Mind the European Gap: Reconciling National Politics and Supranational Policy-Making (SpringerBriefs in Political Science) 303088077X, 9783030880774

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents
About the Author
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Little Democratic Accountability and Poor Policy-making
1.2 National Public Spheres and the European Public Sphere
1.3 Learning from Past Mistakes
1.4 Theoretical Background and Conceptual Framework
1.5 The Caveats to Keep in Mind: Scope, Limitations and Opportunities
References
Chapter 2: Improving on What We Have
2.1 Linking Electoral Results and Leadership Outcomes
2.2 Subscribing to the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory
2.3 Operationalizing Constitutional Reform in Selected Member States
References
Chapter 3: Changing the Political Framework
3.1 Synchronizing National Electoral Cycles
3.2 Respecting the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory
3.3 Constitutional Amendments to Execute the Proposed Synchronization
References
Chapter 4: Attempting the Leap Forward
4.1 A Bottom-Up Reform of Europe´s Quasi-Constitutional Order
4.2 Demoicratic Theory as the Basis for Legitimate and Accountable Reform
4.3 Launching a European Constitutional Reform from the Member States
References
Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Taking Stock
5.2 Moving Forward
Index

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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITIC AL SCIENCE

Matteo Garavoglia

Mind the European Gap Reconciling National Politics and Supranational Policy-Making

SpringerBriefs in Political Science

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Matteo Garavoglia

Mind the European Gap Reconciling National Politics and Supranational Policy-Making

Matteo Garavoglia Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford Oxford, UK

ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Political Science ISBN 978-3-030-88077-4 ISBN 978-3-030-88078-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88078-1 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Orla, Luka and Milo

Preface

The European Union keeps stumbling from one crisis to the next. The 2008 financial meltdown and the ensuing economic depression, the 2015–2017 migrants and refugees emergency, the Covid-19 pandemic. Sadly, the list is likely to grow. And with every crisis, citizens become more frustrated, impatient and angry. “Europe” (whatever that might be in the collective imagination) seems unable to protect its citizens, to solve their problems and to suggest a way forward. Or so goes the narrative. While the European Union is certainly guilty of many inefficiencies, flaws and neurosis, it is unfair to blame it for all ills. The European Union is a work in process, an experiment and a construction site. The frustration that is directed at it stems to a significant extent from the extraordinary successes it achieved since the end of the Second World War. Peace is taken for granted; the most comprehensive welfare state systems in the world are seen as “the bare minimum citizens should expect” and, without much fuss, its economic model—with all its many shortcomings—has distributed prosperity more evenly than almost anywhere else on earth. Yet, citizens feel lost, do not think they have any control of the enormous forces that shape their lives, and increasingly question the benefits of democratic institutions and their governance systems. European citizens are absolutely right to be dissatisfied. Because the widening gap between where they experience political life and where policy-making takes place makes it increasingly difficult for them to hold their political leaderships democratically accountable and for policy-making to offer adequate responses to their needs and aspirations. This gap is dangerous because it breeds mistrust and misunderstandings between our countries and within our societies. This book wishes to provide some very specific suggestions as to how we might begin to narrow it again. Oxford, UK

Matteo Garavoglia

vii

Acknowledgements

This book would have never been possible without the invaluable support of some outstanding institutions and extraordinary individuals. Although this is only the beginning of a long intellectual journey, special thanks are already in order. To Professor Kalypso Nicolaïdis in her capacity as Director of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Oxford for daring to believe in this idea when it was first shared with her and for being instrumental in continuously improving it through her relentless intellectual questioning of it. To Dr. Hartmut Mayer as Director of the European Studies Centre and to my other colleagues and team at the Department of Politics and International Relations as well as at St. Antony’s College. In particular, special thanks go to Prof. Timothy Garton Ash, Prof. Andrew Hurrell, Prof. Alastair Buchan and Prof. Richard Caplan. Away from Oxford but still in academia, I am particularly in debt to Prof. Renaud Dehousse at the European University Institute, to Prof. Daniel Innerarity at the University of the Basque Country and to Dr. Heidi Maurer at the University of Bristol. Outside of academia, I shall thank all those numerous individuals from the worlds of European business, culture, politics, the media and civil society that, sometimes formally and sometimes behind the scenes, critically contributed to the launch of this project in the first place and to its ongoing successful development since it all started. They know who they are, and my most heartfelt thanks go to them all. Most importantly, a big thank you is due to my wife Suzanne and to our kids Orla, Luka and Milo. To Suzanne for putting up with my constant mood swings. And to our kids for making me laugh at the end of the day and, most importantly, for always reminding me why I embarked on this adventure, to begin with. Last but certainly not least, I wish to thank all the team at Springer and, in particular, Niko Chtouris and Parthiban Kannan for their wonderful help and support throughout the writing and publishing process.

ix

Contents

1

2

3

4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Little Democratic Accountability and Poor Policy-making . . . . . . . 1.2 National Public Spheres and the European Public Sphere . . . . . . . 1.3 Learning from Past Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Theoretical Background and Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 The Caveats to Keep in Mind: Scope, Limitations and Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

1 1 2 4 7

Improving on What We Have . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Linking Electoral Results and Leadership Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Subscribing to the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Operationalizing Constitutional Reform in Selected Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 15 . 15

Changing the Political Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Synchronizing National Electoral Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Respecting the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Constitutional Amendments to Execute the Proposed Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 29 . 29

Attempting the Leap Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 A Bottom-Up Reform of Europe’s Quasi-Constitutional Order . . . . 4.2 Demoicratic Theory as the Basis for Legitimate and Accountable Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Launching a European Constitutional Reform from the Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 43 . 43

. 10 . 12

. 19 . 22 . 27

. 34 . 37 . 41

. 46 . 48 . 55 xi

xii

5

Contents

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.1 Taking Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.2 Moving Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

About the Author

Matteo Garavoglia is Research Associate at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Oxford, Senior Research Associate at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and Senior Fellow and Director of the European Public Sphere Project: a research effort engaging top-level movers and shakers from business, media and politics to develop targeted policy-oriented proposals aimed at Europeanizing national public spheres. Previously, he was the Italy Programme Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Centre on the United States and Europe in Washington D.C. and Adjunct Professor at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. He also served as Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, as Visiting Professor at Bocconi University in Milan, as Research Fellow at the Centre d’Etudes Européennes de Sciences Po in Paris and as Research Assistant at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr. Garavoglia has been teaching or speaking at, amongst others, Harvard University, Princeton University, Columbia University and Georgetown University. His work has been published or quoted by, amongst others, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, National Interest, the Atlantic, Voice of America, ABC News, NBC News, National Public Radio, China Global Television Network, Bloomberg, Fortune, the Washington Post, Al Jazeera, Politico, Deutsche Welle, CNN, Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs. Dr. Garavoglia was educated at the University of London (BA), at the Centre d’études européennes de Sciences Po Paris (MA), and at the Freie Universität Berlin (PhD). Dr. Garavoglia lived in twelve different countries across four continents and speaks Italian, English, Spanish, French and some German.

xiii

List of Abbreviations

BVerfG CFSP EC EP EU GDP HR/VP LO LOREG MEP MP OMC RIP UK

Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) Common Foreign and Security Policy European Commission European Parliament European Union Gross Domestic Product High Representative/Vice-President Loi Organique (Organic Law) Ley Orgánica Régimen Electoral General (Organic Law General Electoral Regime) Member of the European Parliament Member of Parliament Open Method of Coordination Référendum d’Initiative Partagée (Shared Initiative Referendum) United Kingdom

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

Little Democratic Accountability and Poor Policy-making

Within the European Union (EU), the overwhelming majority of citizens still experience political life at the level of the nation-state. Policy-making in a growing number of policy areas, however, increasingly takes place at the supranational (i.e. pan-European) level. This state of affairs presents two significant challenges. On the one hand, the democratic accountability of Europe’s multi-layered governance system is called into question as most citizens engage with a political discourse at a level (i.e. the national one) that is not the same as where policy decisions are actually taken (i.e. the supranational one). On the other hand, the quality of the legislative output suffers as political leaders have an incentive to promote policies that must satisfy the demands of their respective national electorates in the short term even if doing so might have negative implications for the broader European interest in the medium to long term. In other multi-layered governance systems, the gap between the local perception of political realities and the formulation of policy-making at higher levels of governance is at least partially recomposed by the presence of a public sphere: an arena within which socio-political actors interact to develop political discourse and, eventually, transform this into policy-making. Today’s European Union, however, is characterized by the presence of deep, comprehensive and long-established national public spheres and, at most, the presence of a very thin, superficial and fragmented pan-European public sphere. In order to begin to recompose the gap between the perception of political life at the national level and the praxis of policy-making at the supranational level, a strong, deep and comprehensive pan-European public sphere must emerge to complement the national public spheres or, alternatively, existing national public spheres must begin to undergo a process of Europeanization. In this respect, Europeanization here is seen as currently taking place through a primarily top-down dynamic as exemplified by Radaelli’s understanding (Radaelli © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Garavoglia, Mind the European Gap, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88078-1_1

1

2

1 Introduction

2003). A take that is shared by Moumoutzis as this is viewed as “a process of incorporation in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes” (Moumoutzis 2011). Within this context, this manuscript will argue that the Europeanization of existing national public spheres is the way forward. More importantly, this book will draw upon liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory in general and on its five conceptual pathways as defined by Nicolaïdis in particular to provide a framework within which any specific normative proposals would have to be embedded to be translated into political reality while at the same time upholding the demoicratic ideal. Indeed, this manuscript strives to acknowledge the need to respect the democratic legitimacy of the nation-state as still understood by the overwhelming majority of citizens as the main repository of democratic legitimacy while at the same time exploring how to bring together best sovereign yet interconnected demoi. Implicitly and in light of the challenges faced today by the European project, it is argued that it is now more than ever a high time to strive to bridge the gap between academic theory and policy-making. Within this context, this book explores which conditions should be met within a liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theoretical framework for any policy proposals aiming at Europeanizing existing national public spheres to be successfully operationalized. This first chapter takes the reader through a number of steps. First, it highlights the rationale for pursuing such an endeavour within the context of existing national European public spheres. Secondly, and so as not to repeat previous mistakes, it lists some of the lessons that might be learned from the past. As a third step, it moves on to present the theoretical and conceptual background underpinning its analytical framework. Having done that, this chapter explores the scope, limitations and opportunities intrinsic in such an enterprise. In the following chapters, the book moves on by presenting three very specific policy proposals aimed at improving the quality of European democratic and policy-making processes through the Europeanization of national public spheres. Finally, the last chapter concludes by taking stock and suggesting a few tentative next steps that could be taken to translate into political reality the proposals put forward so far.

1.2

National Public Spheres and the European Public Sphere

In his 1962 seminal book on the structural transformation of the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas states that “the bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically

1.2 National Public Spheres and the European Public Sphere

3

privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labour” (Habermas 1962). While Habermas’ original understanding of the public sphere is rooted in a socio-historical account of nineteenth century’s European coffee houses, the debate has since evolved so as to encompass both the modern twentieth century European nation-state and the multi-layered governance system of the European Union. Over the last six decades, an impressive body of literature has been accumulated to explore the multifaceted dimensions of public spheres in general and within the European context in particular. While Habermas spoke favourably of a single pan-European public sphere to effectively include all European demoi (Habermas 1992, 1994a, b, 1995), Kielmansegg argued in support of fragmentation of public spheres along primarily cultural national lines (Kielmansegg 1996). An understanding that was expanded upon and even challenged by Gerhards as he championed the Europeanization of national public spheres a few years later (Gerhards 2000, 2002). In turn, his proposals were somehow criticized by Schlesigner as not sufficiently attentive to the needs of sub-groups and minorities to which he counterpoises a European sphere of different publics (Schlesinger 1997; Schlesinger and Kevin 2000; Schlesinger and Fossum 2007). Most recently, Risse provided ample empirical evidence on the role that politicization plays in shaping the very nature of still national but increasingly Europeanizing public spheres (Risse 2014). Within this context, Europe is currently witness to a growing gap between national politics and supranational policy-making. On the one hand, the average European citizen still conceives and perceives political life at the national level. When considering politics, she thinks about the politicians that populate the public discourse of the nation-state where she lives in (Duchesne and Frognier 1998; Carey 2002; Todorov and Bracher 2008; Ciaglia et al. 2018). On the other hand, policymaking is increasingly taking place at the supranational level. When having to address a variety of challenges across multiple policy domains, politicians from across Europe are forced to negotiate solutions within a European multi-layered governance system that extends well beyond the nation-state that they inhabit (Marks 1993). This disconnect leads to two dramatic consequences: an erosion of democratic accountability whereby citizens experience politics at the national level while policy-making is taking place at the European one; and poor policy-making whereby political elites have an incentive to promote policies that, while possibly being perceived as beneficial for their nation-state, might also very well be detrimental to the broader European interest. Because of this, European elites are consistently torn between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, they need to provide policy answers that are often effective only when delivered through a pan-European approach. On the other hand, they need to be accountable for the conflicting instances that come from their individual national constituencies. Within political communities, the gap between politics and policy-making is, to a significant extent, narrowed by the existence of an overarching public sphere (Arendt 1958): an arena within which socio-political actors interact with each other, nurture political discourse and, eventually, give birth to policy-making

4

1 Introduction

(Habermas 1962). Today, however, Europe is characterized by the presence of multiple and very substantive national public spheres coupled with at most a partial and substantively much more limited pan-European public sphere that could never claim to be even remotely as significant as the national ones (Risse 2010). Within this context, the existence of national public spheres contributes to the fostering of political discourse and policies that are, by their very nature, primarily national. While public spheres are a fundamental pillar of each political community and historically played a crucial role in nurturing democratic life and policy-making within the Westphalian nation-state system, in their present format, they might no longer be able to adequately sustain meaningful democratic dialogue and effective policy-making within the European Union. The economic downturn in Europe that was triggered by the 2008 financial crisis, the 2015–2016 European migrant and refugee emergency and the mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic are three cases on point: challenges that would have required a Europe-wide policy response failed to witness a coherent and effective pan-European reaction due to the fact that national political elites consistently had to follow the frequently contradictory political discourses that were emerging within disconnected national public spheres. Europe’s governance system has already moved well beyond the nation-state to embrace increasingly multi-layered dimensions (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2004). Because of this, the public spheres through which citizens partake in democratic discourse and shape policy-making must also evolve. Nurturing the evolution of our national public spheres toward a more Europeanized dimension is particularly important within an historical context whereby nationalist, populist and xenophobic political forces are calling for a retreat within the nation-state as a means to address these challenges. While this book rejects this approach both on empirical and normative grounds, it does acknowledge the legitimate concerns that underlay this proposed withdrawal. We do have a problem but retrenching within the nation-state is not the solution. This manuscript, therefore, suggests a different approach: one where the democratic legitimacy of the nation-state is the starting point for the Europeanization of the national public sphere through a bottom-up approach. The aim of this book is, therefore, to investigate which conditions, within a theoretical framework embedded within liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory, should be fulfilled to offer practical policy recommendations to Europeanize national public spheres to contribute narrowing the gap between national politics and supranational policy-making.

1.3

Learning from Past Mistakes

Before moving forward and without necessarily inferring about the future, it might be wise to look back to learn from the past. Given the sorry state of affairs that the European project finds itself mired in, intellectuals, academics, policy-makers, business leaders and opinion-makers should ask themselves what they got wrong when trying to translate their intellectual aspirations into policy initiatives.

1.3 Learning from Past Mistakes

5

Acknowledging current realities as they are (as opposed to how we would like them to be) is crucial if we are to stand a chance to bring about meaningful change. First, we might consider obsessing less about Brussels. For too long, whenever thinking about reforming the European Union and moving forward the integration process, a tendency existed to consider Brussels as the right place to go to bring about change. However, this is not wise on at least two accounts. Firstly, because an excessive focus on Brussels fails to acknowledge the current situation: whether we like it or not, it is the nation-state, rather than the supranational dimension, that still gives political meaning to the overwhelming majority of citizens’ lives. Secondly, because going through Brussels exponentially multiplies the number of stakeholders that can block any reform process: any decision requiring unanimity at the European level often enables a single actor to veto any proposal. Indeed, each one of the four avenues designed to reform the European treaties involves at a certain stage the possibility for any single member state of the Union to de facto veto any proposed reform (by either explicitly doing so or by refusing to complete the ratification process for the reform in question).1 Going through Brussels to reform our political communities flies in the face of both democratic principles and political savviness. In order to avoid this multiple veto-system, we might wish to explore how to act through individual member states while at the same time still impacting the broader European dimension. Second, we might wish to stop asking citizens to “think through a European perspective” when going to cast their vote in the elections for the European Parliament. Again, there are at least two reasons whereby this might be a good idea. On the one hand, because citizens do not think through a European perspective. Why should they? It took most European nation-states centuries and a lot of hard work (through military conscription, mass literacy campaigns, nationalist propaganda, etc.) to turn individuals at first loyal only to local communities into citizens also devoted to the nation-state. One cannot now expect those very same citizens suddenly (i.e. in a matter of a few decades) seamlessly to re-wire their political identities into new constructs underpinned by a shared understanding of European citizenship. That will possibly happen. But it will be a gradual process that might well take many more decades if not centuries and will probably entail the nurturing of multi-layered identities (i.e. regional, national and European ones) for each citizen with, at most, a “European identity lite” (Risse 2010). On the other hand, the very moment citizens were to start to think of themselves as primarily Europeans (on top of citizens of the nation-state and members of regional communities within the nation-state), nationalists, xenophobes and populists would suddenly find it much harder to frame their questionable political discourses (Wodak and Boukala 2015). Within this context, we might have to refer to the governance system of the nation-state (that the average

1

The four avenues available as outlined in the Treaty of Lisbon being the Ordinary Revision procedure (ORP), the Simplified Revision Procedure (SRP), the general “passerelle clause” and the accession treaties.

