Muslim Women and Gender Justice : Concepts, Sources, and Histories 2019031587, 9781138494862, 9781351025348, 9781351025331, 9781351025317, 9781351025324

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Contents
Notes on contributors
Muslim women and gender justice: an introduction
Part I Concepts: Muslima theology, Islam, and feminism
1 Feminist exegesis and beyond: trajectories in Muslima theology
2 Islamic feminism by any other name
3 Islam and feminism: German and European variations on a global theme
4 Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany
Part II Sources: Qur’an, hadith, and history
5 Woman-man equality in creation: interpreting the Qur’an from a nonpatriarchal perspective
6 The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation
7 With ʿA’isha in mind: reading Surat al-Nur through the Qur’an’s structural unity
8 The Qur’anic turn of women’s image: from being the object to the subject of history
9 Verse 4:34: Abjure symbolic violence, rebuff feminist partiality, or seek another hermeneutic?
Part III Histories: knowledge, authority, and activism
10 Umm Salama’s contributions: Qur’an, hadith, and early Muslim history as sources for gender justice
11 Religious educated women in early Islam: conceptions of women’s images in Arab-Islamic texts until the tenth century
12 Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia: the transformation of Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad
13 Leading the way: women’s activism, theology, and women’s rights in Southeast Asia
Index

Citation preview

Muslim Women and Gender Justice

This volume brings together the work of a group of Islamic studies scholars from across the globe. They discuss how past and present Muslim women have participated in the struggle for gender justice in Muslim communities and around the world. The essays demonstrate a diversity of methodological approaches, religious and secular sources, and theoretical frameworks for understanding Muslim negotiations of gender norms and practices. Part I (Concepts) puts into conversation women scholars who define Muslima theology and Islamic feminism vis-à-vis secular notions of gender diversity and discuss the deployment of the oppression of Muslim women as a hegemonic imperialist strategy. The chapters in Part II (Sources) engage with the Qur’an, hadith, and sunna as religious sources to be examined and reinterpreted in the quest for gender justice as God’s will and the example of the Prophet Muhammad. In Part III (Histories), contributors search for Muslim women’s agency as scholars, thinkers, and activists from the early period of Islam to the present – from Southeast Asia to North America. Representing a transnational and cross-generational conversation, this work will be a key resource to students and scholars interested in the history of Islamic feminism, Muslim women, gender justice, and Islam. Dina El Omari has been postdoctoral researcher in the research group “Theology of Mercy” at the Centre for Islamic Theology, University of Münster, since 2013, with a focus on “Feminist exegesis of the Qur’an.” She earned her PhD in Islamic studies and Spanish philology at the University of Münster. She studied Islamic studies, Spanish philology, and German philology at the University of Münster. She is the author of Das arabische Element in der spanischen Dichtung des 15. bis 17. Jahrhunderts am Beispiel der Schönheitsbeschreibung (2014) and Das Menschenpaar in der Schöpfung und Eschatologie unter Berücksichtigung der Geschlechterfrage (2020). Juliane Hammer is Associate Professor and Kenan Rifai Scholar of Islamic Studies in the Department of Religious Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She specializes in the study of gender, sexuality, and race in Islam, contemporary Muslim thought and practice, and Sufism. She is the author of Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland (2005), American Muslim Women, Religious Authority, and Activism: More Than a Prayer (2012), and Peaceful Families: American Muslim Efforts against Domestic Violence (2019). Mouhanad Khorchide studied Islamic theology and sociology in Beirut and Vienna. He has been Professor of Islamic Religious Education since 2010, head of the Center for Islamic Theology since 2011, and Investigator of the Cluster of Excellence “Religion and Politics in the Cultures of the Modern and Modern” – all at the University of Münster. Among his latest publications are God’s Revelation in Human Word (2018) and God Believes in Man: With Islam to a New Humanism (2015).

Routledge Islamic Studies Series

This broad ranging series includes books on Islamic issues from all parts of the globe and is not simply confined to the Middle East. Young Muslim Change-Makers Grassroots Charities Rethinking Modern Societies William Barylo Da‘wa and Other Religions Indian Muslims and the Modern Resurgence of Global Islamic Activism Matthew J. Kuiper A Genealogy of Islamic Feminism Pattern and Change in Indonesia Etin Anwar The Idea of European Islam Religion, Ethics, Politics and Perpetual Modernity Mohammed Hashas Dispute Resolution in Islamic Finance Alternatives to Litigation? Adnan Trakic, John Benson and Pervaiz K Ahmed Muslim Women and Gender Justice Concepts, Sources, and Histories Edited by Dina El Omari, Juliane Hammer and Mouhanad Khorchide Islamic Conversation Sohbet and Ethics in Contemporary Turkey Smita Tewari Jassal For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/middle eaststudies/series/SE0516

Muslim Women and Gender Justice

Concepts, Sources, and Histories Edited by Dina El Omari, Juliane Hammer and Mouhanad Khorchide

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Dina El Omari, Juliane Hammer and Mouhanad Khorchide; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Dina El Omari, Juliane Hammer and Mouhanad Khorchide to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: El Omari, Dina, 1982– editor. | Hammer, Juliane, editor. | Khorchide, Mouhanad, editor. Title: Muslim women and gender justice : concepts, sources, and histories / edited by Dina El Omari, Juliane Hammer, Mouhanad Khorchide. Other titles: Routledge Islamic studies. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge Islamic studies series | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019031587 | ISBN 9781138494862 (hardback) | ISBN 9781351025348 (ebook) | ISBN 9781351025331 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781351025317 (mobi) | ISBN 9781351025324 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Qur’an—Feminist criticism. | Women in Islam. | Feminist theology. | Women in the Qur’an. | Women in the Hadith. | Feminism—Religious aspects—Islam. | Sex role—Religious aspects—Islam. Classification: LCC BP173.4 .M933 2019 | DDC 297.082—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019031587 ISBN: 978-1-138-49486-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-02534-8 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Notes on contributorsvii

Muslim women and gender justice: an introduction

1

JULIANE HAMMER

PART I

Concepts: Muslima theology, Islam, and feminism15   1 Feminist exegesis and beyond: trajectories in Muslima theology

17

JERUSHA TANNER RHODES

  2 Islamic feminism by any other name

33

AMINA WADUD

  3 Islam and feminism: German and European variations on a global theme

46

RIEM SPIELHAUS

  4 Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany

62

IRENE SCHNEIDER

PART II

Sources: Qur’an, hadith, and history87   5 Woman-man equality in creation: interpreting the Qur’an from a nonpatriarchal perspective RIFFAT HASSAN

89

vi  Contents   6 The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation

106

DINA EL OMARI

  7 With ʿA’isha in mind: reading Surat al-Nur through the Qur’an’s structural unity

123

ZAINAB ALWANI

  8 The Qur’anic turn of women’s image: from being the object to the subject of history

140

MOUHANAD KHORCHIDE

  9 Verse 4:34: Abjure symbolic violence, rebuff feminist partiality, or seek another hermeneutic?

170

CELENE IBRAHIM

PART III

Histories: knowledge, authority, and activism183 10 Umm Salama’s contributions: Qur’an, hadith, and early Muslim history as sources for gender justice

185

YASMIN AMIN

11 Religious educated women in early Islam: conceptions of women’s images in Arab-Islamic texts until the tenth century

204

DORIS DECKER

12 Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia: the transformation of Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad

221

HATOON AJWAD AL FASSI

13 Leading the way: women’s activism, theology, and women’s rights in Southeast Asia

237

SUSANNE SCHRÖTER

Index259

Contributors

Zainab Alwani is Founding Director and Associate Professor of Islamic Studies, Howard University School of Divinity. Her work focuses on Qur’anic studies, Islamic jurisprudence, the relationship between civil and religious law in the area of family, women and gender, and interreligious relations. She has authored and coauthored a range of publications, including textbooks, book chapters, and scholarly articles. She is serving as the founding editor-in-chief of the online Journal of Islamic Faith and Practice, (Indiana University Press). Yasmin Amin is completing a PhD at Exeter University’s Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, researching “Humour and Laughter in the Ḥadith.” Her research covers various aspects of gender issues, early Muslim society and culture, and the original texts of Islamic history, law, and ḥadith. She is the author of the forthcoming Musnad Umm Salama and the Factors Affecting its Evolution, a cotranslator of The Sorrowful Muslim’s Guide and a coeditor of the forthcoming Islamic Interpretive Tradition and Gender Justice: Processes of Canonization, Subversion, and Change. Doris Decker is a research assistant in the Department of Comparative Studies in Culture and Religion, University of Marburg. Her PhD thesis focused on women in early Islamic sources. Her main research areas are the religious history of Islam, sexuality and religion and gender-related topics. Studies and research have taken her to Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Her postdoctoral research project focuses on gender and sexuality in modern Shi’ite Islam. Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi is a women’s rights activist and an associate professor of women’s history at Qatar University as well as an Honorary Fellow of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies in the School of Arts, Languages and Cultures, in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Manchester. Al Fassi’s research has focused on historical studies of women in pre-Islamic Arabia. She is the author of Women in Pre-Islamic Arabia: Nabataea. Al Fassi has been active in women’s right to vote campaigns in Saudi Arabia; she was awarded the MESA Academic Freedom Award in 2018. Riffat Hassan is professor emerita at the University of Louisville, where she taught religious and Islamic studies for thirty-three years. Originally from

viii  Contributors Pakistan, she obtained BA hons and PhD from Durham University. She is a pioneer of feminist theology in Islam and has written extensively on this subject. She has been the spokesperson of progressive Islam at numerous national and international meetings and is the recipient of many honors and awards, including the 2019 Amel Zonoune-Zouani Rights and Leadership Award by International Action Network for Gender and Law. Celene Ibrahim is Muslim Chaplain at Tufts University. She holds a PhD in Arabic and Islamic civilizations from Brandeis University. Her work focuses on Qur’anic studies, women and gender in Islamic intellectual history, religious leadership, multifaith relations, and spiritual care. She is the editor of One Nation, Indivisible: Seeking Liberty and Justice from the Pulpit to the Streets. Her first forthcoming monograph is on female figures in the Qur’an. Jerusha Tannner Rhodes is a Muslima theologian, scholar, and public educator. She is Associate Professor of Islam & Interreligious Engagement and Director of the Islam, Social Justice, and Interreligious Engagement Program (ISJIE), Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York. Her work and writing focus on Islamic feminism, interreligious engagement, religious pluralism, and social justice. She is the author of Never Wholly Other: A Muslima Theology of Religious Pluralism (2014) and Divine Words, Female Voices: Muslima Explorations in Comparative Feminist Theology (2018). Irene Schneider has been a professor in the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Göttingen since 2003. Her areas of research are Islamic law and gender studies, history of law, relation between state and society, civil society and human rights, and Islam in Germany. She is the author of The Petitioning System in Iran: State, Society and Power Relations in the Late 14th/19th Century (2006) Women in the Islamic World (2014) and coeditor (with Nijmi Edres) of Uses of the Past: Sharīʿa and Gender in Legal Theory and Practice in Palestine and Israel (2018). Susanne Schröter is Professor for Anthropology of Colonial and Postcolonial Orders and the director of the Frankfurt Research Center on Global Islam, Goethe-University of Frankfurt. Her research interests include anthropology of religions, peace and conflict studies, normative orders, and social practices, with a particular focus on political and cultural transformations in the Islamic world. She has published Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power, Gender and Islam in Southeast Asia: Women’s Rights Movements, Religious Resurgence and Local Traditions, and Gott näher als seiner eigenen Halsschlagader: Fromme Muslime in Deutschland. Riem Spielhaus has been a professor of Islamic studies with a focus on education and academic cultures at the University of Göttingen since 2016 and head of the Department of Knowledge in Transition, Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research. In addition to many articles and book chapters in both German and English, she is the author of Wer ist hier Muslim?

Contributors ix Die Entwicklung eines islamischen Bewusstseins in Deutschland zwischen Selbstidentifikation und Fremdzuschreibung and the coeditor of Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Berlin and Schulbuch und religiöse Vielfalt: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven. Amina Wadud is Professor Emeritus of Islamic Studies at Virginia Commonwealth University and a visiting researcher at the Starr King School for Ministry in Berkeley, California. She is the author of the groundbreaking Qur’an and Woman: Re-reading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective, first published over twenty-five years ago, and Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (2006). She is collecting materials for a book on Queer Islamic thought. She is a founding member of Sister in Islam and a resource consultant to Musawah; she has always combined scholarship with social action. For this, she has become known as “the Lady Imam.”

Muslim women and gender justice An introduction Juliane Hammer

In a class exercise I often use with undergraduate students at my university in North Carolina, the students are asked to write the first three words that come to their mind when they hear the phrase “Muslim women.” We then create a word cloud that brings everyone’s three first association words together on the board. This way, the students see what others wrote, but the word cloud also demonstrates the frequency with which certain words are associated with Muslim women. The front-runners are usually negative terms, such as “silent,” “oppressed,” “veiled,” or “hidden.” In the past few years, other words have appeared more frequently, such as “agency,” “activist,” and even “feminist.” My students represent a young and somewhat educated slice of the American public, so their perceptions of Islam, Muslims, and especially Muslim women can safely be assumed to reflect broader trends. And while negative perceptions persist, not in the least because they are continually reproduced by media and political actors, I find some hope in the fact that words like agency and feminist in regards to Muslim women have even entered their conceptual vocabulary. Nevertheless, scarcely a day goes by without the global media reporting on the oppression of Muslim women somewhere in the world. Similarly, the academic study of Muslim women has seen an unprecedented level of growth since the 1970s and the emergence of feminist theory and activism in Europe and America. Sensationalism, simplification, and sound bites are the bread and butter of the news media, while, at least in theory, the academy instead engages in thorough fact-finding and analysis to ultimately produce knowledge that is more than just packaged information. Nevertheless, the production of knowledge on Muslim women is, like all knowledge production, embedded in power structures and institutional histories that makes such knowledge inherently and unequivocally political. It is important to acknowledge this politics from the outset in order to better situate and understand the work presented to the reader in this volume.

Studying Muslim women To engage, then, in the study of Muslim women – as agents in history, as subjects of gender norms and religious practices, as addressees and sources of discussions in Islamic and Muslim sources, and as political actors – requires keen

2  Juliane Hammer attention to power dynamics among women, between Muslim women and men, and between those who dominate global politics and those who are oppressed by them. Historically, the academic study of Muslim women can be traced back to European colonialism, European women travelers, and the beginnings of the European Orientalist knowledge project. Leila Ahmed and others have traced how European feminists implicated themselves in the colonial projects of their empires and participated in the production of an Orientalist image of Arab and Muslim women as oppressed by their religion, Muslim men, and their Muslim societies.1 Henceforth, Muslim women and men would live their lives directly colonized or forced into conforming to European notions of modernity, progress, rationality, and later democracy and individual rights. Their societies, discourses, and practices permanently altered, these Muslims carried out intellectual projects of rethinking Islam, responding to colonial modernity, and transforming their societies, for better or for worse, under the continued gaze and judgment of European and American observers, long after the colonial project had come to an official end and their societies had been reformed into nation states, many with sizable Muslim majority populations. From the early accounts of European women traveling in the Middle East, often the wives and daughters of colonial officers and Orientalist scholars, the EuroAmerican study of Muslim women has come a long way in nuancing approaches and representations, developing a diverse methodological toolbox, and representing a variety of academic disciplines, from anthropology and history to sociology, political science, and religious studies. Many scholars in the 1970s and 1980s were concerned with demonstrating Muslim women’s poor social status and sometimes blaming religious doctrine for it. In the 1990s by contrast, some scholars saw in Islam an egalitarian impulse thwarted by the pressures of its patriarchal context or the machinations of individual men. Female-authored studies of the Qur’an during the next decade claimed an unimpeachable basis for female rights, holding up the Qur’anic ideal of equality as a standard by which to judge social realities and condemn those that fail to measure up. Other scholars, however, have sought to complicate the view of Muslim women’s unrelenting oppression and worked instead to recover evidence of past and present female resistance and agency. Studies of feminist activism and thought, women’s leadership in Muslim communities, female presence and strategizing in family courts, and female-dominated popular pious movements, especially since the 2000s, suggest that women are creating spheres of autonomy and negotiating successfully within the constraints of broader social structures. This historical sketch, however, does limit the study of Muslim women to EuroAmerican academic institutions or those situated in Muslim majority contexts but structured like Euro-American institutions. As will become clear here and in several chapters in this volume, European epistemologies and histories of knowledge production certainly dominate global academic networks and institutions today but need to be recognized as forcefully universalizing knowledge rather than opening up equal-access conversations and exchanges of ideas. Even within the institutions of higher learning from which scholars in this volume hail, the

Muslim women and gender justice 3 question of who is an insider or an outsider, especially a religious insider or outsider, has animated theoretical and methodological debates for decades. Can a Muslim scholar study Islam and Muslims and produce knowledge? Or is it necessary for a scholar to be a detached outsider in his or her field of study? Is a Muslim scholar necessarily going to engage in religiously normative work? Or is it in fact an extension of Orientalist perceptions of Muslims that essentialize Muslimness to such an extent that a Muslim scholar can ever only be producing “Muslim theology”? What does it mean to be a Muslim insider? Is an Egyptian woman scholar writing about masculinity in a Lebanese political party an insider or an outsider relative to her research context? Conversely, because of the long history of colonial scholarship, should only Muslims be allowed to study their sources and societies because outsiders have ulterior political motives and are necessarily implicated in Eurocentric domination of the world? Rather than answering these questions with a qualified yes or no, the contributors to the current volume engage in deep and sustained conversation on these and related questions. The chapters brought together here represent a deliberate attempt to bridge the gap between insider and outsider scholars and, even more so, to deny the simple binary between them. Instead, the chapters explore possibilities for convergence and conversation and demonstrate that the drawing of simple boundaries – between religious studies and theology, between inside and outside, between the “West” and the “rest,” etc. – inhibits a more nuanced and complex landscape of studying Muslim women and gender justice. The politicization and indeed the instrumentalization of the oppression of Muslim women from the colonial period to the present should not be underestimated in its power to shape public and even academic discourses. It is incumbent on serious scholars of Islam and Muslims to reflect deeply and in a sustained manner on the myriad ways in which anti-Muslim hostility, or what Germans call “Islamfeindlichkeit,” shapes our perspectives on Muslims and, with that, our scholarship. From the deliberate and politically motivated production and dissemination of gruesome images of Muslim women’s oppression by Muslim men, Islam, and their respective societies to be saved by “Western” intervention of the economic or military kind and the resulting discrimination against Muslims as minority communities in Europe and North America to denying that Islam is a religion or that Muslims can be truly modern, the Islamophobia Industry2 and its counterparts in state structures have dominated media production and public policy. Scholars are part of their respective societies and thus not immune to the danger of being influenced by media pundits and, increasingly, populist right-wing movements in Europe and North America that combine xenophobia and racism with antiMuslim bigotry in word and action. Muslim women have long held center stage in anti-Muslim political rhetoric as objects of white savior narratives, as objects in need of liberation from their religion and culture, and as a demographic danger to white supremacist societies and a threat to national security.3 We need to be aware of the ways in which our scholarship, despite all intended nuance and even with full awareness of the surrounding politics, can inadvertently participate in such othering. It also has the potential to offer explicit resistance and counterpoint

4  Juliane Hammer to such instrumentalization, and several chapters in this volume represent such endeavors quite clearly.

The history of this volume Does an edited volume have a history? Does that history matter? In the case of the current volume, the background and, with that, the history of this set of chapters presents a story that is worth telling and helps the reader understand why the research and the ideas of this group of scholars were brought together in its pages. Since the early 2010s, the German government and German academic institutions have embarked on a unique and innovative intellectual and institutional project, namely the creation of centers, institutes, and programs for Islamic theology. Switzerland and Austria have since followed suit, and, as of the writing of this introduction, a number of such programs have been created in locations such as Muenster, Paderborn, Frankfurt, Erlangen, and Osnabrueck. Additional programs are still in various stages of development. The institutionalization of Islamic theology as an academic discipline in a secular country such as Germany has been modeled on similar structures for Christian and Jewish theologies in the same context. However, contrary to the models for Christian theology, which have very different histories from those of parallel efforts for Judaism and Islam, the confessional study and teaching of Islamic theology was not without controversy and led to complex and intense debate in German academia and politics. German and by extension European Islamic theology, as conceived by its creators and proponents, both acknowledged the presence of living Muslim communities as part of German society and the need for religious instruction as well as the development of European models of Muslim thought, norms, and practices. Detractors come not only from an anti-Muslim, xenophobic right that maintained the foreignness and otherness of Islam and Muslims in Germany but also from the long established field of Islamic studies. This academic discipline, attached both to modern studies and older fields of historical critical Bible study – which in the German context was to a lesser degree implicated in the colonial Orientalist project – nevertheless had over a century and a half steadfastly maintained that any normative work by Muslim scholars could not be considered unattached; thus, objective scholarship should not take place in the secular academy. The debate was and still is too complex to represent here as a simple binary, but it exposed some of the complicated narratives and self-perceptions of German academics in and beyond Islamic studies and their relationship with their objects of study, Islam and Muslims.4 In December 2015, a center for Islamic theology in Muenster, Germany, held a conference titled “Muslima Theology: Islamic Theology as a discipline pursued by women.”5 The organizers, and my coeditors for this volume, Dina El Omari and Mouhanad Khorchide, conceived of the conference as an opportunity to bring together scholars to reflect on gender justice in Islam from distinct angles. Their expressed goal was to focus on the possibilities for distancing understandings of Islam from patriarchal readings of the tradition, to reexamine the Qur’an and

Muslim women and gender justice 5 other Islamic sources, and to recognize the important roles Muslim women played as active, even if numerically underrepresented, participants in Islamic knowledge production. In inviting scholars, they expressed a commitment to and deep interest in creating opportunities for conversation across the divide between Islamic studies and Islamic theology and between Euro-American and Muslim majority countries. The conference provided a platform for a diversity of scholars from different parts of the world, representing several generations of (mostly women) scholars in various disciplines and approaching the conference questions from a range of angles. The paper and discussions brought scholars together and allowed for critical as well as collegial debate on these vital questions. It was also the beginning but by no means the end of a conversation that has since continued in a variety of forms and venues. The current volume thus reflects much more than conference proceedings: instead, it takes its place in the ongoing academic conversation on Muslim women and gender justice that has continued to advance our understanding and our work for change. It includes the voices of intellectual giants of the first generation and younger scholars who have built upon their earlier ideas and are taking the field in new and exciting directions while acknowledging their indebtedness to those who came before them and are, excitingly, still engaged in the work and thus current conversation partners. The volume is a testament to this generational dialogue and its opportunities for fruitful engagement. As a scholar of Muslim women’s activism and negotiations of gender norms in Muslim societies in the modern period, I was especially interested in participating in this project, and I am proud of the final product. The chapters and their contributors also transcend the particularity of the German debate outlined earlier. There is certainly a North American methodological debate about normativity in religious studies and a continued struggle over the necessity (or lack thereof) of a clear demarcation between the secular academic study of religion and theological or prescriptive scholarship.6 Combined with a sustained critique of the Protestant history and bias of North American religious studies (not without its roots in European modernity and the Enlightenment), Islamic studies in this context has had its fair share of debates about insiders and outsiders in the discipline, its Orientalist past, and its opportunities for a more inclusive future that acknowledges its indebtedness to theories of power in knowledge production and hegemonic European epistemologies, as well as the notion of secular critique. It is also important to acknowledge that those of our contributors who live and work in Muslim-majority contexts face different but no less substantial difficulties. Those who have spent their careers working on prescriptive projects for gender justice and identify as scholar-activists (as some of our colleagues do in both Europe and the United States) have encountered both academic and political backlash and pressure against their work. It is possible and indeed absolutely necessary to identify such backlash and even persecution as a response from particular actors, the state, and patriarchal institutions and structures without othering

6  Juliane Hammer or implicating Islam or Muslims per se. The struggles of scholars and activists for gender justice, in any context and at any point in history, have been met with opposition, denial, threats, and sometimes even violence. If we understand gender justice as a project that critiques and aims to dismantle patriarchy in contemporary societies, resistance from patriarchal actors, institutions, and systems is to be expected. It is our sincere hope as editors that the ideas, analyses, histories, and stories in this volume make a lasting contribution to this gender justice project.

Structure of the volume: concepts, sources, histories The chapters of the volume are distributed in three sections – the chapters in each section can be read as engaging with each other in a particular aspect of the broader conversation. At the same time, all thirteen chapters in the volume are also in a sustained and broader conversation on aspects of Muslim women and gender justice. The volume moves from a conceptual discussion of the possibilities of Muslim theology and the relationship between Islam and feminism to several contributions to gender-just engagement with the Qur’an, hadith, and Muslim histories; it comes full circle with chapters on knowledge, authority, and activism in the lives of Muslim women from the early period of Islam to the present. Concepts: Muslima theology, Islam, and feminism The term “gender justice,” which I have used throughout with the assumption that it conveys its meaning easily enough, perhaps does require some elaboration. It has been used by Muslim women scholars for some time and seems to have emerged as a way both to link gender equality with broader social justice projects and to avoid a potentially contentious debate about the relationship between Islam and feminism. Amina Wadud, in her 2006 book Inside the Gender Jihad, describes the gender jihad as a struggle to establish gender justice in Muslim thought and practice. At its simplest level, gender justice is gender mainstreaming – the inclusion of women in all aspects of Muslim practice, performance, policy construction, and in both political and religious leadership.7 The four chapters in this section, by Jerusha Tanner Rhodes, Amina Wadud, Riem Spielhaus, and Irene Schneider, are engaged in a conversation about the role and possibilities of Muslim theology and Islam and feminism respectively. Jerusha Tanner Rhodes opens her chapter with the observation that Muslim women scholars in the United States have made significant contributions to approaches and interpretations of the Islamic tradition that seek to critique and overcome both internal and external forms of patriarchy and androcentrism, while also struggling for religious authority and the inclusion of their perspectives into the spectrum of authentic Muslim thought. Her chapter offers a critical overview of the prominent strategies these women scholars have used to negotiate limits and

Muslim women and gender justice 7 assert authority. Such strategies include a focus on the Qur’an, a juxtaposition of the Qur’an and hadith, and attempts to relegate patriarchal and androcentric texts by attributing them to extra-Islamic sources and contexts. Tanner Rhodes lays out her concept and understanding of Muslima theology as an approach that opens up novel trajectories in women’s approaches to the Islamic tradition through its unique combination of comparative, constructive, and theological lenses. In what could be read as a response and certainly a challenge to Tanner Rhodes and Muslima theology, Amina Wadud’s chapter opens with the observation that the Muslim women’s movement today is experiencing a critical mass and has seen, more than at any other time in history, the participation of Muslim women in the radical changes of their lives and in formulating the basic paradigms upon which their lives are measured. Wadud then narrates the emergence of a variety of discursive formations among Muslim women scholars and activists in the movement for women’s rights that have been both in dialogue and in tension with each other over the past several decades. The author locates her own life experiences and intellectual contributions to this movement and discusses the utility of identifying women’s engagement with Islamic sources, principles, and interpretations as feminist interpretation and activism versus Muslima theology. The chapter by Riem Spielhaus furthers the volume’s conceptual engagement with Islam and feminism and locates the debate about women’s emancipation and Muslim women’s rights in the context of complex political, historical, and social structures, especially in Europe and the United States. Spielhaus engages conversation about the compatibility and the political embeddedness of feminism and Islam through an exploration of the work of late prominent German gender studies scholar and psychologist Birgit Rommelsbacher. In conversation with her sources, Spielhaus argues that any struggle for the improvement of the situation of Muslim women, in Germany and elsewhere, needs to be carefully weighed against colonial and neocolonial political entanglements, domestic gender politics and in system of political and economic power in which intervention has the potential to further the oppression of Muslim women. Irene Schneider contributes to the conceptual conversation through a critical examination of the newly created academic discipline of Islamic theology in German universities, which, she argues, has offered the opportunity to consider questions related to Islam and gender norms from a different perspective. Schneider focuses her exploration of academic programs on the tension between traditional and, in her view, not gender-just interpretation of Qur’anic verses and the values of a democratic modern German society. She argues that points of conflict lie especially in the gender equality enshrined in the German Constitution and the possible disconnect from traditional Muslim gender norms, and she laments that, to date, none of the academic positions in Islamic theology have included a focus on gender studies. The chapter engages with the arguments, actors, and debates involved in Islamic theology and asks which perspectives are amplified and which are underappreciated. The very ideas and concepts discussed in this first part of the volume are taken up in the second part in distinctly normative and exegetical terms by authors who see much at stake in exploring if and how Islamic

8  Juliane Hammer sources, including the Qur’an and sunna, and the textual, social, and political histories of Muslims can contribute to gender-just ethics and norms for contemporary Muslims. Sources: engaging Qur’an, hadith, and history It is a truism that Muslims consider the Qur’an to be their sacred text and direct revelation from God. Whether its meanings are self-evident and require only a literal reading of the text or engagement with the Qur’an requires interpretation, exegesis, or explanatory commentary (tafsir) depends on when and where we look at Muslim engagements with the text. The chapters in this section consider the Qur’an central enough to search in its verses and chapters for indications of divine approval or even command for gender justice, and they do so based on a variety of methodologies. Each engages in Qur’anic interpretation by looking for thematic coherence in selected passages, putting the Qur’an in conversation with hadith and early history, and searching for Muslim women in its pages and in prophetic history, as role models for a more gender-just Muslim community. These approaches to the Qur’an, some more implicitly and some very directly, acknowledge the Qur’an as a sacred text that also has a concrete historical context in which it was revealed. This historical context offers lessons on the universality of a Qur’anic ethic and the particularity of seventh-century Arabian Muslim society. For some, the implications for the present are self-evident; for others, the application of these new and gender-just readings of the Qur’an is foremost. Riffat Hassan, one of the intellectual and activist foremothers of gender justice in Islam, in her chapter challenges a widely held belief among Muslims, Christians, and Jews that women are unequal to men. According to Hassan, the primary theological assumption on which this belief is based is that God’s primary creation was man, not woman, and since woman is believed to have been created from man’s rib, she is seen as his derivative and thus as ontologically second. Hassan argues that this assumption is unwarranted based on her nonpatriarchal reading of the Qur’an, which affirms in thirty-three passages that God created woman and man as equal. Since God is the ultimate arbiter of value and man and woman have been created equal by God, it follows that the social and religious inequality of women and men, a global problem, is a subversion of God’s plan for humanity. Building on Hassan’s work, Dina El Omari’s chapter also focuses on the creation of both sexes (and of the pair) as a sign of God’s omnipotence and argues at the outset that, in addition to the verses of the female companions in paradise, this creation of the sexes is among the earliest Qur’anic motifs that deal with the female sex. The Qur’an also emphasizes the equitable creation of both sexes on the basis of the principle of duality. This principle represents the divine order of creation, and, accordingly, the equal creation of both sexes is embedded in a Qur’anic passage that focuses on signs of creation. This chapter demonstrates how this motif of the Qur’an develops through the early-Meccan period, thus providing the seed for a gender-equitable reading of the Qur’an. The author develops an even more sophisticated hermeneutical method to make this case that foregrounds

Muslim women and gender justice 9 a historical-critical and literary-scientific reading of the Qur’an that employs a diachronic reading technique for the sacred text. The chapter by Zainab Alwani approaches Qur’anic exegesis differently and argues, based on the history of the tafsir tradition, that a multiplicity of interpretations is a consistent historical feature in Qur’anic scholarship and that the intratextual method (tafsir al-Qur’an bi-l-Qur’an) has been accepted as a central method of interpretation. Building upon this method, Alwani explores and furthers the methodology of Al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an (the Qur’an’s structural unity) and argues that reading the sura/chapter as a structural unit can yields significant exegetical insights. By focusing on Surat al-Nur (Qur’an 24) and on a historical incident involving ʿA’isha bint Abu Bakr (d. 678/57) as an example, this chapter draws attention to hadith scholarship identified with a revisionary body of literature that takes as its scope the verification and validation of a prophetic tradition. Representing Muslim women’s scholarly contributions, Alwani argues for the importance of identifying the organic interconnections between the Qur’an and Prophetic sunna in order to further hermeneutical insights. Mouhanad Khorchide critically engages the production of modern Qur’anic exegesis, which, he argues, has developed strategies to relativize problematic verses by establishing the difference between universal and specific verses, raising the question whether a relativization of Qur’anic verses that are apparently in conflict with modern worldviews is based on theological concepts or contemporary political agendas. With a particular focus on critically engaging feminist Muslim hermeneutics, Khorchide develops a historical-theological hermeneutics that acknowledges the Qur’an as divine revelation but understands it as a dialogical revelation in which God discloses Himself in and throughout history. Khorchide focuses his hermeneutical application on his reading for the place of women in the Qur’an and in history and argues for the merciful intent of the revelation and its potential for human liberation based on the promise and challenge of human freedom. Celene Ibrahim turns her attention to one of the most contentious passages in the Qur’an, verse 4:34, on which a sizable literature, especially in the modern period, has been produced. She puts the passage in the context of others concerned with marital harmony and conflict resolution strategies for spouses but points out the uniqueness and unique challenge of Q 4:34 – that it appears to contain permission for husbands to physically discipline their wives under certain circumstances. What are those circumstances, and what kind of physical discipline may be prescribed? Can this verse be reconciled from within a theological framework that is feminist or female-centric? Ibrahim, too, engages with recent Muslim feminist scholarship on Qur’an 4:34 and provides textual, linguistic, and social analyses to argue that the key to addressing marital violence as a modern phenomenon may lie in pastoral and communal practice rather than hermeneutical maneuvering. The five chapters in Part II are in continual conversation with each other and offer a window into the remarkably rich and varied approaches to hermeneutics and exegesis, even among this small group of scholars. They elaborate on and

10  Juliane Hammer critique existing scholarship across the artificial divide between Muslim and nonMuslim scholars and demonstrate the fruitfulness of substantial yet respectful disagreement. The academic and activist engagement with and debate about Muslim source texts for the possibilities and limits for gender justice are put into historical perspective in the third part of the volume, which directly addresses questions of knowledge production and dissemination by Muslim women in various periods of history and the attended questions of religious authority. While framing work for religious and societal change toward gender justice may only be described as activism in the modern period and beyond, the contributors to this section are also concerned, from a different angle, with the impulse for positive change. Histories: knowledge, authority, and activism The third section of the book links the first two through an exploration of Muslim women as scholars and change-makers. The authors explore early examples of Muslim women scholars and their quest for authority, the role of women in the Qur’an itself, and contemporary movements and individuals who have engaged in the intellectual and practical struggle for gender justice. Here, too, the question of whether the past can yield models for the struggles and values of the present – and how such lessons from history coincide with deep differences between history and the present – animates reflections and arguments. Such engagement, rather than being entirely separate from conceptual and source questions, indeed organically links them with each other in a productive triangle that also bridges the artificial divide between Islamic studies and theology. Yasmin Amin opens this section with her argument that the question of gender justice is not a new construct by Muslim feminists – it has a long tradition as a part of Muslim discourse since the Prophet’s time. She finds support for this proposition in her analysis of certain gendered aspects of Islamic jurisprudence, rituals, and the language of the Qur’an in the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Amin locates the significance of women as questioners, knowledge seekers, and embodied historical role models in a number of reported dialogues between Umm Salama and the Prophet. Umm Salama’s questions and those of other Muslim women were addressed by the Prophet and sometimes even appeared as a part of Qur’anic revelation, which we can see partially preserved in the Islamic canon, such as in the asbab nuzul al-Qur’an (reasons for revelation) genre and in hadith. The author argues that blueprints for gender justice can be traced to the time of the Prophet and should be located, rather than as modern innovation, in the exegetical literature of the premodern period. Doris Decker takes the reader to the next important phase in early Muslim history and argues that the earliest texts contain clues to early Muslim gender constructions and modes of religious education and authority. She sees evidence since the early formation of Islam and a Muslim community in the seventh century for women to have been engaged in Islamic knowledge production, taking up teaching positions, acting as preachers, and thus contributing immensely to

Muslim women and gender justice 11 the consolidation and transmission of Islam. Decker recovers some of this history of women as scholars, teachers, and preachers through a close reading of foundational historical texts including the sira by Ibn Hisham, the Kitab al-Maghazi by al-Waqidi, the at-Tabaqat al-Kubra by Ibn Sa‘d, the hadith-collection of alBukhari, and the Ta´rikh of al-Tabari. She argues for the necessity to produce a gender-conscious history of knowledge in this period and to emphasize the essential contributions of women to the formation of the Islamic tradition. Taking us to the present, Hatoon Al Fassi identifies as her starting point that the a male monopoly is a problem in the recognition of Islamic religious authority, especially in matters related to women, and offers avenues for challenging this monopoly. Al Fassi, a globally renowned scholar-activist in her own right, argues that it is necessary to create alternative sources of authority from within the realm of religious scholarship through women scholars laying direct claim to the interpretation of sacred texts. She uses the works and experiences of the Saudi scholar Suhaila Zain al-Abedin as a specific example for this approach. Al-Abedin has engaged through her writing in debates about Islamic law, the use of weak hadith in jurisprudence, and open critique of Saudi legal rulings and practices. The chapter also considers the intense backlash against her work and her impact on Saudi public opinion. In the closing chapter of the volume, Susanne Schröter turns our attention to an important yet often overlooked geographical region with a rich history of Muslim women’s activism and contemporary Muslim thought. She introduces the work of Muslim women’s rights activists and scholars in Southeast Asia and their struggles for the right of women through their own interpretations of the Qur’an and the sunna, with a particular focus on how such interpretations can impact reforms in Muslim family law. Informed by fieldwork with various Muslim women and organizations in Malaysia and Indonesia, Schröter explores the histories of several women’s organizations and the roles of women in Southeast Asian institutions and debates surrounding gender justice and the protection of women in family law. She traces the origins of these organizations and debates, including the role of feminism, and offers concluding thoughts on the future of feminist Islamic theology in this important contemporary Muslim-majority region.

Closing thoughts and openings Much has been said about the oppression of Muslim women and their need for liberation from such oppression. This introduction began with a critical examination of the history of the study of Muslim women and culminates with additional thoughts on Muslim women, scholarship, and activism. In the global arena of nonprofit work, development aid, European and American economic and political intervention, the motto that women’s rights are human rights has become a truism. The investment of NGOs that work in Muslim-majority societies and Muslimminority communities across the world in this paradigm should not be underestimated in its power to generate much-needed funding, address the immediate and urgent needs of particular Muslim women, and provide relief, training, and

12  Juliane Hammer support for economic, social, and political improvement. When anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod asked in early 2002, right after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, whether Muslim women really needed saving, she was concerned with the instrumentalization of the plight of Muslim women (which is very real) in imperialist projects of domination rather than a genuine interest in or opportunity to improve the lives of women.8 Before and since, scholars and activists have been concerned with the application of a women’s rights and human rights framework that is based in an assumption of potentially false universalism. The history of the Eurocentric human rights framework, based in post–World War II history and elevated to the level of global policy through the United Nations and other organizations, has seen its fair share of critique while also, as I said earlier, empowering activists and organizations on the ground. A politics of cultural, religious, or even historical relativism is a poor substitute, but the binary between those two poles is perhaps more of a spectrum that needs to be critically engaged. In my own work, I have been inspired by discussions of critique by Miriam Cooke, who has introduced me to the notion of multiple critique. Rochelle Terman has taken notions of critique further in order to reflect and meaningfully respond to the conundrum of being stuck in either feminist critique of Muslim women’s oppression or progressive and anticolonial critique of American and European intervention. Terman moves from the “double bind between imperialism and gender injustice”9 to the possibility of a double critique and from there to the need for responsible critique: In order to engage in the “productive undoing” of the double bind, I propose we shift the paradigm of responsible critique from recruitability to one based on openness. A responsible critique is one that opens the widest analytic space in which a double critique can take place, qualifies the most voices, and allows for the greatest creativity in producing new political imaginaries. This applies to both feminists in the Muslim world who prioritize the critique of religious fundamentalism as well as academic postsecular feminists who prioritize the critique of liberal secular power.10 The contributors to this volume are in a variety of ways engaged in one or the other aspect of this critique and navigate its challenges in insightful ways.

Women, gender, knowledge, and experience Whether it is in the terminology of Muslima theology or in the various readings of the creation of the sexes in the Qur’an, there are two underlying premises for the contributions to this volume. One is a deep and fully accepting investment in the gender binary as male-female, and the other is an argument for women qua women being different enough from their counterparts in the gender binary to warrant separate attention and treatment. The latter assumption can appear in the form of arguing that “Islam” would have been different and Muslim societies would be different today if Muslim women had been and were equally and fully

Muslim women and gender justice 13 participating in the exegetical and practical project of being a Muslim. Much has been made of the existence of an ethical Islam and its differentiation from Muslim culture or practice, and Muslim feminist thinkers and activists have argued that patriarchy as a societal institution that both can and should be extricated from an essentially gender-just Islam. In the process, a tendency to essentialize the category of “women” has led to what I see as an overinvestment in gender difference as absolute rather than as a spectrum. To the contrary, as my students have recently argued in a class discussion, women’s interpretations would be different from those of men – not because of an innate, biologically determined absolute (sex) difference but rather because their positions in patriarchal and other systems of power have produced different life experiences that do and should inform both intellectual production and work to change the world. The investment in the category “women” could also be read as a form of strategic essentialism11 in order to address the dramatic power imbalance in historical and contemporary societies. I see the engagement with these questions, as well as the possibility of opening up gender justice to more than the heteronormative gender binary, as the beginning of the next conversation. In addition, gender justice work can and should be embedded, both intellectually and politically, in a commitment to intersectional projects for social justice, both in the present and in the future.

Notes 1 Ahmed 1992, 127–168. 2 See Ernst 2013; and Duss et al. 2015. 3 See Hammer 2013, 2019. 4 Khorchide and Möller 2012. 5 www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/zit/veranstaltungen/2015/2015_flyer_ tagung_muslima.pdf. 6 See the roundtable conversation in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84:1 (March 2016), on “Normativity in Islamic Studies” which I edited. Contributors to the roundtable included Zareena Grewal, Sarah Eltantawi, Elliott Bazzano, Jonathan Brockopp, and myself, with a response by Anna Gade. See Hammer et al. 2016. 7 Wadud 2006, 10. 8 Abu Lughod 2002. 9 “In an age of Islamophobia, how does one engage in a feminist critique of women’s status in Muslim contexts without providing ideological fuel for undesired political ambitions? When the U.S. invokes the oppression of Muslim women to justify war, how do we practice feminist solidarity without strengthening orientalism and imperialism?” Terman 2015, 2. 10 Terman 2015, 24. Terman’s double critique reminds me of the earlier work of Miriam Cooke in an article titled “Multiple Critique,” see Cooke 2002. 11 Spivak 1985, 1993.

Bibliography Abu Lughod, Lila (2002) “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” American Anthropologist 104 (3) (September): 783–790. Ahmed, Leila (1992) Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press).

14  Juliane Hammer Bazzano, Elliott (2016) “Normative Readings of the Qur’an: From the Premodern Middle East to the Modern West,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84 (1) (March): 74–97. Brockopp, Jonathan (2016) “Islamic Origins and Incidental Normativity,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84 (1) (March): 28–43. Cooke, Miriam (2002) “Multiple Critique: Islamic Feminist Rhetorical Strategies,” Nepantla: Views from the South 1 (1): 91–110. Duss, Matthew, et al. (2015) “Fear Inc.2.0: The Islamophobia Network’s Efforts to Manufacture Hate in America,” February, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/02/FearInc-report2.11.pdf. Eltantawi, Sarah (2016) “What Does ‘Modernity’ and ‘Postmodernity’ Mean to Northern Nigerian?” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84 (1) (March): 60–73. Ernst, Carl, ed. (2013) Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance (New York: Palgrave). Gade, Anna (2016) “A Response,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84 (1) (March): 113–126. Grewal, Zareena (2016) “Destabilizing Orthodoxy, De-territorializing the Anthropology of Islam,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84 (1) (March): 44–59. Hammer, Juliane (2013) “Center Stage: Muslim Women and Islamophobia,” in Islamophobia in America, ed. Carl Ernst (New York: Palgrave), 107–144. Hammer, Juliane (2016) “Normativity in Islamic Studies: An Introduction,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84 (1) (March): 25–27. Hammer, Juliane (2016) “To Work for Change: Normativity, Feminism, and Islam,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84 (1) (March): 98–112. Hammer, Juliane (2019) “Muslim Women, Anti-Muslim Hostility, and the State in the Age of Terror,” in Muslims and Contemporary US Politics, ed. Mohammad Khalil (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Khorchide, Mouhanad, and Marco Möller, ed. (2012) Das Verhältnis zwischen Islamwissenschaft und Islamischer Theologie (Münster: Agenda Verlag). Spivak, Gayatri (1985) “Criticism, Feminism, and the Institution,” Interview with Elizabeth Grosz, Thesis Eleven 10–11 (1) (February): 175–187. Spivak, Gayatri (1993) “An Interview with Gayatri Spivak, by Sara Danius and Stefan Jonsson,” Boundary 2 20 (2) (Summer): 24–50. Terman, Rochelle (2015) “Islamophobia, Feminism, and the Politics of Critique,” Theory, Culture & Society (2015): 1–26. Wadud, Amina (2006) Inside the Gender Jihad (Oxford: Oneworld).

Part I

Concepts Muslima theology, Islam, and feminism

1 Feminist exegesis and beyond Trajectories in Muslima theology Jerusha Tanner Rhodes

Introduction Over the last few decades, a number of Muslim women scholars in the United States have made significant contributions to Islamic exegesis. Promoting equality, justice, and women’s rights, they have argued that the Islamic tradition offers egalitarian resources and have thus sought to articulate interpretations of Islamic sources and traditions that promote the full humanity of women.1 These interpretations – along with the broader discourse on Islam, women, and gender – have been influenced by interwoven narratives, histories, and realities. The interpretations arise in response not only to patriarchal and androcentric interpretations and practices within the tradition but also to hegemonic and patriarchal discourses that emanate from outside the tradition. These diverse narratives, histories, and realities impact feminist exegesis in that they all seek to control and define the field of legitimate and authoritative interpretations. I begin this chapter with a brief overview of the manner in which internal and external patriarchy, androcentrism, and hegemony seek to do this. I then offer some observations about the prominent strategies Muslim women scholars in the United States have used to negotiate limits and assert authority. These strategies include a focus on the Qur’an, juxtaposition of the Qur’an and hadith, and attempts to relegate patriarchal and androcentric texts by attributing them to extraIslamic sources and contexts. While these approaches have had clear and extensive impacts, other Muslim women scholars have raised important critiques of the dominant strategies. These critiques include a concern about Qur’an-centric interpretation and its limits, an emphasis on the necessity of engaging with hadith, and observations about the ways in which interpretation can co-opt “women-friendly” rights while failing to scrutinize the underlying patriarchal infrastructure of legal and exegetical traditions. Building upon these more recent critiques, I conclude this essay by exploring the approach of Muslima theology, an approach that opens up novel trajectories in its unique combination of comparative, constructive, and theological lenses. Muslima theology builds upon and extends existing contributions with the objective of identifying some new ways to assert authority and agency without inadvertently reinscribing the limits of hegemonic, androcentric, and patriarchal discourses.

18  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes

Defining the limits: hegemonic othering, patriarchy, and authority In the United States, the discussion of Islam and gender, and specifically of Muslim women, is part of a larger and extremely charged discourse in which Islam is depicted as other, different, and foreign. This depiction is not one of mere distinction; Islam is not just different. The depiction is also frequently concerned with evaluation and juxtaposition.2 Thus, Islam as the “other” is seen as not only different but also less valuable or in fundamental opposition to generally accepted norms and customs. Discussions of Islam, gender, and Muslim women are also shaped by various manifestations of androcentrism and patriarchy, both outside and within the Islamic tradition. Patriarchy and androcentrism are evident, for example, in the way the rhetoric of “saving Muslim women” has been routinely deployed to justify colonial, missionary, and imperial engagements in Muslim contexts. As Lila Abu Lughod illustrates, images of and references to Muslim women have been used as provocative capital in debates on topics ranging from military incursions in Afghanistan and Iraq to European immigration policies to legislation on the wearing of religious symbols to the broader War on Terror.3 The rhetoric of salvation echoes the observations of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in its calls for “saving brown women from brown men.”4 Muslim women are not only to be saved but also to be saved from the oppression caused by Islam as a tradition and enforced by Muslim men. Notably, Muslim women are not capable of saving themselves. The rhetoric of salvation is also striking because of the manner in which it coopts and deploys theories and concerns of feminism and feminist theology.5 This co-optation assumes a universal or essentialized view of women and their goals, without substantially engaging Muslim women or soliciting their diverse perspectives. More insidiously, even when the perspectives of Muslim women are solicited, some perspectives are labeled as manifestations of brainwashing or “false consciousness.”6 These labels are used to delegitimize perspectives that do not conform to the predetermined assumptions of universal, hegemonic formulations of feminism. It is this pairing of the rhetoric of salvation with hegemonic feminism that has had the unfortunate consequence of fostering the ambivalence that many Muslim women feel toward feminism and feminist theology. Real issues that some Muslim women face are highlighted, but the rhetoric simultaneously perpetuates negative stereotypes of Islam and undercuts the autonomy and the voice of Muslim women. This places Muslim women in a double bind. They appreciate attention being drawn to their actual concerns but are far from comfortable with the foundational assumptions of this rhetoric, especially the paternalistic assumption that Muslim women do not (and even could not) really know what they want or need.7 Aspects of the Islamic tradition and specific discourses that emerge from within Muslim communities also influence Muslim women’s perspectives on feminism and interreligious feminist engagement. Specifically, legacies of patriarchy and androcentrism impact sources, interpretations, and interpretative methods, as well as ideas about authority and legitimacy. These legacies stretch back to the original

Feminist exegesis and beyond 19 context of the revelation to Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century ce in the Arabian Peninsula. Aspects of this particular context are preserved in the central Islamic sources: the Qur’an and the hadith. Since the relevance of these sources is seen to extend beyond their original temporal, geographical, and cultural contexts, exegetes debate how details from the time of Prophet Muhammad should or should not be implemented in new contexts. Opinions on the boundaries of emulation or enactment of contextual specifics span a spectrum of possibilities. On one end is the attempt to reenact every aspect of Prophet Muhammad’s lifestyle, including dress, food, and marital customs. This approach assigns the highest degree of righteousness to the earliest generations of Muslims and advocates for widespread reenactment of their specific practices. On the other end of the spectrum is the attempt to distill general ethical principles from Prophet Muhammad’s life and then apply those principles in new forms to new contexts. This approach is widely associated with Fazlur Rahman’s interpretative theory.8 In this approach, contextual details become less important than the pursuit of overarching ethical objectives. In diverse contexts, the objectives will only be achieved through forms of practice tailored to those contexts. It is perhaps not surprising that, in many contexts, practices related to women and gender have tended toward the reenactment end of the spectrum. This is especially evident in some exegetical and juridical texts and in the relative interpretative silence (or deliberate silencing) of women throughout Islamic history.9 Ayesha Chaudhry, for example, provides a vivid illustration of this in her 2013 book, Domestic Violence and the Islamic Tradition, which traces historical perspectives on Qur’an 4:34.10 In doing so, she uncovers a longstanding and littlecontested trend of juridical permissions for physical (even if only “symbolic”) discipline of women by men. Such trends in interpretation, including the lack of women’s voices, are also significant because the Islamic tradition tends to privilege precedent as a measure of authority and legitimacy. This is connected to emulation of Prophet Muhammad, and it is exemplified in the way classical scholars justify their own interpretations with extensive references to earlier exegetes.11 Appeals to precedent thus become important in legitimating egalitarian claims. Such appeals, though, can be hindered both by patriarchal and androcentric aspects of the original context of revelation and by the dominance of male perspectives throughout the history of Islamic interpretation. In contemporary discourse, moreover, precedent as an Islamic standard of authority is often confined to Islamic sources, rulings, and scholars; legitimate precedent is rarely found outside the Islamic tradition. This reveals a privileging of the tradition, which is not uncommon to many religious traditions. However, it also reveals another trajectory of hegemonic othering, one that elevates Islamic values, sources, and teachings above the non-Islamic and non-Muslim other. In doing so, it shapes the discourse of Muslim women by demanding references to earlier Islamic history and sources, while simultaneously shunning and devaluing any references or insights that may emerge (or be accused of emerging) from non-Islamic sources.

20  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes The varied and tangled strands of hegemonic othering, androcentrism, and patriarchy directly impact Muslim women, both in their lived realities and in their quests to voice diverse interpretations of the tradition. These strands have colored and continue to color gender roles, views of sexuality, and women’s statuses and rights. They also – in distinct ways – function to delineate the range of possible legitimate or authoritative interpretations through their respective demands for correspondence to already defined values and conclusions. Thus, they aim to dictate who can speak, what can be said, and even what can be “thought” or heard. In doing so, they unavoidably impact how scholars and the public talk about, teach about, and research Islam, Muslim women, and gender. The questions that are raised, the books that are published and read, the speakers that are embraced by mainstream media and by Muslim communities, and the topics that are foregrounded by both Muslims and others – all of these are conspicuously shaped by hegemonic, androcentric, and patriarchal conceptions of Islam and Muslim women.

Negotiating authority: trends among U.S. scholars How have Muslim women exegetes in the U.S. attempted to navigate this complex tangle of discourses to assert authority and promote egalitarianism? What strategies have they adopted, and what have been the trade-offs of those strategies? I will not endeavor herein to survey the content of specific contributions and arguments. Rather, I will focus on the main strategies that have been adopted to negotiate the tensions produced by the confluences of hegemonic othering, androcentrism, and patriarchy. The first strategy that is widely employed by Muslim women exegetes – including Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, and Riffat Hassan – is to prioritize the Qur’an, using it as the primary standard of assessment for other sources.12 By privileging the Qur’an in this way, these scholars are tapping into the preeminent and central authority that the Qur’an holds within the Islamic tradition. They are thus asserting power by aligning with a preexisting intra-Islamic notion of authority. While they tap into this authority, they offer markedly novel interpretations thereof, arguing, for example, that the Qur’an is fundamentally egalitarian, that it depicts an undifferentiated human creation, and that divine sovereignty rules out all forms of human domination.13 When these exegetes directly engage other Islamic sources, particularly hadith, they do so with a basic hermeneutic of suspicion or “skepticism.” They accept content from these sources when it corresponds to their interpretation of the Qur’an and dismiss it when it does not. Hadith are therefore seen to be of varying degrees of authority. Some are authentic – others are not. Assessment of the authenticity of hadith is not new within the Islamic tradition; the field of hadith sciences (usul al-hadith) in classical Islamic thought is devoted to screening and evaluating the hadith corpus. Yet, Muslim women scholars dismiss some hadith reports that have been labeled “sound” (sahih) or authentic by this classical process. Assessment by Muslim women scholars appears to follow new or more specific criteria. These

Feminist exegesis and beyond 21 scholars, though, have not yet articulated a robust methodology for their hadith assessment.14 Since hadith reports remain central in guiding ritual practice and are widely circulated within Muslims communities, such a methodology is direly needed.15 Without such a critical methodology, critiques of nonegalitarian hadith reports are likely to have less resonance. In advocating that the Qur’an and authentic prophetic traditions are inherently egalitarian, Muslim women exegetes are left to explain apparent discrepancies; they are left to explain how seemingly misogynistic, patriarchal, and androcentric interpretations and sources entered the tradition. Elements of the Qur’anic text that appear to address men only or to correspond to patriarchal norms are commonly explained through the contextual distinction of universal and particular or the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive aspects of the scripture. The former asserts that some parts of the Qur’an are for all times and places (universal), and others are specific to the time of Prophet Muhammad (particular). The latter argues that the egalitarian guidance of the Qur’an is present as a prompt to action (prescriptive), while patriarchal aspects are simply accounts of what was present in the original context that are not intended to be emulated (descriptive). Notably, it is the authority and integrity that many Muslim women scholars accord to the Qur’an that prevents them from explaining Qur’anic discrepancies through claims of androcentric authorship or claims of textual or editorial accretions. The presence of patriarchal or androcentric traditions in the hadith corpus is accounted for through two main strategies. The first  – reassessment – co-opts classical hadith assessment methods and reauthenticates the content and chain of narrators. Hassan does this with several hadith that negatively portray women, and thereby argues that these hadith are weak (da’if) or fabricated.16 The second strategy is appeal to the ideas of corruption and foreign transplantation, particularly those from culture and from other religious traditions. Hassan, for example, tackles widely held, androcentric theological assumptions about the created superiority of men.17 In addressing the creation of woman, she argues that the Qur’an’s depiction of an “undifferentiated humanity” is more legitimate than and should take precedence over hadith that echo the Genesis 2 account of Eve’s creation from the rib of Adam.18 She similarly argues against prominent male interpretations of the events of the Garden, contending that exegetes introduced incongruous details from hadith reports, details that had their origin in Biblical accounts.19 These explanations are very provocative because they echo hegemonic and patriarchal rhetoric. The authenticity of nonegalitarian hadith reports is undercut by tapping into Islamic hegemonic othering and affiliating these reports with external, non-Islamic, and therefore illegitimate sources. While this strategy may assist exegetes in gaining some foothold within the Islamic discourse, the attribution of negative accretions to other religious traditions reinscribes hegemonic parameters and inhibits insights that could be gained through comparative theological exploration. These strategies profoundly impact discussions of Muslim women and the lives of actual Muslim women. Nonetheless, critiques of these dominant strategies have begun to arise, and they revolve around several themes, including the sufficiency

22  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes and limits of Qur’an-focused reinterpretation; the need to engage more deeply with other Islamic sources; the need to reevaluate underlying assumptions; and the need for new and constructive approaches. In more recent writings and lectures, for example, Wadud herself has grappled with the fact that there are portions of the Qur’anic text – for example, Qur’an 4:34 – that cannot be understood as egalitarian or embraced in any action.20 This has moved her to focus on the importance of ethical and theological paradigms in shaping and altering views on women, gender, and equality.21 Critiques of Qur’an-focused interpretation also emphasize the need for in depth and critical analysis of other sources within in the tradition, particularly hadith and law. Ayesha Chaudhry, for instance, draws attention to the way Muslim feminist scholars have not yet systematically “tackled” the sunna (example of Prophet Muhammad) and hadith.22 While she acknowledges many legitimate and methodological reasons for a primary focus on the Qur’an, she also identifies specific challenges that the sunna presents to feminist scholars, including the less delimited nature of the texts and the fact that the sunna necessitates engagement with Prophet Muhammad’s context. Similarly, Kecia Ali argues that the Qur’ancentered approach avoids the messy business of women’s everyday lives, which are largely shaped by hadith and the legal tradition.23 While she does acknowledge that some scholars do focus on laws, she describes these efforts as “feminist apologetics.”24 In response to Western hegemonic critiques, feminist apologetics highlights pro-women laws that do indeed exist in the tradition, depicts them as liberating, and yet fails to problematize the underlying patriarchal infrastructure of Islamic law.25 Aysha Hidayatullah has also raised questions about the extent to which the project of demonstrating that the Qur’an supports gender equality has been successful.26 In analyzing the contributions of Hassan, Wadud, and Barlas, she asserts that the Qur’an may not in fact be reconcilable to our contemporary notions of equality and justice.27 Hidayatullah does not propose this to delegitimize contemporary notions of equality and justice or to reify patriarchy. She does, however, argue that Islamic feminist positions will have to be based on more than the Qur’anic text itself and that scholars should admit that their perspectives are “guided by conceptions of justice not definitively traceable to the Qur’anic text.”28 This leads to the final observation I  will make regarding Muslim women scholars and the discourse on Islam, gender, and Muslim women – that, in the United States, critiques are coupled with calls for new approaches, new methodologies, and alternatives.29 There is ample discussion of the fact that something new needs to be done. Yet, detailed articulation of and implementation of actual new approaches and methodologies is limited. As Hibba Abugideiri observes, the “deconstructionist approach” remains the dominant method of Islamic feminists.30 Muslima theology Such approaches and methodologies are absolutely necessary for the interpretations of Muslim women to become more robust and transformational. We need to

Feminist exegesis and beyond 23 envision and enact new trajectories, not only to unravel patriarchy but also to find new ways to assert authority and agency without inadvertently reinscribing the limits of hegemonic, androcentric, and patriarchal discourse. In the remainder of this essay, I explore the contours of one such alternative – which I call Muslima theology – highlighting and unpacking its unique combination of comparative, constructive, and theological lenses. Muslima theology is a label I use to describe my work as a Muslim scholar, theologian, and activist. This label arises in conversation with – not rejection of – diverse formulations of feminism. While I consider my work to be feminist, I am also interested in asserting particular characteristics of my location, approach, and concerns. Therefore, I use the term Muslima (meaning, in Arabic, a female who submits to God, a female Muslim) to highlight my personal positioning as a female, as a Muslim, and as an individual committed to critical reappraisal and interpretation of the Islamic tradition in pursuit of egalitarianism and justice. I also use the label to highlight my theoretical positioning as a scholar who draws upon gender theory and feminist discourses to interrogate the value assigned to various forms of human difference, including – but not limited to – gender and biological sex. I do not apply this label to other scholarship but recognize similar strands of work and the possibility that others may employ this label to describe their own contributions.31 Comparative possibilities To begin, Muslima theology is an explicitly comparative endeavor. It is carried out in critical conversation with other theological discourses on religion, women, and gender, especially those articulated by women in other faith traditions. Explicit engagement with other traditions is a unique feature of my formulation of Muslima theology; it is not something that is assumed or embraced by all Muslim women scholars, activists, or theologians. In my view, however, comparative engagement is practically advantageous and theologically legitimate. I do recognize the historical complexities of the relationship between Islam and feminism, especially a hesitancy to holistically adopt the general norms and approaches of feminism and feminist theology. However, such hesitancy is not unique to Muslim women scholars, or to the discussion of Islam, Muslim women, and gender. Rather, it has been strongly voiced by many scholars and theologians, resulting in the articulation of multiple genres of theology, including the womanist theology of Delores Williams, the mujerista theology of Ada María Isasi-Díaz, the Asian women’s theology of Chung Hyun Kyung, and the African woman’s theology of Mercy Amba Oduyoye.32 As with these genres of theology, Muslima theology arises in explicit critique of universal and hegemonic feminisms that portray women’s experiences, concerns, and goals in a single fashion. It foregrounds the existence of meaningful diversity, a desire for agency, and recognition of the importance of self-definition. Though not wholly congruent, the overlapping areas of concern among these theologies indicate that there is much to be learned on all sides through direct comparative theological engagement.33 Comparative feminist

24  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes engagement can be productive, rather than destructive, distracting, or disfranchising. Admittedly, it has not always been a productive endeavor for a variety of reasons, including the obstacles presented by certain interpretative strategies; failure to grapple with latent, and sometimes explicit, power and privilege; and a general lack of knowledge about religious traditions other than one’s own.34 These realities, though, do not negate the validity of the endeavor; they demand better methods of engagement. Better methods will never circumvent all the risk entailed in comparative feminist engagement, but the potential payoffs outweigh those risks. To clarify, I use the term “comparative” not solely to indicate the general process of comparison, but rather the more technical field and specific method of comparative theology. As defined by Francis X. Clooney among others, comparative theology is both comparative and theological. It describes “acts of faith seeking understanding which are rooted in a particular faith tradition but which venture into learning from one or more other faith traditions . . . for the sake of fresh theological insights.”35 Comparative theology is the double process of venturing out of one’s tradition to learn deeply about and from other traditions, and then returning to one’s own tradition with new insights, questions, and perspectives. The underlying assumption is that there are things that can only be learned in and through conversation with various “others.” This learning however cannot be premised upon superficial knowledge or caricatures or upon projections and assumptions of full parity among traditions. Rather, it is deep knowledge and attentiveness to incomplete similarities and differences that opens the possibility of learning new things. In this process, we understand ourselves in new ways in the “light” of the other.36 It is important to emphasize that this does not mean that the objective of comparative theology is appropriation, direct cooptation, or abandonment of one’s own tradition(s).37 It is an assertion that we notice new facets of ourselves, our traditions, our sources, and our practices when they are illuminated by comparative engagement. We ask new questions of our traditions and, as comparative theologian Michelle Voss Roberts states, we “discover patterns hidden beneath the grooves of well-worn narratives.”38 We see new possibilities. Muslima theology as a genre of comparative theology seeks to engage other “feminist” theologies, seeking to learn about, be challenged by, and potentially even enriched by other perspectives and approaches. Since these feminist theologies are rooted in various religious traditions, it is necessary to explore their perspectives conscientiously and critically to avoid flattening out fundamental epistemic differences or universalizing a particular feminist theological perspective to all women. Comparative theology does not rest on an assumption of parity among traditions. At the heart of this endeavor is the affirmation that particularities are illuminating and provocative. Muslima theology thus does not engage in wholesale co-optation, but the critical and comparative lens can prompt us to imagine new legitimate and rooted options beyond the dominant forms of theology, interpretation, and practice within our traditions.39 The comparative lens assists in penetrating the “unthought” and the “unthinkable,” that is, those aspects of and possibilities within our own traditions

Feminist exegesis and beyond 25 that are obscured or rendered invisible by prevailing formulations of orthodoxy and interpretations of texts and practices.40 Comparative engagement also does not imply an evolutionary view of feminist theological discourse. We are not all on the same path toward the same goal, nor do we all share the same objectives, questions, and desires. But there are profound areas of overlap, and in charting courses forward, Muslima theologians stand to gain much from familiarity with these areas of overlap and openness to the possibility of learning from and with other scholars and theologians. Comparative engagement provides a way to learn with other traditions, and to gain new and indispensable insights related to egalitarianism and liberation. Engagement among traditions becomes a theologically sound, theologically rich, and practically effective means of change. It reveals new resources crucial to our own struggles. Rather than a distraction or side project, comparative feminist theology recasts interreligious engagement as an invaluable resource for practical and theological reflection and action. Before moving on, let me provide a concrete example of such comparative theological engagement. Christian feminist theology tends to foreground the role of women’s experience; experience becomes a central measure of authenticity and authority. As Rosemary Radford Ruether indicates, human experience – including experience of the Divine, of self, of community, and of the world – is the “starting point and ending point of the hermeneutic circle”; theology and tradition are rooted in and renewed through experience.41 Traditional symbols, doctrines, and practices are authenticated or devalued based on their capacity to respond to and explain experience. Ruether recognizes that authority structures within traditions often seek to invert the relationship between tradition and experience; they attempt to “make received symbols dictate what can be experienced as well as the interpretation of that which is experienced.”42 While this is a common strategy, she contends that it is bound to fail. When religious practices and traditions cease to respond to or align with experience a theological “crisis of tradition” ensues.43 This crisis can be remedied in a variety of ways, but it demands attention in order for the tradition to continue to be passed along and thrive. In short, Ruether highlights the authoritative role of experience and its dynamic and reciprocal relationship with tradition. The explicit prioritization of human experience may seem out of place in Islamic discussions that idolize precedent (male precedent or at least male recounted precedent typically), but what if we dared to ask questions from this perspective? What if, for example on the question of women’s ritual leadership, we asked not only about precedent (about whether it has happened before) but also about the experiences of and impact on women themselves? About how it colored their spirituality and humanity to be limited and excluded from these central roles? Muslim women exegetes and scholars certainly understand the role of experience. When they stress that primarily male scholars in patriarchal contexts articulated legal and exegetical opinions, for example, they are stating that those scholars’ experiences and frames of reference were particular and diverge from other experiential frames. This is one of Wadud’s stated motivations for writing Qur’an and Woman, and it aligns well with Ruether.

26  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes From a comparative perspective, though, what Ruether accentuates is the detrimental impact – even impossibility – of ignoring human experience. It is not just that experience is always in play. Nor is it just that some (male) experience has been privileged. It is that experience has to always be in play for the tradition to continue to thrive. Yes, orthodoxy will attempt to invert the relationship between tradition and experience, aiming to condition and dictate experience based upon the parameters of earlier tradition. This is such an illuminating description of the debates on women’s ritual leadership and woman-led prayer. Not only is the legitimacy of woman-led prayer flatly denied but also is the legitimacy of the experiences that prompt the discussion of woman-led prayer. The experiences of wanting ritual and social equality, of being excluded, and of lacking physical and topical representation are ignored, belittled, or weaponized as supposed indicators of lack of faith or “external” influence. Therefore, when Juliane Hammer highlights the discursive disconnect between legal and symbolic arguments about woman-led prayer, it is not just a discursive issue.44 It is intentional avoidance of considering the role of experience. Since experience has no role in the mythological, ahistorical, politically defined “tradition,” there is no reason to address or language to render authoritative the very real psychological, sociological, and spiritual impacts of exclusion and lack of representation. Engagement with Ruether does not provide Islamic answers or resolutions to how experience becomes authoritative within Muslim communities and consciousnesses. However, through comparative overlaps and distinctions, it does help to identify the issue and begin to consider possible, organic responses. Constructive possibilities The second characteristic of Muslima theology is that it is constructive. By this, I  intend that it is not only about “retrieval” and “purification” of what already exists in the tradition and sources. Muslima theology aims to go beyond exegetical work and historical resourcement. It is a constructive enterprise that is rooted in reinterpretation of the central sources and historical figures but is not limited to this activity. This characteristic responds directly to a number of critiques, including those of Ali and Hidayatullah, that call for structural revision of the entire legal system and consideration of the egalitarian limits of the Qur’an. This characteristic also responds to Abugideiri’s critique of the dominance of deconstructive analysis. It aims to foster constructive rethinking of the tradition, methods, and approaches. It aims at structural revision, faithful and grounded revision, but structural revision nonetheless. Such revision, though, will be contextually specific and carried out in an ongoing fashion. Muslima theology does not aim to dethrone one monolithic representation of Islamic orthodoxy and enshrine another. This also means that we will have to be willing to take risks, go beyond deconstructive critique, and make constructive claims. For example, in a recent essay Celene Ayat Lizzio offers an insightful evaluation of laws of ritual purity and

Feminist exegesis and beyond 27 ritual preclusion, noting the unique manner in which they bar female participation in central rites.45 She also draws attention to the fact that “centuries of patriarchal intellectual productivity attest to the malleable nature of normative prescriptions” in a variety of areas.46 Notably, in regard to purity norms for women, the customs and precedent of early generations of Muslims are largely and uncritically embraced, irrespective of their androcentric assumptions. Lizzio notes that more investigation of the notion of purity is required, but she states that it is not her intention to argue that women should be compelled to perform rituals during menstrual or postpartum periods. Lizzio provides a brief, insightful, and provocative deconstructive critique. However, she stops at the deconstructive critique and does not in her essay answer the constructive questions: If this is the critique, then what? What does it mean? What should happen? I recognize that professional context may limit constructive contributions. I also recognize that the articulation of constructive claims will subject exegetes to scrutiny, to accusations of innovation, and to delegitimization. However, change does not come from challenge alone. At certain junctures, faithful, critical, conscientious and constructive claims need to be made. The constructive characteristic of Muslima theology, moreover, is also a way for Muslim women to assert authority and transcend a stance that is primarily reactive to power, negative stereotypes, and male dominance within and outside the tradition. Constructive contributions are not primarily occupied with refuting negative characterizations of the tradition, not premised upon androcentric methodology, and not restricted to the limited possibilities of precedent alone. Theological possibilities The third and final characteristic of Muslima theology that I will discuss is that Muslima theology is actually theology. The use of the term “theology,” while not as common in Islamic discourse, indicates a concern with articulating integrated interpretations of God and God’s relation to the world, including humanity. Therefore, in Muslima theology, the goal is to contextualize discussions of women and gender within a broader theological exploration of the nature of the Divine, the types of interactions between the Divine and humanity (including topics such as creation, revelation, prophethood, morality, and ethics), and the nature and purpose of humanity itself (theological anthropology). Theological exploration serves to problematize and destabilize assumptions that have gained traction in the tradition. The Muslima approach uses theological concepts and the integration of these concepts to assess existing practices, laws, and interpretations, and to suggest new practices, laws, and interpretations. Components of this theological enterprise already exist in the writings of Wadud and Barlas who invoke principles such as tawhid, divine sovereignty, and shirk as their basis for arguing against the permissibility of patriarchy and androcentrism.47 It is also present in Hassan’s discussion of Qur’anic depictions of creation and human nature.48 There is, though, a need for even more intentional and extensive theological reflection. There is a need to further uncover and evaluate

28  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes the implicit theological assumptions of existing interpretations, practices, and methodologies. Theological reflection, for example, can offer new insights on topics such as the marriage of Muslims to non-Muslims. In reference to this topic, reflection raises questions about the implicit theological assumptions that lie behind the legal permission for men alone to engage in “interfaith” marriages. Ali highlights weaknesses in various legal arguments and conceptual hierarchies related to such marriages.49 Asma Lamrabet argues for reconsideration on the basis of Qur’anic silence, context, and the ethical objectives of the Qur’an.50 Theological reflection expands the discussion to focus on assumptions of intratradition homogeneity; universalized notions of Muslim men’s capacity for respect and tolerance; depictions of women as collectively impressionable; and depictions of God as automatically favoring one religious community over others.51 The question then becomes whether we (as communities and individuals) accept these assumptions and their collateral implications with respect to theological anthropology and views of God. What does this denial say about how we understand women and men in general? What does it imply about how we view humanity and its purpose? What kind of God do we, perhaps inadvertently, embrace when we assent to this legal ruling? How does our understanding of biological and gender differentiation reflect or distort our view of God? If the theological assumptions and implications are found to be distortions of humanity, distortions of God, or distortions of the relationships between humanity and God, legal, ethical, and contextual practices related to interfaith marriage should be reconsidered. I am not advocating for fixed answers, but rather for the necessity of tracing these interconnections and implications, and of reflecting deeply on whether we comfortable accepting them in light of our tradition and our experience. Finally, the theological component of Muslima theology also expands its relevance beyond the topic of women. When we start to reflect on and make assertions about the Divine, about humanity, and about the relationship between the two, our insights are no longer particular to this subject alone. They become relevant to broader discourses, especially those concerned with how we understand and/ or value human otherness. These include examinations of gender more broadly, of sexuality, of race and ethnicity, and of religious diversity. I have, for instance, employed Muslima theology to examine the topic of religious difference in the Qur’an.52 In sum, the theological focus provides a way to critically and constructively engage the Islamic tradition, simultaneously stirring new possibilities and retaining deep (and thus provocative) connections.

Conclusion I have aimed in this essay to provide an overview of the ways hegemonic othering, androcentrism, and patriarchy shape exegesis by Muslim women. I have surveyed prominent strategies and critiques thereof and outlined a new trajectory of Muslima theology. By way of concluding, it is clear that moving Islamic feminist exegesis forward is a complex and multi-faceted process. I do, however, hold

Feminist exegesis and beyond 29 that interpretations that are comparative, constructive, and theological have the potential not only to offer new perspectives on women, gender, and Islam but also to redefine notions of authority and legitimacy within and outside the tradition.

Notes 1 Their major works include Hassan 1998; Wadud 1999, 2006; and Barlas 2002. Some helpful surveys of their writings include: Hidayatullah 2014; Barlas 2006; Lamptey 2014, 81–96; and Hammer 2012, 56–76. 2 See Pew Research Center, “How Americans Feel about Religious Groups,” July 16, 2014, www.pewforum.org/2014/07/16/how-americans-feel-about-religious-groups/, accessed July 27, 2015. 3 Abu-Lughod 2013, 26–29. 4 Spivak 1988, 296–297; see also Abu-Lughod 2013, 33, 46–47. 5 Ahmed 1992, 155. 6 See Mahmood 2004, 1–2; and Bullock 2002, 37–40. 7 Zine 2004, 173. 8 Rahman 1982, 2000. 9 Wadud 1999, 1–2. 10 Chaudhry 2013. 11 See for example al-Tabari’s Qur’an commentary; Al-Tabari 1987. 12 See note 1 for their major works. 13 Wadud 1999, 17–20, 23–25, 44–53; Barlas 2002, 36; and Hassan 1998, 262. 14 Chaudhry 2015, 89; and Hidayatullah 2014, 81–86. 15 Hidayatullah 2014, 81–86. 16 Hassan 1998, 43. 17 Ibid., 254. 18 Ibid., 255–256. 19 Ibid., 257–261. 20 Wadud 2006, 198–203. 21 For example, see Wadud 2015. 22 Chaudhry 2015, 89. 23 Ali 2003, 164–167. See also, Ali 2006. 24 Ali 2003, 164. 25 Ibid., 166–167, 182–183. 26 Hidayatullah 2014, 147. 27 Ibid., 152–153. 28 Ibid., 176. 29 Ibid., 175–176; Ali 2003, 182. 30 Abugideiri 2010, 137–138. 31 For example, Aslan et al. 2013. The editors use “Muslima theology,” yet acknowledge that it is not used or used in this sense by all Muslim women scholars, activists, or theologians. 32 See Williams 1993; Isasi-Díaz 1996; Kyung 1990; and Oduyoye 2001. 33 See also Hidayatullah 2009. 34 Hidayatullah 2013, 150–151. See also, Wadud 2006, 122; and Kassam 2013. 35 Clooney 2010, 10. 36 Ibid., 16; Voss Roberts 2014, xxii; and Locklin and Nicholson 2010, 499. 37 Fredericks 1999, 178; Phan 2014, 262; Thatamanil 2006, 23–24; and Tiemeier 2010, 139. 38 Voss Roberts 2010, 18. 39 Voss Roberts 2014, xxii; and Clooney 2016, 227. 40 Arkoun 2002.

30  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Ruether 1993, 12. Ibid., 12. Ibid. Hammer 2012, 36–37. Lizzio 2013. Ibid., 178. For example, Wadud 2006, 24–37, 39–42, 158–162; and Barlas 2002, 13–15. Hassan 1998, 253, 257–261. Ali 2006, 14–22. Lamrabet 2013. Lamptey 2014a. Ibid.

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Feminist exegesis and beyond 31 Clooney S. J., Francis X. (2016) “Afterword: Some Reflections in Response to Teaching Comparative Theology in the Millennial Classroom,” in Comparative Theology in the Millennial Classroom, ed. Mara Brecht and Reid B. Locklin (New York: Routledge), 219–234. Fredericks, James (1999) Faith Among Faiths: Christian Theology and Non-Christian Religions (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press). Hammer, Juliane (2012) American Muslim Women, Religious Authority, and Activism: More Than a Prayer (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press). Hassan, Riffat (1991) “Muslim Women and Post-Patriarchal Islam,” in After Patriarchy: Feminist Transformations of the World Religions, ed. Paula M. Cooey, William R. Eakin, and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis), 39–64. Hassan, Riffat (1998) “Feminism in Islam,” in Feminism and World Religions, ed. Arvind Sharma and Katherine K. Young (New York: SUNY Press), 248–278. Hidayatullah, Aysha (2009) “Inspiration and Struggle: Muslim Feminist Theology and the Work of Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 25 (1): 162–170. Hidayatullah, Aysha (2013) “The Qur’anic Rib-ectomy: Scriptural Purity, Imperial Dangers, and Other Obstacles to the Interfaith Engagement of Feminist Qur’anic Interpretation,” in Women in Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Catherine Cornille and Jillian Maxey (Eugene, OR: Cascade), 150–167. Hidayatullah, Aysha (2014) Feminist Edges of the Qur’an (New York: Oxford University Press). Isasi- Díaz, Ada María (1996) Mujerista Theology: A Theology for the 20th Century (Maryknoll: Orbis). Kassam, Zayn (2013) “Constructive Interreligious Dialogue Concerning Muslim Women,” in Women in Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Catherine Cornille and Jillian Maxey (Eugene, OR: Cascade), 127–149. Kyung, Chung Hyun (1990) Struggle to Be the Sun Again: Introducing Asian Women’s Theology (Maryknoll: Orbis). Lamptey, Jerusha (2014a) Never Wholly Other: A Muslima Theology of Religious Pluralism (New York: Oxford University). Lamptey, Jerusha (2014b) “Interfaith Marriage: A Muslima Response,” in McGinley Lecture Series (New York: Fordham University Press), 36–43. Lamrabet, Asma (2013) “What Does the Qur’an Say About the Interfaith Marriage?” January, www.asma-lamrabet.com/articles/what-does-the-qur-an-say-about-the-inter faith-marriage/. Lizzio, Celene Ayat (2013) “Gendering Ritual: A Muslima’s Reading of the Laws of Purity and Ritual Preclusion,” in Muslima Theology: The Voices of Muslim Women Theologians, ed. Ednan Aslan, Marcia Hermansen, and Elif Medeni (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang), 167–179. Locklin, Reid B., and Hugh Nicholson (2010) “The Return of Comparative Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (2) (June): 477–514. Mahmood, Saba Mahmood (2004) Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Oduyoye, Mercy Amba (2001) Introducing African Women’s Theology (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press). Phan, Peter (2014) “From Soteriology to Comparative Theology and Back: A Response to S. Mark Heim,” in Understanding Religious Pluralism: Perspectives from Religious

32  Jerusha Tanner Rhodes Studies and Theology, ed. by Peter Phan and Jonathan Ray (Eugene, OR: Pickwick), 260–264. Rahman, Fazlur (1982) Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Rahman, Fazlur (2000) Revival and Reform in Islam: A Study of Islamic Fundamentalisms, ed. Ebrahim Moosa (Oxford: Oneworld). Ruether, Rosemary Radford (1993) Sexism and Godtalk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston, MA: Beacon Press). Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 66–111. Thatamanil, John J. (2006) The Immanent Divine (Minneapolis: Fortress Press). Tiemeier, Tracy Sayuki (2010) “Comparative Theology as a Theology of Liberation,” in The New Comparative Theology: Interreligious Insights from the Next Generation, ed. Francis X. Clooney, S. J. (London: T & T Clark), 129–150. Voss Roberts, Michelle (2010) Dualities: A Theology of Difference (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press). Voss Roberts, Michelle (2014) Tastes of the Divine: Hindu and Christian Theologies of Emotion (New York: Fordham University Press). Wadud, Amina (1999) Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University). Wadud, Amina (2006) Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld). Wadud, Amina (2015) “The Ethics of Tawhid Over the Ethics of Qiwamah,” in Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition, ed. Ziba Mir Hosseini, Mulki Al-Sharmani, and Jana Rumminger (London: Oneworld), 256–274. Williams, Delores (1993) Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist GodTalk (Maryknoll: Orbis). Zine, Jasmin (2004) “Creating a Critical Faith-Centered Space for Antiracist Feminism: Reflections of a Muslim Scholar-Activist,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 20 (2) (Fall): 167–187.

