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English Pages [223] Year 1992
Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
Preface
1. On Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes Climacus
2. An Ironical Thought Experiment
3. Constructing an Alternative to the Socratic View of “The Truth”
4. The Poetry of the Incarnation
5. Thought, Passion, and Paradox
6. The Echo of Offense
7. Reason and the Paradox
8. Belief and the Will
9. Faith and History
10. Christianity in the Contemporary World
Notes
Index
Passionate
Philosophical
Fm^ments
ASSIONATE
REASON
The Indiana
Series in the
Philosophy of Religion
GENERAL EDITOR Merold Westphal
ASSIONATE
REASON
MAKING SENSE O
F
KIERKEGAARD'S Philosophical Fragments
C.
STEPHEN EVANS
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS Bloomington
& Indianapolis
©
1992 by C. Stephen Evans All rights reserved
No
part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses' Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition. The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI
Z39.48'1984.
@™ Manufactured
in the
United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Evans, C. Stephen. Passionate reason
:
making sense of Kierkegaard's Philosophical
fragments / C. Stephen Evans. p.
cm.
—
(Indiana series in the philosophy of religion)
Includes bibliographical references
ISBN 0-253-32073-9 alk. 1.
2.
(alk.
paper).
(pbk.
Kierkegaard, Sc^ren, 1813-1855. Philosophiske smuler.
Religion— Philosophy.
I.
Title.
3
4
II.
Series.
1992
91-30417
201-dc20 2
ISBN 0-253-20722-3
paper)
BL51.E858 1
and index.
-
5
96
95
94
93
92
:
To my father and dearly missed mother, in gratitude for
many happy memories
that
are blended with the writing of this book.
Digitized by the Internet Archive in
2015
https://archive.org/details/passionatereasonOOcste
CONTENTS ix
Preface
1.
On
Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes
Climacus
1
2.
An
3.
Constructing an Alternative to the Socratic
Ironical
View
of
Thought Experiment
'The Truth"
13
26
4.
The
5.
Thought, Passion, and Paradox
58
6.
The Echo
80
7.
Reason and the Paradox
8.
Belief
9.
Faith and History
10.
Poetry of the Incarnation
of Offense
and the Will
Christianity in the
46
96 119
143
Contemporary World
170
Notes
183
Index
199
Preface
Schopenhauer called the mind-body problem "the world-knot" because he thought that all the problems of philosophy met there; untangle that problem
and clear
lines
could be found to unravel
Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments sense,
and
unravel
all
1
would not argue that
is
all
the others.
hardly a world-knot in just this
a successful interpretation of
the problems of philosophy. However,
1
am
it
would
convinced that
several of the key problems faced by the contemporary mind, not to
mention contemporary philosophy, come into focus when this book is read in a clear-headed way. Two problems have a special significance. The first problem concerns the place of religious faith especially in the contemporary world, whether that world be Christian faith thought of as "modern" or "postmodern." Traditional Christianity believed that the key to human existence was to be found in the life, death, and resurrection of a historical figure. Such faith has had grave knocks in the modem world dominated by Enlightenment rationalism. The historical beliefs about Jesus of Nazareth, bound up as they are with the acceptance of the miraculous and the supernatural, are alleged to be unfounded or even downright irrational. Perhaps even more fundamentally, the Enlightenment mind has had difficulty understanding how any historical events could have this kind of meaning for life here and now. Some theologians and religious thinkers see the postmodern world as more receptive to religious faith, and perhaps it is. The impact of Bill Moyer's PBS program, Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth, shows that contemporary society is still fascinated by religious themes. Perhaps the sociological picture of an increasingly and inevitably secular society is an empty "myth" that fails to recognize the power mythology still holds for us. Many Christian thinkers think we must accept perhaps even celebrate the categorizing of the central Christian stories as myths. However, it is by no means obvious that the transformation of the Christian gospel to mythology does not fundamentally change its meaning. Kierkegaard, at least, thought that something distinctive about Christianity, something that distinguished Christian faith from Greek philosophy, would be lost by the elimination of the historical. He thought not only that such a transformation would alter the character
—
—
—
—
of Christian faith in a decisive way, but that the character of my history
X
Preface
/
would be altered when the meaning of human existence is no longer centered in something historical. Philosophical Fragments pointedly raises the issue of whether history, either the history of a figure of an earlier period or the contemporary history of a living person, can have what
Kierkegaard would call "eternal significance."
The second problem that Philosophical Fragments brings into focus one that Kierkegaard confronts in dealing with the first issue. It concerns the place and character of reason in the contemporary world. is
The Enlightenment urged was seen
us to "dare to use your own reason." Reason an autonomous, objective power, a timeless faculty whose
as
was not taken seriously This image of reason
historical character
challenged by Kierkegaard,
who
what might be
dares to look at
the interested character of reason. For Kierkegaard, reason influenced by the passions;
it
has
itself
become
is
is
called
not merely
passionate.
Here Kierkegaard anticipates the collapse of classical foundationalist on by postmodern thinkers in a manner quite similar to the way Kierkegaard was utilized by existentialism in an earlier generation. However, I believe Kierkegaard's epistemology, and his work has been seized
deepest convictions
postmodernism as poorly as they fit postwar book I try to show that Kierkegaard does not
fit
existentialism. In this
leap from the passionate character of reason to relativism or antirealism.
He
thinks that a reason that recognizes
friend to
humans
gaard thinks there
might find
it.
its
passionate character
is
a
struggling to find their place. Furthermore, Kierkeis
a place to find
and that
it
is
even possible we
Thus, he poses a challenge both to modernism and
postmodernism. Both the friends and foes of "reason" are forced to
reexamine the actual character of Readers of
my
may wonder about Kierkegaard. territory.
Of
After
thinking.
and
Postscript,
the relation of this work to that attempt to engage
course
all,
human
earlier work, Kierkegaard's Fragments
it
is
a venturesome thing to return to familiar
Thomas Wolfe
has warned that you can't go
home
and the Johannes Climacus section of Kierkegaard's authorship is in some ways home ground for me. The reasons for returning to this ground are multiple. First, the ground is not wholly or even mainly the same. There is a fundamental difference between the structure of my again,
earlier
script
book and the current work. is
a thematic study, organized
Philosophical Fragments
Kierkegaard's Fragments and Post-
around the key concepts of both
and Concluding
Unscientific Postscript.
attempted to deal with these concepts in what order, with
1
more primitive concepts and arguments
1
there
took to be a logical treated before those
Preface
which presuppose them.
No
attempt
is
made
xi
/
there to look at the order
or literary structure of the Kierkegaardian texts.
The
present work limits
itself to
and
Philosophical Fragments
attempts to give a consistent reading of the book as a whole.
it
It is
a
kind of philosophical commentary that combines exegesis (though not of the line-by-line type), interpretation, and critical interaction. After
some
initial orientation,
I
work
straight
through the text of Fragments,
attempting to deal with the major issues that would worry a serious
and order of Fragments So the book differs from my one of the Climacus books and in
reader. Questions about the purpose, structure,
come
obviously earlier
one
in for special attention.
in limiting itself to
attempting to treat that work as a literary whole. Besides these structural differences, there are differences in problems and perspective as well. As I have continued to read and think about the Johannes Climacus literature, I have seen a number of problems emerge that either were not dealt with or were not dealt with adequately in
my
earlier book. Secondly, to the degree there
is
overlap in the
somewhat new perspective on the ground covered. Though I think the present book is consistent with the main theses of my earlier work, my reading of other authors on books,
I
believe this book reflects a
the Climacus books has changed
my
thinking. In particular,
I
now
think a great deal more attention must be paid to the literary form of these works and the irony that pervades that form.
Nevertheless, this book shares philosophical purposes with lier
one.
have not
I
refrained, therefore,
such questions as the relation of
from having
human
my own
my
ear-
say
on
reason to purported divine
revelations and the relation tianity I
and
between a revealed religion such as Chrismy own arguments for the views hope my readers will go back and continue to read
history, or
wish to defend.
I
from presenting
Philosophical Fragments for themselves, but
tivation for doing so issues the
book
is
I
believe that the best
mo-
gained from hard work on the philosophical
raises.
must in conclusion express my gratitude to Merold Westphal for convincing me that a book of this sort on Fragments was needed, and for his confidence that I was the person to do it. I join that expression of thanks with a hope that he will soon complete his own projected I
commentary on Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which in my mind will serve as a natural companion to my own book. I also owe a heavy debt to Robert Roberts, George Connell, and to Charles Taliaferro, all of whom read an earlier draft of this work and gave me detailed criticisms and suggestions.
xii
Preface
/
The principal work for this book was done at Emory University in 1988-89 with the support of a Fellowship for College Teachers from the National
vided
me
Endowment
Humanities. Emory University pro-
for the
with congenial working conditions and an office in their
excellent Candler Library as a Fellow of the Institute for Faith Devel-
opment.
am
St.
Olaf College also provided
profoundly grateful to
Though
of chapter "Is
me
with an early sabbatical.
articles in
work was conceived and written as part of one worked through the issues, some portions were order to get some critical feedback. Thus, a section
7,
in
an
I
earlier incarnation,
was published under the
Kierkegaard an Irrationalist? Reason, Paradox, and Faith," in
ious Stvidies,
I
three of these institutions.
this entire
coherent project, as
spun off as
all
Volume
25. Similarly,
in earlier versions, appeared as
some
title
Relig-
sections of chapters 8 and 9,
"Does Kierkegaard Think
Beliefs
Can
Be Directly Willed?" and "The Relevance of Historical Evidence
for
Christian Faith," in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (Vol-
ume
26) and Faith and Philosophy
(Volume
7) respectively.
to those journals for permission to use that material.
My
thanks
ASSIONATE
REASON
CHAPTER 1 ON READING KIERKEGAARD AND JOHANNES CLIMACUS
Philosophical Fragments
generally agreed to be one of Kierkegaard's
is
most significant works. There
is,
however, no general agreement about
the nature of the book's significance.
It
is
a short book, only a little
over a hundred pages in length, attributed to a pseudonym, one
Johannes Climacus. himself says that
could write, lessness"
on the
it
this
^
on the
in
It is
not a book which every divinity school student
is
is,
one sense a simple book. Though Climacus
I
think, due
more
to a lack of "dialectical fear-
part of the seminarian than to a lack of
part of the student, since the content of the
knowledge
book
is
for the
most part "nothing but old-fashioned orthodoxy with a suitable degree of severity."^ But in a deeper sense to understand,
one
full
relation to the content
As
if
the book
possible to decide it
is
itself
how
it
is
a
book which
enough
from easy
difficulties,
it
is
im-
the book should be approached without seeing
whether Kierkegaard's authorship does have, if so,
far
deeply puzzling.
did not present
in the larger context of Kierkegaard's authorship.
purpose, and
is
of irony and satire, with a literary form whose
what that purpose
pseudonyms must be decided,
is.
The
as
One must
decide
he claimed, a unifying
nature and purpose of the
as well as the relation
between the
pseudonymous section of the authorship and that which Kierkegaard published under his
own name. Having done
that,
one must then
decide the specific character and purposes of the Johannes Climacus
pseudonym and I
have no
faction of
all
its
role in Kierkegaard's overall literature.
illusions that
I
can answer these questions to the
Kierkegaard interpreters. Nevertheless,
I
owe my
satis-
readers
2
PASSIONATE REASON
/
some account of the assumptions with which and the thinking which
lies
shall
I
approach the work,
behind those assumptions. The richness
of Kierkegaard's authorship makes the quest for anything like a final, definitive interpretation a hopeless one,
and there
are approaches to
my own, and
Kierkegaard's literature which differ radically from
have shown themselves
my
approach
illuminating
is
and
to be interesting
one that
is
fruitful.
faithful to the text
way of approaching
I
yet
claim only that
and that
provides an
it
a host of significant problems.
THREE TYPES OF KIERKEGAARD LITERATURE I
find
useful to divide recent literature
it
broad types.
pseudonyms and read Kierkegaard
on Kierkegaard's
on Kierkegaard more or
there are books which
First,
less
into three
ignore the
as a straight philosopher,
literature as a whole.-
I
would place
drawing
in this group
philosophers such as Stephen Dunning, Louis Pojman, John Elrod, and
Mark C.
the early writings of
Taylor.
Though
obviously the philo-
sophical approaches of these authors differ greatly, ranging from the analytic perspective of
Pojman
of Dunning, they have in
to the structuralist, dialectical reading
common an
approach which emphasizes
Kierkegaard as a philosopher and makes the particular character of
We
the pseudonyms unimportant.
might
call this
the philosophical
approach.
The second way approach, since to
book, Kierkegaard:
proach"
is
of reading Kierkegaard could be called the literary
some degree
A
Kind of
it
stems from Louis Mackey's important
Poet."^
However, the term
not completely satisfactory, since
later writings of
Mark C. Taylor and
have
I
in
"literary ap-
mind here the
others associated with the series
Kierkegaard and Postmodernism, of which Taylor
is
editor.
These authors
wish to bring Kierkegaard into relation with deconstructionism and other contemporary
approach"
is
Kierkegaard's work literary artist,
there
is
movements
and
in
is
decisive. Kierkegaard
The term
"literary
is
fundamentally a poet or
Mackey's words, "Whatever philosophy or theology
in Kierkegaard
the poetry."^
in literary criticism.'
suggestive, since for these authors the literary form of
is
sacramentally transmitted
'in,
with, and under'
— On
Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes Climacus
However, the term
"literary
way the Kierkegaardian
approach"
fails
approached
texts are
The
apparent content.
its
view" in Kierkegaard
to express the distinctive
as Uterature here. Follow-
ing Derrida, these authors see Kierkegaard's
subverting
work
as
fundamentally
search for any overall "point of
therefore regarded as hopeless.
is
3
/
must be read on their own terms, and their work destructive than directed toward establishing
is
The pseudonyms
more
ironical
and
—or even undermining
traditional philosophical positions through straightforward arguments,
and so on. Hence
dialectical analyses, this
A I
I
think the best description of
second perspective may be "the ironical approach."^ third category of
would term
it
work
is
best seen as a synthesis of the
Recent books on
literary-philosophical.
two;
first
Philosophical
Fragments by H. A. Nielsen and Robert Roberts would be excellent illustrations of
what
have
I
second group, Nielsen
in mind.*^ Like the
and Roberts take the pseudonyms
seriously,
and
this leads
the literary structure of the books seriously. Also, as
much
the ironical interpreters, they see
is
them
to take
the case with
of Kierkegaard's intent as
negative, humorous, and ironical subversion of the philosophical and theological status quo. However, unlike the ironical group they see this approach as blocking
philosophical, but,
on the
any consideration of the text
do not
as primarily
contrary, as freeing the reader up for an
encounter with the text which
be philosophical in what might be
will
termed a Socratic sense. Though tatives of all three approaches,
have learned much from represen-
I
it
approach that
this third
is
I
shall
attempt to follow most closely in the present work.
The assumption
that underlies
my
approach
is
that though Kierke-
gaard does subvert the epistemological tradition of classical foundationalism,
he
is
no
friend of historicism
and relativism
either. Kierkegaard
reminds us forcefully of our finitude, and he wants us to recognize the relativity
and
historicity of our situation,
even with respect to what
philosophers like to call Reason and Evidence. There
method of grasping the
truth. Nevertheless, there
and what Kierkegaard wants us to see just a screen that distorts the truth,
that,
when
but
is
is
is
no
risk-free
truth to be grasped,
that our subjectivity
may be
or
become
a
is
not
medium
controlled by the right kind of passion, opens us up to an
encounter with truth. This encounter cannot produce "the system";
cannot eliminate the
risk that
we
are mistaken.
However,
it
it
can allow
4
PASSIONATE REASON
/
us to participate in a truth that, provisionally
can transform our
and
partially at least,
lives.
A POINT OF VIEW ON THE AUTHORSHIP I
begin by affirming that
literature has
he put to
it
in
end a
an overall
agree with Kierkegaard himself that his
I
religious purpose
The Poird of View for
and that Kierkegaard was,
My Work as an Author,
as
"from beginning
religious author." In this review of his literature, Kierkegaard
views his whole authorship as consisting of two streams, one aesthetic
and one
religious.
The
apparently aesthetic writings have, however, as
their purpose leading the aesthetic reader to the place
where he can
seriously confront the religious works. This claim of Kierkegaard has
on the grounds
often been attacked
that
it
is
by no means clear that
Kierkegaard understood his purposes at the beginning of his authorship as
he did
at the end,
when he wrote The
Point of View. Louis
Mackey
has recently argued that there can be no such ''point of view" for Kierkegaard's writings, only points of view.*^ This charge goes in
hand
with a view of Kierkegaard as deeply confused and even radically
own
deceived about his I
have no wish
to
or clarity about his areas,
though
I
life
endow Kierkegaard with superhuman
life.
Like the rest of
us,
self-insight
he surely struggled
in these
do think he probably struggled more energetically and
The
readings of his works and
successfully
than most of
us by Josiah
Thompson," Henning Fenger, and
Louis
self-
and authorship.^°
Mackey seem
us.
unjustifiably cynical to
life
given
in the later writings of
me; certainly they
fall
short
of the standard of love discussed by Kierkegaard himself in Works of Love, where he argues that the lover "believes
all
things" in the sense
of always seeking to discover the most charitable interpretation of
another's
life.'^
However,
for
my
purposes,
it is
the truth of Kierkegaard's account of his
not necessary to decide
own
life.
For in the final
analysis, as Kierkegaard himself would be the first to affirm, the
meaning
of a body of literature cannot be determined by the intentions of the
author, but by
what the author
In other words,
my
realized.
justification for seeing a religious purpose as
providing a unity to Kierkegaard's literature
is
not that he affirms that
On he intended such a
Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes Climacus
illuminates
it
way
unity, but that looking at the literature in this
manner. Kierkegaard himself admits that
in a powerful
he did not have a clear understanding of the plan of the the outset.-^ His
5
/
own
literature at
understanding of what he was about changed as
he personally developed. He attributed the unity of the authorship providence/"* an explanation
which
which many
certainly involves a recognition
on
his part that the
whole thing
was not planned out in advance. Whether Kierkegaard intended not, the unity
is
to
will doubtless discount, but
it
or
there in the text, in the sense that an honest reading
of the authorship beginning with Either /Or and continuing through
the later explicitly Christian writings can discern a consistent
Arguments and
literary
the reader toward religious In a sense what
mony;
I
can
I
issues.
am
offering
on behalf of
truly affirm that the literature has
me when read in how the literature
this is
telos.
forms work together in an amazing way to draw
manner. But
clarified
also
hope
to
to test
my
is
show my
and illuminated when read
them
and, ultimately, challenge
I
this thesis
testi-
taken on a power for readers
in this way,
claims by going back to
Kierkegaard.
TAKING JOHANNES CLIMACUS SERIOUSLY No area of Kierkegaard interpretation has given rise to more controversy than the pseudonyms. Some have taken
remark
at the
affirms that
end of Concluding
though he
donymous books, "not
is
as literal fact Kierkegaard's
Unscientific Postscript, in
which he
the legally responsible author of the pseu-
a single word" of the
belongs to Kierkegaard himself.
Indeed, Louis
pseudonymous authors
Mackey has even
gested that the books Kierkegaard authored under his
own name
simply from another pseudonym, so that "S0ren Kierkegaard"
one more
literary persona.^^
is
sug-
are just
At the other extreme, some authors have
simply ignored the pseudonyms altogether, and have developed an
overview of "Kierkegaard's" views by drawing from
all
the pseudony-
mous works.
The Johannes Climacus pseudonym
has given
rise
to as
much
controversy as any. There has been a tendency to view the Climacus
6
PASSIONATE REASON
/
pseudonym
as a
mask
for Kierkegaard,
even on the part of those who
take other Kierkegaardian pseudonyms quite seriously. Niels Thulstrup, for
example, argues that because of the similarities between Fragments
and other works Kierkegaard published is
at the time,
documentary evidence that the work was
and because there
originally written
under
own name, with only minor changes when the pseudonym "the work is both thought and written in Kierkegaard's own
Kierkegaard's
was added,
name and
therefore cannot be considered a truly
Consistent with this claim, Thulstrup's
pseudonymous work."^^
own commentary
takes the
Fragments as a straightforward philosophical work. Thulstrup locates historical antecedents, tries to discern at objections, is
main
theses
its
and arguments, looks
and so on, under the guiding assumption that the text
Kierkegaard's own. In contrast, H. A. Nielsen's Where the Passion
Is:
A
Reading of
Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments takes the Johannes Climacus
pseudonym with
great seriousness, or with as
much
seriousness as
one
can give to a professedly playful author. Nielsen takes deliberate account of the non-Christian point of view from which Climacus writes in
end of chapter
interpreting and assessing the book. For example, at the 1,
Climacus puts forward what he describes
as a
of the hypothesis he has "invented," a hypothesis
"proof of the truth
which bears
resemblance to the Christian story of the incarnation provide salvation for
human
beings. Since
as
a striking
God's plan to
Climacus professes not to
be a Christian, Nielsen argues that there must be a difference between accepting the truth of this hypothesis and genuine Christian a similar
manner, Robert Roberts,
riously, tentatively suggests that
who
also takes the
faith. '"^ In
pseudonym
some of the arguments
se-
in the "Inter-
lude" section of the book are bad arguments which are to be read ironically as parodies of
genuine arguments, a conjecture which Roberts
on the humoristic character of the pseudonym.'^ book I intend to follow the policy of Roberts and Nielsen
partially bases
In this
and the precedent of
my own
Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript,
by taking the Johannes Climacus pseudonym as a genuine pseudonym.
Thulstrup
is
undoubtedly right in claiming that Fragments was originally
written under Kierkegaard's
own name,
but that fact does not have the
decisive importance that Thulstrup gives
it.
First, as
Thulstrup himself
points out, there were revisions to the book after the
pseudonym was
On
Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes Climacus
One cannot
added, notably to the preface.
however
that these changes,
an a
say in
may not be
small,
the thrust of the book as a whole. Taking the
7
/
priori
manner
significant in altering
pseudonym
seriously, for
example, allows one to consider the possibility that the tone of the preface alters the sense of the
Even more
pseudonym
possibility that the transition to a
result of a discovery
book.
as a whole.
significantly, taking the
open the
leaves
book
on Kierkegaard's
as a
genuine persona
pseudonym was the
part about the character of the
Any creative author, and Kierkegaard was nothing if not creative, his own work in the process of writing and
makes discoveries about rewriting.
may
It
well be that the humoristic, non-Christian Climacus
pseudonym embodies the standpoint have taken
in the
of the pseudonym, even
made, can be seen part,
that Kierkegaard found himself to
composition of the book. In if
fact,
no other changes
as a significant act of rewriting
one which potentially
the mere affixing
in the
book had been
on Kierkegaard's
sentence by altering the per-
alters every
spective of the author. Finally, taking the little risk.
no
pseudonym
In reading the
book
is
a strategy
and sober philosophy, this in
some
simply because
as
If
we choose
we
will
pseudonym
I
think
it
make or
its
does indeed
to play along with Kierkegaard
And
if
and regard
Climacus does present
views which are substantially in agreement with Kierkegaard's the time the book was written, there fact.
offers
not be barred from learning things
ourselves as learning from Climacus.
ognizing that
I
the book presents us with serious
Thulstrup asserts (and
sections),
which
by Johannes Climacus,
a priori assumptions about the character of the
relation to Kierkegaard himself.
do
seriously
as written
is
own
at
nothing to prevent our rec-
In summary, taking the
pseudonym
seriously safe-
guards several significant possibilities for the reader while foreclosing
none. At
least this will
be true for the philosophical reader.
purpose in reading Philosophical Fragments
may be
our
for
present in attributing the book to the pseudonym.
If,
however, we read the book, with a
If
to construct a history of
some potential
the development of Kierkegaard's loss
own
is
as
I
views, then
wish to do,
as forcing us to grapple
set of significant philosophical questions,
grapple with Johannes Climacus.
then we do well to
8
PASSIONATE REASON
/
GETTING TO KNOW JOHANNES CLIMACUS If
we
are to grapple with
Johannes Climacus, we need to get to know
him, of course. That task turns out not to be an easy one. Climacus a
somewhat
biographical facts to work with, and this
on the
readers to focus
who
curious readers
he
issues
speculate
on
is
discusses;
own
his
said
is
most
me
ask
is
real
he does not want nosy,
personal standpoints.
Such
work with.
where Climacus does
clearly in the preface,
best to fend off the reader's curiosity: "But
no one
have no
no accident. Climacus wants
readers are frustrated by being given nothing to
This
We
elusive, as well as ethereal, character.
what
my
is
his
opinion?... Let
about that, for next to knowing whether
I
have an
opinion, nothing could be more insignificant to another person than
knowing what my opinion possible that so,
it
is
Climacus goes on to say that
is."^'
he may find some personal benefit from
"Do
his business.
who, serving by the
altar,
I
get any reward for this,
themselves eat of what
vacy, and
1
me
will force us to think
which the book was
I
is
if
like those
on the
altar?..
take the Johannes
to respect this request for pri-
shall try to follow this policy,
form of the book
am
laid
me to
Leave that to me."" The same reasons that lead
Climacus pseudonym seriously lead
is
it
his work, but
though
at times the literary
about the perspective from
written.
a nosy desire to know Johannes Climacus' know more about what kind of an author he is and literature he is offering us. The literature is evidently
one can, without
Still,
opinions, want to
what kind of
philosophy of a philosopher of a
sort,
which presumably makes Johannes Climacus
sort. It
is
that Climacus has a great interest in issues,
but which
a host of issues
studies"
I
would prefer
Some
to
which come up
which do not insight here
interest is
a
equally evident from the content of the book
what some might
term in
what
Climacus
call religious
spiritual issues, since there are
at
is
today termed "religious
all.
,
provided by the name. Johannes Climacus
means "John the Climber." The name is that of a monk from the monastery on Sinai, who is well known for having written The Ladder of Divine Ascent, a
book which purports
for attaining spiritual perfection.
to give step- by-step instructions
Our Johannes Climacus
is
obviously
On
Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes CUmacus
a different person, and he shows
no
how an
in the question as to
knowledge of the
interest in or
Johannes Climacus. However,
original
monk, he
like the
9
/
is
interested
individual attains spiritual wholeness.
Perhaps a remark about Hegel in Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers gives us the right clue here.
"Hegel
who
a Johannes Clinuicus
is
does not
storm the heavens as do the giants, by setting mountain upon mountain
—but
enters
them by means of
his syllogisms.""
Johannes Climacus
is
thought in attaining
spiritual perfection.
As
a philosopher
interested in the question as to the value of
What
thought in general, play in becoming what
Many commentators have
1
role
can philosophy, or
should become?
explored an early, unfinished work of
Kierkegaard's, unpublished during his lifetime, Johannes Climacus,
De Omnibus Dubitandum
Est,'"*
in order to gain
Or
more knowledge about
Johannes. In this work Kierkegaard sketches a biography of a young
man, Johannes Climacus, who
tries seriously to realize
program of universal doubt. The subject of
number
this
the philosophical
biography
of acute questions about the nature of doubt and
to philosophy. Kierkegaard evidently intended the critique of
contemporary philosophers
easily attained
and
easily
who
book
wrote as
transcended standpoint.
if
as
its
raises a
relation
an indirect
doubt were an
The plan
of the book
was evidently to have young Johannes enmesh himself in doubt and then discover no way of resolving his doubts, even his doubts about doubt.
While Johannes Climacus its
own
sake,
I
shall
author of Philosophical -Fragments First,
we must remember
work that
a
is
not employ
it
.
as
is
well worth studying for
an intellectual biography of the
There
are several reasons for this.
that Johannes Climacus
is
an unfinished work
that Kierkegaard decided not to publish. Secondly, basis for
assuming that the subject of the book
is
we have no
author of Philosophical Fragments. Thirdly, Johannes Climacus
authored by Kierkegaard. Even that the subject of the
we would have only
book
if
is
we made
who seems
a
book
identical with the author of Fragments,
the third-person testimony of Kierkegaard about
far
removed from the mature,
somewhat enigmatic, author of
We
is
the unwarranted assumption
Climacus. Furthermore, the picture given of Climacus
innocent
real
identical with the
is
of a young
self-confident,
if
Philosophical Fragments.
are not limited to the text of Fragments for our
knowledge of
10
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Climacus, however, for he
the author of Concluding Unscientific
is
work which
Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, a
to Fragments in a
which
is
number of ways. The
Postscript
half-promised at the end of the
number of places.
discusses Fragments in a
first
is
obviously tied
is
a sequel to Fragments
book, and the sequel
We have every right therefore
to look at Fragments in light of that latter work, with the proviso of
course that the text of Fragments
And we
have every
mind the
in
Climacus
Climacus turns out to be an
fact that
who
what he means or thinks
author of
as the
respect to both works, however,
downright devious author, say
remains our primary concern.
right to understand
With
Postscript as well.
itself
we
shall
elusive,
keep
if
not
perhaps cannot always be trusted to
in a straightforward
manner.
In the Postscript Climacus describes himself as a humorist. This suggests of course that his writings will be funny,
looks for wit and
humor
in Climacus' writings will not be disappointed.
However, the concept of humor involves
and the reader who
much more than
Climacus
for
just wit.
This
is
a rich one,
which
not the place for a
is
full
account of the concept of humor in Climacus' writings (and Kierkegaard
Here
generally).'^
I
merely
will
of the concept which shed light
Humor
for
Climacus
important business of
ament.
We
find
in
sketch a few significant aspects as
It
involves insight into the
what Climacus
better termed incongruities.
A
is
relief
from the
human
calls contradictions,
caricature
predic-
perhaps
comical because of the
is
contradiction between likeness and unlikeness
who
an author and character.
not merely amusement, a
is
life.
humor
try to
on Climacus
it
contains.
A comedian
takes a pratfall by falling into a hole while gazing up at the sky
funny because of the incongruity between the upward gaze and the
downward
ascent.^^
Of course
not every incongruity or contradiction
such incongruities are
tragic.
To
must have the sting removed.
qualify as
We
is
humorous; often
humorous, a contradiction
must somehow find the situation
painless, by gaining a
detached perspective on, the contradiction, by
having what Climacus
calls "a
Everyone
is
way
in this situation
out."'^
some of the
time; everyone laughs at
The person Climacus describes as a humorist is someone who has somehow been able to take this humoristic perspective on life as a whole. The whole of human existence is seen as deeply incongruous.
some
things.
On
We human
Reading Kierkegaard and Johannes CUmacus
11
/
beings have the grandest plans and yet are frustrated by
on human somehow found "the
the most trivial of circumstances. Nevertheless, the final word
not tragedy.
life is
The
existential humorist has
way out" which allows him
human As
aspirations to
what
and what
this
between
to smile at the contradiction life
"way out"
has to
offer.
Climacus
is,
coy,
is
and perhaps
it
be different things for different humorists. However,
it
something
The humorist
like a religious perspective for
a contradiction
not
striving for
meaning and
sees
significance
we
all in fact
to get nowhere. Nevertheless the humorist finds this
funny and
and the
seem
between our busy
Climacus.
will
seems to involve
fact that in the end,
"we
and in so doing reveals
tragic,
all
a conviction,
what we human beings are seeking the end.
The assumption seems
get equally far;"^^
is
however obscure, that
something we
to be that
possess, at least in
what various
religions
called "salvation," "eternal life," or "eternal consciousness"
This allows the humorist to relax a
within
us.
not
removed from that of the speculative philosopher,
far
bit,
is
have
present
an attitude
to take
whom
Wil-
liam James described as taking a "moral holiday" from the seriousness of the ethical
purpose."
life.
A
humorist, says Climacus, has "no seriousness of
Though he may be
his action, regards
Climacus
is
it
as
active, in the
end he always "revokes"
having no fundamental importance.^*^
careful to distinguish this humoristic religious perspec-
from Christianity. The religious perspective of the humorist may
tive
have come about through an encounter with Christianity;
one place Climacus suggests that a humorist a kind of intellectual
religious perspective of the
and passion of Christian one which calls is
is
in at least
someone who has gained
knowledge of Christianity that has not been
existentially realized.^^ Still, the humorist
The
is
faith,
is
far
from being a Christian.
humorist leads, not to the commitment but to a kind of detached perspective,
conducive to philosophical reflection and what Climacus
psychological experimentation (more
on the
latter will follow). It
Climacus also says that humor can be the outward
true that
disguise,
the incognito, of a true Christian, and in reading Fragments,
tempting
at
Christian,
times to speculate that Climacus
who
has adopted
humor
but
we
we
find Climacus himself taking
are
still
may be
as his outer cloak.
just
This
is
it
is
such a possible,
better off in such a case respecting the disguise, unless it
off to reveal himself.
(There are
12
PASSIONATE REASON
/
some passages see.)
he
I
in Fragments that
can be read
shall therefore, at least initially, take
says
he
is
as
doing
Climacus
this, as
at his
we
shall
word when
not a Christian.
among other
Philosophical Fragments,
relation of Christianity to philosophy.
things,
is
One can
a
book about the from the
easily see,
preceding description of the humorist, that someone like Johannes
Climacus
is
an
such a book. As a humorist, Climacus
ideal author for
can be knowledgeable about Christianity and interested as well as other religious perspectives.
He
in Christianity,
can, however, maintain the
philosophical detachment necessary to look at the issues
fairly.
His
thinking as a humorist has what one might call an experimental quality to
it.
By "experiment" Climacus does not mean anything one does
ically.
in
he experiments by thinking hypothet-
a laboratory of course. Rather,
The Hongs have chosen
to translate the
Danish experiment by
"imaginative construction," and the translation certainly captures an essential aspect of
what
is
meant. The experimenter
is
a thinker
who
thinks under the guise of "suppose this were so." Philosophical Fragments is
just
such an experiment,
as
we
grand attempt to think
shall see, a
out the consequences of a certain assumption, one which
is
never
asserted as true but only entertained hypothetically. In the next chapter I
shall try to give
an overall perspective on
descending to the details of the actual
issues
this
experiment, before
and problems discussed.
CHAPTER
AN IRONICAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Before examining the details of Philosophical Fragments to
have an overall perspective on the book.
I
it
,
will
be helpful
shall try to provide
such
a perspective in this chapter by sketching the book's overall project as I
see
it
and by looking
Having noted it
is
warring approaches to reading Kierkegaard,
my own,
hardly surprising that any such sketch, including
be controversial.
by
motto, and preface.
at the book's title page,
earlier the
its
The
fruitfulness of
power to make sense of the
my approach will,
1
must
hope, be shown
particular issues to be discussed in
subsequent chapters.
AN INITIAL SKETCH Philosophical Fragments
is,
at least
on the
surface,
an extended thought
experiment. Climacus begins by posing a Socratic (or Platonic) puzzle
How
about truth.
can the truth be learned?
It is
very soon evident that
He is not talking essential for human beings to would make human life ultimately
by truth Climacus means something very significant. about 2+2=4, but the truth which have, the truth whose possession
worthwhile.
We
might
it is
as well signify the specialness of the
by speaking of "the Truth" in cases where
this special
concept
kind of truth
is
in mind, as the original English translation of Fragments did, rather
than
just truth.
The
How I
Socratic puzzle concerns the difficulty of seeking the Truth.
can
I
seek for what
do not need
to acquire
1
do not know?
it,
If
and cannot be
I
already
know
said to seek
it.
the Truth, If
1
do not
14
know
PASSIONATE REASON
/
the Truth,
I
cannot seek
and could not recognize
for
that this Socrates
is
it,
it if I
for
do not know what
I
found
it.^
in
looking
evident
a very Platonic Socrates) solved this puzzle, ac'
cording to Climacus, by postulating that
Truth
am it is
I
Socrates (and
some way and
human
beings do possess the
that the acquisition of the Truth
really a
is
recollection of something a person already possesses.
own
Consistent with this hypothesis, Socrates viewed his teacher as that of a midwife ideas.^
The person who
who
learns
helps others give birth to their
from Socrates that the Truth
himself already realizes at the same moment,
he
.really
is
own
within
has learned
essential debt.
has learned he has learned from himself, and Socrates has
served only as an occasion for his in
if
owe Socrates any
the Socratic lesson, that he does not
What he
role as a
which a person acquires
tance either, for at the same
moment
Truth, he realizes that at bottom
Climacus thinks that acquisition
is
it
it
The moment
cannot have a decisive impor-
at
which the person acquires
this
has always been in his possession.
among
Truth and
philosophers. Indeed,
it is
its
more
taken for granted; most philosophers simply
is
assume some variation of alternative.
self-actualization.
this "Socratic" picture of the
very widely held
accurate to say that
own
this insight
this picture
(What Climacus means by
and cannot even imagine an this
and why he thinks
be explored in the next chapter.) Hence, he
sets
this will
himself the philo-
sophical task of trying to discover an alternative to the Socratic view.
He embarks on a thought experiment which consists of the construction is different from the Socratic view. He does not (with
of a view which
a few apparent exceptions, to be discussed in due course) concern
himself with the truth of this alternative, but merely attempts to see if
there
is
any such alternative. In sketching out
underlying procedure
is
this alternative, the
simply to ask, "Is this view genuinely different
from the Socratic view?" Thus, Climacus
will often reject a possibility
by arguing that accepting such a view would "return us to Socrates,"
and
just as frequently,
he
will
add a wrinkle to his "thought-project"
by merely claiming that the wrinkle makes his constructed view genuinely different
from the Socratic perspective. Of course one might think
that there are
many views which
Socratic view, and
Climacus
will
it
are genuinely different from the
seems possible a
be happy
if
priori that this
he can think up
just
might be
one coherent
so,
but
alternative.
An Even an unsophisticated
Irordcd
Thou^
Experiment
15
/
reading of Fragments would reveal
first
that the alternative Climacus seems to be "inventing" bears a suspicious
resemblance to Christianity.
be otherwise" than the
"If things are to
moment
Socratic view, says Climacus, then "the
decisive significance, unlike the Socratic view,
With
has no intrinsic importance.
Chmacus
moment
The
learner must not
acquire or develop the Truth
on his
mean
to
everything,
must be one of being
state of the learner
devoid of the Truth.^
must have
this slim hypothetical foundation,
goes to work. In order for the
then the preceding
in time"
where the moment
totally
even have the capacity to
Such a state of error Climacus
own."*
decides to call "sin." In such a case the teacher required will be
mere midwife, but someone who
Such an
grasp the Truth.
act
amounts
to a re-creation of the learner,
and therefore only the god could be the teacher on
The god-teacher who mere teacher, but a
no
will give the learner the ability to
this alternative.^
thus makes possible the learner's
savior, deliverer, reconciler,
and
new birth is no The disciple
judge.^'
of the god cannot regard his relationship to the god Socratically; he
owes the god everything, and that
he
sees himself as
back on his old
life
his
new
life
with the god
is
so different
one who has been converted, who must look
with a kind of sorrow described as repentance.^
In chapter 2 Climacus imaginatively fleshes out his experiment by a poetic attempt to for
human
show that the god could function
human
persons only by becoming a
as
such a teacher
person himself.
The
divine teacher can carry out his teaching only through an incarnation.
The
god's actions in
historical events.
to gain
becoming the teacher must therefore be actual
Chapter
3 reflects
knowledge of God and
of unaided
human
on human philosophical attempts
specifically tries to
show the
reason to gain the kind of knowledge of
such an incarnation would make possible. Here
it is
own
inability to
for the
it
When
unaided
cannot even adequately understand
know God, though something
encounter with the god
that
argued that reason
cannot even gain a knowledge of the god^ negatively. by the god's self-revelation,
inability
God
is
its
of positive significance
nonetheless learned from the
failure.
Chapters 4 and 5 return to the story of the god's appearance and sketch the kind of historical relationship
human
beings might have to
such an incarnate god, both for immediate contemporaries of the god in history,
and
for later generations.
The
thrust of the account
is
simply
16
that
PASSIONATE REASON
/
one becomes a
disciple of the god, capable of learning the
Truth
from him, only through a direct relationship. This relationship occurs by means of sensory experience, in the case of the immediate contemporary of the god's appearance, and by means of historical testimony in the case of later generations.
However, neither the sensory experience
nor the historical testimony
is
more than an occasion
for a direct
encounter with the god that establishes the relationship. In neither case
is
god a product of rational evaluation of evidence.
faith in the
The book
as a
whole thus has a
a hypothesis about the Truth,
is
tight, logical structure.
deduced
in chapter
1
.
The
skeleton,
This hypothesis,
which involves the idea that the knowledge of God must be given through a divine self-revelation,
is
poetically concretized in chapter 2
by imagining the revelation as an incarnation. In chapter 3 the content of the hypothesis
is
illuminated by contrasting
it
with rational, philo-
sophical approaches to the knowledge of God. In chapters 4 and
5,
the
implications of the hypothesis for the question of how a person becomes a disciple of the incarnate to the role historical
The whole
God
are explained, specifically with respect
knowledge plays and does not play
in the process.
thing follows quite closely some of the central teachings of
Christianity;
one could hardly imagine anyone "inventing" such a
tale
outside of a culture familiar with Christianity.
IRONY AND MORE IRONY In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus has an extended
footnote giving his reaction to a review of Fragments that appeared in a
German
a "plot
theological periodical. Climacus says that the review gives
summary" of the book
that
is
generally accurate but nevertheless
gives "as misleading
an impression of the book
The
is
reason for this
no
forwardly, with
whole
project.
An
as
is
possible to give."^
simply that the review takes the book straight-
real appreciation of the irony that
pervades the
attentive reader of Fragments will hardly need this
external reminder from Climacus in order to see that something funny is
going on. Clues abound within the text of Fragments
The most who appears
itself.
obvious clues are the "dialogues" with an interlocutor
frequently in the text, particularly at the ends of chapters.
An
Ironicd
For example, at the end of chapter
Thou^ 1
Eyperivnent
17
/
the interlocutor shows up and
berates Climacus for undertaking the ludicrous project of inventing
something that
is
already well
known. Climacus
in the afternoon exhibited for a fee a
ram that
like "the
is
in the
On
could see free of charge, grazing in an open pasture. the irony
which
simply that
is
CHmacus
Danish Lutheran
his
man who
morning anyone the surface
pretending to invent something
is
and catechized
readers, all baptized
children, were already intensely familiar with,
namely Christianity.
as
No
attentive reader could accept the idea that the concepts Climacus
explores in his thought-project, concepts such as an incarnate
who air.
God
functions as Savior and Redeemer, were simply pulled out of the
Even
at the surface level, therefore,
Climacus
is
pulling our leg.
However, the irony goes deeper than the extended joke of pretending to invent something that
well
is
him
exploration of his experiment leads
experiment
That
is
to everyone. Climacus'
to the conclusion that his
one that no mere human being could have thought
up.
the very content of the hypothesis that he pretends to be
is,
inventing has as one of
essential features the impossibility of
its
invention by any mere human!
by a
known
human
Any
its
concept that could be invented
being essentially presupposes the Socratic view that the
potential to discover the Truth
lies
within
human
The
nature.
alter-
native Climacus claims to be inventing presupposes that the capacity for the
Truth
is
lacking in
human nature and must be
brought to
human
beings by the god. Climacus argues (how plausibly remains to be de-
termined) that this story
is
cepts and could only have
Even since
rooted in a divine revelation, not in
is
ing" something well
being."'
he
'
is
philosophizing.
to
all,
but because, in Climacus'
own words, human
myself something that belongs to no
Of course Climacus' is
human
angry with Climacus not merely for "invent-
known
falsely attribute to
that
the god himself.
argument on Climacus' part may be part of his borrowing,
Thus, the interlocutor
"I
one that employs non-Socratic con-
so clearly reflects the traditional Christian claim that Chris-
it
tianity
this
itself
come from
cheerful admission of his plagiarism shows
merely teasing his reader, not seriously attempting to claim
the God's story as his own.
The which
fact that the Fragtnents
a thought-experiment
is
is
a kind of extended ironical joke in
invented, \^'hose content
is
such that
18
/
PASSIONATE REASON
supposedly could not be invented,
it
we sketched
portrait
Even the
specific character of the joke reflects the distinctive character
of the humorist as Climacus defines
he
says,
most
him
in Postscript.
always "revokes" or "calls back" his
serious,
own
his
certainly consistent with the
is
of Climacus as a humorist in the last chapter.
he
pulls the rug out
efforts. Just
from under our
feet
The humorist, when he seems
by undermining
In a similar way, in Fragments Climacus seems to
efforts.
develop a thought-experiment that
nullifies itself, at least as a
thought-
experiment.
would, however, be very rash to take the humoristic character
It
of Fragments as nullifying any serious philosophical purpose. Climacus
himself says in Postscript that that where irony
"it
is
the project as a whole
is
who assume The fact that
only assistant professors
present, seriousness
is
is
excluded."^^
ironical does not entail that particular argu-
ments within the project
are not
sound or intended
as sound.
The
conceptual distinctions Climacus draws between Christian and Socratic
ways of thinking, if
we
for
example,
may be
quite sound and important, even
recognize that they are presented to us in a jesting form.
Thus
our recognition of the ironical form of the book as a whole by no
from the philosophical task of examining and think-
means exempts
us
ing through
arguments and claims, even though we recognize that
at times
to
its
Climacus may be pulling our
examine the
leg.
We
shall therefore
proceed
"details" of the jest.
THE TITLE PAGE The
original title page of Philosophical Fragments,
reproduced on page
1
of the
Hong
contains several things worth noticing. First there
Philosophiske Smuler eller or
A
itself
whose content
is
translation in Kierkegaard's Writings, is
the
title
itself:
En Smule Philosophi (Philosophical Fragments The notion of a fragment of philosophy
Fragment of Philosophy).
has a humoristic ring, or at least
it
did in Kierkegaard's day, as
Hegelian philosophers of the time had practically identified philosophy with systematic thinking.
Danish term Smuler
would
suggest.
It is
is
As many commentators have
noted, the
actually lighter than the English "fragments"
an everyday word, not a philosophical term, but
a
An homed word a person would use
sophical Bits or Philosophical Scraps
By
in
To
his very title, then,
is
smule
Climacus wishes to distance his philosophical
little
fairly recently
and we
become popular
doubt that Hegelianism, particularly
represented by Danish theological Hegelians, target of Fragments,
lille
translate the title as Philo-
would not therefore be inappropriate.
from the Hegelianism which had
Denmark. There
19
/
dinner table to ask for "en
at the
more) of something.
mere'' (a little bit
efforts
TTiought Experiment
will take
is
as
a primary polemical
due notice of the implicit criticisms
of this type of view at appropriate places.
It
would, however, be a great
mistake to overemphasize the particular historical circumstances in
which
Philosophical Fragments
was written. The book deals with philo-
sophical problems and questions that have a perennial importance, and if
Hegelians are attacked, they are attacked for holding views which
are very
common among
theologians and philosophers today as well.
That the book does deal with can also be gleaned from the questions:
point?
"Can an
issues of abiding philosophical interest
title
which poses three
page,
How can such a starting-point have more than historical interest?
Can one
build one's eternal happiness
on
historical
knowledge?"
inappropriate to try to answer these questions at the outset,
It is
or to suggest Climacus' answers to them, or even to say
answers. However, tions
related
eternal consciousness have an historical starting-
mean,
if
we
crucial issue here religions
we must have some
are to read the is
initial
book with
if
he has
sense of what the ques-
insight. It
is
clear that the
that of the relation between history and what
have called salvation. Most of the world's great
many
religions,
though they may be rooted in history in the sense that they may trace their origins to the teachings
in the
and
life
of a historical founder, do not
end base the salvation of humans on any
Rather, salvation
is
of practices that have a timeless quality about them.
who
historical events.
gained through adherence to a teaching and/or set
realizes his unity
The devout Hindu
with the Divine and understands the Vedic
teaching "That Art Thou," whether this
is
achieved through yogic
exercise or philosophical contemplation, has gained
an insight into a
The devout Buddhist
truth
which has no
who
has gained release from suffering by attaining selflessness has
historical datedness about
similarly realized a state of being
it.
which seems equally relevant to any
20
PASSIONATE REASON
/
No
historical period.
particular historical facts about the
Buddha seem
an achievement.
to be necessary conditions for such
Traditional Christianity seems markedly different from such religions.^^
According to Christianity the salvation of human beings depends
on the
life,
Nazareth,
some
death, and resurrection of a historical figure, Jesus of
who
is
God
incarnate.
tice of life to
be imitated, but
historical figure.
rootage,
many
is
How
dependent on one's relation to an
foundation as a prob-
this historical
could the eternal destiny of
events at a particular place and time?
little
not premised on
is
essentially timeless prac-
philosophers and theologians in the nineteenth century,
depend on one's awareness of seems
on some
Though many Christians have celebrated this historical
and perhaps even more today, see lem.
Here salvation
ahistorical doctrine, or merely
human
beings be decided by
How could one's eternal salvation
a few contingent historical facts?
There
doubt that such worries are one of the factors contributing
behind these
tradi-
and discover a
"Jesus
to the continuing attempts by theologians to get
tional Christian claims about Jesus as the Christ
of history"
who
religions.^"*
These embarrassing claims about
is
more
could be eliminated
and teachers of other great
like the founders
Jesus as
God
incarnate
could be shown that they were creations of
if it
the early church which actually
falsify
the meaning of Jesus'
life. If,
for
example, Jesus essentially offered us a teaching about our relationship to
God, or perhaps represented
for us a lifestyle characterized
by
self-
giving love, and this teaching and/or lifestyle turns out to be the key
would be no need
to salvation, then there
that Jesus was uniquely
God,
a claim that
for the traditional claim
a deep stumbling-block to
is
those looking for ways to see the great world religions as compatible
with each other.
The
first
of the three questions
on the
title
consciousness have an historical starting-point?" tal
to the others.
The
page, is
"Can an
logically
eternal
fimdamen-
expression "eternal consciousness" here
preliminary clue to what
is
is
a
termed in the text the possession of the
Truth. Climacus simply assumes that hum.an beings are seeking this
Truth or "eternal consciousness," whatever
it is.
An
eternal conscious-
ness seems a very close cousin to what Christianity has termed eternal life,
but
sense.
it
must be taken
in Philosophical Fragments in a
more formal
An eternal consciousness is the fulfillment of my goal as a human
An being, and Climacus takes
goods.
However the
would doubtless different ways, as to
horded TTiowg^ Experiment
for granted that this
it
21
/
not simply temporal
is
Socratic view and
CUmacus' alternative hypothesis
specify the content of
an eternal consciousness in very
which
in turn leads to opposing answers to the question
whether such an eternal consciousness could have an
historical
starting-point.
The
question essentially
termed salvation, eternal
is
whether what
religions
or nirvana
something that can be
life,
is
moment, or
acquired (or lost) in time. Could one particular
moments, have eternal significance
for a person?
had proposed that
tian orthodoxy
person's decisions in this
life
set of
Old-fashioned Chris-
A
dramatic manner.
did, in a
it
have variously
with respect to Jesus of Nazareth could
have the consequences of eternal blessedness or eternal damnation.
Such a view makes eternal destiny
is
history decisive in
own
decided by her
historical decisions in turn revolve
two
respects.
An
individual's
historical decisions,
around an historical
and those
figure, Jesus of
Nazareth.
The second more than
of the questions
historical interest?")
affirmative answer to the
first
("How can such is
question
could be decisive with respect to
How
How
could
I
come
merely as another historical
possible.
Assuming that
how
salvation,
history
could this be so?
to view a particular historical figure not
figure,
answer to the crucial question
human being? The last of the
ones that precede possible for
my
role
Though
I
I
am
to
and that an
is
historical event or
historical interest for
me,
knowledge play in the acquisition of
this
Would
I
need
what kind of
get
historical starting-point
have more than merely
historical
if so,
and how would
how
Assuming that an
eternal consciousness?
or figure, and
as to
eternal consciousness
would
my life and the fulfill my destiny as
but as the center of
three questions again presupposes answers to the it.
figure could therefore
what
my
is
have
how an
could an event at a particular place and time have eternal con-
sequences?
a
a starting-point
really just the question as to
historical
historical
knowledge of the event
knowledge would
I
need
it?
these questions obviously are pertinent ones for Christian
theologians, they are
all
properly philosophical ones. That
not presuppose the truth of Christianity or
its
revelation.
is,
they do
They
are
22
PASSIONATE REASON
/
questions that are logically prior to embarking
on
a quest for the
an apologetic attempt to prove the truth of the
historical Jesus, or
gospels, or a critical attempt to
demolish the gospels as a basis
for faith.
Before embarking on these historical enterprises, Climacus wishes to ask precisely what one might be able in principle to accomplish through
such historical research, by looking at the possible ways salvation might be dependent on history or independent of Besides the
of course, the
title itself
name
and the questions, the
on Johannes Climacus, and
The
this point. is
title
page also contains,
of the author, Johannes Climacus, and as ''Udgiver''
(editor or publisher), S. Kierkegaard.
length
it.
1
have already commented
will say
inclusion of Kierkegaard's
some
at
nothing more about him at
own name on
the
title
page
doubtless significant, since Kierkegaard did not do this with any of
the pseudonymous books which precede Philosophical Fragments. Kierkegaard's
name
appears in a similar way
Unscientific Postscript,
on the
title
and the significance of the
page of Concluding
fact
is
noted when
Kierkegaard himself says in The Point of View that the inclusion of his
name
in this
and have a
way
in Postscript was a "hint, for those
that sort of thing. "^^
flair for
My own
who worry
conviction
the relationship between Climacus and Kierkegaard himself
but complex one. However, putting Kierkegaard's
name on
page as editor by no means implies that the pseudonym
mask
for
Kierkegaard himself.