6

1 Introduction

citizen is most familiar with) as the blueprint through which she can understand and influence the broader process of European integration. Third, we might consider taking advantage of confusion and misunderstandings rather than keep fighting them unsuccessfully. Let us acknowledge the fact that, aside from a tiny minority, the overwhelming majority of Europeans often have little idea which institution is responsible for which policy area within the multi-layered governance system that the European Union is today (Magnette 2003). When we listen to people calling for national governments to negotiate trade deals or for Europe to take military action then we know that confusion reigns supreme. Mass public educational campaigns could theoretically, in time, educate citizens by explaining that trade policy is (primarily although not only) handled by the European Commission and that defence is a policy area overwhelmingly (although no longer only) under the aegis of national governments. Yet, who would sponsor those mass educational campaigns? The national politicians that take advantage of the current situation by being able to take credit for the good times while at the same time blaming “Europe” for anything unpopular? (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Unlikely. Rather, we should acknowledge that intellectual confusion is likely to remain the dominant state of affairs in both European governance and people’s minds. And then we should make the most of this chaos. If we acknowledge that complexity is often used as an excuse to provide simple but false solutions that appeal to citizens (Innerarity 2016), then we must attempt to frame in equally appealing simple terms our proposals while at the same time striving to stick to intellectually honest solutions. Fourth, we might rethink a multi-speed Europe beyond the constraints of history and geography so as to turn the concept into an opportunity for all member states. While the logic of a Kerneuropa (core Europe) as advocated by Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble holds an obvious appeal in Carolingian Europe, this is, for equally understandable reasons, opposed by more peripheral member states (Lamers and Schäuble 1994). While a multi-speed Europe is already a political reality, it could be argued that this is at times tied to almost inescapable geographic considerations. Because of this, any way forward must explore and involve reform proposals where the differing geographies, histories and administrative capacities of the various member states could not plausibly be considered as valid reasons to exclude any of them from joining a political vanguard across policy realms or, possibly, institutional arrangements. Finally, and while not necessarily discounting them a priori, we must be aware of the challenges that enhanced cooperation and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) entail as possible means of addressing the obstacles we face. The former allows for at least one-third of member states to move forward by sharing a common approach in one policy domain (with the exception of foreign policy) within the framework of the EU institutions. The latter relies on voluntary commitments and informal peer pressure to get member states to deepen their cooperation in a policy area. Both approaches come with significant challenges. Enhanced cooperation because it would still require, post-Brexit, at least nine member states to take part for it to come into force: a threshold likely to frustrate the ambitions of the most

1.4 Theoretical Background and Conceptual Framework

7

reformist member states.2 The Open Method of Coordination because, lacking meaningful sanction mechanisms, could tie into negotiations more reformist member states to less reformist ones without providing the former with tools to hold the latter accountable for their progress (or lack thereof). Enhanced cooperation could be an option only in as far as the number of member states involved was to be set at a minimum of nine (both before or after Brexit), but would not be legally viable if one were to think to focus the attention on a significantly smaller number of countries. The Open Method of Coordination could possibly stand a better chance of succeeding if this were to be limited to two to three member states that find themselves politically and ideologically closely aligned within the framework of a specific policy proposal. Legally binding arrangements between member states, on the other hand, are the tools through which the process of European integration has historically moved forward.

1.4

Theoretical Background and Conceptual Framework

Different understandings of the concept of public sphere have been presented over the years ranging from Jürgen Habermas single discursive public sphere (Habermas 1992) to Charles Taylor’s multiple and segmented communalist or multiculturalist public spheres (Taylor 1992). However, to fulfil its ambition and in line with the thinking of Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum (Eriksen and Fossum 2001) and Thomas Risse (Risse 2010), this book gives primacy to the Europeanization of national public spheres. In normative terms, there are three reasons to think that the Europeanization of already existing national public spheres might be the most desirable aim to pursue. To begin with, because the overwhelming majority of European citizens still view the nation-state (with its associated national public sphere) as the most legitimate setting for the synthesizing of political discourse. In democratic terms, it is, therefore, appropriate to root within national public spheres the source of political interaction. An understanding that might be aligned with broader concepts promoted by liberal intergovernmental demoicratic theory (Moravcsik 1997).3 Secondly, because while a very “thin” pan-European public sphere might be in the making and could even be normatively encouraged to complement the existing national public spheres, for the foreseeable future, such a pan-European public sphere is bound to be limited to a very privileged set of individuals, to very specific professional contexts and to very clearly defined socio-cultural contexts (Eder 2003). Thirdly, because most empirical studies dedicated to investigating communication within and across European public spheres seem to be increasingly coming to the

2

As outlined in article 20 of the Treaty on the European Union and articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 3 Admittedly, a debate on this is still ongoing between Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis.

8

1 Introduction

shared conclusion that attempts at Europeanizing national public discourses are more likely to succeed than experiments aiming at forging a brand-new pan-European public sphere that would be “dropped from above” on top of existing national public spheres (Kevin 2004). Within the context presented above, any interventions that could be proposed must be underpinned by a conceptual framework that rests heavily on a number of theoretical and analytical contributions made by Kalypso Nicolaïdis within her broader work on European demoicracy (Nicolaïdis 2003). This is conceived as “a union of peoples governing together but not as one” (Nicolaïdis 2013) and rests on a Kantian understanding of the European Union as a potential federal union rather than a federal state (Nicolaïdis 2012). In particular, any possible proposals aimed at nurturing the Europeanization of national public spheres would have to follow the five conceptual pathways proper of liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory presented by Nicolaïdis (2018). First, the acknowledgement that, while in time a thin supranationalist pan-European demos might emerge, for the time being, national demoi still look at the nation-state as the source of democratic legitimacy underpinning major policy decisions. Within this understanding, Europe’s democratic credentials rest therefore on the extent to which the nation-state is allowed to perform its legitimate function of aggregator of political preferences. Indeed, European peoples (demoi) exist in light of this process. Because of this, all reform proposals should strive as a minimum not to harm the democratic fabric of the European’s Union’s constituting national democracies. Framed with this caveat, any possible proposals would then be less likely to unsuccessfully demand citizens of the nation-state to think of themselves as Europeans, therefore overcoming one of the challenges mentioned earlier on. Second, the understanding that all types of horizontal transnational networks (political, social, cultural, etc.) must be given a key normative role in framing political discourse along with the more traditional and established state-centred, administrative and governmental national networks (Slaughter 2017). A focus on democratic interdependence is crucial within this context as it acknowledges that the processing of political discourse that contributes to shape one demos inevitably contributes to influence and shape the other demoi through a process of “otherregardingness” or legal empathy (Nicolaïdis 2017). The implication here being that civil society must, whenever possible, be empowered to give substance and voice to the instances expressed by its stakeholders (Sternberg et al. 2017). Avoiding the mistake of “instinctively rushing to Brussels” mentioned earlier is in this respect crucial to allow for a greater focus on nurturing horizontal transnational networks. Third, the question of cratos must be addressed: how can institutional frameworks deal with power asymmetries that might lead to both vertical and horizontal patterns of domination? Here the challenge is certainly both vertical and horizontal (Nicolaïdis 2018) but, also, internal to each and every European demos. Whenever possible, European institutions should be prevented from subjugating national sovereignties while larger member states should be put in no position to dominate smaller member states. At the same time, in an ideal demoicratic world, the cratos within the nation-state would constantly engage in a continuous and respectful

1.4 Theoretical Background and Conceptual Framework

9

dialogue with its own demos. While the trap constituted by the “instinctive rush to Brussels” highlighted earlier must be avoided, on a selective basis, Brussels could become the national demos’ best friend. By engaging with Brussels on specific issues, the various national demoi can seek ad hoc support from the European dimension to fend off attempts at both vertical and horizontal patterns of domination within and between the nation-state. Fourth, the commitment to allow separate but interconnected sovereignties to sustain meaningful democratic discourse and policy-making interaction over time (Cheneval and Nicolaïdis 2016). A pledge, this one, that must go hand in hand with an effort to continuously beware of institutional attempts (both supranational and intergovernmental ones) to shut down the legitimate avenues that must be available to socio-political actors to question decisions previously taken. Within this context, demoicratic theory would seem to welcome the presence of any of those institutional mechanisms that would allow interconnected demoi to modify and even reverse any policy decisions previously taken by the Union through the intrinsic reversibility of sunset clauses. We must therefore acknowledge that legally binding mechanisms enshrined into law, rather than enhanced cooperation or open methods of coordination, might be the most effective way forward to protect the right of our demoi to modify or even reverse policy decisions. Fifth, the idea that different narratives embedded within national discourses as to what Europe is and how it should develop coexist and must dialectically grow together (Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010; McNamara 2015). Here the only constant being one of all Europeans being “united in their diversity”4 in a shared commitment to an ever-evolving understanding of their separate yet interconnected identities. Again, demoicratic theory argues in favour of a constant questioning of what Europe is or should become. The underlying assumption here being that what is being questioned is not the fact that different but interconnected demoi must engage with one another to shape their shared futures but, rather, those different understandings of the present and wishes for the future must continually interact to enrich each other. Within this context, public discourses and political narratives might not set us free from the constraints of history but might, at least, set us free from the constraints of geography beyond Kerneuropa. These five conceptual pathways would have to guide any normative proposals aimed at nurturing the Europeanization of national public spheres because, in Nicolaïdis’ words, “a normative theory of sustainable integration would connect the evolving nature of the constitutional settlement with its social foundations, incorporating some of the original intuitions of the neo-functionalists on informal integration but freed from their teleological overtone” (Nicolaïdis 2018). Ultimately, this book advocates that any tangible and actionable reform proposals must always nurture the demoicratic ideal (Nicolaïdis 2017) whereby horizontally intertwined polities pursue vertical transfers of sovereignty only in as so far as these are necessary to promote and sustain European demoicracy and policy-making. 4

“Unity in diversity” already being the official motto of the European Union.

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1.5

1 Introduction

The Caveats to Keep in Mind: Scope, Limitations and Opportunities

The implementation of tangible proposals to nurture the Europeanization of national public spheres through an operationalization of liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory is bound to face the usual trade-off between breadth and depth: focusing on all member states of the Union but working on these only superficially, or concentrating on only a few selected countries but in far greater depth. Faced with this dilemma, it might be wise to opt for the latter and limit one’s scope to only four member states: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. There are both more and less obvious reasons to choose these specific four member states. As it is immediately apparent, these member states are the most important ones within the European Union according to a number of objective criteria. To begin with, they have the largest populations (as of 1 January 2021, accounting for 257,246,400 people out of a total of 447,007,600). In other words, they make up almost 57.6% of the total population for the post-Brexit EU27 (Eurostat 2021a). Secondly, they have the most significant Gross Domestic Products (as of the1 January 2021, Euro 8,412,333 out of a total out of Euro 13,348,749 for the EU27). This is equivalent to almost 63.1% of the European Union’s GDP (Eurostat 2021b). Thirdly, they have the most votes within both the Council of Ministers and the European Council whereby they make up just over 14.8% of the total number of member states (4 out of 27) but account for over 57.6% of the votes (Council of the European Union 2021). This is important under the “double majority rule” whereby a qualified majority is reached if 55% of member states (i.e. 15 out of 27 member states after the United Kingdom left the European Union) representing at least 65% of the total EU population vote in favour of a proposal if this has been presented by the European Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy qualified NB: The threshold for the number of member states is raised to 72% (i.e. 20 out of 27 member states of the European Union) if the proposal has not been presented by the European Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in a reinforced qualified majority vote. Finally, these countries boost the most Members of the European Parliament (for a total of 310 Members of the European Parliament MEPs out of a total of 705 MEPs since February 2020). This is equal to almost 44% of the total number of MEPs (European Parliament 2021).5 The fact that these are the four largest member states of the European Union in demographic terms is certainly appealing as it makes it possible to concentrate on the greatest possible number of citizens with only four units of analysis. This is to be welcomed as long as the five conceptual pathways proper of liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory in general and the one pertaining to the cratos’ tendency to seek patterns of horizontal domination, in particular, are respected.

5

This also includes the speaker of the European Parliament who normally does not cast her vote.

1.5 The Caveats to Keep in Mind: Scope, Limitations and Opportunities

11

On a less obvious but possibly more significant note, there is another and more pertinent reason to focus on these countries: these four member states are characterized by the presence of national public spheres that are somewhat relatively more similar to one another than those of other member states of the European Union. Indeed, the national public spheres of countries such as the United Kingdom (pre-Brexit), Sweden or Poland consistently display more variation and more heterogeneous characteristics than those of France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Within this context, a whole set of empirical studies have repeatedly highlighted that, while all differing in a number of aspects from one another, some national public spheres seem to be more Europeanized and interconnected to each other than those of other member states (Risse 2014). A point, this one, also brilliantly illustrated through comprehensive empirical analysis by Koopmans and Statham from a more sociological perspective (Koopmans and Statham 2010). Recommendations aimed at operationalizing liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory to nurture the Europeanization of national public spheres will therefore focus on these countries not only because they are particularly significant in demographic terms. Rather, these member states have been selected because they already display national public spheres with relatively more similar characteristics than other countries. They could, therefore, more likely to respond in relatively similar ways to any policy proposals that could eventually be put forward. In this respect, this book does not seek to look at the four member states in question as case studies to evaluate the five conceptual pathways proper of intergovernmental demoicratic theory. Rather, it argues for the implementation of any future possible policy proposals that are respectful of the five conceptual pathways to focus on these four member states, to begin with. This approach must not be understood as an endorsement of a “multi-speed Europe” approach but, rather more modestly, simply as an acknowledgement of the need to concentrate our available energies first and foremost on those member states that stand a better chance of positively responding to our policy proposals. While seeking to nurture the Europeanization of national public spheres and, possibly in due time, the development of a complementary pan-European public sphere, another constraint that one must deal with are the constraints posed by the already existing national public spheres. By their very own essence, diverse national public spheres display different temporal windows of political opportunity. The conditions might be in place to promote a specific reform proposal today in France, tomorrow in Germany, next month in Italy and next year in Spain. Because of this, and perhaps counterintuitively, it must be feasible to successfully operationalize any selected reform proposals on a national basis independently of the progress (or lack thereof) that might be experienced in other member states. Indeed, no policy proposal should a priori be blocked from being successfully implemented in a specific member state because of lack of support for it in another one. Doing so would disrespect a key tenet of liberal intergovernmental demoicratic theory whereby the democratic legitimacy of the European Union rests on the strength of the democratic processes within individual countries. Furthermore, all proposals presented must always strive to secure the widest possible support from a broad range of key movers and shakers from across the

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1 Introduction

political spectrum. Crucially, this is not about anodyne proclamations about the need for widespread buy-in for a broad spectrum of stakeholders. Rather, because translating proposals into policies might take a significant period of time within which leadership positions might be occupied in turn by different socio-political actors, it is imperative for these to be shared and welcomed across the political spectrum so as to increase the likelihood of these being implemented despite changes at the top in the realms of business, politic and media. Cross-party support in parliament or buy-in from the broadest number of business leaders and civil society actors is to be sought at all times. Last but not least, any proposed reforms would have to take place across national public spheres over a period of time that goes well beyond the political life expectancy of those individuals currently in leadership positions. Because of this, the implementation of any proposals requires nurturing relationships with selected personalities that might be willing and able to advocate for these across both time and space. These selected individuals must be interested in macro-political historical processes rather than merely in current affairs, and they must enjoy relatively easy access to the very highest echelons of power, they must have secure and independent socio-professional positions in their own right and, finally, they must be willing and able to deploy some of their reputational capital to facilitate the implementation of these reform proposals by feeding them to the ruling political leaderships of the four member states in question.