2 Islamic feminism by any other name Amina Wadud

Editors’ note Dr. Amina Wadud is one of the most eminent interpreters of the Qur’an and scholars of Islamic studies of our time. She offered the keynote lecture at the 2015 symposium and we are including the text of this lecture in the volume as her contribution to the conversation.

Dr. Wadud’s lecture I arrive to this forum from a workshop in Morocco, run by Musawah.org.1 These workshops are regional training sessions and the participants are usually among activists working on reform and human rights in their home countries. The workshop in Morocco included participants from the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. I arrived early to Morocco from another forum in Oslo, Norway, where the intersection of Islamophobia and human rights takes many forms. To celebrate my early arrival, I was scheduled to meet my friend, and Musawah advocate, Dr. Asma Lamrabet at a lunch scheduled to introduce me to Dr. Fatema Mernissi. This would be our first time to meet. Our email communications expressed our mutual enthusiasm about this meeting. When Asma came to pick me up at the hotel, however, she offered profuse apologies from Fatema: her health had taken a turn for the worse and she was unable to breathe on her own without oxygen. She could not make our lunch engagement. It was not public knowledge that she was battling cancer. Four days later, we received the sad news that she had passed away. She was 75 years old. She and I were never to meet in person. Her passing reminds me to look at the Muslim women’s movement with greater comprehension and a sense of urgency. When I was doing research for what would become my first book, Qur’an and Woman: Re-Reading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective in the 1980s, no name stood out on matters of Islam and women from a reformist perspective like the name Fatema Mernissi. By the 1990s I would find it problematic when her work was compared with mine. While there are distinctions still between our work, reconciling our discrepancies owes much to the construction of Islamic

34  Amina Wadud feminism in the twenty-first century. Since binaries persist in other areas and disciplines in relation to the lives and perspectives of Muslim women, I describe here a personal, historical and ethical evolution, from a place where the distinctions seemed irreconcilable and can be summed up in terms of methodology. What was our journey to this meeting point?

Critical mass The Muslim women’s movement today is experiencing a critical mass. More than at any other time in history, Muslim women participate in the radical changes of our lives and in formulating the basic paradigms upon which our lives are measured. In my lifetime alone, there have been more radical considerations of the possibilities of how to live as Muslim women, than at any other time in history or, as I would like to say, except at the time of the advent of Islam. However, the aspect about which I speak cannot even be said about the nascent community of Islam over fourteen centuries ago. This is important because while there was a radical shift in worldview and praxis with the transformation of Islam, certain rights were given to women that had not existed anywhere in the world, like: A woman’s right to inherit. A woman’s right to own property. A woman’s right to choose her husband. A woman’s right to learn or receive an education. A woman’s right to act as a witness in a court of law. A woman’s right to divorce her husband for as little as failure to satisfy her sexually. A woman’s direct agency before Allah, responsible for her own soul. While these were tremendous benefits for women, transforming their lives neck and neck with the transformations in the lives of men – if not more so, given the abysmal status of women before revelation and at the time of Islamic beginnings – of note, however, women were not themselves the agents of change. They were beneficiaries of divine revelation to the Prophet, who received the revelation in the form of the Qur’an and established his lifestyle to embody it. Thus, the message was always pragmatic as well as spiritual. It was also transformative and not just in terms of the lives of women, although that is my focus here. What marks our present time, in the new Millennium, as exceptional is the critical mass of Muslim women engaged in the struggle for the realization and political implementation of their own self-determination, as women and as Muslims. Yet, many are still stuck in the old imperialist paradigm that ascribes to a Muslim woman the single role of helpless victim waiting to be saved from her culture and liberated from her religion. I remember when saying “Muslim feminist” was an oxymoron. For some, it is still. In these remarks, I review the historical developments from the time when feminism was not wide enough to embrace Muslims

Islamic feminism by any other name 35 and Muslim cultures, and Islam was not universal enough to embrace feminism. I do this in order to critique the implications of choosing the name Muslimah theology as meaningful or transformative within the context of this history. To be sure, in the past several decades Muslim women have engaged at every level of the community, in every community, even to the most remote villages within the arenas of education, law, science, politics, family, economics, environment, theology, spirituality and art. Wherever there are Muslims and women in the world, Muslim women have become the agents of change, advocates of human dignity, and architects of transformation toward a paradigm shift and a radically inclusive epistemology. Within this critical mass, Muslim women demonstrate diverse perspectives on how to go about this change. They do not all go about it in the same way. Sometimes there is great contradiction and discord. This is natural, and in many ways necessary. However, the dynamics of discord can be obscured when insensitivity to the identity politics leaves the sublime beauty of diversities to become a tool to divide Muslim women and pit them against each other for who controls the terrain of advocacy and progress. Instead of seeing how the various strategies lend themselves toward the collective goal of complete human dignity and honor for all women, Muslim women can be pitted against each other to determine who is right, or who has the right to decide for others exactly what is the nature of the Muslim women’s agenda and what are the strategic methods for change and transformation.

Personal location I was in that divisive location when my work would be compared to Fatema Mernissi’s. I had worked on gender issues long before I could own the word “feminism” as appropriate for my scholarship, activism and identity. I persist with my aim to make certain articulations toward gender equality from a “faith perspective.” I am the descendent of enslaved Africans to the Americas, born to Christian parents. My sojourn in Islam had nothing to do with Western feminist movements because they tended to marginalize Black and women of color, poor women, and gender nonconforming women. My principal motivation in the gender debates is linked to my spiritual yearnings. From my religion at birth, Christianity, I took certain ideas that remain true to the gender jihad in Islam. First is the idea that God is love. So crucial, in fact, I chose the name Wadud, an attribute of God in Arabic that means loving. Second, I was born into the US civil rights movement. My father, a Methodist minister, took me to the March on Washington with Dr. Rev. Martin Luther King in 1963 when I was 11 years old. I have never conceived of a separation between ideas of God and the fight against oppression, no matter what form the oppression takes, who is the oppressor, or who is being oppressed. When I began my university studies in Islam, I was keenly aware that the Sacred is present in diverse manifestations leading to a variety of religious preoccupations. I had also accepted that people of faith engage in life according to their understanding of what is Sacred and how to follow the Divine Will.

36  Amina Wadud I began studying Eastern religious traditions that lead me to practice Buddhism, from which I also carried away certain ideas still paramount to my gender jihad. First: meditation reminds us that we breathe in the presence of the “Sacred” reality at every moment. Therefore, we must intentionally focus our energies honestly and individually toward “That” which is imminent in all creation, to our connection with the creation and with its Creator. Second, I took away a deeper understanding of how the Sacred can be lost in human discourse about It. It is evident that what one person might mean, when in conversation with another person, using the same words, might not actually be the same thing. Language matters. Indeed, God is bigger than any discourse, acts in ways not fathomable to human beings at all, and is intimately connected to each human being, even if they choose not to respond to that living “Presence,” or reality. This benevolence is not to offend or be imposed on people who do not believe in God. I say this instead because it is important to my location and to my comments here.

Islam Every discussion about Islam and women begins with some implicit meaning of the word “Islam.” People often operate on a presumption that there is uniform agreement on what the word “Islam” means. When people say, for example, “Islam means peace,” “Islam prohibits homosexuality”; “in Islam you must wear hijab,” or “Islam is a violent religion”; the source of such abstractions is frequently not provided. One important development that the women’s movement helped to forge in international debates at the beginning of the new Millennium was the distinction between Muslim cultures and Islamic primary or classical sources, namely the Qur’an, the established sunna or normative practice of the Prophet, his authentic ahadith, and sometimes “Islamic law” – which is understood somewhere between the terms shari’a and fiqh. There has never been a single uniform understanding of how these sources were constructed or how they should come into construction within the dynamic and diverse Muslim communities across space and time. For this chapter and for all of my work, I  build upon a definition of Islam encapsulated by its most basic and fundamental principle – tawhid. At its most fundamental level, tawhid refers to God as One. For matters of social justice, it refers to the more intensified form of its syntactical origin: the making of one from fragments: diversity, or plurality, and could be defined as Unity. This social principle of tawhid mandates a relationship between human beings only of equality and reciprocity. According to the Qur’an, the role of women in Islam is to be khalifa on the earth: a moral agent of Allah within the Sacred order of balance and harmony in the universe. This teleology is confirmed by the Qur’anic passage: “Inni jaa’ilun fi-l-‘ard khalifa, Indeed, I will create an agent on the earth” (Q 2:30). Woman was not created as a by-product of, helpmate for, or second-class citizen to man. Furthermore, her agency is in a direct relationship to God, unmitigated by men, men’s agency, family, or culture. This agency is to be manifest by actions “fi-l-‘ard: in the

Islamic feminism by any other name 37 creation”: standing up for justice and gender equality, working to reform asymmetrical gender policies and toppling tyrannical practices and epistemologies are thus essential to an agent as part of the human-Divine relationship. These aspects of justice are all mandated by Allah as articulated in the Qur’an, and established by the Prophetic sunna. Coincidently, this is the same as the role of men in Islam. Women are human. They do not depend upon men for their humanity. It is given to them by Allah. While women have always been a part of the Muslim community, expected to conform to the development of Islam within that community, in the early development of the foundational paradigms of Islamic thought and practice, they did not enjoy equal participation in establishing the fundamental understanding of what Islam is and how it would be legislated. In fact, as the Muslim empire spread geographically and politically after the Abbasid period, women’s contributions to the fundamental canon of Islam were further marginalized and ultimately silenced. This had a profound effect on the subsequent generations of Islamic thought and in the establishment of both legitimacy and authority. If we look back over Islamic history from our vantage point, we see a minor role played by women in establishing the basic epistemology that would come to stand as authority and legitimacy. Today, women are present and accounted for at every level of the community, not the least of which is the scholarly and ritual community. Women work to make sure we contribute to the establishment of precedent for later communities in Islam. We participate fully in establishing new canon, constructing new traditions, forming new policies, living in the present, with an eye on the past, and a conscious trajectory toward the future. This is a corrective to the asymmetry between women and men in Muslim communities in the past. However, we do not go about this without some contention between our voices, perspectives, methods, and objectives. This is natural, inevitable, and for the most part useful.

History of a divide My most coherent memory of the problems that would arise when Muslim women have different perspectives was during the Beijing Global Conference for Women in 1995. More Muslim women were present than at any such forum before or since, so they decided to form a caucus. Nightly meetings would dissolve into chaos and shouting. Two divergent perspectives had developed, that would dominate the conversations and shape the discourse over Islam and women for several decades, up until today. Because of the nationalist movements to gain independence from colonialism, the first wave of Muslim women’s movements was eclectic, taking inspiration from global women’s movements initiated in the west. A movement for women in particular, by women and men, was a direct offshoot of liberation and nationalist movements. The movements to establish independent nation-states offered the promise of equal citizenship for all. However, they did not benefit women as they did men. The disappointing unequal benefits of national agendas between women and men would herald in Muslim women’s independent advocacy. The modern

38  Amina Wadud Muslim women’s movements would begin in earnest. In the early part of the twentieth century, Muslim women would organize away from being just another branch of nation-building political organizations and direct themselves toward concerns specific to themselves as women. Like all early movements, their strategies were not always clearly defined. They borrowed from both Islamic principles and sources internally as well as from principles and initiatives gleaned from existing women’s suffrage movements in the west. These civic organizations had a wide range of initiatives that took up the cause of women’s equal citizenship, access to resources, mobility and opportunities to grow, or general wellbeing. They were led primarily by the educated elites and linked to other global women’s movements. In 1980, the world would witness the rise of political Islam, or Islamism. Political Islam would have an impact on all debates about Islam and Islamic reform from that time forward. It would have a lasting impact on all who organized to stand up for women’s rights. It would lead women to locate themselves either in agreement or in distinction from Islamism, helping to forge a more pronounced secular orientation for some, where this had never before been a concern. On one hand, the secular Muslim women’s perspective could be understood as an objection to the developing fervor over Islamism and the idea of an Islamic state, which puts forward the power of the state as an enforcement mechanism for a single, patriarchal understanding of Islam. Since non-Muslim nation-states, even the ones that had colonized Muslim lands, had a longer established history with their women’s movements, it was easily tempting to defer to the existing strategies, theories and objectives of those movements. While it was especially important to challenge undue patriarchal privileging of men and to assert equal rights and access to resources for women, political Islam would promote the idea that such privilege was fundamental to Islam itself. Rather than challenge this interpretation, many Muslim women would articulate a divide between their location and Islam all together. It has also become evident, that secularism can be reified in its own ideology and push to remove all vestiges of religion from the public space, civil society and the human rights discourses. This would have consequences for the Muslim women’s movements and has been especially catastrophic for Muslim women living as minorities in the global north. In the context of Muslim majority nation-states, secular Muslim feminists, like the ones at Beijing in 1995, are mostly concerned that patriarchal interpretations of Islam – interpretations that stand as though unchanged and unchangeable – needed to be set aside for a more engaged democratic process of how to manage the state and its laws. Whenever “Islam” was used by the state it had become an excuse for closing off critical thinking and for women that has been especially problematic. Many secular feminists today – including Muslim secular feminists – advocate removing religion from the debates over women’s rights as the only way to justice and equality. Deeming Islam irrevocably patriarchal, they do not want to contend with it, its spokespersons or its authoritative sources. The launching of CEDAW (The Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) in 1979 further encouraged them to take up the position that

Islamic feminism by any other name 39 there could be no justice within Islam for women and defer to the international human rights instruments as the better direction for gender justice. The other dominant voice at Beijing was the voice of Political Islam or Islamism. Political Islam seems to offer the solution to many Muslims who are fed up with the aftermath of colonialism in the form of imperialism. They prefer to locate their struggles in their authentic identities as Muslims. Furthermore, they propose that Islam is the solution. Islam is superior to all other worldviews, especially a worldview that advocates the removal of religion. Islamism as part of a long and arduous development of modern Muslims also displays intricate diversities within. On one hand, there are violent extremists, and on the other hand, there are quietest neo-conservatives. Islamist developments emphasized the need to go back to some imagined utopia known as “Islam.” When and where that utopia is believed to have existed there is no consensus among the Islamists. It is believed that true Islam was established with the Prophet and maintained uncontested and uniformly until the invasion of the colonizers. In reality, much of what gets associated with this Islam has been derived after the haphazard intrusion of the colonizers in Muslim majority contexts. One critical consequence of forming the nation-state under colonial rule was fulfilling the requirement of transferring Islamic legal theory into positive law. This would rob Islamic jurisprudence of its flexibility and context specific ambiguity and complicate the relationship of the legislature to what is deemed Islamic law in a manner that was both eclectic and haphazard. With regard to the women’s movement, the Islamist position defers to its vision of Islam – no matter how haphazardly conceived – over international human rights instruments. After all, these instruments were developed in the west, among those who had colonized. They can be seen as a way to continue to maintain Western hegemony over formerly colonized peoples, including Muslims. At the very least, these discourses are constructed taking for granted certain Western liberal ideas – whether genuinely put into practice by the very same architects of colonialism. This is a major sore spot. Furthermore, the proponents of these declarations claim universal supremacy over all other ideas and ideologies, thus especially over Islam. These two perspectives have dominated the discussions about women and Islam beyond Beijing. They form a powerful and mutually supportive dichotomy, agreeing that one cannot have both Islam and Human Rights – or Islam and feminism. In many ways, this location continues to have an impact on Muslims in the discourse about Islamic reform and particularly the women’s movements. Feminism and human rights had to be secular. Islam was irredeemably patriarchal and thus impossible to integrate into global discussions. For secularists, Islam was the basis of the problem for Muslim women, and needed to be abandoned, relative to global conversations and international agencies. For Islamists, Islam needed to be followed devoutly, without questions in order to arrive at its “Truth.” In fact, a whole new conversation would emerge with the rise of Political Islam to encourage all believers to aspire to this True Islam. It would be juxtaposed to any articulation of Islam that was understandably partial,

40  Amina Wadud situated, ambiguous, nuances or just localized. A superior location of “true” Islam, “true” Muslims and “true’ understanding, asserted with a confident ring to it, became the goal point of Islamist discourses and activism. Such a singular “true” Islam was wholly fabricated in the context of the modern nation-state as constructed by conservative thinkers, activists and public intellectuals. This would go unnoticed until the rise of more violent Islamists extremists. Instead of rigorous intellectual engagement on the nature and source of this “true” Islam, all who differed from whatever details were currently in use could be deemed an apostate to the faith. Disagreement with particular Islamist agendas were deemed anti-Islamic.

Unraveling the dichotomy A subtle, yet important, development shaping Islamic reformist dialogue – especially within the Muslim women’s movements – was the agreement between secular Muslim feminists and Islamists that there could be no feminism or “universal” human rights and Islam. Upon this dichotomy, an irreconcilable gap between diverse efforts would take the next few decades to bridge. At almost every level of the conversations: the confessional communities, the grassroots, local and regional activists, funders, United Nations and other global Islam and Human Rights architects and participants, this dichotomy would be fundamental to determining what steps to take next, and how to support the overall movement. From the 1990s forward, Muslim women would be forced to choose between their belief in Islam and their feminism at every level of discourse and advocacy. This is why titles like “Believing Women” are problematic; after all, secularist Muslim feminists are believers too. In 1995 at Beijing, Muslim women who were in the middle of this divide would remain ambiguous or invisible until the phenomenon of Islamic feminism develop a way forward. One leading articulation came from a small organization from Malaysia, Sisters in Islam (SIS). SIS was founded by eight professional Muslim women in the late 1980s. I joined two other SIS members at the Beijing meetings. I was still participating in the false dichotomy and refused to be called a feminist. Instead, I claimed my work was pro-faith pro-feminist. However, because SIS would not disavow Islam, we were branded Islamists, especially at certain levels of international conversation. Thus, secular Muslim women’s organizations were more efficient at fundraising from within major Western philanthropy and development networks. They were more easily understood because they had a shared language articulating their goals only within the terms used by the UN instruments. The UN rejected anything projected as “faith based,” let alone “Islam” or “Islamic.” Meanwhile, SIS would critique patriarchal practices that dominated Muslim cultures and would thus be rejected by Islamists groups, who had access to petrodollars in the form of philanthropic support. They would accuse us of trying to destroy “Islam,” or of being deviant. Compounding this problem, although all but three Muslim majority nation-states have ratified CEDAW, many proposed

Islamic feminism by any other name 41 exemptions to article 16, “in the name of Islam.” Clearly, more was needed at the level of theory and methodology to unravel this loggerhead. This would be taken up in earnest, at the beginning of the new millennium, which would lead to a new trajectory, called Islamic feminism. At stake was not only the origins and nature of global human rights debates over women’s rights but also the stymied global discussions about Islam. Paradoxically, the Islamist attempt to translate fiqh notions of gender into policy controlled by the state would be a catalyst for the emergence of a new gender discourse. In Islamic intellectual history there have been many reform movements. This current reform movement does more than merely seek to find an Islamic genealogy for modern concepts; it has radically de-constructed the very nature of what is reflected as “Islam.” Today’s Islamic reformist thinkers emphasize the production of knowledge in Islamic thought. One aspect of this production of knowledge is the designation of gender as a category of thought. Any statement, law or policy deemed “Islamic” requires critical analysis of gender as a tool of inquiry. Islamic classical sources and discourses did not engage with gender as a tool of analysis but implicitly understood gender based on difference as hierarchy. Since women and men are different, one of them must be superior to the other. With this understanding, any assertion of women’s rights looks like displacement of men because of centuries of male privilege. Dismantling male privilege is not about men; it is about privilege. A new use of foundational epistemology and a new gender inclusive theology would form the basis for a radical transformation. Part of this transformation would be feminist analysis, whether the term is also used as personal identification or not. We are now decades into Muslim women’s feminist research and analysis. For example, in the areas of Qur’an and tafsir, by scholars like Dr. Riffat Hassan, Dr. Asma Barlas, Dr. Asma Lamrabet, and myself, and in other areas, like hadith and fiqh there are contributions from Dr. Fatema Mernissi, Dr. Zahia Jahouri, Dr. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Dr. Amira Sonbol and others. All areas of Islamic thought began to be reexamined with a critical lens given toward gender. In many ways, the divide between secular feminists and Islamists helped some of us, who were already engaged in the gender debates, to forge a more pragmatic understanding of what was at stake in determining our diversity. To be sure, the increasingly aggressive location of secularism and Islamism is not tenable. Unspecified secularism ignores how much the Muslim community sees its identity in Islamic terms. To advocate the removal of Islam is an insult and affront. Furthermore, it is exclusivist while claiming the language of universalism – a particular imperialistic tool. All official human rights discussions since the founding of the United Nations operate on a platform of Western liberalism; a platform that neglects its own spotted history, including its wholesale participation in colonizing other nations. While classical Muslim thinkers did not use gender as a category of thought, they left clear indications that demonstrated their location was hegemonic and patriarchal. The resulting privileging of men is a construct, neither inherently nor exclusively Islamic.

42  Amina Wadud The discourse on gender equality confirmed an either/or binary. Islamic feminism began the necessary work of moving toward radical pluralism. It starts by interrogating key terms, like “human rights” and “feminism,” but more importantly, the term “Islam.” Taking full agency over particular usage of terms would be foundational to Islamic feminism and to moving beyond a static location on feminism, human rights and Islam. Because of the hard-earned place to achieve the goals of even more nuanced discourses, I  particularly find the assertion of something called “Muslima Theology” redundant and elitist. It lacks epistemological coherence relative to the history of Muslim women’s movements. From neo-conservatives, or, Islamists – even for Da’esh – to even the most hardcore secular Muslims, 1.6 billion souls are identified by the word “Muslim/a.” A comprehensive look across centuries of Muslim theory, theology, politics, philosophy, ethics, spirituality, aesthetics, and community clearly demonstrate that Islam has been aligned to a wide diversity of beings and ways of being. It is impossible and disingenuous to deny that such a wide spectrum exists among Muslims. Fundamentally, all Muslims share in the basic belief in the one God and in the prophecy of Muhammad (saw). However, what they might believe about God or about prophecy has never been uniform. No single canon captures it. Liberal Muslims share with violent extremists at the level of these fundamentals. One formula of Islamophobia in the west is to collapse all Muslims into a single category as determined by the actions of violent extremist Muslims. Thus, the location chosen as the sum total of Islam itself is from only the most violent reactions of one aspect of Political Islamist Muslims. While I might protest violent extremism, I must still concede that Muslims can also do violence. Even when I might wish to be distinguished from those who do violence, I cannot do so by laying singular or exclusive claim to being “Muslim.”

Musawah In 2009, when the Musawah movement was launched, I became an Islamic feminist. This was both a practical and theoretical development, inspired by the launching of Musawah and by decades of struggle. What I had refused to accept under the identity of feminist was clarified for me by 2009 as another construct. I became my own agent, as part of the mandate of responsibility in all definitions and practices within identity politics, including Islam and feminism. I determine for myself how much participation qualifies me to be Muslim or feminist. Principal to my construction is resistance to imposed binaries. It is not only possible but also necessary to have both Islam and feminism or both Islam and human rights, and all definitions are open to discussion and transformation. There are infinite layers of diversity within Muslim women’s human rights movements. Instead of an external mandate to be singular or contradictory, it is possible to move within various perspectives on justice and reform, by embracing those whom we had been led to think of as problematic and to change the way we live Islam. Some secular feminists are still adamantly opposed to all religious discourse taken as one aspect of the rights debates, or even of identity. They oppose

Islamic feminism by any other name 43 the insertion of Islam into international and state constitutional discourses and developments, even when they might concede to religion (as spirituality) on the personal level. Some Islamist are willing to join ISIS as Jihadi brides. In the gender debates, they can repeat the dichotomy between Islam and all Western initiated ideas about democracy, human rights, feminism and liberalism. However, they are fast losing efficacy the more the general population of Muslims become better educated and aware of the subtle coercion of the tactic that presumes Islam belongs only to one perspective. Muslim feminists also come from varied perspectives: some are personally and politically outside religion, and do not engage in rethinking Islam from its classical construction to the present. Still, they are motivated to identify as both Muslim and progressive. This is part of liberal Islam, since liberal Muslim feminists do not construct epistemological debates or consciously engage with the construction of new knowledge in Islam. They borrow from a wide range of sources and these might include Islamic Classical sources, or primary texts. However, there is no consistent attention to methodology. Thus, they also borrow from secular sources. Whatever suits their agenda. There are endless conversations and epistemologies aligned with the overall agenda of individual freedoms and collective interrelations within the Muslim women’s movement today; only Islamic feminist have participated in the rigorous intellectual process of critical interrogation of Islamic canonical sources to discern the basis of their gender bias and then to reconstruct Islam from its own principles. This reconstruction benefits many. Islamic feminism not only interrogates the systemic gender bias within Muslim classical discourse but also provides for a reconstruction of the very principles that are still subsumed under other unequal systems because of prevailing hegemony. For example, the principle of justice, considered fundamental to all Islamic thought, was developed using Aristotelian logic that presumed hegemony even when it discussed equality and dignity. Justice, as a kind of benevolence that keeps some people above others, even allowing slavery and the subjugation of women, must be broadened to our current understanding of unconditional equality and reciprocity. It is no longer possible to sustain all humans on the planet unless justice is for everyone: friend and foe alike.

Conclusion By the twenty-first century, my thinking and the thinking of Fatema Mernissi had evolved from the binary of 1980s. Where I had felt the need to distinguished my pro-faith location above the location of anyone who merely identified as Muslim because he or she had background in a Muslim culture, I have come to see that being Muslim(a) is not a monolith. Mernissi was a secular feminist when she began her work but close to her death, when her last public event was a meeting with Musawah, it was clear, how much she had benefited from the critical engagements that was part of its formation.

44  Amina Wadud Today, I understand that any Muslim/a can be conscientious – whether Muslim by circumstance of birth and culture, or by choice. I would not deny any one their identification of being Muslim/a, even when I might adamantly reject many aspects of their particular manifestations, like violence. Being Muslim(a) is an epistemological void because this identification does not determine if the actions or thoughts of such a person are genuinely motivated by Islamic principles or sacred texts. The word “Muslim/a” is indistinguishable. No purpose is served by terms like Muslima theology. That name lacks clarity or reason, except to avoid being an association with feminism while providing an elite status to Muslim women theologians. It steps into the arena carved out by Islamic feminism on matters of interpretations, but as a ruse to unnecessarily privilege a particular location as “believing” or “Muslim.” It ignores the overlap in women doing theology because our particular location as theologians still might not form a unified whole. Furthermore, after centuries of exclusion among notable male interpreters, it would seem repugnant to employ a term to identify us that participates in its own forms of elitism and exclusion. If an Islamist woman disagrees with some aspect of my interpretive work, she is no less and no more a Muslima than I am. Why would I attempt to capture a special field of study by using such a broad comprehensive term as my usages can take it over, closing out those who might disagree with me? While it may be intended to embrace the radical inclusion of Muslim women into discourses over Islamic theology, I confess to having higher expectations. I expect Islamic feminism, an intellectually rigorous engagement that serves the greater good by a comprehensive use of gender as a category of thought. It is not only doing theology as a female who is Muslim but also doing theology to transform gender relations in our community toward inclusive equality and reciprocal human dignity. It prepares Muslims to enter a radical future on a planet we share with those who are not and may never be Muslim. Furthermore, a radical interrogation of gender as a category of thought is not just about women or about being female. It is done by more than just women – or Muslims. The inclusion of Muslim men who engage critically is a must; just as the inclusion of non-Muslim theologians to broaden our capacity to think through sacred texts and their location in a world rapidly moving away from some of the core values gleaned from these sources. All who interrogate the epistemology of Islamic theology to offer deeply thought solutions for sticky problems about how to move forward toward greater human dignity are welcome. This is not possible with a term like Muslima theology. When I started working on gender and Islamic thought, I was isolated with no support networks and foremothers. I was also naïve, prone to self-protection and survivalism. This location lent a bias to my work. When I moved to Malaysia to join the faculty at the International Islamic University, and I became a founding member of Sisters in Islam, I also began to glimpse a bigger picture about working for radical transformation in the lives of Muslim women and men as part of what it means to be Muslim – and what it means to be human.

Islamic feminism by any other name 45 The ability to participate in making changes in the lives of Muslim women is still impacted negatively by the manipulation of Muslim personal status laws as well as by the mindset that says we can do nothing to these laws because they are sacred. At Beijing, and for decades after, this was the position of both secular Muslim feminists and Islamists. Their agreement on this point was the precise place where an epistemological change was needed. Who defines this Islam: and whose definitions have authority? When will definitions evolve that are inclusive of the voices of those who are marginalized within the discourse as well as in life? Muslim personal status law as practiced today was constructed on the basis of certain assumptions from the time of its origins. These assumptions would be further adversely affected by the end of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of colonialism and the solidification of the nation-state, when Muslim personal status law would be codified into positive law. The blanket and yet haphazard revival of Muslim personal status law under political Islam has scarcely managed to evaluate the principles intended before the law’s construction and implementation under the nation-state. Even when people are unaware of the very nature of legislative structures within Islamic thought, like fiqh, it is a construct that needs to be revisited as a primary tool for providing access to resources and power for Muslim women. Without this link of the theoretical work on gender in Islam to the realities in the lives of Muslim women, there is little purpose behind Muslimah theology except an exercise in abstraction. For while this side of the matter is still my preference, since it is intimately connected to the development of ideas about God, I have only come to life when that work has been challenged by the lived realities for Muslim women. It does not mean that everyone must identify as feminist. What you name yourself is not as important as whether you are part of the problem or part of the solution. However, while I cannot be feminist without a radical interrogation of it, I can no longer choose Islam except from a radical feminist perspective. Islam is what we make it. We can change it and it can change us. But if we mean for it to go into the future with the best of its possibilities unfolding, it cannot be the same as it was before – even in the time of the Prophet, upon him be peace. The best possible future is one that removes all limitations against the full humanity for women, and all others who are marginalized by a notion of gender that is at best complimentary but at its extreme is adversarial. So far, Islamic feminism has been leading this move toward such a future by combating the ill effects of gender binaries that pit one against another.

Note 1 Musawah is a global movement for reform in Muslim Family Law, see www.musawah.org.

3 Islam and feminism German and European variations on a global theme Riem Spielhaus

During the past decades a number of women-related issues have become inherent parts of the Islam “debate” in countries that adopted women’s issues as a marker of their modernity: first, in terms of the role of women “in Islam,” further in research on emancipatory movements of Muslim women, and finally as an interest in gender-specific approaches to the interpretation of Islamic texts and legal sources. Islamic studies were primarily concerned with Muslim women as addressees and objects of normative interpretations of the Qur’an and thus with interpretations of a text with the potential to shape society. However, the interest in gender-sensitive and gender-specific approaches to the interpretation of Islamic texts and legal sources is increasing. For the last decade or more, the sociopolitical framing of the interest in and debates about Muslim women itself has become a focal point of (self) critical research. Both American anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod1 and the German psychologist and education scholar Birgit Rommelspacher2 have drawn attention to how European and American governments and elites use arguments of gender equality to follow their project of domesticating Islam while at the same time ignoring the structural discrimination of women in their own societies.3 Rommelspacher has formulated this relationship between majority culture and the project of liberating minority women in these words: Now the majoritywomen are no longer primarily concerned with gender relations, but they are engaging in the distinction between themselves and the oppressed “other woman.” Their position regarding men is no longer their main measurement for emancipation, but rather their distance from the “other women.” It seems as if gender hierarchy is compensated by an ethnic hierarchy.4 Abu Lughod and Rommelspacher’s works analyze the interfaces between religion, ethnicity and social rank and thus reveal that the still much-vaunted feminist solidarity has often been sacrificed in favor of cultural superiority. In this context, Abu-Lughod and Rommelspacher pose the question: why, all of the sudden, do conservative circles appear to be engaged in the emancipation of women as long as – and only when – Muslims are concerned? This alliance between some

Islam and feminism 47 feminists, on the one hand, and conservatives or even right-wing circles, on the other hand, deserves further investigation. Rommelsbacher goes on to suggest that any engagement with the situation of Muslim women anywhere in the world needs to reflect the potential instrumentalization of any speech act about women for strategies to maintain or establish local and global power structures in order not to have a detrimental effect. In many cases, the very interest of power brokers, politicians, and scholars, feminist or otherwise, in Muslim women appears to be advanced in order to enforce their own interests or to maintain the status-quo in an increasingly diverse society. This chapter engages with the religion-oriented works of Rommelspachers and argues that in her works concerning feminism, religion and Muslim women, she actively participated in debates in and beyond in Germany addressing the Muslim headscarf and analyzed discursive formations in which feministic positions were brought into sharp relief. In the remainder of the chapter, I put some of Rommelspacher’s ideas into conversation with other scholars of Islam and Muslims in Europe as well as global scholarship on Islam and feminism. Rommelspacher’s work illustrates that any struggle for the improvement of the situation of Muslim women, in Germany and elsewhere in the world, has to reflect on the embeddedness and function of bringing up the situation of Muslim women and on strategies for establishing or preserving local and global power structures, in order to avoid achieving the contrary, namely the further oppression of Muslim women. It is common for the “best interest” of Muslim women to be brought up only in order to address other political interests or to retain the status-quo in a changing and pluralizing society. The chapter summarizes some of Rommelspacher’s powerful arguments and critique and puts them into conversation with other scholars and other contexts who have also considered the supposed clash of Islam and feminism. It is inspired by a number of texts that reflect not only on modern gendered ways of being but also on how they are studied and conceptualized. Very convincingly, Fatima Seedat has argued that easy conflations or inflations of the space between the two paradigms, Islam and feminism, need to be avoided to maintain a critical view of how and why they converge in order to understand the dynamic between Islam and feminism.5 The aim here, therefore, is to sketch different lines of argumentation concerning this dynamic and to critically review how they are approached in contemporary academia.

When Islam and (hegemonic) feminism come together While Muslim women in Europe experience exclusion in work and other areas of life,6 the public discourse about Islam and Muslims is dominated by the idea that Islam is diametrically opposed to feminism, the emancipation of women, and gender equality. According to a widespread assumption, Islam itself – if not all religions, especially the monotheistic ones – are patriarchal through and through and their teachings and practices inevitably are oppressive of women. According to this understanding, the (only) reason for a lower participation of Muslim

48  Riem Spielhaus women in the labor market has to be understood as outdated gender roles and norms. It is, thus, Islam that is held responsible for the inadequate social integration of immigrants and not the many racist or sexist mechanisms of exclusion in European societies.7 The consequences of this discourse are twofold: On the one hand, it ignores and to a certain extent even denies the possibility for Muslim women who profess their religion and who (want to) live differently, to reinterpret religious texts and act upon such interpretations.8 On the other hand, such a view discharges the state and society from responsibility, refusing any consideration and debate of exclusionary mechanisms, thus preventing any engagement to find a remedy for such discrimination. Accusing Islam of being oppressive can produce and legitimate the exclusion of Muslim women. For example, the introduction of a headscarf ban for teachers in eight German states by the year 2005 was supported by arguments that alleged support of a backward and misogynistic interpretation of Islam that Muslim women expressed by covering their hair in public. During these debates about the Muslim headscarf, it was often pointed out that the “freeing” Muslim women from the headscarf had been a tool of colonial endeavors.9 The historical trajectory of the fight against the Muslim headscarf in postcolonial societies provides helpful tools for understanding why the image of women oppressed by Islam had become a commonsensical, widely shared trope before the headscarf debates in various European countries commenced.10 Meanwhile, the juxtaposition of Islam and feminism as mutually exclusive ways of thinking and living has been criticized in many debates as a dominant and dominating intellectual and political position that characterizes Muslim women as passive or accomplices in patriarchal structures and systems of oppression. When she wrote about Egyptian women activists and characterized them as “Islamic feminists” in the late 1980s, the American historian and Middle East scholar Margot Badran was met with great surprise and considerable pushback.11 Such a combination seemed simply unconceivable among many of those who thought of the world in the mode of binaries – both in what is constructed as “the West” and its counterpart, constructed as the “Islamic world.” Muslim women’s rights activists have often been caught right between these lines, since they did not fit this dichotomy. They have also shown a reluctance to use the term “feminist” to describe their ideas, projects, and struggles. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, a London-based legal anthropologist, no longer refrained from describing herself as both a feminist and a Muslim on her website in 2017: As a feminist, I expose and criticize the injustices that these laws continue to inflict on women in some Muslim contexts. As a Muslim, I approach these injustices by stressing one crucial element in the tradition of Muslim legal thought: the distinction between Shari‘a (the “path,” found in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s practice) and fiqh (“understanding,” the jurists’ efforts to deduce laws from these textual sources); this distinction enables us to see patriarchal laws not as “divine Shari‘a,” but as outdated human fiqh. My aim

Islam and feminism 49 is to bring Islamic and human rights frameworks together in order to lay the basis for an egalitarian Muslim family law.12 However, a publication that was published twenty years earlier documents her struggle with the term: It is with great reservation that I use the term feminism [. . . .] There is no equivalent term for it in Persian although as a consciousness it has always existed. This consciousness in its indigenous form remains largely unexplored in the Muslim context. Studies of feminism in the Muslim world predominantly deal with its expression among the Westernised and educated elite and align it with its Western counterpart.13 In the 1996 chapter then, Mir-Hosseini argues that the idea that underlies feminism is not at all new to Muslim women. She provides her definition of the motivation and concern underlying what she calls the feminist consciousness as “a broad concern with women’s issues and an awareness of their oppression at work, in the home and in the society, as well as action aimed at improving their lives and changing the situation.”14 This message is directed to two audiences and thus correlates to the two sides Muslim women’s activists have been most challenged by: Muslim men and non-Muslim women. In her writings and actions as a cofounder of the Musawah Global Movement for Equality and Justice in the Muslim Family, she has shown that Muslim women are fully capable of taking on the struggle for their rights without renouncing their religion, and that this struggle is not automatically directed against Muslim men or Islam.15 On the contrary, Mir-Hosseini, as well as many other Muslim activists, have argued that Islam is not a hindrance to gender equality, but that its sacred texts can be understood and interpreted in ways that support the fight against any oppression of God’s creatures. A close reading of the Qur’an has been part of what U.S.-based scholar Amina Wadud has called gender jihad, which according to her is “a struggle to establish gender justice in Muslim thought and practice. At its simplest level, gender justice is gender mainstreaming – the inclusion of women in all aspects of Muslim practice, performance, policy construction, and in both political and religious leadership.”16 The South African scholar Sa’diyyah Shaikh, who positions herself as a Muslim feminist, characterizes the existing exegetical work as male-centered and biased, and has developed a different approach to interpret the Qur’an. She applies feminist hermeneutics – as a theory, method and perspective that is sensitive to and critical of sexism – to Islamic jurisprudence and other scholarly work. Shaikh approaches tafsir texts with a “hermeneutic of suspicion,” which means alertness “to both explicit and implicit patriarchal bias.”17 Based on hermeneutics derived from the biblical scholar Gerald West, who tries to read (the society) behind the text, she adopts a stance of suspicion toward interpretive traditions not simply trusting or accepting them as truth. “The aim is to critically evaluate and expose patriarchal structures, values and male-centred concerns.”18

50  Riem Spielhaus This approach focuses on exegetical works as ideological and androcentric products that are “representative of a patriarchal historical cultural milieu” and follows the aim to redress the silences on women’s lives, to lift out the marginalized voices, to reconstruct the absent female and to be vigilant of the patriarchal assumptions.19 It has been employed by female Muslim scholars in different parts of the world, including by the German Muslim theologian Muna Tatari who holds one of the recently established German chairs for Islamic theology at the University of Paderborn. Tatari is engaged in comparative theology and applies the hermeneutics of suspicion to readings of Qur’anic verses.20 Internationally, a notable interest in gender-specific approaches to Islamic texts and sources of jurisprudence has arisen, though it has been questioned whether women’s claims to religious authority can be exclusively located in and as a product of modernity.21 After having served as the more or less passive addressees and objects of normative and interpretations of the Qur’an, (some) Muslim women are increasingly being “upgraded” to objects of study as relevant speakers for themselves and Islam – with their active contributions to Islamic debates and their manifestations in everyday life. Female exegetes, transmitters of the prophetic tradition, teachers for religious knowledge, community leaders and women’s rights activists have become of special interest to many of those who study Islam, the Islamicate world, or Muslims. This new form of interest in Muslim women maintains the earlier disinterest in the agency of Muslim women as scholars and participants in the production of Islamic knowledge and in their role as religious authorities who are also transmitters of religious knowledge – this holds true both in their own communities and in the academic field of Islamic studies. Thus, Muslim women are struggling on all fronts for visibility and recognition as legitimate speakers for themselves and for Islam among Muslims and among non-Muslims. Often, these outspoken Muslim women are confronted with the accusation by non-Muslim critics of Islam and populists that the Islam they advocate could not be the “real” Islam since “Islam” is undeniably misogynistic. This is a statement that resembles the criticism Muslim women’s rights activists receive from some conservative and more extremist Muslims. Extremists on both sides seem not only to share an understanding of the role of the sexes in Islam but also to assume that a uniform and homogenous interpretation of Islam exists. The German philosopher, historian and Catholic theologian, Heiner Bielefeldt, who was appointed the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief by the United Nations in 2010, called this the “Semantik des eigentlichen Islam” (the semantics of an actual Islam) or what might be explained as the authenticity bias.22 The cofounder of the Liberal Islamic Federation in Germany and frequent guest on TV talk shows on Islam, Lamya Kaddor, has become a constant target for criticism. She has described her observation that Muslims who advance an interpretation of Islam, which is compatible with democracy and women’s emancipation, are confronted not only with conservative Muslims but also with Islam critics who do not want to give up on their understanding of an Islam that is incapable of progress. Muslims like her, Kaddor explains, would be represented either

Islam and feminism 51 as hypocrites or as marginalized groups who are part of an exceptional case.23 Mostly implicitly, but sometimes explicitly too, talk show hosts and dialogue partners suggest that either their liberal attitude or their Islam have to be questioned, in addition to their legitimacy to speak for Muslims.24 Meanwhile, a growing number of academic publications demonstrate the very diverse ways that Muslim women live and shape their Islamic and Muslim lives.25 Research on and among Muslim women has led not only to a new focus on understudied demographic groups and topics but also to the creation of new methods and techniques of analysis. Based on her research on domestic violence among Muslim women in South Africa, Sa’diyya Shaikh argues to include lived interpretations of the Qur’an in our studies by taking them as seriously as the written interpretations of Islamic scholars. The concept of a “tafsir of praxis” allows for including the perspectives of marginalized groups and individuals and their engagement with the Qur’an and other texts of Islam in research.26 Implicitly, this approach conveys a fundamental critique of the methods of Islamic studies in the past, for leaving power structures and dominant ideas about the Islam of the ulama unquestioned. Who and what is studied under the labels “Islam” and “Muslim” has implications for what is perceived and acknowledged as authentically Islamic by scholars. Shaikh’s method exposes the involvement of research that claims neutrality in a normative project, even if unconsciously so.

(Re)Searching for agency Research that is interested in gender-sensitive interpretations of the Qur’an often includes a normative perspective, which in principle is not problematic so long as normativity (statements about what should be) does not stand in the way of perception (statements about what is). Kathrin Klausing, a German Islamic theologian, critically notes that interest in female Islamic scholarship is often based on the assumption that there is a substantial difference between female and male approaches to Islamic texts and that women’s readings are an authentic representation of a uniquely female perspective.27 In her analysis of feminist Qur’an exegesis and gender-sensitive interpretations of the Qur’an, Klausing addresses the challenge of verses, which manifest the hierarchical structure of gender relations in the Qur’an. While some writers solve this problem by selecting verses that support their ideas and minimize those with opposing meanings, others are concerned with the classification of verses as part of a specific historical context t and in relation to the circumstances of revelation of the texts according to the classical Islamic Qur’anic interpretation. Through a comparison of interpretations of gender relations in the Qur’an, Kathrin Klausings shows that there is significantly more complexity to the verses and their interpretations.28 The liberation of Muslim women, as Klausing underscores, is not the aim of all religious and political communities of Muslim women and far from all female religious authorities in Islam are fighting for equal rights of men and women. This does not, however, mean that they have no agency as Saba Mahmood has

52  Riem Spielhaus demonstrated in her analysis of the Egyptian mosque movement.29 Yet current research on Muslim women appears to be interested mostly in women who demonstrate the compliance of Islam with (some kind of) feminism. To ignore female leaders and communities who do not follow the (or any) emancipatory project might however just be the other side of the coin of the earlier neglect for the work of female exegetes and religious authorities. There is also an ongoing intra-Muslim debate about the question of whether the aim of Muslim women’s engagement and activism is or should be gender equality, gender equity, or gender justice, with each term’s specific meanings being debated by scholars and activists alike. While in the European context and international organizations, the legal equality of men and women is promoted, some Muslim women demand instead policies and discourses that respond differently to the assumed different needs of women and men instead of calling for adjustments that equalize them.30 The many encounters between Islam and feminism have been very productive on the Muslim side and have led to diverse positions, which Fatima Seedat describes as coalescing around several strands: Muslim women today present themselves as Muslim feminists with secular reference frameworks or as Islamic feminists with clear religious references. Others have a negative notion of feminism or feminist movements; often perceived as a “Western” project. Still others see the value of equality and justice so strongly rooted in Islam and the consciousness of social gender justice so embedded in the tradition of Islam that an external frame of reference or movement is not needed.31 The many and at times violent colonial interventions in the name of women’s liberation and feminism have certainly left their marks on almost every Muslim line of thought and movement. In order to grasp the productive tensions between Islam and feminism, Seedat advocates for a separation of the two terms in description and analysis, even if some women combine them in their practice and self-description.32

Gender equality as a European value While the previous section of this chapter focused on the encounters with feminism in Islamic thought, this section addresses the effects of an increasingly common and popular representation of the idea of equality as a European or Western value. Since the 1980s, debates about national and European identities in Western parts of Europe have increasingly been characterized by expressions of concern for and about Muslim minorities while discussions about the headscarf, the construction of mosques, religiously approved slaughtering methods, freedom of expression, and male circumcision, have travelled across Europe and inspired debates about what it means to be French, British, German, Danish, or just European.33 These debates are often framed as addressing (European) fundamental values and cultural principles and, in most cases, they focus on or at least involve gender issues. Within the rising geopolitical and national debates about the presence of Islam and Muslims in Europe, Muslim women appear to be positioned at the intersection of religious, national, racialized, and ethnicized identities. In these deeply

Islam and feminism 53 gendered debates, Muslim women are caught between exclusion and belonging, having to face marginalization both within larger societies and Muslim communities. Furthermore, in the context of their religious minority status, women find themselves frequently in the role of (often visible) representatives of Muslim communities, while simultaneously their legitimacy to speak for Islam and Muslims tends to be questioned by both Muslim and non-Muslim actors.34 This is especially apparent in discussions about religious clothing, forced marriage, and so-called honor murders, which have, as the Belgian researcher on Islam in Europe Nadia Fadil argues, transformed the bodies of Muslim women into emblematic symbols of the representation of Islam.35 The situation of Muslim women has become a central theme of broader European as well as specific national identity politics.36 Gender relations in Muslim families and communities are, at the same time, understood and represented as in opposition to the European self, with its claimed liberal values ​​and civil virtues. These values always ​​include, with particular emphasis, the notion of gender equality37 As Rikke Andreassen has demonstrated with a particular focus on the current Islam debate in Denmark, social grievances are projected onto a minority and solutions for existing problems are often delayed. Questions of gender equality and the commitment to women’s freedom have become a test case for Muslims with liberal and secular values. Similarly, the ban on wearing headscarves for schoolgirls and teachers in French schools and the banning of the face veil in public in France were described by their proponents as support for the freedom and integrity of Muslim women against their husbands and families. The Canadian scholar Jennifer Selby, however, argues that the French state and dominant voices among secular French feminists have adopted a narrative in which secularity, democracy, and modernity are defined as gender equality, which, in turn, is diametrically opposed by Islam. The close focus on (presumed) subordinated status of Muslim women within Muslim communities and families is at the same time perceived as a hindrance to their full integration into French society and as a problem that can only be solved by laïcité. This argument effectively silences Muslim migrant women, according to Selby, leaving their everyday problems of racism, exclusion, discrimination and potential isolation from French society unaddressed.38 Meanwhile, as other scholars, including Sabine Berghahn, have argued, such legislation has severe discriminatory side effects on Muslim women with and without religious clothing.39 In some cases, bans like those on the headscarf in France and Germany had a decidedly negative impact on the participation of Muslim women in European societies.40 In other countries, for example in the Netherlands, such legal bans and restrictions have led to a direct support of activism and empowerment of Muslims in their own organizations.41 Similarly, the oppression of Muslim women, especially in the form of domestic and so-called “honor”-related violence, became a core topic of integration and immigration debates. As Gökce Yurdakul and Anna Korteweg have shown in a comparative analysis of Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Canada, such debates in several European countries led to the introduction of specific laws,

54  Riem Spielhaus which were intended to combat and curtail (gender) violence by focusing on culturally or religiously motivated violence against women.42 Debates on “European” values, as suggested by Schirin Amir-Moazzami and Sarah Bracke, are fulfilling two functions: one the one hand, they render the national belonging of Muslims conditional and thereby legitimatize their exclusion and, on the other hand, they contribute to the construction of an ideal image of the European.43 According to Birgit Rommelspacher, the Muslim minority is thus used to deflect attention from the stagnation of equality of the sexes that is possible by pointing at the allegedly worse off Muslim woman. While the early feminist movements were comparing the situation of women to that of men, recent debates have been using “other women” as a backdrop.44 The elevation of gender equality to a European ideal was paid for with the stagnation in its implementation. Meanwhile gender equality has entered the speeches of European politicians as a key rhetorical figure. The gender pay gap, human trafficking and forced prostitution are much more difficult to enter into mainstream media or political debates than “burka bans” or immigration laws for accompanying spouses. She writes: If [. . .] feminism, instead of the affirmation of cultural hierarchies, wanted to refer more strongly to its egalitarian traditions, it would have to question all forms of domination and, with the inequality of the sexes, also question the hierarchy between social classes, ethnic groups and religions.45 In exchange for their support in carving out national “Western” identities, women are promised social recognition for exclusivist feminist positions. It is not easy to resist such a covenant. A critique of the instrumentalization of feminist arguments for the exclusion of others not only is necessarily connected to self-critical reflection but also requires the refusal of such offers. The discrepancies between men and women in what Rommelspacher calls Dominanzgesellschaft (dominance society) become side stages in comparison to the main contradictions of cultures in the Kulturkampf (culture clash). Thus, feminists become cultural warriors and the struggle for equality between men and women is turned into a struggle for a greater distance from the “Other Woman.” However, as Rommelspacher points out, such positions lose their feminist essence – the fight against inequalities on the basis of gender – and can hardly be called feminist anymore.46 That the need to protect women is a very powerful discursive formation was demonstrated yet again, more than a decade ago, when the liberation of Afghan and Iraqi women was used as a justification for the invasion of both Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States and its European allies. In her article titled “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” which appeared in 2002, the PalestinianAmerican anthropologist Lila Abu Lughod documents how this argument was deployed to mobilize for the U.S.-Afghanistan war by President George W. Bush and his wife Laura Bush, who were calling for and claiming to save Muslim women from their culture (and religion). With the help of moral categories of this kind, U.S.-Americans were persuaded to support violent interventions and

Islam and feminism 55 war policies, of which they would otherwise have been extremely critical, Abu Lughod argues. In her later book with a similar title, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, she draws attention to the actual impacts of war on the situation of Muslim women and calls for caution whenever the concept of “the rights of Muslim women” is used.47 This concept has been used not only to fight and bomb for democracy and the liberation of women but also to discard and ignore Muslim women’s rights activists.48 The logic behind it can be summarized as follows: If the Muslim woman is not silent, but can speak, act and make demands for herself, she cannot be a victim. If she is not a victim, we cannot save her. If we cannot save her, we have fewer arguments to exclude her from societal resources or to go to war against Islamic regimes. In a critical stance on what she calls “dominance feminism,” the U.S.-based women’s rights activist and legal scholar Janet Halley calls for a break from feminism, in order to reflect on the partly uncritical relationship of feminists to their own power, and above all their role as collaborators in governance. This would mean taking a break from their own presuppositions to govern responsibly on behalf of women.49 Some strands of feminist movements are placing themselves at the service of dominant powers – for example, the political elite of European states or the U.S. – or they are co-opted to legitimize the power of the state without being asked for permission. A different feminist current – the one represented by Birgit Rommelspacher – embodies a very different trend in feminism that self-critically reflects and is very cautious of being instrumentalized. Therefore, feminism can in no way be labeled as generally anti-Muslim. This applies particularly to those schools of thought that deliberately engage with the intersectionality within dimensions of discrimination and identity who are prepared to follow through on their analysis. In increasingly nationalist public debates, intersectional feminist movements and groups currently seems to fight a losing battle. In fact, their position is quite difficult. Just as Muslim women’s rights activists, they are fighting on at least two fronts.

Islam and feminism: two intricate epistemological traditions In conclusion, the discursive formations of and between Islam and feminism are characterized by a rich diversity within while being confronted with homogenization from the outside. Both conceptual constellations, Islam and feminism, are experiencing gross simplifications in the dominant discourse. Therefore, answering the question of whether Islam and feminism fit together would not do justice to the theoretical, analytical, and empirical challenges posed by these complex and heterogeneous traditions, which are today referred to as “feminist” and “Islamic.”50 The diversity among different feminist strands is mirrored by the multiple stances Muslim men and women have taken on the quest for better living conditions for women. While feminism is not generally anti-Muslim, Muslims – male

56  Riem Spielhaus or female – can also not be commonly labelled as misogynist. The positions of Muslim men concerning feminism and gender roles would deserve a separate chapter and, in fact, much more research. Gender roles for men and other dimensions of masculinity in daily life have recently become a new focus of interesting research on the Middle East and Muslim communities.51 The discourse on gender and Islam clearly has to be understood in the context of current power structures. In the paradigm of a “clash of civilizations,” there are different interests within a society given the emphasis on Muslims as being “different” and “foreign,” while the emphasis on diversity also eliminates similarities within national or cultural boundaries, especially between women. Focusing on Islam or “culture,” from which Muslim women – as the dominant debate frames it again and again – must be saved, diverts the question of how our governments, our economy, and our actions have contributed to the suffering of Muslim and non-Muslim women. Instead, it is time to identify the real causes of existing problems especially those in which we are involved and can therefore have an impact. This may be unpleasant knowledge, because it involves speaking of one’s own privileges and advantages, which are at the expense of other women. Characterizing “cultural” or religious differences and conflicts as “indissoluble differences” would open up the path to concrete improvements in the living conditions of Muslim women. However, this can hardly be done over their heads, in other words without their direct involvement and without creating access to resources for them. This also means to accept that Muslims and other immigrants want not only to be able to define how they want to shape their lives but also to do so with regard to how they understand, interpret, and practice religion.

Notes 1 Abu Lughod 2002, 2013. 2 Birgit Rommelspacher 1945–2015 was a scholar and professor of psychology and education. Her work focused on intercultural relations and gender studies. Specific projects included women’s and girls’ labour in theory and practice; women’s psychology; issues of racism and anti-semitism in German society and women in right-wing movements. Rommelspacher coined the German term “Dominanzkultur” cultural dominance but also domineering culture and developed the theoretical foundations for research on structural and systemic discrimination and the cultural dominance of whiteness. See Rommelspacher 2002, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010, 2013a, 2013b for several of her most influential publications. 3 The domestication of Islam has been described and analyzed by the Dutch anthropologist Thijl Sunier 2014. 4 Rommelspacher 2010, 23. 5 Seedat 2013a, 420. 6 Hussain 2008; Peucker 2010; and Frings 2010. 7 Rommelspacher 2010, 8. 8 Middle East scholar miriam cooke has fused the words “Muslim” and “woman” to create the new term “muslimwoman.” She writes: “In what follows I combine “Muslim” and “woman” into one word, Muslimwoman, when these two words are used together to evoke or describe a singular identification. The Muslimwoman is both a noun and an adjective that refers to an imposed identification the individual may or may not choose for herself. The Muslimwoman is not a description of a reality; it is the ascription of a label that reduces all diversity to a single image.” Cooke 2007, 140.

Islam and feminism 57 9 One example is Lord Cromer who forced (partly violently the unveiling of women as a step against women’s oppression in Egypt, while opposing the introduction of women’s suffrage in the United Kingdom. See Braun and Mathes 2007, 309–316. 10 See for example, Ahmed 2011; El Guindi 2000; Scott 2007; and Amir-Moazami 2011. 11 Badran 1995. 12 www.zibamirhosseini.com. 13 Mir-Hosseini 1996. 14 Ibid., 151. 15 Musawah is an international organization, founded in 2009, of Muslim women activists and scholars that seeks to provide resources and networking opportunities for grassroots organizations and initiatives throughout the world that work for equality and justice in the Muslim family. See the website of the organization, musawah.org. 16 Wadud 2006, 10. 17 Shaikh 1997, 51. 18 Shaikh 2003, 53–54. 19 Ibid., 54. 20 See Tatari 2010. 21 Hammer and Spielhaus 2013, 287–288. 22 Bielefeldt 2008. 23 Kaddor 2010. 24 Spielhaus 2012b. 25 See for example Safi 2003; Kalmbach and Bano 2012; and Delong-Bas et al. 2013. 26 Shaikh 2007. 27 Klausing 2012. 28 Klausing 2013. 29 Mahmood 2005. 30 Ibid. 31 Seedat 2013a, 2013b. 32 Seedat 2013a, 2013b, 2016. 33 See Tiesler 2006; and Modood 2002. 34 Spielhaus 2012a, 437–455. 35 Fadil 2011. 36 Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014. 37 Amir-Moazami 2011; Bracke 2011; and Andreassen 2012. 38 Selby 2012. 39 Berghahn 2016. 40 Rommelspacher 2010, 24. 41 Korteweg and Yurdakul 2010. 42 Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014. 43 Amir-Moazami 2011; and Bracke 2011. 44 Rommelspacher 2010. 45 Ibid., 23. 46 Ibid., 21–22. 47 Abu Lughod 2002, 2013. 48 See Selby 2012. 49 Halley 2006. 50 Amir-Moazami et al. 2011, 1; see also Seedat 2013a, 2013b. 51 See for example, Naguib 2015; and Mir-Hosseini and Al-Sharmani 2015.

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58  Riem Spielhaus Abu-Lughod, Lila (2013) Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Ahmed, Leila (2011) A Quiet Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press). Ali, Kecia (2014) “Feminist Thought in Islam,” in Muhammad in History, Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God, vol. I, ed. C. Fitzpatrick and A. Walker (New York: ABC-CLIO), 195–197. Amir-Moazami, Schirin (2009) “Islam und Geschlecht unter liberal-säkularer Regierungsführung – Die Deutsche Islam Konferenz,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 37, Juden und Muslime in Deutschland, ed. José Brunner und Shai Lavi (Recht Religion, I): 185–205. Amir-Moazami, Schirin (2011) “Dialogue as a Governmental Technique: Managing Gendered Islam in Germany,” Feminist Review 98 (1): 9–27. Amir-Moazami, Schirin, C. M. Jacobsen, and M. Malik (2011) “Islam and Gender in Europe: Subjectivities, Politics and Piety,” Feminist Review, 98 (1): 1–8. Andreassen, Rikke (2012) “Gender as Tool in Danish Debates about Muslims,” in Islam in Denmark: The Challenge of Diversity, ed. Jørgen S. Nielsen (Lanham: Lexington Books), 143–160. Badran, Margot (1995) Feminism, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Berghahn, Sabine (2016) “Die Kopftuchdebatte in Deutschland,” in Rassismuskritik und Widerstandsformen, ed. Karim Fereidooni und Meral El (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag), 193–212. Bielefeldt, Heiner (2008) Das Islambild in Deutschland: Zum öffentlichen Umgang mit der Angst vor dem Islam (Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte). Bracke, Sarah (2011) “Subjects of Debate: Secular and Sexual Exceptionalism, and Muslim Women in the Netherlands,” Feminist Review 98 (1): 28–46. Braun, Christina von, und Bettina Mathes (2007) Verschleierte Wirklichkeit: Die Frau, der Islam und der Westen (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag). Cooke, Miriam (2000) Women Claim Islam (New York: Routledge). Cooke, Miriam (2007) “The Muslimwoman,” Contemporary Islam 1 (2): 139–154. Delong-Bas, Natana J., Asma Afsaruddin, Hibba Abugideiri, und Heba Ezzat, eds. (2013) The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Women (New York: Oxford University Press). Dennerlein, Bettina, Elke Frietsch, und Therese Steffen, eds. (2012) Verschleierter Orient – Entschleierter Okzident? (Un-)Sichtbarkeit in Politik, Recht, Kunst und Kultur seit dem 19: Jahrhundert (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag). El Guindi, Fadwa (2000) Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance (Oxford: Berg Publishers). Fadil, Nadia (2011) “Not-/Unveiling as an Ethical Practice,” Feminist Review 97 (2): 83–109. Frings, Dorothee (2010) Diskriminierung aufgrund der islamischen Religionszugehörigkeit im Kontext Arbeitsleben – Erkenntnisse, Fragen und Handlungsempfehlungen: Diskriminierungen von Musliminnen und Muslimen im Arbeitsleben und das AGG (Berlin: Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes (ADS). Halley, Janet (2006) Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Hammer, Juliane (2010) “Performing Gender Justice: The 2005 Woman-Led Prayer in New York,” Contemporary Islam 4 (1): 91–116. Hammer, Juliane (2012) American Muslim Women, Religious Authority, and Activism: More Than a Prayer (Austin: University of Texas Press). Hammer, Juliane, und Riem Spielhaus (2013) “Muslim Women and the Challenge of Authority: An Introduction,” The Muslim World 103 (3): 287–294.

Islam and feminism 59 Heath, Anthony, and Jean Martin (2013) “Can Religious Affiliation Explain ‘Ethnic’ Inequalities in the Labour Market?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36: 1005–1027. Hussain, Serena (2008) “Counting Women with Faith: What Quantitative Data Can Reveal About Muslim Women in‚ Secular ‘Britain’,” in Women and Religion in the West: Challenging Secularization, ed. Kristin Aune, Sonya Sharma, und Giselle Vincett (Aldershot: Ashgate), 165–182. Johansen, Birgitte S., and Riem Spielhaus (2012) “Counting Deviance: Revisiting a Decade’s Production of Surveys Among Muslims in Western Europe,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 1 (1): 81–112. Kaddor, Lamya (2010) “Warum es mich nicht geben darf,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 28. Kalmbach, Hillary, und Masooda Bano, eds. (2012) Women, Leadership, and Mosques: Changes in Contemporary Islamic Authority (Leiden: Brill). Klausing, Kathrin (2012) “Weibliche islamische Gelehrte als Gegenstand muslimischen Interesses,” in Geschlechtergerechtigkeit als Herausforderung der Religionen, ed. Christoph Elsas, Edith Franke, Angela Standhartinger (Berlin: EB-Verlag), 241–252. Klausing, Kathrin (2013) Geschlechterrollenvorstellungen im Tafsir (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang). Klausing, Kathrin (2014) “Innermuslimische Positionen zu Feminismus – Begriffe, Bewegungen, Methoden,” in Welcome to Plurality – Feminismus/en heute, ed. Y. Franke, K. Mozygemba, K. Pöge, and B. Ritter (Bielefeld: Transcript), 89–100. Korteweg, Anna, and Gökce Yurdakul (2010) Religion, Culture and the Politicization of Honour-Related Violence: A Critical Analysis of Media and Policy Debates in Western Europe and North America (Geneva: Thematic Papers for United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Korteweg, Anna, and Gökce Yurdakul (2014) The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of National Belonging (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Kulaçatan, Meltem (2013) Geschlechterdiskurse in den Medien: Türkisch-deutsche Presse in Europa (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag). Mahmood, Saba (2005) Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (1996) “Women and Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran: Divorce, Veiling and Emerging Feminist Voices,” in Women and Politics in the Third World, ed. Haleh Afshar (London and New York: Routledge), 149–169. Mir-Hosseini, Ziba, and Mulki Al-Sharmani (2015) Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition (Oxford: Oneworld). Modood, Tariq (2002) “The Place of Muslims in British Secular Multiculturalism,” in Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, ed. Nezar Alsayyad and Manuel Castells (New York: Lexington Books), 113–130. Naguib, Nefissa (2015) Nurturing Masculinities: Men, Food, and Family in Contemporary Egypt (Austin: University of Texas Press). Peucker, Mario (2010) Diskriminierung aufgrund der islamischen Religionszugehörigkeit im Kontext Arbeitsleben – Erkenntnisse, Fragen und Handlungsempfehlungen Erkenntnisse: Erkenntnisse der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung und Handlungsempfehlungen (Berlin: Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes). Rommelspacher, Birgit (2002) Anerkennung und Ausgrenzung: Deutschland als multikulturelle Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag). Rommelspacher, Birgit (2009a) “Feminismus und kulturelle Dominanz. Kontroversen um die Emanzipation der muslimischen Frau,” in Der Stoff, aus dem Konflikte sind. Debatten um das Kopftuch in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz, ed. Sabine Berghahn und Petra Rostock (Bielefeld: Transcript), 395–412.

60  Riem Spielhaus Rommelspacher, Birgit (2009b) “Islamkritik und antimuslimische Positionen – am Beispiel von Necla Kelek und Seyran Ates,” in Islamfeindlichkeit – Wenn die Grenzen der Kritik verschwimmen, ed. T. G. Schneiders (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 433–456. Rommelspacher, Birgit (2009c) “Zur Emanzipation ‘der’ muslimischen Frau,” Aus Politok und Zeitgeschichte 5: 34–38. Rommelspacher, Birgit (2010) “Emanzipation als Konversion: Das Bild von der Muslima im christlich-säkularen Diskurs,” Ethik und Gesellschaft: Ökumenische Zeitschrift für Sozialethik 4 (2): 1–30. Rommelspacher, Birgit (2012) “Identitätspolitik in Deutschland zwischen Islamisierung und (Re-) Christianisierung,” in Islam und Diaspora: Analysen zum muslimischen Leben in Deutschland aus historischer, rechtlicher sowie migrations-und religionssoziologischer Perspektive, ed. Rauf Ceylan (Frankfurt am Main: Lang), 205–220. Rommelspacher, Birgit (2013a) “Feminismus, Säkularität und Islam: Frauen zwischen Modernität und Traditionalismus,” in Islam, Frauen und Europa: Islamischer Feminismus und Gender Jihad – neue Wege für Musliminnen in Europa, ed. I. Wunn and M. Selçuk (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer), 159–175. Rommelspacher, Birgit (2013b) “Zur Emanzipation ‘der’ muslimischen Frau: Kontroversen im Kontext kultureller und patriarchaler Dominanz,” in Gehört der Islam zu Deutschland? Fakten und Analysen zu einem Meinungsstreit, ed. K. Spenlem (Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press), 419–434. Rommelspacher, Birgit (2014) “Emanzipation und Integration: Christliche Kultur und die Emanzipation ‘der’ muslimischen Frau,” in Ressentiment und Konflikt: Vorurteile und Feindbilder im Wandel, ed. W. Benz (Schwalbach: Wochenschau Verlag). Safi, Omid, ed. (2003) Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld). Scott, Joan (2007) The Politics of the Veil (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Seedat, Fatima (2013a) “When Islam and Feminism Converge,” The Muslim World 103 (3): 404–420. Seedat, Fatima (2013b) “Islam, Feminism, and Islamic Feminism: Between Inadequacy and Inevitability,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 29 (2): 25–45. Seedat, Fatima (2016) “Beyond the Text: Between Islam and Feminism,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 32 (2): 138–142. Selby, Jennifer (2012) Questioning French Secularism: Gender Politics and Islam in a Parisian Suburb (New York: Palgrave MacMillan). Shaikh, Sa’diyya (1997) “Exegetical Violence: Nushuz in Quranic Gender Ideology,” Journal for Islamic Studies 17: 49–73. Shaikh, Sa‘diyya (2003) “Transforming Feminism: Islam, Women, and Gender Justice,” in Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, ed. Omid Safi (Oxford: Oneworld), 147–161. Shaikh, Sa’diyya (2007) “A Tafsir of Praxis: Gender, Marital Violence, and Resistance in a South African Muslim Community,” in Violence Against Women in Contemporary World Religions: Roots and Cures, ed. Daniel C. Maguire and Sa’diyya Shaikh (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press), 66–89. Spielhaus, Riem (2012a) “Making Islam Relevant: Female Authority and Representation of Islam in Germany,” in Women, Leadership, and Mosques: Changes in Contemporary Islamic Authority, ed. Hillary Kalmbach and Masooda Bano (Leiden: Brill), 437–455. Spielhaus, Riem (2012b) “Gender Justice as a Common Value? Configurations of Islam in Germany,” in A Jihad for Justice: Honoring the Work and the Life of Amina Wadud,

Islam and feminism 61 ed. Kecia Ali, Juliane Hammer, and Laury Silvers, 90–104, www.bu.edu/religion/ files/2010/03/A-Jihad-for-Justice-for-Amina-Wadud-2012-1.pdf. Spielhaus, Riem (2013) “Europe,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Women, ed. Natana Delong-Bas, Asma Afsaruddin, Hibba Abugideiri, and Heba Ezzat (New York: Oxford University Press), 523–525. Sunier, Thijl (2014) “Domesticating Islam: Exploring Academic Knowledge Production on Islam and Muslims in European Societies,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37 (6): 1138–1155. Tatari, Muna (2010) “Geschlechtergerechtigkeit und Gender Ǧihād: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen frauenbefreiender Koraninterpretationen,” in Und nahe ist Dir das Wort . . . Schriftauslegung in Christentum und Islam, ed. Hansjoerg Schmid, et al. (Regensburg: Theologisches Forum Christentum – Islam), 129–143. Tiesler, Nina-Clara (2006) Muslime in Europa: Religion und Identitätspolitiken unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (Münster: LIT-Verlag). Wadud, Amina (2006) Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld).

4 Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany Irene Schneider

Problems and solution approaches In 2011, Islamic theology was instituted as an academic offering to students on the advice of the (German) Science Council at several universities in Germany. In the Süddeutsche Zeitung of January 20, 2016 the Federal Education Minister, Johanna Wanka, praised the expansion, commenting that “the performance of those centres and their expertise” were good.1 The development of Islamic theology in Germany, within the framework of a secular state guaranteeing freedom of religion, is both an opportunity and an obligation – an obligation in so far as teachers at public schools and in the future possibly imams at mosques must be trained. This is based on the guaranteed right of Article 7 paragraph 3 of the German Constitution2 for the Muslim population in Germany – which has now increased to about five million people – to Islamic religious education.3 Islam is currently taught in mosques and will continue to be in the future,4 but it will also be taught intensively at state schools. Islamic theology as a university discipline must therefore provide teacher training. Islamic theology provides the opportunity, insofar as the “points of conflicts” can be dealt with scientifically. These points arise between traditional interpretations of specific Qur’anic verses and the values of a modern democratic society, all concerning the areas of legal equality between the sexes (see Qur’an 4:34, 4:3, 2:282, etc.), the freedom of religion (Qur’an 2:256, 16:106, 9:74),5 jihad (Qur’an 2:190 and 191 and 9:5), and cruel corporal punishments (Qur’an 24: 1–5, 5:38, 5:33).6 The “normatively correct” gender- position is so fiercely contested because it is linked closely to cultural identity and authenticity discourses, which are seen as different from “Western” or “European” ideas.7 Conservative discourses about “Islamic” gender positions contradicting the values of the German Constitution include the right of a man to polygyny, his sole right to divorce through repudiation (Arabic: talaq), gender unequal perceptions of inheritance, guardianship for children, and the role of a man as the head of the family.8 In Muslim states, active women’s movements have persistently struggled to improve the legal position of women over the past hundred years – not unlike in Europe – and have gradually forced a conservative religious establishment, which claims the interpretation of the sacred texts for itself, to compromise.

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 63 To start there and develop a gender equal theology is the genuine task of Islamic theology at German universities. But has it fulfilled its task so far? The following theses have been formulated to define the field of research and guide this research: •

Islamic theology has not yet adequately performed its tasks to implement a gender-just theology. • There are hardly any coherent, methodical, and logically structured approaches to modern exegesis.9 Many of the proposed interpretations of problematic verses are methodically unsatisfactory. Some eclectic verses are chosen depending on a certain intention and position, but those that are contrary to the intention are ignored, leading to the unsatisfactory “Qur’anic verse ping-pong” between the representatives of different views.10 • Modern values such as gender equality and nonviolence are implicitly read into the Qur’anic text and interpreted as the “spirit” of the Qur’an, which have been derived from context. To achieve such a “modern” (i.e. genderappropriate) interpretation, the literal meaning is over-stretched and no clear line is drawn between verses being seen as universally valid and those whose validity is regarded as restricted for various reasons (i.e. validity for a particular group of people, etc.). The basic questions of this essay are as follows: what role does the text, especially the Qur’an, play in the development of a new gender-just understanding in Islamic theology? Which method(s) appear most promising for a coherent and contemporary interpretation?11 Since the author of this chapter is a professor of Islamic studies specializing in Islamic law and gender questions in Muslim societies and not a Muslim theologian, she can only point to developments, analyse approaches, and evaluate them on the basis of internal coherence and methodology. She can, furthermore, show which approaches are compatible with the German Constitution (and thus with the legal equality of the sexes) and which are not. However, the development of gender-just theology itself lies in the hands of Muslim theologians.12 Every Muslim exegesis, argues Stefan Wild, must face the challenges of modernity. It must refer to circumstances, which decreasingly have to do with the milieu from which Qur’anic revelation came. He outlines three exegetical tasks: • • •

the need for a distinction between text levels of the Qur’an, between different levels of understanding and interpretation and thus between different levels of obligation; the explicit consideration of the growing multipolarity of the Islamic world and its cultures and the willingness to accept exegetical differences; the use of scientific approaches to the Qur’an, which are not being developed from within the classical-exegetical tradition.13

64  Irene Schneider Based on these tasks of modern Qur’anic exegesis, which are essential for the successful implementation of Islamic theology as an academic discipline in Germany, I want to develop and discuss the following conditions: • •

•

•

It is evident that a gender-just theology must be implemented and cannot be excluded from theology as demanded by a representative of an (Islamic) organization.14 Since Islamic theology is an academic discipline, it has to refer to the research of related disciplines, critically take up methodological discussions, reflect theories, and verify or falsify them for the Islamic theological context. This applies to the research of Islamic studies on the Qur’an, the history of hadith, and early Islamic history. It is here where major divergences from classical Muslim research tradition are found, i.e., in the field of source criticism, the reconstruction of the early period due to limited sources, as well as anachronistic positions used in political discourse. This happens especially when the social, political, and legal context of the Qur’an is reconstructed. It is an endeavor that, in Islamic studies, is seen as very difficult (if not impossible) because of the problematic source situation.15 For a gender-just modern theology that fits into the European secular environment, research in gender studies and the use of the analytical category “gender” as a historically and culturally changeable construct are indispensable. This means that “gender” and related questions about the roles of the sexes, a normative hierarchy of genders etc. have to be understood as belonging to the respective cultural and historical context and have no timeless validity. The same applies to concepts such as “justice,” which also have no timeless meaning, but must be understood in each case and context. A theology based on a “true” and “false” binary misunderstands the fundamental problems of exegesis and ignores the traditional Islamic variety of interpretations: in classical Islam, exegetical differences were subjects of discussion and are reflected in the dictum “ikhtalafa al-fuqaha” (the scholars of law are always in disagreement). However, a theology has limitations in a secular and constitutional state. While it is useful and necessary to also analyze extreme and radical misanthropic or misogynistic theological stances, such a theology can never form the framework for an applied theology, which is the basis of religious instruction in schools in Germany. Here, Islamic theology differs from critical Islamic studies, which can examine a variety of approaches in research. While Islamic theology as a subject must take this multitude into account, it must also develop a theological approach that is applicable in a modern European state. Herein lies the unique responsibility of Islamic theology.

In what follows, the question of what is meant by a gender-just theology will be discussed based on the interpretation of one of the most problematic verses in the Qur’an on gender positions, 4:34. In a second step, the position of Islamic gender-oriented theology in Germany today will be discussed, specifically which

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 65 persons and organizations will or could give incentives for the implementation of a gender-just theology and – with the help of two examples – what the discussed approaches look like. The concluding section summarizes the results and assesses these theses in their potential for implementation.

