Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany : New Developments in the 21st Century [1 ed.] 9789004234475, 9789004230552

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Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany

Muslim Minorities Editors

Jørgen S. Nielsen, University of Copenhagen Felice Dassetto, University of Louvain-la-Neuve Aminah McCloud, DePaul University, Chicago

VOLUME 12

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mumi

Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany New Developments in the 21st Century

By

Kerstin Rosenow-Williams

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2012

D-294 Cover illustration: Sheikh Lotfollah Mosque, Isfahan, Iran, photo by Tunart, 2008, istockphoto.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rosenow-Williams, Kerstin. Organizing Muslims and integrating Islam in Germany: new developments in the 21st century/ by Kerstin Rosenow-Williams. p. cm. -- (Muslim minorities, ISSN 1570-7571; v. 12) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-23055-2 (alk. paper) 1. Muslims--Germany. 2. Muslims--Germany--Societies, etc. 3. Associations, institutions, etc.--Germany. 4. Organizational behavior--Germany. 5. Muslims--Germany--Ethnic identity. 6. Muslims--Cultural assimilation--Germany. 7. Islam--Germany. 8. Germany--Ethnic relations. 9. Germany--Emigration and immigration--Social aspects. I. Title. DD78.M87R67 2013 305.6ʼ970943--dc23 2012035161

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Randy Williams

CONTENTS List of Figures���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� xiii List of Tables��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xv Acknowledgments������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ xvii List of Abbreviations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������xix 1 Introduction�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1  The Research Question���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4  Structure of the Book�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 2 Studying Islamic Organizations: Empirical and Theoretical  Approaches����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11  Existing Studies on Muslim Life in Germany and the Missing  Link to Organizational Sociology������������������������������������������������������������� 12   Early Muslim Presence in Germany�������������������������������������������������������� 13   The Arrival of Muslim Migrant Workers ������������������������������������������������ 14   The Integration/Segregation Debate������������������������������������������������������� 17   Quantitative Studies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19   Qualitative Studies��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21   Comparative Studies������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 24   Transnational Studies���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25   Criticism of the Shortcomings of Existing Studies������������������������������ 28  The Institutional Environment and the Importance  of Organizational Legitimacy: The Neoinstitutional  Perspective������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 31   Sociological Neoinstitutionalism������������������������������������������������������������� 31   Cognitive Sense-Making and the Individual Actor����������������������������� 34   The Organizational Field���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 37   The Three Dimensions of the Institutional Environment����������������� 38   The Concept of Legitimacy������������������������������������������������������������������������ 40   Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41  The Organizations’ Situation and the Relevance  of Organizational Efficiency: The Contingency Approach���������������� 42   Early Open-System Approaches��������������������������������������������������������������� 42   The Research Program of the Contingency Approach����������������������� 43

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  The Aston School������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 44   Summary��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 45  The Importance of Members’ Interests within Organizations:  The Research on Intermediary Organizations�������������������������������������� 46   The Blind Spot of Member Interests������������������������������������������������������� 46   Research on Intermediary Organizations���������������������������������������������� 47   Membership versus Influence Logic�������������������������������������������������������� 50 3 A New Research Framework: Applying Organizational  Sociology to the Study of Islamic Organizations���������������������������������� 53  Conceptualizing the Theoretical Research Framework:  between Institutional Expectations and Members’ Interests���������� 56   The Organizational Field of Islamic Organizations in Germany����� 56   Applying the Three Dimensions of the Institutional   Environment to the German Context������������������������������������������������ 58   The Importance of Organizational Legitimacy   for Islamic Organizations���������������������������������������������������������������������� 60   Organizational Ties Across Borders and Their Linkages   to Legitimacy and Efficiency���������������������������������������������������������������� 62   The Effect of Contextual Factors on Organizational Behavior��������� 63   The Importance of Members’ Interests as an Additional   Explanatory Variable������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 66  Patterns of Organizational Behavior between Adaptation  and Protest������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 67   Homogeneous Behavior of Organizations: The Concepts   of Isomorphism and Adaptation��������������������������������������������������������� 69   Heterogeneous Behavior of Organizations: The Concepts   of Decoupling and Protest��������������������������������������������������������������������� 72  Three Research Hypotheses���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 77   Hypothesis 1: Adaptation��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 78   Hypothesis 2: Decoupling and Protest���������������������������������������������������� 79   Conditions of Organizational Behavior�������������������������������������������������� 81   Hypothesis 3: Organizational Trajectories��������������������������������������������� 82  Research Methods��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 84   The Selection of Case Studies�������������������������������������������������������������������� 86   The Interview Methodology���������������������������������������������������������������������� 93   Analyzing Organizational Documents��������������������������������������������������100  Summary of the Research Framework�������������������������������������������������������103

contentsix 4 The Institutional Environment: A Macro-Perspective  on the Changing Discourses on Islam, Integration,  and Security in Germany��������������������������������������������������������������������������105  The Regulative Dimension: Parallel Policy Developments  Regarding the Migration Regime, Security Issues,  and the Legal Status of Islam�������������������������������������������������������������������106   The Legal Status of Islam in Germany��������������������������������������������������107   The Changing Migration Regime�����������������������������������������������������������111   The New Security Legislation������������������������������������������������������������������120  The Cognitive Dimension: Securitization and Islamization  of Theoretical and Public Discourses on Integration  and Immigration�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������127   The Social Construction of Security Threats���������������������������������������128   The Media and the Islamization of the Security   and Integration Debates����������������������������������������������������������������������135   Attitudes toward Muslims in National   and International Contexts�����������������������������������������������������������������140  The Normative Dimension: The Political Discourse  and the Expectations Faced by Islamic Organizations  in Germany���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������144   The Political Discourse on Questions of Islam   and Integration Before and Since 9/11��������������������������������������������145   Political Expectations Faced by Islamic Organizations�������������������149  Summary of the Changes in the German Institutional  Environment������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������160 5 The Individual Organization: A Micro-Perspective  on the Organizational Behavior of Three Islamic Umbrella  Organizations�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������163  Facts and Figures on Islamic Organizations in Germany���������������������164   List of Islamic Organizations in Germany�������������������������������������������165  Member Interests as Perceived by the Organizational  Representatives�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������172   Organizational Patterns of Perceived Members’ Expectations������172   Member Interests of the Younger Generation   and the Older Generation��������������������������������������������������������������������180   The Women’s Role and Female Interests����������������������������������������������184   Members’ Interests: A Summary������������������������������������������������������������186

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 The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious  Affairs e. V. (DITIB)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������187   DITIB’s History from the Point of View of Existing Studies������������188   DITIB Representatives’ Narratives of Organizational Change�������199   DITIB’s Structures���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������205   DITIB’s Activities�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������220   DITIB’s Partners�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������231   Analysis of DITIB’s Patterns of Organizational Behavior�����������������236  The Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG)������������������������������������������249   IGMG’s History from the Point of View of Existing Studies������������251   IGMG Representativesʼ Narratives of Organizational Change�������261   IGMG’s Structures���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������267   IGMG’s Activities����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������281   IGMG’s Partners������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������291   Analysis of IGMG’s Patterns of Organizational Behavior����������������292  The Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD)����������������������������304   ZMD’s History From the Point of View of Existing Studies�������������305   ZMD Representativesʼ Narratives of Organizational Change���������310   ZMD’s Structures�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������317   ZMD’s Activities������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������325   ZMD’s Partners��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������334   Analysis of ZMD’s Patterns of Organizational Behavior������������������336  Summary of the Three Organizational Case Studies�����������������������������345 6 The Organizational Field of Islamic Organizations  in Germany: A Meso Perspective on Shifting Relationships  and Interactions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������351  Relations among Islamic Umbrella Organizations���������������������������������354   From Competition to Cooperation: The Historical Development   of Organizational Relations����������������������������������������������������������������354   The Contextual Factors Surrounding   the Establishment of KRM������������������������������������������������������������������359   The Structuring of KRM and Its Effect on   the Organizational Field����������������������������������������������������������������������366   The Possible Future of KRM��������������������������������������������������������������������370  Relations with the German Political Level�����������������������������������������������373   From the Margins to the Center of Political Attention:   Organizational Responses�������������������������������������������������������������������374   The German Islam Conference (DIK)���������������������������������������������������378

contentsxi   Organizational Competition over Political Legitimacy��������������������383   An Outlook into the Future of Relations between the   Political Level and the Islamic Umbrella Organizations�������������390  Relations with the Media and the Public��������������������������������������������������393   Organizational Perceptions of the German Public   and the Media Debates������������������������������������������������������������������������395   The Press Releases Issued by DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD���������������������399   Comparison of Turkish and German Publications   by DITIB and IGMG������������������������������������������������������������������������������409  Relations with Other Organizations in Germany�����������������������������������416   Relations with Non-Muslim Religious Actors in Germany��������������417   Relations to the Law Enforcement Agencies���������������������������������������425   Relations with Other Actors��������������������������������������������������������������������432  Relations with Actors Abroad����������������������������������������������������������������������439   The Turkish Context and Its Various Ties to Islamic Umbrella   Organizations in Germany������������������������������������������������������������������439   Advantages and Disadvantages of Relations   with Actors Abroad�������������������������������������������������������������������������������443   A Look into the Future������������������������������������������������������������������������������446  Summary of Changes within the Organizational Field  and Organizational Reaction Strategies�����������������������������������������������449 7 Conclusion and Outlook��������������������������������������������������������������������������������453  Applying Organizational Sociology to the Study  of Islamic Organizations���������������������������������������������������������������������������455   Combining Theoretical Approaches�����������������������������������������������������455   Four Explanatory Variables����������������������������������������������������������������������456   Three Patterns of Organizational Behavior�����������������������������������������457  Results from the Organizational Case Studies�����������������������������������������460   DITIB’s Balancing Act��������������������������������������������������������������������������������460   IGMG’s Repositioning��������������������������������������������������������������������������������461   ZMD’s Struggle for Recognition��������������������������������������������������������������463   Organizational Responses to Political Expectations:   Similarities and Differences����������������������������������������������������������������464  Open Questions, Shortcomings, and Future Research  Agenda�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������466   Addressing Research Limitations�����������������������������������������������������������466   Identifying Future Research Agendas���������������������������������������������������468  The Future Development of the Organizational Field��������������������������470

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  Increasing Mutual Awareness in the Context of Integration   and Security Debates����������������������������������������������������������������������������470   Pending Issues of Official Recognition�������������������������������������������������471   The Volatility of the Organizational Field��������������������������������������������472 Bibliography�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������475  Secondary Sources�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������475  Primary Sources�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������498 Index of Subjects���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������511 Index of Organizations����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������515 Index of Selected Authors����������������������������������������������������������������������������������517

LIST OF FIGURES    1. Research program of the contingency approach����������������������������������� 43    2. Organizational behavior in the area of conflict between external expectations and members’ interests�������������������������������������� 54    3. The perception of internal and external expectations������������������������ 56    4. Actors in the organizational field surrounding Islamic umbrella organizations��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 58    5. Conditions of organizational behavior of adaptation, decoupling and protest��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 82    6. Operationalization of organizational changes��������������������������������������� 83    7. Comparison of DITIB’s German and Turkish press releases in 2009 (%)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������228    8. IGMG’s organizational structure��������������������������������������������������������������274    9. Comparison of IGMG’s German and Turkish press releases, comments, and associational news in 2009 (%)���������������������������������291 10. The organizational field of the four main Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany�������������������������������������������������������������������������352 11. Press releases issued by the organizations from August 2005– December 2009 (% of all releases)����������������������������������������������������������401 12. Press releases concerning security (% per year)����������������������������������402 13. Press releases concerning cooperation (% per year)��������������������������404 14. Press releases concerning the five political expectations (% per year)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������406 15. Press releases concerning religion (% per year)����������������������������������407 16. Comparison of DITIB’s and IGMG’s German and Turkish press releases issued in 2009�������������������������������������������������������������������������������412 17. Topics discussed in DITIB’s and IGMG’s member magazines 2007–2009 (Ø %)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������415

LIST OF TABLES    1. Ideal types of migrant organizations�������������������������������������������������������� 27    2. Three dimensions of the institutional environment���������������������������� 39    3. Target groups of organizational legitimacy��������������������������������������������� 61    4. Variances of organizational behavior patterns�������������������������������������� 69    5. Relevant dimensions in the selection of case studies (ex ante assumptions)����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 92    6. Organizational representatives interviewed for this study����������������� 94    7. Available press releases for DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD for the period 2000–2009 (headline analysis)�������������������������������������102    8. References to Islam in Der Spiegel and WAZ (share of the five most frequently mentioned items)�������������������������136    9. The five most frequently mentioned items in parliamentary debates in Germany in 2000/01 and 2003/04�������������������������������������150 10. DITIB’s German press releases Aug. 2005–Dec. 2009 (absolute numbers)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������229 11. Partners for DITIB events (2005–2009)�������������������������������������������������232 12. Actors invited to DITIB Events (2005–2009)���������������������������������������234 13. IGMG press releases in German, Jan. 2000–Dec. 2009���������������������290 14. ZMD member organizations���������������������������������������������������������������������321 15. ZMD’s German press releases Jan. 2000–Dec. 2009��������������������������333 16. ZMD’s partners as identified in its press releases (2000–2009)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������335 17. Organizational patterns of behavior (DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������346

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Writing a book is indeed a collaborative effort. Therefore, I would like to thank all those who have assisted and supported me throughout this process and who have inspired me in one way or another. First of all, I thank my husband, Randy Williams, for his unconditional support and love which led him far away from his native land. I am very grateful and indebted to him, my dear family, and my friends, who made writing this book a rich and wonderful learning experience for me. I also sincerely thank Prof. Dr. Ludger Pries, whose help, advice, and supervision were invaluable for the completion of my PhD thesis at the Faculty of Social Science at Ruhr University Bochum (RUB) and which made this publication possible. His colloquia offered a welcoming platform to present my drafts and results and to learn from the experiences of others. I would like to thank all the participants for their helpful feedback, especially Dr. Zeynep Sezgin, Tülay Tuncer-Zengingül, Dr. Barbara Laubenthal, Patricia Pielage, and Veronika Dehnen for their comments on earlier versions. Everyone at the Chair for Sociology/Organization, Migration, Participation at Ruhr University Bochum made me feel at home from the very first day, and I thank my colleagues for their open doors. The University of Göttingen, far away from Bochum, has also become an important place for me, due to Prof. Dr. Matthias Koenig. I am very grateful for his knowledge and guidance, which also had a significant influence on this project. His team welcomed me many times, and I always greatly appreciated our exchange of ideas and the valuable feedback. Specifically, I would like to thank Miriam Schader, Dominik Bohl, In-Sook Choi, Katharina Moosbauer, and Dr. Stefan Kroll. Finally, this research would not have been possible without the great assistance of the analyzed Islamic umbrella organizations and their members. I always experienced great hospitality and friendliness among the competent interviewees, who spent hours explaining their work and challenges to me. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to each of them. I am also very thankful for the two scholarships that facilitated this project immensely by giving me scientific and financial freedom. One was awarded by the RUB Research School and funded by Germany’s Excellence Initiative (DFG GSC 98/1), the other by the Wilhelm and Günter Esser Foundation at RUB.

xviii

acknowledgements

There are many more people at RUB who accompanied me along the way. The team at the Social Science Library was more than supportive, providing me with the much sought-after office space. I am also very thankful to the researchers at the Center for Religious Studies (CERES), especially Prof. Dr. Volkhard Krech and Raida Chbib, who provided valuable feedback throughout this process. The same is true of the “Religion vernetzt” research group, who helped me during the last stages of this project. The RUB Research School became my second home base at the campus, and I would like to thank the whole team, especially Dr. Ursula Justus, for their encouragement and for helping us with our research. Finally, I thank Prof. Dr. Dennis Dijkzeul and the team at the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) for their support during this publication process. Special thanks go to Nelly Schubert, Caterina Rohde, Dr. Matthias Kortmann, Dr. Riem Spielhaus, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments, and to Tugba Kuscu for her great help in analyzing the organizational documents. I also thank Fini Pöhlmann, William White, René Reinholz, and the editors at Brill for their assistance during the final proofreading stage. Finally, I want to thank my friends for being there for me and for the good times we have had.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Organizations AABF AAGB ACK ADÜTDF

AKP AMGT ATIB

BAMF BFmF BfV BGS BIG BKA

Federation of the Alevi Communities in Germany (Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu - Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e. V.) Union of the Alevi Youth in Germany (Almanya Alevi Gençler Birliği – Bund der Alevitischen Jugendlichen in Deutschland e. V., now BDAJ) Consortium of Christian Churches in Germany (Arbeitsgemeinschaft christlicher Kirchen) Federation of Turkish-Democratic Idealist Associations in Europe (Avrupa Demokratik-Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonum – Föderation der Türkisch-Demokratischen Idealistenvereine in Europa e. V.) Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) Union of the Millî Görüş in Europe (Avrupa Millî Görüş Teşkilatlar – Organisation der Millî Görüş in Europa e. V., or Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europa e. V., now IGMG) Turkish-Islamic Union in Europe (Avrupa Türk-Islam Birligi – Türkisch-Islamische Union in Europa) or: Turkish Islamic Union for Cultural and Social Cooperation in Austria (Türkisch Islamische Union für kulturelle und soziale Zusammenarbeit in Österreich) Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) Muslim Women’s Center for Encounter and Further Education (Begegnungs- und Fortbildungszentrum muslimischer Frauen) Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) Federal Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz) Alliance for Innovation and Justice (Bündnis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit) Federal Criminal Agency (Bundeskriminalamt)

xx BMI BpB BVerfG BVerwG CDU C.e.m. CIBEDO CIG cm-fi CSU CTC DBK DIK DIK I DIK II DITIB DIWAN Diyanet DML Bonn DML Hamburg efms

list of abbreviations Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern) Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) German Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) Headquarters for Republican Education (Cumhuriyetci Egitim Merkezi) Christian Islamic Encounter and Documentation Center (Christlich-islamische Begegnungsund Dokumentationsstelle) Christian-Islamic Society (Christlich-Islamische Gesellschaft e. V.) Christian-Muslim Peace Initiative (Christlich-Muslimische Friedensinitiative e. V.) Christian Social Union of Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern) Counter Terrorism Committee (UN) German Bishop Conference (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz) German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz) 2006–2009 Since 2010 Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işeri Türk Islam Birliği – TürkischIslamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V.) German Islamic New Moon Council (Deutscher Islamwissenschaftlicher Ausschuss der Neumonde) Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet ışleri Başkanglığı) German Muslim League Bonn (Deutsche Muslim-Liga Bonn e. V.) German Muslim League Hamburg (Deutsche Muslim-Liga e. V.) European Forum for Migration Studies (Europäisches Forum für Migrationsstudien)



list of abbreviationsxxi EIF EKD EMUG EUNET EXPO EZP FBI FDP FES FOREGE FP FVM GTAZ HDI IAK IASE ICA ICCB IFB IGB IGBD IGD IGH

European Integration Fund Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland) European Mosque Building and Support Organization (Europäische Moscheenbauund Unterstützungsorganisation) European Network for Education and Training e.V. World’s Fair (Exposition Mondiale) Invitation to Paradise (Einladung zum Paradies e. V.) U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) Research Center for Religion and Society (Forschungszentrum für Religion und Gesellschaft) Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) Free Association of Muslims (Freier Verband der Muslime e. V.) Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (Gemeinsames Terrorismus Abwehr Zentrum) House of Islam (Haus des Islam e. V.) Islamic Working Group in Germany (Islamischer Arbeitskreis in Deutschland) Islamic Working Group for Social and Educational Professions (Islamische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sozialund Erziehungsberufe e. V.) Islamic-Christian Working Group (Islamisch-Christliche Arbeitsgruppe) Union of Islamic Associations and Communities (Islami Cemaat ve Cemiyetler Birligi – Verband der Islamischen Vereine und Gemeinden e. V.) Islamic Federation Berlin (Islamische Föderation Berlin e. V.) Islamic Community Braunschweig (Islamische Gemeinschaft Braunschweig e. V.) Islamic Community of Bosniacs in Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland e. V.) Islamic Community Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V.) Islamic Community Hamburg (Islamische Gemeinschaft in Hamburg e. V.)

xxii IGMG IGS

IHH IKO IRCA IRD IRH IZA IZH IZM KCID KIRU KIS KRM LKA MAD MNP MSP MSV

list of abbreviations The Islamic Community Millî Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e. V.) Islamic Community of Shiite Communities in Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden Deutschland e. V.) Or: Islamic Community Saarland (Islamische Gemeinde Saarland e. V.) Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation) Competence Center Islamic Science (Islamwissenschaftliches Kompetenzzentrum) Islamic Religious Community in Austria (Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, also IGGiÖ) Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e. V.) Islamic Religious Community Hessen (Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen e. V.) Islamic Center Aachen (Islamisches Zentrum Aachen e. V.) Islamic Center Hamburg (Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e. V.) Islamic Center Munich (Islamisches Zentrum München e. V.) Coordination Council of the Christian-Islamic Dialogue in Germany (Koordinierungsrat des christlich-islamischen Dialogs e. V.) Commission for the Islamic Religious Education (Kommission für Islamischen Religionsunterricht) Commission on Islamic Ritual Slaughter (Kommission Islamisches Schächten) Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland) Office of Criminal Investigation of a German Federal State (Landeskriminalamt) Federal Armed Forces Counterintelligence Office (Militärischer Abschirmdienst) National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi) National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi) Muslim Student Association in Germany (Muslimische Studentenvereinigung in Deutschland e. V.)



list of abbreviationsxxiii MWL NIF RAF RP SCHURA SP SPD SWR TAZ TCN TGD TJ UETD UMTA UIAZD UN VIKZ VG ZJD ZMaD ZMD ZSU ZfT

Muslim World League (Islamische Weltliga) Dutch Islamic Federation (Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie) Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion) Prosperity Party or Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) Islamic Council Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) South-West Radio (Südwest Rundfunk) The Daily Paper (Die Tageszeitung) Third-Country National Turkish Community in Germany (Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland e. V.) Society for Spreading Faith (Tablighi Jama’at – Gemeinschaft der Missionierung und Verkündigung) Union of European-Turkish Democrats (Union EuropäischTürkischer Demokraten e. V.) Union of Togolese Muslims in Germany (Union des Musulmans Togolais en Allemagne e. V.) Union of Islamic Albanian Centers in Germany (Union der Islamisch Albanischen Zentren in Deutschland e. V.) United Nations Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e. V.) Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland e.V.) Central Council of Moroccans in Germany (Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland e. V.) Central Council for Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e. V.) Center for Social Support (Zentrum für soziale Unterstützung) Foundation Center for Studies on Turkey and Integration Research (Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung)

xxiv

list of abbreviations Further Abbreviations

9/11 art. AuslG bn BvR CA CO e. V. FLG FRG GDR GG IN KRW m NGO NRW SGB TBG TBEG T.K. TRAMO OJ POS POW PR StGB VereinsG

September 11, 2001 Article Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz) Billion Constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) Country of Arrival Country of Origin Registered Association (eingetragener Verein) Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland) German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) German Basic Law (Deutsches Grundgesetz) Interview Kerstin Rosenow-Williams million Non-governmental Organization North Rhine-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen) Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch) Counter-Terrorism Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz) Act Supplementing the Counter-Terrorism Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz) Tugba Kuscu Transnational Migrant Organizations Project (Transnationale Migrantenorganisationen Projekt) Official Journal (EU) Political Opportunity Structure Prisoner of war Press release German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) Act Governing Private Associations (Vereinsgesetz)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION There are about 4 million Muslims living in Germany,1 forming one of the largest Muslim populations in the European Union, along with the Muslim populations of France (about 4.7 million) and the UK (about 2.9 million) (PEW 2011a: 124). Organizations which meet the needs and represent the interests of Muslim communities are not a new phenomenon, either in Germany or in other European countries. In Germany, it was mainly Muslim immigrants who arrived during the 1960s under the so-called “guest worker” agreements and founded such Islamic associations to practice their religion. Over the years, Islamic umbrella organizations have emerged which represent various local mosque communities. Their focus of activities ranges from the religious to the political sphere, and they differ in their orientations toward their country of settlement and their country (or countries) of origin. The turn of the 21st century marked a period of transition in terms of the political perception of the role of this organized form of Islam in Germany. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the political ‘discovery’ of the Muslim population of Germany, Islamic umbrella organizations have increasingly gained political attention. After a long period of “non-recognition” (Tietze 2008: 218), they began to act as official contacts in political, public, and media settings to represent the point of view of organized Muslims in Germany. This heightened attention, however, has provided opportunities as well as challenges for Islamic organizations. They have had to adapt to the various expectations with which they are confronted and position themselves with regard to the ongoing debates surrounding the integration of Islamic religion into German society. 1 The most recent survey was conducted by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) among Muslim immigrants, excluding German converts for technical reasons. It concludes that there are between 3.8 and 4.3 million Muslims living in Germany, which is between 4.6 and 5.2 percent of the population (Haug et al. 2009: 11). Accordingly, 45 percent are German citizens, and the majority is of Turkish origin (between 2.5 and 2.7 million) (ibid.: 12). The top ten countries of origin are Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Morocco, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Syria (German Federal Government 2006a). More information will be available in Spring 2013, when the results of the Census 2011 are released.

2

chapter one

Public and political attention which develops in this way not only instigates organizational developments but also requires novel research strategies. While many studies focus mainly on the outcome of the work of Islamic organizations and ask whether they promote the integration of their members into society, this study is more generally aimed at understanding the organizational behavior and its causes in times of political change. With regard to the ongoing public and academic debates on religious pluralism and Islamic organizations, the German context proves to be an interesting case study. For the longest time, Germany treated Islam as a cultural element of the migrants’ countries of origin and “being a Muslim was not identified as a religious matter in Germany (in contrast to France, for example)” (Tietze 2008: 219). Until today this tradition has an impact upon the official recognition of Muslims and their organizations in Germany. In contrast to other European countries, where issues of religious pluralism and Islam politics are discussed in the context of traditional national church-state relations (ranging from laicité to official state churches), the German political level has increasingly intertwined debates on organized Islam with migration and integration policies and the security discourse. This situation can be explained by two recent historical developments. On the one hand, the (late) political declaration at the turn of the 21st century that Germany is an immigration country paved the way for a more inclusive approach to migrants and their interest groups (Cyrus/Vogel 2005). This also concerns Islamic organizations, which are still largely perceived as migrant organizations both by politicians and academics, despite the fact that 45% of Muslims living in Germany are German citizens (Haug et al. 2009: 12) and one of the major Islamic organizations was headed by a German convert to Islam (cf. Spielhaus 2011: 40f.). On the other hand, Islam and Islamic organizations have received increasing political, public, and media attention since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the USA and the subsequent attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). These forms of attention, however, have often been characterized by a somewhat discriminative attitude toward foreigners in general and Muslims in particular (see Chap. Four). Overall, this so-called double shift sends a contradictory message to organized Muslims in Germany. For the first time, their organizations have been invited to political dialog meetings such as the annual German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, DIK) which was initiated in 2006. At the same time, the government has certain expectations of them in the

introduction3 sense of the new integration paradigm of “fördern und fordern”, which can be translated as “to promote and oblige”. It is this tension between adaptation and the conditional granting of additional rights which is at the center of ongoing negotiations between organized Muslims and the German state. A struggle that is also observed in other European countries, as Laurence notes (cf. also 2012): In an era of advanced secularization in Western Europe, ironically, gov­ ernments there have fallen back on religion policy – via state-church institutions – as a central tool of immigrant integration. The most striking evidence of this development is a European-wide move towards “nationalization” of Islam through the development of national consultations with Muslim civil society (2006: 253).

While Laurence rightfully points to the political attempts to “nationalize” Islam (which are also discussed throughout this book), a lack of official recognition of Islamic organizations has to be acknowledged in the German case. No Islamic umbrella organization has yet obtained the official status of a corporation of public law, which is granted to other denominations in Germany according to Article 140 of the German Constitution (Federal Law Gazette (FLG) I (41): 2034ff., 28-Aug-2006). Other central demands such as the introduction of Islamic religious education in public schools and the associated recognition as religious communities have also been pending since the 1980s, although the first steps in this direction are currently being taken.2 Several of the above-mentioned issues have already attracted researchers’ attention, such as the political emphasis on security issues and the related focus on Islamic fundamentalism (Eckert 2008a, b; cf. German Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI) 2004a), as well as the changing German political attitude toward the issue of Islam in general (Halm 2012, Kreienbrink/Bodenstein 2010; Laurence 2006; Peter 2009). The debates surrounding the demands of religious organizations and the resulting degree of national, regional, and local accommodation have also been addressed (Koenig 2007b; 2009; for a discussion from a legal point of view see Rohe 2008 and Muckel 2004). However, there has been no comparative analysis of the impact of these diverse debates 2 The Alevi umbrella organization (Alevi Community Germany e. V., AABF) has been granted the right to provide religious education in five German federal states, while Sunni religious education is provided in Berlin and will be introduced in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) in 2012 and in Hesse in the near future (Jonker 2002; Landtag North RhineWestphalia 2011, DITIB PR 19-July-2012). For the legal implications of these decisions see Chap. Four: The Regulative Dimension.

4

chapter one

on Islamic umbrella organizations.3 Therefore, the aim of this research is to analyze these institutional changes from the perspective of those organizations in Germany which are most affected by the political and public debates about Islam in Germany—that is, Islamic umbrella organizations which claim to represent the Muslim community in Germany.  The Research Question The analysis of the organizational strategies and behaviors of Islamic organizations is at the very center of this research. Therefore, this study develops and applies an innovative research framework from the perspective of organizational sociology. The aim is to understand and explain patterns of organizational behavior in the context of changing internal and external environments. While political debates are treated as part of the external organizational environment, it is argued that not only the political environment but also the organizations themselves are constantly evolving—a fact that is too often overlooked in the public, political, and academic debates and which is at the core of this research project. With the aim of understanding the organizational behavior of Islamic umbrella organizations in the context of a period of political transition, this investigation centers on the research question “How and why do Islamic umbrella organizations interact with their organizational field?”4 In order to explain organizational behavior, this study develops a conceptual research framework that combines various approaches of organizational sociology such as neoinstitutionalism, the contingency approach, and research on intermediary organizations. The proposed analytical framework can explain a) forms of organizational response to the changes in their institutional environments (ranging from adaptation to decoupling to protest against external expectations); b) behavioral differences

3 For a preliminary analysis of the impact of the new laws on members of the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG) see Schiffauer (2007c, 2008b, 2010). For a more detailed overview of existing studies see Chap. Two: Existing Studies. 4 The term ‘organizational field’ will be discussed in detail in Chap. Two: The Institutional Environment. It constitutes a set of actors that “participate in the same meaning systems, are defined by similar symbolic processes, and are subject to common regulatory processes” (Scott 1994b: 71). “[A] field is formed around the issues that become important to the interests and objectives of a specific collective of organizations” (Hoffman 1999: 352).

introduction5 between organizations, and c) organizational influences on the other collective actors in their issue-specific organizational field. The neoinstitutional framework of analysis provides a suitable theoretical background, due to its focus on the impact of the institutional environment on organizations. According to this perspective, it can be assumed that Islamic organizations can increase their legitimacy in Germany by complying with and adapting to changing institutional expectations. In the context of the changing integration and security landscapes in Germany and their new focus on Islam, this research evaluates the impact of this policy change on Islamic umbrella organizations (see Chap. Two: The Institutional Environment). Do they adapt to political rhetorics and expectations relating to issues such as the general denunciation of terrorism, fundamentalism, and parallel societies? And how do they position themselves with regard to the alleged necessity to adapt to German values, and the separation between “good and bad” Muslims (Cesari 2005b: 45)? These questions will be answered in three detailed case studies of major Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany (see Chap. Five). The neoinstitutional framework also provides an opportunity to analyze organizational strategies in the context of an organizational field. This enables a comparative approach that highlights the interaction patterns among the actors involved in the issue-specific field that surrounds the integration of Islam into the German society. The third empirical chapter therefore analyzes the shifting relationships among Islamic umbrella organizations and their organizational relations with actors in the spheres of politics, the media, the public, the churches, law enforcement, and other non-profit organizations, as well as with actors from abroad (see Chap. Six). In addition to the implications of organizational behavior for the organizational field, this research also focuses on the implications for the Islamic umbrella organizations themselves. In this context, yet another group of actors becomes relevant: the organizational members. Members are relevant for the organizational legitimacy both externally and internally. In Germany, questions concerning the representation of Islam have increasingly been linked to membership figures. Organizations which represent larger Muslim communities than others can receive increased external legitimacy, provided that they are also internally legitimated by their members. Therefore, this research argues that the organization has to adapt its activities both to its members and to the external political and social environment. Due to this duality, internal conflicts can arise within

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organizations which require appropriate coping strategies. Since neoinstitutionalism has not yet included organizational members as an explanatory variable, the perspective of the members’ interests and their role as an organizational resource is introduced in this research framework. This is done with reference to the literature on intermediary organizations, which contrasts the organizational logic of membership with the logic of influence (cf. Schmitter/Streeck 1999; see also Chap. Two: The Importance of Members’ Interests). Furthermore, it is argued that in order to understand why organizations react differently in similar institutional environments, one also needs to consider certain organizational contextual factors along with the influence of the organization’s members. In the tradition of the contingency approach, internal and external context factors such as organizational history, size, resources, ideology, and independence are introduced to explain different patterns of organizational behavior further (cf. Pugh et al. 1963; see also Chap. Two: The Organizations’ Situation). Overall, this research focuses on a sample of Islamic umbrella organizations that represent different Muslim (migrant) communities including two distinct Turkish organizations—the Turkish Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V., DITIB) and the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e. V., IGMG)—as well as one mixed Islamic umbrella organization—the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e. V., ZMD), which represents Muslim communities from various countries of origin and the majority of German converts. The in-depth analysis of the changing structures and behaviors of these three organizations can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Islamic umbrella organizations by describing their organizational goals, experiences, and changing interaction patterns. The choice of case studies also focuses on three members of the newlyfounded Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM).5 The recent KRM establishment, on March 28, 2007, represents a significant change in the organizational field

5 IGMG is not a direct member of the KRM but, being the main member of the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Islamrat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e. V., IRD) which is a KRM member, it is also associated with the KRM. The fourth umbrella organization in the KRM is the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (Verband Islamischer Kulturzentren e. V., VIKZ).

introduction7 in Germany in response to institutional expectations, which will be analyzed in more detail in the context of the shifting relationships between the actors in the organizational field (see Chap. Six).  Structure of the Book In order to analyze the relationships between the various changes that have taken place on the societal macro-level, the organizational microlevel,6 and the meso-level of the organizational field, this book is divided into the following Sections: After a review of the existing literature on Islamic organizations in Germany (Chap. One), an introduction to the main theoretical concepts is presented in Chapter Two (neoinstitutionalism, contingency theory, research on intermediary organizations). Chapter Three develops the research framework, including the hypotheses concerning patterns of organizational behavior and a description of the research methodology. Chapter Four, the first empirical chapter, discusses the changing discourse on the German migration and security regimes and its relevance to the integration of Islam into German society. This macro-perspective on the institutional environment—separated into sections on the regulative, cognitive, and normative institutional levels—provides the basis for the empirical analysis of how the Islamic umbrella organizations respond to these changes both on a structural and a behavioral level. The results of the analysis of the organizational micro-perspective are discussed in Chapter Five on the basis of semi-structured interviews with representatives from the headquarters and executive boards of the three selected organizations. The interviews are supplemented by findings from secondary studies, primary organizational documents, and a quantitative headline analysis of organizational press releases from the period 2000–2009. The analysis of each individual organization is then expanded to include a meso-level perspective on the shifting relationships within the organizational field, with a special focus on the mutual relationship

6 The term ‘micro-perspective’ as used in this study refers to an internal view of the organization’s affairs, activities, and structures. Although organizational members do play a role in this Chapter, it does not focus on individuals, but rather provides an in-depth organizational analysis.

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between the Islamic organizations and their institutional environments (Chap. Six). The concluding remarks summarize the findings and their implications for future research, specifically the political and theoretical implications of the research for non-profit religious (interest) organizations (Chap. Seven). Overall, the structure of the book provides a comprehensive overview of the political as well as the organizational developments in Germany since the turn of the 21st century. The research reveals that the political expectations, raised by the German state, play an important role in the behavioral patterns of Islamic organizations. At the same time, the organizations also have to meet the expectations of other interest groups while taking into account the requirements for organizational legitimacy and efficiency. The in-depth analysis of their related coping strategies provides valuable insights into the structures and activities of Islamic umbrella organizations. The empirical Chapters Five and Six describe processes of organizational professionalization and adaptation, as well as issues of internal conflict which can lead to organizational decoupling and protest behavior with regard to the political discourse. The study shows that Islamic organizations in Germany can be characterized by similar interests, such as in the continuing institutionalization of Islam, despite differences among the organizations. These dissimilarities can be explained by different context factors (organizational history, resources, size, independence), different organizational opportunities for resource acquisition in Germany (in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance) and different members’ interests. By evaluating the political and organizational efforts that have taken place during the first decade of the 21st century, this research contributes to the ongoing discussion on the integration of Islam into the German society. In doing so, it supports the political statements of the former German President Wulff made on the twentieth anniversary of the German reunification in 2010 and those of the former Minister of the Interior Schäuble made during the inauguration of the DIK in 2006, who both emphasized that Islam belongs to Germany—a self-evident fact that still arouses controversy.7 7 In his much discussed speech the German President Wulff stated that “Christianity is without a doubt part of the German identity. Judaism is without a doubt part of the German identity. Such is our Judeo-Christian heritage. But Islam has now become part of the German identity as well” (Wulff 2010). In reply, Hans-Peter Friedrich, the new Minister

introduction9 Focusing on the perspectives of organized Muslims on these debates tries to promote mutual understanding among the actors, pointing out from the perspective of organizational sociology the challenges faced as well as the existing and future strategies for their solution. However, these developments are not limited to Germany; similar dialogues with organized Muslims are taking place in most Western European countries. The German approach is one example of a state-led, top-down negotiation process which is not always accompanied by bottom-up organizational support, since the internal and external expectations differ at important junctures which are explored throughout this research.

of the Interior, said at the beginning of his term in March 2011 that “there is no historical evidence that Islam is a part of Germany […]. I do not agree that Islam is part of our culture. […] To be clear, the Leitkultur [core culture] in Germany is the Christian-JudeoOccidental culture. It is not the Islamic one and it will not be this way in the future” (cited from Carstens, FAZ.net March 4, 2011, translated by the author).

CHAPTER TWO

STUDYING ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES A theoretical framework that analyzes organizational behavior from the perspective of organizational sociology has not yet been developed and applied to study migrant organizations in general and Islamic umbrella organizations in particular.1 While most studies focus on the activities of Islamic organizations to ask whether they promote integration or increase segregation, an analysis of their organizational strategies and underlying motives that promote or hinder change in their structure and behavior is still missing. This is especially noteworthy because it has been agreed that Islamic organizations have to deal with much more than the delivery of religious services (e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Schiffauer 2010; Sezgin 2010; Rosenow/Kortmann 2011). They can function as bridge builders between the countries of origin and settlement of their members, and act as service providers and spokespersons for religious and non-religious interests that can be linked but not limited to the migration background of their members. In order to understand the multiple constraints and expectations with which Islamic umbrella organizations are confronted, a theoretical framework is needed which opens the black box of organizational behavior. Such a research framework will be developed and empirically tested in this research project. In order to develop such an analytical framework, one has to take into account the existing research on this subject. This section starts with an introduction to the changing research foci on the role of Muslims in Germany, which historically reflect the development of their status on the political agenda. The late development of political attention to the topic of Islam is echoed in the rather recent emergence of scientific interest in the organizational level of Muslims in Germany and the analysis of these organizations as strategic actors. The following research overview also identifies problems and theoretical shortcomings found in this literature, which this project attempted to 1 A notable exception is the analysis of transnational migrant organizations and their cross-border ties in Pries/Sezgin 2012.

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avoid. For example, many of the studies focus too narrowly on the question of whether organizations promote integration or segregation, while others fail to provide primary data and/or a theoretical framework which would enable researchers to move beyond this somewhat narrow focus. This chapter acknowledges the existing research gaps and introduces three relevant theoretical perspectives that can explain organizational behavior and structures. These perspectives focus on three independent variables: (i) the influence of the institutional environment; (ii) contextual factors, and (iii) interests of the members of the organization. First, the framework of neoinstitutionalism will be introduced. It includes a set of analytical tools that focus on the links between the organization and its institutional environment, with the latter influencing the former through institutionalized expectations (DiMaggio/Powell 1991b; Scott 2001). Neoinstitutionalists assume that Islamic non-profit organizations have to seek legitimacy vis-à-vis the German state to strengthen their status in the German debate on the institutionalization of Islam. Second, the contingency approach argues that to understand the differences between the organizational structuration of Islamic umbrella organizations, one has to consider not only the institutional environment but also a number of organizational contextual factors such as organizational history, charter, size, resources, and ownership (Pugh/Hickson et al. 1963). Organizations have to continuously adapt to these contextual factors to be able to increase their efficiency. Third, this research highlights the important role of organizational members and their interests. This observation is particularly true for interest-based non-profit organizations which are highly dependent on their members as a resource. Therefore, the literature on intermediary organizations is introduced which highlights the duality of logic of membership and logic of influence (Schmitter/Streeck 1999). Finally, Chapter Three combines these empirical and theoretical insights into a new research framework that analyzes organizational behavior with regard to possible discrepancies between institutional expectations and member interests. Existing Studies on Muslim Life in Germany and the Missing Link to Organizational Sociology This section first outlines the relatively late development of research on Muslim life in Germany, which reflects the immigration process and



studying islamic organizations13

international political developments. As already mentioned, these studies have often focused on the tensions between integrative and segregative tendencies of Islamic organizations in Germany, which is also one of the main points of criticism summarized in the second half of this chapter. Early Muslim Presence in Germany The presence of Muslims in Germany is often seen as a relatively recent phenomenon which is linked primarily to the establishment of bilateral working agreements during the 1960s. However, the following historical introduction on existing studies on Muslims in Germany also reveals older traces of a well-organized Muslim community, which nearly completely perished during World War Two. Muslim presence in Germany goes back to the 17th century. After the second Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683, captured Turks arrived as prisoners of war and since then Muslims have continuously lived in the territory of the current Federal Republic of Germany (Thielmann 2008: 2; Lemmen 2002a: 15). In 1798 the first Muslim cemetery was established in Berlin, as a tribute to the third Ottoman ambassador, Ali Aziz Effendi. Schwanitz shows that since the end of the 19th century Germany has developed a particular interest in economic, cultural, and military relations with the Middle East, which he calls the Deutsche-Orient Gründer­ jahre (German-Orient founding years). This engagement culminated in the development of a jihad-ideology by the German archaeologist and diplomat Max von Oppenheim, whose aim was to mobilize Muslim populations against British, French, and Russian colonialists during World War One and World War Two (Schwanitz 2008: 186). In 1915, during World War One, the first mosque in Germany was constructed in a prisoner of war camp near Berlin. The Wünsdorfer mosque served Muslims from Berlin and across Germany until it was closed in 1924, due to construction defects. According to Schwanitz, the living conditions for Muslims in Germany were quite good after the German defeat in 1918. In 1922 Muslims from 41 nations founded the Islamic Community in Berlin, but they had to abandon their project to build a central mosque due to financial problems. The first central mosque in Berlin-Wilmersdorf, owned by the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at-i-Islami community, was inaugurated on April 16, 1925.2 Headed by an Indian imam, it was open to every 2 Not to be confused with the Ahmadiyya Mission from Qadian/Rabwah, Pakistan. They also built some of the first mosques in Germany in Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main (Abdullah 1981: 52ff.).

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Moslem (Abdullah 1981: 27ff.; Thielmann 2008: 2; Lemmen 2002a: 16). Between 1924 and 1940 the mosque published the Moslemische Revue (Moslem Revue) and one of their imams wrote the first Arabic-German version of the Qur’an. During this time, students, intellectuals, merchants, and politicians established newspapers, journals, and other clubs such as the Islam Institute. However, during World War Two, almost all Islamic organizations in Germany disappeared, and after the war the central position of Berlin within the Muslim community was diminished. The Muslim refugees from the countries of the Soviet Union who arrived right after World War Two founded their own Islamic organizations, mainly in southern Germany. Their activities included the publication of the magazine Al-Muhadschirun (The Refugees) and the establishment of the Spiritual Administration of Muslim Refugees in Munich on March 29, 1951 (Abdullah 1981: 37). The Arrival of Muslim Migrant Workers Overall, the number of Muslims remained relatively low until the recruitment agreements were signed due to the economic demands of post-war West Germany. Aside from Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968), immigrants were also recruited from southern European countries such as Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), and Portugal (1963). The migrant workers were allowed to stay and work for two or three years before they had to return to their country of origin (Bade/Oltmer 2007: 159ff.). In 1960 1.3% of the workforce in Germany was made up of foreigners. By 1973, the year of the recruitment ban, this percentage had risen to 11.9%. Of the foreigners in 1973, 23% were Turkish citizens and 17.7% were from Yugoslavia. Statistics on the number of Muslims in Germany during this period are not available (BMI 2009c). The last official census of 1987 states that 1.65 million Muslims were living in Western Germany, which represented 2.7% of the overall population (Lemmen 2000: 17), compared to about 5% today (Haug et al. 2009: 11). In addition to the migrant workers, Muslim refugees and asylum seekers arrived in Germany due to political conflicts. The main groups arrived from Lebanon (1975), Iran (1979), and Afghanistan (1979), and later from Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1992) and Kosovo (1999) (Lemmen 2002a: 17). With regard to the visibility of the Muslims in Germany, Tietze calls the 1960s and 1970s the “period of non-recognition” (2008: 218). Muslim



studying islamic organizations15

workers were not identified as Muslims, nor did they identify themselves as such when dealing with the German authorities or the general public. Nonetheless, this period triggered a change in the social function of Islam. Most Muslims immigrated from rural areas where religion played a dominant role. Upon their arrival in Germany, no public facilities to meet their religious needs were provided by their employers, political officials, or other civil organizations. According to Schiffauer (1991: 146 with reference to Nagel 1981), this migratory experience led to an “Islamization” of the self in the sense that religious practices become part of one’s individual conscience, and “a kernel of identity” (Laurence 2007). The recruitment ban of 1973 changed the situation of the migrant workers, leading to permanent settlement and family reunification movements. In this “second phase, immigrants began perceiving themselves as Muslims as they shifted the focus of their lives, whether consciously or not, to Germany” (Tietze 2008: 219). This change from temporary to permanent settlement strategies is reflected in the creation of organizational structures. In the late 1970s and early 1980s organizations were created to serve the religious needs of Muslim families. Most of these were religious organizations which were oriented toward Turkey because Turkish immigrants formed the largest minority group (Doomernik 1995). In 1980 33% of the immigrants in West Germany were from Turkey, followed by migrants from Yugoslavia (14%) and Italy (13.9%) (Bade/Oltmer 2007: 160). By the end of 2005, Turkey still was the country with the largest Muslim immigrant group (2,437,000), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (188,000) and Iran (130,000).3 In the beginning, the main responsibilities of these organizations included the provision of space for religious practices and assistance with any questions related to religion (Şen 2008: 37), including Qur’an lessons, spiritual guidance, and assistance with funerals, marriages, circumcisions, and pilgrimages to Mecca. In the early 1970s the first “backyard” mosques were established in converted buildings (Abdullah 1981: 78; Lemmen 2002a: 9).

3 The following figures on the population of Turkish origin in Germany published by the International Crisis Group (2007: 4) illustrate the sharp increase in the number of Turks in Germany after the guest worker agreement of 1961 and the recruitment ban of 1973: 6,800 (1961), 132,000 (1965), 205,000 (1968), 469,000 (1970), 910,000 (1973), 1,546,000 (1981), 1,779,000 (1991), 2,014,000 (1995), 2,107,000 (1997), 2,371,000 (2001), 2,500,000–2,600,000 (2005). However, these figures say nothing about the religious affiliation of Turkish migrants (which they are not required to disclose upon arrival in Germany).

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During the 1980s mosques expanded their services to include other responsibilities with regard to social issues and the countries of origin and settlement, offering recreational activities and social and family advice, and organizing sport, cultural, and informational events (Şen 2008: 37; see also Chap. Five: Facts and Figures). According to Karakaşoğlu et al. (2006: 144), engagement to promote integration is a fairly new phenomenon observed among the Islamic organizations, which were originally oriented toward the preservation of cultural and religious traditions. Some authors stress the linkages between the Turkish organizations and their country of origin and the ongoing political debates between political models of laicism and Islamization. Landman (2005: 589), for example, mentions a “European front” of groups outlawed by the Turkish state, which were able to establish their organizations freely in Europe. The extent of organizational competition, the increasing trend toward cooperation, and the shifting relationships with actors abroad are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. For a short while, the reunification of guest worker families rekindled academic interest in the role of women in Islam (Baumgartner-Karabak/ Landesberger 1978; Müller 1980). However, the focus on oppression enhanced the picture of Islam as a pre-modern religion.4 After the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, topics such as fundamentalism and radicalism became new research foci that prevailed until the 1990s. A wide range of studies deal with the concept of fundamentalism in relation to Islam (Heitmeyer et al. 1997; Nirumand 1990; Schiffauer 1998; 2000). In general, one can argue that the focus on fundamentalism in connection to Islam contributes to the notion of a ‘securitized Islam’ that will be critically discussed in this work. To sum up, one may say that the tradition of research on issues of Islamism and fundamentalism in Germany is older than the debates that followed the terrorist attacks in the USA and Europe at the turn of the 21st century (Kramer 2003). Nonetheless, various studies have since appeared which reflect the increased attention to the phenomena of Muslim fundamentalism (FES 2007; BMI 2004b; Heckmann 2004; Kepel/Roberts 2004; Kreitmeir 2002; Meng 2004; Tartsch 2008). 4 Tibi (1981), for example, portrays Islam as a pre-industrial defensive culture which is incompatible with modernity and its principle of human rights. Tibi’s work, which also claims that a confrontation between “the Islam and the West” is inevitable, has been widely criticized among scholars (see, e.g., Bölke 1993).



studying islamic organizations17

In the 1990s a third phase began which can be described by the key term “struggle for recognition” (Tietze 2008: 221; see also Honneth 1992; Taylor 1992). The younger generation in particular demanded changes in the agenda of the Islamic organizations, which consequently shifted their focus to integration activities and the right of free exercise of religion (Frese 2002; Schiffauer 2003). One of the aims of the organizations has been to receive the status of a corporation of public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts), which would grant Islamic organizations rights that are comparable to those of the Christian churches and the Jewish community such as the collection of church tax by the state, the right to religious education in school, the right to open schools, and access to public funding for social activities. (Thielmann 2008: 3f.; Şen 2008: 36). Both the legal status of Islamic organizations and the question of religious education are subjects of intense debate in Germany (Reichmuth 2006; Rohe 2008; see also Chap. Four: The Regulative Dimension). So far, no Islamic Organization has been officially recognized as a corporation of public law. Jonker argues, in this context, that the “older generation simply was not educated enough to meet the demands” (2002b: 43). Now the first generation is joined by their grandchildren, who further promote the integration of Islamic organizations into the German system both on the content level but also with regard to formal requirements of the law on the relationship between church and state (Staatskirchenrecht), which requires “internal differentiation, organizational transparency and the formation of experts” (Ibid.). The research results presented throughout this study clearly indicate that organizational change along these dimensions still is an ongoing process. The Integration/Segregation Debate Overall, the development of scholarly research on Islam in Germany partly reflects the introduced patterns of development of Muslim presence in Germany. Since the beginning, research has often focused the key terms ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’, which are widely debated in sociology and which imply different definitions and approaches to coexistence in society. While Esser uses the term “structural assimilation” to describe the inclusion in the education system, the workforce, and other central institutions of the receiving country (2001), this research refers to this pro­ cess  of granting participatory rights as ‘integration’. Integration is thus

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considered distinct from the concept of “cultural assimilation” developed by the Chicago School in the 1920s, which expects migrants to lose their cultures and traditions over time in the “melting pot” of the U.S. (Hoerder et al. 2007: 48), and which resurfaced in the course of the German Leitkultur debate (see Chap. Four: The Normative Dimension). In line with Tietze’s concept of a period of non-recognition, religion was originally seen as an obstacle to integration in the dominant modernization paradigm which postulated that secularization is the overarching goal (Karakaşoğlu et al. 2006). Furthermore, the question of whether migrant organizations generally promote or hinder the integration of their members into the German society has been prominently discussed since the 1980s between Elwert (1982; 1984) and Esser (1986; 2001), with the former stressing the integrative and the later the segregative effect of ethnic communities. Elwert (1982) argues that the organization of migrants in migrant associations and ethnic clubs (to facilitate “Binnenintegration”) enables their integration into the host society because it allows them to develop selfesteem and expertise in dealing with everyday situations and provides the opportunity to form pressure groups. Esser (1986), by contrast, criticizes the lack of openness of ethnic communities and emphasizes problems of cultural and social isolation within  ethnic communities, which hinder structural integration and upward mobility. He argues that cultural pluralism is only possible at the level of an individual lifestyle, and that on the level of collective ethnic groups it must be avoided to prevent ethnic stratification. Esser (2001) also  maintains that structural assimilation requires a certain degree of acculturation. Combining both arguments, Heckmann (1992: 96ff.) emphasizes in his concept of “ethnic colonies” the positive functions of migrant organizations such as mutual aid networks, interest representation, identity building, and socialization of immigrants, but he also criticizes that contact with the host society may be limited due to the self-sufficiency of the ethnic colony, which in turn may promote ethnic stratification (Ibid: 115). This narrow focus on the positive or negative effects of migrant organizations is still characteristic of many research projects and political debates (e.g., Diehl 2004). It has been criticized (Jungk 2001; Pries 2010a) because it fails to analyze the issue from the organizations’ point of view. This research seeks to fill this gap, as will be discussed in more detail below.



studying islamic organizations19 Quantitative Studies

The 1990s saw a widening of the scope of studies on Islam in Germany, which led to a growing number of quantitative and qualitative studies. The quantitative studies include Halm (2006a) and Şen (2008) for the Foundation Center for Studies on Turkey and Integration Studies (Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung, ZfT);5 the annual surveys conducted by Heitmeyer et al. (1997); parts of the Shell study by Fuchs-Heinritz (2000); Brettfeld/Wetzels (2007); Meng (2004); Weidacher (2000), and, most recently, the studies by the BAMF (Haug et al. 2009), the Bertelsmann Foundation (2007), and the Open Society Institute (2009). According to Eilers, Seitz, and Hirschler (2008), these studies mark the “beginning of an ‘empirical sociology’ of Islam”. The subjects of these quantitative studies include Muslim attitudes to the issue of fundamentalism or Islamism, their social integration, and their attitude toward the German political and legal system. In her critical review of surveys on Muslims in Europe, Spielhaus argues that many quantification attempts can be regarded as “a governmental praxis to control, manage and represent populations” (2011a: 711), noting that by focusing on quantitative figures researchers often neglect research on religious practices and the production of religious knowledge. Aside from the recent attempts to determine the overall number of Muslims living in Germany, most quantitative studies have focused on the perceived and practiced religiousness among Muslims in Germany. The ZfT conducted a survey on the experiences of Turkish immigrants in 2000 and 2005.6 One of the results was a notable increase in the number of Muslims who consider themselves “very religious” (7.0% in 2000 and 28.1% in 2005), while the majority consider themselves to be “quite religious” (64.6% and 55.2%). However, the combined figure is higher in 2005 (83.3%) than in 2000 (71.6%), a result that is consistent with most comparable quantitative studies. The survey conducted in 2000 shows that older Turkish people tend to be more religious than younger ones; that the 5 The Center conducts various research projects on the Turkish community in Germany, including an annual quantitative survey on Muslim life in the German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. URL: www.zfti.de [last visited 27-May-2012]. 6 In 2000, 2,066 respondents were interviewed via telephone based on a representative random sample of 280,000 common Turkish names that were identified using the online telephone directory KlickTel. The respondents included people with Turkish or German citizenship who had a Turkish migration background. In 2005 the questions related to experiences with Germans were asked again, this time in interviews with 1,019 respondents from a new sample of 330,000 names (Halm 2006a: 13; 33ff.).

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longer the Turkish migrants have lived in Germany the more religious they feel, and that the higher their education level the more they tend toward modern views on religion (Şen 2008: 40ff.). In their 2000 survey of 10,000 students with an average age of 15.3 years, Brettfeld and Wetzels (2007) found that 73.1% of the Muslim respondents considered religion to be “very important” or “important”. This rate is higher among Muslims of Turkish descent (76.8%) than among those of ex-Yugoslavian descent (61.3%). Only 17.2% of their Christian peers mentioned these categories, but it should be noted that these figures are higher for Christians with a recent migration background. Weidacher’s survey among 812 Turkish respondents aged 18 to 25 showed that more than 60% consider religion to be “important” or “quite important” (Weidacher 2000: 125). Heitmeyer’s survey among 1,221 Turks aged 15 to 21 found that 67.8% of respondents consider their religious community to be “important” or “very important”, 23.3% never go to the mosque, and 31% go several times a month (Heitmeyer et al. 1997). According to a recent BAMF study conducted in 2009, the combined figure of “very religious” and “quite religious” respondents among the 2,417 cases of interviewed Muslims aged 16 and older has increased to 86.4% (Haug et al. 2009: 141). However, these increases in the degree of perceived religiousness are not accompanied by equally high levels of practiced religiousness. For example, according to Haug et al. (2009: 146ff.), 65% of respondents rarely or never attend religious service, and only 29.4% of the men and 39.1% of the women pray every day. The figures for Alevis are considerably lower (with an average of 14.2% praying every day and 42.3% never praying at all), which is due to the fact that prayer, one of the five pillars of Islam, is not as central to their religious practice as to that of other Muslim communities (cf. Sökefeld 2008b: 95ff.). Eilers, Seitz and Hirschler, who use two indexes of perceived and practiced religiousness, come to a similar conclusion, namely “that there is a large gap between perceived and practiced religiousness” (2008: 107). 72.1% of respondents state that religion is “very important or rather important” (perceived religiousness), while only 30.3% read the Qur’an “often or sometimes” and pray “every day or several times per week” (practiced religiousness). Only 0.7% state that religion is “rather unimportant or very unimportant”, and 39.1% state that they “neither pray nor read the Qur’an”. However, Spielhaus questions the explanatory power of telephone surveys of this type (2011b: 50f.), noting that not only may questions be  phrased ambiguously, but that it is also difficult to determine with



studying islamic organizations21

certainty whether religiosity or, rather, the importance associated with a religious identity has increased due to intrinsic or extrinsic identification processes. To resolve these questions, many authors including Spielhaus have reverted to the use of qualitative research designs. Qualitative Studies In the late 1990s and early 2000s the research focus shifted again. The modernization of Islam through individualization became a research topic, which has led to a more detailed picture of Muslim life in Germany (cf. Thielmann 2008; Spielhaus 2011b), with a growing number of qualitative studies on Muslim men (Frese 2002; Tietze 2001), Muslim women (Karakaşoğlu 2000; Klinkhammer 2000; Nökel 2001; 2002; Pinn/Wehner 1995), and Europe’s new Muslim political elite (Klausen 2005b; Klausen/ Hennessy 2006; see Tietze 2003 for an overview of these studies). Eilers, Seitz and Hirschler note that the trend toward a higher degree of religiousness described above may have been caused by the pressure to defend one’s religion against the negative publicity Islam has received in the media since 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks (2008: 113f.). The authors assume that religious affiliation can be interpreted as a resource that promises recognition as a dialog partner due to the prominent role ascribed to religion in Germany. At the same time, the definitions of what ‘religiousness’ actually means differ among generations, in particular in contexts of immigration (Ibid: 90). For many immigrants, religion is an “anchor” for their identity and the continuity of the family tradition in the country of settlement, which may be perceived as foreign and chaotic (Lemmen 2002a: 3). In her in-depth analysis of the self-identification and religious practices of Muslims in Germany, Spielhaus notes: The ways in which Muslims are presented in the media and political debates not only force individuals of Muslim background and belief to cultivate an attitude of self-defense, but also cause them to identify even more strongly with Muslims in Germany (Spielhaus 2011b: 184, translation KRW).

In addition to the overall focus on individual Muslims and their religiosity in numerous qualitative studies, there are also a variety of informative indepth studies on Islamic organizations, which provide useful insights into some of the organizations studied in this work. Among these studies are Schiffauer’s work on the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (2004; 2007c; 2008b) and Cemaleddin Kaplan’s banned organization (2000); Jonker’s work on the Süleymanci movement (2002a), and Sökefeld’s work on the Alevi community (2008a; b; c).

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This body of recent literature is often in contrast to older studies which were rather critical in their portrayal of the activities of Islamic organizations in Germany (Binswanger/Sipahioğlu 1988; Feindt-Riggers/Steinbach 1997; Gür 1993; Nirumand 1990; Özcan 1989). Overall, this list of case studies suggests a limitation of in-depth comparisons between the organizations and their interaction. The comparative studies that do exist focus on certain issues such as the emergence of these organizations (Vermeulen 2006), their transnational ties (Mügge 2011; Jørgensen 2009), the religious dialog (Lemmen/Miehl 2001; Halm 2006b; Tezcan 2006), organizational welfare provision (Beaumont/Cloke 2012); the life of imams in Vienna (Kroissenbrunner 2002), and civic and political participation (Cyrus 2005; Halm/Sauer 2005; Ministry for Work, Social City Planning, Culture and Sport of the State of North RhineWestphalia 1999; Sezgin 2008a; b; Tillie 2004). Until now, few studies have conducted comparative interviews with the representatives of the major Islamic organizations. One example is a structured group discussion with four representatives of Islamic organizations held by ZfT in 2005.7 Due to the relevance of their statements for this study, the main results are summarized below. In general, the representatives emphasized that they have experienced increased legitimization pressure since the turn of the 21st century. On the one hand, this pressure arguably resulted in a tendency among the organizations to criticize each other. On the other hand, this tendency is countered by the perceived need to unite the Sunni groups to regain the power of definition with regard to the discourse on Islam in Germany (Halm 2006a: 36; see also Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Umbrella Organizations). During the group discussion the Muslim representatives criticized that the increased interest of German politicians in the question of Islam is accompanied by a largely negative image. One example mentioned are attempts to associate disintegrative tendencies within the immigrant community with the question of religious affiliation. This signifies a loss of conclusive authority for the organizations themselves. In addition, the representatives complained that the issue of equal treatment of Islamic organizations has not moved up on the agenda, while security discussions are increasingly linked to integration debates. 7 The participants were Mehmet Yilmaz and Erol Pürlu (VIKZ), Ali Kızılkaya (IRD), and Turgut Öker (AABF). Representatives from DITIB, the C.e.m. Foundation, ATIB, ZMD, and IGMG were invited but did not participate (Halm 2006a: 14).



studying islamic organizations23

According to Halm, these results are partly reflected in the changes in the parliamentary debates and the media coverage since 2001, which have focused less on the deficiencies of the host society regarding questions of integration (cf. Chap. Four: The Cognitive and the Normative Dimension). When asked about their relationship with the media, the organizations stated that they are not actively involved in the discourse, which they believed is dominated by researchers. One reason they gave was that their public affairs were often overstrained after the 9/11 attacks, a problem that is linked to the issue of limited resources. However, the participants also noted that relations with the media had improved, which led to an atmosphere of mutual trust. In addition, the representatives complain about the unequal character of the dialog activities with the German society and politics because the latter decide upon the character of integration and dialog to which the Islamic organizations have to adapt (Halm 2006a). The related argument that the German state acts as an “agenda-setter” which defines the themes of the “in-group”, to which the “out-group” must respond is also found in Schiffer’s analysis of the way in which Islam is presented in the German media. She concludes that “the defensive stance of those reacting means that the range of their objections is reduced” (Schiffer 2008: 436). Tezcan also criticizes that the present dialog discourse and its links to integration issues implies that every immigrant with a (supposed) Muslim background has to clearly state his or her position on Islam, regardless of whether he or she is a believer or not (2006: 32). He argues that the changing public discourse in Germany with regard to the religiosity of migrants turns political attention from race to faith and from multiculturalism to multi-religious societies, culminating in the creation of a “Homo Islamicus” who is both the subject and the object of governmentality (2007: 71). Consequently, the use of the adjective “Muslim” in the context of social problems may result in a reduction to the religious and identity sphere, despite a variety of factors that are linked to questions of immigration (Tezcan 2009: 81). In this research, these developments are referred to as the “Islamization” (Islamisierung) of discourses (cf. Tiesler 2006: 22ff., 124ff.), which means that a variety of debates are now linked to the issue of Islam, which often represents a shift away from the former ethnic focus on immigrant groups in Germany. Tiesler argues that the importance of religious denomination is now even more overestimated than during the political and academic debates of the 1970s (Ibid: 22).

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This renewed focus on Islam can be observed in media discourses and political debates (see Chap. Four: The Cognitive and the Normative Dimension), as well as in the interviews with the organizations (see Chap. Five and Six). The influence of this shift in the political and public attention on the Islamic organizations is part of the empirical analysis that seeks to assess how wide the range of organizational actions and responses is, and how the analyzed Islamic organizations use their opportunities to adapt or to protest. Comparative Studies In addition to these chronologically described developments, a comparative tradition of research on migrants’ claims-making has been established in Europe (Koenig 2005; Koopmans/Stratham 1999; 2000ab; Rohe 2001; Soysal 1997). This line of research is relevant for this analysis because of its focus on institutional conditions that influence the claims-making process. Originally based on analyses of social movements (Rucht 1998; Tarrow 1991), the political opportunity structure (POS) approach has been the most prominent approach used to describe the influence of the political context on claims-making strategies (Duyvené de Wit/Koopmans 2001; 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; on the combination of the POS concept with studies on transnationalism see Jørgensen 2009; Mügge 2011; ØstergaardNielsen 2003). Laubenthal has noted some of the shortcomings of the POS literature when it comes to explaining the emergence of social movements. She advocates, for example, for the narrowing of POS with regard to a certain policy field (Laubenthal 2007). This reduction to “issue-specific fields” can be associated with the conceptual approach of an organizational field which is part of the neoinstitutional framework that is presented below. With regard to the study of Muslims in Europe, Fetzer and Soper (2005) have argued that the modes of religious governance need to be considered as part of the issue-specific opportunity structures for Islamic organizations. In his comparison of the Dutch and the German contexts and their influence on Islamic organizations, Kortmann (2011) concludes that the differences encountered by the organizations across both borders can be explained by differences in the POS and the different modes of religious governance (see also Musch 2011). A similar conclusion with regard to the differences between the Austrian and the German context can be found in Sezgin/Rosenow-Williams (2013) and Sezgin (2008b).



studying islamic organizations25

In general, it can be said that an increasing number of studies have been dealing with opportunity structures from a comparative perspective. This development can be linked to the increased attention to the study of the institutionalization of Islam in the European context (see, e.g., Allievi/ Nielsen 2003; AlSayyad/Castells 2002; Cesari/McLoughlin 2005; Klausen 2005a; Koenig 2003; Kreienbrink/Bodenstein 2010; Laurence 2012; Shadid/ van Koningsveld 2002; Waardenburg 2003). In his analysis of the Europeanization of religious politics, Koenig (2007a: 364) notes that European identity discourses provide potentials for the inclusion as well as the exclusion of Muslims. While the concept of a European civilization based on various religious traditions is being used by Muslims to emphasize their compatibility with secular principles of democracy and human rights, other European identity frames still strengthen national symbolic boundaries between a distinct Christian heritage and Islam. The outcomes of religious claims-making by Islamic organizations— for example, concerning the right to religious education, public acceptance of religious practices, and the question of organizational status—are also frequently discussed in this increasing body of research (e.g., Jonker 2002b; Potz/Wieshaider 2004; Muckel 2004; Rohe 2008), as will be discussed in more detail throughout the following chapters. Transnational Studies Another international line of research focuses on the transnational character of migrant organizations and the lives of migrants who “sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch et al. 1997: 7). This research field has received increasing attention since the late 1990s. Since then, transnationalism has become a widely used and accepted concept in the social sciences for the analysis of migration-related phenomena which transcend territorial boundaries (Basch et al. 1997; Faist 2000; Pries 1997, 1999; Vertovec 2009).8 Transnational networks, which can have cultural, economic, political, or religious dimensions, enable migrants to generate new social spaces and global linkages which extend between and beyond two or more geographical spaces (Pries 2008a). Portes et al. characterize these transnational social relations as “frequent and durable participation of immigrants 8 For an overview of the increasing number of articles and research projects on transnational migrant organizations in Germany and internationally see Schimany/Schock 2010.

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in the economic, political, and cultural life of their countries, which requires regular and frequent contact across national borders” (2007: 252). Accordingly, transnational activities have to be differentiated from “international activities conducted by governments and other nationally based institutions; the multinational initiatives of UN agencies, global churches, and corporate actors operating in multiple countries” (ibid.). The emergence of cross-border and/or transnational organizations has been studied with reference both to the industrial sector (Bartlett/ Goshal 1990; Meier 1997; Pries 2000) and to migrant organizations. The focus of several of the studies on transnational migrant organizations mentioned below is on organizational aims, structures, and activities both in the countries of origin and the countries of settlement, as well as, more recently, on topics such as organizational members, networks, and POS (Allievi/Nielsen 2003; Amelina/Faist 2008; Amiraux 2003; Cappai 2005; Faist 2000; Jørgensen 2009; Mandaville 2001; Mügge 2011; ØstergaardNielsen 2000; 2003; Portes et al. 2007; Pries 1997; 1999; Pries/Sezgin 2012; Schiffauer 2007b; Schimany/Schock 2010; Trautner 2000; on transnational activism of social movements see Keck/Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). According to the definition developed by the Project “Transnational Migrant Organizations” (TRAMO),9 a transnational organization is ideally characterized by a strong coordination of material resources, knowledge, and interests across national contexts, and a strong distribution of activities and structures both in the country of arrival (CA) and the country of origin (CO)10 (Pries 2006; Pries/Sezgin 2012). This definition is displayed in the rightmost column of Table 1 below, which describes six ideal types of migrant organizations.   9 The project “Diffusion and Contexts of Transnational Migrant Organizations in Europe” (TRAMO) seeks to identify the characteristics of border-crossing migrant organizations; analyze the diffusion of transnational migrant organizations; study the context factors which influence the emergence of such organizations in Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Spain, and address the consequences of the transnationalization of migrant organizations on the participation of migrants and their integration into European societies. The project is headed by Prof. Dr. Pries (Faculty for Social Science at the RuhrUniversity Bochum). URL: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/tramo/en/index.shtml [last visited 1-Feb-2012]. 10 The TRAMO project uses the terms ‘CA’ and ‘CO’ to avoid more normative terms such as ‘home country’ v. ‘host country’ and ‘sending’ v. ‘receiving states’ (Pries/Sezgin 2012). However, with regard to the empirical context of Muslim migrants in Europe, this research argues that the term ‘country of settlement’ describes the current situation of Muslims in Europe more appropriately than the term ‘country of arrival’ because in many cases settlement is permanent. I would like to thank Martin Sökefeld for this comment during the international TRAMO conference, June 14–16 2010.



studying islamic organizations27

Table 1: Ideal types of migrant organizations Ideal type Country Country Country Country Multiof of of of national arrival – focal arrival – global origin – focal origin – global Character­istics 

Transnational

Mobilization and distribution of resources – Membership, money, infrastructure

CAcentered

CAcentered

COcentered

COcentered

CO- and CO- and CA-centered CA-centered

Main themes and demands – Subjects, target groups, allies

CAcentered

CAcentered

COcentered

COcentered

CO- and CO- and CA-centered CA-centered

Arrangement of CAexternal activities centered – Publication strategy, public activities, events/ meetings

CAcentered

COcentered

COcentered

CO- and CO- and CA-centered CA-centered

Arrangement of Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong internal activities coordination coordination. coordination. coordination. coordination. coordination– communication flow, meetings, internal elections, decision making Source: Pries et al., TRAMO project, unpublished document (no date); cf. Pries/Sezgin 2012: 19.

Until now, the factors that facilitate processes of transnationalization have been associated with new communication and transportation technologies and the increasing importance of remittances. However, this research stresses the importance of expectation structures as an additional dimension that needs to be investigated to understand the orientation of an organization. Expectations can be supporting or restraining factors that lead to the organization’s orientation toward one of these six ideal types of structuration. A Turkish Islamic organization may have to deal with expectations of Germany and Turkey, as well as various actors linked

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to these national contexts. These expectations may be in conflict with one another, requiring the organizations to find appropriate coping strategies, which will be discussed in the empirical case studies in Chapter Five. It should be noted here that although the focus of this research is primarily on the German institutional environment and its impact on Islamic organizations, this does not preclude an evaluation of the importance of organizational relations with actors abroad and the impact that changes in the country of origin can have on organizational development in the countries of settlement. These relations need to be understood from a theoretical and a functional perspective. This analysis will be presented in Chapter Six: Relations with Actors Abroad, which will also discuss whether the current paradigm of political expectations that argues for a “de-transnationalization of Islam” (Laurence 2006) and the termination of institutionalized ties to the countries of origin is viable from the point of view of the Islamic organizations themselves. Criticism of the Shortcomings of Existing Studies This brief presentation of existing research on Muslims and their organizations in Germany conducted over the last 35 years revealed several significant gaps in the literature that are relevant to this research project. The first point of criticism is that many studies have limited their focus to the question of whether, and to what extent, migrant organizations (including religious ones) promote the integration of their members into the German society (see the Esser–Elwert debate above). This perspective is also evident in the official government reports such as the biannual reports on foreigners in Germany and the Federal Integration Plan (German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration 2002; 2005; 2007a; 2007b). In the relevant sections on Islamic organizations, both reports particularly emphasize the security risks or the opportunities for dialog and demand that the Muslim immigrants be more fully integrated into the German society (cf. Pries 2010a: 9ff.). Pries criticizes the implied either-or semantic with regard to the question of whether organizations promote integration or segregation, which he believes should be replaced by an analysis of the contextual factors that cause the organizations to act in one way or another (Pries 2010a: 20). In keeping with this line of criticism, this research analyzes the concepts of segregation and integration from the point of view of the Muslim migrant organizations themselves. The concepts are therefore seen as



studying islamic organizations29

contextual factors in the current German political discourse. This shift in focus to the organizational perspectives enables an in-depth analysis of the behavior, strategies, and concerns of Islamic umbrella organizations and thus goes beyond questions of organizational utility. Second, this shift to the bottom-up perspective of the organizations creates a need for qualitative research which enables researchers to understand organizational strategies and the related attitudes toward public and political discourses. A qualitative research design which combines indepth interviews with document analysis that focuses on primary and secondary data guarantees not only originality but also timeliness of results, which is necessary in this continuously changing and highly flexible organizational field. In this respect, it can be argued that many existing studies on Islamic organizations do not involve primary empirical research. One example is the work of Tartsch (2008), which relies on publications on the analyzed Islamic organizations in Germany by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Third, with regard to the choice of case studies, this research acknowledges that various scholars (e.g., Thielmann 2008; Eilers et al. 2008) have criticized that most studies focus on Turkish immigrants, which is due to the fact that Turks represent the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Germany (Halm/Sauer 2005; Kelek 2002; Klinkhammer 2000; Özcan 1989; Sezgin 2008a; b; Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 2001; ZfT 1995). This research counters this criticism by including the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, whose member organizations include Albanian and Arab Muslims, as well as Sunnis and Shiites, among others. This is also in response to criticism by Tezcan (2003: 242), who disapproves of the abstract descriptions of immigrants and their organizations which fail to consider the differences between religious ideologies. As will be discussed below, the structures and activities of an organization are influenced by its charter, which describes the organization’s purpose, ideology, and value system, including its religious orientation. Although it was not possible to include the complete perspective of religious variety in the sample of the analyzed case studies, it is important to note that there is no such thing as “the Islam” or “the Islamic Organization” in Germany (Rosenow/Kortmann 2010; Schiffauer 2003: 143). Rather, it is important to understand the differences among the Muslim commu­ nity, which are caused by different organizational trajectories and different internal and external expectations, which in turn lead to divergent

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organizational strategies. Since many research projects only focus on one Islamic organization, the comparative perspective of this endeavor fills another gap in the research. Finally, it should be noted that the development of a theoretical framework to analyze the behavior of organizations—which have to meet institutional expectations and satisfy their members’ interests at the same time—has been long overdue in the research on migrant organizations in general and Islamic organizations in particular. The majority of studies on these organizations have no theoretical framework at all. Instead, various publications on the German context contain descriptions of the organizational landscape and the life, activities, and structures of organizations (Abdullah 1981; Hero et al. 2008; Kücükhüseyin 2002; Landman 2005; Lemmen 2002a; Seidel et al. 2001; Şen/Aydin 2002; Spuler-Stegemann 2002; Wunn 2007; ZfT 1995). The internal interpretation processes that take place in the Islamic organizations and the impact of the institutional environment on their strategies have been neglected. This research therefore fills yet another research gap by presenting an in-depth analysis of Islamic umbrella organizations and the strategies they use to adapt to or resist changes in their organizational field. The reason why approaches of organizational sociology have not yet been applied to this research field may be that most organizational theories were originally developed for the world of business organizations (Kieser/Walgenbach 2003: 26). The links between organization theory and the study of religion have been discussed theoretically (DiMaggio 1998) but are rarely applied empirically. An exception is Sacred Companies (i.e., Demerath et al. 1998), which includes various articles that employ an organizational perspective to study religious organizations. An institutional analysis of the new religious movements in Germany is also presented in Hero (2010). In addition, neither the analysis of interest organizations nor the study of the non-profit sector in Germany has yet established migrant organizations in general and Islamic organizations in particular as a field of research. This is evident from the fact that none of the major publications on interest organizations refers to this particular topic (Mayntz/ Biedenkopf 1992; Müller-Jentsch 2003: 140ff.; Sebaldt/Straßner 2004; Willems/von Winter 2000; von Winter/Willems 2007). A very recent exception is Blätte (2011), which employs the perspective of associational economy to Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany. With regard to the limited research attention to the organizational level of Muslim life in immigration contexts, it can be argued that both



studying islamic organizations31

concepts—the institutional environment and the organizational field— are largely undertheorized. The gap in the research on external influences on organizational behavior of Islamic organizations can be filled by using the neoinstitutional framework and its focus on organizational legitimacy. In addition to the neoinstitutional emphasis on organizational legitimacy, the issue of organizational efficiency needs to be considered as well. According to the contingency approach, ‘efficiency’ not only refers to resource acquisition. Rather, it implies the adaptation of organizational structures to contextual factors such as the history, size, interdependency, and location of an organization, which in turn can explain organizational differences across cases. Finally, theoretical assumptions on intermediary organizations show that organizational members and their interests are crucial for voluntary organizations whose members are their main resource. Therefore, their members’ expectations represent another explanatory variable that must be included in a research framework which can be used in organizational sociology to study any non-profit collective member organization. The next section is a brief theoretical introduction to these three lines of organizational research. A combined research framework that predicts the choices of organizational behavior in relation to external and internal expectations is presented in Chapter Three. The Institutional Environment and the Importance of Organizational Legitimacy: The Neoinstitutional Perspective The literature overview identified the theoretical weakness of many studies, especially with regard to the institutional contextualization of Islamic organizations. Some studies do assume a relationship between national opportunity structures and organizational behavior, but in many cases, it remains unclear how these linkages function and how they can be operationalized empirically. Neoinstitutionalism enables the researcher to fill this gap because it provides a useful set of analytical tools that allow for a structured analysis of organizational behavior in the context of institutional environments in general and organizational fields in particular. Sociological Neoinstitutionalism The concepts of sociological neoinstitutionalism were developed in the 1970s by North-American organizational sociologists who assumed that regulative and normative pressures as well as cognitive constraints influence organizational behavior (DiMaggio/Powell 1991b; Scott 1994b; 1995).

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chapter two While the new institutionalism that is currently sweeping through political science, economics and sociology assumes many guises and speaks with many tongues, there is no doubt concerning its major impact on the study of organizations. These perspectives are calling attention to the ways in which individual corporate actors—whether for-profit firms or voluntary associations—are influenced by wider belief systems and bundles of rules (Scott 1994a: 203).

Institutional theory and the study of the link between institutions and individuals have a long tradition in sociology that stretches back to Cooley, Durkheim, and Hughes at the beginning of the 20th century. According to Scott (1995), these authors stressed the interdependence of individuals and institutions, but neglected the study of organizations. They believed that institutions such as the church or the family are enacted through interactions of individuals whose behavior is often unconsciously affected by these institutions. Cooley summarizes this interdependence, noting that “[t]he individual is always cause as well as effect of the institution” (as cited in Scott 1995: 8). For Durkheim, social institutions are symbolic systems which consist of “systems of knowledge, belief, and ‘moral authority’” (Ibid: 10). The church-member finds the beliefs and practices of his religious life readymade at birth; their existence prior to his own implies their existence outside of himself. […] These types of conduct or thought are not only external to the individual but are, moreover, endowed with coercive power, by virtue of which they impose themselves upon him, independent of his individual will (Durkheim 1964 [1985]: 1f.).

Parsons agrees, arguing that behavior is motivated by moral norms which “regulate the relations of individuals to each other” (Parson 1990 [1934]: 327) rather than by instrumental concerns. By emphasizing the influence of values and norms on individual behavior, these early institutionalists already contradicted the rational choice paradigm of a profit-maximizing Homo economicus. Senge (2006) groups these early studies into those that follow a functionalist paradigm regarding the importance of institutions for societal structures and processes (Durkheim and Parsons) and those that follow an action-oriented perspective on institution with a focus on the socially constructed process of institutionalization (Cooley, Hughes, Goffman, and Berger/Luckmann). According to Senge, neoinstitutionalism has been influenced by both paradigms, in that it focuses on the functional link between institutions and organizations and analyzes processes of institutionalization (Tolbert/Zucker 1996).



studying islamic organizations33

Max Weber, with his work on bureaucratic organizations (1972 [1922]), is often cited as the forefather of organizational research on the links between institutions and organizations (cf. Scott 1995: 116ff.). In the middle of the 20th century, Weber’s concepts of power, authority, and legitimacy were widely employed by organizational researchers who focused on the societal consequences of organizations (cf. Senge/Hellmann 2006: 9ff.). Also among the early studies on organizations were the “functionalist” approach of Merton (1965 [1949])11 and his student Selznick (1957),12 the work on “performance programs” by March and Simon, who criticize the “boundaries of rationality” (1958: 141ff., 171), and Parsons’ late work on organizations (1956a; b). In this context, the open-system approach was developed with its characteristic focus on the reciprocal relation of organizations and the society (Senge/Hellmann 2006: 13). According to Scott, early open-system approaches like the contingency theory and the resource-dependency approach emphasized the impact of influence relations and technical requirements on organizations (Scott 1987: 498; 1995: xiv). It was the achievement of the developing neoinstitutional theories to expand this narrow focus on exchange interdependencies and to highlight the cultural aspects of the institutional environment. According to neoinstitutional theorists, organizational actors, interests, and rationalities are thus seen as products of the institutional environment of organizations. A perspective shared by old and new institutionalism is the focus on the embeddedness of organizations in societal contexts, with institu­ tions  functioning as the link between the two (Senge/Hellmann 2006: 19). However, while the old institutionalists focus on the unanticipated consequences of social actions and the normative dimension analyzed by Durkheim and Parsons, the new institutionalists focus on the “unreflectivity” of social actions (DiMaggio/Powell 1991a: 11ff.). This logic of orthodoxy is characteristic of the cognitive dimension, which has become the foundation for the sociological version of new institutionalism (Scott 1995: 13, 40). 11 In his chapter on “bureaucratic structure and personality”, Merton identifies the limitations of Weber’s bureaucracy paradigm and describes the development of symbolic rather than utilitarian rules (1965: 200). See also Tolbert and Zucker on Merton’s focus on social functionalist theory (1996). 12 Selznick’s analysis of the social structure of organizations and his reference to internal interest groups (1957: 90ff.) will be discussed in the section on intermediary organizations.

34

chapter two Cognitive Sense-Making and the Individual Actor

The cognitive dimension refers to the coding of reality through knowledge (Klatetzki 2006: 48). It was advocated by the main protagonists of the neoinstitutional tradition whose views are presented in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, an influential collection of essays by Powell and DiMaggio published in 1991.13 Cognitive theory has its origins in the 1940s and 1950s, when an active organism was added to the stimulus response approach. Cognitive structures are seen as programs employed by the individuals to select and process information. During the process of socialization, the individual learns to deal with institutions, which in turn opens up a range of alternative options for action (Senge 2006: 42). Although “institutions control actors by providing definitions of situations and identities”, this social constructivist approach no longer regards individuals as passive rule followers, but as active participants who interpret and construct their world (Scott 1995: 22ff.; Berger/ Luckmann 1967;14 Zucker 1991). Thus, Durkheim’s assumption that norms and rules influence cognition is turned on its head. In the neoinstitutional perspective, cognitive sensemaking of the world becomes the basis for the analysis of changes in the structure and action of organizations. More generally, the organization itself is seen as a collective cognitive construction (Klatetzki 2006: 49, 61). It is important to note at this point that knowledge in the form of rules and taken-for-granted scripts is influenced by the environment and continues to exist independently of individuals. DiMaggio and Powell, for instance, criticized Parsons’ subjective view of culture as an element of the personality system which guides the individual’s action. Instead, they advocated an objective view that situates culture as an object of orientation outside the individual (1991a: 17f.; on the links between culture and

13 This volume includes the influential articles by Meyer/Rowan (1991 [1977]) on the rationalization of cultural rules; DiMaggio and Powell’s work (1991b [1983]) on organizational isomorphism within organizational fields, and Zucker’s article (1991 [1977]) which emphasizes the micro-foundations of institutions. The text by Meyer and Rowan was first published in the American Journal of Sociology 1977, 83: 340–363; DiMaggio and Powell’s article in the American Sociological Review 1983, 48, 147–160, and Zucker’s chapter, with the exception of the postscript, in the American Sociological Review 1977, 42 (5), 726–743. 14 Berger and Luckmann argue: “It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity. […] society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product” (Berger/Luckmann 1967: 60f.).



studying islamic organizations35

cognition and the points of convergence between sociology and psychology; see also DiMaggio 1997). However, some authors have also pointed out and criticized that neoinstitutionalism, which regards itself as a macro-theory, lacks a microfoundation (Zucker 1991: 103ff.). One of the main points of criticism of institutional theories is that organizations remain black boxes that are studied without sufficient attention to individual actors. This ‘blind spot’ regarding the influence of individual actors is also mentioned by DiMaggio and Powell (1991a: 15ff.). In response, some scholars, including Scott (1995) and Barley/Tolbert (1997), combined Giddens’ structuration theory with neoinstitutionalism to include individual action in the neoinstitutional framework.15 Giddens’ theory of structuration assumes that structures represent both the context and the product of action (1997 [1984]). This assumption is compatible with neoinstitutionalists, who argue that institutions “both arise from and constrain social action” (Barley/Tolbert 1997: 95). The perspective employed in this research project therefore highlights the active role of organizations and their members. This approach avoids the criticism that neoinstitutionalists conceptualize organizations as passive actors by focusing on varieties of active adherence to externally legitimated rules and agendas and internal members’ interests (Hirsch 1997: 1718ff.; Oliver 1991). Organizations are regarded as a product of decisions by their members, with both the organizations and their members being influenced by the institutional environment and changing it at the same time. In their early works, Meyer and Rowan (1991) advocated this active agency perspective, stating that organizations strategically choose to comply with institutional expectations to secure benefits such as legitimacy, resources, and the chance to survive (Scott 1987: 498). Another prominent proponent of this active agency perspective is Richard W. Scott, who argues that “[a] concern for self-interest, issues of effectiveness, the use of strategic behavior, even rational calculation and 15 Barley and Tolbert argue that Giddens’ concept of structural modalities (interpretative schemes, resources, and norms) that connects the institutional realm with the realm of action (Giddens 1997 [1984]: 81) should be substituted with the notion of scripts. They argue that scripts not only merge the institutional and the action dimension, but that they are also easier to access empirically (“who interacts with whom in what ways at what times”, Barley/Tolbert 1997: 105). According to them, organizational scripts represent “observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting” (Ibid: 98).

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innovation are not incompatible with an institutional approach” (Scott 1994b: 77). Although it is assumed that action and interests are institutionally influenced by shared cultural scripts and meaning systems, it is not necessary to regard organizations as passively succumbing to environmental pressures. Instead, they can try to alter the demands individually or in a joint effort in their organizational field: Organizations are affected, even penetrated, by their environments, but they are also capable of responding to these influence attempts creatively and strategically. By acting in concert with other organizations facing similar pressures, organizations can sometimes counter, curb, circumvent, or redefine these demands. And collective action does not preclude individual attempts to reinterpret, manipulate, challenge or defy the authoritative claims made upon them. Organizations are creatures of their institutional environments, but most modern organizations are constituted as active players, not passive prawns (Scott 1995: 132).

This short theoretical introduction focused on neoinstitutional approaches from a sociological perspective rather than from an economic or political science perspective which focus more closely on the concept of the rational actor and the related “strategic or utility-maximizing models of action” (Schneiberg/Clemens 2005: 196; cf. Abell 1995; DiMaggio/Powell 1991a: 2ff.; Meyer/Jepperson 2000; Scott 1995: 34ff.; 1994b). Sociological neoinstitutionalists, by contrast, do not take rational action taken for granted, but instead try to explain its social conditions. In this sense, actors can act strategically, but the underlying motives to reach these goals are influenced by the institutional environment. The above-mentioned approach advocated in the early work of Scott and Meyer/Rowan also represents only one of several research traditions of sociological neoinstitutionalism (Mense-Petermann 2006; Scott 1987). A different perspective is provided through the approach taken by Zucker, who interprets organizations as institutions and studies the effects of institutionalization on cultural persistence (1991). In the late 1980s Meyer and his colleagues developed a “world polity” research perspective which regards organizations as the embodiment, product, or reincarnation of cultural parameters. They no longer focus on organizational structures, but instead stress the role of formal organizations with regard to processes of diffusion of cultural and structural patterns across (world) society (Meyer et al. 1994; 1997; Krücken 2005). This brief overview indicates that neoinstitutionalism does not represent a consistent theory of organizations (cf. Scott 1987) but a research program which includes a diversity of perspectives that have developed



studying islamic organizations37

over time. These perspectives are united by their skeptical view of rational choice models of organizations and a common emphasis on the influences of shared meaning systems, rule complexes, and symbolic elements on organizations (cf. Mense-Petermann 2006: 64, 70). The Organizational Field It was the achievement of DiMaggio and Powell to narrow the overall institutional environment down to the organizational field. The concept of organizational fields was at first associated primarily with the analysis of the industrial or entrepreneurial sector. In their definition of an organizational field (1991b: 64) DiMaggio and Powell therefore referred to key suppliers, consumers, and regulatory agencies. Later, Stone Sweet et al. (2001) and Fligstein (2001) applied the field concept to the political arena. According to DiMaggio and Powell, an organizational field must be institutionally defined, and its “structuration” consists of the following four parts: An increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of sharply defined inter-organizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which organizations in a field must contend; and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio/Powell 1991b: 65).

Scott provides a second relevant definition of organizational fields which points to the influence of the institutional environment on the organizations. With reference to DiMaggio and Powell, he argues that “fields identify communities of organizations that participate in the same meaning systems, are defined by similar symbolic processes, and are subject to common regulatory processes” (Scott 1994b: 71; cf. also 1994a). Besides the Islamic organizations, there are also other actors that are part of the organizational field and that are linked more or less closely through interaction and common awareness. In this respect, Hoffman’s conceptual development of organizational fields is important. He argues that [A] field is formed around the issues that become important to the interests and objectives of a specific collective of organizations (1999: 352).

Unlike in the original concept, fields are therefore not formed around technologies or industries but “around issues that bring together various

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field constituents with disparate purposes” (Ibid.). According to Hoffman, any actor that issues coercive, normative, or cognitive influence on a population of organizations can be part of the organizational field and thus compete for its definition powers. The operationalization of the organizational field of Islamic organizations in Germany in Chapter Three draws on these definitions. The Three Dimensions of the Institutional Environment Institutions guide individual actions by indicating typical options for action; they are relatively stable and external to the individuals who create them through interaction. Senge argues that social rules can turn into institutions when they are significant for an empirical phenomenon, binding for one or more actors, and long-lasting (Senge 2006: 42ff.). The most extensive discussion of institutions is provided by Scott, who describes three pillars of institutions—a regulative, a normative, and a cognitive pillar—which “provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (1995: 33) and which are “identified as making up or supporting institutions” (Ibid.: 35). While the regulative frame is legally sanctioned, the cognitive frame is characterized by cultural support, and the normative frame is morally governed (cf. Table 2). In his seminal work Institutions and Organizations (1995), Scott links this pillar structure to different theoretical concepts. According to him, the regulative pillar is dominated by assumptions of social realists and the concept of a rational actor, while the normative and cognitive pillars are associated with research from a social constructivist perspective, which does not take preferences and actors as given but defines them as socially constructed through constitutive processes (Ibid: 50, 137). Shortly before the introduction of the pillar structure, Scott argued for an integrated model of institutions to combine all three levels into one framework, as the following quote illustrates: Institutions are viewed as made up of three component elements: 1. meaning systems and related behavior patterns, which contain 2. symbolic elements, including representational, constitutive and normative components, which are 3. enforced by regulatory processes (Scott 1994b: 56).

Following this interpretation, Scott argues that both cognitive and normative elements are present and important within our behavioral patterns, which can be backed up by formal or informal regulatory processes (Ibid.). While Scott’s pillar structure, which draws on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1991b), has been widely referred to in the neoinstitutional



studying islamic organizations39

Table 2: Three dimensions of the institutional environment Basis of compliance Mechanisms Logic Indicators Basis of legitimacy

Regulative

Normative

Cognitive

Expedience

Social obligation

Taken for granted

Coercive Instrumentality Rules, laws,  sanctions Legally  sanctioned

Normative Appropriateness Certification,  accreditation Morally  governed

Mimetic Orthodoxy Prevalence,  isomorphism Culturally  supported, conceptually correct

Source: Scott 1995: 35

discourse, it has also been criticized, mainly because of the implication that all three pillars represent institutional dimensions which operate on a comparable and/or independent level (Hirsch 1997). Senge argues that the regulative and normative dimensions should be subsumed under the cognitive dimension because the latter refers to the perception of  the world through scripts, which in turn implies the perception and cog­ nitive construction of both rules and norms (2006: 41). All institutions would thus be cognitively embedded, and regulative and normative institutions could be seen as special cases of the cognitive dimension (Klatetzki 2006: 61). Another criticism concerns the difficult distinction between the first and second pillars, because every law has a moral basis and its enforcement not only depends on coercion but also on moral implications and taken-for-grantedness. This discussion shows the difficulties associated with the pillar structure if the pillars are interpreted as exclusive categories. In this research, they are therefore regarded as overlapping dimensions of the institutional environment (Hirsch 1997; Hoffman 1999) and treated primarily as theoretical constructs. In keeping with the above-quoted passage by Scott, all three institutional dimensions are important for individual and organizational behavior. Although the pillars are associated with distinct research traditions, the dimensions are combined for this analysis of the institutional environment because they each provide a possible framework the actors

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chapter two

can use to gain legitimacy. They allow for the analytical separation of the different factors that constitute an institutional environment in which the actors and the policy changes are embedded and which they shape. The conceptual separation along a regulative, a normative, and a cognitive dimension of the institutional environment thus becomes particularly useful for structuring the legal, political, and societal changes which take place in Germany with regard to the issue of Islamic umbrella organizations (cf. Chap. Three and Four). The Concept of Legitimacy Traditionally, the term ‘legitimacy’ goes back to Weber’s study on the necessity of legitimacy for social order and political leadership (1972 [1922]: 16ff., 122ff.). Berger and Luckmann (1967: 92ff.) adopted the idea for their concept of the institutionalization of scripts and routines, which depend on a shared belief in their legitimacy. The legitimacy and stability of an organization or institution are closely connected, and neoinstitutionalists assume that legitimacy secures both the survival and the success of organizations (Hellmann 2006: 75) and institutions (Boulding 1968: 3). Therefore, the primary objective of an organization is to achieve and secure legitimacy—from its members, the public, or the political level. DiMaggio and Powell note that in this perspective, the legitimacy imperative can be more influential in decision-making processes than rational efficiency approaches: “Each institutional isomorphic process can be expected to proceed in the absence of evidence that it increases internal organizational efficiency” (1991b: 73). Meyer and Rowan also argue that conflict between legitimacy and efficiency can result in internal conflicts: “Conformity to institutionalized rules often conflicts sharply with efficiency criteria” (1991: 41). From the neoinstitutional perspective, organizations achieve legitimacy through conformity with institutional expectations. According to Meyer and Rowan, the survival of an organization “depends on the ability of given organizations to conform to, and become legitimated by, environmental institutions” (1991: 53). This means that legitimacy is socially constructed, which confirms the institutionalist assumption that legitimacy represents a condition rather than an operational resource as postulated by strategic approaches and the traditional resource-dependence perspective (Scott 1995: 45; Suchman 1995).



studying islamic organizations41

According to Suchman, organizations benefit from legitimacy “primarily by making them seem natural and meaningful; access to resources is largely a by-product” (1995: 575f.). Suchman also provides a definition of ‘legitimacy’: “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995: 574). Because legitimacy is socially constructed and generalized, it is resilient to particular events and observers. Suchman also emphasizes aspects of “gaining”, “maintaining”, and “repairing” legitimacy (Ibid.). The related “cultural support” the organizations strive to gain (Meyer/ Scott 1983a: 201) can come from various types of ‘authorities’ and often takes the form of certification and accreditation, but also of approval and trust. This definition includes two aspects. The first is that the organization plays an active part in achieving legitimacy through its actions, which are influenced by the expectations of the environment. The second aspect is that the environment and the relevant institutions are expected to legitimate these actions and the organization if they are in compliance with the institutional requirements. Therefore, both the organization and its institutional environment are relevant research dimensions, with the former striving to gain legitimacy and the latter granting it. Summary The neoinstitutional approach presented above enables the researcher to study organizational behavior in the context of an organizational field. In accordance with Scott’s concept of the three institutional pillars, the expectations which institutions have of organizations that are situated in an organizational field can be conceptualized at a regulative, a normative, and a cognitive dimension. The organizations perceive these expectations through a process of cognitive sense-making and respond to them accordingly. In keeping with the active agency approach, this research argues that the patterns of organizational behavior are not limited to an unquestioned adaptation to institutional influences. It will also argue within the research framework presented in Chapter Three that organizational patterns of behavior can range from adaptation to decoupling to protest. The members’ interests represent an important explanatory variable, which will be discussed below. However, before we address these interests, the following section will discuss the contingency approach to identify the various contextual factors that can explain organizational differences.

42

chapter two The Organizations’ Situation and the Relevance of Organizational Efficiency: The Contingency Approach

As outlined above, the neoinstitutional approach focuses on the institutional environment to ask how institutional expectations cause an organization to act in a manner that is not necessarily guided by the principle of efficiency. In doing so, neoinstitutionalism diverges from the contingency approach, which also focuses on the adaptation of organizations to their organizational context. Early Open-System Approaches The contingency approach emerged in the late 1950s in critical response to existing approaches which postulated universally valid management principles believed to enhance organizational efficiency. Contingency theorists call such general principles into question and highlight the importance of contextual or situational factors (such as size, technology, and environmental dynamics), which they believe should be considered before any advice on organizational design can be given (cf. Preisendörfer 2005: 80; Kieser 2002). However, organizational efficiency remains the dependant variable in the contingency approach. Efficiency is analyzed with reference to the situation of the organization, a method which supposedly allows for conclusions to be drawn which eventually facilitate greater organizational efficiency. Schreyögg (1995) argues that the studies which employ the contingency approach can be grouped into those focusing on the influence of the external environment and those that emphasize the influence of technology on organizational structures. Examples of the former are Burns and Stalker (1961) and Lawrence et al. (1967), which are based on the assumption that dynamic environments require “organic structures”, while stable environments require “mechanistic structures” (as cited in Preisendörfer 2005: 91). This distinction between organic and mechanistic structures can also be found in Woodward (1965), a study on 100 industrial companies in England which emphasizes the influence of the production technology on organizational structures. Both approaches have been met with criticism from various authors. Some have called the technology-determinism into question. Lutz (1976), for example, notes that differences between the educational systems in France and Germany have had a much greater influence on the organizational structures than the technological standards employed in each



studying islamic organizations43

context. Other authors have critized studies that focus on the external environment because they fail to provide answers concerning the internal strategies an organization can employ to meet the demands of its dynamic environment (Preisendörfer 2005: 92). This study addresses this criticism, since the aim of this research framework is to explain organizational behavior in dynamic environments. The Research Program of the Contingency Approach The research program of the contingency approach is based on three steps: (1) the development of measures to determine organizational structures; (2) the determination of the influence of various contextual factors on these structures to explain organizational differences, and (3) the analysis of the effect of this constellation on the behavior of the organizational members and their efficiency contribution (Kieser 2002). These main characteristics of the contingency approach are illustrated in Figure 1 below, which shows how the organizational structures and, consequently, the behavior of the organizational members are adapted to, or aligned with, the situation of the organization with respect to efficiency expectations. Preisendörfer (2005: 81ff.) criticizes the majority of studies for focusing too narrowly on the arrow that links the situation of the organization to its formal structure. It is important to note at this point that in the concept of the contingency approach, the situation of the organization is not limited to the external environment. Indeed, as postulated by the influential Aston school (Pugh et al. 1963), the situation of the organization also

Situation of the organization

Formal organizational

Organizational members’ behavior

Efficiency of the organization

Figure 1: Research program of the contingency approach. Source: Kieser 2002: 172 (translation KRW).

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chapter two

includes internal dimensions such as its origin, size, ownership, charter, location, and technology.16 The Aston School The Aston school argues that organizational structures are influenced by contextual factors such as origin and history, ownership and control, size, the organization’s charter (i.e., its purpose, ideology, and value system), technology, location, resources, and interdependence (either with other organizations or in relation to political pressures) (Pugh et al. 1963; 1968; 1976: 77ff.). Based on the assumption that the structure of an organization must be consistent with the situation in which it finds itself, the aim of the Aston School is to increase organizational efficiency by empirically identifying positive correlations between contextual factors and types of organizational structures (cf. Schreyögg 1995). To do this, the researchers conducted a study of 52 work organizations in England, in which they operationalized five primary dimensions of organizational structure: specialization, standardization, formalization, centralization, and configuration. These dimensions were grouped into 64 component variables, which were then analyzed using methods of multivariate regression and trajectory statistics. The result was a typology of organizational structures that included four dimensions: structuring of activities, concentration of authority, line control of workflow, and size of supportive component (Pugh et al. 1968). However, due to their focus on for-profit organizations, this conceptualization of organizational structure, which influenced many subsequent studies, cannot be applied to study non-profit organizations. Instead of the five primary dimensions of organizational structure mentioned above, the organizational structure analyzed here refers primarily to the questions of organizational ties and resources. It is assumed that an increase in the number of the structural ties to actors in the same organizational field and an increase in the amount of available organizational resources can increase organizational efficiency. It is argued here that internal and external contextual factors are relevant variables which can explain organizational differences and which enable researchers to 16 ‘Aston school’, as used here, refers to the researchers of the Industrial Administration Research Unit at the University of Aston in Birmingham, England. The research unit was led by the psychologist Derek Pugh. Other influential research groups included the team of Peter Blau at the University of Chicago in the 1960s and, much later, the group led by Alfred Kieser at the University of Mannheim, Germany (Preisendörfer 2005).



studying islamic organizations45

understand the organizational network and its resources (both on a personnel and a material level) as well as its activity and organizational identity. The advantage of the Aston school is that they not only considered one contextual variable (size, environment, production technology) but a variety of factors. Nevertheless, this research project challenges the general assumption of the contingency approach concerning a deterministic relationship between contextual factors and organizational structures. Trajectories may exist between the origins of an organization and its current ties, or between organizational size and resources. However, unlike the early quantitatively oriented studies in the contingency framework, this study does not attempt to identify causal deterministic relationships. Rather, it is assumed that organizations have a choice regarding their organizational patterns of behavior. This behavior is influenced by the contextual factors, but also by the external environment and its institutionalized expectations (as advocated by the neoinstitutionalists), as well as by the interests of their members. At the same time, it is acknowledged here that the contextual factors postulated by the Aston school (Pugh et al. 1963) are an important factor in the comparison of distinct organizational behavior (see Chap. Three). Summary The contingency perspective has often been criticized for limiting its analysis to the study of the influences of the organizational situation on the organizational structure, with the former being the independent variable and the latter the dependent variable (Preisendörfer 2005: 92ff.). This causal assumption is called the congruency-efficiency hypothesis. It links organizational efficiency to the process of structural adaptation to the contextual factors (Schreyögg 1995: 163). This deterministic relationship has been criticized because it leaves no room for organizational choice (cf. Child 1972; 1997), with particular criticism directed at the lack of reference to a micro-foundation which could link the structural dimension to the behavioral dimension. In this regard, it should be noted that the contextual factors presented by the Aston School do not imply a deterministic relationship between such factors and the organizational structure (Pugh et al. 1963; 1968). Rather, the explanatory value of these contextual factors is evaluated empirically, while “making it possible to pinpoint structural differences

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chapter two

between organizations” (Ibid. 1968: 89). It is this latter remark concerning organizational differences which makes an analysis of these context factors a valuable tool to understand organizational trajectories. It has been argued above that the neoinstitutional approach goes beyond the analysis of the influence of functional context factors on organizational structures by identifying regulative, normative, and cognitive dimensions of expectations to which the organization has to respond. The advantage of such a holistic approach, which includes a variety of actors and influences, is stressed throughout this research. However, the arguments of organizational efficiency and the influence of structural trajectories that are linked to factors such as origin, size, and organizational aims are also useful when trying to explain organizational structures and their variation across organizations. Therefore, the contextual factors of the contingency approach and their predicted influences are included in the research framework, which is presented in Chapter Three. At the same time, the case studies were selected carefully to make these contextual factors as comparable as possible in order to limit their influence as explanatory variables while focusing on the impact of the institutional expectations. However, this could only partially be achieved, due to the diversity of organizational histories, ties, charters, and dependencies. The Importance of Members’ Interests within Organizations: The Research on Intermediary Organizations The Blind Spot of Member Interests Both the neoinstitutional and the contingency approach have been criticized because individual members of organizations and their micro-level interactions remain undertheorized. Neither of the two approaches distinguishes between different interest groups, thus neglecting the demands made by the organizations’ members. While Scott’s combination of neoinstitutionalism with Gidden’s actor theory and his focus on active agency allows for an analysis of organizational behavior based on individual cognition of the world (Scott 1987: 498; 1995: xiv), neoinstitutional approaches completely ignore the perception of organizational members and their interests. This is arguably one of the blind spots of neoinstitutionalism. To overcome this blind spot, this research argues that members play a crucial role with regard to both the expectations with which the organization is confronted and the necessity to gain legitimacy. The members’



studying islamic organizations47

perspective becomes especially relevant when the focus is shifted from corporate for-profit organizations to collective voluntary non-profit organizations which are much more dependent on their members (Pries 2010a). The fact that organizational theory in the form of system theories generally fails to acknowledge members’ interests and their influence on organizational behavior was pointed out by Silverman as early as 1970. He argued that one of the major shortcomings of the open-system theory is that it focuses exclusively on the demands directed at the organization by the organizational environment while neglecting internal processes of decision making. Silverman highlights the role of individual actors and their definition of the situation: “Organizations do not react to their environment, their members do” (Silverman 1970: 37). In his proposition of an action frame of reference approach, he notes: Both sets of factors, the internal and the external, need to be given their due attention before we can understand the sense that the actors make of their situation (ibid.: 166).

However, Silverman’s book The Theory of Organizations (1970) does not explicitly refer to the consequences that arise for the headquarters of an organization when the interests of its members have to be taken into consideration. Research on Intermediary Organizations While neoinstitutional studies and much of the research on profitoriented organization lack a focus on the role of the members for an organization, the literature on non-profit or intermediary interest organizations can fill this analytical gap. Wilkesmann (2007), for example, discusses the dilemma of voluntary organizations, which have to reconcile the individual interests of their members with the collective interests of the organization. Ideally, these interests are congruent, but in case of differing interests between the members and the organization, the organization has to act. Unlike companies which simply pay their employees to grant participation, most voluntary organizations cannot rely on monetary incentives (Wilkesmann 2007: 163). Consequently, voluntary organizations which have achieved a certain degree of professionalism often regulate heterogeneous interest input hierarchically through the implementation of a top-down structure (ibid.).

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The problem that this leads to the organizations’ leadership becoming detached from its members was described as the problem of the “iron law of oligarchy” in Michels’ 1911 study on the party system in modern democracies (Michels 1989 [1911]). Similarly, Selznick’s analysis of organizational leadership emphasizes the necessity to create loyalty among members, especially when confronted with diverse internal interest groups (1957: 93). He argues that: Within every association there is the same basic constitutional problem, the same need for an accommodative balance between fragmentary group interests and the aims of the whole (ibid.: 9).

The need to secure internal support for organizational aims is also discussed by Schimank (2002: 38ff.), who highlights the necessity for the organizational leadership to receive the legitimacy of its members and to discourage them from using their “exit” power (Hirschman 1974 [1970]). Streeck outlines three organizational strategies that can occur in times of insecure membership due to decreasing attachment, unspecific loyalty commitment, and heterogeneous member interests. These strategies include new forms of internal and external public relations work, which substitutes the direct affective relationship between the organization and its members. Second, the organization often turns into a service provider for its members, which is due to increasing competition and the wish to decrease the free rider problem by creating incentives in the form of services to promote active membership participation. Third, Streeck assumes that organizations increasingly form coalitions to counteract their membership insecurity, a strategy that is also linked to the acquisition of public funding to secure the necessary resources. All three strategies are relevant to the case of Islamic umbrella organization, which are also faced with the dilemma of insecure membership due to competition in the organizational field and the relatively low level of organization of Muslims in Germany. According to a recent survey by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, only 20% of Muslims in Germany are members of a religious organization, but only 14% of respondents consider themselves active members (Haug et al. 2009: 167ff.; see Chap. Five: Facts and Figures). One field of study that has addressed the active role of the members and the dependency of the organization on their support is the research on unions as collective organizations. For example, Offe and Wiesenthal show the unions’ dependency on their members’ willingness “to pay” and “to act” (1980: 81). The union’s reliance on their members is further expressed in the notion that



studying islamic organizations49 no union can function for a day in the absence of some rudimentary notions held by the members that being a member is of value in itself (ibid.: 79).

Child, Loveridge, and Warner also argue that the nature of membership expectations and actions can in general be assumed to play a major role in the analysis of union organizations (1973: 76).

According to them, representative rationality refers to the need to suit the members’ interests, which leads to a bottom-up structure of the organization, while administrative rationality—a concept that goes back to Weber—is associated with goal implementation and decision making at the top of the organizational hierarchy. Their focus on the pressures that are placed on union officials by their members, and their attention to positive outcomes of congruence between the actions of the union and their member’s expectations—in the form of support and legitimacy for the union leadership (ibid.: 85)—highlight important aspects that can be used for the study of migrant organizations. Walton and McKersie argued as early as 1965 that unions are confronted not only with external expectations but also with internal expecta­ tions, which themselves may be in conflict with each other due to goalmotivational, emotional, or perceptual forces (1965: 298). The authors focused on the role of key actors (“chief negotiators”) and the internal conflict resolution process (Walton/McKersie 1965: 281ff.), which in its microperspective does not represent the main focus of this study, although it would be worthwhile to use their concepts for further studies in this organizational field. Studies of religious denominations have also emphasized the relevance of congregations and individual members. Chaves (1998), for example, describes denominations as dual structures that are separated along a religious authority structure which caters to the internal members, and an agency structure which manages external relations. Davidson (1998) stresses the distinction between inward and outward orientation of religious organizations, arguing that all non-profit organizations combine internal/mutual and public/social intentions. The degree of orientation toward members or non-members can differ between religious organizations, which the author divides into priestly (mainly internal), prophetic (mainly external), and pastoral organizations (equal allocation of resources). The distinction between membership and influence logic that is outlined below (Schmitter/Streeck 1999) has therefore been applied successfully to studies of religious organizations.

50

chapter two Membership versus Influence Logic

Islamic umbrella organizations can be regarded as traditional intermediary organizations which not only have members but also are members of an institutional system (Streeck 1987). Schmitter and Streeck describe this dual responsibility of organizational social integration and system integration in their often-cited discussion paper The Organization of Business Interests (Schmitter/Streeck 1999 [1981]) in which they highlight the dependency of interest organizations on their members. According to their logic of membership, the organization depends on its members both as a resource and for its survival (ibid.). This requires the organization to provide incentives for participation (cf. Blätte 2011). At the same time, the logic of influence requires the organizations to exercise influence over public authorities and to obtain resources from them in the form of recognition, legitimacy, or formal status (Schmitter/Streeck 1999: 19). Although Schmitter and Streeck’s comparative study of business interest associations focuses on for-profit organizations, their description of a general tension—between the perceived internal demands and the expectation to influence the external environment while being influenced by it (ibid.: 30)—is comparable to the tensions experienced by Islamic umbrella organizations. While Schmitter and Streeck argue that legitimacy can be achieved through adherence to accepted values and the “public interest” (ibid.: 11), this study argues that internal members can also grant organizational legitimacy. This justifies an organizational orientation toward their interests. Streeck’s (1987: 34ff.) assumption that one has to focus on the interim position of an intermediary organization which has to reconcile the perceived internal and external expectations is a fruitful extension of the neoinstitutional and contingency approaches. Islamic umbrella organizations represent a special subset of religious organizations in that they are often established as migrant organizations which provide various services that go beyond the religious realm, and which do not necessarily follow a religious leader or authority. In the following, Islamic umbrella organizations are therefore analyzed as intermediary non-profit organizations which have to reconcile multiple internal and external expectations that can often exceed the religious dimension. According to Chaves (1998), power struggles can be expected between the religious authorities in an organization (such as the imam and the religious department) and the agency structure (the elected or appointed representatives). However, the extent of such internal structural or personal



studying islamic organizations51

conflicts and their resolution are not at the heart of this research endeavor, which instead focuses on the agency structure and its perception of the conflicts between internal members’ interests and external expectations. Summary The research presented in the following chapters does not focus on the role of individual actors in an organization, nor does it go into details regarding intra-organizational bargaining processes (Walter/McKersie 1965). Rather, this study focuses on independent variables that can explain organizational behavior. It will be argued that behavioral patterns at the organizational headquarters are influenced by the perceived expectations that emerge from the institutional environment, as well as by perceived internal members’ interests. This chapter emphasizes that the members and their interests represent a relevant independent variable to explain organizational behavior, particularly the behavior of non-profit organizations. As Schmitter and Streeck (1999) note, collective organizations in general and voluntary organizations in particular have to reconcile their member logic with their influence logic. How organizations and their representatives resolve this dilemma, and what circumstances result in what patterns of behavior will be discussed in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER THREE

A NEW RESEARCH FRAMEWORK: APPLYING ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS Although it is true that in their full complexity, every situation is distinctive and unique, a scientific model holds up the value of developing and testing generalizations that apply across time and place. Indeed, institutional the­ ory offers the potential of allowing us to combine general arguments with particular conditions—systematic processes with random events—to pro­ duce explanations of specific structures (Scott 1995: 148f.).

