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DAHRENDORF'^C. WRIGHT MILLS PETER BLAU AL^ JAMES FARGANISOOROTMY smith michel F( >URKHEIM Filie£»Ri€H NIETZSCHE MAX WEBER kLCOTT PARSONS ROI^RT K. MERTON RALF £>AHREI^IiaRF\ ERBERTBLUMER ERVINhesive
CHAPTER
3
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
79
share in the collective energy and supports his
measure avoid the prospect of annihilation we cannot extirpate it; it is inevitable, whatever we do. We may push back the frontier for some generations, force our name to endure for some
own when
years or centuries longer than our body; a
each and each to all, something like a mutual moral support, which instead of throwing the
own
individual on his
him
resources, leads
to
exhausted.
But these reasons are purely secondary. Excessive individualism not only results in
moment, too soon
favoring the action of suicidogenic causes, but
in
such a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away with himself from a protective obstacle, but creates this inclination out of whole cloth and thus gives birth to a special suicide which bears its mark. This must be clearly understood for this is what constitutes
means
it is
itself
the special character of the type of suicide just
distinguished and justifies the
given
What
it.
name we have
there then in individualism
is
has been sometimes said that because of
man cannot live without attachment to some object which transcends and survives him, and that the reason his psychological constitution,
for this necessity
is
perish entirely. Life less
some reason
is
too
he
is
is
we must have
little.
is
life's trials.
involved,
we
He
is
not orUy
hemmed
we have no
Under
He
in spatially;
When,
other object than our-
cannot avoid the thought that our
end
in
nothingness, since
ourselves disappear. But annihilation
courage
some
The individual
also strictly limited temporally.
efforts will finally
us.
not to
said to be intolerable un-
not a sufficient end for his activity.
therefore,
selves
need
is
for existing
purpose justifying alone
a
we
terrifies
would lose act and struggle, our exertions. The
these conditions one
to live, that
is,
to
since nothing will remain of
words, is supposed to be contradictory to human nature and, consequently, too uncertain to have chances of permanence. In this absolute formulation the proposition is vulnerable. If the thought of the end of our state of egoism, in other
personality were really so hateful, we could consent to live only by blinding ourselves voluntarily as to
life's
will
it
order
to
for
most men, always comes
be nothing. For the groups we join prolong our existence by their
must them all our deposit of ourselves. Those are few whose memories are closely enough bound to the very history of humanity to be assured of living until its death. are themselves mortal; they too
dissolve, carrying with
So,
if
we
no such
really thus thirsted after immortality,
brief perspectives could ever
us. Besides,
what
of us
is it
that lives?
appease
A word,
an imperceptible trace, most often therefore nothing comparable to the violence of our efforts or able to justify them to us. In actuality, though a child is naturally an egoist who feels not the slightest craving to survive himself, and the old man is very a sound,
anonymous,
that explains this result? It
when
value. For
if
we may
in a
often
child
a
in
this
and so many other life as much we have seen
respects, neither ceases to cling to
or
more than the
that suicide
is
adult; indeed
very rare for the
first
fifteen
and tends to decrease at the other extreme of life. Such too is the case with animals, whose psychological constitution differs years
from that of men only in degree. It untrue that life is only possible by ing
its
rationale outside of
is
therefore
its
possess-
itself.
Indeed, a whole range of functions concern only the individual; these are the ones indispensable for physical life. Since they are made
purpose
for this
attainment.
In
man
only, they are perfected
everything concerning
by
its
them,
without These functions serve by merely serving him. In so far as he has no other needs, he is therefore self-sufficient and can live happily with no other objective than living. This is not the case, however, with the civilized adult. He has many therefore,
thought
ideas,
of
can
act
reasonably
transcendental
feelings
and
purposes.
practices
unrelated
to
80
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
organic needs. The roles of
art,
morality,
reli-
gion, political faith, science itself are not to
bound by
Instinctively
repair organic exhaustion nor to provide
sound
society.
functioning
supra-
ascribe
physical
of
the
life is built
organs.
All
this
and expanded not because
demands of the cosmic environment but because of the demands of the social environof the
ment. The influence of society is what has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others; it is society which, fashioning us in its image, fills us with religious, political and moral beliefs that control our actions. To play our social role we have striven to extend our intelligence and it is still society that has supplied us with tools for this development by transmitting to us its trust fund of knowledge. Through the very fact that these superior forms of human activity have a collective origin, they have a collective purpose. As they derive from society they have reference to it; rather they are society
itself
to
have
a raison d'etre in
our eyes, the purpose
all
ties
of domestic or political
and unreflectively they and do, the one to his God, the living symbol of the
that they are
Church or
his
Church, the other to his family, the third to his country or party. Even in their sufferings they see only a means of glorifying the group to which they belong and thus do homage to it.
and seeks more fully to his contempt for the flesh and more fully resemble his divine model. But the more the believer doubts, that So, the Christian ultimately desires
suffering to testify
is,
the less he feels himself a real participant in
which he belongs, and more the family and community become foreign to the individual, so much the more does he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purthe religious faith to
from which he
is
freeing himself; the
pose?
incarnated and
individualized in each one of us. But for them
man
for the believer firm in his faith or the
strongly
If,
man
in other is
words, as has often been said, is because social man
double, that
superimposes
man
himself
upon
man.
physical
they envisage must be one not indifferent to us.
Social
We can cling to these forms of human activity only to the degree that we cling to society
which he expresses and serves. If this dissolves, if we no longer feel it in existence and action about and above us, whatever is social
itself.
we
same measure
Contrariwise, in the
as
detached from society we become detached from that life whose source and aim is society. For what purpose do these rules of morahty, these precepts of law binding us to all feel
sorts
of sacrifices,
exist, if there is
serve and in
these
restrictive
no being outside us
whom we
participate?
dogmas
whom What
they
is
the
necessarily presupposes a society
deprived of all objective foundation. is an artificial combination of illusory images, a phantasmagoria vanishing at the least reflection; that is, nothing which can be a goal for our action. Yet this social man is the essence of civilized man; he is the masterin us
is
All that remains
piece of existence.
Thus we are
bereft of rea-
purpose of science itself? If its only use is to increase our chances for survival, it does not
sons for existence; for the only life to which we could cling no longer corresponds to anything
deserve the trouble
actual; the only existence
it
entails. Instinct acquits
itself
better of this role; animals prove this.
Why
substitute
for
uncertain reflection? ing,
above
all? If
be estimated by
it
a
What
more is
hesitant
and
the end of suffer-
the value of things can onlv their relation to this positive
it is without reward and incomprehensible. This problem does not exist
evil for the individual,
still
based upon
reali-
no longer meets our needs. Because we have been initiated into a higher existence, the one which satisfies an animal or a child can satisfy us no more and the other itself fades and leaves us helpless. So there is nothing more for our efforts to lay hold of, and we feel them lose ty
themselves
in
emptiness. In this sense
it
is
true
CHAPTER
3:
to say that our activity needs an object transcending it. We do not need it to maintain ourselves in the illusion of an impossible immortality; it is implicit in our moral constitution and cannot be even partially lost without this
losing
proof
its is
same degree. No
raison d'etre in the
needed
such a state of confucause of discouragement may
sion the least
that in
easily give birth to desperate resolutions. is
If life
not worth the trouble of being lived, every-
thing becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of
But this
not
is
This detachment occurs
all.
not only in single individuals. stitutive
it.
One
of the con-
elements of every national tempera-
consists of a certain way of estimating the value of existence. There is a collective as well as an individual humor inclining peoples to sadness or cheerfulness, making them see
ment
things in bright or sombre lights. In
value of
human
life;
incompetent. The himself and his
experience
is
own
his
own
life to
is
horizon; thus his
He may
indeed consider
be aimless; he can say nothing
On the contrary, without may generalize its own feel-
applicable to others. sophistry, society
ings as to
itself,
its
state of health or lack of
health. For individuals share too life
of society for
it
suffering infection. sarily suffer.
deeply in the to be diseased without their
What
Because
communicated
it is
it
suffers they neces-
the whole,
to its parts.
Hence
it
its ills
are
cannot dis-
integrate without awareness that the regular
conditions of general existence are equally disturbed. Because society
is
the
end on which our
depend, it cannot feel us escaping without a simultaneous realization that our
better selves it
activity is purposeless. Since
we
ual sadness,
has purpose. Then new moralities originate which, by elevating facts to ethics, commend suicide or at least tend in that direction by suggesting a minimal existence.
On
their
appearance
they seem to have been created out of whole
by their makers who are sometimes blamed for the pessimism of their doctrines. In cloth
an effect rather than a cause; they merely symbolize in abstract language and sysreality they are
have, by virtue of their origin, an authority which they impose upon the individual and they drive him more vigorously on the way to which he is already inclined by the state of moral distress directly aroused in him by the disintegration of society. Thus, at the very
moment
that,
with excessive zeal, he frees himself from the social environment, he still submits to its
However
influence.
individualized a
man may
always something collective remaining the very depression and melancholy resulting from this same exaggerated individualism. He effects communion through sadness when he no longer has anything else with which be, there is
—
to achieve
Hence
it.
this
type of suicide well deserves the
name we have given
it.
contributing factor in cause. In this case the life
work, society cannot be conscious of its own decadence without the feeling that henceforth this work is of no value. Thence are formed currents of depression and disillusionment emanating from no particular individual but
ety
its
when chronic, in its way reflects the
poor organic state of the individual. Then metaphysical and religious systems spring up which, by reducing these obscure sentiments to formulae, attempt to prove to men the senselessness of life and that it is self-deception to believe that it
handi-
are
bonds, a sort of col-
lective asthenia, or social malaise, just as individ-
tematic form the physiological distress of the
too limited to serve as a basis for
a general appraisal.
reflect the relaxation of social
body social. As these currents are collective, they
knows nothing but
little
expressing society's state of disintegration. They
only
for this the individual
latter
81
on the
fact,
society can pass a collective opinion
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
Egoism it;
it
is
is
not merely a generating
its
bond attaching man to him to soci-
relaxes because that attaching
is itself slack. The incidents of private life which seem the direct inspiration of suicide and are considered its determining causes are in reality only incidental causes. The individual
yields to the slightest shock of circumstance
82
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
because the state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide. Several facts confirm this explanation. Suicide is known to be rare among children and to diminish among the aged at the last confines of life; physical man, in both, tends to become the
whole
man. Society is still lacking in the forhas not had the time to form him in its image; it begins to retreats from the latter or, what amounts to the same thing, he retreats from it. Thus both are more self-sufficient. Feeling a lesser need for self-completion through something not themselves, they are also less exposed to feel the lack of what is necessary for living. The immunity of an animal has the of
mer, for
same
it
causes.
We
and some animals
woman's
life is
to care for, the old
full.
If
unmarried
she remains faithfully
attached to religious traditions and thus finds
ready protection against suicide, it is because these very simple social forms satisfy all her needs. Man, on the contrary, is hard beset in this respect. As his thought and activity develop, they increasingly overflow these antiquated forms. But then he needs others. Because he is a more complex social being, he can maintain his equilibrium only by finding more points of support outside himself, and it is because his moral balance depends on a larger
number
of conditions that
is
it
more
easily disturbed.
shall likewise see in the next
chapter that, though lower societies practice a
form of suicide of discussed
just
is
Since their social
their
own, the one we have
almost life is
unknown
to
them.
very simple, the social
thus they need find
unless his needs are sufficiently proportioned
They readwhich they
means. In other words, if his needs more than can be granted, or even merely something of a different sort, they will be under continual friction and can onlv func-
for satisfaction.
little
external
objectives
to
become attached. If he can carry with him his gods and his family, primitive man, everywhere that he goes, has all that his social nature demands. This
is
isolation
also
more
why woman easily than
can endure
man.
When
a
life in
widow
seen to endure her condition much better than a widower and desires marriage less pasis
sionately,
one
is
led to consider this ease in dis-
pensing with the family a mark of superiority; it is said that woman's affective faculties, being very intense, are easily employed outside the domestic circle, while her devotion is indispensable to man to help him endure life. Actually, if this is her privilege it is because her sensibility is rudimentary rather than highly developed. As she lives outside of community existence more than man, she is less penetrated by it; society is less necessary to her because she is less impregnated with sociability. She has few needs in this direction and satisfies
them
easily.
be happy or even exist
and
inclinations of individuals are simple also
ily
ANOMIC SUICIDE No living being can
With a few devotional practices
to
his
require
tion painfully.
Movements incapable
of pro-
duction without pain tend not to be reproduced. Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and as the impulse to live rest,
it is
bound
to
is
merely the result of
weaken
all
the
as the others relax.
In the animal, at least in a nornial condition, this
equilibrium
is
established with automatic
spontaneity because the animal depends on
purely material conditions. All the organism
needs is that the supplies of substance and energy constantly employed in the vital process should be periodicallv renewed by equivalent quantities; that replacement be equivalent to use. When the void created by existence in
own
its
resources
is filled,
satisfied,
asks nothing further.
reflection
is
the animal,
Its
ine other ends than those implicit in cal
nature.
demanded
power
of
not sufflciently developed to imag-
On
its
the other hand, as the
of each organ itself
phvsi-
work
depends on the
CHAPTER
3:
general state of vital energy and the needs of
organic equilibrium, use
is
regulated in turn by
is automatic. The one are those of the other; both are fundamental to the constitution of the existence in question, which cannot exceed them. This is not the case with man, because most of his needs are not dependent on his body or
83
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
Unlimited
itself.
and
definition
desires
are
insatiability
insatiable
by
rightly consid-
is
replacement and the balance
ered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimited, they
limits of
constantly and infinitely surpass the
not to the
same degree.
may consider that
Strictly
speaking,
we
the quantity of material sup-
maintenance of a human life is subject to computation, though this be less exact than in the preceding case and a wider margin left for the free combinations of plies necessary to the physical
the will; for
beyond the indispensable mini-
mum
which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better condiseemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admittedly sooner or later reach a limit which they cannot pass. But how determine the quantity of wellbeing, comfort or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his psychological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. The functioning of individual life does not require them to cease at one point rather than at another; the proof being that they have constantly increased since the beginnings of history, receiving more and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health. Above all, how establish their proper variation with differtions,
ent
conditions
of
life,
importance of services,
occupations, etc.? In
relative
no society are
they equally satisfied in the different stages of the social hierarchy. Yet stantially the
human
same among
tial qualities. It is
not
all
human
nature
men,
is
sub-
in its essen-
nature which can
assign the variable limits necessary to our needs.
They are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling
is
in
it-
and bottomless abyss. nothing external can restrain this capacity, it can only be a source of torment to self an insatiable
But
if
their
means at command; they cannot be quenched.
Inextinguishable thirst torture.
human
It
been
has
is
constantly renewed
claimed,
indeed,
activity naturally aspires
signable
and
limits
sets
itself
that
beyond
as-
unattainable
goals. But how can such an undetermined state be any more reconciled with the conditions of mental life than with the demands of physical life? All man's pleasure in acting, moving and
exerting
himself implies
sense that his
the
and that by walking he has advanced. However, one does not advance when one walks toward no goal, or which is the same thing when his goal is infinity. Since the distance between us and it is always the same, whatever road we take, we might as well have made the motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances behind and our feelefforts are not in vain
—
—
ing of pride at the distance covered can cause only deceptive satisfaction, since the remaining
distance
is
not proportionately reduced. To
pursue a goal which able
is to
condemn
Of
ual unhappiness.
contrary to sures even
all
is
by
course,
reason, and
when
definition unattain-
oneself to a state of perpet-
man may hope
hope has
unreasonable.
It
its
may
plea-
sustain
him for a time; but it cannot survive the repeated disappointments of experience indefinitely. What more can the future offer him than the past, since he can never reach a tenable condition nor even approach the glimpsed ideal? Thus, the more one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs. Shall action as such be considered agreeable? First, only on condition of blindness to
its
uselessness. Secondly, for
and to temper and half accompanying painful unrest, such unending motion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the lack of ease which this pleasure to veil
the
be
felt
84
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
it, itself, entails. But it would be a miracle if no insurmountable obstacle were never encoun-
tered.
Our
thread of
life
pretty thin, breakable at
on these conditions any instant.
is
must play the same
according to
role for
wise the the
existence; only conscience, therefore, can
means to re-establish it. Phvsical would be ineffective; hearts cannot be
furnish the
touched by physio-chemical
forces.
So
far as
the appetites are not automatically restrained
by physiological mechanisms, they can be halted only by a Hmit that they recognize as just. Men would never consent to restrict their desires
if
assigned
they
limit.
justified
felt
in
passing the
But, for reasons gi\'en above,
they cannot assign themselves this law of jus-
So they must receive
it from an authority which they yield spontaneously. Either directly and as a whole, or through the agency of one of its organs, society alone can play this moderating role; for it is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts. It alone has the power necessary to stipulate law and to set the point beyond which the passions must not go. Finally, it alone can estimate the reward to
tice.
which they
respect, to
be prospectively offered
human
mon
functionary, in the
to
every
name
class
of the
of
com-
a matter of fact, at every
tory there
is
a
dim
moment
of his-
perception, in the moral
consciousness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, the relative
reward due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation.
The
to
each,
man
of wealth is reproved if he lives poor man, but also if he seeks the refinements of luxury overmuch. Economists may protest in vain; public feeling will always be scandalized if an individual spends too much wealth for wholly superfluous use, and it even seems that this se\'erity relaxes onlv in times of moral disturbance. A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimatelv aspire. However, there is nothing immutable about such a scale. It changes with the increase or decrease of collective revenue and the changes occurring in the moral ideas of societ^^ Thus what appears luxury to one period no longer does so to another; and the well-being which for long periods was granted to a class only bv exception and supererogation, finallv appears strictly life
of a
necessary and equitable.
Under this pressure, each in his sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limit set to his ambitions and aspires to nothing beyond. At least if he respects regulations and is docile to collective authority, that
interest.
As
assigned
place in the hierarchy. Accord-
of living is considered the upper limit to which a workman may aspire in his efforts to improve his existence, and there is another limit below which he is not willinglv permitted to fall unless he has seriously demeaned himself. Both differ for city and countrv workers, for the domestic ser^'ant and the day-laborer, for the business clerk and the official, etc. Like-
the state of equilibrium of the animal's dor-
restraint
its
public opinion and a certain
well-being
way
moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs. This means that the force can only be moral. The awakening of conscience interrupted
mant
in
of
coefficient
ing to accepted ideas, for example, a certain
To achieve any other result, the passions first must be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But since the individual has no way of limiting them, this must be done by some force exterior to him. A regulative force
are graded
different functions
is,
has a wholesome
moral constitution, he feels that it is not well to ask more. Thus, an end and goal are set to the passions. Trulv, there is nothing rigid nor absolute about such determination. The economic ideal assigned each class of citizens is itself confined to certain limits, within which the desires
have
free range.
But
it
is
not infinite. This
CHAPTER
limitation
relative
and
moderation
the
make men contented with
involves,
3:
it
their lot
while stimulating them moderately to improve
and
average contentment causes the feeling of calm, active happiness, the pleasure it;
this
and
existing
in
which characterizes
living
health for societies as well as for individuals.
Each person
is
then at
least,
generally speak-
harmony with his condition, and desires only what he may legitimately hope for as the ing, in
normal reward of not
his activity. Besides, this
condemn man
may
does
to a sort of immobility.
seek to give beauty to his
life;
He
but his without
attempts in this direction may fail causing him to despair. For, loving what he has
and not
fixing his desire solely
lacks, his
wishes and hopes
has happened to aspire
wholly
He
destitute.
may
to,
without his being
has the essentials. The
equilibrium of his happiness it is
defined,
and
a
on what he of what he
fail
is
secure because
few mishaps cannot discon-
cert him.
But
it
would be
of
little
use for everyone to
recognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions established
by public opinion,
if
he did
not also consider the distribution of these functions just.
The workman
is
not in
harmony
with his social position if he is not convinced that he has his deserts. If he feels justified in occupying another, what he has would not satisfy him. So it is not enough for the average level of needs for each social condition to be regulated by public opinion, but another,
more
must fix the way in which these conditions are open to individuals. There is no society in which such regulation does not exist. It varies with times and places. Once it regardprecise rule,
ed birth as the almost exclusive principle of social classification; today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than hereditary fortune and merit. But in all these various forms its object is unchanged. It is also only possible, everywhere, as a restriction upon individuals imposed by superior authority, that is, by collective authority. For it can be established only
85
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
by requiring of one or another group of men, usually of all, sacrifices and concessions in the
name of
the public interest.
Some, to be sure, have thought that this moral pressure would become unnecessary if men's economic circumstances were only no longer determined by heredity. If inheritance were abolished, the argument runs, if everyone began life with equal resources and if the competitive struggle were fought out on a basis of perfect equality, no one could think its results unjust. Each would instinctively feel that things are as they should be. Truly, the nearer this ideal equality
were
approached, the less social restraint will be necessary. But it is only a matter of degree. One sort of heredity will always exist, that of natural talent. Intelligence, taste, scientific, artistic,
lit-
courage and manual dexterity are gifts received by each of us at birth, as the heir to wealth receives his capital or as the nobleman formerly received his title and function. A moral discipline will therefore still be required to make those less favored by nature accept the lesser advantages which they owe to the chance of birth. Shall it be demanded that all have an ec]ual share and that no advantage be given those more useful and deserving? But then there would have to be a discierary or industrial
pline
far
ability,
stronger
make
to
these
accept
a
treatment merely equal to that of the mediocre
and incapable. But like the one
mentioned, this disciconsidered just by the peoples subject to it. When it is maintained only by custom and force, peace and harmony are ilfirst
pline can be useful only
if
lusory; the spirit of unrest
and discontent are
la-
ready and Greece
tent; appetites superficially restrained are
to revolt.
when
This happened in
Rome
the faiths underlying the old organization
of the patricians
and plebeians were shaken, and
our modern societies when aristocratic prejudices began to lose their old ascendancy. But this state of upheaval is exceptional; it occurs only when society is passing through some abnorin
86
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
mal
crisis.
normal conditions the
In
collective
regarded as just by the great majority of persons. Therefore, when we say that an authority is necessary to impose this order on order
is
we
do not mean that violence is the only means of establishing it. Since this regulation is meant to restrain individual passions, it must come from a power which dominates individuals; but this power must also be obeyed through respect, not individuals,
certainly
fear. It is
not true, then, that
released from
human activity can be Nothing
all restraint.
in the
world
can enjov such a privilege. All existence being a part of the universe its
is
relative to the remainder;
nature and method of manifestation accord-
depend not only on
itself but on other consequently restrain and regulate it. Here there are only differences of degree and form between the mineral realm and the think-
ingly
beings,
who
ing person. Man's characteristic privilege that the
bond he accepts
He
is
is
not physical but
governed not by a material environment brutally imposed on him, but by a conscience superior to his own, the superiority of which he feels. Because the moral; that
is,
social.
is
practice the increased self-repression to
they
unaccustomed.
are
So
they
which not
are
adjusted to the condition forced on them, and its
very prospect
is
intolerable;
hence the suffer-
ing which detaches them from a reduced existence even before they have It is
the
same
if
made
trial
of
it.
the source of the crisis
is
an
abrupt growth of power and wealth. Then, truly, as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources, since it largely determines the share of each class of producers. The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained
equilibrium,
their
unknown and
so
all
values
respective
regulation
is
are
lacking for a
The limits are unknown between the posand the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint upon aspirations. If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the princitime.
sible
ples controlling the distribution of
men among
greater, better part of his existence transcends
various occupations. Since the relations between
the body, he escapes the body's yoke, but
various
is
when
is disturbed by some by beneficent but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily incapable of exercising this influence; thence come the sudden rises in the curve of suicides which we have
But
society
painful crisis or
pointed out above. In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something like a declassification occurs which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower state than their previous t)nc. Then they must reduce their requirements, restrain their needs, learn greater self-control. All the advantages of social influence are k>st
si)
far as
they are con-
cerned; their moral education has to be recom-
mended. But
them instanand teach them to
societv cannot adjust
taneously to this
new
parts
of
society
are
necessarily
modified, the ideas expressing these relations
subject to that of society.
life
must change. Some particular class especially favored by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on the other hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion become disoriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to them. Besides, they are at the same time seized by a sort of natural erethism simply by the greater intensity of public life. With increased prosperity desires increase. At the very
moment when
traditional rules ha\'e lost
their authority, the richer prize offered these
stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The state of de-regulation or anomie is thus further
appetites
CHAPTER
3
heightened by passions being less disciphned, precisely when they need more disciplining. But then their very demands
ment
impossible.
make
Overweening
fuU'ill-
ambition
always exceeds the results obtained, great as they may be, since there is no warning to pause here. Nothing gives satisfaction and all this agitation is uninterruptedly maintained without appeasement. Above all, since this race for an unattainable goal can give no other pleasure but that of the race itself, if it is one, once it is interrupted the participants are left emptyhanded. At the same time the struggle grows more violent and painful, both from being less controlled and because competition is greater. All classes contend among themselves because no established classification any longer exists. Effort grows, just when it becomes less productive. How could the desire to live not be weakened under such conditions? This explanation is confirmed by the remarkable immunity of poor countries. Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have to
depend upon resources
to
some
extent; actual
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
87
the very source of immorality. This, of course,
is
no reason why humanity should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity is
not irremediable,
it
should not be forgotten.
anomy never appeared
If
except, as in the
above instances, in intermittent spurts and acute crisis, it might cause the social suiciderate to vary from time to time, but it would not be a regular, constant factor. In one sphere of the sphere of trade and social life, however industry
—
—
it is
actually in a chronic state.
For a whole century, economic progress has mainly consisted in freeing industrial relations from all regulation. Until very recently, it was the function of a whole system of moral forces to exert this discipline. First, the influence of
was
by workers and masters, It consoled the former and taught them contentment with their lot by informing them of the providential nature of religion
felt
alike
the poor and the rich.
the social order, that the share of each class
was assigned by God himself, and by holding out the hope for just compensation in a world to come in return for the inequalities of this governed the
recalling
that
possessions are partly the criterion of those
world.
So the less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility
that worldly interests are not man's and higher they must be subordinate to other interests, and that they should therefore not be pursued without rule or measure. Temporal power, in turn, restrained the scope of economic functions by its supremacy over them and by the relatively subordinate role it assigned them. Finally, within the business world proper, the occupational groups by regulating salaries, the price of products and production itself, indirectly fixed the average level of income on which needs are partially based by the very force of circumstances. However, we do not mean to propose this organization as a model. Clearly it would be inadequate to existing societies without great changes. What
aspired
to.
The
of unlimited success against them.
limited one feels, the tation appears.
more
intolerable
Not without reason,
less
all limi-
therefore,
have so many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching self-restraint. Forc-
ing us to constant self-discipline,
it
prepares us
It
latter,
entire
to accept collective discipline with equanimity,
we
while wealth, exalting the individual, may always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is
influence,
lot,
stress is its existence, the fact of its useful
take
its
and
place.
that nothing today has
come
to
88
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
Actually, religion has lost
And government,
most of
its
nomic life, has become its tool and servant. The most opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the latter leave it the task of doing the collective bookkeeping, that
of recording the
is,
demands
of
consumers, transmitting them to producers, inventorying the total revenue and distributing it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse it any power to subordinate other social organs to itself and to make them converge toward one dominant aim. On both sides nations are declared to have the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity; such is the
dogma
economic materialopposed sysas these theories merely express the
implication of the
of
ism, the basis of both apparently
tems.
And
being still regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individustate of opinion, industry, instead of
als
and
Thereupon the appetites become freed of any limiting
societies alike.
thus excited have authority.
By
sanctifying them, so to speak, this
them seems like a sort of sacrilege. For this reason, even this purely utilitarian regulation of them exercised by the industrial world itself through the medium of occupational groups has been unable to apotheosis
above
all
of
well-being
human
has
placed
law. Their restraint
persist. Ultimately, this liberation of desires
has
been made worse by the very development of industry and the almost infinite extension of the market. So long as the producer could gain his profits only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted amount of possible gain could not much overexcite ambition. Now that he may assume to have almost the entire wt)rld
how
could passions accept their former confinement in the face of such limitless prospects?
as his customer,
Such
power.
instead of regulating eco-
is
predomand which has
the source of the excitement
inating in this part of society,
thence extended to the other parts. There, the state of crisis
and anomy
is
From top
to
speak, normal.
constant and, so to
bottom of the
lad-
aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Reality seems valueless by comparison with der,
greed
the
dreams
is
of fevered imaginations; reality
therefore abandoned, but so too
abandoned when
in turn
it
thirst arises for novelties,
is
is
possibility
becomes
reality.
A
unfamiliar pleasures,
nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known. Henceforth one has no strength to endure the least reverse. The whole fever subsides and the sterility of all the tumult is
apparent, and
it
is
seen that
all
these
new
cannot form a solid foundation of happiness to support one during days of trial. The wise man, knowing how to enjoy achieved results without having constantly to replace them with others, finds in them an attachment to life in the hour of difficulty. But the man who has always pinned all his hopes on the future and lived with his eyes fixed upon it, has nothing in the past as a comfort against the present's afflictions, for the past was nothing to him but a series of hastily experienced stages. What blinded him to himself was his expectation always to find further on the happiness he had so far missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks; from now on nothing remains behind or ahead of him to fix his gaze upon. Weariness alone, moreover, is enough to bring disillusionment, for he cannot in the end escape the futility of an endless pursuit. We may even wonder if this moral state is sensations
in
their
not principally what
phes of our dav so eties
where
man
is
quantity
makes economic
catastro-
fertile in suicides. In soci-
subjected to a healthv dis-
he submits more readilv
to the blows of The neccssarv effort for sustaining a litmore discomfort costs him relati\el\' little,
cipline,
ciiance. tle
a
infinite
CHAPTER
since he
But
used
is
when every
to
3:
discomfort and constraint.
constraint
is
hateful in
itself,
how can closer constraint not seem intolerable? There is no tendency to resignation in the feverish impatience of men's lives. When there is no other aim but to outstrip constantly the point arrived at, how painful to be thrown back! Now this very lack of organization characterizing our economic condition throws the door wide to every sort of adventure. Since imagination is hungry for novelty, and ungoverned, it gropes at random. Setbacks necessarily increase with risks and thus crises multiply, just when they are becoming
more
destn.ictive.
Yet these dispositions are so inbred that soci-
ety has
grown to accept them and is accustomed them normal. It is everlastingly repeat-
to think
man's nature
be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal. The longing
ed that
it
is
for infinity
to
daily represented as a
is
mark
of
moral distinction, whereas it can only appear within unregulated consciences which elevate to a rule the lack of rule from which they suffer. The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress has become an article of faith. But other theories appear parallel with those praising the advantages of instability, which, generalizing the situation that gives
claim that
evil,
sure and that
it is it
them
Industrial
it
men is
only by false
greatest in the eco-
has most victims there.
and
commercial
functions
are
among the occupations which furnish greatest number of suicides. Almost on a
89
were distinguished from workmen, for the former are probably most stricken by the state of anomy. The enormous rate of those with independent means sufficiently shows that the possessors of most comfort suffer most. Everything that enforces subordination attenuates the effects of this state. the lower classes
is
At
least the
limited
horizon of
by those above
them, and for this same reason their desires are more modest. Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains them. Anomy, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies; one of the springs from which the annual contingent
So
feeds.
we have
new
here a
type to distin-
from them in which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them. Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, because this basis for existence appears to man situated beyond life guish from the others. its
It
differs
dependence, not on the
way
in
The third sort of suicide, the existence of which has just been shown, results from man's activity's lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings. By virtue of its origin we itself.
name
of anomic
egoistic suicide
have kin-
shall assign this last variety the suicide.
richer in grief than in plea-
attracts
claims. Since this disorder
nomic world,
birth, declare life
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
Certainly, this
and
Both spring from society's insufficient presence in individuals. But the sphere of its absence is not the same in both cases. In dred
ties.
egoistic suicide
it is
deficient in truly collective
thus depriving the latter of object and
really
activity,
the
meaning. In anomic suicide, society's influence
with the liberal professions, they sometimes surpass them; they are especially more afflicted than agriculture, where the old regulative forces still make their appearance felt most and where the fever of business has least penetrated. Here is best recalled what was once the
is
general constitution of the economic order.
an anomic
And the divergence would be yet greater if, among the suicides of industry, employers
vice versa. These
level
lacking in the basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein. In spite of their relationship, therefore, the two
types are independent of each other. We may offer society everything social in us, and still be
unable
to control
state
do not draw
our desires; one may live in without being egoistic, and
two
sorts of suicide therefore
their chief recruits
from the same
90
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
one has
social environments;
among
its
careers,
intellectual
principal field
the
world
of
—
thought the other, the industrial or commerworld.
cial
But it has been less frequently noticed that religion has not confined itself to enriching the
human certain
intellect,
number
forming the
formed beforehand, with a
of ideas;
has contributed to
it
Men owe
to it not only a good part of the substance of their knowledge, but also the form in which this
Emile Durkheim: The Elementary
Forms
of Religious Life
The study which we are undertaking fore a
way
conditions, the old
gion. To be sure,
up
is
there-
new problem of the origin of reliif by origin we are to under-
of taking
again, but under
intellect itself.
knowledge has been elaborated. At the roots of all our judgments there are a certain number of essential ideas which dominate all our intellectual life; they are what philosophers since Aristotle have called the categories of the understanding: ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, substance, person-
They correspond to the most univerThey are like the solid frame which encloses all thought; this does not seem to be able to liberate itself from them without destroying itself, for it seems that we cannot think of objects that are not in time and space, which have no number, etc. Other ideas are contingent and unsteady; we can conceive of their being unknown to a man, a societv or ality, etc.
stand the very
nothing
first
scientific
beginning, the question has
about
olutely discarded. There
it,
and should be
res-
was no given moment
when
religion began to exist, and there is consequently no need of finding a means of transporting ourselves thither in thought. Like everv human institution, religion did not com-
mence anywhere.
Therefore,
all
speculations of
this sort are justly discredited;
they can only
and arbitrary constructions which are subject to no sort of control. But the problem which we raise is quite another one. What we want to do is to find a consist in subjective
means of discerning the ever-present causes upon which the most essential forms of religious thought and practice depend. it has been known that the systems of representations with which men have pictured to themselves the world and themselves were of religious origin. There
For a long time
first
no religion that is not a cosmology at the same time that it is a speculation upon divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born of religion, it is because religii>n began by taking the place of the sciences and philosophy. is
sal properties of things.
an epoch; but these others appear to be nearly inseparable from the normal working of the intellect.
They are
intelligence.
like the
Now when
framework
primitive
of the
religious
beliefs are systematically analysed, the princi-
pal categories are naturally found.
Thev are
born in religion and of religion; they are a product of religious thought. This is a statement that we are going to have occasion to make many times in the course of this work. This remark has some interest of itself already; but here is what gives it its real importance.
The general conclusion of the book which him is that religion is
the reader has before
something eminently
social.
Religious repre-
sentations are collective representations which
express collecti\e
realities; the rites are a
man-
ner of acting which take rise in the midst of the
Source
Reprinted frcim Fmilo Durkheim,
lan/ Fornii of Rt-ligioiis Life.
The Free
Press.
Tlic Elcincn-
assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups. So if the categories are of
CHAPTER
religious origin, they this
nature
common
ought
3:
to participate in
to all religious facts; they
too should be social affairs and the product of
—
At least for in the actual condition of our knowledge of these matters, one should be careful to avoid all radical and collective thought.
exclusive statements
—
it
allowable to sup-
is
pose that they are rich in social elements. All
known
religious beliefs,
or complex, present one
all
the
and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or opposed groups, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and sathings, real
cred (profane, sacred. This division of the
into
two domains, the one containing
sacred, the other
all
that
is
profane,
all
is
sorts
of
things,
them
world that
is
the dis-
tinctive trait of religious thought; the beliefs,
myths, dogmas and legends are either representations or systems of representations
sion of the others. But
forms of the contrast is
which
fane things.
human thought
there
two categories
of
things so profoundly differentiated or so radically
opposed
to
one another. The
opposition of good and bad
is
traditional
nothing beside
good and the bad are only two opposed species of the same class, namely morals, just as sickness and health are two different aspects of the same order of facts, life, while the sacred and the profane have always and everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in common. The forces which play in one are not simply those which are met with in the other, but a litthis; for
tle
the
stronger; they are of a different sort. In dif-
ferent religions, this opposition has
ceived in different ways.
have been
vary, the fact of the
universal.
of these two classes manioutwardly with a visible sign by which we can easily recognize this very special classification, wherever it exists. Since the idea of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from the idea of the profane in the thought of men, and since we picture a sort of logical chasm between the two, the mind irresistibly refuses to allow the two corresponding things to be confounded, or even to be merely put in contact with each other; for such a promiscuity, or even too ciirect a contiguity,
The opposition
fests
itself
would
contradict too violently the dissociation
The sacred thing is which the profane should not touch, and cannot touch with impunity. To be sure, this interdiction cannot go so far as to make all communication between the two worlds impossible; for if the profane could in no way enter into relations with the sacred, this latter could be good for nothing. But, in addi-
par excellence that
of
first
howsoever much the
may
and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with pro-
no other example
seemed
put into an ideal and transcendental world, while the material world is left in full posses-
of these ideas in the mind.
In all the history of
has
in different parts of
the physical universe; there, the
express the nature of sacred things, the virtues
exists
it
91
if**************
characteris-
they presuppose a classification of
tic:
two
these
sufficient to localize
contrast
whether simple
common
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
been con-
Here, to separate
tion to the fact that this establishment of rela-
tions
is
always a delicate operation in itself, great precautions and a more or
demanding less
complicated initiation, it is quite impossiprofane is to lose its specific char-
ble, unless the
acteristics
and become sacred
after a fashion
degree itself. The two classes cannot even approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time.
and
to a certain
Thus we arrive at the first criterium of religious beliefs. Undoubtedly there are secondary species within these
two fundamental
classes
which, in their turn, are more or less incompatible with each other. But the real characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always
92
PARTV THE CLASSIC TRADITION
suppose
which embrace cally
whole unitwo classes but which radi-
a bipartite division of the
known and knowable,
verse,
all
into
that exists,
exclude each other. Sacred things are
those which the interdictions protect and isolate;
profane things, those to which these inter-
dictions are applied a distance
and which must remain
at
from the first. Religious beliefs are which express the nature of
the representations
sacred things and the relations which they sus-
with each other or with profane conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of these sacred objects.
group, the family or the corporation. Moreover,
even these particular religions are ordinarily only special forms of a more general religion which embraces all; these restricted Churches are in reality only chapels of a vaster
which, by reason of name still more.
Thus we religion
is
arrive at the following definition:
a unified system of beliefs
relative to sacred things, that
things. Finally, rites are the rules of
apart and forbidden
The
always comdetermined group, which makes profession of adhering to them and of practising the rites connected with them. They are not merely received individually by all the members of this group; they are something belong-
mon
really religious beliefs are
to a
and they make its unity. The individuals which compose it feel themselves united to each other by the simple fact that they have a common faith. A society whose members are united by the fact that thev think in the same way in regard to the sacred world and its relations with the profane world, and by the fact that they translate these common ideas into common practices, is what is called a Church. In all history, we do not find a sii\gle religion without a Church. Sometimes the Church is strictly national, sometimes it passes the frontiers; sometimes it embraces an entire people (Rome, Athens, the Hebrews), sometimes it embraces only a part of them (the ing to the group,
Christian societies since the advent of Protes-
sometimes it is directed by a corps of sometimes it is almost completely devoid of any official directing body. But wher-
this
***************
tain, either
***************
Church
very extent, merits
this
—
is
and
A
practices
to say, things set
and practices, which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The second element which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by beliefs
showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that should
religion
be an eminently collective
thing.
*************** The proposition established
in the
preceding
chapter determines the terms in which the prob-
lem of the origins of totemism should be posed. is everywhere dominated bv the idea of a quasi-divine principle, imminent in certain categories of men and things and thought of under the form of an animal or vegSince totemism
etable, the explanation of this religion tiallv the this,
explanation of this
we must seek
to learn
led to construct this idea rials It
essen-
how men have been
and out of what mate-
they have constructed is
is
belief; to arrive at
it.
obviously not out of the sensations
which the things serving as totems are able to arouse in the mind; we have shown that these things are frequently insignificant. The lizard,
tantism);
the caterpillar, the rat, the ant, the frog, the
priests,
turkey, the bream-fish, the plum-tree, the cock-
ever it
we
observe the religious
has a definite group as
its
life,
we
find that
foundation. Even
the so-called private cults, such as the domestic cult or the cult of a corporation, satisfy this
condition; for they are always celebrated by a
atoo,
etc.,
appear
to
cite
frequentiv
only those names which in the lists of Australian
upon and strong impressions which in a wav resemble religious emotions and which impress a sacred character upon the totems, are not ot a nature to produce
men
these great
CHAPTER
objects they create.
It is
true that this
is
3:
not the
case with the stars and the great atmospheric
phenomena, which have, on the that
necessary to strike
is
the
contrary,
all
imagination
forcibly; but as a matter of fact, these serve only very exceptionally as totems. It is even probable that they were very slow in taking this office. So it is not the intrinsic nature of the
thing
whose name
the clan bears that
marked
it
out to become the object of a cult. Also, if the sentiments which it inspired were really the determining cause of the totemic rites and
would be
the pre-eminently sacred animals or plants employed as totems would play an eminent part in the religious life. But we know that the centre of the
beliefs,
cult
it
the
thing;
actually elsewhere.
is
It
is
the figurative
representations of this plant or animal and the
totemic emblems and symbols of every sort, which have the greatest sanctity; so it is in them that is found the source of that religious nature, of which the real objects represented by
emblems receive only a reflection. Thus the totem is before all a symbol,
these
a
material expression of something else. But of
what?
From the analysis to which we have been giving our attention,
it is
and symbolizes two the
first
place,
form of what
it
evident that
is
it
expresses
the outward and visible
we have called
ple or god. But
it
different sorts of things. In
is
the totemic princi-
also the
symbol
of the
determined society called the clan. It is its flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything which is a part of the clan under any title whatsoever, men, beasts or things. So if it is at once the
god and of the society, is that not because the god and the society are only one? How could the emblem of the group have been able to become the figure of this quasi-divinity, if the group and the divinity were two distinct realities? The god of the clan, the totemic prinsymbol
ciple,
of the
can therefore be nothing else than the
EMILE DURKHEIM; ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
93
itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the ani-
clan
mal or vegetable which serves as totem. But how has this apotheosis been possible, and how did it happen to take place in this fashion? In a general way,
society has
all
that
it is
is
unquestionable that a
necessary to arouse the
sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the
power that it has over them; for to its members it is what a god is to his worshippers. In fact, a god is, first of all, a being whom men think of as superior to themselves, and upon whom they feel that they depend. Whether it be a conscious personality, such as Zeus or Jahveh, or
merely abstract forces such as those in play totemism, the worshipper, in the one case as
in in
manners of acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred principle with which he feels that he is in communion. Now society the other, believes himself held to certain
gives us the sensation of a perpetual dependence. Since it has a nature which is peculiar to itself and different from our individual nature, it pursues ends which are likewise special to it; but, as it cannot attain them except through our intermediacy, it imperiously demands our aid. It requires that, forgetful of our own interest, we make ourselves its servitors, and it submits us to every sort of inconvenience, privation and sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible. It is because of this that at every instant we are obliged to submit ourselves to rules of conduct and of thought which we have neither made nor desired, and which are sometimes even contrary to our most fundamental inclinations also
and instincts. Even if society were unable to obtain these concessions and sacrifices from us except by a material constraint, it might awaken in us only the idea of a physical force to which we must give
way
of necessity, instead of that of a moral
power such
as religions adore. But as a matter
of fact, the empire
which
it
holds over con-
94
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
the
due much less to the physical which it has the privilege than to moral authority with which it is invested. If
we
yield to
sciences
is
supremacy
is
of
its
orders,
it is
not merely because
it
strong enough to triumph over our resis-
tance;
it is
primarily because
it is
the object of a
venerable respect.
We
say that an object, whether individual or
collective, inspires respect
when
tation expressing
mind
in the
it
such a force that relative
to
gifted with
automatically causes or
it
inhibits actions, without iv^nrd for tion
the represenis
useful or
their
any considera-
injurious effects.
When we obey somebody because of the moral authority which we recognize in him, we follow out
seem
his opinions, not because they
wise, but because a certain sort of physical energy is imminent in the idea that we form of this person, which conquers our will and inclines it in the indicated direction. Respect is the emotion which we experience when we feel this interior and wholly spiritual pressure
upon us. Then we are not determined by the advantages or inconveniences of the attitude which is prescribed or recommended to us; it is by the way in which we represent to ourselves the person recommending
operating
or prescribing
it.
This
ally take a short,
place for hesitation; is
a
all
why commands
it is
command and
excludes
is
gener-
peremptory form leaving no because, in so far as
goes by
its
own
force,
it it
idea of deliberation or calculation;
efficacy from the intensity of the mental which it is placed. It is this intensity which creates what is called a moral ascendancy. it
gets
its
state in
*************** Since
it
is
in spiritual
sure exercises
men exist
the idea
itself,
that
it
ways
that social pres-
could not
fail
to
give
outside themselves there
one or several powers, both moral and,
at
same time, efficacious, upon which they depend. They must think of these powers, at the
least in part, as outside themselves, for these
address them
in a
tone of
command and some-
times even order them to do violence to their
most natural true that
influences ety,
inclinations.
It
is
undoubtedly
they were able to see that these
if
which they
feel
emanate from
soci-
then the mythological system of interpreta-
would never be born. But social action ways that are too circuitous and obscure, and employs physical mechanisms that are too complex to allow the ordinary observer to see when it comes. As long as scientific analysis does not come to teach it to them, men tions
follows
know
well that they are acted upon, but they
do not know by whom. So they must invent by themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves in connection, and that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way by which they were led to represent them
from
under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to transfigure them by thought. But a god is not merely an authoritv upon whom we depend; it is a force upon which our strength relies. The man who has obeyed his god and who for this reason, believes the god is with him, approaches the world with confidence and with the feeling of an increased energy. Likewise, social action does not confine itself to demanding sacrifices, privations and efforts from us. For the collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act upon us wholly from without; but rather, since society cannot exist except in and through indi\'idual consciousness, this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated and magnified. There are occasions when this strengthening and vivifying action of society is especially apparent. In the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces; and when the assembly is dissoh'ed and when,
we fall back to we are then able to measure which we have been raised above
finding ourselves alone again,
our ordinary the height to
ourselves.
I
level,
listory
abounds
in
examples of
this
CHAPTER
sort.
is
It
enough
3:
to think of the night of the
Fourth of August, 1789, when an assembly was suddenly led to an act of sacrifice and abnegation which each of its members had refused the
day
and
before,
prised the day
at
which they were This
after.
is
why
all
all
sur-
parties
economic or confessional, are careful to have periodical reunions where their members may revivify their common faith by manifesting it in common. To strengthen those sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, it is sufficient to bring those who hold them together and to put them into closer and more active relations with one another. This is political,
the explanation of the particular attitude of a
man speaking to a crowd, at least if he has succeeded in entering into communion with it. His language has a grandiloquence that would be ridiculous in ordinary circumstances; his gestures
show
thought
is
a
certain
impatient of
domination; his very all rules,
and
easily falls
because he feels within him an abnormal over-supply of force which overflows and tries to burst out from him; sometimes he even has the feeling that he is dominated by a moral force which is greater than he and of which he is only the interpreter. into all sorts of excesses.
It is
by this trait that we are able to recognize what has often been called the demon of oratorIt is
ical inspiration.
Now
this exceptional increase
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
of
some
great collective shock, social interac-
have become much more frequent and active. Men look for each other and assemble together more than ever. That general effervescence results which is characteristic of revolutions
tionary or creative epochs.
vidual forces.
now
Men
ferent.
states,
where makes
intermittent
are other more durable ones, strengthening influence of society
there this
itself felt
with greater consequences and
men become
dif-
are of such
*************** In addition to
men, society also consecrates
things, especially ideas.
If
a belief
is
unani-
mously shared by a people, then, for the reason which we pointed out above, it is forbidden to touch it, that is to say, to deny it or to contest it.
Now
the prohibition of criticism
is
an interdic-
and proves the presence of something sacred. Even today, howsoever great may be the liberty which we accord to others, a man who should totally deny progress or ridicule the human ideal to which modern societies are attached, would produce the effect of a sacrilege. There is at least one principle which those the most devoted to the tion like the others
examination of everything tend to place to regard as untouchable, that is to say, as sacred: this is the very principle of free examination. This aptitude of society for setting itself up free
purely
and
differently
an intensity that they cannot be satisfied except by violent and unrestrained actions, actions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism.
incarnate and personified.
passing
more and
The passions moving them
as a
these
see
merely of shades and degrees;
degree they strengthen his own sentiment. The passionate energies he arouses re-echo within him and quicken his vital tone. It is no longer a simple individual who speaks; it is a group Besides
this greater
than in normal times. Changes are not
above discussion and
is
Now
activity results in a general stimulation of indi-
something very real; it comes to him from the very group which he addresses. The sentiments provoked by his words come back to him, but enlarged and amplified, and to this of force
95
god or for creating gods was never more apparent than during the first years of the French Revolution. At this time, in fact, under the influence of the general enthusiasm, things laical
by nature were transformed by
public opinion into sacred things: these were the Fatherland, Liberty, Reason.
*************** We
are
now
able to understand
how
the
frequently even with greater brilliancy. There
totemic principle, and in general, every
are periods in history when, under the influence
gious force, comes to be outside of the object in
reli-
96
PART
1
:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
which it resides. It is because the idea of it is in no
wav made up
of the impressions directly pro-
Rehgious forces are therefore moral forces.
made
of the consciousnesses that experience them,
such as
To be objectified, they are fixed upon some object which thus becomes sacred; but anv object might fulfil this function. In principle, there are none whose nature predes-
the legal
objectified.
tines
them
to
it
to the exclusion of all others;
but also there are none that are necessarily impossible. Everything depends upon the circumstances which lead the sentiment creating religious ideas to establish itself here or there,
upon
this point or
upon that one. Therefore, assumed by an object is
the sacred character
not imphed in the intrinsic properties of this latter: it is added to them. The world of rehgious things nature;
is
not one particular aspect of empirical superimposed upon
*************** if is
In addition to
all
it.
the reasons ^vhich have been
gi\'en to justif}' this conception, a final one may be added here, which is the result of our whole work. As we ha\'e progressed, we have established the fact that the fundamental categories of thought, and consequently of science, are of rehgious origin. We have seen that the same is true for magic and consequently for the different processes which have issued from it. On the other hand, it has long been known that up until a relatively ad\anced moment of e\olution, moral and legal rules have been indistinguishable from ritual prescriptions. In summing up, then, it may be said that nearly all the great social institutions have been bom in religion. Now in
order that these principal aspects of the collective life may have commenced by being only
obviously be the eminent form and, as it were, the concentrated expression of the whole collective life. If religion had gi\en birth to all that is essential in society, it is because varied aspects of the religious
necessary that the religious
the idea of society
is
life, it is
life
the soul of religion.
forces,
***************
duced by this thing upon our senses or minds. Rehgious force is only the sentiment inspired by the group in its members, but projected outside
and
human
But,
it
is
what
said,
society
the basis of religion? it
is it
Is it
that has thus
the real society,
is and acts before our \'ery eyes, with and moral organization which it has
laboriouslv fashioned during the course of histor\'?
This
is full
and imperfections.
of defects
goes beside the good, injustice often reigns supreme, and the truth is often obscured by error. How could anything so crudely organized ir^pire the sentiments of love, the ardent enthusiasm and the spirit of abnegation which all religions claim of their followers? These perfect beings which are gods could not have taken their traits from so mediocre, and sometimes e\-en so base a reahty. But, on the other hand, does someone thiiJc In
it,
evil
of a perfect societs',
where
and
justice
\vould be so\ereign, and from which its
e\-il
forms would be baiushed for ever?
would
cienv that this
is
the religious sentiment;
No
in close relations for,
truth in all
one
with
they would say,
it
towards the realization of this that all reUgions strive. But that societv is not an empirical fact, definite and obser\-able; it is a fanc\', a dream with which men have Ughtened their sufferings, but in which thev have never really Uved. It is merely an idea which comes to express our more or less obscure aspirations towards the good, the beautiful and the ideal. Now these aspirations have their roots in us; they come from the very depths of our being; then there is nothing outside of us which can account for them. Moreover, they are already is
religious in themselves; thus that the ideal society
from being able But, in the
simplified
to explain
first
when
alistic side: in its
it
would seem
presupposes rehgion,
far
it.
place, things are arbitrarily
religion
way,
it
is
seen onlv on
is realistic.
its
There
ide-
is
no
physical or moral ugliness, there are no vices or e\'ils which do not ha\'e a special There are gods of theft and trickery, of
divinity. lust
and
CHAPTER
3:
war, of sickness and of death. Christianity itself, howsoever high the idea which it has made of the divinity
may be, has been obUged
to give the
mythology. Satan is an even if he is an impure being, he is not a profane one. The anti-god is a god, inferior and subordinated, is true, but nevertheless endowed with it extended powers; he is even the object of rites, at least of negative ones. Thus religion, far from ignoring the real society and making abstraction of it, is in its image; it reflects all its aspects, even the most vulgar and the most repulsive. All is to be found there, and if in the
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
they transport themselves by thought. But that is is
merely changing the terms of the problem; it not resolving it or even advancing it. This
spirit of evil a place in its
systematic idealization
essential piece of the Christian system;
teristic
we
majority of cases
see the
good victorious
over evil, life over death, the powers of light over the powers of darkness, it is because reality
97
innate
of religions.
is
an
essential charac-
Explaining them by an
power of idealization is simply replacword by another which is the equiva-
ing one
lent of the
first;
it
is
as
if
they said that
men
have made religions because they have a rehgious nature. Animals know only one world, the one which they perceive by experience, internal as well as external. Men alone have the faculty of conceiving the ideal, of adding something to the real. Now where does this singular privilege come from? Before making it an initial fact or a mysterious virtue which escapes science, we must be sure that it does not
between these were reversed, life would
depend upon empirically determinable condi-
be impossible; but, as a matter of fact, it maintains itself and even tends to develop. But if, in the midst of these mythologies and
The explanation of religion which we have proposed has precisely this advantage, that it gives an answer to this question. For our definition of the sacred is that it is something added to and above the real: now the ideal answers to this same definition; we cannot explain one without explaining the other. In fact, we have
is
not otherwise.
two contrary
theologies
we
the relation
If
forces
see reality clearly appearing,
it
is
none the less true that it is found there only in an enlarged, transformed and idealized form. In this respect, the most primitive religions do not differ from the niost recent and the most refined. For example, we have seen how the Arunta place at the beginning of time a mythical society
whose organization
exactly repro-
duces that which still exists today; it includes the same clans and phratries, it is under the same matrimonial rules and it practises the same rites. But the personages who compose it are icieal beings, gifted with powers and virtues to which common mortals cannot pretend. Their nature is not only higher, but it is different, since it is at once animal and human. The evil powers there undergo a similar metamorphosis: evil itself is, as it were, made subof
whence
Some
for idealizing, that
collective life
awakens
religious
activity.
Vital energies are over-excited, pas-
more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds sions
him. In order to account for the very particular
impressions which he receives, he attributes to the things with which he is in most direct con-
which
sense, does not exist except in thought, but to
men have is
if
thought on reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic
to say, of substituting for
this idealization
reply that
seen that
which they have not, exceptionpowers and virtues which the objects of everyday experience do not possess. In a word, above the real world where his profane life passes he has placed another which, in one
lime and idealized. The question itself
tions.
now
raises
comes.
a natural faculty
the real world another different one, to
tact properties al
98
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
which he
attributes a higher sort of digi^ity
than to the
first.
Thus, from a double point of
place for investigating
problem,
this
can touch; it is a natural product of social life. For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must
power
assemble and concentrate itself. Now this concentration brings about an exaltation of the mental life which takes form in a group of ideal conceptions where is portrayed the new life thus awakened; they correspond to this new
of conceiving the ideal.
which we have
which
is
added
to those
our disposition for the daily tasks of existence. A society can neither create itself or recreate itself without at the same time at
creating an ideal. This creation
is
not a sort of
work of supererogation for it, by which would complete itself, being already formed; is
the act by
which
it is
periodically
it it
made and
remade. Therefore when some oppose the ideal society to the real society, like
two antagonists
which would lead us in opposite directions, they materialize and oppose abstractions. The ideal society is
a part of
is
it.
not outside of the real society; it Far from being divided between
between two poles which mutually repel each other, we cannot hold to one with-
them
as
out holding to the other. For a society is not made up merely of the mass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occu-
which they use and the movements which they perform, but above all is the idea which it forms of itself. It is undoubtedly true that it hesitates over the manner in which it ought to conceive itself; it feels itself drawn py, the things
in
divergent
directions.
But
these
conflicts
which break forth are not between the ideal and reality, but between two different ideals, that of yesterday and that of today, that which has the authority of tradition and that which has the hope of the future. There is surely a
it
still
these ideals
may
remains that
view it is an ideal world. The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible fact which escapes science; it depends upon conditions which observation
set of psychical forces
whence
evolve; but whatever solution
be given to
all
passes in
the world of the ideal.
Thus the expresses
is
collective
far
of the individual, but
school of collective
learned to idealize.
life
It is
which religion vague innate
ideal
from being due
to a
it is
rather at the
that the individual has
in assimilating the ideals
elaborated by society that he has become capable It is
society which,
by
sphere of action, has made him acquire the need of raising himself above the world of experience and has at the same time furleading him within
its
him with
nished
the
means
conceiving
of
another. For society has constructed this
new
world which
indi-
in constructing itself, since this expresses.
it
is
society
Thus both with the
vidual and in the group, the faculty of idealizing has nothing mysterious about it. It is not a sort of
luxury which a man could get along without, but a condition of his very existence. He could not be a social being, that is to say, he could not be a
man,
if
he had not acquired
it.
It is
true that in
incarnating themselves in individuals, collective ideals tend to individualize themselves. Each
understands them after his own fashion and marks them with his own stamp; he suppresses certain elements and adds others. Thus the personal ideal disengages itself from the social ideal in proportion as the individual personality develops itself and becomes an autonomous source of action. But if we wish to understand this aptitude, so singular in appearance, of living outside of realitv, it is enough to connect it with the social conditions
upon which it depends.
Thus there is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively en\'eloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective
sentiments and the collective ideas which its
unity and
its
personality.
Now
this
make moral
CHAPTER
3:
remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results.
What
essential difference
is
there
between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the
life
of Christ, or of
Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a
EMILE DURKHEIM: ANOMIE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION
will
come when our
societies will
new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity; and when these hours shall course of which
have been passed through once, men will spontaneously feel the need of reliving them from time to time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their memory by nieans of celebrations which regularly reproduce their fruits. We have already seen how the French Revolution established a whole cycle of holidays to keep the principles with which it was inspired in a state of
perpetual youth.
mulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life? If we find a little difficulty today in imagining what these feasts and ceremonies of the future could consist in, it is because we are going through a stage of transition and moral
quickly
away,
The
great things of the past
which
our fathers with enthusiasm do not excite the same ardour in us, either because they have come into common usage to such an extent that we are unconscious of them, or else because they no longer answer to our actual aspirations; but as yet there is nothing to replace them. We can no longer impassionate ourselves filled
for the principles in the tianity
recommended
to
name
of
which Chris-
masters that they treat
humanely, and, on the other hand, it has formed of human equality and fraternity seems to us today to leave too their slaves
the idea
which
large a place for unjust inequalities.
Its
how
it
could be realized in
facts. In
a word,
the old gods are growing old or already dead,
and others are not yet born. This
is
fell
tionary faith lasted
If this
institution
was because the revolubut a moment, and decep-
it
and discouragements rapidly succeeded moments of enthusiasm. But though the work may have miscarried, it enables us to imagine what might have happened in other conditions; and everything leads us to believe that it will be taken up again sooner or later. There are no gospels which are immortal, but neither is there any reason for believing that humanity is incapable of inventing new ones. As to the question of what symbols this new faith will express itself with, whether they will resemble those of the past or not, and whether or not they will be more adecjuate for the reality which they seek to translate, that is something which surpasses the human faculty of foresight and which does not appertain to the principal tions
the
first
question.
pity for
the outcast seems to us too Platonic; we desire another which would be more practicable; but as yet we cannot clearly see what it should be
nor
again
those hours of creative effervescence, in the
reunion of citizens commemorating the pro-
mediocrity.
know
99
what
ren-
dered vain the attempt of Comte with the old historic souvenirs artificially revived: it is life itself, and not a dead past which can produce a living cult. But this state of incertitude and confused agitation cannot last for ever. A day
Thus sociology appears destined to open a to the science of man. Up to the present, thinkers were placed before this double alternative: either explain the superior and specific faculties of men by connecting them to
new way
the inferior forms of his being, the reason to the senses, or the lent to
mind
denying
to matter,
which
is
equiva-
their uniqueness; or else attach
them to some super-experimental reality which was postulated, but whose existence could be established by no observation. What put them
100
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
in this difficulty
was
the fact that the individ-
ual passed as being the
finis
natunv
—the
ulti-
mate creation of nature; it seemed that there was nothing beyond him, or at least nothing that science could touch. But from the moment when it is recognized that above the individual there is society, and that this is not a nominal being created by reason, but a system of active forces, a new manner of explaining men becomes possible. To conserve his distinctive traits it is no longer necessary to put them outside experience. At least, before going to this last extremity, it
would be well
to see
individual, though
come from
if it
that is
which surpasses the
within him, does not
this super-individual reality
which
we experience in society. To be sure, it cannot be said at present to
what point these explanations
may be able to reach, and whether or not they are of a nature to resolve
all
the problems. But
mark
it is
advance a limit beyond which they cannot go. What must be done is to try the hypothesis and submit it as equally impossible to
in
methodically as possible to the control of This is what we have tried to do.
facts.
