Philosophy and psycho-analysis

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PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

By John Wisdom OTHEI. MINDS

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

JOHN

WISDOM

Professor of Philosophy in the University of Cambridgt

OXFORD BASIL BLACKWELL

FIRST PRINT!D JANUARY 1953 REPRINTED JANUARY 1957 REPRINTED JANUARY 1964

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UNULP

CONTENTS

Pages OSTENTATION

Is

1-15

(Reprinted from Psyche, Vol. XIII, 1933) ANALYSIS A UsEFuL METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY?

(Reprinted from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XIII, 1934)

PillLOSOPIUCAL PERPLEXITY

{Reprinted from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XVI, 1936)

METAPHYSICS AND VERIFICATION

16-35

36-50

51-IOI

(Reprinted from Mind, Vol. XLVII, N.S., No. 188, 1938) A CRITICAL NOTICE: Science and Ethics By C. H. wADDINGTON AND OTHERS (Reprinted from Mind, Vol. LII, 1943)

102-1I I

PHILOSOPHY, ANxmrY AND NOVELTY

II2-II9

(Reprinted from Mind, Vol. LIii, No.

1944)

210,

MooRE's TECHNIQUE

120-148

GODS

149-168

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

169-181

(Reprinted from The Philosophy ofG. E. Moore, The Library of Living Philosophers, 1944)

(Reprinted from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sodety, 1944) (Reprinted from Polemic, No. 4, 1946)

CRITICAL NOTICES

(Reprinted from Mind, Vol. LV, No.

220,

1946)

182-194

BERTRAND RUSSELL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

195-209

A

210-216

(Reprinted from Politics and Letters, 1947) NoTB ON PROBABILITY

(Reprinted from Philosophical Analysis, Cornell University Press, 1950)

TlDNGS AND PERSONS

217-228

NoTE ON THE NEW EDmoN OF PROFESSOR AYER's

229-247

(Reprinted from Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XXII, 1948)

Language Truth and Logic (Reprinted from Mind, Vol. LVIl, No.

228,

1948)

PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICS AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS V

-..

.

45C06

248-282

ACKNO WLEDGMENT S The thanks of the author and the publisher are due to the Editors of the following Joumals for permission to reprint extracts from their publications. Psyche, The Ariltotelian Society, Mind, The Library of Living Philosophers, Polemic, Politics and Letters, and to the Cornell

University Press and Professor Max Black for permission to use the extract A Note On Probability from Philosophical Analysis.

vi

OSTENTATION (Psyche Vol. XIII) Tms paper is designed to show that ostentation is the main means to satisfying the desires of the philosopher. I am not imagining that in maintaining this I am maintaining anything which is new in any exciting sense. On the contrary, I believe that philosophers have always employed ostentation although they have seldom said so because, being busy philoso­ phizing, they have had little time to philosophize about philoso­ phizing. I believe that Jeremy Bentham meant by his word 'paraphrasis' 1 something very like what I mean by 'ostentation' and that those philosophers, such as Russell and Moore, who have spoken of 'incomplete symbols' and 'logical constructions' have had in mind the same ideas. Ostentation is a species of substitution. I substitute one sentence, S', for another, S, ifl state that anyone who utters S' is saying the same thing as anyone who utters S. 1 I perform the operation of ostentation upon a sentence S, when I substitute S' for S and S' reveals more clearly than does S, the structure of the fact (or facts) they locate.• Next 'locate' must be defined. Anybody who utters a sentence is claiming that there is a fact (or facts) having such and such an internal structure - such and such elements arranged in such and such a way. Any fact which answers to the description is said to be located by the sentence. The description may of course be more or less complete. The sentences which completely locate facts are those which are made up from adjectives, verbs and prepositions and proper names (grammar-book sense) only. The sentences which incompletely

1 Bentham, Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 246-8. For the relation between paraphrasis and logical constructions, see my fottrprtMtio11 m,d A11al ysis. For the relation between logical constructions and ostentation see my articles on logical constructions in Mi11d, April, 1931, October, 1931, October, 1932, January, 1933, April, 1933. 1 'To substitute' nuy mean to stak that S' may� putfor Sor it may mean to put S' for S. 'To translate' is subject to the same ambiguity. 1 This definition is not the same as that which I give in articles in Mind. There I define ostentation as the substitution of sentences which more nearly Display Facts. Display is not defined in terms of insight but of identity of structure. That definition is superior but is long and difficult.

