Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy 019766718X, 9780197667187

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
1. Marx and Markets
2. Marx and Democracy
3. Marx and Minority Revolution
4. Marx and Majority Revolution
5. Marx and Social Democratic Revolution
6. Marx and Social Democracy
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy

Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy P H I L I P J. KA I N

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Control Number: 2022049871 ISBN 978–​0–​19–​766718–​7 DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.001.0001 1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America

Contents Acknowledgments  Abbreviations 

vii ix

Introduction 

1



 arx and Marxisms  M Terminology 

1 6

1. Marx and Markets 

16

2. Marx and Democracy 

40

3. Marx and Minority Revolution 

58

4. Marx and Majority Revolution 

76



 arkets and Fetishism  M Ending Fetishism  Post-​capitalist Stages  Socialist Inefficiency   olitical Alienation  P Paris Commune  Democracy  Dictatorship of the Proletariat  State as Battleground  Proletarian Minority   inority Revolution  M Permanent Revolution  Russian Revolution 

 ajority Revolution  M Historical Materialism and the Categorical Imperative  Compatibility of Models for Revolution  Political Revolution and Social Revolution 

16 23 26 35 40 43 46 49 52 56 58 66 70 76 80 84 87

vi Contents

5. Marx and Social Democratic Revolution 

S ocial Democratic Revolution  Industrial Proletariat Never Becomes a Majority  Social Democracy and the Categorical Imperative  Social Democracy and Historical Materialism  Marx and the Social Democratic Party of Germany 

90

90 94 99 113 121

6. Marx and Social Democracy 

125

Notes  Bibliography  Index 

153 201 219



 haracteristics of Social Democracy  C The Meidner Plan  Planning  Social Democracy and Capitalism  Polarization and Immiseration  Concluding Remarks 

125 131 135 141 146 151

Acknowledgments I began studying Marx some fifty years ago in graduate school at UC San Diego. I studied a bit under Herbert Marcuse and then under Stanley Moore. The latter became my dissertation director, and the dissertation became my first book. I have been deeply influenced by Moore. His thought permeates all my work, especially that on Marx. Nevertheless, we disagree significantly on some issues. Moore was a Marxian who became an anti-​Marxian. He favored market socialism and pitted it against Marx. I have remained a Marxian and I think Marx more and more became a social democrat. Where Moore saw contradictions in Marx’s thought, I tend to see shifts and development. That is what I will argue in this book, which, if not a settling of accounts, is at any rate another engagement with Moore.

Abbreviations Capital Ch1 Marx, Capital, Volume I, Chapter 1 CHPL Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law CHPLI Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Introduction” CPE Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy CSF Marx, The Class Struggles in France CWF Marx, The Civil War in France EPM Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 GI Marx & Engels, The German Ideology “Gotha Program” Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Programme” ICSF Engels, “Introduction to Karl Marx’s The Class Struggles in France” ICWF Engels, “Introduction to Karl Marx’s Civil War in France” JQ Marx, “On the Jewish Question” KMP&R Avineri, Karl Marx: Philosophy and Revolution M&E Kain, Marx and Ethics M&MPT Kain, Marx and Modern Political Theory Manifesto Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party MECW Marx & Engels, Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works MME&H Kain, Marx’ Method, Epistemology, and Humanism “Principles” Engels, “Principles of Communism” S&PTKM Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx SH&M Kain, Schiller, Hegel, and Marx SPD Sozialdemokratishe Partei Deutschlands

Introduction Marx and Marxisms Many people consider Marx to be a totalitarian and Soviet Marxism the realization of his thought.1 If one shows them the texts, proves to them that Marx was a radical democrat, they often flip and think him utopian. Totalitarian or utopian—​for many those seem to be the alternatives. How might one combat this completely mistaken conception? What if one could show that European social democracy exemplified Marx’s thought far better than did Soviet Marxism?2 If social democracy is closer to being the true heir of Marx, then all claims of totalitarianism evaporate. There is nothing remotely totalitarian about social democracy. It is as democratic as what we have in the United States—​and arguably more so. Nor is there anything remotely utopian about social democracy. It exists. It exists all over Western Europe and Britain—​as well as elsewhere. Nevertheless, when a lot of people think of Marxism, they think of the USSR. And Western capitalists have certainly worked to reinforce this notion. The USSR was obviously anti-​democratic and totalitarian. Marx must be also. No need to slog through all those difficult texts—​just look at the Soviets if you want to understand what Marx leads to. Moreover, the Soviets themselves reinforced this capitalist propaganda. They claimed they were the real Marxists, the ones that put into practice the thought of Marx. They were the ones that actually succeeded in making a Marxist revolution. They claimed to be the Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy. Philip J. Kain, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.003.0001

2  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy true Marxists—​which served to legitimate them, reinforce their authority, and justify their leadership. Capitalists and communists, the United States and the USSR, find themselves in agreement here. Both think the true realization of Marx’s thought is to be found in Soviet Marxism—​and both are wrong. From early on there had been serious ideological disagreement between European social democracy and Soviet Marxism. The SPD, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratishe Partei Deutschlands), the party of Liebknecht, Bebel, Kautsky, and Bernstein, had been critical of Lenin and the Bolsheviks from the start. They opposed their undemocratic and extra-​parliamentary tactics, their refusal to allow other parties, and certainly the claim that they ought to be the model for Western Europe.3 On the other hand, Lenin and the Bolsheviks painted the SPD as renegades, reformers, revisionists, all terms of abuse suggesting the abandonment of real Marxism—​and all of this when Marx and Engels for years had worked closely with Liebknecht, Bebel, Kautsky, Bernstein, and the SPD. Despite all that, it was supposed to be Lenin and the Bolsheviks that were the true Marxists. As for Western capitalists, it was very much in their interest to tie Marx, Marxism, and social democracy to the Soviets, to emphasize the Soviet absence of democracy, and to paint this as the telos of Western European social democracy, all while the SPD was gaining strength through parliamentary democracy—​actually winning elections in Germany and gaining seats in parliament.4 Indeed, just before the First World War, the SPD became not only the largest party in Germany with the largest number of seats in the Reichstag,5 but the largest socialist party in the world.6 Someone like Hayek pushes this sort of tactic to extremes. He claims that Soviet Marxism is the true telos of all Western European socialist parties, and then faults those same parties for being “inhibited by their democratic ideals; they did not possess the ruthlessness required for the performance of their chosen task.”7 The actual parliamentary activity of social democrats, their actual

Introduction  3 commitment to democracy, their actual democratic success, is dismissed as irrelevant. On what grounds? Because Hayek can discern the true essence of socialism behind its surface appearance. Either it moves toward Soviet totalitarianism, or it fails to realize its essence. Metaphysics of the very worst sort.8 It is the SPD that represented orthodox Marxism, which was quite different from and hostile to Soviet Marxism. But social democracy is caught in a dilemma. For a social democratic party to show insufficient opposition to Soviet tactics would lose them votes, and thus seats in parliament, and thus the ability to move society toward socialism, which then would lose them even more votes. A social democratic party must insist, and wants to insist, that it rejects the Soviet model. But then the Soviets will say it is rejecting real Marxism and real socialism. So, what should social democrats do? Well, they can swear off Marxism altogether so as not to be lumped with the Soviets, as some social democratic parties in fact did. Or they can defend Marx, the Marxism of Marx himself, and real democracy. And they can argue against Soviet Marxism and its lack of democracy. But this will get them into complex philosophical arguments about Marxism that few will be able to follow—​and few voters would care about. The capitalists, of course, will ignore all such arguments, which they do not understand anyway, and simply insist that social democrats are just socialists that, if allowed to proceed, will eventually be seen to be no different than the Soviets.9 One of the major stumbling blocks to the development of a socialist consciousness in the United States has been the unacceptable and undemocratic character of the Soviet Union. Fetscher, for example, even thinks “the ‘victory’ of socialism in backward Russia did more harm than good to the chances of a socialist revolution in the industrial Western countries.”10 For any contemporary Marxian, one of the biggest issues, if not the biggest, is that of democracy. What went wrong? Why were the Soviets so undemocratic? Not because Marx was undemocratic. Certainly not because it is the essence of Marxism to be undemocratic. Not because

4  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy if Marxism actualizes itself in the world it will necessarily be undemocratic. That is all capitalist propaganda, enabled by the undemocratic character of one of the first countries to try to establish socialism. So why did Russia fail to develop democratically? One of the major reasons was that it was hardly a capitalist society and barely had a proletariat. The proletariat amounted to a small percentage of the population. The vast majority were peasants. If Russia had stuck to democracy, it could not have developed socialism. Even if it had succeeded in winning over the proletariat democratically, it would only have had the vote of a small minority. A peasant majority could not have been expected to vote for socialism. Peasants wanted their own piece of land. If Russia was going to become socialist, it could not proceed democratically. To move toward socialism, it had to use non-​democratic means. And that is the course it chose. And socialists in the West have suffered from it since.11 In this book, I hope to untangle the distorted relationship that has developed between Marx and Marxism—​between Marx and the Soviets and between Marx and social democracy. I should be clear from the outset, though, that this will be a book on Marx. It will be concerned with social democracy and with Soviet Marxism only so far as will help us understand Marx. I must also add that to make the case that Marx is best understood as a social democrat, I will have to quote more textual evidence than would normally be tolerated. I ask the reader’s indulgence ahead of time. It is my view that there is little in common between Marx and Soviet Marxism. To a considerable extent, I have addressed this matter in a series of earlier books and will not spend too much time on it here.12 Here I will mainly explore the relationship between Marx and social democracy, their conceptual compatibility, and the way Marx interacted with social democracy. Doing so, I think, will illuminate the democratic as well as the realistic (non-​utopian) character of Marx’s thought. Aristotle thought that if you want to understand the nature, say, of an acorn, you look at a full-​grown

Introduction  5 and healthy oak tree, not at some stunted specimen that did not have the right soil, adequate water, or sufficient sunlight. I do not want to lapse into Hayekean metaphysics here, but I do think that social democracy can tell us a great deal more about Marx than can Soviet Marxism. I hope to show that Marx and social democracy have a great deal in common—​indeed, that it is legitimate to call Marx a social democrat. Several things must be done to demonstrate this relationship between Marx and social democracy. First, it will be necessary to show that for Marx proletarian society, socialist society, the society he is after, is compatible with a market economy—​as long, that is, as markets are controlled to eliminate alienation or fetishism. That will be the task of Chapter 1. Second, it will also be necessary to show that markets can be controlled without a political state that stands over and dominates society; that is, that markets can be controlled democratically—​ and that Marx was very much a democrat. That will be the task of Chapter 2. Third, it will also be necessary to show that Marx had a theory of revolution (a theory of social transformation) compatible with a democratic electoral movement engaged in by a social democratic party. This, a more complicated issue, will be the task of Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Finally, we must show that Marx actually worked with—​ supported, advised, and criticized—​ an actual social democratic party, the German Social Democratic Party (the SPD) of Liebknecht, Bebel, Bernstein, and Kautsky. That will be the task of Chapter 6, although the topic will be introduced in Chapter 5. Let me emphasize, again, that this will be a book on Marx, not a book on the history of social democracy. It will be necessary, certainly, to say enough about social democracy to allow us to understand the social democratic dimension of Marx’s thought. A discussion of nineteenth-​century social democracy during the lives of Marx and Engels, the German Social Democratic Party of

6  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Liebknecht, Bebel, Kautsky, and Bernstein, all of whom interacted with Marx and Engels, will be necessary to make this connection. Moreover, the Meidner Plan of the 1970s will be important for the argument. But this will not be a book about contemporary social democracy. It will certainly not be a book about the current problems of social democracy or the waning of social democracy since the 1970s—​if it is waning.13 The point is to understand Marx by understanding the social democratic dimension of his thought.

Terminology Before we go any further we need to get some terminology straight. In the first place, the term “revolution” is ambiguous. It can mean a violent insurrection, and Marx certainly uses the term in this sense, but that is very definitely not the only sense, let alone the most important sense, in which he uses the term. By “revolution,” one can also mean a long-​term, fundamental social transformation—​like, say, the industrial revolution. When Marx speaks of a proletarian or a socialist revolution, it is this sort of revolution he has in mind—​ which may or may not involve a violent insurrection. And a violent insurrection that does not lead to a fundamental social transformation is certainly not what Marx is interested in.14 Thus, when Fletcher says, “It is an indisputable fact that no socialist revolution has yet taken place in a single advanced capitalist country,”15 we must admit that this claim is correct if by “revolution” is meant a violent insurrection that installs a socialist regime. But it is false if by “revolution” we mean a fundamental social transformation in a socialist direction. Such transformation has occurred through democratic processes in several Western European social democratic countries. Whenever I use the term “revolution,” I will make clear whether I mean a violent insurrection or a fundamental social transformation. Social democracy would certainly prefer the latter without the

Introduction  7 former. Moreover, it should be clear that it is at least possible that a democratic parliament over time could facilitate more and better social transformation than could a violent insurrection alone.16 Secondly, I will whenever possible avoid using terms like “revisionist” or “reformist.” I think it confusing to oppose real revolutionary socialism to revisionist or reformist socialism. Such concepts have been worked up, developed, and weaponized in a long struggle between Soviet Marxists and social democrats. Such concepts need to be untangled and dissolved, rather than employed and reinforced. I have no interest in discussing whether or not the SPD, or Kautsky, or Bernstein were revisionists. Such questions begin by assuming that revisionism is some sort of divergence from orthodoxy, and then may proceed to trace back such divergence to earlier thinkers. It has been claimed, for example, that Engels was the first revisionist.17 My earlier books argued that there are fundamental shifts in Marx’s thought—​that is, that he revised his views.18 I guess, if we were to take the concept of revisionism seriously, we would have to say that Marx was the first revisionist. Kolakowski argues that it is pointless to ask who is the “true” Marxist. All Marxists are entitled to invoke the name of Marx.19 What I will try to show is that social democracy, far more than Soviet Marxism, captures, expresses, and realizes elements of Marx and Engels’ thought that are really there in Marx and Engels’ thought. I want to show that there is no straight developmental line from Marx to Bolshevism, as there very definitely is from Marx to social democracy. If we were to use the term “revisionist,” we would have to hold that the Soviets were the real revisionists—​much more so than the SPD. But this would make for serious confusion—​as if there were not enough already. Lastly, “socialism” is a loose and sloppy term that can be used in very different ways. It can refer to a third or middle way between capitalism and communism. It can be used to refer to the first and lower stage of communist society—​full communism being the second and higher stage. For some, it is virtually identical to

8  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy communism. Soviet communists often referred to themselves as socialists, or as working to achieve socialism. Others simply use the term “socialism” rather than “communism” so as not to appear so left-​wing. Social democracy is thought by some, including opponents on the left, to be virtually capitalist,20 whereas social democrats often refer to themselves as socialists.21 And, again, “socialism” is very often taken to refer to a society that, while retaining markets, has common, collective, or state ownership of all at least major means of production.22 To explain how I will use the term, let us envision a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, imagine a capitalist laissez-​faire economy—​one with all means of production privately owned, with unregulated markets, and with no governmental planning. Such an ideal type exists nowhere in the actual world. Even capitalism in the United States contains a lot of publicly owned freeways, schools, forests, libraries, transportation systems, a postal service, and so forth. Moreover, a great deal of governmental planning goes on in conjunction with large corporations. At the other end of our spectrum, imagine a full communist society—​a society with no markets at all and no private ownership of means of production. All means of production would be publicly, collectively, or state owned. The entire economy would be centrally planned. And there would be no buying or selling of commodities—​indeed, there would be no money. Such a society, as Marx puts it, would distribute to each according to need.23 This, too, is an ideal type that nowhere exists in the actual world. The Soviets certainly had not achieved anything approaching this.24 Capitalism and communism, however, must not be imagined as neat, fixed, binary poles—​as if they were distinct natural kinds. They are stages along a spectrum. Between them we have various forms of socializing or socialist societies; that is, societies that to varying degrees transform capitalism. They do so by replacing private ownership of the means of production to one degree or another with common, collective, or public ownership. On the other

Introduction  9 hand, all these societies keep a market, but to varying degrees regulate, guide, or control it to prevent poverty and other social ills. It is a mistake to think that if you have markets, you have capitalism. Markets existed long before capitalism and will exist long after capitalism. Moreover, to varying degrees these societies engage in planning, which can be centralized to a greater or lesser extent. At one end of the socializing/​socialist spectrum we have social democratic societies, like those of the Scandinavian countries, with relatively little public ownership of means of production,25 some regulation of markets, and some centralized planning. The development of such societies is democratically guided by strong labor parties (backed by powerful labor unions) that decide in parliamentary fashion how far and how fast to move along toward full socialism; that is, full public ownership of the major means of production. As we will see in Chapter 6, this is what social democratic Sweden actually did in taking up and then rejecting the Meidner Plan, a plan that over time would have, by completely legal and parliamentary means, transferred majority ownership of the large scale means of production to workers. While Swedish society finally decided against the Meidner Plan and thus against moving toward public ownership, it is quite clear that they could have decided for, and were even on the way toward, public ownership—​that is, toward full socialism. The important point here is that social democratic societies actually decide how far away from capitalism and how far along toward full socialism they want to move. They not only decide how far but also how fast they want to go—​and they do so in a democratic way. Western European social democracies have not voted to go all the way, I think, because they have believed they can achieve what they need to achieve within social democracy; that is, that they can control the means of production without needing to own them. On the other hand, there have been societies, further along our spectrum of socializing/​socialist societies, that actually have had state ownership of the means of production, along with strong

10  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy centralized planning, and who also wanted to have markets. These were all Soviet societies that started with long established state ownership of the means of production together with bureaucratized central planning, and, to overcome economic problems, decided to marketize, or to create markets that had not existed. Such market socialism, at least in theory, is something social democratic states might democratically decide to move toward, as with Sweden’s Meidner Plan, but, in fact, they have not (or have not gone very far in this direction). Rather, market socialism arose from Soviet states attempting to marketize, and this attempt did not succeed.26 We will have to discuss in Chapter 1, at least a bit, difficulties that confront full socialist societies, that is, the argument of Weber, Mises, and Hayek that socialism is unable to carry out rational calculation and thereby achieve efficiency. The Mondragon community of northern Spain, on the other hand, would be an exception in that it is not a Soviet state trying to marketize; it is market socialism developing on its own democratically—​although only as part of a state.27 There are also theorists that argue for the democratic development of a market socialist society.28 It must also be noted that besides degrees of public versus private ownership, there are different types of public ownership. Means of production could be owned directly by the state as in Soviet states. Exclusive state control could be relaxed such that firms operate independently with their own boards of directors representing workers and/​or banks.29 Firms could be self-​managed by workers as in Yugoslavia. They could be majority owned by workers through their labor unions as projected by the Meidner Plan of Sweden. They could be owned by workers through voluntary cooperatives as with the Mondragon community. The goal of all these socializing or socialist societies would be to harness the positive aspects of markets while offsetting their negative features, and to do this through coordination, guidance, and control. For social democracy, this requires a balancing act. It

Introduction  11 wants to regulate away the ills of the market, but within those limits it wants to encourage the market. It needs to keep entrepreneurs engaged, but not let them dominate. It needs to empower labor unions, eliminate poverty, and benefit all workers, but without impairing the market. As Meyer puts it, social democracies want social justice as well as economic efficiency and growth.30 Within this spectrum, the lines between capitalism, social democracy, and market (or full) socialism will be fuzzy, rather than sharp and clear. At this point, one might want to ask: why all this emphasis on social democracy? It is quite clear that Marx’s ideal is full socialism as a step toward full communism.31 Why talk about social democracy? The first reason is that there is nothing whatsoever utopian about social democracy.32 It has existed all over Western Europe and elsewhere, whereas attempts to achieve communism, full socialism, or market socialism are utopian—​at least in the sense that until now attempts to realize them at the national level have failed. Secondly, social democracy has been able to avoid totalitarianism, as Soviet societies that had not even successfully reached full socialism were not. Social democracies have been democratic—​even paradigms of democracy. And thirdly, Marx actually became a social democrat. Social democracy, we must not forget, is a process of democratically deciding whether and how far to move beyond capitalism toward full socialism. And even if full socialism is not reached, as this book will try to argue, social democracy can get Marx what he is after. The aim of this book is to show that Marx and social democracy are much closer to each other than is usually thought. Social democracy attempts to keep the benefits of a market (diversity, entrepreneurial energy, technological dynamism) while avoiding its problems (poverty, alienation, misdirection of investment). Moreover, it is necessary to see that a social democratic society can, while remaining a social democracy, even move toward realization of the communist ideal of “to each according to need.” How is this possible? We can think of social democratic society as

12  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy having different sectors. Call one of these the communist sector. Here there would be no buying or selling. Goods and services would be free.33 Even in capitalist society, freeways, parks, libraries, and grade school are free. A social democratic society could add education through graduate school as in several Western European societies. Healthcare could be included. So could childcare. So also, transportation and communication. The principle in this sector would be “to each according to need.” By increasing or decreasing this sector, a social democratic society could, to varying degrees, incorporate a communist dimension. Besides the communist or free sector, a social democratic society would also have a socialist, or regulated market, sector. Here goods and services would be bought on a market but kept affordable. In this sector, a social democratic society could put housing, basic food stuffs, and power. Or, if it were to find it unaffordable, it could decide to move, say, healthcare, childcare, higher education, or transportation out of the free communist sector and into the regulated socialist sector. The aim of the socialist sector would be to see to it that no one is priced out of necessities. Again, a social democratic society could vote to increase or decrease this sector, and also shift things back and forth between the communist and the socialist sector. The third sector would be a free market sector—​a capitalist sector, if you like—​where non-​essential goods and services would be regulated only by supply and demand. Our social democratic society would decide over time what to put in which sector. It would decide what it could afford to put in the communist free sector, what it could only afford to put in the socialist regulated sector, and what should be left in the capitalist sector. It would also decide what would create the best balance between stimulating the economy and avoiding poverty. Moreover, and most importantly, it must control investment. Otherwise, as Mandel puts it, production would develop:

Introduction  13 not in the sectors where the most urgent real needs are to be found, but rather in those where the highest profits can be achieved. The production of alcoholic drinks, of “comic books,” and of drugs takes precedence over the struggle against air-​pollution . . . and even the building of schools and hospitals. In Britain today, more money is spent on gambling than on the fight against cancer.34

Social democratic society would make all of these sorts of decisions democratically through representatives elected to parliament, and it could make changes over time. I am assuming that all societies along our spectrum from capitalism to communism are democratic, although to varying degrees. At the capitalist end of the spectrum, democracy, at least in the United States, is confined for the most part to choosing between the candidates of two political parties, most of whom will serve in legislatures that generally restrict themselves to political matters. There is no democracy inside the capitalist corporation. There the principle is, as Engels paraphrasing Dante puts it, “Lasciate ogni autonomia, voi che entrate!”35 Moreover, capitalist political parties confine themselves to a non-​(possibly even an anti-​) working class agenda and generally will not interfere with decisions customarily left to capitalists. In social democratic societies, on the other hand, democracy is extended to the economic sphere, and possibly even to the inside of the corporation, but certainly to the empowerment of workers through strong labor unions. In the political sphere, to varying degrees, a range of diverse interests is represented by multiple political parties. So also, just as social democratic societies can be more or less democratic, they can be more or less Marxist.36 Full socialism, for Marx, ought to be democratic, but Soviet states obviously have failed miserably at this. Envisioning the spectrum I have set out, we can begin to argue where along the continuum we think our preferred society should be located. We can also advocate for historical development from

14  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy one point to another. We can also adopt a pragmatic and experimental approach that moves back and forth along this spectrum, tries things out, sees what works and what does not, makes corrections, and adjusts.37 Parties would have members disagreeing democratically about how far to go in which direction. Some will consider this democratic character of social democracy to be a form of instability,38 but social democratic societies have remained social democratic even despite occasional victories of bourgeois parties.39 It should be noticed that social democracy is a very broad concept. It can stretch, at one end, from a transformation toward post-​ capitalist society beginning well within capitalism itself, up to, at the other end, a Meidner-​like plan in the process of realizing full socialism. To say that Marx would endorse and support social democracy, then, is to say that he would support what it takes to move from capitalism toward full socialism. That should hardly be surprising or controversial. The task of the present book is to explore these matters in depth and detail, and to ask whether it would be possible (non-​utopian) to move beyond social democracy into full socialism, whether that could be done democratically, and what would be gained by doing so? That is, what would be gained beyond what social democracy, moving up to full socialism, could give us? Social democracy, in my opinion, should not be opposed to socialism, certainly not in the sense that it must give up on socialism, reject it, and want social democracy instead of socialism. Social democracy is a process of democratic transformation of capitalism into a better society. It is a process of discovering what is necessary to produce justice together with efficiency through democratic means. If that requires full socialism, then social democracy would require full socialism. If full socialism is not necessary, not more efficient, not democratically appealing, or not democratically achievable, then social democracy would continue improving things as social democracy. Social democracy is not committed a priori to a specific point along this spectrum, but to a continuous process of improving social, political, and economic conditions for

Introduction  15 the working class. This, I think, is the meaning of Bernstein’s infamous statement, “that what is usually termed the final goal of socialism is nothing to me, the movement is everything.”40 Moreover, Bernstein’s slogan certainly sounds like a rephrasing of Marx and Engels’, “Communism is for us not . . . an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”41

1 Marx and Markets To make the case that Marx accepts social democracy, it must be shown that he accepts markets. But that presents something of a problem because markets produce fetishism.

Markets and Fetishism In the first chapter of Volume I of Capital (hereafter Capital Ch1), Marx discusses alienation in exchange—​or what he now calls fetishism. He claims that in any developed market economy, for any product to be realized as a use value (reach the consumer and satisfy a human need), it must first appear as an exchange value. The only way individuals can get the products they need is to buy them on the market. In such an economy, things are produced by producers as exchange values—​produced to be sold to bring a profit. The producer is not interested in wearing the shoes (using them as use values); the producer wants to sell the shoes (and realize exchange value). This makes the realm of exchange value the realm of primary importance and it leads to alienation or fetishism.1 What is fetishism? In Capital Ch1, Marx says that what are actually relations between persons (relations between workers producing their products) come to appear as relations between things (relations between commodities on a market). Individual producers working independently first come into social contact only when they get to market.2 They put their products on the market, and independent, autonomous market laws (relations Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy. Philip J. Kain, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.003.0002

Marx and Markets  17 between products) set in. These market laws are neither understood nor controlled by the individuals. And these individuals come to be dominated by these impersonal, independent market laws—​these relations between things. As Marx puts it, “their own social action takes the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them.”3 Later, in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels describes it as follows: every society, based upon the production of commodities, has this peculiarity: that the producers have lost control over their own social inter-​relations . . . . Anarchy reigns in socialized production. But the production of commodities, like every other form of production, has its peculiar, inherent laws inseparable from it; and these laws work, despite anarchy, in and through anarchy. They reveal themselves in the only persistent form of social interchange, i.e., in exchange, and here they affect the individual producers as compulsory laws of competition. They are, at first, unknown to these producers themselves, and have to be discovered by them gradually and as the result of experience. They work themselves out, therefore, independently of the producers, and in antagonism to them, as inexorable natural laws of their particular form of production. The product governs the producers.4

In other words, interaction between individuals gives rise to a realm of things that takes on an independent life of its own and comes to dominate those individuals. Such domination is especially obvious in economic crises but is also going on less visibly at all times. Capitalists argue that markets are a realm of freedom, where you choose to buy what you want, and where consumer demand will cause producers to compete to produce what you want. For Marx, markets are not free. They are highly coercive, but they hide that coerciveness.

18  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy For example, education and medical care are goods available on the market—​goods freely available to all. Just put down your money and they are yours. And you are free to choose between this or that school and this or that hospital. But if market forces that you do not understand drive the costs of this college or that hospital, or of all colleges and all hospitals, up, or if market forces drive the income of certain groups down, which the market can do drastically and visibly in crises, but which it is doing less drastically and less visibly at all times, well, what can you do? No one can control the market, you say. You just accept it and think you are still free. But you are not free in Marx’s opinion. Certainly not if it is possible to control the market so these things do not occur. And Marx thinks that is possible—​as do socialists and social democrats.5 At any rate, the point here is that the market looks perfectly free. It is not easy to see how it coerces you. It is not easy to see that fetishism is present. But it very definitely does coerce you and fetishism is very definitely present. Moreover, fetishism occurs not merely for the worker, but also for the capitalist. The individual capitalist does not control the market any more than anyone else, although the capitalist is not likely to suffer from it as much as the worker. Thus, the argument of Capital Ch1, so far, has been that if there is market exchange, there will be fetishism. And in earlier writings, as far back as 1844, although he did not use the term “fetishism,” Marx held the same sort of view—​that market exchange produces alienation or estrangement.6 In the “Comments on James Mill” of 1844, Marx wrote that market exchange: is the abstract relationship of private property to private property . . . . Since men engaged in exchange do not relate to each other as men, things lose the significance of human, personal property. The social relationship of private property to private property is already a relationship in which private property is estranged from itself . . . . [M]‌en create, produce, the human community, the

Marx and Markets  19 social entity . . . but as long as man does not recognize himself as man, and therefore has not organized the world in a human way, this community appears in the form of estrangement . . . his activity therefore appears to him as a torment, his own creation as an alien power, . . . his power over an object as the power of the object over him, and he himself, the lord of his creation, as the servant of this creation . . . . That is to say, our own product has risen up against us; it seemed to be our property, but in fact we are its property.7

In the German Ideology of 1845–​1846, similarly, Marx wrote that: man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him . . . . This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-​operation of different individuals . . . appears to these individuals, since their co-​operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control, which on the contrary passes through a particular series of phases and stages independent of the will and action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.8

In 1859, Marx sums this up succinctly in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: A social relation of production appears as something existing apart from individual human beings, and the distinctive relations into which they enter in the course of production in society

20  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy appear as the specific properties of a thing—​it is this perverted appearance, this prosaically real, and by no means imaginary, mystification that is characteristic of all social formations of labour positing exchange-​value.9

Marx’s view, stated very clearly here, is that fetishism, “this perverted appearance” or “mystification,” will be found in all societies producing exchange value; that is, in all market economies. If you have market exchange, you will have fetishism. As Lukács argues, Marx’s basic underlying thought here is the “retranslation of economic objects from things back into processes, into the changing relations between men.”10 In other words, the task of overcoming fetishism is the task of transforming what have come to appear as relations between things back into what they are—​relations between persons. Moore, on the other hand, would not approve. He seems to think Marx would be better served attending to the problem of exploitation—​that overcoming exploitation should be the main goal of socialists, not the overcoming of alienation, estrangement, or fetishism.11 I think Moore is making a mistake here. I think that if we understand alienation correctly, we see that if we overcome alienation then we overcome exploitation. Exploitation is an aspect of alienation. To appreciate this, we must notice that besides alienation in exchange (or fetishism), there are other forms that alienation can take. Most relevant for our present discussion: one can be alienated from one’s product, one can be alienated in the activity of producing one’s product, and this will alienate one, as Marx puts it in 1844, from the species. Alienation from the species means that you are alienated (frustrated, cut off) from the possibility of consciously and purposively working for the development of the human species as a whole, and even for your own community as a whole, and thus for your own development as an individual member of that community. This results from the two other forms of alienation just mentioned.12

Marx and Markets  21 If you are alienated from the product, if the product is not controlled by you, then you cannot consciously direct it for the benefit of the whole. If you do not control your product, that means it will be controlled by and benefit some other individual rather than the species or community as a whole. It will benefit the owner of the product—​the capitalist. Moreover, if workers are alienated from their products, Marx thinks they will be alienated from their whole socio-​natural world. Our entire world, for the young Marx, is to be understood as nature transformed by human labor into products that satisfy need. How much raw, untouched nature can be found? Hardly any. All of it has been labored upon. Even trees in our forests have been cut and then replanted in the not-​too-​distant past. If workers do not control their products, if they are alienated from them, they will be alienated from their whole socio-​natural world. Workers need nature as the raw material on which to work, as well as for food, clothing, and shelter. They need it, but do not control it. It belongs to another. So, workers become a slave to the product—​to their need for the product. They are dominated and oppressed. Thus, if you do not control your product, if it is lost to you, if it belongs to another, you cannot direct it to realize the species, your community, or yourself. You will be dominated by the product and by your need for it. Moreover, the worker is also alienated in the process of production. This means that the very activity of work is not controlled by you either. It is controlled by another (the owner, the capitalist), and so again your activity cannot be consciously and purposively directed for the benefit of the whole. Again, it will only benefit an individual as opposed to the species or community—​this time it gets the worker a mere wage.13 The more work you do, the more you produce, the more there will be in your world that does not belong to you. It is thus the case, Marx can say, that the more wealth the worker produces, the poorer the worker becomes, “The devaluation of the world of men is in

22  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things.” It should be clear here that alienation from the product results in fetishism, “the object which labor produces—​labour’s product—​ confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.”14 If we do not control our products, if we are alienated from them, if they are lost to us, then, given a market, they will take on a life of their own, they will become a force independent of us, they will become a power over us, and they will dominate and impoverish us. That is fetishism. It should also be clear that exploitation and alienation from the product are the very same thing—​or very close to the same thing.15 If we look at the relationship between workers and their product, taking the workers as our center, we see alienation from the product leading to the fetishism of commodities. If workers are alienated from their product, if it is lost to them, if it takes on a life of its own, if it becomes a power over them, it will come to dominate them. That is fetishism. If we view the very same process taking the capitalist as our center, if we look at the relationship between the capitalist and the worker’s product, we see exploitation, the capitalist expropriating the product produced by the worker, such that the product is lost to the worker. Exploitation is normally taken to be something one person, group, or class does to another, whereas alienation is something one does to oneself. We just have two perspectives on the same thing—​workers losing their products, from one perspective, due to their own alienation, from the other perspective, due to the capitalist’s exploitation. Moreover, it is quite clear that Marx wants to emphasize the former perspective. Indeed, he seems to push it to bizarre lengths. He says, “Private property . . . results by analysis from the concept of alienated labour . . . . [A]‌nalysis of this concept shows that though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence.”16 Marx is saying, in effect, that it is not capitalism that causes alienation; it is alienation that causes capitalism. It is not the capitalist that expropriates

Marx and Markets  23 the workers’ product, it is workers who alienate their product to the capitalist. This might seem—​certainly to socialists—​like an extreme form of blaming the victim. Actually, though, it is a theoretical form of empowering the victim. It allows us to strip away the mystical veil and to see with transparent clarity exactly what workers can do to end alienation, fetishism, and exploitation. They must stop alienating their product—​and that is something completely under their control. Nothing could be simpler or easier—​in a theoretical sense. As Engels puts it, “it depends only upon ourselves to subject [the social forces] more and more to our own will, and by means of them reach our own ends.”17 Practically, of course, it will be quite difficult for the proletariat to organize itself so that it can come to understand and change these matters. At any rate, exploitation and alienation are not to be opposed. They are two perspectives on the same thing.

Ending Fetishism How then can fetishism be ended? One answer, of course, would be to end altogether market exchange. Only full communism, then, could overcome fetishism. If so, then market socialist and social democratic societies—​because they retain a market—​would not be able to overcome fetishism any more than capitalism. This might seem to have been Marx’s view in the earlier writings,18 but this answer certainly will not work for Capital Ch1. It shows us that we can keep the market and eliminate fetishism by controlling the market. This must be explained. At the end of Capital Ch1, Marx gives four examples of economic activity free of fetishism. The first is Robinson Crusoe alone on his island. The second is the relation of lord to serf in the feudal economy of the Middle Ages. And the third is the patriarchal industry of a peasant family. All three are free of fetishism simply

24  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy because there is no market exchange that takes place. There is no buying or selling. Thus, there would be no market laws that could come to dominate, control, and coerce producers.19 But the fourth example of economic activity free of fetishism is different. What is it but a socialist market economy? It is clearly a socialist economy because Marx says there is common ownership of the means of production, the workers are freely associated, and there is a common social plan for production and distribution.20 But it is also a socialist market economy. The distribution of means of subsistence, Marx tells us, “will vary with the productive organization of the community, and the degree of historical development attained by the producers.”21 Marx does not here sketch that historical development as, we will see, he does in the Communist Manifesto. Here, he simply picks a certain point along the line of that development, “for the sake of a parallel with the production of commodities,” that is, for contrast with a fetishized society. “[T]‌he share of each individual producer in the means of subsistence,” Marx says in Capital Ch1, “is determined by his labor time.”22 Later, in the “Gotha Program” of 1875, Marx will describe a socialist society with a higher level of “productive organization . . . and . . . degree of historical development.”23 There too each individual’s share in the means of subsistence will be determined by their labor time, but money will have been replaced by labor certificates. For a given amount of labor, the worker will receive a certificate from society that can be exchanged for means of subsistence.24 In the socialist society of Capital Ch1, there are no labor certificates. It has not reached the level of “productive organization . . . and the degree of historical development”25 where money has been replaced by labor certificates. Obviously, then, for a given amount of labor time, workers would receive a certain amount of money to exchange for their share of means of subsistence. This would be market exchange. So, if you have money, if you have buying and selling, if you have a socialist market economy, why, then, don’t you have fetishism? How can Marx be listing this

Marx and Markets  25 socialist exchange economy as a society free of fetishism? Marx is denying here in Capital Ch1, as one cannot find him doing in earlier writings, that all forms of market exchange produce fetishism. If market exchange per se does not cause fetishism, what is it then about market exchange that does? What aspects of market exchange, that Marx thinks can be eliminated in a socialist market economy, cause fetishism? That is the question raised by Marx’s fourth example of economic activity free of fetishism. The answer, I suggest, is that fetishism is caused by independent producers producing separately and only coming into social contact when they come to market. When they put their products on the market, market laws set in, and the producers, because they are not associated, will not be able to control the interactions that give rise to these laws. These laws, then, will come to dominate them—​ and fetishism will be present. It follows, therefore, that there would be no fetishism in our fourth example—​in our socialist market economy—​because the workers there are associated such that production and distribution are collectively decided ahead of time in accordance with a common social plan.26 This common plan allows the workers to control their market exchange so that it does not control them.27 They have come to understand and use the market as a means to achieve their own ends, rather than let it dominate them. Marx’s view in Capital Ch1, then, is that fetishism can be ended without ending market exchange if you can collectively control the market rather than let it control you. And so, market socialist and social democratic societies could eliminate fetishism as capitalism cannot.28 This conclusion might be disputed. One might point out that the society described by Marx’s fourth example is one in which the “community of free individuals” holds “the means of production in common.”29 And one might want to claim that only a society that holds the means of production in common can end fetishism; that is, that only a full socialist society could do so, not a social democratic society.

26  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy It is not clear that such an argument will hold up. To end fetishism, what is necessary is to control the market so that it does not control you.30 If one could prove that it would be impossible to control the market without common ownership of the means of production, then one could show that a social democratic society, a society which had not yet developed common ownership, would not be able to end fetishism. But on the other hand, we will shortly have to discuss (later in this Chapter) the argument of Weber, Mises, Hayek, and those persuaded by them, that collective ownership of the means of production would make it impossible to calculate economically, would produce serious inefficiency, and thus make it even less possible to control the market. This would suggest that we might even have more fetishism in a full socialist society. If that is the case, if the closer a society comes to full socialism (or at least socialism of a certain kind), the less chance it has to control the market and end fetishism, then the case for social democracy might even become stronger. It might be social democracy that would have the best chance of moving past uncontrolled capitalist markets while avoiding market inefficiencies connected with full state ownership of the means of production. It might be social democracy that would be most likely to find the spot that exerts the right amount and type of control—​and come closest to eliminating fetishism. It “might,” but we have yet to establish that it actually can.

Post-​capitalist Stages We must say more about the way in which Marx understands social development beyond capitalism. Let us begin with the Communist Manifesto, which, as I have already said, gives us a historical sketch of such development. Marx writes, “the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position

Marx and Markets  27 of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.”31 As the proletariat comes to power, it will begin to “wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State,”32 that is, it will work toward full socialism, which will by no means be achieved quickly. The measures the proletariat take will “be different in different countries,” but Marx lists ten measures generally applicable in the most advanced countries.33 These measures would move the proletariat past capitalist society into a social democratic society aiming eventually to achieve full socialism. The proletariat would have a common plan. They would start by abolishing private ownership of land, but not yet private ownership of factories. They would only extend state ownership of factories and instruments of production. It would take some time to reach full ownership. Also, there would still be credit and capital, now centralized in the hands of the state by means of a national bank. It is also clear that there would still be money and markets. While private ownership of land would be abolished, there would still be rents paid on land, which now would be applied to public purposes. Moreover, there would not only be an income tax, but a heavily progressive or graduated income tax. Obviously, then, there would not only be incomes but significantly unequal incomes.34 Given the existence of incomes, rent, credit, and capital, there would obviously be buying and selling. For Engels, in the “Principles of Communism,” an earlier draft of the Manifesto, there also would still be wages paid not only by factory owners but by the state.35 How far is this society expected to develop? In the Manifesto, to a stage where “class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation.”36 We are never told in the Manifesto that money or markets are supposed to disappear, merely that the means of production will come to be collectively owned. That is full socialism. And there is no mention of moving beyond such full socialism to a higher stage of full communism.37

28  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy At the end of the “Principles,” Engels distinguishes democratic socialists from communists. Both desire some of the same measures, however, for democratic socialists, not “as a means of transition to communism but as measures sufficient to abolish the misery of present society and to cause its evils to disappear.”38 Indeed, as we have said, social democrats (that is, democratic socialists) may differ over how far they want to move past capitalism. The historical sketch of post-​capitalist society found in the Manifesto begins with a social democratic society—​a society with a collective plan for controlling an economy with money and markets and for transforming it eventually into a full socialist society, a society with collective ownership of the means of production. The Manifesto does not discuss, as the “Gotha Program” will, going on to a more highly developed socialist society without money, or to a communist society without markets. The earlier and the later stage of the development of post-​ capitalist society, as sketched in the Manifesto of 1848, it must be emphasized, cannot be identified with the two stages of communist society Marx sets out in the “Gotha Program” of 1875. In the Manifesto, in the earlier stage we have a social democratic society and in the later stage a full socialist society. In the “Gotha Program,” on the other hand, we begin, already in the first and lower stage with a full socialist society, and in the higher stage move on to full communism. Thus, only in stage two of the Manifesto do we approach stage one of the “Gotha Program.” There is no discussion of full communism in the Manifesto and no discussion of social democracy in the “Gotha Program.” In the “Gotha Program,” socialism is presented as a transition to communism. In the Manifesto, social democracy is presented as a transition to full socialism. Thus, the historical development that begins in the Manifesto, the “first step” of which is the proletariat winning the “battle of democracy,” proceeds with the proletariat wresting “by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie.” For Engels, this process “will transform existing society only gradually.”39 From there we would

Marx and Markets  29 have a long way to go before we reach stage one of the “Gotha Program,” where we have not only collective ownership of all means of production but planning developed to the advanced level of replacing money with labor certificates.40 In stage one of the Manifesto, we still had money and markets. We achieved collective ownership only in stage two. And there was no mention of ever eliminating money. It is thus quite clear that stage one of the “Gotha Program” is not only a socialist economy but a very highly developed one, despite the fact that Marx describes it, rather oddly, as a society, “just as it emerges from capitalist society, which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth-​ marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.”41 I do not think we can interpret this to mean that what we have here is a society that has just emerged from capitalism in the same sense as the early stage, the social democratic stage, of the Manifesto. Indeed, two pages later in the “Gotha Program,” Marx says stage one “has just emerged after prolonged birth-​pangs from capitalist society” [emphasis added].42 Here, at least, the emergence is taken to be prolonged. I suspect that the way to interpret this passage is as follows. Marx writes it in 1875, well after he had drafted Volume III of Capital. In the latter text he came to hold that socialism begins to emerge within highly developed capitalist society (we will discuss this in Chapter 5).43 Here in the “Gotha Program,” then, he may be suggesting that stage one “has just emerged . . . from capitalist society,” has done so “after prolonged birth-​pangs,” and that those birth-​pangs took place over a prolonged period within a very highly developed capitalist society.44 In the Manifesto, written in 1848, on the other hand, after the proletariat has raised itself “to the position of ruling class,” only then does it begin to construct stage one by following the ten measures designed to transform a far less developed capitalist society into a social democratic society. And from there it will still have a long way to go to reach full socialism, with which the “Gotha Program’s” stage one begins. And then full

30  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy socialism would have to develop further to the point where it can replace money with labor certificates. At any rate, stage one of the “Gotha Program” is much more highly developed than stage one of the Manifesto. On the other hand, stage one of the “Gotha Program” does represent a very early and low level of development relative to the higher stage of communist society that Marx goes on to discuss in the next paragraph: In a higher phase of communist society, after . . . the productive forces have also increased with the all-​round development of the individual, and all the springs of common wealth flow more abundantly—​only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!45

There is something else we must notice here. The “Gotha Program” is more like Capital Ch1 than it is like the Manifesto in that its main point is not to sketch the historical development of post-​capitalist society, at least not in any detail. Rather, it is trying to make an abstract conceptual point. In 1875, two socialist parties in Germany—​ the Eisenachers and the Lassalleans—​joined to form what would come to be called the SPD. The Gotha Programme was the document that founded the new party—​and Marx is attacking it. He thought the Eisenachers conceded too much to the Lassalleans. Indeed, he thinks Lassalle’s view of future socialist society amounts to “obsolete verbal rubbish.”46 He is especially attacking Lassalle’s notion of a “fair distribution of the proceeds of labor,” and so in the “Gotha Program” he sets out stage one to contrast with Lassalle’s views.47 As we have seen in Capital Ch1, and also in the Manifesto, post-​capitalist society “will vary with the productive organization of the community, and the degree of historical development attained by the producers.”48 In the Manifesto, Marx sketches the historical development of the earliest (social democratic) stage. In

Marx and Markets  31 Capital Ch1 he focuses on a later (full socialist) stage. And in the “Gotha Program,” he focuses on an even later and higher stage (full socialism without money). Why discuss one stage rather than another? Simply to make the abstract conceptual point Marx is trying to make at that moment. In short, in the “Gotha Program,” Marx begins by discussing a society with common ownership of the means of production, planning, and labor certificates, not because he thinks that sort of thing is about to emerge in Germany. Indeed, the party that had just been founded by the Gotha Programme had no expectation that Germany would get anywhere near common ownership for a long time to come. The party’s immediate task was to win votes and get elected to the Reichstag, that is, to take “the first step in the revolution of the working class . . . to win the battle of democracy,” a battle that itself would take many years to win. And, indeed, that is what Marx and Engels advised and encouraged them to do. The “Gotha Program” is simply not trying to give us a sketch of this historical development, and certainly not the early stages of it. It is making an abstract conceptual point. It is attacking Lassalle’s “obsolete verbal rubbish,” his objectionable conception of future socialist society—​ a society that Germany could only hope to achieve at some very much later date. At any rate, our concern here is to ask which of these three societies would best eliminate fetishism? It might seem that it would be the one able to exert the most control over production and distribution, that is, the society of the “Gotha Program,” which not only has common ownership of the means of production but has developed planning to the point of replacing money with labor certificates. But we also want to ask how far it is necessary to go to end fetishism? And it is quite clear that we do not need to go all the way to the “Gotha Program” to achieve that. The socialist society of Capital Ch1, very clearly, is listed as a society free of fetishism and it has not replaced money with labor certificates. What about the Manifesto? Could it eliminate fetishism?