Climacus sees things
1
think
it
is
as Kierkegaard himself
fair to
is
is
about that
is
a close
the
title
simply a
say that Johannes
would see them
Kier-
if
kegaard were not a Christian. This means that what Climacus says
about Christianity but
it is still
of the
life
is
usually correct, from Kierkegaard's perspective,
the view of an outsider. This, in turn, means that
much
of faith necessarily remains opaque to Climacus.
THE MOTTO The motto wed."
It is
since
it
is
of Philosophical Fragments
"Better well hanged than
ill-
taken, loosely and several times removed, from Shakespeare, a
Danish translation of the German translation of a
from Twelfth Night. at the
is
^'^
beginning of
line
Climacus himself jestingly comments on the motto Postscript
by noting that the "well hanged author"
— An
honied TTiought Experiment
/
23
of Fragments has been "left hanging." However, "better well hanged
than by an unhappy marriage to be made a systematic in-law of the
whole world. "^^ Niels Thulstrup, in his "Commentary," takes this to be an allusion
H. A. Nielsen takes exception to
to being crucified with Christ.
Thulstrup's claim,
on the grounds
who
kind of reader,"
is
that this reading caters to "the
wrong
curious about the opinions of Climacus.^° Pre-
sumably, Nielsen thinks that Thulstrup's reading implies that Climacus is
really a "closet Christian,"
seems to be an attempt to
and Nielsen properly objects that
this
the sort of curiosity which
satisfy precisely
Climacus himself politely asks the reader not to indulge. Nielsen suggests that the motto
the book
is
a condensed form of the preface,
whose message
is
that
better left hanging than brought into union with systematic
is
philosophy. It
seems to
me
that Nielsen has accurately captured the obvious
meaning of the comment about the Motto is
jesting in this
own
And
motto.
suggestiveness,
meaning
comment, not attempting
in Postscript, but
Climacus
a definitive exegesis of his
of course part of the power of a literary quote
and
I
see
in Climacus'
no reason
mind
is
its
was one "correct"
to think that there
(or Kierkegaard's, for that matter).
When
read more deeply, one can see the motto as concerned with Christianity, as
Thulstrup thought, without in any way violating the standpoint of
Climacus
One
as
non-Christian philosophical observer.
main concerns
of Climacus'
in the
book
to
is
communicate
to his
knowledgeable readers some reminders about what Christianity
really
is,
a task he accomplishes without so
once
Christianity, except
at the very
wish to attack Christianity or to defend standing of
human
it.
As we
shall see,
reaction to Christianity
one of is
much
as
even mentioning
end of the book. He does not it,
his
to find
but to increase our under-
main
it
theses
offensive.
is
As
that a natural a consequence
of this, well-intentioned "defenders" of Christianity are constantly
tempted to
alter Christianity in
by reinterpreting categories.
its
meaning
it
is,
in terms of
as to eliminate this offense,
more acceptable philosophical
Climacus himself finds such alteration jobs offensive. From
his perspective, honesty
what
such a way
whether
it
demands
that
one allow Christianity to be
be offensive or not. So, without in any way
embracing or committing himself to Christianity, he can say that
24
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Christian faith
better off
is
And
philosophy.
hanged than married
distance from systematic philosophy himself,
Climacus to apply the motto to himself "left
off to
of course, as a humoristic thinker
hanging" than married
ments, especially
if
his task
off to is
it
as well.
contemporary
who
keeps his
quite proper for
is
He
too
is
better off
contemporary philosophical move-
in part to dispel confusions traceable to
those philosophical movements.
THE PREFACE The
preface
what
most
the section of Philosophical Fragments where the person-
visible
is
He
is
make
and
not,
not primarily a scholar
is
and textual learning. He to
most
is
clearly displayed. Paradoxically,
precisely the elusiveness of Johannes.
what Johannes
us
tells
do.
is
is
Johannes Climacus
ality of
is
it tells
who
us
what he
The
preface
not trying to
is
wishes to exhibit his historical
not a systematic philosopher
a contribution to the developing (in
who
wishes
Denmark) Hegelian
much jesting and banter about those philosophers who have proclaimed a new era in philosophy, jesting which is directed movement. There
against H. L.
is
Martensen and
Danish Hegelian followers, rather than
his
against Hegel himself. Climacus himself will have nothing to this world-historical self-importance.
He
do with
writes for personal reasons,
modestly and perhaps humoristically describing himself as a "loafer,"
who
has no great justification for his idleness.
As
an overview of
for
nothing
at
As
all.
for that matter,
perspective, Climacus offers us
We
are,
Climacus' opinions, something
1
would describe
I
He
have
appears."
as a
model of how the
own
life,
is
that the
and cannot therefore be answered by reference is,
he
says, to stake his
repeats
and underlines the seriousness of
my
which
life,
book
which must be asked by an individual
to learning. His only contribution to thought
"All
an opmion about
book should be approached. Climacus hints
about his or her
life.^'
us his "opinion" or, as
however, given something other than
deals with very personal questions,
own
tell
whether he has any such thing
the matters discussed.
issues in the
own
his
already noted, he will not
1
this
promptly stake every time a
remark:
difficulty
An
Irordcd Thongfit Experiment
/
25
In coyly offering us a glimpse, not of his convictions, but of
what one might term
his
Climacus deepens and "eternal consciousness"
Truth" in chapter
1.
methodology
alters
for
approaching the problems,
our understanding of what he means by
on the
title
His concern
is
page and what he will term "the
not merely with a concept which
has some importance in the history of religion or some other scholarly
human being naturally shows toward the meaning of her own life. Like other human beings, I will live a relatively short period here on earth. What is the purpose and meaning of this short period? Does my life have any deeper significance, endeavor, but with the very personal concern a
a significance It is
which transcends death
the fact that
consciousness"
own "dancing of death. issues,
its
I
will die
which
itself?
gives the question of
an "eternal
poignancy. Climacus hints at this by noting that his
partner" in thinking through his project
is
the thought
Bringing death into the picture not only personalizes the
but makes
appropriate.
it
clear that disinterested contemplation
may not be
Death approaches, and the luxury of detachment may not
be open to the thoughtful reader. Climacus will not take any other person as "dancing partner," neither as objective authority nor devoted disciple.
Since no one else can die for me, no one else can decide the
meaning of
life
for
me
either.
perspective from
which Climacus
which he hopes
to be read.
It
is
crucial to see that this
writes,
and
it is
is
the
the perspective from
CHAPTER
3 CONSTRUCTING AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SOCRATIC VIEW OF "THE TRUTH"
In chapter
1
of Phibsophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus begins his
experiment in earnest. The project, is
it
will
be recalled,
is
to see
if
there
any alternative to what he terms the Socratic view of the Truth and
how
the Truth
is
learned.
assumption that the Truth
The is
Socratic view
is
characterized as the
already present within each person, so
The teacher on this view will only who helps the learner discover his or her own self-sufficiency. The moment at which this self-realization occurs thus has no essential importance, for the moment at which I acquire the Truth is also the moment I realize that I did not acquire it, but that
it
only needs to be recollected.
be an occasion, a midwife
have always possessed
With
alternative view, in
more
it.
this baseline firmly in
which
detail, that the
mind, Climacus seeks to create an
postulates, as
moment
is
we have noted and
shall explore
all-important, that the learner lacks
the Truth, and that he must be given the Truth by a teacher the god.
We
suspicious of Climacus' procedure. In chapter 2
of Climacus
is
not what
one that implies is
its
ironical through It
who
is
have already seen that we have plenty of reason to be
it
own
I
noted that
this creation
appears to be, since the invention
impossibility as
is
a curious
an invention. Climacus' work
and through.
would, however, be churlish and self-defeating to allow this
realization to block us
from playing along with Climacus' game. In
order for the irony to have a beneficial effect
we must allow at least, as
on
us, if that
be possible,
ourselves to be taken in and take his invention, initially
what
it
appears to be. Otherwise,
we block
ourselves from
An Akemadve a close reading of the
View of "The Truth"
to the Socratic
book
at all
27
/
and have no hope of seeing whether
the irony has a serious point, and what that point might be. therefore play along
and see how
the
far
We
shall
game can be pushed.
THE TRUTH Chapter
"To what extent can the Truth
begins with the question
1
be learned?" This question
Climacus mean by
raises for us the prior one:
'the Truth'?"
argument, that this
I
claimed in chapter
in epistemological discussions. Contrary to suggest. Fragments
is
though
ness"
what Climacus
on the
truths,
title
question
how we
gain
such as necessary truths or em-
at points.
now and then and The Truth here is closer to
have usually termed salvation, and
religions
related to
initial
"truth"
touches on such questions
it
even assumes answers to them
what
what the
does
much
no means
mean by
not really a book about
knowledge of various kinds of pirical truths,
"What
without
a special concept in the book, by
is
equivalent in meaning to what philosophers usually
might
2,
calls
and an "eternal happiness"
page,
it
is
also closely
the attainment of an "eternal consciousat other places in
the book.
What
justification
Part of the justification
The book
is
in
perspectives,
is
is
there for this unusual
of the truth takes
human
even bases
his
not perverse usage?
one sense an extended contrast of Platonic and Christian
and the question with which
Platonic question. In Plato's
highest
if
the grounding of the book in Platonic thought.
task
on is
own thought,
it
begins
it is
is
of course a central
fair to say
that knowledge
religious significance. Plato assumes that our
to gain true knowledge, and, as
own argument
Climacus notes,
for the immortality of the soul
on the
ability of the soul to grasp eternal truths.'
Hence Climacus'
Truth"
and extension of the sense
is
in part simply a continuation
"truth" takes Still,
on
use of "the
in Plato.
one may well ask about
Plato's usage here, too.
justification for equating salvation
with knowing truth
The deeper lies
in the
made by many religions as well as by Plato, that salvation does in the end amount to possessing some kind of insight, some awareness of Absolute or Ultimate Truth. Of assumption, not uncontroversial but
28
PASSIONATE REASON
/
course, this
must not be taken simply
as
knowing the tmth of some
proposition. For example, Christian thinkers have
human good
the ultimate
commonly
described
knowing God, and such knowledge
as
certainly thought of as a grasping or encounter with truth.
is
Hindu
thinkers have described salvation as involving an understanding of the truth that
I
am one
with
have described nirvana
God
or Absolute Reality. Buddhist thinkers
an understanding of the truth about
as requiring
the illusory nature of the self as an entity and the necessity to escape
from the realm of
desire. Therefore,
syncratic to identify
to identify salvation with It
is
is
The
knowing a
for this reason that
article seriously,
he
though
may be somewhat
and
we must
when Climacus
realize that
it is
not at
all
idio-
unusual
special kind of truth.
think that
I
talks
take the definite
about "the Truth"
not talking about truth in general, but a special kind of truth. nature of this truth will be conceived differently by different
religious perspectives, but in all cases
that
it
knowing truth with salvation,
is
essential for
humans
have
to
of salvation. This sense of the Truth
specifies
it
is
taken up again in the
is
it is
talking,
such truth would
essential for a
mean
is
human
Postscript
an important footnote
not about truth in general,
but the kind of truth he calls "essential truth. "^ Essential truth the truth which
it
in order to obtain the equivalent
in the discussion of "truth as subjectivity." In
here Climacus explains that he
whatever truth
being to have.
is
The
simply lack of
a lack of humanness.
This becomes very clear in discussing the alternative hypothesis to the Platonic view of the Truth.
(I
henceforth refer to this
will
alter-
native hypothesis, the one with a suspicious resemblance to Christianity, as the
B
B hypothesis must Truth. The learner must,
hypothesis.) Climacus claims that the
be one which sees the learner
as lacking the
however, have had the condition for understanding the Truth time; otherwise he "would have been merely an animal,
who with
the condition gave
being for the
We
first
at
one
and that teacher a
human
as that
which
him the Truth would make him
time."^
can also discern from
this sense of the
Truth
makes a person human one of the reasons Climacus does not consider the question as to whether salvation beings.
One might
saying that
it
is
is
a real possibility for
human
imagine a secular thinker objecting to Climacus by
possible that salvation
is
not attainable for humans,
An
Altemative to the Socradc View of "The Truth"
and that we should resign ourselves to satisfying
may be
is
if
the objection
then Climacus' answer
we
is
fulfilling
is
and
is
possible for
a
is
telos
satisfying that
even
to
truly
human possible.
is
of course, and
this,
clearly does make."^
human
humans ought
to saying that salvation in this sense
willing to say
objector
will consider later in this chapter.
whether human beings can be
willing to say that there
that
The
To
think, something like this:
I
whether salvation in any sense to question
can.
to the concept of salvation in any form,
is
is,
an assumption he
life,
a real issue, one that
However,
we
challenging the assumption of Climacus that
salvation consists in eternal
This
and now,
living in the here
our finite and relative wants as well as
in this case
29
/
we
beings
question is
simply
human. Anyone who life,
some way of
to enjoy,
is
life
committed
Not everyone
will
case for giving up the concept of salvation in any form. However, is
clearly the case that
as secular
be
shall presently consider the it
even many thinkers who think of themselves
humanists do accept such a concept of salvation.
WHAT VIEWS SHOULD
BE
UNDERSTOOD
AS "SOCRATIC"? This broad understanding of the Truth as the possession of whatever that
it is
human
a person truly
gives us a broad perspective as
on what Climacus means by the Socratic view. Since
well esis
makes
is
view,
constructed solely it is
on the
basis of
its
his
B hypoth-
difference from the Socratic
obviously crucial to gain a clear understanding of what that
view represents. Since the Socratic view
somewhat Platonic
sentative of the Socratic view to define
is
Socrates, the
an altemative
is
defined in terms of the views of a
most obvious candidate
for a repre-
philosophical idealism. Climacus wishes
to idealism
which resembles Christianity
in
order to clearly remind people of the logical differences between the two.
The
tianity
point of course
and Platonism per
is
not to show the difference between Chris-
se,
but to emphasize the differences between
Christianity and nineteenth century idealism, represented by Schelling
and Hegel. The reminder was needed century idealism, especially in
its
precisely because nineteenth
right-wing Hegelian form, claimed to
30
PASSIONATE REASON
/
The barbed "moral" at the end of the book makes this when one nevertheless says essentially
be Christian. clear:
"But to go beyond Socrates
the same thing as he, only not nearly so well Socratic."^ Christianity,
Climacus
the Socratic, though he
is
mean
that
it
is
more
true.
—
that, at least,
However,
to claim to be Christian
essentially repeating the Socratic,
It is
is
candidate for a representative of the Socratic view,
and "go
is
neither
the most obvious it
is
by no means
the Truth means the possession of whatever
the only one.
If
makes
human, then the Socratic view
Hinduism, which assume that the capacity
human
it
that
is
in Philosophical Fragments
must be taken very broadly indeed. Religions such
as
Buddhism and
for the realization of the
Truth
is
falling
under the designation. Robert Roberts, in his book
present within
not
simply muddled.
However, though nineteenth-century idealism
us truly
is
does indisputably "go beyond"
careful to add that this does not necessarily
beyond" the Socratic, while Socratic nor Christian.
says,
beings, certainly
must be regarded
as
Faith, Reason,
and History, has convincingly argued that even such Christian theologians as Schleiermacher, Bultmann, as Socratic thinkers,
inasmuch
and John Cobb must be regarded
as they reduce Jesus in the
and deny that human beings
role of Socratic teacher
error in the radical sense of Climacus.^ Jesus for
the
evocation
of
of
sense
"the
may be
absolute
end
to the
are essentially in
a powerful vehicle
dependence"
in
Schleiermacher's sense, or Bultmann's sense of radical openness to the future
which constitutes authenticity, or he may be a powerful source
for creative transformation in
Cobb's sense. However, there
is
nothing
about Jesus in such views which makes Jesus uniquely necessary for
such things. Perhaps the concept of the Socratic here can even be extended to purely secular thinkers such as a Carl Sagan, or avowedly this-worldly.
philosophers such as Karl Marx. Insofar as a secular humanist has a
concept of truly
human
for achieving this
existence,
and a conviction that the capacity
kind of existence
the humanistic view seems Socratic. thinks this capacity
possessed by
is
than individually, and
this
not envision. However, a small extension.
What
may be
if it
all
is
is
present within
It is
beings,
true that a thinker like
human
Marx
beings collectively rather
a perspective
an extension of
these views
human
which Climacus does
his concept,
it
is
only
— Platonism, Hegelianism, Hin-
An
Akemative
Buddhism,
duism,
—have
to the Socratic
some
versions
View of of
''The Truth"
31
/
and
Christianity,
secular
common is a conviction that the capacity for achieving truly human existence is possessed by human beings and does
humanism
in
not need to be brought to humans by a teacher
who
a divine re-
is
creator of the individual.
WHY ASSUME THAT THE TRUTH CAN
BE REALIZED?
Philosophical Fragments constructs a perspective
be possessed by
how
as to
human
the Truth
attainable at
all
beings and compares gained. But
is
it
on how the Truth can with the Socratic view
why assume
that the Truth
is
human beings? Why assume that salvation is possible,
by
either Socratically or through Christianity? Actually,
Climacus makes any such assumptions; however,
it is it
not clear that
is
true that
he
appears to ignore the alternative possibilities they pose for both the Socratic and his Christian-like perspective.
Climacus anyone
who
assumes that such a state can be realized, perspective. Nevertheless,
one would be willing is
it is
have argued that
falls
under the Socratic
to accept these
two notions. The idea that there flies
in the face of the
widespread relativism endemic to western culture, including that is
And
those
all
who would
accept a normative sense of what
were meant to be have any hope that such a advice of a
Camus
universe
one prominent example of such
is
to reject
striking that
It is
not,
I
state
is
humans The
attainable.
hope and embrace the despair of an absurd a view.^
Climacus gives no argument against such a view.
In fact, he simply gives is
rela-
identified with popular conceptions of "existentialism."
tivism that
not
for
certainly the case today that not every-
normative concept of true humanness
a
I
has a normative concept of true humanness, and
it
no consideration
at
all.
The
reason for this
think, that such a contemporary view was utterly foreign to
him. Certainly, his creator Kierkegaard was not ignorant of such despair, since he created a striking illustration of
it
in Either/Or
I.
Rather,
suspect that Climacus does not address such a view because
ponent does not need and
The
will
its
I
pro-
not be helped by philosophical reflection.
despairer needs hope; he needs encouragement.
He
needs what
32
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Climacus
calls
in Postscript inwardness or subjectivity.
helped to recognize that he
He must
be
an existing being, not identical with
is
Pure Thought. Perhaps he needs therapy. His failings are in any case
not cognitive or intellectual.
Climacus
own
"puts his
time a difficulty appears. From his standpoint,
whether the goal of existence can be achieved, or whether there
to ask is
at stake" every
life
who
writing as an existential thinker, one
is
even a
goal,
to opt out of
is
some proof that
sleeve
life
It is
life.
not that Climacus has up his
has a goal and that
it
can be attained.
Rather, he puts aside this option because demanding such a proof would life which may be suitable for a who is Pure Thought, but which is inappropriate for an existing human being. An analogy may be helpful here. It is often the case, when I play
presuppose a detached perspective on
being
bridge, that in attempting to
only succeed a case
if
one of
my
must play the hand
I
have the
card.
I
do
so,
make
as
I
am
I
I
discover that
I
can
opponent does indeed
have proof that
this
it is
a player,
possible for
me
what
I
need
not some argument about the possibility of winning. Rather,
I
need
I
must assume that
more about the game.
to care
game and my own In a similar
possible. If
it is
I
I
do not do
opponent
As
already in the game.
do not have the luxury of musing about whether
to win. is
that particular
if
not because
does have the card, but because I
a contract
opponents holds a particular card. In such
so,
need to understand the point of the
role in the particular situation in
way Johannes Climacus
is
which
I
find myself.
writing as a person
who
is
game of life and who understands that it is not a game like bridge from which one can abstain and assume the role of kibitzer. He is writing to people like himself who are seeking to become fully human in the
and are committed to that possibility is
he
goal.
That the quest
ignores, not because
it
is
a hopeless
one
can be proven that such
is
a
futility
mistaken, but because the existential passion of the individual rules
such a view out of consideration.
One
further possible objection remains, and that concerns the
assumption Climacus seems to make that the possession of the Truth is
equivalent to the possession of eternal
What
justification does
on the
title
page make
he have it
for
clear that
life
or an eternal consciousness.
such an assumption?
The
questions
Climacus does seem to make such
An
Alternative to the Soaatic
an assumption, and
at times
knowing the truth
B
not surprising for the
of "The Truth."
33
/
he makes others equally bold. For example,
he seems to assume that both hypothesis,
Vkw
for his
B
equivalent to knowing God. This
is
view and
for the Socratic is
hypothesis, since
on
this view, the
Truth must
be given to the learner by the God, but Climacus also says that the
who
Socratic thinker,
has the condition for knowing the Truth within
God
himself, thinks that
exists,
"since he himself exists (er
God
Socratic self-knowledge involves a knowledge of
To
ti/)."^
as well.
conceive of knowing the Truth as equivalent to knowing
God
and possessing an eternal consciousness would seem to commit Climacus to a fairly specific concept of salvation,
defend. However,
I
think there
than meets the eye. specific
meaning
We
must
is
one that he certainly does not
less to
resist
Climacus' assumptions here
much
the temptation to read in
to the concepts of God
and the eternal when Climacus
uses these in the context of the Socratic view. Certainly
we must not
read these concepts as having any recognizable Christian meaning.
Climacus
is
perhaps assuming that true humanness requires a relation-
"God"
ship to something ultimate and absolute, but the concept of
employed here evidently must be vague and formal enough to be satisfied
by Plato's "Form of the Good."
Climacus does seem to assume that true humanness requires an answer to the threat of meaninglessness posed by death and the shortlived character of all
human achievements, but such an assumption Humans have always struggled to see their
seems reasonable enough. lives as
grave,
having some significance and meaning that
and Climacus seems to take
component of knowing the Truth means
clear that this
tality,
though such a view
problem of death
it
will outlast the
for granted that this will
in his sense.
However,
it
is
be a
by no
must be taken in the sense of individual immoris
certainly
one prominent answer
in the history of religious
to the
and philosophical thought.
In the Postscript Climacus does raise the problem of the individual's
happiness to the forefront of existential thinking, and he perspectives
on immortality which promise only
abstract immortality of impersonal thought.
perspectives
Hegelians
view
is
critical of
participation in the
However, these
are the
on immortality which Climacus regarded the contemporary
who were
as holding.
the most prominent illustrations of the Socratic
34
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Interpreted in such a minimal way,
Truth with eternal
in connecting the
think that Climacus' activity
I
life
and the knowledge of God
requires us to restrict the range of the Socratic view only to a slight
Many
degree.
thing
secular views will
qualify
still
on the grounds
that some-
regarded as ultimate and absolute, and some way of giving
is still
the individual's
life
provided. Those
who
a
meaning that can be
are unwilling to
not addressed in the book. Like the
said to be eternal
make such assumptions
is
still
are simply
and pessimists discussed
relativists
above, they need a kind of passion and self-understanding that Climacus the ironical philosopher cannot provide. Perhaps Kierkegaard himself
would
refer
them
to Either/Or.
THE "DEDUCTION" OF THE
HYPOTHESIS
B
After briefly describing the Socratic viewpoint, with of ideas, centering
on the assumption
its
that the Truth
close-knit group
is
present within
humans and including the claim that on such an assumption the teacher and the moment of self-realization can have only vanishing significance, Climacus goes on to construct his alternative B hypothesis. The method of doing this
is,
on the
surface at least, very simple.
use of the basic principles of logic.
If
Climacus makes his alternative say not claim that the
how at
moment
things must be
any point
it
if
He
simply makes
the Socratic view says p, then p.
Beginning with the Socratic
has no essential significance, he
the
moment
is
to have
tries to see
essential significance. If
seems unclear what we are to
say, a refresher in
the
Socratic perspective will help us steer a straight path.
The Condition
of the Learner
Since the Socratic view postulated that the learner already had the
Truth prior to the moment of
self-realization, the
B
hypothesis must
B
assume that the learner lacks the Truth.
To
hypothesis from the Socratic view, one
must assume that the learner
clearly differentiate the
not only lacks the Truth, but also lacks the ability or "the condition" for acquiring the Truth.
view
is
not
Here
it
limited to a strictly
becomes even
clearer that the Socratic
Platonic system of thought.
To
say that
An
the learner possesses the Truth
something
View of
Alternative to the Socratic
''The Truth"
not necessarily a commitment to
is
the Platonic theory of recollection.
like
35
/
Any
system of
thought, Platonic or Aristotelian, religious or secular, which says that
humans
The Truth
Truth
possess the ability to gain the
who
learner
will qualify as Socratic.
thus lacks even the condition for acquiring the
He
described by Climacus as himself untruth.'^
is
not merely
is
own
lacking something he might acquire by accident, but his is
such that
it
is
impossible for
Climacus expresses
efforts.
learner
is
How
this
him
Truth by
to acquire the
by saying that
nature
his
own
on the B hypothesis the
an antagonist of the Truth. did the learner
come
to be in such a state?
Climacus says that
the learner's condition of error must be attributable to the learner him-
The
self.
had the condition
learner must originally have
for under-
standing the Truth; otherwise, given Climacus' sense of the Truth, the
human being. '° We would then how human beings could acquire the Truth, which B hypothesis is supposed to be all about, but about how hu-
learner would never have existed as a
be talking, not about is
what the
man
beings were originally created.
Truth (henceforth
just "the
If
the condition for attaining the
condition") has been
lost,
then Climacus
thinks there are three possibilities. Either the god himself took or
it
was
lost
it
away,
through some nonculpable accidental circumstances that
the learner found himself
in,
or else
it
was
lost
by the misuse of the
learner's freedom.
The
first
possibility
is
on the grounds
rejected
that
would be a
it
"contradiction" for the god to do such a thing. Presumably Climacus is
here simply assuming that whatever else
God may
be,
seen as good, as the source of our true humanness, and
be contradictory to think of
The second given,
possibility
which seems rather
is
God
God must
as the destroyer of that
flimsy,
is
humanness.
two reasons. The
rejected for
that
one could not
be
would thus
it
first
reason
lose the con-
dition by accident, for that would involve the "contradiction" that the inferior (the accidental)
dition). this,
to
It is
would have overcome the superior (the con-
not immediately obvious
since in our experience
overcome what
is
what
is
superior, at least
as to
what
is
contradictory about
inferior rather if
commonly seems
superior and inferior be given
any kind of moral sense, which they apparently bear here.
The second
reason given for rejecting the idea of losing the con-
^
36
PASSIONATE REASON
/
may
dition by accident seems weightier and in fact
Climacus
he
really has in
[the learner] could
mind by the have
he could be in
if
way
that
it
without
this state of loss
being due to himself, then he only possessed the condition acci-
its
dentally,
an
is
the condition in such a
lost
was not due to himself, and
explain what
seemingly flimsy reason. "If
first,
which
a contradiction, because the condition for the truth
is
essential condition."^
What Climacus
is
really
doing here
what some philosophers have
who
the Socrates of the Apology,
good man, either
what
in
life
is
He
human
is
agreeing with
can harm a
affirms that "nothing
or after death."'^
essentially matters in
rejecting the coherence of
called "moral luck."^^
life is
one
If
truly believes that
common
choices, then Socrates' principle, contrary to pears,
is
own
correct. Consistent with his
one free
sense as
ap-
it
principle, Socrates refused
he would not
to escape from prison, reasoning that
if
own
moral character, and
believes that moral character can only be corrupted by one's
be harmed by
truly
allowing himself to be unjustly executed, but that he would indeed
harm
his soul by illegally
Climacus
is
and immorally escaping from
committed
to
something
like this
prison.
by his claim that one
could not possess the condition "accidentally." His argument that
if
you
your control. However, this means that you never really had
I
seem
to
my environment think
it is
is
fair to
altered,
then in a
real sense
1
it
is
cidentally," or
The
is
who
it
I
when it.
an argument helps us see better what
say that such
unlikely to be convincing to anyone
humanness
lose
never really had
Climacus has in mind by the Truth and the condition
true
since
have the condition because
have been brought up in a favorable environment, but
but
it,
obviously thinking of the condition as something which must be
is
integrally linked to yourself. If
I
really
bottom a matter beyond
control, then your having the condition was at
he
is
the condition through circumstances beyond your
lose
who
for
its
attainment,
really thinks that
the sort of thing that could be gained or lost "acthinks that one's moral status
argument's chief value
Roberts might say, that
it
is,
as
someone
like
is
a matter of "luck."
H. A. Nielsen or Robert
improves our understanding of the "grammar"
of these concepts. If
my
loss
appear that
I
of the condition
is
due to
ought to be able to
my own
actions, then
remedy the damage
as well.
it
might
We
can
An
Akemadve
to the Socratic
View of
''The Trwt/i"
37
/
on the grounds
anticipate that Climacus will reject this claim,
that
if
the individual can remedy his unfreedom, then he really has the condition and
is still
in the Socratic position. Nevertheless,
Climacus must
defend the claim that this denial of the individual's power to overcome his
problem
is
logically consistent
due to the individual's
own
with the claim that the problem
defense by emphasizing the historical character of
human
say that a
power
undo or
to
being
is
free
is
freedom.
case through simple examples
one
side in a
to his
own
nature and subsequent
—
for
example, a knight
war and then finds he
He
his offer after his side loses.
moral condition, though they once
call sin.
It
is
who
notes
to recall
fair to
their
person has the power
once thrown.
it
by his
state of the learner as being in untruth
Climacus decides to
freely offers
no longer have power over did, just as a
no power
to throw a stone or not, but
who
his
not free to reverse
is
also appeals to Aristotle,
that depraved and virtuous people
own
fault
say that at this point the
whole enterprise of "inventing" the B hy-
ironical character of the
pothesis begins to
To
reverse the consequences of his misuse of freedom,
on freedom. In an extended footnote, Climacus makes
his services to
The
human
not to say that he always has the
even the consequences with regard limitations
is
misuse of freedom. Climacus makes this
show through rather
clearly.
The Teacher The teacher on the B hypothesis must be, The reason given for this is that in this
god.
as
we have
noted, the
case the teacher must
bring to the individual not only the Truth, but the condition for acquiring the Truth. Giving the condition amounts to a radical trans-
formation of the individual, and according to Climacus, "no being
capable of doing
is
this; if
to take place,
it is
it
human
must be done by
the god himself."'^
How a claim?
does Climacus It
is
know
tempting
this?
On
what
basis
can he make such
at this point to say that here the
ironical
character of the supposed logical deduction shows through, and that
Climacus of the here,
is
helping himself to presupposed Christian understandings
human situation. While I
do not think
it
is
I
don't find such a suggestion implausible
necessary to
make such
a
move
either.
We
38
PASSIONATE REASON
/
my
much content
into
concepts like "eternal consciousness" and "the god" in Climacus.
The
must
recall
about packing too
earlier caution
definite article in the "the god" quite clearly points to the identical
phrase used frequently by Plato. Climacus seems to use at times, certainly
not in a
says that in the Socratic
a knowledge of God.'^
more his
so,
view the self-knowledge of the individual
is
We could simply defend Climacus here by once
that
is
it
is
becomes a necessary
the assumption that the god
activities as a teacher?
The answer
2 of Fragments, but the in chapter
1.
as "the
Truth."
First of all,
that he
the teacher
The
to the discovery of is
and the
learner,
my own
even
possible,
is
this
if
Climacus
B
may
his
own,
hypothesis,
be,
it
even
if
is
a
"the one and only
it is
a vitally important
holds that the activity of the
come
he
is
this
to understand his
though the teacher makes
crucial to see that
he does not make
he lacks the condition,
one discovery on
necessary, because with respect
even though
necessary in order for the learner to is
with meaning
for the learner to "recall"
only an occasion, whoever he
shall see later that
point. In chapter 4
"the
is
untruth, "the Socratic principle applies:
analogy to the Socratic" in the
it
already provided
things possible.
"an occasion"
is
his
teacher does then function in this one respect
so to speak. Climacus says that this
We
is
B
given in chapter
is
the god and the learner
with the teacher's help, to make
the teacher
he carry out
will
fullness of time,"^^ a phrase as fraught
as a Socratic teacher,
able,
How
most part
main outline of the answer
The moment makes two
untruth.
is
an
indeed the teacher, as the
is
for the
The encounter between
moment," or "the
character. If that
totally transform
truth.
hypothesis requires, what will the god do?
god."'^
human
the source of a person's
then the claim that only the god could
On
but
quite loosely
concept of "the god." Perhaps for Climacus the god simply designates
individual
is
it
Christian manner. For example, he
treating his claim as a "grammatical remark," in this case about
whatever is
strictly
god
own
is
error,
this discovery
inevitable.
Secondly, in the moment, the teacher gives the condition, at least for
some
individuals. This
is
not a sure thing;
if it
were, the decisive
moment would be undermined. In the moment the can recollect his own error; "whether or not he is to go any
importance of the individual
further, the
moment must
decide."'^
Climacus does not
spell
out here
An how
Akemative
the condition
is
to the
Socradc View of "The Truth"
imparted; that
is
/
39
the task of the remainder of
the book.
The The
Relationship of Teacher and Learner
we
Socratic teacher had, as
for the learner.
The one who had
saw, only vanishing significance
best learned the Socratic lesson that
the Truth was within himself learned at the same time that he did not really
need Socrates. Climacus
must be
different.
the learner, the teacher reconciler.
The
"The
is
is
the god
no mere midwife, but
hypothesis things totally transforms
a savior, deliverer,
and
learner will never be able to forget such a teacher."^°
reason for this
is
clearly that
not acquired in a once and
is
B who
says that for the
Since the teacher
Climacus thinks that the condition
for all fashion,
but rather that the learner's
it is dependent on his relationship to the god. At this point Climacus' irony does begin to be a bit transparent. The relationship between the teacher who is the god and the learner is now described in a plethora of explicitly Christian terms.^' The
continued possession of
teacher's giving of the condition
is
a bestowal of
something to be held
in trust; the teacher will hold the learner accountable for this
hence
properly understood as a judge.
is
is
former
life
rebirth,
to
show
radical
and
change in the
described as a conversion, accompanied by a sorrow over his
learner
is
The
properly described as repentance.
and so on. So
far as
1
The outcome of the change
can see Climacus makes
little
attempt
that these qualities can be logically deduced simply by negating
the Socratic situation, though the logical clarity and power of the distinctions
made
earlier has a
tendency to beguile the reader
at this
point into continuing to play along with Climacus and to think he has
accomplished more by purely logical reflection than he really has. is
clear,
and what
relationship
still
seems sound in the "deduction"
is
What
that the
between teacher and learner Climacus describes seem to
be quite different from the relationship of Socratic teacher and learner.
CAN THIS THOUGHT'PROJECT Near the end of the
first
BE
THOUGHT?
chapter, Climacus poses a question practically
guaranteed to throw his reader for a loop. "But can what has been
40
PASSIONATE REASON
/
developed here be thought ^'^^ In possible to think
what he has
course, you just thought
and warns us not does not do issue of
One
just thought.
asking whether
is
is
tempted to
it
say,
is
"Of
Climacus anticipates such a hasty response
Such
to be in too big of a hurry.
full justice
who
it."
he
effect,
to the question, since
it
a hasty response
doesn't consider the
supposed to be doing the thinking, and what kind of
is
"thinking" has been going on.
Climacus himself agrees with the "of course" answer in one
However,
it
makes a great deal of difference who
is
respect.
doing the thinking:
who bom? The latter, of course, is an irrationality that cannot occur to anyone."" The obvious suggestion here is that it is only the person who has been reborn by receiving the condition from the god who can conceive of "This matter of being bom, can is
supposed to think
it
it
—one who
be thought? Sure,
bom
is
or
why
one who
not? But
not
is
the possibility Climacus has sketched. This, in tum, would imply that
Climacus himself must be seen
one who
Postscript as
The
one who adopts humor
as his incognito.^"*
suspicion that something like this
by the dialogue with an interlocutor
Climacus
is
interrupted by
own
thing off as his
question as to
invention which
who
is
going on seems confirmed
is
at the very close of the chapter.
someone who accuses him of passing someis
pleads guilty to the charge but uses
common knowledge." Climacus it
an occasion to pose the
as
the real author of the project. Perhaps the
interlocutor has himself invented the project? "Or, will
if
you then also deny that someone has invented
human
perhaps
as a Christian writer after all,
the description of the Christian he himself gives in
fits
being ?"^^ This question
is
I
am
that
is,
this,
some
evidently rhetorical, for Climacus
human
assumes the respondent will agree that no author: "In that case,
you deny
it,
being
is
having invented
just as close to
the true it
as
any
other person.""
Climacus moves from
this
claim that his project has no
author to an apparent claim that the project the project has for
it
is
true.
no human author] enchants me
human
"This oddity [that
to the highest degree,
provides a test for the correctness of the hypothesis and
onstrates
dem-
The ground for this is, I think, the fact that an essential B hypothesis is its origin in a divine teacher; to go beyond
it."^^
feature of the
the Socratic, Climacus says at one point,
is
to reach the concept of
.
An revelation.^^ it is is
Altemative
The
indeed a
fact that the
fact,
View of "The Truth"
to the Socratic
B
hypothesis
human
origin,
if
would appear to be a powerful confirmation that
it
is
indeed not a mere thought-project, but a revelation. Climacus seems
to be saying that the very possession
of the is
not of
41
/
B
hypothesis,
a guarantee of
its
which correspond,
One
truth.
and understanding of the ideas as
we have
of the truth of Christianity, or of at least
became
seen, to Christianity,
an a
writer has termed this
proof
priori
central idea, that
its
God
a man.^°
However,
"proof of the truth of Christianity
this
difficulties. First
of
of Fragments, where Climacus claims to have
"goes further than" the Socratic
from the Socratic view
—but B
tion as to whether the view.^' Secondly,
and undermine
it
his
raises several
appears to contradict the "Moral" at the end
all, it
—
that
shown
in other words,
is
that his project
genuinely different
one cannot thereby decide the ques-
hypothesis
is
more
true than the Socratic
would appear to blow Climacus' cover, so to speak,
own
Christian. Finally, the
he
assertions in the Postscript that
is
not a
whole "proof simply seems most implausible,
even incredible. Does Climacus
really
think that the mere fact that a
person has an understanding of Christianity
is
sufficient to guarantee
the truth of Christianity for that person?
The
first
and
last difficulty
that the "proof," to
if it is
can,
1
think, be resolved
someone who already has the condition.
Climacus introduces person
who can
this
really
been reborn. But
this
if
we
recognize
intended to be such, will only be convincing
whole discussion by a claim that the only
understand his project is
must be recalled that
It
precisely the person
condition from the god, and
it is
the person
is
who
who
has
has received the
reasonable that this person will view
the consciousness he has received from the god as something he could
only have thus received. So Climacus' argument cannot be seen as
intended to convince the non-Christian that Christianity insofar
it
Christianity cannot be
known
is
true,
and
to be true, but rather that the question
cannot be decided without a "new organ," namely remark
is
does not contradict the "Moral," which does not say that
faith.^^
Climacus'
not an "objective argument," but one more reminder of
the person
who
However,
how
has the condition will see things.
this resolution
that the fact that Climacus
only aggravates the second
is
one of those who
sees the
difficulty, in
B
hypothesis
42
as
PASSIONATE REASON
/
coming
humans from
to
revelation would strongly imply that he
one of those who have received the condition from the god. Even however, Climacus' status remains elusive. Only the believer
is
here,
will
be
inclined to accept the claim of Climacus that the hypothesis he has
spun out
is
of divine origin.
rejecting the "proof,"
blown, slip
it
The
be for those
will only
unbeliever will reject this notion in
and properly
so.
who
Hence,
Climacus' cover
if
is
share the faith he has allowed to
out of the disguise. One's decision about Climacus cannot be
disentangled from the knot he has tied with respect to Christianity itself.
The
reader
is
here challenged by the claim of Christianity, echoed
by Climacus in his B hypothesis, to
than any
human
clearly differs
rest
thought. This claim
is
on
part
a divine revelation rather
and parcel of a view which
from the Socratic. The reader who nosily
insists
on
penetrating the incognito of Climacus can only do so by disentangling the knot he poses and deciding what he thinks about the claim of Christianity to rest
on
a revelation.
CAN A NON'CHRISTIAN UNDERSTAND CHRISTIANITY? But what about the claim of Climacus that only the person who has
been reborn can understand
his project?
imply that Climacus himself
is
must be so
as well,
if
Not only does such
one of the reborn, but that
his readers
they are to understand him. Perhaps this
and we should see Climacus
as directing his
book
a claim
is
correct,
to Christians, re-
minding them of what they already know. Certainly, Climacus seems to assume that his reader
is
knowledgeable about Christianity, and
perhaps he assumes that his reader thinks of himself as a Christian.
This seems to be the case
for the interlocutor
who shows up
end of the chapters and a few other places. However,
it
believe that Climacus really thought his readers were
all
is
at the
hard to
genuinely
reborn. Furthermore, the claim that only the reborn can understand
the project seems too strong.
It just
does not seem to be the case that
only Christies can understand Christianity, and
would seem
tb
make
it
impossible for anyone
if
that were so,
it
to accept or reject
An Akemadve Christianity. in
View of
''The Truth!'
43
/
One cannot accept or reject what one does not understand
any sense. Furthermore,
his
to the Socratic
we
if
accept this strong claim of Climacus, then
whole project begins to look not merely
Whether Climacus
ironical, but fraudulent.
personally a Christian or not, he
is
is
pretending
to invent something that looks like Christianity merely by reflecting
on the
Socratic view.
however, one thinks that only the Christian
If,
believer can even understand Christianity, then such an exercise must
be impossible, and Climacus' deduction must involve quite a bit of sleight-of-hand.
We have
seen that in
its
essentials the logical exercise
Climacus puts us through seems sound, however, though
it is
admittedly
embellished in the details by the use of Christian language. However unlikely as a matter of fact,
it
seems logically possible
had the Socratic picture of things hypothesis. Climacus' I
bility
to think
own account would seem
we must
Since he says
makes
own
to
show
B
this.
it
will
be necessary to do some
about the problems. Climacus himself in Postscript
between two types of understanding of Christianity:
a distinction
understanding what Christianity
The
to be a Christian.^^
latter
is
is
and understanding what
it
means
only possible for Christians, but the
former must be a possibility for non-Christians as well. latter
like the
what we mean by "understanding."
about this here,
little
thinking on our
clarify
someone who
comments on the thinka-
believe that to disentangle Climacus'
of his project,
for
up something
It is
kind of understanding that Climacus has in mind
surely this
when he
says
that only the person who. has been reborn can understand his project.
Given
this assumption,
standing Christianity
is
it
makes sense that he would claim that under-
tantamount to seeing
viction of the believer that Christianity
understanding in
it
as a gift
hand with being All this
is
is
its
truth, since the con-
true surely derives
from
from God, an understanding which goes hand
a Christian.
compatible with the admission that a type of understand-
ing of Christianity
is
possible for the non-Christian. This
would be an
"intellectual" kind of understanding, a grasp of the logical relationships
the various Christian categories have to each other and to nonChristian ways of thinking. Such an intellectual understanding would
make
it
possible for a non-Christian to read Climacus'
book and follow
44 logical
its
PASSIONATE REASON
/
moves, but
it
would not necessarily make
possible for such
it
a reader to understand the implications of Christianity for his
Though I have even
if
them
discussed
together, Climacus poses
related issues at the conclusion of chapter
who
question as to whether the individual
The second
understand the project.
is
The
1.
life.
two
distinct
first is
the
has not been reborn can
the question as to whether the
content of the project could have been invented by a or must rather be traced to divine revelation.
The
first
human
question
being, I
have
argued must be answered by specifying further the kind of understanding
The second
in question.
answer
sible
is
issue
must
also be further specified
In saying that the project cannot be traced to a
Climacus might be taken to
a defen-
if
to be found.
as saying that
human
author,
impossible for the hypothesis
it is
have a human author, because no human who has not received the
condition from the god can even understand the project, invent
what
If
it.
it
we
means
understanding
much
less
take understanding in the strong sense of "understanding to be a Christian," is
Climacus probably thinks that such
impossible for the non-Christian. However, as
seen, the lack of such understanding
would not preclude a
kind of intellectual understanding, and
it
is
we have different
only this intellectual un-
derstanding that would seem to be required to think through the hypothesis.
that
If
is
correct,
then we should distinguish the claim that
Christianity could not have had a
human
author from the claim that
a non-Christian cannot understand Christianity. Perhaps
Christianity would not exist unless
it
compatible with saying that once revealed
someone who
On
this
someone
to
is
view
it is
true that
had been revealed, but that it
is
can be understood by
not a Christian. it
might seem that
it is
at least logically possible for
have invented Christianity or something
like Christianity,
thus undermining the "proof Climacus finds himself enchanted by. Surely,
up,
if
what
my
I
am
capable of understanding,
I
am
capable of thinking
imaginative powers are great enough. Certainly, the non-
Christian will want to
make
this very claim,
and
I
do not see that
Climacus says anything to prove the contrary. This concession that is
it
logically possible for someone to have come up with a system of ideas
that resembles Christianity fact
is
quite compatible with the claim that in
no human thinker has come up with anything
like this, a
claim
An
Akemadve
makes
that Climacus
to ihe Socratic
View of "The Truth"
made such
And
at the conclusion of the book.^"*
compatible with the Christian view that no
human
45
/
it is
equally
being could have
a discovery, not because such an understanding
logically
is
impossible for a non-Christian, but because of the sinfulness that characterizes the If
we
human
race.
take Climacus to be asserting the weaker thesis that Chris-
tianity could not
have been discovered apart from a revelation, he
still
seems to claim something which non-Christian readers cannot and will not accept. However, at
least this
weaker
thesis does
to the highly implausible claim that non-Christians
Christianity at
all. It
allows
standing possible for one for the it.
itself
if
to hold that there
own
a type of under-
has "heard about" Christianity but not yet accepted
intellectual understanding
would not have much value at least
deduction
is
in
makes sense of the
it
non-Christian readers can understand Climacus'
own
work.
not necessarily spurious or logically flawed. Even
the logical relationships would not have been perceived unless
Christianity
once more of possible:
knows how invented
to analyze
it."^^
may
into
its
to use
this sort
gunpowder,
components, does not mean that he
may understand Christianity withwho have grown up in a Christian
it,
and those
also possess a type of understanding, without this implying is
issues raised
or could have been a
human
invention.
here about the uniqueness of Christianity,
in a divine revelation,
come up again
now
it
how
Similarly, Christians
that Christianity
The
Climacus hints that understanding of
believers,
"Simply because someone knows
out having invented culture
is on the scene, the Though he may be thinking
had been revealed, once Christianity
relationships in question can be understood.
is
is
has not received the condition, at least
from a Christian standpoint, but
fact that
His
who
person
Such an
him
who
not commit him
cannot understand
and the
possibilities for
understanding
in our consideration of Philosophical Fragments.
turn our attention to chapter
2,
its it
origin
will all
We must
where Climacus continues
his
thought experiment by speculating about the way in which the god
might become the savior- teacher he has postulated in chapter
1.
.
CHAPTER
4 THE POETRY OF THE INCARNATION
In chapter 2 of Philosophical Fragments Johannes Climacus continues his
"thought experiment" by sketching the way in which the god might
carry out the task of teaching the learner by transforming him.
pretense of a logical deduction
is
here dropped, and the chapter's efforts
are plainly designated "a poetical venture."
One might
this that the ironical character of the project
is
the notion that a tianity
human
The
expect from
thereby lessened, since
being might describe something like Chris-
by employing her imaginative powers seems
audacious than
less
the idea that the same thing could be arrived at merely by logical reflection
on the
Socratic view. However, this expectation
Climacus himself says that Christianity
no more
is
is
incorrect.
accessible to the
imagination than to purely reflective reason, and the richness and denseness of the biblical allusions in chapter 2 ter, if
anything, even more pronounced than
is
make
ironical charac-
its
the case in chapter
1
THE TEACHER'S GOALS AND MOTIVES Chapter 2 begins by returning once more Climacus describes Socrates
lation to his social circumstances.^ Socrates
prompting" to be a teacher, and a ground in his
to the figure of Socrates.
as possessing a
this call
complex, "reciprocal" presumably
or needs, but his
is
own
therefore not simply
as well.
re-
and
and prompting doubtless had
own upbringing and education.
as a teacher, Socrates
felt a "call
The upshot
In taking up his vocation
moved by of
others'
all this is
demands
that Socrates'
The Poetry of behavior
as a
teacher
is
not purely
the
altruistic;
Iruzarmtkm
47
/
he meets the needs of
others to learn something, but at the same time he satisfies his
own
needs. Socrates himself understands this and therefore understands that
situation of the teacher in the case of
money or fame.^ the B hypothesis is
We
cannot imagine that
he needs no further reward
The
for his activities,
completely different, according to Climacus.
such
as
the god has the kind of socially conditioned need that he imagines Socrates as possessing, and "the god needs no disciple in order to
What
understand himself."^
then could motivate the god to become
the teacher? Climacus suggests that only love could be the motive, a
pure love for the other which has no element of need for the other or
any self-serving quality. Only such a love would allow the god to "move
himself and thus
satisfy
who moves all else The allusion to
the situation of Aristotle's
while remaining
unmoved
unmoved mover,
himself."^
Aristotle should not, however, fool the reader into
thinking that the god Climacus
is
poetically sketching
is
in other
ways
remote unmoved mover Aristotle describes. The god Climacus
like the
sketches has
no need of
others, but
he
is
described as having a need
within himself to love the other. Far from being remote, the god in this case
is
who
a passionate lover
is
capable of profound suffering on
behalf of his beloved, a suffering which of
much
of the teacher-god If
Climacus
classical theology.
alien to the impassible
God
the whole story
a story of suffering.-
is
one asks how Climacus knows that the god does indeed love the
human
beings
whom
he does not know
he seeks
it.
It
is
as his disciples, the
an assumption that
hypothesis going, so to speak. if
is
says, in fact, that
The
project,
it
will
answer is
made
is
simply that
to
keep the
be recalled,
is
to see
any alternative to the Socratic perspective can be conceived.
only alternative,
it
is
argued in chapter
1,
is
one
in
The
which the god
is
the teacher. Climacus' justification for the assumption that the god loves
human
beings
is
simply his claim that he can conceive no other
possible motive for the god to
The assumption about
become such
a teacher.
the god's motives provides Climacus with a
goal for the god's activities as a teacher as well. In the case of such
pure love for the other, motive and goal must coincide, so the goal of the god's activities must be to "win" the learner, to establish and
maintain a loving relationship with him.^ This relationship
is
variously
48
PASSIONATE REASON
/
described as one that standing.
a relationship
is
becomes
also
It
is
characterized by equality, unity, and underclear in the discussion that follows that such
one characterized by freedom on both
a voluntary
sides.
Climacus here seems to make some pretty significant assumptions about the nature of love. Are these assumptions defensible? Does genuine love require equality
and mutual understanding? Does
require
it
One might argue the contrary, citing the love of parent and Do we not here have genuine love which requires
freedom?
child as example.^
and certainly does not presuppose mutual understanding,
inequality
since neither the child nor the parent can fully enter the other's world?
For his argument to work, Climacus does not have to claim that all
love requires equality and mutual understanding, but only that the
highest form of love requires
this.
Such
a claim
is
defensible,
think,
I
even when we consider the case of the relationship of parent to
Even
if
we put
how much
beautiful
its
I
believe that the parent-child relationship
fullest potential
only
when
the child
and touching the love of a parent
and however lovely the love of the child is
much a live one, as to may in the end be mixed
aside the question, surely very
the love of a parent for a child
with self-interested motives,
can reach
a sense in
child.
which
this love
may
may
be,
be, there
in the context of the child's
A parent who
a child would not really love that child.
grown. However
for the parent
must be seen
potential to grow to maturity.
is
for a small child
wanted
The
a child to
remain
love of parent and child
thus potentially, though of course not always in reality, becomes deeper
and richer
as the child develops.
fullest potential
fully
when
Perhaps such a love only reaches
the child has
become
a parent herself
understand the sacrifices and love made by the parent.
when
this stage
dominant
Even
made
me
that Climacus
is
only is
a
possible by the greater degree
in the relationship of parent
and
child, then, greater
and mutual understanding deepen and enrich the
therefore to
and can
It is
reached that an element of mutual freedom
factor in the relationship,
of equality. equality
is
its
love.
It
seems
entitled to his assumptions about the
nature of a love relationship, at least in the context of such a poetical venture.
The
Poetry of the Irvxirnadon
49
/
THE TRIALS OF LOVE Given Climacus' assumptions about the motives and god,
we can
see
how
poetry, for to be
the poet.
