Intercultural Thinking in African Philosophy: A Critical Dialogue with Kant and Foucault 1032658738, 9781032658735

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
PART I: Rethinking Kant. Contemporary African philosophy and Kant
1. Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism
2. Cosmopolitanism in the philosophy of Appiah and Mbembe. A critical dialogue with Kant
3. Critical dialogue with Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism in the work of Wiredu and Gyekye
4. Rereading Kant. Philosophy as critique in the philosophical concepts of Serequeberhan and Odera Oruka
PART II: Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy
5. Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work
6. Language in the work of Kant and Foucault
7. History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy
8. Foucault and contemporary African philosophy
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

Intercultural Thinking in African Philosophy

This book sets up a rich intercultural dialogue between the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Michel Foucault, and that of key African thinkers such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, Achille Mbembe, Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, Tsenay Serequeberhan and Henry Odera Oruka. The book challenges Western-centric visions of an African future by demonstrating the richness of thought that can be found in African and Afrodiasporic philosophy. It shows how thinkers such as Serequeberhan have criticised the inconsistencies in Kant’s work, whereas others such as Wiredu, Gyekye, Appiah and Mbembe have referenced his work more positively and developed progressive political concepts such as the metanational state, par­ tial cosmopolitanism and Afropolitanism. The book goes on to consider how Mbembe and Valentim-Yves Mudimbe have responded to Foucault’s ideas in deciphering the various Western, African and Afrodiasporic discourses of knowledge on Africa. It concludes by considering various theories of inter­ cultural exchange, from Gyekye’s cultural borrowing to Appiah’s conversation across boundaries, Wiredu’s cross cultural dialogue, Mbembe’s thinking outside the frame, Serequeberhan’s dialogue at a distance, and Oruka’s call for global re-distribution and a new ecophilosophical attitude to safeguard human existence on the planet. This book invites us all to engage in intercultural dialogue and mutual respect for different cultural creations. It will be an important read for researchers in philosophy wherever they are in the world. Marita Rainsborough teaches as an associate professor (PD) at the Institute for Philosophy and Art History at Leuphana University Lüneburg and at the Institute for Romance Studies at Kiel University, Germany. She is an associate member of the Centre of Philosophy University of Lisbon (CFUL) and co-editor of the journal Estudos Kantianos.

Routledge Studies in African Philosophy Africanizing African Legal Ethics John Murungi Consolationism and Comparative African Philosophy Beyond Universalism and Particularism Ada Agada Futurism and the African Imagination Literature and Other Arts Edited by Dike Okoro Critical Conversations in African Philosophy Asixoxe - Let's Talk Edited by Alena Rettová, Benedetta Lanfranchi and Miriam Pahl Environmental Justice in African Philosophy Munamato Chemhuru Feminist African Philosophy Women and the Politics of Difference Abosede Priscilla Ipadeola Kimmerle’s Intercultural Philosophy and Beyond The Ongoing Quest for Epistemic Justice Renate Schepen African Epistemology Essays on Being and Knowledge Edited by Peter Aloysius Ikhane and Isaac E. Ukpokolo African Ethics and Death Moral Status and Human Dignity in Ubuntu Thinking Motsamai Molefe and Elphus Muade Intercultural Thinking in African Philosophy A Critical Dialogue with Kant and Foucault Marita Rainsborough For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Routledge-Studies-in-African-Philosophy/book-series/AFRPHIL

Intercultural Thinking in African Philosophy A Critical Dialogue with Kant and Foucault

Marita Rainsborough

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Marita Rainsborough The right of Marita Rainsborough to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Translated by Alison Fry and Dominic Rainsborough. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-65873-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-65874-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-65875-9 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759 Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

Preface Introduction

vi

1

PART I

Rethinking Kant. Contemporary African philosophy and Kant

23

1 Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism

25

2 Cosmopolitanism in the philosophy of Appiah and Mbembe.

A critical dialogue with Kant

45

3 Critical dialogue with Kant’s epistemological and ethical

universalism in the work of Wiredu and Gyekye

73

4 Rereading Kant. Philosophy as critique in the philosophical

concepts of Serequeberhan and Odera Oruka

104

PART II

Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy

125

5 Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work

127

6 Language in the work of Kant and Foucault

145

7 History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy

164

8 Foucault and contemporary African philosophy

183

Conclusion Index

204

212

Preface

We have to counter, to the nature sanctioned logic of brute force, a logic of recognition, respect, and dialogue – a logic grounded in the finitude, or humanness, of our shared existence. Tsenay Serequeberhan1

The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world. Immanuel Kant2 Thus, if philosophy of the future exists, it must be born outside of Europe or equally born in consequence of meetings and impacts between Europe and non-Europe. Michel Foucault3 This book is based on a series of lectures on the topic of Reler Kant na filosofia contemporânea Africana (Rereading Kant in contemporary African philosophy); a seminar titled Reler Kant: O dialogo crítico com o uni­ versalismo epistemológico, ético e político de Kant na filosofia contemporânea Africana (Rereading Kant: The critical dialogue with Kant’s epistemological, ethical and political universalism in contemporary African philosophy) in May and June 2019; and a seminar on Michel Foucault in October 2019 entitled Repensar Foucault: Diálogos, dissidências e experimentações na filosofia (Rethinking Foucault: Dialogues, dissidences and experimentations in philoso­ phy) at the University of Lisbon. These events – the Lisbon Lectures – were made possible by the CFUL, the Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon, in particular by the research group HPhil, and by the CEC, the Center for Comparative Studies of the University of Lisbon, in cooperation with the research project Experimentation & Dissidence. I would like to thank the vice-director of the CFUL and the head of the research group,

Preface vii HPhil Prof. Dr Filipa Afonso; the former director of the CEC, Prof. Dr Fernanda Mota Alves; and the head of the Experimentation & Dissidence research project, Prof. Dr José Miranda Justo, for hosting my lectures and seminars in Lisbon, for the support and encouragement of this book project, and for the excellent cooperation. I would also like to thank Alison Fry and Dominic Rainsborough for the translation of this text into English. In the spirit of Foucault, this book represents an attempt to “think differently”4 in an inter- and transcultural dialogue. In Serequeberhan’s words: in “a logic of recognition, respect, and dialogue – a logic grounded in the finitude, or humanness, of our shared existence.”5

Notes 1 Serequeberhan, Tsenay: Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophy. New York (State University of New York Press), 2016, p. 72. 2 Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthro­ pology, History, and Education. Zöller, Günter; Louden, Robert B. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2007, p. 130. 3 Foucault, Michel: “Michel Foucault and Zen: a stay in a Zen temple (1978)”. In: Foucault, Michel: Religion and culture. Selected and edited by Jeremy R. Carrette. New York (Routledge), 1999, p. 113. 4 Cf. Foucault, Michel: The History of Sexuality. Volume II: The Use of Pleasure. New York (Routledge), 1990, p. 8. 5 The partly different German edition was published under the title Rainsborough, Marita: Interkulturelles Philosophieren: Kant und Foucault in der afrikanischen Gegenwartsphilosophie. Bielefeld (transcript), 2022.

Introduction

Contemporary African philosophy, particularly in its scientifically oriented academic form, reflects on itself and other elements of African and Afro­ diasporic culture. Philosophy in Africa and the African diaspora is currently attempting to achieve its inclusion into philosophical discourse in the global context. Parallel to this, there is a tangible growing interest in African and Afrodiasporic philosophy, also outside of Africa. Despite this it can still be asserted that these philosophies are marginalised. Remedying this situation is a primary concern of this investigation. The focus of African and/or Afro­ diasporic philosophical work in its various forms, such as sage philosophy, ethnophilosophy, nationalistic ideology and academic philosophy, is on the processing of experiences in the African and Afrodiasporic worlds, which are always characterised by encounters with other cultures. The dialogue with continental and Anglo-European philosophy has been of key significance for African and Afrodiasporic philosophy since its emergence as an academic discipline, whereby it references very diverse philosophical concepts. The socialist–nationalist orientation, for example, makes reference to Marx. Cri­ tical dialogue also repeatedly focuses on Hegel’s master–slave dialectic and the associated questions of power and recognition as well as also his racist differentiations. Academic African and Afrodiasporic philosophy references the entire spectrum of continental and Anglo-European philosophy, from ancient philosophy to contemporary philosophy.1 In this context both a negative, critical-unmasking approach as well as also a constructive attitude can be identified within the scope of intercultural dialogue. In the meantime, a critical-productive referencing of African and Afrodiasporic philosophy can also be observed in the West. There is, however, still a long way to go before this relationship can be viewed as reciprocal. Intercultural philosophy can make a contribution to expanding the dialogue and/or polylogue between equals. This investigation focuses on African referencing of Kant and Foucault, attempting to identify the various functions of this rereading in the theories of African and Afrodiasporic philosophers. Kant and Foucault are among the most important, critically reread European philosophers in Africa and the African diaspora. As a prototype for the philosophical Enlightenment, DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-1

2

Introduction

Kant’s philosophy is subject to particularly strong criticism regarding its essentialism and universalism, which go hand in hand with hierarchisation of race, and the claim to European cultural and political dominance which it formulates. African and Afrodiasporic philosophy also accuses Foucault of Eurocentrism. Despite this fundamental criticism, theorems and/or processes from the work of both philosophers have been integrated into African and Afrodiasporic concepts in an essential, constructive manner. Kant is thus primarily concerned with his ethnic and epistemic universalism and cosmo­ politanism as well as his theorems of the individual, humanity and race. The focus of intercultural dialogue in the work of Foucault is on the theorems of discourse, power and the subject. In addition to this, another reason for choosing these two philosophers is the fact that Foucault’s philosophical thinking references Kant in a fundamental manner. Taking Kant’s theorem of a priori knowledge, of Enlightenment and critique – based on a new understanding of philosophy which draws from history, literature and sci­ ences such as criminology and psychology – as his starting point, Foucault thus develops, in particular, the concept of the historical a priori and a free, critical subject which forms itself within the scope of existing knowledge and power references in combination with the vision of a free society. This investigation will explore Foucault’s experimental approach, in particular regarding his understanding of philosophy and history; the significance of parrhesia, Enlightenment and critique; and his view of literature and the visual arts. In addition to Foucault’s theories on discourse, power and the subject, contemporary African/Afrodiasporic philosophy critically-productively references in particular his archaeology and genealogy procedures. The question posed by this investigation is what the focus of Foucault’s Kantian critique is and what function it fulfils as regards the formulation of his fundamental theorems and line of argument. Is this engagement just as interesting for contemporary African philosophy or does it focus on other issues? What is the intent of African contemporary philosophers when read­ ing the work of Immanuel Kant and/or Michel Foucault; which aspects of the latter’s philosophies do they draw on and how do they reference these thinkers? What functions does the critical investigation of both thinkers have for the various concepts of contemporary African philosophy? These research questions will be explored using the concept of intercultural philosophy. In intercultural philosophy,2 mutual exchange is based on the concept of the equivalence of cultures and is determined by the idea of productive exchange and mutual stimulation, but also by correction. This is explored using the term interculturality,3 which should always be understood as a method, because it is associated with a certain procedure.4 Intercultural phi­ losophy seeks to clarify the concept of interculturality based on the character of philosophy itself. Kapumba Akena identifies the “dialogical nature of philosophy”5 as its central characteristic, which is both the condition for interculturality and for interdisciplinarity.6 The interactions result in “fruitful friction and constructive similarities”.7 This also involves “the perception of

Introduction

3

the many voices, the new and unfamiliar, the foreign”, which forms “the basic figure of intercultural philosophizing”.8 In the domain of philosophy, intercultural philosophy should not only be perceived as a discipline among others, but as a fundamentally different concept of philosophy which seeks to overcome Eurocentrism within philosophy, based on the notion that Western philosophy must always be understood as the product of intercultural exchange, intercultural interaction and the integration of views from other cultures, such as Egypt and India − a blind spot in the historiography of philosophy. The claim that it originated in Greece cannot be upheld. Philo­ sophy has different places of origin in the world. Intercultural philosophy “is an open project based on a ‘philosophy of exploration’, which promises us humans a new being without any exclusive normative content”.9 Philosophi­ cal thought, according to the idea of intercultural philosophy, can therefore have a very different character. This is also about accepting other ways of philosophising. The concept of philosophy itself must be radically questioned and redefined in this context. Because of these difficulties, there is also a tendency to avoid a definition of the specifically philosophical, for example Fornet-Betancourt prefers to speak of “intercultural thinking”10 as regards intercultural philosophy. Like other thinkers, he adopts a broad concept of philosophy, which more or less refers to every form of rational thinking aimed at explaining the world. In addition, Fornet-Betancourt makes a broader claim and believes that it can “help improve the quality of life in the world”.11 He speaks of intercultural philosophy as a “committed philoso­ phy”12 and of “philosophy’s historical commitment”.13 Based on the idea of globality, it aims for a “peaceful and respectful coexistence of humanity”.14 Thus it clearly transcends the framework of a comparative philosophy.15 Dhouib says: The concept of interculturality goes beyond the factual pluralism of cul­ tures by recognizing and reconstructing the binding aspects between human beings in order to preserve the unity of humanity. Building on this, transculturality seeks to think of the universality of norms as a common aspiration and to strive for corresponding action.16 The goal is a humane coexistence of people from different cultures which are in a constant process of transformation. Here, interculturality and transcul­ turality are conceived in conjunction; transcultural processes build on inter­ cultural processes. In contrast to the concept of interculturality, the term transculturality, like Homi Bhabha’s third space,17 positively avoids any reference to an essentialist concept of culture, which, however, does not have to be linked per se with the term interculturality. This investigation uses it more in the sense of a specific perspective, in which the differing specifics of cultures, understood as processuality, are imagined, whereby it goes without saying that the concepts and work of African and Afrodiasporic philosophy which are being explored may be based on another, different cultural

4

Introduction

concept. Choe asserts that there is a risk as regards the concept of transcul­ turality: “Transculturality results in the individualisation and atomisation of culture”, with power structures and various types of boundaries lost from sight.18 Interculturality in contrast strengthens relationships between cul­ tures, revealing the boundaries between them as boundaries of power which, depending on the context, may be drawn differently.19 Nevertheless, she goes on to advocate continued use of the term transculturality in a modified form since it places particular emphasis on the important aspects of the internal dynamic and diversity of a culture.20 I share this position. The concept of transculturality assumes the fundamental hybridity of all cultures, which, however, is inconceivable without a – usually ideal-typical – construction of a culture which can be differentiated from other cultures and is considered to be a culture of origin, reference and/or reconnection, subject to permanent resignification and reinterpretation processes. Interculturality and transcul­ turality are thus closely linked; transcultural and intercultural processes are interlinked; each retaining their own perspectives and focuses.21 It is the attempt to go beyond the exchange, the coexistence and the mutual criticism of cultures and to hold on to binding principles in the pur­ suit of what is shared, which can consist among other things of a new humanism, a new conception of morality,22 a revised ethical universalism,23 for example in the form of human rights, the question of political orientation and structure, as can be seen in the debate on democracy, and a common goal, for example as modified cosmopolitanism − mostly conceived in a combination of different aspects. This discussion about the concept of phi­ losophy in terms of inter- and transculturality can be found at the level of the question of African philosophy and its specificity in a comparable way. The issue under discussion is the preference for scientifically oriented academic philosophy in comparison to sage philosophy and ethnophilosophy and the associated need for a definition of philosophy itself; the integration of these forms of philosophising; the exchange with other cultures and their philoso­ phical thinking and the role of African philosophy for a better coexistence in the world. This type of philosophising explores new ways of thinking, which have become visible in African and Afrodiasporic philosophy in polylogue with other cultures. According to Bohlken, it should have the status of a prima philosophia.24 Contemporary African philosophy develops concepts of shaping the future which relate to aspects of individual and collective identity and the explora­ tion of political concepts such as democracy, the meta-national state and cosmopolitanism as societal models and their ethical implications. The poli­ tical concepts are most often based on African humanism. A cultural anchoring in the African is conspicuous. The analysis of traditional African cultures; African cultures in transition and dialogue between cultures − especially between African and Western cultures − represent the main points of consideration. What is striking about the current visions of an African future is a perception of the international context and the growing conviction

Introduction

5

that future problems can only be solved in a global context − taking local characteristics into account. According to Kimmerle, African philosophy has already “joined the international philosophical discourse”.25 He speaks of an emerging world philosophy to which the African and Afrodiasporic philoso­ phy provide or could provide an important contribution. Kimmerle under­ stands world philosophy26 in the sense of an intercultural philosophy, a dialogical philosophy.27 The World Congress of Philosophy in Düsseldorf in 1978 under the direction of Alwin Diemer marks a turning point as it represents the date of an institutional inclusion of African philosophy.28 From that point onwards, African philosophy remains an integral part of the concept of the World Congress. Eberfeld speaks in this context of a “globa­ lization of philosophy”, “thus today increasingly a postcolonial philosophis­ ing is becoming possible, also opening up a new perspective on the history of thought”,29 with which he approaches Eze’s conception of African philoso­ phy as postcolonial philosophy. In contrast to Eze, however, he understands it more generally, not specifically related to Africa. Global philosophising is associated with intercultural and/or transcultural thinking both in terms of content and methodology. At the International Philosophical Symposium on Culture and Identity of Africa (Düsseldorf, 1982),30 Alwin Diemer already addressed the topic of interculturality and transculturality in his lecture Kulturidentität, interkulturelles Verstehen, Philosophie als transkultureller Dialog (Cultural identity, intercultural understanding, philosophy as transcul­ tural dialogue; own translation),31 in which he understands ‘transcultural’ in the sense of ‘universal’, as transcending the boundaries of different cultures.32 The growth in the international significance of African philosophy is linked to a strengthening of African philosophy in Africa itself and in the African diaspora.33 In Mbembe’s work, starting from the aspect of human nomadism and the idea of immersion and dispersion in Africa, the thesis of dynamic cultural spaces and the notion of culture as a process of hybridisation or creolisation emerge. As a mixture of disparate entities, African culture cannot be under­ stood as autochthonous, authentic and self-sufficient, but instead always as an intercultural or transcultural project. This concept of culture corresponds both to the observation of individual and collective identity in the African context and to questions of ethical coexistence and political organisation in the micro and macro spheres. The particular and the universal are equally considered in the concept of man, of human coexistence and of the social in all relevant dimensions such as law, economics and politics. In their theories, philosophers Kwame Anthony Appiah and Achille Mbembe generally apply the aspect of being human to support their ethical and political concepts of partial cosmopolitanism and/or Afropolitanism, with Appiah’s philosophy focusing on the question of identity, while Mbembe explores the concept of global nomadism and reconciliation. Kwasi Wiredu’s model of consensual democracy − based on African experiences and ways of thinking − criticises the Western concept of democracy and develops a cultural universalism.

6

Introduction

Kwame Gyekye, with his concept of moderate communitarianism, is impor­ tant in this analysis, in particular as regards his concept of the person; the connection between the individual and society; the concept of a metanational state and the question of the legitimacy of power. Odera Oruka develops a concept of environmental ethics and a philosophy of nature, exploring ques­ tions of justice in a global context. Other African and Afrodiasporic philo­ sophers, such as Tsenay Serequeberhan, primarily analyse Western philosophy as regards issues such as Eurocentrism, the universal view of man, race, etc. and strive for a decolonisation of thought by means of her­ meneutic critique. The focus of this investigation is on inter- and transcul­ tural aspects of philosophical theories in their cross-cultural dialogue between Africa and the West. It is difficult to define African philosophy; the starting point is usually geographical, ethnic and/or racial. Paulin J. Hountondji, for example, emphasises the geographical origin by defining African philosophy as the creation of philosophical texts by African authors and excluding oral philo­ sophy in which reflexive self-reference is not possible: “By ‘African philoso­ phy’ I mean a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves.”34 There are, for example, distinctions between traditional and modern African philosophy as well as between the ethnic philosophy of Africa and the philosophy of the African diaspora, especially Afro-Caribbean and African-American philoso­ phy. Odera Oruka distinguishes between ethnophilosophy,35 sage philoso­ phy,36 nationalistic ideologies37 and the academic philosophy of Africa, which includes Afrodiasporic philosophy.38 He later added hermeneutic phi­ losophy39 and artistic-literary approaches to philosophy,40 topics which share the underlying notion of a dialogue between philosophy, literature and art.41 The umbrella term ‘Africana philosophy’ by Lucius Outlaw does not offer a solution to the problem of defining African philosophy, since it is based on geographical and racial determinations, in particular on a gene pool defining physical characteristics related to a geographical origin and a specific cul­ tural-historical experience.42 Eze, in critical analysis of Outlaw’s proposal to conceptualise the diversity of African philosophical phenomena, alternatively proposes the term ‘postcolonial African philosophy’. The idea of ‘African philosophy’ as a field of inquiry thus has its con­ temporary roots in the effort of African thinkers to combat political and economic exploitations, and to examine, question, and contest identities imposed upon them by Europeans. The claims and counter-claims, jus­ tifications, and alienations that characterize such historical and con­ ceptual protests and contestations indelibly mark the discipline of African philosophy.43 Today, philosophy also deals with questions of postcolonial theory, such as epistemic violence,44 which have developed on the basis of various human

Introduction

7

sciences and social sciences and address the issues of postcolonialism and decolonialism.45 The postcolonial theory itself is partially philosophical in character, therefore it is already referred to as a postcolonial philosophy. Examples are Herta Nagl-Docekal and Franz Wimmer with their book Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika (Postcolonial philosophising: Africa; own translation), according to which Africa is a preferred subject of post­ colonial philosophy, and Patricia Purtschert with her essay Postkoloniale Philosophie: Die westliche Denkgeschichte gegen den Strich gelesen (Post­ colonial Philosophy: The Western history of thought read against the grain; own translation).46 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, on the other hand, refers the concept of postcolonial philosophy in his Critical Reader specifically to African philosophy when he speaks of postcolonial African philosophy and identifies the link between philosophy and postcolonialism as a central characteristic of current African and Afrodiasporic philosophy.47 Eze ties contemporary African philosophy primarily to philosophical ana­ lysis of the project of Modernism, which began with colonialisation, and the investigation of “the multiplicities and the pluralisms of these historical ‘African’ experiences”.48 Increasingly, this critical analysis is combined with concepts for the assessment of the current socio-political situation in a global context and the changing and improvement of global coexistence. In this context, a tendency to open up to general human considerations in anthro­ pological, epistemological, ethical, power-theoretical, political and aesthetic respects can be observed in African philosophy, based on the specific experiences of postcolonialism and attempts to decolonise thinking, feeling and acting. This type of African philosophising, which, according to Odera Oruka’s distinctions, can be primarily defined as African academic philoso­ phy, which in the meantime also refers to African symbols, proverbs and practices in the form of recourse to ethnophilosophical considerations and elements of sage philosophy as well as literary-artistic approaches and pro­ cedures of critical hermeneutics, is currently at the centre of African philo­ sophy. In academic philosophy, therefore, a critical-reflexive approach to the forms of African philosophising distinguished by Odera-Oruka can be observed. It becomes apparent that African thought provides stimulating concepts for the future with pragmatic implications for Africa and the world. This inspires hope for a positive approach to the future and reveals that a global effort is required both theoretically and practically. Contemporary African philosophy develops a new type of ‘universal’ philosophy, a global African philosophy which avoids both Eurocentrism and Afrocentrism, start­ ing from postcolonial questions. In this context it becomes clear that the African and Afrodiasporic philosophy of memory – to take up an observa­ tion by Magobe B. Ramose – is primarily a philosophy of memory (memorial philosophy) and philopractice. 49 African and Afrodiasporic philosophy is thus primarily practical philosophy whose focus – as regards the past, pre­ sent and future – is to master the challenges faced by Africa in the global context.