32  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy One might think not, because Capital Ch1 seems to suggest that to do away with fetishism we must end commodity exchange. What does that mean? The easiest way to understand this, perhaps, is to look at the third example of economic activity free of fetishism that Marx lists in Capital Ch1, that of the industry of a peasant family. It produces its own “corn, cattle, yarn, linen, and clothing for home use.” And it engages in “different kinds of labour, such as tillage, cattle tending, spinning, weaving, and making clothes.”49 This family does not produce commodities and does not exchange commodities within the family. Within the family, production and distribution are directly decided upon and directly controlled by the family itself. And so also, the socialist society of the fourth example in Capital Ch1, like the peasant family, owns the means of production in common and the “family of workers” (if we can use that term) controls the production and distribution of goods within their “family” through a social plan. And they do this despite neither money nor a market having been eliminated. The socialist “family,” it is true, distributes its goods through buying and selling on a market. It is just that, like the peasant family, the “family of workers” keeps this distribution within the “family” and under the control of the “family.” They do not work independently of each other and meet only when they come to market such that market laws come to dominate them. So, ending the production and exchange of commodities would not seem to require the elimination of money or the market. They exist in the proletarian society of Capital Ch1 because it is much larger, more spread out, and more complex than a peasant family, and because this society has not developed to the point where it has eliminated money and markets. However, a commodity, Marx tells us, is a use value produced for transfer to others by means of market exchange.50 Thus, there are no commodities and no exchange in the peasant family. But in the socialist economy of Capital Ch1, use values are produced for transfer to others by means of exchange (buying and selling),

Marx and Markets  33 as was not the case in the peasant family. This would suggest that there would still be commodities in this socialist society. Marx does not explicitly claim otherwise. And Lange, for example, thinks that you still have commodities and commodity exchange under socialism.51 If we accept this, then we must say that for Marx socialism can end fetishism without ending commodity exchange.52 On the other hand, like the peasant family, this all takes place within the “family of workers” and is controlled by it. The workers are associated, and they have a common plan. It is this control that ends fetishism. If producers are no longer dominated by market laws, if they control their social interaction instead of being controlled by it, if their exchange is planned, kept within, and controlled by the “family,” it is certainly not like the commodity exchange that until that point dominated them. In this sense, then, we might want to say that commodity exchange has been ended.53 What about the society of the Manifesto? Not only does it still have money and markets, but it has not yet brought about common ownership of the means of production. Could it overcome fetishism, that is, could a social democratic society short of full socialism end fetishism? I think the question boils down to how effectively such a society would be able to control socio-​economic interchange so that it does not control them. Would common ownership of the means of production be required to achieve that degree of control? I do not see why. It seems quite possible that a social democratic society could increase production, control the market, eliminate poverty, and so forth, well before full common ownership.54 Recalling the three sectors of our social democratic society described in the Introduction, we could control the economy by strategically shifting goods and services between the communist sector where they would be free to each according to need, the socialist sector where prices would be regulated so as to remain affordable, and the capitalist sector where only supply and demand

34  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy would determine prices. Certainly, the goods in the free communist sector should not be called commodities. They are not exchanged at all. Those in the regulated socialist sector and those in the capitalist sector are exchanged on a market. But despite that, the market would be contained in something like a large “family,” where we control it and prevent it from controlling us, especially so in the socialist sector. But even in the capitalist sector, the fact that we can shift goods and services back and forth between communist, socialist, and capitalist sectors, itself will exert significant control over the whole market. One might still object that the presence of a market in any significant sense is going to produce fetishism—​the domination of things over persons and market laws over individual relations. But as long as the market is getting us what we need (increased production, the elimination of poverty, affordable basic goods and services, etc.), and as long as it is doing so more efficiently than otherwise, and as long as we can adjust when it is no longer doing so, then this is a way for individuals to use markets as means to their ends. This is a way for persons to control the market rather than being controlled by it. This, then, is a way to end fetishism. Still, one might insist that the market, through an invisible hand, acts behind the back of individuals. Yes, but not if they turn around and study it, come to understand it, learn how to use it to get what they need, and to adjust when it does otherwise. We decide to keep a market as long as we like what it is doing. We keep a free market as long as it is more efficient than otherwise. We let the market to a certain extent “run on its own.” Letting it run on its own, as long as it is working for us and we can adjust when it is not, is the way we decide to exert control over it. Moreover, it seems pretty obvious that actual social democratic societies, even with little collective ownership, have been able to exert more effective control, thus have less fetishism, than did marketized Soviet states with full collective ownership. Indeed, to calculate accurately and produce efficiently, argue Weber, Mises,

Marx and Markets  35 and Hayek, you cannot have full collective ownership of the means of production.

Socialist Inefficiency We must pay at least some brief attention to Weber, Mises, Hayek, and others who have developed a powerful argument against socialism.55 As Heilbroner characterizes it: the most intellectually respectable criticism of socialism in the mid-​1930’s was the effort of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek to destroy the credibility of socialism as a desirable social order, not by inveighing against its ideals or its excesses, but by demonstrating that the economic system on which it was based would not work . . . their criticism was based on the contention that socialism was intrinsically unable to achieve a rational economic order—​that is, a system in which all the factors of production were employed as efficiently as possible—​because it lacked one critical mechanism: a market in which capital could be valued by the free offers of owners of capital and by the free bids of would-​be hirers of capital. Since by definition there could be no private ownership of capital, no free market price for it could ever be ascertained. As a result, the only way of deciding which enterprises were to have capital, and which were not, was perforce the essentially arbitrary decision of some Central Planning Board.56

Rational decisions that efficiently allocate resources require independent owners, competitive markets for the exchange of commodities, as well as the existence of money and the generation of prices. Lacking any of these elements, accurate calculation would be impossible. Without a free market, there would be no pricing mechanism, and without prices there can be no economic

36  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy calculation. Information concerning consumer demand does not exist until the market produces it. Calculation without markets and prices would be so complex as to be impossible. As Mises puts it: Suppose, for instance, that the socialist commonwealth was contemplating a new railway line. Would a new railway line be a good thing? If so, which of many possible routes should it cover? Under a system of private ownership we could use money calculations to decide these questions. The new line would cheapen the transportation of certain articles, and, on this basis, we could estimate whether the reduction in transport charges would be great enough to counterweigh the expenditure which the building and running of the line would involve. Such calculation could be made only in money . . . . We can make systematic economic plans only when all the commodities which we have to take into account can be assimilated to money. True, money calculations are incomplete. True, they have profound deficiencies. But we have nothing better to put in their place. And under sound monetary conditions they suffice for practical purposes. If we abandon them, economic calculation becomes absolutely impossible.57

The Polish Marxist economist, Lange, wrote that, “Both as an expression of recognition for the great service rendered by him and as a memento of the prime importance of sound economic accounting, a statue of Professor Mises ought to occupy an honorable place in the great hall of the . . . Central Planning Board of the socialist state.”58 While Lange is conceding that Mises performed a valuable service in bringing certain problems to the attention of socialist economists, Mises would certainly take Lange’s comment as an insult. He would hardly appreciate being included among the socialist greats—​in the hall of the Central Planning Board no less. Lange’s comment also suggests that as important and serious as the

Marx and Markets  37 problems raised by Mises were, Lange thinks he has a solution to them. Indeed, Heilbroner thinks that Lange goes on in the same essay to effectively demolish Mises’ argument.59 There has been a long and extensive debate concerning socialism’s ability to efficiently calculate without private ownership, markets, money, and prices. A lot of people, including socialists, are convinced to one degree or another by Weber, Mises, and Hayek—​ whose argument, indeed, has been a major impetus to theorizing about market socialism.60 On the other hand, some socialists are not convinced by their argument. Moreover, Mises and Hayek, for the most part, avoid discussing social democracy. Or they dismiss it with the claim that its telos is full socialism and thus failure, which obviously has not been born out, and which, Crosland suggests, no one of any standing believes any more.61 Moreover, the efficiency that concerns Weber, Mises, and Hayek has to do with profit. Capitalist calculation maximizes profit, not the satisfaction of social needs. As we saw in the Introduction, capitalism seems to find alcohol and gambling more rational and efficient than schools, hospitals, or cures for diseases.62 Another concern here is the efficiency of managers. Corneo argues that capitalism can ensure the efficiency of managers better than socialism. It does so through: (1) A labor market for managers—​ inefficient managers would be fired and replaced. (2) Pay would be performance based. (3) Monitoring would be carried out by credit institutions. A socialist society could do all this as well, but (4) in capitalism there would be a stock market and efficient managers would benefit from shares of stock in the company. On the other hand, enterprises with poor management would risk hostile takeover. Corneo argues that without a stock market it is almost impossible to evaluate the quality of management over the long term. A stock market may be ruled out in a full socialist society, although that is not necessarily the case. But, certainly, a stock market would not be ruled out in a social democracy. There is no

38  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy reason, then, to expect capitalist managers to be more efficient than social democratic ones.63 At any rate, I am certainly not going to pretend to resolve the socialist calculation debate (nor the debate on related matters).64 And I have no need to do so. The sort of socialism that I want to focus on retains markets, money, and prices. It has no more difficulties with calculation or efficiency than does capitalism. These are simply not issues for it. And if it can control these markets, it can end fetishism.65 On the other hand, socialism that eliminates all private ownership, as well as money, as does the first stage of the “Gotha Program,” if it cannot avoid the sorts of problems raised by Weber, Mises, and Hayek, or if in trying to do so ends up with the sorts of problems the Soviets had in marketizing, if such socialism implies a bureaucracy not only unable to control the market but which is itself an obstacle to that control, if it means not even being able to get the market to behave as a market, then such socialism would have serious problems—​in fact, it would lock in fetishism. Far from it being the case that state ownership of the means of production along with the elimination of money (or its replacement by labor certificates) would be necessary to end fetishism, it would in fact intensify it. In so far as such factors preclude control, or interfere with it, they fail to end fetishism.66 What we end up with at this point in our discussion, then, is a social democratic society moving past capitalism and considering how far it wants to go toward full socialism—​toward collective ownership of the means of production and then on further toward the elimination of money. What our social democratic society would take into consideration in deciding such matters would be all the arguments of Weber, Mises, and Hayek, as well as of those responding to them. Besides that, it would also take into consideration the failure of Soviet attempts to produce efficient economies by marketizing. It would do this, however, without overlooking the enormous success of the Soviet economy prior to 1980.67 It would

Marx and Markets  39 also take into consideration the degree to which social democratic society, short of the elimination of private ownership of the means of production and short of the elimination of money, is able to control the market, make it serve its ends, and eliminate fetishism. If our social democratic society is not doing well at this, and if it comes to be persuaded by theorists that argue against Weber, Mises, and Hayek, it might decide to move closer to the sort of full socialism that ends private ownership and money. But if it is not convinced that would work, or if it finds even more evidence that it will not work, it would stick with social democracy short of that sort of full socialism. This is to say that social democratic society should not be imagined as some neat and final niche at some fixed place along our spectrum. It should be understood as a process of moving back and forth experimentally in an attempt to find what works.68 The goal is economic efficiency in production, which many think impossible without markets, together with distributive justice; that is, no poverty, no large income gap between top and bottom, and affordability of basic goods and services (healthcare, education, childcare, housing, transportation, and so forth). And all of this to be brought about and controlled by democratic processes in which all, especially workers, play an active part, and thus eliminate fetishism. I think well-​functioning social democratic societies have been capable of achieving these goals. I do not think capitalist society has come anywhere near doing so. I think Soviet socialism completely failed to do so. And I think that whether full socialism that eliminates private ownership, money, and prices would be capable of doing so is questionable—​but that means it remains a question.

2 Marx and Democracy In Chapter 1, we saw that to end fetishism it was necessary to control the market so as not to be dominated by it. We must now ask what it would take to do such controlling? Wouldn’t it require a powerful state apparatus? If so, wouldn’t that produce political alienation? Do we just have to choose between one sort of alienation or another: either market fetishism or political alienation? This is the issue we must take up in this chapter.

Political Alienation Besides the forms of alienation that we have already discussed, alienation from the product, alienation in the process of production, alienation from the species, and alienation in exchange (fetishism), there is another important form of alienation: alienation of the political state from civil society—​or, simply, political alienation. The political state, for Marx, is the realm of government—​the administration, the executive, the legislature. It handles the general and universal concerns of society as a whole. Civil society, on the other hand, is the realm of everyday socio-​economic life—​under capitalism, the competitive, Adam Smithian sphere of particular interest. The political state is the realm in which individuals come together as a whole and are represented as a community—​as species-​ beings. And it is the instrument they would use to consciously control their interactions, work for society as a whole, and realize the universal. But as members of civil society, they are cut off from Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy. Philip J. Kain, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.003.0003

Marx and Democracy  41 this collective political sphere. They are locked into the privacy and isolation of their particular lives, where they cannot consciously and collectively control their social world, where as individuals they have private interests, involvements, and pressures, such that they may even be unaware of the common, universal concerns of the whole. In capitalist society, civil society is alienated from the political state. The political state appears as a distant, far-​off realm that one concerns oneself with perhaps every few years in casting a vote. One does not actually participate in governing—​as Aristotle, for example, thought a citizen must. And so, in our everyday lives we are buried in private interest and thus inevitably dominated by the far-​off state that we do not participate in and do not control.1 This alienation, this being cut off from the political state, means that we lack the wherewithal to assert conscious and collective control over our social world for the realization of the species as a whole and thus ourselves as individuals. If we are cut off from this agency, then we will be dominated not just by our social world but also by this controlling state—​and by the class the state represents. For Marx, this alienation of state from society must be overcome: Only when the real, individual man re-​absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-​being in his everyday life, in his particular work . . . only when man has recognized and organized his “forces propres” as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.2

How can one overcome the alienation of the political state from civil society? The answer, from 1843 on, for Marx, is democracy: The question here is not whether civil society shall exercise the legislative power through representatives or by all individually;

42  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy the question is rather one of the extension and greatest possible generalization of election, both of the right to vote and the right to be elected . . . . The election is the actual relation . . . of civil society to the political state . . . . It is therefore self-​evident that elections are the chief political interest of actual civil society. Civil society has really raised itself . . . to political being as its true, general, essential mode of being only in elections unlimited both in respect of the franchise and the right to be elected.3

We must notice that there was political alienation to be found in the earliest stage of the Manifesto. In Chapter 1, we concluded that to end fetishism we must control market exchange so that it does not control us. The Manifesto gave us a description of such a controlling state, one that dominates society and would produce estrangement: the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class . . . . The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class . . . . Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property.4

We seem to have a serious dilemma here. It seems that to end fetishism, to control the market, we need a political state that would have to stand over and dominate society—​and thus we would have to accept political estrangement. It seems we must accept either market alienation or political alienation. Furthermore, to accept political alienation would raise even further problems. Up to now, the terms “state ownership,” “common ownership,” and “collective ownership” have been used more or less interchangeably. But if the political state is alienated from civil

Marx and Democracy  43 society, if it stands over and dominates civil society, then state ownership of the means of production would not only be different from, it would be opposed to, common or collective ownership. The means of production would be owned and controlled by the state as opposed to individuals in civil society.

Paris Commune After the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx and Engels decide they made a mistake in the Manifesto—​or at least they declare some of its views outdated. In the “Preface to the 1872 German Edition of the Manifesto,” they write that given the “Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months,” the program of the Manifesto “has in some details become antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that ‘the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-​made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.’ ”5 Marx discusses the Paris Commune at length in the Civil War in France. During the Franco–​Prussian War of 1871, Germany under Bismarck invaded France and defeated it. The French government and its army retreated past Paris to Versailles and surrendered. But the citizens of Paris refused to surrender. They rebelled against the national government of Thiers in Versailles, prepared to resist Bismarck, and established their own government, which lasted for two months before it was brutally crushed by the national French army in accord with Bismarck’s order. The government set up in Paris—​the Paris Commune—​socialists consider to be the first worker’s government.6 Marx did not consider it socialist. It was an “uprising of one city in exceptional circumstances” and “the majority of the Commune was in no sense socialist.”7 On the other hand, Marx thought that the Commune intended to work toward socialism.8

44  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy At any rate, in his discussion of the Commune, Marx says the working class did not attempt to take over the state apparatus and wield it over society. They destroyed the state apparatus.9 In other words, Marx has changed his mind about the earliest stage of post-​ capitalist society. In opposition to the Manifesto, he no longer thinks a powerful political state standing over and dominating civil society is necessary, even at the start. So, then, what sort of state, or lack of state, do we have here? Marx describes the conditions of the Commune as follows. First, it replaced the national standing army attached to the government with a citizen militia,10 which, for Marx, is key to ending political estrangement. With no national army, the state could not have a monopoly on the means of violence necessary for a minority to control a majority. The citizen militia made up of and controlled by the people could see to it that no state arose to stand over and dominate society. Marx here is influenced by Rousseau and by the actual National Guard of Paris.11 The National Guard was made up of citizens with ordinary jobs who in times of crisis would be called up. They would go to various armories around Paris, arm themselves, and become a militia. Whenever the citizen militia sided with the national army, all was most likely lost for any protest or insurrection in Paris. But when it sided with the insurrectionaries, they often carried the day. Second, the Commune included universal male suffrage. Moreover, the members of the Commune were elected for very short terms, subject to immediate recall, and, most importantly, were subject to a direct mandate. They were deputies, not representatives. They could not, like representatives, go off and vote as they pleased. They were deputies given voting instructions worked up by their constituents in local communes. If they did not vote as expected, they could be recalled quickly. So, the Commune was a governing body with elected deputies, but it was not a state standing over society—​it had no army of its own and it was controlled by its constituents. So also, the police as well as all officials of the

Marx and Democracy  45 administration were no longer to be agents of a central government but the responsible and revocable agents of the Commune.12 What we have here, then, is not the total elimination of government, as Bakunin would have it, and not even the complete “withering away of the state,” in Engels’ phrase.13 We certainly do not have Lenin’s notion that in abolishing the state, “under socialism all democracy will wither away.”14 While Hunt wants to speak of the state as disappearing,15 Shoikhedbrod correctly argues that while the repressive and class character of the state, as well as organized coercion, will be abolished, neither the state, nor all coercion, will disappear entirely.16 I think that what we have, for Marx, is much the same thing he had been advocating since 1843, the destruction of a political state standing over and dominating society, that is, as he now puts it: the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-​eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for workmen and managers in his business. And it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly.17

A question remains, however, concerning the radically democratic details of the Commune. Would Marx advocate all of them for future socialist society? He originally thought it would

46  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy be “desperate folly” to oppose the French government with the German army “knocking at the doors of Paris.”18 Nevertheless, when the communards did exactly that, he stood in solidarity with them. What did he think of what they then put in place? I suspect Marx would agree with Engels, who writes: A lot of follies are unavoidably committed in every revolution, as they are indeed at all other times, and when at last people calm down sufficiently to be able to review events critically, they inevitably draw the following conclusion: we have done many things that it would have been better to leave undone, and have failed to do many things that it would have been better to do . . . . But what a lack of critical attitude is needed to declare the Commune impeccable and infallible.19

This makes it pretty clear that Engels would not agree with every particular detail of the Commune. I think we can say about Marx that he honored the heroic accomplishment of the communards, mourned the tragically short life of the Commune, and was outraged at the subsequent brutal treatment by Versailles.20 To what extent he was committed to the specific details of the governmental structure of the Commune, however, is just not clear. Most likely he would consider them as falling under the general catch-​ all that such things will of course be different in different countries with different levels of historical development, different material conditions, and different levels of consciousness.21 On the other hand, what is quite clear, I think, is that Marx fully supported, as he had since 1843, the democratic attempt to do away with a political state, alienated from, standing over, and dominating civil society.22

Democracy Whatever we decide about the Paris Commune, we must notice that Marx and Engels, from 1848 on, became increasingly

Marx and Democracy  47 committed to democratic electoral processes. In 1850, Marx writes that, “Universal suffrage did not possess the magic power which republicans of the old school had ascribed to it. Instead . . . it possessed the incomparably higher merit of unchaining the class struggle.”23 This would allow, as he had put it in the Manifesto, the proletariat to raise itself “to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.”24 In 1852, he writes, “Universal Suffrage is the equivalent [of] political power for the working class of England, where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population . . . . The carrying of Universal Suffrage in England would, therefore, be a far more socialistic measure than anything which has been honored with that name on the Continent.”25 Marx helped found, in 1864, and began to work actively with, the International Working Men’s Association. Mehring argues that it was “the growing movement for a reform of the franchise which brought the International its first signal successes.”26 Marx also worked with Bebel, Liebknecht, and the Eisenachers after their founding in 1869. And he worked with the SPD, which grew out of a merger in 1875 between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers. These parties worked for suffrage for all males over twenty years of age, and the SPD’s Program of 1891 demanded suffrage for both sexes.27 In a speech of 1871, Marx says: it must not be thought that it is of minor importance to have workers in parliament . . . . [I]‌f, like Bebel and Liebknecht, they are able to speak from this platform, the entire world can hear them—​in one way or the other it means considerable publicity for our principles . . . . The governments are hostile to us. We must answer them by using every possible means at our disposal, getting workers into parliament is so much gaining over them.28

A year later in a speech in Amsterdam, Marx claims that there are countries like England, the United States, and perhaps Holland, “where the workers may achieve their aims by peaceful means.”29

48  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Engels in several places says, “the working class can only come to power under the form of a democratic republic.”30 In 1874, Engels writes, “the secret ballot has enabled a large number of workers who usually were politically passive to vote with impunity against their exploiters.”31 In 1877, he says that universal suffrage will cause the bourgeoisie “to make political concessions in order to safeguard its own economic interests.”32 In 1880, Marx says that the “revolutionary action of the . . . proletariat” requires that it be “organized into an independent political party . . . using all the means at the disposal of the proletariat, including universal suffrage, thus transformed from the instrument of deception which it has been hitherto into an instrument of emancipation.”33 In 1881, Engels writes, “that the time is rapidly approaching when the working class of this country will claim, with a voice not to be mistaken, its full share of representation in Parliament.”34 In 1895, Engels writes, “Thanks to the intelligent use which the German workers made of the universal suffrage introduced in 1866, the astonishing growth of the party is made plain to all the world by incontestable figures.” Indeed, he continues, the German workers, “supplied their comrades in all countries with a new weapon, and one of the most potent, when they showed them how to make use of universal suffrage.” He adds that “the bourgeoisie and the government came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the illegal action of the workers’ party, of the results of election than of those of rebellion.”35 He continues: To keep this growth going without interruption until it gets beyond the control of the prevailing governmental system . . . , not to fritter away this daily increasing shock force in vanguard skirmishes, but to keep it intact until the decisive day, that is our main task. And there is only one means by which the steady rise of the socialist fighting forces in Germany could be temporarily halted . . . a clash on a grand scale with the military, a blood-​ ­letting like that of 1871 in Paris. In the long run even that would

Marx and Democracy  49 be overcome. To shoot a party which numbers millions out of existence is too much even for all the magazine rifles of Europe and America . . . . The irony of world history turns everything upside down. We the “revolutionaries,” the “overthrowers”—​we are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal methods and overthrow.36

Dictatorship of the Proletariat At this point, then, it would seem that for Marx we can control exchange and avoid fetishism, and we can do so democratically, that is, without a political state that stands over and dominates society, and thus without political alienation. But there is a problem here. Despite all this emphasis on democracy and the overcoming of political alienation, the earliest stage of socialism is standardly referred to as the dictatorship of the proletariat.37 How do we dictate without a powerful state standing over and dominating society? How can we have democracy if we have dictatorship? Lenin, in a democratic moment (which is not at all to say that he was a democrat), interpreted this as follows. If the proletariat forms the majority of the population, then no state in the proper sense need exist. The state is a tool involving a monopoly on the means of violence necessary for a minority to repress a majority.38 Thus, we can say that if the proletariat is the majority, no such repression would be necessary. They could rule democratically, simply by voting, and there would be no political estrangement. A dominating political state would not be necessary, but they could still outvote, and thus, we could say, “dictate to,” the bourgeoisie. Aristotle, for example, understood at least one form of democracy as class rule: the rule of the people (demos) over the higher classes.39 The proletariat would be controlling (“dictating to”) the bourgeoisie, but democratically. Thus, we can say that there is a sense in

50  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy which you can dictate without a powerful political state.40 But it is just democracy—​the majority getting its way. Indeed, Engels says explicitly, “our party and the working class can only come to power under the form of a democratic republic. This is even the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat.”41 And he says of the radically democratic Paris Commune, “Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.”42 One might still want to object that a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat would be a tyranny of the majority. If that argument is raised against proletarian democracy as a defense of bourgeois democracy, which is a tyranny of the minority, it would be absurd. If it is raised simply as an issue that a proletarian society should take seriously, it is quite legitimate. Still, a great deal depends on which minority is being tyrannized. If it is the bourgeoisie that is being outvoted and deprived of their old privileges, that is not tyranny but democracy, and it is as it should be. If the minority is, say, an ethnic, racial, or religious minority that is not being treated as other workers are, then we have a serious problem. But it is not the case that socialism has this problem more than capitalism, and certainly not because of a dictatorship of the proletariat. It is an issue that all societies should address. At any rate, in the earliest stage of socialist society, we do have a government or a state. It does carry out the legitimate functions of governing, and it does control the market to end fetishism. But it is not, and need not be, a state standing over and dominating society. It is democratically controlled by and responsible to the citizens, the majority of which are workers. One may still want to object, however, that this does not fit with plenty of things said about the state. For example, Engels writes, “the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy.”43 Engels also writes:

Marx and Democracy  51 A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets, and cannon—​ authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough?44

Of course, a peaceful democratic movement toward socialism is only a possibility, and, without a doubt, it depends on the reaction of the bourgeoisie. As Marx writes in 1878: An historical development can remain “peaceful” only for so long as its progress is not forcibly obstructed by those wielding social power at the time. If in England, for instance, or the United States, the working class were to gain a majority in Parliament or Congress, they could, by lawful means, rid themselves of such laws and institutions as impeded their development, though they could only do so insofar as society had reached a sufficiently mature development. However, the “peaceful” movement might be transformed into a “forcible” one by resistance on the part of those interested in restoring the former state of affairs.45

Nevertheless, as Schumpeter claims, “to an extent undreamed of by nineteenth-​century socialists” it has been “possible to extract from the bourgeois stratum, by taxation and wage policies, the bulk of what in Marxist terminology is called Surplus Value.”46 As Przeworski puts it, “not only did the bourgeoisie not rise in arms against the electoral progress of socialists but, first in Denmark in 1916, and then in Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, and France, socialists were either invited to form minority governments

52  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy or to join multi-​party coalitions.”47 And Roemer points out that “the Scandinavian countries have remained social-​democratic despite . . . occasional victories” of bourgeois parties.48 Bernstein argues that universal suffrage may in the short run be used by the oppressor, but not in the long run: “it was for a while possible for universal suffrage to serve as Bismarck’s instrument, but in the end it compelled Bismarck to serve as its instrument. It did temporarily serve the purposes of the junkers . . . but it has long since been the terror of these very same junkers.”49 Marx does not rule out violent insurrection, but he very definitely does allow for a peaceful, parliamentary transition to social democracy. In a speech of 1871, it is reported that he said, “we shall act against you peacefully whenever possible—​and take up arms when that is necessary.”50 Again, I do not want to underemphasize the fact that a peaceful and democratic transition to socialism is only a possibility for Marx, but it very definitely is a possibility.

State as Battleground I think that, for Marx, we should view the state as a battleground—​ upon which we must “win the battle of democracy.” In short, two different and opposed naïve positions should be rejected. The first is a view attributed by some Marxists to liberals and social democrats, namely, that the existing state is simply neutral, fair, and impartially concerned with justice for all. The second is a position held by some Marxists, that the state is simply and completely controlled by the capitalist bourgeoisie, such that it cannot be transformed short of violent overthrow. Instead, for Marx, the state should be seen as a battleground where it is possible to “win the battle of democracy.” That is the sort of state Engels is describing in the following passage: The last socialist elections in Germany prove that one cannot kill socialism just by stopping its mouth. Indeed the law against the

Marx and Democracy  53 socialists will be a great success for us. It will complete the revolutionary education of the German workers . . . . With great effort and great sacrifices they had won the degree of freedom of the press, of association and assembly which they enjoyed. It was a continuous struggle, but in the end victory always remained on the side of the workers. They could organize, and whenever there was a general election it was a new triumph for them.51

Marx writes: between the two limits of this maximum rate of profit an immense scale of variations is possible. The fixation of its actual degree is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the working man constantly presses in the opposite direction. The matter resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants . . . . As to the limitation of the working day in England, as in all other countries, it has never been settled except by legislative interference. Without the working men’s continuous pressure from without that interference would never have taken place.52

Despite the fact that the wrong side is winning the battle of democracy, the following passage is another illustration of the state as battleground. Marx writes that during the Second Empire: The governmental power with its standing army, its all directing bureaucracy, its stultifying clergy and its servile tribunal hierarchy, had grown so independent of society itself, that a grotesquely mediocre adventurer with a hungry band of desperadoes behind him sufficed to wield it . . . . Humbling

54  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy under its sway even the interests of the ruling classes, whose parliamentary show-​work it supplanted by self-​elected Corps Législatifs and self-​paid senates, sanctioned in its absolute sway by universal suffrage.53

To say that the state is a battleground on which the proletariat can “win the battle of democracy,” is to reject a concept of democracy of the sort that one finds in Schumpeter, who claims that “democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms ‘people’ and ‘rule.’ Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.”54 Such democracy, obviously, would perpetuate political alienation, not overcome it. Heald writes, “Social democracy presupposes a degree of confidence in the competence, legitimacy and accountability of state institutions. It requires a sense of common purpose and of belonging and inclusiveness, which together underpin social solidarity.” This is not to say, however, that it does not involve a battleground. He continues, “Yet social democracy is also about . . . sometimes uneasy compromises . . . . The foundations of social democracy are therefore vulnerable to attack from multiple directions.”55 This battle will mean that power swings back and forth. One side does not annihilate the other. Capital and capitalists will be needed at least until full socialism is achieved. Thus, the working class must assert itself to contain capitalism. It does not want and does not need a Soviet-​style state bureaucracy. It does not need and it does not want a political state that stands over and dominates society. But it does want and does need a state that can regulate capitalism and control the market. It wants to end fetishism. It wants a state that is neither the executive committee of the bourgeoisie nor the executive committee of the proletariat. It wants a battleground. Hopefully, it can be a parliamentary battleground, but even so it will still involve a fierce battle, one in which the proletariat can win the battle of democracy. The Scandinavian countries,

Marx and Democracy  55 as well as France and Germany, have exemplified this reasonably well. As Keating and McCrone put it: Social democracy has historically assigned an important role to the state as an agent of social change. This need not, indeed does not, imply state ownership of the means of production so much as an interventionist role in managing capitalism, setting the ground rules, managing the framework. Social democratic belief in the benign potential of the state has too easily been caricatured as paternalistic, inefficient and expensive, but the disasters of unregulated markets in recent years, not to mention the growth of unaccountable corporate power . . . now show the state in a better light and remind us of the need for proper regulation.56

Marx’s rejection of a state standing over and dominating society is not to be interpreted as endorsing a libertarian or conservative minimalist state, let alone an anarchist elimination of the state altogether. Too weak a state would not end fetishism nor empower individuals in society; it would increase fetishism and empower capitalist enterprises, which have certainly grown much larger and more powerful since the days of the Paris Commune.57 What is necessary is a state that can work for the benefit of society as a whole, or, as Marx would have put it in 1844, for the benefit of the species. Such work is not engaged in simply and directly, but it is mediated by the market. Overall goals are decided democratically and then used to guide and adjust the market. The market is used to increase production and reduce poverty. At the same time, it is necessary to shelter from the market education, healthcare, housing, basic food stuffs, and the environment. It is also necessary to build strong labor unions and increase workplace democracy. If this is successful, if we see that we can control the economy for the good of ourselves and others, and if we see that we can guide the market to realize these ends, then we can reduce fetishism. If we see that the products we produce and the work we do in the factory contributes

56  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy to this process and benefits others, not just that it gains a profit for the owner and a wage for ourselves, then we reduce alienation from the product and in the process of production. If there is sufficient democracy, democracy in the political sphere and democracy in the economic sphere, a strong labor party and strong labor unions, then we can eliminate political alienation and work for the benefit of the species.58 And with sufficient democracy we can be continually refining, adjusting, and developing these elements—​we can move ourselves along toward socialism to the degree that we choose.

Proletarian Minority There are, however, further problems that we must address. In 1875, Marx seems to abandon the view set out in the Civil War in France, namely, that the Paris Commune had shown us that a state standing over and dominating society is not necessary even in the earliest stages of post-​capitalist society. He seems to return to the view of the Manifesto, that is, that such a powerful state is necessary. The anarchist, Bakunin, regularly attacked Marx as an authoritarian. Bakunin thought that the proletariat upon coming to power should immediately destroy the state—​destroy any sort of government at all. In rejecting this, Marx argues as follows: as long as the proletariat is still fighting against [other classes] (for when the proletariat obtains control of the government its enemies and the old organization of society will not yet have disappeared), it must use forcible means, that is to say, governmental means; as long as it remains a class itself, and the economic conditions which give rise to the class struggle and the existence of classes have not yet vanished they must be removed or transformed by force, and the process of transforming them must be accelerated by force.59

Marx and Democracy  57 Why this shift? Why this return to the views of the Manifesto? In the next paragraph, Marx points out that the proletariat is not the majority anywhere in Europe. The peasants “form a more or less considerable majority . . . in all the states of the West European continent, where they have not yet disappeared and have not been replaced by agricultural day labourers, as in England.”60 If the proletariat is not the majority, then it could not rule democratically simply by outvoting other classes. If it is to rule as a minority, it will need a powerful state, that is, a monopoly on the means of violence that would allow a minority to control a majority. This gives rise to a series of problems that will have to be addressed in following chapters.

3 Marx and Minority Revolution We must now begin to discuss Marx’s theory of revolution. What we need is a revolution that will get us to a democratic society able to end fetishism by controlling the market, and that can do so without an alienated state standing over and dominating society. Moreover, this revolution must be able to achieve these goals while handling the problems met in Chapter 2, most importantly, the fact that the proletariat was by no means a majority in any European country. This is a most significant matter for socialists because the Russian Revolution notably failed at all of this, and thus became one of the greatest stumbling blocks to the development of a socialist consciousness in other countries.1 The discussion of Marx’s theory of revolution will be fairly complicated because, in my view, Marx actually has three distinguishable models for revolution. The first outlines a minority revolution in an undeveloped or pre-​capitalist society. The second outlines a majority revolution in a highly developed capitalist society. The third—​the one we are after—​outlines an electoral revolution by a social democratic party.2 Each needs to be examined at length and in detail. That will be the task of this and the following two chapters.

Minority Revolution In the Introduction to his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Marx argues for a proletarian revolution in Germany, which in 1843, when the Introduction was written, could Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy. Philip J. Kain, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.003.0004

Marx and Minority Revolution  59 only have been a minority revolution in a pre-​capitalist society. Capitalism had barely started to develop in Germany and Marx admits the proletariat was only just “coming into being.”3 In this Introduction, Marx distinguishes between what he calls a partial or political revolution—​a bourgeois revolution—​on the one hand, and, on the other, a radical or universal, that is, a proletarian revolution. Marx claims that, “It is not the radical revolution . . . which is a utopian dream for Germany, but rather the partial, the merely political revolution.”4 Marx is saying that a proletarian revolution is possible, but a bourgeois revolution is not—​or is only a utopian possibility. In other words, Marx is suggesting that Germany can skip stages—​it can skip a bourgeois revolution.5 In a partial or political revolution, Marx says: part of civil society emancipates itself and attains general domination; . . . a definite class, proceeding from its particular situation, undertakes the general emancipation of society. This class emancipates the whole of society but only provided the whole of society is in the same situation as this class . . . . No class of civil society can play this role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm in itself and in the masses . . . and is perceived and acknowledged as its general representative.6

In other words, in a partial or political revolution (in a bourgeois revolution like, say, the French Revolution), a particular class gains political power and asserts its class interest. For this class to succeed (for any class to succeed in any revolution), its particular class interest must represent the general interest of all (at least for a time). And the bourgeoisie did this—​after all, they ended serfdom, increased production, established some equality and freedom, and so forth.7 But in a partial revolution (in a bourgeois revolution), the class interest of the bourgeoisie will not continue to accord with the general interest—​certainly, not with the interests of other lower

60  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy classes. It will begin to diverge from, oppose, and even become hostile to those interests. A proletarian revolution, on the other hand, Marx thinks, would be a radical or universal revolution. Its particular class interest would truly accord with the universal—​the general interest. What is implied here is that it does not matter how small the proletariat is. It did not matter, after all, how small the bourgeoisie were when they came to power in the French Revolution. What matters is that one’s class interest represents the universal—​the interest of all. What we have here is not so much a socio-​economic argument for what will actually produce revolution. That will only come two years later in the German Ideology. Here we have a philosophical-​ moral argument for revolution—​an argument for why we ought to have a revolution. Indeed, for Marx this revolution will be made by philosophy: philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat . . . the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy . . . . The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot be made a reality without the abolition of the proletariat, the proletariat cannot be abolished without philosophy being made a reality.8

How can philosophy be made a reality? Marx tells us, “Theory can be realized in a people only insofar as it is the realization of the needs of that people . . . . Will the theoretical needs be immediate practical needs? . . . Only a revolution of radical needs can be a radical revolution.”9 Such revolution, Marx thinks, is morally demanded. It “proceeds from the standpoint of the theory which proclaims man to be the highest being for man.”10 Furthermore, “the teaching that man is the highest being for man” gives us a “categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being.”11 What we have in Germany, Marx says, is:

Marx and Minority Revolution  61 a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong but wrong generally is perpetrated against it . . . a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without . . . emancipating all other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete rewinning of man.12

Pulling all this together, we have a rather ingenious argument. Philosophy can be made a reality only if it realizes the needs of the people. The proletariat is so oppressed that its needs can be nothing other than fundamental human needs—​needs any and every human being would have—​needs for food, clothing, shelter, education, the development of human powers and capacities, etc. Because the proletariat is so oppressed, its interests simply cannot be seen as interests in special privileges—​as could the interests of other higher classes like the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. The needs of the proletariat are the needs all human beings would have. Radical needs. Species needs. Needs that would be universalizable. Needs that thus would accord with a categorical imperative. For Kant, the first and basic formulation of the categorical imperative is to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”13 A second formulation of the categorical imperative is: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”14 Thus, whatever the selfish, particular interest of this or that proletarian, the class interest of the proletariat (which drives it and makes it an actor on the historical stage) would tend to drive it toward acting in accordance with a categorical imperative. It would thus drive the proletariat toward the realization of a society that accords with the categorical imperative. It would drive the proletariat

62  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy toward the realization of a moral society, and it would do so more than would the class interest of any other class. Class interest must be distinguished from personal interest. A class interest is something sociologists can study. It is based on the needs of a class of people in specific social and economic circumstances. A person’s class interest could even be the opposite of their personal interest. A specific proletarian’s personal interest could be selfish, corrupt, and immoral, but because the proletariat’s basic needs are universalizable, their class interest, their interest in satisfying those needs, will accord with, and push them towards, the categorical imperative. The personal interest of a particular bourgeois might be quite moral, generous, even benevolent, but the class interest of the bourgeoisie, their needs as a class, will involve and push them towards the exploitation of labor, individual profit, and self-​interest. Of course, any average proletarian can be as selfish as any average member of the bourgeoisie. If you think an average member of the bourgeoisie is likely to be less selfish than the average proletarian, then I suggest you are suffering under class prejudice. At the personal level, one is as likely to be as selfish as the other—​just as one is as likely to be as moral as the other. But the class interest of the bourgeoisie would reinforce selfishness. And the class interest of the proletarian would oppose and work against selfishness. Proletarian society has more pushing it toward morality than bourgeois society. That makes proletarian society morally preferable to bourgeois society. That means that a proletarian society is more likely to be moral than a bourgeois society. Of course, things can go wrong. Individuals can be corrupt. Leaders can be power hungry. That can happen in any society—​it can happen in proletarian society or in capitalist society. But only the proletariat has a class interest operating on it whose tendency is to push toward morality. Moreover, the class interest of the proletariat, like the class interest of any class, will exert a certain amount of pressure on the members of that class to work together to realize their class

Marx and Minority Revolution  63 interest—​if they want to see it realized. Individual deviation from a common class interest in the direction of personal interest will lessen the likelihood of realizing the class interest. Marx is arguing here that a proletarian revolution in Germany, a minority revolution in a pre-​capitalist society, can be a moral revolution—​a revolution that is morally demanded and morally justified. He is not arguing that it can be or will be democratic.15 Hunt argues the reverse. He claims that while Marx and Engels “repeatedly predicted violent revolution during this period, they never made any systematic attempt to justify it morally.”16 Moreover, Hunt argues that Marx intends the revolution he is discussing here in 1843 to be democratic. Both these claims are mistaken. Engels, in the 1870s, gives us a description of a minority revolution, which, by that time, he thinks had “long since become obsolete.”17 Engels says Blanqui believed: that, if a small well-​organized minority should attempt to effect a revolutionary uprising at the right moment, it might, after scoring a few initial successes, carry the mass of the people and thus accomplish a victorious revolution . . . . Since Blanqui regards every revolution as a coup de main by a small revolutionary minority, it automatically follows that its victory must inevitably be succeeded by the establishment of a dictatorship—​not, it should be well noted, of the entire revolutionary class, the proletariat, but of the small number of those who accomplished the coup and who themselves are, at first, organized under the dictatorship of one or several individuals.18

This small band of revolutionaries would “seize the helm of state” and “maintain power until they succeeded in sweeping the mass of people into the revolution.”19 What we have here, then, is a model for revolution in a society where capitalism has not developed very far, and the proletariat is still a small minority of the population. In such a society, a small band seizes power through an insurrection.

