standards to encourage its member states to become engaged, the implementation of these frameworks depends ultimately on the buy-in of member states and the priority they attach to migration issues. Mbembe in his opening remarks at a 2017 conference of Migration in South Africa argued that the challenges or failure of the African Union Migration Framework can fundamentally be attributed to post-colonial African states who have failed to articulate the common legislative framework and policy initiatives in relation to border management, the upgrading of civil registries, visa liberalisation, or the treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in member states. The modern-day migration policies of African states deviate further to the ideals of Abuja treaty, particularly on the idea of integration through free movement. While a claim of borders is strongly referenced to colonial era, the end of such a rule has not ushered a new era characterised by the extension of the right to freedom of movement to all. Instead, Africa has retained the colonial boundaries with seemingly no decisive push towards regional integration. This, however, does not discredit the great strides some of the economic blocks have advanced in ensuring that the dream of integration is kept alive beyond goods and services. The Economic Community of West African States led the continent through demonstrating that the idea of free movement of peoples of Africa is not a far-fetched dream. It is doable when state interest is not just individualistic, but is drawn out of an idea of an integrated Africa post colonialism. Moreover, the migration challenges of a “post-colonial” Africa as reflected in the geopolitics of our times seem to be accounted to external powers that might be able to dictate to each of our fragile national states the terms and conditions under which our own people can move, including within Africa itself. The future of Africa does not depend on restrictive immigration policies and

Migration Policies in Africa

79

the militarisation of borders. The continent must open itself to itself. For mobility to become the cornerstone of a new pan-African agenda, we need to leave behind migratory models based on anti-humanist concepts such as “national interest” and embrace our own long held traditions of flexible, networked sovereignty and collective security (Mbembe, 2017:1). Migration is of considerable importance to the continent, especially in advancing the regional integration that Africa requires. Migration policies have for a long time been associated with movement of people, labour and capital from one sovereign state to another. The policies have a great impact and influence on integration both at social and political level and in economic spheres. These policies are sound and they that dictate how the integration process is achieved. It is from this context that this chapter explores the migration policies of Africa looking at the Abuja treaty and the AU frameworks. From there, the chapter will explore the sadc and ecowas migration policies to show the extent that each of the region’s migration policy are a reflection of the ideals captured by both the African Union and the Abuja Treaty. 4.2

From Abuja Treaty to the AU Migration Policy Frameworks for Africa

Africa is historically a region of migration and population movement and the chapters coming earlier in this book have delved deep on this. This is prompted by demographic, economic, ecological and political factors. Other factors contributing to migration especially in the recent years include the burden of many African countries; deteriorating living conditions; environmental degradation; the effects of structural adjustment programmes; the widening international economic inequalities; and the lack of long-term peace and security. It is out of such observation that the Abuja treaty establishing economic communities of Africa was born. Born to explore through policy ways in which Africa can be integrated and explore ways in which each state can be of assistance to others. Augmenting the above assertion, the African Union Commission (2010) argued that the post-independence dialogues and the vision of migration in Africa are best captured by the Abuja Treaty that established the African Economic Community, signed in 1991 which commits African countries progressively to bring about among other things the free movement of persons, and to ensure that Community nationals enjoy the right of residence and right of establishment. The Abuja Treaty captured six stages that speak to the integration of the continent within a maximum period of 34 years. The free movement of

80

chapter 4

people and their right of residence and establishment together with the movement of goods, capital and services is part of stage six. Further to the Abuja treaty is the AU which defines its approach to migration through two key policy frameworks: The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (mpfa), and the African Common Position on Migration and Development (acpmd). The mpfa addresses nine key migration issues including labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, the human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data, migration and development, and inter-state cooperation and partnerships. The acpmd on the other hand raises eleven priority policy issues and recommendations for national, continental and international action. These include ­Migration and Development, Human Resources and the Brain Drain, Remittances, Trade, Migration and Peace, Security and Stability, Migration and Human Rights, Gender, Regional Initiatives and Access to Social Services. Indeed, the African Union has set itself high standards in terms of frameworks that have to do with migration and regional migration. It has done so out of reflection of liberation ideals Africa yearned for since the era of colonialism AU (2006). Both these two policy frameworks by the AU were adopted by the Executive Council of the AU in 2006. They provide the continental body’s most detailed and expansive guidance on how African states should regulate migration. They also address policies governing how member states regulate migrant access to their territories, and the treatment of immigrants within their lands. However, worth noting is that neither policy documents is binding on AU member states, although both highlight AU member states obligations to comply with legally binding migration-specific regional and international law. Further to the Abuja Treaty and the two frameworks from the AU, there are several other policy instruments, commissions and declarations by the AU that affect and facilitate migration, but are not specifically crafted to govern it. Examples include the 2004 AU Plan of Action on Employment Promotion and Poverty Alleviation. The 2012 AU Plan of Action on Boosting Intra African Trade, the 9th Ordinary Session of the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission of 2013, and the Declaration on Migration adopted by the 25th AU Assembly in June 2015. The Joint Labour Migration Governance Programme (jlmp), a four-year AU-led initiative for regional integration and development in Africa, co-sponsored by the AU Commission (auc), the ilo, the International Organization for Migration (iom) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (uneca). It was endorsed by the Extraordinary Session of the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission (lsac) in Windhoek, Namibia, in April 2014 and adopted by AU Heads of State and Government at the 24th Session of the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2015.

Migration Policies in Africa

81

The fundamental challenges of the frameworks as argued by Landau and Achiume (2015:1) is that neither the African Common Position nor the Migration Policy Framework has a dedicated institutional mechanism for guiding or monitoring AU member states’ compliance with their content. As such, member states cannot be held accountable within these frameworks, and even those states committed to implementing the frameworks must do so without much-needed guidance and support at the level of the AU. As a result, an important next step is for the AU to move towards establishing an institutional mechanism that would provide the necessary guidance and accountability measures necessary to achieve the vision it lays out in its existing policies. The idea especially in the continent that seeks to prioritise movement of goods and services over the movement of people is problematic and works against the integration of the continent beyond economic interests. The policy framework serves to provide the necessary guidelines and principals to assist governments and their rec s in the formulation of their own national and regional migration policies as well as, their implementation in accordance with their own priorities and resources. Whether rec s and member states takes these frameworks into consideration when developing their own national policies is another issue that will be demonstrated on the following sections of this chapter. 4.3

Regional Economic Communities and Migration Policies in Africa

The fact that regional agreements tend to be viewed more favourably by states than the continental agreements has been made a justification for an integration to start from regions and gradually move towards the continent. Within a specific region, shared interests on issues pertaining to migration, coupled with the smaller number of states involved, as well as similarities in levels of economic development, make it easier to reach comprehensive agreements regionally. That regional arrangements provide a better option for migration governance than bilateral agreements, because of the lower transaction costs and shift preference which are additional arguments submitted by several scholars of migration at regional level. While in bilateral agreements states are usually more concerned about the cost of dealing with immigration, regional frameworks provide a collaborative space for integrated management of migration, which include the sharing of costs and the institutional capacity to seek win-win solutions. Whereas bilateral agreements pit receiving countries (which are usually in a stronger economic position) against sending countries, regional arrangements are more likely to dilute power imbalances and generate side-payments and other forms of cooperation among weaker

82

chapter 4

countries capable of producing multilateral outcomes. For the above-mentioned reasons this chapter turns to cases of sadc and ecowas to explore the extent to which conception and implementation of Migration policies is rolled out. 4.4

Migration Policies in the Southern African Development Community

In June 1995, the Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community (sadc) was announced. The Declaration and Treaty establishing sadc commits sadc to developing policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the Region generally, among Member States of the sadc Treaty (1992:6). The protocol was set up as a legal instrument to implement the provisions of the sadc Treaty under Article 10.3 of the Treaty. The Protocol was crafted in view of the need to redress imbalances in large-scale population movements within sadc. The Protocol commits, inter alia, to support, assist and promote the efforts of the African Union which encourages free movement of persons in African Regional Economic Communities as a stepping stone towards free movement of persons in an eventual African Economic Community Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in sadc (2005:1). sadc initiatives on free movement go back a little earlier than the Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons. A sadc Secretariat sponsored workshop held in Harare in 1993 had led to the sadc Council of Ministers’ meeting of 1994 commissioning a team of consultants to draw up a protocol on free movement for the region (Oucho & Crush, 2001). Worth noting is that the organisational chart for the sadc does not include a unit dealing with migration. sadc citizens would, therefore, be able to move freely (or visa-free) ­between and within sadc Member States while non-SADC citizens would have their movements regulated. The prospect of complete abolition of border controls on people’s movements within sadc did not resonate well with some sadc Member States. The economic disparities between sadc States, it was argued, were such that the region was not yet ready for free movement of people (­Williams & Carr, 2006). Because of the above-mentioned concerns presented as challenges to the treaty, it became the object of considerable criticism from a plethora of a­ ctors. In 1997 the 1995 Protocol was finally being overturned and replaced by the

Migration Policies in Africa

83

Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the sadc. The Preamble to the 1997 Protocol notes that the objective of attaining the free movement of people is intimately related to the promotion of interdependence and integration of the sadc region. The free movement of people was also to result in the fostering of a ‘community spirit’ among sadc citizens. But, the 1995 Protocol was more ambitious than simply trying to foster regional integration in Southern Africa. It saw such regional initiatives as the first step towards building an African Economic Community by the year 2000, resulting in the free movement of people throughout the continent. Thus, the free movement of people and regional integration as its concomitant, was seen as the first steps in realising the Organisation of African Union’s vision of a ‘United States of Africa’, by the drafters of this Protocol. According to Article 3 of the Protocol, the ultimate objective was to achieve the progressive elimination of all controls on sadc citizens so that there would be free movement of people in the region within ten years from the date of entry into force of this Protocol. Article 2, more specifically, mentions the following rights to be accorded to citizens of member states: – The right to enter the territory of another member state freely and without a visa for a short visit; – The right to reside in the territory of another member state; and – The right to establish oneself and work in the territory of another member state. To realise the objectives of the Protocol, four phases were identified. Phase 1 was to see the visa-free entry of sadc nationals into member states for short visits not exceeding six months. Phase 2 was to see the rights of residence extended to all sadc nationals, while phase 3 was to result in the right to establish, including the right to work. Phase 4 aimed to result in the elimination of all internal national borders between sadc member states. However, unlike its predecessor, the 1997 Protocol was more modest in its aims. This is demonstrated by its very title: the ‘facilitation of movement of persons’, as opposed to the 1995 Protocol’s ‘free movement of persons’. More specifically, Chapter Two, Article 2 of the 1997 Protocol lists the objectives as follows: – To facilitate the movement of citizens of member states within the region by gradually eliminating obstacles which impede such movement; – To expand the network of bilateral agreements among member states in this regard, as a step towards a multilateral regional agreement; – To co-operate in preventing the illegal movement of citizens of member states and the illegal movement of nationals of third states within and into the region;

84

chapter 4

– To co-operate in improving control over external borders of the sadc community; and – To promote common policies with regard to immigration matters where necessary and feasible. While the 1997 Protocol also sought to promote the free movement of people within the region, it was clearly cognisant of the difficulties attached therein. The concern was with illegal immigration and the fact that it did not specify a time-frame to achieve the objective of the free movement of persons. The debate over free movement in sadc is often hijacked by populist sentiments. Inter-regional labour movement tends to evoke security concerns, as well as fear of a ‘flood’ of migrants to major receiving countries such as South Africa and Botswana. The eruption of xenophobic attacks against foreign African nationals in South Africa in 2008 highlight the difficulties in promoting a balanced discussion on free labour movement. In their review of sadc’s efforts to establish a protocol on free movement of people in Southern Africa, Oucho and Crush (2001:140) note South Africa’s role, allied by Botswana and Namibia in aborting the Community’s efforts at instituting free movement of citizens of member states. Having blocked sadc’s efforts to initiate a regional approach to the management of migration, South Africa through the Department of Home Affairs (dha) produced a cautious alternative to the Free Movement Protocol in 1997 and called it the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement. South Africa’s protocol aimed to firstly, assert the sovereignty of national interests over regional consideration and place the emphasis back on policing and the control of national borders. Secondly, the ‘Facilitation Protocol’ sought to halt the process of freeing movement across regional borders at the first stage (visa-free entry), and to avoid any further commitment particularly in regard to rights of residence and establishment. Thirdly, it aimed to avoid committing the South African government to a phased implementation and a fixed timetable, as well as to provide exit options if government did not agree with any proposal under the Protocol Except for Madagascar and the Seychelles, all 15 Member States of sadc have adopted and signed the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons. Of the thirteen that have signed the 2005 Protocol only five namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland, have ratified it (Klavert, 2011; Africa and Europe in Partnership, 2012). The Protocol is, however, not in force because of the required minimum of two-thirds of ratifications. The latest country to ratify the Facilitation of Movement Protocol was Zambia on 26 March 2013 (Lusaka Times, 2013). Apart from this, however, the process around this protocol has stalled for the past few years. Perceptions of migration between individual sadc Member States differ, and so do their respective

Migration Policies in Africa

85

policies on migration. Also, most sadc countries do not incorporate much of the existing multilateral international instruments in their migration regimes. Although sadc has adopted the Facilitation Protocol, because the Protocol is not yet ratified by two-thirds of Member States and is therefore, not in force, national laws continue to regulate cross-border and labour migration throughout the sadc territories. If and when ratified and translated into Member States’ national legislations and policies, the Facilitation Protocol will have various impacts there. Williams and Carr (2006) list seven considerations and three significant implications of the protocol on Member States. First, on security, the protocol places this task and function in the custody of a Committee of Ministers responsible for Public Security, along with any other committee appointed by the Ministerial Committee of the Organ of Defence, Politics and Security. Reading this in conjunction with Article 11 of the protocol, which calls Member States to exchange information on security, crime and intelligence, suggests that States are substantially concerned about security risks that come with migration. Secondly, on facilitation, Williams and Carr (2006) find it counter-intuitive that despite the Protocol’s aims to facilitate movement it also calls for the management of the movement of persons by increasing infrastructure and ­personnel. The Protocol apparently places more emphasis on controlling or managing movement than facilitating it. Thirdly, with regard to the significance of the Protocol, it would seem that the Protocol is not representing any radical departure as it claims, content-wise, from the status quo. Rather the contents of the Protocol affirm what is happening in the sadc region, domestic legislations of Member States and the bilateral and multilateral agreements between Member States. In fact, the Protocol largely elevates to a regional level what is already obtained in domestic legislations of individual Member States (Williams & Carr, 2006:10). It is worth noting, without undermining the importance of such a Protocol for the region, that the sadc region is unlikely to witness a significant policy and legislative shift in the short and medium terms. Fourthly, despite making provisions for legislative, policy and logistical adjustments, the Protocol does not state clearly the extents of Member States’ obligations to comply with the Protocol, or how to enforce the Protocol domestically. No mechanisms exist through which Member States should amend their respective legislations in line with the Protocol. All the Protocol’s provisions are subject to Member States’ domestic legislation. Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2013) argue that in essence sadc and all its challenges of integration is as a result of a lack of a regional framework governing the movement of people beyond the interest of the member states. Other rec s on the continent, contrary to sadc have migration laws and regulations along

86

chapter 4

with provisions in their respective national constitutions that affect migration and might, therefore, have consequences for labour migrants in and entering their territories. Also, sadc States continue to enter into bilateral agreements with one another that relate to, inter alia, labour migration as discussed later below Oucho and Crush (2001). Such agreements may dampen prospects of ratifying the Protocol on Facilitation of Movement as some sadc Member States might find the agreements a desirable alternative to the regional migration regime the Facilitation of Movement Protocol seeks to establish. It has been argued for instance by Segatti (2008) that even if the protocol was ratified it would still lead to an emphasis on bilateral agreements, because dominant member states such as South Africa and Botswana were pushing for such a bilateral instead of a regional approach. 4.5

Migration Policies in the Economic Community of West African States

ecowas’s Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and E ­ stablishment, signed in 1979 and enforced in 1980, defines the objective of free movement of persons of the ecowas Treaty. Upon signing, the Protocol had a three-phased implementation schedule to be completed within 15 years. The stages included firstly, the right of entry and abolition of visas, 1980 to 1985; secondly, the right of residence, 1985 to 1990; and thirdly, the right of establishment, 1990 to 1995. Member States ratified the first phase in 1980 giving the 90-day visa-free right of entry to Community citizens on condition they possess a valid travel document and international health certificate. The second phase, which allowed ecowas citizens freedom to reside, and seek and take up employment in another ecowas Member State was ratified by all Member States and came into force in 1986, being implemented by a supplementary protocol. In 1992 ecowas revised the 1975 Treaty. A step towards achieving ecowas economic and monetary union is Article 55.1 (ii) of the revised Treaty, which undertakes to completely abolish all obstacles to free movement of people, goods, capital and services and establish the right of entry, residence and establishment. ­Article 59, on immigration, reiterates Article 27 of the 1975 Treaty to establish the right of entry, residence and establishment of Community citizens in Member States, and goes on to affirm Member States’ commitment to putting all ­appropriate measures in place to implement and ensure that Community citizens enjoy the said rights. The ecowas Protocol on Free Movement is said to be the most comprehensive and well-implemented protocol on free movement of persons in Africa

Migration Policies in Africa

87

(Mengelkoch, 2001). The implementation is currently partly expedited by the ecowas Common Approach on Migration, the region’s benchmark policy paper on regional and international migration informed by ecowas’ objective to establish a link between migration and development and adopted in January 2008 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), 2012; ecowas, 2012). In addition to emphasizing the link between migration and development, the ecowas Common Approach on Migration adds an external dimension as well as the issue of refugees to the internal free movement of person’s policy framework. Furthermore, the ecowas has a Free Movement of Persons Department, operating under the Commissioner for Trade, Customs and Free Movement. The ‘Trafficking in Persons Unit’ in the Humanitarian and Social Affairs Department is answerable to the Commissioner for Human Development and Gender. There is a ‘labour and immigration department’ in the eac, operating under the Director of Social Sectors. The igad has a subsection on migration under Economic Cooperation and Social Development, focusing on border management and illegal migration. By ensuring the free movement of goods and persons and improving the road transportation system, the Authority of Heads of States and Government adopted a decision to establish national committees to monitor implementation of ecowas decisions and protocols on the free movement of persons and vehicles. In 2008 an ECOWASWest African Monetary Institute (wami) joint task force was established to accelerate ratification and implementation of all ecowas protocols and conventions relating to trade and the free movement of persons, goods, services and the right to establish business in the West African Monetary Zone (wamz). The Common Approach further emphasises the importance of free movement for regional integration and focuses on promoting intra-regional mobility, regular migration to third countries – and the value this holds for ecowas, irregular migration, migrants’ rights, women migrants and trafficking (­European Centre for Development Policy Management (ecdpm), 2010). Through the Common Approach, Member States commit to attaining coherence in policies involving ecowas’ agreements and bilateral agreements with third countries. The Common Approach further commits to setting up, and making operational, a regional fund to finance cross-border cooperation along with the launch of a regional territorial strategy aimed at developing new growth and development areas. Also outlined in the Common Approach is the ­harmonization of development and policies related to migration as well as the strengthening of dialogue between ecowas, transit countries and host countries. In adopting the Common Approach to Migration, West African countries

88

chapter 4

clearly reflect a commitment to a comprehensive regional approach to migration and management. Arguably, ecowas has the most advanced freedom of movement regime in Africa. Despite the hurdles in implementing phases two and three of the Protocol (arising from economic decline in West Africa and massive human displacements) resulted from the wars in Liberia in the 1980s and Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Adepoju, 2009). All Member States have abolished the visa entry requirement for Community citizens for 90 days. ecowas has thus fully implemented phase one of the free movement protocol and ratified phase two. Member States are yet to ratify the third phase of the protocol relating to “Right of Establishment” (ecowas, 1990 in Nita, forthcoming), which will give Community citizens the right to, inter alia, settle or establish, set up enterprises and access economic activities in another Member State as well as enjoy the same conditions as host country nationals. The Authority of the Heads of State and Government of ecowas adopted a standardized ecowas Travel Certificate and a uniform ecowas passport (designed to eventually replace national passports) in 1985 and 2000, respectively, in order to ease cross-border movement and make it cheaper. ecowas citizens can now, therefore, use one of three documents when travelling across national borders in the region: the ecowas Travel Certificate, the ecowas common passport and National Identity Cards (nic s). The regional passport in ecowas has contributed to an increase in migration in that region (Adepoju, 2007). In addition, the ecowas Brown Card, an instrument of integration aimed at facilitating the free movement of people and goods, allows insurance policy holders the opportunity to move freely within the ecowas region without being detained for the non-provision of evidence to pay compensation should they cause an accident in an ecowas Member State they visit (The Insurance Association of The Gambia, 2012). The ecowas Protocol on Free Movement of Persons came into effect at a time when the region and especially countries bordering Nigeria were experiencing economic decline (Adepoju, 2011). Nigeria’s oil fuelled boom at the time attracted skilled and unskilled labour migrants from Cameroon, Chad, Ghana and Mali. Most of these migrants (ranging from 900,000 to 1.3 million) would, however, later be expelled from Nigeria when the government revoked Articles 4 and 27 of the Free Movement Protocol following a slump in Nigeria’s oil boom (Adepoju, 2009). 4.6

ecowas and sadc – Comparative Context

The African rec s presented above have clearly demonstrated the two sides of the same coin in which migration and its policies in Africa are manifesting.

Migration Policies in Africa

89

While ecowas envisages hope that an integrated Africa is possible as long as states are able to commit to regional policies in ways that sovereignty of states are not prioritised over region or in any way compromising the ideals of regional integration. sadc on the other hand, has demonstrated the challenge of states who struggle to compromise for the ideals of the region to emerge. ecowas serves as an example in this respect. In spite of this, these rec s continue to face practical obstacles in realising the desirable longer-term labour migration. This challenge seems more pronounced in Southern Africa and the sadc, in particular, the only regional group in Africa that has refused to endorse the general idea of free movement of persons within the community. Peters (2010) compares the slowness and reluctance with which sadc has been moving on the migration governance front with the relative progress made by other rec s, such as the eac, which launched a common passport in 1999 and began negotiations on free movement of labour and goods in 2008, thus transforming the eac into a Common Market. Moreover, the region went ahead to revise the Treaty establishing ecowas and renewed commitments to abolishing all obstacles to free movement of factors, including labour. Apart from the Protocol on Free Movement, ecowas’s policy paper on migration, the ecowas Common Approach on Migration indicates further the commitment and political will to achieve regional free movement and shows that ecowas appreciates the migration-development nexus. Their policy paper expedites implementation of the free movement protocol. This contrasts with sadc shying away from and dropping the free movement of persons’ protocol. ecowas has fully implemented Phase 1 of its Free Movement protocol and allowed visa-entry to Community citizens. The eac and ecowas are both committed to removing obstacles to movement for their workers and this is reflected in the several phases of their free movement protocols that have already been implemented. The absence of a formal sadc framework to govern labour migration negatively impacts the AU’s envisaged African Economic Community to be built through rec s by 2028. In addition to defining its approach to migration, the AU’s two key migration policy frameworks suggest the organisation recognises that migration is crucial to development and that there are political and socioeconomic challenges associated with migration in Africa. In adopting the mpfa, for example, African Heads of State and Government demonstrate that in principle they agree with the document’s principles and guidelines. Though the mpfa is not legally binding, the current absence of a regional migration policy in sadc evidently shows Member States are not yet ready to implement the basic mfpa guidelines. Some African (and other) rec s, however, have made considerable progress towards achieving intraregional free movement of persons and labour. Their experiences provide helpful lessons and examples

90

chapter 4

to sadc for the governance of its regional labour migration. ecowas provides a good example. Why is the ecowas Protocol on Free Movement said to be the most comprehensive and best implemented? ecowas enforced an ambitious protocol on free movement, residence and establishment in 1980 to be fully implemented, in three phases, by 1995. The fact that all Member States ratified phases 1 and 2 of the Protocol, is significant and shows consensual commitment in ecowas to free movement of persons and labour. Despite clear gains that emanate from labour movement, Southern African Development Community (sadc) Members are reluctant to embrace the idea of free movement of persons, including labour. Even as other African Regional Economic Communities (rec s), including the East African Community (eac) and the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas), have made significant progress toward opening up borders for their labour migrants, sadc seems a long way off in achieving this goal. 4.7

Challenges of Migration Policies in Africa

The challenges of migration policies in Africa lie first in the way migration is conceptualised by nation-states. The conceptualisation of migration in Africa is drawn from the international security nexus that has seen a reconceptualization of migration as a security issue. As a result, this has deviated Africa’s conception of integration as encapsulated under the Abuja Treaty. Secondly, the challenges of these policies can be in the fluid relationship that exists between regional bodies and member states and the extent to which member states implement regional policies of migration. Lyakurwa (1997:176) argues that another challenge of migration policies in Africa can be accounted for by lack of a strong and sustained political commitment and macroeconomic instability. He argues that this has hindered the progress of economic integration in Africa. Driven by nationalism and political expediency, these states have asserted their sovereignty and enacted migration laws, affecting entry, residence and recruitment of foreign nationals in domestic economies. What is clear from the above is that the states in Africa have not fully complied with the Migration Policies of the African Union. In the case of sadc for instance, the immigration laws of individual sadc states reflect preoccupations with respective national interests as opposed to regional interests. Foreigners from the sadc region need to have work permits for them to engage in work in neighbouring sadc states. Immigration legislation in these countries protects national interests while helping keep unwanted elements out of the country. Moreover, the Namibian Immigration Control Act, in Section 26.3(e) only allows for non-Namibian nationals to get

Migration Policies in Africa

91

e­ mployment in the country on condition that such foreigners do not and are not likely to pursue any employment, business, profession or occupation that a sufficient number of persons are already engaged in. In Botswana, Section 19.4 of that country’s Immigration Act states, “in determining an application for a resident permit, the Board shall have primary regard to the interests of Botswana.” Whether originating from a sadc country or not, therefore, foreigners need to obtain a work permit before they can engage in work in a host country. Zimbabwe’s Immigration Act in Section 41.3(a) (ii) requires such migrant workers to secure employment before arriving in the country. South Africa’s Immigration Act (No. 13 of 2002) in Section 27(a) provides for a foreigner to be issued permanent residence upon receipt of an offer of permanent employment among other conditions. In view of the non-enforcement of the existing protocol on movement of persons in the sadc region resulting from non-ratification, sadc and Member States’ commitment to regional integration should be questioned. Perhaps sadc should revisit its integration goals and objectives and develop appropriate measures to achieve these goals. Regularisations are ad-hoc measures and by no means provide the type of sustainable legal framework needed to manage regional migration effectively, let alone guarantee the basic forms of protection for both local and migrant workers. The lack of a clear regional framework is also triggering continuous repatriations and ‘emergency measures’ such as forced deportations, which impose significant costs. This has been seen more dominantly in the South African government, while showing no effectiveness at controlling undocumented migration flows. Most of the undocumented migrants that are deported from South Africa return, once again, via informal routes. Linked to such challenges of migration in Africa is its insistence on allowing the international discourse to define what seems to warrant local specificity in both conceptualization and implementation. The discourse on migration in Africa is captured by the modern conception on International Migration as a security issue. As outlined by Ibrahim (2005:164), the discourse of securitization of migration is built upon the concept that cultural difference leads to a ‘social breakdown’. Once migration was viewed as a security threat, it led to a series of attempts not only to restrict its progression in countering organized crime and terrorism, but also to protect the “socio-political cohesion” (Karyotis, 2007:1–2). Therefore, the political construction of migration as a security threat should be embedded in the politics of belonging. To provide and ensure security for their citizens, nations develop traditions and systems of justice and rights. Immigrants from different cultural backgrounds are seen as an imbalance to the nation. It is thus seen as rational to preserve one’s culture through the exclusion of other cultural groups. By examining the discourse of