8

Introduction

The question posed by this investigation is grounded in the context of the intercultural philosophy project, whose fundamental concept assumes the dialogicity of cultures and that cultural equality is the norm. This is a phi­ losophical approach which does justice to the idea of cultural spaces which are in movement in a globalised world and assumes the mutual inspiration, differentiation and/or critique of the philosophical concepts. Intercultural philosophy requires the investigation of dialogicity and the polylogue50 between African or Afrodiasporic philosophy on the one side and AngloEuropean philosophy on the other as well as the associated intertextual references.51 Interculturality references discourses, theories, metatheories; economic, legal, scientific, media and political concepts; cultures of memory with their topics, motifs, etc.; and also religious-metaphysical concepts and their associated practices. In addition to this, it relates to the dialogical interaction of everyday cultures – phenomena to master everyday life – with corresponding everyday practices and languages with their differing gram­ mar, semantics and pragmatism, whereby a connection can be established between the thought and value concepts and practices of different cultures.52 The cultural concept may itself also be involved in this context. Intertextual examination of the philosophical texts focuses on the polylogue of philoso­ phical voices in the philosophical concepts; it should be analysed and reflec­ ted on critically. Intertextual references are more than vague similarities between texts; they include, for example, references to the original text (author’s names, titles of works; paratexts; quotations; etc.); critical engage­ ment with the original text’s theorems; metareflexive considerations regard­ ing the relationship with the Anglo-European author and/or the text and general dialogicity regarding philosophical theorems which are of equal interest in terms of texts and authors and their selectivity and/or focus. The theory of inter- and/or transtextuality thus provides a methodological instrument for intercultural philosophy in its primary textual character. This analysis is equally embedded in a historic context of colonisation, post and/or neocolonialism and globalisation; the question of African thinking and belief and African tradition; the search for non-European, for example Ethio­ pian, philosophical roots and/or the expansion of perspective to include the overall global context. Differing experiences, which are also expressed in reli­ gion, art, music, etc., become part of cultural memory, influencing the image and concept of history. The possibilities discussed for intercultural encounters in the field of philosophy have very different facets, and critique can appear to be deconstructionist; hermeneutic and/or reconstructive; critically unmasking; constructively structured or to have a visionary focus. In this regard, herme­ neutic, re/constructivist or deconstructionist access to philosophical thought structures becomes important. The overall procedure is based on one which can, in the widest possible sense, be understood as hermeneutic53 and com­ parative. In this context, theories of understanding; de/construction and reconstruction54 and theories of translation,55 which focus on the connection between the linguistic and the conceptional dimensions in particular, provide

Introduction

9

the required theoretical tools. The African and/or Afrodiasporic philosophers selected for this investigation also represent, among other things, these various methodologies. Serequeberhan, for example, unmasks Kantian philosophy in the deconstructionist manner, while Wiredu and Gyekye integrate elements of Kantian philosophy into their own philosophical concepts, including them in an altered form in their lines of argument. In addition to this, this investigation references theories of cultural memory,56 which explore forgetting, silence, memory and suppression strate­ gies;57 aspects which play a key role in contemporary African and Afrodias­ poric philosophy, for example in the work of Achille Mbembe. Mabe warns against unreflected use of the term collective memory in the colonial context “Those who have been colonised and the colonisers were unable to cultivate a shared memory because their experiences of colonisation and memories of that period are contradictory and irreconcilable.”58 When discussing issues concerning memory in intercultural dialogue or polylogue he refers to com­ municative memory.59 “Despite the differences in memory, the objective is [to] be able to build a shared future and [to] have to do so.”60 Taking the term communicative memory as the starting point, critical appraisal of col­ lective forms of memory; collective forgetting and ideological-political manipulation of memory can be carried out within the scope of intercultural philosophy. Contemporary African and Afrodiasporic philosophy includes very diverse intents as regards critical exploration of Western philosophy and its philosophical function and the presentation of this diversity is one of the objectives of this investigation. The African and Afrodiasporic philosophies which have been selected reflect, among other things, the interest in being able to present differing access routes, intents and functions to illustrate this. The focus on Kant and Foucault to demonstrate the dialogue and/or polylogue with Western philosophies (Parts I and II) serves two purposes: first, to show the value and critique placed on them by African and Afro­ diasporic philosophy, whose philosophical concepts reference both authors in a decisive manner within the scope of their lines of argument, and second, to reflect the dialogicity which exists between Foucault and Kant. Parallel to this, links to other Western philosophers such as Mill, Rawls, Lyotard, Der­ rida and others, are explored insofar as they are relevant in the context of answering the research questions posed above. The rereading of Kant and Foucault in contemporary African and Afrodiasporic philosophy includes an exploration of Kant’s political universalism in the work of Achille Mbembe and Kwame Anthony Appiah (Chapter 2); of Kant’s epistemic and moral universalism – also regarding its political implications – in the work of Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye (Chapter 3) and critique as a philosophical concept in the work of Tsenay Serequeberhan and Henry Odera Oruka (Chapter 4). In this context, these African and Afrodiasporic philosophies represent specific approaches to the rethinking of the intentions, processes and lines of arguments associated with Kantian philosophy and will be identified; compared with one another and critically evaluated.

10 Introduction Part II will begin by analysing Foucault’s critical dialogue with Kant (see Chapters 5 and 6); the topics of history, power and art (Chapter 7) as the basis for an investigation of the rereading of Foucault in contemporary African and Afrodiasporic philosophy, using the work of Valentim-Yves Mudimbe and Achille Mbembe to illustrate this (Chapter 8). It will, on the one hand, become clear that Foucault’s experimental understanding of phi­ losophy and his archaeology and genealogy procedures are key influences on the methodology of African philosophers and, on the other, that these phi­ losophers reference central Foucauldian theorems such as, in particular, subject, discourse and power – with their historic forms and/or strategies of sovereign power, disciplinary power and bio-power. The procedures used and theories have a profound impact on the philosophical concepts while also being interlinked with them. The concluding chapter of this investigation will critically evaluate the theoretical approach, questions, lines of argument and the procedures used. The summary will bring together the outcome of this analysis, illustrating the necessity of a deeper understanding of diverse world views; of differing phi­ losophical concepts and practices; the coming to terms with injuries and traumas; of mutual respect for otherness; mutual understanding; creative dialogue and cooperation; and recognition of human vulnerability and human dignity in the other – as a pioneering dimension of intercultural philosophy.

Notes 1 African and/or Afrodiasporic philosophy, for example, critically examines ancient philosophy (e.g. Plato and Aristotle in the work of Outlaw); German idealism (e.g. Hegel and Kant in the work of Serequeberhan); utilitarianism (e.g. Mill in the work of Appiah); post-structuralism (e.g. Levinas and Foucault in the work of Mbembe) and postmodernism (Lyotard, Derrida, Vatimo, etc. in the work of Outlaw). Bernasconi, writing on the parallels between the philosophical con­ siderations of Lucius Outlaw and Derrida’s deconstruction, states: “Outlaw argues that African philosophy challenges the very idea of Philosophy in a way that can be called deconstructive because it can be associated with the complex set of practices within the enterprise of Western philosophy that goes under the name.” In: Bernasconi, Robert: “African Philosophy’s Challenge to Continental Philoso­ phy”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (Ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Cambridge, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, p. 187. Outlaw himself makes his intention clear in the following statement: “However, ‘decon­ struction’ is but another strategy by which to read ‘texts’ of various kinds, though one guided by decidedly different agenda, logos, and form of self-consciousness, and with different consequences. It is a strategy that, when called ‘deconstruction’, is principally identified with the work of Jacques Derrida, among others (includ­ ing Nietzsche and Heidegger). […] Rather, it is my contention that contemporary discussions about ‘P/philosophy’ in Africa have been ‘deconstructive’ […].” In: Outlaw, Lucius T.: On Race and Philosophy. New York (Routledge), 1996, p. 53. 2 The following text passages can be found only slightly modified in the introduc­ tion to the special edition of Estudos Kantianos, cf: Rainsborough, Marita: “Introduction”. In: Jesus, Paulo; Rainsborough, Marita; Inácio, Valentim (Eds.):

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Estudos Kantianos. Kant em Africa e África em Kant (Special Edition). 9(2), Marília, Jul./Dec. 2021, pp. 10–11. Elberfeld points out that the term interculturality was used for the first time in 1922 in biology and was adopted by the arts in 1927, initially in religious studies. In the 1950s Stewart Hall developed the concept of Intercultural Communication, which resulted in the establishment of a new academic subject. It can be proven that the term was used in philosophy as early as 1947. Cf. Elberfeld, Rolf: “Forschungsperspektive ‘Interkulturalität’: Transformationen der Wissensord­ nungen in Europa”. In: Konersmann, Ralf; Krois, John Michael; Westerkamp, Dirk (Eds.): Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie. 2(1), 2008, p. 16. The term trans­ culturality has been used since the 1940s, in particular in psychology and philosophy. It is not the same as the term transculturación, used by Fernando Ortiz – already in the 1940s – and understood as cultural transformation and/or cultural change. Cf. Ortiz, Fernando: Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar. Madrid (Cátedra), 2002. In 1956 Arthur Danto, writing in a review, mentions “transcultural values” and in 1959 he describes the sciences as transcultural, emphasising the possibility of uncovering transcultural norms in scientific practice (cf. Elberfeld 2008: 22–23). Cf. Elberfeld 2008: 35. Kapumba Akenda, Jean-Chrysostome: “Die Kultivierung transversaler und transkultureller Tugenden als Voraussetzung für Interkulturalität”. In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, p. 388 (own translation). Cf. Kapumba Akenda 2011: 388. Dhouib, Sarhan: “Zur Transkulturalität der Menschenrechte” In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, p. 291 (own translation). Boteva-Richter, Bianca; Gmainer-Pranzl, Franz: “Einleitung: Auf der Suche nach Methoden interkulturellen Philosophierens”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkul­ turelles Philosophieren. 27, 2012, p. 4 (own translation). Dhouib 2011: 278–279 (own translation). Dhouib refers here to Meskini, Fethi: “Entschuldigung, Verzeihen und Rechtfertigung oder Monotheistische Politiken”. In: Poulain, Jacques; Sandkühler, Hans Jörg; Triki, Fathi (Eds.): Gerechtigkeit, Recht und Rechtfertigung in transkultureller Perspektive. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2010, pp. 138–139. Cf. Fornet-Betancourt, Raúl: “Intercultural Philosophy from a Latin American Perspective”. In: Note, Nicole; Fornet-Betancout, Raúl; Estermann, Josef; Aerts, Diederik (Eds.): Worldviews and Cultures. Philosophical Reflections from an Intercultural Perspective. Berlin (Parodos), 2009, p. 155. Fornet-Betancourt 2009: 160. Fornet-Betancourt 2009: 159. Further, he speaks of the “paradigms of liberation and interculturality” (ibid.) and of the need to counter the hegemonic model of civilisation (cf. Fornet-Betancourt 2009: 159–160). Fornet-Betancourt 2009: 160. Estermann, Josef: “Diatopische Hermeneutik am Beispiel der Andinen Philoso­ phie”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 27, 2012, p. 25 (own translation). In particular, the dialogical form of philosophising; the openness of the concept of philosophy and the notion of equal rights for different forms of philosophising distinguish intercultural philosophy from comparative philosophy. Dhouib 2011: 292 (own translation). In this context he also cites Fathi Triki: “Transculturality again [includes] the critical aspect of all cultures in order to

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determine, in a transversal and transcendent way, what could be universal and thus forms a critical corpus and constantly reaffirmed common values that should apply to humanity”. In: Triki, Fathi: “Pluralisme culturel et transculturalité”. In: Kühnhardt, Ludger; Takayama, Mamoru (Eds.): Menschenrechte, Kulturen und Gewalt. Ansätze einer interkulturellen Ethik. Baden-Baden (Nomos), 2005, p. 336 (own translation). According to Triki, cultures are linked by a transversal move­ ment which includes ontological and historical ties. On this basis, he calls for a rewriting of history which includes a ‘transcultural theory of modernity’ incor­ porating the Arab philosophy of the 12th and 19th centuries. Cf. Triki, Fathi: “Die Transkulturalität der Philosophie: Die Philosophie des Mittelmeerraums”. In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, pp. 358–369. The third space is viewed as the location for negotiation of differences and a powerful space. Culture is understood as permanent translation, whereby for Bhabha the question of origin does not arise. In contrast to the concept of transculturality he foregoes any search for commonalities, for example in the normative domain, choosing to emphasise diversity. What the terms share is the idea of an open exchange of information and cultural openness. Cf. Bhabha, Homi: “The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha”. In: Rutherford, Jona­ than (Ed.): Identity, Community, Culture, Difference. London (Lawrence & Wishart), 1990, pp. 207–221. Choe, Hyondok: “Kulturelle Vielfalt versus Gendergerechtigkeit: Über einen (Schein)konflikt aus einer Diaspora-Perspektive”. In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Trans­ kulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, p. 424 (own translation). Cf. Choe 2011: 425. She refers here to her essay Choe, Hyondok: “Migration, Gender, Transkulturalität – Philosophieren zwischen den Kulturen”. In: Sand­ kühler, Hans Jörg (Ed.): Philosophie wozu? Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2008, pp. 367–368. Cf. Choe 2011: 423. Cf. Dhouib 2011: 293. Fathi Triki refers to an “ethics of coexistence” (Triki 2011: 368). Similarly to other philosophers, Triki adopts a position of critical humanism and a shared universalism (cf. Triki 2011: 367). Cf. Bohlken, Eike: “Interkulturelle Philosophie nach transzendentaler Methode”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 27, 2012, p. 11. Kimmerle, Heinz: Afrikanische Philosophie im Kontext der Weltphilosophie. Nordhausen (Traugott Bautz), 2005, p. 7 (own translation). “World philosophy cannot and should not be a uniform entity, in which the dif­ ferent traditions and ways of thinking are suspended, but a dynamic event, in which in each case both the same and the similar as well as the different and the diverse emerge” (Kimmerle 2005: 14; own translation). “The contextual relations between African and other philosophies which exist in the world are articulated in the context of intercultural philosophy” (Kimmerle 2005: 12; own translation). It is essential in this context that the reference point of other philo­ sophies does not remain exclusively Western philosophy, but that “relations between non-Western philosophies” are added (Kimmerle 2005: 12–13; own translation). Cf. Kimmerle 2005: 11. At this congress, the African philosopher Tshiamalenga Ntumba from Zaire (today the Democratic Republic of Congo) spoke on the topic Die Philosophie in der aktuellen Situation Afrikas (Philosophy in Africa’s current situation; own translation). In 1973 he became a member of the executive committee of the Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie, which became increasingly international (cf. Elberfeld 2009: 161–162). On African

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philosophy, the Symposium on Philosophy in the Present Situation of Africa (1978) and the International Philosophical Symposium on Culture and Identity of Africa (1982) were held in Wiesbaden and Düsseldorf. They can be regarded as addi­ tional signs of the increasing relevance of African philosophy in the global con­ text. Equally noteworthy was the collaboration between African and Dutch philosophers at a symposium in Rotterdam on the topic I, We and Body. This resulted in a joint research project on intercultural philosophy. In 1991 a congress on Philosophy, Man, and Environment took place in Nairobi. Since the 1970s, African philosophers have been included in philosophical discourse with their questions and topics in English-language scientific literature. In France, however, the journal Presésence Africaine has served as a forum for African literature since 1947 and later also for African philosophy (cf. Kimmerle 2005: 11). It is regarded as a voice for proponents of the Négritude movement and Pan-Africanism. Elberfeld, Rolf: “Globale Wege der Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert: Die Welt­ kongresse für Philosophie 1900–2008”. In: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie. 34(1), 2009, p. 149 (own translation). And he continues: “Following this develop­ ment, an interculturally and globally oriented philosophy today is no longer only about primarily receiving ‘traditional’ ways of thinking in Europe, but also about discussing contemporary philosophical approaches, which have also emerged and been derived from sources beyond Europe and North America” (Elberfeld 2009: 153; own translation). Notably, the International Congress of Philosophy was renamed the World Congress of Philosophy in 1973. Ortland refers to the opening of philosophy to the world as a shift of the horizon of theorising. Cf. Ortland, Eberhard: “Horizontverschiebungen des Denkens. Der 22. Weltkongress der Phi­ losophie in Seoul 2008”. In: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie. 33/3, 1/2009, pp. 287–296. In general, this is about opening up towards Asian and Latin American philosophies etc. The World Congress, as the new name already indi­ cates, is now not only international, but global. This is reflected not only in the venues of their events such as Istanbul (Philosophy Facing World Problems, 2003) and Seoul (Rethinking Philosophy Today, 2008) − the first congress outside of Europe and North America, the 13th International Congress, took place in Mexico City in 1963 − but also in the selection of sections (e.g. Philosophy in Africa: Contemporary Issues, 2003), themes and speakers. In 1988 there were already about a dozen sections on African philosophy at the congress in Brighton. When studying the history of the congress, initially only Indian, Japanese, and Chinese philosophies were included (cf. Elberfeld 2009: 154–158). Since 1978, as was pointed out above, African philosophy has also become an important part of the congress. Although the end of World War II represented a distinct shift towards ‘global orientation’, it took until 1968 before an international panel of speakers emerged (cf. Elberfeld 2009: 159, 161). The first lecture on African phi­ losophy, entitled A Thought Pattern of Ethiopian Philosophy, was held by Cana­ dian Claude Sumner at the 15th World Congress of Philosophy in Varna in 1973 (cf. Elberfeld 2009: 161). At the Philosophical World Congress in Seoul in 2008, Asian languages (Chinese and Korean) were admitted for the first time, in addi­ tion to English, French, German, Spanish and Russian. This also illustrates an opening and decentralisation of philosophy (cf. Elberfeld 2009: 164). In 1978, the Symposium on Philosophy in the Present Situation of Africa had already taken place in Wiesbaden under the direction of Alwin Diemer. Diemer, Alwin: “Kulturidentität, interkulturelles Verstehen, Philosophie als transkultureller Dialog”. In: Diemer, Alwin (Ed.): Africa and the problem of its identity: L’Afrique et le problème de son identité: Afrika und das Problem seiner Identität. Frankfurt am Main, Bern, New York (Peter Lang), 1985, pp. 51–63. Cf. Elberfeld 2009: 162. The president of the congress at the time said, in his lec­ ture of more than thirty years ago, that: “‘First of all it can and must be said that

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for the first time in the history of mankind the equivalence of all cultures of the world is […] recognised. […] This fact requires the inter- and transcultural intel­ lectual dialogue in which the ideo-cultural horizon must be crossed. […] This is only possible in a philosophical effort that is transcultural, […] transnational and transideological; it would be a philosophical effort, perhaps to be understood as a kind of Third Enlightenment’” (ibid.; own translation). In this context, Elberfeld identifies the need for “a considerable hermeneutic effort” (Elberfeld 2009: 165; own translation). In some African countries, even before independence, university institutions were founded which depend on parent universities based in London or Paris. After formal independence, there was an initial establishment of departments of ‘Reli­ gion and Philosophy’, but philosophy soon became an independent department within the Faculty of Humanities. The curriculum is structured differently in French and English-speaking countries, focusing on the one hand on French continental philosophy and on the other on Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy. European-Western philosophy was initially the focus of attention, in particular questions of practical philosophy. Meanwhile African philosophy has become multifaceted, corresponding to the above-mentioned directions. Since 1978 numerous international congresses have been organised in Africa, e.g. Philosophy and Culture (1980) in Nairobi. Cf. Kimmerle, Heinz: Spiegelungen westlichen und afrikanischen Denkens. Nordhausen (Traugott Bautz), 2008, pp. 92–96. Hountondji, Paulin J.: African Philosophy: Myth & Reality. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press), 21996, p. 33. A reflexive self-reference is only possible in a written discourse. He is accused of falling into Eurocentric patterns of thought. Cf. Dübgen, Franziska; Skupien, Stefan: “Das Politische in der Afrika­ nischen Philosophie”. In: Dübgen, Franziska; Skupien, Stefan (Eds.): Afrikanische politische Philosophie: Postkoloniale Positionen. Berlin (Suhrkamp), 2015, p. 17. Kimmerle, on the other hand, insists on the inclusion of oral African philosophy. Houndondji subsequently changes his position on orality, also adopting a more conciliatory tone as regard ethnophilosophy, recognising its task and assigning it to sociology within the ethnosciences. See in this regard: Hountondji, Paulin J.: The Struggle for Meaning: Reflection on Philosophy, Culture, and Democracy in Africa. Athens, OH (Ohio University Press), 2002. A Belgian missionary’s account of the Bantu philosophy is regarded as the pio­ neering work of ethnophilosophy. Cf. Temples, Placide: Bantu Philosophy. Orlando (HBC Publishers), n.d. Sage philosophy explores orally conveyed ideas and concepts of sages. Odera Oruka distinguishes between folk sages and philosophical sages. The latter distin­ guish themselves through original reflexive and self-critical thinking and demon­ strate the existence of an original African philosophy as oral philosophy. This type of African philosophy, however, can be seen as a source of inspiration, a starting point for thought and a point of reference for argumentation within academic philosophy. Sage philosophy is also important for the historiography of African philosophy. Kimmerle calls this direction of African philosophy ‘political philosophy of African leaders’. It is closely linked to the struggle for independence and the establishment of formally independent African nations (cf. Kimmerle 2005: 15–23). This type of philosophy evolved at African universities and from African-born philosophers at foreign universities, primarily in the USA, where, for example, chairs of African philosophy were created in the field of Black Studies and later African-American Studies. By this Odera Oruka refers in particular to the linguistic analyses of Kwasi Wiredu, in which proverbs form the starting point for philosophical considera­ tions. The so-called ‘critical hermeneutics’ of Tsenay Serequeberhan, in which the