And
as
m
appropriate
for
is
the realm of love the case in
is
it
many
is
him
goals of the teacher-
surely to be in the realm of
a tale of love, the saga Climacus
recounts concerns the difficulties love encounters in
Love
fillment.
stories
almost always involve
there should be a difficulty
is
not
from logic to
to turn
its
quest for
difficulties, so
itself surprising.
ful-
the idea that
In most love stories,
They are some such
the difficulty concerns the lovers' inability to be united.
pulled
apart by feuding families or the conflicts of war, or
thing.
Climacus says that these is
in
difficulties
do not concern him. To begin,
it
hard to imagine the god being thwarted by such circumstances, and
any case
this sort of
problem
at
most means that the lovers cannot
be together in time. Eternity, presumably, will here set things
The more
troubling as well as
right.
more relevant case involves an
nal rather than an external difficulty.
No
inter-
environmental obstacle pre-
vents the lovers from being united, but something in their relationship
is
a barrier to the mutual understanding that love seeks. Specifically, a relationship characterized by great inequality
The unequal
as
one could
be.
troubled in this way. disciple
of course as
is
Climacus does not here talk about the meta-
physical inequality between
on God's
is
between the god and the
relationship
God and
a
human
being; the focus
superiority because of his omnipotence, omniscience,
on, though he seems to assume that the god inequality has to
is
all-powerful.
do with the dependence of the
The
disciple
is
not
and so
relevant
on the
god.
In the case of the Socratic situation the disciple was genuinely autono-
mous and owed Socrates nothing. The B postulates that the god
new
creature.
Such
The
makes
it
disciple thus
a situation
is
hypothesis,
on the other hand,
possible for the disciple to
become
a
owes the god everything.
fraught with danger, as Climacus sees
it.
Genuine
love wants to build up the lover, but in this case the love of the god
threatens to destroy the self-confidence, or, as psychologists today might say, self-esteem of
at the
human
the disciple.
The god must then
"look with concern"
race, "for the individual's tender shoot
can be crushed
50
PASSIONATE REASON
/
The
as readily as a blade of grass.
out of love to
is
therefore far
more
uphold the created world
task the teacher-god has set himself
difficult
than the sheer power required
in existence.*^ It
this difficulty that
is
the whole story of the god as a teacher a story of suffering. for the
makes
What agony
god to find himself in danger of crushing that which he wants
to save by the very act of attempting to save.
Climacus seems to be of two minds with respect to the of our understanding the god's sorrows in such a case.
he says that we human being are so cannot understand such a love and
selfish in
its
our
On
own
possibility
the one hand love that
accompanying sorrow.
language "does not even have an intimation of such a sorrow."'^ the other hand, he says that any person
intimation of such a sorrow
"is a
who
we
Human
On
does not have at least an
lumpish soul with only
as
much
character as a small coin which bears neither Caesar's nor God's image."'
^
Perhaps he wants to say that though we cannot truly under-
stand the god's position, there are faint analogies in our experience that give us
Climacus'
some understanding. That
own
situation in
at
least
is
consistent with
procedure, for he proceeds to describe an analogous
some
detail "to
awaken the mind
the divine," even though he cautions us "that
an understanding of
to
no human
situation can
provide a valid analogy."'^
THE KING AND THE MAIDEN The
question as to
how
the god might actually perform his "teaching"
and unite himself to the is
disciple in
mutual understanding out of love
answered by Climacus through his analogy, which takes the form of
some musings on the well-known type of fairy tale in which a powerful king falls in love with a peasant maiden. Through this poetic tale we get to see the inequality
and the
distress
it
occasions, and
allowed to explore alternative strategies for overcoming the
The king case.
No
king
is
is
one and no external
politicians or foreign powers dare to
are
difficulties sully the
make
trouble, yet the
troubled by the kingly worry that his love will only
woman unhappy forget
a powerful
we
difficulty.
make
the
by reminding her of "what the king only wished to
— that he was the king and she had been
a
poor maiden."'^ In
The Poetry of
how can
such a case
the
Immnatkm
51
/
the love relationship be characterized by the
freedom, equaUty, and mutual understanding that love demands? Will
not the maiden always be conscious of her dependence on the king?
To story
is
moment from
turn for a
god who
story of the
is
supposed in turn to illuminate, the importance of the issue here
cannot be overemphasized. The problem
B
assumption of the is
Christianity claims to be a faith ness, but
it
human
the problem.
Is
at the heart of is
about the
and
fulfills
faith.
our human-
on God
persons
itself
to
overcome
degrading and
can appear to be, and such a reaction will later
lies
term "offense." Whether such
human
From the point of view
condition.
beings are actually guilty before
to transform
them
Only by recognizing our
so as to
make
hypothesis and does
room
even
To
if
B
we presume him omnipotent, has The actions he must take
make the
important to see that offense
B
fulfilled.
this feature of Christianity in his
in this situation.
to avoid misunderstanding
assumption of the
with him possible.
humanness be
so.
shall see, the god,
limited maneuvering
of Chris-
God and dependent on
a relationship
actual situation can our
Hence Climacus must reproduce
simply ignored.
human
dehumanizing and degrading depends on what the
in fact
human
it
what Climacus
truth
As we
restores
What
anything but humane. Christianity posits
as
not such a view of
a view
tianity,
which
beings are sinful and are dependent
dehumanizing? Certainly
God
stems directly from the
has often been perceived, by Enlightenment thinkers and
by secular humanists today,
is
really
hypothesis that the learner lacks the Truth.
might be termed the humane character of Christian
at stake
that
own
the fairy tale back to Climacus'
our lover, and to the Christianity which that
is
possibility of offense acute. It
not something the god
hypothesis the inequality
avoid
the inferior party happier,
it
is
or ignore
it,
while
is
it
real
wills.
On
is
the
and cannot be
may appear
to
make
ultimately to destroy the possibility of an
honest relationship.
The
and to see how we The poet has two possible strategies for removing The king must either elevate the maiden to his own
inequality must therefore be dealt with,
return to the fairy tale.
the inequality. level, or else
descend to her
level. In
both cases the king
is
the agent
of change, since to imagine the maiden as capable of elevating herself to his level
is
to imagine she
is
more than a maiden, and would
52
/
PASSIONATE REASON
invalidate the analogy to the case of the god,
cannot be abolished by the
human
where the inequality
disciple without returning to the
Socratic position.
Union through Ascent It
might appear that the king could simply bring the young
to his level by
making her
his queen.
There
are several
ways
woman
this
might
be accomplished. In each case Climacus claims, however, that his noble
What
king has "seen the difficulties" with such a strategy.
are those
difficulties?
That the king might simply order the woman expect her to obey out of fear of the consequences
by Climacus, since such a relationship that
is
obedience
fearful
the king's goal.
More
is
to marry
from the loving
far
is
plausible
the idea that the
is
woman
ascent could be brought about by dazzling the young
splendors of her fairy tale to like:
new
position.
the situation of the god and describes what this would be learner up toward himself, exalt
him, divert him with joy lasting a thousand years. the misunderstanding in his tumult of
would
with the
Climacus switches quickly back from his
"The god would then draw the
standing?"
him and
not even considered
Why
is
it
that the
joy."''*
girl (to
.
.let
What
the learner forget
is
this
"misunder-
switch back to the fairy tale)
in such a case be "essentially deceived?"
The misunderstanding
lies, I
the young woman's situation favor. In herself she
is
is
think, in the fact that in such a case totally a function of the king's
nothing, and
if
she
is
good
conscious of this nothingness
she cannot possibly have the "bold confidence" she needs to love the
king
freely.
The deception
lies
in the "diversion" that blocks her
from
gaining such a consciousness by virtue of the delights that have been
bestowed upon her. Even
if
the young
happy, their relationship would not
The problem "before the lowly rise
woman would
satisfy
the king.
reappears even more acutely
maiden
over her hut... and
consider herself
if
the king appeared
in all his splendor... let the sun of his glory
let
her forget herself in adoring admiration."
own glorification, but the The king presumably wants the girl to love him, not for his power and riches, but for himself. To lure her by riches and grandeur Since he
girl's."'^
is
in love, the king desires "not his
The Poetry of
the
Incarmtion
know
could not serve his ends, because he could not possibly
responding to
him
53
/
she was
rather than the riches and grandeur. This fear of
the king's corresponds to the god's worry that should he dazzle the learner with a
show of
his power, the learner
would "love only the
omnipotent miracle worker."'^ Furthermore, the king wants a response characterized by freedom and self-confidence, a response that requires
the
girl to
have a sense of her own worth, to understand that she
indeed loved by the king and
is
is
not merely his plaything.
In the case of the god and the learner, this difficulty increases to
The
a wholly different order, since the learner lacks the condition. learner
is
in fact totally
dependent on the god; receives her value and
How
worth in receiving the condition. being crushed?
How
can she receive
this
without
can she maintain the self-confidence and boldness
to love the god freely?
Union through Descent
The
solution must be for the union to be accomplished through
the god's descent rather than through the learner's elevation. to this
is
present in the fairy
tale,
of course. Tlie king
him
peasant in disguise, hoping she will learn to love
An analog
comes
and power. Both the maiden and the king
distractions of wealth
understand the relationship and will understand that the love given on both
to the
apart from the
is
will
freely
sides.
In the case of the god, a disguise will not do.
The god must not
simply appear to be the equal of the beloved, but actually share the situation of the beloved: "For this
is
the boundlessness of love, that in
earnestness and truth and not in jest
beloved, and
it is
resolute love's
it
wills to
be the equal of the
omnipotence to be able to do
which neither the king nor Socrates was capable, which assumed characters were
The bottom line
is
still
in
an external fashion.
is
brought about by the god changing himself.
there
is
this,
why
of
their
a kind of deceit."^^
that love does not impose changes
The
is
on the beloved
learner must be changed, but the change
The
difficulty
is
that
a real risk that the god will not be recognized, just as the king
opens himself up to the
possibility of rejection
himself. If the god's incognito
is
no mere
by coming
easily
as a peasant
seen through disguise,
54
PASSIONATE REASON
/
but his true form, then the to argue that there is
is
The
to be established.
risk will
no way
be genuine, but Climacus wants
to avoid
it
if
a real relationship of love
ultimate sorrow of the god
course of action that represents the only possible
that the very
is
way of
satisfying the
love relationship can be the very thing that separates the lovers.
ultimate suffering of the god
power
to
is
The
not the relinquishment of his glory and
assume the lowly position of the learner, but the realization
may be all for naught. The very action may be the action that blocks the learner from responding to the god's wooing. The suffering in the relationship is not reserved for the god alone, however. Toward the close of the chapter, Climacus hints that in some way the learner who that this tremendous sacrifice that
is
necessary to save the learner
becomes the god's
disciple
who
ably the individual
must share in the god's
suffering.''^
Presum-
does not respond must be understood as mis-
erable as well, since he will continue to lack the Truth, even
if
this
person thinks of himself as happy. In the appendix to chapter 3 Climacus calls the learner's misunder-
standing and rejection of the god offense, and attitude
more
fully
later.
possibility of offense
is
However,
it
is
we
shall discuss this
important to see that the
inherent in this situation of love between
unequals frc^m the very beginning.
stems from the god's love for the
It
learner, a love that expresses itself in a respect for the
freedom and
dignity of the learner.
THE POEM AS THE WONDER We saw that at the close of chapter
1
a strange dialogue
ensued between
Climacus and an interlocutor, who objected to Climacus' whole procedure on the grounds that his thought-experiment was something well
known
to everyone. Climacus' response
was to admit that something
funny has been going on and to claim that not only not invented by him, but has no that raises, as
we
author
was
claim
as author.
close of chapter 2 this strange dialogue
more intense
at all, a
saw, complex problems about the form of the book
and Climacus' own stance
At the
his thought-project
human
level.
The charge made by
is
the interlocutor
rejoined, at a is
even
angrier:
The Poetry of
the Incarnation
55
/
"What you are composing is the shabbiest plagiarism ever to appear." Once more CUmacus pleads guilty and this time explicitly attributes his poem to the deity.''' In chapter 1 the fact that the thought-project is of more than human origin "enthralls" Climacus and becomes a proof of the correctness of his hypothesis. In chapter 2 the contem-
"amazement"
plation of his poem's divine origin grips his soul with
and "adoration" and induces him
which
is
not really a
poem
to stand
but
''the
wondrously before the poem,
wonder' {Vidunderet or "the
miracle").-'
Even more obviously than his
own
disguise slip aside
in chapter
Climacus here seems to
1
and reveal where
he may seem to be making
his heart really
a highly debatable
is
human
being could have invented,
speaking.
writing
The
for, are
interlocutor,
let
Though
and dubious empirical
claim here, namely that the central core of Christianity a
is.
is
not something
we must remember
to
whom
he
and presumably the readers Climacus
is
evidently people brought up as Christians; they are at
The interlocutor acpoem "something that any
the very least knowledgeable about Christianity. cuses Climacus of putting forward as his child knows."--
It
Christianity rests
has always been part of Christian teaching that
on
placeable. Climacus
a divine revelation that is
not so
much
is
both unique and
irre-
arguing for this bold claim as
reminding his presumably Christian readers of
it
and what
it
means.
In a culture where familiarity with the Christian message has brought
with
it
dullness
if
not contempt, he
is
trying to rekindle a sense of the
strangeness of the Christian story, a strangeness that can be taken as a sign of
its
truth.
in fact the case that the analogies to the Christian
It is
concept of
the incarnation are at best few and far between. Neither Moses nor
Abraham nor Mohammed dhists say the
are thought of as divine.
and the idea of the Buddha both
differ significantly
that the
as the incarnation of the
within
central message
human
are irreducibly plural. For these
have been many incarnations of the divine, and there
can be more. Such a concept its
Buddha-essence
from the Christian view of the incarnation in
Hindu and Buddhist concepts
religions, there
because
Theravada Bud-
same of the Buddha. The Hindu notion of a divine avatar
beings.
is
is
rooted in the Socratic view of things,
ultimately the possibility of god-likeness
The uniqueness
of the Christian claim lends
56
PASSIONATE REASON
/
plausibility to the claim of Climacus:
human
"Presumably
could occur to a
it
being to poetize himself in the likeness of the god or the god
in the likeness of himself, but not to poetize that the
human
himself in the likeness of a
god poetized
being."" That a culture informed
by the Christian story might produce some imitators of the Christian view, such as might be found in the Unification Church, which appar-
Moon
ently views the Reverend
an incarnation of
as
God
(a reincar-
nation of Jesus?), does not really undermine this claim. Despite the reverent response of Climacus himself, the uniqueness of the Christian story, even
genuinely distinctive, does
if it is
establish the truth of Christianity.
many contemporary was
really divine
claim
is
little
to
The widespread embarrassment
of
Christian theologians over the belief that Jesus
makes
The uniqueness
this clear.^^
of the Christian
seen as an irritant that makes good ecumenical relations
between Christianity and other religions impossible. Despite reverence at the end of chapters
is
not at
of this uniqueness claim. in itself
and
offense" to
One point.
all
It is
in Climacus'
its
and
2,
which
in
is
grips the
a major reason
"poem"
why
Christianity, both
version, poses the "possibility of
hearers.
Climacus wants to
insist that Christianity lies
powers of reason and imagination.
He
lies right at this
beyond the human
will argue in chapter 3 that the
a paradox that cannot be understood
is
seeming
ignorant of the double-edged character
of the great ironies of Philosophical Fragments
incarnation
his
both cases
an emotion of "amazement" that
attributed to a "spell" or
author, Climacus
1
and
as
such poses
the possibility of offense. Yet the net impact of Climacus' reflection
is
to help us understand the plausibility of the incarnation, given his
assumptions about our situation as one in which we lack the Truth
The incarnation human expectations, yet something completely contrary to our natural human expectations is precisely what we must have on the premises of the B hypothesis. It might seem that Climacus is undermining his own case here by and the god seeks to remedy is
this defect out of love.
completely contrary to our natural
he has imaginatively invented Christianity,
his poetic invention. If
doesn't that
show
that
it
course Climacus has done tion of
what
a
is
not necessarily of divine origin? But of
no such
thing. His "invention"
is
a transcrip-
Sunday School student today knows or should know.
The Poetry
What he has done through his of what
is
thus so familiar.
of the
Incanvmon
mark
of
57
is
rekindle a sense of the strangeness
CUmacus
helps the believer at least to see
irony
that his inabilit\' to understand the Christian message standable, and a
j
its
is
itself
truth: a sign that Chnstianiry"
is
under-
indeed
what "eye has not seen, ear has not heard," something that has not originated within any
human
heart.-'
CHAPTER
THOUGHT, PASSION, AND PARADOX
Chapter 3 of
"The Absolute Paradox
Philosophical Fragments, entitled
(A Metaphysical
Caprice),"
is
probably the richest and most suggestive
chapter of the book from a philosophical standpoint, yet
A
most puzzling and enigmatic. reader immediately
book
to the
becoming
as a
is
also
is
the
simply to determine the relation of the chapter
whole. Chapter
a teacher by taking
and builds on chapter
it
central problem that confronts the
1.
2,
on the
with
its
poetic tale of the god
state of the learner, clearly follows
Chapter 4, which begins "So, then
(to
continue
our poem)," clearly takes up where chapter 2 leaves off and continues the tale of the god
an
human
which
understanding and
are interesting, but
being. Chapter 3 contains
what comes before and
relation to various passions,
its
do not seem
On
after.
be a kind of digression, and far
human
a
influential critique of natural theology, a host of provocative claims
about
to
who becomes
its
to be immediately
all
of
connected
the surface, the chapter seems to
purpose and function in the book are
from being immediately obvious.
Chapter 3 begins,
as did
chapter
1,
with Socrates, and
1
think
best to see the chapter as a kind of starting-over, a retracing of
of the same ground covered in chapters different angle.
We
1
and
begin with a Socrates
nature, unsure as to whether he
is
"a
2,
who
though from a is
it is
some
slightly
puzzled by his
own
more curious monster than Typhon
or a friendlier and simpler being, by nature sharing something divine
229
e)."'
However, "in order to get started" Climacus
shifts
from
this uncertainty to a type of certainty: "Still,
(see Phaedrus
immediately
now,... make a bold proposition: let us assume that
let us
what
a
human
being
is."^
With
this
we know
assumption Climacus has indeed
Thought, Passion, and Paradox
returned to the starting point of chapter
know what and
this
a
assumption
recollection.^
edge
human
being is
is
there
is
1
that
we
least that
assumption that we
by Climacus to the theory of
we humans possess
identical with the assumption that
is
59
said to be the criterion of truth,
specifically linked
Hence the assumption
for the
,
/
we
this
knowl-
possess the Truth, or at
possess the condition for gaining the Truth.
Having made the Socratic assumption, however, Climacus moves away from
even more rapidly than
in chapter
1.
In an obscure passage,
the understanding's postulated self-knowledge
is
rendered doubtful by
it
an encounter, a "collision" with something. "But then the understanding stands
still,
as did Socrates, for
now
the understanding's paradoxical
passion that wills the collision awakens and, without really understanding
itself,
wills its
own
downfall."'^
This collision, involving a paradox
"intimated" but not known,
that
is
own
puzzlement about himself.
said to be the source of Socrates'
is
The
collision
is
therefore an event that
seems to point the individual in the direction of the B hypothesis by putting the Socratic assumption in question. I
believe that this gives us the clue
we need
The
of chapter 3 in Philosophical Fragments.
kind of starting-over
The author chapters, is
correct, but
is
it
issues
The central issue attitudes human reason can it is
1
and
is,
two 3, It
take toward the
B
I
believe, the various
hypothesis. In surveying
how far human its own steam. two chapters that human
proper to begin by exploring
B
hypothesis
know from the first B hypothesis on
reason cannot generate the is
in the first
2 constantly lurks in the back-
of the chapter
thinking can go toward generating the
be precise, we already
a
once more with the Socratic position,
true that the chapter begins
these possible attitudes
come
posed there form an agenda for chapter
ground.
is
not a starting from scratch.
has some sense of where he has
and the
but the hypothesis of chapters
To
is
to rightly see the role
sense that chapter 3
proper for Climacus to see
if
there
is
its
on
own. Nevertheless,
it
any possible point of contact
between human reason and the contents of the B hypothesis. In looking at the attempts of
Climacus
is
human
reason to understand what
between human thinking and something lision
is
ultimate,
beginning with a plausible point of contact: an encounter
with what he terms the unknown.^
it
cannot understand, a col-
The
closest reason
can come
60
PASSIONATE REASON
/
B
to generating the
hypothesis, even
attempt by reason to discover
The most
own
its
if it
is
unsuccessful, will be an
limits.
plausible attempt along these lines
is
the fabled Socratic
ignorance, in which Socrates, despite the Platonic assumption of recollection Climacus foists to
means
will
human
concede that his
earlier
is
that
Climacus by no
thyself."
contention about the inability of
B hypothesis is incorrect. The central human reason cannot by itself conceive
"absolutely different."^ Nevertheless, he
is
that something of significance
Human
to a standstill over his inability
"know
reason to generate the
thrust of the chapter
of what
on him, comes
the Delphic injunction to
fulfill
reason
is
powerless by
is
"collides." Nevertheless there
is
This "point of contact"
collision.
itself to
discover that with which
human
in is
inclined to think
is
present in this Socratic ignorance. it
reason an affinity for this
not sufficient for reason to dispense
with God's self-revelation. Nevertheless, the search for the limits of reason reveals a potential affinity between reason and revelation. affinity
becomes actual only when certain conditions
but the fact that reason possesses this potential cant. This affinity
is
the
theme
first
I
is
The
are actualized,
nevertheless signifi-
wish to explore.
REASON'S PASSION: WILLING
ITS
OWN DOWNFALL Almost
at the
understanding^
beginning of the chapter, Climacus claims that is
gripped by a peculiar passion: the desire for
We can recognize right away that Climacus
downfall.
and poetically here.
Strictly speaking,
have passions; they are
and
their thinking
qualities of persons.
may embody
paradox pitch
is
offers little support or
is
is
speaking loosely
understanding does not
However persons do
think,
or reflect their passions.
Climacus makes several claims
which he
human
human own
its
at the
beginning of the chapter for
even elaboration. Asserting that "the
the passion of thought" and that "every passion's highest
always to will
its
own
downfall," he concludes that "thus
it
is
the highest passion of the understanding to will the collision, although in
one way or another the
hard to say whether this
is
collision
must become
its
downfall."^
intended as argument. In any case,
It is it
is
Thou^, enough where Climacus wants
clear
and Paradox
Passion,
to go: "This, then,
61
/
the highest
is
paradox of thought: to want to discover something that cannot be thought."^
That human reason has an enduring fascination with the paradoxseems right to me; an encounter with the paradoxical does engender
ical
something that
name
rightly deserves the
"passion."
The psychology
involved in the claim that every passion involves something like a
Freudian death- instinct seems more dubious to me, but fortunately
nothing hangs on to
know
if
downfall;
it
human
every
passion at
be enough to see
will
We
this universal psychological claim.
if
its
do not need
highest point wills
something
like this desire
own
its
present
is
dominant passions that appear to drive human reason.
in the
Actually, the dubious psychology almost disguises a really decisive
move Climacus makes, and making
place. In
first
that
is
to
a controversial
view reason
we almost do not
the ultimate passion of the understanding,
we have accepted the
that
From Climacus'
perspective,
as passionate in the
and perhaps dubious claim about
idea that the understanding
human
reason
is
notice
passionate.
not a disinterested quest
is
for a god-like
view of things, but the expression of a very interested
human
It
being.
is
only in the context of viewing
the expression of
itself
begins to
make
Climacus
"is
we do not
ever,
passion that the more striking claim
us that the desire to discover
we
something that thought
notice this "because of
habit. "^° Little
think they
I
is
given
make some
sense
take a particular view of reason, a view which
though by no means developed. The view use the
title "imperialistic
reason." Reason,
a neutral dispassionate faculty, or even domination.
because
it
is
not
know my way
this
realm
It
A
is
more
I
around, and
my own. The
I
of paradox
my
help
see as implicit
one which could aptly this view, far
from being
an instrument of control
paradox engenders passion in
The realm
unknown
is
on
like
a challenge, a reality that
control or dominate.
indeed to the
How-
fundamentally present everywhere in thought."
here to understand these remarks, but if
reason as
sense.
tells
cannot think
human
human
human
reason
do not yet know how
to
the realm in which
do
is
response reveals a desire to
I
make
response of reason to the paradoxical, and
generally, reveals a desire for mastery.
certainly does not appear immediately obvious that all thinking
62
is
PASSIONATE REASON
/
gripped by the passion to discover something that thought cannot
think, but
it
becomes more plausible
if
we view human thinking
as the
expression of this type of desire for mastery. Consider natural science,
which many would view
most important achievement and char-
as the
acteristic expression of reason.
frontier of knowledge.
hensible are
The
incitements to scientific discovery, which continually
all
attempts to understand what
much
not yet understood. This seems not so
is
a passion for discovering
as a passion for
Science continually pushes back the
paradoxical, the surprising, the incompre-
something that thought cannot think
understanding everything. However, on close inspection,
the latter passion can be interpreted as a disguised form of the
seeking to understand what to
there are
all
scientist
In
first.
does not understand, in restlessly seeking
unknown territory, is not reason any limits to human understanding?
conquer
The
it
seeking to discover
if
seems never to find or be content with any ultimate
explanation. Molecules are explained in terms of atoms.
Atoms
are
explained in terms of subatomic particles. Subatomic particles are explained in terms of God knows what.
were found? think?
Two
What
if
possible responses
feeling of defeat
is
What if some ultimate explanation
reason discovered something that thought cannot
On
can be imagined.
easily imaginable.
The
the one hand, a
scientist has at last hit
on
something impervious to imperialistic reason, something that we cannot explain,
and therefore cannot dominate or control.
has failed.
On
the other hand,
we might
well take
Imperialistic reason
some
having reached what could reasonably be termed the explained
all
somewhat
that could be explained, and
less imperialistic stance,
it
if
goal.
We
have
reason could take a
might see the discovery
an ambition that was implicit in reason's activity
The
satisfaction in
all
as fulfilling
along.
discovery that Climacus envisions as playing such a role for
reason does not of course
come from
natural science, but from the
human quest for self-understanding. Nevertheless, the same responses that we envisioned in the case of such a discovery in natural science are possible in the case of the paradox of self-knov/ledge. Socrates, in his quest for self-knowledge,
awakens "the understanding's paradoxical
passion that wills the collision." This passion, "without really under-
standing
itself,
wills
reason has a natural
own
The key point here ambivalence about its own limits. Such
its
downfall.""
is
that
a limit
and Paradox
Thoug/it, Passion,
would be reason's "downfall." However,
could also be seen as the
it
an excursion
fulfillment or satisfaction of reason's ultimate goal. After
and
into natural theology
limitations,
its
sideration of this ambivalence,
and we
63
/
Climacus returns to a con-
will follow his
example.
PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE After his puzzling "collision" with
immediately
initial
discussion of Socratic self-knowledge
an unknown which
it
both
fears
and
desires,
and
its
Climacus
of natural theology, the classical
shifts to a discussion
The
attempts to prove God's existence.
transition
is
made
in the
following manner:
But what
is
this
unknown
against
which the understanding in its man and his
paradoxical passion collides and which even disturbs
self-knowledge? insofar as
It
unknown. But
the
is
he knows man, or anything
let us call this
unknown
not a
is
it
human
being,
he knows. Therefore,
else that
only a
name
that
that this does not
seem
to be only a
the god. It
is
we
give to
it.'^
The as
difficulty,
however,
is
Climacus himself immediately begins a discussion of the
attempts to prove that
God
exists,
strong evidence that the
name,
classical
name was
not exactly chosen at random.
The
justification for this procedure lies,
I
think, in the Socratic
viewpoint from which the chapter begins. Climacus has consistently interpreted the Socratic position as equivalent to the claim that knowl-
edge of the divine
knowledge leads
is
bound up with self-knowledge.
to the "collision" with the
Insofar as self-
unknown,
it
is
logical to
regard this encounter as itself an encounter with the divine, and since
the encounter leads to bewilderment, in turn to interpret the divine as
unknown. The ultimate purpose of Climacus termed negative theology.
Can
reason by
of God, precisely by conceiving of
God
is
to explore
what might be
come up with a concept what is unknown to reason?
itself
as
Or, put in terms of our earlier question, can thought discover something
thought cannot think?
If it
could, would
it
thereby discover
God?
But why does Climacus discuss the proofs of God's existence, which
64
PASSIONATE REASON
/
knowledge of God? Climacus
are of course attempts to gain positive
must
consider these attempts by reason to discover God's
first
and find them wanting. Given
their failure,
reality,
he can then see whether
reason can redeem this failure by constructing an understanding of God
unknown.
negatively, as the
The claim
that "the god"
is
on the
a bit of playful irony
name" seems
"only a
serious look at attempts to gain
If
is
have knowledge of God, then he ought to be able
and hypothetical, and since
his conclusion
knowledge of the divine, the
way functions
illegitimately.
know God
tempts to
philosophically
Climacus were trying to show that we human beings do to justify his equation
of the divine with the limits of reason. Since his purpose
rational
misfire,
is
linguistic
Climacus looks
and
is
B
like the
position too
is
tried
at the
ways positive
hypothesis by examining
the chapter, but
it
is
reading,
is
So
examine far as
I
own
itself
The
discover
failures.
This
interest
is
discussion of the theistic
by no means the central theme of
a discussion that
of interest in
is
and certainly has attracted a great deal of briefly
its
and found wanting, but something of
my
at-
this leads naturally to the position
nevertheless to be learned from the failure.
arguments then, on
experimental
we do not have any sleight of hand in no
that
he wants to consider, namely whether reason can by something
taking a
is
an understanding of what humans have
thought of as ultimate or divine. However, the irony innocent.
therefore to be
part of Climacus, since he
interest
its
own
from readers.
I
right shall
his critique.
can
tell,
Climacus has two general or a
priori objections
to the idea of proving God's existence, as well as specific objections
and
to the ontological
general arguments
first,
teleological arguments.
and
1
shall
examine the
in that context look at his objection to
the ontological argument, and then look at the criticism given against the more empirical teleological argument, or argument from design.
Thought and Being: General Arguments against Natural Theology and the Ontological Argument
The exists or
first critical
course
argument takes the form of a dilemma. Either God
he does not,
it is
says Climacus. If
God
impossible to prove that he does.
If
does not
exist,
God does exist,
then of
however,
Thou^, Climacus says that
moment
the very
"it
is
Passion,
want
foolishness to
and Paradox
to demonstrate
the proof begins would presuppose
This argument of Climacus
65
it,
since
I,
in
decided. "^^
it... as
show
obviously not designed to
is
/
that sound
proofs of God's existence cannot be given, but rather that the project of
giving such proofs
The
is
idea that
somehow
prove
it?
believe,
if I
Although
person would not
am
seems to be simply that
it
I
would not
were already convinced that
why
should
God
try to
I
true for psychological reasons that a
prove God's existence
not obvious that
it is
I
already convinced,
may be
it
try to
must be
true.
who
did not already
Could not someone who
simply undecided attempt to discover an argument that would thereby
produce a conviction that is
pointless. this
prove God's existence unless
try to
did exist. However,
is
behind
lies
right about this,
pointless.
may be
It
that
God's existence were
I
me
is
any
case,
even
if
Climacus
would not bother to construct a proof of
I
I
construct
may
still
have value.
and strengthening
in confirming
that the belief
exists? In
not already convinced of God's reality on other
grounds, but the proof
value for
God
does not imply that proofs of God's existence are
it
reasonable.
Even more
consider the idea that such a proof
my
significantly,
may have
It
may have
showing
belief,
Climacus
me
fails
to
value for other people
than myself.
The second general argument offered by Climacus
is
more promising
and certainly more interesting from a philosophical standpoint. The claim
is
that
one cannot
because existence
ment.
"I
is
really
God
constantly draw conclusions from existence, not towards
existence."^"*
Here Climacus seems
niscent of Hume's claim that
The
demonstrate the existence of
not something that can be demonstrated by argu-
to take a position
which
is
remi-
no "matter of fact" can be demonstrated.^^
reason Climacus gives for this view, however,
argument that no matter of
fact
not Hume's
is
can be demonstrated because the
contrary of a matter of fact can always be conceived as logically possible,
but rather seems to rest on another Kant's famous argument that existence
Humean is
claim,
one echoed
in
not a quality or property that
something can be shown to have.'^ As Climacus puts
it,
existence
is
always something presupposed by an argument, or perhaps something
added to
he
it,
but
says that
is
never
itself
we do not prove
established by the argument.
As examples,
that a stone exists, but that
some
existing
66 thing
PASSIONATE REASON
/
a stone,
is
and that
in a criminal trial,
criminal exists, but that a person
who
exists
we do not prove a criminal.'^
is
Humean, namely
supported by another claim that sounds
can be accomplished by a demonstrative argument consequences of a concept. is
not a concept to
we add
If
Humean
this
that a
These
that
all
are
that
to develop the
is
the Kantian claim that existence
claim that only "relations of ideas"
are subject to demonstrative proof, then the conclusion Climacus wants
seems to follow. All of this touches on an issue that
of central importance in
is
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship, namely the relationship of
thought to being. In Concluding Unscientific
Climacus argues
Postscript,
that to avoid idealism one must hold fast to a distinction between
thought and being, a distinction that
undermined
is
if
one concedes
concept to be thought. The distinction between thought
that being
is
a
and being
is
not a distinction between one thought and another, but
a distinction
between what
deals with possibility; being
actual
X
there
may be no
merely thought and what
is is
actuality.
difference at
Between
all in
Thought
is.
a possible
X
and an
conceptual qualities.
The
not one of content but of mode, and Climacus wants to
difference
is
insist that
we understand what
it is
to be actual not by thinking about
a certain quality called "existence" but by being actual, by existing.^^
This discussion of thought and being in to the critique of the ontological
Climacus looks
in chapter 3 of Fragments.
offered by Spinoza, in is
to be the
existence
enjoys
is
is
which
it is
due to a
closely related
at a version of this
exist necessarily, since necessary
failure to distinguish clearly
"being," ideal being and factual being.
To
between two senses of
speak of ideal being it is
is
to.
to speak of essence.
possible for things to exist in different ways, including existing
necessarily,
and
it
is
here appropriate to speak of degrees of being.
Factual being, however, to be or not to be."
is
said to be subject to the
Here the question
thing possesses, but whether
it
exists at
is
"Hamlet
that
an argument
like Spinoza's
dialectic,
not what kind of being a
all.
It
cannot be established
that a thing exists in the factual sense merely by considering all
argument
On Climacus' view, any success this argument
speak of what kind of being a thing possesses; It is
is
given in a footnote
is
argued that God, whose very nature
most perfect being, must a perfection.'*^
Postscript
argument that
can accomplish
is
its
essence;
to explore the
and Paradox
TTioMgfit, Passion,
nature of God's existence a profound tautology:
if
he does
"God, who
exist.
The argument amounts
The argument does not
but what he must be like
if
to
a necessary being, exists necessarily."
is
In effect, Climacus glosses this roughly as follows: "God, exists necessarily."
67
/
establish
he
if
exists,
God exists,
whether
he does.
Contemporary^ defenders of the ontoiogical argument would doubt-
makes
reply that the hypothetical clause in the above proposition
less
the proposition incoherent, since
contradictory to suppose that a
it is
necessary being might not exist. God's existence cannot be merely
contingent, since
if
God's existence
However, Climacus anticipates Leibniz that
it is
true that God's existence
but claims that this difficulty. "^^
I
amounts
still
is
then
it
believe.
I
necessary'
to a tautology
is
He
necessary'.^^
agrees with possible,
if it is
and "circumvents the
we do not really know we know that he actually
think he means by this that
whether God's existence exists.
possible,
is
this reply,
is
possible unless
The ontoiogical argument then, on Climacus' view,
is
a perfect
example of what can and cannot be established by conceptual argument.
We can elucidate what what
is
contained in a concept but we cannot establish
exists.
Now
it
must be conceded that
in
ordmary
life
the existence of things as established by argument.
we do often regard The physicist cites
evidence for the existence of a hitherto unknown subatomic particle. The astronomer cites evidence for the existence of a hitherto unknown planet. The neighbor argues that a burglar exists on the block by citing the pattern of break-ins that have occurred recently.
On
Climacus'
view, these arguments for the existence of something are misnamed,
and we are speaking loosely
in
such cases.
that a something, assumed to exist,
is
that a particular astronomical body
unknown person
is
in fact a burglar.
that a particular concept applies to
However,
it is
is
at all.
not to
in fact a is
subatomic
clear,
do
show
is
particle, or
an
We are really giving a justification some
existing reality.
is
is
right about this.
It
does
not about whether an existing
rightly described as a planet or not, but about
Whether
really
in fact a planet, or that
not obvious that Climacus
appear at times that the argument
"X"
What we
whether "X"
exists
or not Climacus senses the force of this objection
but in any case he does shift ground.
God for cases like the subatomic particle and
The analog with
is
respect
the planet are arguments
68
PASSIONATE REASON
/
that the works of
CUmacus
God
in nature provide evidence for
moves from
quickly
his general, a priori
more
natural theology to a consideration of
ments such
arguments, as
we
specific, empirical argu-
argument from design. The
as the
shall see, are of a
Critique of the
God's existence.
argument against
he has of such
criticisms
wholly different kind.
Argument from Design
Climacus does not bother to give
a precise statement of
what
is
generally called the argument from design, but that does not matter
too much, for he
is
ments
not a specific version.
in general,
really criticizing the inspiration
He wants
behind such argu-
to consider
or not God's existence can be inferred from God's works, "the in nature
happy
and the goodness or wisdom
to accept the tautology that the works of
do not immediately not
obvious to
that
nature as
it
I
wisdom
Governance."" Climacus
in
want
is
god can only be done
how we
by the god, but he then goes on to wonder
works of god. "The works from which
whether
identify those
to prove his existence
exist."^^
The wisdom and goodness
in nature are
The
starting-point of the proof
is
us.
immediately appears to
us,
not simply
but nature interpreted according
work of God. Climacus
to a certain ideal, nature understood as the
argues that the acceptance of such an ideal interpretation of nature
is
equivalent to "presupposing that the god exists." Thus, the belief in
God which
the proof
is
supposed to support
way around.
proof, rather than the other
Climacus
says, that
so,
if
argument, then religious life
my
is
only because of
this,
can have any confidence in the argument, daring
1
to "defy all objections,
were not
actually supporting the
is
It
even those that have not yet
God
faith in
really rested
arisen." If this
on such an empirical
could not have the kind of confident belief the
I
demands,
for
would be continually
I
that "something so terrible
happen
in suspense, worried
[the Holocaust?] that
my
fragment
of proof would be ruined."^"*
So a
far as
I
can
sound argument
What he or to be
of
some
denies
more
see,
for
is
Climacus does not
really
deny the
possibility of
God's existence from the works of God in nature.
that such an argument can be
precise, that
it
known
to be sound,
can be known to be sound independently
subjective faith. His real target
is
the notion that such a
and Paradox
Thougfir, Passion,
Once
rational proof could be a substitute for faith.
it is
/
69
conceded that
the recognition of such an argument requires faith and cannot be a substitute for
it,
Socrates, in fact,
he seems to have no objection
to such arguments.
taken as a model of the proper way to pursue such
is
argument
things. Socrates, the reputed inventor of the
"constantly presupposes that the god exists, and
on
in question,
this presupposition
seeks to infuse nature with the idea of purposiveness."-'
am
I
here using "faith" or "belief in one of
4 and 5 of the positive response of a
who
with the god
God
ordinary- senses,
it
has become human. In speaking of the proofs of
as requiring faith,
of a premise that
its
when speaking in chapters human being to an encounter
not in the special sense Climacus gives
is
I
mean
only that they require the acceptance
not self-evident or undeniable, or perhaps the
adoption of a way of seeing the world which
equivalent to accepting
is
such a premise. Regardless of the merits of any of the other criticisms of natural theology- given by Climacus, his view here seems eminently
Arguments
defensible.
for
recognizable as sound, but
God's existence may be sound, and even it
does not seem true that such arguments
depend on premises that any sane, rational person who understands
them must fail
accept. Otherwise,
to accept It
is
why would
so
many
sane, rational persons
them?
worth noting that Climacus does not here conclude that no
God
"natural" knowledge of
have seen, assumes that
a
is
The
possible.
knowledge of God
Even the B hypothesis does not
rule out all
is
Socratic position, as
we
linked to self-knowledge.
knowledge of God. Although
from the point of view of the B hypothesis, the kind of knowledge of
God
that
is
equivalent to knowing the Truth
beings, this by to
know
that
no means
God
exists
implies that
is
not possible for
human
human beings
and some things about God. The B perspective
requires us only to hold that whatever
available
is
impossible for
it is
knowledge of
this sort that
not sufficient for "salvation." Such a knowledge about
does not amount to knowing the Truth. arguing for the truth of the
B
perspective
Of
on
course Climacus
is
is
God not
this issue, but considering
that perspective "hypothetically." Nevertheless, the critique of natural
theology given here
is
quite compatible with the view Climacus devel-
ops at length in Postscript, which
is
that a natural religious
Religiousness A, which involves an awareness of God,
is
life,
termed
possible for
70
PASSIONATE REASON
/
human beings, without any requirement of any special revelation from God. The view attacked in chapter 3 of Fragments is the claim of reason to develop an understanding of God that can function independently of the individual's subjective participation in the religious life. The target is not natural awareness of God but objective, speculative proofs of God.
The conclusion tive.
Human
of the discussion of natural theology
beings, relying
on
then nega-
is
their speculative, rational powers,
can
explore the consequences of various concepts of the divine, which in effect to say
what would be
correct. Alternatively, they
true
if
onstratively compelling by accepting a premise that certain.
Climacus says that in the
from the proof by a
leap."^^
latter case
This
is
is
not dem-
not objectively
"the existence
itself emerges
the only use in Fragments of the
is
famous Kierkegaard ian concept of the about the notion of the leap
God was
a certain conception of
can accept an argument which
leap.
We
shall say
much more
connection with the discussion
later, in
of belief and the will in the Interlude between chapters 4 and talk of a leap
is
Here
5.
seems merely to be a way of indicating that the individual
has contributed something of a personal nature to the knowing enterprise.
Climacus compares
doll that rights itself
this personal contribution to letting
when
it
is
released.
He
go of a
says that so long as
I
am
engaged in proving God's existence, "the existence does not emerge, if I
for let
no other reason than that
I
am
go of the proof, the existence
to say the least, but
I
is
engaged in proving
it,
there."" This passage
think the view that underlies
it is
but is
when
obscure,
something
like
the following:
Both
in Fragments
and
Postscript
Climacus seems to hold the view
that a natural awareness of God's reality
awareness
is
is
possible.'^
However,
this
gained, not through objective speculation, but subjectively,
in the course of existing. Proofs of
God's existence owe whatever force
they have to this natural awareness of God's
conviction as this which
is
illustrated
reality;
it
is
such a
by Socrates' procedure of "infusing
nature with the idea of purposiveness" and thus constructing the
argument from design. However,
it
is
Climacus' view that objective
speculation and subjective existence are opposite and incompatible
movements. Thus, to the extent that existence,
I
I
try to speculatively
prove God's
make God's reality appear doubtful by removing myself
Thought, Passion, and Paradox
from the existential standpoint which actually for
offers assurance.
God's existence to "emerge from a proof,"
proof"; that
remove myself from the
is,
71
/
must
I
"let
Thus,
go of the
indifferent standpoint of the
disinterested speculator and take up once more the standpoint of the
Only
concretely existing person, replete with interests and passions.
from
can
this standpoint
accept the
1
premise or premises the proof this letting
rests
go of the proof,
is
less
than objectively certain
upon. This existential movement,
thus what Climacus
means here by
a leap.
CAN THE UNKNOWN
KNOWN?
BE
we can now
After this extended look at natural theology,
return to
Climacus' central concern, the quest of reason to discover something that thought cannot think.
It
looks as
the failure of natural theology
if
might actually be of some positive use to reason in reason
now
and which
define the it
unknown
as that
therefore unable to
is
which
this quest.
Cannot
absolutely different,
is
know? And would not such
a
recognition imply a kind of negative knowledge of the god? Climacus recognizes
how tempting
this
move
is,
but rejects
says that "defined as the absolutely different, to be at the point of being disclosed, but
it
not
nonetheless.
it
Ithe so."^^
that the understanding cannot really conceive of
He
unknown] seems
The
what
is
difficulty
is
"absolutely
different."
The understanding lides," "reaches,"
and
in "is
its
"paradoxical passion" continually "col-
engaged" with the unknown, and yet the
unknown remains unknown. The unknown is a "frontier" or "boundary" {Graendse) to reason. As such, the unknown is, one might say, a reality in the
life
unknown.
of reason, a factor in It is
like a
something must
its
activities,
but
it
nevertheless remains
place-holder in mathematics, an indication that
exist to
that something must be.
fill
the space, with no understanding of what
Having teased
us by calling the
unknown
"the
god" and going on to examine the traditional proofs of God's existence,
Climacus returns to his serious claim that "the god"
and the name therefore It
is
"just a
is
unknown
to us,
name."
appears that the understanding might be able to
make some
72
PASSIONATE REASON
/
progress toward understanding the "absolutely different," but Climacus says that this
itself,
not
is
when
says that
so.
With more than
the understanding
the result
is
conceive of the
god
idolatry, in that the
echo of Feuerbach, he
a little
tries to
is
unknown by own
manufactured in our
image:
The understanding cannot even cannot absolutely negate
think the absolutely different;
but uses
itself
consequently thinks the difference in transcend
itself
scendence that
and therefore thinks thinks by
it
solely the frontier,
with the
The
many
above
itself
unknown
the
only the tran-
(the god)
then the one idea about the different
is
is
idea here seems to be that the understanding confuses
what
is
candidates supplied by the imagination for what
and here Climacus
what
is
The content from among the
only relatively different.
of the "frontier" gets filled in by the reason, selecting
divine,
not
confused
ideas about the different."
absolutely different with
many
it
and
cannot absolutely
itself,.... It
as
itself. If
that purpose
itself for
mind the
calls to
is
genuinely
incredible diversity in
conceptions of god that are found in various cultures, especially pagan cultures.'^
own image
Manufacturing god in our in that
it
in
one sense comfortable,
allows us to select a god which suits
really secure in playing this
game
is
requires a certain degree of self-deception
because
it
is
at
bottom aware of the
confusion "does not
know
we cannot be
quest for
its
To
play this
part of reason,
one
In reality the understanding its
own
boundary, and in
and quite consistently confuses
itself
with the difference." Climacus
on the
arbitrariness in selecting
conception of god rather than another. has become "confused" by
but
us,
game, according to Climacus.
calls this situation
its
itself
"the self-ironizing of
the understanding,"^^ probably one of the more obscure phrases in the
whole of Kierkegaard's authorship. exactly what this self-ironizing
is
reason in manufacturing gods in
becoming so confused that
it
It
is
its
occupies a superior standpoint.
itself
A
itself
me
clear, to
own image
confuses
be absolutely different, makes
not
supposed to be.
Is
it
at
any
rate,
the activity of
Perhaps reason, in
with what
is
supposed to
appear ironical to someone
second possibility
is
who
that the self-
ironizing of the understanding refers to reason's recognition of the
Thou^,
whole procedure. In
arbitrariness of the
would be an
Passion,
and Paradox
this case, the self-ironizing
ironical recognition of the problematic character of reason's
attempt to transcend
itself.
However the phrase be understood, Climacus self'ironizing
tries to illustrate this
with a "sketch" of a situation that in some respects looks
curiously like the
He
73
/
B
hypothesis that he will focus on in chapters 4 and
who looks just human being, grows up as do other human beings," and so on, and yet "this human being is also the god."^^ How does Climacus know this? He says, "I cannot know it, for in that case I would have to know the god and the difference, and do not know the difference."^^ 5.
supposes that "there exists, then, a certain person
any other
like
I
I
think the point of this
knowing
simply to show the impossibility of rationally
is
conception of the divine, but Climacus uses
a particular
this
particular arbitrary conception of the god to underline the fact that
reason could not possibly
The conclusion Reason
in
boundary
like
the
B
falls
it
into perplexity about
at a it
depth
and even has an awareness of
level. It
has formed
failure
is
on the
is
its
own
However, when
itself.
attempts to gain any positive knowledge of this frontier, capriciously
hypothesis.
quest for self-knowledge naturally confronts
its
as
come up with anything
of the matter seems to be something like this:
it
it
behaves
this capriciousness, at least
aware that the idea of the "absolutely different"
not really altogether different.
part of reason
is
far
The
recognition of this
from actually forming a concept of
the unknown, but in the postulated encounter between reason and the
god of the B hypothesis,
it is
not without significance,
as
we
shall see.
THE PARADOX OF THE GOD'S SELF-REVELATION In the last section of chapter 3 the interlocutor reappears and
becomes
clear
"sketch" Climacus has
human being
whom we tation:
is
it
finally
where the whole discussion has been going. The
made
of the god
who
final
looks just like an ordinary
sufficient to exhaust the patience of the dialogue partner
have already met several times, and he bursts in with
"You
are a spinner of whimsicalities, that
you certainly do not believe that
it
would occur
I
to
know
me
full well,
to be
irri-
but
concerned
74
PASSIONATE REASON
/
whim
about a
so strange or so ridiculous that
occurred to anyone and, above
have to lock everything
all,
have in
I
is
"whim" he has
in several key respects,
human
beings,
and
is
is
B
As we
hypothesis
something that does appear unreasonable to
and even "ridiculous" from a
He does make one jab respondent's own assessment of
that the
basically agreement.
suggested, resembling the
certain perspective.
no means completely
would
I
consciousness out in order to
certainly "strange"
is
probably has never
so unreasonable that
my
think of it."" Climacus' response to this shall see, the
it
objective.
The
at the interlocutor
by noting
his rational capacities
idea that the interlocutor
is
is
by of-
fended by the requirement that he "lock everything out of his consciousness" shows that the respondent has presuppositions to which he
attached, despite his presumption "to think about... [his] conscious-
is
ness without presuppositions."^^ Despite this jab, Climacus wants to say to the interlocutor: "It
of
my
is
exactly as you say; you can't
make any
sense
idea."
The reason for this is simple: If the god is truly absolutely different from human beings, then this is not something human beings will be able to figure out for themselves. The god must teach it to them. "If it [the understanding] is going to come to know this, it must come to
know
from the
this
god."^*^
Climacus goes on, however, to
state a
come to know this, it cannot understand come to know this." So the understanding cannot this and consequently cannot come to know the god as absolutely different by itself nor with stronger thesis. "If
the god's help.
At
it
does
this point,
Climacus
says,
"we seem
to stand at a
paradox. '"^^
What to gain
is
this
If
the problem
is
simply that there
is
believe,
one human
from the
desire, but
fact that there
is
no paradox. The paradox arises, a sense in which human beings
can come to know the god by revelation. As Climacus puts purpose of God's self-revelation
understand
him."'*'
The problem
So
lies in
turns out to be I
it
is
is
one who
it,
the
to allow the. learner "to completely
known at all. known in this way
not that the god cannot be
the fact that the god in a sense
believe that Climacus
"know"
no way
any understanding of the god, then there would seem to be
frustration of I
paradox?
is
who
is
cannot be known.
in this
second assertion using the word
in a special, philosophical sense.
To
say that the god could be
Thou^t, Passim, and Paradox
known
to say that
is
75
/
he could be assimilated into our previous stock
show that the knowledge we humans claim to know.
of beliefs and convictions; that one could
of
him could be derived from other
In
things
claiming that the god cannot be known, even after he has revealed himself, Climacus
is
claiming that the god's self-revelation
not some-
is
Not only could the god on their
thing that can be appropriated and then dispensed with.
human
beings not have discovered the true nature of
own; even
after the
something that
and
beliefs.
is
god has revealed himself, what
revealed
is
is
discontinuous with our existing stock of knowledge
The god cannot be mastered and domesticated and
his self-
revelation remains our only channel to apprehend him. In short, the
knowledge which the god makes possible bumps up against what earlier
termed the imperialistic character of reason. Insofar
consists of mastery, the
This, however,
is
god
who
is
knowledge
as
absolutely different cannot be
known.
compatible with saying that in an ordinary, unphi-
losophical sense of the
word "know," when the god reveals himself
absolutely different, the learner, at least satisfied,
I
can come to know the god
when
as
certain conditions are
as absolutely different.
What is the nature of this absolute difference between the god and human beings? Here much nonsense has been written on the assumption that Climacus has in mind a metaphysical difference. Thus, many have assumed that the problem is that God is supposed to be infinite, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, and so on, and that these are qualities that are so different
from their
human
analogs that
human
beings cannot
understand them. However, Climacus says very clearly that he has
nothing in
like this in
human
different
mind
from a
owes to the god
human
The
absolute difference does not if
the god
being, this can not have
(for to that
to himself.... What then It is
at all.
finitude per se, but in sin: "But
is
its
is
lie
to be absolutely
basis in
what man
extent they are akin) but in what he owes
the difference? Indeed, what else but
sin therefore that lies at the basis of the
know God on our own, and at the basis we come to know God through God's
human
sin.'"*^
inability to
of the paradox that even self-revelation,
"know" God. Climacus obviously thinks
we
still
when
do not
that sin has rather profound
epistemological implications, or, to take account of the hypothetical
form of
his work,
implication.