92

chapter 4

challenges of migration in the continent it is possible to understand that the new migrant as a threat narrative reflects a discourse that is reinforced through the securitization of migration (Ibrahim, 2005:165–166). The securitization of migration is an argument emerging from the Copenhagen School, which argues that migration was constructed as a security threat by the political and security elite, who had the capacity to produce security knowledge about the level and seriousness of the issue. More specifically, their approach signifies that securitization refers to a “speech act” through which “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:23–24). In other words, securitization is the process through which migration becomes a security issue, not necessarily because of the nature or the objective importance of a threat, but because it is presented as such. The securitization approach to migration in Africa is particularly problematic for various reasons. First, the politics of difference, which has ensured that fellow Africans are treated as the criminal other, is an artificial construction that lack historical evidence. Across the various geographical configurations of the continent, Africans moved across their regions of origin before the colonial intrusion. Scholars have proved that Africans moved both northward and southward in search of economic opportunities, personal protection, among others (Nshimbi & Fioramonti 2015; Ochonu, 2015; Zeleza, 1993). For instance, Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2015) argue that for centuries, mine workers have moved across the whole gamut of Southern Africa region to take advantage of mining opportunities, in the Copper mines of Zambia, Gold mines of South Africa and other mining spots in the region. Secondly, the artificial and harmful bifurcation of African territories by the imperialists was done without consideration for linguistic or cultural affinities. Hence, there are Zulu speaking Zimbabweans, whose origin are traceable to the present day South Africa, just as there as Yoruba speaking citizens of Benin Republic whose origins are in Nigeria. It was essentially the arbitrary partition that made these sets of people to become foreigners in their homelands. Consequently, it has become problematic to consider all migrants as security threats. Thirdly, the geopolitics of race makes Africans, especially South of the Sahara to be grouped as a monolithic entity whose location is in the fringes of humanity. Due to the colour of their skins, they are treated with scorn, indignity and utter disrespect. This shared sense of marginalization should ordinarily serve as a springboard and rallying point of unity for Africans. One critical lesson from the struggle for political decolonization of the continent was the importance of collective action. As scholars have argued, Pan-Africanism provided the rallying point through which p ­ olitical

Migration Policies in Africa

93

colonization was defeated (Oloruntoba, 2015a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). To attain economic and social freedom today, that approach which is hinged on unity and commonality of purpose, remains pertinent. A fundamental challenge of migration and its policies in Africa is captured by Mbembe (2017) when he argued that by subscribing to the state centric model of territoriality delimited nations with closed and well-guarded borders, post-colonial African states disavowed long traditions of circulation that had always been the dynamic motor of change on the continent. In so doing, they embraced the anti-humanist drive inherent in Western Philosophies of movement and of space and turned it against their own people. Evident in the migration policy discourses of the sadc region discussed above is what Mbembe has captured as the fundamental challenge of migration policies in Africa, for instance. The continuity of these challenges robs Africans not only of their identity, but the socio-cultural, economic and political advantages that could be derived from a more integrated continent. The rate at which young Africans are risking their lives to cross to Europe in search of economic opportunities and the human degradation that is associated with it, should warrant a rethink among African leaders on their lacklustre approach to integration. Although we agree that regional integration may not be the magic wand for solving all the socio-economic challenges that were confronting the continent, the lessons of history show that a more integrated Africa presents higher possibilities for development than a fragmented Africa. At the normative level, a more serious commitment to integration on the continent and a deliberate shift from the current securitisation of border to accommodation of the vulnerable segments of the African population could serve as an alternative to the right wing and racism of the many countries in the West, where migrants are increasingly considered as anathema. 4.8 Conclusion The idea of an establishment of rec s as captured in the Abuja treaty more than anything else validates the extent to which these disparate rec s contribute to the broader AU goal of integrating the continent, by 2063. Consequently, the question of migration policies in Africa is a question of whose response elucidates the extent to which Africa’s dream of integration will be realised sooner or delayed or whether it is an idea that will ever live. This chapter has noted that migration is of considerable importance to the continent in any way one looks at it especially in advancing the regional integration that ­Africa requires for its socio-economic development. Migration policies have for a

94

chapter 4

long time been associated with movement of people, labor and capital from one sovereign state to another. The policies have a great impact and influence on integration both at social level, political level and in economic spheres. It is the sturdiness of these policies that dictates how the integration process is achieved. It is from such a perspective that this chapter explored the migration policies of Africa looking at the Abuja treaty and the AU frameworks and using sadc and ecowas as case studies. The chapter noted that the African rec s in general and ecowas and sadc in particular as case studies in this chapter clearly demonstrated the nature of challenges of migration and its policies in Africa. While ecowas envisages that an integrated Africa is possible as long as states are able to commit to regional policies in ways that sovereignty of states are not prioritised over region or in any way compromising the ideals of regional integration, sadc on the other hand, has demonstrated the challenges associated with states that lack political will to advance regional integration. While ecowas member countries have continued to push for a more integrated region, through such policies as free movement of people, the interest of sadc members underscores free movement of capital, goods and services, but not of people. A key lesson from Africa from these two case studies is the importance of political will and commitment of elites to agenda of regional integration. The role of regional hegemons in driving this agenda is also critical. In the case of West Africa, Nigeria has, from inception been playing a very critical role in advancing regional integration in the sub-region. On the contrary, South Africa has not been disposed to the integration of the sadc sub-region from the days of apartheid. Although the end of apartheid has resulted in increased political discourse, concerns over economic costs of fostering deeper integration have made South Africa to be lukewarm to the domestication and implementations of various treaties and protocols that can deepen integration in the sub-region. Thus, the AU might want to work with regional powerhouse of each of the eight rec s to further support its integration agenda. The future of Africa does not depend on restrictive immigration policies and the militarisation of borders. The continent must open itself to itself. For mobility to become the cornerstone of a new pan-African agenda, we need to leave behind migratory models based on anti-humanist concepts such as “national interest” and embrace our own long-held traditions of flexible, networked sovereignty and collective security. It is indisputable that Africa’s development will be achieved through the unity of its people. The AU envisages a continent wide economic community to be realised by using rec s as pillars on whose efforts towards regional integration the AU can extend integration to the continental level. That labour

Migration Policies in Africa

95

migration is significant to processes of regional integration and that harmonising policies and standards to provide for good governance in labour migration is essential to effective regional agreements and as demonstrated in the cases above, this can be done and can be a success given the case of ecowas. Have African rec s progressed towards achieving free movement of persons and, therefore, realising Africa’s integration? This question and the broad migration conundrum is made even more complex by the fact that migration pressures are a fundamental component of social life, which makes the policy governance issue extremely crucial. As migration cannot be avoided, the question becomes: how can it be more successfully governed? In this regard, global and regional experiences can provide important pointers and lessons. Economic, security and other such concerns always arise when sovereign states open up their borders. Rather than allow such fears to hinder the integration agenda, states in Africa ought to seek ways to jointly address these concerns. These issues can be addressed in several ways which include the following. First, identifying the root causes of migration. While migration is as old as human beings, several socio-economic and political factors constitute foster higher level of movement of people from one region to another. As Adedeji (2009) argues, the success of regional integration is contingent on the capacity of the economy of the respective states to manage itself effectively and foster development. Where states are able to accommodate the needs of their citizens, emigration will be a voluntary activity and the tempo will be less. Apart from economic consideration, other causes of migration in Africa are conflicts, which usually result from political instability. The AU mechanism on Peace Building and Security will need to be made to be more effective in addressing the causes of conflict on the continent. National initiatives that are geared toward nation-building should also receive higher priority in such a way that will lead to more elite consensus and managing the centripetal and centrifugal forces that compete for attention in any given country. Secondly, one of the major challenges to the actualisation of the lofty objectives toward regional integration is lack of mechanism to mainstream regional agreements, treaties and protocols to national development strategies. The AU will need to develop a mechanism to ensure that states in Africa are able to incorporate these agreements into national development strategies through building the capacity of bureaucrats. Although it has been noted that bureaucrats at the national levels generally lack incentives to support regional integration (Kaplan, 2006), a deliberate programme of action in this regard can help in changing their orientation and perspectives. Thirdly, effective communication is required to ensure that both political elites and citizens appreciate the importance and benefits or regional integration. As the

96

chapter 4

Afrobarometer (2014) shows, many citizens in Africa know little or nothing about regional integration nor the benefits that can be accrued to them from a more integrated continent. To many of them, integration is essentially an elite construction. In the majority of cases, the political elite latches onto this ignorance or nonchalance of their citizens to score cheap political points by appealing to narrow nationalism and politics of difference. It is in this context that civil society organisations as well as think tanks have a critical role to play in communicating the benefits of integration to the people.

Chapter 5

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa 5.1 Introduction In this chapter, we discuss the findings on migration and regional integration in West and Southern Africa, commencing with West Africa. In the first instance, drawing from secondary sources as well as data from key informants, we detail the history of migration and mobility within the West African region. The second part presents empirical data drawn from individual interviews with migrants living in Ghana and Nigeria. The second section presents data from Southern Africa is discussed. In this section a detailed account of migration within the Southern African region is given and thereafter the findings from the research are shared. The chapter makes the point that in both regions the migration of individuals has a long history and in order to understand contemporary patterns of movement and the clamour for integration we have to understand the historical antecedents of mobility. The chapter discusses the nature and character of contemporary movement particularly its gendered nature and the ties that migrants maintain with their home areas through remittances. Below is a historical account of the history of migration in West Africa. 5.2

The History of Migration in West Africa

There is a long history of migration within the West African region dating back to the pre-colonial times (Afolayan, 1988; Yaro, 2008). Afolayan (ibid.) states that migration during the pre-colonial times mainly consisted of movement from the south to the north and was aided by ill-defined or essentially nonexistent political boundaries. Yaro (ibid.) asserts that during the pre-colonial era, “migration occurred largely in search of security, new safe for settlement and fertile for farming.” Afolayan (1988) states that, the imposition of ­colonial boundaries transformed, “many traditional movements, which were continual, to become international in the strictest sense.” The colonial boundaries disrupted the long-standing pattern of relations that existed among the various nationalities in West Africa. As Ki-Zerbo (2005) argues, the arbitrary © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_006

98

Chapter 5

d­ emarcation of the borders successively dislocated the people as they were compelled to become the nationals of another country which is different from what they have known for centuries. To put this argument in proper context, one finds people of Yoruba extraction in Benin Republic who are nationals of the latter, despite the fact that the majority of their kith and kin are found in the former. The same thing applies to Ghanaians at the Ivory Coast and vice versa. Contestations over artificial boundaries drawn by the colonialists have been responsible for most of the wars in post-independent Africa (Prah, 2008). The colonial enterprise in Africa transformed the patterns and dynamics of movement and migration. Adepoju (2005a) states that colonial powers imposed different political and economic structures, and these included the enforcement of tax regimes and the establishment of territorial boundaries. Yaro (2008:3) illustrates, for example, that economic policies such as those that instituted forced labour regimes were deployed and they “stimulated regional labour migration from Mali, Togo and the Upper Volta to road networks, plantations and mines in the Gold Coast and Ivory Coast.” During this period, labour migration was given immense impetus by the development of infrastructure such as roads, rail as well as the growth of cities such as Accra, Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Dakar, Lome and Cotonou. Yaro (ibid.) argues that: Transportation development also facilitated labour migration by reducing the distance and hazards that hitherto hampered long distance migrations. These developments stimulated and altered large-scale population movements, giving rise to the male dominated, seasonal and crossborder migration, which subsequently became institutionalized. An important point to make about this period is that much of the mobility and migration was enforced indirectly through the use of tax regimes and in some instances through the use of sheer brute force. There were however, voluntary migratory streams alongside these forced labour movements. The historical background is imperative in that contemporary migration is being viewed and analysed against the backdrop of these historical patterns of movement. According to Tony Elumelu, the Deputy Director of ecowas, his institution perceives migration, at least partly, against these historical antecedents: Our institution sees migration within Africa in light of historical ties that existed among the people before the creation of artificial borders. Migration is seen from two angles as intra and inter-regional mobility.

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

99

Elumelu’s view is very apt in the light of the imperative of deconstructing the crisis of identity, politics of difference and divide-and-rule tactics of the colonialists. These contradictions have cast Africans as strangers to themselves and exposed them to predatory relationship with other parts of the world. For as Nyerere (1997) argues, without unity there is no future for Africa and that although unity may not make Africa rich, it will make it difficult for Africa and its people to be disregarded and humiliated. The accounts of immigrants that are presented subsequently indicate that their perceptions of mobility are shaped and informed by their historical view of migration particularly borderless movement. The following section examines migration patterns during the post-colonial era. Mobility and migration in the immediate post-colonial period were characterized by accelerated labour migration with individuals moving in search of wage work. Mobility during this era underlined the inter-dependence that existed across the artificial borders imposed during the colonial era. Migration is however, largely driven by the developmental aspirations of the new states. In the immediate post-independence period, individuals migrated in search of wage labour in the resource-rich West African countries like Nigeria where discovery and commercial exploration of oil started almost immediately after gaining political independence from Britain. Indeed, as a result of the oil boom in the early 1970s, Nigeria attracted significant numbers of migrants comprising a mix of professionals and low skilled workers. Migrants also travelled to countries where the expansion of cash crop production created demand for labour. As such, the cocoa belts in Ghana and in the Ivory Coast as well as the coffee plantation in the Ivory Coast, groundnut and cotton belts in the Senegambia attracted many migrants from countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mali, Guinea, Cape Verde and Togo (Yaro, 2008). In a nutshell migration in West Africa was mainly from the North-South with people moving to the resource rich countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and the Gambia. In a paper entitled Migration in West Africa, Adepoju (2005b) explains some of the causes of migration in West Africa. He cites population pressure, poverty, poor economic performances and endemic conflict as key factors encouraging migration in the region. In the same vein he identifies different forms of migration from and within the sub-region which includes temporary crossborder workers, female traders and farm labourers, professionals, clandestine workers and refugees. He also notes that migration in this sub-region is essentially intra-regional, short term and male dominated in response to the interdependent economies of neighbouring countries. It is important through to­

100

Chapter 5

emphasise that many migrants within West Africa have also settled permanently in their host countries. In this regard, there are Nigerians who have permanently settled in Côte d’Ivoire (Adeniran, 2014) as well as in Ghana. There are also nationals from different parts of the sub-region that are found in Nigeria and other parts of the ecowas member countries. Although scholars such as Anarfi and Kwankye (2003) make the point that in the immediate post-independence phase, the pan-Africanist policies initiated by the presidents of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire created avenues for migrants to reside and work in their countries, this was not entirely so. Afolayan (1988:6) argues for instance that, “spatial mobility in the post-independence era, especially in the 1960s, was dictated more by consciousness of nationhood than any other factor.” Afolayan (ibid.) illustrates that the Ghanaian government sought to improve the economic situation of the country by passing the Alliance Compliance O ­ rder in 1969. The order led to the deportation of foreigners without residence permits and all traders without a license were deported. This action led to the deportation of more than 60,000 Nigerians, Dahomeans, Togolese and Voltans. During this time, countries such as Liberia, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria (which at this time had relatively fewer migrants) maintained liberal migration policies, which enabled them to attract many migrants. In the post-colonial era, West African countries have sought to regulate movement and migration under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) and specifically, through the protocol on ‘free movement’ established in 1975. The ecowas treaty on the free movement of persons stipulates that: … citizens of member states shall be regarded as community citizens and accordingly member states undertake to abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the community. The treaty further recommends that: … member states shall, by agreements with each other, exempt community citizens from holding visitors’ visas and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories. Adepoju (2012) highlights that the Free Movement of Persons Protocol was the first to be ratified and operationalized and the intention was to progressively establish the protocol within fifteen years from the date it was signed. The first

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

101

phase of the protocol sought to abolish the requirements for visas and entry permits within the ecowas region for a period of up to 90 days. West African states sought to maintain control on migratory patterns through controlling and classifying the individuals that could enter their respective countries. In this regard, migrants classified as ‘inadmissible’ could be denied entry. The second phase of the protocol came into effect in 1986, after its ratification by member states although the Right of Establishment has not yet been implemented (Adepoju, 2007). The implementation of the protocol was often fraught with inconsistencies and nationalistic imperatives often held sway. As an illustration Adepoju highlights that a short-lived oil boom in Nigeria in the late 1970s created immense opportunities that drew professionals and skilled individuals into the country. However, between 1982–1985, the Nigerian economy underwent a recession that rapidly lowered living and working conditions within the country. In response to this rapid economic decline, the Nigerian government revoked Articles 4 and 27 of the Protocol and expelled between 900,000 and 1.3 million individuals classified as illegal aliens and most of these were Ghanaians (­Adepoju, 2009). A revised ecowas treaty signed in 1992 further affirmed the rights of citizens of the community to enter, reside and settle within member states (Adepoju, 2012). The onus was still placed on member states to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the revised treaty. A further initiative was agreed upon and this was the ecowas Common Approach on Migration that was adopted in January 2008. According to Adepoju, the thinking behind the approach was to: enhance the management of migration through the development of a harmonized system and a comprehensive, balanced approach as a basis upon which member states would develop, strengthen, implement and coordinate migration policies and programmes in cooperation and partnership with the international community. ecowas, 2003, 2008

While the ecowas member states have at different moments grappled with the obligations of the free movement protocol the region is characterized by intense forms of migration. Gagnon and Khoudour-Casteras (2012:9) illustrate that close to 3% of the population of West Africa resides outside the country of birth and mostly in another West African country. Up to 75% of the migrants live within the region (Gagnon & Khoudour-Casteras, ibid.; oecd, 2009) Gagnon and Khoudour-Casteras (2012:9) show that within the ecowas region the main countries of immigration are Côte d’Ivoire (2.4 million immigrants in 2010); Ghana (1.9 million) and Nigeria (1.1 million immigrants). Against

102

Chapter 5

this backdrop the two scholars argue that the ecowas Protocol on the free ­movement of persons helped spur migration with the region. Gagnon and Khoudour-Casteras (2012:11) argue that: In a context of strong historical, cultural and linguistic regional ties, and despite its many limits, the protocol facilitates both regular and circular migration. The protocol has also drawn attention to regional mobility and migration, an often-neglected area within migration studies in Africa. Tacoli (2009: 515) points out that despite the attention paid to so called ‘international migration’: It is misleading to assume that movement from poor to rich countries is the predominant form of migration. International migration only accounts for a small proportion of all movement; much of it is within regions rather than towards high-income countries. Mobility, migration processes and trans-border trade in contemporary West Africa have been given impetus by economic reform processes. Meagher (2003:57) points out that, whilst part of the ambitions of economic reform programmes was the removal of trans-border trading systems by reabsorbing individuals into formal economies the introduction of the neo-liberal economic agenda had paradoxical effects, which have transformed the patterns of movement and trans-border trade: Under the influence of structural adjustment and globalisation, these trans-border trading structures have not disappeared, but have themselves been restructured and globalised. In fact, despite the contraction of some dimensions of the parallel economy, the overall effect of structural adjustment and globalisation in West Africa has been a significant expansion of trans-border trade. This expansion has taken place in the context of a dramatic transformation of the trade, involving shifts in the direction and composition of trade flows, as well as far reaching changes in the organisation of parallel trading networks, and in the role of parallel currency markets. Contemporary West African migration and ‘resilient economies’ have therefore been shaped and informed by both historical processes as well as contemporary economic and political transformations.

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

103

In the section below, we examine integration processes within the ecowas region, particularly the reasons that account for the failure to integrate the states especially in the context of intense migration. 5.3

Regional Integration in ecowas

Despite the relative success of the ecowas member states in fostering and promoting the free movement of persons within the region there is a lack of policy framework, explicitly promoting regional integration. Adepoju (2001:47) underscores the importance of regional integration and he argues that effective regional integration processes ought to be considered as part of strategies to enhance economic growth in the region. Adepoju (ibid.) argues that efforts aimed at promoting integration in Africa have often been hampered by states’ overlapping memberships and institutional arrangements. For example, member states of ecowas, comesa and sadc belong to more than one sub-regional organization with different ideologies and objectives. Adepoju (ibid.) argues further that economic unions such as ecowas and sadc are often dominated by the economies of a single country or a few countries such that immigrants often migrate to a few countries within the region. Nigeria and Ghana are among the countries that attract migrants within the ecowas region. Gagnon and Khoudour-Casteras (2012) argue that integration has not been explicitly given priority at the level of policy and law and often the absence of such laws and policies reinforces discriminatory practices in both overt and covert ways. The two scholars identify a number of consequences that arise upon the lives of immigrants as a result of poor integration. In Côte d’Ivoire there was an escalation of nationalism brought about by the concept of ‘ivoirite’, which generated civil unrest (Adepoju, 2001). Low skilled immigrants are often blamed for taking away jobs from the locals and lowering salary and wage scales by accepting low payments. In contexts of economic decline and fragmentation low-skilled migrants are often perceived as responsible for increased unemployment and also for taking resources away from nationals. Gagnon and Khoundour-Casteras (2012) assert that countries often institute discriminatory legal policies that curtail immigrants’ access to jobs, houses and services. Within the ecowas region countries, such as the Côte d’Ivoire, has enacted laws that prohibit and severely punish xenophobic practices, racism and tribalism while Mali has made major Muslim and Christian holidays

104

Chapter 5

official state holidays. All these measures are aimed at fostering the integration of immigrants living within their domain. 5.4

The Brief Profile of Nigerian Migrants in Ghana

The section below presents a profile of the sample of Nigerian immigrants living in Ghana who were interviewed for this study. The purpose of this section is to draw up a general profile of the immigrants and provide a rather broad insight into patterns of contemporary migration in West Africa. The data presented here pertains to the age, gender and education level of the migrants and also focuses on patterns of remittances and livelihoods. Research data shows that migration is still predominantly male dominated. Of those interviewed 84% were male respondents while 12% were females. There are several reasons that might account for the gender disparity in patterns of movement. Migration might have remained a male domain due to social pressures where men are expected to be the main breadwinners and they therefore, move in pursuit of livelihoods. Within certain West African countries, the movement of women is controlled in particular ways. In Nigeria for example, married women can only move with the consent of their spouses. This is part of the cultural imperative and practice, which require that wives should submit to their husbands. Although feminists will consider this as a sign of a patriarchal culture which reinforces the inferiorisation of the womenfolk, one can argue that men also travel to distant lands to ply their trade, perhaps with the permission of their wives. Although the study sought to focus on individuals working within the ‘resilient’ sector, particular categories of individuals working within this economic sphere are rendered invisible. These

12%

4%

Male 84%

Female Blank Figure 5.1 Gender of Nigerian immigrants

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

105

60% 50% 40% 30%

56%

20%

36%

10% 0%

Below 30 years

30–40 years

4%

0%

4%

40–50 years

Above 50 years

Blank

Figure 5.2 Age of Nigerian immigrants

may include women working as domestic workers or commercial sex workers who may desire to remain invisible even to researchers. Nigerians in Ghana are predominantly young men who are aged below the age of 40 with most of them below the age of 30. Those below the age of 30 comprised 56% of the respondents. The mobility of relatively young men may perhaps be attributed to limited livelihood opportunities available within Nigeria, which compels young people to migrate in search of economic opportunities, real or imagined, beyond their borders. Figure 5.2 shows the ages of the respondents. An important point to note is that migration is dominated by young and middle aged men who perhaps seek to maximize their economic potential in the prime of their lives. The migrants’ levels of education are varied with the majority of the respondents holding high school certificates (such as O levels). A significant number of the respondents, comprising 20% of the participants held University degrees while 12% had college level diplomas. The participants’ levels of education points to the migration and entry of early career professionals into areas of social entrepreneurship as much as there is migration motivated by the search for either wage labour or for setting up different forms of trades and livelihood options. The participants’ levels of education are shown in Figure 5.3. 5.5

A Brief Profile of Ghanaian Immigrants in Nigeria

The section below presents a profile of Ghanaian immigrants residing and working within Nigeria. The purpose is to try to construct a general profile

106

Chapter 5

Blank 4% 20%

University

12%

College

48%

Matric or equivalent 16%

Below matric/O-level 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Figure 5.3 Educational levels of Ghanaian respondents

84%

Figure 5.4

16%

16%

Male Female

Gender of Ghanaian respondents

of the ­Ghanaian immigrants in Nigeria. Ghanaian migration to Nigeria is ­male-dominated with 84% of the sampled individuals being men and only 16% being females. The reasons for the gender disparity in mobility can possibly be attributed to the social expectations of men to earn a living and support a family. The majority of the Ghanaian immigrants are middle-aged individuals between the ages of 30–40. However, a significant number of the respondents, comprising 36% of the sample size are aged 40–50. The age profiles of the Ghanaian immigrants differ significantly to that of the Nigerian immigrants and this highlights that Ghanaian migration to Nigeria has somewhat slowed down within recent years perhaps due to the precarious security situation in parts of Nigeria. Figure 5.6 shows the employment status of the respondents. A large majority of the respondents, comprising 52% of the sample, are not formally employed. Taken together migration between Ghana and Nigeria can aptly be described as mixed comprising different categories of individuals. Black and King (2004) drawing from the iom assert that within the context of West ­Africa

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

107

40% 30% 40%

20% 10%

36% 16%

8%

0% Below 30 years Figure 5.5

30–40 years

40–50 years

Above 50 years

Age of Nigerian respondents

16% Yes

32%

No 52%

Blank Figure 5.6 Employment status of Nigerian respondents

“many types of migration can be observed: unskilled and semi-skilled labour migrants, highly-educated professionals and students, as well as nomads, ‘undocumented’ migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons.” The assertion by the two scholars support the data presented in this chapter, which highlights the ‘mixed’ nature of migration between the two countries. 5.6

Immigrants’ Experiences of Migration

Within the field of migration and development, scholars such as Black and King (2004:77) point out that perceptions of migration differ but one of the ­ dominant views within scholarship perceives migration, particularly ‘­international migration’, as a process that points to the ‘failure of development’. According to these two scholars (ibid.):

108

Chapter 5

International migration is also seen as being something, which drains developing countries of their skilled professionals and talented individuals, reinforcing these countries’ position of weakness and dependency in the world economy. Contrary to such views and the perspectives presented within the ­‘migration-development nexus’ (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002), our research material reveals that regional migration is seen as a generally positive phenomenon for individuals and communities and it is perceived to possess the potential to unlock social, economic and political benefits. The interview data also shows that migration in West Africa is perceived to offer better living conditions through improving access to economic opportunities and increased incomes as well as offering secure and peaceful environments within which to live and conduct business. In general, whilst Ghanaians living in Nigeria perceive migration mainly in terms of its potential economic benefits and opportunities, Nigerians living in Ghana revealed that the security, peace and stability offered by Ghana were key attractions for them as immigrants in the context of instability in parts of Nigeria. The accounts given by Ghanaian immigrants reveal that there is an economic rationale behind their migration to Nigeria and most of them believed that they were better off in the country of migration as compared to their home country. One of the individuals interviewed in the study stated that: We are better off here in this country because it is now like home for us, because we have so many opportunities and God has been there for us in many places. We have been in the country for some time now. We mingle with the people of this country, I got married and I have children and that is good enough for us. The country has been an opportunity avenue for us. Another research participant, a Ghanaian immigrant living in Lagos echoed similar sentiments and highlighted that: I am better off in the host country than in my country because the living conditions are better than my country and the business environment is conducive compared to the country of origin (Ghana). Ghanaian immigrants found Nigeria conducive to conducting business due to the country’s relatively better infrastructure and large population which ­offered a larger market and unique opportunities than those available in their