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specifically African horizon of experience is interpreted philosophically, is oriented differently (cf. Dübgen & Skupien 2015: 20). Dübgen & Skupien mention as examples Chinua Achebe, Ngügi wa Thiong’o and Wole Soyinka (cf. Dübgen & Skupien 2015: 21). Further works on this topic: Okolo, Mary Stella Chika: African Literature as Political Philosophy. London (Zed Books), 2007 and Mutiso, Gideon-Cyrus Makau: Socio-Political Thought in African Literature. London (Macmillan), 1974. According to Dübgen and Sku­ pien, African feminist theories are also based on artistic-literary approaches, in particular on literature and music (cf. Dübgen; Skupien 2015: 21.) They also refer to Arndt, Susan: Feminismus im Widerstreit. Afrikanischer Feminismus in Gesell­ schaft und Literatur. Munster (Unrast), 2000 and to Ogunyemi, Chikwenye: “Womanism. The Dynamics of the Contemporary Black Female Novel in Eng­ lish”. In: Phillips, Layli (Ed.): The Womanist Reader. New York (Routledge), 2006, pp. 21–36. Cf. Dübgen & Skupien 2015: 13. Also refer to: Odera Oruka, Henry: “Grundle­ gende Fragen der afrikanischen ‘Sage-Philosophy’”. In: Wimmer, Franz M. (Ed.): Vier Fragen zur Philosophie in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika. Vienna (Passagen), 1988, pp. 35–36. Cf. Eze 1997: 2–3. Eze 1997: 11–12. Although the term is not used by Foucault himself, it is closely related to his analysis of knowledge, according to which epistemes structure knowledge of a certain period. The term epistemic violence is found in particular in postcolonial theory, e.g. in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Walter D. Mignolo, who emphasises epistemic disobedience. Dhouib, a representative of intercultural philosophy, states, similarly to what a postcolonial thinker might express: “On the one hand, the ideals of freedom, equality and brotherhood are emphasized as ideals for all of humanity; on the other hand, non-European cultures and peoples in Latin America, Africa and Asia are systematically disregarded” (Dhouib 2011: 291). Nagl-Docekal, Herta; Wimmer, Franz (Eds.): Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika. Munich (Oldenbourg), 1992. The term postcolonial philosophising is unfortunately not explained in more detail. As the preface to Christian Neuge­ bauer’s selected bibliography makes clear, it seems to be primarily a temporal definition. He says: “As far as the criteria for selection are concerned, I first assumed − in view of the topic of the volume: ‘Postcolonial Philosophising: Africa’ − a temporal limitation. I chose the year 1960 as the term post quem; this year went down in history as the ‘African Year’, because at that time most African states became formally independent.” In: Neugebauer, Christian: “Wo liegt Afrika? Eine Auswahlbibliographie”. In: Nagl-Docekal, Herta; Wimmer, Franz (Eds.): Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika. Munich (Oldenbourg), 1992, p. 215 (own translation). Postcolonial philosophising thus refers to African philosophy after independence from the colonial powers. Of course, this historical change also entails subject-specific emphases in philosophising. The term is also used by Purtschert, Patricia: “Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Die westliche Denk­ geschichte gegen den Strich gelesen”. In: Reuter, Julia; Karentzos, Alexandra (Eds.): Schlüsselwerke der Postcolonial Studies. Wiesbaden (VS Verlag), 2012, pp. 343–354. It attempts to grasp postcolonial philosophy with the help of three aspects: the critique of the way in which the world is represented by Western systems of knowledge; the uncovering of Eurocentric principles and the attempt to make philosophical theorems compatible with the postcolonial project. Purt­ schert lists three modes of postcolonial philosophy: critique, self-criticism and appropriation, and she also refers in this context to pioneering Western philoso­ phers such as Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, Gramsci, Althusser, Derrida and Foucault

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(cf. Purtschert 2012: 343). Purtschert presents a definition of postcolonial philo­ sophy which is oriented towards content and thus clearly goes beyond NaglDocekal, Wimmer and Neugebauer. The concept of postcolonial philosophy therefore becomes meaningful and applicable. On the one hand, postcolonial philosophy can be characterised by a dialogue with postcolonial theory − in some cases it is even integrated into this theory − and on the other hand it can be placed in the context of intercultural or transcultural philosophy. Overall, its pri­ mary concern must be the processing of the post-colonial situation and the deco­ lonisation of thinking, feeling and acting. Philosophy is defined by the author as the following differentiation from postcolonial theory: “Both are related to the self-conception of philosophy as a discipline that is not primarily concerned with particular phenomena, but with the foundations of being and thinking. Accord­ ingly, philosophy is concerned with making statements about man, the world, society or language that are not historically or culturally confined but universally valid” (ibid.; own translation). In a postcolonial philosophy this conception of philosophy would have to be changed according to an inter- and transcultural concept in order to remain applicable. Cf. Eze 1997: 4. Eze 1997: 11–12, 15. Magobe B. Ramose says on this: “The above considerations, applied to African philosophy – including indeed the ‘wretched of the Earth’, the now more than ‘bottom billion’ – do more than suggest that for these peoples philosophy is much more than conjuring up theories, especially moral theories, that fail to recognise that philosophy proper is philopraxis. African philosophy takes philopraxis thus defined seriously. She cannot but do so because she is a philosophy of memory. A memorial philosophy that takes her anthropology and ‘his-story’ into cognisance whenever she reflects critically upon the condition of the African anthropos in its relations with other human beings on planet Earth. Her critical reflections lead ineluctably to the submission that epistemic justice is an indispensable com­ plementary to social justice. As philopraxis in pursuit of this submission, African philosophy is a practical question of life and death in the race ‘between reason and death’.” In: Ramose, Magobe B.: “Introduction: Contrasts and contests about philosophy”. In: South African Journal of Philosophy. 34(4), 2015, pp. 393–394. The theory of intertextuality has its origins in Bakhtin’s concept of dialogicity. He explores the dialogue between voices and their polyphony in the domain of lan­ guage as an art form, asserting that specific words and forms of speech are the expression of “all socioideological voices” of an era. Taking Bakhtin as her starting point, Julia Kristeva develops the term polylogue, which assumes that there is a diversity of voices in a universally understood text, and, in this context, a concept of intertextuality. Cf. Bachtin, Michail M.: Die Ästhetik des Wortes. Grübel, Rainer (Ed.). Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1979, p. 290 and Kristeva, Julia: Polylogue. Paris (Éditions Philippe Rey), 1977. The concept of intertextuality is expanded by Broich/Pfister. The authors establish six criteria which can be used to identify the intensity of intertextuality: refer­ entiality, communicability, autoreflexivity, structurality, selectivity and dialogicity. Cf. Broich, Ulrich; Pfister, Manfred (Eds.): Intertextualität. Formen, Funktionen, anglistische Fallstudien. Tübingen (Max Niemeyer), 1985. Genette has a similar theory; his concept of transtexuality differentiates between inter-, para-, meta-, hyper- and architextuality. Cf. Genette, Gérard: Palimpseste. Die Literatur auf zweiter Stufe Aesthetica. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1993. Cf. Bohlken 2012: 10. Bohlken proposes a transcendental method for intercultural philosophy which, in accordance with its Kantian archetype, begins by question­ ing the conditions for the possibility of intercultural thought, thus making itself the object of consideration. Transcendental reflection results in a relative a priori

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which aspires to the universal reconstruction of conceptuality, comprehensibility and translatability of formations of meaning (cf. Bohlken 2012: 19–20). According to Bohlken, intercultural philosophy consists of a theoretical and a practical thread, whereby the former poses questions regarding the cultural concept; uni­ versalism and relativism; intercultural understanding and the subject of inter­ cultural discourses and the latter questions regarding the fundamental ethical attitude to the cultural other; the resolution of intercultural conflicts and criteria for making judgements (cf. Bohlken 2012: 20). Estermann, writing on ‘intercultural’ hermeneutics, refers to ‘diatopical’ and/or ‘pluritopical’ hermeneutics or also ‘dia-paradigmatic’ and/or ‘poly-paradigmatic’ hermeneutics which are based on an interpretative to and from of rationality ideals which usually differ, in the sense of ‘multiple rationality’; the search for similar or equivalent functions of terms, symbols, etc. of various cultural world views and thus a specific cultural contextuality. According to Estermann, intercultural understanding must take differing cultural interpretative contexts or frameworks into consideration (cf. Estermann 2012: 30–33). When doing so, the focus is also on becoming aware of ‘blind spots’ or tacitly assumed fundamental preconditions, which requires an inter­ cultural deconstruction and also an ‘intercultural correction’ (cf. Estermann 2012: 38). Estermann says “The methodology of intercultural philosophy does not focus on the inter as an ‘ontological place’ but instead as a living, open process of a con­ tinuous to and from between different traditions of thought which, in the final ana­ lysis, means between subjects (i.e. specific individuals) who call these traditions of thought their own” (Estermann 2012: 39; own translation). Referencing of Clifford Geertz’s concept of thick description, which he develops within an ethnographic fra­ mework as a significant theory of culture and which asserts that understanding pre­ supposes a mélange of contextualisation, reconstruction of systems of meaning and sense and their deconstruction, would also be conceivable. Cf. Geertz, Clifford: Dichte Beschreibung: Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp)14, 2019. See in this context Angehrn, Emil: “Interpretation zwischen Hermeneutik und Dekonstruktion”. In: Dalferth, Ingolf U.; Stoellger, Philipp (Eds.): Interpretation in den Wissenschaften: Interpretation Interdisziplinär. Vol. 3. Würzburg (König­ shausen & Neumann), 2005, pp. 137–150. Available at: https://edoc.unibas.ch/ 14824/1/BAU_1_005251793.pdf (retrieved: 31 July 2023). Walter Benjamin explores the impossibility of similarity between the original and the translation. Benjamin, Walter: “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers”. In: Benjamin, Walter: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. IV/1. Frankfurt am Main, 1972, pp. 9–21. See on the topic of translation from the deconstructionist perspective also: Derrida, Jacques: “Babylonische Türme. Wege, Umwege, Abwege”. In: Hirsch, Alfred (Ed.): Übersetzung und Dekonstruktion. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1997, pp. 119–165. The topic of translation is a focus of African and Afrodiasporic thinkers. See on this Wiredu, Kwasi: Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1996, pp. 82, 85, 95–104. Wiredu supports the possibility of intercultural translations. African and Afro­ diasporic philosophy is also particularly concerned with the question of choice of language in the literary, philosophical and other contexts. See on this among others Thiong’o, Ngu˜ g˜ı wa: “The Language of African Literature”. In: Olaniyan, Tejumola; Quayson, Ato (Eds.): African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 82013, pp. 285–306. And: Appiah, Kwame Anthony, “African Philosophy and African Literature”. In: Wiredu, Kwasi (Ed.): A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 2006, pp. 538–548. Assmann argues that every culture creates a connective structure which has an affiliating impact in the social and temporal sense by “forming a shared space for

18 Introduction

57 58 59

60

experiences, expectations and actions”, which involves the impulses ‘memory’, ‘identity’ and ‘cultural continuation’ with their narrative and normative aspects. Cf. Assmann, Jan: Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in den frühen Hochkulturen. Munich (C.H. Beck), 52005, p. 16 (own translation). In this context, he references Maurice Halbwachs (‘collective memory’) to develop the term ‘cultural memory’, which is primarily concerned with symbols, icons and representations such as monuments and tombstones. Cultural memory shapes the traditions and communications of members of a society; it also however, results in “negative forms of forgetting by means of externalisation and suppression via manipulation, censorship, destruction and replacement” (Assmann 52005: 23; own translation). ‘Cultural memory’ is closely linked to ‘political memory’, which is in equal parts linked to a ‘partiality of memory’ and a creative reshaping of past events through the construction of a national and personal identity. Cf. Assmann, Aleida: Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses. Munich (C.H. Beck), 2003, p. 65. In this context the past is defined in a ‘social-constructionist’ manner – “a social construction which is the result of the need for meaning and the frame of refer­ ence of the relevant presents; the past is not a natural construct, it is a cultural concept” (Assmann 52005, 47–48; own translation). Cf. Assmann, Aleida: Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur: Eine Intervention. Munich (C.H. Beck), 2013. Mabe, Jacob Emmanuel: Vom kollektiven Gedächtnis zur Konvergenzhistorik – Afrikanische und europäische Erinnerungen an den Kolonialismus hinterfragt: Wissenschaftlicher Aufsatz. Munich (Grin), 2005, p. 1 (own translation). Cf. Mabe 2005: 3 (own translation). Mabe says specifically: “A memory is [considered] communicative if it originates from humans’ shared experience with history.” In addi­ tion to this, Mabe differentiates it from transcendental memory, which serves individual recognition, action and memory (cf. Mabe 2005: 3; own translation). Mabe believes that the term collective memory is unsuitable as a tool to examine colonialism since it “has very little capacity to prevent politically and ideologically motivated abuse of the memory term” (Mabe 2005: 3; own translation). The development of an ethical per­ spective is required within the scope of shared work to remember the past (cf. Mabe 2005: 5). “The creation of a shared ethical principle is indispensable for an interpreta­ tion of history which is both non-ideological and also transcends and bridges cultures” (Mabe 2005: 5: own translation). In this context the focus is on recognising “– colonialism […] as an important element of history” (Mabe 2005: 6; own translation). Mabe 2005: 4 (own translation).

Bibliography Angehrn, Emil: “Interpretation zwischen Hermeneutik und Dekonstruktion”. In: Dalferth, Ingolf U.; Stoellger, Philipp (Eds.): Interpretation in den Wissenschaften: Interpretation Interdisziplinär. Vol. 3. Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 2005, pp. 137–150. Available at: https://edoc.unibas.ch/14824/1/BAU_1_005251793. pdf (retrieved: 31 July 2023). Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “African Philosophy and African Literature”. In: Wiredu, Kwasi (Ed.): A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 2006, pp. 538–548. Arndt, Susan: Feminismus im Widerstreit. Afrikanischer Feminismus in Gesellschaft und Literatur. Munster (Unrast), 2000. Assmann, Aleida: Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses. Munich (C.H. Beck), 2003.

Introduction

19

Assmann, Aleida: Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur: Eine Intervention. Munich (C.H. Beck), 2013. Assmann, Jan: Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in den frühen Hochkulturen. Munich (C.H. Beck), 52005. Bachtin, Michail M.: Die Ästhetik des Wortes. Grübel, Rainer (Ed.). Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1979. Benjamin, Walter: “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers”. In: Benjamin, Walter: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. IV/1. Frankfurt am Main, 1972, pp. 9–21. Bernasconi, Robert: “African Philosophy’s Challenge to Continental Philosophy”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (Ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Cambridge, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, pp. 183–196. Bhabha, Homi: “The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha”. In: Rutherford, Jonathan (Ed.): Identity, Community, Culture, Difference. London (Lawrence & Wishart), 1990, pp. 207–221. Bohlken, Eike: “Interkulturelle Philosophie nach transzendentaler Methode”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 27, 2012, pp. 5–20. Boteva-Richter, Bianca; Gmainer-Pranzl, Franz: “Einleitung: Auf der Suche nach Methoden interkulturellen Philosophierens”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 27, 2012, pp. 2–4. Broich, Ulrich; Pfister, Manfred (Eds.): Intertextualität. Formen, Funktionen, anglistische Fallstudien. Tübingen (Max Niemeyer), 1985. Choe, Hyondok: “Migration, Gender, Transkulturalität – Philosophieren zwischen den Kulturen”. In: Sandkühler, Hans Jörg (Ed.): Philosophie wozu? Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2008, pp. 349–368. Choe, Hyondok: “Kulturelle Vielfalt versus Gendergerechtigkeit: Über einen (Schein) konflikt aus einer Diaspora-Perspektive”. In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, pp. 412–426. Derrida, Jacques: “Babylonische Türme. Wege, Umwege, Abwege”. In: Hirsch, Alfred (Ed.): Übersetzung und Dekonstruktion. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1997, pp. 119–165. Dhouib, Sarhan: “Zur Transkulturalität der Menschenrechte”. In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, pp. 278–296. Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011. Diemer, Alwin: “Kulturidentität, interkulturelles Verstehen, Philosophie als transkul­ tureller Dialog”. In: Diemer, Alwin (Ed.): Africa and the Problem of its Identity: L’Afrique et le problème de son identité: Afrika und das Problem seiner Identität. Frankfurt am Main (Peter Lang), 1985, pp. 51–63. Dübgen, Franziska; Skupien, Stefan: “Das Politische in der Afrikanischen Philoso­ phie”. In: Dübgen, Franziska; Skupien, Stefan (Eds.): Afrikanische politische Philosophie: Postkoloniale Positionen. Berlin (Suhrkamp), 2015, pp. 9–52. Elberfeld, Rolf: “Forschungsperspektive ‘Interkulturalität’: Transformationen der Wissensordnungen in Europa”. In: Konersmann, Ralf; Krois, John Michael; Westerkamp, Dirk (Eds.): Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie. 2(1), 2008, pp. 7–36. Elberfeld, Rolf: “Globale Wege der Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert: Die Weltkon­ gresse für Philosophie 1900–2008”. In: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie. 34(1), 2009, pp. 149–167.

20 Introduction Estermann, Josef: “Diatopische Hermeneutik am Beispiel der Andinen Philosophie”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 27, 2012, pp. 21–40. Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Cambridge, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 1997. Fornet-Betancourt, Raúl: “Intercultural Philosophy from a Latin American Perspec­ tive”. In: Note, Nicole; Fornet-Betancout, Raúl; Estermann, Josef; Aerts, Diederik (Eds.): Worldviews and Cultures. Philosophical Reflections from an Intercultural Perspective. Berlin (Parodos), 2009, pp. 149–161. Geertz, Clifford: Dichte Beschreibung: Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 142019. Genette, Gérard: Palimpseste. Die Literatur auf zweiter Stufe Aesthetica. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1993. Hountondji, Paulin J.: African Philosophy: Myth & Reality. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press), 21996. Hountondji, Paulin J.: The Struggle for Meaning: Reflection on Philosophy, Culture, and Democracy in Africa. Athens, OH (Ohio University Press), 2002. Kapumba Akenda, Jean-Chrysostome: “Die Kultivierung transversaler und trans­ kultureller Tugenden als Voraussetzung für Interkulturalität”. In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philosophie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, pp. 388–402. Kimmerle, Heinz: Afrikanische Philosophie im Kontext der Weltphilosophie. Nordhausen (Traugott Bautz), 2005. Kimmerle, Heinz: Spiegelungen westlichen und afrikanischen Denkens. Nordhausen (Traugott Bautz), 2008. Kristeva, Julia: Polylogue. Paris (Éditions Philippe Rey), 1977. Mabe, Jacob Emmanuel: Vom kollektiven Gedächtnis zur Konvergenzhistorik – Afri­ kanische und europäische Erinnerungen an den Kolonialismus hinterfragt: Munich (Grin), 2005. Meskini, Fethi: “Entschuldigung, Verzeihen und Rechtfertigung oder Mono­ theistische Politiken”. In: Poulain, Jacques; Sandkühler, Hans Jörg; Triki, Fathi (Eds.): Gerechtigkeit, Recht und Rechtfertigung in transkultureller Perspektive. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2010, pp. 137–160. Mutiso, Gideon-Cyrus Makau: Socio-Political Thought in African Literature. London (Macmillan), 1974. Nagl-Docekal, Herta; Wimmer, Franz (Eds.): Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika. Munich (Oldenbourg), 1992. Neugebauer, Christian: “Wo liegt Afrika? Eine Auswahlbibliographie”. In: NaglDocekal, Herta; Wimmer, Franz (Eds.): Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika. Munich (Oldenbourg), 1992, pp. 214–246. Odera Oruka, Henry: “Grundlegende Fragen der afrikanischen ‘Sage-Philosophy’”. In: Wimmer, Franz M. (Ed.): Vier Fragen zur Philosophie in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika. Vienna (Passagen), 1988, pp. 35–54. Ogunyemi, Chikwenye: “Womanism. The Dynamics of the Contemporary Black Female Novel in English”. In: Phillips, Layli (Ed.): The Womanist Reader. New York (Routledge), 2006, pp. 21–36. Okolo, Mary Stella Chika: African Literature as Political Philosophy. London (Zed Books), 2007. Ortiz, Fernando: Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar. Madrid (Cátedra), 2002.