2

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

locate facts are those in which common nouns and an article are used. They are derived from complete sentences by sub­ stituting 'something' for one or more of the proper names in the complete sentence. Thus 'Bob is happy', 'England fought France', and 'Othello was jealous ofDesdemona on account of Cassio' completely locate facts. (Words like 'of' and 'to' and auxiliary verbs are neglected.) 'Something is happy', 'Something which is wicked is happy', 'Everything which is wicked is happy' incompletely locate facts. 'Something wicked is happy' is obtained from 'Bob is wicked and Bob is happy'. 'Everything which is wicked is happy' means 'Something wicked is happy and it is not the case that something wicked is not happy'. 'The thing which is wicked is happy' means 'Something wicked is happy and it is not the case that something else is happy'. 'Bob loves Jessie' completely locates the fact that Bob loves Jessie and no other fact such as Bert loves Jessie. 'Something loves Jessie' incompletely locates Bob loves Jessie and Bert loves Jessie but not Bob loves Elizabeth. 'Something loves something' still more incompletely locates Bob loves Jessie and any other case of love. When a sentence completely locates a fact it expresses it. 1 But we must not say of a sentence which incompletely locates a fact that it expresses that fact. It is customary, however, to say of an incomplete sentence, say 'Joan loves someone' that it expresses an incomplete (or general) fact. This is just a misleading way of saying that it incompletely locates a fact. And if we spoke only in the best style we should never use the expression 'incomplete fact'. Obviously there is a sense in which 'incomplete fact' is a nonsensi­ cal expression. 'Incomplete fact' is a nonsensical expression if 'fact' is used in the way it is when we speak of the fact (complete) that Peter loves Joan. There are not two species of fact, the one complete, the other incomplete; there are sentences which com­ pletely and incompletely locate facts. Whatever is said about the incomplete fact that F, could be said by speaking about the sentence 'F' which incompletely locatesC, a fact (complete). The form (incomplete) of the fact (incomplete) Something loves Joan is the form of the fact which 'Something loves Joan' locates. Joan is an element in the fact Something loves Joan means Joan is an 1 S expresses the fact that F if and only if S and the sentence F' locate with equal completeness the same fact, i.e. if 'F' is substitutable for S. 1

OSTENTATION

3

element in the fact which 'Something loves Joan' locates and is (unlike Peter) specified by 'Something loves Joan'. Thus do incomplete facts vanish, though their grins, of course, remain. A fact (complete) is either of the sort This is Q, where Q, like 'red' names a quality; or of the sort This R that, where R like 'adjoins' names a relation; or of the sort This R that to that, where R like 'gives' names a relation; and so on to facts with n-terms. The this's and that's are the terms or constituents of the facts; the relations and qualities are the components of the facts; the elements of a fact are its constituents and components. Two facts are of the same form when they have the same number of terms. The fact aRb differs from the fact bRa, not in its elements, nor in its form, but in arrangement. Ostentation, I have said, is substitution which results in insight into the structure of the fact a sentence locates - a clearer, though not more complete, apprehension of the elements of that fact and of how they are arranged. No doubt you will find this statement obscure but I hope to remove the obscurity later. I.

THE PmtosoPmc RESPONSE

If you stimulate a philosopher in a suitable way he will begin to philosophize. To philosophize is to analyse. 1 When a man analyses he makes statements of a certain kind with a certain intention. What kind of statement? One about words. What kind of intention? Insight into structure. Let us consider these two points. I. The philosopher's statement is verbal. All philosophic state­ ments are, of course, made in words. We may go further, however; for all philosophic statements mention words. Contrary [ to Analysis and Interpretation (p. I 6) 'The fact you considered yesterday has such and such an analysis' is no exception.] Philosophic statements are of the form 'The fact located by S has the elements and arrangement revealed by S''. For example:

The fact expressed by 'The average man has an intelligence quotient of 60' has the elements and arrangement revealed by 'The .sum of human intelligence quotients divided by their number equals 60'.