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

109

country. Immigrant traders working in Nigeria indicated that they were better off in Nigeria due to the country’s large population which offered a bigger and diverse market. One of these traders stated that: I make more sales and profits compared to when I was in my country [Ghana]. This country is larger than ours with diverse ethnic groups and nationalities; it is the giant of Africa. It is a force to reckon with on the continent because it is blessed with abundant resources and manpower. Another trader revealed that: I am better off in this country [Nigeria] because it is a larger country and has better facilities than what obtains there [in Ghana]. Nigerian immigrants in Ghana were, in contrast, attracted to the country by its relative peace and stability rather than potential economic benefits. One of the research participants stated that the security that Ghana offered was imperative in his decision to stay in Ghana rather than in his home country Nigeria. In this individuals’ account, Nigeria provided a relatively better economic environment, but Ghana offered peace and stability that was absent at home. He is of the opinion that salaries are better in Nigeria but Ghana is peaceful. The cost of living is high in Ghana. Similar sentiments were expressed by other participants who revealed, for instance that: The two countries are good in different ways. In Ghana there are free speech and free movement whereas in Nigeria there is more money and better exposure. In instances where perceptions of migration have been positive the focus has very often been on the economic benefits derived from the phenomenon, such as the growing importance of remittances to development processes within migrant-sending communities (Hermele, 1998; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). Our material suggests that when migration is examined within regional integration processes, immigrants perceived benefits that went beyond material factors but encompassed political and social benefits, which collectively could affirm identities such as language and cultural understandings. As Oloruntoba (2016e) argues, there are several norms, mores, practices, cultural distinctiveness and linguistic similarities that unite Africans across the Sahara. These is social capital that could be leveraged upon to advance African citizenship and

110

Chapter 5

Pan-African nationalism. However, these similarities have been sidestepped and undermined by the politics of difference, under which conservative political and intellectual elites define their relationships with other Africans on the basis of narrow nationalism. Paradoxically, whenever it is convenient, either for personal, class or national interests such conservative elites engage in the rhetoric of Pan-Africanism. One of the key findings of this study is that the dispossessed and underclass people in Africa are generally inclined towards a more integrated and united continent, in which people are free to move across borders. The benefits of regional integration are explored below. 5.7

The Benefits of Regional Integration

A widely shared view amongst immigrants in both countries was that regional integration held immense benefits for African countries. The views expressed by the participants were varied in this regard but they center on the idea that regional integration was in itself an affirmation of African unity and an ­essential requisite for economic and cultural development. Most of the participants expressed the view that migration or the free movement of individuals across countries was an illustration of the desired integration and could also be one of the benefits or outcomes of successful integration processes. Broadly, regional integration was perceived by participants as necessary for economic growth, political stability and social and cultural exchange. This is in line with arguments expressed in Gumede and Oloruntoba (2017). In many of the interviews, participants expressed the view that the benefits of regional integration lay upon its potential to boost economic growth and the development of economies. In Ghana, a Nigerian immigrant stated that: There are lots of benefits in Africans living together and these include intercultural integration and business cooperation. There is potential for [countries] to support each other during emergencies; (through) accommodating refugees, intermarriages, regional integration, bilateral relationships, technical know-how and intellectual ability can be transferred to another country. A Nigerian trader residing in Ghana envisaged successful regional integration in Africa by comparing it with the integration processes obtained within the European Union. He asserted that:

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

111

Europeans can enter any European country; only Ghana and Nigeria (in West Africa) have a policy where movement is unrestricted. In the European Union there is joy and peace and transfer of business activity. From the perspective of this participant regional integration processes were essential in not only promoting unrestricted mobility between countries in the same region, but it could also promote economic growth through e­ conomically involving countries within a region in economic production processes. In this way household incomes could be increased throughout a region rather than be concentrated in one particular country. The interview material highlights that immigrants yearn perceive potential benefits in regional integration processes. In response to the question of whether there were benefits to Africans living together, a respondent from ­Nigeria stated that: Look at the European Union (EU). Due to their coming together and having their citizens live wherever they wish they have been able to have a common citizenry. Taking the EU example, the benefits can be seen as it has brought development amongst the countries. So I think there are lots of benefits in Africans living wherever they want [on the continent]. Even though there are reasons for it the EU managed to achieve it. This was one of the goals of the former Libyan president to have a United States of Africa. Some of the benefits of regional integration were seen and expressed through hassle-free movement experienced in other contexts and these were presented as the ideal that African countries could aspire for. As an illustration one of the respondents stated that: It’s like in America now. I am not sure if you want to go to another state they will ask you to get a passport before you travel. If we can move here to Benin, to Togo without a passport it will help. If we can do that then we can be better than other continents. The other benefits of regional integration were seen to lie in its potential to foster economic inclusion through perhaps the adoption of a common currency that would eliminate the disadvantages of foreign currency exchange rates. For most traders in the ‘resilient economy’ the adoption of a common currency would ease trade and beyond that promote inter-cultural ­understanding.

112

Chapter 5

Many respondents expressed the view that regional integration would facilitate the use of a common currency and promote peace. One of the participants highlighted that, integration would ‘promote peace as well as the use of a single currency’. In a book entitled Migration and Regional Integration in West Africa: A Borderless ecowas (2014), Adeniran discusses Migration and Regional Integration in West Africa. He examines how different immigration policies and multiple monetary zones have hindered sustainable cross-border socio-economic interactions in West Africa. Our findings lend credence to the ­argument advanced in this book. Drawing from this observation we assert the view that migrants have persistently enabled the processes of regional integration and inter-community development through promoting trade and economic development. In many of the interviews a common view that emerged was that regional integration was perceived as a platform to usher in peace and unity between African countries. Some of the participants perceived regional integration as a long-standing goal that African countries ought to strive for. Three of the participants stated that: Africans living together has been the dream of our forefathers such as that Africans should unite and live wherever they wish on the continent. They should be able to share love and unite for a greater Africa. By so doing they’ll be able to conquer any external aggression. Regional integration will enable individuals to move in and out of fellow African countries and trade freely without barriers. It will also create employment opportunities for fellow Africans and countries can come to the aid of smaller or problematic nations should the need arise and also provide relief to each other should the need arise. Another participant saw integration as an expression and affirmation of a common African identity but that would in essence promote efficient economic transactions. This participant stated that: We are blacks; we should be one. It would be faster to do business. Another participant was of the view that integration processes would improve relations between African countries and promote better communication between countries. This participant stated that: I see Africans living together as a way of bringing cordial relationships and understanding. There will be better understanding and there will be ways of communicating among ourselves.

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

113

Respondents also identified several positive social spin-offs that could arise from regional integration processes. A Nigerian migrant resident in Ghana ­asserted that regional integration could create strong bonds and collaboration amongst African countries, which could lead to the adoption of a common language. A key observation that emerges from the data is that regional integration is perceived as an affirmation of African unity and the ‘oneness’ of its people. In Ghana, Nigerian migrants stated that, some of the benefits of regional integration would be the removal of geographic boundaries and concomitantly, discriminatory practices. One of the research participants stated that a key benefit arising from regional integration would be that, everyone would live as Africans with no discrimination. Another Nigerian migrant interviewed in Ghana stated that the concept of regional integration was itself stepped on the idea that; We are one and we should be able to relate freely and the envisaged benefits from regional integration processes are that there is greater potential for sharing ideas and having one another’s interests at heart. One of the views expressed by a few of the participants was that regional integration could strengthen democratic processes through the establishment of regional bodies that could promote democratic ideals and values. Some of the views expressed by the participants were that: We can have a United States of Africa and foster more inter-country dialogues; and There can be transparency and honesty in governance so that the living standards can improve. Closely related to these views was the strongly-held belief that regional integration could unite and secure African countries could unite as a single bloc. Such views seem to emanate from the belief that African states were weakened by their lack of integration and this was often exploited to stir conflict. A Ghanaian national stated that: If all of us become one like a broom, it will be difficult to break us down. If all of us become one, non-African countries will not be able to intervene in our affairs.

114

Chapter 5

Another Ghanaian participant indicated that regional integration could also promote understanding amongst people within the continent and reduce chances of violent conflict: Working together will bring about mutual understanding and knowing what others want will also bring about duality of indigenes. What I mean here is that there is a situation whereby the father is Ghanaian and the mother is Nigerian which means that the children have dual citizenship. If there is a kind of crisis between the two countries it is difficult to raise a child and tell him to go and invade his father’s or mothers’ country so they will try and reason with themselves and try to settle any differences between themselves. The section below examines participants’ views with regards to how regional integration could be achieved and offers participants’ insights on the factors that have hindered integration processes. 5.8

Towards Regional Integration: Perspectives from Below

A commonly shared view that emerged from participants in both Ghana and Nigeria was that regional integration could be achieved through dialogue at government level and through regional institutions such as ecowas and the African Union. A Nigerian participant, residing in Accra stated that regional integration could be attained through the auspices of inter-regional organisations such as ecowas. He stated that: The government(s) should collaborate with ECOWAS to make sure every country works in tandem and ensure equal opportunities for all ECOWAS citizens. They should remove bottlenecks and ensure the free movement of people within ecowas and the duty-free movement of local products. Other participants articulated similar sentiments and the transcripts below are illustrative. One of the study participants attributed the failure of integration to the lack of political will within the continent. He lamented policies and practices that often resulted in the ‘othering’ of African citizens through deportations of African nationals from countries they resided in and sought to pursue livelihoods:

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

115

Regional integration can be achieved through our leaders. If they can understand themselves we can live together. There was a time when the ­Nigerian government deported Ghanaians and the Ghanaian g­ overnment did the same to Nigerians in Ghana. So if our leaders can understand each other it will be easier for us followers to do the same. Another participant stated that: Governments should not be selective; they should regard migrants and nationals as one. They should create a level playing field for everyone. While many respondents stated their belief that the responsibility for fostering integration lay with national governments and institutions such as the AU and ecowas there was a need to eliminate forms of discrimination among nationals and non-nationals, which often hindered integration. A Nigerian participant residing in Ghana stated that: When Africans stop discriminating like what happened in South Africa recently. Everyone should be regarded as one irrespective of where one comes from as long as you’re African and Black or white then it can be achieved. Another respondent stated that: We can achieve benefits only when we forget tribal and religious differences. These two hamper our co-existence. The accounts of the immigrants and the increase in cross-border migration and trade highlight a form of regional integration one that is fostered from ‘below’ through the activities and initiatives of individuals rather than the express interests of regional groupings and political leaders. There seems to be a lack of political will to foster regional integration and in many individual states policies are determined by national rather than regional interests. 5.8.1 Gendered Migration in West Africa The migrants in the West African region are mixed consisting of men and women with the male population being larger in number than that of their female counterpart. As explained above, social cultural factors are largely responsible for the differences in the percentages of migrant workers that are male in contrast with the women. Although the females are very active in the

116

Chapter 5

resilient sector at the national level, the ease of travelling to other countries in terms of the independence to take decisions make it easier for the males to travel outside their countries of origin in West Africa. This contrasts with the experience in Southern Africa where female folks from Zimbabwe are more in South Africa than the male counterparts. Notwithstanding this disparity, the responsibility to send remittances back home more or less compensate for the absence of the women folk in those countries. 5.9

History of Migration in Southern Africa

This section examine the history of migration in Southern Africa. This covers the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period. 5.9.1 Pre-colonial Migration in Southern Africa Movement of people across Southern Africa has continued for centuries. Beyond the artificiality and the politics of difference that has come to define inter-state relations today, migrant workers have moved to work in different parts of the countries in the sub-region both pre-colonial and colonial times. Apart from economic motives, more have also moved in search of security during inter-tribal wars of the pre-colonial times. It was in this context that Adepoju (2002) argues that migration in Africa should be contextualized within political and historical evolution of African societies. Pre-colonial Zimbabwe had a surge of migrants from South Africa mostly made up of the Ndebele tribe to occupy the Shona dominated territory of present day Zimbabwe. The Ndebeles make up part of the minority groups in Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Migration in Southern Africa was sparked by the Mfecane revolution as discussed earlier (also see Gumede, 2015). Water scarcity and droughts in the late 1700s led to scarcity of resources and starvation which the South African History Online (saho) reports to have fuelled conflict over grain, cattle and water. saho also notes the violent clashes over ivory and other trade commodities in contemporary Mozambique. Trade ports influenced people’s movement towards the south of what is today Mozambique where ivory, gold and other goods were traded. Mfecane, which the Basotho call difaqane/lifaqane, means forced migration. “The Mfecane was caused by a number of interrelated factors including environmental and societal changes, as well as severe conflict and fear among the peoples of southern Africa. 5.9.2 Colonial Migration in Southern Africa Labour migration system is better suited to explain colonial period migration in Southern Africa. For instance, Beremauro (2013:29) notes that “Zimbabwe

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

117

was a sender and receiver of migrant labours,” particularly mine workers from Malawi and Zambia. Zimbabweans also migrated to South ­Africa during colonial times. In fact, “South African mines … attracted labourers not only from Zimbabwe, but also from Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho and other far-flung regional countries such as Tanzania” (Beremauro, 2013:29). The demand for labour, particularly cheap labour, within the mining industries played a critical role in eliciting cross border migration not only in South Africa but Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) which also attracted labour from Mozambique. Adepoju (2002) highlights that amidst improved economic pursuits as reason for migration, in South Africa low wages and poor working conditions contributed to high labour turn over. However, in certain instances, disillusioned workers with inadequate access to social services, certain workers did not return to the mines thus contributing to the patterns of migration at the time. There are other categories of migration that characterized cross border migration including refugee migration. “Since the 1850s the Tsonga (also known as the Shangaan) had been travelling from the Delagoa Bay area to Natal to work for wages and in the 1860s Mozambicans (from Gaza, Inhamabane and Lourenco Marques districts) worked as seasonal workers on farms in the Western Cape” (Katzennellenbogen, 1982:37). Moreover, the Mozambican war of independence caused refugee migration which led to the emigration of the Portuguese. 5.9.3 Post-colonial Migration in Southern Africa Civil war and famine in the 1980s caused an exodus of Africans from Mozambique to neighbouring countries. Zimbabwe, upon independence in the 1980s, also experienced ‘white flight’, however the migration of Africans in Zimbabwe is attributed to the state’s violence hurled at Southern and Western districts of Zimbabwe Solomon (2003). South Africa gained political independence in 1994, the liberation struggle also led to the exile of Africans from apartheid South Africa. The end of formal apartheid also yielded an exodus of settler colonialists, however a significant number remained while others semi-grated to the Western Cape which is considered to be a mini-Europe within the African continent. The Zimbabwean crisis also led to a surge in economic refugees migrating to South Africa among other countries. Contemporary patterns of migration reveal that people continue to migrate as means of not only escaping poverty but for better business prospects as was found to be the case for the Zimbabwean and Mozambican migrants in this study. Moreover, according the data captured, the majority of the Mozambican migrants went to Zimbabwe after 2009 with 52% reported to have immigrated to Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2015. Moreover, in 2005 the Southern African Development Community (sadc) protocol on the facilitation of the movement of person was signed. The protocol entails the objective of the development of policies aimed at enabling

118

Chapter 5

free movement of capital and labour, goods and services and the people from the member states of the region without obstacles. The preamble of the treaty highlights the duty of the 15 heads of states “to promote the inter-dependence and integration of our national economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the region, as well as the need to involve the people of the region centrally in the process of development and integration” (sadc protocol preamble, 2005). Twenty-eight percent (28%) of the respondents in the study categorised migrating as very easy compared to the 20% that reported the migration process as difficult. The frequency of movement across the border was 32% for those who went home more than 3 times a year, 24% migrate once a year while 4% do not. 5.9.4 Regional Integration in the sadc Region Peter-Berries (2010:11) argues that sadc has made “the most substantial steps towards sustainable and deeper regional integration.” In the sadc context, regional integration is viewed as a political and economic project and he also highlights that regional integration in the region goes as far back as the colonial times, for instance the Southern African Customs Union (sacu) was formed between British colonies and territories. Unfortunately, trade in goods and services have been relatively low due to a number of factors. These include limited productive capacity, lack of diversification; primary commodities-based economies, heavy dependence on revenue imports consequently affecting decision to eliminate trade tariffs, infrastructural capacity limitation for cross-border trade including cumbersome regulatory frameworks. Unfortunately, studies on regional integration have mostly focused on the integration of the formal economy at the exclusion of the informal sector. Terence Jackson (2016) notes that the International Labour Organization (ilo) estimate that the informal sector constitutes an average percentage of 41% Sub-Saharan gdp. In sadc’s South Africa ranges between 30% and 60% for ecowas’ ­Nigeria (­Jackson, 2016). The following section entails the profiles of the migrants operating within what the study renders the resilient economy in Southern Africa. Due to confidentiality promised to the research participants, all the names used in this chapter are fictional. This part entails the analysis of the migration and regional integration primary data from Southern Africa with a focus on Zimbabweans in South A ­ frica and Mozambicans in Zimbabwe. The study was less about the reasons for migration and more about the experiences of cross border economic actors operating within the resilient economy with the purpose of assessing the relationship between migration and regional integration from grassroots. Nonetheless, the study found that in as much as Zimbabweans emigrate from their

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

119

country due to economic challenges, Mozambicans also migrate to Zimbabwe in pursuit of improved economic benefits although with little satisfaction with economic circumstances by Mozambicans. However, there are grievances pertaining to social benefits, economic opportunities including social integration within the host country. Similar experiences were noted by the Zimbabwean migrants in the context of South Africa in relation to cross border collaborations. As means of further assessing the process of integration of the region with a case study focus of the above-mentioned countries, we deal with narratives of the experiences at the borders and the host countries. The study found nuanced experiences of the migrants operating within the resilient economy and the competition between the formal economy and the resilient one as well as distinct gender dynamics in migration between the three countries. 5.9.5 The Profile of Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa This section provides a profile of the sample of the Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. The data drawn from the interviews conducted in Alexander, Sunny and Midrand are used to draw a general profile of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa including a broad view of contemporary migration patterns in the region. As done in the previous chapter, the quantitative data presented is in relation to age, gender and level of education the migrants have including the patterns of remittances and responses regarding the status of their livelihoods. The majority of the Zimbabweans in South Africa are females constituting 64% compared to 36% of the male migrants in South Africa. Zimbabwean economic crisis and unemployment have been attributed to the mass migration of Zimbabwean women (see gender section A focus group discussion (fdg) revealed that more women cross borders into South Africa as a result of dynamics involving men with multiple families. For instance, one of the fgd respondents gave a gendered and matrimonial scenario explaining other reasons behind women’s migration. She said:

36%

Male Female

64% Figure 5.7 Gender of South African respondents

120

Chapter 5

Even you as ren know that if you are the one working and you earn R5000, yet you have 3 separate families, each family needs food, even you need to eat, dress and need pocket money for the entire month. So if you give me R1000 what will I do with it? So I realize it’s better to use that R1000 to stock goods. I use the profit in such a way that the R1000 will remain … we don’ t have many needs. We just realize that the money we range of Age range of respondents 50% 40% 30% 20%

32%

44% 16%

10% 0%

Below 30 years

30–40 years

8% Above 50 years

40–50 years

Marital status of respondents 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

Figure 5.8

d ce vo r Di

ted ra pa Se

er) w( ido W

ati ng Ne ve r/N ot ma rri ed

bit ha Co

M

arr

ied

0%

Age and marital status of South African respondents

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

12%

121

4% Below matric/O-level Matric or equivalent

16%

College 68%

Figure 5.9

University

Educational level of Zimbabwean immigrants

40% 60%

Yes No

Figure 5.10

Employment status of South African respondents

respondentsBsget won’t see us through the month. So if you just focus on that R1000 it won’t suffice. So it is better toNBY stock and sell, survive on the profit, go back and ell or do another business. According to the data, 44% of the respondants are aged between 30 and 40 years and are married while 52% of the Zimbabwean migrants in the study have never been married. 44% of the respondants stated that they did not migrate with their immediate family members to South Africa, however 72% of the respondants already have family members living in South Africa. Sixteen percent (16%) of the respondents have matric/Grade 12 or equivalent while 68% have below matric/O-level education with 12% possessing college education and 4% with university qualifications. Moreover, the majority of them are employed within the resilient economy as domestic workers characterised by cleaning, cooking and in some instances care for the child minding. Some are hair stylists and cashiers who sell fast food products such as fish and chips; others are gardeners and so forth.

122

Chapter 5

Figure 5.10 shows that 40% of the respondants are unemployed, while 44% run their own businesses out of which 20% indicated that they operated their own businesses while they were in Zimbabwe (see Figure 5.11 below). Note tmhat the 60% that is blank is for respondants who were employed and not running their own businesses. The majority send remittances home monthly. 5.9.6 The Profile of Mozambican Migrants in Zimbabwe Unlike Zimbabweans in South Africa, the majority of the migrants in Zimbabwe are males with 92% being young males aged below 30 years. The profiles of the sample townships at which the study was carried out did not offer Mozambican migrant women opportunities except in one case of a widow whose case is noted in the gender section of this chapter. Sixty-four percent (64%) of the respondents are married while 42% have never been married. The majority constituting 60% stated that they live with their family members in Zimbabwe, however, their spouses did not operate within the same areas. One of the respondents mentioned that the women are mostly found by the second hand clothing market. Unfortunately, field workers found it difficult to locate women and consequently the study focus was on Mbare and Highfields. More on these townships will follow in the following section. The study sample reveals that 80% of the respondents do not have matric/Olevel education while only two respondents reported that they have matric/ O-level and two more have college education with one respondent possessing university level of education.

60%

Blank

20%

No

20%

Yes 0% Figure 5.11

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Zimbabwean participants’ business ownership in home country

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa 8%

Male Female 92%

Figure 5.12 Gender of Mozambican immigrants

64%

70% 60% 50%

32%

40% 30% 20%

0%

10% 0%

Below 30 years

Figure 5.13

30–40 years

40–50 years

4%

Above 50 years

Age of Mozambican immigrants

90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40%

80%

30% 20% 10% 0% Below matric/O-level Figure 5.14

8%

8%

4%

Matric or equivalent

College

University

Educational level of Mozambican respondents

123

124

Chapter 5 4%

Yes No Figure 5.15 Employment status of Mozambican immigrants

96%

32%

Better employment prospects Study

0% 24%

Better business prospects Favorable laws

8%

Other

36% 0%

Figure 5.16

10%

20%

30% 40%

Reasons for migrating to Zimbabwe

Better employment prospects

68%

Study

8% 20%

Better business prospects Favorable laws Other

0% 4% 0%

10%

20%

30% 40%

Figure 5.17 Reasons for migrating to South Africa

50% 60%

70%

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

125

Blank

No

Yes 0% Figure 5.18

20%

40%

60%

80%

Mozambican participants’ business ownership in home country

Figure 5.15 shows that 96% of the respondents classified themselves as unemployed however, they are traders with the exception of one respondent who sells meat at an employed butchery in the Highfields. The figure below shows that employment prospects constituted 32% of the responses while only 24% migrated to Zimbabwe for business related reasons. Figure 5.16 shows that 24% of the respondents stated that they were also running their businesses while they were in the country of their origin. This is a 4% difference compared to Zimbabweans in South Africa. 5.9.7 Narrative of Experiences in Zimbabwe The Zimbabweans that we interviewed in South Africa are engaged in economic activities such as hairdressing, low-scale IT repairs and so on – areas in which the locals are not very involved. This follows the pattern of migration in advanced countries where the existential conditions of migrants compel them to engage in activities that citizens may not be inclined to undertake. It is only when acute shortage of opportunities in the formal sector force citizens out of their comfort zones that they pry into the activities of migrant workers, thus sometimes leading to xenophobic attacks. Our respondents in Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe also operate in the resilient sector of the economies of those countries. Even though attitudes towards them are somehow hostile, especially from law enforcement agents, these migrants expressed preferences to continue to work in their host countries rather than countries of origin. This was particularly so for Zimbabweans in South Africa who had fled the harsh economic and political environments in their host country to seek for better

126

Chapter 5

lives in South Africa. In the section below, we detail the accounts of some of the respondents and their experiences and provide interpretations of their situation in host countries. Emanuel Chilowa (pseudonym) migrated to Zimbabwe in 2015 as a result of the loss of a breadwinner at his rural home in Mozambique. He is a single unmarried young man who is barely 30 years old without an A-level (matric) qualification. He operates as a trader in Zimbabwe selling sweets and cigarettes in the dusty, dilapidated and densely populated township called Mbare in Zimbabwe near Harare. Mbare is known for its rich political heritage and it has become the Zimbabwean contemporary hub of the informal economy with anecdotal evidence of an estimated amount of $2 billion circulating within the informal sector annually. Out of this economically fascinating peri-urban area, migrants such as Emanuel arrived in Mbare, Zimbabwe in search of better economic prospects. The United States currency that Zimbabwe is utilizing as standard currently has influenced many of the decisions of the Mozambican men to immigrate to Zimbabwe despite the economic turmoil facing the country. For instance, Emanuel said: I am better off in Zimbabwe. I get better value for my products and goods due to the strength of the US dollar that is used in this country. Jose Tambwe (pseudonym), a young man involved in a similar trade and of the same demographic characteristics also shared similar sentiments telling us that the US dollar exchange rate yields him greater returns compared to the Mozambican metical. Some participants argued that the two economies are no different from one another, however the stronger US currency utilized in Zimbabwean has an advantage. Moreover, Mbare offers better business incentives as opposed to the rural areas which most of the migrants originate from. The relatively high number of self-employed people or informally employed residents of Mbare serve as a market for the Mozambican traders. However, others mentioned challenges with the limited market in terms of people’s economic circumstances limiting their purchase potential. Other participants have also expressed their dissatisfaction with the Mozambican level of development and prospects from the state. For instance, Amos Kandagona (not real name) criticized the Mozambican level of infrastructural development. He argued that: 2015 in Mozambique is like 2008; they are backward, and they are so. I went to South Africa during the soccer World Cup, and noticed that

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

127

South Africans are better off. In Mozambique there is no tap water, and no good schools. UN and WHO should go to Mozambique urgently. I don’t think the quarter of the people don’t have passports, most don’t have matric. There is an evident nationalistic and identity dissociation exhibited in Mr. Kandagoma’s use of language. There is an apparent uniqueness which could be attributed to his level of disappointment in his country of origin. Another ­research participant echoed his own dissatisfaction with the Mozambican level of development and narrated a positive experience of his stay in Zimbabwe by saying that: In Zimbabwe everything is good. It is my own country now. When we came to Zimbabwe, we were still young. We know everything culturally, everything. Our own country is poor, we need a better life. Life here is better than in Mozambique. A lot of the men expressing these sentiments come from a poor economic background in Mozambique. Many of them are from the rural parts of Mozambique and upon arrival in Zimbabwe, life appears to be better. For instance, one of the respondents who had been in Zimbabwe for just over a month stated that: Life is better in Zimbabwe; in Mozambique there are no proper plans to enable vending activities to sustain a living. In Zimbabwe, life is better because I can even afford a toothbrush. It would appear that the economic circumstances that some of the members of this resilient economy experience, particularly the sweets and cigarette traders in Zimbabwe, were considered to be more attractive business opportunities than what could be found in Mozambique. One of the locals who served as a translator explained that the Mozambican migrants experience discrimination from the locals. Some are referred to in derogatory terms. There is also a level of harassment endured by the Mozambican traders; one reported being assaulted by some of the locals: We are at times beaten up and I have had my cigarettes confiscated. There is discrimination, because we are foreigners so they don’t want to pay for our goods knowing that we won’t report to the police.

