Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics: Reception in the Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Traditions 9781350028029

Table of contents :
Introduction, Jakob Fink (University of Gothenburg, Sweden) and Jessica Moss (New York University, USA)
1. The Ancient Greek Reception of Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics, Frans de Haas (Universiteit Leiden, The Netherlands)
2. The Arabic Tradition: With Special Emphasis on Averroes' Interpretation, Frédérique Woerther (CNRS Paris, France) and Rotraud Hansberger (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany)
3. The Byzantine Tradition on EN 6.5.1140b16-17, Michele Trizio (Università di Bari, Italy)
4. The Latin Tradition: Phronesis, Phantasia and Moral Feelings, Iacopo Costa (CNRS Paris, France)
5. The Hebrew Tradition on EN 6.5.1140b16-17, Chaim Neria (University of Chicago, USA)
6. Epilogue: The Argument of EN 6.5.1140b16–17 from a Contemporary Perspective, Jakob Fink (University of Gothenburg, Sweden)

Citation preview

Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics

Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition General Editor: Marco Sgarbi, Universita Ca' Foscari, Italy Editorial Board: Klaus Corcilius (University of California, Berkeley, USA); Daniel Garber

(Princeton University, USA); Oliver Leaman (University of Kentucky, USA); Anna Marmodoro (University of Oxford, UK); Craig Martin (Oakland

University, USA); Carlo Natali (Universita Ca' Foscari, Italy); Riccardo Pozzo (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy); Renee Raphael (University of California, Irvine, USA); Victor M. Salas (Sacred Heart Major Seminary, USA); Leen Spruit (Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands). Aristotle's influence throughout the history of philosophical thought has been immense and in recent,years the study of Aristotelian philosophy has enjoyed a revival. However, Aristotelian ism remains an incredibly polysemous concept, encapsulating many, often conflicting, definitions. Bloomsbury Studies in th~ Aristotelian Tradition responds to this need to define Aristotelianism and give rise to a clear characterization. Investigating the influence and reception of Aristotle's thought from classical antiquity to contemporary philosophy from a wide range of perspectives, this series aims to reconstruct how philosophers have become acquainted with the tradition. The books in this series go beyond simply ascertaining that there are Aristotelian doctrines within the works of various thinkers in the history of philosophy, but seek to understand how they have received and elaborated Aristotle's thought, developing concepts into ideas that have become independent of him.

Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition promotes new approaches to Aristotelian philosophy and its history. Giving special attention to the use of interdisciplinary methods and insights, books in this series will appeal to scholars working in the fields of philosophy, history and cultural studies. Available titles:

The Aftermath of Syllogism, edited by Marco Sgarbi, Matteo Cosci Elijah Del Medigo and Paduan Aristotelianism, Michael Engel Pantano's Virtues, Matthias Roick

Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics Reception in the Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Traditions Edited by Jakob Leth Fink

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NF.W DF.T.Hl •

~YDNEY

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Pic 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1 B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY. BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Pic First published in Great Britain 2019 Copyright© Jakob LethFink, 2019 Jakob Leth Fink has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editor of this work. Series design: Catherine Wood Cover image: Rembrandt van Rijn, ·Aristotle with a Bust of Homer. 1653 Oil on canvas. Metropolitan Museum of Art, NewYork/Aiamy Stock Photo All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Pic does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN:

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Contents Preface

vi

Introduction Jakob Leth Fink and Jessica Moss THE ANCIENT GREEK TRADITION 2

'What Appears Good to Us' in Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias Frans A. ]. de Haas

15

THE ARABIC TRADITION 3

Averroes's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's

Nicomachean Ethics Frederique Woerther

37

THE MEDIEVAL GREEK TRADITION 4

Eustratius of Nicaea on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b 17-18

Michele Trizio

65

THE MEDIEVAL LATIN TRADITION 5

Phronesis, Pleasure and the Perception of the Goal Iacopo Costa

79

THE MEDIEVAL HEBREW TRADITION 6

Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle's Concept of Phantasia in the Hebrew Translations and Commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b16-17 and 1.13.1002b9-11 Chaim Meir Neria