1 Apart from speculative philosophy, which is the deductive study of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

4

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANAL YSJS

There are many who would refuse to say that philosophic state­ ments, even when confined to statements in analytic philosophy, are statements about words. And since to deny what they say would be to take a paradoxical and surprising view,1 we may expect that what they say is in some important sense correct. Closer investigation will confirm this; it will also, however, show that it is very easy to make a mistake about the sense in which philosophic statements are not about words and that in a very important and proper sense they are only about words. I used to say that philosophic statements are not about words. I did not, of course, mean that they are not made in words, nor even that they do not mention words. I meant that what the philo­ sopher primarily intends to locate by his sentence is a fact which is not about words. I primarily intend to produce a situation, S, when I intend for its own sake to produce it. I secondarily intend to produce a situation, S, when I intend to produce it as a means to another situation, S '. Suppose now that I say 'The man on the donkey is the Sultan'. If my primary intention is merely to tell you which man is the Sultan, then although I mention a donkey and therefore, in some sense, my sentence is about a donkey, nevertheless there is a sense in which my sentence is not about a donkey - it is not primarily or essentially about a donkey. This being so I should of course be annoyed if you objected: 'You are wrong. That is not a donkey, it is a mule'. I mentioned the donkey merely in order to draw your attention to a fact which is not about a donkey at all, the fact That is the Sultan.

Now it may be claimed that things are like this with the philo­ sopher; that his primary intention is to draw attention to facts which are not about words at all, that he only secondarily intends to draw attention to facts about words. But this won't do. For what could this non-verbal fact, to which the philosopher primarily intends to draw our attention be? Take the case: 'The fact expressed by "England fought France" has the structure revealed by ''Englishmen fought Frenchmen''.' From 'The tallest man is older than the smallest' we can obtain 1 Surprising conclusions may be a sign of one's devotion to logic but they arc also a sign of the falsity of one's premisses or 1/,e ambiguity of 011t's la11g11agt.

OSTENTATION

s

a fact which makes no reference to size, by substituting names for descriptions thus - 'Bob is older than Bert'. Can something similar be done when we have 'The fact expressed by ''England fought France" has the structure revealed by "Englishmen fought Frenchmen" ', and wish to obtain a fact which has no reference to ,.vords? We could do this if the relation involved were anything other than the pseudo-relation identity-ofstructure. But as it is we can­ not remove the descriptions without talking nonsense; just as we cannot remove descriptions when we have the pseudo-relation of identity between things. 'The tallest is identical with the smallest' yields falsity or nonsense when names are substituted for the descriptions. For if 'Bob is identical with Bert' is not false, we can re-write it 'Bob is identical with Bob'; and that is nonsense. 1 Similarly we cannot substitute the name 'this' for the descriptive phrase 'the fact expressed by "England fought France" ', and the name 'that' for the descriptive phrase 'the fact expressed by "Englishmen fought Frenchmen" ', and then write : This is identical in structure with that. For since no two facts have the same structure if 'This is identical in structure with that' is true, we can re-write it 'This is identical in structure with this' - which is nonsense. How would it do to write, not 'The fact located by ''England fought France" has the structure revealed by "Englishmen fought Frenchmen" ', but 'The fact that England fought France has the structure of the fact that Englishmen fought Frenchmen' or 'England fought France has the structure of Englishmen fought Frenchmen' ? 1 It would not do at all. For Englishmen fought Frenchmen is an incomplete fact and there­ fore has neither structure, nor form, nor elements, nor arrange­ ment in the sense in which the complete fact Englandfought France has. Still less is the structure of the one identical with the structure of the other. Some people would say 1 trivially tautologous'. I believe that •nonsense' is right. It might be thought that the expression 1The fact that England fought France', and the expression 1F.ngland fought France', are alternative expressions for 1The fact expressed by England fought France" •. This of course would give me what I want - the verbal­ ncss of philosophic statements - at once. But I do not think it is true. I do not think that It is good that he is happy means Thefact expressed by •He is happy' is good. Similarly I do not think that Tut England fought France has the structure, etc. means The fact expressed by •1:nz1andfouzht France' has the structure, etc. 1

1

11

6

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Shall we say that England fou,ght France is identical in structure not with the incomplete fact Englishmenfought Frenchmen, but with the complete fact which 'Englishmen fought Frenchmen' incom­ pletely locates, namely the fact that Tom, Dick and Harry (Englishmen) fought Henri, Frarn;ois and Jean (Frenchmen) � But this is not true. Englandfought France is a two-termed fact and contains England as a term ; it is not 6-termed and it does not contain Tom as a term. We could say ifwe liked that England invaded France has six (say) ultimate terms and contains Tom, Dick and Harry as ultimate referent terms, fought (as applied to individuals) as ultimate component, and Henri, Fran