128

Chapter 5

Failure to report to the police is not so much that foreigners have no right to security; instead failure is attributed to fear of being deported, because of the illegal status of the migrant. In the context of limited employment and economic opportunities, the foreign Mozambicans at Mbare are also strategically excluded from tapping into other avenues of the informal economy. Zimbabweans in South Africa highlighted xenophobia as a concern where one of the respondents argued the following: As a foreigner, I do not discriminate. South Africans tend to discriminate culturally. Before 2008 nobody fought others, we lived well together. When I first started working here, people did not see the way we worked; we were hard workers unlike South Africans. When they realized that they started fighting with us. The discrimination highlighted above is labelled xenophobia however, similar although less violent forms of similar discriminatory actions in Zimbabwe are not labelled as xenophobia. Moreover, the discourse of laziness is explained by Joy DeGruy which originates in discourse on the justification of slave labour. It was believed that black people are lazy despite the fact that black slaves worked themselves to death. DeGruy theorized about post traumatic slave syndrome (ptss), which is “the notion that something that happened ages ago still affects black people today in terms of their behaviours, negative perception of self and various viewpoints” (website). ptss is partially responsible for the contemporary behaviours and incessant need for black to disprove their laziness by overworking themselves on underpaying jobs. Moreover Piore (1979) speaks about a dual labour market constitutive of the primary and secondary sectors which provide wage and job differentials. The secondary sector is characterized by unskilled labour and low wages and is often unattractive to native workers. Moreover, Samuel Black also informed us that migrants are often found in jobs characterized by 3D which stands for dirty, dangerous and difficult (2015, interview) and the natives often shun such jobs. Taking up such jobs, which are often low paying, is aided by the belief that engaging in low-paying jobs reaffirms that those engaged in the most exploitative forms of labour are not lazy. Moving back to the issue of the discrimination of Mozambican migrants in the township of Mbare, data reveals that Highfields was different. Highfields is a former industrial hub characterized by the unwavering spirit of dullness found in industrial districts. The buzz in the streets where informal second-hand car spares traders selling on the pavements competing with established car spares stores. The open field is densely populated with a buzz of

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

129

various industrial activities ranging from make-shift workshops for fixing cars, mini-outdoor metal manufacturing zones with gas cylinders and other goods that are a part of the means of production and many intensive labouring men in dirty overalls. There is also a yard for all sorts of scrap metals including broken cars. There is a polish wax manufacturing firm with local men and women lined up to purchase for redistribution and trading. The informal business owners at Highfields are involved in diverse trades, for instance Adriavas Gungunhana is a butcher and he is also a farmer ­employed at Highfields. Jose Maguiguane sells padlocks, bulbs and cell phone chargers while Joseph Nheleti manufactures metal sheets and does material fabrication. It was at Highfields that an overly optimistic young male participant by the name of Freddie Franciso expressed that he grew up “having lots from Zimbabwe.” He praised the quality of education in the country and better business opportunities coupled with a better standard of living offered by Zimbabwe compared to Mozambique, saying: In Zimbabwe I have been able to meet some of my basic needs better than I thought. On the other hand, participants such as Sabastian Amos, an older married man who has been living in Zimbabwe for 15 years and sells and repairs tyres sees lack of access to social infrastructures such as housing as an impediment because the cost of renting is said to be high. The participants that have been integrated into the community mostly shared the view that the standard of living is better in Zimbabwe compared to Mozambique. This is despite the socio-economic circumstances of the migrants within an economically sanctioned country being unfavourable. Nonetheless, the general assessment of Zimbabwe by the resilient economy traders is that of positive experiences. 5.9.8 Narrative of Experiences in South Africa There are mixed reactions pertaining to the social, economic and cultural experiences of the migrants at the host country in Sunnyside, a suburb in Pretoria which is populated by students from the various universities around. There are also professionals living in Sunnyside. The study was also carried out in Alexandria Township near the affluent Sandton, resembling a dual nation economy constitutive of racial and extreme class inequalities in contemporary South Africa. Alexandria is an overpopulated 800-hectare area with infrastructure designed to cater for about 70,000 people yet it is estimated to have about 350,000 people staying there. This high-density zone of death for a township is

130

Chapter 5

Not satisfied

32%

Partially satisfied

36%

Satisfied

32% 30%

Figure 5.19

31%

32%

33%

34%

35%

36%

37%

Zimbabwean participants’ level of satisfaction in host country

characterized by inhumane living conditions thus the migrants become integrated into the extremely dire socio-economic circumstances. Other participants note economic improvements as a characteristic of their experiences including job opportunities. This is in line with the 68% of the respondents listing the search for better economic prospects as reasons for migrating to South Africa. Business prospects rated at 25% while 8% of the respondents said they migrated for study purposes. The economic challenges in Zimbabwe have been highlighted as the main reasons for migration to South Africa. Interestingly, the Mozambicans migrate to Zimbabwe in pursuit of e­ conomic prospects and advantages linked to currency strength. However, South Africa’s market is highlighted as the benefit for the traders. Moreover, South Africa’s employment opportunities have been highlighted as the pull factor unlike the Mozambicans who migrated to Zimbabwe solely for business/ trading opportunities, because the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe remains extremely high. Access to housing and food makes Zimbabweans’ experiences slightly challenging in South Africa where everything is commercialised, for instance access to shelter comes at a cost, Alexandria Township’s excessively dense population and spatial concretization characterized by back-yard-less rooms build on top of each other forces migrant residents of the Township, including the locals, to engage in revenue generating activities to obtain basics such as food. Ruth Gumbi says that she is better off at home (Zimbabwe) because she can stay there without money and will be fine. Here she needs money all the time. However, others’ views differed on this one, for instance one respondent argued that in Zimbabwe, life is much more expensive.

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

131

In Zimbabwe with R100 you don’t eat, here with that amount you will be okay. If Zimbabwe had jobs, I would stay there and have no reason to be in South Africa. The difference in views is accounted by the different location of origin, those from the rural areas with ample land and capacity to grow their own food and shelter shared the sentiments of Ruth Gumbi while others with such an option differed. The Zimbabwean respondents were more likely to request the government to create jobs than the Mozambican whose demands from the ­government were mostly centred on improving and creating conditions for their businesses to thrive. Nonetheless, in the South African case, it is found that migrants are more entrepreneurial than South Africans. 5.9.9 Challenges within the Resilient Economy Moreover, issues around location for trading were highlighted. Dorothy Ndlovu, an elderly woman selling imported shoes in Alexander at a corner that is diagonal to the busy Pan-Africa mall lamented that the authorities demand that they move to an area which she feels does not have much ‘traffic’ or movement of people thus affecting her business. Similar contentions regarding competition between traders within the resilient economy and businesses in the mainstream economy also came up in the Zimbabwean case whereby registered business owners even placed pressure on the Zimbabwean government to ‘deal’ with traders within the informal economy as they felt their profit margins are suffering as a result of the members of the resilient economy selling goods at relatively cheaper prices. The extent of competition between the mainstream and resilient economies is not similar in the South African case as consumer market is relatively larger and has greater purchasing power. According to the quarterly Labour Force Survey in 2012 there were over 2.1 million people in South Africa operating within the resilient economy, 1.2 million of them were men and 857,000 were women. Most of the street vendors in South Africa trade goods that are not of greater threat and competition to established corporations in the hinterland. However, at the border post of Musina, the traders engage in businesses that compete with the formal corporations. One of the focus group respondents said: Even us now, we have already taken over the job of the bank, those bureau de change, we are changing the money. We know they will arrest us, it’s not because we like it, but we didn’t go to school and to count money you don’t need a certificate, yeah that why we are doing that. But they are arresting us.

132

Chapter 5

Similar responses from the authorities of capitalist states conduct random raids. The government’s response to formal business demands is explainable by utilizing the lens of public choice theory whereby the needs of the mainstream businesses are placed before the needs of the members of the resilient economy. For instance, the value proposition offered by the mainstream businesses involves tax revenue that is collected by the state from registered companies. This is a typical expression of opportunities that are sought are ones that facilitate making excess profits. However, it is pivotal to note that the state issues out permit for vending upon application. A new by-law was p ­ ublished in the Zimbabwe gazette in 2014 stipulating that the vendors must erect temporary stalls which indicate their names and period of the permit. Those whose goods are confiscated have 30 days to approach council to pay a fine. The bylaw also allows municipalities to designate land for vending including the registration of vendors. Many of the vendors do not have permits to trade. It is mostly because the migrants often come from a poor background and are ‘illegal’ migrants. There is a daily fee of $3 charged to flea market operators and $1 expected from fruit, vegetable, airtime, dried food and newspaper vendors. Some of the traders sell sweets and the confiscation of goods and fines cost more than the income generated from the sales. Moreover, permits and licences come across to the traders as legal obstacles that are utilized to maintain the special privileges granted to the business interest group (Butler, 2012:80). However, despite the hostile responses from the state for those without permits, the traders devised means of surviving arrests and confiscation of their goods. For instance, a young female cosmetics trader by the name of Khudzanai Nandoro devised a strategy to sell her products from her hand bag and at the sudden detection of authorities, she immediately shuts her bag and walks about appearing as a mere consumer shopping around. These are some of the strategies for survival within the sector where there is often hostility from authorities as well as the locals. One of the respondents argued that: The things are not good in South Africa compared to circumstances in Zimbabwe. You walk around as a Zimbabwean, and police are harassing you about papers. There is no peace in South Africa. Zimbabwe is a peaceful country compared to South Africa; it’s just that there are no economic prospects. A sense of being an ‘other’ and an alien/foreigner is constantly emphasised by the constant ‘harassment’ for papers. It is not only ‘paper’ of identification but papers for ‘legalized’ trade through permits and licences. In explaining the challenges of conducting business at the borders, the focus group participants stated that:

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

133

60%

70% 60% 50% 40%

20%

30%

12%

8%

20% 10% 0% Very easy Figure 5.20

Not so easy

Difficult

Blank

Zimbabwean participants’ ease of migration

There are too many challenges; there are so many. We are not allowed at all to carry out our business. We are not allowed to set up a market here. They need a permit, not only that, as you must also register – you see all those things. So at the end of the day they will follow you … the municipality officers come and they throw away the bananas, wreak havoc, we run away. They throw everything away, we are not allowed. 5.9.10 Crossing Borders and Running Businesses The required documentation is expected from the cross border traders, yet there is little faith in the institutions as well as a sense of support from the government in a sense that it is believed that the confiscated goods at the border are as a result of the officials requiring the traders to at least purchase products from Zimbabwe instead of South Africa. Moreover, crime affects the traders immensely especially at the borders. The perception of the failure of the police to protect the migrants threatened the livelihoods of the migrants including efforts for integration within the communities. Moreover, corruption featured extensively in the South African and Zimbabwean context as a challenge faced by the traders. Officials at the borders are reported as having tendency to extort money from the migrants in some instances their goods are confiscated for reasons the respondents did not articulate. Having passports and permits or not, seems not to make much difference in eliminating chances of being solicited for a bribe. Despite these grievances expressed in the survey that 50% of the respondents reported ease of migration while 8% reported not much

134

Chapter 5

ease and 20% expressed that it was difficult. However, it must be noted that those expressing ease are passport holders who migrate to South Africa. Those without passports are much more vulnerable not only to corrupt officials but to fellow migrants too. Lack of possession of legal documents exacerbates the negative experiences. Jose Francisco shared that … you don’t have the passports you are border jumpers; it’s not easy, you find someone to give the shoes to cross with the goods for you. Sometimes when you give someone they run away with your shoes, goods and some demand more money taking advantage because you are not from their country. The neighbouring police take advantage of us. In terms of language, they can see you are not from their country and they treat us the other way around. Moreover, one of the participants felt that the Zimbabwean Revenue Agency (zimra) was extorting money from him by charging him US $3,000 customs fee for a car that was bought for just over US $1,000. Moreover, the migrant’s difficulty in obtaining passports or vending licenses is linked to the corruption of departmental officials that are responsible for issuing permits. The respondents stated that the officers solicit bribes from them. The plea made by the traders is for governments to tighten their responses to corrupt activities including issuance of passports and other documents. Others have requested for free movement and the scrapping of visas as such would benefit their businesses. Moreover, such a move would facilitate integration according to the respondents. Moreover, the delays at the border post including the minimal number of days that the South African government permits foreigners to stay in South Africa affect the migrants who may seek to move in and out of the country trading goods. One of the participants requested 90 days be given to migrants so as to have enough time to learn new skills from the country which can also be taken back to be implemented at the country of origin. Samuel Black, a key informant, argued that opening up the borders minimizes unidirectional flow of migrants from one country to another. He shared that initially opening up borders yields a surge of people moving to one country but ultimately people do move back to their home countries. He argued that this is part of labour migration’s circularity. However, when ease of access is hampered and there is an assessment of which country represents more value for the migrants, the chances of moving back home are minimal. He argued that: If people had the confidence that they are able to cross the border, they are able to work in South Africa now, tomorrow and the day after, then

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

135

I think you would see more circularity of migration rather than unidirectional motion (Samuel Black, 2015, interview). Moreover, Samuel Black argued that regional integration has been, to some extent, pushed by migrants ahead of the formal legislation. 5.10

Towards Regional Integration: Perspectives from the People

Integration has been viewed favourably for cultural, political and economic advantages. One respondent argued that integration would even assist in responding to an economic crisis like that which severely affected Zimbabwe in 2008. It is believed that free movement would have aided the process of Zimbabweans who were forced to travel to neighbouring countries to purchase food. He also reiterated that: I should not feel like I am not at home, having difficulty getting basic things because of sanctions, if it wasn’t for SA, millions would have been dead. Food, health, good roads, cause challenges and people would have died. The crisis forced migrants to not only send remittances from other countries, but food and other basic goods. In many instances goods were transported home to be traded. For instance, Farai mentioned that during the crisis which culminated in food shortages, they purchased maize meal from neighbouring countries to sell in Zimbabwe. In some cases, cross border trade began this way. The minimal days to stay in South Africa creates a challenge for the traders as some have argued that they are sometimes allowed to stay in the country for two days, which means they do not have enough time to move around the country to purchase goods. This then leads to staying longer in South Africa consequently contravening immigration laws. One of the respondents argued “when my permits expire I encounter problems at the border such as being given a few days to stay in South Africa which affects my business” (Farai, 2015, interview). 5.10.1 Social Integration in Communities Moreover, the level of social integration within the communities exerts an influence on how the traders perceive their experiences. For instance, those who mentioned close alliances and friendships with the locals expressed satisfaction despite the xenophobic violence that transpired in South Africa.

136

Chapter 5

Most of my friends are South Africans, we love each other. They don’t treat me like a foreigner. I am not happy economically with my life. I try my best so that I don’t end up stealing or prostituting myself (Gloria Chirisa, 2015, interview). It is evident that not all the Zimbabwean migrants perceive improvements in their lives in as much as they migrated for economic reasons. Moreover, other respondents expressed dissatisfaction economically arguing that South Africa is economically challenging for them. Elements of political turmoil surfaced, some migrants are not only economic refugees, and they are political migrants as well. Furthermore, when asked if there is a difference in their lives in the host country, some respondents argued that the political intimidation from the state coupled with lack of employment opportunities render South Africa better however, if there were opportunities in Zimbabwe, migrating back to Zimbabwe would be the first thing done. Home is best, its only circumstances that brought me here. I would like to be with my family all the time, but different circumstances dictate otherwise (David Gatsheni, interviewee). Michael expressed the view that: Should Zimbabwe economically improve, one could go back home. A similar sentiment was shared by Mozambican migrants such as Francisco who pleaded for the Mozambican government to improve its social infrastructure such as education so that they could return home. In the context of an economically stronger South Africa, others expressed decline in business revenue while unemployment for others renders South Africa no different from Zimbabwe when assessing the hardships encountered. In fact, the economic challenges that South Africa is facing are reported to have an influence on their businesses and incomes There are other non-economic factors reported to influence revenue generation, namely the language barrier for the migrants. In the South African and Zimbabweans context, the language did not surface as frequently as it did for the Mozambican respondents. Reasons could be attributed to Ndebele speakers whose dialect has origins and influence from South Africa thus easier integration and adoption of local South African languages, particularly IsiZulu.

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

137

5.10.2 Language of Integration and Regional Business Conduct In the Zimbabwean case, knowledge of Shona (a Zimbabwean language) is paramount in conducting business or integrating within the society. It is often difficult to identity a non-Zimbabwean or an outsider until one speaks and the language barrier gives it away. Language has been expressed to be a significant feature in the categories of exclusion and inclusion in conducting business. One of the traders from Mozambique, who partnered with other nationals from Malawi and the drc, said that they speak different languages but are united by the local language which enabled them to forge partnerships. Their outsider status also encouraged their collaborative efforts as they were united by the experience of being foreigners seeking better livelihoods. Language was a salient feature in the sense that it played a role in not only conducting business but integrating into the communities as well, including the exemption from harassment by the locals. It is worth mentioning that the language also became a barrier to the ease of data acquisition thus a regional language may be of necessity especially in the context of regional integration. Moreover, Faith Nyambawire, a domestic worker at Midrand shared that she is exempted from the hostile xenophobic townships due to the area of her work, but her inability to speak a local language often left her vulnerable by way of automatic assignment as an outsider in everyday interactions such as in commuter minibuses commonly known as taxis when she travels thus resulting in fearfulness. The fear is rooted in the violence despite lack of primary experience. Farai Guzi stated that: Although I was not affected personally, it was scary how migrants were brutalized. 5.10.3 Social Services for Regional Citizens The fear from associational identity and group trauma had an impact on those who were not even affected directly by the attacks. The shared identity of being a migrant elicited the feeling of insecurity which also affected business and job seeking. A response to xenophobia would assist enormously in minimizing the risk of loss of income which also has its own socio-economic consequences. The respondents posited that they all have access to social services including the protection from the police. Yet in some cases there is no faith in the law enforcement officers as they are also implicated in the hostile treatment to illegalized/criminalized bodies of traders and migrants. There is recorded ease of access to social services however, as mentioned previously,

138

Chapter 5 I am better off in Zimbabwe

16%

I would be better off in my home country

12% 4%

68%

It’s all the same (indifferent) Blank/I don’t know

Figure 5.21

Zimbabwean participants’ level of satisfaction in host country

the experiences are marred by experiences of hostility. For instance, one of the respondents stated that ‘wherever he goes’ there is a problem, as a foreigner in the hospital they abuse you and things are tough. This also highlights issues around knowledge of one’s rights and awareness of channels for reporting such incidents. Moreover, xenophobic attitudes and corruption remain the biggest sources of insecurity for the traders. The views differ in this regard; other respondents have expressed relative satisfaction with the social and economic progress within the material circumstances positioned within. However, there is acknowledgement of potential improvements and ambitions for further growth. In this context the resilient economy is viewed as a transitioning phase on the socio-economic continuum. For instance, one of the participants, amongst others, stated that the Government should create employment so that we can search for formal employment rather than selling or vending. Few respondents requested employment opportunities to be extended to the migrants while others argued that the government of Zimbabwe must cater for its citizens and allow them to trade. Similar sentiments were expressed in South Africa whereby the migrants urged the government to aid its own South African citizens in providing basic services and employment so as to minimize xenophobic incidents. The sense of familyhood and unity of Africans was also reported as a useful move to thwart divisions. 5.10.4 Free Movement and the Benefits of Continental Unity The intervention expected by the various governments are the dialogue, collaborations and pursuit of stabilizing and improving economies which are p ­ erceived to be in crisis. The task to governments as suggested by the

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

139

r­ espondents includes thed facilitation of unitB. It is also believed that greater understanding among Africans may foster integration. However, there were distrusting voices from the respondents. Chikuni Farai said that: The fundamental issue must be to overcome the big brothers (colonizers). Africa’s disunity is perpetuated by former colonizers so that must be overcome. Leaders are the ones who refuse progress of unity because they are benefiting from former colonies. The above-mentioned indicates little faith in the leaders of the African continent and leadership to advance the programme of unity. This fits into the argument about rentierism whereby political elites exploit their political power and positions to secure personal benefits at the expense of the public progress. Felkins (1997) explains that politicians are driven by self-interest and public choice theory allows us to dispel that decisions are never made in the ‘public interest’, because the notion of public interest is in itself impossible, because we exist in a world of plural values and often those values clash. The foundational premise of some of the choices made by public officials is proclaimed to be on the basis of rent seeking. Butler (2012:76) asserts that “Rent seeking is the attempt by particular groups to persuade governments to grant them [all] sorts of valuable monopolies.” Samuel Black (pseudonym) on the other hand, informed us that barriers to integration are rooted in administrative inertia and administrative capacity. He indicated that: Lesotho and Swaziland … are very much in favour of regional integration and even on a bilateral basis … they recognize that there is no point in trying to do things by themselves. The above-mentioned statement indicates the political will from politicians to integrate, however the barrier is the capacity to negotiate with South Africa. For instance, the Lesotho minister of home affairs was recorded as stating that: We go to the meeting with SA to negotiate about liberalizing movement across borders, basically the protocol of free movement and we go with 3 people and they come with a room full of lawyers. Thus, the need and request for assistance is paramount because in the absence of capacity, the chances of yielding mutually beneficial agreements becomes minimal consequently there exists hesitation to enter negotiation.

140

Chapter 5

The migrants may urge the state to enable free movement of people or facilitate access to documents such as passports as there are more radical pronunciations made pertaining to the abolition of visas. The question then becomes, in the context of regional integration making headway by bigger corporations such as dstv multi-choice, Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Standard bank and so forth into other countries, what interest would be it be for the state to advance for free movement of people when goods are already in motion across the region? A simple answer to a complex question in need of a sophisticated response is that integration and migration from below have already begun thus the ­facilitation thereof would be of developmental benefit as greater opportunities will be gained for those operating in the resilient economy, dealing with massive inequality gaps and unemployment largely resulting from the political economy trajectory traversed by the regional economies. Intergovernmental collaborations were also encouraged as means of realizing the benefits of regional integration and the unification of Africa. This would also feature in achieving and sustaining peace in the region which has also been identified as a prerequisite for conducting business especially for members of the resilient economy who will greatly benefit from peace and security including the eradication of crime because security infrastructures such as insurance are often outside the affordability spectrum for the migrants. Moreover, a call for post-national affinities is said to enable the unification of the African continent. Ms. Nondoro suggested the following: People should be given passports but within neighbouring African countries people should be allowed to travel even without passports. Alternatively, there can be common passports and IDs within Africa so that people are not differentiated according to nationality. For Mr Kandagona, dialogue and awareness of the commonalities amongst Africans will aid in the social integration process which would play a role in enhancing migration experiences and integration within communities. A sense of familyhood is also suggested at the same time discarding the concept of foreigners. Moreover, cross border collaborations have been highlighted as one of the benefits of having chosen to migrate to different countries. For instance, Joseph shared that he met a Mozambican and he helped him start his own mini-empire which is brotherhood and unity. He also taught him to speak the local language. Moreover, skills sharing and transfer have also featured as a benefit that the migrants have noted in the experiences. Sifiso Radebe, a young Zimbabwean salon owner in Alexandra Township, said that staying wherever they wish

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

141

makes them to be able to learn new ideas that will advance betterment of the continent. She mentioned that she has learned how to do women’s hair as a result of learning from some Nigerian ladies who are also hairdressers. Mr Ndlovu, a migrant from Zimbabwe, also mentioned that migration and integration also benefits hosts countries in the sense that some of the business that nonsouth Africans are doing here was not done. The traders also view their roles as not of parasitic extraction but as major contributors to the development of the host economy. For instance, when one of the participants was asked what benefit would there be if there was unity, he said: I could practice my skills and transfer them to other African countries. I would also be able to learn new skills from other Africans. There are greater chances of exchanging business ideas and aiding one another. Moreover, a greater market for the traders has been highlighted as a benefit because it is believed that one would easily move across the region to trade or set up businesses in various countries as a businessman. It would imply that they would do business in at least three African countries, SA, Botswana and drc. However, for the business to thrive, the migrants argued that the conditions for conducting business need to be improved and common laws at the sadc level are necessary. 5.10.5 Business Environment and Micro-Finance Ease of access to documentation which would legalize the trades was highlighted as pivotal. A conducive and friendly business environment is needed; the Zimbabwean government is expected to lift restrictions that inhibit informal trade. It was also suggested that embassies should play a role in facilitating the process. The Zimbabwean government and legislation already offers such opportunities. It is evident here that there is limited knowledge of the laws that govern the informal sector. Registering the informal trades should be coupled with incentive to access knowledge. Moreover, Zimbabwe’s economic recovery is expected to boost the market in which the traders supply their goods and services. Moreover, business micro-finance came up as a need. Tailored loans for the resilient sector may also facilitate the registration of businesses operating within the sector. However, the challenge would then emanate from issues pertaining to documentation and ‘legality’ of the migrants. The impact of the crisis on the economies also extended to access to micro-finance, one of the respondents highlighted that they used to receive financial aid, however it is no longer the case. Mr Nheleti said that the law enforcement agency must

142

Chapter 5

help by giving them money and a space to sell. He, among others, highlighted the need for micro-finance. He said he needed money so he could even employ people and pay their wages. Most importantly, a single currency was highlighted as important in the ease of facilitating cross border trade. 5.10.6 Gendered Migration Mozambican migrants in Zimbabwe were predominantly male. They constituted 92% of the participants. There were literally only two non-Zimbabwean females who could be located via snowballing referrals for the field work in Mbare. One of the women is less than 30 years old unemployed married ­Mozambican woman who migrated to Zimbabwe with her husband. She reported that she is highly unsatisfied with her living conditions in the host country which is without employment opportunities. As a means of supplementing her husband’s income, she sells food and has been doing so since 2011. Unfortunately, she operates her small restaurant with fear and uncertainty. She lamented that her business is affected by the unstable exchange rate and police intimidation. The fluctuating exchange rate and unavailability of products force her to import products needed from South Africa and lack of documentation exposes her business to vulnerability, because she feels such results from the police taking all your stuff. She reported that there was a clean-up operation in cbd and she did not know if they would come there. Another woman who is slightly older and a widow moved to Zimbabwe by herself, but she sends remittances home from time to time. According to the data acquired, Zimbabweans send remittances more frequently than the ­Mozambican migrants. See figure 19 below. Forty percent (40%) of the Mozambican respondents did not send remittances home. This could be attributed to the fact that some of the male migrants are married and have migrated with tier family members; others are young while others have never been married. This suggests there is minimal or no assumed family responsibility to others back in their country of origin. The widow vehemently expressed satisfaction with her living conditions and health however she argued that she has no access to basic services. This widow sells second hand clothing for a living, a business she also conducted in her country of origin and has been doing it so for five years. As highlighted earlier, 20% of the Zimbabwean respondents in South Africa highlighted that they were conducting their trade in their home countries. Moreover, extortion from the authorities and individuals still featured imminently. She expressed her grievance regarding the confiscation of her goods particularly at the border posts and explanations are not provided to respond accordingly within the confines of the laws. There are reports in the media that

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

24%

4%

143

I am better off in Zimbabwe I would be better off in my home country

72%

It’s all the same (indifferent) Figure 5.22

Zimbabwean immigrants’ perceptions about living in South Africa

Frequency immigrants in Southern Africa send remittances home 12% 4% 20% 56%

Figure 5.23

Weekly Monthly Quarterly Yearly

Frequency immigrants in West Africa send remittances home 32%

40% 8%

20%

Monthly Quarterly Yearly Blank / undisclosed

Participants’ frequency of remittances in sadc and ecowas

the Zimbabwean manufacturing companies put pressure on the government to ban the importation of second hand clothing as means of protecting the local textile industry. Part 3 of Zimbabwean Act 17 of 1999 explains the state’s conceptualization of dumping and the regulations around anti-dumping charges and levies. The confiscation of products in the South African case was largely reported on the basis of permits for vending. Moreover, as mentioned before, the number of Zimbabwean women in South Africa is higher and the majority of them have never been married and the services they offer in host country are gendered. Their trades are mostly centred on cooking, cleaning, sales, receptionist, hair dressing and so forth. These roles could then account for Mozambican women’s absence in Highfields. A unicef Report revealed the sex disparities of migration in Mozambique. In 2013, more males were reported as constitutive of migrant stock as opposed to females. The report shows that the Mozambican male migrant population aged 20–24 was recorded at 13,708 compared to 9,408 for females. There were 21,208 males and 14,755 females aged 25–29 and 11,290 males compared to 6,887 females belonging to the 30–34 age category. The report shows that there are more Mozambican males migrating than females. Pertaining to women and migration, Muzvidziwa (2004) highlighted those Zimbabwean women