The literature review presented in Chapter Two revealed that a research framework based on organizational sociology has not yet been applied to study Islamic organizations. In order to close this research gap, this study develops a new research framework which informs our understanding of Islamic organizations and their patterns of organizational behavior. The aim of this research project is to reveal both the motivations and the con­ straining factors that can explain how and why Islamic umbrella organiza­ tions interact with their organizational fields. Organizational sociology has developed various theoretical approaches to explain organizational behavior in the context of internal and external influences on organizations. Three such approaches—neoinstitutional­ ism, the contingency approach, and the study of intermediary organi­ zations—were introduced in the previous chapter. These theoretical approaches were introduced because they focus on two distinct yet impor­ tant factors: the external environment of an organization and the internal members’ interests. In this research, the three approaches are combined for the first time into one research framework which focuses on the condi­ tions that can explain organizational behavior in the context of diverse and sometimes conflicting expectations. Figure 2 below shows three independent variables (institutional expec­ tations, context factors, and member interests), which in this research framework are combined to explain organizational behavior. The arrows in the diagram indicate how members’ interests and institutional expec­ tations influence one another, although they can also still result in conflicting expectations, as will be discussed below—a conflict that is characteristic not only of Islamic umbrella organizations, but of religious and/or voluntary organizations in general (Schmitter/Streeck 1999).

54

chapter three Institutional expectations

Internal context

Organizational behavior

External context

Members’ interests

Figure 2: Organizational behavior in the area of conflict between external expec­ tations and members’ interests.

The following research framework does not have to be limited to the situ­ ation of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany. Rather, the aim of this work is to develop a framework that allows for an in-depth study of any non-profit organization that faces institutionalized pressures to adapt to its environment to maintain its legitimacy, while having to take into consideration internal members’ interests as well as contextual factors that influence organizational development. Originally, neoinstitutionalism was developed to explain the nonrational behavior of profit organizations. On the one hand, this endeavor thus implies adapting the neoinstitutional framework to the field of nonprofit organizations. On the other hand, it is argued that for voluntary organizations in particular the interests of the members of the organiza­ tions play a decisive role—interests which have been neglected by the neoinstitutional and the contingency approaches. Members’ interests as they are perceived from the point of view of the organization are therefore incorporated into this research framework as an independent variable. The existing literature is generally in agreement that Islamic umbrella organizations have to perform various responsibilities simultaneously. Being linked to a religious community of more or less organized believers, they offer a variety of activities to serve this community, often including both religious services and interest representation.



a new research framework55

To facilitate their activities, Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany seek recognition both as official cooperation partners of the German government and as religious communities or corporations of public law (Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts). The latter status would grant them far-reaching rights comparable to those of the established churches in Germany. However, to achieve this prestigious corporation status, the German system of religious governance requires religious organizations to meet a number of requirements that are modeled after those for Christian denominations. Islamic organizations are expected to be structured like religious member organizations, with transparent organizational struc­ tures, internal legitimation, diversification of activities, and a religious consensus (Jonker 2002b). No Islamic organization in Germany is cur­ rently recognized as a corporation of public law. This situation has led to a legal and political negotiation process that is still ongoing (see Chap. Four: The Regulative Dimension). These debates also involve normative political expectations that go beyond the structural requirements. In their struggle for legitimacy, Islamic umbrella organizations are required not only to adapt their struc­ tures to meet certain requirements, but to act (and react) to fulfill norma­ tive expectations (see Chap. Four: The Normative Dimension). At the same time, they have to serve their members’ interests, since organiza­ tional members are not only an important financial organizational resource, but also a source of legitimacy with regard to the issue of representativeness. We see from the above that Islamic umbrella organizations generally have to reconcile potentially conflicting external and internal demands. This multitude of expectations is cognitively perceived by the organiza­ tional representatives, who act in the name of their organization (see Figure 3). Building on the neoinstitutional conception of cognitive sensemaking, this research therefore takes their perception of reality as the starting point of the analysis. The distinct patterns of organizational behavior that can result from potentially conflicting internal and external expectations are discussed in detail in this chapter. The structure of this chapter is as follows: First, the main concepts are operationalized for this research context. Second, three patterns of organi­ zational behavior are discussed, ranging from adaptation to decoupling to protest. Third, the research assumptions are presented. Finally, the research methods are described in detail, including the case selection and the interview and document analyses.

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chapter three

Organizational representatives

Perception of internal interests

Organizational members

Perception of external expectations

Organizational environment

Figure 3: The perception of internal and external expectations.

Conceptualizing the Theoretical Research Framework: Between Institutional Expectations and Members’ Interests This section first links the theoretical concepts of neoinstitutionalism (such as the organizational field, the institutional environment, and the concept of legitimacy) to the research context of Islamic organizations in Germany. Second, organizational cross-border ties and their implications for organizational legitimacy and efficiency are discussed. Third, the influ­ ence of contextual factors on organizational behavior is described. Finally, members’ interests are introduced into this research framework as an additional important explanatory variable. The Organizational Field of Islamic Organizations in Germany The concept of ‘organizational field’ is one of the key elements of the neo­ institutional framework. It is applied in this research to reduce the institu­ tional environment to those actors that interact with the Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany. DiMaggio and Powell’s definition of the struc­ turation of an organizational field (1991 b) presents four useful analytical criteria that allow us to answer the questions of “Who is part of the field of Islamic organizations in Germany?” and “What changes have taken place at this level over the last ten years?”



a new research framework57

First, DiMaggio and Powell (ibid.) consider the question of interaction, which concerns both contact among Islamic organizations and their con­ tact with other actors. Second, patterns of coalition building manifest themselves in this context. Coalitions can be regarded as a response to an increased information load that can be associated with an increase in the external expectations with which the organizations are confronted. Finally, the structuration of the organizational field can lead to an increas­ ing awareness among the organizations that they are facing similar chal­ lenges in a changing institutional environment in Germany. These four tendencies will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six, which focuses on shifting relationships within the organizational field. Another relevant factor when defining an organizational field is the conceptual development by Hoffman (1999), who argues that fields are not formed around technologies or industries but “around issues that bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes” (ibid.: 352). For this research, the issue that constitutes the organizational field is the role of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany. The major Islamic umbrella organizations are key actors that compete over the definition power. Other relevant actors in this field are the German governments on the federal, regional, and local levels (including the legal system) and vari­ ous actors in the country of origin, including ethnic and religious groups abroad, ministries and other state institutions, political parties, and indi­ vidual political leaders, among others. In addition, the organizational field includes the churches, which participate in the interreligious dialogues; the media, which regard the organization as a spokesperson on general issues of Islam, and the general or local population, which is further divided into potential members of the organization and non-Muslims. The organization’s members themselves are part of the organization and are therefore not situated within the institutional environment but associated to the internal level. With reference to the studies on interme­ diary organizations, it is assumed that organizational members represent an important source of internal expectations. However, an empirical anal­ ysis is needed to determine how much attention the organization devotes to meeting their members’ interests; how they perceive them, and to what extent the internal demands may be in conflict with the expectations of other interest groups. Figure 4 shows the actors within the organizational field mentioned above. It should be noted at this point that the organizational field can be dif­ ferent for each case study, and that local mosques are generally faced with

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chapter three German Government

Actors within the country of origin (state institutions, parties, religious communities)

Headquarters Islamic organizations Members

Actors within the country of settlement (media, churches, political parties, other migrant or civil organizations, general public)

Potential Members

Figure 4: Actors in the organizational field surrounding Islamic umbrella organizations.

different expectations and interaction patterns than their umbrella orga­ nizations. It is therefore important to remember that this research focuses on Islamic umbrella organizations and the patterns of behavior of their headquarters. With regard to the external and internal influences that may constrain the autonomy of the headquarters, it is also important to remember the orthodoxy of the cognitive dimension, which implies that institutional influence does not necessarily have to lead to conscious decision-making processes, but can also result in unconscious adaptation processes. The main focus of this research is on the organizational response to the institutional environment in Germany, in particular the expectations the German government has of organizations. Applying the Three Dimensions of the Institutional Environment to the German Context A second key element of the neoinstitutional framework concerns its defi­ nition of the institutional environment, which influences the organiza­ tions in their organizational field. The definition that will be employed for this analysis is based on the three-dimensional structure of the institu­ tional environment introduced by Scott (1995). Although the pillars originally represented distinct research traditions, they are combined for this analysis of the institutional environment because each of them pro­ vides a possible framework on which the actors can draw to gain legiti­ macy (cf. Hirsch 1997). It is argued that the conceptual distinction along a



a new research framework59

regulative, a normative, and a cognitive dimension of the institutional environment is useful for this research in that it allows us to structure the changes in the role of Islamic umbrella organizations which are taking place in Germany. In the following empirical analysis, the regulative dimension of the institutional environment is defined as the legal basis of laws and policies; the cognitive dimension includes the public debates and the opinions of academia, the media, and the general public; the normative dimension includes the political expectations, which are based on the logic of appro­ priateness (see Chap. Four). It should be noted that the debates cannot be attributed to one institution alone, such as the German Federal Government and the established church-state relations. Rather, it is more useful to analyze the scope of the institutional environment along all three dimensions to be able to provide an appropriate contextualization for the following empirical case studies. However, the distinction between the cognitive and the normative dimension in particular is primarily theoretical. Hirsch (1997) and Hoffman (1999) note that Scott’s pillars overlap and are interconnected. One of the implications of this is that developments in one area affect the other two areas. Consequently, laws can be backed by political expecta­ tions as well as by culturally supported scripts that can underline the orthodoxy of the constitutional order. Similarly, institutional expectations can arise at all three levels and from all actors involved in the organiza­ tional field. In this analysis, the majority of external expectations are expectations of the German Federal Government due to its relevance to the institution­ alization of Islam in Germany, although other actors in the organizational field and their expectations are also relevant to the Islamic umbrella orga­ nizations. Expectations that are raised in the country of origin are there­ fore also included in this research framework, which analyzes multiple and possibly conflicting expectations. However, due to the limited scope of this research, the majority of expectations from abroad are derived from the interviews with organizational representatives in Germany and from the organizational document analysis. It should also be noted that it is nearly impossible to determine empiri­ cally whether a strategy is chosen because it is morally governed or cultur­ ally accepted as “the way things are done by persons like me in situations like this” (Scott 1995: 138; cf. Hirsch 1997: 1720). Therefore, the empirical focus of this research is on the organizational interpretation of the formal and informal rules, symbols, and meaning systems. This means that the

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individual actor who translates the influences of the institutional environ­ ment into organizational action becomes relevant. The first step of the analysis is to use semi-structured and partly narra­ tive expert interviews to examine the cognitive sense-making of the world by actors who are involved in the decision-making structures at the head­ quarters of the umbrella organization. The results of this analysis enable us to analyze the influence of diverging expectations by studying individ­ ual accounts of the organizational context. Such a focus on individual behavior in the context of organizations has also been suggested by Scott, who argues that it is essential that we not lose sight of the human agents that are creat­ ing and applying these symbols, interpreting these meanings, and formulat­ ing, conforming to, disobeying, and modifying these rules (1994b: 60).

Nonetheless, the research methods also involve an extensive document analysis of members’ magazines, press releases, mission statements, web­ sites, and organizational events. The Importance of Organizational Legitimacy for Islamic Organizations The third key concept that needs to be adapted for the case studies of Islamic umbrella organizations is that of legitimacy. According to Scott, all three dimensions of institutions (regulative, cognitive, and normative) provide a basis for achieving legitimacy. The regulative approach stresses legitimacy based on compliance with the rules, whereas the normative approach emphasizes the moral basis of legitimacy. In the cognitive approach, legitimacy is derived by adopting common frames of reference (Scott 1995: 47). A similar model has been provided by Suchman (1995: 577ff.), who distinguishes between pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy. Overall, the neoinstitutional focus on legitimacy expectations and the limited influence of efficiency constraints suits the analysis of Islamic organizations, which are non-profit organizations that are often depen­ dent on voluntary work. In general, non-profit organizations are faced with different restrictions than for-profit organizations. For example, they rely more on public confidence than on efficiency constraints. They also depend more on their members as their constitutive element and their financial resource. One could argue that the influence of the regulative dimension is lower in non-profit organizations than in highly regulated industry sectors, which are bound to laws affecting the workforce, the use of technologies, and other bureaucratic measures.



a new research framework61

It could be said that the opportunities for Islamic organizations to receive legitimacy have increased over the last ten years due to the catalyst effects of the changes in the migration regime and the public discourse on security, which led to greater public attention to their organizations. This attention could be said to have provided Islamic organizations with the opportunity to raise their concerns and to state their opinions pub­ licly. However, the effectiveness of this window of opportunity is question­ able (cf. Rauer 2008), with some of the top-down dialogue mechanisms associated with the DIK being among the practices criticized by the Islamic organizations (see Chap. Six: Relations with the German Political Level). Table 3 below shows possible sources and target groups of organiza­ tional legitimacy for Islamic organizations in Germany; the dual target group in the country of settlement and the country of origin, and an assumed organizational trajectory toward the country of settlement. The table also suggests a shift in the orientation with regard to the historical dimension due to the prolonged stay of Muslim immigrants who transi­ tioned from temporary to permanent settlement following the recruit­ ment ban in 1973 (Vermeulen 2006). At the same time, the recent changes in the German discourse on Islam since the beginning of the 21st century and the shifting opportunity structures can also explain an increasing ori­ entation toward Germany as the country of settlement. Some Islamic umbrella organizations may have no ties to the countries of origin of their members at all. From the perspective of this research, this would mean that they lack an additional source of organizational legitimacy and thus an important resource. However, the fact that organizational independence from interest groups abroad (such as state agencies, political parties, and religious groups) can also have advan­ tages is discussed further below and in Chap. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad. Table 3: Target groups of organizational legitimacy Members

Public

Politics

Country of origin Country of settlement Members

Public

Politics

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chapter three Organizational Ties Across Borders and Their Linkages to Legitimacy and Efficiency

Although no research in the countries of origin of the analyzed Islamic organizations is conducted in this project and the primary focus is not on their cross-border organizational ties (see Mügge 2011; ØstergaardNielsen 2003; Pries/Sezgin 2012), it is nonetheless useful to keep in mind  the size of the possible target groups for organizational legitimacy. Table 3 shows that organizational members, the public, and diverse politi­ cal levels both in the country of origin and the country of settlement can heighten and secure organizational legitimacy. As has been noted, various actors from the country of origin can be part of the organizational field, with the result that actors from abroad can raise expectations of the organization. Since each organization has an individual configuration of relevant interest groups, the extent and intensity of cross-border ties that tran­ scend national borders vary widely. An extensive characterization of the content, type, strength, and hierarchy of cross-border ties ranging from low to high institutionalization and from kinship ties to professional ties is provided in Mügge (2011). Since this research focuses only on organizations and not on individu­ als, it is the professional ties of organizations that are of primary interest. These ties can be either identified through a) linkages implemented in the bylaws of the organization (on the most formal level); b) an analysis of  organizational activities and related guests, speakers, or cooperation partners; c) a secondary literature review; or d) the information provided in the interviews with organizational representatives. In the latter, one also has to consider that interviewees are reluctant to admit such crossborder ties, which may not be judged favorably in one or both national contexts. However, although interviewees acknowledge various more or less institutionalized relations with actors abroad, this research focuses mainly on the German institutional environment and its impact on Islamic orga­ nizations in Germany. This limitation is due to time constraints, but also to access difficulties concerning the expectations raised by the relevant actors in the country of origin. For the Turkish organizations, this would require a discourse analysis of the political, public, and media discourse in Turkey, similar to the one conducted for Germany in Chapter Four. For multinational organizations such as ZMD, which has limited transna­ tional ties at the federal level due to its focus on Germany, various coun­ tries of origin would be relevant to its member organizations.



a new research framework63

Nevertheless, future studies on institutional expectations which influ­ ence organizations should consider multiple national contexts (such as the countries of origin and settlement, as well as other European or even global contexts) to identify the relevant expectations that influence an organization. In particular, the analyzed sources of external expectations should be expanded, if greater emphasis is to be placed on processes of organizational transnationalization and the extent of transnational ties (cf. Mügge 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Pries/Sezgin 2012). In this research project, transnational ties are regarded as one aspect of organiza­ tional structures and activities which are discussed in the relevant case studies and in Chapter Six: Relations with Actors Abroad in particular. The Effect of Contextual Factors on Organizational Behavior The contingency approach argues that organizational structures are influ­ enced by internal and external contextual factors. According to Pugh et al. (1963), internal factors include organizational origin and history, ownership and control, size, charter, technology, location, and resources. The only external factor mentioned is organizational interdependence (either with other organizations or in relation to political pressures). These contextual factors will be referred to throughout the analysis to contextualize the empirical observations. The overview presented in the following sections illustrates how useful these factors can be to understand similarities and differences between Islamic organizations. The origin and history of an organization is the first contextual factor that influences organizational structures and activities (Pugh et al. 1963: 308). Organizational history is linked to the time of an organization’s establishment, as well as to the founding actors. This “historic structure” affects the present organizational situation, including its structural ties in Germany and with actors abroad. With regard to Islamic umbrella organi­ zations, one can say that different ties to the country of origin can be asso­ ciated with the organizational foundation phase. In this context, it is important to know whether the organization was originally established from abroad (and if so by whom), or whether it was founded without cross-border influences. It is also relevant to know when and under what circumstances the organization was established, and how it has evolved since. The organizational trajectories are described in detail in Vermeulen’s (2007) seminal study on migrant organizations in Germany and the Netherlands. Ownership and control is the second independent variable used in the framework of the Aston school. It focuses on issues of shareholders,

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executive boards, the management, quoted or unquoted firms at the stock exchanges, or public institutions vs. government departments (Pugh et al. 1963: 308ff.). However, the Islamic umbrella organizations studied in this framework are non-profit organizations comprised of both individual and organizational members that are represented on a collective level by the headquarters of the umbrella organization. The issue of shareholders is thus a slightly different one. Nonetheless, it is important to establish who has how much influence in the organization. How are the members repre­ sented, and how is the executive board structured? In this context, DITIB and IGMG, umbrella organizations of mainly Turkish mosque community associations in Germany, and ZMD, an umbrella organization of various umbrella organizations (including Albanian, Arab, Iranian, and Turkish organizations), differ significantly with regard to issues of ownership and control. Size, the third contextual variable, refers both to the number of employ­ ees (organizational members) and to the total net assets of an organiza­ tion (ibid.: 309). Size is a highly relevant contextual factor when comparing Islamic organizations. A higher number of associated mosque communi­ ties means that more organized Muslims are being represented by the organization, which in turn yields higher net assets. An organization is considered to be particularly rich in assets if it owns the mosque buildings. Resources, in the sense of membership fees and donations, represent another context factor, according to Pugh et al. (1963). This leads to greater legitimacy and efficiency in the German institutional context, where the status attributed to Islamic umbrella organizations is largely influenced by their size and number of members, as has also been noted by Halm and Sauer (2012), a recent comprehensive quantitative evaluation of mosque communities in Germany. The contextual variable charter describes the purpose, ideology, and value system of the organization, which in turn influence its structures and activities (ibid.: 310). While the purpose of Islamic umbrella organiza­ tions seems to be fairly comparable, slight differences can be expected in their focus on religious services vs. interest representation. Differences in the organizational charter influence both their structural ties to the institutional environment and their activities. In order to understand the purpose, goals, and ideology of an organization, certain underlying “com­ mitments” need to be analyzed: Such commitments define what he [Selznick, KRW] calls the ‘character’ of an organization, and these may come into conflict with official goals and lead to change (Pugh et al. 1963: 310).



a new research framework65

Such a conflict can relate to the commitment of Islamic organizations to their first-generation members, because their expectations can be differ­ ent from the organizational goals the second or third generation is trying to implement (see Chap. Five: Members’ Interests). Technology, the fifth contextual factor, refers mainly to the techniques used by an organization to manage its workflow, a concept that is particu­ larly relevant to the manufacturing industry. This sector was studied by Woodward, who coined the term ‘technology determinism’ (Schreyögg 1995: 98ff.). For modern Islamic umbrella organizations, competency and the use of new media technologies (email, web pages, and their manifold functions) with regard to internal communication and external public relations work is certainly relevant and determines both the structure (How many people are involved in this new form of content production?) and the activities of an organization (How does the organization commu­ nicate and disseminate information?). Location, the sixth contextual variable, refers to national and regional, as well as urban and rural differences between companies. According to Pugh et al., it is the “differences in product, size, technology, type of resources used and market supplied by an organization” which determine what type of a location is best suited for the purpose (1963: 311). Mosque communities represent the relevant market for Islamic umbrella organi­ zations, and the individual Muslims are the users of their products. Changes in the location of the headquarters can be explained by changes in the size and resources of the organization, but also by shifts in the orga­ nizational field. For example, the close relationships between the organi­ zational representatives and the large number of Muslims living in the region of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) explain why the headquarters of all of the major Islamic umbrella organizations are located in the vicinity of Cologne. Resources is the seventh context variable identified by Pugh et al.: The basic resources of an organization are the human, ideational, financial, and material elements at its disposal. We are concerned with characterizing the quality, quantity, and range of such resources together with the sources of supply (1963: 311ff.).

Resources include the employees of an organization with their individual educational and social background and their occupational skills. In Islamic umbrella organizations, this means the volunteers engaged at the various organizational levels, the hired imams, and the ordinary members. Resources also include material resources such as the mosque buildings,

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the land on which they stand, other assets, and companies associated with an organization. Most of the capital comes from member donations, membership fees, and common income-generating activities of Islamic umbrella organizations such as the organization of funerals and the hajj pilgrimage. The importance of these endogenous resources for Muslim organizations in comparison to externally acquired resources is discussed in detail by Blätte (2011), who argues that the ability to obtain internal resources helps Muslim organizations to become independent from their political environment. Interdependence is the final category of contextual factors that influ­ ence organizational strategies and activities. According to Pugh et al., it is the only variable that is related to the external environment. It “reflects the relationship between one organization and other organizations and institutions in its social environment” (1963: 312). The degree of interde­ pendence with other actors in the organizational field is assessed on a scale from monopoly power to perfect competition. Interdependence influences organizational structures (ties and resources), but it also touches on the legitimacy dimension, since an organization that creates a service monopoly can heighten its legitimacy among those interested in these services. The pressures exerted on an organization by its environ­ ment are relevant as well. This includes the “degree of political control” (ibid.) exerted over the organization by the institutional environment in the country of settlement or in the countries of origin. Interdependence thus is an important contextual factor to explain the transnational charac­ ter of an organization when examining the influence of political control on an organization (see Chap. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad). The Importance of Members’ Interests as an Additional Explanatory Variable In general, this analysis of Islamic organizations and their interactions with the organizational field provides an opportunity to apply the neoin­ stitutional framework to non-profit organizations, while highlighting the importance of members’ interests as an additional explanatory variable which so far has been given little attention in neoinstitutional studies. With regard to the contextual factor of ownership and control, it is important to note that this study focuses on Islamic umbrella organiza­ tions, that is, collective organizations which represent their members through elected delegates. However, the type of election process varies among organizations, as does the number of hierarchy levels that connect the individual members and the executive boards.



a new research framework67

Being umbrella organizations, the cases studied in this research are classic examples of “intermediary organizations”, which not only have members, but also are members of an institutional system (Streeck 1987). This leads to a dual responsibility of social integration at the internal orga­ nizational level on the one hand and system integration on the other. According to the logic of membership, the legitimacy, resources, and sur­ vival of organizations depend on their members. This dependency requires the organizations to provide incentives for participation. At the same time, the logic of influence requires them to exercise influence over public authorities and to obtain resources from them such as in the form of rec­ ognition and formal status (Schmitter/Streeck 1999: 19). Given the differences in their membership relations, Islamic umbrella organizations represent an interesting case in terms of the role of mem­ bers’ interests. Some organizations function as communities with a net­ work approach of decision making and a bottom-up structure, while others are hierarchically structured and do not rely on a sense of commu­ nity among their members (cf. Yükleyen/Yurdakul 2009). Organizations also differ in terms of resource dependence on their members. Most Islamic organizations depend on their members as the only source of income and activity potential, but there are also organiza­ tions which are funded independently of their members or which have only limited access to internal resources due to insufficient income from membership fees and donations. Given the varying levels of dependence on members (which can be measured in terms of financial dependence and with regard to the cognitive perception of the role of members for the organization), one would expect that different member interests also have different levels of influence on the organizations. On the whole, it is reasonable to assume that all Islamic umbrella orga­ nizations are highly dependent on members’ interests, considering the importance of the number of members in the organizational field and the high level of competition among the various Islamic organizations. Patterns of Organizational Behavior between Adaptation and Protest It has been noted above that the analysis of divergent patterns of organi­ zational behavior in the context of external and internal influences remains a research desideratum both within the neoinstitutional and the contingency approaches. Both approaches have been criticized for their deterministic assumptions with regard to the impact of the institu­ tional environment on the organizations, which are expected to act in a

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homogeneous manner. Nevertheless, the overview of patterns of organiza­ tional behavior presented in this section demonstrates that organizational sociologists such as Child (1972), Meyer and Rowan (1991), Oliver (1991), and Scott (1995) also acknowledge the possibility of organizational choice and confirm the assumption that organizations can act heterogeneously. Drawing on both research traditions, this section distinguishes between three major patterns of organizational behavior—adaptation, decoupling, and protest—which will be analyzed in the context of the three empirical case studies of Islamic umbrella organizations. The following characterization of alternative organizational strategies is influenced by Oliver’s article ‘Strategic responses to institutional pro­ cess’ (1991), in which she combines the research traditions of homoge­ neous adaptation processes with those that emphasize heterogeneous responses to institutional change. She also criticizes that neoinstitutional­ ism fails to give particular attention to the analysis of strategic behavior of organizations. To address this issue, she combines the institutional per­ spective with the resource dependence approach to demonstrate how organizational behavior may vary from passive confor­ mity to active resistance in response to institutional pressures, depending on the nature and context of the pressures themselves (Oliver 1991: 145f.; cf. Schneiberg/Clemens 2005: 214ff.).

According to Oliver, organizations can employ one of five strategies: “acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation” (1991: 152ff.). The first strategy, acquiescence or conformity with institu­ tional expectations, is the one emphasized by the majority of studies and will be discussed below with regard to the concepts of isomorphism and adaptation. The second strategy, compromising, refers to a negotiation process which usually takes place in times of conflict. The third possibility is to avoid the institutional demands, such as by disguising one’s nonconformity. The fourth strategy, defiance, refers to a public denunciation of institutional pressures to conform. The aim of the fifth strategy, manipulation, is to strengthen the legitimacy of the organization by exerting influ­ ence or control over the environment. Table 4 below shows Oliver’s framework of five patterns of organiza­ tional behavior (acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation) along the three categories of adaptation, decoupling, and protest. These three patterns of organizational behavior are at the center of this research framework and are regarded as functional alternatives which are suitable for the organization under certain conditions that will be described in detail below. The patterns are therefore not situated along



a new research framework69

Table 4: Variances of organizational behavior patterns Adaptation

Decoupling

Protest

Acquiescence  Habit  Imitation  Compliance

Compromise  Balancing  Pacifying  Bargaining

Defiance  Dismissal  Challenge  Attack

Coercive pressures Normative pressures Mimetic pressures

Avoidance  Concealment  Buffering

 Escape Manipulation  Co-option  Influence  Control

Source: Original illustration based on Oliver (1991), DiMaggio/Powell (1991b), and Meyer/Rowan (1991). The dotted lines represent alterations to Oliver’s model, which are outlined below.

a continuum between assimilation and segregation. Instead of this nor­ mative political point of view, this research emphasizes the organizational perspective and the conditions that prompt organizational behavior. While Oliver assumes that only the resource dependence approach “elaborates the virtues of non-compliance” (1991: 150), it is argued here that most of her demands, such as the demand to give more attention to the organizational interests and the active agency perspective, can be incorporated into the neoinstitutionalist framework used to study organi­ zational behavior, which is divided analytically along the spectrum from homogeneity to heterogeneity (cf. Meyer/Rowan 1991; Scott 1995). Homogeneous Behavior of Organizations: The Concepts of Isomorphism and Adaptation The focus on conformity with institutional expectations—in the sense of organizational adaptation—and the resulting isomorphism, which describes organizational resemblance within the organizational field, rep­ resent an early perspective within organizational research which was first used by population ecologists (Hannan/Freeman 1977) and neoinstitu­ tionalists (Meyer/Rowan 1991; DiMaggio/Powell 1991b). Population ecolo­ gists and neoinstitutionalists refer to Hawley, who notes: Units subject to the same environmental conditions […] acquire a similar form of organization. They must submit to standard terms of communica­ tion and to standard procedures in consequence of which they develop simi­ lar internal arrangements (Hawley 1968).

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Both old and new institutionalists have focused on this process of adapta­ tion to the environment (Becker-Ritterspach/Becker-Ritterspach 2006; Oliver 1991). In 1977 Meyer and Rowan were among the first to emphasize that legiti­ macy expectations of the institutional environment lead to similar formal organizational structures (Meyer/Rowan 1991). However, they limit adap­ tation to changes on the structural level, which they consider to be differ­ ent from the day-to-day activities of the organization. This process is also referred to as the decoupling strategy, which will be discussed separately below. Instead, adaptation will be operationalized using the second wellknown definition provided by DiMaggio and Powell (1991b). Their concept is used because it transcends the assumption of mere ceremonial adapta­ tion. Instead, it refers to the adaptation of organizational activities and formal structures to institutional expectations and pressures. DiMaggio and Powell argue that internal consistency of this sort is an important means of inter-organiza­ tional coordination. It also increases organizational stability (1991b: 75).

The changes and adaptations of the daily activities at the internal level of organizational activities are relevant to this research because a processoriented analysis of organizational trajectories is to be conducted. In this context, it is assumed that strategies of compliance originate at the level of formal structures and externally employed frames of reference. These changes are then expected to promote change at the activity level of an organization. This trajectory and the effect of unintended consequences are discussed in more detail below. DiMaggio and Powell also distinguish between three dimensions of pressures that promote processes of adaptation and isomorphism at the level of the individual organization and the organizational field, respec­ tively. These include (1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the prob­ lem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization (ibid.: 67, original emphasis).1 1 For an earlier approach to compliance see Silverman’s discussion of the studies by Etzioni, who distinguishes between a coercive-alternative, a remunerative-calculative and a normative-moral type of compliance. Silverman criticizes Etzioni’s intriguing analysis for explaining congruence in terms of a supposed trend toward greater efficiency while ignor­ ing other factors (Silverman 1970: 20ff.).



a new research framework71

Coercive pressures are the result of laws, government mandates, or any other dependence on donors, hierarchies, or support. The greater the dependence of an organization on another organization, the more similar it will become to that organization in structure, climate and behavioral focus (ibid.: 74).

It should be noted that the three forms of isomorphism do not nece­ ssarily  correspond with Scott’s pillar structure. For example, coercive iso­ morphism can be based on both regulative elements such as laws and normative expectations that are expressed through hierarchies or other structures (Hertwig 2008). Mimetic pressures are pressures that cause organizations to mimic the structure of an organization which they perceive as successful. Instead, they can also rely on established legitimate procedures to increase their legitimacy and “survival characteristics” (DiMaggio/Powell 1991b: 70, 75). According to Soule, organizations monitor what other, similar organizations are doing and fol­ low suit in an effort to ensure their own legitimacy“(cited in Schneiberg/ Clemens 2005: 202).

One possible reason for mimetic isomorphism is the ambiguity of organi­ zational goals, which in some cases are changed rather than discussed internally. DiMaggio and Powell also stress that organizational models can diffuse unintentionally, which highlights the cognitive dimension of orthodoxy with regard to mimetic isomorphism. Normative pressures are the result of professionalization and social­ ization processes which promote isomorphism in organizational behav­ ior  (DiMaggio/Powell 1991b: 70ff.). In this context, professionalization emerges through a similar formal education and through the extension of professional networks that span across organizations. DiMaggio and Powell’s concept of isomorphism and the related idea of organizational adaptation to external pressures are also expressed in Oliver’s strategy of acquiescing, which she divides into the categories of habit, imitation, and compliance. Habit refers to the “unconscious or blind adherence to preconscious or taken-for-granted rules or values” (Oliver 1991: 152). Organizations in which expectations have become social facts may unconsciously act in accordance with these expectations. This strategy points to the importance of the cognitive dimension and the related processes of making sense of the institutional environment, although it should also be noted that Oliver’s implied argument of advice

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from professional associations is actually more consistent with the con­ cept of normative isomorphism in DiMaggio and Powell’s framework. Imitation refers to the process of mimetic adaptation, meaning the imitation of successful organizations, while compliance means deliberate compliance with institutional requirements to gain legitimacy and stabil­ ity and sustain the logic of confidence. In conclusion, we can say that the concept of homogeneous organiza­ tional behavior focuses on the influence of the external environment on the organization. This influence is exerted through laws, societal pres­ sures, professionalization among the organizations, and taken-for-granted organizational models. It has yet to be determined to what extent organi­ zations in a given organizational field act homogenously and which of the mechanisms mentioned above can explain their adaptation to the expec­ tations of the environment and related forms of isomorphism. However, it should be noted at this point that the issues of conflicting expectations and internal members’ interests are not incorporated into these concepts of adaptation and isomorphism. Therefore, another set of strategies—decoupling and protest—is introduced below to determine how the organizations actually reconcile conflicting expectations. Heterogeneous Behavior of Organizations: The Concepts of Decoupling and Protest While earlier studies emphasized the influence of the institutional con­ text on all of the organizations in a given environment, later studies focused on differences in the responses of organizations (Scott 1995: 114). One example is Strang et al., who use heterogeneous diffusion models to trace the multiple effects within an organizational field, confirming the assumption that institutional influences may diffuse differently across field segments (cited in Schneiberg/Clemens 2005: 205ff.). Accordingly, the concept of heterogeneity within organizational fields suggests active agency of each organization. This includes various possible strategies of non-compliance with institutional demands, particularly in situations of conflicting interests and if multiple options to receive legiti­ macy are available. This line of research therefore contradicts the tradi­ tional concept of adaptation and isomorphism: Acknowledging heterogeneity challenges conventional images of causality and pushes institutional analysis away from strong forms of structural deter­ minism” (Schneiberg/Clemens 2005: 214f.).



a new research framework73

The concepts of compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation in Oliver’s set of strategies represent an “ascending order of active organiza­ tional resistance towards […] institutional pressures and expectations” (1991: 159). These four strategies focus on the restraints that are caused by conflicting demands directed at the organization. The following section combines Oliver’s four strategies of organizational behavior with two other dominant concepts of the neoinstitutional research framework: decoupling and protest. Decoupling This section combines the strategy of decoupling outlined by Meyer and Rowan (1991) with Oliver’s two strategies of moderate resistance to external expectations (compromise and avoidance). Decoupling is a strategy that can ensure organizational survival in times of conflicting expectations. While the early studies of Glassman (1973) and Weick (1976) used the term ‘loose coupling’, in 1977 Meyer and Rowan introduced the term ‘decou­ pling’ into sociological neoinstitutionalism, noting that decoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal struc­ tures, while their activities vary in response to practical considerations (Meyer/Rowan 1991: 58).

According to Meyer and Rowan, the term ‘decoupling’ implies two dimen­ sions: (a) the separation of the formal structure and the activities of the actors, and (b) the separation of structural elements from each other such as in the creation of new departments (ibid.: 57). It is important to note that from the perspective of the organization this is a highly efficient and therefore legitimate strategy, one that is used to resolve conflicts “between ceremonial rules and efficiency” (ibid.) and between internal and external expectations. In general, decoupling is sup­ ported by the logic of confidence and good faith which an organization displays to further absorb uncertainty and to commit its members to work things out ‘behind the scenes’ so that the organization can keep up its “cer­ emonial façade” (ibid.: 59).2 Oliver’s (1991) findings on compromising and avoidance are consis­ tent with the observations made above. Oliver believes that compromising 2  Tolbert and Zucker (1996: 179) also make reference to Goffman’s theory of back stage/ front stage behavior.

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is necessary in times of conflicting demands, particularly if these demands  come from multiple interest groups. The organizations can thus  balance, pacify, or bargain to meet their own interests while also partially complying with the expectations. Balancing becomes impor­ tant when external expectations are in conflict with each other, such as when political actors in the country of origin and the country of settle­ ment confront the organizations with incompatible demands. The pacifying tactic refers to the fulfillment of minimum standards, with little resistance from the organization and most of its efforts being devoted to appeasing the institutional environment. The aim of bargaining is to cause the institutional environment to make concessions. What all three categories have in common is that the organization partially complies with the expectations while resisting them in key areas where internal conflicts arise. Oliver’s strategy of avoidance of conformity also implies that organiza­ tions have to conceal their non-conformity and to buffer or escape institu­ tional pressures. Concealment refers to the separation of structures and actions, which is closely related to the decoupling concept of Meyer and Rowan (1991), whom Oliver also cites in her overview of possible strategies such as ‘window dressing’, ritualism, ceremonial pretense; or symbolic acceptance of institutional norms, rules or requirements (Oliver 1991: 154f.).

From an institutional perspective, the focus on appearance rather than on actual conformity is justified because it is often sufficient for the attain­ ment of legitimacy. Buffering refers to the separation between the internal work activities and the formal structures that are assessed externally. Schneiberg and Clemens note: Insofar as the adopted policies ‘buffer’ the organization from environmental demands or volatility […] adoption may improve the odds of survival (2005: 208).

Buffering is more effective when the organization does not depend on public approval, whereas in environments where public scrutiny is high, this strategy may be considered suspicious (Oliver 1991). The third strategy is to escape from the domain in which the pressure to conform is exerted, thus allowing the organization to avoid conformity altogether, which is why it is regarded as part of the protest strategy discussed in the next section.



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Protest The protest strategy represents the strongest form of resistance to institu­ tional expectations. For this research, it is defined as a combination of Oliver’s concepts of defiance and manipulation that will be introduced below. Meyer and Rowan also regard resistance to “ceremonial requirements” as one of four possible but insufficient responses to conflicting expecta­ tions (1991: 56f.),3 with protest representing a suboptimal strategy because it criticizes the expectations of important sources of resources and stabil­ ity. Meyer and Rowan therefore prefer the strategy of decoupling as the best strategy when dealing with conflicting interests. Nonetheless, the concept of protest, including Oliver’s subcategories, will be relevant for this analysis as the strongest form of resistance to insti­ tutional expectations. It is associated with the need to meet the interests of the members of the organization, particularly when the organization is confronted with highly incompatible expectations. Unlike Meyer and Rowan, who neglect the influence of the members of an organization, and hence prefer the strategy of decoupling to meet the demands directed at the environment from external sources, this research argues that a close examination of the internal demands can well explain why organizations frequently display protest behavior. Oliver’s strategy of defiance refers to the public denunciation of institu­ tional pressures to conform. It includes the dimensions of dismissal, chal­ lenge, and attack (Oliver 1991), which are consistent with the traditional understanding of protest behavior and the expression of dissatisfaction in the sense of “voice” (Hirschman 1974). Organizations choose to dismiss institutional expectations if they are in irreconcilable conflict with their internal objectives or with the members’ interests, and if their external enforcement is perceived to be low. In line with the argument of the importance of the cognitive dimension of behavior, and in contrast to the argument of rational behavior, Oliver argues that this strategy is “exacer­ bated by deficient organizational comprehension of the rationale behind 3 Other strategies include isolation, the cynical acknowledgement that formal struc­ tures and work demands are inconsistent, and the promise of reforms. According to Meyer and Rowan, these strategies are also suboptimal because they do not enable the organiza­ tion to deal equally well with all of the environmental expectations with which it is con­ fronted; because they do not take all responsibilities equally seriously, or because they acknowledge an unsatisfactory status quo of the organizational layout (Meyer/Rowan 1991: 57; cf. Becker-Ritterspach/Becker-Ritterspach 2006: 107).

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the institutional pressures and the consequences of noncompliance” (Oliver 1991: 156). Organizations can also challenge the expectations with which they are confronted. This is most likely to happen if the organiza­ tion considers widely shared external beliefs to be less important than their own point of view. Attack is the strongest form of resistance within the strategy of defiance, where organizations “strive to assault, belittle, or vehemently denounce institutionalized values and external constituents that express them” (ibid.: 157). According to Oliver, the attack strategy is likely to be used if the institutional expectations are organization-specific, negative, and discrediting, if the organization sees its “rights, privileges, or autonomy” in danger, or if it has little to lose, which implies that the per­ ceived cost of protest is low while the internal conflict arising is perceived to be severe (ibid.). Oliver’s strategy of manipulation represents the most active and oppor­ tunistic strategy of resistance because it is intended to actively change or exert power over the content of the expectations themselves or the sources that seek to express or enforce them (Oliver 1991: 157).

Organizations can co-opt, influence, or control the institutional environ­ ment. Co-opting refers to coalition building projects, institutional ties, or, at the highest level, the inclusion of key players in the board of directors of an organization. The second strategy is to influence the institutional envi­ ronment, with the aim being to set or change institutionalized values and norms, define acceptable practices, or influence the criteria that are used to evaluate the organization. This strategy is widely used among organiza­ tions which focus on claims-making strategies in legal and normative set­ tings. Control tactics are used to establish power and control over the institutional sources and processes. This situation is most likely to occur if institutional expectations are “incipient, localized, or weakly promoted” (ibid.: 158). In the context of the case studies, the strategy of manipulation can be associated with the establishment or enforcement of press departments and dialogue work in the organizations, which focus on establishing rela­ tionships and institutional ties to strengthen the legitimacy of the organi­ zation by exerting influence on or control over the environment. Scott describes the press departments as new boundary units which create a life of their own and which not only play a symbolic role but also actively con­ nect the organization with its institutional environment while also signal­ ing compliance (Scott 1995: 129).



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It should be noted that the behavioral pattern of protest used here is not consistent with the neoinstitutional approach. Protest is motivated by internal factors and the possibility that intentional (but not necessarily rational) behavior may be in conflict with external expectations. However, as we have seen, the possibility of protest becomes a relevant option when we take into account the internal dimension of members’ interests, which can be in conflict with external expectations. The following section on the research assumptions shows that an organization can act in various ways depending on the kind of expectation with which it is confronted and the related level of internal conflict. Three Research Hypotheses The discussion of the crucial role of organizational members and their interests for any voluntary non-profit organization presented in the previ­ ous section led to the conclusion that the neoinstitutional focus on the influence of the institutional environment has to be contrasted with pos­ sibly conflicting expectations raised at the internal level of the organiza­ tion. Consequently, the organizational leaders at the headquarters of the umbrella organizations, which are at the center of this analysis, have to reconcile internal and external demands which may differ or even conflict to varying degrees. It is important to emphasize again that this research is situated at the level of the organizational headquarters of Islamic umbrella organiza­ tions, which means that the following analysis will focus exclusively on the strategies that are employed and decided on at this level. These deci­ sions are based on the perceptions of the organizational elite concerning the internal and external expectations. Due to this focus on the perspec­ tive of the organizational representatives who decide on the organiza­ tional behavior of the headquarters, the members’ interests are not evaluated quantitatively through surveys or interviews. Instead, they are derived from the interviews with the representatives of the organizational headquarters (see Chap. Five: Members’ Interests).4 Despite the narrow focus of this study on the behavior of the organiza­ tional headquarters, this research framework could be applied to any 4 An interesting research question would be to compare the perceived members’ inter­ ests documented in this study with the points of view of actors at the various levels of the organization, such as individual members or elected local and regional representatives.

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organization and to various organizational levels. In general, it appears safe to assume that all organizational levels and their representatives are confronted with external and internal expectations that need to be reconciled. Based on the assumptions discussed in this research framework with regard to the underlying motives that can explain organizational behavior in the form of adaptation, decoupling, and protest, we can formulate three research hypotheses, which will be empirically tested throughout the case studies. H 1: Adaptation to external expectations is possible if external and internal interests are congruent, or if the organizations deliberately risk conflict with their members to heighten their external legitimacy. H 2: Decoupling or protest against external expectations takes place if the latter are conflicting with organizational (members’) interests. The stronger the conflict or the weaker the influence of the external environment, the more likely protest behavior occurs. H 3: Changes at the external level (decoupling) eventually lead to changes at the internal level (adaptation).

Hypothesis 1: Adaptation According to Hypothesis 1, adaptation to external expectations requires that member interests are not in conflict with the institutional expecta­ tions, or that they are ignored by the organizational headquarters to be able to obtain external legitimacy. It is also argued that the process of adaptation is promoted by expected resources in the form of increased legitimacy, status, and financial assistance, as well as by the interconnect­ edness of the organizations, which mimic each other while adhering to similar taken-for-granted norms. Adaptation is assumed to take place at the external and internal levels of an organization. Changes at the external level are defined as the estab­ lishment of new positions in the form of new formal structures and the use of external frames of reference which are employed in the organiza­ tional public affairs and directed at the external environment. Changes at the internal level are specified as changing activities or internal frames of reference. Internal adaptation to external expectations therefore indicates that new formal structures also lead to new activities, and that externally employed arguments influence internal activities and frames of reference. Empirically, the employed frames of reference are derived from organiza­ tional press statements (external level) and member magazines (internal level).



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With regard to the multilevel character of umbrella organizations, it should be noted that only the adaptation process at the headquarters is analyzed. The local level response within the individual mosque commu­ nities represents yet another level of analysis, which may be confronted with different expectations and members’ interests (cf. Yasar 2012). With reference to DiMaggio and Powell (1991b), it is also assumed that the behavioral pattern of adaptation can result from the three institu­ tional pressures: coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures. Coercive pressures as the result of laws, government mandates, or any other depen­ dence on donors, hierarchies, or suppor will be discussed further with regard to the expectations that are derived from the document analysis of the German Federal Government for the period 2005–2008 (see Chap. Five: The Normative Dimension). Normative pressures is exerted from within the field as a result of professionalization. Examples of profession­ alization processes in umbrella organizations are the level of professional training and education among its representatives and the foundation of the Muslim peak organization KRM. This observation is consistent with Oliver’s finding that interconnectedness facilitates patterns of adaptation (Oliver 1991: 171). Mimetic adaptation refers to the imitation of a successful organizational model by another organization. This process of isomor­ phism refers to a field-internal process. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991b), mimetic adaptation usually occurs in times of uncertainty. This was certainly the case for Islamic umbrella organizations after 9/11. Hypothesis 2: Decoupling and Protest Hypothesis 2 refers to the strategies of decoupling and protest, which are likely to occur in cases where internal expectations are in conflict with external expectations. The fact that an internal conflict of interests is regarded as a precondition helps to avoid the trap that every adaptation process is suspected to represent a form of decoupling. Decoupling An organization is expected to use the decoupling strategy if the institu­ tional environment and the members on which it depends have conflict­ ing expectations which can be reconciled by using decoupling strategies, including aspects of compromise and avoidance (Oliver 1991). Decoupling is therefore a legitimate solution for an organization in cases of conflicting interests.

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Examples of decoupling are changes at the external level of organiza­ tional affairs which are not associated with internal changes. One example of decoupling on the structural level is the establishment of new depart­ ments to buffer the external expectations while avoiding the necessity to change the daily business. Another example can be the professionaliza­ tion of the external affairs department, provided that its work does not interfere with the work of the rest of the organization. There is also a form of decoupling which concerns the frames of reference used by this depart­ ment. In this context, one can ask: Are the external frames of reference in compliance with institutional expectations, thus balancing, pacifying, or buffering the external expectations to create more leeway for the other organizational activities and to protect the organization’s own interests and that of its members? This would be the case, for example, if the argu­ ments raised publicly in press statements were different from the internal rhetoric used among the organizational members in member magazines or meetings. Differences in rhetoric may also exist in the form of organiza­ tional bilingualism, which can be used strategically to meet divergent interests. Decoupling can also take place between the activities of the headquar­ ters and the local activities of its member organizations. However, this form of decoupling is not at the center of this analysis, which focuses exclusively on the behavior of the headquarters and its personnel and on their influence on the local level. Due to its limited scope, this research cannot discuss in detail the local implementation of the headquaters’ strategies, which is likely to be very different across the thousands of mosques communities. Protest For this research, the strategy of protest presents the third alternative pat­ tern of behavior in cases of conflicting interests. Protest is most likely to occur if 1) the members’ interests and organizational goals are in funda­ mental conflict with the external expectations; if 2) the organization is marginalized; if 3) it has nothing to lose, and if 4) there is little chance that it will receive external resources (in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance). Protest behavior can include the elements of defi­ ance and manipulation specified in Oliver’s (1991) set of organizational patterns of behavior. Press departments and legal departments are key actors of protest, and are likely to attempt to manipulate and influence the external



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environment’s perception of the organization or even change the institu­ tionalized practices. The empirical analysis therefore pays close attention to the role of the external affairs departments within the organization. Conditions of Organizational Behavior This research framework is based on the assumption that the choice of organizational behavior patterns can be explained by three independent variables: 1) the organization’s dependence on its members, 2) the institu­ tional environment, and 3) the level of conflict between internal interests and external demands. It is generally assumed that all voluntary non-profit organizations depend heavily on their members, who represent their main resource (in terms of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance). However, this logic of membership can be complemented by similar forms of resource acquisi­ tion from the institutional environment due to the logic of influence. In this context, it should be noted that the main focus of this study is on the influence of the German government on the organizations, although other interest groups are also considered in the case studies. Strong environmental influence is thus defined as the opportunity to obtain external resources (in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance), and weak influence is characterized by a lack of such an opportunity. The two dependence dimensions are associated both with actual resource dependence and with the organization’s perception of this dependence. Accordingly, perceived internal or external dependence can cause organizational behavior independently of actual dependence or perceived internal conflicts. Consequently, the three independent variables depend on the impor­ tance attached by them within the organization. Their influence cannot be defined ex ante. Instead, they must be derived from the interviews with organizational representatives and from other organizational documents. Figure 5 below illustrates that the combination of internal and external organizational dependences and the level of internal conflict can explain the three distinct patterns of organizational behavior: adaptation, decou­ pling, and protest. It should be noted that Figure 5 only presents ideal types of organiza­ tional patterns of behavior. As discussed in the section on Hypothesis 1 above, adaptation is likely to occur if no internal conflict exists between internal interests and external expectations, but it can also occur if the interests of organizational members are not congruent with the external

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Decoupling

Protest

Headquarters

Headquarters

Headquarters

Conflict

Strong Conflict

No conflict Members

Environment

Members

Env.

Members

Env.

= Strong influence (through legitimacy, status, and financial support) = Weak influence

Figure 5: Conditions of organizational behavior of adaptation, decoupling, and protest.

expectations and if the organization risks offending its members to obtain external resources. However, this is not an ideal case, and it would more likely lead to patterns of decoupling or protest. The diagram also shows that protest behavior is more likely to occur in cases of serious conflict between external and internal expectations where the influence of the environment is weak due to a lack of resource opportunities. The logic of membership, however, is assumed to remain relevant to all three patterns of organizational behavior because the organizations under study are vol­ untary member organizations. Hypothesis 3: Organizational Trajectories Hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on the variance of organizational strategies used in response to institutional expectations and members’ interests. These strategies can be observed at a given moment and may differ in terms of external expectations. At the same time, it can be argued that these orga­ nizational patterns of behavior can also be analyzed using a processoriented approach to account for the fact that organizations are not static but constantly evolving. Hypothesis 3, therefore, suggests that decoupling and adaptation can be regarded in terms of temporality, with the former typically occurring before the latter. This implies that (a) the perception of change in expecta­ tion structures leads to changes at the external level of the organization,



a new research framework83 External Change New positions

Externally employed rhetoric

New activities

Internally employed rhetoric

Decoupling Adaptation

Internal Change

Figure 6: Operationalization of organizational changes.

and that (b), in line with the concept of unintended consequences,5 exter­ nal adaptation may lead to internal adaptation, as described by DiMaggio and Powell (cf. Figure 6). When analyzing organizational change, the issue of time becomes rel­ evant. According to Scott, time matters in two dimensions. First, the insti­ tutional environment changes over time, a process to which Schneiberg and Clemens refer as the “period effect” (2005: 206). This effect is relevant to this study due to its focus on organizational changes in the political, legal, and public debates on integration, Islam, and security since the beginning of the 21st century. But time is also important to the organiza­ tion itself, specifically in the form of history and development, both of which influence the organization’s structures and actions (Scott 1995: 135). Therefore, the analysis of organizational change must also consider data on organizational history and development as a relevant contextual factor. This hypothesis also takes into account the criticism which has been leveled at the decoupling strategy. For example, Scott argues that bound­ ary units may be decoupled and installed for symbolic reasons, but even­ tually develop a “life of their own” and thus change the activities of the organization (Scott 1995: 129; cf. DiMaggio/Powell 1991b: 67; Walgenbach/ Meyer 2008: 82). Tolbert and Zucker (1996) also criticize Meyer and Rowan’s decoupling hypothesis and its implication that institutionalized structures do not necessarily translate into action, arguing that this would be in contradiction to the relation between social structures and action assumed by Giddens, Berger/Luckmann, and Zucker.

5 For an overview of the various facets of the term ‘unintended consequences’ and the factors that limit our prediction of outcomes which may be unforeseen but are not neces­ sarily undesirable, see Merton (1936: 895).

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Neoinstitutional approaches do not address the study of path depen­ dence and organizational trajectories directly. However, DiMaggio and Powell note that there is variability in the extent to and rate at which organizations in a field change to become more like their peers. Some organizations respond to external pressures quickly; others change only after a long period of resis­ tance (1991b: 74).6

The most relevant study on organizational trajectories of migrant organi­ zations is The Immigrant Organising Process (i. e., Vermeulen 2006). How­ ever, Hypothesis 3 contradicts Vermeulen’s assumption that the “founding phase of an organization sets the stage for its further development” (2006: 11). Instead, this research argues that organizational change is possible at any time. It can be required, encouraged, or prohibited by actors in the organizational field. At the same time, it can be promoted or inhibited by the internal interests of the members or the representatives of the orga­ nizational headquarters. Both protest and decoupling therefore remain possible patterns of behavior in cases of conflicting internal and external expectations. Research Methods This section provides a brief introduction of the methodology used to col­ lect data and conduct the empirical fieldwork. It has been noted above that the focus of this research is on the perception of internal and external expectations by organizational elites. Therefore, the methodology used here is based on the interpretative paradigm of qualitative studies. According to Wilson (1970), the aim of the interpretative paradigm is to reconstruct the (organizational) interpretations of social reality in con­ trast to the normative paradigm, which assumes that action is governed primarily by rules. In accordance with the Thomas theorem (Thomas/ Thomas 1928: 571), it can be assumed that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”.

6 Studies which focus on path dependence have also been conducted in other areas of organizational sociology. Examples include Pries 2000 and the publications of the research network Groupe d’études et de recherche permanent sur l’industrie et les salaries de l’automobile (GERPISA), which focuses on different internationalization paths at the end of the 1990s (URL: http://gerpisa.org/ [last visited 01-May-2012]; Pries 2000).



a new research framework85

In order to understand shared social sense-making in an organization and the related relevance systems (Lamnek 2005: 30), this explorative eval­ uation of Islamic umbrella organizations and their interaction with their organizational field follows three ideals of qualitative research. First, it focuses on organizational interpretations of the external and internal contexts. This contextuality is indispensable for understanding social behavior and its meaning (Sinn-Verstehen) (Hollstein 2011: 405). To make this point easier to understand for the reader, Chapter Four first describes the changes in the organizational environment with regard to the regulative, cognitive, and normative dimensions and then analyzes the organizational points of view. Second, the research remains open to the field throughout the entire research process. In the German research literature, this kind of research approach is called the methodologically controlled understanding of the other [which requires that] the researcher be open to the subject matter and to acknowledge that any previous understanding of the topic in question is only preliminary (ibid.).

This includes narrative sequences in the interviews, the use of inductive and interpretative methods during analysis, and a circular research pro­ cess where theoretical ideas and empirical findings continuously influ­ ence each other. For example, Research Hypotheses 1 and 2, which are intended to explain the underlying motives of organizational behavior, were altered in a recursive manner throughout the research process to include empirical observations. Member interests were included in the research framework as an independent variable after the analysis of the first interview.7 Third, this section discusses the research steps to increase the reliability of results. While it is not the aim of qualitative approaches to provide rep­ resentative results, generalizations can be made about other organiza­ tions that are comparable to the sample. Therefore, one has to ensure that the research framework and the methods used are reproducible by other researchers. These ideals of qualitative research are also summarized by Kleinig and Witt, who postulate four goals: 1) openness of the research person; 2) openness of the research topic; 3) maximum variation of perspective, 7 The interview mentioned here was an interview conducted with a DITIB representa­ tive in September 2008. Later, he also agreed to participate in a second interview. Both interviews are subject to the analysis in this research.

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and 4) the discovery of similarities and the integration of data (Kleinig/ Witt 2001: 9ff.). According to these assumptions, a dual research process was used which applies this new theoretical research framework to the study of Islamic umbrella organizations. First, the changes in the institutional environment in Germany are ana­ lyzed. The changes at the political level are then summarized in the form of five major normative political expectations with which Islamic organi­ zations are confronted. These expectations are derived from a content analysis of political documents published between 2005 and 2008. Then, the actions and reactions of the major umbrella organizations with regard to these political expectations are analyzed in the empirical chapters, Chapter Five (organizational case studies) and Chapter Six (relations within the organizational field). In order to identify patterns of organizational behavior and to test the explanatory value of this research framework, a combination of reactive and non-reactive methods is used to allow for the widest possible varia­ tion in perspective. Qualitative interviews are conducted with headquarters representa­ tives of three Islamic umbrella organizations. These semi-structured expert interviews are used to understand the organizational structures and internal activities, and to gain insights into the organizational under­ standing of internal and external changes and the resulting organizational patterns of behavior. In addition, the external and internal affairs of these organizations are evaluated to further investigate what patterns of organizational behavior are used, and under what circumstances. This document analysis is based primarily on official statements, most of which are provided on the web­ sites of the organizations and in official press releases issued by the orga­ nizations. The document analysis includes the identification of thematic priorities; topics of public claims-making; cooperation partners, and pub­ lic outreach strategies, which are analyzed with regard to the underlying relevance of external and internal expectations. The analysis also includes a comparison of internal documents which are directed at the members. The issue of bilingualism is also studied to investigate whether rhetorical decoupling takes place between German and Turkish publications. The Selection of Case Studies In 2006 the German government invited five Islamic umbrella organiza­ tions to the first German Islam Conference (DIK I). As a result, these



a new research framework87

organizations were officially recognized as dialogue partners and repre­ sentatives of the communities of organized Muslims in Germany. The five organizations were the Federation of the Alevi Communities in Germany (Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e. V., AABF); the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V., DITIB); the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Islamrat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e. V., IRD); the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e. V., VIKZ), and the Central Council for Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e. V., ZMD). ZMD represents Sunni and Shiite Muslims from various countries of  origin, and the other four organizations mainly represent Muslims with a migration background from Turkey. In Germany, AABF represents some 500,000 Alevis, a religious community that differs from orthodox Islam (Haug et al. 2009: 314; Sökefeld 2008b: 82ff.). While other Islamic organizations also exist (see Chap. Five: Facts and Figures), these five umbrella organizations represent the largest Islamic umbrella organiza­ tions that operate at the federal level. This could be regarded as the main reason why they were originally invited and given special status by the German government in its search for contacts within the Muslim community. This process of political recognition by the DIK coincides with a pro­ cess of restructuring of the organizational field. In 2007 four Islamic orga­ nizations (DITIB, IRD, VIKZ, and ZMD) established the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM). The KRM was met with reservations by the German government, which continues to address the organizations independently (Rosenow/Kortmann 2011; see also Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Umbrella Organizations). Before the establishment of the KRM, only ZMD and IRD were so-called peak organizations—meaning umbrella organizations of various Islamic umbrella organizations. IRD, for example, comprises the Islamic Com­ munity Millî Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş, e. V., IGMG), which runs 323 mosques in Germany. Until 2010, both ZMD and IRD included the Islamic Community of Bosnians in Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland e. V., IGBD), which represents 61 Bosnian mosque communities. Currently, the IGBD is no longer a full member of ZMD, but only an associated member. ZMD also includes the Islamic Community of Germany (Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland e. V., IGD), which coordinates Arabic mosques in Germany; the Union of Islamic Albanian Centers in Germany (Union der Islamisch-Albanischen

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Zentren in Deutschland e. V., UIAZD), which coordinates 15 Albanian mosques, and the Turkish-Islamic Union in Europe (Türkisch-Islamische Union in Europa e. V., ATIB), which represents some 120 Turkish associa­ tions (Lemmen 2000). The other organizations (AABF, DITIB, IGMG, and VIKZ) only represent individual local mosque associations. However, this monograph refers to all Islamic organizations that represent Muslim mosque associations on the federal level as umbrella organizations, while IRD, ZMD, and KRM can also be referred to as peak organizations. Due to the considerable differences in the structures and activities, it is not feasible to analyze all five main umbrella organizations and the newlyestablished KRM in depth in this study. Therefore, three umbrella organi­ zations are selected based on a theoretical sampling, the aim of which is to compare contrasting cases. The sampling is based on two assumptions that are derived from the theoretical framework. First, it has been noted that member interests and the external political expectations are relevant explanatory variables for the analysis of organi­ zational patterns of behavior. While the institutional environment with regard to the German political level is relatively constant and compara­ ble,8 differences between the organizations can be explained by varying internal interests. Organizations whose internal interests are congruent with the institutional expectations are more likely to adapt to these expec­ tations. At the same time, existing conflicts between internal and external expectations are predicted to result in processes of decoupling or protest. In order to include cases that decisively vary in relation to the dimen­ sion of internal interests, organizations that differ along the following two dimensions are selected: religious or politically oriented Islamic umbrella organizations, as well as organizations that focus on the country of origin or the country of settlement. It is argued that contrasting cases along these two dimensions prompt different internal members’ interests, which in turn lead to different patterns of organizational behavior in dealing with external expectations. However, it must also be acknowledged that ex ante assumptions along these dimensions based on existing studies should be verified empirically to produce fairly non-exclusive but comprehensive organizational profiles. 8 The general changes in political attitudes are comparable, but it should be noted that differences exist concerning the marginalization of organizations monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which are delegitimized as cooperation partners and excluded from external resources.



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It can be assumed that all organizations regard themselves as reli­ gious communities (Glaubens- oder Religionsgemeinschaft) which demand rights in Germany based on this identity. However, preliminary research results showed differences depending on the emphasis the umbrella orga­ nizations place on providing religious services or claims-making and politically oriented activities. The underlying assumption is that reli­ giously oriented members are less likely to support external expectations that require non-religious organizational activities, while members who expect their organization to fulfill a primarily representative function in the political sphere are more willing to support organizational activities that are perceived as necessary to gain external organizational legitimacy. With regard to the orientation toward the country of settlement or the country of origin, one can assume that organizations that are primarily oriented toward Germany are more likely to adapt to the expectations raised by the German political environment, whereas organizations which are heavily influenced by interest groups abroad and whose activities and general organizational identity focus primarily on the country of origin can either ignore the demands raised in Germany, or they have to recon­ cile both national contexts. Studies on transnationalism and cross-border organizations assume that the necessity to combine two or more institu­ tional contexts is particularly relevant to organizations that are oriented toward several countries and interest groups. Second, the proponents of the contingency approach and the research­ ers of the Aston school (e.g., Pugh et al. 1963) have argued since the 1950s that organizational structures are influenced by contextual factors such as organizational origins and history, ownership and control, size, technol­ ogy, location, and independence from versus dependence on other organi­ zations (Schreyögg 1995). The contingency approach assumes that the structure of an organization must be suitable for the conditions in which the organization finds itself. This study focuses on the neoinstitutional concept of expectation structures, but it also acknowledges that contex­ tual factors can help to explain the observed differences in organizational structures. This will be noted where appropriate. In addition, the case studies were selected to ensure that contextual factors such as size, his­ tory, and location would be kept as comparable as possible to limit their influence as explanatory variables. Based on these assumptions, the selected case studies include the three umbrella organizations DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD. DITIB was seleceted because until recently it was mainly oriented toward the religious sphere and its country of origin. This is associated with

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its status as the organization that represents the “official Islam” of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs in Germany. However, this study argues that both orientations have undergone significant changes since the beginning of the 21st century. DITIB has increasingly broadened its agenda to address Germany’s expectations and thus has expanded its activities, which are now no longer restricted to the religious sphere, but also include activities in the social sphere and the sphere of political claims-making. This development can be explained by changing internal and external expectation structures, as will be discussed at a later point in this research framework (see Chap. Five: DITIB). IGMG, by contrast, recently shifted its orientation from a political community to a religious community, thus loosening its ties to the Islamist par­ ties of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey and focusing on the global Ummah. Located in various European countries, IGMG coordinates activities across the world. Since the organization is under observation by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, IGMG is not invited to the DIK and therefore is not an official partner of the German government. IGMG is however a member of IRD, which participated in the DIK I (see Chap. Five: IGMG). ZMD was selected as the third organization to provide a contrasting example to DITIB and IGMG. Being an interest organization, it is strongly oriented toward Germany and the political sphere, and has fewer ties to interest groups abroad. It has been engaged in dialogue with the public and political spheres since its establishment, and was a major partner for the German government after the 9/11 attacks. Similar to IRD, ZMD has refused to participate in the DIK II (see Chap. Five: ZMD). IRD was not selected as an additional case study due to the dominance of IGMG among its associated members. A peak organization that repre­ sents various umbrella organizations, IRD has structures which are similar to those of ZMD, despite the majority of IRD members being Turkish mosque communities. To avoid limitation to Turkish Muslims in Germany, ZMD was selected as the third contrasting case study. VIKZ was excluded because its characteristics as a religiously oriented organization are similar to those of IGMG. Both VIKZ and IGMG experi­ ence significant external pressures to justify their legitimacy, although it could be argued that this pressure has been more pronounced for IGMG. There are some studies on VIKZ, including the seminal work by Jonker (2002a), who conducted an ethnographic study of the organization in the 1990s.



a new research framework91

The Alevi umbrella organization AABF was not selected because the interests of its members differ from those of the members of the other Islamic umbrella organizations due to AABF’s internal struggle with its religious identity (Spuler-Stegemann 2003). While some members accept AABF’s strategy—that is, to define itself as an Islamic organization (ibid.: 20ff.) and to participate in related events such as the DIK—others reject this definition, instead defining themselves as an independent tradition and faith. The Alevis are still being oppressed in Turkey, the country of origin of 95% of Alevis living in Germany (Haug et al. 2009: 314). This explains why some of the members strive for independence as a religious community outside of the Islamic Ummah. This internal process of self-definition is highly interesting (cf. Aksünger forthcoming; Sökefeld 2008b), but the internal struggle over the question of whether or not AABF can be regarded as a Muslim organization makes it difficult to conduct comparative research which focuses on member interests and external expectations. While the latter are probably more or less the same for all five Islamic umbrella organizations that are invited to the DIK, the significant differences in AABF’s internal expectations were a reason not to include AABF as a case study because it was impossible to ensure comparability between the organizations with regard to this aspect. The above considerations indicate that open identification with Islam by the organization and its members was established as a common char­ acteristic of the organizations selected for this study. The internal dissen­ sion within AABF on this issue can explain why AABF experiences the changes in the German institutional environment very differently than the Sunni organizations (see Halm 2006a; Sökefeld 2008b). On the organi­ zational level, Alevis living in Germany experience less discrimination against their religious practices and believes, which are perceived as lib­ eral by the German society and political actors in Germany. Alevis do not  wear the headscarf, nor do they pray in mosques, so they are less visible to the general public, who is usually unaware of their practices and traditions. The positive political perception of AABF is also reflected in the fact that the organization was quickly granted the right to provide religious education in public schools in five German federal states (Bundesländer),9 9 Alevi religious education has been provided in Berlin since 2002, in North RhineWestphalia and Bavaria since 2008, and in Hesse since 2009. An experimental project at schools in Baden-Württemberg began in 2006 (DIK 2009b).

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a right that was granted for the longest time to only one Sunni organiza­ tion in Berlin.10 However, this is not to deny the fact that individual Alevis experience xenophobic discrimination. Table 5 below summarizes the previously discussed dimensions rele­ vant to the selection of the case studies, including the different assump­ tions concerning the organizational orientation with regard to their focus on the religious or the political dimension, as well as their orientation toward the country of origin versus the country of settlement. It should also be noted here that the assumptions represent ex ante statements based on existing studies that can be challenged throughout Table 5: Relevant dimensions in the selection of case studies (ex ante assumptions). Factors

DITIB

IGMG

Focus on the religious  dimension Focus on the political  dimension Country-of-origin  orientation Country-of-settlement  orientation Contextual factors  Founding year  HQ Location  Size

X

X

 Structure

X X

ZMD

X

X X

1985 Cologne 889 mosques

1995 Cologne 323 mosques

1994 Cologne 300  mosques 20 member 15 regional 15 regional  associations  associations  associations in Germany

Source: Profiles provided by the organizations

10 In 2000, after a nearly twenty-year legal battle, the Islamic Federation Berlin (Islamische Föderation Berlin e. V., IFB) was given the status of a religious community, which includes the right to provide Islamic religious education in Berlin (BVerwG 6 C 5/99; see Jonker 2002b; Pfaff/Gil 2006). Sunni religious education is currently provided in Berlin and will be introduced in North Rhine-Westphalia in 2012 and in Hesse in the near future (Jonker 2002; Landtag North Rhine-Westphalia 2011, DITIB PR 19-July-2012). For the legal implications of these decisions see Chap. Four: The Regulative Dimension.



a new research framework93

the project due to ongoing organizational changes. Therefore, each of the cells will be discussed further in Chapters Five and Six, which discuss the increasing orientation of all three organizations toward Germany as their country of settlement, among other things. Table 5 also shows that the organizations are partly comparable (in terms of location and year of foundation). However, significant differences exist regarding organiza­ tional resources, interdependence with other actors, charter (ideologies and aims), size, and structure, which will become relevant during the analyses of the organizational case studies. The Interview Methodology In this study, qualitative expert interviews are conducted with representa­ tives of the Islamic umbrella organizations. Meuser and Nagel note that organizational representatives possess both contextual and operational knowledge about their organization (2005: 76). Contextual knowledge refers to the internal interpretation of circumstances that influence orga­ nizational behavior. This perception of both internal and external circum­ stances is particularly relevant to this study, because it links the perception of expectations, dependences, and related conflicts between member­ ship  and influence logic to distinct patterns of organizational behavior. The interviewees’ operational knowledge about internal processes and structures is relevant to this study, because such structural information is required to determine whether an organization’s headquarters adapts to, decouples from or protests against certain political expectations. The Interview Sample The majority of organizational representatives interviewed were press and public affairs spokespersons, secretary generals, and other members of the executive boards of the umbrella organizations.11 The interviews are presented anonymously throughout this study. However, the names and functions of the interviewees are given in Table 6 below. The number of people involved in the work of the organizational head­ quarters is limited, so the relatively small sample of 11 interviews does cover the dominant organizational perspectives. The saturation of the interview data was considered independently for each organization and 11 It should be noted that the representatives who participated in this study were extremely cooperative. Most of the interviews were conducted shortly after initial email contact, and I cordially thank the participants for their time.

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Table 6: Organizational representatives interviewed for this study. DITIB

Mr. Bekir Alboga, born 1963 in Konya, Turkey. He came to Germany in 1979. Mr. Alboga studied Islamic Studies and Journalism in Göttingen and Heidelberg. He has been the DITIB spokesman for intercultural and interreligious dialogue since 2004. Before that, he worked as an imam and education officer at a DITIB mosque in Mannheim. He is also the founder of the Mannheim Institute for Integration and Interreligious Dialogue.12 Ms. Ayse Aydin, born 1971 in Trabzon, Turkey. She came to Germany at the age of two. Ms. Aydin studied Political Science, Social Science, and Media and Communication Studies in Germany. She then worked in the UK for one year. She has been the DITIB spokeswoman for press and public affairs since January 2008. Dr. Hasan Karaca migrated to Germany at the age of five. He studied Sociology in Berlin. He has been the head of the DITIBsponsored Research Center for Religion and Society (FOREGE) since 2007.13 Between 2004 and 2007 he was liaison manager for Germany at the Diyanet headquarters in Ankara. Ms. Ayten Kiliçarslan, born 1965 in the Sauerland region in North Rhine-Westphalia. She grew up in Turkey and re-migrated to Germany in 1981. Ms. Kiliçarslan studied Educational Sciences and Economics in Germany. She was DITIB’s deputy secretary and a member of the executive board from 2007 to 2009. She also works for the Meeting and Educational Center for Muslim Women in Cologne.14 IGMG Mr. Engin Karahan, born 1979 in Istanbul. He migrated to Ludwigshafen at the age of two. Mr. Karahan studied Law in Mannheim and Cologne. He has been working at the legal department at IGMG’s general secretariat and the pub­ lic  affairs department since 2005. He has been active at IGMG since 1994. He was engaged in the youth section in Ludwigshafen, in the regional section, and in the student association of IGMG. (Continued) 12 URL: http://www.institut-mannheim.de/ [last accessed 10-May-2012]. 13 URL: http://www.forege.de/ [last accessed 10-May-2012]. 14 URL: http://www.bfmf-koeln.de [last accessed 10-May-2012].



a new research framework95

Table 6: (Cont.)

ZMD

Mr. Ünal Koyuncu, born 1977 in Aksaray. He came to Germany in 1989. Mr. Koyuncu studied Political Sciences at the University of Siegen. He was engaged in IGMG’s youth section in Siegen from 1994 to 2005. He has been working as the coordinator at IGMG’s general secretariat since 2005. He is responsible for the website igmg.de. Mr. Oguz Üçüncü, born 1969 in Hamm. Mr. Üçüncü studied Engineering in Dortmund. He has been IGMG’s elected secretary general since 2002 and has been actively involved in the organization since 1986. He was the head of the youth department of the local IGMG organization in Hamm-Pelkum. From 1991 to 1993 he was on the executive board of IGMG’s youth organization in Eastern Westphalia. He then worked at the youth department of the IGMG headquarters in Kerpen. Mr. Üçüncü owns an engineering company in Dortmund. Mr. Mounir Azzaoui, born 1978 in Aachen. Mr. Azzaoui studied Political Science in Aachen. His Ph.D. project analyzes the role of Islamic umbrella organizations in the U.S. He was the ZMD spokesman from 2005 to 2006, and the ZMD public relations manager from 2001 to 2004. He also works as an independent political consultant. Mr. Aiman A. Mazyek, born 1969 in Aachen. Mr. Mazyek studied Philosophy, Economics, and Political Sciences in Germany, and Arabic Studies in Cairo. He has been the President of ZMD since September 2010. Between 1998 and 2000 he was responsible for the Islam pavilion at the EXPO in Hanover. He was also the ZMD spokesman from 2001 to 2004 and the secretary general from 2006 to 2010. He is in charge of the website Islam.de. Ms. Nurhan Soykan, born in 1970 in Kayseri, Turkey. Her family migrated to Kassel when she was three years old. Ms. Soykan studied Law in Cologne, where she has been working as a lawyer since 2005. She has been the secretary general of ZMD since 2010. From 2007 to 2010 she acted as the spokeswoman of ZMD.

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was compared both to the content of organizational documents and to the results of the secondary studies. This summary of individual biographies shows the high level of educa­ tion among the interviewees. All of the interviewed representatives stud­ ied at universities in Germany, even though many of them were born in Turkey. Therefore, this sample can be used to test the assumption that socialization and education processes in Germany promote organiza­ tional orientation toward the country of settlement. At the same time, their bilingualism also allows the organizations to remain oriented toward their countries of origin. The group of interviewees consists of bridge builders who are often asked for in public and political discourses, and who could be regarded as a representative sample of the new generation of organizational leaders at the headquarters of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany. The Interview Guidelines To increase comparability of the interviews, semi-structured interview guidelines are used (Meuser/Nagel 2005: 81) which involve narrative sequences (see below) and fact-oriented questions. The questions about organizational development which are used to assess the interviewees’ operational knowledge concern activities, structures, and collaboration with other organizations. However, special emphasis was placed on the interviewees’ contextual knowledge, that is, their personal perception of the external and internal changes in general, and the political and public discourses and the overall development in their organizational field in particular. At the end of each interview, the interviewees were asked what they thought the role of their organization should be in Germany in the future. After experiencing difficulties with the introductory sequence within the first interview, a narrative question regarding the overall experiences of the interviewee in relation to the organization was introduced.15 The opening of an interview with a narrative question enables the interviewee to structure the interview according to his ideas and experiences. This can

15 The introductory statement read: “I am interested in people who get involved in Islamic umbrella organization. Please tell me about your experiences (Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen). If you like, you can start at the point when you joined organization XY. I will not interrupt you. I will take notes and ask a few more questions later (Nachfragen). You can tell me everything that come to your mind” (translation KRW).



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generate a narration that highlights many aspects, which might not have been revealed by a direct question concerning a certain topic. In keeping with the qualitative interview techniques developed by Rosenthal (2008), the first narrative is not interrupted by the interviewer. Instead, the main points mentioned by the interviewee are picked up in the second step, with ‘internal questions’ such as: “Could you tell me more about XY?” and “You mentioned XY. Could you elaborate on this point?” Many of the topics of the semi-structured interview guidelines are brought up in the first narrative, so in some cases the internal questions overlap with the ‘external questions’ noted in the semi-structured interview guidelines. Although the interview focuses primarily on the questions contained in the guidelines, the interviewer still follows the lead of the interviewee. This means that interviewer does not follow the guidelines strictly. The guidelines include the most important aspects that should be covered by the researcher, but the interview can also be expanded depending on the expert’s tacit and explicit knowledge. The first interviews, conducted with representatives from the DITIB headquarters between September 2008 and July 2009, influenced the the­ oretical research design and caused the researcher to modify certain ques­ tions of the semi-structured guidelines concerning regional structures, religious education, and the role of member interests, among other aspects). The Interview Analysis The interviews were transcribed verbatim using the audio transcription software f416 and elements of Bohnsack’s (2003) system of transcription. The following rules were applied: (2) break in seconds; ( ) unclear; ((laughing, etc.)) remarks by the transcriber; //mhm, etc.// interruption by the interviewer. Because of the fact-oriented research strategy, intonation was not included in the transcript and is therefore not part of the analysis. Pauses, repetitions, fillers, interjections, and exclamations such as laugh­ ter were included because long pauses and the frequent use of repetitions and fillers may indicate interview passages which are complicated or con­ flicting for the respondent, while laughter may change the meaning of a 16 F4 is a freeware program that allows the user to adjust playback speed and to use the F-keys on the keyboard to play, forward, and rewind recorded audio files at different speeds. URL: http://www.audiotranskription.de/english/f4.htm [last visited 01-May-2012].

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statement. No punctuation was used to avoid arbitrary assignment of meaning to often rather long sentences. However, punctuation was added to the quoted statements to make them easier to read. The transcription complete, a content-based analysis was performed using the software Atlas.ti.17 Programs for computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) such as Atlas.ti allow for easy document access and retrieval throughout the research process (cf. Lewins/Silver 2007). Atlas.ti enables the researcher to handle the texts and interviews profes­ sionally, such as when looking for sequences that were linked to a certain category. However, the analysis of the relevance of this sequence within the interview—that is, its placement within the narrative context—can only be performed by the researcher. The advantage of the CAQDAS pro­ grams is that they always provide the textual context of the information when documents are scanned according to category systems (see below). However, this process requires a verbatim transcript of the interview. Once imported into the software, all the interview material was coded inductively, which means that categories were derived from the texts, rather than being predetermined. Inductive coding was used to ensure openness to the material, which often generates new topics of interest, which in turn can be included and focused on in interview scenarios at a later point in time. In general, segments of text can have more than one code and can vary in length. The codes are mainly used to structure the material based on factual information about the organizational development and its contex­ tual interpretation. This method identified a total of 49 codes, which were grouped into thematic units consisting of four main categories and vari­ ous subcategories. The four main issues are: 1) organizational history (establishment of the organization and narratives about organizational change); 2) organizational activities and structures; 3) internal expectations (development of members’ interest, including their differentiation, and information on the communication structure between the organization and its members), and 4) external expectations (relationships with the German political level, law enforcement agencies, and other organizations in Germany, including other Muslim organizations, churches, and welfare organizations; rela­ tions with the media and academia, and ties to the home country). The empirical results presented in Chapters Five and Six are structured along the frames of references used by the organizations representatives. 17 For more information see http://www.atlasti.com [last visited 27-May-2012].



a new research framework99

The case studies involve the following subsections: existing studies, narra­ tives of organizational change by the interviewees, organizational struc­ tures, activities, partners, and patterns of organizational behavior. With regard to the hypotheses and the different patterns of organiza­ tional behavior that are the focus of this research, it should be noted that the patterns of organizational behavior (adaptation, decoupling, and pro­ test) cannot be coded. Instead, they have to be derived from an analysis of the observed organizational perceptions of internal and external changes, and from the actual organizational development with regard to the struc­ tures, activities, and the rhetoric used. This analysis is described separately at the end of each case study. The sequence of argumentation was also taken into consideration, such as in the analysis of the narratives of organizational change and the underlying argumentation, while the relevant passages about issues such as organizational finances were only compared with regard to their content. One aspect, which creates difficulties in these interviews, is stressed by Mummendey. Partners in conversations, he suggests, especially if they are functionaries or have roles to play, tend to give answers that are ‘socially accepted/ expected’ (Kroissenbrunner 2002: 183).

Bias toward positive representation was also found in some of the inter­ views conducted with the representatives of the Islamic umbrella organi­ zations. However, their statements provide an in-depth look into their internal affairs and their external presentation, which also include critical self-evaluation and informal notes. The latter were often linked to the per­ sonal histories of the interviewees, who were encouraged by open ques­ tions which promote narrative sequences. The analysis of their subjective interpretation of the institutional envi­ ronment involves a comparison of their positions on certain topics. While it is acknowledged that it can be problematic to hold one expert respon­ sible for an entire organization, the comparison of positions among the interviewed experts of one organization and the combination of reactive and non-reactive methods increases the reliability of the data. Cases with divergent positions are identified as such. A similar procedure was used for the analysis of the press statements (see below), and the results were compared to the findings from the interviews. Finally, it should be noted that the passages taken from the interviews and the subtitles (which are also indirect quotes from the interviews) were translated by the author, who is also responsible for any translation errors.

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The interviews are quoted anonymously using the following syntax: IN (interview)_Name of organization_paragraph number. Direct and indirect interview quotes are italicized. Analyzing Organizational Documents Over the last ten years, the “linguistic turn” in the social sciences made its way into the organizational studies and the study of social movements (Alvesson/Kärreman 2000). Relevant studies in this regard include Tarrow’s analysis of the translation of domestic claims into global frames (2005: 59ff.) and Keck and Sikkink’s study on the “framing” of issues within transnational advocacy networks (1998: 2ff.). According to the latter, frames have to be comprehensible for target audiences, attract attention, encourage action, and “fit” with favorable institutional venues. In their article ‘Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy’, Suddaby and Greenwood focus on the active role of organizations in influencing dominant logics within their organizational field through the use of language (2005: 35f.). Organizations do not only react to shifts in their institutional environ­ ment, but also try to alter the existing frameworks according to their selfinterests (cf. Oliver’s category of manipulation, which is assigned to the pattern of protest behavior; Chap. Three: Patterns of Organizational Behavior). It should be noted that although this study focuses on a variety of pat­ terns of organizational behavior, it will not track the outcomes of organi­ zational attempts to influence their institutional environment.18 Rather, the focus is on the use of particular frames of reference and their linkages with external and internal developments. This combination of neoinstitu­ tional approaches with the framing concept of social movements research was also proposed by Hellmann (2006). The analysis of organizational documents provides another opportu­ nity to evaluate organizational patterns of behavior. In this context, the units of measurement are the public statements of the organizations (websites, member magazines, press releases), which are analyzed with regard to the patterns of compliance with (adaptation) or resistance to (decoupling and protest) the institutional expectations discussed above. 18 A detailed analysis of this aspect in the context of Turkish migrant umbrella organi­ zations and their struggle for migrants’ rights is provided in Sezgin (2008a). Although it is difficult to describe the direct connections between political activism and policy out­ comes, this aspect would surely merit the attention of research projects on religious Muslim organizations in the future (see also Koopmans et al. 2005).



a new research framework101

For this purpose, this research analyzed the documents available in the organizations’ online archives for the years 2000–2009. Since this decade was a period of political change which affected organized Muslims in Germany, the aim was to determine to what extent this change influenced the organizations. The underlying question is whether or not the frames of reference used by the organization are adapted to the perceived external expectations to gain legitimacy. For example, do the organizations adopt the rhetoric of good and bad migrant organizations, which is a dominant element in the security debate (Cesari 2005: 46)? And at what point do they raise their own claims and criticize their institutional environment? The analysis also reveals the general orientation and the main areas of the public affairs work. This enables the researcher to compare three Islamic umbrella organizations which are assumed to have different agen­ das based on the criteria outlined above. In addition to the content of their publications, the structural aspects of their public affairs work are com­ pared. The establishment of new public outreach positions often indicates processes of organizational professionalization. An analysis is performed to determine to what extent this process is associated with new demands directed at the organizations by the public and political levels in Germany. The document analysis consists of a quantitative headline analysis of all organizational press releases for the years 2000–2009, and an analysis of German and Turkish documents issued by DITIB and IGMG (ZMD pub­ lishes press statements in German only). The comparison of German and Turkish publications can help to determine whether bilingualism is used functionally to meet different interests. In addition, the main target groups of the press releases are identified (members, politicians, the media, the general public in Germany or abroad), with a special focus on the relationship between the organiza­ tions and the German government. The quantitative analysis allows for a longitudinal comparison of the main issues that are relevant to the organi­ zations and the identification of similarities and differences between the organizations. However, theoretical assumptions that support such a lon­ gitudinal analysis are confronted with empirical limitations. For example, the first press releases of DITIB were only issued in German in August 2005 and in Turkish in June 2007. The document analysis also includes a comparison of internally distrib­ uted member magazines published by DITIB and IGMG. Here, the argu­ ment of bilingualism is particularly relevant because the content can be compared to the German and Turkish press releases, and the magazines themselves are partly bilingual.

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Finally, the comparison of the content, services, and languages of orga­ nizational websites represents an additional source of information which allows us to characterize the organizations and their relations with vari­ ous interest groups. This also includes a comparison of the cooperation partners and invited experts, who can be identified using information about the events organized by the organization. Table 7 lists the text corpus and the selected documents that are used for the quantitative document analysis. In order to establish a categorization scheme that guides the headline analysis, a preliminary study was conducted of press releases issued by Table 7: Available press releases for DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD for the period 2000–2009 (headline analysis). Online availability of PRs (German) Period of analysis (German) Total number of PRs (German) (all analyzed) Average per year Online availability of PRs (Turkish) Period of Analysis (Turkish) Number of PRs (Turkish) (all analyzed) Other sources analyzed

DITIB

IGMG

ZMD

Since Aug. 2005

Since April 1997

Aug. 2005–Dec. 2009 185

Jan. 2000–Dec. 2009 227

Since Nov. 1995 Jan. 2000– Dec. 2009 168

37 Since June 2007

23 Since Nov. 2004

17 -

Jan.–Dec. 2009

Jan.–Dec. 2009

-

192

24

-

-

Since Jan. 2007

284 associational news (German) 2009 (144 analyzed) 57 comments (German) 2009 Since Jan. 2002 -

Jan. 2007, 2008, 2009, Dec. 2009

Jan. 2007, 2008, 2009, Dec. 2009

Online availability of member magazines Period of analysis



a new research framework103

DITIB and IGMG during the period 2005–2008, which combined deduc­ tive and inductive elements of analysis. The political expectations raised by the German government were used as categories of reference, and it was asked whether the organizations refer to them in their press state­ ments. This includes the areas of 1) the Basic Law; 2) security; 3) integra­ tion; 4) German values, and 5) cooperation (see Chap. Four: The Normative Dimension). The analysis also revealed additional expectations that were not included in the expectations of the German political level. This included the areas of 6) religious services; 7) claims-making; 8) internal affairs such as internal elections and events; 9) orientation toward the country of origin, and 10) statements on public affairs such as natural disasters, non-religious holidays, and commemorations that were grouped as mis­ cellaneous. These statements are related to members’ interests, organiza­ tional identity, and the interests of the headquarters. Based on this preliminary study, which followed a recursive process that allowed for an adaptation of categories and keywords throughout the coding process (Mayring 2008), a list of keywords was developed and applied to the headline analysis of the press releases issued by the three organizations. Keywords include topic-related terms that appear in the headlines or subtitles of the press releases. According to this approach, each of the over 1,000 press releases was grouped into one of the ten cate­ gories mentioned above. In order to address the issue of bilingualism, the system was also trans­ lated into Turkish and applied to the press releases of DITIB and IGMG for the year 2009. The results of this analysis and a more in-depth analysis of the content of key articles are presented throughout the case studies and in a comparative evaluation in Chapter Six: The Relations with the Media. Summary of the Research Framework First, this Chapter operationalized the key concepts of this new research framework, which combines three approaches from organizational sociol­ ogy—neoinstitutionalism, the contingency approach, and associational studies—to advance our understanding of Islamic umbrella organiza­ tions. In order to address the research question: “How and why do Islamic umbrella organizations interact with their organizational field?”, external and internal explanatory variables were introduced, including expecta­ tions of the institutional environment and the organizational members,

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differing level of internal conflict resulting from these expectations, orga­ nizational dependence on its members and or the external environment as well as contextual factors that influence the organizational structures. Second, three patterns of organizational behavior—adaptation, decoupling, and protest—were introduced and linked to existing studies such as the detailed framework of organizational strategies provided in Oliver (1991). Then, three research hypotheses were presented. Hypotheses 1 and 2 detail the conditions that are assumed to promote the patterns of behav­ ior. It is generally assumed that organizational behavior is influenced by external and internal expectations, their possible conflict, organizational contextual factors, and the availability of external or internal resources in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance. It should be noted that the three patterns are not considered to exist in a normative continuum from assimilation to segregation, but that, from an organizational point of view, they represent functional alternatives. The aim of all three research hypotheses is to explain why organizations act the way they act. Hypothesis 3 introduces the concept of organizational trajectories and analyzes how the patterns of adaptation and decoupling progress throughout the development of an organization. All three hypotheses will be tested in the course of the case studies. Third, the methods were discussed to increase the comparability, reli­ ability, and validity of the research results. Any generalization made at the end of this study will be based on the selection of the case studies, inter­ viewees, and analyzed documents described above. The aim of the case studies on DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD presented in Chapter Five is to provide a detailed account of organizational behavior, including their interaction within the organizational field. The following chapter discusses the institutional context in Germany in more detail to provide the background for the organizational case studies (Chap. Five) and the analysis of the changes in the organizational field in Germany (Chap. Six).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT: A MACRO-PERSPECTIVE ON THE CHANGING DISCOURSES ON ISLAM, INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY IN GERMANY To be able to analyze the extent to which changes within Islamic umbrella organizations are caused by their institutional environment, we must first define the term ‘institutional environment’. The German institutional environment provides a rich field of study with regard to shifting dynamics between the government, the media, the general public, and different groups of Muslims and their organizations. The ongoing debates concerning the integration of Muslims into the nation state, the institutional system, and mainstream society, as well as the linkages of this integration discourse with security concerns are not limited to Germany, but take place in many European countries. The following description of the German context and its particularities is therefore an illustrative case study that can contribute to further cross-country comparisons. However, academic, public, and political debates which link questions of Muslim rights to questions of immigration are particularly popular in the German national context (see Chap. Two: Existing Studies). Germany thus differs from other European countries such as Austria, France, and the Netherlands, where issues of religious pluralism are more strictly separated from debates on migration and integration policies (cf. Kortmann 2011; Laurence 2012; Sezgin/Rosenow-Williams 2013; see also the other comparative studies cited in Chap. Two). The effects of the topical linkages between Islam and questions of immigration in Germany have been a subject of controversial debate, and it is not the aim of this study to support the mixing up of the two topics in the current political debates. Nevertheless, the analysis of the German institutional context in this chapter confirms the existence of such linkages, which will be examined from the point of view of the analyzed organizations in the second step. This chapter is structured in line with the concept of three institutional pillars developed by Scott (1995) to present recent developments in German political and public debates since the beginning of the 21st century. As noted in Chapter Two, the three pillars refer to the regulative, normative, and cognitive dimensions of the institutional environment.

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All three dimensions influence the actors in an organizational field. While the regulative frame is legally sanctioned, the cognitive frame is characterized by its cultural support, and the normative frame is morally governed. According to Scott, all three pillars of institutions provide a basis to achieve legitimacy and a possible framework on which the actors can draw to position themselves in their institutional environment. On the legal level, two changes have taken place simultaneously in Germany since the beginning of the 21st century, both of which affect Islamic organizations. On the one hand, the German migration regime underwent changes in the form of a more inclusive approach to immigration and integration. In 2000, for the first time ever, Germany officially declared itself an “immigration country”. On the other hand, there has also been a shift in the security laws, which has led to an exclusive stance against criminal foreigners (as reflected in the ongoing debate about Islamist extremists, the Counter Terrorism Act, and the campaign of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany Party (CDU) and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria party (CSU) against criminal foreign youths during the state elections in Hesse in 2008). The first part of Chapter Four—the regulative dimension—examines the extent to which changes in the migration and security regimes are interlinked with the ongoing debates about the role of Islam in German society and its legal implications. This is followed by an analysis of the cognitive dimension with regard to the scripts and frames of reference that are associated with these legal changes from the perspective of academia, German politics, the media, the host population, and Muslim immigrants. This section discusses an observable ‘Islamization’ of integration debates and processes of ‘securitization’ with regard to the topics of migration and Islam. The third part of this chapter examines the normative dimension of the institutional environment and introduces a set of institutional expectations the political level has of Islamic organizations. The Regulative Dimension: Parallel Policy Developments Regarding the Migration Regime, Security Issues, and the Legal Status of Islam The regulative dimension emphasizes a stable system of rules that are backed by sanctions and obeyed by the actors out of expedience, fear, and belief in their legitimacy. Rules and laws consequently influence the



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activities and arguments of the organizations. The new anti-terrorism laws, for example, allow for the prosecution of unconstitutional activities and the ban of an organization.1 At the same time, the policy framework also provides an opportunity for non-conformity, such as in the form of protest against certain laws. The German government plays an important role in the regulative framework because of its role as a referee, and enforcer of rules and thus as the main source of coercion. This is also reflected in DiMaggio and Powell’s concept of coercive pressures that promote processes of adaptation and isomorphism (1991b: 67ff.). The following section examines three dimensions of parallel policy changes: a new migration regime, tightened security laws, and the related debate on the legal status of Islam in Germany. The Legal Status of Islam in Germany In order to understand the struggle between the German state and Islamic organizations concerning the official recognition of Islam in Germany, one needs to consider the legal sphere and the specific tradition of the church-state relations in Germany (Jonker 2002b; Koenig 2005; Rohe 2001). German Church-State Relations Until 1919, the Lutheran Church in Germany had the status of a state church. This status was changed by the Weimar Constitution. The law governing the relationship between church and state (Staatskirchenrecht)2 privileged the established Evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish commu­ nities,  in that it granted them the status of corporations of public law (Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts). There are currently 26 Christian organizations and several Jewish communities that have the status of a religious corporation of public law in accordance with Article 140 of the German Constitution (German Federal Government 2006: 37, 110).

1 Counter Terrorism Act (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz (TBG), January 1, 2002, FLG I (3): 361–395, 11-Jan-2002). The TBG was reviewed and amended five years later (Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz (TBEG), January 1, 2007, FLG I (1): 2–9, 1-Jan-2007. 2 The provisions affecting the relationship between church and state in Germany are summarized in Article 140 of the German Constitution, which includes Articles 136, 137, 138, 139, and 141 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. FLG I (41): 2034ff., 28-Aug-2006.

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No Islamic organization has been granted this corporation status on the ground that they do not fulfill the requirements. In 1954 the ministers of the interior of the German federal states decided that a community has to prove that it has remained stable over a period of 30 years (Rohe 2008: 57). A clear organizational structure with transparent decision making procedures and a reliable body which decides about doctrine and order are also required, along with religious consensus and being a membershipbased organization. According to the decision of the Constitutional Court from December 19, 2000, the organizations also have to prove compliance with German laws (BVerfG 19-Dec-2000: 2 BvR 1500/97, cf. Jonker 2002b). While the religious communities that existed at the time of the enactment of the German Constitution in 1949 automatically obtained this status, others can apply for it. In this context, Spuler-Stegemann stresses that more than one Islamic organization can receive the status of a religious corporation of public law. This would reflect the situation of the Christian churches and the Jewish congregations in Germany, which are also represented by multiple religious corporations of public law (Spuler-Stegemann 2002: 229). Jonker describes in detail the challenges that this bureaucratic understanding of membership organizations poses for Islamic organizations: Pressing Muslim community life in the mold of a democratically organized bureaucracy with boards, directors and expert committees cannot but produce sever changes in the traditional forms of bonding, which provokes uneasiness and withdrawal on the part of believers (Jonker 2002b: 40).

In his discussion of the demands for formal bureaucratization and external attempts of organization building, Koenig (2007c: 102) also cautions against the weakening of civil forms of religious collectivization. The empirical analysis presented in this study reveals that Islamic organizations in Germany are still in the process of adapting to these external expectations concerning their organizational structure. Nonetheless, over the last three decades, they have continuously applied for the status of a corporation of public law (German Federal Government 2006: 38ff.), which would increase their legitimacy and equality in the German system of religious governance. There would also be certain material benefits, including the right to levy taxes from the community members, to organize a parish, and to employ people under a belief-orientated labor-law, as well as property tax reductions and exemptions (Rohe 2008: 57; German Federal Government 2006: 101ff.).



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Religious Education in Public Schools To be given the right to provide religious education in public schools, an organization does not necessarily have to have the status of a corporation of public law (BVerwG 23-Feb-2005: 6 C 2.04). The legislation implies that each religious group (e.g., Sunnis, Shiites, Alevis, Armadis) has the right to its own form of religious education, provided that enough students attend the classes. The German federal states are responsible for the introduction of religious education for Muslims in public schools, and various concepts exist in the different states. For example, Article 7(3) of the German Constitution,3 which determines the prerequisites for the right to provide religious education in public schools, does not apply to Berlin, where religious instruction is not a part of the regular state school curriculum. According to Article 23 of the Berlin School Law, religious instruction is to be given by the responsible body, such as the churches and representatives of certain religious denominations, while being financially and organizationally supported by the school administration. In 2000 the Islamic Federation Berlin (Islamische Föderation Berlin e. V., IFB) won a nearly twenty-year legal battle, at the end of which IFB was officially recognized as a religious community, and was given the right to provide Islamic religious education in Berlin (BVerwG 6 C 5/99; see Jonker 2002b; Pfaff/Gil 2006). However, Berlin is still the only federal state that offers Islamic religious education (Sunni) in public schools. North Rhine-Westphalia is planning to introduce Islamic religious education at the end of 2012, and Hesse has decided in July 2012 to acknowledge DITIB Hesse and the Ahmadiyya Association in Hesse as religious communities and as suitable partners for the provision of religious education (Unknown FAZ.net 2012).4 Unlike the Sunni Islamic organizations, the Alevi umbrella organization AABF was officially recognized by the German decision-making bodies as the religious organization that represents Alevis in Germany. Subsequently, ministries of culture and education in various federal states such as Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Hesse and North RhineWestphalia gave AABF the responsibility of preparing curriculum material for providing Alevi courses, teaching Alevism in German public schools, and training teachers for that purpose (DIK 2009b). 3 German Basic Law of 23-May-1949, FLG I (41): 2034ff., 28-Aug-2006. 4 For more information see Bock (2007a; b); Reichmuth et al. (2006); German Federal Government (2006a: 63ff.) Rohe (2008: 61f.).

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The Role of the German Courts The German courts play a specific role in the institutionalization of Islam. Their institutionalization of rights on a case-by-case basis has been discussed by various authors (Koenig 2005; Rohe 2008; Tietze 2008). Tietze notes: The culturalized concept of Islam, which was dominant in the 1980s and reduced religion to a characteristic of immigrants’ otherness, has effectively hindered the development of integrating Islam comprehensively into German institutions of religious policy (2008: 222).

This means that the establishment of Muslim rights was facilitated primarily by court decisions rather than by federal and regional policies. The major court decisions were at first based on the constitutionally guaranteed principles of religious freedom (Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the German Basic Law).5 These individual rights were soon extended to include corporative rights, as a result of which Muslims were eventually recognized as a collective German actor, as the case of religious education illustrates. In addition, Article 3(3) of the German Basic Law6 prohibits discrimination or preferential treatment on the grounds of religious belief. On the European level, religious freedom is enshrined in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).7 However, Tietze concludes that the culturalized concept of religion remains present in Germany, leading to a

5 Article 4 [Freedom of faith, conscience, and creed] (1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be inviolable. (2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed (GG, 23-May-1949, FLG, I (41): 2034ff., 28-Aug-2006). 6 Article 3 [Equality before the law] (3) No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavored because of disability (ibid.). 7 Art. 9 ECHR (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. (2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, Rome 4 November 1950, Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, June 2010. URL: http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318 -B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ENG_CONV.pdf [last accessed 11-Nov-2010].



the institutional environment111 hierarchical regulation of religious pluralism, in which the majority— defined as a Christian-occidental community—tolerates its religious minorities (2008: 238).

Several legal issues also arose concerning the specific claims made by Muslims in Germany. Some courts rejected Muslim claims because they did not consider Islamic organizations as religious communities in the legal sense. According to Rohe (2008: 55), this was based on the “legally wrong” understanding that a structure similar to Christian faith was necessary. On January 15, 20028 the Constitutional Court finally rejected older interpretations in its ruling on halal slaughtering, granting diverse forms of organizations of groups of people with a common belief the right to public claims-making. Some courts also called the imperativeness of Islamic rules into question and had to consider the validity of contradicting doctrines,9 thus violating the state’s neutrality in religious matters (Rohe 2008: 55). A third paradox is that German lawmakers did not consider themselves competent to decide practical religious questions, a situation that led to case-by-case decisions. Tietze argues that this resulted in a trend of excluding foreigners from the legal sphere. Nonetheless, in certain respects, the legal status of Muslims in Germany has begun to resemble that of Christian churches and Jewish communities, due to the various court decisions (Tietze 2008: 222; Rohe 2008). The Changing Migration Regime As outlined in Chapter One, this study of Islamic organizations argues that an examination of Germany’s immigration history can improve our understanding of the current debates affecting organized Muslims in Germany. The section above emphasized that the reluctance of political actors to acknowledge the permanent settlement of immigrants is still reflected in the patchwork approach to Islam politics in Germany. This section summarizes the key developments in the German migration regime, which refers to rules, norms, and value systems that govern the arrival, departure, and stay of migrants, including their participation rights and duties. This definition of a migration regime is thus in contrast to narrower definitions which neglect questions of integration (cf. Hoerder et al. 2007: 39). 8 BVerfG, 1 BvR 1783/99, 15-Jan-2002, pp. 1–61. 9 On halal slaughtering see BVerwG BVerwGE 99, 1; BVerwG NJW 2001, 1225.

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Historical Patterns of Emigration and Immigration Germany has traditionally regarded itself as a country of emigration, but it has also had a long history of immigration. Examples of early immigration groups are French Protestants, who fled to Germany in the second half of the 17th century, and Polish immigrants, who settled in the Ruhr region after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 (BMI 2008a). Emigration from Germany took place primarily during the 19th century, when over five million Germans migrated to the USA due to unemployment and a population increase.10 At the beginning of the 20th century this situation changed. Germany became the second most important country of immigration after the USA (Bade/Oltmer 2007: 149). Economic immigration was fueled by Germany’s industrial expansion. Migrant workers contributed to the economic growth, particularly in the coal and steel industries. In 1913 over 1.2 million migratory workers were employed in Germany on a temporary basis, most of whom were from Poland and Italy (Oltmer 2005). Oltmer mentions various restrictions for Polish migrants, who were only allowed to work in the agricultural sector as seasonal workers. During World War I, up to 2.5 million foreign workers, including 1.5 million prisoners of war (POWs), worked in Germany to meet the increasing demand for labor. In addition, forced migration movements occurred as a result of resettlement and the arrival of refugees, most of whom fled from the Russian civil war following World War I. The aim of the migration policies of the Weimar Republic was to restrict the permanent settlement of immigrants. Due to the increased influence of the unions, Germans had to be hired first and migrants were paid equal wages to prohibit wage dumping. However, during the global economic crisis of the 1930s, the number of foreign workers declined to 100,000, which again led to a shortage of labor. The National Socialist government under Hitler continued the restrictive immigration policy. At the beginning of World War II only 375,000 migrant workers were employed in German industry and agriculture. By 1944, the number of migrant workers had increased dramatically to 8 million forced laborers, including 2 million POWs, representing a quarter of the German working population (Oltmer 2005).

10 On earlier emigration movements and the significant emigration from Germany to the East and the South see Bade/Oltmer (2007).



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World War II saw the largest migration wave in German history. The aim of the German army was to populate the occupied territories with ethnic Germans and displace and deport other nationals in the process. The genocide that killed over 6 million Jews during World War II is one of the darkest chapters of German history (Benz 1996). After World War II, up to 12 million displaced persons came under the control of the allied forces, whose aim was to repatriate them as quickly as possible. By 1950, when Germany was given the responsibility for this group of people, only 150,000 were still living in German territory (Oltmer 2005). The industrial reconstruction after the war soon turned into an economic boom, which once again led to an increase in the demand for temporary labor migration. In the early 1980s the German Demo­ cratic  Republic (GDR) recruited migrant workers from other socialist countries such as Poland, Cuba, Mozambique, and Vietnam (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 128). In West Germany, the demand for labor was met by the introduction of eight guest worker agreements with sending countries such as Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). The workers, most of them young male migrants, lived in designated housing areas and made significant contributions to the economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) of post-war Germany. An estimated total of 14 million migrants arrived in West Germany under these bilateral agreements. The rotation principle, which was supposed to ensure that their stay would be temporary, was often undermined by the employers as well as the employees, and family reunifications actually took place even before the official recruitment ban of 1973 (Reißlandt 2005). By 1973 some 2.7 million guest workers were living in West Germany (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 131). The expiry of the recruitment agreements did not lead to a decrease in the number of migrants living in Germany. In fact, their number increased due to permanent settlement and family reunification. At the same time, the economic stagnation, rising unemployment, and the 1973 oil crisis led to an end of the economic growth, and rising prices led to a process described as “stagflation” (Borowsky 1998). During the 1970s and 1980s, the German government continued its restrictive immigration policy, but also granted immigration permits to families who wanted to settle permanently in accordance with the Resident Law of 1965 (Reißlandt 2005). While there was no integration policy that would allow for the permanent integration of immigrants, the

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first German Federal Government Commissioner for Foreigners’ Issues, Heinz Kühn, proposed such an integration concept as early as 1979 (Kühn 1979). With regard to the idea of ‘temporary’ integration, Kühn notes that undifferentiated concepts of ‘temporary’ integration are contradictions in themselves, are unrealistic, and are obviously disproved by reality all the time (ibid., translation KRW).

On November 11, 1981, the then Social Democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said at a press conference: “The Federal Republic of Germany is not supposed to, and will not, become an immigration country” (cited in Meier-Braun 2006; translation KRW). Shortly after this statement, in 1982, the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl was elected Chancellor. Kohl put immigration issues on top of the political agenda, but basically consolidated the existing policies, including those on the end of recruitment agreements, restrictions to family reunification, and the support of return migration.11 Until the end of the 1990s, Kohl avoided the term ‘immigration’ in official statements. Instead, migration movements were categorized as the return of ethnic Germans, the temporary recruitment of workers, or the temporary reception of asylum seekers and civil war refugees (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 127).

The end of the Cold War, the German reunification in 1990, and the conflicts in the Balkans during the early 1990s led to a new immigration situation in Germany. While the end of the Cold War was characterized by an increasing number of immigrants, particularly ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe,12 the conflicts in the Balkans at the time led to an increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees.13 On January 1, 1991, immediately after the reunification, the first major revision of the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz, AuslG) came into effect

11 Until today, the promotion of voluntary return continues to be a key policy of the German Federal Government (BMI 2008a: 150ff.). Meier-Braun (2006) and other authors have criticized this policy as an example of failed symbolic politics. 12 Between 1990 and 2003, 2.4 million ethnic Germans and nearly 180,000 Jewish quota refugees from the area of the Soviet Union arrived in Germany (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 131). 13 Between 1990 and 2003, 2.69 million asylum seekers were registered in Germany (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 132). The number of asylum seekers reached its peak in 1992, when nearly 440,000 applications were recorded. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995, Germany granted temporary residence to 345,000 Bosnian refugees, which is more than all the EU countries combined.



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(FLG I: 1354, 09-July-1990). The new law was the culmination of a long debate that continued throughout the 1980s. Its aims were to prevent the entry of immigrants from non-EU countries, to facilitate return migration, and to promote the integration of legally residing immigrants. It also improved the rights of settled migrants and restricted the discretion of authorities at the local level (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 128). In 1992/93 Germany was shaken by racist mob attacks against refugee shelters and migrants in major German cities such as Rostock (August 1992), Mölln (November 1992), and Solingen (May 1993). Despite these social conflicts, the German government maintained that Germany was not an immigration country (Reißlandt 2005). The government responded with restrictive mechanisms aimed at asylum seekers, including the introduction of the safe third country regulation which makes it easier to deny asylum and deport asylum seekers14 (Smandek 1999). Since the reform of asylum law in 1993, the number of asylum seekers has steadily shrunk; in 2006, there were only about 21,000 applications, the lowest level since 1983 (German Federal Government 2008:17).

In this context, Cyrus and Vogel (2005: 17) also note that “non-integration policy” measures were directed at people who had no regular residence permit. Tolerated migrants and migrants with temporary residence status were encouraged to return and were given limited access to formal employment including a restriction of professional training for the children of tolerated migrants, if a “privileged person” can be placed in the training program. Legal Changes Since the Beginning of the 21st Century The end of the 1990s also marked a turning point with regard to the German nationality law. In the 20th century the German nationality law had been dominated by its jus sanguinis tradition, which made naturalization processes an exception rather than the rule (Hailbronner 2006: 213). Migrant organizations were particularly interested in the dual citizenship option originally advocated by the coalition government of SPD and Green Party under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder which had won the federal elections of 1998. After a heated controversy that culminated in

14 These changes were included in Article 16a of the Basic Law and in the Asylum Procedure Act of 26-June-1992 (FLG I: 1798, 02-Sept-2008). For an overview of the German laws governing asylum see BAMF (no date a).

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a signature campaign against a dual citizenship option initiated by the CDU and the CSU,15 a compromise was found. On July 15, 1999 reforms to the citizenship law were eventually agreed on. The Act to Amend the Nationality Law entered into force on January 1, 2000.16 It made it easier for immigrants to become German citizens and for the first time included jus soli elements (in Article 4) (BMI 1999, 2008a: 112ff.; Faist et al. 2004: 18f.). Children born in Germany after January 1, 2000 now automatically have German citizenship in addition to any other citizenship that they might have, under the condition that one of their parents has been a legal permanent resident of Germany for eight years and has been granted permanent resident status (ibid.: Article 4). When they turn 18 they have to decide whether or not they want to keep their German citizenship. If they do, they have to give up any other citizenship by the age of 23. Adults receive the right to become German citizens after eight years instead of fifteen. To be naturalized, applicants must also speak the German language, abide by the German Basic Law, and, as of September 1, 2008, pass a naturalization test (ibid.: Article 8; BMI 2008a: 115). The new citizenship law of 2000 also abolished the option to acquire dual citizenship once an immigrant has German citizenship, although exceptions do exist.17 This legal change was received positively by the international press. The New York Times, for example, noted: Declaring Germany ‘a country of immigrants’, the future governing partners reached a landmark agreement today to promote the integration of immigrants by modernizing the nation’s 85-year-old citizenship law (New York Times, 15-Oct-1998).

In 2000 the German government for the first time issued a work permit scheme for computer experts similar to the U.S. Green Card. The attempt to attract IT specialists was accepted by the general public. However, by

15 Over five million signatures were collected against the proposed law, which, according to Faist, Gerdes and Rieple, led to the defeat of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party in the state elections in Hesse in early 1999 (Faist et al. 2004: 19). 16 FLG I (38): 1618–1624, 23-July-1999. 17 If the foreigner is unable to give up his or her old citizenship or is only able to do so under very difficult conditions the requirement is waived. This usually also applies to refugees and victims of political persecution. As of August 19, 2007, nationals of the EU member states and Switzerland are no longer required to give up their citizenship in order to receive German citizenship, and vice versa, in accordance with the Act to Implement Residence- and Asylum-Related Directives of the European Union (FLG I (42): 1–146, 21-Aug-2007).



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the end of 2004, only 17,931 applications had been approved (BAMF 2005: 89ff.). Originally encouraged by the wide acceptance of the program, the Federal Minister of the Interior appointed an Independent Commission on Immigration, which in its first report emphasized the long tradition of immigration to Germany and the necessity of future immigration due to global competition and demographic change, also noting that immigration should not be prevented but managed properly (Independent Commission on Migration to Germany 2001). Shortly afterwards, the Federal Minister of the Interior Schily presented a draft of a new immigration law, which in many details was more restrictive than the Independent Commission’s proposals. The debate on the bill that followed coincided with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the USA. In the subsequent discussions in Germany, security aspects became increasingly important (efms 2001), as will be discussed in more details below. Cyrus and Vogel state that the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the economic decline of the IT industry “fuelled the renaissance of non-immigration options” (2007: 136). Due to national political struggles, not all parts of the new immigration law entered into force in 2002, and eventually it was overturned by the Constitutional Court. After “lengthy negotiations with limited information given out to the public” (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 130) the new “Law for Managing and Containing Immigration and for the Regulation of the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and Foreigners”, also called the Immigration Act, came into force on January 1, 2005 (FLG I (41): 1950– 2011, 05-Aug-2004). One of the most important aspects of the Immigration Act is the introduction of mandatory, publicly funded integration courses for new immigrants, which focus on language acquisition (600 hours) and an orientation course to familiarize participants with the history, culture, and legal system of Germany (now 45 hours). Participants are expected to contribute €1 per hour, which can be waived if their income is too low. Residents with a migration background may also participate, if places are available or if they are obliged to participate by the authorities due to integration deficiencies (German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration 2005: 218). However, humanitarian actors complained that the law failed to address the needs of immigrants who are already residing in Germany (Cyrus/Vogel 2005: 4). This development of the German migration regime has been described as a “paradigmatic shift” (Cyrus/Vogel 2005) in the attitude toward the notion of Germany being an immigration country, which had been denied

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by the German government for a long time. Given the legal changes described above, it is now safe to say that Germany is not only a de facto country of immigration, but a de jure country of immigration as well (Bade/Oltmer 2007: 169). However, the Act to Implement Residence- and Asylum-Related Directives of the European Union (EU-Directives Implementation Act) in particular, which entered into force on August 28, 2007 (FLG I (42): 1970–2115, 27-Aug-2007), provoked severe criticism from Turkish migrant organizations, which complained that the law discriminates against Turkish nationals, considering that some countries which do not require visas are exempt from this new legislation.18 Other points of criticism included the requirement to demonstrate German language proficiency as a prerequisite for family reunification, and the raising of the minimum age for spouses who want to migrate to Germany from 16 to 18 (KRM PR 07-July-2007). The changes in the national legislation reflect the strict implementation of this optional clause in the EU directive 86/2003/EC on family reunification rights for third-country nationals (TCNs) (Official Journal (OJ), Nr. L 251, S. 12–18), which allows nation states to require immigrants to comply with integration measures (Rosenow 2007; 2009). Germany follows the trend of other traditional immigration countries such as the Netherlands, which has also implemented stricter integration requirements for new immigrants (Gropas/Triandafyllidou 2007: 363). The EU countries are still deeply divided on the question of whether TCNs who are not members of an EU member state should be granted local voting rights. Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and a number of other countries do not grant such local voting rights. However, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK grant full voting rights at the local level, provided that certain special requirements are fulfilled (ibid.: 374). The German case shows that migrants must acquire German citizenship to rise from the status of a “denizen” (Hammar 1990: 12ff.) with restricted rights to that of a “citizen” who enjoys participation rights on all levels. Another late change to the German migration regime was the establishment of a far-reaching anti-discrimination policy. The grand coalition of

18 DITIB and the Turkish Community Germany (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland e. V., TGD), and two other organizations boycotted the Integration Summit of 2007 (Spiegel Online, 11-July-2007).