CHAPTER
4
Friedrich Nietzsche:
Reason and Power
INTRODUCTION
Among social theorists in recent years, Friedrich Nietzsche has become the focus of increasing scholarly attention. Earlier interest in Nietzsche
among
had
been confined to understanding the linkages between his ideas and those of Georg Simmel and Max Weber. Simmel had written a full study of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and Weber's views on methodology, bureaucratic rationality, and charisma had Nietzschean influences that were and continue to be the subject of scholarly interest.
sociologists
Indeed, Weber paid tribute to Nietzsche
when he said: One can measure ar,
and
how he
the integrity of a
modern
especially of a
sees his
own
modern
schol-
philosopher, by
relationship to Nietzsche
and Marx. Whoever does not admit
that he could
not accomplish very important aspects of his
work without
work
own
two have performed, deceives both himself and others. The world in u'hich we ourselves exist intellectually is largely a world stamped by Marx and Nietthe
that these
zsche.
However,
it
is
the growing recognition of
Nietzsche's thought as the center of post-mod-
ernism (Chapter 17) that has stimulated the more recent serious concern with the works of this brilliant
and
eccentric nineteenth-century
philosopher, and compel his inclusion
among
the seminal texts in social theory.
Nietzsche was born in 1844 in the town of in Saxony into a long line of Lutheran
Rocken
clergymen. His father and both his grandfathers had been ministers in the Lutheran
Church.
When
Nietzsche was five years old,
his father died suddenly, leaving the
young
Nietzsche to be raised by his mother, his sister, his grandmother, and two maiden aunts. He
was
sent off to boarding school at the age of
and he later attended the University Bonn, where he was drawn to the study of Greek and Roman literature. He finished his advanced degree in philology at Leipzig and took a professorial post at the age of twentyfour at Basel. Nietzsche taught at Basel for ten years, from 1869 to 1879, during which time he produced his first major work. The Birth of Tragedy. Thereafter, Nietzsche published a number of important works. Human, AU-tooHitman (1878), The Gay Science (1882), Beyond fourteen, in
101
.
102
PART1
Good and
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
Evil
(1886),
Toivnrd a
Genealogij of
reason to nature and society had the effect of
(1889),
extending the Apollonian stranglehold on the emotional life of humankind. Human progress could be assured if reason were enthroned and ercitic sensuality repressed. The vapid, narrow,
Morals (1887), The Twilight of the and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1892).
Idols
Nietzsche had to resign his post at Basel in 1879 because of iUness, but in the creative
work out
struggle to
his
philosophy over the
next decade, Nietzsche recovered physically,
only to succumb to madness in his final years. life was an extraordinary testament
and
sterile life of
nineteenth-century bourgeois
which Nietzsche rebelled, was then the contemporary expression of centuries
society, against
repression.
Max
Weber's "iron cage" of
Nietzsche's
of
bouts with the psychosomatic illnesses that plagued him. Nor was Nietzsche the ordinary type of scholar that one might encounter in the university. His
bureaucratic rationality, which speaks to the par-
to the will to live despite serious
writing
was emotionally charged,
his visions
were graphically presented, his style was poetic and aphoristic, and he did not follow the
celling
out
of
He
ing
and to ignore its and sensual component. For Nietzsche, Christianity continued to emphasize the Apollonian mode as it held out rewards in heaven for nal expressions of the culture
those
who
Similarly,
repressed the erotic Dionysian the
Enlightenment's
spirit.
promise
himian betterment through the application
spirit,
parallels
treatment of the human sciences as disciplinary agents of social control (Chapter 1 7) Nietzsche saw in the transition from Greek aristocratic morality to Christianity a funda-
mental change
erotic
human
later
expected rules of scholarly discourse. In his private life as well Nietzsche seemed eccentric.
never married, he developed a deep-seated misogyny, established a long-standing agonistic relationship with Richard Wagner, fell in love with Wagner's wife Cosima, and depended on a wide array of drugs to help him cope with his various illnesses. He drove himself to work feverishly and spent the last decade of his life in madness, unable to care for himself. In his studies of ancient Greece, Nietzsche detected what he called the Apollonian and the Dionysian cultures, which together captured the reality of Greek life. The Dionysian cults, celebrated with orgiastically expressive dance and music, represented a deeply emotional and irrational human force that strained to achieve ecstasy. In sharp contrast, the rational, analytical, and coolly logical Apollonian culture was represented in geometrically precise temples and in timeless marble statues. Greece was reason and passion, and it is a mistake to focus on the ratio-
the
Nietzsche's thesis, as does Michel Foucault's
to a slave morality.
ian doctrine of altruism, humility,
was designed
willful
to
and sensual.
The and
Christsuffer-
humble and restrain the It was Nietzsche's intenlegitimating myths that
explode the support these repressive religious authorities that presume to shape human life according to their values. His early support of Wagner and tion
the
to
Wagner movement,
as well as his
own
doc-
trine calling for the trans\aluation of values
were expressions of Nietzsche's profound contempt for bourgeois civilization and for the distorted values by which it justified itself. Nietzsche wrote about the Ubennensch, the next and higher stage of human development, in which the sensuous and creative individual comes forth, embracing life rather than fearing it, and in which the creative powers are encouraged as the rightful expression of free individuals. Weber's writings on rationalization and charisma, as well as Foucault's later works dealing with the care of the self, seem to resonate with Nietzsche's views. More immediately selfevident are the affinities between Sigmund Freud's views on repression and sublimation and Nietzsche's attack on bourgeois morality. The excerpts below, from Nietzsche's W/// to
of
Power, illustrate the aphoristic style that he
o\
occasionally used; but
more importantly, they
CHAPTER
point in the direction of perspectivism, idea that
all
assertions about truth
i.e.,
the
and mean-
ing are but relative claims that reflect social or
personal perspectives. This doctrine permitted Nietzsche to challenge the claims to universal
and from philosophical writings. The proclamation truth emanating from Christian teachings
that
"God
is
Dead"
is
Nietzsche's
that Christian morality
is
way
of saying
no longer privileged,
now
understood as a human construction propagated by social institutions that benefit from the widespread belief in the divini-
and
ty
that
it is
and universal
truth of Christian doctrines.
4;
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: REASON AND
there
no
is
POWER
103
single, valid truth or interpretation.
All texts are subject to interpretation,
and what-
moment is a function of power and not of truth. The appropriation of Nietzsche by post-modern advocates of feminism and multicultural democracy appears ironic, since Nietzsche himself expressed misogynistic and anti-democratic ever interpretation prevails at any given
sentiments. as Allan
Is
the democratization of Nietzsche,
Bloom has argued
in Tlic Closing of the
Amcricn)! Mind, a fundamental misappropriation
and misreading
incoherent?
Can
of his
work
the strongly
that renders
elitist
it
character of
Similarly, Nietzsche's perspectivism allows for
the Uhcrmensch, calling for transcendence of the
the deconstruction of the claims to universal
slavish pursuit of comfort
by philosophy and other disciplines, based on the privileged position of reason.
reconciled with egalitarian democracy and the
truth
Weber (Chapter
5)
objectivity, rationality, far
addresses the issues of
and
scientific truth in a
more sustained and systematic fashion than
Nietzsche. But Nietzsche's influence
is
appar-
and happiness, be
worship of popular mass culture? More importantly, is the Nietzschean challenge capable of providing a new basis for social order? For example, while Marx is critical of the bourgeois
capitalist
order and predicts
its
revolutionary
contemporary debates surrounding post-modernism and in the claims that rational and objective truth are
transformation, he also provides an account of
but
transvaluation of values develops a powerfully
ent throughout as
it
is
in the
legitimations of Eurocentric, Western, white-male dominated forms of power parading as knowledge. Post-modern theories of deconstruction can be traced back to Nietzsche through the works of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Nietzschean skeptical and perspectival formulations lie at the very heart of the current epistemological controversy over the meaning of truth and vaUd knowledge. Proponents of feminism and multi-culturalism argue that the suppressed voices of the marginalized groups in society must be heard. Their suppression is now seen as a consequence of the power of those privileged and established groups whose
claims to represent excellence and meritorious
the principles
critical cultural
creative
is
to
be
potential
which
lib-
may
be recognized and released. But Nietzsche's
philosophy pays scant attention to the question of what makes social order possible. Postmodernist appropriators of Nietzsche's thought are dealing with profoundly important social issues that go to the heart of the question of cultural change and social order. Is the contemporary celebration of popular culture among post-modernists a form of deconstructive liberation from the elite culture of the past, or is it really an unwitting affirmation of the values of
consumer capitalism and a further descent into barbarism and social breakdown? As social theorists
seen as self-serving rationalizations. All social reality and its meaning structures are a conse-
problem of
quence of
best, or
social construction, and, as a result.
perspective, through
eration from the past
achievements have been scrutinized and deconstructed by post-modernists and are cultural
upon which new order
constructed. In contrast, Nietzsche's call for the
or as critics of society, Nietzsche's contem-
porary exponents are constrained to address the social order or accept the charge
that their theories are romantically irrelevant at
mindlessly
nihilistic at
worse.
— 104
confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives. This is the
The
Power
expression of the diseased condition in man, in contrast to the animals in
My
attempt to understand moral judgments as symptoms and sign languages which betray the processes of physiological prosperity or failure, likewise the consciousness of the condi-
—
and growth a mode of interpretations of the same worth as astrology, prejudices prompted bv the instincts (of races, tions for preservation
communities, of the various stages of life, as youth or decay, etc.). Applied to the specific Christian-European morality: Our moral judgments are signs of decline, of disbelief in
life,
a preparation for
pessimism. no moral phe-
nomena, there is only a nioral interpretation of these phenomena. This interpretation itself is of extramoral origin.
What does
it
mean
has projected a contradiction into existence? Of decisive importance: behind all other evaluations these moral evaluations stand in
command. Supposing they were abolished, according to what would we measure then? And then of what value would be knowledge, ?
?
259 (1884) Insight: all evaluation
perspective:
that
individual, a
church, a
of
is
made from
for
even
community,
that valuation
is
a
a
race,
— Because
of the state,
we
a
forget
always from a perspective, a
single individual contains within
tions?
From
—a
rare accident
A sort of planetary motion
means
Is
"An end" Whence come evalua-
willing an end.
their basis a firm
norm, "pleasant"
and "painful"?
we first make a thing with an evaluation. The extent of moral evaluations: they play a part in almost every sense impression. Our world is colored by them. We have invested things with ends and values: therefore we have in us an enormous fund in countless cases
painful by investing
it
but by comparing values it appears that contradictory things have been accounted valuable, that many tables of value have existed (thus nothing is valuable "in of latent force:
him
Analysis
the conditions of a limited
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will
that
fo
Power,
individual
—often —
group
Obser\'ation
a vast
by VV.ilter Kaufmann. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc.
of
revealed that their erection
now 14(i7
in us!
well as his great
harmony
includes an evaluation.
force Source
of grand
260 (1883-1888)
and
Copyright
men —as
types of
all
moments
itself").
a definite
the preservation
faith, a culture.
existing
all
—
But
that our interpretation
which
to quite definite tasks.
This contradictory creature has in his nature, however, a great method of acquiring knowledge: he feels many pros and cons, he raises himself to justice to comprehension beyond esteeming things good and evil. The wisest man would be the one richest in contradictions, who has, as it were, antennae
"Willing":
chief proposition: there are
etc., etc. ?
answer
instincts
258 (1885-1886)
My
—
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
Friedrich Nietzsche: to
—
we employ that
of
tables
was
of
value
the erection of
erroneous
—of existence
for its preservation.
contemporary
man
re\'eals
very diverse value judgments
they no longer have any creative
— the
basis, "the condition of existence," is missing from moral judgment. It is much
more superfluous, it is not nearlv so It becomes arbitrary. Chaos.
painful.
CHAPTER
Who
creates
the
goal
that
stands
above
mankind and above the individual? Formerly one employed morality for preservation: but nobody wants to preserve any longer, there is
4;
is
POWER
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE; REASON AND
one has compel accept as a norm.
a kind of lust to rule; each
spective that
it
other drives to
would
like to
1
05
per-
its
all
the
nothing to preserve. Therefore an experimental
497 (1884)
morality: to give oneself a goal.
The most strongly believed
me
are for
462 (SPRING-FALL 1887)
law of
much
belief,
of morality.
that reason truths?
In place of "sociology," a theory of the forms
so
a part of us that not to believe
would destroy
it
the
causality, a very well acquired habit of
Fundamental innovations: In place of "moral values/' purely naturalistic values. Naturalization
in
a priori "truths"
provisional assumptions; e.g.,
preservation of
the race. But are they for
What
a conclusion!
As
if
the
man were a proof of truth!
of domination. In place of "society," the culture complex, as
498 (1884)
my chief interest (as a whole or in its parts). In place of "epistemology,"
a perspective
theory of affects (to which belongs a hierarchy of the affects; the affects transfigured; their
superior order, their "spirituality"). In place of "metaphysics"
theory of eternal recurrence
and
religion, the
(this as a
means
To what extent even our intellect is a consewe would quence of conditions of existence not have it if we did not need to have it, and we would not have it as it is if we did not need to have it as it is, if we could live otherwise.
—
:
of
breeding and selection).
499 (1885) "Thinking" in primitive conditions (pre-organ481 (1883-1888)
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena would say: No, are only facts" I facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a
— "There
—
of crystal. is fitting
—In our thought, the essential feature
new
crustes' bed),
material into old schemes (=Pro-
making equal what
is
new.
557 (1885-1886)
thing.
"Everything
the crystallization of forms, as in the case
ic) is
subjective,"
is
you
say;
but
even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is. Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is inven-
The properties of a thing are effects on other "things": if one removes other "things," then a thing has no properties, i.e., there is no thing without other things, i.e., there is no "tliing-initself."
tion, hypothesis.
In so far as the
word "knowledge" has any
meaning, the world
knowable; but it is iiiterpreiable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. "Perspectivism." It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is
—
558 (SPRING-FALL 1887)
The
"thing-in-itself" nonsensical.
the relationships,
all
If
I
remove
the "properties,"
all
all
the
"activities" of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of
— 106
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
logic,
— —
thus with the aim of defining,
communi-
In motion,
cation (to bind together the multiplicity of rela-
tion.
tionships, properties, activities).
therefore
559 (NOV. "Things selves"
1887-MARCH
that
1888)
have a constitution
568 in
them-
—a dogmatic idea with which one must
break absolutely.
it is
is given to sensacannot contain motion:
content
is,
a form of being.
(MARCH-JUNE
1888)
Critique of the concept "true and apparent world."
Of
mere
these, the first is a
fiction,
—
constructed
of fictitious entities.
560 (SPRING-FALL 1887) That things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is a quite ideal hypothesis; it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing. Conversely, the apparent objective character of things: could it not be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? that perhaps that which changes slowly presents itself to us
—
as "objectively" enduring, being, "in-itself" that the objective
no new
That which
is
only a false concept of a
genus and an antithesis within the subjective?
562 (1883-1888)
"Appearance" itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; i.e., in a world where there is no being, a certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created through appearance: a tempo at which observation and comparison are possible, etc.
Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been its
work;
at
to say,
we
perfectly true for us: that
it is
live,
we are
able to Hve in
it:
is
proof of
truth for us
the world, apart from our condition of living in
it,
world
the
that
we have not reduced
to
our
being, our logic and psychological prejudices, exist as a world "in-itself"; it is essenworld of relationships; under certain conditions it has a different aspect from every point; its being is essentially different from
does not tially a
every point;
it
presses
upon every
—and
the
point, every
development of thought a point had to be reached at which one realized that what one called the properties of things were sensations
every case quite incongruent.
of the feeling subject: at this point the proper-
being possesses the other measure of power; in
"In the
ties
ceased to belong to the thing." The "thingremained. The distinction between
in-itself"
point resists
it
The measure what form,
of
sum
of these
is
in
power determines what
force, constraint
it
acts or resists.
the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us
Our particular case is interesting enough: we have produced a conception in order to be
on the
able to live in a world, in order to perceive just
is based form of perception which granted energy to things; but analysis revealed that even force was only projected into them, and likewise substance. "The thing affects a subject"? Root of the idea of substance in lan-
older, naive
enough
to
endure
it
—
guage, not
in
beings outside us! The thing-in-
no problem at all! Beings will have to be thought of as sensations that are no longer based on something devoid of sensation. itself is
569 (SPRING-FALL 1887)
Our
psychological perspective
is
determined
by the following: 1.
that for
communication is necessary, and that communication something
there to be
CHAPTER
has to be firm, simplified, capable of preci-
a subject ject.
For
it
all
to
in
the [so-called]
identical
be communicable, however,
it
were, logicized;
lies in
the continual recurrence of identical, related
things
their
in
character, in the belief that here to 3.
4.
604 (1885-1886)
meaning most cases a new interpre-
"Interpretation," the introduction of
not "explanation"
over
tation
(in
an old interpretation that
we
605 (SPRING-FALL 1887)
phenomenal world
is
The ascertaining
and "untruth," the
of "truth"
different
"unknowable" for us; questions, what things "in-themselves" may be like, apart from our sense receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be
how could we "Thingness" was The question is whether
rebutted with the question: that things exist?
created by us.
many
other
ing such an apparent world
ways
—and
not
short,
itself
—
of creat-
mold
pretation
facts
according to
it;
that
is,
active inter-
and not merely conceptual
transla-
tion.
the best-guaranteed reality; in
whether
that
which "posits things"
is
not the sole reality; and whether the "effect of the external world
upon us"
is
not also
only the result of such active subjects other "entities" act
parent world
is fundamentally from creative positing, from forming, shaping, overcoming, willing, such as is of the essence of philosophy. To introduce a meaning this task still remains to be done, assuming there is no meaning yet. Thus it is with sounds, but also with the fate of peoples: they are capable of the most different interpretations and direction toward different goals. On a yet higher level is to posit a goal and
whether
this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying is
has itself
are able
mulable world of the chaos of sensations another kind of phenomenal world, a kind
there could not be
that
now
—
ascertaining of facts in general,
first
is
only a sign). There are no facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relaour opinions. tively most enduring is
not "the true world," but the formless unfor-
know
the sub-
logicized
reckon and calculate;
the antithesis of this
—a modus of
become incomprehensible,
the world of "phenomena" is the adapted world which we feel to be real. The "reality"
familiar,
a subject
it
must be experienced as adapted, as "recognizable." The material of the senses adapteci by the understanding, reduced to rough outlines, made similar, subsumed under related matters. Thus the fuzziness and chaos of sense impressions are, as
upon
107
POWER
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: REASON AND
sion (above case).
2.
4:
upon
us;
—The
our adapted ap-
an adaptation and overpowactions; a kind of defensive
is
ering of their
measure. The subject alone is demonstrable; hypothesis that only subjects exist that "object" is only a kind of effect produced by
—
606 (1885-1886) Ultimately,
man
finds in things nothing but
what he himself has imported finding
is
into them: the
called science, the importing
Even
—
art,
should be a piece of childishness, one should carry on with both and be well disposed toward both some should find; others zoe others! should religion, love, pride.
if
—
import!
this
—
CHAPTER
5
Max Weber: The
Cage
Iron
INTRODUCTION mid-1950s, Leo Strauss, a renowned political philosopher and severe critic of Max Weber wrote: "Whatever may have
Writing
in
Max Weber was born into a middle-class fam-
the
ily
on April
father
21, 1864, in Erfurt,
Germany. His
was an active politician serving at various
Weber's sociology is the idea of rationalization and its consequences for modern life. Unlike Marx and Durkheim, both of whom projected optimistic outcomes in the transition to modernity, Weber rejects the Enlightenment's view of evolutionary progress and happiness. Instead he projects a "polar night of icy darkness," a highly rational and bureaucratically organized social order, an "iron cage" in which people are trapped. Modernity also produces a new character type, a technical as opposed to a cultured
and national government, while mother was a devout Protestant who raised a family and tended to the household. The Webers moved to Berlin in 1869 and settled in a fashionable suburb favored by academics and politicians. The Weber household hosted many notables from Berlin society. Weber studied law at the universities in Berlin and Gottingen and went on to take a Ph.D. in economic and legal history in 1889. He married Marianne Schnitger in 1893, and her devotion to him is evidenced throughout her famous biography. Mux Weber: A Life. The death of Weber's father in 1897 and the circumstances surrounding it had a profound impact on Weber's life. Since he had had a fearsome quarrel with his father shortly before his death, Weber felt guilt and overwhelming remorse to the point of depression. His life fluctuated between manic periods of extraordinary producti\'ity and
coldly calculating,
severe, almost catatonic depression. After a brief
actor.
stay in a mental hospital
been his errors, he is the greatest social scientist of our century." Weber's contribution is truly immense in both breadth and complexity. His methodological work provides a framework for research
and
instruction,
and
his substantive
explorations in religion, economics, history, and politics give a
the
unique insight into the origins of
modern world and
individual, a
its
evolution. Central to
passionless,
and instrumentally rational
108
levels of local his
Weber resumed
his
CHAPTER
responsibilities
Heidelberg
at
in
Two
1902.
Webers came to visit the United States, a trip which aicied his recovery and left him with an enduring fascination with America. Upon his return to Heidelberg, Weber assumed a full schedule of writing and was active in the intellectual life of the community. Following a brief period of service during World War I as a years
the
later,
5:
writes, capitalism
desire to
gious inspiration
in
Vienna
Society.
During the
in
died in June 1920, leaving behind a tal
last
few
Weber began lecturing again, 1918, and in Munich in 1919. He
life,
monumen-
scholarly corpus. In Tlw Protestant Ethic atid the Spirit of Capi-
study of the relationship of religious Weber offers an insight into the process of transformation and rationalization. Weber argued that seventeenthtalism, a
ideas to economic activity,
century beliefs in predestination and asceticism flowing from Calvinism shaped the actions of the faithful
and contributed
to the rise of capi-
adopted attitudes towards work and money that revolutionized their daily lives. To ease the pain of living with
talism. Specifically, Calvinists
the uncer-
the doctrine of predestination,
i.e.,
tainty of one's eternal fate as a
member
of the
damned, true believers sought a sign that they were favored. Hard work and economic success were taken as signs of salvation. Asceticism led to a frugal way of life and the resulting accumulation of capital. The preconditions for capitalism, namely available capital for investment in nascent industries, were set into elect or the
motion by the belief in Calvinism. Good Calvinists who wished to save their souls inadvertently engaged in those actions of industriousness and frugality that contributed to capitalism's rise.
Weber concludes his essay with some reflecon the future course of capitalist development. The Protestant beliefs that initiated this tions
have long since ceased to function as a justification for economic action. As Weber activity
sake;
its reli-
modern
has become a rational
become money-making instruments who no longer believe passionately in salvation and damnation. Weber does not long romantically an earlier era of Protestant no turning back from modernity and the scientific and industrial revolutions that made it possible. However, Weber wants us to recognize what we have become and to for the return of
Economy and
own
gone. Like other
system, an "iron cage," in which people have
belief.
years of his
is
perpetuated by the
for its
institutions, capitalism
Weber returned to the University in 1916 and continued to work on his major pro-
ject.
now
is
make money
captain in charge of running several Heidelberg hospitals,
109
MAX WEBER THE IRON CAGE
There
is
up to the realities of a disenchanted world. Whereas Marx predicted a proletarian revolution that would shatter the capitalist order and usher in the new age of socialism, Weber saw no such progressive future. Were socialism to arise, Weber claimed, it would not escape face
the bureaucratic fate of mociern institutions but
would succumb
to the rationalization process.
He
regarded the creation of a centralized state administration to oversee the economy unc^er socialism as an even greater threat to individual freedom than the separate and oppositional spheres of state and economy under capitalism.
What was
this rationalization process
and
why was it significant for Weber's social theory? Weber's reflections on bureaucracy, excerpted below, provide us with an important point of departure. Weber argued that the characteristic form of modern institutional organizations, including the state, the corporation, the military,
the university, the church,
is
bureaucratic.
Highly specialized tasks are coordinated in a hierarchical order, with each level of organization reporting to the one above in a pyramidal fashion until one reaches the head of the organization. Depersonalization, routinization, and mechanical predictability are the characteristics of bureaucracies, and they survive and expand because they are the most efficient method for coordinating a large
number
of different tasks.
Decision making within bureaucracies
on a particular mode
is
based
of thinking, instrumental
110
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
reasoning, or Zweckrational, as
Weber
called
it.
This form of reasoning breaks down all problems into a means-ends chain and entails rational calculation of costs incurred
be secured
if
and
benefits to
a particular line of action
is
pur-
to study is a consequence of the values one holds and the relevance of particular events or phenomena to
those value assumptions.
Sociology
falls
methodology
sued.
Apart from his careful depiction of the role
and function
of the official,
Weber
characterizes
bureaucratic organizaticins as operating with "calculable rules"
and "without regard
What does he mean by
sons."
for per-
these terms?
Does "dehumanization," as Weber describes it, have any positive consequences? Bureaucracy and democracy exist in an uneasy relationship. Is the expertise that is fostered by bureaucratic organization compatible democratic
with
What problem one chooses
processes?
What
are
the
somewhere between
of the natural sciences
erary interpretation.
although
it
It
is
and
the
of
lit-
not a hard science,
respects the need for systematic
study and empirical analysis in order to arrive at generalizations. On the other hand, because sociology deals with
human
behavior,
it
is
obliged to inquire into the subjective meaning verstehende sociology meets need by supplementing the more objective methodologies with an interpretive one in which the sociologist attempts a deeper understanding by probing subjective meaning stn.icof action. Weber's this
potential sources of abuse
by experts and how can these be overcome? What does Weber have
tures.
say about the possibility of revolution in the age of bureaucracy? Finally, how does bureau-
Michel Foucault's "carceral society" (Chapter 17) and his
son and reality. The Hegelian-Marxist claim to grasp the totality of history was rejected by Weber, who saw the mind as a limited instrument capable of dealing empirically with a particular slice of reality. Weber suspected totalistic views leading to prophecies because they misconstrued the relation between the reasonine mind and social reality. Social theorists con-
description of instrumental rationality, as the
struct
to
cracy impact on the educational system and
with what kinds of results? The reader should keep in mind that the rationalization process in
Weber describes
mode
it
modern
society as
anticipates
Weber warned against the
models or
conflation of rea-
ideal types that explain the
society,
interrelationships of relevant key elements of
gives concrete empirical expression to Niet-
the social world. Weber's essay on bureaucracy, presented below, provides an example of a rational model or ideal type. The ideal type is a
prevalent
of thought in
modern
zsche's Apollonian type (Chapter
Max
4).
Weber's essays on the methodology of
the social sciences likewise demonstrate a Niet-
rational construct that helps to orient us to the
zschean influence and anticipate the postmodernist critique of truth and objecti\'ity (Chapter 17). Reprinted below are excerpts from one of those essays, in which Weber probes deeply into the question of the relation-
confusing infinity of social
ship of values to science and the possibility of
social realit\'
objective research in sociology. Weber's position
is
complex and not
easily
summarized. He which we
characterizes the social reality in
move
as infinite; yet out of this infinity of facts
a particular focus
even begin
is
to think
necessary before one can
about a social question.
not the reality;
which
to
it
The model is framework with
facts.
pro\'ides a
obser\e and determine
processes deviate from the
ways
how
in
social
which the
model organizes them. In other words, is more complex, more contingent, and more subject to unanticipated consequences than our rational models are able to predict. If we mistake reason, i.e., the models or ideal types, for the reality, we do \iolence to the complexities of exervdav life, and rather rational
than respect the integrity of our subject,
we
CHAPTER
may compel
it
to
fit
the rational
demands
If
For Weber,
of
our model.
5:
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
this is
111
an oversimplification.
He
power in modern society; class, status, and party. Weber and Marx share similar views on the meaning and significance of economic class. Ownership of property and its disposition on the open market are signs of considerable power. However, the political significance of economic power is more problematic for Weber, as he questions distinguishes three avenues to
models emanate from academic
these
establishments, think tanks, or governmental
agencies and they are implemented, they
may
become blueprints for social engineering, thus empowering a technocratic elite to shape the future, a development decried by Habermas (Chapter 16) and Foucault (Chapter 17). For Weber, scientific analysis was a tool for understanding social reality and not an appropriate instrument for social change. Directed social change presupposes the achievement of a valued objective; it deals with moral conceptions of justice and right. Science is an enter-
and interpretaand therefore it cannot make valid judgments about moral claims. Weber argued
whether economic itself?
class identity is the basis for
When
collective action.
Weber makes
does a class act for
collective class action
more
problematic than does Marx. Social status may be yet another dimension of power. Those with high status in society may
prise limited to factual analysis
also be wealthy; but they need not be.
tion,
over, those
that the appropriate arena for the struggle over
enjoy high status. For example, wealthy criminals do not have social status, and the nouveaux
and the moral claims that and not the one. In so doing, Weber placed sci-
who
are rich
not admitted to high society. But sta-
different policies
riches are
they support
tus groups are also ethnic
scientific
is
the political arena
ence and politics into different spheres, each with very different functions to perform. Analysis of society was not the equivalent of changing it, and the obligation of the sociologist
was
to
transform
understand social reality and not to If social change was needed, then
it.
pohtical parties
and
effective vehicle to
their
leaders were
the
The essay
"Class, Status, Party," reprinted
Weber deals with the question of the of political power to economic
relationship class class.
and
offers
an alternative
Marx claims
to
Marx's ruling
that the ruling class controls
economic and political power in capitalist society. The owners of the means of production are the dominant class because they control the wealth of society and therefore also political power. While they may not run for office, they either directly or indirectly control those
do.
The dominant ideas
who
—the ruling ideas—are
the ideas of the ruling class.
for
the objective categories of class.
Contemporary
events in the former Soviet Union seem to bear out these Weberian observations, as witness the
re-emergence of powerful religious and nationemotions despite a seventy-year regime
alistic
of proletarian class consciousness.
Weber turns
to the third
contemporary
dimension of power
namely, the political party. The fact that people are rich or that they enjoy high social status does not guarantee in
below, reveals yet another aspect of Weber's sociology.
and religious groups, Weber, these emerge as more significant in shaping values and behavior than
and
accomplish these ends in a
representative system.
Moredo not necessarily
society,
their success in politics. Politicians
win
elections
tions.
The
and gain support
abilities
in order to rise to
must
also
for their posi-
required of a political leader
prominence within a
political
party and to win elections reside in his persuasive personal characteristics and social skills.
Those
talents constitute yet another
power beyond
class
and
status.
avenue
to
Despite the
powerful linkages that connect class, status, party, Weber's analytic distinctions recognize ethnic, racial, and charismatic claims to
and
political leadership.
112
PARTI:
When
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
to poHtics,
Weber saw the
value preferences, but since as teachers they
possibility that "the iron cage"
might be shat-
enjoyed their legitimacy through the special
he turned
tered. PoUtical leaders
with a
new
vision of the
might project a moral vision of the just society and gather the support needed to bring about social change. future, a charismatic leadership,
But politics also entailed rational calculation. that the "ethic of ultimate ends,"
claims of science,
Weber saw
their politiciza-
tion of the classroom as dishonest.
At the end of The Protestant Ethic ami the Weber allows us to glimpse what modernity has in store when he writes: Spirit of Capitalism,
Weber wrote
the moral vision,
had
to
be accompanied by the
"ethic of responsibilitv," the cool calculation as to
how
to
overcome obstacles and
achie\'e the
desired goals. In any event, academics trained in social analysis were neither intellectually equipped nor temperamentally suited to engage in the politics of social change. Weber urged their participation as citizens, of course, and as
writers, their
work
\vas
bound
to express their
one knows who will live in this cage in the whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsi\e self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be trulv said: "Specialists without sensualists without heart; this nullit\' spirit, imagines that it has attained a level of civilization
No
future, or
never before achieved."
Max Weber: Bureaucracy
BUREAUCRACY officialdom functions in the following
manner: I. There tional
tions. (1)
is
the principle of official jurisdic-
which are generally ordered by is, by laws or administrative regula-
The regular of
the
bureaucratically
The authority
tributed in a stable
principles of
clearly established
governed
offers
to
give the
commands
way and
is strictly
is
dis-
delimited
rules concerning the coercive
cal,
The
II.
channels of appeal
lower
required for the discharge of these duties
by
and
of
many
not precisely delimited and are temporarily
for the
activities required
structure are assigned as official duties. (2)
these cases, the ruler exe-
all
means, physisacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be
placed at the disposal of
officials.
and of
hierarchy
office
(Iiistanzenziig)
stipulate a
system of super- and subor-
dination in which there
This means:
purposes
of conquest,
feudal states. In
called into being for each case.
areas,
rules, that
Mongolian empires
cutes the most important measures through personal trustees, table-companions, or courtservants. Their commissions and powers are
CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN Modern
113
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
CHAPTERS:
is
a supervision of the
by the higher ones. Such a system the governed the possibility of appeal-
offices
ing, in a precisely regulated manner, the decision of a lower office to the corresponding
superior authority. With the
full
development
of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy monocratically organized. archical office authority cratic
structures:
in
The is
is
principle of hier-
found and
state
in all
bureau-
ecclesiastical
(3) Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the exercise of the correspond-
structures as well as in large party organiza-
ing rights; only persons who qualify under general rules are employed.
authority
In the sphere of the state these three ele-
ments constitute
a bureaucratic agency, in the
sphere of the private economy they constitute a bureaucratic enterprise. Bureaucracy, thus understood, astical
fully developed in political and ecclesicommunities only in the modern state,
is
and in the private economy only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism. Permanent agencies, with fixed jurisdiction, are not the historical rule but rather the exception. This is
even true of large
political structures such as those of the ancient Orient, the Germanic and
tions
and private
It does not matter bureaucracy whether its called "private" or "pubHc."
enterprises.
for the character of
When tency"
is
the principle of jurisdictional "compe-
is
not
mean
carried
fully
subordination
—
through, hierarchical
at least in public office
that the "higher" authority
—does
is
autho-
rized simply to take over the business of the
"lower." Indeed, the opposite is the rule; once an office has been set up, a new incumbent will always be appointed if a vacancy occurs. III.
The management
of the
modern
office is
based upon written documents (the "files"), which are preserved in their original or draft form, and
upon
a staff of subaltern officials
scribes of all sorts.
The body
and
of officials work-
ing in an agency along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files
makes up "Bureaucracy," From Max Weber, Economy and 2, pp. 956-963, 973-975, 983-985, 987-989, 998-1003, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Copyright 1978 by the Regents of the University of California, University of California Press. Reprinted by permisSource
Society,
Vol.
a bureau (in private enterprises often
called the "counting house," Kontor). In principle, the
modern organization
of the
civil service
separates the bureau from the private domicile of the official and, in general,
segregates official activity from the sphere of
114
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
Public monies and equipment are from the private property of the official. This condition is everywhere the product of a long development. Nowadays, it is found in public as well as in private enterprises; in the latter, the principle extends even to the private
life.
divorced
more or learned.
less
exhaustive, and which can be
Knowledge
of these rules represents a
special technical expertise
possess.
It
which the
officials
involves jurisprudence, admirustra-
management. The reduction of modern office management
tive or business
deeply embedded in
very nature.
entrepreneur at the top. In principle, the Koiitor (office) is separated from the household, busi-
The theory
ness from private correspondence, and busi-
for
The more ness assets from modern of business manconsistently the type agement has been carried through, the more are these separations the case. The beginnings
order certain matters by decree
been legally granted to an entitle the agency to regulate the matter by individual commands given for each case, but
of this process are to he found as early as the
only to regulate the matter abstractly. This
Middle Ages.
stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of
private wealth.
the peculiarity of the
It is
modern
entrepre-
neur that he conducts himself as the "first official" of his enterprise, in the
in
which the
bureaucratic
very same
ruler of a specifically state
[Frederick
of
II
way
are
intrinsically
different
from the management of
in
contrast,
is
management,
Office
IV.
ment
is
way
of
American way.
its
public administration, that
the
relationships through individual privileges
such relationships are not
bv sacred tradition.
THE POSITION OF THE OFFICIAL WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF BUREAUCRACY All this results in the following for the internal
and external position of the
official:
at least all special-
— —
I.
Office Holding as a Vocation
thorough training in a field of specialization. This, too, holds increasingly for the modern
That the office
executive and employee of a private enterprise,
scribed course of training, which
es
just as V.
it
does for the state
When
activity
the office
demands
the
is
officials.
fully
developed,
official
of the
the fact that the length
working hours in the bureau may be limited. In the normal case, this too is only the product of a long development, in the public as well as in the private office. Formerly the normal state of affairs was the reverse:
of his obhgatory
Official
business
was discharged
expression,
first,
is
a
"vocation" (Benif) finds
in the
requirement of a pre-
demands
the
working capacity for a long period of time, and in generally prescribed special examinations as prerequisites of employment. Fur-
entire
full zoorkiii^'^ capaciti/
official, irrespective of
authority to
—which has agency —does not
and bestowals of favor, which, as we shall see, is absolutely dominant in patrimonialism, at
Prussia]
management and such manageusually presupposdistinctly modern
ized office
assumes
instance,
fixed
pri\'ate offices is a
totally foreign to the
modern
least in so far as
character
continental European notion and, by
all
of
modern
spoke of himself as "the first servant" of the state. The idea that the bureau activities of the state
to rules is
as
a
sec-
ondary activity. VI. The management of the office follows general ri//t's, which are more or less stable.
thermore,
it
finds expression in that the posi-
tion of the official (Pfliclit).
is
in the nature of a
"duty"
This determines the character of his
manner; Legally and holding is not considered ownership of a source of income, to be exploited for relations in the following actually, office
rents or
emoluments
in
exchange
for the ren-
dering of certain services, as was normally the case during the Middle Ages and frequently up to the threshold of recent times, nor is office
CHAPTERS:
holding considered a
common exchange
vices, as in the case of free tracts. Rather,
one
entrance into an
office,
including
economy, is considered an specific duty of fealty to the
in the private
acceptance of a
purpose of the
office (Aiiitftreiw) in return for
the grant of a secure existence. the
of ser-
employment con-
modern
type,
it
It is
decisive for
loyalty to an office that, in the pure
does not establish a relationship to a
person, like the vassal's or disciple's faith
under
feudal or patrimonial authority, but rather
is
devoted to impersonal and fnnctiotial purposes. These purposes, of course, frequently gain an ideological halo from cultural values, such as state, church, community, party or enterprise, which appear as surrogates for a this-worldly or other-worldly personal master and which are embodied by a given group.
The
political official
— —
at least in the fully de-
veloped modern state personal servant of a op, the priest
is
ruler.
not considered the Likewise, the bish-
and the preacher are
in fact
no
longer, as in early Christian times, carriers of a
purely personal charisma, which offers otherworldly sacred values under the personal mandate of a master, and in principle responsible only to him, to everybody who appears worthy of
them and asks
tial
sur\'ival
become
of
for them. In spite of the par-
the
old
theorv,
they
have
officials in the service of a functional
115
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
"insults to the office" and "contempt" of state and church authorities. The social position of the official is normally
highest where, as in old civilized countries, the
following conditions prevail: a strong demand for administration by trained experts; a strong
and
stable
social
where the
differentiation,
predominantly comes from socially and economically privileged strata because of the official
social distribution of
power or
the costliness of
the required training and of status conventions.
The possession patents
of educational certificates or
—discussed below
(sec.
13 A)
—
is
usually
linked with qualification for office; naturally, this
enhances the "status element"
position of the factor
is
explicitly
in the prescription that the
aspirant to an office career
body. This
is
acceptance of an
depends upon the
consent ("election") by the official
in the social
Sometimes the status acknowledged; for example,
official.
members
of the
the case in the officer corps
the German army. Sinular phenomena, which promote a guild-like closure of officialdom, are typically found in the patrimonial of
and, particularly, in prebendal officialdom of the past. The desire to resurrect such policies in changed forms is by no means infrequent
among modern
bureaucrats;
for instance, in the
letarianized
demands
[zt'fnsfi'o-]
played a
it
role,
of the largely pro-
officials
(the
tretii
ele-
purpose, a purpose which in the present-day "church" appears at once impersonalized and
ment) during the Russian revolution [of 1905].
ideologically sanctified.
low where the demand for expert administration and the hold of status conventions are weak. This is often the case in new settlements by virtue of the great economic opportunities and the great instability of their
II.
The Social Position
Usually the social esteem of the
of the Official
Social Esteem and Status Convention. Whether he is in a private office or a public bureau, the modern official, too, always strives for and usually attains a distinctly elevated
social stratification: witness the
governed. His social position is protected by prescription about rank order and, for the political official, by spe-
official as a rule receives a
social esteem vis-a-vis the
cial
officials is
especially
prohibitions of the criminal code against
Rank
United
States.
The
as the Basis of Regular Salary.
tion in the
form of a
salary,
monetary compensa-
normally
fixed,
and
the old age security provided by a pension.
The salary
is
not measured like a
wage
in
terms
116
of
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
work done, but according
to "status," that
is,
according to the kind of function (the "rank") and, possibly, according to the length of ser-
The
vice.
security
great
relatively
of
the
official's income, as well as the rewards of so-
cial
esteem,
make
the office a sought-after posi-
tion, especially in countries which no longer provide opportunities for colonial profits. In
such countries,
low
this situation
permits relatively
salaries for officials.
The
Fixed Career Lines and Status Rigidity. official is set for a "career" within the hierarchi-
apparatus compares with other organizations exactlv as does the machine with the nonmechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination,
reduction of friction and of material and
personal costs
—these
are raised to the opti-
mum point in the strictly bureaucratic adminisand especially in its monocratic form. compared with all collegiate, honorific, and As tration,
avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy is superior on all these points.
And
as far as complicated tasks are concerned,
order of the public service. He expects to move from the lower, less important and less well paid, to the higher positions. The average
paid bureaucratic work
mechanical fixing of the conditions of promotion: if not of the
service.
cal
official naturally desires a
offices, at least of the salary levels.
He wants
is
not only more preit is often cheaper
cise but, in the last analysis,
than even formally unremunerated honorific
Today,
it
is
primarily the capitalist market
these conditions fixed in terms of "seniority,"
economy which demands
or possibly according to grades achieved in a
ness of public administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and
system of examinations. Here and there, such grades actually form a character indclcbilis of the official and have lifelong effects on his career To this is joined the desire to reinforce the right to office and to increase status group closure and economic security. All of this makes for a tendency to consider the offices as "prebends" of those qualified by educational certificates.
The necessity of weighing general personal and intellectual qualifications without concern
that the official busi-
with as much speed as possible. Normally, the very large modern capitalist enterprises are themselves unequaled models of strict bureauBusiness management organization. cratic
on increasing precision, above all, speed of operations. steadiness, and, determined by the peculiar naThis, in turn, is communication, means of ture of the modern throughout
including,
rests
among
other things, the
news
ser-
the often subaltern character of such patents of specialized education, has brought it
vice of the press. The extraordinary increase in the speed by which public announcements, as
about that the highest
well as economic and political facts, are transmitted exerts a steadv and sharp pressure in
for
ly
the "ministerial"
filled
political offices, especial-
positions,
without reference to such
are as a rule certificates.
THE TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION OVER ADMINISTRATION BY NOTABLES The decisive reason
for the
advance of bureau-
the direction of speeding
up
the
tempo
of
administrative reaction towards various situations. The optimum of such reaction time is normally attained only by a strictly bureaucratic organizatit)n.
(The
fact
that the bureaucratic
apparatus also can, and indeed does, create certain definite impediments for the discharge
manner
best adapted to the in-
cratic organization
of business in a
tccliiiical
dividualitv of each case does noi belong into
has always been its purely superioritv over any other form of
organization.
The
fully
developed bureaucratic
the present ct>ntext.)
CHAPTERS:
Bureaucratization offers above
mum
possibility for carrying
the opti-
all
through the prin-
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
117
demanded by the external apparatus modern culture in the most favorable combi-
attitudes of
only
bureaucracy has
ciple of specializing administrative functions
nation.
according to purely objective considerations.
established the foundation for the administra-
Individual performances are allocated to func-
who have
tionaries
who by tise.
ly
specialized training and
constant practice increase their exper-
"Objective" discharge of business primari-
means
a discharge of business according to
calculable rules
and "without regard
for per-
In
particular,
rational law conceptually systemon the basis of "statutes," such as the later Roman Empire first created with a high degree of technical perfection. During the Middle Ages, the reception of this [Roman] law
of a
tion
atized
coincided with the bureaucratization of legal
The advance
sons."
administration:
"Without regard for persons/' however, is also the watchword of the market and, in general, of all pursuits of naked economic interests. Consistent bureaucratic domination means the leveling of "status honor." Hence, if the principle of the free market is not at the same time restricted, it means the universal domination of the "class situation." That this consequence of bureaucratic domination has not set in every-
trained expert displaced the old
where proportional to the extent of bureaucrais due to the differences between possible principles by which polities may supply their requirements. However, the second element mentioned, calculable rules, is the most important one for modern bureaucracy. The peculiarity of modern culture, and specifically of its technical and economic basis, demands tization
this
very "calculability" of results. When fully bureaucracy also stands, in a
developed,
specific sense,
under the principle of
sijw ira ac
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is appraised as its spestudio.
by capitalism. The more complicated and specialized mod-
cial
virtue
more porting apparatus demands
ern culture becomes, the
detached and
its
trial
procedure
to tradition or to irrational
presuppositions.
THE LEVELING OF SOCIAL DIFFERENCES In spite of
its
indubitable technical superiority,
bureaucracy has everywhere been a relatively late development. A number of obstacles have contributed to this, and only under certain social and political conditions have they definitely receded into the background. A. Administrative Democratization cratic
organization
power on and social
has
usually
Bureau-
come
into
economic differences. This leveling has been at least relative, and has concerned the significance of social and economic differences for the assumption of administrative functions. Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern the basis of a leveling of
mass democracy, in contrast to the democratic
self-government of small homogeneous units. This results from its characteristic principle: the abstract regularity of the exercise of authority,
which
is
a result of the
demand
for "equality
before the law" in the personal and functional
—hence, of the horror of "privilege," and
sense
external sup-
the principled rejection of doing business "from
personally
case to case." Such regularity also follows from
the
strictly objective expert, in lieu of
the lord of older social structures
moved by
which was bound
of the rationally
who was
personal sympathy and favor, by
grace and gratitude. Bureaucracy offers the
the social preconditions of
its
origin.
Any non-
bureaucratic administration of a large social structure rests in
some wav upon
the fact that
existing social, material, or honorific prefer-
— 118
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
ences and ranks are connected with administrative functions and duties. This usually means
bureaucratically. In France, however, attempts
that an economic or a social exploitation of position, which every sort of administrative activity provides to its hearers, is the compensation for the assumption of administrative functions. democratization Bureaucratization and
basis of an election svstem that
within the administration of the state therefore
the entire country and break their influence,
an increase of the cash expenditures of
could not be overcome. Every advance of sim-
signify
the public treasury, in spite of the fact that
bureaucratic administration
is
usually
more
"economical" in character than other forms. Until recent times at least from the point of view of the treasury the cheapest way of satisfying the need for administration was to leave almost the entire local administration and lower judicature to the landlords of Eastern Prussia. The same is true of the administration by justices of the peace in England. Mass
— —
democracy which makes a clean sweep feudal, patrimonial, and at least in intent
of the
—
the
plutocratic
privileges
in
administration
unavoidably has to put paid professional labor in place of the historically inherited
tional" administration
B.
Mass
Parties
"avoca-
by notables.
and the Bureaucratic Conse-
quences of Democratization This applies not state. For it is no accident that in their own organizations the democratic mass parties have completely broken with traditional rule by notables based upon personal relationships and personal esteem. Such personal onlv to the
structures
still
persist
among many
old conser-
vative as well as old liberal parties, but cratic
mass
demo-
parties are bureaucratically orga-
nized under the leadership of party
officials,
professional party and trade union secretaries, etc.
In
Germany,
for instance,
this
has hap-
Democratic party and in mass-movement; in England earliest in the caucus democracy of Gladstone and Chamberlain which spread from Birmingham
pened
in the Social
the agrarian
United States, both parties since Jackson's administration have developed in the 1870's. In the
to organize disciplined political parties
bureaucratic
The
failed.
have
organization
on the
would compel repeatedly
resistance of local circles of notables
against the otherwise unavoidable bureaucrati-
zation of the parties, which
election
ple
alone al
techniques
as, for instance, the
representation,
means
would encompass
based on numbers system of proportiona strict
and
inter-local
bureaucratic organization of the parties and
therewith an increasing domination of party
bureaucracy and discipline, as well as the elimination of the local circles of notables this
holds for large
The progress
at least
of bureaucratization within the
administration
state
—
states.
itself
is
a
phenomenon
parallehng the development of democracy, as is quite obvious in France, North America, and
now
England. Of course, one must always that the term "democratization" can misleading. The demos itself, in the sense of be shapeless mass, never "governs" larger assoa rather is governed. What changes ciations, but in
remember
wav
which the executive leaders are selected and the measure of influence which the dciiwf. or better, which social circles from its midst are able to exert upon the content and the direction of administrative activities bv means of "public opinion." "Democratiis
only the
in
zation," in the sense here intended, does not
necessarily
mean an
increasingly active share
of the subjects in government. This result of democratization, but ily
it is
may
be a
not necessar-
the case.
We must expresslv recall at this point that the concept of democracy, cieduced from the "equal rights" of the governed, includes these further postulates: (1) pre\ention of the political
development of a closed status group of officials in the interest of a universal accessibility office,
and
(2)
of
minimi/ation of the authority of
officialdom in the interest of expanding the
CHAPTER
sphere of influence of "public opinion" as far as practicable. Hence, wherever possible, political democracy strives to shorten the term of
through election and
office
and
recall,
to
be
relieved from a limitation to candidates with special expert qualifications.
Thereby democra-
cy inevitably comes into conflict with the bureaucratic tendencies which have been pro-
duced by its very fight against the notables. The loose term "democratization" cannot be used here, in so far as it is understood to mean
power
the minimization of the civil servants'
in
favor of the greatest possible "direct" rule of
means the respecdemos. The decisive
the demos, which in practice tive party leaders of the
—indeed
aspect here
—
rather exclusively
is
it
the leveling of the governed in face of the governing and bureaucratically articulated
so
is
group, which in
may occupy
turn
its
autocratic position, both in fact
and
a quite
in form.
THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE BASES OF BUREAUCRATIC PERPETUITY Once
bureaucracy
fully established,
is
among
those social structures which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy
is
the
means
of transform-
organized an instrument of rationally organizing authority relations, bureaucracy was and is a power instrument of the first order for one who controls the bureaucratic ing
social
action
into
rationally
action. Therefore, as
apparatus.
Under otherwise equal
rationally
organized
(Gesellschnftslumdeln)
is
and
conditions,
directed
action
superior to every kind
and also action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) opposing it.
of collective behavior (Massenlwndehi) social
5:
119
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
the professional bureaucrat
is
chained to his
economic and ideological existence. In the great majority of cases he is only a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially activity in his entire
fixed route of march. The official is entrusted with speciaUzed tasks, and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top. The individual bureaucrat is, above all, forged to the com-
mon
interest of all the functionaries in the per-
petuation of the apparatus and the persistence of
its
rationally organized domination.
The
ruled, for their part, cannot clispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus once it exists, for it rests upon expert training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set on habitual virtuosity in the mastery of single yet methodically integrated functions. If the apparatus stops working, or if its work is interrupted by force, chaos results, which it is difficult to master by improvised replacements from among the governed. This holds for public
administration as well as for private eco-
nomic management. Increasingly the material fate of the masses depends upon the continuous and correct functioning of the ever more bureaucratic organizations of private capital-
and the idea of eliminating them becomes more and more Utopian. Increasingly, all order in public and private ism,
organizations is dependent on the system of files and the discipline of officialdom, that means, its habit of painstaking obedience within
ed sphere of action. The
latter is the
its
wont-
more
deci-
however important in practice the files are. The naive idea of Bakuninism of de-
sive element,
Where administration has been completely
stroying the basis of "acquired rights" together
bureaucratized, the resulting system of domi-
with "domination" by destroying the public documents overlooks that the settled orientation of man for observing the accustomed rules and
nation
is
practically indestructible.
The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus into which he has been harnessed. In contrast to the "notable" performing administrative tasks as a honorific duty or as a subsidiary occupation (avocation).
regulations will survive independently of the
documents. Every reorganization of defeated or scattered army units, as well as every restoration of an administrative order destroyed by revolts.
120
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
panics, or other catastrophes,
by an
effected
is
appeal to this conditioned orientation, bred both in the officials and in the subjects, of obe-
and
dient adjustment to such [social orders.
If
the appeal
is
successful
it
political]
brings, as
it
BUREAUCRACY AND EDUCATION A. Educational Specialization,
Degree
Hunting and Status Seeking
We
cannot here analyze the far-reaching and
were, the disturbed mechanism to "snap into
general cultural effects that the advance of the
gear" again.
rational bureaucratic structure of
The
to gain
domination develops quite independently of the areas in which it takes hold. Naturally, bureaucracy promotes a "rationalist" way of life, but the concept of rationalism allows for widely differing contents. Quite generally, one can only say that the bureaucratization of all domination very
A rationally ordered officialdom
strongly furthers the development of "rational
objective indispensability of the once-
existing apparatus, in connection with
its pecu"impersonal" character, means that the mechanism in contrast to the feudal order
liarly
—
based upon personal loyalty
work
for
—
is
easily
anybody who knows how
control over
it.
made
continues to function smoothly after the
to
enemy
matter-of-factness"
and the personality type
of
has occupied the territory; he merely needs to change the top officials. It continues to operate
the professional expert. This has far-reaching
because it is to the vital interest of everyone concerned, including above all the enemy. After Bismarck had, during the long course of his years in power, brought his ministerial colleagues into unconditional bureaucratic dependence by eliminating all independent
of the process can be briefly indicated here:
statesmen, he
saw
to his surprise that
upon
his
ramifications, but only
effect al
upon
one important element
the nature of education
its
and person-
culture (Erzieliu)ig iimi Bihiuug).
Educational institutions on the European continent, especially the institutions of higher
learning
— the
uni\'ersities, as well as technical
academies, business colleges, gymnasia, and
—
are dominated
and
resignation they continued to administer their
other secondary schools
unconcernedly and undismayedly, as if it had not been the ingenious lord and very creator of these tools who had left, but merely
influenced bv the need for the kind of "educa-
offices
some
individual figure in the bureaucratic ma-
chine which had been exchanged for other figure. In spite of
all
the changes of
some mas-
France since the time of the First Empire, the power apparatus remained essentially ters in
Such an apparatus makes "revolution,"
in
the sense of the forceful creation of entirely
formations of authority, more and more technically, because of its control
—
impossible
over the modern means of communication (telegraph etc.), and also because of its increasingly rationalized inner structure.
"revolutions"
coups
which
is
bred by the system of special-
ized examinations or tests of expertise (FachpriifuiigfU'cscn)
increasingly indispensable for
modern bureaucracies. The "examination for expertise" in the modern sense was and is found also outside the strictly bureaucratic structures: today, for instance, in the so-called "free" professions of
the same.
new
tion"
,
d'etat,
the classical
is
under
The place
this process
of
taken by
as again France demonstrates in
manner
since
all
successful trans-
formations there have been of this nature.
medicine and law, and in the guild-organized trades. Nor is it an indispensable accompani-
ment of bureaucratization: the French, English and American bureaucracies ha\e for a long time done without such examinations either entirely or to a large extent, using in-service
training
and performance
in the party organi-
zations as a substitute.
"Democracy" takes an ambivalent attitude also towards the system of examinations for expertise, as
it
does towards
all
the
phenomena
CHAPTER
of the bureaucratization which, nevertheless,
On
promotes.
it
the one hand, the system of
examinations means, or
appears to
least
at
mean, selection of the qualified from all social strata in place of the rule by notables. But on the other, democracy fears that examinations and patents of education will create a privileged "caste," and for that reason opposes such a system. the
Finally,
found already
examination
expertise
for
in prebureaucratic or
is
semibu-
its
earliest regular
historical locus is in prebeyidally
organized struc-
reaucratic epochs. Indeed,
domination.
of
tures
prebencis,
first
The
expectation
of church prebends
—as
of
in the Is-
lamic Orient and in the Occidental Middle
Ages
—and
then, as
was
especially the case in
China, also of secular prebends,
is
the typical
which people study and are examined. These examinations, however, have only in part prize for
5:
121
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
can again be turned to economic advantage. role played in former days by the "proof of
The
ancestry," as prerequisite for equality of birth,
access
and,
to noble prebends and endowments wherever the nobility retained social
power, for the c^ualification to state offices, is nowadays taken by the patent of education. The elaboration of the diplomas from universities, business and engineering colleges, and the universal clamor for the creation of further educational certificates in
all
fields serve the
formation of a privileged stratum in bureaus and in offices. Such certificates support their holders' claims for
connubium with
the nota-
bles (in business offices, too, they raise
hope
for
preferment with the boss's daughter), claims to be admitted into the circles that adhere to "codes of honor,"
claims for a "status-appropriate"
salary instead of a
wage according
to perfor-
bureaucratization brings the system of rational
advancement and old-age insurance, and, above all, claims to the monopolization of socially and economically advantageous positions. If we hear from all
examinations for expertise
sides
the character of tests for specialized "expertise."
Only
modern
the
development
of
irresistibly
full
to the
The American Civil-Service Reform movement gradually imports expert training and fore.
specialized examinations into the United States;
the examination system also advances into
all
main (European) breeding ground, Germany. The increasing bureau-
other countries from
its
mance, claims
demands
for assured
for the introduction of regulated
curricula culminating in specialized examina-
reason behind this is, of course, not a suddenly awakened "thirst for education," but rather the desire to limit the supply of candidates for these positions and to monopolize tions, the
them
for the holders of educational patents.
enhances the importance of the specialized examination in England. In China, the attempt to replace the old semipatrimonial bureaucracy by a modern bureaucracy brought the expert examination; it took the place of the former and quite differently structured system of examinations. The bureaucratization of capitalism, with its
For such monopolization, the "examination" is today the universal instrument hence its irresistible advance. As the curriculum required
demand
cational patent are always
cratization
etc.,
of
administration
for expertly trained technicians, clerks,
carries
such examinations
all
over the
for the acquisition of the patent of education
requires
considerable
is,
above
all,
greatly fur-
expenses and
a
long
period of gestation, this striving implies a repression of talent (of the "charisma") in favor of property, for the intellectual costs of the edu-
low and decrease,
rather than increase, with increasing volume.
The old requirement
world. This development
—
of a knightly style of
the prerequisite for capacity to hold a
life,
fief,
is
thered by the social prestige of the "patent of
nowadays in Germany replaced by the necessity
education" acquired through such specialized examinations, the more so since this prestige
of participating in
its
surviving remnants, the
duelling fraternities of the universities which
122
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
grant the patents of education; in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, the fulfill
the
same
athletic
and
social clubs
function.
On the other hand, bureaucracy strives everywhere for the creation of a
"right to the office"
by
the establishment of regular disciplinary proce-
dures and by the elimination of the completely arbitrary disposition of the superior over the
subordinate secure
the
official.
The bureaucracy seeks position,
official's
to
orderly
his
advancement, and his provision for old age. In this, it is supported by the "democratic" sentiment of the governed which demands that domination be minimized; those who hold this attitude believe themselves able to discern a weakening of authority itself in every weakening of the lord's arbitrary disposition over the officials. To this extent bureaucracy, both in business offices and in public service, promotes the rise of a specific status
group, just as did the quite
different officeholders of the past.
We
have
al-
ready pointed out that these status characteristics
are usually also exploited
nature contribute
to,
for,
and by
their
the technical usefulness of
man," rather than end sought bv education and the basis of social esteem in the feudal, theocratic, and patrimonial structures of domination, in the English administration bv notables, in the old Chinese patrimonial bureaucracy, as well as under the rule of demagogues in the Greek states during the so-called Democracy. The term "cultivated man" is used in slogans, the "cultivated
the "specialist,"
was
the
here in a completely value-neutral sense;
it
is
understood to mean solely that a quality of life conduct which zms held to be "cultivated" was the goal of education, rather than a specialized training in some expertise. Such education may have been aimed at a knightly or at an ascetic type, at a literary type (as in China) or at a gymnastic-humanist type (as in Hellas), or at a conventional "gentleman" type of the AngloSaxon variety. A personality "cultivated" in this sense formed the educational ideal stamped by the structure of domination and the conditions of
membership
stratum
societv
of
the
in
in
the ruling
questic>n.
qualification of this ruling stratum rested
The upon
bureaucracy in fulfilling its specific tasks. It is precisely against this unavoidable status character of bureaucracy that "democracy" reacts in its striving to put the election of officials for short terms in place of the appoint-
the possession of a "plus" of such cultural quality
ment
recall of
cultivated at the
discipli-
gravity in the Hellenic, in the medieval, as well
and to substitute the by referendum for a regulated
of officials
officials
nary procedure, thus seeking to replace the arbitrary
disposition
of
the
hierarchically
superordinate "master" by the equally arbitrary disposition of the
governed or
rather, of
the party bosses dominating them.
(in the quite variable
and value-neutral sense
of the term as used here), rather than
upon
a
"plus" of expert knowledge. Military, theological
and
legal expertise was, of course, intensely
same
time. But the point of
as in the Chinese educational curriculum
was
formed by elements entirely different from those which were "useful" in a technical sense. Behind all the present discussions about the basic questions of the educational system there lurks decisively the struggle of the "specialist"
Excursus on the "Cultivated Man" Social prestige based upon the advantage of schooling and education as such is by no means specific to bureaucracy. On the contrary. But
type of man against the (.>lder type of the "cultivated man," a struggle conditioned by the irresistibly expanding bureaucratization of all pub-
educational
ever-increasing importance of experts and spe-
B.
domination
prestige rests
in
upon
other
structures
of
substantially different
foundations with respect to content. Expressed
lic
and private
relations of authority
and bv the
knowledge. This struggle affects the most intimate aspects of personal culture.
cialised
CHAPTER
CONCLUSION
5:
123
MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE
not rational in this sense of the term. Hence
may
ask:
What were
we
these structures?
During its advance, bureaucratic organization has had to overcome not only those essentially negative obstacles, several
times previously
mentioned,
the
stood
that
in
way
of
the
required leveling process. In addition, adminis-
based on different principles did and still do cross paths with bureaucratic organization. Some of these have already been mentioned in passing. Not all of the types existing in the real world can be discussed here this would lead us much too far afield; we can analyze only some of the most importrative structures
—
tant
structural
principles
schematic exposition.