Introduction

21

Ortland, Eberhard: “Horizontverschiebungen des Denkens. Der 22. Weltkongress der Philosophie in Seoul 2008”. In: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie. 33(3), 2009, pp. 287–296. Outlaw, Lucius T.: On Race and Philosophy. New York (Routledge), 1996. Purtschert, Patricia: “Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Die westliche Denkgeschichte gegen den Strich gelesen”. In: Reuter, Julia; Karentzos, Alexandra (Eds.): Schlüsselwerke der Postcolonial Studies. Wiesbaden (VS Verlag), 2012, pp. 343–354. Ramose, Magobe B.: “Introduction: Contrasts and contests about philosophy”. In: South African Journal of Philosophy. 34(4), 2015, pp. 391–394. Temples, Placide: Bantu Philosophy. Orlando, FL (HBC Publishers), n.d. Thiong’o, Ngu˜ g˜ı wa: “The Language of African Literature”. In: Olaniyan, Tejumola; Quayson, Ato (Eds.): African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 82013, pp. 285–306. Triki, Fathi: “Pluralisme culturel et transculturalité”. In: Kühnhardt, Ludger; Takayama, Mamoru (Eds.): Menschenrechte, Kulturen und Gewalt. Ansätze einer interkulturellen Ethik. Baden-Baden (Nomos), 2005, pp. 323–340. Triki, Fathi: “Die Transkulturalität der Philosophie: Die Philosophie des Mittel­ meerraums”. In: Dhouib, Sarhan; Jürgens, Andreas (Eds.): Wege in der Philoso­ phie: Geschichte – Wissen – Recht – Transkulturalität. Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft), 2011, pp. 358–369. Wiredu, Kwasi: Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1996.

Part I

Rethinking Kant. Contemporary African philosophy and Kant

1

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism

On the Kantian concepts of person and humanity Kant embeds man in a holistic concept of complex relationships with nature, the cosmos and the world, also in political-historical terms.1 He notes in the chapter “The character of species” in his work Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798): So it presents the human species not as evil, but as a species of rational beings that strives among obstacles to rise out of evil in constant pro­ gress toward the good. In this its volition is generally good, but achievement is difficult because one cannot expect to reach the goal by the free agreement of individuals, but only by a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united.2 (Anth, AA 07: 333) To achieve moral perfection, human beings need a cosmopolitan system whose organisational structure supports the moral endeavour of the person. In this context, Kant emphasises the cultural orientation of man, particularly as regards the perfectibility of human beings as a species which is destined to develop its talents in the course of history through progression.3 Human morality is at the centre of his concept of man as the perfection of the person and humanity, and his practical philosophy includes a universalist compo­ nent in the form of the categorical imperative, the a priori principle of prac­ tical reason. Man obtains dignity through Kant’s formula of the end in itself, demonstrating the ability to gain autonomy and freedom, particularly in his morality, aspects of which essentially determine Kant’s concept of man. Kant analyses man in terms of his potential; the decisive factor is what man makes of himself. This comprises the realisation of a ‘moral and legal humanity’ in the sense of the normative understanding of the concept within us, which also focuses on the human right to freedom and dignity. “Freedom (inde­ pendence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-3

26 Rethinking Kant the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity”4 (MS, AA 06:237). The realisation of the regulative principle of a “humanity within us” (MS, AA 06:436) understood as “perfect humanity”5 (KrV A568 / B596) is a task for all of humanity. The concept of humanity in our own person refers to the idea of man as an end in itself, in which the person embodies the intelligent nature of man in terms of his moral being. Kant summarises the free and independent qualities of the individual in the “idea of personality, awakening respect” (KpV, AA 05:87). Kant’s concept of the person focuses on the aspect of the idea of the ‘I’6 as well as the attribution of actions in relation to the subject as “being endowed with the power of practical reason and consciousness of freedom of his power of choice” (Anth, AA 07:324). This concept also implies duties as regards the person, whose free and self-determined actions are to be respected. Thus the concept of the person implies both the possibility of a reflexive relationship to oneself as well as the aspect of interpersonal relationships, whereby moral action pre­ supposes having to assimilate the points of view of “every other rational being, as lawgiving beings (who for this reason are also called persons)”7 (GMS, AA 04:438). The term ‘person’ in Kant’s work thus emphasises in particular the moral autonomy of the individual, which culminates in selfdetermined action; their freedom and the claim to esteem and respect. The ability to share the other’s perspective is the precondition for respectful interaction with one another and a recognition of the other’s dignity. The principle of the ‘humanity in us’ refers to the inherent forward-looking character of the person as being human, which generally focuses on the per­ fection of humans’ historical development. This is a reflection of the special nature of the person’s moral, legal and political position within the scope of humanity as a moral-political project. The theorem of teleology in The Critique of the Power of Judgment8 (1790) provides the justification for Kant’s idea of progress, while his seemingly utopian philosophy of history provides its political framework. The focus is on the contextual integration of the person, even if Kant’s critical endeavours may initially have a solipsistic appeal. The analysis of human reason and its relation to the subject does not exclude interpersonal aspects, communication and the relation to the other, even though Kant develops the principle of morality based not on human coexistence, but on an a priori of practical reason. Kant also considers economic activity to be linked to the perfection of man in terms of civilisation, culture and morals within the scope of perfecting the human species over the course of history. It is the spirit of trade, which cannot coexist with war, which will, sooner or later, take hold of every people. Since, among all of the powers (means) subordinate to state authority, the power of money is likely the most reliable, states find themselves forced (admittedly not by motiva­ tions of morality) to promote a noble peace and, wherever in the world war threatens to break out, to prevent it by means of negotiations, just

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 27 as if they were therefore members of a lasting alliance. For the great alliances for the purpose of waging war, as is the nature of the matter, can arise only very rarely, and even more seldom can they succeed.9 (ZeF, AA 08:368) In the preface to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View a cosmo­ politan conception of human nature; knowledge of man as a citizen of the world, becomes apparent. The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of think­ ing in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world. – This much belongs to anthropology. As for what concerns this distinc­ tion according to metaphysical concepts, it lies entirely beyond the field of the science treated here. That is to say, if the question were merely whether I as a thinking being have reason to assume, in addition to my own existence, the existence of a whole of other beings existing in community with me (called the world), then the question is not anthropological but merely metaphysical.10 (Anth, AA 07:130) According to Kant, a way of thinking which goes beyond the person is open to diversity and plurality. In Kant’s anthropology, the self-conception of the individual as a citizen of the world is the starting point for his pre­ occupation with man. Pragmatic anthropology focuses on “what he as a freeacting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” (Anth, AA 07:119). Kant’s anthropological considerations must thus be considered in combination with his cosmopolitically oriented historical-philosophical conception and substantiate it. Kant’s theorem of ‘unsociable sociability’ can be regarded as the core of his philosophy of intersubjectivity and, parallel to this, as a motor for the realisation of humanity within us. Man proves to be “a socially antisocial being [in his behaviour] towards his fellow human beings”.11 Kant applies the theorem to domestic, intergovernmental and global processes, thus adding a political dimension to his theory of inter­ subjectivity.12 Antagonism thus allows us to “understand the dichotomy […] between individualism and the desire to belong on a small scale, between nationalism and globalization on a large scale”.13 This applies equally to the conflict between particularism and universalism and between the local and global. This theorem in particular demonstrates the significance of Kant’s philosophy of history for his overall philosophical concept. “Kant regards history as the space of being in which man can accomplish his humanity in an approximating and optimizing manner.”14 Belwe continues: The unsociable sociability of human beings is defined as anthropological fact. Without the antagonism of different natural predispositions, without

28 Rethinking Kant the antagonism between the individual and society as a mechanism of competition and self-assertion, the natural predispositions on which they are based could not be refined, nor could they differentiate man as a social and individual being, because only as a social being can man become an individual being. Man can only become an autonomous as well as a socially competent individual if he has become a social being.15 Humans as individual and social beings are thus also closely related to each other in Kant’s theory, which is generally not emphasised clearly enough in Kant’s reception. In addition to the individual being, which harbours human reason, the theoretical significance of humans as social beings is usually underestimated or forgotten. The very desire for recognition and prestige is the expression of mutual interdependencies in spite of all the unsociable qualities of man. Kant’s concept of broadened thought also presupposes the inclusion of the other and emphasises thinking from the other’s perspective as the intellectual realisation of other modes of thought and positions in order to qualify one’s point of view and achieve the respect of others on the basis of human dignity. Broadened thought counterbalances universal think­ ing in Kant’s philosophy. This theorem in particular also enables us to think intercultural philosophy from a Kantian perspective. Kant’s universalism in his concept of man, which is based in particular on human reason and morality, is impeded, but not suspended, by the differ­ ences in race and gender which he observes. Kant’s imperfect universalism and egalitarianism is rightly criticised time and again, but this does not alter the validity of his basic theorems. His concept of cosmopolitanism attempts, among other things, to regulate global international trade relations by means of contractual agreements and the establishment of international as well as cosmopolitan law and to legitimise them. He thus creates a basis for the establishment of republics which, according to Kant, will gradually be transformed on a voluntary basis into a federal federation at a global level whose goal is perpetual peace. In his philosophy Kant claims to present universal knowledge in the sense of universal validity, guaranteed by the apriority of reason. The cornerstone of his cosmopolitan concept is his nor­ mative view of man, humanity and the person, whose realisation in the his­ torical process is conceived on the basis of fundamental teleological assumptions. The realisation of humanity within us therefore requires the cosmopolitan orientation of his philosophy.

Kant’s cosmopolitan concept Kant’s essay Toward Perpetual Peace is the central point of reference for cosmopolitan thought. Within the scope of the essay Kant develops both a theory of politics16 as well as also a theory of political action, whereby his concern is with issues of legitimacy and a definition of the political. In Kant’s work the basis for the theory of politics is the theory of rights17 –

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 29 rationalism, natural law, human rights – interlinked with a personal claim to freedom and a will to implement reforms. The law of nations is supplemented by a right to world citizenship, which is conceived as a right to visit other nations. According to Volker Gerhardt “peace [is] ‘the foundation, the char­ acteristic and the norm’ of the political”18 in Kant’s work. Wars have, in Kant’s view, lost their cultivating function: “War has historically outlived itself.”19 The colonisation of the entire planet which has now taken place is the geographical precondition for this development towards peace. In addi­ tion to this, the culture-endowing and moral achievements of war have become obsolete, in particular with regard to their motivational role for the creation of human communities as the impulse for nation-building. In this context Kant refers to the “Devil’s race” (366/B 60f.) which is unable to prevent peace: “Peace is thus attainable. Nature is not an obstacle to it. Most certainly not human nature. On the contrary: If human beings were only to put into action what nature has equipped them with, then it would be nature itself which guarantees peace.”20 Gerhardt continues: Those rights whose development has previously been promoted by war are now so far developed that they can only be harmed by future wars. As a result states can, and must, also enter into legally compliant rela­ tionships with one another, regulating their external dealings in a peaceable manner.21 ‘Distress’ forces the states to do so. A federation of states comprising those with republican constitutions becomes necessary. Kant believes that it would be unrealistic to expect a world republic to be established; it would also bring with it the risk of despotism. Republicanism makes politics the task of the citizen. 22 Gerhardt writes in this regard “Politics is the self-determination of a ‘society of humans’ and the state is its organ.”23 This union for peace should not, however, be invested with any powers of its own.24 A republican form of organisation; global trade and a political transparency which requires publicity and can, in general, be viewed as global transparency, promote the trend towards peace which embodies an ‘intention of nature’. Habermas comments in this context: In order to solve this problem Kant develops a philosophy of history with a cosmopolitan intent which is intended to make plausible the ‘unanimity of politics with morals’ which originates from a concealed ‘intention of nature’ and appears at first glance to be improbable.25 The “epistemological link which subjects nature and history to the condi­ tions of human knowledge and actions”26 identified by Kant is, according to Gerhardt, still not appreciated enough. According to Kant the reason why we may, in the final instance, be so confident in this expectation is that the epistemic conditions of our

30 Rethinking Kant understanding of nature are, in their origins, linked to the constitutive conditions of our actions. We have absolutely no means of escaping nature, of which we, particularly in our reasonable desires, are part and which we imagine in the analogy of our desires. The inner expediency of the nature we imagine in accordance with our own expediency makes it impossible for culture to contradict it – assuming (and I specifically repeat it here) human beings remain beings which act upon the basis of their comprehension and are thus reasonable beings. 27 The concept of nature is, in this context, cosmologically focused on the dynamic overall context which also references culture, includes order, expedience and beauty and may only be understood in the analogy of the ‘as if ’. The cosmological and teleological concepts of nature are closely inter­ linked: “Kant thus places politics within the context of nature which is viewed as a large whole of a teleological nature.”28 Furthermore: Only a teleological view of nature provides the means required for a theo­ retical justification of the term history. This term not only presupposes an integrated model of life composed of the past, present and future, but also, of necessity, assumes a continuity between natural events and human acts. […] We thus have the epistemological licence to suppose that there may be intersections between nature, history and the nature we desire.29 The result is the “embedding of politics in nature”,30 a concept developed by Kant and which, according to Gerhardt, has not yet been fully exhausted. Kant’s idea of a right to world citizenship – a right to visit other nations – represents a new paradigm capable of further development. “The right to world citizenship brings with it a legislative innovation: People are entitled to positive rights irrespective of their specific nationality.”31 It guarantees a guest the entitlement to assistance, protection and a temporary period of tolerance on the part of a foreign state. It is precisely in this aspect that we can identify a further element of the Kantian concept which is capable of further develop­ ment. Kant’s literary fiction of a peace treaty is not a utopia but rather offers an explanation of the political, of the principles to be complied with and the specific concepts for action and/or a strategy for political action.32

Equality, universalism and world citizenship in Kant’s cosmopolitanism Kant speaks out against elitist cosmopolitanism, as advocated by Wieland for example, advocating an egalitarian position which views man as a being of reason and thus rationality33 as a basic prerequisite for morality and pol­ itics. “Kant designated all humans, qua rational beings, as fellow citizens of a shared moral world.”34 According to Kant, participation in the moral com­ munity of all human beings by being human also requires a legal structure of society, in which particular obligations apply but may also be transcended. In

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 31 addition to this, Kant understands cosmopolitanism as an attitude, as Kleingeld emphasises: Instead, in Kant’s view, cosmopolitism is an attitude taken up in acting: an attitude of recognition, respect, openness, interest, beneficence and concern toward other human individuals, cultures, and peoples as mem­ bers of one global community. One need not travel at all to merit the designation of being a citizen of the world.35 The rational nature of man embodies a global commonality which underlies moral as well as legal and political action. Kant’s political cosmopolitanism is linked to both an epistemic and also an ethical cosmopolitanism, whereby universal principles in the domain of cognition as regards the apriority of sensibility; understanding and reason; and morals together with the a priori practical principle in the form of the categorical imperative form the foun­ dation of his political concept. Kant thus understands world citizenship on the one hand in the sense of the Stoa, namely as membership in a moral world community, but, on the other, also as the quality of attitudes and actions in the domains of culture, economy and politics, which presuppose global international institutions for their practice.36 According to Kleingeld, a shift can be observed in Kant’s conception of a federation of states away from a global union in the essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784), in which the loose confederation of states is initially seen only as a first step on the path to a closer federation, towards a federal league of nations, which is propagated in the essay Toward Perpetual Peace.37 Over time, Kant became increasingly aware of the danger of despotism associated with a world republic. He therefore opted for a federation for pragmatic reasons rather than out of a fundamental opposition.38 Kant argues that the cosmopolitan objective is therefore an international state as a voluntary federation encompassing all the states of the world and not a world republic established by coercion.39 He asserts that it is only through the voluntary nature of the unification process that the tendency towards armed conflicts between states on the path to perpetual but constantly precarious peace can be tamed and that legal and institutional solutions can be achieved. In The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant speaks instead of a league of nations and also of a union of states and permanent congress of states (MS, AA 06:350), conceivable as a federal state of states, and emphasises its character as an aspirational ideal. He asserts that cosmopolitanism is clearly more than an individualistic nomadism in a global world and should not, or not only, be understood as a concept of global justice and the idea of a uniformly governed world. He is concerned with the pacification of the world through autonomy and cooperation in legal and institutional contexts which are based on morality. In Kant’s view, cosmopolitanism and patriotism are certainly compatible.40 Kant’s patriotism as a form of consideration of particular interests is,

32 Rethinking Kant however, not unconditional and does not refer to the country of birth itself, but instead is primarily linked to the just political system of a state. “In the older tradition of republicanism, patriotism is the citizens’ commitment to or love for their shared political freedom and the institutions that sustain it.”41 The intended participation of the citizen in the state presupposes or pro­ motes a patriotic feeling. According to Kant, this point of view enables the individual to make his loyalty to a state dependent on conditions of citizen­ ship. Kant’s reconciliation of patriotism and cosmopolitanism is based on the fact that freedom, equality and independence of citizens in self-legislative processes create a community which makes it possible to identify with both active citizenship in the individual state and in the confederation of states.42 For him patriotism is rooted in republicanism, which he defines as a representative system with a separation of powers.43 This duty is not based on consent or received benefits but flows from the special role citizens play in a republic. This is a role that they can play only for the republic in which they are citizens. Therefore, one could usefully distinguish this form of patriotism from other versions by calling it ‘civic patriotism’.44 According to Kleingeld’s interpretation, this ‘civic patriotism’ in Kant’s work results in a more peaceful world.45 The above-mentioned relationship between patriotism and cosmopolitan­ ism can be seen as an attempt to link universalism and particularism in Kant’s work and is thus of crucial importance for his critical reception, especially in the African and Afrodiasporic context. For example, in order to provide a justification for local ties to a nation.

Kant’s universalism and his concept of race Kant argues that humanity exhibits both commonalities and also differences. Sensory-affective disposition and an endowment with reason are shared human characteristics, as demonstrated in Kant’s anthropology and his cri­ tiques. He develops a concept of race based on the theory of hereditability and adaptation to climatic and geographic conditions in order to explain differences. His starting point is a human tribe, and/or a ‘phyletic species’ (Stammgattung)’ (cf. VvRM, AA 02:440), which develops into a variety of races based on their existing dispositions as affected by differences in the geography and climate of their corresponding locations. He refers to nature’s caring role within the context of the possibility of the ‘unfolding’ of micro­ organisms and predispositions (cf. VvRM, AA 02:434). While this idea represents an attempt to build an egalitarian concept based on biological facts, it is, however, continuously undermined by cultural-moral judgments concerning various races. Kant argues that the closest relations to the phy­ letic species are “inhabitants that are white, however they are brunette”

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 33 (VvRM, AA 02:441). The various races display widely divergent character­ istics as regards appearance, character and cultural and moral capabilities.46 Kant asserts that non-whites are incapable of ruling themselves (cf. Refl, AA 15:877–878). Many passages in Kant’s writings include statements which instrumentalise non-whites or reflect a paternalistic attitude (cf. for example: V-Anth Ko, AA 25:362–365; V-PG, AA 26:178, 189; V-PG, AA 26:236, 238; VvRM, AA 2:438–439). These views are diametrically opposed to Kant’s egalitarian understanding of humans, which appears to be conceived in Eurocentric terms, and to his epistemic and moral universalism, resulting in an inconsistent universalism or egalitarianism. Bernasconi speaks of a “tension within Kant’s philosophy between his racism and his universalism.”47 Philosophical debate concerning this aspect of Kant’s work is the subject of much controversy. One group disputes its significance for Kant’s philosophy,48 while another regards it as an influence on his central concepts.49 When discussing Kant’s work, Mills (2005) assumes that the concept of the person presupposes a classification and hierarchisation, referring to so-called ‘subpersons’.50 Kleingeld, in turn, demonstrates that Kant’s concept of the person is linked to the ability to be rational and cannot be viewed in the context of hierarchising classifications. She argues that discussions of Kant’s work since the 1990s have undergone a rethinking as regards the inter-related aspects of race and colonialism, refer­ encing Kant’s Second Thoughts,51 a theory which is questioned in particular by Bernasconi (2011).52 Kant’s change in attitude can be seen in particular in his concept of cosmopolitan rights, as discussed in his works Toward Perpe­ tual Peace and The Metaphysics of Morals. Colonial rule over a daughter by a mother country is described as a ‘loss of dignity’ (cf. MS, AA 06:348) and a colonial status is argued to be irreconcilable with political autonomy. In the essay On the common saying: that may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793) paternalist rule is described as despotic (cf. TP, AA 08:290– 291). This point of view, illustrated with examples from Greek antiquity and British history, is also applied to European colonialism. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant argues that: we should not be authorized to found colonies, by force if need be, in order to establish a civil union with them and bring these human beings (savages) into a rightful condition (as with the American Indians, the Hottentots and the inhabitants of New Holland); or (which is not much better), to found colonies by fraudulent purchase of their land, and so become owners of their land, making use of our superiority without regard for their first possession. (MS, AA 06:266) In Toward Perpetual Peace he criticises European use of force in the colonial context (cf. ZeF, AA 08:358–359). For example:

34 Rethinking Kant If one compares with this the inhospitable behavior of civilized, especially commercial, states in our part of the world, the injustice they show in visiting foreign lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to horrifying lengths. When America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, to them, countries belonging to no one, since they counted the inhabitants as nothing. (ZeF, AA 08:358) Paternalism is replaced by negotiation of contracts and the goal of achieving consensus (cf. MS, AA 06:353). The trade in black slaves is explicitly criti­ cised as an infringement of the rights of world citizenship (cf. VA, AA 23:174), as is the enslavement of the indigenous peoples of the American continent (cf. VA, AA 23:173–174). Kant does, however, tolerate the presence of colonists in some countries, such as the German colonies in Russia. He thus argues that immigration and emigration as well as banishment to the provinces which are based on a legal structure should be possible. In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View he refers only in passing to the topic of ‘race’, in a very short section entitled ‘On the character of the races’, focusing on the necessity of the “heterogeneity of individuals” (Anth, AA 07:321) in the context of racial differences. The topic appears to have lost its significance or to have been reduced to the role of a rationalising function for the diversity of the human race, which, equally, represents the starting point for the use of the term. Kant’s political philosophy now primarily empha­ sises, not only in moral but also political terms – in particular based on the concept of the rights of world citizenship (cf. ZeF, AA 08:357–360; MS, AA 06:352–353; Refl, AA 23:174) – equality and universality in the context of the individual and co-existence in a republican-oriented league of nations, which should ensure perpetual peace on the basis of legal agreements.53 Rights of world citizenship;54 conditions of universal hospitality and a right to make visits which does not, however, represent a right to remain, govern relation­ ships with citizens of other states and of states with one another, so far as this is not defined by international contracts. They also form the basis for worldwide development of a voluntary, federal cosmopolitanism which will promote global communications; interrelationships, particularly the exchange of goods; and peaceful coexistence. The theorem of the right of world citi­ zenship is considered to be one of the key achievements of Kantian philoso­ phy, since it provides a theoretical basis for, and demands, the rights of the individual vis-à-vis states and communities of states. It thus goes beyond the limits of citizens’ rights and national and international public law, forming a central element of the new legal concept of cosmopolitanism. The right of world citizenship contributes to the political freedom and autonomy of the individual, protecting them against a lack of rights vis-à-vis national, inter­ national and transnational institutions and thus making it the theoretical basis for human rights.