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CDU, CSU, and SPD agreed on the Antidiscrimination Law (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz), which came into force on August 18, 2006 (FLG I: 1897, 14-Aug-2006). The law protects against discrimination based on race, gender, and ethnic origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, and religion. It became necessary because four EU anti-discrimination directives adopted between 2000 and 2004 required national ratification and Germany had already received a warning from the European Court of Justice because of the delay in the ratification process. According to Raasch (2007), this led to a hasty decision which does not comply with all of the relevant EU provisions. However, other authors emphasize the progress made in adopting the new legislation: After a long period of discussion whether Germany should have an Antidiscrimination Law, this is more than [what] was expected by those who argued for the necessity of such a measure to combat discrimination on different levels in Germany (Karakaşoğlu et al. 2006: 153).

Two years later the wave of legal claims arising from this law that many had expected still failed to materialize, and by August 15, 2008, the antidiscrimination body had only received 2,671 complaints, most of which did not seek a court ruling but at an out-of-court settlement (Dernbach, Tagesspiegel, 15-Aug-2008). New Dialogue Initiatives Somewhat in contrast to these legal changes to the migration regime, the German government also decided to promote the dialogue on integration issues, which led to the establishment of the annual Integration Summit and the German Islam Conference (DIK) in 2006. The first annual Integration Summit took place on July 14, 2006. Its aim was to create a joint strategy on integration by summer 2007. This was achieved through dialogue with migrants, based on the principle of talking “with them and not about them” (German Federal Government 2007). 87 participants from the German Federal Government, the federal states, local authorities, migrant organizations, institutions, organizations from the areas of science, media, culture, sports, and trade and industry, trade unions, and religious groups formed six working groups to discuss issues such as integration courses, German language skills, education and vocational training, the situation of women and girls, local integration activities, and ways to strengthen civil society. Together the working groups developed the National Integration Plan – New Paths, New Opportunities, which was presented at the second

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Inte­gration summit on July 12, 2007. The document contains over 400 measures and voluntary commitments relating to integration (German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration 2007b). The effects of these measures are discussed in the National Action Plan on Integration presented at the 5th Integration Summit on January 31, 2012 (German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration 2011, 2012). According to the Federal Government, the common principle used in this process provides support, but also requires migrants to do their part (EUNET 2007). This is also reflected in the slogan “fördern und fordern”. It should be noted that there were no representatives of any Islamic umbrella organizations among the 87 participants of the first Integration Summit. Islamic organizations were invited to the first DIK on September 27, 2006 (see below), and some organizations such as ZMD, DITIB, and the Turkish Community in Germany (Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland e. V., TGD) participated in the workshops that prepared the National Integration Plan. The New Security Legislation In addition to changes to national immigration and integration policies, the German government also introduced changes to security policies. It should be noted that the German border control system was completely overhauled after the German reunification in 1990 (Cyrus/Vogel 2007: 128f.). Border control at the western and southern borders of the EU was no longer carried out by units which control the ports of entry but by mobile units which actively search for illegal immigrants. At the eastern borders with the Czech Republic and Poland, a completely new system was installed to restrict immigration while allowing access for seasonal workers who are needed in the agricultural industry (Baumann 2006). However, the legislative and executive changes in the German security policy framework concerning Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany implemented after the attacks of September 11, 2001 are more relevant to this research. The fact that the attacks had been planned at least in part in Hamburg drew considerable international attention to Germany and immediately prompted a political response in the form of the first security package enacted on September 19, 2001. According to Tartsch, these changes are associated with the fact that the Federal Minister of the Interior and the members of the opposition



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parties wanted to be regarded as the guardians of national security. Tartsch argues that the cooperative role of the parliament and the rapid legislative processes are signs of activism which aims to restore the government’s battered reputation (Tartsch 2008: 269). Some authors also argue that the attacks were used as a pretext to adopt legislation that had already been in the making, but had not received enough political support (Cesari 2005: 50; Koch 2002), and Eckert notes that 9/11 provided an opportunity for many governments to overcome some—or most—of the resistance posed by parliaments, the media, civil rights groups or the judiciary (2008b: 24).

The Balance between Liberty and Security This debate must be considered in the light of the struggle of any democracy to ensure the highest possible degree of liberty while providing as much security for its citizens as is deemed necessary (Zöller 2004: 471; Glaeßner 2003). While Hobbes’ Leviathan embodies the right of the state to resort to force in order to ensure security, post-Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant and Hegel and the liberal proponents of the French and American Revolutions advocated the ideal of individual liberty. The state has the responsibility to ensure a balance between these two concepts with their divergent historical traditions (Denninger 2004). In Germany, the idea of free development for everyone is enshrined in Article 2(1) of the German Basic Law.19 According to Lepsius, the terrorist activities of the left-wing Red Army Faction (RAF) in the 1970s and 1980s led to a development in German law that gave security considerations priority over civil liberty rights (Lepsius 2004). For the first time, security was declared a basic right which must be provided for by the state. Lepsius argues that this development undermined individual rights in favor of the common good “security”, which itself was wrongly elevated from an object of legal protection to a goal of the state (ibid.: 87, translation KRW). However, Zöller notes that during the 1970s and 1980s it was generally accepted that it is impossible to guarantee absolute security in a democratic order (2004: 473), arguing that the introduction of electronic

19 Article 2(1) “Everyone has the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or against morality” (GG, 23-May- 1949, FLG, I (41): 2034ff., 28-Aug-2006).

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surveillance of private homes in 1998 tipped the balance toward an emphasis on the security dimension.20 Therefore, 9/11 does not represent a turning point with regard to the balance between liberty and security. However, the legislative changes following these terrorist attacks increased the emphasis on security while also focusing on preventive action (Denninger 2004: 52; Schiffauer 2007c: 361). Cesari notes that the tightening of security laws led to an “almost total identification of domestic security and the international war against terrorism” (2005: 41). Eckert emphasizes that this development includes a new concept of danger, which is no longer connected to the activities of individuals but to an omnipresent threat from Islamist terrorist networks (Eckert 2008b: 12). The new security legislation must also be considered in the light of Germany’s international obligations to combat terrorism, to protect human rights, and to protect life, liberty, and property in its territory. Immediately after 9/11, the UN Security Council established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), which receives and reviews national reports on counter-terrorism legislation.21 Germany was not criticized in these reports and thus fulfills its various international obligations to combat terrorism (UN Security Council 2002). However, Zöller also notes that the CTC does not determine whether state legislation is compatible with human rights law (Zöller 2004: 476, 481; cf. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2003). A New Focus on Islamist Terrorism To better understand the links between security developments and the Muslim community in Germany, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the official website of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI), in particular the sections on terrorism. The government’s official line of argumentation, which associates German legislative developments with the events of 9/11, is evident in the second sentence: “The attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed a new

20 In 2004 the Constitutional Court ruled that much of the original law on electronic surveillance of private homes (“Großer Lauschangriff”) was unconstitutional (BVerfG, 1 BvR 2378/98: 1 - 373, 3.3.2004). 21 The CTC was established by Security Council resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373 (2001)) (UN Security Council no date).



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and global dimension of threat” (BMI no date a; cf. Boukhars 2009: 308ff.). The ‘threat’ scenario for Germany is directly associated with Islamist terrorism, which is still identified as a “top priority” of German security authorities: Islamist terrorism constitutes the greatest current threat to our freedom and security. The attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed a new and global dimension of threat.  These terrorists have no qualms about using violence; they have excellent logistical networks and plan their attacks across borders and well in advance. That is what makes them so dangerous.  The foiled suitcase bombings in 2006 and the planned attacks by the Sauerland group in 2007 show that Germany is not simply a safe haven for Islamist terrorists; on the contrary, they have set their sights on Germany as a target. Combating Islamist terrorism is a top priority of the security authorities (BMI no date, English website, ‘Terrorism’, 01-Feb-2012).

The text then goes on to detail the top five goals of the new anti-terror policy in this fight against Islamist terrorism: 1) Breaking up terrorist networks by intensifying investigation efforts in order to increase the pressure on offenders; 2) preventing terrorism; 3) doing away with the causes of terrorism; 4) protecting the population; taking preventive measures and reducing our country’s overall vulnerability; 5) Further expanding international cooperation (ibid.).

The BMI’s official rhetoric is also reflected in the legislative and administrative changes implemented after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Just hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the special force unit Special Build-up Organization USA (Besondere Aufbauorganisation USA) was created, which at one point employed over 600 people to investigate the attacks and to prevent future ones. Later, this special force became a regular unit with 450 employees of the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) working to combat Islamist terrorism (BMI 2002). On December 14, 2004 the Joint CounterTerrorism Center (Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GTAZ) in Berlin became operative. The GTAZ is staffed with 190 employees from the BKA and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitu­ tion  (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) (BMI no date b). In April 2009 the Islamic Science Competence Center (Islamwissenschaftliches Kompetenzzentrum, IKO) of the BfV was established, which provides the agency with intelligence information on the issue of Islamism and liaises with Islamic organizations and scholars in Germany (BMI no date c).

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One year after 9/11, during a press conference regarding the work of the BKA, the then German Federal Minister of the Interior Schily announced that 72 preliminary proceedings with respect to Islamist terrorist backgrounds were being conducted, which led to the first successful prosecutions. In his statement, the fight against terrorism is given more attention than the fight against organized crime or the positive developments in the German crime statistics which are only briefly mentioned (ibid.). The measures to combat the “Islamist terrorist threat” adopted by the BKA also included raids in a number of mosques on the last day of Ramadan (Allen/Nielsen 2002: 19; Schiffauer 2008b: 69ff.). These raids were possible due to various legislative changes, which are described below. Muslim individuals and organizations complained that the entire Muslim community was being tarred with the same brush, and official protests followed in January 2003 after police had simultaneously conducted raids in Stuttgart, Mannheim, and Freiburg, arresting 617 Muslims (Fekete 2004: 11). Legislative Changes after 9/11 The legislative changes implemented after 9/11 include the Security Packages I and II, both of which were agreed on at the end of 2001. Security Package II was introduced in the form of the Counter-Terrorism Act (TBG, FLG I (3): 361–395, 11-Jan-2002). Five years later a reviewed and amended version was enacted as the Act Supplementing the Counter-Terrorism Act (TBEG, FLG I (1): 2–9, 01-Jan-2007). In addition, changes to the dragnet (Rasterfahndung) and surveillance laws were enacted even before 2001. Security Package I was adopted on September 19, 2001. The Federal Council of Germany ratified its funding on November 30, 2001 (Tartsch 2008: 270). It consisted of four goals, with the general aim being to prevent future terrorist attacks. First, in line with the focus on Islamist terrorism mentioned above, a law was enacted that changed the Private Associations Act (FLG I (64): 3319, 7 December 2001) and abolished the ‘religious privilege’ (formerly § 2(2)3), which protected religious associations from forced closure (Karakaşoğlu et al. 2006: 149). The deletion of Article 2(2)3 allowed agencies to ban extremist organizations if their activities violate the Criminal Code, the constitutional order, or the principle of international



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understanding (cf. Art. 3(1), and Zöller 2004). As a result of these changes, five Islamic organizations were shut down.22 Second, amendments to Article 129 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) allowed for the prosecution of members of terrorist organizations that do not have their headquarters in German territory (Guiwa-Schindler 2002). In the past, Article 129 only applied to members of terrorist organizations with formal connections to Germany such as the Red Army Faction, which had been the target of the old legislation. The third and fourth goals of Security Package I were to introduce measures to improve air traffic safety and combat money laundering. The second security package was adopted in the form of the CounterTerrorism Act on January 1, 2002. It expanded the powers of the BKA, the BfV, the German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND), the Federal Armed Forces Counterintelligence Office (Militärischer Abschirmdienst, MAD), and the Federal Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz, BGS) with regard to the collection and sharing of information (BMI 2002). The Counter-Terrorism Act includes various changes to 19 laws and 6 statutory orders such as the integration of biometric information into German passports and amendments to the air traffic law, the Criminal Code, the Asylum Act, and the Foreigners Act. Additional amendments to the Act Governing Private Associations are highly relevant to Islamic organizations and migrant organizations in general because they may provide reasons to ban associations whose members are mainly foreigners (Art. 14 VereinsG). According to Art. 9(2) TBG, such reasons include activities directed against peaceful co-existence of Germans and foreigners or foreigners among each other, or against Germany’s obligations under international law, incitement to violence or support of organizations abroad which plan or support attacks against persons or property (Zöller 2004: 489).

Curiously, EU nationals are exempt from this rule, a fact Zöller interprets as discriminatory (2004: 490). In addition, Security Package II ensures that

22 The “Caliphate State” and 19 supporting organizations were banned on December 12, 2001. Its leader, Metin Kaplan, was convicted of incitement to murder and sentenced to four years in prison (Zöller, 2004: 490). Other banned organizations include Al-Aqsa e. V. (August 5, 2002), Hizb-ut Tahrir (January 15, 2003), Yeni Akit GmbH (February 25, 2005), and YATIM Kinderhilfe e. V., a successor organization of Al-Aqsa e. V. (September 5, 2005) (Karakaşoğlu et al. 2006: 149).

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information about foreigners who wish to enter is available to the relevant institutions to make it easier for them to deport asylum seekers or revoke residence permits of potential terrorists (ibid.: 490). The changes to the Aliens Act mentioned in Article 11 of the Counter-Terrorism Act are now included in Section 54 of the Ordinance Governing Residence of 2004, which stipulates that a person can be expelled if he or she is a threat to the free democratic order or the security of the Federal Republic of Germany; if he or she participates in acts of violence, publicly incites violence, or threatens the use thereof, is or was a member of an organization that supports terrorism or is permanently banned with no chance for appeal, supports or has supported such an organization, or makes false or incomplete statements regarding their contacts to persons or organizations that are suspected of supporting terrorism (FLG I (3): 368, 11 January 2002, art. 11 III). These reasons have been used to deny naturalization to members of IGMG and other organizations, and even to revoke naturalization if the individuals concerned provided incomplete information about their being a member of IGMG (German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration 2005: 344ff.; Schiffauer 2008b: 60ff.). According to Zöller, one of the main problems is the vague wording of the laws, which do not define terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘support’, thus leaving the decision to the authorities which process the applications for asylum and naturalization. Zöller also discusses the restrictions to the non-refoulement principle resulting from Security Package II (2004: 490ff.). Dragnet searches (Rasterfahndung), which are used to systematically search for criminals and terrorist ‘sleepers’ by matching certain criteria against existing datasets, have received increased attention since 9/11. Tartsch mentions a ‘terrorist-profile’ provided by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that was used by the German authorities. The criteria included in the profile were: male; affiliation with Islam; between 18 and 41 years old; student or former student; living in Germany as a legal resident; originally from one of 27 countries (Tartsch 2008: 273).23 To support this dragnet search, the Counter-Terrorism Act allows for the sharing of social security information about persons who receive social security aid,24 including general personal information, information

23 See also the decision of the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) 518/02, 4 April 2006: 8. 24 Art. 18 amended Art. 68 (3) of the Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB).



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about the persons’ nationality and religious affiliation, their address, employer information, and a record of all social welfare payments received. According to the BKA, the German federal states submitted 31,988 personal data sets with information about the mentioned criteria,25 which were matched against 200,000 to 300,000 data sets stored by the BKA. Two identical items found in the sets were considered to constitute a match. The list of matches was sent to the Offices of Criminal Investigation of the German Federal State (Landeskriminalämter, LKA) for their own use. The other two lists were destroyed in June and July 2003. Although the dragnet searches did not identify a single ‘sleeper’ (BVerfG 518/02, 04-Apr-2006: 9), it was not until 2006 that the Constitutional Court declared preventive dragnet search unconstitutional (ibid.). According to the Constitutional Court, the assumption of a current threat following 9/11 does not constitute sufficient reason for a dragnet search, because it may only be used to neutralize a specific threat. The ruling of the Constitutional Court also acknowledged a complaint filed by one of the persons affected by the screening in North Rhine-Westphalia (ibid.). The Cognitive Dimension: Securitization and Islamization of Theoretical and Public Discourses on Integration and Immigration In every European country, public debate is focused on the dangers of Islamic dogma, the urgency of breaking the religious collective, and the necessity of taming and institutionalizing Islam in a much more securitized and secularized process (Boukhars 2009: 297).

The debate on the role of Islam in Germany and Europe goes back to European political myths of the nation states which portray Muslims as conquerors and a “threat and the enemy par excellence” (François/Schulz 1998: 25). 25 In order to achieve this number, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia asked its registry office and its central registry of aliens on October 2, 2001 to submit personal files of male persons who were born between October 1, 1960 and October 1, 1983. In addition, universities and similar institutions had to submit information about students meeting these criteria, who were enrolled between January 1, 1996 and October 1, 2001. In North Rhine-Westphalia, this resulted in a set of over 5.2 million items of information. After cross matching this information with other criteria, 11,004 data sets were submitted to the BKA on October 5, 2001. The remaining data sets were destroyed on December 10, 2001. All of the 11,004 persons were informed after the end of the procedure (BVerfG 518/02, 04-Apr-2006: 29–32).

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Today, Germany and Europe perceive themselves as secular, but according to Zollberg and Long, they are also rooted in a Christian tradition “in relation to which Muslim immigrants constitute the visible ‘other’” (1999: 7). Many organized Muslims who increasingly claim their right to religious freedom are confronted with a public discourse focused on national identity and core values (Koenig 2005). With regard to these claims, Islam is often portrayed as the opposite of a modern, liberal, and secular Western tradition, or simply as “the other” (Eckert 2008a). Casanova (2006) calls this discourse in Europe an “anti-Muslim discourse”. The role of Islam in the Western world, related discriminatory tendencies, and policy developments have been discussed by various scholars since the late 1970s (e.g., Etienne 1990; Gerholm/Lithman 1988; Koenig 2003; Pauly 2004; Al-Hamarneh/Thielmann 2008). In her study on the situation of Muslims in six European countries and the impact of the securitization debates after 9/11, Cesari notes: One common element of mainstream discourse on Islam in the post-9/11 world has been the constant correlation between Islam as a religion and Islam as a factor in political violence. One of the effects of this correlation can be seen in the acts of aggression against Muslims in both the United States and Europe (Cesari 2005: 39).

This section provides an analysis of research literature, media analyses, and population surveys to determine how Muslims and their religion have been portrayed since 9/11. The section begins with an analysis of the cognitive frameworks that associate migration issues with security issues because these issues are increasingly linked to the discourse on Islam. This is followed by a discussion of the process of ‘securitization’ with regard to the theoretical concept and its application to the issues of integration and Islam. The third step is to analyze how Muslims are perceived by the German media, with a special focus on the increasing ‘Islamization’ of integration debates. The final part discusses the opinion that the German public has of Muslims and compares this perception to international survey results. The Social Construction of Security Threats The “migration-security nexus” (Faist 2006, efms 2007) and the “securitization of migration” (Guiraudon/Joppke 2001; Huysmans 2000; Ibrahim 2005) have received scholarly attention in various disciplines. Although researchers have been well aware of the link between the two topics for



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over a decade,26 the term has received increased public and academic attention since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Publications range from national security studies in political science (Adamson 2006a; b; Kirshner 2006; Rudolph 2003) to the study of the rights of immigrants in the context of European integration (Levy 2005; Sasse 2005) to law studies (Tumlin 2004; Eckert 2008a) to organizational case studies (Schiffauer 2008b), and even psychoanalytic studies (Davids 2006). It is worthwhile to take a closer look at this literature because it has been increasingly associated with Islam. Many Islamic organizations were established by, and consist of, people with a migration background. As we have seen, this is particularly true of organizations in Germany, but also for organizations in other European countries. As a result, Islamic organizations are confronted with the securitization of migration and the fact that religion is increasingly portrayed as an identity marker of the migrant population (cf. Tezcan 2007: 56). This section argues that in order to understand the dominance of security concerns in the institutional environment, we must also understand how security discourses are constructed and how frames such as “parallel societies” and “clash of civilizations” emerge (Huntington 1993, 2002), which have been increasingly intertwined with the question of how to integrate Islam into Western societies. In 2005 Ibrahim used the title ‘The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse’ to describe the existing literature on the link between migration and security questions, noting: The migration-as-a-threat narrative is reaching a climax in the wake of September 11th. With links between migrants and threat already in place, fears of terrorism have strengthened this discourse. […] Due to assertions of international organizations, states, academics and journalists, migration has become synonymous with a new risk to the liberal world. This discourse has reached its pinnacle, normalizing the view that migrants are a threat (Ibrahim 2005: 173, 163).

What was it that led Ibrahim to draw this challenging conclusion, which accuses a wide variety of actors of supporting the view that migrants can be perceived as a “threat” to our world? 26 The classical works on the link between migration and security issues published before 9/11 are Bigo (2001); Wæver et al. (1993a) and studies by other authors of the Copenhagen School; Poku/Graham 1998; Graham/Poku 2000; Miller (1998; 2000); Skeldon (1998), and Weiner (1995a; b). Studies which focus on the European level include Geddes (2000); Huysmans (2000); Koslowski (2001), and Tomei (2001).

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Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Since the end of the Cold War, the issues of terrorism, illegal migration, and “the global migration crisis” (Weiner 1995a) have reached the agenda of the international political level as the new threats of the 21st century. Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations has received much attention during this period. In it, the author describes a new division of the world along religious divides manifested in seven competing civilizations, which are regarded as “the broadest level of cultural identity” (Huntington 2002: 43). The Islamic civilization is characterized by an Islamic resurgence that “embodies acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life” (ibid: 109). Overall, Huntington paints a negative image of Islam, which is characterized by “bloody borders” (ibid.: 254) and a history of threats to the Western world that “put the survival of the West in doubt” (ibid.: 210). He does not just criticize Islamist extremism, but Islam per se (ibid.: 213ff.). His work is full of generalizations and anti-Muslim sentiments intended to justify his conclusion that the West and Islam are generally incompatible. The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power (Huntington 2002: 217).

Huntington’s book received much praise and attention, perhaps because of the simplicity of the assumptions and stereotypes it contains.27 However, it also received considerable criticism. Critics emphasized the necessity to live peacefully together and the responsibility of the West to learn more about other religions through a dialogue of cultures (Müller 1998: 241;28 Pauly 2004: 22). The hype around the book and the emergence of a new Weltanschauung that is captured in the catchphrase “clash of civilizations” must be viewed critically if global and local tensions are to be prevented. Sanders notes on the much more likely and more desirable future of various cultures peacefully living together: 27 On the cover of Huntington’s book, the former U.S. Secretary of State and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying: “one of the most important books to have emerged since the end of the cold war”. The book broke sales records and Huntington’s article of 1993 became the most widely discussed article in the history of the U.S. journal Foreign Affairs. The German government also invited Huntington to the German Bundestag as an expert on cultural policies. 28 In 1998 Harald Müller published Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen – Ein Gegenentwurf zu Huntington (The Coexistence of Cultures: An Alternative Concept to Huntington, translation KRW), a book that challenges Huntington’s work.



the institutional environment131 It seems clear to me that the global dynamics of the twenty-first century are not primarily going to be a clash of civilizations, but more likely a marbling of civilizations and people (2006: 824).

However, Huntington’s work is a good example of how the subjects of security, migration, and religion are interlinked through the creation of fear (of the possible effects of overpopulation in Muslim countries, among other things) and an emphasis on cultural differences. He regards multiculturalism “as a cause of societal disintegration” (Huysmans 2000: 757), with the underlying assumption being that cultural differences lead to societal breakdown. The aim of this line of argumentation is to create “otherness”, meaning the dichotomy between ‘us’ (the native population) and ‘them’ (the immigrants). Ibrahim (2005) argues that this segregation is not new and has already been discussed at length by Barker (1981), who coined the term ‘New Racism’. According to Barker, nation states generally have an interest in ensuring stability for the nation through traditions, systems of justice, and rights. The argument that this balance may be “disturbed” by immigrants is frequently used to limit the number of immigrants (Ibrahim 2005: 166). Duffield argues in a similar vein that new racism, which no longer focuses on categories of hierarchy and superiority, but on cultural differences, “has modernized racism and made it respectable” (Duffield 1996: 175). The Societal Security Concept Many authors consciously or unconsciously repeat the assumption that migration might lead to societal instability, which is frequently found in the existing literature which links migration and security issues (Buzan 1993a; Heisler/Zig-Layton 1993; Wæver et al. 1993). At this point, the term ‘societal security’ should be introduced, which was coined by Wæver et al. (1993). The concept of societal security is based on the notion of a common societal identity that has to protect itself from external influences. The “survival of a society is a question of identity” (ibid.: 24), while state security, as a parallel concept, is linked to the question of sovereignty (Wæver 1995: 67). Using the “societal security” concept, the authors can take the security issue from an external immigration level and a matter of border control to questions of internal integration. Thus, the underlying framing of ‘us’ against ‘them’ is reiterated by the perception of security in terms of a threat in societal identity terms. With regard to the debate about parallel societies and the assimilation discourse, Wæver’s arguments can be used,

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for example, to justify the exclusion of anyone who does not support the general identity of a given society. The author himself acknowledges this in a footnote describing the possible political abuse of threat scenarios concerning state sovereignty or societal identity (ibid.: 82). Examples in this context are Heisler and Layton-Henry (1993), who describe the danger of illegal immigration and the loss of state control over its borders, which in turn leads to feelings of societal insecurity. Buzan (1993b) emphasizes the threat posed by migrants who do not assimilate to the receiving countries, noting: The threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society […]. This threat works on the societal level when the incoming population is of a different cultural or ethnic stock from the residents. It is amplified when migrants seek to maintain their identity rather than adapting to that prevailing in their adopted country (Buzan 1993b: 45, as cited in Ibrahim 2005: 170).

Buzan’s observation and the work of the Copenhagen School in general imply that a society can be defined in terms of common traditions and values, which are expressed in a single societal identity. McSweeney (1996) criticizes this objectivist assumption which maintains that societies simply have one identity to which people belong and which fails to take into account the process character of identity discourses and the possibility of personal choices. Consequently, McSweeney warns that the assumptions postulated in Wæver et al. (1993b) “will make claims for the protection of national identity all the easier to substantiate” (McSweeney 1996: 91). This very development can be observed in the German debate about a common ‘Leitkultur’ (which can be translated as ‘core culture’), a debate that also ignores the fact that societal values and traditions are in constant flux. By implying that the supposed German ‘Leitkultur’ is superior to immigrant cultures and other subcultures, proponents of this idea ignore positive contributions of migrants, such as their contributions to the economic development of nation states and their cultural and language diversity, which can also enrich our mutual understanding in daily life. Still, adaptation to German values remains one of the central institutional expectations German politicians have of Islamic organizations (see the last section of this chapter). The Securitization Theory In general, the linking of migration and security questions and the subsequent creation of a new discourse can be interpreted as the “exercise of



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power” (Foucault 2002: 93). Power relationships also play an important role in terms of the securitization of migration. According to Wæver and the Copenhagen School,29 securitization refers to a “speech act” that determines what security stands for. In this sense, security is no longer regarded as an objective truth, but as a social construction (1995: 55). Actors in general and elites in particular thus play an important role in defining both the “referent object” (the object that is threatened) and the source of the “threat” (Wæver et al. 1993b: 186ff.; Bigo 2001). In this context, Bigo analyzes the role of security professionals who have the legitimacy and institutional power required for the “social construction of a threat” (2001: 121). Security professionals “manufacture” (ibid.: 122) an unsettled environment concerning immigrants to legitimize their position in safeguarding the public from this new “threat”. With reference to Edelman, Bigo notes: Security agencies benefit from the social construction of threat that turns immigration (legal or illegal) into the cause of society’s problem and boost their budget and legitimacy” (ibid.: 128).

From their point of view, a securitization strategy is successful when the “threat” is embedded in the “ordinary public sphere”. With regard to the “securitization of migration” (especially with a focus on Muslim immigrants), such an implementation strategy for the wider context of everyday life can be interpreted as successful, as the following section on the media and the political discourse shows. In summary, the securitization theory has been both praised and criticized. As noted above, McSweeney strongly disagrees with the societal security concept, which assumes that societies have one single identity. He warns that this conceptualization may increase prejudice against, and the exclusion of, other identity groups in a society and lead to conflict (McSweeney 1996: 87). He also notes that the assumed focus on identity threats fails to take into consideration the security concerns of the people who constitute the “society” (ibid.: 85). This criticism is discussed in the empirical analysis, which focuses on the perspective of organized Muslims. Williams (2003) defends the “securitization” approach because it allows for an analysis of the processes of construction of a single societal identity 29 The Copenhagen School is a special research project developed at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). Between 1985 and 2004, scholars such as Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Egbert Jahn, and Lene Hansen conducted collective research on security, which was theoretically informed and empirically oriented. (See C.A.S.E. Collective 2006.)

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under the condition of attempted securitization. The “speech act” of securitization aims to transform the fact that every society has multiple identities by creating the feeling of a single societal identity that is faced by a unifying threat. Williams argues that, according to the Copenhagen School, this process of securitization—that is, the act of dramatizing to turn any referent object into an extraordinary threat—is something to be avoided (ibid.: 523). The Copenhagen School criticizes the political act of manufacturing while arguing for a process of “de-securitization”. Huysmans, for example, argues that the threat scenarios can be unmade through a “sociology of everydayness” by de-dramatizing security questions by contextualizing them in a wider social, economic, and political problematique expressed in everyday practices (Huysmans 1998: 574, 588).

Williams, in a similar vein, criticizes the ethical implications of revoking a Schmittian understanding of politics, that is, the friend/enemy dichotomy inherent to the securitization theory. However, he also notes that this ethical problem is being resolved by focusing on the public, who has to judge the success of securitization attempts (Williams 2003: 515ff.). The public can challenge the definition power of the security professionals because “security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects” (Buzan et al. 1998: 31). Therefore, not all securitization attempts have to be successful. Aradau argues that it is an ethical political choice not to choose exceptional politics (2004: 393). The securitization theory has also been criticized for being limited to speech acts without taking into account the power of media and images in the production of security threats (Williams 2003: 524ff.). Although this research does not focus on the production process of securitization discourses (but on organizational responses to this process), it should be noted that the work of the Copenhagen School is a very important point of reference for security concepts. This research acknowledges McSweeney’s criticism that one has to take into account responses and identity choices of different groups of society because identity cannot be taken as a given fact in objectivist terms. Also in line with McSweeney (1996: 91), one could argue that it is more useful to employ the concepts of interests and legitimacy rather than those of identity and societal security when analyzing securitization strategies. The same holds for the responses to processes of securitization, which are subject to the empirical analysis presented in Chapters Five and Six.



the institutional environment135 The Media and the Islamization of the Security and Integration Debates

The media is an actor that is generally accused of promoting images of emerging ‘threats’. According to Bigo, the media and politicians on both the right and the left play on people’s fears by focusing on images of immigrants and minorities in relation to various issues such as demographic change, urban insecurity, the decline of social rights, Islam, transnationalism, and issues of (non-)proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Bigo 2001: 126; cf. also Butterwegge 1999). The Media Before and After 9/11 This section focuses specifically on the attention given by the media to the topic of Islam. In this regard, it should be noted that Islam had been portrayed in negative terms in the media long before the attacks of 9/11 (Cottle 2000; Klemm/Hörner 1993). In his study on the portrayal of Islam in Western media published in 2000, Hafez notes: There is a strong tendency in Western mass media to characterize Islam as a fanatic and violent religion cutting-off hands, repressing women, and representing a clear antagonism towards Western ideas of freedom, human rights and democracy. Islam is equated with politics (a); Islamic politics is equated with fundamentalism (b); fundamentalism with terrorism (c); and political violence is interpreted without taking into consideration its social and political context (d) (Hafez 2000b: 5).

Sander describes the portrayal of Islam in Western media prior to 9/11 as “negative, stereotypical, ethnocentric, xenophobic, orientalistic and focused on violence and terrorism” (2006: 811), noting that the media studies that focus on the post-September 11 period “do not seem to indicate any improvement” (ibid.; cf. also Allen/Nielsen 2002; Karim 2002; Zelizer/ Allan 2002). Sander’s own study with 176 respondents from the Muslim community in Gothenburg, Sweden, indicates that 89% of respondents experience the media coverage of Islam and Muslims after 9/11 as “much more negative” or “somewhat more negative” (Sander 2006: 816). Various studies have been conducted on the situation in Germany.30 A study by Ruhrmann, Sommer and Ulemann concludes that the negative image of migrants in the media has been increasingly associated with terrorism since 9/11: “More than 35% of all TV news dealing with immigrants 30 For an overview on studies see Hess-Lüttich (2003); for an overview of quantitative and qualitative press studies and TV analyses see Müller (2005); case studies are presented in Hafez (2002a; b); Klemm/Hörner (1993), and Schiffer (2005a; b; c).

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is about terrorism, which is the most frequent topic category” (Ruhrmann et al. 2006: 47). The analysis was based on 285 news reports from daily news shows on four German TV stations (ARD, ZDF, RTL, Sat.1) broadcast between January and December 2003. The new focus on “terrorisms” is made evident by the comparative analysis of press statements issued between 1995 and 1999, and the TV reports on this topic broadcast in 2003, which focus explicitly on migrants. Between 1995 and 1999, 0% of press statements were concerned with “terrorism”. In 2003 about 23% of TV news reports on migrants were related to terrorism, with another 45% focusing on crime-related issues. Comparable results with a focus on Muslim representation in the media can be found in the study conducted by Halm (2006b) for the ZfT, which analyzes the content of the popular weekly magazine Der Spiegel and Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ), the most-read daily newspaper across social classes. It is remarkable that the link between Muslims and terrorism dominates the reports in the two publications both in the period before (11-Sep-2000–11-Sep-2001) and after 9/11 (29-Sep-2003–29-Sep-2004) (rank one with an increasing number of references). The increase is more

Table 8: References to Islam in Der Spiegel and WAZ (share of the five most frequently mentioned items). Der Spiegel (weekly magazine)

WAZ (daily newspaper)

11.09.2000– 29.09.2003– 11.09.2000– 29.09.2003– 11.09.2001 29.09.2004 11.09.2001 29.09.2004 1. Exclusion 2. Emphasis on danger 3. Irreconcilability of Islam and the West 4. Non-critical/ positive discourse 5. Other/ not-definable

17.2 26.4

29.0 33.5

16.9 20.6

21.6 37.7

8.2

4.3

10.0

2.7

44.8

26.9

46.1

34.3

3.4

6.3

6.4

3.7

   408

    1043

N =  379

  935

Source: based on Halm 2006b: 28 (translation KRW).



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dramatic in Der Spiegel, with up to 31.3% of reports in 2003–2004 dealing with Islam and Muslims in relation to terrorism reports, albeit without necessarily drawing a direct correlation between the two (Halm 2006b: 19). Other dominant themes include the portrayal of Muslims as victims (mostly in relation to the Kosovo conflict) and the argument that “Muslims are different in a negative sense” (ranks two and three in Der Spiegel in both years). According to Halm (2006b), the media discourse reflects the parliamentary debate on the trend toward negative reports on Muslims (see the following section). Before 9/11 some 45% of portrayals in the two analyzed print sources were positive. By 2003–2004, only 34.3% of reports in the WAZ and 26.9% of reports in Der Spiegel portrayed Muslims in positive terms (see Table 8). At the same time, the percentage of reports which focused on exclusion of Muslims increased from 16.9% to 21.6% in the WAZ and from 17.2% to 29.0% in Der Spiegel. The percentage of reports which emphasized the threat of Islam also increased, from 20.6% to 37.7% in the WAZ and from 26.4% to 33.5% in Der Spiegel. It must be noted that the absolute number of positive references also increased in the two publications, due to the total increase in the number of relevant items, which more than doubled in both periods. The results of an analysis of visual aids used in Der Spiegel presented in Halm 2006b confirms this negative trend. In the 2000–2001 period most images showed politicians, aspects of Islamic culture, and Muslims as victims of violence. In 2003–2004, by contrast, the ranking shows a different picture: (1) Muslims as aggressors and terrorists; (2) non-Muslims as victims of Muslims, and (3) veiled women. Most studies indicate that immigrants in general and Islam in particular were portrayed in negative terms in the media before 9/11. However, the discriminatory trend has been accelerated since the attacks (Ruhrmann et al. 2006). One striking example is the use of archive footage of celebrating Palestinians filmed in 1990, who were accused of celebrating the 9/11 attacks. Ateş argues that this old footage was used across the world in the wake of 9/11 propaganda efforts to create the images of “Islamic fundamentalists” as the new enemies who replace the “Communist threat” (Ateş 2006: 157, 166; see also Huysmans 1998: 569). As a result of this development, the fear of Islamism has become a dominant theme in the media. Junge (2003) concludes that in the month after 9/11 the search for explanations of the attacks in three major German newspapers focused primarily on the cultural differences between the

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Western world and Islam, with particular emphasis placed on the security discourse. In her critical analysis of “Islam in German media”, Schiffer also notes that the categorization of events within a “framework, which equates Islam with a ‘problem’” has increased since 9/11 (Schiffer 2008: 423; cf. also Schiffer 2005; a; b; c). This strategy includes references to examples that are supposed to serve as proof and facts, and the use of visual aids that evoke a negative image without explaining the context. Schiffer also criticizes the use of metaphors such as disease-related terms in connection with Islamism (a term which is all too often used interchangeably with ‘Islam’), and the crisis orientation of the media that neglects less sensational topics. On the whole, the use of symbols leads to the reinforcement of negative stereotypes. One example is the change in the connotation of the word ‘mosque’ from a place of worship to a place of conspiracy, which was caused by frequent front page reports on police raids, while the fact that these raids did not turn up any evidence was either reported in the back pages of the newspapers or left unreported (Schiffer 2008: 432). Schiffer notes that the media still manages to present this heterogeneous group as a “homogeneous mass, threatening or at the very least backwards” (ibid.: 424), despite the fact that there are 1.2 billion Muslims living in various countries and continents. Linkages to Xenophobia There are many similarities between the debates about Islam and Muslims in the media and reports which voice xenophobic sentiments against immigrants in general. Karakaşoğlu et al. (2006: 164f.) present a convincing list of similarities between the lines of argumentation, along with the sources that analyze each of these tendencies: The use of frightening metaphors like “waves or flood of migrants” (cf. Böke 1997).  The exclusive division into them and us (cf., e.g. Mannitz/Schiffauer 2004).  The generalization and thus neglect of diversity within the Muslim groups.  The use of assertive cues and induction, i.e. the surrounding texts can influence the perception of a text on Islam, which holds even more true with regard to images (cf. Schiffer 2005a).  Stereotyping of Islam and Muslims, especially, but not only women (cf., e.g. Pinn/Wehner 1995).  The connection of several topics, i.e. religion and terrorism.



the institutional environment139  The use of Turkish or Arabic names and notations where this is of no specific informative interest with respect to the news presented (cf. Schiffer 2005a).  The limitation of Muslim migrants to only a few roles, such as mainly offender or victim.

According to Karakaşoğlu et al., the German media does not display racist hostility toward Muslims, nor are Muslims openly discriminated against, but generalizations based on negative statements or events are frequently found in the media (2006: 165). Media reports in Germany may not be openly racist, but they have negative undertones and imply negative attitudes which are believed to be better able to influence public opinion than open racism. Migrants are often portrayed in negative terms in the German media, which is not sufficiently compensated for by positive or in-depth reports that show migrants as active agents rather than as a “burden for society” (Müller 2005: 100ff., 112). In his overview of existing media content analyses, Ruhrmann notes that the media portrays a negative image of “foreign” workers, which is often associated with aspects of delinquency (1999: 101), while the daily life of Muslims is almost never discussed in the media (Karakaşoğlu et al. 2006: 156, 164; Butterwegge 1999: 69). HessLüttich complains that the host society applies its own criteria to immigrants and constructs simplistic monocausalities (2003: 95). With regard to media reports on Islamic organizations, Karakaşoğlu et al. (2006: 165) complain that many journalists use metaphors such as ‘a wolf in sheep’s clothing’ to refer to religious political organizations, an image that has also been popularized by reports of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Other authors such as Dantschke also openly criticize these organizations, particularly the Islamic Community Millî Görüş, for using lawsuits and restraining orders to actively suppress the freedom of the press (Dantschke 2004). The Influence of the Media Several media analyses which examine the influence of the media on the users refer to the media as the “Fourth Power”, which exerts a strong influence on the public opinion and the attitude of the public toward migrants (Jäger/Link 1993; Schultz 1998). This is particularly true of Muslim migrants because Germans and Muslims are rarely in contact with one another (Ateş 2006). Allen and Nielsen note that “as a whole, there is little evidence to conclude comprehensively whether the media impacted either positively or

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negatively” after 9/11, and that negative stereotypes exist of Islam which may even lead to a “naturalization” of Islamophobia in the media (Allen/ Nielsen 2002: 50). However, the authors also mention various responsible reports and show that no acts of aggression or changes in attitudes have been caused directly by the media (ibid.: 53). This debate reflects the debates about how to measure media influ­ ence  on users in the literature. In her review of the existing litera­ ture,  Weber-Menges concludes that the research on media influence (Medienwirkungsforschung) has not yet developed a general theory which provides definitive answers (Weber-Menges 2005: 128). Still, Allen and Nielsen’s conclusion regarding the representation of Muslims in the mass media appears doubtful given that the media actively structures our perception of events and the list of negative stereotypes associated with the representation of Islam in the media, as discussed above. It therefore seems unlikely that these negative stereotypes can remain unnoticed by the general public. According to Weber-Menges, such an influence would be particularly high with uncritical users and people who have no personal experiences with migrants in general and Muslims in particular (2005: 174). The following section discusses whether this assumption is confirmed by survey results. Attitudes toward Muslims in National and International Contexts This section discusses the public attitudes toward Muslims before and after 9/11. For this purpose, a brief overview of international research results is given, and the attitudes of the German population toward Muslims are discussed and contrasted with experiences of immigrants, with a special focus on the Muslim community. International Studies According to Halliday, the events of September 11, 2001 had a greater effect on various areas of life than any other international crisis in history, including political, economic, cultural, psychological effects (2002: 31). In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USA, surveys and studies have been conducted in many countries to measure the impact of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks such as the attacks on the public transportation systems in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005). These studies focus on members of the host society and their attitudes toward foreigners (e.g., European Commission 2001, PEW 2011b), but also discuss the responses of immigrant groups. In addition, researchers in various



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countries focused specifically on the responses of Muslim immigrants and their experiences of discrimination in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks (EUMC 2005; Hopkins 2007; Khalema/Wannas-Jones 2003; Peek 2003; Sander 2006). In his study on Muslim students in New York City campuses, which examines the question of discrimination against Muslims, Peek concludes that those who are perceived to be of Muslim faith, increasingly “became the victims of discrimination, harassment, racial and religious profiling, and verbal and physical assault” (2003: 271). Hopkins reaches a similar conclusion, noting that Muslims in Scotland have also experienced increasing levels of harassment, violence and scrutiny since 11 September 2001, particularly during the months shortly following the events (2007: 191).

In his study on young Muslim men, Hopkins highlights the insecurity of the street as the place of expected and experienced racism, which has led to changes in the daily habits regarding the “access to and use of the mosque, peer-group and leisure activities” of the young Muslim men (ibid.: 196). In his study on ‘Experiences of Swedish Muslims after the Terror Attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001’, Sander notes that 90% of the 176 respondents interviewed between the end of September and December 2001 believe that the attitudes of non-Muslim Swedes toward Islam and Muslims have become “much more negative” or “somewhat more negative”. 90% of respondents also stated that the Muslims in Sweden have been the target of discrimination to “a much increased extent” or in a “somewhat increased extent” after 9/11, while only 65% noticed an increase in their personal experiences of discrimination (Sander 2006: 815ff.). The study also concludes that the more an individual or an orga­ nization  was visually identifiable with traditional Islamic or Muslim religion or culture, the more they were targeted (ibid.: 821).31 This conclusion is shared both by Hopkins (2007: 196) and Allen and Nielsen’s summary report on the EU-15 nation states prepared for the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (Allen/Nielsen 2002: 35ff.).

31 The study is based on 176 questionnaires completed by the Muslim community in the Gothenburg area between the end of September and December 2001.

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The hijab for women, the beard and headgear for men (the turban in particular), are visual identifiers that have led to increased discrimination. Visually identifiable mosques, Islamic schools, and cultural centers have also become targets of aggression and violence. Muslims are the primary victims, but other ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities are also discriminated against, particularly if they can be mistaken for Muslims due to the way they dress, the most prominent group in Europe being the Sikh population (ibid.). With regard to the attitudes of the host population toward immigrants in general and Muslims in particular, the 15 national focal points of the EUMC also observed a general increase in ethnic xenophobia in the three months after 9/11, along with fear and greater awareness of existing prejudices (Allen/Nielsen 2002: 6). The summary report states: Muslims became more vulnerable, which is a situation that probably remains true in the contemporary context with international tensions and uncertainties relating to the ongoing ‘war against terrorism’ being very high in the consciousness of many in the West (ibid.: 39).

The Situation in Germany An EUMC report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001 states that Germany did experience a rise in Islamophobia after the terrorist attacks of September 11, but that it steadily decreased until the end of 2001. Muslim women and children were the most common targets of verbal abuse, while Islamic organizations also recorded murder and bomb threats (ibid.: 19). In this context, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (2003: 2) complains that none of the existing surveys, such as the biennial ALLBUS survey, measures the attitude of the German population toward Islam. In his study ‘What do Germans think of Islam?’, he therefore uses a survey conducted among 2,000 German citizens by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in December 2002, according to which Germans can be described as openminded to Islam. The right to practice the Muslim faith is not questioned, and the majority (63%) would not feel disturbed by a mosque in the neighborhood. 76% do not agree with the statement that Germany is a Christian country where Muslim customs have no place, and only 20% are against Islamic religious instruction in German schools. Prejudice is more common among persons with lower educational levels, workers, unemployed people, retirees, and people over 60 (WilamowitzMoellendorff 2003: 14). Prejudices are more dominant in the Eastern



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German states, where direct contact with Muslims is much rarer in those areas. The author agrees with Weber-Menges (2005: 174) that existing contacts lead to a more tolerant attitude, a finding that applies to all regions, despite the fact that most respondents who come in contact with Muslims live in the Western parts of Germany. In their analysis of GMF-survey data regarding group-related xenophobia, Leibold and Kühnel (2003; 2008) show that Islamophobia in the German society is stronger with regard to the cultural concept of Islam. The rejection of Muslims is less significant, but has increased between 2003 and 2007. In 2003 26.5% of the 2,600 respondents stated that Muslim immigration should be restricted. In the 2007 survey with 1,700 respondents, 29% of respondents held this opinion. In 2003 31% stated that they sometimes feel like a foreigner in their own country due to the number of Muslims. By 2007, the percentage had increased to 39%. In response to the questions that measure the cultural distance and the cultural devaluation of Islam, 66% denied in 2003 that Islam is quite compatible with our Western world. By 2007, the percentage had decreased to 61%. The percentage of respondents who did not feel that “Islam has developed an admirable culture” increased from 37% in 2003 to 44% in 2007. The authors assert that, like the media, most respondents associated Islam and Muslims with terrorism. However, similar to the twofold conclusion drawn concerning the opinion of the German population, a recent survey conducted by the ZfT in 2005 also produces differentiated results with regard to the opinions of the Turkish population concerning the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany. 73.7% of respondents of Turkish descent answered in the negative when asked whether it is difficult “for you personally to live as a Moslem in Germany, that is, in a country influenced by Christianity” (Halm 2006a: 35, translation KRW) Of these, 55.5% stated that it is “not difficult at all”, with 18.2% finding it “not particularly difficult” (ibid.). A similarly positive result is found regarding the perceived understanding for Muslim religious practices in various situations. In official settings (agencies, public service institutions), the level of perceived understanding for Muslim religious practices was about 90% in 2000 and 2005. The lowest level of understanding is observed at the job level, where some 79% of respondents stated that they experience sympathy, while the level of nonunderstanding rose from 10.8% to 15.3%. In personal settings, the rate of non-understanding among Germans rose slightly from about 5% to about 10% (neighbors and friends).

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In 2005 53% of the interviewed Turkish immigrants felt a negative impact on the coexistence of Christians and Muslims in Germany due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The Iraq War and the war in Afghanistan were regarded as a disturbance by 43.9% and 39.2%, respectively (Halm 2006a). According to Sauer (2007: 141), many respondents also felt treated unfairly in their everyday lives compared to Germans (65% in 1999, 80% in 2002 and 2003, but only 72% in 2006). A study based on a survey among 159 Muslim leaders in six Western European countries by Klausen comes to the conclusion that 32% of the 45 German respondents were dissatisfied with the treatment of Muslims. 85% believe that there were “many special problems for Muslims” (2005: 54). Both results represent the highest levels in the cross-national context, which indicates significant dissatisfaction among the interviewed Muslim leaders in Germany. On the whole, the above-mentioned results provide a differentiated picture of the discrimination of Muslims in Europe. Xenophobic tendencies exist, particularly toward Islam as such, while mistrust of Muslims is less pronounced (Leibold/Kühnel 2003). At the same time, the perceived level of discrimination in the everyday lives of Muslims rose to 80% in 2002/2003 and declined thereafter (Sauer 2007). Nevertheless, the Turkish community also experiences a high degree of understanding for their religious practices, particularly in public settings in Germany, that is not altered by the developments during the period 2001–2005 (Halm 2006a). However, the question remains: To what extent do these developments influence Islamic organizations? Does the analyzed negative portrayal of Islam in the public and media debates increase the pressure on the organizations to justify and legitimize themselves? The Normative Dimension: The Political Discourse and the Expectations Faced by Islamic Organizations in Germany According to Scott’s concept of institutional pillars (1995), a distinction can be made between a regulative, a normative, and a cognitive dimension, which make up or support institutions. The political level is situated at the normative dimension of the institutional environment because it is argued that its expectations and discourses are morally governed by the logic of appropriateness and social obligation rather than by taken-forgrantedness and orthodoxy.



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In order to narrow down the research question, the multitude of changes in the environment are summarized in the form of five key political expectations that are derived from key political documents. The political level is selected as a reference point because the German government is regarded as one of the main actors in the organizational field which confront Islamic umbrella organization with certain expectations. Expectations set by the media and the general public are often associated with the normative political expectations discussed below. The following section describes the changes in the political debate about Islam since 9/11, and provides a brief discussion of the German Leitkultur debate. Then, five political expectations are derived from a number of political documents published between 2005 and 2008. The organizational responses to these expectations are analyzed in the three organizational case studies presented Chapter Five. The Political Discourse on Questions of Islam and Integration Before and Since 9/11 During the 1980s Germany treated Islam as a cultural element of the migrants’ country of origin. “Being a Muslim was not identified as a religious matter in Germany (in contrast to France, for example)” (Tietze 2008: 219). The religious needs of Muslims were thus considered to be a matter of the country of origin. Consequently, Islamic religious education was provided in Turkish language classes offered during this period to facilitate the return of Turkish migrants. According to Tietze, this culturalized concept of Islam prevented its integration into German politics of religious governance as well as public and political discussions about Islam’s possible contribution to a religious diversification in Germany. Exclusionist tendencies towards ‘foreigners’ were also manifest in the restrictive citizenship law (in effect until the reform in 2000), which limited the number of immigrants who could become German citizens. The Political ‘Discovery’ of Islam The federal political level officially ‘discovered’ Islam shortly before the end of the 20th century. On June 15, 1999, the CDU and the CSU held a hearing in the German Parliament with representatives of Islamic umbrella organizations. Among the participants were representatives of ZMD, IRD, DITIB, and the Council of Turkish Citizens in Germany, as well

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as representatives of the main churches, politicians, other migrant organizations, and academics (IRH PR June 1999). The hearing was the first symbolic step toward the recognition of organized Muslims in Germany in that it placed them on the political agenda for the first time. The first hearing focused on the introduction of religious education in schools, but other questions regarding the legal status of Islam soon followed. In 2000 the German federal government issued a detailed answer to a major interpellation regarding the role of Islam in Germany (German Federal Government 2000), followed by a second statement regarding the legal status of Islam in Germany six years later (German Federal Government 2006). Both documents indicate the increasing attention paid to the role of Islam on the political agenda, which is also emphasized in the introductory remarks to the second interpellation, which gives the following signs of progress: pilot projects to introduce religious education for Muslims; university chairs for Islamic Studies; spiritual guidance in institutions, and arrangements for Islamic burial practices (ibid.: 4). In 2006 the government finally decided to formalize its relations with the Muslim community by initiating the first German Islam Conference (DIK) under the theme of “Muslims in Germany – German Muslims” (DIK no date). According to the government, the aim of the DIK is to create a broad consensus on compliance with social principles and politics of religion while emphasizing adherence to the principles of liberal democracy as enshrined in the German Constitution (German Federal Government 2006: 3, BMI 2007a). Laurence notes that this process of an attempted “nationalizing” of Islam is taking place in various European countries, and that after a period of “outsourcing”, a period of “incorporation” has begun, in which governments try to “reassert state sovereignty over transnational Muslim networks” (2006: 266). The ‘Leitkultur’ Debate and the Concepts of Integration and Assimilation The concepts of ‘parallel society’ and ‘Leitkultur’ (‘core culture’) used in the political debate express the expectation that foreigners should not isolate themselves in ethnic quarters, but integrate themselves into the German society. In particular the idea of a German ‘Leitkultur’, which requires adaptation to German values, follows the concept of assimilation, a term that was first used by the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s to describe a static concept of culture with regard to the host society, in which the immigrants are expected to lose their cultures and traditions in



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the U.S. “melting pot” (Hoerder et al. 2007: 48). However, the assimilation concept ignores the fact that the host society’s culture is constantly influenced and changed by immigration, which is promoted by the “mythos” (ibid.) of a homogeneous national culture. The argument that a Muslim parallel society has been established in Germany (mainly in larger cities) has been debated in various academic and non-academic texts which either confirm or deny its existence (Binswanger/Sipahioğlu 1988; Heitmeyer et al. 1997 vs. Halm/Sauer 2006). The politically coined term ‘parallel society’ suggests that immigrants actively and deliberately segregate, refuse to acquire basic cultural techniques (language, education) and thus provoke high rates of unemployment and require high rates of social assistance (Cyrus/Vogel 2005: 20).

Schiffauer (2008a) distinguishes between three lines of argumentation with regard to parallel societies, referring extensively to the work of Lanz (2007), according to whom the fact that ‘Leitkultur’ advocates imply a cultural conflict scenario between the West and Islam when referring to parallel societies is a new dimension in relation to older “ghetto discourses” (2007: 264, 276). According to Schiffauer (2008a), the first often-cited position holds that integration fails due to the establishment of parallel societies, which are regarded as being particularly prominent in Muslim communities. Spuler-Stegemann (2001: 221) notes that parallel societies are supported by an independent Islamic business sector, criticizing the ignorance of German politics of these issues. A second line of argumentation suggests that ethnic communities in immigrant countries are part of everyday life, which allows them to participate in societal life, rather than preventing participation. The economic benefit of ethnic plurality is emphasized, and migrants are characterized by the rational choice model of a Homo economicus. The third position, by contrast, criticizes the pessimistic and optimistic views, emphasizing instead the role of power and the responsibility of the majority society for the creation of parallel societies. All three positions differ in terms of the emphasis they place on the role of culture for society. While the first position would most likely agree with the arguments raised by the advocates of a German ‘Leitkultur’, the second position can be criticized for giving too little attention to cultural factors that influence everyday life. Throughout these debates about a ‘Leitkultur’ and ‘parallel societies’, one question remains: Exactly what is ‘a national culture’, and how can

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one refer to an ‘Islamic culture’ that is associated with immigrants (at least in Germany) when taking into account that communities and societies are made up of a diversity of people with different (national) backgrounds, opinions, values, and social positions? Schiffauer, in an attempt to resolve this dilemma, notes that we start to regard culture as a subject while ignoring its process character, its continuing flux and creation. With reference to Norbert Elias (1970; 1984), who describes a similar process of reification for the terms ‘society’ and ‘time’, Schiffauer points to the dilemma of actually defining the “core cultural values” that go beyond the acceptance of the Basic Law (2008a: 135ff.). Based on his ethnological studies of the Muslim immigrant communities in Germany, Schiffauer outlines the problems caused by the expectation to accept German values. He further argues that German values are automatically being adapted through contact with the German education system and the workplace. Yet another problem is the asymmetry implied in the term, which encourages assimilation to the majority society and the distancing from the cultural origin. This ignores the importance of the ancestral aspect and does not support those who discuss their culture of origin critically. The possibility of an “as well as” is ruled out by an “either/or” option, which diminishes the advantages of being a migrant since it does not appreciate their possible bridging function (Putnam 2000). Another discriminatory element is involved when the thought of a ‘Leitkultur’ is only raised in connection to migrants from the East and the South. Schiffauer (2008a: 111ff.) argues that the image of a network of cultures or a “network-culture” would make it much easier to accept the parallel existence of values and subcultures than the term ‘Leitkultur,’ provided that subcultures overlap and that there is no clear dividing line between them. Therefore, the various subcultures do not have to share certain values or opinions, as long as some of their members share the positions of another group. According to Schiffauer, this crosscutting of values can lead to a cultural identity that does not rely on “a solid common basis” (ibid.: 119, translation KRW). What is needed is an open dialogue with all actors that follow the law. This dialogue should ideally start with the acceptance of each other’s culture rather than with mistrust. Successful cooperation strengthens the integration-oriented actors in the communities and weakens those who demand complete segregation (ibid.: 124). The desire to promote the culture of origin in this process can be regarded as a natural desire to maintain one’s identity in the migration process. It should be respected, and the



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attempts of the immigrants to unite both cultures should be appreciated. In particular the second and third generations, who grew up in Germany, should be recognized as equal partners who can have an important bridging function. They should not automatically be viewed with suspicion if they get involved in more traditional country of origin-oriented activities and migrant organizations. The fact that this distrust nonetheless exists is stressed by Landman (2005: 587) and Tezcan (2003: 241), both of whom discuss the frequent use of the term taqīya, particularly in relation to Islamic organizations that are believed to hide their true intentions. Political Expectations Faced by Islamic Organizations It should be noted that institutional expectations are generally diffuse and mostly communicated indirectly between the political level and the organizational level. Few studies on the political level and its documents focus specifically on the role of Islam and Muslims in Germany. An EUMC report on the political responses to the 9/11 attacks in 15 European countries reaches a positive conclusion: The vast majority of politicians across the EU were immediate in providing a response to the attacks on the US. Many combined condemnation with a call for solidarity with Muslim communities in the West and for the need to differentiate between Muslims/Islam and terrorists/terrorism (Allen/ Nielsen 2002: 46).

However, when we look at the long-term political effects we find that there is also a negative side to the immediate responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks highlighted in this positive assessment, as the following analysis of the debates in the German Parliament before and after 9/11 shows. Shifting Responsibilities: Parliamentary Debates Before and After 9/11 In 2006 the ZfT conducted a detailed comparison of parliamentary debates held both between September 11, 2000 and September 11, 2001 and in the post-9/11 period from September 29, 2003 to September 29, 2004 (Halm 2006b). The number of items analyzed in each period increased from 275 in 2000–2001 to 401 in 2003–2004. The analysis reveals a trend toward more negative connotations of Islam in the parliamentary debates that focus on Muslims in Germany. While 73% of the topics of the 48 analyzed debates before 9/11 referred to positive aspects of Islam and its equal status in society, only 50% of the 44 relevant debates between 2003 and 2004 referred to positive aspects,

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while negative statements that focused on Islam as a “threat”, including notions of fear and terrorism, increased from 9.4% to 24.4%. These changes are very visible in the comparison of the five major issues mentioned in the parliamentary debates. Prior to 9/11, the four key arguments show a positive attitude toward Islam, and in only in 5.8% of the debates political actors mentioned that (some) Muslims are terrorists. In 2003–2004 this argument is made in no less than 10.5% of the debates, followed by the notion of Islam as a threat (7.7%). According to Halm (ibid.: 41), another major change concerns the lack of self-criticism among German politicians after 2001. This is reflected in the sharp decrease in the use of the item “Guilt of the (German) society regarding the non-integration of Muslims” from 9.1% to 1.7%. Consequently, the responsibility for non-integration is transferred to the immigrant communities. This is also reflected in the citizenship test and other measures in which newly arriving immigrants are now required to participate. Other disproportional changes include an increase in the number of debates in which Islam were associated with anti-Semitism from 0.4% to 5.0%, and a decline in the number of debates that emphasize religious tolerance from 17.8% to 4.7% (Halm 2006b: 18; see also Table 9 below). Table 9: The five most frequently mentioned items in parliamentary debates in Germany in 2000/01 and 2003/04. 11-Sep-2000–11-Sep-2001

29-Sep-2003-29-Sep-2004

1. General statements against religious discrimination (17.8%) 2. Call for a dialogue with Islam to prevent and educate (9.1%) 3. Guilt of the (German) society regarding the disintegration of Muslims (9.1%) 4. Islam is not the cause of, but the legitimation for extremism (6.2%) 5. Muslims as terrorists (5.8%)

1. Call for a dialogue with Islam to prevent and educate (14.7%) 2. Muslims as terrorists (10.5%)

N= 48

N = 44

Source: Halm 2006b: 16f. (translation KRW).

3. Islam as a threat (7.7%) 4. Only a few Muslims become terrorists (6.0%) 5. Muslims are anti-Semitic (5.0%)



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To address the lack of studies of the underlying political expecta­ tions,  this section uses the above observations to identify normative political expectations from a set of six key documents. These documents are selected to represent the federal political level, including various institutions, parties, and events that are characteristic of the latest developments. A) Coalition Agreement between the governing parties CDU, CSU, and SPD of November 11, 2005 (German Federal Government 2005a); B) First government policy statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel of November 30, 2005 (Merkel 2005a; b); C) Answer of the German government to the second major interpellation by the Green Party regarding Islam in Germany of June 29, 2006 (German Federal Government 2006); D) Online statement regarding the aims of the German Islam Conference (BMI 2006a); E) National Integration Plan based on the 2006 Integration Summit (German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration 2007b); F) Report on Migration and Integration published by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (2008a). The documents are analyzed with regard to the expectations political actors have of organized representatives of Muslims living in Germany. Due to the focus on the organizational level, expectations which institutions have of individuals are excluded, despite the fact that organizations are sometimes held responsible for the behavior of individual Muslims living in Germany. All passages that refer to the organizational level in particular (or to Islam in general) are collected. Then the statements are grouped and summarized into five general expectations. The following section introduces the political documents, their key points, and the relevant expectations. The Message of Six Key Political Documents (2005–2008) A) The title of the Coalition Agreement between the CDU, the CSU, and the SPD of November 11, 2005 is Working Together for Germany – With Courage and Compassion. A notable fact is that of the 226 pages of the German version only three pages deal with the topics of migration and integration

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under the heading of “Security for Citizens” (Sec. VIII). The topic “1.2 Managing Migration – Promoting Integration” is immediately introduced after the topic “1.1 Organizing Security”, and both chapters are subsumed under the heading of “1. Domestic Policy: Germany – A Safe and Free Country”. This categorization of topics sets the tone for the expectations with which Islamic organizations in Germany are confronted. In line with the political rhetoric discussed above, the Coalition Agreement focuses on the threat of Islamist terrorists and the strategies to defend the country against it. With reference to the Counter-TerrorismAct, possible amendments to the Penal Code are evaluated, “for instance provisions relating to the drumming up of support for terrorist organizations and activities” (German Federal Government 2005a: 111). In addition, the work of the Counter-Terrorism Center in Berlin is praised as a key step toward “improving the exchange of information in the fight against Islamist terrorism” (ibid.). Section 1.2, “Managing Migration – Promoting Integration”, only includes indirect references to Islamic organizations which mention plans to initiate “intensive dialogue” with “Muslims” and “Islam”. The dialogue with Islam is especially important in this connection. Within this context, clearly naming the differences which separate the partners in dialogue is a vital sign of mutual respect (ibid.: 112).

This statement implies the expectation that organizations which claim to speak for “the Islam” in Germany have to be organized and able to engage in such dialogue. They also have to accept the rules of conduct that require mutual respect and the right of the government to mention shortcomings, which are described as “differences”. One of the issues that must be discussed in this dialogue is equality of women and men. This includes the topic of forced marriage, which, according to the Coalition Agreement, will be made a punishable offense (ibid: 114). Migrant organizations in general are also presented as partners in the context of youth services for migrant children (ibid.: 113). B) The first government policy statement presented by Chancellor Angela Merkel in the German Bundestag on November 30, 2005 also pays relatively little attention to the topics of integration and immigration (Merkel 2005a; b). The Section on the “fight against extremism, racism and antiSemitism”32 refers to the German government’s support for civil society 32 In the English translation, the headings are omitted. For the German version see Merkel 2005b.



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initiatives that participate in this fight. At the same time, such support and German tolerance in general are linked to the expectation that the “German traditions and culture are cherished”. The Chancellor argues that “a sense of belonging” (“Heimat”) is important for each individual and the country as a whole, noting that “[p]arallel societies in which the fundamental values which govern life in our country are not respected do not fit into this line of thinking”. This line of argumentation emphasizes the importance of German traditions, a topic her party (the CDU) introduced in the form of the key term Leitkultur. Merkel’s speech continues with a reference to the necessity to learn German, the significance of the dialogue with Islam, and a strategy of zero tolerance to forced marriages and honor killings. Merkel’s speech confirms the statements of the Coalition Agreement, but it only emphasizes what German culture and tradition do not include, without explaining what they do include (cf. Schiffauer 2008a: 11). C) The answer of the German government to the second major interpellation by the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) regarding Islam in Germany is a response to 36 questions posed to the German federal government by the Green Party (German Federal Government 2006). In its introductory remarks, the Green Party emphasizes the need for dialogue with Muslim living in Germany. Unlike the documents mentioned in subsections A and B, this statement does not include demands directed at Muslim dialogue partners. Instead, the Green Party asks the German government to make credible efforts to grant Islam rights that are comparable to those of other religions in order to promote dialogue, asserting that integration requires continuous communication and cooperation with religious representatives. However, no mention is made of who should participate in this dialogue. As a response to this statement, the federal government stresses in its introductory remarks that the intercultural and interreligious dialogue is already envisaged in the Coalition Agreement, arguing that the aim of the DIK dialogue is to improve the integration of the Muslim population to prevent Islamism, extremism, and the segmentation of Muslims in Germany with the aim of creating representative structures of Islam in Germany, which are regarded as prerequisites for organizations to receive the status of a corporation of public law. The aim of the DIK is to create a broad consensus on compliance with social principles and politics of religion while emphasizing the adherence to the free democratic basic order (German Federal Government 2006: 3). This implies the expectation that the representatives invited to the DIK

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help to achieve this consensus and respect the principles of the German Constitution. With regard to the institutionalization of Islam in Germany, the government declares that it would appreciate it if the Muslim community established representative bodies on the federal and state levels which could function as points of contact. However, the government also notes that it has no means to influence this process of institutionalization due to the constitutionally guaranteed right to religious selfdetermination (ibid: 48). D) The online statement regarding the aims of the DIK summarizes the developments since the inaugural meeting on September 26, 2006 and the second meeting on May 2, 2007 (BMI 2006a). Like the documents cited above, the online statement indicates that the aim of the DIK is to promote dialogue with organized and non-organized Muslims, but also emphasizes that Muslims are expected to unquestioningly follow the principles of “Germany’s liberal democracy”: The goal of the conference is to improve religious and social integration of the Muslim population in Germany. The conference is based on an understanding of integration which recognizes cultural and religious differences while requiring the complete acceptance of Germany’s liberal democracy (BMI 2006a).

The reiteration of this requirement confirms the impression that the acceptance of democratic values cannot be taken for granted and therefore has to be requested of Muslims. This expectation goes hand in hand with the distinction between “political Islamism” and “Muslims who abide by the Basic Law” (verfassungstreue Muslime) introduced by the CDU, which has been used in public debates to emphasize the threat of lawbreaking Muslims (German Federal Parliament 2004). The online statement also associates the problems of second- and third-generation Muslims in Germany with the threat of ‘parallel societies’. According to Schiffer (2008), this can be seen as a “meaning-induction cut” which indirectly links two independent topics. Similar to the Coalition Agreement and Chancellor Merkel’s first government policy statement, the DIK statement cited below also links the topics of ‘parallel societies’ and ‘fundamentalism’ to Muslims in Germany and their representatives, who are expected to prevent these issues. Many immigrants from Muslim countries of origin are well integrated into German society. They live and work in Germany and have become an integral part of our culture and daily lives. However, some persons with an immigrant background face growing difficulties with integration. Young second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in particular are having



the institutional environment155 a harder time finding their way in school and in the labor market. In order to deal with the risk of developing “parallel societies” and prevent every form of fundamentalism, Federal Minister of the Interior Schäuble initiated the German Islam Conference as a long-term process of negotiation and communication between representatives of the German State and Muslims living in Germany (BMI 2006a).

E) The National Integration Plan – New Paths, New Opportunities is based on the first Integration Summit organized by the German government in 2006. The 200-page document was presented at the second Integration Summit on July 12 2007 (German Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration 2007b). The National Integration Plan is a joint document designed in cooperation with various actors from every social sphere who worked together in ten working groups. On the whole, the document does not draw much attention to the topic of Islam and Muslims in Germany. Of the five organizations invited to the DIK, only ZMD and DITIB participated. Their major contributions were on the subject of the “life situation of women and girls” (ibid.: 87ff.), which was also the section in which Islam is most frequently mentioned. In it, various participating non-governmental organizations agree to participate in informational activities regarding women’s rights, domestic violence, sexuality, health, old age, and forced marriage. Regard­ ing the latter, a differentiated picture is drawn which underlines the fact that forced marriage does not only occur in Muslim families and that the public debate led to general suspicion against marriages of Muslims, a trend which must be reversed. The organizations demand that more quantitative studies be conducted to combat this public stereotype. In this respect, the German federal government’ emphasis on the topic of forced marriage is indirectly criticized. Information campaigns by migrants for migrants are considered necessary to avoid a one-sided focus on forced marriages and other stigmatizing attributions, with particular emphasis placed on the female right of self-determination (ibid.: 90). Islam is also briefly mentioned in the sections on sports and the media, which provide examples of best practice. With regard to the question of institutional expectations, this document emphasizes the Integration Summit aim of “lending support while requiring migrants to do their bit” (EUNET 2007). The paragraph on forced marriages also shows that participation of Muslim representatives leads to a more nuanced debate, but it should also be noted that their input is limited to this subject area. F) The BMI report “Migration and Integration – Residence Law and Policy on Migration and Integration in Germany” (BMI 2008a) provides

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information about the legal foundation of the Immigration Act as well as structural data on specific groups and immigration in general. The 195page publication is available in English. Only two sections of the document mention Islam and Muslims in Germany. One page is devoted to the DIK, and the second section associates Islam with security concerns. The section on the DIK reiterates the “problematic” situation of Muslims in Germany. Although the first sentence acknowledges that most of the 3.4 million Muslim in Germany are well-integrated, the text continues to discuss issues such as “integration into economic/cultural and religious life”, “Islamist activities”, “a lack of education”, “social and emotional isolation”, and “so-called parallel societies” (ibid.: 108). These issues affect a large number of Muslims and are presented as a reason for the establishment of the DIK, the aim of which is to create “greater mutual understanding”. However, even the conference appears to focus primarily on conflicts, which are to be “acknowledged, addressed and overcome”. In this context, the issues are associated with security and Islamism again, with a reference to violent and legalistic Islamist activities, which are not defined or explained in more detail:33 The DIK also makes an important contribution to preventive security policy. It helps prevent both violent and legalistic Islamist activities, thereby helping to preserve the security and freedom of everyone in Germany regardless of their faith (BMI 2008a: 108f.).

Chapter 12, which focuses on security, is the second section that refers to Islam (ibid.: 156ff.). It begins with a definition of extremism, with a distinction made between left-wing and right-wing extremism and extremism by foreigners. This is followed by a section on Islamism, which is introduced with a reference to the constitutional protection of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 4 of the Basic Law. Here, the focus is on the organizational level, which is directly associated with the inflow of political refugees, the use of legal means to establish “Islamist conditions” in Germany, and the creation of an “Islamist parallel society” (see the passage quoted below). These topics are mentioned without further 33 The argument of a “legalistic” organizations is however explained further at the website of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution where it is stated: “A third category comprises organisations which, exploiting the instruments of the state of law (= legalist) are trying to impose Islamist positions in social life in Germany, as well, or at least to achieve freedom for organised Islamist activities in Germany and which are consequently contributing to disintegratingly establish an Islamist sub-society.” URL: http:// www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en_fields_of_work/islamism/ [last visited 08-May-2012].



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discussion. The accused organizations are not identified by name, which leaves much room for interpretation, particularly because there is a connection between this section and the establishment of the DIK discussed above, which is also intended to prevent ‘parallel societies’. The report fails to make a clear distinction between the goals of Islamic organizations and those of Islamist organizations, and images of a “threat scenario” are repeated in both sections on the legal and illegal activities of Muslims in Germany: Other Islamist organizations want to change society and the government in their home countries by violent means (terrorist activity or guerrilla war). Many of those who belong to these organizations have come to Germany as political refugees and try to provide logistical and propaganda support from Germany for the struggle in the crisis region, thus constituting a latent threat to their home countries’ facilities and interests in Germany. Further organizations exploit democratic means to establish Islamist conditions in German society or at least try to find openings for organized Islamist activity in Germany, thus working against state efforts at integration by trying to set up an Islamist parallel society (BMI 2008a: 157).

Five Political Expectations Faced by Islamic Umbrella Organizations The summary of key political documents issued between 2005 and 2008 identifies a number of frequently mentioned topics related to Islam in Germany. This includes the emphasis on the threat of violent and “legalistic” Islamist activities, the rejection of parallel societies, the focus on dialogue “with Islam” including its prerequisites such as the acceptance of German traditions and culture, and compliance with the legal order, social principles, and the politics of religion in Germany. This observation is consisent with Boukhars’ conclusion that throughout Europe, the public discourse has become more culturalist and policy responses are increasingly colored by ideology rather than much needed pragmatism (2009: 298).

The DIK was such a first step toward pragmatist solutions of Muslim claims, but now the decisions must be addressed at the level of the German federal states (cf. Busch/Goltz 2011; see also Chap. Six: Relations with the German Political Level). In order to analyze the relationship between the organization and its political environment, a set of institutional expectations is derived from the political documents, which are discussed in the empirical section that analyzes the strategies of three Islamic umbrella organizations with regard

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to the various expectations with which they are confronted. The following list focuses on the most frequently occurring expectations in the debates cited above. It should be noted that all five expectations are interconnected and often appear in the same statement. Here, they are presented as distinct entities to highlight different dimensions of arguments that are often used interchangeably:  1. To follow the law;  2. To denounce Islamism and terrorism;  3. To reject ‘parallel societies’ and to promote integration; 4. To adopt German values;  5. To organize and cooperate. The first expectation, “to follow the law”, refers primarily to the German constitutional order. However, there have been an increasing number of rules and laws regarding security issues that directly influence Islamic organizations since 9/11. These rules and laws are the focus of this research.34 The most severe sanction is the dissolution of religious organizations due to unconstitutional activities. A few organizations have been banned; others are being watched by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Detailed information about the activities of this agency is provided in the annual report on the protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutzbericht) (e.g., German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2010). The analysis of organizational documents reveals that many organizations respond to these developments by emphasizing their loyalty to the German Constitution in their bylaws, self-portrayals, and press statements. The second expectation, “to denounce Islamism and terrorism”, is implied in the repeated reference to an “Islamist threat”. The expectation associates security concerns with the need to protect the German Constitution against Islamists whose aim is to establish their own norms and laws in Germany (BMI 2008a: 156ff; cf. Tezcan 2007: 68). This expectation includes a classification into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims by the government, which is expected to be publicly confirmed by organizational representatives who belong to the “law-abiding” segment of the Muslim population (German Federal Parliament 2004). This is a normative expectation which requires active organizational engagement that goes beyond 34 On the individual level, similar new laws on integration measures and immigration conditions were enacted which can be enforced through sanctions such as denial of entrance and citizenship. These changes are only mentioned briefly in this study.



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merely following the legal order. The Islamic umbrella organizations meet this requirement primarily by condemning any form of violence and by emphasizing that terrorism and Islam are unrelated. They also signed the progress report of the DIK, which asserts that a “serious threat of a terrorist attack in Germany exists that will be legitimated with reference to Islam” (BMI 2008c: 14). The third expectation, “to reject ‘parallel societies’ and to promote integration”, refers to civic engagement of organizations. Individuals are required to improve their German language skills, and the organizations are expected to get involved in the political and local community and to promote contact and understanding between their members and the host society. As a result, the Islamic organizations have been increasingly offering services that meet this expectation, including the initiation of, and participation in, interreligious and intercultural dialogue, the organization of events with various local partners, language courses and other measures to support the social and economic integration of their members. The fourth expectation, “to adopt German values”, is often seen from an “either/or” perspective rather than from an “as well as” perspective with regard to different cultural backgrounds. According to Chancellor Merkel (2005a), the idea of German culture and tradition must be “cherished”, and the organizations are required to “participate in forming a consensus on the compliance with social principals and politics of religion” (German Federal Government 2006: 3). However, in most cases this is not a process of negotiation but of adaptation, since the principles and values have already been established. The organizations criticize this assimilation rhetoric, and distance themselves from it, emphasizing their support for the German laws and value system established in the German Constitution, but also their willingness to promote integration (BMI 2009a: 7). At the same time, Islamic umbrella organizations are confronted with the expectation of some of their members to cultivate their traditions and identity in relation to their country of origin, a possible conflict that is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. The fifth expectation, “to organize and cooperate”, implies that the organizations are regarded as a partner in the political dialogue with Islam, which means that they have to be able to speak for others, choose responsible contacts, and fulfill the expectations mentioned above. The Islamic umbrella organizations are asked to perform a bridging function and to make efforts to extend the consensus reached at the federal level (in institutions such as the working groups for the National

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Integration Plan or the DIK) to their communities. The German government would appreciate more representative structures among the Muslim communities living in Germany, which could help to prevent a “segmentation of Muslims in Germany” (German Federal Government 2006: 48). It can be argued that the state actively encourages centralized structures. Laurence interprets these structures as a “reaction to the challenge of transnational religion” (2006: 259). The creation of the KRM in Germany in 2007, which includes the main four (Sunni) Islamic umbrella organizations that are also members of the DIK, can be interpreted as a response to this expectations (see Chap. Six: Relations with the German Political Level). Summary of the Changes in the German Institutional Environment As we have seen, the legislative changes since 9/11 have had direct influences on the situation of Muslims and their organizations in Germany, who have often been the targets of these new security measures, whether they approve of it or not. When summarizing possible impacts of the regulative dimension on the Islamic organizations, one must note that the three legal areas (religion, migration, and security) pose different challenges to the major Islamic umbrella organizations. While the Alevi AABF is already recognized as a religious community, other organizations are currently attempting to receive the related right to provide religious education in public schools. The various attempts and regional debates are addressed in more detail in Chapter Six. The changes to the migration and integration laws also have had consequences for Islamic organizations and their members, who feel targeted and discriminated against by some of the legal developments. Organi­ zations have criticized the laws governing German language acquisition, integration courses, naturalization tests, the necessity to prove economic self-sufficiency, the denial of dual citizenship for Turkish citizens, and the lack of local voting rights for TCNs, among other things. Chapters Five and Six show that IGMG played the most active role in the public protest against these legal changes. The KRM also issued a detailed legal critique of the changes to the Immigration Act and the EU-Directives Imple­ mentation Act (KRM PR 03-July-2007). Another example of public protest behavior was the boycott of the 2nd Integration Summit by DITIB and TGD in 2007.



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The new security legislation and its focus on Islamist terrorism also changed the expectations political actors have of Islamic umbrella organizations. IGMG had already been politically marginalized because it was being watched by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. After 9/11, however, all Islamic organizations have had to make public statements to overcome doubts about their stance on the fight against terrorism. The moral expectation to denounce terrorism and violence, which has become a taken-for-granted cultural norm, has been regularly met by the organizations as the press release analysis reveals (see Chap. Six: Relations with the Media). One example is the joint prayer of 13 Islamic umbrella organizations on September 11, 2006 to commemorate the victims of the 9/11 attacks (IGMG et al. PR 11-Sept-2006; cf. also KRM PR 07-Sept-2007). The second section on the cognitive dimension of the institutional environment has discussed a process of securitization and Islamization of integration and immigration debates. With regard to academic security discourses, media reports, and public attitudes since 9/11, it has been argued that the negative portrayal of Islam is not a new trend. Nonetheless, it has received increasing attention since the beginning of the 21st century. This finding is consistent with Schiffauer’s conclusion that the second generation is “doubly discriminated against both as immigrants and as Muslims” (2007b: 78). In response, Islamic organizations in Germany have been trying to combat negative stereotypes and to fight Islamophobia in their public outreach activities by repeatedly making statements concerning the denunciation of terrorism, the self-evident adherence to the Basic Law, and the compatibility between Western culture and Islamic norms. Another response to the overall increase in media attention following 9/11 was the professionalization of press departments, which is also reflected in the fact that the organizational websites are increasingly directed at the German public (cf. Chap. Five and Six). The third section of this chapter on the normative dimension has provided a review of the changes in the political debates since 9/11 and has identified five political expectations which describe the political climate in Germany with regard to the issue of integrating Islam into German society and related security concerns.35 In addition, it has presented a brief 35 The five political expectations are: to follow the law; to denounce Islamism and terrorism; to reject ‘parallel societies’ and to promote integration; to adopt German values, and to organize and cooperate.

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introduction of organizational responses to these expectations, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. In summary, the cooperation between the major Islamic umbrella organizations and the German government during the DIK and, in some cases, between the Islamic organizations and the security authorities36 indicates the importance attached to the normative expectation to cooperate. However, in 2010 the cooperation was discontinued because both IRD and ZMD refused to participate in the DIK II process (see Chap. Six: Relations with the German Political Level). There has also been increased cooperation among the organizations themselves, which had had limited contact before the establishment of the KRM due to organizational competition (cf. Chapter Six: Relations among Islamic Organizations). The foundation of the KRM and the official cooperation with the German government indicate that the organizations have been increasingly oriented toward meeting some of the political expectations. This finding is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s assumption of a homogeneous response due to culturally established expectations and rules established by actors on which the organizations depend, but also due to processes of professionalization and mimesis in the organizational field at times of insecurity. The empirical analysis presented in the next chapter focuses particularly on the internal struggles and the differences between the analyzed Islamic umbrella organizations with regard to responses to political expectations. The empirical fieldwork is presented with reference to the three organizational case studies of DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD (Chap. Five) and the overall organizational field (Chap. Six).

36 During the second DIK in 2007, a “Clearing Point” to coordinate and support cooperation projects between law enforcement agencies and Muslim organizations was established at the BAMF (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2008a: 30).

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INDIVIDUAL ORGANIZATION: A MICRO-PERSPECTIVE ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR OF THREE ISLAMIC UMBRELLA ORGANIZATIONS The aim of this study is to analyze the behavior of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany in the 21st century, with a particular focus on the underlying factors that promote and facilitate organizational developments. This does not include a judgment as to the validity of the organizations’ claim to speak for German Muslims. Rather, the purpose of this research is to understand their behavior and strategies from an analytical point of view, based on the research framework developed in Chapter Three, which assumes that Islamic organizations are confronted with diverse and at times conflicting expectations. Such expectations have already been discussed with reference to the German political level. The internal expectations as perceived by the interviewed organizational representatives are introduced in this chapter. All of the case studies presented here show that other actors in the organizational field also participate in the institutionalized discourse on organized Islam in Germany, which is why Chapter Six deals explicitly with the shifting relationships between Islamic organizations and other relevant actors in Germany such as the government, the law enforcement agencies, the churches, the media, the general public, and various actors outside Germany. However, before we focus on the meso-level of the organizational field, three case studies are presented which include a micro-level analysis of three Islamic umbrella organizations. The cases studies selected for this purpose are DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD, which presumably have slightly different characteristics with regard to their orientation toward the religious and the political spheres, and toward the countries of origin and settlement. It seems safe to say that differences also exist in member interests and the orientation of the organizations toward the German institutional environment. These are discussed in detail in the following case study analysis. This in-depth comparison of Islamic umbrella organizations improves our understanding of the differences between organizational structures, strategies, and trajectories, as well as their position in the organizational

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field. When we look at their specific tasks and choices since the beginning of the 21st century, it becomes clear that there is no such thing as ‘the Islamic umbrella organization’, nor is there any such thing as ‘the Islam in Germany’, as noted by Schiffauer (2003: 143). Based on the in-depth case studies, conclusions are drawn both regarding similarities and differences between the organizations with reference to the strategies of adaptation, decoupling, and protest, and the overall organizational trajectory. This analysis, which is based on a conceptual research framework inspired by organizational sociology, thus explores the dynamics of organizational behavior and its underlying motivations, which have not been the main focus of studies dealing with Islamic organizations. To present an overview of the variety of Islamic organizational actors and their members, this chapter first provides some facts and figures on the majority of Islamic organizations in Germany. It then presents and summarizes members interests for each of the three chosen case studies, as they are perceived by the interviewed organizational representatives. Following this, the three organizations—DITIB, IGMG and ZMD— are discussed in detail in alphabetical order. Finally, preliminary conclusions are drawn about their organizational characteristics and behavior. Chapter Six proceeds to present a more comprehensive analysis of their relationships within the organizational field (Chap. Six). .

Facts and Figures on Islamic organizations in Germany Currently 2,400 mosque communities exist in Germany. The majority of these belong to Turkish- Islamic organizations, mainly because of the infrastructural advantages that they have (i.e. an educated imam, the availability of written material, and help with bureaucratic problems). There are a number of unions which do not belong to a larger group or organization. It is estimated that about 15 percent of the Sunni Muslims are organized. There is no compulsory membership of these organizations and families can use the services and take part in the leisure activities they offer without being members (Şen 2008: 36).

The most recent survey of Muslim communities with prayer rooms (Gebetsräumlichkeiten) was conducted by the ZfT in 2011. It concludes that 2,342 such communities exist in Germany. Of these, 111 are Alevi Cem houses (Halm/Sauer 2012, Halm et al. 2012). 98% of the 1,141 interviewed communities have prayer rooms, 95% of the non-Alevi communities have separate prayer rooms for women, and 81% have additional rooms for



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other activities. However, only 29% of the communities own the facilities, while 22% receive income from renting out rooms. Only 12% of the nonAlevi Muslim communities have a representative mosque with a minaret (ibid.). None of the mosque building projects has received any federal or regional financial support from German authorities (German Federal Government 2006), and most Muslims in Germany are organized in registered associations (eingetragener Verein, e. V.) or foundations (Stiftungen). List of Islamic Organizations in Germany The major organizations with a Muslim immigration background are listed below in alphabetical order. The list, which is not intended to be exhaustive, only includes organizations with a religious background (for more details see Lemmen 2000; Spuler-Stegemann 2002). It must be noted that various studies have mentioned the significant number of mosque communities that are not linked to any of the Islamic organizations listed below (Chbib 2011; Hero/Krech/Zander 2008). AABF (Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu – Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e. V.).1 The Alevi community in Germany was founded in 1990 (Lemmen 2000). It has about 120 member associations and 20,000 registered members. Its regional associations have received the status of a religious community in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Berlin, and Bavaria, which allows them to offer religious education in state schools (DIK 2009; Sökefeld 2008a; b). AABF has participated in the DIK I (2006–2009) and the DIK II (since 2010). ADÜTDF (Avrupa Demokratik-Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonum – Föderation der Tükisch-Demokratischen Idealistenvereine in Europa e. V.).2 Founded in 1978, ADÜTDF is a nationalistic group with ties to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in Turkey. After the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the 1970s, the formerly political organization integrated Islam into its nationalistic concept of Turkey (Lemmen 2000: 55). In 1996 the organization adopted the name German Turkish Federation (ATF) (Almanya Türk Federasyo – Deutsche Türkische Föderation). ATF is also known as the “grey wolves” due to its symbol (Bozkurt). ATF is not a member of any Islamic umbrella organization. ATIB (Avrupa Türk-Islam Birligi – Türkisch-Islamische Union in Europa).3 Founded in 1988 under the name Union der Türkisch-Islamistischen 1 URL: http://alevi.com/de/ [last visited 27-May-2012]. 2 URL: http://www.turkfederasyon.com/ [last visited 27-May-2012]. 3 URL: www.atib.org (Turkish Version); http://www.atib.org/deutsch/ (very limited German version) [last visited 20-Apr-2012].

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chapter five Kulturvereine in Europa e. V. (Türk Islam Kültür Dernekleri Birligi / TIKDB), ATIB consists of associations that separated from ADÜTDF in 1987. It describes itself as a religious organization which also focuses on cultural, social, and educational matters (ATIB website; Lemmen 2000). ATIB is said to have between 8,000 and 10,000 members (Becker 2006). ATIB is a member of ZMD. DITIB (Diyanet Işeri Türk Islam Birliği – Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V.).4 DITIB was established in 1984. It has various ties to the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanglığı), which is part of the Turkish Prime Minister’s office (Seufert 1999a). With 896 member associations, DITIB is the largest umbrella organization in Germany. It is a member of the KRM and has participated in the DIK I and DIK II. EZP (Invitation to Paradise – Einladung zum Paradies e. V.).5 EZP is an organization based on Saudi Arabian Salafism. It is headed by Pierre Vogel, a native German who converted to Islam in 2002 at the age of 22. For a short time he studied in Mecca. He has been preaching Islam to a growing community of young Muslims since 2006, which has been watched critically by German authorities (DIK 2012). EZP is not linked to any Islamic umbrella organizations (Dantschke 2007; ufuq.de PR 12-Sept-2008). Jama’at un-Nur (Islamische Gemeinschaft Jama’at un-Nur e.V.).6 Jama’at unNur was established in Cologne in 1979. It is a religious reform movement which follows the doctrine of Said Nursi (1873–1960) and seeks to establish a traditional orthodox Islam in the framework of secular state systems (Lemmen 2000: 52). Its website lists 48 associated organizations. Jama’at unNur is a member of IRD. ICCB (Islami Cemaat ve Cemiyetler Birligi – Verband der Islamischen Vereine und Gemeinden e. V., “Kaplancis” or „Caliphate State“). ICCB was founded as a spin-off from IGMG (then called Islamic Union) by Cemaleddin Kaplan in 1984. Its aim was to establish a caliphate state (Kalifatstaat) in Turkey. After Cemaleddin’s Kaplan’s death in 1995, his son Metin Kaplan became the leader of the “Caliphate State” (Atacan 1999; Schiffauer 2000). In December 2001 the organization was banned in Germany due to its strong fundamentalist tendencies, and Metin Kaplan was convicted of incitement to murder (Zöller 2004: 490). IGD (Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland e.V.).7 The Islamic Community of Germany was founded under a different name in 1960. In 1967 it established the Islamic Center in Munich (IZM). IGD has associated communities in

4 URL: www.DITIB.de [last visited 20-Apr-2012]. 5 No direct URL for EZP is available anymore. Related URLs: http://pierrevogel.de/ and http://muslimtube.de/ [last visited 20-Apr-2012]. 6 URL: www.jamaatunnur.com [last visited 20-Apr-2012]. 7 URL: www.igd-online.de [last visited 04-June-2012].



the individual organization167 various German cities, most of which represent Arab Muslims living in Germany. The organization is watched by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and is accused of having ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2010). IGD is a member of ZMD and the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE).8 IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e. V.).9 The Islamic Community Millî Görüş was founded in 1995, but has existed under different names since 1976. IGMG claims to represent 514 mosque communities in Europe. 323 of these communities, which together have 34,000 members, are located in Germany (organizational profile). The organization is watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (2010) due to its links to Necmettin Erbakan and his parties in Turkey (cf. Lemmen 2000: 45; Schiffauer 2008b; 2010). IGMG is a member of IRD and KRM, and has participated in the DIK I. IGS (Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden Deutschland e. V.).10 The Islamic Community of Shiite Communities in Germany was founded in Hamburg on March 7, 2009. It regards itself as the only representative of the Shiite communities in Germany, which includes Shiites of Afghan, German, Iranian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, and Turkish origin (IGS PR 16-Mar-2009). The German Federal Government estimates the number of Shiites in Germany to be at 200,000 (2006: 6). IGS is not a member of any Islamic umbrella organization, but some of its members are represented by ZMD. IRD (Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e. V.).11 The Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1986. Its founding member VIKZ left the organization in 1988, while IGMG (then AMGT) joined IRD in 1990. IRD represents 30 member organizations, the largest being IGMG (DIK no date; Spuler-Stegemann 2002: 105ff.; Lemmen 2002b). IRD is an official member of KRM and participated in the DIK I. KRM (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland).12 The Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany was established on March 28, 2007. Its member organizations are the major Sunni umbrella organizations in Germany, including DITIB, IRD, VIKZ, and ZMD. The presidency changes every six months and alternates between its four member organizations. The KRM office is located at DITIB’s headquarters.

  8 URL: www.fioe.org [last visited 04-June-2012].   9 URL: www.igmg.de [last visited 04-June-2012]. 10 URL: www.igs-de.de [last visited 04-June-2012]. 11 URL: www.islamrat.de [last visited 04-June-2012]. 12 URL: www.koordinationsrat.de [last visited 04-June-2012].

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chapter five TJ (Tablighi Jama’at, Gemeinschaft der Verkündigung). The Society for Spreading Faith is a transnational Muslim movement from South Asia (mainly India and Pakistan) which arrived in Europe in 1940 (Faust 2000). It was founded by Maulawi Muhammad Ilyas (1885–1944) in India in 1926 and has 10 million followers worldwide. The first TJ organization in Germany was created in Frankfurt am Main in 1980 (ibid: 150). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution watches TJ because it is expected to have a “disintegrative and radicalizing” influence on Muslims in Germany. It estimates that the organization has 700 members in Germany (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2010: 238ff.). TJ describes itself as apolitical, but adheres to a conservative interpretation of the Qur’an (Dantschke 2007). TJ mosques are not officially linked to any Islamic umbrella organization in Germany. VIKZ (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e. V.).13 Founded in 1973, the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers is a Turkish Sunni organization whose members practice Sufism (Islamic mysticism), which is related to the Sufi Naqschibandiyya order. VIKZ follows the teachings of the Turkish religious leader Süleyman [Hilmi Tunahan] Efendi, who died in 1959 (Jonker 2002a). Some 300 mosque communities with 21,000 members and 80,000 community members are affiliated to VIKZ (Spuler-Stegemann 2001: 221). The organization was once a member of IRD and, later, of ZMD. Currently it is only a member of KRM. VIKZ participated in the DIK I and II. ZMaD (Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland e. V., ZMaD). The Central Council of Moroccans in Germany was only recently founded in 2008. According to Brandt (2011) it represents 47 communities and members while being linked to 150 Moroccan mosque communities in Germany that are established by the estimated 180,000 Moroccans. ZMaD has ties to the Moroccan Ministry of Religions Affairs and to the Hassan II Foundation. The former supports the organization financially and aids in the selection of imams who are send to Germany (ibid.). ZMaD is not a member of another Islamic umbrella organization but has participated in the DIK II. ZMD (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e. V.).14 Founded in 1994, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany is the successor umbrella organization of the Islamic Working Group in Germany (Islamischer Arbeitskreis in Deutschland, IAK), which included the Turkish organizations DITIB, IGMG, and VIKZ. None of these organizations are a member of ZMD, which represents 18 Islamic organizations. Its member organizations are multi-ethnic and include Shiite communities (Lemmen 2002a: 88ff.) ZMD is a member of KRM and participated in the DIK I.

13 URL: www.vikz.de [last visited 04-June-2012]. 14 URL: www.islam.de or www.zentralrat.de [last visited 04-June-2012].



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Issues Concerning Membership and Representativeness of Islamic Organizations There are various terms used to describe the different types of Islamic organizations in Germany. In this chapter, a distinction is made between single associations (Einzelverbände), which are also referred to as mosque communities and umbrella organizations (Dachverbände) that join several single organizations and even umbrella organizations. Şen (2008) calls umbrella organizations ‘peak’ or ‘head organizations’, which according to him include IRD and ZMD. In 2007 IRD, ZMD, DITIB, and VIKZ founded the KRM, which is thus the main peak organization in Germany although it is not officially recognized as such by the political level. One reason that is linked to this low rate of political legitimacy is the fact that KRM does not include the relatively large community of Alevi Turks (480,000–551,500, or 13% of the Muslim population of Germany,15 the South/South-East Asian Ahmadis (2%), and the mystic Sufi Dervishes (0.1%) (Haug et al. 2009: 83, 97; see also Spuler-Stegemann 2001: 221). However, some of the Shiite Muslims (7%) are represented by ZMD. The Alevis formed their own union (AABF), which does not represent Alevi organizations with ties to the C.e.m. foundation16 because the latter supports the positions of the Turkish Diyanet, which AABF opposes (Lemmen 2002a: 60f.). The C.e.m. foundations cooperate more closely with IRD and   ZMD, while contacts between KRM and AABF are limited to the DIK,  to which AABF is invited as the main representative of the Alevi community. With regard to the issue of diversity of the Muslim community, it must be noted that “the current perception of Muslims being a homogeneous group of people with a strong religious affiliation is simply wrong” (Rohe 2008: 51). This also refers to the non-organized Muslims and the various local mosque communities that are not affiliated with any of the umbrella organizations mentioned above (see Chbib 2011). The local diversity of 15 The figures are estimates based on the most recent studies conducted by the BAMF in 2008 (Muslim life in Germany), and are pretty much the same as those presented in older studies. Heitmeyer et al. (1997: 46) notes that 13% of the Muslim population of Germany are Alevi, and according to Worbs/Heckmann (2004: 142) and Meng (2004), 11.5% or 11.3% respectively are Alevis. Spuler-Stegemann estimates the total number of Alevis living in Germany in 2001 to be between 400,000 and 600,000 (2001: 221), and according to Rohe, there are 500,000 Alevis living in Germany (2008: 48). 16 C.e.m. is the abbreviation of Cumhuriyetci Egitim Merkezi, meaning “headquarters for republican education” (AAGB PR no date).

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organized and non-organized Muslims cannot be covered in this analysis, but would merit further research. Another reason for the political tensions over the question of whether Islamic umbrella organizations in general and KRM in particular can represent and speak for the organized Muslims living in Germany is their relatively low number of formal members. The low membership rates can be related to the institutional structures of Islam, which differ from the hierarchical organizational structures of Christian denominations. Islamic organizations in Germany do not require formal membership or formal initiation rites to receive services (Lemmen 2002a: 9). In fact, “one belongs to Islam through sheer belief”, and Islam plays a central role in a believer’s daily life (Şen 2008: 35). Different Islamic rules and regulations on how to practice religion exist, but all of them share “the Qur’an, the five pillars, the heritage of Prophet Mohammed as interpreted (sunna and hadith) by Muslim scholars” (ibid.). The Alevi community differs significantly from this generalization because some Alevis do not regard Alevism as being part of Islam (cf. Sökefeld 2008b: 93ff.). The largest number of formal members of a mosque or umbrella organizations of all Muslims in Germany has been provided by the ZfT, which concludes that 36% of the 2,066 interviewed Turkish immigrants are members of a religious organization (most of them were DITIB members (72.2%), followed by IGMG (8.3%), VIKZ (4.5%), and ATIB (2.5%) (Şen 2008). In the same survey, 55% of respondents with a Turkish immigration background confirmed that they go to a specific mosque to pray or attend festivals.17 However, the German Federal Government estimates that 10–15% of Muslims in Germany are formal members of a religious organization, while nearly half a million Muslims attend Friday prayers (2006: 7ff.). This figure was recently updated by a BAMF study, which concludes that 20% of the Muslims living in Germany are members of a religious organization, a figure that is similar to the level of formal membership in religious organizations among the German population (19%) (Haug et al. 2009:

17 In their survey among 308 Muslim respondents aged 10–30 conducted in Kiel in 2004/05, Eilers, Seitz and Hirschler found that 29.9% were formal members. However, the question only referred to “sympathy for an association” because “usually it is only the head of the family who is registered in a Muslim club or association, although the entire family is de facto members of it” (Eilers et al. 2008: 112).



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167). No exact figures on membership statistics are available because Islamic organizations do not require formal registration. The degree of membership in an organization also differs in terms of religious orientation. 22% of Sunnis, but only 10% of Shiites and Alevis are formal members of a religious organization (Haug et al.: 168). The results for active organizational engagement are much lower (13.3% among Sunnis, 11.5% among Shiites, 6.9% among Alevis, and 23% among other groups such as Ahmadis and Ibadis). The results clearly show that organizations must recruit new members and maintain their legitimacy among their existing members. A final point should be made concerning the cross-border ties of the Islamic organizations. The Turkish organizations AABF, DITIB, IGMG, and VIKZ in particular have established cross-border networks (see Chap. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad; Pries/Sezgin 2012; Mügge 2011), which connect organizations in various countries of settlement to their country of origin. However, according to Koenig (2007a; b), their engagement on the European level is still limited, and none of the 36 confessional NGOs with a consultative status at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg is an Islamic organization. There are some transnational Muslim peak organizations in Brussels, such as the Council Musulman of Cooperation in Europe (CMCE), which was established as a lobby organization in 2003.18 ZMD is the only German organization among the 13 members of CMCE, with the former ZMD President Nadeem Elyas acting as the Vice President. However, Koenig concludes that compared to the influence of the Christian churches, the presence of Islamic organizations has been rather limited in both Brussels and Strasbourg (2007b: 922).

Summary This brief overview of the major Islamic organizations in Germany shows that diversity and membership influence the work of Islamic umbrella organizations. The diversity of the Muslim community and their organizations has led to a multitude of actors, the aim of which is to serve and represent Muslims living in Germany. Various Islamic umbrella organizations of numerous single associations have been created. Current debates on the official recognition of religious corporations of  public law attach great importance to the membership status of 18 URL: www.cmce-europe.eu [last visited 04-June-2012].

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organizations, which leads to structural and legitimacy problems for these organizations. Islamic umbrella organizations can neither claim to represent the majority of Muslims due to the large number of non-organized Muslims, nor can they provide the often requested membership figures due to the large number of mosque visitors who are not official members of any organization. Both issues are discussed in more detail in the case studies and the section on the government’s request of a “single phone number” for organized Muslims in Germany in Chapter Six: Relations with the German Political Level. Member Interests as Perceived by the Organizational Representatives As outlined in the research framework, this study assumes that organizational behavior is influenced by both external and internal expectations. The political expectations with which the Islamic umbrella organizations are confronted are discussed in Chapter Four. This section provides a description of the internal expectations with a special focus on tendencies that are considered important by the decision makers of the three analyzed Islamic organizations. Thus, particular attention is given to perceived internal expectations, which are derived from the interviews with the organizational representatives. Additionally, organizational documents are consulted that refer to internal expectations. To this aim, the main patterns of members’ interests are outlined for each organization, followed by a discussion of different interests in relation to age and gender aspects, which were frequently mentioned in the interviews with representatives from DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD. The resulting conflicts between internal and external expectations and possible coping strategies are analyzed in more detail in the organizational case studies. Organizational Patterns of Perceived Members’ Expectations The overview of the perspectives of the organizations on the interests of their members presented in this section follows the order of the three case studies, beginning with DITIB, followed by IGMG, and ending with ZMD. Each section summarizes the members’ interests from the point of view of the organizational representatives interviewed. The analysis also draws on relevant organizational documents that refer to the role and interests of individual or collective members of the organizations.



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DITIB’s Perspectives on Members’ Interests This section shows that internal members’ interests play an increasingly relevant role for DITIB. The organization has realized that it must diversify the services it provides to be able to satisfy its members. DITIB also has to meet the interests of its members in the preservation of a Turkish identity, while simultaneously meeting the requirement to promote the integration of its members into German society, a requirement that is set by both internal and external actors. Other member interests mentioned by DITIB representatives (see below) concern apprehension with regard to interference in Islamic affairs by the German government and the general fear of discrimination against Muslims, which has increased in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the related security debates. “Our Fellow Citizens Develop New Needs Every Day” We have to respond to the needs of our fellow citizen. Our responsibilities are not limited to counseling and supporting religious service. Every day our fellow citizens develop new needs to which we must respond. Our top priorities are to protect and conserve of our own identity, and to convey cultural and intangible values to our children and youths (DITIB PR 05-Sept-2007, translation KRW).

This press release quotes former DITIB President Arslan (2007–2011) during his visit to the general consul for Turkey in Germany. It relates to two important internal expectations. First, it is acknowledged that the members of the organization and their interests and needs play a relevant role for the DITIB headquarters. The statement quoted above clearly shows that DITIB can no longer keep its members interested in the organization by focusing exclusively on religious services. The resulting diversification of activities that go beyond religious services are discussed throughout the case study. It is interesting to note that members are called ‘fellow citizens’, a term that can refer to both the general German public and the Turkish citizens living in Germany, although it seems safe to say that a conversation between two Turkish civil servants at a Turkish embassy is more likely to refer to the latter. “The Protection and Conservation of Our Own Identity” DITIB also has an internal agenda that promotes the protection of a Turkish identity outside Turkey. This was one of the main reasons for the  establishment of the organization, and 25 years on, it still is one of its  priorities, as we can see from the press release quoted above.

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The Turkish identity question can be linked to the expectations of the  Diyanet, the Turkish government, and individual DITIB members, most of whom belong to the older generation that emigrated from Turkey 40 years ago. However, the rhetoric regarding a Turkish identity is used primarily in the context of Turkish organizations. It is not mentioned in any of the official organizational bylaws, nor in the interviews because it is in conflict with the political expectations with regard to integration and the adoption of German values. Like other migrant organizations, DITIB thus has to find a balance between country-of-origin- and country-of-settlementoriented patterns of organizational behavior. “The Fear that Germans Want to Reform Islam” The issue of members’ interests also becomes relevant in the context of DITIB’s increasing cooperation with the German government. Although DITIB has not encountered any internal struggles concerning its cooperation on the federal level, some uncertainty remains over the members’ interests. One of the things DITIB members are afraid of is “that, quote, unquote, ‘the Germans’ want to change Islam, want to reform it” (IN DITIB 1: 125). Although the interviewee emphasizes that this fear is unfounded, DITIB must still respond to it and therefore focuses on the protection of religious traditions and practices. “The Fear of Being Discredited” With regard to cooperation with the law enforcement agencies in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks, the interviewees stated that the DITIB community supported the “radical measurements” that were introduced (IN DITIB 1: 223). Internally, this cooperation, which is considered to be “very strong perhaps too strong”, is explained by a “phobia to be labeled as radical Muslims” (ibid.: 165). The interviews show that this fear of being discredited is most common among the heads of the mosque communities, who are afraid that they may be the next to be affected by mosque raids or discrimination: The fear is perhaps that we are the next. And I believe that to prevent this, as a precaution, so to speak, one simply takes sides with the governmental security agencies (ibid.: 179).

According to this interview, it is in the members’ interest to cooperate with law enforcement agencies such as the police. However, this development has been viewed critically by some. For example, the interviewee criticizes the underlying assumption of this cooperation that Muslims can



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pose a threat to Germany,19 which is regarded as “not very ethical” and technically a “self-accusation” (ibid.: 165, 199).20 IGMG’s Perspectives on Members’ Interests The members’ interests identified by IGMG representatives are even more fraught with conflict than those described for DITIB. A distinction can be made between three distinct but interconnected issues. First, conflicts between orientations toward the country of origin and orientations toward the country of settlement are also relevant for IGMG. This is often associated with generational differences among IGMG members. Second, there is an IGMG-specific dispute which concerns its organizational change of identity from a political organization to a religious organization. Third, conflicts exist between integrative attitudes and segregative attitudes in the IGMG community. All three lines of disputes (see below) are constitutive for the organization, which must first balance these internal interests before it can find solutions to meet external expectations. “The Interest in Turkey Is Vital, and We Maintain This Interest” Like DITIB, IGMG acknowledges that its increasing orientation toward various countries of settlement must go hand in hand with an organizational focus on Turkey. The fact that we are still predominantly Turkish citizens shows that the interest is actually vital, and we keep it vital because the relations with the country of origin must be kept alive because there is language competency that one should not neglect, a cultural competence because of a century-old history and where one would be like a fish out of water if one ended this tie (IN IGMG 1: 116).

Ties to Turkey are based on the Turkish language, culture, and history, as well as annual visits, but also on organizational relations with the Turkish state which are used to promote Turkish interests in Europe. Traditionally, however, IGMG’s orientation toward Turkey differs from DITIB patriotism, due to IGMG’s history of political opposition to the Turkish government 19 The progress report of the DIK discussion group on Islamism and security concludes that “in Germany a serious threat for a terrorist attack that is legitimized with reference to Islam exists”. The DIK participants agreed that it is their responsibility to prevent this threat and to promote the dialogue with the law enforcement agencies (BMI 2008c: 14f., translation KRW). 20 Similar arguments were made during the final declaration of the DIK I in 2009, albeit not by DITIB representatives but by IRD, which refused to sign the final DIK I declaration (see Chap. Six: Relations to the German Political Level).

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and its stronger orientation toward the global Ummah (ibid.: 91; see also Chap. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad). The internal tensions over orientations toward Germany and Turkey can be linked to a gap between the generations (see below). IGMG attempts to resolve these tensions by balancing of themes and interests: We believe that we have to find a balance. Care for the culture of origin and for the receiving culture, and, indeed, not to impose something. All our members must be able to decide where they want to stand. But, as I said before, we, the organizational representatives, always try to show this balance in the events and in the publications by reporting on topics from Germany and from Turkey (IN IGMG 2: 19).

“We Are Not a Political Party Anymore, We Are a Religious Community” The second organizational struggle concerns the division between political and religious interests of IGMG members. During the 1990s, IGMG was a highly politicized organization oriented toward the Islamic parties of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey, who was the Turkish Prime Minister from 1996 to 1997. However, changes in the political landscape in Turkey and Erbakan’s loss of power also led to changes in IGMG communities across Europe, which now define themselves as religious communities rather than as political activists (cf. Schiffauer 2010). Once again, the organization has to find a balance regarding its organizational identity due to the divergent members’ interests associated with this organizational development. This also requires an adjustment of its activities, as the following statement shows: In the past—by which I mean 1993, ’94, or ’95—the organization was much too political with regard to Turkey. But now, well, [now it is] religious. We now say that we are a religious community and we, but also the organizational members have internalized this, and we try to figure out what it means to be a religious community in Germany. Because this is a big difference, we are, so to speak, no longer a political party, but a religious community […]. As a religious community, we can of course talk about everything, but the way we act is different now (IN IGMG 2: 15).

“Skepticism About the Move to the Center of Society” Conflicts between integration-related and separation-related interests are another reoccurring theme mentioned by the IGMG representatives interviewed. The conflicts are not only based on generational differences, but are also linked to different attitudes toward the country of origin and the country of settlement. Criticism of and skepticism toward the German institutional system is frequently voiced within IGMG. However, the headquarters of IGMG and younger IGMG members in particular advocate an



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integrative strategy, a strategy that is closely associated with the term ‘at the center of society’, which is linked to issues of responsibility for one’s surroundings (Igmg.de: Standpoint on Parallel Society and Integration).21 The term thus contradicts certain discriminatory attitudes of the general public, who consider IGMG to be located at the margins of society or even in a ‘parallel society’. The quote below is a good summary of this internal struggle of members’ interests, a struggle that has been going on since the 1990s. The younger generation rather supports that the organization opens up to the country of settlement, while members of the older generation are perceived to call this strategy into question internally (cf. Schiffauer 2010). Due to the extensive dialogues between IGMG associations in Europe, both sides are well aware of their differences and constantly discuss their implications for organizational behavior. Since the middle of the 1990s an institutional examination of one’s surroundings, with the country, with the Constitution, has taken place, which has led to the awareness that one has to move to the center of society. Whereas for IGMG, you know this for sure, this was not done without skepticism from the general public, nor without skepticism from our own community. We had to ask ourselves: Is this even right? Do we want to stay permanently, or do we not actually want to leave altogether? And even if we do not want to leave, does this society even want us at its center? Are we not on the wrong track if we approach society and it does not want us? And the conflicts and positions become entrenched, as it were, where it would actually be much better if both sides kept to themselves? These are, in my words, the tensions from within but also tensions from outside, which in the end represent the challenges to our work (IN IGMG 1: 50).

With regard to the recent developments since the establishment of the DIK in 2006, the IGMG headquarters has observed a growing frustration among IGMG members, due to the slow progress made in the institutionalization of Islam in Germany. Especially with regard to the issue of religious education and official recognition of Islamic organizations “the community is becoming more and more critical” (IN IGMG 1: 302). Another reason for the frustration is the political marginalization of the organization, which repeatedly causes the organizational representatives to emphasize that

21 This refers to the English version of the IGMG website. URL: www.igmg.de/ gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues.html [last visited 04-June-2012]. The following chapters do not mention the URL again; the relevant headings on the website are provided in the text.

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chapter five we are heading toward the center of the society (community), and we do not to bob up and down at the edge as a marginal and radical organization that lives in some kind of fantasy world. I don’t want that, this community doesn’t want that, and not a single member wants that, because it has nothing to do with how we see ourselves. We want to be among people and contribute to solutions (IN IGMG 1: 306).