103

ARISTOTLE AND THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION 7

Aristotle on Deliberative Phantasia and Phronesis Jakob Leth Fink

127

Bibliography

148

Index Locorum

160

Index Nominum

166

Index Rerum

169

Preface This volume originated in a seminar held in November 2015 at the University of Gothenburg. The seminar was organized by me with the financial support of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation as part of the project Representation and Reality in the Aristotelian Tradition, also funded by the

Foundation and the University of Gothenburg. Iacopo Costa, Jessica Moss (per Skype), Michele Trizio, Frederique Woerther and I presented papers on that occasion. Subsequently, Frans de Haas and Chaim Neria were also involved and contributed a chapter,each. Apart from my colleagues at Representation and Reality in the Aristotelian Tradition, Gosta Gronroos from the University of Stockholm offered valuable

comments on the papers presented at the original seminar. Margareta Fredborg took language

revisio~

of the chapters upon her, and David Bennett, one of

my wonderful colleagues at Representation and Reality, helped me type some Arabic texts. The board at Bloomsl;mry Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition offered helpful comments in the early stages of bringing this volume to realization. The series editor, Marco Sgarbi; my copy editors, Andrew Wardell, Helen Saunders and Bindhiya Nirmalkumar; and the project manager, Manikandan Kuppan, were supportive and very patient from beginning to end. I wish to thank everyone mentioned here. Your involvement has been invaluable. Jakob Leth Fink, Copenhagen, April2018

1

Introduction Jakob Leth Fink and Jessica Moss

Scope and aims of the volume As originally conceived, this volume was to be devoted to a single sentence in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, eleven words altogether (EN 6.5.1140b 17-18). Here, Aristotle puts forward a remarkable claim concerning the appearance

(phantasia) of moral principles. The chapters were to describe the reception of this string of words among a number of interpreters from the Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Aristotelian traditions from Antiquity to the late Middle Ages and ascertain its philosophical merits. But it soon became clear that this narrow focus on one sentence would have to be widened to a more general focus on phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics. Due to the hazards of transmission, there is simply not enough material devoted to the sentence in the Ancient Greek, Arabic and Hebrew traditions. Nevertheless, these traditions do contain interesting material concerning phantasia more generally. As a result, the present volume discusses the relevance of phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics generally, while never losing sight of the one claim concerning the appearance of moral principles from Nicomachean Ethics 6.5. The aims remain the same. They are to describe the reception of phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics among ancient and medieval Aristotelians - as far as possible with this one sentence in view- and ascertain its philosophical merits. It might seem odd to focus on just one sentence out of the entire Nicomachean

Ethics. However, from Aspasius in the Imperial Period of Rome to Joseph b. Shem-Tob in Renaissance Spain, commentators on the Nicomachean Ethic! proceeded by singling out passages and scrutinizing the argument in them

Phanta;ia in Aristotle's Ethics

2

So the present volume

me~ely

adopts an approach found in its sources. This

has the advantage of making otherwise unwieldy material, spanning four language traditions and more than a thousand years, manageable. Since our commentators basically follow the same approach, their interpretations are actually directed at the same problem posed in fairly similar terms. This gives a reasonable coherence to the discussions of these very different commentators. But obviously this focus comes at a price. The volume covers neither the Nicomachean Ethics in its entirety nor the reception of it in the entire Aristotelian tradition. Far from it. It covers a specific topic, phantasia, and a single passage as interpreted by a select number of interpreters across the Aristotelian tradition. Readers who wish to know more about the general reception of Aristotle's Ethics are advised to consult the survey literature on this subject. 1 Our focal point sentence appears in the chapter on phronesis ('practical wisdom; 'prudence'). Aristotle says: But the principle does not-immediately appear (euthus au phainetai arch€) to the person who has been corrupted by pleasure or pain. (EN 6.5.1140b 17-18; trans. J. Fink) 2 On a straightforward reading, Aristotle seems to say that an agent of a certain kind suffers from what