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 35

Kant in African and Afrodiasporic philosophy In African and Afrodiasporic philosophy Immanuel Kant, the philosopher of the Enlightenment, remains a crucial point of reference for intercultural dialogue, although an embittered conflict concerning the interpretation of what is asserted to be a problematic link between universalism and latent racism in his work still rages today. As one of the most important catalysts for contemporary cosmopolitanism;55 the establishment of human rights and the creation of transnational institutions,56 he is also an indispensable ele­ ment in the African and Afrodiasporic context. Kant is a dialogue partner for epistemic, ethical and political issues as well as for a critical exploration of aspects such as critique, individual autonomy and ability to act. Critical investigation of Kant’s ethical concept is thus of great significance in aca­ demic African and Afrodiasporic contemporary philosophy – for example in the work of Wiredu and Gyekye. In this context, the focuses of interest when critically rereading Kant are the idea of the autonomy of self-legislation, according to which the individual provides themselves with moral laws by applying the categorical imperative, which only examines the generalisability of personal maxims, and the formula of the end in itself, according to which the individual should, when seen from a moral point of view, never be trea­ ted simply as a means but always at the same time as an end. As is the case in Kant’s work, the ethical considerations of African and Afrodiasporic thinkers culminate in political visions. African and Afrodiasporic philosophy also critically evaluates Kant’s epistemic ideas. Kant argues that the possibi­ lity of objective, true cognition is based on the apriority of the human cog­ nitive faculty in the a priori forms of sensibility; the categories of understanding and the regulative principles of reason, which are attributed to all rational beings equally. The apriority of theoretical reason is the founda­ tion for the universality of human cognition, just as the categoric imperative as an a priori principle in the domain of practical reason ensures the uni­ versality of morals. The principles of the a priori elements of theoretical and practical reason form the basis for the equality of all humans, facilitating cross-border understanding between and the coexistence and cooperation of differing individuals and cultures. Kant’s ethical and epistemic universalism is thus, among other things, a central issue within the scope of critical exploration of his philosophy in contemporary African philosophy. In this context, interest focuses in particular on the question of the necessity of universal thought as well as on the issue of appropriate consideration of the particular, plurality and diversity in the various spheres and dimensions. Kant’s essay Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) is considered to be one of the philosopher’s most important works and its cosmopolitan orientation is still of particular, and even existential, importance today: “In our century, this topic has become literally a matter of life and death for the entire planet.”57 Kant views the possibilities for perpetual peace as being defined by the his­ torical process within the scope of which nature delineates the development

36 Rethinking Kant of the faculties provided to the human race. “But in comparison with the idea of possible rational beings on Earth in general, the characteristic of the human species is this: that nature has planted in it the seed of discord, and has willed that its own reason bring concord out of this, or at least the con­ stant approximation to it”58 (Anth, AA 07:322). Kant believes that the cos­ mopolitan task of humans is based, in particular, on their rationality; their moral condition; in world citizenship and in the concept of a federation of states. It is also linked to the project of Enlightenment. In this context, he presupposes the parallelism of the paths of rationality and nature, which provides the grounds for optimism as regards the achievability of cosmopo­ litan goals. Is Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism still relevant today? Wood states: Kant’s time, of course, is no longer ours. In the past two centuries, his Enlightenment project has been developed and expanded, meeting with both victories and defeats. Right now, it is under attack from many sides. Its confidence in reason is assailed both with corrosive forms of scepticism and by enthusiasms new and old.59 How is this process of criticism of, and disillusionment with Kant’s cosmo­ politan project expressed in contemporary African or Afrodiasporic philo­ sophy? These questions will serve as the basis for a discussion of Partial Cosmopolitanism by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Achille Mbembe’s Afropolitanism. According to Balakrishnan (2017) it has been possible to speak of a ‘cos­ mopolitan turn’ in Africa and the African diaspora in combination “with a new wave of optimism”60 at the very latest since 2000. Appiah’s essay “Cos­ mopolitan Patriots” (1997) introduces this trend in African Studies, while his work Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2006), which focuses on shared moral values, “extra-local forms of belonging” and “a cosmopoli­ tan self-styling”, represents an important milestone in this development.61 The cosmopolitan focus of contemporary African philosophy marks a break with emancipatory concepts such as Pan-Africanism, which were built on racial differences and focused in particular on a more positive assessment of black people, and a move to cosmopolitan thinking based on the universality of being human – a “post-racial universalism”.62 In contrast to Kant’s ‘Enlightenment legacy’, the universalising principle which unites humans in Appiah’s work is no longer reason but a human coexistence which is based on habits and originates from shared ethics. In Partial Cosmopolitanism he develops a cosmopolitan system of ethics based on a minimal moral con­ sensus. Mbembe’s Afropolitanism (2007) defines cosmopolitanism in a plur­ alistic sense as the possibility of the emancipatory politics of a “futuristic post-racial order”.63 Mogobe Ramose demands “[transcendence of the] dogmatic dimension of cosmopolitanism”,64 which is already expressed in the ‘ism’ and does not do

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 37 justice to the character of being, which exists in movement, fragmentation, solidarity and multi-directionality. He argues that possible transcendence is based on the ‘ubuntu’ principle,65 whereby the Eurocentric character of cos­ mopolitanism, expressed in the referencing of Kant, is overcome. In this context, the concept of cosmubuntuism is of significance, which is based on the principle of African humanism: “I am human through other humans” – “unity in diversity”.66 It focuses on the possibility of “peaceful co-existence” and “conditions for heterogeneity”.67 Do Appiah and Mbembe, the two principal representatives of African and/or Afrodiasporic cosmopolitanism, do justice to, among other things, the demand for a ‘decolonised cosmopo­ litanism’68 when referencing Kant? Or must, as Uimonen demands, other historical lines be drawn for the development of cosmopolitanism? “It appears pertinent to identify other genealogies of cosmopolitanism, so that we can arrive at a more cosmopolitan understanding of the world as a whole, by way of anthropology.”69 In today’s world it is pertinent to ask whether there are other theoretical approaches and argumentative objectives, for example regarding the concept of environmentalism in its universalist form, as, in the context of African and Afrodiasporic philosophy, can be identified in particular in the work of Odera Oruka. These questions will be explored in later chapters, also as regards epistemic, ethical and political universalism; and ecophilosophical concepts.

Acknowledgements The section “On the Kantian concepts of person and humanity” is part of the article: Rainsborough, Marita: “Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. Michel Foucault’s Questioning of the Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works”. In: Caranti, Luigi; Silva, Fernando (Eds.): The Kantian Subject: New Interpretative Essays. New York: Routledge, 2023, pp. 132-142. The section “Kant’s cosmopolitan concept” is part of the book chapter: Rainsborough, Marita: “Rethinking Kant’s Shorter Writings. Kant’s Philo­ sophy of History and Today’s Cosmopolitanism”. In: Orden Jimenéz, Rafael V.; Rivera de Rosales, Jacinto; Sánchez Madrid, Nuria; Hanna, Robert; Louden, Robert (Eds.): Kant’s Shorter Writing: Critical Paths outside the Critiques. Newcastle upon Tyne (Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 2016, pp. 474–476. (Published with the permission of Cambridge Scholars Publishing) The two sections titled “Equality, universalism and world citizenship in Kant’s cosmopolitanism” and “Kant’s universalism and his concept of race” are based on passages from the following texts (translated from German into English): Cf. Rainsborough, Marita: “Another Cosmopolitanism. Seyla Benhabibs Antwort auf Kants philosophisches Konzept des Kosmopoli­ tismus”. In: Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo (ed.): Estudos Kantia­ nos. Marília. 2(1), Jan./Jun., 2014, pp. 126–129. And Rainsborough, Marita: “Kant revisited. Die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Universalismus und Kosmopolitismus in der afrikanischen Philosophie”. In: Falduto,

38 Rethinking Kant Antonio; Klemme, Heiner (Eds.): Kant und seine Kritiker – Kant and his Critics. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York (Olms Verlag), 2018, pp. 374–377. (Published with the permission of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.)

Notes 1 Kant’s works are cited in this book according to the abbreviations used in the phi­ losophical journal Kant-Studien. The following German editions are used: Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 1–22 edited by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften; vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; vol. 24–27 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin (De Gruyter), 1900 et seq. Whenever available, English translations are taken from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. In the case of foreign-language texts, the sigles of the ori­ ginal are also given according to the Kant-Studien index. See: www.kant-gesellschaft. de/de/ks/Hinweise_Autoren_2018.pdf (retrieved: 31 July 2023). 2 Kant, Immanuel: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Louden, Robert B. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2006a, p. 238. (Text cited as “Anth”.) 3 In this process man can be confident, according to Kant’s natural teleological assumptions, that his projects and ambitions fit into nature. 4 Kant, Immanuel: The Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1991, p. 63. (Text cited as “MS”.) 5 Cp. Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul; Wood, Allen W. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2009, p. 551. (Text cited as “KrV”.) 6 “The fact that the human being can have the ‘I’ in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person” (Anth, AA 07:127). The ability to say ‘I’ to oneself focuses human thinking and is linked to the normative concept of the person, which assigns dignity to man as an end in itself in autonomous moral action. 7 Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Prac­ tical Philosophy. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1996, p. 87. (Texts cited as “KpV”, “GMS”, “MS”, “ZeF”, “TP”.) 8 Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: The Critique of the Power of Judgment. Guyer, Paul (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2000. (Text cited as “KU”.) 9 Kant, Immanuel: Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. Kleingeld, Pauline (Ed.). New Haven, London (Yale University Press), 2006b, p. 92. (Text cited as “ZeF”.) 10 Kant 2006b: 18. 11 Belwe, Andreas: Ungesellige Geselligkeit: Kant: Warum die Menschen einander ‘nicht wohl leiden’, aber auch ‘nicht voneinander lassen’ können. Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 1999, pp. 20–21 (own translation). 12 The ‘unsociable sociability’ between individuals is equivalent to war in the inter­ governmental domain. According to Kant, war means “unavoidable conflict of culture with the nature of the human species” (Belwe 1999: 27; own translation). At the same time, he promotes cultural development until humans are forced “to renounce offensive war altogether, in order to enter upon a constitution which by its nature and without loss of power is founded on genuine principles of right, and which can persistently progress toward the better” (ibid.). Belwe cites Kant, Immanuel: Conflict of the Faculties. New York (Abaris), 1979, p. 169. (Text cited as “SF”.)

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 39 13 Belwe 1999: 9 (own translation). 14 Belwe 1999: 12 (own translation). 15 Belwe 1999: 17 (own translation). He continues: “Freedom to unite (sociability) and as its counterpart freedom to be independent (unsociability) in the mutually constitutionally guaranteed autonomy” (Belwe 1999: 27; own translation). 16 “Kant’s essay thus marks the transition from a conception of politics which was solely based on the internal conditions of a state to a political understanding which counted the economic, cultural and legal interdependency of states among the functional conditions for all political action.” In: Gerhardt, Volker: Immanuel Kants Entwurf ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’: eine Theorie der Politik. Darmstadt (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), 1995, p. 232 (own translation). 17 “The Pax Kantiana is based on rationalism and human rights and aims at a law of nations which includes all nations and enables the conflicts of rights which naturally continue to be stemmed by means of contracts and controls and – where required – to be arbitrated by means of international cooperation und binding legal rulings” (Gerhardt 1995: 9–10; own translation). 18 Gerhardt 1995: 7 (own translation); Gerhardt quotes here from Sternberger, Dolf: “Begriff des Poltischen. Heidelberger Antrittsrede 1960”. In: Staatsfreundschaft, Schriften Bd. IV. Frankfurt am Main (Insel Verlag), 1980, p. 305. 19 Gerhardt 1995: 20 (own translation). 20 Gerhardt 1995: 125 (own translation). Gerhardt points out that man’s endowment with reason is not required for this but rather that “politics requires the whole person” (ibid.; own translation). Writing on the relationship between nature and culture in Kant’s work, Gerhardt notes “Because everything which humans dis­ cover in themselves has come into being, most of it presumably under their influ­ ence. Nature and culture are, at all events, indistinguishable when considering human behaviour” (Gerhardt 1995: 208; own translation). 21 Gerhardt 1995: 19 (own translation). 22 Gerhardt 1995: 21 (own translation). 23 Gerhardt 1995: 52 (own translation). 24 Gerhardt views this as a structural deficit in Kantian thinking and notes some contradictory elements (cf. Gerhardt 1995: 103). 25 Habermas, Jürgen: “Kants Idee des ewigen Friedens – aus dem historischen Abstand von zweihundert Jahren”. In: Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias; Bohman, James (Eds.): Frieden durch Recht: Kants Friedensidee und das Problem einer neuen Weltordnung. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1996, p. 11 (own translation). 26 Gerhardt 1995: 111–112 (own translation). He also says “We want to know if we have the opportunity to actually achieve our self-defined aims. It is thus the inter­ est in the successes of our actions and the resultant sense of reality which guides our attention to the natural conditions of our existence. […] We pay attention to the degree to which our purposes are at one with nature, discovering amazing conditions which we accept as if they were advance services on the part of nature which we cannot fail to view as anything but favourable for our practical goals” (Gerhardt 1995: 111; own translation). 27 Gerhardt 1995: 119 (own translation). 28 Gerhardt 1995: 114 (own translation). 29 Gerhardt 1995: 115 (own translation). “[T]his (critical) definition of history had already been developed by Kant in 1784 in his Idea. His concept is consistently defined by the supposition that there is a fundamental correspondence between natural occurrences and historical events; a correspondence which today attracts virtually no attention thanks to the humanistic focus of historical science” (Ger­ hardt 1995: 115; own translation). “The expedience of natural events thus runs seamlessly in to the purposive action of human beings since those carrying out the actions also assume the expedience of nature” (Gerhardt 1995: 118; own

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translation). He continues, “Assuming that nature’s favourable state of equili­ brium is preserved, human actions correspond to the context of life and their own actions compensate for nature’s deficits” (Gerhardt 1995: 118; own translation). Gerhardt 1995: 113 (own translation). Gerhardt 1995: 106 (own translation). Kant makes specific proposals in this context concerning, for example, the rejec­ tion of the existence of standing armies or of war loans. He also demands a ban on intervention among nations and the renunciation of violence within states. In addition to this, in his sixth preliminary article he bars all acts which could destroy the mutual confidence between peoples. The romantic cosmopolitanism of Novalis or Schlegel accuses Kant’s cosmopoli­ tanism of emphasising human rationality, that he neglects the meaning of feelings. “For example, key figures in romantic cosmopolitanism, such as Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, criticized Kant for relying on enlightened self-interest as con­ ductive to peace and for disregarding the importance of feelings. They developed an alternative cosmopolitan ideal that revolved around the emotional and spiri­ tual unity of humankind.” In: Kleingeld, Pauline: Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2012, p. 8. Even if, according to Kleingeld, the reproach of Kant’s neglect of the emotional cannot be upheld, since he repeatedly emphasises the affective preconditions of cosmopolitanism, as for example becomes clear in his under­ standing of patriotism, the primacy of rationality can justifiably be attributed to Kant. Kleingeld 2012: 17. Kleingeld points out that Kant himself does not always do justice to this egalitarian position: “It should be added straightaway, however, that Kant does not always follow his own egalitarian theory in practice. There is some irony in the fact that Wieland, despite his inegalitarian bent, is more critical of sexism and racism than Kant” (Kleingeld 2012: 18). Despite the internal con­ tradictions, Kleingeld considers it important to clearly emphasise the fundamen­ tally egalitarian position of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. It is based primarily on Kant’s ethical principle, the categorical imperative (cf. ibid.). She continues: “There are subtle differences between these various ideas, but their common core is that all rational beings are conceived (and should conceive of themselves) as fellow citizens in a moral community that transcends all other communities, and that all are united into this community by common laws” (Kleingeld 2012: 17). Kleingeld 2012: 1. “Kant, by contrast, does address global political institutions, extending his cos­ mopolitism beyond the moral context. In Toward Perpetual Peace and The Metaphysics of Morals, he posits an analogy between individuals (who should leave the state of nature and establish a state) and states (which should leave the state of nature and form a federation)” (Kleingeld 2012: 43). “In the third essay in ‘On the Common Saying’ (1793), no mention is made of such a league. Here Kant criticises the ideal of a world state under one head, with the argument that it is likely to result in dangerous despotism. […] The idea of a loose league is mentioned for the first time in ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ (1795)” (Kleingeld 2012: 48). In Kant’s second definitive article on eternal peace, he states: “As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which contains only war, than for them to relinquish, just as do individual human beings, their wild (lawless) freedom, to accustom themselves to public binding laws, and to thereby form a state of peoples (civitas gentium), which, continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all of the peoples of the world. But since they do not, according to their conception of international right, want the positive idea of a world republic at all, thus rejecting

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 41

39

40

41 42 43 44 45

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47 48 49 50 51

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in hypothesi what is right (in thesi), only the negative surrogate of a lasting and continually expanding federation that prevents war can curb the inclination to hostility and defiance of the law, though there is the constant threat of its breaking loose again” (ZeF, AA 08:357). Kleingeld draws attention to a development in Kant’s attitude. If one compares Kant’s statements from the middle of the 1790s with earlier ones, it is noticeable that his position has changed as regards this question. She describes Kant’s struggle for an appropriate understanding of this central aspect until he finally arrives at the position described. “Moreover, he agrees with Wieland that world citizenship is compatible with loy­ alty and special duties toward particular groups, such as one’s own state or one’s own family. Kant even goes so far as to say that patriotism is a cosmopolitan duty” (Kleingeld 2012: 19). Kleingeld stresses that Kant’s combination of cosmopolitanism and patriotism is usually overlooked in secondary literature. Kleingeld 2012: 21. “Kant’s argument hinges on the fact that a just state is a system of self-government and that, conceptually, such a system entails that its citizens have special concern for their own state, at least to some degree” (Kleingeld 2012: 28). Cf. MS, AA 06:341 and MS, 06: 315–17, 319, 322; on the necessity of law in the state refer to e.g. MS, AA 06:236–37, 255–57, 264–66, 311–13. Kleingeld 2012: 31. “Tending toward perpetual peace, which in turn enhances the stability of the republics themselves. In short, Kant’s view is that the more cosmopolitan patriots of the right sort there are in the world, the more people there are who support republican forms of government, and the more this will promote the cause of freedom, right, and world-wide peace” (Kleingeld 2012: 33). In his essay Of the Different Races of Human Beings (1775) he divides humans into four groups based on their natural dispositions – “First race High blondes (Northern Europeans) from humid cold. Second race Copper-reds (Americans) from dry cold. Third race Blacks (Senegambia) from humid heat. Fourth race Olive-yellows (Indians) from dry heat” (VvRM, AA 02:441). In this context Kant assumes that European races are superior. In his essay Idea for a Universal His­ tory with a Cosmopolitan Goal (1784) he alludes to the idea of hegemony and Europe’s role-model function – “then one will discover a regular course of improvement of state constitutions in our part of the world (which will probably someday give laws to all the others)” (IaG, AA 08:29). Bernasconi, Robert: “Kant’s Third Thought on Race”. In: Elden, Stuart; Mendietta, Eduardo (Eds.): Reading Kant’s Geography. Albany (Suny Press), 2011, p. 311. For example, Louden, Robert B.: Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2002. For example, Hill Jr., Thomas E.; Boxill, Bernard: “Kant and Race”. In: Boxill, Bernard (Ed.): Race and Racism. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2001, pp. 448–471. Mills, Charles W.: “Kant’s Untermenschen”. In: Valls, Andrew: Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy. Ithaca, NY (Cornell University Press), 2005, pp. 169–193. Kleingeld, Pauline: “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race”. In: The Philosophical Quarterly. 95(229), 2007, pp. 573–592. And: Kleingeld, Pauline: “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism”. In: Flikschuh, Katrin; Ypi, Lea (Eds.): Kant and Colonialism. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2014, pp. 43–67. Among other things, Bernasconi accuses Kleingeld of failing to sufficiently con­ sider the historical situation in Kant’s era, which necessitates a different inter­ pretation of texts. He argues that the paradox between moral universalism, cosmopolitan conception and Kant’s concept of race cannot be solved (cf. Bernasconi 2011).