These underlying conflicts between the expectations of the organizational environment, its internal identity disputes, and leadership changes are discussed further in the case study. ZMD’s Perspectives on Members’ Interests With regard to the members’ interests perceived by ZMD representatives, three major topics are repeatedly mentioned in the interviews: the focus on interest representation, the multi-nationality of the organization, and the diversity of the members’ positions concerning certain external expectations, which require internal dialogue efforts to reach a consensus. On the whole, ZMD members’ interests differ from those of DITIB and IGMG members due to differences in the history, charter, and ownership of the organizations, and due to interdependence characteristics. “One Always Wanted Effective Representation and a Certain Degree of Recognition” Most of the ZMD’s lobbying efforts focus on the institutionalization of Islam in Germany, the aim being to effect changes in the system of religious governance. According to one of the interviewees, members’ interests involve the topics of “religious education, ritual slaughtering, the ban on headscarves, Islamic burial, pastoral care in prisons and hospitals” (IN ZMD 1: 113). These topics are also mentioned in the Islamic Charter of ZMD, which was issued in 2002 (see Chap. Five: ZMD). In addition, the mission of the organization involves “the pursuit of the way towards unification” (IN ZMD 3: 69) of the Muslim community in Germany. Organizational unification has been one of the main goals of  ZMD since its beginning, and is also supported by ZMD member organizations, which expect better opportunities for their claims-making efforts through a pooling of resources and the establishment of a Muslim consensus. Representation, in the sense of the way Islam is portrayed in the public sphere, is another interest of ZMD members, as the statement below shows. In this context, it is interesting that the interviewee refers to “the Muslims” and then corrects himself to say that the statement only applies



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to ZMD members. Nevertheless, references to the interests of the entire Muslim population in Germany can be found in many of the official press releases of the organization and in its Islamic Charta of 2002 (ZMD 2002). To portray Islam as a matter of course; to smooth out misunderstandings; to achieve peaceful coexistence with the majority society; to provide awareness training, and to perform integration work. These are the main expectations. But of course the Musl[ims], well, our members also want to see an institutionalization of Islam, and that is our great task (IN ZMD 2: 75ff.).

“We Do Not Represent a Turkish Islam, but a Multi-Ethnic Islam” Another issue that is important to ZMD and its members is its focus on a German or a European Islam which is not dominated by one country of origin. Even though one of the main ZMD organizations, ATIB, is of Turkish origin, ZMD believes that the fact that the organization is different from the Turkish-dominated Islamic umbrella organizations is an important characteristic of the organization, which intends “to present the voice of Islam, or of German Islam” (IN ZMD 3: 69). The issue of multi-nationality also concerns individual Muslims in general, and German converts in particular. The strong interest of German converts in non-Turkish mosques is related to the strong link between a Turkish identity and Islam in the Turkish mosque communities. Few, if any, converts join Turkish mosques. Instead, they join Arab or multinational mosques because they simply feel that they are not welcome in Turkish mosques (IN ZMD 1: 61).

“There Always Are Controversial Issues” The characteristic multi-nationality of ZMD also leads to a variety of internal positions and interests, including liberal and conservative positions. Not only are these positions in conflict with some of the external expectations with which the organization is confronted; they must also be managed internally to present the German public with a consensual position. There is an increasing need for internal debates, especially because the disputes involve issues that can threaten organizational survival (such as the respect for the German Basic Law and related interests in the establishment of an Islamic state in Germany, as well as issues concerning cooperation with the law enforcement agencies in Germany). For a variety of reasons which include internal positions of ZMD representatives and institutional pressures, continuous internal dialogue processes have been taking place, and an organizational consensus has been reached and made public in a number of documents, such as the ZMD’s Islamic Charta (IN ZMD 1: 174; see also Chap. Five: ZMD).

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Member Interests of the Younger Generation and the Older Generation “They have slowly become part of this society” Like other migrant groups that came to Germany under the guest worker agreements in the 1960s, many Muslims decided to stay after the immigration ban of 1973, to settle down, and to give up their plans to return. This was due in part to the changes in the migration regime, which no longer allowed immigrants to travel back and forth between two countries. Instead, families decided to stay and “in the middle of the 1990s they realized that they had slowly become part of this society and did not want to return to Turkey” (IN DITIB 2: 36). This observation of an increased orientation toward the country of settlement is found in several interviews with IGMG representatives, who associate this development with Erbakan’s failed leadership in Turkey at the end of the 1990s. “The Gap Is a Generational Gap in the Umbrella Organization and the Communities” This migration history and the process of family reunification which started in the 1970s led to the emergence of a second, third, and fourth generation of Muslims in Germany. In the 1980s the second generation of organizational leaders took over responsibility for the associations that had been established by their parents (Doomernik 1995: 51). One result of this generational shift was that the struggles between the various groups and ideologies in Turkey that dominated the worldviews of the first generation of migrants were not continued with the same vigor by the younger  generation. As a result, the formerly competing organizations began to initiate organizational dialogue activities (see Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Organizations). However, it should be noted that although the younger generation is more interested in their situation in Germany or Europe than their parents, its religious and political views are also diversified. This diversity also explains the heterogeneity of Islamic organizations: While the exile Islam of the first generation developed very similar positions throughout Europe, because on the whole it turned its back on Europe, this no longer applies for the positions of the second generation. The differences between individualized, collectivist orthodox, and anti-hegemonic ultraorthodox Muslims will in all probability develop differently in England than in France; and in The Netherlands, differently than they will in Germany. The gradual replacement of Turkish, as the language in which the debates are conducted will drive this diversification yet further. European Islam, then, will not only continue to have a multiplicity of voices, but it will indeed have an increasing multiplicity of voices (Schiffauer 2007b: 93).



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All three of the Islamic umbrella organizations analyzed in this research are aware of their responsibility for the next generations. Not only do the organizations depend on them as members and representatives who continue the work of the organizations; they also feel responsible for the upbringing of the next generations. The demographic characteristics of the Muslim population in Germany also explain why the younger generation is extremely relevant. About 42% of Muslims in Germany are younger than 26, as compared to 35% of the general population. By contrast, only 3% of the Muslim population belong to the age group of 65 years and older, as compared to about 20% of the non-Muslim population (Haug et al. 2009: 104ff.). According to a study by the Foundation Center for Studies on Turkey (2000), IGMG members have a relatively low average age of 35.5 years. In 2000, 14% of IGMG members were born in Germany. IGMG therefore has a significant younger member structure than DITIB and VIKZ. IGMG members have lived in Germany for an average of 20.2 years, and their main reasons to migrate were family reunification (65.6%) and a “guest worker” background (18.8%, as compared to DITIB members, 33.9% of whom were former “guest workers”) (ibid.).22 These generational differences are also reflected in the conflicting members’ interests with which the organizations have to deal. For example, DITIB has to balance two conflicting interests regarding its ties with Turkey. For the older generation in particular it is important that DITIB has little to do with ideology and [represents] what is conforming to Turkey from the theology and the conceptions. What it also good is that the counselor of the embassy is president of the executive board (IN DITIB 1–2: 39).

The recent introduction of regional structures by DITIB, which can be interpreted as a weakening of ties with Turkey, is internally debated and is usually viewed with skepticism by those who prefer close ties with their country of origin (IN DITIB 1: 215). Another related issue for DITIB is the training for imams and their command of the German language:

22 The figures should be treated with caution because the study only includes 2,066 respondents, of whom only 36% are formal members of a Muslim association, so the IGMG results are based on only 62 respondents who are formal IGMG members. The most recent study on Muslim organizations (Haug et al. 2009) provides no information about IGMG, the reason given being that IGMG is not directly involved in the DIK (ibid.: 174). Therefore, the membership characteristics of all Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany would merit further examination.

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chapter five I think DITIB is well aware that imams have to be trained in Germany because deployment from Turkey will no longer be possible in the long run. One reason is that it cannot be supported politically. Another is that imams will not go down well with the community in the medium term due the generational gap. Right now, there are still many elderly people in the community for whom it is very important to also have an imam from Turkey. One has to adapt to this change (IN DITIB 1–2: 128).

Language issues are also relevant for IGMG, which, like DITIB, focuses on Turkish as the organizational language due to its European dimension of membership. Another argument that is raised in this context concerns the establishment of Turkish as a European language. In light of the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EU, the portrayal of Turkish in the public sphere becomes another “pragmatic” reason in addition to the need to communicate across national contexts and to maintain a common Turkish identity (IN IGMG 2: 101). However, after many IGMG members had given up their plan to return, and IGMG had slowly developed a new orientation toward Germany, a younger generation of new activists emerged in the organization: There comes an entirely new generation, and this generation speaks, thinks, and feels German. Well, what are we going to do now? And if we only spoke Turkish internally, then this German-speaking youth would have no means to express themselves (IN IGMG 2: 201).

Despite its focus on its Turkish roots, IGMG also developed platforms in the languages of its countries of settlement while maintaining its goal of being a “generation-spanning organization”. The latter point is highly relevant for all Islamic organizations in Germany. It was the first generation of immigrants who established Islamic communities and worked for their institutionalization in the form of registered associations, including the eventual establishment of representative mosque buildings. The older generation still runs the mosque communities in many places, and their engagement is vital to the umbrella organizations, which have to reconcile the interests and living situations of various generations: The respect for the people who laid the foundations and who actually did all the preparatory work and established the infrastructure shapes our work. And our religious beliefs would also make it impossible to disrespect these persons even if one does not necessarily share their views concerning the organizational work, which arise from their own experience, from their social context, and their expectation and life experiences here in the European context. Still, they have had enough faith in us to entrust the place to our care (IN IGMG 1: 71).



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While the second generation of organizational representatives who now manage IGMG’s headquarters clearly sees a need to meet the various member interests across generations (out of respect, or due to dependences or the feeling of having to justify the confidence placed in them), the statement of a DITIB representative quoted below shows that Islamic organizations also realize that they have to encourage young Muslims to get involved to keep them interested in the project that was established by their families. “Actually, the Younger Ones Are the Contact Persons” Yes, the first generation, they do indeed exist, but they do not have to be taken so seriously anymore, if I may put it so simply, and actually the younger ones are the contact persons for DITIB, who do not come to the mosque or less than. Therefore, the religious service has changed, reacted, in the direction that one includes the younger generation (IN DITIB 1: 301).

This organizational necessity to continuously recruit new members can be observed in all other voluntary organizations. DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD use different strategies to recruit younger-generation Muslims, and with different success. ZMD, being a peak organization, can leave the matter of recruiting individual Muslims to its associated member organizations, thus limiting its services to its online platform Islam.de. DITIB and IGMG are more directly concerned with this issue. IGMG has been focusing on youth work since its beginnings in Germany, and DITIB discovered the necessity to provide increasing support for its local youth work only recently. DITIB acknowledges that most cities do not have a youth association in their mosque communities. DITIB youth groups that do exist are often founded by a group of friends or students who are already involved in the executive board of their mosque community. However, a DITIB program to promote youth engagement was only added to the official bylaws in 2009.23 The activities of the DITIB youth section are promoted on a separate organizational website,24 but cater primarily to youths in Cologne, where the DITIB headquarters is situated. DITIB mosques are increasingly 23 In 2009 the DITIB bylaws were amended to include a paragraph that identifies youth work as one the organizational aims. The bylaws also emphasize the importance of women’s work for the organizational activities (DITIB bylaws 2009 § 2 (9, 10, 11)). 24 URL: www.DITIBjugend.de [no longer accessible]. The activities included soccer and martial arts courses, and joint and separate activities for boys and girls under professional supervision at the facilities provided by DITIB. Currently DITIB refers to information available at the website of its sports club DİTİB SPORTKLUB KÖLN 1989 e. V.; URL: http://www .dsk-koeln.de/index.php [last visited 04-May-2012].

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diversifying their services because it is believed that the mosque should remain the central meeting point for activities. One example in this regard is the fact that a DITIB mosque community in Bavaria bought a fitness center and added a mosque room to it to attract the younger generation. The DITIB interviewee mentions the Turkish expression ‘[t]o grow up in the shadow of the mosque.’ That one actually does not go to the mosque and does not pray and so on, but that one should have experienced the atmosphere of the mosque. This is what we try to achieve (IN DITIB 1: 321).

However, it is not clear to what extent this distanced view on religious practices can be generalized for DITIB. It seems safe to assume that differences also exist between DITIB and IGMG in the emphasis on religious practice, because for IGMG, religiosity is closely associated with its social activities (Kortmann 2011; Schiffauer 2010). However, on the whole, DITIB’s diversification of activities to meet the internal member interests also follows the example of IGMG, which has long been offering its local members various social activities, with a particular focus on youth work and women groups. The Women’s Role and Female Interests “The Women Carry the Mosque Communities on their Shoulders” The role of Muslim women in Western societies is an important topic, not least because of public discourses on gender equality and female oppression, which are often linked to the topic of Islamic traditions and practices. Issues such as the headscarves, ‘honor’ killings, forced marriages, and machismo are publicly debated and linked to the safeguarding of the interests of female Muslims. In particular Muslim women who wear a headscarf have increasingly been regarded as the visible face of Muslim presence in Western societies. Those who are visible have to carry the discussions on their shoulders; they are included as objects of the discussion (IN DITIB 2: 194).

In addition to these public debates in which the Islamic organizations have to take a stance, female Muslims are also relevant to Islamic organizations due to their sheer number and their religiosity. Muslim women constitute nearly 50% of the Muslim population in Germany, and 41% of Muslim women regard themselves as very religious, as compared to 31% of Muslim men (Haug et al. 2009: 141).



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The fact that issues which concern Muslim women are often decided by the German courts (such as the headscarf debate and exemptions for Muslim girls from swimming lessons and class trips) has attracted much public attention and has led to organizational activities to address these issues. All three organizations under analysis now have women’s departments or a responsible person for women’s affairs. ZMD does not offer special services in addition to its lobbying activities for female Muslim rights, but IGMG and DITIB have implemented a wide array of services, with IGMG focusing more on education on religious and non-religious issues,25 and DITIB offering information and consultation services as well as recreational activities.26 However, at DITIB, this adaptation to Muslim women’s interests is a fairly recent development. The first female member of the DITIB executive explains: Without services for women, DITIB cannot continue to exist, because the women are the ones who carry everything on their shoulders. And if the women carry the mosque communities on their shoulders, then they should also take the responsibility (IN DITIB 2: 36).

The passage quoted above refers to both women’s responsibilities and the need for organizational change, which is linked to organizational survival in a rather extreme rhetoric. Aside from a few exceptions, mosque communities are generally headed by men. Changes are slowly being made, but organizational change takes time. However, despite being skeptical at first, the mosque communities appreciate the women’s involvement in the local executive boards. The interviewee quoted above argued that men were afraid that women may not participate regularly due to their responsibility to care for the children, but the men seem to have realized that the female perspective and the women’s insights into the daily lives of the mosque members actually help them in their work. The interviewee argued that men are not as aware of society as women due to their being members of a “society of men”, which is somehow detached from the education of their children. Because of their solution-oriented work, women are portrayed as an advantage. At least according to the first DITIB woman on the DITIB executive board, women are now seen as allies in the organization’s efforts to develop the associated mosque communities very soon and in so doing make them “more modern” (IN DITIB 2: 142). 25 URL: http://www.igmg.de/gemeinschaft/wir-ueber-uns/taetigkeitsbereiche/frauen -abteilung.html [last visited 20-Apr-2012]. 26 URL: www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=6&sid=12&lang=de [last visited 14-Apr-2012].

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The introduction of a women’s quota for the regional executive boards is also in line with this expectation. The analysis provided in this section reveals that the Islamic umbrella organizations have acknowledged the female potential with the result that more women than before are actively involved in the work of the organizational headquarters (this is at least true of DITIB and ZMD). However, further qualitative and quantitative research on Islamic organizations should be conducted to investigate the extent to which this trend is followed locally, and the actual differences between the interests of male and female members. Members’ Interests: A Summary This overview identifies similarities and differences between the member interests perceived by DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD. Many of the characteristics described here can be explained by organizational contextual factors (Pugh et al. 1963) and external expectations with which the organizations are confronted. For example, organizational origin and history affect not only the organizational structures but also the expectations members have of the organization. In many cases, the first generation of organizational members is particularly loyal to the original charter of the organization established during its foundation period. For DITIB, this implied a focus on religious services and political neutrality, while for IGMG, religion and Turkish politics were originally closely connected. ZMD, by contrast, has always been an interest organization which focuses on political claims-making for religious rights. Any current changes concerning these original goals and ideologies are therefore likely to cause internal conflicts. Due to changes in the ownership and control of the Islamic organizations, which are increasingly headed by members of the younger generation, the members’ interests also change due to differences between the backgrounds and motives of the first, second, third, and fourth generations of immigrants. As a result, the organizations are forced to adapt both their structures and activities to these demographic changes. This development goes hand in hand with the factor of interdependence with the external environment. For example, members’ interests can influence the degree of political control actors in the country of origin or in the country of settlement have over the organization. Generational shifts can therefore lead to a situation where expectations of the German government have a greater influence on the behavior than expectations of actors outside Germany. However, due to varying degrees of institutionalized ties



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to the countries of origin, it can be assumed that this process of complete adaptation to the German environment is currently not feasible, at least not for DITIB and IGMG. These two organizations have to balance their orientations toward both countries, due to conflicting members’ interests. The fact that this internal conflict is also increased by conflicting external expectations of a variety of actors in the organizational field is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs e. V. (DITIB) The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs e. V. (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği, Dachverband Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V., DITIB) is the largest Turkish Sunni umbrella organization in Germany. DITIB is an interesting case study not only because of its size, but also because of its strong institutionalized ties to the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanglığı, Diyanet, which can be translated as ‘piety’). DITIB is being criticized for such ties within the German institutional context, and is actually forced to reconcile conflicting expectations which originate both from Germany and Turkey. DITIB also has to adapt to the changing members’ interests (see above). The existing research on DITIB focuses primarily on the organization’s close affiliation with its country of origin. Its recent attempts to increasingly meet the expectations of the German government and thus to secure both legitimacy and new resources in its country of settlement have not yet been analyzed comprehensively. This section attempts to explain DITIB’s organizational behavior and to answer the research question of how and why organizations respond to the changes in their institutional environment. The section is organized as follows: First, an overview of the state of research is provided to discuss DITIB’s organizational history in Germany and its ties to its country of origin. Second, a summary of the results of the empirical research is presented to describe the influence of various external and internal expectations with which the organization is confronted. DITIB’s organizational development during the first decade of the 21st century is discussed with reference to changes in its structures and activities, as well as regarding its patterns of organizational behavior. This includes an overview of narratives of organizational change from the point of view of representatives

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who are currently active at the organizational headquarters. These narratives reflect the perceived need for change, the aim to work more effectively and professionally, an increasing orientation toward political expectations in Germany, and the evolution from a Turkish to an Islamic umbrella organization. Third, the recent changes on three organizational levels of the organizational structures are described. On the level of the headquarters, the element of professionalization is reflected in the creation of new outreach positions, while on the regional level, a process of decentralization has been initiated through the creation of regional structures. The third part also includes some remarks on the local level and the internal communication structures to identify reconciliation strategies such as bilingualism and different foci of services, which become necessary due to conflicting expectation structures. Fourth, new project developments with regard to DITIB’s activities at the level of the headquarters are described to provide examples of service diversification. These new projects are aimed at the general public (through the creation of opportunities for coming together) and at the members and their interests (through more issue-related work). Fifth, DITIB’s contact partners are presented, including a list of partners for DITIB events, as well as the main groups of actors that are invited to these events. This process reflects the organizational necessity to meet the interests of different target groups. Finally, the second part of the research question regarding the underlying reasons why the organization developed in the way described above is discussed with reference to the organizational patterns of behavior used by DITIB. In accordance with the research framework, this includes an analysis of the strategies of adaptation, decoupling, or protest, and the underlying trajectories between them. One can conclude that DITIB has implemented a new overall orientation and has increasingly adapted itself to its German environment, and the fact that it has maintained its ties to the country of origin qualifies the organization to be labeled a transnational organization. DITIB’s History from the Point of View of Existing Studies It has been widely discussed in the literature that DITIB is a branch of Diyanet, which initiated DITIB’s establishment in Germany during the 1980s (Amiraux 2003; Gibbon 2009; Laurence 2007; 2006; Schiffauer 2007b; Seufert 1999a; Yaşar 2012). The establishment of DITIB’s first registered



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association in the organizational field in Germany in Cologne in 1984 occurred relatively late, considering that other organizations such as VIKZ and predecessors of IGMG were established in 1973 and 1975 respectively. Reasons for DITIB’s Late Establishment The military coup in Turkey on September 12, 1980 and other conflicts between left-wing and right-wing forces in Turkey can be regarded as one reason for this relatively late engagement of Diyanet outside Turkey (Seufert 1999a). In 1980 the military ended the civil unrest at Turkish universities. The clashes between left and right had left over 10,000 dead. A state of emergency was declared and all political parties were forbidden. Many leftist, rightist and Islamist activists were imprisoned or fled to Europe (Schiffauer 2007b: 76; cf. Franz 2000).

These developments resulted in increased emigration to Germany, thus spreading the political tensions to countries outside Turkey. At the time, Germany was already host to many religious organizations that had been outlawed in Turkey. It was during these turbulent days in the early 1980s that Turkey shifted from a policy of effectively ignoring the migrants to a conservative cultural policy, whose aim was to increase the tie of Turks abroad to the Turkish State (Schiffauer 2007b: 73).

Seufert regards Diyanet’s late involvement primarily as a reaction to the success of Islamic organizations which were not affiliated with the Diyanet or outlawed in Turkey (Seufert 1999a: 262). Riexinger (2005) notes that the decline in remittances also led the Turkish state to increase its ties to the Turkish community in countries outside Turkey, and Amiraux links Diyanet’s engagement with the goal of maintaining influence there (2003: 155). Recently, this latter interest has received renewed attention due to the establishment of a Directorate for Turks Living Abroad in 2010,27 a development that Laurence has characterized as the interest of foreign

27 The Directorate for Turks Living Abroad (Yurtdisi Türkler Baskanligi) combines the activities of more than ten Turkish ministries that are currently dealing with Turkish affairs abroad (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18-Mar-2010). For the legal text in Turkish of the law that came into force on March 24, 2010 see FLG 49(5), no. 27544, 04-June-2010, URL: http://www .mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.5978&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch = [last visited 20-Apr-2012].

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embassies in uniting and thus controlling religious organizations under a “homeland banner” (2006: 261). This Islam of the embassies seeks to retain a guardian status over the religious practice in the Diaspora. The emergence of the Turkish, Algerian, and Moroccan federations in Europe that remain loyal to the official Islam of the homeland was no spontaneous event. Rather, the consulates and embassies have encouraged – and even helped to administer – organizational structures that bring together the existing prayer associations founded in different European countries under a homeland banner (ibid.).

After the establishment of Diyanet’s first German office in Berlin in 1982 (Laurence 2006), a DITIB organization was founded in Cologne on July 5, 1984. DITIB’s federal umbrella organization, as it exists today, was eventually established through a change in the bylaws of DITIB Cologne on April 26, 1987 (DITIB bylaws, see Municipal Court Cologne 43 VR 8932;28 cf. Seufert 1999a). The Interests of the German State While the Turkish state regarded the establishment of a branch of Diyanet in Germany as an initiative aimed at the Turkish community in Germany, the German government was interested in establishing a moderate form of Islam in Germany and therefore welcomed Diyanet’s engagement (Amiraux 2003; Seufert 1999a; Trautner 2000: 65). But the governments of the countries of origin and their official Islam did not only guarantee security. The new countries of arrival were also interested in receiving expertise and funding for religious services. The German interest in foreign investments in religious matters was linked to the imagined ideal of a return option, which was upheld and institutionally supported in Europe until the 1980s (Laurence 2006). However, this constellation of interests, which Laurence calls an “outsourcing strategy” eventually developed into a “strategy of incorporation”. After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the initial strategy was considered counterproductive with regard to the integration of Muslims. This led to an attempt of “de-transnationalizing” Islamic organizations. At the same time, dialogue initiatives were initiated with all Muslim groups across 28 In Germany, the bylaws and the minutes of general meetings, as well as changes in the bylaws and provisions concerning the members of the executive board must be reported to the competent municipal court. These documents can be accessed by the general public upon request. The following information referred to here is available at the municipal court Cologne (case number 43 VR 8932).



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Europe, including those representing the political Islam. According to Laurence, now the aim of these dialogue initiatives was to integrate Islam as a “national” religion (ibid.; see also Chap. Six). The same transformation took place with regard to the German state’s position on DITIB’s ties to Diyanet, which are expected to be cut off before any further rights can be granted in Germany. This criticism is linked primarily (though not exclusively) to the ongoing debate concerning the right to provide Islamic religious education in German public schools. The main argument is that since the German state must not influence the subjects of religious education (which are the sole responsibility of the denominations), it cannot accept that another state has an influence on the curricula. The ties between DITIB and Diyanet have thus become an increasingly important subject of the political disputes about the institutionalization of Islam in Germany. Diyanet’s influence also plays a role in terms of DITIB’s goal to become a religious community or a corporation of public law in Germany. (This is discussed below with reference to the recent establishment of regional structures and related processes of organizational decentralization.) DITIB’s affiliations to its country of origin have been critically discussed as its main characteristic by many researchers. Spuler-Stegemann (2001: 222) criticizes DITIB as an “unstable” organization due to its relationship to the Turkish state and its dependence on the political settings in Turkey. The following section provides an overview of DITIB’s ties to Diyanet and asks how DITIB responds to the criticism leveled at these links in the German environment. DITIB’s Ties to Diyanet Diyanet was founded in 1924, shortly after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. The first President of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal,29 introduced various reforms to establish a democratic and secular modern nation state united by a common Turkish Muslim identity (cf. Franz 2000; Yaşar 2011).30 Republican elites viewed religion as an obstacle to modernization but also recognized its potential to unite a diverse population, so they took steps to consolidate and extend institutional controls over religion that had been 29 In 1934 the Parliament bestowed on him the honorific name Atatürk (“Father of the Turkish People”). 30 It should be noted that the Turkish understanding of laicism is different from Western forms, as Kara (1999) explains in more detail.

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chapter five established during the Ottoman Empire. To that end, the DRA [= Diyanet, KRW] was founded in 1924 to replace the Ottoman Ministry of Religious Law and Charitable Foundations. Sufi lodges and shrines were closed down, religious brotherhoods were outlawed, and the DRA assumed control over mosques, preachers, and religious teaching (Gibbon 2009: 6).

Diyanet was thus established as an institution associated with the Office of the Prime Minister, from which it also receives its budget.31 Tezcan notes that the underlying aim of the newly founded Republic of Turkey was to submit religion to state control. According to him, this did not signify a radical break with Turkish history because clerics of the Ottoman Empire also had mainly subordinate and legitimizing functions (Tezcan 1998: 114). The struggle over the definition power of Islam after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey culminated in the outlawing of the articulation of religious language in public affairs. One of the most striking examples was the ban on Islamic dress in the public sphere (ibid.). The nationalistic ideology also required that prayers and calls for prayers be held in Turkish rather than in the traditional Arabic language. This was revoked in 1952 (Riexinger 2005). According to Articles 68 and 69 of the Turkish Constitution, religion may still not be exploited for political purposes, and the laic principles of the Republic of Turkey may not be called into question (a punishable offense under Articles 146 and 163 of the Turkish criminal code). According to Trautner, these laws indicate that the Turkish state continues to have the sole power to interpret provisions concerning religious matters, and it exercises this power through Diyanet (Trautner 2000: 62; cf. Doomernik 1995: 49). Diyanet employs some 90,000 state employees (Trautner 2000: 62) and manages more than 77,000 mosques (Gibbon 2009: 6). In 2007 Diyanet had a budget of TKL 1.638bn (€800m), according to its own statistics.32 Its main responsibility is to organize religious life of Turks in and outside Turkey. This includes the issuing of fatwas (religious rulings on matters of  Islamic law) and the preparation of Islamic sermons (cf. Gibbon forthcoming). The training and payment of religious personnel and the administration of places of worship are also under Diyanet’s control, as is

31 Diyanet website, English version (Establishment and Historical Development) URL: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/default.asp [last visited 14-Feb-2012]. 32 Diyanet website, German version [last visited 15-Apr-2010/no longer available]. The German, English and Turkish versions of the Diyanet website do not specify the currency for the figure of 1.638bn. Only the Arabic version refers to the Turkish Lira (TKL).



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religious “propaganda” (Trautner 2000) in and outside Turkey. Diyanet describes this as its responsibility “to inform society on religion”.33 Kara notes that the image of being responsible for all religious areas which Diyanet creates of itself is at odds with reality, and that it actually has limited powers. For example, it is not responsible for religious education in public schools, nor does it have access to religious foundations and their funds, which are regulated by another agency called Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü (Kara 1999). Like the authors mentioned above, Kara argues that the young Republic of Turkey used religious politics to legitimate its political aims among the public. To this aim, the Turkish state established a certain degree of control over Diyanet (the Prime Minister appoints the President of Diyanet and controls its budget) and restrained its influence (ibid.: 212ff.), a development that has been criticized by Diyanet, as the following statement by a former Diyanet president shows: It lacks, without doubt, religious authority. The reason for this is that the Directorate appears to be the long arm of politics and that some circles exploit this situation (cited in Kara 1999: 236, translation KRW).

Trautner also criticizes the links between the ruling parties and the Diyanet personnel, arguing that Diyanet’s main contribution to the protection of laicism is that it abstains from criticizing any ruling government (Trautner 2000: 63). According to the website of the Dutch Diyanet organization (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi), organizations associated with Diyanet exist in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland;34 for Austria see Kroissenbrunner 2002; Waldrauch/Sohler 2004; for the Netherlands see Kortmann 2011; Mügge 2011). According to the Diyanet website, these European organizations are represented by the European Religious Institutions Union, which was established as a “supervision union” in Belgium on November 7, 2002. Its first meeting was held in Ankara on February 3, 2003.35 This European body was not mentioned in the interviews with DITIB officials, nor is it discussed in the literature. Since it presumably has a limited function, it is not analyzed in depth in this research either. 33 Diyanet website, English version. URL: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/default .asp [last visited 14-Nov-2011]. 34 URL http://www.diyanet.nl/; see category ‘Linkler’ [last visited 04-June-2012]. 35 URL: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/default.asp; see: Information, Activities, Abroad Services, Services Provided to Our Citizens Who Live in the Western Countries, Establishing the European Religious Institutions Union [last visited 27-Apr-2012].

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An example of present-day ties between Diyanet and DITIB are the imams who are sent from Turkey to Germany, where they are paid by Diyanet. Imams have special immigration conditions and work in assigned DITIB mosques for a period of four years under the supervision of the Attachés for Religious Affairs at the 13 Turkish consulate generals in Germany. Gibbon notes that in 2006 some 530 imams were employed in Germany, which means that not all mosque associations employ a government-funded imam (Gibbon 2009: 5). In addition, 130 imams were sent to Germany in 2006 for one-year stays, which were jointly funded by the local mosques and Diyanet (ibid.). Doomernik (1995: 52) calls the provision of imams through Diyanet its “trump card” with regard to its aim to encourage mosque communities to join DITIB and similar Diyanet organizations across Europe. However, this practice has been criticized because many imams do not speak German when they arrive for their four-year appointment.36 In 2002 this led to the introduction of four-month German classes for future imams in Germany provided by the Goethe Institute in Ankara. These courses are co-funded by Diyanet and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Goddar 2008). In 2006 the Konrad Adenauer Foundation joined this cooperation to offer a one-week orientation course to prepare imams in Ankara for their stay in Germany (Ernst 2006). Similar courses also exist for imams who are sent to other countries (for the Dutch case see Mügge 2011). The aim of Diyanet itself is to provide training at the Islamic theology faculties in Istanbul and Ankara to students from Germany who have a Turkish migration background to help future imams to overcome language barriers. The project was presented in 2006 (Ernst 2006: 5). As of 2010, the first cycle of studies was not completed, but 114 Turkish students from Germany were enrolled (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010). The focus of this project on the Turkish theology faculties reflects Diyanet’s doubts whether the academic quality of the theology departments in the countries of settlement can match the quality of imam courses provided by the universities in Turkey with which Diyanet cooperates (interview with a spokesperson of the Diyanet Foreign Affairs Department in Ankara, cited in Mügge 2011). This position can be related to the Diyanet’s aim to continue to control both the agenda and the education of imams living abroad. This influence is also reflected in the following statement by an 36 For an analysis of the setting of imams in Austria see Kroissenbrunner (2002), who compares Muslim organizations including ATIB, DITIB’s Austrian counterpart.



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imam in Germany who was interviewed by Gibbon in 2006. The statement contradicts the official organizational rhetoric, which stresses that DITIB itself is an independent organization which is not controlled by Diyanet. DITIB is a state institution. That is, it’s the representative of the Directorate of Religious Affairs here [in Germany]. It is not the representative of an individual; it represents the official state view. That’s why DITIB is not a religious community like Millî Görüş or the Süleymancıs; DITIB is the state. Whatever views the state holds we hold the same view. At the end of the day, this organization has a leader; there is the Directorate of Religious Affairs, there are other agencies. We maintain our existence here according to the daily correspondence we receive from the Directorate: Do this. Do that (Gibbon 2009: 8).

Part of the described relationship between the imams and the Diyanet is the fact that the sermons for the imams were drafted by the Diyanet experts in Ankara and distributed in and outside Turkey. At least, this was the common practice until recently (Amiraux 2007: 287). In his analysis of Friday sermon policies, Gibbon argues that “the centralized sermon regime came to an end in June 2006” (2009: 26). Now religious figures in 81 Turkish provinces and 12 German regions or cities are responsible for the preparation of sermons. The aim of this change is to adapt the religious services to the local needs of the community, and to dispel the image of a centralized agency which restricts religious expression (ibid.). However, although the sermons can now be summarized in German at the end of the services—a practice used in 50 mosques, according to former DITIB President Arslan—Turkish remains the main language of the religious services. The youth in particular is supposed to be encouraged to learn Turkish. “This is why no complete German sermon will be held” (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010). Despite Arslan’s clear statement which underlines the importance of the Turkish language in promoting  individual ties to the country of origin, DITIB has been offering German  versions of the weekly Friday sermons for download since December 2007. Despite this presumably strong link between Diyanet and the imams who are sent as state employees to the German DITIB mosques, this system may change in the future. The German government is currently funding the establishment of four Centers for Islamic Theology at German universities in Münster/Osnabrück, Tübingen, Frankfurt/Gießen and Nürnberg-Erlangen to finally establish Islamic theology in Germany. This initiative follows a decision of the German Science Council of January 29, 2010. The aim is to prepare teachers for the planned introduction of Islamic

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education in public schools, and to promote the study of Islamic theology (German Federal Ministry for Education and Research 2010). In an interview in 2009, DITIB’s dialogue representative already stressed that DITIB is willing to cooperate with the German authorities (Forum am Freitag 2009). The same was stated in a DITIB press release after the decision of the German Science Council (DITIB PR 05-Feb-2010), although the media had originally reported responses to the contrary (Preuß/Schultz, Süddeutsche Zeitung.de, 30-Jan-2010). The former DITIB president Sadi Arslan (2007–2011) declared in 2010 that there are some 300 theology graduates with Turkish roots living in Germany who could be trained to become teachers for religious education in addition to those trained in Turkey. He predicts that a comprehensive basis of teachers will be established in a few years (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010). The study of Islamic religion in Germany is also supported through Diyanet’s co-financing of the foundation professorship of theology at the University of Frankfurt am Main, which is currently held by Prof. Dr. Özsoy (Keller 2009). However, the related Institute for Culture and Religion of Islam37 does not yet provide imam training, nor does it educate teachers for Islamic religious education in public schools in Germany. Ties between Diyanet and DITIB also exist in the form of the Counsellor for Religious Services of the Turkish embassy in Berlin, a post that is currently held by the President of DITIB. The Counsellor has diplomatic status and is paid by the Diyanet. DITIB’s executive board has also been electing him DITIB President every two years, a position that is voluntary and not remunerated by DITIB (IN DITIB 3 2009). One of the interviewees stated that the Counsellor for Religious Services of the Turkish embassy, who is always a trained theologian and an experienced diplomat, offers more qualities and skills than any other candidate for the DITIB presidency could offer. In particular his theological training, which often includes being a mufti (meaning a Muslim legal expert), distinguishes him from other candidates. In an interview, DITIB’s former president Arslan (2007–2011) mentions that other candidates may hold this position in the future: Whatever we do in social and societal perspective we are still a religious organization and therefore we will appoint Presidents that are knowledgeable in religious questions (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010).

37 URL: http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb09/islam/index.html [last visited 04-June -2012].



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Here, DITIB’s organizational self-understanding as a religious organization becomes evident, despite the fact that it is currently expanding its services to include other domains as well (see below). DITIB’s advisory council is another structural link to Diyanet (cf. Seufert 1999a: 263). According to §11 of the DITIB bylaws of 1985 (which are also included in the latest version from 2009), the advisory council consists of five Attachés for Religious Affairs from Diyanet and is headed by the President of Diyanet (Municipal Court Cologne 43 VR 8932). Diyanet’s President is also always appointed as an honorary DITIB member for the duration of two years, which allows him to participate in member meetings and meetings of the executive boards, though without voting rights (§10). In addition, Diyanet’s President attends and chairs DITIB’s general meetings.38 According to §12 of the DITIB bylaws of 2009, the responsibilities of the advisory council include the provision of counseling to DITIB’s executive board on all matters relevant to the association, including the right to have access to all of its documents. The advisory council also decides on appeals filed by individual members who have been excluded from the association, and it has the power of decision concerning the admittance of new members (§ 4(4)) and the sale of property (§ 9(9)). It can also call for general meetings, which are usually held every two years. The general meeting decides on changes to the bylaws and the provisions concerning the admission and expulsion of members, both of which require a 2/3 majority and the approval of the advisory council (§ 8(2; 5e)). The most far-reaching link is reflected in the fact that the 14 candidates who can run for the seven seats on the DITIB executive board must also be suggested by the advisory council (§ 9(2)). The following statement by a DITIB representative describes the tensions that emerge due to this duality of ties and demands. His argumentative distancing from Diyanet provides a good starting point for the analysis of DITIB’s organizational self-understanding in the 21st century presented below, which is based on the five interviews conducted with DITIB representatives between 2008 and 2009. First of all – we don’t represent the Diyanet in Ankara but we closely work together concerning one matter. We ask the Diyanet for imams because up to this point they cannot be trained in Germany. […] We are not a foreign country organization of the Diyanet but an umbrella organization founded 38 This is confirmed by the minutes for the years 2005, 2007, and 2009. Minutes for years earlier than 2005 were not reviewed (Amtsgericht Cologne 43 VR 8932).

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chapter five in accordance with the German law of association. I am not a member of the Diyanet, and, just as, except for one exception, neither are our board members (Interview with the chairman of DITIB Mehmet Yıldırım, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09-Feb-2005; cited in Amelina/Faist 2008: 96)

Summary The review of the research literature presented above shows that DITIB’s origin and history clearly influence its current structure, which is interdependent with Diyanet. Diyanet can communicate the expectations it has of the organization through a) DITIB Presidents who are also heads of the Attachés for Religious Affairs; b) the Attachés for Religious Affairs that supervise the imams; c) imam training, which is supervised in Turkey; d) the sermons, which are drafted by Diyanet personnel, and e) the advisory board, which influences organizational changes. In addition, Diyanet provides the resources for the imam training as well as their salary during their time abroad, which in turn influences DITIB’s human and material resources. These links are impressive, but the results of the following case study show that this is only one part of the story. The organization is increasingly trying to counterbalance the focus on networks and resources in the country of origin through equally active cooperation with actors in Germany. This new orientation toward Germany can in turn result in the acquisition of new human and material resources. These changes take place both on the structural level and the activity level (see below). This research argues that, in light of the current organizational developments, the characterization of DITIB as a country of origin-oriented organization found in most of the research literature mentioned above is not accurate. Rather, DITIB can be described as a transnational organization whose structures and activities are equally oriented toward the country of origin and the country of settlement. The termination of its relations with actors in Turkey (primarily with Diyanet) as demanded by the German government and even by many Muslims in Germany is not easily feasible for DITIB due to the highly institutionalized nature of its ties abroad and their efficiency advantages for the organization. On the level of legitimacy, the results are even more complicated due to conflicting first- and second-generation interests and the conflicting expectations of the German and Turkish governments. These assumptions are discussed in more detail in the following analysis of the empirical results, which begins with a summary of internal narratives of organizational change.



the individual organization199 DITIB Representatives’ Narratives of Organizational Change

The previous sections discuss DITIB’s organizational history and the influences its origins have on the current organizational design. However, to be able to understand the resulting organizational behavior and to explain why the organization is opening itself up to the environment of its country of settlement, it is necessary to know the internal perspectives on organizational change. Organizational change was a prominent theme in the interviews with DITIB officials. Their subjective interpretation of organizational developments reveals various directions of change as well as related meaning systems that are associated with either the past or the present. Change is linked, justified, or demanded with regard to current or past developments both in Germany and in Turkey, and with regard to DITIB’s internal member interests. The following is an overview of DITIB’s trajectory from its establishment to the emergence of the challenges with which the organization is faced today. In the second step, this trajectory is linked to the current changes in DITIB’s structures and activities, which are presented later. “The Advantage of Political Neutrality” The first period of organizational development includes its initial success following its establishment in the mid-1980s. By 1988, just one year after DITIB officially established itself as a federal umbrella organization, it already consisted of 640 associated mosque communities (Lier and Piest 1994: 19). In the interviews, this success story of the Turkish community is related to DITIB’s political neutrality (IN DITIB 1–2: 10).39 The interviewees argued that after the military coup in Turkey in 1980, which led to the spread of the tensions to the Turkish communities in Germany, many Turks in Germany did not want to get involved in political conflicts and instead tried to find a neutral organization that would allow them to practice their religion, preserve their culture, and speak their language. It should be noted that DITIB enjoyed the confidence of many Turks who believed in the neutrality of the Turkish state, which the interviewees regarded as distinct from the Turkish government. The imams and the Attachés for Religious Affairs sent to Germany by Diyanet in particular gave migrants a sense of security in the sense that they were believed to ensure that political discourses would be kept out of their mosques. 39 None of the DITIB representatives mentioned that DITIB’s success can be linked to its financial advantage concerning the provision of imams, while IGMG officials put particular emphasis on this structural imbalance (IN IGMG 1).

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chapter five The religious attachés and so on played a role, of course, because they were theologians for the people, and they were somehow representatives of the state, and not from the political currents but from the state, which is independent of all Weltanschauungen (IN DITIB 2: 36).

This introductory statement stresses both Diyanet’s and DITIB’s position of political neutrality, but by calling attention to DITIB’s advantage of standing above party lines it also regards DITIB as distinct from political Islamic organizations without explicitly referring to them.40 The emphasis on political neutrality can also be linked to the often heard criticism that DITIB is the long arm of the Turkish government and thus committed to the ideology of the ruling party (Spuler-Stegemann 2002: 104; 2001: 222). “Slowly Becoming Part of the German Society” The second phase of organizational change, which followed the establishment of the organization, is associated with the mid-1990s and the growing realization among DITIB members that they were “slowly becoming a part of the German society and that they do not want to return to Turkey” (IN DITIB 2: 36). The literature often links the abandonment of return plans to the official recruitment ban of ‘guest workers’ in 1973 and the resulting establishment of organizational structures in Germany. However, the described change in the orientation of DITIB members toward the country of settlement appears to occur rather late when compared to Tietze’s classification of periods of organizational development. Other organizations had made this shift a decade earlier and by the 1990s were already engaged in “the struggle for recognition” (Tietze 2008: 219). The delay in DITIB’s organizational development can be explained by the fact that it was established a decade later than its Turkish counterparts. It also seems safe to say that its members simply continued to believe that they would return because of DITIB’s strong focus on Turkey as the country of origin. Nevertheless, the increasing orientation of DITIB’s members toward the German society also resulted in changes to the activity structure. The provision of services that go beyond the religious realm—a development which also began later than in other Islamic organizations—is discussed below. Some of the interviewees also criticized the German government’s failure to appreciate the Muslims’ willingness to stay permanently. One interviewee believed that the political level and the media impulses were 40 This neutral argumentation with regard to political Muslim organizations such as IGMG is found in many interviews and can be linked to their recent organizational cooperation with KRM (see Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Organizations).



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responsible for unsuccessful integration and the lack of emotional attachment to Germany among older and younger Muslims (IN DITIB 2: 36). The remarks on the responsibility of the political level in the context of organizational development can be interpreted as a hint at external pressures with which the organization is confronted, the implication being that, while DITIB and its members have always been willing to integrate into the society, the political climate and the media climate prevent them from realizing their ambitions. The interviewee also stated that, despite this “muddle” (“Wirrwarr”), DITIB has become larger than any other civil society organization that represents people from Turkey in Germany. The repeated emphasis on organizational size is linked to the number of DITIB’s mosque communities as well as DITIB’s support rates among the Turkish population. This indicates once more that DITIB strives to act as an important contact for the German government, and that the organization tries to officially establish the argumentation that organizational size alone gives an organization legitimacy and political leverage. “Follow These Changes in the 21st Century” The 21st century, which is the focus of this research project, represents the third period of organizational change for DITIB. Political changes in Germany and shifting member interests have created strong pressure for the organization to change. Organizations that cannot follow these changes, that cannot read them anew, so to speak, they will cease to exist one day” (IN DITIB 2: 36). The perception that organizations are forced to change is expressed in more detail in the following statement, which indicates how important it is for DITIB to adapt to its members and their interests: I am sure, as long as DITIB also follows the developments in the world and develops appropriate patterns of action on how the people here can become simply happy, then DITIB will continue to grow and grow and will also exist. But if DITIB, like other organizations as well, simply cannot follow these changes and does not open itself up; women services, youth services, social work if all this remains limited; then the people will find another organization another structure, that is certain and we are aware of it (IN DITIB 2: 106).

The reference to the existential necessity of organizational development identifies a core challenge for the organization. The statement quoted above can be used to legitimate organizational change either vis-à-vis the members or vis-à-vis the executive board, depending on the sources of change and the target group that needs to be encouraged to accept and implement changes.

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“A Wish to Work More Functionally and Professionally” All interviews indicated that the challenge of adapting to societal change and changing internal expectations is successfully met by the organization. In addition, a number of new activities and structures were mentioned, which are discussed below. In the context of the above narrative, the need to adapt to external and internal demands is also linked to the interviewee’s personal engagement in the organization. At the beginning of the 21st century, when the organization decided to redefine itself and its role in German society, new people were recruited for the voluntary and professional work at the headquarters. One of the interviewees was the first woman to be elected to the executive board in 2007. From the point of view of organizational change, her appointment represents a major development in terms the opening up of DITIB to the diversity of its members. She explained the underlying motivation for organizational change as follows: “Here, I see a wish, a really intensive wish, to create change, a wish to work more functionally and professionally” (IN DITIB 2: 36). With regard to the intended professionalization of DITIB—another important organizational keyword that is discussed in detail below—the welfare organizations in Germany such as the church-based Caritas and Diakonie are regarded as role models, due to the amount of resources they receive for their services from the German state. Caritas is the charity organization of the Catholic Church in Germany. Several times the interviewee described it as an organization that has enough resources to provide the professional services DITIB intends to provide to its members. Although the number of Caritas employees is greatly underestimated by the interviewee (Caritas has 500,000 employees and 500,000 volunteers in Germany, according to its website),41 it is used to highlight the necessity of hiring additional staff for the associated DITIB mosques. According to the interviewee, DITIB needs up to 1,500 professional employees for its mosque communities, but currently employs less than one tenth of this number of people and relies primarily on voluntary work (IN DITIB 2: 198). The interviewee also emphasized that Caritas does not limit its services to Catholics, a principle DITIB intends to adopt in the future to render the argument of the establishment of a “parallel society” irrelevant (ibid: 118). This strategy may also explain why DITIB presents itself both as a religious organization and a migrant organization. This dual ambition of providing 41 URL: http://www.caritas.de/ [last visited 04-June-2012].



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religious and social services to Muslims and migrants is reflected in the following passage from DITIB’s official mission statement, which also makes special mention of DITIB’s size: DITIB is now the migrant organization with the largest membership in the Federal Republic of Germany. It has become a recognized part in the chain of other establishments and institutions with religious and social purposes in the Federal Republic of Germany. It has thus become an important pillar of society. According to surveys, DITIB represents more than 70% of the Muslims living in Germany (DITIB.de: organizational profile, translation KRW).

“A Stronger Emphasis on Islam” Another important aspect of organizational development is related to the shift in the identity from an ethnic organization to a religious organization, or from a Turkish organization to an Islamic organization. (IN DITIB 1: 47). The interviewees associate this development with the changes in the German public debate on foreigners, which had focused primarily on Turks until 2000/2001, and which did not focus on their religious background in the sense of the previously discussed Islamization of discourses until after 9/11 (cf. Shooman 2009; Tiesler 2006). Actually, the same group is now identified with religious symbols. And DITIB participated in this development, a stronger emphasis on Islam” (IN DITIB 1: 47).

One example mentioned in this context is the fact that DITIB eventually agreed that religious education in school should be provided in German (Micksch/Süssmuth 2005: 95). This represents a step back from the close ties to the Turkish culture and language axiom that characterized the organization for a long time. It also highlights DITIB’s interest in providing Islamic education. Cooperation with Muslim communities with different ethnic backgrounds was another factor that led to the reduction of the ethnic motive for the organization. It is argued that this cooperation requires all organizations to increasingly emphasize their Islamic religious identity as their common denominator (IN DITIB 1; see Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Organizations). “Somehow Everything is Politicized” The final internal narrative of organizational change is also linked to other Islamic organizations in the organizational field. It is argued that due to the external pressure to cooperate, the organizations are forced to redefine themselves. Their traditional strategy of distinguishing themselves from one another at the others’ expense no longer works due to the

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perceived need to cooperate to gain external legitimacy and political influence. However, since the organizations continuously try to pursue distinct agendas, they now respond more effectively to public discourses, which according to one interviewee leads to a reduction of theological self-reproduction and the development of the organizations from religious actors to political actors. The implied politicization of DITIB (IN DITIB 2: 387) thus presents another motive for change besides professionalization. The orientation toward the political level is not without doubts and problems. This is most clearly reflected in the fact that the interviewee mentioned a reorientation toward “religiosity” when he was asked about his wishes for the future at the end of the interview. The observation of an increasing politicization is consistent with the findings of Faist and Amelina, who argue that although DITIB was not engaged in claims-making in the past and limited religion to the private sphere, after gaining experiences with the German political representation regime and the growing public pressure after 9/11, DITIB started to voice itself politically (Faist/Amelina 2008: 96; cf. Schiffauer 2007b: 73).

This development should be contextualized in more detail with regard to the organizational field and the closer cooperation between the Islamic organizations and the political level (see Chap. Six). Summary The narratives of organizational change presented in this section provide important insights into the motives behind DITIB’s organizational development. First, the changing interests of DITIB’s individual members are discussed with regard to the prospect of settling in Germany and their request for additional services that go beyond the religious sphere. Second, the influence of the German institutional environment is apparent in the aim to professionalize and in the sometimes involuntary politicization of the organization. The comparison between DITIB and the German welfare organizations identifies yet another opportunity structure that allows organizations to obtain legitimacy and resources. Due to the institutionalized relationship between the German state and denominational or secular welfare organizations, these organizations receive public funding for their services. In this context of changing opportunity structures and expectations in the German environment (although changes in Turkey also play a significant role), the necessity of cooperation across formerly rivaling Islamic



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organizations is also acknowledged. The necessity of distinguishing themselves from one another and emphasizing their own advantages remains a prominent aspect of the organizational rhetoric, although the partners never criticize each other openly. Rather, the emphasis on size and political neutrality is used to achieve legitimacy in the German institutional environment. The related rhetoric of being a trustworthy partner and a leader among the Islamic umbrella organizations is analyzed in more detail in Chapter Six, which describes the organizational links to the political sphere and to other actors in the organizational field. The following section presents the practical outcomes of these narratives of organizational change. This overview further illustrates that DITIB’s activities and its organizational structures have changed considerably over the last ten years due to external as well as internal expectations. DITIB’s Structures It has been mentioned that DITIB’s structures have changed on different levels over the last decade, due to the overall growth of the organization and the development of new responsibilities associated with changing external and internal expectations. On the whole, the structural changes result in the hiring of additional personnel and the creation of new departments both at the headquarters and in the mosques communities. In addition, DITIB recently established 15 regional associations at the level of the German federal states.42 This step is undertaken with the organization’s aim of being recognized as a religious community. This restructuring allows the organization to meet both the political demand for a single contact on the federal and regional levels and the internal demand for more local responsibilities and the gradual detachment from Turkey. The creation of regional structures also leads to organizational decentralization. All of these developments, including the associated internal debates that accompany them, are described in detail below. This section begins with a discussion of the level of DITIB’s headquarters, and the regional and local levels. The overview of DITIB’s internal communication structure at the end of this section provides insights into the relationships between these three levels. With reference to a comparison between messages that are sent out to the general public and those published in the internal member magazine, the analysis also determines 42 http://www.ditib-landesverband.de/[last visited 25-Apr-2012].

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the level of satisfaction with the selection of subjects and language in these different communication structures among different target groups. The Headquarters As of 2012, DITIB includes 889 mosque communities, according to its website, as compared to 230 in 1984, the year of its foundation (Lier/Piest 1994).43 The rapid growth of DITIB represents a major development that has required structural changes at DITIB’s headquarters. Currently, there are twenty people working full-time at the headquarters in Cologne. In addition, there are twenty part-time employees, trainees, and volunteers. According to the organogram published on the Turkish webpage,44 the headquarters in Cologne is divided into eight departments covering the areas of religious services and religious education, women’s services, hajj and Umrah, mosque building projects and real estate, religious publication, human resources and administration, interreligious and intercultural dialogue, youth and sports, education and culture, and accounting. The departments are headed by a general director. Seven departments are also linked directly to the president of DITIB. These include the central administration, the Center for Social Support and the Research Center on Religion and Society (FOREGE),45 the council for religious questions, the general secretary, the center for press work, publications and public relations, and the legal counseling department. “A Process of Renewal” With regard to the question of how the organization responds to its external environment, it was found that two major changes have taken place in the area of public affairs management: (a) the hiring of two spokespersons, one for inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue and one for press and public affairs, and (b) the establishment of FOREGE. The following is a brief overview of these changes, which can be regarded as a sign of increasing professionalization and increasing organizational orientation toward the German environment. In April 2004 a spokesperson for interreligious and intercultural dialogue was hired for the headquarters office. After graduating high school 43 Lier and Piest note that DITIB already included 520 associated mosque communities in 1987, 640 in 1988, and 700 in 1993 (Lier/Piest 1994: 19). 44 URL: http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=5&sid=8&lang=en [last visited 04-June2012] (translations TK). 45 FOREGE is the acronym of Forschungszentrum für Religion und Gesellschaft. URL: http://www.forege.de/web/ [last visited 26-Apr-2012].



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in Turkey, he came to Germany to study Islamic Studies and Journalism. From 1995 to 2004 he was the second imam and the responsible for interreligious dialogues at a local DITIB mosque, where he also established the Institute for German-Turkish Integration and Interreligious Dialogue.46 In 2004 he was asked to assume his new position at the headquarters, the primary aim of which is to represent DITIB in public affairs and to provide training for additional local and regional dialogue representatives. Due to his extended network and his various positions in the religious, scientific, and political communities,47 he soon became an important partner for high-level dialogues that were initiated across Germany. He also acts as an internal mediator when conflicts at associated DITIB mosques need to be resolved (IN DITIB 3: 73). Initially, his role as a spokesperson for interreligious and intercultural dialogue represented a change and a centralization of power in the organization, due to the impact his statements had in the public sphere. The following passage shows that his opinion has often been taken as the opinion of the organization. This has forced the organization to react and in some cases has promoted organizational change. But often, well, there is this process that someone else says something that is said in this moment because he [the dialogue representative, KRW] says it personally or he just wants to say it for his dialogue department. That is taken as the opinion of the DITIB as a whole, and then DITIB has to react. And this also leads them to develop in a certain direction because they have to admit something or deny something, or what do I know, there are compromises (IN DITIB 1: 107).

In 2008 the press and public affairs department hired a trained spokesperson. The creation of this post led to the separation of the dialogue department from the public affairs department, which in turn promoted the professionalization of the organization. The new post was created to reduce the public affairs workload of the spokesperson for interreligious and intercultural dialogue, who was formerly the figurehead of the organization. Both spokespersons completed professional training in Germany, but  their organizational history is different. The spokesperson for 46 URL http://www.institut-mannheim.de/ [last visited 26-Apr-2012]. 47 The dialogue representative was the spokesperson of KRM twice; he participated in the German Islam Conference and the Integration Summit and sits on the executive boards of the DITIB project “proDialog” and the interreligious project “Do you know who I am?”. He is a member of the international project “The Institute for Interreligious Studies” (INTRA e. V.; URL: http://www.interrel.de/frame.html [last visited 04-June-2012], and has been invited as an expert to the OECD (IN DITIB 3: 11).

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interreligious and intercultural dialogue has a long history of organizational engagement and an extensive social network. The spokesperson for press and public affairs was hired for her skills. She studied Political Science, Social Sciences, and Media and Communication Studies in Germany and then worked in the UK for one year. Although her father is the head of a DITIB community, she was not an active member of DITIB before her appointment. Both these examples show that DITIB personnel at the headquarters use internal as well as external hiring strategies. This is also the case for the DITIB executive board, which consists of founding members of the organization, locally established members, and newcomers. The latter are encouraged to participate even at the highest representative level of the organization due to their skills, which they acquired mainly in the world outside the local mosque communities.48 Therefore, the organization combines its interest to support long-term organizational commitment with the need to motivate externally trained people to join DITIB at a later stage in life. This mix of newcomers and established members enables the organization to meet various demands. The spokespersons are familiar with the newest communication technologies and use the internet as a communication channel and source of information for professional purposes. The regular use of blogs, YouTube, and social platforms such as Facebook is one of the responsibilities of the spokesperson for press and public affairs. The long-term members facilitate contact to the grass roots level of the organization and guard organizational or issue-specific knowledge on which the newcomers can rely (IN DITIB 4: 27).49 Most of the interviewees stated that the organization has evolved past the “foundation phase” and the “phase of keeping things going” and is now in a “phase of renewal” (IN DITIB 4: 99). They also acknowledged that the organization is slow to adapt to the changes in its external environment by acquiring new resources that allow for the envisioned professionalization. These resources are mainly linked to the second generation, which increasingly fills the positions at the headquarters and thus influences the direction of the organization and its activities. 48 This is the case for the first woman on the executive board, for example, who is also a women’s rights and education activist outside of DITIB’s structures. Between 2007 and 2009, there were a second theologian in addition to the DITIB president, an engineer, an orthopedist, a retiree, and a social pedagogue on the executive board. 49 During the interviews, almost all doors at the headquarters building in Cologne were always open. The atmosphere was very relaxed and lively, with various interactions taking place between the actors, even during the interviews.



the individual organization209 Well, a process of renewal always has to be socially compatible, also has to be compatible with regard to content, and a process of renewal requires, first, that the resources are available that the resources are tested so to speak on the labor market and are operational, and that is why sometimes it takes longer than one might think it should take looking backwards, but it is societal changes, for example, are much faster than an organization can ever be and one always forgets this (IN DITIB 4: 99).

In 2007 the Research Center on Religion and Society (FOREGE) was established in Cologne to provide critical background studies on the current public discourses (IN DITIB 1: 265, 283). In 2009 FOREGE, which is financed by DITIB, hired three full-time and several part-time employees. FOREGE also offers scholarships for Ph.D. students.50 One of the interviewees linked DITIB’s engagement in science to its mission to promote education and knowledge, which is also reflected in its aim to establish religious education (IN DITIB 1–2: 10). Furthermore, the theological approach of FOREGE is connected to the work of Prof. Özsoy of the foundation professorship at Goethe University Frankfurt, whose aim is to establish a theology that meets the needs of “many from the center of Germany” (ibid.: 277). The current work of FOREGE also includes the development of a concept for a theological representation of the Muslims in Germany which might eventually allow for binding decisions similar to the Islamic Religious Community in Austria (IRCA, Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich).51 In addition, FOREGE is involved in the academic reflection of political discourses that are considered to be going around in circles (ibid.: 83). FOREGE was initiated by Diyanet’s officer responsible for German affairs, who was later sent to Germany to establish and lead the center. Like the spokesperson for press and public relations, he grew up in Germany. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Berlin University and then moved to Turkey. This shows that the recruitment of experienced and trained personnel for the jobs at Diyanet and the DITIB headquarters is a recurring strategy.

50 URL: http://www.forege.de/web/ [last visited 26-Apr-2012]. 51 URL: http://www.derislam.at/index.php [last visited 14-June-2012]. IRCA has the status of a corporation of public law. It is led by its elected president, a mufti, a first imam, and a Shura Council. Its decisions are binding because IRCA represents all Muslims in Austria (IN DITIB 1–2: 83). However, ATIB, DITIB’s Austrian counterpart, refuses to join the IRCA because “it claims institutional representation within IRCA (as ATIB), whereas the IRCA constitution only refers to individual members” (Kroissenbrunner 2002: 204; cf. Sezgin/ Rosenow-Williams 2013).

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Finances No exact figures are available for the finances of DITIB and its headquarters. In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, former DITIB President Sadi Arslan (2007–2011) stated that DITIB has an annual budget of about €5 million (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010). The money comes from donations, which are higher when representative mosques are under construction. The Turkish state pays the imams and the personnel at the consulates, but does not provide funding for individual projects or mosques. The financial situation in Germany is thus very similar to the situation in Turkey, where the state provides funding for the Diyanet personnel but not for its mosques or other services (ibid.). The interviewees also noted that none of the DITIB mosques receive any money from Turkey or from abroad aside from the salary for the imams (IN DITIB 3: 114). The sources of donations and sponsors are not publicly disclosed, except at the local level, where a list of donations and membership fees is provided in some cases (IN DITIB 3: 115). Arslan further reports that the headquarters receives income from renting out apartments that are adjacent to the mosques (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010). According to Laurence, once the mosque communities join DITIB, their property becomes the property of Diyanet (Laurence 2006: 261). ZSU GmbH, the social service agency linked to DITIB,52 also provides services that generate income for the organization, such as burial, travel, and insurance services, a book and gift store, and the organization of the pilgrimage which DITIB coordinates with Diyanet (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010). The funding is used to pay the wages of the 20 full-time employees at the DITIB headquarters. The imams and the president are paid by the Turkish state through Diyanet. Despite the fact that at the end of the fourth panel of the DIK the organizations pledged to disclose their finances to the public,53 no details other than this general information are available for DITIB. Diyanet provides information on budget credits online, which increased from around TRY1.1bn (€550m) in 2005 to TRY1.6bn (€800m) in 2007,54 as 52 ZSU is the acronym of Zentrum für soziale Unterstützung (Sosyal Dayanişma Merkesi), which can be translated as Center for Social Support. URL: http://www.cenazefonu.de/v1/ [last visited 14-June-2012]. 53 The discussion group concludes: “transparency has to include, disclose, and discuss financial and actual income, including income from abroad” (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2009a: 31, translation KRW). 54 URL: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/german/default.asp [last visited 15-Apr-2010, no longer available], (cf. Footnote 32).



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compared to €225m (DM440m) in 1996 (see Seufert 1999a). This is a significant increase over the last decade. Diyanet uses some of that income to pay the imams in Turkey and abroad. DITIB bylaws provide that DITIB and its associated organizations are non-profit organizations. Their resources can only be used for statutable purposes (Ditib.de: Tätigkeiten, Gemeinnützigkeit, translation KRW).

The status of a registered association (“eingetragener Verein e. V.”) and its non-profit character also allow the organization to apply for public funding. Although one interviewee noted that “the mosque communities did not receive any money from the [German] state” (IN DITIB 2: 36), on the level of the headquarters, cooperation with German and European funding agencies is practiced with increasing success. This includes project work by BAMF, BMI, and the European Integration Fund (EIF). These projects and their significance with regard to a shift of interests and resource venues are discussed further below. The Regional Level “A Process of Decentralization” The most significant structural transformation DITIB is currently undergoing is a process of “decentralization” (IN DITIB 1–2: 10). This mainly refers to the creation of so-called regional structures, meaning regional organizations that are situated at the level of the German federal states. Before the establishment of these regional state structures, DITIB used a rather top-down management approach characterized by “centralistic thinking” at the headquarters (IN DITIB 1: 53; IN DITIB 1–2: 10). However, regional organizations are a prerequisite for being acknowledged as a religious community, a status that is granted on the level of the federal states in the context of the right to provide Islamic religious education in public schools. Therefore, Islamic organizations must adapt to the existing church-state relations, which are modeled after the Christian churches.55 A first success being the acknowledgement of DITIB Hesse in July 2012 as a religious community and partner in the future provision of Islamic religious in that state (DITIB PR 19-July-2012, unknown FAZ.net 2012). 55 As discussed in Chapter Four, the existence of structural differences between Islamic umbrella organizations and the established churches in Germany is frequently used as a reason to deny the right to provide Islamic religious education or to be acknowledged as a corporation of public law.

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Overall, DITIB acknowledged that the close ties to the Turkish state hinder their official recognition as a religious community (IN DITIB 3: 19). The critical public discussion concerning this topic in recent years strengthened the organization’s willingness to establish decentralized structures (ibid.). In addition, DITIB introduced voluntary registration of its members to fulfill the criteria set for the introduction of religious education and the acknowledgement as a religious community (IN DITIB 2: 142).56 This shift took place despite the fact that Islam only requires individuals to state that they believe in Allah and the Prophet Mohammed, which means an official membership status in an Islamic organization is not necessary. Another element that is linked to the establishment of regional structures is the introduction of a women’s quota for the delegates that are sent to the federal state level assembly. Every organization with more than 200 members has to send two delegates, at least one of whom must be female (§ 12(3); 43 VR 15912). In the initial meetings, the heads of the local organizations automatically became delegates who could be substituted. In Berlin, this led to the participation of women in the inaugural meeting, who were also elected onto the regional executive board (IN DITIB 2: 154). The introduction of a women’s quota is said to be generally “well accepted” by the mosque communities (IN DITIB 2: 36), and the organization states that it actively encourages its associated member organization to promote the engagement of women in leadership positions (Arslan/ Çelikbudak 2010). The delegates are elected locally, while the imams are automatically members of the federal state level assembly. However, there is an informal agreement that the imams from Turkey cannot be elected onto the regional executive boards due to their lack of knowledge about Germany. The agreement that the imams are not members of the executive board is an informal agreement and is not included in the bylaws because there may be imams who are born and trained in Germany, in which case they should have the opportunity to assume responsibilities on the regional executive boards (IN DITIB 2: 142). Both the German language and the general knowledge about Germany are prerequisites for becoming a member of the regional executive boards, who are elected every two years by the organizational delegates including 56 See also the bylaws of DITIB’s federal state level organization in North Rhine-Westphalia, the regional organization in Cologne, which were enacted on February 15, 2009 (DITIB-Landesverband NRW, Regionalverband Köln; 43 VR 15912; municipal court Cologne).



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the imams (ibid.: § 17). However, the candidates for these regional executive boards are nominated by the DITIB executive board (ibid.: § 16 (1c)). In addition, the regional organizations also include a religious council, which advises the executive board on religious questions primarily related to the issue of Islamic religious education. Its members are also directly appointed by the DITIB executive board, and eligible candidates must have studied Islamic Theology for at least four years. However, this process of DITIB’s restructuring is not without internal struggles. According to the interviewees, these struggles are not associated with the individual members, but are initiated by the heads of the local associations who used this time of change to advance their interests within the organization. These interests are not specified in the interview, but are referred to as “revisiting older debates” (IN DITIB 1–2: 39), which are likely related to the distribution of responsibilities and the organization’s country of origin orientation versus country of settlement orientation. One interviewee also stated that there is a generational conflict between the younger generations, who support an increase of local competencies, and the older generation of members, who are critical of the increasing detachment from the Turkish state. The hiring of younger personnel at the headquarters thus also facilitated the process of decentralization. Finally, it must be noted that the regional organizations do not exactly correspond to the geographical boundaries of the German federal states, but are modeled after the districts of the Attachés for Religious Affairs.57 The organization thus chose the easier way by using existing structures. This explains the existence of two regional executive boards in some federal states. The two executive boards each elect one spokesperson, who then negotiates with the representatives of the federal state. In most cases, this structure is justified with reference to the question of feasibility. Some federal states are so large that the members of the executive board find it impossible to reach all their member organizations. This is also due to their status as volunteers who have to pay the travel expenses out of their own personal funds.58 In addition, the churches, which are 57 There are ten attachés for religious services in Germany, who work as counselors for the 13 Turkish consulate generals. These consulate generals are not found in all German federal states. Instead, they are situated in areas with a large population of people of Turkish origin: Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover, Münster, Düsseldorf, Essen, Mainz, Frankfurt am Main, Karlsruhe, Hürth, Nuremberg, Munich, and Stuttgart (Turkish Embassy in Germany, URL: http://berlin.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ContactInfo.aspx [last visited 22-Feb-2012]). Aside from Berlin, DITIB has no mosque community in the former Eastern German states (Wolleh/Zunzer 2007: 56). 58 The regional DITIB executive boards are expected to meet at least once a month (ibid.: § 18 (4)).

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divided into dioceses, established regional churches, and synods, are cited as examples of organizations whose structures do not correspond to the boundaries of the German federal states either (IN DITIB 3: 142). However, one interviewee criticizes this set-up of the regional structures as not very “far-sighted” (IN DITIB 1–2: 39) because it is vulnerable to criticism regarding the attachment to Turkey due to its attachment to the Attaché districts. This is in conflict with one of the professed aims of the process: the severing of the ties with the Turkish state. Chapter Six discusses the general conflict between DITIB and the other KRM organizations over the independent or joint establishment of regional structures with reference to KRM. DITIB has been aware of a potential conflict with KRM, but still proudly presents the regional structures as the most recent organizational achievement, which also reflects DITIB’s motivation to professionalize the organization. While the aims associated with this restructuring (such as recognition as a religious community by the German state) are not new at all, DTIIB officials argue that long-term planning is finally taking place within the organization, with structured thinking replacing ad-hoc responses to certain events or daily issues which characterized DITIB in the past (IN DITIB 1–2: 10). The Local Level The majority of Turkish immigrants who are members of a mosque association are members of a DITIB mosque community (Şen 2008). The BAMF study on Muslim Life in Germany does not ask questions about membership in an umbrella organization, but about “knowledge of”, and “perceived representation” by, an umbrella organization (Haug et al. 2009: 17).59 DITIB has the highest rates of all umbrella organizations participating in the DIK I and KRM in both categories (44% know of DITIB, and 16% feel represented by it). According to a controversial study by the ZfT,60 DITIB most members are men (54.7%) with an average age of 41.8 years, who have lived in Germany for an average of 23.4 years. Their main reasons to migrate were family reunification (53.9%) and “guest worker” status (33.9%). In 2000

59 The question about representation could be criticized for being too far-reaching. It would have been more productive to ask questions about membership or the use of services with reference to each of the six surveyed Islamic umbrella organizations. It would also have been of interest to include IGMG, which was omitted from the BAMF study despite the fact that it consists of 323 associated mosque communities (see below). 60 The study was conducted among 2,066 Turkish immigrants in 2000. It was criticized in the interviews as not being representative.



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only 9.7% of members were German-born, which shows that DITIB’s links to the younger generation of Turkish origin in Germany are relatively weak (Şen 2008: 45). It must be noted that the local DITIB mosque communities differ greatly in terms of size and resources. This is often associated with their geographic location and catchment area. In general, mosques and mescits are open to every Muslim. He or she can participate in the activities without having to become an official member. The local communities are voluntary registered associations which follow DITIB bylaws. They also elect a local executive board and a president. Everyone who pays the membership fee of €10–20 a month can run for these offices. In many cases, the names of the members and the amount of their donations or fees are posted on the bulletin board in the mosque, a policy regarded as a sign of transparency. According to one interview, the local organizations are completely selffunded, with the exception of the imam, who is paid by Diyanet. “Thus there is no DITIB mosque that receives money from abroad, not a single one, and also not from Turkey, aside from the imams” (IN DITIB 3: 114). This finding regarding financial independence is consistent with Kroissen­ brunner’s observation that the Austrian counterparts of DITIB, IGMG, and VIKZ also emphasized that the local associations are independent from their umbrella organizations. Kroissenbrunner argues that although this is legally correct given their status as registered associations, “each mosque association is served and ideologically controlled by its headquarters” (Kroissenbrunner 2002: 182). The local associations, for example, have to adapt to and follow the bylaws of their umbrella organization. With regard to recruiting members who run the organization, the local communities face problems similar to those experienced by all voluntary organizations. Most of them are run by retirees who have enough time during the day and who are supported by the working community members on weekends or at night. The following passage highlights the importance of the resources that can be contributed by the working members in the form of education and access to knowledge and contacts. The majority of the voluntary staff in the mosques are old people, and then there are of course those who also come after work and on the weekend, who are very engaged but who do something else in their main job, and they have different competencies and also capacities, which means that one must always look at how well a local community works, and that is always linked to its size and the resources that they possess, whereas the resources are not even the financial ones, but rather the resources concerning education, access to knowledge, and contacts (IN DITIB 4: 75).

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This research focuses on the headquarters and therefore does not examine the diversity of local mosque communities affiliated with DITIB (cf. Beilschmidt forthcoming; Yaşar 2012). However, it must be noted that changes concerning the diversification of DITIB’s activities and the decentralization of its structures have a local impact. In particular, the extension of the public affairs work at DITIB’s headquarters is reflected in the local mosque communities, where new jobs were created in the area of dialogue work and public relations, with the latter often being part of the former (see below). The process of decentralization has also brought more participatory rights to the local mosques, which now have to send delegates to the regional organizations. However, the following analysis of DITIB activities shows that in many cases, financial and human resources which are needed to expand service activities are insufficient. In her study on DITIB mosque communities, Yaşar (2012) also notes that sometimes local members do not embrace new service offers. This indicates a gap between organizationally desired services and local engagement for these activities. Organizational Communication Structures The basis of our work are of course opinions, feelings, interests, fears, those are all part of our work, and one has to determine them and one has to see what exists out there, and to what one can react and how (IN DITIB 4: 63).

The passage quoted above refers to the work of the spokesperson for press and public affairs, who monitors new media channels to find signs of topics and feelings that can be addressed by DITIB. However, this fairly new way of getting in touch with members and the general public is only a minor part of the internal communication strategy. “Personal Conversation Is Actually the Most Important Form” Internal communication generally relies heavily on personal communication between members of the headquarters and the local communities. The personal communication channels include the president of DITIB, who can be contacted by the members when he visits the local mosque communities. In the interviews, this is presented as a sign of a flat organizational hierarchy. Another option is communication via the Attachés for Religious Affairs, who are in regular contact with the imams and provide information to the executive board of the headquarters (IN DITIB 1: 349). Supervision of the imams allows the Attachés to gain insights into the activities of the mosque communities with which they have loose relationships, although



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they are not directly linked to them. Thus, one way of communication between the local mosques and the headquarters is through the Attachés for Religious Affairs, who are also in close contact with the president of DITIB (IN DITIB 1: 349). Actually, many things are communicated by telephone, through personal contacts, via the internet, via email, they are communicated by letter, and sometimes an association from Stuttgart, they just say we come by (…). Personal conversation is actually the most important form of communication. Of course there is also always someone who travels to the individual communities when there are problems or wishes (IN DITIB 4: 83).

DITIB tries to determine the interests of its members, but this is not done systematically. However, there are plans to establish an internet platform for the empirical analysis of mosque attendance and local wishes within the structure of the representatives for dialogue affairs, who are trained in the proDialogue project (see below) (IN DITIB 4: 95). “That Is Already a Generational Issue, Really” The passage below introduces another channel of communication: the monthly members’ magazine Haber Bülteni. It functions as a network link between the mosque communities, which can present their activities in this member magazine, which is distributed in all local mosques. According to one interviewee, the members feel appreciated when they read their own contributions. Thus, the magazine has a “bonding character” between the headquarters and the 889 mosque communities (IN DITIB 3: 93). And the members’ magazine is issued once a month, and there we have also already included passages in German, for example. It is not translated completely because, like I said, there one must also always see who are the main actors in the mosque communities (3) that is my dad and my mum, but that is a different generation, and that is already a generational issue, really (IN DITIB 4: 127).

Until September 2008, Haber Bülteni was published in Turkish only. Since then, German translations of four texts about themes of the month have been published.61 These German texts are also published in the quarterly magazine DITIB Zeitschrift, which has been in publication since the end of 2008 and which is available on the German webpage, while Haber Bülteni 61 The topics of the issues published before the end of 2009 were: Ramadan, mosques, pilgrimages, foundations, science, youth, old age, peace messages from the Prophet, the parents, the environment, the education of children, and Ramadan.

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is only accessible through the Turkish website. This differentiation can also be regarded as an indicator of the separation of topics. While the Turkish magazine focuses on internal affairs such local religious and cultural festivities which often involve visits from the Turkish consulates and their Attachés, the German press releases focus more on the organizations’ integration goals.62 According to the interviewees, the recent decision to include German texts in the member magazine is explained by the establishment of the research center (FOREGE) in 2008 and the increase in court cases relating to claims raised by the Muslim community in Germany. However, it is also acknowledged that “it makes no sense to pursue scientific work there” (IN DITIB 1: 299). Therefore, the texts continue to be written by the communities themselves. They send them to the headquarters, which publishes them on the Turkish website and in the member magazine Haber Bülteni. In one interview, the description of the magazine is followed by this statement: There definitely exists, I think (5) yes, I don’t know, a divide is put too strongly, between the organization DITIB, especially between the headquarters and the community (5) (IN DITIB 1: 301).

This criticism is based on the fact that the headquarters feels somewhat detached from the local communities (except the one in Cologne), and that the headquarters is so occupied with its new focus on press and public relations work that the link to the community has diminished (ibid.). To show that the members still play a role, the interviewee continued his narrative by stressing the importance of the younger generation for DITIB (see above). “In the Past, the Headquarters Used to Carry It to the Associations” The fact that the existing communication structures did not suit the growing number of mosque associations was another factor that fostered the process of decentralization. The contextual factor ‘size’ thus becomes relevant given the relatively fast growth of the organization. One representative hinted at organizational problems that emerged due to the required coordination tasks, such as the reduction of flexibility at the head­quarters (IN DITIB 1: 53). Although the interviewee mentioned that direct contact to the DITIB president is relatively open, “even when one is an imam” 62 Detailed results of the headline analysis of the German and Turkish press releases and the members’ magazine are discussed below and in Chapter Six: Relations with the Media.



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(ibid.: 353), the following passage indicates a perceived lack of support, which is to be addressed through the introduction of regional structures. In the past, the headquarters used to carry it to the associations, but until it arrived [there, KRW] and was actually accepted and understood and, and, and, and. Of course, there were regular meetings, but all this was not possible. Now we at least have regional structures which are trained continuously and receive certain information. Where they can act relatively freely in their  federal states, but that can support the associations much better. Support is guaranteed much more now. In the past, support came from the headquarters, and there you couldn’t support all associations equally well (IN DITIB 2: 226).

Transforming the organizational structures into a more decentralized system thus meets two demands—an internal and an external one. It meets the members’ demand for more support, as well as the political and legal expectations that are associated with the establishment of a religious community and the associated right to deliver religious education in public schools. Adaptation of the structures therefore seems ideal and can serve to gain organizational legitimacy on both levels. Summary The most notable development of DITIB’s structures of the last ten years was the expansion of personnel at the headquarters, particularly in the area of public affairs. This includes the hiring of both long-term members and externally trained personnel, a process which also involved the DITIB executive board. This structural change can be explained by increasing internal demands due to a growing and diversified community of individual and collective DITIB members. The focus on the role of women and public outreach activities (such as the foundation of FOREGE) can also be linked to external expectations of the German institutional environment with which the organization is confronted. The same duality of expectations was found for the second major structural change, the establishment of regional structures. On the one hand, the associated process of decentralization meets internal demands concerning more participatory rights, overstretched resources at the headquarters, and the aim to offer religious education, which necessarily requires a decentralized structure. On the other hand, there is the external expectation that these regional structures provide regional negotiation partners at the level of German federal states and limit the authority of Diyanet over DITIB. The fact that this step is highly controversial in the organizational field of Islamic umbrella organizations, which expected

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a  similar process with regard to KRM, is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. It can be concluded that DITIB portrays the process of its decentralization as an important part of its professionalization strategy. Interviewees noted that this step primarily serves the interests of the second generation of activists, while the older generation is rather skeptical due to the perceived detachment from Turkey. With regard to the explanatory value of the eight contextual factors, it was found that the issues of size, ownership and control, and interdependence are relevant in the context of restructuring. The growth of the organization necessitates changes to the control structures, which are in turn influenced by the interdependent relationship with the Turkish Attachés for Religious Affairs, as reflected in the establishment of regional DITIB districts. This is further explained by the history of the organization and its traditional links to Diyanet and the Turkish state, which can cause problems and offer advantages for the organization, as discussed in more detail in Chapter Six: Relations to Actors Abroad. DITIB’s Activities The narratives of organizational change presented above also indicate that DITIB must change its activity structure. The resulting development within the organization is aptly described by the term ‘diversification of services’, which extends the responsibility of providing religious service that used to be central to the organization. One of the representatives referred to the comparison between old and new mosques and their functions, concluding that in the new mosques, such as the central mosque currently under construction in Cologne, religious services may even become “secondary” (IN DITIB 1: 73). This is explained by the fact that the demand for religious services is satisfied. According to the interviews, this diversification of services is new to the organization and its mosque communities, and it is related to the demands raised internally and externally on the German political level. Gibbons’ study on Diyanet’s evolution also emphasizes a third important influence that is related to the broadening of activities, namely the changes within Diyanet after Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu became its president in 2003. As a former professor, his aim was to promote religious education and the public presence of religion through project work that goes beyond the facilitation of worship: These include ambitious measures to increase staff capabilities and broaden the agency’s services by expanding into sectors where religious actors were



the individual organization221 not commonly found, such as family counseling. The DRA [= Diyanet, KRW] has also recently funded the free distribution of religious literature and organized hundreds of conferences on religious topics that are open to the public. The agency’s emphasis on expanding religious services beyond facilitating worship reached its peak with the DRA’s 2009–2013 strategic plan, released in fall 2008, which includes measures to transform 200 mosques into social and cultural centers by building libraries, classrooms, and tea houses on their grounds (Gibbon 2009: 18).

DITIB now describes itself as a service provider for its associated member organizations. According to its website (www.ditib.de), DITIB services in Germany include: religious services, interreligious dialogue, cultural activities, integration services, social work and other forms of assistance, youth work, activities for women, welfare services, funeral services, pilgrimage services, research activities of the newly-founded FOREGE, public relations work, and a family and social counseling hotline. The interviewees noted that the members can approach the different departments at the headquarters to receive advice on various issues ranging from legal and managerial issues to event planning to the construction of mosques. This also includes the provision of mediators in local conflicts, which can be resolved through personal conversations or visits by headquarters representatives (cf. IN DITIB 3: 73; IN DITIB 4: 83). The Professionalization of Project Work The first part of this section focuses on the projects provided by DITIB which represent more long-term activities. The second part discusses these activities, from the perspective of the organizational event management that is prominent within DITIB’s public affairs work. This overview of activities suggests a diversified profile of DITIB services offered. However, a distinction must be made between the services offered by the headquarters and those offered by the local mosque communities. This is where the question of resources becomes relevant. Many local communities built a mosque in recent years, but now they lack the financial resources to offer services that require the hiring of qualified personnel whom they would have to pay on their own. The result is that the headquarters has to support them despite limited resources on both sides. “Putting Issue-Related Work at the Center” One change that is expected to take place in the future is that DITIB will shift its focus from mosque building projects toward issue-related activities. “In the immediate future we will move slowly but steadily from erecting buildings to putting issues-related work at the center” (IN DITIB 2: 36).

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According to the interviewee, building and investing in mosques was one of the main interests of many local organizations which wanted to get out of the so-called backyard mosques to offer their members better opportunities without having to renegotiate the rent with a landlord every year. The DITIB community wanted “something that belongs to them and what they can give back to their children, being able to say I have done that for my grandchildren” (IN DITIB 2: 36). Despite the fact that the property acquired belongs to Diyanet (Laurence 2006), the erection of mosques is seen as a sign of arrival and settling down: “This phase is also a sign that they have understood that they belong here” (ibid.). This argument is also found on a KRM flyer for the day of the open mosque in 2007, which justifies the construction of mosques as places that are needed for social activities as follows: “Those who build intend to stay” (“Wer baut, will bleiben”) (KRM 2007b). However, the fact that millions of euros have been invested in the construction of local mosques by DITIB members has also prevented investment in other projects and activities. The DITIB headquarters personnel tries to fill this gap by initiating projects that can enrich the activities at the local level without having to spend much money. The following section presents five projects in which DITIB participates or which were directly initiated by the DITIB headquarters. The Project “Do You Know Who I Am?” One of the larger interreligious projects in Germany is called “Do You Know Who I Am?” (“Weißt Du, wer ich bin?”). It is a joint project of the consortium of Christian Churches in Germany (Arbeitsgemeinschaft christlicher Kirchen, ACK), the Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland e. V., ZJD), ZMD, and DITIB. The project was initiated in 2005 and ran until 2011. It brought together people from diverse religious backgrounds to promote peaceful coexistence in Germany. Local initiatives, which can also involve secular actors, are supported by the project partners. In the first period (2005–2008) over 100 projects were funded. Most of the funding is provided by the German Bishops’ Conference (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz, DBK), the Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, EKD), BMI, and EIF. The other organizations contribute ‘symbolic’ amounts (€1,000–€5,000). The project has an annual volume of €100,000. With regard to the involvement of DITIB, the project’s evaluation report optimistically notes that in the first period, 2005–2007, DITIB increased its



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dialogue personnel to three full-time positions, which strengthened its dialogue capacities outside of the project (Wolleh/Zunzer 2007: 47). DITIB is also involved in the executive board and the project committee. However, DITIB does not actively promote this project on its own website. For example, it is not mentioned in any of its press releases. The only related document available in the Events section of the website is a report on the signing of the Cologne Peace Declaration on October 29, 2006, which condemns terrorism and violence.63 The Project “Christian-Muslim Peace Initiative” (cm-fi) In September 2006 the “Christian-Muslim Peace Initiative” (ChristlichMuslimische Friedensinitiative e. V., cm-fi)64 was established as a registered association. It was presented to the public on November 29, 2007. The main partners in this project are the German Association of Cities,65 the Coordination Council of Christian-Islamic Dialogue in Germany (Koordinierungsrat des christlich-islamischen Dialogs e. V., KCID),66 and DITIB. The general aim of cm-fi is to reduce tensions and build bridges between the Islamic cultural background and the Western world. It supports local initiatives and operates under the motto: “Achieving integration together”. More specific aims include integration, the search for common values, peaceful coexistence, and interreligious and intercultural meetings. The initiative rejects discrimination, extremism, and any form of violence. DITIB is the only Islamic umbrella organization within this initiative, but cm-fi is generally open to anyone. Its main activities include an annual awareness week, which includes a central event in Berlin, as well as Germany-wide local initiatives that also take place within DITIB communities, including a panel discussion at the headquarters in Cologne. This initiative was not mentioned in any of the interviews, but is dealt with in the German press statements issued on the DITIB website. The Project “ProMotivation” In 2008 DITIB initiated a training program for dialogue representatives at local mosque communities (DITIB PR 12-Dec-2008). The project is called 63 URL: http://www.DITIB.de/default1.php?id=9&sid=52&lang=de [last visited 23-Feb2012]. 64 URL: http://www.cm-fi.de/start.html [last visited 23-Feb-2012]. 65 URL: www.staedtetag.de [last visited 23-Feb-2012]. 66 URL: www.kcid.de [last visited 23-Feb-2012].

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“proMotivation” and is funded by the German Federal Government in cooperation with BAMF. Its aim is to provide training to a group of people (40 in the first round),   who are to function as multipliers of knowledge in their local communities. In this project, the expectation of the government “to organize and to cooperate” is directly met by DITIB. The aim of “proMotivation” is to support bridge builders in their function as ‘integration guides (‘Integrationslotsen’), who are to initiate local integration-oriented projects and act as spokespersons for their organization. The project includes courses in the areas of efficient office organization, correct complaint management, presentation techniques, project planning, and application for funding. Information was also provided about the latest immigration and integration policy changes, the relevant German institutions, and the integration activities already offered by DITIB. Requirements for participation were fluency in German and knowledge about German structures and politics (IN DITIB 2: 36). In addition to the ideal of promoting integration, the project’s idea is also linked to the general problem of scarce resources. The limited funding from the German government, which did not support the work of local mosque communities until very recently,67 is criticized in the interview (ibid.). Due to the lack of funds for professional employees, the organization has to rely on voluntary work. “proMotivation” meets the need to activate the potential of younger members for the organization by giving them the necessary tools and responsibility to organize local activities. The first results include the provision of language classes and activities for women in some cities. That the project is supported at the highest level of the organization is publicly stated in the press release issued to announce the award of the certificates by the DITIB president, who was accompanied by the assistant secretary and the religious attaché from the Turkish consulate in Düsseldorf (DITIB PR 12-Dec-2008). The Project “ProDialogue” On May 22, 2009 DITIB announced its project “proDialogue – In the Midst of Life” (“proDialog – mitten im Leben”). The project is supported by BAMF

67 The list of projects funded by German federal agencies includes “proDialogue” (see below) and a project to promote intercultural opening and qualification of local Muslim communities in Stuttgart (participants included DITIB, VIKZ, and other Bosnian, Albanian, and Alevi organizations (DIK 2009a: 415ff.).



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and EIF (DIK 2009a: 415; DITIB PR 09-Dec-2009) and ran for three years (February 2009–December 2011). Its aim was to “qualify voluntary multipliers and dialogue representatives for intercultural and interreligious cooperation” (DITIB flyer).68 Young men and women who speak German fluently and also know Germany’s institutional structures were trained as bridge builders for the project. The plan was to train 1,800 people as dialogue representatives in the areas of interreligious and intercultural dialogue and press and public affairs, and to teach them software skills (e.g., Microsoft Office). At the end of the courses the representatives received a handbook that enabled them to share their knowledge with other community members. In addition, a website was created to allow participants to communicate with each other in the future. Another aim of “ProDialogue” was to facilitate Germany-wide evaluation processes among DITIB communities, with questions such as “How many regular visitors do we have? Where do most of them come from? What are their main interests? What do they think about our service?” (IN DITIB 4: 91) It is a huge challenge, this project, but at the same time it is a very important project not only for the communities but also for Germany, it is a very important project because even when we train these people, today he is with DITIB and tomorrow he is somewhere else, but he has received competencies (IN DITIB 4: 95).

“ProDialogue” is the largest project DITIB has ever initiated, and it took one year to prepare. One interviewee noted that the personnel resources are crucial for planning such a project. The recently hired spokesperson for press and public affair, a trained project manager, emphasized that much of the project work and its preparation was voluntary and done in addition to regular working hours. However, she also believed that it was important to get people together “to overcome the stage of ‘we could and we should’” (ibid.). The Project “Hotline for Family and Social Counseling” In April 2009 DITIB set up a telephone hotline to offer family and social  counseling.69 Like other telephone services in Germany that are  provided by public and church initiatives, the hotline is anonymous. 68 URL: www.DITIB.de/media/File/prodialog_flyer.pdf [last visited 26-Apr-2012]. 69  URL: http://www.DITIB.de/default1.php?id=6&sid=57&lang=de [last visited 14-June2012].

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The advertisement for the hotline lists the following services in this order: family conflicts, education and upbringing, addiction, psychosocial problems, domestic violence, sexual abuse, forced marriage, marriage and separation, debts, family reunion and residency, institutions and administrations in Germany, and discrimination (translation KRW). In providing this fairly wide range of services, the project is guided by the principle of “helping people to help themselves”. The aim of the hotline is to provide official sources of help with guidance on the above-mentioned issues. Located at the DITIB headquarters, the hotline is one of the projects that were initiated by Ms. Kiliçarslan in her role as assistant secretary of the organization. The list of topics covered by the hotline can be regarded as a response to external integration expectations, which see Islamic organizations as bridge builders between their members and the German society. DITIB claims to meet this expectation by advocating the use of official institutions. In addition, the hotline covers controversial topics such as forced marriage and family reunification, as well as the upbringing of children. It would be interesting to conduct studies on the advice provided and the types of questions asked by the anonymous callers. The hotline is open to everyone, but is aimed primarily at women and can therefore be regarded as one of DITIB’s activities to better serve the needs and interests of women. Another aim is to analyze the problems and demands mentioned during the calls to determine the members’ interests. The results of this analysis could also be used to facilitate organizational professionalization (IN DITIB 2: 36). The Professionalization of Public Affairs Work The following overview of the public affairs work shows that the diversity of demands on the organization is also reflected in its external communication patterns that target the general public. The second part of this section discusses the content of DITIB’s press releases and compares the Turkish and the German press releases to identify possible decoupling mechanisms in this context. “The Creation of Opportunities to Come Together” In the interview with the newly-hired spokesperson for press and public affairs70 it turned out that the scope of DITIB’s outreach work in Germany is much broader than one might expect of an organization whose 70 She refers to herself as “Referentin für Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit”.



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members are all of Turkish descent. When asked about the daily routine and the target groups of public affairs activities, she mentioned a variety of groups, but specifically focused on the general public, with expectations “to cooperate” and “to promote integration” being presented as taken for granted. Well, it is not that one would say we have a target group now, our target group is everyone who is interested in the topic, our target group are also those who do not know us yet, those to whom we should simply introduce ourselves, and somehow, definitely, also those who are afraid of contact, or to put it bluntly, who have prejudices, whereas this is, of course, the target group, one can reach the hardest, but there are also possibilities, and we are, for example, always open to requests when a group says we would like to get to know you (IN DITIB 4: 55).

DITIB’s public affairs work often involves event management, including the participation in and the organization of events. On the one hand, information brokering, on the other hand always also the creation of communication space, or as it is called in ‘new German’: ‘cometogether opportunities’ (IN DITIB 4: 55).

It is interesting to note that the political level is regarded as marginal because “it does not help if I reach the political level in a positive sense, as it were, but then lose the people in the process” (IN DITIB 4: 75). This shows that the political level is an important player within the field and is perceived as such. It also shows that DITIB strives for recognition by the general public. To present a positive profile, DITIB is actively engaged in public outreach projects such as local festivities, guided tours of local mosques, informative programs (e.g., their weeklong activities marking the 60th anniversary of the German Basic Law in May 2009, and panel discussions. Another notable outreach activity is the extensive bilingual webpage in German and Turkish, which includes a large archive of German orga­ nizational press releases and information on DITIB’s activities.71 A comparative analysis of the German and Turkish press statements shows that DITIB’s German press releases put greater emphasis on the expectations to “promote integration” and “denounce terrorism” (27% and 10% 71 URLs: http://www.DITIB.de (DITIB) and http://www.DITIBjugend.de/ (the youth section). The amount of content provided in German is remarkable compared to ATIB’s website in Austria, which has only recently been translated into German (URL: http://www .atib.at). The Dutch website is in Turkish only (URL: http://www.diyanet.nl/ [all links last visited 26-Apr-2012]).

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respectively), and that the Turkish press releases focus more closely on the local issues such as cooperation (29%), religion (23%), and internal affairs (15%). The difference between German and Turkish press releases is particularly noticeable with regard to “cooperation”: Only the Turkish versions include frequent reports on local meetings, which often involve Turkish actors such as Attachés for Religious Affairs from the Turkish consulates (cf. Table 10). One interviewee indicated that this may be due to the fact that local meetings would not be of interest to the German readership (IN DITIB 4).72 The much larger number of Turkish press releases (192, as compared to 49 German press releases) is linked to the fact that many Turkish articles are also printed in the members’ magazine Haber Bülteni. The difference in the number of press releases can also be explained by the different target groups of the Turkish and German websites. It is mainly the Turkish website that is frequented by the members of the organization who want to find internal information on current organizational affairs. This is only 50 40 30 20

10

Turkish PRs (n=192)

29

27

23

13

18

15 14

10

10

0 0

ak 8. in In g ter na la 9. ffa Co irs un tr y of or 10 ig .M in isc ell an eo us

io n

4

German PRs (n=49)

s-m

aim

Re lig 7.

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6.

ra tio n

s lu e

2

oo pe

an

va

5. C

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1 2

3.

Se 2.

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1714

Figure 7: Comparison of DITIB’s German and Turkish press releases in 2009 (%).

72 For example, IGMG has a separate news section which reports exclusively on the internal level of activities at each of its member organizations. This section is available in German and Turkish, with direct translations of articles provided. The professed aim of this detailed reporting is to provide the German readership with insights into the daily life of mosque communities in Germany and Europe to promote mutual understanding and transparency (IGMG 2: 324).



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partly due to their language preference. The German website simply does not offer the same information, especially concerning local events. However, if a press release concerning a certain topic is published in both languages, it is nearly always a direct translation. Therefore, the accusation that the opinions are portrayed differently in the Turkish versions is unfounded. Rather, the focus and selection of topics differ with regard to the readership, a strategy that is used by many organizations. Table 10 shows the changes in the content of the German press releases between 2005 and 2009. What is most remarkable is the increase in the number of press releases that deal with questions of integration, which can be linked to the changes in DITIB’s activities, which are described in this section under the key term ‘diversification of activities’. The religious content, however, has not decreased in absolute numbers, although Figure 15 (p. 407) shows a decrease in relative numbers since 2007. The number of references to the country of origin is extremely low, except in 2007, when the newly-elected DITIB president met with various Turkish actors in Germany to introduce himself and DITIB. The second most prominent category after ‘religion’ is ‘cooperation’, which is dealt with in reports on the various meetings held and attended by DITIB personnel. The third most frequently occurring category, ‘miscellaneous’, refers to congratulations and condolences as well as reports on current events in Germany and across the world. Summary The development of DITIB’s activities indicates a diversification of activities as well as the ambition of further professionalization. This is mainly, Table 10: DITIB’s German press releases Aug. 2005–Dec. 2009 (absolute numbers). Basic Secu- Integra- German Cooper­ ReliLaw rity tion values ation gion 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total

0 0 0 1 0 1

3 3 6 5 5 22

0 2 5 5 13 25

0 0 0 0 1 1

5 3 10 8 5 31

4 11 8 7 9 39

Claims Internal Country Miscel­ Total Making affairs of Origin laneous 0 3 0 2 2 7

1 0 13 4 7 25

Highlighted cells represent the most frequently mentioned topic in each year.

0 0 5 1 0 6

4 5 1 11 7 28

17 27 48 44 49 185

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but not only, directed at the establishment of professional dialogue work on all levels of the organization. This dialogue increasingly involves the installment of evaluation mechanisms to provide better knowledge about internal members’ interests. Professionalization ambitions are also present in the project work introduced above, the aim of which is to train personnel to meet the increasing external demand to cooperate with various actors. By providing or acquiring the funds for these training measures, the headquarters meets the interest of its members and the expectation of the German government. The resulting cooperation with external donors strengthens DITIB’s ties to the German institutions. Overall, one can conclude that an increasing emphasis on Germany becomes apparent with regard to DITIB’s projects and its public affairs work. However, the organization also has to keep up traditions and relations with Turkey, mainly at the daily local level both in the religious services (prayers, sermons, holiday celebrations, and Qur’an courses) and the cultural activities, such as traditional dance and music classes and Turkish language courses, which are held in addition to German language courses. The ties to Turkey are also highlighted symbolically, such as by presenting the Turkish flag next to the German flag in official pictures.73 The practiced organizational transnationalism is also structurally embedded on the level of institutionalized relations with Diyanet, which can be observed much more openly on the local level than on the levels of the DITIB headquarters. For example, while the presence of the Diyanet president during the biannual meetings of the executive board is not mentioned in the official press releases (concerning the meetings see DITIB PR 08-Apr-2007 and 10-Nov-2009), the invitation of Attachés for Religious Affairs or other Diyanet personnel to local events is frequently announced in the description of events in the members’ magazine Haber Bülteni. A comparison between the content of the official press releases and the articles in the member magazine also reveals differences between activities and projects organized by the headquarters and at the local level, with the local level placing greater emphasis on religion and homeland traditions, and the headquarters emphasizing integration-related activities. The following section shows that German and Turkish public affairs are

73 See, for example, the presentation of the members of the executive board on the DITIB website, URL: http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=5&sid=56&lang=de [last visited 14-June-2012].



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further separated in terms of the events organized by DITIB and the invited cooperation partners. DITIB’s Partners74 DITIB’s self-understanding is that of a facilitator of cooperation. The organization simultaneously tries to establish good ties with the German government and various other actors, including the other umbrella organizations. This indicates a notion of competition, which is due to the dependence of each organization on public and membership support. In this context, DITIB repeatedly emphasizes its special role as the largest and thus most influential Islamic umbrella organization in Germany. The activities and press releases presented above show that DITIB initiates or participates in cooperation projects to promote integration, civic engagement, dialogue, and the fight against discrimination. An analysis of the actors who initiate joint projects with DITIB headquarters also reveals an interesting focus on non-Muslim partners (cf. Table 11). The following conclusions are based on the German and Turkish announcements of events in the form of posters published in the “Events” section of the website, which are analyzed with respect to partners and invited experts for the period April 2005 to December 2009. According to this analysis, the Catholic and Evangelic churches in Germany in particular represent the main contacts for the events announced on the German website. This can generally be attributed to the long tradition of interreligious dialogue activities, which began in 1976. However, in the case of DITIB, this is a fairly recent development, according to Jonker, who observes that at the very beginning these inter-faith dialogues did not forge partnerships with laicist Muslims. Rather they established links with lay Sufi movements that did not represent the majority of the Turkish population (Jonker 2005).

The well-established cooperation between DITIB and the churches in Germany also contradicts an earlier analysis by Seufert, who emphasizes the negative attitude of Diyanet toward any Christian organizations in Turkey and abroad (1999). Today the churches are mentioned first in the interviews, when the interviewees are asked to name organizational

74 Chapter Six provides a detailed analysis of the relationships among the Islamic umbrella organizations and their relations with other actors in this organizational field.

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contacts. Internally, this is linked to the churches’ initiatives to engage in common project and dialogue work. The analysis of the events presented on the Turkish DITIB website, by contrast, shows that Turkish state actors become the most important partners, an observation that is in stark contrast to that for the German website (21 and 3 respectively). This is further proof of the organization’s strategy to use bilingualism to reach different target groups and to convey different information about its ties to the country of origin. Table 11: Partners for DITIB events (2005–2009). Actors

Frequency Turkish website

German website

Religious organizations

18

18

Organizations in Cologne

8

6

German federal 5 ministries 4 Science

5

Other Islamic organizations Other federal organizations

5

5

3

3

Interreligious dialogue Others Total

4

3

2 70

2 46

Turkish organizations

21

3

4

Details

Turkish embassy in Germany (13/2), consulates in Germany (7/0), Turkish House in Berlin (1), Protestant Church (7), Catholic Church (8), Jewish Community (3) City of Cologne (2), Police (2/1), Chamber of Trade (1), Adult Education Center (1), BFmF (1), Rhine Energy Foundation (1/0) Federal (2), regional (3) Islamic Chair in Frankfurt (3), Catholic University (1) KRM (3), ZMD (1) Federal Agency for Civic Education (2), German Association of Cities (1) cm-fi (1), KCID (1), CIG (2/1) Israeli embassy (2/2)

Source: DITIB’s German and Turkish website, section “Events” (April 2005– December 2009). Number of events listed: German website: 34; Turkish website: 115 (including 24 events that are also announced on the German website).



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The third largest group of DITIB’s partners is made up of regional ministries and the city officials in Cologne, followed by German federal ministries. This shows that the political network spans various levels (local, regional, federal, and international), but has a strong focus on the region of North Rhine-Westphalia.75 With regard to scientific actors, it was observed that particular emphasis is placed on the Diyanet-funded chair for Islamic Studies at the Goethe University Frankfurt. Most of the advertised events take place in Cologne and are organized by the mosque community Cologne-Ehrenfeld or the DITIB headquarters, which are closely associated with the local mosque communities. Events organized by other DITIB mosque communities are not advertised on the DITIB website from which this list of partners is derived. It is interesting to note that the other Islamic umbrella organizations were rarely referred to in the DITIB interviews. In most cases, the question concerning these contacts was answered with reference to KRM. ZMD is not mentioned at all, although DITIB does cooperate with ZMD on the level of mutual cooperation projects.76 IRD is mentioned only once in the interviews concerning its protest against the final progress report of the DIK in 2009, which arguably could not “be prevented” by KRM (IN DITIB 3: 45). Furthermore, DITIB generally only refers to other Sunni umbrella organizations. AABF is mentioned only once in a reference concerning the successful achievement of the status of a religious community (IN DITIB 3: 61). Table 12 lists the actors involved in the analyzed DITIB events, further underlining differences between the events presented on the German and the Turkish websites. While artists are much more frequently invited to events that are announced in Turkish (which indicates the cultural character of many Turkish events), the group that was most frequently invited to the events that are announced on the German website are scientific actors (including eleven experts with university ties in Germany and six from Turkish universities). The emphasis on scientific debates, which is 75 The DITIB headquarters is located in Cologne, and its representatives act as contact partners at all three levels simultaneously (Cologne, North Rhine-Westphalia, and on the federal level). During a discussion at a conference, Anton Rütten (Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women, and Integration of North Rhine-Westphalia) remarked, correctly, that this increasing responsibility to act as contacts on various social and political levels can lead to excessive demands on the (voluntary) personnel of Islamic organizations. 76 Joint projects include the interreligious dialogue “Do You Know Who I Am” and the joint cooperation between the police and local mosque communities which led to the establishment of the concept of “confidence-building measures” (BpB 2005).

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Table 12: Actors invited to DITIB Events (2005–2009). Actors

Frequency Turkish German website website

Artists

36

6

Science

23

16

DITIB

22

15

Turkish organizations

16

4

Religion

15

8

Other organizations federal and regional

10

1

9 Other organizations in Cologne

8

Details

Music (26/0), authors (4/0), comedians (2/2) painters (4/4), moderators (2/0) Islamic Chair in Frankfurt (4), University of Ankara (5/3), other universities in Germany (7), other Turkish Universities (7/2), Imams (2), presidents (7/3), executive board (7), Forege (2), others (4/1) Turkish consulate/embassy in Germany (8/2), Turkish embassy in the UK (1/1), Diyanet (7/1) Protestant Church (4/3), Catholic Church (4), Jewish Community (2/1), Qur’an recitation (5/0) German Association of Cities (1/1), German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (1/0), Union of Turkish Women (1/0), Turkish-German Union (1/0), European Association for Education and Science (1/0), LAGA NRW (1/0), Federation of Turkish Parents Associations NRW (1/0), West German Chamber of Crafts and Skilled Trades’ Council (1/0), Düsseldorf Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1/0), Migration Council of Oberhausen (1/0) The City of Cologne (Administration and Politics) (7), Adult Education Center (1), Chamber of Trade (1/0)



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Table 12: (Cont.) Actors

Frequency

Details

Turkish website

German website

German Ministries and Politicians Others

9

7

NRW (3/2), Federal (6/5)

5

1

Other Islamic organizations Interreligious Dialogue Total

3

3

Israeli embassy (1), medical personnel (3/0), transport company (1/0) KRM (3)

3

1

151

71

cm-fi & KCID (0/1), cm-fi (1/0), KCID (1/0), CIG (1/0)

Source: Based on information provided in the “Events” section of DITIB’s German and Turkish website (April 2005– December 2009). Number of events listed: German website = 34; Turkish website = 115 (including 24 events that are also announced on the German website).

limited primarily to theological debates, reveals the organizational focus on the education of its members and an interest in promoting religious dialogue. The latter interest is also reflected in the foundation of DITIB’s research center FOREGE. The majority of guests come from religious organizations, which reflects the religious identity of the organization, although the events are not necessarily limited to debates on religious topics. Table 12 also highlights the importance of networks between religious actors in the organizational field. It was only recently that this field was extended to include nonreligious actors from the areas of politics, education, and wider civil society (see Chap. Six). An example of the link to the German Federal state is the Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration’s participation in three events between 2005 and 2008. Such prominent guests support DITIB’s legitimation and underline its role as an official contact of the federal government. Finally, the table also indicates the vitality of the links between DITIB and the Turkish state representatives, which, again, only becomes visible through the analysis of DITIB events that are announced in Turkish on the Turkish DITIB website.

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chapter five Analysis of DITIB’s Patterns of Organizational Behavior

The following empirical analysis draws conclusions concerning DITIB’s organizational responses to political expectations. Since the research framework can only be applied to individual external expectations and does not describe the overall behavior of the organization, the following analysis is structured based on the expectations that were derived from the document analysis of the German political level, as well as further expectations that are perceived by the organization as expressed in the interviews. This section presents cases of adaptation, decoupling, and protest and discusses the trajectories of organizational behavior. Adaptation to External Expectations According to DiMaggio and Powell, adaptation to external expectations occurs due to three forms of institutional pressures (coercive, normative, and mimetic). For this research, it is assumed that adaptation to external expectations is possible if external and internal interests are congruent, or if the organizations accept conflict with their members to increase external legitimacy. DITIB meets three of the five expectations of the German political level by using the strategy of adaptation, which implies that the organization adjusts its activities and structures to them. Adaptation processes also occur in response to internal expectations (see below). The Expectation “To Follow the Law” It is evident that the expectation “to follow the law” must be met to avoid marginalization as an organization. DITIB responds to it on the regulative level, and has not been sanctioned in a legal sense. The normative character of the expectation also elicits an organizational response within its basic principles. The first of the DITIB principles is that DITIB only pursues aims that are consistent with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. We pledge allegiance to the free democratic basic order (Ditib.de: Grundsätze, translation KRW).

To undermine this statement, DITIB has also organized special events such as the awareness week on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Basic Law in 2009. It can be argued that the political emphasis on the German Basic Law is perceived as a taken-for-granted expectation due to mimetic pressures. The expectation is probably not controversially discussed internally, which facilitates the above-mentioned events and declarations. The passage from the interview quoted below shows that DITIB’s principles



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are clear to all members and their mosque communities, and that the approval of humanist values77 and the Basic Law are prerequisites for DITIB membership. The expectation is thus also directly linked to the organizational activities. This presumably prevents fundamental internal conflicts. But noteworthy conflicts do not exist. The majority knows our sensibilities, the bylaws are quite clear. The values that we have in the bylaws of the umbrella organization we also have in the regional bylaws. Well, charitable, interreligious, and supporting integration, love, brotherliness, these humanistic values, or adherence to the Basic Law; no legal or natural person can become a member if he or she does not accept the Basic Law as the basis of our living together; in that respect, everything is known and great, so fundamental conflicts cannot develop (IN DITIB 3: 73).

Overall, it can be assumed that DITIB’s commitment to the German Basic Law also does not conflict with the expectations from the Diyanet, although an overall disparity of interests between the German and the Turkish State concerning the education of Turkish citizens and their descendants in Germany does exist.78 The Expectation “To Denounce Islamism and Terrorism” With regard to the expectation “to denounce Islamism and terrorism”, which is closely related to the post-9/11 situation, it was found that DITIB is one of the most outspoken advocates of taking a stand against terror and violence. This position is also included in its basic principles: “Every form of violence or call for violence is rejected” (Ditib.de: Grundsätze, translation KRW). Although DITIB’s pre-2001 publications were could not be accessed for this project, it can be assumed that this rhetoric has increased along with the security-related discourses. The fact that DITIB’s annual memorial press statements for the 9/11 victims condemn any form of terrorism and highlight the non-existence 77  The DITIB bylaws (2009) list a number of values that are in accordance with the basic principles of Islam: “amicability, respect, charity, tolerance, and solidarity of the people among each other and toward other religious groups” (Municipal court Cologne: AZ 43 VR 8932, translation KRW). 78 Diyanet intends “to give service in protecting and strengthening the social stability and peace, and the national unity and solidarity, and to warn them [the Turkish people, KRW] against negative activities of various destructive, harmful, and sectarian movements” (Diyanet website, basic principle no. 3; URL: http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/ default.asp [last visited 12-June-2012]). The German government demands complete integration of immigrants into the German society, while also referring to a nationalistic argument of protecting the German free democratic basic order. DITIB’s responses to this “Leitkultur” debate are discussed further below.

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of links between the Muslim faith and violence can be explained by normative as well as mimetic pressures. If any organization breaks this cycle of public confirmation of denouncing terrorism and violence, it risks normative punishment that may diminish its legitimacy. At the same time, the continuing relevance of security issues to the organization79 also reflects the ongoing importance of this discourse in the German society. The expectation that Muslims denounce terrorism because of the alleged links that have been reiterated in the media and other discourses has become an element of the cognitive dimension, and thus this expectation continues to exert strong pressure on the organizations to meet this demand. Not only does DITIB comply at the level of its external rhetoric, but it also adapts its activities. This is reflected in the recent collaboration with the law enforcement agencies at the federal, regional, and local levels,80 in the organization of demonstrations to articulate DITIB’s stance against terror,81 and in the active participation in the DIK working group on “Islamism and security”. In these cases, the second part of the research guiding Hypothesis 1 (“if the organizations deliberately risk conflict with their members to heighten their external legitimacy”) may apply, since the interviews reveal a certain degree of insecurity in the organization concerning the level of internal conflict caused by these new forms of cooperation. Nonetheless, various joint projects exist that acknowledge the danger arising from terrorism and that promote the fight against the radicalization of mosque members. In addition to the external pressure to adapt to this expectation, an internal desire not to be “discredited as radicals” was mentioned in the interviews (IN DITIB 1: 165), which indicates congruence between external and internal expectations, at least on the level of organizational representatives. 79  29% of the press releases issued by DITIB in 2005 referred to security topics, as compared to 17% of the press releases from 2009 (see Chap. Six: Relation with the Media). 80 In 2005 a dialogue process was established between the BKA, the BfV, several state level criminal police offices, DITIB, and ZMD. The aim of the resulting concept of “confidence-building measures” is to increase cooperation and promote confidence among Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2008c: 13, cf. also the publication “Police and Mosque Communities”, BpB 2005). 81 See, for example, the local demonstration against the right-wing organization “Bürgerbewegung pro Köln” on May 9, 2009, and the demonstration for peace and against terror “Gemeinsam für Frieden und gegen Terror” with 25,000 participants on November 21, 2004, which was organized by DITIB without support from other organizations (Rasche 2004).



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The Expectation “To Organize and Cooperate” The expectation “to organize and cooperate” includes coercive as well as normative pressures. Coercive pressures are linked to Article 7(3) of the German Constitution, which determines the requirements for the right to provide religious education in public schools.82 The processes of decentralization and restructuring at DITIB are direct responses to this coercive pressure to organize regionally. Normative pressures concern the expectations of the German government regarding cooperation with its agencies and thus the reorganization of the organizational structures to provide appropriate contacts. Structural adaptation occurs through the creation of new dialogue positions at the headquarters and on the regional and local levels to provide resources in the form of contacts, skills, and experiences in their respective field. This aids the organization in its orientation toward more structured long-term project planning (see the discussion on professionalization above). Cooperation efforts are also motivated by normative pressures arising from the professional education of organizational representatives. It was clearly shown how new positions such as the establishment of a spokesperson for interreligious and intercultural dialogue and for press and public affairs facilitated new organizational activities. The establishment of projects that support the training of dialogue representatives at the local level can be linked to the previous hiring of similar personnel at the headquarters. The organizational development thus reflects the changing expectations of its environment, while the internal needs and expectations are changing as well. The resulting congruence in terms of the perceived necessity of dialogue skills once again supports the strategy of adaptation due to normative pressures that are exerted by the increasingly professionalized actors at DITIB. However, due to limited funding, professionalization at the local level still proceeds at a much slower pace. While the headquarters employees are paid by DITIB, the local communities rely primarily on voluntary work. In many cases, they do not yet have the means to establish professional project work, although this is not to understate the diversity of their activities.