It
is
he thinks that the B hypothesis requires such an sin that distinguishes the
B
hypothesis from the
76
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Socratic view of things, even the Socrates to
know
himself. In beginning his
who
recognizes his inability
"poem" Climacus distinguished
hypothesis from the Socratic view by supposing that untruth.
come
Now,
some meanderings,
after
same point
to the
again.
becomes
it
humans
clear that
"we have
'"^^
Socrates discovered "otherness" and "difference" of a
made him "almost bewildered about
discovery
Socrates lacked "the consciousness of
sin,
The
sort.
himself." Nevertheless,
which he could no more
teach to any other person than any other person could teach
This
him.""*"^
why
is
his
are in
it
to
the paradox with which Socrates collides turns out
known or understood."^^ Chapter the closest analogs within the field of human reason to of sin, namely the failure of human beings to gain any
to be merely "intimated" but not really
3 has explored
the realization
knowledge of the god and the resultant bewilderment of our
own
nature
is
divine."^^
is
encounter with what
relatively different
be that what
alistic
reason
is
is
is
is
When
an en-
genuinely different and other occurs, the result
given a hard knock. is
Our
other
is
revelation, says Climacus.
It
we
"presupposition" that
are
put into question. This hard
knock which imparts the consciousness of cannot be the
sin
must be imparted by
result of Socratic reflection,
from the point of view of the B hypothesis.
Thus chapter least
and other.
encountered cannot be mastered or tamed. Imperi-
capable of assimilating what
at least
This encounter with
"other," turns out to be, however, only an
the different, with what
will
paradox
confronted, not knowing whether we are monsters
more curious than Typhon or something
counter with what
as the
3
is
an extended "repetition" of chapters
1
and
2.
At
begins where those chapters begin, with the Socratic view of
it
the Truth, and ends where they end, with a sketch of a dramatically different alternative, the
an understanding of
ignorance it
hypothesis. Chapter 3 attempts to describe
reason as not only unable to attain the Truth, but unable to
human attain
B
lacks
is
one
its
inability to attain the truth. Socratic
the closest approximation to this latter understanding, but thing: the consciousness of sin.
The
interlocutor
is
quite
right to exclaim that he cannot understand the story of the god that is
spun out by the B hypothesis. The content of the hypothesis
the god
is
which he
what is
is
absolutely different from
unable to understand.
him and
thus
it
is is
that
that
Thou^t,
now
Climacus
77
/
begins to refer to the content of the hypothesis
regularly as "the paradox."
a term
It is
postpone a thorough treatment of
would be helpful
and Paradox
Passion,
he uses
learner,
in several ways.
We
will
until later, but a brief introduction
The term
at this point.
between the god and the
it
and
used both for the relation
is
becoming
for the god's action in
a
human
being to be our teacher. In both of these contexts, the paradox
is
said to
have a "double aspect."
the
B
When the term
hypothesis, at the end of chapter 3,
it
is
is first
the relationship which
seems to be the primary focus of concern. The paradox to the
god
is
god
is
is
is
that a relation
make any
established by an encounter that seems to
relation impossible, or, to put
of the god
used to describe
it
knowledge
in epistemological terms,
made possible by the discovery that no knowledge of the The natural question at this point is whether any sense
possible.
can be made of such a paradox.
It is
to this very issue that
Climacus
turns.
REASON'S AMBIVALENT RESPONSE TO THE PARADOX The
question Climacus poses
"conceivable.'"^^
thought?")
(Literally,
One might
is
whether a "paradox such
"does such a paradox allow
cannot understand. However,
as
if
response
on the
It is
is
is
is
be
obvious,
one that reason
he anticipates our quick response,
Climacus warns us not to be in a hurry, since but correctness."
itself to
think that the answer to this question
since Climacus has already told us that this paradox
as this"
"it
is
not speed that wins
true that there are weighty reasons for a negative
part of reason:
The understanding certainly cannot think it, cannot hit upon it on its own, and when it is proclaimed, the understanding cannot understand
it
and merely detects that
the understanding has
It is
much
it
will likely
to object
be
its
downfall. Insofar,
to,..."*^
evident from this that reason has plenty of grounds for hostility
to the
B
hypothesis, yet
it is
just as
evident that this inability of reason
to "understand" the paradox does not settle the question of it
is
possible to "think" or "conceive" the paradox.
whether
78
On
PASSIONATE REASON
/
CUmacus
the other side of the coin,
that "yet, in
tells us
paradoxical passion the understanding does indeed will
which
fall,"
is
what the paradox
mutual understanding," which
we have
of passion. "'^'^ Here
which
is
is,
own down-
its
and thus "the two have a
wills also,
however, "present only in the
returned to the
its
initial
moment
theme of the chapter,
reason's paradoxical passion to discover
own
its
downfall, a
passion that inspires Socrates' quest for self-knowledge, but which the Socratic paradox does not adequately
B hypothesis. At quest,
we saw
imperialistic reason as
limit, a limit to
which
points of chapter 3
it
engaged in a quest for
feels a natural
we have
ambivalence.
discovered
discover that which
Now
is
that might
make
lision" of Socrates
hypothesis;
fails;
reason cannot on
it
a
something in the nature of reason
different,
harmonious relationship
possible.
with the paradox of self-knowledge
The
lacks the consciousness of sin.
namely that reason
which
is
itself
is
When
reason
is
"col-
made
is
However, by looking
it
at the
gained which
is
cannot on
is
its
own produce
gripped by this "passion" then a happy
between reason and the paradox
collides with the
The
not the B
capable of desiring a collision with
absolutely different, though
such a collision.
is
true collision
Socratic analog, an insight into reason's character
relation
its
a possible meeting ground
is
possible by the god's self-revelatory action.
that
own
a further point of the chapter emerges. Understanding this
between reason and the
valuable,
its
of the main
genuinely other or absolutely different.
quest of reason helps us to see that there
itself
One
that the quest of reason to
is
discover that which thought cannot think
own
according to the
satisfy, at least
the beginning of the chapter, in looking at the Socratic
is
possible.
paradox of the B hypothesis, which
When
reason
not merely
is
we saw in looking evidence. The negative
"intimated" but actual, the two ambivalent responses at the Socratic collision are still very
reaction of reason to the paradox
understand, but that
Climacus
tries
is
is
much
in
easy to anticipate and easy to
merely one of the two
possibilities.
to explain the ambivalence of reason toward the
paradox by using what he admits erotic love.
is
The happy
is
an imperfect "metaphor," namely
possible relationship
between reason and
faith
explicated in an extended proportional analogy, in which reason
said to be related to faith as self-love basis of love, but at
its
is
is
to love. "Self-love lies at the
highest point wills precisely
its
own
destruction.
Thou^t,
This
is
what love wants
The thought which
agreement
in
of passion, and this passion
Ues behind this
79
/
two powers are
too, so these
moment
with each other in the
and Paradox
Passion,
precisely
is
think, that there
is
often a tension between self-love and genuine love, but the tension
is
love."^^
not a necessary one. basis of the love
their
own
is
a person falls in love, the initial ground or
people
self-love;
happiness.
in love, self-love
When
is
I
is,
in love because they are seeking
fall
The paradox
is
that
when
they genuinely do
transcended, dethroned, as
it
were.
fall
The person
gains happiness in sacrificing happiness for the sake of the loved one.
Thus,
when genuine
love
is
present, love
Climacus thinks that there relation
between the understanding and
understanding
dethroned;
is
it
the understanding will have in the grip of self-love
that there at the
may
a sense in
is
and
itself desires;
be rational, at
is
3 but soon to be termed "faith."
and
its
to emphasize that
I
it
is
is
is
a kind of
fulfills self-love.
unnamed
shall say a great deal
relation to the understanding.
when
it
under certain conditions, those
least
Here
in chapter
more about it
is
enough
present, reason evidently can conceive
the paradox in some sense, even while it
that degree
that the recognition of the limits
conditions being the presence of a certain passion,
this passion
"To
which the dethroning of the understanding
clear implication of this itself
limits.
"shrink from love."^^ Yet Climacus suggests
fulfillment of the understanding, just as love
of reason can
its
to object to," just as a selfish person
same time what the understanding
The
In faith the imperialistic
faith.
must recognize
much
self-love are united.
a significant analogy here to the
is
it
continues to
fail
to understand
in another. Climacus' analogy also implies that the alternative to
this passion that
makes
on with each other
is
it
possible for reason
and the paradox to get
not a neutral, dispassionate stance, but a rival
passion, a passion analogous to that of the "selfish lover
from love." This faith
rival passion
Climacus
and offense seem possible
grounded in
its
will
for reason;
who
shrinks
soon term "offense." Both
both are in some sense
very character. Each in a sense can only properly be
understood in contrast with
its rival.
It is
proper then, that Climacus
devotes an appendix to chapter 3 to exploring this negative, hostile passion before looking in detail at faith. in the next chapter.
We
shall look at this analysis
CHAPTER THE ECHO OF OFFENSE
Climacus adds an appendix to chapter 3 that discusses in some
detail
the nature of reason's passionate rejection of the paradox, a passion he
now is
terms offense.
be very
will
obvious that
It is
common.
It is
not a universal response.
been so taken with
who
this
thinks that this response
Some
Kierkegaard ian commentators have
concept that they have assumed that every^one
truly understands the
even an aspect of
CUmacus
important to recognize, however, that offense
paradox
will be offended, so that offense
faith, or at least that
it is
is
something that the person
of faith must have passed through and surmounted. However, at the
end of the appendix
to chapter 3
including TertuUian and
Climacus describes
Hamann, who
group of people,
a
describe the paradox in the
language used by offense, but are not themselves "the offended ones but the very ones
who
held firmly to the paradox."'
this that offense
and
faith are mutually exclusive responses,
follows that
Though
if
faith
and
is
not universal,
it
common
was certainly
Climacus' day and remains so in our own. There
is
much
sometimes "postmodernity" has brought about. believe that traditional Christian faith has
was already
for
in Climacus' day,
used varied somewhat.
The appendix
implicit response to this kind of thing. still
thought-experiment,
or.
people seem to
become more
difficult or
an educated, thoughtful person today. Similar
common
that Christianity,
Many
in
talk today
about "secularization," and the decline of faith which "modernity"
even impossible
it
a possibility, offense will not be universal.
is
offense
evident from
It is
talk
though the particular words
to chapter 3
is,
Climacus takes
I
it
believe,
an
for granted
presented hypothetically in the guise of his
now
briefly
summarized
as the paradox, will
be
The Echo of Offense regarded as absurd by many, perhaps most, people.
appendix
that
is
this
fact
is
but rather a confirmation of for those
who
not its
itself a
are familiar with the
found in Kierkegaard's
literature,
The
thrust of the
reason to doubt Christianity,
Recognizing this
truth.
81
/
contempt
may be
difficult
for apologetics often
but a careful reading makes the point
emphatically clear, while at the same time explaining
why Climacus
rejects traditional attempts to argue for the truth of Christian faith.
The answer to those who believe that modern forms of thought have made it particularly difficult to believe in Christianity is that there is nothing particularly "modem" about the difficulty. Climacus thinks that
has always been true that "the understanding cannot get
it
the paradox into
its
head,,"^
and notes that the paradox
fully
the understanding to regard this fact as a problem, though
it
expects
is
hardly
a problem from the point of view of the paradox. Actually, to be more precise, the negative response of reason to the
been present;
to say that
paradox has not "always"
not only to forget the option of faith but
is
to forget the historical character of the paradox. Since offense
response to the paradox, is
a historical
it
follows that offense, like the paradox
phenomenon.
It
has not always existed, but has
is
a
itself,
come
The difficulty of believing the paradox much less the twentieth centur>', but is inherent in the paradox itself. As soon as we have the paradox we have offense, and as long as we have the paradox, offense into existence with the paradox.^
has nothing to do with the nineteenth century,
remains possible.
The whole
of the appendix
presented as a kind of dialogue
is
between reason and the paradox, each personified It is,
for literary purposes.
however, a peculiar kind of dialogue, in which the claims of one
partner, the understanding, are asserted by the paradox to be echoes
of
what the paradox has already
possible
is
said.
The
"acoustic illusion" this makes
understanding in reality originate with the paradox. is
merely a source of echoes, but
originator of
This
come from the The understanding
simply that the outbursts that appear to
its
"I said
it
somehow
assertions, a claim that the it
first"
argument
swiftly degenerates, as
phal has said, into a name-calling contest."*
what one would regard
takes itself to be the
paradox indignantly denies.
Hence
as intellectual discourse
Merold West-
the dialogue
on the highest
is
not
plane.
82
A
PASSIONATE REASON
/
certain mutual disrespect marks the encounter, and understanding
the nastiness
is
crucial to understanding the point of the appendix.
to say that Climacus clearly seems to side with the paradox
It is fair
and describes the
in the mud-slinging contest
At
view.
from
its
point of
times this strains the reader's ability to hold on to the literary
perspective that Climacus
no concern
here, with
is
simply engaging in a thought-experiment
for truth.
We
there are ample reasons in chapters
Climacus
battle
detached
as
is
as
have already seen, however, that
and 2
1
for questioning
whether
he claims, particularly with respect to the
"proofs" Climacus offers for the correctness of his hypothesis at the
conclusions of those chapters.
The appendix
has the same flavor, and
indeed Climacus speaks of the offended consciousness as "an indirect the correctness of the paradox."^
test of
The
reader can continue to
play along with Climacus' game, and indeed
is
do
invited to
so by
occasional reminders of the hypothetical character of the enterprise,
but
increasingly hard not to feel as
it is
Already in chapter point, since
1
we saw
if
one
is
being ironically teased.
a problem with Climacus' literary stand-
he seems to understand things which he should not be
able to understand unless he
is
himself one of the god's disciples. In
the appendix the irony once more seems a bit translucent, transparent. faith
is
One
of the claims Climacus will
if
not
offense
and
that they are the only possible responses to the paradox.
and indifference
trality
make about
are either impossible or illusory. Since
Neu-
Climacus
does not appear to be offended, there are good reasons once more for seeing
him
as a
person of
our
leg, a serious
in a
new
we have
light,
faith,
whose
literary
joke that helps us see
or perhaps reminds us of
a strong tendency to forget. In
and controversial claims about offense
form
is
a
way of
pulling
some things about Christianity some things about Christianity
what follows, will
several provocative
emerge, claims clearly made
from the perspective of the paradox.
THE PASSIVE CHARACTER OF OFFENSE The
general
theme of the appendix seems
understood as is
suffering.
a painful condition,
to be that offense
must be
Climacus does not mean primarily that offense
though that
is
certainly part of
it,
but that
it
is
The Echo of Offense
an
The term
essentially passive condition.
Hong
the
{lidelse),
translated as "suffering" in
common Danish noun
for
but an adjective formed from the verb at
lide
translation^ {lidende)
painful suffering
83
/
not the
is
That
(to let or allow) that emphasizes passivity.
is,
offense
is
something
that the understanding suffers or undergoes as a result of the activity
of the paradox.
The
sense in which offense
clear that
is
passive
is
not easy to determine.
is
Climacus does not mean that offense
simply happens to the understanding, and over which
he
for
says that offense
offended consciousness
has no control,
The
not completely inactive, and in fact the
between various cases of offense allows
differences in degree of activity
him
it
"always an action, not an event.
is is
It
something that
is
can be made between active and passive
to claim that a distinction
forms of offense, while keeping in mind that
all
forms are essentially
passive. I
think the basic sense of passivity in mind here can best be grasped
by looking
name-calling contest. Reason begins the contest by
at the
calling the paradox the absurd.
The paradox
these words were taken right out of
what a
it
has heard.
blockhead and
a
Of
dunce
it
The encounter
response of reason
is
is
it is
is
paradox, but a response that
clear that reason
of
itself as
So reason
just as
active. Its
is
itself
is
active, but
is
not only a response to the
its
activity
learned from the paradox but
is
now
originator.
Climacus
suggests.
is
one that reason
The understanding
itself is
wishes to think
the discoverer of the paradox's absurdity, the objective
tribunal that has tried the paradox
and
is
initiated by the paradox. TTie initial
This claim of the passivity of reason likely to deny,
is
a problem.^
the paradox that sets the terms
unoriginal and lacks spontaneity. Offense
its
is
an imitation of the paradox, something revealed
to reason in the encounter.
turned against
merely echoing
is
the absurd, but reason
is
for thinking this
In this exchange of epithets
responds by insisting that
mouth. Reason
course the paradox
passivity consists in the fact that
of the encounter.
its
and found
it
wanting. Alternatively,
repugnant from the point of view of the paradox, the
understanding "takes pity upon the paradox" and
"assists
explanation."^ In both cases the understanding presumes
judge of the acceptability of Christian faith.
it
to
itself to
From Climacus'
an
be a
perspective.
84 far
/
PASSIONATE REASON
from the knowledgeable judge, the understanding here plays the mimic, or perhaps a
role of a
way what
distorted
it
standing seems to deceive it
is
who
caricaturist,
itself,
merely copies in a
Even worse, the under-
learns from the paradox.
or at least to be unconscious of what
doing.
REASON COMPETENT TO EVALUATE
IS
CHRISTIAN FAITH? The
response of Climacus to the claim reason makes to be a competent
evaluator of Christianity
is
interesting but controversial. Insofar as
we
name "philosophy" to human thinking which aims at truth through rational reflection, we could describe the issue as bearing on the relation of Christianity to philosophy. The strength of his position is that it allows him to concede unchallenged the correctness of certain criticisms commonly made against Christianity, by arguing that these give the
criticisms are not really objections.
What
the critics say
is
correct, but
they are incorrect in thinking that what they say constitutes an objection to Christian faith.
The true,
logic of his position
then
human
is
essentially as follows: If Christianity
is
beings lack the Truth, and must have the Truth
brought to them by the god. However, since they lack the Truth, the
Truth when brought to them must be what challenges and breaks with their established patterns of thinking.
appears absurd
when
what one would expect
if
Christianity
Christianity appears absurd to reason is
in fact a confirmation of
There
is
Hence the
fact that Christianity
evaluated by those patterns of thought
its
true.
is is
exactly
is
Therefore, the fact that
no reason
to think
it
false;
it
truth.
a defensible point in this argument, but
that must be carefully qualified. In general,
I
think
I
it is
is
one
right that
one
think
it
of the characteristics one would expect to find in a true revelation of
the god,
have
it
if it
were the case that humans lack the Truth and need to
brought to them, would be that
it
would challenge and correct
our previous ways of thinking. Hence the fact that Christianity appears
when
and not
a
negative, though obviously this confirmation of Christianity's claims
is
unreasonable to
us, at least
first
considered,
is
a plus
The Echo of Offense not a proof.
It is
confirmation, but the weak kind of confirmation in
which one of the consequences of
shown
and hence
obviously
many
account for views that
The view,
is
has passed a test of
it
would be discon-
However, there are
sorts.
other things besides the truth of Christianity that could
many
appearing unreasonable, and there are
its
may seem
ableness.
it
other rival
equally unreasonable.
chief difficulty with Climacus' argument, from that
been
Christianity's being true has
to hold. If things were otherwise, Christianity
firmed,
85
/
my
point of
collapses together too quickly different kinds of unreason-
There
unreasonable to
are indeed
human
some ways
in
which Christianity
will
appear
beings that are a consequence of our sinfulness.
For example, in both Sickness Unto Death and Training
in Christianity,
Anti-Climacus, another Kierkegaardian pseudonym, suggests that Christianity appears unreasonable because
part of
God
for us that
we
it
postulates a kind of love
understand.'^ In effect our
own
able to us that such love
is
lack of love
a reality.
makes
With
our sinfulness, and the fact that
people
is
just
it
The
fact that Chris-
indeed a consequence of
appears unreasonable to unloving
what one would expect
the appropriate response to a critic
is
appear unreason-
it
respect to this sort of
unreasonableness Climacus' argument makes sense. tianity appears unreasonable in this case
on the
comprehend or
ourselves lack and cannot
if
Christianity
who makes
is
true. In this case
the charge of unreason-
"Of make
ableness would seem to be just the one Climacus recommends:
course
it
seems unreasonable to you and
it
should."
To
try to
Christianity acceptable to a "cultured despiser" of this sort by modifying it
would be a
betrayal.
However, there are other ways Christianity has been alleged to be unreasonable for which this sort of response does not seem quite so evidently right. Suppose, for example, that
objection that
someone puts forward an
rooted in a misunderstanding of Christianity. For
is
example, imagine that someone has gotten the idea that Christianity teaches that God,
who
is
supremely good and loving, loves some
human
beings but hates others. Surely in such a case the proper response
not to say that say that
but after
God all,
is
"It
is
exactly as you say; of course
it is
is
unreasonable to
supremely loving and yet does not love some people,
Christianity
is
would be to explain to the
unreasonable." Rather, the best response
critic that his
objection
is
faulty because
it
86
PASSIONATE REASON
/
is
rooted in a confusion or mistake of some kind. This sort of response
is
not so
much
a matter of putting reason in
The defender
of using reason. to
why
it
when
incompetent when
as
it
it
interesting case,
it
seems to me,
may
is
is
It
purposes and
would appear that
competent
one
a matter
is
it
well inquire as
suits one's
it
does not.
some principled way of deciding when reason
The most
place as
of rational scrutiny
legitimate to use reason
is
then dismiss
its
in
needed.
is
which the
claims that Christianity involves a logical contradiction and
critic
thus
is
Many commentators have in fact thought that what Climacus himself claims when he says that the as a human is a paradox.'^ In the next chapter will
repugnant to reason.
was precisely
this
god's incarnation
give a
full
a paradox,
tation
I
treatment of what Climacus means by calling the incarnation
and
will argue that this "logical contradiction" interpre-
I
mistaken. Here
is
simply want to consider the implications of
I
viewing the paradox as such a contradiction, as well as some implications of an alternative view.
Let us suppose then that Climacus, or someone the incarnation
is
saying this can be imagined. For example,
God
essentially eternal,
is
else,
claims that
a formal, logical contradiction. Various reasons for
might be maintained that
it
omnipotent, and omniscient, and
human
beings are essentially nonetemal, and finite in knowledge and power.
Hence being
to say that a
is
human
being
God
is
is
to say that this
human
both eternal and nonetemal, limited and unlimited in knowl-
The
edge and power.
one cannot
philosopher-critic then appears and objects that
rationally believe a formal, logical contradiction,
Christianity must be rejected as false.
What
and that
should the Christian
sponse be? Suppose the Christian admits that the faith
is
re-
contradictory
and therefore absurd from the viewpoint of reason, but maintains that it
tianity
is
Such
and cannot apprehend the
logically absurd
is
arise
if
one sign of
its
hard to see
literally
it
this
Two
one
is
should be believed anyway.
how an abandonment
can be confined to
truth.
one admits that Christianity
tradictory but asserts that
then
in fact
truth.
a response seems a grave mistake to me.
seem insuperable
is
human reason is The fact that Chris-
should be believed anyway, presumably because
distorted by sin
area. If
anything can be
problems that con-
logically First
of
all, it
of the principles of formal logic
both "P" and "not P" can be
true.
One consequence
of this
is
true,
that
The Echo of Offense the careful thought-experiment of Climacus
whole work
and
its
assert
on
He
logical principles.
invalidated. Climacus'
is
attempts to "invent" a
coherent alternative to the Socratic position on the Truth
logically
on the
rests
87
/
acquisition.
The invention
basically a logical exercise, resting
is
policy that where Socrates asserts 'T" then the alternative must
"not P" and thus be genuinely different.
The
logical principle of
noncontradiction, which asserts that "P" and "not P" cannot both be true, underlies this policy.
The
fact that the
invented
invention
is
a bit of a ruse, since
what
is
supposedly
simply Christianity, in no way invalidates the significance
is
of logic for the enterprise, for Climacus clearly thinks that the logical relations
between Christianity and the Socratic view are such that the
two views are mutually exclusive. tradiction is
is
not valid,
no reason
if
there
is
even one exception
B
to think that the
the logical principle of noncon-
If
hypothesis
an
is
to
it,
then there
alternative to the
may be true simultaneously. In short, how Climacus can rely on logic to make his case that
Socratic view. Both
it is
see
Christianity
and idealism are mutually exclusive presents rests
on the notion
how dependent
sees clearly
the Christian alternative he
if
that logic
hard to
not valid. Climacus himself
is
his project
on
is
traditional logic
and
vigorously defends the validity of this kind of logic.
However, even more
significantly,
tradiction,
asking
me
then
it is
hard to see
to believe "P"
to believe nothing at
all.
If
I
assertion?
is
is
is
What
no man
not god.
is
man
to be god.
exactly
1
hard for
me
man
am
I
even
possible. For
is
God
is
God, and I
seem
to see
how
me
logically is
the
asked to believe? Suppose I
also believe that this
believe that
thus believe
god, and this would
It is
is
perilously close to asking
not God, then what exactly
logically contradictory because
impossible for a that
is
to say that a
believe that Jesus of Nazareth was
belief
recognized as a logical con-
is
such belief
and "not P"
equivalent to saying that he
meaning of the
how
belief in Christianity requires
if
which
belief in a logical contradiction
it
it
is
logically
to be a necessary truth
to imply that Jesus of Nazareth I
can believe
all
these things
simultaneously without confusion or self-deception. Clear-headed belief in a logical contradiction does not
The
contrary opinion that
is
seem psychologically
evidently held by
possible.
many Kierkegaardian
commentators who have interpreted the paradox
as a logical contra-
88
PASSIONATE REASON
/
diction seems to
me
on confusing the
to rest
idea of believing a logical
contradiction with the very different notion of believing something
which appears
to be logically contradictory. This
should be understood. believe that
incidentally, as
is,
some
It is
state of affairs that appears contradictory
For example, a materialist on the mind-body problem thinking physical brain thing
may appear
thought
is
I
how Climacus' notion of the paradox not uncommon or difficult for someone to
next chapter,
shall argue in the
a reality.
is
may hold
that a
a reality, even though the idea of such a
is
contradictory to a dualist committed to the idea that
an immaterial process necessarily carried on by an immaterial
substance. But of course in committing himself to the reality of such a thinking brain, the materialist
contradiction in such a state of
commits himself
affairs
is
may appear
In a similar way, though the incarnation
many
dictory to
is
is
is
committed
who
actually
to the claim that the contra-
only apparent and not genuine. "X appears to John to be P"
logically consistent
Now
logically contra-
people, for a variety of reasons, anyone
believes in the incarnation
diction
to the claim that the
only apparent and not genuine.
what
is
with "John believes that
the upshot of
X
not in fact P."
is
the claim that philosophy
all this for
The
not competent to pass on the reasonableness of Christianity? conclusion
I
wish to draw
is
that the Christian would be unwise always
to take the response to philosophical criticism
respect to certain objections,
it
mistaken.
When
it
the
is
at
should
it
if it is
first
response appropriate and I
think the answer
then the
is
part of the critic or
on the
thinking. However,
when
when
making
is
part of those
the objection false
appropriate response would be to
understanding of Christianity
whether the
critic
regard just
is
should the
something but
is
like
offended
response seems appropriate. In this case the offense,
first
from the Christian point of view, can be traced to
the critic
course
critic
when
When the critic basically has got Christianity right,
it,
"Of With
say,
true."
seems better to argue that the
second be followed? In general, this:
Climacus proposes. With
seems appropriate to
Christianity appears absurd to you; to other objections,
is
is
is
sin, either
who have shaped
is
the
on the critic's
based on misunderstanding,
claims about Christianity, then the set
him
or her straight.
present, then
really offended in
it
If
a
genuine
can become
clear
Climacus' sense. In other words,
not every philosophical attack on Christianity constitutes offense, and
The Echo of Offense
89
/
not every philosophical defense represents a devious selling out of Christianity to I
make
it
acceptable to sinful
human
beings.
believe that this qualification of Climacus' view
on the
between philosophy and Christianity makes sense of some
relation
historical
would otherwise be inexplicable, namely, that there have
facts that
been many philosophers who have defended the reasonableness of revealed Christian faith without thereby altering and distorting that faith.
On
Climacus' view,
would seem that philosophers who have
it
considered Christian faith should either be opponents or else people
who have to
by altering
tried to justify Christianity
it
to
make
it
acceptable
However, there are of course philosophers such
unbelievers.
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
who seem
to
as
have done neither of
these things.
To
claim that philosophical thought
objections to faith
what Climacus
may
some
legitimately defuse
to call into question the monolithic character of
is
"the understanding." Throughout his discussion,
calls
he personifies the understanding and therefore implies that reason speaks with a unified voice. There
such a procedure.
is,
I
would argue, much danger
tends to obscure the
It
fact, a fact
in
that Kierkegaard
himself helps us to recognize in other contexts, that there
is
no such
thing as "reason" or "the understanding." There are simply a lot of
people
who
reason,
and they do not
all
think in the same way.
Many
are offended by Christianity, but not all of them.
Why does Climacus assume that the understanding will be offended by Christianity?
The
question
is
misleading because, as
we have
already
noted, Climacus does not assume that everyone will be offended by Christianity.
Some
will believe,
question must be rephrased. a natural tension
offense I
is
is
not offended. So the
does Climacus assume that there
is
between the understanding and the paradox, so that
one might
is,
and a believer
Why
say, a natural
if
not universal reaction?
believe that he sees offense as a consequence of two things.
that Christianity, particularly the incarnation,
is
One
something that
human
reason cannot understand or comprehend. In saying that Chris-
tianity
is
essentially paradoxical,
claim that but he
is
it is
Climacus
logically contradictory
committed
is
not committed to the
and therefore contrary
to the claim that
it
is
something
to reason,
human
reason
can never master or comprehend, a claim that has been traditionally
90
PASSIONATE REASON
/
expressed by saying that the incarnation factor in explaining the natural tension is
what
tianity
have termed the imperiaUstic character of reason.
I
something reason cannot
is
whatever
is
The claim
real
must be
fully grasp,
combined with Climacus' from what
is
Strictly speaking,
that
it
it
is
set for battle.
is
against reason follows from
is
imperialistic
this
that reason will always be imperialistic?
Climacus does not assume
this,
since
we have seen
not the case for the person gripped by the passion of
assumption
is
is
and naturally
cannot master.
What he does assume is that reason is naturally who have not been transformed by faith, and this
Chris-
If
insists that
above reason when
is
thesis that reason
why should we assume
But
and reason
then the stage
fully graspable,
of Climacus that Christianity
the traditional claim that Christianity
recoils
above reason. The second
is
between reason and the paradox
simply that
understanding of sin
is
it is
making
his reason for
a consequence of sin.
traditionally that
faith.
imperialistic in people
The
Christian
consists fundamentally in
it
an attitude of prideful autonomy over against God. Climacus attitude as expressed epistemologically in the
demand
sees this
that whatever
I
accept as true be certified as correct by the standards of evidence and probability that
I
currently live by.
He
ment of
his
thought experiment
if
of course, fully justified in
is,
making the assumption that humans are
sinful
because
it
is
a require-
the hypothesis "invented"
is
to be
genuinely different from the Socratic position.
One might in
some
think that by arguing, as
I
have above, that reason may
cases legitimately give a defense of Christianity against the
charge that
it
unreasonable,
is
I
have necessarily rejected the view of
a betrayal of Christianity, a
Kierkegaard that apologetics
is
Climacus seems to share. In
fact
apologetics, but
I
still
I
do
view that
reject a blanket indictment of
think that the view
I
am
defending
is
consistent
with the central intentions of Kierkegaard and of Climacus. tinction can be issue
is
A
dis-
made between different kinds of apologetics. The central
the role played by special revelation and authority. Climacus
wants to say that Christianity can only be known to be true by revelation,
and hence philosophical attempts
essarily betray
it
to defend Christianity nec-
by making Christianity appear to
than revelation. Certainly, such as those of people
like
many attempts
rest
on reason rather
to defend religious belief,
Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel
fit
this
The Echo of Offense pattern.
However, Climacus does not seem
of a philosophical defense of Christianity
91
/
to consider the possibility
which does not attempt
to
replace revelation with reason, but argues for the reasonableness of
recognizing the limits of reason and the need for revelation.
cannot see
1
how Climacus can
rightly object to that sort of philo-
sophical defense of Christianity, because is
He
doing.
for reason
recognizes
is
it
himself arguing that there
and the revelation of the god,
own
its
limits.
seems to be what he himself
meeting place
a possible
is
where reason
in that case
Climacus would probably respond to
the kind of philosophical defense
I
this that
when
here envisage can only occur
the understanding has been transformed by faith. Perhaps this
but
it
raises
one further
difficulty for
Why
Climacus.
should
who
case that only the thinking of the "unborn" person
deserves to be termed "reason" or "the understanding?" to be the case that people with faith
obvious It is
why
reason or understanding
true that offended people
can think is
It
do
in this case
is
to
make
should not be
made
so.
Given the
and
it
is
not
also.
tried to appropriate the
find Christianity absurd, but that "reason" does so.
just that
they
Climacus thinks the
a present of the
the opponent, and insist that Christianity
so,
lacks faith
not operative in them
have often
is
be the
would appear
as well,
term "reason" or "understanding" and thus to claim, not
best thing to
it
term "reason" to
not "reasonable" and
is
variety of senses of "reason"
the variety of ways something can be said to be unreasonable,
and thus I
do not
think that Christians can afford to be so polite as to allow the offended
person to appropriate the term. Certainly, from Climacus' view,
it is
not the case that the offended person
tially objective,
is
just as
much
a passion as faith.
faith represent forms of passionate thinking,
and
the unbeliever's form of thinking deserves the honorific
however much the unbeliever would
own
point of
reasoning in an essen-
neutral manner, while the person of faith
subjective, since offense
and
is
it
is
is
biased and
Both offense unclear
title
why
of "reason,"
like to appropriate the term.
THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PARADOX TO THE OFFENDED CONSCIOUSNESS In several respects Climacus views the spat between Vv^hat he calls the
understanding and the paradox as one which
is
not between equals.
92
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Rather, the paradox occupies a superior position. This
"unhappy
his characterization of offense as
ogous to the "misunderstood understand this better,
The analogy is
was,
let us
it
that there are formulas for the
happy unions of the
Where
if
is
factors involved.
the understanding and self-love
a certain kind of self-love
then love becomes impossible. Similarly, fended, then faith
To
to self-love. This equation implies
is
be blocked
are in certain conditions.
discussed in chapter 3.
self- love"
be recalled, a proportional equation: faith
will
will
anal-
is
return to the analogy with love.
to the understanding as love
These happy unions
implicit in
is
love," a love that
if
is
present,
the understanding
is
of-
impossible and the marriage between the under-
standing and the paradox cannot be brought about. force of the analogy for the relations
between
faith
To
understand the
and reason,
it
would
be helpful to understand the romantic situation more precisely. Unfortunately,
Climacus says
little
about the kind of unhappy love he has
we must largely fend One comment he does make
in mind, so
the understanding for the paradox,
has
its
basis in
since the it is
clear
of love
is
control
is
misunderstood
power of accident from
this that
for ourselves. is
that offense, the
"is
self-love; the is
he has
analogy stretches no further
capable of nothing in
unhappy love of
only like the unhappy love which
mind
a case
here,..."'"*
I
think
where the unhappiness
due to factors internal to the lovers and over which some possible.
That
is,
he does not want to consider cases
in
which
the lovers are separated by external factors, such as social conditions
over which they have no control, but the case in which something
within the lovers
means that
make
it
impossible for
them
in the analogous case of offense,
external factors also must be ruled out. This
to
come
together. This
what might be termed
means
that a person
has never had the opportunity to hear about Christianity, or it
who
who
rejects
because social and cultural factors similarly not subject to his or her
control produce a distorted understanding of faith,
is
not offended in
Climacus' sense. Offense must be traceable to something within the offended person.
But to return to the case of romantic love, what stood self-love?"
What
What
does
it
mean
underlies Climacus' discussion
that self-love
is
this
"misunder-
for self-love to "shrink
from love?"
is
his
the basis of love, and
is
assumption on the one hand
on the other hand
that love
The Echo of Offense represents a dethroning of self-love that
ment. People
To
what they
find
submerge their
same time
at the
is
own
in love while they are seeking their
fall
are looking for, however, they
own
its fulfill-
happiness.
must be willing to
happiness and run the risk that
The who is
93
/
is
inherent in
who
linking their happiness to that of another.
person
from love" out of
unwilling to run this
risk.
He
self-love
the person
is
"shrinks
or she clings to self-love and fearfully resists caring for the
other, worried that such caring will lead to misery.
way
love in this
it
because
is
misplaced and will make
Climacus
me
asserts that this
I
form of
I
is
The
own
its
in control.
rooted in misunderstand-
ing. It fails to see that in clinging to self-love
attaining
shrink from
no longer be
will
self-love
I
commitment may be
think such a
vulnerable.
If
blocks self-love from
it
goals.
application of the analogy to the case of faith and the under-
standing
interesting
is
and sheds much
light
on the
superior position
of the paradox. Belief in the paradox represents the dethroning of the
understanding, which here must
mean something
Yet Climacus has told us in chapter 3 that "in the understanding does indeed will
have
like
"human thinking
can be carried on independently of the god's revelation."
insofar as this
its
own
its
paradoxical passion
downfall. "^^
a dethroning that represents a fulfillment.
Once more we
The paradox
is
supposed
to satisfy the deepest longings of the understanding.
The
superiority of the paradox to offense lies in the failure of offense
to grasp this. Offense clings to the security of imperialistic reason that
must retain control,
own
to find
that
just as selfish self-love clings to
happiness, blind to the need for
it
its is
own
true
seeking to
need of the
self.
commitment
the quest for
its
to the other in order
Offense misunderstands the need of reason
fulfill, just
self for happiness.
as selfish self-love
misunderstands the
The paradox understands this situation The inequality lies in the
while the offended understanding does not. fact that the
paradox understands the reaction of the understanding,
both in faith and offense, but the offended understanding misunderstands
up
its
own
relation to the paradox. Believing that
as a judge in order to
standing
fails
to see that
defend it is
Rather, the understanding of the paradox.
is
its
own
integrity, the
it
must
set itself
offended under-
not an independent, disinterested party. a passionate responder to the initiatives
94
PASSIONATE REASON
/
The significance of the echo charge made by the paradox lies here. The dependence and lack of originality of the understanding make it plain that the charges
learned from revelation.
shows that
it
hurls against the paradox are things
it
The
fact that
has misunderstood
its
it
regards these as objections
position. All the while,
implies, the understanding suffers in the
more ordinary
ness and resentment reveal an underlying sense of
its
paradox, just as the bitterness of the selfish person love lover
may reveal an underlying who is being rejected.
These claims seem noted
earlier,
What we
far
have, in
fact,
is
is
lies
in the
As
situation.
the viewpoint of the believer.
faith.
a bit thin here,
what he or she
is
rejecting.
though similar accounts are fleshed Nevertheless, what
out in other Kierkegaardian writings. irritate
like
Climacus seems to be saying
that the antireligious person in reality wants
probably sufficient to
bitter-
more often employed by people
Freud and Nietzsche against Christian
is
its
own need for the who shrinks from
sense that true happiness
made from
Climacus
the kind of depth psychology being applied
to the religious skeptic that
The psychology
sense;
from an objective view of the
they seem to be
has
it
the unbeliever.
What
then
is
said
is
the purpose
is
of saying these things?
The main one
is
I
think to underline the passional character of
reason. Climacus wants us to look through the understanding's selfportrait as a neutral, objective truth-seeker
of imperialistic reason.
Such
and see the actual character
a reason will necessarily
come
into conflict
with Christian faith. Pointing this out to someone in the grip of imperialistic reason will probably
do
little for
that person but anger
him. However, perhaps the anger will reveal to that person that he not so disinterested and objective after situation will at least alter the faith
to
all.
remove the temptation
make
it
And
for the believer to try to
acceptable to the offended person.
believer, in other words, should acquire a certain boldness
dence
is
understanding the
The
and confi-
in the face of certain objections. In fact, the believer should
regard these objections as a confirmation of the truth of her faith.
At
the conclusion of the appendix the interlocutor once more appears and accuses Climacus of plagiarism for citing without credit the words of
Hamann,
Lactantius, Shakespeare, and Luther.'^ Climacus cheerfully
acknowledges the plagiarism but claims that one can see from these
The Echo of Offense
/
95
authors that a clear understanding of the nature of offense can be found in the
nonoffended person. Offense
is
understood by faith but not vice
versa.
Analyzing the character of offense reminds the believer of the dangers of substituting reason for revelation. In Climacus' words,
it
reminds the believer of the "difference" between reason and the para-
dox/^ or the difference between a philosophical worldview and ethic that depends
on unaided human thinking, and
depends on God's revelation of himself. the reason the reminder still
is
needed
is
It
that in the happy passion of faith,
not named by Climacus, "the difference
with the understanding."
The formula
"The understanding surrendered
given:
which
Christianity,
interesting to note that
is
in fact
is
itself
on good terms
happy passion
for this
is
now
and the paradox granted
Itself."'^ It is
in this
important to see that the understanding
happy relationship. The understanding
is is
aside by revelation, but in faith learns to surrender
see a
theme emerging that
I
will
develop more
not totally passive not rudely shoved itself.
fully in
Here we can the next two
chapters. Despite the reputation of Philosophical Fragments as a
book
that presents and defends a fideism that exalts irrational faith, Climacus in his
own way
is
suggesting that a faith rooted in a revelation that
reason cannot fully understand
may indeed be
rational.
CHAPTER
7 REASON AND THE PARADOX
In chapter 4 Climacus resumes his 2
had
left off
"poem" and
takes up where chapter
by imagining the god has "made his appearance as a
teacher" by taking the concrete form of a humble
human
poor,
insignificant person.'
Climacus pauses
whether a god who devotes himself to such a
or anxieties about the daily grind of earning a living
of family
bilities
affirmatively.^ really
give a
can be thought to be
life,
The
servant form
is
The
usually translate the
Danish
with no worries
and the responsi-
human, and answers
disguise, for the
god has
task of the chapter
more concrete account of how the god can
and how the learner can become the god's
Hongs
fully
no mere
taken on the state of the learner.
worry about
briefly to
lofty task,
being, a
common,
servant, not in the literal sense, but in the sense of being a
is
to
carry out his task,
disciple, or follower, as the
Discipel.^
The formula
for
how
this
occurs has already been given at the conclusion of the appendix to
chapter
3,
and Climacus
reiterates the formula
with a slight change in
wording: "The understanding and the paradox happily encounter each
when
other in the moment,
paradox gives that
is
itself.""*
the alternative to offense
receives the
name
"faith,"
not matter much. Faith for
the understanding steps aside and the
This encounter occurs
is
is
that "happy passion"
present, a passion that finally here
though Climacus
now
when
tells us
that the
name does
explicitly identified as "the condition"
understanding the truth, the condition that Climacus has, in order
to distinguish his hypothesis from the Socratic position,
assumed that
human beings lack and must receive from the god. To unpack this formula we must now tackle head-on an was raised and skirted
issue that
in the discussion of offense in the last chapter,
Reason and
namely the nature of the paradox and exactly does it
mean
mean
it
to say that the
the
These questions are
97
/
What What does
relation to reason.
its
paradox
is
a paradox?
to say that in faith the understanding
"yield itself?"
Paradox
must "step aside" or
crucial ones, not only for understand-
ing the perspective of Johannes Climacus in Philosophical Fragments,
but for Kierkegaard's whole authorship. For Kierkegaard grated (or praised) as an opponent of reason, a fideist irrationalism,
on the strength of Climacus' remarks
course argue that the
pseudonym
is
often deni-
who
here.
gloried in
We
could of
protects Kierkegaard from any such
charge, since one cannot simply assume that Kierkegaard and Climacus
think alike here. Such an argument would have merit; at the very least the critic must produce some reason to think that Climacus does represent Kierkegaard to to do, however,
is
make such
to see
criticism stick.
What
I
should like
whether the charge of irrationalism can
justly
be directed to Climacus himself. Without assuming anything about the relationship of Climacus to Kierkegaard,
1
hope thereby to show that
this central section of Kierkegaard's literature
a glorification of irrationalism.
what might be termed a
It is
justly
be read as
Climacus presents us with
true that
critique of reason,
cannot
one that
is
in the spirit of
the critiques offered by Nietzsche and Marx, but that critique that
is
ultimately in the service of reason.
It is
is
one
not an attempt at reason's
destruction.
IS THE PARADOX A FORMAL CONTRADICTION?
Why
is it
that faith in the paradox requires reason to "set itself aside?"
Climacus says that the
difficulty for reason lies in the fact that the
paradox involves a "contradiction," the contradiction that the same individual
is
both the god and a
human
to be able to give the condition,
put the learner in possession of is
in turn the object of faith
exactly does Climacus
it,
and
being: "In order for the teacher
he must be the god, and
in order to
he must be man. This contradiction is
the paradox, the moment."^
mean when he
calls
What
the incarnation of the god
a contradiction? Does Climacus think that the believer in the paradox
'
98
is
PASSIONATE REASON
/
someone who abandons the
by embracing a
Two
logical
universal vahdity of logical principles
contradiction?
contrasting traditions of interpretation have emerged over the
Many
years as responses to these questions.
beginning with
writers,
David Swenson and continuing with such commentators
MacKinnon, Comelio Fabro, and N. H. macus^ is
is
not really an
irrationalist,
because the paradox he discusses
not a formal, logical contradiction. For them Climacus
that Christianity
is
critics
such as Brand Blanshard,'^ have interpreted
asks for faith in the paradox,
he
is
impossible. Herbert Garelick
typical of
is
ultimate challenge to the intellect, for
diction,
to the laws of
known
is
many: "This Paradox
all
this reading, faith
is
is
the
is
attempts to understand
and excluded middle. Yet the Paradox
on
even
to be false,
judgment and discourse:
Rationally, the statement 'God-man' Clearly,
when Climacus
asking one to abandon the laws of
and to embrace something which
must conform
asserting
friends of Kierkegaard such as Alastair
the paradox as a logical contradiction. For these writers,
logic
is
above reason, not against reason.
Other writers, both purported
Hannay^ and rabid
as Alastair
S0e,^ have claimed that Cli-
it
identity, contra-
violates these laws....
a nonsensical statement.
more properly described
as
being against
reason than above reason. I
shall try to give a
others
who
convincing demonstration that Garelick and
share his reading of Climacus are wrong.
Climacus does not mean a formal,
of the paradox of the incarnation. However, that task.
a
I
is
must then explain what Climacus does mean
manner which does
shall
I
logical contradiction
I
must account
that
speaks
only half of
my
by "paradox" in
justice to his claims that there
between reason and the paradox.
show
when he
is
a tension
for the tension
between
reason and the paradox while at the same time showing that this tension
is
not a necessary opposition. In carrying out
keep chapter 4 of Fragments to look at other parts of the Unscientific Postscript,
Occasionally
1
as
my main
book and
focus, but
this task,
it
will
I
shall
be helpful
to look several times at Concluding
also by Climacus,
to clarify his
terminology.
shall take note of other works of Kierkegaard that critics
have perceived
as relevant to the issues.
A case that Climacus does mean a formal,
logical contradiction
of course be made. Sometimes the case hinges
can
on the commentator's
Reason and
own who
belief that the incarnation
the
Paradox
/
a logical contradiction.
is
99
Someone
believes this might naturally assume that Kierkegaard must
have
discerned this as well. Louis Pojman, for example, says that the paradox is
"the uniquely absurd proposition that has the most objective evidence
against it
it."^'
The
objective evidence against the paradox
is
simply that
The argument that this is so God and human persons, however.
or entails a logical contradiction.
is
relies
on Pojman's own view of
Pojman, not Kierkegaard, says that since
human
unchanging, and
"God and man
infinite, eternal,
is
are mutually exclusive genuses."'^
Climacus does describe
God
as
is
provided by the fact that
unchanging and
One may
beings as finite and temporal.
eternal,
and human
well conclude from this that
appear to be mutually exclusive genuses. However, what
appears to be the case
not always the case, and there are reasons to
is
be cautious about drawing the conclusion Pojman draws here. that
two of the
qualities
Pojman
alludes to here, etemality
porality, in the Postscript are described
of
human
life
and
beings are finite, nonetemal, and changing,
Support for Pojman's argument here
God and man
God
One
is
and tem-
by Climacus as the constituents
generally, not just the incarnation.^^ So,
Climacus does
not necessarily equate temporality with being nonetemal, as Pojman illicitly
The
assumes.
a paradoxicalness it is
paradoxicalness of the incarnation thus mirrors
which
is
generically present in
human existence, and human existence
implausible to claim that Climacus understands
itself as
a logical contradiction,
even though he does describe existence
as a "contradiction."'"^
Certainly, Climacus claims in
contradiction; the incarnation
The
is
many
passages that the paradox
even described
is
logical or formalist reading of "contradiction"
is
supported by the
frequent claims that the contradiction consists in the fact that what eternal has
become
historical.
where Climacus
in the Postscript,
in the fact that the eternal its
own
nature."'^
where Climacus dition is,
is
The
a
as a self-contradiction.'^
strongest statement to this effect
is is
says that the contradiction consists
can only become historical by "going against
A statement almost this strong
asserts that the contradiction
regarded as something that
is
is
is
found in Fragments,
that an eternal con-
acquired in time.'^
moreover, often designated in the Postscript
not, interestingly enough, in Fragments .^^
The paradox
as the "absurd,"
though /
100
PASSIONATE REASON
/
WHY THE PARADOX
IS NOT A FORMAL CONTRADICTION
Despite this support for the "against reason" view,
whelmingly strong case can be made not is
mean
"logical contradiction"
The evidence
a paradox.
for the
when he
for this
think an over-
I
claim that Climacus does
claims that the incarnation
of two kinds: textual evidence
is
and more general arguments derived from an overall understanding of the project of Climacus.
Textual Evidence
The
point which must be taken into account
first
is
that the terms
"contradiction" and "self-contradiction" {Modsigelse and Selvmodsigelse) are not generally used by
Climacus to
term a logical contradiction. sense,
He
and when he does, he appears
to hold firmly to the principle
that a contradiction cannot be affirmed. later.)
what we would today
refer to
does sometimes use the terms in this
(I
more about
will say
this
Frequently, however, he uses the term contradiction to refer to
something that
is
evidently not a logical contradiction. For example,
in the "Interlude"
Climacus says that "coming into existence"
"contradiction."''^ Thus, the
mere
fact that
the paradox as a contradiction does very the paradox
is
Climacus often
little
the Hegelians,
who
he
is
a
to support the idea that
a logical contradiction. Climacus' usage
to a contemporary reader, but
is
refers to
here, as at so
many
may seem
sloppy
points, following
notoriously used the term "contradiction" in a very
broad manner.^° Climacus (and other Kierkegaardian pseudonyms) regularly uses the
term "contradiction" to
refer to
what might today be
designated as an "incongruity," with formal, logical contradictions seen as a species of the incongruous.
This can be clearly seen in the discussion of humor and the comical in
Climacus'
diction,"^
•
Postscript.
and
in a
The comical
is
defined as a "painless contra-
lengthy footnote which
follows,
Climacus gives
numerous examples of contradictions, none of which logical contradictions.
a caricature,
which
is
We
already noted in chapter
1
are formal or
the example of
said to be comical because of the "contradiction
Reason and
between likeness and unlikeness"
man who
falls
is
between
up
at a
it
is
not him.
quarter yards
tall
is
A
is
window. Here the
whom
you are conversing
man and
fairy-tale character described as
said to be
is
yet are aware
seven and one
said to be comical because the exactness implied
by the use of the fraction
which
101
/
upward gaze and downward ascent. See-
his
shadow of a man with
comical because in the shadow you both see the that
Paradox
contains, as well as the case of the
into a cellar while looking
"contradiction" ing the
it
the
contradictory to the distance from reality
is
associated with the fairy tale. All of these contradictions are
not fonnal, logical contradictions.
clearly cases of incongruity,
Furthermore, on some of the occasions of formal, logical contradictions,
it
is
when Climacus
does speak
in the context of a defense of
the Aristotelian position that the law of noncontradiction must be upheld. In the Postscript Climacus' polemic against Hegel are genuine either-or's; not every opposition
can be
is
that there
intellectually medi-
ated so that one can reach the position of both-and. This polemic
depends on a resolute defense of the principle of noncontradiction and the consequent existence of "absolute distinctions." In Philosophical
Fragments Climacus says that absolute and lectician,"^-
on
it
is
"an unshakable insistence on the
absolute distinctions that makes a person a good dia-
though
this has
been forgotten in our age because of our
failure to take the principle of
noncontradiction seriously. Aristotle's
argument that one must assume the principle of noncontradiction even to
deny
it is
put forward.^- In a blast at the theology of his day, which
by denying the principle was able to have
many
its
cake and eat
it
too
on
crucial issues, Climacus, in alluding to King Lear, crisply affirms
that saying yes and
no
at the
same time
Not only does Climacus defend explicitly distinguishes
is
not good
theology.^"^
the law of noncontradiction.
between a formal,
logical self-contradiction
He and
the kind of contradiction which constitutes the paradox. In the course
how people The contemporary generation of believers
of his discussion of the incarnation, Climacus analyzes
become
believers or disciples.
will obviously receive the
condition of faith directly from the God.
But what about subsequent generations?