We
in
much
shall
simplified
proceed
in the
main, although not exclusively, by asking the following questions:
Max Weber:
"Objectivity" in Social
Science and Social Policy*
We
all
know
that
our science, as
is
the case
with every science treating the institutions and
human
events of
culture, (with the possible
exception of political history)
first
arose in con-
Its most immediate and often sole purpose was the
nection with practical considerations.
of value-judgments concerning measures of State economic policy. It was a
attainment
administrative struc-
"technique" in the same sense as, for instance,
tures in their developmental chances subject to economic, political or any other external determinants, or to an "autonomous" logic inherent
the clinical disciplines in the medical sciences
1.
How
far are these
tion
has now become known how this situawas gradually modified. This modification
any, are
was
not,
which these administrative structures exert? In doing this, one must keep one's eye on the fluidity and the overlap-
tion
of
in their technical strticture?
What,
2.
if
the economic effects
ping of
all
these
organizational
Their "pure" types, after
all,
principles.
are to be consid-
ered merely border cases which are of special
and indispensable analytical value, and bracket historical reality which almost always appears in mixed forms. The bureaucratic structure is everywhere a late product of historical development. The further back we trace our steps, the more typical is the absence of bureaucracy and of officialdom in general. Since bureaucracy has a "rational"
means-ends calculus, and matter-of-factness predominating, its rise and expansion has everywhere had "revolutionary" character, with rules,
results, in a special sense
still
to
be discussed,
as had the advance of rationaiism in general.
The march
of
bureaucracy accordingly de-
stroyed structures of domination which were
are.
It
however, accompanied by a formulathe
logical
(priiizipicllc)
distinction
between "existential knowledge," i.e., knowledge of what "is," and "normative knowledge," i.e., knowledge of what "should be." The formulation of this distinction was hampered, first, by the view that immutably invariant natural laws, later, by the view that an unambiguous evolutionary principle gov-
—
—
Smirce
Reprinted with the permission of The Free from Max Weber, The
Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc.,
Methmtolog}/ cf the SoeinI Scieucea, translated and edited Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Copyright 1949
©
The Free
Press; copyright
by by
renewed 1977 by Edward A.
Shils. * This essay was published when the etiitorship of the Archh' fur Sozialwisfeui^chaft unci Sociatfolitik was transferred to Edgar Jaffe, Werner Sombart and Max Weber. Its form was influenced by the occasion for which it was written and the content should be considered in this light. (Marianne Weber.)
124
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1;
and value-judgsomewhat more
erned economic life and that accordingly, xohat was normativehi right was identical in the former case with the immutably cxiftent and with the inevitably emergent. in the latter
scientific
With the awakening of the
ments of meaningful human conduct
—
—
—
—
historical sense, a
combination of ethical evolutionism and histor-
became
relativism
ical
the
predominant
atti-
tude in our science. This attitude sought to deprive ethical norms of their formal character and through the incorporation of the totality of cultural values into the "ethical" (Sittlichen) sphere tried to give a substantive content to ethical norms. It was hoped thereby to raise economics to the status of an "ethical science" with empirical foundations. To the extent that
an "ethical" label was given tural ideals, the particular
to all possible cul-
autonomy
of the eth-
ical imperative was obliterated, without however increasing the "objective" validity of those ideals. Nonetheless we can and must forego a
discussion of the principles at issue.
We
merely
ments?
criticism
This
All serious reflection about the ultimate ele-
are appropriate or inappropriate,
way
of
an
empirical specialized discipline must, as
we
wish ple.
journal
the
as
representative
show shortly, reject this view in princimust do so because, in our opinion, it
to It
can never be the task of an empirical science to
provide binding norms and ideals from which immediate practical activity can
directives for
be derived.
What It is
is
the implication of this proposition?
certainly not that value-judgments are to
be withdrawn from scientific discussion in general simply because in the last analysis they rest
on
certain ideals
and
are therefore "subjec-
tive" in origin. Practical action
our journal would always
and the aims
reject
of
such a propo-
not to be suspended in the presence of value-judgments. The problem is
sition. Criticism is
rather:
what
is
can in
this
end by
certain available means. In this
can indirectly itself
way we
criticize the setting of the
end
as practically meaningful (on the basis of
the existing historical situation) or as meaning-
with reference to existing conditions. Fur-
when
the possibility of attaining a
proposed end appears
mine
to exist,
we
can deter-
(naturally within the limits of our exist-
ing knowledge) the consequences which the
means to be used will produce in addition to the eventual attainment of the proposed end, as a result of the interdependence of all events. We can then pro\'ide the acting person with the ability to weigh and compare the undesirable as over against the desirable consequences of his action. Thus, we can answer the question: what will the attainment of a desired end "cost" in terms of the application of the
practical affairs.
Our
we
estimate the chances of attaining a certain
thermore,
of
orient-
undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis. Inasmuch as we are able to determine (within the present limits of our knowledge) which means for the achievement of a proposed end
less
among men
is
ed primarily in terms of the categories "end" and "means." We desire something concretely either "for its own sake" or as a means of achieving something else which is more highly desired. The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a given end is
economics does and should derive valuejudgments from a specifically "economic point of view" has not disappeared but is especially current, quite understandably,
a
detailed analysis.
point out that even today the confused opinion that
of ideals
requires
the
meaning and purpose of the
predictable loss of other values? Since, in the vast majority of cases, every goal that
is
striven
does "cost" or can "cost" something in this sense, the weighing of the goal in terms ot the incidental consequences of the action which realizes it cannot be omitted from the deliberation of persons who act with a sense of responsibility. One of the most important functions of the tcchniciil criticism which we ha\'e been disfor
cussing thus far
is to
make
this sort of analysis
CHAPTER
To apply the
possible.
results of this analysis in
making of a decision, however, is not a task which science can undertake; it is rather the the
task of the acting, willing person: he weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world. Science can make him realize that all action and naturallv, according to the circumstances, inaction imply in their
consequences the espousal of certain values and herewith what is today so willingly overlooked the rejection of certain others. The act
—
—
of choice itself
We
is
his
own responsibility. who makes
can also offer the person, the
into
insight
choice,
We
significance
a
the
of
them
also "judge"
critically.
have only
of course
125
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
5:
This criticism can
a dialetical character,
i.e., it
can be no more than a formal logical judgment of historically given value-judgments and ideas, a testing of the ideals according to the postulate of
the
desired end.
It
consistency
internal
can, insofar as
it
the
of
sets itself this
goal, aid the acting willing person in attaining final axioms ends are derived. It can assist him in becoming aware of the ultimate standards of value which he does not make explicit to himself or, which he must presuppose in order to be logical. The elevation of these ultimate standards, which are manifested
concerning the
self-clarification
from which
his desired
can teach him to think in
in concrete
value-judgments, to the level of
terms of the context and the meaning of the ends he desires, and among which he chooses.
explicitness
is
We do
this
entering into the realm of speculation.
oping
in
desired object.
through making
do or which can underself-evident that one
"ideas" which actually lie
the concrete end.
of the
and develmanner the
explicit
consistent
logically
a
It is
most important tasks of every science of
cultural
life
is
under-
to arrive at a rational
standing of these "ideas" for which really or allegedly struggle. This
step the boundaries of a science
men
either
does not over-
which
strives
for an "analytical ordering of empirical reality," although the methods which are used in this interpretation of cultural (geistiger) values are not "inductions" in the usual sense. At any rate, this task falls at least partly
limits of
to the
that
the scientific
As
to
whether the person expressing these valuejudgments sliould adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair; it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge. An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do but rather what he can do and under certain circumstances what he wishes to do. It is true that in our sciences, personal value-judgments have tended to influence scientific arguments without being explicitly admitted. They have brought about continual confusion and have caused various interpretations to be placed on scientific arguments even in the sphere of the determination
—
—
—
among
belongs
of simple casual interconnections
Howev-
according to whether the results increased or
the historical influence of ideas in the devel-
decreased the chances of realizing one's per-
conventional
among er,
beyond the
economics as defined according
the utmost
treatment of value-judgments can do without
opment
division
of
labor.
It
the tasks of social philosophy.
has been and
facts
the possibility of desiring a
so
sonal ideals,
i.e.,
great that our journal cannot renounce this
certain thing.
Even the editors and the collabo-
task. this
It
of social
life
still
is
shall rather regard the investigation of
phenomenon
as one of
its
most important
obligations.
But
the
judgments
of
human
as alien" to
is
scientific
may
not
treatment
only
of
value-
and
understand
our journal will regard
rators
a long
human
them
way from
this
it
frailty to the belief in
an "ethical"
sci-
ence of economics, which would derive ideals
and produce concrete
from
ends and the ideals which underlie them;
norms by applying general
can
But
acknowledgment of
empathically analyze (uncherlcboi) the desired it
"nothing
in this respect.
its
subject matter
ethical imperatives.
— 126
PARTI;
It is
true that
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
we
regard as objectively valuable
labor
protective
of
sections
legislation
—
in
those innermost elements of the "personality,"
short,
those highest and most ultimate value-judgments which determine our conduct and give meaning and significance to our life. We can indeed espouse these values only when they appear to us as valid, as derived from our highest values and when they are developed in the struggle against the difficulties which life pre-
appearance, only the means for the attainment
sents. Certainly, the dignity of the "personali-
expediency which would very often be incorrect even in this case we would have to recog-
ty" lies in the fact that for
about which
organizes
it
there exist values
—even
all
those issues in which, at least in
of the goal are at issue. But even
if
we were
to
mistake the illusion of self-evidence for truth which science can never do without damaging itself
—and wished to view the confUcts imme-
diately
from
arising
realization
attempts
practical
at
purely technical questions of
as
—
—
these
nize that this illusion of the self-evidence of
values are in certain cases concentrated exclu-
normative standards of value is dissipated as soon as we pass from the concrete problems of
it
its life;
if
sively within the sphere of the person's "individuality," then "self-realization" in tlwse interests for
which
it
claims validity as values,
idea with respect to which is
is
the
whole existence oriented. Only on the assumption of belief in
the validity of values
value-judgments jiiii^c
is
the attempt to espouse
However,
meaningful.
the validity of such values
faith. It
may
perhaps be a task
tive interpretation of life
is
it
to
a matter of
for the specula-
and the universe
quest of their meaning. But fall
its
in
certainly does not
within the province of an empirical science
which
be practised here. The empirically demonstrable fact that these ultimate ends undergo historical changes and are debatable does not affect this distinction between empirical science and value-judgments, contrary to what is often thought. For even the in the sense in
knowledge
of the
it is
most
to
certain proposition of
—
our theoretical sciences e.g., the exact natural sciences or mathematics, is, like the cultivation and refinement of the conscience, a product of culture. However, when we call to mind the practical problems of economic and social policy
(in the
usual sense),
we
see that there are
many, indeed countless, practical questions in the discussion of which there seems to be general agreement about the self-evident character of certain goals. Among these we may mention emergency credit, the concrete problems of social hygiene, poor relief, factory inspection, industrial courts,
employment exchanges,
large
philanthropic and protective social and eco-
nomic
economic and
services to problems of
The
social policy.
distinctive characteristic of a
problem of social polici/ is indeed the fact that it cannot be resolved merely on the basis of purely
which
considerations
technical
assume
already settled ends. Normative standards of
value can and must be the objects of dispute in a
problem of
discussion of a
because the problem
And
eral cultural values.
merely, as
we
the
social
policy
domain
of gen-
the conflict occurs not
are too easily inclined to believe
between
today,
lies in
"class interests" but
general views on
and the
life
between
uni\'erse as well.
This latter point, however, does not lessen the truth
the
that
decided quite
among
between
accepting
the
by
degree it
the
for
value-
individual espouses
is
other factors and certainly to a
significant
affinity
ultimate
particular
judgment which
and
the
degree
of
his class interests
time
being
this
only
unambiguous term. One thing is under all circumstances, namely, the
superficially
certain
more "general" this case, the
the problem in\olved, i.e., in broader its cultural significance,
the less subject it is to a single unambiguous answer on the basis of the data of empirical sciences and the greater the nile played by \alueideas (Werfideen) and the ultimate and highest personal axioms o( belief. It is simply naive to believe, although
there are
many
specialists
CHAPTER
who
even
now
occasionally do, that
and
ble to establish fically valid
to
it is
demonstrate as
"a principle" for practical social
norms
for the solution
of practical problems can be
unambiguously
science from which the
However much
Only an optimistic syncretism, such as
possi-
scienti-
127
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
5:
the product
times,
is,
at
of evolutionary-historical
delude
relativism, can theoretically
about
itself
the profound seriousness of this situation or practically shirk
its
consequences.
It
can, to be
the social sciences
sure, be just as obligatory subjectively for the
need the discussion of practical problems in terms of fundamental principles, i.e., the reduction of unreflective value-judgments to the premises from which they are logically derived and however much our journal intends to devote itself specially to them certainly the creation of a lowest common denominator for our problems in the form of generally valid ultimate value-judgments cannot be its task or
practical politician, in the individual case, to
derived.
—
mediate between antagonistic points of view as to take sides with one of them. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific "objectivity." Scientifically the "middle course"
not truer even
extreme
in/
party
Nowhere
are
a hair's breadth,
ideals
the
the
of
interests
of
is
than the most or
right
left.
more
science
poorly served in the long run than in those
sit-
science.
uations where one refuses to see uncomfortable
Such a thing would not only be impracticable; it would be entirely meaningless as well. Whatever the interpretation of the basis and the
and the realities of life in all their starkThe Archiv will struggle relentlessly against the severe self-deception which asserts
nature of the validity of the ethical imperatives,
that
from them, as from the norms for the concretely conditioned conduct of the individual, cultural values cannot be unambigu-
points of view, or by following a line between
arrived
ously derived as being normatively desirable;
since this piece of self-deception tries to
can do so the less, the more inclusive are the values concerned. Only positive religions or
its
more
bound
than the former naive faith of parties in the
of cul-
entific
in general the task of
it is
any empirical
certain that
it
—
sects
precisely expressed: dogmatically
—are able
to confer
tural values the status of ethical
on the content
unconditionally valid
imperatives. Outside these sects, cultural
which the individual wishes to realize and ethical obligations which he should fulfill do not, in principle, share the same status. The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to ideals
others as ours are to us.
facts
ness.
through the synthesis of several party
them, practical norms of at.
own
it is
is
It
scientific validity
standards of value in
more dangerous
to the
distinguish
to
knowledge
and
freedom of research
between duty
and
own ideals constitute which we wish to adhere with our
the
to see the fac-
tual truth as well as the practical
to
sci-
empirical
value-judgments,
fulfillment of the scientific
for
mask
relativistic terms,
"demonstrability" of their dogmas. The
capacity
up
can be
necessary to do this because,
duty the
to
stand
program
ever increas-
ing firmness.
There
is
and always
reason that
it
will
concerns us
be—and the —an unbridgeable this is
among (1) those arguments which appeal to our capacity to become enthusiastic about and our feeling for concrete practical distinction
aims or cultural forms and values, (2) those arguments in which, once it is a question of the validity of ethical norms, the appeal is directed to our conscience, and finally (3) those arguments which appeal to our capacity and need
128
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
for analytically ordering empirical reality in a
manner which
lavs claim to validity as empiri-
This proposition remains correct, desee, the fact that those highest
cal truth.
we shall
spite, as
this point. There is one tenet to which we adhere most firmly in our work, namely, that a social science journal, in our sense, to the extent that it is scientific should be a place
"values" underlving the practical interest are
where those
and alwavs
remain with our
will
be decisively significant in
truths
which — —can claim, even
sought,
are
illustration
to
determining the focus of attention of analytical
for a Chinese, the \'aliditv appropriate to
activitv (ordnende Tdtigkeit des Denkens) in the
analvsis of empirical reaUty.
sphere of the cultural sciences.
It
has been and
remains true that a systematically correct scientific proof in the social sciences, if it is to achieve its purpose, must be acknowledged as or more precisely correct even by a Chinese
—
— —
must constantly strive to attain this goal, which perhaps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data. Furthermore, the stated
it
successful logical analysis of the content of an
and
ideal
its
ultimate axioms and the discovery
of the consequences it,
which
arise
from pursuing
must also be valid the Chinese. At the same time, our Chinese
logically
for
and
practically,
can lack a "sense" for our ethical imperative and he can and certainly often will deny the ideal itself and the concrete value-judgments derived from
it.
Neither of these two
latter atti-
tudes can affect the scientific value of the analysis in any way. Quite certainlv our journal
and inevitably recurunambiguous interpre-
will not ignore the ever
rent attempts to give an tation
On
culture.
to
the
contrary,
these
attempts themselves rank with the most impor-
an
Of course, the editors cannot once and for all deny to themselves or their contributors the possibility of expressing
the ideals
in
value-judgments
which motivate them. However two
important duties arise in connection with this. First, to keep the readers and themseh'es sharplv aware at every
moment
of the stan-
dards by which they judge reality and from which the value-judgment is derived, instead of, as happens too often, deceiving themselves in the conflict of ideals by a value melange of values of the most different orders and types,
and seeking
something
to ever^'body If heeded, the practical evaluative attitude can be not only harmless to scientific interests but even directly useto offer
this obligation is rigorously
and indeed mandator)'. In the scientific and other practical recommendations, the motives of the legislator and the ideals of the critic in all their scope often can not be clarified and analyzed in a tangible and intelligible form in any other way ful,
criticism of legislative
follow with care the course of these discussions
than through the confrontation of the standards of value underlving the ideas criticized with others, preferably the critic's own. Every meaningful valuc-judg)ncnt about someone else's aspirations must be a criticism from the
of "social philosophy" (as here understood).
standpoint of one's
We
must be
under dvnamic
tant products of this cultural life and,
circumstances,
certain forces.
We
among
its
will therefore constantlv strive to
are furthermore completely free of the prej-
own
Wclta)isclianung:
a struggle against another's ideals
it
from
udice which asserts that reflections on culture which go bevond the analvsis of empirical data
the standpoint of one's own. If in a particular concrete case, the ultimate value-axioms which
order to interpret the world metaphysically
underlie practical acti\'itv are not only to be designated and scientificallv analyzed but are
in
can, because of their metaphysical character fulfill
no useful cognitive
cognitive tasks are ical
is
tasks. Just
what these
primarily an epistemolog-
question, the answer to which
and can,
in \-iew of
we must
our purpose, disregard
at
also to be
shown
in their relationship to other
value-axioms, "positive" criticism by means of a systematic exposition of the latter able.
is
unavoid-
CHAPTER
In the pages of this journal, especially in the
discussion of legislation, there will inevitably
be found social ideals,
policy,
in addition
analysis of facts. But
i.e.,
the statement of
social science,
to
we do
i.e.,
not by any
the
means
intend to present such discussions as "science"
and we
guard as best we can against allowing these two to be confused with each other. In such discussions, science no longer has the floor. For that reason, the second fundamental imperative of scientific freedom is that in such cases it should be constantly made will
clear to the readers (and
above
—again
we
say
one's
self!)
exactly at
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
"objections," replies
and
129
rebuttals, but in
its
pages no one will be protected, neither its contributors nor its editors, from being subjected sharpest
the
to
factual,
Whoever cannot bear
scientific
criticism.
who
takes the
this or
viewpoint that he does not wish to work, in the service of scientific knowledge, with persons whose other ideals are different from his own, is
free not to participate.
However, we should not deceive ourselves about
it
—
this last
in practice
the
it
which point the scientific investigator becomes silent and the evaluating and acting person begins to speak. In other words, it shouki be made explicit just where the arguments are addressed to the analytical understanding and where to the sentiments. The constant confusion of the scientific discussion of facts and their evaluation is still one of the most widespread and also one of the most damaging traits of work in our field. The foregoing arguments are directed against this confusion, and all to
5;
first
than
it
sentence means
seems
to
do
much more
at first glance. In
place, there are psychological limits
everywhere and especially in Germany to the possibility of coming together freely with one's political opponents in a neutral forum, be it social or intellectual. This obstacle which should be relentlessly combatted as a sign of narrow-minded party fanaticism and back-
ward
political culture, is reinforced for a jour-
nal like ours through the fact that in social sci-
ences the stimulus to the posing of scientific problems is in actuality always given by practical "questions."
Hence
the very recognition of
the existence of a scientific
problem coincides,
not against the clear-cut introduction of one's
personally, with the possession of specifically
own
oriented motives and values.
ideals into the discussion.
An
attitude of
moral indifference has no connection with scientific
"objectivity."
The Archiv, at least in its been and should never be
intentions, has never
a place
where polemics against
certain currents
in politics or social policy are carried on,
should
it
be a place where struggles are
nor
waged
has
come
into existence
A journal which under the influence of
a general interest in a concrete problem, will
always include among
who
its
contributors persons
are personally interested in these prob-
lems because certain concrete situations seem to be incompatible with, or seem to threaten,
for or against ideals in politics or social-policy.
the realization of certain ideal values in
There are other journals for these purposes. The peculiar characteristic of the journal has rather been from the very beginning and, inso-
they believe.
far as
it is
in the
power
of the editors, shall con-
tinue to be that political antagonists can meet in
it
to carry
on
scientific
work.
a "socialist" organ hitherto shall not
from
be "bourgeois."
its circle
It
of contributors
place himself within the tific
and
discussion.
It
It
has not been
in the future
it
excludes no one
who
is
willing to
framework of
scien-
cannot be an arena
for
A bond
which
of similar ideals will hold
this circle of contributors together
and
it
will be
the basis of a further recruitment. This in turn will tend to give the journal, at least in
ment
its treat-
of questions of practical social policy, a
which of course inevitably accompanies every collaboration of vigorously certain "character"
whose evaluative standpoint regarding the problems cannot be entirely expressed even in purely theoretical analysis; sensitive persons
in the criticism of practical
recommendations
130
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
and measures it quite legitimately finds expression under the particular conditions above discussed. The Archiv first appeared at a time in which certain practical aspects of the "labor problem" (as traditionally understood) stood
—
constituted a source of strength for the journal;
under the given circumstances it was perhaps even one of its claims to the justification for its existence.
There can be no doubt that the development
in the forefront of social science discussions.
of a "character," in this sense, in a scientific
Those persons for whom the problems which the Archil' wished to treat were bound up with ultimate and decisive value-judgments and who on that account became its most regular contributors also espoused at the same time the view of culture which was strongly influenced by these value-judgments. We all know that though this journal, through its explicit selfrestriction "scientific" discussions and to through the express invitation to the "adher-
journal can constitute a threat to the freedom of
ents of
all political
would pursue less
standpoints," denied that
a certain "tendency,"
it
it
nonethe-
possessed a "character" in the above sense.
This "character" was created by the group of its
regular contributors. In general they were
men who, whatever may have been
other
divergences in their points of view, set as their goal the protection of the physical well-being of the laboring masses and the increase of the latters'
share of the material and intellectual
values
of
our
culture.
employed the combination
As
a
means,
they
of state intervention
into the arena of material interests with the
shaping of the existing political and legal Whatever may have been their opinion as to the form of the social order in the more remote future for the present, they accepted the emergent trends of the capitalist system, not because they seemed better than the older forms of social organization but because they seemed to be practically inevitable and because the attempt to wage a fundamental struggle against it appeared to hinder and not aid the freer
order.
—
working class. In the situawhich exists in Germany today we need not be more specific at this point this was not and is not to be avoided. Indeed, it bore direct fruit in the successful many-sidedness of the participation in the scientific discussion and it cultural rise of the tion
—
—
scientific analysis;
when
it
really
does amount to that is purposely
the selection of contributors
one-sided.
In
this
case the cultivation of a
"character" in a journal
is
practically equiva-
The ediaware of the responsibility which this situation imposes upon them. They propose lent to the existence of a "tendency."
tors are
neither the deliberate transformation of the
character of the Archiv nor
vation by
means
contributors
to
its artificial
scholars
of
party loyalties. They accept
await
which
further
its it
fications
takes in
which
preser-
of a careful restriction of the
it
certain it
definite
as given
and
"development." The form the future and the modi-
may undergo
the inevitable broadening of
as a result of
its circle
of con-
depend primarily on the characpersons who, seeking to serve the ter of those cause of science, enter the circle and become or tributors will
remain frequent contributors. It will be further affected by the broadening of the problems, the advancement of which is a goal of the journal. With these remarks we come to the question on which we have not yet touched, namely, the factvial delimitation of our field of operations. No answer can, however, be given without raising the question as to the goal of social science
knowledge
in general.
When we
distinguished
between "value-judgments" and "empirical knowledge," we presupposed the existence of an unconditionally valid type of knowledge in the social sciences, i.e., the anain
principle
lytical
ordering of empirical social reality This
now becomes our problem we must discuss the meaning
presupposition
in
the sense that
of
objectively "valid" truth in the social sciences.
The genuineness of the problem is apparent to anyone who is aware of the conflict about
CHAPTER
5:
methods, "fundamental concepts" and presup-
description of
positions, the incessant shift of "viewpoints,"
of this "individual
and the continuous redefinition of "concepts" and who sees that the theoretical and historical modes of analysis are still separated by an
of explaining
apparently unbridgeable gap. It constitutes, as a despairing Viennese examinee once sorrow-
only a
fully complained,
only
What
"tzoo sciences of
economics."
meaning of "objectivity" in this The following discussion will be
the
is
context?
devoted
***************
There
to this question.
is
no absolutely "objective"
scientific
— —
or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently of "social phenomena" for our purposes independent of special and "one-sided" viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository pur-
analysis of culture
—
poses.
The reasons
of the cognitive goal of
all
research in social
sci-
all
it
the individual
phenomena,"
components
to say
nothing
causally. All the analysis of
which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that infinite reality
portion of this reality constitutes
finite
the object of scientific investigation, is
it
and
that
"important" in the sense of being
"worthy of being known." But what are the criby which this segment is selected? It has often been thought that the decisive criterion in teria
the cultural sciences, too,
was
in the last analy-
the "regular" recurrence of certain causal
sis,
relationships.
The "laws" which we are able
to
perceive in the infinitely manifold stream of
events must
—according
to this
conception
contain the scientifically "essential" aspect of reality.
—
for this lie in the character
131
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
.
.
.
.
.
.
We seek knowledge of an historical phe-
nomenon, meaning by
historical: significant in
individuality (Eigenart).
its
element in
this is that
And
the decisive
only through the presuppart alone of the infinite
ence which seeks to transcend the purely formal treatment of the legal or conventional norms
position that a finite
regulating social
knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful. Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of "laws," we
The type interested ity
is
life.
of social science in
an empirical
which we are
science of concrete real-
(Wirklichkeitswissenschaft).
Our aim
is
the
understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move. We wish to understand on the one hand the relationships
variety of
phenomena
is
significant,
does the
are helpless in the face of the question:
how
is
the causal explanation of an individual fact possi-
—since
ble
a description
of
even the smallest
and on the other the causes of their being historically so and not otherzvise. Now, as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situa-
can never be exhaustive? The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention. A chaos of "existential judgments" about countless individual events would be the only
presents an infinite multiplicity of suc-
result of a serious attempt to analyze reality
and the
cultural
significance
of
individual
events in their contemporary manifestations
tions,
it
and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both "within" and "outside" ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused on a single
cessively
"object," for instance, a concrete act of exchange,
as soon as
we
seriously attempt an exhaustive
slice of reality
presuppositions." And even this only seemingly possible, since every single perception discloses on closer examination an infinite number of constituent percep-
"without
result
is
which
can never be exhaustively judgment. Order is brought into chaos only on the condition that in every
tions
expressed this
in a
132
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
case only a pmrt of concrete reality
and
is
interesting
because only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach significant to us,
reality.
Only
which we
attribute
—are
They alone
And even
a
therefore
ficance
same
comphenomenon, namely those to
certain sides of the infinitely
plex concrete
general cultural signi-
worthwhile
knowing.
are objects of causal explanation.
this causal
explanation evinces the
an exhaustive causal investigaany concrete phenomena in its full
character;
tion of
—
only practically impossible it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual reality is not
an event. Where
case, the "essential" feature of
the
indii'iciualiti/
phenomenon
of a
the question of causality lazvs
concerned,
not a question of
is
but of concrete causal
a question of the
is
relationships;
it
is
not
subsumption of the event
under some general rubric as a representative its imputation as a consequence of
case but of
some
constellation.
It
is
in brief a question of
—
phenomenon an "historical indiunder consideration, the knowledge
a "cultural
vidual"
is
Wherever the causal explanation of
imputation.
is not the end of the investigation but only a means. It facilitates and renders possible the causal imputation to their concrete
of causal laws
causes of those components of a
phenomenon
which is culturally signiand only so far as it achieves this, is it valuable for our knowledge of concrete relationships. And the more "general," i.e., the the individuality of ficant.
more
So
far
abstract the laws, the less they can con-
are "objectively" less governed
on a basis of the
in zuhich situations this is the case is not
empirical reality of "laws,"
not
meaningless,
as
is
is
the reduction of
meaningless.
often
because cultural or psychic events
It is
maintained, for instance
it is
decided accord-
ing to the value-ideas in the light of which
view "culture" ture"
a finite
is
we
each individual case. "Culsegment of the meaningless
in
world process, a segment on beings confer meaning and significance. This is true even for the human being who views a particular culture as a mortal enemy and who seeks to "return to nature." He can attain this point of view only after viewing the culture in which he lives from the standpoint of his values, and finding it "too infinity of the
human
which
soft."
This
which
is
is
the purely logical-formal
when we speak
involved
fact
of the logi-
cally necessary rootedness of all historical enti-
"evaluative ideas."
ties (historische Individuen) in
of every our finding a certain culture or any "culture" in general to be valu-
The transcendental presupposition cultural science lies not in
able
but rather in the fact that we are cultural beendowed with the capacity and the will to
ings,
take a deliberate attitude towards the world
and
to
lend
and
is
which the concrete have for us in certain
revealed to us by any law;
phenomena and, more intlirectly, to the understanding of the significance of cultural events.
that the ideal of science
is
individual concrete situations. In which sense
and
significance
The conclusion which follows from the above is that an "objective" analysis of cultural events, which proceeds according to the thesis
It
significance
constellations of reality
tribute to the causal imputation of individual
***************
by laws.
meaningless for a number of other reasons. Firstly, because the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end; secondly, because knowledge of cidtural events is inconceivable except
tain
significance.
it
may
phenomena
be,
of
it
will lead
human
Whatever
this
us to judge cer-
existence in
its
light
respond to them as being (positively or negatively) meaningful. Whatever may be the to
content
of
this
attitude
— these
have cultural significance significance alone rests
for
its
phenomena
us and on this
scientific
interest.
Thus when we speak here of the conditioning of cultural knowledge through ezuduative ideas (Wertideen) (following the terminology of modern logic), it is done in the hope that we will
CHAPTER
to crude misunderstandings such as the opinion that cultural significance should be attributed only to valuable phenome-
not be subject
na. Prostitution
as
much
a cultural
is
phenomenon
just
as religion or money- All three are cul-
phenomena
because and only insofar as their existence and the form which they historically assume touch directly or indirectly on our cultural interests and arouse our striving for knowledge concerning problems brought tural
onli/
by the
into focus
ev^aluative ideas
which give
fragment of reahty analyzed
significance to the
by those concepts. All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from pmrticular points of view. When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementary presupposition that they distinguish the important
from the
trivial
and
that they should
have the
must understand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or that they
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
133
out the investigator's conviction regarding the significance of particular cultural facts, every attempt to analyze concrete reahty is absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his work. And the values to which the scientific genius relates the obbelief, the refraction of
ject
of his inquiry
may
determine,
i.e.,
decide
whole epoch, not only
the "conception" of a
concerning what is regarded as "valuable" but also concerning what is significant or insignificant, "important" or "unimportant" in the
phenomena. Accordingly, cultural science in our sense involves "subjective" presuppositions insofar it concerns itself only with those components of reality which have some relationship,
as
however
indirect, to events to
cultural significance.
necessary "point of view" for this distinction,
we mean
5:
.
.
used
Accordingly
.
by
historians
.
.
which we attach
.
the are
synthetic either
concepts
imperfectly
the notion that those stand-
as soon as the ehmination of ambisought for, the concept becomes an abstract ideal type and reveals itself therewith as a theoretical and hence "one-sided" view-
points can be derived from the "facts them-
point which illuminates the aspect of reality
unconsciously to universal "cultural values" and to select out those relationships which are significant for us.
If
selves" continually recurs,
it is
it
is
due
to the
who
to the naive
unaware evaluative ideas with which
self-deception of the specialist that
due
is
defined
guity
or,
is
with which are
it
shown
schema
can be related. But these concepts be obviously inappropriate as
to
which reality could be completely For none of those systems of ideas, which are absolutely indispensable in the understanding of those segments of reality into
he unconsciously approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns
integrated.
himself. In connection with this selection of
which are meaningful at a particular moment, can exhaust its infinite richness. They are aU
individual special "aspects" of the event which
always and every^vhere occurs, consciously or unconsciously, there also occurs that element of cultural-scientific work which is referred to by
attempts, on the basis of the present state of
work if its existence is to be To be sure, without the investigator's evaluative ideas, there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no meaningful
our knowledge and the available conceptual patterns, to bring order into the chaos of those facts which we have drawn into the field circumscribed by our interest. The intellectual apparatus which the past has developed through the analysis, or more truthfully, the analytical rearrangement of the immediately given reahty, and through the latter's integration by concepts which correspond to the state
knowledge of the concrete
of
the often-heard assertion that the "personal"
element of a
scientific
valuable in
and
it,
work
is
what is really must be ex-
that personality
pressed in every justified.
reality. Just as
with-
its
knowledge and the focus of
its interest, is
1
34
PART
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
1
in constant tension with the new knowledge which we can and desire to wrest from reaUty. The progress of cultural science occurs through this conflict. Its result is the
perpetual recon-
which we
struction of those concepts through
order
its
data into a system of concepts, the is to be acquired and slowly
content of which
perfected through the obser\'ation of empirical the
regularities,
and
construction of hypotheses,
their verification, until finally a "complet-
seek to comprehend
ed" and hence deductive science emerges. For
cial sciences is
this goal, the historical-inductive
reality. The history of the soand remains a continuous process
passing from the attempt to order reality analytithe cally through the construction of concepts
—
dissolution of the analytical constructs so constructed through the expansion scientific
horizon
of concepts
and
shift of the
—and the reformulation anew
on the foundations thus
trans-
formed. It is not the error of the attempt to construct conceptual systems in general which is shown by this process every science, even simple descriptive history, operates with the
—
conceptual stock-in-trade of this
its
time. Rather,
process shows that in the cultural sciences
concept-construction depends on the setting of the problem,
and the
tent of culture
itself.
latter \'aries
The
with the con-
relationship
between
present-dav
is
work
of the
a preliminary' task necessitated
by the imperfections of our discipline. Nothing can be more suspect, from this point of view, than the construction and application of clearcut concepts since this seems to be an overhasty anticipation of the remote future.
This conception was, in principle, impregnable within the framework of the classicalscholastic epistemology which was still funda-
mentally assumed by the majority of the research-workers identified with the Historical School. The function of concepts was assumed to
be the reproduction of "objective" reality in
the analyst's imagination.
Hence
references to the unreality of
all
the recurrent clear-cut con-
at theor\'-construction
If one perceives the implications of the fundamental ideas of modern epistemology which ultimately derives from Kant; namely,
our science were always useful for revealing
that concepts are primarily analytical instru-
the limits of the significance of those points of
ments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data and can be only that, the fact that precise
concept and reality in the cultural sciences involves the transitoriness of all such syntheses.
in
The great attempts
view which provided their foundations. The greatest advances in the sphere of the social sciences are substantively tied in
practical
guise of a
Adherence
up with
the shift
cultural
problems and take the
critique
of
to the
concept-construction.
purpose of
this critique
and
conclusions which are to be
not cause
him
desist
to
from constructing
them. The relationship between concept and historical research is reversed for those who appreciate
this;
the
goal
of
the
Historical
among drawn
end of understanding phenomena \vhich are significant from concrete indi\idual \iew-
of
the primary tasks of our journal. In the
genetic concepts are necessarily ideal types will
School then appears as logically impossible, the concepts are not ends but are means to the
therewith the in\estigation of the principles syntheses in the social sciences shall be
cepts.
from what has been said, we come to a point where perhaps our views diverge here and there from those of many, and even the most
points.
outstanding, representatives of the Historical too are to
only purpose of which was to trace the course of the hair-line which separates science from
be numbered. The latter still hold in many ways, expressly or tacitly, to the opinion that it is the end and the goal of everv science to
quest for social and economic knowledge. The ohjectiiv validity of all empirical knowledge
School,
among whose
offspring
we
*************** We are now at
faith
and
to
the
make
end of
this discussion, the
explicit the nieani)ig of the
CHAPTER
upon
5:
135
MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE
ordering of the
discontinue assessing the value of the individ-
given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that
ual facts in terms of their relationships to ulti-
they present the presuppositions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of
ness
exclusively
rests
the
of
value
those
knowledge alone
is
the
which empirical The means
truths
able to give us.
available to our science offer nothing to those
persons to whom this truth is of no value. It should be remembered that the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures and is not a product of man's original nature.
Those
for
whom scientific truth is
of
no
value will seek in vain for some other truth to take the place of science in just those respects in
which
it is
of concepts
unique, namely, in the provision
and judgments which are neither
empirical reality nor reproductions of
which
facilitate
its
analytical
but
it
ordering in a
mate value-ideas. Indeed,
we have
knowledge
its
ultimate
value-ideas in general.
it
will lose
And
it
aware-
its
rootedness
the
in
well that
is
should be so. But there comes a moment when the atmosphere changes. The significance of the unreflectively utilized viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road
is lost
in the twilight.
problems moves on. Then science too prepares to change its
The
light of the great cultural
standpoint and its analytical apparatus and to view the streams of events from the heights of thought. It follows those stars which alone are able to give meaning and direction to its labors: ". der neue Trieb erwacht, .
.
Ich eile fort, ihr ewiges Licht zu trinken,
Vor mir den Tag und unter mir die Nacht, Den Himmel ;auuber mir und unter mir die
valid manner. In the empirical social sciences, as
of
Wellen."-
seen, the possibility of meaningful of
what
infinite richness of
is
essential for us in the
events
bound up with
is
the
viewpoints of a specifically particularized character, which, in unremitting application
of
the last analysis, are oriented
on the
able as elements of meaningful
and analyz-
human
con-
deduced
duct, but their validity can not be
from empirical data as such. The "objectivity" of the social sciences depends rather on the fact that the empirical data are always related to those evaluative ideas which alone make them worth knowing and the significance of the empirical data is derived from these evaluative ideas. But these data can never become the foundation for the empirically impossible proof of the validity of the evaluative ideas.
.
Class, Status, Party
basis of
evaluative ideas. These evaluative ideas are for their part empirically discoverable
Max Weber:
.
A. Economically Determined
Power and the
The structure
of every legal
Status Order.
order directly influences the distribution of
power,
economic
or
otherwise,
respective community. This
is
orders and not only that of the
within
true of
all
its
legal
state. In general,
we understand by "power" the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action
even against the resistance of oth-
who are participating in the action.
ers
"Economically conditioned" power
is
course, identical with "power" as such.
not, of
On
the
.
All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once
it is
oriented towards a
given subject matter through particular tings
of
problems and has established
setits
methodological principles, will consider the analysis of the data as an end in
itself. It
will
Act I, Scene II. (Translated by Bayard-Taylor) "The newborn impulse fires my mind,
'Fauil:
hasten on, his beams eternal drinking, The Dav before me and the Night behind. Above me Heaven unfurled, the floor of waves beneath I
me."
136
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
emergence of economic power be the consequence of power existing on other grounds. Man does not strive for power only in order to enrich himself economically. Power, including economic po^ver, mav be \'alued for its own sake. Very frequently the stri\'ing for power is also conditioned by the social honor it entails. Not all power, however, entails contrary, the
are not communities; they merely represent
may
possible,
The
social honor:
typical
American Boss,
as well
as the typical big speculator, deliberately relin-
social honor.
Nor
is
power
the only basis of
component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. This is
It
way
the
in
property
distributed
purpose of exchange,
specific life chances.
honor,
may
be guaranteed by the legal order,
but, at least normally,
The
it
is
not their primary
an additional enhances the chance to hold power or honor; but it can not always secure them. The way in which social honor is distributed in a community between typical groups particsource.
legal order is rather
factor that
ipating in this distribution order."
The
social
we
order and
call
the "status
the economic
order are related in a similar manner to the order. However, the economic order merely defines the way in which economic goods and services are distributed and used. Of course, the status order is strongly influenced by it, and in turn reacts upon it. legal
Now:
"classes," "status groups,"
ties" are phenomena of the power within a community.
and "par-
distribution
of
a plurality of
in
in itself creates
The mode of distribution, accord with the law of marginal utility,
excludes the non-wealthy from competing for highly valued goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives to
them
a
monopoly
to acquire
such goods. Other things being equal, the mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable deals for all
those who,
provided with goods, do not necessarily have to exchange them. It increases, at least generally, their power in the price struggle with those who, being propertyless, have nothing to offer but their labor or the resulting products, and who are compelled to get rid of these products in order to subsist at tioiT
all.
The mode
of distribu-
gi\es to the propertied a moiiopoly on the
from the sphere of use as "wealth" to the sphere of "cap-
possibility of transferring property
ital,"
that
is, it
function and indirectly in
Determination of Class Situation by Market Situation. In our terminology, "classes" B.
among
people, meeting competitively in the market for the
very frequently has been. Power, as well as
"class situation."
which the disposition over material
is
may even be
and
is
the most elemental economic fact that
social honor. Indeed, social honor, or prestige,
the basis of economic power,
for social action.
speak of a "class" when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal
quishes social honor. Quite generally, "mere eco-
nomic" power, and especially "naked" money power, is by no means a recognized basis of
and frequent, bases
We may
gives
them the entrepreneurial
chances to share directly or returns on capital. All this holds all
true within the area in
which pure market conand "lack of proper-
ditions prevail. "Property"
ty" are, therefore, the basic categories of all
and
from M.ix Weber; Eamomy and Socicli/, Vol. 2, pp. 926-939, edited bv Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Copyright 1U78 by The ReSource
"Class, Status
Party,"
gents of the Uni\ersitv of California, University of California Press Reprinted bv permission.
does not matter whether
class
situations.
these
two categories become
It
competiti\'e struggles of the
the
effecti\'e in
consumers or
of
the producers.
Within these categories, however, class
situ-
ations are further differentia ted: on the one
CHAPTER
137
MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE
5:
hand, according to the kind of property that is usable for returns; and, on the other hand, according to the kind of services that can be offered in the market. Ownership of dwelUngs; workshops; warehouses; stores; agriculturally usable land in large or small holdings a quantitative difference with possibly qualitative consequences; ownership of mines; cattle; men (slaves); disposition over mobile instruments of
ever primitive, with rates of interest increasing
production, or capital goods of
They
—
cially
money
exchanged
or objects
for
all sorts,
espe-
could
plutocracy
develop.
Therewith "class
struggles" begin.
Those men whose fate is not determined by goods or services for themselves on the market, e.g., slaves, are not, howthe chance of using
ever, a class in the technical sense of the term. are, rather, a status
group.
can easily be
that
money; disposition over prod-
own
according to the extent of dearth and factual monopolization of lending in the hands of a
C. Social Action
According
Flowing from Class
Interest.
ing to their kinds of services as according to the
our terminology, the factor that creates "class" is unambiguously economic interest, and indeed, only those interests involved in the existence of the market. Nevertheless, the concept of class-interest is an ambiguous one: even as an empirical concept it is ambiguous as soon as one understands by it something other than the factual direction of interests following with a certain probability from the class situation for a certain average of those people subjected to the class situation. The class situation and other circumstances remaining the same, the direction in which the
way
in which they make use of these services, continuous or discontinuous relation to a recipient. But always this is the generic connotation of the concept of class: that the kind of chance in the market is the decisive moment
individual worker, for instance,
in a
sue his interests
which presents a common condition
for the
interests
in
social action of a larger or smaller portion of
ucts of one's
labor or of others' labor dif-
fering according to their various distances
consumability;
disposition
monopolies of any kind
—
all
over
from
transferable
these distinctions
differentiate the class situations of the propertied just as
does the "meaning" which they can
give to the use of property, especially to property
which has money equivalence. Accordingly,
the propertied, for instance,
may
belong to the
class of rentiers or to the class of entrepreneurs.
Those
who have no
individual's
fate.
who offer much accord-
property but
services are differentiated just as
Class situation
is,
this
The effect of naked possession per se, which among cattle breeders gives the non-owning slave or serf sense, ultimately market situation.
into the
power
of the cattle owner,
is
only a
fore-runner of real "class" formation. However, in the cattle loan
and
in the
naked severity of
the law of debts in such communities for the first
time mere "possession" as such emerges
as decisive for the fate of the individual; this
much
in contrast to crop-raising
is
communities,
which are based on labor. The creditor-debtor relation becomes the basis of "class situations" first in the cities, where a "credit market," how-
to
whether he task at
those
is
likely to pur-
vary widely, according to
constitutionally qualified for the
is
hand
low degree.
may
to a high, to In the
may
an average, or
same way,
to a
the direction of
vary according to whether or not
commonly
affected
or even an association
trade union, has
by the
class situation,
among them,
grown out
e.g.,
a
of the class situa-
tion, from which the individual may expect promising results for himself. The emergence of an association or even of mere social action from a common class situation is by no means
a universal
The
phenomenon.
class situation
may
be restricted in
its
efforts to the generation of essentially similar is to say, within our terminology, "mass behavior." However, it may not even of have this result. Furthermore, often merely
reactions, that
138
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1;
amorphous
the latest industrial development, namely, the
D. Types of Class Struggle. Thus every class may be the carrier of any one of the innumerable possible forms of class action, but this is not necessarily so. In any case, a class does not in itself constitute a group (Gemeinschaft). To treat "class" conceptually as being equivalent to "group" leads to distortion. That men in the
slowdown
same
social action emerges. For
known
the "grumbling" of workers
example,
in ancient
The moral disapproval of the work-master's conduct, which in its practical significance was probably equivalent to an Oriental ethics:
phenomenon
increasingly typical
of precisely
by virtue of tacit agreewhich "social action" and possibly associations emerge from the mass of laborers
ment. The degree
in
behavior of the members of a class is linked to general cultural conditions, especially to those of an intellectual sort.
extent
of
the
evolved, and
It
contrasts
is
is
also linked to the
that
have
already
especially linked to the trans-
parency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation. For however different life chances may be, this fact in itself, according to all experience, by no
means gives
birth
to
"class
action"
(social
by the members of a class). For that, the real conditions and the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. For only action
class situation regularly react
in
mass
actions to such tangible situations as economic
ones in the direction of those interests that are most adequate to their average number is an important and after all simple fact for the understanding of historical events. However, this fact must not lead to that kind of pseudo-scientific operation with the concepts of class and class interests which is so frequent these days and which has found its most classic expression in the statement of a talented author, that the individual may be in error concerning his interests but that the class is infallible about its interests. If classes as such are not groups, nevertheless class situations emerge only on the basis of social action.
However,
social action that brings
chances can be felt not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant from either (1) the given distribu-
forth class situations
tion of property, or (2) the structure of the con-
Social actions that directly determine the class
then the contrast of
life
crete
economic
may
react against the class structure not only
through
acts
order.
of
protest, but in the
It is
only then that people
and irrational form of rational association. intermittent
There have been "class situations" of the category
(1),
of a specifically
naked and
first
trans-
parent sort, in the urban centers of Antiquity
and during the Middle Ages: especially then when great fortunes were accumulated by factually monopolized trading in local industrial products or in foodstuffs; furthermore, under certain conditions, in the rural
economy
of the
is
not basically action
among members of the identical class; action among members of different situation of the are: the labor
and the
it is
an
classes.
worker and the entrepreneur
market, the commodities market,
capitalistic enterprise. But, in its turn,
the existence of a capitalistic enterprise presup-
poses that a very specific kind of social action
goods per se, and especially the power of individuals to dispose, in principle freely, o\'er the means of production: a certain kind of legal order. Each kind of class situation, and above all when it rests upon the power of property per :?c, will become most clearly efficacious when all other determiexists to protect the possession of
most diverse periods, when agriculture was increasingly exploited in a profit-making manner. The most important historical example of
nants of reciprocal relations are, as far as possible, eliminated in their significance. It is in this
the second category
the market obtains
the
modern
(2) is
proletariat.
the class situation of
way
power of property in most sovereign impor-
that the use of the
tance.
its
CHAPTER
Now
status groups hinder the strict carry-
ing through of the sheer market principle. In the present context they are of interest only
from
one point of view. Before we
this
consider them, note that not al
much
briefly
of a gener-
nature can be said about the more specific
kinds of antagonism between classes
meaning
of the term).
The
our
(in
which
great shift,
has been going on continuously in the past, and up to our times, may be summarized,
although
a
at
cost
of
some
the
precision:
struggle in which class situations are effective
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
5:
were completely secondary as well as to conflicts in the
139
to slave rebellions
commodity market.
The propertyless of Antiquity and of the Middle Ages protested against monopolies, pre-emption, forestalling, and the withholding of goods from the market in order to raise prices. Today the central issue is the determination of the price of labor. The transition is represented by the fight for access to the market and for the determination of the price of products. Such fights went on between merchants and workers in the putting-out system of
has progressively shifted from consumption credit toward, first, competitive struggles in the commodity market and then toward wage
domestic handicraft during the transition to modern times. Since it is quite a general phe-
disputes on the labor market. The class strug-
antagonisms that are conditioned through the market situations are usually most bitter between those who actually and directly participate as opponents in price wars. It is not the rentier, the share-holder, and the banker who suffer the ill will of the worker, but almost exclusively the manufacturer and the business executives who are the direct opponents of workers in wage conflicts. This is so in spite of the fact that it is precisely the cash boxes of the rentier, the shareholder, and the banker into which the more or less unearned gains flow, rather than into the pockets of the manufacturers or of the business executives. This simple state of affairs has very frequently been decisive for the role the class situation has played in the formation of political parties. For exam-
Antiquity
of
gles
—to
the
extent
they
that
were genuine class struggles and not strugwere initially gles between status groups carried on by peasants and perhaps also artisans threatened by debt bondage and struggling against urban creditors. For debt bondage is the normal result of the differenti-
—
ation
wealth
of
commercial
in
especially in seaport cities.
has existed
among
A
cities,
similar situation
cattle breeders.
Debt
tionships as such produced class action
rela-
up
to
days of Catilina. Along with this, and with an increase in provision of grain for the city by transporting it from the outside, the struggle over the means of sustenance emerged. It centered in the first place around the provision of bread and determination of the price of bread. It lasted throughout Antiquity and the entire Middle Ages. The propthe
together against those
who
ertyless
flocked
actually
and supposedly were interested
the dearth of bread. This fight spread until
involved the
way
all
of
in
and
to handicraft production.
There were only incipient discussions of wage disputes in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. But they have been slowly increasing up into
modern
times.
In
the
earlier
periods
ple,
it
has
made
archal socialism formerly, at least to
here that the class
possible the varieties of patri-
and the frequent attempts
—of threatened status groups
form alliances with the proletariat against
the bourgeoisie.
it
those commodities essential to
life
nomenon we must mention
they
E.
Status Honor.
In contrast to classes, Stande
normally groups. They are, however, often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to the purely economically determined "class situation," we wish to designate as status situation every typical component of the life of (status group's) are
140
men
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
that
is
determined by a
specific, positi\'e
or negative, social estimation of honor. This
honor
may
shared bv a
be connected with any quahty plurality, and, of course, it can be
knit to a class situation: class distinctions are
linked in the most varied u'ays with status distinctions. Property as such is not always recog-
nized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. In the
subsistence
associations,
it is
economy
of
neighborhood
often simply the richest
who
belong to the
circle.
tion are restrictions
intercourse
is,
all those who wish to Linked with this expectaon social intercourse (that
expected from
is
life
which
not subservient to eco-
is
nomic or any other purposes). These restrictions may confine normal marriages to within
and may lead to complete endogamous closure. Whenever this is not a mere indi\-idual and socially irrelevant imitathe status circle
tion of another style of
of
action
closing
this
but consensual
life,
character,
status
the
under way.
is the "chieftain." However, this often is only an honorific preference. For example, in the socalled pure modern democracy, that is, one devoid of any expressly ordered status privileges for individuals, it may be that only the families coming under approximately the same tax class dance with one another. This example is reported of certain smaller Swiss cities. But status honor need not necessarily be linked
de\'elopment
with a class situation. On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to the preten-
ferentiation evolves in such a
sions of sheer property.
inant at a given time in society. This submis-
Both propertied and propertyless people can belong to the same status group, and frequently thev do with very tangible consequences. This equahty of social esteem may, however, in the
sion to fashion also exists
long run become quite precarious. The equality of status among American gentlemen, for instance,
is
expressed by the
fact that
outside
by the different functions of business, it would be considered wherever the old tradition strictly repugnant the subordination determined
still
prevails
—
—
if
even the richest boss, while
playing billiards or cards in his club would not treat his clerk as in every sense fully his equal
but would bestow upon him the condescending status-conscious "benevolence" in birthright,
which the German boss can never dissever from his attitude. This is one of the most important reasons why in America the German clubs have never been able to attain the attraction that the American clubs have. In content, status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of
In
status
is
characteristic form, stratification
its
groups on
the basis
by
of conventional
styles of life evolves at the present time in the
United States out of the traditional democracy. For example, only the resident of a certain street ("the Street") is considered as belonging to "society," is qualified for social intercourse,
and
is
visited
for strict
ica
to
and
invited.
Above
way
all,
make is dom-
as to
submission to the fashion that
a
this dif-
among men in Amerdegree unknown in Germany; it
appears as an indication of the fact that a given man puts forward a claim to qualify as a gentleman. This submission decides, at least prima facie, that he will be treated as such. And this recognition becomes just as important for his
employment chances and abo\'e all, for
in
swank
social
establishments,
intercourse
and
"esteemed" families, as the qualification for dueling among Germans. As for the rest, status honor is usurped by certain marriage with
families resident for a long time, and, of course, correspondingly wealthy (e.g. F.F.V., the First
Families of Virginia), or by the actual or alleged
descendants of the "Indian Princess" Pocahontas,
of the Pilgrim fathers, or of the Knicker-
bockers, the
members
of almost inaccessible
and all sorts of circles setting themselves apart by means of any other characteristics and sects
badges. In this case stratification is purely con\entionaI and rests largely on usurpation (as
CHAPTER
does almost But the road
all
status
honor
in its beginning).
to legal privilege, positive or
ative, is easily traveled as
neg-
soon as a certain
tal
and unconnected coexistences
of ethnically
segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and subordination. Correctly formu-
order has in fact been "lived in" and has achieved stability by virtue
lated: a
of a stable distribution of economic power.
political unit.
stratification of the social
141
MAX WEBER; THE IRON CAGE
5:
comprehensive association integrates
the ethnically divided communities into one
They
way:
differ precisely in this
ethnic coexistence, based on mutual repulsion F. Ethnic Segregation and Caste. Where the consequences have been realized to their full extent, the status group evolves into a closed caste. Status distinctions are then guaranteed not merely by conventions and laws, but also by religious sanctions. This occurs in such a way that every physical contact with a member of any caste that is considered to be lower by the members of a higher caste is considered as making for a ritualistic impurity and a stigma which must be expiated by a religious act. In addition, individual castes develop quite dis-
tinct cults
and gods.
caste structure brings about a social subordination in
and an acknowledgment
of
"more honor"
favor of the privileged caste and status
groups. This
become
is
due
ethnic
structure
to the fact that in the caste
distinctions
"functional"
such have within the
as
distinctions
political association (warriors, priests, artisans
war and for and so on). But even pariah peoples who are most despised (for example, the Jews) that are politically important for
building,
are usually apt to continue cultivating the be-
however, the status structure reaches such extreme consequences only where there are underlying differences which are held to be "ethnic." The caste is, indeed, the normal form in which ethnic communities that believe in blood relationship and exclude exogamous marriage and social intercourse usually associate with one another. As mentioned before, such a caste sitviation is part of the phenomeIn
and disdain, allows each ethnic community to its own honor as the highest one; the
consider
general,
non
lief in is
their
own
specific "honor," a belief that
equally peculiar to ethnic and
status
to
groups.
However, with the negatively privileged
sta-
tus groups the sense of dignity takes a specific
deviation.
A
sense of dignity
tion in individuals of social
ventional
demands which
is
the precipita-
honor and of cona positively privi-
leged status group raises for the deportment of
of pariah peoples and is found all over the world. These people form communities, ac-
its
quire specific occupational traditions of handi-
naturally related to their "being" which does
crafts or of other arts,
and cultivate a belief in community. They live in a diaspora strictly segregated from all personal intercourse, except that of an unavoidable sort, and their situation is legally precarious. Yet, by virtue of their economic indispensability, they are tolerated, indeed frequently privileged, and
not transcend
their ethnic
"beauty and excellence" (Ka/\.oK(XYa6{a). Their kingdom is "of this world." They live for the
they live interspersed in the political
A
status segregation
that
is, it is
is
related to their
present and by exploiting their great past. The
sense of dignity of the negatively privileged strata naturally refers to a future lying
the present, whether
is
it
of this
beyond
life
or of
transforms the horizon-
first,"
histori-
from
tion: the caste structure
itself,
groups
grown into a caste difa mere ethnic segrega-
The Jews are the most impressive example.
fers in its structure
of dignity that charac-
must be nurtured by the belief in a providential mission and by a belief in a specific honor before God. The chosen people's dignity is nurtured by a belief either that in the beyond "the last will be the
ties.
cal
communi-
members. The sense
terizes positively privileged status
another. In other words,
or that in this
life
it
a
Messiah
will
appear
142
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
world which has cast them out the hidden honor of the pariah people. This simple state of affairs, and not the resentment which is so strongly emphasized in Nietzsche's much-admired conto bring forth into the light of the
struction
Genealogy of Morals,
the
in
the
is
of carrying
arms
—
—which
most obvious in its to be a dilettante, for
is
the right consequences example, to play certain musical instruments. However, material monopolies provide the most effective motives for the exclusiveness of ,
a status group; although, in themselves, they
source of the religiosity cultivated by pariah status groups moreover, resentment applies only to a limited extent; for one of Nietzsche's
are rarely sufficient, almost always they
main examples, Buddhism,
est of the families in the
it
is
not at
ap-
all
development of status groups from etlinic segregations is by no means the normal phenomenon. On the contrary. Since objective "racial differences" are by no means behind every subjective sentiment of an ethnic community, the question of an ultithe
mately
there
the
rest,
racial
monopolization of at least of equal
bridegrooms is importance and is parallel to the interest in the monopolization of daughters. The daughters of the members must be provided for. With an increased closure of the status group, the con-
foundation of status structure
is
ventional preferential opportunities for special
employment grow
Very frequently a status group is instrumental in the production of a thoroughbred anthropological type. Certainly status groups are to a high degree effective in producing
groups,
case.
they
for
types,
individuals
who
selects those
are
fit
(e.g.
select
the
personally
knighthood
for warfare, physically
and psychically). But individual selection is far from being the only, or the predominant, way in which status groups are formed: political membership or class situation has at all times been at least as frequently decisive. And today the class situation is by far the predominant factor After
all,
the possibility of a style of
expected for members of a status group ally conditioned economically.
is
life
usu-
into a legal
monopoly
of
members. Certain goods by status entailed estates, and fre-
special offices for the
become
qualified
extent. Within a status circle
the question of intermarriage; the inter-
is
rightly a question of the concrete individual
extreme
some
potential
plicable.
For
into play to
come
objects for monopolization typically,
quently also the possession of serfs or bondsmen and, finally, special trades. This monopooccurs
lization
group
is
manage them; and maintain
when
positively
exclusively entitled to
its
group must
status
the
own and
to
negatively when, in order to
way of life, the status own and manage them. For the
specific
)!ot
life in status honor groups are the specific bearconventions. In whatever way it may
decisive role of a style of
means
that status
ers of all
be manifest,
all
stylization of
nates in status groups or
by them. Even
if
is
life
either origi-
at least
conserved
the principles of status con-
ventions differ greatly, they reveal certain typical traits, especially
among
the most privileged
Quite generally, among privileged status groups there is a status disqualification that operates against the performance of common strata.
G. Status privileges. For all practical purposes, stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities, in a manner we have
come
to
know
status honor,
as typical. Besides the specific
which always
rests
upon distance
physical
labor
"setting in" in
This disqualification
is
America against the old
now tradi-
Very frequently every economic pursuit, and especially en-
tion of esteeni for labor
rational
looked upon as a dis-
and exclusiveness, honorific preferences may
trepreneurial activity,
consist of the privilege of wearing special cos-
qualification of status. Artistic
tumes, of eating special dishes taboo to others.
tivity
is
is
and
literary ac-
also considered degrading
work
as
CHAPTER
soon as
it
when
is
it
exploited for income, or at least connected with hard physical exeris
An example
tion.
mason
is
the sculptor
working
like a
dusty smock as over against the painter in his salon-like studio and those forms of musical practice that are acceptable to the status group. in his
5:
that recurs everywhere. Precisely
Stratification.
of the gainfully
The frec^uent disqualification employed as such is a direct
result of the principle of status stratification,
and a
of course, of this principle's opposition to
distribution
power which
of
is
regulated
exclusively through the market. These
two
fac-
with various individual ones, which will be touched upon below. operate along
tors
We
have seen above that the market and its knows no personal distinctions: "functional" interests dominate it. It knows
processes
nothing of honor. The status order means precisely
the reverse:
stratification
in
terms of
honor and styles of life peculiar to status groups as such. The status order would be threatened at its very root if mere economic acquisition and naked economic power still bearing the stigma of its extra-status origin could bestow upon anyone who has won them the
same or even
greater honor as the vested
interests claim for themselves. After
all,
given
equality of status honor, property per se repre-
an addition even if it is not overtlv to be such. Therefore all groups having interest in the status order react with special sharpness precisely against the pretensions of purely economic acquisition. In most cases they react the more vigorously the more they feel themselves threatened. Calderon's sents
acknowledged
respectful
treatment
of
the
peasant,
for
opposed to Shakespeare's simultaneous ostensible disdain of the canaille illustrates the different way in which a firmly structured status order reacts as compared with a instance, as
status order that has carious. This
is
become economically
an example of
pre-
a state of affairs
143
because of
the rigorous reactions against the claims of the "parvenu" is never acceptand without reservation, by the privileged status groups, no matter how completely his style of life has been adjusted to
property per
fe,
ed, personally
theirs.