42 Rethinking Kant 53 The discussion of race does not, however, cease entirely but evolves in the sense of a consistent egalitarianism, as shown by Kant’s postscript to his 1792 lectures on geography. Bernasconi compares Kant’s thoughts on race and the resulting egali­ tarianism as being similar to the relationship between war and peace and the theory of ‘unsocial sociability’ (cf. Bernasconi 2011: 309, 311). 54 These include being welcomed in a friendly manner and that individuals whose lives are in danger cannot be turned away. Pauline Kleingeld argues that they also include the right to asylum and that they form the basis for existing refugee laws. Cf. Kleingeld, Pauline: “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late EighteenthCentury Germany”. In: Journal of the History of Ideas. 60(3), 1999, p. 514. 55 “Despite his Eurocentric perspective, Kant’s thoughts on world citizenship and cosmopolitan right have been heralded as milestones in modern cosmopolitan theory.” In: Uimonen, Paula: “Decolonising cosmopolitanism: An anthro­ pological reading of Immanuel Kant and Kwame Nkrumah on the world as one”. In: Critique of Anthropology. 40(I), 2020, p. 86. 56 After World War II transnational institutions such as the League of Nations (1920– 1946); the United Nations (1945); the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (1944) were established. “In all these processes, many thinkers have played important roles. They held lay, religious, idealist, positivist, socialist, liberal, conservative or revolutionary positions, clearly demonstrating the plasticity and effi­ cacity of cosmopolitanism across political and theoretical persuasions. They thought of an international court and army (Abbé de Saint Pierre), a federation of nations and eternal peace (Kant), technological solutions for rationally organising the planet (Saint-Simon, Goethe), global alliances against oppression (Marx), world govern­ ment and state (H.G. Wells, Lippmann), world economic regulations (Keynes).” In: Ribeiro, Gustavo Lins: “What is cosmopolitanism?” In: Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology. 2 (1/2), 2005, p. 22. Available at: www.vibrant.org.br/downloads/v2n1_ wc.pdf. (retrieved: 26 August 2023) 57 Wood, Allen W.: “Kant’s Project for Perpetual Peace.” In: Cheah, Pheng; Rob­ bins, Bruce (Eds.): Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation. Minneapolis, London (University of Minnesota Press), 1998, p. 62. 58 Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education. Zöller, Günter; Louden, Robert B. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2007, p. 417. (Texts cited as “Anth”, “VvRM”, “ZeF”, “IaG”.) 59 Wood 1998: 72. 60 Balakrishnan, Sarah: “The African Idea: New Perspectives on Cosmopolitanism in African Studies”. In: History Compass. Special Issue (Online): Making and Unmaking the Nation in World History. 15(2), 2017, p. 1. 61 Cf. Balakrishnan 2017: 5. 62 Balakrishnan 2017: 8. 63 Ibid. 64 Ramose, Mogobe Bernard: “Transcending Cosmopolitanism”. In: Diogenes. 59 (3–4), 2014, pp. 30–35. 65 Leonhard Praeg differentiates between ubuntu as a life principle and moral-societal norm, the cornerstone of African humanism, und Ubuntu as a post-colonial philo­ sophical concept, which must be understood as a critical-deconstructive power and should not be ideologised. Cf. Graneß, Anke: “Ubuntu – Afrikanischer Humanismus oder postkoloniale Ideologie? Zu: Leonhard Praeg: Bericht über Ubuntu”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 31, 2014, pp. 85–93. 66 Cf. Davids, M. Noor: “Re-imagining Cosmopolitanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Reviving Historical ‘Cosmubuntuism’ in Forced Removal Spaces for a Democratic Future.” In: The International Journal of Community Diversity. 18(1), 2018, pp. 24–27.

Kant’s epistemic, ethical and political universalism 43 67 Cf. Davids 2018: 32. 68 Cf. Uimonen 2020: 81. 69 Uimonen 2020: 97. Elsewhere she says comparably “Anthropologists can hope­ fully add more cosmopolitan genealogies to broaden scholarly and popular understandings of the world as one” (Uimonen 2020: 97). Uimonen sees here, for example, Nkrumah’s Consciencism as a source. In this regard, Chielozona Eze references Mandela’s ‘empathetic cosmopolitanism’. Cf. Eze, Chielozona: “Empathetic cosmopolitanism: South Africa and the quest for global citizenship”. In: Strategic Review for South Africa. 39(1), 2017, pp. 236–255.

Bibliography Balakrishnan, Sarah: “The African Idea: New Perspectives on Cosmopolitanism in African Studies”. In: History Compass. Special Issue (Online): Making and Unmaking the Nation in World History. 15(2), 2017, pp. 1–11. Belwe, Andreas: Ungesellige Geselligkeit: Kant: Warum die Menschen einander ‘nicht wohl leiden’, aber auch ‘nicht voneinander lassen’ können. Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 1999. Bernasconi, Robert: “Kant’s Third Thought on Race”. In: Elden, Stuart; Mendietta, Eduardo (Eds.): Reading Kant’s Geography. Albany, NY (Suny Press), 2011, pp. 291–318. Davids, M. Noor: “Re-imagining Cosmopolitanism in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Reviv­ ing Historical ‘Cosmubuntuism’ in Forced Removal Spaces for a Democratic Future”. In: The International Journal of Community Diversity. 18(1), 2018, pp. 23–36. Eze, Chielozona: “Empathetic Cosmopolitanism: South Africa and the Quest for Global Citizenship”. In: Strategic Review for South Africa. 39(1), 2017, pp. 236–255. Gerhardt, Volker: Immanuel Kants Entwurf ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’: eine Theorie der Politik. Darmstadt (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), 1995. Graneß, Anke: “Ubuntu – Afrikanischer Humanismus oder postkoloniale Ideologie? Zu: Leonhard Praeg: Bericht über Ubuntu”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 31, 2014, pp. 85–93. Habermas, Jürgen: “Kants Idee des ewigen Friedens – aus dem historischen Abstand von zweihundert Jahren”. In: Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias; Bohman, James (Eds.): Frieden durch Recht: Kants Friedensidee und das Problem einer neuen Weltordnung. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1996, pp. 7–24. Hill Jr., Thomas E.; Boxill, Bernard: “Kant and Race”. In: Boxill, Bernard (Ed.): Race and Racism. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2001, pp. 448–471. Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 1–22 edited by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften; vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; vol. 24– 27 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin (De Gruyter), 1900 et seq. Kant, Immanuel: Conflict of the Faculties. New York (Abaris), 1979. (Text cited as “SF”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1991. (Text cited as “MS”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1996. (Texts cited as “KpV”, “GMS”, “MS”, “ZeF”, “TP”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: The Critique of the Power of Judgment. Guyer, Paul (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2000. (Text cited as “KU”.)

44 Rethinking Kant Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Notes and Fragments. Guyer, Paul (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2005. (Texts cited as “Refl”.) Kant, Immanuel: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Louden, Robert B. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2006a. (Text cited as “Anth”.) Kant, Immanuel: Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. Kleingeld, Pauline (Ed.). New Haven, CT (Yale University Press), 2006b. (Texts cited as “TP”, “ZeF”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthro­ pology, History, and Education. Zöller, Günter; Louden, Robert B. (Eds.). Cam­ bridge (Cambridge University Press), 2007. (Texts cited as “Anth”, “VvRM “, “ZeF”, “IaG”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul; Wood, Allen W. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2009. (Text cited as “KrV”.) Kleingeld, Pauline: “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany”. In: Journal of the History of Ideas. 60(3), 1999, pp. 505–524. Kleingeld, Pauline: “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race”. In: The Philosophical Quarterly. 95(229), 2007, pp. 573–592. Kleingeld, Pauline: Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2012. Kleingeld, Pauline: “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism”. In: Flikschuh, Katrin; Ypi, Lea (Eds.): Kant and Colonialism. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2014, pp. 43–67. Louden, Robert B.: Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2002. Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias; Bohman, James (Eds.): Frieden durch Recht: Kants Friedensidee und das Problem einer neuen Weltordnung. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1996. Mills, Charles W.: “Kant’s Untermenschen”. In: Valls, Andrew: Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy. Ithaca, NY (Cornell University Press), 2005, pp. 169–193. Ramose, Mogobe Bernard: “Transcending Cosmopolitanism”. In: Diogenes. 59(3–4), 2014, pp. 30–35. Ribeiro, Gustavo Lins: “What is Cosmopolitanism?” In: Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology. 2(1/2), 2005, pp. 19–26. Available at: www.vibrant.org.br/downloads/ v2n1_wc.pdf (retrieved: 26 August 2023). Sternberger, Dolf: “Begriff des Poltischen. Heidelberger Antrittsrede 1960”. In: Staatsfreundschaft, Schriften Bd. IV. Frankfurt am Main (Insel Verlag), 1980. Uimonen, Paula: “Decolonising Cosmopolitanism: An Anthropological Reading of Immanuel Kant and Kwame Nkrumah on the World as One”. In: Critique of Anthropology. 40(I), 2020, pp. 81–101. Wood, Allen W.: “Kant’s Project for Perpetual Peace.” In: Cheah, Pheng; Robbins, Bruce (Eds.): Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation. Minneapolis, MN (University of Minnesota Press), 1998, pp. 59–76.

2

Cosmopolitanism in the philosophy of Appiah and Mbembe A critical dialogue with Kant

Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism between Kant and Mill Kant and Appiah’s cosmopolitanism and universalism According to Kwame Anthony Appiah, cosmopolitanism means, in recourse to Kant, that everyone must be regarded as a ‘citizen of the cosmos’ or ‘citizen of the world’ and not primarily as part of a ‘community among communities’, and that our ‘shared citizenship’ and ‘shared humanity’ mean that our responsibility extends beyond those in our immediate vicinity.1 Appiah hereby references Kant in three respects – in his concept of the sig­ nificance of universalism for cosmopolitanism; in the context of Kant’s the­ orem of world citizenship and his recourse to humanity in the sense of a common constitution of all human beings in a moral respect – and redefines them. He also refers to the human orientation towards ideals, towards the Kantian as if and says: our praktische[r] Absicht [,] has a Kantian taproot. The two-standpoints doctrine suggests, then, that talk of agency is guided by different interests or intentions from talk of structure; and we go only a little further when we say that these different interests make different idealizations appropriate, different as ifs useful.2 Parallel to this, referencing of Kant’s autonomy as self-determination in moral action is an important point of reference for Appiah’s theory.3 In Appiah’s philosophy, thinking of universal concerns should be linked to respect for the other, the different and the divergent: “[A]n obligation can be both special and universal.”4 Appiah wishes to combine moral and cultural cosmopolitanism.5 His universalism proves to be a minimal moral consensus based on the existence of cross-cultural moral values. In contrast to Kant’s formal principle of reason for ethics, it is justified anthropologically and bound to habitual actions of man. The motivational basis is not the goodwill and respect for the law promoted by Kant, but instead a concept of moral honour, which he describes in his work The Honor Code: How Moral DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-4

46 Rethinking Kant Revolutions Happen. “I am arguing, against Kant, that honor is another of the calls on us made by reason; it is a call that depends on our recognition of the many different standards presupposed by those codes of honor.”6 In doing so, he differentiates between moral and ethical obligation, which differ in terms of the degree of obligation. Appiah justifies this by referring to Kant’s remarks in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 7 He calls his own concept partial cosmopolitanism or rooted cosmopolitanism, which represents his ideal and can be understood as a “project of liberal cosmopolitanism”.8 It becomes apparent that Appiah belongs to the Kantian tradition but does not adopt its formal orientation of universalism, which is based on the principle of the categorical imperative; a focus on human reason in its apriority and a conception of natural teleology. Partial cosmopolitanism sig­ nificantly modifies fundamental aspects of Kant’s universalism and cosmo­ politanism. “A cosmopolitanism with prospects must reconcile a kind of universalism with the legitimacy of at least some forms of partiality.”9 Appiah points out that neither universalism nor the Enlightenment are completely discredited by the deficiencies of Kant’s theories − for example as regards his racism – in view of the criticism of ‘Enlightenment humanism’:10 What has motivated the recent antiuniversalism has been, in large part, a conviction that past universalism was a projection of European values and interests. This is a critique best expressed by the statement that the actually existing Enlightenment was insufficiently Enlightened; it is not an argument that Enlightenment was the wrong project.11 For Appiah, the search for truth and justice is the embodiment of a com­ monality with the concerns of the Enlightenment. Appiah also says: “I prefer to speak with the Enlightenment: to think of dialogue − and I don’t mean just the dialogue across nations that cosmopolitans favor − as a shared search for truth and justice.”12 When demanding justice Appiah follows the Kantian tradition, repeatedly emphasising the necessity and significance of human rights and the asso­ ciated inter- and transcultural dialogue.13 Going beyond Kant, he believes that justice is not primarily a legal concept, but rather is linked to the pos­ sibility of realising personal life plans with their necessary, material, psycho­ logical, cultural, etc. conditions. As regards the question of truth, Appiah calls for humility, invoking the “wisdom of epistemological modesty” and “an organized social enterprise of knowledge”.14 The intercultural search for truth and justice does not, however, mean that African roots should be neglected, as pointed out by Appiah in his work In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. “We all experienced the persistent power of our own cognitive and moral traditions.”15 Appiah’s theorem is based on a humanistic concept.16 He ultimately grounds his humanism, “the appeal to human essence”,17 in biology and derives both his egalitarian and his uni­ versalist claim on this basis.18 This is reminiscent of Kant’s biological-organic

Cosmopolitanism in the philosophy of Appiah and Mbembe

47

conception of nature, whose basic assumptions are revealed in biological metaphors, but unlike Kant Appiah’s assumptions are not understood in terms of teleology. Appiah’s liberal cosmopolitanism simultaneously emphasises the impor­ tance of the individual’s personal dignity and of human identity as an indi­ vidual project of creative self-determination in the sense of a social construct, whereby, for example, ethnic and national identities “fit a personal narrative into a larger narrative”.19 This struggle for identity in a narrative process, which presupposes the recognition of the other, is also common to all people and connects them with each other. Appiah focuses on understanding as cross-cultural communication through common interaction: So I’m using the word ‘conversation’ not only for literal talk but also as a metaphor for engagement with the experience and the ideas of others. And I stress the role of imagination here because the encounters, prop­ erly conducted, are valuable in themselves. Conversation doesn’t have to lead to consensus about anything, especially not values, it’s enough that it helps people get used to one another.20 Appiah is concerned with a substantial concept of ‘goodness’ and speaks out against pure formalism and proceduralism.21 He says: “Despite first appear­ ances, then, Kant’s rather abstract universalizability principle is not going to be enough to get us a content for morality.”22 Despite this, Appiah does not wish to dispense with Kant’s imperative of universalisation in his practical philosophy.23 Elsewhere he says on the significance of rationality in the moral domain “We do not need the full apparatus of Kantian ethics to require that morality be constrained by reason.”24 Kant’s formula for uni­ versalisation is, argues Appiah, also a suitable instrument to prevent dis­ criminatory judgments based on racial differences. Morality is, however, not solely limited to this formal, rational character but instead is also related to people trying “to make a success of their lives”.25 He wishes material and social aspects to be included in moral concerns, seeing this as an illustration of the proximity of his approach to Aristotelian ethics.26 Identity, ethics and cosmopolitanism in Appiah’s work At the core of Appiah’s partial cosmopolitanism is his concept of identity. Appiah emphasises that his referencing of liberalism concerns, in particular, the personal situation of the individual. His starting point is Mill’s27 aspect of ‘individuality’ – all human beings must master their personal life in their given environment, taking into consideration their responsibility towards fellow human beings when doing so; choosing among the opportunities available to them and making decisions. While the central term ‘identity’ may invite the misconception that it should be understood in the sense of entirety, for example in psychological terms or as the ‘homogeneity of difference’ in

48 Rethinking Kant the ethical sense, it has the advantage over concepts of race or culture that it is more strongly focused on the individual. If there is something distinctive in my approach, it is that I start always from the perspective of the individual engaged in making his or her life, recognizing that others are engaged in the same project, and concerned to ask what social and political life means for this ethical project we share. This is then, I want to emphasize, a work of ethics, in the special sense I have picked out, and not of political theory, because it does not start with an interest in the state.28 Appiah regards the shaping of our own lives as an ethical project which can only be fully understood in the context of the individual life plans of others. The individual’s ethical projects must, furthermore, also be under­ stood in terms of cosmopolitanism in the political context. “[T]he others whose ethical projects matter are not only our fellow citizens, they are also the citizens of every other nation on the planet.”29 Appiah says: But he argued with a special fervour that the cultivation of one’s indivi­ duality is itself part of well-being, something good in se, and here liberty is not a means to an end but part of the end. For individuality means, among other things, choosing for myself instead of merely being shaped by a constraint of political or social sanction.30 Appiah adopts Mill’s idea of the individual life plan as part of a self-realisa­ tion: “He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties.”31 It is based on a concept of individual choice; self-observation and self-control; the ability to make decisions; weighing preferences; goal orientation and the desire to further develop one’s capacities to think and act as a human being, and thus on the concept of man in liberalism.32 Appiah cites Mill, who speaks of an individual conception of singular existence: “his own mode of laying out his existence”.33 According to Mill and also Appiah, individuality refers both to the prerequisites of the individual for shaping his or her life and to the outcome of the individual’s development. Essential in this context is the aspect of self-design, ‘self-creation’, of the individual and the emphasis on the neces­ sity of freedom as a prerequisite for this process.34 Appiah responds to critics of this concept, such as Daniel A. Bell and John L. Mackie, by saying that he does not see life plans as being strictly consistent, but rather as disparate and frequently changing.35 In this context Appiah advocates the individual’s per­ sonal responsibility as regards shaping their own life: “All of us could, no doubt, have made better lives than we have: but that, Mill says, is no reason for others to attempt to force those better lives upon us.”36 Like Mill, Appiah assumes that individuality does not contradict socia­ bility. “This can lead us to think that the good of individuality is reined in by

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or traded off against goods of sociability so that there is an intrinsic oppo­ sition between the self and society.”37 Appiah assumes an interdependence between the self-design of the individual and his social anchoring: “indivi­ duality presupposes sociability”.38 He contradicts both the existentialist notion of self-design and the notion of authenticity, being true to one’s self, emphasising the dependence of self-creation on social, geographical and his­ torical factors and the fundamental possibility of change. For Appiah iden­ tity is, and there is a similarity to Charles Taylor’s view,39 conceived in a dialogical manner. The social anchoring of an individual identity must also be regarded as the basis of human morality. In this context Appiah cites Mill: “This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality.”40 Values must be understood as inherent to identity: “many values are internal to an identity”.41 Appiah speaks of “a person’s ethical self”.42 Mill’s philosophical concept – and based on it also Appiah’s theory − com­ bines individuality, sociability, morality, liberty, autonomy and happiness. The process of shaping life should not be understood as a project of indivi­ dual perfection but this can be an essential element of individual life plans.43 Parallel to this, the construction of identity involves telling individual and collective life stories. “I made a distinction earlier between a personal and a collective dimension of identity. Both play a role in these stories of the self.”44 Identities are therefore constructed narratively.45 Prerequisites for the creation of personal identity are rational abilities such as calculating and processing information as well as an ‘informed desire’, for which Appiah refers to James Griffin.46 Education in rational, emotional and social contexts plays an important role, as Mill also emphasises. Elements used to construct identity include categories such as race, gender, nation and tribe, which are based on fictions. In his work Appiah demonstrates, for example, the lack of a scientific basis for the concepts of ‘race’,47 ‘tribe’ and ‘nation’, speaking out against a biologically rooted con­ ception of race. “In short, I think it is clear enough that a biologically rooted conception of race is both dangerous in practice and misleading in theory: African unity, African identity, need securer foundations than race.”48 He opposes a racially based construction of identity, considering it regressive.49 Appiah believes that the proclamation of theoretical truths will not be with­ out consequences in the long term and regards intellectuals50 as having an obligation to contribute to education in this respect. Nevertheless, he thinks that for strategic reasons it can be useful to resort to certain ideologically afflicted concepts, since they have a mobilising character and can unite people in a common struggle for a better world. “I am […] enough of a political animal to recognize that there are places where the truth does more harm than good.”51 He cites Pan-Africanism as an example of an international project. “In sum, the demands of agency seem always − in the real world of politics − to entail a misrecognition of its genesis; you cannot build alliances without mystifications and mythologies.”52 Thus the concept of the ‘black person’ can forge alliances between Africans,

50 Rethinking Kant African-Americans and other people of colour living outside Africa.53 Taking the relativity of the identity concepts as his starting point, Appiah concludes that each must be re-examined and re-evaluated in different socio­ historical situations.54 He argues that a cosmopolitanly focused identity is desirable.55 He continues by saying: “but in this world of genders, ethnicities, and classes, of families, religions, and nations, it is as well to remember that there are times when Africa is not the banner we need.”56 Appiah also considers the recourse to African authenticity, as found, for example, in Soyinka’s lit­ erature, to be problematic; he speaks of “the mythology of authenticity”.57 Appiah’s emphasis on the necessity of identity concepts for political mobili­ sation to achieve peace and progress is in stark contrast to Kant’s philoso­ phical concept, in which these goals are embedded in human reason and in the teleological constitution of nature. Appiah’s recourse to Mill to avoid Kant’s universalism and formalism overlooks Kant’s theoretical proposals for solving the relationship between particularism and universalism and, unlike Kant, his partial cosmopolitanism displays deficits in the con­ ceptualisation of political structures and political organisation as well as in legal and institutional implementation. The aspects which Appiah focuses on − in particular, the question of identity formation in a heterogeneous world community and the creation of consensus in a global context – must be supplemented by elements of Kant’s theory to be practicable. In turn, Appiah can be commended for having considered the level of identity formation in plural societies in a global context. Appiah’s orientation towards individual happiness and satisfaction con­ trasts with Kant’s theorem of happiness. Although Appiah can circumvent key points of criticism of Kant’s theory, such as formal rigour; disregard for the particular and the natural-law justification of the teleological view; and disregard for socio-historical and geopolitical conditions in his conception, his recourse to Mill entails new problems. Appiah focuses on the aspect of identity which is associated with morality; on the model of the conversation which creates new habits in the concrete interaction of people with each other, and on ideological proposals of identity which are aimed at mobilising action to achieve common goals. Appiah’s philosophical concept is also based on a universalist model of morality, which presupposes a minimal consensus of all people and considers the hierarchy of values to be negoti­ able. Ultimately this consensus seems to tacitly amount to Mill’s con­ sequentialism.58 Mill’s ethical model seems to implicitly underlie Appiah’s ad hoc notion of acting together to improve the world and the individual’s possibilities of living in it when he argues consequentially as regards the jus­ tification of these conceptions and, as regards human action, primarily pro­ ceeds from the results of action.59 In Appiah’s theory, Kant’s ethical universalism60 is replaced by Mill’s utilitarian concept. Thus, Kantian cos­ mopolitanism is quite decisively altered in Partial Cosmopolitanism, if not tacitly suspended.