Is it
possible that they receive
the condition of faith from their immediate historical predecessors,
have passed on to them the possible,
and the ground of
historical report? his denial
is
Climacus denies
that this proposal
who
this is
is
self-
102
PASSIONATE REASON
/
contradictory and "meaningless," in a different sense than the paradox itself is said to
he contradictory}^ If the later disciple receives the condition
of faith from the earlier generation, this would in effect
make the
earlier
generation the god, which contradicts the supposition that the earlier generation had received the condition from the god, and was therefore not itself god.
That meaninglessness
[that the later generation receives the con-
dition of faith from the earlier generation!, however, in a different sense
than when we
is
unthinkable
state that that fact [the incar-
nationl and the single individual's relation to the god are unthinkable.
Our hypothetical assumption
individual's relation to the
become preoccupied with
thus thought can
self-contradiction;
which
reasonableness
god
for the
it
with the strangest
as
That meaningless consequence, however, contains
possible thing.
sonable,
of that fact and the single
god contains no self-contradiction, and
it is
not
satisfied
a
with positing something unrea-
our hypothetical assumption, but within this un-
is
produces a self-contradiction: that the god
it
contemporary, but the contemporary in turn
is
is
the
the god
for a third.
I
believe that the
same distinction between
the kind of contradiction which
is
a formal contradiction
found in the paradox
an often-quoted but somewhat obscure passage
is
and
implicit in
in Postscript,^''
where
Climacus attempts to distinguish between nonsense and the incomprehensible.
One can
believe the incomprehensible but reason protects
one against believing nonsense, between the incarnation can be found in
at
says Climacus.
as a "contradiction"
least
and
A
similar distinction
a formal contradiction
one Kierkegaard ian passage from Anti-
Climacus.^^
Arguments from Climacus' General Strategy Seeing that the paradox is
spective shows
how
not for Climacus a formal contradiction
inappropriate
such a contradiction. the incarnation it
is
not merely a matter of proof-texting. Reflection on his overall per-
is
is its
One
it
is
to think of the incarnation as
of the key points in Climacus' treatment of
uniqueness.
The
the absolute paradox and as such
incarnation is
is
not
just a
paradox;
absolutely unique. Explaining
Reason and
what Climacus means by
this
the
Paradox
no easy matter, and he
is
gives
the way of argument for this uniqueness. Nevertheless, that such uniqueness
103
/
it
little
in
obvious
is
not served by treating the paradoxicalness of
is
the incarnation as a formal contradiction. Such contradictions are not
only not unique; they can be generated at
and
sees this
raises
it
will.
Even Louis Pojman
as a criticism of Kierkegaard,^'^
with Climacus by Pojman, but
serves rather to
it
assumption that Kierkegaard must
mean by
who
is
identified
undermine Pojman's
contradiction what Pojman
thinks he means.
Even more fundamentally,
if
the paradox
is
a formal contradiction
and can be known to be such, the assumption that undergirds the B is that human beings lack who assume that the incar-
hypothesis of Philosophical Fragments, which the Truth, would be undermined. Those
nation
is
a logical contradiction believe that
standing of what
God
being.
it
means
to be
infinite, eternal,
is
"God" and "human being"
assumes that we have a
human
a clear under-
Thus we can know
temporal, limited in their knowledge. predicates
we have
God and what it means to be a human all-knowing; human beings are finite, that the
are logically exclusive. All this
reliable, natural
knowledge of both
God and
beings.
However,
as
we have
B hypothesis constitutes a The whole of Philosophical Fragthought-experiment on the following lines.
seen, Climacus'
radical challenge to this assumption.
ments
is
a
development of a
Socrates had proposed that the Truth, the eternal truth, which for
Kierkegaard means the knowledge of God, was present within beings already. Climacus
tries to
of denying this Socratic assumption.
assumption that
human
human
think through the logical implications
He wants
to explore the contrary
beings lack the truth about
God and
therefore
must receive that truth from a revelation which comes directly from
God. Thus chapter
3,
which develops the notion of the incarnation
a paradox, consistently looks at
autonomous, unaided
The
irony here
is
human
God
as the
unknown,
that
as
which
reason cannot know.
know that the incarnation is a we would have to have the kind of knowlpoint of the incarnation to deny we possess.
clear. In order to
formal, logical contradiction
edge of God which
One cannot know
it is
the
that a round square
is
a contradictory
concept with-
out a clear concept of roundness and squareness. Similarly, one cannot
104
know
PASSIONATE REASON
/
that the concept of the
God-man
is
contradictory without a clear
concept of both the divine and the human.
WHAT We
IS
THE PARADOX?
can now understand what Climacus does mean by calling the
incarnation a paradox and also lay a basis for seeing that there
dox is
a tension
is
something that we cannot understand or comprehend.
is
A paradox
the result of an encounter with a reality which
is
our concepts are inadequate to deal with, a reality that ceptual knot.
When we try to understand
it
we may find
ity
we have encountered
is
itself self-contradictory. It
ourselves saying that the real-
means that there
a problem with our conceptual equipment. If
one
is
convinced that our conceptual equipment
is
exactly this reason, those
adequate will naturally
stand
God
who resist
then
in order,
the natural response to a paradoxical reality will be to dismiss
is
con-
ties us in a
mean
self-contradictory things, but of course this does not
is
thinks
A para-
something that may appear to us to be a contradiction. In general the
discovery of a paradox
is
why he
between the paradox and human reason.
it.
think our natural understanding of the suggestion that
For
God
we can only under-
through a revelation from God. For such people, the paradox
truly "against reason."
To
understand
briefly in
chapter
this reaction consider again the parallel case, used 6,
of a mind-body dualist
who
believes that our
concept of consciousness logically entails that thinking must inhere in a nonphysical substance
which
is
the subject of consciousness. Suppose
who believes that the subject of To the dualist, the notion of a thinking logical contradiction. The materialist might respond as follows:
this dualist
encounters a materialist
thinking
simply the brain.
brain
is
a
To you
is
the idea of a thinking brain
contradiction.
is
The problem, however,
paradoxical;
does not
lie
it
appears to be a
in the reality of a
thinking brain, but in your constricted concept of the mental.^' In exactly the same manner, the believer in the incarnation
respond to the unbeliever: the idea of
may even appear
God becoming
a
man
is
to be a logical contradiction.
may para-
The
doxical to you;
it
problem
your constricted conception of God, and more specif-
lies in
Reason and
Paradox
the
105
/
ically, in your assumption that you understand who God is and what God can and cannot do. Of course there must be some carry-over between our prior understanding of God and the new understanding which results from our encounter with the God in time, just as there must be some carry-over
from our
concept of the mental to a materialistic
earlier, dualistic
concept of the mental. Otherwise, the term "God" in the expression
"God-man" would be
utterly meaningless, as
would "mind"
analogous "material mind." But this requirement rather drastic conceptual transformations. that
it is
impossible for an
no concept could an
atom
originally
No one
to be split
in the
compatible with
is
today wishes to argue
on conceptual grounds,
yet
haVe been more paradoxical than that of
indivisible, smallest unit of
matter being divided.
THE TENSION BETWEEN REASON AND THE PARADOX We
are
now
in a position to see
why Climacus
in the incarnation as against reason, rather
reason. Faith
is
frequently talks of faith
than simply being above
said to be against reason because all of us are in a
position in this matter analogous to the dualist
who
is
offended by the
notion of a thinking brain. All of us have a strong tendency to think that our ideas about
God, or whatever
to us, are adequate, or that
"condition," the ability to
The B
if
is
ultimate and finally important
they are not, at least that
make
we
own
hypothesis must label this confidence in our
capacities in this area as sin, since the essence of sin assertion of our
Since the
B
own independence and autonomy and therefore are
all
sinners,
it
is
rational
a prideful
over against God.
hypothesis begins with the assumption that
lack the Truth,
possess the
progress toward such truth.
human
beings
naturally thinks that
human thinking, dominated as it is own autonomy, and Christian faith, which implies
there will be tension between our
by an assertion of our
that our intellectual capacities in this area are essentially impaired.
Human
beings are sinful, and their sinfulness not only blocks
from a proper understanding of God; tension between
human
it
is
them
the ground of the natural
reason and the paradox.
The
difference, the
106
PASSIONATE REASON
/
God and man which makes the is plainly said to derive from human
absolute qualitative difference between idea of the
God-man offensive
to us
not the metaphysical qualities cited by Pojman
sinfulness,'-
of the paradox. Hence, there
and the paradox, but
it is
is
a natural tension
which does not
a tension
knowledge of the nature of God.
It
rests rather
as the heart
between human reason
on any
rest
rational
on what one might
call
the natural self-confidence of reason.
Note be
carefully that
I
am
which God makes evident of
human
reason.
transformed by
for
may
surpass the capacities
an unfallen reason,
unfathomability
itself
and understands
its
own
ference" that creates the tension
between the
difference
between the God who
the learner and the
own
desires,
human
inability to understand.
not
is
who demands
and who, desperately seeking
cannot understand the one who cares only
We
and
this
infinite "dif-
the
it is
sacrifices all for
the fulfillment of his
and dominate,
to control
for the other.
can see now what Climacus means by calling the paradox of
One
the incarnation the absolute paradox.
contradiction" view of the paradox
is
difficulty
that
it
with the "logical
cannot explain what
is
Though
it
"absolute" or unique about the paradox of the incarnation. is
reason
The
this natural difference;
unselfishly gives
being
just as for
not a problem. In
is
situation reason recognizes the natural "difference"
and
and the love
beings. God's nature
in the incarnation
However,
faith, this
God would
not saying that apart from sin
human
comprehensible to
fully
not easy to make sense of what Climacus
the uniqueness of the incarnation
is
offend us because of our sinfulness.
The
human beings one would expect any human
says here,
closely related to
idea
is
believe that
I
its
capacity to
that the incarnation
is
not an idea
naturally shocking to
because of
that
being to invent.
Some paradoxes
are relative in the sense that they are paradoxical to
some people but
not to others. This paradox
grounded on some that
is
is
it is
absolute in the sense that
relative intellectual deficit, but
universally present in
in question
is
sin, so
human
beings.
on
it
is
not
a characteristic
The conceptual inadequacy
not one that could be remedied by a
little
education or
hard thinking, as might be the case for other paradoxes, such the
paradox of the "material mind."
One of
why
could wish that Climacus had said more about the question
it is
that sinfulness
makes the incarnation incomprehensible
to
Reason and
us.
He
the
Paradox
107
/
does suggest in at least one passage that the paradox should be
understood in terms of probability, as "the most improbable of things."" This passage supports the idea that the paradox or logical contradiction, since such a contradiction
probable, but impossible.
Why
is
is
all
not a formal
not merely im-
does the incarnation appear so improb-
able to us? Climacus does not really say, but a plausible answer
is
provided by another Kierkegaardian pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, in his
The answer
discussion of offense.^"*
roughly
is
As
represents the epitome of pure, selfless love.
sinful beings
incapable of such love and have never experienced of what
is
it.
be too good to be
It
we
are
Hence our sense
probable, conditioned by our past experience,
against the likelihood of such a love being actual.
between
the incarnation
this:
is
decidedly
simply appears to
This answer explains the "infinite difference"
true.
God and human
beings as a function of
human
sinfulness, as
Climacus does, and makes the improbability of the incarnation to be a function of that
same
sinfulness.
CAN REASON HAVE If
I
am
right in
my
contentions, then the
when
(and frequently Kierkegaard, tionalist rests
on
and
a misreading
to the degree that the charge
is
LIMITS? common
view of Climacus
the two are identified) as an
is
not adequately supported,
grounded
in the
view that Climacus
urges religious believers to violate the laws of logic. still
whether certainly
it
Is
so,
made by Climacus,
what
on my
I
is
or at least
course
it
may for
reading, depends heavily
on
irrational to urge that reason
is
hypothesis he ent.
is
Of
an appropriate one
be the case that the label "irrationalist"
Climacus. Whether that
irra-
at least
it
is
is
limited, for that claim
is
part
is
and parcel of the
constructing and which he evidently regards as coher-
have termed the natural self-confidence of reason healthy
self-esteem or arrogant imperialism?
An
assertion that reason
is
limited
is
surely not
enough
in itself to
convict a thinker of irrationalism. Otherwise, Kant and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus,
must surely drawn.
lie
in
among
what the
others,
would stand
limits are said to
The answer how they are
guilty.
be and
108
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Climacus' writings are often pictured as Kierkegaard's attempt to save religious belief by locating
The
limits" to reason."
in
it
an enclave which
assertion that
made
what
is
impervious to reason
is
foreign to Climacus, as well as Kierkegaard, though
many who
itself
is
marked
is
"off
behind the boundary
lies
dogmatically. This kind of attitude it
is
present in
Climacus actually stigmatizes
are allegedly influenced by S.K.
the attempt of well-meaning religious people to demarcate a creed, sacred book, or person as an ultimate, unchallengeable authority as
and narrowness of
"superstition
human need reflection,
something
for
he regards
this
spirit. "^^
Though he
"really firm" that
need
weakness and says
as a
recognizes the
impervious to rational
is
it is
incompatible
with the kind of subjective concern which he regards as the foundation of the authentic religious
life.
Although Climacus argues that the incarnation cannot be rationally understood, he regards
which
is
subject to rational scrutiny.
is
One cannot
something which
claim as
this
itself
one
rationally understand
the paradox, but one can hope rationally to understand
why
the paradox
cannot be understood." In other words, the claim that reason has
limits
Of course reason could be limited in a variety of ways. We have already made a distinction must
itself
be a claim that reason can adjudicate.
between a possible
inability to
grounded
and an
in finitude
relevant, since
is
must be able It
is
come
to
crucial to
tension between
To
maintain
its
it
is
it is
remember
human is
that Climacus does not think that the
reason and the paradox
is
a necessary tension.
must always retain the
possibility
only a possibility, not a necessity. For the believer,
one
temptation which has been surmounted. Faith passion in which reason and the paradox are
between reason and the paradox sets itself aside."'^ In if
the latter sort of
the kind of limit with which reason
a temptation, but to the degree that
and reason
It is
to terms.
integrity, Christianity
of offense, but this
in sin.
the source of the tension between
is
it
reason and the paradox, and so
is
understand that can be traced
and assumptions rooted
to the attitudes limit that
understand the incarnation that
inability to
is
is
is
a believer,
is
no
is
a
described as a happy
on good
terms.
possible in the case
other words, there
it
conflict
The
accord
where "reason between
faith
reason can accept the limitations of reason. This claim
of Climacus that reason and faith can have a happy relationship means
Reason and
that Climacus' perspective
d\e
Paradox
109
/
ultimately consistent with Kierkegaard's
is
statement, often quoted by partisans of the above-reason interpretation of the paradox: absurd.
"When
the believer has faith, the absurd
In the last chapter
we saw how Climacus
said to be related to faith as self-love
important enough to be worth reiterating: "Self-love ot love, but at is
its
highest point wills precisely
what love wants
moment
each other in the
There
love.""^'
is
but the tension
it
is
When
not a necessary- one.
they genuinely do
were.
is
the basis
destruction. Tliis
agreement with
in
of passion, and this passion
because they are seeking their
as
own
lies at
is
precisely
often a tension between self-love and genuine love,
the initial ground or basis of the love
when
its
two powers are
too, so these
which reason
This analog\'
to love.
is
happy
explicates this
relationship through an extended proportional analog^', in is
not the
is
"^^
The person
fall
own
a person falls in love,
people
self-love;
is
happiness.
in love, self-love
is
fall
The paradox
in love is
that
transcended, dethroned,
gains happiness in sacrificing happiness for the
sake of the loved one. Thus,
when genuine
love
is
present, love
and
self-love are united.
Similarly, in faith the understanding its
limits.
"To
to," just as a selfish love.""^^ is
is
dethroned;
it
must recognize
much to object may "shrink from
that degree the understanding will have
person in the grip of self-love
Yet Climacus suggests that the dethroning of the understanding
at the
same time what the understanding
itself desires;
of fulfillment of the understanding, just as love
The
clear implication of this
of reason can
itself
is
it
is
a kind
fulfills self-love.
that the recognition of the limits
be rational, at least under certain conditions, those
conditions being the presence of the passion of faith, whose formula repeated several times: the understanding yields grants
itself."^-
What
is
important here
is
itself,
is
the paradox
that the understanding yields
Itself.
HOW What
is
this
condition?
the acquisition of faith
IS
FAITH ACQUIRED?
How is
in
does one acquire
some
it?
We
have seen that
respects like the conceptual trans-
110
PASSIONATE REASON
/
formation one might undergo in becoming a materialist with respect
mind-body problem, so
to the
mind-body
a convinced
and that
it
might be helpful to ask how a similar
made with
transformation might be
dualist be
his conceptual difficulties
equipment and
his conceptual
How
respect to that issue.
convinced that materialism with
it
are rooted in a
beliefs, rather
might is
true,
problem with
than being rooted in prob-
lems with materialism? Obviously, no easy answer to this question
The
possible.
component
reasons for the change will be complex, but
will
be central in any plausible account. There
antee that anything will work, but central motivation will
cannot be is
falsified
to occur,
it
will
if
such a change
come from an encounter with
by any crucial experiment, but be motivated by
new
no
is
to be
is
adequate to deal with
guar-
made, the Dualism
reality.
a transformation
if
factual discoveries about the
which show that one's previous assumptions simply
brain,
is
think one
I
reality, or at least that these
are not
assumptions are not
pragmatically effective any longer.
Of
course as Climacus
tells
the story there
is
a strong disanalogy
between the mind-body case and the case of Christian is
he
faith.
The
dualist
asked to give up convictions which are very important to him, but
not asked to give up the assumption that he has at
is
ability to revise his
conceptual structure to make
Christian revelation,
on the other hand,
that
must recognize, not only that
it
ability to
own
make
steam.
truth
is
Its
it
says to
human
conceptual equipment with respect
understanding
proceeds on
it
its
autonomy and denies
Nevertheless, despite this disanalogy,
I
its
its
to ultimate religious
not only flawed, but irremediably broken, so long as
on
The
lacks the Truth, but lacks the
progress toward the Truth so long as
rialistically insists
"How
least the
adequate.
it
it
impe-
brokenness.
believe that the question
does one acquire faith and arrive at the condition in which
reason can understand the reasonableness of recognizing
be answered in a way that
is
quite parallel to the
question for the mind-body case can be answered.
Climacus
says.
One
its
limits?"
can
way the corresponding
At
least this
is
what
acquires the passion through an encounter with
reality, a first-person
meeting with the
God
himself.
The God must
grant the condition."*^ Just as one might conceivably learn that brains
think by encountering a brain that thinks, so one might learn that
God became
a
man
by encountering the God-man. The disanalogy
is
Reason arA
that in the brain case
formed by the encounter, but
CUmacus part of the
my
gets transalso trans-
happens via a transformation of
fundamental cares and attitudes are
says that this transformation
believer,'*'*
111
/
my thinking that paradox, my thinking is
this
even though he
(or perhaps repeated acts of will) it
Paradox
fundamentally
it is
formed. In the case of the absolute
myself in which
the
is
will
on the
an act of
clearly thinks that
necessary for
is
altered.
not an act of
will
to occur, because
it
not an act which the agent can simply carry out on his or her
is
own. The
something which the believer can
ability to believe requires
only receive directly from the god. Faith represents a discontinuity with the past and what one has received through one's natural
endowments
and experiences. In a similar way, Climacus denies that faith amounts to knowledge.'*^ I
think he means that the conceptual transformation which
here
person's intellectual
what
is
known
is
life.
when
Normally,
certified
I
come
what
being transformed
is
know something,
to
by standards of evidence and past
the case of faith, however, the transformation since
required
is
too drastic to be assimilated to ordinary transformations in the
is
precisely
is
My
standards of evidence and past beliefs.
is
beliefs.
In
qualitatively different,
my
confidence in those
standards of probability and
evidence are themselves brought into question. Furthermore, as we
have noted, in
this case the intellectual transformation
is
not funda-
mental but derivative from a transformation of the whole person that
can be described
One way to
as
moral or
spiritual.
of illuminating the intellectual change that does occur
is
employ the distinction Alvin Plantinga has made between evidence
and grounds. Plantinga has defended the claim that be properly basic for some not believe in
God on
one of the basic
belief in
God may
This means that these people do
people.'^^
the basis of evidence. Rather this belief
beliefs in their noetic structure. It
is
itself
might seem that
such beliefs would be arbitrary and that there would be no way to
determine whether such a belief this
is
not the case.
evidence,
me,
for
it
may
example,
He
still
says that
have a
is
justified or not. Plantinga thinks
though such a belief
ground.'*^
may be grounded
in
The
belief that
an experience
in
aware of God's providential care. Such an experience by Plantinga to be evidence, for
it
is
is
not based on
God
which
is
cares for I
become
not considered
not a proposition which has any
112
PASSIONATE REASON
/
The
expe-
and perhaps cannot be
trans-
evidential relationship to the propositional belief
rience
is
not an argument for the
belief,
it
grounds.
formed into any kind of philosophical argument, and certainly does not need to be thus transformed. Rather, the experience transforms the experiencer.
It
causes
him
one which
is
to be aware of God's loving
care for him.
In a similar
way Climacus
be basic and not the
may
argues that faith in the incarnation
result of historical evidence.
Evidence
neither
is
necessary nor sufficient to produce the transformation of the individthe experience of meeting
ual."*^ It is
God which
of faith. This passion transforms the learner and set of beliefs. It
possible, of course, that the believer
possible a
may
new
be, perhaps
presented with evidence in the course of this encounter, but
usually
is,
what
essential
is
is
produces the passion
makes
is
the encounter
itself.
Such an encounter may properly
be said to be the ground of faith without constituting evidence for faith.
Climacus supports
He
his claims here with
imagines a person
who
is
some thought experiments.
a contemporary of the god
who
has
"limited his sleep to the shortest possible time" and hired a "hundred secret agents" in order to spy
records of his every
on the god and keep
detailed historical
movement. Another contemporary has
a similar
group of employees to keep track of every word of the god's teaching.
No
greater historical
that such knowledge
knowledge can be imagined, but Climacus claims is
two characters genuine
On
by no means sufficient to make either of these disciples of the
god."**^
was out of the country during most of the god's stay and only to see the
god when the god
is
knowledge
is
"if
the
able
moment was
Hence, no special amount of
decision of eternity.
is
dying. This historical ignorance would
be no barrier to his receiving the condition
him the
who
the other side of the coin, Climacus imagines someone
for
historical
necessary for faith, either.
Here, Climacus must walk a fine for the historical altogether,
he
is
line, for
if
he removes the necessity
back to the Socratic position,
himself clearly recognizes. His way of resolving this problem that though for the disciple the external form of the god
the detail of that form
is
not.^'
The
disciple
is
must have
is
as
he
a claim
important, a historical
point of departure for his or her transformation. Without that
we do
Reason and
Paradox
the
indeed return to the Socratic position that the Truth
So the "news of the day
already.
is
eternal.""
occur
The
moment
still
remains
postpone any discussion of
as the
how much
question of
not addressed here, but
is
is
within us
is
the beginning of eternity. "^^
details of this historical point of departure are,
"so long as the
113
/
The
however, insignificant,
point of departure for the
detail
must remain
in chapter 5,
and we
for this to
shall therefore
this question until later.
HISTORICAL CONTEMPORARIES AND REAL CONTEMPORARIES The account Climacus
gives of faith as the result of a first-person
encounter with the god
is,
think, faithful to the experience of
I
many
Christian believers. His account of the role played by historical evidence in
becoming a
disciple implies that historical contemporaneity,
might seem, to be a decided advantage out to be no advantage at
all.
in
becoming
a disciple, turns
Contemporaries may have more historical
knowledge, but such knowledge does not necessarily lead to later disciple is
no
may have
barrier to faith.
little
What
is
which
faith; a
historical information, but this ignorance
crucial
is
that whatever historical knowl-
edge the person has must become more than historical knowledge;
it
must become the occasion for an encounter with the god that transforms the learner.
Climacus works
this out
by distinguishing between a historical con-
temporary of the god and a "real" or genuine contemporary.
who has received the condition from whether a
historical
He knows
the god and
something
contemporary or not, is
known by
like the splendid
The person
the god via a first-hand encounter,
him.^"^
wedding
is
a genuine contemporary.
The
glory of the god
feast of a great
anyone would count himself or herself fortunate
to
is
not
emperor, which
have been able to
experience. For such a wedding feast a historical contemporary has a real
advantage over those
who must
rely
on
historical accounts."
The
glory of the god, however, cannot be seen directly with one's physical eyes, but only
The
with the eyes of
faith.
interlocutor reappears at this point to object that
sumptuous of the god to claim that
his
it
is
pre-
knowledge determines who
is
114
a
PASSIONATE REASON
/
contemporary of
Climacus patiently explains once more that
his.^^'
the god cannot be seen directly with one's physical eyes, but only
through the faith that the god himself must provide. Thus, being by the god
known
a necessary condition for real contemporaneity. This
is
account of the value of contemporaneity or lack thereof has obvious implications for the case of the disciple of a later generation, implica-
which the interlocutor claims
tions
The
to
have immediately discerned."
interlocutor appears to be a rather dim,
Climacus seems
if
well-read, person,
any
a bit skeptical of this claim. In
and
case, testing
it
allows Climacus to discuss the issue of the later disciple at length in
chapter
5,
Why
and we
will accordingly consider the issue again in
due course.
how someone becomes a believer corresponds to the experience of many Christian believers? It is because most Christians, at least of those who have made
do
I
claim that the account Climacus gives of
a conscious choice,
do trace their conversion to something that
could be described as an encounter with Jesus Christ. Very few would
While
trace their conversion to historical evidence. for Christians to is
usually the
account^^ from
not the ground of
faith,
Anthony Bloom,
typical in form,
While
I
is
not unusual
be interested in historical apologetics, such an interest
outcome of
if
not the
other side of
my
so strong that
it
The
following
a militant atheist to a believer,
details:
was reading the beginning of
reached the third chapter,
it.
a Metropolitan of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church, who was transformed from is
it
I
St.
Mark's Gospel, before
I
suddenly became aware that on the
desk there was a presence.
And
was Christ standing there that
it
the certainty was
has never
left
me.
had been in his presence I could say with certainty that what the Gospel said about the crucifixion of the prophet of Galilee was true, and the centurion was right when he said, 'Truly he is the Son of God." This was the
It
was
real turning point.
Because Christ was alive and
in the light of the Resurrection that
I
I
could read with certainty
the story of the Gospel, knowing that everything was true in
because the impossible event of the resurrection was to certain than any event of history. History
Resurrection
I
knew
for a fact.
Gospel beginning with
its first
I
had
to believe, the
did not discover, as you see, the
message of the Annunciation, and
me as a story which one can believe or disbelieve.
it
did not unfold for
It
began
it
was a direct and personal experience.'*^
as
I
it
me more
an event that
left all
problems of disbelief behind because
Reason and
This account may not seem Climacean in in
115
/
respects, particularly
all
emphasis on the resurrection, which Climacus certainly does not
its
much
talk
Paradox
the
places living
about.
(Though
I
think that the strong emphasis Climacus
on receiving the condition
God
in a first-hand
certainly presupposes the resurrection,
the Christian story
Bloom's story
fill
out the
illustrates
primary notion
is
B is
the details of
hypothesis.) However, in
the points in Climacus
that faith
encounter with a
when
I
its
wish to
essentials
stress.
The
the result of a first-person encounter
with Christ. In Bloom's account, this encounter comes by means of a historical record, rooted in the accounts of contemporaries
and passed
down frqm
merely the
means. This
generation to generation, but that record is
precisely the formula
"The person who comes
of faith:
Climacus gives
later believes hy
sion) the report of the contemporary, by the
for the acquisition
means of (the occa-
power of the condition
he himself receives from the God. "^^^ Bloom would seem contemporary of Christ, while obviously
is
failing to
to be a
genuine
be a historical con-
temporary in the ordinary sense. It is
in the
also clear in this
way Plantinga
account that Bloom's faith
describes, yet
namely the experience. Bloom historical
account
as a result of
he comes to evaluate the
it
is
basic for
him
nevertheless clearly has a ground,
clearly does not decide to believe the
evidence for
its
trustworthiness; rather
historical trustworthiness of the
account on
the basis of his encounter with a living Christ. Notice also the characteristic
Climacean perspective on
faith as a certainty
something which from one perspective appears absurd,
concerning
or, in
Bloom's
words, impossible.
Bloom's account may not seem typical of the experience of believers to some.
It
is
perhaps more dramatic, more "mystical" than most
conversions. However, these differences do not seem significant to me,
and they are not features that Climacus' account requires to be present or absent.
In the Interlude between chapters 4 and 5 Climacus analyzes faith or belief as something that involves the will, nicely with the
well-known description of
"leap." This term
is
an
analysis that corresponds
faith in the Postscript as a
often thought to express a view of faith as a sheer
choice to believe something with no basis for the choice at shall
examine the
role of the will in
coming
to faith
more
all.
We
closely in
'
116
PASSIONATE REASON
/
we can already see that the leap of faith is hardly the dark. The believer knows both what he is leaping
the next chapter, but a blind leap into to
and why he
leaping.
is
To
anticipate
one of the arguments of the
next chapter, faith does not require a kind of immoral manipulation of
my
who
not someone is
not
she
some have
belief structure, as
tries to
make
herself believe
about what
person of faith
true, as a result of
is
is
something she knows
something she has no reason to think
true, or
someone who now has good reason
is
The
charged.^'
is
Rather,
true.
to mistrust her earlier ideas
an encounter with
reality that has
fundamentally altered the dominant passions that form the core of her being and shape her thinking.
Why then
is
will necessary? Actually, in the
of the acquisition of faith in chapter 4, there
other than the negative claim faith
is
account Climacus gives almost no talk of
will,
we have mentioned
already,
namely that
human
willing.
The whole
cannot be identified with an act of
chapter could in fact be read as preparation for a thorough-going doctrine of predestination, so strongly does Climacus emphasize the
primacy of the god's actions and the impotence of impression see,
Climacus allows a
human makes
freedom. it
The
possible for
role to
we
human
will
it
does not
make
shall
God
in time
it
necessary."^
take seriously the notion that the source of the difficulty in is
sin,
then the troubles humans have
believing in the incarnation have very physical conceptual puzzles.
We
little
to
do with
We
have trouble believing because we is
are
pure
have trouble believing because we are proud and do
not wish to recognize that there are grasp. All this
in
esoteric meta-
and we have trouble comprehending an action which
unselfishness.
is
This
we
as
an individual to recognize the bankruptcy of
believing the incarnation
selfish
effort.
because of a desire to protect
transforming encounter with the
imperialistic reason, but If
human
however, qualified in the Interlude. There,
is,
may
realities
which we
are unable to
be mostly implicit in Philosophical Fragments, but
it
quite consistent with the perspective adopted by another Kierke-
gaardian pseudonym, Anti-Climacus. In Training
Climacus gives example
after
in Christianity
example of offense, and
Anti-
in every case the
negative reaction can be traced to moral attitudes on the part of the
offended party. clearly:
"The
In The Sickness unto Death the point
real reason
is
made
people are offended by Christianity
is
just as
that
it
Reason and
is
too high, because
it
wants to make a
its
goal
human
he cannot grasp the
human
not the goal of
is
Paradox
the
117
/
persons, because
being into something so extraordinary that
thought."^"*
CONCLUSION: UNDERMINING NEUTRALITY So
is
the paradox above reason or against reason? In a sense
above reason in that
It is
God
concrete
human
unlikely,
which
finite
human
could become a
human
person.
both.
beings cannot understand
It
is
in turn shaped by our
how
against reason in that our
thinking, permeated by our sense of is
it is
own
what
selfishness
is
and
likely
and experience
of others' selfishness, judges the possibility as the "strangest of things."
However,
the laws of logic.
Or
at least that
is
what the believer
cannot think that what has actually occurred
course the unbeliever does not believe
have seen that the incarnation contradiction.
is
irrational ist?" will
depend on who
view corresponds with Climacus'
main concern tianity;
nor
likely to
So perhaps the answer
is
is it
is
thinks. For
one
and the
impossible,
God-man.
believer believes in the reality of the
Of
all
not against reason in the sense of being against
it is
it
has occurred, and
appear to
him
to the question, "Is
is
own
we
to be a formal
Climacus an
answering the question. Such a conclusions
on the
matter. His
certainly not to argue for the reasonableness of Christo maintain that Christianity
argue the impossibility of neutrality.
When
is
unreasonable.
It is
to
reason encounters the par-
adox, faith and offense are both possible; what
is
not possible
is
indifference.^^ It is
important, however, not to allow offense to disguise
as purely rational, a straightforward logical
to hide
behind logic
is
with the real
and
issues.
flag,
The ground
candidate to wrap
and thereby evade having to deal
of offense
is
not pure
self-assertiveness, a confidence in the unlimited
reason.
reaction
deduction. Allowing offense
like allowing a presidential
himself in patriotism and the
its
logic,
but pride
powers of
human
Here we see once more the importance of the message of the
"Appendix"
to chapter 3 of Philosophical Fragments,
Illusion," in
which
neutral authority
it
is
"An
Acoustic
argued that reason would like to pose as the
which has exposed the absurdity of the paradox. In
^
118
PASSIONATE REASON
/
the tension between reason and the paradox
fact,
a tension
is
which
reason has learned about through revelation. Faith and offense are passions,
and neither passion
from the laws of
— indeed no passion
at all
—can be derived
logic.
Perhaps the best way of answering the question as to whether
Climacus sees
faith as against reason
one means by "reason." answer
faculty, the
If
that faith
is
is
to say that
one thinks of reason is
If
one thinks of reason
the laws of logic, faith
one thinks of reason as
it is
is
depends on what
not against reason in this sense,
because reason in this sense does not exist in
myth.
it
as a timeless, godlike
as simply
human
beings.
It
is
not necessarily against reason either. But
as the
a
thinking in accordance with
concrete thinking of
human
by our basic beliefs and attitudes, then there
is
if
beings, shaped
a tension
between
reason and faith, one which can be eliminated only at the cost of the identification of Christianity with
what Kierkegaard
will
later call
Christendom.
Climacus
in this respect resembles a sociologist of
term "reason,"
like
knowledge. The
"knowledge" and "logic," often functions
as
an
instrument of control. Those with social power attempt to legitimate their
ways of seeing and acting in the world by identifying their com-
mitments with abstractions
like
reason and logic. Climacus says that
Christians think that, because of sin, the established attitudes, values,
and
beliefs
which
will necessarily
will
come
dominate the designation of what
into conflict with Christian faith.
of a cultural critique thus stands or
falls
is
"rational"
The
possibility
with the possibility of a
critical
examination of these established patterns of thinking. Fortunately,
Logic or Reason. as
Climacus
philosopher.
no human being
We
are flesh
in the Postscript It is
is
identical with
and blood is
something called
creatures, finite
and temporal,
constantly reminding the speculative
a constant temptation for us, however, to attempt to
evade responsibility for our commitments by attributing them to these ghostly substantives. tradiction
that
is
human
To
interpret Climacus' paradox as a logical con-
to give in to this temptation
thinking
is
and subvert
his
reminder
always carried on by existing individuals.
CHAPTER AND THE WILL
BELIEF
The
"Interlude" between chapters 4 and 5 of Philosophical Fragments
chapter
rivals
the honor of being the most difficult and obscure
3 for
section of the book.
The
difficulty here,
however,
is
of a different type.
In chapter 3 the chief problem lay in determining the overall point of
the chapter and
its
place in the book as a whole.
The
individual
sentences and paragraphs were, with some exceptions, clear enough, but the purpose of the chapter was not. is
just the reverse.
book
is
not too
accessible.
The
The
difficult to
prose
is,
The problem with
the Interlude
place of the Interlude in the structure of the
determine, and
however,
easily the
its
overall point
is
likewise
most philosophically dense
in the book.
The
alleged function of the Interlude
illusion that
some time has
passed, so that
is
to give the reader the
one can move smoothly
from the problem of ho.w the historical contemporary of the god be-
comes
a disciple to the
might become a
problem of how a member of a
disciple.
The
later
generation
actual function seems to be to protect
the view of faith sketched out against certain possible objections, by analyzing the nature of historical knowledge and belief. In this section
Climacus, under the ruse of amusing the reader, "shortening the time to
fill it
up,"' indulges his philosophical, speculative nature
and
treats
a host of profound philosophical issues in a breathtakingly brief compass.
Climacus begins with metaphysics, discussing the nature of bility
possi-
and necessity and the character of that kind of change called
"coming into existence." This nature of the past and what
leads naturally to a discussion of the
may
These metaphysical excursions
properly be described as historical.
are,
however, undertaken with episte-
/
120
PASSIONATE REASON
/
mological ends in mind, as Climacus moves swiftly to a discussion of historical
knowledge, which requires in turn an analysis of belief and
doubt in general, with important claims about the nature of skepticism
and how are
it
can be overcome.
drawn about the nature of
from these discussions
Finally, lessons
faith in the
paradox of the god in time.
Climacus makes an important distinction in the Interlude between
two kinds of faith or
belief.
by both words;
the
it is
(The Danish Tro can be translated
noun form
the ordinary sense, translated by the in any convictions
tence";
it
part
is
Hongs
we have about anything
and parcel of
all
correctly
of the verb "to believe.") Faith in as "belief,"
that has
that David
Hume
an element
is
"come
into exis-
called cognition
of "matters of fact." Faith in the special or eminent sense
is
faith in
who has appeared in history; it is faith in the paradox. Though it is important to understand the distinction between
the god
two kinds of
faith,
it
is
eminent sense presupposes or includes ordinary This must be the case unless that
is
if
these
equally important to see that faith in the
the god has truly
faith as a
come
component.
into existence,
and
assumed, the whole "poem" collapses back into the
Socratic position. Climacus says this very clearly: "It Ithe historical fact
no immediate contemporary,
of the god's appearance in time] has
because it
it is
historical to the first
power
(faith in the ordinary sense);
has no immediate contemporary to the second power, since
based on a contradiction (faith in the eminent sense )."^
I
it
is
say this at
the outset to call attention to the fact that this implies that everything
Climacus says about ordinary well, a point
faith
must be true of eminent
some commentators have
POSSIBILITY
faith as
missed.^
AND NECESSITY: COMING
INTO EXISTENCE Climacus begins by inquiring called
as to the character of that
is
said to be
First, all
other kinds
"coming into existence." This kind of change
different
from other kinds of change in two ways.
of changes presuppose that what
is
kind of change
undergoing the change already
exists,
but obviously, something that comes into existence does not exist prior to that change. Second, in other kinds of change, the object
changed
Belief
and
the
WiR
121
/
undergoes some change in quality. However, in a case of coming into existence,
then
it is
if
the object coming into existence thereby changes
not
its
comes into existence, but some
that object that
nature,
different
one."*
The key
to understanding these differences
from not existing to existing essence (Vaesen). it is
What comes
a something that
a possibility,
is
a
One might
change
Such
a being
is,
Climacus
says,
in Aristotelian fashion, that
a transformation of the possible into the
say that the
in something's
to see the change
into existence must be something, but
and he therefore concludes, is
is
change in being (Vaeren) rather than
a "nonbeing."
is
coming into existence actual.^
as a
change from the possible to the actual
mode
of being, rather than a change in
its
essence.
He
then
raises the
question as to whether the necessary can
and answers the question with an emphatic "no."
into existence,
commentators, such
as
come Some
H. A. Nielsen, have been somewhat embarrassed
by the robustly metaphysical character of the discussion here and in the following sections and have tried to interpret Climacus as giving us bits of linguistic analysis. Nielsen sees
Climacus
as providing us
with
"grammatical reminders" about the use of our concepts, reminders that are unfortunately usually expressed by
Climacus in "fact-like"
ments that have to be "decompressed" in order to discover grammatical existence
is
status.^
So when Climacus
necessary,"
all
he
tells
really saying
is
us that is
state-
their true
"no coming-into-
that the
two concepts
of necessity and coming-into-existence "do not go together in our discourse."^ It is
of course perfectly true that the points Climacus
deeply embedded in our language and thus
grammatical. However,
it
points simply reflect the if
we
talked
regarded
seems to
way we
that way.
When
is
is
making
they would no longer hold
no reason
to think that
Climacus
Climacus gives his points a "fact-like"
expression instead of simply making remarks about "our concepts"
not see
are
rightly be described as
a mistake to think that these
talk, as if
some other way. There
them
me
may
I
do
this as "unfortunately obscuring" his point.® Certainly the fact-
like statements
he makes do not express empirical
that Climacus does not think they do. But that there are
no other kinds of
"facts"
why
facts,
but
it is
clear
should one assume
than empirical ones?
'
122
Nielsen,
It is it
PASSIONATE REASON
/
who
think,
I
tends to obscure the point, by making
appear that Climacus only wants to raake some inoffensive remarks
about the way we necessity
of the
and
Climacus himself
talk.
way things
He
are.
is
clearly trying to talk about
not as features of our language, but
possibility,
focusing
is
on what
necessity, the necessity of things themselves, rather
is
be.
Climacus seems closer
dicto neces-
nature of things
do not dictate how things
reflected in our statements; our statements
must
than de
The
the necessity of propositions or statements.
sity,
as features
logicians call de re
in sensibility to a
Greek or medieval
philosopher here than to contemporary Wittgensteinians. His claims,
while they
may
well be in accord with
what could be
sense metaphysics," are not uncontroversial, but
many
metaphysical convictions held by Briefly,
Climacus claims that what
is
called
"common-
in the face of
fly
philosophers.
necessary cannot undergo the
change of coming into existence because the realm of necessity realm of the unchangeable. This same point different ways: "All
coming into existence
The
the necessary cannot suffer."^
whatever necessarily then
it is
what
it
not necessarily what
at all, because
in the
is
it
is
made
in a
is
the
number of
a suffering (Liden),
and
thinking here seems to be that
cannot change,
it is.
always relates
same manner."^°
is
is
for
if it
can change,
"The necessary cannot be changed
itself to itself
and
relates itself to itself
A necessary being would have to be something
that was completely independent of the actions of anything else, for it is
dependent on something
be what
it
else,
then again
it
if
would not necessarily
is.
So vehemently does Climacus hold
necessity apart from actuality,
that he rejects Aristotle's claim that there are two kinds of possibility in relation to necessity.'
'
Aristotle reasoned, plausibly enough, that
whatever was necessary was surely possible, since sible.'^
However, what
is
seems to imply that what
and thus
also
may not
merely possible is
cannot be impos-
it
may not
exist, so his
necessary and must exist
exist. Aristotle deals
with
this
is
view
also possible
by positing two
different kinds of possibility, mere possibility and the kind of possibility
which necessity
includes, but
Climacus
rejects this solution
his mistake lies in accepting the idea that the necessary
Climacus moves from
his claim about necessity to
was
and
says
possible.'^
some very sweep-
ing claims about the nature of the actual: "All coming into existence
Belief
way of
occurs through freedom, not by
and
necessity.
the
WiR
123
/
Nothing coming into
existence comes into existence by virtue of a ground, but everything
by a cause. Every cause ends in a freely acting
it
sounds
Nielsen again
cause."''*
finds this claim to be embarrassingly metaphysical,
and what
like Christian or at least theistic metaphysics.'^ It
indeed to understand here a reference to a world that
and whose contingency
reflects
of God. Nielsen says that
its
status as
we must
resist
is
worse,
seems natural contingent,
is
one created by a
free action
the temptation to read this
passage in that way, since Climacus has rejected natural theology in
chapter 3 and cannot appeal to the authority of revelation without violating the hypothetical character of his experiment. 1
think Nielsen
is
right to insist that
we must not read Christian
convictions into Climacus at this point, and indeed, his language sounds
more Greek than Christian. Every cause ends
in a freely acting cause,
but Climacus does not identify this freely acting cause with God, and indeed, does not even claim that cause. ficult
However, though
this
causes end with one freely acting
all
may not be
Christian metaphysics,
it is
dif-
not to see this as metaphysics. In claiming that everything that
happens does so ultimately because of a
freely acting cause,
Climacus
does seem to adopt a view of the world as rooted in personal agency, for the word "freedom" simply does not apply to anything other than actions.
Though
these
comments
are not explicitly Christian
and do not
even by themselves constitute a commitment to theism, they certainly
seem
to be congenial to a theistic
Does I
view of things.
this contradict the attack
cannot see
how
it
does, since, as
identify this freely acting cause,
on
natural theology in chapter 3?
have
I
even
if
said, there
we assume
is
no attempt
there
is
to
only one,
with God. Certainly this freely acting cause seems miles away from "the Truth," that truth that gives is
the real subject of chapter
3.
human beings their humanness, which
Even
thinks of the world as requiring a
if
speculative metaphysics rightly
"first
mover," that hardly would
constitute the Truth that Climacus thinks
is
bound up with
self-
knowledge. In any case,
focused
we must remember
that the attack in chapter 3
is
to prove that God exists. Even if Climacus is God in the Interlude, he is certainly not attempting to God exists. His claims come closer to being bald assertions
on attempts
thinking of
prove that
/
124
PASSIONATE REASON
/
than proofs; they are quite compatible with the view of chapter 3 that a type of knowledge of the
God can
be gained, not through a proof,
but through a "leap."
That, however, raises a different sort of question, namely what sort of justification Climacus can give for these claims. really gives
As
I
have
said,
he
nothing that could be called an argument for his view that
everything that comes into existence does so ultimately because of a "freely acting cause."
Why
does he think he
is
make such
entitled to
statements?
The
outrageousness of his procedure here
may be
partly attributable
to the whimsicalness of the literary structure at this point. recall that
Climacus purports only to be
the illusion that 1843 years have passed. Such a project
him
We
must
killing time, giving the reader
may
entitle
to a few bald claims, thought-provoking but not established.
However, the claims
The audience Climacus
in the context are not all that outrageous.
is
addressing consists of people
nominally Christian, even Christian commitments.
if
who
are at least
they do not fully understand their
As such they could be expected
own
to be familiar
with and accept the standard Christian view of the world as created
by
God
any
in a free action. In
case, since Climacus' purpose
is
to
explore the conceptual differences between Christianity and philosophical idealism,
it
is
not so outrageous for him to take for granted
the broadly theistic picture of things that Christianity presupposes.
we
In the final analysis, as
mological
issues,
support for the view that
all
into existence are contingent, truths.
Since
shall see
what Climacus
many
is
when we
get to the episte-
really interested in
is
providing
judgments about things that have come
and thus can never amount
philosophers
who
to necessary
reject the quasi-theistic
meta-
physics Climacus seems to espouse will accept this claim, the underlying
metaphysics
may not be
all
that important to his argument.
NATURE AND HISTORY In the second and very brief section of the Interlude, Climacus extends his analysis of
"coming into existence" by distinguishing between two
different senses of "history." In
one sense anything that has come into
Beh4 and
Win
the
existence has a past and therefore has a history.
125
/
The whole
natural
world can therefore in one sense be said to have a history, and one properly speaks of natural history.'^ In another sense, however, Climacus
have a history" because
says that nature "does not
Nature thus must be contrasted with that which
with respect to time" because
it
historical in the stricter sense
a redoubling (Fordobling), that
within
its
One
own coming
historical "in the stricter sense."
is
that
which "contains within
coming into existence
could hardly ask for denser philosophical prose than
Climacus
is
itself
into existence."^^
talking about being "dialectical with respect to time"
onym,
"dialectical
is
is
a possibility of a
is,
too abstract
is
sense of the word, with respect to
to be dialectical, in the stricter time."^^
The
"it
talking about the
I
this.
In
believe that
same thing another Kierkegaardian pseud-
Vigilius Haufniensis, discusses in
The Concept of Anxiety
making a distinction between mere time and
in
temporality.^^ Haufniensis
there says that temporality differs from mere succession by virtue of tense. Past, present,
and future
are qualitative features of experienced
or lived time that cannot simply be regarded as objective features of a successive universe, but arise
who
when
that universe
is
lived by a being
has the power to reflect on possibilities and act on them. Such a
being makes time "dialectical" by understanding the present as the
moment
in
which what he
what he could
necessarily
is
(the past)
is
projected into
possibly be (the future).
In a similar way, Climacus suggests that history in the stricter sense,
the kind of thing that
is
meant when we speak of the
person or a nation, only comes into being
when we have
being or beings on the scene, whose lives contain
history of a
a self-conscious
possibilities.
Human
beings are obviously natural creatures and share in the biological "history" of the planet.
However,
their nature as creatures
is
not fixed;
they are constituted by possibilities, not merely in the sense in which there are various possibilities for an animal or a plant, but in the stronger sense that scious
use
and can
made
humans have
possibilities of
Climacus thus seems to commit himself to
be
are con-
concerns the
of those possibilities.
rather strong sense.
To
which they
freely choose. History in the strict sense
Human
human freedom
in a
beings are "relatively freely acting causes."
sure, they are creatures,
which
is
why
their
freedom
is
only
'
126
relative,
PASSIONATE REASON
/
and must be placed within the context of "an absolutely
acting cause." Nevertheless,
human
characterized by contingency. since history
of
it
reflects the
freely
doubly
contingency
who have been
beings are creatures
brought into existence, but
is
the contingency of nature,
It reflects first
Human
itself.
which
a process
is
a part of nature, but secondly,
is
human freedom
freely
history
as part of their nature, they possess
the power to bring actions into existence. In
all
of this Climacus once
more seems
to help himself to a healthy
dose of metaphysics, and the quasi-Christian character of the metaphysics seems even to
whitewash
more pronounced. H. A. Nielsen once more
this, as if it
were something to be ashamed
that the second "coming into existence"
of the
self,
and that
that
all
this
is
thereby gains the power to speak a language. effecting cause speak.^°
who
identified with those
is
seems to miss the
fact that the
on freedom. History can apprehend
life
is
relatively freely
taught the individual to
my
first
have
is
not on language but
possible by the fact that
possibilities for action,
a language
making my
part of
focusing on, but Nielsen
made
me
freedom and the necessity
into a narrative by
events but the
is
past as providing I
is
emphasis here
in the strict sense
my
merely by the fact that past. It
that the individual
The
certainly correct to connect being able to use language
It is
with the reflective power that Climacus
I
tries
and suggests
the coming into existence
is
meant by
is
of,
not
by which to recount that
for decision that
makes my
past not merely a succession of
an on-going
story.
THE UNCHANGEABILITY OF THE PAST In the next two sections Climacus begins to reveal his agenda in his speculative claims.
event.
If it is
The paradox
of the god in time
is
making
a historical
possible to understand historical events as necessary, then
reason might be able to remove the paradox icalness of the paradox by
coming
to understand
it
as necessary.
Climacus' hypothesis, so he swiftly
by arguing that what be
is
historical
known as necessary. The claim that what
is
This would be a disaster for
moves
to block
any such attempt
not necessary and therefore cannot
has happened can be understood as necessary
Belief
and
the
WiR
111
/
was one that Hegelians had made. Hegel had taught that the movement of history as a whole was necessary in some sense, only
understand the necessity of what occurs at the time in retrospect. This
we cannot
occurs, but only
expressed in one of Hegel's most memorable
is
"The owl of Minerva fallen." It
it
takes flight only
seems quite obvious that
when
this
lines:
the shades of night have
Hegelian view
is
incompatible
with the metaphysics of freedom that Climacus has so boldly adopted
and assumed
but Climacus nevertheless takes the time to deal
as true,
with one confusion that makes the Hegelian view seem more plausible
than
it is.
This confusion
a failure to distinguish
is
changeability and metaphysical necessity.
and
as such,
past
is
not the same thing this.
as
What
to be otherwise than
understood the is
in such a case
is;
issue, since
historically
torical, since
no
remains contingent.
It
may be
we can reasonably hope to matter once we have fully
that
come
could have been otherwise.
losing sity
its
historicity.
It
his-
into existence with freedom,
Thus anyone who claims is
it
remains true that
contingency without
lose this
to understand the neces-
claiming to have a knowledge of
something historical that would transform torical, a curious
possible.
The
what has happened cannot now be
cannot
of a historical event in effect
is
this characteristic.
changed and thus cannot become otherwise, but it
unchangeableness
alternative state of affairs
unchangeable lacks
involves what has
it
this
metaphysically necessary cannot be conceived
is
it
historical un-
metaphysical necessity. Roughly, the difference
attain absolute certainty concerning the
What
between
quite true that the past
cannot be changed. However,
is
seems to be
It is
it
into something nonhis-
kind of knowledge indeed.^^
Climacus buttresses his argument here by some interesting claims about the relationship between the past and the future. if
one concedes the necessity of the
that the future
is
past,
then
it
He
says that
will follow logically
inevitable as well.^^ His thoughts here are supported
by an interesting and well-known argument for the truth of fatalism that has been developed by contemporary philosopher Richard Taylor.