64  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy It begins to transform society, but it does not have the numbers to do so democratically. It thus requires a dictatorship, not a democratic dictatorship by a proletarian majority, but a dictatorship of the insurrectionaries who hope to win over the majority and eventually become democratic. Hunt argues at great length that Marx was not a totalitarian democrat in the Blanquist tradition and that he did not hold to a model of minority revolution.20 I fully agree that Marx was opposed to Blanqui and to totalitarian democracy, but it does not at all follow that he did not have a theory of minority revolution. Hunt does recognize that a proletariat hardly existed in Germany in 1843 and thus asks how Marx could expect a proletarian revolution to produce democracy. The answer, Hunt thinks, is that while Marx wildly overestimated its speed and extent, he expected a rapid development of the proletariat produced by industrialization and a consequent disintegration of society. But this, even if true, does not remove the problem. It does not at all obviate the fact that Marx calls for a proletarian revolution while the proletariat was still a tiny minority—​even before the bourgeoisie had developed far enough to make its own bourgeois revolution. Furthermore, there is no suggestion to be found in the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Introduction” that the proletarian revolution would be based on universal male suffrage, as Hunt tries to suggest in several places.21 Marx, of course, hoped this minority revolution would not remain a minority revolution. He hoped it could win over the numbers to become democratic. But the fact that it would hopefully become a majority revolution does not alter the fact that it began as a minority revolution. Marx is holding that a minority revolution could eventually achieve the numbers to become democratic. He thought a minority could start the revolutionary process. He did not think the proletariat had to become a majority before it started. And he did not foresee the consequences of a proletarian revolution in which the proletariat remained a minority for a lengthy period of time.

Marx and Minority Revolution  65 After coming to power, such a minority could well find it very difficult to win over the majority and become democratic. Its undemocratic methods could in fact alienate the majority. Indeed, the longer it takes for capitalism to develop and the proletariat to grow into a majority, and the longer it takes to transform the socio-​ economic realm so as to satisfy the needs of, and win over, this majority, the more likely it is that undemocratic processes would solidify and get institutionalized. They would get built into the foundations of the new society, and thus make it increasingly difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to ever achieve democracy. The worry here is not just whether a violent insurrection by a minority can succeed in the first place. The worry is what happens if it does succeed? What happens for the possibility of democracy? Such a society faces a dilemma, and it will continue to face this dilemma for a long time. It must choose between socialism or democracy—​it can have one or the other but not both. If the proletariat is a small minority, then democracy will not lead to a proletarian society. It will not lead to a society that satisfies the needs and interests of the proletariat. If it is to attempt to become a proletarian society, one that satisfies the needs and interests of the proletariat, it cannot proceed democratically. It will have to be a dictatorship. This dilemma will continue to exist until the proletariat becomes the significant majority and society can become both democratic and proletarian. But at that point, the majority, including proletarians, may not want proletarian society, given its undemocratic track record. Heilbroner thinks experience has shown that some “degree of coercion, expropriation, forced nationalization, or collectivization seems an inescapable course for a newly constituted socialism in a backward society—​a course that will inevitably affect the tone and character of the regime’s subsequent political and economic career.”22 Such a society faces a further dilemma. It must choose between the possibility of a distorted, undemocratic, even totalitarian socialism, or, if it does not seize the chance when it can, if

66  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy it lets the bourgeoisie continue to develop capitalism, it is likely to suffer oppression, poverty, and subjugation that could be as bad or even worse. Nove argues that the “experience of many (most?) developing countries suggests . . . the capitalist development road requires the maintenance of order by a powerful repressive apparatus, a military or one-​party regime.”23

Permanent Revolution In 1847–​1848, Marx and Engels introduce a variation on their theory of minority revolution in a pre-​capitalist society, one that does not involve stage skipping. In the “Principles of Communism,” Engels writes, “the proletarian revolution, which in all probability is impending, will transform existing society only gradually.” And he adds, “This will perhaps involve a second fight, but one that can end only in in the victory of the proletariat.”24 The Manifesto goes into more detail: In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way . . . . But they never cease, for a single instant, to instill into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may begin. The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilization, and with a much more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France

Marx and Minority Revolution  67 in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.25

Hunt admits that, if taken literally, this passage from the Manifesto implies a minority revolution, but insists that Marx and Engels “did not really mean what they appear to say in these world-​famous lines.” And he proceeds to argue against such a view at length.26 Hunt seems to overlook the fact that the proletariat, a small minority, begins its revolution, the proletarian revolution, by helping the bourgeoisie, itself a minority, make a bourgeois revolution, and then turns it into a proletarian revolution. Such a revolution starts as a minority revolution and hopes to eventually become a majority revolution.27 At any rate, there is no stage skipping here. There are two revolutions back-​ to-​ back—​ first, a bourgeois revolution, and then a proletarian revolution. Indeed, the proletariat must help the bourgeoisie make its revolution by fighting “with the bourgeoisie . . . against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.”28 The proletariat latches on to a bourgeois revolution in progress, helps it along, keeps it going, and eventually transforms it into a proletarian revolution. As Marx and Engels put it in 1850, the task is “to make the revolution permanent.”29 The proletariat does not skip the bourgeois revolution—​it piggy-​backs on it. In doing so, the workers must put forth their own demands and their own candidates alongside those of the bourgeois democrats. They must establish their own revolutionary workers’ government alongside the official government. And the workers must be armed and organized.30 Here the proletarian revolution, or the process that becomes the proletarian revolution, begins well before the proletariat has become a majority, even well before capitalism has solidly established itself against feudalism. In Chapter 1 we saw that the first stage, the earliest stage, of post-​capitalist society in the Manifesto, the society

68  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy described by the ten measures, was a much earlier stage than stage one of the “Gotha Program.” Only in the latter, not the former, did we have collective ownership of all means of production as well as planning developed to the advanced level of replacing money with labor certificates. In now discussing a minority revolution by the proletariat, either of the stage skipping or the permanent revolution variety, we are talking about an even earlier stage than that described in stage one of the Manifesto. The proletariat would be nowhere near large enough to, as the Manifesto put it, “win the battle of democracy,” and capitalism would not have developed far enough for it to make sense for the proletariat to “wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie.”31 The task of the proletariat at this early stage would be to build capitalism, or to support the bourgeoisie in building capitalism. Only thus could it begin to build itself into a large enough majority that it would eventually be possible for it to “win the battle of democracy.” All of this would be required just to get to the stage described by the ten measures. Before that there would be little capital to wrest. If the proletariat were to forge ahead at that very earliest stage and take over anyway, it would then have to build up capitalism itself, which, indeed, is what occurred in the Russian Revolution. Moreover, for the minority revolution model to have any plausibility in the first place, we must notice, a certain underlying assumption would seem to be required. As Harrington puts it, “In the years leading up to 1850 Marx was a democrat in the Jacobin sense. He saw the coming revolution as a gigantic popular explosion from below, as a democratic insurrection.”32 And Lichtheim writes, “Marx and Engels thought in terms of the revolutionary experience of 1789–​1794, when moderate factions were displaced by more radical ones, until the whole democratic movement had advanced far beyond its original starting-​point.”33 Marx himself writes: In the first French Revolution the rule of the Constitutionalists is followed by the rule of the Girondins and the rule of the Girondins

Marx and Minority Revolution  69 by the rule of the Jacobins. Each of these parties relies on the more progressive party for support. As soon as it has brought the revolution far enough to be unable to follow it further, still less to go ahead of it, it is thrust aside by the bolder ally that stands behind it and sent to the guillotine. The revolution thus moves along an ascending line.34

By 1850, however, Marx is clearly having doubts about the possibility of such a minority revolution: the workers thought they would be able to emancipate themselves side by side with the bourgeoisie . . . . As soon as it has risen up, a class in which the revolutionary interests of society are concentrated finds the content and the material for its revolutionary activity directly in its own situation . . . . The French working class had not attained this level; it was still incapable of accomplishing its own revolution. The development of the industrial proletariat is, in general, conditioned by the development of the industrial bourgeoisie. Only under its rule does the proletariat gain that extensive national existence which can raise its revolution to a national one, and does it itself create modern means of production, which become just so many means of its revolutionary emancipation. Only its rule tears up the material roots of feudal society and levels the ground on which alone a proletarian revolution is possible.35

By 1859, in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx holds that: “No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.”36 This means that while the proletariat may try to grab political power at an earlier stage,

70  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy and even succeed, it would not be able to transform capitalism into socialism, or even make much headway in that direction, until capitalism had been fully developed—​until “all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed.” Moreover, given the fact that during this time the proletariat would not be a majority, this economic transformation could not likely be carried out democratically. If the proletariat is not able to rule democratically, then it may well alienate even those who started out in support of such transformation.

Russian Revolution Several aspects of Marx’s theory of minority revolution in a pre-​ capitalist society anticipate what actually occurred in the Russian Revolution. Lange argues: It so happened—​and not accidentally—​that the first socialist governments, the first socialist revolutions, emerged not in the most developed countries, but in backward countries where capitalism earlier manifested its incapacity to further expand the productive power of society. Hence the additional problems of development, the additional tasks which confront backward countries after the conquest of political power by the working class. From this resulted the weakness of the sector socialized by the revolution . . . . Socialization of big capital and the banks—​ and thus, as in Russia, the whole of industry—​created but a small socialist islet in a great peasant-​petty-​bourgeois and partly also small-​capitalist sea.37

Russia in 1917, like Germany in 1848, was not a developed capitalist economy. How could its proletariat overcome this backwardness? It certainly was not large enough to do so democratically. Kolakowski writes that:

Marx and Minority Revolution  71 Instead of organizing the proletariat for practicable aims and raising it to a higher level the Bolsheviks had incited it to take revenge on individual capitalists, destroyed all elements of democracy, and allowed the immaturity of the movement to bear fruit in universal savagery and banditry. They were trying ineffectually, like the Jacobins before them, to cure economic difficulties by mass terror and forced labour . . . . The original sin of Bolshevism lay in the suppression of democracy, abolition of elections, and the denial of the freedom of speech and assembly, and in the belief that socialism could be based on a minority despotism imposed by force.38

Luxemburg admits that Lenin and his comrades “showed a quite cool contempt for the Constituent Assembly, universal suffrage, freedom of the press and assembly, in short, for the whole apparatus of the basic democratic liberties of the people.”39 Mises says, “the Constituent Assembly, elected by universal franchise for men and women, had only about twenty percent Bolshevist members.” And Lenin dispersed it by force of arms.40 Luxemburg says, “in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading and an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions unanimously.” She calls it “a dictatorship to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, however, but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians.”41 In short, Russia had all the problems one would expect from a minority revolution in a pre-​capitalist society. As for Marx’s theory of permanent revolution, Berlin comments on it as follows: The petite bourgeoisie struggling against the pressure of the classes immediately above it was the workers’ natural ally at this stage, but being unable to rule by its own strength, it would become more and more dependent on the workers’ support, until the moment arrived at which the workers, already economic

72  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy masters of the situation, acquire the official forms of political power, whether by violent coup, or by gradual pressure. This doctrine . . . is familiar to the world because it was urged by Trotsky in 1905, adopted by Lenin, and put into practice with the most literal fidelity by them in Russia in 1917. Marx himself, however, in light of the events of 1848, abandoned it, at any rate in practice, in vital respects.42

Marx’s theory of permanent revolution anticipates and was adopted by Trotsky, Lenin, and the Russian Revolution. But it is not just Marx’s theory of permanent revolution that illuminates the Russian Revolution, Marx tells us in a letter of 1877 that, “In order to reach an informed judgment of the economic development of contemporary Russia,” he learned Russian and “spent several long years studying official publications and others with a bearing on this subject.” He concluded that, “if Russia continues along the path it has followed since 1861, it will miss the finest chance that history has ever offered to a nation, only to undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist system.”43 In a draft of a letter to Vera Zasulich in 1881, he argues that the Russian rural commune, the mir, could preserve itself, eliminate private property, develop common ownership of the land, and thereby “gain possession of the fruits with which capitalist production has enriched mankind, without passing through the capitalist regime.”44 Marx here is not just talking about avoiding permanent revolution. He is talking about skipping stages—​skipping capitalism altogether. He is speculating about the possibility that Russia could “pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership.”45 Russia was the only European country in which archaic communal property had been preserved on a nationwide scale. Shanin argues that the populists saw the peasant commune as a collective shield against the external world of squire, police, tax officer, and intruder. It was also seen as a possible tool of mobilization for the anti-​tsardom struggle. And it was to be the basic form of a

Marx and Minority Revolution  73 future organization of local power—​together with a democratically elected national government.46 The Russian peasant commune involved both individual and communal land ownership. Marx writes, “The ownership of land is communal, but each peasant tills and uses his field on his own account.” Moreover, peasants had private ownership of their house and garden.47 Thus, Marx thought two roads of development were possible. On the first, private ownership would be emphasized, capitalism would be developed, and the commune destroyed. Or, on the second, the communal element could prevail. Revolution could remove anti-​communal pressures and Western technology (mechanized cultivation on a large scale) could be put to use under communal control.48 As Marx says, the commune could: incorporate the positive acquisitions devised by the capitalist system without passing through its Caudine Forks. It can gradually replace parcel farming with combined agriculture assisted by machines . . . . [I]‌t may become the direct starting point for the economic system toward which modern society tends and turn over a new leaf without beginning by committing suicide.49

Whether or not it is sensible to think that Russia might have skipped capitalism and passed directly from the mir to full communism, I leave aside. The fact is that the Russian Revolution decided to take the first—​the capitalist—​route. Consequently, the proletariat was going to be a small minority in Russia and thus could not have built an industrialized proletarian society democratically. We are still buried deeply with the minority revolution model here and still have all the problems with democracy that have already been discussed, problems that the Russian Revolution in no way solved, but rather, in fact, exacerbated. One other issue should be noted. While Marx’s concept of a communist party in the Manifesto, we will see, is the furthest thing imaginable from a Leninist vanguard party, the concept of a party that

74  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Marx sketched in 1843 is quite different. It is not, by any means, a Leninist vanguard party, but it bears some few resemblances to one.50 For Lenin, a vanguard party is a small group of professional revolutionaries that bring consciousness and direction to the workers from without.51 For Marx, “philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat” and “the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy . . . . The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat.”52 Such a party gives the proletariat vision, leads it, guides it, seizes power with its assistance, and eventually hopes to bring about democracy. Except that it may never get to democracy—​it certainly did not in Russia. The Bolsheviks succeeded in making a minority revolution in a pre-​capitalist society; they succeeded in seizing power; they succeeded in holding it; and they succeeded in transforming Russia into a modern industrial state, indeed, more rapidly than would have been expected otherwise. In other respects, though, the Russian Revolution did not succeed—​it was an utter failure when it came to democracy and basic freedoms. Moreover, far from advancing socialism, it stunted it, and raised a major obstacle to the development of a decent form of socialism elsewhere.53 In his Introduction to Karl Kautsky’s The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, K. H. Kautsky writes of Kautsky’s: bitterness and disappointment that a faction which had grown out of the Marxist movement—​which to Kautsky was, above all, a democratic movement—​should have abandoned the very goals for which he had by then fought for some forty years . . . . [H]‌is words were to be a warning to other socialists, who were also attached to democratic values, not to follow Lenin. And . . . they served as a sharp polemical weapon to which Lenin was particularly vulnerable, because having used Marxian, i.e., Western democratic, symbols all along, he could now be accused of having betrayed his own past.54

Marx and Minority Revolution  75 Far from it being the case that the road to socialism inevitably led to totalitarianism, as Hayek and Mises want to think, it was the absence of democracy, due to the absence of a sufficiently large proletariat, that, in Russia, deformed socialism and hindered its development elsewhere. As Kautsky puts it: An impatient midwife who employs force to deliver a pregnant woman in the fifth month instead of the ninth will perform the feat of considerably shortening the period of pregnancy, but all the vital functions of the child will be suspended after a few convulsions, and the mother will be lucky if she escapes a lingering illness or even death. This species of midwifery is at the moment being practised on that poor mother called Russia by a number of doctors who assert that they have walked the Marxian hospital. These loud-​ mouthed saviours announce in every accent of quackery that their application of force is the appropriate means “of shortening and mitigating the birthpangs of Socialism . . . .” When the working class captures power . . . [t]‌he danger does not lie in the fact that too little revolutionary driving force will be released, but that it will be expended in an inappropriate manner, upon measures which will achieve the opposite of what is expected.55

4 Marx and Majority Revolution Majority Revolution There is also to be found in Marx’s thought a model for majority revolution in an advanced capitalist society.1 In 1859, in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx sketches the development his thought had taken since 1843: The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarized as follows. In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely, relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life.2

In the German Ideology, Marx called this his “materialistic view of the world.”3 It has come to be called his doctrine of historical materialism.4 Out of it, in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx develops a theory of revolution. He claims that, as they develop, the forces of production come into conflict with the relations of production. The latter, from forms of development Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy. Philip J. Kain, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.003.0005

Marx and Majority Revolution  77 of the forces of production, turn into their fetter. “Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead, sooner or later, to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.”5 This gives us a theory of revolution quite different from that discussed in the previous chapter. Marx continues, “No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.”6 There is no stage skipping here. We cannot skip over capitalism on to socialism. Capitalism will not disappear before it has been fully developed, and socialism will not arise until the material conditions for its existence have matured within and developed out of a highly developed capitalist society.7 Moreover, such an advanced stage of capitalism will require, and will produce, a very large proletariat. Were a minority to seize power earlier, it follows from this new model, it would not be able to achieve socialism until after capitalism had developed fully. It is not even clear that the permanent revolution model could work anymore if it is taken to mean that the bourgeois revolution would be “the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.”8 The proletarian revolution would have to wait quite a while—​while capitalism developed to its fullest. Marx explains this concept of revolution in more detail in the German Ideology: This “estrangement” . . . can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises. In order to become an “unendurable” power, i.e., a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity “propertyless,” and moreover in contradiction to an existing world of wealth and culture; both of these premises presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development.9

78  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy What is necessary to produce revolution is a polarization between classes (a great gap in wealth and culture) and the immiseration (the pauperization, the propertylessness) of the lower class. Thus, “a class is called forth . . . which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution.”10 Marx develops his model of majority revolution in an advanced capitalist society as he develops his theory of historical materialism. This begins in the German Ideology of 1845 and is fully developed in the Critique of Political Economy of 1859. It can also be found in the Manifesto of 1848. There, Marx begins by saying that the means of production “on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society.” But at a certain stage of development, “the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.” So also: Modern bourgeois society . . . a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells . . . . The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them . . . . The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.11

Such highly developed capitalism, where the forces of production are about to burst their own shell, also produces a highly developed

Marx and Majority Revolution  79 proletariat: “In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed.”12 As industry develops, the proletariat increases in number, grows stronger, and begins to form trade unions.13 “All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-​ conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority.”14 At this point, the proletariat will be in a position, that is, the material conditions will be present, such that it would actually be able to “raise [itself] to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.” And thus to “use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.”15 Unlike the minority revolution model, there is no notion of the primacy of politics here.16 A revolution cannot be made in the absence material conditions that enable it.17 Moreover, such a revolution will also require a different sort of political party, a party nothing at all like a Leninist vanguard party, and not even like the party of 1843, that is, not a party that is expected to bring consciousness and direction to the workers from outside.18 The party Marx describes in the Manifesto is not even “a separate party opposed to other working-​class parties.” It certainly has “no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.” And it does “not set up any sectarian principles of [its] own, by which to shape and mold the proletarian movement.”19 Instead, this party is: distinguished from other working-​class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working

80  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.20

Again, there is no primacy of politics here. Material conditions determine the possibility of revolution. The task of the party is to study those conditions, understand them, and serve as a clearing house and communications center. It studies and informs the proletariat as a whole of what is going on among diverse sectors of the proletariat. Only thus does it gain “the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.”21 The theoretical conclusions of this party: are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered by this or that would-​be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.22

Such a party does not so much make a revolution, as study, understand, and guide a process that is already actually taking place in the existing socio-​economic world. And it does so by communicating, that is, informing all sections of the proletariat of what is actually taking place elsewhere. It is nothing like a Leninist vanguard party, but then, neither is it described as an electoral party like the SPD that Marx will eventually come to support.23

Historical Materialism and the Categorical Imperative In 1850, Marx tells us that proletarian revolution “is only possible” when “modern productive forces and the bourgeois forms of production, come in collision with each other.” It will not occur, he says,

Marx and Majority Revolution  81 merely due to “moral indignation.”24 In Chapter 3, I argued that Marx’s theory of minority revolution, in the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, was primarily a philosophical-​ moral theory for why there ought to be a revolution. After 1845, Marx wants more than that. He wants a theory for what will actually produce a revolution, and thus a theory that would allow us to understand and guide that revolution: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”25 Engels writes, “revolutions are not made deliberately and arbitrarily but . . . everywhere and at all times they are the necessary consequence of circumstances which are not in any way whatever dependent either on the will or on the leadership of individual parties or of whole classes.”26 This is not to say that Marx abandons all talk to the effect that the class interest of the proletariat drives it toward the universal—​ the categorical imperative. We still find a good bit of that. It is just that the argument is now that material conditions drive the proletariat toward the universal; not that the universal itself exerts a moral force moving the proletariat toward revolution, and certainly not that philosophy is the head of this process and the proletariat its heart.27 In the German Ideology, Marx argues that Kant separated—​abstracted—​morality from its basis in real “material interests . . . conditioned and determined by the material relations of production.”28 In the same text he also writes: each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones . . . . It can do this because initially its interest really is as yet mostly connected with the common interest of all

82  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy other non-​ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of other classes which are not winning a dominant position . . . . Every new class, therefore, achieves domination only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously.29

Moreover, just as in the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law of 1843–​1844, where the class interest of the proletariat in satisfying its needs, including the need to develop its powers and capacities, accorded with the universal, the categorical imperative,30 so in the German Ideology: things have now come to such a pass that the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve self-​activity, but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence. This appropriation is first determined by the object to be appropriated, the productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal intercourse. Even from this aspect alone, therefore, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the productive forces and the intercourse. The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves.31

In 1843, the class interest of the proletariat and the categorical imperative demanded the satisfaction of the needs and the development of the powers and capacities of individuals. In 1845, material conditions, the extensive development of the forces of production,

Marx and Majority Revolution  83 force the development of the powers and capacities of individuals—​ if they are to safeguard their very existence. The latter argument is purely a historical materialist argument, not a moral argument, but it gets us the result that would be demanded by morality. Marx writes that the realization of the individual will only “cease to be conceived as an ideal . . . when the . . . world which stimulates the real development of the abilities of the individual is under the control of the individuals themselves.”32 Moore tends to dismiss the moral arguments of Marx’s early writings as weak arguments, and he seems to prefer Marx’s historical materialist arguments as realistic, scientific, and solid. But then he finds it suspicious that the historical materialist arguments of the German Ideology reach the same conclusions as the moral arguments of the earlier writings.33 I do not share this worry. I think Marx, as he develops his doctrine of historical materialism, does want to develop a theory for what will actually achieve certain results, not just a theory arguing that they ought to be achieved. But this does not mean that he wants to abandon his earlier moral conclusions altogether. Indeed, historical materialism takes its task to be the explanation of all forms of consciousness—​including “ ‘pure’ theory, . . . philosophy, morality, etc.”34 Morality is not sufficient to give us an adequate theory of revolution. Nevertheless, revolution will not lead us away from, but toward, what morality would demand.35 On the other hand, the agreement between the class interest of the proletariat and the categorical imperative no longer functions, as it did on the minority revolution model, to substitute for the impossibility of democracy.36 Instead, in conjunction with the majority revolution model, the categorical imperative expresses at the ideal level the universal democratic interests of the actual majority. Put another way, the class interest of the proletariat always tends to accord with the universal. Where the proletariat was still a small minority, Marx hoped, the categorical imperative would guide it toward the universal. As the proletariat becomes the vast

84  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy majority of the population, its material class interest will actually realize the universal. Here it is not the categorical imperative that leads to revolution; it is the revolution that leads to the categorical imperative.37

Compatibility of Models for Revolution We must notice that in the Manifesto we find set almost side by side both models for revolution that we have discussed so far. On the one hand, we are told that: “The proletarian movement is the self-​ conscious, independent movement of the immense majority.”38 It should thus be able to raise itself “to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy,” and subsequently “to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie.”39 On the other hand, at the same time, on the last page of the Manifesto, we are told that “Germany . . . is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution,” that the proletariat will help the bourgeoisie make its revolution by fighting with it “whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie,” so that “after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin,” and lead to “an immediately following proletarian revolution.”40 This is the theory of permanent revolution, which is a theory of minority revolution, a theory for starting revolution well before the proletariat actually has the numbers to make its own revolution. Bernstein thinks the Manifesto is trying to combine two conflicting theories of revolution, but that what we end up with is only a compromise, not a solution to the conflict.41 In the “Principles of Communism,” Engels seems to suggest a solution. A proletarian revolution: will inaugurate a democratic constitution and thereby directly or indirectly, the political rule of the proletariat. Directly in

Marx and Majority Revolution  85 England, where the proletariat already constitutes the majority of the people. Indirectly in France and in Germany, where the majority of the people consists not only of proletarians but also of small peasants and urban petty bourgeois, who are only now being proletarianized . . . . This will perhaps involve a second fight, but one that can end only in the victory of the proletariat.42

In short, the majority revolution model would work in England, where the proletariat is the majority. Elsewhere, where the proletariat is a minority, only the permanent revolution model could work. That might sound like a solution, but as Moore points out, at no place does Marx explicitly contrast these two models.43 And there is reason to think he may sometimes confuse them. Marx, we have seen, was impressed by the democratic character of the Paris Commune.44 But while the proletariat was large and powerful in Paris, it was not a majority of the population in France as a whole.45 Thus the revolution that occurred in Paris, viewed from the perspective of the whole nation, was not a majority revolution. But in studying the political organization of the Commune, which was radically democratic, it fit with what theoretically should result from the majority revolution model. But a minority revolution could not produce results that can only follow from a majority revolution.46 Nevertheless, they seemed to do so, perhaps because the Commune lasted only two months before it was crushed. In that short period of time, what the Commune achieved, in one city, is perhaps best described as an ideal of what society ought to be, an ideal that, given time, would have proven to be incompatible with actual historical conditions. The proletariat, a minority in France as a whole, could not have come to power, let alone maintained itself in power, democratically. Does Marx see any of this? Is he confusing two models for revolution in his discussion of the Paris Commune? Perhaps he just does not want to discuss them there. We have seen that he originally thought an uprising in Paris, while surrounded by Bismarck’s army,

86  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy would be “desperate folly.”47 But nevertheless he stood in solidarity with the communards.48 This might suggest that perhaps Marx’s comments on the Commune should be read more as a praise of heroic action than the articulation of his theories of revolution and a resolution of their conflicts. At any rate, bringing about the dictatorship of the proletariat on the majority revolution model could give us class rule by the demos—​the proletarian majority—​and thus real democracy. On the minority revolution model, the dictatorship of the proletariat would give us plain old dictatorship—​the rule of a few. Thus, drawing all the elements of the majority revolution model together: in a highly developed capitalist society with a very large proletariat, the social relations of production will come to fetter the enormous capacities of the forces of production. This will produce a polarization of classes and the immiseration of the proletariat. That will lead to a revolution by the immense majority. Finally, this revolution could result in democracy and proceed without a powerful state standing over and dominating society. Except that there never has been such a revolution. In no advanced capitalist society has there been a proletarian majority that rose up, seized power through an insurrection, and moved democratically toward socialism. On the other hand, we have very definitely seen actual implementations of the minority revolution model, not least in the Russian Revolution. One might be tempted to think that it is the majority revolution model that is utopian. What we do find in advanced capitalist societies is the development of social democratic parties that move electorally toward a socialist transformation of society. That constitutes a third model for revolution, which we will discuss in Chapter 5. There is another problem here that must be noted. While Marx and Engels claim that in England, because there is no peasantry, the proletariat forms the majority,49 nevertheless, Marx suggests that it is the industrial proletariat that is most significant. What is critical

Marx and Majority Revolution  87 is the “struggle against capital in its developed, modern form, in its decisive aspect, the struggle of the industrial wage-​worker against the industrial bourgeois.”50 Yet in no country has the industrial proletariat ever formed the majority of the population. This is a problem that the social democratic electoral model will have to face up to and handle.

Political Revolution and Social Revolution There is another issue that we must take up here. Both of the models for a revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism that we have so far discussed put the political revolution before the social revolution.51 This is the exact opposite of what occurred in the bourgeois revolution—​the transformation from feudalism to capitalism. In the bourgeois revolution, the social revolution preceded the political revolution. Pockets of capitalism developed here and there in feudal society. They grew and spread. The capitalist economy became much more powerful and efficient than the feudal economy. And when this social transformation had reached a very high level of development, only then did the political revolution occur (e.g., the French Revolution), in which the bourgeoisie assumed political power after holding economic power for a long time. As Lange puts it: The transition from capitalism to socialism takes place differently than the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Capitalism is born in the womb of feudalism . . . . Trade and usury provided the means from which developed the first capitalist production enterprises—​mostly in manufacturing . . . . [T]‌his took place within the framework of the old feudal society . . . . Feudal relations in agriculture, guild restrictions of production in the towns—​ the whole feudal monarchical superstructure—​ were

88  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy obstacles to the further development of capitalist production. These resulted in bourgeois revolutions which eliminated these obstacles . . . . The bourgeois revolution thus cleared the road for the further growth of capitalist production . . . . The transition from capitalism to socialism takes place in an entirely different manner. Socialist production relations do not arise in the womb of capitalist society . . . . Socialist production relations—​which transform the capitalist economic structure into a socialist one—​ensue only after the victory of the proletarian revolution, hence after the acquisition of political power by the working class.52

As we will see in Chapter 5, social democrats do not at all agree that the socialist revolution must put the political revolution first, that is, grab political power before beginning the social transformation of society. Lange dismisses their views and tries to normalize what occurred in the Russian Revolution, which did put the political revolution first. At any rate, for both models of revolution discussed so far, for the majority and the minority revolution models, the socialist revolution does not wait for socialism to grow up within capitalism. In fact, only the majority revolution model even waits for a highly developed capitalism and a large proletariat. The minority revolution does not even wait for that. Both put the political revolution before the social revolution. In the Manifesto, for example, the ten measures intended to produce a social revolution (slowly change a capitalist society into a social democratic and then a socialist one) are only initiated after the proletariat succeeds in winning the political revolution—​in raising itself “to the position of ruling class.” This raises problems for democracy.53 It may raise fewer problems if the revolution has been made by a majority, rather than by a small minority, but nevertheless, if, after gaining political power, your task is to transform a capitalist economy into a socialist one, and if this must begin at the very beginning, that is, if no

Marx and Majority Revolution  89 socialism has developed within existing capitalism, if all socialism must be introduced anew, then there very likely may be some resistance to such fundamental changes. And one very well may face the dilemma discussed in the Introduction, that one must choose between socialism or democracy. If everything is to proceed democratically, there may be reluctance to vote for unsettling social transformation, even among the proletariat. If you are going to insist on socialist transformation nevertheless, then you may have to do it other than democratically. Moreover, to transform society so fundamentally may well require a state standing over society, and the more resistance there is to this social transformation, the more it will have to be a dominating state. It is in response to issues like this that social democracy developed.

5 Marx and Social Democratic Revolution In the 1870s, Marx increasingly worked with social democratic parties. First with the Eisenachers, the party of Liebknecht and Bebel, then with the party that grew out of the 1875 merger of the Eisenachers with the Lassalleans and eventually became the SPD (Sozialdemokratishe Partei Deutschlands).1

Social Democratic Revolution A social democratic revolution, the third model for revolution that we can find in Marx, differs from the other two models that we have discussed so far: the minority revolution and the majority revolution models. It does so especially in that it does not, as they do, put the political revolution before the social revolution. On the other hand, it would not really be accurate to say that it puts the social revolution first. It would be best to say that the relationship between social and political revolutions is interactive—​or, if you prefer, dialectical. The proletariat begins working for social transformation by building its own political party along with strong labor unions. As this party begins to win elections and hold seats in parliament, it can be more effective in transforming society. And if it succeeds in effectively transforming aspects of society, it will win more elections. The social revolution, the transformation of society to serve the class interest of the proletariat, is a slow, gradual, and Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy. Philip J. Kain, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.003.0006

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  91 ongoing process. The political revolution, the winning of seats in parliament, too, is a slow, gradual, and ongoing process. One does not precede the other in any meaningful sense. Each makes possible, leads to, and supports the other. Revolution, on this model, is not something that occurs at a neat and fixed point in time. The revolution is not in any very significant sense a violent uprising, even if that were to occur somewhere along the way. The revolution is the whole process, the fundamental, long-​term, democratic transformation of the social, economic, and political order. That is what is important. And this, I think, is what Bernstein meant in saying, “that what is usually termed the final goal of socialism is nothing to me, the movement is everything.”2 This revolutionary process would start well before the social democratic party wins its first election and would continue long after it becomes the largest party. The process would have its ups and downs—​its gains and losses. Successful social and economic transformation would translate into increased political power and increased political power would enable further socio-​economic transformation. Indeed, this model would seem to deserve the title “permanent revolution” more than the minority revolution model described in the Manifesto and in the “Address of the Central Authority to the League.”3 In 1877, the SPD won nine percent of the vote, making it the fourth largest party in Germany with twelve seats in the Reichstag.4 Bismarck’s anti-​socialist law was passed in 1878 and remained in effect for twelve years.5 The SPD was not prohibited from running candidates or holding seats in the Reichstag, but they could not hold meetings in Germany and their newspaper had to be moved to Switzerland, then later to London, and copies smuggled back into Germany. But despite the anti-​socialist law, the SPD grew. In 1884, it won ten percent of the vote and twenty-​four seats in the Reichstag.6 In 1890, the anti-​socialist law lapsed, and the SPD won twenty percent of the vote and thirty-​five seats.7 By 1912, it won thirty-​five percent of the electorate, over four million votes, and

92  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy held 110 seats.8 That made it the largest party in Germany and the largest socialist party in the world.9 At any rate, the model for a social democratic revolution differs from the models for a minority and a majority revolution in that it does not put the political before the social revolution. Nevertheless, in other respects it might even be considered a variant of the majority revolution model. Both assume a very highly developed capitalist society and a very large proletariat. Moreover, both assume the proletariat has organized its own independent political party such that the proletariat increasingly becomes aware of its class interest. On the other hand, the type of party, we will see, differs. Furthermore, both models are compatible with and depend upon the doctrine of historical materialism. On the majority revolution model, the enormous development of the productive forces, fettered by capitalist relations of production, will eventually lead to a crisis, an explosion, and a need for socialism as the only solution. As we will see, in later volumes of Capital, Marx recognizes that, as a part of this capitalist development, socialism begins to grow within capitalism much as capitalism originally grew within feudalism. Recognizing and understanding that process would allow a social democratic party to assist and steer the emergence of socialism—​ possibly without an explosion.10 On the other hand, unlike the majority revolution model (in its non-​social democratic variant), which has never actually been realized in any society, social democratic governments came into power all over Western Europe. It is also the case that the social democratic model for revolution presupposes not only a very large proletariat but a broad extension of the franchise. It requires at least something approaching universal male suffrage—​something not achieved until the late 1860s. Before that, the social democratic model would have been inconceivable—​ the best that would have been possible was the majority revolution model involving a violent explosion. The International Working Men’s Association was founded in 1864 and worked hard for universal male suffrage.11 In 1867, the upper layer of the British male

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  93 working class got the vote. In the same year, Bismarck introduced universal male suffrage into the North German Federal Reichstag. Liebknecht and Bebel were elected to it that year. In 1870, universal male suffrage was established in France.12 Before the late 1860s, the third model for revolution was unimaginable. Thus, in 1871 Marx was able to say: it must not be thought that it is of minor importance to have workers in parliament . . . . [I]‌f like Bebel and Liebknecht, they are able to speak from this platform, the entire world can hear them—​in one way or the other it means considerable publicity for our principles . . . . The governments are hostile to us. We must answer them by using every possible means at our disposal, getting workers into parliament is so much gaining over them.13

In 1872, in a speech in Amsterdam, Marx was able to say that there are countries like England, the United States, and perhaps Holland, “where the workers may achieve their aims by peaceful means.”14 In 1871, he said, “In England . . . the way to show political power lies open to the working class. Insurrection would be madness where peaceful agitation would more swiftly and surely do the work.”15 And after the merger of 1875, we have seen, the SPD begins winning seats in the Reichstag. In 1891, it puts forth the demand for women’s suffrage.16 In 1895, Engels writes that: In Germany . . . Social-​Democracy experienced a . . . rapid and enduring growth. Thanks to the intelligent use which the German workers made of the universal suffrage introduced in 1866, the astonishing growth of the party is made plain to all the world by incontestable figures . . . . [T]‌he German workers rendered a . . . great service to their cause . . . a service performed by their mere existence as the strongest, most disciplined and most rapidly growing socialist party. They supplied their comrades in all countries with a new weapon, and one of the most potent, when they showed them how to make use of universal suffrage.17

94  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy And a few pages later, Engels says the SPD’s growth: proceeds as spontaneously, as steadily, as irresistibly, and at the same time as tranquilly as a natural process. All government intervention has proved powerless against it . . . . [B]‌y the end of the century we shall . . . grow into the decisive power in the land, before which all other powers will have to bow, whether they like it or not. To keep this growth going without interruption . . . not to fritter away this daily increasing shock force in vanguard skirmishes, but to keep it intact until the decisive day, that is our main task. And there is only one means by which the steady rise of the socialist fighting forces in Germany could be temporarily halted, and even thrown back for some time: a clash on a grand scale with the military, a blood-​letting like that of 1871 in Paris . . . . The irony of world history turns everything upside down. We, the “revolutionaries,” the “overthrowers”—​we are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal methods and overthrow.18

Berlin sums up the policy of late nineteenth-​and early twentieth-​ century socialists as one of: gradual expansion and the slow conquest of political power through recognized parliamentary institutions, accompanied by systematic pressure on an international scale upon employers through trade unions and similar organizations, as a means of securing improved economic conditions for their workers.19

Industrial Proletariat Never Becomes a Majority There is, however, a problem that this third model—​the social democratic model—​must face. As Przeworski reminds us, “workers

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  95 never became the overwhelming majority of any electorate.”20 Moreover, only rarely do they win the support of half the people that went to the polls. Even further, they do not even win the votes of all workers.21 Marx and Engels hold that because there are no peasants in England, the proletariat—​that is, the industrial combined with the agricultural proletariat—​forms the majority of the population.22 However, in 1875, Marx says, “A radical social revolution . . . is only possible . . . where alongside capitalist production the industrial proletariat accounts for at least a significant proportion of the mass of the people.”23 Yet in Theories of Surplus Value, Marx himself admits that the proportion of wage workers who participate directly in the production of material objects (that is, the industrial proletariat) declines relative to all wage workers.24 And, indeed, as Miller and Potthoff inform us, in Europe the industrial labor force constituted only a small section of the population.25 It follows from this, then, that to win elections a social democratic party cannot rely solely on the industrial proletariat, and, if they cannot expect all workers to vote for them, they cannot even safely rely on the industrial combined with the agricultural proletariat. In 1847, Engels defines the proletariat as, “that class of society which procures its means of livelihood entirely and solely from the sale of its labour and not from the profit derived from any capital.”26 In a note to the 1888 English edition of the Manifesto, Engels defines the proletariat more precisely as “the class of modern wage-​ labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour-​power in order to live.”27 Even on a strict definition like either of these, all sorts of people, not just industrial or agricultural workers, are proletarians. For Marx, one’s class is determined by one’s relationship to the means of production, not by income or status level.28 Proletarians are those who do not live off means of production. To live they must sell their labor power.

96  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy For our purposes here, let us distinguish between the proletariat-​ narrowly-​understood, the industrial proletariat, on the one hand, and on the other, the proletariat-​broadly-​understood, all those who must sell their labor power to live. In this broad sense, all workers, all employees (which include service workers, office workers, white collar workers, professionals, and so forth), are part of the proletariat.29 In some cases, these employees may earn more than industrial workers, but in other cases some may, indeed, earn less than some industrial workers.30 All previous ruling classes in history have been small minorities that ruled over large majorities. Were the proletariat to come to power, it would not be the case that the industrial proletariat would be a majority, let alone an immense majority. Nevertheless, it would be the case that the industrial proletariat would be larger than any previous ruling class in history, and it would certainly be the case that the proletariat-​broadly-​understood would be the vast majority of the population. Kolakowski informs us that Liebknecht held the view that: the working class should be taken to include all those who lived wholly or mainly by the work of their hands . . . . Moreover, [that] . . . the socialist party should be more interested in whether its members professed socialist ideas than in whether they were wage-​earners. If the movement were based exclusively on the industrial proletariat it could not become a majority or achieve its aims. It must be a movement of the whole people other than the nobility, clergy, and upper bourgeoisie.31

To proceed democratically, a social democratic party must appeal to others besides the industrial proletariat, and even to others besides the combined industrial and agricultural proletariat. It must appeal to the proletariat-​broadly-​understood. Moreover, it is clear that Marx and Engels agree with this. In 1848, Engels suggests that the petty bourgeoisie “has in many respects the same interest as

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  97 the proletariat,” that we should reach an understanding with their party, “and in general for the time being pursue as much as possible a common policy with them.”32 In 1850, Marx says, “The French workers could not take a step forward . . . until the course of the revolution had aroused the mass of the nation, the peasants and petty bourgeois . . . and had forced them to attach themselves to the proletarians as their protagonists.”33 He also points out that “the party of the workers and that of the petty bourgeois, united to form the social-​democratic party.”34 In 1871, Marx suggests that the Paris Commune represents “not only the interests of the working class, [but] the petty middle class, in fact, all the middle class with the exception of the bourgeoisie.”35 Moreover, in 1881, Engels writes that capitalist businesses increasingly, “are owned, not by individual capitalists who manage their own business, but by joint-​stock companies whose business is managed for them by paid employees, by servants whose position is to all intents and purposes that of superior, better paid workpeople.”36 In 1895, he predicts that the SPD, “by the end of the century . . . shall have the greater part of the middle strata of society, petty bourgeoisie and small peasants, and we shall grow into the decisive power in the land, before which all other powers will have to bow.”37 Lichtheim argues that while socialists began by appealing to manual laborers there was no reason why they should not appeal to the developing strata of white collar, professional, brain workers.38 Thomas argues that, “social democratic parties have always attracted significant middle-​class support.”39 And Przeworski points out that the bourgeoisie did “not rise in arms against the electoral progress of socialists, but . . . socialist were either invited to form minority governments or to join multi-​party coalitions.”40 This raises a problem. A social democratic party, Przeworski argues, “must choose between a party homogenous in its class appeal but sentenced to perpetual electoral defeats or a party that struggles for electoral success at the cost of diluting its class

98  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy orientation.”41 In other words, if a social democratic party, to win elections, attempts to address the interests of the proletariat-​ broadly-​understood, will it have to ignore or contradict the interests of the proletariat-​ narrowly-​ understood, such that it becomes meaningless to talk about a proletariat that has any sort of unified class interest? As Przeworski says, “no party will be able to win the support of everyone without losing the support of someone.”42 We should notice, however, that for Marx any class has different sections with different and even conflicting interests. In the Class Struggles in France, Marx distinguishes between the industrial bourgeoisie, the finance bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and he discusses in detail disagreements between them.43 It would be completely unrealistic to deny the existence of similar differences among sections of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood.44 But it certainly does not follow that they do not share common interests. Labor unions like the AFL-​CIO, the Teamsters, and the SEIU successfully organize widely different sectors of the working class: industrial workers, agricultural workers, office workers, service workers, teachers, nurses, on and on. Obviously, there are different, and even competing, interests here, but if these workers do not join together, few or none of those interests would ever be satisfied. And the task of the labor union is to make workers aware of that. Marx and Engels write to Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, Bernstein, and others in the SPD: The emancipation of the working class must be achieved by the working class itself. Hence we cannot co-​operate with men who say openly that the workers are too uneducated to emancipate themselves, and must first be emancipated from above by philanthropic members of the upper and lower middle classes.45

Marx and Engels are opposed to a social democratic party of this sort, that is, one in which the middle class from above leads the proletariat, which would be quite different from a party that appeals

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  99 to the proletariat-​ broadly-​ understood because they all share overlapping interests. What Engels does find acceptable is that “in a growing workers’ party, the accretion of petty-​bourgeois elements is inevitable, nor does it do any harm. Any more than the accretion of ‘academics,’ failed students, etc. A few years ago they still constituted a danger. Now we are able to digest them.”46 In other words, they are included and absorbed within—​they do not dominate or lead—​the proletariat-​broadly-​understood.