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Thinking outside the frame. Mbembe’s project of the future and the politics of possibility Mbembe’s Afropolitanism and the concept of pluriversality Mbembe views global interrelations as “the fundamental precondition for the development of the global society dreamed of by Kant and Habermas”.61 He believes that both a detachment from the nation state as well as also the adoption of anthropocentric concepts which favour an instrumentalisation of nature are necessary, demanding the “decentralisation of the human” and “an opening to the non-human elements of being”.62 Speaking on this expansion, Mbembe refers to the planetary and a “cohabitation on earth”, according to which everything has a relationship to everything else.63 Mbembe argues that the outcome of the crisis of liberal democracy which can be observed and is linked to neoliberal erosion is a “becoming black of the world”.64 This in turn makes a new project of democracy within a pla­ netary, cosmopolitan framework necessary. In this context, he references Kant’s right of visitation, a right of world citizenship to which every human in the world is entitled to, since the world belongs to all humans.65 The metaphor of the human as a bystander (passant)66 in his ethics of the pas­ serby illustrates the fundamental human anthropological situation, namely that we are merely temporary residents of Earth, as beings whose lives focus on death. The task of humans in the planetary era is, asserts Mbembe, to create a democracy which will enable freedom of movement around the world.67 Achille Mbembe combines an anthropologically based universalist approach68 with cosmopolitan thinking, dispensing with a search for the manner, the origin and the possibility of African participation based on an appreciation of the black race. His analysis of black discourse reveals the well-known discourse strategies of emphasising the autochthonous; African tradition; etc. with its defence strategy as an aberration in the form of “dis­ courses of inversion”,69 which attempt to reverse the devaluation of non­ whites which can also be found in the work of Kant and Hegel in particular. According to Mbembe, this “discourse of rehabilitation” is based on “a racist paradigm” and perpetuates the “fiction of race”, a term which refers to Appiah.70 Mbembe argues that we need Kant as an advocate of perpetual peace, which opens up the horizon for a world community which can be regarded as a kind of association of owners.71 In contrast to Kant’s cosmo­ politan concepts of world citizenship, federation of peoples and hospitality, Achille Mbembe’s concept of Afropolitanism primarily focuses on cosmopo­ litan considerations regarding the continent of Africa. The openness of Africans to the world, which must also be considered in conjunction with the traumatic experiences of deportation, exile and diaspora, and contemporary forms of cosmopolitan nomadism are the starting point for his cosmopolitan thinking. Mbembe sees Africa as its own central location, which, by facil­ itating intercontinental and global mobility, should and can become an

52 Rethinking Kant attraction for people around the world. For Mbembe, the focus on Africa therefore also presupposes an openness towards the world. With this in mind, he demands the facilitation of border crossings; the granting of resi­ dence rights and the acquisition of citizenships as institutional and legal prerequisites for improving coexistence in the world. He strongly rejects exclusion and isolation, stressing the importance of diversity and plurality. According to his newly conceived humanism, people all over the world can be regarded as brothers. What is required is the assumption of responsibility and overcoming of the victim status associated with the tendency towards victimisation, which perpetuates feelings of revenge, resentment and vio­ lence.72 In this context, Mbembe refers to Kant as an advocate of a concept of man as a sovereign being of reason which can control its passions and affects and is capable of moral judgment.73 According to Mbembe, uni­ versalism in the egalitarian sense is based on an anthropological condition, the general constitution of the human species. The concept of progress asso­ ciated with his African cosmopolitanism firmly rejects the primarily techni­ cal-material view of the European-American understanding and its paternalistic attitude. In his politics of possibility Mbembe focuses on the shaping of Africa’s future in a global context − a future which he combines with a democratic orientation in the political and social domains. It becomes clear that Mbembe’s Afropolitanism embodies an Afrocentrism with some cosmopolitan elements, while Kant ultimately transcends the Eurocentrism of his philosophy by means of the fundamental theorems of world citizenship, federation of peoples and hospitality. As an African, international and global project74 Mbembe’s politics of possibility include the forward-looking concept of Afropolitanism, which is linked to the process of decolonisation of thought and action.75 Starting from the premise that Africa is both a place of immersion and dispersion and that mobility today determines the general way of life – he speaks of a “paradigm of itinerancy, mobility, and displacement”76 – Mbembe criticises concepts of Afrocentrism and presents his theory of a cosmopolitan Afropo­ litanism. His starting point is also the experience of genocide in Rwanda as the most extreme example in Africa’s recent history that the African brother can become a deadly enemy. This shows, among other things, that victimi­ sation and feelings of resentment and revenge can have fatal consequences, not least because the acts derived from these feelings are usually not directed against the former torturers, but rather involve innocent victims and perpe­ tuate violence and suffering. Mbembe calls for forgiveness, which should go hand in hand with coming to terms with, and keeping alive the memory of, the suffering experienced during post/colonisation and decolonisation pro­ cesses, such as the history of, and the traumatising experiences associated with, slavery, plantations and mining work and life in the diaspora. When constructing African identity, recourse to categories such as race, nationality and topography should be avoided; it should be developed within scope of the complexity and disparity of an in-between.

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Mbembe’s concept of pluriversality emphasises the diversity of the epis­ temic concepts of different cultures and, parallel to this, assumes the exis­ tence of generally accepted human universalities. “It is a process that does not necessarily abandon the notion of universal knowledge for humanity, but which embraces it via a horizontal strategy of openness to dialogue among different epistemic traditions.”77 Intercultural dialogue which is based on dif­ ferent traditions of thought in different cultures can therefore take on transcultural dimensions in the pursuit of common thought processes, theorems, values and goals. In Mbembe’s work, the universal generally takes the form of the communal, the common and the unifying.78 In the process of decolo­ nisation he searches for ways of radical re-justification and radical new con­ cepts,79 assuming equal rights among different cultures; openness towards the different and a critical rethinking of the existing orders of knowledge based on Foucault’s ideas. Mbembe references Michel Foucault in this respect and also takes him as a starting point to examine the aspect of power. The concept of man, as well as classical dualisms such as body and soul, nature and culture, also require critical analysis. According to Mbembe, man must reflect on his embeddedness in the cosmos and overcome prevailing anthropocentrism. He demands a new way of thinking about the future without neglecting to engage with the past and the present. Mbembe’s critical thinking is linked to cultural, social and aesthetic otherness − the elsewhere, which also possesses an intercultural dimension: Under these conditions, the major challenge facing our epoch is to refound critical thinking, that is, thinking that thinks its possibility out­ side of itself, aware of the limits of its singularity, within the circuit that always connects us to an Elsewhere. Such a refounding refers, by neces­ sity, first to a certain disposition, which affirms the total, radical freedom of societies vis-à-vis their past and future. It is also thinking capable of confronting its world, which seeks to understand the history in which we are stakeholders, and which makes it possible to identify the power of the future inscribed in the present.80 Critique thus serves to analyse what has emerged and to identify possibilities to shape the future. With reference to Waldenfels, he emphasises the rela­ tionship between the familiar and the foreign. He states: If we must, together, walk anew the paths of humanity in companionship with all species, then it is perhaps necessary to begin by recognizing that at bottom there is no world or place where we are totally ‘at home,’ masters of the promises. What is proper always arises at the same time as what is foreign.81 He characterises critique in this context as follows: “the advent of such cri­ tical thinking capable of nourishing lateral universalism requires going

54 Rethinking Kant beyond the radical opposition between the proper and the foreign, the human and the nonhuman”.82 In his book Necropolitics he reflects on the connectedness of human beings and the integration of human beings into larger contexts in the sense of common ownership of the Earth by all living beings. Critique thus takes on an additional dimension for him: Backdropped by the world’s narrowing and the Earth’s repopulation, as well as new cycles of population movements, this essay endeavors not merely to open new paths for a critique of atavistic nationalisms. Indir­ ectly it also reflects on the possible foundations of a mutually shared genealogy and thus of a politics of the living beyond humanism.83 Mbembe’s objective is to provide “a critique of our time”, in which he treats the present as a “reverse reading”.84 For him, the four factors which characterise our time are the shrinking of the world; the redefinition of the human being − no longer on the basis of the theorem of the ‘human condition’ but on that of the ‘terrestrial condition’; computer technology; and the link between the possibility of reshaping the human being and the power of capital. At the same time, these changes pose a threat to politics.85 Mbembe asks questions based on these aspects: “If, ultimately, humanity exists only through being in and of the world, can we find a relation with others based on the reciprocal recognition of our common vulnerability and finitude?”86 He also asks: Can there be anything that links us to others with whom we can declare that we are together? What forms might this solicitude take? Is another politics of the world possible, a politics that no longer necessarily rests upon difference or alterity but instead on a certain idea of the kindred and the in-common? Are we not condemned to live in our exposure to one another, sometimes in the same space?87 Mbembe emphasises human vulnerability, which fundamentally makes everyone equal and links them to one another. In addition, he observes that borders today are increasingly dividing lines, attempting to overcome separation and demarcation and strengthen global thinking. “Now, global thinking can only ever be that which, turning its back on theoretical segre­ gation, rests on the archives of what Édouard Glissant called the ‘All-world’ (Tout-monde).”88 The democracy of the future must overcome thinking in singularities and “the simplistic ideology of integration”.89 Mbembe says: In addition, a democracy-to-come will rely on a clear-cut distinction between the ‘universal’ and the ‘in-common.’ The universal implies inclusion in some already constituted thing or entity, where the incommon presupposes a relation of co-belonging and sharing – the idea of a world that is the only one we have and that, to be sustainable, must

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be shared by all those with rights to it, all species taken together. For this sharing to become possible and for a planetary democracy to come to pass, the democracy of species, the demand for justice and reparation is inescapable.90 Mbembe denounces the tendency of liberal democracies to divide society into equals and non-equals and friends and enemies, identifying “obsessions about the real identity of the enemy”91 and a trend towards the “security state”.92 He further states: “Never have hospitality and hostility been so directly opposed.”93 On the other hand, he puts his faith in the unifying character of the vulnerability to which all human beings are equally sub­ jected. His ethical philosophy presupposes the “reciprocal recognition of this vulnerability”94 and he says: Allowing oneself to be affected by others – or to be defenselessly exposed to another existence – constitutes the first step toward that form of recognition that will not be contained in the master-slave paradigm, in the dialectic of powerlessness and omnipotence, or in that of combat, victory, and defeat. On the contrary, the kind of relation that arises from it is a relation of care. So, recognizing and accepting vulnerability – or even admitting that to live is always to live exposed, including to death – is the point of departure of every ethical elaboration whose aim, in the last instance, is humanity.95 When considering future mankind he speaks of “the ethics of the passerby”.96 His solidarity is characterised by distance but not by indifference. Mbembe asks: “Do not one’s being able to sojourn and to move about freely constitute the sine qua non conditions of sharing the world, or again of what Édouard Glissant has called the ‘World Relation’? What could the human person resemble beyond the accidents of birth, nationality, and citizenship?”97 In his Afropolitanism, Mbembe develops the idea of Africa as its own central location,98 which, by facilitating intercontinental and global mobility, should and can become attrac­ tive to people all over the world. “As Europe closes its borders, Africa will have to open its borders.”99 The focus on Africa is thus associated with an openness towards the world, whose outcome is a return to Africa. He is particularly concerned with facilitating the crossing of borders, the granting of residency rights and the acquisition of citizenships in order to improve global coexistence. He strongly rejects exclusion and isolation, stressing the importance of diversity and plurality. This demand considerably expands Kant’s cosmopolitan law, which is conceived as a right to hospitality. Mbembe’s ‘Critique of Black Reason’ and his concept of race The title Critique of Black Reason100 refers to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,101 which in French is Critique de la Raison Pure. Mbembe’s

56 Rethinking Kant investigation of ‘black discourse’ − in the sense of Foucault’s discourse ana­ lysis − largely refers to Pan-Africanism and the Négritude movement, but also, for example, to colonial and African studies and institutions such as museums, world exhibitions, collections, etc. as related dispositives. Mbembe summarises: In this context ‘Black Reason’ names not only a collection of discourses but also practices − the daily work that consisted in inventing, telling, repeating, and creating variations on the formulas, texts, and rituals whose goal was to produce the Black Man as a racial subject and site of savage exteriority, who was therefore set up for moral disqualification and practical instrumentalization.102 In Mbembe’s book, the Western image of the identity judgment is juxtaposed with the image of black people’s declaration of identity,103 whose “goal was, in effect, to write a history for the descendants of slaves that re-opened the possibility for them to become agents of history itself”.104 Mbembe calls “this second narrative the Black consciousness of Blackness”, which often bears traits of the first narrative and emerges in a process of “intellectual globalization”,105 which he wishes to analyse and critique.106 Mbembe says: “The ultimate historical gesture consisted in enacting the journey from the status of a slave to that of a citizen like all others.”107 This project of black reason takes up the concepts of civilisation and progress and the theme of cultural difference, which is based on the aspects of race, geography and tradition.108 Mbembe criticises: Defining oneself in this way depended on a reading of the world that later ideological currents would amplify, one that laid claim as much to progressivism and radicalism as to nativism. At the heart of the para­ digm of victimization was a vision of history as a series of inevitabilities.109 In this context, Mbembe speaks of a conspiratorial reading of history which conceals the aspect of personal responsibility.110 For Mbembe, the discourse of black reason is a “discourse of refutation and rehabilitation”.111 In this context, however, he refers to the criticised concept of race.112 Being African and being black are equated, resulting in the exclusion of non-black Afri­ cans.113 Mbembe, on the other hand, believes that tradition must be decon­ structed to reveal its fictional character. For the philosophical project, it is crucial to give people a perspective for the future, and black identity must be understood as an identity in the process of becoming.114 Within the scope of this process it is important to perceive and reflect on one’s contribution to colonial history: “I have stressed that Blacks remember the colonial poten­ tate as a founding trauma, yet at the same time refuse to admit their unconscious investment in the colony as a desire-producing machine.”115

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Mbembe firmly rejects the use of violence to counter violence or as an ‘escape from the great night’,116 as demanded by Fanon, who assigns an ethical dimension to counter-violence. The relationship between critique and struggle must be reconsidered and updated on the basis of Fanon and beyond.117 This also involves an analysis of power in its modified forms as well as a consideration of the metamorphosis of power. This in turn requires an elaboration and expansion of the resulting forms of power and power techniques, for example using the power of necropolitics, while still main­ taining Foucault’s definition of power as productive, changeable and also at home in the microphysical realm. An important aspect in Mbembe’s critical project is “the critique of race”118 as a “privileged language of social conflict”.119 He says: “In many ways our world remains a ‘world of races’, whether we admit it or not.”120 He clarifies this as follows: We must understand the principle of race as a spectral form of division and human difference that can be mobilised to stigmatise and exclude, or as a process of segregation through which people seek to isolate, eliminate, or physically destroy a particular human group.121 These processes are linked to the constitution of the racist subject.122 Socio­ biological transcription in the 19th century was preceded by a centuries-long discourse on the struggle between races.123 Mbembe refers to the critique of the concept of race which is primarily biologically based, in particular to Appiah. The latter’s critical analysis regards race as an untenable biological category. Mbembe however notes: ‘Racism without races’ is now surfacing in many countries. To practice racism today even as it is rendered conceptually unthinkable, ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ have replaced ‘biology’. Republican universalism is pre­ sented as blind to race, even as non-Whites are locked in their supposed origins. Racialized categories abound […].124 The concept of race has a delusional, imaginative and ideological dimension as regards its underlying structure, combined with a “remarkable capacity for vio­ lation”,125 whereby the other is constituted as threatening.126 The associated establishment of power relations has a particular economic significance. It would be a mistake to believe that we have left behind the regime that began with the slave trade and flourished in plantation and extraction colonies. In these baptismal fonts of modernity, the principle of race and the subject of the same name were put to work under the sign of capital.127 Taking the contemporary analysis of society as his starting point, Mbembe asserts that it is possible to identify the phenomenon of the ‘becoming black

58 Rethinking Kant of the world’ − he also speaks of the black condition as a transnational phenomenon128 − which concerns “all of subaltern humanity”129 and the associated danger for the “promise of liberty and universal equality”.130 In this context the term ‘black’ represents a manifest sign of a “social link of subjection and a body of extraction”.131 In contrast to past conditions, Mbembe complains that the problem today is, in particular, the redundancy of the subaltern classes, in other words the casting off of servants who are no longer profitable. “Yet, encouraged by processes of globalization and the contradictory effects they provoke, the problematic of race has once again burst into contemporary consciousness.”132 In this context, Mbembe also recognises the danger of genetic intervention by means of molecular biology techniques or the use of cyborgisation methods based on racial criteria. He states: “Race and racism, then, do not only have a past. They also have a future, particularly in a context where the possibility of transforming life and creating mutant species no longer belongs to the realm of fiction”133 and identifies a variety of “metamorphoses of the beast”.134 Furthermore, Mbembe asserts that the “reactivation of the logic of race” goes hand in hand with the spread of an ideology of security.135 Procedures of differentiation, classification, and hierarchization aimed at exclusion, expulsion, and even eradication have been reinvigorated everywhere. New voices have emerged proclaiming, on the one hand, that there is no such thing as a universal human being or, on the other, that the universal is common to some human beings but not to all.136 He continues: “Like the beginning of the nineteenth century, the beginning of the twenty-first constitutes, from this perspective, a significant moment of division, universal differentiation, and identity seeking.”137 In addition to Foucault, who analyses race in the context of the state and questions of power in biopolitics, regarding it as a discourse of justification for the legitimisation of killing in the normalising society, Mbembe examines the imaginative structure of the racist subject associated with racism, which transforms reality and shapes affects,138 taking Fanon as his starting point. He compares racism to a mental disorder, in which the dark sides of the unconscious are at work.139 In this process, Mbembe, like Fanon, focuses in particular on an exploration of subjectification as an outcome of the inter­ pellation of the constituted subject and its self-perception, thus filling a gap in Foucault’s theory. For Mbembe, as for Foucault, the principle of race remains an ideology and a technology of governance and is linked to the dispositive of security.140 Racist categorisations reify man, giving a name to the ‘surplus’ “that require[s] neither explanation nor justification. We can therefore compare the work of race to a sacrificial cut”.141 Mbembe notes: The racist subject sees the humanity in himself not by accounting for what makes him similar to others but by accounting for what makes him

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different. The logic of race in the modern world cuts across social and economic structures, impacts the movements within them, and constantly metamorphoses.142 The logic of race enters and permeates the social and economic structures of society.143 Furthermore, Mbembe examines the “call to race in Black dis­ course” as a “memory of a loss”,144 analysing and critiquing the underlying shift of Western discourse, which is concerned with the transformation of the “symbol of abjection […] into a symbol of beauty and pride”.145 “They constituted, by the force of things, a supplemental humanity engaged in con­ stant struggle to escape imprisonment and repetition, and driven by a desire to return to the place where autonomous creation had once been possi­ ble.”146 The “critique of race” is Mbembe’s most urgent task, since the “result of the work of race” is “the very negation of the idea of the common, or of common humanity”, which is the objective of his philosophising.147 As is the case in Appiah’s work, the focus is not only on criticism of the idea of race as a justification for colonialisation but also on the significance of race in the African discourse, as, for example, expressed in the Négritude move­ ment. The concern is to show the insufficient theoretical justification and the individual and societal functions as well as the effects of using racial cate­ gorisation both historically and in the present, and to employ cosmopolitan thinking to break through their influence. It becomes clear that Mbembe not only fundamentally rejects Kant’s judgmental and hierarchical principle of race classifications, but also expands the concept sociologically and psycho­ logically. In doing so, he focuses on the social and political function of the category and the negative consequences of its application in the individual, social and global spheres in particular, relating this to the current geopolitical situation. Afropolitanism and the aesthetics of entanglement Mbembe is also concerned with the creation of a new ‘Afropolitan’ culture which has a transnational character: Thus, we need to move on to something else if we want to revive intel­ lectual life in Africa and, at the same time, the possibilities of an art, a philosophy, an aesthetics that can say something new and meaningful to the world in general.”148 This culture is characterised by openness and vision: “Such ‘broad-mind­ edness’ is found more deeply still among a great number of artists, musicians and composers, writers, poets, painters – workers of the mind who have been aware since the beginning of the postcolonial era.”149 Mbembe describes the project of Afropolitanism in the following words: “Afropolitanism is an aes­ thetic and a particular poetic of the world. It is a way of being in the world,

60 Rethinking Kant refusing on principle any form of victim identity – which does not mean that it is not aware of the injustice and violence inflicted on the continent and its people by the law of the world.”150 He continues: “It is also a political and cultural stance in relation to the nation, to race, and to the issue of difference in general.”151 In this context, Africa is engaged in a permanent dialogue within the scope of the process of immersion and dispersion. In the age of dispersion and circulation, this same creation is more con­ cerned with the relation to an interval than to oneself or an other. […] Africa itself is now imagined as an immense interval, an inexhaustible citation open to many forms of combination and composition. The reference is no longer to an essential singularity, but rather to a renewed capacity for bifurcation.152 He continues: “The cultural history of the continent cannot be understood outside of the paradigm of roaming, mobility, and displacement.”153 Mbembe criticises in this context: When it comes to aesthetic creativity in contemporary Africa and the question of knowing who and what is ‘African’, political and cultural critique is often silent on this historical phenomenon of the circulation of worlds in silence.154 In this context Mbembe asserts “the capacity of Africans to inhabit several worlds at once and situate themselves simultaneously on both sides of an image”.155 These circulating worlds are linked to an aesthetic hybridity and a cultural dialogue or polylogue. The primarily aesthetic component is a cen­ tral element of his concept of Afropolitanism. Aesthetics as an element of shaping life, co-existing and forming the self and human relations is more than an aesthetic project in the Kantian sense. In Mbembe’s work, aesthetics and politics are closely linked to the supposedly private. The formal language of aesthetic objects plays an important role in discourse and power contexts as well as in subject formation. In contrast, Kant’s aesthetic work Critique of Judgment emphasises a teleological basis for his conception of the philosophy of history, continuing his epistemological investigations in the search for apriority when judging the beautiful and the sublime, which he identifies in disinterested pleasure. Kant thus identifies a universal principle in aesthetics which makes a general understanding of the beautiful possible. For Mbembe, on the other hand, the formative dimension of aesthetics in all their aspects, such as art, music, film, photography, architecture, etc., primarily concerns an expressive and unifying force in interpersonal communication across borders. The aesthetic-creative component of Afropolitanism goes beyond Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which focuses on structural-political, economic and legal action. While Kant sees the idea of perpetual peace as a guiding principle, substantiating it legally and politically in the sense of a treaty, which includes

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state, interstate and supranational constitutionality and institutionalisation, legal provisions and teleological ideas in relation to nature to support peo­ ple’s moral and political actions, in Mbembe’s attempt at realisation, man is primarily dependent on his insight, his morality and his willingness to exchange and cooperate. Mdembe does not, however, ignore legal aspects as evidenced, for example, by his demand for a change in citizenship law. When analysing colonial and postcolonial history, Mbembe focuses on confronting traumas; our own guilt; overcoming the victim role and the power of for­ giveness, aspiring to socio-political processes of transformation to achieve a greater sense of responsibility, participation, justice and mutual exchange. According to Mbembe, Kant remains necessary today for two reasons. Firstly, as an advocate of perpetual peace which opens the horizon of a world community, a world society which can be regarded as a community of owners, and, secondly, as an advocate of man as a sovereign rational being who can control his passions and affects and is capable of moral judg­ ment.156 Furthermore, Mbembe references Kant’s concept of hospitality as a right of world citizenship, which he modifies significantly. Kant’s funda­ mental assumptions thus form the overall foundation of Mbembe’s theory and are incorporated into his objectives without shaping them in terms of the formulation of specific theorems and the underpinning of an epistemological and ethical universalism combined with a teleological position. Kant’s rationality is, for example, replaced with human vulnerability in its more bodily and mental form as an essential definition of man. Instead of deon­ tological ethics based on the categorical imperative, Mbembe’s work includes an ethics of vulnerability. In contrast to Kant, whose cosmopolitanism, with its principle of human dignity, is anthropocentric, Mbembe attempts to overcome anthropomorphism with his concept of the planetary. The aes­ thetic-creative component of Afropolitanism also goes beyond Kant, who focuses on economic and legal action. While Kant’s cosmopolitan concept is based on Europe, Mbembe’s focus is on Africa and the African diaspora. With his philosophical intention to develop a diagnosis of the times; his emphasis on the aesthetic as a medium of subject formation, also in eman­ cipatory terms; his historicising of Kantian apriority in discourse theory, in which historical principles, rules and procedures of exclusion structure knowledge; and his power-theoretical considerations, Mbembe references a Kant who has been decisively changed by Foucault’s approach.