What does gender equal Islamic theology mean in Germany? In her book about sexual ethics in Islam, the American Islamic studies scholar and Muslim, Kecia Ali, summarizes in the chapter on female bodies and male power of action: Though the Qur’an stresses individual accountability on numerous occasions without reference to gender, men seem to have greater scope for action and moral agency, particularly with regard to marriage and sex. [. . .] The Qur’anic privileging of male sexual agency suggests that in some crucial sense the Qur’an is a thoroughly androcentric – though not, I would argue, misogynist – text.16 The conclusion of this Muslim scholar clearly rejects the idea that, with existing traditional exegetical-methodical tools, a reinterpretation of the critical verses opposing gender equality could be accomplished. How can this manifested goal – to achieve a gender equal understanding of Islam and to abandon patriarchal readings of religious tradition in the Qur’an – be obtained then? If one argues, as Ali does, that the Qur’an treats men as the first receivers of the divine message, since it speaks to them practically all the time, one must ask whether the egalitarian view of the gender justice, which she herself and others want to see anchored in the Qur’an, is in contradiction to some of the textual evidence: Honesty requires me to concede the strength of some scriptural interpretations positing a privileged role for males in family and society.17 Can a feministic theology provide an answer? Feministic theology is based on the belief that within the framework of a patriarchal tradition, the interpretation of the Qur’an was made from the point of view of (male) scholars, and a new feminine view could correct many of the results of their interpretation. However, as Ali’s quotation shows, this hope seems too ambitious. Without denying that patriarchal structures have had important effects on textual understanding in Europe as well as on Muslim countries, it is not enough to believe that if an appropriately trained woman were to tackle that problem, a gender equal interpretation would automatically be the result. The issue is more complex and requires not only the focus on “the women” and verses concerning women in the Qur’an but also an involvement of the other gender. It therefore requires the methodological and theoretical skills of gender research.18

66  Irene Schneider Therefore, it first has to be clarified what a “gender-just understanding of Islam” means – a phrasing that is often used in this context – and how it can be achieved. If it means that gender equality has to be established in the formal and actual sense then it would be compatible with the German Constitution. In the context of an understanding based on essential gender differences, it might imply that each of the two genders is given a different role with different rights defined as only for their respective gender.19 Such an understanding could distinguish between the genders and their rights and duties, and thus would not be in accordance with the Constitution. In what follows, the term gender-just theology is used in the first of the two meanings, as gender equality. Equal rights or gender equality within the meaning of the Constitution are in contradiction to a few Qur’an verses, which have been interpreted as containing a hierarchy of the sexes for centuries. This will be exemplified by verse 4:34. A difficult verse Verse 4:3420 is a difficult verse for gender relations. We will deal with the interpretation of the “Centre for Islamic Women Research” (ZIF) below.21 In the translation of Paret, the verse reads as follows: The men stand above the women because God has honoured them (by nature before them) and because of the expenses they have made of their fortune (as a dower for the women). And the righteous women are humble (before God), and pay attention to what is hidden (to the outside), because God is paying attention (that is, because God is worried that it does not come to the public). And if you are afraid that (any) women will rebel, then admonish them, avoid them in the marriage bed and beat them! If they obey you, then do not do anything against them. God is sublime and great.22 Gender hierarchy seems to be evident in the text. The men stand above the women – according to other translations they are “in charge of women”23 or they are the protectors or maintainers of women.24 Righteous women are humble; they obviously accept their subordinate position. Women are not described as selfconfident believers who assume full responsibility before God. The imperatives that follow address men, telling them how to treat their wives if they fear arrogance or rebellion.25 An important question is, What does “standing above” or “having authority and responsibility” (Arab. qawwamuna ʿala) mean exactly? Neither of them is compatible with “equality” in the sense of the German Constitution. What is meant by the imperatives advising men to handle their wives, which obviously form increasing levels of escalation (exhort/admonish – avoid/ keep away – and beat)? Feminist Qur’an commentators have especially focused on the word “beating.” Al-Tabari’s (d. 923) classical tafsir can be taken as evidence that this verse is discussed as controversial even among male commentators. Among his various interpretations he cites one that reduces the object with which the husband can beat the wife to a toothpick. But even then the husband is

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 67 still authorized to beat the wife. The literal meaning does not cover the translation of daraba as “to separate” in this context.26 It has furthermore been argued that the expression “daraba mathalan” means not “to beat” but “to set an example,”27 but this phrase is not found in Q 4:34. These interpretations thus stretch the meaning of the word and cannot be justified on the basis of the text. Generally, such an approach is “linguistic-philological” and characterized by a close adherence to the text and the attempt to find a “new” understanding. Often  – as will be discussed in section III  – a specific modern concept of gender positions, namely legal equality, which prohibits men from the beating of women, is read into the text. This is often done by asserting a certain “spirit” of the Qur’an rather than proving it. Kecia Ali has sharply criticized this “manipulation”28 of the Qur’anic text, which she has often found in literature: Commentators have broadly agreed, though, that the term is meant literally, not metaphorically, and that the verse gives permission for a husband to strike his wife for nushuz, although only if admonition and abandonment in bed have had no effect.29 Solutions From the point of view of Islamic studies, which can focus on the consistency of the approaches and their possible congruence with the Constitution, the question arises: Is it useful to apply a text revealed in the seventh century to the German Constitution of the twentieth century? Is the linguistic-exegetical method qualified to produce a consistent modern interpretation of 4:34 that could be useful for Islamic theology? Would it not make more sense to see the Qur’anic text in those areas that obviously reflect the social and legal circumstances of the time within which the Qur’an was revealed as a temporal – not timeless – ruling? Only Islamic theology as stated earlier can develop the answer to these questions. But examples from history show that Muslim scholars were well aware of this problem. With the Muslim revivalist theology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries two exegetical approaches were formed. One tried to bring certain verses into harmony with the new social developments through a new exegesis;30 thus utilizing the so-called “linguistic-philological” perspective, which tries to reinterpret the word daraba, because, according to those exegetes, it should not mean “to beat” in the twenty-first century, since a man should have no right to beat his wife. The other more radical direction, according to Wild, denied that the Qur’an could and should serve as a source of law for a modern society.31 Wild mentions the Sudanese scholar Mahmud Taha (executed in 1985), who attracted attention with a radical reinterpretation of the concept of abrogation. Based on the distinction of the Meccan from the Medinan verses, he regarded only the Meccan suras and verses as originally and eternally valid, because they contained spiritual-religious doctrines. The revelations given in Medina after the emigration of the Prophet and the foundation of a political community were only temporarily valid and, compared with the Meccan revelations, less valuable for

68  Irene Schneider today’s understanding because they were adapted to the necessities of the Medinan society of this time. The Meccan parts include according to him: equality of the sexes, the peaceful spread of the Islamic faith, the equality of all social classes, and freedom from bodily punishment, while the Medinan verses contain gender hierarchy, slavery, and holy fight to spread Islam.32 With this exegetical concept, Mahmud Taha presented a human rights compatible interpretation of the Qur’an. The Iranian scholar Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945) has distinguished between religion and religious science. The revelation cannot be changed, he argued, while science, contrary to revelation, is not necessarily without contradiction.33 The Egyptian scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid (d. 2010) has developed and applied a communication-theoretical concept to the text. He too, assumed that the innerdivine process that resulted in the Qur’anic text is not accessible to human science. Science is limited to researching the message, the medium of the message, and the recipients. Science can only try to explore how the text was understood by humans at the time of revelation. To him it is undeniable that historically the relations between the Qur’anic text and its recipients at the Prophet’s time cannot and should not be seen independently from the social and cultural conditions of this time and that the relationship between the text and a modern recipient can no longer be the same.34 These and other Qur’an exegetic approaches offer numerous links to a modern Islamic theology and seem to allow the application of the category of “gender” to verses that deal with the legal-social position of women and with gender-related topics. How exactly can a gender-just Qur’an exegesis benefit from gender research? The difference between sex and gender as established in gender studies, that is, the differentiation between the biological sex on the one hand, and the socially constructed, cultural, historically changeable “gender” as an activity on the other hand, serves as an analytical tool for the gender roles and hierarchies in different times and spaces. Gender is used as an analytical instrument and makes it possible to recognize that ideas about what women and men should and could do, how they must behave as faithful Muslims, and how their interrelationship is to be shaped, can change. Biological gender is therefore only a reason for a social role, in which the individual grows up and becomes socialized.35 Therese Frey Steffen has defined this as follows: Firstly, the difference between biological and cultural gender has played a role since the beginning of human history. Secondly, gender is also a historically changeable, sociocultural phenomenon, with the categories “woman” and “man” being defined, according to the prevailing social doctrine. Hierarchical, hegemonizing, and limiting, gender remains an identity-determining power beyond emancipation.36 Contrary to the notion of an inescapable gender identity, Gender studies and the formulation of “gender” as an analytical tool broke the path to recognize that “femininity” and “masculinity” were not to be understood as natural-ontological

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 69 categories but as sociocultural constructions, which are constituted discursively, and appear culturally variable and historically changeable. With this redefinition of a naturally determined to a culturally created classification, gender was separated from its biological determinism and connected to the cannon of other social classification features. A rejection of the universal category “woman” as a description of a collective identity was the consequence of this concept.37 Gender can be considered an extremely useful category to all disciplines and areas of research, especially to Islamic theology. Historical research has dealt with the construction of gender images and argues that “gender equality” in the modern sense can be found neither in seventh-century Europe nor in seventh-century Arabia. Both societies were characterized by patriarchal ideas and social structures, even if these differed in detail. Corresponding verses in the Qur’an thus, one could argue, reflect only realities on the ground. The introduction of the category “gender” thus allows us to avoid reading twenty-first-century gender understanding (equality) into a text that was revealed in the seventh century and that therefore referred to numerous circumstances of that period. Those addressed (in 4:34 it is men) were requested to behave in a way considered normal and established in their society at that time. From what has been said, it becomes evident that there is an arc of tension between the two different approaches. •

•

On one hand, there is the traditional “linguistic-philological” approach, which tries in detailed efforts to bring certain verses in line with the requirement of gender equality. Gender equality is desired by Muslim men and women alike, and thus is interpreted into the text. As demonstrated earlier, this approach faces many problems. On the other hand, there is an approach that examines a “historical” understanding of certain verses of the Qur’an. It contextualizes the Qur’anic message of these special verses into the framework of society at the time, i.e., seventh century Arabia. The category “gender” can be fruitfully applied in this approach. Verses that regulate the position of gender can be understood before the backdrop of historical context, and as a manifestation of that historical moment.

Here, the term “gender” can explain this historical conditionality and embeddedness of gender representation in the Qur’an while also developing new concepts of gender roles that are anchored in religion and the requirements of modernity.

Islamic theology and gender roles in Germany today Given the problems within gender-just Qur’anic exegesis and the difficult source situation for reconstructing the early Islamic era, the question of the persons or organizations who could promote the development of a genderjust theology arises. What organizations, persons, or actors, male or female, could provide decisive incentives for the development of gender equality

70  Irene Schneider within theology in accordance with the Constitution in Germany? What form do these incentives take? There are several options: • • •

large Islamic organizations, which are united in the “Co-ordinating Council of Muslims in Germany” (KRM); smaller independent civil society organizations and associations, which dedicate themselves to “the women’s question”; Islamic theology institutes at German universities being in statu nascendi.

The coordination council and its organizations38 Many Islamic organizations and associations have emerged over the past decades as mosques. Muslims have created structures to fulfil their religious interests. According to Thomas Lemmen, a large differentiated organization network has emerged that constitutes a major difference compared with the structures of the countries of origin.39 For a religious community which is characterized by a completely different organisational model than that of the church, such an internal differentiation with central co-ordinating councils, clerical administrations and other institutions may seem unusual.40 The regional and national activity of those organizations is mostly based on numerous small local groups and mosque associations. The organizations claim rights, which churches and the much smaller Jewish community already have, in order to safeguard certain interests: building mosques, getting permission for the call of prayer, organizing Islamic religious education at state-run schools, conducting animal slaughtering and compliance with food formalities, providing funeral services, and getting permission for presence in public media. The many Muslim organizations in Germany reflect the religious and ethnic diversity within Islam in Germany and were united under one umbrella organization, which was founded in 2007 under the name of “Co-ordinating Council of Muslims in Germany” (KRM).41 From April 1, 2015 to September 30, 2015, a woman (lawyer Nurhan Soykan) was spokesperson of the KRM for the first time.42 The role of women in these organizations has not really been explored. According to Riem Spielhaus, female Islamic religiosity has been researched mainly with regard to the “daughters of immigrants.”43 The highest level of organization is found at mosques of the VIKZ, where women are theologically trained. In Cologne, a three-year study of Islamic theology is offered to both men and women.44 Completing the program qualifies for voluntary activity in a mosque. Certain qualified female students are given a second year of education, after which they can undertake religious tasks in female circles as clergy (Turkish hoca). In this organization, women can participate broadly in the religious life of the mosque, but they are strictly separated from men. Female students are independent in their own rooms, but men still represent the mosque

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 71 symbolically. The engaged women portray the image of a “traditional” Islam as represented by these organizations.45 The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs (DIB) in the form of its European Representation (DITIB) has often been criticized for not responding to the demands and needs of the younger Turkish generation in Europe. Imams were sent from Turkey to Germany and usually stayed only for a short time, not enough to become familiar with the language and culture of German society and to get to know the environment in which the Turkish immigrant population is living. Since 2007, women have increasingly entered the boards of the organizations. They have fought for acceptance both inside and outside their organizations.46 However, women are still underrepresented in the large Muslim organizations of Germany; they have barely any leadership positions. The organizations are considered conservative in regard to their position on gender equality as well as in structure, i.e., in terms of representation and content. On the websites of the organizations, there are no indications of a discussion on questions of gender, feminist Qur’an interpretation, or gender-just theology, let alone announcements for conferences on this topic. As a result, the Coordination Council cannot be considered a main advocate for a new gender-just theology. Female theologians and civil society organizations Associations and organizations have been established that address specific target groups in society.47 For the present context, two organizations have been selected as examples that address the topic of gender equal theology on their websites: The Liberal Islamic Association (LIB) under the chairwomanship of Lamya Kaddor and the Center for Islamic Women Research & Development (ZIF). The Liberal Islamic Association (LIB) LIB was established in May 2010 and registered as an association in Cologne. The organization sees itself as a representative of Muslim citizens and takes the responsibility to represent “liberal positions” of views of Islam in Europe.48 Chairwoman Lamya Kaddor, the daughter of Syrian immigrants, was born in Ahlen (Germany) in 1978. Alongside Arabic and Islamic studies, Kaddor studied Pedagogy in Muenster and worked as a teacher in the school pilot project of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). Since 2013, she has been teaching Islamic Religion at a school in Dinslaken after she was granted teaching permission by the Islamic Advisory Board of NRW. In addition to her autobiography, she has published many books. Her latest book, Ready to Kill, deals with the migration of young Muslims into the Islamic State. The Liberal-Islamic Association commits itself to the German Constitution on its website.49 It describes itself as open to different perspectives and defines its function in German society as supporting: •

a “dogma-free” interpretation of religious texts, i.e., the Qur’an, including the historical and social contexts;

72  Irene Schneider • a comprehensive gender justice and its pedagogical and theological realization; • the introduction of a comprehensive Islamic religious education at public schools in Germany.50 As stated on the website, the theological basis for the representation of liberal Muslims consists of trusting in a religious belief based on reason, respect, and tolerance toward other positions, and to be critical toward any claim to absoluteness.51 The shared theological basis, the “smallest common denominator” for the LIB is the creed (Arab. shahada).52 “It is improper to require dogmatic and cultural uniformity on any matter going beyond this core principle.”53 Muslims should be able to interpret the Qur’an and the sunna according to their own conscience and openly, free of fear. The most important principle (outside the common denominator of shahada) is probably the acceptance of different interpretations of the scriptures: [The LIB] is open to contradictory perspectives in the sense of a changing understanding to the benefit and enabling a common gain of knowledge. The LIB supports a pluralistic concept of society and is committed to the liberal democratic constitution. Consequently, the LIB rejects any form of racist, anti-Semitic, anti-Christian or anti-Islamic conception.54 Two of the five position papers available on the website deal with gender issues: a position paper on “Homosexuality in Islam” and, for our purposes even more interesting, a position paper on “Diversity of Gender, Gender Identities and Sexual Orientations.”55 In the gender position paper, gender equality is deduced from the Qur’anic verse 4:1.56 The fight against male chauvinism belongs to the understanding of Islam of the LIB. This may be deduced from the Qur’an and authentic hadith. An “Islam justifying chauvinism” is criticized, as well as a “static” gender understanding. Theologians such as Asma Barlas, Rabea Müller, and Amina Wadud are named, but their assumptions should not be accepted without questioning them. They belong to the point of departure according to which a multitude of interpretations can and must be negotiated: For a liberal understanding of Islam, we consider a constructive debate on these newer theological approaches as important and significant. As an association, we reckon the demand for a stronger social justice as a central point of the Qur’anic message, which we also expect to be realized in the relationship of the sexes, whether on the path of traditional Islamic exegesis or on the path of a more recent, historical, contextualizing and dogmatic freer interpretation of the Qur’an.57 Implicitly, the LIB refers to the concept of “gender” as an analytical category for the study of history and the development of a contemporary Muslim gender perception: The demand for greater justice must, according to our understanding, by no means remain with a simple structural equality between man and woman. We

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 73 need to discuss, at a more fundamental level, what gender and sexuality mean in a modern liberal Islamic understanding, and what role biological, social, cultural, and individual factors should play here. We want to discuss these results openly without trying to make dogmatic restrictions, which were selfevident in earlier centuries.58 In summary, the positions of the LIB can be classified as follows: • • • • • • •

adherence to the liberal-democratic constitution, explicit support of equality of women and men; Qur’anic interpretation for all Muslims free from fear, according to one’s own conscience; acceptance of plural interpretations; theological basis, as the lowest common denominator, is the Creed; liberal is understood not only as support of pluralistic interpretations but also as a comprehensive tolerance toward different gender identities (“inclusive”): homosexuality is not “sinful”; explicit statements against discrimination; responsibility and autonomy of the individual.

In the arc of tension between the linguistic-philological Qur’an interpretation on the one hand and a historical one on the other, the LIB is more strongly positioned within the historical Qur’anic interpretation. At the same time, it is open to different positions, and considers historical interpretations that allow a tolerant position toward same-sex relations. Centre for Islamic Women’s Research (ZIF) According to the website of the ZIF, the association “for Islamic Women’s Promotion and Women’s Research” is a registered association founded in 1995. It emerged from a roundtable discussion between Islamic scholars, theologians, teachers, and students of these subjects. Spielhaus mentions Rabea Müller as “a Muslim scholar and activist from ZIF.”59 The reason for founding the association was to identify the problems of Muslim women, “which cannot be subsumed under common standards in research.”60 According to ZIF, conceptions and advice have not yet been helpful to Muslim migrant women; thus, their work has been motivated by the conviction, “that neither well-meant offerings, nor a religious tradition of education and life can be supported by those Muslim women who want to decide consciously for a life with a religious self-responsibility.”61 And furthermore, The wish for change and development requires a basic research of Muslims, on whom alone it may be possible to develop responsible concepts into which Muslims can participate, without having to abandon their basic religious convictions as a condition for participation in the democratic process. Muslims are convinced that Islam offers this opportunity not only exemplary, but rather fundamentally.62

74  Irene Schneider Several conversation circles on hermeneutics, dialogue, women’s research, women’s work as well as an interreligious discussion group have taken place and are mentioned on the website.63 The understanding of hermeneutics is elaborated on a separate page. The first sentence is programmatic: The statements made by the Qur’an on women and women’s lifestyles, which in modern discourse are usually regarded as regularizing women and even as against women’s interest, are, in truth, a liberation, and a support for women through god’s justice. [Bold print in text, IS]64 And If they want to meet the requirements of the discourse, the readings developed by women must be recognizable from the Qur’anic self-understanding.65 The actors of the ZIF therefore consider it possible to reach a “true” understanding of the problematic Qur’anic verses and consider patriarchically influenced theologies responsible for the present problematic situation of Muslim women. This situation can only be improved through research. Therefore, one of the focus areas of ZIF is the continuous work on a woman-centered Islamic theology based on classical and generally accepted methods of textual interpretation. ZIF does not point to equality between men and women as it is anchored in the German Constitution, but only argues that the Qur’an is “women-liberating and womensupporting.” Both qualifications are not explicit. In contrast to the LIB, there is no explicit adherence to the Constitution on the website. ZIF describes the hermeneutic method as a “pendulum” between text and context to connect the spirit of the text with the context and requirements of a contemporary interpretation, while the essence of the text remains unaffected.66 The hermeneutic approach is described in detail in a booklet titled: “A single word and its great effect.”67 In this publication, the authors intended to undertake a new hermeneutic approach on Qur’an 4:34 regarding gender relations in Islam. In the introduction, references are made to a widespread patriarchal understanding of the Qur’an, and women are encouraged to develop their own interpretations. How this could be done and whether special training is necessary is not addressed. The focus is on verse 4:34, because it is “the bone of contention par excellence.”68 A deeper analysis of the ZIF interpretation is not possible in this chapter, but the main arguments of the ZIF are shortly presented and analysed for inner coherence, especially regarding the word “beating.” Hereby it must be remembered that the ZIF claims that a “true” understanding of Qur’an verses can be established For a scientific approach, the authors argue, both times should be considered: the time of the revelation and the time at which the text is interpreted. In doing so, the situatedness of interpretation is taken into account. Four central questions are presented: • •

What was the real purpose of the statement under the circumstances at the time? How can the purpose of that time be transferred into the present context under the changed conditions?

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 75 • •

How can the spirit and essence of the message (Arabic: Ruḥ at-tašri [sic]) become relevant in the given context? How can dysfunction69 be avoided under changed conditions?70

The authors consider it important to identify which meaning a certain term had during its revelation in the Qur’anic language usage.71 Therefore, the task of exploring the historical context of the Qur’an is imposed. Regarding the word “beating” (Arabic daraba), the ZIF asks: Why should women be allowed to be beaten (by their husbands or even at all)? How can family violence (and beating is nothing else) contribute to the personality development of a creature, here a woman, maybe, a mother who gives birth to children? What should women and children, and what should society learn from it? What kind of society do we picture as Muslims when half of their members can be beaten and humiliated?72 These rhetorical questions do not analyse the historical context, as required. This is also scientifically difficult to be reconstructed because of the scarcity of sources and because the sources contradict each other.73 The rhetorical questions rather reflect the ethical point of departure: the beating of women. This is underlined by the general reference to the Prophet, who, according to ZIF, had never beaten his wives.74 Thus, ZIF puts Prophetic behavior against the Qur’anic verse. They claim that violence contradicts the Qur’anic marriage concept.75 In general, ZIF argues that from 4:34 no ontological superiority of the man can be deduced, because his superior position is only connected to his economic position, i.e., to his upkeep of women.76 This could have been a starting point for a gender equal interpretation and for the use of the category of “gender.” In modern commentaries, it is often stated that the family model, according to which men pay dower and alimony and in return women owe them obedience, has changed. Women are breadwinners themselves, now, it is argued and thus the money-against-obedience constellation becomes more and more obsolete.77 However, this line of argument, which would historicize the gender relation reflected in 4:34, is not followed here. Instead, to answer the question, if “to beat” is the right translation, the authors refer to present-time empirical surveys, according to which physical violence cannot be a solution to a marriage crisis as a basis of argument. The traditional limitation of the classical Qur’an commentaries (“slap,” “beating with the toothpick”) are rejected, since violence generally creates further violence and sets an uncontrollable spiral in motion.78 Why should this “empirical research” serve as an ethical starting point for the argument? How does this modern empirical research connect to the Qur’anic text? Above all, it is not evident why, according to ZIF, the concept of daraba and the concept of violence contradict the Qur’anic and Islamic marriage concept.79 The verse 4:34 casts heavy doubt on such a claim and of course leaves much room for contrary interpretations; it was actually understood differently over more than one and a half millennia. The ZIF authors fail to refute this, since they presuppose

76  Irene Schneider circularly what they actually want to prove: a Qur’anic marriage concept that is opposed to and critical of violence. Furthermore, they use the “occasions of revelations” (Arab. asbab al-nuzul), according to which a woman whose husband had slapped her came to the Prophet who promised her the right to retaliation (Arabic qisas), meaning he allowed her to slap him back. Even if he had never beaten his wives himself – a point that was made by ZIF earlier in the text – this would mean that the Prophet generally accepted beating in the family in the form of retaliation, which ZIF denied earlier. More importantly, the Prophet’s permission was abrogated by the revelation of 4:34, and the Prophet himself now referred to the new Qur’anic verse as obligatory. ZIF interprets this situation of the abolition of the Prophet’s action regarding the prophetic statement 4:34 with the request “beat them,” as follows: If Qiṣaṣ is applied in principle but does not come into question in cases of the prevailing state of affairs after the appearance of the text of the revelation, consequently no case of a husband beating his wife may happen, because the victim can no longer apply Qisas.80 This argument is logically wrong because the Qur’anic verse now applies instead of qisas and its text is clear and it allows the husband to beat his wife.81 The translation of daraba as “beating,” as already shown, does not leave much room for interpretation. It is also a fact that the interpretation has been taken literally and not metaphorically by the great majority of the Qur’an commentators. The attempt of ZIF to see daraba as another variant of “separate oneself” is neither new82 nor linguistically convincing. This is due to the fact that “keep away from the beds” is already used by the word (wa- hajuruhunna fi l-madaji’) and that, in this context, the intention is to escalate the level of intervention. The interpretation of ZIF appears incoherent, methodically problematic, and contradictory. A contemporary Qur’an exegesis containing mutual condemnation of “beating” in the Qur’an or sunna cannot be established convincingly. In summary, the following applies to the ZIF: •

unlike LIB, there is no explicit commitment to the liberal-democratic basic order or to the equality of gender; • unlike LIB, tolerance toward pluralistic interpretations is not assumed, but a new interpretation is developed – e.g., for 4:34 – which is regarded as fundamentally valid, as “true”; • theologically, the interpretation is oriented more closely to the text whose “spirit” (Arabic ruh) should be discovered: the readings must correspond to the “Qur’anic self-understanding” – the “true” understanding can be detected; • like the LIB, all Muslims (especially women) are also asked by ZIF to develop their own understanding of the Qur’an, but with the limitation that the readings must be in accordance with the “Qur’anic self-understanding”; • controversial issues like homosexuality, values, or tolerance etc. are not mentioned.

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 77 ZIF is thus clearly anchored in the linguistic-philological interpretation approach and not in historic contextualization. ZIF authors describe the hermeneutic effort as a “pendulum” between the text and the context, so that the position of the exegete is taken into account, but ZIF continues to use classical hermeneutics with other methods and wants to establish one “legitimate” interpretation, hence it is obviously not willing to accept plural interpretations. Islamic theology in Germany Our third example is Islamic theology, which was created in 2011 at several German universities. The Science Council, which ordered its implementation, stated that Islamic theology has to act in the context of the German religions-neutral state. Islamic theology has therefore taken on a pioneering role in many regards that, according to the theses given, it has not yet fulfilled. What are the reasons? Although the points of conflict between a conservative-traditional interpretation of Islamic law and the German Constitution are well known, the website of the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) provides little indication that gender research should play a role in the newly or soon to be established theological professorships in Münster, Osnabrück, Erlangen, Frankfurt, and Tübingen.83 The Islamic associations, which play an important role in the context of appointing professors, cannot be said to be in favour of a gender-oriented theology. Ali Dere, for example, a representative of DITIB, spoke out against a gender theology using the unconvincing argument that Islamic theology is already based on the equality of the sexes during the German Islam Conference in April 2012. He added that possible gendered hierarchies would not be a theological but a sociological problem. It is not an expression of ignorance, when I  affirm that gender equality belongs not to the realm of religion of Islam. If we speak of a missing gender equality among Muslims, we cannot mean religion in its theological dimension. Indeed, we transfer the results of socio-cultural analyses to theology, which is not the object of research. The distinction between theology and sociology of Muslims is of great importance, if we are looking for a solution for gender equality. If we transfer our sociological analysis to theology, we deny Muslims the opportunity, to solve the problems within their religious affiliation. Especially Islam in its theological dimension is striving to create a virtuous man, regardless of gender, origin and skin colour, who receives justice. That is why, I vote in this part of my speech, for a clear distinction of sociology and theology.84 Due to the influence of the large Muslim organizations, Islamic theology is structurally oriented toward the curricula of the traditional Islamic universities in the Arab-Islamic world instead of dealing with questions of gender and other points of conflict with the Constitution. This curriculum includes study of Qur’an, hadith,

78  Irene Schneider Qur’anic exegesis (Arabic tafsir), Qur’anic recitation (qiraʾa), Islamic law (fiqh) etc. A short overview of the existing professorships (state: May 2018) reveals the following: • • • • • • •

Osnabrück: six professorships, male, none of them a focus on gender research; Münster: two professorships, male, no gender focus; Frankfurt: six professorships, one woman, no gender focus; Tübingen: four professorships, one woman, no gender focus; Erlangen: five professorships, one woman, no gender focus; Academy of World Religions of the University of Hamburg: one professor (female), no gender focus; Paderborn University: one junior professor (female), no gender focus.

Altogether, this constitutes twenty-three professorships, of which five are held by women. This corresponds to a women’s share of 21.7 percent,85 while in 2017 women held 25 percent of professorships at German universities.86 But, as one can see online, none of the professors focus on gender research.87 Has the opportunity to create new structures been missed? At least as far as the institutionalization of Islamic-theological gender research is concerned, this conclusion is to be answered so far in the affirmative. However, there are welcome approaches, such as the international colloquium in Münster, titled “Muslima Theology” (the basis for this volume, December 4–5, 2015), at which the questions raised here were discussed openly and controversially.88 It is obvious that a professorship in Islamic gender theology is necessary. But what would be expected of such a professorship? In general, the different existing approaches of hermeneutics must be noted and the students of the subject should be taught to distinguish between their own interpretations and the range of existing interpretations by other scholars. A critical discussion of the methodological possibilities and of the limitations of the respective approaches is also necessary. Since linguistic-philological approaches are often based on the concept of the Qur’anic “spirit,” which is detected through historical research, it is essential to consider early Islamic history critically.

Conclusion An analysis of which persons and/or organizations can initiate or stimulate the implementation of a gender-oriented theology has shown that there has been no desire to do so from the Science Council or the Ministry. Although it launched Islamic theology at the universities of Germany, it has lost sight of the related aims of the development of an Islamic theology within the framework of the Constitution, especially of a gender-oriented theology. The Coordination Council did not give any encouragement, and largely ignored the subject or seemed unwilling to promote a critical theology. Dere’s speech at the Islam Conference can be interpreted as an attempt to “displace” the subject into sociology, as if there were no religiously motivated gender models. As the Coordination Council and

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 79 its subordinate associations have been prominently involved in the filling of the chairs, it has to be concluded that they do not give the problem the attention it deserves. On the other hand, there obviously are ideas and interesting approaches for new interpretations of the Qur’an and new approaches to gender-just theology among civil society organizations and individuals. While ZIF is more oriented toward a linguistic-philological (re)interpretation of the Qur’an, LIB has a more liberal and wider approach and includes references to the historical-contextual interpretation. In fact, civil society is a pioneer in new hermeneutics. Islamic theology itself has shown initial beginnings, but it can and must become a trendsetter, because its task is to take up the presented approaches, bundle them, and reflect on them scientifically. To determine what such a gender theology should look like is the task of Islamic theology, which still lies ahead of it. Wild’s statement, that a plurality of interpretations must be accepted, is indispensable. This also applies to classical exegesis. For Islamic studies, it is necessary to take note of exegetical differences, to examine them, to describe and analyse them. Islamic theology, on the other hand, must go one step further and prepare an interpretation that is compatible with the social and legal situation of Islam in Europe. Various methods are possible and must be explored. According to Wild, the distinction between different text levels in the Qur’an and between different levels of obligation must be taken into account. For the present context, this would mean that some social reflections on gender found in the Qur’an would no longer be considered to be an eternal norm but instead time-bound. This paper proposes explicitly to include the category “gender” introduced by gender studies into the exegetical toolbox. Accordingly, biological gender must be seen as separated from the social. Biologically, the Qur’an assumes a dualism of men and women. The analytical category of “gender” can provide valuable services if it shows that all (social) ways of seeing masculinity and femininity, males’ and females’ rights and obligations are time- and place-bound and differ in historical developments and cultural contexts. Based on the analysis of the linguistic-philological and historical-contextualizing interpretation, it was demonstrated that the former method caused numerous methodological problems, and that the analysis of 4:34, based on this method, did not lead to a coherent interpretation that could withstand the classical gender hierarchical interpretation. The interpretation of the historical context assumes that the interpreted verse is not based on an essentialist image of gender, but rather on a concrete form of addressing people in their social role in the seventh century, embedded in a social context that did not provide gender equality, neither in Arabia nor in Europe. Therefore, the image of gender is related to the given social structures. This makes a modern interpretation compatible with the Constitution. Such an interpretation is possible even if a distinction is made between different levels of texts and different levels of obligation of the Qur’anic rulings and messages. This is often done in the Muslim world, because only a few Muslim states today still have the Qur’anic corporal punishment and slavery has been abolished all over the Muslim world. In addition, there is what Wild called the “radical”

80  Irene Schneider approach, which denies that the Qur’an could and should serve as a source of law for a modern society. However, these positions are not yet widely accepted in the Islamic world. The question arises – why? In her article “The Roots of the Difficulty of Islamic Conversation on New Hermeneutic Approaches to the Qur’anic Text,” Rotraut Wielandt has given an illuminating answer to this question, which can be helpful within a German or European context. According to her, it is already critical if an author in a Muslim country makes a specific reference to the form and content of the Qur’anic text in a specific situation with the temporal and place-bound understanding of its first addressees, even if they do not claim that the meaning of the Qur’an is exhausted in this context.89 Nevertheless, a distinction between the binding divine will and (with regard to the historicity of the human receiver) its limited valid expressions must be made and can be found in the hermeneutic approaches of different theologians such as Abu Zaid. All they demand is a new human understanding of the Qur’anic text, instead of an older human understanding. The large majority of them were vehemently opposed by established religious scholarship. The idea that Muslims, because of the nature of revelation, were not able to think of an interrelation between text and recipients, is disproved by the existence of new hermeneutical approaches as well as by past developments such as the “reasons of revelation” (Arab. asbab al-nuzul). Thus, this cannot be the reason. The reason lies for Wielandt somewhere else:90 In practice, a reference to the text as such, as if it were independent from conditions and limitations of human understanding, implies an immense increase of the authority not simply of the Qur’an but of those responsible for its exegesis – according to conventional terms especially the “ulama.”91 The reason is not that Muslims cannot think of an interrelationship, but that the power of the scholarly establishment, which is responsible for the exegesis, is in danger. This establishment defends itself with all its strength, which is at its disposal in the Muslim countries. This condition, however, is to be countered by the empowerment of modern-minded Muslims and theologians who struggle against conservative and hierarchical establishments. Moreover, here lies the unique opportunity of an Islamic theology that can develop beyond the reach of this scholarly establishment in Europe.

Notes

1 2 3 4 5

Osel 2016. See www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf, accessed December 19, 2017. Langenfeld 2005. Schneider and Strunk 2010. According to classical law, the apostate is generally punished with death, but classical Islamic criminal law is applied in only a few countries (including Saudi Arabia, Iran. See Peters 2005, specifically, 64–65, 153–181. 6 See Schneider 2005, 61–62, 2014, 86–91.

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 81 7 The fear of neo-imperial influence is great, see Wielandt 1996. 8 See Schneider 2014, 58–75. For example, the role of the family head has now been abolished in Morocco, without removing the right of the man to polygyny. For the various women’s movements in different countries see 172–202. 9 See Wild 2001, 43. 10 See also Ali 2006, 151: “a methodology of picking-and-choosing, combining isolated elements in expedient ways, will prove insufficient to resolve the core issue at stake.” 11 Wild 2001, 42–44. I will especially focus on his sharp analysis of modern Qur’an exegetes, on their methodological and theoretical strengths and weaknesses. 12 I am grateful to Prof. Khorchide and Dr. El Omari for the invitation to the conference that has made this volume possible. 13 Ibid., 31. 14 See section III of this chapter for details. 15 For an example of this problematic in reconstructing early Islamic social history and especially gender relations see Schneider 2014, 31–36. 16 Ali 2006, 131–132. 17 Ibid., 133. 18 Opitz-Belakhal 2010, 10–18. 19 Wapler 2016, 16–18. 20 The present chapter emerged from a lecture in Islamic Theology at the University of Münster on December 5, 2015. After the end of my lecture, the theologian Riffat Hassan spoke up and asked me why I had cited this verse, which she had already demonstrated quite a long time ago that gender equality was anchored in. Apart from the fact that she wanted to say that I, as a non-Muslim, would have no right to deal with the subject, I quote her conception for the reason that seems to me to reflect the aporia of Islamic feminist exegesis: such a position, which is represented by Riffat Hassan, seems to me to be an exact reflection of what male Qur’an exegetes claimed for centuries, namely, their own interpretation as “right” and “true,” the other as “incorrect” and “false.” Such positions lead the discourse into the impasse. 21 See section III. 22 Translated into English from the German translation by Rudi Paret (2010). Unless indicated otherwise, the author has translated German sources into English. 23 See https://Qur’an.com/4/34, accessed December 19, 2017. 24 See www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=4&verse=34, accessed December 19, 2017. 25 The Arabic word is nashiz, the abstract is nushuz. The meaning of this word is controversial, because in the Qur’an it is also used for men, but with a very different meaning; see Ali 2006, 120–122. 26 Ali 2006, 122. 27 See Lane 1984. 28 Ali 2006, 124. 29 Ibid., 122; see also Schneider 2014, 46–57. 30 Wild 2001, 42. 31 Ibid., 42. 32 Ibid., 43–44. 33 Ibid., 45. 34 Ibid., 49–50. 35 Wapler 2016, 21. 36 See Frey Steffen 2006, 10. 37 See Budde 1997, 128–129. I will not go deeper into the theoretical discourse in gender sciences, but see for example Breger 2005. 38 See www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_40905-544-1-30.pdf, accessed March 8, 2018. 39 For an overview, see Schneider 2008. 40 Lemmen 2000, 26.

82  Irene Schneider 41 See the article on Wikipedia: Coordination Council of the Muslims in Germany: https:// de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koordinationsrat_der_Muslime_in_Deutschland, accessed March 8, 2018. 42 See http://krm.yeniprofil.com/ueberuns, accessed March  8, 2018. See also the relevant information on the website of the Catholic Women’s Community of Germany: www.kfd-bundesverband.de/newsletter-2015/newsletter-kfd-direkt-nr-42-april-2015/ nurhan-soykan-neue-sprecherin-des-koordinationsrats-der-muslime.html, accessed March 8, 2018. Mrs. Soykan also has a Wikipedia entry, see https://de.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Nurhan_Soykan, accessed March 8, 2018. 43 See Spielhaus 2012, on women in organizations, see 447–451. 44 See www.vikz.de/index.php/Imamausbildung.html, accessed March 8, 2018. 45 See Boos-Nünning 2010. This study confirms that the gender separation is selfevident in the dormitories. It is, however, not certain whether this is due to conservative thought, or to the idea that single-sex groups are more effective to promote, see page 63 of the study. 46 See Spielhaus 2012, 449. 47 See Lemmen 2000, 25. 48 See the website of the LIB, https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/wir-%C3%BCber-uns/, accessed March 8, 2018. 49 See https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/wir-%C3%BCber-uns/, accessed March 8, 2018. 50 Ibid. 51 See https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/wir-%C3%BCber-uns/grunds%C3%A4tze/, accessed March 8, 2018. 52 Here, the Germanized notation of Arabic terms is adopted from the websites. 53 https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/wir-%C3%BCber-uns/inhalte-und-ziele/, accessed March 8, 2018. 54 See LIB 2013a, https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/wir-%C3%BCber-uns/, accessed March 8, 2018. 55 See LIB 2013b, https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/wir-%C3%BCber-uns/positionspapiere/, accessed March 8, 2018. 56 The Qur’an verse 4:1 is in Paret’s translation: “Ihr Menschen! Fürchtet euren Herren, der euch aus einem einzigen Wesen (d.h. aus dem ersten Menschen, nämlich Adam) geschaffen hat, und aus ihm das ihm entsprechende andere Wesen, und der aus ihnen beiden viele Männer und Frauen hat (hervorgehen und) sich (über die Erde) ausbreiten lassen.“ 57 LIB 2013b, 2; see https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/app/download/14243423925/Positionspapier_Gender.pdf, accessed March 8, 2018. 58 LIB 2013b. 59 Spielhaus 2012, 449. According to the LIB Website she is also a member of LIB and even a member of the board, see https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/wir-%C3%BCber-uns/vorstand/, accessed December 19, 2017. 60 See www.zif-koeln.de/4466.html, accessed March 8, 2018. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 See www.zif-koeln.de/7538.html, accessed March 8, 2018. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 See ZIF 2005 (German). 68 Ibid., 2–3. 69 It is not explained what this term “dysfunction” means here. 70 See ZIF 2005, 6. 71 Ibid., 7.

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 83 72 Ibid., 23. 73 See Schneider 2014, 31–36. 74 ZIF 2005, 23–24. 75 Ibid., 38. 76 Ibid., 29. 77 See Ali 2006, 117. 78 See ZIF 2005, 34–38. 79 Ibid., 40. 80 Ibid., 44. 81 Ibid., 43. 82 See Ali 2006, 122, where she mentions this approach. 83 See www.bmbf.de/de/islamische-theologie-367.html, accessed March 8, 2018. In 2011, a conference that was supposed to explore the cooperation between Islamic Science and Islamic Theology took place with the exclusion of German Islamic studies scholars: www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/zit/irp_pb_mail.pdf, accessed March 8, 2018. 84 Speech by Ali Dere, see www.ditib.de/detail_pos1.php?id=3&lang=de, accessed March 8, 2018. 85 In comparison, critical religious science (Islamic studies) has been less developed. Between 1997 and 2015 only 5.5 professorships were established. There are now thirty-four professorships, which is completely inadequate in the light of the latest political developments in the region, which are to be explored alongside the historical, religious, legal, literary, and other topics. See www.kleinefaecher.de/entwicklung-derprofessuren-und-standortzahlen-in-den-kleinen-faechern/, accessed March 8, 2018. 86 Deutscher Bundestag 2017. 87 There is no professorship in Islamic studies / gender studies in the Federal Republic, but in Switzerland (Zurich), see Forschung and Lehre 2014. 88 See www.uni-muenster.de/ZIT/Veranstaltungen/2015/20151013.html, accessed March  8, 2018. 89 Wielandt 1996, 272. 90 Ibid., 273–276. 91 Ibid., 276.

Bibliography Ali, Kecia (2006) Sexual Ethics & Islam (Oxford: Oneworld). Boos-Nünning, Ursula (2010) Praying and Learning: A Study of the Pedagogical Work in the Dormitories of the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ) (German), www. vikz.de/index.php/publikationen.html, accessed March 8, 2018. Breger, Claudia (2005) “Identität,” in Gender@Wissen, ed. Christina von Braun and Inge Stephan (Köln: Böhlau), 47–65. Budde, Gunilla (1997) “Das Geschlecht der Geschichte,” in Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft, ed. Thomas Mergel and Thomas Welskopp (München: Beck), 125–150. Coordination Council of the Muslims in Germany (2018) Wikipedia, see, https://de.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Koordinationsrat_der_Muslime_in_Deutschland, accessed March 8, 2018. Der Koran, transl. Rudi Paret (2010) 11th ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer). Deutscher Bundestag (2017) “Genderprofessuren,” www.bundestag.de/blob/536708/ f920fd8afc4c784a7bd0ce05801097bd/wd-8-043-17-pdf-data.pdf, accessed May 3, 2018.

84  Irene Schneider Forschung & Lehre (2014) “Genderprofessuren – Aktuelle Daten,” Forschung & Lehre 11: 890–891. Frey Steffen, Therese (2006) Gender (Leipzig: Reclam). Lane, Edward William (1984) Arabic-English Lexicon (2nd ed., reprint Cambridge: IslamicTexts Soc.). Langenfeld, Christine (2005) “Rechtliche Voraussetzungen für islamischen Religionsunterricht an öffentlichen Schulen,” in Islamische Religionsgemeinschaften und islamischer Religionsunterricht: Probleme und Perspektiven, ed. Christine Langenfeld, Volker Lipp, and Irene Schneider (Göttingen: Universitätsdrucke Göttingen), 17–36. Lemmen, Thomas (2000) Islamische Organisationen in Deutschland (Electronic Ed. Bonn: FES Library), www.fes.de/fulltext/asfo/00803toc.htm, accessed March 8, 2018. LIB – Liberal-Islamischer Bund e.V., ed. (2013a) Homosexualität im Islam: Positionspapier des Liberal-Islamischen Bundes e.V., https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/app/download/13504862025/2013.12_Homosexualitaet_im_Islam.pdf?t=1496062843, accessed March 8, 2018. LIB – Liberal-Islamischer Bund e.V., ed. (2013b) Entwurf für das Positionspapier des Liberal-Islamischen Bundes e.V. zum Thema “Diversität der Geschlechter, geschlechtlichen Identitäten und sexuellen Orientierungen,” https://lib-ev.jimdo.com/app/download/14243423925/Positionspapier_Gender.pdf?t=1496062843, accessed March 8, 2018. Opitz-Belakhal, Claudia (2010) Geschlechtergeschichte (Frankfurt am Main: CampusVerlag). Osel, Johann (2016) “Millionen für Islam-Professoren,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 20. Paret, Rudi (2010) Der Koran: Übersetzung von Rudi Paret (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer). Peters, Rudolph (2005) Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Rohe, Mathias (2001) Der Islam  – Alltagskonflikte und Lösungen: Rechtliche Perspektiven (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder). Schariati, Ali (1981) Fatima ist Fatima (Bonn: Botschaft der Islam. Republik Iran, Presseund Kulturabteilung). Schneider, Irene (2005) “Muslime in der Diaspora – Probleme der Positionierung im säkularen pluralistischen Staatswesen,” in Islamische Religionsgemeinschaften und islamischer Religionsunterricht: Probleme und Perspektiven, ed. Christine Langenfeld, Volker Lipp, and Irene Schneider (Göttingen: Universitätsdrucke Göttingen), 61–72. Schneider, Irene (2008) “Islamisches Recht zwischen göttlicher Satzung und temporaler Ordnung? Überlegungen zum Grenzbereich zwischen Recht und Religion,” in Recht und Religion in Europa: Zeitgenössische Konflikte und historische Perspektiven, ed. Christine Langenfeld and Irene Schneider (Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen), 138–191. Schneider, Irene (2014) Women in the Islamic World (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers). Schneider, Irene, and Katrin Strunk (2010) “Islamische Erziehung an deutschen Moscheen – eine Bestandsaufnahme der Forschung,” Recht der Jugend und des Bildungswesens 1: 53–69. Spielhaus, Riem (2012) “Making Islam Relevant: Female Authority and Representation of Islam in Germany,” in Women, Leadership and Mosques, ed. Masooda Bano and Hilary Kalmbach (Leiden: Brill), 437–455. Wapler, Friederike (2016) “Recht und Geschlecht: Grundfragen der juristischen Geschlechterforschung,” in Beiträge zum Islamischen Recht XI, ed. Thoralf Hanstein and Irene Schneider (Frankfurt am Main: PL Academic Research), 13–31.

Gender equal Islamic theology in Germany 85 Wielandt, Rotraut (1996) “Wurzeln der Schwierigkeit innerislamischen Gesprächs über neue hermeneutische Zugänge zum Qur’antext,” in The Qur’an as Text, ed. Stefan Wild (Leiden: Brill), 257–282. Wild, Stefan (2001) Mensch, Prophet und Gott im Qur’an (Münster: Rhema Verlag). ZIF – Centre for Islamic Women Research and Women’s Advancement, ed. (2005) A Single Word and Its Great Effect: A Hermeneutical Way of Looking at Qur’an Sūra 4, Verse 34, with Regard to Gender Relations in Islam (German) (Cologne: ZIF).

Part II

Sources Qur’an, hadith, and history

5 Woman-man equality in creation Interpreting the Qur’an from a nonpatriarchal perspective Riffat Hassan Since 1974 when I began my focused study of Qur’anic teachings relating to women, I have been engaged in the exploration of the theological roots of the issue of woman-man inequality in the Islamic tradition. My interest in this subject expanded to include the Christian and Jewish traditions after I became, in 1979, a member of the Trialogue,1 a group of scholars who became the pioneers of interreligious dialogue in the three Abrahamic religions in the U.S. As a result of my study and deliberation over a decade, I came to perceive that, in both the Islamic tradition and the Jewish and Christian traditions, there are three theological assumptions on which the superstructure of men’s alleged superiority to women (which implies the inequality of woman and man) has been erected. These three assumptions are: (1) that God’s primary creation is man, not woman, since woman is believed to have been created from man’s rib and hence is derivative and secondary ontologically; (2) that woman, not man, was the primary agent of what is customarily described as the “Fall,” or man’s expulsion from the Garden of Eden, hence all “daughters of Eve” are to be regarded with hatred, suspicion, and contempt; and (3) that woman was created not only from man but also for man, which makes her existence merely instrumental and not of fundamental importance. The three theological questions to which these assumptions may appropriately be regarded as answers, are as follows: how was woman created? Was woman responsible for man’s exodus from Paradise? Why was woman created? The profound significance – both theoretical and practical – of these three questions in the history of ideas and attitudes pertaining to women in the Islamic (as well as the Jewish and Christian) tradition, is undeniable. However, in my judgment, the issue of woman’s creation is more basic and important, philosophically and theologically, than any other in the context of woman-man equality, as this paper will demonstrate. Here it is important to point out that despite the fact that women such as Khadijah and ‘A’ishah (wives of the Prophet Muhammad) and Rabi‘a al-Basri (the outstanding woman Sufi) figure significantly in early Islam, the Islamic tradition has, by and large, remained rigidly patriarchal until the present time, prohibiting the growth of scholarship among women particularly in the realm of religious thought. This means that the sources on which the Islamic tradition is mainly

90  Riffat Hassan based, namely, the Qur’an, the sunna,2 the hadith3 literature, and fiqh,4 have been interpreted almost exclusively by Muslim men who have defined the ontological, theological, sociological, and eschatological status of Muslim women. This paper is written from the perspective of a nonpatriarchal reading of the Qur’an, which is regarded by me as well as the majority of Muslims in the world as the highest authority of normative Islam. The ordinary Muslim believes, as seriously as the ordinary Jew or Christian, that Adam was God’s primary creation and that Eve was made from Adam’s rib. If confronted with the fact that this firmly entrenched belief is derived mainly from the Bible and is not only extra-Qur’anic but also contradictory to the Qur’an, this Muslim – whether man or woman – is almost certain to be shocked. The rather curious and tragic truth is that even Western-educated Muslims seldom have any notion of the extent to which the Muslim psyche bears the imprint of the collective body of Christian and Jewish ideas and attitudes pertaining to women. This paper challenges the prevalent age-old beliefs among Muslims regarding woman’s origin by presenting a systematic account of the theme of human creation in the Qur’anic narrative, which differs significantly from the Biblical account of human creation.

The Biblical accounts of human creation There are two creation accounts in Genesis, the first book of the Hebrew Bible. The first one is in Chapter 1, verses 26–27, and the second one is in Chapter 2, verses 18–24. The names of the authors of the two accounts are not known; hence, they are referred to by their likely religious or professional affiliation. The first account, probably written in the fifth century bce, is attributed to the “Priestly” writer,5 and reads as follows: 26. God said, “Let us make man (adam) in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves and let them be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all the wild beasts and all the reptiles that crawl upon the earth.” 27. God created man (ha adam) in the image of himself, in the image of God he created it, male and female he created them.6 Pointing out that the correct translation of the term “ha adam” is “the human,” Leonard Swidler has stated that this term “is clearly a collective noun . . . as can be seen in the plural ‘let them be masters.’ ”7 This means that in the Priestly account, reference is to the creation of all humankind, which is described in completely egalitarian terms, with God “creating humanity immediately in its dual sexual form; there is no priority expressed or implied.”8 The second creation account – commonly referred to as the “rib-story” – is in Genesis 2, verses 18–25. This account attributed to the “Yahwist” writer was written in the tenth century bce, which means that though located in Genesis 2, it

Woman-man equality in creation 91 was written about five hundred years earlier than the Priestly account in Genesis 1. It reads as follows: 18. Yahweh God said, “It is not good that the man should be alone. I will make him a helpmate.” 19. So from the soil Yahweh God fashioned all the wild beasts and all the birds of heaven. These he brought to the man to see what he would call them; each one was to bear the name the man would give it. 20. The man gave names to all the cattle, all the birds of heaven and all the wild beasts. But no helpmate suitable for man was found for him. 21. So Yahweh God made the man fall into a deep sleep. And while he slept, he took one of his ribs and enclosed it in flesh. 22. Yahweh God built the rib he had taken from the man into a woman and brought her to the man. 23. The man exclaimed: “This at last is bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh! This is to be called woman, for this was taken from man.” 24. This is why a man leaves his father and mother and joins himself to his wife, and they become one body. 25. Now both of them were naked, the man and his wife, but they felt no shame in front of each other.9 The Biblical accounts of the creation of the first human pair consisting of two different sources, the Yahwist and the Priestly, from which arise two different traditions, has been subject of much Christian and Jewish scholarly controversy. There are four references to woman’s creation in Genesis: (1) Genesis 1:26–27, fifth century bce, Priestly tradition; (2) Genesis 2:7, tenth century bce, Yahwist tradition; (3) Genesis 2:18–24, tenth century bce, Yahwist tradition; (4) Genesis 5:1–2, fifth century bce, Priestly tradition. A study of the texts shows that the Hebrew term adam (literally, “of the soil,” from adamah: “the soil”) functions mostly as a generic term for humanity. According to Swidler, “It is a mistake to translate it (ha Adam) in Genesis 1 to 2:22 either as man in the male sense or as a proper name, Adam (until Genesis 4:25 the definite article ha is almost always used with Adam, precluding the possibility of its being a proper name: in 4:25 it becomes a proper name, Adam without the ha). Moreover, it is clearly a collective noun in Genesis 1 to 2:22, as can be seen in the plural ‘let them be masters’ ” (Genesis 1:26).10 Of the four texts referring to creation, undoubtedly the most influential has been Genesis 2:18–24, which states that woman (ishshah) was taken from man (ish). From this text it has generally been inferred that: (1) Adam was God’s primary creation from whom Eve, a secondary

92  Riffat Hassan creation, was derived, hence is inferior and subordinate to Adam, and (2) Eve was created simply and solely to be the helpmate of Adam.

The theme of divine creation in the Qur’an In the Qur’an, creation is not seen merely as an event that occurred “at the beginning” but as an on-going process to which reference is made a number of times (for instance, in sura 2: al-baqara: 28, sura 27: an-naml: 64, sura 29: al-‘ankabut: 19–20, and sura 35: al-fatir: 1. Recognizing the central importance of the theme of divine creation in the Qur’an, Toshihiko Izutsu observes: In fact, the Koran may be regarded in a certain sense as a grand hymn in honor of Divine Creation. At any rate, the whole Koran is literally impregnated with the thought of Creation and a feeling of profound admiration for it.11 It is one of the most dominant ideas in the Qur’an that Allah’s creations are “signs” (ayat) for those who seek to understand reality and be faithful to God who alone created (khalaqa, bara’a), originated (ansha’a, bada’a), brought forth (fatara), brought about (ja‘ala), or produced first (abad’a), everything in the heavens and on or within the earth (fi-s samawat wal-l ard). The Qur’an also affirms repeatedly that God created everything with authenticity, purpose and durability (bi-l haqq)12 and not the opposite (batilan),13 or in sport,14 and that God “made beautiful everything that He created.”15 Whilst stating that God “creates what you know not”16 and “adds to Creation what He pleases,”17 the Qur’an refers to the creation by God of a number of particular creations belonging to various spheres including the celestial, natural, animal and human. Reference is made, for instance, to the creation of the sun and moon, the stars, the mountains, the rivers, the trees, fruits, grains and herbs, the animals, the angels (mala’ika), the “jinn,” and human beings. Lest human beings regard their own creation as Allah’s highest achievement, sura 40: ghafir: 57 points out: “Greater indeed than the creation of man is the creation of the heavens and the earth: yet most men do not understand (what this implies).” At the same time there is no doubt that the creation of humanity – to which reference is made more than thirty times in various suras – is of particular importance as may be seen, for instance, from sura 17: al-isra’: 70: “Now, indeed, We have conferred dignity on the children of Adam, and borne them over land and sea, and provided for them sustenance out of the good things of life, and favored them far above most of Our creation” and sura 95: at-tin: 4: “Verily, We create man (al-insan) in the best conformation (fi ahsan-I taqwim).” That human beings have been created by God in a very “personal” way is also indicated by verses such as sura 15: al-hijr: 28–29,18 sura 32: as-sajdah: 9,19 and sura 38: sad: 71–72,20 in which it is stated that after fashioning (bashar) or (al-insan) (both generic terms for humanity), God breathed “My spirit” into the creation, and sura 38: sad: 75 in which God asks Iblis why he did not bow in submission of humanity “which I have created with My hands.”21

Woman-man equality in creation 93 God’s proclamation to the angels prior to the creation of Adam: “I am going to place on the earth a khalifa” (sura 2: al-baqara: 30), further testifies to the importance of human creation. The term (khalifatun) from the root kh-l-f, which means “to be behind; to come after; to succeed,”22 has been variously translated as “vicegerent,”23 “viceroy,”24 “ruler,”25 “substitute,”26 “deputy,”27 “successor,”28 “one in my stead,”29 and “one who shall inherit the earth.”30 Much has been written about what is meant by Adam being a khalifa31 and interpretations range from regarding Adam as God’s deputy on earth exercising the special capabilities possessed by human beings to create an order in conformity with God’s revealed will, to regarding Adam merely as a successor to earlier creations albeit with great power and authority in the world. The former view was presented by the most outstanding modern thinker Muhammad Iqbal throughout his writings. The latter view was presented, for instance, by Al-Mawardi.32 Whichever interpretation one accepts, one fact remains clear: the creation of Adam is an event of exceptional significance from the perspective of the Qur’an.

The meaning of “Adam” in the Qur’an Regarding the origin of the term “adam,” E. W. Lane states in his ArabicEnglish Lexicon: “there are various opinions respecting its derivation; but (these it is unnecessary to mention for) the truth is that it is a foreign word, (i.e. Hebrew).”33 As stated earlier, in Hebrew, the term adam, which is the masculine counterpart of the feminine term adama (literally, the soil), is a collective noun that literally means “of the soil” and refers to humanity in general. Turning to the Qur’an, we find that the term “adam” occurs in it twenty-five times. Since Arabic has no capital letters, it is not possible to tell whether the term is used as a proper name or as a common noun without looking at the context in which it occurs. A study of the Qur’anic passages containing the term adam shows that this term is used as a proper noun, in the following verses: Behold, God raised Adam, and Noah, and the House of Abraham, and the House of ‘Imran above all mankind. (sura 3: al ‘imran: 33) And relate to them truthfully the story of the two sons of Adam (sura 5: al-ma’idah: 27) These were some of the prophets upon whom God bestowed His blessings – (prophets) of the seed of Adam and of those whom We caused to be borne (in the ark) with Noah, and of the seed of Abraham and Israel: and (all of them were) among those Whom We had guided and elected; (and) whenever the messages of the Most Gracious were conveyed unto them, they would fall down (before Him), prostrating themselves and weeping. (sura 19: maryam: 58)

94  Riffat Hassan In all the remaining Qur’anic references to “adam,” the term is used as a collective noun and refers to more than one or two human beings. Among these references is sura 3: al ‘imran: 59, which is the only verse in the Qur’an that mentions the creation of Adam. This verse reads as follows: Verily, in the sight of God, the nature of Jesus is as the nature of Adam, whom He created out of dust and then said unto him, “Be” – and he is. Commenting on that verse, the eminent Muslim scholar and Qur’anic exegete Muhammad Asad states: The above passage is part of an argument against the Christian doctrine of the divinity of Jesus. The Qur’an stresses here, as in many other places, the fact that Jesus, like Adam by which name, in this context, the whole human race is meant – was only a mortal “created out of dust,” i.e., out of substances, both organic and inorganic, which are found in their elementary form on and in the earth. . . . That Adam stands here for the human race is clearly implied in the use of the present tense in the last word of this sentence.34 That the term adam functions as a collective noun and stands for humankind is substantiated by an analysis of several verses in which this term occurs. It is also corroborated by the fact that all human beings are assimilatively addressed as “Children of Adam” (Bani Adam) in sura 7: al-‘araf: 26, 27, 31, 35, 172;35 sura 17: al- isra’: 70;36 and sura 36: ya Sin: 6.37 Further, the Qur’an sometimes replaces the term adam by al-insan or bashar, which are both generic terms for humanity. Here it is important to note that though the term adam mostly does not refer to a particular human being, it does refer to human beings in a particular way. As pointed out by Iqbal: Indeed, in the verses which deal with the origin of man as a living being, the Qur’an uses the word Bashar or Insan, not Adam, which it reserves for man in his capacity of God’s vicegerent on earth. The purpose of the Qur’an is further secured by the omission of proper names mentioned in the Biblical narration – Adam and Eve. The word Adam is retained and used more as a concept than as the name of a concrete human individual. This use of the word is not without authority in the Qur’an itself.38 It is noteworthy that the Qur’an uses the terms bashar, al-insan, and an-nas while describing the process of the physical creation of human beings. It uses the term adam more selectively to refer to human beings only when they become representative of a self-conscious, knowledgeable, and morally autonomous humanity.

Woman-man equality in creation 95

The Qur’anic references to human creation While in Genesis specific reference is made to the creation of Adam and Eve, there is no corresponding reference in the Qur’an. Instead of “Adam and Hawwa’,” the Qur’an speaks of “Adam and zauj” in sura 2: al-baqara: 35, sura 7: al-‘araf: 19, and sura 20: ta ha:117. Muslims, almost without exception, assume that “Adam” was the first human being created by Allah and that he was a man. If “Adam” was a man, it follows that “Adam’s zauj” would be a woman. Hence the zauj mentioned in the Qur’an becomes equated with Hawwa’. Neither the initial assumption nor the inferences drawn from it are, however, supported in a clear or conclusive way by the Qur’anic text. The Qur’an states neither that Adam was the first human being nor that he was a man. The term “adam” is a masculine noun, but linguistic gender is not sex. If “Adam” is not necessarily a man, “Adam’s zauj” is not necessarily a woman. In fact, the term zauj is also a masculine noun and, unlike the term “adam,” has a feminine counterpart, zaujatun. (Here, it may be noted that the most accurate English equivalent of zauj is not “wife” or “husband,” or even “spouse,” but the term “mate.” The Qur’an uses the term zauj with reference not only to human beings but also to every kind of creation, including animals, plants, and fruits.) However, neither the term zaujatun nor the plural form zaujatun is used anywhere in the Qur’an, which consistently uses the masculine forms zauj and azwaj. It has been pointed out by the authoritative Arabic lexicon Taj al-‘Arus that only the people of Al-Hijaz (Hejaz) used the term zauj in reference to women, and elsewhere the usage was zaujatun. Also, Arabic legal terminology always uses the term zaujatun in reference to women. Why, then, does the Qur’an, which surely was not addressed only to the people of al-hijaz, use the term zauj and not zaujatun if the reference is indeed to woman? In my opinion, the reason why the Qur’an leaves the terms “adam” and zauj deliberately unclear, not only as regards sex but also as regards number, is that its purpose is not to narrate certain events in the life of a man and a woman (i.e., the Adam and Eve of popular imagination), but to refer to some life experiences of all human beings, men and women together. While the Bible, which is chronological in structure, refers to human creation in the first book Genesis, the Qur’an describes human creation in several passages that are found in various chapters. Given are thirty-three passages that refer to the subject of human creation. (1) sura 2: al-baqara: 21: O mankind (an-nas)! Worship your Sustainer, who has created you and those who lived before you, so that you might remain conscious of Him. (2) sura 4: an-nisaa’: 1: O mankind (an-nas)! Be conscious of your Sustainer, who has created you out of one living entity (nafsin wahidatin), and out of it created its mate, and out of the two spread abroad a multitude of men and women. And remain conscious of God, in whose name you demand (your rights) from one another, and of these ties of kinship. Verily, God is ever watchful over you!

96  Riffat Hassan (3) sura 6: al-an‘am: 98: And He it is who has brought you (all) into being out of one living entity (nafsin wahidatin), and (has appointed for each of you) a time-limit (on earth) and a resting-place (after death): clearly, indeed, have We spelled out these messages unto people who can grasp the truth! (4) sura 7: al-‘araf: 189: It is He who has created you (all) out of one living entity (nafsin wahidatin), and out of it brought into being its mate, so that man might incline (with love) toward woman. And so, when he has embraced her, she conceives (what at first is) a light burden, and continues to bear it. Then, when she grows heavy (with child), they both call unto God, their Sustainer, “If Thou indeed grant us a sound (child), we shall most certainly be among the grateful!” (5) sura 16: an-nahl: 4: He creates man (al-insan) out of a (mere) drop of sperm: and lo! this same being shows himself endowed with the power to think and to argue! (6) sura 16: an-nahl: 72: And God has given you mates of your own kind ad has given you, through your mates, children and children’s children, and has provided for you sustenance out of the good things of life. Will men, then, (continue to) believe in things false and vain, and thus blaspheme against God’s blessings? (7) sura 18: al-kahf: 51: I did not make them witnesses of the creation of the heavens and the earth, nor of the creation of their own selves; and neither do I (have any need to) take as My helpers those (beings) that lead (men) astray. (8) sura 22: al-hajj: 5: O men (an-nas)! if you are in doubt as to the (truth of) resurrection, (remember that,) verily, We have created (every one of) you out of dust, then out of a drop of sperm, then out of a germ-cell, then out of an embryonic lump complete (in itself) and yet incomplete, so that We might make (your origin) clear unto you. And whatever We will (to be born) We cause to rest in the (mothers’) wombs for a term set (by Us), and then We bring you forth as infants and (allow you to live) so that (some of) you might attain to maturity: for among you are such as are caused to die (in childhood), just as many a one of you is reduced in old age to a most abject state, ceasing to know anything of what he once knew so well. And (if, O man, thou art still in doubt as to resurrection, consider this:) thou canst see the earth dry and lifeless – and (suddenly,) when We send down waters upon it, it stirs and swells and puts forth every kind of lovely plant! (9) sura 23: al-mu’minun: 12–14: Now, indeed, We create man (al-insan) out of the essence of clay, and then We cause him to remain as a drop of sperm in (the womb’s) firm keeping, and then We create out of the drop of sperm a germ-cell, and then We create out of the germ-cell an embryonic lump, and then We create within the embryonic lump bones, and then We clothe the bones with flesh – and then We bring (all) this into being as a new creation: hallowed, therefore, is God, the best of artisans!

Woman-man equality in creation 97 (10) sura 25: al-furqan: 54: And He it is who out of this (very) water has created man (bashar), and has endowed him with (the consciousness of) descent and marriage-tie: for thy Sustainer is ever infinite in His power. (11) sura 27: an-naml: 64: Nay  – who is it that creates (all life) in the first instance, and then brings it forth anew? And who is it that provides you with sustenance out of heaven and earth? (12) sura 30: ar-rum: 20–21: And among His wonders is this: He creates you out of dust – and then, lo! you become human beings (bashar) ranging far and wide! And among His wonders is this: He creates for you mates out of your own kind, so that you might incline toward them, and He engenders love and tenderness between you: in this, behold, there are messages indeed for people who think! (13) sura 31: luqman: 28: (For Him,) the creation of you all and the resurrection of you all is but like (the creation and resurrection of) a single soul nafsin wahidatin); for, verily, God is all-hearing, all-seeing. (14) sura 32: as-sajda: 7–9: (God) makes most excellent everything that He creates. Thus, He begins the creation of man (al-insan) out of clay; then He causes him to be begotten out of the essence of a humble fluid; and then He forms him in accordance with what he is meant to be, and breathes into him of His spirit: and (thus, O men,) He endows you with hearing, and sight, and feelings as well as minds: (yet) how seldom are you grateful! (15) sura 36: ya sin: 77: Is man (al-insan), then, not aware that it is We who create him out of a (mere) drop of sperm – whereupon, lo! he shows himself endowed with the power to think and to argue? (16) sura 36: ya sin: 79: Say: “He who brought them into being in the first instance will give them life (once again), seeing that He has full knowledge of every act of creation. (17) sura 38: sad: 71–72: (For,) lo, thy Sustainer said unto the angels: “Behold, I am about to create a human being (bashar) out of clay; and when I have formed him fully and breathed into him of My spirit, fall you down before him in prostration!” (18) sura 39: az-zumar: 6: He has created you (all) out of one living entity, and out of it fashioned its mate; and He has bestowed upon you four kinds of cattle of either sex; (and) He creates you in your mothers’ wombs, one act of creation after another, in threefold depths of darkness. Thus is God, your Sustainer: unto Him belongs all dominion: there is no deity save Him: how then, can you lose sight of the truth? (19) sura 45: al-jathiya: 4: And in the creation of yourselves and the fact that animals are scattered (Through the earth), are Signs for those of assured Faith.39 (20) sura 49: al-hujurat: 13: O men (an-nas)! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so

98  Riffat Hassan that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware. (21) sura 53: an-najm: 45: and that it is He who creates the two kinds – the male and the female. (22) sura 55: ar-rahman: 3–4: He has created man (al-insan): He has imparted unto him articulate thought and speech. (23) sura 55: ar-rahman: 14: He has created man (al-insan) out of sounding clay, like pottery. (24) sura 71: nuh: 14: seeing that He has created (every one of) you in successive stages. (25) sura 71: Nuh: 17: And God has caused you to grow out of the earth in (gradual) growth; and thereafter He will return you to it (in death). (26) sura 75: al-qiyama: 36–39: Does Man (al-insan) then, think that he is to be left to himself, to go about at will? Was he not once a (mere) drop of sperm that had been spilt, and thereafter became a germ-cell – whereupon He created and formed (it) in accordance with what (it) was meant to be, and fashioned out of it the two sexes, the male and the female? (27) sura 76: al-insan: 2: Verily, it is We who have created man (al-insan) out of a drop of sperm intermingled, so that We might try him (in later life): and therefore We made him a being endowed with hearing and sight. (28) sura 77: al-mursalat: 20–22: Did We not create you out of a humble fluid, which We then let remain in (the womb’s) firm keeping for a term preordained? (29) sura 78: an-naba’: 8: And We have created you in pairs. (30) sura 82: al-infitar: 6–8: O man (al-insan)! What is it that lures thee from thy bountiful Sustainer, who has created thee, and formed thee in accordance with what thou art meant to be, and shaped by nature in just proportions, having put thee together in whatever form He willed (thee to have)? (31) sura 86: at-tariq: 5–7: Let man (al-insan), then, observe out of what he has been created: he has been created out of a seminal fluid issuing from between the loins (of man) and the pelvic arch (of woman). (32) sura 95: at-tin: 4: Verily, We create man (al-insan) in the best conformation. (33) sura 96: al-‘alaq: 1–2: Read in the name of thy Sustainer, who has created man (al-insan) out of a germ-cell! In the light of an analysis of these cited verses, a number of important points can be made, including the following: (a) Two ways of describing the creation process The Qur’an refers to the creation of humanity (and nature) in two ways: a) an evolutionary process whose various stages or phases are mentioned sometimes together and sometimes separately, and b) as accomplished fact or in its totality.

Woman-man equality in creation 99 Referring to these two ways of describing creation as “two views of creation,” Shinya Makino has correctly pointed out in her Creation and Termination: In the one, the creation of nature and mankind is expressed concretely, while in the other . . . it is expressed more abstractly or symbolically. And in the one creation is described analytically, in an explanatory way and realistically as seen in such expressions as, spreading the earth, putting mountains upon it, making ways among them, and as for mankind producing them out of semen, then a clot of blood, then a lump of flesh, then bone, and so on, while in the other, it is shown more generally, comprehensively, declaratively and as a command, as is expressed in “Be” and it is.40 It is important to note that in all the Qur’anic descriptions of the process of human creation, not only the first step or stage but also each progressive step or stage of development is referred back to God. These points toward the Creator who is personally involved in every step of the evolutionary process, whose creative power comes into play at the beginning of the process and recurs at each stage of the development of human life. (b) Human creation described in generic terms for humanity It is very important to note that in the context of human creation, the Qur’an uses an-nas, al-insan, and bashar, which are all generic terms referring to humanity as a whole. None of the quoted verses pertaining to human creation can be cited in support of the idea that man was created before woman or that woman was created from man. Though reference is made in some of them to God’s creation of human beings as sexually differentiated “mates,” no priority or superiority is accorded to either male or female. Here, it is apt to observe that in the passages in which human creation is described “concretely” or “analytically,” no mention is made of the separate or distinct creation of either man or woman. It also needs to be noted that the Qur’an evenhandedly uses both feminine and masculine terms and imagery to describe human creation. I Human beings created from one source In a number of verses already cited, reference is made to the creation of all human beings from one source or being (nafsin wahidatin). In sura 31: luqman: 28, ref­ erence is made not only to the unity of all creation at the point of origin but also at the time of resurrection. The expression nafsin wahidatin has been translated variously, for instance, as “soul,”41 “person,”42 “being,”43 “living entity,”44 and “man.”45 However, it is understood by the majority of Muslim scholars as referring to a single living source from whom all human life or human beings are derived. That God’s original creation was undifferentiated humanity (al-insan) and not either man or

100  Riffat Hassan woman (who appeared subsequently) is implicit in a number of Qur’anic passages relating to human creation. Among the passages in which this point is made explicit, perhaps the clearest is sura 75: al-qiyama: 36–39, which has been cited. There are, however, some verses in the Qur’an that are understood in such a way that they appear to endorse a version of the Genesis 2 story of woman’s creation from man. These verses can be grouped into two categories. The most important verses in the first group are: sura 16: an-nahl: 72; sura 30: ar-rum: 20–21; and sura 35: al-fatir: 11. Muslim arguments that women were created from and for men, are supported as follows: (1) sura 30: ar-rum: 21 uses the term ilaiha to refer to “mates” created from and for the original creation. Since ha is a feminine attached pronoun, the “mates” it refers to must be female (thus making the original creation male); (2) all three verses cited use kum as a form of address. Hence, these verses are addressed not to humanity collectively, but only to men, since the term used is a masculine attached pronoun (second person plural). Men are, therefore, the primary creation whose mates were created from, and for, them. Regarding (1) ilaiha literally means “in her” and not “in them” and refers not to women (who are not mentioned here) but to azwaj (masculine plural used in the Qur’an for both men and women). If the “mates” were clearly designated as women, the term used would be hunna, not ha. The use of ha here is consistent with the Arabic grammatical rule that permits the use of feminine singular terms for a class or collectivity. The fact that the creatures to whom the passage is addressed are referred to as bashar further supports the argument that the “mates” created by Allah are not only women (for men), since bashar obviously has a bisexual reference. Regarding (2), Arabic usage permits the use of kum in reference to men and women together. When women alone are concerned, kunna is used. Here it is of interest to note that in his book Haquq-e-Niswan (The Rights of Women), a pioneer advocate of women’s rights, Syed Mumtaz ‘Ali had pointed out that the Qur’an uses the masculine form of address to prescribe fundamental duties (e.g., salat, zakat, fasting) to Muslim men and women.46 If masculine terms of address are understood by the entire Muslim umma to apply to both men and women in highly significant contexts, such as the prescription of basic religious duties, it cannot consistently be argued that these terms apply to men invariably and exclusively. Regarding the second group of verses that are cited to prove man’s ontological priority and superiority to woman, the following are of exceptional importance: sura 4: an-nisaa’: 1; sura 7: al-‘araf: 189; and sura 39: az-zumar: 6. In these verses (as also in sura 6: al-an‘am: 98 and sura 31: luqman: 28) reference is made to the creation from one source or being (nafsin wahidatin) of all human beings. Muslims, with hardly any exceptions, believe that the one original source or being referred to in these verses is a man named Adam. This belief has led many translators of the Qur’an to obviously incorrect translations of simple Qur’anic passages. For instance, sura 4: an-nisaa’:1; if correctly translated, reads as follows: “O an-nas be circumspect in keeping your duty to your Sustainer who created you (plural) from one being (nafsin wahidatin) and spread from her (minha) her mate (zaujaha) and spread from these two beings

Woman-man equality in creation 101 many men and women.” However, most translators (e.g., Hashim Amir-‘Ali, Muhammad ‘Ali, A. J. Arberry, A. K. Azad, A. M. Daryabadi, N. J. Dawood, S. A. Latif, A. A. Maududi, M. M. Pickthall, George Sale, and M. Y. Zayid) translate the feminine attached pronoun ha in minha and zaujaha as “his” instead of “her.” Given the eminence of the translators mentioned, one wonders how much a mistake could have been made. Could it have been the case that given their preconceptions and psychological orientation, these interpreters of the Qur’an (who all happen to be men) are totally unable to imagine that the first creation could have been other than male? Or could they have been apprehensive that a correct translation of ha might suggest the idea – even for an instant – that woman, not man, was the prior creation (and therefore superior if priority connotes superiority) and that man was created from woman and not the other way around (which, in a reversal of the Eve from Adam’s rib story would give Eve the primacy traditionally accorded to Adam)? Certainly no Qur’anic exegete to date has suggested the possibility that nafsin wahidatin might refer to woman rather than man.

No Hawwa’ or “Rib-Story” in the Qur’an A review of the Qur’anic passages relating to the subject of human creation reveals two important points: (i) The term hawwa’ (comparable to the Hebrew term havvah meaning “living” or “life”) is not mentioned in the Qur’an, although it is a part of the Arabic language and the Islamic tradition. (ii) There is no “ribstory” in the Qur’an, hence Muslims have no basis for assuming or asserting that Adam was God’s primary creation and Eve was made from his rib. It has been made amply clear in the foregoing account, that the Qur’an does not distinguish between the creation of man and woman. According to the numerous passages pertaining to human creation that have been cited earlier, man and woman were made by God at the same time, of the same substance, in the same manner. If that is the case – and it clearly is -, the question must be raised as to why the majority of Muslims, like Christians and Jews, believe in the “rib-story” which had a negative impact on women through the ages. Though omitted altogether by the Qur’an – as pointed out by Iqbal47 – the “rib-story” has had profound influence on Muslims throughout the ages. It is, therefore, necessary to review it and to understand the role that it has played not only in the Christian tradition (where it originated) but also in the Jewish and Islamic traditions. The issue of woman’s creation is more fundamental and important, philosophically and theologically, than any other. This is due to the fact that if man and woman have been created equal by God who is the ultimate giver of value, they cannot become unequal, essentially, at a subsequent time. On the other hand, if man and woman have been created unequal by God, then they cannot become equal, essentially, at a subsequent time. If one upholds the view that man and woman were created equal by God – which is an unequivocal and indisputable teaching of the Qur’an – then the existing inequality between men and women – a global phenomenon – cannot be seen as having been mandated by God but must be seen as a subversion of God’s original plan for humanity.

102  Riffat Hassan

Notes 1 The Jewish-Christian-Muslim Trialogue was sponsored by the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Washington D. C. in which I participated from 1979 to 1982. 2 sunna: practical traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. 3 hadith (plural: ahadith): oral traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. 4 fiqh: jurisprudence. 5 Swidler 1979, 75. 6 Jones 1968, 6. 7 Swidler 1979, 76. 8 Ibid., 75. 9 Jones 1968, 6–7. 10 Swidler 1979, 76. 11 Isutzu 1964, 120. 12 For instance, see the following verses: (Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the Quran in English are taken from Asad 1980). Muhammad Asad’s translation of the Qur’an is regarded by many to be among the best in English and is my preferred translation). surah 6: al-an‘am: 73: And He it is who has created the heavens and the earth in accordance with (an inner) truth – and whenever He says, “Be,” His word comes true; and His will be the dominion on the Day when the trumpet (of resurrection) is blown. He knows all that is beyond the reach of a created being’s perception, as well as all that can be witnessed by a creature’s senses or mind: for He alone is truly wise, all-aware. sura 10: yunus: 5: He it is who made the sun a (source of) radiant light and the moon a light (reflected), and has determined for it phases so that you might know how to compute the years and to measure (time). None of this has God created without (an inner) truth. Clearly does He spell out these messages unto people of (innate) knowledge. sura 14: ibrahim: 19: Art thou not aware that God has created the heavens and the earth in accordance with (an inner) truth? He can, if He so wills, do away with you and bring forth a new mankind (in your stead): sura 15: al-hijr: 85: And (remember:) We have not created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them without (an inner) truth; but, behold, the Hour (when this will become clear to all) is indeed yet to come. Hence, forgive (men’s failings) with fair forbearance: sura 16: an-nahl: 3: He has created the heavens and the earth in accordance with (an inner) truth; sublimely exalted is He above anything to which men may ascribe a share in His divinity! sura 29: al-‘ankabut: 44: (and hence are certain that) God has created the heavens and the earth in accordance with (an inner) truth: for, behold, in this (very creation) there is a message indeed for all who believe (in Him). sura 30: ar-rum: 8: Have they never learned to think themselves? God has not created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them without (an inner) truth and a term set (by Him): and yet, behold, there are many people who stubbornly deny the truth that they are destined to meet their Sustainer! sura 39: az-zumar: 5: He it is who has created the heavens and the earth in accordance with (an inner) truth. He causes the night to flow into the day, and causes the day to flow into the night; and He has made the sun and the moon subservient (to His laws), each running its course for a term set (by Him). Is not He the Almighty, the All-Forgiving? sura 44: ad-dukhan: 39: none of this have We created without (an inner) truth: but most of them understand it not.

Woman-man equality in creation 103 sura 45: al-jathiya: 22: for, God has created the heavens and the earth in accordance with (an inner) truth, and (has therefore willed) that every human being shall be recompensed for what he has earned and none shall be wronged. sura 46: al-ahqaf: 3: We have not created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them otherwise than in accordance with (an inner) truth, and for a term set (by Us): and yet they who are bent on denying the truth turn aside from the warning which has been conveyed unto them. sura 64: at-taghabun: 3: He has created the heavens and the earth in accordance with (an inner) truth, and has formed you – and formed you so well; and with Him is your journey’s end. 13 For instance see sura 38: aad: 27 which reads as follows: And (thus it is:) We have not created heavens and earth and all that is between them without meaning and purpose, as is the surmise of those who are bent on denying the truth: but then, woe from the fire (of hell) unto all who are bent on denying the truth! 14 For instance see the following verses: sura 21: al-anbiyaa’: 16: And (know that) We have not created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them in mere idle play. sura 44: ad-dukhan: 38: For (thus it is:) We have not created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them in mere idle play. 15 For instance see sura 32: As-Sajdah: 7 which reads as follows: Who makes most excellent everything that He creates. Thus, He begins the creation of man out of clay. 16 For instance see the following verses: sura 16: an-nahl: 8: And (it is He who creates) horses and mules and asses for you to ride, as well as for (their) beauty: and He will yet create things of which (today) you have no knowledge. sura 36: ya sin: 36: Limitless in His glory is He who has created opposites in whatever the earth produces, and in men’s own selves, and in that of which (as yet) they have no knowledge. 17 For instance see sura 35: al-fatir: 1 which reads as follows: All praise is due to God, Originator of the heavens and the earth, who causes the angels to be (His) message-bearers, endowed with wings, two, or three, or four. (Unceasingly) He adds to His creation whatever He wills: for, verily, God has the power to will anything. 18 sura 15: al-hijr: 28–29 read as follows: And lo! Thy Sustainer said unto the angels: “Behold, I am about to create mortal man out of sounding clay, out of dark slime transmuted: and when I have formed him fully and breathed into him of My spirit, fall down before him in prostration.” 19 sura 32: as-sajda:9 reads as follows: He (God) forms him (al-insan) in accordance with what is meant to be, and breathes into him of His spirit: and (thus, O men,) He endows you with hearing, and sight, and feelings as well as minds: (yet) how seldom are you grateful! 20 sura 38: sad: 71–72 read as follows: (For,) lo, thy Sustainer said unto the angels: “Behold, I am about to create a human being (bashar) out of clay; and when I have formed him fully and breathed into him of My spirit, fall you down before him in prostration!”