m~ht

be called moral blindness. The agent lacks

a certain sort of moral perception, it seems. But on further reflection, the claim provokes a number of questions. Is it a principle (arche) of action or of deliberation that does not appear; is it a principle that or a principle why? What is the force of immediately (euthus), and how can pleasure and pain corrupt an agent's moral phantasia? What kind of moral agent does Aristotle have in mind, an incontinent or a vicious one, and why is this corrupted agent introduced here in the chapter on phronesis? Finally, and directly addressing the theme of this volume, what does appear (phainetai) mean? What is the role of phantasia in Aristotle's moral psychology? It is slightly surprising, perhaps, that standard commentators of the

nineteenth and twentieth oe Ol£.um:Ta8at to tvepyeTv tft aia8T]tLKft-!l£GOtT]tL rrpoc; to 6.ya8ov ~ KaK6v,

ti tOLauta.

Kal ~ TTJV im6A.T]~'Lv. Ou yap iinaaav im6ATJ\j1Lv

ota.!""· 4..]\ ("t"

U""' ("'17'. _,. ~

~~ ~ ~I..:J 4,... w\.p,ll L>" ~ _,. U"Wll L>" .AI_, JS

ui.S ul! ~t.:....,......,. u-1c "-:!WI~~

"'-:!W4 ~ ~ W) ~ .J.Jy:;.11 ~ ~ U"Wll L>" .Ai ~ ~ ul.J ~ ~ " ~ ufo. ~

ufo. ul .)l clb.:l ~ •~~.J\-! _,.~"-:!WI .)l J!y\1 ui.S ill!~"~1 Z) ~ illl:.!.J ~.~-11 ·"'I l.:i.i...>..ltib::..,.j · - ·• . ._·, '-?~ ill· -·'I~L..J;..-·1..\\.., ·~~.)•. ~.):!A:! ~·

34 Si autem dixerit quis quoniam omnes homines desiderant illud de quo eis videtur quod sit bonum, sed visio non est in posse eo rum. At vero unicuique

eo rum talis finis videtur qualis dispositionis ipse fuerit, et hoc est per necessitatem consequendi dispositiones suas. Si ergo fuerit unusquisque hominum per ali quem ,!DOdorum causa disposition is sui ipsius, et fuerit phantasia sua sequeris sui dispositionem, erit etiam quodam modo causa fantasiae suae.

35 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 126: iJ'~ )i'lj1;'J ;'JJ;'J 071~1 Jltl ~1;'11/l o;,7 ;'Jij11'W ;'Jij 7~ 1PP1nlll' o7:J O'WJ~;'JW 1m~ "llj~ 0~1

7:J ;,,;, o~ 7J~ .O;'J'J'Jll7 ll/lljJ;'J n"l:J;'JJ ;'JT11J'Jll '!l:l ri'7:Jn;, 17 ;'Jij11' o;,lj 1m; 7:J 7J~ o;,7

p

0~ ~1;'1 ;'JJ;'J 1"1~1n7 4WijJ )1'1j1;'J ;'1';'11 11/l!lJ "1~1n7 ;'JJO )'11:!i;'ilj 1:!1:1 ~1;'1 O'WJ~;'J )lj 1n~

.1J1'1j17 ;'JJO )'1U;'Jij 1:!1:l

36 W 11'~1;"11 ;"ll1::lr1;"1 ':>

44 f.16.ALOTU cS' oi 6~e'ic; Kai flEAUYXOAlKOi T~V 7tp07t£T~ UKpacrlav eicriv aKpUT£LJI.J>:l:Jiyt.:.......:.l~ 'i i'l..li)-!(»b,.L..;, 'i u_,;fo.WJ.J

.~l.hlill t\,GI -..JJ u~ riJ"i0hiJI U.J~ 'i o~l u\S.J

46 Dixit. Et illi qui sunt non continentes cum praevisione sunt qui bus dominatur

cholera nigra. Etenim quidam istorum propter velocitatem quae est in eis et quidam eorum propter voluptatem non sequuntur rationem, in tendo non auscultant ad hoc quod mandat ratio et sequuntur phantasiam. 47 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 246: l11i';"l~;"l 'i'i~J 1'iM Tlljl '::J ;"li1n11i;"l ;,;~;, ''ill:! t:l;-t ;-JJ;-J l11i::lM1;"1::l t:l'lnl'i M'i t:l;"l i11il'\1 i~l'\