Taylor precisely expresses a view of the past and future that
is
alternative to Climacus':
Yet, there
is
one thing
I
know concerning any
stranger's past
and
the
128
PASSIONATE REASON
/
the past of everything under the sun; namely, that whatever hold, there
is
nothing anyone can do about
happened cannot be undone. The mere guarantees
And
it
fact that
now. it
it
is,
by the same token, of the future of everything
anyone can do about fact that
it
it is
What
now.
going to
nothing
is
happen cannot be happen guarantees this." will
altered.
crucial issue here concerns the reality of freedom.
future contain real possibilities? Or, as Taylor claims,
"nothing becomes true or ceases to be simply
is
has
has happened
under the sun. Whatever the future might hold, there
The
might
this.
so
The mere
it
What
true."^'*
true;
is it
whatever
is
Does the
the case that truth at
Climacus would say that the error of Taylor
is
all
that
he has confused the unchangeableness of the past with metaphysical unchangeableness. Having stolen the contingency of the past, Taylor quite consistently robs the future of its openness as well.
point of view a philosopher necessity of the past
is
who
the mirror image of a prophet
be able to predict the future with
From Climacus'
claims to be able to understand the
who
claims to
inevitability.^^
THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE: BELIEF AND THE WILL With a bit of metaphysics securely in place, Climacus can now focus on his primary epistemological concern, namely our cognitive relationship to past events. necessary, but
He
has ruled out any understanding of the past as
what type of understanding of the
Climacus' discussion here
is
past
is
possible?
complex; his main thrust seems to be to
emphasize the uncertainty of historical knowledge and the role of the will in
overcoming
this uncertainty.
His comments have been widely
read as rooted in skepticism, and his claims about the role of the will in the formation of belief
lence, since
have been taken
as irrationalism par excel-
he seems to many to embrace the absurd view that with
respect to historical matters
it
is
up to the individual to decide to
believe whatever he or she wants, regardless of the historical evidence that
may
bear
on the
matter.
I
believe that a careful reading of the
and
Belief
show
text will
129
/
that these criticisms are rooted in misinterpretations of
what Climacus actually
A
WiR
the
says.
good example of the
sort of criticism
1
have
in
mind here
provided by Louis Pojman. In his book Religious Belief and
Pojman has analyzed and is
criticized
is
the Will,'^^
what he terms volitionalism, which
a position that regards beliefs as under the control of the will.
Pojman
distinguishes several kinds of volitionalism." First, he distinguishes prescriptive from descriptive volitionalism. Prescriptive volitionalism a normative doctrine that holds that
it
is
permissible, perhaps
obligatory, to will to hold certain beliefs. Descriptive volitionalism
do
to
Pojman
is
have the
a psychological theory that holds that the will actually does
power
is
even
this.
also distinguishes direct
volitionalism treats the action by
from indirect volitionalism. Direct
which a
belief
is
formed
as a basic
action which can simply be willed. Indirect volitionalism regards the
formation of a belief as an outcome of doing other actions. Both
and descriptive volitionalism can be either
prescriptive
direct
or
indirect.
In his book
Pojman
analyzes Kierkegaard as a classic example of
volitionalism, basing his analysis primarily
whom
he
identifies
on the
with Kierkegaard. (For
writings of Climacus,
literary consistency
1
shall
henceforth speak of Climacus where Pojman discusses Kierkegaard, since
it is
the Climacus literature that
literature that
tionalist
who
is
my
is
mainly
at issue
and
it is
accepts both descriptive and prescriptive volitionalism.
Clim.acus and volitionalists in general are strongly criticized by
on
that
concern.) Pojman sees Climacus as a direct voli-
several counts. Direct, descriptive volitionalism
is
Pojman
said to run afoul
of psychological laws and to involve a conceptual confusion as well.^®
While Pojman allows
that
we can and do modify
beliefs indirectly,
and
thus concedes the truth of indirect, descriptive volitionalism, he claims that prescriptive volitionalism, even of the indirect sort,
censure.
A plausible ethics of belief must see
prima facie
Pojman
duty,^^ but
insists
siderations,^'^
is
truth-seeking as a strong,
forming a belief through an act of
must mean forming
it
subject to
will,
which
independently of evidential con-
shows a lack of concern
for truth. It
is
in fact a kind of
lying to oneself.^' I
shall
not here challenge Poj man's arguments against volitionalism,
/
130
though
PASSIONATE REASON
/
my judgment
in
they
fail,
due to overly
tious definitions of the positions attacked.
restricted
What
I
want
and tenden-
to
do
is
chal-
lenge his reading of Climacus as a direct volitionalist.
should be noted that Poj man's reading of Climacus
It
means unusual. Terence Penelhum,
for
and Skepticism, gives such a reading of Kierkegaard, identifies
belief as
Penelhum
an act of
in
will,
gaard's position
One way
can only be carried out with divine
sense.
assistance.^^
though
of defending Climacus' analysis of faith against this charge
faith "in the
Even
and thinks Kierke-
to indirect forms,
can be reformulated in these terms.
on the
of volitionalism would be to trade
between
all
though in the case of Christian
also regards this direct volitionalism as untenable,
somewhat more sympathetic
is
God
whom Penelhum
with Climacus. According to Penelhum, Kierkegaard saw
grounded
belief the act of will
he
by no
is
example, in his fine book
if
eminent sense" and
ordinary belief
not imply that the same
is
distinction Climacus
treated as subject to the will, this
is
makes
faith or belief in the ordinary
true for faith. Faith,
it
would
might be argued,
is
a miracle that resists philosophical analysis, the result of a divine act that
humans cannot fathom."
Even as to belief,
if
this line of
thought were sound,
I
would
still
be concerned
whether Climacus has given an adequate account of ordinary
and
I
see
no reason
an untenable volitionalism
to
concede the claim that he has adopted
in his
view of
that genuine faith has nothing to
stand up
belief.
However, the claim belief does not
do with ordinary
to critical scrutiny.
In fact, this claim makes
should invest so
Even more
much
it
mysterious
why Johannes Climacus
energy analyzing the concept of ordinary
significantly,
Climacus
says very clearly, as
we have
belief.
already
noted, that faith in the eminent sense includes faith in the ordinary sense as a component.^"* Climacus analyzes the concept of belief in the
ordinary sense because he sees eminent faith as a special kind of
Eminent
faith
adox
its
as
is
belief.
ordinary historical belief which has the absolute par-
historical content
and which
is
acquired, not through
considerations of evidence, but through a life-transforming encounter
with the god.
One cannot
then insulate Climacus' concept of faith against phil-
osophical scrutiny by claiming that
it
has nothing in
common
with
Belief
ordinary- belief. If volitionalism
who
wishes to see
if
is
and
the
WiH
131
/
an objectionable view, then anyone
Climacus' project has merit must challenge the
assumption that Kierkegaard
is
a direct volitionalist in his
view of
belief.
Why
do philosophers
Pojman and Penelhum
like
attribute direct
volitionalism to Climacus? Climacus does say in the Interlude that "belief
is
not a piece of knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression
He maintains that the
of will.'"^^
"conclusion of belief is not a conclusion
but a resolution," and that the opposite of
dent on the
belief,
doubt,
also
is
depen-
will.''^
We must look at the context of these remarks. The polemical target in
view here
is
the claim
we have
analyzed in the
last section,
made
by Hegel and employed by some religious Hegelians in the defense of Christianity, that historical events can be understood as necessary. If historical assertions could be converted philosophically to necessary truths,
then Christianity could retain
at the
same time gaining
a
its
historical critical scholarship. Climacus'
those
who would
argument
directed against
is
avoid risk and claim to attain a kind of final knowl-
edge, in this case of
Humean
historical foundations, while
kind of invulnerability to the ravages of
view that
human
all
history. Climacus' counter-position
is
the
matters of fact are contingent, historical matters
of fact being doubly so, and thus
no knowledge of
history
can attain
the certainty of a necessary truth.
SKEPTICISM AND DOUBT We
have seen that Climacus thinks metaphysical truths
rule out
any
understanding of history as necessary, but he underlines the point with
some epistemological
reflections that
cism, particularly Sextus Empiricus. ever, that
draw heavily on
It is
classical skepti-
important to recognize, how-
Climacus does not embrace skepticism himself.
He
borrows
arguments from the skeptics, but he says very clearly that he assumes that there
is
knowledge of the
past;
he only wants to analyze the nature
of this knowledge.^^
The account given
of historical knowledge
but the main points seem to
me
is
not easy to interpret,
to be as follows. First,
Climacus claims,
'
132
in
PASSIONATE REASON
/
agreement with both
cism, that there
classical
foundationalism and classical skepti-
"immediate sensation and
a category of truths,
is
cognition," which can be apprehended with certainty, and which "can-
not deceive. "^^ Climacus does not
spell out the nature of this
immediate
knowledge, which seems similar to Hume's knowledge of impressions,
and
it
me
seems to
in
many ways
a dubious position to hold.
However,
the realm of objectively certain knowledge Climacus here concedes
He
turns out to be vanishingly small.
meaning. The
first is
two examples
gives
that of perceiving a star; the second
to clarify his
perceiving
is
an event. In the
example, Climacus says that "when the perceiver sees
first
a star, the star
becomes dubious
aware that
has
what
(troer)
that
This
it it
does not
but
sees,
it
come
it
the
moment he
see;
"Thus
come
some have interpreted Climacus
a view star
is
one can
star,
since
rightly object that
as saying that
and
However,
this
I
becomes
clear
this
when we
light
but not
star,
Against such
being perceived
even possible that the
it is
do not think
past."*'
even our present awareness of the
an awareness of a past object, since the
has taken years to arrive, and exists.
occurred in the
it
exists, for
into existence."'*^
one can have im.mediate knowledge of the existence of a of the genesis of the
become
seeks to
faith (Tro) believes
does not believe that the star
it
believes that the star has
obscure, and
is
him
for
into existence."-"
star
no longer
can be Climacus' intended meaning,
look at the second example, that of
perceiving an event.
Here Climacus but not that occurring."'*^ star,
but
I
it
says that "the occurrence
I
am
it
is
in the process of
This may seem even more obscure than the case of the
believe what Climacus has in
the case of the star and the event, there
which
can be known immediately
has occurred, not even that
mind is
is
simply
this.
Both
in,
a something, a content, of
immediately aware. This something has been articulated
by different philosophers in different ways, but he surely has in view
what some have labeled "sense data," and what others have thought of in terms of what might be
been performed. Whatever diately aware,
world which
it
left after
this
a phenomenological epoche has
something
is
of which
we
are
imme-
cannot be identified with an object in the space-time
we think
of as "objective," out there, so to speak.
affirm the existence of a star as
To
an object which has "come into
BehefcmdtheWiR existence"
is
to affirm the existence of
my
diate content of
object with a it
experience.
pubUc
has occurred,"
something more than the imme-
to affirm the existence of a
It is
history. Similarly, to affirm of
that the event has occurred entails that one
is
pubUc
an occurrence "that
The
affirmation
committed
to affirming
not simply to utter a tautology.
is
133
/
a "transition from nothing, from non-being. "'^^ Here the event
is
again
not simply a content in one*s consciousness but a part of the public world, and such an affirmation carries with
for
it
Climacus inescapable
The risk is grounded in the logical gap between my experience, when that experience is construed as giving me certain knowledge, and risk.
the world as
Note
ordinarily perceive
I
that even
if
one
and act in
it
does not damage Climacus' main
this
judgments about matters of
fact.
and events
stars
But
now
the
to
Climacus sees in the argues that
main
issue,
agreeing that
and
the riskiness of
is
well find doctrines of sense
human judgments
fallible.
which concerns the implications
riskiness of affirmations about matters of fact.
He
the uncertainty of these judgments which makes skep-
it is
ticism possible.
still
are contingent
world of certainty,
which
thesis,
One may
data and their like dubious while
about
it.
rejects the implied inner
The Greek skeptics "doubted not by virtue of knowledge
but by virtue of
will."'^'^
This in turn implies that "doubt can be
The
nature of doubt
in turn illuminates the true nature of faith or belief,
which must be
terminated only in freedom, by an act of
will."^^
seen as the "opposite passion of doubt.""^^
Pojman
reads these passages as a
of volitionalism.. beliefs are if I
believe that
I
commitment
to
sees the matter, Kierkegaard
an extreme form is
saying that
all
under the direct and immediate control of the believer. Thus
words, or that decision
As he
I
I
am looking at a computer screen as I bom in Atlanta, Georgia, this is the
was
have made, and
1
type these result of a
could easily have willed to believe the
opposite of these things, regardless of the evidence. Such a position implausible, to say the least.
under I
It
is
does not appear that beliefs are normally
direct, voluntary control in this way.
believe that Poj man's reading rests
what Climacus means by such terms tracing belief to will, Climacus by beliefs are consciously chosen.
on
a faulty understanding of
as "will"
no means
and "freedom."
First, in
necessarily implies that
Climacus does not
tell
us very
much
134
PASSIONATE REASON
/
about the psychological theories he holds, but
seems
it
fair to
assume
that he would accept the general psychological convictions that Kierke-
gaard and other Kierkegaardian pseudonyms hold. This assumption
is
especially reasonable in the context of responding to criticisms like
who
those of Pojman, If
he
is
anything
is
identifies Kierkegaard
evident about Kierkegaard as a psychologist,
While Kierkegaard
a depth psychologist.
central place in the
make
hardly ever
with Climacus.
human
full
that
he thinks that human beings
personality,
choices with
it is
certainly assigns will a
consciousness of what they are
doing. In The Sickness unto Death, for example, though both despair
and
sin are traced to the will, the
most people are in despair and
what one
is
doing
is
pseudonym Anti-Climacus
sin unconsciously.
Lack of
says that
clarity
about
the rule, not the exception, in the Kierkegaardian
picture of the personality.
This point Fragments.
skepticism
is
just as
The Greek is
rooted in
evident in the discussion of skepticism in
skeptic would agree will,
and understand that
according to Climacus,
to the degree that
his
he
has understood himself ^'^ [emphasis mine] This implies, of course, that
the skeptic
may not understand
himself,
may not
realize that
because he wills to doubt. Thus, to say that belief will
by no means implies that belief
is
is
he doubts
grounded in the
always or even usually the result
of a conscious act of willing.
Secondly, Climacus nowhere says that beliefs can be controlled by the will
directly.
Poj man's reading implies that beliefs can be produced
or annihilated willy-nilly, but this
is
simply not present in the text.
Pojman simply does not consider the speaking of the in
human power
mind the well-known
fact that beliefs
in the course of doing other things.
Climacus has in mind both belief and doubt
is
possibility that Climacus,
to will to believe something,
That
can be modified
it is
in
may have indirectly,
the latter possibility that
strongly suggested by the fact that he calls
passions."*^
Passions are not things that can be
created by an immediate act of will, and neither Kierkegaard nor
Climacus conceives of them
as that sort of thing. Passions are things
and constantly renewed. Acts of willing and Kierkegaard regards the higher ethical things we are responsible to achieve. However,
that must be slowly cultivated
play a role in this cultivation,
and
religious passions as
by and
large, passions are
formed on a long-term
basis,
and they are
BeMandtheWiR
135
/
not simply willed into existence, but formed indirectly through a process of wiUing to do other things.
Strong support for this interpretation
found in the discussions of
is
skepticism in the Postscript and in Fear and Trembling.
which
parallels a familiar refrain in
Hume,
Contemporary Hegelians, who claim
is
have overcome skepticism
to
through a universal doubt which overcomes
itself,
mercilessly
are
on the grounds that universal doubt cannot
attacked, primarily
be achieved,
A major theme,
the difficulty of skepticism.
much
less
overcome
could
if it
be."*^
What
which he
skeptic regarded as the task of a lifetime, an infinite goal
could only hope to approximate, since
from
us,
is
lecture. It
possibly
the ancient
continually elicits belief
life
accomplished by the contemporary professor in his opening the fact that doubts
is
—and
beliefs
—
are not always
under
our voluntary control that makes such a professor a comic figure for
The
Kierkegaard.
doubt
difficulty of
is
major theme of the
also a
unfinished Johannes Climacus.
And
of course the same
is
true of other passions discussed in the
Kierkegaardian literature, especially the passion of
faith.
The polemic
against "going further" than faith, for example, presupposes that faith is
not something one can acquire simply by
fiat.^°
Once more,
it is
said
to be a task for a lifetime.
A the
plausible reading of Climacus' discussion of the role of will in
life
of the skeptic must
of mind. is
It is
first
focus
on the
skeptic's goal: tranquility
the attainment and sustaining of this state of
the primary object of the skeptic's
from drawing conclusions.
A
will.
To
hasty reading
this
may
end he
mind which
wills to refrain
suggest that Climacus
thinks that the skeptics can do this by a direct act of will: "By the
power of the
will
he (the skeptic) decides to restrain himself and hold
himself back... from any conclusion."^^ Climacus emphasizes that the will that
is
decisive here, not rational argument: "Insofar as
skeptic) uses dialectics in continually
are
nothing
more
than
is
making the opposite equally
probable, he does not erect his skepticism
which
it
he (the
on
outer
dialectical arguments, fortifications,
human
accommodations.""
Though
the emphasis
is
on the
will, since
Climacus wishes to claim
that the skeptic
is
a skeptic in the final analysis because
a skeptic, there
is
no claim here that
he
wills to
belief states are always or
be
even
136
PASSIONATE REASON
/
ever under the direct control of the
will is
is
indirect.
Though
the contrary, there
the ultimate source of doubt
make
These may be denigrated
tions."
as
is
the
cases the control exercised hy the
the
is
doubt
will,
human
achieved through cognitive means. Because of the facts of
psychology, the skeptic must
is
On
will.
some
clear statement that at least in
use of dialectics, "outer fortifica-
"human accommodations,"
but
it
nonetheless important that such accommodations are necessary.
Climacus also says that the skeptic "used cognition to preserve
his state
of mind."" This suggests that the control exercised by the skeptic was at least
not complete, and that
it
was achieved by such techniques
looking for evidence on the other side of a belief toward which one inclined, constructing arguments sides of
an
issue,
and so
So Climacus' point
which
as is
on both
are equally balanced
forth. is
not the indefensible claim that beliefs are
always simply willed into being, regardless of the evidential situation of the believer.
It is
between whatever
totally objective, certain
makes skepticism
is
a logical gap
evidence we have for mat-
of fact, and our beliefs about these matters.
ters
it
rather the subtler claim that there
as a willed life-stance possible.
this
gap which
It
is
It
provides room, as
were, for the skeptic to do what he needs to do to arrive at a state
of suspended judgment, though this certainly not be successful in
need to do that
is
is
not spelled out, and there
a matter of empirical psychology.
what must be done strategies
not necessarily easy and will
What is
exactly the skeptic will
no reason
it
should be, since
Climacus evidently thinks that
to be a skeptic will include familiar cognitive
such as focusing on arguments for both sides of a position.
Since most of us are not skeptics, differ
is
all cases.
from
it
follows that
the skeptic in a crucial respect.
We
we nonskeptics must
do not
will to
that state of suspended judgment that the skeptic longs different ends
and consequently do not embark on the
the skeptic employs to achieve his ends. Climacus
think that particular beliefs the
will,
case.
does think
is
We
for.
activities
may
or
have
which
may not
are sometimes under the direct control of
but he certainly does not think this
What he
achieve
that
ultimately plays a decisive role in
This claim may point to a
is
always or generally the
what we want
to believe
what we do believe and
fact of
human
and think think.
psychology which
many
philosophers find regrettable, and not to be welcomed, but so far from
BeMcmdtheWiR being implausible,
comments
find
I
it
Who
utterly undeniable.
137
/
can observe the
of hearers after a so-called debate between the presidential
candidates without realizing that the beliefs of the hearers about
won
the debate,
who had
heavily shaped by their It is
commitments
a plain and evident fact of
how we
interpret evidence,
be good evidence, influence flecting
is
on
human
one candidate or the other?
psychology, like
my whole
a presidential debate
much more
I
I
Of
course this
noetic structure. In re-
recently saw,
1
believe that one
sincere and concerned about important
problems than the other, not simply because but because
or not, that
it
weigh evidence, even what we consider to
generally mediated by
candidate was
to
heavily shaped by our desires.
is
I
want that
to be true,
was already convinced that the second candidate was an
unprincipled opportunist. However, the past beliefs which
on the
to bear
who
the strongest arguments, and so on, are
situation were equally colored by
emotions, and values. So will
still
my
I
brought
past desires,
played a significant factor in shaping
the belief.
When we come
to
sense, the logical gap
what Climacus
between
calls
the historical in the strict
totally objective, certain
evidence and
Here we have not only the contingency
belief
becomes even
of
matters of fact, but the double contingency introduced by free
all
human
actions,
greater.
which always must be interpreted and understood.
Climacus seems to be right in maintaining that there
room
for
disagreement and uncertainty with regard to
and hence more room
for skeptical stratagems, as
is
even more
human
activity,
shown by the
is
status
of such disciplines as history and sociology as compared with physics
and chemistry. Notice that Climacus does not seem to adopt a radical relativism or historicism
on the
basis of his assertion of the significance of sub-
jective factors in the formation of belief.
there
is
no objective
is
is,
he does not say that
truth about nature or history.
that our beliefs cannot be true in to maintain
That
some objective
Nor does he claim
sense. All
he wants
that our beliefs always contain an element of risk, because
the objective evidential situation always contains an element of uncertainty is
which we resolve
made
in the formation of our beliefs. This resolution
possible by our desires, hopes,
and
fears,
and so on, which in
turn reflect themselves in our behavior and choices. Climacus' general
138
term in
PASSIONATE REASON
/
for this "subjective" factor in belief
many ways
a poor choice, but
personal responsibility.
He
may be
"will." It
is
Climacus' desire to maintain
does not see this emphasis on "subjectivity"
as alien to or incompatible
When human
formation
reflects
it
with a concern for truth.
beings resolve their beliefs in certain directions, they
certainly are not motivated solely by "objective" evidence, but there is
no reason
essarily lead
to assume that they think that "subjective" factors nec-
them away from the
truth.
On
the contrary,
we
generally
think that subjective factors can help as well as hinder the search for truth.
Hence
it is
not surprising that Climacus seems quite
his assumptions about truth
subjectivity with a realism that it
realistic in
and cheerfully combines an emphasis on
may
rightly be
termed "Greek," since
follows Plato and Aristotle very closely. In the next section
explore in more depth the question of whether this emphasis jectivity
is
I
on
shall
sub-
indeed compatible with a concern for truth.
EMINENT FAITH AND THE ROLE OF WILL I
believe that
I
have cleared Climacus of the charge that he holds to
an untenable form of descriptive volitionalism, which
humans the power
form their
to
beliefs willy-nilly,
new human
ascribes
cognitive considerations. However, a
criticism
defense. Suppose that
beliefs are frequently
by our
it is
desires, hopes,
fact to be derided,
true that
and
fears.
is
to
independently of suggested by
my
shaped
Surely that represents a melancholy
not a goal to be emulated. However, Climacus seems
to think a prescriptive volitionalism that accepts willing to believe
praiseworthy.
Pojman and others who share
of belief regard this as wrong; they say
a
commitment
to
is
an ethics
we ought to form our beliefs on we can. Is it possible for will
the basis of evidence to the extent that
to play a role in the acquisition of belief without the a concern for truth?
I
shall try to argue that
acquisition of faith in the eminent sense. to faith in the paradox because that
and
in
Actually, he says
abandonment of
can, at least for the
shall restrict
my
discussion
the main concern of Climacus,
how
the will operates in
enough about how the
will operates in the
any case he says very
other cases to shape
is
I
it
little
about
just
belief. little
Belief
case of eminent faith as well, but
and
WiR
the
believe he says
I
139
/
enough
faith in the paradox.
On the
to enable
coming
us to construct a plausible account of the role will plays in
typical picture given of Climacus' account
The
of faith and the will, a concern for truth seems totally absent. typical picture given of
(Though the
faith."
Postscript rather
to
eminent
faith
that
is
requires a "leap of
it
comes from
discussion of faith as involving a leap
than Fragments.) The leap
is
necessary because Chris-
tian faith requires belief in the reality of the incarnation, the absolute
paradox, which the critic perceives as a logical contradiction. Assisted
by divine grace, the believer manages, through a heroic act of
what he knows
get himself to believe
is
absurd, for
what
is
will, to
logically
contradictory could not possibly occur. In the previous chapters is
I
fundamentally flawed. Here
The paradox
conclusions.
a logical contradiction.
have shown that
this picture
shall briefly recapitulate
some of my
believe I
of the incarnation cannot be
It
is
human
a mystery to
appears to be a contradiction to us
make
I
known
reason,
when we attempt
to master
totally incongruous. It appears to us to
that
God and man
our sinfulness makes
it
dismiss
To know
we
lack any such knowledge.
possess;
it
is
a logical contradiction, it
means
The
to see the limitations of her
person
who can
given
in-
will
as
to be
we would
God and
Climacus spins
it
to be out,
is
God is not something God himself. The person who own knowledge in this area is a truth about
must be brought to us by
comes
an act of
is
demands
what we cannot dominate and master.
that the incarnation
human. The message of the B hypothesis, that
is
be a contradiction, not because
impossible for us to understand an act which
have to have a clear grasp of what
we
and it
are mutually exclusive genuses, but because
a manifestation of pure, unselfish love, and our pridefulness
we
it
our own. Relative to our experience and expectations,
it
we know
that
to be
one which
respond to
on the
God
in faith. This faith
is
part of the believer, but rather
not produced by is
a gift of
God,
a first-person encounter.^"*
Just as a
convinced mind-body dualist might be convinced that the
paradoxical notion of a thinking brain
is
a reality
if
he should encounter
one, so the believer might be convinced that the paradoxical notion of the
God-man
is
a reality by a personally transforming first-person
encounter with the God-man." The belief
is
a response to the trans-
140
PASSIONATE REASON
/
forming encounter with
not of some arbitrary act of
reality,
from being an abandonment of any concern
changed her mind about what
true as a result of
is
will.
Far
for truth, the believer has
an encounter with
the Truth in which she has acquired the Truth.
Does
account leave any role
this
of will,"
it
is
tempting to say that
in the acquisition of faith. in accord with
a doctrine for
is
to play a role. Early
informed us that there
B
is
because
I
view
me
I
role at all
who
on
does leave some "room"
book he has already
in the
one point of analogy between the Socratic
is
Socratically
that
is
my
am
I
sinfulness
is
cannot discover
this act of
con-
untruth] the Socratic principle applies: the
my own
can discover
"To
in untruth.
may
only an occasion, whoever he
Even my
no
hypothesis; the one thing that the god in time can
sciousness [discovering
teacher
willing plays
Such a view of faith could easily be completed
not for Climacus, however,
position and the
me
human
not an act
is
well-known Christian doctrines of predestination. Such
human agency
teach
When we
for the will at all?
consider the explicit statement of Climacus that "faith
be,
even
he
if
a god,
is
untruth only by myself."^^
something that must be revealed; on Climacus' it
when
by myself. However,
in the encounter with the
god
have a choice
I
is
revealed to
as to
whether to
it
accept this insight. This choice turns out to be decisive for whether acquire faith or not, since
in turn
it
is
to understand the limitations of
my
the paradox, since that reaction
is
We
a gift of the god.
It
However, an
The
a transforming one.
if
revelation
is
act of will
is
is
I
I
can come
natural reaction to
my
sin.
in the
role of will
not an act of
necessary
the encounter with the
if
will;
the
God-man
it
gift is
is
to be
my own ideas about God are must accept my dependence on a divine
recognition that
irremediably flawed and that
I
not easily attained. Such a recognition runs counter to
natural, sinful tendency to assert
change me, what
required
is
changed. Humility
is
is
a
willed.
my own autonomy. which
What
is
I
know
is
God
it is
is
to
to be
quite proper to see as
required in the leap of faith
not an immoral attempt to manipulate
myself believe what
If
humble acceptance of my need
a moral quality
something which must be is
its
shaped by
remains true that faith
to be received, necessary
my
reason and
itself
can now understand something of the
acquisition of faith. is
decisive for whether
my
untrue. Rather,
I
beliefs so as to
am
make
asked to transform
Belief
myself so that
my
necessary
is
the
is
life.
some
individual as retaining
it
as necessary to see the
natural, intellectual ability,
Even
his honest recognition of his ignorance.
possible by the encounter with
is
on anyone. Such
essentially m.oral
quences, and
and
God, but
it is
namely the
wisdom consisted
ability to recognize its inability, just as Socrates'
forces
141
/
the relinquishment of imperialistic reason and
the acquisition of humility. Climacus saw
God
WiR
can be open to an encounter with the tmth which
I
will totally transform
What
and
this recognition
is
in
made
not a recognition which
a transformation from pride to humility
however
practical,
vast
its
intellectual conse-
attainment requires no sin against any plausible ethics
its
of belief. In seeing the passion of faith as grounded in the leap of the will,
Climacus
is
not endorsing manipulation of
beliefs,
but recognizing
the essential role moral character plays in the quest for truth, especially
with regard to religious truth.
Eminent
be
faith turns out to
uncertain for Climacus. Since into existence,
it
shares with
triply
its
all
contingent and therefore triply
content
coming into existence introduces. Since the
the god
who
god's appearance
freedom involved in
human
history,
which
is
own unique
The
shaped expectations of what
though is
more
to be
this
the
I
Finally,
is
I
the
natural,
will,
decide not to follow the strenuous path of
not necessarily a conscious, datable decision.
to in retrospect. For
by Christianity, then that pertains to
in the
If
me, there
can know something about
Roman Empire
The
my
has
probable.
long-term fundamental project that
committed I
is
it is
have, consciously or unconsciously, chosen to believe,
choice
like a
world and
histori-
two kinds of uncertainty get resolved by the human
first
according to Climacus. the skeptic,
is
uncertainty, since the god's appearance in time
absolute paradox, the event that absolutely goes against sinfully
come
constituted by a
"coming into existence within a coming into existence." its
has
with other historical truths the uncertainty that attaches
cal, it shares
to the
is
matters of fact the contingency that
fell I
because
its
it.
If
I
I
may really
It
discover myself is
an external
decide to believe that
moral toughness was undermined
have successfully resolved the greater uncertainty
human
history.
uncertainty that attaches to the paradox cannot be resolved
same manner.
It
can only be resolved
as a result of the
encounter
142
/
PASSIONATE REASON
with the god through one of the two passions that ensue from that encounter: offense or faith. Will does play a role, however, in deter-
mining which of these passions ensues from the encounter. Nevertheless, faith in the paradox shares the other two kinds of uncertainty, and Climacus views this as significant, since barrier to
anyone who would
it
implies a
try to substitute objective factors for
subjective factors in the acquisition of faith. This cannot even be successfully for
which involves
ordmary all
faith. It
is
utterly impossible for
eminent
the uncertainty of the other kinds as well as
unique uncertainty. In get resolved. Existing
all
done faith,
its
own
of these cases, however, the uncertainties do
human
beings do arrive at beliefs, and
encounter the incarnation they also arrive
at faith
—and
when
offense.
they
CHAPTER
FAITH
AND HISTORY
In chapter 5 Climacus returns to the question of a later generation
might become
posed ironically in the chapter
how
title,
"The
the
The
disciples of the god.
Disciple at
members
second hand.
A
is
Second Hand,"
since chapter 4 has already forcefully argued that there can be disciple at
of
question
person becomes a disciple only by a
no
first-
person encounter with the god in which the god grants the condition of faith.
Thus every
disciple, of
whatever generation,
of the god in the significant sense, and
historical
is
a contemporary
contemporaneity
becomes unimportant. In essence, then, the problem posed in chapter 5 has already been
answered in chapter locutor,
who
4,
which
leads
Climacus to hope that the
inter-
has already claimed to have immediately discerned the
far-reaching consequences of that chapter, perhaps perceives the impossibility of asking
about a "disciple at second hand." Alas, the
whose dimness
terlocutor,
is
becoming
point. Instead of seeing that the
hand
is
in-
a bit tiresome, does not get the
whole question of a
disciple at
second
based on a confusion, the interlocutor, befuddled by the 1843
years that
correct to
have supposedly passed during the Interlude, wonders
lump
all
if it is
the subsequent generations together. Should one
not consider whether the situation of the people of the third generation
might
differ
from the people of the
fifth
generation, and so on?^
Climacus patiently humors the interlocutor by embarking on a detailed comparison of the two extremes within the class of later
generations, the
generation.
We
will turn out to
first
generation after the god's appearance and the
last
can be confident that the differences between the two be relative and inconsequential, since
if
there
is
no
i
^
144
/
PASSIONATE REASON between
essential difference ciple,
it
a historical
would be surprising indeed
"later disciples"
some
advantage over
earlier
later
if
contemporary and
a later dis-
within the general category of
generation turned out to possess an essential
ones in the acquisition of
faith.
THE FIRST AND LATEST GENERATIONS OF "SECONDARY" DISCIPLES The comparison between of later disciples
the two extremes within the general category
executed
is
briskly.
The
first
generation has the ad-
vantage of being closer in time to the god's appearance. This makes easier for
them
it
to obtain accurate historical information about the
event.
Of
that
inherent in the historical realm, according to the Interlude, and
is
course even this generation must deal with the uncertainty
thus cannot gain absolute certainty, especially with regard to the details.
Climacus argues that contradictions with respect
what one would expect from the most agreement would probably be the
However, the
really decisive
minor
to
details
result of a
problem
concocted
story.
for the first generation
the fact in question, the paradoxical entry of the god into time, a "simple historical fact." in
human
nesses, so
The
is
truthful witnesses, since complete
divinity of the god, since he
is
is
is
that
not
present
form, could not be directly observed, even by the eyewitit
could hardly be directly inferred from the testimony of
those witnesses to their immediate successors. Even the miracles or
god are of no value to those
signs performed by the
The
only genuine advantage possessed by the is
the god's appearance
is
sure to bring. This jolt
will certainly attract attention
and
is
raise the
is
valuable in that
it
awareness of the people
by no means partial to
as easily lead to offense.'*
The
person that a decision
called for.
later
generation, ac-
first
Unfortunately or fortunately, this heightened aware-
ness, according to Climacus,
The
lack faith.'
that they are closer in time to the "jolt" that
cording to Climacus,
who hear the news.
who
is
only advantage
is
that
faith;
it is
it
can
just
clearer to the
generation has the apparent advantage of being able to
observe the consequences of the god's appearance. fact in question has
If
perchance the
"completely transformed the world, has penetrated
Fcddi
even the most insignificant provides those
who come
trifle
with
and History
145
/
omnipresence,"^ then this
its
CUmacus
with a "probability proof.
later
has several reasons for thinking this advantage to be an illusion.
he argues that the consequences of a of the fact, any
this.
more than
the fact in question
is.^ If
if
fact of
who
his father
no consequences can
a paradox, then
Secondly, he argues that
First,
cannot change the character
can change the
a son
is
fact
alter
indeed transformed the
this fact has
come about through the power of the faith it has inspired.^ If those consequences make faith unnecessary, then presumably the consequences may well undo themselves. Most world in such a manner,
important, however,
it
has
the fact that historical significance
is
is
no
guar-
antee of truth, since misunderstandings can also have consequences,
and untruths can be powerful. In is
full
Climacus says that
fact,
human history
of this phenomenon.^ This last point throws a significant light
on how Climacus understands
"truth." Kierkegaard's writings are often
read as developing a "subjective" concept of truth, in which truth
simply this
identified with the existential
is
me
argument seems to
an element of objectivity to
power of an
idea.
Climacus in
onto a concept of truth that has
to hold
since he here claims that a falsehood
it,
can be existentially powerful.
So neither the
greater historical accuracy of the
first
generation
with respect to the original fact nor the long-range historical perspective
who can
of the later generation,
see the original fact as the beginning
of a process, has any real value for Climacus. clings to in
both cases
could only serve to
is
make
partial to probability
—
some
basic insight Climacus
that the evidence available to each generation faith
more probable, but
to say that about faith
low estimate of the value of probability consider in
The
detail later, for
is
"faith
would be
is
by no means
slander. "^° This
something that we
will
crucial to Climacus' rejection of
it is
historical apologetics.
clear that of the
two types of
is
the
argument from the consequences that draws Climacus' greatest
ire.
It is
Someone who
thinks that the
their greater historical
generation
first
mformation
historical apologetics,
is
is
better off because of
mistaken, and the mistake has as
a practical consequence a romantic delusion that
better to
it
it
would have been
have lived near the time of the god's appearance. However,
the delusion of the later generation
is
more
pernicious.
The
idea that
146
PASSIONATE REASON
/
the consequences of the fact qualitatively alter the situation of the later believer
tantamount to the notion that
is
"naturalized."" Clearly, Climacus has in
one born it
is
might become
mind here the
idea that some-
might simply possess
in a "Christian land"
faith automatically;
the same idea that he skewers in Postscript in his discussions of
whether a person might gain an
faith
faith automatically
and which becomes the
infant,
by being baptized as
target of Kierkegaard's final attack
on "Christendom."
The notion
that faith might
become
naturalized in this
ultimate in lunacy, according to Climacus, since
bom
claim that one can be
second birth are
it
way
amounts
is
to the
with one's second nature. Birth and the
Climacus says that he can make som.e
identified.'^
sense even of the doctrine of reincarnation, but the idea of being
with faith
"is just as plausible as
Climacus'
venom
makes
criticism
it
here
is
being
instructive,
no sense of
a
bom
twenty-four years old."" his criticism.
clear that logical clarity
first
birth that
first birth.
is
bom
as
is
First,
the
and the avoidance of con-
tradiction are things that Climacus prizes very highly.
presupposes a
the
He can make
simultaneously a second birth that
This confirms our
paradox cannot properly be understood
as
earlier
contention that the
something that contains a
logical contradiction.
The ground I
for the
venom of the
think the right clue here
to
its
domestication.^'^
The
is
attack
is
perhaps harder to discem.
that the naturalization of faith
evil of
Christendom
something of surpassing value in Christianity,
is
its
It is
and transform things.
of
its
it
amounts
eliminates
discontinuity with
this discontinuity that
the existing order of things. for Christianity to subvert
tianity
that
To
makes
it
possible
naturalize Chris-
therefore to deify the established order, to rob Christianity
is
power
to call into question established values, attitudes,
and
institutions.
THE IRRELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR FAITH Having
dealt with the quibbles of the interlocutor
differences
between
later generations,
conceming the
Climacus returns to the central
Fcdth
issue,
which concerns the
and History
/
147
situation of the later disciple. Before an-
swering the question, which he actually has already answered in chapter 4,
he makes some "observations
he describes three possible categories under
Essentially,
sibilities.^^
which the
fact of the
god in time might
fall.
the fact might be a simple historical
First,
concerning the pos-
for orientation"
a historical contemporary
is
In this case being
fact.
an advantage, but
in that case the fact
could only have relative value and significance. Secondly, the fact
might be an "eternal
He
fact."
This concept
says of such a fact that "every age
an example of the
not immediately transparent.
is
equally close to
is
alleged philosophical insight such as the
Hindu conviction
human
The
being
is
suffering stems
Such
insights
divine:
"That
Perhaps
it."^^
Climacus has in mind would be an
sort of thing
art thou."
that every
claims of Buddhists that
from the desires of the ego might be another example.
have no
They may have been their truth does not
connection to any "datable" event.
intrinsic
first
propounded by some
historical figure, but
depend on any knowledge of the propounder's
or any other historical event.
They
life,
are pure "Socratic" truths.
Eternal facts are then equally available to every historical period,
but Climacus says that such truths are not grasped by faith, for "faith
and the
historical correspond perfectly to
here that Clim.acus sense.
is
each other."^^
using the term "faith" in a
It is
obvious
somewhat technical
People often do speak of someone's commitment to some
"Socratic" principle as a faith commitment, and Climacus himself
admits in Postscript that his usage
can speak of Socrates Climacus
is
quite justified in his
big difference in
between
is
a bit fastidious here
as possessing a
main
kind of point,
which
a faith like Christianity,
and that one Nevertheless,
faith.^^
that there
is
which involves
genuine historical events, and the "faith" that
is
a
belief
involved in ac-
is
The
historicity of the former type of
belief involves possibilities for being
mistaken that are absent in the
cepting some Socratic principle.
latter case.
The fact."^^
third possibility
hypothesis belongs is
is
that the fact in question
This category, which to, is a
is
kind of hybrid of the
historical, as in the case of the first category,
an eternal
is
"an absolute
of course the one Climacus says his
fact in being equally relevant
first
but
two.
it
is
and available
Its
content
absolute like to every gen-
148
PASSIONATE REASON
/
eration. "If that fact
an absolute
is
fact,... then it
is
a contradiction for
time to be able to apportion the relations of people to the historical
essential
is
if
his hypothesis
is
it."^°
So, although
not to collapse back into
a Socratic position, the historical aspect must not "be accentuated in
such a way that
it
becomes absolutely decisive
for individuals."^^ Fol-
lowing this line of course requires that Climacus adhere to the view
he has already announced, that there contemporary generation or any
The
reason this
is
so
is
later
that faith
is
no advantage
is
one
to either the
in the acquisition of faith.
always acquired in a first-hand
transformative encounter. For the historical contemporary, his percep-
god provides the occasion
tual experience of the
for this encounter,
while for the later generation the report of the contemporary provides the occasion.
There
What
is
essential
the transforming encounter
is
clearly a kind of egalitarian assumption lying
is
itself.
behind the
claims Climacus makes about the necessity for an "absolute fact" to be equally available to every generation.
but the idea life
is
roughly that whatever
It is difficult it
is
and
in isolation,
might be defended, but line of defense. If
would
it
not be
a principle,
"Would
it
we assume
fair
difficult to see
is
later in the
and
to put
God
God
way
When
and
justly?
he would
human
being at every time
Climacus' egalitarian principle
God
it
is
linked
acquires great appeal, though
it
self-evidently true. is
clearly a large part of the reason that
sticks strongly to his
formula for the later generation's ac-
This egalitarian principle
Climacus
fairly
whom
not be worthy of the god to make the
to the concept of
by no means
Put so
that Christianity accepts,
and would we not expect God to operate
in every place...""
human
such an assumption
the god allow the power of time to decide it
history.
to operate along the lines of such
reconciliation equally difficult for every
in this
how
precisely,
it
essential for
chapter Climacus suggests a plausible
the kind of
just of
grant his favor, or would
is
is
must be equally available to every age of human
baldly
and
that
quisition of faith: ''By means of the contemporary's report (the occasion),
the person
who comes
later believes
by the power of the condition he
himself receives from the god."^^ Since the historical records are only
an occasion, the accuracy and completeness of the records are completely insignificant. "Even if the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except these words, 'We have believed that in such
Fcdth
and such a year the god appeared lived
and taught among
149
/
humble form of
a servant,
more than
enough."^"*
died,' that
is
then Christians and those considering Christianity
If this is right,
who
in the
and then
us,
and History
worry about the strength of the historical evidence of the gospels
New Testament are misled. The historical records do not function
in the
but as occasion for an encounter with the god, and their
as evidence,
ability to
do that
unrelated to their quality as historical evidence.
is
In any case Climacus says that the content of the alleged fact, being a paradox,
not the sort of thing for which any evidence would
is
be adequate. "Law7ers say that a capital crime absorbs crimes
—
so also with faith:
Discrepancies,
ters.
its
which
all
the lesser
absurdity completely absorbs minor mat-
usually are disturbing,
do not disturb here
and do not matter."" There are several
different kinds of issues that are tied together in
Climacus' dismissal of the relevance of historical evidence. is
the egalitarian principle
we have
First,
identified. Secondly, there
claim that the encounter with the god
is
there is
the
unaffected by the quality of
the historical records, which function solely as an "occasion." Thirdly, there
is
the contention that the paradoxical content of the belief in
this case
warrant
such that no historical evidence would be sufficient to
is
belief,
and hence
actual evidence available egalitarianism,
it
is
makes no difference whatsoever
poor in quality.
I
and then deal with these other
shall focus first
issues in the
if
the
on the
next section.
CLIMACUS THE EGALITARIAN The
egalitarian principle
thing like this principle
Climacus seems to accept
is, I
suspect, a chief reason
is
appealing.
Some-
why many modem
theologians reject the idea that historical beliefs are necessary for salvation,
which converts
their
brand of Christianity into a Socratic
view, according to Climacus.^^ Climacus, however, thinks that the principle
is
compatible with the traditional Christian understanding of
faith as including historical beliefs,
from the dead
However is
hard to see
after suffering
such as the belief that Jesus rose
under Pontius
appealing, this principle
how
a Truth that
is
is
Pilate.
problematic for Climacus.
historical
It
can be "equally available
150
PASSIONATE REASON
/
to people in every time
and place." Even
if
Climacus
is
right in his
contention that the contemporary generation has no essential advantage over later generations, that hardly
demands.
Many
amounts
to the equality
he
people in both the contemporary and later generations
cannot possibly have
faith in Climacus' sense, for the simple reason
that they live in places where the story has not reached, even in a
fragmentary way. Such people
may not be excluded from
the Truth by
being members of a particular generation, but they are surely excluded
by being part of a particular region, and
as
Climacus himself
affirms,
discrimination by geography seems no better than discrimination by time.
And
with respect to the generations that lived before the god's
appearance, time would appear to decide whether faith for
is
a possibility
them. Perhaps Climacus would be better off weakening his egalitarian
principle to something like the claim that
among
those
who have been
confronted by the news about the god's appearance, there of opportunity.
The
is
equality
quality of evidence then will be irrelevant for this
may be salvageable, but it faces problems too, in light of what we know about the sociology of knowledge. It does not appear obvious that those who have heard of class of people.
the event are
Something
like this principle
on an equal
footing, for they
same way. Does a young Marxist
who
have
all
not heard in the
has only heard the story of the
who describe it as superstition have the who have heard from believers? Climacus'
god's appearance from those
same opportunity
as those
account would seem to imply an affirmative answer, but that seems dubious, to say the
weakened hard to see
least.
In any case,
if
the principle of equality
to take into account accidents of time
why
it
and geography,
it
is is
should not be further weakened to take into account
other sorts of "accidents of upbringing."
An
alternative to
altogether.
A
weakening the principle would be to abandon
convinced Calvinist,
for
example,
full
it
of confidence in
God and full of suspicion of our human moral how God should behave, might simply reject the idea
the sovereignty of intuitions about
that people in different ages
and places should have an equal oppor-
tunity to obtain the Truth. Perhaps the selectivity involved in historical faith
is
simply part of God's
one might argue that such
will.
Alternatively, and less Calvinistically,
selectivity
is
a necessary evil, something
Faith
that
God must
accept
if
and History
151
/
he chooses to reveal himself to human beings
historically. Still
another alternative for Climacus, and the one
most appealing,
is
personally find
I
to "save" the principle of equality in
its
strong form
who had no those who have
by an "auxiliary hypothesis" which implies that those opportunity to hear about the incarnation of God, or
had no
fair
opportunity to hear, will nevertheless have an opportunity
to obtain faith.
manner
that
The danger
is
The
trick here
is
to
form such a hypothesis in such a
does not amount to a reversion to the Socratic position.
it
that
if
the Truth
their historical situation,
it
is
available to all people, regardless of
be construed as a Socratic truth which
will
has no essential relation to history. that everyone idea of
God
Truth, then
who
existentially
If,
for
commits
example, one simply said
or other moral ideal available to
we would
most adequate
herself to the
them
thereby in the
is
be back to Socrates.
clearly
There are several possible
auxiliary hypotheses that
might avoid
however. For example, one might hold that those
this fate,
not have an opportunity to encounter the god in this the news of the god's appearance proclaimed to
them
life
who do
will
have
after their death.
People in this situation would be excluded from the Truth during their
temporal existence, but would not be excluded eternally, and their situation
would not seem to
differ
much from
those
who
only heard
about the god at the end of their lives and were thus similarly excluded
from faith
for
Of course
much it
of their lives.
must be acknowledged that the Socratic position may
indeed be the correct one, and tortions
we
recalled,
is
if
that position
is
accepted, the con-
Climacus himself,
are exploring are unnecessary.
not trying to argue that the Socratic view
is
it
will
be
wrong, but
only experimentally attempting to develop an alternative. In view of the difficulties with that alternative,
The answer so,
there
is
surely lies in
no reason
lack the Truth,
then there course, that
is
if
it
is
fair to ask,
bother?"
to bother with the alternative. If
human
If
beings
they are in fact sinful as Climacus' hypothesis assumes,
every reason to bother.
human
sinfulness
is
It
is
part of the hypothesis, of
something that
of the encounter with the god. Therefore, those
encounter, or
"Why
whether human beings possess the Truth.
who have
is
itself
revealed as part
who have not had
the
in offense refused to believe they are sinful,
152
PASSIONATE REASON
/
whole business
will naturally think the
according to Climacus,
is
a waste of time.
a reaction,
completely natural and to be expected but
by no means entails that the alternative hypothesis
IS
Such
is
false.
FAITH INDIFFERENT TO THE QUALITY OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE?
Let us assume for the
moment
that Climacus' thought-experiment
is
presented in order to illuminate the nature of Christian faith, as
Climacus himself clearly says assumption faith
and
is
at the conclusiori of the book.
When
this
made, Climacus' thoughts on the relationship between
when compared with
historical evidence are quite unusual
most Christian thinkers, and their oddity seems to stem from
a
deep
internal tension.
On
the one hand, Climacus wants to maintain there
difference
is
an
essential
between Christianity and Greek modes of thought, a
differ-
ence which depends on the historical component of Christianity. Either Christianity
is
something essentially different from what Socrates could
have come up with, or because
it
else Christianity does
donym, Johannes de
Silentio.
He
in us,
exist,
"precisely
locates this essential difference ul-
timately in the historical entrance of the alternative to Socratic is
not
has always existed,"" to borrow the words of another pseu-
even
The Truth
in the
immanence
God
requires that
form of a potentiality
into history.
we deny
A
real
that the Truth
for recognizing the Truth.^^
as well as the capacity to recognize the Truth must be
brought to us by a
God who
enters history.
So any attempt
to replace
the Jesus of history with a mythical figure whose real significance
meaning of the narrative or
in the existential
teaching must be rejected.^^ in order to get
"the
The
God
in the
lies
content of the
objectivity of the historical
is
required
outside yourself,"^^ as Climacus says in
Postscript.
This emphasis on history of historical
coming
knowledge
a disciple.
as in
is,
however, coupled with a depreciation
any way necessary or
Climacus seems to make
tually irrelevant to faith:
sufficient for be-
historical
knowledge
vir-
Faith
Even
if
and History
the contemporary generation had not
except these words,
"We
left
153
/
anything behind
have believed that in such and such a year
humble form of a servant, lived and taught this is more than enough. The contemporary generation would have done what is needful, for this little announcement, this world-historical nota hem, is enough to become an occasion for someone who comes later, and the most prolix report can never in all eternity become more for the person who comes the god appeared in the
among
us,
and then died"
—
later.'^
The unusual nature of Climacus' ideas is now clear. More commonly, who have held that the incarnation was a genuine historical
those
event in something
may
be,
have
like the traditional sense,
also held that
it
who
evidence for that event. Those evidence, but
believe
have tended to reinterpret the incarnation
The
its
question
I
is
wish to pose
more
is
still
as the divine lord,
symbol whose power
is
whether the conjunction of the
essential with the claim that historical
unimportant makes sense.
modify would
as a
objective historicity.
claim that the historical
evidence
we do not have such
wish to affirm a faith in Christ
still
does not rest on
however varied that sense
was important to have good historical
If
not, the question of
be open. Both traditional Christians
liberal Christians still
engaged in the quest
would argue that what must go
is
which
to
as well as those
for the historical Jesus
the cavalier dismissal of historical
evidence. These groups have been suspicious of Kierkegaard for what
Many contemporary
they perceive as his irrationalism.
theologians,
on
the other hand, convinced that making faith dependent
evidence
is
a recipe for disaster,
on
historical
would argue that what must go
is
the
assumption that faith must be grounded in factual historical events. I
believe that Climacus has strong reasons for wishing to avoid both
of these recommendations. cisive,
and indeed whether there
revisions his critics
There
Whether those really a
reasons are ultimately de-
coherent alternative to the
would urge upon him, remains to be determined.
are several reasons
why he
dent on historical evidence.
we examined
is
First,
wishes to avoid making faith depenthere
is
the egalitarian
in the last section. Secondly, there
called the incommensurability
and matters of
between authentic
intellectual evidence. This
is
commitment
what might be
religious
commitment
theme, which
is
more de-
154
PASSIONATE REASON
/
veloped in Postscript than in Fragments, focuses on the character of Christian commitment, which has about
A
person of faith
someone who
is
is
an absoluteness and
it
willing to risk her
The evidence
everything on what she believes.
life
finality.
and stake event
for a historical
can never be more than probable and tentative, subject to revision in light of
new
evidence,
it
findings.
Climacus thinks that
would necessarily share
if
faith
were based on
in this tentativeness.
see faith as a life-transforming passion but does not see
He wants to how such a
passion could be engendered by calculation of evidential probabilities.
On the other hand, Climacus wishes to resist giving up the objective historicity of the incarnation because
the actual historicity of the
it is
incarnation that makes possible a revelation that can confront and
my
correct
indeed this
is
deep-rooted assumptions about
sinful,
and
God and
The
not a possibility to be dismissed in a cavalier way.
makes Christianity what dence." Transcendence as a corrective
is
is
termed in
important here not only for
and challenge
to
my
the secret of Christendom, which
what human
is
incarnation
its
possible value
individual errors and pride, but
human
established social order constantly attempts to deify
Christianity to do
am
I
Postscript a religion of "transcen-
represents as well the foundation of any genuinely
The
myself. If
those deeply rooted assumptions are wrong, then
if
social order. itself;
that
is
merely the attempt to employ
societies always do.