104  Riffat Hassan 21 sura 38: sad: 75 reads as follows: Said He (God): “O Iblis! What has kept thee from prostrating thyself before that (being) which I have created with My hands? Art thou too proud (to bow down before another created being), or art thou of those who think (only) of themselves as high?” 22 Penrice 1975, 44. 23 For instance, by B. M. Ahmad, H. Amir-‘Ali, ‘A. Yusuf ‘Ali, Richard Bell, A. M. Daryabadi, M. Abu’l Fazl, M. Z. Khan, S. A. Latif, A. A. Maududi, P. Salahud-Din, A. H. Siddiqui. 24 For instance, by A. J. Arberry, M. M. Pickthall. 25 For instance, by Muhammad ‘Ali. 26 For instance, by George Sale. 27 For instance, by N. J. Dawood, M. Y. Zayid. 28 For instance, by H. G. Sarwar. 29 For instance, by J. M. Rodwell. 30 For instance, by Muhammad Asad. 31 For instance, see Ibn Kathir n.d., 90–91. 32 Al-Mawardi 1978, 15. 33 Lane 1863, Book I-Part 1, 37. 34 Asad 1980, 76, footnote 47. 35 These verses read as follows: sura 7: al-a‘raf: 26–27: O children of Adam! Indeed, We have bestowed upon you from on high (the knowledge of making) garments to cover your nakedness, and as a thing of beauty: but the garment of God-consciousness is the best of all. Herein lies a message from God, so that man might take it to heart. O children of Adam! Do not allow Satan to seduce you in the same way as he caused your ancestors to be driven out of the garden: he deprived them of their garment (of God-consciousness) in order to make them aware of their nakedness. Verily, he and his tribe are lying in wait for you where you cannot perceive them! Verily, we have placed (all manner of) satanic forces near unto those who do not (truly) believe. sura 7: al-a‘raf: 31: O children of Adam! Beautify yourselves for every act of worship, and eat and drink (freely), but do not waste: verily, He does not love the wasteful! sura 7: al-a‘raf: 35: O children of Adam! Whenever there come unto you apostles of your own, conveying My messages unto you, then all who are conscious of Me and live righteously – no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve. sura 7: al-a‘raf: 172: And whenever thy Sustainer brings forth their offspring from the loins of the children of Adam, He (thus) calls upon them to bear witness about themselves: “Am I not your Sustainer?” – to which they answer: “Yea, indeed, we do bear witness thereto!” Of this We remind you,) lest you say on the Day of Resurrection, “Verily, we were unaware of this.” 36 sura 17: al-isra’: 70 reads as follows: Now, indeed, We have conferred dignity on the children of Adam, and borne them over land and sea, and provided for them sustenance out of the good things of life, and favored them far above most of Our creation. 37 sura 36: ya sin: 60 reads as follows: Did I not enjoin you, O you children of Adam, that you should not worship Satan – since, verily, he is your open foe. 38 Iqbal 2009, 66.

Woman-man equality in creation 105 39 This translation is by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, see Ali 1975. 40 Makino 1970, 29. 41 For instance, by Muhammad ‘Ali, A. J. Arberry, A. M. Daryabadi, N. J. Dawood, M. Z. Kha, S. A. Latif, A. A. Maududi, M. M. Pickthall, A. H. Siddiqui, M. Y. Zayid. 42 For instance, by George Sale, A. Yusuf ‘Ali. 43 For instance, by Muhammad ‘Ali, A. A. Maududi, M. M. Pickthall, M. Y. Zayid. 44 For instance, by Muhammad Asad. 45 For instance, by A. K. Azad, S. A. Latif, J. M. Rodwell, George Sale. 46 Ali 1898. 47 The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 66.

Bibliography ‘Ali, Abdullah Yusuf (1975) The Holy Qur’an, Text, Translation and Commentary by ‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Ali (Indianapolis: The Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada). ‘Ali, Syed Mumtaz (1898) Haquq-e-Niswan (The Rights of Women) (Lahore: Dar-ulIsha‘at Punjab). Al-Mawardi, A. H. A. bin (1978) Al-Ahkam al-sultaniyah wal wilayet ad-diniyah (Beirut: Dar-ul-Kutub-ul-‘Ilmiyah). Asad, Muhammad (1980) The Message of the Qur’an, a translation of the Qur’an by Muhammad Asad (Gibraltar: Dar Al-Andalus). Ibn Kathir (nd) Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Karachi: Nur Muhammad Karkhanah Tijarat-e-Kutub). Iqbal, Muhammad (2009) The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, ed. and annotated by M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture). Isutzu, Toshihiko (1964) God and Man in the Koran (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural Linguistic Studies, Keio University). Jones, Alexander Jones (General Editor) (1968) The Jerusalem Bible (Reader’s Edition) (New York: Doubleday). Lane, Edward W. (1863) Arabic-English Lexicon (London: Williams and Morgate). Makino, Shinya (1970) Creation and Termination: A Semantic Study of the Structure of Qur’anic World View (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, Keio University). Penrice, John (1975) A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran (Lahore: Al-Biruni). Swidler, Leonard (1979) Biblical Affirmations of Woman (Philadelphia: Westminster Press).

6 The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation Dina El Omari

Introduction The creation of both sexes (and of the pair) as a sign of God’s omnipotence are, in addition to the verses of the female companions in paradise, the earliest Qur’anic motifs that deal with the female sex. In the early and middle Meccan periods, they appear more often, while in the late Meccan period they are mentioned just occasionally. Because of the creation motif of both sexes from one origin, they are extended and thus move into the background. The fact that the Qur’an focuses already in the early period of revelation on the human pair as proof of God’s power of creation deserves specific attention. With the repeated mention of the female sex as an equal member of the pair, the Qur’an paves the way for a gender equal interpretation of the Qur’an from the beginning. From the outset, the focus lays on the pair without giving the male dominance any advantage. Because this happens in the form of embedding it into the Qur’anic signs of creation, it gives additional weight through equal emphasis on the pair and both the sexes as a sign of God’s omnipotence. All in all, it inevitably gives those motifs an intense significance. This chapter intends to show that the two motifs, the creation of both sexes and the creation in pairs, developed during the early Meccan phase as well as how they can be interpreted in accordance with a gender equal reading. The composition of the sura, the location of the respective verse in the context of the sura, as well as the historical contextualization of the Qur’an in its late antique context shall be used to point toward the possibility of a gender equal interpretation. In light of this, it will become evident that the Qur’an might explicitly seize ideas/ concepts from late antiquity that could facilitate and promote such a gender equal reading. In some places in this chapter, reference will also be made to examples of traditional exegesis followed by the analysis/evaluation as the former shows indicators of a gender equal reading of the text despite heavily patriarchal structures. In order to develop a foundation for this later analysis, a few theoretical foundations are required for a general understanding of the Qur’anic passages. The starting question that needs to be asked is” What exactly is meant by signs of creation in the Qur’an and what role do they play? Following that, I offer an overview of the duality in creation as it appears in the Qur’an. This is necessary

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 107 because this duality forms the basis for both motifs. Qur’anic passages pertaining to these motifs from the early Meccan period will be analyzed, including the following suras: 92:3, 75:39, 78:8, 51:49, 53:45.

Signs of creation The Qur’an talks about signs of creation (arab. ayat) several times. They manifest themselves in the earth and also in humankind, hence they can be both animate and inanimate. The most frequently mentioned are “the creation of the heavens and earth, the creation of men, the shining of the sun, the moon and the stars, the alternation of day and night, sending down rain and the permanence/durability and stability of nature“1 and also “thunder, lightning, fire [. . .] the human understanding and relationships, the diversity of languages and colors, hearing, seeing, etc.“2 The signs of creation certify God’s omnipotence and creativity because he is the one putting them forward and, according to the Qur’an, he is doing it in such an obvious way that they cannot be ignored, hence the continuous references to those who reflect on the signs and turn to God through them.3 Such mentions of creation are usually introduced by a series of details about creation that are still mostly implicit in the early suras and only get explicitly referred to as signs of creation after the late Meccan period.4 In the early Meccan sura 80, verses 24–32, it says: Then let man look at his food, (and how We provide it): for that We pour forth water in abundance, and We split the earth in fragments, and produce therein corn, and grapes and nutritious plants, and Olives and Dates, and enclosed Gardens, dense with lofty trees, and fruits and fodder, – for use and convenience to you and your cattle.5 In the late Meccan sura 16, verses 10 and 11, the signs are directly mentioned: “It is He who sends down rain from the sky: from it ye drink, and out of it (grows) the vegetation on which ye feed your cattle. With it He produces for you corn, olives, date-palms, grapes and every kind of fruit: verily in this is a sign for those who give thought.” As shown in the last verse, a passage about the sign is combined with a direct reference to God or a warning to the listeners to think about the signs.6 According to Angelika Neuwirth, the signs of creation always point beyond themselves since, as mentioned before, they hermeneutically serve as evidence of the presence and omnipotence of God. They create their own Qur’anic genre that has two meanings from the very beginning: the signs are of a physical and of a textual nature, i.e., they are reflected in the readable text as well as in the creation.7 Already the first verses of pair creation of both sexes are used as signs in the Qur’an and are accordingly embedded in passages of signs of creation. At the same time, the topic of dualism of the human creation is always emphasized, but nevertheless the influence of different subtexts is shown consequently a different

108  Dina El Omari composition of the account. Before turning to several textual examples and their dynamics, the dualism in the creation of the Qur’an shall be considered.

Duality in the creation In various places, the Qur’an points to the fact that there is an underlying symmetry in God’s creational. This is especially visible in sura 55, the Compassionate (Arab. ar-rahman), since it does not only depict this symmetrical creation “in a factual/objective way but also structurally illustrates it with the help of the morphological form of the dual, so that it can be seen as a divine hypostasis.”8 The whole sura encompasses a range of pair phenomena but also their antitheses. The people referenced in this sura are the pair of two human beings/ jinn that are directly addressed a total of five times. They stand for the juxtaposition of the real and the mystic world. Neuwirth argues the following on the topic of symmetry: But now, the game of the phenomenon of pairing goes far beyond this combination ins/ ǧinn and rather constitutes the specific character of the entire Sura. A multitude of phenomena come together in pairs in this Sura [. . .]: first the heavenly bodies šams/qamar in v. 5, then the two specimen of the vegetation persisting in adoration naǧm/šaǧar (V.6) [. . .] The following group of six verses is completely made up of an antithesis heaven/earth with three verses each, while it is remarkable that [. . .] the pair 14/15 with its generic pair of human being/ ǧinn does not appear unexpected/abrupt in any way, but is already prepared due to a few other geminated phenomena of creation. The Sura continues in the same style/ductus.9 The sura thus becomes a prime example for the fact that God created his creation based on the principle of equality and justice, and that he did so in his role as the All-merciful, just the way the sura does is at the beginning: “(Allah) Most Gracious! It is He Who taught the Qur’an. He has created man: He has taught him speech (and intelligence).” This principle of justice is also reflected in the creation of living creatures as the Qur’an makes it clear in several instances that this creation happens in pairs (Arab. Sg. zawj/Pl. azwaj). In sura 51:49, among others, it says: “And of everything We have created pairs; That ye may receive instruction.” Conceptually speaking, the term zawj is neither masculine nor feminine but should be seen as gender-neutral in the sense of “partner” or “second component of the pair.” This pair is made up of two coexisting forms of an individual reality that have absolute equivalence and only differ from each other in a few characteristics and functions. Creation in pairs therefore means that every counterpart of a created pair is a part of God’s plan. Consequently, the male cannot exist without the female and the female cannot exist without the male.10 They require each other. No hierarchy is mentioned in their creation. Quite the contrary: from the early Meccan suras on, the Qur’an strongly emphasizes the duality of creation and thereby also the equality of both genders. This is also continued in later verses when the creation of both

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 109 sexes from one entity (Arab. nafs) is mentioned. Yet neither male nor female is granted explicit characteristics. The only exception is the role of childbearing that is biologically attributed to the female. However, the Qur’an does not elaborate on further issues, such as parenting, as a specific characteristic of the female. This leads us to the conclusion that femininity and masculinity are not inherent characteristics of creation but that they are rather constructed by socio-cultural circumstances.11 It turns out that the motif of creation in pairs, or both sexes, is implemented in different ways in the Qur’an while emphasizing their duality at all times. It seems to either be a sole naming of the creation in pairs, or both sexes, or it is extended by tracing back both sexes to one origin, the human semen. During the late Meccan period, this is attributed to the substance of the human being, clay. The complementary function of both parts of the pair, or both sexes, becomes clear with the mere naming of the motif in these verses. However, this tracing back to a common origin additionally emphasizes the essential equality of both sexes. This is further deepened by the motif of creating both sexes from one nafs. Due to the fact that the emphasis of the essential equality of male and female is always found in the text in relation to God’s power of creation, this essential equality receives additional support since it can be interpreted as a part of the divine plan of creation, i.e., it is intended/wanted by God.

The development of both pictures in the early Meccan period The earliest verse that discusses the creation of both components of the pair takes place in sura 92 (Al-Layl). This sura consists of twenty-one verses in total and can be split into three blocks according to Neuwirth: verses 1–4 form a number of oaths and each one of them forms a contrasting pair, verses 5–13 contain a double picture, and in verses 14–21 the eschatological dimension is portrayed.12 Here, the relevant passage is the following: 1 2 3 4

By the night when it draws a veil! And the day when it shines! And the creating of the male and the female– Your striving is surely (for) diverse (ends).

After the oath by night and day, the view turns to worldly phenomena: to the contrasting pair of the sexes, the male and the female. Even if the reference does not explicitly follow, that it is about a sign of creation, the structure and context of the passage clarifies that it is about such a creation. The verse is interesting in many ways. Primarily, it is the first verse that stresses the female by emphasizing equality compared to the male without mentioning any form of hierarchy. In this context, embedding this image into the first passage of the sura is also important, since it forms part of an analogy that additionally emphasizes the equivalence of the two components of the pair. In this analogy, night and day are related to the

110  Dina El Omari masculine and the feminine, and the similarity is that each pair consists of two uniform counterparts, which are absolutely equivalent in their essence. Therefore, they do not differ in their essence, but the Qur’an introduces in verses one and two an additional attribute that is unique to each one: the night is shrouded, and the day is shining. By looking at the difference between the two parts of the pair, the Qur’an builds a bridge between verses 3 and 4 of the sura, for even the male and the female, alike in their essence, differ in one fundamental point: in their actions. Thus, the core statement of the sura finds its base and foundation here, that all men and women are equal in their essence, but they differ in their actions. The Qur’an emphasizes clearly that there is no hierarchy between the sexes, as there is no hierarchy between night and day; on the contrary, the position of each person depends on his or her deeds. The sura forms a clear ring structure in this respect, which is shaped in such a way that “the two contrasting pairs used in the oath day/night and male/ female [. . .] form the structural matrix for the perception of further opposites.”13 This is followed by a double image, “which the different groups of human being present in their worldly activity, then with their [. . .] retribution,”14 whereby the godly ones are opposed to the arrogant ones. The former strive toward the promise of salvation, the latter strive for the earthly good. Human beings here include women as well as men. In the third part of the sura, another double image follows that also presents opposites. The hellfire for the denier is placed in contrast to God ‘s retribution for the God-fearer. The ring closes by finally pointing out that in this sura, it is the action of the human being and his/her striving that ultimately brings him salvation in the hereafter: “only in the striving for the face of your Lord, the Most High.”15 Another interesting point corresponding to the motif of the creation of male and female is the relation of the verse to the first creation report of the Bible. Here, some parallels become apparent. In the Bible, it says: “So God created man (Hebr. ha’adam) in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.”16 Here, man (Adam) is understood collectively in the sense of the human creation, without any gendered differentiation, meaning at the beginning of the creation stands undifferentiated humankind that comprises both sexes. The differentiation between the sexes occurs only in the second part of the twentyseventh and twenty-eighth verses in which both sexes are mentioned. A hierarchy between the sexes does not appear, but the pair and their joint tasks are emphasized, “Be fertile and increase.”17 If we return to the Qur’anic verse, it becomes apparent that the mention of the sexes is also embedded in the topic of creation, namely to portray the basis of the double picture that follows it. The Qur’an therefore embeds the present picture in new structures and accentuates the equality in the essence of the sexes, emphasizing the difference between the sexes on in their striving. The aspect of reproduction does not fall within the Qur’anic implementation of the motif. However, it is interesting that Muslim exegetes incorporated this last aspect in their exegesis of the verse. Al-Qurtubi for example, points out that all of humankind can be traced back to the original pair, which serves as a multiplier and is responsible for the whole

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 111 of creation.18 With that he identifies, like Zamakhshari and Razi before him, that in both Qur’anic verses humankind is not specified by sexes until the first human pair, thus establishing a connection with the representation in the Bible verse on the topic.19 The identification of the biological pair as well as the hint toward the reproductive function and their responsibility to creation suggests that the exegetes knew the biblical context. The Qur’anic verse does not contain any direct reference, nor does it name the biological pair. At the same time, the exegetes’ reference to the biblical context suggests that this motif is taken up consciously in the Qur’an and in reliance on the same motif in Genesis I, with both emphasizing the uniformity of both sexes and the subsequent measuring of the difference of people in their endeavors and actions. In sura 75 verse 39 (al-Qiyama), the Qur’an again mentions both sexes, but develops it further through two basic elements and emphasizes the essential equality of both sexes. The sura is composed of forty verses in total and can be divided into three blocks: verses 1–6 contain a pair of oaths and statements that are connected with a rebuke to humans, verses 7–25 portray a scene of an eschatological nature and process as well as a recitation instruction and a double image. The sura ends with verses 36–40 which focus on the power of creation.20 The verse that is relevant for us here is embedded in this final context: 36 37 38 39 40

Does man think that he is to be left alone without purpose? Was he not a drop of fluid, emitted forth? Then he became a clot, then God gave him shape and perfected him. Then He made of him a pair; the male and female. Has not such a one the power to raise the dead to life?

This passage represents the movement from the creation of humankind to their reawakening to focus on the omnipotence of God. It is striking that the motif of the creation of both sexes is used as a sign of creation as well. However, this happens in the form of rhetorical questions and is extended with more motifs. In this way, the origin of the creation is associated with a drop of human semen from which God formed both parts of the pair, man and woman. This is the first time that male and female are complementary to one another and have a common origin. This means that both sexes are juxtaposed without hierarchy. Here, two essential references to late antiquity are significant: the connection to the creation story as already mentioned, and the embryology of the physician Galen (129–199), who in his work “De Semine” which “as synthesis and reference work of antique medicine had validity until the modern era,”21 described the creation of humans as well as the following development in four steps: But let us take the account back again to the first conformation of the animal, and in order to make our account orderly and clear, let us divide the creation of the foetus overall into four periods of time. The first is that in which, as is seen both in abortions and in dissection, the form of the semen prevails. At this time, Hippocrates too, the all-marvelous, does not yet call

112  Dina El Omari the conformation of the animal a foetus; as we heard just now in the case of semen voided in the sixth day, he still calls it semen. But when it has been filled with blood, and heart, brain and liver are still unarticulated and unshaped yet have by now a certain solidarity and considerable size, this is the second period; the substance of the foetus has the form of flesh and no longer the form of semen. Accordingly, you would find that Hippocrates, too no longer calls such a form semen but, as was said, foetus. The third period follows on this, when, as was said, it is possible to see the three ruling parts clearly and a kind of outline, a silhouette, as it were, of all the other parts. You will see the conformation of the three ruling parts more clearly, that of the parts of the stomach more dimly, and much more still, that of the limbs. Later on, they form “twigs,” as Hippocrates expressed it, indicating by the term their similarity to branches. The fourth and final period is at the stage when all the parts in the limbs have been differentiated; and at this part Hippocrates the marvellous no longer calls the foetus an embryo only, but already a child, too, when he says that it jerks and moves as an animal now fully formed.22 The process described here can be divided into the following four steps: 1) The semen, which functions in this statement as the starting point of the human creation, 2) A body of blood, which emerges through the filling of the semen with blood, 3) A silhouette occurs, bones and flesh are developing, and 4) The extremities and organs of the body are shaped.23 Galen’s work reached the Mediterranean area and the Middle East because it was translated by Sergios Resh Aina (d. 532) into Syriac and later into Arabic by the scholar and translator Ḥunayn ibn Ishaq (d. 873),24 so it could have been known to the prophet and his contemporaries. What might have played an equally important role for the transmission of Greek knowledge into this living environment is the “medical school in the southern Mesopotamian city Gundeshapur, founded by the Iranian ruler Anurshirvan in the year 555 ad.”25 This school used to be an important “center for the reception and further development of Greek medicine.”26 Thus, it is certainly possible that the Qur’an picks up this specific knowledge from the context of the audience/ listeners because the Qur’an uses this knowledge as a reminder of God’s creativity without there being the need to explain this reminder. It does not seem to be an unknown image to the audience that creation evolves from a “sperm-drop” that God forms into a human being, as this is the first reference of that kind in the Qur’an, though it is not followed up by any further explanation. This second fact is what makes it possible to argue that the audience of the Qur’an was familiar with such knowledge. In relation to this early Meccan description, there is a possible allusion to Galen’s embryology, however, it is extended by one description: the creation of the male and female sex from this common origin. This image is modified in the late Meccan period by saying that both sexes are created from one entity (Arab. nafs) or from within themselves (Arab. min anfusikum). Here we have a clear reference to the late antique context that already becomes apparent to some extent in sura 75. It deals with the idea that both sexes go back to a common origin and

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 113 are split to be formed into dual sexes. This creation of both sexes by dividing the previously created whole is already mentioned in verse 39: “And of him He made two sexes, male and female.” In the late antique context, this idea had already established itself in the Jewish midrash literature, but can also be traced back to Plato, who embeds the creation of both sexes into a fictional and literary dialogue. The framework of this dialogue is a symposium where six people participate in and give speeches on their understanding of Eros and the erotic. The fourth speaker is Aristophanes, who describes human creation in its origins as spherical humans that can only find their perfection/completion by reuniting as a pair: In the first place, let me treat of the nature of man and what has happened to it; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. The sexes were not two as they are now, but originally three in number; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the word “Androgynous” is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond [. . .] Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts [. . .] At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: “Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and improve their manners; men shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg.” He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might contemplate the section of himself: he would thus learn a lesson of humility. Apollo was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. [. . .] After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another, entwined in mutual embraces, longing to grow into one, they were on the point of dying from hunger and self-neglect, because they did not like to do anything apart; and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them, being the sections of entire men or women, and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan: he turned the parts of generation round to

114  Dina El Omari the front, for this had not been always their position and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. Each of us when separated, having one side only, like a flat fish, is but the indenture of a man, and he is always looking for his other half.27 This notion of an initially androgynous being from which the sexes originated is taken up in Jewish midrash literature through Greek literature, namely regarding the creation of the first human being, Adam.28 In Bereschit Rabb 8,1 it says: R’ Yirmiyah ben Elazar [said]: in the hour when the Holy One created the first human, He created him [as] an andogyne/androginos, as it is said, “male and female He created them.” Said R’Shmuel bar Nachmani: In the hour when the Holy One created the first human, He created [for] him a double face [. . .], and sawed him and made him backs.29 The reception of this notion is very prevalent, even among Syrian Orthodox Christians.30 Yet different interpretations develop in late antiquity, one of which can already be heard in Plato’s symposium. A completion is consummated in the act of mutual affection but also through coitus.31 The Qur’anic verse does not pick up on these nuances but only alludes to the notion described in both texts by talking about the creation of the pair from a common origin, here the semen. However, it does not stay that way by any means as later verses that talk about the creation of humankind from “within itself” or “from one entity”32 show a strong resemblance to the late antique notion described earlier. It should be noted at this point that there are examples in exegetical texts that also indicate that there is reference to the late antique notions in the Qur’an. For example, the existence of a hermaphrodite/hybrid is addressed in al-Qurtubi.33 This reference in those verses might not be very obvious, however, against the backdrop of this late antique notion, its thematization within exegesis seems very plausible. Let us go back to the verses 37–39 from sura 75 and the significance of the aforementioned arguments for a possible interpretation of this passage. Due to the fact that the creation motif of the male and the female as depicted in sura 92 verse three is extended by additional elements – the return to a common origin, the human semen, and the explicit emphasis that both sexes make up a pair – the nonhierarchal creation of both sexes as well as their complementary functions are emphasized even more. This impression is reinforced by the late antique references, echoed in the Qur’an, which also emphasize a nonhierarchal creation.

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 115 Unlike the passages quoted, the topic of equal creation of both sexes is not the main objective of the statement. It rather serves as empirical evidence of God’s creative power, hence the reference to Galen’s embryology. This function also becomes evident due to the ring structure of the sura since it is initiated with the rhetorical question of whether God could have a human being resurrected. It is followed by eschatological sceneries and a death scene that eventually close the ring in the quoted passage. The creation of both sexes from one drop of semen is cited here as evidence of God’s creativity and everything is concluded once again with the rhetorical question of whether God, who is capable of creating human beings in this specific manner, is not also capable of resurrecting them. Consequently, the nonhierarchal creation of both sexes serves as empirical evidence of the omnipotence of God. The emphasis on the essential equality is continued in the following verses in the Qur’an, thereby steadily connecting them to God’s power of creation implemented in the form of a sign of creation. As a result, essential equality becomes an additional underpinning, because it is part of the divine plan of creation, desired by God in this way. This also becomes evident in sura 78, which contains a relevant third verse and can also be divided into three blocks. Verses 1–23 include oaths and statements as well as a double image and a sign of creation, verses 24–46 represent historical doctrines based on legends depicting mercy and penalties, and verses 47–60 relate to signs of revelation and assertions to the Prophet.34 The verses relevant for us are 8 and 9 and are embedded in the following passage:   6   7  8  9 10 11

Did We not make the earth a spreading, The mountains tent-pins? We created you in pairs, And made sleep for you to rest, The night a covering, And the day for seeking livelihood.

In terms of the chronology of revelation, sura 78 is very close to the earlier sura 75 and therefore also falls in the early Meccan period. The eighth verse, unlike the verse before, only picks up one motif that had been mentioned for the first time in sura 75 verse 39 and discussed earlier. It is the motif of the pair, which is woven into several signs of creation that all emphasize the omnipotence of God. In those signs of creation, the duality and symmetry of creation are strongly hinted at and therefore the ethical principle of justice and equality is underlined yet again. This is clearly reflected in the composition of the earlier-quoted passage. Firstly, the even surface of the earth, with mountains resembling tent pegs emerging from it, forming a vertical line, are described. This is the first pair mentioned in the signs of creation. It is followed by the naming of the first human pair that, again, is woven into other pairs: sleep and rest, night and covering, day and livelihood. It is notable that, just as in sura 92 verse 3, the motif of the human pair is associated with day and night. However, at this point, the Qur’an does not stress characteristics in the form of an analogy but describes their meaning for humankind in the

116  Dina El Omari three last-mentioned pairs. The description of the night as a cover seems to be an allusion to the sexual union of the pair that wraps itself like a cover.35 Embedding the creation of humankind in pairs into a series of signs of creation that also form pairs, supports the statement of a nonhierarchical creation of the sexes. At the same time, the complementary function of the human pair is emphasized in analogy to the complementarity of the other pairs. In terms of both the allusion to the togetherness of the pair as well as to their sexual union, a similar understanding regarding the creational context can be found in the late antique context. An example for that would be Genesis 5,1–2 and its interpretation in the rabbinic midrash literature. This extract from Genesis bears significant resemblance to Genesis 1: “This is the list of the descendants of Adam. When God created humankind, he made them in the likeness of God. Male and female he created them, and he blessed them and named them ‘Humankind’ when they were created.”36 The rabbinical midrash, on the other hand, interpreted this in a way that a man and a woman only represent the human species halfway, thus they form one entity together, a pair. As a result, the rabbinical scholars concluded that the creation “human” can only be complete if it is put together in pairs. R. El’azar says: “Any man who does not have a wife is not a man, as it is stated: ‘Male and female He created them . . . and called their name Adam.’ ”37 On a mundane level, this means that “the man who has no wife will live without joy, without blessing and without the good,”38 as R. Tanchum and R. Chanina have taught, and therefore the union between man and woman through marriage takes the duality of both sexes back to their initial unity, their primal state according to creation.39 The later Rabbi Saadia Gaon concludes that the human species is basically the same, as the creation in its totality can only be represented by man and woman together. God expresses this equality for all people in the creation of the first human pair.40 With regard to this key aspect, the interpretation of the Qur’anic verse by Ibn Kathir appears to be very interesting since he draws a direct connection to the emotional and biological function of the pair. This means that again, the focus is put on the marital relationship and the significance of the human pair for each other/ each one of them.41 The Qur’anic verse itself, however, gives away much more since it picks up the context of creation and emphasizes the equality of both sexes by using the motif of the pair directly. Thus, the Qur’an does not leave it at a possible interpretation only. This impression is additionally reinforced by the fact that the motif is embedded in a series of signs of creation that also emphasize the duality of creation. Therefore, in terms of distinctness, the Qur’an goes a step further than the extract from Genesis. In that light, it can be conclusively noted that the integration of the motif of the pair and the reference to the late antique notion both emphasize the creation of both sexes as equal parts of a pair and as being a larger part of the divine will of creation. The embeddedness of the motif into empirical evidence of God’s omnipotence can also be understood as a reinforcement of the message since the nonhierarchal creation of the sexes in pairs is intended just as clearly in this context as sleep is intended for rest (verse 9), the night is supposed to be like a cover, and the day is intended for making a living (verse 11).

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 117 In sura 51 verse 49, the Qur’an once again takes up the motif of the pair, but the tone becomes much more pressing, emphasizing the empirical evidence of God’s creative power. sura 51 has sixty verses and can be divided into three blocks: verses 1–23 contain oaths and testimonies, as well as a double image and signs of Creation. Verses 24–46 reproduce teachings from history on the basis of legends of grace and punishment. Verses 47–60 deal with signs for the revelation and promises to the Prophet.42 The relevant verse is in the last part of the sura: 47 We built the heavens by Our authority; and We are the Lord of power and expanse. 48 We spread the earth a carpet; what comfort We provide! 49 And We created pairs of everything that you may contemplate. The date range for sura 51 falls under the end of the early Meccan period and in verse 49, just as the previously discussed verse from sura 78, it picks up the motif of the pair within a few signs of creation. However, the motif is related not only to human creation but also explicitly to all creation. This description, on the other hand is embedded in the juxtaposition of the pair of heaven and earth. Here again, the duality and symmetry of creation are clearly pointed out, and through that the ethical principle of justice and equality is emphasized. The relation to the late antique context (Genesis and midrash literature) is also reflected in this passage, and it also becomes an element of exegesis that mentions the aspect that both sexes are equal components of a pair that can only represent the totality of creation together. Ar-Razi points out that both partners are made to match/are appropriate for each other. They resemble each other in their own way; they are opposites but still absolutely equal.43 Al-Tabari states: “if every species existed without its counterpart, like the fire whose quality is heating up but is not suited for cooling down, and ice, whose quality is cooling down but is not suited for heating up, both will not be complete.”44 With regards to the previously mentioned verses as signs of creation, this can still mean that the equality of men and women is part of the divine will of creation, and in this passage, they are supposed to clarify this will of creation and God’s omnipotence. Stylistically, this statement is underpinned by the admonishing nature of the sura or the quoted passage in particular. First of all, the message of the verse, unlike the previous verse in sura 78, is not only dedicated to the addressees (“And have We not created you in pairs”) but to all creation. However, it is not only this absolute statement that gives this passage its special emphasis. It is also the use of imperatives that underlines the admonishing nature of the quoted passage about signs of creation, because those emphasize the motif of the creation in pairs by directly confronting the addressees: “the creation of heaven and earth as well as the symmetry in creation are an expression of God’s omnipotence, signs that call for contemplation.”45 Moreover, the ring structure of the sura, similar to what we have already seen in sura 75, reinforces the intention of admonishing the addressees. The sura starts with a number of oaths on natural phenomena and the announcement of

118  Dina El Omari Judgement Day. This is followed by a double image of the doomed people in hellfire and the pious people in paradise with a subsequent list of punishments of the former. These dimensions are drawn together by mention of further empirical evidence of the creative power of God as well as encouragements for the Prophet and a final warning of Judgment Day. The vehemence that this Qur’anic sura contains culminates in the quoted Qur’anic passage and its signs of creation, i.e., the nonhierarchal creation in pairs functions as empirical evidence of God’s creativity and can therefore be interpreted as a part of the divine plan. The repeated embedment of the motif into the creational topic shows a connection to Genesis 5:1. At the same time, the motif of the pair is emphasized even more by the admonishing character of the Qur’an so that through this motif, the Qur’an stresses that interpretation of the midrash literature even more: men and women are created equal and are mutually dependent on each other because creation would not be complete otherwise. The last early Meccan verse, which takes up the motif of a pair as well as the two sexes, is found in sura 53. This sura consists of 62 verses and can be structurally divided into four blocks: verses 1–32 deal with the inspirational character of the message that was given to the Prophet, as well as with the discourse about the three Meccan goddesses al-Lat, al-’Uzza, and Manat. Verses 33–56 contain revelatory polemics and several signs of creation and history, and verses 57–62 round the sura out with yet another eschatological theme.46 The relevant passage for us here is as follows: 43 44 45 46

That it is He who makes you happy and morose, And He who ordains death and life; That He created pairs, male and female, From a drop of semen when emitted;

In its content, verse 45 shows strong resemblance to verse 39 from sura 75. In contrast to sura 75, the act of creating both sexes is not the only empirical evidence of God’s creative power, but is placed in a line of other signs of creation. Therefore, the context of the sura is a different one since as the duality and the symmetry of creation are supported by other opposite pairs, giving the principle of equality more emphasis. In the quoted Qur’anic passage, this duality is reflected in the juxtaposition of laughing and crying and life and death that the creation of the pair, as well as the creation of both sexes, later build on. On the content level, it is striking that verse 46 (“from a drop of semen when emitted”) was deliberately used as an addition to verse 45 (“that he created pairs, male and female”), because if one looks at the description of the previous signs of creation, it is simply described as every sign of creation that God creates them without answering how. In order to create consistency/ uniformity on both a structural and content level among all signs of creation, this passage could have easily ended with verse 45. The fact that it does not end in that way can be interpreted to mean that the description of the creation of the pair as well as both sexes from one drop of semen is supposed to emphasize

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 119 the absence of hierarchy between them as well the undifferentiated creation of both sexes from the same origin. Quoting this as a sign of creation shows once more the particularly important role the nonhierarchal creation of both sexes plays in the Qur’an. It is cited as evidence of God’s creativity in the Qur’an and therefore reflects his divine will for a nonhierarchal creation of both sexes that are essentially the same. The impression that this passage highlights the motif of the pair as well as the creation of both sexes from one origin in a very empathic way is further reinforced by the dramaturgical structure of the sura. The structure is presented such that the entire sura, which starts with a slow development (confirmation of the revelation – polemic against polytheism – another confirmation of the revelation) culminates in the signs of creation as well as in historical signs and only falls back in the last verse of the sura, which is also a prompt to prostrate: “but fall ye down in prostration to Allah, and adore (Him)!” Moreover, this Qur’anic passage clearly shows once more how the late antique notion is picked up and orchestrated anew in order to emphasize the duality of creation. Here, we can find more potential connection to Genesis 1, the reference to the Jewish commentary on Genesis 5:1, as well as Galen’s embryology, which is abridged in this verse. The reason for that might be that a certain background knowledge is presupposed by the audience addressed in this verse or that it happened for the sake of stylistic reasons to keep verse 46 just as short as the previously mentioned signs of creation, all of which take up one verse each. Al-Tabaris interpretation of this verse also shows how this mindset had some influence on the field of exegesis as he emphasizes that God created both sexes and made them into complimentary parts of a pair so that the male sex is the partner of the female sex and vice versa. Consequently, according to Al-Tabari, every single one of them is the partner of the other. Therefore, an interpretation of the Qur’anic passage is reinforced in a way that the duality of creation is emphasized to be an equal creation that is mutually dependent.47 All verses mentioned are united by the fact that the essential equality of both sexes is clearly emphasized. This is done by establishing connections to the late antique context, the creation story in the Bible, embryology, as well as explicit mention of the creation of the sexes or the pair (partially with addition of the semen as the origin as a sign of creation). Those signs of creation emphasize the creation of the sexes as equal parts of the creation, and as part of a divine creation plan. This can also be clearly traced in later Qur’anic passages. Humankind therefore finds its origin in one creation without any inherent hierarchy, which can be traced back to one origin.

Notes 1 Welch/Paret/Pearson, Al-Ḳurʾan. 2 Ibid. 3 Abrahamov 2016. 4 Neuwirth 2011.

120  Dina El Omari 5 Transl. by Yusuf Ali. All of the following quotes from the Qur’an, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the same translation. 6 Abrahamov in EQ, vol. 5, 7bf. (Art. Signs). 7 Neuwirth 2011, 435. 8 Ibid., 608. 9 Neuwirth 1985, 173–174. The author of the chapter translated quotes from German into English. 10 Wadud 1999, 21. 11 Ibid. 12 Neuwirth 2011, 228. 13 Ibid., 233. 14 Ibid. 15 Qur’an 92:20. 16 Genesis 1:27. 17 Genesis 1:28. 18 www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=5&tSoraNo=92&tAyahNo=3 &tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1, accessed March 27, 2017. 19 www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=2&tSoraNo=92&tAyahNo=3 &tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1 and www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tM adhNo=0&tTafsirNo=4&tSoraNo=92&tAyahNo=3&tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&L anguageId=1, accessed March 27, 2017. 20 Neuwirth 2011, 418f. 21 www.corpuscoranicum.de/kontexte/index/sure/23/vers/13, accessed August 26, 2016. 22 Galen de Semine I, 8 – Kleinasien und Rom – 2. Jh. n.Chr. (Griechisch) – Mekka II – TUK_0986. (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum 1992) Galeni de Semine, edidit, in linguam Anglicam vertit, commentatus est Ph. De Lacy, CMG V 3, 1, (Berlin), 92–94; (http://galen. bbaw.de/epubl/online/cmg_05_03_01.html?p=92 = 206). 23 Ibid., 2, 94. 24 www.corpuscoranicum.de/kontexte/index/sure/23/vers/13, accessed August 26, 2016. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/symposium.html, accessed January 1, 2018. 28 Boyarin 1993, 43. 29 Midrash Rabbah. www.sefaria.org/Bereishit_Rabbah.8?lang=bi, accessed February 23, 2018. 30 Boyarin 1993, 40. 31 Ibid., 44f. 32 First time in the Qur’an 16:72: Allah has made for you mates (and companions) of your own nature. 33 See www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=5&tSoraNo=75&tAyahNo =39&tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1, accessed September 15, 2017. 34 Neuwirth 2011, 455. 35 Ibid., 459. 36 www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+5&version=NRSV, accessed September 15, 2017. 37 Talmud Bavli Yevamot 63a (translation from the William Davidson Edition). www.sefaria. org/Yevamot.63a.3?lang=bi&with=About&lang2=en, accessed September 15, 2017. 38 Talmud Bavli Yevamot 62. 39 Genesis 2,24. 40 Saadja 1984, 327. 41 www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=7&tSoraNo=78&tAyahNo=8 &tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1, accessed September 15, 2017.

The pair in the Qur’an as sign of divine creation 121 42 Neuwirth 2011, 525ff. 43 www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=4&tSoraNo=51&tAyahNo=49 &tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1, accessed September 15, 2017. 44 www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=1&tSoraNo=51&tAyahNo=49 &tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1, accessed September 15, 2017. 45 Neuwirth 2011, 539. 46 Ibid., 645ff. 47 www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=1&tSoraNo=53&tAyahNo=45 &tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1, accessed September 15, 2017.

Bibliography Abrahamov, Binyamin (2016) “Signs,” in Encyclopedia of the Qurʾan, vol. 5, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Leiden: Brill). al-Qurtubi, Abu ʿAbdallah (1969) (d. 671/1272) Jamiʿ li-ahkam al-Qurʾan, 20 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-kitab al-ʿarabi li-t-Tibaʿa wa-n-Nasr). al-Razi, Abu ʿAbdallah M. b. ʿUmar b. al-Husayn Fakhraddin (2003) (d. 606/1209) Mafaṭiḥ al-Rayb 32 parts in 16 vols. (Cairo: Al-Maktaba Al-Tawfiqiyya). al-Ṭabari, Abu Jafar (1968) (d. 310/923) Jamiʿ al-bayan fi taʾwil al-Qurʾan. 30 parts in 12 vols. (Cairo: Maktaba wa- Maṭbaʿat Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi). al-Zamakhshari, Abu l-Qasim b. ʿUmar (2010) (d. 538/1144) Al-Kashaf ʿan haqaʾiq attanzil wa-ʿuyun al-aqawil fi wujuh at-taʾwil, vol. 4, ed. Yusuf al-Ḥammadi (Cairo: Publisher). Boyarin, Daniel (1993) Carnal Israel: Reading sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press). Corpus Medicorum Graecorum: Galeni de Semine, edidit, in linguam Anglicam vertit, commentatus est (1992) Ph. De Lacy, CMG V 3, 1 (Berlin: Akedemie Velag), 92–94, http://galen.bbaw.de/epubl/online/cmg_05_03_01.html?p=92 = 206 Galen de Semine I, 8 – Kleinasien und Rom – 2. Jh. n.Chr. (Griechisch) – Mekka II – TUK_0986. Ibn Kathir, ʿImadaddin Ismaʿil b. ʿUmar (2008) (d. 774/1373): Tafsir Ibn Kathir, 8 vols., ed. Muhammad Bayyumi (Cairo: Dar Tayba). Midrash Rabbah, www.sefaria.org/Bereishit_Rabbah.8?lang=bi Neuwirth, Angelika (1985) “Symmetrie und Paarbildung in der koranischen Eschatologie. Philologisch-Stilistisches zu Surat ar-Rahman,” in Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph. Melanges in memoriam Michel Allard, S.J. (1924–76), Paul Nwyia, S.J. (1925– 80), ed. Louis Pouzet (Beirut: University of Saint Joseph), 447–480. Neuwirth, Angelika (2011) Der Koran: Band 1: Frühmekkanische Suren (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen). Saadja, Gaon (1984) Perusche Rav Saadja Gaon le-Bereshit, ed. M. Zucker (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary). Talmud Bavli Yevamot 63a (translation from the William Davidson Edition), www.sefaria. org/Yevamot.63a.3?lang=bi&with=About&lang2=en. Wadud, Amina (1999) Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press). Welch, A. T., R. Paret, and J. D. Pearson. “Al-Qurʾan,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs, http:// dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0543.

122  Dina El Omari Websites www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=5&tSoraNo=92&tAyahNo=3&tDi splay=yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1. www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+5&version=NRSV. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/symposium.html, accessed January 01, 2018. www.corpuscoranicum.de/kontexte/index/sure/23/vers/13.

7 With ʿA’isha in mind Reading Surat al-Nur through the Qur’an’s structural unity Zainab Alwani

Introduction A consistent feature of Qur’anic interpretation throughout Islamic history has been the multiplicity of interpretations. Scholarly consensus, however, suggests that interpreting the Qur’an intratextually (tafsir al-Qur’an bi-l-Qur’an) is the most accepted method of interpretation. Qur’anic scholars have expressed this notion with the maxim, “al-Qur’an yufassiru baʿḍahu baʿḍan” (different parts of the Qur’an explain each other).1 Building upon this method, this chapter explores the Qur’anic methodology of Al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an2 (the Qur’an’s structural unity) and its impact in the arena of religious sciences and beyond.3 A term coined by Taha Jabir al-Alwani,4 al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an conceptualizes the Qur’an as a perfect structure in all its suras, verses, words, letters and parts;5 it is one unit (Q. 11:1), similar to how the sky and the stars, as described in Surat Al-Mulk, are “in full harmony with one another” (Q. 67:3). I argue that the methodology of reading the sura/chapter as a structural unit is significant to Islamic studies in general and Qur’anic studies in particular.6 It is my hope that a broader and more consistent application of this method to the Qur’an will allow Islamic scholars to approach social, cultural, and legal rulings more holistically by connecting them to the Qur’an’s spiritual and ethical framework. Using an incident involving ʿA’isha bint Abu Bakr (d. 678/57) as an example, this chapter draws attention to an important and underresearched area in hadith scholarship identified with a revisionary body of literature that takes for its scope the verification and validation of a prophetic tradition.7 I argue that this method allows scholars to identify organic interconnections between the Qur’an on one hand and the Prophetic sunna, hadith, and sira on the other. As a case example, this chapter analyzes sura 24 of the Qur’an, sura al-Nur, to illustrate the way my proposed methodology envisions a holistic relationship between the Qur’an, the sunna, hadith, and the sira. Some of the earliest companions of the Prophet assumed a role that went beyond the mere transmission of a legacy to its critical authentication. ʿA’ishaʿ’s “al-Ijaba fima istadrakat ʿA’isha ʿala al-Sahaba” (The Answer to what ʿA’isha Revised on the Companions)8 belongs to this category and occupies a place of pride within it. In her didactic and often witty rebuttals to the companions’ narrations of

124  Zainab Alwani hadith, ʿA’isha deliberately advanced a consistent and coherent rationale for dealing with contested issues in the community. Through teaching by example, she also imparted an ethic for disagreement and disputation that drew on the source and model (the Prophet) that inspired and infused her own practice. By going beyond the conventional hagiographies of ummahat al mu’mineen, the mothers of the believers,9 exemplified in ʿA’isha’s knowledge, this chapter points to new and creative possibilities for the classic disciplines for reclaiming a tradition and building on it. In this chapter, I  introduce the significance of ʿA’isha for tafsir, as she is at times the link between the Qur’an and the sunna.10 I argue that ʿA’isha’s methodological contribution is a potential model for how to read hadith, the sira, and even the occasions of revelation (“Munasabat al Nuzul”) in the light of the Qur’anic message and objectives. In order to exemplify the relationship between the Qur’an and the sunna of the Prophet, I  examine ʿA’isha’s methodological contribution as a potential model for how to link the Qur’an and the sunna. This chapter will examine the incident of the ifk (slander against ʿA’isha) through the lens of sura al-nur and ʿA’isha’s narration of events. This cross-examination of sources teaches us about the critical reading of the Qur’an based on the reality and the experience of the first Muslim community in relation to a very sensitive and crucial event: the incident of the ifk. Al-Bukhari narrated the events in great detail from none other than ʿA’isha herself. The hadith is insightful and allows us, through ʿA’isha’s first-person narration, to live this experience as she witnessed it. Yet, how does the Qur’an examine the incident of the ifk against the Mother of the Believers, ʿA’isha, and the Prophet’s household?

The mothers of believers: engagement with the foundational sources Defining the relationship between the Qur’an and sunna is significant in its impact on Islamic scholarship and practice.11 Muslims regard the Qur’an as the ultimate reference for human affairs and believe it to be safeguarded by God from distortion. The Qur’an regards the Prophet as a role model for humanity (e.g., Qur’an 33:21); his mission was to explain, clarify, and demonstrate how to implement the teachings of the Qur’an (e.g., Qur’an 2:151, 3: 164, 62:2). The question of how to approach the sunna had not yet arisen during the time of the Prophet, as he instructed the believers to follow him as he adhered to the Qur’an. Translating its teachings through his actions, the Prophet showed them how to apply the Qur’an as their guide in life. Once, when asked about the Prophet’s character, ʿA’isha replied, “Do you not read the Qur’an? His character was embodied in the Qur’an.”12 If asked about his way of worship, parenting, marital affairs, transactions, etc., she would have responded the same: “His __________ was embodied in the Qur’an.”13 Since the inception of Islam, diversity and plurality have been the main characteristics of Islamic culture and society. This relationship, which has been described in disparate ways and from a variety of perspectives based on changing

With ʿA’isha in mind 125 historical circumstances, has given rise to varied forms of knowledge and expertise. From the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, the sunna has a range of different hermeneutic functions vis-à-vis the Qur’an. For instance, jurists regularly discuss and deliberate how a particular hadith, relates to the text of the Qur’an. First, each hadith is evaluated for authenticity on a sliding scale based on the content and the reliability of the chain of narrators. Then, if the content of a reported hadith has no apparent relation to the Qur’an, jurists may accept it as a part of the body of religious law on the condition that it does not directly contradict a more firmly established principle.14 Furthermore, the reported action could be general and apply broadly, or it could be a matter that specifically pertained only to the Prophet. Jurists also deliberate whether the action represents simply a custom particular to the time and geographic location, in which case it is not necessarily religiously binding on Muslims at large, or whether a given tradition represents a more fundamental principle that should be religiously binding. This is merely a simplistic rendering of a complex body of legal theory on the relation between Qur’an and sunna. A vast array of individual hadith reports comprise the corpus of sunna, and this corpus differs across sects, schools of thought, and geographic location.15 Across all trends of thought, the underlying esteem for the Prophet is fundamental. The Prophet was a teacher, a moral guide, and a committed family member; all of these roles were in the reception and subsequent perception of his prophecy and traditions.16 In particular, the role of the women in his household is highly significant. These women had access to intimate knowledge about the Prophet, including information about many of the situations that he faced in his public life as well as in his more private affairs. The critical engagement of these women is exemplary. Upon examination, the Qur’an and sunna demonstrate the significant role that the female companions and family of the Prophet played in Islamic scholarship by broadening religious knowledge. The Qur’an emphasizes this distinguished place occupied by the women in the Prophet’s household and designates the title ummahat al-mu’minin for the wives of Prophet Muhammad. The title is evocative of characteristics such as love, care, intuition, and wisdom.17 Indeed, the Qur’an specifically instructs the women of the Prophet’s household: “Remember [and proclaim] what is recited in your houses of God’s revelations and wisdom for God is all subtle, all aware” (Q. 33:34).18 This verse is directly following a strong confirmation of the equal merit of men and women who are submissive to God (al-muslimina wa al-muslimat): Truly, submissive men and submissive women, believing men and believing women, obedient men and obedient women, truthful men and truthful women, steadfast men and steadfast women, humble men and humble women, charitable men and charitable women, fasting men and fasting women, the men who guard their private parts and the women who guard, and the men who remember God often and the women who remember – God has prepared for them forgiveness and a rich reward (Q. 33:35).

126  Zainab Alwani The verses mentioned serve to illustrate the responsibility that God bestowed upon the women of the Prophet’s household, as well as the parity of both men and women of good character. The women in the Prophet’s household contributed greatly to the development of Islamic scholarship, alongside the contributions of many other women in the early Muslim community. As in the example of sura al-nur, the sunna manifests as a body of knowledge and presents a model for the Qur’an’s application to reallife situations. ʿA’isha spent over three decades after the Prophet’s death honoring his legacy by transmitting knowledge, explaining, interpreting, and correcting misperceptions. ʿA’isha made the Prophet’s sayings and the Qur’anic teachings the solid basis from which she launched her dissenting opinions. Her critical methodology is based on narrating the literal words of the Prophet. For her, it was unacceptable to only convey the meaning of the hadith, as the meaning was a matter of interpretation and could be modified as a result of the narrator’s limited memory or level of understanding. For instance, it is commonly explained that some Companions of the Prophet used to attend the initial part of the Prophet’s meetings and would miss the latter part, while others came late, hearing only the last of what the Prophet had said. Hence, ʿA’isha commented on the reports of many who misunderstood the narrative due to tardiness or premature departure.19 With a distinctive rhetorical skill, she tactfully analyzed, criticized, corrected, and debated in order to expose the weak points in any report she found offensive, misunderstood or otherwise incorrect.

The methodology of al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an in practice Understanding the Qur’an’s unity and divine language, as well as reading it conceptually for the explicit purpose of tracing the derivation of words, is essential to my work. Invariably, such a systematic approach relates the appropriate meaning and application of Qur’anic language to any situation (in time or place). It is, however, challenging to read the entire Qur’an as one unit; therefore, it is more effective to begin with one specific word or sura to pave the way, and thus enable the reader to connect with the Qur’an as a whole. For instance, when the reader attempts to understand a Qur’anic word in a certain sura, she traces it throughout the Qur’an in order to attain a better understanding of the word and its relevance. This helps the reader to observe the movement of the word and how it changes in meaning when in a different context, without violating the original meaning of the word.20 In the case of sura al-nur, reading the opening verse attracts the reader’s attention immediately to the significance of this sura. It begins: “This is a sura that which We have sent down and We have made it mandatory, and We have sent down clear signs in it, in order that you may remember” (Q. 24:1). A strong thesis statement clearly defines its goal, methodology and outcome. Each word is clear and precise, has a specific function and role, and leaves no doubt in how to follow its direction in order to reach the accurate meaning.

With ʿA’isha in mind 127 There are three specific words of hermeneutic significance in the opening lines of sura 24. It begins with “This is a sura that which We have sent down (‘anzalnaha).” The word (‘anzala) means “the act of descent or sending down.” The Qur’an describes itself as a scripture that God ‘sent down’ to the Prophet. This expression – sent down – conveys immediately, and in itself, the concept that the origin of the Qur’an is divine and that Muhammad is merely a recipient. This concept is mentioned four times in Surat al-Nur, twice in the first verse and then again in 24:34 and 24:46 to emphasize the significance of this sura as a whole and its aya/verses that were sent down from above.21 The expression ‘sent down’, in its various forms, is used in the Qur’an well over 200 times. The second key word is farada (“and We have made it obligatory”). By tracing the Qur’anic usage of the word, it means; “it is your duty to apply its rulings” because it was laid down in plain terms.22 The third key word is bayinat, an adjective describing the content of this message as clear and manifest. It is self-explanatory; therefore, there is no need for interpretation because the message is clear-cut. The last word tadhdhakrun means to remember your covenant with your Creator to be stewards on this earth by virtue of submission to your Creator. It conveys the commitment to a lifetime of doing what is good and forbidding what is wrong. The foremost quality of mind and character that flows from this commitment is a state of constant awareness of the presence of God, the All-Knowing, that leads to a holistic purification, or tazkiyya (Q.49:13, 35:15, 87:14, 91:9). While sura 24 uses the verb anzala, the Qur’an uses the second grammatical verb form – nazzalna – which reflects a gradual descent of scripture in many other verses, such as 2:23, 2: 97, 3:3, 4:47, 15:9, 16:89, 17:106 and 76:23. The use of this Arabic verb form is significant because it captures the historical reality of the Qur’an’s descent to the earthly realm. Qur’anic revelation came to the Prophet gradually over a period of twenty-three years. Therefore, its content is intertwined with the realities of those early communities who witnessed its revelation; it spoke to historical and personal events within the communities that believed in it as well as those that rejected it. A distinctive feature of the Qur’an is its direct response to the affairs of those early communities. sura al-nur, without question, is one of those suras that captures and responds directly to events on the ground. The significance of the Qur’an’s gradual descent is addressed directly by the Qur’an in the form of a response to the pagans of the Quraysh: “The disbelievers also say, ‘Why was the Qur’an not sent down to him all at once?’ We sent it in this way to strengthen your heart [Prophet]; We gave it to you in gradual revelation” (Q. 25:32); “It is a recitation that We have revealed in parts, so that you can recite it to people at intervals; We have sent it down little by little” (Q. 17:106). A second significant reason for its gradual descent is to allow its teachings to slowly enter the hearts and lives of its first recipients. This was exemplified by the Prophet’s companions, both men and women, who were in the habit of learning and practicing the verses of the Qur’an at the same time. Abu Abdur Rahman AlAslami reported: “The companions of the Prophet would learn ten verses from the Messenger of God and they would not take another ten verses until they learned their meaning and ruling. They said, “We would learn knowledge and action

128  Zainab Alwani together.”23 They also taught what they had learnt by helping others to memorize the Qur’an, and most importantly, through their practical example, which reflected directly what they had learnt from the Qur’an.24 There are at least fifteen times where the Qur’an states: “They ask you about.” Most of the questions are mentioned in the Qur’an related to social, economic and legal issues. This indicates that the Qur’an invites the readers to ask the questions about their issues and challenges and seek its guidance. In relation to this fact, it is important to understand munasabat al-nuzul (Occasions of revelation)25 in light of al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-qur’an as a methodology. How should we understand this genre of literature that describes the events or questions that allegedly elicited the revelation of certain verses? What are the best methods that we should use to reach the accurate meaning that relates to specific events? What do the questions of the first generation of Muslim men and women illustrate to us, in our current context, about the questions we should be asking of the Qur’an? I argue that surat al-nur makes for one of the best examples of how to read the sunna, hadith, and sira in light of the Qur’an. It provides a good illustration of the critical experience facing the first Muslim community, during which no other than the Prophet’s wife was accused of adultery. To exemplify the approach of al-wahda al-bina’iyya, I will present a unitary reading of the sura. I will not present a line-by-line tafsir; rather, I will illustrate how to connect the sunna, hadith, and sira to the Qur’an as related to social and ethical-juristic issues in order to demonstrate the application of the al-wahda methodology in cultivating an understanding of the Qur’an that is relevant to our modern era. The experience of the first generation dialoguing with the revelation paves the way for our own conversations with this primary text.

The story of the Ifk: a comprehensive method of reading the sira, sunna, and hadith in light of the Qur’an How does the Qur’an examine the incident of the ifk? The event, as narrated in Ṣahih al-Bukhari, occurred after the Battle of Ahzab during the expedition of the Bani Mustaliq in the sixth year after the hijra. The hadith is insightful and allows us, through ʿA’isha’s first-person narration, to live this experience from a human perspective.26 Despite her overwhelming grief, she was careful in her judgment of other people who were involved in this incident. ʿA’isha never abandoned her trust in God, even in the most intense moments of this trial. It was customary for the Prophet to take his wives along on expeditions or battles. This hadith indicates that women used to travel, even during war, with their husbands and other close relatives. On this expedition, ʿA’isha became separated from the group and noticed she had lost a special necklace. Though she eventually found her necklace, when she came back to rejoin the travel party, no one was there. However, she knew that someone would come back to look for her, because it was customary for a Companion to trail behind to look for people who had become separated from the army. In this case, Safwan b. al-Muʿattal was

With ʿA’isha in mind 129 appointed to the task. While waiting for someone to come back, ʿA’isha had fallen asleep. Later, when Safwan saw her, he helped her onto his camel and started to walk quickly to catch up with the army. ‘Abd-Allah ibn Ubayy, the leader of the hypocrites, saw them enter Medina and remarked: “By God! Neither ʿA’isha nor that man will be acquitted of this incident!” Rumors quickly spread. The first Muslim society was not immune from ‘Abd-Allah ibn Ubayy’s insinuations. For over a month until the revelation of surat al-nur, the hypocrites were able to successfully deceive some sincere believers and even got them to join the slander. Surat al-nur not only defended the Mother of Believers but also provided a preventive model for avoiding such a moral disaster in the future. This experience was an extensive training session that required people to go through an internal and external filtering process under the observation of the Divine. Hypocrites at every stage of Islam’s history have had a pivotal role in igniting rumors, controversy, and accusations in order to undermine the moral foundations of the Muslim community. The Qur’an illustrates and teaches us how to diagnose this social problem by providing a comprehensive and systematic methodology to deal with false accusations. The principle of carefully evaluating one’s words and actions and that mechanisms should be developed to hold people accountable based on their actions surfaces in more than one context in the Qur’an.27 I will now illustrate the relationship between the Qur’an and the sunna, hadith and sira by using the narrative of ʿA’isha.

Through ʿA’isha’s eyes What can we learn about the sunna of the Prophet in terms of his relationship with his wife? What public activities were women at that time involved in? How did ʿA’isha describe the hijab? Did this stop women from traveling? ʿA’isha narrated:28 Whenever the Prophet intended to go on a journey, he used to draw lots among his wives and would take with him the one on whom the lot had fallen. So he cast these lots on one of these expeditions and my name came up, so I traveled with the Prophet. This was after the verses pertaining to veiling were revealed and therefore I would travel in my hawdaj and be carried in it. “The hawdaj is a small type of tent, placed on top of the camel wherein the women would sit. Through this narration, ʿA’isha provided details about women’s diet, size, and morals during her time: During those days women were very thin and they had not put on a lot of weight. They used to only eat a few morsels of food, so the men did not question the lightness of the hawdaj when they picked it up and put it on the camel. And on top of that, I was a young woman. So they sent the camel forward and I found my necklace after they had gone. By the time I returned

130  Zainab Alwani to the caravan camping ground, there was not a soul in sight, so I went to the place where I used to stay, thinking that they would miss me and come back in my search. While I was sitting at my place, I felt sleepy and slept. How did men behave toward women? According to ʿA’isha, this is how men treated women at that time: Safwan bin Al-Mu’attil As-Sulami Adh-Dhakw-ani was behind the army. He had started in the last part of the night and reached my stationing place in the morning. He saw the shape of a person sleeping, and when he saw me, he recognized me for he had seen me before the revelation of the verses of veiling. I was woken up by his exclamation of (Inna lillahi wa inna ilayhi raji’un) “We surely belong to God and to Him we shall return,” which he uttered on recognizing me, so I covered my face with my outer garment. And I swear by God we did not speak a word to each other nor did I hear any statement from him except “Inna Lillahi wa inna ilaihi rajiun,” He lowered his camel such that I could ride on it and when I mounted the camel he guided it until we caught up with the caravan while they were encamped. That is where the rumors started spreading and the people that spread the rumors were destroyed; the leader of them was ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Ubay ibn Salul. What do we learn about the Prophet in terms of how he tended to his wives when they were ill? Why did ʿA’isha not hear anything about the rumor initially? What do we learn about the household of the Prophet? What was the reaction of the Prophet to the rumor? ʿA’isha narrates: So we arrived in Madinah but I fell ill with a fever for a whole month. The inhabitants of Madinah were all talking about the slander, but I did not know anything about it. However, I was hurt by the fact that I did not see the tenderness I used to see from the Prophet while I was sick. He would enter upon us and ask all of us, “How are all of you doing?” then he would leave. So I was doubtful but I did not realize evil was afoot. She continues: After I had been cured I once exited with Umm Mistah (ʿA’isha’s great aunt and the Prophet’s first cousin) toward the area that we used to relieve ourselves and used not to go out for this purpose except from night to night, and that was before the time that people started building restrooms close to their houses. We considered it troublesome and harmful to take lavatories in the houses. How did ʿA’isha eventually learn about the rumor? What was her reaction? How long had the rumor been spreading? What was her parents’ reaction to the rumor? “So I went out with Umm Mistah and her son was Mistah bin Uthatha. When we had finished our affair, as we returned to my house, Umm Mistah tripped

With ʿA’isha in mind 131 over a stone and exclaimed, “Let Mistah be ruined!”” When something happened to the Arabs, they would curse someone. So she cursed her son. I said to her, “What an evil thing you have said. How can you curse a person who has witnessed the Battle of Badr? She said, “O you there! Didn’t you hear what he has said?” I said, “And what did he say?” She then told me the statement of the people of the Ifk (forged statement), I became ill, worse than before. She goes on to further say: When I returned home, and the Prophet came to me, and after greeting, he said, “How is that (lady)?” I said, “Will you allow me to go to my parents?” At that time, I intended to be sure of the news through them. The Prophet allowed me and I went to my parents and asked my mother, “O my mother! What are the people talking about?” My mother said, “O my daughter! Take it easy, for by God, there is no charming lady who is loved by her husband who has other wives as well, but that those wives would find fault with her.” I said, “Subhan Allah! Did the people really talk about that? “That night I kept on weeping the whole night till the morning. My tears never stopped, nor did I sleep, and morning broke while I was still weeping. It is important to note here that ʿA’isha did not hear anything about the rumor from the Prophet or from any member of his family until she left the house. So what do we learn about their moral and ethical standard? He did not berate her, abuse her, or insult her. He did not even accuse her of the crime. However, after a month of rumors circulating around Madina, the rumors cast suspicions in the mind of the Prophet. At this point, the Prophet decided to consult two of the closest members of his family, who were in a position to give him some insight on Aisha’s moral character: Then the Prophet called ‘Ali bin Abi Talib and Usama bin Zaid when the Revelation delayed, in order to consult them as to the idea of divorcing his wife. Usama bin Zaid told the Prophet of what he knew about the innocence of his wife and of his affection he kept for her. He said, “O Messenger! She is your wife, and we do not know anything about her except good.” ‘Ali bin Abi Talib said, “O Messenger! God has not restricted matters upon you and there are plenty of women beside her. If you however, ask her maidservant; she will confirm what she knows about her. It is important to point out that all of the Prophet’s actions at this point fell within the realm of the private sphere. He did not take any public measures either to rebuke ʿA’isha or those accusing her of adultery. Rather, he continued to seek knowledge to arrive at an informed decision. === ʿA’isha narrates: So the Prophet called for Barira and said, “O Barira! Have you ever seen anything from ʿA’isha that will cause you to have doubts about her? Barira said,

132  Zainab Alwani “By Him who has sent you with the truth, I have not seen anything from her what so ever that will cause me to have doubts about her except one thing. Except that she is a young girl who sometimes falls asleep when she is kneading the dough. And when she falls asleep, the lamb comes, eats the dough and goes away. So this is the crime that I know she does.” ʿA’isha further stated that: The Prophet also asked Zainab bint Jahsh about my case. He said, “O Zainab! What have you seen?” She replied, “O Messenger of God! I protect my hearing and my sight (by refraining from telling lies). I know nothing but good (about ʿA’isha).” Of all the wives of God’s Apostle, it was Zainab who aspired to receive from him the same favor as I used to receive, yet, God saved her (from telling lies) because of her piety. But her sister, Hamna, kept on fighting on her behalf so she was destroyed as were those who invented and spread the slander. How did the Prophet feel during that time? How did he express his feeling toward ʿA’isha, the people who spread the rumor, and the community? What is the sunna of the Prophet when he was confronted with this trial? The Prophet and his family did not discuss the rumor while ʿA’isha was home until she left to her parents’ house. He heard testimony from family members who interacted with ʿA’isha on a daily basis. ʿA’isha later described the reaction of the Prophet and how he addressed the people publicly about the rumor for the first time. Although it was clear the Prophet had no doubt about his wife, he did not want his regard for his wife to cloud his vision or even to say anything before there was clear evidence. So the Prophet got up (and addressed) the people. While the Prophet was on the pulpit, he said, “O Muslims! Who will help me against a man who has hurt me by slandering my family? By God, I know nothing except good about my wife, and people have blamed a man of whom I know nothing except good, and he never used to visit my family except with me. What was the reaction of people? What does the reaction of the people tell us about the complexity of the situation? In Madina at that time, there were two great tribes, the ‘Aws and Khazraj. The man who instigated the crisis was from the Khazraj and was protected by his tribe. When the Prophet asked for the people’s support to stop spreading the lies, members of the two tribes began to fight one another. The Prophet had to calm them down and resolved their argument. At that time, the Prophet went to visit ʿA’isha at her parents’ house for the first time about the rumor. ʿA’isha described the meeting: “While I was in that state, the Prophet came to us, greeted, and sat down. He had not sat with me for the whole month while these rumors were being spread. For this whole month he had not been receiving revelation concerning my case.”

With ʿA’isha in mind 133 ʿA’isha continues: The Prophet praised God after he sat and he said, “Thereafter, O ʿA’isha! I have heard about you such and such, so if you are innocent, then God will clear you of this charge, and if you have slipped into a sin then seek God’s forgiveness and repent to Him, for whenever a servant does a sin, admits to it, and repents, God accepts his repentance from him.” ʿA’isha said: “When the Prophet had finished his speech, my tears ceased completely so that I no longer felt even a drop thereof. Then I said to my father, “Reply to the Prophet on my behalf as to what he said.” He said, “By God, I do not know what to say to the Prophet.” She said: “I know by God that you have heard this story (of slander) so much that it has been settled in your minds and you have believed it. So now, if I tell you that I am innocent, and God knows that I am innocent, you will not believe me; and if I confess something, and God knows that I am innocent of it, you will believe me. By God, I cannot find of you an example except that of Joseph’s father said: ‘But [as for myself,] patience in adversity is the best: [in the sight of God]; and it is to God [alone] that I pray to give me strength to bear the misfortune which you have described to me.’ (Q. 12:18) How did ʿA’isha feel at that time? What did she expect? What was the outcome? “Then I turned away and lay on my bed, and at that time I knew that I was innocent and that God would reveal my innocence. But by God, I never thought that God would sent down about my affair, Divine Inspiration that would be recited (forever), as I considered myself too unworthy to be talked of by God with something that was to be recited: but I hoped that the Prophet might see a dream in which God would prove my innocence. She continues: “By God, the Prophet had not left his seat and nobody had left the house when the Divine revelation came to the Messenger. So there overtook him the same hard condition which used to overtake him (when he was Divinely Inspired) so that the drops of his sweat were running down, like pearls, though it was a (cold) winter day, and that was because of the heaviness of the Statement which was revealed to him. When that state of Prophet was over, and he was smiling when he was relieved, the first word he said was, “ʿA’isha, God has declared your innocence.” My mother said to me, “Get up and go to him.” I said, “By God, I will not go to him and I will not thank anybody but God.” (Q. 24:11–20)

134  Zainab Alwani It is interesting that ʿA’isha explained another significant reaction by her father, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, who at first neither said anything or took any action against Mistah for the entire month until the verses were revealed. Abu Bakr was Mistah bin Uthatha’s caretaker and guardian. He later decided to stop taking care of him. The Qur’an responded beautifully to the action of Abu Bakr, in a general way that includes any person in a similar situation: “And let not those of virtue among you and wealth swear not to give [aid] to their relatives and the needy and those who have migrated from their homes in the cause of God. Let them forgive and overlook. Do you not wish God to forgive you? God is forgiving and merciful. (Q. 24:22)

The general meaning of sura al-nur I identify the theme of sura al-nur as “establishing a pure and healthy family and then society.” This is due to the fact that the family, rather than the individual, is the basic unit of society. From this, we can derive a Qur’anic model for how to develop an integrated, tawhid-based society. The title of the sura means “the light,” which reflects that things will be exposed and clarified. This sura deals with the mutual relations of the sexes and with the ethical rules that come with these interactions. It opens with one of the most serious and uncompromising rulings in the event of transgressing the bounds of morally defined sexuality.29 How can this critical convergence between sexuality and spirituality be explained? The sura introduces a new model for the community, one that is clear with its various provisions designed to reinforce morals for both individuals and families. Sustained mutual support and realistic measures uphold the moral fabric of the community, as much as that of its nuclear units and individual members. Sura al-nur reveals that the Qur’an sought social change by exposing the most sensitive and complicated moral issues such as sexuality, marital relations, and longstanding customs that viewed women as bringing shame and dishonor. The Prophet and his household were chosen to lead this difficult and painful transition for the entire community. The personal and collective struggle reveals that change takes planning, time, and struggle. This sura therefore reflects the Qur’anic comprehensive plan for reform. It illustrates that seeking to abolish ancient customs requires the involvement of the entire community. The community must be educated, convinced of the need for change, and then trained to implement these changes. Sura al-nur provides strategies for how to examine established customs and introduce change into society. The Qur’an not only deconstructs unjust and misogynistic practices but also offers practical and healthy alternatives. In this context, a comprehensive Qur’anic reform plan includes: 1) saving a women’s honor and life from any injustice done against her; 2) presenting women as respected, equal, and active partners with men in establishing society, and enforcing this perspective legally; 3) presenting a new model of sexuality and gender relations; and 4) presenting the family and its structure, rather than the tribe, as the cornerstone of society. An example of this is what happens when a man accuses a woman

With ʿA’isha in mind 135 of zina (fornication). While in pre-Islamic Arabia it was considered a socially acceptable punishment for a man to kill his wife if he suspected her of having an affair, to protect the family’s honor and uphold moral values, the Qur’an prohibited this act of violence and introduced reforms to protect the wife and those who were accused of immoral conduct by introducing fair and just legal procedures to address the problem. Sura 24 prescribes a severe punishment for people who accuse chaste women of adultery without bringing sufficient evidence and requires a strict measure for determining the truth of such an accusation (four witnesses of upright character must have each witnessed the act of sexual intercourse). This verse prohibits men from taking action against women based on their own assumptions or even their private proof of wrongdoing. It establishes the legal premise that men are not allowed to take matters into their own hands and must resort to the state or legal authorities. Furthermore, verse 24:4 makes clear that the mere accusation of a woman of zina without the proof of four witnesses is punishable by law. Under the law, the wife’s testimony is also equal to her husband’s. If a woman swears to her innocence, even if she is lying, her testimony is enough to avert her punishment.30

The Qur’anic strategy against rumors: an analytical reading in sura al-nur How did the Qur’an describe and analyze this experience? What are the main issues that the Qur’an emphasizes? How does the Qur’an examine the attitude of the people toward the slander? Does the Qur’an provide guidance and strategies for people on how to deal with similar problems? What was the problem according to the Qur’an? Why is it important to analyze people’s stands on issues? How do we define the relationship between the Qur’an and sunna in light of sura alnur? There are clear rules that can be formulated from this sura. First, as God says, is to assess the people who instigate the story and circulate it without confirmation and to hold them accountable: “Indeed those who came with a falsehood amongst you are a group among you. Do not regard it as a misfortune, for it is good for you. Every one of them shall be held to account for the sin he has committed; and he who took the greater part in it shall have a terrible punishment” (Q. 24: 11). Second is to establish strong relationships among the community based on trust and compassion. “Why when you heard it for the first time did not the believing men and the believing women think good of one another and say, ‘This is an obvious falsehood?’ ” (Q. 24: 12) Third, verify the story before making any comments or statements. Those who spread lies must face the consequence of their actions. “Why did they not bring four witnesses. And when they do not produce the witnesses then it is they in the sight of God who are the liars. Had it not been for the favor of God upon you, and His mercy in this world and the hereafter, you would have been touched for that lie in which you were involved by a great punishment” (Q. 24: 13–14).

136  Zainab Alwani Fourth, be mindful of what you say because your words could cause irreparable damage. They can create problems and lead to conflict among people. “When you received it with your tongue and said with your mouths that which you had no knowledge of, you thought that it was an insignificant thing, while it was in the sight of God something very great” (24:15–16). Fifth, create mechanisms to help control rumors from spreading. “Why when you heard it did you not say: ‘It is not for us to talk about this. Glory be to You (O God)! This is a great lie. God warns you against doing this forever if you are true believers. And God explains the commandments clearly to you, and God is the All-Knowing the All-Wise’ ” (Q. 24:17–18). Sixth, set firm rules of accountability for those who gossip and spread slander. “Those who love (to see) scandal broadcast among the Believers, will have a grievous Penalty in this life and in the Hereafter: God knows, and you know not” (Q. 24: 19). And finally, strengthen your relationship with God and seek His guidance. “But for the grace of God and His mercy upon you, and were not God compassionate and merciful, [you would have come to grief]” (Q. 24:20).

Conclusion Given the preceding discussion, it is important to continue searching for systematic methodologies in approaching the Qur’an and sunna. We should push for more discussion about reading the Qur’an in its unity and interpreting the Qur’an intertextually. Since the Qur’an is an eternal guide for humanity, all the problems facing Muslims since its revelation can be addressed via a comprehensive vision based on Qur’anic principles and in conjunction with the examples provided by the sunna. The Qur’an states that the Prophet is a role model for humanity (e.g., Q. 33:21). Thus from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, the sunna explains, clarifies, and demonstrates how to implement Qur’anic teachings (Q. 75:16–19). The sunna represents the ethics, morals, and behaviors outlined in the shariʿa. A holistic relationship between the Qur’an, the sunna, and hadith has been clearly established as evidenced in the example of surat al-nur. Based on this example, we can examine the authenticity of any given hadith, including the actions (fiʿl), sayings (qawl), and spoken approval (taqrir) of the Prophet, by examining a particular narration and reading it holistically in light of the Qur’an. This body of knowledge presents a model for its application to real-life situations. Islamic scholars need to construct a methodology that enables them to relate the teachings of the revelation to the lives of Muslims living today. In other words, one should not read the hadith separately from the Qur’an or focus only on the sunna’s legal rulings, but rather on its reasoning, as evidenced in the different examples cited in this chapter. Doing so will release the sunna from merely being a collection of particular responses to specific questions and circumstances.

Notes 1 See Ibn Taymiyyah 1392 ah, 93. There are only a few tafsirs which bear the title of tafsir al-Qur’an bi al-Qur’an, two of which are Aḍwa’ al-bayan fi iḍaha al-Qur’an bi al-Qur’an by Muhammad al-Shinqiti, and Al-Tafsir al-Qur’ani li al-Qur’an by ‘Abd

With ʿA’isha in mind 137 al-Karim Khatib. However, upon close reading, these two tafsirs are not really tafsir al-Qur’an bi al-Qur’an as the titles seem to suggest. However, Al Farahi-Islahi’s Urdu exegeses, Tadabbur-i-Qur’an is one of the important references in this regard. 2 Al-Alwani 2006. 3 For more details of the classical and contemporary debates concerning the genealogy of this method, see my article “Al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an: A Methodology for Understanding the Qur’an in the Modern Day, Alwani 2018. 4 In the interest of full disclosure and an attempt to make clear any possible bias, it should be noted that the late Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani was the author’s father. AlAlwani earned his PhD at Egypt’s Al-Azhar University. His dissertation, a comprehensive six-volume study of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s Mahsul fı¯ ‘ilm al usul, is a systematic review of the classical literature on usul al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). He examined 700–800 scholars’ arguments on different areas of classical Islamic thought. See alRazi 1400 AH; and Al-Alwani 2005. This collection of articles first appeared in the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, most of which were translated by Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo. In his more than thirty books, al-Alwani wrote extensively about the need for ijtihad (legal reasoning) and called for the critical examination of the turath (the Islamic legacy) by Muslims themselves. For the last three decades of his life, he focused on Qur’anic Methodology and published more than ten books and numerous articles discussing this issue. 5 Early exegetes referred briefly to how consecutive āyāt and sūrahs connect with each other called, ‘ilm al-Munasabat of Qurʾānic discourse. See the two major tafsir works that have been known to use this method are: Al-Razi 1981; and Al-Biqaī 1995. 6 See Mir 1986, 6–8, 1993. Hamiduddin Farahi (1863–1930) was an Islamic scholar of South Asia known for his groundbreaking work on the concept of Nazm, or Coherence, in the Qur’an. Farahi’s views on the subject are found in two of his works: Farahi 1394 AH, in which he states his theory, and Farahi 1973, which is a collection of his commentaries on a small number of the Qur’anic surat. 7 At least three classical Sunni scholars have previously sought to develop this field of study: Abu Manṣur ʿAbd al-Muhsin bin Muhammad bin ʿAli al-Baghdadi (d. 489/1095 or 6), was the first to compile about twenty-five sayings attributed to the Prophet by his Companions which ʿA’isha had revised in a volume titled: “al-Ijaba fima istadrakat ʿA’isha ʿala al-Ṣahaba” (The Answer to what ʿA’isha Revised on the Companions); subsequently, Muhmmad ibn ʿAbd Allah Badr al-Din al-Zarkashi (d. 794/1370), a prominent scholar of hadith and Qur’anic sciences, composed a commentary on al-Baghdadi’s example; and finally, Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, (d. 910/1505), composed another commentary on this material which had come to be known as istidrakat ʿA’isha, (ʿA’isha’s revisions). 8 al-Zarkashi 1980. 9 See ʿAbd al-Rahman 1984, 25. 10 This chapter draws upon a published article by the author. See Alwani 2002, 181–198; and see her recent publication on this methodology, Alwani 2013, 45–58. 11 See Al-Alwani 2017. 12 Qur’an:68:4. 13 It is mentioned in the lengthy story about Sa’d ibn Hisham ibn ‘Aamir, when he came to Madinah and went to ‘A’isha and asked her about some matters. He said: “I said: O Mother of the believers, tell me about the character of the Messenger of Allah (S).” She said: “Do you not read the Qur’an?” I said: “Of course.” She said: “The character of the Prophet was the Qur’an.” “I wanted to get up and not ask about anything else until I died . . .” Narrated by Muslim (746). 14 See Kamali 2003; Al-Alwani 2003; and Hallaq 1997. 15 See Brown 2009, 150–183; and Alwani 2013, 47–48. 16 See Mottahedeh 2001. 17 See ʿAbd al-Rahman 1984, 25.