144

Chapter 5

who were cross border traders were vilified in state discourses and were labelled as prostitutes and carriers of disease. Moreover, transactional sex as an option of supplementing income deficits surfaced. Transactional sex refers to a sexual relationship or act(s) outside marriage or sex work, structured by the implicit assumption that sex will be exchanged for material benefit or status. “While driven primarily by instrumental intentions, transactional relationships may also include emotional intimacy.” (Stoebenau et al.). A young woman stylist from Zimbabwe complained that: You may have a boyfriend who does not give you money, so you end up having sex yemahara’ (for free). It seems it’s better to be a prostitute (Hazel, 2015: interviewee). Luibheid (2014) argued that sexuality, in this context, speaks to social access to resources and benefits, networks and information that enable migration. “Migrants’ … sexualities are often evaluated in terms of their supposed success or failure in ‘assimilating’ to dominant cultural sexual norms.” The commoditisation of sex in South Africa has a long history, in fact ­colonial and slave history and sexualisation of black women feature p ­ rominently in scholarly works by DeGruy (2012) and Gqola (2015). Moreover, socioeconomic circumstances and the patriarchal configuration of men as providers have enabled the culture of exchanging sex for commodities. Nonetheless, women migrate in search of better economic opportunities and as the majority of migrants; they facilitate the integration of the region through migration and trade thus rendering the intersection of migration and regional integration a gendered phenomenon. 5.11 Conclusion The chapter analysed findings from fieldwork, starting with the discussion of the historical antecedents upon which contemporary migration processes are predicated. Particularly important to note is that at many levels borders as we know them today are not perceived by individuals as a given, but rather as relics of coloniality. They are seen as frontiers and artificial constructions superimposing social and economic differences that hitherto did not exist. Under the auspices of the ecowas, states within West Africa have fostered movement and mobility of individuals. The ambitions of such initiatives have,

Migration and Regional Integration: West and Southern Africa

145

very often, been hampered by nationalistic policies pursued by different states at different moments. Regional integration processes have been hampered by a lack of a clear policy framework as well as political will but the accounts of immigrants indicate that there is a desire for African regions to be more integrated in ways that would promote free movement of people, economic development and intercultural understanding. With regards to sadc, as indicated above, there are more women involved in migration. It is also important to highlight that the majority of African w ­ omen are operating within the resilient economy. These women are also championing the process of regional integration through the intersection of migration and cross border trade. There are several challenges which they face but through their resilience, they continue to march towards integrating the region from grassroots and informally. Interestingly, there are more women from Zimbabwe crossing the border to South Africa as compared to Zimbabwean men and Mozambican men in the context of Zimbabwe-Mozambique migration. It is not only labour that migrates to service host countries’ informal economies; members of the resilient economy also facilitate the process through tradeable commodities. Moreover, the environment of operation has been shown to be hostile due to a number of obstacles such as institutional challenges around accessibility of permits. Nonetheless, there remain strategies employed to retain above float despite the income shocks experienced as a result of what respondents express as harassment. Regional language also surfaced as one of the needs that would facilitate cross border trade for the members of the resilient economy. Micro-finance was also highlighted as an important element of supporting the resilient economic sector. Overall, the experiences of migrants captured in this book support the view we are advancing that regional integration is happening from below. Although those interviewed – people that are in the resilient economies in the countries the study was undertaken – face many hurdles and encounter many d­ ifficulties, but their resilience ensures that they continue to do what they intend doing, thereby ensuring that regional integration happens with or without supportive policies and laws. The major implication of the findings is that regional integration could foster African countries’ cooperation whilst simultaneously disentangling them from dominant yet exploitative economic and political relationships with the West and East. The expression of interest in regional integration by migrants in the resilient sector is a further testimony to the prospects of integration. As Oloruntoba (2016a) argues, the lacklustre attitude of the political elite to

146

Chapter 5

the project of integration makes it particularly compelling to have the people take charge of the integration agenda. A clear communication strategy which shows the benefits of integration to the common man is needed to galvanise their support. The effectiveness of such an approach will depend on organisation, mobilisation and networking. Civil society organisations as well as intergovernmental organisations such as the ecowas and sadc, among others need to be strengthened to further deliver on their mandate to achieve integration on the continent. While the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement and the Continental Free Trade Agreement that is currently being planned are good start for integration, it is important that the informal or resilient economy is included.

Chapter 6

sadc and ecowas: Comparative Perspectives 6.1 Introduction This chapter provides a comparative analysis of migration and regional integration in Southern Africa and in the West African region. We look at patterns of migration in the pre-colonial and colonial eras as well as contemporary configurations of migration in the two regions. The chapter also examines how mobility is acted upon by the two regional bodies – sadc and ecowas. The main argument we present here is that historical patterns of migration are not dissimilar in the two regions. Equally, contemporary migration as well as the factors that give such mobility impetus are in many ways the same in the two regions. However, the manner in which the two regional institutions manage migration and attempt to foster integration while comparable in certain respects also differ in significant ways that demand careful consideration. 6.2

Migration: A Historical Perspective

Our documentary analysis suggests that historical patterns of migration and mobility within the Southern African region are strikingly similar. Adepoju (2009:20) states that migration in West Africa prior to colonisation was driven by the search for security and lands for settlement and farming. In Southern Africa migration was also motivated by a combination of factors, and these included the search for security. Particularly noteworthy is the expansion of the Zulu Kingdom under the leadership of Shaka Zulu, the rush for ivory and trade commodities in Mozambique as well as environmental factors. Collectively, these factors motivated some of the pre-colonial states to migrate. What is significant from the two regions is that historically, there was in essence ‘a borderless system’ whereby individuals and communities could migrate without the hindrance of borders. The empirical material presented in earlier chapters drawn from the two regions indicates that both immigrants and nationals invoke the idea of a shared African identity which stems as much from the borderless system that was in existence during the pre-colonial era as the shared languages and cultures. Such a historical understanding informs debates on regional integration and migration on the continent. Hamdy (2011) examines regional integration in © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_007

148

chapter 6

Africa in the context of the conditions and challenges of bridging the divides between sub-Saharan and North Africa. With special attention to countries such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, perceived as non-African generally, the historical and political features of these countries still ensure their connectedness to the continent. However, our intended project has a different focus which is to look at regional integration in ecowas and sadc region. Notwithstanding, the book is important to the extent that it raises the pertinent issue of identity formation in Africa. Our conceptualisation of African identity as a necessary condition for development on the continent merit further interrogation in the context of the debates around who is an African. While Pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah had a continental and diasporic focus to the construction of African identity (Nkrumah, 1963), scholars like Prah (2013, 2008) and Chinweizu (2011) conceive only the blacks in Africa as the subject of integration. While the position of the former was based on continentalism, those of the latter was based on race. For instance, Chinweizu (2011) argues that given the havoc that the Arabs have wrecked in Africa in the form of slave trade for centuries, the continued genocide against the blacks in Sudan by the Al-Bashir led Government, the disdain with which the Arabs treat Africans and the closer allegiance that Arab Africans have with their counterparts in the Middle East, they cannot be considered to carry the Pan-African identity that is shared by the blacks. While there are merits in this argument, other scholars have argued that the current day North African countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and to a certain extent, Algeria were originally inhabited by the Berbers and other black Africans. They argue that the Arabisation of North Africa was akin to settler colonialism that happened in countries like South Africa and Kenya – with cultural and religious assimilation through the force of violence to the fore (Ochonu, 2015). Given the complexities of framing a Pan African identity and citizenship, two options remain open for consideration. The first is to follow a constitutional approach to the construction of African identity in which anyone who lives on the continent and identifies with the aspirations and struggles, regardless of race or colour is considered an African. This is equivalent to what the Freedom Charter in South Africa and its eventual post-apartheid Constitution of 1996 adopted (Gumede, 2016) in this regard. While this approach could demonstrate the cosmopolitanism of Africans and the refinement of their thoughts in relation to other races on the continent, the evidence of history under which racism was used as a tool for domination and imperial control and the realities of racial profiling in the arrangement of the global capitalist order, in which the so-called white continue to occupy position of privileges

Sadc And Ecowas: Comparative Perspectives

149

make this approach to be problematic. To elaborate, the ease with which the Europeans were able to penetrate and subdue Africans and other parts of the world was not only because of the development of weapons of destruction such as guns but their proclivity toward the pursuit of power and profit. As scholars like Diop (1999) and Asante (2008) have argued, Africa was the cradle of human civilization with mathematics and other forms of scientific discoveries as proofs. However, these Africans related with the rest of the world on peaceful terms without any intention for imperialism. The value of Ubuntu, which is widely shared across the continent, especially in relations to strangers was responsible for the pacific orientation to life. On the contrary, the other parts of the world, particularly Europe and Arabs appear to interpret the world differently as the realist notions of power, domination and self-interest dictates their relations with Africans and other parts of the world. The second option is to limit the construction of African citizenship to the Blacks irrespective of their locations in the world. As Zeleza (2008) and Falola (2013) argue, there are blacks in virtually all regions of the world such as Europe, Asia, Caribbean, Latin America and even the Artic region, in sizable proportions. Although these Africans migrated under different conditions and at different periods, they remain connected in one form or the other to the motherland. Contrary to the claim by a scholar like Campbell (2006) who argues that many Africans in Diaspora are not motivated to return to the motherland, Falola (2013:12) contends that ‘Diasporic identity can be part of the “condition” of living and surviving in other people’s lands’. The increasing level of identification of many Africans in Diaspora with African traditional religions and the maintenance of dress codes in the host countries further establish the continuity of identity consciousness of Africans. The contention of scholars like Apiah that the forefathers of Africans on the continent were responsible for selling Africans to the Europeans has not been sufficient for keeping many both first and second-generation Africans in the Diaspora from identifying with the homeland. The construction of a Pan-African identity and citizenship, which is one of the focus of this study is particularly compelling in the light of the rising wave of racist and nationalistic politics across the world. 6.3

Migration in Colonial West and Southern Africa

Colonialism severely altered patterns of migration and integration in much of Africa including the regions of interest in this study. In both sadc and ecowas,

150

chapter 6

migration was enforced through the establishment of tax regimes as well as contract and forced labour. In West Africa Adepoju (2009:20) states that: A series of economic and recruitment policies (compulsory recruitment, contract and forced labour legislation and agreements) were implemented to stimulate regional labour migration from Mali, Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) for road networks, plantations and mines on the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Côte d’Ivoire (Adepoju, 2005a). Transportation development also facilitated labour migration by reducing the distance and dangers of journeys that hitherto hampered long distance migrations. These developments led to male-dominated, seasonal and cross-border migration, which subsequently became institutionalized. Furthermore, the building of infrastructure such as roads, railways as well as the development of cities such as Accra, Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Dakar, Lome and Cotonou were instrumental in fostering migration in the sub-region, even though there were still cases of voluntary migration or cases where people departed for personal reasons having nothing to do with labour. Labour migration processes in Southern Africa also followed a similar trajectory. Individuals, mainly young men migrated either voluntarily or through forced labour regimes to mainly South African gold and diamonds mines. Zimbabwe was also a recipient of labour migrants from mainly Malawi and Zambia. In fact, Jensen and Buur (2007) assert that Southern Africa developed one of the most complex labour migration systems with individuals moving from countries such as Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe in search of wage work in South Africa. This complex labour migration system marked the region’s insertion into the global economy. 6.4

Post-colonial Migration

Post-colonial migration in sadc migration was informed by the need to survive. In this context, people fled from civil wars and famine in countries such as Mozambique and Angola to other parts of the sub-region; white settlers left Zimbabwe in 1980 after independence and black Zimbabweans fled for their lives during violence in Southern and Western districts of Zimbabwe (Crush & Tevera, 2002; Solomon, 2003). The need to survive also influenced the departure of freedom fighters from South Africa during apartheid and the exodus of many white South Africans after the advent of democracy in South Africa.

Sadc And Ecowas: Comparative Perspectives

151

In contrast to the situation in the sadc region where people escaped wars and lack of freedom, or to avoid real and potential violence, in the ecowas region, the main cause of migration is the search for wage labour. In fact, economic migration is at the centre of departures. Even though in sadc one also finds economic migrants, the latter had been the main cause of exodus in ecowas. On the legal front, both sadc and ecowas have adopted Protocols aimed at enabling free movement of capital and labour, goods and services and the people within their sub-regions. However, in both sub-regions the implementation of these Protocols is often hindered by nationalistic tendencies based on the need to protect nationals in time of economic crisis or lack of job opportunities. This can be illustrated by the expulsion of thousands of foreigners, mostly Ghanaians from Nigeria in time of economic meltdown (Adepoju, 2009). A similar illustration can be found in sadc where South Africa had been the site of numerous xenophobic attacks where victims are mostly from other sadc countries. This is to say that although in both sadc and ecowas, the adoption of Protocols to secure a real sub-regional regional integration are positive developments, with a good amount of movement across borders, much more should be done to turn them into reality on the ground. This can be observed in detail in an examination of aspects of regional integration in both sub-regions below. As mentioned above, in spite of positive developments to foster integration in both sadc and ecowas, efforts are hindered by the lack of policy framework explicitly promoting regional integration (Adepoju, 2001:47). It is therefore imperative that member states incorporate regional integration into their national strategies to enhance economic growth in the sub-region and region. The other hindrance to regional integration can be found in competitive membership whereby sadc and ecowas member states belong to various sub-regional groups with dissimilar ideologies and objectives. In this regard, member states of ecowas, comesa and sadc belong to more than one subregional organization with different ideologies and objectives. Furthermore, in both sadc and ecowas, the economy in the sub-region is often dominated by one or two countries, South Africa in sadc and Nigeria and Ghana in ecowas. As a result of this imbalance, migrants will flock to these countries only. There is therefore a need to seek ways to foster the entire economy of the entire sub-region through national development plans and other national initiatives. This entails moving beyond mere nationalistic interests for the sake of the entire sub-region and the continent at large, through the enactment of adequate laws and policies. In this regard, member states must avoid the adoption of discriminatory laws and policies that restrain immigrants access to jobs, houses and other services (Gagnon & Khoudour-Casteras, 2012).

152

chapter 6

In a similar vein, both sadc and ecowas must foster productive capacity, diversification of their economy, avoid high dependence on revenue imports which end up hindering their ability to eliminate trade tariffs. In addition, infrastructural capacity should be enhanced while cumbersome regulatory frameworks are set aside. 6.5

The Profile of Migrants in Both Regions

In the sadc region, most Zimbabweans in South Africa are women aged between 30 and 40 years, who left their country on the ground that men have many families/extended families to take care of and that their income/­ remittance will not be enough to sustain all their families. This is in contrast with the number of Mozambican males in Zimbabwe who are generally below 30 years old and in the majority of cases with low levels of education. In contrast, in ecowas, the trend is that migrants are mostly male who travel as result of social pressure that forces them to go away in pursuit of livelihoods. Nevertheless, both in sadc and ecowas, migration can be characterised as mixed encompassing different categories of individuals such as “unskilled and semi-skilled labour migrants, highly-educated professionals and students, as well as nomads, ‘undocumented’ migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons” (Black & King, 2004). The other common point is that most migrants are unemployed in both sadc and ecowas and their migration is often caused by poor economic conditions in the home country which generally compel them to travel in search of better opportunities in the host country. 6.6

Immigrants’ Experience in Both Regions

In general, individuals within the sadc region depart from their home country to seek better economic opportunities in terms of trade/business for Mozambicans in Zimbabwe and trade/business and employment for Zimbabweans in South Africa. In contrast, in ecowas, there is dissimilarity in the cause of migration. Whilst Ghanaians travel to Nigeria for better economic opportunities which also inform migration in sadc, Nigerians migrate to Ghana for peace and security reason being, the Islamic sect Boko Haram has become a security threat, especially in Northern Nigeria. The similarity in both sadc and ecowas is that in spite of the negative experience of xenophobia, migrants are of the view that they are better off than

Sadc And Ecowas: Comparative Perspectives

153

in their home countries. In this respect, while Mozambicans in Zimbabwe are pleased with the high value of the US Dollars used there, Zimbabweans in South Africa are happy with the life standard except in townships such as Alexandra where social economic conditions are difficult. The feeling of accomplishment in migrant communities is also found in Nigeria where Ghanaians claimed they are better off than in Ghana where there are fines imposed on them regularly. As far as sending money back home or remittance is concerned, respondents in ecowas remit home to their respective countries of origin. Ghanaian migrants in Nigeria send money home at different intervals. We found that 4% of them do so weekly, 28% monthly, 44% quarterly and 12% yearly. At the same time, 4% of Nigerian migrants in Ghana send money home weekly, 20% monthly, 16% quarterly and 32% yearly. This information was instrumental in understanding how migrants contribute to the development of their societies and that migration is in itself a device for social protection for many families in the home country. We found similar patterns of remittances in Southern Africa. For instance, Zimbabweans send more money home from South Africa, than Mozambicans do from Zimbabwe. Fifty six percent (56%) of Zimbabweans send money home monthly, 20% quarterly, 12% yearly and 4% weekly. At the same time, 32% of Mozambicans send remittances home monthly, 40% weekly, 20% quarterly and 8% yearly. The fact that most Mozambicans do not send money home could be linked to the fact that the majority of them are men who often travel with families or start families on arrival or some are young and yet to be married. The differences in the frequencies of remittances between Zimbabweans and Mozambicans is a further proof of the die economic situations of the former. It goes without saying that the opportunity which the migrant workers in the resilient sector have to work and send money home helps to alleviate the effects of the harsh economic conditions in the countries of origin. Nigerian migrants in Ghana do send money home more than Ghanaians in Nigeria. Despite the relatively better performance of Nigerian economy in comparison with the Ghanaian economy, it would appear that the sheer population of Nigerians in Ghana account for the larger percentage of money that the latter remit to their country of origin. In the final analysis, in both sub-regions, migration is informed by the need to improve access to economic opportunities and increased incomes, and in general migrants are of the view that there are better off in the host country than back home. Even though they are perceived by some as not important for development, in general they are considered as agents of development for

154

chapter 6

their productivity in the host country and the remittance they send back to the home country. 6.7

Benefits of Regional Integration

In both the sadc and ecowas regions respondents are of the view that regional integration is key for economic growth, political stability and social and cultural exchange. It fosters skills sharing and transfer between migrants and the host countries as already noted by respondents. Furthermore, notwithstanding challenges related to xenophobia in some places, the lack of or insufficient access to services by migrants in host countries, the emerging view is that migration and integration also benefit the host countries in the sense that migrants are economic actors where they live. In addition, regional integration is essential to foster Africa’s strength in international relations (Gumede & Oloruntoba, 2017). In this respect, it will bring Africans together in terms of cooperation and ensure that that the continent is not subdued by external forces. In fact, regional integration will be the important step for the achievement of peace and security on the continent as well as the African unity. This view is shared by sadc and ecowas. 6.8

Regional Economic Communities as Catalysts for Migration and Regional Integration

The Southern African Development Community (sadc) was established in 1992 as a replacement for the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (sadcc). While the latter came into existence in 1980 to serve as the rallying point for members of the frontline state to campaign for the decolonisation of the sub-region, the former was aimed at achieving economic development and maintenance of peace and security among many objectives. The sadc is made up of fifteen countries with divergent and disparate capacity and resources for development. The member countries of sadc include the following: South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Seychelles, Malawi and Tanzania. The understanding that these countries share similar historical experiences and contemporary challenges necessitated the formation of the organisation to serve as a framework for cooperation and as an institutional mechanism for fostering regional integration.

Sadc And Ecowas: Comparative Perspectives

155

Historically, people in the sadc region have interacted together on the basis of mutuality of purpose that is underpinned by similar culture but importantly economic benefits. Various studies have provided empirical evidence to the fact that the emergence of a mining economy in the sub-region facilitated both northward and southward migration over one century ago as people move to the copper belt in Zambia and down to the gold mines in South Africa. Although the bondage of colonial boundaries has created some artificial differences among the people, leading to requirements for visas and other means of identification, informal cross-border movements have continued unhindered among the people (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014). Nevertheless, leaders in the sub-region recognise that the continuity of restrictions to the movement of people has limited the realisation of the huge developmental potentials. Consequently, sadc has been at the forefront of fostering free movement of people. In order to achieve this, a draft protocol was put in place in 1995. The 1995 draft protocol on the free movement of persons in sadc sought free movement for sadc citizens over a 10-year period allowing citizens to establish themselves in another country, free entry and residence was part of the deal. Ten years after, another sadc protocol on facilitation of free movement of people was adopted. Article 5, 2(d) of the Treaty mandates sadc to formulate policies that will ensure free movement of the factors of production in the sub-region. It was geared towards eliminating obstacles to the movement of people in the region and territories of member states. This will allow citizens of member countries to have entry into a territory of the member states for 90 days per year without a visa. The protocol was also to facilitate permanent and temporary residence and establishing oneself and working in the territory of another state party. The protocol emphasizes the need for harmonization of member state’s national laws. The protocol requires 9 signatories for it to come to effect, yet few states have ratified it. Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2016) noted that the degree of economic development similarities have an impact on the ease with which a region can handle cross border mobility. The policies are not the same, since some permit complete free movement while others are geared at specific categories of workers. Nshimbi and Fioramonti further note that in light of the mining boom and demand for external cheap labour, the South African Chamber of mines established an association that institutionalized labour migration in southern Africa. Despite the huge benefits that countries have developed through migration flows, the combination of crisis of identity, narrow nationalism and the appeal of populist politics by politicians have prevented the full ratification of the protocol. For instance, South Africa which has historically benefited from the labour of migrant workers from the sub-region has refused to ratify the

156

chapter 6

protocol. Indeed, while some member countries of sadc support full implementation of the protocol, South Africa has consistently ensured that it is not fully operationalised on the basis that if this happens, the country will be the preferred destination for citizens of the poorer countries who may wish to seek greener pastures in the country. However, as we argued above, this is merely a misplaced fear. While migration has been part of human history from time immemorial, it is not true that everybody wants to move. Notwithstanding the fears and the political factors that have hindered the full implementation of the protocol of facilitation of free movement of people, the socio-economic benefits that are tied to free movement of people makes it mandatory for sadc continue to work with the governments of the member states as well as the civil society organisations to ensure that all members ratify the protocol. As we demonstrate in the next section, the sadc experience with free movement of people contrast with ecowas where a common passport has been adopted with citizens having the latitude to move across the member countries without necessarily requiring a visa to be issued. Interestingly, the ecowas experience has debunked the myth that if people are allowed to move freely, everybody will want to move from poorer countries to richer countries. Although countries like Nigeria and Ghana are economically better off than their neighbours such as Niger, Chad or Mauritania, not all the citizens from these poorer countries have migrated to the relatively better countries. Rather, what they have done has been to move goods and services across borders to sell and return to their countries. This pattern of movement is a key finding of this study both in Southern and West Africa. In other words, despite the official restrictions in sadc region, people still move around to sell their wares and return to their countries. As we have noted above, there is no evidence that people in the resilient economy want to settle permanently in their host countries. Indeed, some of the people who are engaged in the resilient economic activities such as hairdressing, repairs or domestic work would probably prefer to engage in better cross border economic activities if the restriction in movement was removed. Turning to the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas), it should be noted that it was formed in 1975 to promote economic cooperation and development in the sub-region. It is currently made up of fifteen-member countries. The regional grouping has its headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria and is currently comprised of fifteen-member states and these are Benin, ­Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde joined ecowas in 1976 whilst Mauritania withdrew from the grouping in 2000 to ­become part of the Arab Maghreb Union. The functioning organ of the

Sadc And Ecowas: Comparative Perspectives

157

­ ommission and its agencies include the following: The Authority of Heads C of State and Government, the Council of Ministers; the Community Parliament; the Economic and Social Council; the Community Court of Justice; the ecowas Commission; the ecowas Bank for Investment and Development (ebid); the West African Health Organization and the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (giaba). These institutions execute their mandate through a number of specialized agencies such as West African Monetary Agency (wama), The Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food (raaf), the ecowas Regional Electricity Regulatory Authority (erera), the ecowas Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ecreee), The West African Power Pool (wapp), the ecowas brown card and ecowas Gender Development Centre (egdc). The formation of ecowas came on the heels of the recognition of the imperative of regional approach to development in Africa. The formation of ecowas was preceded by various meetings which were attended by leaders from the newly independent countries in the sub-region. Despite the personal ego of the leaders, the colonially imposed boundaries and differences between Anglophone and Francophone countries, many of the leaders made spirited efforts to forge an integrative agenda in the years after independence. The aims of the community are to foster economic cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the growth and development of the African continent. Other objectives of the community include a gradual removal of obstacles to the movement of factors of production, harmonisation of economic policies, facilitation of investment, boosting of industrialization and, establishment of a bridging fund to meet the needs of less developed members, free movement of people, a common population policy and so on. The Treaty of Lagos, which laid the basis for the establishment of ecowas in 1975 was largely informed by the need for economic cooperation among the member states. However, this Treaty was revised in 1993 to accommodate issues of political concerns such as promotion of democracy and good governance as well as maintenance of peace and security (Oloruntoba, 2016c). Before the bifurcation of Africa into small and disparate enclaves, the people in the region shared similar cultures, values and identities. However, colonialists forcefully separated former nations into different countries, with some of them speaking different languages such as French and English (Ki-Zerbo, 2005). The founders of ecowas recognised that this artificial division undermined potentials for socio-economic ­development of the sub-region. This explains why as far back

158

chapter 6

as 1979, the ecowas Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment was established. Article 27 of the ecowas Treaty makes provisions for freedom of movement and residence. Since the ratification of this Protocol, the ecowas Commission has followed up to ensure that the terms of the article is implemented. Notwithstanding the noble intention that informed the drafting of the Protocol, the economic challenges that have confronted many African countries have led to situations in which mass deportation of Africans have occurred, including in Nigeria and Ghana. ecowas has been lauded for its efforts to create a ‘borderless’ sub-region through the initiatives meant to promote free movement of people. Adepoju who describes ecowas as a pacesetter among regional economic communities in Africa points to initiatives such as the ecowas passport, the ecowas Brown card, and the ecowas travel certificate which were all attained with minimal or little institutional human and material resources (Adepoju, 2009:18). The long-term goal of ecowas is to enable free movement of persons without the need for the acquisition of visas. Towards the attainment of this goal the ecowas Summit of March 2000 resolved to eliminate rigid border formalities and to grant ecowas citizens 90-day period of stay at the point of entry. This took effect in April 2000. The Summit also resolved that ecowas travel certificates be issued and used whilst a single ecowas passport as well as a single Schengen type visa were introduced. The ecowas passport was particularly perceived as an affirmation of regional unity (Adepoju, 2009). Adepoju (2009) explores migration and regional integration within the ecowas region. He argues that some of the initiatives adopted or encouraged by the regional grouping have had varying degrees of success. Most of the ­e cowas member states do not charge citizens for a visa-free stay of up to 90 days. An ecowas Brown Card Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme was developed in 1982 to provide coverage for vehicles traveling between participating member states. The ecowas Travel Certificate introduced in 1985 is available in seven countries. It is cheaper to produce and acquire compared to the national passports. During an interview with the Director of Migration and Free Movement at the ecowas Secretariat in Abuja, he was very optimistic that the Commission will succeed in getting all member countries to respect and implement the Protocols of Free Movement of People. In his words “we have succeeded in removing barriers to travel through the adoption of Common ecowas Passport and we are definitely going to succeed in ensuring that African citizens have the right to live and establish in any part of the sub-region.” Despite such