References Arendt H (1958) The human condition. Chicago University Press, Chicago Carey S (2002) Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration? Eur Union Polit 3(4):387–413 Cheneval F, Nicolaïdis K (2016) The social construction of demoicracy in the EU. Eur J Polit Theory 16(2):235–260 Ciaglia S, Fuest C, Heinemann F. (2018) What a feeling?! How to promote European identity. EconPol Policy Report 9. https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2018-10/EconPol_Policy_ Report_9_2018_European_Identity.pdf. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Council of the European Union (2021) Voting calculator. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ council-eu/voting-system/voting-calculator/ Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Duchesne S, Frognier AP (1998) Is there a European identity? In: Niedermayer O, Sinnott R (eds) Public opinion and internationalized governance. Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford, pp 193–226 Eder K (2003) Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie. In: Jachtenfuchs M, Kohler-Koch B (eds) Europäische Integration. Springer, Opladen, pp 85–120 Eriksen EO, Fossum JE (2001) Democracy through strong publics in the European Union? ARENA Working Paper Series 16. https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arenaworking-papers/2001-2010/2001/wp01_16.htm. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 European Parliament (2021) Distribution of seats in the European Parliament. https://www. europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180126STO94114/infographic-how-manyseats-does-each-country-get-in-in-the-european-parliament. Accessed 6 Aug 2021

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Eurostat (2021a) Population of the European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title¼File:Table1-Demographic-balance-2020.png. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Eurostat (2021b) Gross domestic product. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NAMA_ 10_GDP/default/table?lang¼en. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Gerhards J (2000) Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. In: Bach M (ed) Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften, Sonderheft 40 der KÖlner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Wiesbaden, pp 277–305 Gerhards J (2002) Das Öffentlichkeitsdefizit der EU im Horizont normativer Öffentlichkeitstheorien. In: Kaelble H, Kirsch M, Schmidt-Gernig A (eds) Transnationale Öffentlichkeit und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert. Campus, Frankfurt a. M., pp 135–158 Habermas J (1962) Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin Habermas J (1992) Further reflections on the public sphere. In: Calhoun C (ed) Habermas and the public sphere. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Habermas J (1994a) Citizenship and national identity. In: Van Steenbergen B (ed) The condition of citizenship. Sage, Newbury Park Habermas J (1994b) Struggles for recognition in the democratic constitutional state. Princeton University Press, Princeton Habermas J (1995) Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe need a constitution’? Eur Law J 3:303–307 Hobolt S, Tilley J (2014) Blaming Europe? Responsibility without accountability in the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hooghe L, Marks G (2001) Multi-level governance and European integration. Rowman and Littlefield, Boulder, CO Hooghe L, Marks G (2004) Contrasting visions of multilevel governance? In: Bache I, Flinders M (eds) Multi-level governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 15–30 Innerarity D (2016) For a complex democracy - save liberal democracy. https://www. danielinnerarity.es/opinion-preblog-2017/for-a-complex-democracy/. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Kevin D (2004) Europe in the media: a comparison of reporting, representation and rhetoric in national media systems in Europe. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London Kielmansegg P (1996) Integration und Demokratie. In: Jachtenfuchs M, Kohler-Koch B (eds) Europaeische Integration. Leske und Budrich, Opladen Koopmans R, Statham P (eds) (2010) The making of a European public sphere - media discourse and political contention. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Lacroix J, Nicolaïdis K (eds) (2010) European stories. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lamers K, Schäuble W (1994) Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik. https://www. bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/schaeuble-lamers-papier-1994.pdf?__ blob¼publicationFile&v¼1. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Magnette P (2003) European governance and civic participation: beyond elitist citizenship? Polit Stud 51(1):144–160 Marks G (1993) Structural policy and multi-level governance in the EC. In: Cafruny A, Rosenthal G (eds) The state of the European Community: the Maastricht debate and beyond. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO McNamara KR (2015) The politics of everyday Europe: constructing authority in the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford Moravcsik A (1997) Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics. Int Organ 51(4):513–553 Moumoutzis K (2011) Still fashionable yet useless? Addressing problems with research on the europeanisation of foreign policy. J Common Mark Stud 49(3):607–629 Nicolaïdis K (2003) Our European demoi-cracy: is this constitution a third way for Europe? In: Nicolaïdis K, Weatherill S (eds) Whose Europe? National models and the constitution of the European Union. Oxford University Press, Oxford

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Nicolaïdis K (2012) The idea of European demoicracy. In: Dickson J, Eleftheriadis P (eds) Philosophical foundations of European Union law. Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford Nicolaïdis K (2013) European demoicracy and its crisis. J Common Mark Stud 51(2):351 Nicolaïdis K (2017) Mutual recognition: promise and denial, from sapiens to Brexit. Curr Legal Prob 70(1):1–40 Nicolaïdis K (2018) Braving the waves? Europe’s constitutional settlement at twenty. J Common Mark Stud 56(7):1614–1630 Radaelli C (2003) Policy transfer in the European Union: institutional isomorphism as a source of legitimacy. Governance 13(1):25–43 Risse T (2010) A community of Europeans? Transnational identities and public spheres. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Risse T (ed) (2014) European public spheres: politics is back. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Schlesinger P (1997) From cultural deference to political culture: media, politics and collective identity in the European Union. Media Cult Soc 19(3):369–391 Schlesinger P, Fossum J (eds) (2007) The European Union and the public sphere. A communicative space in the making? Routledge, London Schlesinger P, Kevin D (2000) Can the European Union become a sphere of publics? In: Eriksen E, Fossum J (eds) Democracy in the European Union. Integration through deliberation? Routledge, London Slaughter AM (2017) The chessboard and the web: strategies of connection in a networked world. Yale University Press, New Haven Sternberg C, Gartzou-Katsouyanni K, Nicolaïdis K (2017) Mutual recognition lost: the GrecoGerman affair in the Euro-crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London Taylor C (1992) Modernity and the rise of the public sphere. The Tanner lectures on human values. Stanford University, Stanford, 25 February 1992 Todorov T, Bracher N (2008) European identity. South Cent Rev 25(3):3–15 Wodak R, Boukala S (2015) European identities and the revival of nationalism in the European Union: a discourse historical approach. J Lang Polit 14(1):87–109

Chapter 2

Improving on What We Have

2.1

Linking Electoral Results and Leadership Outcomes

A first proposal envisions a state of affairs whereby a member state would pass legislation that would legally compel it to nominate its candidate for the post of European Commissioner from within the pool of individuals that have been elected as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) within its national constituency. At the same time, this proposal also suggests a reform that would compel the member state in question to support the leader of the European political group or coalition that obtained the most seats within the European Parliament as the country’s candidate for the posts of both President of the European Commission and President of the European Council.1 This reform would bring about a number of positive results when it comes to both the quality of the democratic process and of policymaking across the European Union’s multi-layered governance system. The aspects of this proposal pertaining to the election of the national candidate to the post of European Commissioner would nurture a stronger bond between the various national demoi and the European Commission. To begin with, citizens would know that the leader of the electoral list of the national party or coalition that were to obtain the most seats in the country’s European elections would likely become the country’s candidate for the post of European Commissioner. They would, therefore, more easily understand how their vote in the European elections is translated into a tangible political outcome. This is a far cry from the current situation whereby the national candidate for the post of European Commissioner is selected behind closed doors through party negotiations well after the elections for the European Parliament have taken place.2 The innovation proposed by this reform

1

A similar proposal was outlined by the then President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek in a speech given at Humboldt University in Berlin on the 22 March 2010. 2 Once appointed as Commissioners, national candidates are supposed to work exclusively in the interest of the Union as a whole and to leave their national interests behind. In reality, that is rarely © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Garavoglia, Mind the European Gap, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88078-1_2

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would be conceptually similar to what currently happens at the national level following parliamentary elections, and it would therefore be easy to understand and support for most citizens.3 Another positive result of this reform would be to provide the European Commission with a significantly enhanced degree of democratic legitimacy. This would be the case for two reasons. On the one hand, because the national candidate to the post of Commissioner would command the public support of the citizens that have nominated her through the European elections in the member states where she comes from. On the other hand, because she could also count on the direct support of those MEPs that would have been elected to the European Parliament as candidates of the national list that she would have led to victory.4 With such a system in place, there would be little room left for populist or nationalist parties to claim that the European Commission lacks any democratic legitimacy. Indeed, the Commission would be granted its legitimacy through both a national and a European mandate. Finally, a reform whereby the leader of the national party list or coalition that wins the elections for the European Parliament automatically becomes the member state’s candidate for the position of Commissioner would also enhance the cohesion and the esprit de corps of the European Commission itself. This would be the case because a newly-appointed Commissioner would have had months (if not years) to build strong relationships with politically like-minded movers and shakers from across Europe. This would have happened through the meetings organized by pan-European political groups across the continent, through her networking efforts for being chosen as the lead candidate for the national party list and through her engagement in the electoral campaign for the European Parliament. Within this context, newly-appointed Commissioners from other member states that would have also adopted these proposals would have been culturally and politically “Europeanized” through a similar process. Sitting together in the College of Commissioners, these individuals would therefore share an esprit de corps that could give greater internal cohesion to the Commission. This is not currently the case as individuals with virtually no European experience or contacts are often “parachuted”

the case. Throughout their time in office, Commissioners frequently continue to display a particular sensitivity for their national constituencies. The proposed reform would therefore acknowledge the reality of this state of affairs and, rather than ignoring it, provide European citizens with better tools to exert democratic control over it. 3 In a context whereby citizens always expect the winner of the electoral contest to assume a position of leadership within a formal institutional framework (for instance by becoming a minister in government). 4 This would be the case because, having taken place on the exact same day (see next chapter), the elections for the national parliament and for the European Parliament would most likely provide a similar electoral outcome whereby the party or coalition that obtained the most votes in the national elections would also have obtained the most votes in the European elections.

2.1 Linking Electoral Results and Leadership Outcomes

17

to Brussels by their national executives solely in light of domestic political considerations (European Union 2016).5 The element of this reform pertaining to the election of the President of the European Commission (who would double as the President of the European Council) would also bring about a number of significant positive implications. To begin with, this amendment would turn the member state in question into a guarantor of European demoicratic life. By acknowledging that the collective will of all European demoi, as expressed conjointly through the elections for the European Parliament, should be respected, the member state in question would implicitly recognize that the democratic legitimacy of the European Union as a whole rest on the sovereignty communally granted to it by independent but interconnected European demoi. As currently stated by the treaties, the European Council is legally bound to take into account the results of the European elections before proposing by qualified majority a candidate for the post of President of the European Commission. The European Parliament has then the right to approve or reject the nomination (European Union 2016).6 The “institutional coup d’état” engineered through the Spitzenkandidaten process in the run up to the 2014 elections that witnessed European parties putting forward their own candidates for the post of President of the European Commission had no firm legal basis in itself and rested upon the shaky legal ground provided by the treaties.7 Because of this, national governments were later easily able to reverse this innovation.8 By making it legally binding for a member state only to support the leader of the European party or coalition that obtained the most seats within the European Parliament for the position of President of the European Commission, this provision would turn the member state in question into a guarantor of the shared will of the European demoi. Another positive result of this reform would be to strengthen the institutional bond between the member state(s) that would have signed up to this proposal and the European Parliament. This would be the case on two accounts. On the one hand, the member state in question would enhance the relevance of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the European Council by being compelled by its own constitution to uphold the principle that only a democratically elected MEP could be appointed as President of the European Commission. On the other hand, the European Parliament could strengthen the bargaining power of the member state in question vis-à-vis those member states that would have not (yet) signed up to this proposal by refusing to give its consent for the European Council to appoint the new European Commission unless the member state’s candidate for Commissioner is accepted by the other 5

Article 17 of the Consolidated Treaty on the European Union specifically mentions that individuals considered for the role of Commissioners should have previously displayed a “European commitment”. 6 Again, as per Article 17 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. 7 By many accounts, this was engineered by some of the most pro-European individuals within the European Parliament, the European Commission and some national governments by going against the wishes of some extraordinarily influential figures such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. 8 As they de facto did following the European elections of May 2019.

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member states. Within this context, any increase in the number of member states that were to adopt this proposal would strengthen both the position of the European Parliament versus the European Council as well as the position of those member states that support this reform vis-à-vis those that do not. The reform proposed would however go well-beyond the current state of affairs by making it legally binding for a member state to support the same individual for the roles of both President of the European Commission and President of the European Council.9 By doing so, this proposal would contribute to the possible establishment of the new institutional role of the facto President of the European Union. While each willing member state could independently submit itself to the constraint of such a provision, its eventual implementation would not require any reform of the European treaties. That is the case because the treaties currently only state that the President of the European Commission cannot hold any national office. They do not forbid the cumulating of two or more positions at the European level. Indeed, Europe is already witnessed to a similar arrangement with the “double-hat” worn by Josep Borrell in his twin role as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, at the same time, Vice President of the European Commission. As it is already the case for the HR/VP, it would already be legally possible to have the same individual to hold the titles of both President of the European Commission and President of the European Council without having to go through any legal changes at the European level. This state of affairs would promote a number of positive developments. To begin with, it would make it easier for citizens to have a clearer understanding of “who is in charge”: the same name and face would come up on television screens whenever the media talk about Europe. Crucially, this would be the case irrespectively of whether an issue was to be handled by the European Council or the European Commission. By doubling her or his media exposure, the new de facto President of the European Union would stand a good chance to become a household name. That is currently not the case: the overwhelming majority of European citizens would struggle to name the President of the European Council or the President of the European Commission (let alone the President of the European Parliament). We surely have a problem in terms of democratic accountability when citizens cannot name the individuals in charge of the three most important institutions of the European Union. Such development would therefore make it easier for citizens to identify which individuals (and political parties) should be held accountable for Europe’s political course. This is something that we should not easily dismiss as Europe should be about collective accountability as much as shared proposals. Still on a positive note, the European Union would finally have a primus inter pares to represent it in international fora. Avoiding the pathetic show of institutional clumsiness whereby multiple “presidents of Europe” take it in turns to meet the president of a third country, the de facto President of the European Union would be

9

As suggested by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in his State of the Union address on the 13 September 2017.

2.2 Subscribing to the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory

19

far more likely to be taken seriously by the leaders of other global powers. While such a reform in itself would not lead to greater European cohesiveness on the global stage, it would still have positive repercussions. On the one hand, it would provide a semblance of unity in a context where symbolism matters. On the other hand, it would put additional pressure on European capitals to frame a more genuinely common foreign and security policy. Last but not least, the creation of a de facto new job profile could provide a formidable opportunity to help turning the two possible developments mentioned above into self-fulfilling prophecies. In the early years of the reform, the prime ministers of smaller member states could rightly look at the possibility of becoming the President of the European Union as the ultimate goal of their political careers. Even a President of the European Union with very limited powers compared to his American or Chinese counterparts would still be more influential, prestigious and powerful than the prime minister of a small or medium European state. In due time and as the role might evolve, even the leaders of the most influential countries in Europe could think about the position as the true climax of their political careers. Indeed, the more national leaders were to want to become the President of the European Union, the more prestige, influence and relevance the position itself would assume over time.

2.2

Subscribing to the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory

This proposal would also subscribe to the five conceptual pathways of liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory for a variety of reasons. To begin with, this reform would respect the principle according to which the democratic legitimacy of the European Union as a whole rest on the legitimacy and accountability that each national demos accords to it (Nicolaïdis 2018). This would be the case because the decision on whether or not to support this reform would be taken autonomously by the nation-state in question without having been inflicted by the European institutions through a vertical imposition. The demos would therefore remain pouvoir constituant as a collective under the state and take normative precedence over the supranational dimension. Within this context, the provision whereby the various national demoi should be equipped with instruments to manage their democratic interdependence (Nicolaïdis 2017) would also be strengthened by this proposal. This would be the case because, to guarantee her own political survival outside her member state of origin, each newly-appointed national Commissioner would need to broaden her appeal to both ideologically like-minded Commissioners from other member states and to MEPs of her own political persuasion that have been elected through national party lists in countries other than her own (therefore possibly engaging with the general public across member states). Such state of affairs would provide national civil societies

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with two important avenues through which they could advance their positions while at the same time counterbalancing the more traditional cooperation patterns established by their respective governments and bureaucratic structures. On the one hand, transnational non-state actors could cooperate across borders by reaching out to their own respective national Commissioners to ask them to forge political alliances with ideologically like-minded Commissioners. On the other hand, they could also work together to encourage MEPs that sit in the same party but in other national contingents within the European Parliament to ask them to broaden the political pressure on a specific Commissioner. This proposed reform would therefore help to give a greater normative voice to transnational non-state actors by taking advantage of the democratic interdependence that would be experienced by the Commissioners themselves. As an additional benefit, the dangers posed by the pitfalls of domination intrinsic of cratos (Nicolaïdis 2018) could also, at least to some extent, be mitigated through this proposal. Both vertical patterns of domination involving the European institutions vis-à-vis the member states as well as horizontal patterns of domination between member states themselves could be reined in as soon as national Commissioners sharing a similar ideological background would come together in an informal caucus within the European Commission. These Commissioners would share a concomitance of their ideological backgrounds, the support of their MEPs within the European Parliament and, possibly, the backing of their ideologically aligned national governments. Because of these factors, Commissioners could increasingly be inclined to privilege the formation of ideological coalitions with like-minded Commissioners to resist the pressure that might be applied onto them individually by some of the most powerful member states of the Union and, therefore, control horizontal patterns of domination. However, all Commissioners would also be directly accountable to their national governments and to the MEPs that they led to victory within the European Parliament for both their democratic legitimacy and their future job prospects. Because of that, the Commissioners themselves would have an incentive to act as checks and balances on the European Commission’s instincts of vertical domination. Furthermore, the conceptual pathway whereby different demoi shall be able to express different understandings as to what Europe is and what it should become (Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010) could also be more meaningfully fulfilled through this reform. That is the case because the appointment of the national Commissioner would rest on the twin democratic legitimacy conferred to her by the vote of confidence that she would have obtained from her national demos by winning the European elections within her member state of origin as well as through the support that she would enjoy from the MEPs elected through the national party list or coalition that she led to victory. As an embodiment of the synthesis of the process of preference formation that took place within the national sovereign, the newlyappointed Commissioner would have both the right and the duty to share the vision for Europe expressed by her national demos with all those stakeholders that are based outside her country of origin.

2.2 Subscribing to the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory

21

The element of this proposal pertaining to the support of the member states for a joint appointment of the same individual as both President of the European Commission and President of the European Council would also be respectful of the five conceptual pathways of liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory. First, the overall democratic legitimacy of the de facto President of the European Union would rest at the same time on two complementary pillars. On the one hand and in a process mirroring the overwhelming majority of European parliamentary democracies, her democratic legitimacy as President of the European Commission would rest on the consent given to her appointment by the European Parliament (i.e. the slowly emerging European demos). On the other hand, her democratic legitimacy as President of the European Council would stem from having been appointed by the European Council (i.e. the national governments elected by the various national demoi). The fact that the roles of President of the European Council and President of the European Commission were to be embodied by the same individual would be a beautiful representation of the ideal whereby historically well-established national demoi could also in time be complemented by a slowly blossoming European demos. Second and unlike it is currently the case, horizontal non-state transnational networks would be provided with an individual to address as they develop their own transnational political discourses and reform proposals. That is crucial because the normative process of “other-regardingness” underpinning democratic interdependence necessitates opportunities to be jointly synthesized by the national demoi that sustain it. Indeed, while the ambition of demoicratic theory to bring transnationalism all the way down is laudable (Nicolaïdis 2018) and should be nurtured as much as possible, non-state actors must also be provided with shared individuals that they can reach out to so as to occasionally bring unity to the diversity of their demands and therefore be able to more easily nurture transnational political discourses. This process of joint synthesizing of their demands is crucial if civil society and non-governmental stakeholders are to stand a chance to effectively exercise their common demoicratic citizenship. While this process might veer near aggregation, which, of course, is anti-demoicratic, this might be a price worth paying for the sake of securing greater democratic accountability of the European level of policy-making to the various European demoi. Third, the cratos question would also be addressed (Nicolaïdis 2018). At no point would the de facto President of the European Union be able to progress any policy initiatives or claim enough democratic legitimacy to promote significant reforms without the explicit support of both national governments and European citizens. Acting as two distinct but interconnected collective principals, the European Council and the European Parliament would therefore, at all times, severely limit the opportunities available to the President of the European Union for deviating from her mandate.10 The President of the European Union would be extraordinarily absorbed by her own efforts at managing and balancing not only the political dynamics of the Union’s institutional triangle but also the horizontal and vertical

10

For more on Principal–Agent Theory, please see: Ross (1973).