138  Zainab Alwani 18 Here, A. Yusuf Ali in his translation of this verse explains that the verb adhkurna takes the wives of the Prophet as its subject and means not only “remember” but also “recite, read, make known, and publish the message.” See Ali 2004, 1067. 19 Al-Zarkashi 1980, 103. 20 Al-Raghib al-Isfahani’s classical work, al-Mufradat fi Gharib al-Qur’an, contributed to the development of al-mafahim al-Qur’aniyya, a sub-field in the realm of philology by which links are established between different words and their meanings to show the structural unity and coherence of the vocabulary of the Qur’an. al-Isfahani, Al-Raghib (n.d.) Al-Mufradat fi Gharib al-Qur’an, ed. Muhammad Seyd Kaylani (Beirut: Dar al M’arifa). 21 See al-Isfahani n.d., 376. 22 Ibid. 23 Source: Musnad Ahmad 22971. 24 Source: Al-Qurtubi n.d., 1/52. There are many authentic narrations that urge a Muslim to learn the Quran. The Prophet, said: “The best of you is he who learns the Quran and teaches it to others.” Sahih al-Bukhari 5027, Book 66, Hadith 49. USC-MSA web (English). 25 Al-Suyuti n.d., 28. See, for further readings about the coherence of the Qur’an; Mir 1986, 29–30, 61–62. 26 Her narrative should be studied as a model for historians, sociologists, and even anthropologists, as the story establishes key principles of societal relations and sexual morality. 27 See Surah 49, al-Hujurat for another example. 28 Sahih Al Bukhari Book 6: Volume 60: Hadith 274, Prophetic Commentary on the Qur’an www.Qur’anexplorer.com/Hadith/English/Hadith/bukhari/006.060.274.html. 29 A Surah [is this] which We have bestowed from on high, and which We have laid down in plain terms; and in it have We bestowed from on high messages which are clear [in themselves], so that you might keep [them] in mind. (1) AS FOR the adulteress and the adulterer flog each of them with a hundred stripes, and let not compassion with them keep you from [carrying out] this law of God, if you [truly] believe in God and the Last Day; and let a group of the believers witness their chastisement. (2) [Both are equally guilty:] the adulterer couples with none other than an adulteress – that is, a woman who accords [to her own lust] a place side by side with God; and with the adulteress couples none other than an adulterer – that is, a man who accords [to his own lust] a place side by side with God: and this is forbidden unto the believers. (3) 30 Qur’an, 24:8 “But it would avert the punishment from the wife, if she bears witness four times (with an oath) By Allah, that (her husband) is telling a lie.”

Bibliography ʿAbd al-Rahman, ʿA’ishah (1984) Tarajim sayyidat bayt al-nubbuwa (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-ʿArabi). Al-Alwani, Taha Jabir (2003) Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence: Usul al-fiqh al-Islami (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought). Al-Alwani, Taha Jabir (2005) Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani: Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought (London and Washington, DC: IIIT). Al-Alwani, Taha Jabir (2006) Al-Wahda al-bina’iya lil-Qur’an (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Shuruq al-Dawliya). Al-Biqaī, Burhan al-Din ibn Umar (1995) Nazm al-Durar Fī Tanasub al-Ăyāt wa al-Suwar, ed. Abd al-Raziq al-Mahdī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya). al-Razi, Muhammad b. ‘Umar (1400 AH) al-Mahsul, ed. T.J. al-Alwani (Riyadh: Imam Muhammad University Press).

With ʿA’isha in mind 139 al-Razi, Muhammad b. ‘Umar (1981) Tafsīr Māfatih al- Ghāyb (Beirut: Dar al Fikr). al-Suyuti, Jalal al-Din (nd) al-Itqan fi ‘Ulum al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Nadwah al-Jadidah). al-Zarkashi, Badr (1980) al-Ijaba lil-irad ma istadrkathu ʿA’ishah ʿala al-Ṣahaba (answering Aisha’s commentaries of the Sahaba) – ed. Saeed Al-Afghani (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami). Ali, Abdullah Yusuf Ali, transl. (2004) The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, 11th ed. (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications). Alwani, Taha Jabir (2017) Reviving the Balance: The Authority of the Qur’an and the Status of the Sunnah, Translate Nancy Roberts (London and Washington, DC: The International Institute of Islamic Thought). Alwani, Zainab (2002) “Dalalat Manhajiah fi Qira’at al Siyda ‘Aisha al Qurania: al Istirakat namujan,” Journal of Women & Civilization- Al Mar’a Wa Al Hadara 3 (Fall). Alwani, Zainab (2013) “Muslim Women as Religious Scholars: A Historical Survey,” in Muslima Theology: The Voices of Muslim Women Theologians, ed. E. Mendeni, E. Aslan, and M. Hermansen (Berlin: Peter Lang), 45–58. Alwani, Zainab (2018) “Al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an: A Methodology for Understanding the Qur’an in the Modern Day,” Journal of Islamic Faith and Practice 1 (1): 7–27. Brown, Jonathan (2009) Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World (Oxford: Oneworld). Farahi, Hamiduddin (1394 AH) Im’an fi Aqsam al-Qur’an (Cairo: al-Matba’at alSalafiyyah) 1349 ah. Farahi, Hamiduddin (1973) Majmu’ah-i-Tafasir-i-Farahi (Urdu translation by Amin Ahsan Islahi (Lahore: Daira-i-Hamidiyyah). Hallaq, Wael B. (1997) A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Ibn Taymiyyah (1392AH) Muqaddimah fi usul al-tafsir, ed. Adnan Zarzour, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dar al Ma’rifa). Isfahani, Al-Raghib al- (nd) Al-Mufradat fi Gharib al-Qur’an, ed. Muhammad Seyd Kaylani (Beirut: Dar al Ma’rifa). Kamali, Hashim (2003) Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (London: The Islamic Texts Society). Mir, Mustansir (1986) Coherence in the Qur’an: A Study of Islah’s Concept of Nazm in Tadabbur-i Qur’an (Washington, DC: American Trust Publications). Mir, Mustansir (1993) “The Sura as a Unity: A Twentieth-Century Development in Qur’an Exegesis,” in Approaches to the Qur’an, ed. G.R. Hawting and Abdul-Kader A. Shareef (London: Routledge). Mottahedeh, Roy (2001) Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (London: I. B. Tauris). Qurtubi, Abu Abdullah al- (nd) Jami li-Ahkam al-Qur’an: Tafsir Al Qurtubi (Beirut: Dar al Fikr).

8 The Qur’anic turn of women’s image From being the object to the subject of history Mouhanad Khorchide In response to the question on the Qur’anic perception of women’s image, one must face the challenge that the Qur’an contains verses that address the equality of men and women, such as Q 33:35,1 but at the same time confronts us with verses that seem to be problematic with regard to the reception and application of the Qur’an in the modern world, in which gender equality has already become a self-evident fact, e.g., Q 4:112 and Q 4:34.3 Within recent years, modern Qur’anic exegesis has developed strategies that have spread throughout the Islamic world in order to relativize such unpleasant verses by establishing the difference between the always applicable meaning on the one hand (universal, and time- and situation-bound meaning) and specific verses on the other hand. However, a very crucial question should be addressed, namely whether a relativization of Qur’anic verses that are apparently in conflict with modern worldviews is based on theological concepts or whether the often-violent accusations are justified. By identifying the relativization with a certain (political) agenda, or arbitrarily seeking a compatibility of the Qur’an with modern perceptions of reality, is one ultimately transgressing religious boundaries? In what follows, the author wishes to draw attention to the problem of the lamentably missing criteria for such a differentiation that distinguishes between universal and specific verses of the Qur’an, with a focus on developing an alternative reading of the Qur’an. This reading should be based on historical-theological hermeneutics. Such hermeneutical reading acknowledges the Qur’an as divine revelation but understands it as a dialogical revelation in which God discloses himself in and throughout history. Every linguistic, cultural and psychological language of revelation is time-bound, but not its content. Moreover, this content is well grounded in the unconditioned divine mercy, which is revealed in time by the limited and culturally contingent language of the Qur’an. Essentially, divine mercy seeks to continually unfold by means of freeing itself from the boundaries of culturally contingent parameters. And this seems to be the task of contemporary exegesis. Firstly, one must uncover divine mercy in the dynamic Qur’anic history, which ultimately should be understand as the history of the relationship between God and mankind. Secondly, unfolding divine mercy should be understood as the transport/translation of the original underlying principle to the new historical context through a continuation of the revealed thoughts while simultaneously

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 141 safeguarding its essence. Such a procedure acknowledges the Qur’an as an open text, but not as an arbitrary text. Mercy, which the present author wants to underline in the categories of the modern-day idea of human freedom (as it was explicated mainly by Christian theologies) evinces the possibilities of such a continuation of the divine essence.4 That being said, the Qur’an remains a continuous encounter with the divine loving mercy, which in turn steadily encourages the recipient to unfold this love and mercy.

Universal versus particular/specific verses of the Qur’an A literalist reading of the Qur’an focuses not so much on the question of whether the Qur’an contains universal and/or particular/specific verses, i.e., statements. The reason for such negligent approach is based on the conviction that basically all Qur’anic statements – and more precisely, their word-for-word meaning – should be understood as universally binding instructions that should be safeguarded by all means, especially when the word of God should be taken seriously. Every attempt at relativizing certain Qur’anic statements as specific – i.e., directed to a certain historical context – must be some sort of defamation of the word of God and is, thus, vehemently rejected according to the advocates of such literalist approach. Behind such literalist reading of the Qur’an lurks the so-called monological understanding of divine revelation. To understand the revelation of the Qur’an as a monologue of the Divine is implicitly also linked to the idea of an I-monologue of God, which exists unbound from its historical context. According to this approach, God has revealed His holy world in an ahistorical manner, which by definition proves any attempt to comprehend the context of the respective revealed verses of the Qur’an, as well as the history of the processual revelation itself, superfluous. According to such a definition of revelation, every relativization of the Qur’anic diction should no longer be understood as the verbatim instruction in the here and now and is doomed to be labeled a defamation of the Qur’an. Proponents of such an understanding of revelation seek to safeguard the sovereignty of God and are, thus, of the opinion that God would not make Himself dependent on any historical context.5 The divine speech should hold true to all mankind in each and every age in unchangeable manner. Accordingly, God has said in the Qur’an everything that had to be said, so that there remains little room for hermeneutical interpretation. Therefore, the Qur’an must be understood as a closed/sealed book. Muslims must just read the Qur’an, comprehend it philologically in an adequate manner and should then know precisely what God wanted to tell them. In doing so, the Qur’an is limited to a collection of trans-temporal/eternal instructions. Today’s Muslims, who are trying to contextualize the corporal punishments existing in the Qur’an by establishing the historical link to the corporal punishments of seventh-century Arabia and claiming that such punishments would no longer be applicable to the own reality are reproached for such contextualization and are quickly called “falsifiers” of God’s eternal word.

142  Mouhanad Khorchide According to such a literalist understanding of Qur’anic verses that are dealing with women’s image, the verses are not explained to be “descriptive” by nature, but “prescriptive,” which have, by definition, a normative quality. In sura 4 (alnisa‘, “On Women”) we read that female descendants should only receive one half of the inheritance that is thought to belong to the male descenders, i.e., their brothers: “God chargeth you concerning (the provision for) your children: to the male the equivalent of the portion of two females.” (Q 4:11). According to the literalist reading, the verse would be understood as a divinely prescribed regulation, unbound by context, eternally applicable, and essentially independent of historical contexts, including the respective societal and/or personal underlying conditions. An increasing number of male and female Muslim theologians, especially those living in democratic countries, criticize such literalist reading of the Qur’an and seek alternative readings that attempt to propose and implement values in accord with their strong attachment to democratic structures. A wide-spread reading by mainly female Muslim theologians dealing with women’s rights focuses on the differentiation between universal and particular/ specific verses of the Qur’an. The main focus of attention here is the historical contextualization of certain Qur’anic verses in which assigned content is no longer accepted as valid in its verbatim and universal sense. One of the mentors of such historical contextualization6 is the liberal theologian of Indo-Pakistani descent, Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988).7 He emphasizes the historicity of the Qur’an in his provoking work.8 This ultimately means that the Qur’an is revealed into a specific (and therefore reconstructible) historical situation and should not be regarded as ideal-typical norm. The later advocates of such historical readings followed in Rahman’s footsteps and are mainly the members of the so-called Ankara-School of Islamic theology, e.g., Mehmet Paçacı (b. 1959) und Ömer Özsoy (b. 1963).9 The exponents of the Ankara-School, as well as Fazlur Rahman and Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid (1943–2010) previously, strive for a contemporary approach to catapult the Qur’an to the present, not in its exact wording but in its ethical principles. The ethical reconstruction of the Muslim faith takes a lot of space in this approach. Similar approaches of historical contextualization and recontextualization of the implied higher ethical principles are drawn up by Muslim feminist thinkers, e.g., Asma Barlas and Amina Wadud.,1011 Wadud, for example, makes the distinction between general (universal with universal validity) and specific (with timebound validity) verses. However, Wadud further remarks that general verses are context-dependent, as what applies in general to one historical context and does not necessarily also apply to another context with different socio-cultural conditions. According to Wadud’s reading, only those verses that have a link to the transcendent dimension and describe God’s attributes have universal quality: What I consider universal in the Qur’anic statements can only be understood in light of the transcendent. Transcendence does not adhere to mundane limits. In fact, its definition is best articulated in negative theological terms, by stating or focusing on what the sacred or the divine is not. “Allah is one”

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 143 compares to an unlimited possible articulation of what Allah, or Its “oneness,” is not. It is not multiple gods, idols, and literal prescriptions to its manifestations throughout creation, especially in nature. The multiplicity of human responses to the idea of the sacred or the ultimate have been and continue to be expressed in terms relative to all these negated qualities despite their apparent correlations.12 Specific verses are those that are disclosed in certain historical situations, and, thus, would address specific addressees alone; a position that she exemplifies with regard to Q 33:35.13 However, this criterion is not really convincing, especially if one understands the act of the very revelation of the Qur’an as a dialogical and, therefore, communicative act. Thus, the entire revelation of the Qur’an is through this act of communication between God and the early Muslim community of the seventh century addressed to very specific addressees, and should as such be understood as situation-dependent. However, this does not mean that the Qur’an has no meaning altogether that would be valid for similar situations and that the later recipients of the Qur’an do not have it in the back of their minds at a later stage. It is rather my intention to point to the difficulties that are shared by situation-dependent and situation-independent verses of the Qur’an. It remains also unclear how and to what measure it would be possible to determine exactly what should be considered universal quality. Wadud’s own approach is clearly in the tradition of Fazlur Rahman, and also intends to work out the general ethical principles behind the particular/specific verses of the Qur’an.14 Since both Wadud and others who try to differentiate between universal and particular/specific verses of the Qur’an have not yet developed clear corresponding criteria for such a classification, their approach can be easily accused of arbitrariness. It is, thus, an easy task to defame them of classifying Qur’anic verses as particular/specific and nullify their normative validity, when they are not in accord with the respective worldview.15

Criticism and appreciation The reflections of Fazlur Rahman, the Ankara-School, numerous feminists such as Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas, are undoubtedly nourished by a noble intention. They all see themselves as more or less devout Muslims, who want to catapult the message of the Qur’an to the modern age. They endeavor to offer first and foremost an alternative reading of the Qur’an, dismissing the literalistic one that is ostensibly oriented to the exact wording and instead focus on historically contextualized reading. It also provides fertile ground for the relativizing of the bulky passages in the Qur’an that seemingly give the male (man) a higher rank in contrast to the female (woman), at times even legitimizing domestic violence. This is is due to the fact that such Qur’anic statements are located in a specific historical context. All these (validity) approaches are not concerned with the contextual wording of such Qur’anic verses of normative quality, but with their

144  Mouhanad Khorchide ethical reconstruction. The ethical principles behind these verses, therefore, have a universal and universally valid claim. One of the main criticisms of this approach concerns its selectivity. According to which criteria could the verses of the Qur’an be divided into general/universal and particular/specific ones? Aysha Hidayatullah has explicated such criticism in her book Feminist Edges of the Qur’an and there is no need to repeat them here.16 The criticism that focuses on the selectivity seems to be justified to some extent. Why should of all verses in the Qur’an, not just those that run contrary to modern democratic values, represent unpopular views?17 Why are they categorized as particular/specific, while other are more “pro-feminist” verses are regarded as general/universal and universally valid? Very often one cannot help but get the impression that more is read into the Qur’an than what the Qur’an really says, and that the respective historical context of the exegete him/herself delineates the boundaries of the content of the Qur’anic statements than the Qur’anic dictum itself. For this very reason, exegetes need a criterion or even a set of criteria to protect the Qur’an from arbitrariness to do justice to its message as much as possible. In his criticism of the ethical reconstruction of the Qur’an by scholars such as Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid or the contemporary Frankfurt-based researcher Ömer Özsoy, Klaus von Stosch rightly notes that “for them the Qur’an is primarily a pointer that instructs about a certain way of life, an invitation to a certain life plan and, thus, primarily of ethical nature.”18 For both schools, a historical localization of the Qur’an in the context of its proclamation is necessary in order to be able grasp its ethical instructions. However, Klaus von Stosch sees several problems in such a reduction of Qur’anic hermeneutics to an ethical reconstruction: Even if I can reconstruct the precise reason for a revelation of a certain Qur’anic passage reliably on reasonable grounds, one wonders how I can come to a normative conclusion from this description. [. . .] How do I know that the normative meaning of the Qur’an has to be decoded from its historical situation, when God has to know that his word is heard in other situations as well? Is not the time-bound meaning potential of the texts that is undermined here and the variety of their interpretive possibilities unnecessarily reduced and tends to be arbitrarily reduced? If one wishes to erase the element of arbitrariness that is inevitably contained in the deduction of the ethical principles of the Qur’an, one must also autonomously justify the principles used in philosophic manner. This is precisely what the Ankaran school seems to anticipate. At any rate, the ethical principles of the Qur’an raised here are evident from the perspective of autonomous morality, and this is exactly what the interpreters of the Ankaran school seek to determine with regard to the reasonableness of the Qur’an. This, however, makes the critical religious question, whether the Qur’an should not be seen entirely as a projection of human lifestyles, even more virulent. If one denies the convergence (and thus the derivability) of the ethical principles of the Qur’an with the ethical principles of practical reason and at the same time emphasizes that

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 145 the Qur’an demands a higher ethos than reason, which cannot be deduced from it, one gets into a dangerous proximity to fundamentalist interpretations, which regard crimes as the will of God. If one emphasizes the autonomously philosophical profitability of the ethical principles of the Qur’an, one enters into the aphorism already stated in the Enlightenment by Lessing, namely that revelation is actually only required for pedagogical reasons. In other words: Either the Qur’an embodies only the ethical, which would be known to man even without him, so that he is ultimately superfluous or he contradicts the ethical and is, thus, regarded as suspect from the perspective of modern-autonomous reason.19 The questions addressed by von Stosch are directed toward all modern hermeneutical concepts that attempt to directly deduce from the Qur’an any modern phenomena such as gender equality, human rights, basic democratic values, and so on. All these approaches give the impression that much is read into the Qur’an that is, in reality, not contained in the text. Thomas Bauer also warns of the danger of a manipulative exegesis of the Qur’an: “It should not be too difficult to always distil the ‘core’ (essence) that one is eager to hear.”20 In fact, when religion is reduced to its ethical dimension, it becomes functionalized and ultimately superfluous. Ethical foundations can be derived autonomously from human reason. Already in the eighth century there existed discussions on that matter between the Mu’tazilites and their opponents. The Mu’tazilites are considered a rationalist school in Islam. They argued that man could autonomously recognize by his reason what is good and what is bad. For this, he needs neither prophets nor a message from God. This is due to the fact that all of these discussions reminded people only of what they already know or at least should know. This position was also represented by the Maturides (named after the scholar al-Maturidi, d. 941). The opponents of the Mu’tazilites contradicted such claims because they saw too great an emphasis on the autonomy of man, which would relativize the meaning of the divine proclamation. On the other hand, they emphasized man’s dependence on God and his instructions altogether. In fact, both positions are highly problematic, because both reduce religion to an ethical or legal dimension respectively. Religion must fulfill a task that reason does not, otherwise it will become replaceable. The approach I wish to propose here is based on an understanding of the Qur’an as God’s self-disclosure; in other words: Gods self-presence. The Qur’an as God’s self-disclosure is much more than a static legal schema full of instructions. The Qur’an is rather, first and foremost, a medium of an encounter with God’s love and mercy. This encounter aims to give people the perspective of aligning their lives with God. Consequently, the Qur’an should awaken an attitude of love and compassion in people, rather than dictate/prescribe to people how they have to structure their lives in detail exactly by means of legal and ethical instruction. More precisely, this means that the Qur’an offers a multitude of potential meanings by which contemporary recipients are intellectually challenge and spiritually

146  Mouhanad Khorchide and emotionally moved, even though the meanings that readers and listeners today associate with and assign to the text may not be identical to the meanings assigned to it by the first addressees of Qur’anic verses associated with them. Moreover, it is not possible to reduce sacred texts, which are considered to have a potentially temporal significance, to the impact that it had for the first listeners.21 Thomas Bauer comes to the sober conclusion: “The restriction to a historical-critical interpretation of the Qur’an could never ever give way to a Sufi interpretation, since at the time of the revelation of the Qur’an nothing existed, which could be associated with the later forms of mysticism.”22 Modern approaches to the interpretation of the Qur’an do not always demand the “openness” of various readings of the Holy text, as Thomas Bauer states, and their claim to have fully grasped the only and entire truth makes them in part “more susceptible to ideology than traditional methods.”23 Therefore, one has to agree with Bauer, when he emphasizes: “Again, assigning to the Qur’an potentially temporal meaning and, thus, a multiplicity of meanings, as the classical scholars did (without this necessarily being always reflected in their actions), may indeed be the only possibility to overcoming the time-relatedness of exegesis.”24 However, Bauer’s criticism should not be misinterpreted in the sense that we could really understand the Qur’an today without applying any sort of historical contextualization or historical-critical method. The main concern is not to use these methods as instruments for a closure of the Qur’an, so that in the end only one single interpretation of the Qur’an, as true as possible, becomes apparent. Rather, the historical contextualization and the historical-critical method should serve as tools to demonstrate the dialogue between revelation and the reality of life in the very context of the proclamation of the Qur’an and to finally reconstruct its dynamics, thus revealing the history of revelation as the history of God’s involvement with humans.

The Qur’an and the becoming a subject of women What does the Qur’an have to say about the image of women? The only answer is: very little and still very much. Very little if we expect the Qur’an to be a kind of universal description of the role of the women, be it as a wife, as a mother, as a sister, as a working person, as a housewife, and so on. Also, very little if we expect the Qur’an to providing us with a manual that describes exactly how women are, how they think, how they “work,” etc. The Qur’an also provides us with very few legal statements concerning women’s rights, such as inheritance. The Qur’an, thus, provides us with few statements about women when we expect them to be regarded as objects, and teaches us little about these objects by means of appropriate doctrines. But it provides us with the essentials, e.g., when it comes to elevating the woman as the subject of history and to liberating her from the imprisonment of the status of an object. That is precisely the thesis of this present article. By the few individual statements on women’s issues, the Qur’an does not want to provide any instructions on how to deal with women, even if legal regulations of inheritance are concerned (cf. Q 4:11), or even if their role in relation

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 147 to man is outlined (cf. Q 4:34). Rather the Qur’an, understood as the revelation of God, wants to express through these statements something about the action of God in this world, the image of man in himself, and finally, the God-human relationship. The involvement of God in the history of the seventh century on the Arabian Peninsula seeks to bring about a change in the position of women at the time of the proclamation of the Qur’an, a change that emphasizes the subjectivity of both genders and wants to turn both from the status of the object to the status of the subject. From the Qur’anic point of view, this applies not only to women but also to all humans as such. In today’s language, one should say that the Qur’an seeks to implement some sort of anthropological turn that sees mankind as subjects who have the right to selfdetermination, overturning its assigned status of the alienated object. In order to explain this thesis, I wish to explain two necessary steps: The first step is to rethink the understanding of the Qur’anic revelation and question whether the Qur’an is more than just a communication of instructions, or rather as a guide for action to live in the self-presence of God. This is a fundamental question for today’s Islamic theology, on which much depends. Because the Qur’an is considered the main source of Islam and dealing with it decides the further understanding of this religion. Is the Qur’an only about revealing laws and rules, or is it about meeting God in the Qur’an, and is this meeting meant to kindle within people the fire of love?25 The second and, consequently, following step is the application of such newly gained understanding of the Qur’an as the self-presence of God. This allows for a reflection on the Qur’anic message anew, where from the beginning onwards, the focus is laid on the change of the role of the woman, a change of her status from object to subject by means of historical demonstration.

The revelation of the Qur’an as the visualization/ manifestation of God The Qur’an characterizes God as a being, who is in a very personal way necessarily turned toward mankind. The Qur’anic descriptions of God as the loving and merciful hands over to man a message of and about God. The attributes make statements about God’s nature, how He is and how He acts in this world. However, the Qur’an as the self-revelation of God also means that not only a communication or the will of God is revealed but also the reality of God Himself, which is the actual content/message of the revelation. The Qur’an is, therefore, much more than just a book that one can read as a practicing Muslim, finding instruction about how God is and what God wants to share. This is due to the fact that the Qur’an is an event in which the attention of God manifests. God Himself becomes present/visible/manifest in the Qur’an.26 To make this point clearer, one must place oneself in the context of the revelation of the Qur’an both in the seventh century and on the Arabian Peninsula (time and context-dependent). How did Muḥammad and the first addressees understand the Qur’an?

148  Mouhanad Khorchide It is well known that the Qur’an was not revealed all at once but successively, peace-meal so to speak, within a period of twenty-three years (610 to 622 Meccan period / 622 to 632 Medinan period) in different temporal, spatial, political, economic and social contexts. The Qur’an most directly accompanied people over this period and responded to their respective concerns. Conscious of the abilities of the first addressees, the Qur’an was not abstract (by means of form and content), nor was it an independent book that would just teach them some dogma. It was a constant presence of God to be experienced in their lives. The addressees were distressed, concerned, caring and concerned about God. They did not read the Qur’an as anyone would do today, because the Qur’an was only later written after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, codified as a book within covers. In the consciousness of the first addressees, the Qur’an was not actually the Qur’an that accompanies them on their life-journeys, but God himself.27 In the Qur’an, they found revealed to them a God full of loving mercy, who turns unconditionally to all mankind and invites them to join the proposed God-man-relationship. This loving mercy manifested itself to the first addressees in the inherent sound of the Qur’an, through which God’s “emotions” became realizable/accessible. These first expressed God’s concern for the oppressed, the needy, the suffering, but also for those who replied with a clear “no” to the offer of God’s loving mercy. The Qur’an, therefore, represented for them the invitation into God’s relationship, and the testimony of His commitment: “[h]e loves them and they love him.” (Q 5:54). God invites man to direct his life toward Him, and tells him to come close to Him time and again, to gravitate toward Him, as the self-attribution of the Qur’an huda, “guidance,” makes clear: “The month of Ramadan in which was revealed the Qur’an, a guidance/invitation (huda) for mankind.” (Q 2:185). This expression is otherwise often translated as “guidance” and can easily be interpreted in a purely legalistic manner, although it is, in truth, about God’s continuous commitment, assisting man in his/her existential basic needs. A notion of the term huda, also common among Muslims, refers primarily to legal aspects. According to this notion, the Qur’an is primarily a legal book that outlines a legal schema that embraces as many people as possible.28 According to this understanding, Islam is concerned with the observance of laid out laws, which the Qur’an explicitly lists and prescribes for all times and places.29 On the one hand, many Muslims face the dilemma of literally transferring all of the Qur’anic legal regulations into the here and now, but these cannot be reconciled with their timely realities. On the other hand, many people in non-Islamic countries are afraid of a religion that claims to introduce its own laws into an alien context, some of which are in competition with or even in conflict with the law of the respective national state.30 The distinction that I am presenting here is that of a new perception of the Qur’an, namely as a communication or self-communication of God. If the Qur’an is merely a letter or a message from God so that one can learn about His will in the Qur’an encountering Him as a divine reality is doomed to fail. If one reduces the Qur’an to a communication/instruction from God, the task of believers today would be limited to treating the Qur’an as a text to be interpreted (philologically, historically, literarily, etc.) to understand what God is, and what He wishes to

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 149 communicate to mankind by means of instruction. Truly, the Qur’an is a text. But does this imply then that the text is central and not God? On the contrary, one desperately needs God to do the Qur’an justice. It can be pointed out that according to the first understanding of the Qur’an, God no longer plays an immediate role; one does not need God in dealing/understanding the Qur’an. It would just be the “decoding”31 of a text or the ethical reconstruction of its message,32 as God in the Qur’an has already said everything he wanted to communicate to mankind; the Qur’an is seemingly now complete/d. The contrasting view understands the Qur’an as the self-disclosure of God. In the Qur’an, one is directly confronted with God’s presence. The Qur’an is, therefore, not merely a text that wants to be interpreted but an encounter with God’s reality. This calls for freedom and wants to be experienced as an exercise of freedom itself, just as Muḥammad and the first addressees had experienced it. God is present in the experience of the Qur’an, especially in the act of recitation; His word means commitment, which sounds in the heart of the believer and touches it. His word wants to kindle the fire of love and makes the nondeniable offer even to the believer today. To accept this love and to realize it in life is the goal today.

The transcendent and the immanent side of the Qur’an According to traditional theology (Ash’arite as well as Maturide thought), God is one by means of His essential qualities, which is why both schools of theology start from the noncreation of the Qur’an. For both, the word of God corresponds to His essence. However, they make an important differentiation for they speak of the Qur’an as kalam lafẓi (“outer speech of God”) which gives expression and form to the kalam nafsi (“inner speech of God”).33 While kalam nafsi corresponds to the very nature of God, the kalam lafẓi is represented by human language and is created in time.34 Accordingly, one could say that traditional Islamic theology always distinguishes between the transcendent and the immanent sides/ aspects of the Qur’an. His transcendence and, thus, uncreated side expresses his unconditionality as the essential message, while his immanent and created side is the expression of his conditionality in the employed language. For the traditional Islamic Theologians, it was clear that God did not speak Arabic prior to the creation of the world, but that the concrete manifestation of the Qur’an in a clear Arabic language could only become a reality in time/creation. Yet it was important to them that this immanent verbalization of the essentially eternal message of God does, in fact, captures that message precisely in human words. With the Ash’arite and the Maturide position one could, therefore, argue that the Qur’an represents the essential message of God but has entered the conditioned/ material world as a spoken or recited word. This double character of the Qur’an, emphasized especially by the Ash’arite school, underlines an unconditional transcendental side: the Ash’arites here speak of the inner speech of God, the kalam nafsi,35 and a conditionally immanent side to complement it. Immediately one has to raise the question of how the transcendent (side) can be recognized in the immanent side.

150  Mouhanad Khorchide The Qur’an itself uses the term aya (“sign of God”) to think of the transcendent in the immanent. To explain this term, I refer to the “real-symbol” in Magnus Lerch, with which he refers to the “unity in difference of unconditional determination and conditional expression.”36 Therefore, the Qur’an is not God, for its conditional form “cannot be absolutely identical with the formal unconditional determination with regard to the specifications of the analysis of freedom;”37 but God is nevertheless present in the Qur’an. At the same time, that ultimately implies that the divinity of the Qur’an must be conveyed at the same time somehow. Here, the “spirit” (ruḥ) is of central importance.38 The Qur’an says that the word of God was not revealed to Muḥammad abruptly, but through the Spirit.3940 Since God has informed man through his Spirit (Q 15:29 [fa-idha sawwaytuhu wa-nafakhtu fīhi min ruḥi fa-qaʿu lahu sajidin, “So, when I have made him and have breathed into him of My Spirit, do ye fall down, prostrating yourselves unto him.”]), this spirit fulfills him, and enables man to be capable of recognizing God in the Qur’an. At the same time, it also enables him to update/ actualize His word in his own life. One could say that, according to traditional Islamic theology, when one speaks of the Qur’anic revelation one has to distinguish between the original uncreated divine word and the created Qur’anic speech. The latter is contingent and expressed in a human language that Muḥammad has proclaimed according to the Islamic faith, yet in it one encounters the essential word of God because both aspects correspond to one another but are not identical with one another. And so here I speak of the presence of God in the Qur’an. It is God himself who humans encounter in the Qur’an.

Following in the footsteps of Qur’anic mercy Mercy is the central category of the Qur’an. According to the Qur’an, God has committed himself to nothing other than mercy: kataba ʿala nafsihi l-raḥmata, “He hath prescribed for Himself mercy.” (Q 6:12). This statement is repeated in a late-Meccan sura in verse 54. God, therefore, attributes himself to mercy without reservation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the category of mercy is – quantitatively speaking – the attribute of God most strongly present in the Qur’an: divine loving mercy is mentioned 169 times (al-raḥman) while His forgiving mercy is mentioned 226 times (al-raḥim).41 However, the Qur’an also names other attributes that also seek to express the mercy of God, such as al-wadud (“affectionate”), al-ra’uf (“gentle, clement”), al-laṭif (“attentive, subtle”), etc., so that a total of 598 times such a name/attribute occurs in the Qur’anic discourse. A total of 113 of the 114 suras also begin with the invocation formula “bi-smi llahi l-raḥmani l-raḥim” (“In the name of God, the All-Merciful, the Beneficent”), which is generally known by the acronym “basmala.” As Angelika Neuwirth, scholar of Qur’anic studies, assumes, this formula most likely dates back to the Middle-Meccan period: Its use corresponds to that of the Trinity formula “In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit” in Christian texts prefixed in all public and

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 151 official communications. This is here (i.e. in the Qur’an) reframed as a statement about the one God.42 The Catholic theologian Klaus von Stosch refers to the current Metropolitan bishop of the Syrian Orthodox Church in Germany, Mor Philoxenos Mattais Nayis, when he writes: If one looks at the literature of pre-Islamic Syrian church fathers, one notes, however, that the basmala was a common introduction to one’s own speech even among Christians. Only in response to the usurpation of this speech by Muslims does the Christian invocation of the Trinity seem to have prevailed in response to the Muslim formula.43 By turning the mercy of God absolute while his punishment remains relative, the Qur’an raises God’s mercy to a great status encompassing all creation: “I smite with My punishment whom I will, and My mercy embraceth all things” (Q 7:156). The Islamic scholar Abdoldjavad Falaturi says: The number of those divine names which, because of his righteousness, indicate his wrath and his punishment, constitutes a fraction of what emphasizes his mercy. Even the mention of his righteousness (faḍl and qisṭ) is far behind in frequency, which also emphazises His mercy, forgiveness, goodness and mercy . . . that His mercy also includes those to be punished, is particularly emphasized by this juxtaposition.44 He sums up: “The basic attitude of Islam is based on the highest principle of action, raḥma.”45 Therefore, the Qur’an itself refers to the proclamation of Muḥammad as mercy: wa-ma arsalnaka illa raḥmatan li-l-ʿalamin, “We merely sent you as mercy for all the worlds” (Q 21:107), thus explaining it to be the center of its message and providing humans with an important hermeneutic key to encountering the Qur’an. But what exactly does mercy mean in the Qur’an? Etymologically, the Arabic term for mercy, raḥma, refers to gentleness of the heart (in Arabic: riqqa), affection/compassion (in Arabic: ta’aṭṭuf) and goodness (in Arabic: iḥsan);46 derived from the same root is also the word raḥim (“womb”).47 From the abundance of verbal and nominal forms derived from the root r-ḥ-m, two nouns, al-raḥman and al-raḥim, have gained central importance throughout Islam. When the Qur’an speaks of God’s mercy it uses these two terms, both derived from the term raḥma (mercy).48 Most scholars agree that both names al-raḥman and al-raḥim are not mere synonyms,49 for al-raḥmān (literally, one who possesses unsurpassable “raḥma“)50 refers to the mercy of God throughout His creation, while raḥim is limited to His mercy toward the faithful.51 Al-raḥman is, therefore, more comprehensive than al-raḥim and, thus, implies another quality of God’s mercy other than al-raḥim.52 Therefore, the classical exegete al-Qurṭubī (died 1272) emphasizes that al-raḥman is the term that substantial content (meaning: mercy) cannot surpass and therefore, unlike al-raḥim, can neither exist as a dual or plural.53

152  Mouhanad Khorchide The attribute al-raḥim is often used in the Qur’an in connection with the forgiveness of sins and is therefore very often coupled with the name of God, alghafur (“the forgiving”).54 Thus, al-raḥim is an “attribute of action.” If there is talk of mercy here, it is not of mercy as the act of forgiveness by God al-raḥim but as an expression of His absolute mercy as al-raḥmān, which affects all people equally. As al-raḥim, God forgives “whom He wants, and he punishes whoever he wants.”55 God sometimes gets angry56 and sometimes punishes.57 The mercy of God as al-raḥman seeks to express aspects other than the process of forgiveness. For al-raḥman is an expression of the unconditional devotion of God to man. This exact Qur’anic meaning of al-raḥman corresponds to the Syro-Aramaic translation of the word, namely the lover.58 Thus al-raḥman is the loving God. Therefore, one has to speak here of loving mercy in order to avoid misunderstandings, because with mercy is always meant as the character of God and His freedom directed to love. This mercy, inscribed in God’s nature, has nothing to do with the sovereignty one would now think of when that term is used. Von Stosch so quotes: This distinction would allow us to assert an unconditional and ever-lasting mercy of God for all people (. . .). God would then be always dedicated to peoples full of mercy and would be awaiting their turn towards Him.59 This loving compassion takes the literal meaning of the Semitic languages seriously and describes the concern of God to His “bowels.” In this picture, God is deeply touched by the need of the people. He does not have to choose this concern and cannot distance Himself from it without giving Himself away. Taking this idea into account, freedom would not be understood primarily as an absolute selfchoice, but rather as God’s self-correspondence in His unconditional commitment to and affinity with man. The revelation of God, therefore, must be understood as the loving mercy of God, which becomes manifest and which is nothing other than the nature of God itself. It is God who, in His unconditional mercy, reveals Himself to mankind through the Qur’an and invites them to an intimate relationship. Taking this idea into account, freedom would not be understood primarily as absolute selfelection, but rather as God’s self-correspondence in His unconditional dedication to mankind.

Divine mercy in the context of women The divine name al-raḥman appears prominently in the Qur’an in the middleMeccan period, namely in the group of the so-called raḥman-suras60 (Q 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 36, 43, 67, 68), hence the name Rahman phase. The divine name al-raḥman takes the place of the usual al-rabb/rabbuka (Lord / your Lord).61 In Central Mecca, therefore, something is put into the foreground, which has so far been addressed and experienced by the prophet and the church, but without that it was called with its own name of God: the personality and thus the emotionality

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 153 of God. God is not merely an uninvolved First cause of the world, but he gets involved in the people and reveals himself in the story, he can also move emotionally. He enters history, however, not in the form of a human, as in the case of Christianity, but as the merciful God, who is also experienced in the recitation of the Qur’an. Elsewhere, the Qur’an itself is described as mercy, e.g., B. Q 31:3; Q 45:20. The name of God al-raḥman is connected with Q 1:1 [bi-smi llahi l-raḥmani l-raḥim, “In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful”] as the since the late-Meccan period name of God Allah,62 who had previously been used only occasionally. The common name of God (Hebrew ha-raḥaman), which is also used in prominent Jewish liturgical and epigraphic texts, was probably transmitted to the North Arabic liturgical language via South Arabia. The etymologically and semantically closely related predication raḥim translates – so to say – the given name once more into the usual Arabic.63 Neuwirth assumes in the predominance of the name of God al-raḥman that there is a defined group of the middle-Meccan period, the so-called “raḥman-suras” beyond this genealogy; an initiation from the liturgical direction.64 Neuwirth refers here to Surat ar-Raḥman (Q 55), standing at the end of the early-Meccan period, a text that rewrites a liturgically prominent psalm (Ps 136) in terms of theology of creation and quite clearly has liturgical experience for the focusing of the guiding idea (cf. especially: harmony of creation as a sign of divine grace) was crucial [. . .] Consider, for example, the ubiquitous in the Christian liturgy Formal kyrie eleēson (“Lord, have mercy”).65 It is noteworthy that after the first mention of the divine name al-raḥman in Q 55 (the middle of the Qur’an), compassion appears for the first time in the Qur’an so prominently in connection with sura 19, a sura that deals extensively with Mary and Jesus.66 The Divine Mercy is the main theological theme of this entire sura. Neuwirth rightly points out that the discovery of mercy as the name of God is a special inheritance of Mary in the Qur’an and that this connection between the name of God with a female figure in view of the relationship of the concept of mercy (raḥma) with which the womb(raḥm) is no coincidence.67 The Qur’an obviously seeks to emphasize the continuity of the message of both religions (Islam and Christianity), namely by the mercy of God.68 This encounter is possible in the Quran also through the figure Jesus because both are referred to as mercy:69 The thesis that demonstrates that the mercy, which is represented by Jesus (Q 19:21), ties him to the common name of God in the middle-Meccan period. This mercy, a little later [namely in Q 19], becomes surprisingly clear in regard to the figure of Mary.70

154  Mouhanad Khorchide Especially in Q 3 and Q 5 which deal extensively with the Biblical figure of Jesus of Nazareth, the relationship between God and man is described in words of love. Accordingly, one can also find evidence in the Qur’an that the relationship between God and man is determined as a kind of love-relationship, and, indeed, as confirmation and even continuity of the Christian faith.

The Qur’an and the modern-day idea of freedom “Loving mercy” is the Qur’anic criterion for a fuller understanding of revelation: Q 21:107, wa-ma arsalnaka illa raḥmatan li-l-ʿalamin, “And we [God] have sent you [Muhammad] solely as mercy for all the worlds.” In the following, I would like to philosophically explain the discourse of “loving mercy” in the light of the concept of modern-day freedom in order to establish an intersubjective basis for such discourse. Why is the category of freedom appropriate to explore the hermeneutic key to a fuller understanding of the Qur’an? In its chronologically presumed last sura, namely Q 5, the Qur’an first and foremost describes a relationship between God and man, which has hitherto been far too insufficiently acknowledged within Islamic-theological thought. God speaks here of people yuḥibbuhum wa-yuḥibbunahu, “whom he loves and who love him” (Q 5:54) and whom he calls as witnesses to people who are about to lose their faith. Apparently, God has special confidence in these people whom he loves. Therefore, it does not seem too far-fetched to suppose that the proclaimer of the Qur’an accepts this reciprocal love-relationship as a most important aspect of the fulfillment of human existence itself. But when God invites people into a love-relationship, he has to also respect their freedom.71 For freedom is, anthropologically speaking, a constitutive criterion of love, and without freedom no sincere love for God can unfold to exist. Therefore, it can be said that God has sent prophets and their messages to people because he wants to invite them into this special love-relationship. That is why the call to Islam from the Qur’anic point of view is an invitation (da’wa) by all means. An invitation can only be accepted in full freedom if love should become a reality through it. If the freedom of man is to be preserved and protected, God will intervene in the world only in a way that does not undermine that freedom. Therefore, God seeks the freedom of man to enable freedom. First and foremost, it is man who realizes God’s intention for love and mercy and translates it into an experiential reality here and now. Therein lies the highest appreciation of man. He is God’s partner in this love-relationship, in the Qur’anic language “kalif” (khalifa), in order to make the divine intention a reality. Therefore, divine and human action should not be placed in competition or confrontation with each other. On the contrary, the more mankind advocates freedom, the more the intention of God is realized within His creation. Man’s commitment to this very freedom is realized in his actions with respect to love and mercy. Both must, therefore, become an acknowledged goal of human action. Here it must be noted that under freedom by no means merely the freedom of choice is meant, but the self-determination of man along with respective rational criteria.

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 155 This understanding of divine freedom means his decisiveness for man, in which he opens himself up to man in freedom and affirms the freedom of man respectively. It represents the epitome of God’s loving mercy. To think of God as freedom means to speak of a God, who is perfect in Himself and, therefore, is not in need of creation. He does not bring forth the world for the sake of its fulfillment and perfection. This corresponds to the traditional discourse about the absolute freedom of God (irada as the essence of God). At-Taftazānī,72 like many other scholars, argues that irada needs no motive behind it. It is the motive of all motives in God. It is only the loving mercy of God that causes God to create the world. It is not necessary, as it opens and allows for other aspects freedoms. This testifies to the omnipotence of God. This should also emphasize that the discourse about the nonnecessity of creation should by no means signify its abundance. The world – and above all man himself – is wanted by God, so it has a special meaning and appreciation. The Qur’anic creation narrative seeks to express this point: when God created man (symbolized by Adam in the Qur’an), the angels were commanded to prostrate themselves before man in order to emphasize their place as beings at the center of God’s interest.73 To think of God as this absolute freedom, and, therefore, as perfection, makes clear why the self-disclosure of this God is only a promise to the addressees of His revelation for its own sake and not because He needs something of and/or from them. Such a freedom-oriented theological approach places man at the very center of the event of revelation. Accordingly, it is the person who is a personal interlocutor of this commitment of God, and he is invited to voluntarily and consciously choose to accept this revelation. Thus, he relates to God and reciprocates His love in his own actions, affecting creation. The purpose of God’s self-disclosure is to invite people to accept the promise of God, who works together with the human being who is understood as caliph, the representative of God and the medium of the realization of God’s intention for love and mercy in history. Thereby the human being is able gain the tools of love and mercy in full freedom and, thus, is enabled to realize the intention of God for love and mercy by means of freedom. Following the Catholic Thomas Pröpper (d. 2015), well-respected scholar of dogmatic and fundamental theology, the point of departure for a theological reflection on God’s self-revelation should first and foremost be grounded in transcendental-logical reflection.74 Such reflection is most suitable to contemplate the bursting-forth of the unconditional in the nonconditional/contingent by means of a revelation-theological claim, paving out theological traces of anthropological dynamics. The transcendental-logical approach acknowledges the condition of the possibility of thinking about God’s disclosure as some sort of selfcommunication, and, thus, contemplates the event of revelation from a human point of view. This anthropological turn within the reflection on Islamic revelation aims to boost the discussion around the Qur’an into a more detailed dialogic dimension. Accordingly, the Qur’an represents God’s human-word, in which God reveals Himself into a history, experienced and guided by man, enabling Himself to be determined by it. Pröpper’s transcendental logical reflection on the selfdisclosure of God is a purely philosophical one that allows the application of

156  Mouhanad Khorchide his reflections independently of any specific religious conviction. In addition, he argues related to the subject and/or freedom. These two aspects make his reflections suitable for Islamic theology today. Following the philosopher Hermann Krings, Pröpper and his students speak of a transcendental or even formalistic unconditionality of freedom. Therefore, it is worthwhile to briefly summarize the Krings’ considerations once again. By His self-disclosure, God has revealed himself to man and, thus, opened Himself to him/her. This boundless and fundamental openness is the condition and very foundation of freedom. Freedom, on the other hand, also implies self-determination because only those who determine themselves (to a certain course) are free by all means.75 What seems to be initially a formal openness only turns concrete when it opens up to a specific content. If one reads a book, for instance, and deals with its content, one opens up to its content, and only then is one’s freedom actually realized. The principle openness that every person carries within him or herself gets concretized regarding a specific content (here: the content of the book). The concretization takes place in the sense of self-determination or freedom, which assigns to the free will a specific and concrete content.76 The will generally has “the transcendental meaning of opening itself to a contentual possibility, or of closing itself to it.”77 Only when it opens can it be the condition of self-determination. On the other hand, if it closes, this condition is no longer present, and, thus, no self-determination or freedom is given. This means that freedom is given only where the will opens, that is, if something is conceived as affirmative in nature. If formal openness becomes concrete through “a determination for a something” in the first place, the question immediately arises regarding this concrete content78 – in other words, the openness in regard to the affirmation of a something. If unlimited and, thus, principle openness is the condition for selfdetermination, “the corresponding determination of this self-determination is deeply founded in the affirmation of freedom itself,”79 The content of freedom that seeks to be fulfilled can be none other than freedom itself.80 Only in the affirmation of freedom is freedom fulfilled. Concretely, God fulfills freedom both formally and materially; God is freedom. His original will is the will to openness and, thus, to freedom. Transcendental freedom takes place only through the affirmation of another freedom. “Only in the resolution to the other freedom does freedom itself materializes in its full form,”81 for only in this way can the value of freedom be in “its assigned form and dignity.”82 That is, God’s perfect and unconditioned freedom takes place through the affirmation of human freedom itself. As such, human freedom refers to God’s perfect freedom, for man also carries within him a principle and unlimited openness, which only becomes concrete through the affirmation of freedom itself. “Man affirms such freedom in his freedom. He is freedom.”83 Unlike God, man still remains relative and transient. Since the exercise of human freedom is subject to a finiteness, the unconditionality of its freedom, which finds its condition in the principle and unlimited  – and, thus, inexhaustible, openness – it must be traced back to something unconditioned, namely

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 157 unconditional freedom. Man has always affirmed this unconditioned freedom by affirming finite freedom, and this unconditioned freedom is God himself. So that human freedom can exist as an affirmation of finite freedom, God must have unconditional freedom and must carry the unconditionality of human freedom. God, conceived as unconditional freedom, is the unconditioned “opening-up.” Human freedom takes place in the conditional dimension and, as such, is conditional for the time being. However, if it is really meant to be free, it is necessarily transcendental. By this is meant that freedom: if it is really to be freedom by all means, it cannot be fully explained by the conditions under which it takes place. Of course, freedom is shaped by environmental influences and genetic dispositions. But if people are just the product of them, they would not be called free. The condition of the possibility of asserting freedom is, thus, a moment of nonconditionality within human freedom. This nonconditionality does not call into question that human freedom takes place under certain conditions and is, therefore, never free from conditionality. But from a formal perspective, these conditions must not condition them completely if they are to be essential in themselves. By employing this discourse about freedom, it becomes clear that the thinking about freedom offers the possibility of developing a concept of the unconditioned dimension, which allows man to critically test claims of the unconditioned aspects.84 It also opens up an orientation, insofar as it can be shown by such thinking of freedom that freedom is realized only when it refers by itself to freedom; the fulfilling content of freedom can be none other than freedom itself.85 Only in the affirmation of freedom is freedom fulfilled.

The loving mercy of God as a call to freedom in the sense of self-determination If we translate these considerations of the God-man relationship into the Qur’anic discourse by means of God’s self-disclosure, it becomes clear that the Qur’an, in Muslim terms, is the reality of God’s commitment to man. He realizes it Himself in His dedication to man and by His loving mercy. The Qur’an is God’s dedication to man. In order to be able to fully trust this commitment, one has to seriously take into account that God’s will and essence are authentically expressed in it. That is calling the encounter with the Qur’an an encounter with God’s freedom. The acceptance of this commitment means in the particular situation an attitude of opening oneself to the human being. And so Muḥammad and the first addressees of the Qur’an perceived and experienced Him. It reveals an emotional, empathic God affected by the suffering, worries, hopes, expectations, fears, and desires of the people. It is precisely this emotionality, which meets the recipients of the Qur’an and wants to move them, that testifies to a thoroughly emotional God, to whom the suffering of the people, injustices in the world, poverty, wars, and oppression are not left untouched. This emotionality that strikes men in the Qur’an seeks to move man to action in order to reduce suffering and distress in the world. The loving mercy of God revealed in the Qur’an seeks to seize and move man to action, albeit without compromising his freedom, and therefore remains an

158  Mouhanad Khorchide inviting, loving mercy and not an engaging one. Love requires freedom not only in relation to the love of God but also in view of the freedom of man to respond to this divine love. Both freedoms are necessary to facilitate the realization of mutual love. The fact that God engages with man and reveals Himself to him is an expression of the nature of God as loving mercy. Therefore, we can say that God is essentially human-related and compassionate in the sense of his loving mercy. Precisely because this dedication of God to man corresponds to his being as freedom, we humans can have the confidence that God is serious with us humans and will not give us up. However, in the Qur’an, God does not reveal Himself detached from the story of Muḥammad and his community. This is, therefore, constitutive of the Qur’anic revelation. The story of the revelation of God’s loving mercy and the story/event of the Qur’an is the story of God’s involvement in the life of the community in Mecca and Medina in the seventh century. However, because He is involved in a way that enables and does not limit freedom, this involvement of God is an invitation to mankind for total freedom. The history of the Qur’an testifies at the same time to the acceptance and also rejection of this invitation. The loving mercy of God revealed in the Qur’an is an event that has been experienced as such by the addressees and wants to be experienced by the recipients of the Qur’an. Therefore, the Qur’an is more than a text or a book; it was, is, and remains an event of God’s loving mercy, which is recorded in the history of man: In the hereafter God will ask man: “I was sick and you I did not visit Me, I was hungry and you gave Me nothing to eat, and I was thirsty and you gave Me nothing to drink.” The man will then ask in astonishment: “But You are God, how can You be sick, be thirsty or be hungry?!” Then God will answer him: “That day, an acquaintance of yours was ill, and you did not visit him; if you had visited him, you would have found Me there with him. One day a friend of yours was hungry, and you did not give him anything to eat, and one day a friend of yours was thirsty, and you gave him nothing to drink.”86

The “openness” of the Qur’an and the daughter’s inheritance (Q 4:11) In Q 4:11 we read the instruction that female descendants should only receive one half of the inheritance, which is thought to belong to the male descendants, i.e., their brothers: yuṣikumu llahu fi ʾauladikum li-ḏ-ḏakari miṯlu ḥaẓẓi l-ʾunṯayaini, “God enjoins upon you concerning your children: unto the male a share equal to that of two females.” If one read this sentence outside its historical context and as divine instruction, eternally applicable, this would be a clear eternally binding obligation for all Muslims. This would be an ahistorical legal force. But if one accepts the Qur’an as a platform of an “open” and not “closed” communication, one must ask for the historical context of this enunciation, delineating the social background of the revelation and the social context of the reader/

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 159 listener. At the time, the possession of the deceased went to their sons or eldest son only, and daughters were deprived of inheritance altogether (if not arranged otherwise). The Qur’anic exegete, Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), author of one of the most widely spread and accepted Qur’anic commentaries Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (“Commentary”) preserves a tradition that reports that many early believers were puzzled by Muhammad’s message; they argued that it is most inappropriate to give a share of the inheritance to women and, therefore, rejected the message: “Women and little children should be given a share of the inheritance, even though they are not able to fight in the battle and could never get their hands on spoils of war? Withhold this (strange) idea of Muhammad, maybe he will forget, what he had taught, or we could even persuade him to repeal such regulations.”87 And Ibn Kathir even continues: “They went to the prophet and complained (about it) [. . .], because the people in pre-Islamic times used to give inheritance to the male, but not to the females; only those, who partook in wars were eligible to inherit. There were split according to age [i.e. older member of the family got more than younger family members].”88 Upon this occasion this very verse was revealed. We can conclude that the reason for the pre-Islamic inheritance regulations is based in historical and societal conditions. Among the pre-Islamic tribes, significant competition and rivalry, the battle for economic well-being and dominance was every-day business, resulting in armed conflicts and battles. Spoils of war guaranteed the survival of the tribe, and the one who was successful in warfare, and therefore financially well-off was granted a higher rank in the tribal system. Such factors are equally reflected in the inheritance regulations. Women were understood as risk factors: they were often relegated to spoils of war, a subject and matter for the victors, humiliating the pride of the beaten tribe; furthermore, women were often married to men of other tribes for political and economic reasons. Therefore, women should not inherit anything at all, so that the property of a tribe or parts thereof would not fall into the hands of opponent tribes. The prophet Muhammad wanted to clean up those discriminatory structures, and he constantly worked for this task. In his opinion, women should become a full-fledged member of society and be acknowledged as such. Read in this historical context, the verse Q 4:11 becomes clearly about inheritance-regulation. Here, it was, in fact, a revolutionary first step toward the task of granting equality to all members of society. However, from our present-day perspective, such a regulation would still mean a retrograde step in the bigger struggle for gender balance. It is, therefore, paramount not to stop at this first step, taken in the early seventh century, but to acknowledge the Qur’anic revelation as “open” in its potential. It is the task of today’s Qur’anic hermeneutics to accept the impetus of the Qur’an and go further all along the line, meaning to granting full dignity to women. It is at this point that Qur’anic hermeneutics must be inspired by God’s loving mercy in history, which is inviting to freedom. Somebody could raise the objections, asking why the Qur’an is not clearly stating what was intended. Why is the Qur’an not directly addressing the equality of men and women; why is the Qur’an not demanding the same share of the inheritance for women as for men? At this point one has to once again be reminded of the communicative character of the revelation, as God reveals himself into

160  Mouhanad Khorchide history. And the history is itself constitutive for the external form and language of the revelation. Within the historical context, into which Q 4:11 was revealed, the equality of men and women was unknown. The Qur’anic verdict, to grant surviving dependents of the female sex half of the amount of the dependents of male sex, must be regards as a great revolution – a revolution that was not accepted without criticism by everyone because it was considered a too progressive step. If we read the verse in Q 4:11 in its historical context, into which the message was revealed, it becomes clear that God’s loving will invites women to progress and demands for them financial emancipation in order to be slowly exempted from the rigid boundaries of the patriarchal structures of their respective societies. Such impetus, mind you, is reasonable in its historical context. As such, I cannot extract the advocacy of equal rights from this verse alone. But I can discover in the very verse evidence for God’s loving mercy, evidence for his involvement in history and ultimately handing over to mankind the gift of freedom. This is the task of the exegete today; my task, namely to decipher God’s loving mercy, as I encounter it constantly in the Qur’an and to appropriate it within today’s categories and realize its full potential in my very own history. Today, we would unequivocally speak of the equality of men and women, not only because the Qur’an speaks about it or alludes to it in various ways but also because we are convinced that equality grants and guarantees the dignity of both sexes as well as their right to human autonomy. Ultimately, it is the realization of God’s loving mercy, inviting mankind to autonomous humanity. This example should make clear what sort of consequences the diverging readings of revelation could bring about and what consequences this would mean for the present discourse about and around Islam. This applies also to questions such as: “is Islam reconcilable with human rights?” or “is Islam compatible with the fundamental values of democracy?” It is our task as Muslims to realize God’s loving mercy in man’s own history, in accord with man’s experiences and possibilities today. In doing so, the event of the Qur’an would remain “open,” which has ever since been the history of the involvement of God with human affairs. He does not want to take action against us, or without us, but longs dearly to act jointly with His creation. God acts in dialogue, or better, in tandem with human freedom: a freedom He implicitly wants to make use of.

Two steps toward a theological hermeneutics of the Qur’an This understanding of the Qur’an as a dialogical communication has also significant consequences with regard to the theological/ historical approach today. As the Qur’an is understood dialogically (the applied hermeneutics must be dialogical in order to prove its validity) this ultimately leads to the actualization of the event of revelation. It not only reveals the divine mercy within the history of the Qur’anic event and its testimonial (i.e., probable denial) but also paves the way for an encounter with God’s loving mercy, then and now.

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 161 It is not about delineating the last and final aspect of meaning or every single Qur’anic verse or every single sura; to finally reach the opinion to have understood the Qur’an completely and perfectly. It is not about a single true interpretation of the Qur’an, because there is no such thing. The Qur’an in its Arabic language is a form of God’s self-disclosure of revelatory content. The Qur’an is the realization of God’s loving mercy. Nothing else is at stake in our project of a thematic commentary of the Qur’an that tries to bridge the abyss separating historical and theological understandings, respectively. The loving mercy can be experienced in and through the Qur’an from the earliest moment of the Qur’anic event, stretching over a period from 610 and 632. By application of the historical/ critical method, it is for us to discover the various possibilities to implement this mercy in our lives and to urge coreligionists to do the same. This is done through a two-step regime: Step 1: Firstly, it is about the discovery of the testimonials of the loving mercy of God within the event of the Qur’an (610–632), and the question concerning its realization in reality. At what point, and in what situation, did the Qur’an reach the first addressees, lighting the sensible flame of love? What kind of change was initiated by the Qur’anic message by means of liberation? Step 2: Secondly, it is about today’s situation. The recipients of the Qur’anic message today must be sensitized to a reading of the Qur’an that discovers God’s loving mercy. The possibility should be opened not only to realize the loving mercy at work but also to implement it within their own lives and to turn it into a first-hand experience. Such experience guarantees that the Qur’an lives on in the experience of the believers, and that the human will not be deprived of the feeling of shelteredness in God’s love. The Qur’an wants to be understood as a message, instructing less about judgements and rulings or juridical quality, but inviting toward love. God does not turn addressees into objects of serfdom. On the contrary, they remain constant subjects of the Qur’an itself, inscribing themselves into the life-realities by means of an “open” communication with the merciful God. In doing so, they ask themselves the question: how and to what extent can they implement the experience love, encountered through the emotional relationship with the Qur’an and how to carry it along their respective life plans. A theological hermeneutics of the Qur’an does not focus on the seclusion of divine revelation, because revelation is an “event” which recurrently happens at any time, in every human encounter with the message, especially by means of its chanted recitation. If the human only accepts this invitation to encounter love and mercy, and actualizes and realized it in his/her own actions, he/she perpetually continues the divine message. As the history of the Qur’an is the history of the reality of divine loving mercy, so the life of the faithful should be itself a testimony to that divine loving mercy. These thoughts will surely be elaborated over the years to come, but they can already bolster us Muslims up and call us to open up more vigorously. The Qur’an call us to religious confidence, namely that the divine message invites us to freedom, touching our hearts to their depths, and encouraging us to become His extended hands of love.

162  Mouhanad Khorchide

Conclusion Many feminists are accused of arbitrariness in their Qur’an readings as they put into perspective unpleasant verses or statements of the Qur’an without having made clear criteria for their actions. The concern of what I call historicaltheological hermeneutics is to show that if I “think away” the Qur’an today and do not stop at the wording, it is by no means a selective reading. The Qur’an is the manifestation of the presence of one loving, merciful God, who not only met the first addressees of the Qur’an in the seventh century but also revealed Himself to man today through the Qur’an. This self-presence of God as loving mercy is the hermeneutic criterion for thinking ahead of the Qur’an. It is a theological criterion (hence the term theological hermeneutics), and this mercy has been attested to by the history of the proclamation of the Qur’an in the seventh century, continuing today through its readers and recipients. Revelation does not happen monologically but dialogically, by God revealing to people their respective history. In order to preserve the freedom of man, this God makes himself “dependent” on man and his history in the act of revelation. He does not reveal Himself by divine categories, to which man has no access, but enters the history of man. People get involved with him in order to address him in categories that are understandable for him. In the following a conclusive summary of the proposed historical-theological hermeneutics of the Qur’an is offered and described in seven points: (1) The point is departure is the acceptance of the Qur’an as a divine selfrevelation, meaning that the one can encounter God instantaneously in and through the Qur’an. In such an understanding, the Qur’an reveals to be much more than just a message written by God and addressed to mankind. It is God, who immediately discloses himself; it is God who one encounters in and through the Qur’an. For that very reason I wish to lay out the basis for a theological hermeneutics of the Qur’an, in which the claim to a better understanding of the Qur’an, is much more than just a question of textual interpretation by means of text-treatment, but the question about the encounter with God itself. The Qur’an is, thus, not only a text which calls to interpretation but also an encounter with the divine reality, calling to liberty and which aims are to be experienced in freedom, just as Muhammad and the first addresses of the message have experience it. God is first and foremost present in the experience of the Qur’an by means of recitation, his unconditioned promised word in the Qur’an. It is an offer which concerns my life in the here and now, and challenges me to accept this love and to implement it into my daily life. This understanding of the Qur’an and God as conveyed instructions/a message on the one side and its understanding as divine presence revealed by the Qur’an on the other is vital for my exegetical work and the entire project of the commentary. (2) The Qur’an is understood as divine self-disclosure. But of what kind of God are we talking about here? The category of loving mercy is positioned as the

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 163 Qur’anic revelation, and so we could say that the Qur’an is the revelation of divine loving mercy itself. (3) The revelation is not understood as a monologue; the Qur’an is not at all the sole speech of God, but rather a sign of his involvement in history. (4) That also means that history is constitutive for the form of the revelation itself and as such one cannot understand or make sense of the revelation without understanding the history of the enunciation of the Qur’an in the early seventh century. (5) The task of a historical/ theological hermeneutics of the Qur’an in the unfolding of God’s mercy by means of his involvement in history. But where can this be made concrete? How did the revelation transform the society in the seventh century? And how can we trace the direction of impact? Here I am speaking explicitly of “direction of impact,” because the Qur’an remains “open” and invites man today to continue and perpetuate this “direction of impact.” (6) That means ultimately that the Qur’an remains “open” and not “closed” in its impact. The “direction of impact” will be sought over, elaborated and updated – even in today’s society. (7) In discussing the revelation of God through the Qur’an, I join modern-day thinking in terms of freedom, in order to make the modern turn to the subject fruitful for dealing with Islamic revelation. Freedom, as the determinant of the relationship between God and man, corresponds to the Qur’anic category of mercy, which should be called “loving mercy” in the sense of the Syro-Aramaic interpretation of the Qur’anic word for the description of the nature of God al-raḥmān (the lover) to differentiate from a mere forgiving mercy.89 With the loving mercy, there is the unconditional devotion of God to man and his determination for him and thus for his freedom to understand. In the center of the speech of God, therefore, stands human freedom in its original unconditionality. At the same time, this is regarded as an indication of man’s lasting responsiveness to and reliance on a word that reveals itself. To think of revelation as a process of freedom solves the problem of a constructive competitive position of divine and human freedom, of divine and human will. In the event of love as a free accommodation, the other freedom remains and is acknowledged and man is further encouraged to redefine himself out of this obliging love.90 Because freedom is realized through the affirmation of other freedoms, there is no rivalry between divine and human freedom and thus no mutual limitation or even negation, just a complementary relationship. Freedom as belonging to the essence of God means that God by nature has determined to give himself freedom. Equipped with this freedom, man is given the potential to realize himself as this freedom. If the Qur’an has determined the goal of divine creation as a search for loved ones, “he loves them and they love him” (Q 5:54), freedom is already included. And so, the history of God with the human – and closely related to His selfrevelation happening – is necessarily a story of freedom and an experience of freedom, because love presupposes real freedom; freedom is the law of love.

164  Mouhanad Khorchide According to the Qur’anic self-testimony, the seal of freedom is man’s destiny as khalīf (“deputy of God”), a medium for the realization of God’s intention for love and mercy. In order to protect the freedom of man, God only intervenes in the world in a way that does not interfere with man’s freedom, and, therefore, mainly through man himself, who is free to release freedom/love. It is not God who intervenes directly in the world to eliminate famine, or to prevent wars or evil, but we humans are the “hands” of God to accomplish this when he/ she makes him/herself available in freedom. Man, thus, has a responsibility in God’s creative work. By opening up God and making himself available as a medium for the realization of God’s love and mercy, man realizes his own freedom. And that is exactly the story of the revelation of the Qur’an. It is a story whose main actors are God and man. In it, God visualizes himself in human categories (in the created Arabic language of the Qur’an, which corresponds to, but is not identical with, the essence of God). The Qur’an is the revelation of God in the word of man. For the revelation of God as an event of absolute freedom, it wants to encourage the addressees of the Qur’an to freedom and does in no way want to turn them into uninvolved recipients alone, mere objects of God’s mercy. At the same time, the Qur’an testifies to the risk that God takes to determine his relationship with people as a freedom-relationship, as He gives freedom to man. Very often, humans have abused this very freedom, they have been given and permanently misrepresented it. This is the situation still today. The Qur’an as the self-revelation of God in human categories testifies to this relationship between God and man. Therefore, the Qur’an does not draw the picture of a perfect world without suffering, war, and selfishness, but describes existing deficits that mostly result from the abuse of human freedom and the rejection of freedom. He wants to encourage, through his poignant and moving sound, both the first addressees as well as the present recipients of the Qur’an, through their own actions and through their commitment in the world, to be a medium for the realization of divine loving mercy. They will then become self-aware and selfreliant to meet his/ her own freedom. Through the sound of the Qur’an, God’s self-revelation happens in every act of recitation and listening to the Qur’an. The first addressees of the Qur’an have heard this as a promise of the loving mercy of God and as an encounter with the absoluteness of His divine freedom, which calls the addressees of the Qur’an to freedom. At the same time, Muḥammad and his community faced the condition/s of human freedom. Humans reach their limits, and not infrequently break with the promise, and thus excessively demonstrate the lack of freedom, an attitude of self-closing. The realization of man as a free being is always threatened by failure. And it is precisely here that the encounter with the loving mercy of God revealed in the Qur’an should give hope. It wants to liberate man and light the fire for love.

Notes 1 “Lo! men who surrender unto God, and women who surrender, and men who believe and women who believe, and men who obey and women who obey, and men who speak the truth and women who speak the truth, and men who persevere (in righteousness) and women who persevere, and men who are humble and women who are

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 165 humble, and men who give alms and women who give alms, and men who fast and women who fast, and men who guard their modesty and women who guard (their modesty), and men who remember God much and women who remember – God hath prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward.” 2 “God chargeth you concerning (the provision for) your children: to the male the equivalent of the portion of two females, and if there be women more than two, then theirs is two-thirds of the inheritance, and if there be one (only) then the half. And to each of his parents a sixth of the inheritance, if he have a son; and if he have no son and his parents are his heirs, then to his mother appertaineth the third; and if he have brethren, then to his mother appertaineth the sixth, after any legacy he may have bequeathed, or debt (hath been paid). Your parents and your children: Ye know not which of them is nearer unto you in usefulness. It is an injunction from God. Lo! God is Knower, Wise.” 3 “Men are in charge of women, because God hath made the one of them to excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of women). So good women are the obedient, guarding in secret that which God hath guarded. As for those from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, and scourge them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! God is ever High, Exalted, Great.” 4 For the Christian context cf. Pröpper 1991. 5 See von Stosch 2016, 11ff. 6 The beginnings of such historical contextualization dates back to the time of classical exegesis in Islam, e.g., the sub-disciplines (a) asbab al-nuzul (“occasions of revelations”), (b) al-nasikh wa-l-mansukh (“the abrogating and abrogated [verses]”), as well as (c) the differentiation between Meccan and Madinian verses and their chronological ordering (=the diachrone reading of the Qur’an) 7 See Rahman 1982. Here Rahman develops the methodological method, which he calls “double movement,” a two-step hermenenutics of the Qur’an. For biographical details cf. Amirpur 2013, 91–116. 8 See Sonn 1991. 9 See Körner 2005, 118–121. 10 See Barlas 2002. 11 See Wadud 1999, 2006. 12 Wadud 2006, 195. 13 Ibid., 196. 14 Wadud 2004, 331; cf. also Wadud 1999, 100f. 15 For example, Q 4:4 “And give unto the women (whom ye marry) free gift of their marriage portions; but if they of their own accord remit unto you a part thereof, then ye are welcome to absorb it (in your wealth).” and/or Q 4:34, while other are granted the status of general verses, as e.g., Q 4:11 and/or Q 33:35. 16 See Hidayatullah 2014. 17 Beating of women in Q 4:34; the superiority of men in Q 2:228: “Women who are divorced shall wait, keeping themselves apart, three (monthly) courses. And it is not lawful for them that they should conceal that which Allah hath created in their wombs if they are believers in Allah and the Last Day. And their husbands would do better to take them back in that case if they desire a reconciliation. And they (women) have rights similar to those (of men) over them in kindness, and men are a degree above them. Allah is Mighty, Wise.” 18 von Stosch 2016, 26; see also von Stosch 2008: “The Qur’an is like a finger, pointing in a certain direction; it would be wrong to stare at the finger.” 19 von Stosch 2016, 26f. 20 See Bauer 2011, 130. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid, 130f.

166  Mouhanad Khorchide 25 See Khorchide 2018, 78ff. 26 Falaturi laments: “Obviously, Islamic theologians and philosophers have felt no need to ask the question of the possibility and reality of a human experience of God beyond their speculations about God, the necessity of their existence, and beyond their properties. It is even difficult to find a fitting Arabic or Persian expression for God’s experience, without running the risk of belittling, humanizing, or enslaving the Islamic God in his absolute transcendence. It is therefore necessary to start with this question of the purely religious feeling of a devout Muslim and to keep strictly to the Koran source wise, without the disagreement of the Islamic schools and schools to play.” (Falaturi 1980, 45. 27 See Khorchide 2018, 124. 28 Ibid., 124. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 See Ab Abu Zaid 2008, 165. 32 See von Stosch 2016, 26. 33 See al-Bāqillānī 2000, 84ff. 34 Ibid. 35 al-Āmidī 2004, 353ff. 36 Lerch 2017. 37 Lerch 2015, 310. 38 See the unpublished dissertation by Cornelia Dockter, “Wort im Geist. Zur Bedeutung Jesu Christi in Christentum und Islam.” 39 See, for example, Q 26:193: “Which the true Spirit hath brought down. 40 In the Islamic tradition, this spirit is identified as Gabriel. 41 Shomali and Heydarpoor 2008, 19. 42 Neuwirth 2017, 88. 43 von Stosch 2016, 65. 44 Falaturi 1996, 66f. 45 Ibid., 80. 46 See Ibn Manẓūr n.d., 1611f. 47 Ibid., 1613. 48 See aṭ-Ṭabarī 2001, 125; cf. also al-Qurṭubī 2006, 160; and al-Bayḍāwī 1998, 27. The following hadith have been handed down to at-Tirmiḏī and Aḥmad: “The Prophet Muḥammad said: ‘God the Exalted said: I am al-Raḥman, I have created the womb (Arabic: raḥim) and made him a name from my name.’ ” Thus, al-raḥman gains a physical and emotional connotation of maternal love. Abdoldjavad Falaturi writes: “The relationship between God and man thus acquires maternal, ie feminine, traits in Islam and paternal, not male, traits, as in Christianity. His relationship to men is thus not based on his omnipotence, that is, on his strength, but more determined by raḥma (mercy), which, as the highest principle of action, even points towards this direction” See also Falaturi 1996, 76. 49 aṭ-Ṭabarī 2001, vol. 1, 125. 50 Ibn Manẓūr n.d., 1612. Ibn Manẓūr quotes al-Azharī: “one should not call anyone other than God” ar-rahman “because ar-rahmān should express the unsurpassable mercy. Ibn ‘Arabī considers ar-rahmān to be the noblest name of God (cf. al-Qurṭubī 2006, vol. 1, 163). 51 See aṭ-Ṭabarī 2001, vol. 1, 126; al-Qurṭubī 2006, vol. 1, 162; al-Kalbī, Abū l-Qāsim Ibn Juzzī (1995) al-Tashīl li ʿulūm al-tanzīl, vol. 1, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāshim (Beirut), 43 cf. also an-Nasafī 2005, 30. 52 See al-Bayḍāwī 1998, vol. 1, 27; al-Kalbī 1995, vol. 1, 43; an-Nasafī 2005, vol. 1, 30; cf. also Ibn Kaṯīr 1999, 124. 53 See al-Qurṭubī 2006, vol. 1, 160. 54 See Q 2:37, 2:54, 2:128, 2:160, 9:104, 9:118, 10:107, 12:98. 55 Q 3:129, see also Q 48:14.

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 167 56 See Q 2:61, 2:90, 4:93. 57 See Q 3:128, 4:173, 5:40. 58 Muslim exegetes such as ar-Rāzī mention the possibility of a Syro-Aramaic origin of the name of God al-raḥman. See his commentary on Sura al-Fatiḥa, ar-Rāzī 1981, 1169. 59 von Stosch 2016, 67. 60 See ibid., 33ff. 61 For this reason, Neuwirth locates the origin of the basmala in the Middle-Meccan period. (Cf. Neuwirth 2017, 88; 2010, 472ff). 62 On the history of the name Kiltz (2011). 63 Neuwirth 2010, 88f. 64 Ibid., 89. 65 Ibid. 66 Neuwirth 2017, 487f., 2010, 605, 641. 67 Neuwirth 2010, 636ff. 68 von Stosch 2016, 65. 69 Also interesting is the fact that God’s mercy is so prominently portrayed in sura 19, which at the same time addresses the relationship between parents and children and, at the same time, details Jesus’ birth in detail. This implicitly assesses the relationship between parents and their children under the guiding category of mercy and taps into it. In addition, Jesus’ life is placed under this guiding category and interpreted by her. 70 von Stosch 2016, 154. 71 This is what God also does according to the Koranic testimony, because he has committed people to the original contract. (Q 7: 172): “Am I not your master? They answer with a clear, ‘yes,’ so be it.” Also in the rabbinic tradition, one encounters a similar representation in which God did not simply oblige man without return, but proved them good deeds and then swayed to the Lord, what then accept them in recognition of God’s care. On that point cf. Hartwig 2008, 191–202. 72 at-Taftazānī 1988. 73 See Q 2:34. 74 See especially, Pröpper 1991, 183ff. 75 See Krings 1980, 171. 76 See ibid. 77 See ibid., 173. 78 See ibid., 172. 79 Budi Kleden 2001, 81. 80 Krings 1980, 174. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Budi Kleden 2001, 81. 84 See von Stosch, Klaus 2010, 74–81. 85 Krings 1980, 174. 86 Muslim, ḥadith-number 2569. 87 Ibn Kaṯīr 1996. 88 Ibid. 89 See Khorchide 2018, 105ff. 90 See Jansen 2007, 92; also Pröpper 1991, 176.

Bibliography Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid (2008) Gottes Menschenwort (Freiburg in Breisgrau: Herder). al-Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn (2004) Abkar al-afkar fī usūl al-dīn, vol. 1 (Kairo). al-Bāqillānī (2000) al-Inṣāf fīmā yajib iʿtiqādu wa-lā yajūz al-jahl bihi, ed. M. al-Kawtharī (Kairo).

168  Mouhanad Khorchide al-Bayḍāwī, al-Qādī (1998) Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-taʾwīl, vol. 1 (Istanbul). al-Kalbī, Abū l-Qāsim Ibn Juzzī (1995) al-Tashīl li ʿulūm al-tanzīl, vol. 1, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāshim (Beirut). al-Qurṭubī, Abū ʿAbd Allāh (2006) al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-qurʾān, vol. 1, ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkī (Beirut). an-Nasafī, Abū l-Barakāt (2005) Madārik al-tanzīl, vol. 1, ed. Marwān al-Shaʿʿār (Beirut). Amirpur, Katajun (2013) Den Islam neu denken: Der Dschihad für Demokratie, Freiheit und Frauenrechte (München: Verlag C. H. Beck). ar-Rāzī, Muḥammad Ibn ʿUmar Fakhr al-Dīn (1981) Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī al-mushahhar bi-l-tafsīr al-kabīr wa-mafātīḥ al-ghayb, vol. 1 (Beirut). at-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad Ibn Jarīr (2001) Tafsīr al-ṭabarī: Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-qurʾān, vol. 1, ed. ʿAbd Allāh al-Turkī (Kairo). at-Taftazānī, Saʿd al-Dīn (1988) Sharḥ al-aqāʾid al-nasafīya, ed. Aḥmad as-Siqqā (Kairo). Barlas, Asma (2002) “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an (Austin: Saqi). Bauer, Thomas (2011) Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine andere Geschichte des Islam (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen). Budi Kleden, Paulus (2001) Christologie in Fragmenten: Die Rede von Jesus Christus im Spannungsfeld von Hoffnungs- und Leidensgeschichte bei J. B. Metz (Münster: Lit). Dockter, Cornelia “Wort im Geist. Zur Bedeutung Jesu Christi in Christentum und Islam” (unpublished dissertation). Falaturi, Abdoljavad (1980) “Wie ist menschliche Gotteserfahrung trotz des strengen islamischen Monotheismus möglich?” in Drei Wege zu dem einen Gott: Glaubenserfahrung in den monotheistischen Religionen, ed. Abdoljavad Falaturi, et al. (Freiburg: Herder), 45–49. Falaturi, Abdoldjavad (1996) “Der Islam – Religion der raḥma, der Barmherzigkeit,” in Der Islam im Dialog – Aufsätze von Professor Abdoljavad Falaturi, ed. Abdoljavad Falaturi, et al. (Hamburg: Islamwissenschaftliche Akademie Verlag). Hartwig, Dirk (2008) “Der ‘Urvertrag’ (Q 7:172) – ein rabbinischer Diskurs im Koran,” in “Im vollen Licht der Geschichte”: Die Wissenschaft des Judentums und die Anfänge der kritischen Koranforschung, ed. Dirk Hartwig, et al. (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag). Hidayatullah, Aysha Anjum (2014) Feminist Edges of the Qur’an (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Ibn Kaṯīr, Ismāʿīl (1996) Tafsīr al-qurʾān, vol. 1 (Beirut). Ibn Kaṯīr, Ismāʿīl (1999) Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm, vol. 1, ed. Sāmī al-Salāma (Riad). Ibn Manẓūr (nd) Lisān al-ʿarab, ed. Abdullāh al-Kabīr, et al. (Kairo). Jansen, Helmut (2007) Wenn Freiheit wirklich wird. Erlebnispädagogische Jugendpastoral in kritischer Sichtung (Münster: Lit). Khorchide, Mouhanad (2018) Gottesoffenbarung in Menschenwort: Der Koran im Lichte der Barmherzigkeit (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder). Kiltz, David (2011) “The Relationship Between Arabic Allāh and Syriac Allāhā,” in Der Islam, vol. 88 (Berlin: De Gruyter), 33–50. Körner, Felix (2005) Revisionist Koran Hermeneutics in Contemporary Turkish University Theology: Rethinking Islam (Würzburg: Ergon). Krings, Hermann (1980) “Freiheit: Ein Versuch Gott zu denken,” in System und Freiheit: Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. Günther Bien (Freiburg: Alber). Lerch, Magnus (2015) Selbstmitteilung Gottes: Herausforderungen einer freiheitstheoretischen Offenbarungstheologie (Regensburg: Pustet).