82 German Basic Law of May 23, 1949, FLG I (41): 2034ff., 28-Aug-2006.

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Adaptation to Internal Expectations In addition to the external expectations of the German political level, DITIB is also confronted with internal expectations that have been outlined at the beginning of Chapter Five. Although the aim of this research project is to analyze organizational strategies with respect to the norms and expectations that prevail in their external environment and therefore have become institutionalized, the internal demands must be taken into consideration as well because they are often interrelated with external developments. One link between internal and external expectations concerns the role of women. It has been argued that DITIB did not explicitly promote women’s active engagement in the representation of the organization in the past. However, the election of Ms. Kiliçarslan as the first female member of the executive board in 2007 and the subsequent introduction of a women’s quota for regional representatives are signs that the organization is opening up. In the interviews, this development is presented as being motivated internally by the female members who demand more targeted services that go beyond the traditional women’s groups that already existed within the communities. The promotion of equality and gender fairness also meets external norms and expectations, which can strengthen the organization’s legitimacy.83 The establishment of the hotline is a notable step in this regard. It is also presented as a tool to monitor and evaluate internal changes in members’ interests. These developments can be attributed to the professionalization of the representatives of the organization, which is consistent with the concept of adaptation due to normative pressures. Ms. Kiliçarslan has worked with Muslim women outside of DITIB in her job at a nongovernmental organization, the aim of which is to educate Muslim women.84 Her expertise has influenced the organizational activities and has contributed to the promotion of organizational change. The strengthening of the role of women within the organization is also in line with the general diversification of activities (see above). In the inter­ views, it became clear that this development is associated with changing internal demands. There is also an element of mimetic pressure caused by 83 A study of the motives and desires of female members of DITIB would be of interest for further research (for a study of women within IGMG see Amir-Moazami 2009). 84 Muslim Women’s Forum for Continuing Education (Begegnungs- und Fortbildungszentrum muslimischer Frauen, BFmF), URL: http://www.bfmf-koeln.de/ bfmf-root/German/Default.aspx [last visited 27-Feb-2012].



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the element of organizational competition, which generally enhances the need to meet the interests of both existing members and potential members, with the latter group being larger and therefore also highly relevant when it comes to membership motivation, an assumption that is supported by the observation that the DITIB headquarters organizes a large number of outreach activities. The diversification of activities involves a process of politicization of the organization, which was criticized by some interviewees. The reorientation from solely religious communication to inclusion of claims-making activities mimics developments other Islamic umbrella organizations have undergone (Kroissenbrunner 2002), a reorientation toward Germany, which is facilitated by increasing engagement of the second and third generations. Due to mimetic pressures, protest and claims-making activities have increasingly become part of the organization’s portfolio. DITIB intends to act as a representative of its members and other Muslims living in Germany, but many of its claims are limited to the religious sphere. However, the claims raised by DITIB (such as claims concerning the discourse on integration and migration) are also relevant to the political sphere, as the following section on protest behavior shows. It can be argued that Islamic umbrella organizations in general and DITIB in particular not only mimic each other, but also model themselves on the churches, which, in the 19th century, underwent a similar process involving the diversification of activities and the provision of nonreligious services (Vanderstraaten 2009). While the churches originally only provided services to the poor, they expanded their range of services in response to the perceived threat of secularization. This led to the establishment of welfare organizations such as Caritas and Diakonie in Germany, which were mentioned as role models by DITIB representatives. It remains to be seen to what extent the churches’ bridging function between the religious sphere and other spheres can be adapted by Islamic umbrella organizations. The observed trend toward a process of hybridization of DITIB in the sense of meeting diverse expectations (e.g., of the religious and political spheres) can be interpreted as a process of mimetic adaptation. Decoupling between External and Internal Expectations It is assumed that decoupling is likely to occur when the organization depends in equal measure on its institutional environment and its members. In this case, the organizational behavior of decoupling can resolve

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the dilemma of conflicting expectations. DITIB uses decoupling to respond to two of the five political expectations analyzed in this research. The Expectation “To Reject ‘Parallel Societies’ and Promote Integration” Concerning the expectation “to reject ‘parallel societies’ and promote integration”, a twofold answer must be given. While the term ‘parallel society’ does not play an important role for the organization (it is only mentioned once by an interviewee), the term ‘integration’ is omnipresent. Interestingly, integration is not mentioned in any of the basic principles of DITIB, but is only stated as one of the organization’s professed aims: “to coordinat­ ing  and support the integration work in the communities” (Ditib.de: Integrationsarbeit, translation KRW). DITIB associates integration work with German language education and other resource mobilization activities for its members, recognizing integration as an important interest not only of the German government but also of migrants who have decided to stay and who are interested in receiving integration-related services. DITIB understands integration as societal participation, which requires acceptance and equality of migrants under the condition of mutual acknowledgement of differences regarding culture, language, traditional customs and traditions, and religious affiliation (ibid.).

This emphasis on the acceptance of differences enables DITIB to balance different expectations which arise from the German and Turkish national contexts and which reflect migrants’ realities. Integration is not called into question. However, it is not associated with assimilation but with participation rights and the right to be different (Schiffauer 2007; Sezgin 2010; cf. Amelina/Faist 2008). This behavior cannot be regarded as open protest because the organization does not publicly voice its concerns about assimilation claims or the parallel society discourse. However, it can be referred to as a process of decoupling. Integration efforts are emphasized in the German press releases and implemented in the project work discussed above. On the other hand, the relevance of Turkey for DITIB members is upheld and practiced simultaneously through projects and services that are oriented toward the country of origin. Such services include Turkish language classes, cultural and religious events, traditional groups such as music, dance, and painting groups, and the organization of burial services in Turkey. Most of these activities are communicated in Turkish and presented in the monthly magazine Haber Bülteni or on the Turkish DITIB website.



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This duality of a parallel integration into two countries is symbolically expressed in the notion of Germany as the “second home country and new life environment” (Ditib.de: Integrationsarbeit, translation KRW), which means that the migrants have given up their plans to return and have instead chosen Germany as a second home country. However, this does not necessarily involve the severing of ties to Turkey, as the detailed studies on transnationalism show (Allievi/Nielsen 2003; Faist 2000; Mandaville 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2000; Pries 2010b; 2008a; Schiffauer 2007b; see also Chap. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad). The expectation “To Adopt German Values” The German government’s expectations concerning Germany’s “core values” required the Islamic organizations that participated in the DIK I to sign a consensus statement, the aim of which was to promote acceptance of social principles and politics of religion. DITIB complied with the DIK procedures, but tied its support of German values to the religious dimension by highlighting the similarity between principles of Islam and humanist values.85 The organization thus balances two expectations: the internal expectation to promote the Muslim faith, and the external expectation to support integration efforts. However, the degree of organizational emphasis on national Turkish values and traditions is contested in the organization. Promoting Turkish nationalism and undermining the assimilation rhetoric in the countries of settlement clearly are expectations of the Turkish state (see Seufert 1999a: 268). This was also expressed by Prime Minister Erdoğan in his speech in Germany on February 10, 2009 where he declared that “assimilation is a crime against humanity” (Erdoğan, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13-Feb-2008). This argument is not found on the DITIB website, nor did the website comment on Erdoğan’s speech. It has been shown above that the employees of the Turkish embassy and consulate (especially the Attachés for Religious Affairs) have strong ties to DITIB. It is not surprising, then, that the rare press statements concerning “the protection and conservation of our own identity, the teaching of cultural and intangible values to our children and youths” were issued in the context of a meeting between the DITIB president and the Turkish consul (DITIB PR 05-Sept-2007). The German DITIB website, by contrast, emphasizes an organizational orientation toward Germany to meet this expectation while mostly avoiding the issue of German values. 85 For the list of values cited in the DITIB bylaws see Footnote 78 above.

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Further Cases of Decoupling In addition to the above-described decoupling strategies concerning the two normative expectations with regard to integration and German values, a number of other elements of decoupling were also identified. First, one has to acknowledge that differences exist between the content of activities organized at the DITIB headquarters and at the local level. While the headquarters’ activities increasingly diverge from the religious dimension and are oriented toward the German public and the expectations of the German political environment, this process is less pronounced on the local level. Although the mosque communities open their doors more and more often to visitors and generate income through the organization of festivities and markets that are no longer limited to open days of the mosques, their main activities are still aimed mainly at Turkish members, with a particular focus being placed on religious and country of origin-oriented services. Another compromise was found with regard to the establishment of the regional structures. These structures meet the expectations set out in Articles 7(3) of the German Constitution regarding the establishment of religious education, but they also uphold the regional separation along the districts of the Attachés for Religious Affairs. Although DITIB’s regional organizations are represented by a single elected representative who is responsible for the federal state level negotiations, the organizations maintain their traditional regional attachment to the Turkish state authorities, while simultaneously trying to adapt to German regional structures. This indicates a prominent “as well as” approach, the aim of which is to use the mechanisms of balancing and pacifying to resolve internal disputes. In addition, there are notable differences between the external and internal rhetoric used in the German and Turkish public relations work. While DITIB employees argue that it is not practicable to translate all articles from Turkish into German and that the translated topics are chosen randomly or are chosen depending on the language skills of the author, the selection of articles with regard to two diverse readerships nonetheless resembles the strategy of decoupling. The bilingual analysis of DITIB press releases from 2009 shows that most reports on local affairs and ties to Turkey are published in Turkish, while the policy- and integrationrelated events and statements are all available in German (see Chap. Six: Relations with the Media). One can also observe a distinction between the external and internal framing concerning the cooperation among the Islamic umbrella organizations. While the creation of KRM forced the organizations to combine



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their approaches and highlight their similarities, the interviews show that the element of competition is still alive and emphasized. This is noticeable with respect to the independence of each organization, or to the special role of the largest umbrella organization, which DITIB claims for itself. In the public sphere, however, the organizations avoid this conflict to fulfill the German government’s expectation regarding a homogeneous German Islam with one single contact. Finally, the argument of transparency is used externally in DITIB’s principles86 and in the DIK’s final declaration of 2009, which states that the transparency of organizational finances, including the resources received from abroad, is a mutual goal (BMI 2009a). In the interviews, transparency was also frequently mentioned in connection with such issues as the translation of sermons into German and the public announcement of members’ donations in local mosques. However, little is known about how much access is provided to information about financial and institutional ties to Diyanet and other international actors, a situation, which reflects the behavior of other organizations. Therefore, the combination of multiple interests—in this case, confidentiality and transparency, which presumably can occur simultaneously in most organizations—represents another form of decoupling. Protest Against External Expectations Protest is the third pattern of organizational behavior analyzed in this research framework. It implies that external expectations do not cause any internal change, but are ignored. It is assumed that protest is most likely to occur if internal conflicts between members’ interests and external expectations are so significant that the organization cannot accept any externally motivated changes because it depends on their members. The analysis presented above shows that DITIB is characterized by a low level of internal conflict, which, if necessary, can be resolved by decoupling. This holds true for the five normative expectations of the German government to which the organization responds rather acquiescently. Nevertheless, the institutional changes described in Chapter Four also evoked protest behavior in a more traditional sense of “voice” (Hirschman 1974). 86 In the principles, DITIB commits itself to “transparency toward members and the outside” (Ditib.de: Grundsätze, translation KRW).

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In the interviews, the representatives emphasized that the government must understand that DITIB does not necessarily agree with everything: As DITIB, we have always been an unproblematic partner in this cooperation, and I think that won’t change, but when we have reservations or when we see points that we find problematic, then we will present them publicly (…) they also have to understand that we can’t agree with everything (IN DITIB 2: 182).

Empirically this argument is expressed in an act of defiance. In July 2007 DITIB boycotted the integration summit due to amendments to the family reunification law. This explicit and public action challenged the German government’s notion of a joint dialogue, since DITIB criticized that is was excluded from negotiations over important legal matters such as the family reunification law. However, this protest remained an exception with regard to its directness and publicity. Other issues that led to open protest include discrimination against Muslims and their alleged link to security topics. Furthermore, the political level is expected to adapt more readily to the Muslim presence in Germany, and to refrain from simply demanding adaptation to its expectations. These claims are examples of the defiance strategies of dismissal, challenge, and attack. At the same time, manipulation strategies of co-opting, influencing, and controlling are used as well. For example, the request for additional funding and the acclaimed inclusion in political decision-making processes represent co-opting patterns in the sense of coalition-building projects with key players. This took place during the DIK meetings, where DITIB tried to exert influence on its institutional environment to emphasize its role as an important actor in the organizational field. It is reasonable to expect that DITIB will continue to raise its concerns and protest against developments in Germany that are highly relevant to its members. It is also reasonable to expect that DITIB will increasingly use the strategy of adaptation. This assumption is based on the expected decrease of differences between the external and internal interests, due to the continuing demographic rejuvenation of the organization and its members. In addition, the increasing cooperation on funding and official status opportunities with the German state prevents DITIB from using the protest strategy excessively. Identifying Organizational Trajectories The third assumption of this research framework moves from the caseto-case analysis of diverse expectation settings to a process-oriented



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approach, which assumes that decoupling and adaptation can be considered in terms of temporality, with the former typically occurring before the latter. The underlying trajectory of this behavior shows that an organization is not static but constantly evolving (cf. Davidson/Koch 1998). The assumption that external adaptation in the form of decoupling is likely to precede internal adaptation was already described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991b). Their findings were supported by the literature on unintended consequences (Merton 1936) and by critical studies on the feasibility of decoupling over the long run (Scott 1995: 129). At least three trajectories can be described which caused DITIB to adapt to external expectations of the German government with which the Islamic umbrella organizations are faced: (1) adaptation to the securityrelated expectations, (2) processes of strengthened integration work, and (3) structural reorganization. With regard to adaptation to security-related expectations, it was found that DITIB, like other organizations, at first responded by changing its external rhetoric, which emphasized its stance against terrorism. Over time, this framing led to internal changes in activities (such as demonstrations and cooperation with the law enforcement agencies), which in turn also promoted structural changes, such as changes in the appointment of organizational contacts on various levels that are now listed in the BAMF clearing point on prevention cooperation (BAMF no date b). Second, the question of integration work also led from the declaration of a need for more service-oriented activities to the structural establishment of more professional services at the local level. The level of the headquarters is characterized by the highest level of diversification of activities and structures. However, the local level is starting to reflect this development despite limited resources. Third, the expectation regarding the organization and cooperation process is also met by the organization in a path-dependent way. Perhaps due to the structural limitation that DITIB’s elected president has stronger ties to Turkey than to Germany and certain language barriers, the organization appointed additional contacts for the increasingly requested dialogue responsibilities. In 2004 this led to the appointment of a representative for intercultural and interreligious dialogue. The interviews showed that this structural change was regarded by the environment as a shift of powers, with the result that the opinion of the dialogue representative was perceived to represent the entire organization. It can be assumed that, due to the public impact of his statements, this led to some unintended changes within the organization, although their nature was not specified in the interviews.

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One can argue that this development of announcing contacts in addition to the elected board of representatives is further promoted through the development of regional structures. The underlying process of decentralization also implies a decentralization of power, which in turn meets the external expectation that the organizational contacts must possess certain decision-making powers. Thus, the DITIB president himself is increasingly becoming only a representative among others. This is also evident in the press releases, which are increasingly published under the name of the organization rather than as personal messages from the president to his members and the public. This process of decentralization is also a sign of diversification, which may promote orientation toward Germany due to the organizational choice of contacts who preferably have a German and a Turkish background, while the president on the other side upholds the institutional and symbolic ties to Turkey. In addition to the establishment of regional structures and delegations, the training of local dialogue representatives can also be interpreted as a path-dependent outcome of the initial decision to meet the expectation “to organize and cooperate”. The interviews revealed that this training was also facilitated by the interests of internal members who support the structural decentralization. Older members, on the other hand, criticized the implied detachment from Turkish roots and ties. This led to a compromise on the structuration of the regional level, but with greater availability of resources in Germany this choice may over time lead to a process of adaptation in the sense of giving up the institutionalized attachment to the Turkish consulates. As regards the likelihood of future developments, one must also take into account the resources and the financial situation of DITIB. As long as Diyanet is the main source of funding, training, and supervision of imams, its expectations of the organization will continue to be relevant, despite the fact that they may at times be in conflict with the expectations of the German government. However, by offering new venues for acquiring resources (in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance) within the German or the European institutional system, the balance of resource dependence can shift from the country of origin to the country of settlement. If such a shift in resource opportunities occurs in addition to a shift of internal interests—due to the generational change which increasingly promotes an orientation toward the country of settlement, especially concerning claims-making activities—then the organization’s logic of influence may change. Hence, its level of dependence on its



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German environment could increase, and processes of adaptation to the political expectations in Germany could become more likely. However, as long as organizational resource dependence is linked to multiple donors, the organization can at best reconcile possibly conflicting expectations by using strategies of decoupling (see above). In this context, it must be noted that the literature on transnationalism emphasizes that a complete reorientation and the severing of financial and normative ties with the country of origin do not occur as frequently as national integration policies may imply or expect. Therefore, it is also important to understand the diversity of cross-border organizational ties and to discuss them in a transparent manner without condemning them ex ante as an obstacle to integration (cf. Amelina/Faist 2008; TRAMO 2009; Pries/Sezgin 2012; see Chap. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad). The Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG) The Islamic Community Millî Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş e. V., IGMG) was founded in 1994, but has existed under different names since 1976. IGMG officially consists of 514 Turkish mosque communities in Europe. 323 of these communities, the majority, are located in Germany; the rest are located in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (Igmg.de: organizational structure).87 IGMG is thus a truly European organization. It is organized hierarchically, and its headquarters are located in Cologne. In addition to IGMG-associated mosques, IGMG Europe also includes facilities for women, youth, sports, and education, with a total of 1,833 facilities and 87,000 members. According to the IGMG profile, Friday prayers are regularly attended by 300,000 people across Europe.88 In Germany, the organization is watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution as a legalistic Islamist organization. According to a 87 In the following, the English version of the IGMG.de website and its sections are quoted if available. http://www.igmg.de/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues .html?L=.html.html.html%2Finclude%2Flib.inc.php.html [last visited 30-Apr-2012]. 88 In the interviews, slightly higher numbers were stated: “In our mosque communities we have a membership of over 100,000 people. That includes the members of our youth departments and our women departments. And when one takes the visitors of our Friday prayers as the basis, we serve 300,000–400,000 people” (IN IGMG 1: 22). The numbers provided by IGMG regarding their registered members across Europe are significantly lower (52,927 in 2010, with 34,394 of these in Germany; personal communication with IGMG 03-Aug-2010).

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recent federal report (BMI 2010: 187), the aim of IGMG is to change the power relations in Turkey to establish an Islamic state, while lobbying with legal means to establish the basis for a life that is in line with the sharia (Islamic laws) in Germany. The German state authorities argue that IGMG’s strengthening of a separate religious and cultural identity and its efforts to prevent assimilation to the German society may promote the emergence and diffusion of Islamist milieus in Germany (ibid.: 187, translation KRW).

However, IGMG insists on its right to exercise and support the religious and cultural identity of its members. The organization sees itself as a religious community (Religionsgemeinschaft) which “addresses all issues regarding Muslims while at the same time representing their interests” (IGMG 2010a; b). The organization can therefore be characterized as an interest organization that lobbies for the rights of Muslims in their countries of settlement and provides religious services through imams, sermons, religious guidance, religious festivities, pilgrimages, donation campaigns, and Islamic burials. The political dimension of the Millî Görüş movement and its interests in Turkish politics are no longer regarded as the main focus of organizational interests, as the following historical overview from the point of view of existing studies shows. Rather, IGMG now emphasizes its integration-related activities, which are directed at its members and the societies of settlement. This integrationist intention is summarized in the organizational slogan “at the center of society”. IGMG has undergone various changes since its origins as a political movement established both in Turkey and in Europe in the 1970s. Many of the debates are about IGMG’s organizational identity, which has changed due to external and internal circumstances from a political movement initiated by Necmettin Erbakan and closely connected to his Islamist parties in Turkey to a religious community with transnational structures across Europe. The increasing public and political interest in Islamic organizations in Europe in general and Germany in particular since the turn of the 21st century has also led to a professionalization of the organization. IGMG has increasingly extended its position as a publicly visible organization through various means of communication, a development that is also linked to a generational change within the organization, which encouraged IGMG’s increasing orientation toward its multiple European countries of settlement. At the same time, the ties to Turkey as its country of origin have weakened, but still continue to exist due to internal members’ interests. Relations to Turkey, however, are accompanied by ties to the



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global Muslim Ummah, which has become yet another target group of IGMG’s organizational activities. The analysis of IGMG’s patterns of organizational behavior reveals IGMG’s current dilemma with regard to complete adaptation to the expectations of the German government due to internal organizational conflicts. IGMG therefore prefers to decouple or to protest against external expectations to meet the interests of its members, who are increasingly frustrated with the high degree of organizational marginalization in the German society. For example, associated IGMG mosques are not allowed to receive financial support for their dialogue and integration-related activities because IGMG is watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In 2010 the organization was also officially barred from participating in the DIK due to criminal investigations against its headquarters in Cologne.89 The next section is structured as follows: First, IGMG’s history and the related developments are described in more detail from the point of view of existing studies. Then, an empirical analysis of current narratives of organizational change, IGMG structures, activities, and organizational contacts is conducted. The section concludes with an examination of organizational patterns of behavior. IGMG’s History from the Point of View of Existing Studies IGMG is probably the most extensively researched Islamic Organization in Germany (see Dantschke 2004; Feindt-Riggers/Steinbach 1997; Heckmann 2004; Inan 2007; Kreitmeir 2002; Kücükhüseyin 2002; Lemmen 2000; 2001; 2002a; b; Lier/Piest 1994; Meng 2004; Özcan 1989; Pielage 2010; Rauer 2008; Schiffauer 1998; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007a; b; c; 2008b; 2010; Seidel et al. 2001; Şen 2008; Spuler-Stegemann 2002; Yükleyen/Yurdakul 2009; Wunn 2007). Although many of these studies are actually overviews of the organizational field in general with brief descriptive parts on IGMG’s

89 In September 2010 the responsible court in Munich dismissed a portion the case against the General Secretary of the organizations because no proof of any criminal activities had been found during the investigation. However, the ban on IGMG’s participation in the DIK was upheld due to an ongoing investigation into allegations of tax evasion and affiliation with the charity organization Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (Insani Yardim Vakfi, Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation, IHH), which was banned in June 2010 due to ties to Hamas (Preuß, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21-Sept-2010). See also IGMG press releases of 21-Sept-2010 and 23-Sept-2010, which accuse the German state of having political motives to investigate IGMG.

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structures and activities, some involve extensive fieldwork carried out in various countries at different points in time. IGMG has been studied most often with regard to its relationship to its German institutional environment. A particularly notable example of a comprehensive overview of IGMG’s organizational development is the recently published monograph by Schiffauer (2010), who has been conducting anthropological research on IGMG since the 1980s. Various other studies compare the German and the Dutch contexts with refer­ ence  to IGMG (Doomernik 1995; Lucassen/Penninx 2009; Mügge 2011; Kortmann 2011), and two studies focus on IGMG associations in Austria (Kroissenbrunner 2002; Reiser 2000). There have also been an increasing number of studies on the organization’s transnational ties to Turkey, which are reviewed separately in Chapter Six (see Amelina/Faist 2008; Amiraux 2003; 2007; Laurence 2006; Pries/Sezgin 2012; Seufert 1999b; Tezcan 2002; Trautner 2000). In addition, IGMG activities have been discussed with reference to the creation of a “Euro Islam” (Amir-Moazami 2009; Aydin et al. 2003). In the German context, we find the peculiar situation that numerous German state authorities analyze the activities of IGMG due to security concerns.90 Particularly since the terrorist attacks at the beginning of the 21st century, IGMG has been faced with increasing public, political, and media attention in Europe. Necmettin Erbakan’s open anti-Semitism, which is publicly displayed in the Millî Gazette, has caused great difficulties for IGMG in Germany. The German Office for the Protection of the Constitution link the Millî Gazette to IGMG and watch the published statements closely, despite IGMG’s public denial of organizational links (see, e.g., Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2008: 63ff.). Consequently, IGMG leaders have acknowledged the problem that anti-Semitism played a decisive role in identifying oneself through the mechanism of othering: This also means that in our identity construction duality played an important role, as reflected in the terms ‘hak’, as opposed to ‘batıl’. Based on this, simplistic worldviews, anti-Semitism, and the assumption of a Jewish world conspiracy have also played a role in our identity. That’s the way it is. 90 See Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (2006; 2007; 2008); German Federal Ministry of the Interior (2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010); Ministry of the Interior Bavaria (2008); Ministry of the Interior Berlin (2005; 2009); Ministry of the Interior Hamburg (2009) Ministry of the Interior Hesse (2009); Ministry of the Interior LowerSaxony (2009); Ministry of the Interior NRW (2008a; b; 2009); Ministry of the Interior Schleswig-Holstein (2009); Ministry of the Interior Rhineland-Palatinate (2009); Office for the Protection of the Constitution Baden-Württemberg (2006; 2008).



the individual organization253 It would simply be insincere to deny the history and to deny that these simplistic worldviews find recipients, especially among the younger generation. The great challenge for this community and for its leaders is to deal with racism and anti-Semitism among ourselves (IGMG comment 26-Oct-2010, translation KRW).

The sincerity of this statement and the internal success in changing their member’s attitudes has often been called into question by the German authorities, which view the organization critically and watch the antiSemitic tendencies both among IGMG members and Millî Görüş activists in Turkey. It can be assumed that this relatively large academic body of literature has been inspired by the increasing public and political attention to IGMG due to the controversial orientation of the Millî Görüş movement in Turkey and in Europe and its ongoing organizational changes. In particular, the organizational development from a politically motivated movement in Turkey to a religious community in Europe, which coincided with a reorientation from country of origin-focused activities to opportunities in the countries of settlement, has been a controversial subject in the literature. The following section presents the results of existing studies on IGMG’s history and provides an empirical analysis of current organizational changes since the turn of the 21st century. The First Millî Görüş Mosque Community in Germany (1972) The first mosque community in Europe that associated itself with the Turkish politician Necmettin Erbakan was established in Braunschweig in 1972 (Schiffauer 2010: 76). Erbakan, a practicing Muslim who had earned his Ph.D. in Engineering in Germany, had just founded his first Islamic party, the National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi, MNP), in Turkey in 1970. His political and economic vision of a strong Turkey impressed Turkish emigrants who hoped to return to Turkey some day. In 1975 Erbakan coined the term Millî Görüş (National View, Nationale Sicht), which became the slogan of his political movement. With reference to the Ottoman Empire and in opposition to Kemal Atatürk’s laicist revolution in 1923, Erbakan and his Millî Görüş followers argued that Islam is constitutive for the national identity of the Turkish people. They thus envisioned a reversal of the separation between church and state in Turkey that was installed in 1923. Their professed aim was to promote a reorientation toward Islam in Turkey to renew the country’s political and economic strength (Seidel et al. 2001: 45f.). In 1991 these goals were summarized in Erbakan’s book Adil Ekonomik Düzen (Just Economic

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Order, Gerechte Wirtschaftsordnung), which envisions an economic system somewhere between communism and western capitalism that functions “according to a moral-political order, in which religious communities play an important role” (Schiffauer 2010: 69, translation KRW).91 Economically, the focus was on the nationwide establishment of a heavy industry sector in Turkey, with centralistic planning, a state-owned banking system, and the abolishment of usury, as proscribed by the Qur’an (Seidel et al. 2001: 48). In 1971 the Turkish state outlawed Erbakan’s National Order Party (MNP) due to violations of the Kemalist principles. This step led to the establishment of various Islamist successor parties.92 Although Islam was not allowed to enter the party political arena, it was commonly known that a party like the Millî Selamet Partisi [MSP] (before the 1980 military coup) was religiously oriented and was striving for a Turkish state based on the sharia, Islamic law. It was the political arm of what is commonly known as the Millî-Görüş movement (Doomerink 1995. 50).

91  Seidel et al. (2001) note that the term Adil Düzen goes back to Süleyman Karagülle, who coined the term with ideological connotations in 1976 (cf. Office for the Protection of the Constitution Baden Württemberg 2008: 64). According to Schiffauer, the terms Millî Görüş and Adil Düzen are boundary objects, or Signifikanten, which are reinterpreted throughout the different parts of the movement and within the generational shifts. For example, IGMG now traces the term Millî to the notion of ‘Millet’ in the Qur’an, which “denotes a community that gathers around a prophet and the values he conveys. It does not refer to a nation or an ethnicity. […] No connection whatsoever should be made with the Turkish meaning of the word ‘millet’, i.e., “people” or “nation” (IGMG 2010a, b). 92 Erbakan founded the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) on January 26, 1970. Its aim was to establish an Islamic state in Turkey. It was banned on May 20, 1971 as a threat to the secular character of the republic. On October 11, 1972 the National Salvation Party (Milli Selâmet Partisi, MSP) was established, which was dissolved after the military coup of September 12, 1980. On July 19, 1983 the Prosperity Party (also referred to as Welfare Party, Refah Partisi; RP) was founded. Erbakan was not officially acknowledged as its leader until October 1987, when his political ban was lifted by referendum. In the elections on December 24, 1995, the Prosperity Party won 21% of the national votes, and it was involved in a government coalition from June 1996 to June 1997, with Erbakan as Turkey’s Prime Minister. On June 30, 1997 Erbakan was forced to resign due to pressures from the Turkish military. He was banned from politics for five years. In January 1998 the Prosperity Party (RP) was dissolved. Shortly before the ban in December 1997, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) was founded, which was banned on July 22, 2001, one day after party members founded the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) (cf. Kepel/Roberts 2002: 342ff.). After his political ban expired, Erbakan was the leader of the Felicity Party (SP) from May 2003 until January 2004, when he resigned from all posts and left the party due to a conviction of financial fraud. The German security authorities nonetheless concluded that “his actual power position within the ‘Milli Görüş’ seems unaffected” (Ministry of the Interior NRW 2010). As of 2010, the Felicity Party (SP) was not represented in the Turkish parliament.



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During the 1970s, more and more mosque communities were established across Europe, which associated themselves with the Millî Görüş movement. The mosques were established in a snow ball system with similar bylaws. They were often led by people from the same regions in Turkey. This led to the emergence of a loose transnational organizational network (Schiffauer 2010: 79). Due to the political pressures on religious parties in Turkey, the religious communities in Europe were able to develop more freely abroad than in Turkey (Mügge 2011; Landmann 2005: 589). Their support for Erbakan’s parties was linked to various election campaigns. This support increased throughout the 1980s, as more party members migrated to Europe in the aftermath of the military coup in Turkey. The First Millî Görüş Umbrella Organization in Germany (1976) In 1976 the first Islamic umbrella organization of Millî Görüş followers was established in Cologne under the name Turkish Union Europe (Türkische Union Europa e. V.). In 1982 it was renamed Islamic Union Europe (Islamische Union Europa e. V.) (Lemmen 2002a: 40). As early as 1983, however, internal disputes over the political identity of the organization culminated in an organizational schism. The Islamist preacher Cemaleddin Kaplan argued that the attempts to change Turkey through parliamentary elections had failed due to the military coup in 1980. Unlike Erbakan, Kaplan argued that a more radical revolution was necessary similar to the one in Iran in 1979. According to Schiffauer (2010: 85), two thirds of the Millî Görüş communities in Europe agreed with Kaplan. Together, they founded the independent Union of Islamic Associations and Communities (Islami Cemaat ve Cemiyetler Birligi, Verband der Islamischen Vereine und Gemeinden e. V., “Kaplancis”, ICCB) in 1984. The aim of ICCB was to establish a caliphate state in Turkey. After Cemaleddin Kaplan’s death in 1995, his son Metin became the leader of the organization Caliphate State (Kalifatstaat) in Germany. The organization was banned in December 2001 due to its strong fundamentalist tendencies (Atacan 1999; Schiffauer 2000; Şen 2008: 38). Reestablishment under the Name AMGT (1985) The division between Millî Görüş and the ICCB traumatized and depleted the organizational network of Millî Görüş’ mosque communities, which eventually depended on support from Turkey in order to reestablish their organization (Schiffauer 2010: 90). On May 20, 1985 the Union of the Millî Görüş in Europe was founded (Avrupa Millî Görüş Teşkilatları, Organisation

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der Millî Görüş in Europa e. V., or Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europa e. V., AMGT). At the same time, Erbakan’s Prosperity Party (RP) expanded its powers in Turkey, and the ties between the AMGT headquarters in Cologne and the party center in Ankara were reinforced. The support during the reestablishment of the German communities through the newly-established party under the name Prosperity Party tied the Millî-Görüş communities to the center in Ankara. Close links replaced the loose connections that existed throughout the 1970s. Necmettin Erbakan clearly stood at the head of it: he installed the leaders in Germany and made them bind themselves by oath. This continued to the bottom. The regional leaders were bound by oath to the headquarters in Cologne. A closed and effective organization, the establishment of a teşkilat, superseded the loose network of mosque communities that were gathered around an idea. The open network of communities was transformed into a corporation (Schiffauer 2010: 91, translation KRW).

Due to the negative experiences with the organizational schism in 1983, hierarchical structures were established between the IGMG headquarters and the mosque communities in Europe. This involved a quarterly reporting system and the instalment of local personnel by the headquarters. However, Schiffauer (2010: 93) concludes that the local mosques maintained their autonomy and the leaders in Turkey and Germany knew that they depended on their local engagement. The strong transnational ties involved frequent visits of party members (including Erbakan himself) to AMGT events in various European countries of settlement of Turkish migrants. These visits became more frequent in the early 1990s (Mügge 2011). In 1991 DM6 million (€3 million) were transferred from Germany to Turkey to support an election campaign. As a result, the Prosperity Party (RP) won 17% of the votes in Turkey (Amiraux 2003: 162f.). This exchange was not limited to financial transfers, but also included the exchange of personnel: In the case of the legislative elections in 1991 and 1995, diverse MPs have then been imported from Germany to Refah lists. […] In a way, they materialize an imagined community of which IGMG and the Refah are not rivals but two faces of the same figure (ibid.).

After the success of the RP in the Turkish elections of 1995, in which Erbakan won 21% of the national votes, attention to the European organizations decreased, due perhaps to the sufficient organizational support for the RP from within Turkey (Mügge 2011). The increasing success of the Millî Görüş both in Turkey and in Germany throughout the 1980s also promoted the separation between the logics of



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a political party in Turkey and a religious community in Germany and in Europe. Both parts of the organizations wanted to mobilize the masses at the center of society. In Europe, however, the focus was much more on the provision of religious services due to the interest of Turkish migrants abroad. This shows that AMGT identified itself as a religious organization as early as the 1980s (Schiffauer 2010: 95). This can be linked to the fact that other religious Islamic organizations (in particular ICCB, DITIB, and VIKZ) were the most significant competitors of AMGT in Germany, while the main competitors in Turkey were other political parties. The Transformation into IGMG and EMUG and the Generational Shift (1994) The number of AMGT-associated mosques grew steadily since the end of the 1980s. This was stimulated by the political success of the RP in Turkey, which culminated in Erbakan’s appointment as Prime Minister in June 1996. By 1994 the growth of AMGT in Europe made organiza­ tional  restructuring necessary. AMGT split into the European Mosque Building and Support Organization (Europäische Moscheenbau- und Unterstützungsorganisation, EMUG)93 and the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş, IGMG). EMUG is currently in charge of the economic and financial matters of the mosque communities, while IGMG manages the religious, social, cultural responsibilities of the organization (IGMG profile 1999, cited in Lemmen 2000a: 40). After Erbakan’s appointment as Prime Minister of Turkey in June 1996, the Millî Görüş movement was at the peak of its powers. However, only one year later, in June 1997, Erbakan was forced to resign from his post due to a ‘soft’ military coup. The Turkish National Security Council then outlawed foreign financial support of Turkish parties, which affected the organizational practices concerning the support of political campaigns (Amiraux 2003: 157). After Erbakan was banned from political activity in Turkey, he renewed his attention to Europe, but the political turmoil in Turkey and the disappointment in Erbakan’s political leadership had already led to a second identity crisis within the organization in Europe. This internal conflict was also linked to the collapse of various Islamic holdings at the beginning of the 21st century. The holdings had promised 93 The EMUG manages some IGMG mosques and associated facilities purchased by IGMG communities. Other properties are owned independently by the communities or rented from other owners (IN IGMG 2: 257).

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to invest money in Turkey with guaranteed rates of return of up to 50%. Many IGMG members had trusted the holdings, which had sponsored annual IGMG events and recruited respectable contacts from IGMG mosques in the past. In 2000, however, the first Islamic holdings collapsed and many IGMG members lost their entire savings (Schiffauer 2010: 106ff; Seidel et al. 2001: 49ff.). According to Schiffauer, the main reason why IGMG survived this political and economic crisis was because a second generation of IGMG activists was available at the time. Schiffauer argues that this second generation consists of two distinct groups of Turkish and German Bildungsbürger (educated middle class citizens). The former were educated in Turkey and migrated around 1980, when they were between 15 and 20 years old. Their first contact addresses were IGMG mosques, and they often worked as volunteers with IGMG’s youth services. The latter group was educated and socialized in Germany and was generally 5 years younger. It can be said that both groups are much more detached from Turkey than their parents. They have to join both worlds that have formed them equally. The synthesis that they envision is the creation of a place for a life in compliance with the sharia in Europe (Schiffauer 2010: 110, translation KRW).

Together, this second generation eventually assumed the leading positions within the regional and federal IGMG structures, while the first generation—usually the traditional ‘guest-worker’ cohort—remained in charge locally (ibid.: 115). IGMG Presidency of Mehmet Erbakan (1999) The main leader during this phase of organizational restructuring was Mehmet Sabri Erbakan. Mehmet Erbakan was raised in Germany as the son of the brother of Necmettin Erbakan and his German wife, who worked as a lawyer. He studied medicine and was appointed IGMG Secretary General in 1995. In 1999 he became the president of IGMG (Schiffauer 2010: 112ff.).94 His aim was to position IGMG within Europe to overcome the organizational crisis.

94 In November 2002 Mehmet Erbakan stepped down as IGMG president due to rumors of an extramarital affair. He was replaced by the current president (and former vice president) Yavus Celik Karahan, who represents the Turkish Bildungsbürger (Schiffauer 2010: 125; Musharbash, TAZ, 30-Oct-2002).



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According to Schiffauer, Mehmet Erbakan’s vision included three aspects: first, the “creation of a European Islam”; second, “a new definition of the relationship with Turkey and the Islamic world community”, and third, “a repositioning within Germany” (ibid., translation KRW). This vision also entails the necessity to define a new role for Islam within the European secular rules of law. IGMG lobbied for the naturalization of its members in their countries of settlement, but stressed that the European constitutions and Islam are compatible. According to Mehmet Erbakan, life in prosperous Europe allows Muslims to get involved more actively in the global Ummah. This global task, which is linked to the provision of developmental aid, requires Muslims to succeed in collective socioeconomic upward mobility in their countries of settlement. Education has thus become a major goal of IGMG communities, which also seeks to overcome the stigma of a workers’ religion (ibid.: 114). With this programmatic vision, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan and his team at the IGMG headquarters in Cologne decisively changed the direction of the organization, which has been defining itself as an exclusively religious community since 1999. According to Schiffauer, this change was also reflected in the annual mass gatherings of IGMG, which he describes as identity fests (ibid.: 150ff.; cf. Senyurt, TAZ, 05-June-2000 and 19-June-2002; Tezcan 2002). Until his death in 2011, Necmettin Erbakan and other party representatives participated in these festivities (in some cases only via conference call). Nonetheless, Schiffauer argues that the character of a political rally—with an economic agenda and religious elements centered on Erbakan’s party—has been transformed since the turn of the century to emphasize the religious character of the organization. In Turkey, meanwhile, Erbakan’s former followers established their own party. In 2001 the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) was founded as a breakaway from Erbakan’s Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP). Among the leaders of the AKP is the current Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In 2002 the AKP won 341 of 550 seats in the Turkish Parliament under Erdoğan’s leadership, while the SP is no longer represented in the Turkish parliament. This development led to escalating tensions between the former allies, which increased the risk of a renewed division between IGMG communities in Europe. The new IGMG leadership tried to remain neutral regarding these political developments and continued to respect Erbakan’s

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leadership while maintaining ties to the AKP, which has not yet established its own organization in Europe.95 Schiffauer (2010: 158ff.) stresses that IGMG has increasingly distanced itself from the political ties to the parties of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey, but his empirical analysis also identifies the internal constraints of a complete detachment. He argues that an elite group of more than 5,000 “organic intellectuals” (in the sense of Gramsci) promote a post-Islamist ideology within IGMG, which is based on the visions of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan described above. According to Schiffauer, these “organic intellectuals” have been socialized in two worlds and act as bridge builders both within society at large and within their organization. They are committed to Europe with the long-term goal of establishing Islam as a minority religion in the framework of the legal system of European states (Schiffauer 2008b: 57).

However, IGMG’s reorientation under the leadership of the “post-Islamists” since the turn of the century does not imply a detachment from Turkey as the country of origin. For example, Şen argues that IGMG still has a conservative political stance, which “is regarded as strongly Islamic with strong emphasis on preserving the Turkish culture in Germany” (2008: 37). Schiffauer also argues that it is its communitarian engagement which distinguishes IGMG from three other groups of Muslims: first, the modernists, whose aim is to limit the role of Islam to the private sphere; second, the radical Islamists, who pursue the Islamization of the Islamic and the Western worlds, and third, the quietists, who practice a mystical or a puritan-radical Islam (2010: 218ff.; translation KRW). The following empirical analysis provides a detailed discussion of the extent to which these assumptions are reflected in the current structures, activities, contacts, and organizational patterns of behavior of IGMG. Summary This overview of IGMG’s historical development showed that the political Millî Görüş movement and the related parties in Turkey developed separately from the Millî Görüş mosque communities that have been 95 Instead, AKP supports the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD). Estab­ lished in 2004, UETD has offices in five European countries, where it lobbies for Turkey’s EU accession and the visibility of European Turks. The headquarters in Cologne was established in 2005. The opening was attended by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and German Chancellor Schröder (Mügge 2011; cf. the organizational website URL: www.uetd .de [last visited 12-June-2012]).



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established across Europe. The degree of internal coordination between the two organizational forms and their level of contact has varied throughout the different phases of organizational development. The transnational character of cooperation depended not only on the interests of the political party center in Ankara, but has also been influenced by the changes in the organizational agenda in Europe and the changing opportunities provided by the Turkish political system. IGMG is not yet firmly established as a religious community in Europe, as reflected in the fact that it is not officially recognized as a corporation of public law in Germany. The German state also avoids close contact with IGMG and monitors its activities through the Office for the Protec­ tion of the Constitution. The effects of this political stance regarding IGMG’s structures and activities in Germany is analyzed below. Prior to this analysis, the historical developments are compared with the narratives of organizational change offered by the IGMG representatives interviewed. IGMG Representativesʼ Narratives of Organizational Change This section presents the narratives of organizational change offered by two IGMG representatives96 who are currently working for the IGMG Secretary General. Both interviewees were involved in IGMG’s youth work and had moved up the organizational ranks in Germany from the local and regional levels to the federal level. One of the interviewees was born in Turkey and moved to Germany at the age of eleven, while the other was born in Germany. They both studied in Germany. The following section starts with the narratives of organizational change of the German-born IGMG representative. During an internship in Turkey in the early 1990s he realized how deeply rooted he was in Germany. Despite his strong roots in Turkey—he still has a Turkish passport—he felt uncomfortable and really like a fish out water in Turkey during his internship but perfectly happy (pudelwohl) in Germany. In his narrative, he links this feeling to constitutional advantages perceived in Germany regarding democracy and human rights, which he thinks are still fragile in Turkey. His positive attitude toward Germany is also reflected in his narrative of organizational change.

96 The narrative part on organizational change of the third interview is shorter due to its focus on other topics of interest. Generally speaking, its framing is similar to the narratives presented below.

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“The History of IGMG Is the History of Migration” When asked about organizational change, the interviewee’s began his narrative with a few remarks on the migratory experience of Turkish guest workers in Western Europe, stating that mosque communities were established because neither the Turkish nor the German state had taken religious needs into account: One did send doctors who looked into the mouth and checked to see of the extremities were complete, but that the people had needs beyond work which derived from their being human and devout, that is something they somehow ignored in the Muslim community, and in particular the Turkish community (IN IGMG 1: 50).

Because guest workers were people and “not machines”, they got involved in religious communities, which “laid the basis for what we call today institutional Muslim presence in Germany” (ibid.). The mosques that were established in basements and backyards were supposed to provide the desired services until the planned return to Turkey. However, this return was soon postponed, and family reunification became a priority. According to the interviewee, the last of the former immigrants had eventually realized that the return plans were “merely an illusion” (ibid.). The increasing orientation toward the country of settlement in turn influenced an institutionalization process that started with basic rooms for prayers and Qur’an classes: But with the change of attitude came the change of infrastructure. Yes, one bought buildings and invested a lot of money. One refurbished them. The first new mosques with a minaret and a dome were built. One showed that one sees one’s presence permanently in this country. And accordingly, the issue-related arrangement of our work was affected by this change (IN IGMG 1: 50).

“In the Mid-1990s People Started to Realize That One Has to Move to the Center of Society” The change of content of IGMG services was linked to the members’ interests and the external environment. The interviewee argued that one had to provide a “hometown” for the community to keep them committed to IGMG (IN IGMG 1: 50), which is why IGMG focused on religious and cultural services that also had a political emphasis (although the latter point was not prominent in this interview). However, the interviewee also stresses that the Islamic communi­ ties  became aware that they “had neighbors” (ibid.). With reference to the Muslim ideals of taking responsibility for one’s community, an



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institutional examination of the environment and its constitution took place in the mid-1990s. In the interview, this is expressed in the often-used expression “to move to the center of society” (ibid.). This development has been described by Schiffauer as the change initiated by the second generation of IGMG representatives. However, despite the emphasis on organizational efforts to open up the organization, the interviewee also talked about internal skepticism among IGMG communities: And even if we do not want to leave, does this society even want us at its center? Are we not on the wrong track if we approach society and it does not want us? (ibid.)

Such internal debates and the turbulent political times in Turkey are described as core challenges to the work of the IGMG headquarters and the organizational aim to situate IGMG in the countries of settlement. “We Have Been Professionalizing for a Decade” When asked about a solution to the challenges described above, the interviewee first mentioned the professionalization of public affairs work. Second, the community work was emphasized, the aim of which is to offer services beyond the religious services, especially in the realm of education, to support the advancement of IGMG members in society. Third, it was argued that the work of the imams and the community representatives is influenced by the prospect of staying and taking responsibility for the community. The understanding of serving both the community and society goes back to the early 1990s, when the term ‘integration’ was first introduced into IGMG’s youth work at the IGMG headquarters. For IGMG, integration implies the encouragement of individual educational advancement and the request for societal bridge building in the form of participation in local round tables, local affairs, and foreigners’ councils. The organization sees itself as a pioneer in this context of integrationrelated activities, and complains that politicians did not acknowledge integration-related problems as quickly as IGMG. The interviewee’s narrative included positive examples of bridge building and local political engagement. At the same time, the interviewee disapproved of the related discourse of mistrust with which IGMG representatives in Germany have been confronted. The feeling of being victims of a process of marginalization remains a strong and reoccurring frame, although the interviewee acknowledges that the mistrust of IGMG does not come out of nothing:

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chapter five But I am deeply convinced that one does great injustice to many hundreds of people who like to get involved because of a true inner conviction of this community and society, and that one slams the door in their faces although they do not deserve it (IN IGMG 1: 54).

“It Took Us a Long Time to Put the Theory into Practice” With regard to the feasibility of the above-mentioned change in the direction of the center of society, internal problems and criticism were mentioned repeatedly. While the youth department enthusiastically envisioned broad changes, IGMG community cautioned that: One can write down a lot, but when one does not have the potential with regard to people that can implement it, then it remains a paper tiger. And that is why it took us a long time to develop practical work from the theory (IN IGMG 1: 59).

This passage also indicates that there are internal quarrels caused by the headquarters’ strategy. The organizational divide becomes even more apparent in the following passage, which describes the task of finding an organizational consensus on the question of whether immigrants should integrate into the various countries of settlement: If I had to describe the [last, KRW] eight years, they were the time I had to explain to the people that what I say publicly is also what I really think. Meaning that this has to be part of our community work as well, and it needs to be implemented accordingly, so that the public statements find their expression in the community work (IN IGMG 1: 63).

How the organization has tried to convey these messages to its communities and how it has linked them to the religious realm is discussed further below. At this point, the narrative of organizational change ended. It is interesting to note that it did not refer to Necmettin Erbakan or the political Millî Görüş movement at all (Erbakan was not mentioned directly during the three hours of the interview). Instead, the focus was on IGMG’s country of settlement orientation. Contrary opinions are described as challenges which need to be resolved internally. Later in the interview, these internal tensions and the required respect for the first generation are mentioned even more frequently. It becomes clear that the generational change that is often discussed with regard to IGMG is also manifested in the biography of this leading IGMG representative, whose narrative is tightly interwoven with his socialization in Germany. His colleague, who migrated from Turkey in 1989, offered a slightly different narrative of these developments, as the following section shows.



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He migrated to Germany at the age of 12 and has been active within IGMG since the age of 16. “In Comparison to the Past, Much More Orientation toward Germany” The following narrative of organizational change begins with the interviewee’s migration background. He stated that in the first years after his arrival in Germany in 1989 his own orientation toward Turkey reflected the general organizational focus on the country of origin. However, he immediately contrasts this attitude with his current orientation toward Germany, which he compares to a similar change in the attitudes of other young IGMG members. Accordingly, this reorientation toward Germany requires an adaptation of IGMG activities, which need to follow the incidents, the developments here in Germany. This leads to the fact that we can no longer follow the developments in Turkey. From time to time, we observe of course what is going on there, but in terms of time, we have no opportunity to do so anymore (IN IGMG 2: 13).

As in the narrative discussed above, the decision to stay in Germany or other European countries is believed to have led to changing internal motivations with regard to the activities of IGMG. The promotion of the Turkish language is partly replaced by the emphasis on educational achievements, which are not intended to facilitate return but to promote possible integration into the countries of settlement. “We Now Say That We Are a Religious Community” In line with the perceived change of organizational identity concerning the national orientation, the interviewee also directly pointed to the fact that the organization shifted its focus from politics (until the mid-1990s) to religion: We now say that we are a religious community and we, but also the organizational members have internalized this, and we think about what it means to be a religious community in Germany. Because this is a big difference, we are, so to speak, no longer a political party, but a religious community (IN IGMG 2: 15).

Interestingly, this implies the understanding that IGMG members can consider themselves to be members of a religious community as well as a political party, which partly contradicts the official statement of being an exclusively religious community.97 In all cases the organization is forced to 97 For example, in its bylaws, IGMG describes itself as a religious community which provides religious services to its members. Political activities that go beyond the

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find a balance between both fields due to the multiplicity of internal interests. Overall, this interviewee presented the current state of affairs as an open search for answers and an ongoing process of organizational identification between the political and the religious spheres. However, he concluded that the orientation toward Germany as the country of settlement has been and will continue to be stronger than the country-of-origin orientation. For example, Friday prayers; of course one can talk about everything. […] But when one talks more often about political issues then one says hello, where are we now? Are we, so to speak, a political or a religious community? Yes, indeed, what are we then? Well, we deal with these questions. And also the ties to Turkey, there are organizational members who believe that we have to cultivate this relationship—not just that we can, but that we have to. But then there are also organizational members who believe that we have to have relations with Germany. So this in-betweenness reflects within the organization and for the members. According to my observations, I can say that the second approach, the relations with Germany, dominates now and will continue to dominate in the future (IN IGMG 2: 15).

“We Have to Find a Balance between the Culture of Origin and the Receiving Culture” The necessity to find an organizational balance between the various national contexts of the country of origin and the countries of settlement has already been discussed above with regard to the members’ interests. It is therefore argued that it is impossible for the organization to orient itself exclusively toward Turkey or toward Germany. Rather, an organizational balance is required.98 The members are invited to choose their own orientation, while the organization tries to reach the masses through a balanced approach to planning and implementing its activities: We believe that we have to find a balance. Care for the culture of origin and for the receiving culture; and, indeed, not to impose something. Rather, every one of our members must be able to decide where he or she wants to stand. But as organizational representatives we always try, as I said before, to show this balance in the events and in the publications by reporting on topics from Germany as well as from Turkey (IN IGMG 2: 19). representation of Muslim interests in the countries of settlement are not mentioned as organizational aims (IGMG bylaws 2001: § 2). The bylaws are available at the municipal court in Bonn: AG Bonn, VR 6621, 15-Apr-2001. 98 The underlying reasons that can explain this balancing strategy, which is also reflected in IGMG’s transnational strategy, are discussed further in Chap. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad.



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Summary This overview of the narratives of organizational change of two IGMG representatives shows that IGMG has undergone various developments since the mid-1990s that increasingly tied the organization to the European context. On the one hand, this development is linked to the migration experiences of IGMG members who have decided to settle in their countries of arrival. On the other hand, the opportunities provided to IGMG and the expectations of the institutional environments in their countries of settlement with which it has been confronted have increased the perceived need for integration-related and professionalized activities that serve both the members and society at large. While the political side of the Millî Görüş movement is absent from the first narrative, it is contrasted in the second interview with the current self-understanding as a religious community. However, this does not imply that IGMG is turning its back to Turkey. Rather, a balanced approach is envisioned which meets the members’ interests in their country of origin and their country of settlement. In the discussion of the organizational activities below, the factual emphasis on the countries of settlement becomes even more apparent. IGMG’s Structures Although IGMG is organized in 11 European countries and its activities are spread all the way across the globe, the public and political debates about IGMG have focused primarily on its German dimension. Furthermore, IGMG is often accused of having obscure structures which involve various formal and informal ties to local mosque communities and other organizations. In the literature, IGMG is described as a hybrid organization involving “centralist, de-centralist and federal structural elements” (Lemmen 2000a: 32). This section discusses the structure of IGMG in Germany and Europe to contribute to the debates, including an overview of the German headquarters, the 30 regional associations, and the local level of mosque communities. It also analyzes the underlying structure of IGMG’s internal communication to understand the emergence of organizational patterns of behavior that are discussed later. In addition, information on organizational financing is presented, which characterizes the organization as highly dependent on the support of its members. The Headquarters IGMG’s executive board consists of a president, a vice-president, and the secretary general. It is elected every five years by IGMG’s representatives’

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assembly. The representative assembly meets every two years and involves one delegate per associated mosque and three delegates per regional and national association, as well as the IGMG executive board, honorary members, and invited guests. Every delegate except honorary members and guests has a voting right (IGMG bylaws 2001: § 8). A religious expert council (fiqh council) consisting of 5 trained theologians advises the IGMG executive board on questions and internal disputes concerning Islamic theology (ibid.: § 10). Finally, a directorate consisting of former IGMG presidents monitors and advises the IGMG executive board. The directorate can also demand a report on organizational affairs at any time (ibid.: § 10a). The IGMG’s bylaws do not mention any organizational ties to Turkey. Among the services offered by the IGMG headquarters are the organization of the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, the donation of sacrificial animals during the Eid-al-Adha campaign, the prayer calendar, and the provision of a solidarity fund for burial services. The IGMG headquarters is also responsible for the recruitment and education of imams who are sent to the local mosque communities across Europe (Igmg.de: Organizational Structure). “We Feel Responsible for the Things That Happen in Austria and Holland” IGMG’s headquarters has been located in an industrial part of Kerpen, a city some 30 km southeast of Cologne, since 2001 (Lemmen 2002b: 149). A second office of the general secretariat is located in central Cologne, where it shares offices with EMUG. The IGMG headquarters employs 51 people full-time and 16 students who work part-time as journalists for the IGMG website or the legal department.99 IGMG has a relatively large infrastructure compared to other Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany, which can be linked to the fact that IGMG Germany also manages and represents the European level of the organization. While the majority of associated mosque communities are in Germany (15 regional associations with 323 mosques and 34,394 registered members), IGMG is also present in 10 other EU countries (15 regional associations with 191 mosques and 99 The employees are distributed across departments as follows: Executive Board (3), General Secretariat (3, plus 16 students), Community Development (3), Education Department (3), Department for Spiritual Guidance (5), Accounting (13), Human Resources (9), Youth Department (5), and Women’s Department (5) (personal correspondence 03-Aug-2010). In another interview, 60 employees were mentioned, including 8 lawyers (IN IGMG 3: 164). In addition, IGMG employs apprentices in the areas of information technology, media design, and office management (IN IGMG 1).



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18,533 registered members) (Igmg.de: organizational Structure; personal communication 03-Aug-2010; IGMG self-portrayal 2010a; b).100 In Germany, IGMG is perceived as a German organization, while the European dimension of IGMG’s headquarters is largely ignored in public and academic debates. In order to counter this general perception, the secretary general, who has held this post since 2002, stresses that he is as familiar with the societal and political situation regarding Islamic matters across Europe as with those in Germany. He monitors the developments in other countries closely to find out “where one needs to exert influence and that one has proper personnel structures there […]to be properly represented with local people” (IN IGMG 1: 326). Therefore, the recruitment of people for IGMG positions across Europe is one of the central concerns of the headquarters, which appoints the leaders of IGMG’s regional associations (Mügge 2011; Schiffauer 2010: 161).101 The European dimension of IGMG is thus very closely connected and tied to the headquarters in Germany, which “feels responsible for the things that happen in Austria as well as for those that happen in Holland” (IN IGMG 1: 42). This centralized organizational structure also sets IGMG apart from other Islamic umbrella organizations. For example, Diyanetrelated organizations and the Alevi confederation AABK also exist in Europe, but, according to an IGMG representative, they “do not meet under one roof. Instead, every country organization is responsible for its own affairs” (ibid.). “The Implementation of the Goals Is Planned and Managed from Kerpen” The headquarters in Kerpen has a hierarchical function for IGMG affairs. The headquarters and especially the general secretariat are responsible for the strategies of IGMG, which are implemented across Europe and beyond. This responsibility is exercised not only through regular meetings in Germany, but also through frequent visits of IGMG representatives to associated mosque communities across Europe to keep in touch with organizational members and local representatives. The headquarters also closely monitors the work of its affiliated organizations, which are expected to adapt to the strategies adopted by the IGMG headquarters: 100 The figures provided by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are slightly lower (29,000 members for 2009, and 27,500 members for 2008) (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2010: 188). 101 The “development of internal competencies” is also achieved through a scholarship network that supports young IGMG activists (IN IGMG 1: 326). Currently, IGMG’s scholarship fund supports 200 students (IGMG PR 22-Apr-2010).

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chapter five But we at the headquarters actually account for the work, the content design with regard to teachers and educational work, concerning campaigns, the standards, and the strategy. Furthermore, the implementation of these goals is planned and managed from Kerpen (IN IGMG 1: 34).

A similar statement can be found in the organizational profile provided online: The central administration in Germany is responsible for the coordination of all religious, educational, and social services within the community. It develops and provides the organization’s general strategy regarding essential topics. (Igmg.de: Organizational Structure).

The 30 regional associations are involved in the decision-making process through bimonthly meetings in Germany. The underlying aim is to decide on a common language and terminology for the organization as a whole. The man from the headquarters, together with the regional representations, decides on the strategy, he makes sure that we use the same terms so we understand what we are talking about, and so this is implemented locally (IN IGMG 1: 326).

To counter the accusation of a diktat concerning the decision-making process, the discursive process of decision making, which involves the regional representatives, is repeatedly mentioned throughout all of the interviews.102 However, it must be noted that the regional executive board members (the president, the vice president, and the secretary general) are appointed directly by the IGMG executive board, which is further evidence of its hierarchical powers.103 In her analysis of the Dutch regional IGMG associations (Dutch Islamic Federation, Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie, NIF), Mügge notes: The NIF’s ties to Turkey are generally mediated by the IGMG, particularly when issues concern religion. Millî Görüş’ religious practices are not controlled by Diyanet; the IGMG recruits imams in Turkey for Milli Görüş mosques in the Netherlands. This case again highlights the importance of European federations in mediating transnational activities. (2011: 112).

Mügge concludes that the hierarchical structure and the services provided by IGMG’s headquarters in Germany (including the maintenance of ties to

102 See the section on the internal communication structure below. 103 See § 10.3 of IGMG’s bylaws of the regional association Cologne (AZ 43 AR 152/06). § 10.6 also stipulates that IGMG’s headquarters may remove executive board members.



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Turkey) actually “facilitates country of residence directed politics” at the regional and local levels of associated mosque communities (ibid.). One can argue that, on the whole, the strong coordination of internal affairs across Europe characterizes IGMG as a cross-border organization. The TRAMO project concludes that due to its centralistic structure with regard to its German headquarters and its limited degree of decentralization of decision making IGMG should be characterized as a country-ofarrival-global organization, according to the criteria listed in Table 1 (Pries 2006; Pries/Sezgin 2012) (see Chap. Six: Relations to Actors Abroad). The Regional Level The regional level, that is, IGMG’s 30 regional associations,104 plays a central role within IGMG’s structure in that these associations actually “facilitate” the work of the organization (IN IGMG 1: 30). The regional representatives from across Europe meet every two months in Germany to discuss organizational matters. The organizational language continues to be Turkish due to the different national contexts. The hierarchical structure of IGMG also extends to the regional level, which monitors and facilitates the activities of the local level: On the one hand, the regional organizations constitute a linkage between IGMG center and the associated local communities. On the other hand, they coordinate the work of the local communities. They are above all responsible for the coordination of religious and educational services and for the arrangement of cultural events. The cooperation between the associated local communities as well as their mutual exchange of experiences are among the tasks that our regional organizations undertake as well. Furthermore, they are in charge of coordinating the imams in the communities (Igmg.de: Organizational Structures.).

The regional associations are represented by an executive board which consists of three members and a Shura council with as many members as there are regular and associated organizations (§ 10.2).105 Only the regular 104 There are 15 regional organizations in Germany: Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Hanover, Northern Ruhr Basin, Ruhr Basin A, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Hesse, Rhine-Saar, Stuttgart, Swabia, Freiburg, Northern Bavaria, and Southern Bavaria). Regional organizations in other European countries are structured as follows: 4 in France (Paris, Strasbourg, Lyon, and Annecy), 2 in Austria (Austria-1 and Austria-2), and the northern and southern parts of the Netherlands (2 each). In the remaining European countries (Switzerland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and the UK), IGMG is represented by only one national organization each (Igmg.de: Organizational Structures). 105 The section numbers given refer to the bylaws of the regional association in Cologne, which was established on May 20, 2006. The bylaws are available at the municipal court in Cologne (AG Köln AZ 43 AR 152/06).

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member organizations have voting rights within the Shura council concerning regional IGMG affairs (§ 11.1). The Shura council meets once a year or on special occasions. All decisions are made by simple majority (§ 11.4), while a qualified majority is required for changes in the bylaws (§ 11.8), which must also be approved by the IGMG executive board (§ 11.9). Any legal business involving amounts greater than €20,000 also requires IGMG approval (§ 10.7). The regional Shura council cannot decide on theological questions either (§ 11.11). The bylaws are prepared by IGMG’s legal department, which is further evidence of IGMG’s centralistic organizational structures (Protocol on the foundation of IGMG regional association Cologne 2006). IGMG’s hierarchical structure is also apparent in the fact that the regional executive boards are appointed directly by the IGMG executive board (ibid: § 10.3). IGMG’s regional organizations were established in response to internal needs, rather than to external expectations. As a result, IGMG has four regional associations in North Rhine-Westphalia. Although the regional associations coordinate their work internally, they do not elect a joint representative to communicate with the authorities of the German federal states. This is currently done by representatives of IGMG’s headquarters. With regard to the overall restructuring of the organizational landscape of Islamic organizations in Germany, it was found that IGMG supports the establishment of Islamic religious communities on the level of the German federal states. Although this transformation into a democratically elected body which joins and represents all Islamic organizations would signify a loss of influence and a sharing of power, it is preferred by IGMG because it allows the organization to establish a “reasonable infrastructure that ensures our continued existence in the future” (IN IGMG 3: 51). Therefore, IGMG’s main aim in Germany is not necessarily to obtain the status of a corporation of public law or a religious community, as envisioned by DITIB and other organizations. The majority of studies on regional IGMG associations across Europe focus primarily on the Netherlands, where an internal divide between the northern and southern regional associations was observed after their split in 1997. The southern association remained closer to Erbakan’s party politics and in 2002 organized a voting trip to Dutch airports on its own initiative, a move that was criticized by the northern association. However, the relations to the Felicity Party (SP) are described as ideological rather than organic, according to a party official (Mügge 2011: 159). This example of transplanted homeland politics in the Netherlands is also reflected in differing opinions with regard to Turkey’s EU accession,



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which are evidence of the different positions of the SP and the AKP in Turkey. IGMG in Germany has tried to increase its influence on the Dutch organizations after they increasingly claimed autonomy in the 1990s. Mügge also notes that the influence of IGMG’s headquarters continues to be particularly strong in the southern Dutch association (ibid.). Overall, it must be noted that most of the existing comparative studies analyze the national or regional level of the organization (for the Dutch regional and national context see Kortmann 2011; Mügge 2011, and Yükleyen 2012; for Germany see Pielage 2010 and Schiffauer 2010). So far, no comparative analysis has been conducted of the 15 regional associations in Germany, nor have any studies compared differences in local IGMG organizational life across the 10 national EU contexts Thus there is a clear need for further research into this area. The Local Level The smallest units of our religious community are the local mosques. It is them which provide the necessary infrastructure – such as praying rooms and imams – for the daily religious practices. Beyond that, the women’s and youth departments also operate locally. They not only carry out activities for general purposes but primarily focus on the needs of each of their target groups (Igmg.de: Organizational Structure).

On its website, IGMG states that it maintains 1,833 local facilities, including 514 mosque communities. These differ greatly in terms of size and related resources, ranging from 50 to 1,000 member families (ibid.; IN IGMG 3: 37). As described earlier, IGMG communities depend on the voluntary engagement of their members. The imam is generally the only paid position in the local association. His salary is provided by the community through membership fees and donations. Sometimes additional funds can be generated through stores and businesses that are located on the organization’s premises. Changes concerning the organizational buildings are implemented by the members themselves or supported by EMUG after successful application for funding (Pielage 2010: 59). Like the hierarchical relationships between the regional and federal levels, the local level is closely connected to the regional IGMG organizations. Every mosque has to submit monthly activity reports to its regional organization, which facilitate internal monitoring processes but also support the exchange of best practices. Pielage (2010: 60) notes that extensive handbooks and checklists are used for the different areas of activity, and that there is a certain degree of competition between regional associations with regard to local achievements (cf. Schiffauer 2010: 92).

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The local level is also managed directly by the department of organizational development at the IGMG headquarters, which not only supervises the communal work but also offers help whenever organizational problems occur. When new communities are founded the department takes care of the formulation of a charter and of aspects regarding fiscal law (Igmg.de: Organizational Development).

Like the regional associations, members of the local executive boards were also originally appointed through AMGT’s headquarters in Cologne (Lemmen 2000: 41f.). It is not known to what extent the local bylaws and the relevant § 11 have changed across Europe in recent years. Most of the volunteers involved in the local executive boards are men, but women’s involvement is officially supported (Igmg.de: women’s department). The close coordination of local affairs through the regional level and the IGMG headquarters is also characterized in the organizational chart provided on the website (Igmg.de: Organizational Structure). The links between local mosques and the IGMG headquarters have been extensively discussed in the literature due to diverse forms of organizational membership. Some mosque communities are official IGMG mem­ bers, while others are only unofficially associated with IGMG through certain activities (cf. Lemmen 2000: 40ff.). Despite the fact that their mosques are registered as independent associations, individual Muslims, for example, participate in activities organized by IGMG, such as the hajj pilgrimage (IN IGMG 2: 265). The independence of some local and regional

30 Regional Associations 514 Mosque Communities IGMG European Association

Regional Association Nothern Netherlands

Mosque Community 1

Mosque Community 2

Regional Association Berlin

Mosque Community 3

Figure 8: IGMG’s organizational structure. Source: Igmg.de: Organizational Structure

National Association Belgium

Mosque Community 4

Mosque Community 5



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organizations106 can be related to the fact that IGMG is being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and is confronted with prejudices that result from this situation. Although this functional separation of formal ties has been practiced for some time, it is also part of an internal organizational discourse: “We are currently discussing whether they want to be an IGMG member at all or not. This is an internal discourse that is going on right now” (ibid.: 263). Nevertheless, IGMG also maintains local cooperation with other actors in the organizational field, but faces similar problems and issues of discrimination as other IGMG levels because the organization is being watched by federal law-enforcement agencies in Germany (Pielage 2010). Communication Structure between the Organization and Its Members The internal communication structure of IGMG is relatively complex due to the wide distribution of member communities across Europe. The topdown structure described above is also reflected in various communication devices. Means of communication include the official IGMG website with its wide range of information provided, an IGMG radio station, two IGMG magazines (Perspektif and Sabah Ülkesi), and regular meetings and events which bring the associated organizations together on the regional, national, and European levels. The Turkish newspaper Millî Gazette is also often associated with IGMG, especially by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution which quotes extensively from the Millî Gazette to highlight IGMG’s Islamist and anti-Semitic tendencies (see, e.g., German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2006: 32f.; Ministry of the Interior NRW 2008b: 63ff.). One security official interviewed by Jonathan Laurence for the International Crisis Group (2007: 11) states that IGMG “claims that the Millî Gazette isn’t theirs—yet ask anyone”. This is consistent with the official stance of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which often considers the political Millî Görüş movement in Turkey and IGMG in Europe to be one and the same. 106 In an early IGMG profile from 1996, the nine Islamic federations that are organized at the level of the German federal states are listed as independent IGMG members (Lemmen 2000: 41ff.). Today, these Islamic federations still exist but are not officially associated with IGMG. Instead, they declare that they are independent. For example, no links or references to IGMG can be found on their websites, and they deny related statements. Nevertheless, many of their associated mosques are also listed on the IGMG website. The underlying reasons why some organizations openly associate themselves with IGMG while others do not are also a matter for further research.

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However, IGMG denies having ties to this Erbakan-loyal newspaper: “Millî Gazette is not the mouthpiece of IGMG. Our organizational magazine Millî Görüş Perspektif is and will continue to be our only mouthpiece” (IGMG PR 05-Dec-2001, translation KRW). It is not surprising, then, that the Millî Gazette is not mentioned in any of the IGMG interviews or on the website. Nevertheless, the Millî Gazette is frequently read by IGMG members. During the visit to IGMG’s headquarters, for example, various issues of the Millî Gazette were laid out on the coffee tables in the entrance office. On the first pages, the papers reported on the recent visit of the newlyappointed Turkish Minister for the Turks Living Abroad to IGMG’s headquarters (cf. IGMG PR 22-Feb-2010). Perspektif, which is published monthly, is IGMG’s official platform for comments on national and international affairs, with only limited reporting on internal events. Its comment section is used to present the opinions of the headquarters’ representatives, particularly the general secretariat. The regular IGMG comments and dossiers on the issues headscarves, hajj, Ramadan and the sacrificial animal campaign, which are available online, have a similar function. IGMG also publishes its internal news in the website’s Associational News section (Verbandsnachrichten), which is discussed below. Perspektif has been published since the 1990s and has been providing German translations of articles since the end of the 1990s. The IGMG member magazine is supplemented by a Turkish cultural magazine, Sabah Ülkesi, It is produced quarterly by IGMG Germany and reports on media, films, books, music, cities, and countries in Turkish. Both magazines are sent out to registered IGMG members across Europe. They are also available on the IGMG website. Due to their international readership, the magazines focus on the Turkish language. The establishment of a true associational magazine which would reports on local activities in Germany is currently being discussed internally (IN IGMG 2: 75), but no decision has been made. The IGMG website (Igmg.de) is regarded as the “daily organ” of the organization (IN IGMG 2: 75). It has a very informative character due to its large selection of news articles on national and international topics. Originally, the website was published in German only, but when nonGerman regional associations complained about this the website was made available in Turkish in 2004. However, a bilingual comparison of the German and Turkish versions revealed that more services are available on the German website, including more extensive archives, more contact details, an Islam glossary, videos, and a number of press releases that have not been translated into Turkish.



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The German website is intended to serve as the main website for the entire European level of the organization. Demands to provide this service in languages other than German and Turkish cannot be met due to funding constraints (IN IGMG 2: 75). National websites of associated organizations exist but do not link to Igmg.de. However, some sections of IGMG’s profile have been translated into English. The website is designed and maintained by the general secretariat in Cologne, which is also responsible for the translation of the published articles. As of 2010, five technicians and eight journalists worked for igmg. de. Most of them are students who focus their reports on the German or the Turkish context. Additional reporting on current events and political developments in other European countries is planned but not yet available, due to limited input from the regional associations and limited resources in Cologne. The main bottom-up feature in content production is the extensive reporting on associational news, which involves reports that are sent in from local mosque communities across Europe. The website represents the entire spectrum of IGMG activities. Unlike DITIB, IGMG is less focused on presenting itself on its website and more on the dissemination of ideas and information with regard to daily affairs and religious matters. Information related to IGMG itself represent only one out of seven website sections, which include “News”, “Islam”, “Muslims and Rights”, “Knowledge and Education”, and “Service and Contact”. These findings are consistent with the observations made by Schlicht (2007), who compares the websites of IGMG and DITIB: DITIB presents itself and the ‘offline’ activities of the organization on its website primarily in the form of an ‘online bulletin board’. The medium is also used to present DITIB’s views on current issues to contribute to the religious instruction of its members. IGMG, by contrast, addresses its readers virtually on various levels. It provides a virtual platform on its website which allows the user to interactively join discussions on general topics that also go beyond religion and thus to participate actively in the formation of associational life. These activity opportunities for the users provide the prerequisites for the creation of an online community that strengthens the feelings of community and belonging. In addition, IGMG links its members to its organization through a multitude of service offers that range from the kids club to the funeral expense fund. The organization thus serves a variety of everyday needs of its members to commit them even beyond religious aspects. IGMG also attracts new members through its service offers. They can register themselves through the website (Schlicht 2007: 5f., translation KRW).

IGMG radio was available online on the IGMG website and under www .igmg.fm until September 2010. The radio station was established in 2002

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and its personnel expanded in 2004. It was under the jurisdiction of the IGMG general secretariat, and its aim was to disseminate Islamic songs, stories, and Qur’an recitations and to broadcast a one-hour news feature every day at noon, as well as programs for children, educational features, a radio theater and prayers (IGMG PR 05-Feb-2008). The station usually broadcast seven days a week between 10 a.m. and 6 p.m., but the station itself was available 24 hours a day. The radio facilities could also be used internally for local and regional productions (ibid.). According to Inan (2007: 122ff.), the radio station claimed to be the 200th most successful internet radio worldwide, with listeners from across the globe. Inan’s analysis of the content of 50 hours of airtime, reveals a consistent emphasis on religious and cultural issues, which are nonetheless intertwined with information about the German school system and IGMG’s request to study hard and become a citizen in the countries of settlement (ibid.). Organizational meetings and events represent the fourth means of internal communication. The extent of meetings held at the local, regional, national, and European levels is rather intensive compared to other Islamic organizations. It has been discussed above that the personnel of the IGMG headquarters’ travels extensively across Europe on a regular weekend basis to meet with the member organizations. The representatives of the headquarters are also expected to participate in these events to act as “contact partners” and “justify the current decisions” (IN IGMG 3: 174). The following passage illustrates that this close contact is not only seen as a top-down process of disseminating ideas, but also links the headquarters to the base of the organization, which in the end has to legitimize the overall course of action of IGMG in Europe. It’s not as though one sees the representatives of the headquarters only once a year, but repeatedly on various platforms and at various events, which are organized by the regional associations or the communities. And it is expected that the headquarters also send people there and that one is available then as a contact. On these platforms one is then also approached with questions related to the direction of policies that are implemented, and one is also called to account. Therefore, one cannot afford to say: OK, I will muddle through because I think the situation is unpleasant and I do not want to be the spoilsport again, when I know that I cannot justify my decisions to my community. And this also represents a compelling reason to say no if necessary (ibid.).

The diversity of member interests which can be in conflict with external expectations and the related internal struggles concerning the organizational identity have been discussed above. With regard to the



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communication structure, it was found that this internal struggle is described as a lively “culture of criticism” (IN IGMG 3: 174), despite IGMG’s hierarchical structure. Internal normative control actually begins at the individual level. IGMG representatives not only have to justify their work in official meetings and events; they are also approached directly in their local mosque communities. In addition, they emphasize that they have a responsibility to their families and their community to advance the institutionalization of Islam in Germany (ibid: 172). These timely feedback mechanisms are used extensively by IGMG to establish an organizational consensus on issue-specific positions. For example, positions on the DIK process were continuously discussed with the regional associations, which at times even suggested that IGMG should not participate in the DIK at all. Common positions are eventually presented in “position papers” and translated into Turkish. A similar translation process occurred regarding the DIK results (IN IGMG 1: 242). The fact that traditionally oral agreements are now put into text is appreciated as a growing organizational “culture of textualization” (ibid.: 326) which differs from previous modes of negotiation:“Actually, it used to work in a more oriental manner, and now it becomes increasingly German, but that lies in the nature of things” (IN IGMG 3: 180). The bureaucratization process is therefore accepted as a natural development, although it represents a decisive change in the internal communication process. In line with the concept of isomorphism, this can be interpreted as mimetic adaptation to the customs of the countries of settlement. Finances Like the other Islamic umbrella organizations, IGMG is financed primarily through membership fees and donations. The membership fee of a minimum of €10 per month is the same as the fee charged by DITIB. In the registration form, one can choose between a membership fee of €10, €20, and €30, or indicate a different amount. Donations can be collected at any time. However, they are institutionalized in the zekat and fitre donations. While zekat represents a mandatory Islamic donation of 2.5% of the capital and gold owned by every Muslim whose means exceed a certain limit, the fitre donation is collected before the fasting month of Ramadan. According to the IGMG brochure, it is fixed for Germany at €9. The zekat and fitre donations are used for

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international aid projects in Muslim countries, individuals in need who apply for funding, educational institutes, and scholarships for students and activists (IGMG self-portrayal 2010a; b). In 2000 the IGMG president stated in an interview that IGMG had an annual turnover of DM400–450 million (€200–225 million) (Beucker/ Seidel, TAZ, 03-Aug-2000). Current figures are not available. On the local and regional levels, branches manage their funds autonomously. Merely an account of their financial activities is given to the central administration (Igmg.de: Finances).

Membership fees and donations also pay for the 51 full-time employees at the headquarters, the hired students, and the services provided by the headquarters (content and project work, various publications, counselling, and representative functions) (IN IGMG 2: 91). The headquarters has more staff than many other Islamic umbrella organizations. However, one of the interviewees stated that this is “nothing compared to the churches” (IN IGMG 3: 162). IGMG also organizes a burial fund (cenaze fonu, Bestattungskoste­ nunterstützungsfond), a sacrificial animal campaign, and the hajj pilgrimages which are advertised on the IGMG.de website. In addition, a book shop for religious and general texts was mentioned as a “single purpose business”. To what extent these services contribute to the internal funding is unknown. The activities are stated to be non-commercial (Igmg.de: Finances). Like other organizations, IGMG still relies primarily on voluntary work. At the local level, only the imam is paid by the community, while the various departments (e.g., youth, women, and public relations) and the executive boards (local and regional) are not remunerated. IGMG representatives and activists from the local, regional, and federal levels of the organization also act as trainers and speakers for the internal projects and events. IGMG receives no public funding for its project work (unlike DITIB, which increasingly cooperates with funding institutions at the European and national levels). However, the fact that IGMG does not receive public funding was not criticized in the interviews. Indeed, the organizational independence with regard to the content of its project work is seen positively in light of possible external interventions linked to public funding regulations (IN IGMG 3: 150). Finally, it must be noted that IGMG premises have been raided on several occasions since the turn of the 21st century by the German authorities



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due to various accusations. These searches have increased since 2008, in an attempt to prove organizational financial fraud, forgery, and membership in a criminal organization of the General Secretary of IGMG (Unknown, Spiegel.de, 29-Mar-2009).107 Many legal procedures are still pending. Nevertheless, the accusations served to justify the exclusion of IGMG and IRD from the DIK II process (De Mazière 2010; DIK website). Summary This overview of IGMG structures shows that the organization can be characterized as a transnational organization due to its strong coordination of internal activities including the flows of communication, internal elections, and decision-making processes. Although the organizational structures involve no formal ties to Turkey, the organization is established across Europe with a clear center in Germany. Germany hosts the majority of associated mosque communities, organizational representatives, and the IGMG headquarters in Kerpen. Despite the fact that IGMG has gradually expanded its structures over the last decade, its overall structure and its hierarchical character have been relatively stable. The headquarters still exercises a strong influence on the associated organizations, with a focus of power being at its general secretariat. On the whole, IGMG nonetheless maintains a lively exchange of opinions, which is facilitated through numerous meetings and events as detailed below. IGMG’s Activities The activities of IGMG are aimed at four target groups: the individual IGMG members; all Muslims living in Europe; the global Ummah; and the general population including various dialogue partners. This section discusses activities aimed at all four target groups, starting with the Muslim community and ending with the public relations work.

107 In a detailed press release, IGMG lists the various accusations, which include embezzlement of donations for the sacrificial animal campaign, the misrepresentation of the number of pilgrims to an insurance company and the amount of social security payments for imams. IGMG and EMUG are also still being investigated for suspected tax evasion between 1996 and 2005. IGMG denies this and has taken legal action against these allegations (IGMG PR 04-Dec-2009). The accusations concerning the establishment of a criminal organization are described in the article ‘Investigators are on the trail of German Hamas sponsors’ (Unknown, Spiegel online, 29-Mar-2009 (translation KRW). In September 2010 the charges against IGMG’s Secretary General were dropped (IGMG PR 21-Sept-2010, 23-Sept-2010).

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Professionalization of Religious Services and Community Development “Addressing All Issues Regarding Muslims” The following passage from the official IGMG profile indicates that IGMG sees itself as an organization that focuses its activities on the Muslim community regardless of national background. Unlike other Turkish organizations, IGMG does not focus primarily on the preservation and practice of a Turkish Islam: “It is not the preservation of specific regional-cultural forms of religiosity which IGMG aims at” (IGMG 2010a). Instead, IGMG stresses the “cultural diversity sustained by the Qur’an and the Sunnah” and it “avows itself to its responsibilities regarding the world wide Muslim community (Ummah)” (IGMG 2010b: 5). However, this is contradicted by the fact that nearly all of its members across Europe have a Turkish migration background and that Turkish is the language most widely used by the organization to coordinate Europe-wide IGMG activities. IGMG is an Islamic community which comprehensively organizes the religious lives of Muslims. IGMG not only aims at maintaining the Islamic teachings, proclaiming the Islamic creed and communicating religious duties resulting from that proclamation. Other than that IGMG addresses all issues regarding Muslims while at the same time representing their interests. It is the goal of IGMG to improve the living circumstances of Muslims as well as to provide for their fundamental rights (Igmg.de: What is IGMG; IGMG 2010a: 4; 2010b: 3).108

“Typical Services of a Religious Community” The activities of IGMG quoted above also show that IGMG regards itself as a religious community that offers religious services and interest representation for Muslims across Europe (cf. IGMG bylaws 2001: § 2). The focus on religious services (as opposed to political activism in Turkey) is also highlighted with regard to the various IGMG service areas which are described as “typical services of a religious community” (Igmg.de Tätigkeitsbereiche, translation KRW). In this context, IGMG sees itself as a service organization whose activities serve the needs of its members:

108 Most of the information used in the following section is provided both online and in two brochures. All three English sources are largely identical and are consistent with the German versions (translations are provided by the author where necessary). The English IGMG website is referred to as Igmg.de: headline of online section. URL: http://www.igmg .de/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues/what-does-milli-goerues-mean.html [last visited 15-Apr-2012]. Additional information is derived from the interviews and IGMG press releases.



the individual organization283 IGMG is a service organization; the members are religious people, devout people. IGMG is a religious community. Based on this definition, the aim of IGMG is to meet the needs of the members (IN IGMG 2: 29).

“The Only Organization That Can Afford Legal Practitioners” The interlinking of religious services and interest representation is achieved primarily through IGMG’s extensive legal work, which is provided by eight legal practitioners working for the general secretariat. They “collect and document cases of discrimination in order to inform the public”, while aiming at the “protection of fundamental rights of Muslims” (Igmg.de: general secretariat, cf. IGMG bylaws 2001: § 3.10). This antidiscrimination work also involves political activism and cooperation with other civil rights organizations (IN IGMG 3: 137). In Germany, IGMG is the only Islamic organization that employs legal practitioners. They prepare the court cases filed by the organization to defend itself against reports published by the Office for the Protection of the Constitutions, force the media to publish corrections and clarifications (cf. Schiffauer 2010: 267ff.), provide expertise with regard to the institutionalization of Islam, and inform Muslim individuals about their rights. The latter task mainly involves consultation services and aims to resolve disputes informally (IN IGMG 3: 139). The legal work has expanded over the years due to the increase in public awareness of Muslims in Europe and internally perceived responsibilities regarding the institutionalization of Islam. With regard to this responsibility, one interviewee stated that the “legal department is one of the centers of competence for Islamicized Islam in the German Federal Republic” (IN IGMG 1: 238). “A Steadfast Identity Is the Only Way to Successful Integration” IGMG’s headquarters has eight departments that represent the main fields of activities: Education, Irshad (religious guidance), General Sec­ retariat, Finances, Organizational Development, Social Services, and the Women’s and Youth departments (Igmg.de: Service Areas; IGMG 2010a, b). The aim of the youth department is to establish a “steadfast identity”, which is linked to the religious education and the practice of faith (Igmg. de: Youth Department). The youth work has not changed much over the years, although the focus on the countries of settlement has increased due to the end of the return mentality (IN IGMG 2: 15, IGMG 2010b: 33ff.). In addition to Qur’an courses and religious education, the youth department also offers

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The organization claims to reach 107,000 children across Europe through its basic courses (IGMG PR 22-Apr-2010). Many of these activities, including the development of new formats and activities, are organized locally and regionally. One example is the project “Yıldız Gençlik” (“youth under the stars”), which was established by the regional association Ruhr A in 2007. Its aim is to provide training and education to young people in the areas of religion, school, work, and general knowledge to help them become an “example for their generation and to hold important positions at the organizational level” (IGMG PR 25-Apr-2009, translation KRW). Various IGMG women’s departments provide similar services to women and girls, with a special focus on addressing the German language deficits among first-generation migrant women.109 A particular focus is on religious services because “only well-founded knowledge makes a conscious religious life possible” (Igmg.de: Women’s Department). IGMG actively promotes the wearing of the headscarf (hijab) (cf. Inan 2007: 130), which is worn by most female IGMG members. Wearing a veil (hijab) is part of the Islamic dress code and is therefore to be adhered to. Yet wearing or not wearing a veil is not significant in terms of one’s affiliation to Islam. By any means, Muslim women should wear headscarves by choice and out of their own conviction of faith. Discrimination against women who do not wear a headscarf is as unacceptable as discrimination against women who have decided for themselves to wear a veil” (Igmg.de: Standpoint on Dress Code).110

Since its beginnings, IGMG has also complemented the religious services offered to women with courses on everyday issues such as marriage, parenting, and health (ibid.). Similar programs are now being implemented by other Islamic organizations in Germany such as DITIB. 109 “The first generation of migrant women consisted mainly of housewives who had had barely access to school or professional education in Turkey. Even after migrating to Europe they hardly managed to compensate those deficits. Especially Muslim women with limited German language skills often experience restrictions in their everyday lives. This is still one of the fundamental challenges IGMG Women’s Department has to bear” (Igmg.de: Women’s Department). 110 See also the pictures in the profile brochure, which show all women wearing a headscarf and women and men grouped separately (IGMG 2010b: 34, 42, and 44). Schiffauer describes the wearing of a headscarf as a strong symbol that expresses the collective right to difference (2010: 216).



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“To Join Social Responsibility and Community Development” In the interviews, the internal IGMG activities were often placed within a general societal perspective and simultaneously linked to the aim of individual education: To bear responsibility in the community, in the society, and at the same time to make sure that my community develops, [that it, KRW] makes a step up (IN IGMG 1: 50).

One of the links between IGMG and the society is the establishment of community assistants, who have been trained since 2008. The program included 12 weekend seminars and an internship at a local mosque. The assistants were expected to develop a joint project with the local municipality, but the interviewee complained that they were often confronted with prejudice and that many municipalities refused to cooperate (IN IGMG 3. 145). There are a multitude of internal education projects across the organization. They are funded and organized internally and presented at internal meetings and in the Associational News section of the IGMG website. IGMG student associations also play an important role in promoting the religious and non-religious education of IGMG members. The majority of leaders in the education departments are men, since gender separation is still prevalent in IGMG activities.111 The IGMG education department itself supports the organizational work with religious teaching materials that are developed specifically for the European context (Igmg.de: Education). The education department directly associates education with integration while “cultivating a selfcontained Islamic identity”. This link between religion and education generally reflects the organizational profile of all of the departments described above. “Religious Guidance: The Main and Central Duty” Religious guidance for the members is described as the main and central responsibility of IGMG. It is provided by the Irshad department and an associated fiqh council in charge of interpreting the religious sources. The Irshad department is responsible for the provision of individual advice, the Friday prayers (hutbas),112 and the education, training, and supervision of the imams (Igmg.de: Irshad). 111 For a representative example see the picture provided in the profile brochure, which shows some 90 young men to portray the youth department (IGMG 2010b: 46). 112 For an overview of all Friday prayers since 2003 see Igmg.de: Islam – Freitagspredigt.

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In the interviews, the difficulties concerning imam recruitment were outlined. At first the mosques had to rely on laymen. Later retired imams from Diyanet were hired, who were trained in Turkey. However, the most lively community life was stimulated by young and well-trained imams who arrived in Germany because of family reunifications. Due to limited local resources, their permanent engagement was difficult to finance, and their numbers were too few to meet the demand. Currently, IGMG supports the training of young Muslims either abroad or in the countries of settlement to credibly accomplish the change toward a rooted Islamic community in German territory or in European territory (IN IGMG 1: 83).

“A Bridge between the Wealthy and Those in Need” While the legal practitioners of IGMG provide their services for the European “Muslim citizens” and the local, regional, and federal organizational bodies aim to support individual Muslims in their religious and educational needs, the global Ummah represents the third target group of IGMG. The Ummah perspective is related to welfare provision and a global distribution of IGMG donations to “those in need” (IGMG 2010b: 29). One of the main campaigns in this humanitarian aid context is the annual distribution of sacrificial animals during the Eid al-Adha (Feast of Sacrifice). In 2009 75,618 donations led to a distribution of 82,363 sacrificial animals in 78 countries managed by IGMG volunteers (IGMG PR 17-Dec-2009). In addition to the hajj, this campaign is seen as a means to put the Ummah concept into practice. Currently, IGMG tries to institutionalize this symbolic help in various development projects. The Eid al-Adha campaign is seen as a door opener to institutionally start dialogues, to exchange ideas and look for possibilities to cooperate, and to mutually benefit from experiences (IN IGMG 1: 95).

These exchanges of ideas concern forms of institutionalizing Islam and organizing Muslims, which are discussed “fruitfully” in Sri Lanka, South Africa, and the Balkans. These dialogues are also seen as sources for the internal motivation of IGMG’s associational work in Europe (ibid.). Development projects include the establishment of schools and training centers, orphanages, hospitals, and other facilities in Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. As in other humanitarian organizations, the focus of the work is on the creation of enduring projects and opportunities to promote local self-help involvement (ibid.). IGMG is also active in emergency and reconstruction aid in disaster areas.



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For example, it sent a delegation to Pakistan to coordinate the distribution of food parcels funded by IGMG members (IGMG 2010b: 27ff.; IGMG PR 21-Aug-2010; cf. Rosenow/Sezgin 2011). Turkey is not explicitly mentioned in the description of the social services department, but is also a priority country within these social activities due to the interests of IGMG members (IN IGMG 1: 100). However, the omission of Turkey in the description of social services is consistent with the organizational strategy to establish visible ties with the global Ummah across the globe and to downplay or even overcome the traditional focus on Turkey as the country of origin of most of the active IGMG members. This behavior can be partly explained by the expectations of the German political environment, which accuses IGMG of an Islamist ideology that mainly linked to the political engagement of Erbakan in Turkey. Professionalization of Public Affairs and Press Releases “Friends and Foes, It Is an Abstract Public” The German and the European general public, including the media and the political sphere, represent yet another target group of IGMG activities. To address the general public, IGMG publishes news articles and organizational press releases on its website. Thus, Igmg.de not only functions as a tool for internal communication; its extensive content production also aims to improve public relations in the figurative sense of representing Muslims and their faith. The website and the related radio station (Igmg .fm) disseminate IGMG’s points of views while informing listeners about religious and political issues. The IGMG website originally started as a static German website which provided information about organizational contact details. Over the years, it has been developed into a dynamic website, and since 2004 has been produced bilingually in Turkish and German. Currently, the website Igmg.de has, on average, some 2,500 visitors per day. The majority of 2,000 visitors are from Germany, about 30 people visit the website from Turkey, and the rest are from other European countries (IN IGMG 2: 300). Of these 2,500 visitors, some 2,000 use the German version of the website and 500 the Turkish one. The organization concludes that the majority of visitors is comprised of members of the German public (“friends and foes, it is an abstract public”) (ibid.: 304). According to the interviewee, the main topics of interests are IGMG’s comments section, followed by news, features on religious topics, and book reviews. The Friday prayers are another traditional feature that attracts online visitors. Press releases and associational news are less

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regularly read, depending upon their content. Nonetheless, the extensive publication of associational news is seen as having an important internal and external function with regard to transparency. The regional and local levels have the opportunity to express themselves in this section, while the public can read about everyday affairs of IGMG. The publication of associational news is therefore seen as an offer to “answer the repeatedly posed questions about what’s going on in the Muslim communities” (ibid.: 324). “In Turkey, the Organization Is Not Perceived as We Would Like It to Be Perceived” The low awareness of IGMG activities in Turkey remains a contested issue, especially with regard to the visibility of the website. In order to lobby for the interests of Turks living abroad, IGMG envisions stronger public relations involvement in Turkey in the future. The related difficulties are expressed in the passage quoted below, which also includes a reference to the different perceptions of the organization in Turkey and Germany. While in Turkey the Millî Görüş movement is still linked to political party offices, in Europe the organization has always been grounded in the mosque communities—something that was not possible under the statecontrolled religious system in Turkey. Overall, the focus of the IGMG website on Germany is mainly linked to the availability of resources (IN IGMG 1: 304). At the same time, external expectations of both the German and the Turkish institutional environments can also be assumed to have played a role in this trajectory of public relations work, with the former demanding more transparent information than the latter. It is not good for us when only 20 or 30 people from Turkey visit us because we want to raise awareness of the Turks living abroad among the Turkish public. What is the reason why no one knows us in Turkey? If people know us, then they say that are just simple mosques. Demarcating, I would say. In Turkey, the organization is not perceived as we would like it to be perceived. We are working on that, but we are not so advanced, yet, that we visit editorial offices in Turkey. To provide information about the needs of the Turkish minority in Germany there we have not managed yet. We focused primarily on Germany to establish ourselves. If we now develop the resources, then we will have the opportunity to act in the Turkish public as well; that is of course an important difference (IN IGMG 1: 304).

With regard to the organizational trajectory, it should be noted that the public relations work has increased since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Due to the ensuing debates and the public interest in the topic of Islam, IGMG has perceived the necessity to hire people to “present us as we



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are” (IN IGMG 2: 163). The recruitment of students for the content production is promoted internally through speeches at IGMG events and meetings, especially at those organized by the student or youth organizations. Young people are encouraged to learn the languages and the techniques of image editing, writing, and science to express themselves “in this society as we are” (ibid.). This focus on authenticity and transparency is prevalent in the interview sections concerning public affairs. This can be linked to the frequent public accusation of being a two-faced organization which only act as if they accept the Basic law “while being the carrier of an extremist and therefore anti-constitutional ideology” (Ministry of the Interior NRW 2008a: 22, translation KRW). The IGMG news articles are produced by the young journalists, while the official IGMG press releases are carefully worded at the general secretariat (IN IGMG 3: 178). A basic organizational position is developed based on the position papers prepared in accordance with the regional associations. Relying on this consensus, the press releases are prepared with the help of the responsible departments. They are then reviewed and approved by the heads of the general secretariat (ibid.: 183). The analysis of the headlines of IGMG press releases published between 2000 and 2009 (n = 227) reveals that IGMG has increasingly focused on religious issues since 2007 (n = 50; see Table 13). Security-related issues are the second most important topic (44), with a clear focus of attention in 2001 (13). Third, the organizational focus on claims-making is notable (33), followed by statements concerning internal affairs (31), most of which were statements to counter public accusations. The same holds true for the press releases concerning the Basic Law, most of which criticize the reports published by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (19). Articles that refer to cooperation or joint meetings with other actors in the organizational field are issued considerably less frequently (15) compared to DITIB and ZMD (see Chap. Six: Relations with the Media). This limited external contact reflects the analysis of IGMG partners, which is presented below. A comparison of German and Turkish press releases shows that IGMG’s aim of organizational bilingualism is nearly completely achieved (see Fig­ ure 9). Press releases that are available in both languages represent direct translations, and in 2009 only two German PRs were not translated.113

113 Both press releases referred to the category of internal affairs and countered public accusations.

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Table 13: IGMG press releases in German, Jan. 2000–Dec. 2009. Basic Secu- Integra- German Cooper­ Reli- Claims Internal Country Miscella- Total Law rity tion values ation gion Making affairs of Origin neous 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

0 1 0 2 6 2 3 3 2 0

4 13 4 2 4 3 6 4 2 2

0 5 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 2

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

1 3 1 3 1 2 3 1 0 0

0 2 6 6 2 3 3 9 9 10

0 7 7 5 2 5 1 0 3 3

0 8 4 6 1 0 4 0 1 7

0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 1

0 1 3 4 3 0 2 0 1 0

6 41 26 28 20 17 22 19 22 26

Total

19

44

12

2

15

50

33

31

7

14

227

Highlighted cells represent the most frequently mentioned topic in each year.

The comparison of the associational news, the IGMG comments, and the IGMG press releases reveals a discrepancy in the results which underlines divergent functions of these publication formats. While most of the comments represent personal views of IGMG representatives on issues such as integration (32%), claims-making (30%), and security (19%), the locally and regionally produced associational news report on religious affairs such as festivities and religious campaigns (48%), integration-related events such as educational seminars and workshops (19%), and cooperation-related news (15%) which mainly refer to internal partners. Internal affairs are more frequently discussed in German and Turkish IGMG press releases than in the associational news. This is linked to the fact that this category involves issues such as local festivities, elections, and mosque building projects, as well as official statements to deny public allegations. These counterstatements are found in the German and Turkish IGMG press releases, while the local topics are mentioned more frequently in the associational news. Summary The overview of IGMG’s activities shows that the organization focuses primarily on religious services, which represent its “main and central duty” (Igmg.de: Irshad). The services are aimed at individual IGMG members, but also at the entire Muslim community in Europe and the global Ummah.



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60

Association news German (n=144)

48

50

42 38

40

32

00

German press releases (n=26)

n tio

13

0

0

1

44

2

10 0

5

Comments German (n=57)

Cl ai

ra

Co o

0

12

lig io n m sm ak In in te g rn al aff Co air un s try of or M ig isc in ell an eo us

0

es

44

13

9

lu

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va

tio ra

m an

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er

te g

cu

In

Se

law ic Ba s

1

rit y

000

0

4 3

15

88

8

pe

8

10

27 21

19 19

20

Turkish press releases (n=24)

Re

30

30

Figure 9: Comparison of IGMG’s German and Turkish press releases, comments, and associational news in 2009 (%). Note: Only 144 of the 284 associational news published in 2009 were analyzed.

In order to fulfill its self-designated role as a service organization, IGMG provides legal services that promote Muslim interest representation and the institutionalization of Islam in Europe. In addition, various educational activities complement the religious life, and social services target those “in need” both in the local community and in the global Ummah in accordance with Muslim tradition. The general public is reached through the provision of organizational information and online content production, which aims to improve organizational transparency. All areas of IGMG activities have increasingly undergone processes of professionalization. This development has been strongly supported by the involvement of young volunteers who studied at universities in the countries of settlement. The hierarchical structures and the internal communication devices have also been aiding the internal dissemination of best practices among internal and external organizational activities. IGMG’s Partners The relationships between IGMG and other actors in the organizational field are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. This section summarizes the results of a document analysis of IGMG’s press releases and events between 2005 and 2009. Figure 9 shows that the majority of articles on cooperation projects and contacts are published in the associational news section of the IGMG website. However, only five of these articles refer to

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external contacts (three visits from local mayors, one travel report, and one conference report), while 16 articles are related to internal events such as national and regional meetings of the various IGMG bodies. The analysis of IGMG posters reveals a similar focus on internal cooperation. Of the 31 posters for the period 2005 to 2009 that were provided by IGMG on request, only five mentioned external guests (with three of them being guests at the European Qur’an recitation contests).114 The fact that major IGMG events such as IGMG symposiums are not among the advertised internal events suggests that the organization also uses other means of communication to advertise its events. IGMG symposia in 2007 and 2010, for example, involved renowned academics from Turkey, Europe, and North America who jointly discussed integration-related topics with the IGMG community (IGMG PR 06-May-2010). These conferences were mainly attended by the younger IGMG generation and were booked out within days of being announced (personal observation May 1–2, 2010). IGMG’s emphasis on internal cooperation also supports the assumption that IGMG can be described as marginalized when it comes to contacts to non-Muslim actors in the organizational field. Relations among Islamic organizations in Germany have become closer since the turn of the 21st century, but IGMG is still often excluded from public dialogue events (e.g., the DIK II). This is linked to its status as a “legalistic Islamist organization” which the Office for the Protection of the Constitution accuses of promoting anti-constitutional, non-integrative, and Islamist ideologies (e.g., BMI 2010: 228ff.; Ministry of the Interior NRW 2008a: 22, translation KRW). Analysis of IGMG’s Patterns of Organizational Behavior The following analysis reveals the patterns of behavior the organization shows in response to the expectations of the political level in Germany. It can be noted that the marginalized position of IGMG due to its being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution leads to a considerable amount of internal criticism of the institutional environment in 114 These data are not comparable to the DITIB posters, since many of IGMG posters were advertisements for donation campaigns (for zekat and fitre campaigns and for students in need) and the hajj pilgrimages, the burial fund, or IGMG membership. Only 13 posters refer to actual events which are mainly related to religion in the form of recitation or knowledge contests. It is possible that the 31 posters provided on request do not cover the entire spectrum of posters published on Igmg.de between 2005 and 2009. The annual IGMG mass gatherings, for example, were not among these advertisements. For an analysis of these “identity fests” see Schiffauer 2010: 150ff. and Tezcan 2002.



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Germany raised by IGMG members. This conflict is further aggravated by IGMG’s limited opportunity to acquire resources from the German government in the form of legitimacy, status, or financial assistance. Due to this combination of explanatory variables—a strong conflict between external and internal expectations, a high dependence on the members and a low dependence on the German government—no incident of adaptation behavior was found. Possible future trajectories that might increase organizational adaptation to the political expectations of the German government are discussed at the end of this section. Decoupling Between External and Internal Expectations As has been noted in the description of the theoretical framework, decoupling is likely to occur when the organization has to reconcile conflicting expectations. The analysis shows that this level of conflict is higher in IGMG than in the other two Islamic umbrella organizations under analysis. Therefore, the organization is forced to find compromises, which often involve bargaining tactics and attempts to reconcile divergent interests to find a balanced approach between the logics of influence and membership. If the conflict is perceived as being too strong the organization also frequently chooses to protest against the external expectations. The Expectation “To Reject ‘Parallel Societies’ and Promote Integration” The existence of integrative and segregative tendencies within IGMG has been described with regard to the internal members’ interests and with regard to the narratives of organizational change. Both sections indicated that, with regard to the question of integration, IGMG has to overcome internal reservations concerning its strategy of placing IGMG communities at the center of society, rather than at its margins. Schiffauer (2010) also provides a detailed description of the internal struggle between the younger and the older generation of IGMG activists and their internal negotiation processes. The interviews conducted in 2010 reveal that the integrationist attitude and the orientation toward Germany are currently dominating in the organization (IN IGMG 2: 13–15). The characteristic IGMG rhetoric of being “at the center of society” is expressed in detail in the following standpoint on parallel societies and integration: IGMG considers itself to be at the center of social life. For that reason, IGMG does not only deal with affairs regarding migrants but with issues concerning the entire society. IGMG purposes a life at the center of society for both the organizational and the individual level. Its activities do not aim at constructing a parallel society but rather at enriching social life by active

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chapter five participation. IGMG rejects isolation and exclusion. It actively takes part within the social discourse and encourages its members to do so as well. IGMG is particularly concerned to arrange all its activities in a transparent manner. The facilities and activities of IGMG do not stand for isolation from society, but for a natural way of keeping alive religion and traditions, which the believers themselves organize within the framework of civil society. IGMG supports the integration of Muslims into society. For that purpose, it offers language courses, advanced training and education. However, integration is a mutual process which requires endeavors on both sides, i.e. the minority as well as the majority. In other words: All social groups have to play a part in this process. At the same time, IGMG dismisses the misusage of topics such as integration and parallel society fur populist purposes. Integration is one of the preconditions for a proper social climate. It is something for which long-term solutions in terms of societal benefits are to be developed (Igmg.de: Parallel Society and Integration).

Interestingly, this standpoint does not refer to the rejection of assimilation expectations, which are often condemned by Islamic organizations in this context. Instead, it emphasizes the aim to participate in society in general and addresses the rejection of parallel societies and isolation directly. By highlighting integration-related activities such as language courses and advanced training and education, the framing of this standpoint meets the political expectation to reject parallel societies and promote integration on various levels. In addition, IGMG lobbies for the political participation of its members in federal election campaigns (IGMG comment 30-Aug-2009) and supports naturalization (Schiffauer 2010: 113), but it also criticizes the current naturalization procedures and the exclusion of IGMG members from German citizenship (e.g., IGMG PR 03-Dec-2009). IGMG’s endeavors to improve education among its members also generally aim to facilitate social participation opportunities in the countries of settlement. However, IGMG also actively “keeps religion and tradition alive”. This involves support of religious symbols such as the headscarf and claimsmaking activities concerning the establishment of a right to difference such as in the exemption from swimming lessons and class trips for girls. The IGMG press statement that describes the ban on headscarves as an “admission of failure by a legal order that calls itself free and liberal” (IGMG comment 24-Nov-2009, translation KRW) is only one example of IGMG’s public lobbying for religious rights of Muslims in Germany. Such claims are interpreted as “non-integrative tendencies” both by certain segments of German society and by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.



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Nevertheless, the demand of a right to difference concerning religious issues reflects the interests of IGMG’s members who do not want to choose between integration and religious practices but rather aim to reach a compromise that accommodates their religious interests. While IGMG and in particular its legal department promote the institutionalization of Islam in Germany though structural, legal, and ideological support, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior regards these efforts as “capable of fostering the creation and extension of Islamist milieus in Germany” (BMI 2010: 187). As a result, the organization is faced with conflicting external and internal interests. On the one hand, the members and especially the young IGMG leaders want to situate themselves at the center of society to practice their belief and receive resources in the form of public legitimacy, a higher status in the form of expanded rights, and possibly even financial support. The chances to receive these external resources are still perceived as good, despite the continuous confrontation with the law enforcement agencies and the resulting political marginalization. The organization thus continues to adapt to the expectation to integrate (which also reflects internal members’ interests) while at the same time lobbying for religious rights. Integration-related activities (such as dialogue and education activities) are implemented on all levels of the organization, but various levels of internal resistance to the strategy of actively approaching society are also reported in the interviews. One can conclude that the members are   strongly influenced by the attitudes of the external environment toward their organization. Therefore, it is not primarily a question of whether the members support integration in general. Instead, the conflict concerns the extent of required adaptation and the extent of granted rights for religious practices in the sense of a right to difference (Schiffauer 2010: 216). IGMG’s solution strategy in this conflict is to find compromises in which both sides seek reconciliation. The envisioned compromise in this case is the coexistence of two value orders and traditions in the sense of a multicultural approach. Such a compromise also becomes apparent with regard to the claimed right to “education in the native language”, while acknowledging the necessity of learning the language of the majority as the “the basis of a conjoint culture” (Igmg.de: Standpoint on education in the native language).

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Another value that is often discussed in this context is the role of women. IGMG stresses the importance of the family, which is “above all based on a voluntarily established marriage”. This is consistent with the government’s expectation to fight forced marriages (Igmg.de: Standpoint on the relation between men and women) and shows that the organization publicly meets certain expectations while bargaining for the accommodation of rights concerning other issues, such as the Islamic dress code. The Expectation “To Organize and Cooperate” The expectation “to organize and cooperate” entails normative and coercive elements. While the normative expectation is related to cooperative behavior in various dialogue settings, the coercive pressures are related to Article 7(3) of the German Constitution (GG) on the acknowledgement of religious communities for the establishment of religious education and Article 140 on the official recognition of corporations of public law. Both articles expect a certain form of organizational structure to meet the formal criteria (see Chap. Three: The Regulative Dimension). Interestingly, IGMG claims to meet the criteria of an Islamic religious community on the federal, regional, and local levels, according to its bylaws (e.g., § 2 regional IGMG association Cologne bylaws 2006). It also joined the KRM through its IRD membership and thus contributed to the expected unification process in the organizational field. In practice, however, IGMG did not alter its structures in response to this expectation. Rather, the internal structure of IGMG with regional associations in Germany and Europe has existed since the split of ICCB in the mid-1980s. IGMG stresses that its structures meet the requirements of the German federal states, but actually they mainly meet internal organizational demands and have not been altered recently. With regard to the normative pressures to cooperate, it was found that the organization is also faced with a slightly different dilemma than the other two Islamic umbrella organizations analyzed in this study. While IGMG stresses its willingness to cooperate with the main actors in the organizational field (IGMG 2010a: 6), it faces certain barriers to cooperation. It is also forced to reject certain cooperation projects due to internal pressures. In particular the relationship to the German law enforcement agencies, which have been watching the organization because of suspected anti-constitutional activities, is characterized by avoidance and open protest behavior on the part of IGMG. For example, the participation of civil servants of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution caused



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IGMG to leave the federal and regional Islam forums which aimed to promote interreligious dialogue (IN IGMG 3: 113). However, interreligious dialogue is still accepted as a part of IGMG’s religious responsibilities. IGMG mosques open their doors to the public during the annual day of the open mosque, and more and more dialogue representatives have been trained internally. Nonetheless, the experienced marginalization from many dialogue forms was also specifically mentioned in the interviews and in the IGMG standpoint on dialogue: Thus IGMG sets a high value on a dialogue which is based upon mutual understanding and which neither judges nor excludes any of the interlocutors (Igmg.de: Standpoint on Dialogue).

This reflects the fact that IGMG-associated mosques cannot receive any public funding for dialogue activities from German authorities as long as the organization is being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. As the above discussion of IGMG’s partners shows, the organization relies heavily on its own international network of speakers and dialogue partners. The tendency to balance the Turkish and the European dimensions in any organizational activity, including the choice of invited guests, has been described as part of the organization’s self-understanding and that of IGMG’s members (IN IGMG 2: 19). Cooperation with the German state represents another issue that has caused internal conflicts (ibid.: 31). In particular during the DIK I process, IGMG had to negotiate its position internally before an agreement could be reached with the other actors at the DIK. Thus, compromises were necessary to reconcile the internal and external expectations (IN IGMG 3: 176). The analysis of this context revealed the array of behavioral patterns associated with the decoupling strategy. IGMG representatives tried to find a balance between the segregative and the integrative attitudes of the organizational members while assuaging the external demands through certain compliance agreements (for example, the denunciation of terrorism and the pledge of allegiance to the German Constitution were specifically mentioned and formally agreed on in the preliminary declarations of the DIK). At the same time, IGMG continuously bargained with the German authorities to advocate its members’ interests. Protest Against External Expectations According to this research framework, protest behavior implies that external expectations do not cause any internal change but are rather ignored

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or publicly protested against. The situation of IGMG in Germany—the fact that it is being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and marginalized as a “legalistic extremist organization”— has mobilized internal protest behavior in various contexts. These include the expectations to follow the law, to denounce Islamism and terrorism, and to adopt German values. Although the organization also partly complies with these expectations, it also openly criticizes their consequences both with regard to IGMG in particular and Muslims in general. The Expectation “To Follow the Law” The Office for the Protection of the Constitution declares that IGMG is a “legalistic Islamist organization”, due its use of non-violent means to advance its “extremist anti-constitutional ideology” which “undermines our free democratic basic order” (Ministry of the Interior NRW 2008a: 22, 26ff.). One federal report states that IGMG only pretends to be willing to integrate and follow the Basic Law, arguing that IGMG aims to strengthen an independent cultural and religious identity which prevents assimilation into German society. Such organizational behavior is believed to be “capable of fostering the creation and extension of Islamist milieus in Germany” (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2010: 187). IGMG is currently being watched by the regional and federal branches of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in all of the states where IGMG affiliated mosques exist. Due to this status, the German state and its law enforcement agencies are not willing to cooperate with IGMG. On the level of individual members, the official status of IGMG in Germany results in discriminatory experiences. This involves, among other things, complications or refusals within their naturalization processes (Schiffauer 2008a). These individual experiences directly influence the organizational behavior of IGMG, which strongly rejects and protests against these practices and affirms its adherence to the law (cf. Boukhars 2009: 311). IGMG does not pretend to be a law-abiding organization; it is a law-abiding organization (IGMG PR 26-Jan-2006, translation KRW).

This is a typical IGMG statement in response to the accusation of only paying lip service to the German Constitution. The organization also accuses the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Ministry of the Interior of violating the constitution, in particular the constitutional right to religious freedom “by denunciating religious practice to intimidate Muslims” and by trying to “associate Muslims with terrorism”.