Social Democracy and the Categorical Imperative The question, then, is whether a social democratic party, to win elections, must move beyond being the party of a class, a proletarian party, to become a Volkspartei, a people’s party? And must this Volkspartei cease to represent the class interest of the proletariat to represent a broader interest of the people? It is certainly the case that this would not be Marx’s view. As we have seen, his view, as early as the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, and also in the German Ideology, has been that the class interest of the proletariat, unlike that of any other class, accords with the universal, the general interest, the categorical imperative.47 Marx first makes this argument in 1843, where, given that a proletariat barely existed in Germany, it could only be a moral argument for why there ought to be a revolution. In the German Ideology, he gives us a historical materialist argument for what will actually produce a revolution, a majority revolution that will also accord with the universal. While the proletariat-​narrowly-​ understood never becomes the majority, the proletariat-​broadly-​ understood certainly does, and given the fact that it has been excluded from power, dominated, and deprived, its class interest certainly could not center on privileges for a few, as for the bourgeoisie. Individuals might dream of such privileges as individuals.

100  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy But the interest of a class, as a class, must center on interests shared by the whole class—​if these interests are to have any realistic hope of being achieved. After all, to be able to satisfy its interests, the proletariat-​broadly-​understood will have to come together, agree on a program, and gain the power to realize it. Given the fact that they all must sell their labor power to survive, the proletariat-​broadly-​understood will have shared interests in, among other things, high (or full) employment, safe and healthy working conditions, workplace rights and democratic input, good pay, affordable food, clothing, and housing. They will also have interests in affordable healthcare, education, general human development, civil rights, and the environment. All these needs and interests would be universalizable—​they would accord with a categorical imperative. Moreover, the only way to effectively satisfy these needs and interests would require acting as a class—​it would require cooperation. Each individual paying attention to their own personal interest might try to make it alone à la Andrew Carnegie or some other variant of a rags to riches mythology. But that will not achieve the interest of the class as a class. Nor would acting alone even be likely to satisfy these needs and interests for very many individuals. To achieve the power to satisfy such needs for individuals requires that they act not as individuals but as a class. We might ask ourselves which groups could be included in this universal—​ this class interest of the proletariat-​ broadly-​ ­understood? Which groups could be won over to it—​which groups could come to see that this class interest really is their interest? Not the aristocracy. Not the big bourgeoisie. Some of the petty bourgeoisie. Certainly, the agricultural and industrial proletariat. But so could all who must sell their labor power to survive—​including members of minority racial, ethnic, or religious groups. So also, women. So also, LGBTQ groups. These individuals would no doubt have identities and interests other than class interests that they may find are not represented, are ignored, or even opposed by other members of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood. But the

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  101 class interest of the proletariat, correctly understood, will require overcoming such prejudices. It will require seeing that proletarians need other proletarians, as many of them as possible, the vast majority if possible, if they are “to win the battle of democracy.” To the extent that the interests of different sectors of the proletariat-​ broadly-​understood differ, their class interest demands that these differences be negotiated and resolved, if elections are to be won, thus problems solved, so that needs can then effectively be satisfied. Berman tells us that for Bernstein there was a “natural community of interest between workers and the vast majority of society who suffered from the injustices of the capitalist system.”48 If a social democratic party can appeal to the proletariat-​broadly-​ ­understood, win elections, produce legislation that addresses their interests, thus be able to win more elections, so as to act to address further interests, negotiate these, adjust, keep taking up new interests, then they could consolidate the power of the proletariat-​ broadly-​understood. This will not occur without reversals, without setbacks, without problems, but it could be enough to convince the majority that their class interest can only be realized by joining together in a social democratic movement. It is even the case, I think it can be argued, that the class interest of the proletariat is, in fact, the class interest of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood, and that this is the class interest even of the proletariat-​narrowly-​understood, the industrial proletariat, because any interest that fails to mobilize a significant majority, any interest that alienates a significant minority, risks fragmenting the proletariat-​broadly-​understood and thus paralyzing the realization of the interests of any sector of the proletariat. Nevertheless, all of this in large part has been a moral argument for what ought to be done. What is needed besides is a historical materialist argument for what actually would produce a social democratic revolution. But before we move on to the historical materialist argument, a bit more must be said about the moral dimension of Marx’s

102  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy argument. Wood, Buchanan, and others have argued that communist society, as Marx understands it, would pass beyond and leave behind principles of right and justice—​such issues would disappear.49 I think this view is mistaken and have argued against it at length in my earlier Marx and Ethics.50 It is true that the issue of whether or not moral concepts like right and justice apply to communist society is not that relevant to the argument I am presently making here, which concerns social democracy, and to some extent socialism, rather than communism. However, there are other associated claims found in some of these authors that, were they true, would present problems for my argument. For example, Wood thinks that capitalism, for Marx, is not unjust and cannot be morally criticized as unjust. In general, these authors argue, it is not legitimate to appeal to post-​capitalist—​socialist or communist—​ standards to condemn capitalism. In the same way, neither can one criticize any past society. Slavery in the ancient world, for example, would have to be accepted as just.51 Wood’s argument runs as follows. Marx regards moral norms like right and justice “as determined by correspondence to the prevailing mode of production.”52 In Capital, Marx writes: The justice of the transactions between agents of production rests on the fact that these arise as natural consequences out of the production relationships. The juristic forms in which these economic transactions appear as willful acts of the parties concerned . . . cannot, being mere forms determine this content. They merely express it. The content is just whenever it corresponds, is appropriate, to the mode of production. It is unjust whenever it contradicts that mode.53

It follows, Wood thinks, that standards appropriate to a postcapitalist mode of production would not be appropriate to any earlier modes of production—​including capitalism.54 Each mode of production gives rise to its own standards and, if it corresponds

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  103 to those standards, it is just. Moreover, the “new mode of production will not be ‘more just’ than the old, it will only be just in its own way.” Any attempt to use such standards to condemn capitalism, would be “mistaken, confused, and without foundation.”55 The first and most basic problem with this argument is that it tends to treat capitalism and communism as neat, fixed, mutually exclusive abstractions, which is not Marx’s view at all, and which even undermines the very historical materialism the argument purports to be explicating. In the Manifesto, Marx writes: When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.56

Proletarian condemnations of capitalism, it is true, would not express, would not correspond with, would not be meaningful within, a capitalist society at its high point—​when it is at its strongest. But, as we will see, capitalist society will begin to dissolve, and elements of socialism will begin to emerge within it. Along with this emergence will come new ideas, socialist ideas, ideas that will revolutionize society. This will include new ideas of right and justice. These new ideas will be rational, meaningful, legitimate, and effective to the degree that they express and correspond to the new society emerging within the old.57 After all, the proletariat has “no ideals to realize, but to set free elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.”58 Proletarian moral criticism of capitalism does not require an external standard; it expresses nothing but what is emerging within capitalism—​and thus is in perfect accord with Marx’s historical materialism. The new moral values alone and of themselves cannot realize the new society. But as the new society emerges within the old dissolving society, the new society will generate new needs

104  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy and interests that will ground new moral values that will express those needs and interests. These new values will increasingly have meaning, legitimacy, and efficacy, just as the old values will increasingly have less meaning, legitimacy, and efficiency. Thus, in the German Ideology, Marx writes that proletarians achieve unity, “only through a long process of development in which the appeal to their right also plays a part. Incidentally, this appeal to their right is only a means of making them take shape as ‘they,’ as a revolutionary, united mass.”59 In the Grundrisse, Marx writes that the working class’s: recognition of the products as its own, and its awareness that its separation from the conditions of its realization is improper and imposed by force, is an enormous [advance in] consciousness, and is itself the product of the mode of production based on capital, and just as much the KNELL TO ITS DOOM as the consciousness of the slave that he cannot be the property of another, his consciousness of being a person, reduced slavery to an artificial lingering existence, and made it impossible for it to continue to provide the basis of production.60

Marx also says in the German Ideology, that the new class will be “compelled . . . to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society,” that is, to give them “the form of universality,” to “present them as the only rational, universally valid ones.” Indeed, “Every new class . . . achieves domination only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously.”61 Just as the moral values of the emerging society gain increasing significance and effect, so, on the other hand, the moral values of the dissolving society have decreasing significance and effect: The more the normal form of intercourse of society, and with it the conditions of the ruling class, develop . . . and the greater the consequent discord within the ruling class itself as well as

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  105 between it and the class ruled by it, the more fictitious, of course, becomes the consciousness which originally corresponded to this form of intercourse (i.e., it ceases to be the consciousness corresponding to this form of intercourse), and the more do the old traditional ideas of these relations of intercourse, in which actual private interests, etc., etc., are expressed as universal interests, descend to the level of mere idealizing phrases, conscious illusion, deliberate hypocrisy. But the more their falsity is exposed by life, and the less meaning they have for consciousness itself, the more resolutely are they asserted, the more hypocritical, moral, and holy becomes the language of this normal society.62

The point here is that Marx’s commitment to historical materialism does not make it impossible for the proletariat to condemn capitalism, and it is not impossible that such condemnation would have some significant effect. Moreover, we have already noted earlier in this chapter, Marx and the International Working Men’s Association worked hard for and finally won universal male suffrage in England—​that is, the right to vote.63 It is also clear that such condemnation of capitalism does not require an external standard. It requires nothing more than what is emerging within capitalism, “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”64 Moreover, G. A. Cohen argues that while some market inequalities “are not condemned by justice, they are nevertheless repugnant to socialists when they obtain on a sufficiently large scale, because they then contradict community.”65 Thus, for Cohen, we can condemn aspects of capitalism without having, or appealing to, a concept of justice. The second and more complicated problem with the view of Wood and Buchanan is that it does not seem to be aware that there are significant differences between the historical materialist

106  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy method of the of the German Ideology and that worked up in the Grundrisse and employed in Capital.66 This new method, understood correctly, undermines many of their claims. I have discussed this method at length and in detail in earlier books.67 Here I will give just a brief summary. In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx contrasts two methods for the study of the social world. The first is a historical method, which straightforwardly traces the development of production from one historical point to another. The second method, instead, begins by sorting out features common to all historical periods of production. It arrives at an abstraction: production in general (or at least certain features of production in general). With this abstraction, it then seeks to identify precisely and in detail the differences—​the specific features—​that uniquely characterize a certain, specific historical stage of production (say, capitalist production) and thus distinguish it from other stages (say, feudal production) and also from production in general. Only at that point does it become possible to study actual capitalist production. This is an analytical method.68 The historical method starts with a certain period, with real, actual, empirical details—​the visible, observable, empirical characteristics of the period. It seeks to understand how various elements are connected and how they develop historically, say, from feudalism to modern capitalism. This, basically, was the method sketched in the German Ideology. It started from feudalism and moved to capitalism by discussing the development and transformation of material conditions. It started with material processes of production, then studied the form of intercourse (the relations of production) connected with them, and then, only then, did it try to understand the theoretical production—​the ideas—​that grew out of these material conditions. For this method, Marx says, ideas and abstractions come only at the end—​they are traced from material conditions. This method does not start with general ideas, abstractions, or categories to probe, organize, or categorize the

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  107 material. These appear only at the end of the study and merely sum things up.69 In the Grundrisse, this method, the historical method, Marx says, is the wrong method, and he rejects it. The “correct scientific method,” Marx says, starts with ideas, abstractions, abstract categories (like labor, money, value, commodity, and so forth), concepts that have been found to characterize the most highly developed period of production, that is, modern capitalist society. It does not start with actual empirical details; it starts with abstractions. It tries to relate and connect these abstract categories into an abstract model of a capitalist economy. It tries to reconstruct the whole, the complex, the concrete, out of these simple categories. This is the correct, necessary, starting point.70 The concrete, Marx says, is not adequately given to scientific knowledge just as it sits there in the world. The actual world is obscure, chaotic, and vague. For science, the concrete arises only as the result of thought, study, and analysis, which organizes the chaos, understands all its specificity, connections, determinations, relations, and shapes it into a coherent picture.71 For experience or observation, Marx says, the actual world is the starting point, but for science (for the method), the concrete is not the starting point, but a result, a construction. To get at the concrete for science requires a general model, a theoretical construct, a paradigm, which organizes things clearly and coherently. That is the starting point for science. Only after the construction of this concrete-​for-​thought, this paradigm, can empirical study of actual historical reality begin. You cannot go directly to an empirical study of the actual world as in the German Ideology—​it would be chaotic and confused. You could not understand anything. Only after you have worked up a paradigm out of abstract categories can you begin to clearly see and empirically study actual historical reality. The method cannot proceed as history does. Historical development is the reverse of the method. In history, you have an actual world that is developing, and ideas, abstractions, categories, only

108  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy arise out of the development of the historical world. When industry and industrial labor actually arise in history, only then do you have ideas, categories, or abstractions that express industry and industrial labor. But for the method, we start with these abstract categories, worked up into a paradigm, to go back and try to understand the concrete as well as its past historical development.72 Clearly, this is the method employed in Capital. It starts with abstract categories (value, commodity, labor). It tries to connect these categories, understand their interrelations, and to develop a concrete-​for-​thought, a paradigm, for a modern capitalist economy. And only at the very end of Volume 1 of Capital does it begin a historical study of the development from feudalism to capitalism. All ideas or categories (labor, value, commodity, capital, and so forth) do arise from the development of material conditions in the Grundrisse just as in the German Ideology. The modern category of value or capital cannot be grasped until the reality (value and capital) has actually developed historically there in the material conditions of a modern economy. But the actual economy cannot be understood simply by direct empirical observation. One cannot start with the economy at one historical point and simply and straightforwardly trace its development to a later point (e.g., from feudalism to capitalism). One must first grasp the abstract categories, their relation and interconnection, in the modern, most highly developed economy, construct a concrete-​ for-​thought or a paradigm, and only then is it possible to begin to study and understand actual modern capitalism and its historical development. Each abstract category must be worked up to fit and capture the aspect of the economy it is to express. And so, as the actual economy develops and changes historically, these categories will also have to be changed, transformed, and remolded, if they are going to express the new changed economic reality. It follows that the categories that express one period will not express or explain a later period. For example, in feudal society,

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  109 industry was a minor thing and agriculture was the main form of production. Consequently, the labor that produced wealth was taken to be agricultural labor. This category will not help to understand capitalist society where industry becomes the main form of production and agriculture plays a relatively minor role, and where it becomes apparent that labor in general (as Adam Smith first points out), not just a particular form of labor, not just agricultural labor, produces all wealth. The category of labor as the source of wealth gets fundamentally transformed. First, only agricultural labor, and then labor in general, produces all wealth.73 On the other hand, this method is capable of giving us insight into past societies. Marx even thinks it gives us insight into ancient Greek art. In early history, with a less complex world, categories stand out and predominate—​labor, for example, appears as a particular form of labor: as farming, metal working, and so forth. In later history, with a more complex economy, categories become subordinate. The particular form of labor in capitalist society is relatively unimportant. Labor in general, labor in the abstract, is the source of all wealth. And labor becomes subordinate to complex economic forces and their fluctuations.74 This is important for art. In a less developed economy like that of Homeric Greece, Marx writes, the imagination can stand out and predominate—​it can dominate nature and society. It can wrap up nature and society in a unified mythology, and, as in the Homeric epic, have an enormous scope, universality, and totality. Because the world is relatively simple, the imagination can unify it, and this makes for the greatness of Greek art—​which is “in certain respects regarded as a standard and unattainable model.”75 Such art is not: possible in the age of SELFACTORS, railways, locomotives and electric telegraphs . . . . What is Vulcan compared with Roberts and Co., Jupiter compared with the lightening conductor, and Hermes compared with the Crédit Mobilier? All mythology subdues, dominates, and fashions the forces of nature in the

110  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy imagination and through the imagination; it therefore disappears when real domination over these forces is established.76

In general, Marx thinks: Bourgeois society is the most developed and many-​faceted historical organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the understanding of its structure, therefore, provide, at the same time, an insight into the structure and the relations of production of all previous forms of society the ruins and components of which were used in the creation of bourgeois society . . . . The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of the ape. On the other hand, indications of higher forms in the lower species of animals can only be understood when the higher forms themselves are already known. Bourgeois economy thus provides the key to that of antiquity, etc.77

We must also notice that what the scientifically correct method discovers is understood by Marx as an inner essence behind surface appearance. In Capital, he writes that, “all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided.”78 Indeed, value is to be understood in this way, “Value . . . does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products.”79 The method begins with abstract categories and works them into an interconnected structure that grasps the essence of things. Only then does it turn to the study of the concrete empirical world. The first volume of Capital begins by studying abstract categories like the commodity, value, and labor. The third volume of Capital, Marx tells us, slowly works back to the phenomenal surface of society, to prices, and profit. Marx tells us that “a scientific analysis . . . is not possible, before we have a conception of the inner nature of capital,

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  111 just as the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies are not intelligible to any but him, who is acquainted with their real motions, motions which are not directly perceptible by the senses.”80 I think this method also applies to morality. In a letter to Engels of 1858, Marx makes it clear that the categories of equality and freedom belong to the realm of surface phenomena, which disappear at the level of essence.81 In the Grundrisse, he writes: In the totality of existing bourgeois society, this postulation as price and its circulation etc., appears as the superficial process, bellow which, in the depths, entirely other processes occur in which the apparent equality and freedom of individuals disappear . . . [and] turn out to be inequality and unfreedom.82

Wood makes a great deal out of Marx’s claim that the extraction of surplus value in capitalist society “is peculiar good fortune for the buyer [of labor power], but no injustice at all to the seller.” Wood thinks it “involves no unequal or unjust exchange.”83 I agree that this is so, but only at the level of surface appearance.84 Marx tells us that, “Surplus value and rate of surplus value are, relatively, the invisible and unknown essence that wants investigating.”85 But that: The wage-​form . . . extinguishes every trace of the division of the working day into necessary and surplus labour, into paid and unpaid labor. All labour appears as paid labor . . . even surplus labour, or unpaid labour, appears paid . . . . [H]‌ere the money relation conceals the unrequited labour of the wage labourer.86

In the Grundrisse, Marx writes, concerning the worker and the capitalist, that: The two sides confront each other as persons. Formally, their relation is that of equal and free exchangers.

112  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy That this form is mere appearance, and deceptive appearance at that, appears, as far as the juridical relationship is concerned, as an external matter.87

Thus, on the one hand, we can say, as Wood does, that the contract between capitalist and worker is not an injustice because it was entered into “freely” and it involved an exchange of equivalents. Freedom and equality amount to justice. A contract is just if it is freely accepted and consists of an equal exchange. But, on the other hand, contrary to Wood, this is so only at the level of surface appearance, and, as we have seen, equality and freedom (and therefore justice) disappear at the level of essence. In the “Notes on Adolph Wagner,” Marx writes: I depict the capitalist . . . and demonstrate at great length that he not only “deducts” or “robs” but . . . I demonstrate in detail that . . . the capitalist—​as soon as he pays the worker the real value of his labour-​power—​would have every right, i.e. such right as corresponds to this mode of production, to surplus value . . . which he can appropriate “legally,” i.e. without infringing the law corresponding to the exchange of commodities.88

Despite Wood’s attempt to wriggle out of it, this passage clearly says both that the capitalist robs and that the capitalist acts in accord with right. The capitalist is acting both justly and unjustly. It is not legitimate to dismiss one side or the other of the apparent contradiction.89 Wood thinks there is no way out of this contradiction but to dismiss the claim of robbery. The way out, it should be clear, is to see that the capitalist acts legally and with full right at the phenomenal level of surface appearance, but at the level of essence, the level of scientific analysis, the capitalist can be accused of robbery or exploitation.90 We should now be able to see that the more the new society emerges and the old dissolves, the more arguments to the effect that

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  113 the capitalist acts with full rights will appear as “mere idealizing phrases, conscious illusion, deliberate hypocrisy.”91 Whereas, the fact that the capitalist robs or exploits will more and more be seen as the real essence of things arrived at by scientific analysis.92 So also, we should now be able to see that as the new society emerges, higher forms of right and justice will emerge that express the new society. Instead of an illusory and hypocritical exchange of equivalents, in socialist society the principle of justice will be “to each according to contribution.” In full communism, it will be “to each according to need.”93 And social democratic society, I have argued since the Introduction, would carve out a communist and a socialist sector that would at least in some basic areas (for example, healthcare and education) try to realize these higher principles of justice. Moreover, as Marx’s method suggests, these higher categories would function to show that earlier capitalist principles of justice involved a principle of equality that served to mask the robbery or exploitation involved. Capitalism certainly did not provide the worker an equivalent for the worker’s actual contribution. The capitalist “rightly” and “justly” paid only the value of labor-​power. Surplus labor was unpaid, thus allowing the capitalist to pocket the surplus value, that is, in essence, to rob the worker. We can now turn our attention from Marx’s moral argument to his historical materialist argument—​to the argument for what would actually produce a social democratic revolution.

Social Democracy and Historical Materialism In the third volume of Capital, Marx develops an argument to the effect that just as capitalism grew up within feudalism, so socialism begins to grow up within capitalism. He admits that, “all labour in which many individuals cooperate necessarily requires a commanding will to coordinate and unify the process . . . much

114  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy as that of an orchestra conductor. This is a productive job, which must be performed in every combined mode of production.”94 It does not follow, however, that this job needs to be performed by the capitalist. Indeed, capitalism “itself has brought matters to a point where the labor of superintendence, entirely divorced from the ownership of capital, is always readily obtainable. It has, therefore, come to be useless for the capitalist to perform it himself.” Moreover, Marx thinks, “Cooperative factories furnish proof that the capitalist has become no less redundant as a functionary in production as he himself, looking down from his high perch, finds the big landowner redundant.” In such factories, “the manager is paid by the labourers instead of representing capital counterposed to them.” Moreover: Stock companies in general—​ developed within the credit system—​ have an increasing tendency to separate the work of management as a function from the ownership of capital . . . . [T]‌he mere manager who has no title whatever to the capital . . . performs all the real functions . . . and the capitalist disappears as superfluous from the production process.95

Further on in the third volume of Capital, Marx writes that the formation of joint stock companies, besides separating management from ownership, that is, replacing the capitalist with an employee, makes possible: “An enormous expansion of the scale of production and of enterprises, that was impossible for individual capitals.”96 As capitalism develops, individual capitalists become unable to finance large projects—​railroads, telegraphs, electrification. Capitalists must combine together to finance such projects through joint stock companies. This, Marx thinks, indicates the increasing socialization of capital: The capital, which in itself rests on a social mode of production and presupposes a social concentration of means of production

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  115 and labour power, is here directly endowed with the form of social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) as distinct from private capital, and its undertakings assume the form of social undertakings as distinct from private undertakings. It is the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of the capitalist mode of production itself . . . . This result of the ultimate development of capitalist production is a necessary transitional phase toward the reconversion of capital into the property of producers, although no longer as the private property of the individual producers, but rather as the property of associated producers, as direct social property.97

This is to say that the highest development of capitalism itself gives rise to a transitional stage toward socialism. Capitalism itself develops beyond the stage where individual ownership continues to be possible. It itself increasingly requires social ownership. Ownership is socialized in that there are increasing numbers of stockholders that own the company and can influence its direction and control. As Marx says, “It is the historical mission of the capitalist mode of production to raise these material foundations of the new form of production to a certain degree of perfection.”98 Socialists “have no ideals to realize, but to set free elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.”99 Engels develops this line of argument even further. In a passage added to Marx’s discussion in the third volume of Capital, Engels argues that since Marx wrote, further “new forms of industrial enterprises have developed . . . representing the second and third degree of stock companies . . . . [T]‌his is taking place through the big industrialists . . . joining in a cartel for the regulation of production.”100 Engels continues in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific: the productive forces, as they grow more and more powerful . . . [force] the capitalist class itself to treat them more and

116  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy more as social productive forces, so far as this is possible under capitalist conditions . . . . [This] tends to bring about that form of the socialization of great masses of means of production which we meet with in the different kinds of joint-​stock companies. Many of these means of production and of distribution are . . . so colossal, that . . . [a]‌t a further stage of evolution this form also becomes insufficient. The producers on a large scale in a particular branch of industry in a particular country unite in a “Trust,” a union for the purpose of regulating production. They determine the total amount to be produced, parcel it out among themselves, and thus enforce the selling price fixed beforehand . . . . The whole of the particular industry is turned into one gigantic joint-​stock company . . . and the production without any definite plan of capitalistic society capitulates to the production upon a definite plan of the invading socialistic society.101

Engels admits that this is all still to the benefit of the capitalist, but he thinks the exploitation involved is so obvious that it will ultimately break down: “No nation will put up with production conducted by trusts, with so barefaced an exploitation of the community by a small band of dividend-​mongers . . . . [T]‌he State—​will ultimately have to undertake the direction of production.” This will occur first in “great institutions for intercourse and communication—​the post-​office, the telegraphs, the railways.”102 Engels is careful to add that this development alone is not enough to end capitalism: The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head. But, brought to a head, it topples over. State-​ownership of the productive forces is not the solution of the conflict, but concealed within it are the technical conditions that form the elements of that solution. This solution can only consist in the practical recognition of the social nature of the modern forces of production, and

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  117 therefore in the harmonizing the modes of production, appropriation, and exchange with the socialized character of the means of production. And this can only come about by society openly and directly taking possession of the productive forces which have outgrown all control except that of society as a whole.103

To oversimplify a bit, social democracy does not have to rely just on moral arguments. It does not have to rely on the primacy of politics. It does not just put forth its own ideals. It certainly does not need any sort of dictatorship. It attends to what is actually happening in society—​in existing capitalist society. It studies it, understands it, explains it, and communicates what is going on, and it democratically facilitates, eases, capitalist society’s own development toward socialism. Moreover, it must do so if it is to protect the interest of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood and avoid it being crushed. Avineri is correct in arguing against Lange. The latter, we have already seen, holds that, “Unlike the bourgeois revolution (which came when capitalist relations of production had already considerably developed within feudal society), the socialist revolution precedes the establishment of socialist relations of production.”104 That is certainly what happened in the Russian Revolution—​it is not what Marx argues in the third volume of Capital. Avineri writes: According to Marx, the recourse to political power can never do more than realize potentialities already existing within the socio-​ economic structure. Political power . . . can never create anything ex nihilo . . . . Political power may be crucial for the realization of potentialities, but it does not create the new structures realized. It perfects existing reality, giving dominance to what may still be marginal in existing society, but it can never be the prime mover. Like other followers of Lenin, Lange shares his view about the omnipotence of politics, which is at variance with Marx’s opinions.105

118  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Hilferding takes the discussion of cartels even further. In raising the question of the limits to the development of cartels, Hilferding responds that: the answer must be that there are no absolute limits. On the contrary there is a constant tendency for cartelization to be extended. As we have seen, the independent industries become increasingly dependent upon the cartelized industries until they are finally annexed by them. The ultimate outcome of this process would be the formation of a general cartel. The whole of capitalist production would then be consciously regulated by a single body which would determine the volume of production in all branches of industry . . . . This would be a consciously regulated society, but in an antagonistic form.106

In his Introduction to Hilferding’s Finance Capital, Bottomore argues that Hilferding’s view is that there should be “a change in the attitude of the socialist movement toward the state; it is no longer a question of ‘smashing’ the bourgeois state as a purely repressive apparatus, but of taking it over and extending its role in planning and controlling socialized production.”107 Hilferding writes: Finance capital puts control over social production increasingly into the hands of a small number of large capitalist associations, separates the management of production from ownership, and socializes production to the extent that this is possible under capitalism . . . . The struggle to dispossess this oligarchy constitutes the ultimate phase of the class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. The socializing function of finance capital facilitates enormously the task of overcoming capitalism. Once finance capital has brought the most important branches of production under its control, it is enough for society, through its conscious executive organ—​the state conquered by the working class—​to

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  119 seize finance capital in order to gain immediate control of these branches of production. Since all other branches of production depend upon these, control of large-​scale industry already provides the most effective form of social control without any further socialization.108

Avineri and Hilferding are sympathetic to the idea found in Marx and Engels that, as capitalism grew within and out of feudalism, so socialism develops within and out of capitalism. Others, like Lange, are quite hostile to this idea. And Lukács thinks “it would be a utopian fantasy to imagine that anything tending toward socialism could arise within capitalism.” Only the possibility of socialism arises within capitalism, a possibility that can only be realized after the collapse of capitalism.109 Again, Lenin and the Russian Revolution, not the development of social democracy in advanced capitalist states, are taken to be the norm. Following Avineri and Hilferding’s reading of Marx and Engels, a social democratic party does not have to persuade the majority to make radical changes to existing society. Capitalism is making those changes itself. The task of a social democratic party is to develop a careful analysis and understanding of this economic development—​a development that is actually occurring. Its task then is to disseminate this knowledge widely—​educate the majority. Along with this its task is to develop strong labor unions to implement this understanding and give workers a direct say in the process. In the language of Marx and Engels back in the German Ideology, what we would have here would be a historical materialist movement toward the universal, toward the realization of the universalizable needs and interests of the great majority of society; that is, interests that would accord with the categorical imperative. If all of this is so, then it increases the chances that a social democratic party could move forward peacefully and democratically. The overall argument, then, is that socialism begins to arise within capitalism in that joint stock companies, cartels, and

120  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy trusts, given their size and the large amount of capital needed to fund them, increasingly shift ownership from single capitalists to larger and larger social groups. These developments need to be understood and facilitated by strong unions and a social democratic party so that the interests of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood increasing play a role in this development, guide it, and come to be satisfied by it. If so, we will be pushed in the right direction, toward the satisfaction of needs and interests that are universalizable, and that thus would accord with a categorical imperative. And all of this will increase the likelihood that we can move toward socialism democratically, not impose it from outside.110 Again, it must be emphasized that a peaceful social democratic revolution is only a possibility, a possibility under certain conditions.111 As Marx put it, “we shall act against you peacefully whenever possible—​and take up arms when that is necessary.”112 One last issue before we conclude this section. A social democratic party would differ from both of the parties we contrasted in Chapter 4. A social democratic party would attempt to be a Volkspartei, that is, a party that seeks to win the votes of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood. It will not be a small party like that sketched in the Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law of 1843–​1844, which sought to lead a tiny proletariat in beginning a revolution that would have to be followed by a further revolution in the hope that the proletariat would eventually become large enough and rule democratically. Nor will it be like the party described in the Manifesto aimed at the proletariat-​narrowly-​ ­understood, which it hoped would be a majority. A social democratic party has come to realize that to win a majority it will have to appeal beyond even the agricultural and industrial proletariat to a broader swath of the working class.113 Moreover, the party of the Manifesto, we saw, did not so much seek to make a revolution, as study, understand, and guide a process already taking place in the actually existing socio-​economic world. It then engaged in communication, education, propaganda, and

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  121 consciousness raising. A social democratic party does the very same thing,114 but it also seeks to make a revolution. In this sense we can say that it is more like the party of 1843–​1844, except that it makes its revolution by winning seats in parliament, which then allows it to engage more effectively in communication, education, propaganda, and consciousness raising, as well as to actually guide the development of the socio-​economic world in accord with the interests of the majority. Like the party of the Manifesto, it studies an actual historical materialist movement taking place in the socio-​ economic world, it educates, and it propagandizes, but it also leads like the party of 1843–​1844. It does not, however, try to lead us to a violent insurrection, whether made by a minority or an imagined majority proletariat. It seeks a democratic transformation of society. It hopes to lead electorally and to educate from the senate chamber.115

Marx and the Social Democratic Party of Germany Cole tells us that Marxist concepts were “accepted as the theoretical foundation of the Social Democratic movement which developed in the ’seventies and ’eighties, first in Germany and then in other countries.”116 Indeed, Marx and Engels actively supported, advised, and encouraged the SPD—​the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Moreover, they knew and were personal friends with several of the leading members of this party. Liebknecht, after being banished from Switzerland, moved to London, where he stayed from 1850 to 1862. He became a member of the Communist League along with Marx and Engels and began a lifelong collaboration with them. After his return to Germany, he was elected to the Reichstag in 1867. Kautsky spent 1885 to 1890 in London and became a close friend of Engels, who put him to work editing Marx’s three volume Theories

122  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy of Surplus Value. During the period of the anti-​socialist laws, the SPD’s newspaper had to be moved to Switzerland where it was edited by Bernstein. He corresponded continuously with Marx and Engels. When Bernstein was exiled from Switzerland in 1888, he moved the newspaper to London, became a close friend of Engels, and interacted with him even more than before. In general, Marx and Engels carried on an extensive and continuous correspondence over many years with Liebkneckt, Bebel, Bernstein, and Kautsky. Marx and Engels berate them for missteps and blunders, praise them at times, encourage them, sometimes disagree with them, even threaten to distance themselves on certain issues, and generally provide political analysis and advice. In the “Critique of the Gotha Program” of 1875, for example, Marx forcefully disagreed with Liebknecht, Bebel, and the Eisenachers. He criticized at length their acceptance of various Lassallean concepts, which they thought necessary to facilitate the merger into what became the SPD.117 Nevertheless, Mehring writes that after the collapse of the International in 1878: although Marx had withdrawn from active public life he nevertheless remained active in the European and American working-​ class movements. He was in correspondence with almost all working-​class leaders in the various countries and whenever possible they came to him for advice on important matters. He became more and more the much-​sought-​after and always-​willing adviser of the fighting proletariat.118

In 1879, Engels writes in a letter to Bebel concerning the SPD: As you and Liebknecht know . . . for the past sixteen years, I have . . . been approached over and over again with the request that I write for party organs, and I have actually done so . . . . Again, you know that Marx and I have voluntarily

Marx and Social Democratic Revolution  123 conducted the defence of the party against its opponents abroad throughout the party’s existence, and that we have never asked anything of the party in return, save that it should not be untrue to itself.119

In 1881, two years before Marx’s death, Engels writes to Bernstein concerning the Reichstag elections of that year: If any one outside event has contributed to putting Marx more or less to rights again, then it is the elections. Never has a proletariat conducted itself so magnificently . . . . In Germany, after 3 years of unprecedented persecution and unrelenting pressure, during which any form of public organization and even communication was a sheer impossibility, our lads have returned, not only in all their former strength, but actually stronger than before. And stronger in one crucial respect, in that the movement’s center of gravity has shifted from the semi-​rural districts of Saxony to the large industrial towns.120

In 1883, Engels writes to Bebel: That you would sooner not sit in the Reichstag, I am ready to believe. But . . . [s]‌ome years ago Bracke wrote to me saying: Bebel is, in fact, the only one of us possessed of real parliamentary tact. And I have found this constantly confirmed. So there’s probably no alternative but for you to return to your post at the first opportunity and I should be delighted were you to be elected in Hamburg . . . . Certainly, agitational and parliamentary work becomes very boring after a time. It is much the same thing as advertising, puffing one’s wares and travelling around are in business: success is slow in coming, and some never achieve it. But there’s no other alternative . . . . And the Anti-​Socialist Law means that this, the only course to have remained open, simply cannot be dispensed with.121

124  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Engels writes to Schmidt in 1890: Our electoral victory was indeed astonishing and the success it scored in the outside world was no less glorious . . . . People have seen that the German bourgeoisie and the Junkers do not constitute the German nation; the brilliant victory of the workers after 10 years of oppression . . . has impressed people . . . . The world knows that it was we who overthrew Bismarck, and the socialists of all countries are now aware that, like it or not, the movement’s center of gravity has shifted to Germany.122

6 Marx and Social Democracy Characteristics of Social Democracy In this chapter, we must characterize social democracy in greater detail. If, as we saw in Chapter 5, capitalism itself is tending toward socialism, then social democracy must assist in the emergence of socialism out of capitalism. In doing so, generally speaking, social democracy wants especially to accomplish two things. As Meyer puts it, “First, it should achieve social justice . . . . [It] should be able to secure the just distribution of life chances . . . . Second, it must promote economic efficiency and growth.”1 As Berger puts it, the economic sphere cannot be left to its own devices. The political sphere needs to take responsibility for its overall development. And social democracy must continue the democratization of all spheres of life.2 For Keating and McCrone, social democracy is “a political philosophy seeking to reconcile market capitalism with social responsibility.” It “refuses to accept the automatic primacy of markets or the need for inequality.” It “seeks to include the needs of the deprived and to emphasise the public domain over the private.” It involves an acceptance “of the necessity and instrumental value of the market but a belief . . . that it needs to be socially and politically constrained.”3 For Rothstein and Steinmo, social democracy involves the commitment to: provide all people in society, regardless of their background, with a set of general social rights to certain kinds of service and Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy. Philip J. Kain, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023. DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197667187.003.0007

126  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy economic support . . . . The classical “universal programmes” such as healthcare, universal child allowances, free public education, elderly care and broadly based tax systems are examples of this approach . . . . The second commitment in social democratic politics can be described as an ambition to tame, but not replace nor control, the market economy. To the surprise of many who do not know these systems, social democratic polities are remarkably pro-​market. These systems, however, combine a positive attitude toward free trade, free labour markets and economic competition, with a realisation that a well running market economy demands a wide range of public regulations to function properly.4

While Moene and Wallerstein themselves advocate market socialism, they admit that “there is little reason to say there is anything wrong with social democracy.” They think that “social democratic governments in Norway and Sweden have done remarkably well in fulfilling their objectives while maintaining conditions conducive to continual private investment and economic growth.”5 And they conclude that, “Social democracy in Norway and Sweden can be credited with a number of achievements . . . . The elimination of severe poverty and the provision of health care, housing, and a modest but decent income as a right of all citizens stand out.”6 On the issue of collective ownership of the means of production, social democracy is best described as open. Some social democrats do think society should move toward full socialism and common ownership of all or most means of production. Such social democrats would have different opinions about how fast to do so and what form collective ownership should take. On the other hand, some social democrats have decided that a great deal of nationalization of the means of production, or even much at all, is not necessary, and not desirable. Sweden, for example, has very little state ownership of enterprises.7 Moene and Wallerstein, on the one hand, think social democrats have “failed in terms of their original

Marx and Social Democracy  127 goal to lead their societies out of capitalism and into socialism.”8 On the other hand, they admit that, “Given the disastrous experience with the Soviet model based upon extensive state ownership and central planning, the refusal of social democrats to seriously entertain attacks on the central role of the market is commendable.”9 It must be pointed out, nevertheless, that it is quite possible for a social democratic society to decide to actually move toward full socialism and common ownership of the means of production. The Meidner Plan in Sweden, which we will discuss next, demonstrates this tendency. But just as Sweden finally decided against the Meidner Plan, so I suspect most social democratic societies would not vote for full socialism, and especially so given the problems Soviet states had in trying to develop socialist markets.10 Moreover, as Przeworski argues, social democrats came to see that: nationalization of the means of production was no longer necessary. Public ownership of some banks, perhaps of transport, or some strategic firms may facilitate government control over the economy, but nationalization is just one among many policy instruments, not a panacea. Capitalist economies could be controlled without state ownership: business cycles could be avoided, or at least attenuated, and unemployment with them; income distribution could be corrected; adversities could be insured. This was the great discovery of social democrats, first in Sweden in the 1930s and then elsewhere.11

Moreover, Harrington argues that the increasing separation of management from ownership, pointed out by Marx in the third volume of Capital, as we saw in the previous chapter, makes: the classic case for nationalization irrelevant. Now that rational, plan-​oriented managers have taken over from individualistic capitalists, . . . it is no longer necessary to change the title to

128  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy property . . . . [T]‌he corporate executives will see that it is to their interest to observe the broad priorities established by the state.12

As Przeworski puts it: The regulatory activities of the state are based on the belief that private capitalists can be induced to allocate resources in a manner desired by citizens and expressed at the polls. The basic notion is that in a capitalistic democracy resources are allocated by two mechanisms: the “market,” in which the weight of preferences of decision-​makers is proportional to the resources they control, and the state, in which the weight of preferences is distributed equally to persons qua citizens. The essence of contemporary social democracy is the conviction that the market can be directed to those allocations of any good, public or private, that are preferred by citizens and that by gradually rationalizing the economy the state can turn capitalists into private functionaries of the public without altering the judicial status of private property.13

Przeworski argues that Keynesianism “held out the prospect that the state could reconcile private ownership of the means of production with democratic management of the economy.” Keynes thought, “It is not the ownership of the instruments of production which it is important for the state to assume. If the state is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the instruments and the basic reward to those who own them, it will have accomplished all that is necessary.”14 Keynes, like social democrats, rejects the view that markets operate best when left to themselves. Instead, what is needed is substantial state intervention in the economy.15 Social democracy does not want to eliminate markets. It wants to harness them and contain them. That means that capitalists cannot be in control politically, but they must have a seat at the table. Social democracy is a balancing act. It wants to regulate away the

Marx and Social Democracy  129 ills of the market, but within those limits it wants to encourage the market. It must assure the capitalist a profit. But it does not regulate the market solely—​or even primarily—​in the capitalist’s interest. It allows the proletariat-​broadly-​understood to regulate the market in the interest of the vast majority of workers. It is not likely to nationalize all or even most means of production. Mises points out that when the SPD came to power in 1918 it did not, as did the Soviets, nationalize all branches of production at once, but only specific isolated ones.16 Hunt points out that as of 1959 the program of the SPD no longer included an explicit demand for national ownership of the major means of production.17 Meyer contrasts coordinated versus uncoordinated market economies. An uncoordinated market economy like the United States, he thinks, “has never devised effective instruments for steering and regulation . . . . Instead, control over markets is left to a ‘legalistic regulatory culture.’ ” On the other hand, in a coordinated market economy, like Germany: Top management . . . rarely has the opportunity to make important decisions unilaterally. Instead, it must seek the approval of boards of directors and networks, in which—​besides banks—​ other companies, employees, and state actors are represented. Consequently, it is not so much the stockholders’ short term interest in higher returns that drives the firm’s decision, but rather the interests of a multitude of stakeholders in society.18

Moreover, in uncoordinated market economies, “trade unions are perceived by management as impediments to decision-​making and play only a minor role in coordinating a firm’s activities.” In contrast, market economies “coordinated at the national level, feature top-​tier negotiations and consultations between hierarchical organizations of employers and employees on all important issues.” Here “governments typically play a moderating rather than a directive role.”19

130  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Meyer also argues that social democracy has an advantage over neoclassical economics in planning sustainable development.20 Setting high environmental standards, for example, may: help incubate new industries and technologies that will generate jobs . . . . Many new jobs would be created by retrofitting houses to reduce their heating and cooling costs, reconstructing cities around community, public transportation, and public spaces, replacing leaky water systems, recycling more of our waste. We should . . . think of these steps . . . as an opportunity to design a more efficient economy that saves money, provides jobs, and improves the quality of life.21

Social democrats will likely take off the market entirely, or at least off the “free market” (and place on a regulated market): healthcare, education, housing, social security, the environment, transportation, urban planning, and so forth.22 As Crosland puts it, the political authority removes: a wide, and strategically decisive, segment of economic decisions out of the sphere of purely market influences, and [makes] them subject to deliberate political control . . . . [T]‌he state now consciously regulates (or seeks to regulate) the level of employment, the distribution of income, the rate of accumulation, and the balance of payments; and its actions heavily influence the size of industries, the pattern of output, and the direction of investment-​decisions.23

In the Introduction, I suggested thinking of the economy as divided into three sectors. The first was a communist sector where goods and services would be free. There would be no buying or selling. Goods and services would be distributed “to each according to need.” Education would certainly belong in this sector, and perhaps healthcare and childcare. The second sector would be a

Marx and Social Democracy  131 socialist or regulated market sector. Here goods and services would be kept affordable. Housing, transportation, and power would go here. Perhaps healthcare and childcare if it were not possible to make them free. The third sector would be a “free” market sector. Social democratic society would decide over time what it should, and could afford to, put in which sector. It would seek, experimentally and pragmatically, the best balance between efficiency and justice—​stimulating the economy while avoiding poverty.