The Qur’anic turn of women’s image 169 Lerch, Magnus (2017) Hypostatische Union als Freiheitsgeschehen: Zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion um eine transzendentalphilosophische Reformulierung der Christologie (Wien). (quoted in unpublished dissertation from Cornelia Dockter: Wort im Geist. Zur Bedeutung Jesu Christi in Christentum und Islam), 11. Neuwirth, Angelika (2010) Der Koran als Text der Spätantike (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen). Neuwirth, Angelika (2017) Der Koran, vol. 2/1: Frühmittelmekkanische Suren: Das neue Gottesvolk: “Biblisierung” des altarabischen Weltbildes (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen). Pröpper, Thomas (1991) Erlösungsglaube und Freiheitsgeschichte: Eine Skizze zur Soteriologie (München: Kösel). Pröpper, Thomas (2001) Evangelium und freie Vernunft: Konturen einer theologischen Hermeneutik (Freiburg: Herder). Rahman, Fazur (1982) Islam and Modernity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Shomali, Mohammed Ali, and Mahnaz Heydarpoor (2008) “The Image of God in the Qur’an,” in God: Existence and Attributes, Hg. Mohammad Ali Shomali (London: Institute of Islamic Studies). Sonn, Tamara (1991) “Fazlur Rahman’s Islamic Methodology,” The Muslim World 81: 212–230. von Stosch, Klaus (2008) “Die fünf Aspekte der Scharia,” Forschung Frankfurt 1: 28. von Stosch, Klaus (2010) Offenbarung (Paderborn: Schöningh). von Stosch, Klaus (2016) Herausforderung Islam: Christliche Annäherungen (Paderborn: Schöningh). Wadud, Amina (1999) Qur’an and Women: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press). Wadud, Amina (2004) “Qur’an, Gender and Interpretive Possibilities,” HAWWA – Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 2: 317–336. Wadud, Amina (2006) Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld Publications).

9 Verse 4:34 Abjure symbolic violence, rebuff feminist partiality, or seek another hermeneutic? Celene Ibrahim Crisis of conscience Direct and authenticated prophetic teachings prohibit injuring a wife; this is not a matter up for contention in normative frameworks of Islamic law that base their jurisdictional authority in the Qur’an and sunna.1 At the same time, preliminary anthropological data suggests that there is general confusion over what acceptable means of conflict resolution between spouses entails with respect to the guidelines of the Qur’an, sunna, and subsequent interpretive frameworks.2 Furthermore, one verse of the Qur’an in particular, verse 4:34, prompts what feminist scholar and theologian Laury Silver’s has called a “crisis of conscience”3 in that the literal meaning of the verse could – and has – been interpreted as the Qur’an itself commanding acts that could be placed in the category of domestic violence. As a professional chaplain who is responsible both for teaching and providing pastoral care, and in particular as someone who is called upon to provide premarital counseling and to guide married couples through difficulties in their relationship, the ethical guidelines of such dispute resolution strategies are to me of practical concern. In a pastoral care context, how should the ethical limits be articulated so as to be coherent with the letter and spirit of Islam and effective in securing the wellbeing of all parties? As someone who is particularly invested in issues of women’s well-being and in elevating women’s concerns within the arena of Islamic legal discourse, I also have an investment in how, on a theoretical level, normative principles are derived, articulated, and taught. In several key ways, verse 4:34 potentially places the scholar-practitioner concerned with the ethics of marital dispute resolution at a hermeneutic impasse. She could break with a historically mainstream Qur’anic interpretation by claiming that previous scholars did not quite articulate the true gist of the Qur’anic message; she can allow for some degree of physical “correction” of “recalcitrant” women albeit as a noninjurious intervention that somehow serves the greater good; or she can assert that God’s intent is for a gradualist reform process whereby in the current age even noninjurious physical discipline is unacceptable, even if corporal forms of spousal reprimand were not outright prohibited by some of the most influential scholars who derived Islamic law in the medieval period. As we will see, each of these solutions carries its own advantages and disadvantages and wider implications,

Verse 4:34 171 and the key to get through this impasse on a practical level might not even lie within the domain of hermeneutics.

A weighty word A few words on the nature, import, and general etiquette of exegesis are in order. In an early Meccan verse, the Qur’an describes its revelation upon the Prophet Muhammad as “a weighty word” (Q. 73:5), and core to the etiquette of the religious scholar is showing great deference when attempting to elucidate the divine command. One such religious authority, Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali (b. ah 736/1335 ce), the founder of a school of Islamic law that has endured to the present, reflects on the reticence of his predecessors in issuing opinions on matters of religious law: The early imāms were cautious about speaking about it [the lawful and unlawful], because one who speaks about such matters is relating information from Allah, enunciating His commandments and prohibitions, and passing on His sacred law. It was said about Ibn Sīrīn, “If he was asked about something regarding the lawful or the unlawful, his color would change. He would be transformed until he no longer seemed the same person.” ʿAṭāʾ ibn al-Sāʾib said, “I met people who, when asked for a religious verdict, would tremble as they spoke.” It is related that when Imam Mālik was asked about a legal matter, it was as if he were suspended between Heaven and Hell. Imām Aḥmad was extremely hesitant to speak on the lawful and unlawful, to claim that something was abrogated, or related matters that others would readily expound. He frequently prefaced his answers with phrases such as, “I hope that. . . ,” “I fear. . . ,” or “It is more beloved to me.” Imām Mālik and others used to frequently say, “I do not know.”4 In this paradigm, uncertainty is deemed virtuous and humility is not simply a matter of showing polite etiquette; skilled interpreters must be on guard against egoistic or politically expedient commentary as they are attempting to elucidate the divine command and, from a theological perspective, are morally responsible for their interpretations and any potential harm that may result from them. Even an established scholar with all of the requisite training and expertise, and with, presumably, upright intentions, strives to elucidate the law, the exegete is not an infallible source. Consider the esteemed exegete and grammarian Mahmud b. ʿUmar al-Zamakhshari (d. 538/1143), who on one occasion enumerates the ways in which men were categorically thought to be superior to women, ranging from purportedly innate qualities, to equestrian skill, facial hair, and fashion in a passage that has become particularly emblematic in some contemporary Muslim feminist writings of the way in which gendered biases can color the exegetical enterprise of otherwise well-schooled and upright men: Concerning the superiority of men over women, the exegetes mention rationality (ʿaql), good judgment (ḥazm), determination, strength, writing – for

172  Celene Ibrahim the majority of men – horsemanship, archery, that men are prophets, learned (ʿulamāʾ), have the duties of the greater and lesser imamate, jihād, call to prayer, the Friday sermon, seclusion in the mosque (iʿtikāf), saying the prayers during the holidays (takbīrāt al-tashrīq), according to Abū Ḥanifa they witness in cases of injury or death (ḥudūd and qiṣāṣ), they have more shares in inheritance, bloodwit (ḥimāla) . . . authority in marriage, divorce, and taking back the wife after a revocable divorce, a greater number of spouses, lineage passing through the male line, and they have beards and turbans.5 This premise of male supremacy here is brazenly depicted as divinely ordained and natural. Al-Zamakhshari is merely one example of a prominent exegete who contributed vastly to formative and erudite religious scholarship and who, at times, also advanced plainly belittling views on women as a general category in comparison to men. One may be tempted to compose a retort touting women’s ability to birth and suckle, the nature of the womb and its connection to the divine qualities of Mercy and Compassion, the fact that men are ordained to spend upon woman, the status of the mother in the Prophet Muhammad’s own regard, and any number of other aspects in which God has “preferred” woman,6 but perhaps ultimately more useful than a tit for tat on issues of sex and gender is to point out that this “male superiority” described by al-Zamakhshari is quite likely not an authentic reflection of divine intent but rather a consequence of an exegete’s biased self-interest. On theoretical and practical levels, what methods do contemporary scholars, theologians, pastoral caregivers, and a general Muslim population concerned with ways in which gender is inscribed in religious texts and traditions have for separating out the exegetical bias of the commentator from the prerogatives offered by the primary religious sources themselves? One commonly employed strategy is to point out the sociocultural, political, and idiosyncratic exegetical biases while simultaneously pointing to epistemologically authoritative instances of what has been termed the “egalitarian impulse” of a host of Qur’anic verses, authenticated teaching of the sunna, and scholarly tradition.7 For instance, even as he asserts male superiority, al-Zamakhshari prefaces his commentary on male superiority by stating that male “governance’ over women is “not by dominance, an overbearing attitude, or subjugation.”8 This cautionary clause does not address the “hierarchical cosmology”9 inherent in alZamakshari’s commentary on the verse, but it does suggest that he was concerned about how his theoretical postulates about gender relations could impact male behavior toward women in practice. The questions that this verse evoked for premodern exegetes include: What offense requires discipline? What constitutes recalcitrance? Under what conditions may discipline be applicable, and what specific actions are permitted or forbidden? Is the imperative to hit an obligatory command? Is it a discretionary permission? How should one hit? Where should one hit? With what should one hit? How many times should one hit? What is excessive hitting? How did Muslims in the early generations hit? What reconciliatory steps must come before resorting to physical discipline? And so forth.

Verse 4:34 173 Contemporary exegetes are asking: How can the injunctions in this verse be understood from a theological lens that is explicitly concerned with women’s well-being? Can renewed scholarship on Qur’an 4:34 serve as a corrective to the bulk of premodern exegesis that inscribes hierarchal relations between male and female spouses? What is the value of continuity with premodern sources? From a critical vantage point, it is also pertinent to analyze the degree and ends toward which academic analysis from within the secular academy – as fashioned and wrought by the vociferous demands and salient pressures to liberalize Islamic thought for the sensibilities of Western audiences – impacts the verse’s contemporary interpretation?10 From a practical angle, I ask: how can those contemporary scholars, community leaders, and family members who are invested in women’s well-being understand this verse and its guidance without inadvertently condoning potentially harmful spousal altercations and without undermining, detrimentally, well established systems and principles for deriving religious laws and ethics.11

Q. 4:34 as ascribing a gender hierarchy Among the handful of Qur’anic verses and prophetic sayings that may be used to bolster the concept of a divinely ordained gender hierarchy, verse 4:34 has been axiomatic. Much has been said on this issue in prior works, so a brief review will suffice here. In essence, the verse appears in one of several extended segments of the Qur’an dealing with the relationship between spouses, the proper disposition and conduct of spouses, sanctioned ways of dealing with recalcitrant spouses and dissolving marriages, and other topics related to spousal harmony and conflict resolution.12 Interpreters concerned with the possibility of excessiveness on the part of a husband restrict the hitting to a symbolic gesture or argue that this verse was part of the Qur’an’s gradual approach to reforming society and is now overridden by the verses speaking of spousal love and harmony.13 The verse itself has ambiguous aspects, and the ambiguity is only heightened by uncertain circumstances surrounding the verse’s initial revelation.14 Perhaps the most widely attested to interpretive method to temper possible extremity is to restrict this potential hitting to very extenuating circumstances and to limit it to hitting that is devoid of aggression or force and noninjurious (ghayr mubarrikh).15 This partly reconciles the interpretation of “hit” with other Qur’anic verses and with teachings of the Prophet involving tenderness and mercy between spouses.16 The Prophet Muhammad is also noted to have attempted to mediate between a party of the men and women in Medina when he instructed his companion ʿUmar b. Khattab (d. ah 23 / 644 ce), “Do not hit the maidservants of God,” in response to ʿUmar’s request for the permission for men to physically discipline their recalcitrant wives.17 Additional prophetic statements indicate that to refrain from hitting is the more praiseworthy course, but some would argue that an extreme dislike of a practice still does not explicitly overrule the possibility of a nonextreme, noninjurious hitting. Some disputed accounts even report

174  Celene Ibrahim an incident that after the revelation of verse 4:34 the Prophet himself said to the effect: “I wanted one thing and God wanted another.”18 The existence of physical reprimand within Islamic law is drastically unsatisfying for those who regard any degree of “discipline” as an affront on the dignity of women.19 In an attempt to rectify this misapplication of verse 4:34, some contemporary scholars have posited that the phrase wa-dribuhunna in the verse should be interpreted as “and leave them” (the recalcitrant wives/women), rather than the historically dominant and widespread rendering of the phrase as “and strike them.”20 In another argument, the verb that is most frequently understood as “to hit” can also mean, “to prevent,”21 as in: If there are women who are not guarding the unseen with what God [has commanded to be] guarded (hafizatun li-l-ghaybi bi-ma hafiza llahu) . . . prevent them [from engaging in the wrong].22 Scholars who argue for these interpretations are striving for interpretations that can avert even symbolic degrees of physical discipline in order to mitigate the greater harm of men potentially exceeding the bounds.23 Despite the differences of opinion as to what the phrase wa-dribuhunna commands or allows, exegetes and legal scholars – including among them scholars of feminist persuasion working in the academy – are in agreement that verses of the Qur’an do not stand alone in elucidating the divine command. The most epistemologically sound exegesis coheres with what can be reliably established from the Prophet’s legacy. This record of the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (the sunna) has no mention of the Prophet raising his hands against a woman family member or companion.24 Interpreters aiming to temper the possible negative implications of verse 4:34 point as well to the many edifying principles in the sunna relating to the treatment of wives and women in general.25

Ambiguous terms The question about how to navigate the potential “recalcitrance” (nushuz) of a spouse is merely one point of exegetical contention in verse 4:34.26 The scope of the exegetical debate on the full verse extends beyond our discussions here; however, a few highlights are needed to situate the issue at hand. Verse 4:34 opens with a general statement regarding the relationship between men and women, a point of tremendous interest for precolonial, modern, and contemporary commentators alike. For instance, do the terms men (ar-rijalu) and women (an-nisaʾi) mean “husbands” and “wives” in a specific sense? What is the precise nature of the relationship that is specified by the phrase qawwamuna ʿala (rendered in italics in the excerpts)? What is the nature of “God’s preference for some over others” (bi-ma faddala llahu baʿdahum ʿala baʿdin)? The differences in interpretation can be observed by comparing renditions of the verse from three respected English translations: The Study Quran editors: Men are the upholders and maintainers of women by virtue of that in which God has favored some of them above others and by virtue of their spending from their wealth. Therefore the righteous women

Verse 4:34 175 are devoutly obedient, guarding in [their husbands’] absence what God has guarded. As for those from whom you fear discord and animosity, admonish them, then leave them in their beds, then strike them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Truly God is Exalted, Great.27 Haleem: Husbands should take good care of their wives, with [the boundaries] God has given to some more than others and with what they spend out of their own money. Righteous wives are devout and guard what God would have them guard in their husbands’ absence. If you fear high-handedness from you wives, remind them [of the teachings of God], then ignore them when you go to bed, then hit them. If they obey you, you have no right to act against them: God is most high and great.28 Qara’i: Men are the managers of women, because of the advantage Allah has granted some of them over others, and by virtue of their spending out of their wealth. So righteous women are obedient, care-taking in the absence [of the husbands] of what Allah has enjoined [them] to guard. As for those [wives] whose misconduct you fear, [first] advise them, and [if ineffective] keep away from them in the bed, and [as the last resort] beat them. Then if they obey you, do not seek any course [of action] against them. Indeed Allah is all-exalted, all-great.29 As can be seen in these translations, the verse has degree of ambiguity in terms of precisely who is preferred over whom, and for what reasons. Much debate and speculation has also surrounded the word qanitat (f. pl.), which translations often render either as “devout” as in the case of Haleem, or “obedient” as in the case of Qara’i, or “devoutly obedient” in the case of The Study Quran. To whom are righteous women in this verse devout, and what is the nature of their devotion? In other Qur’anic contexts, the word qanitat is used to refer explicitly to obedience to God and can apply both to males and females, but some exegetes working within the paradigm of male superiority over women take this opportunity to assert that devotion/obedience is merited to husbands as well as to God, a clear interpolation of male privilege. The verse also praises women who are “preserving of the unseen” (hafizatun li-l-ghaybi), or as it can perhaps be inferred, women who exercise utmost discretion with regard to their sexual conduct. Looking again at the translations, the phrase “in their husbands’ absence” is interpolated by all of the translators, with Haleem’s translation not signaling that it is in fact an interpolation. Alongside this relative ambiguity of the term qanitat is the term nushuz, translated into English in the verses as “discord and animosity” (The Study Quran), “high-handedness” (Haleem), and “misconduct” (Qara’i). The verse then discusses what to do if there is “fear” that women are not meeting this standard, which leads the exegete to ask: What constitutes legitimate “fear”?30 The verse discussing the nushuz of a man is rendered by The Study Quran translators as “animosity” as follows: “If a wife fears animosity (nushuz) or desertion from her husband, there is no blame upon them should they come to an accord, for an accord is better. Souls are prone to avarice, but if you are virtuous and reverent, surely God is Aware of whatsoever you do (Q. 4:129).”31 Concern for the upright

176  Celene Ibrahim treatment of women is clearly expressed in this verse, and the Qur’an in this instance points to a mediated outcome, not to physical disciplining. When taking into consideration this discussion of the nushuz of a man, as if to add emphasis, both the preceding and following verses (Q. 4:128 and 130) also stress justice toward girls and women and even emphatically point out the shortcomings of men, and human beings generally in this regard. As if to add emphasis to this principle of justice and divine accounting, Q. 4:129 is preceded by a verse that emphasizes utter parity in moral accountability for females and males: “And whoever performs righteous deeds, whether male or female, and is a believer, such shall enter the Garden, and they shall not be wronged so much as the speck on a date stone” (Q. 4:124). Verses such as this one outline a theological worldview in which God is the ultimate Rectifier of Affairs, even though the Qur’an encourages disputing parties to seek a mediated outcome and resolution for their disputes. Returning to verse 4:34, this imperative to find a harmonious resolution to domestic tension is also emphasized in the following verse, Q. 4:35, which provides both a practical means for dispute resolution as well as the reassurance that God supports the reconciliation effort of those who enter the process with upright intentions: And if you fear a breach between the two, then appoint an arbiter from his people and an arbiter from her people. If they desire reconciliation, God will bring about agreement between them. Truly God is Knowing, Aware (Q. 4:35). This verse, with its practical import, is a call for communal structures that can help to provide dispute resolution.

From ethical norms to practical situations Mechanisms within religious law that discourage abuse are critical to impacting attitudes and behaviors, but issues related to domestic discord are not merely a matter of text and hermeneutics. On a practical level, what courses of action are effective if someone has grounds to think his or her partner or perhaps a family member is engaging in sexual misconduct, spousal abuse, or otherwise behaving in an ethically precarious manner? Perhaps discourse around verbal and psychological abuse in the context of family and intimate partnerships could be more robustly considered in conjunction with the Qur’an’s abundant condemnations of vile speech, tyranny, iniquity, and oppression (dhulm). From an institutional standpoint, religious authorities must directly address and seek to mitigate the harmful interpretations potentially arising from the misappropriation and misinterpretation of this verse. Different coalitions of Muslims in the North American context, for example, have been generating resources to answer such questions. The effort is led by academics, social service providers, and advocacy organizations such as the Peaceful Families Project that was founded in 2000 by activist Sharifa Alkateeb (1946–2004). Other networks of such organizations, community

Verse 4:34 177 leaders, and activists are found in many locations and are engaged in research and teaching of best practices in combating sexual violence, supporting survivors of abuse, teaching peaceful methods of dispute resolution, and mining spiritual resources from the foundational, authoritative religious sources. From a practical standpoint, more sociological and anthropological research is needed to determine how much religious teachings impact how individuals conduct themselves vis-à-vis their spouses or females in their charge. Contrary to polemical discourses, it cannot simply be assumed that any self-declared Muslim, or individual with an Islamic-sounding name or from a majority Muslim society who acts violently toward a woman is understanding himself to be carrying out the tenets of religion. Do self-identifying Muslims who are physically abusive toward their spouses justify their actions vis-à-vis their interpretation of verse 4:34 or other foundational religious sources? To my knowledge, the question has not yet been explored thoroughly through empirical methods. Other practical avenues for further study include: How can Islamic religious formation in fact help deter violence, and how can religious and other social networks be best mobilized to remove individuals expediently from harmful situations? What kinds of religious instruction or education more broadly can equip individuals to know what to do if their dignity or sexual integrity is being violated and to secure support? What concepts and passages have motivated survivors of abuse to heal?32 How can the Qur’anic ethic of forgiveness come into play in the individual and communal healing processes in the wake of breaches in conduct?33 These are all directions for further scholarship. Yet, to return to my initial theoretical and practical inquiries: Does the marital bond, according to the divine will, formally institute the right of physical disciplinary correction in certain circumstances? Is it possible for a religious scholar concerned with the well-being of women to acknowledge some level of physical reprimand as being part of the religious law without this being misconstrued as a condonation of spousal abuse? Undeniably, a straightforward, literal reading of verse 4:34 in the Qur’an, without any reference to supplementary sources of law or an intertextual reading does seem to explicitly acknowledge that physical punishment is warranted for the offense of promiscuity under very particular circumstances. In a teaching video on the subject of 4:34, American Qur’an scholar Nouman Ali Khan (b. 1978) argues that much of the entire lengthy chapter in which this verse is embedded deals with odd and outlying familial circumstances, and that this particular verse is dealing with the subject of breaches of “fidelity” and loyalty on the part of a wife.34 That the circumstances described in verse 4:34 are outlying, and that the verse is fundamentally a restriction on egregious forms of domestic violence, as a figure like Nouman Ali Khan outlines, is key to countering their otherwise potential norm-setting allure for a domineering, hot-headed, and disgruntled husband. Such messaging by influential figures must continue to be produced and disseminated,35 but it is not enough to simply teach what actions to avoid without also deriving and disseminating clear guidance for how to proactively handle breakdowns of marital harmony. For instance, how should a spouse who is being wronged by the extramarital affairs of his or her spouse address it

178  Celene Ibrahim in a just and upright manner? How are communities providing safe spaces for women who fear retaliation should they bring issues of abuse to light? What communal training forms are in place to help people, male or female, who have difficulty controlling their impulsive tendencies toward anger, for instance? From a theoretical perspective, the issue of whether or not a noninjurious contact is permissible, even if disliked, is an open question that will like remain unresolved. It is abundantly clear from the Qur’an and from the early sources that harm to a spouse or harshness, is absolutely prohibited. Yet, what precisely would a physical exchange look like that could serve as a behavioral corrective in cases of infidelity but would not harm and is not harsh? Could such intervention guide a person back to a righteous path for worldly and other-worldly benefit? Does affirming even a highly restricted degree of physical exchange leave open a “slippery slope” where prohibited degrees and harshness and violence would readily ensue? Feminist scholarship on the Qur’an in particular is concerned with how to avoid the Qur’an being badly interpreted to (re)inscribe unjust gender and other social hierarchies, but is there an appropriate place for some restricted level of physical exchange that would not fall in the realm of oppressive or unjust? If indeed a wife is engaging in sexual misconduct, a very serious moral shortcoming and a severe breach of trust and family harmony, can some degree of physicality ever function as a way of altering the relationship for the better? If God did not permit any physical contact and intended something else with the phrase wadribuhunna, the question then becomes, why did God employ double entendre, the incorrect interpretation and application of which could so readily lead an individual down the wrong path? A fundamental Islamic premise is that God is the Just One (al-ʿAdl), and that God’s speech is deliberate. The “higher intention” (maqasid al-shariʿa) of the law would ideally bring about the greatest possible good in this world and in the next, according to the theory of the law as it was developed in the precolonial period.36 One possible answer for why a double entendre involving the meaning of the phrase (wa-dribuhunna) could be taken back to the Qur’anic description of worldly life as a test by which the righteous will stand out from the unrighteous. From this angle, Muslim feminist scholar Laury Silvers grounds her analysis of verse 4:34 in the cosmology of the esteemed scholar Abu ʿAbd Allah Muhammad ibn ʿAli ibn Muhammad ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 638/1240), arguing that even if God permitted some degree of physicality under certain restricted circumstances, God has also made clear the better course of action: For Ibn al-ʿArabi – and this is an important point – God may intend all meanings, but it does not follow that He approves [emphasis original] of all meanings. In this light, I argue that the purpose of the existence of the verse would be to remind human beings of the extraordinary burden of freedom.37 Pointing toward free choice and its consequences may be one potential solution on the ontological level, even if it requires turning to other verses to discern the practical matters about how spouses should ideally resolve grave breaches of trust between them.

Verse 4:34 179 Continuing to point toward the Qur’an’s emphatic and persistent emphasis on kindness, considerateness, and mutual accountability between spouses is of upmost import when working with couples in pastoral care situations, but virtues such as kindness are not categories based upon which religious law operates. Solutions that are pastorally grounded could be construed as being apologetic or not sufficiently effective as deterrents to actual harm being enacted. Despite such a potential charge, the best, most internally coherent approach to 4:34 may in fact be that posited by the Qur’an itself, in the very next verse: the most sensible approach to 4:34 may ultimately lie in 4:35, a verse with both applied and ontological implications, one that underscores diplomatic, communal approaches to dispute reconciliation, and one that reaffirms God’s capacity and promise to facilitate for those who have sincere desire for reconciliation. It stands to reason that what is needed to fulfil the very practical Qur’anic instructions in verse 4:35 is family and communal support systems that can recognize marital discord before it becomes exacerbated and who have the means, knowledge, and practical systems to mediate and arbitrate effectively. Hermeneutical theory alone will not lead out of the labyrinth; praxis holds the key.

Notes 1 See al-Hibri 2003; Mubarak 2004; and Mahmoud 2006 for recent treatments of this subject. 2 Chaudhry 2017, 32–36. 3 Silvers 2006, 177. 4 Shakir 2001, 21. 5 Commentary on the phrase ar-rijalu qawwamuna ʿala n-nisaʾi bi-ma faḍḍala llahu baʿḍahum ʿala baʿḍin, in al-Kashaf, 1:496, trans. Ayesha S. Chaudhry; in Chaudhry 2014, 46n80. 6 For reflections on God’s “preference of some over others” see Chaudhry 2014, 25–28. 7 Naguib 2010. 8 Chaudhry 2014, 46n8. 9 For an excellent discussion of the competing idealized cosmologies, and their impact on communal life and institutions, see Chaudhry 2014, 11–13. 10 For an excellent account of the evolution of interpretations of 4:34 in modern and contemporary German Muslim exegesis, see Christmann 2015. 11 Ayesha Chaudhry summarizes the dilemma: “the uniformly patriarchal nature of the Islamic tradition necessitates that postcolonial scholars seeking to root egalitarian positions in this tradition either misrepresent the tradition in order to reconcile it with egalitarian values or compromise their commitment to gender-egalitarian values” 2014, 139–140. 12 See also Q. 42:38, 65:6, 49:13, 2:187, and 2:228. 13 For one example of this approach in feminist literature, see the work of al-Hibri. 14 The prevailing opinion is that the verse dates to between the years 3/625 and 5/627, but the circumstances are not agreed upon. See Mahmoud 2006; Bauer 2006; and al-Hibri 2003. 15 This wording is attributed to the Prophet Muhammad himself on several occasions, most notably in his speech during his last pilgrimage. See Chaudhry 2014, 213–214. 16 For example, Q. 30:21. Some legal opinions that restrict hitting to a symbolic measure do so with reference to the example of the prophet Job who in a moment of compromised patience is said to have sworn an oath to harshly discipline his wife but was then given a merciful way out of his oath by God; see Q. 38:44 as discussed by al-Hibri 2003, 223; and Barlas 2002, 188.

180  Celene Ibrahim 17 For different variations of the hadith, see Chaudhry 2014, 90–91; and Ali 2006, 143–55. 18 For details on hitting in the hadith literature, see Chaudhry 2011. 19 For instance, in their edict on the matter, Homayra Ziad and Hisham Kabbani argue that even symbolic discipline is outside of ethical bounds: “Where tapping a woman with a toothstick was considered gentle, where violence against women was previously acceptable, in fact there is no place for physical punishment of a wife, however gentle.” See Kabbani and Ziad 2011. See also Silvers 2006, 173. 20 See the comments on this verse by Laleh Bakhtiar, who translates the phrase in question as follows in her English translation of the Qur’an: “and those females whose resistance you fear, then admonish them, and abandon them in their sleeping places, and go away from them,” Bakhtiar 2007. 21 See the discussion of this possibility by Barlas 2002, 189. 22 This interpretation accords well with Q. 9:17. For critical discussion of this approach, see Chaudhry 2014, 176–183. 23 Shannon Dunn and Rosemary B. Kellison discuss cases wherein women survivors of domestic violence are not granted a court divorce in non-Muslim courts on account of the faulty understanding that even extreme physical discipline is permissible in Islam; see Dunn and Kellison 2010, 11. 24 Kecia Ali, Azizah Hibri, Amina Wadud, and other feminist scholars argue that the Prophet Muhammad did not solve marital dilemmas through physical violence, and this example is the best model for how to behave. See, for instance, Ali 2004. In one hadith, out of the more than two thousand narrated on her authority, the Prophet Muhammad’s wife ʿAʾishah bint Abi Bakr (d. 73 ah / 687 ce) relates an episode where the prophet jolted her out of a sense of urgency. Some polemical commentators take this narration to be a sign that the Prophet Muhammad applied physical discipline. However, when the entirety of the hadith is examined, the context makes that interpretation a logical stretch. See Sahih Muslim, Book 4, The Book of Prayers (Kitab al-Salat), in a section about praying at graves, no. 2127. Retrieved from the Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement, University of Southern California, August 15, 2016, www.usc.edu/org/ cmje/religious-texts/hadith/muslim/004-smt.php#004.2127. 25 For detailed analysis of the different hermeneutic strategies of prominent feminist interpreters writing in English as well as the limitations of the discourse, see Hidayatullah 2014. 26 See excellent commentary on the whole of this verse by Amina Wadud; Wadud 1999, 70–78. 27 Nasr et al. 2015, 206–208. See also extensive commentary outlining some of the prominent interpretations of this verse in n34. 28 Haleem 2010a, 54; see also Haleem 2010b, 46–54. 29 Qara’i 2005, 114. 30 See Ali 2007, 309–13; and Wadud 1999, 75. 31 Nasr et al. 2015, 249–250. 32 I take up many of these questions in my chapter titled, “Sexual Violence and Qur’anic Resources for Healing Processes” (2017). 33 For example, Q. 4:110. 34 See Nouman Ali Khan, “Hitting Women, That’s Messed Up,” Bayyinah Institute, December 21, 2015, minute 14:22–32, www.youtube.com/watch?v=1azySjz4edk. 35 For an excellent example of taking up this issue comprehensively from the minbar, see Shaykh Yasir Fahmy, “Violence against Women: Dishonoring Our Sacred Trust,” Muslim American Society and the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, October 21, 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=cR4SD4633yE&index=97&list=UUBttIwg2Wj9z feLaeUex-QQ. 36 For discussion of the history and contemporary application of the concept of maqasid al-shariʿa as a legal hermeneutic, see Attia (2008); and Auda (2008). 37 Silvers 2006, 172.

Verse 4:34 181

Bibliography al-Hibri, Azizah (2003) “An Islamic Perspective on Domestic Violence,” Fordham International Law Journal 27 (1): 195–224. Ali, Kecia (2004) “ ‘A Beautiful Example’: The Prophet Muhammad as a Model for Muslim Husbands,” Islamic Studies 43 (2): 273–291. Ali, Kecia (2006) “ ‘The Best of You Will Not Strike’: Al-Shāfiʿī on Qur’an, Sunnah, and Wife-Beating,” Comparative Islamic Studies 2 (2): 143–155. Ali, Kecia (2007) “Obedience and Disobedience in Islamic Discourses,” in Encyclopedia of Women in Islamic Cultures, ed. Suad Joseph (Leiden: Brill), 309–313. Alkhateeb, Maha B., and Salma Elkadi Abugideiri, eds. (2007) Change from Within: Diverse Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Muslim Communities (Great Falls, VA: Peaceful Families Project). Attia, Gamal Eldin (2008) Towards Realisation of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law, Maqasid Al Shari’ah: A Functional Approach (Naḥwa tafʻīl maqāṣid al-sharīʿa), transl. Nancy Robers (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought). Auda, Jasser (2008) Maqāṣid al-sharīʿah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A  System’s Approach (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought). Bakhtiar, Laleh, transl. (2007) The Sublime Quran (Chicago: Kazi Publications). Bakhtiar, Laleh (2011) Concordance of the Sublime Quran (Chicago: Kazi Publications). Barlas, Asma (2002) “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press). Bauer, Karen (2006) “ ‘Traditional’ Exegeses of Q 4:34,” Comparative Islamic Studies 2 (2): 129–142. Chaudhry, Ayesha S. (2011) “ ‘I Wanted One Thing and God Wanted Another. . . ’: The Dilemma of the Prophetic Example and the Qur’anic Injunction on Wife-Beating,” Journal of Religious Ethics 3 (3): 416–439. Chaudhry, Ayesha S. (2014) Domestic Violence and the Islamic Tradition: Ethics, Law and the Muslim Discourse on Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Chaudhry, Ayesha S. (2017) “Islamic Legal Studies: A Critical Historiography,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, ed. Anver M. Emon and Rumee Ahmed (Oxford Handbooks Online), 1–40, www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780199679010.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199679010-e-1. Christmann, Andreas (2015) “Setting the Record Straight: Contemporary Interpretations of Q. 4:34 by German Muslims,” in The Qur’an and Its Readers Worldwide: Contemporary Commentaries and Translations, ed. Suha Taji-Farouki (Qur’anic Studies Series, New York: Oxford University Press in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London), 499–532. Dunn, Shannon, and Rosemary B. Kellison (2010) “At the Intersection of Scripture and Law: Qur’an 4:34 and Violence Against Women,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 26 (2): 11–36. Fahmy, Yasir (2015) “Violence Against Women: Dishonoring Our Sacred Trust,” Muslim American Society and the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, October 21, www.youtube.com/watch?v=cR4SD4633yE&index=97&list=UUBttIwg2Wj9zfeLae Uex-QQ. Greifenhagen, Franz V. (2004) “North American Feminist Interpretation: The Case of Sūrah 4:34, with a Comparison to Christian Feminist Interpretation,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 33 (1): 51–70. Haleem, Muhammad Abdel (2010a) The Qur’an: A New Translation, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

182  Celene Ibrahim Haleem, Muhammad Abdel (2010b) Understanding the Qur’an: Themes and Style (New York: I. B. Tauris). Hidayatullah, Aysha A. (2014) Feminist Edges of the Qur’an (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Ibrahim, Celene (2017) “Sexual Violence and Qur’anic Resources for Healing Processes,” in Sexual Violence and Sacred Texts, ed. Amy Kalmanofski (Cambridge: Feminist Studies in Religion). Kabbani, M. Hisham, and Homayra Ziad (2011) The Prohibition of Domestic Violence in Islam (Washington, DC: World Organization for Resource Development and Education). Khan, Nouman Ali (2015) “Hitting Women, That’s Messed Up,” Bayyinah Institute, December 21, www.youtube.com/watch?v=1azySjz4edk. Mahmoud, Mohamed (2006) “To Beat or Not to Beat: On the Exegetical Dilemmas Over Qurʾan 4:34,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 126 (4): 537–550. Mir-Hosseini, Ziba, Mulki Al-Sharmani, and Jana Rumminger, eds. (2015) Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition (London: Oneworld Publications). Mubarak, Hadia (2004) “Breaking the Interpretive Monopoly: A Re-Examination of Verse 4:34,” Hawwa 2 (3): 261–289. Naguib, Shuruq (2010) “Horizons and Limitations of the Muslim Feminist Hermeneutics: Reflections of the Menstruation Verse,” in New Topics in Feminist Philosophy of Religion: Contestations and Transcendence Incarnate, ed. Pamela Sue Anderson (Dordrecht: Springer), 33–50. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, et al. (2015) The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary (San Francisco: HarperOne). Qara’i, ‘Ali Quli (2005) The Qur’an: With a Phrase-by-Phrase English Translation (London: Islamic Publications International). Shakir, Zaid (2001) The Heirs of the Prophets, translation of Wārith al-anbiyāʾ by Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali (Chicago: The Starlatch Press). Silvers, Laury (2006) “ ‘In the Book We Have Left Out Nothing’: The Ethical Problem of the Existence of Verse 4:34 in the Qur’an,” Comparative Islamic Studies 2 (2): 171–180. Wadud, Amina (1999) Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press). Wadud, Amina (2006) Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: Oneworld Publications).

Part III

Histories Knowledge, authority, and activism

10 Umm Salama’s contributions Qur’an, hadith, and early Muslim history as sources for gender justice Yasmin Amin Introduction Feminism, as a phenomenon that engages issues of women’s rights, liberation, and gender equality,1 started taking shape as an academic field in the 1960s and continued to grow during the 1970s and 1980s. The term “Islamic feminism” came into use during the 1990s and advocated for women’s rights, gender equality, and social justice, specifically using an Islamic discourse.2 Islamic feminism highlights the teachings of equality and equity in Islam and encourages the questioning of patriarchal interpretations of Islamic teachings through the Qur’an, hadith and jurisprudence in order to create a more equal and equitable society.3 In the past twenty years, one can see a significant dent being made in the patriarchal narrative of Islam as an egalitarian version of Islam steadily takes wider hold.4 The question of gender justice is not a new construct by feminists or Muslim feminists and has a long tradition that was very much part of the discourse during and after the time of the Prophet. This chapter addresses this discourse, which raised questions about certain gender aspects in Islamic jurisprudence and even the language of the Qur’an as witnessed by various dialogues between Umm Salama and the Prophet. Umm Salama’s questions, but also those of other Muslim women, were addressed to the Prophet and were sometimes even answered by Qur’anic revelation. This discourse is preserved in the Islamic canon, such as in the asbab nuzul al-Qur’an genre (occasions for revelation), tafsir, hadith (Prophetic traditions) and jurisprudence.

Feminism and the mothers of the believers The Mothers of the Believers received ample attention in Islamic literature in general and in feminist literature in particular due to their rank and the special status awarded to them in the Qur’an. These women, who were married to the Prophet at various times during his life, were a diverse group; young, old, virgins, divorcees, widows, alluring, beautiful, homely, intellectual, witty, wise, powerful, and humble. Being addressed by the scripture raised their status, though they were also human. In The “Mothers of the Believers”: Stereotypes of the Prophet Muhammad’s Wives, Ghassan Ascha discusses the effect of the Mother of the

186  Yasmin Amin Believers’ biographies in creating role models and how their perception changed in three areas: the tafsir literature, the hadith compendia, and the reformist movement during the second half of the nineteenth century.5 Since the 1970s, feminist writers have been mining Islamic literature to find evidence for their feminist views, describing the early Islamic period in Medina as the Golden Age of Feminism.6 Each period had its own interpretations about the lives of the Mothers of the Believers and was further affected by popular, cultural and moral values. The emphasis on the Prophet’s wives did not originate from their historical personalities, but rather from the continuous modifications, alterations, interpretations, and modernisations of the portrayed personalities.7 They were used to justify a great variety of attitudes. Ascha writes: They were portrayed as ideal, obedient, gentle, affectionate, content, pious, inside their houses, veiled, but also jealous, angry, quarrelling, having great kayd (cunning) sowing fitna and sometimes with an imperfect mind, yet also as erudite teachers, daring, strong personalities, intelligent, political activists, even leaders in wars and of course feminists.8 However, looking closely at the literature, particularly feminist literature, one can easily discern a focus. Unlike Khadija and ʿA’isha, who have been thoroughly studied, other wives have not yet been given their due in scholarly research. Shi’ite literature (with ʿA’isha, Umm Salama and Umm Habiba being exceptions) diminished the roles played by the Prophet’s wives and enhanced those of the members of ʿAli b. Abu Ṭalib’s household and his bloodline.9 Some scholarship regarded the Prophet’s wives as a collective and treated their individual biographies as parts of a whole.10 In Shi’ite literature, Khadija is mostly portrayed as the most important wife in the life of Muhammad. She is always credited with being the first to believe in Islam and in Muhammad as the Messenger of God. In Sunni literature, she similarly holds a special position. In popular literature, she is also a favourite heroine.11 However, it is ʿA’isha that receives the most attention in feminist literature.12 Even in works that are not exclusively devoted to the study of ʿA’isha, she is still mentioned frequently and portrayed as an authority on subjects ranging from law to variant readings of the Qur’an, a source of legal traditions and hadith. For example, she is Fatima Mernissi’s central female figure in The Veil and the Male Elite, epitomizing the early Islamic encouragement of female self-assertion. Mernissi argues that Islam actually allowed the flourishing of women’s self-determination and autonomy, using ʿA’isha as an example.13 In a case study about orphans and polygamy, Ayesha Chaudhry points out a hadith that she finds particularly interesting with regard to the discussion on wilayah, orphans, and consent. The hadith discusses the responsibilities of guardians vis-à-vis the rights of orphan girls in a dialogue between ʿA’isha and her nephew. Here, ʿA’isha offers a commentary on two Qur’anic verses.14 Ibtissam Bouachrine describes ʿA’isha’s role in the “Battle of the Camel” in Women and Islam: Myths, Apologies, and the Limits of Feminist, claiming that she briefly assumed political leadership after Muhammad’s death.15

Umm Salama’s contributions 187 Bouachrine emphasizes ʿA’isha’s accusations against Abu Hurayra of reporting hadith he never heard.16 She also contrasts Khadija and ʿA’isha, pointing out that Khadija enjoyed more liberties than ʿA’isha, who spent most of her life as a Muslim.17 In Lifting the Veil: The World of Muslim Women, the authors debate if ʿA’isha was the original Muslim Feminist, as she pondered the reasons why a woman was categorized alongside animals such as dogs and donkeys.18 In Literature and the Development of Feminist Theory, Robin Goodman points out that other scholars have focused on ʿA’isha’s linguistic power as she becomes the first of the “rawiyat” (female transmitters of the Prophet’s words).19 Even within the field of Masculinity studies, writers claim that Muslim feminists use the role of motherhood to highlight the uniqueness of femininity. In his book The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities, Amanullah De Sondy quotes Asma Barlas, who recalls that while ʿA’isha did not have children, that did not diminish her importance in the Prophet’s life or her appeal as a role model for women.20 Even in a book about the pilgrimage, The Hajj: Pilgrimage in Islam, Asma Sayeed points out that legal discourse mandated the presence of a guardian during Hajj and therefore subsumed the fulfilment of a central pillar of practice to chance. Sayeed highlights that it was ʿA’isha who recognized early on that this outcome was flawed and opined that not every woman has a mahram (guardian).21 Even in popular literature and novels, ʿA’isha is a favourite heroine.22 Sayeed devotes a chapter to ʿA’isha23 in her book Women and the Transmission of Religious Knowledge in Islam, though she also devotes a chapter to Umm Salama.24 Unlike Khadija and ʿA’isha, Umm Salama does not receive much attention in scholarly literature, especially in English. A few detailed studies about her exist in Arabic and Urdu.25 Nonetheless, the original Islamic sources, especially the Sunni ones show that Umm Salama’s testimony was actively sought and considered decisive on several issues. She addressed several gender aspects in Islamic jurisprudence, and even the language of the Qur’an. But who was Umm Salama?

Umm Salama Umm Salama was Hind Bint Abu Umayya, who was also known as Zad al-Rakib, Ibn al-Mughira b. ʿAbd Allah b. ʿUmar Ibn Makhzum.26 She was first married to Abu Salama, ʿAbd Allah Ibn al-Asad Ibn Hilal Ibn ʿAbd Allah Ibn ʿUmar Ibn Makhzum,27 who was the Prophet’s brother bil ridaʿah (by means of suckling) from the same nursemaid, namely Wahmaza Thuwaiba.28 Ibn Ishaq wrote that Abu ʿUbayda Ibn al-Harith, Abu Salama Ibn ʿAbd al-Asad and ʿAbd Allah Ibn al-Arqam al-Makhzumi, as well as ʿUthman Ibn Mazʿun rushed to the Prophet to give their allegiance and convert to Islam. The Prophet recited some verses of the Qur’an to them and they took their shahada (oath), declaring that he was bringing them al-huda wal nur (enlightenment and illumination).29 There has been no explicit mention in the sources about when Umm Salama converted to Islam, but al-Dhahabi mentions that Umm Salama was one of the earliest Muslims.30 Most of the sira (Prophet’s biography) books mention that Abu Salama was among the first to take the shahada; Ibn Ishaq mentions

188  Yasmin Amin that he was the eleventh man to become Muslim.31 When he became Muslim, Abu Salama was already married to Umm Salama, so it is likely that she also converted at the same time or very soon after, as sources also mention that she emigrated with Abu Salama to Abyssinia in the fifth year after the commencement of revelation. Umm Salama is one of the favourite authorities quoted about events in Abyssinia, especially describing the conversation between the Muslims and the Abyssinian emperor al-Najashi, when he refused to send back the Muslim refugees.32 Umm Salama also described the battle that erupted between the forces of alNajashi and an opponent across the Nile, describing how al-Najashi and his forces were victorious and how al-Najashi continued to offer his protection to the Muslims until their return to Mecca.33 When Umm Salama returned from Abyssinia to Mecca with her husband, she discovered that the news about the Quraysh ceasing their harassment of Muslims was nothing but a rumour. Her husband, Abu Salama, decided to leave again, this time to Medina. However, Umm Salama was prevented from joining him.34 Though this episode is interesting and shows her resilience and courage until she finally joins her husband in Medina, the scope of this chapter permits the inclusion of neither all the details nor the details of their early life in Medina until he died from wounds received in the Battle of Uhud. After his death, two eminent companions of the Prophet, Abu Bakr and ʿUmar, wished to marry her, but she declined both marriage proposals.35 She accepted the Prophet’s proposal after initially turning him down twice. When the Prophet married Umm Salama, ʿA’isha was very jealous. She felt that her position was being threatened. In her own words, she is to have said: I was exceedingly sad, having heard much of her beauty. I was gracious to her, desiring to see her for myself. And, by Allah, I saw that she was twice as beautiful and graceful as she was reputed to be. I mentioned this to Hafsa but she said: “No, by Allah, this is nothing but jealousy [clouding your vision]; she is not as they say.” Hafsa, too, was gracious to her, and having called to see her, she said to me, “I see her not as beautiful as you say, not even anywhere near it; though she is [unquestionably] beautiful.” I saw her afterwards and, by my life, she was as Hafsa had said. But still I was jealous.36 The Prophet respected Umm Salama and her wisdom and often sought her advice and counsel. Many narratives, scattered in different history books and biographical dictionaries, indicate that the Prophet had a special fondness for Umm Salama and respected her for her devotion and good judgment. Al-Baladhuri, for example, mentions that the Prophet used to say: “ʿA’isha holds a special position nobody else has reached, she is a part of me.” After his marriage to Umm Salama he was asked about ʿA’isha’s previously mentioned position. He remained silent, which was taken as an implicit admission that now Umm Salama held this position and occupied a special place in his heart.37 While most Sunni history books mention that ʿA’isha was the Prophet’s favourite wife, Umm Salama also occupied

Umm Salama’s contributions 189 a special place in his heart, as sources report that he used to start with her house every evening and end in the house where he would be spending the night.38 Although ʿA’isha claims in her list of privileges that she alone, among the Prophet’s wives, saw Angel Jibril, it is recorded in the hadith collection of Muslim that Umm Salama also saw him. Like ʿA’isha, Umm Salama’s account emphasizes that the angelic presence took the human form of Dihya al-Kalbi.39 Though all the wives of the Prophet possessed great knowledge, ʿA’isha and Umm Salama had no rivals when it concerned hadith. Mahmud Ibn Labid40 said, “The wives of the Prophet were treasuries of Hadith but ʿA’isha and Umm Salama had no equal.”41 Sunni and Shi’ite sources both show that Umm Salama had an especially close bond with al-Husayn, and therefore, she was among the favourite authorities quoted on the ahl al-bayt. She narrated hundreds of hadith,42 among them hadith al-Kisaʿ (The Mantle of the Prophet) and the Verse of Purification,43 hadith al-Thaqalayn (The Two Weighty Things), hadith al-Qarura (The Flask), hadith al-Manzala (Status) and many more about the Prophet’s relationship with ʿAli. Sources reveal that Umm Salama accompanied the Prophet on seven of his battles and military missions, such as Ghazwat al Muraisiʿ – Banu al-Mustaliq (5 ah),44 Ghazwat Banu Qurayza (5 ah) Ghazwat Khaybar (7 ah),45 Fath Mecca and Ghazwat al- Ṭa’if (8 ah). Umm Salama also joined the Prophet on his journey to perform the pilgrimage in the sixth year of Hijra, which resulted in the Treaty of Hudaibiya.46 The next section focuses on Umm Salama’s contributions as found in Islamic heritage.

The tafsir (exegesis) and asbab nuzul al-Qur’an genre (occasions for revelation) The tafsir (exegetical) genre preserved the information that not only Qur’anic verses had been revealed in Umm Salama’s house but also many verses had also been revealed prompted by her questions. Umm Salama once asked the Prophet why the Qur’an seems only to address men, while women also accepted Islam, fought side by side with the men, migrated with them, and sacrificed as much as the men – if not more. A few days after she asked that question and while she was combing her hair with the help of a servant, she heard the Prophet reciting verse Q 33:35 from the minbar (pulpit).47 It is one of the longer verses of the Qur’an and reads as follows: Surely the men who submit and the women who submit, and the believing men and the believing women, and the obeying men and the obeying women, and the truthful men and the truthful women, and the patient men and the patient women and the humble men and the humble women, and the almsgiving men and the almsgiving women, and the fasting men and the fasting women, and the men who guard their private parts and the women who guard, and the men who remember Allah much and the women who remember – Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and a mighty reward.48

190  Yasmin Amin Mohammad Ali Syed49 argues that verse Q 33:35 was just the start of a new trend in the Qur’anic revelations.50 Many succeeding verses of the Qur’an deal with both men and women using separate expressions for both genders. He further argues that verse Q 33:35 puts women on the same spiritual level as men. This is achieved by repeating the good qualities of both men and women separately, ten times, and by declaring the same rights of reward for both genders.51 While not granting women the same rights as men, this verse articulates the spiritual equality of women before God. This was also recognized by Ibn ʿArabi who states that that there is no spiritual qualification conferred on men that is denied to women. He argues that the Qur’an affirms that each virtue leading to spiritual refinement is equally accessible to men and women. “In addition, he points out that this gender-inclusive verse reflects a central Qur’anic teaching on the complete ontological equality of men and women.”52 Most exegetes attribute the revelation of this verse to Umm Salama, yet other attributions have also been used, such as for example Asma’ bt. ʿUmays und Umm ʿUmara al-Ansariyya.53 Al-Tabarsi,54 for example, attributes the revelation of verse Q 33:35 to a question asked by Asma’ Bint ʿUmays, one of the female companions of the Prophet (d. after 40/660). She is considered as one of the first Muslims, as she converted to Islam early on with her husband, Jaʿfar b. Abi Ṭalib. In other exegetical works, the identity of the woman who poses the question is withheld and the question is asked by a collective of “some women.”55 The asbab nuzul al-Qur’an genre also reports that another verse, namely Q 4:32 – “And do not covet that by which Allah has made some of you excel others; men shall have the benefit of what they earn and women shall have the benefit of what they earn” – was revealed after Umm Salama asked the Prophet about why women only inherit half of the amount men do and whether this was because men were obligated to fight in battles while women were not. According to Ayesha Chaudhry, verse Q 4:32 is usually read in connection with verse Q 4:3456 which has two documented reasons for revelation, one of them being that Umm Salama asked on behalf of the women why men had a preference over them in inheritance.57 Karen Bauer agrees with that assessment and adds that verse Q 4:32 was revealed prior to Q 4:34, yet both are read together, indicating that men receive more money in inheritance shares, but in turn must spend their money on maintaining their wives and female relatives (mothers, aunts).58 However, according to al-Baydawi, that verse was revealed in response to Umm Salama wishing that she were a man, because men go to battle and receive a full share of inheritance.59 Regardless of which story about the occasion of the revelation is correct, it was the difference in inheritance shares and in booty of jihad that prompted the question. And yet another verse, Q 3:195, is reported to have been revealed after Umm Salama asked the Prophet why the emigration and hardship of the women were not mentioned in the Qur’an: “So their Lord accepted their prayer: That I will not waste the work of a worker among you, whether male or female, the one of you being from the other.” Shiʿi exegetes also attribute the revelation of verse Q 3:195 as being a response to a question by Umm Salama, such as in the works of al-Tusi60 and Tabataba’i61

Umm Salama’s contributions 191 al-Tabarsi,62 though, does not attribute it to Umm Salama’s questions, though he mentions that it was reported by other (unnamed) sources that Umm Salama posed this question. On another occasion, verse Q 9:102 was revealed in her house: “And others have confessed their faults, they have mingled a good deed and an evil one; maybe Allah will turn to them (mercifully); surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.” The verse in question is in reference to the repentance of the Ansari Abu Lababa (Marwan Ibn al-Munzir).63 Marwan had chained himself to a pillar in the mosque as a form of repentance and out of guilt for divulging the Prophet’s plans to raid the Banu Qurayza. He announced that he would not leave this pillar until Allah accepted his repentance. The tafsir genre remains rather vague on whether Umm Salama asked about his fate or not, but the sources record that it was during the night that Umm Salama heard the Prophet laugh out in delight as he told her that Abu Lababa has been pardoned by a verse. Umm Salama asked him straight away if she could rush out to the mosque and be the one to bring him the good news. The Prophet allowed her to do so and she hurried to the mosque shouting joyfully: “Rejoice Abu Lababa, Allah has pardoned you.”64 In addition to these narratives, which are found in most Sunni sources and in some Shiʿi sources, there are additional Shiʿi sources that claim that verses were also revealed to vindicate Umm Salama. A portion of verse Q 49.11 is said to have been revealed on account of ʿA’isha and Hafsa mocking Umm Salama: “O you who believe! let not (one) people laugh at (another) people perchance they may be better than they, nor let women (laugh) at (other) women, perchance they may be better than they.” Tabataba’i reported that Umm Salama had tied a long white cloth around her waist in form of a belt and that the two ends were trailing behind her. ʿA’isha and Hafsa laughed about her and ʿA’isha told Hafsa: “Look at what is trailing behind her. It looks like a dog’s tongue.”65 Mohammad Ali Syed argues that verse Q 49:11 is especially important for egalitarian purposes, as women have usually been targeted as the gender more likely to indulge in gossiping and backbiting.66 Yet the verse criticizes persons of both genders for mocking fellow human beings and does not restrict it to women. Apart from these verses where Umm Salama has been directly involved, either by asking questions or where the verse was revealed in her house or in response to a situation involving her, there are many Qur’anic passages addressing human righteousness or the lack thereof and God’s rewards or punishments to humankind that use gender specific language. Men and women – whether believers, hypocrites, or unbelievers  – are addressed specifically and separately. The Qur’anic text leaves no doubt that the believers, male and female, are equally charged with the fulfilment of obligations and that they will reap equal rewards.67 These verses that address men and women separately are generally dated to the Medinan period with the exception of Q 16:9768 and Q 40:40,69 which are considered late Meccan revelations, as Barbara Stowasser observes.70 The fact that God spoke specifically to the women of the believers did not go unnoticed and roused Muslim attention. This feature of the revelations is generally explained in hadith and tafsir as a result of questions or complaints by Umm

192  Yasmin Amin Salama in particular, or Muslim women in general, who felt that they had been left out. Ibn Saʿd notes this in his biographical dictionary Kitab al-Ṭabaqat alKubra.71 However, the corpus notes that the first such verse that was revealed, using this language, was Q 33:35 which was prompted by Umm Salama’s question. Thus, Umm Salama opened this particular door. This statement is intended neither to highlight Umm Salama’s role as being the medium to deliver a critique on the language of the Qur’an nor to say that Umm Salama received any form of revelation to prompt these questions. After all, the Qur’an says that it has been guarded in a tablet,72 meaning that the text was complete before Umm Salama questioned its language. However, asking these questions as a woman allowed her – and all women – to play an assertive role in the new religion and allowed women after them not to remain as passive bystanders, but to engage with the text critically. The Qur’an also says that God is the facilitator of events,73 and hence Umm Salama’s questions were not surprising coming from a woman concerned with all issues affecting her gender.

The hadith and fiqh corpora In the hadith corpus, numerous questions about differences between men and women or egalitarian concerns were also preserved as having been raised by Umm Salama. For example, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, and Sunan Ibn Majah, report that Umm Salama asked the Prophet about “nocturnal emissions” (popularly termed as “wet dreams”). It was narrated that at one of the gatherings ʿA’isha asked the Prophet, on behalf of a Muslim man, about washing in the morning after awakening and finding some evidence of having ejaculated in the night without engaging in sexual intercourse or remembering any dream or vision. The Prophet told ʿA’isha that the man had to perform his ritual purity washing. Umm Salama then asked whether women experienced that as well and if so, what they were required to do? The Prophet replied that women had the same experiences as men and should also perform the ritual purity washing.74 Aḥmad Ibn Hanbal reports another example in his Musnad, when the Muhajirun (emigrants) came to Medina and started to settle down there. They started intermarrying with the Ansari (helpers) women. However, the Muhajirun were accustomed to different sexual practices than the Ansar. One practice was a particular position in intercourse, (popularly termed “doggy style”) where the woman would kneel in front of her partner. Ansari women were not accustomed to this and did not engage in that practice. One of the Muslim Muhajirun wanted to force his Ansari wife to accept this and to engage actively with him. The woman was too shy to ask the Prophet and went to Umm Salama and requested Umm Salama to ask the question on behalf of her. Umm Salama asked the Prophet who recited verse Q [2:223]: “Your wives are a tilth for you, so go into your tilth when you like.” However, he restricted this practice to one particular bodily opening (the vagina) and prohibited anal sex.75 In his Sahih al-Sunan, Ibn Majah reports that Umm Salama once asked the Prophet about jihad for women. He replied saying that the Jihad of women does

Umm Salama’s contributions 193 not involve going to war or participating in battles as warriors, but that their jihad was performing hajj and ʿumra (the big and the small pilgrimage).76 According to another version in the same book, Umm Salama narrated that the Prophet told her that performing the pilgrimage is the jihad of those who are physically weaker.77 In a third version, Umm Salama was told that jihad for women was pregnancy and childbirth.78 Yet women did participate in battles and were responsible for caring for the wounded; nursing them and giving water to warriors or digging graves. Some women actively participated in battles, as was recorded also in the biographical dictionaries and hadith compendia. Sources reveal that Umm Salama accompanied the Prophet on seven of his battles and military missions like Ghazwat al Muraisiʿ against Banu al-Mustaliq (5 ah),79 and Ghazwat al Khandaq (Battle of the Trench).80 Umm Salama narrated many hadith traditions about the events of the battle and its details. She also accompanied the Prophet on Ghazwat Banu Qurayza in the fifth year of hijra and Ghazwat Khaybar in the seventh year of hijra. Twenty women accompanied the troops into the Battle of Khaybar. Sixteen of them were named in the sources, among them Umm Salama.81 The Prophet consulted with Umm Salama when he negotiated the treaty of Hudaibiyah. Many companions were angry at the weak terms of the treaty. It was Umm Salama whose counsel helped to ease the tension among them.82 The Prophet asked the Companions and all others who were with them to go shave, cut their hair and slaughter their sacrifices, but nobody listened to him because they thought that the treaty was unfair to the Muslims. They were additionally disappointed at being prevented from performing the pilgrimage. The Prophet asked them again to start sacrificing their animals, but again nobody listened. He entered Umm Salama’s tent troubled and related the events to her and how hurt he was that they would not obey him. He said to Umm Salama: “Thrice have I commanded the people to slaughter their animals and shave their heads. But look how listless and indolent they are!” Sources report that she intuitively comforted him saying: “O Prophet of Allah, you can’t make these fifteen hundred men do what they don’t want to do. Just do your own duty, which Allah has imposed on you. Go ahead and perform your own rites in an open place so that every one of them can see you.”83 The Prophet realized the sense of this advice. He stepped out of the tent and saw that the sun had risen. He went up to the herd. Everybody was now watching him. Even the pagans of Mecca who had stayed there overnight saw him picking Abu Jahl’s camel, which had a white, shining, silver nose-ring. He brought it out into the open, hobbled it and slaughtered it. The Prophet took Umm Salama’s advice and the result was exactly as she had predicted. Umm Salama did not like half-measures and preferred to err on the side of caution. When the Prophet allowed Suhayla Bint Sahl (in a different version Sahla Bint Suhayl) to breastfeed her teenage adopted son, so that she could keep him as a member of her household without having to cover herself as she did in front of strangers, ʿA’isha used this permission to ask her sisters and nieces to breastfeed the men with whom she wanted to mix. Umm Salama disapproved of this practice

194  Yasmin Amin and said that breastfeeding was only for infants and adults should not be breastfed, be it directly or through drinking the expressed milk from a container.84 Most of the Prophet’s wives followed Umm Salama’s reasoning in opposing the practice. ʿA’isha however argued that if this was a license given to them by the Prophet, they should make use of it.85 It has been reported that Umm Salama’s wisdom was appreciated and acknowledged. A saying “we have not known any other woman who offered advice and it turned to be correct except for Umm Salama” is attributed to al-Juwayni, the Imam of the haramayn.86 Four other women were present at hudaibiyah, Umm Salama, Umm ʿUmara,87 Umm Hani88 and Umm Amir al Ashhaliyah.89 Not only did women offer political advice, but they participated in battles, such as Nusayba b. Ka‘b al-Ansariyya who took part in the Battle of Uhud (625 ad). She carried a sword and shield and defended the Prophet from enemies, sustaining several lance wounds and arrows as she placed herself in front of him. The Prophet is reported to have said that she was a better fighter than any man. She continued to fight in battles throughout her life and even after the Prophet’s death, until she lost her hand at the Battle of ‘Uqraba (in 634 ad).90 Khawla b. al-Azwar (d. 639 ad) is best known for her participation in the “Battle of Yarmuk” (636 ad). She is described as having the skill and fighting ability of the famed Muslim general Khalid b. al-Walid and impressed ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭab with her skills.91 Fighting was not the only way to participate in battle, and some women devised schemes to help in winning a seemingly lost battle. Azdah bint al-Harith b. Kaldah saved the day when she realized that with the men gone, they had been left defenceless. She turned to the women at the camp and instead of waiting for the coming attack, she – together with the other women – created a banner using their headscarves. With Azdah in the lead, the women charged toward the approaching enemy, who mistook them for reinforcement troops and therefore retreated in the middle of the battle.92 The women also swore oaths of allegiance to the Prophet, and verse Q 60:1293 enjoins the Prophet to accept their pledge. Hadith collections and biographical dictionaries identify the Muslim women who pledged allegiance to the Prophet by name. 129 were migrants from Mecca (seventy from the Quraysh and fifty-nine other women)94 and 349 women from the Medinian Ansar.95 They did not take the oath on one single occasion but on several occasions. The formula of the oath taken defines the conditions of female citizenship after the establishment of the umma (community) and hence acknowledges women as political actors.96 Equality and equity as understood then was in support of the Qur’anic ideals of justice in general and social justice in particular,97 emphasizing that all people within society have the same status. This shows not only the recognition of gender equality between women and men and an acknowledgement of women’s rights but also the equality between Arab and non-Arab, or different ethnicities and races within Islamic society. It also includes slaves as equal human beings. Umm Salama is reported to have narrated a hadith in which the Prophet told Abu Dharr to listen and follow the advice of even a slave from Abyssinia with amputated limbs, because he could have an innate wisdom like anyone else.98

Umm Salama’s contributions 195 While it is generally portrayed that men occupied the public sphere and women were more or less confined to the private sphere,99 evidence from the sources suggests otherwise. The Prophet listened to women and their complaints, advice, and opinions, and spoke to the men of his communities about how important the women in Islam and in general truly are. The women’s participation in sociopolitical events, decision-making processes, and their intervention in certain cases have been recorded in the sources.100 Umm Salama was keen on talking about what had transpired between her and the Prophet in their home so as to let the Muslims know what was permissible or prohibited and to enable them to derive rules of conduct from that, which was reflected in fiqh. One example was the permissibility of kissing between husband and wife during the fast of Ramadan. Umm Salama narrated that the Prophet used to kiss her during the day of Ramadan and before breaking the fast at sunset.101 A different version mentions that a woman came to Umm Salama and told her about her husband who used to kiss her while fasting. She wanted confirmation that this was permissible during the fast. Umm Salama reassured her that it was, by citing the example of the Prophet.102 According to a third version of the same, ʿUmar Ibn Abi Salama asked the Prophet if it was permissible for a man to kiss while observing the fast. The Prophet told him to go and ask his mother, Umm Salama, who then told him that the Prophet used to kiss her while he was fasting.103 Another example would be the ruling about lying with a wife while she was menstruating. According to one narrative, while the Prophet was sleeping in Umm Salama’s house she awoke during the night and felt that her menses had started. She got up from under the covers and went to check. Her suspicions were confirmed, and she cleaned herself, used the appropriate bindings and returned to the room, yet was afraid to go back to bed in case she would sully the Prophet. The Prophet asked her if she had started menstruating and she confirmed. He lifted the covers and invited her back to the marital bed.104 In a slightly different version the Prophet is said to have invited her back to bed saying that this was the normal way with all the daughters of Adam.105 Umm Salama was not shy about revealing intimate details of her life with the Prophet for the benefit of the Muslim community. She related how the Prophet and herself used to use the same vessel of water to purify themselves together from janaba (impurity) after having engaged in marital relations.106 Umm Salama also used to derive fiqh rulings from the hadith she heard and narrated and used to render advice based upon them. Once a woman asked her advice about visiting her father to take care of him during his illness while she was in her waiting period and not supposed to leave her house. Umm Salama told her to go and tend to her father during the day, but to make sure that she would spend part of the night in her own house and thereby fulfil both obligations – – to stay in her house and to tend to her father.107 A final hadith that Umm Salama narrated and that also reflected on fiqh, resulted in the ruling that it is not necessary for a woman to open her braids for the ablution ritual after intercourse, menstruation or postnatal bleeding.108

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Conclusion The Qur’an establishes that all humans were created equal. Q 39:6, “He has created you from a single being, then made its mate of the same kind,” and Q 4:1 “O people! be careful of (your duty to) your Lord, Who created you from a single being and created its mate of the same (kind) and spread from these two, many men and women; and be careful of (your duty to) Allah, by Whom you demand one of another (your rights), and (to) the ties of relationship; surely Allah ever watches over you” and Q 49:13 “O you men! surely We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families that you may know each other.” The Qur’an also asserts that the noblest in the sight of God is the one most possessed of taqwa (piety), that this is the only valid ranking of humans in the eyes of God based on godliness and virtue regardless of lineage, wealth, and power. This ranking is equally independent of gender because believing men and believing women are equals in obligations to be guardians of each other Q 9:71.109 As demonstrated, the question of gender justice is not a new construct by feminists or Muslim feminists and has a long tradition as part of the discourse during and after the Prophet’s time. Umm Salama’s questions engaged Qur’anic revelation and her hadith narrations reflected on fiqh, as preserved in Islamic canon such as in the asbab nuzul al-Qur’an genre, hadith, and jurisprudence.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Badran 2008, 25. Badran 2009, 243. Ibid., 247. Badran 2008, 32. Ascha 1995, 89–107. Kloppenborg and Hanegraaff 1995, x. Amin 2013. Ascha 1995, 107. Amin 2013. See for example, Ahad 2004; Bint al-Shāṭi' 2006; Debas 2009; Ilāhī 2007; Qureshi 1986; and Thomson 2012. See for example, Buyuksahin 2016; Haylamaz and Coşar 2011; and Mujahid 2012. See for example, Abbott 1962; Geissinger 2004, 2005, 2011; Jordan 2010; Sadda 2001; and Spellberg 2012. Rhouni 2009, 202. Chaudhry 2015, 88–105. Bouachrine 2014, 53. Ibid., 54. Ibid., 57. Parshall and Parshall 2002, 31. Goodman 2015, 236. De Sondy 2013, 78; quoting Barlas 2011, 179. Sayeed 2016, 67. See for example, Haylamaz 2012; Jones 2008, 2009; and Pasha 2009. Sayeed 2013, 26–34.

Umm Salama’s contributions 197 24 Ibid., 34–38. 25 See for example, al-Hasanī 1998; and Tayyab and Imaa’illah 2008. 26 See al-Dhahabi 1982, vol. 2, 201; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 1959, vol. 1, 802; and Ibn Qutaybah 1934, 60. 27 See Ibn Saʻd 1920, vol. 8, 87; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 1959, 802; and al-Nuwayri 1940, vol. 18, 179. 28 al-Dhahabi 1987, 255. 29 Ibn Ishaq 1976, 144. 30 al-Dhahabi 1987, vol. 8, 98. 31 Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 1959, vol. 3, 940. 32 Ibn Kathir al-Dimashqi 1966, vol. 3, 80. 33 Ibn Hisham 1928, 263–267; and Ibn Kathir al-Dimashqi 1966, vol. 3, 79–82. 34 Ibn al-Athir 1965, vol. 2, 101. 35 Ibn Ḥanbal 1974, vol. 6, 317; and Ibn Ḥajjar 1959, vol. 4, 997. 36 Ibn Saʻd 1920, vol. 2, 66; Ibn Ḥajjar 1959, vol. 4, 888; and al-Bukhari 1981, vol. 3, 126, 132. 37 al-Baladhuri 1987, vol. 1, 432 and vol. 2, 65. 38 Al-Ṭabari 1982, 76; and Ibn al-Muthanna 1999, 155. 39 Muslim 1980, vol. 7, 144. 40 He was also known as Abū Nuʿaym al-Anṣari and was born during the lifetime of the Prophet; however, his status as a Sahabi (Companion) is disputed. Ibn Ḥibban classifies him as a Tabiʿi (follower), while al-Bukhari considers him a Sahabi as per his biographical entry (1762) in al-Bukhari 1962, vol. 7, 402. 41 Geissinger 2015, 214; and Ibn Sa’d 1920, vol. 2, 522. 42 Baqiy b. Mukhallad (d. 276 ah) sets them at 378, while al-Dhahabi (d. 748 ah) counts 380 and al-Mizzi (d. 742 ah) only 158 narrations. 43 Q 33:33. 44 al-Ḥalabi 1902, vol. 2, 279; Ibn Saʻd 1920, vol. 2, 64; and Wellhausen 1882, 184. 45 Wellhausen 1882, 283. 46 Ibn Saʻd 1920, vol. 2, 95; and al-Ḥalabi 1902, vol. 3, 9. 47 Ibn Ḥanbal 1974, vol. 6, 301. 48 All English translations of the Qur’an were translated by M. H. Shakir. 49 Mohammad Ali Syed (1933–2010) was a practicing Barrister in the English Bar since 1975. He was also a scholar, an activist and a recognized expert on Islamic law. In 2003, the Queen of England made him a Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE). 50 Syed 2004, 14. 51 Syed 2004, 15. 52 Shaikh 2012, 82. 53 Pink 2010, 191–192. 54 al-Ṭabarsi 1961, vol. 3, 358. 55 Ibid. 56 Q 4:34: “Men are the maintainers of women because Allah has made some of them to excel others and because they spend out of their property; the good women are therefore obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded; and (as to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat them; then if they obey you, do not seek a way against them; surely Allah is High, Great.” 57 Chaudhry 2013, 31. 58 Bauer 2015, 169. 59 al-Baydawi 1990, vol. 1, 212. 60 al-Ṭusi 1963, vol. 3, 89. 61 al-Ṭabaṭaba’i 1970, vol. 4, 40.

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62 al-Ṭabarsi 1961, vol. 3, 40. 63 Ibn Kathir al-Dimashqi 1971, vol. 2, 385. 64 al-Dhahabi 1987, 313. 65 al-Ṭabaṭaba’i 1970, vol. 18, 331. 66 Syed 2004, 15. 67 Stowasser 1996, 28. 68 Q 16:97: “Whoever does good whether male or female and he is a believer, We will most certainly make him live a happy life, and We will most certainly give them their reward for the best of what they did.” 69 Q 40:40: ”Whoever does an evil, he shall not be recompensed (with aught) but the like of it, and whoever does good, whether male or female, and he is a believer, these shall enter the garden, in which they shall be given sustenance without measure.” 70 Stowasser 1996, 28. 71 Ibn Saʻd 1920. 72 Q 85:21–22: “Nay! it is a glorious Quran, In a guarded tablet.” 73 Q 36:82: “His command, when He intends anything, is only to say to it: Be, so it is.” 74 See al-Tirmidhi 1988, #98 and also al-Bukhari 1981, vol. 4, 102 and Muslim 1980, #313; and finally, Ibn Majah 1988, #600. 75 Ibn Ḥanbal 1974, vol. 6, 318. 76 Ibn Majah al-Qazwini 1988, #2901. 77 See Ibid., #2902. 78 See Ibid., #2902. 79 al-Maqdisi 1994. 80 al-Ḥalabi 1902, vol. 2, 314. 81 Ibid., 283. 82 Ibn Saʻd 1920, vol. 2, 95; and also al-Ḥalabi 1902, vol. 3, 9. 83 al-Bukhari 1981, vol. 3, 182. 84 al-Banna n.d., vol. 16, 185. 85 Muslim 1980, #1454; Abu Dawud 1989, #1815; and al-Nasa’i 1988, #3118. 86 Ibn Ḥajar 1959, vol. 5, 347. 87 Nusayba bint Kaʿb al-Anṣariyah, was an early convert to Islam and the first woman to fight in defense of the religion. 88 Fakhitah Bint Abi Ṭalib, the Prophet’s first cousin. 89 Wellhausen 1882, 242. 90 Souaiaia 2010, 5. 91 Kurzman 2002, 72. 92 Kaḥḥāla 1959, vol. 1, 41–42. 93 “O Prophet! when believing women come to you giving you a pledge that they will not associate aught with Allah, and will not steal, and will not commit fornication, and will not kill their children, and will not bring a calumny which they have forged of themselves, and will not disobey you in what is good, accept their pledge, and ask forgiveness for them from Allah; surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.” 94 Ibn Saʻd 1920, vol. 8, 161–230. 95 Ibid., 230–239. 96 Moghissi 2004, vol. 1, 186. 97 Izutsu 1966, 209–211. 98 al-Mizzi 2008, #11956. 99 Sonbol 1996, xi. 100 For more details, see Decker 2012, 292–296. 101 See al-Bukhari 1981, vol. 2, 233 and Ibn Ḥanbal 1974, vol. 1, 300, as well as al-Ṭabari 1982, 142. 102 Ibn Ḥanbal 1974, vol. 6, 291. 103 Muslim 1980, #1108; and al-Ṭabari 1982, 142.

Umm Salama’s contributions 199 104 al-Bukhari 1981, vol. 1, 83; and Muslim 1980, vol. 1, 296. 105 Ibn Majah 1988, #637; and Ibn Ḥanbal 1974, vol. 6, 294. 106 See al-Bukhari 1981, vol. 1, 83; and Muslim 1980, 296 as well as Ibn Majah 1988, #380. 107 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah 1959, vol. 5, 591, 686. 108 Ibn Ḥanbal 1974, #25938. 109 Stowasser 1996, 33.

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200  Yasmin Amin al-Tusi, Abu Jaʻfar Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Hasan (1963) al-Tibyan fi tafsir alQur'an (al-Najaf: al-Maṭbaʻah al-ʻIlmiyah). Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, AbuʿUmar Yusuf ibn ʿAbd Allah ibn Muḥammad (1959) al-Istiʿab fi maʿrifat al-ashab Cairo: Maktabat Nahdat Misr wa-Maṭbaʿatuha. Ibn al-Athir, ʻIzz al-Din Abi al-Hasan ʻAli ibn Abi al-Karam Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Karim ibn ʻAbd al-Waḥid al-Shaybani (1965) al-Kamil fi al-tarikh (Beirut: Dar Sadir). Ibn al-Muthanna (Abu ʿUbayda) Muʿammar al-Tamimi (1999) Azwaj al-Nabi wa Awladihi (Cairo: Dar al- Haramayn). Ibn Hajjar, Shihab al-Din Abi al-Faḍl Aḥmad ibn ʻAli ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʻAli al-Kinani al-ʻAsqalani thumma al-Misri al-Shafiʻi (1907) al-Isabah fi tamyiz al-Sahabah (Cairo: Maṭbaʻat al-Saʻadah). Ibn Hajjar, Shihab al-Din Abi al-Faḍl Aḥmad ibn ʻAli ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʻAli al-Kinani al-ʻAsqalani thumma al-Misri al-Shafiʻi (1959) Fath al-bari bi-sharh alBukhari (Cairo: Maktabat wa-Maṭbaʻat Musṭafa al-Babi al-Halabi). Ibn Hanbal, Aḥmad (1974) al-Musnad (Cairo: Dar al-Iʻtisam). Ibn Hisham, Abi Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Malik (1928) Sirat al-Nabi ʻalayhi al-salah wa-alsalam (Cairo: Maṭbaʻat Muḥammad ʻAli Subayḥ). Ibn Ishaq, Muḥammad (1976) Kitab al mubtada’ wa-l mabʿath wa-l maghazi (Fez: Maʿhad al-Dirasat wa-l Abḥath li-l Taʿrib). Ibn Kathir al-Dimashqi, ʿImad al-Din Ismaʿil Ibn ʿUmar (1966) al-Bidayah wa-al-nihayah (Beirut, Maktabat al-Ma’arif. al-Bidayah wa-al-nihayah). Ibn Kathir al-Dimashqi, ʿImad al-Din Ismaʿil Ibn ʿUmar (1971) Tafsir al-Qur’an al-’azim (Cairo: Dar al-Sha’b). Ibn Majah al-Qazwini, Muḥammad ibn Yazid Abi ‘Abd Allah (1988) Saḥiḥ Sunan Ibn Majah/ Tashih Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (Riyadh: Maktab al-Tarbiyah al-ʻArabi li-Duwal al-Khalij). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah, Shams al-Din Abu Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Abi Bakr al-Zarʿi (1959) Zad al-ma ad fi Hady Khayr al-Abad Muhaṃmad Khatim al-Nabiyin wa-Imam al-Mursalin (Cairo: al-Matbạ ah al-Misriyah). Ibn Qutaybah, Abi Muḥammad ʻAbd Allah ibn Muslim (1934) al-Maʻarif (Cairo: al-Matbaʻah al-Islamiyah). Ibn Saʻd, Muḥammad (1920) Kitab al-ṭabaqat al-kabir/tasnif Muhammad ibn Saʻd katib alWaqidi, wa-mushtamil aydan ʻala al-sirah al-sharifah al-nabawiyah: ʻaniya bi-tashihihi wa-ṭabʻih Idward Sakhaw (Leiden: Brill). Muslim, ibn al-Hajjaj al-Qushayri al-Nisaburi (1980) Saḥiḥ Muslim (Riyadh: Ri’asit Idarit al- Buhuth al-ʿIlmiya wa-l Ifta’ wa-l Daʿwa wa-l ‘Irshad bi-l Mamlaka al-ʿArabiya al-Saʿudiya).