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interactions of both governmental and non-state actors operating across Europe’s multi-layered governance system. In short, imposing the cratos of her own institutional role would be an astonishing feat in itself and one unlikely to materialize. The fourth conceptual pathway underpinning demoicratic theory calls for greater employment of sunset clauses in EU legislation to avoid the foreclosing of alternative options due to commitment strategies (Nicolaïdis 2018). Unfortunately, the use of sunset clauses in EU legislation is constantly declining in a context whereby legislation seems to increasingly come into force for an unlimited period of time (Toshkov 2014). Within this context, a de facto President of the European Union could come to the rescue. Having to embody the synthesis of the political views of a sizeable percentage of all European demoi, the President of the European Union would always have to be ready to modify or even reverse existing policies. This would promote sustained meaningful political commitment between independent but interconnected demoi and, at the same time, go some way toward providing opportunities for European demoicracy to revise or even withdraw previously taken political decisions. Fifth, the de facto President of the European Union would constitute the embryonic leg of the “unity” part of the equation encapsulated by the EU’s motto of “unity in diversity”. Europe is awash with ideas as to what it is or what it should become. Hard-core federalists and Brexiteers are only extreme examples of the many extraordinarily diverse views available on the subject. Europe has plenty of “entrenched diversity”. What it lacks are “moments of unity” to share that diversity through mutual recognition (Nicolaïdis 2017). Thankfully, a President of the European Union would never be able to impose on the various European demoi a single vision as to what Europe should be. However, she could hopefully nudge them toward a more creative, sophisticated and respectful common political dialogue to share their diversity. Europe’s shared ideal remains one of unity in diversity. To strive toward that ideal, Europeans need opportunities and individuals to help them unite through the sharing of their diversity.

2.3

Operationalizing Constitutional Reform in Selected Member States

From a strictly legal point of view, this proposal could be translated into reality through very targeted reforms of the constitutions of the four member states taken into consideration. These changes would range from amending an existing article of the constitution to including an entirely new one. Sensitivity would have to be ensured to respect different constitutional histories and traditions by carefully choosing both the location of the amendments within each constitution as well as their specific wording.

2.3 Operationalizing Constitutional Reform in Selected Member States

23

In the French case, the way forward would entail the insertion of a new article 88-8 within title XV of the constitution.11 This would state that “the French Republic must at all times promote democratic principles within the European Union. In particular, it must always take into account the results of the elections for the European Parliament” (Assemblée Nationale 1958). For this to be done and as mandated by article 89 of the constitution, a relatively easy to obtain the three-fifth majority of the votes in both the National Assembly and the Senate would be required.12 The French Constitutional Court would most likely not even review the legality of such a reform as legal precedent and scholarly opinion agree that such a change, being approved by Parliament, could not be contested by the Constitutional Court.13 Having done this, two articles that would specify what this would mean in practice for the procedure to appoint the President of the European Commission and the country’s candidate to the post of European Commissioner would be adopted through a different piece of legislation by either adopting a framework law (a loi cadre) or an ordinary piece of legislation. These would respectively state that “the French Republic actively supports the leader of the political group or coalition that obtained the most seats within the European Parliament to the post of President of the European Commission as well as to the post of President of the European Council” and that “the French Republic proposes the leader of the electoral list or coalition that won the European elections within the French constituency as the country’s nominee to the post of European Commissioner”.14 Both the loi cadre (which would in itself have to refer to article 88-8) and the ordinary piece of legislation could be adopted by a simple absolute majority. However, the former would, by law, have to be scrutinized for its constitutionality by the Constitutional Court, while the latter would not. There would be a number of advantages that would stem from translating this proposal into reality. First, this way of proceeding would make it easier to pass the constitutional reform proper (which requires a three-fifth majority) thanks to the fact that the provision inserted directly in the constitution would be rather uncontroversial both in its aim and wording. Second, it would make it easier to pass the more contentious elements of the reform (i.e. the formulation of the two specific elements pertaining to the President of the European Commission/President of the European Council and the French Commissioner) by adopting them through a loi cadre or an ordinary legislative procedure. Third, it would still allow some room for interpretation so as to give the President of the Republic or the Government the possibility to at least influence the exact outcome of the process in line with the 11

This section of the French constitution is dedicated to the European Union and includes articles 88-1 to 88-7. 12 Article 89 of the French Constitution regulates the procedures to be undertaken for constitutional reforms. 13 As confirmed by a number of constitutional scholars in a series of semi-structured interviews with the author. 14 As of the European Parliament elections of May 2019, France is constituted by one single constituency.

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political context within which the decision would have to be taken (i.e. the reform would be politically more palatable and likelier to be accepted by the executive). Fourth, it would provide an “emergency mechanism” whereby Parliament, through the power relations determined by the number of seats held by the various political parties, would have the opportunity to avoid outcomes that could potentially be catastrophic for the democratic life of the country and the functioning of the European institutions. Fifth, this approach would not come into conflict with articles 20 and 21 (pertaining to the government’s right to set the policy agenda) or with article 27 pertaining to the mandate imperatif.15 Finally, such an approach would be more consistent with the country’s constitutional history, whereby the level of detail presented by the two specific provisions proposed would be best introduced through ordinary legislation with reference to a broader principle outlined in the constitution itself. Should the idea of effecting these legislative changes through a constitutional reform seem too ambitious, three alternatives (to be acted upon independently or in conjunction) would also be available. These would be a solemn declaration of the President of the Republic as per article 18 of the Constitution, a government declaration as per articles 49 or 50-1 of the Constitution, or a resolution of Parliament as per article 34-1 of the Constitution. Separately or certainly even more so combined, these last three interventions that do not require any constitutional amendments could themselves achieve the objectives set forth by this proposal. When it comes to Germany, the way to proceed would involve amending article 23 of the German Constitution (Deutsche Bundestag 1949) by including a new paragraph 8.16 This would state a broader principle according to which “The Federal Republic shall at all times promote democratic principles within the European Union. It shall take into account the results of the elections for the European Parliament both across the whole of the European Union and within the Federal Republic. It shall strive to ensure that the will of both European and German citizens as expressed through the European elections is adequately translated into political reality”. Having included the new paragraph 8 in article 23 as mentioned above, one would then be able to include two specific paragraphs outside Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz). For this to be done, one would look at enshrining the two much more specific principles within the existing legislation within the European Electoral Law (Europawahlgesetz) after paragraph 24 (Bundesamt für Justiz 1978) as new paragraphs 25 and 26 within a new section 3 (therefore turning the current section 3 into a section 4 with the current paragraphs 25 and 26 becoming paragraphs 27 and 28). These two paragraphs would respectively state that “with a view to promoting democratic principles within the European Union, the Federal Government must proactively support the appointment of the leader of the European political group or

15

Because this only applies to Members of Parliament (MPs) and, therefore, would in itself not be a constraint in the drafting of an article 88-8 or legislation springing from it. 16 This article is specifically dedicated to the European Union, the protection of basic rights and the principle of subsidiarity.

2.3 Operationalizing Constitutional Reform in Selected Member States

25

coalition that won the greatest number of seats within the European Parliament’s elections to the post of President of the European Commission and President of the European Council” and that “with a view to promoting democratic principles within the European Union, the Federal Government shall nominate the country’s candidate for the post of European Commissioner from among those individuals that have been elected as Members of the European Parliament”17. There would be a number of advantages if one were to proceed this way. First, and while the general (and not particularly controversial) principle outlined in the proposed paragraph 8 of article 23 would have to be approved by a two-third majority both within the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, more stringent and politically changes to the Europawahlgesetz could be passed with a simple absolute majority. Second, and in particular for what concerns the appointment of the German representative to the European Commission, the Federal Government would have some leeway to support a candidate that could conceivably harness the support of a majority of MPs within the Bundestag. Third, such an approach would be consistent with constitutional practice dictating that the minutiae regulating a broader principle outlined within the Basic Law shall generally be outlined in greater detail in another piece of legislation.18 In the case of Italy, the reform would focus on article 11 of the constitution (Senato della Repubblica Italiana 1948). This is referred to as the “international relations article” by Italian constitutional scholars as it has historically provided the legal basis upon which the Republic has justified its participation in various international organizations. This article, however, was originally drafted to allow for Italy’s partaking in institutions such as the United Nations and, therefore, does not make explicit reference to the European Union.19 In order to introduce the proposed changes, article 11 would therefore have to be amended with an article “11bis” so as to explicitly refer to the European Union with a general principle that could then be spelled out in further detail into ordinary legislation. Such a revised article could state, for instance, that “the Italian Republic participates in the process of European integration and plays a proactive role within the institutions of the European Union, of which it respects and promotes the democratic principles at all times. An ordinary law determines and specifies the principles outlined in this paragraph”. Having done this, Parliament would have three options to give more detail and substance to the revised article. It could adopt an entirely new piece of legislation, it could amend Law 18 of the 24 January 1979 for the European Parliament elections

17

As it is the case for France, when it comes to the elections for the European Parliament, the Federal Republic of Germany also has only one electoral constituency. 18 As confirmed by a number of constitutional scholars in a series of semi-structured interviews with the author. 19 Currently only stating that “Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy shall agree, on conditions of equality with other States, to such limitations of sovereignty as may be necessary to ensure peace and justice among Nations. Italy shall promote and encourage international organisations pursuing such goals”.

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(legge per le elezioni europee) previously approved by the Italian Parliament (Parlamento Italiano 1979) or it could modify Law 400 of the 23 August 1988 pertaining to the regulation of government’s activities and policy-making (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri del Governo della Repubblica Italiana 1988). In any of these scenarios, three rather specific principles would be outlined. First, it would be stated that “the Italian Republic always takes into account the results of the elections for the European Parliament, both in the broader European context as well as in the specific Italian situation”. Second, it would be stressed that “the Italian Republic proactively supports the leader of the political group or coalition that obtained the largest number of seats in the European Parliament in the nomination process to the post of President of the European Commission and President of the European Council”. Third, it would highlight that “the Italian Republic proposes the name of the leader of the electoral list or coalition that won the greatest number of seats in the Italian elections for the European Parliament as the country’s candidate to the post of European Commissioner”. This way of proceeding would present a number of advantages. To begin with, it would firmly anchor the “European dimension” in the Italian Constitution. Something that, extraordinarily, is to this day still missing. Put it simply, the Italian Constitution would finally “get to know” the European Union. Furthermore, the least controversial element of the reform (i.e. the one that would constitute the new article 11bis) could be passed with a two-third majority in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate while, crucially and almost at the same time, the more specific and politically sensitive elements of the reform could be approved with a simple absolute majority through ordinary legislation. Finally, Italian constitutional praxis would be upheld following the country’s tradition whereby only very general principles are enshrined in the Constitution while referring to ordinary legislation for the details. Looking at Spain, one currently does not have a “European section” on the model of the French and German constitutions. Because of this, the legislator would have only two options to proceed. One the one hand, one could think of creating a brand new “European article” (possibly incorporating a series of other provisions as well to comprehensively and organically address the European dimension). On the other hand, one could look at amending article 97 of the constitution (Senado de España 1978). This article regulates government’s policy-making in the field of international relations and, given the fact that the Spanish Constitution currently does not have a “European section”, it could be the most appropriate article through which one could intervene.20 From a purely legal point of view, one could insert three norms directly within the constitution so as to state three principles: One, that the Government shall at all times promote democratic principles in the functioning of the European Union and take into account the results of the elections for the European Parliament. Two, that the Government must nominate the candidate at the top of the electoral list or the

20

As confirmed by a number of constitutional scholars in a series of semi-structured interviews with the author.

References

27

leader of a coalition that won the European elections within the Spanish constituency as the country’s nominee for the post of European Commissioner. Three, that the Government must proactively support the appointment of the leader of the European political group or coalition that won the greatest number of seats within the European Parliament to the post of both President of the European Commission and President of the European Council. The constitutional amendments outlined above are, from a purely legal point of view, entirely viable. The extent to which the wording would more or less strictly define the detail of these principles would only be a matter of political sensitivity. The advantages of this approach would be threefold. First and as required by article 167 of the Spanish Constitution, such an amendment could be carried with a relatively easy to obtain three-fifth majority of the votes in both chambers of parliament. Second, the details of all the normative elements outlined in the amendments would be relatively protected from the threat of possible changes in the future thanks to the fact that these could be included directly within the constitution itself (and not in secondary legislation that could be easier to modify at a later stage). Third, Spain would finally endow itself with a “European dimension” in its constitutional order on which it could further build upon in the future if and when required.

References Assemblée Nationale (1958) Constitution de la République Française. http://www.assembleenationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Bundesamt für Justiz (1978) Gesetz über die Wahl der Abgeordneten des Europäischen Parlaments aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Europawahlgesetz - EuWG). https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/euwg/BJNR007090978.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Deutsche Bundestag (1949) Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. https://www. bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 European Union (2016) Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, Brussels Lacroix J, Nicolaïdis K (eds) (2010) European stories. Oxford University Press, Oxford Nicolaïdis K (2017) Mutual recognition: promise and denial, from sapiens to Brexit. Curr Legal Prob 70(1):1–40 Nicolaïdis K (2018) Braving the waves? Europe’s constitutional settlement at twenty. J Common Mark Stud 56(7):1614–1630 Parlamento Italiano (1979) Legge 24 Gennaio 1979, n. 18. Elezione dei membri del Parlamento Europeo spettanti all’Italia. Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana. https://www. parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/79018l.htm. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri del Governo della repubblica Italiana (1988) Legge 23 agosto 1988, n. 400. Disciplina dell’attivita’ di governo e ordinamento della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. http://presidenza.governo.it/normativa/legge2308_400.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021

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Ross S (1973) The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. Am Econ Rev 63 (2):134–139 Senado de España (1978) Constitucion Española. http://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/ normas/constitucion/index.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Senato della Repubblica Italiana (1948) Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana. http://www.senato. it/1024. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Toshkov D (2014) 55 years of EU Legislation. http://www.dimiter.eu/Eurlex.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021

Chapter 3

Changing the Political Framework

3.1

Synchronizing National Electoral Cycles

This book also makes a second and rather more ambitious proposal whereby a constitutional reform would be passed in one or more member states of the European Union for national parliamentary elections to take place on the same day as the elections for the European Parliament and for this to be the case irrespectively of when previous national parliamentary elections took place. In doing so, this reform would significantly contribute to two momentous developments. On the one hand, the conditions would be in place for concomitant public discourses to take place on the same topics and at the same time across national public spheres. While the different natures of national public spheres across Europe will by definition always allow for variation in how similar political issues are addressed, the fact that these could be debated at exactly the same time across multiple countries with an enhanced focus on them provided by upcoming synchronized elections would create a state of affairs whereby Europeans could much more easily nurture transnational dialogues. As things stand, national public discourses regularly supersede European ones. While not enough to ensure that a pan-European conversation might emerge on a certain topic, the synchronization of electoral campaigns across member states would at least provide transnational civil society and political entrepreneurs with a radically different political framework within which they would stand a much better chance to nurture shared political narratives to complement existing national political discourses with more European ones. On the other hand, this reform could also synchronize policy-making opportunities across EU member states. While the European Parliament and the European Commission might provide some sort of continuity across time when it comes to policy-making, it is a fact that variation between the timeframes of the legislative periods of national parliaments across Europe still has an enormous impact on the extent to which major reforms proposals can be moved forward. Put it bluntly, if national parliamentary elections are coming up in key member states such as France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Garavoglia, Mind the European Gap, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88078-1_3

29

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or Germany, no major pan-European political initiative can be launched. Synchronizing the electoral cycles of the national parliaments of two or more key member states would therefore provide more occasions to develop joint policy-making and coordinate ambitious reforms across Europe.1 The fact that governments in the Council of the European Union act in the shadow of national elections by signalling responsiveness to their publics (Schneider 2019, 2020) could provide further opportunities in this respect. Aside from the two broad observations made above, this proposal could bring about a series of other positive developments. First of all, where two or more large member states to sign up to this reform, they would de facto become the “trendsetters of the European political rhythm”. If France and Germany or, perhaps, France, Italy and Spain were to align their respective national parliamentary elections with those of the European Parliament and, therefore, with one another, they would be in an extraordinarily strong position to de facto dictate the timing of any pan-European legislative agenda. This state of affairs could, in turn, contribute to a bandwagon effect whereby more member states might be interested in joining the Europeanized electoral and policy-making cycles also to become one of the trendsetters. Within this context, smaller member states would have a vested interest to join this pioneering group of countries so as to better cope with the potential horizontal power asymmetries that could emerge as a result of the synchronization of the legislative periods of larger member states. The more member states were to adopt this proposal, and the more member states would have a stronger incentive to become part of this group of pioneering countries. Secondly, holding national parliamentary elections at the same time as the elections for the European Parliament would implicitly address the (understandable) confusion that the overwhelming majority of European citizens experience when trying to understand which level of governance is responsible for policy-making in a specific domain. Aside from a privileged elite, the overwhelming majority of citizens do not know that trade policy is primarily handled by the European Commission at the European level. Equally, most citizens expect “Europe” to speak with one voice in the field of security and defence.2 In a healthy democratic system, citizens would be informed and educated as to which governance level is responsible for a specific policy area. Yet, the chances are that citizens will not have a clear understanding of the situation for many years to come. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, the European Union is a multi-layered governance system whereby policy-making

1

Thus, addressing Emmanuel Macron’s frustration. Elected on an unashamedly pro-European platform in the spring of 2017, Macron quickly realized that no major European reform could have been launched until Germans would have gone to the polls in September of the same year. What he did not know was that, having voted for a new Parliament, Germans would have had to wait another six months for politicians to form a government. As result of all this, the French President’s European ambitions were put on hold for well over a year. 2 A policy area that, despite some recent major developments, is still overwhelmingly controlled by national governments and dealt with on an intergovernmental basis.