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(IGMG PR 26-Jan-2006, translation KRW). IGMG responds to these official accusations with public statements which include critical passages from the reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (IGMG comments 15.9.2009, 19-June-2009) and ask the members to form their own opinion. In its standpoint concerning democracy, IGMG also stresses that it adheres to the free democratic basic order. While this mimics an affirmation of the expectation to follow the law that is also found in other Islamic organizations, IGMG links this statement to the demand of political participation rights for people with a migration background. IGMG thus openly protests against the legal status quo, which does not grant local voting rights to TCNs in Germany (Igmg.de: Democracy). Another example is the public discourse since the 9/11 attacks. The former IGMG President announced in a press release: “We have 500 mosques in Germany and serve 200,000 members. None of our members were ever noticed because of violence and no weapons were ever confiscated from them” (IGMG PR 01-Oct-2001, translation KRW). IGMG actively emphasizes that it does follow the laws in Germany, but it also protests against contradicting accusations raised by the German authorities. This is motivated by integration-related organizational interests, which are in conflict with the external perception of the organization. On the other hand, the organization does not have much legitimacy to lose in this context and thus can openly criticize the German state and attack the security policies. The Expectation “To Denounce Islamism and Terrorism” The analysis of IGMG press releases shows that security-related news were the second most frequently discussed topic between 2000 and 2009. For example, IGMG raised its voice regarding all the major terrorist attacks, “condemning terror in the harshest of terms” (IGMG PR 06-July-2007, translation KRW). In the same press release concerning a failed terrorist attack in the UK, IGMG President Karahan stated that “such people have no place in the Muslim community. Nothing gives them the right to misuse Islam for their fatuous ideology” (ibid.). IGMG condemns terrorist attacks, which take place worldwide, including events in Turkey such as the murder of a Turkish journalist (IGMG PR 21-Jan-2007). IGMG also publishes various press releases to condemn terrorism which are jointly issued by Islamic organizations in Germany or by KRM (IGMG et al. PR 25-Aug-2006, 11-Sept-2006; KRM PR 07-Sept-2007, 14-Sept-2007). IGMG’s security-related press releases also deal with the Gaza conflict. In this

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context, demanding an end to the “spiral of violence and a peaceful solution” (IGMG PR 18.4.2006, translation KRW; see also IGMG PR 11-June2006, 03-Feb-2008, and 28-Dec-2008). The strong denunciation of violence and terrorism in the public statements of IGMG representatives is thus consistent with the political expectation “to denounce Islamism and terrorism” and generally reflects the arguments raised by other Islamic organizations. However, IGMG also openly protests against the securitization of Islam and lobbies against a related “prevention logic” of the German authorities, stating that the security discourse has a negative impact on the Muslim community (IGMG comments 29-Apr-2009, 02-May-2009, and 10-Dec2009). On September 11 2001 the organization immediately demanded that politics and the media should refrain from making sweeping accusations against Muslims. IGMG has also frequently pointed to trends in this direction (see e.g. IGMG PRs 11-Sept-2001, 01-Oct-2001, 08-Oct-2001, and 06-Nov-2001). IGMG is the most outspoken organization when it comes to assailing the securitization of discourses. In the interviews and in their public statements, IGMG representatives frequently excoriate the work of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which in their eyes sows distrust among people. This is consistent with IRD’s criticism of the final DIK I declaration (IRD PR 25-June-2009), in which IRD emphasized that public cooperation between the umbrella organizations and the police and other law enforcement agencies only reinforces the suspicion that the Muslim community in Germany poses a threat that must be prevented through dialogue initiatives. IGMG also protests against identity checks in front of mosque communities after Friday prayers, which are criticized for publicly reinforcing the image of Muslims as a potential security threat (IGMG PR 11-Dec-2005). To end its exclusion from most of the security-related dialogues (with the exception of the DIK I), IGMG has repeatedly stressed its own contribution to internal security in Germany, and has been expressing its interest in joining dialogues with the political level since 2001. The organization has complained about being excluded and about its pledge of allegiance to the Basic Law being viewed as mere lip service (IGMG PR 08-Oct-2001). IGMG has been refusing to cooperate with the law enforcement agencies altogether since its first attempts to join the security related dialogues were rejected and the organization remained on the watch list of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. At first, IGMG’s protest strategy mainly involved press releases that rectified discrediting press articles,



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but later also increasingly involved legal means of protest in response to the political and public pressures (cf. Dantschke 2004; Unknown, TAZ, 08-June-2002). To change its public image as a security threat, IGMG developed a strong protest behavior with regard to the security-related discourses, including various activities to combat discrimination against the Muslim community in general. This behavior has been criticized as a “victimization” discourse (Kandel 2002: 2; Inan 2007: 147, 211; Reinecke, TAZ, 04-May2010), but IGMG intends to increase its legitimacy through these activities. The main target groups are political actors and the general public, as well as its members and the Muslim community in general. The Expectation “To Adopt German Values” As discussed above, IGMG publicly declares its allegiance to the free democratic basic order (Igmg.de: Standpoint on Democracy). It also excoriates the German political debates about a German Leitkultur both in the interviews and during the debates at the DIK I. The basis of our living together is the Constitution, and it is good that it exists. But to try to exclude me from things through auxiliary constructions that go beyond it, I think that is dangerous (IN IGMG 1: 392).

IGMG has argued that political pressures were exerted within the DIK I working group “Societal Consensus and Value Order”. According to IGMG, this working group demanded that the organizations accept Leitkultur conceptions and a preventive logic without defining to what extent these values actually exceed those enshrined in the German Constitution (IGMG PR 16-Mar-2010). The efforts of the Islamic organizations were successful in that the term Leitkultur was not used in the DIK I final declaration, which was in line with their view that the main German values are already enshrined in the German Constitution, to which all organizations adhere anyway. Following IGMG’s exclusion from the second DIK process in 2010, the organization stated its criticism even more clearly: In the political discourse, the ‘Leitkultur’ debate serves the rhetoric of exclusion and the utopian construction of an autochthonous population that is characterized by a closed homogeneous value system which remains undefined and is used arbitrarily, depending on its usefulness (IGMG PR 16-Mar2010, translation KRW).

IGMG protests most vigorously against the public “abuse” of these value debates for populist purposes, emphasizing that it adheres to values that

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are part of German society and derived from the Islamic tradition (the passage below mentions helpfulness, unselfishness, and solidarity). IGMG thus aims to reconcile the two value orders while stressing its willingness to “resolve problems” and to “seek dialogue”. IGMG entrusts Muslims with moral values and duties and therefore plays a significant role in their everyday lives as well. However, it is not the preservation of specific regional-cultural forms of religiosity which IGMG aims at, but rather the exercise of a faith based on the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition. […] IGMG encourages a life that is bound to values and principles such as helpfulness, unselfishness, and solidarity. Thus it participates in social discourses that conduce to finding solutions to the society’s economic, political, and social problems. Concerning these topics, IGMG – while orienting by the Islamic sources – continuously seeks dialogue with political as well as other social groups (Igmg.de: What is IGMG?).

The organization clearly protests against the debate about a German Leitkultur, but it does not actively protest against German values in general. It demands the right to religious freedom on the individual level, but also promotes a separate cultural identity (IGMG PR 22-Apr-2010) to establish the right to practice their own “moral values and duties” based on the Qur’an. Direct criticism of German values is not raised publicly. Instead, IGMG employs a decoupling strategy of buffering to mediate between both cultures which creates an organizational space for Muslim religious practices while trying to avoid public suspicion concerning the establishment of ‘parallel societies’. Overall, it can be concluded that the political pressure on IGMG and the lack of resource opportunities from the German state in the form of legitimacy, status, or financial aid result in organizational opposition which promotes IGMG’s increasing protest behavior. Identifying Organizational Trajectories The analysis of organizational patterns of behavior reveals the impact of both external and internal expectations on IGMG. Due to the diversity of internal expectations which partly contradict the political expectations with which the organization is confronted, IGMG has thus far been unable to achieve complete adaptation to the German political environment and is unlikely to do so in the future. This has also been due to the exclusionary attitude of German authorities toward the organization. Therefore, external and internal views and expectations have a significant influence on each other. It should be noted in this connection that the critics within IGMG who argue for a non-cooperative strategy in dealing with the



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German institutional environment are strengthened by the fact that the organization remains on the watch list of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. However, the activities described are also evidence of IGMG’s integrative attitude as emphasized by the headquarters and the representatives interviewed. According to their accounts, it is also supported across IGMG communities. Especially with regard to the “need to integrate” and “to cooperate”, however, the organization largely meets the external expectations by facilitating education, training, dialogue, civic engagement, counterterrorism, law abidance, and a general willingness to cooperate, although these activities are often viewed with suspicion and accused of being mere lip service to the German constitutional order. IGMG was invited to the first DIK through the peak organization IRD, but both organizations were excluded from its second phase. This exclusion alleviated the internal tensions in the organization that were linked to its DIK participation in the first place. It remains to be seen to what extent this exclusion plays into the hands of IGMG members who criticize the integrationist course. However, the generational change, which is inevitable due to the demographic characteristic and the related socialization process of IGMG’s members in the countries of settlement, may present an opportunity for organizational change. Such change concerns IGMG’s structures and activities, possibly continuing the opening up of the organizational identity to its institutional environment. At the same time, internal criticism and external skepticism may prevent processes of further adaptation to external expectations. With regard to the theoretical framework, it can be concluded that IGMG needs the prospect of resource acquisition in Germany to decide whether it should use decoupling or adaptation behavior in dealing with political expectations. The lack of resource opportunities in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance with which the organization is currently confronted reinforces its protest behavior. IGMG is highly dependent on its internal support and has little to lose in terms of its relations to the German government, although it still seeks to be recognized as a legitimate contact and as a religious community. The analysis also shows that IGMG is not a German but a truly European organization. Therefore, it is not only influenced by political changes in Germany and Turkey but also by the other national contexts it encounters in its countries of settlement. Nevertheless, Germany has a particular role due to IGMG’s strong presence and the particular difficulties discussed in this case study.

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chapter five The Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD)

The Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD) was established in 1994 as a coalition of various Islamic organizations. Its aim is to represent the interests of Muslims living in Germany. ZMD is a multinational organization that includes Turkish, Bosnian115 and Albanian Muslims, as well as a majority of organized Muslims with an Arab and German background (Spuler-Stegemann 2002: 117). With its avowed orientation toward Germany and in particular the political sphere, ZMD is chosen as a contrasting example to the two Turkish Islamic umbrella organizations DITIB and IGMG. The latter two also have stronger ties to interest groups abroad than ZMD and are more directly involved in providing religious services to their members. ZMD represents a classic example of an interest organization which lobbies for the institutionalization of Islam in Germany on the societal, political, and legal levels. ZMD has been involved in dialogues with the public and political spheres since its beginnings in 1994 and has been a main contact for the German government since the 9/11 attacks. The fact that ZMD’s members are not individual mosque communities but umbrella organizations also sets ZMD apart from the other two organizations analyzed in this study. The effects of this constellation on the organizational structures and its activities are discussed below. This section begins with an overview of the rather limited literature on ZMD. The second part presents the organizational narratives regarding the influence of the institutional environment and the organizational members’ interests on the organization. In the third part, ZMD’s structures are discussed, revealing significant differences in size and resources in comparison to DITIB and IGMG. The fourth part shows that these resource limitations are compensated for by extensive public relations work and that there is also a wide network of contacts which promotes ZMD’s mission to advance Muslim rights and supports its organizational status as a relevant contact.

115 As of 2010, the Islamic Community of Bosniacs in Germany – Central Council (Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland – Zentralrat e. V, ICBD) is no longer a full member of ZMD. It decided to become an associated member, which still supports ZMD’s work.



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The analysis of the behavior the organization exhibits in response to the external expectations supports the assumption that ZMD has the mandate to protest against the status quo concerning the integration of Islam into German society. Its members’ expectations are in conflict with the political expectations in many respects, and due to the organization’s dependence on its members, their demands for the right to difference (Schiffauer 2007b) cannot be ignored by the organization. At the same time, ZMD is forced to maintain its status as a contact for the German state because of the logic of influence, which is highly relevant as well due to its being an interest organization. The resulting patterns of behavior that try to reconcile the logic of membership with the logic of influence are discussed at the end of this section. ZMD’s History From the Point of View of Existing Studies ZMD was established on November 27, 1994. Its first bylaws were signed on March 26, 1995. The foundation of ZMD signifies a continuation of the previous cooperation of Islamic organizations within the Islamic Working Group in Germany (Islamischer Arbeitskreis in Deutschland, IAK). IAK was established in 1988 as a loose cooperation among Islamic organizations to establish common positions on issues such as religious education and ritual slaughtering. IAK was not registered as an association (eingetragener Verein, e. V.) and included prominent Turkish organization such as DITIB, VIKZ, AMGT (later IGMG), and ATIB. It also involved the main religious centers in Aachen, Hamburg, and Munich as single associations (Lemmen 2000: 76). However, as a broad union of organizations IAK was weakened during the process of restructuring that led to the foundation of ZMD. First, AMGT left IAK on September 14, 1993 to join IRD. Second, DITIB announced shortly before the creation of ZMD that it would not join any of the two peak organizations. With this step, DITIB laid the foundation for its claims to act as an independent representative of Muslims in Germany (Lemmen 2002a: 88). Third, in 2000 the third largest umbrella organization, VIKZ, left ZMD. The resulting weakening of the organizations has attracted much criticism in the academic, public, and political spheres with regard ZMD’s representativeness (see below). Exact membership figures do not exist and are not provided on the ZMD website (www.zentralrat.de). Kücükhüseyin (2002: 45), the Ministry of Interior NRW (2002: 1), and Uphoff (2001) maintain that ZMD has only been representing 10,000–15,000 members since VIKZ and its 20,000

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members left, but these figures were rejected by the President of ZMD in an official press release in December 2001. He stated that 500 mosque communities are associated with ZMD, each of which serves, on average, 1,200 Muslims (ZMD PRs 24-Dec-2001 and 19-Aug-2002). This would amount to 600,000 Muslims being represented by ZMD, a figure which, according to Lemmen, does not bear up to close examination. Lemmen (2002a: 90.) notes that one can assume that ZMD represents around 200 communities which make up less than 10% of organized Muslims in Germany. The official DIK website (DIK no date) states that ZMD represents 300 mosque communities by its own accounts, while in the interviews 400 associated mosque communities were mentioned (IN ZMD 1: 57). In any case, ZMD has fewer members than the other umbrella organizations, including IRD, which is dominated by the 34,000 German IGMG members. However, one of ZMD’s advantages is that it represents a great variety of organizations. Its 18 member organizations116 represent different nationalities, confessional and sociopolitical directions, which are not dominated by one single organization (Lemmen 2002a: 89). ZMD does not accept individual mosques as full members (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 4.2),117 with the exception of founding members such as the three Islamic Centers in Aachen, Hamburg, and Munich. The Islamic Center in Hamburg is the main center for Shiite Muslims in Germany118 (Lemmen 2000: 63), while the centers in Aachen (IZA) and Munich (IZM)119 are frequented primarily by Arab Muslims and German converts. However, independent mosque communities can register as associated members, in which case they receive a monitoring status during the representatives’ assembly though without voting rights (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 3.2). ZMD itself is not being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, although links to the Islamist fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in 1928, are investigated concerning the ZMD member organization Islamic Community in Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V., IGD), which has ties to various Islamic centers in Germany such as Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt 116 URL: www.zentralrat.de [last visited 12-June-2012] (cf. table 14 below). 117 The bylaws in the version of July 18, 2011 are available on the organizational website, URL: http://zentralrat.de/2596.php [last visited 07-Mar-2012]. 118 URL: http://www.izhamburg.com/ [last visited 12-June-2012]. 119 URL: http://izaachen.de/; URL: http://islamisches-zentrum-muenchen.de [last visited 12-June-2012].



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am Main, Cologne, Marburg, Braunschweig, and Münster (Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2010: 225f.). According to the latest report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (ibid.), IZM is also linked to IGD. IZA, by contrast, is not mentioned in the reports and publicly denies allegations that link IZA to the Muslim Brotherhood.120 ZMD is generally described as an interest organization which aims to publicly represent the interests of its member organizations, while extending this mission to lobby for Islamic issues that affect all Muslims in Germany (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 2). In the literature, it is often acknowledged that the leadership of Dr. Nadeem Elyas in particular aided ZMD in becoming a prominent representative of Muslim communities. Elyas was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, studied medicine and Islamic studies in Germany, and was ZMD’s president between 1995 and 2006. In the literature, Elyas is described as well conversant with the exigencies of dialogue diplomacy, [he KRW] is widely perceived as a prominent speaker of the Muslims and therefore one of the best known figures in Islamic affairs (Eissler 2008: 163, cf. Lemmen 2002a).

After Elyas’ resignation in 2006 until 2010 ZMD was headed by Dr. Ayyub Axel Köhler, a German convert who was the former ZMD secretary general between 2001 and 2006. In October 2010 Aiman Mazyek, the former ZMD secretary general between 2006 and 2010, was elected as the new ZMD president. The existence of two Muslim peak organizations in Germany (ZMD and IRD), both of which claim to represent the interests of organized Muslims in Germany, can be attributed to the fact that the German state has neither officially recognized any organization as its official contact, nor granted the status of a corporation of public law to any Islamic organization. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and even at the beginning of the 21st century, the relationship between ZMD and IRD was therefore rather competitive. Nonetheless, joint commissions such as the Commission on  Ritual Slaughter (Kommission Islamisches Schächten, KIS) (ZMD PR 13-Feb-2002; Mazyek 2004) and the German Islamic New Moon Council (Deutscher Islamwissenschaftlicher Ausschuss der Neumonde, DIWAN), which sets the dates for the Islamic calendar, have existed for some time. Lemmen also argues that due to manifold relations between the members

120 URL: http://izaachen.de/ (Geschichte) [last visited 12-June-2012].

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of IGMG, IRD, and ZMD, “the lines between these organizations seem to blur” (2002b: 132, translation KRW). Since 2005, this cooperation has become publicly known through a new unification attempt among the Islamic organizations. The negotiations eventually led to the establishment of a new joint peak organization in 2007, the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM). This unification process was decisively supported by both ZMD and IRD. The unification under the KRM umbrella can be interpreted as a response to the slow progress of Muslim claims-making and the political and legal expectations with which the Islamic organizations in Germany are confronted, albeit a different outcome was originally envisioned (see Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Organizations). In the literature, the work of ZMD has been most intensively discussed since the publication of its Islamic Charta on February 20, 2002, which was subtitled: “Fundamental Declaration of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD) on the Relationship Between Muslims, their State and their Society”121 (Eissler 2008; Kandel 2002; Ministry of the Interior NRW 2002; Molthagen 2002; Tietze 2008). The Charta was published in response to the 9/11 attacks and the related expectations and prejudices with which the Muslim community in Germany was faced. The Islamic Charta consists of 21 articles. The first nine articles refer to theological and ethical principles of Islam such as the Day of Judgment, gender roles, and the five pillars of Islam (§§ 6–7). Articles 10–19 reflect on the situation of Muslims in Germany, stressing the adherence to the German Constitution (§ 11), the compatibility between “Islamic doctrine and core Western human rights” (§ 13), and the reference to a European “Judeo-Christian-Islamic heritage” (§ 14). The document ends with specific demands (§ 20) and a final statement on ZMD’s political neutrality (§ 21). Tietze notes that in its twenty-one articles, the Charta confirms the basic principles of Islam, at the same time it affirms the Muslim communities’ faith in the maxims of the German Federal Republic’s Constitution (Tietze 2008: 224).

The perception of the Islamic Charta among the general public and in the literature has been ambiguous. Tietze regards it as an attempt to establish 121 URL: http://www.islam.de/3037.php. In 2008, a similar Charta was signed on the European level by the Federation of Islamic organizations in Europe (FIOE). URL: http:// www.methaq.eu/index_en.html [last visited 16-Apr-2012].



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Muslims and their faith “as a group that is ‘one of our own’ within the community of Germans” (Tietze 2008: 226). According to her, the Islamic Charta has a twofold goal: First, formulating a theological consensus for the largest possible number of Muslim in Germany; and second, formulating the political and institutional principles that establish ZMD’s role as an Islamic actor in Germany’s public sphere and a negotiating partner for the government’s authorities (ibid.: 224).

The endeavor to formulate a theological consensus and the related selfconstitution as a religious denomination strengthens ZMD’s aim of becoming officially recognized as a corporation of public law and of legitimizing its claims with regard to Muslim rights vis-à-vis the German state. Tietze’s analysis therefore highlights the functional aspect of the Islamic Charta in the competitive organizational field and the pending issues of institutionalization of Islam in Germany. Kandel (2002), Molthagen (2002), and the Ministry of the Interior in North Rhine-Westphalia (2002) also discuss each of the twenty-one articles in detail, concluding that the Islamic Charta is a necessary first step to negotiate the terms of coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, many questions remain unresolved, and the ambiguity of some of the articles and the limited membership basis of ZMD are frequently criticized. In particular, ZMD’s attempt to speak for all the Muslims in Germany through its Charta, which is only signed by the member organizations of ZMD, is viewed critically. Lemmen argues in this context that the Islamic Charta had no sustainable impact on the Muslim community in Germany and was even disputed in the ZMD-associated organizations (2002a: 91f.). The report of the Ministry of the Interior of North RhineWestphalia (2002: 7) provides the most critical assessments, concluding that the Charta can be regarded as an attempt to cover up the essential problems between the Constitution and sharia through ambiguous phrasing (ibid.). The most comprehensive overview of the public perception of the Islamic Charta can be found in Eissler (2008). The author extensively compares arguments raised by the churches, academics, and Muslim actors themselves.122 Eissler’s comparison between ZMD’s Charta and 122 This includes a discussion of the critical statements made by von Denffer, who, interestingly, represents the Islamic Center Munich, which is a member organization of ZMD. Eissler concludes: “Thus, it is evident that what some Muslims in this country would welcome as opening the dialogue through acknowledging a common, democratically-based

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a document on “Christian Faith and Non-Christian religions” issued by the Evangelical Church in Germany concludes that both texts highlight the internal ruptures and fissures within the communities, which reveal “unsettled fundamental questions on both sides”. His conclusion challenges the observers to take a closer look at the actors involved to increase mutual respect, acceptance, and confidence (ibid.: 180f.): What we need as an integral part of a promising future development of Christian-Muslim dialogue is a shift from the merely horizontal view of the agents in the dialogue (organizations, denominations, interreligious groups and initiatives with their respective themes and agendas) to a fair and thorough-going vertical perception, as it were, of the internal profiles and structures of the participating groups and their argumentation (Eissler 2008: 180).

Summary Overall, it can be concluded that the literature on ZMD is not as extensive as the studies on other Islamic organizations in Germany. Thus far, few studies123 have empirically investigated the internal profile, structures, and overall argumentation of ZMD as requested by Eissler. While existing studies focus on the composition and the agenda of ZMD, or controversially discuss one of its projects—namely the Islamic Charta of 2002—an analysis of the motives, underlying challenges, and tensions that have been experienced by ZMD since its establishment in 1994 has yet to be conducted. This deficit is covered by the following analysis, which is based on a review of organizational documents, three interviews conducted with ZMD representatives in 2009, and secondary literature. ZMD Representativesʼ Narratives of Organizational Change This section takes a closer look at the historical development of ZMD from the organizational point of view. It describes and interprets the main steps of organizational change following the narrative passages on this subject from the semi-structured interviews and provides additional insights into rationale, others would brand as an unacceptable concession and even as a betrayal of the very basic of Islam – and that from within! It is not surprising that even much more critical views were uttered from Muslims not affiliated with ZMD” (Eissler 2008: 171; cf. Brunner 2002). 123 For a critical analysis of ZMD’s online appearance see Inan 2007. However, Inan’s work as well as other overview articles on ZMD do not include interview material with ZMD representatives.



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the aspects that have been discussed above (organizational membership changes, external events such as 9/11, and internal responses in the form of the Islamic Charta). This internal perspective on organizational change is presented to provide some useful insights into the organizational trajectory from its establishment to the current challenges it faces. “ZMD Goes Public” In 2000 the world’s fair (Expo) took place in Hanover, and ZMD was asked to organize the first informative Islam pavilion at an Expo. This Islam pavilion is the starting point for one of the interviews with regard to the  narrative of organizational change and the interviewee’s voluntary work for ZMD. These “exciting two months”, during which he worked as a guide for a couple of hundred thousand visitors to the ZMD exhibition at  the Expo, were followed by his voluntary engagement in the ZMD working group for the Day of the Open Mosque (Tag der offenen Moschee) in 2001. Until today, this working group helps mosque communities to prepare their public relations work for this annual day of open doors and to coordinate the press work at the federal level. The Day of the Open Mosque has taken place annually since 1997 on the Day of German Unification (October 3). While preparing this event in 2001, the 9/11 attacks interrupted the usual chain of events. The close proximity between September 11 and October 3 gave the Day of the Open Mosque “a very special importance” due to the increased public interest in Islam. “This is how I came from being a volunteer to working part time for ZMD as a spokesperson for public affairs” (IN ZMD 1: 5). This short introduction to the interview and the personal history of organizational engagement reveal important information about ZMD. First, its status as a contact for the Muslim community was already established at the end of the 1990s as its engagement at the Expo shows. Second, together with other umbrella organizations, ZMD provided services to the individual mosque communities in the form of the Day of the Open Mosques working group, which supported the public outreach attempts of Muslim communities even before 9/11. The work of ZMD itself, however, was mainly based on voluntary engagement, and it was not until 2001 that a paid position for a spokesperson on public affairs was established. This step toward organizational professionalization can be directly linked to the external expectation, which increasingly demanded organizational media presence in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

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“The Others Have a Body without a Head; ZMD Has a Head Without a Body” The turn of the 21st century also brought about another important organizational change for ZMD. In 2000 VIKZ left ZMD. After IGMG and DITIB had decided not to take part in the foundation of ZMD in 1994, VIKZ’s pullout signified a major “weakening” of ZMD, considering that it was one of the largest member organizations with around 300 associated mosque communities (IN ZMD 1: 13). Attempts to prevent this loss were unsuccessful, due to a change in the leadership of VIKZ in Turkey and the resulting restructuring of organizational goals.124 For ZMD, this weakening in terms of membership numbers was at first “covered up” by the successful and professional public affairs work of the organization (IN ZMD 1: 13).125 At the turn of the century, ZMD already offered information through both of its websites, Islam.de and Zentralrat.de, through its professional press work, and through its president, Nadeem Elyas. A much sought-after contact at the time, Elyas was invited to see the Chancellor and engaged in a dialogue with the heads of the churches. However, according to the interviewee, the years 2003/2004 marked a  turning point in terms of the status of ZMD as a respected contact and a  representative for the Muslim community in Germany. Voices that stressed the limitations of ZMD with regard to its representativeness gained importance in the public arena. This accusation culminated in the figurative expression “the others have a body without a head; ZMD has a head without a body” (IN ZMD 1: 13; cf. Lemmen 2002a: 90). IRD, which represents “the others” in this expression, was engaged in an internal leadership struggle during these years and was therefore described as headless. However, the accusation of having no body and thus no right to represent the Muslim community in Germany was one of the most powerful arguments raised against ZMD. Organizational Independence Another argument raised first by the Islam expert Thomas Lemmen concerned ties between ZMD and the Muslim World League (MWL)126 124 An analysis of this process, which ended the strong dialogue engagement of VIKZ and led to its renewed attention to religious service, is documented by Jonker, who completed her in-depth research on VIKZ during these years (Jonker 2002a). 125 In the interview, it is acknowledged that the pull-out of VIKZ could have been handled in a more professional and transparent manner although the pull-out itself is not regarded as a justifying argument to delegitimize ZMD (IN ZMD 1: 13). 126 URL: http://www.muslimworldleague.org/mwlwbsite_eng/index.htm [last visited 14-June-2012].



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(Lemmen 2002a: 92). Founded in Mecca in 1962, MWL promotes Islamic mission work across the world, including the “support of Islamic culture, suggestions for the Islamization of laws, responses to the Christian mission work among Muslims and the creation and dissemination of Qur’an translations” (Szyska 2002). MWL is financed by Saudi Arabia and represents Saudi interests. In the interview, Lemmen’s report is cited as the second main argument used to “delegitimize” ZMD (IN ZMD 1: 13). Lemmen’s accusation of organizational ties between ZMD and MWL was based on a visit to Germany by an MWL delegation in the aftermath of 9/11. ZMD President Nadeem Elyas organized the program and agreed to accompany the delegation to talks with politicians, including the Federal Chancellery. Lemmen argued that the fact that Elyas accompanied the delegation was evidence that he was a member of the delegation and therefore called ZMD’s claim of organizational independence into question (2002: 92). Lemmen’s scientific reputation in the community further supported his accusation that ZMD was being influenced or even dependent on actors from abroad (which would be in conflict with ZMD’s self-image as an independent German organization). The interviewee continued to remark that Lemmen later agreed in personal talks that this assumption was not fair. Still, the public damage was done and another argument against ZMD had been raised.127 However, despite the organizational criticism leveled against Lemmen’s accusations of ties between ZMD and MWL, links to MWL were mentioned in the same interview, with reference to the planned establishment of a global forum of Islamic organizations, which is to develop from the current MWL conference formats (IN ZMD 2: 246). In another interview (IN ZMD 3: 185), even a membership in MWL is mentioned,128 despite the fact that formal ties to organizations abroad are denied and no links are provided on ZMD’s websites, which can be linked

127 This line of argumentation reflects political expectations of organizational independence which follow the political trend of detransnationalizing and nationalizing Islam, as described by Laurence (2006). For more details on the issue of transnational ties see Chap. Five: Relations with Actors Abroad. 128 When asked whether his visits abroad are of a personal nature or in the name of ZMD, the general secretary answers: “We are a member of the Islamic World League [MWL, KRW], and we are a member of the Islamic Conference in Cairo, and we have our work in Kuala Lumpur, and we have a good connection to Mecca, so why should we say we don’t do this” (IN ZMD 3: 185). Another link to MWL is the sponsoring of the videos in the section Sogesehen.tv, which portray the opinions of young Muslims, the general public, and Islamic experts on ZMD’s website www.Islam.de. The videos are sponsored by IslamicRelief.de, a charity organization that is also linked to MWL.

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to legitimacy concerns, as discussed above.129 ZMD also participates in the Islamic Conference in Cairo (ZMD PR 17-Mar-2009) and various other international forums such as a conference on Sunni-Shiite relations in Tehran. In these contexts, ZMD is the only participating organization from Germany, and it sees itself as a “bridge builder” to the Muslim world outside Germany. The Relationship Between ZMD and IGMG The interview narrative continues with the relationship between ZMD and IGMG, which became increasingly controversial after the 9/11 attacks. IGMG has been a member of IRD since 1993. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, IGMG was increasingly under pressure, even facing the threat of being outlawed (IN ZMD 1: 13). ZMD was often asked to clarify its relationship to IGMG at public events such as television talk shows. Its attempts to provide a diplomatic answer that stressed the importance of sound proof before taking action, the positive role of dialogues, and the ongoing changes within IGMG were not received positively by IGMG. According to the interviewee, IGMG argued that the ZMD president had pointed out negative issues with regard to IGMG and thus had betrayed his “Muslim brothers and sisters to be accepted as a contact” (ibid.). However, this conflict did not lead to further estrangement between the organizations. Rather, it marked the beginning of closer organizational cooperation. To end the disputes, ZMD responded with a dialogue invitation which led to talks with IGMG and other organizations in 2004. “We tried to set the record straight and to pose the question of how we can achieve cooperation” (IN ZMD 1: 13.). This attempt was related to the perception that the political level did not have a consistent view regarding the Islamic organizations, but instead favored one organization over the others and changed its mind from time to time. These first interorganizational talks in 2004 eventually laid the basis for the later unification process and the establishment of KRM in 2007. The original dispute between ZMD and IGMG shows that organizational competition between the Islamic organizations did exist, although they did not prove to be as insurmountable as many academic observers had expected. ZMD (and the other organizations) had to join forces and 129 The organizational profile states: “We take care to remain independent of foreign governments and any ideologies and movements, and we are not monopolized by any interest groups or parties. The funding of ZMD, then, is based on membership fees and private donations” (Zentralrat.de, translation KRW).



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cooperate due to the political criticism with regard to its low membership numbers and the related question of representativeness. The political and legal prerequisites for official recognition also demanded a reorganization of the Islamic organizational landscape in Germany to reflect the centralized structures of the Christian churches. “And Then Islam Suddenly Was at the Center of Attention and No Longer the Foreigners” While the interview passages presented above refer to the structure and activities of ZMD, another interviewee stressed the impact of public debates on ZMD. With regard to 9/11, the interviewee stated: I think that really was a turning point. The fears and hostility existed before that, too, but they were directed against foreigners, and after this attack it suddenly turned against Muslims. And then Islam was suddenly at the center of attention and no longer the foreigners (IN ZMD 2: 117).

As in the discourse analysis presented in Chapter Four, the ZMD representative for public affairs complained that in this post-9/11 period, Islam was “discovered as a problem” not only by the general public but also by various studies (ibid.), a phenomenon that is discussed in detail by Allievi (2005). When asked about the German public, the interviewee expressed mixed feelings including anger, helplessness, and a desire for action (IN ZMD 2: 113). The negative turn of the debates concerning Islam in Germany is therefore also regarded as positive because of the solutions the discussions might provide. The fears of the German public of becoming a minority in their own country are acknowledged by the interviewee and linked to the increasing number of mosques and the presence of Muslims outside of “traditional cleaning jobs”. Although the related fears are regarded as “nonsense”, they are also described as a motivation to contribute to the task of Aufklärung. All of the ZMD representatives interviewed have been aware of the academic literature on Islam in Germany. In this narrative sequence, the interviewee directly criticized the existing studies on forced marriage and honor killings, which are also cited frequently in public discourses, because they portray Muslim life “as really really bad”. The interviewee dismissed their results, arguing that she has not perceived these problems in her own community in her 38 years of living in Germany. In her opinion, forced marriages and honor killings are not related to religion but are traditional archaic problems, against which Islam itself takes action (IN ZMD 2: 123). Nonetheless, they are presented as facts by high-ranking politicians,

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“Assimilation Is Actually the Only Form of Integration. But This We Cannot Accept” The feeling of paternalism expressed in the passage above further continues in the narrative with regard to the issue of assimilation. The interviewee argued that German politicians and the general public “try to snip at the Muslims, erase everything visible to be able to imagine they aren’t there” (IN ZMD 2: 125). The debates about minarets and headscarves were also mentioned, which have been discussed controversially among the German public. Disapproval is directed primarily at the political level. The feeling that politicians want to change Muslims in Germany and take away their identity caused the interviewee to remark: “Assimilation is actually the only form of integration. But this we cannot accept” (ibid.). This expression of protest with regard to the perceived assimilation rhetoric is linked to the warning that a continuation of this political course might lead to real integration problems. To support her statement, the interviewee cited studies which stress the risk of an individual rejection of society once a threat to one’s identity is perceived. With regard to the division between ‘good and bad Muslims’, the narrative criticized the attempt to divide the Muslim community into a secular and an orthodox camp. This is illustrated with a narrative of liberal women who wear headscarves and of traditional women who wear no visual symbols but pray five times a day and reject class trips for their children, a story which is intended to show that one cannot reach conclusions about someone’s personal attitudes based on a religious symbol alone. The narrative of organizational change culminated in the proposition of a solution which aims to request active societal engagement of all people regardless of their faith and their way of practicing it. The purpose of this request is to achieve organizational parity with other actors in the field and individual equality and non-discrimination. Both topics of equality can be seen as the underlying motive of this narrative, which is also evidence of the core challenge of ZMD, which wants to be recognized “as a group that is ‘one of our own’ within the community of Germans” (Tietze 2008: 226). Summary The interviews demonstrate the influence of the organizational environment and its normative and cognitive dimensions on ZMD. Generally, the



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task of the organization is to channel the perceived feelings of discrimination into active engagement and positive perspectives for Muslims in Germany. The individual representatives therefore aim to provide solutions which usually accompany their assessments of external change. While the first narrative culminated in the necessity to restructure the organizational field and unite the Muslim community, the second narrative demanded greater involvement by politicians, Islamic organizations, and individuals. The interviews also showed that 9/11 had a significant impact on the relations with the media and the general public, highlighting ZMD’s organizational independence, which had been publicly called into question; the improved relationships with other Islamic organizations due to ZMD’s efforts; and the perceived necessity to protest against the assimilation rhetoric and a negative portrayal of Islam in Germany. The influence of these developments on the structures and activities of the organization is discussed in detail in the following two sections. ZMD’s Structures In order to understand the organizational behavior, one has to understand the relevant contextual factors. A brief overview of the organization’s origin and history and its professed independence has been provided above. This section discusses the factors of ownership and control, size, technology, location, and resources, starting with ZMD’s headquarters, followed by a brief reference to its member organizations, and an outline of the internal communication structure. This overview highlights the differences in resources, means of communication, and related legitimacy concerns between the structure of ZMD as a peak organization of various umbrella organizations and DITIB and IGMG as representatives of their associated mosque communities. The Headquarters In 2006, following the resignation of the ZMD president Nadeem Elyas, the ZMD headquarters relocated from Eschweiler to Cologne. ZMD is now situated in close proximity to the other major Islamic umbrella organizations (DITIB, IRD, KRM, and VIKZ). The relocation is described as a sign of the closing of ranks among the Muslim community with the aim of establishing an integrative representation of Muslims in North Rhine-Westphalia and in Germany (ZMD PR 30-June-2006b). The ZMD headquarters is located in a small apartment, which includes a secretariat, a conference room, and an office where guests are received.

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The ZMD headquarters is very modest compared to the large buildings owned by DITIB and IGMG and certainly reflects the financial situation of the organization. While DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD are funded through their members, ZMD’s annual budget of about €130,000 (figures for 2001–2006, IN ZMD 1: 69) is nothing like the €5 million available to DITIB Germany. ZMD’s budget is derived from membership fees from each of the 18 member organizations, which vary between €100 and €200 per organization (IN ZMD 1: 234) depending on their size and voting rights (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 10). However, most of ZMD’s funding comes from individual donations and issue-specific calls for donations. The tradition of donating money for a certain cause reflects the Muslim traditions more than the payment of membership fees “for which you do not see anything specific in return” (IN ZMD 2: 93). Overall, ZMD has the status of a non-profit public interest organization (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 3). The limited funding also has structural consequences for the organization. ZMD only has two paid positions, which are located at the general secretariat of the headquarters (IN ZMD 1: 85). While the position of the press spokesperson was remunerated until 2006, the current position is also based on a voluntary commitment. The work of the executive board and the committees is voluntary as well. In 2009 the president was a retiree, the vice-president a teacher, the secretary general a self-employed individual involved with the ZMD website, Islam.de, and the spokesperson for public affairs a registered lawyer. The Main ZMD Bodies According to Its Bylaws The main bodies of ZMD are its representatives’ assembly (Vertreter­ versammlung) and its executive board (Vorstand). The representatives’ assembly is the highest executive body and consists of the representatives of the member organizations. Each full member organization sends one representative or “often two” (IN ZMD 1: 182). Associated member organizations have no voting rights but can send observers (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 4: 3.2). The representatives generally have the same voting power, except in elections and when changes to the bylaws are to be made, in which case a member organization’s voting power is based on its size (ibid.: § 6.6). The representatives’ assembly meets at least three times a year. It is responsible for the coordination of ZMD’s projects and activities and the required committees. It also elects the executive boards and decides on



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the recommendations of the Islamic expert council. The assembly also decides on changes in the bylaws, the annual budget, and all issues relevant to the work of ZMD (ibid.). The executive board is responsible for the implementation of the decisions made by the representatives’ assembly. It manages ZMD’s funds and the operational business (ibid.: § 7). The executive board is elected every two years and consists of a president, two vice-presidents, a secretary general, and a treasurer. It is supported by an advisory board (Beirat), which consists of the honorary ZMD members who elect a speaker among themselves. This position is currently held by Mr. Elyas, the former ZMD president. Honorary members are recommended by the executive board and are elected by the representatives’ assembly. The selection is based on their merits with regard to the interests of Muslims in Germany. The advisory council prepares recommendations for the executive boards concerning the establishment of public contacts; the maintenance of the public reputation of Islam in the media; priorities for ZMD’s activities with regard to the future of Islam in Germany; analyses of current problems in ZMD’s area of activity, and support for ongoing projects (ibid.: § 8a). There is also an Islamic expert council (Islamischer Gutachterrat) which provides guidance on religious issues. It is made up of German Islamic experts (main members), who are supported by Islamic experts from outside Germany (advisory members). The tasks of the Islamic expert council include the “attendance and expert opinion” on all local problems of individual Muslims and Muslim communities; the appraisal and the formulation of curricula for Islamic religious education from a theological perspective, and the development of guidelines for the eligibility of teachers and teaching materials. The council also decides on the moon calendar and the Islamic festivities (ibid.: § 8, translation KRW). The relatively strong influence of the representatives’ assembly on the work of ZMD strengthens its status as a membership organization with the appearance of a “democratically organized bureaucracy” (Jonker 2002b: 40). According to Jonker, this organizational form has been required by the German courts as a prerequisite for the status of a corporation of public law. Related requests for transparency and expert committees are also met. The creation of the Islamic expert council meets the criticism that a religious community cannot limit its activities to interest representation on behalf of its members, but must also provide a religious consensus (ibid.).

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ZMD Member Organizations According to § 4.2 of the ZMD bylaws of 2011, only umbrella organizations can become members of ZMD. This provision is related to the fact that ZMD is structured as a peak organization which aims to represent the interests of a large portion of the organized Muslim population in Germany. Originally, its aim was to bring the main Islamic organizations together under the ZMD umbrella. However, this was never achieved due to the independence of DITIB and VIKZ and IGMG’s membership in IRD. With regard to the independent mosque communities, it was reported in the interviews that ZMD has received multiple membership requests by individual mosque communities which could not be accepted because of the resources that would be required for the internal communication with individual associations (IN ZMD 1: 222). These independent organizations are mainly linked to the Arab Muslim community in Germany, which feel a certain affinity to ZMD due to its status as a multinational organization. Despite this exclusion of individual associations from ZMD’s structures, it is acknowledged by ZMD representatives that independent mosques must get involved in the process of organizational unification, although changes in the ZMD bylaws in this direction have not been implemented yet. Nonetheless, various independent associations are currently ZMD members due to their status as founding members. As of March 2012, ZMD has five associated members: IGBD, formerly a full member of ZMD and IRD (since 2010); the Council of Imams and Scholars (Rat der Imame und Gelehrten), the German-Islamic Mosque Foundation of Düsseldorf (Deutsch-Islamische-Moscheestiftung Düsseldorf), Deaf-Islam e. V. (an organization for deaf Muslims founded in 2010), and the Islamic Community in Erlangen (Islamische Gemeinde in Erlangen e. V.). Table 14 below lists the 20 official ZMD members as of March 2012. “ZMD Is a Rather Loose Alliance” This statement is a good characterization of ZMD and IRD, which mainly function as associations to further the common interests of their members. If any other form of organization can provide this service better, then at least ZMD members would be willing to give up ZMD structures altogether. This was decided in 2006 during a representatives’ assembly with regard to the plans to establish regional- and federal-level Islamic religious communities (IN ZMD 1: 25). The idea of organizational restructuring and even the dissolution of organizational structures to adapt



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Table 14: ZMD member organizations. Name

Location

1. Deutsche Muslim-Liga Bonn Bonn e. V. (DML Bonn) 2. Bundesverband Aachen für Islamische Tätigkeiten e. V. 3. Deutsche Muslim-Liga Hamburg e.V. (DML Hamburg) 4. Haqqani Trust – Verein Mönchenfür neue deutsche gladbach Muslime e. V. 5. Haus des Islam Lützelbach e. V. (HDI) 6. Islamische Lübbecke Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sozial- und Erziehungsberufe e. V. (IASE) 7. Islamische Munich Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V. (IGD) 8. Islamische Hamburg Gemeinschaft in Hamburg e. V. (IGH) 9. Islamisches Duisburg Bildungswerk e. V. 10. Islamisches Zentrum Aachen Aachen e. V. (IZA) 11. Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg Hamburg e. V. (IZH) 12. Islamisches Zentrum Munich München e. V. (IZM) 13. Muslimische Cologne Studentenvereinigung in Deutschland e. V. (MSV) 14. Union der Islamisch Hamburg Albanischen Zentren in Deutschland (UIAZD)

Homepage

Founding member

URL: http://muslimliga .de URL: http://www .abubakr-koeln.de /home.html –

X

URL: http://www .osmanische-herberge.de

–

URL: www.hausdesislam .de –

–

URL: www.igd-online.de

X

–

X

–

–

URL: www.izaachen.de

X

URL: www.izhamburg.de

X

URL: http://islamisches -zentrum-muenchen.de –

X

X X

X

X

URL: http://www.uiazd.de X

(Continued)

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Table 14. (Cont.) Name

Location

Homepage

Founding member

15. Union der Türkischlslamischen Kulturvereine in Europa e. V. (ATIB) 16. Islamische Gemeinde Saarland e. V. (IGS) 17. Freier Verband der Muslime e. V. (FVM) 18. Islamisches Zentrum Dresden e. V. 19. Islamische Gemeinschaft Braunschweig e. V. (IGB) 20. Union des Musulmans Togolais en Allemagne e. V. (UMTA)

Cologne

URL: http://www.atib.org

X

Saarbrücken URL: www.igsaarland.de

–

Düsseldorf

URL: http://www.freier -verband-muslime.de URL: http://izdresden.de

–

Braunsch­ weig

–

–

Eschweiler

–

–

Dresden

–

Source: URL: http://zentralrat.de/16660.php [last visited 07-Mar-2012].

to external developments shows how fragile and flexible organizational cooperation is in the field of Islamic organizations, which have to find a way to continuously meet legal, political, and internal expectations with their organizational structure. This fragility of organizational cooperation is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six: Relations Among Islamic Organizations. Unlike DITIB and IGMG, ZMD was not organized on the regional level. It was not until 2010 that ZMD announced its first representatives on the level of the German federal states. Thus far, such contacts have been appointed for three regions (North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and the eastern states). Plans in this regard were only briefly mentioned in the interviews (IN ZMD 3: 83). The ZMD bylaws of 2011 (§ 2.4) allow for the establishment of such regional organizations; the details, however, are governed by their rules of procedure. The regional level is important for the organizations because the German states are responsible for the jurisdiction concerning the status of an organization as a corporation of public law and concerning the acknowledgement of religious communities that have the right to provide religious education in public schools. In this



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context, ZMD expresses its support for all regional Islamic bodies that have been established to meet these demands.130 Organizational Communication Structures Communication between ZMD and its member organizations takes place on various levels. The main meeting place is the representatives’ assembly, which meets three times a year. However, these meetings are often perceived as too short. To compensate for this, retreats are organized to discuss certain topics in detail. With regard to these meetings, two difficulties were acknowledged in the interviews. It was stated that the opinions of the representatives do not necessarily match those of the Muslim community. This mismatch of opinions is linked to the fact that the representatives “do not necessarily reflect the basis but already come from higher above” (IN ZMD 1: 182). This is most likely linked to differences in education and resources of those engaged in representative functions and those participating in the services provided by the member organizations. However, it is argued that a certain level of leadership is necessary to guide the community in directions that may also be “uncomfortable” for them (ibid.). This suggests a hierarchical decision-making structure with regard to disputes, and the distance between the leadership and the organizational members described reflects Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” (1989 [1911]). On the other hand, it is acknowledged that the flow of communication between the individual mosque communities and ZMD is often interrupted. This is due to the fact that the communication process is organized through ZMD member organizations which have to distribute the information to their members. A restructuring of the flow of communication and a more direct involvement of the individual mosque communities is envisaged, which is also discussed with regard to the unification process and the creation of federal and regional Islamic religious communities (see Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Organizations). With regard to the limited contact between the ZMD headquarters and individual members, Lemmen also critically notes that ZMD can hardly mobilize its members for public events (2002b: 132). In addition to the representatives’ assembly, the representatives of the member organizations are contacted by the executive board via telephone 130 Among the regional organizations that demand to be granted the status of a religious community are the SCHURA organizations in Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Bremen, as well as the Islamic Religious Community in Hessen e. V.

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to achieve a consensus on urgent matters. ZMD also regularly sends out information packages about the latest events and decisions via mail. This process has been increasingly shifted to email communication since 2005. A member magazine does not exist. This can be linked to the limited resources and the different character of ZMD as a peak organization. The dissemination of analyses on current affairs from the point of view of ZMD’s headquarters actually resembles the content of IGMG’s monthly magazine Perspektif. However, with the exception of the official press releases, ZMD does not make its information public. While the aim of DITIB’s magazine, Haber Bülteni, is to provide a bonding function between the individual mosque communities, ZMD is less engaged in facilitating local networks. Instead, its member organizations are expected to provide this service to their members. This rather limited community character of ZMD is further evidence of its being a peak organization, the primary mission of which is public interest representation. The online platforms Islam.de and Zentralrat.de provide individual members with updated information on ZMD in particular and Islam in general. The editorial office of Islam.de, which was established in 1996, works independently of ZMD, but the two are associated and officially linked through both websites. This connection is also observed at the level of the active personnel. Generally speaking, the ZMD website (Zentralrat. de) is much more static than Islam.de, as discussed in detail in the section on the organizations public affairs work below. Summary ZMD is a peak organization that brings together and represents 18 Islamic organizations. Its members are not individual mosque communities but Islamic umbrella organizations of various mosques. This structural characteristic poses various challenges for ZMD. One challenge concerns the communication gap between the executive board and the individual Muslims. ZMD has no influence on the way its member organizations communicate with their members. Written and oral communication also occur but are largely limited to the executive board and the organizational representatives, thus preventing direct involvement of the local level. The limited ZMD resources (finances and personnel) also affect the communication flow. Generally speaking, the headquarters relies on voluntary work in managing the daily business. The main organizational concerns are discussed at the representatives’ assemblies, which are held three times a year. Additional meetings are held, but the geographical distribution of



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the member organizations does not allow for regular meetings. The website Islam.de has increasingly become the main source of information for the associated Muslim communities. ZMD press statements also exist, as discussed below. ZMD’s character as a peak organization enables it to represent a variety  of organizations, which have to reach a consensus within ZMD’s representatives’ assembly. This executive body ensures the democratic development of activities and the legitimation of the work managed by the ZMD’s executive board and the associated committees. Although ATIB, with its 122 mosques, currently represents the largest member organization, and therefore has more voting rights, ZMD remains a multinational organization with a clear focus on the organizational field in Germany. ZMD’s Activities According to its bylaws, ZMD deals with Islamic issues relevant to all Muslims and provides a continuous information and dialogue platform for the public interests of Muslims in Germany (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 2). It coordinates its members, organizes joint activities, and represents their common interests. It thus serves primarily as a representative of the interests and points of views of Muslims and regards itself as a “bridge builder” vis-à-vis the general public, the state, and the relevant authorities (IN ZMD 1: 178). It uses its funds for the above-mentioned purposes (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 2). In addition to these responsibilities of general interest representation, the facilitation of religious services for the Muslim community is also highlighted in its self-image: “Our most important responsibility is to support Muslim life and Islamic spirituality in Germany and to enable and facilitate the practice of religion” (Zentralrat.de, translation KRW). The centrality of lobbying for the institutionalization of rights for Muslims in Germany is expressed in the following key demands contained in ZMD’s Islamic Charta: Introduction of Islamic religious instruction into the school system, to be provided in German • Establishment of academic professorships for the university education of teachers of Islam and imams • Permission of the building of mosques in down-town areas, authorization of the public call to prayer, reinforced by loud-speakers • Respect by schools and administrations for the Islamic dress code • Co-option of Muslims into the existing media control bodies • Implementation of the right to slaughter according to the Islamic ritual as decided, in 2001, by the Federal Constitutional Court

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chapter five • Recruiting Muslim imams into the chaplain’s corps of the armed forces • Muslim religious assistance in hospitals and social institutions • Official protection of the two Muslim religious holidays • Providing cemeteries, or Sections thereof, for Islamic burial (ZMD 2002: § 20).

In many of the above-mentioned aims ZMD demands equal rights with regard to other religious communities (e.g., Islamic professorships, media control bodies, imams in the armed forces and in hospitals, protection of religious holidays, and Islamic burial). At the same time, ZMD also argues for exemptions from existing restrictions of religious freedom (e.g., concerning the building of mosques, ritual slaughter, and Islamic dress codes).131 Their list of rights reflects the interests of ZMD member organizations, which expect the continuous advancement of these issues by ZMD’s executive board. To support its activities, ZMD has formed various committees which deal with a variety of issues, including theology, women and family, dialogue, pedagogy and religious education, social affairs, the Day of the Open mosque, the German Islamic New Moon Council, certification of Islamic financing, the environment and animal protection, media, legal affairs, and scientific expertise (Zentralrat.de). With the creation of these committees ZMD fulfills the legal expectations with which religious corporations of public law are confronted. According to Jonker, German court decisions on this issue require the establishment of membership organizations with the appearance of a “democratically organized bureaucracy” (2002b: 40). This structure is oriented toward the Protestant model of church denominations and involves the creation of expert committees and areas of specialization to prove internal differentiation and transparency (ibid.). Jonker and others (e.g., Koenig 2007a; b) discuss the problems associated with the adaptation to the Protestant churches, which “cannot but produce severe changes in the traditional forms of bonding, which provokes uneasiness and withdrawal on the part of the believers” (Jonker 2002b: 40). The current structures of ZMD can be regarded as a primary example of a membership organization with the “appearance of a bureaucracy” (ibid.) which comes at the cost of more traditional forms of bonding. ZMD delegates issues of bonding and religious communication to the lower level of member organizations, or these issues are executed through ZMD’s Islamic expert council, which is supposed to provide guidance on 131 With regard to demands of equality and exemption see Koenig 2009: 300ff. On the struggle for equality and the right to difference see also Schiffauer 2007.



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general issues such as religious education and internal disputes. As discussed in detail below, the larger part of ZMD’s activities are directed at the external environment. The Professionalization of Project Work and Dialogue Activities The following section provides an overview of ZMD activities with regard to both project work and dialogue activities, showing that ZMD has been an active and highly visible actor in the organizational field despite its relatively limited resources. The organization has increasingly professionalized its work within the limitations described above. The following activities are presented in chronological order and represent only a selection of ZMD’s claims-making projects and dialogue activities. Islamic Education in Public Schools (Since 1994) As early as April 1994 ZMD’s predecessor IAK published a concept for the provision of Islamic religious education in public schools in the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia (ZMD (IAK) PR 10-Apr-1994). The concept was supported by both ZMD and IRD. To negotiate the administrative and theological questions, the Commission for the Islamic Religious Education (Kommission für Islamischen Religionsunterricht, KIRU) was established. Islamic education was envisaged to be taught in German. The materials were to be supervised by KIRU and two university chairs with five professors each, which were to be established in North RhineWestphalia (ibid.). In the case that not enough teachers could be provided by the state, KIRU offered to train and hire Islamic teachers who would teach Islamic religion in public schools. In January 1995 the state government of North Rhine-Westphalia announced that it would extend Islamic education within the voluntary Turkish classes that were offered at the time. Originally offered in grades 1–4, these classes were extended to grades 5–7. ZMD welcomed this step but criticized the continuing lack of general Islamic religious education in German, since only 13% of the 75,000 Muslims in grades one to four were reached through these voluntary Turkish classes. ZMD also complained about the fact that it has not been recognized as a partner in the creation of the curriculum (ZMD PR 17-Jan-1995). The problem of religious education has not yet been resolved in all German federal states, and ZMD continues its lobbying activities. One example is a ZMD proposal for a curriculum for Islamic religious education in public schools which is available from its website (Zentralrat.de).

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The Day of the Open Mosque (Since 1997) In 1997 ZMD initiated the Day of the Open Mosque (Tag der offenen Moschee), which invites the general public on October 3 to visit the participating mosque communities. To emphasize that Muslims are an important part of Germany society, the Day of the Open Mosque was deliberately timed to coincide with the German Unity Day, which commemorates German reunification. The Day of the Open Mosque has become an institution in the dialogue relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany, and the majority of mosques in Germany participate in this event. A working group has been created within ZMD, which provides information and practical guidance for the participating mosques. These efforts existed prior to the 9/11 attacks but have gained more public and internal attention since. The Day of the Open Mosque is advertised prominently on the ZMD website. The Islam Pavilion at the Expo in Hanover (2000) In 2000 ZMD hosted the Islam pavilion at the Expo in Hanover. The first ever Islamic pavilion at an Expo, the pavilion offered religious services such as daily prayers, Qur’an citations, and even a wedding ceremony. Models of the mosques in Mecca and Medina were exhibited and information tours for the general public offered. The pavilion was organized by ZMD, which provided consulting to other national and international Islamic organizations. Despite ZMD’s approach of “calling upon other organizations to get involved” (IN ZMD 2: 27), the accreditation of ZMD with the sole responsibility for this pavilion strengthened its ambitions to function as the main representative of organized Muslims in Germany. In addition to providing the external advantages of this publicity, the Islam pavilion also promoted the internal mobilization of members. For example, the voluntary engagement during the Expo was the first step toward the engagement of the future public affairs officer of ZMD. The former pavilion manager is now the president of the organization. The Unification Process of Islamic Organizations (“Hamburger Prozess”) (Since 2004) Following a dispute between ZMD and IGMG, and due to various other external and internal expectations, a process of unification between the Islamic organizations has been taking place in the organizational field



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since 2004. This development has been termed “Hamburger Prozess” because the first official meeting to discuss a restructuring of the organizational field took place in Hamburg on February 26–27, 2005. ZMD has played a very active role in initiating and facilitating this process, which eventually led to the creation of the KRM in 2007 (see Chap. Six: Relations among Islamic Organizations). Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies (Since 2005) Another dialogue activity concerns the cooperation between ZMD and the law enforcement agencies. An example of this newly-created dialogue process on the federal level is the cooperation between the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV), several state-level criminal police offices, DITIB, and ZMD. This broad cooperation has been established since 2005, following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. The resulting concept of “confidencebuilding measures” aims to increase cooperation to promote confidence among Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany (BMI 2008c: 13; ZMD, BKA, BfV, and DITIB joint PR 27-Apr-2009). This concept also draws on the results of local cooperation projects that took place between the police and mosque communities in Berlin, Essen, and Stuttgart from 2003 to 2004. The findings and experiences are summarized in the handbook Police and Mosque Communities (BpB 2005). Further cooperation takes place within the training program for police officers at the German Police University in Münster, where ZMD representatives give talks on the topic of Islam and Muslims in German society. The interviewees considered the cooperation necessary to show that one has nothing to hide, [although] we do not actually find it great that we are seen as a security problem, but we can gladly show you that we aren’t (IN ZMD 2: 197).

The Project “Do You Know Who I Am?” (Since 2005) ZMD was also a member of the interreligious project. “Do You Know Who I Am?” (Weißt Du wer ich bin?), which was organized in cooperation with ACK, ZJD, and DTIB. It was initiated in 2005 and ended in 2011. Local initiatives, some of which also involved secular actors, were supported by the project partners. Most of the funding was provided by DBK, EKD, BMI, and EIF. However, the project was not advertised on the ZMD website.

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Participation in the DIK I (2006–2009) and Boycott of the DIK II Process (Since 2010) ZMD was an active member of the first DIK process, but during the preparations for the second DIK process it announced its official resignation as a member (see Chap. Six: Relations with Political Actors). Although all of the participating Islamic umbrella organizations had hoped to continue the DIK dialogue, the exclusion of IRD from the DIK II and the lack of progress concerning the official recognition of religious communities in particular caused ZMD to resign (ZMD PR 12-May-2010). The official resignation from the DIK II process in 2010 represents a decisive change in the dialogue activities of ZMD, which until then had been strongly oriented toward meeting the external expectation “to organize and cooperate”. However, with regard to the theoretical framework, it could be said that this protest behavior is understandable considering the limited advantages of continuing participation, as discussed in more detail below. The Professionalization of Public Affairs Work Aside from the project and dialogue work described above, the public affairs work of ZMD represents a third area of organizational activities that has undergone some changes over the last decade. In particular the visibility of Islam.de on the internet strengthens ZMD’s online presence. The website appears among the first links in any German online query using the search term ‘Islam’. As of 2005, Islam.de states to have 600,000 monthly visitors.132 The success of Islam.de is not only an advantage because it gives ZMD publicity, it also supports it structurally. The Islam. de staff consists of “several dozen volunteers”, including a few regular employees whose expenses are paid from revenues generated by Islam.de (IN ZMD 3: 21). Islam.de, therefore, has more resources to update the public outreach work than ZMD and it increasingly helps ZMD in its public affairs work (IN ZMD 2: 7). ZMD also provides a separate website for KRM with KRM press releases, photos, addresses, and the KRM rules of procedure. KRM did not establish its own website (www.koordinationsrat.de) until May 20, 2011 (KRM PR 20-May-2011). The website Islam.de provides information on Muslim life (addresses of mosques and embassies, dialogue forums, praying times, TV tips, surveys, and partner searches for Islamic marriages) and links to other Islamic 132 Figures are for 2005 and can be found in the profile section of the website Islam.de: URL: http://islam.de/1628.php [last visited 14-June-2012].



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websites (cf. Inan 2007). It also provides a wide range of informative articles on Islam in general, including various recommendations for Muslims in the form of answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs). This extensive list of FAQs includes answers in 12 categories: marriage and family; relations to Jews and Christians; getting to know Islam; the five pillars of Islam; death in Islam; food; Islam and medicine; Muslims in Germany; questions concerning religious practice; other questions and comments; woman in Islam, and financial issues.133 The answers offer guidance on most issues relevant to religious practice in general and German laws and customs in particular. The platform Waymo.de was created for the younger generation, which mainly consists of video uploads that include music and YouTube videos, but also video self-images of mosque youth groups. The section Sogesehen. tv includes informative videos on thematic issues (such as Ramadan, the financial crisis, elections, Muslim Youth meetings, and Muslim life in Germany in general). The videos provide interpretations of daily events and present the opinion of young Muslims who work for the program. They also include interviews with the general public and renowned Muslim intellectuals. In addition, Islam.de provides interactive tools such as forums where visitors can post information about events and letters to the editor (cf. Inan 2007: 183ff.). The services on the website Islam.de are directed both at members of the general public who are looking for information on Islam and at the Muslim community. This is reflected in the user characteristics. According to a ZMD representative, 70% of visitors are Muslims (mostly academics between 20 and 50) and 30% are non-Muslim opinion leaders such as journalists and politicians (IN ZMD 3: 17). However, in addition to the professionalization of Islam.de, ZMD also provides its own organizational website, Zentralrat.de, which can be characterized as a website that emphasizes transparency concerning organizational affairs. The publications of member organizations and committee lists and the public availability of the bylaws distinguish it from IRD, which provides very little information online. Even the detailed websites of DITIB and IGMG do not provide access to the bylaws, which can only be viewed at the relevant courts. ZMD also provides an online archive of all of its press releases, which goes back to the days of its establishment. In 2010 the archive became a paid-for service of Islam.de. Both the strategy of remuneration and the 133 URL: http://islam.de/1640.php [last visited 14-June-2012].

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extent of the archives further differentiate this organization in the organizational field, taking advantage of its status as an object and subject of public interest. Zentralrat.de also offers information and flyers on the Day of the Open Mosque and the Islamic Charta, which is available in four languages. Overall, the website aims to provide information about ZMD activities and ZMD interests. The characteristic of an interest organization is therefore met, while guidance on religious issues has largely been outsourced to Islam.de. ZMD’s public affairs work relies mainly on its press releases to communicate the organization’s point of view to the outside world. The press releases are available as a dynamic bookmark, are sent out to journalists, and appear on the website Zentralrat.de. The analysis of the press releases issued by ZMD yielded the following results.134 Between 2000 and 2009, ZMD issued 168 press releases, which is much less than the number of press releases issued by DITIB and IGMG. (However, it should be noted that the press releases concerning German and international affairs issued by Islam.de are not included in this analysis.) Claims-making (33 press releases), security (32), and cooperation (31) have been the most relevant categories for ZMD. Religious press releases (25) represent the fourth category. They temporarily received more attention in 2002, but their number has decreased since (see Table 15). This is in sharp contrast to DITIB and IGMG, where religion is the most often used category. The most prominent of ZMD’s claims-making issues are the headscarf debate (10) and the introduction of religious education (5). Both issues have been debated in Germany in various regional contexts, and ZMD has been actively lobbying for the right of a Muslim teacher to wear a headscarf in public schools.135 This right was denied by the Federal Administrative Court in 2004 after amendments in the regional public school laws had been enacted which outlawed the wearing of political, religious, or ideological signs that may endanger or harm the political, religious, or ideological peace at school.136 134 On the methodology of the analysis see Chap. Three; for the comparison of results with the other two organizations, DITIB and IGMG, see Chap. Six: Relations with the Media. 135 See: ZMD PRs from 10-Oct-2002, 02-June-2003, 03-June-2003, 24-Sept-2003, 23-Oct-2003, 11-Nov-2003, 14-Jan-2004, 27-Feb-2004, 31-May-2006, and 19-June-2007; cf. Inan 2007: 203ff.. 136 BVerwG 2 C 45/03, BVerwGE 121, 140, 24-June-2004; see also VG Düsseldorf 2 K 1752/07, 14-Aug-2007.



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Table 15: ZMD’s German press releases Jan. 2000–Dec. 2009. Basic Secu­ Integra- German Cooper­ Reli­ Claims Internal Country Miscella- Total Law rity tion values ation gion Making affairs of Origin neous 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

1 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1

0 4 3 4 4 6 3 3 0 5

2 0 3 0 3 0 1 2 0 1

0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0

1 3 3 2 1 4 6 2 2 7

2 0 7 1 1 3 3 3 1 4

1 3 4 7 3 1 5 2 4 3

1 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 2

0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0

0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 5

      8    12    24    19    13    16    22    13    13    28

Total

8

32

12

3

31

25

33

11

2

11

168

Highlighted cells represent the largest number of press releases in each year.

Other Muslim claims such as the right to Islamic cemeteries and ritual slaughter are also commented on by ZMD, as is the frequently voiced demand of official recognition as a religious community. These issues can be assumed to meet the interests of ZMD’s member organizations, which expect the advancement of the institutionalization of Islam in Germany and therefore have joined ZMD (IN ZMD 3: 77). To advance these interests, ZMD interacts closely with various actors in Germany, as detailed below. Summary The analysis of the development of ZMD activities over the last decade reveals that ZMD has consistently aimed to promote the institutionalization of Islam in Germany. For this reason, ZMD was created in the first place, and for this reason, the organization has entered into various dialogue activities both within the Muslim community and within the organizational field in general. ZMD has not only repeatedly made its demands (in press releases and position papers), but has also facilitated the circulation of these demands. Very early on in its existence it recognized the relevance of gaining the approval of the general public for their Muslim neighbors, which led to the creation of the annual Day of the Open Mosque in 1997, the Islam pavilion at the Expo in Hanover, and the participation in

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interreligious dialogue activities. ZMD also recognized the need to collaborate with the law enforcement agencies to reiterate its stance against terrorism, and when the organization had to realize that its efforts on the  political level did not yield the desired outcome despite increasing dialogue opportunities, it also lobbied for changes within the Muslim community. The underlying motives for these activities are discussed below with regard to the strategies of adaptation, decoupling, and protest (the latter being most clearly pronounced in 2010, when ZMD resigned from the DIK II process). At this point, it can be concluded that ZMD’s activities at the turn of the century reflect its aspiration to function as a contact for the German government and thus to represent Muslim communities in Germany. ZMD’s Partners Two approaches are used for the analysis of the partners of ZMD. First, a list of actors is extracted from the press releases that were grouped under the category “cooperation”. This list includes dialogue projects and meetings, as well as statements directly addressed at other actors, such as open letters.137 Second, a list is compiled of partners and invited experts who were mentioned in the list of events published on the website Islam.de.138 The analysis of the press releases clearly shows that ZMD is very involved in the Muslim community (see Table 16). The fact that ZMD most often refers to other Islamic umbrella organizations reflects its active engagement in trying to reach a cooperation consensus among the various Islamic organizations and to create a new common Islamic umbrella organization. The second-largest group of partners after Islamic organizations are politicians and religious actors. However, the political and the religious spheres are not only contacted for dialogue, but also receive critical attention by ZMD in the form of open letters of protest. These letters are also evidence of ZMD’s interest in continuing dialogue. Another group of

137 Two of the open letters are addressed to politicians and one to the German Federal Government. They either criticize political views or express the willingness to cooperate. Other letters concern DITIB, the general public, and the Pope. Since these statements are directly related to other actors in the organizational field, they fulfill the expectation to cooperate and are therefore included in the list mentioned above. 138 For technical reasons, this list only includes events that were announced between August and December 2010 at Islam.de. The website Zentralrat.de does not announce ZMD events.



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relevant actors are the law enforcement agencies (see under “Security” in the Table below). The results presented in Table 16 cannot be confirmed by the partners mentioned in the list of activities posted on Islam.de. Here, only one local Muslim mosque community regularly posts its events, while major events organized by the Islamic umbrella organizations such as the Day of the Open Mosques are not mentioned. Instead, two Catholic actors (dioceses in Rottenburg-Stuttgart and Essen), the federal state of BadenWürttemberg, and non-governmental actors such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation use this platform to advertise their Islam-related activities and events. This can be interpreted as a lack of interest in this particular service of Islam.de among Islamic organizations, which probably use other venues for information exchange. However, it also shows that the website is accepted by non-Muslim actors. By appearing on Islam.de, they support the website and contribute to the legitimation of ZMD as a partner and facilitator of dialogue venues. The close cooperation between ZMD and the churches, in particular with their Islam delegations, was also confirmed in the interviews. The churches were mentioned as the most important external contacts, followed by politicians and media representatives (IN ZMD 1: 141). Lawyers Table 16: ZMD’s partners as identified in its press releases (2000–2009). Actors

Frequency Details

Other Islamic organizations

10

German politicians

8

Religious organizations

7

Security actors Others

5 2

Total

32

Islamic organizations (3), IRD (2), DITIB, KRM, DIK, Shiite umbrella organization, Highest Council for Islamic Affairs Egypt Politicians (3), political parties (2), German Federal Government, Chancellor The Pope (3), Evangelical Church, Catholic Church, Jewish and welfare organizations BKA and BfV (5) General public, Violence prevention network

Source: Based on ZMD’s press releases grouped under “Cooperation” 2000–2009 (n = 31).

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who are responsible for the various individual court cases concerning Muslim claims were also described as partners of ZMD. This analysis of partners shows that ZMD is very involved with other actors in the organizational field. Despite ZMD’s limited resources (in terms of members, personnel, and finances), it has managed to position itself as a key contact both within and outside the Muslim community. True to its role as an interest organization, it emphasizes the need to cooperate and build networks to promote the achievement of organizational goals. Its partners therefore range from Islamic organizations to religious, political, and public actors to law enforcement agencies, which have become increasingly interested in organizational cooperation since the turn of the 21st century. The fact that this contact involves not only adaptation to external expectations but also criticism of external expectations is discussed in detail in the analysis of ZMD’s patterns of organizational behavior below. Analysis of ZMD’s Patterns of Organizational Behavior In order to understand the organizational behavior with regard to the three hypotheses introduced in this research framework, the expectations of the German government versus the organizational members’ interests and the related organizational responses are analyzed. Then, examples of adaptation, decoupling, and protest are presented. The final part of this section discusses the trajectory of organizational development. It must be noted that the structure of ZMD as a “loose alliance” of organizations poses some challenges for the analysis. Due to research limitations and comparability of results, the analysis only focuses on the ZMD headquarters and its point of view. The 18 member organizations and their organizational behavior are therefore only seen from the perspective of ZMD, and are not interviewed separately. Decoupling (including the strategies of compromise and avoidance) is thus used in a narrow sense and refers to events taking place at the headquarters of ZMD and its various bodies. The analysis does not determine whether additional forms of decoupling occur at the level of its member associations and their local mosques. However, differences in rhetoric and behavior between the ZMD headquarters and its associated members seem plausible and were mentioned in the interviews. Due to ZMD’s status as an interest organization, it can be assumed that the relationship between the organization and the German government is of high relevance. Because of its focus on claims-making procedures



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within the German institutional system, ZMD depends more on the legitimacy granted by the German government than an organization which is either mainly legitimized by actors abroad or which acts independently of the approval of the German government. Therefore, it can be assumed that ZMD experiences more pressure to adapt to the expectations of the political level than DITIB and IGMG. In the case of ZMD, the logic of influence can be expected to outweigh the membership logic, although the latter remains highly relevant, as the most recent conflicts concerning ZMD’s DIK II pull-out have shown. Adaptation to External Expectations For this research, it is assumed that adaptation to external expectations is possible if external and internal interests are congruent, or if the organizations accept conflict with their members to increase their external legitimacy. ZMD meets three expectations of the German political level by using the strategy of adaptation (“to follow the law”, “to denounce terrorism”, “to organize and cooperate”), which implies that the organization adapts its activities and structures to these expectations. The Expectation “To Follow the Law” ZMD frequently expresses its respect for the democratic order in Germany both on its website and in its press releases. The preamble of the bylaws states: “We agree that Islamic religious communities in Germany respect the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and its legislation”, and declares: Concerning the means and ways to fulfill our common responsibilities of ZMD, we agree to use the Islamic sources within the framing and in accordance with the Basic Law and the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany (ZMD bylaws 2011: preamble: 4; translation KRW).

In its self-image, ZMD also states: “We offer word and deed to warrant the loyalty to the law” (Zentralrat.de, translation KRW). These pledges are further elaborated in three articles of the Islamic Charta. Article 10 states: Muslims can live anywhere in the world, provided they can fulfill their fundamental religious duties. As a matter of principle, Islamic jurisprudence obliges Muslims in the Occident to respect, and abide by, the local legal order (ZMD bylaws 2011: § 10).

Accusations that the term “local legal order” signifies a degradation of the Basic Law have been publicly denied by ZMD (ZMD PR 19-Aug-2002,

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translation KRW). Article 11 of the Islamic Charta provides details about the members of ZMD and the German Constitution: Whether German citizens or not, the Muslims represented by the Central Council (ZMD) accept the basic legal order of the Federal Republic of Germany as guaranteed by its Constitution, providing for the rule of law, division of power, and democracy, including a multi-party system, universal suffrage and eligibility, and freedom of religion. Therefore they accept as well everybody’s right to change his religion, to have another religion, or none at all. The Qur’an forbids any compulsion or coercion in matters of faith (ibid.: § 11).

The reference to the freedom of religion is added in this article despite the statement being contested in the Muslim world. Article 12 states: We do not aim at establishing a clerical theocracy. Rather we welcome the system existing in the Federal Republic of Germany where State and religion harmoniously relate to each other (ibid.: § 12).

Article 20 mentions the pledge of allegiance to “the Constitution and the existing legal order” again prior to listing ZMD’s claims (ibid.). The extensive adaptation to the external expectation “to follow the law” can be related to all three forms of institutional pressures. Coercive pressures are exerted through the German laws; normative pressures arise from Muslim representatives who argue for the integration of Islam into the countries of settlement, and mimetic pressures arise because since 9/11, Islamic organizations in general have placed increasing emphasis on their adherence to the legal frameworks of their institutional environments. Publicly declared adaptation to the legal order is therefore most likely not an unconscious but a conscious process, the aim of which is to receive public legitimacy. According to its preamble, the Islamic Charta was agreed on unanimously by the ZMD representatives’ assembly, but criticism of its content have also been raised from within ZMD. The most prominent example mentioned in the majority of texts dealing with the Islamic Charta is a statement by Ahmad von Denffer of the Islamic Center of Munich (IZM). His original text, which was published in the magazine Al-Islam, is no longer available, but it is quoted extensively by Eissler (2008: 171), who concludes that each statement that, from afar, looks like an accommodation to Western or even Christian language and thought is denounced and judged as harming vital Islamic-self-understanding (see also Lemmen 2002a: 91; Inan 2007: 184f.).



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In the interviews, internal discussions about the acceptance of the Basic Law and the negation of any intentions to establish an Islamic state were also described in detail. The resulting Islamic Charta can thus be regarded as a compromise between the conservative and liberal positions, which was reached through dialogue. The interviewee presented this consensus as a success story, in which ZMD managed “to strike the right note in the middle” (IN ZMD 1: 174). With regard to these internal disputes, one can argue that the Islamic Charta reflects a strategy of decoupling, which balances, pacifies, conceals, and buffers external expectations. Generally speaking, however, the ZMD headquarters has adapted both its rhetoric and its actions to the expectation “to follow the law”, although this may lead to internal conflicts with some of its members. The fact that certain Muslim rights are fought for in the German court system (as discussed below) can be linked to the legislative options provided by the Basic Law and its rights of religious freedom. The Expectation “To Denounce Islamism and Terrorism” The headline analysis of the press releases issued by ZMD reveals that “security” is the second most frequently used frame of reference. The 32 statements on this topic not only repeatedly emphasize ZMD’s opposition to Islamism and terrorism, but also present Muslims as victims of discrimination and stress that Islam and terror are incompatible (e.g. ZMD PRs 16-Sept-2001 a, b; 11-Sept-2002; 31-Aug-2004). ZMD reminds the Muslim communities of their responsibility to fight against any form of terrorism (ZMD PR 07-July-2005), and to get involved socially and politically (ZMD PR 24-Mar-2004). It also underlines its own involvement in dialogue with law enforcement agencies both at the local and the federal level. For example, ZMD agreed to lobby for the fight against Islamic fundamentalism and to educate people on matters of security and terrorism (DIK 2009; Zentralrat.de: Selbstdarstellung). These cooperation efforts are the main reason why the organization’s response to this external expectation can be regarded as adaptation. While this political expectation is not governed strongly by coercive pressures, the reasons for adaptation are in the positions of ZMD representatives and the activities of other organizations in the field (normative and mimetic pressures). The rhetoric that condemns terrorism has become an oftencited frame not just in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Rather, it is used whenever terrorism, violence, or wars in general occur in the world. The organizational behavior of adaptation can therefore be directly linked to

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the continuing relevance of this normative expectation at the political level. The Expectation “To Organize and Cooperate” The third expectation to which ZMD adapts is related to the request “to organize and to cooperate”. The issue of organizing Muslims’ interests is addressed not only by the structures established within ZMD itself, but also by the various attempts to restructure the cooperation of Islamic organizations in Germany. ZMD’s efforts in the “Hamburger Prozess” which aimed to bring all mosque communities together under a common umbrella was motivated mainly by the normative pressures exerted by ZMD’s representatives; the normative political expectation regarding a “single telephone number”, and coercive pressures set forth in Article 140 GG on the official recognition of corporations of public law. ZMD has also functioned as a partner in various dialogue formats which involve actors from the public, political, administrative, and religious spheres. This strong orientation toward public outreach work can be explained by its function as an interest organization that aims to lobby for Muslim rights in Germany. Cooperation is therefore a necessary task which also meets the normative expectation of the government in its search for a Muslim partner. At first glance, ZMD’s refusal to participate in the DIK II does not seem to be consistent with this strategy of cooperation. However, the combination of internal and external dependencies and the related conflicts can well explain why the strategy of protest was perceived to be more beneficial than the strategy of adaptation (see below). Decoupling Between External and Internal Expectations In this study, decoupling refers to changes at the external level that are not linked to internal changes. For example, decoupling occurs when different frames of references are used at the external and the internal level. Press statements can balance, pacify, or buffer external expectations to create more leeway for other organizational activities and protect the interests of both the organization and its members. This strategy is likely to be used when the organization depends equally on its institutional environment and its members. However, it must be noted that internal conflict arising from an external expectation is regarded as the precondition for decoupling. The Expectation “To Adopt German Values” Unlike the Turkish-dominated Islamic organizations, ZMD has no dual-national identity. It publicly declares itself a part of Germany and



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emphasizes its efforts to promote integration into German society. Due to its multinational membership, its language of choice has been German since its beginnings, and it “supports all efforts for a better minority command of the German language and for better access to German citizenship” (ZMD 2002: § 19). Generally speaking, this emphasis on the German society expresses ZMD’s willingness to adapt to the German value order. At the same time, however, ZMD stresses that “the promoted integration will not be detrimental to the Islamic identity” (see “to integrate while maintaining the Islamic identity” (ibid.: headline § 19). Like DITIB and IGMG, ZMD therefore argues for a duality of identities. Although it does not aim to protect a national identity (such as the Turkish identity in the case of DITIB), ZMD (like IGMG) stresses the existence of an Islamic identity and argues for the development of a “properly European Muslims identity” (ibid.: § 15). It is debatable whether there actually is a German core value order and what place religious identities (in this case, the Muslim identity) would have in it. With regard to these debates, it can be argued that ZMD employs a decoupling strategy. It stresses its German identity, which also attracts many German Muslim converts to its organizations, thus fulfilling the external expectation of a transparent, integrated, and law-abiding contact. At the same time, ZMD is aware that its members’ interests often differ from the ideals of a German ‘Leitkultur’ which have been postulated in the German political and public discourses. This fosters the organization’s claims for religious freedom and its public claims-making efforts regarding the rights regulating religious life in Germany. This behavior can be explained by the internal conflict between the members’ interest and the public expectations with regard to the visibility of Islam in society. A visible Islam is often seen as being in conflict with the ideal form of integration.139 Therefore, complete adaptation to this expectation seems impossible with regard to the logic of membership. At the same time, the organization is aware of the costs of open protest against the German “value consensus” and the related expectations of a loss of legitimacy in the German political sphere. It can be concluded that ZMD, like DITIB and IGMG, does not consider the difference between German and Islamic values to be a problem. Instead of the either-or rhetoric often found in public discourses about German values, an as-well-as framing is used which stresses, among other things, that one can have an 139 See, for example, the ban on minarets in Switzerland following a referendum in 2009.

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Islamic as well as a German identity. This reflects the behavioral pattern of seeking compromise and the related balancing tactic described by Oliver (1991). Consequently, the strategy of decoupling is used to reconcile internal and external interests with regard to issues of identities and values. Protest Against External Expectations In cases where internal and external expectations are in conflict with each other, interest organizations which lobby for the rights of their members are torn between the logic of influence and the logic of membership (cf. Schmitter/Streeck 1999). Due to it being an interest organization and due to its aim of maintaining its logic of influence, ZMD’s protest behavior is relatively moderate compared to IGMG. However, protest behavior becomes necessary when the internal conflicts over external expectations are so severe that ZMD would risk losing the support of its members. The Expectation “To Reject ‘Parallel Societies’ and Promote Integration” ZMD’s strategy to meet the political expectation “to reject ‘parallel societies’ and promote integration” is not easy to place in the theoretical framework. It has been noted above that ZMD meets the expectations to integrate while simultaneously promoting an Islamic identity (ZMD 2002: § 19). However, while the strategy with regard to the German values was twofold and was therefore interpreted as decoupling, the rhetoric concerning the term ‘integration’ is fairly confrontational. Rejecting the term ‘assimilation’, one interviewee argued that in Germany, “assimilation is actually the only form of integration. But this we cannot accept” (IN ZMD 2: 125). The concerns of the Muslim community about their right to a visible Muslim presence in German society have also been expressed in this context: “One tries to snip at the Muslims, erase everything visible to be able to imagine they aren’t there” (ibid.). ZMD not only has to take these concerns of its members seriously; it also has their mandate to lobby for the institutionalization of Islam in various spheres: The well-founded fear of many Muslims that the result of integration would be assimilation, therefore has to be dispelled through trust-building measures as part of the integration process (ZMD PR 30-June-2006a, translation KRW).

This shows that ZMD not only lobbies for the Muslims’ right to be treated like other religious groups, but that it also refers to the exemption from rules based on a Muslim religious identity.



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For example, ZMD actively demands exceptions from established practices such as mixed swimming classes and class trips, animal protection rights for ritual slaughter, and administrative constraints to the construction of mosques. In doing so, ZMD does not adapt to the established normative frames that govern religious rights, but in fact challenges them publicly. In accordance with Oliver’s (1991) set of possible patterns of organizational behaviour, ZMD, in this case, tries to exert influence through manipulation to achieve the institutionalization of values and norms and the definition of acceptable practices. The underlying conflict and the importance of these claims for ZMD member organizations justify this protest behaviour, which may lead to public delegitimization based on the normative accusation of promoting the emergence of ‘parallel societies’ through religious claims-making. ZMD’s Pull-out from the DIK II Process In 2010 ZMD refused to participate in the second German Islam Conference (DIK II) after negotiations over the aims of the conference with the government had been declared to have failed. Although this decision clearly contradicts its strategy of cooperation, it can be easily explained within the theoretical framework of protest behavior. From ZMD’s point of view, the continuation of the DIK process did not guarantee additional organizational resources, so the organization decided to defy the expectation to participate. In particular the lack of progress concerning the official recognition of Islamic umbrella organizations as religious communities has been repeatedly criticized by ZMD. Another reason given by ZMD was the non-recognition of the topic of Islamophobia within the DIK II. However, the frame of official recognition dominated the conflict between internal and external interests: The [German] state tries to override the self-organization of the factual Islamic religious communities. A Muslim contact provided by the state cannot be accepted by the Muslims in Germany (ZMD PR 12-May-2010, translation KRW).

In this case, ZMD accepted its loss of legitimacy as a contact within the DIK, although it stressed its willingness to continue the dialogue with the Ministry of the Interior and the German federal states (ibid.). This pull-out option can be interpreted as taking the opportunity to voice concerns and protest against a lack of adaptation on the part of the German government, which probably did not provide enough resources (legitimacy, status and financial assistance) to motivate the organization to participate.

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By directly challenging and attacking the German government over the DIK II, ZMD tried to influence the criteria that are used to evaluate Islamic organizations as religious communities. However, opportunities for coopting and controlling are now limited, since ZMD no longer participates in the highest level of roundtable talks in Germany. Identifying Organizational Trajectories The third assumption of this research framework is that efforts of decoupling eventually lead to adaptive behavior, since external rhetorics or structures and activities will ‘take on a life of their own’, which influences the internal organizational level. Furthermore, a separation between external and internal behavior is assumed to be too costly for the organization. With regard to ZMD, one can conclude that the patterns of adaptation have existed since the organization’s beginnings. For example, its relatively recent establishment, in 1994, signified a response to the expectation to organize the Muslim community and cooperate with other actors in the organizational field. The expectations to respect the German laws and promote security while denouncing violence have received increasing relevance on ZMD’s agenda since 9/11. A similar trajectory of intensified adaptation can be related to the external affairs of the organization, which have been expanded over the years, involving personnel at the headquarters and at the Islam.de website. The organization has thus oriented itself toward the German public. Due to ZMD’s mission to function as an interest organization, this adaptation to the logic of influence can be interpreted as a path-dependent development which serves its organizational interest. The main area of decoupling concerns the balance between a German and an Islamic organizational identity. ZMD reflects the struggle of many Muslims in Germany, who are confronted with normative and regulative institutional pressures and expectations which sometimes are in conflict with their religious beliefs and norms. The professed goal of ZMD is to promote mutual understanding through integrative and dialogueoriented efforts, which nonetheless involve public claims-making for Muslim rights that can be interpreted as open protest behavior. With regard to the future development of its fight for equality and exemption rights, one can assume that both decoupling and protest behavior are likely to continue as long as ZMD depends primarily on the logic of membership because it has not yet been officially recognized as a corporation or even a religious community.



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One can further conclude that the process of adaptation to the German institutional environment is currently promoted primarily by normative pressures exerted from within ZMD through its representatives. This trajectory, however, can be interrupted at any point when the availability of resources from the external environment is perceived as limited and the members’ interest require public protest behavior. The example of ZMD shows that cooperation and integration is indeed perceived as a twofold process which also requires the implementation of changes at the level of the German system of religious governance, and which leads to a system of true pluralism in which all religions are treated equally, rather than to an oligopoly system of church-state relations that favors some “religious brands” (Yang 2010). The focus of ZMD’s activities could also change if the institutionalization of Islam in Germany is achieved and solutions for the current claims are found at the level of the German federal states. According to an organizational decision made in 2006, the envisioned establishment of an alternative representation structure of Muslims in Germany might even lead to the dissolution of ZMD, which clearly shows how flexible the structures and organizations in the organizational field actually are. This aspect is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. Summary of the Three Organizational Case Studies In order to open the ‘black box’ of organizational patterns of behavior, this chapter has analyzed three Islamic umbrella organizations (DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD). The aim is to understand their organizational perception of the changes that have occurred in the German institutional environment since the turn of the 21st century. The chapter also analyzes the changes that have occurred within the organizational activities and structures over the last ten years. In addition, it discusses the organizational patterns of behavior with regard to the political expectations with which the organizations are confronted and identifies interesting similarities and differences between the analyzed organizations. One of the similarities is the increasing professionalization of Islamic umbrella organizations, which can be regarded primarily as a response to the increased external interest in their public affairs work. However, their members’ interests have shifted as well, due to the demographic developments in the Muslim community, which increasingly consists of the second, third and even fourth generations of descendants of the original “guest worker” immigrants who arrived in Germany during the 1960s.

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The organized Muslims who are using the services provided by the local mosque communities have largely given up their return plans and settled down in Germany permanently. The overview of perceived internal interests also shows that there are also differences between members’ interests. These differences can well be explained with regard to the contextual factors defined by the Aston School, such as organizational history, charter, and independence. In particular in the case of the heterogeneous Turkish community in Germany, the organization’s history and its ties to different actors in the country of origin is reflected in political as well as religious members’ interests, which transfer the divisions between interest groups in Turkey to the countries of settlement. Although these differences may decrease due to the generational changes, their impact on the organizations’ activities and structures still remains visible. Table 17 below shows that the rate of adaptation to the five expectations of the German government is much higher in DITIB and ZMD than in IGMG. This can be explained by the fact that differences in the expectations cause different levels of internal conflict. On the other hand, IGMG cannot receive any resources in the form of legitimacy, status, or financial assistance from the German government, a situation that allows the organization to voice its protest more publicly. While DITIB works most closely with the German government and receives financial assistance for various projects, IGMG is largely excluded from joint projects because it is being watched by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution. As Table 17 shows, DITIB adapts to each of the five expectations, but has to resort to the option of decoupling to protect its hybrid identity as a Turkish organization in Germany. Decoupling is achieved, for example, by  using the option of bilingual websites which announce differrent activities and therefore target different audiences. This promotes the Table 17: Organizational patterns of behavior (DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD). Basic Law Security Integration German values Cooperation

DITIB

IGMG

ZMD

Adaptation Adaptation Decoupling Decoupling Adaptation

Protest Protest Decoupling Protest Decoupling

Adaptation Adaptation Protest Decoupling Adaptation



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simultaneous integration into two national contexts while preventing a complete rupture of the identification with Turkey. Being an interest organization, ZMD is even more dependent on the logic of influence, so it tries to adapt to the external expectations to lobby for its claims-making activities. At the same time, it has to take into consideration internal interests, which may differ from the external expectations, for example, with regard to the promotion of a (European) Islamic identity and the protest against assimilation rhetoric. However, ZMD’s protest is more moderate than that of IGMG, as can be seen in the debate about a German ‘Leitkultur’. No incident of complete adaptation to one of the political expectations was observed in IGMG, while protest behavior represents the dominant form of organizational behavior. This can be explained by the high level of internal conflict that is exacerbated by the negative public opinion with which IGMG members are confronted. The interviewees stated that the critical voices within the organization, which argue for a non-cooperative strategy with regard to the institutional environment, are strengthened by the fact that the organization is on the watch list of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The representatives of the organizational headquarters were eager to stress that large parts of the organization support the integrative aim of placing IGMG “at the center of society”. This approach is reflected in the cooperative efforts to meet some of the political expectations (e.g., cooperation and security concerns despite internal conflicts), as well as in organizational activities aimed at transparency and dialogue activities within local IGMG communities. All three organizations under analysis stress the need to cooperate. Nonetheless, achievements in dialogue are most prominently stressed in DITIB’s and ZMD’s public affair work, as revealed by the press release analysis (see also Chap. Six: Relations with the Media). The necessity to integrate, to reject parallel societies, and to follow the Basic Law is also prominently expressed in the rhetoric of all three organizations. While the three organizations handle the incorporation of these expectations into everyday activities differently, they are well aware that the fulfillment of these expectations may help increase their political legitimacy. The organizations also jointly protest against the assumption that integration should be equated with assimilation. In this context, they join forces to fight against religious discrimination and link it to their demands for the integration of their religious rights in the German institutional system.

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However, there are differences in the intensity of protest between the organizations. While DITIB is still the least involved in public claimsmaking, IGMG’s press releases exceed those issued by ZMD both quantitatively and in terms of the directness of criticism. Further differences exist with regard to the fight against terrorism. While the organizations jointly condemn any form of terrorism and have repeatedly voiced this opinion publicly, their positions concerning the degree of cooperation with the law enforcement agencies and the advantages or disadvantages associated to this dialogue differ significantly (see Chap. Six: Relations with Other Actors). Finally, with regard to the German value order (Werteordnung), all three organizations stress the importance of their own cultural heritage and the role of Islam in their everyday activities, arguing that Islam is not in conflict with the values enshrined in the German Basic Law, and that they respect these values. However, the general debate about a German Leitkultur is viewed critically, although IGMG is the only organization to protest openly, while DITIB and ZMD choose the decoupling strategy. It can be assumed that adaptation to the German institutional environment will be the more likely to occur the more opportunities for external resources the Islamic organizations receive in exchange. Legitimacy, status, and financial assistance provided by the German state would reduce their dependence on other donors (including their own members), although the members remain the most important asset. Members’ interests therefore have a considerable influence on organizational development. DITIB has already adapted to German political expectations. This is helped by the fact that many of Diyanet’s expectations are congruent with those of the German government. Dissociation from Diyanet support is unlikely due to its financial source for the payment of Imams, the history of the organization, and the existing bylaws, which manifest the Diyanet involvement. However, changes which may lead to DITIB’s decentralization are underway and their future impact on the organizational ties to Diyanet remains unknown. With regard to IGMG, it can be concluded that a lack of resource opportunities in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance with which the organization is currently confronted generally facilitates its protest behavior. The generational change, which is also linked to an increasing socialization process of IGMG members in their countries of settlement, presents an opportunity for organizational change regarding its structures, activities, and, ultimately, its organizational identity.



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Whether the integrative or the segregative tendencies within IGMG prevail will largely depend on the credibility of the advocates of the integrative tendencies both within and outside their organization. Their agenda is currently the dominating one at the influential general secretariat, where the interviews for this study were conducted. Nonetheless, the internal tensions and conflicts are apparent and are also internally described as the main challenges for IGMG in the future. ZMD has generally oriented itself toward the German public due to its function as an interest organization. Therefore, the logic of influence remains vital for the survival of the organization in its current form. With regard to the future development of its fight for equality and exemption rights, one can also assume that both decoupling and protest behavior are likely to continue as long as ZMD depends primarily on the logic of membership because it is not yet officially recognized as a religious corporation of public law. The research framework developed in Chapter Three can well explain these observed organizational similarities and differences between patterns of organizational behavior. The combination of independent variables, including expectations of the institutional environment and the organizational members, possible conflicts between them, and contextual factors such as history, charter, and independence can well explain the behavior of Islamic umbrella organizations in particular and voluntary organizations in general. Thus, this research framework enables us to better understand the internal motives and constraints that lead to organizational action and responses to its internal and external environment. The research guiding Hypotheses 1 and 2 concerning the different patterns of organizational behavior were confirmed. The smaller the perceived conflict between internal and external expectations and the greater the external dependence, the more likely the organization is to adapt to external expectations. If the conflict between internal and external expectations is perceived to be high, then the patterns of decoupling and protest are more likely to occur. Protest can be expected when the dependence on the institutional environment is perceived as limited, while decoupling is used to acquire external resources in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance. With regard to organizational trajectories, Hypothesis 3 assumes that in the long run adaptation becomes more likely than decoupling due to unintended consequences. This eventually facilitates internal adaptation to external expectations. Some evidence for this trajectory was found with regard to the professionalization of the external affairs departments,

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which influenced the organizational behavior in other departments. Similar processes concern forms of cooperation, which may have started as mere window dressing, but eventually also required internal adaptation of organizational activities. With regard to the perspective of path dependence and organizational isomorphism, one can say that organizational decoupling in favor of one particular expectation can also lead to adaptation in the long run, due to regulative, normative, and mimetic pressures. Another explanatory factor is the possible change of internal members’ interests, which are also influenced by the external expectations. However, the results of this analysis contradict the assumption that organizational isomorphism is an inevitable process. Organizational processes of decoupling and protest are expected to occur in contexts where the level of internal conflict caused by the external expectations renders organizational adaptation unfeasible. Cases of decoupling and protest, including the different variations described by Oliver (1991), were observed in all three case studies. This variety of organizational behavior is also likely to continue in the future, due to the heterogeneity of Islamic umbrella organizations and the related diversity of the three explanatory variables (expectations, conflicts, and contextual factors) described above.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD OF ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN GERMANY: A MESO PERSPECTIVE ON SHIFTING RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTIONS This chapter introduces a third analytical perspective, which complements the macro- and the micro-perspectives by focusing on the mesolevel of the organizational field to highlight the shifting relationships and interactions among Islamic umbrella organizations and various other actors involved in the organizational field (see Figure 10). These actors include the German federal and regional governments, the media, the general public including non-organized Muslims, the churches, the law enforcement agencies, other groups and organizations in Germany, and actors from outside Germany, most of whom are from Turkey due to the dominance of the Turkish Muslim community in Germany. In addition to the results provided by the in-depth analysis of orga­ nizational developments, this organizational field approach represents another useful tool to elucidate organizational relationships. This perspective also shows that Islamic umbrella organizations are not only influenced by their organizational environment, but also influence it through their organizational behavior. The neoinstitutionalists DiMaggio and Powell use four characteristics to describe the structure of an organizational field: An increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field, the emergence of sharply defined inter-organizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which organizations in a field must contend; and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio/Powell 1991b: 65; my emphasis, KRW).

This chapter analyzes the recent developments in the organizational field with reference to these four characteristics, which also describe an increasing establishment of this relatively young organizational field. It thus focuses on various relationships among the actors in this organizational field and their processes of coalition-building. This includes the questions of whether the actors perceive an increase in information load, or the emergence of a mutual awareness that Islam is part of Germany. The analysis identifies the observed similarities and differences between

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German federal and regional government

Actors abroad Diyanet Turkish Government Political Parties Other Civil Society Organizations

DITIB

IRD

KRM VIKZ

ZMD

Actors in Germany Media Churches Law Enforcement Other Civil Society Organizations

Population (including potential members)

Figure 10: The organizational field of the four main Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany.

the three Islamic umbrella organizations under analysis, DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD. The first section deals with the interorganizational relations among the four Islamic umbrella organizations DITIB, IRD, VIKZ, and ZMD, which increasingly interact with each other and even formed a new coalition in 2007 by establishing their joint umbrella organization, the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM). However, the establishment of KRM was not the first attempt to unify a once divided field. This section identifies the factors that enabled the organizations to establish KRM, examines its effects on the organizational field, discusses problems related to its current structure, and describes possible future scenarios. The second section focuses on the German government. With its various levels, it is another key actor which influences both the structures and the activities within the field. The organizational responses to political expectations have been discussed at the end of each case study in Chapter Five. This section focuses more specifically on the developments of the German Islam Conference (DIK) to discuss the criticism that is being leveled in this context from the organizations’ point of view, and the



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underlying organizational competition for political legitimacy. It can be shown that competition remains a relevant factor despite the increase in cooperation among Islamic organizations discussed above. Finally, this section also provides an outlook on the relationships between the organizations and the political level in Germany by discussing wishes for the future expressed by the organizational representatives interviewed. Third, the relationships between the Islamic umbrella organizations and the media require special attention as well. In particular with regard to the factor “increasing information load”, the demands of the media have affected all three organizations. This led to an increase in the number of organizational positions that are responsible for both press and public affairs. However, in the interviews, the media were also often criticized for what was perceived as “alarmism” when it comes to reporting on Islam. This section discusses these perceptions as well as the recent changes in the relationships between Islamic organizations and the media in Germany. In addition, it analyzes organizational press releases, showing that not only the German government and its expectations are relevant for the organizations but that five additional internal expectations are met, which can be related to the interests of the organization and its members. The bilingual analysis of press releases provides not only new insights but also comparative results that reveal the differences among the three organizations, thus supporting the case study results. Fourth, the relationships with other organizations in Germany are discussed. This includes non-Muslim religious actors such as the churches and other religious organizations, but also non-governmental church-led welfare organizations, which increasingly function as role models for organizational structuring and activities of Islamic umbrella organizations. The relationships with the law enforcement agencies are discussed as well, revealing contradicting organizational approaches that range from adaptation to protest behavior with regard to the expectation “to cooperate”. Finally, the shifting links to other organizations such as academic institutions, political parties, and non-religious migrant organizations are analyzed from the organizational point of view. The fifth section discusses the relationships between the three Islamic umbrella organizations and their country of origin (in the case of DITIB and IGMG, Turkey). This link was not at the center of this research, but deserves further empirical field work in Turkey. However, as the case studies have shown, it is an important part of both DITIB’s and IGMG’s organizational reality. This section therefore briefly outlines the diversity of linkages with actors in Turkey. In the context of increasing criticism of organizational ties to actors from abroad, the advantages and

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disadvantages of such cross-border ties are discussed from a theoretical point of view, taking into account organizational considerations with regard to legitimacy and efficiency, ending with an outlook on possible developments of DITIB and IGMG as transnational organizations. Relations among Islamic Umbrella Organizations The three case studies presented in Chapter Five have highlighted the historic background of the establishment of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany. The tensions among religious and political ideologies imported from the countries of origin (mainly from Turkey) were originally reflected in the organizational field in Germany. However, these tensions have slowly eased since the turn of the 21st century, thus leading to closer relationships among the organizations. The official foundation of KRM in March 2007 represents the latest attempt to institutionalize the continuous to and fro of organizational cooperation that has existed since the organizational beginnings. The reasons for this late truce among the organizations vary according to the narrative provided in the interviews of DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD representatives and include both external and internal motives that are linked to the German and the Turkish national contexts. To shed light on the interorganizational relations, this section first describes how the organizations interpret the history of the organizational field, in which cooperation has always been fragile. Then, it examines the factors that led to the foundation of KRM and its current setting. The third part of this section provides a critical interpretation of KRM’s success from the organizations’ point of view. The final part discusses some possibilities for future developments that are currently discussed among the organizations. The contested establishment of regional and federal structures that would combine all Islamic umbrella organizations into one Islamic religious community is just one example that shows that the struggle for power and legitimacy among the Islamic umbrella organizations has not ended with the establishment of KRM. From Competition to Cooperation: The Historical Development of Organizational Relations The history of the Islamic umbrella organization ZMD is part of the earliest attempts to institutionalize organizational cooperation among all



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major Islamic umbrella organizations. Originally, these organizations were members of the Islamic Working Group (Islamischer Arbeitskreis, IAK), a loosely knit group founded in 1988. However, neither DITIB nor IGMG followed its institutionalization process, which led to the establishment of ZMD as a registered association in 1994. IGMG instead joined the second peak organization IRD, while DITIB began to establish its role as an independent actor in the organizational field. In 2000 VIKZ left ZMD as well, due to leadership changes at VIKZ.1 This led to the current setting of four separate major Islamic umbrella organizations (DITIB, IRD, VIKZ, and ZMD), which established the KRM in 2007 (see below). All four umbrella organizations are regarded as representatives of the Muslim community in Germany, and in this role were invited to the first German Islam Conference (DIK I). The Alevis and their organizations have never been a part of any of the aforementioned Islamic umbrella organizations. This can be attributed to their differences in belief, as well as to their history of oppression in Turkey, which led to their exclusion and caused them to boycott joint Islamic institutions (Sökefeld 2008b). However, the Alevi umbrella organization AABF was also invited to the DIK and has thus become an important actor in the organizational field. This was received with mixed feelings by the other four Islamic umbrella organizations, which subsequently expected AABF to declare its affiliation with the Islamic faith when invited to speak for the Muslim community in Germany. They were invited to the DIK, and they have presented themselves as Muslims there and wanted to be a Muslim voice, but when it came to accomplishing Muslim issues, then they said: But we aren’t Muslims, we are Alevis, and we have to look at it from an Alevi perspective (IN ZMD 2: 213).

Despite the tensions concerning the DIK setting and the demand of the right to offer Muslim religious education—a right which has been granted to AABF in some German federal states—the general organizational policy is to tolerate the Alevis as another religious community while pointing out their internal division. This position is also expressed by the DITIB 1 With regard to VIKZ, Schiffauer notes: “In the Süleymanci community, members of the second generation attempted an opening toward society between 1998 and 2000: a move that would have ultimately led the community closer to orthodox positions. These developments were stopped when a leadership change occurred in Turkey in 2000. Ahmed Arif Denizoglun, who now heads the transnational organization, accused the Muslim communities of Europe of investing their energies in the founding of academies for inter-religious dialogue and neglecting their central task (teaching children in the classic Islamic sciences)” (Schiffauer 2007b: 92; cf. Jonker 2002a: 136ff.).

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president Arslan, who mentions structural ties between Diyanet and part of the Alevi community in Germany: We cannot put the Alevis into one single category; there are different points of views and groups. Those who are devoted to the religion but have different ideas concerning it are welcome and have a place with us. We will help them. We have been bringing Alevi dedes here for three years. There are also some who say they are outside of Islam. What can we say? There is nothing to be done (Arslan/Çelikbudak 2010).

The linkages Arslan mentions, such as the sending of dedes or anas who lead Alevi prayers and rituals, refer only to a small part of the Alevi community in Germany with ties to the C.e.m. foundation. While the C.e.m. foundation supports the Turkish Diyanet, AABF, the largest Alevi umbrella organization, opposes cooperation with Diyanet. AABF’s opposition to the Turkish state is motivated by the history of Alevi discrimination in Turkey, which culminated dramatically with the arson attack on a hotel in Sivas in 1993, in which more than 30 people who had gathered for an Alevi festival died (Sökefeld 2008a). Outside of the DIK, AABF is generally not part of the collaborations among Islamic umbrella organizations. Originally, AABF took part in the Islamic forums that have been taking place at the federal and state levels since 2002, preceding the DIK both in time and with regard to the content of negotiations (Micksch/Süssmuth 2005).2 These Islamic forums are platforms for Islamic umbrella organizations to discuss issues such as the headscarf, ZMD’s Islamic Charta, the way Islam is portrayed in the media, imam training, and the implementation of a clearing program to address discrimination and stereotypes concerning the coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany. The meetings are attended by representatives of other religions, academics, politicians, and officials from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The participation of the latter caused IGMG to refuse to attend the meetings (IN IGMG 3). In September 2003 AABF also declared its resignation from the Islamic forums due to the lacking dialogue character and the increasing number of participants (letter from AABF’s president Öker of September 30, 2003, cited in Micksch/Süssmuth 2005). Micksch notes that some Alevis in Germany consciously practice

2 For a list of the regional Islamic forums and their history see also: URL: http://www .interkultureller-rat.de/projekte/deutsches-islamforum-und-islamforen-in-den-laendern/ [last visited 14-June-2012].



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anti-Sunni propaganda which makes peaceful coexistence difficult (Micksch/Süssmuth 2005: 79). The separation of Alevis from interorganizational forms of cooperation was also observed in the regional relationships between the Islamic organizations, which have become increasingly institutionalized since the 1990s. In 1997 Muslims with different backgrounds founded the Islamic Religious Community of Hesse (Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen e. V., IRH).3 Its aim was to establish religious education in accordance with Article 7 (3) of the German Constitution, a goal that has not yet been achieved. In 1999 the foundation of the SCHURA Hamburg – Council of Islamic Communities in Hamburg followed (SCHURA Hamburg – Rat der Islamischen Gemeinschaften in Hamburg e. V.),4 which regards itself as a religious community that brings together local mosques in this federal city state. The original reason for its establishment was to meet the political demand to provide one contact with regard to the establishment of a Muslim cemetery and a local mosque building conflict. In 2006 two similar SCHURA organizations in Schleswig-Holstein and in Bremen were founded. Their regional structures were characterized by a “unity of all mosque communities and Islamic association, with the exception of DITIB and VIKZ” (SCHURA Hamburg 2009; cf. Yoldas 2007). Although some DITIB and VIKZ mosques originally participated in the SCHURA Hamburg, they are not usually part of SCHURA organizations, which do not include Alevi organizations either. It should also be noted that there are a number of other regional organizations. However, they often do not reflect the generally open SCHURA structures, but rather represent a narrower circle of mosque communities.5 The prevailing power struggle among the Islamic umbrella organizations at the regional level and the lack of a single contact at the federal level was frequently criticized among the SCHURA initiators, which demanded a reform of the organizational cooperation. However, in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks controversies among Islamic umbrella organizations prevailed, and the unifying process progressed only slowly.

3 URL: www.irh-info.de [last visited 14-June-2012]. 4 URL: www.schura-hamburg.de [last visited 14-June-2012]. 5 For an overview dating back to 2005 see URL: www.religion-online.info [last visited 14-June-2012].

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The interviewees stated that around the turn of the 21st century ZMD received increased media attention as a contact for the Muslim community. Consequently, it was required to publicly position itself in relation to IGMG, which was already being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. According to a ZMD interviewee, ZMD’s spokesman Nadeem Elyas tried to use diplomatic reasoning, arguing that one should not form an opinion about an organization without evidence and that changes within IGMG are taking place. However, his critical remarks about IGMG were interpreted by IGMG representatives as a betrayal of his Muslim brothers and sisters to strengthen ZMD’s legitimacy (IN ZMD 1: 13). In 2004 this controversy prompted a ZMD initiative to seek interorganizational dialogue with IGMG and other organizations. Its aim was to smoothen out the misunderstandings and to explore possibilities for closer cooperation. The first negotiations took place in Eschweiler in 2004, followed by an attempt in 2005 in Hamburg to bring together all Islamic organizations under one umbrella and to strengthen the regional models of the SCHURA organizations. On February 26–27, 2005 ZMD, IRD, and SCHURA Hamburg invited the other Islamic umbrella organizations and individual mosque communities to a joint meeting in Hamburg to plan the future structuring of the organizational field in Germany. The aim of this “Hamburger Prozess” was to establish Islamic religious communities at the regional and federal levels. In the structure envisioned, the individual mosque communities were to be the members of the religious communities, regardless of their association with the existing umbrella organizations. At the first meeting, nine representatives of the major umbrella and SCHURA organizations were elected to prepare the establishment of democratic federal structures which would speak with one voice and to prevent the perceived external attempts to divide the Muslim community (Yoldas 2007: 316). DITIB, however, did not participate in this Hamburg Process at this early stage. At the follow-up meeting on September 10, 2005, joint bylaws were proposed to establish several regional and one federal Islamic Reli­ gious Community (Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft in Deutschland). The bylaws envision that each mosque community should become a full member of the regional Islamic Religious Communities, while at the federal level each regional Islamic Religious Community should send one delegate for every ten full members to the annual SCHURA meetings of the federal Islamic Religious Community. In addition to these regional delegates, the annual federal meeting should also involve an elected federal executive board, as well as a senate consisting of the representatives of the



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existing Islamic umbrella organizations. Furthermore, an ulema council at the federal level and an ulema commission at the regional levels should act as contact for theological questions (Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft in Deutschland 2006). However, this process of establishing joint federal structures independent of the existing Islamic umbrella organizations has not yet been achieved. While the SCHURA structure, which is open to all Muslim communities regardless of their country of origin and their affiliation to an Islamic umbrella organization, represents the professed goal of ZMD and IRD (including IGMG), this development has been blocked within KRM, and especially by DITIB. Motives for this blockade were the expectation of increased organizational legitimacy for any organization that would receive the aspired official recognition as a religious community or corporation of public law without having to collaborate with the other organizations. On the other hand, the individual umbrella organizations were afraid to lose influence over their affiliated mosque communities. The current standstill concerning the process of restructuring resulted in a fair amount of resignations among the actors involved, especially among the SCHURA organizations, which are excluded from KRM structures (SCHURA Hamburg 2009). This frustration is also linked to the perception of the limited success of KRM, which is discussed in more detail below. The next section identifies the factors that led to the establishment of KRM, followed by a detailed account of its structuring and possible future developments. The Contextual Factors Surrounding the Establishment of KRM Established on March 28, 2007, KRM brings together the umbrella organizations DITIB, IRD (including IGMG), VIKZ, and ZMD. In the interviews with DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD representatives, several reasons for its establishment were mentioned, one being the long history of cooperation attempts among Islamic organizations (see above). However, the establishment of KRM was also directly related to political pressures arising from the expectations of the German government. These normative pressures are considered to have increased during the DIK initiation phase in 2006. An important aspect in both lines of argumentation is DITIB’s change in attitude toward closer cooperation with the other Islamic umbrella organization, which was allegedly influenced by changes in the Turkish

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political environment (see below). The following section disentangles this variety of contextual factors, beginning with the changes in the German institutional environment. It is argued here that this analysis of KRM’s history facilitates our understanding of present discussions surrounding this new peak organization (its legitimacy and its status), including other possible forms of organizational cooperation. Changes in the Organizational Environment in Germany Counteracting the Political Principle of “Divide and Rule” One motive for the need to increase organizational cooperation was the perception that the political level did not hold a consistent view regarding the various Islamic organizations. This caused the organizational representatives to complain that the perceived principle of “divide and rule” (“teile und herrsche”) (IN ZMD 1: 13) led to ever-changing political attitudes concerning the question of what is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ organization. This notion can also be found in the following interview passage, in which the political sphere is accused of actively hindering interorganizational cooperation. Like the principle of “divide and rule”, the notion of “carrot and stick” is also evoked in this context to express that the German political environment has neither granted a single Islamic umbrella organization the unqualified legitimacy as an official contact, nor actively supported the collaboration efforts among Islamic organizations, despite repeated demands made in this regard. This “political game” is expressed in the following passage, which also emphasizes the solidarity among the umbrella organizations at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, a fact that is expressed in the criticism of the frequent raids of IGMG offices by the German state authorities, among other things. Well, ZMD has been related to Millî Görüş because of Mr. El-Zayat, and I think one finds accusations for every association. DITIB was criticized for its closeness to Turkey. Therefore, every organization has some hobbyhorse for which it is reprimanded and told you have to look at this. And none of you is in line with constitutional requirements. And I think this is also a political game that has always been played as soon as one noticed that they [the Islamic organizations, KRW] band together and achieve to become a unity, then one approaches one with a carrot and tries to achieve a new division. We realize this, all right. And then the time always came for one organization to be reprimanded and then to receive the carrot again to disrupt this unity. I also think that this is deliberately being controlled. I do not know whether this comes from the federal government or from any political camp, but I think there are powers involved that do not want this [organizational unity, KRW], and then they make a point of doing something. For example, now, also with the raids at Millî Görüş, where



the organizational field361 nothing has been found in 14 months, but the reputation has been extremely damaged (IN ZMD 2: 69).