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Umm Salama’s contributions 201 Amin, Yasmin (2013) “The Prophet’s Wives,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Women, ed. Natana J. DeLong-Bais (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 426–429. Ascha, Ghassan (1995) “ ‘The Mothers of the Believers’: Stereotypes of the Prophet Muhammad’s Wives,” in Female Stereotypes in Religious Traditions, ed. Ria and Wouter J. Hanegraaf Kloppenborg (Leiden: E. J. Brill), 89–107. Badran, Margot (2008) “Engaging Islamic Feminism,” in Islamic Feminism: Current Perspectives, ed. Anitta Kynsilehto (Tampere, Finland: Tampere Peace Research Institute), 25–36. Badran, Margot (2009) Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences (Oxford: Oneworld). Barlas, Asma (2011) Believing Women in Islam – Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press). Bauer, Karen (2015) Gender Hierarchy in the Qur’an: Medieval Interpretations, Modern Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Bint al-Shāṭi (2006) The Wives of the Prophet, transl. Matti Moosa (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press). Bouachrine, Ibtissam (2014) Women and Islam: Myths, Apologies, and the Limits of Feminist Critique (Lanham, MD: Lexinton Books). Buyuksahin, Mehmet (2016) Khadijah Bint Khuwaylid (Clifton, NJ: Tughra Books). Chaudhry, Ayesha S. (2013) Domestic Violence and the Islamic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Chaudhry, Ayesha S. (2015) “Producing Gender-Egalitarian Islamic Law: A Case Study of Guardianship (Wilayah) in Prophetic Practice,” in Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition, ed. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Mulki Al-Sharmani, and Jana Rumminger (London: Oneworld), 88–105. Debas, Faridah Masʻood (2009) The Wives of Prophet Muhammad  =  Zawjāt al-Nabī Muḥammad, transl. Sameh Strauch (Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House). Decker, Doris (2012) Frauen als Trägerinnen religiösen Wissens: Konzeptionen von Frauenbildern in frühislamischen Überlieferungen bis zum 9. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer). De Sondy, Amanullah (2013) The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities (London: Bloomsbury). Geissinger, Aisha (2004) “The Exegetical Traditions of ʿĀ’isha: Notes on Their Impact and Significance,” Journal of Qur’anic Studies 6 (1): 1–20. Geissinger, Aisha (2005) “Portrayal of the Hajj as a Context for Women’s Exegesis: Textual Evidence in al-Bukhari’s (d. 870) ‘al-Sahih’,” in Ideas, Images, and Portrayal: Insights into Classical Arabic Literature and Islam, ed. Sebastian Günther (Leiden: Brill), 153–180. Geissinger, Aisha (2011) “ʿĀ’isha Bint Abi Bakr and Her Contributions to the Formation of the Islamic Tradition,” Religion Compass 5 (1): 37–49. Geissinger, Aisha (2015) Gender and Muslim Construction of Exegetical Authority: A Rereading of the Classical Genre of Qur’an Commentary (Leiden: Brill). Goodman, Robin Truth (2015) Literature and the Development of Feminist Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press). Haylamaz, Reşit (2012) Aisha: The Wife, the Companion, the Scholar (Clifton: Tughra Books). Haylamaz, Reşit, and Hülya Coşar (2011) Khadija: The First Muslim and the Wife of the Prophet Muhammad (Clifton, NJ: Tughra Books and Mujahid). Ilāhī, Muḥammad ʻĀshiq (2007) The Wives of the Prophet Muhammad: A Complete Book on the Biographies of the Wives of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (New Delhi: Idara Isha’at-e-Diniyat).

202  Yasmin Amin Izutsu, Toshihiko (1966) Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur’an (Montreal: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University Press). Jones, Sherry (2008) The Jewel of Medina (New York: Beaufort Books). Jones, Sherry (2009) The Sword of Medina (New York: Beaufort Books). Jordan, Brett L. (2010) It’s All a Woman’s Fault: Aisha Bint Abi Bakr and the Origins of the Sunni-Shia Schism (Cheney, Washington, DC: Dissertation: M. A. Eastern Washington University). Kaḥḥāla, ʻUmar Riḍā (1959) Aʻlām al-nisāʻ fī ʻālamai al-ʻarab wa-l-islām (Damascus: Mu’assasit al-Risāla). Kloppenborg, Ria, and Wouter J Hanegraaff, ed. (1995) Female Stereotypes in Religious Traditions (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill). Kurzman, Charles (2002) Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Malik, Abdul, and Syed Ahmed Faisal Nahri (2012) Golden Stories of Sayyida Khadijah: Mother of the Believers (Riyadh: Darussalam). Moghissi, Haideh (2004) Women and Islam: Images and Realities (Oxford: Routledge). Mujahid, Abdul Malik (2012) Golden Stories of Sayyida Khadijah: Mother of the Believers, transl. Ahmed Faisal Nahri (Riyadh: Darussalam). Parshall, Phil, and Julie Parshall (2002) Lifting the Veil: The World of Muslim Women (Colorado Springs, CO: Biblica). Pasha, Kamran (2009) Mother of the Believers: A Novel of the Birth of Islam (New York: Washington Square Press). Pink, Johanna (2010) Sunnitischer Tafsir in der modernen islamischen Welt (Leiden: Brill). Qureshi, Zafar Ali (1986) The Mothers of the Believers (Islamabad: National Hijra Council). Rhouni, Raja (2009) Secular and Islamic Feminist Critiques in the Work of Fatima Mernissi (Leiden: Brill). Sadda, Hoda El (2001) “Discourses on Women’s Biographies and Cultural Identity: Twentieth-Century Presentations of the Life of A’isha Bint Abi Bakr,” Feminist Studies 27 (1): 37–64. Sayeed, Asma (2013) Women and the Transmission of Religious Knowledge in Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Sayeed, Asma (2016) “Women and the Hajj,” in The Hajj: Pilgrimage in Islam, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Shawkat M. Toorawa (New York: Cambridge University Press), 65–86. Shaikh, Sa’diyya (2012) Sufi Narratives of Intimacy: Ibn ‘Arabi, Gender, and Sexuality (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press). Sonbol, Amira El Azhary, ed. (1996) Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press). Souaiaia, Ahmed E. (2010) Contesting Justice: Women, Islam, Law, and Society (Albany: State University of New York Press). Spellberg, Denise A. (2012) Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of ‘A’isha bint Abi Bakr (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press). Stowasser, Barbara Freyer (1996) “Women and Citizenship in the Qur’an,” in Women, the Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, ed. Amira El Azhary Sonbol (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press), 23–38. Syed, Mohammad Ali (2004) The Position of Women in Islam: A Progressive View (Albany: State University of New York Press). Tagliacozzo, Eric, and Shawkat M Toorawa (2016) The Hajj: Pilgrimage in Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Umm Salama’s contributions 203 Tayyab, Amtunnuur, and Lajnah Ima’illah (2008) Hazrat Umm-i Salma (Faisalabad, Pakistan: Lajnah Imaa’illaah). Thomson, Ahmad (2012) The Wives of the Prophet Muhammad (London: Ta-Ha). Wellhausen, Julius (1882) Vakidi’s Kitab al Maghazi (Berlin: G. Reimer Verlag). Zafar, Ali (1986) The Mothers of the Believers (Islamabad: National Hijra Council).

11 Religious educated women in early Islam Conceptions of women’s images in Arab-Islamic texts until the tenth century Doris Decker Introduction: preliminary considerations and questions Since the beginnings of Islam, there have been women who studied their religion, took up teaching positions, acted as preachers, and contributed immensely to the consolidation and transmission of Islam. This has continued in the “medieval era” of Islamic history, in which women were recognized for their qualifications as religious scholars.1 Some of these women were very renowned in the fields of religious law and the narration of prophetic tradition and were also entitled to teach men and women. Especially in the process of transmission, women played an important role as students or teachers. The significance of religious education in the lives of Muslim women and men is reflected in the fact that both the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions explicitly demand to educate oneself.2 One can see over the course of the past decades that the number of female preachers is growing in many countries of the Middle East, North Africa, and Indonesia. It is a new development that runs parallel to the increases in literacy rates among women, as well as the establishment of an educated female middle class all over the Islamic world since the 1970s. Muslim women increasingly demand more rights for themselves and argumentatively use the legally binding Islamic tradition of transmission and interpret the Qur’an in order to assert these rights.3 Reports about early Muslim women, meaning the first generations of Muslim women during the lifetime of the Prophet, become specifically interesting when they are drawn on as examples order to legitimize or to prohibit the lifestyles of contemporary Muslim women.4 Furthermore, as far as the role of women in Islam in the field of religious knowledge is concerned, these historic role models offer an – maybe even the – orientation. Today, more Muslim women reflect on the religious roles of those historical figures, in addition to their religious self-image and heritage, which is passed down through reports and their interpretation.5 From the very beginning of Islam, women have taken over important functions within the Islamic community and have made an essential contribution to the conservation and transfer of religious knowledge. There are numerous reports on how women would acquire religious knowledge, how they would reflect on it,

Religious educated women in early Islam 205 discuss it, use it in arguments, and transmit it to others. Their activities were not limited to the family or private sphere, but were acted out in public, socio-political spheres.6 Up to now, such research findings are almost only discussed in certain circles – usually within the university – and have barely been noticed by the wider public. It is for this reason that this chapter pays special attention to specific representation methods of women in the early Islamic community in order to make them known. This chapter draws on texts from the early seventh century in the Arabian Peninsula, specifically from the regions of Mecca and Medina. Due to the biographical data of the compilers of these texts, they can only be dated back from the eighth until the early tenth century. With that – in simple terms – a double back-projection is made to the early seventh century. The look back from the present day is first directed toward the texts from the eighth until the early tenth century, while these texts themselves look at the past, at the early seventh century. The following compilations were used for this historical review: the sira of Ibn Ishaq (704–768), found in the editorial of Ibn Hisham (d. 834), the Kitab al-Maghazi by al-Waqidi (747–823), the eighth volume of at-Tabaqat al-Kubra by Ibn Sa‘d (784–845), the hadith collection as-Sahih of al-Bukhari (810–870) and the volumes of Ta´rikh of al-Tabari (839–923). They all refer to the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. The analysis of these texts is not aimed at a historical reconstruction of early Islamic time or to question the authenticity of the texts, but it is rather about the reconstruction of the representation of women, thus about the statements made in the texts, to answer the question about whether and how women are described as religiously educated persons.7 Furthermore, the focus of this examination is strictly on the traditions in which women are portrayed as thinking, feeling, and acting subjects in interactive and communicative situations in which they played a decisive role. The traditions that merely mention women or depict behavioral norms discussed for women are disregarded. That is to avoid the reconstruction of a historiography of women, in which they are “constantly questioned and/or admonished by the moral and religious authorities” and are merely “the recipients of a normative discourse, which dictates to them what they have to do, and therefore makes their faces disappear behind old or new masks.“8 However, how can “religious education” express itself in these texts? How can we derive from the texts that women are “religiously educated”? Since the understanding of “religious education” inevitably influences a textual analysis, it has to be clarified in advance how “religiously educated” is to be understood in the context of this chapter. On the one hand, “educated/education” can be understood as “general knowledge, having information or knowledge,” while on the other hand, it can describe a person having undergone a “specific training, course of instruction, upbringing or schooling.” Since the Islamic educational system only emerged in the second half of the seventh century, one can hardly assume that the representation of religiously educated women within the second meaning will be found in the reports of the beginning of Islam of the early seventh century. This being the case, “educated/education” is understood as a person who has certain knowledge without receiving a formal training or instruction. As for “religiously”

206  Doris Decker educated it is considered to mean a person having explicit “religious” knowledge, meaning the knowledge about the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition.9 In the context of religious knowledge, women are depicted as educated in regards to three dimensions in particular: in the reception of religious knowledge, in their handling of the acquired knowledge, meaning their application of religious knowledge, and their transmission of religious knowledge.10 The structure of this chapter builds on these three dimensions and for each dimension, some examples will be given and analyzed. This is notwithstanding that there were many reservations about women’s education and their access to scriptures, as well as their ability to interpret the scriptures.11 The education of women was primarily geared toward moralizing, and therefore even their access to and learning of the Qur’an was tailored accordingly.12

Women in the context of religious knowledge: reception of religious knowledge In order for a person to be considered religiously educated, there is need for a preceding reception of religious knowledge. This is why at the outset, a hadith by al-Bukhari will be quoted, in which the transmission of knowledge, as well as its reception, are described. Moreover, this hadith even mentions women’s demand for education, which in a special way implies that women in early Islam had a great desire for religious knowledge and thus for religious education and even enjoyed it: A woman came to the Messenger of God and said: “O Messenger of God, the men are enjoying your teachings, therefore appoint a day for us where we can come to you, so that you can teach us what God taught you.” And he said: “Gather on such and such day at such and such place.” So they gathered and came to the Messenger of God and he taught them what God had taught him. Then he said: “There is no woman amongst you who has lost her three children without them being a shield for her against hellfire.” A woman of them said: “O Messenger, and if they were two?” And she repeated it a second time. Then he said: “And if two and if two and if two.”13 In this example, a woman explicitly expresses her desire to acquire religious knowledge. A linguistic reading demonstrates this desire for education, as the woman seeking the Prophet does not ask for a possible transfer of knowledge through him (interrogative), but instead claims it for her and/or a group of other women (imperative). With that, one woman and therefore women in general, as this one woman speaks for a group, explicitly expressed their need for religious instructions or for receiving a religious education. Speaking from a gender-critical perspective, there is the interesting aspect that the woman notices an unequal treatment of genders by the Prophet in relation to religious instructions and criticizes it. She notices that men benefitted from the teachings of the Prophet, but women did not – yet. According to her, the transmission of religious knowledge

Religious educated women in early Islam 207 seems to be something both genders have to benefit from and she demands an equal treatment of men and women in terms of religious education. This testifies to a gender specific perception of the woman, as she notes belonging to the group of women in addition to her observation of the unequal treatment of women compared to men in the context of religious knowledge. This is why she demands that the Prophet find a day to be allocated specifically to the women, on which he can regularly teach them. As the Prophet invariably complied with all people’s wishes, one can conclude that he supported her in her demand for gender equality. As the following example of transmission shows, women were taught themes of an eschatological nature. In general, women’s desire for religious knowledge is visible in many reports and ‘A´isha,14 one of the Prophet’s wives, even explicitly says that women studied their religion: “How excellent the wives of the Ansar[15] are! Shame does not hold them back from studying their religion [tafaqqaha16].”17 Women listened to the Prophet, asked him questions and repeated the things they heard. Such transmissions can be found mostly in the works of al-Bukhari and Ibn Sa‘d, who both describe how women would participate in the Prophet’s sermons and prayers. Within those rather short text passages, women emerge as reporters in the first person, telling that they participated in Muhammad’s sermons and prayers and repeated what they heard. For example, they repeated Qur’anic verses. Khawla bint Qays and Umm Hisham report that they had learned verse 50 of sura (Qaf) from the Prophet and recited parts of sura 50 in this transmission.18 Umm Salama recited parts of sura 52 (at-Tur, “the Mountain”), which she learned from the Prophet,19 and Umm Fadl recited the first part of sura 77 (al-Mursalat, “the Emissaries”).20 Such passages depict women as religiously educated and knowing of the revelation; that they also memorized it and are able to recite it back. Other reports certify the reception of religious knowledge by asking direct questions, which evolved at the end of Muhammad’s sermons to clear up ambiguities. Women would approach the Prophet and inquire about the different topics. For instance, it was reported that a woman named Zaynab bint Abi Mu’awiya21 had a question about Muhammad’s sermon. This is reported in two transmissions: in the first one, Zaynab recounts that she was in the mosque and heard Muhammad preaching and asked the women to give sadaqa.22 Since Zaynab had to support her husband, ‘Abdallah ibn Mas’ud and an orphan, it was not clear to her whether these financial expenses would count as sadaqa. When Zaynab posed her question to the Prophet, he said: “Yes, for her [Zaynab] there will be a double reward. One reward for the relatives and one reward for the sadaqa.”23 In this report, it becomes clear that Zaynab’s question is a query to the content of one of Muhammad’s sermons. Zaynab reflects on her own life situation and asks herself whether her financial burden, due to supporting her husband and an orphan, counts as sadaqa. The transmission thereby describes her as an attentive woman, who takes the abstract content of Muhammad’s sermons, relates it to her own situation, and reflected on it. Muhammad’s explanation about sadaqa raised questions in her mind, which she hoped to solve to by going and asking Muhammad at another time.

208  Doris Decker In another version of this report, with a slightly differing content, it says that Muhammad preached after prayer and ordered the people to give sadaqa. After the sermon, Zaynab looked for him and asked him: O Prophet of God, indeed you demanded to give sadaqa today. I own jewelry, which I want to give as sadaqa, but Ibn Mas’ud [her husband ‘Abdallah] asserted that he and his child are more suitable than anybody else I could give sadaqa to.24 The Prophet confirmed that her husband was right. Both reports show that Zaynab wanted to comply with Muhammad’s demands and give her assets as sadaqa. Zaynab reflected on her plan and its validity. She did not trust her husband’s claim blindly – as it is said in the second version of the report – and personally asked the Prophet for instructions. This is in so far remarkable, because in the reports her husband ‘Abdallah is described as an expert on the revelation, therefore a religious authority himself, who, already in Mecca, was the first to publicly recite the Qur’an and is said to have left a variant codex of the Qur’an, different from the ‘Uthmanic codex.25 It becomes obvious that she thought about Muhammad’s sermon and his command to give sadaqa, gauging the possibilities open to her. Then she consulted Muhammad for a clearer understanding later. Due to the participation in the sermons of the Prophet and the subsequent questions, she was able to gain a religious education and is consequently described as a religiously educated woman who, in addition to that, had the need for exact knowledge. Hundreds of similar reports, often with shorter narrative content than in the reports about Zaynab, can be found. In them, women ask the Prophet questions or ask each other about beliefs, the revelation, religious practices and rituals, such as the ritual purity washing, prayer or the pilgrimage. The theoretical-receptive processes usually take place in short conversations (question/answer scheme) and often it remains unclear why the Prophet was asked certain questions. It was possible to detect Zaynab’s motivation through the context. In case nothing is reported about the motivation for the question, some cases could have been the result of similar situations, however, the context was left out in the transmission process, because it is barely relevant for the transfer of the theological-juridical content. All those reports about the receptive processes clearly underline women’s need for religious knowledge, as well as the modality of receiving a religious education.

Application of religious knowledge The depiction of women as religiously educated people becomes even clearer in the application of this religious knowledge they acquired through questioning and otherwise. It is in this context that it becomes evident that women were religiously educated and processed religious knowledge. The compilations describe extensively how women would reflect on, question, problematize, interpret, and argumentatively use the acquired religious knowledge in theological disputes.

Religious educated women in early Islam 209 The religious education of these women becomes apparent through their discourses with the Prophet and among each other, their reference to sayings and actions of the Prophet during discussions in the community, and their applications to strengthen their argumentation, individual interpretations, and explanations of religious knowledge. One woman, who surpasses everyone else in this context, is the Prophet’s wife ‘A´isha. She is not only the most knowledgeable compared to other women during the time of the early Islamic community but also the only person mentioned in relation to dealing with certain aspects of the revelation such as correcting the prophetic tradition, as well as the interpretations of Qur’anic verses recited or quoted by different people. Through her example, she demonstrates the religious education of women in early Islam. In the following reports, ‘A´isha argues using Qur’anic verses in different contexts. The thematic context of each transmission is not interpreted, because it is not relevant for this chapter. What is more interesting here is the depiction of a woman who, for specific reasons, recites Qur’anic verses in order to argue for her point of view. In the first example, she corrects a prophetic transmission and adds a Qur’anic verse supporting her view. The report is about when ‘Umar claimed that the Prophet said that a deceased person would be punished for the wailing of their relatives.26 ‘A´isha replied to it: May God have mercy on ‘Umar. By God, the Messenger of God did not say that God will punish the deceased for his family crying over him, but the Messenger said: “Truly, God will punish the nonbeliever for his family crying over him.” And she said: “The Qur’an is sufficient to you: Nor can a bearer of burdens bear another’s burdens.”[27]28 In this passage, she quotes verse 35:18 in order to support her version of the Prophet’s words. It is interesting that she quotes the Prophet in direct speech. This is supposed to illustrate that she knew the prophetic tradition well enough to quote Muhammad’s exact words. This shows ‘A´isha as a religiously educated woman, who knew not only the revelation perfectly but also the Prophet’s words. In addition to that, she was able to make connections between the two – Muhammad’s words and the revelation – and use the Qur’anic verse as an argument. Another example about ‘A´isha supports the claim of her excellent knowledge about the revelation. Moreover, the tradition can be considered as an explanation of how she gained her religious knowledge, namely by directly asking the Prophet in a conversation. ‘A´isha is the narrator of this tradition and reports: The Messenger of God said: “There is no one whose score will be settled on Judgement Day without them going down.” Then I said: “O Messenger of God, has God not already said: “Then he who is given his Record in his right hand, Soon will his account be taken by an easy reckoning?”[29] After that, the Messenger of God said: “This is related to Judgment Day. No one bargains with God over the reckoning without being punished.”30

210  Doris Decker This text clearly shows that she is depicted as an attentive recipient and knower of the revelation and can therefore be regarded as a theologically educated woman who reflected on her knowledge and appropriately brought her knowledge into discussions. She thought that she found a contradiction between the Prophet’s sayings and the revelation, which implies that she reflected on the revelation and put it in relation to her husband’s statements and compared them both. It is not only these examples that emphasize the exceptionality and uniqueness of her character in the reports. Most of the reports are said to trace back to her while the numbers vary. In al-Bukhari’s hadith collection, 228 reports are narrated on her authority alone. If one includes other compilations, according to Deeb, there are more than 2,000.31 According to Pellat, 1,210 ahadith go back to her, of which three hundred can be found in al-Bukhari’s and Muslim’s32 works.33 As already mentioned, she is the only woman cited in relation to some methods of dealing with the revelation. Generally speaking, she is the one woman mentioned most often with regard to the interpretation of Qur’anic verses in the hadith traditions. She is often asked about her opinion on revelations, which is reported by only a few other women. In such reports, she explains, for instance, what certain verses meant or to which event they referred or reports the occasions of their revelation. Therefore, it cannot be denied that already in early Islam and for the following transmitters, she was an acknowledged authority in terms of religious questions. Nonetheless, one has to emphasize that Muhammad’s wives and daughters are mentioned frequently in the reports and played an important role in the early Islamic community. However, they are not the only women who aroused the interest of the biographers who wrote the prophetic stories, and who depicted them as religiously educated and as religious authorities. In the reports, over 1,200 women in total are mentioned, who are said to have come in contact with Muhammad, appearing in various different ways in the context of religious knowledge and therefore religious education.34 Revelations were subjects of intellectual reflection and interpretation, as well as criticism. Women would memorize verses of the Qur’an, recite them, refer to them and use them in discussions in order to consolidate or support their opinions. It is also reported about Muhammad’s wife Hafsa that she used her knowledge of the revelation argumentatively in an argument with the Prophet.35 Hafsa disagreed with Muhammad in a conversation and strengthened her opinion by quoting a verse from the Qur’an. According to Ibn Sa‘d, the dispute between her and her husband took place as follows: The Prophet said when he was with Hafsa: “As God wills, none of the people who swore allegiance underneath the tree [of Hudaybiya36] will go to hellfire.” She [Hafsa] said: “But yes, oh Messenger of God!” Then he reproached her, after which Hafsa said: “And there is none of you who will not be presented before the confines of Hell.”[37] The Prophet replied: “It has already been revealed, then We will deliver those who were pious (in the world), and will leave the transgressors there on their knees.”3839

Religious educated women in early Islam 211 With her utterance “But yes, oh Messenger of God!” she contradicted the Prophet’s statement, because she was of a different opinion than him. She then tried to reinforce her opposing theological stance by reciting the verse [19:17], which Muhammad countered with a quoting another verse as well. This shows her knowledge of the revelation and her reflection on it. This means that she can draw on a verse, which, according to her view, disproves her husband’s claim and supports her own. This presents her as a religiously educated, equal conversational partner of Muhammad, her husband, who is able to have a theological contention based on her profound religious knowledge.40 From a gender-critical perspective, it can be noted here that a man and a woman are arguing on the same intellectual level with the same resources. It is important to mention that such disputes were neither rare nor limited to the Prophet’s wives. The Medinan Khawla bint Tha’laba, for example, consulted Muhammad one day because of a personal matter. She explained the situation to him, however, she did not accept his ruling and kept on arguing with him until he received a revelation that solved the problem to her satisfaction.41 Khawla bint Tha’laba had gone to Muhammad to complain that her husband had rejected her using the preIslamic custom of zihar, which according to Arab custom, was irrevocable. In the case of zihar, a man swears that his wife is to him “like the back of his mother,” and therefore he forbids himself sexual relations with his wife. The wife is effectively in a state of limbo: neither belonging to her husband nor being allowed to remarry. Muhammad had indicated to Khawla bint Tha’laba that existing customs remained normative, unless God revealed a new ruling. She kept arguing that this was unjust and unlawful.42 The Qur’an condemned zihar in verse [58:2] and treated this statement uttered by the husband as an extrajudicial oath, providing him with the means to expiate it if he wishes to return to his wife, by either manumitting a slave or feeding sixty poor people.43 To conclude the paragraph on the application of religious knowledge, a report will be presented in which a woman, Umm Ya’qub, argued about the content of the revelation. This demonstrates not only that the Prophet’s wives engaged with the revelation and were religiously educated in these issues but also that other women from the early Islamic community did the same. The example that is exclusively reported in one hadith by al-Bukhari is concerned with Umm Ya’qub’s argument with ‘Abdallah ibn Mas’ud (noted earlier) about the interpretation of a Qur’anic verse and her assertion to having “read and studied” the revelation.44 The dispute between them was triggered by ‘Abdallah’s claim that God has damned the woman who is tattooed, plucks her eyebrows and files her teeth, because by doing so, she would change God’s creation. When Umm Ya’qub heard about it, she was upset and went to see ‘Abdallah to confront him. He, however, defended his opinion with a counter question: Why should he not condemn those whom the Messenger of God had condemned himself? Eventually, he explained, that what he just said was written in the book of God. In a self-confident manner, she countered saying that she already “read or studied” what is between those two tablets,45 however, nothing of what he said could be found in them. Thereupon he replied that she

212  Doris Decker would have found it (his held view) if she had really studied the revelation and then asked her if she had “read or studied” the following: “Take whatever the Messenger gives you and refrain from whatever he forbids you.“46 She confirmed that she had “read or studied” that verse, after which he explained that everything he listed is therefore forbidden. However, this did not seem to convince her and she objected by saying that she had seen people from his tribe who had done that to themselves. After that, he asked her to go to these people and to look out specifically for these changes. Following his instructions, she realized that she was wrong.47 Even if Umm Ya’qub – as described in the hadith – ended up being proven wrong, which might be debatable theologically, but not the issue of this chapter, she is being described as religiously educated. She assures ‘Abdallah not only that she has extensive knowledge about the revelation but also that she personally interpreted God’s word, which contrasted with ‘Abdallah’s claim and interpretation of the verse. She was not able to derive ‘Abdallah’s interpretation from her own knowledge and understanding of the revelation. Even after he quoted a specific verse, she still did not seem convinced. It needed an additional practical proof, by her seeking out the women of his tribe to convince herself with her very own eyes that they do not do it in the manner she mentioned. Therefore, in this report, an image of an inquisitive woman, who is also well versed in the revelation, is being created: a woman, who deals with religious problems on her own initiative. On the basis of her knowledge about the revelation, she did not hesitate to critically reflect on other interpretations and confidently engage in a dispute about them. Before that, she did not back off from her discussion partner, ‘Abdallah, who was considered an authority in questions of the Qur’an. Even if, in the report, she does not express her own interpretation of this revelation she is still presented as knowledgeable of the Qur’an and a woman keen to debate. She is an example for the education of women and their reflection of knowledge within disputes with other members of the community – in this specific case between a woman and a man. Overall, it can be noted that the application of religious knowledge of the women in early Islam is reflected in the fact that they deal with the knowledge they received in detail by reflecting on it, critically questioning it, interpreting it and exposing its problems in discussions. As far as the application of knowledge is concerned, which serves as evidence for the women’s religious education, one can see that they recited the revelation in various different situations.48 Moreover, in order to strengthen their views,49 they also interpreted verses from the Qur’an,50 argued with the sayings and actions of the Prophet in various situations51 and corrected misquoted prophetic traditions or Qur’anic interpretations of other people,52 however, that is only reported as having been done by ‘A´isha.53 The resulting discourses on an abstract and intellectual level between women and the Prophet, as well as other members of the Islamic community testify to their religious education in the form of extensive knowledge about theoretical and practical issues.

Religious educated women in early Islam 213

Transfer of religious knowledge The focus of this final section is the topic of transfer of religious knowledge, where women from the early Islamic community were also depicted as religiously educated, passing on received knowledge and skills to following generations. As women appear hundreds of times as transmitters in early Islamic texts, it is apparent that women passed on religious knowledge. Usually, such reports are very short and it is only described briefly that a certain woman reported on what the Prophet did or said (for example, “xy reports, that the Prophet said . . .”). Or a woman quotes, as mentioned earlier, verses from the Qur’an and is characterized by that as religiously educated. Scant reports feature a narrative context that informs the readers where, when, how, or why a transmission of knowledge took place. Ibn Sa‘d for example reports how a boy asked his grandmother Umm ‘Atiya for the meaning of parts of the verse 60:12. This Qur’anic verse contains the conditions of the oath of allegiance, which was taken by those who believed in Muhammad and his religion. One of the requirements included in the verse was that one was not allowed to be disobedient to Muhammad concerning things that are right. The boy now asked his grandmother about this condition. She explained to him that it means that lamentation is prohibited to women.54 Therefore, the knowledge transfer through Umm ‘Atiya is preceded by a concrete question, which led to the transmission of the woman’s knowledge. Notwithstanding that only some transmissions refer to the modality of the transfer of knowledge, in this case a woman is depicted as religiously educated, because she was able to explain verses of the Qur’an that her grandson would not have been able to understand without her explaining their context to him. In other reports, it is also said that women are questioned about their knowledge, like for example Asma, ‘A´isha’s sister, when she went to pilgrimage with her servant. The servant spontaneously asks a question, as he did not know the pilgrimage rituals, which is why he asked her about them. She then explained to him that the Prophet had allowed the sequence in the way she was doing it.55 A few reports point out that women like ‘A´isha were working as teachers, which also proves their religious education. If one could observe a regular training, which only a small number of passages indicate vaguely, one could, as far as the students are concerned, assume that the meaning of “educated” comes in the sense of a specific instruction or training. ‘Amra bint Qays reported that she went to ‘A´isha, asked and listened to her, as well as transmitted reports from her.56 Even though nothing is reported about the transmitted knowledge, some other evidence hints at a regular instruction by ‘A´isha.57 She appears as a teacher; a position she was only able to reach because of her religious education.58 In addition to ‘A´isha, other women who acted as teachers are mentioned. For example, Ibn Sa‘d reported about Umm al-Hasan, who was in service of the Prophet’s wife Umm Salama and the mother of the later Qur’an teacher and Sufi al-Hasan al-Basri. Ibn Sa‘d reports that Umm al-Hasan was seen teaching the Qur’an to a group of women and reporting/talking about the Prophet.59

214  Doris Decker It is noticeable that the questions directly addressed to women, and usually introduced in the collections by words such as sa’ala (asked) or qala (said) are only very few. The women addressed are Umm Salama, Umm ‘Atiya and ‘A´isha.60 However, the traditions mentioning Umm Salama and Umm ‘Atiya as being addressed by the questioner are exclusively found in Ibn Sa‘d’s Tabaqat. ‘A´isha is exclusively addressed by the questioners in hadith collections, such as al-Bukhari. The questioners vary and form a huge group of even male questioners such as ‘Abdallah ibn Rafi´, Isma’il, Masruq, Abu ‘Ubayd, Abu Salama, al-Aswad, ‘Urwa, ‘Alqama, ‘Abas, ‘Ata´ ibn Abi Rabah and ‘Abid ibn ‘Umayr, Umm Humayd, Kabsha bint Abi Maryam, as-Sahba´ bint Karim, Umm Muhammad bint Yazid, and an unnamed woman.61

Conclusion By looking at the examples mentioned, it becomes clear that women in the early Islamic texts were sometimes described as religiously educated. The texts, however, are not limited to depicting only ‘A´isha, as well as other Prophet’s wives or daughters as examples. Numerous women are mentioned, each of whom had a comprehensive religious knowledge and felt the need to acquire the knowledge declared and taught by the Prophet, to reflect on it, and mediate about it. In the reports, women are integrated into a religious space of knowledge, which they shape decisively. The depicted interactions are versatile: women questioned the Prophet about a variety of topics, participated in theological debates that they also initiated themselves and acquired a comprehensive practical and theoretical knowledge base through listening, participation, observation, and imitation that they also then questioned, interpreted individually, and used argumentatively in discussions. As a result, they were awarded intellectual, cognitive and abstract abilities. In terms of content, the women show different levels of knowledge about the Prophetic traditions and the revelation, which also extends to cover the occasions of revelation of certain verses, both temporal and chronological classification, as well as the meaning of verses and their argumentative use. In the field of religious practices, women showed comprehensive knowledge on issues such as prayer, the washing rituals and the pilgrimage. By including a critical gender perspective, it was shown that women and men had discussions on the same intellectual level and used the same resources for their argumentation. Even contradictions specifically directed at the Prophet exist in the sources. It can be concluded from the depiction of such interactions between the two genders, concerning their conversations and arguments, that the transmitters and compilers of the reports regarded discussions between men and women as normal and usual, with regard to the contact/behavior of the two genders. In addition to that, a woman’s endeavor for gender equality in the field of religious knowledge comes through. Women are aware of their gender and the unequal treatment they received compared to men and they demand equal rights to education. According to the transmissions, the Prophet did not ignore that in any way, but explicitly supported and encouraged it.

Religious educated women in early Islam 215 In summary, it can be noted that women seemed to have played not only an important but also a crucial role in the formation and transmission process of Islam. It is striking that the reports do not talk about women, meaning that they are not mentioned as objects, who have certain rights and duties, but that women are represented or appear as independent, autonomous subjects within the formation of a religious system, who actively and decisively participate in producing, managing, and reproducing knowledge. The participation of women, however, is not limited to an educational field: the actions of women span over a wide sociopolitical and economic area, as previously mentioned. Ultimately, women were involved in all areas of society and had a say in the fate of the early Islamic community during the lifetime of Muhammad. In accordance with the depictions in the reports, women in early Islam seemed to have made an essential contribution to the discourse and transmission of religious knowledge and therefore to Islam. Due to the fact that these images of women were preserved in the sources until the tenth century, it can be concluded, as a historical-cultural outcome, that for people and groups involved in the transmission process of the reports – such as transmitters, compilers and scholars – it was unproblematic and self-evident that women were religiously educated, acquired knowledge, had teaching positions and were accepted as religious authorities. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that this positive image of women as religiously educated is the result of a deliberate focus and reading of those reports in which women are portrayed as thinking, feeling, and acting subjects in interactive and communicative situations. Naturally, there are other images and depictions of women in early Islam that are not as positive, and Muslim feminists have critiqued those patriarchal depictions of women as can be seen in other chapters in this volume.62

Notes 1 See Roded 1994; Ahmed 1992; Sayeed 2013; Nadwi 2007; and Geissinger 2004, 1–20, 2005, 153–179, 2011, 37–49, 2013, 305–319, 2015. 2 With regard to the content, this means the memorization of the Qur’an, the acquisition of knowledge of the sayings and actions of the Prophet (the prophetic tradition), law, theology as well as the Arabic language. 3 Deeb 2007, 335–336. 4 This revertible agility is, however, not a generally practiced approach within Islam, but is only used in certain circles. In his book Orientalism, Edward W. Said points out the danger of this approach as, according to him, Orientalists would legitimize fundamentalist’s notions of what is to be understood by Islam. For more on this topic, see Said 1981. 5 Well-known research on this topic has been done by Mernissi 1987, 1992; Ahmed 1992; Barlas 2002; and Hassan 1996. 6 See for example Decker 2017. 7 The underlying theoretical and methodological concept is that of the intentio operis by Eco, see Eco 2004. About the methodological approach also see Schöller 2000. 8 Perrot 1989, 20. 9 The understanding of “religious knowledge,” which this chapter is based on, was described in my study Frauen als Trägerinnen religiösen Wissens 2013, 42–76. Broadly speaking, it refers to the knowledge of the revelation and the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, the prophetic tradition.

216  Doris Decker 10 11 12 13 14

See Decker 2013. Geissinger 2015, 251. Ibid., 202. Al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 96, 9. ‘A´isha (613/614–678) was the daughter of Abu Bakr, the first caliph after the Prophet’s death. She was already married to the Prophet as a child, but stayed at her parent’s house for several years. After the Hijra, the immigration from Mecca to Medina, she received her own apartment in 623 next to the mosque in Medina and the Prophet only then consummated the marriage with her. Abbott 1942. 15 Ansar were the people based in Medina who took Muhammad in and supported him. Arab. ansar “helper, assistance/help; God” (Wahrmund). 16 Arab. yatafaqqahna (Imperfect Indikativ active, 3. Pers. Pl. f., faqaha V.) “to dedicate oneself to the study of law and theology; to become erudite, wise and judicious; understand” (Wahrmund); “understand, comprehend; to study Fiqh; to devote oneself to acquire knowledge, to occupy oneself; enlightenment, to win/get a clear picture/ image” (Wehr); “he learned knowledge, or science; he learned al-fiqh; he took, or applied himself, to the acquisition of al-fiqh; tafaqqaha fi l-‘ilm is like ta’allama he became, or made himself, learned, or thoroughly learned, in science; Qur’an 9:122 li-yatafaqqahū fī d-dīn that they may task themselves to obtain understanding in din (law, religion in general), imposing upon themselves the difficulties attendant on the acquisition thereof” (Lane). 17 Al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 3, 50; arab. ni’ma n-isa´u l-ansari lam yamna’hunna l-hayya´u an yatafaqqahna fi d-din. 18 Ibn Sa‘d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 217, 324. 19 al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 65, 52, 1; 10, 105; 25, 64. 20 Ibid., 10, 98; 64, 83. 21 Zaynab was a women from Mekka who belonged to the Prophet’s early supporters. She believed in his message and fled with him to Medina. 22 Arab. sadaqa “legal alms (the tenth)” (Wahrmund). In later Islam, sadaqa becomes a voluntary donation compared to zakat, which is understood as a legally regimented tax. In the Qur’an, both terms are used rather interchangeably in terms of their meaning. Juynboll 1910, 95; see also Watt 1980, 299–306. 23 Al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 24, 48. 24 Ibid., 24, 44. 25 ‘Abdallāh ibn Mas’ud is considered as one of the first and most loyal followers of Muhammad, who participated in many expeditions. Nagel 2008, 311; and al-Bukhari: Sahih [dt.], 487. 26 ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb was a close consultant of the Prophet. Through the marriage of Muhammad with his daughter Hafsa, he also became his father in law. After the death of the first caliph, Abu Bakr, he became caliph in the year 634, which he held until his death in 644. 27 Qur’an 35:18, trans. by ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 28 Al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 23, 33. 29 Qur’an 84:7–8, trans. by ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 30 Al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 81, 49. 31 Deeb 2007, 335. 32 Muslim is the name of the compiler of another hadith collection from the ninth century. 33 Pellat 1960, 308. 34 Roded 1994, 15. 35 Hafsa bint ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab married the Prophet in the year 625 at the age of 18. Due to her father ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph, and her husband who had fallen in the battle of Badr, she took on a special status among the wives in the house of Muhammad. See Vaglieri 1971, 64; and Watt 1956, 396.

Religious educated women in early Islam 217 36 The expression “people, who swore allegiance underneath the tree of Hudaybiya” refers to a specific group of Meccans that entered into a contract with Muhammad in the year 628. 37 Qur’an 19:71, trans. Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi. 38 Qur’an 19:72, trans. Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi. 39 Ibn Sa‘d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 336. 40 In this context I would like to refer to an article by Khan 2014, 174–216, where she stated that she attempted to build on Geissinger’s work that examines Hafsa bint ‘Umar’s connection with the codification of the Qur’ān. Geissinger refutes the article of Khan in another article; see Geissinger 2017, 1–30. 41 Ibn Sa‘d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 275. 42 Mattson 2007, 1–3. 43 See also Spectorsky 2010, 36. 44 The Arabic verb qara’a cannot be clearly translated with “to read” because in the context of the transmission a translation with “to study” would also be suitable. This would leave open if Umm Ya’qub could read, but underline that she knew the revelation well or/and was able to recite it by heart. 45 This expression points out that the revelations written down and were kept with and protected by a kind of cover from above and below. Arab. lawhayn, dual of lawh “Tablet of wood, stone, bones to write on; board, plank; gate wings; shoulder blade” (Wahrmund); “tablet; sheet/plate/board; plank; slat; wooden sign; shoulder blade” (Wehr). 46 Qur’an 59:7, trans. by Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi. Since this verse deals with the distribution of the (war) booty, the interpretation of ‘Abdallāh does not seem logical. Since this content-related contradiction and the understanding of the verse and the question whether it refers to the change mentioned earlier of natural beauty, are subsidiary in the framework of this chapter, its interpretation will not be pursued. The complete verse is: “Whatever Allah restored to His Messenger from the people of the settlements, belongs to Allah and the Messenger and the kinsfolk and the orphans and the needy and the wayfarers, so that it does not remain circulating among your rich people only. Take whatever the Messenger gives you and refrain from whatever he forbids you. Fear Allah, for Allah is stern in inflicting punishment.” (Qur’an 59:7, trans. by Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi.) 47 al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 65, 59, 4. 48 See al-Waqidi: Kitab al-Maghazi [arab.], 292. 49 See al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 65, 5, 7; 65, 53, 1; Ibn Hisham: Sira [arab.], vol. I, 480; and Ibn Sa’d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 336. 50 See al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 47, 7; 55, 21; 59, 7; 64, 25; and Ibn Sa‘d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 3, 122–123. 51 See al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 8, 102; 8, 105; 13, 20; 59, 2; 61, 25; 85, 3. 52 See al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 23, 33; 25; 79; 60, 19; 64, 8; Ibn Hisham: Sira [arab.], vol. I, 453–454; and at-Tabari: Ta´rikh [arab.], Series I, 1331–1332. 53 Nadwi, also presents a hadith credited to Umm Salama and especially to ‘A´isha that are quoted in exegetical works as examples of women’s tafsir; see Nadwi 2007, 275–277. 54 Ibn Sa‘d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 3. 55 al-Bukhari: Sahih [arab.], 25,98. 56 ‘Amra was a woman from Basra. Since ‘A´isha was in Basra in the year 656 during the battle of Badr, it could be during this time when both women met. Ibn Sa‘d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 359–360. 57 See Decker 2018. 58 Decker 2013. 59 Ibn Sa‘d: at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.], 350. 60 Ibid., 3, 122, 350, 360.

218  Doris Decker 61 Decker 2013, 318–322. 62 Therefore, I would like to refer to different positions, see for example Geissinger 2015, 2018.

Bibliography Abbott, Nabia (1942) Aishah: The Beloved of Mohammed (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press). Ahmed, Leila (1992) Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). al-Bukhari, Sahih [arab.] (1862–1908) Recueil des Traditions Mahométanes par Abou Abdallah Mohammed ibn Ismaīl el-Bokhāri, publié par M. Ludolf Krehl, 4 vols. (Leyden: Brill). al-Bukhari, Sahih [dt.] (1997) Ṣaḥīḥ al-Buḫārī, Nachrichten von Taten und Aussprüchen des Propheten Muhammad. Selected, transl. Arabic and ed. Dieter Ferchel (Stuttgart: Reclam). al-Waqidi, Kitab al-Maghazi [arab.] (1966) The Kitab al-Maghazi of al-Wāqidī, ed. Marsden Jones, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press). at-Tabari, Ta´rikh [arab.] (1964) Annales quos scripsit Abu Djafar Mohammed ibn Djarir at-Tabari, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: Brill). Barlas, Asma (2002) ‘Believing Women’ in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretatins of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press). Decker, Doris (2013) Frauen als Trägerinnen religiösen Wissens: Konzeptionen von Frauenbildern in frühislamischen Überlieferungen bis zum 9. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer). Decker, Doris (2017) “Weibliche Politik im Frühislam am Beispiel von Muḥammads Frau Umm Salama,” Marburg Journal of Religion 19 (1): 1–22, 22 pages. Decker, Doris (2018) “Frauen als Lehrerinnen? Modalitäten und Termini der Wissensvermittlung als Indikatoren für Lehrfunktionen von Frauen zu Beginn des Islam,” in Der Islam und die Geschlechterfrage, ed. Kathrin Klausing, Silvia Horsch, Melahat Kisi, and Annett Abdel-Rahman (Frankfurt: Peter Lang). (in print) Deeb, Lara (2007) “Religious Practices: Preaching and Women Preachers. Arab States (excepting North Africa and the Gulf),” in Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures, vol. 5, ed. Suad Joseph (Leiden and Boston: Brill), 335–336. Eco, Umberto (2004) Die Grenzen der Interpretation (München: DTV). Geissinger, Aisha (2004) “The Exegetical Traditions of ‘A’isha: Notes on Their Impact and Significance,” Journal of Qur’anic Studies 6: 1–20. Geissinger, Aisha (2005) “The Portrayal of the Hajj as a Context for Women’s Exegesis: Textual Evidence from al-Bukhari’s (d. 870) Sahih,” in Insights in Classical Arabic Literature and Islam, ed. Sebastian Guenther (Leiden and Boston: Brill), 153–179. Geissinger, Aisha (2011) “A’isha Bint Abi Bakr and Her Contributions to the Formation of the Islamic Tradition,” Religion Compass 5 (1): 37–49. Geissinger, Aisha (2013) “’Umm al-Darda’ Sat in Tashahhud Like a Man:’ Towards the Historical Contextualization of a Portrayal of Female Religious Authority,” The Muslim World 103 (3): 305–319. Geissinger, Aisha (2015) Gender and Muslim Construction of Exegetical Authority: A  Rereading of the Classical Genre of Qur’ān Commentary (Leiden and Boston: Brill).

Religious educated women in early Islam 219 Geissinger, Aisha (2017) “No, a Woman Did Not ‘Edit the Qur’ān’: Towards a Methodologically Coherent Approach to a Tradition Portraying a Woman and Written Quranic Materials,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 85 (2): 416–445. Geissinger, Aisha (2018) “Feminist Muslim (Re)Interpretations of Early Islam,” in Routledge Handbook on Early Islam, ed. Herbert Berg (New York: Routledge), 296–308. Hassan, Riffat (1996) “Muslim Women and Post-Patriarchal Islam,” in After Patriarchy: Feminist Transformations of the World Religions, ed. Paula M. Cooey, William R. Eakin, and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll: Sri Satguru), 39–64. Ibn Hisham, Sira [arab.] (1858–1860) Kitāb Sira Rasūl Allāh: Das Leben Muhammad’s nach Muhammad Ibn Isḥāq bearbeitet von Abd el-Malik Ibn Hischām, ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Dieterichsche Universitäts-Buchhandlung). Ibn Sa‘d, at-Tabaqat al-Kubra [arab.] (1904) Ibn Sa‘d, Biographien Muhammeds, seiner Gefährten und der späteren Träger des Islams bis zum Jahre 230 der Flucht, vol. VIII. Biographien der Frauen, ed. Carl Brockelmann (Leiden: Brill). Juynboll, T. W. (1910) Handbuch des islamischen Gesetzes (Leiden: Brill). Khan, Ruqayya Y. (2014) “Did a Woman Edit the Quran? Hafsa and Her Famed ‘Codex’,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 82 (1): 174–216. Lane, Edward William (1968) An Arabic-English Lexicon, 8 vols. (Beirut: Librairie du Liban). Mattson, Ingrid (2007) The Story of the Qur’ān: Its History and Place in Muslim Life (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing). Mernissi, Fatima (1987) Geschlecht – Ideologie – Islam (München: Frauenbuchverlag). Mernissi, Fatima (1992) Der politische Harem: Mohammed und die Frauen (Freiburg: Herder). Nadwi, Mohammad Akram (2007) Al-Muhaddithat: The Women Scholars in Islam (Oxford and London: Interface). Nagel, Tilman (2008) Mohammed: Leben und Legende (München: R. Oldenbourg). Pellat, C. (1960) “ʿĀ’iša bint Abī Bakr,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill), 308. Perrot, Michelle (1989) “Vorwort,” in Geschlecht und Geschichte. Ist eine weibliche Geschichtsschreibung möglich? ed. Alain Corbin, Arlette Farge, and Michelle Perrot (Frankfurt: S. Fischer), 15–27. Qur’an [engl.], transl. ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1987) www.streathammosque.org/uploads/ quran/english-quran-yusuf-ali.pdf Qur’an [engl.], transl. Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1972) www.quran411.com/quran/ quran-tafseer-maududi.pdf Roded, Ruth (1994) Women in Islamic Biographical Collections: From Ibn Sa‘d to Who’s Who (London: Lynne Rienner). Said, Edward W. (1981) Orientalismus (Frankfurt, Berlin and Wien: Ullstein). Sayeed, Asma (2013) Women and the Transmission of Religious Knowledge in Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press). Schöller, Marco (2000) Methode und Wahrheit in der Islamwissenschaft (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz). Spectorsky, Susan Ann (2010) Women in Classical Islamic Law: A Survey of the Sources (Leiden and Boston: Brill). Vaglieri, L. (1971) “Hafsa,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill), 63–65.

220  Doris Decker Wahrmund, Adolf (1985) Handwörterbuch der neu-arabischen und deutschen Sprache, 2 vols (Beirut: Librairie du Liban). Watt, W. Montgomery (1956) Muhammad at Madina (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Watt, W. Montgomery, und Alford T. Welch (1980) Der Islam I. Mohammed und die Frühzeit – Islamisches Recht – Religiöses Leben (Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln and Mainz: Kohlhammer). Wehr, Hans (1952) Arabisches Wörterbuch für die Schriftsprache der Gegenwart (Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz).

12 Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia The transformation of Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi Introduction This study takes as its premise that there is a patriarchal/hegemonic monopoly within Islamic religious framings of reference and authority, especially in matters related to women. This is affecting the shape and structure of society, especially in the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, in this chapter, I address the possibility of challenging this authority with reference to women’s experiences, more specifically the example of one woman scholar from Saudi Arabia, Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad. Through her experience, and by analyzing a variety of textual sources, I examine the extent to which it is possible to change the gender dynamics or shift the paradigm when religious authority is challenged. Omaima Abou Bakr is an important academic voice who has worked on women’s religious activities within Islamic history for decades. In her research on women’s production of religious knowledge, she follows the three “R”s of historian June O’Conner: rereading, reconceiving, and restructuring religious history.1 I follow her example here in my exploration of a case in the contemporary context in order to explore the three Rs in terms of space, material, and authority. In addition to the discourse of language and position, this chapter examines representation, voice, absence, and visibility as they pertain to the historical study of women and empowerment.2 Dealing with religion and women brings us in the realm of women studies, history, or feminism. This chapter is part of the larger theoretical currents within Islamic feminism, which has been debated since the late 1980s, taking many forms and definitions.3 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, one of the leaders in forming this line of theory and activism, wrote: “feminist voices and scholarship in Islam are challenging, on their own terms and from within the same tradition, those who use religion to justify patriarchy.”4 Margot Badran, who has written about Islamic feminism in the Middle East, describes her subjects by saying: “Islamic feminists are producing stringent religious argumentation for gender equality and gender justice through new readings of the Qur’an.”5 Miriam Cooke, in her work titled Women Claim Islam, considers Islamic feminists as those who are beginning to challenge conventional histories and canonical texts that either omit mention of women or stigmatize their prominence as aberration.

222  Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi In each case, these writers are pointing to the openness of the Qur’an and sunna to ijtihad, the technical term that refers to the process of independent reasoning that scholars, but also non-scholars, may choose when a legal precedent is not immediately clear and available.6 Therefore, the core of Islamic feminism is a concept, attitude, and activism to revise gender roles from an Islamic perspective that forms its frame of reference. It uses feminist tools of textual critique to challenge the patriarchal elements in Islamic jurisprudence. It aims also to dismantle the authority in question, by entering the realm of the sacred text and by providing an alternative reading and interpretation until the power of authority is shaken, challenged, and the paradigm is shifted. This chapter follows the story of Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad, a woman who “declared . . . jihad against religious interpretations and histories that [she] considers to be harmful to Muslim women . . . engaging in public debate about the proper roles and rights of Muslim men and women.”7 It looks at the fierce resistance she encountered to her idea, both against her rereading of the text or her actual exegesis attempts, followed by an assessment of the possible impact she has had on Saudi public opinion.

The broader context – Saudi Arabia and beyond Saudi Arabia, the nation from which we are taking this example, is a patriarchal country similar to the majority, if not to all, Arab and Islamic countries. However, it has a different weight attached to it in terms of religious power and authority in the Muslim world compared to the rest. It is the cradle of Islam. This element has affected women’s status in Saudi Arabia throughout its modern era. In fact, this specific historic and geographic destiny made Saudi Arabia embrace modernity only reluctantly, since the establishment of the Saudi nation state in 1932, exhibiting much hesitance, suspicion, and demonization toward modernity’s effects on society and on women in particular. Women are conceptualized as the guardians of family, society, and the state’s honor. This conservative construction of women has been at the core of Saudi society and its self-understanding since its creation.8 Part of this conservatism took the shape of misogyny and control over the debate of women’s religiosity. To put it differently, the state assumed control over words and definitions, which it claimed to control because it considered itself well learned in the affairs of women. This includes the fact that women would not find it strange or bizarre to seek a fatwa (religious ruling on what is permitted or prohibited in daily life) from a male scholar on matters of her personal hygiene for example, or on her relationship with her husband. The discourse on women’s “duties” is a common matter, and once a voice tries to appear with a different or challenging tone, he or she will be eliminated, silenced, and delegitimized in all fashions possible. In this chapter, I examine closely one of those challenging voices via the work and experiences of the Saudi scholar Dr. Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad.9 She has been fighting religious

Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia 223 institution and fundamental individuals through her books and weekly columns in newspapers. Her writings over the past decade have tackled thorny issues in Islamic law, have revisited the weak hadiths (Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) and have called put imbalanced fiqh (Islamic Law) articles and traditions, and have openly critiqued and questioned Saudi state laws. These tasks require a strong intellectual background and profound religious scholarship; and one could argue, constitute the work of an entire institution or organization. However, Dr. Suhaila is doing all this solo and courageously so. However, the story is more complicated than that as we will see in our exploration of her multifaceted character and story and the controversy surrounding her. The phenomenon of women entering the religious realm is relatively new in Saudi Arabia except for some female preachers and writers and even those need more space. Challenging religious authority is not a completely new situation in the Arab or Muslim world, however, and it has grown in the past decades gradually through what is known as Islamic feminism. Older traces of women’s dissenting voices can be found in nineteenth-to-twentieth-century Egypt, for example in the work of Malak Hifni Nasif, who wrote a book on women’s rights using her religious knowledge and discussion that was used later by Qasim Amin (1863– 1908) in his writings about women’s emancipation.10 The attempt by women to challenge male religious authority in the world or particularly in the Muslim world, takes on different characteristics in different time periods and geographical locations. One strategy is to claim religious space and authority through piety, which has been observed by Omaima Abou Bakr in her studies of women Sufis’ biographies that are dated between the ninth and fifteenth century.11 This same strategy that can still be found among women in different parts of the world and of different faiths as well, such as in West Africa.12 The second strategy consists of trying to step into religious authority by claiming rights and possibilities of interpretation, mostly through negotiating with the male establishment and partly through growing experience. This can be seen in examples from Syria,13 Iran,14 and, in an interesting twist, established by the state itself in the case of Morocco.15 The third strategy entails claiming the full capacity of religious authority through challenging existing male interpretations, past and present. This strategy produces new knowledge that lays explicit claim to the specific perspectives of female scholars of religion. Such knowledge is directly linked to and originates in Islamic feminism and has been growing in leaps and bounds since the 1990s and into the now second decade of the new millennium. As of now, Islamic feminism has succeeded in establishing itself in many domains and countries such as North America, Europe, and the Muslim World from Indonesia to Morocco.16 The movement/organization of Musawah, founded in 2009, is the best representation of this idea/development in all its dimensions.17 In Saudi Arabia, the closest thing to women to stepping into the religious sphere is the appearance of female preachers, da’iyat, who first came onto the scene in the 1980s and constituted a phenomenon of women entering the religious space, with limited challenge, led by Fatima Naseef in Jeddah.18 Amal Zahid has clearly

224  Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi shown how they stepped into an existing and exclusively male space, even though they were not qualified to challenge any norm or stand up for themselves as most of them were fixated on the binary of “us and the west” or on the woman’s veil and on women’s work that should be controlled and regulated.19 Naseef tried to break some taboos by using ijtihad20 to allow for women’s participation in Islamic jihad21 which was a popular topic in the 1980s because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, most of her articulations revolved around attempts to face modern questions of globalization and women’s rights and demands for equality by merely demonizing globalization and the West.22 Madawi al-Rasheed, in her book A Most Masculine State, has divided religious voices into those whom she calls “multazimat” and unique voices similar to that of Suhaila’s. By multazimat al-Rasheed means the newly religiously educated and tradition-committed women, the guardians of the religious nation and defenders of the Islamic tradition.23 This category became very critical in its own way within the sahwa movement (religious revivalism of the 80s) and continued to grow throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, adopting “a modern activist interpretation of gender and current affairs that encourages women to engage with society outside the home,” represented by women like Fatima Nassif and Nura al-Saad.24 The other, although al-Rasheed did not specify it as a category with a name but recognized it as one voice, is that of Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad. Al-Rasheed describes Suhaila is an “Islamist woman who offers a modern interpretation of religious texts dealing with women and does not shy away from criticizing the official religious views initiated by the religious establishment.”25 However, al-Rasheed does not elaborate on the role Suhaila is playing in relation to the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia. With regards to the Shi’i minority, women have a strong standing in social and civil work. At the same time, however, challenging voices of “the religious” is also rare. There was a strong movement in the 70s, especially after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, that would send women to spend a few years studying in the religious schools of Qom, Iran to qualify as religious leaders or preachers26 and to then return and educate their fellow women.27 They were not taught, of course, to challenge the status quo, but rather to follow in the steps of the great marje’s (the higher positions of the religious hierarchy in Shi’i communities, considered to be infallible) of Iran. Alia Farid, an outspoken Shi’i human rights activist and writer from Safwa (eastern Saudi Arabia), was one of those women educated in Iran in the early 1980s in the hawzah of Qom who returned home after her training only to be jailed. She wrote about her experiences in different media outlets and kept up a personal blog with her writings as well. In a blog post from July 2005, she addressed the need to renew the discourse on women’s rights away from traditions and old-fashioned readings of the text. However, the main demand of her revision to the Shii marje’ (guide or authority), is that women need to be considered for the position of a marje’’s wakeel (agent), similarly to men, which is already a major step forward but is neither about reinterpretation of text or about asking for the right to be a marje’ herself.28

Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia 225 Another voice is that of the columnist Kawthar al Arbash who writes weekly in the al-Jazeera newspaper. In January 2017, she was appointed to the Shura Council as it included women in its ranks for only the second time. She is a controversial name within the Shi’i community and became the mother of a martyr in a suicide bombing of the al-Anood mosque in Dammam in May 2015.29 Kawthar’s outspokenness has more to do with criticizing Shi’i practices and what she considers myths and fables than with claiming religious authority. The challenges she issues can be described as critiquing the Shi’i doctrine and community in Saudi Arabia30 rather than trying to become an authority in that domain. Other Saudi voices, whom I would put into the same category as Suhaila Zain al-Abedin, do exist. Hasnaa Al-Qunaieer31 and Hissah Al Al-Sheikh32 are both writers in al-Riyadh newspaper; the former is an academic at King Saud University while the latter was written from home and had very harsh confrontations with the religious establishment and was silenced through her arrest in 2015. Both authors engage in historical analysis and deconstruct the male dominated interpretation of sacred texts and histories. Their work is equally valuable as that of Suhaila’s, however, there are significant differences that I shall leave for further study.

The story of Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad is a Sunni Islamist scholar and writer from Madina al-Munawara, in western Saudi Arabia. It is the city of the Prophet Muhamad, where he lived, was buried, and established the first Islamic polity. She is the daughter of a prominent preacher daʿiyah at the Mosque of the Prophet in Madina, who herself was a descendant of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr al Siddiq. Her father was also a preacher of Islam in India for thirty years. Her exact date of birth is not given, but she was likely born in the late 1940s or early 1950s. Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad was educated in Madina both formally and informally at al-Haram Mosque (the Prophet’s Mosque). She was affiliated with Riyadh University (later King Saud University) by correspondance and graduated from the History Department (likely in the early 1970s as this system ended in 1975). She continued her studies and received a Masters in Islamic History from alAzhar in Cairo in 1995, to then study for her Ph.D. in al-Azhar as well. Due to an intellectual disagreement, she could not continue her thesis there. She received a Ph.D from an unmentioned university according to her official blog.33 In the meantime she worked for a short time in the field of education as well as performing some voluntary work. She participated in the establishment of female schools of the Charity Society for the Holy Qur’an in Madina (affiliated with the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad bin Saud in Riyadh). She was the head of these schools between 1986–1992. She then concentrated on her other interests including writing, Islamic literature, and Islamic literary critique. Suhaila Zain alAbedin has published twenty books and hundreds of articles, many of which were on Saudi women and on women in Islam.34 As to her family status, she is single and has spent much of her adult life taking care of her ill mother.

226  Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad can be called an Islamic/Islamist scholar, as she is a reciter of Qur’an and received continued education at al-Azhar University that provided her with profound religious knowledge that is reflected in her writings. In addition, she has been a member of the International League of Islamic Literature, based in India, since the early 1990s and she became the head of the Committee for Muslim Women of Literature in 1998. She and the League organized the first internationl conference in Cairo on Muslim women’s literature in 1999. She was also a member of the International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS) until 2015, when she denounced it for their politicisation and association with the Muslim Brotherhood. Suhaila started her writing career in the mid-seventies, and by 1977 she was writing for Okaz newspaper. Her first book, maseerat al-mar’ah al-su’udiyyah, ‘ila ‘ayn? (translated as Whither the Saudi Woman’s March?), was published in 1982. In it, she expressed extremely conservative views regarding women, gender relationships, and the partcipation of women in the public sphere. She was known to be an ultra Islamist35 throughout the 80s and 90s. Her 1982 book was taught in the Islamic university of Imam Muhammad bin Saud and other colleges in Saudi Arabia and its branches abroad. She has continued to express pride in her book’s impact during those days on the public arena, media, and education, inside Saudi Arabia and beyond. One of its main arguments revolves around women’s work, which she said should be carried out from home as is required ofthe pious Muslim woman.36 In her early writings of the 1980s and 1990s, she took on the duty of “islamizing” literature by literally revising ancient and modern creative writings of poetry, novels, or short stories. She looked at her task as purifying literature and defending Islam.37 Suhaila was and is still, to an extent, very literal in her literary criticism and interpretation of literature. She has engaged with and criticized the work of creative writers from Saudi Arabia, such Abdallah al-Ghaddami, Fowziyah Abu Khalid and Rajaa Alim, among others, as well as those from other Arab countries such as Mahmud Abbas al ʿAqqad or Tawfiq al-Hakim, Ihsan ʿAbd alQuddus, Nawal al-Saʿdawi, Adunis, and others. Based on her definition of how literature should be written, to the horror and criticism of literary critics,38 she has cast those writers out of Islam completely. She even accused their writings of being atheistic, blasphemous, and morally decadent.39 However, since the late 1990s, her ideas began to appear more moderate and less hostile to her intellectual opponents or those whom she considered secular or faithless. In March 2004, Suhaila was appointed, together with nine other women, to be members of the first Human Rights Organization in Saudi Arabia called the National Society for Human Rights (NHRS), a quasi-governmental organization, and was chosen as the chair of the Information and Research division of that organization. This post, I suggest, affected her tremendously as she became exposed to women’s hardship on the ground and all types of violations that made her come closer to the domain of human rights and their cases that she then took up and addressed through media and her writings. At the time of her appointment in 2004, Saudi Arabia was going through public debates about the royal

Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia 227 announcement of the introduction of municipal councils. Women’s participation was not mentioned, however, and female activists took the announcement as an opportunity to address both women and men. They engaged in an informal campaign to secure women’s inclusion in the elections by standing and voting.40 Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad, to the surprise of many, started to issue positive statements about women’s participation in the municipal elections. She then appeared on al-Jazeera’s Satellite TV program, For Women Only, to defend this right from an Islamic perspective, by drawing on Islamic arguments to justify women’s inclusion.41 In one of her statements, she gave examples of Muslim women from the early age of Islam such as al-Shiifaʾ, daughter of Abdullah bin Adyy, who was appointed in Madina by Omar bin al-Khattab, the second Caliph of Islam, to monitor the market and check on its merchants and their commodities. She said that history had set the example that we should follow as Muslim women. “This job is similar in our days to the role of the municipality work, or the ḥisbah,” she said, “that wearing the veil did not prevent the female companions of the Prophet from working in the market checking on the merchandise. Therefore, there is no restraint for women to be part of the municipal councils either by elections or appointment.”42 It is interesting to see the contrast between Suhaila Zain al-Abedin’s position and her views in her earlier writings. Here, she demonstrated a shift from the prior two decades, namely on issues of veiling, segregation, work, gender equality, and political participation. While her position on literature remains unchanged in the new millennium, it was no longer the focus of her debates. Today, she is a “crusader” for women’s political rights and rights within an Islamic framework. She challenges the traditional readings of the Qur’an and hadith by providing an enlightened interpretation on women,43 placing her among the few Saudi Islamic feminists. Although she refuses the attribute feminist, her new positions situate her among those described earlier as feminists.44 This is an attitude shared with many traditional reformists elsewhere. In Iran, women’s activists object to being called either Islamic or feminist. They all seek gender justice and equality for women, and their positions are local, diverse, multiple, and evolving.45

Challenging authority As mentioned earlier, Suhaila Zain al-Abedin changed her positions radically in the new millennium, and became more tolerant toward aspects of freedom, such as showing her face in public and in the media or challenging the religious interpretation of Islam to argue FOR women’s rights from within Islam. Significantly, since 1999, she has appeared on magazines with her face unveiled46 and women’s political participation has become a common theme in her writing since 2002– 2003, surprising her fans as well as surprising those who suffered for years from her previous judgements. In these newer articles, she has adopted full support of women’s political rights using her Islamic fiqh expertise and knowledge in finding the right evidence or language for each case. That was very useful and refreshing for many women who finally found an Islamist voice that was telling them that

228  Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi aspiring to leadership positions is not haram (forbidden in Islam), though that was to the discomfort of many “Islamists” men, especially those that belong to the Islamic establishment of the state or those who have a strict interpretation of Islam. Surprised, they wrote criticizing her new “look” and position. Some were accusing her of falling for the secular women she had been criticising in earlier years. Some were asking her to return to her senses and to the right path by republishing extracts of her old position on women’s work, studying abroad, hospitals for women, hijab,47 guardianship, singing, mixing, etc.48 Saddeka Arebi, in her comprehensive study “Women and Words in Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Literary Discourse,” discusses the works of nine Saudi women and their relationship with social and political discourses in Saudi Arabia, among them. Suhaila Zaiin al-Abedin Hammad. Arebi positions her work at the “far right of the ideological continuum,” arguing that she stakes her claims on “hijab, women’s immobility and segregation, by emphasizing the “difference” between the sexes in a way that establishes man as superior and most important” and by her advocacy of discipline and punishment for those who cannot see the “light.”49 Suhaila Zain al-Abedin does not seem to care much about the harsh criticism she has received from those who supported her earlier and continues to be a very strong advocate for women’s rights in Islam by arguing from within the foundational texts and religious history. Zain al-Abedin has further developed her argument in a project to challenge misogynist interpretations of Islamic texts. In a gradual way, she has started to address many taboos. This was the beginning of a series of debates between her and a number of prominent religious scholars. Exhibiting strong faith and will, she has been assertive in defending her right to follow an interpretation that, according to her, does not contradict Islam, but rather contradicts her own earlier position interpretation, thereby allowing for the possibility of changing interpretations. On the political rights front, since the beginning of the new millennium, Suhaila Zain al-Abedin has held that various rights as outlined earlier have been granted to women by Islam according to clear verses in the Qur’an. For example, she has argued that Muslim women have the right to be representatives on the Shura Council and in municipal councils, and to hold leadership positions in the government as ministers. Saudi Arabia does not have women ministers to date but has allowed women on Shura Councils since 2013. She has also argued that the Qur’anic verse in al-Tawbah (Q9:71) directly tasks women with public and political responsibility. The verse reads: “And (as for) the believing men and the believing women, they are guardians of each other; they enjoin good and forbid evil.” Therefore, she maintains that Islam not only has permitted women to be responsible politically and socially but also in fact orders women to be guardians of men and vice versa in “enjoining good and forbidding evil.” These, according to her, are core principles in governing and guardianship.50 In an article asking that women should be appointed to Majlis al-Shura (Council of Consultative) in 2005, she relies on controversial verses from the Qur’an that have been interpreted in different ways but have typically been used against women in leading political positions. Her reading of the same

Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia 229 verses offers challenges to prevalent interpretations though other texts and other scholars’ arguments. In her new position as defending women’s rights to political participation and leadership, she effectively uses the same tools that are usually deployed against women. These developments in her writing and thinking constituted a breakthrough for many men and women in Saudi Arabia. Although her credibility was at stake when she started to use flexible interpretations, she was still respected and supported by other scholars who were starting to open up to new realities within Saudi society, which was tired from the strict unilateral interpretation of religion. Suhaila Zain al-Abedin did not stop at the Majlis al-Shura or municipal councils; she aimed for more. In a continuous debate, she has written a series of articles in order to prove that part of women’s rights of wilaya (guardianship) is to have the greatest wilaya, i.e., to govern the state.51 She has also developed a very progressive interpretation of another controversial concept and rule in Islam related to women, the qiwama (maintenance/protection/care of/control over women).52 On the issue of face covering, she argued her position by appearing unveiled in al-Watan al-Arabi magazine in 1999 for the first time. Later, she appeared in TV interviews with her face unveiled and started putting her photograph53 next to her weekly column in al-Madina newspaper, one of the most conservative national newspapers today. She even addressed the ever-controversial issue of Saudi women driving54 and asked to discuss this issue at the Majlis al-Shura. In a program on an Islamist TV channel Iqra, she was very vocal about arguing that there is nothing in Islam that prevents women from driving.55 She also took up many human/women’s rights issues as part of her work as an executive member of the NHRS including child marriages, setting a minimum age for marriage, domestic violence, child abuse, codifying family law, and gender mixing.56 The latter issue – gender mixing – has become a hot topic in Saudi Arabia since September 2009 when King Abdullah inaugurated King Abdullah University for Technology in Thuwal, which was revealed to be a coeducation graduate university, the first of its kind in Saudi Arabia. The resulting debate was very interesting and caused the sacking by royal decree of a senior member of the higher council of ulama (religious scholars) after denouncing “mixing” as ḥaram on a TV program.57 In fact, high religious officials in the government gave their justifications for mixing and how it is not ḥaram after all on the basis that there is a difference between ikhtilat, i.e., gender mixing and khulwa, i.e., being alone with a woman. Suhaila was very vocal on this subject and supported the mixing principle, considering it a norm in Islam since the beginning of time alongside the unveiling of the face. She blamed extremist interpretations of the Qur’an for excluding women from public life all these passing years for their invalid reasons and rigid interpretations.58 In recent years, she has also addressed the ahad issue in hadith (the traditions and sayings referred to the Prophet reported by only one narrator) and challenged the salafis’ (the principal Islamic school of religious practice in Saudi Arabia) use of it as a reliable source of authoritative hadith. This matters, because such hadiths are relied upon to justify wilaya/ guardianship of men over women. In

230  Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi October of 2015, Suhaila Zain al-Abedin made headlines on social media when she confronted a scholar on TV, challenging him on these issues. As he responded by questioning her faith in an effort to denounce her, she pointed out that he was diverting the discussion from its main topic. Interestingly, this male scholar asked the TV channel to not upload the episode onto their website after filming had ended, which triggered even more interest and enthusiasm when Suhaila Zain alAbedin found it recorded on YouTube and attached it to her blog.59 Suhaila Zain al-Abedin continues to comment on issues related to family law, national laws, and Islamic law. She rereads and revisits weak traditions/hadiths and imbalanced fiqh articles that fill traditional books; she revises books on early Islamic history; and she critiques and questions Saudi laws. Her efforts are opening the door for society and women in particular today to ask similar questions of traditional scholars who in turn are running out of tools left to counter her with.

Analysis Suhaila Zain al-Abedin is taking up a new kind of challenge; one that the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia is not familiar with, especially as it is coming from a local woman. Her strategy follows the line of Islamic feminists, although she does not refer to herself as such. She is, in fact, mirroring what other Muslim women are doing in their countries, “by both uncovering a hidden history and rereading textual sources” and proving that the inequalities embedded in fiqh are neither manifestation of divine will nor cornerstones of an irredeemably backward social system; rather, they are human constructions. They are also showing how such unequal constructions contradict the very essence of divine justice as revealed in the Qur’an and how Islam’s sacred texts have been tainted by the ideologies of their interpreters.60 Although Suhaila Zain al-Abedin meets at heart with Islamic feminism, she is not in direct contact with any scholar of that trend/community abroad or in Saudi apart from myself. Her writings and arguments in many ways are repetitions of what has already been debated and challenged in the Muslim world, but she tries her best to keep away from any women’s group of ideological views. Musawah, for example, with its ground-breaking research and publications mentioned, are still far from her; she prefers to reinvent the wheel restlessly on her own. This choice means that she has to confront her opponents alone, without a community to support her along the way. Their opponents’ strategies in discrediting her utilized all strategies imaginable. In the absence of a true rule of law, anonymous threats and attacks on a person take place with defaming and disseminate rumours commonly used as tools to silence opponents, especially if they are women.

Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia 231 Ziba Mir-Hosseini has described the response of the many opponents of Islamic feminists in Iran (fundamentalists/traditionalists, secularists, and Islamists) and has shown that they have used similar tools: Selective in their arguments and illustrations, the three kinds of opponents, resort to the same kinds of sophistry; for example, they seek to close discussion by producing Qur’anic verses or Traditions (hadith) taken out of context. Muslim traditionalists and Islamic fundamentalists do this as a means of silencing other internal voices and abuse the authority of the text for authoritarian purposes.61 In Saudi Arabia, Suhaila is faced with a different range of Islamists and Islamic fundamentalists. I, for one, admire her courage, which has given hope to many women, especially those of the younger generation. This generation is looking eagerly for a different voice, one that challenges common controversial issues by which women are bombarded day and night through a discourse that is forcing them to accept their status of subordination and servitude to men by using the sacred text as their ultimate tool and authority.

Conclusion In the example of the Saudi writer Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad, who has adopted women’s rights and justice for women as her cause and is studying sacred texts and sacred history in search for alternative readings, we see some success in shifting the paradigm on religious authority in religious, scholarly, and political circles in Saudi Arabia. She has done this by publicly addressing taboos and standing her ground in confrontations with key male figures in the realms of religious power. Her example also shows how complex one’s life experience can be and how hard it is for an intellectual to maintain a unified and consistent set of ideas over a lifetime. It is arguably difficult to classify Suhaila Zain al-Abedin within a single category or apply a single label to her. As she shifts positions, Suhaila Zain al-Abedin has and still is redefining her religious and personal battles and her relationship with Islam. She is rebuilding her Islamic identity by repositioning herself within a social reform movement that encompasses the whole of Saudi Arabia, a reform that has based its demands regarding women within an Islamic legal rights frame. This is the new identity that Zain al-Abedin has preferred to apply to herself. Today, Suhaila Zain al-Abedin is on her way to becoming one important voice of Islamic feminism, and one who challenges the religious authority of male traditional religious scholars. Moreover, a growing number of people in Saudi society are taking up her interpretations. This is a phenomenon that is unfolding every day as a new battle within the larger struggle to gain rights for women of Saudi Arabia on the one hand62 and women of the Muslim world on the other. Having

232  Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi said that, her more recent exegetical work has not been taken up by academia so far. However, I am using it more and more often in teaching my course on women in Islam63 at Qatar University in which I present her as a local fiqh mujtahid from the Gulf region and an authority figure in her own right. Her perspectives and her voice have received both acceptance and appreciation from my students and the broader public.

Notes 1 Abou Bakr 2012, 201–202. 2 Ibid., 202–204. 3 See Mir-Hosseini 2011 for a thorough history, as well as Badran 2009, 2010. 4 Mir-Hosseini 2011. 5 Badran 2009, 6. 6 Cooke 2001, 62. 7 Ibid., 57. 8 Al-Fassi 2013. 9 See my article from 2016, taking Suhaila as one of the Saudi women examples; alFassi 2016. 10 Malak Hifni Nasif/the Badiya Writer (1886–1918) who was one of the earliest to call for women’s right from within the Islamic sources in Egypt. For her complete works, see Nasif 1962. 11 Abou Bakr 1998, 141–162. 12 Frede and Hill 2014, 131–165. 13 Senegal and Huda Habash of Damascus, Kalmbach 2008, 37–57. 14 Mir-Hosseini 2006, 629–645. 15 El Haitami 2012, 227–240. 16 See Mir-Hosseini 2006, and her listing of major scholarship works by women today, 642, fn.22, 23. See also Barazangi 2004, 2015; Wadud 2006; Lamrabet 2010; MirHosseini et al. 2013, 2015, and the latest publication of Musawah 2016. 17 Anwar 2009, 1–9, 2013; and Mir-Hosseini et al. 2013, 107–126. 18 Cooke 2001, 54ff. 19 Zahid 2005. 20 “Ijtihad is the technical term that refers to the process of independent reasoning that scholars, but also nonscholars, may choose when a legal precedent is not immediately clear and available,” Cooke 2001, 62. 21 Cooke 2001, 55. 22 See Fatima Naseef’s own summary of her book on globalization, Naseef 2007. 23 Al-Rasheed 2013, 244 ff. 24 Ibid., 255, 272ff. 25 Ibid., 257. 26 Matthiesen 2015, 122–123. 27 Farid 2005. 28 Ibid. 29 Muhamad al-Arabash, was one of the martyrs at Dammam mosque al-Anood in May 2015 which was attacked by a suicide bomber in an attack that killed four men who were guarding the mosque. al-Jazeera, May 2015. 30 See the article by al-Arbash 2016. 31 See the archive of al-Qunaieer’s articles in al-Riyadh newspaper. 32 See the archive of Hissah Al AlSheikh’s in al-Riyadh newspaper. She was banned from writing and tried in court after stepping on the feet of religious interpretation in 2015, see Hiba Iraqi’s blog for alternative publication, Iraqi 2015.

Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia 233 33 Dr. Suhaila Hammad’s official blog. 34 Ibid. 35 Extremely conservative here means that her views consider women’s work as not allowed outside the house, attire should cover the face, and relationship with men should be restricted to none outside marriage and immediate family. 36 A detailed reading of her early writings and of this book in particular can be found in Arebi 2004, 236ff. 37 Barakat 1999, part 4. 38 Jalal 2000. 39 Barakat 1999, part 5. 40 See, Scott 2004; Ambah 2004; and Abou-Alsamh 2004. 41 Al-Jazeerah TV 2004. 42 Muhammad and Mutawwaʿ 2004. 43 See for example, Zain al-Abedin Hammad 2005, 2011. 44 Hammad 2002. 45 Mir-Hosseini 2006, 640. 46 Barakat 1999. 47 For example, Arebi 2004, 222–124. 48 One example is al-Kharashi (n.d.). 49 Arebi 2004, 234–236. 50 Hammad 2005. 51 Hammad 2008. 52 See her article in al-Madina, 4/4/2015, Hammad 2015. 53 The present writer was the first to have her picture published next to her articles in a Saudi newspaper al-Eqtisadiah on September 1, 2006. 54 Since the original writing of this chapter and during its revision, the royal order was announced to lift the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia on September 26, 2017, to come into force in June 2018, see Saudi New Agency 2017. 55 Unfortunately, the episode has been removed from YouTube, however, her position is very clear in another interview on Al-Jazeera in May 2011 commenting on a driving campaign that appeared then, see www.youtube.com/watch?v=2iRl8J37kCk, accessed May 12, 2018. 56 See her blog post on renewing women’s discourse, 2015. 57 For details see, Hatoon Al-Fassi 2010, 166–167. 58 Hammad 2009. 59 See Hammad and al-Nujaimi 2015. 60 Mir-Hosseini 2006, 642. 61 Ibid., 641. 62 It is worth mentioning that some political and social changes occurred in Saudi Arabia in 2017 towards giving women more rights, but more than that, the state has changed its alliance with the religious establishment and many scholars have been marginalized or even imprisoned for accusations of extremism (since September 2017). There is a hope that this will give room to more moderate voices in Islam to express itself as in alliance with women. 63 My course has been under attack since 2015 and I was stopped from teaching it starting in 2016 after a campaign of slandering and blasphemy accusations. In addition, Qatar University has censored my academic freedom and monitored my class with video recording (this was in Fall 2015), see Lindsey (2017).