1::1 ;"11l1'11i ;,~'i ln'J' K'i 'J1::!i ,i1::11'i t:l'i11ijll1';"1' K'i ;"111'\ll;-t '1::l'i ??~::1 t:llllii/1 t:l::l ;"JW i11iM .]1'~1? 1i11ii1'1 i1::l1;"1

48 OTL cS' ~ Tfi '\IUXfi OW~£1, Kal n ~1;, 'n7.l~:1 ?:::>!Jl:-1:1 :-JJ;J p :-JT 111':1J1 .;J1~m '1::Ji nmn7.l ~1;, lli ::J?7.l ~ll7.l::> ?::>!JJ;"t;J o?1~1 ;J'?lli:):-J '?~ li~l' 111J7.l~:1 :1';1 p'?1 .nP!Jlu~;, m::Jm'? p11l i1J1

'?::>!Jl:-J::J :-Ill~' i!Jl~l:) :17.l11 i/11' 1J1li::J ;JlJ~'1 n1J7.l~J :ll!Jl' i!Jl~ p'?1 .:-T'?ll7.l 1!Jl!lJ ;JW!Jl ,mJ7.l~ 1J'~ ~1:1!Jl1 :11:) :-~'?lll:) '?::>!Jl:l!Jl ;,~iJ 1~::>7.l1 .m'?ll7.l::J ~1;J!Jl17.l::> '?!l!Jl i/11' '?::>!Jl:-T::J ~1;,1 .:1:::>~'?7.) 'Jlli

13 Lawrence V Berman, 'Sophrosyne and enkrateia in Arabic, Latin and Hebrew: The Case of Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle and Its Middle Commentary by Averroes; in Orientalische Kultur und Europaisches Mittelalter, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg and Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), 274-87. 14 Oxford, Bodleian, MS Oppenheim 591 (Neubauer 1426), 196b-197a: O!Jl7.l iTlJ ~1:11 '?:::>!Jl:-1 10!l;J l!l:-1 '?:::>!Jl:-1 ii:)1!Jl '?"i .O'!Jl1i!l11' 11!JJ?::J ~iii'1 i7.l~' :111!Jl:l!Jl ni:)~;J :17.) '?ll '?:)~' 11' 11!Jl'?::J '?::>!Jl:-J;] '?li::J ':::> ;"IT1 1i7.l~ 1;JT1 .!Jl'!Jl'J1i!l ?:::>!JJ:-1'? 11' 1l!Jl'?::J ·~, '::l '?:::>!Jl:-1:1 'll!Jl ~l;J!Jl :11:) 11'1:) '11'!Jl;J '?"i ::>"l ~~n ~i':ll .:-~n7.l!Jl;Jl ?J~;, 11'0!l' i!Jl~7.l lrli::JO im!Jl'!Jl 1J1'0!l'!Jll:) 1n?lll!l i7.l1!Jl ::>"l ~1;, ;,J;, 'lll7.l~:-T np1?1 om~ lTI:)' ~1:-~1 illl:-11 ;,n7.l!Jl:1 nmp )'::J ... l1Jlln:1

15 histapqut has a background in the earlier translation literature. Usually,

histapqut translates an Arabic term which means contentment, in the sense of temperance. Yet in NEheb Book 7 Alguades translates the same term, temperancia, as yosher - straightness.

Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics

122

16 ai flEV yap apxal TWV 1tf,lUKTWV TO ou EV£KU TO. 1tpUKTCt· T(i> 6£ Ol£q>8UpflEV4J Ol' ~oov~v ~

All1tT]V £U8uc; ou cpa[V£TUl apx~, ouo£ 0£iV TOlJTOU EV£K£V oM£ OL

the same passage. This fits the interpretation of phantasia in our passage that I have tried to establish. That the principle fails to appear immediately (euthus) is not a failure in om: corrupted agent's intellectual, decisional (proairetic) capacities. It indicates a failure in his 'dispositional capacity: In other words a failure with respect to his character (ethos). It simply does not follow from who he is, from his disposition or state (apo hexeos), that he should act for the sake

of some genuine· moral end. His character provides him with no 'instinctive' moral perception (phantasia) of whatever situation he happens to be in.