The above passage shows that the German government does not unconditionally accept a single organization as the main contact. Instead, each Islamic umbrella organization is reprimanded for its shortcomings. This is also true of DITIB. Originally, DITIB had unsuccessfully tried to establish itself as the main contact of the German government, but its ties to the Turkish Diyanet received increasing criticism in the political debates (DIK 2009a: 62). DITIB’s closer cooperation with the other Islamic organizations, which eventually led to the establishment of KRM, can also be associated with the acknowledgement of the government’s position toward DITIB. Responding to the Loyalty Test, the Mohammed Cartoon Controversy, and the Thwarted Train Bombing In addition to the argument of solidarity against the German government’s attempts to reprimand individual organizations, there were four public events in 2005 and early 2006 which motivated the Islamic umbrella organizations to join forces: the naturalization test, the Mohammed cartoon controversy, a thwarted terrorist attack in Germany, and the DIK. During the first half of 2006 a fierce debate about the introduction of a naturalization test in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg erupted due to its focus on the nationals of these 57 countries of the Islamic Conference. The limitation of this “loyalty test” to Muslim applicants for naturalization was officially legitimized by the doubts of the Ministry of the Interior of Baden-Württemberg. The ministry officially questioned whether commitment during the naturalization process also represents the actual inner attitude of the applicant, thus justifying the test for the applicants from 57 different Muslim countries (Ministry of the Interior Baden-Württemberg 2006, translation KRW). In a joint press statement, 16 Muslim and Turkish organizations strongly opposed this naturalization test, arguing that it discriminated against Muslims (who were portrayed as a security threat), perpetuated stereotypes about Islam, deeply intruded into the private and intimate sphere of Muslims, and interfered with their freedom of consciousness and opinion (IGMG et al. PR 08-Feb-2006). On September 1, 2008 the German Federal government introduced a mandatory naturalization test for all applicants for German citizenship. It consists of a set of 310 questions (300 general questions and 10 questions

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specific to the federal state in which the application is filed). Applicants have 60 minutes to answer 33 questions. 17 answers must be correct to pass the test.6 In addition, applicants must demonstrate German language skills and pledge allegiance to the German Basic Law (BMI 2008a: 115). The preparation of the joint press statement on the naturalization test was interrupted by the controversy around the Mohammed cartoons by a Danish illustrator, which were first issued in Denmark in September 2005. In January 2006 the cartoons, which link the Islamic prophet Mohammed to terrorism, were republished, which led to worldwide protests. Many Muslims in Germany expected that their organizations would organize public demonstrations in Germany as well, but the umbrella organizations decided not to take to the streets, because we did not find it constructive, and the impression is already that Muslims are easily offended, we did not want to be labeled as such […] that means this outrageous cartoon controversy persuaded us to establish KRM (IN DITIB 3: 37).

This passage shows that the cartoon controversy was an external shock which prompted changes in the organizational field. The aim of the various Islamic organizations of jointly representing the Muslim community in this context was a novelty, influenced in part by the political climate, which expected all Islamic organizations to adopt a common stance on integration- and security-related issues. However, external pressures were not the only reason for collaboration efforts; internal organizational motivations to defend oneself against external accusations played a part as well. A thwarted terrorist attack in Germany was the third event that prompted a public press conference held by 16 migrant organizations, most of which were Islamic organizations, including DITIB, IGMG, VIKZ, and ZMD, as well as AABF and various SCHURA organizations (IGMG et al. PR 25-Aug-2006). This step was also motivated by DITIB, which until then had been against organizational cooperation: Then the reports on the luggage bomber in NRW [North Rhine-Westphalia, KRW] were published, where Bild, interestingly, used a picture of the DITIB headquarters as the background for its headline “This is where the luggage bomber prayed”. Well, the man prayed there, but nobody knew him. That was a fateful headline, which caused DITIB to ask if one couldn’t do another joint press statement. And this is how it went on. That led to the process of 6 The procedure is explained on the BAMF website. URL: http://www.bamf.de/DE/ Einbuergerung/WasEinbuergerungstest/waseinbuergerungstest-node.html [last visited 21-Feb-2012].



the organizational field363 the DIK, where major consultations became inevitable. But when the DIK started, KRM already existed in the way it was established later (IN IGMG 3: 43).

The newspaper reports made the DITIB representatives realize that their organization was regarded with exactly the same suspicions all Muslim communities had to face at that time. The general ‘Islamization’ of the public discourse (Tiesler 2006), along with the ‘securitization’ of the debates played a decisive role in this context (see Chap. Four). The subsequent decision of DITIB, IGMG, VIKZ, and ZMD to agree on Islam as their common denominator and to overcome their original tensions was therefore influenced by the external developments in the public and political discourses, as well as by their internal interest in issuing a joint statement to refute allegations which linked them to violence and Islamism in order to increase their organizational legitimacy. The complementary nature or, possibly, even the tension between external expectations and members’ interests that occurred during this period is also expressed in the first official KRM press release, which cite “the Muslims’ wishes and the expectation of politics and society to provide a single point of contact” as reasons for the establishment of KRM (KRM PR 22-May-2007). Meeting the Expectation to Provide “a Single Telephone Number” On September 27, 2006, just one month after the failed terrorist attack in Germany, the first DIK took place in Berlin. In the emerging DIK process, all four umbrella organizations were confronted with the increasing demand of the German government for a joint contact, which was often described as the demand to provide a single telephone number: This expectation of the politicians to provide one single telephone number I do not find realistic […] what they cannot expect of the Christian part of society, they cannot expect of the Muslim part either (IN DITIB 2: 158).

Generally speaking, the political pressure to join forces has been prominent for years with regard to the issue of religious education and other religious claims. This motivated the above-described coordination efforts at the regional level. However, in 2006 the pressure also increased at the federal political level. The direct relevance of the DIK for the cooperation process and the establishment of KRM remains contested among the organizations interviewed. Some interviewees stressed the importance of the political expectations for the establishment of KRM:

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chapter six And in my opinion, the central motive was the process that the German politics just very strongly demanded this one contact, and of course that the security risks and the terrorist attacks and so on supported this demand (IN DITIB 1: 93).

Another interviewee argued that the political dialogue opportunities forced the organizations to do what would be good for them—in this case, to increase cooperation with the political arena (IN ZMD 3: 103). In addition, organizational representatives also stated that the influence of the German state was a “rumor”, mentioning the long history of organizational cooperation (IN IGMG 3: 45) and the frequent attempts every ten to twenty years to form a unified structure (IN ZMD 3: 103). Another DITIB representative stated that Islam critics and DIK members such as Necla Kelek and Seyran Ates were talking “absolute nonsense” when they said that KRM only became famous due to, and was motivated by, the DIK (IN DITIB 3: 37). Changes in the Political Landscape in Turkey The changes in the political landscape in Turkey represent another contextual factor that has influenced strategy changes in the organizations in general and DITIB in particular. The interviewees stated that the establishment of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in 2001, which split off from Erbakan’s Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), and the AKP’s subsequent electoral success in 2002, initiated changes in Turkey that also influenced the organizational field in Germany. In this context, it is argued that the newly-established cooperation between DITIB and IGMG within KRM would not have been possible in the early phase of both organizations in Germany due to their opposing stance on homeland politics. DITIB has represented the “Islam of the embassies” (Laurence 2006: 261), which focuses on a politically neutral religion in the laic tradition of the Republic of Turkey, while IGMG has been closely associated with Necmettin Erbakan and his Islamic parties, which have been outlawed in Turkey since the 1970. This contradiction has been partly revoked by the current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose personal history as a former member of the Millî Görüş movement enabled him to reconcile the Islamic tradition and the Turkish state.7

7 Until 1998 Erdoğan was a member of Erbakan’s Virtue Party (FP), along with other members of the AKP. He has been the chairman of the AKP since 2001 and the Prime Minister of Turkey since 2003 (Amiraux 2007).



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One argument in this context concerns the assumption that the political changes also influenced the policies of Diyanet toward other Islamic organizations abroad. In 2005 a ZMD delegation discussed DITIB’s problematic blockade of any unification attempts with the Diyanet representatives in Ankara (IN ZMD 1: 13; ZMD PR 27-Oct-2005). Diyanet’s or DITIB’s change of position may actually have been facilitated by a combination of the factors presented in this section. However, in 2006 an observable shift toward closer interorganizational cooperation took place in Germany, and eventually DITIB joined the “Hamburger Prozess” as an observer. Although DITIB did not commit itself to the envisioned profound restructuring of the organizational landscape, it eventually supported the establishment of KRM. It is worthwhile to note that the president of Diyanet, Ali Bardakoğlu, was present during the official KRM announcement on April 10, 2007, which can be regarded as official support of its initiation. The establishment of KRM was publicly announced during this joint festival organized by Islamic umbrella organizations to celebrate the “Mawlid”, the birth of the Prophet Mohammed. The festival was held after the official establishment of KRM, on March 28, 2007, and was attended by 20,000 people (KRM PR 22-May-2007). Well, the interesting thing about the process was that Bardakoğlu himself, the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey, was present during the establishment and actually almost initiated it or introduced the establishment. I am skeptical about whether he himself or the other members had a clear idea of what KRM was actually supposed to become or rather, the latter presumably had divergent opinions (IN DITIB 1: 93).

The second part of this passage refers to the controversies that immediately followed the establishment of KRM. While the organizations were bound together by the above-mentioned pressures and the continuing hope for the long-awaited conferral of the status as a religious community to KRM (IN DITIB 1: 145), the internal developments that followed soon put this new cooperation project to the test, as the following section illustrates. Summary In line with the theoretical framework of this research project, the establishment of KRM can be attributed to a combination of external and internal expectations. While the political climate in Germany promoted the unification process in that it demanded a single telephone number prior to granting institutionalized rights to the Muslim community, the parallel process of dividing the organizations into legitimate and illegitimate

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contacts also stimulated the internal wish for stronger cooperation. DITIB in particular had to acknowledge that it was not accepted as the most important contact by the German government. External events such as the naturalization test, the Mohammed cartoon controversy, and a thwarted terrorist attack in Germany also led to joint organizational responses, which were expected externally but were also promoted by internal motives. These motives include the interest in efficiency with regard to reaching a wider audience and the interest in increased legitimacy, which is attributed to issuing joint organizational press releases to dispel the negative image of Muslims and their organizations in Germany. Finally, one can conclude that the political expectations in Turkey hindered the unification of the major Islamic umbrella organizational in Germany at first and later facilitated this process. The Structuring of KRM and Its Effect on the Organizational Field “To Discuss, Proceed, and Act Jointly” According to the KRM rules of procedure (Geschäftsordnung) (KRM 2007a), the four Islamic umbrella organizations keep their sovereignty and mainly work together on certain topics. KRM meets at least every four weeks with a group of about 10 organizational representatives. Joint press releases8 and related processes of unifying diverse opinions are often cited as the main KRM advantages: “To proceed jointly and to search for possibilities to act jointly” (VIKZ representative 2008); “discuss topics jointly, prepare papers jointly, and discuss positions jointly” (IGMG representative 2008, cited in Rosenow/Kortmann 2011: 52, translation KRW). Generally speaking, the purpose of KRM is to support its affiliated organizations in achieving legitimacy on various levels. First, the political expectations to cooperate and to provide one contact are met. Second, the joint declarations are expected to receive more public and political attention when presented in a coordinated manner. Third, the tendency to be portrayed as a divided community is countered, which also meets the hopes for more efficiency as a result of organizational cooperation. However, the actual success of these expectations with regard to KRM is debatable. However, KRM has not yet been able to meet one of the main expectations of the organized Muslim community: the Germany-wide 8 The KRM press releases are available at URL: http://www.zentralrat.de/8417.php [last visited 14-June-2012], and at URL: http://koordinationsrat.de/default.php?p=1 [last visited 14-June-2012].



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institutionalization of rights such as the right to provide religious education in schools, or even the provision of such services through KRM itself or the official recognition as a religious community. As a result, its work is viewed rather critically (see below). “A Restructuring Was Therefore Dead” The main point of criticism of KRM is that the envisioned regional and federal democratization process, the aim of which was to include every mosque community regardless of its organizational affiliation, has not been achieved. This criticism is also linked to the exclusion of the regional SCHURA organizations from the KRM structure. Consequently, the SCHURA Hamburg (2009) criticized the foundation of KRM, lamenting that “a unifying process in the sense of a re-structuration was therefore dead”. Originally, KRM intended to provide “the support for an integrative representation structure of Muslims within in Germany” (KRM 2007a: preamble). It also stressed, in its inaugural press release, that KRM endorses the establishment of regional structures in accordance with the existing structures (KRM PR 22-May-2007). However, so far, no common regional KRM structure has been established. The expected foundation of a joint Islamic Religious Community, which is set out as a goal in § 1.3 of the KRM rules of procedure, has not been achieved either. It must be noted that no official acknowledgment of the status of a religious community exists in Germany, and a religious community generally exists when followers of the same religious faith unite to publicly proclaim their faith and to jointly fulfill the religious duties that arise from their faith (Rohe 2001: 233, translation KRW).

The requirements a religious community must fulfill to be granted the right to provide Islamic religious education in public schools set out in Article 7.3 of the Constitution are more differentiated. One such requirement is that an official contact be provided who represents the religious community. KRM does provide a contact in the form of the KRM speaker, which alternates every six months between the four umbrella organizations, but KRM has not been acknowledged the rights attributed to a religious community under Article 7.3 of the German Constitution.9 This is linked in

9 It is worth noting that, according to one interviewee and contrary to public statements of other representatives, it has never been the paramount goal of KRM to achieve

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part to the argument raised by legal expert Rohe, who notes that “a union with the sole aim of becoming the contact [for religious education, KRW] would not suffice if a far-reaching religious life among the community is not practiced as well” (ibid.: 238), an argument, however, which is contested by the Islamic organizations. For example, the former ZMD spokesman Azzaoui argues that the mosques fulfill all criteria to have a federation of mosques legally recognized as a religious community: they are comprised of ‘natural members’ and are responsible for ‘comprehensive belief implementation’ (umfassende Glaubensverwirklichung) (Azzaoui 2009: 5, cf. Azzaoui 2011).

Another relevant factor is the requirement that Article 7.3 GG be implemented regionally. However, KRM does not have any regional structures. Within KRM, DITIB is held responsible for the slow process of establishing joint regional structures, a situation which reflects earlier attempts of the “Hamburger Prozess” (see above). At the same time, one said over and over off the record that basically the solution we establish KRM on the regional level is for us […] not a solution because we are afraid to lose our sheep when KRM gains more importance at the regional level, and that basically DITIB mosques then consistently go to KRM and not to the DITIB headquarters. And therefore one was afraid to lose influence over the mosques (IN ZMD 1: 17).

In 2009 DITIB established regional structures of its own, thus stalling similar KRM plans. DITIB argues that the acknowledgment of KRM as a religious community is impossible due to legal difficulties. DITIB repre­ sentatives claim that this would become less of a problem if the four KRM member organizations, or at least one of them, would be established as an Islamic religious community (IN DITIB 3: 49; IN DITIB 2: 158). DITIB claims to fulfill the necessary requirements by implementing a process of decentralization, but the other three umbrella organizations criticize DITIB for pursung an unattainable goal by trying to opt for an independent solution. “At the Most They Can Form a Platform” The internal struggles ensuing after the foundation of KRM can also be explained by the structural conditions DITIB negotiated as requirements for its participation, a participation that at the time was perceived as the status of a corporation of public law. Rather, it strives to be officially recognized as an Islamic religious community (IN ZMD 1: 25).



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indispensable for a successful institutionalization of this joint body. Consequently, DITIB managed to claim a special role as the largest Islamic umbrella organization in Germany. According to the KRM rules of procedure, DITIB is the only organization that has a veto right within KRM. It is also the only organization that sends three instead of two representatives to the biannual KRM member meeting.10 This approach to safeguard its position as an influential actor in the organizational field is also expressed in the following passage, which emphasizes the limitations of KRM’s activities from DITIB’s point of view: The real aim of the foundation of KRM was to develop a platform, a platform where all umbrella organizations can jointly develop a position on upcoming issues and which, as a claim for representation if it is absolutely necessary, can also appear before the public as representatives of the Muslims. This was the topic, and all of a sudden this turned into a discussion that KRM should take up everything that the umbrella organizations had been doing before, and this is not possible. The umbrella organizations are independent organizations, at the most they can form a platform (IN DITIB 2: 158).

“DITIB Achieved a Lot in the Coordination Council” The umbrella organizations in general and DITIB in particular do not want to give up their independence. At the same time, they acknowledge the need to come to joint conclusions on certain issues. That this cooperation is not without internal tensions and that power struggles continue to exist is also reflected in DITIB’s attempts to emphasize its importance as a mediator in the KRM context: Also, at the DIK, we were moderate, we were often mediators in the working groups; for example, without our mediation there, the final declarations may not have been completed in this form. […] For example, in Working Group One on the consensus on values of the Basic Law there, DITIB achieved a lot in KRM, and I think without KRM this cooperation among the Islamic organizations would not have happened (IN DITIB 3:27, 45).

However, the umbrella organizations eventually failed to present a unified position at the DIK in 2009 due to IRD’s refusal to sign the final declaration. This conflict at the end of the DIK I was followed by the exclusion of IRD from the DIK II and ZMD’s refusal to join. As a result, the conflict between individual and collective organizational strategies became even 10 Cf. KRM 2007a. A similar attempt by DITIB to have more representatives than the other organizations present at the DIK was not successful.

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more pronounced. In the interviews conducted between 2008 and 2010, the organizational representatives nonetheless generally portrayed KRM as an important achievement, although plans for the future that questioned KRM’s functionality also existed, as the following section shows. The Possible Future of KRM “Finding Ways out of the Dead End” There is a general sense of insecurity among the organizational representatives with regard to KRM’s future and the cooperation in the organizational field, due to the internal tensions and divergent points of view concerning the future form of organizational cooperation. This general insecurity is expressed in the following passage, in which three options for the future are mentioned. Their feasibility depends on DITIB’s decision for or against an intensified form of institutionalized cooperation. Possible options for the future described in the interview include a consolidation of KRM at the regional level either with or without DITIB, and cooperation at the regional level in the form of round tables between the individual organizations and the political level. The role of the existing SCHURA organizations in these developments also remains an open question, and their involvement may differ between the federal states due to Germany’s federal system. Overall, the position of the Islamic umbrella organizations on the SCHURA organizations is ambivalent, and these organizations are not mentioned in most of the interviews with regard to cooperation plans. However, some SCHURA organizations have contacts to local mosques that are not members of any of the umbrella organizations and therefore can become an important contact when it comes to incorporating these independent mosques into regional bodies. Well, the-state of affairs is now, in my opinion, that one is in a dead end […] and, in addition, DITIB has organized the regional organizations during this time. And, as said before, right now, one is somehow in a dead end and one does not really know how it will continue. Well, in principle, there are two possibilities. One would be that a kind of pressure arises from the political level and DITIB finally agrees, so to speak, to cooperate at the regional level. The other would be […] that one asks the political level to cooperate with the four organizations as four independent organizations at a round table, or that VIKZ, IRD, ZMD say […] basically, we will advance KRM at the regional level and, at the same time, cooperate with DITIB as an umbrella organization (IN ZMD 1: 21).



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The organizational representatives interviewed believe that KRM will continue to exist in the future, either in an intensified form with regionallevel organizations, or simply as a consulting body. Despite the draw­ backs  in achieving the original plans associated with KRM, the opinion prevails  that KRM continues to be a useful tool for the four umbrella organizations. However, its lack of official bylaws and the fact that the organizations still speak for themselves on important decisions are acknowledged as points of criticism. Although a general cohesion-oriented strategy could be observed after the establishment of KRM, which prevented public criticism among the four KRM organizations, this internal constraint appears to have been gradually loosened. This can be attributed to the limited progress toward an official institutionalization of KRM and the resulting discontent which in turn leads to mutual accusations. “KRM Remains an Important Consulting Body for All Islamic Umbrella Organizations—No More and No Less” The limits of organizational commitment to the KRM structure also became visible during the discussions surrounding the DIK II process. KRM failed to find a joint position to negotiate the terms and conditions for joint participation of the three invited umbrella organizations (DITIB, VIKZ, and ZMD) after IRD refused to take on a dormant membership role. Attempts were made to come to a joint position within the KRM structure (KRM PR 10-Mar-2010), but did not lead to a joint decision. While DITIB and VIKZ eventually joined a DIK II preparation meeting in March 2010 (BMI PR 24.03.2010) and participated in the DIK II, which showed that they were adapting to the political expectations, ZMD chose the protest strategy. It demanded further negotiations over the content of the DIK II, and when its demands were not met, ZMD eventually publicly announced its resignation from the DIK II (ZMD PR 12-May-2010). ZMD’s main points of criticisms have been the non-binding character of the DIK process, the lack of debates about discrimination and Islamo­ phobia, and, most importantly, the failure of political actors to acknowledge the Islamic umbrella organizations as religious communities, which is regarded as the prerequisite for achieving results in negotiations over religious education and imam training. In the following self-critical passage from a Tageszeitung interview with ZMD’s secretary general, the results of these heterogeneous organizational strategies are described as a “cacophony”:

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chapter six In retrospect, the other organizations made a big mistake in not opposing DITIB’s delay to sign the KRM bylaws more decisively. If I take a critical look at myself, I see the result now: the actions concerning the DIK fit more into the category of ‘cacophony’. KRM remains an important consulting body for all Islamic umbrella organizations—no more and no less (Mazyek/Am Orde, TAZ, 12-Apr-2010, translation KRW).

Summary Overall, the diversity of the existing Islamic umbrella organizations and their changing settings of cooperation show that the cooperation structures in the organizational field are not fixed but flexible. This has often led to tensions between cooperation and confrontation strategies among the organizations. These tensions can be explained by their religious and ideological diversity on the on hand, and by sometimes conflicting expectations of the national and international levels with which each individual organization is confronted on the other. In this context, the KRM foundation can be interpreted as a process of adaptation to the demands of the German institutional environment and to internal interests that hoped for progress regarding the institutionalization of Muslim rights. However, the implementation rather resembles the strategy of decoupling. At the level of external affairs, KRM acts as a speaker for the umbrella organizations, despite its deficits concerning internal adaptation of its structures and activities to meet the expectations of a unification process. While the ‘single telephone number’ is being achieved through the alternating KRM presidency, the KRM restructuring at the regional level has not yet been accomplished. The blockade of a more extensive restructuring of the organizational balance of power is due in part to the heterogeneity of the umbrella organizations, which can be linked to the different contextual factors involved. DITIB has received a special status in the field due to its size and resources, but IRD is consistently being criticized by the political level due to its interdependence with its member organization IGMG. Moreover, due to their organizational history, the Turkish organizations originally dissociated themselves from each other. Although this process of profiling at each other’s expense has increasingly been reduced, competition still remains an important characteristic of organizational behavior. This can be explained by the importance ascribed to the number of organizational members as an organizational resource, which becomes relevant in the German political context to claim legitimacy as a representative that can speak for a large part of the Muslim community.



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Finally, ZMD is the only organization that has no official ties abroad, whereas DITIB, IGMG, and VIKZ are strengthened through their ties to Turkey in terms of membership numbers, resources, and ideological support. However, their relationships to actors from abroad also lead to a certain amount of suspicion in Germany due to the expected influence of foreign actors and interest groups on the Islamic organizations in Germany (see Chap. Six: Relations to Actors Abroad). By taking all these different contextual factors and interests into account, one can better understand the internal struggles arising from the perceived necessity of increasing organizational cooperation among the Islamic umbrella organizations, a cooperation which can either strengthen or weaken their own positions and legitimation on various levels in the field. Although KRM is likely to continue to exist, it is unlikely that it will provide the basis for an Islamic Religious Community that encompasses all mosque communities in Germany in a democratic bottom-up structure. Instead, KRM currently represents a consulting body for its member organizations, thus enabling cooperation among them, while simultaneously providing opportunities for competition and dissent. The resulting ambivalence between a focus on organizational commonalities versus mutual demarcations therefore remains an important characteristic of the field of Islamic organizations in Germany. This also becomes apparent in the following analysis of the relationship between the analyzed Islamic umbrella organizations and the German political level. Relations with the German Political Level The relationship between organized Muslims in Germany and the German state received increasing public and academic attention in the first decade of the 21st century due to the growing interaction that manifests itself both on the level of the federal states and on the federal political level. A growing body of literature developed that analyzes the legal disputes which regulate Muslim claims concerning such aspects as religious education, the wearing of the headscarf, mosque building, ritual slaughter, prayer times at the workplace, and Muslim cemeteries (Bock 2007a; b; Hüttermann 2006; Muckel 2004; Reichmuth 2006; Rohe 2008; 2009). These studies often emphasize the importance of court cases in the German integration regime (Jonker 2002b; Koenig 2005; Tietze 2008). However, few studies exist on the relationship between Muslims in Germany and the political level from the organizational point of view.

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The first research project on the relationship between politics and Islam in Germany was initiated at the University of Münster in 2009 (Schubert/Meyer 2011; Rosenow/Kortmann 2011). In addition, there is a slowly growing body of comparative studies that include the point of view of various Islamic umbrella organizations with regard to the developments of the political institutional environment (Jørgensen 2009; Kort­mann 2011; Lanz 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The aim of this section is to evaluate the emerging cooperation between the Islamic organizations and the political sphere in Germany from the organizational point of view. It discusses in detail the organizational assessment of the DIK and includes an analysis of organizational strategies of argumentation used to gain political legitimacy ranging from the rhetoric of power and independence to arguments of reputation and representation. Finally, it presents the future wishes concerning the relationship to the political sphere of the organizational representatives interviewed, a relationship which in the end influences their organizational success both in achieving political legitimacy and obtaining public funding and in realizing their political demands of an institutionalization of Islam in German society. From the Margins to the Center of Political Attention: Organizational Responses The developments on the political level of the organizational field have been detailed in Chapter Four with regard to the late decision of the German government to move the issue of Islam to the top of the political agenda and to initiate the DIK in 2006. The German regional political bodies and even more so the German Federal Government are key actors in the organizational field which have decisively influenced the information load, the interaction patterns, and the mutual awareness of the actors in the organizational field. Therefore, this study has taken the political expectations as a starting point for the investigation of action and reaction strategies of Islamic umbrella organizations. The DIK slogan “Muslims in Germany—German Muslims” expresses well the argument raised by Laurence (2006) that after a long period of outsourcing the responsibility of Islamic life in Germany towards the institutions in the countries of origin; the 1990s, and even more so the first decade of the 21st century have led to an attempted de-transnationalization with regard to Islamic matters to regain national influence on organized Muslims in Germany. Links to existing debates about a common



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German ‘Leitkultur’ (‘core culture’) and the adherence to a common value system have been visible throughout the DIK I negotiations, particu­ larly in Working Group One, which dealt with the German societal order and values consensus. The following section describes how the Islamic umbrella organizations interpret these changes in the political climate, which concerns both the integration of Muslims into German society and the integration of Islam into the German system of religious governance. “Islam Is a Part of Germany” Overall, one can say that the relation between the Islamic umbrella organizations and the political level in Germany is characterized by strategies of both adaptation and protest. The organizations emphasize that progress is visible and that Islam has finally arrived on the political agenda after a long absence. In particular the political statements made in 2006 by Chancellor Merkel and the then Minister of the Interior Schäuble, both of whom stressed that Islam is part of Germany and that German society welcomes its 14.5 million members with a migration background, are regarded by DITIB representatives as important tokens of appreciation from conservative politicians (IN DITIB 1: 160; IN DITIB 3: 37). Although the DIK has often been viewed critically, being invited to discuss matters at the federal level was generally seen as an achievement: With the DIK, the state has engaged in long overdue dialogue with its Muslim citizens and thus made an important statement. The state laid the institutional foundation for the dialogue with the Muslims, while simultaneously expressing the religious diversity in our country (IRD PR 25-June-2009, translation KRW).

“Do They Just Do It for Their Own Security?” However, there is also some skepticism and criticism among the organizations concerning cooperation with the political level. This skepticism is often related to the link between the topic of Islam and changes in the German security legislation. The resulting disappointment is also associated with the uncertainty of the Muslim community with regard to German politics: And I think this feeling is always part of the relationship with German politics. How do they mean this now? Do they just do it for their own security? Or is it about more than that? (IN DITIB 1: 123)

Criticism is also leveled at the DIK I discussion group on “Islamism and Security”. Although all of the invited Islamic umbrella organizations participated in this discussion group, its structure and the participation

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by the organizations were generally criticized for supporting the underlying message that Muslims are reactionaries and radicals who must be “educated” by German politics (IN DITIB 2: 178). IGMG and IRD openly protested against the perceived “logic of prevention”, which “postulates a threat from the Muslim community without giving specific reasons” (IRD PR 25-June-2009, translation KRW). Consequently, IRD refused to sign the final DIK I declaration. Its official press release also states that the established logic of suspicion forces Islamic organizations to discuss such issues as transparency, radicalization, and cooperation with law enforcement agencies, despite a long history of peaceful dialogue initiatives and the allegedly self-evident immunization against extremism through the practice of a moderate Islam in the mosque communities that participate in the DIK (ibid.). While IRD protested against this perceived marginalization of Islamic organizations in Germany, the other four participating umbrella organizations signed the final DIK I declaration, thus employing the strategy of adaptation to political expectations. “Political Statements Can Break Emotional Ties” Another point of criticism is that there has been a general lack of political support for the Muslim communities, particularly in the second half of the 20th century. In the case studies, the reorientation of immigrants toward Germany and the increasingly diminishing importance of the return option have been described as an important development in the organizational field. In this context of permanent settlement, which is expressed in the establishment of mosques and an increasing interest in German culture and politics, the Islamic organizations have complained that this development has not been adequately supported by German politics, argue that to resolve this issue the German government and the Islamic organizations should reach out to one another “to meet somewhere in the middle”: And at some point, when the organizations go, go, go again and again, but do not see any change, they will say I can’t take these steps while I am being pulled back, as if by an elastic strap. And the society, too, for example, the mosque communities, when we tell them: “well, go, well, go there, well, go join this, join that”, when they say, but they exclude us, what nonsense are you talking about? That doesn’t work either. Therefore, we really have to react in two ways, so that this path is not becoming longer but rather much shorter, and somehow we can meet in the middle (IN DITIB 2: 186).

In particular the situation of the second and third generations, which are often characterized as having weaker emotional ties to their parents’



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country of origin, is viewed critically in the interviews. The representative interviewed stated that the failure of the German government to actively welcome Muslims and immigrants in Germany in the past influences the second and third generations of migrants and their emotional ties to Germany, which can easily be broken by remarks made by politicians or the media (IN DITIB 2: 186). “The Fear That the Germans Want to Change Islam” Another fear among the community expressed by a DITIB representative is linked to the influence of the German state on religious matters: There is always the fear in the community that the Germans want to, quote, change Islam, want to reform it […]. In my opinion, this is unfounded, but DITIB has to deal with this demand by its community (IN DITIB 1).

A similar internal discourse can be found in IGMG, where two different camps either support or question the organizational path toward closer cooperation with the German society. Generally speaking, the arguments cited above stress the fact that the institutional environment influences not only the organizational activities, but also the individual level. The diversity of internal perceptions of the external environment, the fears concerning organizational independence in theological matters, and the discrimination experienced on the collective and individual levels illustrate the importance of the members’ expectations for the organizations. As outlined in the theoretical framework, the organizations have to reconcile these internal interests with the external expectations. However, this section also shows that the organizations have to respond to their members’ concerns, but they can also use them to support their demands for increasing positive political attention. “The Federal States Do Not Use the Opportunities They Have” Organizational criticism for example strongly prevails with regard to the demands for legal recognition of rights, the establishment of Islamic religious education in public schools, and the official political recognition of Islamic umbrella organizations as religious communities. The interviewees attributed the lack of progress to the reluctance of politicians to address these issues on the regional level of the German federal states and complained that the politicians either do not want to address these questions personally at all or play for time to create headlines in times of election campaigns.

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chapter six In the end, […] the federal state has strong […] framing opportunities, but so far, these opportunities have not been exhausted. On the contrary, they are only used […] to play for time or to shift the discussions to non-political topics. […] There must be more pressure in the kettle, and this just does not exist, and therefore it will always continue to lightly float along. And then it will be pulled out shortly before an election, sometimes, if one is lucky, in a positive manner, but usually rather negatively. Afterwards, it continues to drag on again for years (IN ZMD 3).

“The Mosque Communities Did Not Receive Any Money from the State” The state is also blamed for failing to provide financial support for the mosque communities, and other organizations are accused of misusing public funds. The mosque communities did not receive any money from the state, they tried to do something on their own, and from the mosque communities, at least for DITIB, I can say that no terrorists or anything like that have emerged (IN DITIB 2: 36).

The perceived injustice regarding the distribution of resources is also expressed in a statement that meets the political expectations to denounce terrorism, while upholding the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ organizations. To be able to establish an infrastructure to provide professional services, money is needed. At least DITIB is positive that this situation could change in the future. This assumption is justified by the project work that was recently established and financed publicly. For IGMG, on the other hand, the resource situation is quite different. Even so, the general lack of public funding opportunities is interpreted positively because it is believed to allow for more organizational freedom in project planning (IN IGMG 3). This overview of critical positions with regard to the relationship between the Islamic organizations and the German political level shows that tensions exist between the logic of membership and the logic of influence, tensions that all voluntary interest organizations are facing, according to Schmitter and Streeck (1999). The organizations fight for more recognition and legitimacy to increase their influence and thus to support their members’ interests. However, the fears and worries of their members constrain the activities they implement to achieve complete adaptation to the political expectations. This dilemma recently culminated with regard to the dialogues within the DIK. The German Islam Conference (DIK) The first plenary meeting of the DIK with 30 participants took place on September 27, 2006. 15 participants represented the different local,



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regional and federal political levels, and the other 15 participants were invited to represent the four million Muslims in Germany. Among the Muslim representatives were five organizational spokespersons (representing the Islamic umbrella organizations AABF, DITIB, IRD, VIKZ, and ZMD) and ten individual members who “originate in several areas of public Muslim life” (DIK no date). The fact that at least two of the independent participants were explicitly critical of Islam has been excoriated by the organized Muslims, as the following analysis shows. A total of four annual plenary meetings took place in this DIK I setting between 2006 and 2009, complemented by four working groups, in which 100 additional experts were consulted. The working groups addressed the following topics: 1) German societal order and value consensus; 2) religious questions in the German constitutional understanding; 3) the economy and media as bridges, and 4) security and Islamism. The final DIK I recommendations were discussed on June 25, 2009, shortly before the federal elections in September 2009 (DIK 2009a; b). After the success of a conservative coalition between Christian Demo­ crats and Liberals in 2009, the new Minster of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière, announced the continuation of the consultations in what was then called the DIK II process, which began in 2010. However, although the continuation of the dialogue has been desired by all Islamic umbrella organizations, the exclusion of IRD from the DIK II, which was justified by ongoing preliminary investigations against leading IGMG members (de Maizière 2010; DIK no date), provoked much criticism from the other Islamic umbrella organizations as well as from leading politicians. IRD subsequently denied a dormant membership, while ZMD at first boycotted a preliminary meeting on March 24, 2010 (BMI PR 24-Mar-2010; ZMD PR 21-Mar-2010) and later resigned from the conference (ZMD PR 12-May-2010). AABF, DITIB, and VIKZ continued their cooperation with the German government. The resulting weakening of KRM, which was consequently only partially represented at the DIK II, has been discussed above. It still remains to be seen how the new conceptualization of the DIK II will succeed without two of the KRM umbrella organizations, and what role the new organizational representatives will play in the organizational field.11 Structurally, the former working groups are substituted by 11 In order to have five Muslim organizational representatives, the DIK II now includes representatives from various organizations. The first of these organizations is the Islamic Community of Bosnians in Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland e. V., IGBD). An organization representing some 30,000 members, IGBD was also a member of the two peak organizations IRD and ZMD, which are not participating in the DIK II (URL: http://www.igbd.eu/

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more practice-oriented thematic project groups that meet every two months to prepare the annual plenary meetings. Since the fieldwork does not cover the most recent events in the DIK II, the following analysis focuses on the organizational perception of the DIK I process, including the points of criticism that have been raised by the organizations since their first official invitation to participate (joint PR by DITIB, IRD, VIKZ, and ZMD (ZMD et al. PR 22-Sep-2006)). This criticism is linked primarily to the limited success in institutionalizing Muslim rights and the continuous lack of official recognition as Islamic religious communities and, eventually, as corporations of public law. “To Make the Establishment of a Corporation of Public Law Unnecessary” The circumstances surrounding the initiation of the DIK have already been discussed in the section on the interorganizational history of Islamic umbrella organizations in the organizational field. The Islamic organizations expected—wrongly, as it turned out—that the DIK would finally resolve the pending question of the legal status of Islam in Germany and their recognition as religious communities. On the Muslim side, there was also a naivety that assumed that we are now dealing with the state on equal terms, and now it is only a matter of time until we will get the state treaty (IN ZMD 3).

It is acknowledged that this hope and “main reason of motivation” to participate in the DIK was not matched by the intentions of the German government. One interviewee stated that the German government did not intend to grant the status of a religious community or a corporation of public law, but wanted “to make the establishment of a corporation of public

[last visited 14-June-2012]). However, at least with regard to ZMD it is known that IGBD has limited its full membership to an associated membership since the start of the DIK II. Second, the Central Council of Moroccans in Germany (Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland e. V., ZMaD) is invited. Not much is known about this umbrella organization apart from the information provided on websites of German public bodies such as the DIK and the Security Initiative (Brandt 2011; cf. Initiative Sicherheitspartnerschaft 2012), which appeared only at the end of 2011. According to these sources, ZMaD was established in 2008 and represents 47 associated Moroccan mosque communities. According to the same sources, circa 180,000 Moroccans are estimated to live in Germany. Third, the Turkish Community in Germany (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland e. V., TGD) is invited as a secular umbrella organization that represents 10 regional associations and 9 specialized associations of Turkish dentists, teachers, parents, and students associations (URL: http://www.tgd.de [last visited 14-June-2012]). The invitation of TGD further strengthens the DIK in its goal to include the secular-oriented organizations from countries with an Islamic background (in this case, Turkey) in the dialogues.



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law unnecessary” (IN DITIB 1: 153), accusing the German state of trying to circumvent its own constitution by resolving theological questions within the DIK, which could normally only be negotiated with acknowledged religious communities (ibid.). The fact that the term ‘religious community’ was carefully avoided during the DIK is evident in the following passage: [F]or example, everyone at the DIK was careful not to use the term ‘religious community’, not even accidentally (IN IGMG 3: 90).

It is argued that the DIK tries to circumvent such an official recognition by facilitating an agreement between the German state and the Muslim community. While the DIK negotiations cannot be binding due to the federal state system, which situates responsibilities at the regional level, for example, with reference to religious educational affairs, the DIK recommendations are expected to have a Germany-wide impact. However, the interviewee argued that the results of the DIK did not even come close to such a general agreement. “So the DIK did not achieve what it promised for both sides” (IN DITIB 1: 153). The dashed hope of being acknowledged as religious community and the contradicting political expectations to discuss practical matters had an “effect of distrust” among the Islamic umbrella organizations (IN DITIB 1–2: 67), which eventually resulted in the boycott of the DIK II by ZMD, which vehemently demanded binding steps toward the official recognition as a religious community (ZMD PRs 30-Apr-2008; 12-May-2010). However, the failed hopes for a renewed status of Islamic umbrella organizations were not the only points of criticism, as the next section shows. “The DIK Is Fortunate and Unfortunate at the Same Time” Yes, it is of course fortunate and unfortunate at the same time. Well, we are looking forward to the talks, but that this talk is only taking place in the framing of security debates […] (IN DITIB 3: 37).

It has been discussed before that the organizations criticized the DIK for linking religious topics with security-related topics. The state, and especially the Ministry of the Interior, had very strong domestic policy- and security-related, let’s say, ideas in the […] design of the Conference on Islam, and that did not work out, of course (IN ZMD 3: 169).

Another point of criticism was that many ministerial officials did not know enough about Islam. The presence of scientific experts to address certain topics was positively acknowledged, as were the first visible

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changes in attitude among the attending officials (IN ZMD 2: 51ff.). With regard to the participants, the four KRM organizations also complained that the DIK was attended by Islam critics (ZMD et al. PR 22-Sep-2006) and compared this dialogue to dialogues held with other religions: Well, one should first reflect on how one would approach this. Would they do something like this with the church? Would they invite people who left the church, are against it, criticize it, and bishops to sit down at one table to discuss the structure of the church? […] That I can hardly imagine (IRD representative, cited after Rosenow/Kortmann 2011: 59, translation KRW).

The individual representatives of the non-organized Muslims were also accused of not contributing constructively to the discussions and being more interested in publicity appearances which violated the pledge of secrecy: A lot of time was lost, a lot of emotions, and a good deal of mutual attacks, and that just disrupted, and one did not advance so far. And what bothered me was that we were always asked to treat the meetings with discretion and secrecy, and we obviously did as we were asked. But others certainly exploited it in the press, and […] these press statements ultimately contributed to the negative portrayal of Islam (IN ZMD 2: 41).

The documentation of the negotiations was criticized as well. While it is acknowledged that the atmosphere in the working groups was open and fair, the minutes and final declarations did not always reflect the actual course of discussions, according to the interviewed organizational representatives: The process was not harmonious at any point, from the beginning to the end, it already started at the beginning with disputes over the minutes, where all of a sudden participants received minutes of the first meeting which did not report what had been said, and the things that were published had not been discussed at all. And this dispute lasted for a while. Then, in the end, the fight over issues, which lasted until the end, and where IRD, for example, did not agree with the preliminary summary, but prepared its own statement instead (IN IGMG 3: 50).

The document mentioned in the passage is the final declaration of the DIK I (BMI 2009), which was signed by all of the invited Islamic umbrella organizations with the exception of IRD. IRD particularly criticized the conclusions concerning the “value order” drawn in Working Group One and in the discussion group on “Security and Islamism” (IRD PR 25-June2009). Both the strengthening of the logic of prevention and the general problematization of religion were criticized and cited as the reasons for IGMG’s and IRD’s refusal to sign the declaration (IN IGMG 1: 185).



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Furthermore, the asymmetry in the relationship between the Islamic umbrella organizations and the German state is criticized with regard to both the question of resources and the question of power (IN IGMG 1: 176). The following passage from an interview with a ZMD representative also laments the political pressures on the organizations during the final DIK I negotiations in general, and within the discussion group in particular. Yes, a lot of pressure was exerted and there really were documents that had probably been prepared weeks in advance by some ministries, presented to us, and enough pressure was exerted that one accepted them. And there our heads were really spinning, and yes, one did not want a political scandal. And there one joined sometimes a little bit in waving something through, which one did not find all that great afterwards (IN ZMD 2: 201).

The fact that the organizations signed the document in the end can be attributed to the avoidance of open protest, which is likely due to the organizations’ interests in the logic of influence. DITIB and ZMD sought to adapt to the political expectations and even cooperated closely with the law enforcement agencies in general to counter the assumption of using a decoupling strategy. IGMG, however, was marginalized in the public debates because it is being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Consequently, it had the least influence to lose but the highest stake in the logic of membership, since its members represent IGMG’s main source of legitimacy. Organizational Competition over Political Legitimacy This section compares the underlying frames of reference that DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD employ to achieve political legitimacy. Such an analysis of organizational rhetoric provides even deeper insights into the power struggle in this organizational field. This section identifies issues of organizational representativeness, independence, and reputation—three issues that have been frequently discussed with regard to Islamic umbrella organizations. The following passage from an interview with a DITIB representative is a good example that shows how these three frames of reference are tied together within one argumentation to strengthen organizational legitimacy: The organizational policies of the religious community are decided on in Cologne and not in Ankara or in Berlin. We have recently experienced, due to the Integration Summit and the German Islam Conference, a much stronger consolidation of our relationship with the German state, also with Mister Schäuble, with the Ministry of the Interior, and also with the Chancellor.

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chapter six And I think DITIB currently enjoys a very high reputation with the politics and the German state. Well, I can definitely say that […] more than 3 million of the 4.5 million Muslims [in Germany] are of Turkish origin, and DITIB represents the vast majority of the Muslims of Turkish origin. Well, what the statistics say is tendentious […]. We think DITIB enjoys a high reputation in the eyes of 80–85% of the Muslims of Turkish origin, and the politicians know that, and the employees of the Ministry of the Interior tell me that on the market of Muslim religious communities DITIB is the leader. That is acknowledged now. Unfortunately, without the active support from DITIB, the integration policy would be, well, I would not to say doomed, but the success of the integration policy will be well much greater with the support and approval of DITIB (IN DITIB 3: 23).

Competition for Approval: The Issue of Representativeness One issue that is frequently raised with regard to the question of whether the Islamic umbrella organizations can legitimately speak for the Muslim community in Germany is their allegedly small degree of representativeness. At the beginning of the DIK, the invited Islamic umbrella organizations were accused of representing no more than 10–15% of Muslims in Germany. Few of the Muslims living in Germany belong to religious organizations. Only about 10 to 15 percent are members of a mosque association or another officially recognized organization. The major Islamic organizations in Germany are the Turkish-Islamic Union (DITIB), the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ) and the Alevi Community in Germany (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2006a).

The foundation of KRM has not improved this situation. Its representativeness is called into question by the latest study on “Muslim Life in Germany”, which states that only 10% of the Muslims interviewed know KRM, and that of these, 40% feel partly or completely represented by KRM (Haug et al. 2009: 176). The figures for the other organizations are not much higher, with the exception of DITIB, which is known by 44% of respondents, of whom 67% feel partly or completely represented by it (ibid.)—approval rates that are nonetheless lower than the approval rates of 80–85% cited by the DITIB representative. However, a study on the Islamic communities in North RhineWestphalia (Chbib 2011) concludes that KRM represents 84% of all Islamic organizations and that 40% of the Muslim population of this state use one of the services provided by KRM-affiliated organizations. The regional survey does not provide an answer to the question of how it “feels” to be



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represented by KRM, as posed by Haug et al. (2009). Rather, it concludes that KRM cannot represent the needs of all Muslims, but managed to establish a body which covers most of the Muslim community life in Germany (Chbib 2011: 106). Another criticism leveled at the organizations is that they fail to provide exact membership figures which would prove their representativeness. The Islamic organizations often respond to this by stressing the structural differences to the Christian churches to explain why they do not provide complete membership figures. Another reason given by the Islamic organizations is the high rate of attendance during the religious services on holidays and at Friday prayers, which is quite different from that of the Christian churches, where the number of official members is much higher than the number of churchgoers. Everything is turned around with us, we might only have 500,000 registered members for DITIB, but the Friday prayer is attended by two million people in Germany, or for a holiday prayer during Ramadan or the Eid al-Adha a good two million (IN DITIB 3: 61).

In addition, the Islamic umbrella organizations stress that their services are also used by what they call secular Muslims, who are not registered as members but have the right to take part in religious and non-religious services. To disparage the organizations by saying that they only represent a small amount of people, one should look at the mosques to see how many are actually coming. They’re not just the handful of members that have signed up in the list, they’re the seculars who want their kids to receive religious education, and who want to participate in the courses, who then […] also support the mosques. Well, with the few registered members alone, the mosques cannot stand on their feet. And this is the majority that speaks up for their mosques and their umbrella organizations (IN ZMD 2: 129).

While DITIB and IGMG both frequently refer to size as one of their main assets that requires political attention and the granting of external legitimacy due to the high amount of internal legitimacy within the Muslim community, ZMD cannot rely on this strategy due to the smaller number of affiliated mosque communities. Instead, ZMD emphasizes its multinational membership structure, highlighting that it is the only Islamic umbrella organization in Germany which also represents non-Turkish Muslims in Germany. “In my opinion, the most important task is to participate as a political voice for the Muslims, especially the non-Turkish Muslims” (IN ZMD 2: 75).

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Focusing on the German Political Environment: The Value of Independence The transnational character of Muslim religious communities and their more or less institutionalized ties beyond German borders have been recently perceived as a delegitimizing factor at the political level. In its search for reliable contacts, the German political sphere demands independent partners who negotiate and speak for the Muslim community without being externally influenced by another state or a foreign political party. This normative argument concerning organisational independence has also been anchored at the regulative level, for example, with regard to the provision of Islamic religious education in public schools.12 The fact that in one way or another all four Islamic umbrella organizations within the KRM have contacts abroad, although their influence on the decision-making processes differ considerably, led to an “ambivalent” relationship to the political level in Germany. With regard to DITIB, one interviewee associates this ambivalence with a “lack of trust on both sides”, which has recently been increasingly countered by attempts to understand each other (IN DITIB 1: 117). Overall, DITIB is highly aware of the expectation of organizational independence and therefore does not stress its transnational ties in its public appearances and in the interviews. The insecurity of German politics vis-à-vis DITIB is justifiable because the relationship to Turkey is not revealed. This also often makes this relationship appear larger than it really is. […] However, both sides increasingly try to understand each other. This very much increased with the German Islam Conference, which may not have had a happy ending, but accomplished something nonetheless (IN DITIB 1: 127).

All three Muslims umbrella organizations claim to stand above party lines, although the emphasis is stronger in DITIB’s and ZMD’s organizational profiles. (See also the discussion of the organizational relationship with political parties below.) Only IGMG is relatively open with regard to its 12 The DIK Working Group 2 concludes that “religious education that does not reflect religious self-determination in its basic principles but is substantially influenced by another state does not conform to the Basic Law. A community that is influenced by another state in a way that its basic principles are not an expression of its religious selfdetermination cannot therefore be a partner of the federal states in religious education. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that foreign dignitaries have influence within a religious community, even when they simultaneously hold a state office, as is not uncommon in state-church systems” (German Islam Conference 2009a: 62, translated by the author). Especially the latter sentence opens a backdoor for DITIB’s president, for example, who simultaneously holds the position of Counselor for Religious Services of the Turkish embassy in Berlin.



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cooperation with the Turkish government, which involves the exchange of information and common interests such as the strengthening of organizational cooperation in Germany and education-related issues (IN IGMG 1). However, like DITIB, IGMG emphasizes that these ties are not linked to a particular party but to the Turkish government and its ministries. DITIB does not ignore the fact that transnational relationships exist either, but it is always linked with an emphasis on the German political environment: We cooperate more frequently and more closely with the German state than with the Turkish state (IN DITIB 3: 23). Policies aimed at both countries are actually above party lines, and that is important indeed, but DITIB deals more with the political situation in Germany (IN DITIB 2: 178).

The differences in the relationships with the German state on the one hand and political actors abroad on the other are also evident in the answers to the question of “How would you describe the relationship between your organization and politics?” While ZMD’s representatives automatically referred to the German level, one IGMG member immediately described the Turkish context, and two DITIB interviewees had to ask to which country the question referred before they began their narrative about Germany, although they had been told that the interviewer was interested in both contexts. Overall, this symbolizes the relevance of German politics for the three organizations, and shows that there is an interest in the affairs of the country of origin. However, Turkey is presented as no longer being at the center of attention for DITIB, IGMG, and their members, who over the years have shifted their attention to Germany. This behavior can be explained by internal member interests of younger generations of Muslims growing up in Germany, but also by the expectations of the German government, which requires the organizations to act as an independent contact that is not influenced by the national politics of a foreign country in the sense of “being the long arm” of Turkey (SpulerStegemann 2002: 104). In the context of debates that surround the DIK I motto of “Muslims in Germany—German Muslims”, ZMD’s focus on the establishment of a German Islam also meets this current political expectation. The interviewees stressed the pioneering role of ZMD in the establishment of a German Islam in the German language13 and the differences between the

13 For example, the organizational profile on the ZMD website includes the following passage: “Our working language has always been German. We see ourselves as part of this

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organizations, often citing them as the main motivating factors for Islam converts to join ZMD-affiliated mosques. Well, one already has a certain identity of ZMD with regard to the German language that one wants to develop a German Islam. That is indeed a difference to the other groups, where Turkish is at the fore (IN ZMD 1: 41).

In the organizational profile and ZMD’s Islam Charta, this distinction from the country of origin orientation of other organizations is also linked to ZMD’s aim to contribute to the formation of a European Muslim identity: We support a contemporary reading of the Islamic sources which takes into account both the particular problematic of contemporary issues and the development of a proper European Muslim identity (ZMD 2002: § 15).

Fighting Marginalization: The Question of Reputation Another reason for political exclusion and organizational marginalization besides the criticism concerning the possibly negative influence of transnational organizational relationships is the accusation of violating the Basic Law. This attack on the organizations’ reputation is found in the reports of the state and federal Offices for the Protection of the Constitution on Islamism in Germany. IGMG receives special attention due to its ties to the Islamist Millî Görüş movement in Turkey and the “disintegrative effect” of its activities on Muslims in Germany (BMI 2007b: 205). ZMD is not mentioned directly in the reports, but is also confronted with accusations due to its member organization Islamic Community Germany (IGD). IGD and its president, Ibrahim El-Zayat, are watched because of their links to the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian Islamist movement founded in 1928 (ibid.: 193). One organizational counter strategy used to dispel these accusations is to stress organizational limitations as expressed in the following passage from an interview with a ZMD representative: [Ibrahim El-Zayat] is accused of acting in the Muslim Brotherhood and of following unconstitutional goals, [it is said that] he strives for world domination, which is ridiculous. We are happy when we can keep our small organization on its feet and can somehow defend our positions and views in the political world—to think about world domination in this context is absurd.

country and its society. We are at home here. The integration of Islam and Muslims into the German state order and society is our greatest challenge” (Zentralrat.de: Self-Portrayal, translation KRW).



the organizational field389 Nonetheless, it is written in all the newspapers as self-evident and we are powerless against it (IN ZMD 2: 73).

Another strategy is to emphasize the ongoing process of change within the organizations, which is linked to references to the great organizational potential for integration work, a detachment from the country of origin ideology, and a long-term prospect of staying, as the passage below illustrates. This strategy is employed by all three organizations, but is most prominent within IGMG’s rhetoric. The passage also shows that the accusations by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution have an effect on politicians who fear public criticism and therefore avoid closer contacts with the accused organizations. Yes, one does not dare, especially [with] the organizations watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, one has seen that the picture does not necessarily match the reports, but one does not dare side with them. There were some politicians who sat down with them, approached them openly, and they were criticized afterwards. Well, I think one always fears some opposition when one meets with the groups that are watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. But one has seen that there is a lot of integration potential and that they are very able and actually can do a lot of integration work, and I think the federal government does not want to forgo this. And I hope it will settle down at some point in the future and that these accusations which are rooted in events that happened 30 years ago will go away one day because one just has to see that the people develop continuously and the people exchange opinions and the political attitude is no longer that which was brought with them from Turkey. One has new goals now, and one wants to be part of this country. One has acknowledged that one will not return. Efforts and endeavors of the organizations are also directed at establishing and organizing an Islamic community in Germany on a continuing basis (IN ZMD 2: 65).

A third strategy is the reference to the positive political acknowledgement of the organization as a contact, which is often employed by DITIB but also by the other two organizations, as is evident in the passage quoted above, which describes the initial political progress. This frame is also most clearly expressed in the passage from an interview with a DITIB representative quoted at the beginning of this section: “I think DITIB currently enjoys a very high reputation with the politics and the German state” (IN DITIB 3: 23). Summary In addition to the three patterns of organizational behavior, this section identifies three frames of references used by the organizations to gain

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political legitimacy. The first frame concerns the emphasis on organizational representation, which is either justified by size (DITIB and IGMG) or by diversity of membership (ZMD). Second, the expected focus on the German context is either realized by reducing transnational ties (DITIB), by focusing on organizational change (IGMG), or by stressing the organizational orientation toward a German Islam (ZMD). Third, the question of reputation either leads to the strategy of public protest (IGMG), internal loyalty to its member organizations (ZMD), or an emphasis on organizational success in the political sphere (DITIB). An Outlook into the Future of Relations between the Political Level and the Islamic Umbrella Organizations With regard to the results of the DIK I, the organizations repeatedly stress that the German federal states, as the decisive authorities, are responsible for the implementation of the practice-oriented guidelines agreed on at the DIK. This implementation process is only slowly taking shape. However, despite the continuation of the DIK II on the federal level, resultoriented cooperation between the political level and the Islamic umbrella organizations must take place on the level of the German federal states. The results are a first step, although we do not have anything specific, but at least we have shown that one has to talk with Muslims about certain topics and that one has to take steps, that these steps are important and up to date. And I think the German federal states are the right contacts, and they understand this as well, and they understand the signs, and I believe there are plans now […] where one wants to or has to implement this specifically (IN ZMD 2).

That this cooperation can take on different forms depending on the regional context and the organizational diversity of the religious communities seems evident when taking into account the heterogeneity of relationships among the organizations and their different ties to the political sphere. It has been discussed above that it is too early to say in which direction the KRM will develop and in which settings the organizations will get involved at the state level negotiations. However, the discussion of the relationship between Islamic organizations and the German political sphere shows that some initial changes have taken place since 2006, although the failure to continue the DIK process with all four KRM organizations after both IRD and ZMD resigned their cooperation in 2010 is evidence of the continuing fragility of cooperation that characterizes this organizational field.



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The question of whether the existing cooperation must be attributed to “symbolic politics” or to “material renewal” is being posed in a current research project that focuses on the role of the KRM in the organizational field (Schubert/Meyer 2011). With regard to the status quo, one can conclude that symbolic politics prevail due to the character of recommendations that emerged from the ongoing negotiations. The first steps toward the acknowledgment of Islamic organizations and the granting of rights to Muslims in Germany have been formulated, but implementation at the level of the federal states is still pending in most cases. From the point of view of the Islamic umbrella organizations and their representatives, much needs to be done (Rosenow/Kortmann 2011). The Explanatory Power of the Research Framework It has been argued throughout this study that their organizations’ interest in achieving an institutionalization of their organizational status and claims facilitates their overall adaptation to political expectations based on the logic of influence. From this point of view, however, it also becomes clear that denying all three types of resources (legitimacy, official status and rights, and financial assistance) diminishes the incentives for organizational adaptation to the institutional environment in Germany, which in turn can also strengthen internal criticism of attempts to forge closer cooperation. The organizations are well aware of the political expectations and the related opportunity structures and have to decide to what extent they can meet external expectations without risking their internal coherence and membership support. In trying to meet both levels of demands, the organizations have to become multitasking organizations (Sezgin 2010) which reconcile not only external and internal expectations, but also the two contexts of their country of origin and their country of settlement. This balancing act and the transnational character of organizational contacts and networks are discussed in more detail below. Overall, this section confirms the assumption of the theoretical research framework with regard to the analysis of the relationship between the political sphere and the Islamic umbrella organizations: The degree of adaptation to and cooperation with the political level increases provided that increasing opportunities to obtain resources from the political level exist in Germany and that there is little conflict between the organizational members’ interests and the political expectations. As soon as the political level no longer provides the resources in which the organization and its members are interested (such as legitimacy, status, rights, and

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financial aid), the organizations have the option to refuse cooperation, as the example of ZMD’s pull-out from the DIK II process shows. DITIB’s success in acquiring public funding and receiving legitimacy as a moderate and powerful mediator in the organizational field supports its adaptation strategy, while IGMG’s marginalization and the resulting exclusion from resources supports its protest. Hopes and Wishes of the Muslim Representatives Interviewed Since it is not possible to predict the outcome of future developments, this section ends with a brief discussion of the hopes and wishes the interviewees were asked to express at the end of the interviews. Due to the personal nature of the statements, they are presented anonymously without reference to the organizations. The following passages provide a useful overview of the issues that have yet to be discussed. Key terms such as ‘equality’, ‘establishment’, ‘normality’, and ‘acknowledgement’ all relate to the wish for recognition both as individual Muslims and on the level of the religious communities which jointly aim to increase institutionalization of Islam in German society. Equal treatment and equality of religions—that is a topic that is written on paper, but needs to be implemented in many ways. In this context, I wish that politics approached this with more courage and understanding; Establishment, no more and no less, well, not exclusion by all means, well, not marginalization, and not uprooting either, so, the way we are, to establish ourselves the way we are; It sounds like a cliché, but normality. This simply means that one really interacts calmly and normally with people who see each other as members of this society, and who in this role want to make a contribution to this society. That’s really all I’m asking for; A reorientation toward religiosity, I would say. And […] on the side of German politics […] [that they] take this authentically religious [dimension, KRW] more seriously and also explicitly respond to it; Sometimes, I say, one is so, yes, hopeless because of all the debates and the negative atmosphere that one does not dare wish for anything in the future. Well, what I wish for is that it won’t get worse. That is my fear. That they finally leave us alone. I no longer dare to make demands. I just want them not to constrain us further […] that my children do not lose more rights or suffer discrimination, and that they do not feel forced to emigrate some day, because many are already doing that.

In addition to these demands of equal treatment, another set of thematic arguments is raised with regard to the wishes for the future. These



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arguments include the necessity of internal debate among the Muslim community, the strengthening of the female Muslim community, the improvement of media representation, the need to continue the communication processes, and the fight against discrimination. That the religious-political integration of Muslims, that this […] is much more discussed, also within the Muslim community; More strong women; The Axel Springer publishing house should finally stop portraying Muslims as enemies or a Feindbild, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine [newspaper, KRW] should also work with the reformist circles of the CDU to reform itself a little bit; I think what’s most important is that the communication process does not end and […] both sides who communicate with each other carry the responsibility for it […]. Because it is always easier to destroy something than to build something, and I think if one realizes that one wants to establish something, then one has to put up with a few things.

The responses can well be attributed to the different positions of the representatives in their umbrella organization and their personal experiences, which explains the variety of issues that must be addressed in the near future internally as well as externally in cooperation with the political sphere. In particular the last passage concerning the necessity of ongoing communication for which both sides share the responsibility points the way into the future. It will be up to both sides—the political and the organizational side—to meet this demand because “it is always easier to destroy something than to build something”. Relations with the Media and the Public The relationship between the Islamic umbrella organizations, the media, and the public represents yet another shifting relationship in the organizational field. The boost in public and media interest in Islam and Muslims living in the West since the terrorist attacks at the turn of the 21st century has led to an “increasing information load” for Islamic umbrella organizations, which have to respond to this increased interest. The three organizational case studies have shown that this external demand led to an increase in organizational personnel responsible for press and public affairs. While the necessity to cooperate with the media and the public is acknowledged by the analyzed Islamic umbrella organizations to strengthen their logic of influence, the media are also often criticized in the interviews for their alleged “alarmism” in reporting on Islam.

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Situated in this ambivalent context, this section first describes the organizational perceptions of this relationship and the recent changes. Second, all organizational press releases issued by DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD between August 2005 and December 2009 are analyzed to identify their foci and determine the importance they attach to internal and external expectations.14 Third, other venues of organizational communication such as member magazines are compared with the press releases, and in the cases of DITIB and IGMG are evaluated with regard to the question of organizational bilingualism. The focus on organizational press releases is particularly interesting because the interviewees argued that organizational public affairs and press work has become a new venue for organizational differentiation following the cooperation within the KRM. The following passage shows that the Islamic umbrella organizations felt a need to “redefine” their organizations, because originally their self-definition was mainly based on confrontational dissociation, which turned out to be a disadvantage after the establishment of KRM: Therefore, all communities actually have to redefine themselves, and in doing so, they resort to public discourses often rather accidentally or depending on the circumstances (IN DITIB 1: 83).

Previous studies have often neglected the primary documents produced by the Islamic organizations, such as press releases and internal member magazines, and ignored the highly interesting issue of organizational bilingualism. For example, Rauer (2008) analyzes the reports on Islamic umbrella organizations in German newspapers, noting that the organizations themselves are rarely interviewed or quoted directly. Similar results are reported by Koopmans and Stratham in their cross-national comparison of newspaper reports on migrant organizations (1999; 2000a). There is also little research on organizational websites. Inan (2007) provides a content analysis of the websites of IGMG and ZMD; Schlicht (2007) compares the DITIB and IGMG websites, and Usta (2002) provides a brief overview of the ZMD website. These studies have been discussed in the earlier sections on the means of organizational communication in the case studies and are therefore not the subject of the following analysis,

14 This period was chosen because the earliest DITIB press releases available date from August 2005. For an analysis of IGMG and ZMD press releases issued between 2000 and 2009 see the individual case studies.



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which focuses on the organizational view on the media landscape in Germany. Organizational Perceptions of the German Public and the Media Debates “They Want to Show the Muslims the Right Way” The relationship between the Islamic umbrella organizations and the media is ambiguous. Organizational responses to media requests are part of their daily business, but the organizations also criticize the media for the way they portray Islam in general or their organization in particular. While the organizational representatives acknowledge that the quality of reports has increased, they also believe that the simultaneous increase in the quantity of reports reduces the impact of the more objective articles. According to the interviewees, the increased number of reports fuels “alarmism”, which makes a “spectacle” out of Islam-related topics, with a new topic receiving increased media attention every few weeks. This development is discredited as a political strategy that plays with the fears of the public and “does not improve the situation” (IN ZMD 3: 51). One interviewee accused the media of having “certain reservations” and “Jacobinical patterns of behavior”,15 which “want to show the Muslims the right way” (IN DITIB 2: 182), arguing that this attitude prevents integration into society, which can be observed in the negative behavior of young migrant children who have learned from their peers in school that they are foreigners regardless of which passport they hold (ibid.). Another interviewee directly accused the publishing house Axel Springer and the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine of portraying Muslims in a negative light, and yet another representative complained that publicly owned television stations do not fulfill their responsibility of objective reporting. One example that occurred during the research period was a film broadcast on public television on February 18, 2009,16 which took a critical look at the links between Diyanet and DITIB, while making

15 The Jacobin Club was “the most famous political group of the French Revolution, which became identified with extreme egalitarianism and violence and which led the Revolutionary government from mid-1793 to mid-1794” (Encyclopedia Britannica online version, URL: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/299007/Jacobin-Club, [last visited 12-June-2012]). 16 Für Allah und Vaterland (“For Allah and the Fatherland”) by Alessandro Nasini und Ahmet Senyurt was broadcast on the public station ARD on February 18, 2009 at 10:45 pm. URL: http://video.google.de/videoplay?docid=-2651068907002187478 [last visited 22-Feb-2012].

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clear that Turkey tries to exert influence in Germany through the mosque communities. The sensationalist tone of the film and its underlying threat rhetoric is not only criticized by DITIB, but also by other media commentators (Hirzel 2009). DITIB participated in production of the film, but later expressed its disappointment: I think that when one speaks about Muslims it is important that one must be careful not to jeopardize the coexistence. This is a responsibility the media should show as well (IN DITIB 2: 186).

Similar scenarios of critical media reporting on Islamic umbrella organizations also occur with regard to other organization. IGMG often asks the courts to order the media to withdraw their accusations (cf. Dantschke 2004; Unknown, TAZ, 08-June-2002), which can be linked to their legal resources and the experiences they have acquired in legal proceedings  against the reports of the Office for the Protection of the Consti­ tution.  ZMD and DITIB, however, refrain from this legal option due to their interest in strengthening their cooperative image. This approach is also mentioned in the following passage from an interview with a ZMD representative, who highlights the need to discuss shortcomings with the media without resorting to legal action. He also emphasizes the need to take the responsibility of professional communication within the Muslim community. Well, actually, my experience has always been good. And I have seen that the reports have improved, that the responsibility to establish professional public affairs also lies with the Muslims themselves. And when the media make a mistake not to directly jump on it but to make clear to them where the mistakes are and that one wants to improve [and] integrate. That is why we have really, really rarely relied on the courts and so on, whereas other organizations do this more often (IN ZMD 1: 366).

This short overview shows how closely the media, politics, and the public are perceived to be interlinked. It is not surprising, then, that a similarly ambivalent organizational attitude can be observed with regard to the debates in the public sphere in Germany. While the organizations acknowledge that positive developments have occurred in their relations with the German public, the overall perception of negative attitudes still prevails, as the following answer to the question “How do you perceive the debates in the German public?” illustrates: Yes, there are positive and negative (2) ((laughs))—sometimes, mostly, more negative, but one gets used to it a little bit. Sometimes one is agitated, sometimes one just feels helpless. But one always sees there is still a need for



the organizational field397 action, and one cannot just throw in the towel. And yes, one has to continue. It is not that positive after all, and I think it can still get worse ((laughs)) (IN ZMD 2: 113).

The conclusion the organization draws from this observation is that there is a need to continue the public outreach and information work to counter existing fears and stereotypes. The interviewees noted that it is necessary to understand the worries of the German population, which they link to the increasing Muslim presence in public life. Nonetheless, in addition to this mutual understanding, the need for awareness training for the German public was frequently highlighted. This aspect of the public outreach and press work is analyzed below. Overall, the situation is perceived to have become worse since 9/11, although it is stressed that tensions existed before, which are also attributed to the fall of the Soviet Union and the failure of communism (IN DITIB 3: 19). However, the effect that it was the integration of Muslims which received increased political, public, and media attention after 9/11 rather than the integration of foreigners in general is generally acknowledged and viewed critically with regard to the coexistence and the perceived discrimination on the grounds of religion. It has been noted above that the increased political attention has helped the umbrella organizations raise their claims more publicly, but the everyday life relations with the public have suffered since 9/11. This is well expressed in the following passage: I think that was really a turning point (2) where before there were already fears and hostility, but they were directed against foreigners, and after this attack it suddenly became the Muslims. And then, Islam was at the center, and no longer foreigners in general. And, well, when I think about my childhood that was completely different. Well, religion wasn’t talked about at all, and one did not discuss religion in schools. Or that one somehow had to justify oneself for one’s religion, and this I see now with my children in kindergarten and in primary school, that they already have to defend and explain their religion, so to speak. And I find it a great pity that there are already certain tensions developing (IN ZMD 2: 117).

Outcomes of the DIK Working Group on Media Relations Media representation of Islam was also critically discussed in Work­ ing  Group Three of the DIK I on “The Economy and Media as Bridges”. In their final declaration, the organizations expressed their discontent with the present situation (see BMI 2009a: 27ff.). One interviewee remarked that the working group’s demand that Islam and Islamism

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should not be mentioned in connection with the word ‘terrorism’ remains an unfulfilled goal. Instead, the organizations demand that terrorist organizations be identified with their full name to prevent generalizations and the perpetuation of stereotypes. One should say ‘Taliban terrorism’ or ‘al-Qaeda’ terrorism, like one says ‘Tamil terrorism’ or ‘RAF terrorism’ or ‘ETA terrorism’ in Germany (…) the religious affiliation is not stated (IN DITIB 3: 37).

The criticism raised within Working Group Three was sustained by two joint conferences on the issue of media relations on February 27, 2008 and June 19, 2008.17 The conferences highlighted the important role of the media in promoting integration, the complementary use of German and Turkish media by Turkish migrants, and their underrepresentation in the media profession. One of the first results of Working Group Three was the initiation of the radio show “Islam in Deutschland” (“Islam in Germany”), which is issued once a month on a Friday on the public radio channel SWR.18 There also is a show called “Forum am Freitag” (“Friday Forum”), a weekly online show which offers Muslims an opportunity to contribute their experiences to the societal discourses. It provides information and chat rooms and is part of the editorial office “Kirche und Leben” (“Church and Life”) of the public service broadcaster ZDF.19 Both formats now regularly broadcast Muslim statements similar to the “Das Wort zum Sonntag” (“Word for Sunday”) broadcasting format of the Christian Churches. Presented by Protestant and Catholic speakers, “Das Wort zum Sonntag” is a weekly show on ARD which has been aired since May 8, 1954.20 The DIK working group also initiated a round table of German and Turkish journalists in Berlin, which met three times until August 2009 and 17 For more information on the conference “The Image of Islam in Germany: New Stereotypes, Old Concepts of the Enemy” organized in cooperation with the Herbert Quan­dt Foundation on February 27, 2008 and the conference “Media in Germany: A Chance or an Obstacle to Integration?” organized by the Ministry of the Interior on June 19, 2009 see URL: http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_227/nn_1875566/SubSites/ DIK/DE/BisherigeErgebnisse/Medien/medien-inhalt.html [last visited 12-June-2012]. 18 It can be downloaded as a podcast and as a manuscript at: URL: http://www.swr.de/ contra/-/id=7612/nid=7612/did=2057252/w2tzp1/index.html [last visited 12-June-2012]. For DITIB, Bekir Alboğa contributed to this initiative, along with Hilal Sezgin (journalist), Emina Corbo-Mesic (teacher, KCID member), and Aiman A. Mazyek (ZMD). Mr. Alboğa and Ms. Sezgin have been replaced by Hussein Hamdan, and Lamya Kaddor. 19 For more information see URL: http://forumamfreitag.zdf.de [last visited 12-June -2012]. 20 See: URL: http://www.daserste.de/wort/ [last visited 12-June-2012].



the organizational field399

included political speakers such as Cem Özdemir and Wolfgang Schäuble. The new DIK website also includes a variety of objective information and discussion forums to provide the public with up-to-date information on the subject of Islam in Germany (DIK no date). Finally, the DIK I working group concluded that media skills of the representatives of the umbrella organizations and their local member associations must be strengthened. It is agreed that every mosque community should have a press spokesperson who should ideally have grown up in Germany and who has received some training in public relations work. This expectation is met by DITIB with the project “ProDialogue”, which aims to train 1,800 local dialogue representatives. The project is supported by BAMF and EIF. IGMG has a similar project which trains community assistants. IGMG’s project, however, is not funded publicly despite the fact that the DIK working group wanted to establish a federal program to support the media relations between the organizations and the German public sphere (BMI 2009a: 28f.). Summary The brief overview of the relationships between the Islamic umbrella organizations, the media, and the public has revealed a rather positive development. The DIK provided results in this context, such as the initiation of Muslim broadcasting formats on public television and radio and awareness-raising materials and conferences. Even so, the question of resources still remains a salient issue, since the public funding for local education projects which is required to meet the increased media attention remains limited and is only provided to certain organizations, which further widens the divide in the organizational field. With regard to the media reports, a twofold conclusion is drawn by the Muslim representatives. On the one hand, negative reports are still criticized. On the other hand, an increase in positive relations and objective media reporting is also acknowledged as positive. The case studies have also shown in detail how the analyzed Islamic organizations have adapted both their structures and their activities to the increasing information load and the associated expectations. The Press Releases Issued by DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD This analysis of organizational press releases relies on a detailed bilingual (German and Turkish) document analysis of over 700 organizational press releases. Originally, the aim was to highlight the organizational response

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to the five main political expectations of the German government concerning the issues of “Basic Law, Security, Integration, German Values, and Cooperation” (see Chap. Four: The Normative Dimension). However, as the explorative analysis has revealed, these political expectations are not the only topics addressed by the press releases. Rather, five additional topics of interest for the organization and its members have been identified, which concern the issues of “Religion, Claims-Making, Internal Affairs, Country of Origin, and Miscellaneous”. Although it can be argued that the political expectations are also consistent with internal interests, the ten categories and their varying distribution across organizations corroborate the theoretical assumption that collective organizations have to reconcile both member and influence logic, which leads to different orientations in their press releases (Schmitter/ Streeck 1999). Generally speaking, the analysis of the press releases is conducted to determine the organizations’ relation to the external environment, their ideology and network, and their internal members’ interests. The comparative study of German online press releases issued between 2005 and 2009 and the comparison of German and Turkish statements issued in 2009 provide new comparative results which highlight the differences between the three organizations. It generally supports and enriches the case study results with regard to organizational ideology, interests, networks, and their overall positioning within their organizational field. The quantitative analysis of the headlines is based on the headlines of more than 700 press release issued since January 2000, which were coded according to a coding system which associates one code with each headline. Each code is in turn linked to one of the ten categories introduced above (see Chap. Three: Research Methods). Since DITIB’s press releases are only available from August 2005 onwards, the following summary of results focuses on the period following this date to improve organizational data comparability.21 The quantitative analysis of the distribution of the ten categories in the organizational press releases that are issued on their websites for the period August 2005–December 2009 yields the following results:22 21 For long-term analyses of IGMG and ZMD press releases issued between 2000 and 2009 see the respective case studies in Chap. Five. 22 The figures for each category (meaning the frequency of one of the ten issues derived during the coding process) per organization are calculated using the following formula: ((ΣPRs per organization per category) x 100)/total number of press releases per organization). For the average frequency of each category, the results for the three organizations were added and divided by three.



the organizational field401 50 40

33

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14 13 7

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cu rit y In te 4. gr at G io er n m an v alu 5. Co es op er at io n 6. Re 7. lig Cl io ai n m sm 8. ak In in te g rn 9. al Co a ffa un irs tr yo 10 fo .M rig in isc ell an eo us

111

21

3.

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Ba sic L

aw

0

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17

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Figure 11: Press releases issued by the organizations from August 2005–December 2009 (% of all releases).

The most frequently used category of press releases deals with “Religion” (Ø 23.1% of all press releases issued by the three organizations DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD), followed by “Security”-related issues (Ø 15%) and issues related to “Cooperation”, meaning the positive or negative referencing to other actors in the field (Ø 15%). Press releases that refer to “Internal Affairs” of the organizations, such as the building of mosques, non-religious internal events, and statements following a public accusation of the organization represent, on average, 11.3% of all press releases, followed by “Miscellaneous” (Ø 11.1%), which refer to current events such as condolences in case of natural disasters and fatalities, commemoration days, and congratulations. “Claims-Making”-related (Ø 9.8%) and “Integration”-related press releases (Ø 8.2%) that report on seminars, initiatives, or projects like the annual Day of the Open Mosque both represent less than ten percent of all press releases, although interesting differences exist between the organizations (see below). Finally, the issues of “Basic Law” (Ø 4.5%), references to the “Country of Origin” (Ø 3.3%), and the issues of “German Values” (Ø 0.9%) are hardly every mentioned in the headlines of the press releases. With regard to the country of origin, this reflects the focus of the organizations on their German institutional environment. This is also upheld in the Turkish language press releases, which are compared to their German counterparts in more detail below. The often publicly debated issues surrounding the acceptance of the Basic Law and the German value system are also seldom mentioned in public statements of the organizations, with the exception of IGMG, which often publicly protests against

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the reports issued by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in its press releases. The differences between the organizations are discussed in more detail below. Organizational Responses to Political Expectations It has been stated above that “Security” issues are the second most frequently used frame of reference, representing nearly one sixth of all press releases issued between 2005 and 2009. The long-term analyses of press releases that have been issued by IGMG and ZMD since 2001 indicate a sharp increase in the number of security-related press releases in 2001. For the period between 2005 and 2009, however, a slight decrease in relative importance of this topic can be observed (see Figure 12). Overall, the content analysis of the security-related press releases indicates that the organizations do not generally respond to the same events. In the period following August 2005 not one single event led to three distinct organizational statements in this category. Only the arrest of a terrorist group in Germany in September 2007 led to distinct press statements on all three organizational websites. However, on the DITIB website, only the joint KRM press release was published.23 50 42

40 30 20

21

18 11

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DITIB, n=22 (Ø 13%)

27

14

23

13

18 11

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9

IGMG, n=14 (Ø 13%) ZMD, n=16 (Ø 19%)

0 2006

2007

2008

2009

Figure 12: Press releases concerning security (% per year). Note: For 2005, only the period August–December was considered.

23 Since KRM did not have an independent website until 2011, its press releases were presented on sections of the DITIB and ZMD websites. However, in some cases, not all KRM statements can be found there, and some KRM press releases are only listed in the press release section of its member organizations, including IGMG. Only in the latter cases are the KRM press releases included in the analyses.



the organizational field403

On average, four press releases were released per year in this category between 2005 and 2009. These press releases are not limited to the condemnation of terrorist attacks and the organizational condolences for the victims, but they also pledge for peace and demand the release of hostages. They also condemn military operations worldwide, with an emphasis on the conflict between Israel and Palestine, which is frequently commented on (cf. e.g. ZMD PR 31-Mar-2002; IGMG PR 02-Apr-2002 and 09-Apr-2002, 22-May-2004; DITIB PR 05-Jan-2009). All three organizations have repeatedly protested in their press releases against the portrayal of Islam as a security threat. While IGMG stresses the negative impact of this portrayal on the Muslim community (IGMG PR 08-Oct-2001, 26-Jan-2006), DITIB frequently argues that “Islam is a peaceful religion, which does not, under any circumstances, justifies the threat or the use of violence” and that “violence, extremism, and terrorism have no religion” (e.g., DITIB PRs 11-Sep-2007, 02-July-2008, and 16-July2008, translation KRW). Both lines of argumentation—Muslims as victims of discrimination and the irreconcilability of Islam and terror—can also be found in ZMD’s press releases (e.g. ZMD PRs 16-Sep-2001 a and b, 11-Sep-2002, 31-Aug-2004, as well as in a joint ZMD/IRD PR 05-Apr-2004, and a joint PR of various organizations in German that condemns a failed terrorist attack on a German train: IGMG et al. 25-Aug-2006). The organizations also call on the responsibility of the Muslim communities to fight against any form of terrorism (ZMD PR 07-July-2005), to get involved socially and politically (ZMD PR 24-Mar-2004), to “preserve democratic and human values and to ostracize and condemn inhuman fanaticism” (DITIB PR 11-Sep-2007, translation KRW). With regard to the political expectation to condemn terrorism, it was found that all three organizations actively try to meet this demand in their press releases. However, the term ‘Islamism’ is used less frequently than in the political documents, which can be explained by a clearer separation of the two topics from the organizational point of view. IGMG was found to use a decoupling strategy because of its simultaneously critical stance on cooperation with the law enforcement agencies (see next section). With regard to the fifth expectation of the German political level— the need for “Cooperation”—an important difference was found between the three organizations. While it is the second most frequently used category referring to relationships with over 26 actors and organizations, this category is mainly employed by DITIB and ZMD as the following figure illustrates.

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50 40 30

DITIB, n=31 (Ø 18%)

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24

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10 5

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2007

0

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Figure 13: Press releases concerning cooperation (% per year). Note: For 2005, only the period August–December was considered.

While 23% of ZMD’s press releases released in the period of five years refer to other organizations or individuals, only 4% of IGMG’s press releases fall into this category, which strongly reflects IGMG’s marginalization in the public sphere. However, ZMD and DITIB frequently present their dialogue initiatives and their various meetings with politicians, civil society actors, and other religious communities. Therefore, this part of their public affairs work directly meets the political expectation to cooperate and organize oneself to speak for the Muslim community in the organizational field. The higher rate for ZMD in this category can be explained by its organizational aims, which are strongly oriented toward the logic of influence. As an interest organization, its members expect of ZMD that it realizes their claims through lobbying activities. This is further underlined by the high rate of claims making-related press releases issued by ZMD. The other three expectations (“Integration”, “Basic Law”, and “German Values”) are only ranked seven, eight, and ten, respectively, in the list of frequency of headline references for the period August 2005 to December 2009. It is interesting to note that the number of DITIB’s “Integration”-related press releases rose from 0% in 2005 to 27% in 2009, which represent 14% of all press releases issued between 2005 and 2009, as compared to only 5% for IGMG and ZMD. This difference can be linked to DITIB’s increasing engagement in offering integration-related projects and courses such as German classes and seminars for dialogue representatives, which are repeatedly reported on in the press releases.



the organizational field405

However, DITIB’s strategy is inversed when one refers to DITIB’s Turkish press releases, which are much more numerous since they also include local associational news. This represents a strategy that is in opposition to the one chosen by IGMG, which offers similar courses as DITIB but has not issued any press releases on the subject. Instead, IGMG reports on these seminars in its associational news, where 19% of the headlines in 2009 refer to the category of “Integration” (see Figure 16). The relatively higher number of IGMG press releases in the category of “Basic Law” (Ø 10%, as compared to 3% for ZMD and 1% for DITIB) can be explained by IGMG’s legal and symbolic battle against their inclusion in the reports of the Office for the Protections of the Constitution. Besides this framework of argumentation, the topic of “Basic Law” is not present in the media landscape, and it can be assumed that DITIB and ZMD regard the fulfillment of this expectation as taken for granted without requiring further affirmation that goes beyond their general mission statements. “German Values”, as a category, is similar to the category of “Basic Law”. It receives increased attention in the public debates surrounding the DIK, but is not prominent in organizational press release headlines. The number of keywords that could be associated with this category is therefore rather limited and refers primarily to human rights or the German Unification Day. The press releases that refer to the five political expectations derived from the document analyses in Chapter Four (“Basic Law, Security, Integration, German Values, and Cooperation”) are summarized in Figure 14 below.24 Although the figure shows clear organizational differences, the trajectories are rather unstable. While IGMG increasingly focuses on the other five expectations derived in the headline analysis (“Religion, ClaimsMaking, Internal Affairs, Country of Origin, and Miscellaneous”), DITIB has continuously and increasingly adapted to the five political expectations identified in Chapter Four. IGMG’s trajectory can be explained mainly by its increasing focus on religious issues, while DITIB shifted its focus from religious press releases to organizational efforts toward integration and cooperation. ZMD, by contrast, attaches great importance to issues of security, cooperation, and claims-making, with only a few press releases dealing with religious matters. 24 The figures are calculated using the following formula: (Σ categories 1–5 per organization per year) x 100)/total number of press releases per organization per year. Then the values per year (2005–2009) are added, and the sum is divided by 5.

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45

44

47

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49 43 27 31

30

19

2005

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DITIB, n=80 (Ø 43%) IGMG, n=34 (Ø 40%) ZMD, n=45 (Ø 53%)

2009

Figure 14: Press releases concerning the five political expectations (% per year). Note: For 2005, only the period August–December was considered.

Further Expectations and Organizational Responses The organizational focus on the additionally identified issues of “Religion, Claims-Making, Internal Affairs, Country of Origin and Miscellaneous” can also be derived from the above figure. Consequently, an average of 72% of IGMG’s press releases address these issues, with an increase from 50% in 2005 to 81% in 2009. Different Importance Attached to Religious Press Releases This development mainly depends on the increased importance of religious press releases for IGMG, which saw an increase from 0% in 2005 to 47% in 2007. This shift can be linked to IGMG’s attempts to establish itself as a religious community and to lose its image as a political organization. DITIB, on the other hand, chose the opposite strategy, with references to the religious sphere dropping from 41% of all press releases in 2006 to 17% in 2007. For ZMD, the five-year average for the category of “Religion” is much lower (15 %), as compared to 28% for IGMG and 23% for DITIB. This can be explained by ZMD’s structure, its focus on the collective influence logic, and the fact that its member organizations provide religious services for their associated mosque communities. Among other things, the information provided in these religious press releases refers to religious festivities and religious campaigns such as the Eid al-Adha sacrificial animal donation campaign that is practiced by IGMG worldwide. Press releases also involve organizational holiday greetings (including non-Islamic holidays) to their members, but also inform



the organizational field407

60 47

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41

24 17

20

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17

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8

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ZMD, n=13 (Ø 15%)

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2007

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Figure 15: Press releases concerning religion (% per year). Note: For 2005, only the period August–December was considered.

the general public since the content of the Islamic holiday and their meaning are often explained in this context. The Other Press Releases Concerning Internal and Public Affairs The three categories of “Miscellaneous”, “Claims-Making”, and “Internal Affairs” are each addressed by an average of 10% of the press releases issued between 2005 and 2009 (39, 43, and 30, respectively). Due to the related small n factor, no tables are provided for these categories. It can be noted that DITIB’s values are above average for the topics of “Internal Affairs” (Ø 14%) and “Miscellaneous” (Ø 15%, see Figure 11). This can be explained by the larger number of press releases issued by DITIB, which often include short notes on internal affairs such as the mosque building process and related debates, as well as comments on current affairs such as natural disasters, congratulations, and commemorations, which are grouped under “Miscellaneous”. ZMD comments more on current affairs (“Miscellaneous”: Ø 9%), and fewer statements refer to its internal affairs (Ø 7%). For IGMG, this figure is reversed because the organization issues many counterstatements criticizing media reports on the organization, which are coded as internal affairs (Ø 13%). Public Claims-Making Press Releases Dominated by ZMD In terms of public claims-making, ZMD is the most active organization (Ø 16%, as compared to 10% for IGMG and 4% for DITIB). The list of issues discussed in these press releases is long and includes migrationrelated issues such as the claim for dual citizenship and the fight against

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discrimination, but these press releases focus primarily on religious topics such as Islamic education and other school-related issues, the headscarf debate, mosque raids and other police measures, ritual slaughter, the fight against Islamophobia, and the general claim for recognition as a religious community. DITIB issues fewer claims making-related press releases because this represents a fairly new field of activity and DITIB’s general approach to claims-making is less publicly oriented. In line with the organizational approach to adapt to the institutional environment in Germany, claims are rather raised in forums such as the DIK or at the various meetings that have been reported on within the category of “Cooperation”. The Limited Attention to the Country of Origin The category of “Country of Origin” presents another surprise in the analysis of organizational press releases. Although both DITIB and IGMG emphasize that their Turkish roots remain important and must be cultivated in Germany, less than five percent (Ø 3.3%) of their press releases deal with the developments in Turkey. DITIB only issued five statements in this category in 2007 and one in 2008, and none of them refers to the political situation in Turkey. Instead, they condemn terrorist attacks in Turkey and discuss ties within the Turkish community in Germany. The links between DITIB’s president and the consulates are reported on only once, although an analysis of the internal member magazine reveals that close ties exist between the consulates, their Attachés for Religious Affairs, and the local level. The fact that an institutionalized exchange between Diyanet and DITIB also takes place at the level of DITIB headquarters is not mentioned in the German press releases either. The IGMG press releases which deal with Turkey only refer to political developments. One of the professed aims of IGMG’s public relations department is to increase their coverage on Turkey-related topics. How­ ever, the current lack of resources limits this approach, with the result that only four press releases were issued in this category between 2005 and 2009. Despite the fact that ZMD also has ties to Turkey due to its member organizations, it seldom comments on Turkey-related developments. It also refrains from making further statements with regard to events in other countries of origin which are represented by ZMD-associated organizations.



the organizational field409

Summary The analysis of 366 press releases issued by DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD between August 2005 and December 2009 revealed important organizational differences in their public self-portrayal, which indicate different organizational foci of interest. The most striking difference concerns the issues of “Cooperation” and “Religion”. While IGMG’s press releases increas­ingly focus on the topic of religion and IGMG has published as many religion-related press releases as DITIB, ZMD has always placed less emphasis on this issue. In its role as a peak organization which represents the interests of various associated Muslim (umbrella) organizations, ZMD is more involved in interest representation and related cooperation activities. Between 2005 and 2009, ZMD was also the most active organization in terms of claims-making activities and the denunciation of terrorism and violence (although over the long run since 2000 IGMG was even more actively involved in security-related topics and issued an equal number of press releases concerning claims-making activities. This supports the finding that both IGMG and ZMD portray themselves as religious interest organizations which lobby for the rights of the Muslim community in Germany, while simultaneously trying to strengthen their legitimacy by fulfilling the expectation “to denounce terrorism”. DITIB, on the other hand, appears to place little emphasis on claimsmaking issues. In fact, DITIB has recently started to focus on the question of integration and confirmed that it intends to serve as a traditional welfare organization. In addition, DITIB has also organized various seminars and projects in the past, which led to an increase in the number of press releases concerning these topics from 2 in 2006 to 13 in 2009. Comparison of Turkish and German Publications by DITIB and IGMG25 The idea of conducting a bilingual comparison of German and Turkish press releases and a comparison of organizational publications directed at the organizational environment and publications aimed primarily at the organizational members was developed early in the research process. The underlying assumption is related to the organizational strategy of decoupling, which responds to the challenge of meeting different expectations.

25 ZMD is excluded from this analysis because its internal and external publications are available in German only.

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One question that can be answered by conducting a bilingual analysis is whether organizations separate the foci of their external and internal statements to meet different levels of expectations concerning certain topics. The research on the internal communication of organizations is confronted with certain limitations, either because of its informal and often undocumented character, or because this communication is simply not accessible. The focus on member magazines as one category of internal communication in this research allows for a longitudinal analysis of documents directed at organizational members. However, the fact that they are available on the organizational website also raises the questions of who are the readers and what filters of communication may be in place as a result of the wide distribution of the material within the organization and beyond. DITIB distributes its monthly member magazine Haber Bülteni in its mosque communities. IGMG sends its monthly member magazine Perspektif to its registered members all over Europe. Both organizations also provide free online access to the magazines on their websites. However, DITIB’s magazine can only be found on the Turkish website, while quarterly summaries of the German articles have been made available on the German website since September 2008. The various types of press releases are also different in terms of authorship of statements. While organizational press releases are generally discussed at the organizations’ headquarters prior to publication,  asso­ ciational news (Verbandsnachrichten) are often submitted by the various associated mosque communities themselves and are published on the organizational website either in Turkish only (DITIB) or in German and Turkish (IGMG). Overall, DITIB’s Turkish press releases are much more numerous than those in German (e.g., 192 versus 49 in 2009), which is due to the fact that associational news are only included on the Turkish website. In 2009 the news articles submitted to the IGMG headquarters by mosque communities led to 284 associational news releases, which are presented bilingually in German and Turkish.26 26 Due to this high number of associational news, only every second IGMG press release in this category was included in the analysis (see Figure 16). The direct translation of IGMG’s press releases has been confirmed by a bilingual research assistant. In 2009 only two of IGMG’s press releases were not translated into Turkish, while all the associational news releases were identical in both languages. Therefore, only IGMG’s German associational news releases were analyzed.



the organizational field411

Although the structure of many of DITIB’s Turkish press releases is similar to IGMG’s associational news, the organizational interpretation of this service differs. While DITIB sees the publication of reports from the mosque communities as a form of internal communication with a “bonding character” among the 889 mosque communities (IN DITIB 3: 93), IGMG’s representatives stress the aspect of transparency with regard to the motives of publishing associational news bilingually on their public website. IGMG’s numerous associational news releases are therefore not mainly linked to the expectations of the members but to the wider public. When one now poses the question: “What happens in the Muslim community?”, then one can only say: have a look at our associational news. Well, you can see all of them, read all about the things we do, that are discussed and talked about in the organization. That is very important, especially with regard to the German public, because there is a knowledge gap concerning Muslim life (IN IGMG 2: 43).

Another difference between DITIB and IGMG concerns their available online press releases. IGMG generally differentiates its news services much more than DITIB. IGMG has various categories of press releases on its website (national and international news, science-related news, comments, short notices, associational news, and organizational press releases) some of which date back to 1997. DITIB, by contrast, has only one category of organizational press releases, which are listed in chronological order starting from August 2005. The DITIB website does not provide a news service, unlike the IGMG website and the ZMD-affiliated website Islam.de. Instead, DITIB’s press releases mainly deal with DITIB itself. To facilitate a comparison, only the organizational press releases of DITIB and IGMG are compared (in Turkish and German). For IGMG, the associational news releases are included because they resemble DITIB’s Turkish press releases. The second step is to compare the two organizational member magazines. This dual research strategy cannot be used for ZMD, however, because ZMD publishes all its press releases in German and because it neither publishes associational news on its website, nor does it have a member magazine. The results of the comparative headline analysis of DITIB’s and IGMG’s German and Turkish press releases for the year 2009 are summarized in Figure 16 below. The second most relevant category is “Internal Affairs”, which is equally important for both organizations. IGMG’s German press releases have a slightly stronger focus on this issue (27%) than the Turkish ones (21%).

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60 50 42

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aff air s

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Figure 16: Comparison of DITIB’s and IGMG’s German and Turkish press releases issued in 2009.

This is due to the only two press releases not translated into Turkish, which refer to the rectification of external accusations by the organization. Generally speaking, however, all of the analyzed IGMG press releases were direct translations. The issue of “Integration” shows another surprising difference. While for IGMG, integration work appears to be an internal matter which is stressed in the associational news (19%, as compared to 8% in German and Turkish press releases), DITIB mainly highlights its integration-related activities such as campaigns, projects, and seminars in its German press releases (27%), while the proportion of references to this category in the Turkish press releases is much smaller (13%). Another functional bilingual separation concerns the issue of “Coop­ eration” with other actors. Only 10% of DITIB’s German press releases deal with this issue, but 29% of the Turkish press releases refer to meetings and cooperation with other actors. However, the actors participating in DITIB events clearly differ in the German and the Turkish press releases. While the majority of German press releases report on German actors, the Turkish press releases report on meetings with Turkish actors, usually with visitors from the 13 Turkish consulates in Germany including the Attachés for Religious Affairs. These links between DITIB and the Turkish state are almost never mentioned in the German press releases on the German website.



the organizational field413

This differentiation represents a case of organizational decoupling based on the strategy of bilingualism, which meets contradicting internal and external expectations. DITIB member organizations maintain close ties with the personnel of the Turkish embassies and consulates, which they describe openly in their associational news. On the other hand, the DITIB’s headquarters is well aware of the external criticism of this relationship in Germany, which explains the absence of reports on these ties in the German press releases and the public affairs work. The category of “Cooperation” also yields interesting results for IGMG. The official organizational press releases do not refer to official meetings with various actors at all, 15% of the associational news do. However, a closer look at the actors involved in the meetings reveals that most of them come from IGMG-related groups in Germany and abroad. In 2009 only 5 out of 21 cooperation partners had no affiliation to IGMG. The observed marginalization of the organization and the lack of reports on meetings and cooperation with actors beyond the IGMG community therefore also holds true for the local IGMG level. Additional differences between DITIB and IGMG refer to the importance accorded to the topic of “Security”, which is more prominently featured in the external organizational press releases (IGMG: 8%, DITIB: 10%) than in the internal ones (3% of IGMG’s associational news, 2% of DITIB’s Turkish press releases). “Claims-Making” plays no role in the internal organizational affairs either (IGMG: 0%, DITIB: 2%), while IGMG’s official press releases focus much more on this issue (12–13%) than DITIB’s German press releases (4%). These results generally confirm and reflect the organizational characteristics described throughout the case studies. The Organizational Member Magazines A closer look at the organizational member magazines in a second step confirms the above results concerning the organizational differences between DITIB and IGMG. DITIB’s member magazine Haber Bülteni has been available online since January 2007, but its printed form longer exists. Until September 2008, “it was just an information letter [stating] where things had taken place” (IN DITIB 1: 299). It mainly consisted of a selection of the Turkish associational news releases submitted directly by the mosque communities. After September 2008, the former Turkish magazine was restructured and German articles were added. However, the focus on the Turkish

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language remained because the main actors in the mosque communities are still “the fathers and mothers” of those who produce the magazine now (IN DITIB 4: 127). Monthly topics are decided on with the help of the newly-established research center FOREGE. The main articles are translated into German and are later published in a separate German quarterly edition.27 This led to an increase in the number of German articles in Haber Bülteni from 0% to about 30%, which is linked by an interviewee to the organizational attempt to introduce new content-related perspectives. So, [there was a shift] from the mere delivery of information to education, opening new perspectives, new points of view, and not just “He was there, he did this and that, this community did this […] and there was this sport event and this festivity”. So, from simple presentation to content-related foci (IN DITIB 4: 131).

The results of the content analysis of four issues of Haber Bülteni published between January 2007 and December 2009 (see Figure 17) show that DITIB’s member magazine still reports primarily on internal organizational events in the associated mosque communities (“Internal Affairs”: 36%). It thus fulfills the same function as the Turkish press releases presented above, which are believed to have a bonding function among the mosque communities. Like the German press releases, the reports in the member magazine also focus on the meetings between DITIB mosques and the German society (“Cooperation”: 21%). These visits mainly involve Christian religious groups, students, the general public, or politicians such as candidates who are running for mayor in various towns and cities, but also, to a lesser extent, reports on internal meetings and visits from abroad. Meetings with representatives from the Turkish embassies are less frequently featured in the headlines of the member magazines than in the Turkish press releases, although their presence in the mosque communities is noticeable in the individual articles on internal activities. The structure of IGMG’s magazine Perspektif, by contrast, differs from that of DITIB’s member magazine. IGMG sees Perspektif more as a venue to elicit comments on national and international affairs, with only limited reporting on internal events. However, plans to establish a true associational magazine are discussed internally, but have not yet been realized 27 Between January 2007 and December 2009 the monthly topics under discussion were Ramadan, mosques, the hajj, foundations, science, youth, old age, the peace messages from the Prophet, parents, the environment, and child education.



the organizational field415

(IN IGMG 2: 75). IGMG’s main focus on religious issues is also visible in Perspektif, where 49% of all articles in four analyzed issues refer to this category in their headlines (cf. Figure 17). The second most frequently featured category in Perspektif refers to a variety of issues such as other countries, politics in general, current affairs, and general knowledge (“Miscellaneous”: 22%). The issues of “Claims-Making” and “Internal Affairs” are much less frequently featured in IGMG’s member magazine, which can be linked to the fact that the organizational press releases and the associational news already fulfill these functions. Perspektif is complemented by a Turkish cultural magazine, Sabah Ülkesi, which is produced quarterly by IGMG Germany and which reports on media, films, books, music, cities, and countries. Summary Despite the limitations of a headline analysis, the comparison of Turkish and German press releases and associational news yielded interesting results regarding the use of bilingualism. While DITIB uses bilingualism as a strategy to reach different audiences, which implies a shifting emphasis in messages that mainly differ with regard to internal affairs and related 60 49

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contacts with the Turkish embassies in Germany, IGMG tries to translate its public statements to meet the criteria of transparency and thus generally provides identical information in German and Turkish. Therefore, IGMG’s public affairs work and its website can be described more as adaptation to the expectation of transparency, whereas DITIB’s strategy of bilingualism is more one of decoupling with the aim of functionally meeting distinct expectations, while simultaneously reconciling member and influence logics. However, as regards the content of organizational press releases and their focus on certain issues, DITIB is much more oriented toward the political expectations in Germany, while for IGMG’s public affairs work is much more focused on the religious and claims-making spheres. Relations with Other Organizations in Germany Accordingly, well, stronger public relations, very strong dialogue work, the attempt to network with churches, other associations and institutions, politics, and the public. And what is also new, a stronger attempt to act jointly with other [Islamic] umbrella organizations. This is, in my opinion, the result of German politics and has not evolved from a true inner dynamic, but from the necessity to meet this political demand (IN DITIB 1: 81).

The necessity for Islamic umbrella organizations to increase their public relations work has been discussed throughout this research with reference to the increased public, media, and political interest in Islam in Germany. This section focuses on the first aspect mentioned in the above passage, which refers to dialogue activities with the churches and other associations and institutions such as law enforcement agencies, political parties, and non-religious migrant organizations. While the interreligious dialogue initiatives have been discussed in various research articles (Eissler 2008; Halm 2006b; Klinkhammer et al. 2011; Lemmen/Miehl 2001; Micksch 2008; Spuler-Stegemann 2002: 323ff.; Stoll 1999; Tezcan 2006; ZfT 1995), the perspective of Islamic umbrella organization has rarely been included in these analyses. The following section argues that the Christian churches in Germany are not only an important dialogue partner, but also serve as role models for Islamic umbrella organizations. Their necessity to adapt to the traditional German church-state relations both facilitates and restricts Muslim claims-making activities aimed at increasing rights, status, and resources. Second, the section presents an analysis of the relationship between Islamic umbrella organizations and German law enforcement agencies.



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While this relationship has received increased attention since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the extent of this relationship varies widely between DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD, ranging from adaptation to the expectation to cooperate to public protest against it. Finally, this section discusses existing relationships to other institutions in Germany such as universities, political parties, and other non-religious migrant organizations. Relations with Non-Muslim Religious Actors in Germany Relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities have existed at the local level since the 1970s, when the first Islamic organizations in Germany’s postwar period were established. According to Jonker (2005), the long tradition of religious dialogue activities began in 1976, while Eissler (2008) states that these activities began in 1974 with the foundation of the Catholic ecumenical contact point for non-Christians (Ökumenische Kontaktstelle für Nichtchristen). In the beginning these interfaith dialogues did not forge partnerships with laicist Muslims. Rather, they established links with lay Sufi movements that did not represent the majority of the Turkish population (Jonker 2005).

With regard to DITIB, this observation is also supported by Seufert (1999a), who stresses Diyanet’s negative attitude toward Christian organizations in Turkey and abroad, which allegedly prevented the establishment of religious dialogues in Germany. Despite this skepticism, the following research results show that various forms of interreligious dialogues are currently taking place, which involve all three analyzed organizations. This section provides an overview of the organizations’ opinion about this dialogue work and discusses the importance of the churches as role models regarding their structuring, activities, and funding possibilities. The Interreligious Dialogue The churches were frequently mentioned as the most relevant contact partners for the organizations in the interviews, followed by the state and the media (IN DITIB 1: 81, 271; IN ZMD 1: 141; IN IGMG 2: 133). One reasons for this prominent relationship is the proactive engagement of the church in dialogue. While originally the churches approached Islamic organizations, today this process is reversed (IN DITIB 1: 271; 285). Diverse interreligious dialogue forums were discussed in the individual case studies. It could be said that DITIB and ZMD have frequently been

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engaged in publicly funded projects such as the interreligious initiative “Do you know who I am?”28 The project outline stresses that nonconstitutional organizations are excluded from applying for funding provided by the BMI and the EU. This exclusion concerns IGMG, which is watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. However, IGMG has also taken part in interreligious dialogue activities. It is a member of the Christian-Islamic Forum in North Rhine-Westphalia, which has been meeting three or four times a year since 2000 (CIG no date: flyer). The forum is a project of the Christian-Islamic Society (CIG),29 which has existed as a registered association since 1982. Its aim is to promote interreligious dialogue. CIG is headed by the renowned Islam expert Thomas Lemmen and is a member of the Coordination Council of the Christian-Islamic Dialogue in Germany (KCID).30 CIG and KCID, along with DITIB and the German Association of Cities,31 are also the founding members of the Christian-Muslim Peace Initiative (cm-fi),32 which is also publicly funded by BAMF, a German bank (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband), and the Robert Bosch Foundation. This short summary of various dialogue initiatives does not attempt to provide a complete list of projects that have existed and emerged over the last decades, but is intended to illustrate the diversity of relationships and their often overlapping execution and membership. At the same time, inclusion and exclusion mechanisms nonetheless exist, which are increasingly linked to public funding schemes for dialogue activities. Even so, some authors criticize the institutions for not using exclusion mechanism more often. For example, Spuler-Stegemann notes that the Christian churches enter into a dialogue with all Islamic organizations (except the subsequently banned ICCB): What is downright outrageous is the irresponsible playing down of the threat of an anti-constitutional, anti-Jewish, and anti-secular organization 28 URL: http://www.weisstduwerichbin.de/index.htm [last visited 12-June-2012]. The project involves the consortium of Christian Churches in Germany (ACK), the Central Council of Jews (ZJD), the Central Council of Muslims (ZMD), and DITIB. It is the only project that involves all three religious groups, including the Jewish community. 29 URL: www.chrislages.de [last visited 12-June-2012]. Another project of the CIG is the website Christians and Muslims, which provides information about ongoing dialogue activities in general (URL: www.christenundmuslime.de, URL: www.muslimeundchristen .de) [last visited 12-June-2012]. 30 URL: www.kcid.de [last visited 12-June-2012]. 31 URL: www.staedtetag.de [last visited 12-June-2012]. 32 URL: http://www.cm-fi.de/start.html [last visited 12-June-2012].



the organizational field419 such as the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG) (2002: 327, translation KRW).

Nevertheless, all three Islamic umbrella organizations have contacts to the official dialogue initiatives of the Catholic Church in Germany (e.g., the Christian Islamic Encounter and Documentation Center, CIBEDO)33 and the Evangelic Church in Germany (EKD) (e.g., the Islamic-Christian Working Group, ICA).34 However, in the interviews, these relations were interpreted with increasing criticism, which is linked to both contentrelated issues and to communication problems between some of the actors involved. In particular the EKD guidelines “Clarity and Good Neighbourly Relations: Christians and Muslims in Germany” (EKD 2006) were criticized by the Islamic organizations in a detailed joint press statement (KRM PR 24-May-2007), which asks whether any conclusions from the existing dialogue forums were included in the EKD guidelines, which they regard as Islam-critical. A similar criticism of the inclusion of dialogue results in the EKD guidelines is leveled by Micksch (2008), who is also the former EKD representative for interreligious and intercultural dialogue and the founder of the Islam forums. A meeting between KRM and the EKD President Huber on May 31, 2007 did not resolve the dispute (Welt online PR 31-May-2007a, b). It was the third institutionalized meeting between the actors, but the envisioned dialogue remained without results and has stalled since. Shortly afterwards, in October 2007, the newly elected DITIB President Arslan and DITIB’s dialogue representative Alboğa, who was also the KRM spokesman at the time, met again with Huber to express their interests in joint projects aimed at “strengthening the public interest in religion” (DITIB PR 31-Oct-2007, translation KRW). The expressed focus on DITIB’s interests in promoting cooperation and the lack of reference to the KRM-related 33 URL: www.cibedo.de [last visited 12-June-2012]. The Catholic Church initiated CIBEDO in 1978 as an initiative of a missionary order. Today CIBEDO is part of the Catholic Church. According to its website, it operates with one coordinator, a research assistant, and a consultant 34 URL: www.ekd.de/islam [last visited 12-June-2012]. The EKD established the ICA in 1976 to discuss the problem of foreigners with a focus on the 1.7 million Muslims that were living in Germany at that time (Micksch 2008: 93). According to the EKD information on its website, ICA consists of eight Muslim and eight Christian members including Sunnis and Shiites, as well as Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox representatives. It does not have its own website, and according to Micksch, it has had limited impact in the EKD due to separate dialogue attempts with the Muslim organizations led by former EKD president Huber that have taken place since 2005.

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discussions in this official press release can be seen as one example of DITIB’s differentiation strategy with regard to the other Islamic organizations and shows its own networking strength. In the interviews with the Islamic organizational representatives, two conclusions were drawn from the described situation of the interreligious dialogue. First, it was mentioned that the organizations within KRM are discussing plans to send only one joint representative to the interreligious dialogue meetings, who should speak for all four Islamic umbrella organizations. These plans are officially justified by the large number of events and the required resources (IN IGMG 3: 111). However, the internal debates can also be linked to the difficulties faced by the four Islamic umbrella organizations in representing a common agenda and in forgoing the opportunity to demand public recognition and legitimacy for their own organization. Second, the dialogue itself is expected to find new modes in the future. The disappointment of the Islamic umbrella organizations about the fact that in their opinion the dialogue initiatives did not influence the EKD guidelines more positively led to the conclusion that it would be most efficient to initiate joint practical projects between the religious communities. These projects are intended to transcend the basic knowledge-related questions concerning Islam, which have allegedly been discussed over the last twenty years. Rather, the projects are intended to improve the mutual understanding of religious communities. In the following passage from an interview, a joint soup kitchen project in Ludwigshafen is mentioned as a positive practical example. Similar approaches are supported by the German Federal Government in its funding line “Do You Know Who I Am?” and in the funding line for dialogue initiatives.35 Well, concerning the modalities of the dialogue I think the Christian-Islamic dialogue needs a reviving injection. It must simply become more than just a conversation platform where one really only discusses the role of women in Islam for the twentieth time. Instead, it must develop in the direction of a practical dialogue, where socially active people jointly tackle social problems and then through this joint work identify with each other. And in the end they can also appreciate each other much more than just by talking again and again, where one always gets the impression that it does not find

35 URL: http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_236/nn_1318820/SubSites/DIK/ DE/Projektfoerderung/projektfoerderung-node.html?__nnn=true [last visited 21-Feb2012]. The project funding line explicitly excludes applications from any organization mentioned in a regional report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.



the organizational field421 its way into the church or the mosque—as we have seen in the case of the EKD guidelines (IN IGMG 3: 104).

The Churches as Role Models Another area in which the German churches become relevant for Islamic umbrella organization is the desired official recognition as Islamic religious communities or corporations of public law, which would give them additional rights such as the right to provide Islamic religious education in public schools.36 While organizational restructuring and the appointment of regional contacts by the Muslim community are often publicly discussed as necessary prerequisites, the Islamic organizations’ responses to this discourse are diverse. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that the German state requires the organizations to adapt to the structures of the established churches, before additional rights can be granted; on the other hand, existing differences in these structures between the religions are emphasized. Frequently cited reasons include the lack of official membership rules and initiation rites in the Islamic faith and the large number of non-registered Muslims who attend the mosque services. While it is stressed that one should not expect complete adaptation to church structures in the sense of an “absolute Verkirchlichung” (“total churchification”, IN DITIB 3: 61), some actors still perceive a need to restructure the relationships among Islamic organizations at the local and federal levels. This need to “adapt the structures while simultaneously meeting the interests of the members” (IN DITIB 2: 142) is a prominent topic of internal discussion, as has been shown throughout this research. All three of the analyzed Islamic umbrella organizations identify themselves as religious communities. They believe that they do meet the legal conditions for being granted the right for religious education, although the political acknowledgement of this status has not yet been achieved. DITIB argues with regard to religious education that different courses offered by various Muslim religious communities should be feasible because the Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany also offer differentiated courses: The theoretical possibility to provide one joint regional Islamic education structure within regional KRM bodies is being 36 The regulations affecting the relationship between church and state in Germany are summarized in Article 140 of the German Constitution, which incorporates articles 136, 137, 138, 139, and 141 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. FLG I (41): 2034ff., 28-Aug-2006. Article 7(3) of the German Constitution determines the prerequisites for the right to provide religious education in public schools. German Basic Law of May 23, 1949 (ibid.).

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acknowledged, and it is maintained that independent solutions are possible. DITIB justifies its organizational adaptation to the church structures with reference to the public debates, which demand that the organizations partially adapt to the church-state relations and distance themselves from existing transnational ties: Adaptation to the laws on the relationship between church and state is necessary; that does not mean that an umbrella organization is acknowledged as a religious community when its president works as a counselor for religious services and at the same time has a direct relationship to the Directorate of religious affairs or to the embassy, a relationship that is governed by civil service law (IN DITIB 3: 19).

The above passage shows that the church structure presents an external pressure for organizational adaptation processes to which the organizations yield more or less readily, either individually or collectively. This includes, for example, the envisioned establishment of a theological council on the regional or federal level, since the provision of religious services is a prerequisite for religious communities, according to a decision of the federal administrative court (BVerwG 6 C 2.04, 23-Feb-2005; IN ZMD 3: 131). However, the plurality of Islamic organizations and their members should be preserved in this future structure, which therefore does not necessarily reflect the initiation of a binding theological council such as exists in Austria37 (IN ZMD 1: 302). On the other hand, the church structures are also used by the Islamic umbrella organizations to defend organizational structures which differ from the political expectations. DITIB’s and IGMG’s regional structures, which do not reflect the boundaries of the federal states, are, for example, justified with reference to the similar system of regional synods and dioceses, which is not consistent with the state boundaries either. The churches are also perceived as role models with regard to the extension of press and public affairs work of Islamic organizations. This development is characterized as a follow-up process of a similar extension of public relations of the Catholic Church over the last ten to twenty years (IN DITIB 4: 59). It is emphasized that interreligious dialogue has often been linked to the intercultural dialogue that has existed for a long time but has received renewed attention in recent years. 37 The Islamic Religious Community in Austria (Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IRCA) is recognized as a corporation of public law. It represents all Muslims in Austria. For a comparative analysis of Austria and Germany see Sezgin/Rosenow-Williams (2013). For more information about the structure of IRCA see its website and bylaws: URL: http://www.derislam.at [last visited 12-June-2012].