The Meidner Plan On the other hand, there will most certainly be social democrats that think the best balance between efficiency and justice requires moving on to full socialism. While some social democrats will not want to move on to full socialism anytime soon, or even at all, the importance of the Meidner Plan was that it demonstrated, without any doubt, that it is perfectly possible, if a society chooses, to move peacefully, democratically, and legally to full socialism—​to collective ownership of the means of production. In the 1970s, Meidner, the senior economist of the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions,24 developed a plan to give trade unions greater say in the allocation of profits. It was an attempt to combine profitability of the firm, and thus security of employment, with democratic control over capital formation and thus more influence over investment.25 The plan allowed employees to obtain a share in the growth of assets through the gradual allocation of profits to a system of funds owned and administered by the employees themselves through their trade unions. It thus allowed employees to have greater influence in the firm.26 Normally, an industry’s profits are largely plowed back into the enterprise. Ownership of part of these profits, on the Meidner Plan, was to be transferred to an employee investment fund—​twenty

132  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy percent of the profits each year were to be set aside for employees. The money would not leave the business. It would be reinvested just like the profits still owned by the firm. It is just that the company would issue shares in that amount, which (along with dividends and the growth that would accrue) would be transferred to the employee investment fund, owned by the employees and administered by the union. This would gradually shift the weight of ownership toward employees.27 Schweickart explains the plan as follows: The Meidner Plan was quite simple. Every company with more than fifty employees would be required to issue new shares of its stock each year equivalent to 20 percent of its profits. Since the issuing of new shares does not cost the firm anything, this does not interfere with operating expenses or investment plans . . . . These shares would be held in a “labor trust,” collectively owned by all wage earners. Shares would not be sold. In due time—​Meidner estimated thirty-​five years or so—​most firms would come to have the majority of their stock owned by the trust, that is, collectively by Swedish workers.28

This would translate into increasing influence in the boardroom as employees came to own more stock and have greater voting power. It would also mean that increased profits for the company gained due to wage restraint on the part of unions would more rapidly transfer ownership to employees.29 The Meidner Plan, in a watered-​down version, was put in place in 1982 and accumulated funds until 1991.30 The social democrats of Sweden—​the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (the SAP)31—​for the first time in many years, lost the election in 1991. At that point, the Meidner Plan was abolished entirely. When the SAP returned to power in 1994, they did not revive the plan.32 The Meidner Plan demonstrates that it is possible for a social democratic society to move toward full socialism (collective ownership of the means of production) through a fully democratic,

Marx and Social Democracy  133 peaceful, and legal process employing nothing but ordinary capitalist mechanisms.33 Such a process was actually started and in place from 1982 to 1991. The Meidner Plan is thus a further example of how socialism can emerge within and out of capitalism. Corneo proposes a variation on the Meidner Plan, that is, a sovereign wealth fund to be used as a tool for redistribution. The government would acquire stocks of publicly quoted companies and distribute returns to citizens equally as a social dividend that would not be taxed and not be credited against other benefits to which they would be entitled.34 Coupled with this fund, Corneo proposes an institution that he calls a federal shareholder. It would use the endowment built up in the sovereign wealth fund to acquire a majority stake in selected companies. This would allow it to exercise leadership on the boards of directors of those companies. Again, the dividends from shares owned would accrue to the government’s budget and be used for the social dividend.35 This also raises the question of what collective ownership of the means of production actually means. Clearly, as Marx and Engels saw, private ownership is eroding. The individual capitalist owner is increasingly replaced inside the factory by employed managers and in the boardroom by larger and larger numbers of stockholders. Even if proceeding all the way to majority ownership by workers through a Meidner-​type plan is rejected, we still must ask at what point along this spectrum we should stop talking about private ownership and start talking of common ownership, or a degree of common ownership. Even without Meidner-​type plans, what we see is a tendency within capitalism itself in the direction of common ownership. There is another important point that is illuminated by the Meidner Plan. What if it had been continued? What if it had reached the stage at which employees through their labor unions owned the majority of means of production? What would the Swedish economy look like then? I see nothing to suggest that it would look anything like what Hayek and Mises would suggest.

134  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy I see no reason to think that markets would begin to collapse and disappear. I see no reason to think that money and prices would be eliminated. And, therefore, I see no reason to think that economic calculation would be any different, any more problematic, or more difficult, than it had been in the Swedish economy before the Meidner Plan.36 After all, the Meidner Plan did not mean nationalization of firms. Firms were still to be owned by stockholders. It is just that the majority of stock would eventually come to be owned by the workers through their trade unions. Interestingly, there is a basic agreement here between Marx/​ Engels, Mises/​Hayek, and the Meidner Plan. They all see a tendency within capitalism toward socialism. They all see socialism as arising within and out of capitalism. The difference is that the Meidner Plan shows that there is no good reason to believe that Hayek and Mises are correct in thinking this movement to socialism will eliminate markets, prices, produce inefficiencies, or lead to totalitarianism. Indeed, the Meidner Plan adds a good deal of empirical reinforcement to Marx and Engels’ view that some societies can move peacefully and democratically toward socialism. Furthermore, the fact that Swedish society decided to vote the Meidner Plan out even further undermines the notion that socialism must lead to totalitarianism. At the same time, what the Meidner Plan also indicates is that social democracies are not that likely to move to collective ownership. This is not to suggest that it was the Meidner Plan that caused the SAP to lose power in 1991, nor even that it was the main cause, but it would be hard to deny that it contributed to it.37 One other thing we should notice here is that for social democracy, unions are viewed as an arm of democracy—​one able to penetrate especially deeply into the economic sphere. Economic democracy, for social democrats, is as important as political democracy. Przeworski writes that a report commissioned by the European Trade Union Confederation recently declared: “To accept

Marx and Social Democracy  135 the level of profits required for investments and to give companies a sound financial basis, workers will increasingly demand a say in decisions about investments and a fairer share of the income they generate.”38 And that, after all, is what the Meidner Plan was about. For Bernstein, “trade unions are the democratic element in industry. Their tendency is to erode the absolute power of capital and to give the worker a direct influence in the management of industry . . . . [T]‌rade unions are indispensable organs of democracy.”39 Marx, himself, in a passage that can almost be imagined as a reflection on the Meidner Plan (more than one hundred years ahead of time), said: Trades Unions work well as centres of resistance against the encroachments of capital. They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organized forces as a lever for the final emancipation of the working class.40

Planning Whether social democracy decides for collective ownership of the means of production via a Meidner-​type plan or by other means, or, on the contrary, decides to remain with social democracy short of full socialism, in either case, it will require planning. Indeed, despite its mythology, so does modern capitalism. That was certainly the view of Engels. As we have seen in Chapter 5, he argued that the development of joint-​stock companies becomes “so colossal” that: producers on a large scale in a particular branch of industry in a particular country unite in a “Trust,” a union for the purpose

136  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy of regulating production. They determine the total amount to be produced, parcel it out among themselves, and thus enforce the selling price fixed beforehand . . . . In the trusts . . . the production without any definite plan of capitalist society capitulates to the production upon a definite plan of the invading socialist society . . . . In any case, . . . the official representative of capitalist society—​the State—​will ultimately have to undertake the direction of production.41

Galbraith and others develop such notions a great deal further. Galbraith claims: “The modern large corporation and the modern apparatus of socialist planning are variant accommodations to the same need.”42 He claims that the United States government accounts “for between a fifth and a quarter of all economic activity . . . . This far exceeds the government share in such an avowedly socialist state as India, [and] considerably exceeds that in the anciently social democratic kingdoms of Sweden and Norway.”43 He argues: The genius of the industrial system lies in its organized use of capital and technology. This is made possible . . . by extensively replacing the market with planning. The notable accomplishments of the industrial system are all the result of such planning: there would be no flights to the moon and not many to Los Angeles were market incentives relied upon to bring into existence the required vehicles. The same is true of other services, amenities and artifacts of the industrial system from telephone communication to Chevrolets to dentifrices . . . . To leave these matters to the market would be regarded, by those principally involved, as the equivalent of leaving them to chance.44

Galbraith argues that, beginning with Keynes, markets were no longer assumed to be self-​regulating. Only active intervention by the state would ensure steady growth.45 The state must provide

Marx and Social Democracy  137 overall management for the economy.46 In large and complex corporations: heavy costs are incurred before there is a salable product, and these continue regardless of the return from sales. In such circumstances prices and costs must be under control. So also to the extent possible, consumer and government demand. So also supplies at the controlled costs. Planning . . . is not a willful act of the large enterprise; it is inherent in the whole matrix of development of which advanced technology, intensive use of capital, the rise of the technostructure are a part.47

Marx and Engels would say that this is socialism emerging within capitalism. Galbraith pushes further. He argues that corporate and governmental bureaucracies interact so closely that it is appropriate to speak of a “Bureaucratic Symbiosis.” This is especially so between the Atomic Energy Commission and the industries that supply it, between the Department of Transportation and the automobile industry, and between the Federal Communications Commission and the television and broadcasting networks. This symbiosis, he claims, “reaches its highest state of development in the relation between weapons firms and the Department of Defense.”48 These parallel bureaucracies work hand in hand, share the same goals, and even exchange employees. Galbraith further argues: A final source of political power for the planning system is organized labor . . . . In recent times, . . . the conflict between labor and capital has been greatly eased by the ability of the technostructure to resolve conflict by conceding wage and other demands to the unions and passing the costs along in the price . . . . At the same time the affirmative goals of the technostructure have become consonant with those of the union. A high rate of growth, which

138  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy means steady employment . . . rewards the work force as well as the technostructure.49

One could argue that this is even another aspect of socialism emerging within and out of capitalism, that is, a development that is empowering workers and their unions, a development that would allow a social democratic party working together with those unions to begin directing this development consciously and purposively in the interest of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood. At any rate, Galbraith, while he would want to see a lot of changes,50 is nevertheless willing, himself, to talk about the emergence from within capitalism of a “New Socialism.”51 We must also mention the book, by Phillips and Rozworski, with the marvelous title, The People’s Republic of Walmart: How the World’s Biggest Corporations Are Laying the Foundation for Socialism. They argue that while Walmart’s planning is not democratic, it certainly works. It not only exists but it is more efficient than the market. It is something a future society could take up and improve.52 Walmart is the largest company in the world and the third largest employer. Moreover, it has the thirty-​eighth largest economy on the globe—​about the size of Sweden.53 Their argument is that capitalism develops planning systems that amount to socialism emerging within capitalism. It is just that we must disentangle the positive elements of this development from the systematic degradation of workers that it has involved. The argument is like that of Galbraith, but it makes connections to Marx much more explicit than does Galbraith. The upshot is that there is no (or, at least, much less of a) structural obstacle to moving toward planning in a social democratic or socialist society. Capitalism is giving rise to socialism. Socialism is emerging within capitalism. What is left to do, we might say, even if over simplified, is a subjective transformation. We must recognize that the objective transformation is actually occurring there in society. We must come to better understand it—​both its positive and

Marx and Social Democracy  139 its negative characteristics. We must solve its problems. And we must do so in the interest of the proletariat-​broadly-​­understood. And to do that, it must be done by the proletariat-​ broadly-​ ­understood through its labor unions and its labor party. We must, as Phillips and Rozworski say, bring planning out into the open and democratize it.54 While what we have here is a very interesting and valuable demonstration of Marx and Engels’ argument that socialism emerges within and out of capitalism, it does not seem to me, on the other hand, that Phillips and Rozworski, as they seem to think they do, really engage the calculation argument of Weber, Mises, and Hayek. All the planning discussed by Phillips and Rozworski, like that described by Galbraith, takes place in a market economy with money and prices. The argument of Weber, Mises, and Hayek was that efficient calculation was impossible without a market, money, and prices. Their argument applies against Soviet economies, and to some extent to Soviet economies trying to develop markets and prices. It certainly does not apply against capitalist economies, social democratic economies, nor even socialist economies that retain markets and prices. The calculation and efficiency problems raised by Weber, Mises, and Hayek, therefore, are not something these societies that retain a market and prices need worry about.55 There is, however, a certain ambiguity in the way the word “planning” is used. Weber, Mises, and Hayek understand planning as something that does away with and replaces markets, money, and prices. For Phillips, Rozworski, and Galbraith, planning does not do away with, it attempts to control, markets. It calculates using prices and achieves greater efficiency than the market alone is capable of achieving. Weber, Mises, and Hayek do not show the impossibility of this second sort of planning,56 although Hayek does argue that such planning is to start on the road to serfdom, totalitarianism, and whatnot.57 The arguments of Phillips, Rozworski, and Galbraith suggest that if that is the case, then capitalism is already well on that road. On the other hand, Sweden, Norway, and

140  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy especially the Meidner Plan suggest that the road exists only in Hayek’s imagination. Viewed from a different angle, we can say that Phillips, Rozworski, and Galbraith agree with Mises and Hayek that there is a tendency within capitalism toward socialism. Hayek agrees that industrial monopolies do engage in planning, that this will lead to further planning, and that to control by the state.58 Hayek is even willing to admit that planning can produce “a more just and equitable distribution of wealth.” He just thinks the price that must be paid is too high.59 It is the latter argument, the argument that planning leads to totalitarianism,60 that is easily refuted by the existence of social democratic societies.61 Moreover, Phillips and Rozworski insist that it is not planning that leads to authoritarianism, it is authoritarianism that degrades information and undermines planning.62 If within capitalism, the state must increasingly cooperate with corporations in planning, if this is necessary for those corporations to succeed, if this is necessary for the whole economy to function properly, and if at the same time capitalism is replacing individual ownership with socialized ownership and an increasingly large class of employed managers, and if, along with this, unions grow larger and more powerful, then it becomes increasingly difficult to hold that state assistance in planning serves only the capitalists—​ that the state is merely the executive committee of the capitalist class.63 The state would more and more be the executive committee of emerging socialism. Of course, any given state could try either to block or to facilitate such emergence. What social democrats need to do, then, is take control of this state, increase the power of labor unions and a labor party, give them an increased role in the planning, and make all this open, transparent, and increasingly democratic. The difference between capitalism and social democracy, then, is not so much that the latter needs more planning, certainly not that the latter introduces planning, the difference is that the latter wants the planning to be

Marx and Social Democracy  141 more democratic—​such that it serves the interest of the proletariat-​ broadly-​understood, not merely of capitalists.

Social Democracy and Capitalism There is a very different picture of social democracy that one can find among some Marxists. Berger suggests that the possibility of engaging in parliamentary politics served to integrate working class parties into the existing political system and made them reformist. The only successful socialist revolution took place in Russia.64 Such comments presuppose certain background assumptions that I have tried to show are absurd: that revolution means violent insurrection, not fundamental social transformation, and that success requires accomplishing only the former, not the latter. Indeed, I think such views veer so far from Marx’s as to approach being anti-​Marxian. Sejersted says the early social democrats presented themselves in a revolutionary way, but the movement operated within the established political system. It was characterized by a conflict between Marxist ideology and reformist practice.65 I do not see a conflict. I have tried to argue that legal, peaceful, democratic politics, fully within the established system, can produce profound social transformation—​look at the Meidner Plan. Assisting and guiding the emergence of socialism within capitalism is perfectly revolutionary—​if “revolution” is understood in its primary sense, as profound social transformation, not merely as violent insurrection. Many see social democracy as a form of capitalism, capitalism tamed and tempered, but still capitalism.66 But social democracy generally extends democracy beyond the political sphere into the social and economic sphere. That is not capitalism. Social democracy tries to do this especially by empowering labor unions so that democracy can penetrate within capitalist enterprises.

142  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Social democracy, it is true, does not seek to eliminate capitalists or capitalism, but it does not let them dominate. They have a say. They must be negotiated with. They must even be lured into cooperation. But they must be outvoted by the proletariat-​ broadly-​­ understood. The power of the proletariat-​ broadly-​ ­understood must be maintained. It will wax and wane, but it must predominate. As capitalism develops and socializes, as corporations and cartels get larger and larger, as they involve more and more planning, planning that more and more involves government agencies, thus as socialism emerges within capitalism, the difference between capitalism and socialism becomes harder to see. On the one hand, this is to the advantage of social democrats insofar as they can be perceived by capitalists as simply doing what capitalism requires, thus as behaving capitalistically, which therefore makes it easier for them to gain capitalist cooperation. But it also seems to fool certain Marxists who fail to appreciate that socialism is emerging within capitalism, that this capitalism itself requires the sort of planning that was always thought to be socialist, and that social democracy is facilitating a movement towards socialism. Moreover, it is clear that in 1851 even Marx would have failed to appreciate this. At that point he was not a social democrat. He wrote: The peculiar character of Social-​Democracy is epitomised in the fact that democratic-​republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of superseding two extremes, capital and wage labor, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony. However different the means proposed for the attainment of this end may be, however much it may be embellished with more or less revolutionary notions, the content remains the same. This content is the reformation of society in a democratic way, but a reformation within the bounds of the petty bourgeoisie.67

Marx and Social Democracy  143 I think this view comes to be revised once Marx sees that capitalism itself is replacing owners with managers, socializing ownership, relying on the state for planning, and, indeed, giving rise to socialism within capitalism.68 Achieving democratic control here (bringing, say, the SPD to power) would not be mere democratic control within the bounds of capitalism, it would, already in capitalism, be the democratic control of emerging socialism, and, with something like a Meidner Plan, such control could even proceed all the way to full socialism. Still, it might be objected, Marx very clearly held that real economic transformation requires transformation of the forces and relations of production, not mere changes in distribution and consumption: Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself. The capitalist mode of production, for example, rests on the fact that the material conditions of production are in the hands of non-​workers in the form of capital and land ownership, while the masses are only owners of the personal condition of production, of labour power. If the elements of production are so distributed, then the present-​day distribution of the means of consumption results automatically. If the material conditions of production are the collective property of the workers themselves, then there likewise results a distribution of the means of consumption different from the present one. The vulgar socialists . . . have taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution.69

Is social democracy guilty of separating distribution from production and trying to regulate the former without changing the

144  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy latter? I think the answer is no. Social democracy, as the Meidner Plan demonstrates, could move toward collective ownership of the means of production, or it could decide not to. Even if it does not, Marx tells us in Capital, “distribution will vary with the productive organization of the community, and the degree of historical development attained by the producers.”70 Certainly, the forces and relations of production are undergoing profound transformation as corporations and cartels become ever larger, as individual owners are replaced by employed managers and by larger numbers of stockholders, as corporations require ever greater planning, as they demand ever more involvement of government agencies, as unions exert ever greater democratic influence within these corporations, and as labor parties exert ever greater democratic control overall. To think, as many do, that social democracy means simply engaging in piecemeal reforms that can never lead to socialism,71 is to ignore this whole process of transformation that is actually and materially taking place within capitalism. Any social democratic changes in distribution would very much have to be allowed and conditioned by the transformation actually taking place in the forces and relations of production and could only be a response to those actual transformations. The degree to which social democracy moves toward full socialism would be determined by what sorts of responses to those actual transformations are necessary and what sorts are possible. Social democratic societies are often described as having a mixed or hybrid economy. What does that mean? Does it mean we have a capitalist economy that is reformed and tinkered with in innocuous ways such that what we have is still a capitalist economy? Or is social democracy something different from capitalism? Even if we were to insist that social democracy is nothing but capitalism, we would still have to admit that capitalism itself is becoming socialism. Moreover, a social democratic society that has developed to the point where it is capable of putting in place a Meidner Plan, even if it decides to backtrack on it, is not a capitalist society. It

Marx and Social Democracy  145 tolerates more or less capitalism, it involves itself in the sort of planning required by big corporations, it allows them to think that it is shoring up capitalism, but it is actually using capitalism, it is using it to assist the birth of socialism. It does not support capitalism to ultimately serve capitalist ends. It supports capitalism to serve socialist ends, the interests of the proletariat-​ broadly-​ ­understood. As early as 1850, Marx thought that democracy put the proletariat, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie, “in possession of political power . . . which at every moment [helps these] hostile classes to victory and jeopardise[s]‌the very foundations of bourgeois society.”72 To deny that social democracy is capable of making a real revolution is to misunderstand revolution—​indeed, to have a trivial conception of revolution. None of this is to suggest that social democratic parties have been uniform or homogenous.73 There has been plenty of disagreement over how fast to move to full socialism or whether to do so at all. And there have been disagreements over whether a violent insurrection would eventually be necessary or not. Some members of the SPD in Germany took part in such an insurrection in 1918–​ 1919. It failed; and it split the SPD. Mandel makes an interesting argument here: As the history of our century has proven since the beginning of the debate between “reformists” (or gradualists) and “revolutionists” inside the socialist movement . . . the real issue is not whether revolutions are “advisable” or “bad” . . . . The real issue is whether they inevitably occur again and again, because the contradictions of bourgeois society . . . periodically sharpen.

Mandel goes on to give a long list of revolutions that have occurred in the twentieth century and concludes that “faced with these regularly recurring revolutionary crises, it is the sceptics and gradualists . . . and not the Marxists who appear to be utopians.”74

146  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy I do not think the real issue is whether or not to have a violent insurrection. I think the real issue is how to produce a fundamental social transformation. The way we handle the first issue will very definitely influence the second. A violent insurrection may speed up certain aspects of the social transformation while producing serious obstructions for other long-​term aspects—​like democracy. A peaceful transformation may hold forth the promise of long-​ term results, but in the short term produce wavering, anxiety, and uncertainty. Again, I re-​iterate, a peaceful revolution is a possibility for Marx, Engels, and many social democrats—​and only a possibility under certain conditions. It is not guaranteed that a violent revolution will not be necessary.

Polarization and Immiseration In the German Ideology, Marx argued that what is necessary to produce revolution is a polarization between classes and the immiseration of the lower class.75 It is often argued against Marx that his expectations concerning polarization and immiseration have not been born out. The Erfurt Program of 1891, summing up Marx’s views on these matters, reads: Hand in hand with this monopolization of the means of production go the displacement of the fragmented small-​business sector by gigantic big businesses . . . . All the advantages of this change, however, are monopolized by the capitalists and large landowners. For the proletariat and the sinking middle orders—​ petty bourgeoisie, peasant farmers—​it means a growing increase in the uncertainty of their livelihood and in poverty, pressure, enslavement, degradation, and exploitation. The number of proletarians becomes ever greater, the army of surplus workers becomes ever more massive, the contrast

Marx and Social Democracy  147 between exploiters and exploited becomes ever sharper, and the class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat, which divides modern society into two hostile camps and is the common feature of all industrialized countries, becomes even more vehement.76

This passage makes three major claims. First, the small-​business sector is being displaced by gigantic big-​businesses. This has not been totally falsified. While it has not been the case that the small-​ business sector has decreased, it certainly has been the case that huge stock companies and cartels get larger and larger. And they also absorb many of those small businesses. The second claim is that the proletariat is getting larger and larger. This too has not been completely falsified. While it is not the case that the proletariat-​narrowly-​understood, the industrial proletariat, has, relatively, gotten significantly larger, it certainly is the case that the proletariat-​broadly-​understood has gotten larger and larger. Moreover, in Theories of Surplus Value, Marx himself came to recognize that the middle class (part of the proletariat-​broadly-​ understood) is growing in size.77 The third claim is that the proletariat and the sinking middle orders (that is, the proletariat-​broadly-​ understood) experience increasing poverty, which produces an ever more massive contrast between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Again, this has not been completely falsified. While it is not the case that absolute poverty is increasing in advanced capitalist societies for the proletariat-​ broadly-​understood,78 it is certainly the case, as Piketty shows, that inequality between rich and poor has been increasing quite steadily since Marx’s day.79 Still, the proletariat-​broadly-​understood is not being rapidly pauperized as Marx anticipated. What is the cause of this? I tend to doubt that capitalism left to itself—​pure laisses-​faire capitalism or pure neo-​liberalism—​would produce this result (which I take to be the self-​congratulatory assumption of capitalists). I suspect that plain old class struggle, that is, labor unions, labor parties, and

148  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy parties with some stake in labor, played a big role in producing these results by resisting real capitalist tendencies toward immiseration. On the other hand, these parties are not doing all that well fighting increasing homelessness in the United States these days.80 Thus, concerning polarization and immiseration, we can say, against Marx, that: (1) The proletariat-​narrowly-​understood is not becoming the enormous majority. (2) The capitalist class is not shrinking. Indeed, more and more stockholders are necessary to finance large capitalist enterprises, although the role of the capitalist class is shrinking in the sense that capitalist owners are being replaced by employed managers. On the other hand, it is the case, in agreement with Marx, that: (1) The proletariat-​broadly-​understood is becoming enormous—​ the vast majority (and the growing middle class is part of the proletariat-​broadly-​understood). (2) Whatever the number of capitalists, capitalist enterprises are growing larger and larger, as well as more and more powerful. (3) Polarization, the gap between rich and poor, has continually increased. Indeed, a recent Oxfam report on global inequality claims that 2,153 billionaires held more wealth than sixty percent of planet’s population (4.6 billion people).81 (4) The fact that immiseration of the proletariat-​ broadly-​ ­understood is not worse than it is can be attributed to the action of unions and labor parties in resisting the capitalist tendency toward immiseration together with the ability of larger and larger capitalist enterprises to, as Galbraith put it, concede “wage and other demands to the unions and

Marx and Social Democracy  149 [pass] the costs along in the price.”82 Thus, against capitalist apologists, polarization and immiseration have not been stopped or eliminated as much as transformed. And, though it would be far too complex an issue to take up in this book, one might argue that the extent to which Marx’s prognostications83 concerning the polarization of classes and the immiseration of the proletariat have not been born out is due, at least in significant part, to the emergence of socialist tendencies within capitalism—​to cartels, unions, and labor parties—​that is, to other prognostications made by Marx that have been born out.84 Thus, it is not so much that the majority revolution model discussed in Chapter 4 gets dropped and simply replaced by what Chapter 5 called the social democratic revolution model. It is not that polarization and immiseration simply do not occur. It is certainly not that the forces of production do not grow enormously and come to contradict the old relations of production. It is not that all of this is not producing a revolution. It is just that it need not necessarily produce a crisis, a collapse, and a violent insurrection. But it certainly is producing a revolution in the sense of a fundamental social transformation, which a social democratic party could come to understand, guide, and help emerge. It is not that we have two very different models of revolution here such that one gets dropped and replaced by a very dissimilar model. Rather, one gets transformed into the other. One is a variant of the other. At any rate, it is clear that capitalism has been able to avoid the crises and collapse that Marx, in the Manifesto, expected.85 Bernstein thinks this is due in significant part to the development of large industrial cartels, which have had “a modifying effect on the nature and frequency of crises.” Moreover, he thinks that to “deny this is to deny the superiority of organization over anarchic competition.”86 Such cartels, Engels argued, represent the emergence

150  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy of socialism within capitalism. To deny that the planning they make possible and require can have any effect under capitalism would make it difficult to hold that the same planning could suddenly become effective under socialism. The proper response here, Bernstein says, is that as soon as the development toward socialization and cooperative organization “is sufficiently advanced, the realization of socialism becomes an imperative necessity for the further development of society. To bring it about is the task of the proletariat organized as a class party which, for this purpose, must seize political power.”87 If all this is so, then to accuse a social democratic party of being insufficiently socialist, as Leninists and other Marxists often do, could make some sense if what that means is that the social democratic party has failed to understand accurately the degree to which capitalist development has given rise to socialism within capitalism and thus was failing to properly guide this development toward socialism. If the accusation just means that the social democratic party is not thinking in terms of the majority revolution model, not preparing for a crisis, not expecting an explosion, and not preparing for a violent seizure of power, then the accusation is probably being made by people who do not understand the thought of Marx and Engels as it developed past 1870, do not understand the development of modern capitalism, and certainly do not understand social democracy. Harrington suggests that socialists sit by the sickbed of capitalism both as doctors wanting to cure the patient but also as heirs that want the patient to die.88 I would suggest a slightly different picture. Socialists, even including those interested in implementing a Meidner-​style plan, would certainly be acting as doctors to capitalism, but they need not be wishing for the patient to die. On the other hand, the patient does have an incurable disease. There will never be a day when the patient is finally cured, gets up, leaves the hospital, and goes about its business as before. The patient will have to remain under the care of the doctors to make sure the illness

Marx and Social Democracy  151 does not flare up again. There is no need to kill off the patient as long as the disease remains under control.

Concluding Remarks It is not fashionable among Marxians to think well of social democracy. Why, it might be asked, am I so positive about it? The reasons have already been implied in what has been said. First, social democracy simply does not have the calculation problems raised by Weber, Mises, and Hayek, because it does not eliminate markets, money, or prices. Moreover, the planning it engages in is just a continuation, and a better directing, of already existing capitalist planning. There is nothing remotely utopian here. And the notion that social democracy is on the road to totalitarianism is simply absurd. Social democratic societies have been among the most democratic societies in the world. Moreover, Marx himself supported, endorsed, and advised an actual social democratic party. Second, I take “social democracy” to be a very broad category. It covers the range from beginning attempts to reform capitalism from within, through solidly developed social democratic societies like the Scandinavian ones, all the way to societies that might introduce and maintain a Meidner-​like plan. Social democracy, as I understand it, does not exclude full socialism—​as long as it is democratic socialism. However, I do not see democratic societies deciding to vote in full socialism any time soon. Third, social democracies, certainly up through the 1970s, demonstrated an actual ability to harness the beneficial aspects of markets, their efficiency, while avoiding their negative aspects, poverty. They provided basic goods and services to all and did so through democratic processes that included the empowering of workers and their unions. And in doing so, they reduced fetishism.

152  Marx, Revolution, and Social Democracy Fourth, actual social democratic states have been more just than actual capitalist or communist states—​a great deal more just. Put another way, an acceptable society must be both democratic and socialist. Democracy without social democracy will be unjust for those at the bottom. And socialism without democracy will be bad for everyone. On the other hand, whether or not social democracies will be able to overcome the problems generated by globalization and neo-​ liberalism that have set in since the 1970s remains to be seen.89

Notes Introduction 1. For example, J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), 326. Also F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), xvii, 27 ff. Also L. von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, trans. J. Kahane (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1981), 497–​500. On the other hand, for a variation on this theme, see Rancière’s attack on Glucksmann’s view that Stalinist terror followed from Western Marxism: J. Rancière, The Intellectual and his People: Staging the People, Vol. 2, trans. D. Fernbach (London: Verso, 2012), 100–​105. 2. A view held, for example, by G. D. H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, 5 vols. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1953–​58), 2:286. 3. J. H. Kautsky, in his Introduction to Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, trans. H. J. Stenning (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), xviii–​xix, writes, “the communists, whom Kautsky here accuses of betraying Marxism, have so successfully assumed its mantle that Marxism and communism are widely held to be identical and most democratic socialists no longer lay claim to the Marxian heritage. Kautsky’s book now serves as a useful reminder that, until less than half a century ago, it was generally taken for granted that Marxism stood for democracy.” On these matters, see also R. Blackburn, “Fin de Siècle: Socialism after the Crash,” New Left Review 185 (1991): 8–​11. 4. Kolakowski writes that Marxists and others “are concerned with the question whether modern Communism, in its ideology and institutions, is the legitimate heir of Marxian doctrine. The three commonest answers to this question may be expressed in simplified terms as follows: (1) Yes, modern Communism is the perfect embodiment of Marxism, which proves that the latter is a doctrine leading to enslavement, tyranny, and crime; (2) Yes, modern Communism is the perfect embodiment of Marxism, which therefore signifies a hope of liberation and happiness for mankind; (3) No, Communism as we know it is a profound deformation of Marx’s gospel and a betrayal of the fundamentals of Marxian socialism. The first answer

154  Notes to pages 2–4 corresponds to traditional anti-​Communist orthodoxy, the second to traditional Communist orthodoxy, and the third to various forms of critical, revisionistic, or ‘open’ Marxism.” See L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origins, Growth and Dissolution, 3 vols., trans. P. S. Falla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 1:1–​2. See also M. Harrington, Socialism (New York: Bantam, 1977), 41. 5. See, for example, R. N. Hunt, German Social Democracy 1918–​1933 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), viii, 21. 6. S. Tegel, “The SPD in Imperial Germany, 1871–​1914,” in Bernstein to Brandt: A Short History of German Social Democracy, ed. R. Fletcher (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), 16–​17. For an attempt to thread a course between the views of social democracy and those of Soviet Marxism, see W. P. Cockshott and A. Cottrell, Towards a New Socialism (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1993), 1–​11. 7. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 137. 8. Even Weber thought that the argument of the Kathedersozialisten (socialists of the lectern) to the effect that social reform, “implying (in contrast to a moneyless economy) the continued existence of effective prices, rather than full socialization,” can be considered “merely a half-​measure.” See M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 3 vols., ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1:105. 9. D. A. Chalmers quotes an SPD leader: “The Social Democrats have never suffered so much from what [the party] really was, as from what the deceiving propaganda of the propertied . . . made of it in the eyes of those without judgment” (brackets in the text). See The Social Democratic Party of Germany: From Working-​Class Movement to Modern Political Party (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1964), 109. 10. I. Fetscher, Marx and Marxism (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 309, see also 310. A similar point is made by P. Hudis, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 213. See also Harrington, Socialism, 4, 187–​188. See also, P. Mattick, Marx and Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy (London: Merlin, 1969), 295. 11. Cockshott and Cottrell, Towards a New Socialism, 8, seem to suggest that if only the Soviets has been democratic, socialism would have worked in the Soviet Union, without explaining how they could have proceeded democratically in a society with a tiny proletariat. 12. See Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece (hereafter SH&M) (Montreal: McGill-​ Queen’s University Press, 1982), esp. 3–​ 6; Marx’ Method, Epistemology, and Humanism: A Study in the Development of His Thought (hereafter

Notes to pages 4–6  155 MME&H) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986); Marx and Ethics (hereafter M&E) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Marx and Modern Political Theory: From Hobbes to Contemporary Feminism (hereafter M&MPT) (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993). 13. It is not clear that social democracy is dying and that capitalism represents the “end of history,” as some would have it. Corneo tells us that social democracy expanded up through the mid-​1970s, then stabilized without change until the beginning of the 1990s, and since then the trend has reversed. In Germany, and even Sweden, taxes have become less progressive and welfare benefits have decreased. There have also been “massive job cuts in the civil service, advancing privatization, a retreat of traditional trade unions, significant erosion of the proportion of employees covered by collective wage agreements.” See G. Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete: A Journey through Alternative Economic Systems, trans. D. Steuer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 228–​229. In 2003, the SPD under Gerhard Schröder, for example, introduced Agenda 2010 to promote economic growth and reduce unemployment. The main changes it implemented included drastic cuts to the welfare budget, the weakening of labor laws to allow easier hiring and firing of employees, altering the rules to allow for more part-​time and temporary work, merging unemployment and welfare benefits, and reducing the amount of time a person can receive unemployment benefits. These “reform measures were warmly welcomed by businesses and conservative politicians but loathed by the left and Germany’s labor unions.” The Social Democrats were defeated in the general election of 2005. See R. Staudenmaier, “German Issues in a Nutshell: ‘Agenda 2010,’ ” Deutsche Welle (https://​www.dw.com/​en/​ger​ man-​iss​ues-​in-​a-​nutsh​ell-​age​nda-​2010/​a-​38789​461). See also, P. Camera-​ Rowe, “Agenda 2010: Redefining German Social Democracy,” German Politics and Society 22 (2004): 1–​30; G. Braunthal, “The SPD, the Welfare State, and Agenda 2010,” German Politics and Society 21 (2003): 1–​29. Corneo does not accept the notion that such cuts are necessary to avoid economic crisis. He thinks social democratic parties have to be made to more effectively represent the interests of the working population, and they need especially to address the ability of global capital to avoid taxation by migrating to tax havens; Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete? 230–​233, 237–​238, 244–​248. Corneo also makes other suggestions to overcome the recent problems of social democracy; Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete? 261–​ 287. Meyer argues that globalization has caused uncoordinated market economies to weaken social protections, but the more coordinated market economies “remain organized and lean toward intervention and

156  Notes to page 6 regulation, while continuing to maintain their social protections. When adjustments become necessary, they usually strive to bring about cooperation and concerted action between corporatist actors and government.” See T. Meyer with L. P. Hinchman, The Theory of Social Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 129. Moreover, in opposition “to the neoliberal view that uncoordinated market economies can react better to the global integration of markets in goods and financial services, recent experience suggests that coordinated economies have better medium-​and long-​range prospects. [An uncoordinated] production regime based principally on the low-​wage sector, a rudimentary welfare state, and low taxes can react to global competition only by progressively dismantling regulation and social security. By contrast, coordinated economies can react in more subtle ways to this same challenge, and thrive by relying on a well-​ trained and socially secure workforce as well as high-​value, specialized products.” (T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 132). Meyer goes on to discuss such matters at length; see T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy 163–​187. For a collection of articles on the current problems of social democracy, see The Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe, ed. M. Keating and D. McCrone (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015). They argue that social democracy’s problems “do not stem from a fundamental flaw in the core idea, nor that social and economic change have rendered it redundant.” They argue that there “has been an intellectual failure to think through the bases of a renewed social democracy for contemporary society. At root . . . the problem is one of ideas and politics, rather than of ineluctable economic necessities.” Keating and McCrone, Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe, ix, 10. In this collection, see especially B. Rothstein and S. Steinmo, “Social Democracy in Crisis? What Crisis?” 87–​106. Crouch thinks that globalization and neo-​liberalism have led to post-​democracy. It has the form of democracy, elections exist, but public debate is tightly managed by rival teams of experts in the techniques of persuasion, and elites control government; see C. Crouch, Post-​Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 4–​6. Also see C. Crouch, Post-​Democracy After the Crises (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), 1–​3, 25–​26, 38–​39. But, even so, Crouch suggests possible responses to this erosion of democracy; Post-​Democracy After the Crises, 41–​56, 60–​63. 14. Kautsky makes this point fairly clearly; see K. Kautsky, The Road to Power: Political Reflections on Growing into the Revolution, trans. R. Meyer (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1966), 1. See also, B. Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism: A Marxist Social Theory (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1982), 380.

Notes to pages 6–10  157 15. R. Fletcher, “The Life and Work of Eduard Bernstein,” in Bernstein to Brandt, 45. 16. V. L. Lidtke, The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–​ 1890 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 238–​239, points out that Liebknecht understood revolution in this way, that is, that socialist revolution will be achieved organically, gradually, and irresistibly through parliamentarism. 17. C. F. Elliott, “Quis Custodiet Sacra: Problems of Marxist Revisionism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (1967): 73. 18. See throughout SH&M, MME&H, and M&E. 19. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 1:3. 20. For example, K. O. Moene and M. Wallerstein, “What’s Wrong with Social Democracy,” in Market Socialism: The Current Debate, ed. P. K. Bardhan and J. E. Roemer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 219; M. Keating and D. McCrone, “The Crisis of Social Democracy,” in Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe, 2; Rothstein and Steinmo, “Social Democracy in Crisis? What Crisis?” in Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe, 88; R. L. Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism: Essays in Political Economics (New York: Vintage, 1970), 144; D. Schweickart, Against Capitalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 4, 289. 21. For example, F. Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century, trans. R. Daly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 484. 22. C. A. R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (New York: Schocken, 1963), 64–​65, lists a lot of other ways the term “socialism” has been used. On the other hand, some take socialism by definition to exclude markets and thus see no difference between socialism and communism; see M. Rubel and J. Crump, eds., Non-​Market Socialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987), 1. 23. “Critique of the Gotha Programme” (hereafter “Gotha Program”), Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works (hereafter MECW), 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1975 ff.), 24:87. 24. For a good description of the traditional Soviet economic model and its problems, see M. Ellman, Socialist Planning, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), c­ hapter 2. 25. Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism, 19. 26. See, for example, T. E. Weisskopf, “The Prospects for Democratic Market Socialism in the East,” in Equal Shares: Making Market Socialism Work, ed. E. O. Wright (London: Verso, 1996), 283. On the other hand, S. Moore writes, “To suggest that replacement of bureaucratic socialism by market

158  Notes to pages 10–15 socialism is more likely than its replacement by communism is to reject almost everything Marx wrote on postcapitalist economic organization.” See Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), ix. I will be arguing that to reject the notion that Marx endorses social democracy is to fail to adequately explore what he did write. 27. For a description of the Mondragon community, see D. Schweickart, After Capitalism, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 66–​73. 28. For example, Schweickart, Against Capitalism; see also Schweickart, After Capitalism. See also J. E. Roemer, “A Future for Socialism,” in Equal Shares, 7–​39. 29. See for example, P. K. Bardhan and J. E. Roemer, “Introduction,” in Market Socialism: The Current Debate, 7. 30. T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 140. 31. For example, see “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:85–​87. 32. Rothstein and Steinmo, 87, argue that “social democracy was never a utopian political project . . . social democracy has traditionally been firmly anchored in a concrete, down-​to-​earth pragmatism based on a realist vision that politics must be based on what is ‘possible.’ ” 33. G. Lichtheim also makes this point in A Short History of Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1970), 324. 34. E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, 2 vols., trans. B. Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), 1:171. 35. “Leave, ye that enter in, all autonomy behind!” See F. Engels, “On Authority,” MECW, 23:423. 36. Sejersted points out, for example, that Norway clung to its Marxism for a long time after Sweden moved away from it, and that Sweden was the exception. Norway’s development was closer to that of social democratic parties in Europe; see Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 5, 149, 171. 37. For a ranking of social democratic societies under various categories, see T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 210–​213. 38. T. E. Weisskopf, “A Democratic Enterprise-​Based Market Socialism,” in Market Socialism: The Current Debate, 124; A. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 133, 207. 39. Roemer, “A Future for Socialism,” 33. See also P. A. Samuelson, Economics, 9th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), 734. 40. E. Bernstein, The Preconditions of Socialism, trans. H. Tudor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 190; M. Adler makes a

Notes to pages 15–18  159 similar remark, see “The Cultural Aims of Socialism,” in Austro-​Marxism, ed. T. Bottomore and P. Goode (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 265. See also, K. Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 4–​5. 41. The German Ideology (hereafter GI), MECW, 5:49 (brackets in the text). The German Ideology was first published only in 1932, but after Engels’ death, Bernstein and Bebel were appointed his executors and were entrusted with his literary remains; see P. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 56. Also see Fletcher, “The Life and Work of Eduard Bernstein,” 46. Moreover, Bernstein first published parts of the text serially in the monthly journal that he edited; see E. Bernstein, ed., Dokumente des Sozialismus III (1903) (Berlin: Verlag der Sozialistischen Monatshefte, 1905), 19 ff., 65 ff., 115 ff., 306 ff., 355 ff. Also, Dokumente des Sozialismus IV (1904) (Berlin: Verlag der Sozialistischen Monatshefte, 1905), 210 ff., 259 ff., 312 ff., 363 ff., 416 ff. Bernstein’s slogan can also be likened to the Aristotelian notion that virtuous activity does not seek an end outside itself, but is itself the end. Thus, that socialism is the free activity of realizing a socialist society, not some fixed set of institutions to be finally achieved.