3.1 Synchronizing National Electoral Cycles

31

might indeed not take place exclusively at one specific level of governance.3 On the other hand, national political establishments have a vested interest to nurture a lack of clarity when it comes to the different responsibilities embedded at the national or European governance levels. Such a lack of clarity is indeed instrumental in allowing national politicians to spin public discourse to take ownership for political successes and to use the fuzzy concept of “Europe” as a scapegoat when attempting to deflect criticism. While this state of affairs is understandable within a context whereby national politicians must be responsive to the vested interests that they legitimately represent within their own member state, one certainly cannot expect of them a great deal of support for any efforts aimed at addressing this lack of clarity. As the chances of explaining to citizens the multi-layered nature of Europe’s governance system in the years to come remain slim at best, for the sake of European democracy, we shall take advantage of this confusing state of affairs. By having both national and European parliamentary elections taking place on the same day, we could stop bothering helplessly trying to address this lack of clarity and, rather, exploit it. Indeed, this could be done more easily if transnational civil society and socio-political entrepreneurs were able to boost pan-European public discourses and political narratives by taking advantage of the political climax that we would inevitably come to experience with simultaneous national and European parliamentary elections. In such a context, it would become irrelevant which governance levels would be dealing with the legitimate concerns of our European demoi: institutions and individuals at both the national and the pan-European level would feel pressured into becoming more responsive to the input of their citizens. Ultimately, we nurture our democracies more by having citizens voting simultaneously for different sets of institutions that deal at the same time with different policy areas than by having them voting at different times for diverse sets of institutions that do not deal with the policy areas that citizens believe the institutions in question are dealing with. Another positive result of this reform would be to increase voter turnout. By having a single “super-election day” where citizens are called to elect both their national and European parliaments, the pressure would be on for citizens to go to the ballot box. Across most EU member states, turnout for national parliamentary elections has historically been much higher than for European Parliament elections. The last four decades have seen a constant and significant decrease in voter turnouts for the European Parliament elections despite the fact that, over the same period of time, the European Parliament has steadily increased its powers and competences.4 At the same time, turnout in the elections for both national parliaments and the European Parliament is in decline across most of Europe (European Parliament 2014). With this reform, a lot would be a stake on that single day, and each citizen

3

Indeed, even trade policy, despite being a remarkably Europeanized in nature, regularly benefits from (and must respond to) the legitimate inputs coming from the national capitals. 4 Turnout for the European Parliament’s elections has steadily decreased from a peak of 61.99% in 1979 to a low of 42.61% in 2014 (before slightly picking up again in the 2019 elections).

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would think twice before deciding not to cast her vote in either national or European elections. On top of these substantive considerations, there also exists a financial case for going to vote for both national parliaments and the European Parliament on the same day. As populists across Europe speak up against the costs of running our democratic institutions, having a single day when citizens would vote for both national and European institutions would deprive populist forces of the “money-wasting” financial argument while, at the same time, saving some funds to national treasuries.5 Should local or regional elections within one or more EU member states be also synchronized with the elections for the European Parliament and the national parliament in question, the financial savings could, of course, be even greater.6 While one could argue that the drawback to this state of affairs would be an “information overload” for citizens, the evidence suggests that both in national and European elections, citizens do not pay much attention to the details of the policy proposals put forward by political parties but that, rather, they respond to the much broader political narratives that political entrepreneurs aim at them (Adams et al. 2014). Within this context, the specific provision stating that member states should strive for national parliamentary elections to take place on the same day as the elections for the European Parliament irrespectively of when previous national parliamentary elections took place is a necessary corollary to the core proposal suggesting a synchronization of national parliamentary elections with the elections for the European Parliament. This particular caveat is necessary because national governments across different member states might lose the confidence of their parliaments at any time throughout a legislative period. Unscheduled parliamentary elections might therefore be called at any time, and new legislative periods start anew following early elections. Such a state of affairs would quickly lead us to a situation whereby, within a matter of years, the elections for a national parliament would no longer be synchronized with those for the European Parliament and those of other national parliaments. This provision is therefore fundamental to ensure that, independently of what might happen to the national legislative periods in question, every five years at most national parliamentary elections will be realigned with the legislative period of the European Parliament and of those fellow national parliaments that signed up to this proposal. Aside from legally enforced discipline to be achieved through targeted constitutional reforms in the member states, this provision could also promote a softer kind of discipline on national legislatures. While theoretically, a national government could at any time be brought down by a restless political party or petty electoral 5

A similar state of affairs could be observed in Spain in May 2019 when citizens were called to the ballot box to elect both the European Parliament and some of their local and regional assemblies (although not the Spanish Parliament itself which was elected in a snap election on the 28 April). 6 A concomitance of local and regional elections with national and European parliamentary elections could of course be envisioned. This aspect would however go beyond the scope of this proposal and will therefore, for the time being at least, not be investigated.

3.1 Synchronizing National Electoral Cycles

33

calculations, under this state of affairs, we would likely see a decrease in the number of instances whereby a national parliament withdraws support from the government before the natural end of the legislature. That is likely to be the case because no political leader has an interest in bringing about early elections to strengthen her or his electoral position, only for that position to be questioned again a few months later. Nobody wants to win the elections and then has to go through new elections that might be lost just a few months later. It could therefore be assumed that the closer the time for the twin national and European elections were to approach, the weaker the incentive for leading national political entrepreneurs to bring down a national government would be. Within this context, member states could also consider unilaterally deciding to hold their respective European elections on the last available date among those within which the elections for the European Parliament must take place.7 This initiative could have a variety of positive repercussions. First, this would allow for a state of affairs whereby the last major political rallies of both national and European electoral competitions could take place on the same day across Europe. By doing so, European demoi would have an opportunity to experience a shared emotional bond through the build-up of their respective electoral campaigns. Furthermore, and while still belonging to different demoi, citizens across the Union would have the opportunity to witness their fellow Europeans going to the polls all together on the same day. This would be a visual and very tangible manifestation of a civic duty based on constitutional patriotism being exercised as a common European electorate (Habermas 1994, 1997; Calhoun 2002). Finally, and as it is currently not always the case, the electoral results for both national and European elections would more likely be announced all at exactly the same time across the European Union.8 In all European democracies, this is arguably the political climax when all demoi come together to witness the output of their processes of preference formation. All these developments, combined or independently of each other, would therefore contribute to provide a context more conducive to the further Europeanization of both national public discourses and political dynamics. Thanks to the synchronization of national and European elections, the mandate of a European Commissioner would de facto coincide with the period of time for which the national government that proposed her would remain in office. The Commissioner of the country in question would therefore be ideally positioned to express to her fellow Commissioners the views and wishes of the country from which she hails. At the same time, the Commissioner would be more trusted by the national government in question (as this would have helped her to be appointed to the post in the first 7 Most (but not all) EU member states already have a tendency to de facto opt for the last available date among those that they can chose within which the EP elections must take place (usually a Sunday). 8 EU member states and media outlets across Europe are expected to wait for the polls to close in the last member state going to vote. However, in reality, some national governments and national media outlets have in the past began to release exit polls when not all member states had completed their voting procedures.

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place) whenever she has to report to the national capital the views expressed by the European Commission.9 Crucially, the situation described above is not the one we tend to witness at the moment. As different national governments come and go throughout the five-year lifespan of the European Commission, national governments and Commissioners from the same member state often find themselves on different, if not diametrically opposed, ends of the political spectrum. This is something that, although it could theoretically still happen if citizens within a member state were to vote on the same day for completely different political majorities at the national and the European elections, would likely become the exception rather than the rule. Last but not least, this reform could go some way in complementing from the bottom-up the expectation whereby the European Commission alone should act as the guardian of the treaties and the general interest of the Union. That is because each member state that was to sign up to this initiative would voluntarily make it virtually impossible for any of its future governments to send to Brussels a Commissioner that would not enjoy the democratic legitimacy provided by concomitant national and European elections. By tying the hands of successive national governments until the next election, the amended constitution of the member state in question would ultimately protect both its own demos as well as all other European demoi from the dominating instincts of vertical cratos10 within each member state. It would safeguard its own demos by ensuring that the will of the sovereign is respected by being correctly translated to the European level. And it would support other demoi by providing them with a shining example of such a commitment through the process of “other-regardingness” underpinning demoicratic interdependence (Nicolaïdis 2017). By voluntarily submitting itself to this constitutional reform, the European member state protects its demos, the demoi of fellow member states and, ultimately, the very essence of European demoicracy.

3.2

Respecting the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory

This reform proposal would respect the five conceptual pathways of liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory. First, it would fulfil the condition whereby political reforms must, at least for the time being, be firmly rooted within the 9

While the Treaties explicitly stress that Commissioners should promote the general interest of the Union and not give nor receive instructions from national governments (article 17 of the Consolidated Treaty on the European Union), it is a fact that Commissioners regularly do act as “bridges” between Brussels and the capital of their country of origin. Time to drop the hypocrisy and, instead, manage it as best as possible. 10 Here understood as defined by Nicolaïdis (2018) as the “governing together” that must avoid the pitfalls of domination (both vertical ones between EU institutions and member states and horizontal ones between member states).

3.2 Respecting the Five Conceptual Pathways of Demoicratic Theory

35

nation-state (Nicolaïdis 2018). As each individual EU member state could autonomously decide whether and when to synchronize its electoral process to elect its national parliament at the same time as the European Parliament, the national democratic process upon which each European demos relies upon for decisionmaking would be respected. Each European nation-state would still remain the aggregator of the political preference on whether or not to enact the proposed reform, and its national demos could trust the democratic legitimacy of such a choice. The national demoi would at all times remain pouvoir constituant and the national constituent demoicracies of the European Union would contribute to the democratic vigour of the Union itself. Second, the process of “other-regardingness” (Nicolaïdis 2017) underpinning democratic interdependence would not only be safeguarded but, rather, increased. The synchronization of electoral processes across member states would allow horizontal transnational non-state actors to exploit the enhanced political tension provided by the shared electoral period to engage with one another across national borders to develop their common positions to complement the perspectives already framed by state actors through established intergovernmental bureaucratic mechanisms. By taking advantage of the opportunities for “other-regardingness” that the synchronized electoral process could offer to them, European civil societies could strengthen their horizontal transnational relationships vis-à-vis vertical patterns of political domination.11 The synchronization of electoral processes provides interconnected demoi with a powerful cognitive instrument to demand from nationally elected democratic leaders an enhanced focus on the “other-regardingness” of democratic interdependence. While one could argue that citizens seldom focus on elections in other countries, the demoicratic process of “other-regardingness” could be a powerful tool to blur the lines between the two. Citizens will likely pay more attention to electoral campaigns in other member states if these have a direct bearing on political discourse in their country of origin. Third, those socio-political actors challenging the established cratos could also benefit from this reform and, therefore, subscribe to another conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory (Nicolaïdis 2018). The synchronization of electoral contests at the national and European levels could contribute to partly addressing horizontal power asymmetries by allowing for smaller member states that were ready to play a pioneering role in pursuing this reform to join forces in setting counter-agendas to those proposed by traditionally more dominating member states. Put it bluntly: smaller member states that were to sign up to this proposal could jointly enhance their bargaining power in terms of agenda-setting via-a-vis larger member states. At the same time, vertical pressure from the European institutions could be mitigated by the counterforce that a coalition of states pioneering this reform could apply in 11

This notwithstanding other reforms that could facilitate the transnational cooperation and European civil societies such as the one supported by the European Parliament in its resolution of the 2 July 2013 for a regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation. This reform was however later withdrawn from the Commission’s work program in 2015 following failure to achieve a compromise with the member states (European Commission 2012).

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setting the policy-making agenda. Also, crucially, socio-political actors within national demoi that might be struggling to have their voices heard within a member state due to the sub-optimal quality of their nation-state’s democratic process might find new opportunities to resists vertical patterns of domination within their member state through the unexplored avenues that could be opened to them by this synchronization of democratic practices. Fourth, the synchronization of national elections with each other and with those for the European Parliament would allow separate yet interconnected sovereignties to regularly (re)connect with one another to sustain shared democratic and policymaking processes. This would be a dual process without a priori defined outcomes. On the one hand, European demoi would be able to continuously renew their commitment to a sustainable long-term engagement with one another. On the other hand, they could, more likely in concert with one another than not, call into question and possibly reverse previously taken policy decisions. A renewal of the European demoi’s commitment to one another, as well as a questioning and possible reversal of the arrangements that bound us together, would be possible at all times. The fourth fundamental conceptual framework of liberal intergovernmental demoicratic theory whereby it shall at all times be possible to contest and, if necessary, to revise policy decisions and political discourses (Cheneval and Nicolaïdis 2016) would therefore also be upheld. Fifth, the synchronization of electoral calendars would not infringe on the ability of national demoi to nurture their very own understandings and preferences as to what Europe is or should become. Quite the contrary: this synchronization would provide each national polity with an opportunity to intensify and focus its dialectic engagement with other polities across Europe.12 Through this cross-pollination process, each national demos could both enrich its own public discourse and, at the same time, contribute to a pan-European dialogue that could, in turn, foster transnational political narratives to complement the national ones. Competing imageries of what Europe is and visions of what it should become would therefore help ideologues on both ends of the pro and anti-European spectrum to seek common and hopefully intellectually more stimulating ground. This principle whereby the change is the only constant would therefore respect the fifth conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory (Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010).

12 A state of affairs that would reinforce the process of “other-regardingness” underpinning the concept of democratic interdependence proper of liberal intergovernmentalist demoicratic theory.

3.3 Constitutional Amendments to Execute the Proposed Synchronization

3.3

37

Constitutional Amendments to Execute the Proposed Synchronization

Targeted constitutional reforms in the member states of the European Union would be implemented within the national dimension to have an impact at the European level. The detail and the wording of this proposal would slightly differ between member states so as to take into account the various constitutional traditions of each country. Yet, the substance of the proposed reforms remains the same across member states. This section looks at the legal operationalization of the proposed reforms in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In the case of France, two different approaches could be envisioned: one that would directly amend the constitution and one that would modify an existing organic law (loi organique). If the first avenue were to be chosen, one would seek to amend article 25 of the constitution (Assemblée Nationale 1958). This deals with the replacement of legislators, their compensation, the eligibility for the two chambers, their sizes and the length of the terms for both the National Assembly and the Senate. If the second way forward were to be preferred, one would intervene on the Loi Organique 2001-419 of the 15 May 2001 by modifying articles LO121 and LO122. Article LO121 would be modified so as to state that “the powers of the National Assembly expire on the day in which the following National Assembly convenes for the first time”. Article LO122, instead, would point out that “unless in case of early dissolution, a general election takes place on the same day as the elections for the European Parliament. In case of early dissolution, the new legislature will not be able to extend beyond the first convening day of the National Assembly elected at the same time as the European elections that have taken place following this early dissolution”. While both approaches would legally be feasible, a number of considerations would have to be taken into account when deciding whether to proceed through a constitutional reform of article 25 or the amendment of the Organic Law 2001-419 of the 15 May 2001. To begin with, the French Constitutional Court would almost certainly not review the possible amendment of article 25 for compatibility with the French Constitution.13 However, because it is legally mandated to do so with all organic laws, the court would certainly review the legality of a reform of articles LO121 and LO122 of the loi organique in question. Secondly, an organic law is not set in stone and, unlike in the case of constitutional reform, it could be relatively easily changed by subsequent legislation. As it would be rather straightforward to modify the organic law through a simple absolute majority, it should be kept in mind that it would be plausible for this reform to be modified (or entirely rolled back) at a later stage. Furthermore, and as things currently stand, article 25 of the French Constitution already and explicitly refers to the need for an organic law to address the minutiae of any subsequent reform: it would therefore be more than appropriate 13

Based on historical legal precedent, the French Constitutional Court never rules on constitutional reforms unless a specific complaint with a sound legal basis is brought forward to its attention.

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to change LO121 and LO122 simply by referring to article 25 of the constitution. Finally, it is worth noting that a simple ordinary law is already responsible for detailing whether the elections for the National Assembly must take place through a single or double round of voting. Shifting from a majoritarian two-round vote to a one-round proportional vote could be a relatively straightforward way to further eliminate the uncertainty that might exist when it comes to the exact timing of the elections for the National Assembly in relation to those for the European Parliament.14 Looking at Germany, one would have to work on amending article 39 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) by changing paragraph one and by inserting a new paragraph four (Deutsche Bundestag 1949). The first sentence of paragraph one would be modified so as to state that “save the following provisions, the Bundestag shall be elected for five years, on the same day as the European Parliament”.15 At the same time, a new fourth paragraph would have to be included to stress that “in case of early dissolution of the Bundestag, all efforts should be made to realign at the earliest possible opportunity the elections for the German Bundestag with those for the European Parliament”. These two interventions combined would increase the length of the legislative period of the Bundestag from four to five years to align it with the five-year term of the European Parliament. At the same time, they would address the issue of how to proceed should an early dissolution of the Bundestag take place, therefore leading to a “loss of temporal coordination” with the elections for the European Parliament. A two-third majority (as opposed to the three-fifth majority that is sufficient in some other EU member states such as France and Spain) would have to be achieved for these amendments to be carried. Still, from a purely legalistic point of view, the consensus among constitutional scholars is that there should be absolutely no problem to increase the legislative period from four to five years. Indeed, such timeframe is already envisioned for all German federal states (Bundesländer) except the city-state of Bremen. Within this context, only one challenge remains to be addressed in relation to the proposed new paragraph four. For this, there could be a legal objection pertaining to the possible “devaluation of the sovereign” whereby, following premature elections due to an early dissolution of Parliament, the new legislative period would be shortened and, therefore, limit the temporal sovereignty of the Parliament that would be in office for less than the standard five-year term. This problem would nevertheless be surmountable by making sure that the shortened legislative period would not be less than two and a half to three years. According to a variety of constitutional scholars, this would be the minimum period of time required for such a

14

Something for which there is indeed a precedent in what President Mitterand did in 1986. It currently states that “save the following provisions, the Bundestag shall be elected for four years. Its term shall end when a new Bundestag convenes. New elections shall be held no sooner than forty-six months and no later than forty-eight months after the electoral term begins. If the Bundestag is dissolved, new elections shall be held within sixty days”.