They
will only accept his descendants
who have been H. Economic Conditions and Effects of Status
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
educated in the conventions of
group and who have never besmirched its honor by their own economic their
status
labor
As to the general effect of the status orcier, only one consequence can be stated, but it is a very important one: the hindrance of the free development of the market. This occurs first for those goods that status groups directly withhold from free exchange by monopolization, which may be effected either legally or conventionally. For example, in
many
Hellenic
cities
during the "status era" and also original-
ly in
Rome, the inherited
estate (as
shown by
the old formula for placing spendthrifts a
under
guardian) was monopolized, as were the
and espeand merchant guilds. The market is restricted, and the power of naked property per sf, which gives its stamp to class formation, is pushed into the background. The results of this process can be most varied. Of course, they do not necessarily weaken the contrasts in the economic situation. Frequently they strengthen these contrasts, and in any case, where stratification by status permeates a community as strongly as was the case in all political communities of Antiquity and of the Midcile Ages, one can never speak of a genuinely free market competition as we unestates of knights, peasants, priests, cially the clientele of the craft
today. There are
wider effects than goods from the market. From the conflict between the status order and the purely economic order mentioned above, it follows that in most instances the notion of honor peculiar to status absolutely abhors that which is essential to the market: hard bargaining. Honor abhors hard bargainderstand
it
this direct exclusion of special
144
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
among peers and the members of a
ing for
occasionally
it
status group
Therefore, everywhere
some
taboos
it
in general.
status groups,
and
usually the most influential, consider almost
any kind of overt participation
in
economic
acquisition as absolutely stigmatizing.
With some over-simplification, one might thus say that classes are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisi-
goods;
of
tion
whereas status
groups
are
according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special stratified
styles of
An
"occupational status group," too,
is
a sta-
group proper. For normally, it successfully claims social honor only by virtue of the special style of life which may be determined by it. The differences between classes and status groups frequently overlap. It is precisely those status communities most strictly segregated in terms of honor (viz. the Indian castes) who today show, although within very rigid limits, tus
a relatively high degree of indifference to pecu-
niary income.
As
in
However, the Brahmins seek
many
status,
only the following can be said.
the bases of the acquisition
goods are tus
is
relatively stable,
When
and distribution of stratification by sta-
favored. Every technological repercus-
and economic transformation threatens by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical and economic transformations. And every slowing down of the change in economic stratification leads, in due course, to the growth of status structures and makes
sion
stratification
for
a
toward the acquisition of social power, that is to say, toward influencing social action no matter what its content may be. In oriented
principle, parties
may
well
As over
as in a state.
classes
resuscitation of the important
role
of
and status groups, the
against the actions of for
which
this is not
party-oriented
case,
may aim
cause (the party
gram
social
at realizing a pro-
for ideal or material purposes), or the
goal
may
from
these,
be personal (sinecures, power, and
honor
ers of the party).
and the followUsually the party aims at all for the leader
these simultaneously. Parties are, therefore, only possible within groups that have an associational character, that is, some rational order
to
a staff of persons available
enforce
it.
For
parties
who
are ready
aim precisely
at
and if possible, to recruit from it party members. In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through class situation or status situation, and they may recruit their following respectively from one or the other But they need be neither purely class nor purely status parties; in fact, they are more likely to be mixed types, and sometimes they are neither. They may represent ephemeral or enduring
influencing this
staff,
structures. Their
means
of attaining
power may
be quite varied, ranging from naked violence of any sort to can\assing for \otes with coarse or subtle means: money, social influence, the force of speech, suggestion, to the rt>ugher or
social honor.
exist in a social club as
action always involves association. For it is always directed toward a goal which is striven for in a planned manner. This goal may be a
and
different ways.
economic conditions makthe predominance of stratification by
to the general
ing for
order and are in turn influenced by it. "Parties" reside in the sphere of power. Their action is
necessarily
life.
such income
is within the social order, that is, within the sphere of the distribution of honor. From within these spheres, classes and status groups influence one another and the legal
status groups
more
cknnsv hoax, and so on artful tactics of obstruc-
tion in parliamentary bodies. I.
es
Parties. is
Whereas
the genuine place of class-
within the economic order, the place of
The
sociological structure of parties differs
in a basic
way
according to the kind of social
CHAPTERS:
action
which they struggle
to influence; that
nreans, thev differ according to whether or not
the
community is stratified by status or by Above all else, they vary according to
classes.
the structure of domination. For their leaders
normally deal with
its
conquest. In our general
terminology, parties are not only products of
modern forms
of domination.
We
shall also
MAX WEBER: THE IRON CAGE
groups and parties: The fact that they presuppose a larger association, especially the framework of a polity, does not mean that they are it. On the contrary, at all times it has been the order of the day that such association (even when it aims at the use of military
confined to
force in
common)
reaches beyond the state
boundaries. This can be seen in the [interlocal]
designate as parties the ancient and medieval
solidarity of interests of oligarchs
ones, despite the fact that they differ basically
crats in Hellas, of
from modern
parties.
Since a party always
struggles for political control (Herrscliaft),
organization
too
is
frequently
strict
its
and
Because of these variations between the forms of domination, it is impossible to say anything about the structure of parties without discussing them first. Therefore, "authoritarian."
we of
shall
all
now
turn to this central
phenomenon
social organization.
Before
general
we do
this,
observation
we
should add one more about classes, status
145
and demoGuelphs and Ghibellines in the Middle Ages, and within the Calvinist party during the age of religious struggles; and all
the
way up
to the solidarity of landlords
Congresses of Agriculture), princes (Holy Alliance, Karlsbad Decrees [of 1819]), socialist workers, conservatives (the longing of Prussian conservatives for Russian intervention in 1850). But their aim is not nec(International
essarily the establishment of a
new
territorial
dominion. In the main they aim to influence the existing polity.
CHAPTER
6
Georg Simmel: Dialectic of Individual
and Society
INTRODUCTION
the notion that one can study society as a
typology of the stranger not only addresses the marginality of the person who exists on the fringes of a group, but also describes how
whole and attempt to discover its laws of evolution and development. Society is a moral and
of the
Simmel' s approach to sociology those of
Comte and Durkheim
differs
in that
he
from
rejects
becomes an element of the life group when its members seek to confide the stranger. The marginality of the stranger
the stranger
cultural enterprise involving the association of
in
and therefore it must be approached differently from the way in which we study nature and nature's laws in the physical sciences. For Simmel, society is made up of the interactions between and among individuals, and the sociologist should study the patterns and forms of these associations, rather
connotes a role that is in but not of the group. Thus the stranger can have detachment and objectivity and be sought after by group members as an intermediary or as someone who can
than quest after social laws.
his writings.
free
individuals,
Simmel attempts to capture the complexity and the ambiguity of social life by viewing it dialectically. Although individuals are free and creative spirits and not the mere objects of social determination, they are nevertheless part
and play a role in dynamic tension that
of the st)cinlization process its
continuation.
Simmel wishes
It
is this
to capture in his social theory.
Simmel's explorations of
social
forms and
keep secrets. It is this interactive relationship, from the perspective of the indi\idual and the group, that Simmel so effectively captures in
Simmel began
his inquiries
from the bottom
up, observing the smallest of social interactions
and attempting to see how larger-scale institutions emerged from them. In doing so he often
phenomena that other theorists missed. For example, Simmel obser\'od that the number of parties to an interaction can effect its nature. The interaction between two people, a noticed
di/mi, will
be verv different from that which
social types place the reader in a
vortex of
possible in a three-parly relationship, or
example,
Simmel's
Within a
interactions.
146
Thus,
for
d\/adic
is
trimi.
relationship, each indi\idual
CHAPTERS:
can maintain his or her party to the interaction
is
GEORG
identity. When one no longer interested
maintaining it, the relationship is over. As soon as another person is added, however, the situation and its possibilities change markedly, and group structures which are separate from and influence the indi\'iduals involved begin to emerge. Two of the people can form a group against the third; one person can become the mediator or the object of competition between the remaining two; etc. Simmel saw the forms of in
these interactions as entailing similar options
and strategies whether one was dealing with roommates, nation-states, or corporate groups. Simmel was very interested in and troubled by this relation between the individual and society, and he was particularly acute at relating the most intimate details of individual psychology to larger social structures. Modern civilization in his view was both an aid and a hindrance to the free development of the individual.
Simmel's reflections on culture and alienon the philosophy
ation as well as his writings
money
SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
147
dented degree from the narrow constraints of small town life, a promising development; on the other, the impersonal nature of city life, especially its tendency to cause people to treat others merely as means towards ends, and in purely monetary terms, threatens to become an alienating structure that would dominate and
new-found individualism. The good example of Simmel's eclecticism: he borrows heavily from Durkheim in his analysis of the relation between personality type and the division of labor, and from Marx in his discussion of alienation and objectification. In the end, however, he comes closest in his overall vision to Weber's pessimistic view distort
essay
this
is
a
of the "iron cage," seeing the
way
of
life
new
metropolitan
as threatening to personal freedom
and the quality of mental life. Georg Simmel was born in 1858
in Berlin,
the youngest of the seven children of his pros-
perous and cultured Jewish parents. After graduating from the German equivalent of high school, the Gymnasium, he studied at the University of Berlin, then a locus of intellectual
about weighty themes that have moral implications. But Simmel does not moralize: he approaches his subject dialectically and ana-
Though he was offiphilosophy student, Simmel quickly acquired what was to be a lifelong taste for intellectual eclecticism, studying a broad array of
modern expe-
disciplines including history, social psychology,
of
point to his willingness to write
lyzes the tensions that define the rience.
Modern
activity in central Europe. cially
art,
society has
moved
a
anthropology, and sociology, and cultivat-
to liberate indi-
ing a mild contempt for academic procedures
viduals from the stifling constraints of earlier
such as extensive footnoting and the establish-
forms of association. Urban
ment
life
today allows
individuals to play a variety of roles in different social spaces thereby enhancing freedom
from the constraints of a fixed, static, and communal life of an earlier era. Yet the price of this freedom is to be found in the increasing sense of alienation that people experience in respect to the culture of urban life. This latter theme forms the focus of the essay below, "The Metropolis and Mental Life." On the one hand, Simmel sees the modem emergence of cities and cosmopolitan living as having freed individuals to an unprece-
of strict disciplinary boundaries. This rebelliousness and the refusal to limit himself to a single academic subject, combined
with the considerable anti-Semitism of university administrations, caused
German
Simmel
sig-
academic career. After receiving his doctorate he became a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin in 1885, and despite the many books and articles he was to write, the international fame he was to acquire during his years there, and the efforts of many of his fellow nificant setbacks in his
Max Weber, to obtain him he was repeatedly to be denied
professors, including a professorship,
148
a
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
regular academic appointment.
It
was not
until 1914, four years after his death, that
Sim-
normal professorship, at the and even this achievement was marred by the fact that the university shut down almost immediately with the outbreak of World War I. Despite his ostracism from mainstream academic life, Simmel became a noted figure in the intellectual circles of Berlin and even worldwide. Because he was one of the most brilliant lecturers of his day, his classes were not only favored by students but became intelmel received University
a
of
Strasbourg,
lectual events, with
many of the cultural He was friends
of the city in attendance.
elite
with
many
of the leading intellectual figures of the
day,
including
Max Weber and Edmund
Husserl, and a he
was
a frequent guest at din-
ner parties and social events.
Many
of his six
books and over seventy articles were translated into English, French, Italian, Polish, and Russian.
Simmel has had an enormous effect on sociology and is considered perhaps the major founding figure of microsociology. His influence has been particularly strong in America. Albion Small, a translator of several Simmel articles, Robert Park, who studied with Simmel in Berlin in 1899 and 1900, and George Herbert Mead (Chapter 7), who reviewed Simmel's Philosopliy of Monty, all played a major role in the founding of the Chicago school of sociology and
its
main
theoretical bent, symbolic interac-
tionism (Chapter
14).
CHAPTER
6:
GEORG
inquiry must answer the question of
Georg Simmel: The Metropolis and Mental
SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
personality
Life
ments
accommodates
how
49
the
the adjust-
itself in
to external forces. This will
1
be
my
task
today.
The deepest problems
of
modern
from the claim of the individual
to
life
derive
preserve the
autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture,
technique of
man
primitive
The
life.
has to
tence attains in this
transformation.
upon man
fight
and
of the
with nature which
wage for his bodily exismodern form its latest
The eighteenth century
called
to free himself of all the historical
bonds in the state and in religion, in morals and in economics. Man's nature, originally good and common to all, should develop unhampered. In addition to more liberty, the nineteenth century
demanded
The psychological
basis of the metropolitan
type of individuality consists in the
intensifica-
which results from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli. Man is a differentiating creature. His mind is stimulated by the difference between a momentary impression and the one which preceded it. Lasting impressions, impressions which differ only slightly from one another, impressions which take a regular and habitual course and show regular and tion of nervous stimulation
habitual
contrasts
—
all
these
use up,
so
to
speak, less consciousness than does the rapid
crowding
of
changing images, the sharp
dis-
the functional
continuity in the grasp of a single glance, and
man and his work; this spemakes one individual incomparable to another, and each of them indispensable to the highest possible extent. However, this specialization makes each man the more directly dependent upon the supplementary activities
the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions. These are the psychological conditions which the metropolis creates. With each crossing of the street, with the tempo and multiplicity' of economic, occupational and social life, the city sets up a deep contrast with small town and rural life with reference to the sensorv founda-
specialization of cialization
of
all
ment
others. Nietzsche sees the full cievelop-
by the most
tions
ruthless struggle of individuals; socialism be-
from
lieves in the suppression of all competition for
ent
of the individual conditioned
same
reason. Be that as
of psychic
man
life.
The metropolis exacts
as a discriminating creature a differ-
amoimt
of consciousness than does rural
may, in all these positions the same basic motive is at work: the person resists to being leveled down and worn out by a social-technological mechanism. An
Here the rhythm of life and sensory mental imagery flows more slowly, more habitually, and more evenly. Precisely in this connection
inquiry into the inner meaning of specifically
becomes understandable as over against small town life which rests more upon deeply felt and emotional relationships. These latter are rooted in the more unconscious layers of the psyche and grow most readilv in the steady rhythm of uninterrupted habituations. The intellect, however, has its locus in the
the
modern
life
and
its
it
products, into the soul of
the cultural body, so to speak,
must seek
to
solve the equation which structures like the
metropoUs
set
up between
and Such an
the individual
the super-individual contents of
life.
Reprinted with permission of The Free Press, a Inc., from The Scciolo^y of Georg Simmel, translated and edited bv Kurt H. Wolff. Copyright 1 950, 1 978 by The Free Press. Source
division of Macmillan,
life.
the
sophisticated
psychic
character
of
metropolitan
—
life
higher layers of the
transparent,
conscious,
psyche;
the most adaptable of our inner
it
forces. In
is
order to accommodate to change and
to the contrast of
phenomena, the
intellect
does
'
not require any shocks and inner upheavals;
it
150
is
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
only through such upheavals that the more
mind could accommodate to the metropolitan rhythm of events. Thus the metconservative
—
man which, of course, exists thousand individual variants develops an organ protecting him against the threatenropolitan type of
—
in a
ing currents and discrepancies of his external
environment which would uproot him. He reacts with his head instead of his heart. In this an increased awareness assumes the psychic prerogative. Metropolitan
life,
thus, underlies a
heightened awareness and a predominance of intelligence in metropolitan man. The reaction to metropolitan phenomena is shifted to that organ which is least sensitive and quite remote
from the depth of the personality. ty
is
thus
seen
preserve
to
Intellectuali-
subjective
life
overwhelming power of metropolitan life, and intellectuality branches out in many directions and is integrated with numerous discrete phenomena. The metropolis has always been the seat of the money economy. Here the multiplicity and concentration of economic exchange gives an importance to the means of exchange which the scantiness of rural commerce would not have allowed. Money economy and the domiagainst the
nance of the ed.
intellect are intrinsically
They share
a
matter-of-fact
connect-
attitude
in
men and
dealing with
with things; and, in this attitude, a formal justice is often coupled with
an inconsiderate hardness. The intellectually sophisticated person is indifferent to all genuine individuaHty, because relationships and reactions result from it which cannot be exhausted with logical operations. In the same manner, the individuality of phenomena is not commensurate with the pecuniary principle.
Money
mon
concerned only with what is comall: it asks for the exchange value, it
is
to
reduces
all
question:
quality
individuality, is
to
the
All intimate emotional
between persons are founded in their whereas in rational relations reckoned with like a number, like an
relations
man
and individuality
How much?
element which is in itself iridifferent. Only the objective measurable achievement is of interest. Thus metropolitan man reckons with his merchants and customers, his domestic servants and often even with persons with whom he is obliged to have social intercourse. These features of intellectuality contrast with the na-
which the inevitable knowledge of individuality as inevitably proture of the small circle in
duces a warmer tone of behavior, a behavior which is beyond a mere objective balancing of service and return. In the sphere of the economic psychology of the small group it is of importance that under primitive conditions procluction serves the customer who orders the good, so that the producer and the con-
sumer
are acquainted.
The modern metropolis,
however, is supplied almost entirely by production for the market, that is, for entirely unknown purchasers who never personally enter the producer's actual field of vision. Through this anonymity the interests of each party acquire an unmerciful matter-of-factness; and the intellectually calculating economic egoisms of both parties need not fear any deflection because of the imponderables of personal relationships. The money economy dominates the metropolis; it has displaced the last survivals of domestic production and the direct barter of goods; it minimizes, from day to day, the amount of work ordered by customers. The matter-of-fact
attitude
is
ob\-iouslv
so
inti-
mately interrelated with the money economy,
which is dominant in the metropolis, that nobody can sav whether the intellectualistic mentality first promoted the money economy or whether the latter determined the former.
The metropolitan way of life is certainly the most fertile soil for this reciprocity, a point which 1 shall document merely by citing the dictum of the most eminent English constitutional historian: throughout the whole course of English history, London has never acted as England's heart but often as England's and always as her moneybag!
lect
intel-
CHAPTERS:
certain
In
seemingly
insignificant
GEORG
traits,
the surface of Hfe, the
same
psychic currents characteristically unite.
Mod-
which ern
lie
upon
mind has become more and more
calculat-
SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL
AND SOCIETY
151
from each point on the surface of existence
however closely attached to the surface alone one may drop a sounding into the depth of the psyche so that all the most banal
—
ing.
The calculative exactness of practical life which the money economy has brought about
externalities of life finally are connected with
corresponds to the ideal of natural science: to transform the world into an arithmetic problem, to fix every part of the world by mathematical formulas. Only money economy has filled the days of so many people with weighing, calculating, with numerical determinations, with a reduction of qualitative values to
and
Through the
quantitative ones. ture of
money
new
a
calculative na-
precision, a certainty in
the definition of identities and differences, an
imambiguousness in agreements and arrangements has been brought about in the relations of life-elements
—
just as externally this preci-
by the universal
sion has been effected
diffu-
sion of pocket watches. However, the conditions of metropolitan effect of this trait.
life
The
are at once cause
relationships
and
and
affairs
of the typical metropolitan usually are so varied
and complex
that
without the
strictest
the ultimate decisions concerning the style
of
life.
Punctuality,
meaning
calculability,
upon life by the complexiand extension of metropolitan existence and are not only most intimately connected with its money economy and intellectualistic character. These traits must also color the contents of life and favor the exclusion of those irrational, instinctive, sovereign traits and impulses which aim at determining the niode of life from within, instead of receiving the general and precisely schematized form of life from without. Even though sovereign types of personality, characterized by irrational impulses, are by no means impossible in the city, they are, nevertheless, opposed to typical city life. The passionate hatred of men like Ruskin and exactness are forced ty
Nietzsche for the metropolis
is
understandable
these terms. Their natures discovered the
in
value of
alone in the unschematized exis-
life
punctuality in promises and services the whole
tence which cannot be defined with precision
would break down into an inextricable chaos. Above all, this necessity is brought about by the aggregation of so many people with such differentiated interests, who must integrate their relations and activities into a highly complex organism. If all clocks and watches in Berlin would suddenly go wrong in different ways, even if only by one hour, all economic life and communication of the city would be disrupted for a long time. In addition an apparently mere external factor: long distances, would make all waiting and broken
for
appointments result in an ill-afforded waste of time. Thus, the technique of metropolitan life is unimaginable without the most punctual integration of all activities and mutual relations into a stable and impersonal time schedule. Here again the general conclusions of this entire
from the rapidly changing and closely compressed con-
structure
task of reflection
become obvious, namely,
that
all
alike.
From
the
same source
of this
hatred of the metropolis surged their hatred of
money economy and modern existence. The same
which have thus coalesced and minute precision of the
factors
into the exactness
form of
of the intellectualism of
have coalesced into a structure of on the other hand, they have promoted a highly personal subjectivity. There is perhaps no psychic phenomenon which has been so unconditionally life
the highest impersonality;
reserved to the metropolis as has the blase tude.
The blase
attitude results
atti-
first
trasting stimulations of the nerves.
From
this,
enhancement of metropolitan intellectuality, also, seems originally to stem. Therefore, stuthe
pid people the
first
who
are not intellectually alive in
place usually are not exactly blase.
A
152
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
boundless pursuit of pleasure makes one it agitates the nerves to their strongest reactivity for such a long time that in
life
blase because
they finally cease to react at all. In the same way, through the rapidity and contradictoriness of their changes, more harmless impressions force such violent responses, tearing the nerves so brutally hither and thither that their last
in the
gather
to
and if one same milieu they have no time
reserves of strength are spent;
remains
emerges
new
strength.
to react to
new
An
incapacity thus
sensations with the
appropriate energy. This constitutes that blase attitude child
which,
in
fact,
every
metropolitan
shows when compared with children and less changeable milieus.
of
quieter
This physiological source of the metropoli-
may be unnoticeably minute. However, through the relations of the rich to the objects to be had for money, perhaps even through the total character which the mentality of the contemporary public everywhere
equivalence
imparts to these objects, the exclusively pecuniary evaluation of objects has considerable. the
The
large cities, the
money exchange,
of things to the fore
than do smaller
bring the purchasability
much more
localities.
That
is
the blase attitude the concentration of
individual to attains
its
its
highest achievement so that
achievement
is
and appears
in the peculiar
essence of the blase attitude consists in the
the blase attitude.
transformed into its oppoadjustment of In
this
phenomenon
accommodating and forms of metropolitan life.
ulation the last possibility of
with the half-wit, but rather that the meaning and differing values of things, and thereby the
to the contents
The
things themselves, are experienced as insub-
brought
They appear to the blase person in an and gray tone; no one object deserves preference over any other. This mooci is the faithful subjective reflection of the completely internalized money economy. By being the equivalent to all the manifold things in one and the same way, money becomes the most
objective world, a devaluation
evenly
flat
frightful leveler. For
money
expresses
tative differences of things in
much?" Money, with indifference, becomes
all its
the
all
quali-
terms of "how
colorlessness
and
common denomina-
tor of all values; irreparably
it
hollows out the
core oi things, their individuality, their specific value,
and
their
incomparability.
All
things
Hoat with equal specific gravity in the constant-
moving stream of money All things lie on same level and differ from one another only in the size of the area which they cover. In ly
the
the individual case this coloration, or rather discoloration, oi things through their
money
the
nerves find in the refusal to react to their stim-
that the objects are not perceived, as is the case
stantial.
it
intensification of the saine conditioning factors this
mean
men and
peak. Through the mere cjuantitative
site
blunting of discrimination. This does not
cities are
things stimulate the nervous system of the
which flows from the money economy. The
is
impressively
why
also the genuine locale of the blase attitude. In
joined by another source
tan blase attitude
become quite main seats of
self-preservation of certain personalities at the price of
is
devaluating the whole
which in the end unavoidablv drags one's own personality ciown into a feeling of the same worthlessness. Whereas the subject of this form of existence has to come to terms with it entirely for himself,
city
his self-preservation in the face of the large
demands from him
a
no
less
negative
behavior of a social nature. This mental attitude of metropolitans toward one another we may designate, from a formal point of view, as reserve. If so many inner reactions were responses to the continuous external contacts
with innumerable people as are those in the small town, u'here one knows almost everybody one meets and where one has a positive relation to almost e\ervone, one would be completely atomized internally and come to an unimaginable psychic state. Partly this psychological fact, partlv the right to distrust
men have
in the face of the
which
touch-and-go
ele-
CHAPTER
merits of metropolitan reserve. ly
necessitates
our
we frequenteven know by sight those who have neighbors for years. And it is this
As
do not
life,
GEORG
6:
a result of this reserve
been our reserve which in the eyes of the small-town people makes us appear to be cold and heartless.
Indeed,
if
1
do not deceive myself, the
inner aspect of this outer reserve indifference but,
more
is
we
often than
not only
are aware,
mutual strangeness and repulsion, which will break into hatred and fight at the moment of a closer contact, however caused. The whole inner organization of such an extensive communicative life rests upon an extremely varied hierarchy of sympathies, indifferences, and aversions of the briefest as well as of the most permanent nature. The sphere of indifference in this hierarchy is not as large as might appear on the surface. Our psychic activity still responds to it
is
a slight aversion, a
almost every impression of somebody else with a somewhat distinct feeling. The unconscious,
and changing character of
fluid
this
impression seems to result in a state of indifference. Actually this indifference would be just as unnatural as the diffusion of indiscriminate
mutual suggestion would be unbearable. From both these typical dangers of the metropolis, indifference and indiscriminate suggestibility, antipathy protects us. A latent antipathy and the preparatory stage of practical antagonism effect the distances and aversions without which this mode of life could not at all be led. The extent and the mixture of this style of life, the rhythm of its emergence and disappearance, the forms in which it is satisfied all these, with the unifying motives in the narrower sense, form the inseparable whole of the metropolitan
—
style of
life.
What appears
in the
metropolitan
style of life directly as dissociation is in reality
only one of
its
elemental forms of socialization.
This reserve with
its
overtone of hidden
aversion appears in turn as the form or the cloak of a
more general mental phenomenon
the metropolis:
it
of
grants to the individual a
SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
153
and an amount of personal freedom which has no analogy whatsoever under other conditions. The metropolis goes back to one of the large developmental tendencies of social life as such, to one of the few tendencies for which an approximately universal formula can be discovered. The earliest phase of social formations found in historical as well as in contemporary social structures is this: a relatively kind
small circle firmly closed against neighboring,
some way
strange, or in
However,
this
allows
individual
its
circle
is
antagonistic circles.
and narrow
closely coherent
members only
a
development of unique qualities free, self-responsible movements. Political and kinship groups, parties and religious assoand ciations begin in this way. The self-preservation field for the
young
of very
associations requires the estab-
boundaries and a centripetal cannot allow the individual freedom and unique inner and outer development. From this stage social development proceeds at once in two different, yet corresponding, directions. To the extent to which the lishment of
strict
unity. Therefore they
—
group grows numerically, cance and in content of degree the group's
and the
—
life
is
to
the
same
direct, inner unity loosens,
rigidity of the original
against others tions
spatially, in signifi-
demarcation
softened through mutual rela-
and connections. At the same
time, the
individual gains freedom of movement, far
beyond the
first
jealous delimitation.
The
indi-
vidual also gains a specific individuality to
which the division of labor in the enlarged group gives both occasion and necessity. The state and Christianity, guilds and political parties, and innumerable other groups have developed according to this formula, however much, of course, the special conditions and forces of the respective groups have modified the general scheme. This scheme seems to me distinctly recognizable also in the evolution of
individuality within urban life
in
life.
The small-town
Antiquity and in the Middle Ages set
barriers against
movement and
relations of the
154
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
individual toward the outside, and
it
set
up
independence and differentiation within the individual self. These barriers were such that under them modern man could not have breathed. Even today a barriers against individual
metropolitan
man who
is
placed in a small
town feels a restriction similar, at least, in kind. The smaller the circle which forms our milieu is, and the more restricted those relations to others are which dissolve the boundaries of the individual, the more anxiously the circle guards the achievements, the conduct of life, and the outlook of the individual, and the
more
and qualitative spewould break up the framework of
readily a quantitative
cialization
whole little circle. The ancient polis in this respect seems to have had the very character of a small town. The constant threat to its existence at the hands of enemies from near and afar effected strict coherence in political and military respects, a supervision of the citizen by the citizen, a jealousy of the whole against the individual whose particular life was suppressed to such a degree that he could compensate only by acting as a despot in his own household. The tremendous agitation and excitement, the unique colorthe
fulness of Athenian
life, can perhaps be understood in terms of the fact that a people of incomparably individualized personalities
struggled against the constant inner and outer
pressure of a de-individualizing small town. This produced a tense atmosphere in which the
weaker individuals were suppressed and those were incited to prove themselves in the most passionate manner This is precisely why it was that there blossomed in Athens what must be called, without defining of stronger natures
it
exactly, "the general
intellectual
human
development
character" in the
of our species. For
we
stage in
common,
that
is,
they find their
enemy
narrow formations and groupings the maintenance of which places both of them into a state of defense against expanse and generality lying without and the freely moving individuin
ahty within. Just as in the feudal age, the "free" man was the one who stood under the law of is, under the law of the largest and the unfree man was the one who derived his right merely from the narrow circle of a feudal association and was excluded from the larger social orbit so today metropolitan man is "free" in a spiritualized and refined sense, in contrast to the pettiness and prejudices which hem in the small-town man. For the reciprocal reserve and indifference and
the land, that
social orbit,
—
the intellectual
in their
the
life
conditions of large circles
more strongly by the individual impact upon his independence than in
are never
felt
thickest
crowci of the big
citv.
This
is
because the bodily proximity and narrowness of space makes the mental distance only the more visible. It is obviouslv only the ob\-erse of this
freedom
one nowhere
if,
under certain circumstances, and lost as in the
feels as lonely
metropolitan crowd. For here as elsewhere
by no means necessary
man
be reflected in his
it is
freedom of emotional life as comthat the
fort. It is not only the immediate size of the area and the number of persons which, because of the uni\'ersal historical correlation between the enlargement of the circle and the personal inner and outer freedom, has made the metrop-
olis the locale of
freedom.
It
is
rather in tran-
expanse that any given city becomes the seat of cosmopolitanism. The horizon of the city expands in a manner comparable to the way in which wealth de\'elops; a scending
certain
this visible
amount
of
property
way
increases
in
a
ever more rapid pro-
maintain factual as well as historical validity for the following connection: the most exten-
quasi-automatical
and the most general contents and forms of life are most intimately connected with the most individual ones. They have a preparatory
passed, the economic, personal, and intellectu-
sive
gression.
As soon
al relations
lectual
in
as a certain limit has been
of the citizenry, the sphere of intel-
predominance of the
city o\'er its hinter-
CHAPTER
grow
land,
as
in
geometrical
6:
GEORG
progression.
dynamic extension becomes a step, not for an equal, but for a new and larger extension. From every thread spinning out of the city, ever new threads grow as if by themEvery gain
in
selves, just as within
the city the unearned
increment of ground rent, through the mere increase in communication, brings the owner
SIMMEL; DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
expressed in the working-out of a way of life. That we follow the laws of our own nature
—
and this after all is freedom becomes obvious and convincing to ourselves and to others only if
life
transformed
is
The
directly into qualitative traits of character
sphere of
of the small
life
self-contained
and
town
is,
autarchic. For
in the
it is
sive nature of the metropolis that
main,
the deci-
inner
its
life
overflows by waves into a far-flung national or international area. Weimar is not an example to the contrary, since its significance was hinged
upon individual
personalities
them; whereas the metropolis
is
and died with indeed charac-
by its essential independence even from the most eminent individual personalities. This is the counterpart to the independence, and it terized
the expressions of this nature differ from the
expressions of others. Only our unmistakability
proves that our
imposed by
automatically increasing profits. At this point, the quantitative aspect of
155
way
of
life
has not been super-
others.
Cities are, first of
all,
seats of the highest eco-
They produce thereby such extreme phenomena as in Paris the renumerative occupation of the quntorzieme. They are persons who identify themselves by signs on their residences and who are ready at the dinner hour in correct attire, so that they can be quickly called upon if a dinner party should nomic division of
labor.
consist of thirteen persons. In the its
measure of
expansion, the city offers more and more the
decisive conditions of the division of labor. offers a circle
which through
its
It
size can absorb
a highly diverse variety of services. At the
the price the individual pays for the inde-
same tinie, the concentration of individuals and their struggle for customers compel the
pendence, which he enjoys in the metropolis.
individual to specialize in a function from which
is
The
most
metropolis
significant
this functional extension
is
physical boundaries.
its
in
turn
characteristic
And
of
the
beyond
this efficacy reacts
and gives weight, importance, and
responsibility to metropolitan
life.
Man
does
not end with the limits of his body or the area
comprising his immediate activity. Rather is the range of the person constituted by the sum of effects emanating from him temporally and spatially. In the same way, a city consists of its total effects which extend beyond its immediate confines. Only this range is the city's actual
which its existence is expressed. This makes it obvious that individual freedom, logical and historical complement of such
extent in fact
the
extension,
is
not to be understood only in the
negative sense of mere freedom of mobility
and elimination of prejudices and petty philistinism. The essential point is that the particularly and incomparability, which ultimately every
human
being possesses, be
somehow
he cannot be readily displaced by another. It is that city life has transformed the struggle with nature for livelihood into an inter-human struggle for gain, which here is not granted by nature but by other men. For specialization does not flow only from the competition for gain but also from the underlying fact that the seller must always seek to call forth new and differentiated needs of the lured customer. In order to find a source of income which is not yet exhausted, and to find a function which cannot readily be displaced, it is necessary to specialize in one's services. This process promotes differentiation, refinement, and the enrichment of the public's needs, which obviously must lead to growing personal differences within this public. All this forms the transition to the individualization of mental and psychic traits which the city occasions in proportion to its size. There is a whole series of obvious causes underlying decisive
a
156
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
process. First,
this
one must meet the
culty of asserting his
own
dimensions of metropohtan
the
diffi-
personahty within hfe.
Where
and the expense of energy reach their Hmits, one seizes upon quahtative differentiation in order somethe quantitative increase in importance
how
to attract the attention of the social circle
by playing upon its sensitivity for differences. Finally, man is tempted to adopt the most tendentious peculiarities, that is, the specifically metropolitan extravagances of mannerism, caprice,
and preciousness. Now, the meaning
of these extravagances does not at
all lie in
contents of such behavior, but rather in
its
the
form
of "being different," of standing out in a strik-
ing
manner and thereby
For
many
means
attracting attention.
character types, ultimately the only
of saving for themselves
of self-esteem
and the sense
some modicum
of filling a position
through the awareness of others. In the same sense a seemingly insignificant factor is operating, the cumulative effects of which are, however, still noticeable. 1 refer to the brevity and scarcity of the inter-human contacts granted to the metropolitan man, as compared with social intercourse in the small town. The temptation to appear "to the point," to appear concentrated and strikingly characterisis
indirect,
tic,
lies
much
closer to the individual in brief
metropolitan contacts than in an atmosphere in which frequent and prolonged association assures the personality of an unambiguous
image of himself in the eyes of the other. The most profound reason, however, why the metropolis conduces to the urge for the most individual personal existence no matter whether justified and successful appears to me to be the following: the development of modern culture is characterized by the preponderance of what one may call the "objective
— —
individual in his intellectual development
—
two becomes
we
—
evident. Indeed, at
some
points
notice a retrogression in the culture of the
individual with reference to spirituality, delicacy,
and
discrepancy
This
idealism.
results
from the growing division of labor. For the division of labor demands from the individual an ever more one-sided accomplishment, and the greatest advance in a one-sided essentially
pursuit only too frequently
means dearth
and
with the overgrowth of is reduced to a negligible quantity, perhaps less in his consciousness than in his practice and in the totali-
can cope
less
less
The individual
objective culture.
of his obscure emotional states that are derived from this practice. The individual has ty
become
mere cog in an enormous organizaand powers which tear from his hands all progress, spirituality, and \'alue in order to transform them from their subjective form into the form of a purely objective life. It a
tion of things
needs
merely
metropolis
is
to
be
pointed
out
that
which outgrows all personal life. Here in buildings and educational institutions, in the wonders and comforts of space-conquering technology, in the formations of
and
community
offered such an o\'erwhelming fullness of crystallized
and impersonalized
spirit that the per-
under
impact.
as well as in the objects of the domestic envi-
lations, interests, uses of
embodied
a
sum
oi spirit.
The
life,
in the visible institutions of the state, is
so to speak, cannot maintain
is
the
the genuine arena of this culture
sonality,
ronment, there
to the
personality of the individual. In any case, he
over the "subjective spirit." This is to say, in language as well as in law, in the technique of production as well as in art, in science spirit"
fol-
lows the growth of this spirit very imperfectly and at an ever increasing distance. If, for instance, we view the immense culture which for the last hundred years has been embodied in things and in knowledge, in institutions and in comforts, and if we compare all this with the cultural progress of the individual during the same period at least in high status groups frightful disproportion in growth between the
its
infinitely
On
the
one hand,
easy for the personality
ness are offered to
it
from
life is
in that
itself
made
stimu-
time and consciousall sides.
They carry
CHAPTER
the person as
swim
however,
life is
for oneself.
GEORG
and one needs
in a stream,
if
hardly to
6:
On
the other hand,
composed more and more
of
these impersonal contents and offerings which
tend
to
orations
displace
the
genuine personal
and incomparabilities. This
col-
results in
the individual's summoning the utmost in uniqueness and particularization, in order to preserve his most personal core. He has to exaggerate this personal element in order to remain audible even to himself. The atrophy of individual culture through the hypertrophy of objective culture is one reason for the bitter
hatred
which
the
preachers
of
most
the
extreme individualism, above all Nietzsche, harbor against the metropolis. But it is, indeed,
why
also a reason
these preachers are so pas-
157
AND SOCIETY
SIMMEL: DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL
Goethe and Romanticism, on and thrtiugh the economic division of labor, on the other hand, another ideal arose: individuals liberated from historical bones now wished to distinguish themselves from one another. The carrier of man's values is no longer the "general human being" in every individual, but rather man's qualitative uniqueness and irreplaceability. The external and internal history of our time takes its course within the struggle and in the changing entanglements of these two ways of defining the individual's role in the whole of society. It is century, through
the one hand,
the function of the metropolis to provide the
arena for this struggle and
its
reconciliation.
For the metropolis presents the peculiar conditions which are revealed to us as the opportu-
sionately loved in the metropolis
and why they
nities
appear
man
both these ways of allocating roles to men. Therewith these conditions gain a unique place, pregnant with inestimable meanings for the development of psychic existence. The metropolis reveals itself as one of those great historical formations in which opposing streams which enclose life unfold, as well as join one another with equal right. However, in
to
the
metropolitan
as
the
prophets and saviors of his most unsatisfied yearnings. If one asks for the historical position of these two forms of individualism which are nour-
ished
by
the
quantitative
relation
of
the
metropolis, namely, individual independence
and the elaboration of individuality itself, then the metropolis assumes an entirely new rank order in the world history of the spirit. The eighteenth century found the individual in oppressive bonds which had become meaningless bonds of a political, agrarian, guild, and religious character. They were restraints which, so to speak, forced upon man an unnatural form and outmoded, unjust inequalities. In this situation the cry for liberty and equality arose, the belief in the individual's full freedom of movement in all social and intellectual relationships. Freedom would at once permit the
—
noble substance
common
to all to
come
this
and the
stimuli for the
process the currents of
individual
development of
life,
whether
their
phenomena touch us sympathet-
ically or antipathetically, entirely
transcend the
sphere for which the judge's attitude
is
appro-
have grown into the roots and into the crown of the whole of the historical life in which we, in our fleeting existence, as a cell, belong only as a part, it is not our task either to accuse or to pardon, but only priate. Since
to
such forces of
life
understand.'
to the
substance which nature had deposited in every man and which society and history fore, a
had only deformed. Besides this eighteenthcentury ideal of liberalism, in the nineteenth
'The content of this lecture by its very nature does not derive from a citable literature. Argument and elaboration of its major cultural-historical ideas are contained in my Philosofihie des Geldes
imd
Leipzig:
[The Philosophy of Money; Miinchen
Duncker und Humblot,
1900].
,
CHAPTER
7
George Herbert Mead: The Emergent Self
INTRODUCTION George Herbert Mead was born on February 17 1863, in South Hadley, Massachusetts. His father a clergyman, and his mother well educated. Mead's family encouraged his intellectual development. He spent most of his childhood at Oberlin College in Ohio, where his father held an appointment at the theological seminary, and benefited from the progressive education for which Oberlin is known. He later went to Harvard for his post-graduate degree and studied under William James. After a year, he went to Germanv to study philosophy and met Stanley Hall, the psychologist who sparked Mead's interest in that discipline. His work in social psychology, much of which was done at the University of Chicago, is what most consider to be his greatest contribution to sociology.
Mead
is
considered to be a leader of
the so-called Chicago School, a group of intel-
which includes John Dewey, W. I. Thomas and Robert Park. Generally, this group was marked by its pragmatic philosophy, its commitment to social reform, and its democratic ideas. The city of Chicago became a practical laboratory for sociology. Mead and his ct)nlectuals
158
temporaries were committed to the idea that sociology can be used to help others; thev had
an optimistic view of the society and its future and believed that knowledge should guide social action.
Mead's work can best be assessed
in
compar-
ison to the prevailing behavioristic psychology
view humans respond to stimuli. Watson, behaviorists
of his time. Behaviorism tends to
as reactive creatures
Under
the aegis of
J.
who B.
adopted a scrupulously scientific methodology anci claimed that only observable behavior could be the subject of scientific study. The mental life of an individual was relegated to a "black box" beyond our perceptual grasp, and as a result, behaviorists declared that explanations
that
relied
on the unobservable were
unscientific.
Mead's contribution to our understanding and how it is constituted emphasizes the idea that we are thoughtful and reflective creatures whose identities and actions arise as a result of our interaction with others. We are not simply vessels of behaviors waiting to be released by the appropriate stimuli in our enviof the self
CHAPTER
ronment. That explanation might suffice for pigeons, but Mead was convinced that human behavior was more complex. His most significant insight was his view of human behavior as reflexive, by vvhich he meant that vou and I think before we act in many of our important activities. Although it is true that people do en-
gage
behaviors that are not reflexive,
in
thoughtful behavior and
how
it
was
emerges that
it
Reflexivity entails the capacity to use
respond
to
and
language, symbols, and thoughts, called
the significant gestures.
seen as reflexive because we are able to understand and react to what others think and say about our behavior. Our actions
Our behavior
is
engaged with the actions of others, whose responses tti what we do send us signals
are always
as to their approval or disapproval.
We
are able to step out of ourselves and actions objects to ourselves so that
lyze
and assess the
we
in turn
make our
we
can ana-
reactions of others.
basis of this assessment
On
the
are able to trans-
form our actions and behavior
differently in
159
interactionism, the school of thought to
which
Mead's ideas gave tive process
rise,
claims that the interac-
among humans
was Mead's contention
that this internal
mental dialogue, the dialogue between the "I" and the "me," is what caused the social self to emerge. Mind, Self and Society, published after his death on April 26, 1931, best explicates Mead's perspective. What is interesting about this formulation is Mead's insistence that the "self," as it is commonly understood, cannot exist outside of its social context.
Mead
traces the
He
Even con-
is a social phenomenon, according Mead. Conversely, the structure of society can be understood as the produce of the communication of social acts between individual subjects. The vehicle of this communication is the gesture, which Mead defines as either conscious or unconscious. The unconscious ges-
in
on different roles and proceed to more complex which the child must conceptualize
their play
games
in
many players in order to particiLearning the game, whether it is baseball or soccer, is learning to be a member of the the roles of pate.
team.
It
means learning
teammates and the plays
may bring The game is and Mead is erly,
the positions of one's that, if
a
metaphor
very
example. No intentionality is involved. The conscious gestures define human communication. Symbolic
scream of fear or pain,
for
for
much
democratic
life,
the sociologist of
democracy. Just as children must learn to cooperate, to restrain their impulsive need to score (the "I") in preference for team play (the "me") so also do individuals reflect on their impul-
and engage
Mead
correction.
in self-analysis
and
humans
the
attributes
to
capacity to reshape their behavior in order to
gain approval and acceptance from others. In this way our actions are adjusted to those with
whom we ment, the
interact. fitting
those of others, that life,
is
It
this constant adjust-
together of our actions with is
the substance of social
and particularly of democratic
This process of
fitting
social
life.
together entails a respect
and the "generalized
for the particular other
basically a stimulus-response relation-
executed prop-
victory.
other" or the moral rules.
ship: a
notes that babies
begin to interact on the stimulus-response level and then slowly begin to evolve the skill of
to
is
generally con-
development of these men-
the child.
tal abilities in
sciousness
ture
is
ducted through the use of conscious gestures, or symbols.
sive behavior
future situations. It
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
"play-acting." Children take
most concerned Mead.
which Mead
7:
It
requires a degree
of self-control and adjustment of one's behav-
reduces the need for external authority compel or coerce behavior. In so far as the self is an emergent property, the result of an ior that to
internal dialogue, the cooperative
dimensions
and the tempered by the generalized
of social interaction are underscored willful other.
ego
is
160
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
George Herbert Mead: Mind, and Society
says something, and that calls out a certain
Self
he was going thing,
The is
self,
as that
which can be an
essentially a social structure,
object to
and
it
ences,
and so we can conceive
solitary self. a
arising
self
When
But
it is
its
itself,
arises in
social experience. After a self has arisen,
certain sense provides for itself
it
in a
social experi-
of an absolutely
impossible to conceive of
outside
of
experience.
social
we
can think of a person in solitary confinement for the rest of his life, but who still has himself as a companion, and is able to think and to converse with himself as he it
has arisen
had communicated with others. That process which I have just referred, of responding one's self as another responds to in one's
own
it,
to to
taking part
conversation with others, being
aware of what one is saying and using that awareness of what one is saying to determine what one is going to say thereafter that is a process with which we are all familiar. We are
—
continually following
up our own address to what we
other persons by an understanding of are saying,
and using
that
understanding
direction of our continued speech.
We
in the
are find-
what we are going to say, what we are going to do, by saying and doing, and in the
ing out
process
process
we
are
itself.
continually
controlling
what we say another and
that
action, so that
we shift from what we
do because of
the
In the conversation of gestures calls
out a certain response in in
turn changes our
is
own
started to
the reply the other makes.
conversation of gestures
makes him change what
reply in himself which
The
the beginning of
communication. The individual comes to carry on a conversation of gestures with himself. He
we
thing, but is cruel.
will
when he
The
One
starts to say somepresume an unpleasant some-
to say.
effect
starts to
say
on himself
ing checks him; there
is
of
it
he realizes
what he
is
it
say-
here a conversation of
gestures between the individual and himself.
We mean by is
one that
significant speech that the action
affects the individual himself,
that the effect
upon
and
the individual himself
is
part of the intelligent carrying-out of the con-
Now we, so to speak, phase and dispense with it for the time being, so that one is talking to one's self as one would talk to another person. This process of abstraction cannot be carried on indefinitely. One inevitably seeks an audience, has to pour himself out to somebody. In reflective intelligence one thinks to act, and to act solely so that this action remains a part of a social process. Thinking becomes preparatory to social action. The very process of thinking is, of course, simply an inner conversation that goes on, but it is a conversation of gestures which in its completion implies the expression of that which one thinks to an audience. One separates the significance of what he is saying to others from the actual speech and gets it ready before saying it. He thinks it out, and perhaps writes it in the form of a book; but it is still a part of social intercourse in which one is addressing other persons and at the same time addressing one's self, and in which one controls the address to other persons by the response made to one's own gesture. That the person should be responding to himself is necessary to the self, and it is this sort of social conduct which provides behavior within which know of no other form of that self appears. beha\'ior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself, and, so far as can see, the individual is not a self in the reflexive sense imless he is an object to himself. It is this fact that gives a critical importance to comversation with others.
amputate
that social
1
Si)i//rf the single individual. The meaning of a gesture by one organism, to repeat, is found in the response of
element
in the social act,
CHAPTER
another organism to what would be the completion of the act of the that gesture initiates
and
first
organism which
indicates.
We
sometimes speak as if a person could build up an entire argument in his mind, and then put it into words to convey it to someone else. Actually, our thinking always takes place by means of some sort of symbols. It is possible that one could have the meaning of "chair" in his experience without there being a symbol, but we would not be thinking about it in that case. We may sit down in a chair without
thinking about what
we
are doing, that
is,
the
approach to the chair is presumably already aroused in our experience, so that the meaning is there. But if one is thinking about the chair he must have some sort of a symbol for it. It may be the form of the chair, it may be the attitude that somebody else takes in sitting down, but it is more apt to be some language symbol that arouses this response. In a thought process there has to be some sort of a symbol that can refer to this
meaning, that
this response,
other
and
Our symbols
if
thing
you say You
universal.
that
are
say anything that
tend to
call
out
also serve this purpose for
persons as well.
thought process
is,
is
It
would not be
were not the
all
universal.
a
163
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
course;
universal
is
it
in
We
character.
its
always assume that the symbol we use is one which will call out in the other person the same response, provided it is a part of his mechanism of conduct. A person who is saying something is saying to himself what he says to others; otherwise he does not know what he is talking about.
There
is,
of course, a great deal in one's con-
versation with others that does not arouse in
one's self the ers.
That
is
same response
tional attitudes.
he
else;
is
One
does he
is
The
a symbolic character.
certain attitude he
is,
as
own
as his audience does.
one
is
It is
not an actor
We do at times act and
the effect of our attitude
is
he
is, if
we
this attitude represents grief.
ural situation;
is,
values given in speech
able to respond to his
some sense
may
emosomebody
bully
conscious of these values; that
is
assumes a aware that
time.
tries to
set of
which are not of actor
arouses in oth-
not trying to bully himself. There
whole
further, a
it
particularly true in the case of
say, If
it
gesture in
not a natall
of the
consider just what
going to be, and
we
deliberately use a certain tone of voice to
case.
bring about a certain result. Such a tone arouses
You cannot
the same response in ourselves that we want to arouse in somebody else. But a very large part of what goes on in speech has not this symbolic
absolutely particular; any-
that has
7:
any meaning
at all is
are saying something that calls
status.
out a specific response in anybody else provid-
ed that the symbol exists for him in his experience as it does for you. There is the language of speech and the language of hands, and there may be the language of the expression of the countenance. One can register grief or joy and call out certain responses. There are primitive people who can carry on elaborate conversations just by expressions of the countenance. Even in these cases the person who communicates is affected by that expression just as he expects somebody else to be affected. Thinking always implies a symbol which will call out the same response in another that it calls out in the thinker. Such a svmbol is a universal of dis-
It is
the task not only of the actor but of the
well to find the sort of expression that arouse in others what is going on in himself. The lyric poet has an experience of beauty with an emotional thrill to it, and as an artist artist as
will
using words he
is
seeking for those words
which will answer to and which will call out
emotional attitude, he himself has. He can only test his results in himself by seeing whether these words do call out in
him
ers.
his
in others the attitude
the response he wants to call out in oth-
He
is
in
somewhat the same position as The first direct and immediate not in the form of communica-
that of the actor.
experience tion.
We
is
have an interesting
light
on
this
from
164
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
such a poet as Wordsworth, who was very much interested in the technique of the poet's expression; and he has told us in his prefaces and also in his own poetry how his poems, as poems, arose and uniformly the experience itself was not the immediate stimulus to the poetic expression. A period of ten years might
—
lie
between the original experience and the
expression of
This process of finding the
it.
expression in language which will
out the
call
emotion once had is more easily accomplished when one is dealing with the memory of it than when one is in the midst of the trance-like experiences through which Wordsworth passed in his contact with nature. One has to experiment and see how the expression that is given does answer to the responses which are now had in the fainter memories of experience. Someone once said that he had very great difficulty in writing poetry; he had plenty of ideas but could not get the language he needed. He
was
rightly
words, not
A great
was
that poetry
told
written in
in ideas.
deal of our speech
is
not of this gen-
uinely aesthetic character; in most of
it
we do we
not deliberately feel the emotions which arouse.
We do
not normally use language stim-
out
in
response which
we
to
uli
One
call
ourselves
emotional
the
are calling out in others.
does, of course, have
sympathy
in
emo-
what one is seeking for there is something which is, after all, that in the other which supports the individual in his own experience. In the case of the poet and actor, the stimulus calls out in the artist that which it tional situations; but
calls
out in the other, but this
function of language; the person in
who
is
angry
himself that he
else.
we do
The emotional
is
is
is
not the natural
not assume that
calling out the fear
calling out in
part of our act does not
directly call out in us the response
the other
someone
it
calls
out in
person is hostile the attitude of the other that he is interested in, an attitude which flows naturally from his angered tones, is not one that he definitely recognizes in himIf
a
We
self.
are not frightened by a tone which
we
use to frighten somebody else. On the emotional side, which is a very large part of the vocal gesture, we do not call out in ourselves in any such degree the response we call out in
may
we do in the case of significant we should call out in ourselves the type of response we are calling out in others; we must know what we are saving, and the attitude of the other which we arouse in ourselves should control what we do say. others as
speech. Here
Rationality
which we
means
call
that the type of the response out in others should be so called
out in ourselves, and that this response should
determining what
fur-
and do. communication
that
in turn take its place in
ther thing
What
we
is
are going to say
essential to
symbol should arouse
the
is
what it must have
in one's self
arouses in the other indi\idual. that sort of universality to
It
any person who
same situation. There is a language whenever a stimulus
finds himself in the possibility of
can affect the individual as it affects the other. a blind person such as Helen Keller, it is a contact experience that couki be given to an-
With
it is given to herself. It is out of that language that the mind of Helen Keller
other as sort of
was
built up.
As she has recognized,
it
was
not
until she could get into communication with other persons through symbols which could
arouse in herself the responses they arouse in other people that she could get what
we
mental content, or a self. Another set of background factors genesis of the self ties of
is
represented in the
term a in
the
acti\'i-
play and the game.
Among
priniiti\e people, as
1
ha\e
said, the
necessity of distinguishing the self
and the
we
term the
organism was recognized
in wiiat
"double": the individual has a thing-like self that
is
affected
by the individual as
other people and which the
immediate organism
body and come back
to
is
in that it.
it
affects
distinguished from
This
it
is
can leave the the basis for
the concept of the soul as a separate entity.
CHAPTER
We
find in children something that answers
to this
double, namely, the invisible, imaginary
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
7:
himself as a parent, as a teacher; he arrests himself as a policeman. He has a set of stimuli
companions which a good many children produce in their own experience. They organize in this way the responses which they call out in other persons and call out also in themselves. Of course, this playing with an imaginary com-
which
only a peculiarly interesting phase of ordinary play. Play in this sense, especially the stage which precedes the organized games, is a
uation.
panion
is
play at something.
A
child plays at being a
mother, at being a teacher, at being a policeman; that is, it is taking different roles, as we say.
We
have something
that suggests this in
what we
call the play of animals: a cat will play with her kittens, and dogs play with each other. Two dogs playing with each other will attack and defend, in a process which if carried through would amount to an actual fight. There is a combination of responses which checks the depth of the bite. But we do not
have
in
such a situation the dogs taking a
defi-
nite role in the sense that a child deliberately
on the what we are working with in the kindergarten where the roles which the children assume are made the basis for training. When a child does assume a role he has in himself the stimuli which call out that particular response or group of responses. He takes the role of another. This tendency
part of the children
is
may, of course, run away when he is chased, as the dog does, or he may turn around and strike back just as the dog does in his play. But that is not the same as playing at something. Children
means that which call they would call
get together to "play Indian." This
the child has a certain set of stimuli
itself the responses that out in others, and which answer to an Indian. In
out in the
play period
the
child
utilizes
his
own
responses to these stimuli which he makes use self. The response which he has tendency to make to these stimuli organizes them. He plays that he is, for instance, offering himself something, and he buys it; he gives a letter to himself and takes it away; he addresses
165
they
out in himself the sort of responses out in others. He takes this group of
call
call
responses and organizes them into a certain
whole. Such
the simplest form of being
is
another to one's
The
self. It
ter
and responds
his
responding
in
in
involves a temporal
something
in
another character
lus to himself in the first character,
conversation
goes
A
on.
him and
certain
is
a stimu-
and so the organized
which and these carry on the conversaof gestures between themselves.
structure arises in replies to tion
sit-
one characanother character, and then
child says
If
we
in his other
it,
contrast play with the situation in an
organized game,
we note the who plays
ence that the child
essential differ-
game must
in a
be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in that game, and that these different roles must have a definite relationship to each other. Taking a very simple game such as hideand-seek, everyone with the exception of the one who is hiding is a person who is hunting. A child does not require more than the person
who child
is
is
hunted and the one playing in the
playing, but there
first
is
who
is
hunting.
If
a
sense he just goes on
no basic organization
gained. In that early stage he passes from one role to another just as a
a
game where
a
wliim takes him. But
number
in
of individuals are in-
volved, then the child taking one role must be
ready to take the role of everyone else. If he gets in a ball nine he must have the responses of each position involved in his own position. He must know what everyone else is going to do in order to carry out his own play. He has to take all of these roles. They do not all have to be present in consciousness at the same time, but at some moments he has to have three or
of in building a
four indi\'iduals present in his
a
such as the one the one
who
is
who
is
own
attitude,
going to throw the
going to catch
it,
ball,
and so on.
These responses must be, in some degree, present in his own make-up. In the game, then.
166
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
people out of which our civilization has A striking illustration of play as distinct
there is a set of responses of such others so organized that the attitude of one calls out the
itive
appropriate attitudes of the other.
from the game is found in the myths and various of the plays which primitive people carry out, especially in religious pageants. The pure play attitude which we find in the case of little children may not be found here, since the participants are adults, and undoubtedly the relationship of these play processes to that which
put in the form of the rules of the game. Children take a great interest in rules. They make rules on the spot in order This organization
to
is
help themselves out of
the enjoyment of the
Now,
game
difficulties. Part of is
to get these rules.
which a You can demand a if you take a certain
the rules are the set of responses
arisen.
more or
less in the
minds
of
particular attitude calls out.
they interpret
certain response in others
even the most primitive people. In the process of interpretation of such rituals, there is an organization of play which perhaps might be
These responses are all in yourself as There you get an organized set of such well. responses as that to which I have referred, which is something more elaborate than the roles found in play. Here there is just a set of responses that follow on each other indefinitely. At such a stage we speak of a child as not yet having a fully developed self. The child responds in a fairly intelligent fashion to the immediate stimuli that come to him, but they are not organized. He does not organize his life as we would like to have him do, namely, as a whole. There is just a set of responses of the attitude.
type of play. The child reacts to a certain stimulus, and the reaction is in himself that is called
compared
is
to that
which
is
taking place in the
kindergarten in dealing with the plays of children, will least
where these are made
little
into a set that
have a definite structure or relationship. At something of the same sort is found in the
play of primitive people. This type of activity belongs, of course, not to the e\'eryday life of the people in their dealing with the objects
—
about them there we have a more or less defibut in nitely developed self-consciousness their attitudes toward the forces about them, the nature upon which they depend; in their attitude
—
toward
this
nature which
we have
is
\ague and
much more
primi-
out in others, but he is not a whole self. In his game he has to have an organization of these roles; otherwise he cannot play the game. The
uncertain, there
game
ing at the expression of their gods and their heroes, going through certain rites which are the
child
represents the passage in the
from taking the full
of the
role of others in play to
the organized part that
sciousness in the
life
is
essential to self-con-
sense of the term.
PLAY, THE GAME, AND THE GENERALIZED OTHER
We were
response;
and
that
I
more prim-
finds
its
what these indi\iduals are supposed to be doing. The process is one which de\'elops, to be sure, into a more or less definite technique and is controlled; and yet we representation of
it
has arisen out of situations similittle children play at
lar to those in which
speaking of the social conditions
response
expression in taking the role of the other, play-
can say that
under which the self arises as an object. In addition to language we found two illustrations, one in play and the other in the game, and I wish to summarize and expand my account on these points. have spoken of these from the point of view of children. We can, of course, refer also to the attitudes of
tive
a
—
being a parent, at being a teacher vague personalities that are about them and which affect
them and on which they depend. These are personalities which they take, roles they play, and in so far control the development of their own personality. This outcome is just what the kindergarten works toward. It takes the characters of these wirious \'ague beings and gets
CHAPTER
7:
common
them
the
to
undertakings
into such an organized social relationship each other that they build up the character of the little child. The very introduction of organization from outside supposes a lack of
organization at this period in the child's experi-
Over against such a situation of the little and primitive people, we have the game
ence. child
The fundamental
game
anci play
difference
between the
that in the latter the child
is
social
activity
or set of social
which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are all engaged; and he must then, by generalizing these individual attitudes of that organized in
society or social
group
toward different
social projects
given time
as such.