Chapter 1 1. Capital, I, MECW, 35:84–​85. I here use the terms “alienation” and “estrangement” interchangeably. For a lengthier and more detailed treatment of the concepts in the writings of Hegel and Marx, see my SH&M, chapters II and III. Fetishism, for Marx, is simply one form of alienation—​alienation in exchange. For an earlier and briefer treatment of Marx’s concept of fetishism, see SH&M, chapter IV, section 3. Also see my “Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” Political Theory 7 (1979): 509–​520. 2. Capital, I, MECW, 35:83. For an extended discussion of this process, see I. I. Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, trans. M. Samardžija and F. Perlman (Detroit: Red & Black, 1972), 1–​30. 3. Capital, I, MECW, 35:85. 4. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:311–​ 12. See also Anti-​ Dühring, MECW, 25:259. 5. Horvat (1982, 94) points to Hayek as someone completely buried within fetishism. He says, Hayek admits “that the manner in which the benefits and burdens are apportioned by the market mechanism would in many instances have to be regarded as very unjust if it were the result of a

160  Notes to pages 18–22 deliberate allocation to particular people. But,” he argues, “this is not the case. Those shares are the outcome of a process the effect of which on particular people was neither intended nor foreseen by anyone when the institutions first appeared . . . . To demand justice from such a process is clearly absurd.” See also, F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 2:64–​65; see also, 31–​38, 62–​100. 6. D. McLellan makes this point in Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 345. So does Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 1:173. See also the Introduction by F. Perlman to Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, xvi–​xxii. See also S. Moore, Marx versus Markets (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 64–​65. Also A. E. Buchanan, Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982), 15–​16. See also note 1 of this chapter. Althusser, on the other hand, rejects what he calls the “projection of the theory of alienation found in the early texts, particularly the 1844 Manuscripts, on to the theory of ‘fetishism’ in Capital.” L. Althusser, For Marx, trans. B. Brewster (London: NLB, 1977), 230 n. See also L. Althusser, et al., Reading Capital: The Complete Edition, trans. B. Brewster and D. Fernbach (London: Verso, 2015), 345–​347; L. Althusser, Essays in Self-​Criticism, trans. G. Lock (London: NLB, 1976), 65–​72. 7. “Comments on James Mill, Élémens D’Économie Politique,” MECW, 3:213, 217, 226–​227; see also 212. See also “On the Jewish Question,” (hereafter JQ), MECW, 3:172. 8. GI, MECW, 5:47–​48, see also 93. 9. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (hereafter CPE), MECW, 29:289, see also 275–​276. See also, Economic Manuscript of 1861–​ 63, MECW, 32:317; also 34:411, 415–​416. Also, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–​58, MECW, 28:131–​132. 10. G. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. R. Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), 183. 11. Moore, Marx on the Choice, 11–​17. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 36 ff., seems to hold a variant of this position. 12. For an earlier and lengthier treatment of these forms of alienation, see SH&M, 84–​91. Also M&E, 58–​62. 13. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (hereafter EPM), MECW, 3:271–​277. 14. EPM, MECW, 3:271–​272. 15. Buchanan holds a similar view; see Buchanan, 42–​43.

Notes to pages 22–25  161 16. EPM, MECW, 3:279. See also, MME&H, 16–​20. 17. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:320. R. E. Lane, The Market Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) gives an extended study of market psychology. The text refers frequently to Marx but is written from a capitalist perspective and in very large part defends capitalist markets. 18. It seems to be Marx’s view at GI, MECW, 5:48. 19. Capital, I, MECW, 35:87–​89. For a similar discussion, see CPE, MECW, 29:274–​276, 289. For an earlier treatment of these matters, see SH&M, chapter IV, section 3. Also see my “Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” 509–​520. On a related issue, see my “Hegel and the Failure of Civil Society,” The Owl of Minerva 46 (2014–​2015): 1–​23. 20. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89–​90. 21. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. 22. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. 23. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. 24. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:86. For an argument that such labor certificates should be seen as money, see A. Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 53–​54. For a good argument against, see R. Hilferding, Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, trans. M. Watnick and S. Gordon (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 67 ff. In Volume II of Capital, Marx says that such certificates or “vouchers are not money. They do not circulate.” Capital, II, MECW, 36:356. Also, Cockshott and Cottrell, 28–​29. See also D. Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 68. 25. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. 26. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89–​90. 27. Capital, I, MECW, 35:92. 28. P. C. Roberts claims that, for Marx, alienation is inherent in developed market economies and can only be ended by doing away with markets; see “Oskar Lange’s Theory of Socialist Planning,” Journal of Political Economy 79 (1971), 563–​564. Roberts also argues (565) that later attempts to couple planning with markets abandon the original intent of socialist planning. This certainly does not describe Marx’s views in Capital Ch1, where the socialist society of example four very clearly retains a market and involves planning; see Capital, I, MECW, 35:89–​90. Brus and Laski think that for orthodox Marxism, markets are incompatible with “a rational socialist economy . . . . This is not to say that one could not find in Marx passages compatible with a more benign attitude towards the market

162  Notes to pages 25–27 under socialism, but as far as the essence of the theory goes the conclusion looks indisputable.” Socialism, they think, requires replacing the market. See W. Brus and K. Laski, From Marx to the Market: Socialism in Search of an Economic System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 5–​9. Brus and Laski, then, would have to deny that the discussion of a socialist market economy in Capital Ch1 is essential to Marx’s theory, not a very plausible claim. See also, B. Ollman, “Market Mystification in Capitalist and Market Socialist Societies,” in Market Socialism: The Debate Among Socialists, ed. B. Ollman (New York: Routledge, 1998), 99–​120. See also D. L. Prychitko, Marxism and Workers’ Self-​Management: The Essential Tension (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 20–​22, 67. See also, Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning, 46–​47, 180. Honneth also thinks Marx holds that markets must be eliminated and that Marx was unable to envision alternative forms of the market; see A. Honneth, The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal, trans. J. Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 30, 47, 56–​58, 67 ff. 29. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. 30. See also, GI, MECW, 5:80. Buchanan holds a similar view; see Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 15–​17. 31. Manifesto of the Communist Party (hereafter Manifesto), MECW, 6:504. 32. Manifesto, MECW, 6:504. 33. Manifesto, MECW, 6:505. Schumpeter thinks the Manifesto, “quite illogically lists a number of immediate objects of socialist policy.” See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 317. I think they are measures or guidelines intended over time to transform a capitalist society into a socialist one. See also note 35 of this chapter. 34. Manifesto, MECW, 6:505. 35. “Principles of Communism” (hereafter “Principles”), MECW, 6:350. Engels emphasizes that working toward common ownership of the means of production would be a gradual and democratic process; see “Principles,” MECW, 6:350–​351. Indeed, even the expropriation of landed proprietors would be gradual; MECW, 6:350. See also S. Avineri, Karl Marx: Philosophy and Revolution (hereafter KMP&R) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), 84 ff. See also, J. Lawler, “Marx as Market Socialist,” in Market Socialism: The Debate Among Socialists, 23–​45. In the post-​capitalist society envisioned in the “Demands of the Communist Party in Germany” of 1848, more is said of rent and interest on mortgages paid to the state. There is also a discussion of credit and the gradual substitution of paper money for gold and silver coin so that the means of market exchange will be cheapened, and gold and silver set free for use in foreign trade. There is

Notes to pages 27–33  163 also a discussion of salaries of civil servants and the abolition of taxes on articles of consumption; see, Birth of the Communist Manifesto, ed. D. J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 191–​192. 36. Manifesto, MECW, 6:505. The “Address of the Central Authority to the League” of 1850 calls for the utmost possible concentration of the productive forces in the hands of the state; MECW, 10:286. 37. In the “Principles,” Engels does say that money will become superfluous; MECW, 6:351. But this is left out of the Manifesto. 38. “Principles,” MECW, 6:355. 39. “Principles,” MECW, 6:350. 40. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:85–​86. See also Lawler, “Marx as Market Socialist,” 45 ff. 41. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:85. 42. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:87. 43. Capital, III, MECW, 37:434–​435. 44. See also Avineri, KMP&R, 170. 45. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:87. 46. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:87. 47. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:83–​87. 48. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. Also, Manifesto, MECW, 6:505. 49. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. For a similar discussion, see CPE, MECW, 29:274–​ 276. Also see Economic Manuscripts of 1857–​ 58, MECW, 28:108–​109. 50. Capital, I, MECW, 35:51; see also, 83–​84. 51. O. Lange, “Political Economy of Socialism,” in Problems of the Political Economy of Socialism, ed. O. Lange (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1965), 7, 9. See also W. Brus, “Commodity Fetishism and Socialism,” in The Economics and Politics of Socialism: Collected Essays, trans. A. Walker (London: Routledge, 1973), 48–​49. 52. Brus thinks there will still be fetishism in socialist society—​at least as a tendency to be countered; see Brus, “Commodity Fetishism and Socialism,” 50–​56. 53. Capital, I, MECW, 35:83–​84. 54. Here I disagree with Moore; see Marx on the Choice, 63–​69. Also, Marx himself says, “The life-​process of society . . . does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan.” Capital, I, MECW, 35:90. In other words, to end fetishism (strip off society’s mystical veil), free association and planning are required. Collective ownership is not required—​or at least Marx does not say so here.

164  Notes to pages 35–37 55. Weber, 1:71–​184. Mises, Socialism, esp. c­ hapters 5–​11. F. A. Hayek, “The Nature and History of the Problem,” in Collectivist Economic Planning, Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism, ed. F. A. Hayek (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2015 [reprint]), 1–​40; also see Road to Serfdom. 56. Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism, 88. For a good discussion of planning in an economy without markets, see Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism, 75 ff. For a good critique of the assumptions involved in claiming that markets are efficient, and for a discussion of socialized markets, see D. Elson, “Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market,” New Left Review 172 (1988): 3–​44. See also, B. Wootton, Freedom Under Planning (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1945), esp. chapter IV on consumer sovereignty. 57. Mises, Socialism, 104–​ 105; see also, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” in Collectivist Economic Planning, 108. Schweickart suggests that without markets there would be “no effective means of gauging what people really want. Imagine for a moment filling out a questionnaire in which you would specify which of the available consumer goods you would like next month, and in what quantities, and the relative strengths of your preferences.” Against Capitalism, 85. For a good summary and explanation of Mises’ argument, see S. Horwitz, “Monetary Calculation and Mises’s Critique of Planning,” History of Political Economy 30 (1998): 427–​435. Corneo argues that Arrow and Hurwicz have solved, at least theoretically, the problems raised by Mises and Hayek; see Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete?, 107–​114. See also K. J. Arrow and L. Hurwicz, “Decentralisation and Computation in Resource-​Allocation,” in Essays in Economics and Econometrics: A Volume in Honour of Harold Hotelling, ed. R. Pfouts (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 34–​104. Whether the Arrow–​Hurwicz planning model can actually handle the complexity involved, Corneo thinks, is another question. For an argument that with modern computers, despite the complexity, rational economic calculation is possible without prices, money, and markets, see Cockshott and Cottrell, Towards a New Socialism, ­chapters 3 and 4. 58. O. Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism, ed. B. E. Lippincott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938), 57–​58. 59. Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism, 88 ff. For a brief sketch of the history of these arguments, see Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, 2:633 ff. For a good defense of Lange, see H. T. Sherman, “The Theory of Socialist Planning: Comment,” Journal of Political Economy 81 (1973): 455–​457.

Notes to pages 37–38  165 60. See, for example, L. Makowski and J. M. Ostroy, “General Equilibrium and Market Socialism: Clarifying the Logic of Competitive Markets,” in Market Socialism: The Current Debate, 78. 61. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 343. J. K. Galbraith in 1958 thinks that most business people would view Mises as rather extreme; The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 185 n. See also, Wootton, Freedom Under Planning, esp. chapter X. 62. See Introduction, “Terminology”; and Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, 1:171. For a discussion of capitalist inefficiency, see Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism, 191–​198. See also, Mises, Socialism, 123. 63. See Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete?, 162–​ 167. Nor would social democracies have the problems with entrepreneurial innovation often associated with full socialist societies; see Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete?, 192–​194. 64. For a good summary and discussion of the socialist calculation debate, see Blackburn, “Fin de Siècle: Socialism after the Crash,” 31–​39. See also, Prychitko, Marxism and Workers’ Self-​Management, 40–​49. For a critique of the standard interpretation of the debate, see Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning, esp. 1–​17, but the entire book deals with this issue. 65. Some supporters of Mises and Hayek seem to think that if any private ownership, money, markets, or prices exist then you simply do not have socialism, which conveniently safeguards the claim that socialism cannot calculate efficiently, and that only capitalism can do so (see, e.g., Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning, 155–​156). Weber was much more careful. He admitted that “the so-​called ‘socialists of the lectern’ (Kathedersozialisten) . . . employed as a standard of judgment a mode of social reform oriented to social welfare, implying (in contrast to a moneyless economy) the continued existence of effective prices, rather than full socialization . . . . It is, of course, quite possible to consider this merely a half-​measure, but it is not in itself a nonsensical attitude.” Weber, Economy and Society, 1:105. 66. See also, Prychitko, Marxism and Workers’ Self-​Management, 20–​27. 67. Schweickart points out that, “Between 1928 and 1980 the Soviet economy grew at an annual rate of 4.4 percent, its annual output moving from about one-​quarter that of the United States to three-​quarters.” Against Capitalism, 89. See also, Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism, 48–​ 51. See also, Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete?, 123–​125. I can remember as a teenager in 1957 the shock of Sputnik, when the Soviets beat the United States in launching the first satellite. Furthermore, despite the

166  Notes to pages 38–43 horrors perpetrated by the Soviets, Blackburn reminds us, “the survival of the Soviet Union has had profound, and often positive, implications for those outside Soviet borders. Most obviously the immense and irreplaceable Soviet contribution to the defeat of Nazism, but also the real, though less quantifiable, Soviet contribution to persuading Western ruling classes to cede ground to anti-​colonial liberation movements and to make concessions to their own domestic labour movements. Though other factors are certainly at work, it is interesting to note that welfare and social provision were often at their most generous in those European states bordering on the former Soviet bloc, and were often introduced at a time when the prestige of the Soviet Union was at its high point, in the early postwar period. In Western Europe today we are still enjoying the fruits of 1945, in the form of enlarged democratic rights and more generous social provision for education and welfare.” Blackburn, “Fin de Siècle: Socialism after the Crash,” 24. 68. For a discussion of the importance of experiment in the transition to socialism, see Honneth, The Idea of Socialism, 59–​71.

Chapter 2 1. JQ, MECW, 3:154, 167–​168. Aristotle, Politics, 1275a–​1275b. I have used the Revised Oxford Translation in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols., ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), but so that any edition, English or Greek, may be used I cite the page and column of the standard Bekker edition of Aristotle’s works given in the margins of most translations. For an earlier treatment of political alienation, see SH&M, chapter III, section 3 and also chapter IV, section 3. Also see my “Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” 509–​520. 2. JQ, MECW, 3:168. 3. Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law (hereafter CHPL), MECW, 3:120–​121. 4. Manifesto, MECW, 6:504. 5. “Preface to the 1872 German Edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party,” MECW, 23:175. Also, The Civil War in France (hereafter CWF), MECW, 22:328. Also, Engels, “Introduction [to Karl Marx’s The Class Struggles in France]” (hereafter ICSF), MECW, 27:510 ff. For an earlier and briefer treatment of these issues, see SH&M, chapter IV, section 3. Also see my “Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” 509–​520. 6. For example, see CWF, MECW, 22:336.

Notes to pages 43–45  167 7. “Marx to Ferdinand Domela Neuwenhuis on 22 February 1881,” MECW, 46:66. 8. CWF, MECW, 22:334 ff. 9. CWF, MECW, 22:328, 332. See also, the First Draft of the CWF, MECW, 22:487. 10. CWF, MECW, 22:331; see also the Second Draft of the CWF, MECW, 22:515–​516. See also, Engels, “Speeches in Elberfield,” MECW, 4:249–​250. 11. J-​J. Rousseau, The Government of Poland, trans. W. Kendall (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-​Merrill, 1972), 80–​81, 84. Hunt thinks the National Guard simply replaces the national army “as the coercive instrument of the worker’s state.” See R. N. Hunt, The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, II: Classical Marxism, 1850–​1895 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984), 128, also 235. 12. CWF, MECW, 22:331. 13. Engels writes, “State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not ‘abolished.’ It withers away.” Anti-​Dühring, MECW, 25:268 (translation altered); see also 247. See also Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, MECW, 26:272. On the difference with Marx here, see G. Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Praeger, 1970), 373. See also S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (hereafter S&PTKM) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 202 ff. Badiou thinks that Marx’s views on the commune are marked by ambiguity, tension, even contradiction between commitment to a non-​ state, anti-​state, or dissolution of the state, on the one hand, and, on the other, a statist deploring of such a non-​state’s incapacities; A. Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, trans. D. Macey and S. Corcoran (London: Verso, 2010), 178–​183. 14. V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, in Selected Works, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 2:343, also 299, 346. S. Miller and H. Potthoff quote the SPD slogan, “Socialism can be brought into being only by democracy; democracy can be brought to completion only by Socialism.” They go on to say, “the overwhelming majority of German Social Democrats . . . were in no doubt about where they stood: the Russian way was not their way. Acceptance of democratic majority decisions, the constitutional state and the right to strike, freedom of the individual and of expression, and respect for human rights and human dignity were regarded by Social Democrats as indispensable prerequisites for a just

168  Notes to pages 45–46 social order.” See A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present, trans. J. A. Underwood (Leamington SPA, UK: Berg, 1986), 3–​4. 15. Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 2:231–​265. 16. I. Shoikhedbrod, Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism: Rethinking Justice, Legality and Rights (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 82–​83, 122–​124. 17. CWF, MECW, 22:332–​333. See also, Engels’ 1891 “Introduction [to Karl Marx’s The Civil War in France]” (hereafter ICWF), MECW, 27:190. There is an echo here of Rousseau, for whom the government is “nothing other than a commission, a form of employment.” See The Social Contract, trans. M. Cranston (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 102. In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, MECW, 11:185, Marx says that the executive power, with its enormous bureaucratic state machinery is the heteronomy of the nation, whereas the legislative power is its autonomy. 18. “Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association on the Franco-​Prussian War,” MECW, 22:269. For a fuller treatment of Marx attitude toward the Paris Commune, see Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 2:99–​161. 19. “Programme of the Blanquist Commune Refugees,” MECW, 24:18. 20. “Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann on 12 April 1871,” MECW, 44:131–​132. Edwards puts it well, “Judging the Commune as a revolution, it was . . . a ‘tiger leap,’ one of those moments that jump forwards in history . . . . This is why the Commune can be seen as a success in spite of its immediate failure, though judged in terms of politics as the art of the possible, of the necessary compromise, it was a senseless revolt in impossible circumstances. But as the upsurge of a repressed population against conventional wisdom with its counsel of prudence, as the attempt to develop extensive forms of social freedom, the Commune was a truly revolutionary event, the breakthrough, however fleeting, into a new realm where what seemed barely possible suddenly becomes actual, and so reveals all other forms as condemned. For this reason it provided an inspiration for European socialists and anarchists.” See, S. Edwards, ed., The Communards of Paris, 1871 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973), 42. 21. See, e.g., Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. Hunt tends to assume that Marx accepted and endorsed all or most of the specific details of the governmental structure of the Commune; see Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 2:xi, 80, 223, 231–​265, 366. 22. Avineri argues that after 1848 Marx consistently opposed all attempts at violent insurrection; Avineri, S&PTKM, 194–​201. Also, on the Paris Commune, see Avineri, KMP&R, 151–​161.

Notes to pages 47–49  169 23. The Class Struggles in France: 1848–​1850 (hereafter CSF), MECW, 10:65; see also 54. 24. Manifesto, MECW, 6:504. 25. “The Chartists,” MECW, 11:335–​336. 26. F. Mehring, Karl Marx: The Story of His Life, trans. E. Fitzgerald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 336. 27. The Programs of the Eisenachers (1869) and of the SPD (1875 and 1891) can be found in S. Miller and H. Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy, 236–​242. 28. “Record of Marx’s Speech on the Political Action of the Working Class,” MECW, 22:617. For a good discussion of Engels’ views on these matters, see J. D. Hunley, The Life and Thought of Friedrich Engels: A Reinterpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), chapter VI. 29. “On the Hague Congress,” MECW, 23:255. See also, Engels, “A Critique of the Draft Social-​Democratic Programme of 1891,” MECW, 27:226. 30. “Critique of the Draft Social-​Democratic Programme of 1891,” MECW, 27:227. See also, “Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith,” MECW, 6:102. Also, “Principles,” MECW, 6:350. Also, Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, MECW, 26:271. 31. “The English Elections,” MECW, 23:612. 32. “British Agricultural Labourers Want to Participate in the Political Life of their Country,” MECW, 24:180. 33. “Preamble to the Programme of the French Workers’ Party,” MECW, 24:340. See also, Engels, ICSF, MECW, 27:516. See also, Engels, “A Working Men’s Party,” MECW, 24:404–​406. 34. “Trades Unions,” MECW, 24:387. 35. ICSF, MECW, 27:514–​516. 36. ICSF, MECW, 27:522. See also, Engels, “Farewell Letter to the Readers of the Sozialdemokrat,” MECW, 27:78–​79. 37. CSF, MECW, 10:69, 127. “Marx to Joseph Weydemeyer on 5 March 1852,” MECW, 39:60–​65. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:95. Bernstein argues the term is out of date; Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 145. 38. Lenin, The State and Revolution, in Selected Works, 2:352. See also, Engels, ICWF, MECW, 27:190. Also, Engels, “Letter to August Bebel on 18–​28 March 1875,” MECW, 24:71. On the other hand, Lenin, in another text, distinguishes between “a ‘democratic’ as distinct from a socialist dictatorship” and tells us that what he means by socialist dictatorship is “the forcible suppression of resistance by force and the arming of the revolutionary classes of the people.” Earlier in the same text, he said, a dictatorship “must

170  Notes to pages 49–52 inevitably rely on military force, on the arming of the masses, on an insurrection, and not on institutions of one kind or another established in a ‘lawful’ or ‘peaceful’ way.” See Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, in Selected Works, 1:553, 494; but also 555 ff. See also, SH&M, 145–​149. 39. Aristotle, Politics, 1292a, 1294a. 40. See “Principles,” MECW, 6:350. See also Lichtheim, Marxism, 269. Harrington, Socialism, 58. Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism, 286–​287. For Lenin, though, “dictatorship of the proletariat” means dictatorship, not democracy; see The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, in Selected Works, 3:75. See also, Cockshott and Cottrell, Towards a New Socialism, 177–​181. 41. “A Critique of the Draft Social-​Democratic Programme of 1891,” MECW, 27:227. See also, K. Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 42 ff. For a discussion of Marx and Engels’ conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat as democratic in contrast to Lenin’s conception of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia where the proletariat was a small minority that could not rule democratically, see Fetscher, 186–​187, also 307–​308. 42. ICWF, MECW, 27:191. Marx speaks of the necessity of “a proletarian dictature” for the Commune; “Record of Marx’s Speech on the Seventh Anniversary of the International,” MECW, 22:634. Draper discusses the concept of a “dictatorship of the proletariat” at length and in detail; see H. Draper, “Marx and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” Etudes de Marxologie, ed. M. Rubel (Paris: Cahiers de l’Institute de Science Économique, 1959): 5–​73. See also, R. N. Hunt, The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, I: Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy, 1818–​1850 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), 284–​336. 43. ICWF, MECW, 27:190. 44. “On Authority,” MECW, 23:425. See also, Engels, “Letter to August Bebel on 18–​28 March 1875,” MECW, 24:71. See also, “Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann on 12 April 1871,” MECW, 44:132. 45. “The Parliamentary Debate on the Anti-​Socialist Law,” MECW, 24:248. 46. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 381. 47. A. Przeworski, “How Many Ways Can Be Third?” in Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times: The Left and Economic Policy Since 1980, ed. A. Glyn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 317. 48. Roemer, “A Future for Socialism,” 33. 49. Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 144. 50. “Record of Marx’s Speech on the Political Action of the Working Class,” MECW, 22:618. There are also passages that suggest that democratic

Notes to pages 52–54  171 processes are means to violent revolution at a later stage. In 1850, Marx wrote, “Universal suffrage had fulfilled its mission. The majority of the people had passed through the school of development, which is all that universal suffrage can serve for in a revolutionary period. It had to be set aside by a revolution or by the reaction.” See CSF, MECW, 10:137. In 1892, Engels wrote, “Do you realize now what a splendid weapon you in France have had in your hands for forty years in universal suffrage: if only people had known how to use it! It’s slower and more boring than the call to revolution, but it’s ten times more sure, and what is even better, it indicates with the most perfect accuracy the day when a call to armed revolution has to be made; it’s even ten to one that universal suffrage, intelligently used by the workers, will drive the rulers to overthrow legality, that is, to put us in the most favourable position to make the revolution.” See “Engels to Paul LaFargue on 12 November 1892,” MECW, 50:29. On the other hand, Lidtke argues that in the 1880s, “The actions of the radicals” (that is, the SPD) “in the Saxon Diet demolishes completely the validity of the repeated slogan that Social Democrats used parliamentarism only as an agitational weapon.” See, Lidtke, The Outlawed Party, 228. 51. Engels, “The Anti-​Socialist Law in Germany,” MECW, 24:251. See also Engels, Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, MECW, 26:271. 52. Value, Price and Profit, MECW, 20:146. 53. First Draft of the CWF, MECW, 22:485 (brackets in the text). See also Avineri, S&PTKM, 50–​51. I. Berlin writes that Marx gives “a brilliant analysis of the role of the French state which functions less as the committee of the ruling class . . . than as an independent source of power supported by, but at times overriding the wishes of, the bourgeoisie.” See Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 192. 54. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 284–​285. That Marx rejects such a concept of democracy, see CWF, MECW, 22:332–​333. Crouch thinks that some political scientists of the 1950s and 1960s adapted “their definition of democracy so that it corresponded to actual political practice . . . rather than accept any defects in . . . political arrangements . . . . A similar approach is dominating contemporary thinking . . . . This is a form that stresses electoral participation, as the main type of mass participation, extensive freedom for lobbying activities, which mainly means business lobbies, and a form of polity that avoids interfering with a capitalist economy. It is a model that has little interest in widespread citizen involvement or the role of organizations outside the business sector.” This

172  Notes to pages 54–57 leads to complacency about the rise of post-​democracy, where elections exist, but public debate is tightly managed by rival teams of experts in the techniques of persuasion. Citizens play a quiescent and apathetic part, and they respond only to the signals given to them. Politics “is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests.” If this is accurate, then, Crouch argues, social democracy can expect a reversal of most of its achievements during the twentieth century. Thus, “while the forms of democracy remain fully in place—​and today in some respects are actually strengthened—​ politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of privileged elites in the manner characteristic of pre-​democratic times.” See Crouch, Post-​Democracy, 3–​6. Also see, Crouch, Post-​Democracy After the Crises, 1–​3, 25–​26, 38–​39. 55. D. Heald, “Rethinking Public Expenditure from a Social Democratic Perspective,” in Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe, 68–​69. 56. M. Keating and D. McCrone, “Conclusion,” in Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe, 230. 57. Even in England in 1896, Bernstein calculates that the average factory employed only forty-​nine workers; Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 66. In 1882, Lidtke calculates, fifty-​nine percent of German laborers worked in shops with less than five employees; Lidtke, The Outlawed Party, 11. 58. Crosland thinks alienation is inevitable even under social democracy and that the basic issue is not ownership or control, but large scale; see Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 37. 59. “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy,” MECW, 24:517. See also, Engels, “Letter to August Bebel on 18–​28 March 1875,” MECW, 24:71. Also, Engels, “On Authority,” MECW, 23:425. See also Marx and Engels, “Address of the Central Authority to the League,” MECW, 10:282–​287. 60. “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy,” MECW, 24:517. Marx makes the same point in the “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:93. See also, CSF, MECW, 10:54, 56–​57, 120. Eighteenth Brumaire, MECW, 11:187. Also, Engels, Revolution and Counter-​Revolution in Germany, MECW, 11:11. In 1844, Marx says merely that “the proletariat is coming into being in Germany.” See “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Introduction” (hereafter CHPLI), MECW, 3:186. Engels seems aware of this, although he tries to avoid actually admitting it, in the “Principles,” MECW, 6:350. For an earlier and briefer treatment of these issues, see SH&M, 147–​148. Also see my “Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” 509–​520.

Notes to pages 58–63  173

Chapter 3 1. See, e.g., Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 295. Also see Hudis, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, 213. Also see Harrington, Socialism, 4, 187–​188. 2. Moore calls these three tactics; see S. Moore, Three Tactics: The Background in Marx (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963). 3. CHPLI, MECW, 3:186. See also, Lichtheim, Marxism, 56. 4. CHPLI, MECW, 3:184. 5. See also, Moore, Three Tactics, 14. 6. CHPLI, MECW, 3:184. 7. See, e.g., Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:285–​286. See also, E. Bernstein, Ferdinand Lassalle: As A Social Reformer, trans. E. Marx Aveling (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 2. 8. CHPLI, MECW, 3:187. Marx also says “theory . . . becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses” (CHPLI, MECW, 3:182). Also, that theory “can be realized in a people only insofar as it is the realization of the needs of that people . . . . It is not enough for thought to strive for realization, reality must itself strive toward thought” (CHPLI, MECW, 3:183). Also, see the comments of Lukács on these passages; Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 2–​3. Lukács also thinks the true strength of the proletarian party is moral; Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 42. 9. CHPLI, MECW, 3:183. 10. CHPLI, MECW, 3:187. 11. CHPLI, MECW, 3:182. 12. CHPLI, MECW, 3:186. 13. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:421. I have used the M. Gregor translation in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), but so that any edition, English or German, may be used I cite the volume and page of the standard Akademie edition of Kant’s works given in the margins of most translations. 14. Groundwork, 4:429. For an earlier and lengthier treatment of these issues, see my M&E, 34–​50, also 62 ff. See also my M&MPT, 153–​156, 99–​109. Also see my “Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” 509–​ 520. See also K. Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 29. See also O. Bauer, “Marxism and Ethics,” in Austro-​Marxism, 83. 15. See also M&E, 80 ff. 16. Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:142.

174  Notes to pages 63–70 17. “Programme of the Blanquist Commune Refugees,” MECW, 24:13. See also, “Address of the Central Authority to the League,” MECW, 10:277. 18. “Programme of the Blanquist Commune Refugees,” MECW, 24:13. 19. ICWF, MECW, 27:188. For more on Blanqui, see Cole, 1:161 ff. Also, H. Draper, “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” in Marxism: The Inner Dialogues, 2nd ed., ed. M. Curtis (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 285 ff. 20. Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:13–​48, 59–​86. Hunt argues throughout the book that Marx was not a Blanquist. 21. Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:85–​86, 88. 22. Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism, 142. 23. See Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism, 7. See also Lukács, who describes how the proletariat feel ‘illegal’ as they first come to power and establish their own laws; Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 268. 24. “Principles,” MECW, 6:350. 25. Manifesto, MECW, 6:519. See also, “Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality,” MECW, 6:332–​333. 26. Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:177, 178–​191. 27. In the “Conclusion” to the first volume of his book, Hunt comes closer, or at least a bit closer, to my view; see Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:340. 28. Manifesto, MECW, 6:519. See also “Principles,” MECW, 6:356. 29. “Address of the Central Authority to the League,” MECW, 10:281, see also 287. Here again, Hunt admits that this passage “if understood literally,” implies a minority revolution, but goes on to argue against such a straight-​ forward reading; Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:236 ff. See also, CSF, MECW, 10:104, 127. See also JQ, MECW, 3:156. 30. “Address of the Central Authority to the League,” MECW, 10:283–​284. 31. Manifesto, MECW, 6:504. 32. Harrington, Socialism, 62. 33. Lichtheim, Marxism, 58. 34. Eighteenth Brumaire, MECW, 11:124. See also, Engels, Revolution and Counter-​Revolution in Germany, MECW, 11:32–​33. See also G. Dorrien, Social Democracy in the Making: Political and Religious Roots of European Socialism (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2019), 163. 35. CSF, MECW, 10:56. 36. Preface to CPE, MECW, 29:263. 37. Lange, “Basic Problems of Socialist Construction,” 48–​49. H. Marcuse argues that “the continued strength of reformism among the proletariat

Notes to pages 70–72  175 in the advanced capitalist countries called almost inevitably for a shift in Marxist emphasis to the backward countries, which were predominantly agricultural and where the weakness of the capitalist sector seemed to offer better chances for revolution. True, the notion that the capitalist chain must be broken at its ‘weakest link’—​a notion stressed by Stalin after the revolution—​was originally Trotsky’s rather than Lenin’s, but the whole trend of Leninist thought from the beginning is in this direction.” See Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (New York: Vintage, 1961), 15. See also, Elliott, “Quis Custodiet Sacra,” 83–​84. 38. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 2:50–​51. 39. R. Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution, in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. M-​ A. Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), 379. 40. Mises, Socialism, 502. 41. Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution, 391. Lukács argues that minority rule requires deception; Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 66. He makes this case against the bourgeoisie, but, whether he would admit it or not, it would also be true for the Bolsheviks. 42. Berlin, Karl Marx, 187. See also, Ellman, Socialist Planning, 11–​12. 43. “Letter to Otechestvenniye Zapiski,” MECW, 24, 199; see also 200. 44. “Drafts of the Letter to Vera Zasulich,” MECW, 24:354. See also, “Letter to Vera Zasulich,” MECW, 24:370–​ 371. See also, Engels, “Refugee Literature: V. On Social Relations in Russia,” MECW, 24:44–​48. See also, Engels, “Afterward (1894) to ‘On Social Relations in Russia,’ ” MECW, 27:433. See also, Harrington, Socialism, 171–​173. Indeed, even Western capitalism, Marx writes, is “in a crisis which will only end in its elimination, in the return of modern societies to the ‘archaic’ type of communal property, a form in which, in the words of an American writer [L. H. Morgan] quite free from any suspicion of revolutionary tendencies and subsidized in his work by the Washington government, ‘the new system’ toward which modern society tends ‘will be A REVIVAL IN A SUPERIOR FORM of an archaic social type.’ ” “Drafts of the Letter to Vera Zasulich,” MECW, 24:350. 45. “Preface to the Second Russian Edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party,” MECW, 24:426. For a detailed discussion of skipping stages in Russia, see Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 2:299–​324. See also T. Shanin, ed., Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and “the Peripheries of Capitalism” (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983). Marx was also influenced by Chernyshevskii on the matter of skipping stages in Russia; see Shanin, “Late Marx: Gods and Craftsmen,” in Late Marx and the

176  Notes to pages 72–76 Russian Road, 47. Also, “Nikolai Chernyshevskii: Selected Writings,” in Shanin, Late Marx and the Russian Road, 188. 46. Shanin, “Late Marx: Gods and Craftsmen,” 12. “Drafts of the Letter to Vera Zasulich,” MECW, 24:361–​362. 47. “Drafts of the Letter to Vera Zasulich,” MECW, 24:363, also 351. 48. “Drafts of the Letter to Vera Zasulich,” MECW, 24:351–​352. 49. “Drafts of the Letter to Vera Zasulich,” MECW, 24:368. See also, Shanin, “Late Marx: Gods and Craftsmen,” 16–​17. 50. Cole sounds like he might agree with this; see Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, 1:314–​315. Hunt correctly points out that Marx does not call for a vanguard party (Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:46, 90). But from that it does not follow that Marx’s remarks in 1843 do not bear some resemblance to such a party. 51. What is to be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement, in Selected Works, 1:207, 215–​219, also 143, 182, 190. Such a party, Lenin is clear, is not democratic; What is to be Done? 228–​231. 52. CHPLI, MECW, 3:187. Hunt argues at great length against the notion that either Marx or the Communist League supported anything like a vanguard party; see Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:161–​175. Fetscher, on the other hand, recognizes the similarity between Marx and Lenin here, but goes on to point out other significant differences between them; Fetscher, Marx and Marxism, 73, also 307–​308. 53. See also, Harrington, Socialism, 4. See also, Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 295, 322–​323. Also, Hudis, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, 213. 54. J. H. Kautsky, “Introduction,” The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, xviii. For a discussion of Russian backwardness, lack of democracy, and the difficulties it presented for proletarian revolution, see K. Kautsky, Terrorism and Communism: A Contribution to the Natural History of Revolution, trans. W. H. Kerridge (London: Routledge, 2011), ­chapter 8. 55. K. Kautsky, The Labour Revolution, trans. H. J. Stenning (Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2011), 38–​40.

Chapter 4 1. See Moore, Three Tactics, 37 ff. 2. Preface to CPE, MECW, 29:262–​263. 3. GI, MECW, 5:236. 4. For an extended discussion of Marx’s historical materialism, see my MME&H, esp. 34–​57.

Notes to pages 77–79  177 5. Preface to CPE, MECW, 29:263. For a detailed explanation and defense of Marx’s views on these matters in the Preface to CPE, see G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 134–​180, 326–​340. 6. Preface to CPE, MECW, 29:263. See also, GI, MECW, 5:355. For a detailed discussion of this matter, as well as its relation to the Soviet Union, see G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 389–​395. On the other hand, Cohen’s discussion does not demonstrate an awareness that Marx, certainly in 1843–​1844, was committed to a minority revolution model at odds with the historical materialism and the majority revolution model he began to develop in the German Ideology of 1845. 7. Given these principles set out in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, Cohen is correct to point out that if they “are taken to be true of each society separately,” then Marx’s speculation, discussed in Chapter 3, that it might be possible to move directly from the Russian mir to communism while skipping over capitalism, would simply be “heresy.” Only if these principles were understood globally, might it be argued that “the proletariat was sufficiently developed across Europe as a whole for new, higher relations to count as having matured, in a global sense, within that region.” Nevertheless, this would still be incompatible with Marx’s principles in that there would still have been “enormous scope for further development under capitalism in Europe when Marx wrote his remarks.” See G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 393–​394. Also see the discussion of the Russian Revolution in Chapter 3. 8. Manifesto, MECW, 6:519. This presents even further problems for the minority revolution model. Historical materialism holds that consciousness grows out of material conditions (e.g., GI, MECW, 5:35 ff. Also, Preface to CPE, MECW, 29:263). If that is so, then it becomes difficult to explain how a minority proletariat in an undeveloped capitalist society could even develop a serious and realistic plan for a socialist revolution. 9. GI, MECW, 5:48. See also, Manifesto, MECW, 6:495–​496. 10. GI, MECW, 5:52. See also Moore, Three Tactics, 43 ff. 11. Manifesto, MECW, 6:489–​490. See also, Engels, Anti-​Dühring, MECW, 25:254–​270. Also, Engels, “Karl Marx,” MECW, 24:192–​193. 12. Manifesto, MECW, 6:490. 13. Manifesto, MECW, 6:492–​493. 14. Manifesto, MECW, 6:495. See also, Engels, “Refugee Literature: V. On Social Relations in Russia,” MECW, 24:39–​40. 15. Manifesto, MECW, 6:504.

178  Notes to pages 79–82 16. Berman suggests that Lenin developed a strategy based on the primacy of politics rather than economics. See S. Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 66. This would also characterize Marx’s theory of minority revolution as described in Chapter 3. 17. Marcuse sums up the necessary conditions for a proletarian revolution: “(1) A high level of technological and industrial productivity . . . . (2) The growth of productivity beyond the limits of private control . . . . (3) The growth of the political organization of the laboring classes, who, acting as a class-​conscious force, pursue their ‘real interest,’ not in, but against the capitalist system . . . . These quantitative changes gain momentum until, in the proletarian revolution, they explode the prevailing structure and replace it by a qualitatively different one.” See Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, 5. 18. Avineri argues that after 1850 Marx consistently opposed the type of party that Lenin would build; Avineri, S&PTKM, 257. 19. Manifesto, MECW, 6:497. 20. Manifesto, MECW, 6:497. 21. Manifesto, MECW, 6:497. 22. Manifesto, MECW, 6:498. See also, MME&H, 38–​40. 23. For a good comparison of a Leninist party to a party like that of the SPD, see Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 2:394–​395. 24. CSF, MECW, 10:135. 25. GI, MECW, 5:49 (brackets in the text). See also, M&E, 87–​88. 26. “Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith,” MECW, 6:101–​102. 27. For an earlier, lengthier, and much more complex treatment of these issues, see M&E, c­ hapter 3, sections II–​V. 28. GI, MECW, 5:195. See also, M&E, 105–​107. 29. GI, MECW, 5:60–​61, also 47, 290. See also The Holy Family, MECW, 4:36–​ 37. Avineri, too, notices the similarity between the CHPLI and the GI; Avineri, S&PTKM, 58 ff. The Erfurt Program of 1891 even suggests—​given the development of world trade and production for the world market—​ that the class interest of the proletariat of all capitalist countries worldwide comes to agree; see “Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Erfurt 1891,” in Miller and Potthoff, A History of Social German Democracy, 241. See also, M&E, 108–​111. 30. CHPLI, MECW, 3:182–​183, 186–​187.

Notes to pages 82–85  179 31. GI, MECW, 5:87. See also, M&E, 88, 107 ff. For a similar sort of argument in the context of modern social democracy, namely, that material conditions drive us toward Kantian moral principles, see T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 167–​168. 32. GI, MECW, 5:292. In 1873, in attacking the Bakuninists, Marx and Engels, without mentioning Kant, appeal to the Kantian principle of publicity, “There is only one means of combating all these intrigues, but it will prove astonishingly effective; this means is complete publicity. Exposure of all these schemings in their entirety will render them utterly powerless.” The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the International Working Men’s Association, MECW, 23:459. See Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 8:381–​382. See also M&E, 46–​48. 33. Marx on the Choice, 23 ff. 34. GI, MECW, 5:45. See also M&E, 90–​94. 35. For an earlier and lengthier treatment of these issues, see M&E, 87–​111. 36. See the discussion of minority revolution in Chapter 3. 37. Kolakowski raises an interesting issue; Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 2:22. Should socialists work to defend against all injustice, even for other classes, or focus on the proletariat’s interest and its advance toward socialism? If we think that the class interest of the proletariat drives it toward the universal, the categorical imperative, then we would hold that its class interest would be to achieve justice for all. On the other hand, no political movement can take up every injustice. Human beings are finite, even if they are driven to act in accord with a universal principle. 38. Manifesto, MECW, 6:495. 39. Manifesto, MECW, 6:504. 40. Manifesto, MECW, 6:519. 41. Preconditions of Socialism, 40–​41. 42. “Principles,” MECW, 6:350. Engels makes a similar point in 1891, but without suggesting the permanent revolution model; see “A Critique of the Draft Social-​Democratic Programme of 1891,” MECW, 27:226. 43. Moore, Three Tactics, 49. 44. See the discussion of the Paris Commune in Chapter 2. 45. CSF, MECW, 10:56–​57. 46. Engels seems to admit as much, “A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon . . . and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain,

180  Notes to pages 85–88 it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough.” “On Authority,” MECW, 23:425. 47. “Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association on the Franco-​Prussian War,” MECW, 22:269. 48. See the discussion of the Paris Commune in Chapter 2. Also, “Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann on 12 April 1871,” MECW, 44:131–​132. Also, on these matters, see Moore, Three Tactics, 49 ff. 49. “Principles,” MECW, 6:350; “The Chartists,” MECW, 11:335–​336; “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy,” MECW, 24:517; “Critique of the Draft Social-​Democratic Programme of 1891,” MECW, 27:226. In the “Notes on Bakunin’s Book,” Marx says revolution “is only possible . . . where alongside capitalist production the industrial proletariat accounts for at least a significant portion of the mass of the people. And for it to have any chance of victory, it must be able . . . at the very least to do as much directly for the peasants as the French bourgeoisie did in its revolution for the French peasantry at that time” (MECW, 24:518). That makes it sound like this sort of proletarian revolution would be what Marx in the CHPLI called a partial or political revolution, a revolution like the bourgeois revolution, in which a minority acting in its class interest can emancipate all because it acts in the interest of all—​at least for a time though not for very long; see MECW, 3:184. 50. CSF, MECW, 10:57. Indeed, Marx himself claims that the proportion of wage workers who participate directly in production of material objects declines relative to all wage workers; see Theories of Surplus Value, in Economic Manuscripts of 1861–​63, MECW, 31:112–​113, also 32:187–​ 188, 198. 51. See Moore, Three Tactics, 56 ff. 52. O. Lange, “Basic Problems of Socialist Construction,” 31–​33; see also “Political Economy of Socialism,” 13–​ 14 (both in Problems of the Political Economy of Socialism). See also, Engels, Anti-​Dühring, MECW, 25:256 ff.; Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:307 ff. Also, Engels, “Karl Marx,” MECW, 24:192. See also, Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 282–​283. Also see Moore, Three Tactics, 57 ff. See also H. Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, 2 vols. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977–​1978), 2:31. For a good argument against Lange, see Avineri, S&PTKM, 181–​182. 53. See Moore, Three Tactics, 56–​57.