15

3.3 Constitutional Amendments to Execute the Proposed Synchronization

39

“shortened legislature” not to be considered “meaningless” by the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.16 This state of affairs, therefore, explains why a rather vague wording is suggested for the possible new fourth paragraph in article 39. Such a formulation would allow enough flexibility for an optimal date to be set for the legislative period of the Bundestag to be realigned with the one of the European Parliament while, at the same time, avoiding the risk of the “devaluation of the sovereign” mentioned above. According to article 138 of the Italian Constitution (Senato della Repubblica Italiana 1948), a two-third majority of the votes (to be held with an interval between them of at least three months) is necessary for both the Camera dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) and the Senato della Repubblica (Senate of the Republic) for a constitutional amendment to pass. Should such a majority not be achieved, a reform could still be passed through a second reading where, instead, a simple absolute majority would be sufficient (with a host of additional caveats to follow, of course). Within this context, article 60 of the constitution would have to be amended. This would then state that “the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic are elected for five years, on the same day in which the European Parliament is elected” and that “in case of early dissolution of the chambers of Parliament, all efforts should be made for new elections to take place on the same day when the next elections for the European Parliament are due to take place”. While absolutely feasible from a purely legal and constitutional point of view, this intervention would nevertheless warrant a number of observations. To begin with, this reform would not at any time infringe upon one of the most important prerogatives of the President of Republic, namely her or his constitutional right to dissolve one or both chambers of Parliament. Secondly, the fact that this amendment would directly impact on the sovereignty of the Italian Republic is something that one should be aware of but that is nevertheless already explicitly envisioned and accepted as a possibility by article 11 of the Italian Constitution. Furthermore, and while one could still rely upon article 11 as it has been done many times in the past to provide a legal basis for Italy’s participation in the process of European integration, it could be useful for the Italian Constitution to make somewhere an explicit reference to the European Union in general and the European Parliament in particular. This would both further strengthen the legal basis upon which this reform would rest and provide a more solid foundation for referring to the process of European integration in any future constitutional reforms. Finally, and so as to avoid potential challenges linked to the fact that shorter legislative periods could be interpreted as “diminishing the sovereignty of Parliament”, the proposed amendment would not strictly mandate an immediate realignment of the Italian electoral cycle with the one of the European Parliament. Rather, it would merely encourage all stakeholders to seek a solution for this realignment to be reinstated as soon as possible. While not legally necessary, should it be deemed politically sensitive to

16

As repeatedly confirmed in semi-structured interviews by a number of German constitutional scholars.

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do so, any of the points mentioned above could be explicitly reiterated in the amended article itself. For what concerns Spain, both articles 68 and 69 (section three, chapter one of the Spanish Constitution) would have to be modified. Although extremely similar, the former article pertains to the Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) while the latter relates to the Senate (Senado). More specifically, in articles 68 and 69, paragraphs four and six respectively would be amended so as to read that the Congress or the Senate “is elected for five years, on the same day as the European Parliament” and that the term of office for Deputies or Senators “ends five years after their election or on the day that the House is dissolved”. Aside from this, and so as to ensure the continued synchronization of the Spanish and European legislative periods, in both articles 68 and 69, a new paragraph seven would have to be added. This would state that “in the event of early dissolution, the new legislature may not run beyond the day of the first convening of the Parliament elected at the same time as the European elections following this early dissolution”. The constitutional amendments proposed in this paragraph would modify existing articles of the constitution but still would not represent a complete and coherent “Europeanization” of the Spanish Constitution. Unlike the French and German constitutions that de facto were endowed with new and ad hoc sections to account for the ongoing process of European integration, the Spanish Constitution, like the Italian one, does not have a single specific section where these proposals could be incorporated together in a comprehensive and coherent way. A few considerations might be in order at this point. First of all, this reform is absolutely viable from a purely legal point of view.17 As per article 167 of the constitution (Senado de España 1978), this reform could be passed with a relatively easy to achieve three-fifth majority of the votes in both chambers of Parliament (Cortes Generales), and it is unlikely to be contested on legal grounds by the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional). Secondly, the move from a four to a five-year legislative period should be rather uncontroversial: this is the legislative timeframe already adopted for a number of parliaments across Europe and, oddly enough, both chambers of the Spanish Parliament already have specific bodies following this timeframe as well.18 Third, while some constitutional scholars suggest that it could be possible to go as far as to have set parliamentary terms and to explicitly exclude any early dissolution of parliament, it is a question of political sensitivity to decide how strict any such formulation is included in the Spanish Constitution should be. Because of that, a debate would have to take place as to which exact wording and formulation should be adopted to encourage the Cortes Generales to seek to realign their legislative period with the one of the European Parliament. Finally, and as it is often the case, secondary legislation would have to be

17

As repeatedly confirmed in semi-structured interviews by a number of Spanish constitutional scholars. 18 The Ombudsman for the Cortes Generales (in Spain also known as “defensor del pueblo”) is already currently elected by both chambers of Parliament for five-year terms.

References

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modified as result of these changes. This, however, would be an almost automatic process as any other legislation would hierarchically fall below the constitution itself. A simple absolute majority would then be sufficient to amend the General Electoral Law (Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado 2011).

References Adams J, Ezrow L, Somer-Topcu Z (2014) Do voters respond to party manifestos or to a wider information environment? An analysis of mass-elite linkages on European integration. Am J Polit Sci 58(4):967–978 Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (2011) Ley Orgánica 2/2011, de 28 de enero, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General (LOREG). Boletin Oficial del Estado, Madrid Assemblée Nationale (1958) Constitution de la République Française. http://www.assembleenationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Calhoun C (2002) Imagining solidarity: cosmopolitanism, constitutional patriotism and the public sphere. Public Cult 14(1):147–171 Cheneval F, Nicolaïdis K (2016) The social construction of demoicracy in the EU. Eur J Polit Theory 16(2):235–260 Deutsche Bundestag (1949) Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. https://www. bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 European Commission (2012) Proposal for a council regulation on the statute for a European Foundation (FE). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/? uri¼CELEX:52012PC0035&from¼EN. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 European Parliament (2014) European Parliament final result turnout. Historical trends. http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Habermas J (1994) Citizenship and national identity. In: Van Steenbergen B (ed) The condition of citizenship. Sage, Newbury Park Habermas J (1997) A Berlin republic: writings on Germany. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln Lacroix J, Nicolaïdis K (eds) (2010) European stories. Oxford University Press, Oxford Nicolaïdis K (2017) Mutual recognition: promise and denial, from sapiens to Brexit. Curr Legal Prob 70(1):1–40 Nicolaïdis K (2018) Braving the waves? Europe’s constitutional settlement at twenty. J Common Mark Stud 56(7):1614–1630 Schneider C (2019) The responsive union. National elections and European governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Schneider C (2020) Public commitments as signals of responsiveness in the European Union. J Polit 82(1):329–344 Senado de España (1978) Constitucion Española. http://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/ normas/constitucion/index.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Senato della Repubblica Italiana (1948) Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana. http://www.senato. it/1024. Accessed 6 Aug 2021

Chapter 4

Attempting the Leap Forward

4.1

A Bottom-Up Reform of Europe’s Quasi-Constitutional Order

A third proposal envisions the launch of a deep and comprehensive process of reforms to fundamentally restructure the architecture of the European Union‘s quasi-constitutional order that, crucially, could be promoted and enacted by a very limited number of national parliaments without having to secure the support of all the current member states of the European Union. Importantly, this proposal does not wish to enter in the merit of whether or not the propositions that could emerge from such a reform process should be supported. Much more modestly, this book wishes, among other things, to highlight the benefits that could emerge from such a process and how this could be launched. There exists a number of reasons why such a proposal should be considered. To begin with, it appears crucial to urgently complement the extraordinary degree of economic and financial integration achieved in Europe so far with a comparable extent of political unity. The Euro is a global reserve currency, the European Union (even post-Brexit) is one of the largest economies in the world, the European Commission is a global standard setter when it comes to benchmarks and regulations, the region is one of the wealthiest in the world both at purchasing power parity and in absolute terms, and the Union is an extremely influential block within the global trade system. At the same time, European armed forces (possibly with the exception of France) have severely limited projection capabilities, the European Union seldom speaks with a single voice or is taken seriously on the diplomatic stage, European institutions struggle to cajole the member states to implement decisions taken or to hold them accountable for breaching European legislation, citizens look up to their national leaders rather than to European ones in times of crisis (and the latter are regularly overlooked by foreign leaders in favour of the former), and most European citizens themselves would be hard pressed to name those in a position of leadership that are supposedly meant to be accountable to the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Garavoglia, Mind the European Gap, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88078-1_4

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European demoi. Europe is an economic giant, a political pigmy and a military worm (Bossuyt 2007).1 A comprehensive reform of Europe’s institutional framework and governance system is a sine qua non for this imbalance to be adequately addressed. Within this context, it is imperative for the European Union to address as soon as possible the democratic deficit that plagues it when it comes to both its legitimacy or democratic accountability (Follesdal and Hix 2006). As long as the Union’s institutions were dealing with narrow technical questions as agents of the member states, the permissive consensus granted to them by European citizens was arguably enough to shield them from sustained public scrutiny and criticism. As its responsibilities, powers and prerogatives have exponentially grown over the decades across a variety of policy areas, Europe’s multi-layered governance system has not upgraded its democratic processes to a comparable extent. Claims that the idea of a “democratic deficit” is overblown (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 1998, 2002) are increasingly hard to accept. The European Union is the victim of its own success. It must now deal with it by re-energizing its democratic process so that this is once more perceived as sufficiently legitimate and accountable by the overwhelming majority of its citizens. Only a deep reform of its quasi-constitutional order can adequately address this problem. Third, it is urgently necessary to make the European Union fit for the twenty-first century. Even wishing to set aside the legitimate concerns of great powers’ competition, it is undeniable that a variety of challenges that Europeans face today will either be tackled together or will not be addressed at all. Climate change, demographic decline, cyberconflicts, global pandemics, technological disruption, privacy concerns, the protection of civil liberties and the promotion of human rights, international migration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. This is only a minimalist list of the challenges that no single European state can effectively face alone. The European Union needs to reform its institutions, its governance system and its policy-making to stand a chance of dealing with these tests. Majority voting instead of unanimity (Schuette 2019), the right of initiative for MPs to initiate legislation on an equal footing with the Commission2 and a single representation in international institutions to speak with one voice on the world stage (Oberthür et al. 2017) are only some of the innovations that could be envisioned. Fourth, Europeans could finally have the opportunity to go on the “offensive” in promoting a shared narrative of “unity in diversity”. Xenophobes, racists and nationalists alike take advantage of constitutional freedoms to express and promote their views. Cosmopolitans, liberals and progressives should do exactly the same. Europe is and should be a ground where different ideas, values and ideals engage with each other (Cotta 2012). When it comes to public discourse, one should give

A characterization famously first attributed to former Belgian foreign minister Mark Eyskens. An argument repeatedly made by Antonio Tajani, former President of the European Parliament and current Chair of the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) and also raised by current Commission President Ursula con der Leyen.

1 2

4.1 A Bottom-Up Reform of Europe’s Quasi-Constitutional Order

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due credit to the former for being already out there in the public domain, making an effort to bring their views outside elite circles and institutions. The latter should learn from them and do the same. A shared and contemporary process of constitutional reform launched by the member states from the bottom-up could open up new avenues to also bring a positive European narrative beyond elitist intellectual circles. Within this context, (almost) everything should be up for discussion if Europeans can be safe in the knowledge that they remain bound together by an ideal of “unity in diversity”. Ultimately, this is not only the motto of the European Union. It is also one of the very essences of the demoicratic ideal. Fifth, the launch of a shared bottom-up process aimed at constituting a new European constitutional order could provide an extraordinary opportunity for “making Europeans” through “moments of shared collective identity formation”. As social constructivists correctly point out, to be sustainable over time, every political community needs for its citizens to feel an emotional bond with each other (Wendt 1992, 1994, 1999). Through the months and years of debate that would unfold as part of this process, there could be multiple occasions for some or all European national demoi to come together to nurture the growth of their complementary shared European demos. Public debates, transnational demonstrations, citizens assemblies, live concerts, moving speeches and more could play a role in this respect. The added value is in practice itself. Even before having reached a shared understanding of what Europe is or should become, European demoi could have taken advantage of this process to feel a common European demos as well as being interconnected European demoi. Last but certainly not least, this proposal has the peculiarity to envision a state of affairs whereby some member states could enjoy an extraordinarily strong parliamentary or popular mandate to seek the realization of structural changes to the quasiconstitutional architecture of the European Union independently of whether or not the governments of other member states have received such a mandate. As this proposal could be enacted by either a single country or a relatively small number of member states, it would be possible to bypass the multiple veto system that de facto often makes it impossible to promote significant institutional reforms requiring the consent of 27 national governments. If two or more member states of a significant size (understood in demographic, economic and political terms) were to agree to coordinate the implementation of such a reform, they would equip themselves with a political mandate that would provide them with a significant advantage over other member states in terms of both political momentum and democratic legitimacy. This reform process could be launched either through a popular consultation (i.e. referenda) or, more simply, through a parliamentary vote. Both avenues would provide a strong political (and often a legal) mandate to the government of the country in question.

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4.2

4 Attempting the Leap Forward

Demoicratic Theory as the Basis for Legitimate and Accountable Reform

The launch of a deep and comprehensive reform process of the European constitutional order from the bottom-up and via the nation-state must at all times be both democratically legitimate and accountable to the citizens of Europe. For this purpose, the proposition put forward in this manuscript rests on the theoretical background provided by Kalypso Nicolaïdis’ demoicratic theory (Nicolaïdis 2004). A demoicracy is a “union of peoples governing together but not as one” (Nicolaïdis 2013) within a federal union rather than a federal state (Nicolaïdis 2012). This section, therefore, explores if and how the proposal made in this book subscribes to the five conceptual pathways of demoicratic theory (Nicolaïdis 2017, 2018). The first conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory stresses the point that still and at least for the foreseeable future, the overwhelming majority of European citizens view the nation-state as the most legitimate and accountable unit of analysis within which politics and policy-making must take place. Because of that, any effort that seeks to reform the European governance system and constitutional order must spring from the nation-state, involve the national demos and be accountable to the nation’s democratic process (Nicolaïdis 2018). The proposal put forward in this manuscript clearly subscribes to this first conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory. It does so on three grounds. Firstly, it stresses the need for each member state to consciously take a proactive step to launch and take part in the reform of the European constitutional order by passing specific legislation or amending its constitution. Secondly, it leaves entirely in the heads of each nation-state and its respective existing constitutional order and democratic process to decide how to engage with the proposed reform process. Thirdly, it ensures that, whatever the outcome of the reform process that the nation-states in question arrives at in cooperation with other member states, each individual national demos will have the final say as to whether to approve or reject the proposed new constitutional order. The second conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory highlights the values of “other-regardingness” and democratic interdependence. Here the focus is on how and to what extent democratic processes within on member state might influence similar dynamics in other countries (Nicolaïdis 2017). As the states of the European Union have reached an extraordinary level of interdependence whereby policymaking in one member state directly impacts on that of other countries, it is indeed crucial to explore how democratic processes in one country can influence and shape those of a fellow member state. While this book’s proposal leaves it to each member state of the Union to decide if and when to launch its own attempt at reforming the European constitutional order, it would be highly desirable for this process to start at the same time across at least two member states. Doing so would provide an excellent opportunity for socio-political actors in different countries to engage with the processes of “other-regardingness” and democratic interdependence. As democratic practices aimed at dealing with the same process of European

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constitutional reform would unfold in multiple member states at the same time, these could influence and shape each other through a mutually enriching dialectic exchange. Within this context, the question of cratos would immediately come to the fore. The third conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory warns us to be weary of both horizontal and vertical power asymmetries (Nicolaïdis 2018). European institutions might try to impose their will on the member states, larger member states might attempt to cajole smaller countries in accepting specific dictates, and structurally stronger socio-political actors within each member state might subjugate weaker ones. The synchronization of the launch of and subsequent unfolding of democratic processes within different member states could open a variety of new opportunities to challenge existing patterns of domination. Transnational civil society could launch coordinated public campaigns, smaller member states could forge informal alliances to promote their perspectives vis-à-vis larger countries, and socio-political actors that might be marginalized within their own state might seek to obtain Brussels’ support to apply external pressure on those powers that attempt to dominate them within their own country. The fourth conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory focuses on the need for separate but interconnected national demoi to be able to sustain shared meaningful democratic interdependence and policy-making over a long period of time (Cheneval and Nicolaïdis 2016). This temporal element is crucial to give our European demoi the opportunity to continuously review and, if necessary, outright reverse policy decisions previously taken. Democratic legitimacy and accountability suffer tremendously whenever we live in a state of affairs whereby sunset clauses become the exception rather than the norm and wherever the political system views consent as a one-off experience. Depending on the nature of the reforms that were to be proposed, it could be possible to re-think Europe’s governance framework so as to achieve both of these objectives. Examples of initiatives that could be explored in this respect could include a synchronization of the electoral cycles of the national parliaments with both each other and the European Parliament, a direct link between the results of the European elections within a member state and the nominee of that country for the post of European Commissioner or a stronger connection between the overall performance of a European political group in the European elections and the appointment of the President of the Commission.3 The fifth conceptual pathway of demoicratic theory argues that no single overarching narrative should dominate public discourse when it comes to what Europe is or should become and stresses the importance of a state of affairs whereby multiple narratives interact with each other through a dialectic exchange based on mutual recognition (Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010). If a member state were to launch a process calling for a substantial reform of Europe’s governance system, a public debate would take place as to what should constitute the new order to be established. If two or more countries were to launch this process at the same time, the conditions

3

De facto, a revised and improved variation of the (now defunct?) Spitzenkandidaten system.

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would be in place for the “constructive contamination” of the respective public discourses to take place. Within this context, it would be up to Europe’s civil society and socio-political actors to explore ways in which it could be possible to creatively and sustainably promote a dialogue based on mutual recognition and positive discursive cross-pollination.