167
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
it is
itself,
as a whole, act
which
at
any
carrying out, or toward the var-
ious larger phases of the general social process
which constitutes
its
life
and
of
which these
others
projects are specific manifestations. This get-
involved in that game. The attitudes of the
broad activities of any given social whole or organized society as such within the experiential field of any one of the individuals
must have
the
of
attitude
the
all
other players which the participant assumes
organize into a sort of unit, and it is that organization which controls the response of the
ting of the
involved or included in that whole
is,
in other
individual. The illustration used was of a person playing baseball. Each one of his own acts is determined by his assumption of the action of the others who are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else
words, the essential basis and prerequisite of the fullest development of that individual's
on
ity
that team, at least in so far as those attitudes
affect his
own
particular response.
an "other" which
is
We
get then
an organization of the
atti-
tudes of those involved in the same process.
only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, co-operative social activ-
self:
or set of such activities in which that group
engaged, does he develop a complete self or possess the sort of complete self he has developed. And on the other hand, the comas such
is
The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other." The atti-
plex co-operative processes and activities and
tude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community. Thus, for example, in the case of such a social group as a ball team,
individual involved in them or belonging to
the team
processes and activities and institutional func-
enters ity
is
the generalized other in so far as
—as an organized process or social activ-
—into the experience of any one of the
vidual If
it
members
the given
of
human
individual
human
to
take
it is
the
is
develop
to
not sufficient for
attitudes
of
other
individuals toward himself and toward
one another within the human social process, and to bring that social process as a whole into his individual experience merely in these
must
same way
human
society are also possible only in so far as every that society can take the general attitudes of all
other such individuals with reference to these tionings,
and
organized social whole of and interactions thereby and can direct his own behavior to the
experiential relations
constituted
it.
a self in the fullest sense,
him merely
indi-
institutional functionings of organized
—
accordingly. It is
in the
form of the generalized other that
the social process influences the behavior of the
individuals involved in i.e.,
that the
community
the conduct of in this
form
its
it
and carrying
on,
it
exercises control over
individual members; for
that the social process or
it is
commu-
he
nity enters as a determining factor into the
takes the attitudes of other individuals toward
individual's thinking. In abstract thought the
himself and toward one another, take their attitudes toward the various phases or aspects of
other toward himself, without reference to
terms: he
also, in the
that
individual takes the attitude of the generalized its
168
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
expression in any particular other individuals;
one of the particular organized subgroups
and
(determined in socially functional terms) of is a member within the entire given society or social community. In the most highly developed, organized, and complicated
thought he takes that attitude in so far as it is expressed in the attitudes toward his behavior of those other individuals with whom he is involved in the given social situation or act. But only by taking the attitude of the generalized other toward himself, in one or another of these ways, can he think at all; for only thus can thinking or the internalized in concrete
—
conversation thinking
of
gestures
which constitutes
—occur. And only through the taking
which he himself
human
social
communities
man — these
civilized
or subgroups of individuals to which any given individual belongs (and with the other individual members of which he thus al classes
enters into a special set of social relations) are
by individuals of the attitude or attitudes of the generalized other toward themselves is the
of
existence of a universe of discourse, as that sys-
clubs, corporations,
tem
of
common
meanings which
or social
thinking presupposes at
context, rendered
its
possible.
two
kinds.
individual, then,
Some
of
them are concrete
which are
tional social units, in terms of
vidual
members
actually func-
all
which
The others are
or subgroups, such as the class of debtors and the class of creditors, in terms of
individual
which
that
group or community as such
is
en-
gaged; and as an individual participant in these social projects or co-operative enterpris-
he governs his own conduct accordingly In example, the individual identifies himself with an entire political party and takes the organized attitudes of that entire party toward the rest of the given social community and toward the problems which confront the party within the given social situation; and he consequently reacts or responds in terms of the organized attitudes of the party as a whole. He es,
politics, for
one
to
abstract social classes
group or community (or of some one section thereof) to which he belongs, toward the social problems of various kinds which confront that group or community at any given time, and which arise in connection with the correspondingly different social projects or organized co-operative enterprises in
their indi-
are directly related
takes or assumes the organized social attitudes of the given social
social
classes or subgroups, such as political parties,
another.
The self-conscious human
—those evolved bv
various socially function-
members
which
their
are related to one another
only more or less indirectly, and which only
more
or less indirectly function as social units,
but which afford or represent unlimited possibilities
for the
widening and ramifving and
enriching of the social relations individual
members
among
all
the
of the given society as an
organized and unified whole. The given indi-
membership
vidual's
in
several
abstract social classes or subgroups
of
these
makes pos-
sible his entrance into definite social relations
(however
number
indirect)
with
an
of other individuals
to or are included within
almost
who
infinite
also belong
one or another of
these abstract social classes or subgroups cutting
across
functional
lines
of
demarcation
enters into various other special sets of social
which divide different human social communities trom one another, and including indi\ idual members from several (in some cases from all) such communities. Of these abstract social classes or subgroups of human individuals the one which is most inclusive and extensive is, of course, the one defined bv the logical universe
relations, with various other classes of individ-
of discourse (or system of universally signifi-
uals respectively, the individuals of each of
cant symbols) determined by the participation
thus enters into a special set of social relations
with
all
the other individuals
that political party;
and
in
these classes being the other
who
the
belong to
same way he
members
of
some
and communicative interaction of indi\iduals;
CHAPTER
7:
the one
The game has
which claims the largest number of individual members, and which enables the largest con-
zation of the self
for of all
such classes or subgroups,
it is
number of human individuals to enter some sort of social relation, however indi-
ceivable into
rect or abstract
it
may
be, with
one another
—
169
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
end
such an organirendered possible: there is a
a logic, so that is
be obtained; the actions of the individuals are all related to each different reference to that end so that they do other with definite
to
not conflict; one
is
not in conflict with himself
man on
from the universal functioning of gestures as significant symbols in the general human social process of communication. 1 have pointed out, then, that there are two general stages in the full development of the self. At the first of these stages, the individual's self is constituted simply by an organization of
in the attitude of another
the particular attitudes of other individuals
into the organization of other selves
toward himself and toward one another in the specific social acts in which he participates
reach such a stage as that of the game, as over
relation arising
with them. But
development
at the
second
stage in the full
of the individual's self that self
is
the team.
If
one has the attitude of the person throwing the ball he can also have the response of catching the ball. The two are related so that they further the
purpose of the game
They
itself.
are
interrelated in a unitary, organic fashion. There is
a definite unity, then,
which
against the situation of play
is
introduced
when we
where there
is
a
simple succession of one role after another, a situation
which
own
is,
of course, characteristic of
The
one
constituted not only by an organization of
the child's
these particular individual attitudes, but also
thing at one time and another at another, and
by an organization
them, by means of further organizing, and then
what he is at one moment does not determine what he is at another. That is both the charm of childhood as well as its inadequacy. You cannot count on the child; you cannot assume that all the things he does are going to determine what he will do at any moment. He is not organized into a whole. The child has no definite character, no definite personality. The game is then an illustration of the situation out of which an organized personality
generalizing, the attitudes of particular other
arises. In so far as the child
of the social attitudes of the
group as a generalized other or the These social or whole to which he belongs. within the individgroup attitudes are brought are included ual's field of direct experience, and social
as elements in the structure or constitution of his self, in the
same way
that the attitudes of
particular other individuals are;
and the
indi-
vidual arrives at them, or succeeds in taking
individuals in terms of their organized social
bearings and implications. So the its full
self
reaches
development by organizing these
indi-
vidual attitudes of others into the organized social or
group
attitudes,
and by thus becom-
ing an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behavior in
—
personality.
child
is
does take the attitude of the other and allows that attitude of the other to determine the thing he is going to do with reference to a common end, he is becoming an organic
member
of society.
He
is
taking
over the morale of that society and is becoming an essential member of it. He belongs to it in so far as he does allow the attitude of the other
group attitudes which, through the mechanism of his central nervous system, he takes toward himself, just as he takes the indi\'idual atti-
he takes to control his own immediate What is involved here is some sort of an organized process. That which is expressed in terms of the game is, of course, being continually expressed in the social life of the child, but this wider process goes beyond
tudes of others.
the immediate experience of the child himself.
which it and the others are all involved a pattern which enters as a whole into the individual's experience in
terms of these organized
that
expression.
170
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1;
The importance
game
of the
entirely inside of the child's
is
that
it
that
it
Hes
experience,
of our modern type of edubrought as far as possible
and the importance cation
is
own
is
within this realm. The different attitudes that a child
assumes are so organized
cise a definite control
attitudes in a
response. In
that they exerover his response, as the
game control his own immediate the game we get an organized which is found in and finds its the immediate experience of the
other, a generalized other,
the nature of the child
expression in child.
child's
itself,
And it is that organized own nature controlling
activity in the
the particular
response which gives unity, and which builds
up
his
own self.
What goes on of the child
all
game goes on in the life time. He is continually tak-
in the
the
ing the attitudes of those about him, especially the roles of those
who
whom
him and on
in
some sense
he depends.
He
control
the process by which a personality have spoken of this as a process in which a child takes the role of the other, and said that it takes place essentially through the use of language. Language is predominantly based on the vocal gesture by means of wliich
Such
arises.
is
I
community are carLanguage in its significant sense is that vocal gesture which tends to arouse in the individual the attitude which it arouses in others, and it is this perfecting of the self by the gesture which mediates the social activities co-operative activities in a ried out.
that gives rise to the process of taking the role
of the other.
nate because
which which
is
way at first. It goes over from the play into the game in a real sense. He has to play the game. The morale of the game takes hold of the child
process
is
activities
can completely enter; its morale may have a greater hold on him than that of the family to which he belongs or the community in which he lives. There are all sorts of social organiza-
then acts in
fairly lasting,
some
a period in
which he
likes "to belong,"
gets into organizations
which come
and he
into exis-
tence and pass out of existence. He becomes a something which can function in the organized whole, and thus tends to determine himself in his relationship with the group to which he belongs. That prt)cess is one which is a striking stage in the development of the child's morale. It
him a self-conscious member community to which he belongs.
constitutes
the
of
more
little
unfortu-
sophisticated than that
it
calling out in
more than the larger morale of the whole community. The child passes into the game and the game expresses a social situation in which he
which are
a
where the child's play takes different Here the very fact that he is ready to pay out money, for instance, arouses the attitude of the person who receives money; the very roles.
of
is
involved in our
degree
tions
some
phrase
suggests an actor's attitude
own experience. To does not correctly describe that which I have in mind. We see the process most definitely in a primitive form in those situathis
function of the process in an abstract sort of a
temporary, into which the child is entering, and he is playing a sort of social game in them. It is
latter
it
actually
is
gets the
tions,
The
him
the corresponding
of the other person involved.
The
inciividual stimulates himself to the response
which he
is
calling out in the other person,
some degree
in
response
and
to that sit-
uation. In play the child does definitely act out
which he himself has aroused in himthat which gives, as I have said, a definite content in the individual which answers to the stimulus that affects him as it affects somebody else. The content of the other that enters into one personality is the response in the individual which his gesture calls out in the other. We may illustrate our basic concept by a refthe role
self. It is
erence to the notion of property. is
my
property,
I
shall control
If
it,"
we
say "This
that affirma-
which anv communitv in which property exists. It in\-olves an organized attitude with reference to property which is common to all the members of the community. One tion calls out n certain set of responses
must be the same
in
CHAPTER
must have
own
a definite attitude of control of his
property and respect for the property of Those attitudes (as organized sets of
others.
responses) that
must be
when one
on the part
there
of
all,
so
says such a thing he calls out in
himself the response of the others. He is calling out the response of what I have called a generalized other. That which makes society possible is such common responses, such organized attitudes, with reference to what we term property, the cults of religion, the process of educa-
tion,
and
the relations of the family.
more
the wider the society the versal these objects
must
must
Of course,
definitely uni-
any case there which we and which can belong be. In
be a definite set of responses,
may speak of as abstract,
to a very large group. Property
is
that
It is
ing the attitude of the other dog. says "This
is
my property"
of the other person. The his rights because
which everybody
he
is
is
A man who
taking an attitude
man
is
appealing to
able to take the attitude
else in the
group has with
171
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
own
arouses his
which the
self is
self.
The
on which is
structure, then,
built is this response
one has to be a member of a be a self. Such responses are community to they constitute just what attitudes, but abstract we term a man's character. They give him what we term his principles, the acknowledged attitudes of all members of the community toward what are the values of that community. He is
common
to
all,
for
putting himself in the place of the generalized
which represents the organized responses members of the group. It is that which guides conduct controlled by principles, and a person who has such an organized group of other,
of
the
all
responses in the
in itself a
which the indicontrol and nobody else can vidual himself can from that of a attitude is different control. The fight any other bone. A dog will dog toward a dog trying to take the bone. The dog is not takvery abstract concept.
7:
It
goes
a
is
man whom we say
has character,
moral sense.
is
to
which from a group example, cer-
a structure of attitudes, then,
make up
a self, as distinct
We all of us have, for groups of habits, such as the particular intonations which a person uses in his speech. of habits. tain
is a set of habits of vocal expression which one has but which one does not know about. The sets of habits which we have of that sort
This
mean nothing
to us;
we do
not hear the intona-
we
tions of our speech that others hear unless
are paying particular attention to them.
The
which belong
reference to property, thus arousing in himself
habits of emotional expression
the attitude of others.
our speech are of the same sort. We may know that we have expressed ourselves in a joyous fashion but the detailed process is one which does not come back to our conscious selves. There are whole bundles of such habits which do not enter into a conscious self, but which help to make up what is termed the uncon-
What goes
to
make up
the organized self
the organization of the attitudes
is
which are
to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to
common
get the attitude of the nity.
members
Such, in a certain sense,
is
of the
commu-
the structure of
man's personality. There are certain common responses which each individual has toward certain common things, and in so far as those a
common vidual
responses are awakened in the indiis affecting other persons he
when he
scious
to
self.
is
what we mean by self-consciousness in ourselves of the group of
especially
when
After all,
an awakening attitudes which
we it
are is
responses which go to
arousing in others,
an important
make up
the
set
of
members
community. It is unfortunate to fuse or mix up consciousness, as we ordinarily use that term, and self-consciousness. Consciousof the
ness, as frequently used, simply has reference
172
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
but self-consciousness refers to the ability to call out in ourselves a set of definite responses which belong to the othto the field of experience,
of the group. Consciousness and consciousness are not on the same level. A ers
self-
man
alone has, fortunately or unfortunately, access to his own toothache, but that is not what we
mean by
self-consciousness.
have so
1
far
emphasized what
1
have called
the structures upon which the self is constructed, the
we
framework of the self, as it were. Of course are not only what is common to all: each
one of the selves
is
different
from everyone
but there has to be such a common structure as 1 have sketched in order that we may be members of a community at all. We cannot be
else;
ourselves unless
we are
community
also
members
in
whom
which control the attitudes of all. We cannot have rights unless we have common attitudes. That which we have acquired as self-conscious persons makes us such members of society and gives us there
is
a
of attitudes
selves. Selves can only exist in definite relation-
No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also. The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group; and the ships to other selves.
structure of his self expresses or reflects the
general behavior pattern of this social group to
which he belongs,
just as
does the structure of
the self of every other individual belonging to this social
group.
aware
of the social "me."
and hinted
the social foundathat the self
does
not consist simply in the bare organization of social attitudes.
We may now
explicitly raise
the question as to the nature of the "1" wliich
is
how
a
to raise
person can
mines what his position is in society and feels himself as having a certain function and privilege, these are all defined with reference to an "I," but the "I" is not a "me" and cannot become a "me." We may have a better self and a worse self, but that again is not the "I" as over against the "me," because they are both selves. We approve of one and disapprove of the other, but when we bring up one or the other they are there for such approval as "me's." The "I" does not get into the limelight; we talk to ourselves, but do not see ourselves. The "I" reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of others. Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the "me" and we react to it as an "I." The simplest way of handling the problem would be in terms of memory. talk to myself, and 1 remember what I said and perhaps the emotional content that went with it. The "I" of 1
moment is present in the "me" of the next cannot turn around moment. There again quick enough to catch myself. become a "me" in so far as remember what 1 said. The "1" can this
1
1
1
be given, however, this functional relationship. "1" that we say that we are It is because of the never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action. It is as we act that
we
memory
that the "1"
are aware of ourselves. is
It
is
in
constantly present in
We
can go back directly a few our experience, and then we are dependent upon memory images for the rest. So that the "I" in memory is there as the spokesman of the self of the second, or minute, or day ago. As gi\en, it is a "me," but it is a
moments
tions of the self,
do not mean
be both "I" and "me," but to ask for the significance of this distinction from the point of view of conduct itself. Where in conduct does the "I" come in as over against the "me"? If one deter-
experience.
THE "I "AND THE "ME" We have discussed at length
I
the metaphysical question of
in
"me" which was the "I" at the earlier time. It you ask, then, where directly in your own experience the "I" comes in, the answer is that
CHAPTER
comes in as a historical figure. It is what you were a second ago that is the "I" of the "me." It is another "me" that has to take that role. You cannot get the immediate response of the "I" in the process. The "I" is in a certain sense that with which we do identify ourselves. The getting of it into experience constitutes one of the problems of most of our conscious experience;
it
it is
not directly given in experience.
The
"I"
is
the response of the organism to
the attitudes of the others, the
"me"
is
the orga-
nized set of attitudes of others which one himself
assumes. The attitudes of the others constiand then one reacts
tute the organized "me,"
toward that as an
"I."
I
now wish
to
examine
these concepts in greater detail.
There
is
"me" whole act
neither "I" nor
sation of gestures; the
in the converis
not yet car-
ried out, but the preparation takes place in this field of gesture.
Now,
in so far as the individual
arouses in liimself the attitudes of the others, there arises an organized group of responses.
And
it is
due
to the individual's ability to take
the attitudes of these others in so far as they can
be organized that he gets self-consciousness. The taking of all of those organized sets of attitudes gives him his "me"; that is the self he is aware of. He can throw the ball to some other member because of the demand made upon him from other members of the team. That is the self that immediately exists for him in his
He has their attitudes, knows what they want and what the consequence of any act of his will be, and he has assumed responsibility for the situation. Now, it is the consciousness.
presence of those organized sets of attitudes that constitutes that "me" to which he as an "I" is responding. But what that response will be
he does not know and nobody else knows. Perhaps he will make a brilliant play or an error. The response to that situation as it appears in his immediate experience is uncertain, and it is that which constitutes the "I." The "I" is his action over against that social situation within his own conduct, and it gets
7:
173
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
into his experience orJy after
he has carried out
Then he is aware of it. He had to do such a thing and he did it. He fulfills his duty and he may look with pride at the throw which he made. The "me" arises to do that duty that is the way in which it arises in his experience. He had in him all the attitudes of others, calling for a certain response; that was the "me" of that situation, and his response is the "I." 1 want to call attention particularly to the the act.
—
fact that this
that
is
more
response of the "I" or less uncertain.
something
is
The
attitudes of
others which one assumes as affecting his
own
conduct constitute the "me," and that is something that is there, but the response to it is as yet not given. When one sits down to think anything out, he has certain data that are there. Suppose that it is a social situation which he has to straighten out. He sees himself from the point of view of one individual or another in the group. These individuals, related er,
give
togeth-
all
what is he do? He does not know and nobody
him
a certain self. Well,
going to else knows. He can get the situation into his experience because he can assume the attitudes of the various individuals involved in it. He knows how they feel about it by the assumption of their attitudes.
He
have done certain things
me
says, in effect, "I
that
seem
to a certain course of conduct."
to
commit
Perhaps
if
he does so act it will place him in a false position with another group. The "1" as a response to this situation, in contrast to the "me" which is involved in the attitudes which he takes, is uncertain.
And when
the response takes place,
appears in the field of experience largely as a memory image. Our specious present as such is very short. We do, however, experience passing events; part of the process of the passage of events is directly there in our experience, including then
it
some
of the past
and some
of the future.
We see
and as it does pass part of the ball is covered and part is being uncovered. We remember where the ball was a
a ball falling as
it
passes,
174
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
moment ago and we beyond what
anticipate
where
it
will be
given in our experience. So of
is
ourselves; we are doing something, but to look back and see what we are doing involves getting memory images. So the "I" really appears experientially as a part of a "me." But on the basis of this experience
who
we
distinguish that
doing something from the puts the problem up to him. The
individual
"me" who
is
response enters into his experience only
when
takes place. If he says he knows what he is going to do, even there he may be mistaken. He starts out to do something and something it
happens always a he could
to interfere. little
The
resulting action
is
from anything which This is true even if he is
different
anticipate.
simply carrying out the process of walking. The very taking of his expected steps puts him in a certain situation which has a slightly different aspect from what is expected, which is in a certain sense novel. That movement into the future
is
the step, so to speak, of the ego, of the
something that is not given in the "me." Take the situation of a scientist solving a problem, where he has certain data which call "I."
It
is
for certain responses. call for his
others call
Some
of this set of data
applying such and such a law, while for another law. Data are there with
He knows what such and means, and when he has these
the
experience of the
there for us to act in a self-conscious fashion.
gets into experience until after the action takes place.
Such is the basis for the fact that the "I" does not appear in the same sense in experience as does the "me." The "me" represents a definite organization of the in
our
own
attitudes,
now they are in conflict with he makes one response he cannot make another. What he is going to do he does not know, nor does anybody else. The action of the self is in response to these conflicting sets of data in the form of a problem, with conflicting demands upon him as a scientist. He has to look at it in different ways. That action of the "I" is something the nature of which we cannot tell in advance. The
If
"I," then, in this relation of
the "me,"
responding
is
something that
to a social situation
is,
the "\" and
so to speak,
which
is
within
there
calling
a
for
reis
just
and "me" and the grounds for the sepathe two in behavior. The two are sep-
think, the relative position of the "I" in the situation,
ration of
arated in the process but they belong together in the
sense of being parts of a whole. They and yet they belong together.
The separation fictitious. They
his part; but
community
happens. There is no certainty in regard to it. There is a moral necessity but no mechanical necessity for the act. When it does take place then we find what has been done. The above account gives us, I
something that
such coloration
each other.
and
sponse, but the response that takes place
are separated
on
the
is
It
We are aware of ourselves, and of what the situation is, but exactly how we will act never
their implications.
data before him they stand for certain responses
individual.
answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them. Now, the attitudes he is taking toward them are present in his own experience, but his response to them will contain a novel element. The "I" gives the sense of freedom, of initiative. The situation is
said, the "I" is
an
and the "me"
something that
The "me" does
calculable. sort of
of the "I"
are not identical,
"I" in so far as
for,
as
is I
not
have
is
never entirely
call
for a certain
we meet
the obliga-
but the always something different from what the situation itself calls for. So there is always that distinction, if you like, between the "I" and the "me." The "I" both calls out the "me" and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social expetions that are given in conduct "I"
itself,
is
rience.
The
self is essentially a social
process
going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not ha\-e these two phases there
CHAPTER
could there
conscious
be
not
and
responsibility,
would be nothing novel
"
"
to
conscious
mind
self or
a self finds
the
of the self-
position
in the
community. Such
expression in self-assertion, or in
its
the devotion of itself to the cause of the
com-
appears as a new type of individual in the social whole. There is a new social whole because of the appearance of the type of individual mind 1 have described, and because munity. The
self
of the self with
own
own
its
assertion of itself of
identification with the
self is the
because
important phase
it is
its
community. The development
in the
in the possibility of the importa-
175
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
out his being aware of
it. There is, then, a which the individual in interaction with others inevitably becomes like others in doing the same thing, without that process appearing in what we term consciousness. We become conscious of the process when we do definitely take the attitude of the others, and this situation must be distinguished from the previous one. Perhaps one says that he does not care to dress in a certain fashion, but prefers to be different; then he is taking the attitude of others toward himself into his own conduct. When an ant from
process by
in experience.
THE "I AND THE ME AS PHASES OF THE SELF
We come now
7:
means
another nest
is
of
introduced into the nest of other to pieces.
The
human community may be
that
forms, these turn on attitude in the
and
it
tear
it
of the individual himself, refusing to submit
himself because he does take that tude.
The ant case
human
common
an entirely external
is
individual
atti-
affair,
a matter of
tion of this social attitude into the responses of
but
whole community that such a society could arise. The change that takes place through this
taking the attitudes of the others and adjusting one's self or fighting
importation of the conversation of gestures
of the individual as a self in the process of
the
into the conduct of the individual
takes place in the experience of
all
is
one
of the
that
com-
ponent individuals. These, of course, are not the only changes
community. In speech changes take place that nobody is
that take place in the definite
aware of
at
all. It
requires the investigation of
scientists to discover that
taken place. This
human
myth
as
is
such processes have
also true of other phases of
organization.
unconsciously, as of the
is
They change, we
illustrated in
Wundt
say,
such a study
has carried out in his
The myth carries an account of the way in which organization has taken place while largely without any conscious direction and that sort of change is going on Volkcrpsi/chologic.
—
it
out.
it
It is
is
this recognition
using his self-consciousness which gives him the attitude of self-assertion or the attitude of
devotion to the community. He has become, then, a definite self. In such a case of self-assertion there is an entirely different situation from that of the member of the pack who perhaps dominates it, and may turn savagely on different
members
of
it.
acting instinctively, tion. In the
ual
who
human
There an individual
we
is
just
say, in a certain situa-
society
we have an individown attitude but
not only takes his
takes the attitude in a certain sense of his subjects; in
what
so far as he
to expect.
When
is
dominating he knows
that occurs in the experi-
ence of the individual a different response results with different emotional accompani-
After a while he gets to the point of thinking of
ments, from that in the case of the leader of the pack. In the latter case there is simple anger or hostility, and in the other case there is the expe-
himself in this changed fashion, noticing the
rience of the self asserting itself consciously
all
the time. Take a person's attitude toward a
in the
new
fashion.
It
clothes in the
may
at first
be one of objection.
window and
seeing himself in
them. The change has taken place in him with-
over against other selves, with the sense of power, of domination. In general, when the
176
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
community
reaction has been imported into
the individual there
ence and a
new
is
a
new
value in experi-
order of response.
We have discussed the self from the point of view of the "I" and the "me," the "me" representing that group of attitudes which stands for others in the community, especially that organized group of responses which we have detailed in discussing the game on the one hand and social institutions on the other. In these situations there
a certain organized
is
group of attitudes which answer to any social act on the part of the individual organism. In any co-operative process, such as the family, the individual calls out a response from the other
members
of the group.
Now,
to the extent
that those responses can be called out in the
we
individual so that he can answer to them,
have both those contents which go to make up the self, the "other" and the "I." The distinction expresses itself in our experience in what we call the recognition of others and the recogni-
We
cannot realas we can recog-
tion of ourselves in the others. ize ourselves except in so far
nize the other in his relationship to us.
It is
he takes the attitude of the other that the vidual
We
able to realize himself as a
is
as
indi-
self.
are referring, of course, to a social situa-
tion as distinct
from such bare organic responssome of which
bill into our hand and we take it without any definite consciousness of him or of ourselves. Our thought may be elsewhere but the process still goes on. The same thing is true,
advertising
of course, in the care of infants.
ion,
experience of a
is
person adjusts himself unconsciously about him. In such an experience there
no self-consciousness.
One
attains
self-
consciousness only as he takes, or finds himself stimulated to take, the attitude of the other.
Then he
is in
a position of reacting in himself to
that attitude of the other.
selves in an
economic
Suppose we
situation.
take the attitude of the other in
It is
small
simply by
itself. its
The plant
environment,
no experience of a self. When a self does appear in experience it appears over against the other, and we have been delineating the condition under which this other does appear in the experience of the human animal, namely in the presence of that sort of stimulation in the co-operative activity which arouses
but there
is
in the individual himself the
arouses in the other.
When
same response
it
the response of the
other becomes an essential part in the experi-
ence or conduct of the individual; the attitude of the other
when
becomes an
taking
essential
—
then the individual in his behavior appears in his own experience as a self; and until this happens he does not appear as a self. part
Rational societv, of course, specific set of individuals.
is
not limited to
Anv
person
who
become a part of it. The attitude of the community toward our own response is imported into ourselves in terms of the meaning of what we are doing. This occurs in its widest extent in universal discourse, in the reply which the rational world makes to our remark. The meaning is as universal as the community; it is rational can
that community; it is the response that the world made up out of rational beings inevitably makes to our own statement. We both get the object and oinsehes into experience in terms of such a process; the other appears in our own experience in so far as we do take such an organized and generalized attitude.
making an
boy
self
necessarily involved in the rational character of
offer
we
A
always involves
find our-
ing or declining such an
self-consciousness.
it
when we
can express ourselves in acceptoffer. That is a different response of the self from a distinctly automatic offering that can take place without to us that
does appear
or the lower animal reacts to
is
a
a self
an experience of another; there could not be an
we have to those
self.
When
any
where
without there being present in their experi-
ence a
es as reflexes of the organism,
already discussed, as in the case
Young children
which comes to them, they experience themselves to it in an immediate fashadjust that
thrusts
an
CHAPTER
If
one meets
fails to
that
a
person on the
street
whom
who
toward any other
same community. He
is
of the
the other, the orga-
is
nized, generahzed other,
member
a
is
he
him
recognize, one's reaction toward
you
if
One
hke.
takes
he turns in one direction one is to go in another direction. One has his response as an attitude within himself. It is having that attitude within himself that makes it possible for one to be a self. That involves something beyond the mere turning to the right, as we say, instinctively, without selfconsciousness. To have self-consciousness one must have the attitude of the other in one's own organism as controlling the thing that he is going to do. What appears in the immediate his attitude over against one's self.
experience of one's
taking that attitude
self in
what we term
is
able to maintain
is
recognized in the community in so far as
recognizes the others. Such self
which
is
have referred
I
that self which community, that
It is
the
itself in
it
the phase of the
to as
that of the
"me." the
"me"
is
the
"1."
The
indi-
vidual not only has rights, but he has duties; he is
ty
member
not only a citizen, a
nity,
but he
and
one puts up
his side of the case, asserts himself over against others and insists that they take a different attitude toward himself, then there is something important occurring that is not pre-
viously present in experience.
The general conditions under which one going
is
one
who
of the
reacts to this
in his reaction to
it,
as
commu-
communi-
we have
the conversation of gestures, changes "I" is the
seen in it.
response of the individual to the
The atti-
be present in one's experience, but he is as ignorant of just how he is going to respond as is the scientist of the particular hypothesis he will evolve out of the consideration of a problem. Such and such things are happening that are contrary to the theory
has
that
been
a
it.
change which
As we have pointed is
not present in his
own
experience until after it takes place. The appears in our experience in memory. It is only after we have acted that we know what we have done; it is only after we have spoken that we know what we have said. The adjustment to that organized world which is present in our own nature is one that represents the "me" and is constantly there. But if the response to it is a response which is of the nature of the conversation of gestures, if it cre"I"
ates a situation
which
is
in
some sense
novel,
if
He
explanation. is
they
to
be
suggests that the radium atom
breaking down, and
was
a
On
atom
is
consequently setting
the previous theory an
permanent
affair
not get energy. But
now
atom
out of which one could if it is
assumed
that the
system involving an interrelationship of energies, then the breaking down of such a system sets free what is relatively an itself is a
enormous amount of energy. The point I am making is that the idea of the scientist comes to mind,
is
are
radium would keep a pot of seemingly lead to no expenditure of energy. Here something is happening that runs contrary to the theory of physics up to the conception of radium activity. The scientist who has these facts before him has to pick out some
him,
out, this
How
gram of water boiling, and
tude of the community as this appears in his attitude in turn changes
held.
explained? Take the discovery that a
own
experience. His response to that organized
is
may
to act
free energy.
Over against
177
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
If
is
the "me."
7:
it is
not as yet there in his
rather,
of that idea.
is
A
own mind.
His
the process of the appearance
person asserting his rights on a
certain occasion has rehearsed the situation in
own mind; he has reacted toward the community and when the situation arises he arouses himself and says something already in his mind. But when he said it to himself in the first place he did not know what he was going to say. He then said something that was novel to his
himself, just as the scientist's hypothesis
novelty
Such
when
it
flashes
is
a
upon him.
a novel reply to the social situation
involved in the organized set of attitudes constitutes the "1" as over against the "me." The
178
"me"
is
a conventional, habitual individual.
always
is
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
there.
It
It
has to have those habits,
guage
those responses which everybody has; other-
in
wise the individual could not be a member of the community. But an individual is constantly reacting to such an organized community in the way of expressing himself, not necessarily asserting himself in the offensive sense but expressing himself, being himself in such a cooperative process as belongs to any community. The attitudes involved are gathered from the group, but the individual in whom they are organized has the opportunity of giving them an expression which perhaps has never taken
ment
place before.
This brings out the general question as to
whether anything novel can appear. of course, the novel
and the recognition in
is
of this gets
more general terms
Practically,
constantly happening
in the
its
expression
concept of emer-
is
every
there, but a different use of
new
the reconstruction takes
which they belong. That reconno more given in advance than is the particular hypothesis which the scientist the group to struction
is
brings forward given in the statement of the
problem. Now,
it is
that reaction of the individ-
ual to the organized "me," the
nity,
which represents the
of the
"I" in the
Now
is
of
attitude of the others that guarantees to
own
It
gives
him
dignity of being a
member
which there
himself, that brings to
no novelty. The world is simply a satisfaction of that equation. Put in any values for X and V and the same sides, then, of course, there is
equation holds. The equations do hold, it is true, but in their holding something else in fact arises that
was not
there
is
group of individuals
work
together. In a society there
of
a
common
in all,
under
there before. For instance, that have to must be a set
organized habits of response found
but the
way
in
which individuals
act
specific circumstances gives rise to all of
the individual differences which characterize the different persons. act
in
a
certain
The
fact that
common
they have to
fashion
docs not
him
To be a "me" the important
rights. is
his position, gives
is
absolute equality of the different
experience
primary importance that he is a member community, for it is his taking of the
water is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen, but water was not there before in the separate elements. The conception of emergence is a concept which recent philosophy has made much of. If you look at the world simply from the point of view of a mathematical equation in is
in a
of that
thing.
together, water appears.
is
commu-
The relative values of the "me" and the "I" depend very much on the situation. If one is maintaining his property in the community, it
under those circumstances
hydrogen come
that
of the
self.
was not
time oxygen and
"me"
member
certain sense simply a
but the reorganization brings in something that first
lan-
made
place through the reaction of the individuals to
the recognition of his
The
it is
contact between persons; the ele-
of novelty in
gence. Emergence involves a reorganization, there before.
common
deprive them of originality. The
in the
him
the
community,
it
the source of his emotional response to the
values that belong to
community.
him
as a
member
of the
the basis for his entering into
It is
the experience of others.
At times
it is
the response of the ego or "I"
to a situation, the
importance.
way
One now
which cme expresses one a feeling of prime
in
asserts himself against a
and the emphasis is on the response. The demand is freedom from conventions, from given laws. Of course, such a situation is only possible where the individual appeals, so to speak, from a narrow and certain situation,
restricted
community
larger in
the logical sense of having rights
which are not so
to a larger one, that
restricted.
One
is,
appeals from
which no longer have any meaning to a community in which the rights shall be publicly recognized, and one appeals to others on the assumption that there is a group of organized others that answer to one's fixed conventions
CHAPTER
own
appeal
—even
if
the appeal be
made
to
posterity. In that case there is the attitude of the
over against the "me." Both aspects of the "I" and "me" are essen-
"I" as
tial to
the self in
its full
expression.
One must
take the attitude of the others in a group in
order to belong to a community; he has to employ that outer social world taken within himself in order to carry on thought. It is
through his relationship to others in that community, because of the rational social processes that obtain in that community, that he has being as a citizen. On the other hand, the individual
is
constantly reacting to the social
and
atti-
changing in this co-operative very community to which he belongs. Those changes may be humble and tudes,
process
the
7:
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD: THE EMERGENT SELF
179
ones. One may not have anything to although he takes a long time to say it. And yet a certain amount of adjustment and readjustment takes place. We speak of a person as a conventional individual; his ideas are exactly the same as those of his neighbors; he is hardly more than a "me" under the circumtrivial
say,
stances; his adjustments are only the slight ad-
justments that take place, as sciously.
who
Over against
is
say,
uncon-
the person
who replies to way which makes
has a definite personality,
the organized attitude in a a significant difference. is
we
that there
the "I" that
the experience.
With such
a
person
it
more important phase of Those two constantly appear-
is
the
ing phases are the important phases in the self.
CHAPTER
8
W.E.B. Du Bois:
Double-Consciousness and the Public Intellectual
INTRODUCTION Du Bois was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, on February 23, 1868, and died 95 years later in Ghana. His Hfe spans the histo-
W.E.B.
Harvard University. He was by then onh' the sixth
member
of his race to ha\'e attended the
institution since 1870,
when
the
first
African-
movement from March on Wash-
American was admitted. At Har\ard he studied with the leading
and in the course of it Du Bois left his enduring mark as a sociologist, a public intellectual, and a committed activist in the struggle
philosophers of his time, William James, josiah Royce, and George Santayana, and since Harvard had no sociologv department, Du Bois
modern
ry of the
civil rights
the end of the Civil
War
to the
ington,
was an outstanding young student. high school he was trained rigorously
majored in philosophv He graduated cum laude in 1890 and then enrolled in the Ph.D. program in historv at Harxard. During his
and Greek, and
at the age of 16, the graduating class, he was ready for college. Although he was regarded as brilliant and had set his sights on Harvard, he
graduate studies,
lacked the financial resources and, as David Levering Lewis notes in his recent biography,
Gustav von Schmoller, Adolph Wagner, and
for social justice.
Du
Bois
While
in
in Latin
youngest
there
was
in his
a "distinct lack of
enthusiasm
among
many otherwise kindly, charitable white people for helping even a brilliant 'Negro' attend the nation's leading college." Instead, he attended Fisk University, a Congregational
so
school for blacks, in Nashville, Tennessee.
Du
Bois
went
to
Germany
to
some
course work and attended lectures \vith of the major figures in
German
the great sociologist Ma.\ Weber.
social science,
On
his return
United States, Du Bois completed his Ph.D. with a thesis entitled The Supprcfi^km of
to the
the Africiiii
America.
Slave Traiic to the United States of
163S-1S70, which became the
monograph
to
ed series of
Bois received his degree from Fisk in 1888 and
1915,
then took a second baccalaureate degree at
can to
180
Du
attend the University of Berlin where he took
be published 1
larvard
in the
Historical
newly
first
creat-
Studies.
In
became the first African- Ameribe awarded a Ph.D. from Harvard.
Du
Bois
CHAPTER
Du
Bois
8:
WEB
DU
BOIS:
DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
held academic appointments at
Wilberforce College, at the University of Penn-
and Atlanta University. At the UniverPennsylvania he wrote The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study, a work which recorded his findings from a sociological survey of 45,000 African-Americans living in the Seventh Ward of Philadelphia. It remains as a classic work of empirical investigation that stands on a par sylvania, sity of
with contributions from Chicago School sociologists as models of sociological inquiry. Without research assistants, Du Bois conducted a door-to-door survey to get at the facts about the economic, social, religious, and familial life of the inhabitants of the Seventh Ward, in the hope of dispelling the
myths and fantasies that circucommimity. In keeping with
181
enigma of being an AfricanAmerican. His essays begin with epigraphs from famous European poets and writers followed by the musical notation of a bar or two tures the enduring
of
a
meant
Negro spiritual. This juxtaposition is to convey two ecjual cultures, one black,
the
other white, each with
to
make
the
to
anticipates
what
other,
called
is
contribution
its
and
meaningfully
multiculturalism
Du many things may show the
today. In the Forethought to the collection,
Bois writes: "Herein
which
if
lie
buried
read with patience
strange meaning of being black here at the
dawning ing
of the Twentieth Century. This
mean-
not without interest to you. Gentle Read-
is
er; for
the problem of the Twentieth Century
is
in the utility of scientific research in the solution
As you read the essay "Of Our Spiritual Strivings," make careful note of what Du Bois means by "double-
of outstanding social problems. In this scholarly
consciousness." Does
lated in the white
the reformist ethos of the time,
phase of his entire
life,
career,
Du
Bois believed
and indeed tliroughout
Du Bois was a prolific writer.
his
For the
the problem of the color line."
Du
similation or separatism,
How
what?
do
Du
Bois seek either as-
and
Atlanta University Studies on the American
our
Negro, he wrote no fewer than nineteen monographs based on studies he conducted into every aspect of black life in America, including
debates over multiculturalism?
questions of health, education,
a public intellectual
art,
religion,
and economics. Du Bois wanted database that would provide scholars
imderstanding
It
is
his career
to build a
ses
Metropolis, E. Franklin Frazier's The Negro Family in
America,
and William
Truly Disadvantaged.
Julius Wilson's The
His work remains as a
guide and inspiration to urban sociologists who have followed in his wake. In The Souls of Black Folk, a famous collection of his early essays, Du Bois develops the prescient concept of "double-consciousness," which cap-
of
the
contemporary
not only as an academic and scholar
that W.E.B.
crime, family,
and policymakers with the facts they would need in order to make sound and rational public policy. In this he was a rationalist in the early years, and believed in the power of ideas to shape political and social change. The strong influence of Du Bois's empirical sociology of African- American life can be seen in Horace Clayton and St. Claire Drake's Black
neither, then
if
Bois's ideas contribute to
Du
Du
Bois
remembered but also as and activist. Throughout
is
Bois wrote timely political analy-
and published novels and biographical essays. These writings gave a clear, passionate and courageous message about the condition of blacks in America. As early as 1905 Du Bois organized the Niagara to
Movement
to give voice
the struggle for civil rights for African-
Americans, and four years later on July 4, 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People held its founding meeting which consisted of the original group of prominent blacks that Du Bois had brought together in the Niagara Movement and a number of white intellectuals and professionals. Du Bois
became the editor of Crisis, the NAACP journal, which he conceived as an instrument to raise the consciousness of blacks in
became
America.
It
his vehicle to mobilize against the evils
182
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
racism wherever it existed. Du Bois's uncompromising position on these issues brought him eventually into conflict with the NAACP leadership and forced his resignation from the journal in 1934. of
As an
Du
early proponent of Pan-Africanism,
also elected international president of the Pan-
and presided over the
African Federation. By 1950, Du Bois's politics had swung far to the left and at the age of 82 he became a candidate for the U.S. Senate on the American Labor Party ticket. On February 16, 1951, he was arrested and arraigned for failure to register as an agent of a foreign government in connection with his membership in the Peace Information Center. Although ac-
Bois helped to found
meeting of the Pan-African Congress in 1919 with the express purpose of planning for
first
the future disposition of Africa following
demanded
German
World War
that
the
colonies in
The Congress
1.
African
colonies
be
removed from German control and placed in trusteeship with the League of Nations, in preparation for freedom and nationhood. In 1926 Du Bois visited the Soviet Union for the first time in order to examine the results of its
socialist revolution first
hand. His interest in
Marx and Marxism deepened and
his career as
an activist and public intellectual seemed to have found its theoretical justification in the Theses on Feuerbach, where Marx writes: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." (See Theses on Feuerbach, Chapter 2, in this text.) Following the Depression and the New Deal, Du Bois's thinking turned to long-range economic planning and he developed increasing sympathy with socialism as an alternati\'e mode of economic organization that would promise and deliver greater equality
At the age of retirement,
Du
and
66, in 1934,
Bois
social justice.
when
others sought
embarked on another ven-
ture as chair of the sociology
department
at
Atlanta University where for a ten-year period,
he taught, carried on his research, and founded the journal Phylon.
Du
1950s. He had bv now left Atlanta University and become increasingly absorbed with the international dimensions of civil rights. Appointed as an NAACP consultant to the United Nations Conference in 1945, Du Bois was
Bois's
mount during
political
the
difficulties
began
McCarthy period
in
to
the
quitted of the charges
Du
by former colleagues and 1950s he
came
to the
Bois
was
ostracized
friends. In the early
defense of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg, accepted invitations from the
Union and other Eastern bloc countries, and was lionized wherever he went within the So\'iet
socialist
On to
world.
October
Gus
Hall,
1,
1961, he wrote a long letter
then head of the
Communist
Party in the United States, and applied for ad-
mission to the party. This talism
and the cold war
States,
was
to
be followed by
ture for the Republic of
dent,
letter,
rejecting capi-
policies of the United
Kwame Nkrumah,
Du
Bois's depar-
Ghana, whose a
presi-
long-time friend
and devotee, had extended an in\itation to come to Ghana and direct the Encyclopedia Africana project.
from the United States, because, David Levering Lewis puts it, America, "the promised land, was a cruel, receding mirage for people of color," Du Bois died in Accra, Ghana, on August 27, 1963, on the eve of the massive ci\'il rights March on Washington. In self-exile
as his biographer
CHAPTER
8:
WEB
DU
BOIS:
DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
thought best to
W.E.B. Du Bois: The Philadelphia
Negro:
A
make an
183
intensive study of
and afterward to supplement and correct this information by general observation and inquiry in other parts conditions in this
Social Study
THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
of the
district,
city.
were used among the nine thousand Negroes of this ward; a family schedule with the usual questions as to the number of members, their age and sex, their conjugal condition and birthplace, their ability to read and write, their occupation and earnings, etc.; an individual schedule with similar inquiries; a home schedule with questions as to the number of rooms, the rent, the lodgers, the conveniences, etc.; a street schedule to colSix schedules
1.
General Aim
This study seeks to present the results of an inquiry undertaken by the University of Pennsylvania into the condition of the forty thou-
sand or more people of Negro blood
now
liv-
ing in the city of Philadelphia. This inquiry
extended over a period of fifteen months and sought to ascertain something of the geographical distribution of this race, their occupations and daily life, their homes, their organizations, and, above all, their relation to their million w^hite fellow-citizens. The final design of the work is to lay before the public such a body of information as may be a safe guide for all efforts toward the solution of the many Negro problems of a great American city.
lect
data as to the various small streets and
al-
and an institution schedule for organizations and institutions; finally a slight variation of the individual schedule was used for house-servants living at their places of emleys,
ployment." This study of the central district of Negro settlement furnished a key to the situation in
2.
The Methods
The
the city; in the other wards therefore a general
of Inquiry
survey was taken
began August the first, saving two months, continued
investigation
1896,
and,
December the thirty-first, 1897. The work commenced with a house-to-house canvass of the Seventh Ward. This long narrow until
ward, extending from South Seventh street to the Schuylkill River and from Spruce street to South street, is an historic centre of Negro population, and contains today a fifth of all the Negroes in this city.^ It was therefore
to note any striking differences of condition, to ascertain the general dis-
tribution of these people,
mation
and
statistics
property, crime
and
as
to
and pauperism,
to collect infor-
organizations, political activi-
and the like. This general inquiry, while it lacked precise methods of measurement in ty,
most
cases, served nevertheless to correct the
errors tical
and
illustrate the
meaning
of the statis-
material obtained in the house-to-house
canvass.
Throughout the study such official statistics and historical matter as seemed reliable were used, and experienced persons, both white and colored, were freely consulted. throughout this study use the term "Negro," to persons of Negro descent, although the appellation is to some extent illogical. I shall, moreover, capitalize the word, because believe that eight million Ameri'l
shall
designate
all
1
cans are entitled to a capital Source Social
From W.
Study (1899).
E. B.
letter.
Du
Bois, The Philadelphia Ne^ro:
A "See
Appendix
A for form of schedules used.
— 184
3.
PART1:
The
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
The best
available
methods
of
sociological
research are at present so liable to inaccuracies that the careful student ciiscloses the results of
individual research with diffidence; he knows that they are liable to error from the seemingly ineradicable faults of the statistical method, to
even greater error from the methods of general observation, and, above all, he must ever tremble lest some personal bias, some moral conviction or some unconscious trend of thought due previous training, has to a degree distorted the picture in his view. Convictions on all great
to
matters of
human
and the varying judgments was thus avoided. Despite all drawbacks and difficulties, however, the main results of the inquiry seem credible. They agree, to a large extent, with general public opinion, and in other respects they seem
by one
Credibility of the Results
one must have to a and they will enter to the most cold-blooded scieninterest
investigator,
of a score of censustakers
either logically explicable or in accord with historical precedents.
Thev are
therefore present-
ed to the public not as complete and without error, but as possessing on the whole enough reliable matter to serve as the scientific basis of further study,
and
of practical reform.
THE PROBLEM
greater or less degree,
some tific
extent into
research as a disturbing factor.
We must
study,
we
must investigate, we must attempt to solve; and the utmost that the world can demand is, not lack of human interest and moral conviction,
but rather the heart-quality of fairness,
and an earnest desire
The Negro Problems
of Philadelphia
In Philadelphia, as elsewhere in the United
Nevertheless here are social problems before us demanding carefvil study, questions awaiting satisfactory answers.
4.
for the tn.ith despite its
possible unpleasantness. In a house-to-house investigation there are
States, the existence of certain peculiar social
problems affecting the Negro people are plainly manifest. Here is a large group of people perhaps forty-five thousand, a city within a city who do not form an integral part of the
—
larger social group. This in itself
is
not alto-
gether unusual; there are other unassimilated groups: Jews, Italians, even Americans; and yet in the case of the Negroes the segregation is
more conspicuous, more patent
to the eye,
and
many
so intertwined with a long historic evolution,
sources of error: misapprehension, vagueness and forgetfulness, and deliberate deception on
with peculiarly pressing social problems of poverty, ignorance, crime and labor, that the Negro problem far surpasses in scientific inter-
outside the attitude of the investigator,
the part of the persons questioned, greatly
viti-
ate the value of the answers; on the other hand,
est
conclusions formed by the best trained and
class questions.
most conscientious students on the basis of general observation and inquiry are really inductions from but a few of the multitudinous facts of social life, and these may easily fall far
and
social gravity
The student
What human
ask.
is
most of the other race or
beings? Of what sub-groups and of
must first group is it composed, exist, what sort
of these questions
the real condition of this
whom classes
short of being essential or typical.
The use of both of those methods which has been attempted in this study may perhaps have corrected to some extent the errors of each. Again, whatever personal equation is to be allowed for in the whole study is one unvarying quantity, since the work was done
^he iippondod stiidv of domestic service was done by Miss Isabel Eaton, Fclknv ol the College Settlements Association. Outside ol tills the work was done bv the one investigator.
CHAPTER
8:
WEB. DU
BOIS:
of individuals are being considered? Further,
phians realize
must clearly recognize that a complete study must not confine itself to the group, but must specially notice the environ-
grown and
the
student
ment; the physical environment of city, sections and houses, the far mightier social environment the surrounding world of custom, wish, whim, and thought which envelops this group and powerfully inflLiences its social development. Nor does the clear recognition of the field of
—
work
investigation simplify the it
rather increases
it,
of actual study;
by revealing
lines of in-
quiry far broader in scope than first thought suggests. To the average Philadelphian the
whole Negro question reduces itself to a study slum districts. His mind reverts to Seventh and Lombard streets and to Twelfth and Kater streets of today, or to St. Mary's in the past. Continued and widely known charitable work in these sections makes the problem of poverty familiar to him; bold and daring of certain
crime too often traced
to
these centres has
problem of crime, while the scores of loafers, idlers and prostitutes who crowd the sidewalks here night and day remind him of a problem of work. All this is true all these problems are there and of threatening intricacy; Lmfortunately, however, the interest of the ordinary man of affairs is apt to stop here. Crime, poverty and idleness affect his interests unfavorably and he would have them stopped; he looks upon these slums and slum characters as unpleasant things which should in some way be removed called
his attention
to
a
—
The social student but must point out that
for the best interests of
agrees with
him so
far,
all.
the removal of unpleasant features from our complicated modern life is a delicate operation
requiring
knowledge and
not a simple
know
fact,
it is
a
skill;
that a
symptom and
slum
far
the removable causes of the
beyond the slum
districts.
is
that to
Negro slums one For few Philadel-
of Philadelphia requires a study that takes
185
DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
memory
how
the
Negro population has was a time in the
spread. There
of living
men when
a small district
near Sixth and Lombard streets comprehended the great city.
This
mass of the Negro population of the no longer so. Very early the stream
is
of the black population started northward, but
the increased foreign immigration of 1830 later
turned
back.
it
It
and
started south also but
was checked by poor houses and worse protection. Finally with gathered
police
momentum
from the slums started west, on slowly and surely, taking Lombard street as its main thoroughfare, gaining early foothold in West Philadelphia, and turning at the Schuylkill River north and south to the newer portions of the city. Thus today the Negroes are scattered in every ward of the city, and the great mass of them live far from the whilom centre of colored settlement. What, then, of this great mass of the population? Manifestly they form a class with social problems of their own the problems of the Thirtieth Ward differ from the the emigration
rolling
—
prc")blems of the Fifth, as the black inhabitants
the former ward we have represented the rank and file of Negro working-people; differ. In
and
and waiters. middle class of Negroes feeding the slums on the one hand and the upper class on the other Here are social questions and conditions which must receive the most careful attention and patient interlaborers
This
is
servants,
porters
at present the great
pretation.
Not even
here, however, can the social in-
He knows that every group has upper class; it may be numerically small and socially of little weight, and yet its study is necessary to the comprehension of the whole it forms the realized ideal of the group, and as it is true that a nation must to some extent be measured by its slums, it is also true that it can only be understood and finally judged by its upper class. vestigator stop. its
a
186
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
The
best
class
of
Philadelphia
Negroes,
though sometimes forgotten or ignored cussing the Negro problems,
known
to
many
is
in dis-
nevertheless
Philadelphians.
Scattered
throughout the better parts of the Seventh Ward, and on Twelfth, lower Seventeenth and Nineteenth streets, and here and there in the residence wards of the northern, southern, and
western sections of the ers,
city is a class of cater-
clerks, teachers, professional
merchants,
etc.,
of the Negroes.
men, small
who constitute the aristocracy Many are well-to-do, some are
5.
Plan of Presentment
The study
taken
as
up here divides
—
—
essay permitted. Six chapters consider the general condition
and some hberdifally trained. Here too are social problems fering from those of the other classes, and differing too from those of the whites of a
jugal condition,
corresponding grade, because of the peculiar social environment in which the whole race finds itself, which the whole race feels, but
then more generally for the
wealthy,
all
are fairly educated,
—
which touches this highest class at most points and tells upon them most decisively. Many are the misapprehensions and misstatements as to the social environment of Negroes in a great Northern citv. Sometimes it is said, here they are free; they have the same chance as the Irishman, the Italian, or the Swede; at other times it is said, the environment is such that it is really more oppressive than the situation in Southern cities. The student must ignore both of these extreme statements and seek to extract from a complicated mass of facts the tangible evidence of a social atmosphere surrounding Negroes, which differs from that surrounding most whites; of a different mental attitude, moral standard, and economic judgment shown toward Negroes than toward most other folk. That such a difference exists and can now and then plainly be seen, few deny; but just how far it goes and how large a factor it is in the Negro problems, nothing but careful study and measurement can reveal.
Such then are the phenomena of social conand environment which this study pro-
dition
poses to describe, analyze, and, so far as possible, interpret.
itself
roughly into four parts: the history of the Negro people in the city, their present condition considered as individuals, their condition as an organized social group, and their physical and social environment. To the histor\' of the Negro but two chapters are devoted although the subject is worthy of brief sketch more extended study than the character of this
and sex, conand birthplace; what degree of education they have obtained, and how they of the Negroes: their number, age
earn a living. All these subjects are treated usually for the Seventh Ward somewhat minutely, city,
and
finally
such historical material is adduced as is available for comparison. Three chapters are devoted to the group life of the Negro; this includes a study of the family,
and of organizations of all sorts. It up such phenomena of social maladjustment and individual depravity as crime, of property,
also takes
pauperism and alcoholism.
One
chapter
is
de\'oted to the difficult ques-
and social, one to certain results of the contact of the white and black races, one to Negro suffrage, and a tion of environment, both physical
word form
of general advice in the line of social reis
added.
W.E.B. Du Bois: The Souls of Black Folk
THE FORETHOUGHT Herein lie buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange meaning of being black here at the dawning of the Twentieth Century. This meaning is not with-
CHAPTER
8;
WEB. DU
BOIS:
out interest to you. Gentle Reader; for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color
line.
1
prav vou, then, receive
my little
book in all charity, studying my words with me, forgiving mistake and foible for sake of the faith and passion that is in me, and seeking the grain of truth hidden there. I have sought here to sketch, in vague, uncertain outline, the spiritual world in which ten thousand thousand Americans live and strive. First, in two chapters I have tried to show what Emancipation meant to them, and what was its aftermath. In a third chapter 1 have pointed out the slow rise of personal leadership, and criticised candidly the leader
burden of chapters
I
who
his race today.
have sketched
bears the chief
Then,
in
two other
in swift outline the
two worlds within and without the Veil, and thus have come to the central problem of training
men
for
life.
Venturing
now
ing melody from the only American music which welled up from black souls in the dark past. And, finally, need I add that I who speak here am bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of them that live within the Veil?
Of Our
I
have
of
in the
sand.
mournful cry. and cannot understand
All night long crying with a
As
I
lie
and
listen,
The voice
of
my heart in my side or the
voice of the sea,
O water, crying for rest, is
it I, is it
All night long the water
is
Till
And
the last
the
fire
moon droop and
of the
And
end begin
the heart shall
I?
crying to me.
Unresting water, there shall never be
rest
the last tide
fail.
burn in the west; be weary and wonto
der and cry like the sea, All life long crying without
into deeper de-
avail.
As the water all night long is crying to me.
in
Arthur Syinons
the
clear the present relations of the sons of master
and man. Leaving, then, the white world, 1 have stepped within the Veil, raising it that you may view faintly its deeper recesses, the meaning of its religion, the passion of its human sorrow, and the struggle of its greater souls. All this I have ended with a tale twice told but seldom written, and a chapter of song. Some of these thoughts of mine have seen
—
the light before in other guise. For kindly con-
senting to their republication here, in altered
and extended form,
1
must thank
the publish-
ers of the Aflatitic Monthly, The Worhfs Work,
the Dial, The Nezc World, and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Before each chapter, as now printed, stands a bar of the Sorrow Songs, some echo of haunt-
—
W.E.B.
Du
Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903).
-^
^lit'M'i \
,
j
J
1
ii
-^
J i
^^1^1 ^
^—
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly. How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or. Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real question. How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word. And yet, being a problem is a strange experience, peculiar even for one who has never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe. It is in the early days of rollick-
—
Source
Spiritual Strivings
O water, voice of my heart, crv'ing
two chapters studied the strugmassed millions of the black peasantry, and in another have sought to make tail,
gles
187
DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
— 188
PART1:
ing boyhood upon one, all
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
that the revelation
first
bursts
remember well when the shadow swept across me. 1 was a little thing, away up in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds between Hoosac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads to buy gorgeous ten cents package and visiting-cards a exchange. The exchange was merry, till one in a day, as
it
were.
1
—
—
a
girl,
refused
tall
newctimer,
dawned upon me with a that 1 was different from mayhap,
my
refused
peremptorily, with a glance.
it
in heart
and
life
certain
card,
Then
it
suddenness
the others; or like,
and longing, but shut veil. 1 had there-
out from their world by a vast after
no desire
to tear
down
that veil, to creep
beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows. That sky could beat my mates at was bluest when examination-time, or beat them at a foot-race, through;
1
held
all
I
or even beat their stringy heads. Alas, with the
contempt began to fade; for longed for, and all their dazzling opportunities, were theirs, not mine. But they should not keep these prizes, 1 said; some, all, I would wrest from them. Just how 1 would do it 1 could never decide: by reading law, by healing the sick, by telling the wonderful tales that swam in my head, some way. With other black boys the strife was not so fiercely sunny: their youth shrunk into tasteless sycophancv, or into silent hatred of the pale world about them and mocking distrust of everything white; or wasted itself in a bitter cry, Why did God make me an outcast and a stranger in mine own house? The shades of the prisonhouse closed round about us all: walls strait and stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night who must plod darkly on in resignation, or
years the
all this fine
words
1
—
beat unavailing palms against
the stone, or
steadily, half hopelessly, watcli
the streak of
blue above.
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, a world which yields him no true self-
—
consciousness, but only
lets
him
see himself
through the revelation of the other world. a
peculiar
sensation,
this
It is
double-conscious-
always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, an American, a Negro; two souls, ness, this sense of
—
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
The history tory of this
of the
strife,
—
American Negro this
is
the his-
longing to attain
conscious manhood, to merge his double into a better
and
truer
self.
In this
self-
self
merging he
wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He
would not bleach
his
Negro soul
in a flood of
white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon bv his fellows, without ha\'ing the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
This, then,
coworker
is
in the
the
end of
kingdom
his striving: to
be a
of culture, to escape
to husband and use powers and his latent genius. These powers of body and mind ha\e in the past been strangely wasted, dispersed, or forgotten. The shadow of a mightv Negro past flits through the tale of Ethiopia the Shadowy and of Egypt the Sphinx. Through history, the powers of single black men flash here and there like falling stars, and die sometimes before the world has righth- gauged their brightness. Here in America, in the few davs since Emanci-
both death and isolation, his best
— CHAPTER
pation,
8:
WEB. DU
the black man's turning
BOIS:
hither
—
—
DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
189
and
thither in hesitant anti doubtful striving has
often
made
his very strength to lose effective-
seem
absence of power, like weaknot weakness, it is the contradiction of double aims. The double-aimed ness, to
ness.
And
yet
like it
—
is
struggle of the black artisan to
—on the one hand
escape white contempt for a nation of mere
hewers of wood and drawers of water, and on the other hand to plough and nail and dig for a poverty-stricken horde could only result in making him a poor craftsman, for he had but half a heart in either cause. By the poverty anci ignorance of his people, the Negro minister or doctor was tempted toward quackery and demagogy; and by the criticism of the other world, toward ideals that made him ashamed of his lowly tasks. The would-be black savant was confronted by the paradox that the knowledge his people needed was a twice-told tale to his white neighbors, while the knowledge which would teach the white world was Greek to his own flesh and blood. The innate love of harmony and beauty that set the ruder souls of his people a-dancing and a-singing raised but confusion and doubt in the soul of the black
—
Emancipation was the key to a promised land of sweeter beauty than ever stretched before the eyes of wearied Israelites. In song and exhortation swelled one refrain Liberty; in his tears and curses the God he implored had Freedom in his right hand. At last it came, suddenly, fearfully, like a dream. With one wild carnival of blood and passion came the message in his own plaintive cadences: prejudice;
—
"Shout,
O children!
Shout, you're
For
God
free!
has bought your liberty!"
Years have passed
away
since then,
twenty, forty; forty years of national
—
life,
ten,
forty
years of renewal and development, and yet the
swarthy spectre
accustomed seat at do we cry to this our
sits in its
the Nation's feast. In vain vastest social problem:
"Take any shape but that, and Shall never tremble!"
my
firm nerves
the beauty revealed to him was the soul-beauty of a race which his larger audience despised, and he could not articulate the mes-
The Nation has not yet foimd peace from its sins; the freedman has not yet found in freedom his promised land. Whatever of good may have come in these years of change, the shadow of a deep disappointment rests upon the Negro people, a disappointment all the more bitter because the unattained ideal was unbounded
sage of another people. This waste of double
save by the simple ignorance of a lowly people.
aims, this seeking to satisfy two unreconciled ideals, has wrought sad havoc with the
of the vain search for freedom, the
artist; for
courage and faith and deeds of ten thousand thousand people, has sent them often wooing false gods and invoking false means of salvation, and at times has even seemed about to
—
make them ashamed
of themselves.