Notes to pages 90–92  181

Chapter 5 1. In 1875, the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, the Eisenachers, the party of Liebknecht and Bebel, merged with the Lassallians, the General German Workers’ Association, to form the Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany. After the lapse of the anti-​socialist laws in 1890, it was renamed the Sozialdemokratishe Partei Deutschlands—​the SPD. After Lassalle’s death in 1864, both Liebknecht and Schweitzer had wanted Marx to stand as a candidate for president of Lassalle’s party. Marx eventually agreed but was not elected; see R. Morgan, The German Social Democrats and the First International 1864–​1872 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 46–​47. 2. Bernstein, The Preconditions of Socialism, 190. Schumpeter writes, “Evolution was for [Marx] the parent of socialism. He was much too strongly imbued with a sense of the inherent logic of things social to believe that revolution can replace any part of the work of evolution . . . . The Marxian revolution therefore differs entirely, in nature and in function, from the revolutions both of the bourgeois radical and of the socialist conspirator. It is essentially revolution in the fullness of time.” See Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 58. 3. See Chapter 3 of this text. Lidtke attributes a view like this to Liebknecht; see Lidtke, The Outlawed Party, 238–​239. 4. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 24. 5. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 26. 6. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 41. 7. Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, 47–​49. Also, Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, 3.1:249. 8. Hunt, German Social Democracy, 21. See also, S. Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2000), 72. 9. S. Tegel, “The SPD in Imperial Germany,” 16–​17. J. Vaizey, gives a chart listing the percentage of socialist and social democratic seats in the lower houses of European parliaments between 1920 and 1970; see Social Democracy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), 40. 10. G. Halm sees that Marx has both an evolution theory and a collapse theory of the transition from capitalism to socialism; see “Further Considerations on the Possibility of Adequate Calculation in a Socialist Community,” in Collectivist Economic Planning, 177–​178. 11. Mehring, Karl Marx, 336. It was even the case, Marx claims, that in 1871 the United States House of Representatives, “passed an act for the

182  Notes to pages 92–94 establishment of a Labour Statistics Office, and declared that this act was passed at the express desire of the International Working Men’s Association.” See Marx, “Declaration of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association Concerning Cochrane’s Speech in the House of Commons,” MECW, 23:145. 12. See Lichtheim, Marxism, 98. Also Moore, Three Tactics, 46. In France, universal male suffrage was first introduced in 1792, then again in 1848, but in both cases was short lived. Universal male suffrage was not introduced in Prussia until 1918. Lichtheim argues that the founding of the International in 1864 “quietly inaugurated the appearance on the scene of a new political force: the modern labour movement, committed to democratic socialism. Marx stood at the centre of these currents.” See Lichtheim, Marxism, 122. For a detailed discussion of the possibility of peaceful, electoral revolution, see Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 2:328–​362. 13. “Record of Marx’s Speech on the Political Action of the Working Class,” MECW, 22:617. It must be admitted that the Reichstag did not have much power; see, e.g., Engels, “A Critique of the Draft Social-​Democratic Programme of 1891,” MECW, 27:226. Also, Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism, 228. See also Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 2:343–​355. 14. “On the Hague Congress,” MECW, 23:255. See also, Engels, “A Critique of the Draft Social-​Democratic Programme of 1891,” MECW, 27:226–​227. Hunt points out that the Communist League, as early as 1847, thought it possible to avoid violent revolution in Britain and the United States; see Hunt, Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, 1:160. 15. “Account of an Interview with Karl Marx Published in the ‘World,’” Karl Marx Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1978), 1st Abteilung, Band 22.A:454 (also quoted in Avineri, KMP&R, 167). Fetscher seems to think that only Engels and the SPD, not Marx, turned toward social democracy; Fetscher, 216 ff. See also Rancière, The Intellectual and his People, 106. 16. Miller and Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy, 241. 17. ICSF, MECW, 27:514–​515. See also “Socialism in Germany,” MECW, 27:237 ff. 18. ICSF, MECW, 27:521–​522. See also, “Preamble to the Programme of the French Workers’ Party,” MECW, 24:340. See also, “Engels to Paul LaFargue on 12 November 1892,” MECW, 50:29. It is sometimes argued that the SPD used parliamentarism only as an agitational weapon. Lidtke argues that the SPD’s action in the Saxon Diet completely demolishes this claim; Lidtke, The Outlawed Party, 228.

Notes to pages 94–96  183 19. Berlin, Karl Marx, 189. On peaceful transition to socialism, see also The Transition from Capitalism: Marxist Perspectives, ed. S. Rahnema (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 9–​12. 20. Przeworski, “How Many Ways Can Be Third?” 322. 21. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 26, 103–​104. 22. Engels, “A Working Men’s Party,” MECW, 24:405; Marx, “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy,” MECW, 24:517. See also, “Principles,” MECW, 6:350. 23. “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy,” MECW, 24:518. See also, CSF, MECW, 10:56–​57. 24. Theories of Surplus Value, in Economic Manuscripts of 1861–​63, MECW, 31:112–​113; also 32:187–​188, 198. 25. Miller and Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy, 8. See also D. Bell, The Coming of Post-​Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 124. See also, Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 106. Combined agricultural and industrial wage workers in Germany declined from 56.8 percent in 1895 to 45.1 percent in 1925; whereas, the middle class increased from 4.4 percent of all gainfully employed in 1895 to 11.4 percent in 1925; see Hunt, German Social Democracy, 132–​133. 26. “Principles,” MECW, 6:341. Also, “Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith,” MECW, 6:99. 27. Manifesto, MECW, 6:482n. 28. See Lichtheim, Marxism, 384–​385. This is to say, for Marx, that relationship to the means of production will tell us more about a group’s class interest and thus their behavior than will income or status level. See also, Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 338. See also, Rahnema, The Transition from Capitalism, 163 ff. 29. See, e.g., Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 57. Also P. Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 338. Also Rahnema, The Transition from Capitalism, 163 ff. Also Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Class, 117. See also, H. A. Winkler, “Eduard Bernstein as Critic of Weimar Social Democracy,” in Bernstein to Brandt, 171. 30. See Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 107. Also Hunt, German Social Democracy, 134–​135. Crosland points out that trade union leaders are generally working class by lineage, middle class by income or occupational status, and upper class in terms of power. Furthermore, “The worker knows that even though his income, occupational status, way of life, and whatever else, may be lower than those of his employer, yet ultimately his

184  Notes to pages 96–98 political power is greater; and the employer feels the same.” See Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 114–​115. 31. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 2:134–​135. 32. “Principles,” MECW, 6:356. See also, Manifesto, MECW, 6:518–​519. 33. CSF, MECW, 10:57. See also, “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy,” MECW, 24:517. See also, Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism, 56. 34. CSF, MECW, 10:97. 35. First Draft of the CWF, MECW, 22:492. See also, “Letter to August Bebel on 18–​28 March 1875,” MECW, 24:68. See also, “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:89. 36. “Social Classes—​Necessary and Superfluous,” MECW, 24:416. 37. ICSF, MECW, 27:521–​522. Lange argues that “the peasantry, the petty-​ bourgeoisie and, under certain conditions, a section of the bourgeoisie as well—​namely, that section which finds itself in conflict with big monopoly capital—​may be, and as a rule are, the allies of the working class.” See Lange, “Basic Problems of Socialist Construction,” 36. 38. Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism, 275. See also, The Three Worlds of Social Democracy: A Global View, ed. I. Schmidt (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 6 ff. Berger points out that some members of the SPD demanded the party stop idealizing the industrial proletariat and accept as equal members of the community those who work with hands and brains; Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Class, 117. See also, Hunt, German Social Democracy, 133–​135. 39. A. H. Thomas, “Social Democracy in Scandinavia: Can Dominance be Regained?” in The Future of Social Democracy: Problems and Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe, ed. W. E. Paterson and A. W. Thomas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 198. 40. Przeworski, “How Many Ways Can Be Third?” 317. 41. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 102; see also 105. For a good discussion of the voting problems that social democratic parties face, see ­chapters 2 and 3 of Capitalism and Social Democracy. 42. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 129. See also, Bell, 148–​151. Honneth thinks socialists should not try to represent the interests merely of one “narrow segment of the diverse number of justified experiences of heteronomy and social exclusion.” Honneth, The Idea of Socialism, 72, see also 71, 73, 96–​99. 43. For example, see CSF, MECW, 10:48 ff., 116 ff. 44. For a discussion of this issue, see M. Adler, “Metamorphosis of the Working Class,” in Austro-​Marxism, 224 ff.

Notes to pages 98–105  185 45. “Marx and Engels to August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Wilhelm Bracke and Others (Circular Letter) on 17–​18 September 1879,” MECW, 45:408. See also, “Resolutions of the General Congress Held at the Hague,” MECW, 23:246. 46. “Engels to Wilhelm Liebknecht on 24 November 1894,” MECW, 50:375. 47. See ­chapter 3, section I and c­ hapter 4, section II of German Ideology. 48. Berman, The Primacy of Politics, 15. 49. Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 23, 33, 77–​79. Also see, A. W. Wood, “The Marxian Critique of Justice,” in Marx, Justice and History: A Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader, ed. M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 30. 50. See M&E, c­ hapters 3–​5. 51. A. W. Wood, Karl Marx, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1981), 133, 140. 52. Wood, Karl Marx, 149. 53. Capital, III, MECW, 37:337. G. G. Brenkert, “Freedom and Private Property in Marx,” in Marx, Justice and History, 89. See also, Wood, “Marxian Critique of Justice,” 13, also 3–​4. Also see Wood, Karl Marx, 134. 54. Wood, Karl Marx, 140. 55. Wood, “Marxian Critique of Justice,” 29. 56. Manifesto, MECW, 6:503. 57. Shoikhedbrod makes a similar argument; see Shoikhedbrod, Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism, 41–​44. Furthermore, Engels sets forth quite explicitly the view I am outlining; see Anti-​Dühring, MECW, 25:86–​ 87, 138. 58. CWF, MECW, 22:335. 59. GI, MECW, 5:323. 60. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:390–​391. 61. GI, MECW, 5:60–​61, also 47, 290. See also the Holy Family, MECW, 4:36–​37. 62. GI, MECW, 5:293. 63. Mehring, Karl Marx, 336. In the “Inaugural Address of the Working Men’s International Association” of 1864, Marx writes that the working class should “vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals” (MECW, 20:13). In a letter to Engels, he says that he was obliged by others to insert this passage in the text; see “Marx to Engels on 4 November 1864,” MECW, 42:18. But then Marx includes the same passage in the Civil War in France, MECW, 22:1. 64. GI, MECW, 5:49 (brackets in the text). 65. G. A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 34, see also 37–​38.

186  Notes to pages 106–111 66. Only a brief and sketchy discussion of this method is found in Wood, Karl Marx, 224–​226. 67. MME&H, c­ hapters 2–​3. M&E, c­ hapters 4–​5. 68. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:23, 26, 37–​38. 69. GI, MECW, 5:36–​37, 53–​54. 70. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:37–​38, 40–​45. 71. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:37–​38. 72. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:44. T. McCarthy characterizes Habermas’s understanding of Marx as follows: Marx’s “empirical analyses incorporate in an essential way the institutional framework, the structure of symbolic interaction and the role of cultural tradition. To this dimension belong the configurations of consciousness that Marx calls ideology, as well as their reflective critique—​the formation of class consciousness and its expression in revolutionary practice. His theory is essentially a ‘critical’ theory.” But there is an unresolved tension between this critical theory of social inquiry and the reductivism of Marx’s categorical framework, in which human practice is reduced to and incorporated within material production. See J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), xix–​xx. As Marx puts it in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, “The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (See MECW, 29:263). This interpretation of Marx, however, demonstrates no awareness of the Introduction to the Grundrisse, where the historical materialist method that Marx lays out rejects such crude determinism and reductionism in understanding the relationship of material production to consciousness. For an extended discussion of this method, see my MME&H, ­chapters 2–​3. M&E, c­ hapters 3–​ 4. Also, “Marx, Justice, and the Dialectic Method,” Journal of the History of Philosophy XXIV (1986): 523–​546. 73. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:40–​41. 74. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:39–​44. 75. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:46–​47. 76. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:47. 77. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:42. 78. Capital, III, MECW, 37:804. For detailed discussion of this matter see, G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 396–​408. 79. Capital, I, MECW, 35:85. 80. Capital, I, MECW, 35:321. 81. “Marx to Engels on 2 April 1858,” MECW, 40:303.

Notes to pages 111–113  187 82. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:179–​180. 83. Wood, “Marxian Critique of Justice,” 22 (brackets in the text). 84. Buchanan holds a view very close to this; see Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 53–​54. See also, G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 397 ff. 85. Capital, III, MECW, 37:47. 86. Capital, I, MECW, 35:539–​540. 87. Grundrisse, MECW, 28:392; see also 386. 88. “Marginal Notes on Adolf Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischen Oekonomie,” MECW, 24:535. The Grundrisse speaks of “theft of alien labour time, which is the basis of present wealth.” Grundrisse, MECW, 29:91. 89. See M&E, 137–​138. Wood, Karl Marx, 138 ff; also “Marxian Critique of Justice,” 19 ff. 90. Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 53–​54 seems to see this point. Habermas also makes a similar point in his own more sophisticated way; see J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. J. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 97–​104; also see J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 60. 91. GI, MECW, 5:293. 92. We should also mention Althusser here. He wants to separate Marx’s thought into two distinct periods marked by an epistemological break, an early ethical, humanist, ideological period and a later mature, scientific period. Althusser wants to reject the earlier and affirm the latter. This break or rupture or coupure epistémologique comes in the German Ideology. The works between the German Ideology (1845) and volume I of Capital (1867) he calls transitional works. See L. Althusser, For Marx, 10–​14, 33–​35, 185–​189, 198–​199, 221–​223, 244, 249. Also, Reading Capital, 13, 296–​309, 326–​328. Also, Essays in Self-​Criticism, 153–​155, 195–​207. For a lengthier discussion of these matters, see MME&H, 4–​8. In Althusser’s view, the writings of Marx’s early period “were exhumed by the Social-​Democrats and exploited by them to the detriment of Marxism-​Leninism.” That is, they maintained the importance of Marx’s humanism. For Marx, 51–​52; see also 155–​156. Also Reading Capital, 290. Also, Essays in Self-​Criticism, 83. I agree with Althusser in that I think there are shifts in Marx’s thought, but I do not think they amount to a radical rupture such that Marx abandons humanism for science. What Althusser misses, or struggles to deny (Reading Capital, 290–​291, 345–​347), is that, for Marx, capitalism appears as a set of abstract, impersonal, structural relations because of fetishism or alienation. It is fetishism that hides the fact that they are human relations. Science, it is true, must begin with these abstract, non-​human relationships. It must, as

188  Notes to page 113 the Introduction to the Grundrisse tells us, connect them into an abstract structure, a paradigm, that will allow us to understand a modern capitalist economy. But the whole point is ultimately to get beyond this structure. Science, Marx tells us, first confronts a “social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products” (Capital, I, MECW, 35:85). Science seeks an essence behind appearance; Capital, III, MECW, 37:804. The whole point is to overcome fetishism so as to return to simple, clear, intelligible, social, human, and personal relationships (Capital, I, MECW, 35:86–​92). Althusser explicitly rejects this interpretation as bourgeois idealism; see Essays in Self-​Criticism, 51–​52. For a lengthier discussion of these matters, see MME&H, 118 ff. For a similar argument against Althusser’s interpretation of Marx as an anti-​ humanist, see A. Schmidt, History and Structure: An Essay on Hegelian-​ Marxist and Structuralist Theories of History, trans. J. Herf (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 61–​62. Also A. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, trans. B. Fowkes (London: NLB, 1971), 69, 134–​144. Balibar, a student of Althusser, seems to be distancing himself from Althusser and moving closer to the view that Schmidt and I hold; see Reading Capital, 377–​378. Also, É. Balibar, Citizen Subject: Foundations for Philosophical Anthropology, trans. S. Miller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 191, 201, 299–​302. Also, É. Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, trans. C. Turner (London: Verso, 1995), 56–​62. We see a much more forceful version of such distancing in another of Althusser’s students, J. Rancière, Althusser’s Lesson, trans. E. Battista (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), passim, but esp. 77–​110. Badiou (another Althusser student), thinks that, instead of a single break in which Marx abandons humanism for science, there are three different Marxes. The first is a dialectical Hegelian philosopher of history. The second, especially in Capital, is a Ricardian analytic scientist of society. The third is a revolutionary politician. In Badiou’s view, none of these are abandoned; rather all three interact in a complex and creative manner. The third Marx, “the founder of the International . . . used the two other Marxes . . . to create a tool for revolution, something that could actively contribute to the overthrow of the established order.” See A. Badiou and P. Engelmann, Philosophy and the Idea of Communism, trans. S. Spitzer (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015), 30–​31, see also 27–​29. 93. For an extended argument that these principles are principles of justice, and that communist society does not reject justice, though it transcends it, see M&E, c­ hapter 5. Similarly, Shoikhedbrod argues that rights in communist society will be aufhebung, superseded rather than annihilated; see

Notes to pages 113–115  189 Shoikhedbrod, 12, 76–​84, 87, 119–​120. Buchanan also argues that prescriptive principles of distributive justice are necessary to establish rights to scarce goods, but they would disappear with the elimination of scarcity characteristic of stage two of communist society; Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 23, 57. But scarcity can take different forms. There would always be a tradeoff in communist society between the necessary determination of working time to produce enough to make possible “to each according to need,” on the one hand, while, on the other, allowing for leisure time—​free time for development in the arts and sciences (Grundrisse, MECW, 29:91, 93). Such issues would have to be democratically decided, and one could certainly imagine a calculation that would cause some groups to think they were allotted either not enough leisure time, too much labor time, or that they had not received “according to their needs.” Such groups would thus have a right to say they were not being treated justly—​that the principle “to each according to need” was not being applied to them fairly. Also, Shoikhedbrod argues that there will still be conflicts between individuals to deal with in communist society; see Shoikhedbrod, Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism, 121–​122. 94. Capital, III, MECW, 37:382. 95. Capital, III, MECW, 37:385–​386. 96. Capital, III, MECW, 37:434. 97. Capital, III, MECW, 37:434. See also, Marx, “The Nationalization of the Land,” MECW, 23:131–​132. See Avineri, S&PTKM, 177 ff., for a valuable commentary on these passages from the third volume of Capital. In certain respects, Schumpeter’s views on capitalism transforming itself into socialism resemble those of Marx; see esp. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 134, 219. 98. Capital, III, MECW, 37:439; see also 806. As early as 1850, Marx says that the national ateliers of France, “English workhouses in the open,” bad as they were, “were the first realization of socialism” (CSF, MECW, 10:63). Marx also holds (in the Preface to CPE, MECW, 29:263) that all new social formations develop within and out of the old society. 99. CWF, MECW, 22:335. A. G. Meyer points out that many women in the SPD during the First World War, “finally regarded the wartime measures taken by the government in imposing controls over resources as a token of the growth of socialism within capitalist society, and they welcomed the opportunity to train themselves in public work through this process.” See “The Social Democratic Women’s Movement in Germany, 1914–​1918,” in Bernstein to Brandt, 87.

190  Notes to pages 115–120 100. Capital, III, MECW, 37:435. 101. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:317–​318. See also, Anti-​ Dühring, MECW, 25:264–​265. See also Engels’ addition to Capital, III, MECW, 37:435–​436. See also, Engels, “Social Classes—​Necessary and Superfluous,” MECW, 24:416–​417. 102. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:318. 103. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:319. See also, Anti-​Dühring, MECW, 25:266. See also, Moore, Three Tactics, 80–​82. Mattick argues that “the idea that it was possible to transform capitalism into some kind of ‘socialism’ gradually, by way of reforms” arose from Fabianism and Marxian Revisionism and that this was “counter to Marx’s revolutionary expectations.” See Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 131. In my view, the idea is there to be found in Marx and Engels themselves. 104. Lange, “Political Economy of Socialism,” 13. 105. Avineri, S&PTKM, 181–​182. 106. Hilferding, Finance Capital, 234. 107. Hilferding, Finance Capital, 9. Bottomore also argues that for Hilferding, as well as for other Austro-​Marxists like K. Renner and O. Bauer, a peaceful transition to socialism is possible; see the Introduction to Austro-​Marxism, 25. 108. Hilferding, Finance Capital, 367. Cole attributes a view of this sort to the Fabians; Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, 3.2:963 ff. See also, K. Kautsky, The Labour Revolution, 117–​119. See also, Moore, Three Tactics, 65–​78. See also, Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 94, 99. 109. Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 283. See also, Hudis, Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, 177. For an opposing view, see Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism, 371–​375. Marx himself, as early as the Preface to CPE in 1859, wrote, “No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions of their existence have matured within the framework of the old society” (my italics). See MECW, 29:263. 110. Like Hilferding, Engels thought that the development of trusts of “colossal” size would force society into “openly and directly taking possession of the productive forces which have outgrown all control except that of society as a whole” (Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:317–​319). For a discussion of problems involved with this approach, see F. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism: 1933–​44 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 15–​17, 321–​322.

Notes to page 120  191 Crouch points out that: “Large corporations have frequently outgrown the governance capacity of individual nation states. If they do not like the regulatory or fiscal regime in one country, they threaten to move to another, and increasingly states compete in their willingness to offer them favourable conditions, as they need the investment. Democracy has simply not kept pace with capitalism’s rush to the global. The best it can manage are certain international groupings of states, but even the most important by far of these, the European Union, is a clumsy pygmy in relation to the agile corporate giants.” See Crouch, Post-​Democracy, 29. Also, Crouch, Post-​Democracy After the Crises, 7, 25–​26, 38–​39. On the other hand, a less pessimistic response might be that the increasing size and power of corporations puts increasing pressure on society to develop the capacity and the will to “openly and directly tak[e]‌possession” of these corporations as a response to the fact that they have “outgrown all control except that of society as a whole.” In this regard, see also Crouch’s discussion of the 2008 financial crises and possible responses to it; Post-​ Democracy After the Crises, 41–​56, 60–​63. 111. As Kautsky puts it, “Since we know nothing about the decisive battles of the social war, we can, of course, say just as little whether they will be bloody, whether physical force will play a significant role in them, or whether they will be fought exclusively with the means of economic, legislative, and moral pressure. But one can surely say that, in all likelihood, in the proletariat’s revolutionary struggles, the latter kind of means will predominate over those of the physical sort, that is, military force.” See K. Kautsky, The Road to Power, xlviii, also 34–​36. 112. “Record of Marx’s Speech on the Political Action of the Working Class,” MECW, 22:618. In 1884, Engels writes: “No party, unless it was lying, has ever denied the right to armed revolution in certain circumstances . . . . The military position being what it now is, we shall not go into action so long as we have a military power against us. We can bide our time until that military power ceases to be a power against us. Any revolution prior to that, even a victorious one, would bring to power, not ourselves, but the most radical elements of the bourgeoisie and/​or petty bourgeoisie.” See “Engels to August Bebel on 18 November 1884,” MECW, 47:223. See also, “Engels to Karl Kautsky on 1 April 1895,” MECW, 50:486. See also, Moore, Three Tactics, 83–​86. 113. For a good discussion of the difference between a social democratic party and a Leninist vanguard party, see Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, 2:394 ff.

192  Notes to pages 121–122 114. For a discussion of the extensive cultural and educational organizations developed by the SPD, see D. Geary, “Working-​Class Culture in Imperial Germany,” in Bernstein to Brandt, 11 ff. 115. Kautsky, quoting O. Bauer, writes: “As an example, I will quote the proposal which Otto Bauer made in his Weg zum Sozialismus: ‘Now who is to manage the socialized industry? The Government? Assuredly not. If the Government controls as many undertakings as possible, it would be too powerful as against the people and the popular assembly; such an augmentation of governmental power would be dangerous to democracy . . . . For this reason we have never advocated the nationalization of industry, but always its socialization. Then who is to manage the socialized industry, if it is not to be the Government? . . . To-​day, the big industrial concerns are controlled by a board of directors which is elected by the shareholders. In the future also every branch of socialized industry will be managed by a board of directors; but this administrative body will no longer be chosen by the capitalists, but by the representatives of those social sections whose needs the socialized industry is henceforth to satisfy. Now who has an interest in the management of the socialized industry? First of all the workers, the employees, and the officials who are engaged in this branch of industry; secondly, the consumers who need the products of this branch of industry; and thirdly, the State as the representative of the community. Consequently, the directorate of each socialized industry will be constituted somewhat in the manner following: a third of the members of the directorate will be elected by the trade unions of the workers and by the organizations of the employees employed in the branch of industry. Another third will be formed by the representatives of the consumers. For example, in the directorate of the mining industry there will be representatives of consumers partly selected by the organizations of consumers of domestic coal, and partly by the organizations of consumers of industrial coal. The last third of the members of the directorate will be constituted by the representatives of the State . . . . To a directorate constituted in this manner will be entrusted the supreme control of the branch of industry: the appointment of the managing officials, the fixing of the prices of commodities, the conclusion of collective labour agreements with the trade unions and the employees’ organizations, the disposal of the net profits, etc.’ ” See K. Kautsky, The Labour Revolution, 207–​208. 116. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, 2:286. 117. However, Miller and Potthoff dispute Marx’s criticisms of the merger; Miller and Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy, 28.

Notes to pages 122–131  193 118. 119. 120. 121. 122.

Mehring, Karl Marx, 502. “Engels to August Bebel on 14 November 1879,” MECW, 45:420. “Engels to Eduard Bernstein on 30 November 1881,” MECW, 46:152–​153. “Engels to August Bebel on 10–​11 May 1883,” MECW, 47:20–​21. “Engels to Conrad Schmidt on 12 April 1890,” MECW, 48:476–​477.

Chapter 6 1. T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 140. 2. Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Class, 231–​232. 3. Keating and McCrone, “The Crisis of Social Democracy,” 2–​4. 4. Rothstein and Steinmo, “Social Democracy in Crisis,” 88. 5. Moene and Wallerstein, “What’s Wrong with Social Democracy?” 220. 6. Moene and Wallerstein, “What’s Wrong with Social Democracy?” 231. 7. L. T. Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis, 12th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 92. See also, Berman, The Primacy of Politics, 184. 8. Moene and Wallerstein, “What’s Wrong with Social Democracy?” 219. 9. Moene and Wallerstein, “What’s Wrong with Social Democracy?” 219. 10. Przeworski argues that social democracy will not likely lead toward socialism; see Capitalism and Social Democracy, esp. 239. Also see, Przeworski, “How Many Ways Can Be Third?” 316–​318. 11. Przeworski, “How Many Ways Can Be Third?” 318–​ 319. See also, Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 146. Also Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 324–​25. 12. Harrington, Socialism, 362. 13. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 40; see also 38. 14. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 207. 15. See Berman, The Primacy of Politics, 180. 16. Mises, Socialism, 215–​216. 17. Hunt, German Social Democracy, vii. 18. T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 118. 19. T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 125. 20. T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 48–​51. 21. T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 51. 22. T. Meyer, The Theory of Social Democracy, 135. 23. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 29–​30. 24. The Landorganisationen (or LO).

194  Notes to pages 131–134 25. R. Meidner, with the assistance of A. Hedbord and G. Fond, Employee Investment Funds: An Approach to Collective Capital Formation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 14. 26. Meidner, Employee Investment Funds, 28. 27. Meidner, Employee Investment Funds, 47. For a discussion of alternative versions of this sort of profit-​sharing plan, especially the Danish one, see Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism, 448–​454. 28. Schweickart, After Capitalism, 192. For a lengthier treatment, see L. Lewin, Ideology and Strategy: A Century of Swedish Politics, trans. V. Kayfetz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 274–​304. For an excellent and detailed explanation of the Meidner plan, and an argument that the left ought to revive something like it, see J. Guinan, “Socializing Capital: Looking Back on the Meidner Plan,” International Journal of Public Policy 15 (2019): 1–​27. M. Quirico writes that even though the “distinctly Marxist phrasing” of the first draft “had been toned down, . . . the central ambition remained: to transform the property structure . . . . The purpose was . . . to break up the concentration of wealth, and to increase workers’ control on the economy.” See “Model or Utopia? The Meidner Plan and Sweden in Italy’s Political and Trade Unionist Debate (1975–​ 1984),” Scandinavian Journal of History 37 (2012): 647. 29. Meidner, Employee Investment Funds, 61, 51. 30. Guinan, “Socializing Capital,” 17 ff. See also, B. Silverman, “The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model: Interview with Rudolf Meidner,” Challenge 41 (1998). Also, L. Erixon, “The Rhen-​Meidner Model in Sweden: Its Rise, Challenges, and Survival,” Journal of Economic Issues 44 (2010): 677–​715. 31. The Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti. 32. For an excellent discussion of Meidner, his plan, and its failure, see R. Blackburn, “A Visionary Pragmatist,” Counterpunch December (2005). 33. Shoikhedbrod argues that during the transition to socialism there will be injustice: “Revolutions, irrespective of how democratic they may be in their aims, are unjust insofar as they violate the prevailing standard of right in a given mode of production.” This certainly does not characterize the Meidner Plan; see Shoikhedbrod, Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism, 76, also see 75. 34. Corneo, Is Capitalism Obselete? 263–​268. 35. Corneo, Is Capitalism Obselete? 268–​278. Guinan discusses several other versions of such plans; Guinan, “Socializing Capital,” 22–​23. 36. Even Weber admits that “the so-​ called ‘socialists of the lectern’ (Kathedersozialisten) . . . employed as a standard of judgment a mode of social reform oriented to social welfare, implying (in contrast to a

Notes to pages 134–138  195 moneyless economy) the continued existence of effective prices, rather than full socialization . . . . It is, of course, quite possible to consider this merely a half-​measure, but it is not in itself a nonsensical attitude.” Weber, Economy and Society, 1:105. So also, Mises admits that “As long as only a few undertakings are run by the State, prices for the means of production will be established in the market, and it is thus still possible for State undertakings to make calculations.” Socialism, 206, 215, 535–​536. 37. See Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 374. Also, Schweickart, Against Capitalism, 290n. Przeworski gives various reasons for why social democracy will most likely not move on to socialism; Capitalism and Social Democracy, 43–​46, 239 ff. 38. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 219. 39. Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 139. 40. Marx, Value, Price and Profit, MECW, 20:149. See also, “Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council. The Different Questions,” MECW, 20:191–​192. Also, Engels, “Trades Unions,” MECW, 24:387–​388. 41. Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, MECW, 24:317–​318. 42. J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: Signet, 1968), 44. 43. Galbraith, New Industrial State, 14. 44. Galbraith, New Industrial State, 361. As C. Cohen points out, planning can certainly work, as it did in the redevelopment of Western Europe after World War II, as it does regularly for the military, and as it did in getting humankind to the moon; Four Systems (New York: Random House, 1982), 59. 45. J. K. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 11–​12, also 21–​22. 46. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 20. 47. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 113. 48. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 143. For a Marxist discussion of Galbraith’s views, see Y. Pevsner, State-​Monopoly Capitalism and the Labour Theory of Value, trans. J. Sayer (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), 46–​62. Also see J. O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), esp. 15–​46. Also, Horvat, The Political Economy of Socialism, 11–​20. Habermas also discusses these matters at length, together with potentialities for crisis; see J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 33–​75. 49. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 161. 50. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 256 ff.

196  Notes to pages 138–140 51. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 222. Furthermore, as is often noted, the East Asian development “miracles” show the effectiveness of government intervention in capitalist economies; see e.g., Bardhan and Roemer, “Introduction,” to Market Socialism: The Current Debate, 9. Crosland argues that planning does not require state ownership. It can be quite effective with private ownership of the means of production; Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 316. Also see Elson, “Market Socialism of Socialization of the Market?” 1–​44, for a very good description of such planning. 52. L. Phillips and M. Rozworski, The People’s Republic of Walmart: How the World’s Biggest Corporations are Laying the Foundation for Socialism (London: Verso, 2019), 16, 20. On Walmart as a utopia, see F. Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 2010), 420–​425, 433. 53. Phillips and Rozworski, The People’s Republic of Walmart, 30–​31. 54. Phillips and Rozworski, The People’s Republic of Walmart, 112. See also P. Auerbach and P. Skott, “Capitalist Trends and Socialist Priorities,” Science & Society 57 (1993): 195–​200. For a detailed discussion of what planning might look like in socialist society, see P. Devine, Democracy and Economic Planning: The Political Economy of a Self-​Governing Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1988). See also Cockshott and Cottrell, Towards a New Socialism, ­chapters 4–​9. 55. See, e.g., Mises, Socialism, 118–​119, 206. 56. Although they seem to want to deny that it is planning, or that it is much like socialist planning, or that it is socialism; Hayek, “The Present State of the Debate,” in Collectivist Economic Planning, 218–​219. Mises, Socialism, 10. 57. To put it politely (indeed, over politely), leaving aside the calculation argument, Mises has little to say about Marx that is intelligent, and his understanding of Marx is shallow. This needs to be said because one does not find it said in the literature anywhere near often enough. 58. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 41. See also, Mises, Socialism, 488 ff. 59. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 99, see also194. 60. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 194. 61. It is the case, as we have seen, that Crouch argues that modern states have become post-​democracies. But he proposes responses to this erosion; see the Introduction, note 13. 62. Phillips and Rozworski, The People’s Republic of Walmart, 149–​150. Lavoie (Rivalry and Central Planning, 62–​63) argues that Mises and Hayek also make an epistemological claim, that is, that the central question of all social science is: “How can the combination of fragments of knowledge

Notes to pages 140–145  197 existing in different minds bring about results which, if they were to be brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge on the part of the directing mind which no single person can possess? . . . [S]‌ociety as a whole [is able] to engage in production processes that would be beyond our mental capacities were any of us to have to consciously plan them in their entirety . . . . Each participant can focus his or her limited mental powers on particular portions of a larger production process that is coordinated as a whole unconsciously through the price system . . . . [But no] ‘single man can ever master all the possibilities of production.’ ” Phillips, Rozworski, and Galbraith show that larger and larger capitalist corporations actually do carry out such planning. They do so without eliminating money, markets, or prices, but it follows that social democratic and even full socialist societies that retain money, markets, or prices could plan just as effectively. If they cannot, then capitalist corporations would have the very same problems. 63. Manifesto, MECW, 6:486. 64. Berger, Social Democracy and the Working Class, 82. 65. Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 128–​129. Also, Miller and Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy, 38 ff. 66. For example, J. Crump, “The Thin Red Line: Non-​Market Socialism in the Twentieth Century,” in Non-​Market Socialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. M. Rubel and J. Crump, 36. See also, Corneo, Is Capitalism Obsolete? 226 ff. Also, Ellman, Socialist Planning, 217, thinks Sweden is a capitalist society. 67. Eighteenth Brumaire, MECW, 11:130. 68. This suggests, as Crosland argues, that economic power would less and less be based on ownership; see Crosland, The Future of Socialism, 106. 69. “Gotha Program,” MECW, 24:87–​88. See also the First Draft of the CWF, MECW, 22:491. 70. Capital, I, MECW, 35:89. 71. See, for example, P. M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1942), 249. See also, Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, 3.2:942. See also, Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 43–​46, 239 ff. 72. CSF, MECW, 10:79. 73. For a good discussion of differences between social democratic parties, see H. Keman, Social Democracy: A Comparative Account of the Left-​Wing Party Family (London: Routledge, 2017), esp. c­ hapters 2 and 8.

198  Notes to pages 145–149 74. E. Mandel, “How to Make No Sense of Marx,” in Analyzing Marxism: New Essays on Analytical Marxism (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 15), ed. R. Ware and K. Nielsen (Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press, 1989), 130–​131. 75. GI, MECW, 5:48. See also, Manifesto, MECW, 6:495–​496. 76. “Programme of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Erfurt 1891,” in Miller and Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy, 240. 77. Theories of Surplus Value, in Economic Manuscripts of 1861–​63, MECW, 31:112–​113; see also 32:187–​188, 198. 78. Mattick argues that one must exclude a lot of data to conclude that in a few countries Marx was wrong about increasing misery; Mattick, Marx and Keynes, 336. Habermas argues, “the proletariat as proletariat, has been dissolved.” Judging by their objective role in the process of production, the mass of the population is proletarian, but they are no longer deprived and they have no revolutionary class consciousness; J. Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. J. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 196, see also 97, 202. 79. T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-​First Century, trans. A. Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), e.g., 7–​8, 20–​21, 471. Piketty does argue that this inequality did not increase during the period between the two world wars. 80. Nor, as we have seen, are social democratic societies doing as well as they were up to the 1970s; see the Introduction, note 13. 81. M. Lawson, A. P. Butt, R. Harvey, D. Sarosi, C. Coffey, K. Piaget, and J. Thekkudan, Time to Care: Unpaid and Underpaid Care Work and the Global Inequality Crisis (Oxford: OXFAM, 2020). (https://​oxfami​libr​ary. ope​nrep​osit​ory.com/​bitstr​eam/​han​dle/​10546/​620​928/​bp-​time-​to-​care-​ ine​qual​ity-​200​120-​en.pdf). 82. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 161. Habermas agrees that democratic struggle against capitalism can prevent such immiseration and that social democracy can progressively democratize society such that class conflict loses its revolutionary guise; Habermas, Theory and Practice, 232–​233. 83. I avoid speaking of “predictions.” I have argued elsewhere that Marx is unable, and realizes that he is unable, to make scientific predictions; see MME&H, 76–​81. 84. See also Bell, The Coming of Post-​Industrial Society, 40, 56–​63. 85. Manifesto, MECW, 6:489–​490, 493, 495–​496. 86. Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 94.

Notes to pages 150–152  199 87. Bernstein, Preconditions of Socialism, 99. Fletcher points out that all his life, Bernstein “steadfastly insisted that he was and remained a true disciple of Marx and Engels.” (Fletcher, “The Life and Work of Eduard Bernstein,” in Bernstein to Brandt, 45). I certainly would not claim otherwise. Bernstein has a serious reading of Marx and of social democratic revolution as compatible with Marx’s thought. 88. Harrington, Socialism, 238. See also, Neumann, Behemoth, 31. 89. See the Introduction, note 13.

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Index For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–​53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages. Adler, M., 158–​59n.40, 184n.44 AFL-​CIO, 98 Agenda 2010, 155–​56n.13 alienation in exchange, 16–​23, 25, 40, 159n.1 and exploitation, 20, 22, 23 and Hegel, 159n.1 market, 5, 11–​12, 16–​23, 42 political, 40–​43, 49–​52, 55–​56, 58, 69–​70, 77 in the process of production, 20, 21, 40, 55–​56 from the product, 20, 21–​23, 40, 55–​56 from the species, 18–​19, 20–​21, 40, 41, 55–​56 See also fetishism Althusser, L., 160n.6, 187–​88n.92 Amsterdam, 47–​48, 93 anarchism, 17, 55, 56, 168n.20 anti-​socialist law, 52–​53, 91–​92, 121–​ 22, 123, 181n.1 Aristotle, 4–​5, 41, 49–​50, 159n.41, 166n.1, 170n.39 army standing, 43, 44–​46, 53–​54, 85–​86, 167n.11 See also militia: citizen Arrow, K. J. and J. Hurwicz, 164n.57 Auerbach, P. and P. Skott, 196n.54 authoritarianism, 51, 56, 140, 179–​80n.46

Avineri, S., 117, 119, 162–​63n.35, 163n.44, 167n.13, 168n.22, 171n.53, 178n.18, 178n.29, 180n.52, 182n.15, 189n.97, 190n.105 Badiou, A., 167n.13, 187–​88n.92 Bakunin, M. A., 45, 56, 179n.32 See also Marx: “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy” Balibar, É., 187–​88n.92 Bardhan, P. K. and J. E. Roemer, 158n.29, 196n.51 Bauer, O., 173n.14, 190n.107, 192n.115 Bebel, A., 2, 5–​6, 47, 90, 92–​93, 98, 122–​23, 159n.41, 181n.1 Bell, D., 183n.25, 184n.42, 198n.84 Berger, S., 125, 141, 181n.8, 183n.29, 184n.38, 193n.2, 197n.64 Berlin, I., 71, 94, 171n.53, 175n.42, 183n.19 Berman, S., 101, 178n.16, 185n.48, 193n.7, 193n.15 Bernstein, E., 2, 5–​6, 7, 14–​15, 52, 84, 91, 98, 101, 121–​22, 123, 135, 149–​50, 158–​59n.40, 159n.41, 169n.37, 170n.49, 172n.57, 173n.7, 179n.41, 181n.2, 183n.25, 190n.108, 195n.39, 198–​99nn.86–​87 Bismarck, O. von, 43, 52, 85–​86, 91–​93, 124

220 Index Blackburn, R., 153n.3, 165n.64, 165–​ 66n.67, 194n.32 Blanqui, L. A., 63, 64 Bolsheviks, 2, 7, 71, 74, 175n.41 Bottomore, T., 118, 190n.107 bourgeoisie, 26–​27, 28–​29, 42, 48, 51–​52, 61, 64, 65–​66, 67–​68, 69, 78, 79–​80, 84, 86–​87, 96–​97, 98, 99–​101, 103, 110, 117, 124, 143, 145, 146–​47, 175n.41, 179–​ 80n.46, 180n.49, 184n.37 Braunthal, G., 155–​56n.13 Brenkert, G. G., 185n.53 Brus, W. and K. Laski, 161–​62n.28 Brus, W., 163n.51, 163n.52 Buchanan, A. E., 101–​2, 105–​6, 160n.6, 160n.15, 162n.30, 185n.49, 187n.84, 187n.90, 188–​89n.93 bureaucracy, 9–​10, 38, 53–​54, 137, 157–​58n.26, 168n.17 buying and selling, 8, 11–​12, 23–​25, 27, 32–​33, 130–​31 calculation economic, 26, 133–​34, 151, 164n.57, 165n.65 debate, 35–​39, 139, 165n.64, 196n.57 socialist, 9–​10, 34–​36, 38, 133–​ 34, 139–​40, 151, 165n.65, 194–​95n.36 Camera-​Rowe, P., 155–​56n.13 capitalism as highly developed, 65–​66, 67–​68, 69–​70, 73, 77, 78, 86, 88, 92, 95, 103, 106–​7, 108, 110, 116–​17, 137, 177n.7, 178n.17, 190n.109 laisses-​faire, 8, 147–​48 as neo-​liberalism, 147–​48, 152, 155–​56n.13 not unjust, 101–​3, 105, 111–​13 opposed to communism, 8–​9, 13, 103

as robbery, 111, 112–​13, 187n.88 socialization of, 8–​11, 70, 114–​17, 118–​20, 125, 133, 140, 142, 143–​44, 146–​47, 148, 149–​50, 192n.115 See also alienation; efficiency: capitalist Carnegie, Andrew, 100 cartels, 115, 118, 119–​20, 142, 143–​ 44, 147, 148–​50 categorical imperative and historical materialism, 80–​ 84, 99–​100 and proletarian class interest, 60, 61–​62, 81, 83–​84, 100, 119–​20, 179n.37 and proletarian revolution, 83–​84, 104 and social democracy, 99–​113, 179n.31 Chalmers, D. A., 154n.9 Chernyshevskii, N., 175–​76n.45 civil society, 40–​43, 44–​45, 46, 56, 59, 61 classes disappearance of, 27, 56 middle, 96–​97, 98–​99, 146, 147, 148, 183n.25, 183–​84n.30 struggle between, 46–​47, 53, 56, 66, 79–​80, 86–​87, 117, 146–​48, 198n.82 See also bourgeoisie; interest: class; proletariat Cockshott, W. P. and A. Cottrell, 154n.6, 154n.11, 161n.24, 164n.57, 170n.40, 196n.54 Cohen, C., 195n.44 Cohen, G. A., 76–​77, 105–6, 1​ 73nn.5–​ 7, 185n.65, 186n.78, 187n.84 Cole, G. D. H., 121, 153n.2, 174n.19, 176n.50, 181n.7, 190n.108, 192n.116, 197n.71 commodity, 36, 107, 108, 110–​11, 192n.115 exchange, 8, 16–​17, 32–​34, 35–​ 36, 112