Sadc And Ecowas: Comparative Perspectives

159

a­ ssurance, the experiences of cross border traders reveal that security agents at the borders always subject them to different kinds of harassments. Such harassments are always done with a view to extorting money from the traders. In this regard, the women are the worst affected. It would appear that the enthusiasm of the ecowas Commission in promoting free movement of people and the right of residence and establishment have not been matched with corresponding acceptance by the political elite. In this respect there are some similarities in the experiences of the regional economic communities in Southern Africa and West Africa. While the rec s are optimistic and indeed working towards the realisation of a more effective regime of migration across social divides, the political elite has always been lukewarm and comfortable with paying lip service to fostering regional integration. Working within the frame of neoliberalism of seeking for the removal of tariffs from the member countries as a basis for the promotion of free trade areas, these leaders have neglected the resilient and the informal economy sectors. Yet, within the context of the structural composition of the economies in Africa, in which lack of infrastructures and the hash global economic environment have led to suboptimal outcomes, removal of barriers to movement of persons do have great possibility of unleashing economic potentials of the continent. Beyond economy though is the possibility of deeper levels of integration through better understanding of one another, appreciation of the cultures of others and a higher level of reconstruction of the identity of Africans. These constellation of interactions and self-knowing will further help to create an African citizenship which will have greater voice in global affairs. 6.9

Fostering Regional Integration

Both sadc and ecowas respondents called for a greater political will towards fostering regional integration. They are of the view that besides official rhetoric, there is a need for a strong political will to turn regional integration into reality. One way of doing this will be to remove bureaucracy in order to improve conditions to do business across borders. In this respect, it is essential to adopt a common law across the sub-region. Amongst other means, it would be great to enable populations to travel without passports within the sub-regions and eventually across the continent to secure its unity and development. Simplifying access to documentation which would legalize the trades will be highlighted instrumental. In contrast to ecowas respondents who put a strong emphasis on the role  of governments in the sub-regional and of inter-regional organisations

160

chapter 6

(ecowas), in sadc respondents stressed the need for integration from below, through the communities with the use of local language for example as essential. In this regard, sadc immigrants are of the view that understanding the local language eases the integration process in the host communities. They also point out that by law migrants have to have access to social services. It is important to educate service providers on the need of and rights of migrants that should also be catered for, as some officers display a huge amount of hostility towards migrants. Another insight from ecowas was a call to forget tribal and religious differences to foster peaceful co-existence and realise regional integration. This is an important suggestion that captures well the ecowas context in which Boko Haram, that describes itself as a Muslim organisation, operates. In addition, this can provide further lessons in integration to other regions in Africa that are confronted with the challenge of fostering greater degree of collaborations. This will be sound in many African communities where tribalism is a hindrance to national, sub-regional and even regional unity. Another area of comparison between Southern Africa and West Africa in the context of this study is that while Zimbabweans in South Africa have experienced xenophobic attacks, the same cannot be said of Ghanaians in Nigeria and vice versa. Notwithstanding, Nigeria and Ghana have undertaken retaliatory massive deportation of the citizens of the two countries in the late 1960s and early 1980s. Some Nigerians who work in the resilient sector also complain of arbitrary arrest, detention and even incarceration by Police officers in Ghana. On the contrary, Ghanaians in Nigeria have not reported any such challenges. It is instructive that Zimbabweans in South Africa also narrated their experiences of harassment by the Police in South Africa. Regardless of the unfortunate implications of such Police harassment and brutality against the citizens of other African countries, it is comforting that the citizens generally prefer to relate with one another. The cases of xenophobic attacks in South Africa have both political and criminal undertones. At the political level, the insinuations by the media and certain section of the political class that foreigners are parts of the causes of unemployment in the country generally do trigger resentment against the perceived enemies. As we argued in the preceding section, such appeal to nationalistic sentiments and posturing are usually done to escape the burden of failure to provide the required social services to the people. The criminal dimension of this challenge manifests in the South African townships where criminals attack foreign shops to steal goods and wares. However, the responses of the political leadership and the broad civil society to the xenophobic attacks of 2015 have provided some

Sadc And Ecowas: Comparative Perspectives

161

form of relief to foreigners living in the country that the government is out to protect them. Notwithstanding, the massive deportation of African migrants in the wake of the unfortunate violence leaves much to be desired. In order to prevent future attacks, the government must do well to increase economic opportunities for the citizens through massive investment in education, jobs and social infrastructures. Besides, it will be very important to have South Africans travel more to other African countries with a view to having more exposure to the cultures of other African countries. One of the challenges that we encountered in the course of this research was that we could not find any South African who works in the resilient economy in Zimbabwe. While one may explain this away to mean that the hash economic condition in Zimbabwe does not provide any incentive for South Africans to operate in the resilient economy of that country, the fact that other African nationals such as Mozambicans, Nigerians, Somalian and so on are found in Zimbabwe invalidates such arguments. Indeed, the high opportunity that exists in cross border trade between South Africa and Zimbabwe could help to mitigate the high rate of youth unemployment in South Africa, if exploited. As we mentioned above, the government and the civil society organisations that work on creating economic opportunities in South Africa should facilitate greater level of dialogue and establish a forum through which unemployed South Africans who are interested in retail trade that are generally under the control of migrant workers to could learn the such trade. It is paradoxical that the blacks have always been the victims of xenophobia in South Africa. Although the usual excuse has always been that foreigners are taking the jobs of the locals, the reality that the whites control the commanding heights of the economy in the country has not led to attacks either on them or on their investments. While we are not advocating such occurrence, the attacks against fellow Africans is a manifestation of the identity crisis that black South Africans are faced with. This crisis of identity has been fuelled by centuries of distorted history and the modern equivalent of the rhetoric of South African exceptionalism. The paradox also reinforces our argument of the necessity of constructing a Pan-African identity and citizenship in which the commonality of all Africans is recognised and mutually shared. Beyond South Africa, the various inter-tribal and ethnic conflicts that have bedevilled the continent since independence will be minimised if not completely eradicated as soon as the crisis of identity is settled. This will not come easy as it requires investment in Pan African education and inculcation of indigenous knowledge systems on the citizens from the kindergarten stage to the university level.

162

chapter 6

6.10 Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to compare migrations in both sadc and ecowas. Evidently, there is significant mobility between Nigeria and Ghana and most of the migration is male dominated while for Southern Africa migration is female dominated especially in South Africa where most migrants from Zimbabwe are females. In the context of ecowas, participants perceive migration as beneficial for the sustenance and survival of their households and communities. There are also other benefits that emanate from migration policies that are not only economic in nature but are social such as the promotion of cultural understanding. Migration processes are, however, often hindered by poor integration policies at a sub-regional level. In both sub-regions, one of the biggest factors hindering regional integration processes is the dominance of national interests at the expense of regional agendas. The lack of decisive political will is also instrumental in frustrating regional integration agenda in both sadc and ecowas. In both sub-regions, women (and men) are also championing the process of regional integration through the intersection of migration and cross border trade. There are several challenges which they face but as a result of their resilience, they continue to march towards integrating the sub-regions. In the sadc region however, emphasis is put on regional integration from below through integration of local communities whereas in ecowas it is essential to start from the top through intergovernmental institutions and ensure that it cascades down to the masses.

Chapter 7

Resilient Economy, Migration and Regional Integration 7.1 Introduction Resilience is an all-encompassing concept, centered “on the ability not only to resist and recover from adverse shocks, but also to ‘bounce back’ stronger than before, and to learn from the experience” (oecd, 2014; Michie & Tyler, 2010; Kathryn et al., 2010). In other words, the concept is grounded on the capacity of a specific to adapt to economic challenges. (Lester & Nguyen, 2013:7). Therefore, resilience is multidimensional, including a range of interconnected factors and conditions. So, discussing resilient economy and migration in sadc and ecowas entails addressing the well-being of cross-border migrants seeking better livelihood opportunities in the regions under study. It is in this context that we considered it imperative to examine the occupational diversity of immigrants and resilience in sadc and ecowas. In addition, patterns of immigrants’ economic integration in sadc and ecowas, and attempt to explain which factors or sets of factors are associated with immigrant economic integration and should also be explored. Our focus was on migrants’ access to financial, social (including safety, satisfaction with public services and social connections), and physical well-being and access to healthcare and career well-being (including unemployment and underemployment) (iom, 2013). In this perspective, the study examines legal and policy frameworks for the protection of migrants in the sub-regions and then proceeds to look if they are implemented. Core issues revolve around factors that impact on migrants’ well-being. In addition, attention was paid to remittances sent home by migrants. This entails an interrogation of the role of remittance in development at home and in the host country. An understanding of this phenomenon sheds light on the impact of the resilient economy and migration at home and in the host country. 7.2

Socio-financial Well-being of Migrants in sadc

Resilient economies undoubtedly play an important role in ensuring that migrants and their families survive the harsh economic realities of © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_008

164

chapter 7

c­ ontemporary Africa. As we conclude, we briefly looked at different experiences of ­Zimbabwean informal business owners working in South Africa and how South A ­ frican policy and legal institutions affected their businesses and livelihoods at large. We further analysed resilient economies (informal businesses) of Mozambique migrants in Zimbabwe by reporting on the migration and regional integration nexus as observed in Zimbabwe versus that of South Africa. From the outset, it is important to underscore the point that the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa and migration of Mozambique nationals to Zimbabwe is mainly precipitated by economic hardships and woes of the home countries of migrants. Furthermore, another factor which somewhat facilitated the migration process and transition or made circumstances slightly bearable is the cultural similarity of Africans, especially along the border areas of the countries in question. Language, which is a huge component of culture, made migrants in their respective host countries feel more comfortable doing business in a foreign country, because they reported that it was not difficult learning local languages and this in turn would often should them from being treated as aliens in host countries. In the context of Zimbabwean informal traders in South Africa, there were mixed experiences from respondents about how they felt immigration policies affected their businesses and how this in turn affected their livelihoods and wellbeing. A modest number (36%) of Zimbabwean informal traders reported that they were partially satisfied with their living condition in South Africa when asked how they would characterise their living conditions. Thirty-two percent (32%) were not satisfied and another 32% reported that they were generally satisfied with the living condition in the host country. Figure 7.1 provides a visual depiction and spread of the livelihood of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa.

Not satisfied

32%

36%

Partially satisfied

Satisfied

32% 31%

33%

35%

37%

Figure 7.1 Livelihoods of Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa

Resilient Economy, Migration and Regional Integration

165

One of the respondents, when asked if they are better off in the host country or they were better off in their home country, replied that: I am better off in South Africa even though I am doing something that can be considered as menial, I have managed to buy a home in Zimbabwe, and support myself and family meaningfully. Another Zimbabwean migrant shared the same sentiment even though he still longed to go back home one day due to the harsh working conditions and sometimes the ill treatment he faces from locals and the victimisation from law enforcement. He replied thus: Yes it’s better here. That side there are no jobs. In Zimbabwe with R100 you don’t eat, here with that amount you will be ok. If Zimbabwe had jobs, I would stay there and have no reason to be in South Africa. These responses and the table above, show the type of labour/employment migration which forces immigrants to endure severe working conditions and even compel them to risk their lives crossing the border post without necessary paperwork, because the living conditions at home have become unbearable. Regional integration was almost unanimously supported by Zimbabwean small business owners because most of them recognised the significance of shared prosperity and peace that can be fostered by more inter-relations and intra-trade amongst Africans especially in the sadc region. Contrary to what many assume, especially in academia and among policy makers, the responses we receive when asking about benefits of regional integration from informal traders, were captivating and awe-inspiring. And one of the key lessons we got from conducting the fieldwork was that if only policymakers and other prominent decision makers would genuinely take time from their air-conditioned offices, and descend to the masses, they would design better immigration laws and regulations that would foster rather than impede regional integration. Some of the responses on the issue of regional integration and its interplay with resilient economies were the following: It’s like where I used to rent, there were many people from different African countries. There was no xenophobia there. We even taught one lady how to do hair. We share knowledge there and there was no jealousy. Instead of migration being frowned upon in stronger economies like South Africa, it could rather be used for skills transfer from migrants that come with great business acumen and other professional skills, so that ordinary South

166

chapter 7

Africans in Townships could partner with their fellow Africans in creating new businesses and enterprises. This would go a long way in ensuring that the apartheid legacy of Bantu Education and slave-master relationship between blacks and whites, could be uprooted. Another Zimbabwean informal trader gave this nuanced and well-thought response when asked about benefits of Africans living together wherever they wanted in the African continent: Yes there are. The host government can benefit from taxes. As migrants, we can also take low paying jobs. This may deprive locals of these low paying jobs but individually it is helpful. In Zimbabwe, Mozambique informal traders were plenty and their experience in terms of immigration policies and regulations were almost similar to the experience of Zimbabweans in South Africa, especially pertaining to their victimisation by the police and some locals. For instance, in Mbare market in Harare, where we conducted most of our interviews, a handful of Mozambique informal traders complained that they were often unfairly treated by police for not having the right documents and by locals who stole their merchandise, knowing that they had nowhere to take their grievances. In case of Mozambique informal traders in Zimbabwe, there seemed to be more socio-cultural relations between migrants and locals, because of the strong historical relationships of these two countries and because there are tribes in Mozambique that speak Shona (Zimbabwean widely spoken language), so it was a lot easier for them to be integrated into the communities in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, many of our interviewees were second generation migrants in Zimbabwe as their parents had migrated there many years ago and our respondents were born in Zimbabwe, and had only been to their host country only a few times in their lives. Some of the responses we elicited after asking our interviewees to describe the general experiences in Zimbabwe, from a social, economic, cultural perspective, were quite intriguing: In Zimbabwe everything is good, but we came to Zimbabwe, my home country, when we were still young. We know everything culturally etc., everything. Our own country is poor, we need a better life, and life here is better than Mozambique. This was a response from a young Mozambique man under 30 years of age, who like many of his peers, have been living in Zimbabwe for many years and are now socialised and have been acculturated as Zimbabweans, even though they do not have Zimbabwean citizenship documentation.

Resilient Economy, Migration and Regional Integration

167

By and large, Mozambique migrants who have small business in Zimbabwe gave a positive response about their livelihood and relationship with the local. As with any other thing, there is always an exception to the norm. One respondent gave a rather gloomy experience of being a migrant in Zimbabwe, he responded in the following manner; ‘A lot of racism here, these local guys whey they discover you are not a citizen here. If you need help, like even when you say I need a toilet they will ask you for money, I have learnt a lot from this country. I can even speak 3 of their languages, so I cannot be bullied.’ Figure 7.2 below shows the livelihood sentiment of Mozambique nationals doing business in Zimbabwe.

16%

Not satisfied

16%

Partially satisfied

68%

Satisfied 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Figure 7.2 Livelihoods of Mozambican immigrants in Zimbabwe

Figure 7.2 above shows that a significant number (68%) of Mozambique migrants in the resilient Zimbabwean economy, are satisfied with their living conditions in the host country. Only 16% of them reported that they were not happy with their living conditions in the host country. This reveals a major difference between migrants in South Africa versus those in Zimbabwe. In the former, only 36% were happy with their livelihood in the host country, whereas in the latter, a much larger proportion (68%) of them were happy with their livelihoods in the host country. Perhaps one of the reasons for this huge livelihood discrepancy in the two host countries (South Africa and Zimbabwe), could be the fact that Zimbabwe underwent one of the most severe economic crises in the sadc region in recent years, following the land redistribution and reclamation campaign by the government in 2002. Therefore, because there was not much economic activity in Zimbabwe during this crisis, Mozambican migrants may have felt that there was more space to do business. Coupled with this, the strong cultural ties between migrants and locals may have been

168

chapter 7

largely attributed to such a positive experience and livelihood of migrants in Zimbabwe, unlike experiences of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. 7.3

Remittances in Fostering Regional Integration

Sending remittances back home by migrants has been one of the ways that rural communities and families have survived for centuries in Africa. This trend continues even in modern times especially in countries where their internal economic machinery is facing challenges, and Zimbabwe, like many other African countries is a classical case in point. Millions of Zimbabweans have been migrating to South Africa in an effort to avoid tough economic situations in their home country. Therefore, in many corners of South Africa, especially in big metropolitan cities like Johannesburg and Pretoria, Zimbabweans are easily found in the resilient economies of this economic hubs trying to make a living for themselves and for those they left behind in their host country. Adepoju (1995:100) also reiterates the significance of remittances in the migration process, by arguing that “the sending of remittances by migrants is one of the strongest and most pervasive phenomenon on Africa’s migration system. It is also one that demonstrates, perhaps in the most profound manner, the characteristic feature of African migration is fundamentally a family and not an individual activity.” Adepoju (1995:101) further adds that “several surveys focusing on the remittance mechanism point to the fact that the migrants often remit up to 60 per cent of their earnings, regularly home through formal and informal channels.” Our findings also indicate that a large number (60%) of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa also remit quite often on a

12%

4% Weekly

20%

Monthly 56%

Figure 7.3 Patterns of remittances

Quarterly Yearly

Resilient Economy, Migration and Regional Integration

169

monthly basis/weekly periods. Fifty-six percent (56%) remit monthly and 4% remit weekly. This shows the importance of migration and resilient economies for those left at home because without these remittances, many families would lead very difficult lives. 7.4

Migration by Gender

Migration was for a long time a gendered affair for many centuries in Africa. It is only in recent history that more literature has surfaced looking female migration because males used to dominate the migration process, due to a number of factors like the patriarchal system and gender stereotypes (Pittin, 1984). Some literature found that women dominate short distance intra-rural migrations while man dominate migrations internationally and locally from rural areas to urban areas (Adepoju, 1995). Our findings indicate that in South Africa, slightly more Zimbabwean women were working in the resilient economy. The numbers calculated were 64% women, and 36% men. In Zimbabwe, this picture was inverted, because there were only 8% Mozambican females working in the resilient economy, while a staggering 92% of migrant workers were males. It seems that more women are joining their male counterparts in labour migration.

Chapter 8

Conclusion This study examined how migration affects regional integration, especially in the context of resilient economy. Its significance lies in going beyond the ­official narratives and discourses on regional integration and migration to investigating how the subaltern classes are either contributing to or obstructing regional integration in the two regions that we compared. The study was inspired by the need to bring into proper perspective the inextricable link between migration and regional integration, especially in the context of the resilient economy in Africa, using ecowas and sadc as our points of departure. As we noted in chapter one, the dominant existing literature on migration and regional integration is filled with what Zeleza (2003:423) calls “false comparisons with development elsewhere, especially in Europe.” As Iheduru (2012) also opines, vast literature and theories on regional integration exclude the regionalisation processes in Africa as if nothing of such is taking place on the continent. In cases where efforts have been made to study regionalism, the focus has always been on formal integration in which concern for the creation of market access for corporations is the key objective (Draper, 2013; Collier & Venables, 2008). The evolving transnational flows, which cross border traders and migrants in the resilient economy foster have not been sufficiently studied empirically. Contrary to the dominant narrative that opens borders will rather compound the economic and security challenges of African countries. The study has found that African people prefer a borderless continent in which freedom of movement of people is guaranteed. This study interrogates and challenges the dominant literature on migration and regional integration in Africa. Additionally, the study investigated how the forces of neoliberal globalisation have forced more people to move, how the people in the resilient economy cope with the very strict migration policies in the host countries. In the context of the two regional economic communities, we examine the differences in the rate of integration in ecowas and sadc. Contrary to the dominant narrative on regional integration, which is focused on state to state collaborations, institutionalisation of rules, removal of barriers to trade among others, the study shows that people to people integration is a distinct possibility in Africa. We found that despite the difficulties that migrants from other parts of Africa encounter in their host countries, they fare better economically through their involvement in the resilient economy. Apart © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, and codesria, dakar, senegal, ���� |  doi:10.1163/9789004411227_009

Conclusion

171

from taking care of their immediate needs, migrants also remit money back to their countries of origin, which help to cushion the effects of the harsh economic situations in those locations. Our findings contradict the popular narrative that migrants constitute a security challenge to their host communities. Indeed, as the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa noted in a press release in 2015, criminality has no nationality as criminal elements are found among the citizens of any country as well as among the foreigners. The harsh living conditions of illegal migrants have certainly predisposed them to engage in criminal behaviours. Identifying the causes of such behaviours can go a long way to finding a lasting solution to it. Perhaps, African countries may want to borrow from the United States of America which regularly provides opportunities for illegal migrants to regularise their stay in that country. If African countries adopt such policies many of the illegal migrants who regularly indulge in criminal activities due to lack of access to economic opportunities could have a change of mind. The current policy in which several African countries engage in massive deportation of citizens from other African countries do have serious political consequences of both counter-reactionary actions of retaliation and strained relationships. The study also found out that the operators in the resilient economy do make meaningful contributions to their host communities. Such contributions can include taking up menial jobs that the locals may not be predisposed to do, bringing skills that are not available locally and helping locals to learn such skills. In this respect, two classic examples, which include the operation of spaza shops and hairdressing salons were used in the case of Southern Africa. Given the expertise of migrants from East Africa in the operations of Spaza shops, they provide alternative to the malls in terms of access to cheap commodities and household items. Although this category of migrant workers has been at the receiving end of xenophobic attacks, especially in South Africa, we argue that this ought not to have happened. What is needed is appropriate government policies, which can help in ensuring that interested locals learn the same trade from the migrants. In the same vein, hairdressers who came from West Africa to South Africa appears to have some unique expertise in making various styles of hairdo, which are generally appreciated by local men and women. Apart from the economic contributions that such hairdressers bring to the country, they help to foster diffusion of culture and cross-national learning. In the West African sub-region, migrants from Ghana also bring unique skills to Nigeria in terms of hairdo (Ghana weaves or braids), shoe repairs and other economic activities. The same thing can be said of Nigerians who live and work in the resilient economic sector in Ghana. We also found that many operators in the resilient economy do not reside permanently in the countries

172

chapter 8

where they do business. Rather, they cross borders at great costs to buy and items and return to sell items that may not be available in their countries of origin. The main trust of our argument then is that rather than criminalising operators in the resilient economy, the governments of the various countries should make deliberate efforts to either allow them to stay or move across the borders without much ado. This point is particularly important when one considers the fact that before the colonial intrusion and the construction of the artificial borders, Africans moved in and out of the different nations without having to pay toll gates or some fees to bribe the border policemen and women. In relations to trade among Africans in pre-colonial times for instance, Zeleza (2003:426) notes that “all the evidence indicates that each of the forms of trade-domestic, regional, and international-grew rapidly in the nineteenth century. Intra-and inter-regional commercial networks expanded, and merchants swelled.” Zeleza also countered the argument that Africa was not a capitalist society before the arrival of the Europeans either through slave trade or direct colonialism. In this respect he argues rather poignantly that: All the characteristics of capitalism, from the private ownership of the means of production, production for the market, the sale of labour power as a commodity, to class struggle, the pursuit of profit, company formation, and the possession of that enigmatic of capitalist qualities, the entrepreneurial spirit, already existed in various forms and combinations in the continent’s leading economies. These economies may not have been, in the Marxian sense, capitalist social formations, but they were not ‘precapitalist’ either. This point is very important in the light of the dominant discourses on regional integration in Africa which tends to emphasise North-South integration as the only possibility for economic agglomeration on the continent. Scholars like Draper (2013), and Collier and Venables (2008) argue that intraAfrica trade can do little to foster economic development on the continent. The missing links in their argument are the huge economic activities that take place in the informal and resilience economies across the continent. The historical narrative provided by Zeleza should serve as a springboard for policy action to revitalise the pre-colonial trade routes, which helped in no small measure to boost socio-economic development, which led to great empires such as Mali, Songhai, and Oyo among others, fostered self-knowing of one another as Africans and increased the scale of interactions among the various peoples of the continent.

Conclusion

173

The current artificial borders and boundaries have continued to hinder higher level of cultural flows, trade relations and collaboration among Africans. The harassment that Zimbabweans who wish to cross to South Africa or the Ghanaians who wish to cross to Nigeria suffer at the borders affect the perception that these Africans have of themselves. It is even more puzzling when one considers the fact that some Zimbabweans for instance speak the same language as the Zulus in South Africa. Yet, the maintenance of artificial borders by post-colonial elites in Africa has ensured that the former is treated as the ‘others’ in South Africa. It has been the case that movement of goods across the borders suffer unnecessary delays due to requirements by customs officers for all manners of documentations by the importers and exporters. The NigeriaSeme borders have over thirty checkpoints manned by custom and immigration officials, whose main motif is extortion and exploitation of cross border traders. These delays lead to huge financial loss that could have contributed to economic development on the continent. The empirical findings above necessitate the construction of new theories to foster a better understanding of the peculiarity of migration and integration in Africa. As we noted in the theory section, the various theories that have been advanced to explain the trajectory of regional integration in Africa have been largely informed by economic imperative of seeking market access. The European origin of such theories further made their application in Africa very tedious. The utility of such theories to the important concept of migration is particularly limited given the fact that issues of transnational identity and citizenship are regarded as inconsequential. It was in the light of the above shortcomings that we advance the theories of Pan-African identity and citizenship for the interpretation of complex issue of migration and regional integration in Africa. Pan-African identity and citizenship flows from Pan Africanism. Pan Africanism provided the rallying point for the liberation of African countries from the yoke of colonialism in the twenty centuries. With its cross-national and cross continental appeal, including African in the Diaspora, Pan Africanism served as the spring board of unity and cooperation for decolonisation. The absence of an overarching Pan-African vision after independence have compounded the woes of the continent. To cite Ki-Zerbo again, he argues rather forcefully that given the structural shortcomings of the nation-state in Africa to drive development, “one wonders whether the artificial nature of the nation-state, a fragile state founded on dismembered peoples, with no civil society, no memory and no goals, is not the source of the collective and schizophrenic existential disarray that is poles apart from the nation as a fundamental principle of cohesion.” He concludes that “in the face of the exploitation of real or artificial ethnic identities for selfish ends, we have to foster a new

174

chapter 8

African, nay, an African neo-personality that espouses the ethnic group and jettisons ethnicism” (Ki-Zerbo, 2005:89). The submission above resonates with the theory of Pan-African identity and citizenship in two ways. Identity is very critical for the deconstruction of the politics of difference that have kept Africans apart for decades. It cannot be denied that predatory local and global elites have used the politics of difference to divide and rule Africans for centuries. As Mamdani (2012, 1996) argues, to gain control of the administrative processes of the colonised regions, the colonialists destroyed existing traditional institutions and created new ones that were beneficial to their interests. Contrary to the consultative processes that defined traditional institutions in pre-colonial times, the colonial enterprise led to traditional authoritarian regimes with the result that today, politics have become unduly autocratic, dictatorial and despotic even when they covered in the garb of democracy. The core of his argument in Define and Rule is that when Britain abandoned its attempt to eradicate differences between conqueror and the conquered and introduced a new idea of governance as the definition and management of difference, lines of political identity were drawn between settler and natives and between natives and tribes. Although a language of pluralism emerged out of these contradictions, this has not been operationalised in a way that can bring social cohesion and nation-building. The foundation of difference that the colonialists laid has been sustained by post independent political elites, who most often lash on the rhetoric of tribalism to score cheap political points and keep the countries divided, thus making it easy for them to perpetuate the pattern of exploitation of the colonialists. In over five decades of ethnic politics in post-independent African countries, it has been tales of woes, which have manifested in terms of wars, incarceration of perceived opponents, misallocation of resources and misapplication of laws to satisfy sectional interests. In the process, majority of citizens have continued to suffer while the elites across ethnic divides continue in their unholy unity of exploitation of the resources of their respective countries. In other words, when it is convenient, the elites play the card of tribalism and ethnicity to secure personal and group advantages but when it is time to engage in the primitive accumulation of national resources, tribal and ethnic differences are suspended. The politics of difference is also played out at the cross-national levels as elite in these countries mobilised their citizens to see other Africans as the others, who constitute a threat to their welfare through taking of jobs and opportunities (Nyamnjoh, 2006). Thus, Pan-African identity and citizenship provides an explanatory framework for not only questioning the politics of difference,