Away back in the days of bondage they thought to see in one divine event the end of all doubt and disappointment; few men ever worshipped Freedom with half such unquestioning faith as did the American Negro for two centuries. To him, so far as he thought and dreamed, slavery was indeed the sum of all villainies, the cause of all sorrow, the root of all
—
The
first
decade was merely a prolongation
seemed ever barely
to
boon
elude their grasp,
that
— like
maddening and
a tantalizing will-o'-the-wisp,
misleading the headless host. The holocaust of war, the terrors of the Ku-Klux Klan, the
lies
of
carpet-baggers, the disorganization of industry,
and the contradictory advice
of friends
and
with no new watchword beyond the old cry for freedom. As the time flew, however, he began to grasp a foes,
left
new
idea.
the bewildered
The
serf
ideal of liberty
demanded
for
its
attainment powerful means, and these the Fifteenth Amendment gave him. The ballot, which before he had looked upon as a visible
190
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PARTI:
sign of freedom, he
now
regarded as the chief
and perfecting the Hberty means had partially endowed him. which war with And why not? Had not votes made war and emancipated millions? Had not votes enfranchised the freedmen? Was anything impossible to a power that had done all this? A million black men started with renewed zeal to vote themselves into the kingdom. So the decade flew away, the revolution of 1876 came, and left the half-free serf weary, wondering, but still of gaining
inspired. Slowly but steadily, in the following
years, a
new
dream movement, the
vision began gradually to replace of
political
power,
the unguided, another pillar of after a
—a
powerful
the rise of another ideal to guide
clouded day.
It
by night
know and
letters,
but of
life,
of business, of the
shackled his hands and feet. Nor was his burden all poverty and ignorance. The red stain of bastardy, which tw^o centuries of systematic
test
the
of the
dark pupils of these schools know how faithfully, how piteously, this people strove to learn. It was weary work. The cold statistician wrote
down
the inches of progress here and there, noted also where here and there a foot had
some one had fallen. To the tired was ever dark, the mists cold, the Canaan was always dim
climbers, the horizon
were often and far away. If, however, the vistas disclosed as yet no goal, no resting-place, little but flattery and criticism, the journey at least gave leisure for reflection and self-examination; it changed the child of Emancipation to the youth with dawning self-consciousness, realization, self-respect. In those
own
—
ply of
power
white man, the longing to know. Here at last seemed to have been discovered the mountain path to Canaan; longer than the highway of Emancipation and law, steep and rugged, but straight, leading to heights high enough to overlook life. Up the new path the advance guard toiled, slowly, heavily, doggedly; only those who have watched and guided the faltering feet, the misty minds, the dull understandings, of the
of his striving his
that, to attain his place in the world, he must be himself, and not another For the first time he sought to analyze the burden he bore upon his back, that dead-weight of social degradation partially masked behind a halfnamed Negro problem. He felt his poverty; without a cent, without a home, without land, tools, or savings, he had entered into competition with rich, landed, skilled neighbors. To be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars is the verv bottom of hardships. He felt the weight of his ignorance, not sim-
humanities; the accumulated sloth and shirk-
cabalistic letters of the
slipped or
dim feeling
the ideal of "bookborn of compulsory
was
learning"; the curiosity,
ignorance, to
fire
—
and he saw liimself, darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission. He began to have a
sombre
self-
forests
soul rose before him,
ing and
awkwardness
of decades
and centuries
Negro women had stamped meant not onlv the loss of
legal defllement of
upon
his
race,
ancient African chastity, but also the hereditary
weight of a mass of corruption from white adulterers, threatening almost the obliteration of the
Negro home.
A people thus handicapped ought not to be asked to race with the world, but rather allowed to give all its time and thought to its own
social problems. But alas! while sociolo-
gists gleefully cc^unt his bastards
and
his pros-
titutes, the very soul of the toiling, sweating
man is darkened by the shadow of a vast despair Men call the shadow prejudice, and black
learnedly explain culture
against
it
as the natural defence of
barbarism,
learning
against
ignorance, purity against crime, the "higher" against the "lower" races. To which the
Negro
much
of this
cries
Amen! and swears
strange prejudice as
is
that to so
founded on
just
homage
and meekly does progress, he humbly bows and obeisance. But before that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this he stands helpless. to
civilization,
culture,
righteousness,
CHAPTER
dismayed, and personal
that
8:
well-nigh disrespect
WEB, DU
speechless;
and
BOIS:
before
mockery,
the
and systematic humiliation, the distortion of fact and wanton license of fancy, the cynical ignoring of the better and the boisterous welcoming of the worse, the all-pervading ridicule
desire to inculcate disdain for everything black,
from Toussaint
to the devil,
—before
this there
rises a sickening despair that
would disarm
and discourage any nation save
that black host
to
whom
"discouragement"
is
an unwritten
word. But the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the inevitable self-questioning,
and lowering of ideals which ever accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of contempt and hate. Whisperings and portents came borne upon the four winds: Lo! we are diseased and dying, cried self-disparagement,
the dark hosts;
we
cannot write, our voting
is
what need of education, since we must always cook and serve? And the Nation echoed and enforced this self-criticism, saying: Be content to be servants, and nothing more; what vain;
need of higher culture for half-men? Away with the black man's ballot, by force or fraud, and behold the suicide of a race! Nevertheless, out of the evil came something of good, the more careful adjustment of educa-
— —
tion to real
life,
the clearer perception of the
Negroes' social responsibilities, and the sobering realization of the meaning of progress.
So dawned the time of Sturm uini Drang: storm and stress to-day rocks our little boat on the mad waters of the world-sea; there is within and without the sound of conflict, the burning of body and rending of soul; inspiration strives with doubt, and faith with vain questionings. cal
The bright
ideals of the past,
— physi-
freedom, political power, the training of
brains and the training of hands,
—
all
these in
waxed and waned, until even the grows dim and overcast. Are they all wrong, all false? No, not that, but each alone was over-simple and incomplete, the dreams turn have last
—
—
191
DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
of a credulous race-childhood, or the fond imag-
inings of the other world which does not know and does not want to know our power. To be really true, all these ideals must be melted and welded into one. The training of the schools we need today more than ever, the training of deft hands, quick eyes and ears, and above all the broader, deeper, higher culture of gifted minds and pure hearts. The power of the ballot we need in sheer self-defence, else what shall save us from a second slavery? Freedom, too, the long-sought, we still seek, the freedom of life and limb, the freedom to work and think, the freedom to love and aspire. Work, culture,
—
— —
liberty,
gether,
—
these
all
not
we
need, not singly but to-
but
successively
growing and aiding each, and
ward that vaster Negro people, the
ideal that ideal of
together, all
each
striving to-
swims before
human
the
brotherhood,
gained through the unifying ideal of Race; the
and developing the traits and Negro, not in opposition to or contempt for other races, but rather in large conformity to the greater ideals of the American Republic, in order that some day on American soil two world-races may give each to each those characteristics both so sadly lack. We the darker ideal of fostering talents of the
ones come even now not altogether emptyhanded: there are today no truer exponents of the pure human spirit of the Declaration of Independence than the American Negroes; there is no true American music but the wild sweet melodies of the Negro slave; the American fairy tales and folklore are Indian and African; and,
we
black men seem the sole oasis of and reverence in a dusty desert of dollars and smartness. Will America be poorer if all in all,
simple
faith
she replace her brutal dyspeptic blundering with light-hearted but determined Negro hu-
and cruel wit with loving good-humor? or her vulgar music with the soul of the Sorrow Songs?
mility? or her coarse jovial
Merely a concrete
test
of the underlying
principles of the great republic
is
the
Negro
Problem, and the spiritual striving of the freed-
192
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
men's sons is the travail of souls whose burden is almost beyond the measure of their strength, but who bear it in the name of an historic race, in the
name
thers,
and
of this the land of their fathers' fa-
in the
name
of
human
opportunity.
And now what have briefly sketched in let me on coming pages tell again many ways, with loving emphasis and deepdetail, that men may listen to the striving in I
large outline in
er
the souls of black folk.
CHAPTER
9
Karl
Mannheim:
Sociology of
Knowledge and the Role of Intellectuals
INTRODUCTION Karl
Mannheim was born on March
27, 1893, in
Jewish middle-class parents. the Gynuiasimu, Mannheim was
Budapest, Attending
of
heavily influenced by the thriving intellectual
community around him. Along with many Jew-
Mannheim developed a critical world-view due to his marginal status. Mannheim studied with Georg Simmel in Berlin during 1912-13. He was a member of the Society for Social Science, a group of predominantly Jewish intellectuals who met regularly to discuss the ideas of major European and American thinkers. Later Mannheim came under the influence of a brilliant young Hungarian intellectual, Georg Lukacs, a literary critish intellectuals,
and
insightful
with strong interests in the theory of aesthetics, when he joined a small group of idealistic
active
member
Alfred Weber, and
Kantians and bv of
tique of the culture of capitalism.
After
the
Mannheim
October
Revolution
of
1918,
taught at the University of Buda-
pest under his
mentor Lukacs,
who was
an
was influenced by
Edmund
In 1927,
the
Neo-
Husserl, the founder
Mannheim became
economics and sociology
a professor of
at the University of
where he taught until he was forced from the Nazis to England in 1933. In the six years he spent at Frankfurt, he produced most of his best known works, including Frankfurt,
Ideolog]/
in a cri-
How-
phenomenology.
called the Free School for the Humanities. His views were generally considered leftist, although Mannheim was not a
engage
party.
philosopher Martin Heidegger, studied with
to flee
political activist, preferring to
Communist
the Hungarian
ic
intellectuals
of the
communist government collapsed a year later, and Mannheim was forced to flee from Hungary to Germany, as an anti-communist backlash threatened anyone associated with the party. While in Germany, he was influenced by the blossoming academic atmosphere: he attended lectures by the ever,
and Utopia. Mannheim's intellectual he moved from Germany to
interests shifted as
England. While the earlier focus of his work was the sociology of knowledge, during the war years he became an engaged intellectual concerned with the future of democracy and the role to be played by intellectuals in the future.
193
194
PART1:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
Mannheim developed
his early
work within
the context of the sociology of knowledge, an first generated from within Marxist thought concerning the relationship of ideas to their historical context. Marx wrote that the
idea
cumstances, the context, and the interests that will be, or have been, served by a complex of ideas.
What Marx was interested in unearthing was the ideological function that ideas may serve when they are considered true. In this instance Marx is calling attention to the "false
class.
consciousness"
of
the
proletariat
in
short,
Mannheim
accepted Marx's its
emancipa-
tory praxis.
ruling ideas in a society were the ideas of the ruling
In
sociology of knowledge without
In elaborating his basic thesis,
Mannheim
argued that ideas, facts, and events had to be understood contextually, that is, in the relation to the
dominant
and
historical forces
trends.
There are no eternal or universal truths but only truth claims that always reflect a particu-
believing those ideas about liberty and property
lar social interest or perspective.
Marxism
that clearly benefit their exploiters, the bour-
best seen as an idea system like
others, that
geoisie.
Marx
also spoke of "true conscious-
ness" as the condition of the proletariat
when
it
comprehends its objective condition under capitalism and recognizes how its earlier beliefs have mystified that reality. Mannheim conceived of knowledge as historically determined, tied to both time and circumstance. "Ideology" was the term he employed to characterize the ideas which support the status quo, and "utopia" was that complex of ideas that favored change. The important point here is that, for Mannheim, both sets of ideas advance historical interests and in that sense both have equivalent standing. The Utopian ideas do not have any more truth simply
because
argue
they
Mannheim's position is that of Marx, who saw
for
change.
clearly in opposition to in the "true conscious-
ness" the potential for revolutionary praxis that
would
establish
a
new
truth
in
the
world
through the transformation of social reality. For Marx, the idea of emancipation is a universally valid idea
and
is
absolutely true since
speaks directly to what constitutes being human. Mannheim saw emancipatory ideas as
all
is
an idea complex that is relative to time, and interest. In formulating the problem this manner, Mannheim was grafting in Weber's views on value relevance and perspectives onto Marx's sociology of knowledge, is,
place,
we
claiming that the only truth relational, cal
and
can establish
between ideas and
i.e.,
is
their histori-
social location.
Mannheim designated intellectual,
whom
By virtue of
their
intellectuals
training,
uniquely suited to be
and are thus
a special role for the
he viewed as unattached. critical of all
less likely to
are
perspectives
be special pleaders
for a particular class or party.
The
free-floating
intellectual can see a variety of perspectives,
engage in holisitic analysis, entertain general ideas, and be critical and reflective.
Mannheim furthered his original formulations when he claimed that entire categories of thought are relative to time and place. It is not enough to deconstruct ideologies: one must further examine the concepts and methods that encompass a world-view. For example, while
those which benefit the proletariat, just as the
one can point to Marxism's historical relati\ity, one can go further to penetrate the Marxist world-view, its assumptions about human
bourgeois ideas about liberty and property
nature, the evolution of history,
it
benefit the ruling class.
He
refused to assert
one was true and the other not. The sociolknowledge cannot, he claimed, make a scientific judgment about these matters. What is possible is the careful examination of the cirthat
ogist of
its
vision of
freedom.
Mannheim's writings on
social reconstruc-
completed during his exile in England, seem particularly salient given the course of events in contemporary society. In place of an tion,
CHAPTER
unattached
9;
KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS
intelligentsia,
called for intellectuals
now
Mannheim
committed
to the princi-
and must play an
ples of democracy, social justice, equality,
harmony. The
intellectual strata
active political role in influencing the political elites
and educating
a
population
for
the
preservation of democracy. Social change had to
be planned
in
order to avoid the chaos and
niques of manipulation and propaganda to advance a democratic ideology, to develop a new collective conscience, and to secure a world of harmony and stability. In reading the extracts below, the following
questions should be kept in mind:
edge
way
situateci
is
als really as free
the system, such as depression or inflation.
depicts them?
Mannheim sought
to
War
II,
avoid the consequences
mass politics so evident in the Nazi regime. To this end he called for the use of social techof
and
think
arena?
from
Is
there
project
knowlany
intellectu-
Mannheim
of interests into
the
do you political
any relationship between the and the democratic
relativity of perspectives
process?
Are
interests as
What kinds
intellectuals
If all
relational, is there
to get at the truth of things?
violence that could erupt from any shocks to
Fresh from the experiences of World
195
196
PARTI;
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
Mannheim: The Prospects
Karl
with understanding immediate problems and
of
events emerging from this myopic perspective
Scientific Politics
The Relationship between Social Theory and Political Practice
which obscures everv significant relationship. These seemingly isolated and discrete facts must be comprehended in the ever-present but constantly changing configurations of experience in
WHY IS THERE NO SCIENCE OF
POLITICS?
The emergence and disappearance on our
intellectual horizon are
of problems governed by a
which we are not yet fully aware. Even the rise and disappearance of whole systems of knowledge may ultimately be reduced to certain factors and thus become explicable. There have already been attempts in the history of art to discover whv and in what periods principle of
such plastic arts as sculpture, relief-modelling or other arts arise
and become the dominant
artform of a period. In the same manner the sociology of knowledge should seek to investigate the conditions under which problems and
come
and pass awav. The must be able to do better than to attribute the emergence and solution of problenis to the mere existence of certain talented individuals. The existence of and the complex interrelationship between the problems of a given time and place must be viewed and understood against the background of the structure of the society in which they occur, although this may not always give us an understanding of e\'ery detail. The isolated thinker may have the impression that his crucial ideas occurred to him personally, independent of his social setting. It is easy for one living in a provincial and circumscribed social world to think that the events which touch him are isolated facts for which fate alone is responsible. Sociology, however, cannot be content disciplines
into being
sociologist in the long run
which they actually are lived. Only in such a context do they acquire meaning. If the sociology of knowledge should have anv measure of success in this type of analysis, many prciblems which hitherto, as regards their origins at least, have been unsolved, would be cleared up. Such a de\'elopment would also enable us to see why sociology and economics are of such recent birth and whv thev advanced in one countrv and were
and beset by so many obstacles in othLikewise it will be possible to solve a problem which has always gone unanswered: namethe ly why we have not yet witnessed retarcied
ers.
development of a science of politics. In a world which is as permeated by a rationalistic ethos, as is our own, this fact represents a striking anomaly. There is scarcely a sphere of
we do well as this
life
about which
some scientific knowledge as recognized methods of communicating
not have
knowlecige.
Is it
conceivable then, that the
sphere of human activity on the master)' of which our fate rests is so unyielding that scientific research cannot force it to give up its secrets? The disquieting and puzzling features of this
problem cannot be disregarded. The
question must have already occurred to
many
whether this is merely a temporary condition, to be overcome at a later date, or whether we have reached, in this sphere, the outermost limit of
knowledge which can never be transcended? It
may
be said in favour of the former possi-
bility that the social sciences are still in their
infancy.
It
would be possible to conclude that more fundamental social
the immaturity of the
sciences
explains
"applied" science. SoKrcc York:
I
IB),
Canada.
From U)SS)
K.irl Miinnln-ini, /Jcn/oyi/ miil LltKpin
(.New
Koprinti'd by permission Rmitledgi' in
the If
this
retardation
were
so,
it
of
this
would be
only a question of time until this backwardness were o\'erconio, and further research mii;ht be
CHAPTER
9:
expected to yield a control over society comparable to that which we now have over the
nique for manipulating crowds without which impossible to get on in mass-democracies.
it is
physical world.
History,
The opposite point of view finds support in the vague feeling that political behaviour is qualitatively different from any other type of human experience, and that the obstacles in the way of its rational understanding are much more insurmountable than is the case in other realms of knowledge. Hence, it is assumed that all
history of ideas,
attempts to subject these phenomena to scientific analysis are
foredoomed
nature
peculiar
of
to failure
the
because of the to be
phenomena
analysed.
Even a correct statement of the problem would be an achievement of value. To become aware of our ignorance would bring considerable relief since we would then know why actual knowledge and communication are not possible in this case. Hence the first task is a precise definition of the problem which is What do we mean
—
when we ask: Is a science of politics possible? There are certain aspects of politics which are immediately intelligible and communicable. An experienced and trained political leader should
know
the history of his
own
country, as well as
the history of the countries immediately con-
own and
nected with his
rounding least, a
statistical
conduct.
should
constituting the sur-
world. Consequently, at the
political
knowledge
of history
and the relevant
data are useful for his
Furthermore,
the
own
political
know something about
institutions of the countries with
concerned.
It
is
the
political
leader political
which he
which underlie the instiand through which it func-
likewise be abreast of the politiwhich mould the tradition in which Similarly he cannot afford to be igno-
rant of the political ideas of his opponents.
There are
still
further though less immediate
in our own times have undergone continual elaboration, namely the tech-
questions,
which
disciplines,
knowledge important Were we interested in
to
represent
among of
fields
the political leader.
setting
up
a curriculum
education of the political leader, the
for the
above studies would no doubt have to be included. The disciplines mentioned above, however, offer no more than practical knowledge which, if one happens to be a political leader, might be of use. But even all of these disciplines added together do not produce a science of politics. At best they may serve as auxiliary disciplines to such a science. If we understood by politics merely the sum of all those bits of practical knowledge which are useful for political conduct, then there
be no question about the
would
fact that a science of
politics in this sense existed, and that this science could be taught. The only pedagogical
problem would
consist, then, in selecting
the infinite store of existing facts those
from most
relevant for the purposes of political conduct.
However,
somewhat
it
is
probably evident from statement that
exaggerated
questions "Under what conditions
is
this
the
a science
and how may it be taught?" above-mentioned body of information. In what then does the
of politics possible
do not
refer to the
practical
problem consist? The disciplines which were
listed
above are
with society and the state as if they were the final products of past history. Political conduct, however, is concerned with the state and society in so far as they are still in the process of becoming. Political conduct is confronted with a process in which every moment creates a unique situation and seeks to disentangle out of this ever-flowing stream of forces something of enduring character. The question then is: "Is there a science of this becoming, a science of
He must
lives.
sociology,
theory,
social psychology,
essential that his training be
tutional structure
he
other
and
structurally related only in so far as they deal
of the social relations
cal ideas
many
political
statistics,
is
not only juristic but also include a knowledge
tions.
197
KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS
creative activity?"
198
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
The first stage in the dehneation of the problem is thus attained. What (in the realm of the social)
the
is
significance
of
this
contrast
between what has already become and what is in the process of becoming? The Austrian sociologist and statesman Albert Schaffle' pointed out that at any moment of socio-political life two aspects are discernible first, a series of social events which have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly; and, second, those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which, in individual cases, decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique situations. The first he called
—
the "routine affairs of state," Iniifcndcs Stnnt-
second
sleben; the
"politics."
The meaning
of
be clarified by a few illustrations. When, in the accustomed life of an official, current business is disposed of in accordance with existing rules and regulations, we are, according to Schaffle, in the realm of "administration" rather than of "politics." Administration is the domain where we can see exemthis distinction will
plified
what Schaffle means by "routine affairs Wherever each new case may be taken
of state."
care of in a prescribed manner,
we are faced
not
with politics but with the settled and recurrent side of social life. Schaffle uses an illuminating expression from the field of administration
itself
such cases as can be settled by merely consulting an established rule, i.e. according to precedent, the German word SchiuiincI,' which is derived from the to give point to his distinction. For
Latin simile
is
used, signifying that the case in
be disposed of in a manner similar to precedents that already exist. We are in the realm of politics when envoys to foreign countries conclude treaties which were never made before; when parliamentary representatives
hand
is
to
'Cf. A. Schaffle,
der Politik,"
"Uher den wissenschiiftlichen
Zfilsdirifl
fiir ilic
Begriff
^cmiiiIc Sdm/sic/s.siv/sc/id//, vol.
53(1897).
^The Germdn word note]
tor's
new measures of taxation; when an election campaign is waged; when certain opposition groups prepare a revolt or organize carry through
strikes
ible.
mcdns "mould."
ITninsUi-
For instance, the cumulative effect of a grad-
ual shift of administrative procedure in a long series of concrete cases
new
may actually give rise to a
principle. Or, to take a reverse instance,
something as unique as a new social movement may be deeply permeated with "stereotyped" and routinizing elements. Nevertheless the contrast between the "routine affairs of state" and "politics" offers a certain polarity which may serve as a fruitful point of departure.
If
the
dichotomy is conceived more theoretically, we may say: Every social process may be divided into a rationalized sphere consisting of settled
and routinized procedures in dealing with situations that recur in an orderly fashion, and the "irrational" by which it is surrounded. We are. '
^For the sake of precision, the following remark should be added: The expression "settled routinized elements" is to he regarded figuratively. Even the most formalized and ossified features of society are not to be regarded as things held in store in an attic, to be taken out when needed for use. Laws, regulations, and established customs only have an existence in that li\'ing experiences constantly call them into being. This settledness signifies merely that social life, while constantly renewing itself, conforms to rules and formal processes already inherent in it and this constantly generates itself anew in a recurrent manner Similarly, the use of the expression "rationalized sphere" must be taken in the broader sense. It may mean either a theoretical, rational approach, as in the case of a technique which is rationally calculated and determined: or it may be used in the sense of "rationalization" in which a .sequence of events follows a regular, expected (prbable) course, as is the case with convention, usage, or custom, where the sequence of events is not fully understcxui but in its structure seems to have a certain settled character Max Weber's use of the term "stereotype" as the broader class might be used here, and two sub-classes of the stereotyping tendency then distinguished,
(i?)
this distinction
traditionalism, is
(I')
rationalism.
Inasmuch as
not relevant for our present purpose,
we
use the concept "rationalized stnictua-" in the moR' comprehensive sense in which Max Weber uses the general notion ot stereot\ping. will
i^cliiiiniul
—or when these are suppressed.
must be admitted that the boundary between these two classes is in reality rather flexIt
CHAPTER
KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS
9;
therefore, distinguishing
between the
"rational-
ized" structure of society and the "irrational"
A
matrix.
further observation presents
this point.
ture
is
itself at
The chief characteristic of modern cul-
the tendency to include as
much as
possi-
and to bring it and, on the other
ble in the realm of the rational
under administrative control
—
hand, to reduce the "irrational" element to the vanishing point.
A
simple illustration will clarify the mean-
199
There is no question that we do have some knowledge concerning that part of social life in which everything and life itself has already been rationalized and ordered. Here the conflict between theory and practice does not become an issue because, as a matter of fact, the mere treatment of an individual case by subjecting it to a generally existing law can hardly
be
designated
Rationalized as our
as
life
political
may seem
practice.
to
have
ing of this assertion. The traveller of 150 years
become,
ago was exposed to a thousand accidents. Today everything proceeds according to schedule. Fare is exactly calculated and a whole series of administrative measures have made
place so far are merely partial since the most
travel into a rationally controlled enterprise.
The perception of the distinction between the rationalized scheme and the irrational setting in which it operates provides the possibility for a definition of the concept "conduct."
The a
file
who
disposes of
in the prescribed
manner, or under the the law and
action of a petty official
of
documents
of a judge
who
finds that a case falls
provisions of a certain paragraph in
disposes of
it
accordingly, or finally of a factory
worker who produces
screw by following the prescribed technique, would not fall under our definition of "conduct." Nor for that matter
would
a
the action of a technician
who,
in achiev-
ing a given end, combined certain general laws of nature. All these
modes
of behaviour
would be
considered as merely "reproductive" because they are executed in a rational framework, ac-
cording to a definite prescription entailing no personal decision whatsoever. Conduct, in the sense in which
we reach
we
use
it,
does not begin until
where rationalization has not yet penetrated, and where we are forced to make decisions in situations which have as yet the area
not been subjected to regulation.
It is
in
such
sit-
uations that the whole problem of the relations
between theory and practice arises. Concerning this problem, on the basis of the analyses thus far made, we may even at this stage venture a few further remarks.
all
the rationalizations that have taken
important realms of our social life are even now anchored in the irrational. Our economic life, although extensively rationalized on the technical side, and in some limited connections calculable, does not, as a whole, constitute a planned economy. In spite of all tendencies towards trustification and organization, free competition still plays a decisive role. Our social structure is built along class lines, which means that not objective tests but irrational forces of social competition and struggle decide the place and function of the individual in society.
tional life
Dominance is
in national
and
interna-
achieved through struggle, in
itself
which chance plays an important part. These irrational forces in society form that sphere of social life which is unorganized and unrationalized, and in which conduct and politics become necessary. The two main sources of irrational, in
irrationalism
in
the social
structure
(uncon-
and domination by force) constitute the realm of social life which is still unorganized and where politics becomes necessary. Around these two centres there accumulate those other more profound irrational elements, which we usually call emotions. Viewed from the sociological standpoint there is a connection between the extent of the unorganizeci realm of society where imcontrolled competition and domination by force prevail, and trolled competition
the social integration of emotional reactions.
The problem then must be stated: What knowledge do we have or is it possible con-
— 200
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
life and of the type which occurs in it?^ But now our original problem has been stated in the most highly developed form in which it seems to lend itself to clarification. Having determined where the realm of the political truly begins, and where conduct in a true sense is possible,
cerning this realm of social of conduct
we
can indicate the
ciifficulties existing in
the
between theory and practice. The great difficulties which confront scientific knowledge in this realm arise from the fact
relationship
that
we
are not dealing here with rigid, objec-
with tendencies and strivings
and social thinking, we must, in my judgment, recognize actual differences in stvles of thought differences that extend even into the realm of logic itself. political
—
In this, doubtless, lies the greatest obstacle to a science of politics. For according to ordinary
expectations a science of conduct sible
only
when
would be pos-
the fundamental structure of
thought is independent of the different forms of conduct being studied. Even though the observer be a participant in the struggle, the basis of his thinking, i.e. his observational apparatus and his
method
changes continuously. Wherever the same forces, each unchanging in character, interact,
of settling intellectual differences, must above the conflict. A problem cannot be be solved by obscuring its difficulties, but only by stating them as sharply and as pronouncedly as possible. Hence it is our task definitely to estab-
and
lish the thesis that in politics the
tive entities but
in a constant state of flux.
A further difficulty is
that the constellation of the interacting forces
their interaction,
too,
follows a regular
possible to formulate general laws.
course,
it is
This
not quite so easy where
is
new
ty
is
Still
another
difficul-
that the observer himself does not stand
outside the realm of the irrational, but
is
a par-
ticipant in the conflict of forces. This participa-
tion inevitably binds
him
to a partisan
view
through his evaluations and interests. Furthermore, and most important, is the fact that not only is the political theorist a participant in the conflict because of his values, and interests, but the particular
presents
thought
manner
in
which the problem
him, his most general mode of including even his categories, are
itself to
bound up with general ciercurrents.
So true
is
political
statement of a
logical techniques involved
vary with the political position of the observer.
and forming
incessantly entering the system
unforeseen combinations.
forces are
problem and the
and
this that, in
unthe realm of social
THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF KNOWLEDGE We shall now make an effort to show by means of a concrete
example
that political-historical
thinking assumes various forms, in accordance
with different political currents. h\ order not to go too far afield, we shall concentrate primarily on the relationship between theory and practice. We shall see that even this most general and fundamental problem of a science of political conduct is differently conceived bv the different historical-political parties.
This
may
be easily seen by a survev of the
various political and social currents of the nineteenth
and twentieth
centuries.
As
the
important representative ideal-types, necessary here to repeat that the concept of the "pohtical" as used in conjunction with the correlative concepts, rationahzed structure, and irrational field, represents only one of many possible concepts of the "political."
the following:
1.
Bureaucratic conservatism.
While particularly suited for (he comprehension of certain relationships, it must not be regarded as absolutely the only one. For an opposite notion of the "political" cf. Schmitt, "Der Begriff des Politischen," Archil^ fiir Soziahms-
2.
4.
Conservative historicism. Liberal-democratic bourgeois thought. The socialist-communist conception.
5.
Fascism.
"it
is
C
scii.sc/wf/ Kill/ SiKinli'olitik. vol.
5S (1428).
3.
most
we
cite
CHAPTER
KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS
9:
The mode of thought of bureaucratic conservatism will be considered first. The fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems of tration. tics in
As a
politics into
problems of adminison poli-
result, the majority of books
the history of German political science are
on administration. If we considalways played, especially in the Prussian state, and to what extent the intelligentsia was largely an intelligentsia drawn from the bureaucracy, this onesid-
df fncto treatises
er the role that bureaucracy has
201
administrative mentality constructs only closed
systems of thought, and is always faced with the paradoxical task of having to incorporate into its system new laws, which arise out static
of
the
unsystematized interaction of living if they were only a further elaboration
forces as
of the original system.
A
typical
example of the military-bureau-
The attempt to hide all problems of politics under the cover of administration may be explained by the fact that the sphere of activity
every type of the "stab in the back" legend, Dolclistosslegendc, which interprets a revolutionary outbreak as nothing but a serious interference with its own neatly planned strategy. The exclusive concern of the military bureaucrat is military action and, if that proceeds according to plan, then all the rest of life is in order too. This mentality is rem-
of the official exists only within the limits of
iniscent of the joke about the specialist in the
laws already formulated. Hence
medical world, who is reputed to have said: "The operation was a splendid success. Unfor-
edness of the history of
political science in
Ger-
many becomes easily intelligible.
the development of law of his activity.
As
falls
the genesis or
outside the scope
a result of his socially limited
horizon, the functionary
fails to
see that behind
every law that has been made there lie the socially fashioned interests and the Weltaiisclmiiinigen of a specific social group. it
He
takes
for granted that the specific order prescribed
by the concrete law general.
He does
rationalized order
which
is
equivalent to order in
not understand that every is
only one of
many forms
in
socially conflicting irrational forces are
reconciled.
The administrative,
own
legalistic
peculiar type of rationality.
mind has
When
its
faced
with the play of hitherto unharnessed forces, as, for example, the eruption of collective energies in a revolution, it can conceive of them only as momentary disturbances. It is, therefore, no wonder that in every revolution the bureaucracy tries to find a remedy by means of arbitrary decrees rather than to meet the political situation on its own grounds. It regards revolution as an untoward event within an otherwise ordered system and not as the living expression of fundamental social forces on
which the existence, the preservation, and the development of society depends. The juristic
cratic mentality is
tunately, the patient died."
Every bureaucracy, therefore, the peculiar emphasis on
its
in accord
own
with
position,
own
experience and to realm of administration and of smoothly functioning order represents only a part of the total political reality. Bureaucratic thought does not deny the possibility of a science of politics, but regards it as identical with the science of administration. Thus irrational factors are overlooked, and when these nevertheless force themselves to the fore, they are treated as "routine matters of state." A classic expression of this standpoint is tends to generalize
overlook the
its
fact that the
contained in a saying which originated in these circles: "A good administration is better than the best constitution."^ In
addition to bureaucratic conservatism,
which ruled Germany and especially Prussia a very great extent, there was a second type conservatism which developed parallel to
^Obituary of Bohlau by the jurist Bekker. Zeitschrift Germanist. Abtlg., \oL \'iii, p. vi ff.
Savigny-Stiftiiiig.
to
of it
tier
202
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
and which may be called historical conservatism. It was peculiar to the social group of the nobility and the bourgeois strata among the intellectuals who were the intellectual and actual rulers of the country, but between whom and the bureaucratic conservatives there always existed a certain amount of tension. This mode of thought bore the stamp of the German universities, and especially of the dominant group of historians. Even today, this mentality
still
finds
its
support largely in these
The je ne sais quoi element in politics, which can be acquired only through long experience, and which reveals itself as a rule only to those who for many generations have shared in state.
Historical conservatism
the fact that life
it is
is
characterized by
aware of that irrational realm which cannot be man-
of the state
aged by an unorganized and incalculable realm is which is the proper sphere of politics. Indeed it focuses its attention almost exclusively on the impulsive, irrational factors which furnish the real basis for the further development of state administration.
It
recognizes that there
and society. It regards these forces as entirely beyond comprehension and infers that, as
which the
human
herited
is
impotent
"silently
instinct,
to
working"
spiritual
drawing their strength out of the depths of the unconscious, can be of aid in moulding the future. This attitude was already stated at the end of the eighteenth century by Burke, who served as the model for most of the German conservatives, in the following impressive words: "The forces,
the
"folk
spirit,"
science of constructing a
Volksgeit^t,
commonwealth
of
every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us renovating
that
it
or reforming
practical
it,
science."''
is
like
The
sociological
roots of this thesis are immediately evident.
It
expressed the ideology of the dominant nobilitv in England and in Germany, and it served to
G. Selby (London:
MacmilUm and
Co., 1890), p. 67.
bv
group which
is
blinded to the
by reason of its administrative preconceptions, from the very political aspect of a situation
beginning the nobility is perfectly at home in this sphere. Right from the start, the latter have their eyes on the arena where intra- and interstate spheres of power collide with one another. In this sphere, petty textbook wisdom deserts us and solutions to problems cannot be mechanical-
deduced from premises. Hence it is not individual inteUigence which decides issues. Rather ly
is
every event the resultant of actual historical conservative theory,
political
which
is
essentially the expression of a feudal tradition'
become
self-conscious,
is
primarily concerned
with problems which transcend the sphere of administration. The sphere is regarded as a completely irrational one which cannot be fabricated by mechanical methods but which grows of its own accord. This outlook relates everything to the decisive dichotomy between "construction according to calculated plan"
and "allowing things cal leader
it
is
to grow."** For the politi-
not sufficient to possess merely
knowledge and the mastery of certain laws and norms. In addition to these he must possess that inborn instinct, sharpened through long experience, which leads him to the correct
the right answer.
'Cf.
""Burke's Reflections on the Rn'olution in France, edited
that
life to
another position do not respond.
those in
The
reason
makes
social interests of
sensitive to certain aspects of social
forces.
F.
in
group make the members of
a given
understand
in
aristocratic class. This
manner
clear the
or to control them. Here only a traditionally in-
such,
intended to justify gov-
political leadership, is
ernment by an
Whereas the bureaucracy
circles.
in the
legitimatize their claims to leadership in the
133
"Das konservative Denken,"
ff.
"/bid., p.
472, n. 129.
he.
cit.,
pp. 89, 105,
— CHAPTER
9:
Two types of irrationalism have joined to produce this irrational way of thinking: on the one hand, precapitahstic, traditionahstic irrationalism (which regards legal thinking, for instance, as a way of sensing something and not as mechanical calculation), and, on the other hand, romantic irrationalism. A mode of thought is thus created which conceives of history as the reign of pre- and super-rational forces. Even Ranke, the most eminent representative of the historical school, spoke from this intellectual outlook when he defined the relations of theory and practice.'* Politics is not, according to him, an independent science that can be taught. The statesman may indeed study history profitably, but not in order to derive from it rules of conduct, but rather because it serves to sharpen his political instinct. This mode of thought may be designated as the ideology of political groups which have traditionally occupied a dominant position but which have rarely participated in the administhe
trasted,
two solutions thus far presented are conit will become clear that the bureaucrat
tends to conceal the political sphere while the historicist sees
it
all
thought which either does not see the elements in life and in thought which are based on will, or, if it interest, emotion, and WcUaiischaiiiiiig does recognize their existence, treats them as
—
though they were equivalent to the intellect and believes that they may be mastered by and subordinated to reason. This bourgeois intellectualism expressly demandeci a scientific politics, and actually proceeded to found such a discipline. Just as the bourgeoisie found the
which the
institutions into
first
gle could be canalized
and
electoral system, tions), so
the
new
tional
a
later the
discipline of politics.
The bourgeois attempt
social theory.
its
The organiza-
of bourgeois society appears
thoroughgoing
world
League of Na-
also created a systematic place for
anomaly
also in at
it
political strug-
parliament and the
(first
rationalization
forced nevertheless to halt
is
of
the
when
it
reaches certain phenomena. By sanctioning free
competition and the class struggle, ates a
new
irrational sphere.
it even creLikewise in this
type of thought, the irrational residue in reality
trative bureaucracy. If
203
KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS
the
more sharply and
exclu-
sively as irrational even though he singles out for
remains undissolved. Furthermore, just as parliament is a formal organization, a formal rationalization of the political conflict but not a solution of it, so bourgeois theory attains merely an apparent, formal intellectualization of the in-
emphasis the traditional factors in historical events and in the acting subjects. At this stage we
herently irrational elements.
come to the chief adversary of this theory which,
this
as has been pointed out, arose originally out of
tic
aristocratic feudal mentality, namely, the liberal-
thought, discussion, and organization to mas-
democratic bourgeoisie and its theories. ^° The rise of the bourgeoisie was attended by an extreme intellectualism. Intellectualism, as it is
as if they were already rationalized, the power and other irrational relationships that dominate here. Thus, inter alia, it was believed
used
in this connection, refers to a
mode
of
The bourgeois mind
new in
so
far
as
it
says on the
Diis
fiolitische
Ceipriich
same theme:
pp. 21
" Reflcxionen"
der Theorie," "Uher die Venvandtschaft
(1836), ff.
(1832),
ed.
by
Also other es-
"Vom
Einfluss
und den Unterschied
der Historic mid der Pclitik."
'"For the sake of simplicity we do not distinguish liberalism from democracy, although historically and socially they are quite different.
it is
of
intellectualis-
attempts solely through
that political action could without difficulty be
was assumed
a.d., Saale, 1925),
aware
of course,
ter,
scientifically defined.
Cf. Ranke, Rothacker (Hall
is,
irrational realm, but
First
—the
The science
in question
to fall into three parts:
theory of ends,
i.e.
the theory of
the ideal State.
—the theory of the positive — the description of the Third Second
State.
"politics,"
manner
in
i.e.
which the existing State
formed into a perfect
State.
is
trans-
204
PARTI:
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
thought we "Closed Commercial State" which in this sense has been very acutely analysed by Heinrich Rickert,'^ who himself, however, completely accepts this position. There is then a science of ends and a science of means. The most striking fact about it is the complete separation
As an
mav
illustration of this type of
refer to the structure of Fichte's
between theory and practice, of the intellectual sphere from the emotional sphere. Modern intellectualism is characterized by its tendency not to tolerate emotionally determined and evaluative thinking.
When,
nevertheless, this
encountered (and all political thought is set essentially in an irrational context) the attempt is made so to construe the phenomena that the evaluative elements will appear separable, and that there will remain at least a residue of pure theory. In this the question is not even raised whether the emotional element may not under certain circumstances be so intertwined with the rational as to involve even the categorical structure itself and type of thought
to
make
is
the required isolation of the evaluative
elements de facto unrealizable. Bourgeois intellectualism, however, does not worrv over these difficulties. With undaunted optimism, it strives to
conquer a sphere completely purged
of irrationalism.
As regards there
is
ends, this theory teaches that
one right
set of
duct which, in so far as found, may be arrived the
original
ends of
political con-
it
has not already been
at
by discussion. Thus
conception
of
parliamentarism
was, as Carl Schmitt has so clearly shown, that of a debating society in which truth is sought
mode
of thought lay. behind every theory there are collective forces expressive of group-
self-deception
in
this
Today we recognize
that
purposes, -power, and -interests. Parliamentary discussions are thus far from being theoretical in the
may
sense that they
ultimately arrive at
the objective truth; they are concerned with
very real issues to be decided in the clash of terests.
It
was
left for
the socialist
in-
movement
which arose subsequently as the opponent of the bourgeoisie to elaborate specifically this
aspect of the debate about real issues.
we
In our treatment of socialist theory
are
not for the time being differentiating between
communism,
socialism and
we
for
are here
concerned not so much \vith the plethora of historical phencimena as with the tendencies which cluster around the opposite poles that essentially determine modern thought. In the struggle with its bourgeois opponent, Marxism discovered
anew
that in historical
and
political
matters there can be no "pure theory."
behind everv theorv there
that
lie
It
sees
collective
The phenomenon of collective which proceeds according to interests and social and existential situations, Marx spoke of as ideology. points of view. thinking,
In this case, as so often in political struggles,
an important discoverv was made, which, once it became known, had to be followed up to its final
this
conclusion. This was the more so since discoverv contained the heart of the prob-
lem of
political
thought
in general.
The concept
ideology serves to point out the problem, but the problem is therebv bv no means soh'ed or cleared up.'"
A
thoroughgoing
clarification
is
by theoretical methods.'"^ We know all too well and can understand sociologically wherein the For what folkuvs Part
should be referred to for furwhich only the essentials will be repeated here. The concept of total, general, and non-evaluative ideology, as described earlier, is the one used in the present context. Part IV will deal with the evaluative conceptions of ideology and Utopia. lenceforth the concept to lu~ used will be determined by the immediate purposes of the investigation. '
II
ther discussion of the problem, of
"Cf. Heinrich Rickert, "Ulu-r idi-nlistische I'olilik als Wissenschaff. Ein Beitrngzur I'rublonigoscliichteder Staatsphilosophie," Die Akiutciiiic, ticit 4, Erlangon. ''Cf. Carl Schmitt, Pic \;ci!^lc^^CMiiiclitliclic Ln^c ilcs hciiti-
gcn
Parliiiiicutiirit^imis,
2nd
edit. (Leipzig, 1926).
I
CHAPTER
attainable only
9:
by getting
rid of the one-sided-
ness inherent in the original conception. First of all, therefore, it will be necessary for our
purpose with,
it
to
make two
could easily be
205
KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS
To begin
corrections.
shown
that those
who
think in socialist and communist terms ciiscern the ideological element only in the thinking of
opponents while regarding their own thought as entirely free from any taint of ideology. As sociologists there is no reason why we
is
the discov-
is
up with
the essential
social
This
life.
is
integrally
bound mean-
"It is not the determines their
ing of the oft-quoted sentence,
consciousness of existence but,
men
on the
that
contrary, their social exis-
tence which determines their consciousness."'*
But closely related to
their
should not apply to Marxism the perceptions which it itself has produced, and point out
our opinion,
tion of ideology, in
ery that political thought
this is
tant feature of Marxist thought,
another impor-
namely
a
new
conception of the relationship between theory and practice. Whereas the bourgeois theorist
devoted
a special
chapter to setting forth his
from case to case its ideological character. Moreover, it should be explained that the concept "ideology" is being used here not as a
ends, and whereas this always proceeded from
negative value-judgment, in the sense of insinuating a conscious political lie, but is intended
the Utopian element in socialism. From the beginning he refused to lay down an exhaustive set of objectives. There is no norm to be achieved that is detachable from the process itself: "Communism for us is not a condition that is to be established nor an ideal to which
to designate the outlook inevitably associated with a given historical and social situation, and the Weltanschauung and style of thought bound up with it. This meaning of the term, which
more closely on the history of thought, must be sharply differentiated from the other meaning. Of course, we do not deny that in
bears
may
other connections
it
conscious political
lies.
also serve to reveal
normative conception of society, one of the most significant steps Marx took was to attack a
reality
must adjust
itself.
We
movement which
the actual
conditions.
call
communism
abolishes present
The conditions under which
movement proceeds
result
from those
this
now
"'''
Through
this
existing.
procedure nothing that has a
positive value for scientific research in the notion of ideology has been discarded.
The
great reve-
If
we ask a communist, with a Leninist what the future society will actually be he will answer that the question is an
today
training, like,
historical
undialectical one, since the future itself will be
and political thought is essentially conditioned by the life situation of the thinker and his
decided in the practical dialectical process of becoming. But what is this practical dialectical
lation
it
groups.
affords
It is
is
that every
our task
form of
to disentangle this insight
one-sided political encrustation, and to elaborate in a systematic manner the thesis that
from
its
how one looks at history and how one construes a total situation from given facts, depends on the position one occupies within society. In
every historical and political contribution it is possible to determine from what vantage point
process?
we cannot calculate a priori should be like and what it will be like. We can influence only the general trend of the process of becoming. The ever-present concrete problem for us can only be the next step ahead. It is not the task of political thought to It
what
signifies that
a thing
the objects were observed. However, the fact that our thinking
position
is
the contrary, insight.
is
determined by our social
not necessarily a source of error.
The
it
is
On
often the path to political
significant element in the concep-
'"Karl Marx, A Cotitributicn to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. by N. I. Stone (Chicago, 1913), pp. 11-12. '"Cf. Marx-Engels Archiv, ed. bv D. Rvazanov (Frankfurt a.M.), vol.
i,
p. 252.
206
PART
1
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
:
up an absolute scheme of what should be. Theory, even including communist theory, is a set
function
of becoming. The between theory and
process
the
of
relationship
dialectical
practice consists in the fact that,
first
of
all,
the-
ory arising out of a definitely social impulse clarifies the situation. And in the process of clarification
reality
undergoes
new
thereby enter a
a
We
change.
situation out of
which
a
new
two currents of thought is a very flexible conA basic lesson derived from political experience which was most impressively formulated by Napoleon in the maxim, the
ception of theory.
"0)i
s'eiigagc,
puis
methodological
becomes illuminated when
This theory leads to a certain kind of action; (3) Action changes the reality, or in case of failure,
must go with them.
forces us to a revision of the previous theory.
sis
in
the actual situation brought
new
theory.^''
This view of the relationship between theory and practice bears the imprint of an advanced stage in the discussion of the problem.
notes that
it
was preceded by
One
the one-sided-
ness of an extreme intellectualism and a complete irrationahsm, and that it had to circum-
vent
dangers
the
all
which were already
revealed in bourgeois and conservative thought and experience. The advantages of this solution the fact that it has assimilated the previous formulation of the problem, and in its awareness of the fact that in the realm of politics the usual run of thought is unable to accomplish
here finds
Indeed,
its
pohtical
a concrete situation
penetrated, not merely through acting and
is
act gives rise to a
I'o/f,"''
thought cannot be carried on by speculating about it from the outside. Rather thought
theory emerges. The process is, then, as follows: (1) Theory is a function of reality; (2)
The change about by the
on
sanction.'^
doing, but also through the thinking which
SociaHst-communist theory is then a syntheof intuitionism and a determined desire to comprehend phenomena in an extremely rational way. Intuitionism is present in this theory because it denies the possibilitv of exact calculations of events in advance of their happening.
tendency enters because it aims scheme whatever novelty comes to view at any moment. At no time is it permissible to act without theory, hut the theory that arises in the course of action will be on
The to
rationalist
fit
into a rational
a different level fore.''* It is
from the theory
that
went be-
especially revolutions that create a
lie in
On the other hand, this outlook is too thoroughly motivated by the desire for knowledge to fall into a complete irrationahsm like anything.
conservatism. The result of the conflict between
hv means of the class struggle and thereby the whole social taking cognizance of the changed social situa-
"'"When the changes
its
structure, in
of
proletariat
position in society
finds itself face to face not merely with a its position
tion,
i.e.
new
object of understanding, but also changes
itself,
it
subject. The theory serves to bring the prok^consciousness of its social position, i.e. it enables simultaneously both as an object and it to envisage itself a subject in the social process." (Georg Lukacs, Gcfcliichtr
as a
knowing
tariat to a
iind
—
K/(issra(ic!('i(,ssf,sci?i,
Berlin,
192,'^.)
"This consciousness in turn becomes the motive force of activity, since theory becomes a material force once it seizes the masses." (Marx-F.ngels, Nnchlnss, i, p. 392.)
new
'indeed both Lenin and Lukacs, as representatives of the dialectical approach, find justification in this Napoleonic
maxim.
''""Revolutionarv theory is the generalization of the experiences of the labour movement in all countries. It naturalh' loses its very essence if it is not connected with revo-
lutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined bv revolutionary theory. But theory can become the greatest force in the labour movement if it is indissolubly bound up with revolutionary practice, for it alone can give to the movement confidence, guidance, of the inner relations between alone can help practice to clarif\- the process and direction of class movements in the present and near future." (Joseph Stalin, Fouiidalionf of /.ivi/msiM, rev. ed..
strength,
and understandmg
events and
it
New
York and London, 1432, pp. 26-7.) '"Revolution, particularly, creates the situation propitious to significant knowledge: "History in general, the history of revolutions in particular, has always been richer, more varied, and variform, more vital and 'cunning' than
concei\'ed of b\' the best parties, b\' the most conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This is natural, for the best vanguards express the consciousness, will, pasis
CHAPTER
9:
KARL MANNHEIM: SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS
207
more valuable type
dencies which, even though they are subject to
tutes the synthesis
change, through their very presence do never-
of knowledge. This constiwhich men are likelv to make when they live in the midst of irrationality and recognize it as such, but do not despair of the
theless determine to a large extent the various possibilities.
does not deny the existence of an irrational sphere and does not try to conceal it as the
cies
first task of Marxism is the and rationalization of all those tendenwhich influence the character of the situa-
tion.
Marxist theory has elaborated these struc-
bureaucratic mentality does, or treat
tural tendencies in a threefold direction. First,
attempt
thought
interpret
to is
it
Marxist
rationally
akin to conservative thought in that
it
purely intellectual fashion as
if it
were
as liberal-democratic thinkers do.
it
in a
rational,
Therefore, the analysis
it
points out that the political sphere in a given
based on and
always characterized
distin-
society
is
guished from conservative thought, however, in that it conceives of this relative irrationality as potentially comprehensible through new methods of rationalization."" For even in this type of thought, the sphere of the irrational is not entirely irrational, arbitrary, or incompre-
by the
state of productive relations prevailing
It
is
no statically which this creative process conforms, nor are there any exactly recurring sequences of events, bLit at the same hensible.
fixed
It
and
is
true that there are
definite laws to
time only a limited number of situations can occur even here. And this after all is the decisive consideration. Even when new elements in historical development emerge they do not constitute merely a chain of unexpected events; the political sphere itself is permeated by ten-
sions,
and
revolution altation
fancies of hut tens of thousands, is
and exertion of
all
whereas the
moment of the exceptional exthe human faculties conscious-
effected at the
—
ness, will, passion, phantasy, of tens of millions, spurred
on
by the
nil
bitterest class war." (N. Lenin, "Left" Commi(nisiii:
Infantile Disorder,
New York and
published by the
London,
Toiler, n.d. pp. 76-7, also
accumulated rationaHty tested out experimentally
in the
individual experiences of millions.
sudden and unexpectview which arises therefrom, are conceived of as functions of the degree in which our under'"Thus, fate, chance, everything
and the
religious
standing of history has not yet reached rationality.
the
stage or
The productive
relations are not
regarded
statically as a continually recurring
economic
cycle, but, dynamically, as a structur-
al
interrelationship
which
is
itself
constantly
changing through time. Secondly, it sees that changes in this economic factor are most closely connected with transformations in class relations, which involves at the same time a shift in the kinds of power and an ever- varying distribution of power. But, thirdlv,
it
recognizes that
it is
possible to
understand the inner structure of the system of ideas dominating men at any period and to determine theoretically the direction of any change or modification in this structure.
"Fear of the blind forces of capitalism, blind because they cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people, forces which at every step in the lives of the proletariat and the small traders threaten to bring and do bring 'sudden,' 'unexpected,' 'accidental' disaster and ruin, converting them into beggars, paupers, or prostitutes, and condemn them to starvation; these are the roots of modern religion, which the materialist,
No
if
he desires
to
remain a
materialist,
must
educational books will obliterate religion from the minds of those condemned to the hard labour of capitalism, until they themselves learn to fight in a united, organized, systematic, conscious manner the roots of religion, the domination of capital in all its forms." (.Selections from Lenin The Bolshevik Party in Action, 1904-1914, ii. From the essay, "The Workers' Partv and Religion," New York, pp. 274-5.) "The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life." (Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, tr. by N. 1. Stone, Chicago, 1913, p. 11.) recognize.
1934.)
It is interesting to observe that from this point of view revolution appears not as an intensification of the passions resident in men nor as mere irrationality. This passion is valuable only because it makes possible the fusion of the
ed,
at the time."'
is
—
208
Still
THE CLASSIC TRADITION
PART1:
more important
in the fact that these
not considered
three structural patterns are
independently of one another.
It
is
precisely
which are made to constitute a single group of problems. The ideological structure does not change independently of the class structure, and the class structure does not change independently of the economic structure. And it is precisely the interconnection and intertwining of this threetheir reciprocal relations
fold formulation of the problem, the economic,
the social,
and the
ideological, that gives to
Marxist ideas their singularly penetrating quality. Only this synthetic power enables it to for-
view of history on the basis of be possible at any moment to ask ourselves where we are now and at what stage of development does our movement find rationalized
which
will
it
itself.-
Groups the
of pre-capitaUstic origin, in
communal element
together bv traditions or ments alone. In such a group, theoretical reflection is of entirely secondary importance. On the other hand, in groups which are not welded together primarily by such organic bonds of community life, but which merely occupy simi-
orous theorizing
acceptance of the irrational. Instead
ties
eliminate as
much
of
it
as possible
tries to
by a new
sociologist
the question of the
is
confronted with
general historical-social
form of existence and the particular situation from which the mode of thought peculiar to Marxism arose. How can we explain its singular character which consists in combining an extreme irrationalism with an extreme rationalism in such a manner that out of this fusion there arises a
new
kind of "dialectical" ratio-
nality?
Considered sociologically, of an ascendent class
Viewed theory
a prerecjuisite of cohesion.
is
sociologically this extreme need is
for
the expression of a class society in
which persons must be held together not by local proximity but by similar circumstances of life in
an extensive social sphere. Sentimental
are effective only within a limited spatial
area, while a theoretical Weltanschauung has a
unifying power over great distances. Hence a
effort at rationalization.
Here again the
social-economic system, rig-
lar positions in the
mulate ever anew the problem of the structural totality of society, not only for the past but also for the future. The paradox lies in the fact that Marxism recognizes relative irrationality and never loses sight of it. But unlike the historical school it does not content itself with a mere it
which
may be held by common senti-
prevails,
which
this is the is
theory
not concerned
with momentary successes, and which therefore will not resort to a "putsch" as a means for seizing power, but which, because of its inherent revolutionary tendencies, must always be sensitive and alert to unpredictable constellations in the situation. Every theory which arises out of a class position and is based not on unstable masses but on organized historical
groups must of necessity have a long-range view. Consequently, it requires a thoroughly
rationalized conception of history serves as a socially unifying factor for
space, ity to
groups dispersed in
same time furnishes continugenerations which continuously grow up and
at the
into similar social conditions. In the formation of classes, a similar positicm in the social order
and
primary imporEmotional ties which subsequently spring up are only a reflection of the already existing situation and are always more or less regulated by theory. Despite this extreme ratioa unifying theory are of
tance.
nalizing tendency,
which
is
implicit in the pro-
letarian class position, the limits of the rationality of this class
are defined
and, particularly, by
its
by
its
oppositional
allotted revolutionary
position.
""Without hition.irv
a rfVolutionar\- tlieor\ there
mo\eniont." (Lenin, What
York and London, m3L)
/.
ritv. The better explanations start from the premise that the communication structures that have
systematically
been
as they
framework within which the structural model of ego, id, and superego can be recast.'' Instead
irritability
of an instinct theory that represents the relation
set free in the family
for socialization that are as
are vulnerable.
The
grows, and with
it
pro\ide conditions
demanding
potential
for
the probability that instabili-
distorted
communication— the
reification of interpersonal relations
— the point
of reference for investigating pathogenesis.
theory of communicati\'e action
ot
ego
to inner
The
pro\ides a
nature in terms of a philosophy
— CHAPTER
—
on the model of relations between subject and object we have a theory of socialization that connects Freud with Mead, of consciousness
—
fective stereotypes of a ly replicates
what
16:
mass on
405
THEORY
CRITICAL
culture that mere-
exists;
the other hand,
it
gives structures of intersubjcctivitv their due,
uses up a culture cleansed of all subversive and transcending elements for an encompassing
and replaces hypotheses about
system of
instinctual vi-
cissitudes with assumptions about identity formation."''
more
This approach can
(i)
appropriate
recent developments in psychoanalytic
research, particularly the theory of object relations""
and ego
psychology,'"'
(ii)
take
up
the
theory of defense mechanisms'" in such a way that the interconnections between intrapsychic
social controls,
which
is
spread over
individuals, in part reinforcing their
weakened
internal behavioral controls, in part replacing
mode
them. The industry
is
of functioning of the culture
said to be a mirror
image of the
psychic apparatus, which, as long as the internalization of paternal authority was still functioning,
had subjected
instinctual nature to the
way
and communication disturbances at the interpersonal level become comprehensible,^" and (iii) use the assumptions about mechanisms of conscious and uncon-
control of the superego in the
scious mastery to establish a connection be-
cal
tween orthogenesis and pathogenesis. The cognitive and sociomoral development studied in
against
the Piagetian tradition'" takes place in accord with structural patterns that provide a reliable foil for intuitively recorded clinical deviations. (c) Mass media and mass culture. With its distinction between system and lifeworld, the theory of communicative action brings out the in-
consideration
dependent
ences in programming, viewing practices, po-
communication
logic
barriers
of
socializatory
interaction;
between two contrary types of communication media makes us sensitive to the ambivalent potential of mass communications. The theory makes us skeptithe
corresponding
distinction
cal of the thesis that the
essence of the public
ogy had subjected outer nature
that technol-
domina-
to its
tion.
Against this theory we can raise the empiriobjections that can always be brought oversimplifications
stylizing
—that
it
proceeds ahistorically and does not take into the
structural
bourgeois public sphere; that
enough
to take
differences
in
the
not complex
account of the marked national
—from differences between private,
public-legal, al
change it is
and
state-controlled organization-
structures of broadcasting agencies, to differ-
and so
But there
an even
litical
culture,
more
serious objection, an objection in princi-
ple, that
is
can be derived from the dualism of
media discussed I
forth.
above."'''
distinguished two sorts of media that can
sphere has been liquidated in postliberal soci-
ease the burden of the (risky and demanding)
According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the communication flows steered via mass media take the place of those communication structures that had once made possible public discussion and self-understanding by citizens and private individuals. With the shift from writing to images and sounds, the electronic media first film and radio, later television present themselves as an apparatus that completely permeates and dominates the language of everyday communication. On the one hand,
coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding: on the one hand, steering media, via
eties.
—
it
transforms the authentic content of
culture into the sterilized
modern
and ideologically
ef-
which subsystems are differentiated out of the lifeworld; on the other hand, generalized forms of communication, which do not replace reaching agreement in language but merely condense it, and thus remain tied to lifeworld contexts. Steering media uncouple the coordination of action from building consensus in language altogether and neutralize it in regard to the alternative of coming to an agreement or failing to do so. In the other case we are dealing with a specialization of linguistic processes of con-
406
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
sensus formation that remains dependent on recourse to the resources of the lifeworld background. The mass media belong to these gener-
aUzed forms of communication. They free communication processes from the provinciaHty of spatiotemporally restricted contexts and permit pubhc spheres to emerge, through estab-
• the broadcasting networks are exposed to
far
removed
in space
political and ideological, and aesthetic viewpoints;* nomially the mass media cannot, without gen-
professional •
erating conflict, avoid the obligations that ac-
crue to them from their journalistic mission and the professional code of journalism; • the
and time and through
programs do not
even
texts.
lar
same time remove
—
they considerably strengthen the cacy of social controls. But tapping this authoritarian potential is always precarious because there
into
built
and
practice sets
processes
communicative
against the direct
mass
the technical
development of
electronic
ralism"
and
moment
"television
not
much
democracy" are
more
than
at the
anarcliist
visions."*"
(d)
Potential for protest.
My thesis concerning
the colonization of the lifeworld, for
Weber's theory of served as a point of departure, societal
critique of functionalist reason,
When
media
does not necessarily move in the direction of centralizing networks, even though "video plu-
of
responsible actors.
ma-
media;''^
and •
reaching understanding, but it is only in the first instance that they relieve interaction from
yes/no responses to criticizable validity claims. Abstracted and clustered though they are, these communications cannot be reliablv shielded from the possibility of opposition by
up defenses
nipulative inter\'ention of the
communication structures concentrate
its
against a certain subadtural backgromid;*'
Mass media can simultaneously
contextualize
re-
turned into
is
• the inner logic of everyday
effi-
themselves.
critical
popular
opposite under conditions of being received
a counterweight of emancipatory po-
is
tential
contain as
cause the intended meaning
their
below
may
culture
• ideological messages miss their audience be-
—
—
for the most mass culture;^ forms of popu-
venge;
restrictions
ambivalent potential. Insofar as in lies media one-sidedly channel communicamass centralized network from the tion flows in a or from above to center to the periphery
—"popular
'
even
vv^hen they take the triWal
entertainment, they
messages
at the
on the horizon of possible communication. The one aspect cannot be separated from the other and there-
only, or
part, reflect the standards of
keeping messages available for manifold con-
These media publics hierarchize and
economic,
iiTtegrate
lishing the abstract simultaneity of a virtually
present network of communication contents
com-
peting interests; they are not able to smoothly
which
rationalization
based on a which agrees
is
communications research is not abridged in an empiricist manner and allows for dimensions of reification in communicative evervdav practice,^ it confirms this ambi\'alence. Again and again reception research and program analysis have provided illustrations of theses in culture criticism that Adorno, above all, developed with a certain over-state-
with the critique of instrumental reason only in
same energy has
authoritarian state. In this respect, the earlier
ment.