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Another point of reference to the churches in Germany is their social work, which is embedded within the German system of social partnership between the government and various religious and non-religious nongovernmental organizations (freie Träger). Institutional services in Germany such as kindergartens, retirement homes, and schools, as well as local services for youths, parents, seniors, handicapped people, homeless people, migrants, and other social groups are therefore often provided by religious welfare organizations such as the Catholic organization Caritas,38 the Protestant Diakonie,39 and the Jewish Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland.40 Their activities are supported with public funding, and in accordance with the subsidiary principle (§ 4 SGB VIII), the social partners enjoy priority over public bodies and institutions (öffentliche Träger) that offer similar services (Kunkel 2005). At least for DITIB, it has become one of the organizational goals to train qualified personnel to expand its existing social services in the next five years and to provide new public funding opportunities in this area, because no Islamic organization in Germany currently receives public funding as a social partner. A DITIB interviewee explicitly stated that the organization’s plans have nothing to do with the establishment of the much-feared “parallel societies” and that the services that are guided by a Muslim approach rather than a Christian approach are to be directed at all members of society (IN DITIB 2: 118). One specific project is the opening of a DITIB kindergarten in Mannheim,41 which has already been met political approval (Akyol 2009). IGMG also offers local services in the areas of youth work and educational training, but it cannot expect to be recognized as a social partner or to receive public funding or organizational support from the German government because it is being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Even so, the official recognition of its Muslim youth welfare organizations as social partners was mentioned as a future topic of political negotiations by an IGMG representative (IN IGMG 3: 33). As an umbrella organization, ZMD itself has no means to provide social welfare services. Still, in its self-portrayal, ZMD mentions its involvement in the establishment and operation of kindergartens and the provision of consulting services in this regard as one of the main organizational responsibilities (Zentralrat.de: Selbstdarstellung). 38 URL: http://www.caritas-germany.org/ [last visited 12-June-2012]. 39 URL: http://www.diakonie.de/index.htm [last visited 12-June-2012]. 40 URL: http://www.zwst.org/de/home/ [last visited 12-June-2012]. 41 URL: www.ditib-ma.de/kindergarten [last visited 12-June-2012].

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Summary This section has discussed the ambivalent relationship between Islamic organizations and the established churches in Germany. The Protestant and Catholic Churches are important role models because of the law on the relationship between church and state and its prerequisites for official status acknowledgement and the granting of further rights to the Muslim community. However, the interreligious dialogue initiatives that have existed since the 1970s have had little influence on the current debates. The resulting disappointments culminated in recent organizational disputes between the main actors involved. Envisioned ways out of this dilemma are local joint initiatives between religious communities, which are intended to bring a more practical focus to the dialogue work. These initiatives are also increasingly sponsored by federal state funds, although these funds exclude any group that is being watched by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The dialogue funding therefore increasingly reflects the positions of the law enforcement agencies and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which also have had a significant influence on the attitude of political actors toward the Islamic umbrella organizations. Cooperation is no longer expected of all organizations in the field. This also reflects the relationship to the law enforcement agencies (see below). However, this form of top-down structuring through funding opportunities represents a new development in the interreligious dialogue. Another top-down structuring attempt with regard to dialogue processes was found for the main Christian actors. In particular the EKD has influenced the field with its guidelines on “Christians and Muslims in Germany” (EKD 2006), and it remains debatable whether this increasingly institutionalized structuring of dialogue initiatives will ultimately promote local integration. The long-existing bottom-up-oriented local dialogue initiatives were capable of transcending the boundaries between organizations more easily and thus of promoting integrative community relationships. Similar attempts have also been made at dialogue forums on the regional and federal levels, such as the various Islam forums that generally invite all Islamic organizations (Micksch/Süssmuth 2005). The multitude of forums and the required resources for participation require all religious organizations to adapt their structure to the expectation to cooperate and join forces, a process that could ultimately support their cooperation attempts. At the moment, however, the organizations appear to be focused on indepen­dence.



the organizational field425 Relations to the Law Enforcement Agencies

The relationship between Islamic umbrella organizations, the German law enforcement agencies, and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution is one of the most closely observed relationships in the organizational field due to the securitization of debates discussed in Chapter Four. Various forms of cooperation have been established recently to prevent extremism within the Muslim community. In particular DITIB and ZMD maintain close ties to the German law enforcement agencies. These ties have increased since 9/11. This cooperation is motivated by the organized Muslims’ fear of being discredited as radicals by the public and the security-related actors and institutions, but also by experiences of violent attacks on mosques communities in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. IGMG, by contrast, openly protests against the security-related organizations in Germany because it is being watched by the regional and federal Offices for the Protection of the Constitution in all the states where IGMG affiliated mosques exist (mainly in the former West German states). For example, the 2009 federal report states that IGMG is a “legalistic extremist organization” which only pretends to be willing to integrate into Germany and to follow the Basic Law, arguing that IGMG’s aim to strengthen an independent cultural and religious identity which prevents assimilation into German society “is capable of fostering the creation and extension of Islamist milieus in Germany” (BMI 2010b: 187). The following section briefly analyzes both strategies—cooperation and protest behavior—beginning with forms of organizational cooperation. Forms of Organizational Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, dialogues between Islamic umbrella organizations and law enforcement agencies took place both in DIK discussion groups and in cooperation projects at the local, regional, and federal levels. While the DIK I discussion group on “Islamism and Security” involved all four KRM organizations, the dialogue with the law enforcement agencies on the regional level has mainly involved DITIB and ZMD as cooperation partners. On the regional level, for example, cooperation takes place in the form of requests for organizational expertise on “Muslim crimes”, a term unofficially used by the law enforcement agencies to describe assumed religious

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motives for criminal offenses (IN DITIB 1: 187). Organizations are asked to give their opinion on an individual or collective level about issues such as “violence, forced marriage, terror, jihad, and all that” (ibid.). Cooperation also takes place within the training program for police officers at the German Police University in Münster, where ZMD’s representatives give talks on Islam and Muslims in German society and other issues. An example of a newly-initiated dialogue process on the federal level is the cooperation between the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), several statelevel criminal police offices, DITIB, and ZMD, which was established in 2005 and has been extended since. The resulting concept of “confidencebuilding measures” aims to increase cooperation to build confidence among Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany (BMI 2008c: 13; ZMD, BKA, BfV, DITIB joint PR 27-Apr-2009). This concept also draws on the results of local cooperation projects that were implemented in 2003/04 between the police and mosque communities in Berlin, Essen, and Stuttgart. The findings and experiences are summarized in the handbook Police and Mosque Communities, which was published by the Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB 2005), with 13,000 copies being distributed to the regional and federal police agencies. Both projects—the concept of confidence building measures and the handbook on police and mosque communities—were discussed by the DIK I discussion group on “Islamism and Security”. In the first progress report of the DIK I, all five umbrella organizations agreed that such cooperation projects can reduce the threat of “radicalization” among their members (BMI 2008c: 14f.). The key recommendations that were agreed on were the establishment of fixed contacts who should enjoy a high reputation within their organizations, as well as round tables to include the key actors in the social space that goes beyond the mosques and the police. The aims of the cooperation were to be defined and benchmarked, and the common ground and the willingness to establish long-term cooperation were specifically mentioned. It was also decided that a Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point should be established, which is now located at BAMF.42 Its aim is to establish a Germany-wide network of contacts at law enforcement agencies, the mosque communities, and academia to promote dialogue by providing education and information material. 42 URL:  http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Clearingstelle/clearingstelle-node.html [last visited 12-Apr-2012].



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At the last plenary meeting of the DIK I, the Islamic umbrella organizations (with the exception of IRD and its member IGMG43) also agreed to initiate a publication project under the title “Muslims for Freedom and Diversity” to provide information about the role of Islam for Muslims in Germany (BMI 2009a). With regard to this project, it can be concluded that the participating organizations meet all five expectations of the German government (“to follow the law“, “to denounce Islamism and terrorism”, “to reject ‘parallel societies’ and promote integration“, “to adopt German values”, and “to organize and cooperate”), as the following passage from the final DIK I declaration concerning the planned publication project shows: The aim is to present Islam as part of our society, to strengthen the identification of the Muslim population with our value order as provided in the Basic Law, and to take a firm stand against violence and terrorism. (…) The Islamic organizations agree to promote our value order in their online presence and to turn against every form of political extremism, including religiously motivated ones (BMI 2009a: 33, translation KRW).

In the interviews, the representatives of DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD specifically expressed their discontent with the fact that the above-mentioned statement includes a self-accusation of the Muslim community. However, it is acknowledged that despite this personal discontent there is nothing to be said against the use of preventive measures. Cooperation is also deemed necessary, at least from the point of view of DITIB and ZMD, to show that “one has nothing to hide” (IN ZMD 2: 197). With the start of the DIK II, Hans-Peter Friedrich, the new Minister of the Interior, has put renewed emphasis on the issues of security, the prevention of and the fight against Islamist terrorism, and individual radicalization. On June 24, 2011 an Initiative Security Partnership44 was initiated at the Prevention Summit. The initiative is based on joint projects to extend the work of the Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point that has existed at BAMF since 2008. However, while the cooperation with the law enforcement agencies is mainly initiated within the umbrella organizations in a top-down manner, the headquarters remains unsure of the extent to which their members will continue to support this cooperation. 43 The discussion group was criticized not only by IRD, but also by the other organizations, which complained that the term ‘Islamism’ had not yet been defined in the discussions (IN DI 3: 37). 44 URL: http://www.initiative-sicherheitspartnerschaft.de/SPS/DE/Startseite/startseite -node.html [last visited 12-Apr-2012].

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chapter six This is problematic, I think, and nobody knows how far the communities can go. Well, I didn’t think, for example, that DITIB would go so far as to get involved in such a cooperation (IN DITIB 1: 211).

Overall, it is concluded that the cooperation with law enforcement agencies signifies “a strong change” for the organization (ibid.: 223), which is only possible because the community is going along with it. It is a tightrope walk, one arouses suspicion when one does this. When one does not do this one gives the impression that one has something to hide, and no matter how one does it, one does it wrong. And I think openness is simply the best way; to say we do not actually find it great that we are seen as a security problem, but we can gladly show you that we aren’t (IN ZMD 2: 197).

A recent study on Muslims’ perceptions of the work of the law enforcement agencies by the Open Society Institute (OSI) concludes that 59% of Muslim women and 51% of Muslim men across Europe have a great deal or a fair amount of trust in the police, whereas the percentage of young European-born Muslim males who trust the police is considerably lower (46%).45 The report concludes that this level of trust is consistent with the results of non-Muslim respondents, but it also cautiously suggests that the police must get more actively involved in preventing discrimination against Muslims and to facilitate community relationships. It is critical to ensure accurate reporting and recording of hate crime. The high levels of trust in police provide a good basis from which to develop initiatives to improve reporting. However, it needs to be recognized that the general high levels of trust exist alongside low levels of trust among young European-born Muslim males. This group also appears to experience the greatest amount of discrimination and unfair treatment in the hands of the police. Trust can be lost with a single bad incident that leaves a lasting impression upon the individual (Open Society Institute 2009: 186).

The notion that trust in law enforcement agencies can easily be disturbed  is discussed in the following section, which uses a similar argumentation as part of the organizational protest rhetoric against police discrimination.

45 1,109 respondents answered this question in 11 European cities which took part in the project “Muslims in Europe – A Report on 11 EU Cities”, including the cities of Berlin and Hamburg for Germany. Unfortunately, no country-specific figures are available. URL: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/home/articles_publications/publications/muslims -europe-20091215 [last visited 23-May-2012].



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Forms of Organizational Protest against Law Enforcement Agencies The above-mentioned concerns of the organizations and the results of the OSI study on individual trust in the police highlight the importance of member support for the implementation of cooperation measures between the mosque communities and the law enforcement agencies. Without the agreement of the local mosques and their members the envisioned projects such as the establishment of common local contacts cannot be successful. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, the agreement to cooperate with law enforcement agencies was generally facilitated by the Muslim communities’ fear of being publicly discredited as terrorists. Since then a large number of mosques have opened their doors—not only for guided tours and not only on the annual Day of the Open Mosque. The press release analysis has also shown that public statements condemning terrorist attacks have frequently been issued by all three umbrella organizations. However, differences in these press releases reflect the above-mentioned relationship between the organizations and the law enforcement agencies. For example, IGMG immediately demanded in its press releases of 9/11 that politics and the media should refrain from making sweeping accusations against Muslims, and it has repeatedly criticized existing tendencies in this direction (see, e.g., IGMG PRs 11-Sep-2001, 01-Oct-2001, 08-Oct-2001, and 06-Nov-2001). DITIB and ZMD have used more moderate rhetoric which mainly emphasize their support in the fight against violence and terrorism (e.g., ZMD PR 16-Sep-2001b; DITIB PR 12-Aug-2006). This is consistent with the general observation that IGMG, as an increasingly marginalized organization within the German public and political spheres, is the most outspoken organization when it comes to criticizing the securitization of public discourses. Since IGMG is the organization with the most critical statements against cooperation with the law enforcement agencies, the following section mainly discusses IGMG and its forms of open protest behavior. In the interviews, IGMG representatives repeatedly criticized the work of the national security organizations for being based on a prevention logic that fosters distrust among people. This is also reflected in IRD’s criticism of the final DIK I declaration (IRD PR 25-June-2009). Both organizations argue that public cooperation between Islamic umbrella organizations and law enforcement agencies only confirms the suspicion that the Muslim community in Germany poses a threat, which needs to be prevented by dialogue initiatives.

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To end its exclusion from most of the security-related dialogues, IGMG has repeatedly drawn attention to its own contribution to internal security in Germany. Originally, IGMG also highlighted its interest in joining dialogues with the political level (Unknown, TAZ, 19-Sep-2001). IGMG has also criticized its exclusion and the fact that its pledge of allegiance to the Basic Law is being discredited as mere lip service (IGMG PR 08-Oct-2001). At first IGMG’s protest strategy mainly involved press releases to rectify discrediting newspaper articles, but over time the strategy also increasingly involved legal means of protest in response to the political and public pressures (cf. Dantschke 2004). One example of IGMG’s strong protest concerns the identity checks in front of mosque communities after Friday prayers, which are criticized for perpetuating the image of Muslims as a potential security threat. IGMG protested against the controls of Muslim mosque visitors in the federal state of Lower Saxony and in 2004 informed the political level and the public about the discriminating circumstances (IGMG PR 11-Dec-2005). DITIB and ZMD rarely commented on these events in their argumentation46 and did not issue any press release concerning the controls. In a newspaper interview, the interior minister of Lower Saxony confirmed that 14,000 persons and 6,000 vehicles were checked in the vicinity of mosques and Islamic cultural centers between 2003 and 2005 (Unknown, FR, 25-Oct-2005). In February 2010 these identity checks without reasonable suspicion were eventually banned in Lower Saxony after increasing protests (Unknown, HNA, 02-Feb-2010), a decision that is surely in line with the OSI study (2009: 186), which cautioned that “trust can be lost with a single bad incident that leaves a lasting impression upon the individual”. Summary This brief analysis of the relationship between the law enforcement agencies, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), and the three analyzed Islamic umbrella organizations reveals different organizational strategies, which range from adaptation and open protest to

46 A ZMD press release quotes the former ZMD president Elyas as following: “the raids of Islamic facilities in the past have not yielded any results he underlined. The extremists are not to be found in the mosques. Elyas demanded that Muslims in Germany be finally accepted as future partners in the fight against terrorism. ‘The request to distance themselves from terror is justified. However, we do not want people to think that this has not yet been done’” (ZMD PR 24-Mar-2004, translation KRW).



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organizational cooperation. While DITIB and ZMD have accepted the BKA and BfV’s invitation to join forces in the fight against “radicalization” among the Muslim community, IGMG refuses to cooperate altogether after its first attempts to join the dialogues were rejected because the German state and its national security organizations decided in the aftermath of 9/11 that they are not willing to cooperate with IGMG due to its status of being watched by the intelligence agencies as a legalistic Islamist organization which does not incite violence but which is accused of fostering Islamist milieus in Germany (BMI 2010: 187). The resulting discrimination experienced by individual IGMG members, who experience problems concerning their naturalization, among other things (Schiffauer 2008a), has a direct influence on IGMG’s organizational behavior. To change its public image as a security threat, IGMG developed a strong protest behavior with regard to the security-related discourses, including various activities that are directed against the discrimination of the Muslim community in general. While this behavior has been criticized as a “victimization” discourse (Kandel 2002: 2; Inan 2007: 147, 211; Reinecke, TAZ, 04-May-2010), IGMG intends to increase its legitimacy through these activities. The main target groups are political actors and the general public, as well as its members and the Muslim community in general. DITIB and ZMD’s primary aim is to receive legitimacy from the political level and the general public for fulfilling the expectation “to cooperate” with the law enforcement agencies, while acknowledging that their internal approval rate for this cooperation can vary over time. Overall, this analysis confirms the theoretical assumption that the level of conflict between internal and external expectations can explain differences in organizational behavior. However, it should be noted that the different external expectations with which the three organizations are confronted are also an important explanatory variable. With reference to the theoretical framework, this can be linked to the contextual factor “independence”, which refers to the pressure exerted on an organization by its environment. While the political pressure on IGMG results in organizational protest, the political strategy to include DITIB and ZMD is perceived internally as an opportunity to differentiate oneself and to receive public and political legitimacy through cooperation. This can be interpreted as adaptive behavior, since it also involves local level cooperation projects. Even so, at least for DITIB, the issue is more prominently discussed in its German than in its Turkish press releases, which can be interpreted as an indicator of organizational decoupling.

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chapter six Relations with Other Actors

In addition to the actors discussed so far, there are other organizations and institutions from the scientific, political, and non-governmental spheres, which are situated in the organizational field of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany. To complete the analysis of shifting relationships in the organizational field, the following section provides a brief overview of the ties with academia, political parties, and migrant organizations with a special focus on the differences between DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD. At least the former two organizations also maintain ties to various groups of actors beyond the German nation state. These ties are discussed in the next section. Academia Overall, one can say that all of the three analyzed umbrella organizations have developed positive relations with the academic sphere in Germany. This is reflected on various levels. First, the organizational representatives were very cooperative with regard to the expert interviews for this study. They immediately agreed to be interviewed, generously gave their time, and were very friendly and open. Second, exchange between Islamic umbrella organizations and academic experts takes place at various conferences and events in which the actors from both sides participate and which are also increasingly initiated by the Islamic umbrella organizations themselves. One example is the annual international scientific symposium “The Intellectual Heritage of Islam” at the Goethe University Frankfurt, which have been coorganized by DITIB since 2007.47 The symposium is only one part of the activities of the Institute for the Study of Culture and Religion of Islam, at which the Diyanet foundation professorships for Islamic religious studies are currently located.48 IGMG has also organized three international symposiums since 2007. The first was entitled “Terms of Chaos—Chaos of Terms”,49 the second 47 URL: http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb09/islam/forschung/symposien/index.html [last visited 12-June-2012]. 48 The first guest foundation professorship was established in 2003. A second full professorship position was added in 2005, and a third in 2010. All three professorships are financed directly by Diyanet in Turkey. 49 http://www.igmg.de/gemeinschaft/symposium-2007/programm.html [last visited 23-May-2012].



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discussed “The Ambivalence of New and Old Identities” (IGMG PR 06-May-2010), and the latest dealt with the topic “Muslims Amidst the Tensions of Critique and Conformity” (IGMG PR 01-May-2012). Like DITIBsponsored events, these symposiums involved renowned national and international scholars. IGMG events, however, are internally oriented toward the IGMG community, while DITIB-sponsored conferences are open to the general public and are not advertised internally. Unlike DITIB and IGMG, ZMD does not organize scientific conferences, which can be explained by its limited financial and structural resources. Even so, the individual ZMD representatives emphasized in the interviews that they closely monitor the scientific discourse and generally support the participation of academic experts in dialogue events such as the DIK. A participant observation at the second IGMG symposium showed that this weekend-long conference is mainly attended by young Muslims in their twenties and thirties. The conference was organized by the IGMG student organization, and the speakers and the IGMG members came from various European countries. However, most of the members were from Germany. The conference languages were Turkish, German, and English, which were translated simultaneously. This language diversity also allowed for the attempted balance in guest speakers and can be explained by the European structure of IGMG. When we want to invite an expert, then there is this balance, the attempt to find a balance: one expert from Turkey but then also an expert from Germany. Whereas we can say with regard to Germany that it is not easy for us to invite an expert, you know about the prejudices against IGMG (IN IGMG 2: 19).

The controversial academic debates about IGMG have been discussed in the context of the IGMG case study. It can be argued that IGMG tries to improve its legitimacy by establishing positive relationships with academic scholars at IGMG conferences. IGMG also regularly reports about ongoing academic research projects and publications on its website.50 This brief overview once again highlights the importance of organizational internal and external contextual factors. While internal factors such as organizational resources (financial and human resources) influence the organizations’ ability to organize and sponsor scientific conferences, the organizational charter and existing networks also affect their interest in this kind of cooperation and the available contacts. On the external

50 URL: http://www.igmg.de/nachrichten/wissenschaft [last visited 30-May-2012].

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level, the political pressure and the organizational legitimacy within the organizational field also influence the organizations’ options for cooperation, as well as their status as objects of academic research. Political Parties With regard to the relationship between Islamic umbrella organizations and the German political party system, one has to note that the analyzed organizations generally stand above party lines. DITIB, for example, stresses that it is forbidden to practice party politics within its facilities (Ditib.de: Grundsätze), while ZMD highlights its political neutrality both in its Islamic Charta (ZMD 2002: § 21) and in its self-portrayal, which also stresses the independence from foreign governments and any ideo­ logies, movements, interests groups, and parties (Zentralrat.de: Selbst­ darstellung). DITIB and ZMD explicitly emphasize this fact in their self-portrayals, but IGMG does not. The difference between DITIB and IGMG can be explained by the organizations’ origin and history and their networks and ties. On the one hand, the official Islam of Turkey, which is organized by Diyanet in Turkey and practiced in Germany by DITIB, is politically neutral and follows the laic tradition of separating politics and religion (although changes in Diyanet due to electoral changes can be observed, cf. Kara 1999). On the other hand, IGMG’s establishment in Europe is linked to the ban of Erbakan’s Islamist Millî Görüş movement and its related parties in Turkey. The current ties between IGMG and the Felicity Party (SP) continue to be the subject of ongoing investigation by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution due to the Islamist, anti-democratic, and anti-Semitic orientations of Erbakan (†) and his followers, which are often cited in the German reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution with reference to articles in the Turkish newspaper Millî Gazette. According to these reports, IGMG’s links to the Millî Görüş movement in Turkey mainly involve the joint participation of party officials and organizational representatives in events in Europe and Turkey, IGMGrelated publications in the daily newspaper Millî Gazette, and support during election campaigns (see, e.g., Ministry of the Interior Berlin 2007: 117ff.). IGMG, however, frequently argues that the Millî Gazette is not officially linked to IGMG and that IGMG distances itself from Erbakan’s ideology and his “Adil Düzen” program (Karahan 2007; see Chap. Five: IGMG). During the interviews, meetings with the opposition party in Turkey



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(presumably the Felicity Party) were mentioned openly (IN IGMG 1: 120), but it was emphasized that the cooperation abroad focuses primarily on the Turkish government in general and therefore also stands above party lines. The general struggle between the simultaneous organizational engagement in the religious and political spheres has been discussed throughout the case studies and with regard to the ties to the German political sphere. In particular, the case study discusses in detail the process of separation from IGMG’s political past, its new focus on the identity as a religious community, and the struggles between supporters and opponents of organizational change (cf. Schiffauer 2010). One of the things stressed in IGMG’s self-portrayal in Europe is its organizational identity as a religious  community. With regard to the name of the organization, it is emphasized that The word “Millî” in IGMG (Islamic Community of Millî Görüş) traces back to the Qur’anic notion of “Millet” which often appears in association with the Prophet Abraham. […] As stated by the Qur’an the concept of “Millet” denotes a community that gathers around a prophet and the values he conveys. It does not refer to a nation or an ethnicity. […] No connection whatsoever should be made with the Turkish meaning of the word “millet”, i.e. “people” or “nation” (IGMG 2010a, b).

This can be read as an attempt to dissociate the organization from the Turkish political Millî Görüş movement without directly mentioning it. However, IGMG does not officially dissociate itself from the Felicity Party (SP) or the Millî Görüş movement in Turkey on its website or in its self-portrayal, which, unlike DITIB and ZMD, do not mention political neutrality either. These differences can be well explained by the interests of the organizational members and the expectations of external interest groups. The Islamic umbrella organizations are generally aware that standing above party lines provides influence opportunities in changing government settings. Cooperation with politicians from various parties is therefore common and is also increasingly practiced by IGMG representatives both in Germany and in Turkey. For the German context, one can observe that cooperation with politicians has increased over the last decade, and no official coalition has been formed between a political party and any of the three umbrella organizations. Many of the organizational representatives are also active in political parties in Germany such as the Green Party, the Social Democrats, the

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Liberals, and even a new party that focuses on integration-related issues.51 However, this political engagement is officially separated from their function as organizational representatives, as expressed in the following passage from an interview with a DITIB representative, which summarizes the attempt to achieve political neutrality that characterizes the organizational field: Actually, with regard to party politics, we are neutral, yes, and we adhere to this closely. Well, when we invite the SPD [Social Democrats, KRW] to an event we also invite the CDU [Christian Democrats, KRW] or the Greens. We do not prefer any political party and we invest in our relationship with all political parties. When we are invited individuals are surely members of a political party, I am also a member of a political party, but this is my private relationship to a political party. That means, as soon as I enter DITIB’s house my political views stay outside (IN DITIB 3: 23).

The Green Party has been particularly active in the debates about organizational representation of Muslims in Germany. This was also expressed in their major interpellation in 2006 (German Federal Government 2006). In North Rhine-Westphalia, a group of Muslim Green Party members was established in 2006 to discuss issues related to the integration and participation of Muslims and to offer recommendations (Green Muslims no date). In general, however, the negotiation and cooperation attempts between the political sphere and the Islamic organizations are organized above party lines. This can be seen in the DIK and also in regional negotiation rounds such as the Working Group on Islam (AG Islam) in North Rhine-Westphalia. Non-Religious Migrant Organizations Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany also have contacts to nonreligious migrant organizations. Examples of such ties are the cooperation during certain events (such as demonstrations against right-wing organizations and solidarity demonstrations with the victims of terrorist attacks) and joint press releases (on related topics such as the fight against discrimination and public protest against any form of violence and terrorism). The latter form of joint cooperation, however, mainly involves migrant organizations with a Turkish background (e.g., IGMG et al. PR 25-Aug-2006, 19-Sep-2006). One must also note that no joint press releases, 51 See, for example, the regional party Alliance for Innovation and Justice (Bündnis für Innovation und Gerechtigkeit, BIG) in North Rhine-Westphalia, which was founded in 2010. URL: http://bignrw.de/ [last access 23-May-2012].



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which had always been signed by a large number of migrant organizations, have been issued since the establishment of KRM. This is evidence of a new pattern of coalition formation among the organized Muslim community in Germany. Certain migrant organizations were generally not mentioned as cooperation partners in the interviews, and one interviewee criticized the relationship to them. The background of the concerned interviewee in a non-governmental organization and DITIB’s self-understanding as a migrant organization which is not only open to Turkish Muslim but to “everyone” (Ditib.de: Grundsätze, translation KRW) can explain the motive of organizational competition over resources that becomes visible in the following passage, which raises the question of trust and legitimacy and contrasts the lack of funding for Islamic organizations with the higher levels of trust and funding received by non-religious migrant organizations: We are also realistic, we do not tell the world what we cannot do […]. I do not want to make false accusations but I am sure, I know since I come from social work, because I know the structure in some associations, there are some associations, for example, that have been receiving money from the state for years, because they have indeed been trusted. Perhaps, I don’t know, they have allegedly received project money and still have not done much. Project money has been available for years—where does it go? Why has this integration work still not been achieved? That is, well, the mosque associations have not received a single cent from the state. They have tried to achieve something on their own, and at least for DITIB I can say that no terrorists or something like that have emerged (IN DITIB 2: 36).

The extent of cooperation between mosque communities and other migrant organizations at the local level cannot be determined by this study because it focuses on the level of the organizational headquarters. It can be assumed that a large amount of these local contacts is managed through the venues of interreligious and intercultural dialogue meetings that often take place locally without supervision by the headquarters of Islamic umbrella organizations (Schubert forthcoming). Summary The results of the discussion of the relationship of DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD with other actors in the organizational field (academia, political parties, and migrant organizations) support the general notion of shifting relationships in the organizational field. While contact with academia and German political parties has increased due to growing interest in Islam in Germany, contact with

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non-Muslim migrant organizations is generally decreasing. At least in the eyes of DITIB, the latter relationship is increasingly characterized by competition for resources. Overall, the increasingly narrow focus of the field on the topic of Islam and the coalition building of the four Islamic umbrella organizations within the KRM structures also led to a decrease in official cooperation with non-religious migrant organizations. Generally speaking, the observed organizational differences and similarities can be well explained by the research framework, which involves internal and external contextual factors on the one hand and internal and external expectations with which the organization is confronted on the other. Internal contextual factors such as resources and contacts allow the organization to get involved in the scientific discourse by organizing and sponsoring scientific conferences (DITIB and IGMG), or by establishing a research institute (such as FOREGE) and funding several professorships in Islamic Studies at the Frankfurt University (DITIB). At the same time, political pressures in the form of organizational interdependence influence the ways in which this involvement is perceived by the academic actors in the field, which in turn may also promote scientific interest in the organization. To the political parties, the ownership of the organizations and their charter are most important. The professed ideology of DITIB and ZMD is to stand above party lines, and this stance was incorporated in their organizational history. IGMG is currently changing its perception of its ties to the parties of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey. This behavior can be explained by the increase of pressures exerted in Germany by a new generation of IGMG members and the public and political spheres, which are themselves strongly influenced by the reports of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Consequently, the three organizations increasingly fulfill the expectation “to cooperate” with all political parties. In most cases, this cooperation is related to the ruling parties and the incumbent governments. The purpose of this cooperation is to strengthen the organizational logic of influence. In the German context, political ties are stronger for DITIB and ZMD, while IGMG has openly declared that it cooperates with the Turkish government. The three organizations also maintain relations with other migrant organizations. In most cases, these relations are institutionalized within the Turkish community. This can be linked to the origin and history of the organizational field and the relationships between the actors. However, the issue of resources has also been raised in this context, and it has been



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observed that there is a general competition between religious and nonreligious migrant organizations. Relations with Actors Abroad The characterization of the organizational field presented above (cf. Figure 10) identifies various ties between the Islamic umbrella orga­ nizations in Germany and actors abroad.52 These cross-border ties can have a cultural, economic, political, or religious dimension (Pries 2007) and they can vary in the degree of institutionalization and influence on Islamic organizations in Germany. Relations with actors abroad are therefore constitutive of the organizational field of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany, which extends beyond the borders of the German nation state. So, to understand the diverse and sometimes conflicting expectations with which Islamic organizations in Germany are confronted, their cross-border relations and dependences must be analyzed. The following overview focuses on the Turkish context because it has a particularly strong influence on the organizational field of Islamic organizations in Germany. The next section also contributes to the theoretical debates about transnationalism from an organizational point of view, analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of cross-border ties with regard to organizational legitimacy and efficiency. The last part of the following section provides a discussion of possible future developments for DITIB and IGMG. ZMD is not analyzed in detail because the case study concludes that the organization has no institutionalized ties to actors abroad and only few informal relations with actors and institutions in the Arab world and at the European level. The Turkish Context and Its Various Ties to Islamic Umbrella Organizations in Germany Since four of the largest Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany mainly provide services for Turkish descendants in Germany (DITIB,

52 Since the majority of Islamic organizations in Figure 10 are of Turkish origin, the main actors (Diyanet, the Turkish government, and Turkish political parties) are situated in Turkey. Other organizations abroad can also be relevant. Examples are associated organizations in other European countries (for DITIB and IGMG) and international Islamic umbrella organizations such as the Islamic Conference in Cairo, the Muslim World League, and the Council Musulman of Cooperation in Europe (for ZMD).

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IGMG, VIKZ, and the Alevi organization AABF), the “pronounced” transnational space between Germany and Turkey (Halm/Thränhardt 2009; Faist 2000) must be discussed. The point being made here is that to understand the extent of present cross-border ties one has to take relevant explanatory variables into account such as the organization’s history, its ownership, its charter, and its interdependence with other actors. These variables are discussed in this section. The beginnings of the extensive German-Turkish migration system in the 1960s are closely linked to the foundation of the first Islamic organizations in Germany. It is important to note that the establishment of organizations in Germany was motivated by different factors which reflected the divisions in Turkish society (cf. Amelina/Faist 2008; Franz 2000; Kepel/ Roberts 2003: 342ff.; Kroissenbrunner 2002; Laurence 2006; Schiffauer 2007b). Schiffauer argues, with reference to the different nature of Islamic organizations in Europe, that those communities with an affirmative position towards a laic (strictly secular) Turkey distanced themselves from those communities which, at least in the 1980s, strove for an Islamist refashioning of the country (2007b: 74).

He therefore divides the organizational field into DITIB on the one hand and the Millî Görüş (IGMG), Süleymancıs (VIKZ), and Nurcu movements (e.g., Jama’at un-Nur Köln e. V.) and the Caliphate State (ICCB) on the other (see Chap. Five: Facts and Figures on Islamic Organizations in Germany). The reasons for this distinction between secularism and Islamism in Turkey are discussed in detail by Franz (2000), who traces the political and societal changes in Turkey from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1923, the aim of which was to separate religion and politics, and the creation of the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” which sees Islam as part of the national Turkish culture and identity, to the military coups in 1960 and 1980 and the simultaneous rise of Necmettin Erbakan and his various political parties, which tried to establish an Islamic state in Turkey. At the same time, the Süleymancı53 and Nurcu movements were also banned in Turkey due to their ties to the Islamic Brotherhood, which promotes an Islamic upbringing through training programs (Schiffauer 2007b).

53 On the followers of Süleyman Efendis and their umbrella organization VIKZ see Jonker 2002a.



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The Alevis, a third group, have been actively ignored by the Sunnicentered religious politics in Turkey until very recently (Köse 2010; Subaşı 2010).54 The lethal attack on a gathering of Alevi representatives in Sivas on July 2, 1993 sparked the Alevi protest movement in and outside Turkey. This facilitated the abolishment of the takiye principle, the long practiced concealment of the Alevi belonging, which was practiced until the 1980s due to their history of oppression in Turkey (Sökefeld 2008a: 3). Alevis from Turkey have been founding organizations in Germany since 1986 to protest against the suppression of their religion in Turkey by Diyanet and the Turkish state.55 The ban of all four of these religious groups in Turkey was accompanied by a shift of power between their organizations abroad. While Diyanet enjoyed a monopoly in Turkey, the other Islamic groups were originally more strongly represented abroad (Schiffauer 2007b). In the 1980s, the emergence of identity mobilization (Kurds, Islamists, Alevis) alerted Turkish public authorities to the politicization of various groups of Turkish citizens, gathering behind various types of flags. These movements opened a high competition on the market of ideas and identities, challenging the central state definition of an exclusive national identity (Amiraux 2007: 192).

54 Köse (2010: 146) argues that “[t]he “Alevi opening” is still in its early stages; nonetheless, it has already enabled some conciliatory moves. For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic and the Ottoman State, state authorities have acknowledged the victimhood and traumatic experiences of Alevis. A verbal apology for the oppressions and direct violence that the Alevis had historically suffered from the central authorities was given by the Minister of Culture on behalf of his government and the Turkish State. A commitment to accommodate Alevi requests has been clearly voiced by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his cabinet ministers. The leaders of the Alevi community and Alevi associations have been recognized by the government. And currently, a set of legal reforms are being publicly discussed”. Subaşı (2010: 166) describes a series of workshops held by the AKP and Alevi stakeholders in Turkey, which were completed in January 2010. “The Alevi workshops, which brought together the government and the representatives of the Alevi community, are forums for dialogue enabling the Alevis to express and share their grievances with the state and the general public. Indeed, the challenges the Alevis face can no longer be resolved through “quick” and ineffective fixes, minor legal “amendments,” short term, superficial solutions, or financial transfers of “donations.” These tactics–more often than not–only worsened the situation. The only way that the ‘Opening’ initiative can reach its full potential is if it is actively supported by the state. However, it is equally true that such an initiative needs a societal consensus as well as a common understanding”. 55 For the AABF self-portrayal see http://alevi.com/de/wir-uber-uns/selbstdarstellung [last visited 27-May-2012]. See also the dissertation of Aksünger (2012) and the extensive ethnographic field work of Sökefeld (2008a; b).

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Laurence refers to this division as a separation between the “official Islam” (also known as the “Islam of the embassies”) and the “political Islam”, which he describes as dissident movements that sought refuge from repressive regimes and stakes out operational bases in Western Europe (Laurence 2006: 260).

Overall, the cross-border networks of Islamic organizations in Germany thus involve strictly differentiated partners within the Turkish society. On the one hand, the Turkish state and its Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) are the most important actors for the German DITIB; on the other hand, all the other organizations were created in opposition to this state-controlled religious institution. Their networks have ties to political parties (IGMG), center around certain individuals and their followers (Süleyman Efendi, Said Nursi and, later, Fethullah Gülen), or are made up of a transnationally organized religious community (Alevis). This differentiation in their organizational history and their charters can well explain the different organizational orientations in the countries of settlement.56 The aim of “official Islam” (DITIB) is to promote national unity among the Turks. This is achieved through the provision of religious service, which Seufert (1999a: 287) describes “as a means to an end” to strengthen the Turkish state57 (cf. Kara 1999). “Political Islam” (IGMG), by contrast, had for the longest time a country of origin-oriented agenda, the aim of which was to stimulate political change in Turkey on the basis of Islamic religion (Amelina/Faist 2008; Ögelman 200358 Schiffauer argues that, in a more extreme fashion, the revolutionary movement Caliphate State (ICCB) was the only organization which actually intended to establish sharia in Turkey (Schiffauer 2007b). ICCB was banned in Germany in 2001 (Zöller 2004: 490) and it has no equivalent organization in Turkey. The religious Süleymancı and Nurcu movements, however, are mainly apolitical in their orientation and focus on religious services. The Alevis 56 The main organizational aims and existing ties between Muslim organizations in Germany and actors in Turkey are summarized briefly by Lemmen, who also focuses on nationalistic organizations such as ATIB and ADÜTDF (Lemmen 2002: 104). 57 The DITIB case study also found a diversification of DITIB activities and services which suggests an increasing orientation toward the members’ interest in their country of settlement. 58 It must be noted that this study shows that IGMG’s agenda is currently undergoing changes toward a Europeanization of its goals, which can be linked to Roy’s (2006b: 6) thesis of a de-culturation of Islam in the sense “that the initially ethnic bound Islam detaches itself from its cultural roots and strongly develops itself as a universal belief” (cited in Amelina/Faist 2008: 99).



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actively operate in the religious and the political spheres of both countries to protect and develop their cultural independence and to demand constitutional recognition of Alevism in Turkey, among other things (Amelina/ Faist 2008; Pries/Sezgin 2012). Advantages and Disadvantages of Relations with Actors Abroad The trap of “methodological nationalism”, which is expressed in research designs that are limited to social phenomena within the existing boundaries of nation states, has been criticized extensively since the 1990s (see, e.g., Bash et al. 1997). Accordingly, the literature on transnationalism indicates that individual and organizational networks often span across two or more nation states (Pries 2008a; 2010b; Pries/Sezgin 2012). Against this background, it is argued here that the focus on expectation structures as outlined in this project enables us to understand organizational and probably also individual behavior, and to overcome the limitations of national boundaries. Since expectations can originate from any actor or interest group that is perceived as relevant by the organization (or the individual), they ignore the traditional concepts of territories and national borders. Modern communication technologies, which are often cited as a main facilitator of transnationalism, actually become tools to communicate expectations. The spokesperson for press affairs’ practice of regularly visiting blogs and YouTube to see how her organization is perceived by the public is just one example of the changing digital organizational environment and the manifold expectations that can result from this reality. Shifting Expectations As discussed above, the actors abroad who have direct expectations of the organizations vary from organization to organization, as does their influence. Amelina and Faist rightfully note that Islamic organizations are perceived differently in the German institutional environment due to their different organizational aims. While the connection between ‘identity politics’ and transnational references is acceptable in Germany, thus supporting the case of the Alevis, the link between politics and religion is viewed more critically and the reference to transnational linkages in the cases of DITB and IGMG would increase such suspicions and cause their labeling as not willing to integrate (Amelina/Faist 2008: 115).

The advantages and disadvantages of relations with actors abroad have also changed due to changes in the German political expectation

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structure. Originally, the German government supported the organizational ties to their countries of origin because it assumed that the presence of Muslims in Germany would only be temporary. However, this attitude has changed since the turn of the 21st century. Now the “Muslims in Germany—German Muslims” (DIK no date) are expected to distance themselves from influences from abroad to successfully integrate into society. Consequently, relations with political actors abroad in particular may now lead to conflict with Germany’s integration expectations, because transnational ties of immigrants are seen as detrimental to a successful integration of migrants into German society (Amelina/Faist 2008: 91).

Laurence (2006), who observes similar changes in political expectations with regard to cross-border ties of Muslim communities in various Western countries, has coined the term ‘de-transnationalization’ to describe this phenomenon. Similarly, Tezcan describes the underlying political intentions as a process of “de-nationalization” of Islam to liberate it from its Turkish or Arab origins, noting that instead politicians are trying to promote the “naturalization” or “re-nationalization” of Islam in the form of a “German Islam” or “European Islam” (Tezcan 2007: 65, translation KRW). Some empirical studies criticize this critical political perception of organizational relations with actors abroad. For example, after reviewing several individual and organizational trajectories of transnationalization, Jørgensen concludes that the emergence of transnational social spaces and transnational engagement challenges fixed notions of integration but transnational engagement does not necessarily lead to less integration, rather these processes seem to run parallel (Jørgensen 2009: 341).

Roy’s (2006a) much-discussed theory of a “de-culturalization” of Islam is also relevant in this context because it assumes that the renaissance of religion is decoupled from its cultural origins (cf. Tezcan 2006a; b). Contrary to the optimistic political expectations associated with such a process of de-culturalization of Islam, Roy concludes that when a religion, no matter which one, has to construct itself beyond culture, it inevitably leads to radicalization (Roy 2006b: 7, translation KRW).

At the same time, Roy supports the bottom-up emergence of a European Islam, which should be promoted by European nation states through nationally organized Imam education and other appropriate measures,



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and advocates for the recognition of Islam as a religion rather than as a culture and for the separation of church and state (ibid.: 11). The Organizational Perspective Based on the analysis of these developments from the point of view of Islamic umbrella organizations, this section argues that there are various factors which allow the organizations to continue to maintain their relations with actors abroad despite the current political expectations in Germany. Two such factors are internal members’ interests and expectations of actors abroad, both of which are influenced by path dependences. Moreover, the organizations are also likely to evaluate conflicting expectations with regard to the provision of resources in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance. Orientation toward actors, institutions or interest groups abroad may therefore be beneficial to organizational efficiency and legitimacy. In the research framework presented in Chapter Three, it was emphasized that organizational legitimacy can be achieved and strengthened across borders. The same holds true for organizational efficiency. With regard to the ideal types of migrant organizations (see Table 1, Pries/Sezgin 2012) the organizational network and its resources can focus on the country of origin, the country of settlement, or both, as is assumed by the transnationalism approach. This study argues that a transnational organizational structure which ensures network and resource support in two or more national contexts can increase organizational efficiency. However, whether this also increases its legitimacy depends on the expectations prevalent in the institutional environment and the organizations’ member community. In a more generalized manner, it is therefore assumed, first, that external and internal actors and interest groups and their expectations can either support or hinder processes of organizational transnationalization. This assumption refers to the organizations’ members and their interests as well as to recent changes in the institutional environment both in the country of origin and the country of settlement. Second, it is argued that organizations can use transnationalization as a strategy if it is likely to increase their efficiency and legitimacy (cf. Rosenow-Williams 2012a; b). Organizational efficiency can be improved in a transnational setting through the creation of multiple resource flows which ensure the independence of the organization from one single donor. Organizational legitimacy can be increased through processes of decentralization of coordination in the countries of settlement (which involves a change from a

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hierarchical to a bottom-up structure to avoid accusations of being governed by actors, institutions or interest groups abroad). This is currently practiced by DITIB and IGMG. This study has also identified several examples of organizational adaptation of activities and identities to various border-crossing expectations on the regulative, normative, and cognitive levels, such as adaptation to multiple laws and institutional systems, the combination of value systems, the fulfillment of various cooperation expectations, and adaptation to frames of references that are part of distinct local discourses. Accordingly, the analyzed Islamic organizations try to relate to discourses that take place in and outside Germany. Depending on the expectations with which they are confronted, they focus on events in Turkey, the global Ummah, or the EU. Amiraux argues in a similar vein that as far as Turkish Islamic associations in Germany are concerned, the transnational dynamics become for them a working method and provide them with different types of resources (2003: 150).

Amiraux does not specify the types of resources, but refers more generally to the greater freedoms of religious participation and mobilization in the German context. Similarly, the TRAMO project also highlights the advantages of a “boomerang effect” for the Alevis’ demands on Turkey, which are made through the national level in the countries of settlement and the European level (Pries/Sezgin 2012). A Look into the Future Although nation states have recently been trying to “nationalize” their Muslim communities (Laurence 2006; Tezcan 2007) and require that Islamic organizations cut their ties to constituents abroad, the organizational reality discussed above shows a much more differentiated picture. On the one hand, the organizations evaluate the expectations and the opportunity structures in their countries of settlement, which can lead to structural and behavioral changes; on the other hand, the symbolic and functional ties to the country of origin cannot be cut easily due to expectations of organizational members and other stakeholders involved. This section describes this dilemma for DITIB and IGMG, which are confronted with different expectations and contextual factors, whereas ZMD, as a German Muslim interest organization, does not have enough institutionalized relations with actors abroad to meet the characteristics of a cross-border organization. ZMD occasionally meets with Muslim actors from abroad, which supports its legitimacy as a representative of



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the interests of German Muslims, but these meetings are not institutionalized and its membership in international and European umbrella organizations is rather loosely tied to its daily activities, which mainly concern the German context. According to Pries/Sezgin (2012; cf. Table 1), a transnational organization maintains a strong coordination of activities and structures between multiple countries without having a clear center and, thus, a high degree of decentralization. The Diyanet network has not yet achieved complete decentralization, due to the influence Diyanet still has on DITIB and similar organizations in other European countries. Like IGMG and its strong and influential headquarters in Cologne, both organizations are therefore examples of the ideal type of a global organization that is characterized by a clear center. DITIB and IGMG may yet develop into transnational organizations given the extent of organizational cross-border ties, the high degree of coordination, and the increasing decentralization discussed in both case studies. These possible trajectories are detailed below. Possible DITIB Trajectories In the case of DITIB, one can observe a trend toward organizational transnationalization and the end of a strong country-of-origin focus. This can be related to changing expectation structures in the institutional environment in Germany and Turkey as well as to changing members’ interest of the second and third generations of DITIB members. Although DITIB enjoys efficiency advantages (structural and financial support) and legitimacy advantages (moderate Islam, political neutrality) as a result of its institutionalized ties to Diyanet, the opportunity structures in Germany increasingly question this country-of-origin orientation. The German political expectations concerning organizational integration in the form of structural adaptation to the German church-state relations and the requested cultural acceptance of the German value order leave little room for DITIB’s traditional focus on Turkey. This leads to the traditional question faced by migrant communities: How to adapt to the environment without surrendering group identity? (Shaye/Frerichs 1993, cited in Vertovec 2003: 313).

Various outcomes are possible for DITIB’s organizational development in the long run. Germany’s expectations could become more important both on the efficiency and the legitimacy level because they are linked to new resource opportunities for DITIB. Vermeulen (2006) expects such a

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complete assimilation into the country of settlement. However, this scenario is not likely to occur as long as other interest groups demand a country-of-origin orientation with regard to structural ties, resource acquisition, activities, and identity formation. This is currently the case due to the institutionalized ties to Diyanet and the identity expectations of the first generation of Turkish emigrants, who are still active in the local DITIB mosques in Germany. Therefore, it is argued here that structural and symbolic ties to the country of origin will be maintained as long as they are expected by key interest groups that are relevant to the organizations. Consequently, DITIB is currently trying to reconcile conflicting expectations on the efficiency level through strategies of decentralization, resource acquisition from various sources in Germany and Turkey, the diversification of services, and the broadening of the organizational identity. The identity concept, for example, now follows the general trend in public German discourses from an ethnic Turkish organization toward an organization for all Muslims in Germany that also serves the immigrant community and the general public (see Chap. Five: DITIB and RosenowWilliams 2012a). Possible IGMG Trajectories IGMG, by contrast, is a genuinely European organization because it has branches in ten European countries. While the local mosque communities were originally joined through their support for the Millî Görüş movement in Turkey, in the 1990s these informal organizational ties developed into a hierarchical organizational structure with a dominant IGMG headquarters situated in Cologne. Due to the influence of IGMG headquarters on regional and national personnel questions, the organization has not yet achieved a complete decentralization as envisioned in the form of the ideal type of a transnational organization (Pries 2008a; Pries/Sezgin 2012). Nonetheless, studies on the Dutch context found that the Dutch IGMG associations have a certain degree of independence in their activities and their adaptation to local contexts and opportunities (Kortmann 2011; Mügge 2011). It was also found that a strong internal coordination of affairs exists across the European member organizations, which is the second characteristic of a transnational organization. IGMG depends heavily on the support of its members because it is unable to obtain public funding, at least in the German context. There­ fore,  internal interests are particularly relevant to IGMG. The German



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institutional environment strongly criticizes IGMG’s ties to Necmettin Erbakan and the political Millî Görüş movement in Turkey, and the organization has not yet cut theses ties officially due to its members’ interests and the expectations of Erbakan’s followers in Turkey. Despite the fact that neither IGMG’s legitimacy nor its efficiency in the German context is increased by this behavior, IGMG is likely to continue to maintain informal relations to Erbakan’s political movement, as long as related internal interests prevail and no (or very few) alternative resource opportunities (in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial resources) are available in the institutional settings of the European countries of settlement (cf. Rosenow-Williams 2012 b). Summary This brief overview of DITIB’s and IGMG’s relations with actors abroad shows that to develop an informed understanding of organizational behavior, it is helpful to consider the various expectations with which organizational decision makers are confronted. Expectations can be generated across borders, and their influence can vary depending on the degree of institutionalization of these cross-border ties. In addition, the organizational advantages of fulfilling these expectations can vary with regard to organizational efficiency or legitimacy. With regard to the previously described demands of the countries of settlement to end organizational cross-border relations, one can say that the extent of support for Islamic umbrella organizations in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial and other resources is likely to influence organizational behavior. This observation also holds true for transnational organizational fields which provide multiple opportunity structures and levels of expectation that transcend national borders. However, it should also be noted that cross-border orientation does not in itself hinder organizational integration in the country of settlement societies. Summary of Changes within the Organizational Field and Organizational Reaction Strategies This chapter has enlarged the focus of the organizational case studies by discussing the changing relationships of actors which are involved in this organizational field of Islamic umbrella organizations and the integration of Islam into German society. The discussion of the process of reciprocity has made clear that the Islamic umbrella organizations are not

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only influenced by their organizational environment, but also influence it through their organizational behavior. Therefore, Islamic umbrella organizations are among the key actors that compete over the definition power in their organizational field. Their development from organizational competition to organizational cooperation culminated in 2007 in the newly-established KRM. This development can be interpreted as a process of adaptation both to the demands of the German institutional environment and to internal interests. However, the subsequent implementation of KRM resembles more the strategy of decoupling. The single telephone number has been provided through the alternating KRM presidency, but the restructuring at the regional level and the status of a religious community are goals that have yet to be achieved. Concerning the changing relationships between the Islamic umbrella organizations and the political sphere in Germany, it was concluded that DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD employ three different framing strategies to legitimize themselves. The first frame concerns the emphasis on organizational representation, which is either justified by size (DITIB and IGMG), or by diversity of membership (ZMD). Second, the expected focus on the German context is realized by reducing transnational ties (DITIB), by focusing on organizational change (IGMG), or by stressing the organizational orientation toward a German Islam (ZMD). Third, the question of reputation leads to the strategy of public protest (IGMG), internal loyalty to its member organizations (ZMD), or emphasis on organizational success in the political sphere (DITIB). The analysis of the organizational media representation revealed that IGMG and ZMD portray themselves as religious interest organizations which lobby for the rights of the Muslim community in Germany, whereas DITIB shows little emphasis on claims-making issues. Rather, it has started to address the question of integration in its press releases. Concerning the comparison of Turkish and German content production, it was observed that DITIB uses bilingualism as a strategy to reach different target groups, while IGMG translates all of its public statements to meet the criteria of transparency. With regard to the relations with non-Muslim religious actors, the study found that the churches represent important role models for the Islamic umbrella organizations, but that the interreligious dialogue initiatives that have existed since the 1970s have had little impact on the current debates. The organizational field’s relations to the law enforcement agencies are characterized by two distinct developments. The political pressure on



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IGMG results in individual opposition, which is expressed in increasing protest behavior. The political strategy to include DITIB and ZMD is perceived by both organizations as an opportunity to gain public and political legitimacy through cooperation. It was also observed that relations with academic actors and German political parties have increased due to the increased interest in Islam in Germany, whereas relations with non-Muslim migrant organizations are generally decreasing due to resource competition and the consolidation of relations among the Islamic organizations. The analysis of the transnational relations between Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany and actors from abroad concluded that with regard to the demand of the German government to cut institutionalized cross-border relations, stronger support for organizational activities of Islamic umbrella organizations could motivate their orientation toward Germany. Currently, maintaining cross-border ties is efficient for both DITIB and IGMG despite legitimacy concerns. With regard to the structure and emergence of an organizational field (DiMaggio/Powell 1991b), it can be concluded that all four structuration criteria of an organizational field are fulfilled. First, an increase in the extent of interaction among the organizations was observed. This includes an increasing emphasis on attempts to cooperate with German actors, which can be linked to the political criticism of transnational organizational ties. Second, sharply defined organizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition have emerged as well. These are most prominent in the interorganizational relations, but also exist in other dialogue forums such as the DIK. Third, the increase in information load was confirmed by the organizational representatives, who had to adapt both the structures and the activities of their organizations to the increasing interest in the topic of “integrating Islam into Germany”. Fourth, the development of awareness among participants of the fact that they are involved in a common enterprise can be observed as well. This awareness was found among the four main Islamic umbrella organizations, but also between the organizations and other actors in the organizational field with which they cooperate. This awareness has promoted processes of cooperation, but also of confrontation, which are analyzed throughout this chapter and the three individual organizational case studies.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK The most general conclusion that derives from the application of organizational sociology to the study of Islamic umbrella organizations is that they have to reconcile internal and external expectations, while securing their legitimacy and efficiency in a constantly changing organisational field. The research shows that the interest of the three analyzed Islamic umbrella organizations in achieving further official recognition—which grants them legitimacy, status and financial assistance—facilitates their adaptation to political expectations. However, their willingness to cooperate may also become impaired when these external resources are perceived to be unavailable or unreachable, or when internal interests are in conflict with the perceived external expectations. The research began with the observation that the German institutional environment for Islamic organizations has undergone considerable changes since the turn of the 21st century. Both the changing migration regime and the security debates have directly addressed Muslims and their organizations, which have consequently acted and reacted to these developments, as outlined throughout this book. Until the end of the 1990s, Germany’s ruling parties did not consider Germany to be an immigration country, and (Muslim) immigrants were expected to eventually return to their countries of origin. Therefore, a certain distance between the political sphere and the representatives of the Islamic organizations could be confirmed, which has been described by Tietze as the period of “non-recognition” (2008; cf. Allievi 2005). However, the eventual acceptance of a permanent Muslim presence in Germany and recent changes in the political debate which moved the integration of Muslim communities to the top of the political agenda have changed the relationship between organized Muslims and German politics. New spaces of negotiation were initiated such as the German Islam Conference (DIK) in 2006 which influenced the activities and the status of Islamic umbrella organizations. The new venues for claims-making not only led to closer cooperation within the heterogeneous Muslim community, they also encouraged their

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professionalization, and facilitated their positioning in the political discourses on religious rights, equality, and the next steps towards the institutionalization of Islam in Germany. It was precisely these heterogeneous patterns of organizational behavior in response to the external changes in the organizational environment that were at the center of this research endeavor, a comparative study of three prominent Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany and their interactions with the other actors in their organizational field. Among the contrasting case studies which unite and represent the majority of the organized Muslim communities in Germany are two Turkish umbrella organizations—the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DITIB) and the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG)—as well as one multinational umbrella organization, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD). The research has shown how Islamic umbrella organizations claim their space in the political negotiations and actively shape their own role in the organizational field. This leads to increasing involvement in German public and political discourses. At the same time, it has been shown that the specific nature of involvement differs from organization to organization and from topic to topic. Therefore, Schiffauer’s observation that one cannot talk about the Islam in Germany (2003: 143) also holds true for the organized representatives of the Muslim community in Germany. In order to answer the question of how their organizational behavior is different from each other’s, the organizational reactions to five key political expectations were analyzed in detail throughout the three case studies. Based on a political document analysis, the following five expectations were extracted: to follow the law; to denounce Islamism and terrorism; to reject ‘parallel societies’ and promote integration; to adopt German values, and to organize and cooperate. These expectations characterize the political debate on the integration of Islam into German society in the first decade of the 21st century. They are closely interlinked with security concerns, as outlined in Chapter Four. Throughout this study, the relevance of these expectations for the Islamic umbrella organizations was tested and the underlying reason for different patterns of organizational behavior examined. Analyzing organizational reactions to this variety of external expectations can circumvent the limitations of previous studies, many of which have evaluated migrant organizations in terms of success or failure in promoting integration (e.g., Diehl et al. 1998; Worbs/Heckmann 2004).



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Without doubt, the question of integration plays an important role in pluralistic societies. However, this research has also shown that the simple political expectation “to integrate” is not sufficient to yield changes at the organizational and individual levels. Rather, integration must be the oftencited two-way process in which the actors understand each other, as well as the underlying constraints that influence the decision-making processes on either side. In order to facilitate this mutual understanding, the case studies portray a nuanced and up-to-date picture of the Islamic umbrella organizations and the relationships between them and with the multiple actors in their organizational field. The research framework, which is based on concepts from the sociology of organizations, decisively aided this process of understanding the organizational perception of their institutional environment, while simultaneously taking into account the internal organizational constraints that are described below. Applying Organizational Sociology to the Study of Islamic Organizations The aim of this research project was to open the “black box” of organizational behavior and to understand the motives and challenges of Islamic umbrella organizations in Western societies. The purpose of the analysis was to answer the question: “How and why do Islamic umbrella organizations interact with their organizational field?” On the one hand, this research design allows for an analysis of the differences and similarities between organizational responses to the changes in their institutional environment. On the other hand, the analysis of how they act is supplemented by the development of a theoretical framework that aims at explaining why they act the way they do. Combining Theoretical Approaches The research framework combines theoretical assumptions from neoinstitutionalism, contingency theory, and intermediary organization research. These approaches were chosen because they contribute key insights to the understanding of organizational behavior, which is influenced by both internal and external contextual factors and expectations. As outlined in Chapters Two and Three, neoinstitutionalism highlights the influences of the organizational environment and its expectations (cf. DiMaggio/Powell 1991), while contingency theorists stress the importance of organizational contextual factors—such as origin and history,

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ownership and control, size, the organization’s charter, technology, location, resources, and interdependence (cf. Pugh et al. 1976: 77ff.)—which can explain the differences in organizational behavior and the relevance of efficiency considerations. Finally, studies on intermediary organizations demonstrate the importance of organizational members and the logic of membership, which has to be reconciled with the logic of influence. While the logic of membership requires the organization to provide incentives for participation due to the organizations’ dependence on its members as a resource, the logic of influence requires the organization to exercise influence over public authorities and to extract resources from them in the form of legitimacy, status and financial assistance (cf. Schmitter/Streeck 1999). A review of the literature of organisational sociology shows that this combination of theoretical assumptions in one research framework provides three theoretical advancements. First, both neoinstitutionalism and the contingency approach were originally developed to study for-profit organizations and their adaptation to external demands. The research framework used in this study refines the theoretical tools and applies them to non-profit organisations. Second, by combining both approaches, for the first time, with the literature on intermediary organizations—with its characteristic focus on an organization’s members and their interests—this study emphasizes the complexity of expectations with which voluntary organizations are confronted. Third, the observed differences between the analyzed patterns of organizational behavior in response to the external and internal expectations show that organizations in general, and the organizations under study in particular, are much more flexible than expected by neoinstitutionalism and its assumption of organizational isomorphism, meaning the process of mutual adaptation among the main actors. Four Explanatory Variables Based on theoretical considerations and empirical observations, the research framework determined four explanatory variables that can explain the rather heterogeneous organizational development and responses to the external institutional environment. These differences could be explained by understanding the (1) differing internal and external expectations with which the organizations are confronted. Depending on the members’ interests, these expectations can



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lead to (2) different degrees of internal conflict. Moreover, the possibility to receive (3) external resources from the German government in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance (in contrast to a strong resource dependence on organizational members or actors and interest groups from abroad) also differs among the organizations, which decisively influence their adaptation to the political expectations in Germany. Finally, (4) the different contextual factors such as organizational history, charter, and independence, among others, are also identified as relevant explanatory variables for organizational behavior due to their strong influence on organizational trajectories. For the current political discourse, organizational independence is of particular importance because most Islamic organizations are expected to achieve stronger de-transnationalization. However, the study has identified the organizational advantages that are linked to a multiplicity of available sources of resources, including those available from abroad (cf. Chapt. Six: Relations with Actors Abroad). Three Patterns of Organizational Behavior Similarly, inspired by the linking of theoretical and empirical observations, this study shows that organizational behavior can take three different forms: adaptation, decoupling, and protest. Overall, this focus on a variety of external and internal expectations and differing organizational responses to these expectations not only leads to a differentiation of research perspectives, but also implies a nonmonolithic organizational profile. While a consensus between the organizations’ members’ interests and their environment may be reached in one area of demands leading to adaptation, other areas can remain contested and thus require further organizational decoupling or protest. In order to understand the diversity of organizational positions, it is therefore useful to study issue-specific frames and responses to particular expectations. Adaptation Adaptation to external expectations represents the traditional assumption of neoinstitutionalists, who expect an overall process of isomorphism—mutual adaptation of organizations in the same organizational field—due to regulative, normative, and mimetic pressures. Adaptation can be linked to Oliver’s (1991) strategy of acquiescing and is defined here as involving external and internal organizational changes. Changes at the external level refer to the establishment of new formal structures and the

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use of new frames of reference that are directed at the external environment. Changes at the internal level indicate that new formal structures also lead to new activities, and that externally employed arguments also influence internal activities and frames of reference. According to Hypothesis 1, adaptation is most likely when internal and external expectations are not conflicting with each other, or when the organization deliberately risks a conflict with its members to meet external demands. As has been shown, adaptation to the German institutional environment is all the more likely the more resource opportunities the organization can receive in return in the form of legitimacy, status and financial assistance. Such resources also reduce dependence on actors and institutions from abroad. Decoupling Decoupling is expressed through external adaptation that is not linked to internal changes (Meyer and Rowan 1991). It can be linked to Oliver’s strategies of moderate resistance—compromise and avoidance. In this study, cases of structural and rhetorical decoupling could be observed. One example of the former is the professionalization of the external affairs department, which buffers external expectations while enabling the often undisturbed continuation of day-to-day services. An example of rhetorical decoupling is the use of bilingualism to reach different target groups. According to Hypothesis 2, decoupling of external and internal expectations is expected to occur when both internal and external expectations are conflicting with each other, and when the organization strongly depends on resources provided both by its members and by the external environment. Overall, the study emphasizes that while decoupling is often judged as something negative from the point of view of the external organizational environment (as expressed in accusations such as “paying lip service” or “being the wolf in sheep’s clothing”), organizational sociology actually regards decoupling as a common pattern of organizational behavior and thus as a functional alternative which can reconcile conflicting expectations. In this study decoupling is analyzed only with regard to the level of the organizational headquarters and its representatives. From their point of view, decoupling can be a useful organizational strategy to deal with conflicting internal and external interests.



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Protest Protest is the strongest form of resistance to institutional expectations. It is associated with the need to meet the interests of the members of the organization, particularly when the organization is confronted with highly incompatible expectations. Therefore, a close examination of the internal demands can well explain why organizations frequently display protest behavior, especially if this conflict is combined with the following factors. According to Hypothesis 2, protest is most likely to occur if 1) the members’ interests and organizational goals are in fundamental conflict with the external expectations; if 2) the organization is marginalized; if 3) it has nothing to lose, and if 4) there is little chance that it will receive external resources (in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance). Again, with reference to Oliver (1991), protest behavior can include elements of defiance—the public denunciation of institutional pressures to conform to the expression of dissatisfaction in the sense of “voice” (Hirschman 1974)—and elements of manipulation in the sense of actively trying to influence the external expectations or their sources of power, for instance through the establishment of coalitions or the issuing of direct counter-statements. Empirical evidence was found for both hypotheses, as detailed below in the summary of empirical results. Organizational Trajectories Finally, with regard to the assumption of organizational trajectories, Hypothesis 3 assumes that decoupling will lead to organizational adaptation over time due to unintended effects or changes in members’ interests. Evidence for such a trajectory includes processes of professionalization within the external affairs departments which influenced the organizational behavior in other departments and levels of the organization. Similar processes occur with regard to organizational forms of cooperation, which may have started as mere window dressing, but eventually also required internal adaptation of organizational activities. Vermeulen’s study (2006) on the life cycle of migrant organizations showed similar results, concluding that organizational activities and struc­ tures shift during the various stages of the migration process. However, while Vermeulen assumes that organizations generally adapt themselves to the external environment in the long run, the concept presented in this research allows for continuing organizational heterogeneity and protest behavior. It is argued here that despite the fact that the organizational

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environment of the countries of settlement expects adaptation to its expectations, the possibility of confrontation and dissent remain for the organization as long as internal organizational interests contradict these external expectations. This research, therefore, contradicts the neoinstitutional assumption that organizational isomorphism is an inevitable process. Instead, organizational patterns of decoupling and protest are likely to occur in contexts where the constellation of explanatory factors, such as strong conflict between internal and external expectations, renders organizational adaptation unfeasible. Results from the Organizational Case Studies The application of the research framework to the study of the three Islamic umbrella organizations DITIB, IGMG, and ZMD has led to the following empirical results and revealed new insights into recent developments and underlying motives of organizational behavior in times of a changing institutional environment. DITIB’s Balancing Act The first case study analyzed the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DITIB). DITIB was founded in Germany in 1982 by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), primarily as a reaction to the success of Muslim organizations which were not affiliated with Diyanet or even outlawed in Turkey (Seufert 1999). Due to Germany’s interest in the establishment of a moderate Islam in Germany, the German government originally welcomed Diyanet’s engagement. Despite the fact that the strong cross-border ties are now increasingly scrutinized by German officials, DITIB has been the organization that has worked most closely with the German government. This is expressed in the fact that it receives financial assistance for various projects such as the training of dialogue representatives. In order to maintain its status as an official point of contact for and representative of its nearly 900 mosque communities in Germany, DITIB has a strong incentive to adapt itself to the external political expectations, a strategy that is also supported by low levels of perceived internal conflict regarding external political expectations. In line with these contextual factors, the study concludes that DITIB adapts its behavior to all of the analyzed political expectations. Due to



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organizational interests in the logic of influence and an increasing dependence on resources from the German government, this behavior can be expected to continue. DITIB has resorted to the option of decoupling only when it comes to protecting its hybrid identity as a Turkish organization in Germany. This is realized, for example, by using the option of bilingualism to announce various activities on the German and Turkish websites. At the same time, however, complete dissociation from the Diyanet remains unlikely due to the Diyanet’s remuneration of DITIB Imams, the history of DITIB in Germany and the existing bylaws which indicate the involvement of Diyanet. This study provided both a theoretical and an empirical analysis of the advantages of a transnational organizational identity, which secures organizational legitimacy and efficiency in two countries. Despite these internal advantages of its transnational profile, DITIB publicly emphasizes its disassociation from the Diyanet due to the political pressures exercised by the German government and parts of the Muslim community. The official emphasis on organizational independence is also linked to the current structural change of organizational decentralization into regional associations, which represent a tentative step in the direction of complete organizational independence from Diyanet. At the moment, however, DITIB remains caught up in a balancing act between its country of origin and its country of settlement. IGMG’s Repositioning The Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG), by contrast, is excluded from most external resources because it is watched by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The agency accuses the organization of having close ties to the political Millî Görüş movement in Turkey, which since the 1970s had been led by the Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan, who died in 2011. The negative public and political opinion with which IGMG has been confronted since its establishment during the 1970s also influences the attitudes of IGMG members. Both secondary studies as well as the interviews conducted for this research confirm that IGMG is internally divided with regard to integrative and segregative tendencies. In the face of the continuing surveillance of IGMG, the proponents of segregative tendencies within the organization expect a non-cooperative strategy with respect to the German institutional environment. The IGMG headquarters and the representatives interviewed, on the other hand, emphasize

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the organization’s willingness to integrate itself into the center of society. This intention is expressed in activities promoting local civic engagement of members and activities with a strong emphasis on education. According to the headquarters, this program is being implemented throughout the local IGMG communities. However, this study was not able to provide a closer examination of the local mosque communities. With regard to the patterns of organizational behavior, it can be concluded that a lack of external resource opportunities in the form of legitimacy, status, and financial assistance, and internal criticism of the organization’s marginalization facilitates IGMG’s protest behavior. Overall, no case of complete adaptation has been described, while partial adaptation, at least at the level of external affairs, is observed with regard to the issues of security and cooperation in general. The much-discussed demographic change among IGMG members presented an opportunity for organizational change regarding its structures, activities, and identity, which since the 1990s have increasingly been oriented to the European countries of settlement. This change involved a limiting of IGMG’s official political engagement in the country of origin, a development that is linked to a renewed emphasis on the organizational self-understanding as a religious community. On the one hand, this repositioning is motivated by the political opportunity structures in Germany, which have been granting more rights to Islamic organizations than to politically oriented ethnic migrant organizations1 since the shift in the political agenda after 9/11. On the other hand, such a religious organizational identity is also portrayed as meeting the interests and needs of IGMG members in Europe, who have decided to settle permanently in their former countries of arrival. The analysis has shown that IGMG is not a German organization but a truly European organization which is established in 11 EU countries. Therefore, it is not only influenced by the political changes in Turkey, but also by the various national contexts which it encounters in the countries of settlement. This transnational organizational character is readily apparent throughout IGMG’s internal structuration. Although IGMG’s influential headquarters is centered in Germany, its activities reach across the globe to underline its global Ummah perspective.

1 The influence of Turkish immigrant, workers’, religious, and ethno-national associations on the political level in Germany is discussed extensively in Yurdakul (2010) and Sezgin (2008b).



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Despite its origins as the European counterpart of a Turkish political movement, IGMG tries to detach itself from its national roots, a strategy Roy (2006a) regards as the de-culturation of religion. This IGMG strategy of tentative dissociation from its political claims in Turkey can be linked simultaneously to internal interests and to external political expectations concerning organizational de-transnationalization, which requires organizations’ independence of foreign political influence. ZMD’s Struggle for Recognition The Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), established in 1994, is the third Islamic umbrella organization analyzed for this research. A multinational interest organization that represents the interests of various Islamic organizations, it is highly dependent on the logic of influence. Therefore, in order to lobby successfully for its goals, ZMD tries to adapt to political expectations. At the same time, it also has to take into consideration the internal members’ interests and the logic of membership. These internal interests differ from the external expectations in that they facilitate the development of a (European) Islamic identity and the expected protest against perceived assimilation rhetoric. However, ZMD protest is more moderate than that of IGMG. With regard to the future development of ZMD’s demands for parity and exemption rights, this study assumes that both decoupling and protest behavior are likely to continue as long as ZMD continues to depend on the logic of membership due to a lack of official recognition as a religious corporation of public law or at least as a religious community. However, if the institutionalization of Islam in Germany can be achieved and solutions for current demands can be found at the level of the German federal states, then the ZMD’s focus of activities can be expected to change as well. It must be noted that this trajectory toward increasing adaptation to political expectations can be interrupted at any point if the availability of resources from the external environment is perceived as limited and the members’ interest demands public protest behavior instead. This was the case, for example, when ZMD refused to join the DIK II process. The ZMD case study shows that the Islamic umbrella organizations perceive cooperation and integration as a twofold process which also requires the implementation of changes at the level of religious governance in order to ensure the legal religious pluralism guaranteed by the German constitution.

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chapter seven Organizational Responses to Political Expectations: Similarities and Differences

All three organizations analyzed for this research stress the need to cooperate. The analysis of press releases, however, revealed that dialoguerelated achievements are most prominently stressed in DITIB’s and ZMD’s public affairs work. This observation is closely linked to their networks in the organizational field, in which the relationships are far closer than the relationships between IGMG and non-Muslim actors due to IGMG’s marginalization and subsequent exclusion from joint projects. Differences between the organizations also exist in their approaches to the fight against terrorism. On the one hand, the organizations jointly condemn any form of terrorism and have repeatedly expressed this opinion publicly. On the other hand, with regard to the degree of cooperation with the law enforcement agencies and the advantages or disadvantages associated with this dialogue, their positions differ greatly, with IGMG being the most confrontational organization. Furthermore, the need to follow the Basic Law and the expectations to integrate and to reject parallel societies are also prominent in the rhetoric of all three organizations. While they handle the integration of these expectations into everyday organizational activities differently, the organizations are well aware that fulfilling of both expectations can promote their political legitimacy. Nonetheless, only DITIB and ZMD publicly adapt to the expectation “to follow the Basic Law” (for example, in their mission statements), while IGMG openly protests against the accusation made by the German security authorities that it does not follow the Basic Law. With regard to the expectation to integrate and reject parallel societies, it was found that the organizations generally support the integration paradigm but criticize its assimilative character, arguing that it leaves no room for hybrid identities. While their fight for the institutionalization of Muslim rights is often perceived in the public discourse as an attempt to establish parallel societies, the organisations’ demands follow the logic of membership. A similar internal dilemma exists with regard to the German value order. In the context of these debates, all three analyzed organizations stress their own cultural heritage and the role of Islam in their everyday activities. They argue that Islam does not contradict the values enshrined in the German Basic Law, which they respect and to which they adhere.



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However, the general debate on a German ‘Leitkultur’ (‘core culture’) is viewed with suspicion, although again it is mainly IGMG that publicly protests against the Leitkultur discourse in its official statements. DITIB and ZMD rather quietly choose the decoupling strategy and reconcile the contradicting expectations by establishing a hybrid identity to combine a (Turkish) Muslim identity with the societal norms practiced in Germany. The above shows that, generally speaking, the three Islamic umbrella organizations act as interest organizations lobbying for Muslim rights in an increasingly visible organizational field. They thus reject the assumption that Islamic organizations present a danger to Germany’s security and social cohesion. The results of this study reveal an organizational field which is by no means homogeneous. Although Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany were founded more or less simultaneously during the 1970s and 1980s, the organizational field is characterized by a rather heterogeneous development and different reactions to the external institutional environment. In the future, political and other actors who deal with organized Muslims in Germany must take this diversity into consideration in forming expectations. The division into “good” and “bad” Muslims that is linked to security concerns, but implicitly also refers to the extent of public protest behavior exercised by Islamic organizations must be criticized as well. This study shows that, from the organizations’ point of view, protest represents a legitimate strategy in times of conflicting internal and external expectations and limited external incentives for compliance. With regard to the overall degree of protest, it can be concluded that DITIB is the least involved in making public demands, whereas IGMG and ZMD publicly voice their criticism of the German government, although IGMG’s press releases are not only far more numerous than those issued by ZMD, but also much more direct in their criticism. The organizations are also united in their fight against religious discrimination, which is linked to their demands concerning the implementation of religious rights for Muslims in the German institutional system. The public voicing of demands can be seen as the often expected civic engagement of organizations with a migration background, which have been criticized for their limited political engagement in the past (Jungk 2002). In the end, it remains for civil society, including the Islamic organizations, the political elites, and the courts, to decide how the integration of Islam into German society should be shaped in the future. To what

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extent the non-organized mosque communities or even non-organized Muslim believers can be integrated into this process remains an open question, along with the still negotiated distribution of decision and definition power within this organizational field. Open Questions, Shortcomings, and Future Research Agenda While the research framework presented here has put a spotlight on the challenges and constraints faced by Islamic umbrella organizations, open questions and methodological shortcomings of this research approach remain. The most important ones observed throughout the research process are described in the following. Addressing Research Limitations First, the author acknowledges that it is impossible to “know” everything about the research object. Nonetheless, an attempt to “understand” it is the first step toward a more objective and informed discussion of the research subject. Therefore, to learn more about the organizational behavior of Islamic umbrella organizations, this research was guided by theoretical assumptions which developed and changed throughout the research process, culminating in the research framework presented in Chapter Three, which allows for a comparative analysis of contrasting examples of Islamic umbrella organizations. Second, with regard to the issue of “understanding”, the author concedes that ethnographic or sociological in-depth case studies, which spend more time dealing with their research object than it was possible throughout this research process, allow the researcher to gain more detailed insights into the organizational developments. Although the representatives interviewed provided profound insights into their organizational affairs, members of the organization or an “embedded” ethnographer could probably decipher the underlying motives that prompt the organizational way of doing things even better. It would therefore be interesting to see to what extent the explanatory variables outlined in this research framework can be confirmed or improved by anthropological studies on Islamic organizations. For IGMG, such an organizational ethnography was available (Schiffauer 2010) and proved to be very inspirational during the development of this research framework, since it clearly outlined the dimension of members’ interests and their possible internal divisions.



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Third, the question of language often arises when studying cultures and ethnic groups. Due to the generational change among the organizational representatives, proficiency in German was not a problem among the representatives interviewed at the organizational headquarters. The resulting bias toward younger interview partners (the oldest being 41) has been discussed as part of the current organizational reality, which is characterized by the presence of younger activists in the executive functions. Whether different results would have been reached with other interview partners remains an open question for any qualitative and quantitative research, which always has to take into account the personal biography of both the interviewees and the researcher. Overall, however, the answers were perceived as being rather explicit, and the distance between the researcher and the organizational field could also be seen as an advantage with regard to the request for objectivity and neutrality. Fourth, with regard to the combination of methodologies employed, critical voices often argue that one cannot trust what organizations and their representatives say about themselves because they usually try to portray themselves in a positive light, so their organizational reality may be completely different from how they describe it. This “wolf in sheep’s clothing” rhetoric can be found both in the media and in the political discourse. However, instead of questioning the truth of the information provided in press releases or interview passages, this research has tried to untangle the underlying motives that prompted these organizational statements. Consequently, the material is evaluated with reference to the organizational interests and the expectations of external and internal actors and interest groups. It should be noted that the combination of reactive and non-reactive methods (e.g., interviews and document analyses), bilingual press release analyses, and the overall multiplicity of the primary and secondary documents analyzed (e.g., organizational press releases, websites, member magazines, and posters versus secondary studies and reports about the analyzed organizations) allowed for the validation of research results on various levels. Fifth, it must be acknowledged that further studies would be useful, especially on organizational members and their interests. The scope of this study was limited to perceived members’ interests, since the focus was on the behavior of the organizational elites, which is influenced by their perception of the internal and the external organizational reality. However, a quantitative empirical analysis could clarify to what extent local members’ interests match those perceived by the representatives interviewed at the organizations’ headquarters.

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chapter seven Identifying Future Research Agendas

There is insufficient data available about the diversity of the Muslim community. Their development should be analyzed with regard to civic engagement, social and political orientation, and changing interests both in their countries of settlement and their countries of origin. This study revealed, among other things, that the Islamic umbrella organizations acknowledge the potential of their female membership; more women than ever are active at the organizations’ headquarters (at least at DITIB and ZMD). To what extent this trend is also evident at the local level and in other organizations and countries, and what differences between male and female members’ interests actually exist would surely warrant further qualitative and quantitative research.2 Certain organizational services such as the telephone hotline provided by DITIB would be interesting research objects as well. Provided that such sensitive data were made available, one could learn more about the members’ interests, the internal communication structure, and the nature of the social services that are increasingly being offered by Islamic organizations in addition to other religious or secular welfare organizations. Comparative studies should also examine whether the above conclusions also hold true across various areas of the organizations. This includes comparative studies on the international, national, regional, and local levels. An assessment should be made as to whether the theoretical assumptions can also be applied to other organizations in general. Some comparative studies of cross-border ties of Islamic organizations have been conducted (Mügge 2011; Pries/Sezgin 2012). Transnational research approaches are particularly interesting in light of changing political expectations which have been described in detail by Laurence (2006) as an attempt to “de-transnationalize” Muslims in Europe. In addition, a cross-country comparison should be conducted of the 30 regional associations of IGMG and their associated mosque communities to test the assumption of a hierarchically structured organization with strong influence exerted by the organizational headquarters in Cologne. The overall development with regard to detachment from the political Millî Görüş movement in Turkey is another interesting field of research in light of multiple and often conflicting expectations.

2 At the time of writing there is only one unpublished study on women at IGMG for the German context (Amir-Moazami 2009).



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Similarly, it remains to be seen how the restructuring of DITIB at the regional level will influence the organization’s decision-making processes and its relationship to Diyanet. DITIB’s efforts to become officially recognized as a religious community or perhaps a religious corporation of public law independent from the other Islamic umbrella organizations should also be the focus of future research in this organizational field (DITIB PR 19-July-2012). Issues of public recognition also concern ZMD, which has lobbied for a unified approach of all mosque communities to establish regional structures under the umbrella of a joint Islamic religious community. Nevertheless, as of September 2010, ZMD has also finally appointed its own regional contact partners. More research is also needed on ZMD member organizations and their heterogeneous interests, which have not been analyzed in detail. However, further research should not just focus on the organizational case studies portrayed alone, but also and especially on the interrelations between the various actors in the organizational field that spans across national borders. Interreligious dialogue has received some research attention, but the relations with non-Muslim migrant organizations or the increasingly competitive relationship with the German welfare organizations are still understudied. Linkages to the EU level and the resulting opportunities for organizational lobbying for religious affairs also deserve scientific attention, given the changes that are currently taking place in this area (Greschner 2011; Koenig 2007b, Pries/Sezgin 2012, Tuncer-Zengingül forthcoming). Finally, a trans-Atlantic comparison of Islamic umbrella organizations would further illuminate the opportunities for organizational lobbying and the possible differences in organizational self-representation of mosque communities in a traditionally pluralistic society (Azzaoui 2009). Overall, Germany presents an interesting case study due to its late political acknowledgment of Muslims in Germany and their demands for recognition. The recent political attempts to tackle the issue of integration through the organized representatives of the Muslim communities is not a German invention, but has been practiced in various European countries. Some cross-national comparisons that study the institutionalization of Islam in different European nation states exist (Koenig 2005, 2009; Laurence 2006; Sezgin/Rosenow-Williams 2013; for a comparison of the Netherlands and Germany see Kortmann 2011; Mügge 2011; Yükleyen 2012). However, negotiations between the state and Muslim representatives are still ongoing and are often characterized by a fluidity of coalitions on the

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local, regional, and national levels, not only in Germany, but in many EU member states. For the German case, the volatility of this emerging organizational field has been described in detail throughout this study and is further discussed below (see also Rosenow/Kortmann 2011). The Future Development of the Organizational Field This research has provided an overview of the political and organizational efforts that have been made to promote the integration of Islam into German society since the turn of the 21st century. Since then, the issuespecific organizational field surrounding the integration of Islam into Germany has increasingly been structured according to the four characteristics of organizational fields described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991). Increasing Mutual Awareness in the Context of Integration and Security Debates First, the research has shown that the actors have increased their extent of interaction since the turn of the century, which includes more cooperation between the Islamic organizations as well as with non-Muslim actors. Second, sharply defined organizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition have emerged as well, although these coalitions have not turned into stable and institutionalized structures due to their emerging character with regard to the coalition among Islamic organizations and other dialogue forums such as the DIK. Third, the increase in information load is confirmed by the organizational representatives. In response, the Islamic umbrella organizations have adapted their organizational structures and their activities to the increasing public and political interest in them. Fourth, the development of awareness among participants of the fact that they are involved in a common enterprise can be observed as well. This awareness was observed not only in the Islamic umbrella organizations, but also with regard to their cooperation with the other actors in the organizational field. But what does this mutual awareness lead to? And what can be learned from the ongoing negotiations on the issue of institutionalizing Islam in Germany, negotiations which have not come to any conclusion after a decade of intensified exchange and after nearly four decades since the establishment of Islamic umbrella organizations in Germany? The research has shown that aspects of religious pluralization and equality of religious faiths remain contested. The topics of Islam as a



conclusion and outlook471

religion and Muslims as citizens or residents have been linked, on the one hand, to the concepts of integration and security and, on the other hand, to discourses on secularization and the status of the established churches. The fact that these linkages are debatable and often ignore the long history of Muslim life in Germany, which is far more integrated and peaceful than the fear-laden debates since 9/11 have sometimes made us believe, has been discussed throughout this study. Pending Issues of Official Recognition With regard to the discourse on secularization, it was found that the Islamic organizations’ demands for the recognition of Muslim claims actually meets the interests of the other religious denominations concerning the integration of religion into German society. Nevertheless, efforts to achieve the acknowledgement of Islamic organizations as religious communities and, eventually, as corporations of public law are still met with opposition from many sides. Since earlier attempts to receive official recognition by the government were largely unsuccessful,3 being treated like the established churches still remains an unfulfilled goal for Islamic umbrella organizations. While some steps toward the acknowledgment and granting of rights for Muslims in Germany have been undertaken in courts,4 by expert councils,5 and in the political debates (DIK 2009), in most cases implementation at the regional state level (Bundesländer) is still pending. The current political approach aims at dealing with practical demands such as the introduction of imam training in Germany on a case-by-case basis. This process is supposed to be guided by informal negotiations at the federal level, such as the DIK I and II. This approach would become 3 Only the Islamic Federation in Berlin (IFB) and AABF have been acknowledged as religious communities and have been granted the right to offer religious education in public schools (Jonker 2002b, DIK 2009b). In the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, negotiations with the KRM members are currently underway (DITIB PR 24-Feb-2011) and in Hesse the state acknowledged DITIB Hesse and the regional Ahmadiyya Association as religious communities to start negotiations on the introduction of Islamic religious education in the near future (DITIB PR 19-July-2012). 4 The right of Islamic umbrella organizations to be recognized as religious communities, which is a prerequisite for being able to offer religious education according to Article 7 (3) of the Basic Law, was acknowledged by the Federal Administrative Court in 2005 (BVerwG 6 C 2.04, 23-Feb-2005). 5 In 2010 the science council supported the establishment of Islamic Studies programs at German universities. Teachers are now educated there, who can provide the envisioned Islamic religious education—a development that will influence state level negotiations on Islamic religious education.

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obsolete if more binding structural solutions could be established which do justice to the described heterogeneity of the organizational field. It has been discussed that such a restructuring should consider the individual mosque communities as the smallest organizational unit (Azzaoui 2011; see also Chapter Six: Relations among Islamic Umbrella Organizations). It remains to be seen to what extent a bottom-up structuring involving the entire heterogeneous landscape of mosque communities in a democratically structured regional and federal Islamic Religious Community can be feasible, considering that the first attempts in this direction have failed. With regard to the question of official recognition of Islamic umbrella organizations, one can say that, from a legal point of view, such a unification process is actually unnecessary, as the often drawn parallel to the existing denominations shows. The Jewish community is represented not only by the Central Council for Jews (ZJD) in Germany, but also by various other smaller groups, and the Christian community is represented by the Protestant and the Catholic Churches in Germany, as well as by various smaller Christian congregations, all of which have achieved the status of religious corporations of public law. Therefore, the request for a “single telephone number” should not be upheld as an argument of mere convenience, while the issue of representativeness is not a legal argument per se either (cf. Azzaoui 2011). Although technical prerequisites and legal concerns regarding organizational independence, stability and transparency, and adherence to the Basic Law are appropriate, general political expectations and discourse should be exempt from the political decision-making process with respect to the official recognition of Islamic organizations. The Volatility of the Organizational Field Overall, the research has revealed a high amount of volatility within the organizational field, which is expressed in changing coalitions, new discourses, and the emergence of political expectations to which the actors have to respond. With regard to the status quo of the question of integrating Islam into German society, one can conclude that the loose negotiation process as practiced within the DIK was originally perceived as a good start, despite the increasing criticism from the Muslim organisations and other actors concerning its second phase, which began in 2010 (see, e.g., KRM PR 10-Mar-2010; ZMD PR 10-May-2010).



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The discussions must now continue at the level of the federal states, which are responsible for issues such as Islamic religious education in public schools. If regional cooperation between the state and the organized Muslim community were to fail in the near future, the window of opportunity for the institutionalization of Islam in Germany as one of the many world religions might close. Developments such as rising Islamophobia (Heitmeyer 2010), a volatile political climate, and growing irritation among the Muslim community and its representatives are only some of the difficulties this process has faced. The author of this research supports the political statements of the former German President Christian Wulff on the day of the twentieth anniversary of the German reunification in 2010 and of the former Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble during the inauguration of the German Conference of Islam in 2006, who publicly emphasized the long established fact that “Islam is a part of Germany”. Moreover, this declaration should be made more specific to assert that “Islamic organizations are a part of Germany”. This includes local mosque communities, regional Shura bodies, and Islamic umbrella organizations. All of these organizations can function as points of contact and bridge builders between the Muslim and the non-Muslim population. It is therefore important to recognize their challenges and their solution strategies in a constantly changing organizational field with its multitude of expectations. In order to promote this mutual understanding, this research has provided important insights into the complexity of organizational behavior in the context of internal and external expectations from a novel perspective of organizational sociology, which explores not only how Islamic organizations act, but also why they act the way they do.

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INDEX OF SUBJECTS 21st century 1f., 8, 22, 61, 90, 106, 115ff., 130, 161, 201f., 250–257, 312, 354, 358ff., 373f., 393, 425, 444, 453ff., 470 9/11 (September 11 2001) 21, 23, 121–161, 174, 204, 237, 299, 304, 308, 311, 315, 338, 397, 425–431 Academia 59, 98, 106, 426, 432ff., 437f. Alevi 3, 20, 87, 91f., 109, 160, 164f., 169ff., 269, 355ff., 441ff., 446 Assimilation 17f., 69, 104, 131f., 146ff., 159, 242f., 250, 294, 298, 316f., 342, 347, 448 Associations Theory Logic of membership 6, 50f., 67, 81f., 341f., 344, 383, 456, 463f. Logic of influence 6, 50f., 67, 81, 248, 305, 337, 342ff., 347ff., 378, 383, 391ff., 404, 438, 456, 461ff. Basic Law 103, 110, 115n, 116, 121, 148, 154ff., 161, 179, 227ff., 236f., 289ff., 298ff.,333, 337ff., 346ff., 362, 369, 386n. 388, 400–412, 421n, 427–430, 464, 472 Bavaria 91n, 109, 165, 184, 252n, 271n Berlin 3, 13f., 91f., 109, 165, 190, 196, 212, 213n, 223, 252n, 271n, 329, 363, 383, 386n, 398, 426, 428n, 471n Church as an actor 57f., 98, 109, 111, 146, 231–234, 309f., 312, 335, 352, 382, 416–424 Christian 17, 108, 171, 202, 211, 222, 385, 398, 421 Church member 32 Church-state relations 2f., 17, 59, 107f., 211, 253, 386, 416–424, 445, 447 Established 55, 211, 424, 471f. Role model 111, 213f., 241, 280, 315, 326, 245, 385, 416f., 421ff., 450 Citizenship Dual 115f., 116n17, 160, 407 German 116ff., 294, 341 Law 116, 145, 158n, Naturalization 115f., 126, 259, 294, 298, 431 Test 116, 150, 160, 361f., 366 Contingency Approach 4, 6, 12, 33, 42–46, 67, 89, 103f., 455f.

Aston school 43ff., 63ff., 89, 346 Contextual factors Charter 29, 44ff., 64, 178, 430, 438–442 Interdependence 44, 66, 178, 186, 220, 372, 438 Location 31, 44, 65, 89, 32f., 215, 317 Origin and history 44, 63, 186, 198, 317, 434, 438 Ownership and control 44, 63f., 66, 178, 186, 220, 438 Resources 23, 26f., 35, 41, 44f.,48ff., 65ff., 75–82, 88n, 178, 187, 198, 202–225, 239, 245–248, 273, 277, 286ff., 293ff., 320–349, 372f., 378, 383, 391–399, 408, 420–424, 433, 437f., 445–449, 457f.,461ff. Size 42–46, 64, 89, 92f., 201–205, 215–220, 273, 304, 372, 385, 450 Technology 42–45, 65 Corporation of public law 3, 17, 55, 107ff., 153,191, 209n51, 211n, 256, 261, 272, 307ff., 319, 322, 344, 349, 359, 368n, 380, 422n, 463, 469 Country of origin 1, 14, 26ff., 57–63, 74, 88–92, 103, 145, 149, 159, 171, 174ff., 179ff., 187–200, 213, 228–232, 242–249, 249–253, 260, 265ff., 287–291, 346, 377, 387–415, 442, 445–448, 461f. Country of settlement 1, 21, 26n, 58, 61f., 66, 74, 88–96, 174–180, 186f., 198ff., 213, 248, 262–267, 391, 442n57, 445–449, 461 Day of the Open Mosque 222, 297, 311, 328, 332f., 335, 401, 429 Dialogue Interreligious and intercultural 153, 159, 206ff., 223ff., 239, 247, 419, 422, 437 Discrimination 91f., 110, 118f., 141–144, 150, 173f., 223, 226, 231, 246, 275, 283f., 301, 316f., 339, 347, 356, 371, 377, 392f., 397, 403, 408, 428, 431, 436, 465 Efficiency 8, 12, 31, 40–46, 56, 60, 62ff., 70n,73, 198, 366, 445–449, 453, 456 Expectations Conflicting 53, 75–84, 241–246, 251, 278, 292–303, 305, 340–344, 438

512

index of subjects

External 4, 9, 27, 38, 41, 50f., 75–84, 101ff., 187, 198, 308, 328, 346–350, 443–449, 453–466 Internal 9, 31, 49–51, 75–84, 91, 98, 172–187, 240f., 328, 363ff., 453–466 Institutional 5, 7, 12, 35, 38–46, 75–84, 98, 149, 272 Political 2, 5, 8, 86, 103, 144–160, 188, 236–249, 292–303, 336–350, 359, 363ff., 391,400–416, 427–438, 444–447, 453–466 German culture ‘Leitkultur’ 9n, 132, 146–149, 153, 159, 301f., 341, 348, 465 German federal states 3n, 91, 108f., 127, 157, 205, 211, 213f., 219, 272, 275n, 296, 322, 327,345, 355, 377, 390, 463 German government 55–58, 81, 86f., 90, 101ff., 107, 113–120, 145, 149–162, 174, 190, 195, 200f., 231, 242–248, 293, 303f., 334–337, 343–348., 359–366, 374–380, 423, 444, 457, 460f., 465 German parliament 121, 145, 149f. German politics 13, 145ff., 364, 375f., 386f., 392, 416, 453 Guest workers Agreement 14f., 112ff. Former 181, 262, Recruitment ban 15n, 61, 113, 200 Hamburger Prozess 328f., 340, 358–365, 368 Headscarf 91, 184f., 284, 294, 332, 356, 373, 408 Integration Courses 117–119, 160 Of Islam 1, 5, 8, 17, 305, 338, 375, 388n, 454, 465 Policies 2, 105, .249 Promote 11f., 16ff., 28, 158f., 227, 231. 242, 293f., 341f., 399–416 Summit 120ff., 151, 155, 160, 207n47, 246, 383 Interview Analysis 97–100 Guideline 96f. Methodology 93–100 Partners 93–96, 467 Sample 93–96 Imams From Turkey 194f., 199, 212–216, 248, 270, 286 Recruitment 268ff., 326

Salary 194, 198, 199n, 210f., 215, 248, 273, 348, 461 Training 181f., 194, 197, 285, 325 Islam Five pillars 20, 170, 308, 331 Friday prayer 170, 249, 266, 285n112, 287, 300, 385, 430 Islamic culture 137, 148, 313 Islamic religious education 3, 92n, 109, 145, 191, 196, 211ff., 319, 327, 367, 377, 386, 421, 471n5 Islamization 15f., 23, 127f., 135, 161, 260, 313, 363 Islamophobia 140–144, 161, 343, 371, 408, 473 Legal status 17, 106–111, 146, 380 Qur’an 14, 20, 170, 254, 282, 302, 313, 338 Qur’an courses/classes 15, 230, 262, 283 Sermons 192, 195, 198, 230, 245, 250 Shiite 29, 87, 109, 167ff., 171, 306, 314, 419 Sunni 3n, 22, 29, 87, 91f., 109, 160, 164, 171, 187, 233, 314, 357, 419, 441 Law enforcement agencies 98, 161n36, 174f., 179, 238, 275, 295–300, 329, 334–339, 348, 376, 383, 425–431, 450, 464 Media Relations 23, 161, 252, 283, 300, 311, 317, 319, 325, 335, 353, 358, 393–399, 429 Reports 135–140, 161, 200f., 216, 377, 399–416, 450, 467 Members Interests 6, 8, 12, 30, 35, 41, 46–57, 66f., 77–83, 85, 88, 91, 98, 103, 163, 172–187, 201, 230, 240, 250, 262, 267, 278, 297, 341, 345–350, 363, 378, 387, 391, 445–449, 456–459, 463–468 Magazines 78, 80, 100–103, 217f., 228ff., 242, 275f., 324, 408–416 Migration History 1ff., 13–18, 111–119, 180 Regime 61, 106, 111–120, 180, 453 Statistics 1, 14, 112–116 Mosque Mosque community 64, 183f., 213n57, 214–217, 233, 253, 274, 335, 338, 367 Independent mosque community 306, 320, 379 Mohammed Cartoon Controversy  361f., 366 Muslims Cemeteries 333, 373 Number 1, 14, 15n, 19, 21, 65, 165–169, 172



index of subjects513 Organizations 66, 98, 100n, 161n36, 181n, 194n, 200n, 419n34, 442n56, 460 Women 21, 94, 142, 184f., 240, 284, 284n109, 428 Youth 95, 106, 152, 172, 182f., 124, 217n, 221, 243, 249, 253f., 273, 283ff., 331, 423

Neoinstitutionalism Adaptation 67–73, 78–84, 107, 236–241, 292f., 337–340, 457 Decoupling 73f., 79–84, 241–245, 293, 293–297, 340ff., 458 Isomorphism 34, 68–72, 107, 279, 350, 456, 468 Legitimacy 5, 8, 12, 33–41, 48–82, 89f., 100f., 106ff.,133f., 169–172, 198, 201, 204f., 219, 238, 240, 293, 299, 301, 337–366, 372–391, 431, 445–451, 453–464 Institutional environment 5f., 38ff., 56–60, 67–84, 100–104, 105–162, 204f., 219, 303, 345, 347–350, 360–366, 372–377, 391, 401, 447–450, 453–465 North Rhine-Westphalia 3n, 19n5, 22, 109,127, 127n, 165, 212n, 233n75, 272, 309, 317, 327, 362, 384, 418, 436, 471n3 Organization Organizational change 17, 83f., 93, 98f., 175, 185, 187, 198–207, 220, 240, 251, 261n, 261–267, 310f., 316 Organizational development 2, 8, 96, 98f., 199–203, 239, 252f., 336, 447, 456 Organizational field 4n4, 5ff., 30f.,41, 56.59, 34n13, 36ff., 56–59, 62, 66–72, 84–87, 100, 103f., 106, 145, 162ff., 189, 203ff., 219, 235, 275, 289, 291f., 296, 325, 327f., 345, 351–358, 362–366, 390ff., 399f., 432, 434, 437–440, 449ff., 454f., 464–467, 469–473 Organizational representative 56, 59, 77, 93f., 158, 172, 176f., 183, 236, 266, 281, 324, 364, 366, 370f., 374, 379, 382, 395, 420, 432, 435f., 467 Organizational structure 15, 31. 36f., 42–46, 63, 66 70, 86, 89, 108, 163, 170, 186, 190, 200, 211–216, 269, 272, 274, 281, 296, 304, 320, 351, 422, 445, 448, 451, 470 Organizational trajectories 29, 82ff., 246–249, 302f., 344f., 349, 405f., 444–449, 459f.

‘Parallel Society’ 146, 147, 156f., 177, 202, 242, 293f. Patterns of organizational behavior 4, 6f., 41, 53, 55, 67, 68, 81f., 86, 93, 99f., 104, 174, 236–249, 292–303, 336–350, 457–460, 464ff. POS (Political Opportunity Structure) 24, 26, 204 Press releases Bilingual 101ff., 244, 226–228, 276, 289ff., 299, 300, 353, 409–413 German 218, 218n, 229, 230, 242, 290f., 333, 399–413 Turkish 218, 218n, 291, 409–413 Professionalization 8, 71f., 79, 101, 161f., 188, 202, 206ff., 220f., 226, 229f., 239, 250, 263, 282, 287, 311, 327, 330f., 345, 349, 454, 458f. Protest 8, 67ff., 75–78,80ff., 88, 100, 107, 127, 241ff., 245–249, 251, 297–303, 305, 316f., 326, 330, 340–350, 371, 375, 379, 390, 392, 417, 428–431, 436, 441, 450f., 459–465 Public Civil Society 3, 119, 152, 201, 204, 352, 404, 465 Public relations 48, 65, 95, 206, 209, 216, 244, 280f., 287f., 304, 311, 399, 408, 416, 422 Religion Religious community 20, 54, 87, 90f, 92n, 109, 160, 165, 176, 191, 195, 205, 211f., 219, 250, 253, 259, 261, 265f., 265n, 272f., 282f., 296, 303, 319, 333, 355, 357ff., 367f., 380f., 383, 386n, 406, 422, 469, 472 Religious holiday 103, 326 Religious practice 15, 19, 20f., 25, 91, 143f., 184, 190, 270, 273, 295, 298, 302, 331 Representation Interest representation 18, 54, 64, 178, 283, 291, 324f. Research Framework 4, 6f., 12, 31, 41, 43, 46, 53f., 59, 73, 77f., 81, 85f., 90, 103, 163f., 172, 188, 236, 245f., 297, 336 Hypothesis 78f., 81–84, 104, 238, 349, 458f. Methods 84–103, 467 Question 4ff., 77n, 103, 145, 187f. Ritual slaughter 178, 307, 326, 333, 343, 373, 408

514

index of subjects

Security Legislation 120, 122, 161, 375 Securitization 128–135, 161, 300, 363, 425, 429 TCN (Third-Country Nationals) 118, 160, 299 Terrorism TBG (Counter-Terrorism Act) 107n1, 124f. TBEG (Act Supplementing the Counter-Terrorism Act) 107n1, 124 Terrorist Attack 1f., 16, 21, 117, 122, 129, 140, 142, 144, 149, 173f., 175n, 252, 288, 299, 329, 361ff., 364, 366, 393, 403, 408, 417, 425, 429, 436 Threat 122ff., 126–135, 137, 142, 150, 152, 154, 157, 158f., 175, 175n19, 241, 254n92, 300f., 314, 316, 361, 376, 396, 403, 418, 426, 429ff.

Transnationalism Cross-border organizations 26, 249, 271, 446 Transnational organizations 26, 188, 198, 255, 281, 354, 355n, 445–451, 461f. Transnational ties 22, 62f., 252, 256, 386, 390, 422, 444, 450 Turkey Politics 186–200, 250–261, 272f., 364f., 441f. Country of origin 16, 89–92, 145, 175f, 181, 187f., 191–200, 232, 242ff., 250–253, 260, 265ff., 287, 291, 346, 408, 442, 461 Turkish language 145, 175, 195, 230, 242, 265, 276, 401 Turkish identity 173f., 179, 182, 341 Xenophobia 138, 141f.

INDEX OF ORGANIZATIONS AABF (Federation of the Alevi Communities in Germany) 3n, 87–91, 109, 160, 165, 169ff., 233, 355f., 362, 379, 440f., 471n3 AAGB (Union of the Alevi Youth in Germany now BDAJ) 169n16 ACK (Consortium of Christian Churches in Germany) 222, 329, 418n28 ADÜTDF (Federation of TurkishDemocratic Idealist Associations in Europe) 165 AMGT (Union of the Millî Görüş in Europe now IGMG) 167, 255ff., 305 ATIB (Turkish-Islamic Union in Europe) 22n, 88, 165f., 170, 179, 305, 322, 325, 442n56 ATIB (Turkish Islamic Union for Cultural and Social Cooperation in Austria) 194n, 209n51, 227n BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) 1n, 19f., 115n, 117, 161n36, 169n15, 170, 211, 214, 224, 247, 362n, 399, 418, 426f. BfV (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) 123ff., 238, 329, 335, 426, 430 BIG (Alliance for Innovation and Justice) 436n BKA (Federal Criminal Agency) 123–127, 238n80, 329, 335, 426, 431 BMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior) 3, 14ff., 112–116, 122–125, 146, 151–159, 175, 211, 222, 245, 250, 292, 295, 329, 362, 371, 379, 382, 388, 397ff., 418, 425ff., 431 BpB (Federal Agency for Civic Education) 233n, 238n80, 329, 426 BVerfG (German Federal Constitutional Court) 108, 111n8, 122n20, 126n23, 127 BverwG (German Federal Administrative Court) 92n, 109ff., 332n136, 422, 471n4 CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) 106, 116, 119, 145, 151–154, 393, 436 C.e.m. (Headquarters for Republican Education) 169, 356

CIBEDO (Christian Islamic Encounter and Documentation Centre) 419 CIG (Christian-Islamic Society) 232, 235, 418 cm-fi (Christian-Muslim Peace Initiative) 223, 232, 235, 418 CSU (Christian Social Union of Bavaria) 106, 116, 119, 145, 151f. CTC (Counter Terrorism Committee (UN) ) 122 DBK (German Bishop Conference)  222, 329 DIK (German Islam Conference) 2, 8, 61, 109, 119, 153–162, 165–169, 175n19–20, 177, 181, 210, 224n67, 225, 238, 243–251, 279, 292, 306, 361–369, 374–392, 436, 453, 471f. DIK I (2006–2009) 86–91, 120, 146, 214, 233, 248, 297, 300f., 303, 330, 355–359, 397ff., 425ff. DIK II (since 2010) 162–168, 281, 292, 330, 334, 337, 340, 343f., 371f., 427, 463 DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs) 89–94, 118n, 145, 166, 172ff., 187–249, 329–332, 345–348, 354–471 DIWAN (German Islamic New Moon Council) 307, 326 Diyanet (Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs) 166, 169, 174, 187–200, 209ff., 215, 219–222, 230f., 233f., 237, 245, 248, 286, 348, 356, 361, 365, 395, 408, 417, 432, 434, 439n, 441f., 447f., 460f., 469 DML Bonn (German Muslim League Bonn) 321 DML Hamburg (German Muslim League Hamburg) 321 EIF (European Integration Fund) 211, 222. 225, 329, 399 EKD (Evangelical Church in Germany) 222, 310, 329, 419ff., 424 EMUG (European Mosque Building and Support Organization) 257n, 257, 268, 273, 281n EZP (Invitation to Paradise) 166

516

index of organizations

FOREGE (Research Centre for Religion and Society) 94, 206, 209, 218f., 221, 234f., 414, 438 FVM (Free Association of Muslims) 322 HDI (House of Islam) 321 IAK (Islamic Working Group in Germany) 168, 305, 327, 355 IASE (Islamic Working Group for Social and Educational Professions) 321 ICA (Islamic-Christian Working Group) 419 ICCB (Union of Islamic Associations and Communities) 166, 255, 257, 296, 418, 440, 442 IFB (Islamic Federation Berlin) 92n, 109, 471n3 IGB (Islamic Community Braunschweig) 322 IGBD (Islamic Community of Bosniacs in Germany) 87,304n, 320, 379n–380n IGD (Islamic Community Germany) 87, 166f., 306f., 321, 388 IGH (Islamic Community Hamburg) 321 IGMG (The Islamic Community Millî Görüş) 4n, 6n, 90ff., 94f., 102f.,126, 161, 166f., 170f., 175–187, 249–303, 345–348, 354–468 IGS (Islamic Community of Shiite Communities in Germany) 167 IGS (Islamic Community Saarland) 322 IKO (Competence Center Islamic Science) 123 IRCA (Islamic Religious Community in Austria also IGGiÖ) 209, 209n51, 422n IRD (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany) 6n, 22n, 87f., 90, 145, 162, 166–168, 175n, 233, 281, 296, 300, 303, 305–308, 312, 314, 317, 320, 327, 330f., 335, 352, 355, 358f., 369–372, 376, 379f., 382, 390 IRH (Islamic Religious Community Hessen) 147, 357 IZA (Islamic Centre Aachen) 306f., 321 IZH (Islamic Centre Hamburg) 321 IZM (Islamic Centre Munich) 166, 306f., 321, 338

KCID (Coordination Council of the Christian-Islamic Dialogue in Germany) 223, 232, 235, 398n18, 418 KIRU (Commission for the Islamic Religious Education) 327 KIS (Commission on Islamic Ritual Slaughter) 307 KRM (Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany) 367–372, 438 MSV (Muslim Student Association in Germany) 321 MWL (Muslim World League) 312– 313n128 NIF (Dutch Islamic Federation) 270 RAF (Red Army Faction) 121, 398 SCHURA (Islamic Council) 323, 357ff., 362, 367, 370 TGD (Turkish Community in Germany) 118n, 120, 160, 380n TJ (Society for Spreading Faith) 168 UETD (Union of European-Turkish Democrats) 260n UMTA (Union of Togolese Muslims in Germany) 322 UIAZD (Union of Islamic Albanian Centers in Germany) 88, 321 UN (United Nations) 26, 122 VIKZ (Association of Islamic Cultural Centers) 6n, 87f., 90, 167–171, 181, 189, 215, 224n, 257, 305, 312, 320, 352, 355, 355n, 357, 359, 362f., 366, 370f., 373, 379f., 384 ZJD (Central Council of Jews in Germany) 222, 329, 418, 472 ZMaD (Central Council of Moroccans in Germany) 168, 380n ZMD (Central Council for Muslims in Germany) 87–92, 95, 101f., 145, 155, 162, 166–172, 178f., 183–186, 232f., 238n79, 304–350, 354–469

INDEX OF SELECTED AUTHORS Allievi, Stefano 25f., 243, 315, 453 Amiraux, Valérie 26, 188ff., 195, 252, 256f., 364, 441, 446 Azzaoui, Mounir 95, 368, 469, 472 Bade, Klaus 14f., 112, 118 Buzan, Barry 131–134 Cesari, Jocelyne 5, 25, 101, 121f., 128 Child, John 45, 49, 68 Cyrus, Norbert 2, 22, 113–120, 147 DiMaggio, Paul J. 12, 30–40, 56f., 69–72, 79, 83f., 107, 162, 236, 247, 351, 355, 470 Eckert, Julia 3, 121f., 128f. Elwert, Georg 18 Esser, Hartmut 17f. Faist, Thomas 25f., 128, 198, 204, 242f., 249, 252, 440–444 Halm, Dirk 19., 22f., 29, 64, 91, 136f., 143f., 147–150, 164, 416, 440 Haug, Sonja 1f., 14, 19f., 48, 87, 91, 169ff., 181n, 184, 214, 384f. Heckmann, Friedrich 16, 18, 169n15, 251, 454 Heitmeyer, Wilhelm 16, 19f., 147, 169, 473 Hellmann, Kai-Uwe 33, 40, 100 Huntington, Samuel P. 129f. Huysmans, Jef 128–137 Jonker, Gerdien 3n, 17, 25, 55, 90, 92n, 107ff., 168, 231, 312n124, 319, 326, 355n, 373, 417, 440n, 471n3 Karakaşoğlu, Yasemin 16, 18, 21, 119, 124f., 138f. Klinkhammer, Gritt M. 21, 29, 416 Koenig, Matthias 3, 24f., 107–110, 128, 171, 326, 373, 469 Koopmans, Ruud 24, 100, 394 Kortmann, Matthias 11, 24, 29, 87, 105, 184, 193, 252, 273, 366, 374, 382, 291, 448, 469f. Laurence, Jonathan 3, 15, 25, 28, 105, 146, 160, 188–191, 210, 222, 252, 275, 313, 364, 374, 440–446, 468f.

Lemmen, Thomas 13ff., 21f., 30, 88, 165–170, 251–257, 267f., 274f., 305–313, 323, 338, 416ff., 442 Meyer, John W. 34–41, 68–75, 83, 458 Micksch, Jürgen 203, 356f., 416, 419, 424 Mügge, Liza 22–26, 62f., 171, 193f., 252–256, 260, 269–273, 448, 468f. Oliver, Christine 35, 68–79, 342, 459 Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva 11, 24ff., 62f., 243, 374 Parsons, Talcott 32–34 Powell, Walter W. 12, 31–40, 57, 69ff., 79–84, 236, 247, 351, 451, 455, 470 Pries, Ludger 11n, 18, 25–28, 47, 62f., 86, 171, 243, 249, 252, 271, 439, 443–448, 468f. Pugh, D. S. 6, 12, 43ff., 63–66, 89, 186, 456 Rohe, Mathias 3, 17, 24f., 107–111, 169, 367f., 373 Rosenow(-Williams), Kerstin 11, 24, 29, 87, 105, 118, 209, 287, 366, 374, 382, 391, 422, 445–449, 469f. Rowan, Brian 34–40, 68–75, 458 Roy, Olivier 444, 463 Ruhrmann, Georg 135–139 Sauer, Martina 22, 29, 64, 144, 147, 164 Schiffauer, Werner 4n3, 11, 15ff., 26, 29, 122–129, 138, 147f., 153, 164–189, 204, 242–298, 305, 326n, 355, 431–442, 466 Schiffer, Sabine 23, 135n, 139f., 154 Schmitter, Phillippe 6, 12, 49–53, 67, 342, 378, 400, 456 Scott, Richard W. 4n4, 12, 31–41, 46, 53, 58ff., 68f., 72, 76, 83, 105f., 247 Senge, Konstanze 32–39 Seufert, Günter 166, 188ff., 197, 211, 231, 243, 252, 417, 442, 460 Sezgin, Zeynep 11, 22–29, 62f., 100n, 105, 171, 209n, 242, 249, 252, 271, 287, 391, 422, 443–448,462n, 468f. Sökefeld, Martin 20, 26n, 87, 91, 165, 170, 355f., 441 Spielhaus, Riem 2, 19–21

518

index of selected authors

Spuler-Stegemann, Ursula 30, 91, 108, 147, 165–169, 191, 200, 251, 304, 387, 416ff. Stratham, Paul 24, 394 Streeck, Wolfgang 6, 12, 48–53, 67, 342, 378, 400, 456 Tezcan, Levent 22f., 29, 129, 149, 158, 192, 252, 259, 292n, 416, 444ff. Thielmann, Jörn 13f., 17, 21, 29, 128 Tiesler, Nina 23, 203, 363 Tietze, Nikola 1f., 14–17, 21,110f., 145, 200, 308f., 316, 373, 453

Vermeulen, Floris 22, 61, 84, 447, 459 Vertovec, Steven 25, 447 Wæver, Ole 129–133 Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Ulrich von  29, 142 Yükleyen, Ahmet 67, 251, 273, 469 Yurdakul, Gökçe 67, 251, 462 Zucker, Lynne G. 32–36, 73, 83