Conclusion

175

whose foundation was laid by the colonialists and sustained by post-colonial elite but inculcation of a new consciousness which goes beyond tribal and national limitations. Overcoming the constraints that tribal identities constitute to regional integration and development on the continent will require a deliberate project of creating and recreating identities beyond the individual, tribal and nationalistic ones to a Pan-African one. Adeniran (2014:57) employs the concept of transitional identity to expatiate on this point. He notes that: In the integration process, there are certain identity formation strategies that individuals may utilise to adapt to a new environment, in the migratory or transitional process … the process of identity integration is essentially seen as an evolutionary process, in which an individual transmutes from the rudimentary position of s refuser, who is not particularly cognizant of a group’s functioning, to the enlightened (emphasis ours), position of a ‘resolver’ who consciously seeks self-emancipation within the frameworks of the group’s interests. Indeed, the entire process of transformation, that is, from a refuser to a drifter, a searcher, a guardian and finally a resolver is indicative of paying the way for replacement of personal identity with social (group) identity. The enlightened position that the author mentioned above can mean different things in the context of identity construction. The most important thought is the understanding that identity on the basis of narrow tribal or national characterisation is limited both in outcome and relevance. Given the history of exploitation and the reality of contemporary peripherilization of Africa in the global scheme of things, an enlightened or a liberated mind is required to embrace the high possibilities that lie in the construction of a Pan-African identity and citizenship. Economic conditions in most of the countries in Africa have forced people into engaging in the resilient economic sector as a coping mechanism. It is a testament to the enduring spirit of African, especially the underclass that they have been able to survive in spite of the harsh economic climate under which the continent has operated over the past decades. As scholars have noted, ­African economies have structural problems that undermine their capacity for facilitating inclusive development. The high growth spurts of 2004–2010 did not significantly translate to inclusive development as the growth were generally oriented towards satisfying the political and business elites as well as the members of the transnational capitalist class (Oloruntoba, 2014; Fioramonti, 2011). The Gross Domestic Product as a means of measuring economic performance has been particularly problematic as it does not capture the resilient

176

chapter 8

and the informal economy. In his seminal study of the Gross Domestic Product, Fioramonti (2013) describes it as a Gross Domestic Problem, whose reverent is the preservation of elite interests and the power of the global hegemons. Given the contradictions that are inherent in the organisation of the formal economy in Africa, especially in relations to its peripheral position in the global capitalist system as well as its limitation to accommodate the underclass and the unskilled, it becomes imperative to harness the latent potential in the resilient economy. As we have noted in the preceding parts of the study, movement of African people from one part of the continent to the others are historical realities, which were obstructed or reconstructed through colonial imperial designs. Despite the maintenance of colonial structures, legal systems and terminologies on migration by post-colonial African elite (Nyamnjoh, 2006) Africans have continued to migrate in search of better opportunities. Consequently, in the context of Pan African identity and citizenship which we have advanced in this study, this trend should be sustained. Recognition of A ­ frican citizenship will necessary lead to the dismissal of the colonial mentality of ‘we’ and ‘they’ in the language of inter-African relations. In other words, a sense of common citizenship will ensure that Africans enjoy or suffer together. The historical fact of joining forces together to fight against colonialism provides justification for this assertion. The importance of informal cross border trade (icbt) has been emphasised in this study as it constitutes a high percentage of the many economies on the continent and accounts for about 40% of intra-Africa trade and 70% of trade in some countries (Nshimbi, 2016). The gender dimension of icbt makes it even more relevant to the search for sustainable solutions to the problems of poverty and inequality in Africa. As this study has shown, many women are engaged in the resilient economy across the borders. In order to harness the huge potentials that are available in this sector, it is important for the government to do the following. Firstly, African governments must go beyond the current criminalisation of the icbts by urgently engaging the operators, which could lead to the formalisation of their operations. In Lagos State Nigeria, the government has showed its tax base through engagement with the operators in the informal sector. According to Nshimbi (2016), formalisation can help the women who are involved in informal trade across the borders overcome some of the challenges that are faced with such as sexual abuse, intimidation and harassment by law enforcement agents. He also notes that formalisation will require appropriate laws and legislation on the number of goods to be covered. Despite the new law in Zimbabwe which led to the protests of icbts at the Beitbridge border between South Africa and Zimbabwe in July 2016, Zimbabwe and Zambia already have

Conclusion

177

agreements on the nature of goods that can be imported and exported by the icbts. Other countries in Africa should follow this laudable example. Secondly, there is a need for regional approach to addressing the challenges that operators in this sector are faced with. As we mentioned in the earlier part of this study, a regional approach is necessary as a push factor to force the states, most of whom are unwilling to implement agreed protocols and treaties. Thirdly, the governments or the regional economic organisations should assist in removing or reducing the number of documents that icbts are expected to complete. As many of them are usually illiterate, efforts should also be made to train them so that they will be able to understand the documents. Lastly, a regional social protection programme in form of pension and social security should be put in place to safeguard the future of these traders and migrants. The absence of formal social protection programmes exposes migrant workers to different forms of vulnerabilities. Given that they spend their working lives in the host countries, returning to their countries of origin after retirement without any form of social protection reproduces poverty. The intervention of the Southern African Trust in addressing some of these challenges is very illustrative and significant. For the past three years, the organisation has been at the forefront of tracing the families of dead or living miners who migrated from neighbouring countries to South Africa to work. The organisation found that even though the mining companies deducted pension money from the miners, they were never paid. The money is kept in various financial institutions and it runs to billions of Rands (Southern African Trust, 2016). While this is a commendable effort, the differences in the economic composition of West Africa and the informal nature of the economic activities of migrants may not make the type of intervention that Southern African Trust to link the families of miners to the relevant financial institution in South Africa for possible settlement. Notwithstanding, the ongoing advocacy for establish a regional protection plan is worthwhile and useful for both people who work in the formal and informal sectors.

Bibliography Adebajo, A. (2010). The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War. Kwazulu-Natal: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press. Adedeji, A. (1970). Prospects for Regional Economic Cooperation in West Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 8: 213–31. Adedeji, A. (2012). The Travails of Regional Integration in Africa. In: A. Adebajo and K. Whiteman (eds), The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa, 83–104. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Adedokun, A.S. and Ogun, O.I. (2013). Informal Sector, Market Access and Economic Integration in West Africa Sub-Region. Online: http://www.afdb.org/en/aec-2013/­ papers/paper/informal-sector-market-access-and-economic-integration-in-westafrica-sub-region-1131/, [Accessed on 15 January 2015]. Adeniran, A.I. (2012). Regional Integration in the ECOWAS Region: Challenges and Opportunities. Backgrounder No. 19. Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation. Adeniran, A.I. (2014). Migration and Regional Integration in West Africa: A Borderless ECOWAS. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Adepoju, A. (1984). Migration and female employment in Southwest Nigeria. African Urban Notes, 18: 59–75. Adepoju, A. (2001). Regional Organizations and Intra-Regional Migration in Sub-­ Saharan Africa: Challenges and Prospects. International Migration, 39(6): 43–60. Adepoju, A. (2002). Fostering Free Movement of Persons in West Africa: Achievements, Constraints, and Prospects for Intraregional Migration. International Migration, 40(2): 3–28. Adepoju, A. (2005a). Patterns of migration in West Africa. In: At Home in the World? International Migration and Development in Contemporary Ghana, 24–54. Adepoju, A. (2005b). Migration in West Africa. Paper commissioned by the Global Commission on International Migration. Adepoju, A. (2007). Creating a borderless West Africa: constraints and prospects for intra-regional migration. In: A. Pécoud and P. de Guchteneire (eds), Migration without Borders: essays on the free movement of people, 161–174. New York: UNESCO Publishing / Berghahn Books. Adepoju, A. (2008). Migration in sub-Saharan Africa, Current African Issues 37, Nordic Africa Institute. Adepoju, A., Van Naerssen, T. and Zomers, A. (eds) (2008). International Migration and National Development in sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin. Leiden: Brill.

180

Bibliography

Adepoju, A. (2009). Migration Management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects. In: M. Trémolières (ed.), Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives, 17–47. Paris: OECD Publishing. Adepoju, A. (2012). Child Migration in Africa. Population Studies, 66(3): 355–356. Adetula, V. (2009). ECOWAS and the Challenge of Integration in West Africa. In: J. Ogwu and W. Alli (eds), ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration, 23–47. Lagos: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs. AfDB and World Bank (2011). Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills and Investment. Washington, DC: World Bank. AfDB, oecd, undp (2014). African Economic Outlook, Trade policies and regional integration in Africa. Online: www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook, [Accessed on 4 January 2016]. Afolayan, A.A. (1988). Immigration and expulsion of ECOWAS aliens in Nigeria. International Migration Review, 22(1): 4–27. African Development Bank (2013). Recognizing Africa’s Informal Sector. Tunisia: AfDB. African Development Bank (2015). Regional Integration in Africa. Tunisia: AfDB. African Union (2015). Agenda 2063. Addis Ababa: African Union. Ajulu, R. (2010). Introduction: A region in transition: towards a new integration agenda in East Africa. In: R. Ajulu (ed.), A region in transition: towards a new integration agenda in East Africa. Midrand: Trust Africa and Institute for Global Dialogue. Ake, C. (1981). A Political Economy of Africa. Harlow: Longman. Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Alden, C. and Soko, M. (2005). South Africa’s economic relations with Africa: Hegemony and its Discontents. Journal of Modern African studies, 43(3): 367–392. Anarfi, J., Kwankye, S., Ababio, O.M. and Tiemoko, R. (2003). Migration from and to Ghana: A background paper. Brighton: drc on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso. Arango, J. (2004). Theories of International Migration. In: D. Joly (ed.), International Migration and the New Millennium, 15–36. Aldershot: Ashgate. Asante, S.K. (1995). Pan Africanism and Regional Integration in Africa. In: A. Mazrui (ed.), General History of Africa, 724–743. Oxford: James Currey Ltd. Ayittey, G. (1992). Africa Betrayed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bach, D.C. (2007). Nigeria’s ‘Manifest Destiny’ in West Africa: Dominance without Power. Africa Spectrum, 42(2): 301–321. Ballasa, B. (1962). The Theory of Economic Integration. London: Allen & Unwin.

Bibliography

181

Bathily, A. (1994). The West African State in Historical Perspective. In: E. Osaghae (ed.), Between State and Civil Society in Africa: Perspectives on Development, 41–69. Dakar: codesria. Beremauro, R. (2013). Living between compassion and domination? An ethnographic study of institutions, interventions and the everyday practices of poor black Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand. Bhagwati, F. (2003). Borders beyond control. Foreign Affairs, January/February. Bøås, M., Marchand, M. and Shaw, T. (1999). New Regionalism in the New Millennium, Special Issue. Third World Quarterly, 20(5): 1061–1070. Bøås, M., Marchand, M. and Shaw, T. (2004). The Weave-World: The Regional Interweaving of Economies, Ideas and Identities. In: F. Söderbaum and T. Shaw (eds), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader, 197–210. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bösl, A., Breytenbach, W., Hartzenberg, T., McCarthy, C. and Schade, K. (2008). Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook. Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, 8. Bösl, A., Du Pisani, A., Erasmus, G., Hartzenberg, T. and Sandrey, R. (2010). Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook. Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, 9. Bossard, L. (2009). The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries. Regional Note West Africa. Paris: oecd. Butler, J. (2012). Bodies in Alliance and Politics of the Street. In: M. McLagan and Y. McKee (eds), In Sensible Politics: The Visual Culture of Non-Governmental Activism, 117–137. New York: Zone Books. Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J. (1997). Security: A New Framework of Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Campbell, G. (2006). The African-Asian Diaspora: Myth or Reality? African and Asian Studies, 5(3–4): 305–324. Castles, S., Miller, M.J. and Ammendola, G. (2003). The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: The Guilford Press. Charrière, F. and Frésia, M. (2008). West Africa as a Migration and Protection area. New York: unhcr. Chigara, B. (2011). The Humwe principle: A social-ordering grundnorm for Zimbabwe and Africa? In: Robert Home (ed.), Essays in Land Law, 113–133. Pretoria: pulp. Chinweizu, I. (2011). Pan-Africanism: Rethinking key issues. In: B. Bankie and V. Zimunya (eds), Sustaining the New Wave of Pan-Africanism, 62–95. Windhoek: National Youth Council of Namibia. Chirisa, I. (2014). The Role of the Informal Sector in African Regional Integration: Scope and Limits. Insight on Africa, 6(2): 131–144. Christopherson, S., Michie, J. and Tyler, P. (2010). Regional Resilience: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 3(1): 3–10.

182

Bibliography

Clapham, C., Mills, G., Morner, A. and Sidiropoulos, E. (eds) (2001). Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Comparative International Perspectives. Pretoria: saiia in collaboration with the Nordic Council of Ministers, the British High Commission in Pretoria and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Collier, P. and Venables, T. (2008). Trade and Economic Performance: Does Africa’s Fragmentation Matter? Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Cape Town, South Africa, May 28. Collins, A. (2008). A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organizations?, Contemporary Southeast Asia A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 30(2): 313–331. Cox, R.W. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. Journal of International Studies, 10(1): 126–155. Crush, J. and Tevera, D. (2002). Introduction: Zimbabweans Who Move. In: D. Tevera and L. Zinyama (eds), Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International Migration in Zimbabwe, 1–6. Cape Town: Idasa. De Haas, H. (2008). Migration and Development: A theoretical perspective. imi Working Paper 9, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. De Vletter, F. (2007). Migration and development in Mozambique: Poverty, inequality and survival. Development Southern Africa, 24(1): 137–153. Deacon, B. (2011a). Social Policy, Free Movement, Migration and Regional Integration: Diversity Between Regions and Categories of Movers. Paper delivered at the gresi workshop on migration, unu-cris. Deacon, B. (2011b). Influencing Regional Social Policies from Above: Case Study of SubSaharan Africa. Paper presented at the kfg: Transformative Power of Europe conference on Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa Centre for Area Studies, Free University of Berlin, July 7–8, 2011. Deacon, B. and Nita, S. (2013). Regional social integration and free movement across borders: The role of social policy in enabling and preventing access to social entitlements by cross-border movers: European Union and Southern Africa compared. Regions & Cohesion, 3(1): 32–61. Deacon, B., Marius, O. and Beremauro, R. (2015). “Social Security and Social Protection of Migrants in South Africa and SADC.” MiWORC Report No. 4. Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand. DeGruy, J.A. (2012). Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome: America’s Legacy of Enduring Injury and Healing. New York: Uptone Press. De Haas, H. (2008). The Myth of Invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe. Third World Quarterly, 29(7), 1305–1322. De Haas, H. (2009). Remittances and Social Development. In: K. Hujo and S. McClanahan (eds), Financing Social Policy, 293–318. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bibliography

183

Diop, D. (1999). Africa: Mankind's Past and Future. In: W.M. Makgoba (ed.), African ­Renaissance: The new struggle, 3–9. Sandton and Cape Town: Mafube and Tafelberg Publishing. D’Orsi, C. (2016). Why Barriers to a Pan-African Passport may be insurmountable. The Conversation, July 19. Online: https://theconversation.com/why-barriers-to-a-panafrican-passport-may-be-insurmountable-62602, [Accessed on 16 September 2017]. Draper, P. (2010). Rethinking the (European) Foundations of sub-Saharan African Regional Economic Integration: A Political Economy Essay. Working paper No. 293. Paris: oecd. Draper, P. (2013). Breaking Free from Europe: Why Africa Needs Another Model of Regional Integration. In: L. Fioramonti (ed.), Regionalism in a Changing World: Comparative Perspectives in the New Global Order, 67–82. London and New York: Routledge. Du Pisani, A., Erasmus, G. and Hartzenberg, T. (2012). Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook. Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa Eamann Butler, Public Choice – A primer. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Duchesne, S. (2012). National Identification, Social Belonging and Questions on European Identity. In: R. Friedman and M. Thiel (eds), European Identity and Culture: Narratives of Transnational Belonging, 53–74. Farnham: Ashgate. ecowas Commission (2008). ecowas Common Approach on Migration. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Fagbayibo, B. (2011). If Music Be the Food of Unity, Never Stop Playing. Online: http://­ afrothoughts.wordpress.com/2011/07/01/if-music-be-the-food-of-unity-never-stopplaying-by-babatunde-fagbayibo/, [Accessed on 11 January 2015]. Fagbayibo, B. (2015). ‘I am an African’: A Critical Examination of the Politics of Transnational Identity within the Context of African Integration. Paper presented at the 14th General Assembly of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Dakar, Senegal, June 8–12. Falola, T. (2013). The African Diaspora: Slavery, Modernity, and Globalization. Rochester: University of Rochester Press. Farrel, M. (2005). The Global Politics of Regionalism: An Introduction. In: M. Farrell, B. Hettne and L. van Langenhove (eds), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, 1–20. London: Pluto Press. Fawcett, L. (2005). Regionalism from an Historical Perspective. In: M. Farrell, B. Hettne and L. van Langenhove (eds), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, 21–37. London: Pluto Press. Fawcett, L. and Hurrel, A. (eds) 1995. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foster, K., Pendall, R. and Cowell, M. (2010). Resilience and Regions: Building Understanding of the Metaphor. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 3(1): 71–84.

184

Bibliography

Gaggio, D. (2012). Tourism, Transnationalism, and the Construction of Everyday. In: R. Friedman and M. Thiel (eds), European Identity and Culture: Narratives of Transnational Belonging, 157–174. Aldershot: Ashgate. Gagnon, J. and Khoudour-Casteras, D. (2012). South-South Migration in West Africa: Addressing the Challenge of Immigrant Integration. Working paper No. 312. Paris: oecd. Gedaa, A. and Kebret, H. (2008). Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A Review of Problems and Prospects with a Case Study of comesa. Journal of African Economies, 17(3): 357–394. Gehring, T. (1996). Integrating Integration Theory: Neo-functionalism and International Regimes. Global Society, 10(3): 225–253. Gibb, R. (2009). Regional Integration and Development Trajectory: Meta-theories, expectations and reality. Third World Quarterly, 30(4): 701–721. Gilpin, R. (2001). Global Political Economy-Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gumbo, T. and Bokolo, S. (2014). “Migrant spaza shops: business lessons from Soweto.” Online: http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-july-2014/migrant-spazasho ps, [Accessed on 21 December 2017]. Gumede, V. (2015). Political Economy of Post-apartheid South Africa. Dakar: codesria. Gumede, V. (2016). Post-apartheid South Africa: Economic and Social Inclusion. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press. Gumede, V. and Oloruntoba, S.O. (2017). Regional Integration and African Renaissance: Moving Beyond the Rhetoric. In: C. Landsberg (ed.), Africa Rise Up! Perspectives on African Renewal, 245–258. Johannesburg: Real African Publishers. Haas, E.B. and Schmitter, P.C. (1964). Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America. International Organization, 18(4): 705–737. Hagen-Zanger, M. (2005). Why do people migrate? A review of the theoretical literature. mrpa Working paper No. 28197. Online: http:mrpa.ub.uni-muechen.de/28197/, [Accessed on 12 November 2015]. Hamdy, A.H. (2011). Regional Integration in Africa – Bridging the North-Sub-Saharan Divide. Pretoria: aisa. Hartzenberg, T., Erasmus, G., McCarthy, C., Sandrey, R., Pearson, M., Jensen, H.G., Cronje, J.B., Fundira, T., Kruger, P., Viljoen, W. and Woolfrey, S. (2012). The Tripartite Free Trade Area: Towards a New African Integration Paradigm? Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa. Hassan, A.H. (2011). Regional Integration in Africa – Bridging the North-Sub-Saharan Divide. Pretoria: aisa. Hettne, B. (1999). Globalisation and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation. In: B. Hettne, A. Sapir, and O. Sunkel (eds), Globalism and the New Regionalism, 1–24. New York: St. Martins.

Bibliography

185

Hettne, B. (2005). Regionalism and World Order. In: M. Farrell, B. Hettne and L. van Langenhove (eds), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, 269–286. London: Pluto Press. Hurrell, A. (1995). Regionalism in the Americas. In: L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, 285–305. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ibrahim, M. (2005). The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse. International Migration, 42(5): 163–187. Iheduru, O. (2012). Regional Integration and the Private Authority of Banks in West Africa. International Studies Review, 14(2): 273–302. Institute for Global Dialogue (2008). Liberalising trade in Southern Africa – Implementation challenges for the 2008 SADC FTA and beyond. Conference Proceedings. Midrand: The Institute for Global Dialogue. International Organisation for Migration (iom) (2013). The Well-being of Economic Migrants in South Africa: Health, Gender and Development. World Migration Report Working Paper 2. isa (2015). Global South Caucus (gscis) Conference, January 8th–10th, Singapore. Jayasuriya, S. (2008). African Identity in Asia: Cultural Effects of Forced Migration. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. Kaplan, S. (2006). West African Integration. A New Development Paradigm? Washington Quarterly, 29(4): 81–97. Katzenellenbogen, S.E. (1982). South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railways and Trade in the Making of a Relationship. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Khadiagala, G. (2008). Governing regionalism in Africa: Themes and debates. Policy brief 51, Centre for Policy Studies. Johannesburg, South Africa. King, R. (2012). Theories and Trajectories of Migration: An Overview and a Primer. Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations. Paper 3/12, Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (mim), Malmö University. Ki-Zerbo, J. (2005). African Intellectuals, nationalism and pan-Africanism: a testimony. In: T. Mkandawire (ed.), African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development, 78–97. Dakar: codesria. Klavert, H. (2011). African Union frameworks for migration: current issues and questions for the future. Discussion Paper No. 108. Online: http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/­ uploads/2013/11/DP-108-African-Union-Frameworks-Migration-Issues-QuestionsFuture-2011.pdf, [Accessed on 29 July 2015]. Kösler, A. and Zimmek, M. (eds) (2007). Global Voices on Regional Integration. Discussion Paper 176, Center for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.

186

Bibliography

Kritz, M., Lim, L.L. and Zlotnik, H. (eds) (1992). International Migration Systems: A Global Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Landau, L. and Achiume, T. (2016). The African Union Migration and Regional Integration Framework. Policy and Practice Brief 36. Durban: accord. Leshoele, M. (2019). Regional Integration Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities in Africa: A Case of the Tripartite Free Trade Area. In: S. Oloruntoba and M. Muchie (eds), Innovation and Regional Integration in Africa: Rethinking Theory, Institutions and Policy, 107–120. New York: Springer. Levitt, P. and Schiller, N. (2004). Conceptual and Methodological Developments in the Study of International Migration, The International Migration Review, 38(3): 1002–1039. Little, P.D. (2010). Unofficial Cross-Border Trade in Eastern Africa. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255573660_Unofficial_CrossBorder_Trade_in_Eastern_Africa, [Accessed on 16 July 2018]. Luibhéid, E. (2014). Afterword: Troubling identities and identifications. Sexualities, 17(8): 1035–1040. Lyakurwa, W. (1997). Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, A Review of Experiences. In: A. Oyejide, I. Elbadawi and P. Collier (eds), Regional Integration and Trade Liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Vol. 1: Frameworks, Issues and Methodological Perspectives, 176–182. London: Macmillan. Mabogunje, A. (1970). Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural-Urban. Migration, Geographical Analysis, 2(1): 1–18. Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizens and the Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of late colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mamdani, M. (2012). Define and Rule: Natives as Political Identity. Boston: Harvard University Press. Mansfield, H. and Milner, H. (eds) (1997). The Political Economy of Regionalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Marchand, M.H., Bøås, M. and Shaw, T.M. (1999). The political economy of new regionalisms. Third World Quarterly, 20(5): 897–910. Mbembe, A. (2017). Opening Address at the International Conference on Migration, organised by the Department of Home Affairs, South Africa, Sandton, Johannesburg, 17–19 March, 2017. Meagher, K. (2003). A Back Door to Globalisation? Structural Adjustment, Globalisation and Transborder Trade in West Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 30(95): 57–75. Mengelkoch, S. (2001). The right to work in SADC countries. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Mengisteab, K. and Bereketeab, R. (eds) (2012). Regional Integration, Identity and Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa. Suffolk: James Currey and Boydell and Brewer.

Bibliography

187

Mitrany, D. (1975). The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Sage Publishers. Mkandawire, T. (2005). Towards a development, democratic and socially inclusive Africa once again. Codesria Bulletin, 3 and 4. Muzvidziwa, V.N. (2005). Women without borders: informal cross border trade among women in the Southern African development Community region (SADC). Addis Ababa: ossrea. Mwaniki, J. (n.d.). The impact of informal cross border trade on regional integration in SADC and implications for wealth creation. Unpublished. Nabudere, D. (2000). Globalisation and the Post-Colonial African States. Harare: aaps. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. (2009). Do ‘Zimbabweans' Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State. Oxford: Peter Lang. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. (2013). Decolonial Epistemic Perspective and Pan-African Unity in the 21st Century. In: M. Muchie, P. Lukhele-Olorunju and O. Akpor (eds), The ­African Union Ten Years After, 385–409. Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. and Mhlanga, B. (2013). Bondage of Boundaries and Identity Politics in Postcolonial Africa – The Northern Problem and Ethno-Futures. Pretoria: aisa. Nkrumah, K. (1963). Africa Must Unite. London: Panaf Books. Nshimbi, C.C. (2015). Oscillations: Short-term domestic policy considerations and regional integration in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. Paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Global South Caucus, Singapore, January 2015. Nshimbi, C.C. (2016). Leave No one Behind: Ensuring that female informal cross border traders do not lose in formalisation process. Online: http://includeplatform.net/ question/question-week-4/, [Accessed on 27 July 2016]. Nshimbi, C.C. and Fioramonti, L. (2014). The Will to Integrate: South Africa’s Responses to Regional Migration from the sadc Region. African Development Review, 26(1): 52–63. Nyamnjoh, F.B. (2006). Insiders and Outsiders – Citizenship and Xenophobia in contemporary Southern Africa. Dakar: codesria. Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Hear, N.V. and Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2002). The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options. State-of-the-Art Overview. International Migration, 40(5): 3–47. Nye, J. (1966). Pan-Africanism and East African Integration. Oxford: Oxford University. Nye, J. (1987). Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflicts in Regional Organization. New York: Little, Brown and Co. Ochonu, M. (2015). The Wangara Trading Network in Precolonial West Africa: An Early Example of Africans Investing in Africa. In: M. Pearson, W. Boer and T. McNamee (eds), Africans Investing in Africa, 9–27. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. oecd (1998). Migration, Free Trade and Regional Integration in North America. Paris: oecd Publishing.

188

Bibliography

oecd (2014). Overview Paper on Resilient Economies and Societies. Online: http:// www.oecd.org/mcm/C-MIN(2014)7-ENG.pdf, [Accessed on 10 November 2015]. Ogunyemi, O. and Adedokun, S. (2014). Towards West-Africa Regional Economic Integration: Formalising the Informal Sector. Paper delivered at the 17th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, United Nations Economic Commission for ­Africa, Dakar, Senegal, June 18–20. Olopade, M., Selormey, E. and Gninafon, H. (2016). Regional Integration Index: Could stronger public support turn rhetoric to reality? Online: http://afrobarometer.org/ sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno91_regional_ integration_in_africa_en.pdf, [Accessed on 16 September 2017]. Oloruntoba, S.O. (2015). Politics of Financialisation and Inequality: Transforming Global Relations for Inclusive Development. Africa Development, xl(3): 121–138. Oloruntoba, S.O. (2016a). Regionalism and Integration in Africa: EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and Euro-Nigeria Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Oloruntoba, S.O. (2016b). ECOWAS and Regional Integration in West Africa: From State to Private Authority. History Compass, 14(7): 295–303. Oloruntoba, S.O. (2017). The State and Regional Integration in Africa: Rethinking the neoliberal theories. In: C. Landsberg (ed.), Africa Rise Up: Perspectives on African Renewal, 211–228. Johannesburg: Real African Publishers. Oloruntoba, S.O. and Golpakrishna, S. (2012). The Political Economy of Forced Economic Migration in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges in the New Millennium. Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration, 6: 41–68. Online: http://africamigration. com/issue/dec2012/forced-economic-migration-in-Nigeria-Gopalkrishna-and-­ Oloruntoba.pdf. Oloruntoba, S.O. and Gumede, V. (2016). Regional Hegemons as Catalyst for Continental Integration: Nigeria and South Africa in Africa’s Integration and Development. In: M. Muchie, V. Gumede, S. Oloruntoba and C. Achu (eds), Regenerating Africa: Bringing Africa’s Solutions to Africa’s Problems: The Journey so far, 18–33. Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa Press. Osakwe, P., Nkurunziza, J. and Bolaky, B. (2013). Economic Development in Africa Report (2013). Intra-African Trade: Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism. Geneva: UNCTAD. Oucho, J.O. and Crush, J. (2001). Contra Free Movement: South Africa and the SADC Migration Protocols. Africa Today, 48(3): 139–158. Ozkul, D. and Obeng-Odoom, F. (2013). Temporary Migration in Africa: Views from the Global South. African Review of Economics and Finance, 5(1): 1–6. Peters-Berries, C. (2010). Regional Integration in Southern Africa – A Guidebook. Online: http://www.iaj.org.za/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/sadc_guidebook_for_regional_ integration11.pdf, [Accessed on 7 January 2016]. Piore, M.J. (1979). Birds of passage: migration labour and industrial societies. London: Cambridge University Press.