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Challenging the authority of religious interpretation in Saudi Arabia 235 Barazangi, Nimat (2004) Woman’s Identity and the Qur’an: A New Reading (Gainesville: University Press of Florida). Barazangi, Nimat (2015) Woman’s Identity and Rethinking the Hadith (Farnham: Ashgate). Cooke, Miriam (2001) Women Claim Islam (London: Routledge). El Haitami, Meriem (2012) “Restructuring Female Religious Authority: State-Sponsored Women Religious Guides (Murshidat) and Scholars (’Alimat) in Contemporary Morocco,” Mediterranean Studies 20 (2): 227–240. Farid, Alia (2005) “al-marji’iyyah al-shiiyyah, wal-waqi’ al-matloob,” (The Shii marji’, reference, the needed reality), published on her blog: www.alyafarid.com/?p=63 Frede, Britta, and Joseph Hill (2014) “En-gendering Islamic Authority in West Africa,” Islamic Africa 5 (2): 131–165. Hammad, Suhaila Z. A. (2002) “rihlati ma’ al-kalimah jihad wa kifah” (my journey with the word, struggle and jihad), on Lahaonline.com, www.lahaonline.com/articles/ view/%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86:%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D 9%84%D9%83%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AD/2360.htm Hammad, Suhaila Z. A. (2005) “ʾan al-ʾawaan litaʿyyin al-marʾah fi majlis al-sura,” (It is time for women to enter the Shura/consultative Council), al-Madina, March 18. Hammad, Suhaila Z. A. (2008) “baʿd kul hathihi al-musharakat yaʾti al-duktor Bahaarith bijarrat qalam yanfi ʾay wilayah ʾaw musharakah siyasiyyah lilmarʾah” (Afther these female participations, comes Dr. Baharith withouth hesitance negates any women’s political participation), al-Madina, August 1–August 17. Hammad, Suhaila Z. A. (2009) “attafiq maʿ al-duktor al-ʿeryan fi mafhumihi lil-ʾikhtilat,” (I agree with Dr. Al Eryan in his understanding of Mixing of gender’s concept), alMadina, October 23. Hammad, Suhaila Z. A. (2011) Dr  Suhaila Hammad’s official blog, http://dr-suhaila-zhammad.blogspot.com/p/blog-page_6755.html Hammad, Suhaila Z. A. (2015) “al-wilayah wa al-wisayah wa al-qiwamah 3,” (Guardianship, patria potestas and manus mariti III), al-Madina, April 4, www.al-madina.com/node/598725 Hammad, Suhaila Z. A. (2016) “nahwa tashih al-khitab al-islami lil mar’ah,” (Towards Correcting Muslim Woman’s Discourse,” in Dr. Suhaila Hammad’s official blog, March 31, http://dr-suhaila-z-hammad.blogspot.com/2016/03/ Hammad, Suhaila Z. A., and M. al-Nujaimi (2015) “mu’tamar qanuni yulhib sijal ishtirat al-dhukurah fi al-qadhaa’,” (A Legal conference creates a debate on the condition of maleness for juridical positions), Yahala by Rotana khalijia, October 23, www.youtube. com/watch?v=FitHDYG0nJs Iraqi, Hiba (2015) “hazf maqal hissah al alSheikh wa ihalatuha ‘ala al-tahqeeq,” (Omitting Hissah al Alsheikh’s article and sending for her to be investigated), Hiba Iraqi personal blog, May 21, http://twittereditor.blogspot.qa/2015/05/blog-post_21.html Jalal, Azza (2000) “al-ʾadab al-ʾislami: madkhal liqiraaʾat ʾadab ʿAʾishah’ (The Islamic Literature, A Reading in Aisha’s Literature,” in Society for the Studies of Women and Civilization (Cairo: n.p.). Kalmbach, Hilary (2008) “Social and Religious Change in Damascus: One Case of Female Islamic Religious Authority,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35 (1): 37–57. Kharashi, Sulaiman al- (nd) “man yu’idu lana suhaila Zain al-Abedin?” (Who can bring Suhaila Zain al-Abedin back to us?) sayd al-fawa’ed, www.saaid.net/Warathah/ Alkharashy/m/27.htm

236  Hatoon Ajwad Al Fassi Lamrabet, Asma (2010) al-Qur’an wa al-nisaa, qira’a liltaharrur (Qur’an and Women, A Reading for Emancipation) (Rabat, Morocco: al -Rabita al-Muhamadiya lil’ulamaa). Lindsey, Ursula (2017) “Women and Islam: A Topic that Troubles,” AL FANAR, News & Opinion About Higher Education, March, www.al-fanarmedia.org/2017/03/womenislam-topic-troubles/ Matthiesen, Toby (2015) The Other Saudis, Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (2006) “Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism,” Critical Inquiry 32 (4) (Summer): 629–645. Mir-Hosseini, Ziba (2011) “Beyond ‘Islam’ vs. ‘Feminism’,” IDS Bulletin 42 (1) (January). Mir-Hosseini, Ziba, Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen, and Christian Moe, eds. (2013) Gender and Equality in Muslim Family Law (London and New York: I. B. Tauris). Mir-Hosseini, Ziba, Mulki al-Sharmani, and Jana Rumminger, eds. (2015) Men in Charge? Rethinking Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition (London: Oneworld). Muhammad, Asma and Badr Mutawwaʿ (2004) “suʿudiyyaat yarfudhn al-tasribaat wa al-shaaʾiʿaat al-mustabʿidah lilmarʾah min majaalis al-baladiyyaat wa yutaalibn bilmushaarakah,” (Saudi women reject leaks and rumors that eliminate women’s participation in the municipal elections and demand the full participation), al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 23, http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=43&article=251661&issue no=9400#.WpfXxuhuY2w Musawah (2016) Women’s Stories, Women’s Lives: Male Authority in Muslim Contexts (Malaysia: Musawah), www.musawah.org/sites/default/files/MusawahGPL2016.pdf Naseef, Fatima (2007) In Honour of Dr Fatima Naseef by al- Ithnainiya of Abdel Maqsood Khoja (Summary of Her Book on Globalization) (Jeddah: Abdel Maqsood Khoja publishing), www.alithnainya.com/tocs/default.asp?toc_id=15747&toc_brother=-1&path =0;1;15557;15574;15747 Nasif, Malak Hifni (1962) athar bahithat al-badiya (the full corpus of Malak Hifni Nasif) (Cairo: al-mu’assasah al-masriyah al-‘aammah lilta’lif wa al-nashr). Saudi News Agency (2017) “Royal Decree to Allow Women Issue Driving Licenses,” September 26, www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=1671323 Wadud, Amina (2006) Inside the Gender Jihad: Women’s Reform in Islam (Oxford: One World Publications). Wilson, Scott (2004) “Saudis Take a Small Dose of Democracy,” The Washington Post, September 15, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24559-2004Sep15.html Zahid, Amal (2005) “al-da’iyat al-su’udiyyat: mujtama’ khafi wakhitab muhajjab,” (The Saudi female preachers (da’iyat): A hidden society and veiled discourse), first published in al-Majallah, and then in the electronic newspaper, Elaph, October 9, http://elaph.com/ Web/NewsPapers/2005/10/97894.htm?sectionarchive=NewsPapers

13 Leading the way Women’s activism, theology, and women’s rights in Southeast Asia Susanne Schröter

Introduction Within the Muslim world, Southeast Asia is a region distinguished by particularly liberal interpretations and practices of Islam, as well as by the existence of established women’s rights movements and women’s organizations. Hence, it provided fertile ground for approaches emphasizing an emancipatory, or gender-sensitive, version of Islam. These, however, were never viewed as exclusively theological concepts, but rather as strategies to be employed for progressive innovations in the educational sector, legislation, and politics.

Women’s rights in Islamic Southeast Asia Viewed from a historical perspective, Southeast Asia is a melting pot of diverse religions due to the influence of traders and trading companies, missionaries, and colonizers from the Arab, South Asian, East Asian, and European worlds.1 While Islam superseded Hindu and Buddhist influences in many regions, it also merged with these and entered into competition with various Christian denominations. In addition, expressions of Southeast Asian Islam are strongly influenced by various local religions. The belief system of the Indonesian sultanate of Yogyakarta, which is characterized by hybridity featuring Islamic, Hindu, and local components, is an example of this. Tradition demands that the sultan, who is recognized as the secular and religious ruler, symbolically weds the sea goddess Ratu Kidul at his enthronement; from then on, he is responsible for the performance of all rituals intended to keep the goddess in a favorable mood.2 According to local cosmology, the sacred personification of the sea is complemented by the mountains, of which the Merapi volcano is a prominent part. If the deities feel neglected, they become angry and are likely to cause either volcanic eruptions or seaquakes, for which the sultan is then blamed. It was such forms of Islam that shaped the relations between the genders in the course of history. In many societies, women were active as craftswomen or traders; they could do as they wanted with the income they earned and had control of the landed property they owned. Their economic, social, and political autonomy exceeded that of women in most Muslim societies in South and West Asia

238  Susanne Schröter and North Africa. In West Indonesia and East Malaysia there is even evidence of matrifocal structures that privileged women in terms of inheritance law, kin organization, and affiliation of the children. Men, in contrast, were granted only peripheral status in these societies.3 Historical documents mention female sultans and military leaders in some parts of Indonesia; in others, such lore is part of the passed down mythological repertoire.4 Women participated not only in anticolonial resistance movements but also in subsequent civil wars in Indonesia and the southern Philippines, and in some cases were even armed fighters.5 However, only a few regions witnessed the emergence of modern social movements featuring an explicit women’s rights agenda, and the same is true of a feminist perspective in Islamic theology. Both southern Thailand, which is inhabited by Muslim Malays, and Mindanao in the southern Philippines were the scenes of violent clashes with the state machinery dominated by Buddhists or Catholics.6 These conflicts lasted for decades and left little room for women’s emancipatory movements in those communities. A conservative type of Islam closely related to Salafism is still dominant in southern Thailand.7 Women usually organize themselves jointly with men to claim religious, cultural, and economic rights, including the right to veil themselves.8 If this is indeed an awakening on the part of women, it can best be described as a fundamentalist movement.9 In Mindanao, women are integrated into clan structures in which they can achieve high status and exert political influence.10 Whenever they are active in the political sector of local societies, they focus on the spheres of peace negotiations and capacity building.11 A prominent example of a Muslim woman activist is Amina Rasul, the daughter of a female senator, who has commited herself to making the voices of female Islamic scholars heard in traditional Islamic structures dominated by male scholars (ulema).12 In the Sultanate of Brunei, an authoritarian welfare state with a strictly Islamic agenda, there is no way to establish independent organizations, and thus there never has been any women’s movement or any distinctly female current of theology. While a movement of Muslim intellectuals has been campaigning for girls’ education in Malaysia since the 1920s,13 there were no womenled organizations calling for general emancipation. It was not until the 1980s that Malaysia witnessed the emergence of a distinct Islamic women’s organization with a feminist agenda, sparked by an increase in Islamic fundamentalism. That organization, discussed later, plays an important role in the context of emancipatory female theology. The Indonesian Archipelago is exceptional in every respect. As early as at the beginning of the twentieth century, political organizations in Indonesia founded their own women’s wings, and the religious associations followed suit. At first there were grave dissonances between secular and Muslim women’s organizations. Differences of opinion existed particularly between the communist-oriented “Gerakan Wanita Indonesia” (“Indonesian Women’s Movement”), which in the 1960s had 1.5 million members, and religious activists. Among other things, there was much controversy about the issue of polygyny. In the wake of an attempted coup d’état by the Indonesia’s Communist Party in 1965 and the subsequent

Leading the way 239 takeover of the state by the military, the “Gerakan Wanita Indonesia” was banned. Its members were either murdered or imprisoned,14 and the Indonesian women’s movement was henceforth strictly controlled by the government. General Suharto, who had assumed power after the attempted coup d’état and was to rule for thirty-two years, pursued an ambivalent agenda of modernization. On the one hand, he proclaimed the ideal of the two-child family and encouraged women to join the working force; on the other, he viewed women primarily as mothers and housewives. A particularity of twentieth-century Indonesian gender constructions is the so-called “state motherhood” (state Ibuism), which has provoked harsh criticism from female scholars. Laurie Sears writes: “State Ibuism defines women as appendages and companions to their husbands, as procreators of the nation, as mothers and educators of children, as housekeepers, and as members of the Indonesian society – in that order.”15 A new awakening in the Indonesian women’s movement occurred at the end of the last century, particularly in the wake of Suharto’s fall in which women’s organizations played a significant role.16 A multitude of civil-society associations and initiatives were launched in new, post-authoritarian Indonesia. These, however, were not only of a progressive and emancipatory nature. Within the Muslim spectrum, they also included conservative, fundamentalist, and even SalafistJihadist groups. Radical Islamic organizations are not a novelty in Indonesian history; they had merely been barred from being politically active in the era of dictatorship. The process of democratization brought liberties that were used to reassert old claims – calls for the transformation of the republic into an Islamic state, the introduction of Islamic law, as well as the implementation of rigid morals founded on religion. The budding democracy was put to a grueling test. Civil wars broke out on the outer islands involving Muslims and Christians. There were a series of attacks on churches, Western institutions, tourists, as well as countless assaults on religious minorities.17 Only after massive criticism by the international community did the government take action, restoring the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The other side of democratization was more positive. Indonesia witnessed the emergence of progressive subcultures and civil-society associations that championed environmentalism and the rights of women, workers, and farmers. A lively art, music, and film scene began to flourish, and spaces for social and artistic experiments opened up in urban centers. In the literary scene, provocative female writers caused a stir with brilliant texts featuring dramatic sexual scenes.18 However, there were also popular female Islamic writers who attempted to implement new religious morals.19 Without state-imposed restrictions there was a host of opportunities, which gave rise to a multitude of lifestyles. This might have opened the stage to a colorful future allowing for diverse ways of life. However, Islamist hardliners such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam) attempt – with some success – to implement their concepts of morals and normative orders, using violence to achieve their goals.20 Indonesia is witnessing an increasing Islamization of society; this trend is characterized by a surge in totalitarianism directed against religious minorities, women, and homosexuals. Similar

240  Susanne Schröter developments can be observed in Malaysia,21 Brunei,22 the southern Philippines, and Mindanao.23 This gives rise to various developments with regard to a genderjust Islamic theology, as I will point out later, using the examples of Malaysia and Indonesia.

Fighting Islamism with the Qur’an: sisters in Islam in Malaysia Malaysia’s emancipatory female Islamist theology is related to a group of young, educated women who were searching for ways to resist the increasing Islamization of their country without having to distance themselves from their faith. Jointly with the U.S. scholar Amina Wadud24 they initiated a feminist reformist endeavor that counts among the most unique projects of its kind: Sisters in Islam (SIS), a group that continues to be active to this day and has spawned a series of successor organizations, including the international Musawah network. The establishment of SIS is first and foremost a consequence of the revitalization of a conservative-patriarchal type of Islam during the 1980s. This development was initiated by young academics who had studied in England where they had come into contact with strictly scripturalist interpretations of the Qur’an and Wahhabism,25 as well as by returning graduates from Arab universities such as alAzhar. Believing that they had come to know “true” Islam at the centers of Islamic learning, they reassessed their faith as practiced in Malaysia. They formed prayer groups and religious reading circles and developed strategies to restore Islam to its righteous state and to bring believers back onto the right path.26 A number of these young people formed radical Islamic groups and became victims of state repression; others chose a different path by joining the “Parti Islam Se-Malaysia” (PAS), one of the two most important political parties in Malaysia, which competes with the “United Malays National Organisation” (UMNO),27 to represent the interests of Malaysian Muslims. PAS’s successes brought increased pressure on UMNO, and soon both parties were competing for votes by trying to outdo each other in their Islamist political programs.28 Politically, as well as socially, things began to change. In 1982 the first Islamic Bank was opened,29 and at the same time the government set the framework for shari’a-conforming insurance. A slew of new Islamic schools and colleges were established, and even state-run schools introduced a Islamic education requirement. In 1983, the “Islamic University of Malaysia” opened its doors. A halal industry emerged, producing and marketing Islamic consumer goods30 and people began espousing a new Islamic lifestyle.31 Many Muslim women began wearing so-called Islamic dress: a veil covering hair, neck, and chest (tudung), in combination with a floor-length skirt and a wide, long-sleeved top (baju kurung). Those who wished to be more explicit about showing their piety would wear a wide black robe (hijab) with socks, gloves and a face veil (niqab). There is no doubt that this turn was initially a voluntary move by many women in order to be more pious and engage in Islamic self-improvement, and that they believed women’s rights as propagated by the UN to be wholly irrelevant.32

Leading the way 241 In the course of Malaysia’s Islamic renewal, however, the right to practice Islam in certain ways soon turned into an obligation to engage in proper Islamic behavior. A whole series of new laws and ordinances were passed that were oriented toward Islamic legal and moral norms. In many regions, the traditional legal and value system, adat, which in many ways accorded women a status equal to that of men, was replaced with Islamic norms and law. Family law was most heavily impacted by these changes. It came to be guided by a conservative understanding of Islamic law, and institutionalized the unequal treatment of men and women in inheritance law, the discrimination of women in court, the right of men to marry up to four women, as well as a wife’s obligation to obey her husband.33 Men could divorce their wives by text message, they could deny them access to their own bank account, and use their property to support additional wives.34 Accusing women of misbehavior was now used as a justification for domestic violence. This development shocked many urban intellectuals, and they were determined to stand up to the trend. In 1987, a group of women academics, among them the journalist Zainah Anwar, met to establish the “Association of Women Lawyers” to discuss the reforms introduced to family law. They had access to a substantial political network and and within a year, organized a workshop with government representatives to discuss how women’s rights could be protected under the new socio-political conditions. The Islamization of law, the activists wrote in retrospect, was only one aspect of the disturbing changes taking place. Just as important was the media representation of an Islamically justified gender inequality and the change in public opinion. Islam was increasingly being cited as a source of inequality and oppression. Women were told via radio, television, mosques, and courts that their testimony was only worth half that of a man’s, that they were obliged to unquestioningly obey their husbands, that men were superior to women and had the right to beat their wives or to take a second wife.35 The growing violence against women, which was legitimized by Islamic institutions as being every man’s natural right, provoked them to resist. At the same time, they were also haunted by the question as to whether the new Islamic order was really justified by the Qur’an. Until then, they had considered themselves to be good Muslims and emancipated women and never saw any contradiction in this. But now that their religion was being interpreted in such a misogynous fashion they were no longer sure. They certainly did not want to leave the interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna to theologians who claimed that hell was full of insubordinate women. Instead, they thought it best to approach the texts themselves. This was the context encountered by Amina Wadud upon her arrival in Malaysia. As an Islamic studies scholar with a PhD she had the necessary authority not only to present disputed text passages in a new light but also to justify this perspective with reference to the religious sources. Under her guidance, the women met weekly and studied the Qur’an, especially the critical verses used to justify the discrimination of women. The result of their joint efforts was a complete reinterpretation of these passages using the hermeneutic method Wadud had developed,

242  Susanne Schröter which stood in diametric opposition to the interpretations of the theological establishment. “Our reading,” wrote Zainah Anwar, “opened up a world of Islam that we could recognize, a world for women that was filled with love and mercy and with equality and justice.”36 Islam did not oppress women, Anwar insisted; patriarchal beliefs that existed in many cultures, including in contemporary Malay culture, did. In her view, the new regulations legitimized the “reproduction of archaic and patriarchal forms of subordination and control of women.”37 Islam needed to be purged from these falsifications, so as to make the divine message visible in its full meaning. To emphasize that their critique of predominant interpretations of the Qur’an and sunna was firmly anchored in Islamic epistemology, and also to allay any potential doubts regarding their religiosity, the women began to refer to themselves as “Sisters in Islam.”38 One of their first campaigns was directed against domestic violence. In 1991, two brochures were published in which SIS responded to frequently asked questions. The first of these was titled “Are men and women equal before Allah?”; the second, “Are Muslim men allowed to beat their wives?” SIS’s publications were made publicly available online, where activists also published topical essays on current topics. They also offered workshops and lectures. SIS’s unconventional positions and the members’ insistence that they understood the religious sources better than many Islamic theologians provoked a diverse set of reactions, including protests and accusations. But they also received support, such as from the then “Minister of Women’s Affairs,” Tan Sri Datuk Napsiah Omar. SIS’s success in Malaysia ultimately rested on the fact that many of its members came from influential families,39 and by virtue of the fact that they were scholars, lawyers, and journalists, they also had influential contacts in politics, the state bureaucracy, and the media. Encouraged by their success, the activists began in 1993 to publicly make recommendations to the government. They demanded a memorandum pertaining to the introduction of shari’a criminal law in Kelantan,40 a federal state in which the Islamist PAS was the governing party at the time. SIS not only opposed the discrimination of women under Islamic law but also firmly rejected its draconian punitive measures. The focus of their activities soon went far beyond gender issues and turned to problems of nation building, as well as to fundamental issues pertaining to the Islamization and modernization of Malaysia. In their introductory statement “A Movement for Gender Justice” the group writes: “The SIS Story [. . .] must necessarily be a part of the larger human rights movement, and vice versa.”41 Typical of this stance was the 1992 conference on the topic of “The Modern Nation-State and Islam.” By the end of the 1990s, SIS had intensified their workshop and lecture programming. After Amina Wadud returned to the U.S., SIS invited other guest lecturers such as the Egyptian legal scholar Fathi Othman, who taught at the Islamic University of Malaysia from 1994 until 1995. However, the expertise on which SIS based their activities came not only from abroad. The scholars within the organization were appropriately trained and became well-known experts on the impacts of modernization, globalization, and re-Islamization. In the academic

Leading the way 243 context, Zainah Anwar42 and Norani Othman43 gained national and international recognition. While academic publications served primarily to publicize SIS in the west, the statements on their website, online forums for national and international women’s rights organizations, and essays in regional newspapers were relevant for the local context and the international community of Muslim women activists. For several years, Zainah Anwar wrote a column in the English-language newspaper The Strait Times, and Marina Mahathir, who was elected to the organization’s board in 2009, writes for the daily newspaper The Star. After their inception and growing success, SIS began to change: once a spontaneously acting protest group, they became political professionals. In 1998, an office was established with two full-time directors, Zainah Anwar and Sharifah Zuriah Aljeffri. Since then, SIS has become a professional NGO with a staff that offers a range of consulting and training services for state institutions. Issues pertaining to family law, however, continue to be at the top of the agenda. Between 2008 and 2010, SIS activists conducted an empirical study among the members of polygynous households and collected data in order to support their assertion that women and children in polygynous marriages are disadvantaged. The Qur’an permits men to marry up to four women if they are able to treat them all “equitably.” Men living in polygynous marriages tend to assert that this is no problem for them, stating that everything is mutually agreed upon and the women have agreed to the additional marriages. The SIS study conveyed a completely different picture: 90 percent of the children interviewed and 65 percent of the wives were opposed to polygyny, and the women complained that individual wives were treated far from equitably.44 In 2009, Zainah Anwar and a number of other Muslim women activists from several countries founded the Musawah network quickly gained members in more than fifty countries. Musawah runs a homepage in English, French, and Arabic, with breaking news on family law issues that discriminate against women in most Muslims nations. Musawah members give lectures, train other activists, and are active in the spheres of capacity building, knowledge production, and advocacy. On the Musawah website, the organization describes a holistic approach that combines Islamic principles and jurisprudence, international human rights standards, national laws and constitutional guarantees of equality and nondiscrimination, and the lived realities of women and men.45

Muslim women’s organizations in Indonesia In contrast to Malaysia, specifically feminist-oriented Islamic theology in Indonesia is not merely the concern of a small group of activists, and it has had a broad social impact for many years. This is mainly due to the fact that Muslim mass organizations are deeply rooted in society. Examples include the reform-oriented Muhammadiyah, an education-oriented union rooted in reformist Islam, founded in 1912 in Yogyakarta (Java) and the Nahdlatul Ulama46 (NU) which was founded in 1926.47 Such organizations provided an environment in which emancipatory

244  Susanne Schröter discourses could emerge. Today, the Muhammadiyah claims to represent about thirty million Indonesian Muslims; in the case of the NU, it is forty million. Both organizations have their own women’s wings. In 1917, the Muhammadiyah founded the women’s organization Aisyiyah and in 1919 a young women’s organization called Nasyiatul Aisyiyah. The NU, in turn, established the women’s organization Muslimat in 1946, and launched the women’s youth organization Fatayat NU in 1959. In the past, the Islamic women’s associations Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiah as well as Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama and Fatayat Nahdlatul Ulama had strong ties to the main organizations in terms of ideology and personal involvement. In the course of the last decades, however, they have been eager to cut their own path in matters of religious exegesis and have also become more autonomous in their social and political agendas. At the time it was founded, the Muhammadiyah traced its tradition to reformist Muslim scholars such as Sayyid Jamal al Din al Afghani (1838–1897) and Mohammad Abduh (1849–1905). It objected to the mystic Javanese type of Islam characterized by a veneration of saints and traditional authorities (kyai). Tradition was to give way to knowledge, people’s own religious studies were to replace the repetition of old-school teachings, and hierarchies were challengeable (to a certain extent). The latter also applied to the patriarchal asymmetries between men and women. Girls’ education was a huge public issue, and the first school for girls was established in 1903 by the women’s rights activist Ajen Raden Kartini.48 Ahmed Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, put girls’ education on his agenda too. He is said to have picked out the cleverest girls from his community and trained them to fill leadership positions in the Aisyiyah.49 Female members’ right to education was undisputed, and there was support for initiatives in that respect. Women and girls in the Aisyiyah read the Qur’an and got a solid education in religious matters. From being passive recipients of religious truths conveyed by men, they very quickly turned into independent, competent actors in the religious sphere. According to Doorn-Harder, the Muhammadiyah “encouraged women to read, even if they were getting at risk of getting ‘smarter than their husbands.’ ”50 Women’s participation was soon extended beyond studying religious texts. Women were granted access to mosques, and in 1932 a decree was issued allowing both women and men to preach. In patriarchal Java, this was tantamount to a minor revolution. Pursuing such activities away from home implied that women were allowed to leave their homes without male chaperonage. This, too, was a huge innovation even though there were various restrictions, and women invariably needed permission from their husbands.51 Later in the century, the Aisyiyah women founded prayer houses of their own. Their female preachers (muballighat) were an important resource in home mission activities. Women would form small groups led by a muballighat; they met regularly to read the Qur’an together and to discuss Islamic customs and a proper Islamic way of life. According to the Muhammadiyah, knowledge is not an end in itself; it serves the transformation of society guided by Islamic principles. This is why the women

Leading the way 245 of Aisyiyah have been, and still are, social activists campaigning for education, health care programs, and women’s rights in civil society. One of them is Rahmawati Husein whom I met in Yogyakarta in August 2005. A resolute woman wearing a headscarf and long pants, she headed a department of the Muhammadiyah that was, among other things, in charge of tsunami relief and rebuilding measures in Aceh. Rahmawati Husein organized the building of schools, clinics, and orphanages, was responsible for radio stations and aquacultures, and applied herself to special training programs for women that would enable them to earn their own income. Within the Muhammadiyah, she was a member of the National Commission on Violence against Women and an advocate of anti-discrimination measures. She said the organization still has not enough women in leadership positions, and that this has to change. I also talked to Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, a lecturer of sociology at the “Sunan Kalijaga Institute of Islamic Studies.” Siti Ruhaini Dzuhaytin campaigned for the introduction of human rights and women’s rights classes in academic disciplines including law. She deplored the increasing radicalization of Indonesian Islam and argued that students at the faculty of law ought to be introduced to the principles of human rights and tolerance so as to be able to stand up against such tendencies.52 Siti Ruhaini Dzihayatin taught and published on the fundamental principles of Islam and its meaning in contemporary Indonesian society.53 According to her interpretation, equal rights for women are founded both in the Qur’an and the Islamic traditions. She told me that it is not Islam that discriminates against women but the patriarchal structures in society. To substantiate that statement, she refered to the equality of all humans before God, and particularly to those Qur’anic verses in which God addresses men and women alike. Translated into the present, she argued, this means egalitarian relations within families. Men ought to feel responsible for household matters, and it ought to be a matter of course for women to go to work and to hold leadership positions. Siti Ruhaini Dzuhaytin was a member of the Muhammadiyah’s religious council (Marhelis Tarjih), and thus held a leadership position that was exceptional for a woman. Feminist positions are not unchallenged within the organization, and thus need to be bolstered with clever arguments. This becomes apparent from the example of the polygyny debate. The Qur’an definitely permits that practice. Verse 4.3 says: “And if you fear that you will not deal justly with the orphan girls, then marry those that please you of [other] women, two or three or four. But if you fear that you will not be just, then [marry only] one or those your right hand possesses.” According to Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin’s interpretation, this represents an exception to an egalitarian regulation (equality before God), and only special men such as the Prophet Muhammad were allowed to make use of that practice. Today, such men do no longer exist, and polygyny is thus no longer in accordance with Islamic principles. Islamic feminists such as Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin propose not only a new interpretation of the Islamic polygyny rule but also a fundamentally new model of the family that challenges male dominance as well as wives’ obligation to subordinate themselves.54

246  Susanne Schröter Like Rahmawati Husein, Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin has been active in initiatives against domestic violence for many years. Jointly with other women activists she founded the first Javanese shelter for battered women, the Rifka Anisa Women’s Crisis Center. Rifka Anisa built a women’s shelter, offered psychological and legal counseling, and developed an advanced training program for women who had escaped from violent marriages and needed to become economically independent. In addition, it developed a training program for police officers, judges, lawyers, physicians, and people working in government agencies. The manner in which approaches of feminist theology are used becomes apparent from training materials, such as an essay titled “Unterpretasi feminis terhadap Quran sebagai sebuah kritik ideologi patriarki”55 (“Feminist interpretation of the Qur’an as an ideological critique against patriarchy”). In contrast to Malaysia, where Muslim women activists avoid using the term “feminism,” this term is not per se discredited as a Western concept in Indonesia. In that context, however, feminism is by no means defined as being exclusively a “woman’s thing.” A men’s group with branches in several provinces has emerged from Rifka Anisa’s ranks; calling themselves Aliansi laki-laki baru (Alliance of New Men), they advocate a concept of masculinity beyond dominance and violence. As compared to the Muhammadiyah, the Nahdlatul Ulama has had much more difficulty coming to terms with the concerns of women. The organization had its main strongholds in rural areas where gender concepts were conservative and importance was attached to preserving village traditions. Rural scholars (kiyai) enjoyed almost undisputed authority. Hence, people were eager to maintain good relations with them, and this included offering them daughters for marriage. Kiyai often lived in polygynous marriages, and thus saw little reason to relinquish their gender-based patriarchal privileges. It t comes as no surprise then that the women’s association Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama was not established until twenty years after the founding of the NU. Initially, this was not due to emancipatory considerations either. The sole purpose was to gain influence within the female population and to broaden the membership basis.56 The young women’s association Fatayat NU was founded in 1950. It would later become a key motor for gender reforms. Even though there was less emphasis on education than in the Muhammadiyah, the members of Fatayat NU felt called upon to continuously broaden their religious knowledge, and to pass that knowledge on to other women in settings of religious teaching and in sermons. Additionally, they performed Islamic rituals. Many of them came from families of Islamic scholars and had been trained at Islamic schools. They were thus well acquainted with how to access knowledge and were motivated by it; believing that a society founded on Islamic principles also meant developing that society. This included not only secular education but also religious instruction and the eradication of social ills. Fatayat NU activists organized alphabetization courses and committed themselves to issues of reproductive health including birth control, hygiene, and health care for mothers and children. They offered counseling in infant care, proper

Leading the way 247 nutrition of children, and AIDS prevention. Health and counseling centers were opened in which women from all backgrounds, including poor ones, found competent people with whom to talk. To a certain extent, these programs were met with approval among the conservative mainstream of the Nahdlatul Ulama. However, the young activists soon went far beyond these conventional female spheres of activity. They criticized the rural practice of marrying underage girls off to older men, the practice of polygyny, discrimination against women in divorce law, and endemic violence in marriages. Approaching these issues was socially explosive. After all, they challenged rural authorities and the latter’s concept of an undisputable patriarchal order that obliged women to obey and be silent. The naming of social ills was viewed as interference with social and domestic harmony, and the activists’ push was defamed as being an attack against the family. This, however, did not intimidate the activists. In the late 1990s, Fatayat launched a program to strengthen women’s rights (Pengutan Hak-hak Perempuan), which in 2000 was followed by the establishment of a counseling institute supporting women’s empowerment (Lembaga Konsultasi dan Pemberdayaan Perempuan). Like the women of the Muhammadiyah, those of the NU addressed the issue of polygyny, challenging the male top leaders of their own organization to come up with arguments to justify that practice. Masdar Farid Mas’udi, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, invoked the “natural polygamy of men” to justify the different legal standards applied to men and women. The activists responded immediately. For example, Muslimat NU member Lily Zakiyah Munir commented that this justification is false and un-Islamic. She argued that the Qur’an verses referring to polygamy are not about the sexual needs of men and women but about social justice. She went on the explain that the Qur’anic verse cited to justify the practice had been revealed in a time of war immediately after the Battle of Uhud; and even then the verse included a clear caveat: “But if you fear that you will not be just, then marry only one.” (verse 4:3). Orphans, who were without providers and exposed to exploitation in the merciless cultural setting of the time, are explicitly mentioned in that context.57 Munir argues that the practice of marrying orphans as well as widows was guided by principles of humanitarianism and justice. Any complete equality of the genders was impossible back then; this is why the Qur’an gave pragmatic instructions. However, the verse suggests that it is impossible to treat several wives justly. In that context, Munir quotes al-Ahzab (33:4) where it is stated that God has not bestowed men with two hearts. She concludes that there is no longer any justification for the practice today. Actually, it constitutes an insult of women’s dignity.58

The controversy over a reform of family law Like other discriminatory practices that affect women and are legitimized by referring to Islam, polygyny has been the subject of social controversies in Indonesia for many years. While men’s dominance over their wives and the latter’s obligation to obey were laid down in the codex for Islamic courts (Kompilation

248  Susanne Schröter Hukum Islam) issued in 1991, there were nevertheless changes for the better, improving the legal status of women. A man’s marriage with a second wife now required either written consent by his first wife or verbal consent expressed before witnesses. Divorce could no longer be put into effect by the husband merely reciting the divorce formula three times; it had to be confirmed by a court. Men’s minimum age for marriage was raised to 19 years, women’s to 16. The new Compilation of Islamic Law meant a strengthening of women’s rights even though the basic inequality between the genders continued to exist. However, the compilation only addressed some specific aspects of family law (marital issues, religious endowments, inheritance), and judges at Islamic courts consulted so-called “yellow books” (kitab kuning), whose legal interpretations varied widely, for purposes of reaching a verdict. Hence, a revision of the compilation was deemed necessary twelve years later. The Gender Mainstreaming Team of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Tim Pengarusutamaan Gender Departmen Agama) was put in charge of these revisions. The team was headed by Siti Musdah Mulia, the first woman ever to have gained a doctorate in Islamic theology in Indonesia.59 The appointment of Siti Musdah Mulia was promising in terms of a fundamental revision of family law. Being the granddaughter of a well-known preacher (ulama), she grew up in an environment of traditional Islamic thought and religious intolerance. Her family background had acquainted her with the type of Islam she vehemently opposed as an adult. Whenever she played with her non-Muslim Chinese school friends, she had to wash herself afterwards because only Muslims were regarded as pure in her family. However, these very restrictions experienced in early childhood made her curious about alternatives. She confesses that she became interested in the lived diversity of the Muslim world while still very young.60 As an adult she visited several Islamic countries and became aware of the reforms of Islamic law implemented, for example, in Tunisia and Jordan. Her studies of Islamic theology further encouraged her to view Islam as a cornucopia of possibilities rather than a straitjacket of rules. In her opinion, Islam merely established a number of basic principles including tauwid, worship of but one god. While the relationship between God and humankind is hierarchical, it is egalitarian between humans. She wrote: Islamic teachings have two aspects: vertical and horizontal. The vertical aspect relates to human obligations to God (hablun minallah), while the horizontal aspect pertains to relations between humans (haablun min alnas). With regard to the second aspect, it is deemed crucial that the Qur’an and hadith are filled with principles of humanitarian values, stating that all humans are equal regardless of their gender, ethnicity, race, social status, and even religion (sura 49:13).”61 According to her, this commandment of equality is often ignored by Muslims. The result is intolerance, inequality, and injustice. Mulia comments that the Islamic law to be revised does not reflect the abovementioned Qur’anic principles, either, but rather expresses “all the ‘stone age’ views of the fiqh62 without amendment” (Mulia 2004b, 22). Siti

Leading the way 249 Musdah Mulia repeatedly criticized polygyny in her publications and publicly called for a reform of the Islamic legislation.63 “As the Syari’at Islam (hokum Islam) could become public law,” writes Siti Musdah Mulia, “it needs to be studied from at least three main perspectives: gender problems, pluralism, human rights.”64 In that process, three principles of Islamic jurisprudence must be applied: One, the principle of al-ibrah bi al-maqashid la bi al al fadz = the meaning and not the word is relevant; two, the principle of jawaz naskh al-nushush bi al maslahah = possibility to abrogate the text in the public interest; three, the principle of tanqih al nuhush bi al-aql al-mujtama = revision of the text through the consensus of understanding.65 By emphasizing these principles, Mulia opposed a scripturalist interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna; at the same time that she integrated a new category – that of public interest – into her considerations. What does that imply? A detailed explanation can be found in a chapter titled “A Vision of Indonesia’s KHI.” In Mulia’s opinion, it does not make sense to draft any abstract Islamic legislation. Instead, law ought to be adapted to local particularities, and be based on the wisdom of the people living there. Current Islamic legislation, however, does not “coincide with national law and above all with internationally accepted conventions.”66 What, then, is the specifically Indonesian situation postulated by Mulia? It first alludes to the ethnic and religious plurality of the archipelago and second to nationality: “Indonesia did not recruit its members based on religious criteria, rather based on nationalistic criteria.”67 Both these aspects refer to the Pancasila, the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state promulgated by Sukarno, the first president of the independent nation. He founded Indonesia as a multicultural and multireligious nation, thus taking a stand against politicians from Islamic organizations who called for the creation of an Islamic state. The third aspect, according to Mulia, is “adherence to human rights.”68 She points out that these were already laid down in the foundations of Islam, particularly the “right of religious freedom” and “the right to think feely.”69 The fourth aspect is democracy, which is also one of the five principles of the Pancasila. According to Mulia, democracy is rooted in Islamic teachings as well: “First of all, equality . . . second, liberty . . . third fraternity . . . firth justice . . . fifth deliberation.”70 The fifth aspect is public interest: welfare, justice, mercy, and wisdom,71 and the sixth is gender equality. Mulia writes: “The injustice concerning gender not only offends the spirit of Islam but also marginalises and dehumanises women. Islam said with great emphasis, that man and woman stand on one tier . . . The Koran stresses no preference or disadvantage in terms of gender.”72 When mentioning international conventions, Mulia particularly alludes to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which had been formulated the United Nations General Assembly in 1979. Indonesia signed the convention in 1980 and ratified it in 1984. Siti Musdah Mulia’s professed goal was to reconcile Islamic principles with the Indonesian constitution and the international women’s rights agenda – a truly heroic endeavor that required a considerable degree of specific interpretation.

250  Susanne Schröter However, female Muslim activists were well versed in such interpretations at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The reform package was presented to the public in 2004. As compared to applicable law, concrete changes included the institution of a guardian who is to represent the interests of the bride in the context of marriage. The new draft stipulated that a legal guardian is no longer needed unless the bride is not yet 21. In addition, the draft found fault with the gender of the guardian, who according to current applicable law must be invariably male: “It should be insisted upon that articles concerning guardianship do not differentiate between men and women.”73 The minimum age for marriage ought to be the same for both men and women and should be raised to 19 years. The draft recommended replacing the bride price, which is currently to be paid by the husband only, with reciprocal gifts; that way, the husband is not led to believe he has “bought” his bride. Important modifications concerned the relationship between spouses, which ought to be on an equal level. This would render obsolete the article that stipulates a particular obligation to obey for women. The concept of disobedience was redefined in article 53 so as to apply to both husband and wife if either of them “do not meet their responsibilities.”74 In Indonesia, refusal to comply with marital obedience is often used as a justification of domestic violence. The innovative redefinition would render that justification null and void. All other articles of applicable law that stipulate male superiority in marriage and family were replaced by articles with strictly egalitarian wording as well. The new article 49, for example, rules that “the position, rights and responsibilities of husband and wife are the same in the family life as well as in communal life in society.”75 Article 51 stipulates that husband and wife are responsible in equal measure for “mutually loving, honoring, appreciating and protecting each other. . ., supporting each other, mutually providing the possibility for development of individual potential, caring for . . . their children.” Article 52 emphasizes that pregnancy, giving birth, and nursing children is “equivalent to working to make a living.”76 Polygyny would no longer be possible according to the new legal draft, as it violates equality between men and women. In line with the reference to the pluralist reality in Indonesia, the draft stipulates that marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims ought to be permitted. Children born into bi-religious marriages ought to be allowed free choice of their denomination. When the legal draft was eventually submitted in October 2004, it sparked furious protest among the ranks of conservative clerics and politicians. The head of the powerful Indonesian Council of Ulamas (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) announced that those who keep to the new rules run the risk of becoming apostates. Others found fault with the supposed scarcity of references to the Qur’an and sunna.77 The Ministry of Religious Affairs thereupon withdrew the draft and promised further revisions.

What is the future of feminist theology in Southeast Asia? Siti Musdah Mulia is a member of the “Network Liberal Islam” (Jaringan Islam Liberal or JIL), which was founded in 2001 by a small group of Muslim intellectuals

Leading the way 251 as an umbrella organization for women and men who advocate democracy, gender equality, and pluralism. Both JIL and the principles promoted by the group have repeatedly been the focus of Islamist hostilities, some of which were launched by representatives of influential organizations. The powerful Ulema Council of Indonesia (Majelis Ulema Indonesia), for example, issued a fatwa against pluralism, secularism, and liberalism in 2005. There have been threats against members of JIL, and both Siti Musdah Mulia and Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin told me that they are on “black lists” and fear for their lives. Violence and threats against liberal and feminist forces are but one side of the coin in Indonesia. The other is an emancipatory, or gender-sensitive, current of Islamic theology that is by now firmly established in various spheres, not least due to the CEDAW stipulations. Projects related to feminist theology exist at a number of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), and an emancipatory version of Islam is taught at the Women’s Studies Centers (Pusat Studi Wanita, PSW) of the Islamic universities. Society is divided over the issue, which has become apparent in the most recent presidential elections in 2014. While it is encouraging that the democratic candidate Joko Widodo emerged victorious with a small majority of votes, his failure to do anything to stop Islamist violence is frustrating. Since then the situation has worsened, militant Islamist groups are gaining ground and feminist voices are increasingly silenced. In Malaysia, the situation is hardly any better. The two strongest parties – the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and the United Malaysia Organisation (UMNO) – try to outdo each other in terms of making more and more concessions to an ultraconservative clientele of voters.78 In that process, little importance is attached to women’s rights. There have repeatedly been bans on publications of the Sisters in Islam, and attempts to sabotage the organization’s work. The chance of an emancipatory or feminist version of Islam depends on whether liberal currents in Islam will prevail over conservative or fundamentalist hardliners. In the Philippines, under the rule of president Rodrigo Duterte illiberal movements are fueled and society is deeply divided. The scope of women is shrinking and the conditions for Islamic feminists are getting harder. In southern Thailand, Salafism has become mainstream Islam and female subordination is now recognized as a norm. Ultimately, it is feared that Islamic feminism that started so promisingly will not prevail.

Notes 1 Kulke 1993; Lieberman 2003, 2009; Reid 1988, 1993, 1999; Steenbrink 2006; and Watson/Andaya 2015. 2 Schlehe 1998. 3 Kato 1982; Siegel 1969; and Ong 1995. 4 Schröter 2013, 9ff. 5 Wieringa 1988, 71ff. 6 Yegar 2002; and McKenna 1998. 7 Liow 2009b. 8 The hijab movement of southern Thailand began in 1987/88 with rallies of young female Muslims in the Yala province, and subsequently spread from there. Marddent 2013: 241.

252  Susanne Schröter 9 Marddent 2013. 10 Brecht-Drouart 2013. 11 Rasul 2003, 2013. 12 The Asia Foundation 2008; and Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy 2010. 13 Ng et al. 2006, 3. 14 Still today, it is not completely clear what led up to these events. At any rate, the consequences were terrible for those accused of being members of, or sympathizing with, communist organizations. Both the military and Islamic militias persecuted, tortured, and massacred between 300.000 and one million people, including the secular campaigners for women’s rights. Wieringa 2002. 15 Sears 1996, 101. 16 Schröter 2014b, 80–87. 17 Schröter 2007a, 2007b. 18 This was the so-called sastra wangi literature. Schröter 2014a. 19 Arnez 2009; and Arnez/Dewojati 2010. 20 Schröter 2014a. 21 Abbott/Gregorios-Pippas 2010. 22 Müller 2016, 2015. 23 Liow 2006, 2008; and Yegar 2002. 24 See article in this volume. 25 Anwar 1987, 241. Anwar points out that in the case of Malaysia, students who came into contact with the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had done so during their time spent in Great Britain. 26 Muzaffar 1987; and Nagata 1984. 27 In Malay: “Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu.” 28 On the Islamist rhetoric within the PAS, see Liow 2004; and Noor 2004; on the history of PAS, see Noor 2004. 29 This was the “Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad.” A similar institution had existed since 1975 in the form of the “Islamic Development Bank.” 30 Fischer 2008. 31 Abu Bakar 2001, 64. 32 Judith Nagata pointed out as early as in 1995 that the notion of an oppressed woman Islamist was untenable, and that veiled women were actively leading their own lives Nagata 1995, 104. In a more recent ethnographic study of pious Muslim women, Sylva Frisk 2004 once again confirmed this. 33 In 1984 family law was reformed along “Islamic” lines, and the religiously legitimized restrictions on the rights of women were introduced. 34 Ismail 2006, 50. 35 Sisters in Islam: The SIS story. www.sistersinislam.org.my/page.php?35, accessed January 14, 2012. 36 Anwar 2001, 229. 37 Othman 1994, 135. 38 The group’s membership changed almost completely during the first few years. At the time of its founding most of SIS’s members were journalists and social scientists. 39 Zainah Anwar, for example, is the daughter of Anwar bin Abdul Malik, one of the most important figures of the Malay independence movement. Among his achievements is the founding of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). 40 Kelantan borders on Thailand and is one of the poorest and most conservative federal states in Malaysia. 41 www.sistersinislam.org.my/page.php?35, accessed October 2, 2014. 42 In 1987 Anwar had published a study on the Islamization of students, published two articles on SIS in edited volumes for an international readership (2001, 2005), and after that mostly short pieces in reformist Muslim Islamic online fora, such as the site “Women Living Under Muslim Law” (WLUML).

Leading the way 253 43 Her countless publications deal with women’s rights, public intellectuals and development in Malaysia. See, for example, Othman 1994, 1998, 2006. 44 www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/22/survey-malaysia-children-reject-polyg amy-practice.html, accessed January 16, 2012. 45 See the Musawah Framework for Action, www.musawah.org/about-musawah/frame work-action, accessed May 24, 2018. 46 Alfian 1989; and Nakamura 2012. 47 Nahdlatul Ulama means “Renaissance of the Islamic Scholars,” alluding to the fact that the NU is an antireform organization opposed to the Muhammadiyah, and strives to preserve traditional Javanese values. A history of the organization is found in Bush 2009. 48 Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879–1904) was a Javanese princess who vehemently opposed polygyny and advocated girls’ education. When she was twenty-four, she was married off to a 50-year old regent and died when giving birth to her first child. 49 Etin Anwar 2004, 94. 50 Doorn-Harder 2006, 91. 51 Ibid., 79. 52 Dzuhayatin 2006. 53 See, among others, Dzuhayatin 2016. 54 See also Doorn-Harder 2013, 68–70. 55 http://lakilakibaru.or.id/interpertasi-feminis-terhadap-quran-sebagai-sebuah-kritikideologi-patriarki/. 56 The Muslimat NU existed as part of the Nahdlatul Ulama as early as in 1940. Six years later it became an independent organization but was still modeled after, and associated with, the Nahdlatul Ulama. 57 Munir 2003a. 58 Munir 2003b. 59 Siti Musdah Mulia earned her doctorate at the Syahid Institute of Islamic Studies in Jakarta. 60 Personal communication, 30 September 2005. 61 Mulia 2013, 115. 62 Fiqh can be translated as Islamic law. 63 Mulia 1999, 2004a, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c. 64 Mulia 2004b, 3. 65 Ibid., 25–26. 66 Ibid., 8. 67 Ibid., 27. 68 Ibid., 28. 69 Ibid., 29. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., 30. 72 Ibid., 31. 73 Ibid., 18. 74 Ibid., 54. 75 Ibid., 52. 76 Ibid., 53. 77 O’Shaugnessy 2009, 38. 78 Liow 2009b; and Noor 2014.

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258  Susanne Schröter Watson Andaya, Barbara, and Leonard Y. Andaya (2015) A History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Wieringa, Saskia (1988) “Aborted Feminism in Indonesia: A History of Indonesian Socialist Feminism,” in Women’s Struggles and Strategies, ed. Saskia Wieringa (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies), 69–89. Wieringa, Saskia (2002) Sexual Politics in Indonesia (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan). Yegar, Moshe (2002) The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham: Lexington Books).

Index

Abdallah ibn Mas’ud 211 – 212 Abd-Allah ibn Ubayy 129 Abduh, Mohammad 244 Abdullah, King 229 ablution ritual 195 Abou Bakr, Omaima 221, 223 Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-‘Arabi 178 Abu Bakr As-Siddiq 134 Abu Hurayra 187 Abu-Lughod, Lila 12, 18, 46, 54 – 55 Abu Salama 187 – 188 Abu Zaid, Nasr Hamid 68, 80, 142, 144 adam 91, 93 – 95 Adam 21, 91, 93 – 95, 110, 116, 155 African woman’s theology 23 ahad issue 227 – 228 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal 192 ‘A’isha bint Abu Bakr (wife of the Prophet): background information 216n14; early Islam and 89; feminism and 186 – 187; hadith and 189; Prophet and 9, 123 – 124, 126, 129 – 134, 192; religious education 207, 209, 213 – 214; self-determination and 186; Surat al-Nur and 9, 123 – 124, 126, 129 – 134 Aisyiyah 244 al-Afghani, Sayyid Jamal al Din 244 al-Ahzab 247 al-Alwani, Taha Jabir 123, 137n4 al-Anood mosque suicide bombing 225 al-Aslami, Abu Abdur Rahman 127 al-Baladhuri 188 al-Baydawi 190 al-Bukhari, Ṣahih 11, 128, 205 – 206, 210 al-Fassi, Hatoon 11 al-Hanbali, Ibn Rajab 171 al-Hasan al-Basri 213 al-Husayn 189 Aliansi lak-laki baru (Alliance of New Men) 246

Ali b. Abu Talib 186 Ali, Kecia 22, 65, 67 al-insan (undifferentiated humanity) 99 – 100 Aljeffri, Sharifah Zuriah 243 Alkateeb, Sharifa 176 al-Khattab, Omar bin 227 Allah 34, 36 – 37, 92, 95, 100, 119, 142 – 143, 153, 171, 175, 188 – 191 al-Maturidi 145 al-Mawardi 93 al-Najashi 188 al-Qunaieer, Hasnaa 225 al-Qurṭubī 110 – 111, 114, 151 al-raḥmān 151 – 153 al-Rasheed, Madawi 224 al-Saad, Nura 224 al-Sheikh, Hissah Al 225 al-Shiifa (daughter of Abdullah bin Adyy) 227 al-Tabari 66 al-Tabarsi 190 Al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an (structural unity of Qur’an) 9, 126 – 128 Alwani, Zainab 9 al-Waqidi 11, 205 al-Zamakhshari 172 Amin, Yasmin 10 Amir-Moazami, Schirin 54 ‘Amra bint Qays 213 Andreassen, Rikke 53 androcentrism 17 – 21, 65 animal sacrifice 193 Ankara School of Islam 142 Ansari Abu Lababa 191 Anwar, Zainah 241 – 243 ‘anzala 127 Arebi, Saddeka 228 Aristophanes 113 ar-Razi 117 Asad, Muhammad 94, 102n12

260 Index asbab nuzul al-Qur’an (occasions for revelation) genre 189 – 192 Ascha, Ghassan 185 – 186 Ash’arite school of Islam 149 Asma (‘A’isha’s sister) 213 Asma’ Bint ‘Umays 190 Association of Women Lawyers 241 at-Tabaqat al-Kubra (Ibn Sa‘d) 11 at-Taftazānī 155 authority, negotiating: hadith and Qur’an, juxtaposing 17, 20 – 28; limits of authority and, defining 18 – 20; Muslim women and 17, 20 – 28; precedent as standard for Islamic 19; Qur’an in, prioritizing 17, 20 – 22; see also Muslima theology; Saudi Arabia’s authority of religious interpretation, challenging aya (sign of God) 150 Badran, Margot 48, 221 Bani Mustaliq 128 Barlas, Asma 27, 41, 72, 142 – 143, 187 Bauer, Karen 190 Bauer, Thomas 146 bayinat 127 beating of wife interpretations 66 – 67, 70, 75 – 76, 173 – 174, 177 – 178 Beijing Global Conference for Women (1995) 37, 40 Bereschit Rabb 114 biblical account of human creation 21, 90 – 92 Bielefeldt, Heiner 50 binary 3 – 4, 12 – 13, 42 – 43, 64, 224 biological gender 68 – 69 Bouachrine, Ibtissam 186 Bracke, Sarah 54 breastfeeding practice 193 – 194 Bush, George W. 54 Bush, Laura 54 CEDAW (Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) (1979) 38 – 41, 249, 251 Centre for Islamic Women Research (ZIF) 66, 71, 73 – 77, 79 Chanina, R. 116 Chaudhry, Ayesha 19, 22, 179n11, 186, 190 Christian feminist theology 25 Christianity/Christian models 4, 8, 21, 35, 89 – 91, 94, 101, 150 – 151, 153 – 154, 237, 239 civil society organizations 70 – 77; see also specific name

Clooney, Francis X. 24 colonialism, national movements to gain independence from 37 – 38 comparative feminist engagement 23 – 26 comparative possibilities of Muslima theology 23 – 26 constructive possibilities of Muslima theology 26 – 27 Cooke, Miriam 12, 56n8, 221 – 222 Co-ordinating Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM) 70 – 71, 78 – 79 creation: biblical account of human 21, 90 – 92; divine, in Qur’an 92 – 93; dualism in human 107 – 109; generic description of 99 – 101; in Genesis 21, 90 – 92, 95, 116; human, in Qur’an 95 – 101; passages in Qur’an 95 – 98, 102 – 104nn12 – 21; process, two methods of 98 – 99; “rib-story” and 90 – 91, 101; signs of 107 – 108 creation in pairs in Qur’an: duality in creation 108 – 109; in early Meccan period 106, 109 – 119; overview 8 – 9, 106 – 107; signs of creation 107 – 108 “crisis of conscience” 170 – 171 Crisis of Islamic Masculinities, The (De Sondy) 187 daraba (to separate/beating) 66 – 67, 75 – 76 Decker, Doris 10 – 11 Dere, Ali 77 – 78 De Sondy, Amanullah 187 Directorate for Religious Affairs (DIB) 71 divine creation in Qur’an 92 – 93 divine revelation 141 domestic violence 19, 51, 143, 170, 177, 241 – 242, 246, 250 Domestic Violence and the Islamic Tradition (Chaudhry) 19 dominance feminism 55 Dominanzgesellschaft (dominance society) 54 Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (AbuLughod) 55 Doorn-Harder, Pieternella van 244 double bind 12 double critique 12 dualism in human creation 107 – 109 Dzuhayatin, Siti Ruhaini 245 – 246, 251 education of girls 244 either/or binary 3 – 4, 42 – 43 El’azar, R. 116 El Omari, Dina 4, 8

Index  261 Europe 46, 52 – 55; see also specific country Eve 21, 91 – 92 exegetic approaches 68 face covering 229 Fadil, Nadia 53 Falaturi, Abdoldjavad 151 family law reform, controversy over 247 – 250 farada 127 Farid, Alia 224 Fatayat Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 244, 246 – 247 female theologians 70 – 77; see also specific name femininity 68 – 69 feminism: as academic discipline 185; ‘A’isha bint Abu Bakr and 186 – 187; American government and 46; diversity in 55 – 56; dominance 55; European governments and 46; hegemonic 17 – 20, 47 – 51; hermeneutics 49; Islamic 42, 44, 185, 221 – 222; Islamic theology and 18 – 19, 40 – 42; Islamists and secular 37 – 42; Medina as Golden Age of 186; Mothers of Believers and 185 – 187; Muslim women’s feelings toward 18; Qur’an readings and, accusations of arbitrariness 162; Saudi Arabia’s authority of religious interpretation and Islamic 221 – 222; Umm Salama and 185 – 187; see also feminism and Islam feminism and Islam: Abu-Lughod’s work 46 – 47, 54 – 55; agency and 51 – 52; encounters between, impact of 52; as epistemological traditions 55 – 56; gender justice/equality as European value and 52 – 55; hegemonic feminism and 47 – 51; juxtaposition of 48; Klausing’s work 51; overview 7, 46 – 47; Rommelspacher’s work 46 – 47, 54 – 55 Feminist Edges of the Qur’an (Hidayatullah) 144 feminist theology 18, 65, 250 – 251 fiqh 41, 45, 192 – 196, 227 France, headscarf ban in 53 freedom 154 – 157, 163 – 164 Galen 111 – 112, 115 gender binary 12 – 13 gender equal Islamic theology in Germany: Centre for Islamic Women’s Research and 71, 73 – 77, 79; civil society organizations and 70 – 77; conditions discussed 64; Constitution and, Germany 62; Co-ordinating Council of Muslims

in Germany and 70 – 71, 78 – 79; female theologians and 70 – 77; feminist theology and 65; gender studies and 68 – 69; Islamic theology as academic discipline and 62 – 63; Islamic theology in Germany and 62, 70, 77 – 78; Liberal Islamic Association and 71 – 73, 79; meaning of concept in Germany 65 – 69; mosques of the VIKZ and 70 – 71; overview 7 – 8, 78 – 80; in present times 69 – 78; problems-solution approaches 62 – 65, 67 – 69; questions involving 63; scholarly establishment’s power and, declining 80; verse 4:34 and 64 – 67 gender hierarchy 173 – 174 gender identity 68 – 69, 72 – 73 gender jihad 6, 35 – 36, 49 gender justice/equality: as aim of Muslim women’s movement, debate about 52; concept of 10; either/or binary and 42; as European value 52 – 55; as gender mainstreaming 49; premises 12 – 13; struggle for, by scholars and activists 5 – 6 Gender Mainstreaming Team of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 248 gender studies 68 – 69 Genesis 21, 90 – 92, 95, 116 German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) 77 German Islam Conference (2012) 77 Germany: academic institutions in 4; center for Islam in (Muenster) 4 – 5; Constitution in 62; gender roles in, current 69 – 78; headscarf ban in 53; Islamic theology in 62, 70, 77 – 78; see also gender equal Islamic theology in Germany Global Conference for Women (Beijing) (1995) 37, 40 Goodman, Robin 187 hadith: ‘A’isha bint Abu Bakr and 189; al-Bukhari’s collection 11, 205 – 206, 210; authority of, varying degrees of 20 – 1; ifk story and 128; Muslima theology and 22; patriarchal traditions in 21; Qur’an and 7 – 8, 17, 20 – 28, 125; reassessing, strategies for 21 – 22; religious education for women and 206; sunna and 22; Umm Salama and 191 – 196; weak 11 Hajj, The (Sayeed) 187 Haleem 175 Halley, Janet 55 Hammer, Juliane 26

262 Index Haquq-e-Niswan (The Rights of Women) (Mumtaz) 100 Hassan, Riffat 8, 21, 41, 81n20 hawwa 101 headscarf ban 47 – 48, 52 – 53 hegemonic feminism 17 – 20, 47 – 51 hegemonic othering 17 – 20 “hermeneutic suspicion” 49 Hidayatullah, Aysha 22, 144 hijab movement (Thailand) 251n8 Hind Bint Abu Umayya see Umm Salama historical contextualization of Qur’an 69, 79 historical/critical approach to Qur’an 161 historical-theological hermeneutics of Qur’an 162 – 163 homosexuality 36, 72 – 73 “honor”-related violence 53 – 54, 134 – 135 huda 148

Islamic Advisory Board of NRW 71 Islamic theology: as academic discipline 4, 7, 62 – 63, 77 – 78; authority and 19; center for (Münster, Germany) 4 – 5; concepts of 6 – 8; detractors of 4; feminism and 18 – 19, 40 – 42; gender constructions and, early 10; gender norms and 7; German society and, democratic modern 7; in Germany 62, 70, 77 – 78; histories of 10 – 11; linguistic-philological approaches and 67; male monopoly and 11; Muslim women’s movement and 39; sources for 8 – 10; tawhid 36; woman-man inequality in 89; see also Islam Islamic University of Malaysia 240 Islamism 38 – 40 Islamization of the law 241

Ibn Hisham 11, 205 Ibn Ishaq 187, 205 Ibn Kathir 116, 159 Ibn Majah 192 – 193 Ibn Sa’d 11, 192, 205, 210, 213 Ibrahim, Celene 9 ifk story 128 – 129 ijtihad 224 ikhtalafa al-fuqaha (the scholars of law are always in disagreement) 64 Indonesia 239, 243 – 249 Inside the Gender Jihad (Wadud) 6 intercourse positions 192 International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS) 226 intratextual approach (tafsir al-Qur’an bi-l-Qur’an) 9, 123 – 124, 128 Iqbal, Muhammad 101 Isasi-Diaz, Ada Maria 23 ISIS 43 Islam: Ankara School of 142; Ash’arite school of 149; diversity in 42, 124 – 125; gender and classical sources of 41; gender jihad in 35 – 36, 49; gender-just understanding of, defining 66; genderspecific approaches to texts of 50; ISIS and 43; marital age minimums 248; Maturidies and 145, 149; Mu’tazilites and 145; oppression accusations against 48; patriarchal interpretations of 38; patriarchy and 47 – 48, 89 – 90; personal meaning of 45; political 38 – 39; precedent as standard of authority in 19; reformist dialogue 37 – 41; Wadud’s lecture 36 – 37; women’s role in 36 – 37; see also feminism and Islam; Islamic theology

Jahouri, Zahia 41 Jesus 153 – 154 Jibril (Angel) 189 jihad 62, 172, 190 Jihadi brides 43 jihad for women 192 – 193, 222, 224 Judaism 4, 8, 70, 89 – 91, 101, 113 – 114, 119, 153 Judgment Day 118 Kaddor, Lamya 50 – 51, 71 kalam lafzi (outer speech of God) 149 kalam nafsi (inner speech of God) 149 Kawthar al-Arbash 225 Khadijah (wife of the Prophet) 89, 186 – 187 khalifa 36 Khan, Nouman Ali 177 Khawla b. al-Azwar 194 Khawla bint Qays 207 Khawla bint Tha’laba 211 Khorchide, Mouhanad 4, 9 King, Martin Luther 35 kissing between husband and wife during Ramadan 195 Kitab al-Maghazi (al-Waqidi) 11 Klausing, Kathrin 51 Koran 167n71, 249 Korteweg, Anna 53 – 54 Krings, Hermann 156 Kulturkampf (culture clash) 54 Kyung, Chung Hyun 23 Lamrabet, Asma 33, 41 Lane, E. W. 93 Lemmen, Thomas 70

Index  263 Liberal Islamic Association (LIB) 71 – 73, 79 Lifting the Veil (Parshall and Parshall) 187 linguistic-exegetical approaches to Qur’an 67 – 68 linguistic-philological approaches to Qur’an 67, 69, 79 Literature and the Development of Feminist Theory (Goodman) 187 Lizzio, Celene Ayat 26 – 27 Mahathir, Marina 243 Mahmood, Saba 51 – 52 Mahmud b. Umar al-Zamakhshari 171 Mahmud Taha 67 Makino, Sinya 99 Malaysia 238, 240 – 241, 251 male privilege, dismantling 41 male supremacy/superiority, premise of 171 – 173 marital age minimums 248 Marwan Ibn al-Munzir 191 Mary (mother of Jesus) 153 masculinity 68 – 69 Maturidies 145, 149 Meccan suras 67 – 68 Medinan suras 67 – 68 men’s activist organizations in Indonesia 246 menstruation and lying with a wife 195 mercy 140 – 141, 145, 150 – 152, 161, 167n69 Mernissi, Fatema 33 – 35, 41, 43, 186 midrash literature 113 – 114 Mir-Hosseini, Ziba 41, 48 – 49, 221, 231 Mistah bin Uthatha 134 monological understanding of divine revelation 141 Mor Philoxenos Mattais Nayis 151 mosques of the VIKZ 70 – 71 Most Masculine State, A (al-Rasheed) 224 Mothers of Believers 124 – 126, 185 – 187 Mothers of the Believers (Ascha) 185 Muhajirun (immigrants) 192 Muhammadiyah 243 – 247 mujerista theology 23 Mulia, Siti Musdah 248 – 251 Müller, Rabea 72 – 73 multazimat 224 multiple critique 12 Mumtaz, Syed 100 Munir, Lily Zakiyah 247 Musawah: Global Movement for Equality and Justice in the Muslim Family 42 – 43, 49, 57n15, 243 Muslima theology: androcentrism and 17 – 21; authority and 18 – 22; comparative

possibilities of 23 – 26; concept of 6 – 8; constructive possibilities of 26 – 27; egalitarianism and, promoting 20 – 22; egalitarian resources for 17; hadith and 22; hegemonic othering and 17 – 20; overview 6 – 7, 17, 28 – 29; patriarchy and 17 – 21; Qur’an-focused interpretations and 20 – 22; sunna and 22; term of 23, 29n31; theological possibilities of 27 – 28; Wadud’s lecture 42, 44 Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama 244, 246 Muslim family law 11 Muslim feminists 37 – 43, 52 Muslim insider 3 Muslim outsider 3 Muslim personal status laws 45 Muslimwoman concept 56n8 Muslim women: authority and, negotiating 17, 20 – 28; as change-makers 10; community engagement by 35; in Europe 52 – 55; feminism and, feelings toward 18; headscarf ban 48; historical background to studying 4 – 6; historical perspective 2; “honor”-related violence and 53 – 54, 134 – 135; interest in, new form of 50; as Jihadi brides 43; in labor market 47 – 48; national identity politics and 53; needs of, current 11 – 12; recognition and, struggle for 50; rights of 55; “salvation” of 18, 54 – 55; selfdetermination of 34; studying 1 – 4, 50 – 51; visibility and, struggle for 50; word cloud 1; see also oppression of Muslim women Muslim women’s movement: critical mass 34 – 35; first wave of 37; gender justice/equality as aim of, debate about 52; Islamic theology and 39; modern 37 – 40; Wadud’s lecture and 33 – 35, 37 – 40; see also Southeast Asia’s women’s activism Mu’tazilites 145 nafsin wahidatin (single soul) 99 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 243, 246 Naseef, Fatima 223 – 224 Nasyiatul Aisyiah 244 national identity politics 53 national women’s movements 37 – 38 Network Liberal Islam (JIL) 250 – 251 Neuwirth, Angelika 107 – 109, 150 – 151, 153 nocturnal emissions 192 North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) 71 Nusayba b. Ka‘b al-Ansariyya 194 nushuz (recalcitrance) 174 – 175

264 Index O’Conner, June 221 Oduyoye, Mercy Amba 23 oppression of Muslim women: in immigration debates 53 – 54; liberation and, need for 11; media reporting on, global 1; politicization of 3 – 4; salvation rhetoric and 18 Othman, Fathi 242 – 243 Özsoy, Ömer 144 pair creation see creation in pairs in Qur’an Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) (PAS) 240, 251 patriarchy 13, 17 – 21, 47 – 48, 89 – 90, 222 Peaceful Families Project 176 Pellat, C. 210 Philippines 251 pilgrimage rituals 213 – 214 Plato 113 Plato’s symposium 113 – 114 political Islam 38 – 40 prayer 26, 70, 172, 207 – 208, 214, 240 prayer houses 244 pre-Islamic times 159 problems-solutions approaches 62 – 65, 67 – 69 prophetic tradition, verifying/validating 123 Prophet Muhammad: ‘A’isha bint Abu Bakr and 9, 123 – 124, 126, 129 – 134, 192; call to freedom and 157; companions/wives of 123 – 126, 185 – 187; enactment of lifestyle aspects 19; as mediator between party of men and women 173; as mercy 151; military missions of 189, 193; mother of, status of 172; purity washing and 192; revelation of God and 158; as role model for humanity 136; roles of 125; Umm Salama and 10, 188 – 192; violence against women by, no record of 174 Pröpper, Thomas 155 – 156 purity washing 192, 208, 214 qanitat (obedience) 175 Qur’an: Adam in 93 – 95, 93 – 95; androcentrism in 65; authority of 20 – 21; beating of wife interpretations in 66 – 67, 75 – 76, 173 – 174, 177 – 178; corporal punishments in 141; creation of both sexes and 8, 106; creation passages in 95 – 98, 102 – 104nn12 – 21, 104nn35 – 37; critiques of strategies to negotiate authority 17; descent of, gradual 127, 148; divine creation in 92 – 93; as divine revelation 9; dualism of men and women and, biological 79; exegetical tasks for

facing modernity challenges 63 – 64; exegetic approaches to 68; freedom and, modern-day 154 – 157, 163 – 164; gender-sensitive interpretations of, research on 51; generic terms used in 99 – 101; hadith and 7 – 8, 17, 20 – 28, 125; historical contextualization of 69, 79; historical/critical approach to 161; historical/theological hermeneutics of 162 – 163; human creation in 95 – 101; immanent side of 149 – 150; individual interpretations of 72; intratextual approach to 9, 123 – 124, 136; kindness and accountability in, emphasis on 179; linguistic-exegetical approaches to 67 – 68; linguistic-philological approach to 67, 69, 79; literalist understanding of 142; mercy in, 140 – 141, 145, 150 – 152, 161, 167n69; modern approaches to interpretation of 146; nonpatriarchal reading of 8, 11; open communication and 158 – 160; prioritizing in negotiating authority 17, 20 – 22; Prophet’s companions and 125 – 126; radical approach to 79 – 80; revelation of God and 147 – 149, 152, 155, 158, 161, 163 – 164; “rib-story” in 101; rumors in 135 – 136; as self-communication of God 148 – 149; slander and 135 – 136; structural unity (Al-wahda al-bina’iyya li-l-Qur’an) 9; structural unity of 9, 126 – 128; sunna and 124; theological hermeneutics of 160 – 163; transcendental-logical approach to 155 – 156; transcendent side of 142 – 143, 149 – 150; verse 3:195 190 – 191; verse 4:11 158 – 160; verse 4:32 190; verse 9:102 191; verse 33:35 189 – 190; verse 49:11 191; as visualization/ manifestation of God 147 – 149; women’s role in Islamic tradition and 36; see also creation in pairs in Qur’an; verse 4:34; women’s image in Qur’an Rabi‘a al-Basri 89 radical approach to Qur’an 79 – 80 radical Islamic organizations 239 Rahman, Fazlur 142 – 143 Rasul, Amina 238 rawiyat (female transmitters of Prophet’s words) 187; see also specific name Ready to Kill (Kaddor) 71 religious educated women in early Islam: ‘A’isha bint Abu Bakr 207, 209, 213 – 214; applying religious knowledge

Index  265 and 208 – 212; male questioners 214; overview 10 – 11, 204 – 206, 214 – 215; questions 205 – 206, 214; receiving religious knowledge and 206 – 208; role in process of Islam and, crucial 215; sources of texts 205; transferring religious knowledge and 213 – 214; Umm Salama 214 revelation of God 147 – 149, 152, 155, 158, 161, 163 – 164 revertible agility approach 215 “rib-story” 90 – 91, 101 rituals 10, 21, 25 – 27, 192, 195, 208, 213 – 214, 237, 246 Rommelsbacher, Birgit 7, 46–47, 54 – 55, 56n2 Ruether, Rosemary Radford 25 – 26 ruh (spirit) 150 rumors in Qur’an 135 – 136 Safwan b. al-Mu‘attal 128 – 129 Sahih al-Sunan (Ibn Majah) 192 – 193 sahwa movement 224 Salafism 238, 251 “salvation” of Muslim women 18, 54 – 55 Saudi Arabia 222; see also Saudi Arabia’s authority of religious interpretation, challenging Saudi Arabia’s authority of religious interpretation, challenging: beyond Saudi Arabia 222 – 225; Islamic feminism and 221 – 222; Naseef and 223 – 224; overview 11, 221 – 222; R’s of O’Conner and 221; Shi’i minority voices 224 – 225; strategies for 223; Suhaila Zain al-Abedin Hammad’s story 225 – 232; women entering religious realm 223 – 224; women’s “duties” and 222 – 223; women’s rights changes and 233n62 Sayeed, Asma 187 Schneider, Irene 6 – 7 Schröter, Susanne 11 science 68 Science Council 77 – 78 Sears, Laurie 239 secular Muslim feminists 37 – 42, 52 Seedat, Fatima 47, 52 Selby, Jennifer 53 self-determination 34, 154, 156 – 158, 186 Sergios Resh Aina 112 sexism 49 sexuality 20, 28, 72 – 73, 134 Shaikh, Sa’diyyah 49, 51 shari’a criminal law 242 Shi’i minority 224

Silvers, Laury 170, 178 sira (Ibn Hisham) 11 Sisters in Islam (SIS) 40, 240 – 243, 251 Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin 245 – 246, 251 slander in Qur’an 135 – 136 social grievances and minorities 53 Sonbol, Amira 41 Southeast Asia’s women’s activism: family law reform, controversy over 247 – 250; feminist theology and, future of 250 – 251; Indonesia 239, 243 – 249; Islamism and, fighting 240 – 243; Islamization of the law and 241; Malaysia 238, 240 – 241, 251; men’s organizations and 246; overview 11, 237; Philippines 251; Sisters in Islam 240 – 243, 251; Thailand 238, 251; women’s organizations and 243 – 247; women’s rights and 237 – 240 Spielhaus, Riem 6 – 7, 73 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 18 Steffen, Therese Frey 68 – 69 Stowasser, Barbara 191 Study Qur’an, The 175 Suharto, General 239 Suhayla Bint Sahl 193 sunna 22, 72, 124 – 125, 129, 136 Surat Al-Mulk 123 Surat al-Nur: ‘A’isha bint Abu Bakr discourse with Prophet and 9, 123 – 124, 126, 129 – 134; analytical reading in 135 – 136; foundational sources and, engaging with 124 – 126; ifk story and 128 – 129; intratextual approach and 9, 123 – 124, 128; key words in 127; meaning of, general 134 – 135; opening verse 126 – 127; overview 9, 123 – 124; structural unity of Qur’an and 9, 126 – 128 Surat ar-Raḥman 153 Swidler, Leonard 90 – 91 Syari’at Islam (hokum Islam) 249 Syed, Mohammad Ali 190 – 191 Syrian Orthodox Church 114, 151 Tabari, al- 11, 117, 205 tadhdhakrun 127 Tafsīr al-Qur’ān (Commentary) (Ibn Kathir) 159 tafsir 9, 49, 66 – 67, 124, 189 – 192 tafsir of praxis 51 Tanchum, R. 116 Tanner Rhodes, Jerusha 6 – 7 Tan Sri Datuk Napsiah Omar 242

266 Index taqwa (piety) 196 Ta’rikh (at-Tabari) 11 Tatari, Muna 50 tawhid 36, 134, 248 Terman, Rochelle 12 Thailand 238, 251 theological hermeneutics of Qur’an 160 – 163 theological possibilities of Muslima theology 27 – 28 transcendental freedom 156 transcendental-logical approach to Qur’an 155 – 156 true Islam 39 – 40 Umar b. Khattab 173 Umm al-Hasan 213 Umm ‘Atiya 213 Umm Fadl 207 Umm Hisham 207 Umm Salama: ablution ritual 195; animal sacrifice and 193; asbab nuzul al-Qur’an genre and 189 – 192; background information 187 – 189; breastfeeding practice and 193 – 194; caring for father versus waiting period and 195; egalitarian issues and 192 – 195; feminism and 185 – 187; fiqh and 192 – 196; hadith and 191 – 196; intercourse positions and 192; jihad for women and 192 – 193; kissing between husband and wife during Ramadan 195; menstruation and lying with a wife 195; military missions of Prophet and advising 189, 193; names known by 187; nocturnal emissions and 192; overview of influence 10, 185, 196; Prophet and 10, 188 – 192; in scholarly literature, lack of attention to 187; tafsir and 189 – 192; verse 3:195 and 190 – 191; verse 4:32 and 190; verse 4:34 and 190; verse 9:102 and 191; verse 33:35 and 190; verse 49:11 and 191 Umm Ya’qub 211 – 212 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) 240, 251 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 12, 54 Veil and the Male Elite, The (Mernissi) 186 verse 3:195 190 – 191 verse 4:11 158 – 160 verse 4:32 190 verse 4:34: ambiguous terms in 174 – 176; beating of wife and 170, 173 – 174,

177; challenge of 9; confusion about conflict resolution and 170 – 171; crisis of conscience and 170 – 171; domestic violence and historical perspectives of 19; English translations of 174 – 175; gender equal Islamic theology in Germany and 64 – 67; gender hierarchy and 173 – 174; gender hierarchy in 66 – 67; interpretations of, contrary 75; kindness and mutual accountability and, Qur’an’s emphasis on 179; literal reading of 170, 177; male supremacy and, premise of 171 – 173; physical reprimand and 173 – 174; practical situations and 176 – 179; Umm Salama and 190; wa-dribuhunna in 174; “weighty word” of Prophet Muhammad and 171 – 173 verse 9:102 191 verse 33:35 189 – 190 verse 49:11 191 von Stosch, Klaus 144 – 145, 151 – 152 voting rights for women 227 wa-dribuhunna 174 Wadud, Amina 6 – 7, 27, 49, 72, 142 – 143, 241 – 242 Wadud’s lecture: background information 33; Beijing Global Conference for Women 37, 40; CEDAW 38 – 41; dichotomy of feminism and Islamic theology 40 – 42; divide between secular feminists and Islamists 37 – 42; gender issues work 35 – 36, 44; gender jihad in Islam 35 – 36, 49; Islamic reformist dialogue 37 – 41; Islamic theology 36 – 37; Mernissi 33, 43; Musawah movement 42 – 43; Muslima theology 42, 44; Muslim personal status laws 45; Muslim women’s movement 33 – 35, 37 – 40; overview 43 – 45; political Islam 38 – 39; pro-faith location 35 – 36, 43; secular Muslim feminists 38 – 42; SIS 40; women’s rights 34 Wanka, Johanna 62 War on Terror 18 West, Gerald 49 Widodo, Joko 251 Wielandt, Rotraut 80 Wild, Stefan 63 – 64, 79 – 80 Williams, Delores 23 womanist theology 23 woman-led prayer 26, 244

Index  267 woman-man equality in creation: biblical accounts of human creation and 90 – 92; divine creation in Qur’an and 92 – 93; generic terms used in Qur’an and 99 – 101; human creation in Qur’an and 95 – 101; meaning of Adam in Qur’an and 93 – 94; overview 8, 89 – 90; ribstory in Qur’an and 101 woman-man inequality in Islamic tradition 89 women’s activism see Southeast Asia’s women’s activism women’s image in Qur’an: criticisms of approach to studying 143 – 146; daughter’s inheritance 158 – 160; divine mercy in context of women 152 – 154; freedom and 154 – 157, 163 – 164; immanent side of Qur’an and 149 – 150; literalist understanding 142; loving mercy of God and call to freedom and self-determination 157 – 158; mercy in Qur’an and, 140 – 141, 145, 150 – 152, 167n69; open communication 158 – 160; overview 9, 140 – 141, 162 – 164; revelation of the Qur’an and 147 – 149; selectivity of verses 144; self-determination 156 – 158; theological hermeneutics 160 – 161; transcendent side of Qur’an and 142 – 143, 149 – 150; turn from object to subject 146 – 147;

type of information about 146 – 147; universal versus particular 140 – 143; verses 140 – 143 women’s organizations in Indonesia 243 – 247 women’s rights 34, 42, 237 – 240 women’s rights and human rights framework 11 – 12 women’s ritual leadership 25 – 27 women’s theology 23 Women and the Transmission of Religious Knowledge in Islam (Sayeed) 187 Yurdakul, Gökce 53 – 54 Zahid, Amal 223 – 224 Zain al-Abedin Hammad, Suhaila: ahad issue and 227 – 228; al-Rasheed’s description of 224; analyzing 230 – 231; background information 222, 225 – 227; challenging authority 227 – 230; face covering and 229; fiqh and 227; gender mixing and 227; National Society for Human Rights and 226; overview 222 – 223; success in shifting paradigm 231 – 232; voting rights for women and 227; writings of 225 – 227 Zain al-Abedin, Suhaila 11 Zaynab bint Abi Mu’awiya 207 – 208 zihar 211