Conclusion Why does Aristotle spend time on the utterly corrupted agent in Nicomachean

Ethics 6.5 and his perverted phantasia of moral principles? After all, the chapter is devoted to phronesis, a moral and intellectual excellence. The answer is, I think, that our corrupted agent throws a contrasting light on his exact opposite: the morally virtuous agent (ho phronimos) and his phantasia of moral principles. As mentioned above, and in several of the previous chapters, phronesis and character virtue mutually depend on each other. So much so that Aristotle

Aristotle on Deliberative Phantasia and Phronesis

143

seems willing to identify them (EN 6.13.1144b21- 28). This mutual dependence gives phronesis a peculiar status as an intellectual virtue. It is, as Aristotle is careful to point out, not just a rational state (oud' hexis meta logou monon) (EN 6.5.1140b28). A purely rational state can be forgotten. Presumably this means that its propositional content can be forgotten and perhaps that the state itself can be forgotten. We might forget all proofs in the second book of Euclid's

Elements for example, and perhaps even forget how to do geometry altogether. But phronesis cannot be forgotten (EN 6.5.1140b28-30). In a passage that makes the same distinction concerning states that can and states that cannot be forgotten, Aristotle points out that the morally perfect person lives consistently 'ill, that is with or through, the character virtues (katazen en autais) (EN 1.10.11 OOb 12-17). The same is true of the practically wise. He lives guided by a true assumption concerning the end, an overall conception of living well (eu zen

halos) (EN 6.5.1140a25-28). As such the moral principles ofbravery, temperance and so on have been integrated or internalized irreversibly into his overall conception of living well. He cannot forget phronesis just as he cannot forget to breathe or forget to eat and sleep. His moral state has become second nature. In contrast to the corrupted agent, genuine moral principles never fail to appear (phainesthai) to the practically wise in relevant situations. How things appear to him, his moral phantasia, is simply better and more true than that of others (EN 3.4.1113a29-33), even to the point that his dreams might be better than those of ordinary men (EN 1.13.1102b3-11). It is not that ho phronimos always knows exactly what specific course of action to take (he has to figure this out through deliberation). What always, and in contrast to his corrupted opposite, immediately (euthus), appears to him and what he cannot forget is

for the sake of what a specific course of action has to be found. Ho phronimos is instinctively sensitive to this. His deliberative phantasia is unfailingly triggered by whatever relevant situation he might find himself in. 24

Notes Especially important is Jennifer Whiting, 'Locomotive Soul: The Parts of Soul in Aristotle's Scientific Works', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22 (2002): 141-200. She argues, among other things, that Aristotle thinks that we should

Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics

144

not define 'parts of the s~ul in terms of their having or lacking logos: even though we can characterize some parts in one of these ways (176-77). The distinction between rational and non-rational is not discarded but further modified by scholars who emphasize the amount of continuity between humans and other animals in various aspects of Aristotle's biological thinking, see for example James G. Lennox, 'Aristotle on the Biological Roots of Virtue: The Natural History of Natural Virtue' in Bridging the Gap between Aristotle's Science

and Ethics, ed. Devin Henry and Karen M. Nielsen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 193-213; Jean-Louis Labarriere, Langage, vie politique et mouvement des animaux: Etudes aristoteliciennes (Paris: Vrin, 2004). 2

As advanced, among others, by David Charles, 'Aristotle's Desire', in Mind and

Modality: Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Sima Knuuttila, ed. Vesa Hirvonen et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 19-40; id., 'Aristotle on Practical and Theoretical Xnowledge', in Bridging the Gap between Aristotle's

Science and Ethics, ed. Henry Devin and Karen Margrethe Nielsen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 71-93. At EN 1.13.1102a26-32, Aristotle mentions the two-component view as well as the so-called 'thirdway view', but refuses to commit himself to either. 3

Krisana Scheiter, 'Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle', Phronesis 57 (2012): 251-78; Jessica Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception,

Phantasia, Thought, & Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 51-57; Christopher Shields, Aristotle: De Anima, translated with an Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: darendon, 2016), 274-91. 4

Pace e.g. David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 67.