Bibliography

189

Poot, J. (1986). A System Approach to Modelling the Inter-Urban Exchange of Workers in New Zealand. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 33(3): 249–274. Prah, K.K. (1984). Some Remarks on Aid Agencies and Dependency in the Southern Sudan. Working Paper No. 418. Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi. Prah, K.K. (2008). Language, Literacy and Knowledge Production in Africa. In: B.V. Street and N.H. Hornberger (eds), Encyclopedia of Language and Education, volume 2: Literacy, 29–39. New York: Springer. Prah, K.K. (2013). South Africa in Africa; Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Paper presented at the Final ANC Centenary Dialogue, Centre for Africa Studies, University of the Free State, Mangaung, 13th February 2013. Ravenstein, E.G. (1885). The Laws of Migration – i. Journal of the Statistical Society, 48(2): 167–227. Ravenstein, E.G. (1889). The Laws of Migration – ii. Journal of the Statistical Society, 52(2): 214–301. Robinson, W. (2010). Global Capitalism Theory and the Emergence of Transnational Elites. Working Paper No. 2010/02. Finland: World Institute for Development Economics and Research, United Nations University. Robinson, W. (2004). A Theory of Global Capitalism. Production, Class and State in A Transnational World. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rodney, W. (1981). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London and Tanzania: L’Ouverture publications (second edition). Sahel and West Africa Club/oecd (2006). The Socio-economic and regional context of West African migrations. Working Document 1. Online: http://www.oecd.org/mi gration/38481393.pdf, [Accessed on 7 January 2016]. Saunders, C., Gwinyayi, A.D. and Nagar, D. (eds) (2012). Region-building in Southern Africa Progress, Problems and Prospects. London: Zed Books. Scheffran, J., Marmer, E. and Sow, P. (2012). Migration as a contribution to resilience and innovation in climate adaptation: Social networks and co-development in Northwest Africa. Applied Geography, 33: 119–127. Schulz, M., Söderbaum, F. and Öjendal, J. (2001). Introduction. In: Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes, 1–17. London and New York: Zed Books. Segatti, A. (2008). Migration in post-apartheid South Africa: Challenges and questions to policy-makers, French Institute of South Africa. Online: http://www.migration. org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Migration-in-Postapartheid-South-AfricaChallenges-and-Questions-to-Policy-Makers.pdf, [Accessed on 16 July 2018]. Sen, A. (2001). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, S. (1997). New Approaches to International Theory. In: J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics, 165–190. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Söderbaum, F. (2004). The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

190

Bibliography

Solomon, H. (2007). Towards the Free Movement of the People in Southern Africa? Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, 18, March 1997. Soludo, C. and Ogbu, O. (2004). The Politics of Trade Policy in Africa. In: C. Soludo, O. Ogbu and H.J. Chang (eds), Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa: Forced Consensus?, 111–134. Ottawa: idrc Books. Stoebenau, K., Nixon, S., Rubincam, C., Willan, S., Zembe, Y., Tsikoane, T., Tanga, P., Bello, H., Carceres, C., Townsend, L., Rakotoarison, P. and Razafintsalama, V. (2011). More than just talk: the framing of transactional sex and its implications for vulnerability to HIV in Lesotho, Madagascar and South Africa. Globalization and Health, 7(34): 1–15. Tacolli, C. (2009). Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility. Environment and Urbanization, 21(2): 513–525. Thiel, M. and Friedman, R. (2012). Introduction: Cultural and Narratives of Transnational Belonging. In: R. Friedman and M. Thiel (eds), European Identity and Culture: Narratives of Transnational Belonging, 1–16. Farnham: Ashgate. UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (2012). Migration and human mobility. Online: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Think%20 Pieces/13_migration.pdf, [Accessed on 29 July 2015]. undp (2011). Regional Integration and Human Development: A Pathway for Africa. New York: undp. undp (2011). Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty. New York: undp. uneca (2012). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. uneca (2013). Outcome Statement of the Regional Experts. Meeting on International Migration and Development in Africa in preparation for the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. Addis Ababa: uneca. uneca (2016). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa. Addis Ababa: uneca. unesco (2012). ONU Chair on Regional Integration and Free Movement of People. Policy Brief No. 6/2012 on Advancing Regional Social Integration, Social Protection and Free Movement of People in Southern Africa. unicef (2013). Migration profiles. Mozambique. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2009). Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009. Geneva: United Nations. Vansina, J. (1979). Bantu in the Crystal Ball, I. History in Africa, 6: 287–333. Wallerstein, I. (1979). The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Bibliography

191

White, P. and Woods, R. (eds) (1980). The Geographical Impact of Migration. London: Longman. William, L. and Nguyen, M.T. (2013). The Economic Integration of Immigrants and Regional Resilience. Working Paper. Online: http://brr.berkeley.edu/wp-content/­ uploads/2013/05/Lester-Nguyen-immigrant-integration.pdf, [Accessed on 2 De�cember 2015]. Williams, V. and Carr, L. (2006). The Draft Protocol on the Facilitation and Movement of Persons in sadc: Implications for State Parties. Migration Policy Brief No. 18. Southern African Migration Programme (samp), Cape Town, South Africa. Online: http://samponline.org/migration-policy-briefs/, [Accessed on 16 July 2018]. World Bank (2000). Trade Blocs. Policy Research Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press. World Bank (2012). Defragmenting Africa. New York: World Bank. World Bank (2013). World Development Report. New York: World Bank. Yaro, J.A. (2008). Migration in West Africa: Patterns, issues and challenges. Legon: Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana. Online: http://www.waifemcbp.org/v2/ dloads/MIGRATION%20IN%20WEST, 2 [Accessed on 14 January 2016]. Zeleza, P. (1993). A Modern History of Africa Vol. 1 – The Nineteen Century. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Limited and codesrIa. Zeleza, P. (2008). Africa and its Diasporas: Dispersals and Linkages. Dakar: codesria. Zelinsky, W. (1971). The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition. Geographical Review, 61(2): 219–249. Zelinsky, W. (1983). The Impasse of Migration Theory: A Sketch Map for Potential Escapees. In: P. Morrison (ed.), Population Movements: Their Forms and Functions in Urbanization and Development, 19–46. Liège: Ordina.

Index Abuja Treaty 77–80, 90, 93–4 Addis Ababa 50, 80 Advancing Regional Social Integration 29 AfDB, see African Development Bank (AfDB) Africa 1–5, 7–13, 20–6, 28–32, 34–5, 37–42, 48–51, 53–4, 74–81, 87–91, 93–5, 172–3 development 13 fragmented 28, 93 integrated 89, 93 people-centred regional integration 7 pre-colonial 50 region-building and integration 3, 8 Africa Report 48 Africa Yearbook 26 African borders 13 African citizens 2, 7, 28 African citizenship 7–8, 10, 28, 54, 109, 176 challenges 76 African Common Market 77 African Common Position on Migration and Development 80 African communities 52, 53, 160 African continent 16, 32, 53, 76, 117, 157 African countries 32, 38, 43, 45, 49, 51, 63, 75–7, 79, 110–13, 141, 145, 158, 160–1, 170–1 progress 79 African Development Bank (AfDB) 3, 35, 44 African Economic Community 78, 83 African Economic Community Draft Protocol 82 African economies 12, 175 African elite 176 African experiences 51 African governments 25, 176 African Heads of State and Government 89 African identity 7, 11–6, 20, 33, 49, 51, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76, 112, 147, 148, 161, 173, 174, 175, 176 construction of 20 African integration 44, 48 African leaders 1, 25, 33–4, 75, 93 African markets 61 African migrants 51, 117, 161 African nations 1, 13

African neo-personality 174 African Oceans 50 African Passport 6 African Peer Review Mechanism 34 African personality 71 African population 93 African Regional Economic Communities 60, 90 African regions 145 African societies 116 African states 78, 80, 93 African sub-regions 68 African thinking 60 African traditional religions 149 AU (African Union) 3–6, 15, 26, 30, 33–34, 38, 48, 74, 77–83, 90, 94–5, 114–15 migration frameworks 30, 78 Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) 79 African Union Commission (AUC) 3, 6, 34, 77, 79 African Unity 3, 13, 138 affirmation of 110, 113 African agenda 79, 94 Africans 4–6, 12–13, 21, 30, 51, 70–1, 74, 92, 110–12, 117, 138–9, 148–9, 158–9, 164–6, 172–4 black 20, 148 second-generation 21, 149 subdue 21, 149 young 50, 93 Africa’s development 48, 94 Africa’s disunity 139 Africa’s dream of integration 93 Africa’s migration policy 77 Africa’s migration system 168 Africa’s strength 154 Age 14, 70, 105–6, 119–20, 166 Agreements bilateral 31, 81, 83, 86–7 continental free trade 146 Algeria 20, 148 Arab Africans 20 Arabisation of North Africa 20 Areas, Preferential Trade 59

Index Arctic region 21, 149 Artificial borders 4, 7, 75, 98–9, 173 Asia 21, 30–1, 149 Asia-Pacific region 8 AU, see African Union (AU) Bantu migration 2, 50, 53 Benefits of regional integration 32, 77, 110, 111, 113, 140, 154, 165 Beremauro 43–4, 116–17 Black, Samuel 128, 134–5, 139 Black Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa 117 Blacks 20, 112, 148, 161, 166 Bøås 64 Bodies, regional 31, 36, 113, 147 Border management 78, 80, 87 Border towns 15, 35 Border trade 26, 28, 32, 42, 145, 161–2, 176 Borderless sub-region 158 Borders 1–2, 13, 15, 27–8, 44, 47–8, 51–2, 72–3, 78–9, 118–19, 132–4, 156, 172–3, 176 regional 84 Business strategies 42 Businesses 2, 15, 51, 91, 112, 121–2, 124–5, 131, 133, 136, 141–2, 164, 167, 172 conducting 108, 132, 137, 140–1 Capital 27, 47, 57, 64, 77, 82, 94, 118, 151 Central Africa 44 Central Africa to Southern Africa 50 Central African 2 Challenges of Migration Policies in Africa 90 Citizens 5, 36, 38–9, 44–5, 48, 51, 72, 83, 95–6, 111, 114, 125, 155–6, 160–1, 171 Citizenship rights 46–7 Colonial Migration in Southern Africa 116 Colonialism 1–2, 8, 10, 40, 52, 149 Commitment 3, 6, 34, 45, 76, 84, 86, 88–9, 94 Common Approach 35, 87 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 3 Comparative Perspectives 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159, 161 Competition 119, 131 Conflicts 10, 13, 19, 47, 50–1, 53, 61, 76, 95, 116 Contemporary migration 17, 98, 104, 147

193 Contemporary times 51, 53, 65–6 Contemporary West African migration 102 Continent integration processes 14 Countries 2–5, 12–17, 22–3, 36–7, 39–40, 61–3, 74–5, 90–1, 98–101, 108–12, 125–7, 134–5, 155–8, 160–1, 164–6 advanced 66, 125 ecowas region 103 fifteen-member 6, 156 inspired African 46 neighbouring 32, 48–9, 51, 117, 135, 177 non-African 113 post-independent African 174 regional 15, 117 resource-rich West African 99 respective 34, 101, 153 sending 22, 81 third world 60 various 141, 172 Cross-border migrants 7, 40, 163 Customs Union (CU) 59, 62, 118 Dakar 98, 150 Developed countries 28, 60–1, 66 less 67 Development in Africa in Preparation 42 Development integration 59 Development strategies, national 95 Development transition 65–6 East Africa 24, 90, 171 East Africa Community 3 East and Southern Africa 2 Eastern Africa 26, 611 Economic activities 2, 4, 10, 24, 28, 32, 35, 40, 42, 50, 53, 88, 156, 171–2, 177 benefits, potential 108–9 Economic Commission for Africa 3, 24, 42 Economic Community of Central African States 3 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 6, 12, 29–30, 36, 38, 44–5, 47, 86–90, 100–1, 103, 114–15, 146–7, 149, 151–3, 155–63 borderless 47, 112 member countries 94, 100 member states 48, 103, 151, 158 region 13, 103, 151, 158 respondents 154, 159

194 Economic cooperation 19, 156–7 Economic development 9, 22, 35, 41, 48, 77, 81, 145, 154, 172–3 Economic Development in Africa Report 48 Economic integration 7, 23, 34, 163 regional 26, 46, 48, 57 Economic migrants 44, 151 Economies 32, 35–6, 39, 63, 66, 75, 125–6, 151–2, 159, 161, 165, 172, 176 ecowas Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) 157 ecowas Protocol 47, 86, 88, 90, 102 ecowas Regional Electricity Regulatory Authority (erera) 157 Emigration 48, 67, 117 Employment 35, 67, 86, 91, 138, 152 Employment status 106–7, 121, 124 European Union (EU) 8–9, 19, 23, 30, 32, 44, 58, 111 Europe 8–9, 28–9, 31, 56, 65–6, 84, 93, 149, 170 Europe and Southern Africa 44 European countries 65, 111 European labour migration system 68 EU, see European Union (EU) Facilitation Protocol 84–5 Fifth Southern African Forum on Trade 24 Forced migration 77, 116 Foreigners 30, 38, 43, 45, 47, 74, 76, 91, 100, 127–8, 160–1, 171 Fostering economic integration 6 Fostering intra-African trade 34 Fostering regional integration 48, 76, 154, 159, 168 France 36, 40, 55, 61 Free movement 6, 29, 38, 44, 48, 77–9, 82–4, 86–90, 94–5, 100, 109–10, 138–40, 155–9 (intra) regional 89 of capital 82, 94, 118, 151 of goods 46, 77, 87 of persons 17, 37–8, 47, 77–9, 82–4, 86–7, 89–90, 102 Free Movement of Persons in Regional Integration Processes 46 Free movement policy 43 Freedom Charter in South Africa 148

Index Gender of South African Respondents 119 Gendered Migration in West Africa 115 Ghana 7, 14–15, 48, 50, 75, 97, 99–101, 104–6, 108–11, 113–15, 150, 153, 156 Ghanaian immigrants 106, 108 in Nigeria 106 Gold mines of South Africa 92 Goods 1, 3–5, 44, 46–7, 77–8, 81–2, 86–9, 116, 118, 126, 129, 131–4, 140–1, 176–7 Governments 32–3, 35, 43, 45, 81, 84, 88–9, 114–15, 131, 138–9, 159, 161, 176–7 Greater Horn of Africa 46–7 Hartzenberg 24 Hegemons, regional 12, 23, 45, 51, 56, 61, 94 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 42 Highfields 122, 125, 128–9, 143 History of migration in Southern Africa 116 in West Africa 97 Host countries 21, 23, 27, 32–3, 37, 39, 41, 119, 125–6, 149, 152, 154, 163–5, 167, 170 Human Development 32–3, 87 Immigrants 4, 14, 91, 99, 101, 104, 108–10, 115, 145, 147, 163 Immigrants’ experiences of migration 107 Immigration 32, 67 Informal sector 2, 12, 24–5, 32, 35, 42, 64, 118, 126, 176–7 Integration arrangements, regional 48, 58 experiences 20 in West Africa 180 processes 8, 11, 26, 31, 34, 59, 64, 69, 79, 94, 103, 110, 112, 119, 175 regional 95, 103, 111, 113, 145 regional 24, 54, 83, 94 Integration theory, regional economic 59 Inter-African relations 50, 176 Inter-regional labour movement 84 International migration 22, 42, 66, 102, 107–8 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 40, 44, 46, 80 Intra-African Trade 25, 42 Investment 22–3, 39, 47–8, 60, 157, 161 Ivory Coast 51, 98, 100

Index Jobs 51, 103, 128, 131, 137, 151, 161, 165 Labour 27, 29, 45, 47, 51–2, 64–5, 79, 82, 89–90, 99, 117–18, 145, 151, 155 Labour migration 29, 31, 39, 80, 85, 95, 98, 169 facilitated 98, 150 regional 90 stimulated regional 98 processes in Southern Africa 150 system 116 Labourers 27 Language 12, 109, 127, 134, 136–7, 157, 164, 174, 176 local South African 136 regional 137, 145 Language of Integration and Regional Business Conduct 137 Laws 11, 37, 44, 47, 51, 103, 124, 141–2, 151, 174 Leaders 34, 155, 157, 159 Living conditions 14, 41, 79, 130, 142, 164–5, 167 Markets 34, 46, 57–9, 62, 64, 77, 108–9, 126, 133, 141, 172 common 59–60, 89 Member countries 6, 28, 37–8, 60, 62, 154, 158–9 Member states 38, 47, 72, 78, 81–3, 85–9, 100–1, 118, 151, 155, 157–8 citizens of 4, 84, 100 Migrant labours 117 Migrant workers 10, 27–8, 37, 43–4, 75, 91, 115–16, 155, 169, 171 Migrants 33, 40–4, 68–9, 73, 99–101, 118–19, 125–6, 128–30, 132–4, 136–8, 140–1, 144–5, 152–4, 163–8, 170–1 illegal 171 in South Africa 43 Migration 10–12, 17–19, 35–46, 48–51, 64–9, 78–82, 85–91, 93–5, 97–102, 104–10, 149–54, 162–4 border 41, 117 challenges 78 conceptual underpinnings of 19, 49 cross-border 115, 150 entitled 99, 112 female 29, 169 flows 39

195 gendered 142 governance 81, 89–90 inter-urban 67–8 irregular 50, 80, 87 neglect 39 patterns of 31, 117, 147 perceptions of 107, 109 refugee 117 rural-urban 67 securitization of 76, 92 Migration and Development in Africa  42 Migration and Regional Integration 7, 10, 16, 17, 25, 28, 45, 48, 49, 51, 53, 68, 69, 97, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111–19, 121, 123, 125, 127 in West Africa 112 Migration-development nexus 89, 108 Migration in Colonial West and Southern Africa 149 Migration in Southern Africa 116 Migration in West Africa 36, 68, 97, 99, 104, 108, 115, 147 Migration laws 85 Migration policies 12, 31, 36, 79, 82, 86, 90, 93 in Africa 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89–91, 93, 95 regional 89 Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) 80 Migration pressures 95 Migration processes 102, 118, 164, 168–9 Migration regimes 85 Migration stream 66 Mobility 2, 16–17, 47, 59, 72, 97, 99, 102, 105–6, 144, 147, 162 regional 38, 102 Movement 2–3, 10–12, 16–17, 36–7, 44, 47, 49–51, 79, 81–6, 89, 91, 97–8, 100, 102 Movement protocol, free 47, 84, 88–9, 101, 139, 158 Mozambican immigrants 167 discrimination 127 in Zimbabwe 142 Mozambicans 117, 119, 131, 140, 143, 145, 153, 161 Mozambique 84, 117, 126–7, 129, 137, 143, 147, 150, 154, 166

196 Nation-states 57, 70, 73, 76, 90, 173 Nations 52, 88, 91, 112, 115, 172–3 New regionalism approach (Weave-world) 55 Nexus, migration-development 89, 108 Nigeria 12, 14, 51, 88, 97, 99–101, 105–6, 108–9, 111, 151, 153, 156, 171, 173 Nigeria and Ghana 13, 15, 23, 103, 156, 158, 160, 162 Nigeria and South Africa 12, 44, 51 Nigerian migrants in Ghana 153 Nigerians 14, 100, 105, 108, 114, 153, 171 Non-Africans 71 Non-nationals 44–5, 115 North Africa 20, 148 Pan African 49, 173 education 161 identity 13, 20–1, 51, 70–2, 148–9, 161, 173 and African citizenship 51, 64 and regional integration in Africa 69 nation 70 stars 72 vision 173 Pan-Africanism 1, 13, 28, 70, 110, 148 Peace 26, 31, 54–6, 64, 80, 108–9, 112, 140, 152, 154, 165 Police 132–3, 142, 166 Policy responses 31 Political elites 1–2, 4, 7, 9, 17, 34, 54, 64, 69, 71, 95, 159 Post-apartheid South Africa 31, 51 Post-colonial migration in Southern Africa 117 Post-colonial Africa 78 Pre-colonial migration in Southern Africa 116 Pretoria 15, 24 Profile of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa 119 Protocol 4, 6, 24, 37–8, 48, 82–91, 94–5, 100–2, 151, 155–6, 158, 177 on Free Movement of Persons 158 Region-building 8, 30 Regional agreements 58, 81, 95 Regional approach 45, 84, 86 Regional Development Banks 41 Regional economic communities 4–7, 11, 24, 32–3, 37, 55, 77, 159, 170

Index and migration policies in Africa 81 Regional economic integration in Africa 26 Regional Experts’ Meeting on International Migration 42 Regional governance 11, 26, 41, 54 Regional institutions 114, 147 Regional integration 7–8, 10–12, 14–16, 23–6, 28–33, 35–8, 62–3, 72, 93–5, 109–15, 117–19, 145, 169–70 benefits of 32, 77, 110–11, 113, 140, 165 context of 137, 140 entitled 46 in Africa 7, 20, 24, 25, 32, 44, 45, 48, 59, 69, 72, 76, 110, 170, 172, 173 in Southern Africa 182, 188 neglect 24 perceived 112 process of 31, 46, 109, 112, 162 real 43 real sub-regional 151 Regional integration agreements 24 Regional Integration and Free Movement 29, 44 Regional Integration and Human Development 32 Regional integration nexus 164 Regional migration 80, 89, 91, 108 Regional trade 3, 10, 11, 26, 47, 48, 77 intra-African 11 Regional Economic Communities 154 Regionalisation 4, 10, 19, 26, 30, 54–5, 63–4 Regionalisation processes 4, 8–9, 26, 64, 170 neglect 8–9 Regionalism 8–11, 23, 26, 38, 54–6, 63, 69 new 26, 63 Regionalist projects 55 Regions 11–12, 14–15, 17, 19, 24–6, 35–6, 39, 43–4, 77, 81–5, 88–9, 101–3, 118–19, 140–1, 151–2 borderless 17 Remittances 16, 22, 27–8, 45, 74, 109, 116, 135, 142, 153–4, 163, 168–69 in fostering regional integration 169 Residence 16, 22, 36, 38, 77, 79–80, 84, 86, 90, 100, 155, 158–9 Resilience 7, 13, 17, 145, 163 Resilient economy 11–12, 15, 24–5, 27–8, 35, 41, 75, 118–19, 131–2, 145–6, 161, 163, 165, 167–72, 176

197

Index sacu, see Southern African Customs Union (SACU) sadc, see Southern African Development Community (SADC) sadcc, see Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) Sector formal 2, 35, 125 private 42, 64 Security 17, 19, 26, 54–5, 64, 67, 78–80, 85, 91, 95, 108–9, 140, 147, 154, 157 Social policy, role of 44 Social protection 33, 36, 43–5, 177 Social Protection and Free Movement 29 Social Security and Social Protection of Migrants in South Africa and SADC 43 Social services for regional citizens 137 Societies 1–2, 23, 52, 64, 67, 73, 76, 137 South Africa 38–40, 43–5, 74–5, 94, 115–17, 119, 124–6, 128–31, 133–6, 138–9, 150–6, 160–2, 164–5, 167–9 and Botswana 5, 45, 84, 86 and Namibia 80, 84, 154 and Swaziland 84 and Zimbabwe 7, 13, 161, 176 contemporary 129 return 91 role of 84 South African 23, 84, 91, 117, 128, 138, 150, 161 and Zimbabweans context 136 case 131, 143 non- 141 policy 164 respondents 119 state 45 townships 160 unemployed 161 Southern Africa and West Africa 159–60 case study 72 migration 162 Southern African 97, 147 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 23–4, 26, 30, 37, 43–4, 62, 82, 84–5, 88–90, 117, 146–7, 149, 151–5, 159, 161–3 and East Africa economic community 24 and migrants in South Africa 43

citizens 82–3, 155 countries 31, 38, 85, 91, 151 immigrants 160 member states 82–4, 86 migration 150 migration governance 31 nationals 83 region 13, 17, 29, 32, 36, 85, 93, 118, 151–2, 155, 162, 165, 167 sub-region 25 Treaty 82 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 26, 118 Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 154 Southern African states 12 Southern African Trust 37, 177 South-South countries 63 Sovereign states 55, 61, 64, 94–5 States 11, 29–30, 35–6, 38, 55, 57–9, 61–2, 64, 81, 85, 88–90, 95, 103, 132 Sub-region 4, 6, 12, 23–4, 31, 35–8, 43, 45, 48, 61–2, 94, 99–100, 150–1, 153–9, 162 Sub-Regional Trade and Development  47 Sub-Saharan Africa 48 Theoretical issues 50–1, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75 Theories 8–11, 26, 53–5, 59–63, 67–70, 170, 173 market integration 55, 59 migration 11 regional integration 63 Trade 24–6, 42–3, 46–8, 50, 53, 55, 58, 87, 112, 138, 141, 143, 170–2 intra-regional 48, 77 liberalisation in Southern Africa 24 trans-border 102 Trade/business 152 Traders 100, 109, 126, 130–4, 137–8, 141, 159, 177 informal 164–6 Transnational identity 68, 70–2, 173 Treaties 6, 11, 24, 26, 37, 82, 86, 89, 95, 100, 155, 157, 177 Understanding integration processes 9 undp, see United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

198 uneca, see United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) unesco-onu Chair on Regional Integration and Free Movement 29 unhcr 19 United Nations 23 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 48 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 27, 32, 44 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 3, 11, 25, 42, 80 United States of Africa 111, 113, 211 Village migration systems 68 Visas 4, 36, 44, 48, 82–3, 100–1, 134, 155–6, 158 Well-being of cross-border migrants 40, 163 of economic migrants 44 West Africa 10, 23, 34, 36, 39–40, 43–4, 48, 50, 97, 99–102, 104, 111–12, 156–7 and Southern Africa 11 contemporary 102 to Sudan 50 West African 36, 39, 87, 97, 100, 115, 147 migrations 36, 46 West African Monetary Institute (wami) 87

Index West African Power Pool 157 West and Southern Africa 97, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 125 World 5, 16, 21, 27–9, 31, 45–7, 49, 54, 57–9, 64–5, 69–70, 99, 139, 149 World Bank 11, 22, 24–25, 41, 47, 51, 61 World Migration Report 44 Zimbabwe 75, 116–17, 122, 124–31, 133, 135–6, 138, 141–2, 153, 161–2, 164–9, 176 Zimbabwe-Mozambique migration 145 Zimbabwean government 141 immigrants 14, 164 migrants 119, 136, 165 in South Africa 119, 164, 168 women in South Africa 143 Zimbabwean Revenue Agency (ZIMRA)  134 Zimbabweans 117, 119, 125, 130–2, 137, 142, 145, 153, 164–6, 168, 173 in South Africa 118–19, 125, 152, 160, 166 to South Africa 164, 168 Zimbabweans in South Africa and Mozambicans in Zimbabwe 118 Zimbabwe’s Immigration Act 91 Zulus in South Africa 173