In
the nieantime, the
been put into working out the contradictions resulting from the facts that
and in its ironic u.se ot the word 'reason'. One major difference is that the theory of communicative action conceives of the lifeworld as a sphere in which processes of as reification do not appear as mere reflexes emaintegration manifestations of a repressive nating ivom an oligopolistic economy and an its
intention
—
critical
theory merely repeated the errors of
Marxist functionalism."
My
references to the
CHAPTER
socializatory relevance of the uncoupling of
system and lifeworld and my remarks on the ambivalent potentials of mass media and mass culture show the private and public spheres in the light of a rationalized lifeworld in which system imperatives dash with independent communication structures. The transposition of communicative action to media-steered interactions and the deformation of the structures of a
damaged
intersubjectivity are
by no means
new
16:
CRITICAL
THEORY
407
an expression of and attitudes that R. Inglehart has observed in entire populaDalton, tions.'*'* Studies by Hildebrandt and and by Barnes and Kaase, confirm the change in themes from the "old politics" (which turns on questions of economic and social security, This
tvpe of conflict
is
the "silent revolution" in values
internal tics.
"^^
and military security) to a "new poliThe new problems have to do with
quality of
life,
equal rights, individual self-real-
and human
predecided processes that might be distilled
ization,
from a few global concepts. The analysis of lifeworld pathologies calls for an (unbiased) in-
terms of social statistics, the "old politics" is more strongly supported by employers, workers, and middle-class tradesmen, whereas the new politics finds stronger support in the new
vestigation of tendencies ami contradictions.
The
fact that in welfare-state
class
thereby pacified does not tential
mean
that protest po-
has been altogether laid to
potentials for protest
ent lines of conflict
pect
mass democracies
has been institutionalized and
conflict
them
to
rest.
But the
emerge now along differjust where we would ex-
ing internal colonization.
the thesis of the coloniza-
economic-administrative
if
rights.
we
If
take the view that the growth of the
complex
sets
were correct. In the past decade or two, conflicts have developed in advanced Western societies that deviate in various ways from the welfare-state
processes of erosion in the lifeworld, then
pattern of institutionalized conflict over distri-
rectly
tion of the lifeworld
bution.
They no longer
up
flare
in
domains
of
In
middle classes, among the younger generation, and in groups with more formal education. These phenomena tally with my thesis regard-
—
emerge
participation,
would expect old
new the
ones.
A
be overlaid with forms between, on
conflicts to
line of conflict
one hand,
off
we
a center
composed
of strata di-
involved in the production process and
interested in maintaining capitalist
growth as
material reproduction; they are no longer chan-
the basis of the welfare-state compromise, and,
neled through parties and associations; and
on the other hand,
they can no longer be allayed by compensa-
variegated array of groups that are
tions. Rather, these
new
conflicts arise in do-
mains of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization; they are carried out in subinstitutional tary
—forms
of
—or
at
protest;
least
extraparliamen-
and the underlying
deficits reflect a reification of
communicatively
domains of action that will not respond to the media of money and power. The issue is not primarily one of compensations structured
the welfare state can provide, but of defending and restoring endangered ways of that
life.
In short,
the
new
conflicts
are not ig-
nited by distribution problems but tions
having
of hfe.
to
do with
the
grammar
by quesof forms
gether.
are
Among
further
a periphery
composed of a lumped to-
the latter are those groups that
removed from
the
"productivist
core of performance" in late capitalist soci-
have been more strongly sensitized consequences of the growth in complexity or have been more strongly affected by them.'*' The bond that unites these heterogeneous groups is the criticjue of growth. Neither the bourgeois emancipation movements nor the struggles of the organized labor movement can serve as a model eties,'"'
to
that
the
self-destructive
more movements of the early industrial period, which were supported by craftsmen, plebians, and for this protest. Historical parallels are likely to
be found
in the social-romantic
408
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
workers, in the defensive movements of the
move-
populist middle class, in the escapist
ments (nourished by bourgeois critiques of civilization) undertaken by reformers, the Wnndcrviigcl, and the like. The current potentials for protest are very because scenes, groupings, change very rapidly. To the extent that organizational nuclei are formed at the
difficult to classify,
and
topics
level of parties or associations,
cruited from the
same
members
are re-
diffuse reservoir.^^
following catchphrases serve at the
The
moment
tion
for
the sake of communicatively struc-
tured domains, and not at conquering
new
ter-
There is an element of particularism that connects feminism with these movements; the emancipation of women means not only establishing formal equality and eliminating male privilege, but o\'erturning concrete forms of life marked by male monopolies. Furthermore, ritory.
the historical legacy of the sexual division of labor to which
women were
subjected in the
bourgeois nuclear family has given them access
to
to contrasting virtues, to a register of values
identify the various currents in the Federal Re-
complementary to those of the male world and opposed to a one-sidedly rationalized everyday practice. Within resistance mo\'ements we can distinguish further between the defense of traditional and social rank (based on property) and a defense that already operates on the basis of a rationalized lifeworld and tries out new ways of cooperating and living together. This criterion makes it possible to demarcate the protest of the traditional middle classes against threats to neighborhoods by large technical projects, the protest of parents against comprehensive
public of Germany: the antinuclear and envi-
ronmental movements; the peace movement (including the theme of north-south conflict); single-issue tive
and
local
movements; the
movement (which encompasses
"scene," with
its
alterna-
the urban
squatters and alternative pro-
communes); the mihandicapped, and so forth); the psychoscene, with support groups and youth sects; religious fundamentalism; the
jects,
as well as the rural
norities (the elderly, gays,
tax-protest
movement, school
ents' associations, resistance to
forms; and,
by par-
"modernist"
re-
women's movement. Of significance are the autonomy
finally,
international
movements
protest
the
struggling for regional, linguistic,
and also religious independence. In this spectrum I will differentiate emancipatory potentials from potentials for resistance and withdrawal. After the American civil rights movement which has since issued in a cultural,
—
particularistic self-affirmation of black subcul-
tures
—only
the feminist
movement stands
in
the tradition of bourgeois-socialist liberation
movements. The struggle against patriarchal and for the redemption of a promise that has long been anchored in the acknowledged universalistic foundations of morality and law gives feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas the other movements have a more defensive character. The resistance and withdrawal movements aim at stemming formally organized domains of acoppression
schools, the protest against taxes (patterned after the
movement
in
support of Proposition
13 in California), and most of the
autonomy, on the one
movements
from the core of a new conflict potential, on the other: youth and alternative movements for which a critique of growth sparked by themes of ecologv and for
side,
peace is the common focus. It is possible to conceive of these conflicts in terms of resistance
toward a colonization of the lifehope now to indicate, at least in a cursory way.'* The objectives, attitudes, and wavs of acting prevalent in youth protest groups can be understood, to begin with, as reactions to certain problem situations that are to tendencies
world, as
I
perceived with great sensitivitv. "Green" ('whlcms. scale
industry
into
The intervention ecological
of large-
balances,
the
nonrenewable natural resources, as well as demographic de\'elopments
growing
scarcity of
CHAPTER
present industrially developed societies with
major problems; but these challenges are ab-
and call for technical and economwhich must in turn be globally planned and implemented by administrative stract at first ic
solutions,
means. What
16:
CRITICAL
THEORY
409
mentalism is also a motivating force behind most alternative projects and many citizens' action groups the painful manifestations of deprivation in a culturally impoverished and one-sidedly rationalized practice of everyday
—
tangible destruction of the urban environment;
life. For this reason, ascriptive characteristics such as gender, age, skin, color, neighborhood
the despoliation of the countryside through
or locality, and religious affilitation serve to
housing developments, industrialization, and pollution; the impairment of health through the ravages of civilization, pharmaceutical side that is, developments that effects, and the like noticeably affect the organic foundations of the
build
and make us drastically aware of standards of livability, of inflexible limits to the deprivation of sensual-aesthetic background
enough to be familiar, of decenforms of commerce and despecialized activities, of segmented pubs, simple interac-
needs.
sets off the protest
is
rather the
—
lifeworld
up and separate
tablish
subculturally
off
communities, to escommunities
protected
supportive of the search for personal and collective identity. lar,
The revaluation
of the particu-
the natural, the provincial, of social spaces
that are small tralized
—
plants,
and dedifferentiated public spheres all meant to foster the revitaliztion of possibilities for expression and communication that have been buried alive. Resistance to reformist
atomic waste, genetic engineering, the storage
interventions that turn into their opposite, be-
and the are combined, howev-
cause the means by which they are implemented run counter to the declared aims of social
tions
Problems of excessive complexity. There are certainly good reasons to fear military potenfor
tials
and
nuclear
destruction,
power
central utilization of private data,
These real anxieties er, with the terror of a new category of risks that are literally invisible and are comprehensible only from the perspective of the system. These risks invade the lifeworld and at the like.
same time burst
its
dimensions. The anxieties
function as catalysts for a feeling of being over-
whelmed
view of the possible consequences which we are morally accountable since we do set them in motion technically and politically and yet for which we can no longer take moral responsibility since their scale has put them beyond our control. Here resistance is directed against abstractions in
of processes for
—
—
—
upon
this is
integration, also belongs in this context.
The new conflicts arise along the seams between system and lifeworld. Earlier I described how the interchange between the private and public spheres, on the one hand, and the economic and administrative action systems, on the other, takes place via the media of money and power, and how it is institutionalized in the roles of employees and consumers, citizens and clients of the state. It is just these roles that are the targets of protest. Alternative practice
is
directed against the profit-dependent instru-
mentalization of
work
in one's vocation, the
the lifeworld, although
market-dependent mobilization of labor power,
they go beyond the spatial, temporal, and so-
against the extension of pressures of competi-
that are forced
cial limits of
entiated
complexity of even highly
lifeworlds,
centered
as
differ-
these
are
around the senses. Overhiiniening the communicative infrastruc-
Something
expressed rather blatantly in the manifestations of the psychomovement and renewed religious fundature.
that
is
tion and performance all the way down into elementary school. It also takes aim at the monetarization of services, relationships, and time, at
the
consumerist
spheres of
life
of
private
life-styles.
Further-
redefinition
and personal
more, the relation of clients to public service is to be opened up and reorganized in
agencies
— 410
PART
3:
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
a participatory
mode, along the lines of selfIt is above all in the dopolicy and health policy (e.g., in
help organizations.
mains of
social
connection with psychiatric care) that niodels
move them from the clutches of the steering media, and return these "liberated areas" to the action-coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding.
However
of reform point in this direction. Finally, certain
forms of protest negate the definitions of the role of citizen and the routines for pursuing interests in a purposive-rational manner forms ranging from the undirected explosion of disturbances by youth ("Zurich is burning!"), through calculated or surrealistic violations of rules (after the pattern of the American civil rights movement and student protests), to violent provocation and intimidation. According to the programmatic conceptions
—
of
some
theoreticians, a partial disintegration
employees and consumers, and citizens of the state, is supposed
of the social roles of of clients
to clear the
way
for counterinstitutions that de-
velop from within the lifeworld in order limits to the inner
and
to set
dynamics of the economic
political-administrative
systems.
action
These institutions are supposed, on the one hand, to divert out of the economic system a second, informal sector that is no longer oriented to profit and, on the other hand, to oppose to the party system new forms of a "politics in the
first
person," a politics that
is
expressive
and at the same time has a democratic base.^'' Such institutions would reverse just those abstractions and neutralizations by which in modern societies labor and political will-formation have been tied to media-steered interaction. The capitalist enterprise and the mass party (as an "ideology-neutral organization for acquiring power") generalize their points of social entry via labor markets and manufactured public spheres; they treat their employees and voters as abstract labor power and voting subjects; and they keep at a distance as environments of the system those spheres in which personal and collective identities can alone take shape. By contrast, the counterinstitutions
—
—
are intended to dedifferentiate the formally organized
some
domains
parts of
of action, re-
these ideas
unrealistic
may
be,
they are important for the polemical signifi-
cance of the
movements
new
resistance
and \vithdrawal
reacting to the colonization of the
lifeworld. This significance
is
obscured, both in
and oppo-
the self-understanding of those involved in the ideological imputations of their
nents, tural
if the communicative rationality of culmodernity is rashly equated with the
functionalist
rationality
of
self-maintaining
economic and administrative action systems that
is,
world
whenever the is
rationalization of the
life-
not carefully distinguished from the
increasing complexity of the social system. This
confusion explains the fronts
—which are out of
place and obscure the real political oppositions
—between
the
Young Conservatives tiv^e
antimodernism of the and the neoconserva'
defense of postmodernity^" that robs a
modernity at variance with itself of its rational content and its perspectives on the future.^ C.
—In
this
work I have
tried to introduce a the-
ory of communicative action that
clarifies the
normative foundations of a critical theory of society. The theory of communicative action is meant to provide an alternati\^e to the philoso-
phy
on which earlier critical theory is no longer tenable. It is intended as a framework within which interdisciplinarv research on the selective pattern of capitalist modernization can be taken up once again. The illustrative observations (a) through (d) were meant to make this claim plausible. The two additional themes (c) and (f) are a reminder that the investigation of what Marx called "real abstraction" has to do with the sostill
of history
relied,
but which
cial-scientific tasks of a
theorv of modernity,
not the philosophical. Social theory need no longer ascertain
the
normative contents of
bourgeois culture, of art and of philosophical
CHAPTER
16:
CRITICAL THEORY
411
thought, in an indirect way, that is, by way of a With the concept of a com-
transcendental grounding, but they do call for a self-understanding regarding the character of
municative reason ingrained in the use of language oriented to reaching understanding, it
this
critique o( ideology.
again expects from philosophy that
it
take on
systematic tasks. The social sciences can enter into a cooperative relation with a philosophy that has taken
up
the task of
working on
a the-
ory of rationality. It is no different with modern culture as a whole than it was with the physics of Newton and his heirs: modern culture is as little in need of a philosophical grounding as science. As we have seen, in the modern period culture gave
rise of itself to those structures of rationality
Weber then discovered and described as value spheres. With modern science, with positive law and principled secular ethics, with authat
tonomous
art
three
cism,
and
institutionalized
moments
art
criti-
reason crystallized
of
without help from philosophy. Even without the guidance of the critiques of pure and practical reason, the sons and daughters of modernity learned how to divide up and develop further the cultural tradition
aspects of rationality justice, or taste.
an empiricist abridgement of the rationality problematic is a steadfast pursuit of the tortuous routes along which science, morality, and art communicate with one another. In each of
More and more
the sciences
as a whole. Cognitive ethics separates off prob-
ly
life
deontological,
that Just.
and concentrates on
universalizable
strict-
aspects,
so
what remains from the Good is only the And an art that has become autonomous
pushes toward an ever purer expression of the basic aesthetic experiences of a subjectivity that
is
decentered and removed from the spa-
tiotemporal structures of everyday tivity frees itself
daily
life.
Subjec-
here from the conventions of
perception and
of
The mediation of the moments of reason is less a problem than the separation of the aspects of rationality under which questions of truth, justice, and taste were differentiated from one another. The only protection against no
different
dropped the elements of worldviews and do without an interpretation of nature and history lems of the good
—
tive rightness, or authenticity.
questions of truth,
under these
—as
knowledge. Two questions must be an(i) whether a reason that has objectively split up into its moments can still preserve its unity, and (ii) how expert cultures can be mediated with everyday practice. The reflections offered in the first and third chapters [of Volume 1] are intended as a provisional account of how formal pragmatics can deal with these questions. With that as a basis, the theory of science, the theory of law and morality, and aesthetics, in cooperation with the corresponding historical disciplines, can then reconstruct both the emergence and the internal history of those modern complexes of knowledge that have been differentiated out, each under a diftruth, normaferent single aspect of validity swered:
purposive
activity,
from the imperatives of work and of what is merely useful. These magnificent "one-sidednesses," which are the signature of modernity, need no foundation and no justification in the sense of a
these spheres, differentiation processes are ac-
companied by countermovements that, under the primacy of one dominant aspect of validity, bring back in again the two aspects that were at first excluded. Thus nonobjectivist approaches to research within the
human
sciences bring
viewpoints of moral and aesthetic critique to without threatening the primacy of bear""* questions of truth; only in this way is critical social theory made possible. Within universal-
—
istic
ethics the discussion of the ethics of re-
sponsibility
and
the
stronger
consideration
given to hedonistic motives bring the calculation of consequences and the interpretation of needs into play^' and they lie in the domains
—
of the cognitive
and the expressive;
materialist ideas can
come
in
in this
way
without threaten-
412
PART
ing the
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
autonomy
avant-garde art
is
of the moral.'''' Finally, post-
theory of communicative action
characterized by the coexis-
foundationalist claims.
tence of tendencies toward realism and engagement with those authentic continuations of classical modern art that distilled out the inde'^'^
pendent logic of the aesthetic; in realist art and Vart engage, moments of the cognitive and of the moral-practical art itself,
and
come
at the level of the
that the avant-garde set free.
radically
into play again in
differentiated
It
wealth of forms
seems as
moments
of
if
the
reason
such countermovements to point tonot a unity that could be had at the level of worldviews, but one that might be established this side of expert cultures, in a nonreified communicative everyday practice. How does this sort of affirmative role for philosophy square with the reserve that critical theory always maintained in regard to both the
want ward
in
a unity
—
is
guilty of
we must see how philosophy changes when it enters into cooperation with the sciences. As the "feeder" [Zubringer] for a theoFirst
its
role
ry of rationality,
it
finds itself in a division of
labor with reconstructive sciences; these
up
ences take
the pretheoretical
sci-
knowledge
of
competently judging, acting, and speaking sub-
knowledge of tramost general features of the rationality of experience and judgment, action and mutual understanding in jects,
as well as the collective
ditions, in order to get at the
language. In this context, reconstructions un-
dertaken with philosophical means also retain a hypothetical character; preciselv because of their strong universalistic claims, they are open to further, indirect testing. This can take place in
such a
way
that the reconstructions of uni-
established scientific enterprise and the sys-
versal
tematic pretensions of philosophy?
municative action, of argumentative speech, of experience and of objectivating thought, of moral judgments and of aesthetic critique,
Is
not such
open to the same objecpragmatism and hermeneutics have
a theory of rationality tions that
and necessary presuppositions
of
com-
brought against every kind of foundationalism? Do not investigations that employ the concept of communicative reason without blushing bespeak universalistic justificatory claims that will have to fall to those only too well grounded metaphilosophical doubts about theories of absolute origins and ultiniate grounds? Have not both the historicist enlightenment and materialism forced philosophy
enter into empirical theories that are supposed
which the tasks of a theory of rationality must already appear extravagant? The theory of communicative action aims
ry,
**
—
—
into a self-modesty for
at the
moment
of unconditionality that, with
criticizable validity claims, is built into the con-
ditions of processes of consensus formation. claims they transcend
and
time,
all
all
As
limitations of space
the provincial limitations of the
given context. Rather than answer these questions here with arguments already set out in the introductory chapter (to
Volume
1|,
1
shall
by adding two methodological arguments that speak against the suspicion that the
close
to explain otlwr
phenomena
—for example,
the
ontogenesis of language and of communicative abilities, of
tence;
the
moral judgment and social competransformation of
structural
reli-
gious-metaphysical worldviews; the develop-
ment
of legal systems or of forms of social
integration generally.
From I
the perspective of the history of theo-
have taken up the work of Mead, Weber,
and Durkheim and tried to show how in their approaches, which are simultaneously empirical and reconstructive, the operations of empirical science and of philosophical conceptual analysis intermesh. The best example of this cooperative division of labor
theory of knowledge.
A
is
Piaget's genetic
"
philosophy that opens its results to indiway is guided by the fallibilistic consciousness that the theory of rationality it once wanted to develop on its own can now be sought only in the felicitous coherence rect testing in this
CHAPTER
of different theoretical fragments. Coherence
is
the sole criterion of considered choice at the
on which mutually fitting theories stand one another in relations of supplementing and reciprocally presupposing, for it is only the individual propositions derivable from theories that are true or false. Once we have dropped foundationalist claims, we can no level
to
longer expect a hierarchy of sciences; theories whether social-scientific or philosophical
—
—
have to fit with one another, unless one puts the other in a problematic light and we have to see whether it suffices to revise the one or the other. in origin
The test case for a theory of rationality with which the modern understanding of the world is
to ascertain its
own
universality
would
cer-
throwing light on the opaque figures of mythical thought, clarifying the tainly include
and innot only compre-
bizarre expressions of alien cultures,
deed in such a way that we hend the learning processes that separate "us" from "them," but also become aware of what we have unlearned in the course of this learning. A theory of society that does not close it-
16:
CRITICAL THEORY
413
and speak with one another, stands we have seen, to the explicit knowledge of something. The horizontal knowledge that communicative everyday prac-
gether, act
in peculiar contrast, as
with it is paradigmatic for the with which the lifeworld background is present; yet it does not satisfy the criterion of knowledge that stands in internal relation to validity claims and can therefore be criticized. That which stands beyond all doubt seems as if it could never become problematic; as what is simply unproblematic, a lifeworld can at most fall apart. It is only under the pressure of approaching problems that relevant components of such background knowledge are torn out of their unquestioned familiarity and brought to consciousness as something in need of being ascertained. It takes an earthquake to make us tice iacitly carries
certainty
aware that we had regarded the ground on which we stand everyday as unshakable. Even in situations of this sort, only a small segment of our background knowledge becomes uncertain and is set loose after having been enclosed in complex traditions, in solidaric relations, in
through a critique of deformations that are
competences. If the objective occasion arises for us to arrive at some understanding about a situation that has become problematic, background knowledge is transformed into explicit knowledge only in a piecemeal manner. This has an important methodological implication for sciences that have to do with cultural
rooted in the selective exploitation of a poten-
tradition, social integration,
self off a priori to this possibility of
unlearning
has to be critical also in relation to the preunderstanding that accrues to it from its own social setting, that
is, it
has to be open to
self-criti-
cism. Processes of unlearning can be gotten at
tial
for rationality
that
was once
There
is
also another
of society based tive action
and mutual understanding
now buried over. reason why the theory
available but
is
on the theory of communica-
cannot stray into foundationalist by-
ways. Insofar as it refers to structures of the lifeworld, it has to explicate a background knowledge over which no one can dispose at will. The lifeworld is at first "given" to the theoretician (as it is to the layperson) as his or her own, and in a paradoxical manner The mode of preunderstanding or of intuitive knowledge of the lifeworld from within which we live to-
tion
came
of individuals clear to
—
and the
pragmatism and
philosophy, each in
socializa-
an implication that be-
its
own
to
hermeneutic
way, as they came
to doubt the possibility of Cartesian doubt. Al-
who so convincingly depicted the mode of unquestioned familiarity,
fred Schutz,
lifeworld's
nevertheless missed just this problem; whether a lifeworld, in
its
opaque take-for-grantedness,
eludes the phenomenologist's inquiring gaze or is opened up to it does not depend on just choosing to adopt a theoretical attitude. The totality of
the background
knowledge
constitu-
tive for the construction of the lifeworld is
no
414
PART
more
anv soan objective challenge
at his disposition than at that of scientist
cial
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
—unless
which the lifeworld as a whole becomes problematic. Thus a theory that wants to ascertain the general structures of the lifeworld cannot adopt a transcendental approach; it can only hope to be equal to the ratio essciidi of its object \vhen there are grounds for assuming that the objective context of life in which the theoretician finds himself is opening up to him its ratio cogjioscciidi. arises, in the face of
Marx applied
the type of reflection called for
by Horkheimer
He
one of
to
explained there
why
economy
of political
abstraction,
which
is
rest
his central concepts.
the basic assumptions
on
a
seemingly simple
in fact quite difficult:
step forward for Adam Smith throw out every limiting specification of wealth-creating activity not only manufacturing, or commercial, or agricultural labor, but one as well as the others, labor in general. With the It
was an immense
to
—
abstract universality of wealth-creating acti\-ity
This implication accords with the point behind Horkheimer's criticjue of science in his
we now have
programmatic essay "Traditional and Critical Theory": "The traditional idea of theory is abstracted from scientific acti\-itv as it is carried on within the di\-ision of labor at a particular stage in the latter's development. It corresponds to the acti\itv of the scholar which
labor as such, but labor as past objectified labor
takes place alongside
the other activities of a
all
but in no immediately clear connection with them. In this \'iew of theory, therefore, the
the universality of the object de-
fined as wealth, the product as such or again
How
difficult
and great
tem.
Now
it
might seem that
that
all
which human beings
tion in
—
—
whatever form
in
of society
real social function of science is not
one respect. Not in another ence toward specific labors corresponds
ifest;
conveys not what theory means
it
human
life,
but only what
means
it
lated sphere in which, for historical reasons,
comes
into existence."*'"
critical social
theory
is
to
the self-referentiality of that in
calling;
its
act of
belongs to the objective context of
The context
does not remain external
of
its
it
knowing
it
that
it
emergence
to the theory; rather,
the theory takes this reflectively
up
into
itself:
needs and goals, the experiences and skills, the customs and tendencies of the contemporary form of human existence have all played their part."*'' The same holds true for the context of application: "As the influence of the subject matter on "In
this
intellectual
activity
the
the theory, so also the application of the theor\' to the subject tific
matter
is
not only an intrascien-
process but a social one as well.""^
In his
economy
.
.
.
is
cor-
Indifferto a
form
of society in wliich individuals can with ease transfer
from one labor
to another,
chance
of indifference.
and where the them, hence
for
Not onh' the categor\' 'labor,' but become the means of cregeneral, and has ceased to be or-
labor in reality has here ating wealth in
ganically linked with particular individuals in
any specific form. Such a state of affairs is at its most developed in the modern form of existence of bourgeois society then, for the
first
—
in the
modern economics, namely category
'labor,'
of 1857,
United States. Here,
time, the point of departure of
the abstraction of the
'labor as such,' labor
pure and
simple, becomes true in practice.""^
Smith was able to lay the foundations of modern economics only after a mode of production arose that, like the capitalist mode with its differentiation of an economic system steered via exchange value, forced a transformation of concrete
acti\'ities into
abstract performances,
intruded into the world of
famous methodological introduction
to his critique of political
rect in
it
kiiows
life
play the role of producers. This
specific kind is a matter of
As opposed to this, become conscious of
and through the very
strives to grasp.
in
in the iso-
had been
achieved thereby was to discover the abstract expression for the simplest and most ancient rela-
society,
made man-
mav
this transition \\'as
be seen from how Adam Smith himself from time to time still falls back into the Physiocratic sys-
work with
this real
and thereby created a problem for the workers themselves: "Thus the simplest ab-
abstraction,
CHAPTER
which modern economics places at its discussions and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all straction
the head of
forms of
society, nevertheless achieves practical
truth as an abstraction only as a category of the
most modern
society."^''
A
theory of society that claims universality for its basic concepts, without being allowed
simply to bring them to bear upon their object in a conventional manner, remains caught up in the self-referentiality that Marx demonstrated in connection with the concept of abstract labor. As I have argued above, when labor is rendered abstract and indifferent, we have a special case of the transference of
domains
tively structured
communica-
of action over to
"how even
the
structures of the lifeworld as a tion,
NOTES 1.
A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Wcsterji Sociology (New York, 1970), pp. 25ff.; B. Gruenberg,
"The Problem of Reflexivity 2.
3.
sis of Social
ter of this abstraction, t-hemselves likewise a
(1978): 20ff.
product of historical relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations."'''' The theory of communicative action this is so: the
5.
The
modernity that
1
modern
communicative action "becomes practically true" in the deinstitutionalized forms of intercourse of the familial pri-
Politics: Studies in the
De-
1985), pt.
2.
On what
follows, see H. Dubiel
and A.
Sollner,
Recht und Staat im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt,
is
such an expansion of the scope of contingency for interaction loosed from normative contexts
H. Dubiel, Theon/ and
"Die Nationalsozialismusforschung des Instituts fur Sozialforschung," in Dubiel and Sollner, eds.,
have here
societies there
discussed in W.
velopment of Critical Theory (Cambridge, Mass.,
sketched in broad strokes permits us to recognize the following: In
is
eds., Sozialforschung nls
Kritik (Frankfurt, 1982). 6.
7.
of
program
state of the
Bonss and A. Honneth,
privileged access to the general structures of the lifeworld.
Consciousness," Theory and Society 5
See the nine-volume reprint of Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung by Kosel Verlag (Munich, 1979).
development of
give rise to the problem situ-
ed., Zwischenbi-
4.
ations that objeciively afford contemporaries a
The theory
Sociology of
W. Mavrl, "Genetic Structuralism and the Analy-
epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific charac-
itself
in the
Science," Philosophi/ of SocinfScieiice8(\978):32\fi. See the contributions by K. O. Hondrich, K.
Eder, J. Habermas, N. Luhman, J. Matthes, K. D. Opp, and K. H. Tjaden to "Theorienvergleich in
preall
ac-
cessible to us.
— —for
because of their abstractness
why
in ques-
become
Innz dcr Soziologie (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 14ff.
cisely
must
whole
they have
der Soziologie," in R. Lepsius,
categories, despite their validity
society
why
can account for
most ab-
stract
can explain
415
THEORY
—
case in regard to the category of labor holds true for this as well:
CRITICAL
systems penetrate into the lifeworld and, through monetarization and bureaucratization, force an assimilation of communicative action even to formally organized domains of action in areas where the action-coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding is functionally necessary. It may be that this provocative threat, this challenge that places the symbolic
media-steered interaction. This interpretation
decodes the deformations of the lifeworld with the help of another category, namely, 'communicative action.' What Marx showed to be the
16:
1981), pp. 8.
that the inner logic of
7ff.
As Marcuse presented it even then: "Social Implications of Modern Technology," Zeitschrift fiir Sozialforschung 9 (1941
9.
E.
):
414ff.
Fromm, "Uber Methode und Aufgabe
einer
analytischen Sozialpsychologie," Zeitschrift
vate sphere as well as in a public sphere
Sozialforschung
stamped by the mass media. At the same time, the systemic imperatives of autonomous sub-
in E.
Fromm,
1
fiir
(1932): 28ff. English translation
Tiie Crisis of
wich, Conn., 1971).
Psychoanalysis (Green-
416
10.
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
H. Dahmer, Libido und Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, 1973);
11.
3;
H. Dahmer,
Dobert
R.
and
1975); T. Ziehe, Pubertdt furt,l 1975); R.
(New
ment and "Politics
27.
Fromm,
und Narzissmus (Frank-
M. Merelman, "Moral Develop-
Potential Radicalism in Adolescence,"
Youth and Society 9 (1977):
York,
und Angestellte am Vorabeiid des Dritten Reiches: Eiiie sozialpsychologische Uutersuchung, ed. W. Bonss (Stuttgart, 1980). E. M. Lange, "Wertformanalvse, Geldkritik und die Konstruktion des Fetischismus bei Marx," Neue Philosophische Hefte 13 (1978): Iff. H. Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," in
13. E.
Nunner-Winkler,
G.
Adoleszaizkrise and Identitdtsbildung (Frankfurt,
gie (Frankfurt, 1980).
1942).
15.
See
They did not change their position. See T. W. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," Neic Left Rcviezu 46 (1967): 67-80, and 47 (1968): 79-90.; H. Marcuse, Eros and Ciz'ilization (Boston, 1955); and
idem. Five Lectures (Boston, 1970). 12. E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom
14.
26.
ed., Aiialytische Sozialptsycholo-
29ff.;
C. A. Rootes,
Moral Protest and
of
Legitimation
Problems of the Modem Capitalist State." Theory and Society 9 (1980): 473ff. See J. Habermas, Knoicledge and Human Interests (Boston, 1971), esp. chaps. 10-12; A. Lorenzer,
Arbeiter
Sprachzerstorung und Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt,
Menne, M. Looser, A. Osterland, K. and E. Moersch, Sprache, Handlung und
1970); K.
Brede,
Unbezousstes (Frankfurt, 1976). 28.
J.
Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego
Identity," in
Communication and
the Evolution of
pp. 69-94; R. Keagan, The Evoking Self (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).
Negations (Boston, 1968), pp. 134-58, here p. 135.
Societi/,
16. Ibid., p. 147.
W.
R. D. Fairbane,
An
Object Relations Tlieory of
17. Ibid., p. 158.
29.
18. Ibid.
(London, 1952); D. W. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment (New York, 1965). 30. See E. Jacobson, The Self and the Object World (New York, 1964); M. Mahler, Symbiose und Indi-
19.
See
J.
Personalit]/
Habermas, Communication and
tion of Society (Boston, 1979), esp.
20.
On
the Eivlu-
chaps. 3 and
4.
the discussion of the breakdo'ivn of Keyne-
economic policy in the West, see P. C. "The Breakdown of the Keynesian Model," Public Interest (1978): 20ff.; J. A. Kregel, "From Post-Keynes to Pre-Keynes," Social Research 46 (1979): 212ff.; J. D. Wisman, "Legitimation, Ideology-Critique and Economics," Social sian
Roberts,
P Davidson,
Research 46 (1979): 291ff.;
Keynesian Economics," Public
Interest
"Post
viduation,
mus
Habermas:
Critical
Debates
(New
(1980):
vol.
H. Kohut, Narzissmus, eine Theorie der Beliandlung narzistischer
25.
and idem. Die Heilung
32. R. Dobert, G.
On
J.
Habermas,
33.
(New York,
W. Damon,
ed.,
1980).
Nnc
Directions for Child Dei-
ment. 1 vols. (San Francisco, 1978); H. Furth, Pi-
(New
York, 1962); Erik
Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle 1959).
Nunner-Winkler, and
Selman, The Grozcth of Interpersonal Understand-
The Culture of Narcissism
Adolescence
Swan-
York, 1966);
des Selbst (Frank-
York, 1978).
Bios,
(New
eds., Entzi'icklung des Ichs (Cologne, 1977); R. L.
ing
Christopher Lasch,
P.
Meclwnisms of Defense
(Frankfurt,
Personliclikeitsstorungen
furt, 1979).
(New
the
Ego-Functioning," journal of Neurological Mental Disease 148 (1969): 14ff.
2
(Frankfurt, 1981).
24.
Ego and
York, 1946); D. R. Miller and G. E.
L. B. Murphy, 'The Problem of Defense and the Concept of Coping," in E. Antvonv and C. Koipemik, eds., The Child in His Family (New York, 1970); N. Haan, "A Tripartite Model of
(Cambridge,
Schriften,
Kohut,
(Frankfurt, 1978).
31. A. Freud, The
and Authoritarian Held and J. Thompson,
Mass., 1982), pp. 196-218. 22. L. Liiwenthal, Gesammelte
1972);
1976); O. Kemberg, und pathologischer Narziss-
son, Inner Conflict and Defense
State Socialism," in D.
1973);
(Stuttgart,
(Frankfurt,
Borderline-Storungen
21. A. Arato, "Critical Sociology
23.
vols.
Psychoanalyse
ISlff.
eds.,
2
Narzissmus: H. Kohut, Introspektion, Empathie und
(New
York,
and Knowledge (Chicago, 1981). 277ff., this volume. C. W. Mills, Politics, Poiver and People (New York,
agct 34. 35.
See pp.
CHAPTER
Rosenberg and D. White, eds., Mnss 111., 1957); A. Gouldner, The Dialectics of Ideology and Technology (New York, 1976); E. Barnouw, The Spenser (New York, 1977); D. Smythe, "Communications: Blind Spot of Western Marxism," Canadian ]ournal of Political and Social Theory 1 (1977); T. Gitlin, "Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm," Theory and So-
(Beverly Hills/London, 1979).
Society:
46.
Ibid.,
38. A.
47.
"TV,
Ideology and Socialist
munikation: Die kritische
49.
50.
Funktion
(Frankfurt,
Kritik
1982),
manuscript by K. W. "Zur Diskussion um
a
und
Perspektive
der
"Alternativbewegung";
Huber,
Wer
und Wertwandel
in den supplement to the weekly paper Das Parlament, September 1980,
J.
Raschke,
"Politik
Demokratien,"
pp. 23ff. the dual economy, see A. Gorz, Abschied vom
On
alles ic
pp.
J.
das alles cindern? (Berlin, 1980).
Proletariat (Frankfurt, 1980);
gen," in W. Bonss and A. Honneth, eds., Sozialals
found
helpful:
1980.
13ff.
und MassenkomTheorie und ihre Fol-
"Kulturindustrie
Kellner,
(Frankfurt,
"Okologie- und Alternativbewegung," Munich,
Emancipatory
Review 45 (1979):
1
very
48. Hirsch,
Mass Culture (Lon-
Action
Alternativen
politische
point
this
westlichen
Kellner,
forschung
On
soil
Popular Culture," 40. D.
und
Brand
pp. 38ff. of
Political
1980).
Entstehung,
Singlewood, The Myth
417
Hirsch, "Alternativbewegung: Fine politische
Ritual
don, 1977). 39. D.
J.
al..
THEORY
Alternative," in R. Roth, ed., Parlainentarisches
"Network Television and American Introduction to a Critical Theory of Tele-
vision," Theory and Society 10 (1981): 31 ft.
J.
Huber, Wer
soil
das
dndern? Concerning the effects of democrat-
mass
on the lifeworld contexts of votClaus Offe. "Konkurrenzpartei und
parties
482-515.
ers,
From
koUektive politische Identitat," in Roth, Parla-
Lazarsfeld's early radio studies on the
dual character of communication flows and the role of opinion leaders, the independent weight
communication in relation to mass communication has been confirmed again and again: "In the last analysis
it
inentarisches Ritual.
with people more than people listening reading, or looking at the
mass media
causes opinions to change." Mills, Power,
and People, p. 590. See P. Lazarsfeld, and H. Gaudet, The People's Choice
to,
B.
Kluge, Ojfentlichkeit und Erfahrung (Frankfurt, 1970), and,
by the same authors,
Geschichte und
Eigensinn (Munich, 1981).
91
ff.
Benhabib, "Modernity and the Aporias of
Critical Theory," Telos 49 (1981): 38-60.
44. R. Inglehart,
halten," in
J.
"Wertwandel und Matthes,
politisches Ver-
ed., Sozialer
Wandel
in
Wes-
teuropa (Frankfurt, 1979). 45. K.
Hildebrandt and
R.
J.
Biirgerinitia-
example, P. Berger, B. Berger, and Das Unbehagen in der Modernitdt
Kellner,
J.
Habermas, "Modernity versus PostmoderniNew German Critique 22 (1981): 3-14; Baier, "Wer unsere Kiipfe kolonisiert," in Lit-
L.
craturmagazin 9 (1978). 54. R. Bernstein,
55.
The Restructuring of Social and
Politi-
cal
Theory (Philadelphia, 1976).
In
"The Methodological Illusions of Modern PoTheory," Neue Hefte fiir Philosophic 21
litical
Benhabib stresses the fact proposed by K. O. Apel and myself treats calculations of consequences and, above all, interpretations of needs as essential elements of moral argumenta(1982): 47-74, Seyla
H. M. Enzenberger, "Baukasten zu einer Theorie der Meiden," in Palaver (Frankfurt, 1974), pp.
43. S.
Guggenberger,
ty"
York,
P Lazarsfeld and E. Katz, Personal Influ(New York, 1955). Compare O. Negt and A.
B.
(Frankfurt, 1975). 53.
Berelson,
1948);
ence
H.
Politics
(New
for
52. See,
or
that really
example,
tiven in der Parteindemokratie (Stuttgart, 1980).
people talking
is
see
51. See, for
of everyday
42.
et
S.
ciety 6 (1978): 205ff.
41.
H. Barnes, M. Kaase
1963); B.
Culture (Glencoe,
36. D. Kellner,
37.
CRITICAL
16:
Dalton, "Die neue Poli-
tik," Politische Vierteljahresschrift 18 (1977): 230ff.;
that the discourse theory of ethics
tion. See K. O. Apel, "Sprechakttheorie und transzendentale Sprachpragmatik, zur Frage ethisch-
er
Normen,"
in K. O. Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik
und Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 10-173; J. Habermas, Moralbeivusstsein uiul kommunikatives Handein (Frankfurt, 1983).
418
56.
PART
On
3:
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
this point,
und
alismus
Max Horkheimer's Moral,"
forschung 2 (1933): 263ff. 57.
P.
Biirger, Theory of the
lis,
58. R.
essay "Materi-
Zeitschrift is still
fiir
Sozial-
worth reading.
Aimnt-Garde (Minneapo-
1984).
Rorty,
Philosophy and
the
Mirror of Nature
(Princeton, 1979). 59. R.
F.
45 (1980):
I
materialism
so comprehensive that
own
aims
at
it
encompasses
contexts of origin and applica-
tion. The theory specifies the conditions under which a self-reflection of the history of the species has become objectivelv possible. At the it
addressed,
who
names those can with
whom
to its
the theory
is
help gain enlighten-
ment about themselves and
have examined the methodological pe-
on the context of
its
emancipatory With this reflection origin and this anticipation
connec-
of the context of
its
application, the theorv un-
und Hegels
Dialektik (Frankfurt,
tion with the division of labor
phy and psychology
between phUoso-
in Kohlberg's theor)' of the
development of moral consciousness, in "Interpretive Sociale Wetenschap versus Radicale Hermeneutick," Kennis eii Method 5 (1981): 4ff. In M. Horkheimer, Critical Theor]/ (New York, 1972), pp. 188-243, here p. 197.
62. Ibid., p. 196.
I
once characterized the relation be-
social theory
and
social practice in the
their
role in the process of historv'.
derstands
itself
as a necessary catalytic
moment
complex of social life that it analyzes; and it analyzes this complex as an integral network of coercion, from the viewpoint of its posin the very
sible
transformation."
(Boston, 1973), pp. 2-3. 63. K. Marx, Grundrisse 1973), pp. 104-5.
61. Ibid., p. 205.
tween
is
the theory's
same time
culiarities of reconstructi\'e sciences in
60.
which
Nomna-
257ff.; T. Kesselring, Puigets genetische
Erkenntnistheorie 1981).
"Historical
achieving an explanation of social evolution
and Psvchologism," Synthese
Kitchener, "Genetic Epistemology,
tive Epistemology,
same way:
64. Ibid., p. 105. 65. Ibid.
Theory/
and
Practice
(Harmondsworth,
Eng.,
CHAPTER
17
Post-Modernism
INTRODUCTION The term post-modernism or post-modernity has come to mean many different things. Some associate
it
with the post-industrial
others with the post-Marxist world,
view
movement
society,
still
others
and some view it as a legitimation for new voices in a diverse and multicultural society. It is obviit
as a
in literary criticism,
ously difficult to give a single, encompassing definition to an intellectual
movement
that has
developed in so many different directions. Two basic themes are explored in the excerpts below: one deals with the question of the Enlightenment promise, and the other, and relattheme deals with the relationship of theory
ed, to
knowledge. In the discussion of
and power. In other words, knowledge good can be rationally apprehended, or put differently, knowledge and power are separate and distinct spheres of human action. It is the burden of Michel Foucault's work to interest
of the
demonstrate the opposite: to claim that knowledge and power are inextricably linked. Foucault was born in 1926 in Poitiers, France, where he was educated in Catholic schools and eventually made his way into the Sorbonne and took his degree in philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superieure. He subsequently studied psychology and took a diploma in psychopathology, which led to research and publication
Habermas' work,
refer-
ence was made to his commitment to the Enlightenment project, a view which proposes a democratic and just social order as an evolutionary outcome of modernity. This view is predicated on the assumption that people will be able to come to a rational understanding of the public good, and that this political knowledge can be obtained, under appropriate conditions, without recourse to the distortions of
on mental
illness in a
book
entitled
Men-
and Psychology. Foucault taught at a number of foreign universities but returned to France and in 1964 was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at the University of ClermontFerrand. In 1970 Foucault was designated "Professor of the History of Systems of Thought" in the College de France. In Discipli)U' and Punish, which is excerpted below, as well as in other works, such as Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and tal Illness
419
420
the
PART
first
3:
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
volume
of The History of Sexuality, Fouhow the human sciences
cault demonstrates
have become techniques of power by shaping the views and behaviors of
knowledge,
Scientific
human
sciences,
is
in
human
subjects.
instance
this
the
not a separate sphere of ac-
talents and interests of a community of scholars. On the contrary, the knowledge produced in these disciplines has had a profound impact on the hves of ordinary people and has shaped their views of themselves and others around concepts of normality and deviance. The human sciences have taken human subjects and instead of empowering them with knowledge, they have made them the objects of inquiry and subjected them to norms and rules of appropriate behav-
engaging the
tivity
rarified
have been legitimated by the idea of science itself. Knowledge, therefore, brings power in its wake as it produces new types of human beings who are deemed better because ior that
they are normal. In formulating the
problem
in these terms,
Foucault reconceptualizes power and embeds it
This
ciety."
is
The
what he means by real transactions of
scientific explorations in the past,
otard
tells
us
is
Kuhnian paradigms and tend
the significance of those events empirically. To abandon these metanarratives is to accept the idea that history may have no purpose, that it is not an e\olutionarv or progressi\'e march towards an emancipatory telos, but rather a contingent set of events, often accidental and with
many unanticipated consequences. One consec^uence of this claim privileged position of theorists
the "carceral so-
power
serting
everyday are not in
tion.
stage,
its
own
workers, and psychiatrists.
These are not the benign and amelioratory aides of the welfare state but rather moral agents whose disciplinary power is based on their membership in the credentialed knowledge elite. A related theme of post-modernism is explored by Jean Francois Lyotard in his book, The Post-Modcni Condition: A Rcpoii on K)Hnrl-
Here Lyotard launches a by which
direct assault
he
means
al
truths,
power
ly since there is
"metanarratives,"
that the
is undermined and thev are seen as upholding a viewpoint that promises an objective truth but reveals a partial view that suppresses other views as false or unworthy of considera-
the relationships of people to teachers, doctors,
edge.
is
and philoso-
phers
struggle for
social
impose mean-
to
ing onto historical events rather than to explore
the relationships of citizens to the state, but in
therapists,
but what Ly-
that metanarratives operate like
Played out on the contemporary political post-modernism has legitimated the expression of voices from many quarters, each as-
in the socialization processes of
life.
broadly philosophical discourses, like Marxism and other Enlightenment theories, that have distorted our ability to see the truth of our condition by coloring our perceptions with claims of emancipation, progress, and justice. Metanarratives have given meaning and purpose to
no longer any higher
authority that can In
and each engaged
in a
to legitimate itself political-
sit
in
intellectu-
judgement.
debunking the modernists' commitment knowledge, and to
io reason, to disinterested
truths that are universal, the writings of Foucault
and Lyotard go
far in delegitimating in-
tellectual structures that surreptitioush' exer-
power under the guise of engaging in The contrasts with Habermas could not be greater, and these are directh' drawn out
cise
science.
on
in the essay
the
this chapter.
by Richard Rorty
that concludes
CHAPTER
Michel Foucault: The Carceral Were
date of completion of the
to fix the
I
carceral system,
would choose not 1810 and
1
the penal code, nor even 1844,
laying
down
ment was passed; 1838,
when
the law
the principle of cellular internI
might not even choose
when books on
prison reform by Charles
Lucas, Moreau-Christophe and Faucher were
published. The date
I
would choose would be
22 January 1840, the date of the of Mettray.
Or
better
still,
official
opening
perhaps, that glori-
ous day, unremarked and unrecorded, when a child in Mettray remarked as he lay dying: 'What a pity I left the colony so soon.' This marked the death of the first penitentiary saint. Many of the blessed no doubt went to join him, if the former inmates of the penal colonies are to be believed when, in singing the praises of the
new
punitive policies of the body, they re-
marked: 'We preferred the blows, but the cell suits us better.' Why Mettray? Because it is the disciplinary form at its most extreme, the model in which are concentrated of behaviour. In
all it
the coercive technologies
were
prison, school, regiment'.
erarchized
groups,
into
to
be found
'cloister,
The small, highly hiwhich the inmates
were divided, followed simultaneously five models: that of the family (each group was a 'family' composed of 'brothers' and two 'elder brothers'); that of the army (each family, commanded by a head, was divided into two sections, each of which had a second in command; each inmate had a number and was taught basic military exercises; there
was
a cleanliness
inspection every day, an inspection of clothing every week; a roll-call was taken three times a day); that of the workshop, with supervisors
and foremen, who were responsible for the regularity of the work and for the apprenticeship of the younger inmates; that of the school (an hour or an hour and a half of lessons every day; the teaching was given by the instructor and by the deputy-heads); lastly, the judicial model (each day 'justice' was meted out in the parlour: 'The least act of disobedience is punished and the best way of avoiding serious offences is to punish the most minor offences very severely:
was confinement the best means of children; religion,
it
Reprinted from Michel Foucault, "The Carcerand Punish: Vie Birth of the Prison, (Pantheon Books). Copyright © 1977 by Alan Sheridan. Copyright © 1975 by Editions Gallimard.
is
to one's cell; for 'isolation is
acting on the moral nature of
there above
is
even
if
it
hearts, recovers all
all that the voice of has never spoken to their its emotional power'; the
entire parapenal institution,
which
created in
is
order not to be a prison, culminates in the
on the walls of which are written ters: 'God sees you.'
cell,
in black let-
This superimposition of different models
makes
it
possible to indicate, in
tures, the function of 'training'.
its
specific fea-
The
chiefs
and
Mettray had to be not exactly judges, or teachers, or foremen, or non-commissioned officers, or 'parents', but something their deputies at
of
all
of
mode
these things in a quite specific
intervention.
They were
behaviour;
of
in a sense technicians
engineers
of
conduct,
ortho-
was to produce bodies that were both docile and capable; they supervised the nine or ten working hours of every day (whether in a workshop or in the fields); they directed the orderly movepaedists of individuality. Their task
ments of groups of inmates, physical
exercises,
military exercises, rising in the morning, going to bed at night, walks to the accompaniment of bugle and whistle; they taught gymnastics;' they checked cleanliness, supervised bathing.
was accompanied by permanent obbody of knowledge was being constantly built up from the everyday behaviour of the inmates; it was organized as an instrument of perpetual assessment: 'On entering the servation; a
Source
word
Mettray, a useless
at
punishable'; the principal punishment inflicted
Training
al," in Discipline
421
POST-MODERNISM
17:
422
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
colony, the child
is
subjected to a sort of inter-
rogation as to his origins, the position of his
which he was brought
family, the offence for
before the courts and
make up
all
the other offences that
and often very sad existence. This information is written down on a board on which everything concerning each inmate is noted in turn, his stay at the colony and the place to which he is sent when he leaves.' The modelling of the body produces a knowledge his short
of the individual, the apprenticeship of the tecliniques induces
modes
the acquisition of skills
is
of beha\-iour
and
inextricably linked
with the establishment of power relations; strong, skilled agricultural workers are produced; in this very work, provided it is technically super\-ised, submissive subjects are produced and a dependable body of knowledge built up about them. This disciplinary technique exercised upon the body had a tiouble effect: a 'soul' to
be maintained.
be
One
known and
a subjection to
result vindicated this
work
moment
vvhen 'the fever of revolution fired the imagination of all, when the schools at Angers, La Fleche, Alfort, even the boarding schools, rose up in rebellion, the inmates of Mettray were calmer than e\er' of training: in 1848, at a
was
same apsame coercions as the
to subject the future cadres to the
prenticeships and to the
inmates themselves: they were 'subjected as pupils to the discipline that,
thev would
tors,
were taught the the
first
later,
power
art of
relations.
It
so happens that historians of the
during these same years, it seems, Weber was manipulating his little compass for the measurement of sensations. What took place at Mettrav (and in other European countries sooner or later) was obviously of a quite different order It was the emergence or rather at this time:
the institutional specification, the baptism as
were,
of
a
new
type of supervision
most as humble' as those of the inmates themnever
left their side,
ob-
the formation
And
appearance of these professionals of discipline, normality and subjection surely marks the beginning of a new stage. It will be said that the quantitative assessment of sensorial responses could at least derive authority from the prestige of the emerging science of physitilogy and that for this alone
it
deserves to feature in the
histon' of the sciences. But the supervision of
normality was firmly encased in a medicine or it with a sort of 'sci-
a psychiatry that provided entificity';
among them
ratus which, directly or indirectly, gave
network
permanent obserxation. And, in order to train them themselves, a specialized school had been organized in the colony. The essential element of its programme i>f
vet, in
and growth of psychology, the
serving them day and night; thev constituted a
it
—both
—over individuals who
resisted disciplinary normalization.
selves; they practically
human
sciences date the birth of scientific psychology
knowledge and power
But it cannot be identified absolutely with them. Nor with administration in the strict sense. Heads or deputy-heads of 'families', monitors and foremen, had to li\'e in close proximity to the inmates; their clothes were 'al-
was
'penitentiar\'' was not simply a project that sought its justification in 'humanity' or its foundations in a 'science', but a technique that vvas learnt, transmitted and which obeyed general norms. The practice that normalized by compulsion the conduct of the undisciplined or dangerous could, in turn, by technical elaboration and rational reflection, be 'normalized'. The disciplinary technique became a 'discipline' which also had its school.
Where Mettray w'as especially exemplary was in the specificity that it recognized in this operation of training. It was related to other forms of supervision, on which it was based: medicine, general education, religious direc-
It
training college in pure discipline: the
(Ferrus).
tion.
as instruc-
themselves impose.' They
it
was supported by
a judicial
appa-
it
legal
Thus, in the shelter of these two considerable protectors, and, indeed, acting as a link between them, or a place of exchange, a justification.
CHAPTER
423
POST-MODERNISM
17:
and the right of parAnd, if the appaform of confinement
carefully
worked out technique for the supervinorms has continued to develop right up to the present day. The specific, institutional supports of these methods have proliferated
courts, paternal correction
sion of
ents to lock
since the founding of the small school at Met-
very soon reactivated, rearranged, developed in certain directions. But what is still more important is that it was homogenized, through the
tray; their tity
apparatuses have increased in quan-
and scope;
their auxiliary services
have
increased, with hospitals, schools, public ad-
ministrations
and private
enterprises;
their
agents have proliferated in number, in power, in technical qualification; the technicians of in-
discipline
have founded a
family. In the nor-
up
their children.)
ratus of the great classical
was
partly (and only partly) dismantled,
which were already blurred tended to disappear and to constitute a great carceral continuum that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most intions of discipline,
power of normalization, in the arrangement of a power-knowledge over individuals, Mettray and its school marked a
in the classical age,
new
nocent
But why choose this moment as the point of emergence of the formation of an art of punishing that
is still
more
own? Precisely somewhat 'unjust'. Be-
or less our
because this choice is cause it situates the 'end' of the process in the lower reaches of criminal law. Because Mettray was a prison, but not entirely; a prison in that it contained young delinquents conciemned by the courts; and yet something else, too, because it also contained minors who had been charged, but acquitted under article 66 of the code, and boarders held, as in the eighteenth century, as an alternative to paternal correction. Mettray, a punitive model, is at the limit of strict
whole
penality.
It
was
famous of a beyond constituted what
the most
series of institutions which, well
the frontiers of criminal law,
one might
call
the carceral archipelago.
Yet the general principles, the great codes
and subsequent legislation were quite clear on the matter: no imprisonment 'outside the law,' no detention that had not been decided by a qualified judicial institution, no more of those arbitrary and yet widespread confinements. Yet the very principle of extra-penal incarceration
was
in fact never abandoned. (A whole study remains to be done of the debates that took place during the Revolution concerning family
was
mediation of the prison, on the one hand with legal punishments and, on the other, with disciplinary mechanisms. The frontiers between confinement, judicial punishment and institu-
malization of the
era.
it
disciplines,
transmitting
disciplinary
norms into the very heart of the penal system and placing over the slightest illegality, the smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly, the of
threat
delinquency.
carceral net, with
A
compact
subtle,
graduated but also
institutions,
separate and diffused methods, assumed responsibility for the arbitrary, widespread, badly
integrated confinement of the classical age. I
shall not attempt here to reconstitute the
that formed first the immediate surroundings of the prison, then spread farther and farther outwards. However, a few references and dates should give some idea of the breadth and precocity of the phenomenon. There were agricultural sections in the
whole network
example of which later by Fontevrault, Les Douaires, Le Boulard); there were colonies for poor, abandoned vagrant children (Petit-Bourg in 1840, Ostwald in 1842); there were almshouses for young female ofiiiaisoiis
was
fenders ing a
ci'iitmlcs
Gaillon
who
life
in
(the first
1824,
followed
'recoiled before the idea of enter-
of disorder,' for 'poor innocent girls
whose mothers' immorality has exposed
to
precocious perversity,' or for poor girls found on the doorsteps of hospitals and lodging houses. There were penal colonies envisaged
by the law of demned, were
1850: minors, acquitted or conto
be sent
to these colonies
and
424
PART
'brought
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
up
in
and trained
common, under strict discipline, work and in the
in agricultural
principal industries related to
were
it';
later,
they
be joined by minors sentenced to hard labour for life and 'vicious and insubordinate to
wards
of the Public Assistance.'
farther
still
away from
And, moving
penality in the strict
widen and the form the prison slowly diminishes and finally dis-
sense, the carceral circles
of
appears altogether: the institutions for abandoned or indigent children, the orphanages
Neuhof
demand,
age, a
a
norm. In the
common
od, despite a certain
classical peri-
reference to of-
the order of the crime, the
fence in general,
order of sin and the order of bad conduct remained separate in so far as they related to separate criteria and authorities (court, peniconfinement).
tence,
mechanisms
Incarceration
of surveillance
with
its
and punishment
functioned, on the contrary, according to a principle of relative continuity. the
of
institutions
The continuity which were
themselves,
or Mesnil-Firmin), the establish-
linked to one another (public assistance with
ments for apprentices (like the Bethleem de Reims or the Maison de Nancy); still farther away the factory-convents, such as La Sauvagere, Tarare and Jujurieu (where the girl workers entered about the age of thirteen, lived confined for years and were allowed out only under surveillance, received instead of wages pledged payment, which could be increased by bonuses for zeal and good behaviour, which they could use only on leaving). And then, still farther, there was a whole series of mechanisms that did not adopt the 'compact' prison model, but used some of the carceral methods: charitable societies, moral improvement associations, organizations that handed out assistance and also practised surveillance, workers' estates and lodging houses the most primitive of which still bear the all too visible marks of the penitentiary system.'^ And, lastly, this great carceral network reaches all the disciplinary mechanisms that function throughout so-
the orphanage, the reformitory, the peniten-
(like
—
school
have seen
that,
in
penal
justice,
the
with
the
prison;
the charitable society,
the
workshop, the almshouse, the penitentiary convent; the workers' estate with the hospital and the prison).
A
continuity of the punitive crite-
and mechanisms, which on the basis of a mere deviation gradually strengthened the rules and increased the punishment. A continuria
ous gradation of the established, specialized and competent authorities (in the order of knowledge and in the order of power) which, without resort to arbitrariness, but strictly according to the regulations, bv means of observation and assessment hierarchized, differentiated, judged, punished and moved gradually from the correction of irregularities to the punishment of crime. The 'carceral' with its many diffuse or compact forms, its institutions of supervision or constraint, of discreet sur\'eillance
and
insistent coercion, assured the
tion of
ciety.
We
the disciplinary battalion,
tiary,
the
punishments according
quantity;
it
connected
communicaand
to quality
in series or
disposed ac-
prison transformed the punitive procedure into
cording to subtle divisions the minor and the
a penitentiary technique; the carceral archipel-
serious penalties, the mild and the strict forms
ago transported
of treatment, bad
this
technique from the penal
institution to the entire social body.
With sever-
important results. 1. This vast mechanism established a slow, continuous, imperceptible gradation that made al
marks and light sentences. end up in the convict-ship, the slightindiscipline seems to say; and the harshest
You est
will
of prisons says to the prisoners life:
I
shall
condemned
to
note the slightest irregularity in
offence and back frt>m a transgression of the
your conduct. The generality of the punitive function that the eighteenth centin\' sought in
law
the 'ideological'
it
possible to pass naturally from disorder to to a slight
departure from a rule, an aver-
technique of representations
CHAPTER
and signs now had as its support the extension, the material framework, complex, dispersed, but coherent, of the various carceral mechanisms.
As
a result, a certain significant general-
moved between
ity
the greatest crime; the attack on the
the least irregularity
was no longer
it
common
the offence,
interest,
was
it
the
professional network. Careers
enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him the multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness. The carceral network linked, through innumerable relations, the two long, multiple series of the punitive and the abnormal.
The
carceral,
with
its
far-reaching net-
works, allows the recruitment of major 'delint]uents.' It organizes what might be called 'disciplinary careers'
exclusions
assistance associations, residential apprenticeships, penal colonies, disciplinary battalions,
prisons, hospitals, almshouses. These networks
were already well mapped out
beginning
at the
of the nineteenth century: 'Our benevolent es-
and
in
which, through various
rejections, a
whole process is set opened
to the grave.
in the confines or interstices of society the
confused, tolerant and dangerous domain of
which eluded the power: an uncertain space that
Follow the course of the unfortu-
man: you will see him born among foundlings; from there he passes to the nursery, then to an orphanage; at the age of six he goes off to primary school and later to adult schools. If he cannot work, he is placed on the list of the charity offices of his district, and if he falls ill he may choose between twelve hospitals Lastly, when the poor Parisian reaches the end of his career, seven almshouses await his age and often their salubrious regime has prolonged his useless days well beyond those of the rich man' (Moreau de Jonnes, quoted in nate
.
The
carceral
side.
It
takes back with one
exclude with the other.
the 'outlaw' or at least of that
to
including what
ground and a rethere poverty, unemployment,
gion of refuge;
innocence,
cunning,
the
struggle
network does not
it
waste even what
it
is
unwilling to
panoptic society of which incarceration
is
is
in the law, at the
and produced
saves everything, It
the omnipresent armature, the delinquent
this
not outside the law; he
the system, inculcated docility
It
no outseems
it
has decided to disqualify. In
and laws, and organized crime all came together as chance and fortune would dictate; it was the domain of adventure that Gil Bias, Sheppard or Mandrin, each in his own wav, inhabited. Through the play of disciplinary differentiations and divisions, the nineteenth century
delinquency by the same mechanisms. There was a sort of disciplinary 'training,' continuous and compelling, that had something of the pedagogical curriculum and something of the
is
hand what
punishes.
against the powerful, the refusal of obligations
constructed rigorous channels which, within
.
cast the unas-
similable into a confused hell; there
direct hold of
for criminality a training
.