5

Scheiter, 'Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle' (as note 3), 252. See David Gallop, Aristotle: On Sleep and Dreams, A Text and Translation with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996), 6-10 for a discussion of dreams as episodic and dreams as an apparition in Greek thought.

6

Usually, the account of association described in Mem. 2.451bl4-22 is invoked to explain the activation of phantasia; see for example Klaus Corcilius, Streben und

Bewegen: Aristoteles' 7heorie der animalischen Ortsbewegung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 215-19. 7

Kal E:crTt TO ~ow8at Kal ~urreTcr8at To tvepyeTv Tft aicr8T]nKft JlWOTT]Tl rrpor:; TO aya8ov ~ KUKOV,

8

nTOlUUTa.

Klaus Corcilius, 'Aristotle's Definition of Non-Rational Pleasure', in Aristotle's

Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. Jon Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge

Aristotle on Deliberative Phantasia and Phronesis

145

University Press, 2011), 128. For further discussion of this so-called extentionalist position, see Labarriere, Langage, vie politique et mouvement des

animaux (as note 1), 184-86. 9

The point is stressed already by Aspasius in EN 147.18-23.

10 For the rival view that sense perception of good and bad involves perceiving something as good or bad, see for example Deborah Achtenberg, Cognition of

Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 161-62 or HenryS. Richardson, 'Desire and the Good in De Anima: in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie 0. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 381-99; for discussion of this view, Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (as note 3), 30-41. 11

~

f!EV OUV a[cr6rrnK~ cpavTacria, WG7tEp e'ip'lTUI, Kat tv TOi~ aAAOl~ (lj>ot~ U7tClPXEI,

~

ot ~OUAEUTIK~ tv TOl~ AOYIGTIKOi~ (n6n:pov yap npa~EI TOOE ~ T66e, AOYlGf!OU

~0'1

tmlv epyov· Kal UVUYK'l tvl f!ETpiiv· TO f!EKov yap OU.OKEl· WGTE OUVUTat EV

tK nA.et6vwv cpavTaGf!UTWV noteiv). Kal ahtov TOUTO Toii 06~av

f!~

OOKEiv EXElV,

OTl T~V tK cru>J.oytcrf!OU OUK EXEl [aiiT'l 0£ tKEiV'lV]· 010 TO ~OUAEUTlKOV OUK EXEl ~ ope~~~.

With David Ross, Aristotle: De anima, edited with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 319 ad 431a10-ll, I take Aristotle to refer to

~OUAEUTIK~

cpavTacrta when he writes 'T~V eK cru>J.oytcrf!OU'. I follow

Bywater in excising the words 'aiiT'l ot eKEiv'lv' ('this itself has that') at 434a11 and I do not accept Cornford's emendation 'aiiT'l

ot Ktvel'. Ronald Polansky,

Aristotle's De anima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 531, discusses the different interpretative options in detail. 12 See for example Dorothea Frede, 'The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle: in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima (as note 10), 282-87. 13 See also Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (as note 3), 200-06. To me, Moss seems to go too far in claiming that habituation is exclusively non-rational. See Charles, ~ristotle on Practical and Theoretical Knowledge' (as note 2), 91-92, for discussion and objections. 14 Here I follow the helpful, but brief, remarks by David Sedley, ~spasius on Acrasia', in Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Antonina Alberti and Robert Sharples (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999), 166-67. 15 The phantasma in question results from a string of reasoning (ek sullogismou). In my understanding, 'through a string of reasoning' (ek sullogismou) is just another way of saying 'make one phantasma out of many', since sullogismos basically just means 'counting or putting together', that is making one out of many.

Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics

146

16 Phantasia might also indjcate that some morally relevant situation is at hand, for example, that a wrong has been committed (EN 7.6.1149a32-33) or present the means for reaching a goal (MA 7.701a32-33). However, since I am concerned with the appearance of the principle, I leave these cases aside. 17 Corcilius, Streben und Bewegen (as note 6), 95-102. 18 Myles Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on Learning to Be Good', in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie 0. Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 69-92; Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 157-99. 19 'law