To
foil this
human
attempt at self-deification, epitomized in the Hegelian political philosophy,
we need
lished order
a
God who
can be seen
in
is
its
truly transcendent, so that the estab-
relativity,
and the
dissent be kept open. Despite Kierkegaard's
there that
possibility of critical
political conservatism,
a radical element to his social and political thought, an element
is is
own
tied to transcendence.
we humans
will
manufacture
Without a transcendent God
God
in our
own
image, and
we
in time, will
do
so to buttress the status quo.
Despite these good reasons for holding both to the historicity of the incarnation and the irrelevance of historical evidence, Climacus'
view
is
problematic.
died for
me
as the
Is it
Son
possible to believe that Jesus Christ lived
about the factual character of the extreme, that
evidence at
all,
it
and
of God, and be indifferent to critical questions
my
beliefs?
Suppose, to push things to
could be shown that there was no first-hand
and that overwhelmingly powerful evidence appeared
Fcdth
that the
New
a situation at all,
is
155
/
in the fourth century. In such
would a person not naturally doubt whether Jesus had lived
and a
One
Testament was concocted
and History
fortiori
doubt that he was indeed divine?
could at this point retreat to the view that the object of faith
simply that the god has appeared somewhere, sometime. However,
the content of faith would in that case seem distressingly vague, a
blank canvas that will have
little
power
and overturn our current
to jolt
Socratic ideas. Does such a vague notion really differ Socratic myth?
M.
historical events
is
much from
a
Ferreira puts the point by pointing out that
have identity conditions
refer to them.^^ If
that
].
we want
to say that
the foundation of our faith, but
if
we
are meaningfully to
something occurred in history
how
it
occurred can be
left
to
the historians as unimportant, the question arises as to whether what
occurred can be completely divorced from claims that
we need
at least
how
it
occurred. Ferreira
some information about an event
in order
to identify the event.
Think,
for
example, of Moses. Moses
is
the individual
fronted Pharaoh, led Israel out of Egypt, inscribed the ten
ments, and so on.
Some
but, according to the
or
much of this
information
view of historical reference
I
may be
who concommandinaccurate,
most
find
plausible,
we had no reliable information about Moses whatsoever, then it is hard to see how we could have any true beliefs about Moses, because we could not use the symbol "Moses" successfully to pick out a historical if
figure. In the
same way,
about "Jesus"
as
it
would appear that to speak meaningfully
the historical incarnation of God,
accurate historical information about Jesus.
our information to be historically accurate,
And
we need some
if it is
how can we
important for
avoid a concern
for the quality of the historical evidence?
Climacus' answer to this problem analyzed in chapter
7,
which
lies
in the
Plantinga's sense of the term.^^ Faith
is
is
encounter
not based on evidence.
is
Alvin
grounded in a transforming
encounter with Christ. Historical records function this encounter, but the
view of faith we
sees faith as properly basic, in
itself
as the
occasion for
the ground of faith, which
No amount of historical evidence
is
sufficient
to guarantee that the encounter will occur or that faith will be
outcome, and no specific amount of historical evidence order for the encounter to occur or faith to ensue.
is
its
necessary in
To answer
Ferreira
156
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Climacus must steadfastly maintain that objectivity in the content of one's beliefs
deniable,
I
compatible with subjectivity in the grounds.
is
think, that meaningfully to believe in Jesus as
must have some beliefs
produced
To
as part of the
Why
true,
but
on the
some of my
beliefs
that risk
is
false,
and the person
given.
if
the
mistaken, but
in question
it.
is
not based
or groundless, since
What
Jesus.^"^
which
that this encounter be an experience of Jesus in
in
is
than having
course
unavoidable, and Climacus does not think one should try
grounded in the first-person encounter with
is
Of
basis of the historical record.
Nor does the fact that the belief on evidence mean that the belief is arbitrary to avoid
about
seems possible that a person might believe
it
then they are
beliefs are false,
those
outcome of the encounter?
in the historical record because of her faith in Jesus, rather faith in Jesus
un-
couldn't the beliefs be themselves
refer successfully to Jesus of Nazareth,
Jesus must be
is
God one
why must
true historical beliefs about Jesus. But
be based on evidence?
It
is
true
it is
required
is
knowledge
The situation is analogous to a case of ordinary sense perception I come to believe that there is a flower before me because 1
which
directly perceive the flower. In such a case
I
do not normally regard
the existence of the flower as something that
1
infer or
conclude on
the basis of evidence.
One
objection to Climacus' attempt to rest so
rience of Jesus as necessarily rests
God
on
a host of
to
expe-
background assumptions. Surely a person
cannot simply directly come to perceive Jesus
manding her
much on an
that any interpretation of such an experience
is
do something, or inviting her
as forgiving her,
com-
to faith in the pages of
the gospels without assuming that the gospels are indeed an accurate representation of Jesus and that they provide a reliable means for
becoming aware of Jesus
at
work
sense perception also depends
would not believe there perception
if
I
is
in one's
life.
In a similar way, ordinary
on background
a flower in front of
know
me
is
as a result of
that there
is
a flower in front of
speaking to me,
1
I
my my
So some would argue
me
other things. Similarly, some might argue that to
God
For example,
did not believe that the light was normal, that
eyesight was functioning normally, and so on. that to
beliefs.
must know other things
I
must know these
know
that Jesus as
as well. So, in
both
Fcdth
cases,
may be
it
the evidence
my
argued,
have
I
belief
for these
William Alston has argued that confusion of for a belief
levels.^^
We
is
a flower before
me
is
my
I
To know
need to know such
so. It
that
my
For
belief that
necessary that
it is
eyesight be functioning normally,
not necessary for
have evidence that they are believe them.
is
my
things, but that
me
know
to
these things, or to
sufficient that they are true
belief is
is
properly grounded
may need
know these other may be necessary for
it is
is
God,
not necessary for the
have evidence
individual to
things, or
though that
the individual to
know
them,
for
that
her belief
properly grounded. I
conclude that Climacus' position
There is
and
may
to believe that Jesus reveals himself in certain
ways, and those beliefs have to be true. But
is
I
another matter. In a similar
manner, in order to have a properly grounded belief that Jesus the individual
a
between
for a belief,
justified.
is
to be properly grounded,
the light be of a certain sort, that it
on
rests
should distinguish between having a ground
and knowing that one has a ground
and so on, but
that
beliefs.
kind of objection
this
being justified and knowing that one there
157
/
on other evidence, namely
still rests
background
and History
is
is
philosophically defensible.
nothing incoherent in the notion of a historical belief which
grounded in a transforming experience, rather than
evidence.
Whether
that
is
in fact
how
Christian faith
in historical
is
produced
is
To decide that one must decide whether God and whether experiences of Jesus of the appropriate
another matter, of course. Jesus
is
indeed
sort are possible.
To is
revert to the language of the "thought-experiment," Climacus
probably right in saying that the "scrap of paper" with the words
"we have believed that the god appeared among us" would be "more than enough" to be an occasion
for faith, should the
god choose to
And
use that scrap of paper as an occasion to reveal himself. clearly right in saying that
no amount of evidence
nor necessary for
faith.
Nevertheless,
it is
is
will necessarily
produce faith in someone. So strong, historical evidence sufficient
he
neither
is
difficult to
accept
the further conclusion he seems to draw, namely that evidence
is
irrelevant to faith.
My
worry can be expressed as follows: Certainly
scrap of paper to produce faith. Perhaps
God
could use a
he often does produce
faith in
158
PASSIONATE REASON
/
ways that make evidence irrelevant. But the case?
If
I
have a belief
historical content, beliefs.
and
is
this always or
in Jesus of Nazareth, that
a belief with
cannot be isolated from m.y other historical
it
God produced my belief by overriding my normal thought is hard to see how could regard massive evidence that
Unless
processes,
it
1
Jesus never existed, or never said as utterly irrelevant to
and grounded
my
any of the things attributed to him,
Even
faith.
a belief
in direct perceptual experience
which is
has revealed himself to me,
not the liveness of that
evidence
I
have
is it
is
"properly basic"
subject to being over-
ridden by contrary evidence. Similarly, even though
is
even normally
is
not possible that
I
believe that Jesus
I
am
mistaken, and
by the quality of the
possibility affected
for Jesus' historical reality?
believe that the basic worry Climacus has about admitting the
I
relevance of historical evidence for faith
is
question of faith to be a scholarly question.
who
the ordinary person
is
want the
that he does not
He
does not want to leave
deciding whether to be a Christian or not
in the clutches of the historical scholars, with their endless debates
and never-decided controversies. After
all,
the individual
decide whether or not to become a Christian
how
about
her
life
is
who must
making a decision
should be lived. She does not have the luxury of
waiting for the scholars to reach agreement, which will never happen in
any I
case.
sympathize with Climacus' worry on this point, but
evidence
is
seems to be
historical accounts of Jesus' least,
The
irrelevant for faith.
historical evidence
is
I
believe that
concern can be met without the drastic claim that historical
this
life
actual situation with regard to
this.
For orthodox Christians, the
are regarded as reasonably accurate at
plenty sufficient for faith, and the evidence for this conclusion
regarded as adequate. For others, the account
is
much
accurate,
less
and the evidence accordingly less powerful. In extreme cases, skepticism extends to almost
all
the details of Jesus'
agree that in reality there
is
far
How much more is a matter Now why is it that the evidence
paper."
life.
However,
all parties
would
more evidence than the "scrap of of dispute.
seems adequate to one party and
inadequate to the other? Doubtless each side will have
its
own
explanation. Perhaps skeptics will say that wish fulfillment
preferred
is
at
work
Fdth and History in the believer. Perhaps believers will follow
own experience of Jesus What I wish to maintain
their
159
/
Climacus and say that
the deciding factor.
is
(and here
should be plain that
it
speaking for myself and not Climacus or Kierkegaard)
possible for the believer to say that the encounter with Jesus just as is
am
it
is
decisive,
is
Climacus maintains, without claiming that historical evidence
irrelevant.
That
admit that
if
is,
it
we have
significant that
we
is
as
possible for a believer to claim that
much evidence
did not have evidence of
be possible, while
still
would never be
as
we
some
settle.
type, faith
Though
is
would not is
not in
the evidence by
produce faith in anyone,
sufficient to
it
have, and even to
properly believing that the decision
the end one which scholarship can itself
1
that
is
it is
possible
some
that evidence of a certain type might be necessary for faith for
people, though not everyone, since not everyone will have the reflective
bent or cognitive capacities to appreciate the force of various possible problems.
To
go back to the level distinction we employed
earlier, for
may not be
of a certain reflective bent, being justified in believing
They want
adequate.
know that they are justified, and faith may be troubled by crippling
to
such knowledge, their
more modestly and more
plausibly,
1
think, they at least
out the possibility that their beliefs can be shown to be they
may have
this
false.
Such
admit the relevance of historical argument, while Climacus-inspired view that what
Such
is
they lack
doubts. Or,
need to
false.
rule
Perhaps
is
a believer
still
might
holding to the
finally decisive in settling the
first-hand experience of Jesus.
a person
is
not necessarily thrown back into the clutches of
the scholars, even though he altogether.
if
need because they have encountered people who
claim to be able to show their beliefs are
argument
those
To
may not
ignore the
work of the scholars
avoid the specter of an unending scholarly inquiry which
never leads to commitment either way, he may only need to believe that there
and
it is
is
scholarship. for
enough evidence
hard to see
how
that
to
make the
What the believer holds
one whose
belief has the
truth of his beliefs possible,
weak conclusion could be threatened by is
that the evidence
is
good enough
ground of a first-person encounter, or
perhaps even that the evidence
is
seen in a different light for one
who
has had such an encounter. In the latter case the encounter could be
160
PASSIONATE REASON
/
understood as transforming the individual, giving her the proper per-
which
spective from
view the evidence, or even
to
capacities she needs to appreciate
me
seems to
to
make more
its
sense of the
force.
A
way committed
respond to disturbing historical evidence.
The
as giving
view such
her the
one
as this
believers actually
usual stance
is
not
dis-
missal of the evidence as irrelevant, but confidence that the contrary
evidence will not be decisive.
EVIDENCE FOR A PARADOX: MAKING THE IMPROBABLE PROBABLE Climacus has one further reason insignificant,
which might be
for treating historical
evidence as
called the "capital crime" argument. Just
as a capital offense "absorbs all lesser crimes," so the
paradox icalness
of the incarnation makes minor historical problems insignificant." TTie idea
that the incarnation, being a paradox,
is
appear absurd.
The
so improbable as to
is
such a paradox cannot be
viability of belief in
affected by petty details of the historical records, such as divergencies
and contradictions of various witnesses. low that
it
antecedent probability
Its
is
so
cannot be made meaningfully lower; nor could resolving
such problems make the probability meaningfully higher. Climacus goes so far as to argue that to try to falsify its
character.
one could make
it
ical
attack
on
the incarnation probable
it
An
is
to
by definition the improbable, and it
into
Enquiry Concerning
what
it
is
not.'*^
Hume's famous
strikingly reminiscent of
miracles. In
argues that
is
probable only by making
These arguments are
Hume
make
The paradox
Human
crit-
Understanding
could never be reasonable to believe that a miracle
has occurred, because a miracle, which to the laws of nature,
is
by definition an exception
is
necessarily as improbable
an event
as
can be
imagined, since the laws of nature describe what normally happens and therefore
what one can reasonably expect
and strongest evidence
balance and could never overcome It is
to occur.
for a miracle imaginable
worth inquiring, both
for
Even the
best
would only serve
to
this strong a priori improbability.
Climacus and Hume, what concept
of probability and what assumptions about probability seem to underlie the arguments.
The term
"probability"
is
used in both objective and
and History
Faith
subjective senses. Objectively, to say that an event say that
it is
probable
is
to
Thus the
probability of a certain
are dealt or dice are rolled
can be calculated with
objectively likely to occur.
outcome when cards
is
161
/
We often say that an event
when we know nothing about the objective probabilities of the matter. In these cases we mean that it seems likely to us that the event will occur. For example, I may think it is probable that 1 will receive an exceptionally large raise in salary next year, even though I have no statistical data on which to base such a claim. It is simply rooted in my belief some
that
precision.
my work will
Such a claim
a probability claim
is
it
however, that
if
this
The
on which
beliefs
at first glance to
is
a
it is
based.
be rooted in objective
a miracle improbable. Critics is
Hume's argument, then
shallow understanding of estimated.
it
the infrequency with which laws of nature are
is
which makes
expectancies than
the objective world, and such
no stronger than the
Hume's argument appears violated
my
a statement about
statistical frequencies in
probability, since
probable, however,
be recognized and rewarded by the proper authorities.
more
is
statement about
is
how
have pointed
seems to
it
rest
out,
on
the probability of historical events
a is
probability of a historical event cannot be estimated
simply from the frequency with which an event of that type occurs, since history
may invade
is
replete with unique types of events.
Russia only once in
probability of
an event, we
all
human
French emperor
not only on the frequency of
rely therefore
the type of event in question but
A
history. In estimating the
on our total knowledge of the
situation,
including our knowledge of the intentions and characters of whatever historical agents are involved.
To
think otherwise
is
to confuse history
with dice-rolling or coin-tossing. Believers in miracles regard miracles as the
regarded as a personal agent. therefore,
To
work of God, who
one must do more than consider how frequently they occur.
One must consider whether there is a God, whether he being who could be expected to do miracles from time to
is
in a personal
God, and believe that God has the
and that he
is
a being
who
If
I
what
believe
ability to intervene
has good reasons to intervene
in nature in certain circumstances, then
of a miracle in those circumstances
the sort of
time, in
circumstances this could be expected to occur, and so on.
in nature,
is
assess the probability of a miracle,
I
will estimate the probability
much more
highly than does
Hume.
162
PASSIONATE REASON
/
Anyone who
bases the judgment not merely
on
objective statistical data, but
variety of beliefs about other matters.
who
or others
Hume,
judges miracles extremely improbable, as does
Of course
possible that
it is
on
judge miracles extremely improbable have objectively
powerful evidence that
God
does not
exist, or that
God
not the kind
is
of being
who
Hume
actually simply expressing his beliefs about these matters,
is
performs miracles, but
the judgment of probability It
seems or appears
course miracles
who
a
Hume
likely to
made
likely to
me
that
and
therefore of the subjective kind.
is
Hume
may not appear
seems more
it
that miracles do not occur, but of
someone
nearly so improbable to
Anyone who
holds different convictions about God.
else
actually
believes that a miracle has occurred will of course believe that the
objective probability of that miracle I
is
1.
believe that the concept of probability that underlies Climacus'
argument
also subjective.
is
Climacus says that the believer must firmly
hold to the notion that the incarnation
is
a paradox
and
therefore
is
improbable. However, since the believer thinks the incarnation has actually occurred,
the event
occurred
is
is
1
he cannot believe that the objective probability of
low, since the objective probability of an event that has .
The meaning must be
that the believer understands the
event as one that will appear improbable to someone beliefs.
For example, someone such as
Hume, who
who
holds certain
believes that mi-
make
raculous events are in general improbable, will certainly
the same
judgment about the idea of a divine incarnation. Anyone who
is
inclined to think that only events that can be rationally understood
can occur, and who
human
also
cannot understand how
being, will think the event improbable.
God
could become a
Anyone who
is
inclined
to believe that genuinely unselfish love does not exist will find the
idea of
God
suffering
on behalf of human beings
similarly improbable.
All of this implies that the improbability of the incarnation must be
seen as relative to the perspective from which
This corresponds perfectly with our paradoxicalness of the paradox the "infinite If,
is
itself
it
earlier
it
is
which
God and human
however, the improbability of the paradox
which
viewed.
a function of sin,
qualitative distance between
subjective perspective from
is
contention that the
viewed,
viewing the paradox as probable wrong-headed,
creates
beings.
'"^^
a function of the
is
why as
is
the idea of
Climacus plainly
and History
Foith
says?
Why
is
human
that the perspective of sinful
it
believer assert that
B
in the fact that the
lies
in fact sinners.
human
the perspective that every
And
shouldn't the
probable to her?
it is
The answer surely that human beings are
beings gains a
Why
kind of authority here as the defining perspective?
163
/
The
hypothesis assumes
perspective of sin
being occupies, at
since the transition from sin to faith
is
in fact
least prior to faith.
not, for Climacus, a one-
is
time event, but a transition that must continually be renewed,
it
remains
necessary for the believer to define the content of her faith polemically,
which
necessarily
beings.
The
as that
human person
who
of offense.
in opposition to the thinking of sinful
is
believer
is
not offended but the believer
provocative character and no longer confronts
If faith loses its
our natural patterns of thinking as a rebuke, altered
for her
character. Nevertheless, there
its
carnation
is
no longer improbable
knows
has indeed essentially
it
a sense in
is
which the
to the believer, simply because
something that has occurred.
that she
the
is
has confronted and continues to confront the possibility
It is
init is
improbable only in the sense
appears unlikely or improbable to our sinfully cor-
it
The event remains improbable
rupted patterns of thought.
in that
it
was not something we expected to occur.
Does the subjective improbability of the paradox imply that the quality of the historical evidence
is
no concern?
It
him
the unbeliever, since the event will appear to
improbable.
Whether this
effects of sin are
that evidence
is
on the
of
is
so depends
intellect.
might appear so
to be massively
on how pervasive the corrupting
However,
no value whatsoever
believe that the claim
I
to the unbeliever
implied by the requirements of hypothesis B, though
Climacus would admit
this.
The
for
is
not
I
doubt that
strictly
hypothesis requires that people be
construed as sinful enough that they cannot arrive at the Truth apart
from an encounter with the god in which they receive the condition. It is
not obvious to
me
that
one aspect of
this process of giving the
condition could not consist in giving the individual evidence that the
god-man It is
is
indeed the god.
true that the giving of the condition
is
made
possible by a
life-
changing relationship in which the individual becomes a disciple of the god.
Coming
to
know
the god and becoming his disciple
reducible to a process of obtaining evidence.
If
I
is
hardly
meet a person, even
164
PASSIONATE REASON
/
an ordinary person, and come to know that person, the relationship formed
far richer
is
However,
this
by no means implies that one could never gain evidence
for one's beliefs
to
know
than the notion of accumulating evidence allows.
about another person through the process of coming
same
that person, and the
know
the case of coming to
Of course
possibility
may give him
the individual's sinfulness
any evidence provided, because the
to dismiss
so improbable. But
it
would appear
a strong tendency
beliefs in question
appear
seems possible that strong evidence might chal-
we
lenge this presumption of improbability. So long as
are careful to
the evidence alone could not produce faith in the individual,
insist that it
to hold in
the god.
seems compatible with the B hypothesis to
assert that
which
play a positive role in the process in
evidence might
comes into being
faith
within the individual.
seems possible for evidence to have some value to the
also
It
view to the contrary
believer. Climacus'
that the faith
which
god does not
rest
faith it
is
surely rooted in his claim
is
the result of the first-person encounter with the
is
on evidence
in
any form.
He
This
is
essentially the
section and
Perhaps
it
is is
same argument we examined
subject to the true that
it
is
same reservations that
such a
human
being.
I
in the previous
expressed there.
the experience of meeting Jesus that
decisive in altering the natural judgment that a
if
not be troubled by flaws in the historical record.
will surely
faith,
thinks that
sufficient to overturn the subjective improbability of the event,
God would
Thus the experience may be the
decisive ground of
and the inconclusiveness of scholarly debate may be
to the believer.
However,
this
is
insignificant
compatible with claiming that
important that there be evidence, at troubled by doubts of a certain kind.
least for
is
not become
it
some people who
is
are
The evidence may not be of such it may be the kind of evidence
a nature as to convince unbelievers, but that
is
recognized as sufficient
After
all,
it
is
experience of Jesus which
some reasons
is
seen through the right eyes.
someone
the ground of faith
to doubt is
whether the
veridical. If
to think that Jesus really existed, really
certain character,
is
we have
divine, has a
and so on, such information could be helpful
resolving such doubts. to be
when
surely possible for
Mother Teresa,
If I
I
in
have an experience of someone who appears
will be
much more
likely to believe the expe-
and History
Foith
rience
of I
veridical
is
if I
/
have background information about the reaUty
Mother Teresa and about her
own claims to be divine,
is
may
but they
process by
divine, including the miracles, Jesus'
and perhaps not necessary
faith,
They
are not
many
people,
faith
call the
normal
confirming faith that
for
what one might
well be for others part of
which
in the
the profundity of Jesus' teaching, and especially
the resurrection, could be of significance to a believer.
produce
if
traditional arguments
and the testimony provided
for the reliability of the gospels,
gospels for the claim that Jesus
would be the case
character, than
had never heard of Mother Teresa. Thus the
sufficient to
165
comes into being. They may
also
have value
in
present and helping to relieve doubts and allay
is
various objections.
There
is
doubt,
little
think, that the claims
1
strongly contrary to the intentions of Climacus,
no value
in traditional apologetics.
treatment of what
his presence
is
no value
of
run
simply can see
instructive to look at Climacus'
known
some way,
for the sake of
who
to the person
Climacus admits
in the world in
"accommodation
says that every
hensibility"
It is
traditionally cited as evidence.
make
that the god must
though he
is
am making
1
who
compre-
does not receive the
him Ithe godl only under constraint and against his will.""*^ I do not see why this should be so. As Climacus himself says, it surely makes no sense to suppose that condition, and
therefore "elicited from
is
human being and Of course the gospels meet this requirement in the case of Jesus by presenting him as an authoritative teacher, as a worker of miracles, and as someone who the god
is
that there
literally indistinguishable
is
no
sign
which points
himself claims to be divine. this requires
see
why
some
If
from any other
to his divinity.
the god wills to reveal himself, and
sign or evidence of his divinity, then
is
if
hard to
the god should grant such signs only "under constraint and
against his will." will only
Even
if
we
grant Climacus the claim that such signs
be of value to people of
question that claim, for those people
it
faith,
though
I
have given reason to
does not follow that the signs are insignificant
who do
indeed have
faith.
Climacus says that miracles cannot help much, "the wonder" as the Hongs
strictly translate)
but
It
"is
it
only for
faith.'"*^
is
not clear
as a miracle (or
does not exist immediately,
just
what
this
means.
The
statement could be read as saying that an event becomes a miracle by
166
my
/
belief that
PASSIONATE REASON it is.
However,
this
claim
is
absurd on
its
and in
face,
any case directly contradicts a principle Climacus firmly holds, namely that the apprehension of something cannot alter the nature of apprehended.'^^
If
he means that miracles
will
what
is
only be believed by those
who have faith, this is possible, though not obvious, but that does not mean that the miracles lack evidential value for those who do possess faith.
Surely Climacus
is
right
when he
says that miracles
and other
evidence do not lead automatically to faith and that they can indeed lead to offense. Jesus observed in fact
If
the gospels are accurate,
him perform
many seem
to
many contemporaries
of
miracles without becoming disciples, and
have been offended by him. However,
not imply that the miracles are of no value to those people possess faith. Certainly, the traditional Christian view
is
Jesus did are valuable in this way. For example, Peter's
this does
who
did
that the "signs" first
sermon on
the day of Pentecost appeals to the "mighty works, signs and wonders"
which God had done among the people through tell,
Jesus."^"^
So
far as
I
can
Climacus' deviation from this traditional Christian view and
complete denigration of historical evidence the basic correctness of his individual.
One can
own view
is
unwarranted, even given
of faith and
its
genesis in the
of course resort to the claim that Climacus
is
not
own imaginative construcby his own repeated confessions
trying to present Christianity, but only his tion, but this claim appears strained
of plagiarism and by his explicit mention of Christianity at the end of
the book. His imaginative proposal
clearly intended to illuminate
is
the logical situation of Christian faith.
CLIMACUS CONFESSES:
IS
HIS EXPERIMENT
CHRISTIANITY? At
the conclusion of chapter
benefit of any reader obtuse logical
and conceptual
issues
5,
Climacus plainly
enough
to
have
he has discussed
tips his
hand
for the
failed to see that the
are offered for their value
in helping the reader understand the nature of Christian faith
relations to various philosophical views. After a few
more barbs
and
its
at the
Christendom which wants to "naturalize" Christianity by celebrating
Faith
its
and History
167
/
"triumph," a triumph that amounts to the transformation of Chris-
tianity into
and a concluding defense of the AristoteUan
opposite,
its
principle of noncontradiction, the only defense against the confusion
of the Christian with what
Climacus
tells
what he
is
is
logically incompatible
All the borrowing and allusions to the
New
Christian writers has been intentional, and
if
Testament and other Climacus ever writes a
continuation, he intends to "call the matter by clothe the issue in
its
historical costume. '"^^
difficult to determine, since "as
phenomenon
historical
with Christianity,
about as plainly as an ironical humorist can.
is
well
its
What
known, Christianity
—has wanted
name and is
not
the only
is
— indeed,
that despite the historical
by means of the historical
proper
that will be
precisely
to be the single individual's
point of departure for his eternal consciousness....'"^^
comment
Climacus, in a
that recalls the "proofs" of his hypothesis
end of the
offered to the interlocutor at the
that Christianity
is
unique in
two chapters,
first
says
linking of the individual's eternal
its
happiness with history. Christianity
is
thus distinguished from philos-
ophy, which presents us with ideas for contemplation, from mythology,
which presents
us with imaginative stories,
which presents
us with facts to be
understood as a
human
and from ordinary
history,
remembered. Christianity cannot be
creation;
it
has not "arisen in any
human
heart."^^
Climacus even trick.
We
tips us off as to
have already seen in
one possible reason
his discussion of faith
for his literary
and history a
concern that Christianity, which presents the individual with a decision concerning his or her existence, not become the province of scholars.
One can
easily
imagine a discussion of the issues that Climacus himself
wants to consider, such
as the
nature of faith and
its
relation to history
and to reason, and the difference between Christianity and idealism,
becoming bogged down and philosopher
Y have
in a scholarly discussion of said about the issues.
what theologian
However,
X
"if in discussing
we begin by narrating not finish, but manage to
the relation between Christianity and philosophy
what was
said earlier,
how
begin, for history just keeps
shall
we
ever,
on growing. '"^^
Climacus' admittedly whimsical device of converting the content of Christianity into a "thought-experiment" allows this
him
to cut through
long-winded discussion and go straight to the logical heart of the
168
issues.
PASSIONATE REASON
/
His high-handedness does, however, leave him open to a possible
objection, one that
some
critics
have been
concerning
swift to raise,
the relation between his thought-experiment and Christianity. Does the thought-experiment really accurately represent Christianity?
does this not in
its
call into
If
not,
question whether the experiment can succeed
puipose of illuminating Christianity?
Once
this question
is
asked,
do we not need a scholarly inquiry into the essence of Christianity? so,
Climacus has not missed the clutches of the scholars
If
after all.
Thus, some writers have objected that Climacus' version of Christianity
is
incomplete, since he says nothing about the resurrection of
Jesus or eschatological issues. This kind of objection seems wrong-
headed
He
is
to
me,
for
it
on
rests
a misunderstanding of Climacus' game.
not trying accurately to represent Christian theology, but only
presenting us with a thought-experiment. Admittedly, the experiment
borrows heavily from Christian teachings and Christian teachings, but tion" to
would be absurd
it
embody the whole
is
presented to illuminate
to expect such
an "inven-
of Christian theology. All he needs to
include in his thought-experiment are some features that are adequate logically to delineate Christianity is
therefore
no
objection.
shown
project could be tianity, It
to
It
from
would be
its
neighbors. Incompleteness
a different matter
if
Climacus'
embody something incompatible with
does seem then that to make a judgment on the thought-
experiment one must have some views on what Christianity this
Chris-
however.
does
mean
is,
and
that Climacus cannot totally escape the conclusions of
scholarship. This does not
mean that Climacus will get into a scholarly The genius of his project is that it allows
quarrel with anyone, however.
him
to abstract features of Christianity that are so logically basic that
they are very difficult to deny. Essentially, he assumes that there something distinctive about Christianity
thought, and he
tries to
fact that Christianity
argue that this distinctiveness
is
is
when compared with pagan is
linked to the
rooted in a divine revelation rather than
philosophical speculation, and to the fact that Christianity presents Jesus as a divine savior
and not
just a philosophical sage.
disagrees with these assumptions,
that Christianity
is
Anyone who
anyone whose scholarship implies
not essentially different from Greek thought and
that Christianity does not present Jesus as divine and as the vehicle
Fdth and History
for
God's revelation to humans, has a
It is
hard to see
how one
169
/
difficult task, historically speaking.
could claim that such a view
is
what has
historically
been termed Christianity, though one could perhaps argue
that this
what Christianity should become.
is
tician like
A
humorist and dialec-
Climacus will not get into the thicket of historical scholarship
to argue with such a person, but
Climacus stands ready to point out
that this "advance" for Christianity, this "going further," looks suspiciously like a return to Socrates
and Greek modes of thought.
CHAPTER
10 CHRISTIANITY IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD
Climacus ends his book with a "moral," and we would do well to ponder it
in
drawing our
own
conclusions about the book.
The moral
two straightforward claims and a barbed indictment. The is
claim
that the projected hypothesis "indisputably goes further than the
Socratic." is
contains
first
The second claim
is
that the question whether the hypothesis
than the Socratic view "cannot be decided in the same breath."
truer
This second claim makes
it
clear that the first claim
the hypothesis manages to clearly differentiate view, not that
way.
it
One cannot
is
itself
means only
that
from the Socratic
necessarily truer or cognitively superior in
some
decide the truth question without deciding what one
new organ: new presupposition: the consciousness of sin, a new decision: the moment, and a new teacher: the god in time."^ The barb is thrown, not at the Socratic view per se, but at those contemporary representatives who were attempting to pass the Socratic perspective off as Christianity: "But to go further than Socrates, when thinks about the essential components of the hypothesis: "a
faith,
and
one yet
a
says essentially the
that, at least, it
may
is
same thing
as he,
only not nearly so well,
not Socratic."^ Christianity may be true or
well be something that
we
will
want
to reject,
and
false,
but intellectual
honesty and integrity require that one not convert Christianity into
something with which is
it is
logically incompatible. This
hurled not only against the Hegelians,
with
human
society
who wished
and who saw the Truth
discovery of our identity with the divine.
It is
is
a barb that
to identify
in terms of our
directed against
God own
all
the
nineteenth-century theologies that in one way or another eliminate
Christianity in the
Contemporary World
171
/
from their versions of Christianity those elements that logically entiate
it
from pagan thought:
faith, sin-consciousness, the
differ-
moment,
and most importantly, the incarnation.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMACUS' EXPERIMENT FOR CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY In chapter 3
we noted
in passing that
shown how pertinent Climacus' century theologians.^
A careful
Robert Roberts has
attack here
is
brilliantly
against certain twentieth-
look at such theologians as John
and Rudolf Bultmann reveal that
in their
thought Jesus
is
Cobb
reduced in
the final analysis to the status of Socratic teacher. Cobb, for example, construes the significance of Jesus in the following terms: Understanding
God
himself as the source of the creative transformation of the world,
and salvation
as a creative
human being,
transformation in which the individual
Cobb says that Jesus, more than any other identified his own will with this source of creative novelty
becomes open
to growth,
and thereby makes possible
salvation.'*
For this reason Jesus
is
"the
incarnation of the Logos in the fullest meaningful sense."^ It
appears from this that Jesus
is
However, a closer look reveals that is
thereby given a unique status.
this uniqueness,
if
present at
all,
only quantitative and not qualitative. Jesus simply had a greater
degree of a quality that many, even
all,
people can possess. Even Jesus
did not always perfectly manifest this identification of his will v/ith the
source of creative novelty, and
it is
possible that there are others
who
manifested the same quality: "There might be someone of whom history has
left
no record who was constituted much
idle speculation."^ It
is
clear
from
the individual to receive the truth;
Climacus' sense, and there could be
as Jesus was,
this that Jesus
is
but that
is
not essential for
humans beings are not in error in many "Socratic" teachers who can
help the individual transform himself, even
if
Jesus turns out to be the
most effective one.
An
even more interesting
case, in
some ways,
Bultmann. Bultmann understands salvation past in such a
way
that
as
is
that of Rudolf
being freed from the
one can face the future with openness
responsible chooser. Instead of having an identity that
is
as a
fixed by past
172
PASSIONATE REASON
/
and circumstances, the saved person
decisions, possessions,
open
to hold that this radical openness to the future is
made
a condition
which Jesus.
Roberts shows very convincingly,^ Bultmann gives no
as
credible account of story that
is
an encounter with the good news about
possible only by
However,
totally
is
Bultmann, who has doubtless read Climacus, wants
to possibility.
makes
why
it is
that the story of Jesus should be the only
possible this state of radical openness to the future.
Salvation as radical openness to the future has the strong ring of a "Socratic" truth, and there seems
no plausible reason why other teachers
than Jesus should not help the individual to "recollect" such a
however much Bultmann may deny that
this
is
so.
of salvation, or the Truth in Climacean language,
On it
truth,
such construals
cannot plausibly
be argued that the attainment of salvation depends on a relationship
with the historical
Nor can
Jesus,
understood
as
uniquely God.
be argued plausibly that Climacus has misrepresented
it
the character of Christianity on these essential points; that
is,
that
faith or the incarnation are not really that significant to Christianity.
The evidence all
for this
is
the way
Cobb and Bultmann, who
are after
professed Christians, twist and turn to try to maintain the uniqueness
of Christ and the essential character of a relationship to Christ.
The
theologians themselves testify to the correctness of Climacus' claims
on these points by
desperately, albeit unsuccessfully, trying to
criteria for differentiating Christian
recognition and the attempt,
would surely be that tianity plausible to
of offense that
claims to rest historical
it
on
is
his
the failure?
The answer
of Climacus
due to a misguided attempt to make Chris-
"cultured despisers" and eliminate the possibility
part
is
human
its
why
meet
from pagan thought. Given the
and parcel of authentic Christianity, with
its
God
in
a revelation that
comes
in the person of
flesh.
Other theologians, most notably John Hick, Maurice Wiles, Michael Goulder, and Dennis Nineham,^ and more recently,
Thomas
Sheehan,*^
have forthrightly conceded that traditional Christianity should be jettisoned and that the doctrine of the incarnation should be discarded as a
myth. They are candid in admitting that
this belief
does indeed
offend them. That Christianity should be uniquely and authoritatively true,
resting
on
cannot swallow.
a
savior
who
is
uniquely God,
is
something they
^
Christianity in the
Contemporary World
However, even these theologians, paradoxically,
That
to appeal to the authority of Jesus.
in
173
/
some way wish
they do not simply straight-
is,
forwardly argue for whatever Socratic truth they have latched onto,
but try to show that the truth as they see
it
can be derived from
Jesus'
teachings. Sheehan, for example, claims that Jesus himself taught that
God must
not be thought of as a reality out there, but
present in
human
and
is
experience and community;
God
is
as a reality
"God-with-us"
present in the quest for justice and mercy. This presence of
God
constitutes the beginning of God's kingdom.
The
Father was not to be found in a distant heaven but was entirely
men and women. Jesus' doctrine of the kingdom meant that God had become incarnate: He had poured himself out, had disappeared into mankind and could be found nowhere else but there.... Henceforth and forever God was present only in and as one's neighbor."-^ identified with the cause of
Such
a teaching
presupposing that
clearly "Socratic" in Climacus' sense. Far
is
human
this
teaching implies that
The
interesting question
of this truth,
is it
to Jesus. If Jesus
authority?
If
from
beings are in error and require a divine savior,
human beings at bottom do possess is
the Truth.
why, given the evidently Socratic nature
so important to
Sheehan
to trace this teaching
back
was not the God-man, why does he possess any special
the answer
is
that Jesus' authority derives from the truth
and profundity of the teaching, then analysis the teaching stands
on
its
it
own
is
evident that in the final
Socratic feet, and
it
does not
matter what the historical Jesus taught. Nevertheless, writers such as
Sheehan seem anxious
and argue
to trace their views back to Jesus,
that traditional Christianity
is
somehow
a distortion of his original
message. Sheehan argues that the distortion began with Peter himself,
who
tried to
hold on to the person of Jesus instead of Jesus' message.^
A similar pattern can be seen of
God
Incarnate.
One
in several of the authors in
of the authors of this work argues, for example,
that Jesus' original message was altered to include a savior by the Samaritan church.
matter what Jesus taught?" once
But one may well it is
God
myth ask,
of a divine
"Why
does
it
conceded that Jesus was not divine
and did not teach with divine authority? was
The Myth
If
a person thinks that Jesus
incarnate and that our relation to
him
will
determine our
174
PASSIONATE REASON
/
eternal destiny, then
it
would make some sense
historical scholarship in determining exactly
Jesus
is
for that person to follow
what
Jesus taught, since
recognized by that individual as having divine authority (though
Climacus would caution us that a living relationship with Jesus
moment Jesus
is
within
the basis of faith, not historical scholarship).
is
If,
however,
who points us to a truth that is potentially embedded each of us, why must we cling desperately to his authority? Such a teacher
a view sounds once
more
like a case of "saying the
same thing
Socrates, only not nearly so well," not nearly so well because said
is
in the
as
what
is
burdened with deep conceptual confusion.
In a very interesting "Epilogue" to The
Myth
of
God
Incarnate,
Dennis Nineham sees this problem and clearly voices it. How is it, Nineham asks, that his fellow theologians can deny Jesus' divinity but then go on to make extravagant claims about Jesus as a human being? If
we deny the
inspired authority of the
the historical-critical method, can
man whose concern was
perfect, a
we
New
Testament and
centered totally upon God, and so on?
was morally
really say that Jesus
totally for others, a
At
on
rely
man whose
best such claims
life
would seem
to be consistent with the historical record, but not really historically justified.^
^
In a brief response,
Don
Cupitt accepts the force of this warning
and draws the consequences consistently.
I
acknowledge the limitations of our
critical-historical
of Jesus. However, the core of a religion does not
lie
knowledge
in the biography
or personality of the founder, but in the specifically religious values to which, according to the tradition, I
he bore witness. By these values
mean possible determinations of the human
itself to
spirit
whereby
it
relates
the ultimate goal of existence...''*
Cupitt here straightforwardly acknowledges that the Christianity he putting forward
on
is
a Socratic view. In effect,
Jesus' authority for his position
is
he
is
is
admitting that relying
a mistake, a kind of
hang-over of
old ways of thinking.
One may
well think that this point
a question of how a
word
be permitted their
own
if
modem
is
is
unimportant.
to be used, and shouldn't
sense of "Christianity?"
Isn't
it
merely
modem theologians
Of
course.
However,
theologians are interested in contributing to clarity and
Christianity in the
Contemporary World
how
responsible thought, they will be careful in are millions of Christians today
who
175
/
they use words. There
continue to use "Christianity" to
designate a faith that implies that Jesus was uniquely God's son, a faith
on an
that rests anity
which
authoritative, historical revelation, a view of Christi-
makes
clearly
Such
the Truth.
a
main body of Christian onward.
It
is
logically exclude Socratic perspectives
believers from the time of the
intolerable to
is
that logically exclude
a view that
it
if
modem
to believe in
theologians call
tional Christianity
may be
true or false, but
faith
something is
hardly
one thing
else,
and
obscured. Tradiis
certainly true,
and pagan thought
that traditional Christianity
is
what has heretofore been
have to term their
their relation to the tradition they are continuing
is
Testament
really Socratic "Christianity," the cause of clarity
called "Christianity" will
and that
New
have the same word designate positions
one another. Hence
Those who continue
served.
on
conception of Christianity has characterized the
are genuinely
different.
The message tied, as
it
of Climacus
organ: faith, and a decision: the is
is
therefore that Christian faith today
has always been, to a particular cluster of concepts: "a
new
presupposition: the consciousness of sin, a
moment, and a new
not denying,
I
is
new new
teacher: the god in time."^^ Climacus
think, that there
is
room
for doctrinal
and new understanding of Christian teachings, but he
is
development claiming that
there are certain features that are essential to distinguish Christianity
from pagan thought, ancient and contemporary. Genuine Christian thought
rests
on the assumption
their salvation
that
human
beings are sinful and that
depends on a revelation to them by God, a revelation
that must be accepted in faith and cannot be regarded as something to be transcended or surmounted.
own
entrance into
by which
God
human
history,
it
is
is
heart of this revelation
is
God's
an event which becomes the means
enters the personal history of individuals in every age,
making a moment of decision both of faith
The
not one that can be
possible
and necessary. The response
justified before a neutral, rational tribunal;
rather one that necessarily goes against our existing assumptions
about what
is
probable and which can only be believed
when
individual, including the individual's past ways of thinking,
formed by the encounter with the incarnate God.
is
the
trans-
176
PASSIONATE REASON
/
COMMITMENT: A RETREAT OR AN ADVANCE? Many
thinkers would agree with Climacus that a Christianity that
tied to
God
necessarily conflicts with reason, though they
the sociological critique of "reason" that
Climacus' analysis. For thinkers such
I
may not
have argued
as this,
Christianity through an act of commitment that
They
is
an authoritative revelation which revolves around an incarnate agree with implicit in
is
one can only embrace is
necessarily irrational.
work
see Climacus, or rather Kierkegaard, since Climacus'
understood as part and parcel of Kierkegaard's
own
is
perspective, as
recommending
a repudiation of reason and a "retreat to
Kierkegaard
here seen as tremendously significant, since he exem-
plifies
is
and in many ways
become pervasive
is
commitment."
the fountainhead for a strategy that has
in the twentieth century.
This retreat to commitment Rather, Kierkegaard
is
is
not a blind embrace of irrational ism.
seen as giving a kind of argument for the rea-
sonableness of irrational commitment. Kierkegaard saw through the
bankruptcy of the Enlightenment project of giving a rational
justifi-
cation for our ultimate life-choices, be those choices ethical or religious.
Since no choice of this nature can be rationally that any choice
and
for herself,
is
as justified as
this act of
justified,
follows
it
any other. Each individual must choose
choice will then serve as a "foundation" for
a substitute for the rational foundation the Enlightenment sought
life,
in vain.
Alasdair Maclntyre calls this the doctrine of "radical choice" and claims that
it is
exemplified in Either/Or, where the reader
with a choice between an aesthetic and an ethical objective
way of deciding between them.'^ W. W.
is
presented
with no
lifestyle,
Bartley also credits
Kierkegaard with being the originator of this strategy, and he specifically
mentions the Johannes Climacus
literature as
among
Kierkegaard maintains, says Bartley, "that the correctness of or
way of
life
can never be proved.
infinite regress of proving; essary.
To
Any
its
sources.
any system
attempt to do so generates an
and thus a dogmatic presupposition
adopt any particular
way of life one
has to
make an
is
nec-
irrational
choice of some 'absolute presupposition' or revelation."'^ Bartley
calls
Christianity in the
Contemporary World
argument the "tu quoque argument" and regards
this
Terence Penelhum,
on Kierkegaard that
one
seem
to
as the inspiration
it
contemporary forms of irrationaUsm.
for a host of
care than
111
/
that
in
God and
much greater who freely attributes views to Kierkegaard
very similar, though developed with
is
finds in Bartley,
have
develops a perspective
Skepticism
textual basis.
little
Penelhum
sees Kierkegaard, along
with Pascal, as accepting what Penelhum terms the parity argument. In Philosophical Fragments, he says, Kierkegaard uses the arguments of
ancient skeptics to try to show that
all
our intellectual commitments
regarding matters of fact are rationally unjustified and depend
which
an act of the
is
the will
human
is
made
With
on
faith,
regard to Christian faith, this act of
possible by divine assistance
and
is
not within our
powers. Nevertheless, the analogy between ordinary beliefs and
religious faith
no
will.
is
strong
enough
to
show
that the religious believer needs
rational justification for faith, since she does only
what
all
human
beings do with respect to other matters.
Now
it
is
certainly the case that Kierkegaard's writings, including
the Climacus books, do attempt to reason.
The claim
show the
limitations of
human
to think without assumptions or presuppositions, or
to attain a final, systematic understanding of matters of fact flies in the
face of
human
and
finitude
historicity.
The
Interlude in Philosophical
Fragments does indeed emphasize the role of the will in the formation of
human
belief.
However,
pletely misunderstand
that Kierkegaard
is
what
critics is
such as Bartley nevertheless com-
going on in these
texts.
They assume
worried, as they are, about whether Christianity
can be shown to be reasonable, and they therefore read him to
show
that Christianity
Such point)
is
a
is
as reasonable as
as trying
any other view.
view misses what Kierkegaard (and Climacus too on
all
about.
reasonable or that
He
it is
when
is
no more unreasonable than any other commit-
ment. Rather he wants to show that Christianity unreasonable,
this
does not wish to show that Christianity
is
most definitely
analyzed from the perspective of a person
lacks faith or "the condition."
The
Fragments are not directed at skeptical opponents of Christianity, are regarded as doing Christianity a service by
offense evident. Rather, the target
who
skeptical arguments in Philosophical
is
who
making the nature of
apologists for Christianity, those
178
PASSIONATE REASON
/
who would make
Christianity reasonable by showing
speculatively reinterpreting
For Climacus irrational it
it
not the case that Christianity
is
than anything
else." It
is
the possibility of offense. Given
fulness of
human
be the height of
human faith
its
thinking,
it
irrationality.
probability or
character.
its
"no more
is
the paradox, and embodies within insulting claims about the sin-
its
will necessarily appear, in
The arguments about
one
sense, to
the limitations of
reason are not intended to show "parity" between Christian
and other commitments, and are not intended
response to
critics.
who
rationalistic defenders of faith, defenders
prostitute
The
what they
Human
I
reason
are seen as
being
pimps who
made by Climacus
should term the perspectival nature of is
"you too"
are trying to save.
really decisive epistemological point
concerns what
as a
Rather, they are an attempt to burst the bubble of
human
reason.
not a neutral arbiter of religious truth, but always
expresses the character of the reasoner. Reason
is
passionate;
it
embodies
either the imperialistic urge to dominate that leads to offense or the
humble recognition of my drawn from
this point
is
commitments
limits that leads to faith.
to be
not that one may commit oneself to anything, are equally irrational, but that reflection
since
all
faith
ought to be sensitive to
Christian faith objectionable
on
thing about Christian faith, but Specifically,
The moral
its
own engaged
character. If
rational grounds, that
may
it
Climacus challenges
me
also imply
to reflect
I
may imply some-
something about me.
on whether or not my
objections are an expression of the jolt which Christianity offers to
need to be autonomous and in control of
man"
find the idea of
my
my
world. Does "postmodern
an authoritative, divine revelation intolerable
because we have made some profound intellectual discovery? Christianity
on
find
seem unpalatable because
it flies
in the face of
Or does
what
post-
Enlightenment people want to think about themselves, and, according to Climacus,
what human beings
in every age
have wanted to think
about themselves?
Nor should we implies that offense
forget that the perspectival character of reason is
not the only option for a thinking person. As we
have interpreted Climacus,
embracement of
become
faith in Christ
a logical contradiction.
a follower of Jesus
which
is
made
is
It is
not a blind leap, nor an rather a
possible by
commitment
to
an encounter with
Contemporary World
Christianity in the
179
/
Jesus that transforms the individual, including the individual's thinking patterns.
Climacus does not see
dence, though
have argued that he
really
ought to allow
something
sees belief in Jesus as
transformation and the belief that
What
is
needed
is
for faith
part of is
its
grasp the truth.
Thus Kierkegaard responds
outcome
tique of faith by a critique of Enlightenment thinking
me
the ability to
itself,
realistic
cri-
but he does
concept of truth.
that this description of the encounter begs
the interesting questions. is
are thereby
AND TRUTH
SUBJECTIVITY may respond
that the
Enlightenment
to the
not thereby in postmodernist fashion jettison a
critic
mean
not an arbitrary commitment,
but an encounter with a living reality that can give
A
for the pos-
like a basic belief, a belief that the
transformation makes possible. That, however, does not
groundless.
evi-
evidence might play a positive role in the process. Rather
sibility that
he
I
grounded in
this transformation as
How
indeed an encounter with
does Climacus
God and
know
all
that the encounter
that the transformation
is
one
that brings the individual into the Truth, or the Truth into the individual?
As
a question to Climacus, this query
does not claim to be a Christian.
We
is
misdirected, since he
can, however, understand the
question as a query to the believer, with Climacus as the believer's designated spokesman.
moment Climacus
How,
then, does the believer
has described
know
that the
a reality?
is
Here everything depends on the underlying epistemological assumptions. If one takes
"knowledge" in the sense of classical foundationalism,
then the believer cannot know these things. Here Climacus' skeptical admonitions are pertinent. there
is
If
I
limit myself to
a warrant for the truth of Christianity. is
a
problem
with
what
is
objectively certain,
no body of evidence or philosophical argument that will provide for Christianity or rather
classical foundationalism.
an encounter with the
My
The
Christian faith
living Christ, but
demonstrate that this encounter
question
is
is
whether that
one more indication of a problem
I
may be grounded
in
cannot be expected to
a reality to
an unbeliever, given
the perspectival nature of reason and the inherent uncertainty which attaches to finite hum.an experience.
180
The
PASSIONATE REASON
/
rejection of classical foundational ism does not, however, imply
that "anything goes." Specifically,
does not imply that there
it
no
is
such thing as objective truth or that there are no ways of getting in
touch with that truth. Kierkegaard has,
I
think, rejected
what Gadamer has
called the
He
agreement
Enlightenment "prejudice against prejudice."
has,
many contemporary "postmodern" thinkers, come finitude and historicity of human thinking. He does
with the
assume that finitude and historicity always cut us of truth, as really to is
many contemporary
off
in
to terms with
not, however,
from the
To assume
thinkers do.
possibility
this
not
is
have abandoned the "prejudice against prejudice," because
implicitly to
assume that our "subjectivity" always acts
a veil that clouds the truth.
It is
to fail to
it
as a distortion,
acknowledge the
possibility
that our subjectivity could enable us to grasp truth as well as block us
from the
goal. Like the radical critics of reason, Kierkegaard
shows us
the ways our subjectivity makes any final system of truth impossible.
However, Kierkegaard goes the whole way and seriously.
really takes historicity
This means that the factors that block and distort our grasp
of truth are historical as well and could be changed. Hence, even
though "the system" may not be attainable, truth may be provisionally grasped.
However, the
crucial condition for this
is
not a retreat to
objectivity, but a transformation of subjectivity, a personal change.
Alvin Plantinga, in defending what he has termed "Reformed Epistemology," has argued that knowledge nitive mechanisms,
when
these
is
the product of
mechanisms
my human
cog-
are functioning as they
were designed to function in the environment in which they were inten-
ded to function.^^
Of
course such an epistemological perspective
no means metaphysically things about
neutral;
human beings and
it
is
by
we know some However, why should we
presupposes that
their purposes.
think that any epistemological theory can be metaphysically neutral, or that
we could even get started on an account of what knowledge is withknow some things? If this is
out assuming at least provisionally that we
the kind of epistemological perspective that underlies the question as to
whether the Christian can know that
his
encounter with Christ
uine, then the negative answer the classical foundationalist is
by no means obviously
right.
1
is
gen-
would give
believe a positive answer can be given
with a slight emendation of Plantinga's view.