4.3

Launching a European Constitutional Reform from the Member States

In order to start a reform process leading to the establishment of a deeper and broader European quasi-constitutional order, specific legislation and, at times, targeted constitutional reforms would have to be passed in the member states of the European Union. From a purely legal point of view, this would be crucial to allow the political leadership and the institutions of the member states in question to take a proactive and ambitious stand in this respect. Having said that, the passing of specific and very targeted legislation would not be enough to determine the nature and content of the changes that would be proposed, let alone to complete the reform process itself. More modestly, the changes in the constitutions of the member states suggested in this chapter would simply enable European countries to start this reform process. The modus operandi and the consequent outcome of such a process would, rightly so, be left open to the member states and their respective demoi to determine. This section looks at how such a reform process could be launched in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In the case of France, no constitutional amendments would have to be passed to launch this reform process. That is because the suggested reform would not need to rely on articles 88-5 or 89 of the French Constitution (Assemblée Nationale 1958). On the one hand, article 88-5 states that “any government bill authorizing the ratification of a treaty pertaining to the accession of a state to the European Union shall be submitted to referendum by the President of the Republic”. This is something that clearly is not envisioned in this proposal. On the other hand, article 89 states that “the President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and Members of Parliament alike shall have the right to initiate amendments to the Constitution”. This article would also be irrelevant as this book’s proposal merely envisions asking French citizens whether or not they would be favourable to launching a process of extraordinary reform of the European Union. The reform process would therefore find its legal basis in the first paragraph of article 11 of the French Constitution.4 This regulates the modalities according to which

“Le Président de la République, sur proposition du Gouvernement pendant la durée des sessions ou sur proposition conjointe des deux Assemblées, publiées au Journal Officiel, peut soumettre au référendum tout projet de loi portant sur l’organisation des pouvoirs publics, sur des réformes relatives à la politique économique, sociale ou environnementale de la nation et aux services publics 4

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referenda can be held. A vote on a government decree asking French MPs for permission to address a question to French citizens to be approved with a simple absolute majority would be sufficient to set in motion the process to hold a referendum. A few considerations of both a legal and political nature are in order at this point. First of all, when it comes to deciding how to propose a referendum, two avenues are available: as an initiative of the President of the Republic following a proposal from the government or, alternatively, as a shared initiative (initiative partagée) involving both citizens and MPs, possibly exclusively from the opposition parties (Assemblée Nationale 2013). Within this context, scholarly opinion seems to be almost unanimous that, due to the multiple requirements to be fulfilled for a Référendum d’Initiative Partagée (RIP) to be enacted, the first approach is much more likely to result in a referendum actually to be held.5 Launching a referendum campaign through an explicit act of government rather than through the RIP would seem to be much easier both from a political and legal point of view. Secondly, article 54 of the constitution could not be invoked by the opponents of a referendum as this, in itself, would have nothing to do with ratifying a new international treaty. What could happen at most is that, if and when a new European constitutional order was to be agreed upon and brought to the French citizens for it to be approved, opponents of such a new European constitutional settlement could try to use article 54 of the French Constitution to oppose the proposed new European constitutional order.6 Equally, and as with all pieces of legislation, article 61 of the constitution could be invoked by opponents of this proposal to call upon the French Constitutional Court to vouch for the constitutionality of the legislation proposed. Having said that, expert opinion of constitutional scholars suggests that the French Constitutional Court would be most unlikely even to review the legislation and that, if it were to do so, it would most likely give its approval to it (as it did, for instance, for the Mahoran status referendum in Mayotte in 2000).7 Thirdly, from a strictly legal point of view, there are no consultative referenda in France: all are legally binding in their result. Because of this, no specific sentence would have to be included in the wording of the referendum’s question stating that, once the eventual reform process was to be concluded, French citizens would be called to approve it or reject it in a second legally binding referendum. Having said

qui y concourent, ou tendant à autoriser la ratification d’un traité qui, sans être contraire à la Constitution, aurait des incidences sur le fonctionnement des institutions”. 5 On the first occasion in which this has been used (for a reform pertaining to the management of the Paris airports), the référendum d’initiative partagée obtained less than a quarter of the necessary signatures and, on the 26th of March 2020, was officially deemed to have failed in its attempt by the French Conseil Constitutionnel. 6 Something that was already attempted, unsuccessfully, to stop French ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 7 Author’s semi-structured interviews via triangulations techniques with leading French constitutional scholars.

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that, there are three reasons why it could nevertheless be wise to include such a statement in any referendum. First, providing French citizens with the “reassurance” that they will always have the last word on whether to approve or reject any new European constitutional settlement would make it more likely to see them approving the launch of the reform process in the first place. Second, should the reform process live to its ambition and deliver profound structural changes to Europe’s constitutional settlement, it would be only appropriate for this to be approved by French citizens. Third and finally, the political pressure on holding a referendum on the result of the reform process would at any rate be extraordinary. While from a strictly legal point of view, a second referendum would not be necessary, from a political view, this would be inevitable. Finally, and for what concerns the wording of the question for the referendum, one could think of two different approaches. A more succinct and stringent one could ask, for instance, whether “the French Republic should support as soon as possible the establishment of a new democratic European state, of which the French Republic should eventually become a member”? Alternatively, a broader and less constraining formulation could ask citizens if “the French Republic should promote as soon as possible an extraordinary leap forward in the process of European integration with the aim of enhancing democracy at the European level and enable Europe to effectively address the historical challenges it faces”? The choice between the two would depend on a strategic political decision. On the one hand, the former formulation could come across as rather intimidating, de facto envisioning the dissolution of the French republic within a broader European state. This could make it less likely for the answer to be positive but, should the citizens’ response be negative, it would make it easier for the political system to come up with an alternative but still ambitious proposals (here leaving aside any considerations as to whether or not doing so would be appropriate from a democratic point of view). On the other hand, the latter formulation would be less “extreme” and ask for a mandate that could be easier to be obtained. However, should the latter formulation fail to achieve the support of French citizens, it would be extraordinarily difficult (at least for a number of years) to reinvigorate the reform process. When it comes to Germany and unlike in the case of France, it would probably be necessary to undergo a process of constitutional reform. Here the opinion among German constitutional scholars is divided. Some argue that article 146 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) could provide the necessary legal basis to call for a referendum by passing an ordinary piece of legislation without resorting to amending the constitution (Deutsche Bundestag 1949). They also point to past legal jurisprudence and rulings by the Second Senate of the German Supreme Court that made it clear that, should Germany take part in a process of significant further European integration, a referendum must take place (BVerfG 2009). While the court’s decision was widely interpreted as an attempt to put the brakes on the process of European integration (Maurer 2009), this ruling could be used as the basis upon which the Bundestag could legitimately call for a referendum without first amending the German Constitution. Having said this, the consensus among constitutional scholars

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is that such an approach would certainly be legally challenged and would end up straight to the German Federal Court for its final judgement.8 Because of this uncertainty, a much safer option would be to seek to amend the Basic Law. Article 29 of the Grundgesetz deals with referenda. However, these are foreseen mainly for issues pertaining to changes to the territory of the federal states (Bundesländern) and, therefore, would not be applicable within the framework of this proposal. The most appropriate way to proceed would then involve a reform of article 23. This long article already deals extensively with issues pertaining to the process of European integration. It would therefore be feasible to envision both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (as foreseen by article 79, paragraph 2 of the German Constitution), jointly establishing a provision whereby the German Parliament could (or should?) call for referenda pertaining to the further deepening of the process of European integration. The actual referendum could then be called according to the provisions set forth in the new constitutional article, for instance, via an ordinary legislative procedure to be adopted through an absolute majority vote. A few important issues should be kept in mind within this context. To begin with, it could be sensible to state clearly in the question of the referendum that, as this would only start a reform process, German citizens will then be asked to vote in a second legally binding referendum to approve or reject the result of the reforms that would have been agreed by Germany with other member states of the European Union. This provision would have two benefits. On the one hand, it would reassure citizens that only they, under all circumstances, would have the final say on the proposed new constitutional order. On the other hand, it would protect the referendum, whether or not this were to be only consultative or legally binding, from being legally challenged on the grounds that it would deprive German citizens of their sovereignty. A second provision that could be inserted directly within the question of the referendum is the one pertaining to the upholding of democratic principles. The German Constitution already makes it very clear that the process of European integration should at all times protect and promote democratic principles (Deutsche Bundestag 1949). Past jurisprudence emanating from the Federal Court of Justice has also already stressed the need to reinforce the “democratic element” within the process of European integration (BVerfG 2009). An explicit reference to the fact that the eventual result of the reform process would have to be characterized by a significant enhancement of democratic processes at the European level would clearly acknowledge that the principles stated in the German Constitution and the concerns highlighted by the country’s supreme court in its most recent rulings have been adequately taken into account. Finally, the question for the referendum could include a statement stressing that, should democratic principles cease to be upheld within the reformed European constitutional order, the Federal Republic of Germany would be entitled to withdraw from it unilaterally. Like the two previous recommendations, this formulation would

8

Author’s semi-structured interviews with leading German constitutional scholars.

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not be necessary from a strictly constitutional point of view, but it could certainly help in both political and legal terms. These three caveats would reassure citizens as to the nature of the reform process that will be started with a positive answer to the question of the first (only consultative?) referendum. At the same time, they would pre-emptively neutralize some of the legal challenges that the most conservative elements within the Federal Court of Justice might think of putting forward to stop the reform process from being launched in the first place. Past experience provides a useful template for Italy to work with. While Italian jurisprudence does not foresee the consultative referendum as a legislative tool,9 a consultative referendum specifically on European affairs already took place in Italy on the 18 June 1989, at the same time as the elections for the European Parliament. Held on the basis of the Legge Costituzionale (Constitutional Law) n. 2 of the 3 April 1989, (Parlamento Italiano 1989), the referendum asked Italian citizens if they would have liked for the (then) European Communities to be transformed into a fully fledged Union with a government answerable to the European Parliament and for this to draft a European Constitution.10 The relatively straightforward procedure that was followed on that occasion to allow for the consultative referendum to go ahead could be employed again. A legge costituzionale (Constitutional Law) is a rather peculiar instrument typical of the Italian legal order that allows Parliament to pass a specific piece of legislation that has, in hierarchical terms, de facto the same value as an article of the constitution without directly amending this. In order to be approved, a constitutional law must go through a particularly laborious process (processo rafforzato) as prescribed by article 138 of the country’s constitution (Senato della Repubblica Italiana 1948). The key feature of this process envisions the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) and the Senate (Senato della Repubblica) voting on the proposed legislation two times with a minimum interval of three months between each respective vote and with an absolute majority necessary to carry the second vote. Should the second vote be passed with a qualified majority of more than two-thirds of the votes, the constitutional law enters into force immediately. Otherwise, specific provisions state that a fifth of the member of a chamber of Parliament, 500,000 citizens or five regional councils have three months from the day of the second reading in the second chamber of Parliament to ask for the legislation to be put to a referendum to be finally approved or rejected. A few observations might be necessary at his stage. To begin with, one would have to look at the exact wording of the question for the referendum. The formulation chosen for the referendum in 1989 was very specific. This stated: “Do you think that the European Communities should be transformed into a genuine Union, with a

9

The Italian Constitution foresees only four types of referenda: those abolishing existing legislation (article 75), those pertaining to regional affairs (article 123), those pertaining to the territory of the Republic (article 132) and those to approve, under specific conditions, constitutional changes (article 138). 10 The referendum was approved with 88.03% of the votes in favour.

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government accountable to Parliament, with the European Parliament itself given the mandate to draw up a draft European Constitution to be submitted directly to the competent bodies of the Member States of the Community for ratification?”. The historical precedent would therefore seem to suggest that even extremely ambitious formulations could be approved by the Italian Constitutional Court. Having said that, and while absolutely legitimate on legal grounds, equally precise but perhaps less “intimidating” articulations could stand a better chance of being approved from a political perspective. Secondly, it is important to dispel the idea that faster avenues could be available to move forward with this proposal. While theoretically, one could rely upon article 71 of the constitution as the legal basis for achieving this objective through an ordinary legislative process, this is unlikely to be viable. It is certainly true that the Italian Constitution nowhere explicitly forbids holding consultative referenda. Yet, one of the specific purposes of the leggi costituzionali is to legislate on those matters that have the potential to alter the nature of the Italian constitutional order. The proposal put forward in this manuscript clearly does have such potential and, therefore, the processo aggravato that comes with a constitutional law is absolutely appropriate. Also, in light of historical precedent, by unfolding the process through a legge costituzionale, one could be virtually sure that no legal challenges could succeed if put forward to the Italian Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale).11 As past jurisprudence suggests, such a referendum would be of a consultative nature and would only be aimed at starting a reform process of the European constitutional order. Because of that, a second legally binding referendum would then certainly have to take place to bring to an end the reform process that the Italian Republic would have gone through together with other European Union member states and for Italian citizens to either approve or reject the proposed new constitutional order. There would therefore be some substantive differences between the two referenda. The first would not be legally binding, while the second would be it. The first would not require a quorum, while the second would (probably) require it. Finally, and unlike the first one, the second referendum would almost certainly come under the scrutiny of the Italian Constitutional Court as, should it be approved, the second referendum would possibly de facto sanction a passage of core constitutional competences from the nation-state to the higher level of European governance. As it has been the case for Italy, Spain also provides us with an historical precedent that could point the way forward for the future. On the 20 February 2005, Spanish citizens were called to the ballot box to state whether or not they approved of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.12 This was a consultative, not legally binding referendum that gave a political mandate to the Spanish Parliament (Cortes Generales) to approve the Treaty two months later. A similar approach could therefore be pursued with the aim of entrusting the Spanish

11 12

Author’s semi-structured interviews with leading Italian constitutional scholars. 81.84% of them gave a positive answer.

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government with launching and contributing, ideally together with as many as possible other member states, to a reform process of the European constitutional order. In order for this to happen, two avenues would be available, depending on whether or not one would opt for a referendum with a question that would de facto foresee the “complete dissolution” of the Spanish state within a broader constitutional order. Should one choose this extreme option, it could become necessary, on the basis of article 167, to amend article 93 of the Spanish Constitution through a three-fifth majority vote in each chamber of Parliament. More complex still and as per article 168, a reform of articles 1 and 2 of the constitution might, in this case, have to be considered as well. This change would involve a vote in each chamber of parliament, a general election, and then another vote in each chamber of parliament (Senado de España 1978). This approach would, of course, be extremely complex from both a legal and political point of view and should probably be avoided. Having said that, according to a number of constitutional scholars, this challenging process could be avoided in favour of a significantly less burdensome procedure. The second avenue available consists in relying upon the legal basis provided by article 92 of the Spanish Constitution. This clearly states that a referendum on “particularly relevant political questions” can be called by the Prime Minister by drafting an organic law obtaining the approval of a simple absolute majority of deputies in the lower chamber of parliament. Should this method be chosen, no constitutional amendments whatsoever would be necessary. Additionally, within this context, there would not even be the need for the upper chamber of parliament (Senado) to vote on the issue: approval of the lower chamber of parliament (Congreso de los Diputados) would be sufficient. According to a variety of Spanish constitutional scholars, this should be the preferable course of action: one that, at least from a strictly legal point of view, seems relatively straightforward. It should therefore come as no surprise that this is the approach that was already followed to call for the referendum in 2005 (Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado 2005). Two final remarks are in order at this point if one were to follow an approach that would privilege relying upon article 92 of the constitution to call for a referendum via an organic law adopted through a simple absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. On the one hand, one would have to privilege a “broad formulation” when it comes to the wording of the question for the referendum. Because of this, a formulation along the lines of “should the Kingdom of Spain promote as soon as possible an extraordinary leap forward in the process of European integration that will strengthen democracy at the European level and allow Europe to effectively face the historical challenges it faces?” should be preferred to a stricter wording such as “should the Kingdom of Spain contribute to the establishment and consequently become a member state of a new and complete European democratic state”? On the other hand, two specific provisions might have to be included in the question for the referendum. The first one would have to clearly state that Spanish citizens will be entitled to vote in a second legally binding referendum to either approve or reject the outcome of the reform process that the Kingdom of Spain will

References

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have contributed to together with its European partners. The second one would have to stress that the result of the process leading to a new European constitutional settlement would have to rest on firm democratic principles and that, should these ever cease to exists, the Kingdom of Spain would be free to withdraw from the revised European constitutional order. With these crucial caveats included in the question for the referendum, there should be no major legal obstacles preventing the Spanish government from calling its citizens to the ballot box on the basis of article 92 of the Spanish Constitution. Crucially, the proposed provision of a political mandate to any of the national governments of the four countries in question would not necessarily have to stem from a popular consultation in the form of either a consultive or a legally binding referendum. While such an approach would certainly be the most impressive in both political and democratic terms, it would certainly be also the one fraught with the most risks. Because of this, one or more member states could instead opt for the necessary political mandate to be provided through one or both chambers of parliament. In this case, an ordinary legislative procedure envisioning a simple majority vote could be sufficient to kickstart the process.

References Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado (2005) Real Decreto 5/2005, de 14 de enero, por el que se somete a referéndum consultivo de la Nación la decisión política de ratificar el Tratado por el que se establece una Constitución para Europa. Boletín Oficial del Estado, Madrid Assemblée Nationale (1958) Constitution de la République Française. http://www.assembleenationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Assemblée Nationale (2013) LOI organique n
2013-1114 du 6 décembre 2013 portant application de l’article 11 de la Constitution. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do? cidTexte¼JORFTEXT000028278925. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Bossuyt F (2007) An economic giant, political dwarf and military worm? Introducing the concept of ‘transnational power over’ in studies of (the EU’s) power in IR. Draft paper presented at the 4th ECPR General Conference, University of Pisa, Italy, 6–8 Sep 2007 BVerfG (2009) Judgement of the Second Senate of 30th of June 2009 - 2BvE 2/08. https://www. bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_ 2bve000208en.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Cheneval F, Nicolaïdis K (2016) The social construction of demoicracy in the EU. Eur J Polit Theory 16(2):235–260 Cotta M (2012) Political elites and polity in the making: the case of the EU. Hist Soc Res 37 (1):167–192 Deutsche Bundestag (1949) Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. https://www. bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Follesdal A, Hix S (2006) Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: a response to Majone and Moravcsik. J Common Mark Stud 44(9):533–562 Lacroix J, Nicolaïdis K (eds) (2010) European stories. Oxford University Press, Oxford Majone G (1998) Europe’s democratic deficit: the question of standards. Eur Law J 4(1):5–28 Maurer A (2009) German brakes on integration - consequences and dangers of the Federal Constitutional Court judgment for Germany and the EU. SWP Comments. German Institute for Security and International Affairs, Berlin

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Moravcsik A (1998) European integration at century’s end. In: Moravcsik A (ed) Centralization or fragmentation? Europe facing the challenges of deepening, diversity and democracy. Council on Foreign Relations, New York Moravcsik A (2002) In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing the legitimacy of the European Union. J Common Mark Stud 40(4):603–634 Nicolaïdis K (2004) We, the peoples of Europe. Foreign Aff:97–101 Nicolaïdis K (2012) The idea of European demoicracy. In: Dickson J, Eleftheriadis P (eds) Philosophical foundations of European Union law. Oxford Scholarship Online, Oxford Nicolaïdis K (2013) European demoicracy and its crisis. J Common Mark Stud 51(2):351 Nicolaïdis K (2017) Mutual recognition: promise and denial, from sapiens to Brexit. Curr Legal Prob 70(1):1–40 Nicolaïdis K (2018) Braving the waves? Europe’s constitutional settlement at twenty. J Common Mark Stud 56(7):1614–1630 Oberthür S, Jørgensen K, Shahin J (eds) (2017) The performance of the EU in international institutions. Routledge, New York Parlamento Italiano (1989) Legge Costituzionale 3 Aprile 1989, n. 2. Indizione di un referendum di indirizzo sul conferimento di un mandato costituente al Parlamento Europeo che sara’ eletto nel 1989. Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana. https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1989/ 04/06/089G0146/sg. Accessed 23 Jul 2021 Schuette L (2019) Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting? Centre for European Reform. https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Senado de España (1978) Constitucion Española. http://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/ normas/constitucion/index.html. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Senato della Repubblica Italiana (1948) Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana. http://www.senato. it/1024. Accessed 6 Aug 2021 Wendt A (1992) Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. Int Organ 46(2):391–425 Wendt A (1994) Collective identity formation and the international state. Am Polit Sci Rev 88 (2):384–396 Wendt A (1999) Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1

Taking Stock

All the proposals put forward in this monograph share a number of characteristics. To begin with, they can be implemented within each country in question independently of all other member states of the European Union. This is crucial to make it harder for one or more recalcitrant countries to block pioneering member states from moving forward in adopting, alone or together, one or more of the proposals put forward. Any reform proposals that must receive the approval of all 27 European Union national governments and parliaments to be ratified are unlikely to be discussed, let alone ratified. The beauty of the propositions put forward in this book consists in the fact that, for these to have an impact, it would be sufficient for a couple of large member states to implement them. Should a national government enjoy the necessary majority within its own parliament, it would be possible for it to translate these proposals into reality without having to ask for the approval of other member states, of the European institutions in Brussels, or, to mention just a random capital, Berlin. While the broadest possible support should ideally be obtained for these proposals across all member states of the European Union, it is currently not realistic to expect even a simple majority of member states to be supportive of such ideas. The reasons for this state of affairs are various. Some member states have not gone as far as others when it comes to their overall degree of European integration. Looking up north where the Euro is not (yet?) the official currency, where exemptions from key policy areas in the field of justice and home affairs are the norms and where the process of European integration is still relatively new, the ground might not yet be fertile for such propositions. Looking east, the situation is often rather discouraging. While most countries have, due to historical reasons, a rather different understanding of the process of European integration compared to the “old” member states of the Union, a couple of specific member states, in particular, would pose almost insurmountable obstacles for these reforms to be implemented. A mix of nationalist, xenophobic and populist forces in one country © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Garavoglia, Mind the European Gap, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88078-1_5

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5 Conclusion

and, even worse, increasing authoritarian tendencies in another alert us to the fact that sadly and hopefully only for the time being, these capitals are no-go areas for the socio-political actors that back these proposals. The need for unanimity or even a qualified majority must be dispensed with. These proposals fulfil this requirement: they can become a reality and have an enormous impact on the whole of the European Union simply by being implemented in a couple of key members states. Secondly, all propositions presented here account for the need to deal with different temporal windows of political opportunity. While one of the explicit aims of these proposals is to nurture the Europeanization of national public spheres, at present, we are nevertheless still dealing with remarkably different national public spheres that, in turn, nurture different temporal windows of political opportunity. Because of this, the best moment to promote a specific proposal in each country might differ across both time and space. At any given time, one member state might be led by a fervent pro-European leader who enjoys both the intellectual stature and the parliamentary majority to push for substantive reforms. Another country might be steered by a technocratic government that, while very supportive of these proposals, might be unable to persuade some of the political forces upon which it must rely to back these propositions. A third country might be in the midst of a heated electoral campaign whereby no decision as to if and how these proposals could be supported will be taken until a new post-electoral parliamentary majority will have been sorted out. And a fourth country might see the presence of numerous pro-European forces eager to support such reforms but unable to move forward due to the chronic political instability dictated by the fragmentation of its political landscape. Proposals that aim to be translated into political reality at the same time across member states by ignoring this state of affairs are bound to fail. Those that are flexible enough to be implemented according to different national timelines and the national political circumstances of the moment stand a much better chance of succeeding in the medium to long term. A reasonable expansion of the timeframe of reference could therefore substantially enhance the likelihood of seeing such reforms having a significant impact in more than one member state and, therefore, across the whole of the European Union. These proposals can be put forward at diverse points in time across different member states. Thirdly, it is important to be aware of the fact that all suggestions put forward here have already been checked in terms of their legal feasibility. In consultation with leading constitutional scholars from across Europe, it was possible to establish that, from a purely legal perspective, these propositions are already compatible with the existing legislation, jurisprudence and constitutional requirements of the member states under investigation. Indeed, the proposals shared in this monograph envision a shared end point for all member states in question but, at the same time, acknowledge the different requirements that must be fulfilled within national constitutional and legal frameworks that are still widely dissimilar from each other. Because of this, different avenues are envisioned for each country to achieve the same objective. In some instances, constitutional reforms with two-third or three-fifth majorities are required. In other cases, changes to existing secondary legislation or passing new ordinary legislation with a simple majority vote might be sufficient. In other

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situations, moral suasion might not only be enough but, indeed, the most appropriate way of moving forward. The strength of these proposals, therefore, also lays in the fact that, while all sharing a common objective, they can be achieved flexibly through different political processes, mechanisms and expedients so as to account for the different constitutional, legal and political circumstances of the member states in question. Finally, all the proposals shared in this book could nurture snowball and bandwagon effects whereby the greater the number of member states attempting to pursue a selected initiative, the greater the incentive for a larger number of countries also to promote such reform. Let us for a second assume that one major European country makes it clear that, as far as it is concerned, the leader of the party or the coalition that wins the most seats in the European Parliament should have a go at becoming the President of the European Commission and that all Commissioners should be chosen from amongst democratically elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Would it not become extremely difficult for other member states to resists such a “democratic imperative” and also follow suit to provide a positive answer to such a legitimate demand for more democracy in Europe? Let us now imagine that two or three of the largest member states of the European Union (in economic and demographic terms as well as within the European Parliament and in the Council of the European Union) were to synchronize the elections for their national parliaments with those for the European Parliament. Such a coordination would, almost instantly, set the political and temporal agenda for the whole of Europe. If new parliaments and governments are to be elected in Paris, Berlin, Rome and Madrid at the same time as the European Parliament (and, therefore, the European Commission) in Brussels, the political agenda for the following five years would de facto be set forth in these five capitals. Because of this state of affairs, there would exist a tremendous incentive for other EU member states to join this “elite group of agenda setters”. Would not more national governments want to be among those that set the political agenda for years to come? Other countries would have a strong incentive to promote institutional reforms to synchronize their parliamentary elections with those of the European Parliament and this pioneering group of member states. A positive domino effect would then be kick-started. Finally, let us picture a situation whereby citizens across a couple of key member states were to successfully launch public campaigns to “occupy” their national public spheres to propagate a pro-European public discourse demanding a commitment from their respective governments to engage themselves in favour of a great leap forward in the process of European integration. Would not this state of affairs provide an ideal context for other pro-European forces to “refer to the example of our fellow European citizens next door” to promote a similar dynamic in their own country? As long as national media in one country were to report on the developments taking place in another one, the conditions would be in place for citizens in general and civil society actors, in particular, to synchronize, replicate and support each other’s increasingly transnational and pan-European public discourses. A progressive pro-European public discourse from below could then easily spill over from one country to the other and spread across the Union.

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5.2

5 Conclusion

Moving Forward

What would it take for these propositions to see the light of day? Two avenues (which combined make a third one) might be envisioned. The first one would involve taking these suggestions directly to the highest possible political level to the Presidents, Chancellors and Prime Ministers of the countries in question to explore if these were to have both an interest and the capacity to translate these proposals into political reality. While not exactly straightforward, it is certainly possible to envisage ways to reach these political leaders. Should one or more of these leaders decide to take ownership of some of these proposals, it would then be up to the country’s governmental, institutional and diplomatic structures to activate themselves to coordinate with other member states to translate ideas into political reality. However, while at least some political leaders might be in principle very well disposed towards these suggestions, there exists the danger that they might struggle to find the “political bandwidth” to give them the necessary consideration and to mobilize the political capital required to translate them into reality. Day to day challenges, sudden political crisis and banal party infighting might require their attention in a constant whirlwind of political fire-fighting. To translate these ideas into reality, “going to the top” might be a necessary condition. But possibly not a sufficient one. The second possible avenue to be investigated could involve an approach “from below” aimed at establishing a “grand pro-European alliance” of those actors that exist beyond the world of formal party politics that would have themselves both an interest and the capacity to promote these proposals. A large-scale mapping exercise would be required to systematically determine who these socio-political actors are across EU member states. To do so, one would have to look not only at the domain of formal politics but also to the worlds of business, media (both traditional and new ones), the arts, academia and intellectuals and, of course, to that segment of civil society that is specifically dedicated to fostering the process of European integration. Together, these socio-political actors would be in a position to “put on the map” the reforms that have been proposed and, possibly, contribute to fostering a general climate whereby busy political leaders will suddenly “find the necessary bandwidth” and attention to engage with these proposals adequately. Within the domain of party politics, it would be necessary not only to identify which MPs have a positive predisposition toward the European ideal but, also, to gauge the extent to which these would be willing and able to work across party lines. Crucially, it would also be important to understand the leverage that these individuals could exert within their own political family to carry formal motions in favour of the desired policies and to seek the support of the broader political majority behind the national government or, even better, to form an ad hoc grand coalition with parties from the opposition. While sometimes formal roles and positions within a political party might, at first sight, provide a good proxy for gauging all this, research would have to be conducted to go well beyond such ephemeral picture so as to explore which individuals are likely to play a crucial role over time and across the

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different alliances and strategic constellations that inevitably continuously re-shape all parties internally. Exploring this domain would, of course, also help determining what could be the best timing for the political establishment to try to translate these proposals into legislation. When looking at the world of business and finance, a number of issues should be kept in mind. Which business leaders have the bandwidth to dedicate a small portion of their time to a topic that does not directly address their monetary concerns on the short term? Which ones might be willing not just to talk the talk but also walk the walk and, if required, provide some of the financial resources that any serious political campaign necessitate? What about potential conflicts of interests between the ideals that might be shared with other business leaders and the financial priorities that might separate them from each other? And which business leaders might be most apt at supporting such proposals? Those CEOs that enjoy the influence that comes with having behind them an enormous multinational company with a heterogeneous body of shareholders or those chairpersons from family-owned companies that go back many generations and represent large industrial families? These are only some of the questions that would have to be addressed. The media landscape would also have to be explored. While many national newspapers and, to a lesser extent, television channels and radio stations espouse a relatively clear and defined political stand on European affairs, they would nevertheless have to be analyzed to understand the personal positions of key majority shareholders of the papers’ directors and of their leading journalists. As for “new” (i.e. social and digital) media, a significant amount of time would have to be dedicated to understanding which shapes public discourse on European affairs (both in the eyes of “European policy geeks” and the broader public) and, also, how one could effectively engage with such a dispersed and multifaced (dis)information ecosystem. When it comes to Europe, which media outlets still “set the stage” for others to follow? Despite the proliferation of views and outlets, are there perhaps specific websites, titles and names that lead for all others to follow? And what of regional media outlets (often at least partly owned by larger national conglomerates) or those that, on the other hand, aspire to cater to a small but extremely influential pan-European audience? Artists and creative types oftentimes like to think of themselves as borderless, open and liberal. But is this truly the case? While certainly plenty of them do have strong connections across European countries, many do not. Here significant work would have to go into understanding which artists do genuinely belong to pan-European networks, which ones are still essentially operating and embedded within national contexts and, crucially, how to connect the latter with each other. When and how do artists come together as Europeans? Under which conditions might they be prepared to give a more explicitly political dimension to their work? Are there recognized leaders within the European artistic landscape or key “social nodes” that could be engaged to promote a mobilization of the European arts scene in favour of these proposals? All these questions would need to be answered for the arts to be able to give a crucial contribution to nurturing the image, the narrative and the “story” that would have to accompany any broad societal mobilization.

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5 Conclusion

When it comes to the world of ideas, one could be forgiven for attempting a crass distinction between formal academia and intellectuals, more broadly speaking. As for the former, it would be interesting to explore which academics and other respected scholars would be willing to put their name (or, perhaps more appropriately, their signature) to a manifesto aimed at supporting these proposals. Their engagement would certainly give additional weight and respectability to the proposals put forward in this monograph. As for the latter, it would be fascinating to investigate if and how it could be possible to develop a network of sympathetic opinion-makers and members of a growing transnational European intelligentsia that, each within her or his domain, could buttress a fertile ground for a public discourse supportive of these ideals. Within such a context, it would also be important to explore how it could be possible to synchronize their engagement so as to achieve the maximum impact when it comes to shaping interconnected national public discourses. As for civil society, one is immediately led to think about those organizations specifically dedicated to advancing the process of European integration. They are many, are to be found all over Europe and belong to roughly three categories: those that promote the broad European ideal through think-tank style research and its related outreach initiatives, those that focus on advancing the interests of specific professional categories and institutions through lobbying, and those (often aimed at the younger generations) that promote a more activist approach involving demonstrations, public actions and petitions. For the first type of organizations, it would be particularly important to appreciate how to navigate the inevitable conflicts of interests and “image contests” that tend to emerge as they often compete with one another to secure both public attention and financial resources. For the second group, the key question is if and how their very specific business interests could be aligned with the broader ideals put forward through these proposals so as to obtain their support as well. Finally, for the last kind of associations, it would be crucial to understand what are their effective mobilization capacities (i.e. the extent to which they are actually able to “bring citizens to the streets”) and to assess the quality of their organizational structures (which are often overwhelmingly reliant on young and inexperienced volunteers). Of course, nothing stands in the way of merging the first approach (which aims at “going to the top” by addressing these proposals directly to the political leaderships of the four countries in question) with the second approach (which seeks to nurture a pro-European discourse within interconnected national public spheres that would make it easier for these proposals to be taken on board by the political establishment to translate them into political reality). Quite to the contrary, such a joint approach could be most welcome. What is needed for ambitious reforms to take place across the European Union is a “pincer movement”. Taking a leaf from military strategy, we could think of a “political double envelopment” from both below and above. The former to provide a context characterized by a public discourse that is favourable to the narratives promoted by pro-European socio-political actors. And the latter for pro-European political leaders to take swift and decisive action to implement far-reaching reforms on the back of a synchronized pan and pro-European public

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discourse. It is for the democratically elected leaders of the constituting nation-states of the European Union to decide if and how to translate the proposals put forth in this monograph into reality. But it is for all European citizens, united in their diversity, to take a stand to demand a radical improvement in the quality of European democratic and policy-making processes.

Index

B Basic Law, 24, 25, 38, 50, 51

G Germany, 10, 11, 24, 25, 30, 37, 38, 48, 50, 51

C Commissioner, 15–17, 19, 20, 23, 25–27, 33, 34, 47 Constitution, 17, 22, 23, 25–27, 34, 37–40, 46, 49, 50, 52–54 Court, xv, 23, 37, 39, 40, 49–53

I Intergovernmentalist, 2, 4, 8, 10, 11, 19, 21, 34, 36 Italy, 10, 11, 25, 30, 37, 39, 48, 52, 53

D Democratic, vii, 1–5, 7–9, 11, 15–21, 23–26, 30, 32, 34–36, 44–47, 50, 51, 54, 55, 59, 63 Demoi, 2, 3, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19–22, 31, 33–36, 44, 45, 47, 48 Demoicracy, 8, 9, 22, 34, 46 E Elections, 5, 15–17, 20, 23–26, 29–40, 47, 52, 59 European Commission, xv, 6, 10, 15–18, 20, 21, 23, 25–27, 29, 30, 34, 35, 43, 59 European Council, 10, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25–27 Europeanisation, 1–4, 7–11, 33, 40, 58 European Parliament, xv, 5, 10, 15–18, 20, 21, 23–26, 29–33, 35–40, 44, 47, 52, 53, 59 European Union (EU), vii, xv, 1, 3–11, 15, 17–19, 21–26, 29, 30, 33–35, 37, 39, 43–46, 48, 51, 53, 57–59, 62 Italy, vii

M Member States, 22–27, 48, 53

P President, xv, 15, 17–19, 21–27, 30, 38, 39, 44, 47–49, 59 Public sphere, 1–4, 7, 11 R Reform, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15–21, 23–26, 29–31, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 43–54, 57, 59 S Secondly, 2, 5, 7, 10, 30, 37, 39, 40, 46, 49, 53, 58 Spain, vii, 10, 11, 26, 27, 30, 32, 37, 38, 40, 48, 53, 54 Synchronisation, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 40, 47

U United Kingdom, xv, 10, 11

F France, 10, 11, 23, 25, 29, 30, 37, 38, 43, 48–50

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Garavoglia, Mind the European Gap, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88078-1

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