Index  221 production, 17, 24, 32–​33 See also fetishism communism, 7–​9, 11–​12, 13, 14–​15, 23, 27–​28, 29–​30, 33–​34, 66–​67, 72, 73, 80–​81, 101–​2, 103, 105, 113, 130–​31, 153n.3, 153–​54n.4, 157–​58n.26, 177n.7 Communist League, 121–​22, 176n.52, 182n.14 Corneo, G., 37–​38, 133, 155–​56n.13, 164n.57, 165n.63, 165–​66n.67, 194nn.34–​35, 197n.66 credit, 27, 37–​38, 114, 162–​63n.35 Crosland, C. A. R., 37, 130, 157n.22, 160n.11, 165n.61, 172n.58, 183–​84n.30, 193n.11, 193n.23, 196n.51, 197n.68 Crouch, C., 155–​56n.13, 171–​72n.54, 190–​91n.110, 196n.61 Crump, J., 197n.66 Dante, 13, 158n.35 democracy battle of, 26–​27, 28–​29, 31, 46–​47, 52, 54–​55, 67–​68, 79, 84, 100–​1 bourgeois, 50, 54, 67, 144–​45 capitalist, 13, 143 as class rule, 57 as dictatorship of the proletariat, 49, 50, 86, 169–​70n.38, 170n.41 economic, 13, 55–​56, 134–​35, 141, 143–​44 electoral, 46–​49, 72–​73, 171–​72n.54 Jacobin, 68 and labor unions, 9, 13, 55–​56, 134–​35, 141, 143–​44 and majority revolution, 86, 88–​89 overcoming political alienation, 41, 49, 86 parliamentary, 2, 6–​7, 9, 94 post-​democracy, 155–​56n.13, 171–​72n.54, 196n.61

proletarian, 39, 49–​50, 57, 64–​65, 70, 71, 73–​74, 83–​85, 86, 88–​89, 134–​35, 140–​41, 146, 170n.41 radical, 1, 45–​46 socialist, 13, 39, 45, 46–​47, 50, 55–​ 56, 74, 140–​41, 143, 146, 151, 152, 153n.3 totalitarian, 64 in the workplace, 55–​56 democratic socialists, 28 See also social democracy development economic, 70, 71, 72, 73, 87–​88, 108, 119 of forces of production, 30, 69–​70, 77, 78–​79, 87 historical, 13–​14, 24–​25, 26–​27, 28–​29, 30–​31, 46, 51, 66–​67, 78–​79, 80, 108, 143–​44 individual, 20, 30, 82–​83 social, 26–​27 See also capitalism: as highly developed Devine, P., 196n.54 dictatorship, 49–​50, 63–​ 64, 65, 71, 86, 117, 169–​70n.38–​170nn.40–​41 See also democracy: as dictatorship of the proletariat; proletariat: dictatorship of distribution. See market: distribution domination by the bourgeoisie, 21, 41, 98–​ 99, 142 by market laws, 16–​17, 18–​19, 21–​ 22, 23–​24, 25, 32–​33, 34 by the proletariat, 81–​82, 104 by the state, 5, 40–​43, 50, 88–​89, 192n.115 See also alienation: political; political state: standing over and dominating civil society Dorrien, G., 174n.34

222 Index Draper, H., 170n.42, 174n.19, 180n.52 Edwards, S., 168n.20 efficiency capitalist, 37–​38, 139, 165n.65 of managers, 37–​38 of markets, 151, 164n.56 of planning, 138 of social democracy, 10–​11, 14–​ 15, 125, 130–​31, 139–​40, 151 socialist, 9–​10, 14–​15, 26, 34, 35–​ 39, 134, 139–​40, 165n.65 Eisenachers, 30–​31, 47, 90, 122, 169n.27, 181n.1 elections, 44–​45, 52–​53, 71, 72–​73, 90–​91, 94–​95, 97–​98, 100–​1, 120–​21, 123, 132, 155–​56n.13, 171–​72n.54, 192n.115 See also franchise; suffrage Elliott, C. F., 157n.17, 174–​75n.37 Ellman, M., 157n.24, 175n.42, 197n.66 Elson D., 164n.56, 196n.51 Engels, F. “A Working Men’s Party,” 169n.33, 183n.22 “Afterward (1894) to ‘On Social Relations in Russia,’” 175n.44 Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the International Working Men’s Association, 179n.32 Anti-​Dühring, 159n.4, 167n.13, 177n.11, 180n.52, 185n.57, 190n.101, 190n.103 “Anti-​Socialist Law in Germany,” 171n.51 as revisionist, 7 “British Agricultural Labourers Want to Participate in the Political Life of their Country,” 169n.32 “Critique of the Draft Social-​ Democratic Programme

of 1891,” 93, 169nn.29–​30, 170n.41, 179n.42, 180n.49, ​ 182nn.13–​14 “Demands of the Communist party in Germany,” 162–​63n.35 “Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith,” 169n.30, 178n.26, 183n.26 “Engels to August Bebel on 10–​11 May 1883,” 193n.121 “Engels to August Bebel on 14 November 1879,” 193n.119 “Engels to August Bebel on 18 November 1884,” 191n.112 “Engels to Conrad Schmidt on 12 April 1890,” 193n.122 “Engels to Eduard Bernstein on 30 November 1881,” 193n.120 “Engels to Karl Kautsky on 1 April 1895,” 191n.112 “Engels to Paul LaFargue on 12 November 1892,” 170–​71n.50, 182n.18 “Engels to Wilhelm Liebknecht on 24 November 1894,” 185n.46 “English Elections,” 169n.31 “Farewell Letter to the Readers of the Sozialdemokrat,” 169n.36 “Introduction [to Karl Marx’s The Civil War in France],” 168n.17, 169–​70n.38, 170n.42, 170n.43, 174n.19 “Introduction [to Karl Marx’s The Class Struggles in France],” 48, 166n.5, 169n.33–​169nn.35–​36, 182n.17, 182n.18, 184n.37 “Karl Marx,” 177n.11, 180n.52 “Letter to August Bebel on 18–​28 March 1875,” 169–​70n.38, 170n.44, 172n.59, 184n.35 “On Authority,” 158n.35, 170n.44, 172n.59, 179–​80n.46

Index  223 Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, 167n.13, 169n.30, 171n.51 “Principles of Communism,” 27, 28, 66, 84, 162–​63n.35, 163n.37, 163n.38, 163n.39, 169n.30, 170n.40, 172n.60, 174n.24, 174n.28, 179n.42, 180n.49, 183n.22, 183n.26, 184n.32 “Programme of the Blanquist Commune Refugees,” 63, 168n.19, ​174nn.17–​18 “Refugee Literature: V. On Social Relations in Russia,” 175n.44, 177n.14 Revolution and Counter-​ Revolution in Germany, 172n.60, 174n.34 “Social Classes—​Necessary and Superfluous,” 184n.36, 190n.101 “Socialism in Germany,” 182n.17 Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, 17, 115–​16, 159n.4, 161n.17, 173n.7, 180n.52, ​190nn.101–​ 2, 190n.103, 190–​91n.110, 195n.41 “Speeches in Elberfield,” 167n.10 “Trades Unions,” 169n.34, 195n.40 England, 1, 46–​48, 51–​52, 66–​85, 86–​87, 92–​93, 95, 105, 172n.57, 182n.14 Erfurt Program, 146–​47, 178n.29 Erixon, L., 194n.30 estrangement. See alienation Europe, 1, 2–​3, 6, 9, 11, 48–​49, 57, 66–​67, 72–​73, 95, 122, 134–​35, 158n.36, 165–​66n.67, 168n.20, 190–​91n.110 exchange. See alienation: in exchange; commodity: exchange; market: exchange exchange value, 16, 19–​20

exploitation, 20, 22–​23, 62, 112–​13, 116, 146–​47 See also alienation: and exploitation fetishism, 5, 16–​23, 24, 38, 40, 159n.1, 159–​60nn.5–​6, 163n.52, 187–​88n.92 elimination of, 23–​26, 31–​33, 34, 38–​39, 40, 42, 49, 50, 54, 55–​56, 58, 151, 161–​62n.28, 163n.54 See also alienation Fetscher, I., 3–​4, 154n.10, 170n.41, 176n.52, 182n.15 feudal society, 23–​24, 67–​68, 69, 78, 87–​88, 92, 106–​7, 108–​9, 117 Fletcher, R., 6, 157n.15, 159n.41, 199n.87 forces of production, 76, 77, 82–​ 83, 143–​44 contradict relations of production, 76–​77, 78–​79, 80–​81, 145, 149 fettered by relations of production, 76–​77, 78, 86, 92 See also relations of production France, 43, 45–​46, 51–​52, 54–​55, 66–​67, 69, 84–​85, 92–​93, 96–​97, 170–​71n.50, 171n.53, 180n.49, 182n.12 franchise, 41–​42, 71, 92–​93 reform of, 47 See also elections; suffrage Franco-​Prussian War, 43, 45–​46 Galbraith, J. K., 136–​38, 139–​40, 148–​49, 165n.61​, 195nn.42–49,​​​ 195–​96nn.50–​51, 196–​97n.62, 198n.82 Gay, P., 159n.41, 181nn.4–​7 Geary, D., 192n.114

224 Index Germany, 2, 30–​31, 43, 45–​46, 48–​49, 52–​53, 54–​55, 58–​59, 60, 63, 64, 66–​67, 70, 84–​85, 91–​92, 93, 94, 99–​100, 121–​22, 123, 124, 129, 145, 155–​56n.13, 167–​68n.14, 172n.57, 172n.60, 183n.25 Gotha Programme, 30–​31 Greek art, 109–​10 Guinan, J., 194n.28, 194n.30, 194n.35

Hudis, P., 154n.10, 173n.1, 176n.53, 190n.109 Hunley, J. D., 169n.28 Hunt, R. N., 45, 63, 64, 67, 93, 154n.5, 167n.11, 168n.15, 168n.18, 168n.21, 170n.42, 173n.16, 174nn.20–​21, 174n.26, 174n.27, 174n.29, 176n.50, 176n.52, 181n.8,​ 182–83nn.12–14,​183n.25, 183–​ 84n.30, 184n.38, 193n.17

Habermas, J., 186n.72, 187n.90, 198n.78, 198n.82 Halm, G., 181n.10 Harrington, M., 68, 127, 150–​51, 154n.10, 173n.1, 174n.32, 175n.44, 176n.53, 193n.12, 199n.88 Hayek, F. A., 2–​3, 4–​5, 9–​10, 26, 34–​35, 37, 38–​39, 75, 133–​34, 139–​40, 151, 153n.1, 154n.7, 159–​60n.5, 164n.55, 164n.57, 196n.56, 196nn.58–​60, 196–​97n.62 Heald, D., 54, 172n.55 Heilbroner, R. L., 35, 36–​37, 65, 157n.20, 157n.25, 164n.56, 164n.59, 174n.22 Hilferding, R., 118–​19, 161n.24–​ 190nn.106–​7, 190n.108, 190–​91n.110 historical materialism, 69–​70, 76–​77, 78, 80–​84, 92, 99–​100, 101–​2​, 104–​8, 113–​21, 144–​45, 149, 176n.4, 177n.6, 177n.8, 186n.72, 190n.109 Holland, 47–​48, 93 Honneth, A., 161–​62n.28, 166n.68, 184n.42 Horvat, B., 156n.14, 159–​60n.5, 165n.62, 165–​66n.67, 170n.40, 190n.109, 194n.27 Horwitz S., 164n.57

ideology, 2, 141, 153–​54n.4, 186n.72, 187–​88n.92 immiseration, 77–​78, 86, 146–​51, 198n.78, 198n.82 interest of bourgeoisie, 59–​60, 62, 128–​ 29, 140–​41 class, 59, 60, 61–​63, 81–​84, 90–​91, 97–​98, 99–​101, 103–​4, 180n.49, 183n.28 common, 62–​63, 79–​80, 81–​82, 98, 104, 120–​21, 128–​29, 180n.49, 184n.42 general, 59, 60, 99–​100, 120–​21 proletarian, 79–​80, 81, 82–​84, 90–​ 91, 97–​98, 99–​100​, 103–​4, 119–​ 21, 128–​29, 140–​41, 178n.17, 179n.37 See also categorical imperative: and proletarian class interest International Working Men’s Association, 47, 92–​93, 105, 122, 181–​82nn.11–​12, 187–​88n.92 Jameson, F., 196n.52 joint-​stock companies, 97, 114, 115–​ 16, 119–​20, 135 Junkers, 52, 124 justice, 10–​11, 14–​15, 101–​3, 185n.63, 188–​89n.93 in capitalism, 52, 101–​3, 105, 113, 152

Index  225 in communism, 188–​89n.93 distributive, 39, 140, 159–​60n.5, 188–​89n.93 as equality and freedom, 111–​ 12, 113 in socialism, 101–​2, 113, 140, 179n.37 in social democracy, 113, 125, 130–​31, 140, 152, 167–​68n.14, 194n.33 Kain, P. J. “Estrangement and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” 159n.1, 161n.19, 166n.1, 166n.5, 172n.60, 173n.14 “Hegel and the Failure of Civil Society,” 161n.19 Marx and Ethics, 81, 101–​2, 154–​55n.12, 157n.18, 160n.12, 173n.14, 173n.15, 178n.25,​ ​​​ 179nn.27–32, 179nn.34–​35, 185n.50, 186n.67, 186n.72, 187n.89, 188–​89n.93 Marx and Modern Political Theory, 154–​55n.12, 173n.14 “Marx, Justice, and the Dialectic Method,” 186n.72 Marx’ Method, Epistemology, and Humanism, 154–​55n.12, 157n.18, 161n.16, 176n.4, 178n.22, 186n.67, 186n.72, 187–​88n.92 Schiller, Hegel, and Marx, 154–​ 55n.12, 157n.18, 159n.1, 160n.12, 161n.19, 166n.1, 166n.5, 172n.60 Kant, I., 61, 81, 173nn.13–​14, 179n.31, 179n.32 Kautsky, K., 2, 5–​6, 7, 74, 75, 98, 121–​22, 153n.3, 156n.14, 158–​59n.40, 170n.41, 173n.14, 176n.54, 176n.55, 190n.108, 191n.111, 192n.115

Keating, M. and D. McCrone, 54–​55, 125, 155–​56n.13, 157n.20, 172n.56, 193n.3 Keman, H., 197n.73 Keynesianism, 128, 136–​37 Kolakowski, L., 7, 71, 96, 153–​54n.4, 157n.19, 160n.6, 175n.38, 178n.23, 179n.37, 184n.31, 191n.113 labor, 107, 108–​9, 110–​11, 113 agricultural, 108–​9 certificates, 24–​25, 28–​30, 31, 38, 67–​68, 161n.24 industrial, 107–​9 power, 95–​96, 100–​1, 112, 113, 143 time, 24–​25, 187n.88, 188–​89n.93 as source of wealth, 108–​9 unions, 9, 10–​11, 13, 55–​56, 78–​ 79, 90–​91, 94, 98, 119–​20, 129, 131–​32, 133–​35, 137–​39, 140–​ 41, 143–​44, 147–​49, 151, 155–​ 56n.13, 183–​84n.30, 192n.115 Lane, R. E., 161n.17 Lange, O., 32–​33, 36–​37, 70, 87, 88, 117, 119, 163n.51, 164nn.58–​ 59, 174–​75n.37, 180n.52, 184n.37, 190n.104 Lassalle, F., 30–​31 Lassallians, 30–​31, 47, 90, 122, 181n.1 Lavoie, D., 161n.24, 161–​62n.28, 165nn.64–​65, 196–​97n.62 Lawler, J., 162–​63n.35, 163n.40 Lawson, M., A. P. Butt, R. Harvey, D. Sarosi, C. Coffey, K. Piaget, and J. Thekkudan, 198n.81 leisure time, 188–​89n.93 Lenin, V. I., 2, 45, 49–​50, 71–​72, 73–​74, 79, 80, 117, 119, 150, 167–​68n.14, 169–​70n.38–​ 170nn.40–​41, 174–​75n.37, 176n.51, 176n.52, 178n.16, 178n.18, 178n.23, 187–​88n.92, 191n.113

226 Index Lewin, L., 194n.28 Lichtheim, G., 68, 97, 158n.33, 167n.13, 174n.33, 182n.12, 182n.13, 183n.28, 184n.33, 184n.38 Lidtke, V. L., 157n.16, 170–​71n.50, 172n.57, 181n.3, 182n.18 Liebknecht, W., 2, 5–​6, 47, 90, 92–​93, 98, 121–​23, 157n.16, 181n.1, 181n.3 London, 91–​92, 121–​22 Lukács, G., 20, 119, 160n.10, 173n.8, 174n.23, 175n.41, 180n.52, 190n.109 Luxemburg, R., 71, 175n.39, 175n.41 Makowski, L, and J. M. Ostroy, 165n.60 managers replace capitalist, 97, 113–​14, 118, 127–​28, 133, 140, 143–​44, 148 See also efficiency: of managers Mandel, E., 12, 145, 158n.34, 164n.59, 165n.62, 198n.74 Marcuse, H., 174–​75n.37, 178n.17 market competition, 35–​36 controlled, 5, 8–​9, 10–​12, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 28, 33–​34, 38–​39, 40, 42, 49, 50, 54, 55–​56, 58, 125–​26, 128–​29, 130, 131, 136–​ 37, 139–​40 coordinated, 129, 155–​56n.13 crises, 17–​18, 92, 145, 149–​50 distribution, 127, 130, 140, 143–​44 elimination of, 8, 23, 27, 28, 32, 37, 126–​27, 128–​29, 130, 133–​ 34, 139–​40, 151, 161–​62n.28, 164n.57, 196–​97n.62 exchange, 16–​17, 18, 20, 24–​ 25, 32–​34 for labor, 37–​38, 125–​26 forces, 18

free, 12, 35–​36, 128, 130–​31, 136 laws, 16–​17, 23–​24, 25, 32 prices, 33–​34, 35–​36, 37, 38, 39, 110–​11, 133–​34, 137–​38, 139–​40, 148–​49, 151, 154n.8, 164n.57, 165n.65, 192n.115, 194–​95n.36, 196–​97n.62 regulated, 9, 12, 118, 128–​29, 130–​31, 136–​37, 155–​56n.13, 163n.54 social democratic, 33, 39, 125, 126–​27, 128, 130–​31, 139 socialism, 9–​10, 11, 24–​25, 34, 35, 37, 38, 126, 127, 130–​31, 139, 157–​58n.26, 161–​62n.28 uncoordinated, 129, 155–​56n.13 unregulated, 8, 16–​17, 34, 55, 136–​37 See also fetishism marketize, 9–​10, 38–​39, 139 Marx, K. “Account of an Interview with Karl Marx Published in the ‘World,’” 182n.15 “Address of the Central Authority to the League,” 91, 163n.36, 172n.59, 174n.17, 174nn.29–​30 as social democrat, 4–​6, 11 Capital Ch1, 16–​17, 18, 23–​25, 30–​33, 161–​62n.28 Capital, I, 24, 105–​6, 108, 110–​11, 143–​44, 159n.1, 159nn.2–​3, 161n.19​​, 161nn.20–​23, 161n.25, 161–​62nn.26–​28, 162n.29, 163n.48, 163n.49, 163n.50–​ 110, 163nn.53–​54, 168n.21–​ 186nn.79–​80, 187n.86, 187–​88n.92, 197n.70 Capital, II, 161n.24 Capital, III, 29–​30, 92, 102, 110–​11, 113–​14, 115, 117, 127, 163n.43, 185n.53, 186n.78, 187n.85,

Index  227 187–​88n.92–​189nn.94–​98, 190n.100, 190n.101 “Chartists,” 169n.25, 180n.49 Civil War in France, 43, 56–​43, 166nn.5–​6–​167nn.8–​10, 167n.12, 168n.17, 171n.53, 172n.60, 174n.29, 185n.58, 185n.63, 189n.99, 197n.69 Class Struggles in France, 98, 169n.23, 169n.37, 170–​71n.50, 174n.35, 178n.24, 179n.45, 180n.50, 183n.23, 184nn.33–​35, 184n.43, 189n.98, 197n.72 “Comments on James Mill,” 18, 160n.7 Communist Manifesto, 24, 26–​27, 28–​31, 33, 42, 43, 44, 46–​47, 56, 57, 66, 67–​68, 73–​74, 78, 79, 84, 88, 91, 95, 103, 120–​21, 149–​50–​78, 162nn.31–​34, 163nn.36–​37, 163n.48, 166n.4, 169n.24, 174n.25, 174n.28, 174n.31, 177n.8, 177n.9–​79, 177nn.11–​15–​178nn.19–​22, 179nn.38–​40, 183n.27, 184n.32, 185n.56, 197n.63, 198n.75, 198n.85 Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, 166n.3 “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Introduction,” 58–​59, 64, 80–​81, 82, 99–​100, 120, 172n.60,​​ 173nn.3–​4, 173n.6, 173n.8, 173nn.9–​11, 173n.12, 176n.52, ​178nn.29–​30 Critique of Political Economy, 19, 69–​70, 76–​77, 78, 160n.9, 161n.19, 163n.49, 174n.36, 176n.2–​177nn.5–​8, 186n.72, 189n.98, 190n.109 “Declaration of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association

Concerning Cochrane’s Speech in the House of Commons,” 181–​82n.11 “Drafts of the Letter to Vera Zasulich,” 72–​73, 175n.44–​176nn.46–​49 early writings, 18, 23, 24–​25 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 21, 160n.6–​160nn.13–​14, 161n.16 Economic Manuscript of 1861–​ 63, 160n.9 Economic Manuscripts of 1857–​58, 160n.9, 163n.49 Eighteenth Brumaire, 168n.17, 172n.60, 174n.34, 197n.67 German Ideology, 19, 60, 76–​77, 78, 82, 83, 99–​100, 103–​4, 105–​7, 108, 119, 146, 159n.41, 160n.8, 161n.18, 162n.30, 176n.3, 177n.6, 177n.8,​ 177nn.9–​10, 178n.25,​ 178nn.28–​29, 178n.29–​ 179nn.31–​32, 179n.34, 185n.47, 185n.59, 185n.61, 185n.62, 185n.64, 186n.69, 187n.91, 187–​88n.92, 198n.75 “Gotha Program,” 24, 28–​31, 38, 67–​68, 122, 157n.23, 158n.31, 161n.24,​ 163nn.40–​42–​ 163nn.45–​47, 169n.37, 172n.60, 184n.35, 197n.69 Grundrisse, 103–​4, 105–​7, 108, 111, 185n.60, 186n.68–​108–​9, 186nn.70–​71, 186n.72–​ 112–​13, 186nn.73–​76, 186n.77, 187n.82, 187n.87, 187n.88–​187–​89nn.92–​93 Holy Family, 178n.29, 185n.61 “Inaugural Address of the Working Men’s International Association,” 185n.63

228 Index Marx, K. (cont.) “Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council. The Different Questions,” 195n.40 “Letter to Otechestvenniye Zapiski,” 175n.43 “Letter to Vera Zasulich,” 72–​73, 175n.44–​176nn.46–​49 “Marx and Engels to August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Wilhelm Bracke and Others (Circular Letter) on 17–​18 September 1879,” 185n.45 “Marx to Engels on 2 April 1858,” 186n.81 “Marx to Engels on 4 November 1864,” 185n.63 “Marx to Ferdinand Domela Neuwenhuis on 22 February 1881,” 167n.7 “Marx to Joseph Weydemeyer on 5 March 1852,” 169n.37 “Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann on 12 April 1871,” 168n.20, 170n.44, 180n.48 moral views of, 82–​83, 101–​ 5, 111–​13 “Moralising Criticism and Critical Morality,” 174n.25 “Nationalization of the Land,” 189n.97 “Notes on Adolf Wagner,” 112, 187n.88 “Notes on Bakunin’s Book Statehood and Anarchy,” ​ 172nn.59–​60, 180n.49, 183nn.22–​23, 184n.33 “On the Hague Congress,” 169n.29, 182n.14 “On the Jewish Question,” 160n.7, 166n.1, 166n.2, 174n.29 “Parliamentary Debate on the Anti-​Socialist Law,” 170n.45

“Preamble to the Programme of the French Workers’ Party,” 169n.33, 182n.18 “Preface to the 1872 German Edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party,” 43, 166n.5 “Preface to the Second Russian Edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party,” 175–​76n.45 “Record of Marx’s Speech on the Political Action of the Working Class,” 169n.28, 170–​71n.50, 182n.13, 191n.112 “Record of Marx’s Speech on the Seventh Anniversary of the International,” 170n.42 “Resolutions of the General Congress Held at the Hague,” 185n.45 “Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association on the Franco-​Prussian War,” 168n.18, 180n.47 Theories of Surplus Value, 95, 121–​22, 147, 180n.50, 183n.24, 198n.77 Value, Price, and Profit, 171n.52, 195n.40 Mattick, P., 154n.10, 173n.1, 176n.53,​ 183nn.28–​29, 190n.103, 198n.78 McCarthy, T., 186n.72 McLellan, D., 160n.6 means of production centralized, 26–​27, 42, 79, 163n.36 collectively owned, 7–​9, 25, 26, 27, 28–​29, 34–​35, 38–​39, 42–​43, 67–​68, 126–​27, 131, 132–​34, 135, 143–​44, 163n.54 commonly owned, 7–​9, 24, 25–​26, 31–​32, 33, 42–​43, 72, 126–​27, 133, 162–​63n.35

Index  229 controlled, 9, 25, 31, 55, 127–​28 nationalization of, 126–​29, 133–​ 34, 192n.115 privately owned, 8–​9, 10, 27, 35, 36, 38–​39, 42, 133, 140, 143–​44, 197n.68 publicly owned, 8–​9, 127 relationship to, 95, 183n.28 self-​managed, 10 socialized, 116–​17, 118, 140, 146 state owned, 7–​8, 9–​10, 26, 27, 38, 42–​43, 55, 116, 126–​27, 128–​29 See also public ownership: types of Mehring, F., 47, 122, 169n.26, 181–​ 82n.11, 185n.63, 193n.118 Meidner Plan, 5–​6, 9–​10, 14–​ 15, 127, 131–​35, 139–​40, 141, 143–​45, 150–​51–​132, 194nn.25–​30–​194nn.32–​33 method analytical, 106, 107–​8, 187–​88n.92 essence behind appearance, 110–​ 11, 112–​13, 187–​88n.92 historical, 106–​8 paradigm, 107–​8, 110–​11, 187–​88n.92 scientifically correct, 107–​8, 110–​ 11, 112–​13, 186n.72, 187–​88n.92 Meyer, A. G., 189n.99 Meyer, T., 10–​11, 125, 128–​29, 130, 155–​56n.13, 158n.30, 158n.37, 179n.31, 193n.1, ​193nn.18–​22 militia citizen, 44, 167n.11 Miller, S. and H. Potthoff, 95, 167–​ 68n.14, 169n.27, 182n.16, 183n.25, 192n.117, 197n.65 Mises, L. von., 9–​10, 26, 34–​37, 38–​39, 71, 75, 128–​29, 133–​34, 139–​40, 151, 153n.1, 164n.55, 164n.57, 165nn.61–​62, 165n.65, 175n.40, 193n.16, 194–​95n.36, ​ 196nn.55–​57, 196–​97n.62

mode of production and distribution, 24, 31, 115–​ 16, 143–​44 Moene, K. O. and M. Wallerstein, 126–​27, 157n.20, 193nn.5–​6, 193nn.8–​9 Mondragon, 10, 158n.27 money, 8, 18, 24–​25, 27, 28, 33, 35–​ 36, 107, 111, 139–​40, 161n.24, 162–​63n.35, 165n.65 elimination of, 28–​32, 37, 38–​39, 67–​68, 133–​34, 151, 154n.8, 164n.57, 165n.65, 194–​95n.36, 196–​97n.62 See also labor: certificates Moore, S., 20, 83, 85 Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism, 157–​58n.26, 160n.11, 163n.54, 179n.33 Marx versus Markets, 160n.6 Three Tactics, 173n.2, 173n.5, 176n.1, 177n.10, 179n.43, 180n.48, 180n.51, 180n.52, 180n.53, 182n.12, 190n.103, 190n.108, 191n.112 morality, 81, 83, 101–​5, 111–​13, 117, 185n.63 See also Marx: moral views of; revolution: moral justification of; revolution: philosophical-​ moral argument for Morgan, L. H., 175n.44 Morgan, R., 181n.1 National Guard. See militia: citizen needs, 13, 21, 37, 60, 61, 62, 65, 82–​83, 100, 103–​4, 119–​20, 125, 173n.8 to each according to, 8, 11–​12, 30, 33–​34, 113, 130–​31, 188–​89n.93 species, 61

230 Index neo-​liberalism. See capitalism: as neo-​liberalism Neumann, F., 190–​91n.110, 199n.88 Norway, 51–​52, 126, 136, 139–​40, 158n.36 Nove, A., 65–​66, 161n.24, 164n.56, 174n.23 O’Connor, J., 195n.48 Ollman, B., 161–​62n.28 Paris, 43, 44, 45–​46, 48–​49, 85–​86, 94 Paris Commune, 43–​47, 48–​49, 51, 55, 56, 85–​86, 96–​97, 179n.44, 179–​80n.46, 180n.48 as dictatorship of the proletariat, 50, 86, 94, 167n.13, 168n.18, 168n.20, 168nn.21–​22, 170n.42 parliament, 9, 13, 45, 47, 51, 53–​55, 90–​91, 93, 94, 120–​21, 123, 141, 170–​71n.50, 181n.9, 182n.18 See also democracy: parliamentary; representatives: parliamentary; revolution: parliamentary party bourgeois, 13–​14 communist, 73–​74, 120–​21 democratic, 2–​3, 13–​14, 96–​97 electoral, 80 labor, 9, 55–​56, 138–​39, 140–​41, 143–​44, 147–​49 political, 13 proletarian, 48, 80, 90–​91, 92, 98–​ 99, 120, 122, 123, 149–​50 social democratic, 13–​14, 86, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96–​99, 101, 119–​24, 125–​31, 138, 149–​50, 184n.41, 191n.113, 197n.73 socialist, 2–​3, 79, 80, 91–​92, 93, 96, 97, 124, 150 vanguard, 48–​49, 73–​74, 79, 80, 94, 176n.50, 176n.52, 178n.18, 178n.23, 191n.113

Volkspartei, 99, 120 working class, 79–​80, 96–​97, 98–​ 99, 122 See also SPD pauperization, 78, 147–​48 peasantry, 23–​24, 32–​33, 72–​73, 96–​ 97, 144–​45, 146, 184n.37 eliminated in England, 57, 86–​87, 95 majority, 4, 57, 84–​85, 180n.49 Perlman, F., 160n.6 petty bourgeoisie, 67, 70, 71–​72, 84–​ 85, 96–​97, 98–​99, 100–​1, 142, 144–​45, 146, 184n.37 Pevsner, Y., 195n.48 Phillips, L. and M. Rozworski, 138–​40, 196nn.52–​53, 196n.54, 196–​97n.62 Piketty, T., 147, 198n.79 planning bureaucratic, 9–​10, 38 capitalist, 135–​37, 138–​39, 140–​ 41, 142, 143–​45, 149–​50, 151, 195n.44, 196n.51, 197n.66 centralized, 8–​10, 35, 36–​ 37, 126–​27 governmental, 8, 140, 142, 143–​44 social democratic, 27, 28, 130, 135–​41, 144–​45, 151 socialist, 24, 25, 28–​29, 31, 32–​33, 36–​37, 67–​68, 115–​16, 118, 135–​41, 149–​50, 161–​62n.28, 163n.54, 196–​97n.62 polarization, 77–​78, 86, 146–​51 political state as battleground, 52–​56 control of, 41, 43, 44, 118–​ 19, 140–​41 controlling, 40–​41, 56, 116, 125, 127, 128, 135–​36, 138 elimination of, 44, 45, 55, 56, 118, 167n.13 as executive committee of emerging socialism, 140

Index  231 as executive committee of the bourgeoisie, 54–​55, 140, 171n.53 minimalist, 55 as monopoly on means of violence, 44, 49–​50, 57 social democratic, 118–​19, 125, 127, 128, 135–​36, 192n.115 standing over and dominating civil society, 5, 40–​43, 49–​52, 54, 55, 56–​57, 58, 71, 86, 88–​89, 168n.17, 192n.115 withering away of, 45, 167n.13 See also alienation: political; domination: by the state; superstructure: political poverty, 8–​9, 10–​12, 21–​22, 33, 34, 39, 55–​56, 65–​66, 77–​78, 126, 146, 147–​48, 151 prices. See market: prices profit, 13, 16, 37, 42, 53, 55–​56, 62, 95, 110–​11, 128–​29, 131–​32, 134–​35 prognostications, 148–​49, 198n.83 “Program of The Social Democratic Party of Germany, Erfurt 1891,” 146, 178n.29, 198n.76 proletariat agricultural, 95, 96–​97, 98, 100–​1, 120, 183n.25 broadly-​understood, 96–​101, 117, 119–​20, 128–​29, 138–​39, 140–​41, 142, 144–​45, 147–​49, 184n.37 definition of, 95, 96 dictatorship of, 49–​52, 63–​64, 71, 74, 86, 169–​70n.38, 170n.40, 170n.42 industrial, 69, 86–​87, 95–​97, 98, 100–​1, 120, 147, 180n.49, 180n.50, 183n.25, 184n.38 as majority, 46–​47, 49–​50, 51, 65, 67–​68, 77, 78–​79, 85–​86, 88, 92–​93, 94–​95, 96, 99–​101, 120–​ 21, 148, 177n.7

as majority in England, 57, 84–​ 85, 86–​87 as minority, 4, 56–​57, 58–​59, 63–​ 65, 67, 73–​74, 75, 85, 94–​100, 120–​21, 154n.11, 170n.41, 172n.60 as ruling class, 26–​27, 29–​30, 42, 46–​47, 79, 84–​85, 86, 88 narrowly-​understood, 96, 97–​98, 99–​100, 101, 120, 147, 148 property communal, 72–​73, 175n.44 private, 18–​19, 22–​23, 37, 42, 72, 73, 78, 128, 165n.65 propertyless, 77–​78 See also means of production Prussia, 182n.12 Prychitko, D. L., 161–​62n.28, 165n.66 Przeworski, A., 51–​52, 94–​95, 97–​98, 127, 128, 134–​35, 158n.38, 170n.47, 183nn.20–​21, 183n.29,​ 184nn.40–​42, 193n.10, 193n.11,​ 193nn.13–​14, ​195nn.37–​38, 197n.71 public ownership types of, 10 See also means of production: publicly owned Quirico, M., 194n.28 Rahnema, S., 95, 183n.19, 1​ 83nn.28–​29 Rancière, J., 153n.1, 182n.15, 187–​88n.92 reformism, 2, 7, 141, 142, 145, 174–​ 75n.37, 190n.103 Reichstag, 2, 31, 91–​93, 121–​22, 123, 182n.13 relations of production, 69–​70, 76–​ 77, 81, 86, 88, 92, 102, 106–​7, 110, 117, 143, 149, 190n.109 See also forces of production

232 Index Renner, K., 190n.107 rent, 27, 162–​63n.35 representatives, 13, 40–​42, 59, 129, 181–​82n.11, 192n.115 as deputies, 44–​45 parliamentary, 13, 40–​42, 44–​45, 48, 181n.9 with direct mandate, 44–​45 republic democratic, 47–​48, 50, 142 revisionism, 2, 7, 153–​54n.4, 190n.103 revolution in advanced capitalist society, 6 bourgeois, 59, 64, 66–​67, 69, 77, 84, 87–​88, 117, 181n.2, 191n.112 democratic, 52, 63–​64, 69–​70, 86, 96–​97, 119–​21, 125, 131, 132–​ 33, 134, 141, 194n.33 electoral, 58, 86–​87, 182n.12 French, 59, 60, 68–​69, 87, 180n.49 industrial, 6 as insurrection, 6–​7, 44, 46, 48–​49, 51, 52, 63–​64, 65, 68–​69, 71–​72, 86, 91, 92–​93, 120–​21, 141, 145–​46, 149, 150, 170–​71n.50, 178n.17, 179–​80n.46, 182n.14, 191n.111, 191n.112 Jacobin, 68–​69, 71 legal, 48–​49, 94, 131, 132–​33, 141, 170–​71n.50, 174n.23, 191n.111 majority, 58, 64–​65, 67–​68, 76–​80, 83–​84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92–​ 93, 96–​97, 99–​100, 120, 149, 150, 177n.6 Marxist, 1–​2, 181n.2 minority, 58–​75, 77, 79, 80–​81, 83–​84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 120, 174n.29, 177n.6, 177n.8, 178n.16, 180n.49 moral justification of, 63, 82–​83, 99–​100, 101

parliamentary, 52, 157n.16 peaceful, 47–​48, 51, 52, 93, 119, 120, 131, 132–​33, 134, 141, 146, 182n.12, 183n.19, 190n.107, 191n.111 permanent, 66–​70, 71, 77, 84–​85, 91, 120, 179n.42 philosophical-​moral argument for, 60, 80–​81, 82–​83, 99–​100, 117 political, 59, 90–​91, 180n.49 political before social, 87–​89, 90–​ 91, 92, 117 proletarian, 6, 48, 59, 60, 64, 66–​68, 69, 70, 84, 88, 178n.17, 180n.49, 191n.111 radical, 59, 60, 95 Russian, 58, 67–​68, 70–​75, 86, 88, 119, 141 social, 76–​77, 90–​91, 95 social democratic, 5, 6–​7, 58, 86–​87, 90–​95, 101, 113–​21, 149, 199n.87 socialist, 6, 31, 51, 70, 119–​20, 134, 141, 157n.16, 190n.107 as social transformation, 5, 6–​7, 69–​70, 76–​77, 86, 88–​89, 90–​91, 141, 143–​45, 146, 148–​ 49, 150–​51 rights, 53, 71, 100, 101–​2, 103–​4, 105, 112–​13, 125–​26, 167–​68n.14, 188–​89n.93, 194n.33 bourgeois, 30 Roberts, P. C., 161–​62n.28 Roemer, J. E., 51–​52, 158n.28, 158n.39, 170n.48 Rothstein, B. and S. Steinmo, 125, 155–​56n.13, 157n.20, 158n.32, 193n.4 Rousseau, J-​J., 44, 167n.11, 168n.17 Rubin, I. I., 159n.2 ruling class, 45, 53–​54, 81–​82, 96, 104–​5, 165–​66n.67, 171n.53 See also proletariat: as ruling class

Index  233 Russia, 3–​4, 70–​75, 141, 167–​68n.14, 170n.41, 175–​76n.45, 176n.54 See also Soviet Russian mir, 72, 73, 177n.7 Samuelson, P. A., 158n.39 SAP, 131, 132, 134, 194n.31 Sargent, L. T., 193n.7 Saxony, 123, 170–​71n.50, 182n.18 Scandinavia, 9, 51–​52, 54–​55, 151 Schmidt, A., 187–​88n.92 Schmidt, I., 184n.38 Schröder, G., 155–​56n.13 Schumpeter, J. A., 51–​52, 54, 153n.1, 162n.33, 170n.46, 171–​72n.54, 181n.2, 189n.97 Schweickart, D., 131–​32, 157n.20, 158nn.27–​28, 164n.57, 165–​ 66n.67, 194n.28, 195n.37 Schweitzer, J. B. von, 181n.1 SEIU, 98 Sejersted, F., 141, 157n.21, 158n.36, 195n.37, 197n.65 serfdom, 59–​60, 139–​40 Shanin, T., 72–​73, ​175–​76nn.45–​46, 176n.49 Sherman, H. T., 164n.59 Shoikhedbrod, I., 45, 168n.16, 185n.57, 188–​89n.93, 194n.33 Silverman, B., 194n.30 slavery, 101–​2, 104 Smith, Adam, 40, 108–​9 social democracy as capitalism, 7–​8, 141–​46 and experiment, 13–​14, 39, 130–​ 31, 166n.68 and fetishism, 18, 23, 25–​26, 33, 34–​35, 172n.58 linked to Soviet Marxism, 2, 3, 154n.6 moving to socialism, 3, 9–​11, 14–​ 15, 28, 30–​31, 37, 38–​39, 55–​56, 88, 92, 126–​27, 131, 132–​33,

135, 142, 143–​44, 145, 150, 151, 193n.10 opposed to Soviet Marxism, 1–​6, 7, 11, 126–​27, 167–​68n.14 and the state, 54, 128 transforming capitalism, 9–​11, 14–​15, 18, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29–​30, 33, 38–​39, 52, 69–​70, 88–​89, 125–​27, 128–​29, 135, 144–​45, 150–​51, 181n.10, 198n.82 waning, 5–​6, 152, 155–​56n.13, 171–​72n.54, 198n.80 See also party: social democratic; planning: social democratic; revolution: social democratic socialism emerging within and out of capitalism, 29–​30, 65–​66, 70, 75, 77, 87–​88, 92, 103–​4, 105, 112–​21, 125, 132–​33, 134, 137, 138–​39, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144–​45, 148–​50, 181n.10, ​ 189nn.97–​99, 190n.109 Fabian, 190n.103, 190n.108 and fetishism, 23, 25, 26, 32–​34 full, 9–​11, 13, 14–​15, 25, 26–​27, 28, 29–​31, 33, 37–​39, 43, 54, 126–​27, 131, 143, 145, 151, 154n.8, 165n.63, 165n.65, 194–​ 95n.36, 196–​97n.62 meanings of, 7–​8, 157n.22 as opposed to social democracy, 150 as the tendency of social democracy, 8–​11, 12, 75, 88 as tending to communism, 2–​3, 7–​8, 28 See also market: socialism Soviet economy, 8, 9–​10, 38–​39, 128–​29, 139, 157n.24, 165–​ 66n.67, 177n.6 failure, 11, 13, 34–​35, 38–​39, 71, 74, 126–​27

234 Index Soviet (cont.) Marxism, 1–​6, 7, 154n.6 non-​democratic, 1–​6, 54, 71, 154n.11, 176n.51, 176n.54 SPD, 2, 3, 5–​6, 7, 30–​31, 47, 80, 90, 91–​92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 121–​ 22, 123, 128–​29, 143, 145, 154n.9, 167–​68n.14, 169n.27, 170–​71n.50, 178n.23, 181n.1, 182n.15, 182n.18, 184n.38, 189n.99, 192n.114 species-​being, 41 stages of communism, 28–​30, 38, 188–​89n.93 of post-​capitalism, 26–​35, 44, 50, 56, 67–​68, 101–​3, 162–​63n.35 skipping, 59, 66, 67–​68, 72, 73, 77, 175–​76n.45, 177n.7 Stalin, J., 153n.1 state. See political state Staudenmaier, R., 155–​56n.13 stock market, 37–​38, 133 suffrage universal male, 44–​45, 46–​47, 48, 52, 53–​54, 64, 71, 92–​93, 105, 170–​71n.50, 182n.12 for women, 47, 71, 93 See also elections; franchise superstructure political, 76–​77 supply and demand, 12, 33–​34 surplus value, 111, 113 Sweden, 9–​10, 51–​52, 126, 127, 132, 133–​34, 136, 138, 139–​40, 155–​ 56n.13, 158n.36, 197n.66 Sweezy, P. M., 197n.71 Switzerland, 91–​92, 121–​22 taxes, 27, 51–​52, 125–​26, 133, 155–​ 56n.13, 162–​63n.35

Teamsters, 98 Tegel, S., 154n.6, 181n.9 terror, 51, 52, 71, 179–​80n.46 Thomas, A. H., 97, 184n.39 totalitarian, 1, 2–​3, 11, 64, 65–​66, 71, 75–​134, 139–​40, 151 trade unions. See labor: unions Trotsky, L., 71–​72, 174–​75n.37 trusts, 115–​16, 119–​20, 132, 135–​36, 190–​91n.110 tyranny of the majority, 50 United States, 1, 2, 3–​4, 8, 13, 47–​49, 51, 93, 122, 129, 136, 147–​48, 165–​ 66n.67, 181–​82n.11, 182n.14 use value, 16, 32–​33 USSR. See Soviet utopian, 1, 4–​5, 11, 14–​15, 59, 86, 119, 145, 151, 158n.32 Vaizey, J., 181n.9 voting, 3, 4, 9, 12, 31, 41–​42, 48, 49–​ 50, 94–​95, 105, 132, 142, 184n.41 wages, 21, 27, 53, 55–​56, 111, 137–​ 38, 148–​49, 155–​56n.13 Walmart, 138, 196n.52 Weber, M., 9–​10, 26, 34–​35, 37, 38–​39, 139–​40, 151, 154n.8, 164n.55, 165n.65, 194–​95n.36 Weisskopf, T. E., 157–​58n.26, 158n.38 Winkler, H. A., 183n.29 Wood, A., 101–​3, 105–​6, 111, 112, 185n.49–​185nn.51–​55, 186n.66, 187n.83, 187n.89 Wootton, B., 164n.56, 165n.61 working class. See party: working class; proletariat Zasulich, V., 72