Touquet).
in motion. In the classical period, there
pursued
it,
life:
tablishments present an admirably coordinated
adversary of the sovereign, the social
was
emerged from
as secure, as predictable, as those of public
whole by means of which the indigent does not remain a moment without help from the cradle
alized in the sphere of tactics. Replacing the
up
425
was
it
lum or the prison. It generalized in the sphere of meaning the function that the carceral gener-
2.
POST-MODERNISM
haunted the school, the court, the asy-
departure from the norm, the anomaly; this that
and
17:
is,
from the very outset,
very heart of the law, or at least in the midst of those mechanisms that
from disfrom deviation to offence. Although it is true that prison punishes delinquency, delinquency is for the most part produced in and bv an incarceration which, ultitransfer the individual imperceptibly
cipline to the law,
mately,
prison
perpetuates in
its
turn.
The
merely the natural consequence, no more than a higher degree, of that hierarchy laid down step by step. The delinquent is an institutional product. It is no use being surprison
is
426
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
prised, therefore, that in a considerable proportion of cases the biography of convicts passes
through
all
these
mechanisms and
ments, whose purpose, to in
establish-
widely believed, is lead away from prison. That one should find them what one might call the index of an irit is
Ushments may reproduce the law, the punishments imitate the verdicts and penalties, the
them
to
with
produced by
a
and,
which
in relation to
them
a
is
pure
a sort of official sanction. its
The
carceral,
long gradation stretching from the con-
childhood spent in a reformato-
victship or imprisonment with hard labour to
according to the lines of force of the general-
communicates a type law validates and that justice uses as its favourite weapon. How could the disciplines and the power that functions in them appear arbitrary, when they merely operate the mechanisms of justice itself, even with a view to mitigating their intensity? When, by generalizing its effects and transmitting it to
ized carceral system. Conversely, the lyricism of
model;
police
form, unadulterated and unmitigated, gives
condemned ry,
the
these multiple establishments, the
all
prison,
repressibly delinquent 'character': the prisoner
hard labor was meticulously
repeat
surveillance
above
marginality
image of the
may
find
inspiration
'outlaw', the great social
in
the
nomad,
who
prowls on the confines of a docile, frightened order. But it is not on the fringes of society and through successive exiles that criminality is born, but by means of ever more closely placed insertions, under ever more insistent surveillance, by an accumulation of disciplinary coercion. In short, the carceral archipelago assures, in the depths of the social body, the formation of delinquency on the basis of subtle illegalities, the overlapping of the latter by the former and the establishment of a specified
of
power
every
But perhaps the most important effect of its extension well
that the
level,
makes
it
it
possible to avoid
its full
rigour? Carceral continuity and the fusion of the prison-form
make
it
possible to legalize, or
any case to legitimate disciplinary power, which thus avoids any element of excess or in
abuse
it
may
entail.
pyramid gives punishment a con-
But, conversely, the carceral to the
criminality. 3.
diffuse, slight limitations,
power
text in
to inflict legal
which
it
appears to be
free of all excess
the carceral system and of
and
beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in making the power to punish natural and le-
apparatuses of discipline and of the successive 'embeddings' that they involve, the prison does not at all represent the unleashing of a
gitimate, in lowering at least the threshold of
tolerance to penality.
may be
It
tends to efface what
exorbitant in the exercise of punish-
It does this by playing the two registers which it is deployed the legal register of justice and the extra-legal register of discipline against one another. In effect, the great
ment.
—
in
—
all
violence. In the subtle gradation of the
simply an addidegree in the intensity of a mechanism that has continued to operate since the earliest forms of legal punishment. Between the latest
different kind of power, but tional
where one
the law and
difference
sentences gives a sort of legal
sanction to the disciplinary mechanisms, to the decisions and judgements that they enforce.
Throughout
many
this
'regional'
network, which comprises so institutions,
relatively
au-
tonomous and independent, is transmitted, with the 'prison-form', the model of justice itself. The regulations of the disciplinary estab-
'rehabilitation,'
where one
is
taken in order to avoid prison, and the prison
continuity of the carceral system throughout its
of
institution
is is
sent after a definable offence, the
(and must be) scarcely perceptible.
There is a strict economy that has the effect of rendering as discreet as possible the singular power to punish. There is nothing in it now that recalls the former excess of sovereign power when it revenged its authority on the tortured body of those about to be executed. Prison continues, on those
who
are entrusted
CHAPTER
work begun elsewhere, which
the whole on each individual through mechanisms of discipline. By
427
POST-MODERNISM
17:
of society pursues
question by the fiction of a juridical subject giving to others the power to exercise over him
innumerable
the right that he himself possesses over them.
to
it,
a
means
of a carceral continuum, the authority
that sentences infiltrates all those other author-
that
ities
transform,
supervise,
correct,
im-
might even be said that nothing really distinguishes them any more except the singuprove.
It
larly 'dangerous' character of the delinquents,
the gravity of their departures from normal be-
haviour and the necessary solemnity of the ritual. But, in its function, the power to punish is not essentially different from that of curing or educating. It receives from them, and from their lesser, smaller task, a sanction from below; but one that is no less important for that, since it is the sanction of technique and rationality.
power power
The
carceral 'naturalizes' the legal
to punish, as to
simply,
new economy
of power, the
which is its basic instrument, permitted the emergence of a new form of 'law': a mixture of legality and nature, prescription and constitution, the norm. This had a whole series of effects: the internal disloca-
power
tion of the judicial
or at least of
its
one were ashamed to pass sentence; on the part of the judges to judge, assess, diagnose, recognize the normal and abnormal and claim the honour of curing or rehabilitating. In view of this, it is useless to believe in the good or bad consciences of judges, or even of their unconscious. Their immense 'appetite for medicine' which is constantly manifested from their appeal to psy-
both arouse, thus depriv-
emerged.
to accept the
this
thus homogenizing
ing, as
if
a furious desire
— criminology—expresses
chiatric experts, to their attention to the chatter of
that the
By operating at every level of the social body and by mingling ceaselessly the art of rectifying and the right to punish, the universality of the carceral lowers the level from which it becomes natural and acceptable to be punished. The question is often posed as to how, before and after the Revolution, a new foundation was given to the right to punish. And no doubt the answer is to be found in the theory of the contract. But it is perhaps more important to ask the reverse question: how were people
made
With
be violent in one and
the same calculated, mechanical and discreet methods from one to the other, the carceral makes it possible to carry out that great 'economy' of power whose formula the eighteenth century had sought, when the problem of the accumulation and useful administration of first
4.
carceral system,
In
ing excess in either of any purpose, circulating
men
and real, immediately material counterpart of that chimerical granting of the right to punish.
may
arbitrary in the other, attenuating the effects of
may
the smallest coercions to the longest penal detention, constituted the technical
functioning; an increasing difficulty in judg-
discipline.
revolt that they
tween the power of discipline and the power of the law, and extends without interruption from
'legalizes' the technical
it
them, effacing what
highly probable that the great carceral continuum, which provides a communication beIt is
power
when punished,
to punish, or quite
tolerate being so.
The
theory of the contract can only answer this
power they
tured'; that
it
is at
a certain level
laws; that at another, it
the major fact
exercise has been 'dena-
governed by
more fundamental
functions as a normative power;
economy
power
it
level
is
the
and not that of their scruples or their humanism, that makes them pass 'therapeutic' sentences and of
recommend
that they exercise,
'rehabilitating' periods of impris-
onment. But, conversely, ever more reluctantly to of
condemning, the
if
the judges accept
condemn
for the sake
activity of judging has in-
creased precisely to the extent that the nor-
malizing power has spread. Borne along by the omnipresence of the pline,
basing
itself
on
all
mechanisms
of disci-
the carceral appara-
428
PART
tuses,
it
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
has become one of the major func-
tions of our society.
The judges
are present everywhere.
We
of normality
are in the society
power;
called for a technique of overlapping
it
subjection and objectification;
new
procedures
carceral
on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he
tures of this
Knowable man,
may
ness, conduct,
find himself, subjects to
gestures,
his
behaviour,
it
his
it is
his body, his his
aptitucies,
human
the
brought with
it
The
network constituted one of the armapower-knowledge that has made
of the teacher-judge; the doctor-judge, the ed-
ucator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge;
it
individualization.
of
sciences
possible.
historically
(soul, individuality, conscious-
whatever
it is
ject-effect of this analvtical
called)
is
the ob-
investment, of this
The carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest support, in
nevertheless decried from the outset.
modern
been no more than an instrument of rejection
achievements.
5.
society, of the
The
both the
carceral
normalizing power.
texture of society assures
real capture of the
body and
per-
its
by its verv nature, the apparatus of punishment that conforms most completely to the new economy of power and the instnmient for the formation of knowledge petual observation;
it is,
very economy needs. Its panoptic functioning enables it to play this double role. that
this
By virtue of recording,
it
its
methods of
fixing, dividing,
has been one of the simplest, crud-
also most concrete, but perhaps most indispensable conditions for the development of est,
immense
examination that has If, after the age of 'inquisitorial' justice, we have entered the age of 'examinatory' justice, if, in an even more general way, the method of examination has been able to spread so widelv throughout socithis
objectified
activity of
human
behaviour.
and to give rise in part to the sciences of man, one of the great instruments for this has been the multiplicitv and close overlapping of the various mechanisms of incarceration. am not saying that the human sciences emerged from the prison. But, if thev have been able to be formed and to produce so many profound changes in the episteme, it is because they have been conveyed by a specific and new modalitv ety,
1
domination-observation. 6.
This no doubt explains the extreme solidi-
ty of the prison, that slight invention that If it
was had
or repression in the service of a state apparatus,
would have been
its more more acceptable substitute for it. But, rooted as it was in mechanisms and strategies of power, it could meet any atit
easier to alter
overt forms or to find a
tempt
transform
with a great force of inerwhen it is a question of altering the system of imprisonment, opposition does not come from the judicial institutions alone; resistance is to be found not in the prison as penal sanction, but in the prison with all its determinations, links and extrajudicial results; in the prison as the relay in a general in
to
One
tia.
it
fact is characteristic:
network of disciplines and surveillances;
the prison as
it
functions in a panoptic
mean that it cannot be alnor that it is once and for all indispensable to our kind of societv. One mav, on the regime. This does not tered,
two processes which,
contrary, site the
very continuitv of the processes that
in the
make
the
prison function, are capable of exercising considerable restraint cm
ing
its
internal
its
use and of transform-
functioning.
these processes ha\e alreadv
degree. The
first is
that
And no doubt begun
to a large
which reduces the
utili-
ty (or increases its inconveniences) of a delin-
of power: a certain policy of the body, a certain
quency accommodated as a specific illegalitv, locked up and siiper\ised; thus the growth of
way
great national or international illegalities di-
group of men docile and involvement of of knowledge in relations of
of rendering the
useful. This policv required the
rectly linked to the political
definite relations
paratuses
(linancial
and economic ap-
illegalities,
information
CHAPTER
17:
services,
arms and drugs trafficking, property makes it clear that the somewhat rustic and conspicuous work force of delinquency is proving ineffective; or again, on a smaller scale, as soon as the economic levy on sexual pleasure is carrieci out more efficiently by the sale of contraceptives, or obliquely
Paris, neatly
speculation)
improved plan
through publications, films or shows, the
racks, courtrooms, police stations,
much
ar-
429
POST-MODERNISM
ordered and arranged, here
is
the
which all like things are gathered together At the centre, and within a first
in
enclosure:
almshouses for
hospitals all
for
prisons, convict-prisons for
es,
and
Around
children.
diseases,
all
types of poverty, madhousthe
first
women
men,
enclosure, bar-
houses for
its
prison warders, scaffolds, houses for the exe-
former usefulness. The second process is the growth of the disciplinary networks, the multi-
cutioner and his assistants. At the four cor-
plication of their exchanges with the penal ap-
of Peers, the Institute
more important powers that are given them, the ever more massive transference to them of judicial functions; now, as
Outside, there are the various services that
medicine, psychology, education, public assis-
and
chaic hierarchy of prostitution loses
of
paratus, the ever
tance,
'social
work' assume an ever greater
ners, the
Chamber
of Deputies, the
Chamber
and the Royal
Palace.
supply the central enclosure, commerce, with swindlers and
its
its
bankruptcies; industry
furious struggles; the press, with
its
its
sophisms; the gambling dens; prostitution, the
share of the powers of supervision and assess-
people dying of hunger or wallowing in de-
ment, the penal apparatus will be able,
bauchery, always ready to lend an ear to the
in turn,
become medicalized, psychologized, educaand by the same token that turningpoint represented by the prison becomes less useful when, through the gap between its penitentiary discourse and its effect of consolidating delinquency, it articulates the penal power and the disciplinary power. In the midst of all these mechanisms of normalization, which are becoming ever more rigorous in their application, the specificity of the prison and its role as to
voice of the Genius of Revolutions; the heart-
tionalized;
less
something of their purpose. an overall political issue around the prison, it is not therefore whether it is to be corrective or not; whether the judges, the psylink are losing If
there
chiatrists
is
or the sociologists are to exercise
more power
in
it
than the administrators or su-
it is not even whether we should have prison or something other than prison. At present, the problem lies rather in the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them. In 1836, a correspondent wrote to La Pha-
pervisors;
lange: 'Moralists, philosophers, legislators, flat-
terers of civilization, this
is
the plan of your
rich
against 1
are
.
.
.
shall stop
now
Lastly the ruthless
(La Phalange, 10
all'
far
with
this
away from
August
war
of
all
1836).
anonymous
text.
We
the country of tortures,
dotted with wheels, gibbets, gallows, pillories;
we ers,
are
far,
from that dream of the reform-
too,
less than
fifty
years before: the city of
which a thousand small thewould have provided an endless multiatres representation of justice in which the coloured punishments, meticulously produced on decorative scaffolds, would have constituteci the permanent festival of the penal code. The punishments
in
city, with its imaginary 'geo-politics,' governed by quite different principles. The extract from La Phalange reminds us of some of the more important ones: that at the centre of this city, and as if to hold it in place, there is, not the 'centre of power,' not a network of forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements walls, space, institution, rules, dis-
carceral is
—
model of the carceral city is body of the king, with the powers that emanate from it, nor the contractual meeting of wills from which a body that course; that the
not, therefore, the
— 430
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
was both individual and collective was born, but a strategic distribution of elements of different natures and levels. That the prison is
NOTES 1.
it
asleep
court and the docile or clumsy instrument of the sentences that sults that
would
it
court that
it
hands out and of the
like to achieve; that
external
is
cupies,
it
of 'carceral'
series
are a
enough
alall
but
the
to
— to a
plicity of illegalities, in all
the order of
of severe provisions against noise,
upkeep
.
.
of the dwellings, for
good behaviour,
devotion and each year these prizes
competed for by a large number of competi(Houze de I'Aulnay, 13-15). Crime was explicitly defined by certain jurists such as Muyart de Vouglans and Rousseaud de la Combe. tors'
their diversity of 3.
and the different ways in which they are dealt with by the punitive mechanisms. And that ultimately what presides over all these mechais
is
the heart of the regulations. There
are
whole multi-
nature and origin, their specific role in profit
nisms
number
for signs of
apparatus of production
'commerce' and 'industry'
is
.
the
plied not to transgressions against a 'central' law,
It
.
power of mechanisms are ap-
tend, like the prison, to exercise a
normalization. That these
fall
pillow'
drunkenness, disorders of all kinds. A serious offence brings expulsion. Brought back to regular habits of order and economy, the workers no longer desert the workshops on Mondays. The children are better supervised and are no longer a cause of scandal. Prizes are given for
mechanisms which seem
—since they are intended to leviate pain, to cure, to comfort — but which
distinct
the
example, the following description of
for
Cf.,
the day.
oc-
it
touch
they
nineteenth century: 'Cleanliness
not alone, but linked to a whole
is
moment
the
to
workers' accommodation built at Lille in the mid-
to the
prison. That in the central position that
body helps
taken that games
(Ducpetiaux, 1854, 375-6). 2.
the
it is
and subordinate
re-
is
consist of violent exercise. At night, they
not subordinated to the
is
the
tire
expel bad thoughts; so care
not the daughter of laws, codes or the judicial apparatus; that
'Anything that helps to
not the unitary functioning of an ap-
paratus or an institution, but the necessity of
Jean-Francois Lyotard: The Post-
combat and the rules
Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
of strategy. That, conse-
quently, the notions of institutions of repression, rejection, exclusion, marginalization, are
not adequate to describe, at the very centre of the carceral leniencies, acts
of
the formation of the insidious
city,
unavowable petty
cunning,
calculated
cruelties,
small
methods,
tech-
niques, 'sciences' that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary indiviciual. In this central
centralized
ment
of
humanity, the
effect
and
and
instru-
complex power relations, bodies and by multiple mechanisms of
I
define iposimodeni as incredulity toward meta-
narratives. This incredulity
forces subjected
institution
'incarceration,' objects for discourses that are
narrative
themselves elements for must hear the distant roar of
in
this
strategy,
of
this point
knowledge
in
a
which
in the past relied
function
is
losing
its
on
it.
functors,
The its
battle.
1
modern
undoubtedly
we
end a book that must serve as a historical background to various studies of the power of ni>rmnlization and the formation At
is
product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university
society.
tlit' University of Lyotard, The PosI-MmIcni Comlilioit: A Rcforl mi Kiimi'laigc. English translation 1984 by the Univerity of Minand Forward copyright
Source
Reprintod with permission of
Minnesota Press from
Je.in-Friini;ois
©
nesota Press.
CHAPTER
17:
POST-MODERNISM
431
—narrative,
but
has no relevance for judging what is true Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through discussion, as Jiirgen Haber-
also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive,
and
mas
great hero, its
its
great goal.
narrative
great dangers,
language elements
Conveyed within each cloud
so on.
matic valencies specific to lives at the intersection of
ever,
great voyages,
its
being dispersed in clouds of
It is
we do
its
are prag-
kind. Each of us
many
of these. Hov^'-
not necessarily establish stable lan-
guage combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable.
Thus the
society of the future falls less with-
in the province of a
Newtonian anthropology
(such as structuralism or systems theory) than a pragmatics of language particles. There are
many
different
languages games
—a
hetero-
geneity of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches
—
local
determinism.
The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They allocate our lives for the growth of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on its
—
optimizing the system's performance
efficien-
The application of this criterion to all of our games necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is, commensurable) or disappear. The logic of maximum performance is no cy.
doubt inconsistent in
many ways,
particularly
it
or just.
thinks? Such consensus does violence to
the heterogeneity of language games.
Quebec like to its
social
burden of the
incredulity
is
cies, as Still,
idle population). But our such that we no longer exrise from these inconsisten-
now
pect salvation to
did Marx. the
disenchantment as
positivity
of
is it
delegitimation.
after
the metanarratives,
side?
The operativity
as is
much to the
Where,
can legitimacy
criterion
is
re-
technological;
to
be said that the author of the
philosopher, not an expert.
I
—
two very different lancombine thein here with the re-
the other questions
guage games.
sult that neither quite succeeds.
The philosopher at least can console himself with the thought that the formal and pragmatic analysis of certain philosophical litical
and ethico-po-
discourses of legitimation, which under-
the report, will subsequently see the light
The report will have served to introduce from a somewhat sociologizing one that tnmcates but at the same time
that analysis slant,
situates
it.
Such as stitut
postmodern condition
a stranger to
blind
the
would
ter
lies
(to
I
The latknows what he knows and what he does not know: the former does not. One concludes, is a
of day.
it
at the request of its president.
thank him for his kindness in allowing
remains
report
demands both less work lower production costs) and more (to lessen field:
in-
is
publication. It
with respect to contradiction in the socioeco-
nomic
And
always born of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy. Here is the question: is a legitimation of the social bond, a just society, feasible in terms of a paradox analogous to that of scientific activity? What would such a paradox be? The text that follows is an occasional one. It is a report on knowledge in the most highly developed societies and was presented to the Conseil des Universites of the government of vention
it is, I dedicate this report to the InPolytechnique de Philosophie of the Uni-
—
de Paris VIII (Vincennes) at this very postmodern moment that finds the University nearing what may be its end, while the Instiversite
tute
may just be beginning.
432
PART
3:
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
Transformation in the nature of knowledge, have repercussions on the existing public powers, forcing them to reconsider their relations (both de jure and de facto) then, could well
with the large corporations and, more generally, with civil society. The reopening of the world market, a return to vigorous economic competition, the
breakdown
of the
hegemony
to
repay each person's perpetual debt with
THE PROBLEM: LEGITIMATION the working hypothesis defining the
That
is
field
within which
1
intend to consider the
question of the status of knowledge. This sce-
one that goes by the name computerization of society" (although ours is advanced in an entirely different spirit),
of
American capitalism, the decline of the soa probable opening of the Chinese market these and many other factors are already, at the end of the 1970s, preparing
nario, akin to the
cialist alternative,
"the
States for a serious reappraisal of the role they
What
have been accustomed
fine capacity for discrimination.
—
to
playing since the
re-
spect to the social bond.
makes no claims is
of being original, or even true.
required of a working hypothesis
is
a
The scenario the most highly de-
1930s: that of guiding, or
even directing invest-
of the computerization of
ments. In this
new
veloped societies allows us to spotlight (though with the risk of excessive magnifica-
light, the
technologies can
only increase the urgency of such a reexamination, since they make the information used in
making (and therefore the means even more mobile and subject
decision control)
knowledge and
to
civil institutions
is
not hard to visualize learning circu-
lating along the
of for
effects
its
—
on public power and
would be difficult from other points of view. Our hypothesis, therefore, should not be accorded predictive value in relation to reality, but effects
it
to perceive
piracy. It
tion) certain aspects of the transformation of
of
its
same
lines as
money, instead
"educational" value or political (ad-
strategic
value
in
relation
to
the
question
ministrative, diplomatic, militarv) importance;
raised.
the pertinent distinction would no longer be between knowledge and ignorance, but rather, as is the case with money, between "payment knowledge" and "investment knowledge" in other words, between units of knowledge exchanged in a daily maintenance framework (the reconstitution of the work force, "survival") versus funds of knowledge dedicated to optimizing the performance of a
it has strong credibility, and in our choice of this hypothesis is not arbitrary. It has been described extensively by the experts' and is already guiding certain decisions by the governmental agencies and private firms most directly concerned, such as those managing the telecommunications industry. To some extent, then, it is already a part of observable reality. Finally, barring economic
project.
stagnation or a general recession (resulting, for
were the case, communicational transparency would be similar to liberalism. Liberalism does not preclude an organization of the flow of money in which some channels are used in decision making while others are only good for the payment of debts. One could similarly imagine flows of knowledge traveling
example, from a continued failure to solve the world's energy problems), there is a good chance that this scenario will come to pass: it is hard to see what other direction contemporary technology could take as an alternative to the computerization of society. This is as much as to say that the hypothesis is banal. But only to the extent that it fails to
—
If
this
along identical channels of identical nature, some of which would be reserved for the "decision makers," while the others would be used
Nevertheless,
that sense
challenge the general paradigm of progress in science and
technology,
to
which economic
— CHAPTER
POST-MODERNISM
17:
433
growth and the expansion of sociopolitical power seem to be natural complements. That scientific and technical knowledge is cumulative is never questioned. At most, what is debated is the form that accumulation takes some picture it as regular, continuous, and unanimous, others as periodic, discontinuous, and contlictual."
sions of the question of authority.
But these truisms are fallacious. In the first place, scientific knowledge does not represent the totality of knowledge; it has always existeci in addition to, and in competition and conflict with, another kind of knowledge, which I will
ditions in order to be accepted as scientific. In
narrative in the interests of simplicity
and experimental verification) determining whether a statement is to be included in that discourse for consideration by the scientific community. The parallel may appear forced. But as we will see, it is not. The question of the legitimacy
call
(its
be described later). I do not mean to say that narrative knowletlge can prevail over science, but its model is related to ideas of internal equilibrium and conviviality next to which contemporary scientific knowledge cuts a poor figure, especially if it is to undergo an exteriorization with respect to the "knower" and an alienation from its user even greater than has previously been the case. The resulting demoralization of researchers and teachers is far from negligible; it is well known that during the 1960s, in all of the most highly developed societies, it reached such explosive dimensions among those preparing to practice characteristics will
professions
these
was
— the
students
— that
there
noticeable decrease in productivity at labo-
and universities unable to protect themselves from its contamination.^ Expecting this, with hope or fear, to lead to a revolution ratories
(as
was then
often the case)
is
out of the ques-
change the order of things in postindustrial society overnight. But this doubt on the part of scientists must be taken into account as a major factor in evaluating the present and future status of scientific knowledge. tion:
it
will not
civil
law as an example:
Take any
states that a given
it
category of citizens must perform a specific kind of action. Legitimation is the process by
which
a legislator
is
authorized to promulgate Now take the example of
such a law as a norm.
a scientific statement: that a statement
must
it
subject to the rule
is
fulfill
a given set of con-
this case, legitimation is the process
by which
"legislator" dealing with scientific discourse
a is
authorized to prescribe the stated conditions (in general, conditions of internal consistency
of science has been indissociably linked to that of the legitimation of the legislator since the
time of Plato. From
what
to decide
is
this point of view, the right
true
what
is
not independent of the
even if the statements consigned to these two authorities differ in nature. The point is that there is a strict interlinkage between the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and politics: they both stem from the same perspective, the same "choice" if you will the choice called right to decide
is just,
—
the Occident.
When we examine
the current status of
sci-
—
knowledge at a time when science seems more completely subordinated to the prevailing powers than ever before and, along entific
new
second demoralization has an
technologies, is in danger of bemajor stake in their conflicts the question of double legitimation, far from receding into the background, necessarily comes to the fore. For it appears in its most complete form, that of reversion, revealing that knowledge and power are simply two sides of the
impact on the central problem of legitimation. I use the word in a broader sense than do contemporary German theorists in their discus-
same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? In the computer age, the question of knowl-
It
is
all
the
more necessary and this
—
consideration since point
—the
scientists'
to take is
it
into
the
with the
coming
a
—
434
edge
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3;
now more
is
than ever a question of gov-
tains
an ambigious relation to knowledge. It that knowledge is only worthy of that
shows
ernment.
name
to the extent that
("lifts itself
ing
DELEGITIMATION and culture—postindustrial society, postmodern culture" the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what In contemporary society
—
mode
of
whether tive of
unification
it is
it
uses,
regardless
of
a speculativ^e narrative or a narra-
emancipation.
The decline
of narrative can be seen as an efblossoming of techniques and technologies since the Second World War, which has shifted emphasis from the ends of action to its means; it can also be seen as an effect of the redeployment of advanced liberal capitalism after its retreat under the protection of Keynesianism during the period 1930-60, a renewal that has eliminated the communist alternative and valorized the individual enjoyment of goods and services. Anytime we go searching for causes in this way we are bound to be disappointed. Even if we adopted one or the other of these hypotheses, we would still have to detail the correlation between the tendencies mentioned and the decline of the unifying and legitimating power of the grand narratives of speculation and fect of the
emancipation. It
is,
of course, understandable that both
renewal and prosperity and the disorienting upsurge of technology would have an impact on the status of knowledge. But in order to understand how contemporary science could have been susceptible to those effects long before they took place, we must first locate
the seeds of
and nithe grand narra-
"delegitimation"''
hilism that were inherent in
tives of the nineteenth century. First of all, the speculative
own
its
sublated)
itself
by
cit-
statements in a second-level dis-
mediacy, denotative discourse bearing on a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical
phenomenon,
etc.) does knows. Posinot a form of knowledge. And
property, a physical
know what
not really
tive science is
speculation
it
on
feeds
thinks
it
The
suppression.
its
Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a certain skepticism toward positive learning, as
Hegel himself admits.^ A science that has not legitimated not a true science;
meant
if
itself is
was
the discourse that
seems to belong to a prescientific form of knowledge, like a "vulgar" narrative, it is demoted to the lowest rank, that of an ideology or instrument of power. And this always happens if the rules of the science game that discourse denounces as empirical to legitimate
it
are applied to science
itself.
example the speculative statement: "A scientific statement is knowlecige if and Take
only
for
if
can take
it
its
place in a universal
process of engendering." The question this
statement knowledge as
Only
if
it
can take
its
process of engendering.
do
ists
it
itself
is:
Is
defines
it?
place in a uni\'ersal
Which
it
can. All
it
has
presuppose that such a process ex(the Life of spirit) and that it is itself an exis
to
pression of that process. This presupposition, in fact, is indispensable to the speculative lan-
guage game. Without it, the language of legitimation would not be legitimate; it would ac-
company at least
if
science in a nosedive into nonsense,
we
take idealism's
word
for
it.
But this presupposition can also be understood in a totallv different sense, one which takes us in the direction of
apparatus main-
reduplicates
it
lu'bt sich auf: is
course (autonymy) that functions to legitimate them. This is as much as to say that, in its im-
to
capitalist
up,"
we
postmodern
culture:
could sav, in keeping with the perspective
CHAPTER
we adopted
435
POST-MODERNISM
17;
that this presupposition
knowledge, and through didactics they guar-
must accept in order to play the speculative game. Such an appraisal assumes first that we accept that the
antee the replication of teachers rather than the
earlier,
defines the set of rules one
mode we understand
production of researchers. This is the state in which Nietzsche finds and condemns them."
The
"positive" sciences represent the general
of
knowledge and second, language
this
that
imply certain formal and axit must always
to
iomatic presuppositions that
make
explicit.
This
exactly
is
what Nietzsche
is
potential
erosion intrinsic to the
for
other legitimation procedure, the emancipation
apparatus flowing from the Aiifklnruiig, is no less extensive than the one at work within speculative discourse. But it touches a different
doing, though with a different terminology,
aspect.
when he shows
grounds the legitimation of science and truth
"European nihilism"
that
re-
sulted from the truth requirement of science being turned back against itself.'" There thus arises an idea of perspective that is
not far removed, at least in this respect, from
the idea of language games.
here the
is
What we have by The "crisis" which have
a process of delegitimation fueled
demand
for legitimation itself.
of scientific knowledge, signs of been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress in technology and the expansion of capitalism. It represents, rather, an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is erosion at work inside the speculative game, and by loosening the weave of the encyclopedic net in which each science was to find its place, it
eventually sets them
The ous tion
between the
vari-
—disciplines disappear, overlappings occur
new
borders between sciences, and from these
territories are born.
The speculative
hier-
archy of learning gives way to an immanent and, as it were, "flat" network of areas of inquiry, the respective frontiers of
which are
in
is
that
it
autonomy of interlocutors involved in and political praxis. As we have
ethical, social,
immediate problems with this form of legitimation: the difference between a denotative statement with cognitive value and seen, there are
a prescriptive statement with practical value
is
one of relevance, therefore of competence. There is nothing to prove that if a statement describing a real situation
is
true,
prescriptive statement based of
which
will necessarily
that reality) will
be
be
it
follows that a
upon
it
(the effect
a modification of
just.
Take, for example, a closed door. Between relation of
"Open the door" consequence as defined
in propositional logic.
The two statements be-
"The door is no
there
is
closed" and
long to two autonomous sets of rules defining different kinds of relevance,
free.
classical dividing lines
fields of science are thus called into ques-
at the
in the
distinguishing characteristic
Its
competence. Here, the
and therefore of
effect of
dividing reason
into cognitive or theoretical reason
on the one
hand, and practical reason on the other,
is
to at-
tack the legitimacy of the discourse of science.
Not is
a
but indirectly, by revealing that it language game with its own rules (of
directly,
which the a priori conditions of knowledge in Kant provide a first glimpse) and that it has no
universities lose their function of speculative
game of praxis game of aesthetics, for that matter). The game of science is thus put on a par with
legitimation. Stripped of the responsibility for
the others.
constant flux. The old "faculties" splinter into institutes
and foundations
research (which
was
of
stifled
all
kinds,
and the
by the speculative
special calling to supervise the
(nor the
If
this
"delegitimation"
and
narrative), they limit themselves to the trans-
slightest
mission of what
Wittgenstein
is
judged
to
be established
if
its
does
is
scope in
his
pursued in the widened (as own way, and is
436
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
thinkers such as Martin Buber and
Emmanuel
Levinas in theirs)'" the road is then open for an important current of postmodernity: science plays its own game; it is incapable of legitimating the other language games. The game of prescription, for example, escapes it. But above all, it is incapable of legitimating itself, as spec-
assumed
ulation
The
it
could.
social subject itself
seems
to dissolve in
this
dissemination of language games. The so-
cial
bond
is linguistic,
but
is
not
woven with
a
formed by the intersection of at least two (and in reality an indeterminate number) of language games, obeying different rules. Wittgenstein writes: "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses."'^ And to drive home that the principle of unitotality or synthesis under the authority of a metadiscourse of knowledge is inapplicable, he subjects the "town" of language to the old sorites paradox by asking: single thread.
It is
a fabric
—
"how many houses fore a
town begins
—
or streets does
to
it
take be-
New
languages are added to the old ones, forming suburbs of the old town: "the ibolism of chemistry and the notation of the infin•
itestimal calculus."'^ Thirty-five years later to the
list:
trices of
game
theory,
to relinquish its legitimation duties,''
why
plains
we
machine languages, the ma-
new systems
philosophy
is
which ex-
facing a crisis wher-
such functions studv of systems of logic or the history of ideas where it has been realistic enough to surrender them.'** Turn-of-the-century Vienna was weaned on ever
it
persists in arrogating
and
is
this
pessimism: not
reduced
to the
just artists
such as Musil,
Kraus, Hofmannsthal, Loos, Schonberg, and Broch, but also the philosophers Wittgenstein.'''
theoretical
and
They
Mach and
carried awareness of
and
artistic responsibility for dele-
gitimation as far as
it
could be taken.
We
can
say today that the mourning process has been
completed. There
is
no need
again. Wittgenstein's strength
opt for the positivism that
oped by the Vienna
over
to start all is
that he did not
was being
devel-
but outlined in his investigation of language games a kind of legitimation not based on performativity That is
what
the
rative.
their
It
Circle,""
postmodern world
people have
duced
be a town?"'"*
can add
become compartmentalized and no one can master them all.'" Speculative or humanistic philosophy is forced ished tasks of research have
in
is all
about.
Most
lost the nostalgia for the lost nar-
no way follows
to barbarity.
knowledge
What
that
that they are re-
saves them from
legitimation can
it is
only
own linguistic practice and communicational interaction. Science "smiling into its beard" at every other belief has taught spring from their
them
the harsh austeritv of realism."'
of musical
notation, systems of notation for nondenotative
forms of logic (temporal logics, deontic logics, modal logics), the language of the genetic code, graphs of phonological structures, and so on. We may form a pessimistic impression of this splintering: nobody speaks all of those languages, they have no universal metalanguage, the project of the system-subject
is
a failure, the
goal of emancipation has nothing to science,
we
are
all
do with
stuck in the positivism of
this or that discipline of learning, the learned
scholars have turned into scientists, the dimin-
LEGITIMATION BY PARALOGY Let us say at this point that the facts we have presented concerning the problem of the legiti-
mation of knowledge today are sufficient for our purposes. We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives we can resort neither to the dialectic of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a \alidation for postmodern scientific discourse. But as we have just seen, the little narrative [petit ivcit] remains
—
CHAPTER
the quintessential form of imaginative inven-
guage of science.
most particularly in science."" In addition, the principle of consensus as a criterion of validation seems to be inadec^uate. It has two formulations. In the first, consensus is an agreement between men, defined as knowing free wills, and is obtained intellects and through dialogue. This is the form elaborated by Habermas, but his conception is based on
ic
the validitv of the narrative of emancipatit>n. In
consensus."
tion,
the second, consensus
is
a
component
of the
discussion,
is
morphogenesis.
17;
POST-MODERNISM
437
This, in the context of scientif-
the It
is
same process Thom
calls
not without rules (there
it is always loApplied to scientific discussion and placed in a temporal framework, this
are classes of catastrophes), but cally determined.
property implies that "discoveries" are unpredictable. In terms of the idea of transparency, it is
a factor that generates blind spots
This
summary makes
it
and defers
easy to see that sys-
which is what legitimates the system power. The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy. Paralogy must be distinguished from innovation: the latter is under the command of the system, or at least used by it to improve its efficiency; the former is a move (the importance of which is
tems theory and the kind of legitimation it proposes have no scientific basis whatsoever: science itself does not function according to this theory's paradigm of the system, and contemporary science excludes the possibility of using such a paradigm to describe society. In this context, let us examine two important points in Luhmann's argument. On the one hand, the system can only function by reducing complexity, and on the other, it must induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends."*' The reduction in complexity is required to maintain the system's power capability. If all messages could circulate freely
often not recognized until later) played in the
among
pragmatics of knowledge. The fact that it is in reality frequently, but not necessarily, the case that one is transformed into the other presents
formation that would have to be taken into account before making the correct choice would delay decisions considerably, thereby lowering
no
performativity. Speed, in effect, is a power component of the system. The objection will be made that these molecular opinions must indeed be taken into ac-
system, which manipulates tain ject
and improve of
mann's
its
It is
procedures,
sense. In this case, to
order to main-
performance."
administrative
an instrument
in
it
its
the ob-
in
only validity
Luhis
as
be used toward achieving the
real goal,
—
difficulties for the hypothesis.
Returning to the description of scientific pragmatics (section 7), it is now dissension that must be emphasized. Consensus is a horizon that is never reached. Research that takes place under the aegis of a paradigm"^ tends to stabilize; it is like
the exploitation of a technological,
economic, or artistic "idea." It cannot be discounted. But what is striking is that someone always comes along to disturb the order of "reason." It is necessary to posit the existence of a
power
that destabilizes the capacity for ex-
all
individuals, the quantity of the in-
count if the risk of serious disturbances is to be avoided. Luhmann replies anci this is the second point that it is possible to guide individual aspirations through a process of "quasi-ap-
—
—
prenticeship,"
"free
of
all
disturbance,"
respect individuals' aspirations: the aspirations
planation, manifested in the promulgation of
have
new norms
their effects. Administrative procedures
for
understanding
in a proposal to establish
scribing a
new
field
or, if
new
one
prefers,
rules circum-
of research for the lan-
in
order to make them compatible with the system's decisions. The decisions do not have to
make
to aspire to the decisions, or at least to
individuals
needs in order
to
should "want" what the system perform well."' It is easy to
438
see
PART
what
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
role telematics technology could play
in this. It
cannot be denied that there
persuasive
is
force in the idea that context control
and domi-
nation are inherently better than their absence.
The performativity
"advanprinciple adherence to a
criterion has its
tages." It excludes in metaphysical discourse;
ation of fables;
cold wills;
it
it
it
requires the renunci-
demands
clear
minds and
replaces the definition of essences
with the calculation of interactions; the "players"
assume
it
makes
responsibility not only
for the statements they propose,
but also for
which they submit those statements in order to render them acceptable. It brings the pragmatic functions of knowledge clearly to light, to the extent that they seem to the rules to
relate to the criterion of efficiency: the prag-
matics of argumentation, of the production of proof, of the transmission of learning,
and
of
the apprenticeship of the imagination. It
also contributes to elevating
all
to self-knowledge, even those not withrealm of canonical knowledge. It tends to jolt everyday discourse into a kind of metadiscourse: ordinary statements are now displaying a propensity for self-citation, and the various pragmatic posts are tending to make an indirect connection even to current messages concerning them."^ Finally, it suggests that the problems of internal communication experienced by the scientific community in the course of its work of dismantling and remounting its languages are comparable in nature to the problems experienced by the social collectivity when, deprived of its narrative culture, it must reexamine its own internal communication and in the process question the na-
in the
made
in
name. At risk of scandalizing the reader, I would also say that the system can count severity among its advantages. Within the framework of the power critcricm, a request (that is, a form of prescriptit)n) gains nt)thing in legitimacy by its
but from the fact that the alleviation of hardship improves the system's performance. The
needs of the most underprivileged should not be used as a system regulator as a matter of principle: since the
means
of satisfying
them
is
already known, their actual satisfaction will
not improve the system's performance, but
only increase
its
terindication
is
expenditures. The only counthat not satisfying
destabilize the whole.
new
requests
norms
a redefinition of the
them can
against the nature of
It is
be ruled by weakness. But
force to
nature to induce
meant
of
is
it
in its
to lead to
"life.""''
In this
seems to be a vanguard machine dragging humanity after it, dehumanizing it in order to rehumanize it at a different level of normative capacity. The technocrats declare that they cannot trust what society desigsense, the system
nates as
language
games
ture of the legitimacy of the decisions
on the hardship of an unmet need. Rights do not flow from hardship, virtue of being based
needs; they
its
know
"know"
that society
own
needs since they are not variables independent of the new technologies.'"^' Such is the arrogance of the decision makers and their blindness. cannot
its
—
What
their "arrogance"
means
is
that they
identify themselves with the social system con-
ceived as a totality in quest of
mative unity possible. matics
of
is
we
we
its
most perfor-
look at the prag-
such
an
impossible: in principle, no
sci-
science,
identification
If
learn
that
embodies knowledge or neglects the
entist
"needs" of a research project, or the aspirations
on the pretext that they do not add to the performance of "science" as a whole. The response a researcher usually makes to a request is: "We'll have to see, tell me your of a researcher,
story."^' In principle,
he does not prejudge that
a case has already been closed
power
of "science" will suffer
In fact, the
Of
opposite
is
or that
if it is
the
reopened.
true.
does not always happen like in reality. Countless scientists have seen this their "move" ignored or repressed, sometimes for decades, because it too abruptly destabicourse,
it
CHAPTER
lized the accepted positions, not only in the
university
and
scientific hierarchy, but also in
the problematic.^"
The stronger
the "move," the
more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which consensus had been based.
But when
functions in this
knowledge
the institution of
manner,
it
is
acting like an or-
dinary power center whose behavior is governed by a principle of homeostasis. Such behavior is terrorist, as is the behavior
by Luhmann. By terror by eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him. He is si-
of the system described I
mean
the efficiency gained
lenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has
been threatened (there are many ways to prevent someone from playing). The decision makers' arrogance, which in principle has no equivalent in the sciences, consists in the exercise of terror.
to
It
says:
"Adapt your aspirations
—
toward the various made conditional on performativity.
norms of life enhancing the system's competence
consists in
That
evident in
of the
this is the case is particularly
for
power.
the introduction of telematics technology: the
439
POST-MODERNISM
general metalanguage in which all other languages can be transcribed and evaluated. This
what prevents its identification with the system and, all things considered, with terror. If the division between decision makers and ex-
is
ecutors exists in the scientific
community (and
system and not of the pragmatics of science itself. It is in fact one of the major obstacles to the imaginative development of knowledge. The general c]uestion of legitimation becomes: What is the relationship between the antimodel of the pragmatics of science and soit
does),
ciety? Is
it is
it
a fact of the socioeconomic
applicable to the vast clouds of lan-
guage material constituting a society? Or limited to the
game
of learning?
And
is it
if
so,
what role does it play with respect to the social bond? Is it an impossible ideal of an open community? Is it an essential component for the subset of decision makers, who force on society the performance criterion they reject for themselves? Or, conversely,
is it
ate with the authorities, a
our ends or else." Even permissiveness
games is The redefinition
17:
a refusal to cooper-
move
in the direction
of counterculture, with the attendant risk that all
possibility for research will
due to lack of funding?^" From the beginning of
be foreclosed
this study,
I
have em-
phasized the differences (not only formal, but also pragmatic) between the various language
this
games, especially between denotative, or knowledge, games and prescriptive, or action, games. The pragmatics of science is centered
process attractive for them is that it will result in new tensions in the system, and these will
on denotative utterances, which are the foundation upon which it builds institutions of
technocrats see in telematics a promise of liberalization
tween
and enrichment
interlocutors;
lead to an
in the interactions be-
but
improvement
in
what
its
makes
performativity.
learning (institutes, centers, universities,
etc.).
postmodern development brings a decisive "fact" to the fore: even discussions of denotative statements need to have rules. Rules
To the extent that science is differential, its pragmatics provities the antimodel of a stable system. A statement is deemed worth retaining the moment it marks a difference from what is already known, and after an argument and proof in support of it has been found. Science is a model of an "open system,"'^^ in which a
But
scribe
what
statement becomes relevant if it "generates ideas," that is, if it generates other statements and other game rules. Science possesses no
be
order to be admissible). The function of
its
are not denotative but prescriptive utterances,
which we are
better off calling metaprescrip-
tive utterances to
in
the
avoid confusion (they preof language games must
moves
the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is
440
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
to point out these metaprescriptives (science's
"presuppositions")
'
and
to petition the play-
ers to accept different ones.
make
tion that can
ble
is
new
that
this
The only
legitima-
kind of request admissi-
will generate ideas, in other
it
words,
plicity" of scientific
have the "simpragmatics. It is a monster
formed by the interweaving of works of heteromorphous classes
it
There
would be
metaprescriptives
\'arious net-
of utterances
performative,
prescriptive,
nical, evaluative, etc.).
think that
tech-
no reason
is
the rules
possible to determine
common
to all of these lan-
metaprescriptions
regulating
the
totalitv
of
statements circulating in the social collectivity. a matter of fact, the contemporary decline
—be they traditionor "modern" (the emancipation of humanity, the realization of the Idea) — tied the aban-
of narratives of legitimation
to
is
absence for which the ideology of the "system," with its of this belief.
pretensions to
It
is
totality, tries to
its
compensate and
which it expresses in the cynicism of its criterion of performance. For this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction of a search for universal consensus through what he calls Diskiirs, in other words, a dialogue of argumentation.'*'^ This would be to make two assumptions. first is
come
that
for dissent) destroys a
underlies Habermas' s research,
subject seeks its common emancipation through the regularization of the "moves" permitted in all language games and that the legitimacy of any statement resides in its contribut-
ing to that emancipation.^" It is
it is
possible for
all
speakers to
agreement on which rules or metaprescriptions are universally valid for language games, when it is clear that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules. The second assumption is that the goal of dialogue is consensus. But as I have shown in the to
analysis of the pragmatics of science, consen-
easy to see what function
this
recourse
plays in Habermas's argument against Luh-
mann.
Diskiirs is his ultimate
weapon against The cause is
the theory of the stable system.
good, but the argument is not.*' Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect. We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is
not linked to that of con-
sensus.
A recognition of language tion.
of the
games
is
a
heteromorphous nature first
step in that direc-
This obviously implies a renunciation of
which assumes that they are isomorphic make them so. The second step is the principle that any consensus on the rules defining a game and the "mo\'es" playable terror,
and
tries to
within
on by
must be
it
its
local, in
other words, agreed
present players and subject to eventu-
al cancellation.
The orientation then favors a by which
multiplicity of finite meta-arguments,
'^
The
still
sal)
al
donment
and the search
belief that
to
guage games or that a revisable consensus like the one in force at a gi\'en moment in the scientific communitv could embrace the totalitv of
As
is
end.
its
namely, that humanity as a collective (univer-
statements.
Social pragmatics does not
(denotative,
only a particular state of discussion, not Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy. This double observation (the heterogeneity of sus
1
mean argumentation
scriptives
and
is
that concerns metapre-
limited in space
and
time.
This orientation corresponds to the course that the evolution of social interaction
is
cur-
temporary contract is in pracsupplanting permanent institutions in the
rently taking; the tice
professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family,
and international domains, as well as
litical affairs.
This evolution
is
in po-
of course
am-
biguous; the temporary contract is favored by the system due to its greater flexibility, lower cost, and the creati\o turmoil of its accompany-
CHAPTER
ing motivations
—
all
of these factors contribute
to increased operativity. In any case, there is no question here of proposing a "pure" alternative to the system: we all now know, as the 1970s
NOTES 1.
2.
it.
knowledge decision to such and the games as of language rules and effor their responsibility assume precisely is significant effect Their most fects. what validates the adoption of rules the quest
—
We how
mativity principle. In that case,
it
would
evitably involve the use of terror. But
it
3.
5.
banks. ^"
data
of possible utterances
—
—
is
inexhaustible. This
sketches the outline of a politics that
would
re-
spect both the desire for justice and the desire
hegemony
On
this
"demoralization," see A. Jaubert and
].
eds., (Auto) critique de la sci1.
Habermas, Legittmationsprohleme im Spdtkapitalismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973) [Eng. trans. Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975)]. Certain scientific aspects of postmodernism are inventoried by Ihab Hassan in "Culture, Indeterminacy, and Immanence: Margins of the (Postmodern) Age," Humanities in Societxf 1 (1978):
Jiirgen
51-85. 7.
Claus Mueller uses the expression "a process of delegitimation" in The Politics of Communication (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 164.
8.
"Road
of
doubt
.
.
.
road of despair
.
.
.
skepti-
cism," writes Hegel in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit to describe the effect of the speculative drive on natural knowledge.
Language
games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment. But they would also be non-zero-sum games, and by virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in a position of minimax ecjuilibrium because it had exhausted its stakes. For the stakes would be knowledge (or information, if you will), and language's reserve the reserve of knowledge
unknown.
6.
give the public free access to
memory and
(1978):
1970s and the current dispersion, especially under the influence of Kuhn; not much information on German sociology of science. The term has been given weight by Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (New York, Harper & Row,
M. Levy-Leblond,
in-
by supplying them with the information they usually lack for making knowledgeable decisions. The line to follow for computerization to take the second of these two paths is, in princi-
19
information on
1973). 4.
could
also aid groups discussing metaprescriptives
la soci-
of Merton's school until the beginning of the
the computerization of society affects this
for the
sociologie
Good
ence (Paris: Seuil, 1973), Pt.
It could become the "dream" instrument for controlling and regulating the market system, extended to include knowledge itself and governed exclusively by the perfor-
the
de
English and American currents: the
problematic.
ple, quite simple:
europeennes
257-336 (bibliography).
for paralogy.
are finally in a position to understand
et ses utilisateurs," la societc.
Lecuyer, "Bilnn et perspectives de
P.
Archives
This bears witness to the existence
of another goal within the system:
B.
L'lnfonnntisntion dc
3,
ologie des sciences dans les pays occidentaux,"
to a close, that
tolerates
"La Nouvelle Informatique
Annex
an attempt at an alternative of that kind would end up resembling the system it was meant to replace. We should be happy that the tendency toward the temporary contract is ambiguous: it is not totally subordinated to the goal of the system, yet the system
come
441
POST-MODERNISM
17:
9.
For fear of encumbering this account, I have postponed until a later study the exposition of this group of rules. [See "Analyzing Speculative
Discourse as Language-Game," The Oxford ary Revicu' 10. Nietzsche,
N
VII
(MS. 3);
4,
Liter-
no. 3 (1981): 59-67.]
"Der europaische Nihilismus" (MS.
"der NihiHsm, ein normaler Zustand" VII II 1); "Kritik der Nihilism" (MS.
3);
W
"Zum
kritisclie
Plane" (MS.
W W III), in Nietzsches Werke
Gesaintausgabe,
(1887-89) (Berlin:
De
vol.
7,
pts.
1
and 2
Gruyter, 1970). These texts
have been the object of
a
commentary by
K.
442
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
Nietzsche,
Ryjik,
"On
preamble
the future of our educational institutions,"
de
in Complete Works, vol. 3.
12.
Martin Buher,
Icli
Du
und
(New York: Charles
Thou
and Dinhglsches Leben
Emmanuel
Schocken Ver7 and
(Berlin:
Levinas, Totalite
and
An
Infinity:
Miiller,
1947);
Alphonso
Lingis, To-
20.
die
Philosophen
in
Erkenntnis
theorie"
Kohlhammer, 1963) [Fr. trans. "Martin Buber et la theorie de la connaissance," in M);)/s Propres (Montpellier: Fata Morgana,
21.
22.
15. Ibid.
for
example,
"La
taylorisation
recherche," in (Auto) critique de
pp. 291-93.
And
Little Science,
especially D.
Big Science
University Press,
between
split
la
1963),
a small
J.
(New
de
and
the
23.
of highly produc-
a large
science considered as a social entity
in-
is
"undemo-
and that "the eminent scientist" is a hundred years ahead of "the minimal one" (p. .59)
Desanti, "Sur
sciences et de silencieuse,
la
le
rapport traditionnel des
The
reclassification of
la
is
condemned
academic philosophy as
ble that
it
but it is possiwill not be able to carry out this work, to disappear,
the
title
of
Without Qual-
Exam-
local deter-
fact that the current
tendency to
and weaken administra-
24.
tion is encouraged by society's loss of confidence in the State's performance capability. In Kuhn's sense.
25.
Pomian ("Catastrophes") shows
science
one of the human sciences in this respect has a significance far beyond simply professional concerns. 1 do not think that philosophy as legitimation
is
open systems,
deregulate, destabilize,
philosophie," in La Philosophie
ou critique des phUosophies de
(Paris: Seuil, 1975).
18.
Man
ities. Cited and discussed by J. Bouveresse, "La Problematique du sujet." It has not been possible within the limits of this study to analyze the form assumed by the return
emphasizes the T.
Beard"
realized" (p. 125). Y. Stourdze, "Les Etats-Unis,"
56). J.
its
of Musil's The
—
Columbia
high productivity researchers only really
See
1
minism, antimethod in general, everything that 1 group under the name paralogy. Nora and Mine, for example, attribute Japan's success in the field of computers to an "intensity of social consensus" that they judge to be specific to Japanese society {L'Infonnatisation de la Societc, p. 4). They write in their conclusion: "The dynamics of extended social computerization leads to a fragile society: such a society is constructed with a view to facilitating consensus, but already presupposes its existence, and comes to a standstill if that consensus cannot be
Solla Price,
creases every twenty years. Price concludes that
17.
"Science Smiling into
de
York:
mass of researchers with low The number of the latter grows as square of the former, so that the number of
cratic" (p.
John Viertel (Boston:
1971)].
ples are: the study of
productivity.
the
ed., trans.
of narrative in discourses of legitimation.
la
tive researchers (evaluated in terms of publication)
German
science (note 4),
who emphasizes
number
J.
chap. 72, vol.
1976)].
See
and
Beacon Press,
13. Philosophical Investigatious, sec. 18, p. 8.
16.
de [Vin-
|
(Stuttgart:
14. Ibid.
VIII
Piel, ed., "Vienne debut d'un sie339-40 (1975). See Jtirgen Habermas, "Dogmatismus, Vernunft unt Entscheidung Zu Theorie und Praxis in der verwissenschaftlichen Zivilisation" (1963), in Theorie und Praxis Theorif and Practice, abr. ed.
of 4th
Jahrhunderts
20.
des
Paris
—
Essay on Exteriority (Pitts-
Buber und
"Martin
Departement
cle," Critique,
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969)], and (1958),
de
See Allan Janik and Stephan Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973),
(La Haye:
et Infinite
(typescript,
Universite
cennes], 1979). 19.
Scribner's Sons, 1937)], (Ziirich:
Nijhoff, 1961) [Eng. trans. tality
to the Projet d'un institut polytechnique
phdosophie
philosophie,
[Eng. trans. Ronald G. Smith,
lag, 1922)
without revising its ties to on this matter the
it,
the university institution. See
de Paris VIII [Vincennes]).
versite 11.
or at least advance
manuserit de Lenzer Heide
le
Departement de philosophie, Uni-
(typescript,
that this t\'pe of
functioning boars no relation to Hegelian dialectics.
26.
"What entails
the legitimation of decisions accordingly is
fundamentally an effective learning
process, with a
minimum
of friction, within the
CHAPTER
social system. This
question,
is
an aspect of the more general
31.
'how do aspirations change, how can
the pohtical-administrative subsystem,
itself
only
tions in society through
its
tiveness of the activity of
decisions?'
what
is
the whole, will in large measure
well
it
persons or social systems
effec-
only a part, for
Luhmann,
diircli
1950);
(New
29.
He
." .
.
Feuer, Ein-
S.
(New
York:
As Moscovici emphasizes
born
in
ct
le
Complexe,
(Bruxelles'
in
was
"Relativity
'academy'
makeshift
a
des generations
conflit
1979)],
by
formed
one of whom was a physicist; were engineers or amateur philosophers." friends, not
33. Orwell's
all
"We
paradox. The bureaucrat speaks:
(Boston: Beacon,
are not content with negative obedience, nor
(Le Metalangage, pp. 228ff.)
even with the most abject submission. When finally you do surrender to us, it must be of your
1966).
Rey-Debove
a story yet."
the Generations of Science
Alexandre, Einstein
Man
make
his introduction to the French translation [trans.
is
Marcuse, One Dimensional 28. Josette
and
Basic Books, 1974).
Verfniiren,
developed in David Riesearlier studies. See Riesman, The Lonely (New Haven: Yale University Press, W. H. Whyte, The Organization Man York: Simon & Schuster, 1956); Herbert
This hypothesis
man's Crowd
results don't
For a famous example, see Lewis stein
p. 35).
27.
"My
structures, telling stories 32.
—without thereby pro-
Legitimation
a
concludes, "Scientists are building explanatory
voking considerable functional disturbances" (Niklas
Medawar makes
of expressions often heard in laboratories, in-
cluding,
expectations
— whether these are
{Art of the Soluble, pp. 151-52) compares scientists' written and spoken styles. The former must be "inductive" or they will not be
list
depend on how
new
succeeds in integrating
into already existing systems
The
Medawar
considered; as for the second,
part of society, nevertheless structure expecta-
443
POST-MODERNISM
17:
notes the proliferation of marks of indirect discourse or autonymic connotation in contempo-
own
rary daily language. As she reminds us, "indirect discourse cannot be trusted." As Georges Canguilhem says, "man is only truly healthy when he is capable of a number of norms, when he is more than normal" ("Le Normal et la pathologique" [1951], in Ln Counnis-
ogy the paradox would be expressed as a "Be free," or a "Want what you want," and is analyzed by Watzlawick et al.. Pragmatics of Human
sance de
la
vie
[Paris:
Hachette, 1952],
[Eng. trans. Carolyn Fawcett
On
the
p.
Normal and
David comments that society can only be aware of the needs it feels in the present state of
30. E. E.
its
technological miheu.
It is
basic sciences to discover
of the nature of the
unknown
properties
which remodel the technical milieu and create unpredictable needs. He cites as examples the use of solid materials as amplifiers and the rapid development of the physics of solids. This "negative regulation" of social interactions and needs by the object of contemporary techniques is critiqued by R. Jaulin, "Le Mythe technologique," Revue de
I'entreprise 26, special
"Ethnotechnolo-
gy" issue (March 1979): 49-55. This is a review of A. G. Haudricourt, "La Technologie culturelle, essai de methodologie," in Gille, Historie des techniques.
will"
[New
(1984
Harcourt,
York:
game
terminol-
Communication, pp. 203-7. On these paradoxes, see J. M. Salanskis, "Geneses 'actuelles' et
geneses
'serielles'
de
I'inconsistant
de
et
I'heterogeme," Critique 379 (1978): 1155-73.
210)
the Pathological (Boston: D. Reidel, 1978)1.
free
Brace, 1949], p. 258). In language
34.
See Nora and Mine's description of the tensions that mass computerization will inevitably pro-
duce
in
cicte,
introduction).
French society (L'lnformatisntion de
35. Cf. the discussion of
wick
open systems
et al.. Pragmatics of
Human
in
la so-
Watzla-
Communication,
pp. 117—48. The concept of open systems theory is the subject of a study by ]. M. Salanskis, Le Systematique ouvert (forthcoming). 36. After the separation of
Church and
State,
Feyerabend (Against Method) demands
Paul
in
the
same
"lay" spirit the separation of Science
and
State.
But what about Science and Money? one way of understanding this
37. This is at least
term, which
comes from Ducrot's problematic.
Dire.
38. Legitimationsprobleme (note 5), passim, especially
pp. 21-22: "Language functions in the
manner
of
444
a
PART
MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM
3:
transformer
.
.
changing cognitions into
.
technique of
propositions, needs and feelings into normative
expectations (commands, values). This transfor-
mation produces the far-reaching distinction between the subjectivity of intention, willing, of pleasure and unpleasure on the one hand, and expressions and norms with a pretension to uni-
on the other. Universality signifies the knowledge and the legitimacy of
versality
objectivity of
prevailing norms; both assure the
community
[Genieinsamkeit] constitutive of lived social expe-
We
rience."
see that
1972);
by formulating the prob-
lematic in this way, the question of legitimacy
al
is
criticjue,
ideal
which dissociates conceptual to the former, and or
"suprasensible
life
The subordination
of laws) to Diskurs 144:
every citizen
is explicit,
it
sense that
on his file (about them and address a complaint
to see the entries
example, on
p.
to validity is
it-
them
for
it
whom
about them to the municipal council and if need be to the Council of State; the right of all citizens to know (on request) which data concerning
of the metapre-
the normalization
"The normative pretension
self cognitive in the
40.
(i.e,
of rules: exclusive au-
citizens to all data (on payment); the right of
of
50), to correct
scriptives of prescription
number
which and under what conditions they are communicated; access for all
humanity. 39. Ibid., p. 20.
editori-
in the press; pirate radios (before their
data are collected, to
nature,"
the only possible horizon for the
United States
thority of the municipal council to decide
which forms the horizon of the latter, and on the other hand it maintains that consensus (Gemeinschtift) is
work
enacted a certain
appropriate
universality,
in the
development in Italy); administrative files, the IBM monopoly, computer sabotage. The municipality of Yverdon (Canton of Vaud), having voted to buy a computer (operational in 1981),
that of the subject of action (in opposition to
Kant's
community radios
and Canada; the impact of computers on
fixated on one type of reply, universalitv. This on the one hand presupposes that the legitimation of the subject of knowledge is identical to
universality,
management
'social profiles' to the
mass of the population; the logic of security produced by the automatization of society." See too the documents and analysis in Interferences f and 2 (Winter 1974-Spring 1975), the theme of which is the establishment of popular networks of multimedia communication. Topics treated include: amateur radios (especially their role in Quebec during the FLQ affair of October 1970 and that of the "Front commun" in May of the
is
communicated and
to
whom
(L