Christianity in the
The
who
Christian
Contemporary World
181
/
takes Climacus' view of faith will surely say
that with respect to essential truth, our cognitive faculties are impaired
by
sin;
they are not functioning as they were intended to function in
an environment
in
which they were designed
Hence an
to function.
important modification to Plantinga's definition must be made. Truth, at least essential truth,
the product of the restoration and healing of
is
our cognitive faculties, which makes them able to function as they
were intended to function in an environment in which they were intended to function.
The
restoration
and healing
is
one that
made
is
knower through an encounter
possible by the transformation of the
with Christ. In this transformation, the prideful attitudes of imperialistic reason are put to death, and the individual can begin to recognize Jesus
God
Christ as
one who
incarnate, the
fulfills
hopes, including the needs and hopes of reason
by coming to understand futilely
sought in
its
own
its
domineering manner
my cognitive mechanisms to function my own spiritual transformation.
for
it
does that the truth
inside me.
ably
The
truth
bound up with my own
all
along.
is
required
spiritual transformation,
is
is
insepar-
is
and that
is
The
possible require attitudes that
insights the I
far
on the Christian perspective achieved is
inappropriate here
as well, since the process in this case includes
important role for choice.
Human
What
had
it
inappropriate here, implying as
through a relationship. The term "mechanism" another reason
fulfilled
is
appropriately in this case
rather that the attainment of truth
from a mechanical process, but
for
Reason
the result of some machinery- whirring along
is is
is
deepest needs and
and discovering what
limits
Perhaps the word "mechanisms"
my
itself.
can
an
encounter with Christ makes
will to affirm or repudiate.
existence, as Kierkegaard understands
it,
neither guarantees
nor excludes the attainment of truth. Kierkegaard affirms, with "post-
modern"
writers, the hubris of rationalisms of various sorts,
the finitude and historicity of affirms,
human
existence.
with traditional Christians and on
this point the
as well, the possibility that in that finitude
discover truth. is
With
and
linked to subjectivity-.
We
stresses
also
ancient Greeks
historicity
respect to the Truth, that discover^'
spiritual transformation
and
However, he
is
we may one that
cannot discover the Truth apart from the
whereby we begin to embody the Truth.
Notes
1.
ON READING KIERKEGAARD AND JOHANNES CLIMACUS
1 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 14 (Sarnkde Vxrker, 1st ed., 14 vols. tCopenhagen: Gyldendals, 1901-1906] vol. VII, 2). .
In future references to the Postscript, the
first
number
will refer to the pagination
of the old Swenson-Lowrie translation. All references to Kierkegaard's published writings will also include, as a second
of the first,
first
number
in parentheses, the pagination
edition of the Danish Samlede Vaerker (volume
The new Hong
followed by the page number).
as well as the other
number
volumes in the Kierkegaard's Writings
series,
pagination of this edition in the margins. Throughout this book
modified translations or used
my own,
but
I
will
appear
translation of Postscript,
includes the I
have
freely
always supply an English page
reference for the benefit of the reader. 2. Postscript, p.
3.
245n
(VII, 234n).
The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984);
See, for example, Louis Pojman,
Philosophy of Religion (University,
A
Steve Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); John Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and
Mark
Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Author-
A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 4. Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of
ship:
Pennsylvania Press, 1971). 5. This approach is well illustrated in discussions of Kierkegaard in two of Mark Taylor's recent works, though neither work is devoted solely to Kierkegaard. See his Tears (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), and also Erring: A Postmodein A/Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 6.
Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard:
7.
Besides Taylor's
Postmodernism series
Mackey,
own
A
Kind of Poet,
p. xi.
work, the following books from the Kierkegaard and
illustrate
the kinds of tendencies
I
have
in mind: Louis
Readings of Kierkegaard (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986); Sylviane Agacinski, Aparte: Conceptions and Deaths of Points of Vievj:
S0ren Kierkegaard (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1988); and John Vignaux Smyth, A Question of Eros: Irony in Sterne, Kierkegaard, and Barthes (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986).
the above in some important respects but
still
A
writer
who
differs
from
situates Kierkegaard in the radical
is John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstrucand the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 8. See H. A. Nielsen, Where the Passion Is: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1983);
milieu of Derrida tion,
1
184
Notes
/
fcrr
pages 4-1
and Robert Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1986). Mackey, Points of View, p. 190. See Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). P. 147 and p. 214 contain particularly good examples of this kind of debunking. 11. See Josiah Thompson, Kierkegaojd (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973). 12. Works of Love, translated bv Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 213-30 (IX, 216-34). 13. The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History, translated by Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 72 (XIII, 561-62). 14. See again The Point of View, pp. 64-92 (XIII, 556-75). 15. "A First and Last Declaration," in Postscript, p. 551 (VII, 546). 16. See Mackey, Points of View, p. 187. 17. Many books could be cited as illustrating this procedure, for example John Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works, and James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: Regnery, 1953). 18. Niels Thulstrup, "Commentator's Introduction," in Philosophical Fragments, translated by David Swenson, revised by Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. Ixxxv. 19. See Nielsen, Where the Passion Is, pp. 22-23. 20. See Robert Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History, p. 7. 21. Philosophical Fragments, p. 7; (IV, 177). This quote and all future quotations and references from Philosophical Fragments will be referenced to the 9.
10.
new Princeton
edition. Philosophical Fragments (with Johannes Climacus) edited
and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). in parentheses
is
The
first
number given
to the pagination of the
is
first
to this edition; the
number
edition of Samlede Vaerker,
volume IV. The translations are usually my own; the English reference given is for the convenience of the reader. If no book is cited in a note, the reference is
to Fragments. 11. P. 7 (178). 23. S0ren Kierhegaard' s Journals
and Papers, 7
vols., edited
and translated by
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press,
1967-78), entry #1575. (Subsequent references to the Journals and Papers give only the entry number for the Hong edition.) 24. Published
in English with
the
new Hong
will,
translation of Phibsophical
Fragments. 25. For a fuller account see
my
article "Kierkegaard's
View
of
Humor: Must
Christians Always Be Solemn?" Faith and Philosophy 4, 2 (1987), 176-86, and chapter 10 of my book Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Humanities
26. Postscript, pp. 27. Postscript, p. 28. Postscript, p. 29. Postscript, p.
30. Postscript, p.
Press, 1983).
459-62n
462 403 402 243
(VII, 447-52n).
(VII, 451). (VII, 391). (VII, 391). (Vll, 231).
Notes for pages 14-23
AN IRONICAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
2.
1.
185
/
Plato represents Socrates as posing this paradox and solving
to the soul's recollection of truth
it
possessed before birth, in the
81c). See any standard edition of Plato, such as Plato:
it
by appeal
Meno
(80d-
The Collected Dialogues,
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University
ed. Edith
Press, 1961), p. 363. 2.
TTie image of Socrates as a midwife
logues, pp.
is
developed
Hamilton and Cairns,
Protagoras (I49b'151d). See
at
Plato:
some length in the The Collected Dia-
854-56.
The
reminded that all references without other and that the first number refers to the pagination of the Kierkegaard's Writings edition, and the second number 13 (183).
3. P.
reader
is
identification are to Philosophical Fragments,
(in parentheses) refers to the pagination of the first edition of Samlede Vaerker. 4. P.
14 (184).
5.
Pp. 14-15 (184).
6.
Pp. 17-18 (187).
7.
R19(188).
8.
In developing his thought-experiment, Climacus uses the definite article
to speak of "the god" in a
way reminiscent of
Plato. In understanding the
application of the experiment to Christianity, which will quickly
apparent as the point of the whole procedure,
speak of
God
with no definite
article.
I
will
it
will often
become
be more natural to
sometimes follow Climacus and
use the definite article to keep the flavor of his thought-experiment in view,
but in some cases, particularly where
experiment
for
Christianity,
I
will
I
am
reflecting
on the implications of
his
switch to the more normal Christian
terminology. 9. Postscript, p.
245n
(VII, 234n).
10. P. 21 (191). 11. Pp.
21-22 (191). 246n
(VII, 236n). not attempt to decide the question as to whether there are other religions, such as Judaism and Islam, which are similar to Christianity in posing the problem of a historical foundation for salvation. Climacus thinks that there is something unique about Christianity. 12. Postscript, p. 13.
I
shall
See for example the essay by John Hick, "Jesus and the World Religions," The Myth of God Incarnate, edited by John Hick (London: SCM Press, 1977). Several later books of Hick's repeat this theme. Thomas Sheehan has developed a somewhat similar line of thought in his The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity (New York: Random House, 1986). 15. The Point of View, p. 13 (XIII, 523). 16. For those who want more on the relation between Climacus and Kierkegaard, I recommend chapters 1 and 2 of my Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript and numerous sections near the end of each chapter, particularly at the ends of chapters 11 and 12. 17. Act I, Scene v. 14.
in
18. Postscript, p. 3 (VII, v).
*
'
186
/
Notes for pages 23-41
19. Niels Thulstrup,
"Commentator's Introduction,"
in the
Swenson
trans-
lation of Philosophical Fragments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p.
152.
H. A. Nielsen, Where
20.
the Passion Is, p. 3.
21. P. 8 (178). 22. P. 8 (178).
CONSTRUCTING AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SOCRATIC VIEW OF "THE TRUTH"
3.
1.
9-10 (180). That the highest human
Pp.
knowledge, because knowledge
is
dialogues, including the Protagoras
prove the immortality of the soul 2. Postscript, p.
166n
task
linked to virtue,
is
is
is
a
to gain true
theme
in
wisdom and
many
Platonic
and Meno. The most famous attempt
to
of course in the Phaedo.
(VJI, 178).
15 (184-85).
3. P.
4. See p. 12 (183), for example, where in the discussion of the Platonic view Climacus says that "eternal happiness is given... in the possession of the Truth that I had from the beginning."
Ill (272).
5. P.
See Robert Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History, pp. 30-44. 7. See Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1955). 8. P. 20 (190). 9. P. 14(184). 6.
10. P. 15 (184).
11. P. 15 (185). 12.
See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University concept of moral luck. Apology, 41D, Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns,
Press, 1981), for a seminal discussion of the
13. p. 25.
14. Pp. 15. Pp.
16-17n (186-87n). 14-15 (184).
16. P. 11 (181). 17. P. 18 (188). 18. P. 14 (184). 19. P.
20 (190).
20. P. 17 (187).
17-18 (187). 20 (189). 23. P. 20 (189). 24. Postscript, p. 452 (VII, 440).
21. Pp. 22. P.
28.
R R R R
29.
R11(181).
25. 26. 27.
21 (191). 21 (191). 21 (191).
22 (191).
Notes far pages 41-58 30. See
M.
J.
Ferreira,
187
/
"The Faith/History Problem and Kierkegaard's A
Priori
'Proof," Religious Studies 23 (1987), pp. 337-45. 31. P. Ill (272). 32. P. Ill (272). 33. Postscript, p.
332 (Vll, 322).
34. P. 109 (271). 35. P. 22 (191).
4.
LP. 23
THE POETRY OF THE INCARNATION (192).
2. P.
23 (192).
3. P.
24 (193). 24 (193). 33 (200).
4. P. 5. P.
R 25 (194). Robert Roberts argues in pp. 51-52. 8. ?. 32 (200). 9. R 32 (200). 10. R 28 (196). 11. R 28 (197). 12. R 26 (194). 13. R 27 (196). 14. R 29 (197). 15. R 29 (197). 16. R 33 (201). 17. R 32 (200). 18. R 33 (201). 6.
7.
19.
R
this
way
in his book. Faith, Reason,
and History,
34 (202). 35-36 (202-203). 36 (204).
20. Pp.
R R 23. R 21. 22.
24.
35 (202). 36 (203).
Many
writers
who
are addressing the
problem of the relationship of
Christianity to other faiths in a religiously pluralistic world evidence this sort
of embarrassment with respect to the incarnation. A clear example is found in John Hick, "Jesus and the World Religions," in The Myth of God Incarnate. Much of Hick s writings since this essay is along the same line. 25.
I
Corinthians
2:9.
This Pauline passage
is
alluded to frequently in Kier-
kegaard's writings.
5.
1.
2.
R R
THOUGHT, PASSION, AND PARADOX
37 (204). 38 (205).
188 3. P.
/
Notes far pages 59-70
38 (205).
38-39 (206). 39 (207). P. 45 (212). Climacus generally uses the Danish term Forstanden, which
4. Pp. 5. P. 6. 7.
translated by the
Hongs
as "the understanding,"
when
is
properly
referring to the faculty
human thought. It is of course well known that Hegel and some other German philosophers made a distinction between reason (Vemunft) and unof
derstanding (Verstand) and claimed that though the understanding cannot arrive at ultimate or absolute truth, reason could.
It
might be thought that the
that Climacus uses the Danish term for the understanding that
when he
argues, as
he does
the absolute paradox of the is
B
later, that
human
hypothesis that
limited in this way, not reason.
I
is
significant
fact
and
thinking cannot comprehend
it is
only the understanding that
believe that this inference would be
absolutely mistaken; a close reading of Philosophical Fragments as a whole leaves
no doubt that Climacus thinks that human beings are completely unable to comprehend the paradox of the incarnation. It was in fact to preclude this misinterpretation that David Swenson originally translated Forstanden as "the reason." To signify my own agreement with Swenson on this point, 1 shall talk interchangeably about reason or understanding in discussing these 8. P. 9. P.
10. P.
issues.
37 (204). 37 (204). 37 (204).
11. Pp.
38-39 (206).
39 (207). 13. P. 39 (207). 14. P. 40 (207). 15. See David Hume, "Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding," section 4 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 15-25. 16. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 500-506. 12. P.
17. P. 18.
40 (207).
Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, pp.
280-82, 284-85 (VII 271-73, 275-
76).
41n (208n'209n). See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) pp. 196-221. Plantinga's argument that the possibility of God's existence implies the necessity of God's existence is of course far more complex and ingenious than this bald statement of its import. 19. P.
20.
21. P.
42n (209n).
22. P.
42 (209). 42 (209). 42 (209).
23. P. 24. P.
44 (211). 43 (211). 27. Pp. 42-43 (210). 28. See my Kierkegaard's Fragments and 25. P. 26. P.
Postscript, chapter 8,
and
my
article
Notes for pages 71-86 "Kierkegaard's Attack
on Apologetics,"
/
189
Christian Scholar's Review 10, 4 (1981),
322-32. 29. P.
45 (212).
30. P.
44 (212). 45 (212). 45 (213).
31. P. 32. P.
33. P. 45 (212). 34. P. 45 (213).
35. P. 45 (213).
45-46 (213). 46 (213). 46 (213). 46 (214). 46 (214).
36. Pp. 37. P. 38. P.
39. P.
40. P.
41. P. 47 (214).
46-47 (214).
42. Pp.
43. P. 47 (214). 44. P. 47 (214). 45. P. 39 (206). 46. P. 47 (214). 47. P. 47 (214). 48. P. 47 (214-215). 49. P. 47 (215). 50. P.
48 (215). 47-48 (214-15).
51. Pp.
6.
LP. 54
THE ECHO OF OFFENSE
(220).
2. P.
53(219).
3. P.
51 (217-18).
See Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1987), p. 88. 4.
5. P. 6.
51 (217).
Pp.
49-50 (216-17).
50 (217). Pp. 52-53 (218-19).
7. P.
8.
9. P.
53 (219).
10. P. 51 (217).
11. See, for
example. Training
in Christianity, translated
by Walter Lowrie
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 62-63 (XII, 55-56), and The Sickness unto Death, translated by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University' Press, 1980), pp. 84-87 (XI, 195-99). 12. For examples of commentators who appear to take this line see Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 106-108; Louis Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity (University, Ala.: University of Alabama
190
Notes for pages 87-98
/
100-102; and Herbert M. Garelick, The Anti-Chnstianity (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 29. 108-109 (219, 270).
Press, 1984), pp. 24,
of Kierkegaard 13. Pp. 53,
49 (216). 47 (215). See particularly The Sickness unto Death, pp. 83-96 (XI, 194-207). Pp. 53-54 (219-20).
14. P. 15. P. 16. 17.
18. P. 19. P.
54 (220). 54 (220).
7.
REASON AND THE PARADOX
55-56 (221-22).
1.
Pp.
2.
Pp. 56-57 (222-23).
The Danish word
seems almost perfectly captured by the English me that the Hongs chose to translate it by "follower" in so many cases. The Danish term, like the English "disciple," is a biblical term, and the biblical overtones are surely intended in a work that is so full of biblical allusions and quotations. Also, the English term "disciple" has strong intellectual connotations; one can be a disciple of a teacher, as Plato is sometimes said to be a disciple of Socrates, and these connotations also seem very much present in the Danish text, written as it is in the idiom of philosophical idealism. In short, "disciple" has just the right ambiguity in that it can serve as a term for an intellectual follower but also as a term for a follower of Jesus. "Follower" lacks these rich connotations. Its one merit might seem to be that it is an existential term that suggests action, but this is actually a demerit, since it removes some of the ironical flavor of Climacus' work, which is one that tries to describe an existential commitment (Christianity) in the idiom of philosophical idealism. 4. P. 59 (224). 5. P. 62 (227). 6. See David Swenson's classic Something about Kierkegaard, revised edition (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing Co., 1945). Also see Alastair MacKinnon's "Kierkegaard: Taradox' and Irrationalism," in Jerry Gill, editor, Essays on 3.
"disciple,"
and
Kierkegaard,
and
it
is
Discipel
puzzling to
his "Kierkegaard's Irrationalism Revisited," Intemodonal Phil-
osophical Quarterly 9 (1969), 165-76. Classic essays by Fabro
found in
(New
and S0e can be
A Kierkegaard Critique, edited by Howard Johnson and Niels Thulstrup
York: Harper and Row, 1962).
Actually, these writers and those to be discussed below often refer to Kierkegaard rather than Climacus, even though they are discussing the Climacus 7.
Not everyone acknowledges the distinction between the pseudonym and Kierkegaard himself as I do. To avoid awkwardness in my discussion I shall continue to speak of Climacus rather than Kierkegaard in referring to these treatments of Kierkegaard, even where the authors in section of Kierkegaard's authorship.
question speak of Kierkegaard. 8. See Alastair Hannay's Kierkegaard (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 106-108.
Notes for pages 98-108 9.
10.
/
191
See Brand Blanshard, "Kierkegaard on Faith," in Essays on Kierkegaard. Herbert Garelick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard (The Hague: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 28. 11. Louis
Alabama 12.
Pojman, The Logic of
Subjectivity (University, Ala.:
University of
Press, 1984), p. 136.
Pojman,
13. See, for
p. 137.
example.
Postscript, p.
85 (VII, 73).
The
description of
human
and eternity pervades Kierkegaard's writings. See, for example, the famous opening pages of The Sickness unto Death, edited and translated by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton Unilife
as a synthesis of temporality
versity Press, 1980) pp. 13-14. 14. In
Concluding Unscientific Postscript Johannes Climacus describes existence
as a "striving,"
15. P.
which involves a "self-contradiction"
(P. 84; VII, 72).
87 (250).
512 (VII, 504). 62 (227). 18. For example, see Postscript, p. 183 (VII, 171). It may be that the designation of the paradox as the absurd by Climacus is a consequence of the non-Christian character of the pseudonym, or at least of the professedly nonChristian stance. It is worth noting that Alastair McKinnon's computer studies of the Kierkegaardian text have shown that references to the incarnation as the absurd come almost exclusively from the pseudonymous authorship, which represent how the incarnation will appear to a non-Christian, and are almost nonexistent in Kierkegaard's nonpseudonymous writings. See Alastair MacKinnon, T.He Kierkegaard Indices (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970-1975), particularly volumes III and IV. 19. P. 86 (249-50). 20. For example, Hegel says that nature is a contradiction. See his Philosophy of Nature, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1970), pp. 1716. Postscript, P. 17. P.
22. 21. Postscript, p.
459 (VII, 447).
22. P. 108 (270). 23. Pp.
108-109 (270).
24. P. 53 (219). 25. P. 101 (263).
(My emphasis)
26. P. 101 (263-64). 27. Postscript, p. 28.
be
See Training
504 (VII, 495). pp. 124-25 (XII, 117).
in Christianity,
(New
translation will
titled Practice in Christianity.)
29.
See Pojman, The Logic of
Subjectivity
,
p.
123.
30. P. 39 (207). 31. This
is
just
the materialist 32. Pp.
is
an
illustration.
I
do not mean
correct; as a matter of fact,
my
to suggest by this example that sympathies lie with the dualist.
46-47 (214).
33. P. 52 (218). 34. See
The
Sickness unto Death, pp.
83-96
(XI,
194-207) and Training
in
Chrisuanity, p. 64 (XII, 57). 35.
A good example of this reading of Kierkegaard
is
found in
W. W.
Bartley,
192 III,
/
The Retreat
Notes for pages 108-117 to
Commitment, second edition (LaSalle,
111.:
Open Court
Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 39-49. 36. Postscript, p.
35n (24n).
37. See Fragments, p. 59 (224),
and
514 (VII, 505).
also Postscript, p.
38. P. 59 (224). 39. S0ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, vol
University Press, 1967), entry no. 10,
I.
(Bloomington: Indiana
p. 7.
48 (215). 47-48 (214-15). 42. P. 59 (224). 43. Pp. 55-56 (222). 40. P.
41. Pp.
44. P. 62 (227). 45. P. 62 (227). 46.
Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief
God,"
in
in Faith
edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre versity of
Notre
Dame
and
Dame,
Ratiormlity, Ind.:
Uni-
Press, 1983), pp. 16-91.
"Reason and Belief 59-60 (225-26). 49. Pp. 59-61 (225-26). 50. P. 60 (226). 47. Plantinga,
in
God,"
pp. 78-82.
48. See pp.
51. P. 65 (229). 52. P. 58 (224). 53. P.
59 (225). 66-71 (230-34).
54. Pp.
66-67 (230-31).
55. Pp.
56. P. 57. P. 58.
I
68 (232). 69 (233).
thank Robert Roberts
for calling
my
attention to Bloom's writings and
this passage in particular.
59.
Anthony Bloom,
Beginning
to
Pray
(New
York: Paulist Press, 1970),
p.
xii.
60. P. 104 (266). 61. Louis
Pojman makes
Will (London: Routledge 62.
The
this charge, for
and Kegan
following passage
is
example, in Religious Belief and
the
Paul, 1986).
crucial here: "If the teacher (the god)
the occasion that reminds the learner, he cannot
assist
him
is
to be
to recollect that
he actually does know the Truth.... That for which the teacher can become the occasion of his recollecting is that he is untruth.... To this act of consciousness, the Socratic principle applies: the teacher is only an occasion, whoever he may be, even if he is a god" (p. 14 [184]). 63. See especially the second section. The following quote is very typical: "The decisive mark of Christian suffering is the fact that it is voluntary, and that
it is
the possibility of offence for the sufferer" (italics Kierkegaard's) {Training
in Christianity [Practice in Christianity], p.
1 1 1
64. Sickness unto Death, p. 83 (XI, 195). 65. Postscript, p. 51 (VII, 39).
[XII, 104]).
Notes for pages 119-131
8.
LP. 72 2.
3.
/
193
AND THE WILL
BELIEF
(235).
87-88 (251). For an example, see David Wisdo's Pp.
and Explanation,"
essay,
"Kierkegaard on Belief, Faith,
in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21, 2 (1987),
95-114. 4. P.
73 (236).
74 (237). See H. A. Nielsen, Where the Passion Is, pp. 129-33. H. A. Nielsen, Where the Passion Is, p. 130. H. A. Nielsen, Where the Passion Is, p. 130.
5. P.
6. 7.
8.
9. P.
10. P.
74 (237). 74 (237).
11. P. 75 (238). 12.
On
Richard
Interpretation, 21b-23a.
McKeon (New
York:
See The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by House, 1941), pp. 54-60.
Random
13. P. 75 (238).
14. P. 75 (239). 15.
See H. A. Nielsen, Where 75-76 (239).
the Passion Is, pp.
130-39.
16. Pp.
76 (239). 76 (240). 19. See The Concept of Anxiety, translated by Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 85-91. 20. H. A. Nielsen, Where the Passion Is, pp. 135-36. 21. P. 79 (243). 17. P. 18. P.
22. P. 77 (241). 23.
Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, second edition (Englewood
Prentice Hall, 1974), pp. 67-68. 24- Richard Taylor, Metaphysics,
Cliffs,
N.J.:
p. 68.
80 (243). 26. Louis Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will. 27. See Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, pp. 143-48, 25. P.
for a fuller
account
of the following distinctions.
Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, p. Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, p. 30. Pojman, Religious Belief and the Will, p. 31. Pojman, Reli^ous Belief and the Will, p. 32. Terence Penelhum, God and Skepticism 28. 29.
179. 192.
158. 189.
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1983), pp. 81-82, 114. 33. David Wisdo takes exactly this line in his article, "Kierkegaard Faith,
and Explanation,"
(1987), 95-114.
See Pp. 86-88 (250-51). R 83 (247). 36. R 84 (247-48). 34.
35.
on
Belief,
in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21, 2
194
/
Notes for pages
B 1-147
37. P. 81 (244). 38. P. 81 (244). 39. P. 81 (245).
40. P. 81 (245). 41. Robert Roberts says this in Faith, Reason, and History, pp. 109-17. Roberts
thinks that Chmacus' arguments in the Interlude
CUmacus may be puUing our
leg,
may be
ironical,
and that
forcing us by his outrageous claims to think
things through for ourselves. 42. Pp.
81-82 (245).
43. P. 82 (245). 44. P. 82 (245-46). 45. P. 82 (246). 46. P. 84 (248). 47. P. 82 (246). 48. P.
84 (248).
299n (VII, 290n). Also see Fear and Trembling, translated and edited by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 5-7 (III, 57-59). 50. Fear and Trembling develops this polemic about going further at length, not only with respect to faith, but also with respect to the doubts of the skeptic. Besides the section cited in the last note, see also pp. 121-23 (III, 166—68). 49. See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.
51. P. 85 (248). 52. P.
84 (248).
53. P. 83 (246).
62 (227). example, the stress Climacus puts on a first-hand encounter in which the condition of faith is received from the God (70; 233). 54. P.
55. See, for
56. P. 14 (184).
9.
1.
Pp.
2. P.
3. P.
4. P. 5. P.
6. P. 7. P.
8.
FAITH AND HISTORY
89-90 (252-53).
92 93 93 97 94 95
(255).
(256). (256). (260). (257). (258).
97-98 (260-61). 98 (260). 94 (257).
Pp.
9. P.
10. P. 11. P.
95 (258). 96-97 (259-60). 96 (259). 96 (258). 99 (262). 99 (262).
12. Pp. 13. P. 14. P.
15. P. 16. P.
Notes far pages 147-160 17. P.
20. P. 21. P. 22. P. 23. P.
24. P. 25. P.
195
99 (262).
18. Postsaipt, pp. 19. P.
/
184--85n (VII, 172-73n).
99 (262). 99 (262). 100 (262). 106 (268). 104 (266). 104 (266). 104 (266).
26. For
some excellent examples of how theologians do
this,
even though
they intend to remain fully Christian in their view of jesus, see Robert Roberts,
and History, chapter 1. and Trembling, p. 55 (III, 105). 28. Pp. 13-14 (183-84). 29. P. 109 (271). 30. Postscript, pp. 498 and 507-508 (VII, 489 and 499-500). 31. P. 104 (266). 32. M. J. Ferreira, "The Faith/History Problem and Kierkegaard's A Priori 'Proof ," Reli^ous Studies 23 (1987), 337-45. I realize that Ferreira's argument here presupposes a particular theory of identity for historical figures, and that if one adopted some rival theory, in particular some austere version of a causal theory, this argument may not hold. However, I find Ferreira's view extremely plausible, and 1 am inclined to think that any theory of identity that would have as an implication that I could meaningfully refer to a figure about whom I knew nothing at all would carry a heavy burden of proof. 33. See Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 46-47, for an account of what it is for a belief to be properly basic. 34. I do not wish to deny here that in a wide enough sense of "evidence" this encounter which I describe as the ground could itself be viewed as evidence. In saying it is not evidence I mean first that it is not a propositional belief which has any logical relations to faith, and secondly that it does not form the basis for any process of inference by which the individual arrives at faith. 35. The following remarks are inspired by some points made with respect to religious experience by William Alston, "The Place of Experience in the Grounds of Religious Belief," unpublished paper delivered at a conference at Gordon College on "The Future of God," May 26, 1989. I do not claim that Alston would endorse this use of his distinction. 36. See my "The Epistemological Significance of Transformative Religious Experience," in Faith and Philosophy 8, 2 (1991), 180-92. Faith, Reason,
27. Fear
37. P. 104 (266). 38. Pp. 39.
"A
The
94-95n (257-58n). following well-known passage
miracle
is
lies at
a violation of the laws of nature;
the heart of Hume's argument:
and
as a firm
and unalterable
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined" (An Inquiry Concerning Fluman Understanding [Indianapolis, Ind.:
^
196
Notes far pages 162-176
/
Hackett Publishing Co., 1977], argument. 40. See
my
p. 76).
discussion in chapter
41. P. 56 (222).
I
am tempted
See pp. 72-77
for the thrust of
Hume's
7.
to translate this passage in the following
manner: "Every accommodating aid the one
who
in understanding cannot genuinely help has not received the condition, which is why it is extorted from
the god only unwillingly." 42. P. 93 (256). 43. See the discussion of the necessity of the past 80 (243). 44. See Acts 2:22. 45. P. 109 (270).
in the Interlude, pp.
79-
46. P. 109 (271). 47. P. 109. This
is
one of many
allusions to
I
Corinthians 2:7-9 in Kier-
kegaard's authorship. 48. P. 109 (271).
10.
CHRISTIANITY
IN
THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD LP.
Ill (272).
2. P.
Ill (272).
See Robert Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History, chapter 1. 4. See John B. Cobb, Jr., Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1975), pp. 139, 142. Also see "A Whiteheadian ChristoL ogy," in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, edited by Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 3.
1971), 5.
p.
392.
Christ in a Pluralistic Age, p. 140.
6. Christ in
a
Pluralistic
Age,
p.
142.
Besides Faith, Reason, and History, pp. 34-37, see also Robert Roberts, Rudolf Bultmann's Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976), 7.
chapter 8.
3.
See The Myth of God Incarnate, edited by John Hick (London:
SCM
Press, 1977). First Coming (New York: Random House, 1986). Sheehan, p. 61. 11. Sheehan, p. 12412. Michael Goulder, "The Two Roots of the Christian Myth," in The Myth of God Incarnate, pp. 64-85. 13. The Myth of God Incarnate, pp. 186-203. 14. The Myth of God Incarnate, p. 205. 9.
Thomas Sheehan, The
10.
15. P. Ill (272). 16.
Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, second edition (Notre Dame, Ind.: Dame Press, 1984), pp. 39-47.
University of Notre 17. III.:
W.W.
Bartley,
Open Court
III,
The
Retreat to
Publishing Co., 1984),
Commitment, second edition (LaSalle, p. 42.
Notes far pages 177-180 18.
/
197
Terence Penelhum, God and Skepticism (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D.
Reidel PubUshing Co., 1983), pp. 75-84.
Penelhum, God and Skepticism, pp. 114-15, 81-82. Alvin Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," Faith and Philosophy (1987), 403-26. 19.
20.
4,
4
Index
Accident: learner and
loss
of condition
35-36 Alston, William: faith and historical for acquiring truth,
evi-
dence, 157
order, 154
and place of contemporary world, ix; importance of the historical to character of faith, ix-x, 148-49; Climacus and religious perspective of humorist, 11-12; philosophy and Climacus as humorist, 12; Socratic view of truth, 15; relationship between history and salvation, 20-22; motto of Fragments,
Christianity: traditional
Apologetics: as betrayal of Christianity,
90 Aristotle:
Christendom: naturalization of faith, 146, 166-67; self-deification and social
power of individual to
alter
moral condition, 37; concept of god, 47; principle of noncontradiction, 101; possibility in relation to necessity, 122;
subjectivity and realism, 138 Authors and authorship: approach to
Kierkegaard, 4-5; alternative to
faith in
23-24; nineteenth-century idealism truth, 29-30; a
Socratic view of truth, 40-41; non-
and Socratic view of
Christians and understanding of Chris-
priori proof of truth, 41; divine revela-
tianity,
44-45; Climacus' stance
as,
54-55
ability of
non-Chris-
W.
E.:
Enlightenment view of as dehumanizing and degrading, 51; believer's inability to
of faith, 146
doctrine of "radical
ogy and ontological argument, 64-68. terms from Danish,
knowledge and will, 128-31; skepticism and doubt, 131-38. 120; historical
See also Faith
Blanshard, Brand: paradox as logical contradiction, 98 Bloom, Anthony: conversion experience, 114-15 Buddhism: salvation and history, 19-20; salvation and truth, 28; Socratic view of truth, 30; Christian concept of incarnation, 55; examples of eternal
147
and
Calvinism: egalitarian principles and
150
Camus, Albert: normative view of
human
84-91; egalitarianism
historical evidence, 149-52; indif-
evidence, 152-60; miracles and historical evidence, 166; intent of Climacus'
thought-experiment, 166-69; Climacus' experiment and contemporary theology, 171-75; reason and
commitment, 176-79;
and Christendom Cobb, John: Socratic thought and con-
nature, 31
Change: character of and existence, 120-24
subjectivity
truth, 179-81. See also
temporary theology, 171
Commitment:
Christianity and reason, 176-79 The Concept of Anxiety (Kierkegaard): distinction between time and temporality,
Bultmann, Rudolf: Socratic thought and contemporary theology, 171-72
historical faith,
80-81; competency of reason
for evaluation of,
ference of faith to quality of historical
See also Existence Belief: translation of
understand, 56-57; modern
forms of thought and difficulty of belief,
choice," 176-77 Being: arguments against natural theol-
facts,
55-57;
tians to understand, 42-45;
Baptism: Christendom and naturalization Hartley,
tion, 42,
125
Concluding Unscientific Postscript
to the
Philosophical Fragments (Kierkegaard):
understanding of Johannes Climacus as 10; Climacus on review of Fragments 1 6; inclusion of Kierke-
pseudonym, ,
gaard's
name on
title
page, 22; rela-
tionship of thought to being, 66
Consciousness: paradox and offense,
91-95
200
Index
/
Consequences: argument from historical apologetics, 145-46 Contemporaries: historical and real, 113-17 Contradiction: paradox as formal, 97-
tion of demonstration by argument, 65-67; possibility and necessity, 12024; finitude
and
historicity of
human,
181
104. See also Noncontradiction Conversion: historical and real contemporaries,
Existence: proofs of God's, 63-71; ques-
114
Existentialism: Kierkegaard
and passion-
ate character of reason, x; normative
concept of true humanness, 31
Cupitt, Don: Socratic thought and con-
temporary theology, 174
Experience: historical and real contemporaries, 115; faith
and relevance of
historical evidence, 156-57, 159-60,
Death: eternal consciousness, 25 Design: critique of argument from, 68-71 Difference: absolute between
human
God and
Danish, 12
beings, 75
and relationship to God,
Disciples: love
49-50; translation of term from Danish,
96, 190n.3;
first
and
latest
genera-
tions of "secondary," 144-46;
irrelevance of historical evidence for faith,
164-65 Experiment: translation of term from
146-49. See also Learner and
Fabro, Cornelio: paradox as logical con-
98 consequences and character of, 145-46; eternal and absolute concept of faith, 147-48. See also Evidence tradiction,
Fact:
Faith: critique of
argument from design,
69; love as analogy for relation to
learning
Domestication: Christendom and natural-
understanding, 79, 93; as response to paradox, 82; competency of reason for
ization of faith, 146
Doubt: skepticism and historical knowledge, 131-38
evaluation of Christian, 84-91; as condition for understanding of truth, 96;
97between reason and paradox, 105-107; reason and acquisition of Christian, 109-113; historical and
Dualism: mind-body problem, 88, 104, 110
paradox
as formal contradiction,
99; tension
Dunning, Stephen: philosophical approach to Kierkegaard, 2
real contemporaries,
Egalitarianism: principles of
and concept
of God, 148-49; faith and relevance of historical evidence,
149-52
charge of volitionism, 130-31; skepti-
Either/Or (Kierkegaard): doctrine of "radical
113-17; paradox
and neutrality, 117-18; translation from Danish, 120; Climacus' and
choice," 176
Enlightenment: place of religious faith contemporary world, ix; place and
in
cism and doubt, 131-38; eminent and role of will, 138-42; first and latest generations of disciples, 144-46;
irrele-
character of reason in contemporary
vance of historical evidence for, 14649; quality of historical evidence and,
x; view of Christianity as dehumanizing and degrading, 51; Kierke-
paradox, 163-66;
gaard's response to critique of
reason, 178-79
world,
152-60; subjective improbability of
commitment and 127-28
Christianity, 178-79; prejudice against
Fatalism: argument for truth
prejudice, 180
Fear and Trembling (Kierkegaard):
Equality: love
and analogy of king and
maiden, 50-54. See also Egalitarianism Evidence: as distinct from grounds, 11112; historical
knowledge and
belief,
of,
diffi-
culty of skepticism, 135 Ferreira,
M.
J.:
faith
and
historical evi-
dence, 155; theory of identity for historical figures, 195n.32
137; irrelevance of historical for faith,
Feuerbach, Ludwig von: understanding of
146-49; historical and egalitarianism,
the unknown, 72 Foundationalism: Climacus and classical skepticism, 132; truth of Christianity
149-52; faith and quality of historical, 152-60; paradox and probability,
160-66
and
classical,
179-80
Index Fragments: translation of term from Danish,
18-19
as teacher, 48; nature
and
history,
between past and
126; relationship
28; Socratic
view
incarnation, 55; examples of eternal facts,
147
History and the historical: importance to character of Christian faith, ix-x; author's approach to Kierkegaard, 3-4;
128
future,
and salvation,
of truth, 30; Christian concept of
Freedom: historical character of human, 37; relationship between learner and
God
truth
201
I
Freud, Sigmund: depth psychology and
Future: relationship
between
and salvation, 19-20; knowlfaith, 112-13; historical and real contemporaries, 113-17; cominginto-existence, 124-26; unchangeability of past, 126-28; belief, will, and religions
edge and
Christian faith, 94 past and,
127-28 Garelick, Herbert: paradox as logical
nature of knowledge, 128-31; skepti-
cism and doubt, 131-38;
contradiction, 98
Geography: egalitarian principles and discrimination by, 150 God: teacher and learning of truth, 1516; Socratic self-knowledge and assumptions concerning, 33; learner and conditions for acquiring truth, 35; construction of alternative to Socratic
view of truth, 37-39; goals and motives of teachers, 47-48; love and relationship to disciple, 49-50; love and analogy of king and maiden, 5054; proofs of existence, 63-71; the
known and unknown, 71-73; paradox
est
first
and
lat-
generations of disciples, 144-46;
irrelevance of evidence for faith, 14652; indifference of faith to quality of
evidence, 152-60; evidence for para-
dox and
probability, 160-66; Christi-
anity distinguished from, 167; theory
of identity for historical figures,
195n.32
Human
nature: normative view of, 31; Climacus' assumptions concerning, 5860; Kierkegaard
and depth psychology,
134
Hume, David: Climacus and demonstra-
of self-revelation, 73-77; reason's
tion of fact, 65, 66; cognition of "mat-
ambivalent response to paradox, 7779; tension between reason and paradox, 105-107; historical and real contemporaries, 113-17; first and second
ters
generations of disciples, 144-46; egalitarian principles
and concept
of,
148-
49; probability of miracles, 161-62;
of fact," 120; knowledge of
impressions, 132; difficulty of skepti-
cism, 135; critical attack
on
miracles,
160-62, 195n.39 Humility: as requirement for leap of faith,
141
Humor: concept of
for
Climacus, 10-12;
Climacus and Christian terminology,
serious philosophical purpose and, 18;
185n.8
Climacus' use of term "contradiction,"
Goulder, Michael: Socratic thought and
100-101
contemporary theology, 172 Idealism: Socratic view of truth,
Hannay,
Alastair: paradox as logical con-
tradiction,
98
195n.32
Hegel, Georg: compared by Kierkegaard to Johannes Climacus, 9; Christianity
and nineteenth-century idealism, 2930; noncontradiction and absolute distinctions, 101; history and necessity, 127, 131; translation and usage of title
Immortality: Socratic view of truth,
33-34 Imperialism: reason and Christianity, 90 Improbability: evidence for paradox,
160-66 Incarnation: other religions and Christian concept of, 55-56; as logical con-
terms, 188n.7
Hegelianism:
29-30
Identity: theory of for history figures,
page of Fragments, 19
Hick, John: Socratic thought and contemporary theology, 172
Hinduism: history and salvation,
19;
tradiction, 87-88; absolute
paradox
and uniqueness, 102-103, 106;
sin
genuine historical event, 153; faith and historical belief in, 116; as
and
1
202
/
Index Love: Kierkegaard's standard
Incarnation (continued) evidence, 154-55; probability and improbability, 160-66; references to as
absurd in pseudonymous writings, 19 In. 18. See also Paradox Incongruity: Climacus and concept of
humor, 10-11
and thought experiment, 16-17; Climacus and authorship of B hypothesis, 40; form of book and Climacus as author, 54-55; paradox of
Interlocutor: irony
God's self-revelation, 73-74 Irony: Philosophical Fragments as thought
experiment, 16-18; reader's and Cli-
macus' game, 26-27
of, 4; as
motive for God as teacher, 47-48; assumptions about nature of, 48; relationship between God and disciple, 49- 50; analogy of king and maiden,
50- 54;
and ambivalence of
erotic
rea-
son toward paradox, 78-79; analogy of love and self-love, 92-93, 109
Maclntyre, Alasdair: doctrine of "radical choice," 176 Mackey, Louis: approach
to interpreta-
tion of Kierkegaard, 2,5; point of
view
m
Kierkegaard's writings, 4
MacKinnon,
Alastair: paradox as logical
contradiction, 98
James, William: speculative philosopher
and humor,
1
Johannes Climacus, or
De Omnibus Duhi-
tandum Est (Kierkegaard): study of and understanding of Johannes Climacus, 9;
Christianity and relationship to sal-
vation, 20-22
reason and irrationalism, 107
Hume's
critical attack on,
and value of
62, 195n.39; faith
160-
evi-
(Evans): compared to author's current
work, x-xi
Knowledge: historical and eternal consciousness, 21; faith and conceptual transformation. 111; historical and faith, 112-13; historical and real contemporaries, 113-17; Climacus and sociology of, 118; belief, will, and historical, 128-31; skepticism, doubt, and historical, 131-38; sociology of and egalitarian principles, 150 Language: concept of necessity and coming-into-existence, 121 Learner and learning: construction of alternative to Socratic view of truth,
x.
See also
Postmodernism ments, 170-81 Morality: Socratic view of truth, 36
Moses: relevance of historical evidence, 155 Motto: discussion of
God, 67
Literary criticism: as approach to Kierke-
gaard, 2-3
on Kierkegaard,
2-4
between Christian and Socratic view of truth, 87; paradox and grounds of offense, 1 17
for Philosophical
Fragments, 22-24
Mythology: transformation of Christian gospel
to, ix;
Christianity distinguished
from, 167
Nature: argument for God's existence
from works of God, 68-71; history and coming-into-existence, 124-26 Necessity: concept of and coming-intoexistence, 121-24; unchangeability of past,
126-28
Neutrality: paradox
34-37, 39. See also Disciples Leibniz, Gottfried: existence of
character of reason,
Moral: conclusions of Philosophical Frag-
Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscripts
Logic: relations
104, 110
Miracles:
dence, 165-66 Modernism: Kierkegaard and passionate
Kant, Emmanuel: demonstration of existence by argument, 65, 66; limits of
Literature: three types of
Marx, Karl: Socratic view of truth, 30; critique of reason, 97 Materialism: mind-body problem, 88,
and reason, 117-18
Nielsen, H. A.: approach to Kierkegaard, 3;
Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms,
6;
on Thulstrup's reading of Fragments. 23; concepts of necessity and cominginto-existence, 121-22, 123, 126 Nietzsche, Friedrich: depth psychology and Christian faith, 94; critique of reason, 97
Index
Nineham, Dennis: Socratic thought and contemporary theology, 172, 174 Noncontradiction: Climacus' defense of law
of,
101, 167
Offense: reason and response to paradox,
80-82; paradox and passive character of,
82-84; paradox and offended con-
sciousness, 91-95; Anti-Climacus
discussion
of,
107; sin
and
and
belief in
incarnation, 116-17; logic and grounds of,
203
I
Climacus on character of 94-95 Plantinga, Alvin: distinction between evidence and grounds, 111-12; defense of "Reformed Epistemology," 180-81 Plato: religious significance of knowledge of truth, 27; concept of God, 33; system of thought and Socratic view of truth, 34-35; subjectivity and realism, 138 Pojman, Louis: philosophical approach to Plagiarism: offense,
Kierkegaard,
2;
paradox
as logical
con-
and
tradiction, 99, 103; Kierkegaard
117
volitionism, 129-30, 131, 133; will
Ontology: thought and being, 64-68
and
belief, 134; volitionalism
and
ethics of belief, 138
Pagination: English page references and
Danish
editions, 183n.l, 184n.21,
ate character of reason, x; Christianity
185n.3 Paradox: fascination of
human
reason
with, 61; God's self-revelation, 73-77; reason's ambivalent response to, 79; reason
and offense
77-
as response to,
80-82; passive character of offense, sciousness, 91-95; as formal contradiction,
97-104; reason and description
104-105; tension between reason
and, 105-107; reason and neutrality,
117-18; evidence for and probability, 160-66. See also Incarnation Passion:
human
reason as expression
60-63; will and formation
of,
of,
134-35
paradox and offense, 82-84 Penelhum, Terence: Kierkegaard and
Passivity:
reason,
177
Peter: traditional Christianity as distor-
tion of Jesus' message, 173 Philosophical Fragments (Kierkegaard):
notes on reading
of,
1,
26-45; discussion of chapter
46-57; discussion of chapter
3,
2,
58-79;
discussion of appendix to chapter 3, 4, 96between
80-95; discussion of chapter 118; discussion of interlude
chapters 4 and of chapter
moral
of,
5,
on
and
faith
140
Preface: personality of Climacus,
24-25
Prejudice: Enlightenment prejudice against,
180
160-66 Pseudonyms: approaches to interpretation Probability: evidence for paradox,
of Kierkegaard, 5-7; Kierkegaard's
name on
title
page as editor, 22
Psychology: depth psychology and Christian faith, 94; skepticism
and
and will, 136-37
desires,
Reason: place and character of in contemporary world, x; revelation and
human understanding, unknown and known,
60-63; the 71-73; ambiva-
lent response to paradox, 77-79;
1-12; overall per-
spective on, 13-25; discussion of chapter
37. See also Will
Predestination: Climacus
134; evidence
direct volitionism, 130, 131; Christian
commitment and
and perspectival character of reason, 178-79 Power: individuals and moral condition,
will,
82-84; superiority of to offended con-
of,
Postmodernism: Kierkegaard and passion-
119-42; discussion
143-69; conclusions and 170-81 5,
Philosophy: Christianity and Climacus as
humorist, 12; reason and evaluation of
offense as response to paradox, 80-82;
paradox and passivity of, 83-84; competency for evaluation of Christian faith, 84-91; Kierkegaard and charges of irrationalism, 97; paradox as formal contradiction, 97-104; description of paradox, 104-105; tension between paradox and, 105-107; question of limits, ity,
107-109; paradox and neutral-
117-18; requirements for leap of
faith, 141; Christianity
and commit-
ment, 176-79; subjectivity and truth
Christian faith, 84; Christianity distin-
in Christianity, 181; translation
guished from, 167
use of terms, 188n.7
and
204
Index
/
Recollection: Climacus and theory
Socrates: Climacus
of,
60
59,
Reincarnation: faith and doctrine
of,
146
Relativism: author's approach to Kierkegaard, 3—4; normative concept of true
humanness, 31
and salvation, 19-20; history and
and motives, 46and relationship between God
151; teacher's goals
48; love
disciple,
cerning
authorship, 4-5; relation between his-
and passion, 62; argument from design, 69, 70; quest for self-knowledge, 76, 78; logic
Christianity
87;
Resurrection: conversion experience, 115. See also Incarnation
49-50; uncertainty connature, 58-60; reason
human
eternal consciousness, 21. See also
and Christian view of
truth,
wisdom and recognition of own
ignorance, 141; absolute concept of
between ChristiGreek modes of thought, 152; Climacus' experiment and con-
faith, 147; difference
Revelation: non-Christians and under-
standing of Christianity, 44-45; affinity
difficulty of seek-
native to view of truth, 26-45, 103,
and
Religion: purpose of Kierkegaard's
tory
and
ing truth, 13-15; construction of alter-
to reason, 60-63; paradox of God's
73-77 Rewriting: pseudonyms and perspective
anity and
temporary theology, 171-75
self-revelation,
S0e, N. H.: paradox as logical contradic-
of author, 7
Spinoza, Baruch: existence of God,
Roberts, Robert: approach to Kierkegaard, 3; Kierkegaard's use of pseudo-
nyms,
6;
Christian theologians as
tion,
66-67 Subjectivity: faith
42; Christianity
Socratic thinkers, 30, 171
ish,
construction of alternative to Socratic
view of truth, 27-29 torical evidence,
on
faith
and and
role of will, truth,
and
138-
179-81
Suffering: translation of term from
Salvation: history and religions, 19-22;
Scholarship: Climacus
98
Dan-
83
Swenson, David: paradox tradiction, 98
as logical
con-
his-
Taylor,
158-60, 167-69
Schopenhauer, Arthur: mind-body prob-
Mark C:
literary
approach to
Kierkegaard, 2 Taylor, Richard: argument for truth of
lem, ix
fatalism,
Science: as expression of reason, 62 Self-contradiction: Climacus' use of term,
100 Self-ironizing: reason
and the known and
unknown, 72-73 Self-love: analogy of love and, 79,
92-
93, 109 Sheehan, Thomas: Socratic thought and contemporary theology, 172-73 Sickness Unto Death (Kierkegaard): unrea-
sonableness of Christianity, 85; Christianity
and
human
personality, 134
offense, 111-17; will
Sin: difference
between
and
God and human
beings, 75-76; tension
between reason
and paradox, 105-107;
belief in incar-
nation, 116; improbability of paradox,
162-64 Skepticism: doubt and historical knowledge, 131-38
Social order: self-deification and Chris-
tendom, 154
127-28
Teacher: Socratic view of truth, 14, 15, 26; God and learning of truth, 15-16; alternative to Socratic view of truth,
37-39; goals and motives, 46-48; love and relationship between God and disciple, 49-50; love and analogy of king and maiden, 50-54 Temporality: as distinct from time, 125 Theology: natural and proofs of God's existence, 63-71, 123; Climacus'
experiment for contemporary, 171-75 Thought: construction of alternative to Socratic view of truth, 39-42; being and arguments against natural theology, 64-68 Thulstrup, Niels: Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms, 6-7; on motto of Philosophical Fragments, 23
Time:
as distinct
from temporality, 125; and discrimina-
egalitarian principles
tion by, 150
Index Title page: implications
of,
18-22
Training in Christianity (Kierkegaard):
unreasonableness of Christianity, 85;
examples of offense, 116 Transcendence: Christianity and Christendom, 154 Translation (of terms from Danish): "experiment," 12; "fragments," 18-19; "passivity," 83; "disciple" and "follower," 96, 190n.3; "faith" and "belief," 120; English page references and Danish editions, 183n.l, 184n.21, 185n.3; use of terms, 188n.7 Truth: Philosophical Fragments as thought experiment, 13-16; eternal consciousness,
205
I
Understanding: non-Christians and Christianity, 43-45; reason
and the
known and unknown, 72-73; analogy for relation to
love as
faith, 79, 109;
offense as response to paradox, 89-95; translation
and use of terms, 188n.7
Unification Church: Christian concept of incarnation, 56
Uniqueness: Christian claim
Unknown,
of,
56
the: question of under-
standing, 71-73
Volitionism: criticism of Kierkegaard and, 129-30, 133; Climacus' analysis of faith, 130-31, 138
20-21; construction of alterna-
view of, 26-45; and assumptions of B hypothecompetency of reason to evalu-
tive to Socratic
Westphal, Merold: dialogue in Fragments, 81
learner
Wiles, Maurice: Socratic thought and
sis,
51;
ate Christian faith, 84-91; incarnation as logical contradiction, 103; history
and concept of, 145; egalitarian principles and formation of auxiliary hypothesis, 151-52; Christian and Greek modes of thought, 152; Christianity and subjectivity, 179-81
contemporary theology, 172 power of individuals to change moral condition, 37; faith and role of, 115-16, 138-42; historical knowledge and belief, 128-31; Climacus on skepticism, 133-36 Wittgenstein, Ludwig: limits of reason and irrationalism, 107 Will:
C. the
STEPHEN EVANS,
Professor of Philosophy
and Curator of
Howard V. and Edna H. Hong Kierkegaard
Olaf College, chology
is
Library at St.
the author of S0ren Kierkegaard's Christian Psy-
and Kierkegaard's Fragments and
Philosophy of Johannes Climacus.
Postscript:
The
Religious
Indiana University
Press
ISBN
D
073-1