Acknowledgements The passage on the philosophy of Kwame Anthony Appiah is based on a revision of parts of the texts Rainsborough, Marita: “Cosmopolitanism. Universality. World Citizenship. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Rethinking of Kant’s Philosophy of History”. In: Órdenes, Paula; Alegría, Daniela (Eds.): Kant y el Criticismo: pasado, presente, ¿futuro? Porto Alegre (Editora Fi), 2015, pp. 255–268 and some translated parts of the text Rainsborough, Marita: “Kant revisited. Die kritische

62 Rethinking Kant Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Universalismus und Kosmopolitismus in der afri­ kanischen Philosophie”. In: Falduto, Antonio; Klemme, Heiner (Eds.): Kant und seine Kritiker – Kant and his Critics. Hildesheim (Olms Verlag), 2018, pp. 373–391. (Published with the permission of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft) The passage on the philosophy of Achille Mbembe is based on some trans­ lated parts of the text Rainsborough, Marita: “Kant revisited. Die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Kants Universalismus und Kosmopolitismus in der afrikanischen Philosophie”. In: Falduto, Antonio; Klemme, Heiner (Eds.): Kant und seine Kritiker – Kant and his Critics. Hildesheim (Olms Verlag), 2018, pp. 373–391. (Published with the permission of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft)

Notes 1 Cf. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a world of strangers. London, New York, Dublin (Pinguin Books), 2007a, pp. XII–XIII. According to Appiah, cosmopolitanism must be seen in connection with human mobility: “The nomadic urge is deep within us. […] We have always been a traveling spe­ cies.” In: Appiah, Kwame Anthony: The Ethics of Identity. Princeton (Princeton University Press), 2007b, p. 215. He continues: “[W]e are a traveling species as much as a settled one.” In: Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “Foreword”. In: Sassen, Saskia: Globalization and its Discontents; Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York (The New York Press), 1998a, p. XI. 2 Appiah 2007b: 58.

3 Appiah 2007b: 156.

4 Appiah 2007b: 225.

5 Cf. Appiah 2007b: 222.

6 Appiah, Kwame Anthony: The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen. New

York, London (W. W. Norton & Company), 2010, p. 183. “The emotions and practices of honor − esteem, contempt, respect, deference − developed, it is rea­ sonable to suppose, with hierarchy in troops of early humans” (Appiah 2010: 184). 7 “Kant, in the Critique of Judgment, said that in making aesthetic judgments ‘one solicits assent from everyone else.’ You might suppose there’s a similar distinction to be drawn here: where morality requires compliance, ethics calls for it” (Appiah 2007b: 235). Appiah here quotes from Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: The Critique of the Power of Judgment. Guyer, Paul (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2000, p. 121. (Text cited as “KU”.) 8 Appiah 2007b: 249. Also see Appiah 2007b: 258. 9 Appiah 2007b: 223. He also states: “Here is a respect for difference that remains committed to the existence of universal standards” (Appiah 2007b: 247). He continues: “My complaint against antiuniversalism is that it protects difference at the cost of partitioning each community into a moral world of its own. And so you might suppose that such an approach has simply made itself irrelevant to the project of cosmopolitanism” (Appiah 2007b: 249). 10 Appiah 2007b: 251.

11 Appiah 2007b: 250.

12 Ibid. And he further states: “If there is a critique of the Enlightenment to be

made, it is not that the philosophes believed in human nature, or the universality of reason: it is rather that they were so dismally unimaginative about the range of what we have in common” (Appiah 2007b: 258).

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13 Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “Grounding Human Rights”. In: Gutmann, Amy (Ed.): Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry: Michael Ignatieff. Princeton, NJ (Princeton University Press), 2001a, pp. 101–116. Appiah asserts that human rights lack a satisfactory philosophical substantiation and complains that they are insufficiently asserted. As regards the solution to these problems, he advo­ cates a pragmatic approach in order to further promote the spread and assertion of human rights (Appiah 2001a: 108–109). In the context of human rights Deng also calls attention to the necessity of international negotiation of content, etc. “cross-cultural perspectives on human rights with a view to balancing uni­ versality with relativism”. In: Deng, Francis M.: “Human Rights in the African Context”. In: Wiredu, Kwasi: A companion to African Philosophy. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 2006, p. 506. 14 Appiah, Kwame Anthony: In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1992, pp. 117–129. 15 Appiah 1992: 7. 16 “For what I am calling humanism can be provisional, historically contingent, antiessentialist (in other words, postmodern), and still be demanding. We can surely maintain a powerful engagement with the concern to avoid cruelty and pain, while nevertheless recognizing the contingency of that concern” (Appiah 1992: 155). 17 Appiah 2007b: 252. 18 “I happen to believe that there is such thing as a universal human biology, that there is a biological human nature. I would say, for example, that it is shaped by the more than 99 percent of our genes that we all share, by the fact that our closest common ancestor may have lived a little more than a hundred thousand years ago” (ibid.). 19 Appiah 2007b: 23. 20 Appiah 2007a: 85. 21 Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction”. In: Gutmann, Amy (Ed.): Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition: Charles Taylor. Princeton, NJ (Princeton University Press), 1994, p. 159. 22 Appiah, Kwame Anthony: Thinking It Through: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2003, p. 201. 23 “And if two people share all the properties morally relevant to some action we ought to do, it will be an error – a failure to apply the Kantian injunction to universalize our moral judgments – to use the bare facts of race as the basis for treating them differently” (Appiah 1992: 18). 24 Appiah 1992: 19. 25 Appiah 2003: 217. 26 Cf. ibid. Also refer to Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “The Illusions of Race”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: African Philosophy: An Anthology. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 1998b, pp. 275–290 and Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race”. In: Bernasconi, Robert; Lott, Tommy L. (Eds.): The Idea of Race. Indianapolis, IN (Hackett Publishers), 2000, pp. 118–135. 27 Appiah praises in particular Mill’s essay On Liberty. See for example: Mill, John Stuart: On Liberty: Über die Freiheit. Stuttgart (Reclam), 2009b. 28 Appiah 2007a: XVII. 29 Appiah 2007b: XVI. The significance of political preconditions for this process is also illustrated by the following statement by Mill: “Every step in political improvement renders it more so, by removing the sources of opposition of interest and levelling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes, owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it

64 Rethinking Kant

30 31 32 33 34

35

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51

is still practicable to disregard.” In: Mill, John Stuart: Utilitarianism. Auckland (Floating Press), 2009a, p. 59. Appiah transfers this idea, which refers to a nation-state, to a global political context. Appiah 2007a: 5. Ibid. Appiah cites Mill’s On Liberty. “[F]or Mill the activity of choosing had a rational dimension, was bound up in observation, reason, judgment, and deliberation” (Appiah 2007a: 7). Appiah 2007a: 5. Appiah cites Mill’s On Liberty. “Still, I think it is best to read Mill as finding inherent value not in diversity − being different − but in the enterprise of self-creation. […] On liberty defends freedom because only free people can take full command of their own lives” (Appiah 2007a: 6). “The critics have a point. No doubt such plans can be misleading if we imagine that people stride around with a neatly folded blueprint of their lives tucked into their pocket – if we imagine life plans to be singular and fixed, rather than multiple and constantly shifting” (Appiah 2007a: 8). Not every choice must be rational: “First, it is hard to accept the idea that certain values derive from my choices if those choices themselves are just arbitrary” (Appiah 2007a: 14). Appiah 2007b: 14. Appiah continues: “the mere fact that I have chosen a plan of life recommends it” (Appiah 2007b: 14–15). Appiah 2007a: 15. Appiah 2007a: 20. Cf. Taylor, Charles: The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press), 1991. Appiah 2007b: 21. Appiah quotes here from Mill’s Utilitarianism (CWM 10: 233). Appiah 2007a: 71. Appiah 2007a: 163. Mill, unlike Bentham, believes in qualitative differences in human needs which determine his consequentialism. Appiah 2007a: 23. “Every human identity is constructed, historical; everyone has its share of false presuppositions, of the errors and inaccuracies that courtesy calls ‘myth’, reli­ gion ‘heresy’, and science ‘magic’. Invented histories, invented biologies, inven­ ted cultural affinities come with every identity; each is a kind of role that has to be scripted, structured by conventions of narrative”. In: Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “African Identities”. In: Boxill, Bernard (Ed.): Race and Racism. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2001b, p. 373. Cf. Appiah 2007a: 170–171. Appiah criticises among others Du Bois, because the latter’s socio-historical concept of race conceals a biological one. “The truth is that there are no races”, states Appiah (1998b: 287). Appiah 2001b: 375. Appiah says: “racialized conception of one’s identity is retrogressive” (Appiah 2001b: 380). Intellectuals are, according to Appiah, “searchers after truth” (Appiah 2001: 374). Appiah 2001b: 373. In his pragmatic handling of principles Appiah again demonstrates his similarity to Mill. Mill says: “It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of the human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable” (Mill 2009a: 45). As regards this room for manoeuvre Mill relies on “the moral responsibility of the agent” (ibid.). This is anchored in a subjective feeling. He

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52 53 54

55 56 57

58

59

60

65

states: “[T]he force he is really urged by is his own subjective feeling, and is exactly measured by its strength” (Mill 2009a: 53). Appiah 2001: 374. However, other alliances, for example involving migrants with different skin colours, may also be obstructed by this. “Because the value of identities is thus relative, we must argue for and against them case by case. And given the current situation in Africa, I think it remains clear that another Pan-Africanism – the project of a continental fraternity and sorority, not the project of a racialized Negro nationalism – however false or muddled its theoretical roots, can be a progressive force” (Appiah 2001b: 381). Cf. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity. London (Profile Books), 2018, p. 219. Appiah 2001b: 382. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “African Philosophy and African Literature”. In: Wiredu, Kwasi (Ed.): A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden, Oxford, Carlton (Blackwell Publishers), 2006, p. 540. Appiah particularly criticises Soyinka’s literary project of searching for African authenticity (cf. Appiah 2006: 540–544). In contrast to Bentham’s quantitative approach, Mill develops a qualitative form of utilitarianism, which includes not only the greatest possible happiness of the greatest number of people, but the fulfilment of the most essential human needs. “It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone” (Mill 2009a: 16). Mill presumes the participation of higher human needs and spiritual interests which are linked to the feeling of happiness. “It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower […]” (Mill 2009a: 20). Mill’s statement is well-known: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill 2009a: 19). In this context, it is crucial that utilitar­ ianism does not strive for the greatest happiness of the individual, but for the greatest happiness overall (cf. Mill 2009a: 22). This is not only about increasing happiness, but also about the prevention and mitigation of unhappiness (cf. Mill 2009a: 24). The aim is to combine the happiness of the individual with the interests of all. “As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole” (Mill 2009a: 32). Mill is not aiming to maximise the happiness of the individual, but rather individual satisfaction, which is promoted in particular by ethical action. In this context, Mill criticises the “present wretched education, and wretched social arrangements” (Mill 2009a: 25). Mill is confident, however, that the evils of the world can be eliminated for the most part: “All the grand sour­ ces, in short, of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort […]” (Mill 2009a: 28). Here Mill thinks of poverty and illness, for example. Appiah himself, however, refers in his theory of honour to Aristotle’s idea of the good life (cf. Appiah 2010: XIV). This recourse, however, seems to me to be rather eclectic. Aristotelian moments are generally not important in his philosophy. According to Appiah, Kant’s deontological ethics, based on the categorical imperative, neglect the aspect of motivation for ethical action, which Appiah locates in the pursuit of honour. Goodwill cannot accomplish this (cf. Appiah 2010: 179–182).

66 Rethinking Kant 61 Mbembe, Achille: “Körper in Bewegung. Achille Mbembe im Interview.” In: Mittelweg 36. Zeitschrift des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung. 27(3), June/July 2018, p. 69 (own translation). 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Mbembe, Achille: Critique of Black Reason. Durham, London (Duke University Press), 2017, p. 7. 65 Cf. Mbembe, Achille: Brutalisme. Paris (La Découverte), 2020a, p. 55. 66 Cf. Mbembe 2017: 232. 67 “Être de passage, c’est cela finalement la condition humaine terrestre. Assurer, organiser et gouverner le passage et non instruire de nouvelles fermetures, telle est la tâche de la démocratie à l’ère planétaire” (Mbembe 2020a: 56). 68 Mbembe states: “On a more anthropological level, the obsession with unique­ ness and difference must be opposed by the thematics of sameness.” In: Mbembe, Achille: “African Modes of Self-Writing”. In: Public Culture. 14(1), 2002, p. 258. Available at: https://kexchange.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/ply.pdf (retrieved: 15 July 2023). He continues: “Finally, on a sociological level, atten­ tion must be given to the contemporary everyday practices through which Africans manage to recognize and maintain with the world an unprecedented familiarity – practices through which they invent something that is their own and that beckons to the world in its generality” (ibid.). 69 Mbembe 2002: 256. In this context, Mbembe analyses with reference to Kant and Hegel “this darker side of the enlightenment”, according to which blacks were denied “the power of invention and universality peculiar to reason”, and points to the exclusion of Africans: “Because of the radical difference, it was deemed legitimate to exclude them, both de facto and de jure, from the sphere of full and complete human citizenship: they had nothing to contribute to the universal” (Mbembe 2002: 246). Or: “at best, assigned to them an inferior status in the hierarchy of races” (Mbembe 2002: 253). The discourse on African iden­ tity as a defence strategy faces a dilemma: “Does African identity partake in the generic human identity? […] Or should one insist, in the name of difference and uniqueness, on the possibility of diverse cultural forms within a single humanity − but cultural forms whose purpose is not to be self-sufficient, whose ultimate signification is universal” (ibid.). Mbembe criticises: “Since the racial inter­ pretation is at the foundation of a restricted civic relatedness, everything that is not black is out of place, and thus cannot claim any sort of Africanity. The spatial body, the racial body and the civic body are henceforth one, each testi­ fying to an autochthonous communal origin by virtue of which everyone born of the soil or sharing the same color or ancestors is a brother or a sister” (Mbembe 2002: 256). 70 Mbembe 2002: 254. 71 Cf. Mbembe, Achille: “Was bleibt von Immanuel Kant?” In: Zeit Online, 2015a. Available at: www.zeit.de/2015/49/philosophie-immanuel-kant-vermaechtnis-p hilosophen (retrieved: 26 August 2023). 72 In this context, Mbembe emphasises the need to deal with history, to work through traumatic experiences, and to adopt an attitude of forgiveness. Cf. Mbembe, Achille: “What is postcolonial thinking? An interview with Achille Mbembe”. In: Eurozine, 2008, pp. 9–10. Available at: www.cairn-int.info/article-E_ESPRI_0612_ 0117–what-is-postcolonial-thinking.htm (retrieved: 26 August 2023). 73 Cf. Mbembe 2015a: 1. 74 At the same time, the process of decolonisation goes far beyond Africa’s borders and has a global context: “The decolonisation of Africa was, however, not just an African matter. Both before and also during the Cold War it was an inter­ national matter” (own translation). See also the original text: “La

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75

76 77

78

79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

67

décolonisation de l’Afrique ne fut pas seulement une affaire africaine. Aussi bien avant que pendant la Guerre froide, elle fut une affaire internationale.” In: Mbembe, Achille: Sortir de la grande nuit: Essai sur l’afrique décolonisée: Suivi d’un entretien avec l’auteur. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2013a, p. 25. It deals with the democratisation of Africa and its economic development. These processes are also international concerns (cf. Mbembe 2013a: 28). “Decolonisation itself, as an act of refusal turned into an act of assertion, an act of rebellion turned into an act of refoundation, as sign and Event, was imagined as a kind of relation to the future. The future in return, was another name for the force of self-creation and invention.” In: Mbembe, Achille: Out of the dark night: essays on decolonization. New York (Columbia University Press), 2021, p. 44. Mbembe continues: “As a historic event, decolonization was one of the turning points in what can be called our late modernity” (Mbembe 2021: 49). Mbembe, Achille: “Afropolitanism”. In: Nka: Journal of Contemporary African Art. 40, May 2020b, p. 58. Mbembe, Achille: “Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive”. 2015b, p. 19. Available at: http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbem be%20-%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20 the%20Archive.pdf (retrieved: 26 August 2023). Mbembe criticises the Western conception of the universal: “It has always pos­ ited its own horizon of action as something inevitable and absolute, and this horizon has always wished to be, by definition, planetary and universal. The conception of the universal at issue here is not necessarily the equivalent of that which is valid for all humans as humans. Neither is it a synonymous with a broadening of my own horizons or a care for the conditions of my own finitude. The universal here is the name given to the violence of the victors of wars that are, of course, conflicts of predation.” In: Mbembe, Achille: Necropolitics. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 2019, p. 64. He also states: “What will then emerge in relative clarity are the demands, if not of a possible universality, then at least of an idea of the Earth as that which is common to us, as our communal condition” (Mbembe 2019: 189). He agrees with Césaire and Sen­ ghor regarding their conception of the universal: “Both reject abstract visions of the universal. They argue that the universal is always defined through the reg­ ister of singularity. In their eyes, the universal is precisely the site of a multi­ plicity of singularities, each of which is only what it is, or what links and separates it from other singularities. For both Césaire and Senghor, there is no absolute universal. The only universal is the community of singularities and differences, a sharing that is at once the creation of something common and a form of separation” (Mbembe 2017: 158). Mbembe 2015b: 8. Mbembe 2021: 228–229. Mbembe 2021: 229. Ibid. Mbembe 2019: 2. Mbembe 2019: 9. Cf. Mbembe 2019: 13–15. Mbembe 2019: 5. Mbembe 2019: 40. Mbembe 2019: 9. Mbembe 2019: 40. Ibid. Mbembe refers here to his “Epilogue: There is only one world” (Mbembe 2017). Mbembe 2019: 53.

68 Rethinking Kant 92 Cf. Mbembe 2019: 54. Mbembe states: “As a result, public deliberation, which is one of democracy’s essential features, no longer consists in discussing and seeking collectively, before the eyes of all citizens, the truth and, ultimately, justice. The great opposition no longer being that between truth and falsity, the worst thing is henceforth doubt. For, in the concrete struggle opposing us to our enemies, doubt hinders the total freeing of the voluntarist, emotional, and vital energies necessary for the use of violence and, if necessary, for shedding blood” (Mbembe 2019: 55). 93 Mbembe 2019: 65.

94 Mbembe 2019: 175.

95 Mbembe 2019: 175–176.

96 Mbembe 2019: 188.

97 Ibid. Mbembe continues: “It would have been good to be able to give an

exhaustive reply to all these questions. Let us be content to observe the future thinking will necessarily be about passage, crossing, and movement. This think­ ing will be about flowing life, about passing life, which we strife to translate as an event” (ibid.). 98 “The ultimate challenge, however, is for Africa to become its own centre.” In: Mbembe, Achille: “Africa and the Future: An interview with Achille Mbembe”. In: Swissfuture. 03/2013b, p. 4. Available at: https://africasacountry.com/2013/ 11/africa-and-the-future-an-interview-with-achille-mbembe (retrieved: 26 August 2023). 99 Ibid. 100 Mbembe, Achille: Critique de la Raison Negre. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2013c. 101 Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul; Wood, Allen W. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2009. (Text cited as “KrV”.) 102 Mbembe 2017: 28. 103 Cf. Mbembe 2017: 28, 29. 104 Mbembe 2017: 29. 105 Mbembe 2017: 30. 106 Mbembe 2017: 29. “The second was traversed by the traces, marks, and inces­ sant buzzing of the first and, in certain cases, its dull injunction and its myopia, even where the claim of rupture was most forceful” (Mbembe 2017: 29–30). 107 Mbembe 2017: 29. 108 Cf. Mbembe 2017: 89. 109 Mbembe 2017: 88. 110 Ibid. He states: “Such a conspiratorial reading of history was presented as the radical discourse of emancipation and autonomy, the foundation for a so-called politics of Africanity. But behind the neurosis of victimization lurks in reality a negative and circular way of thinking that relies on superstition to function” (ibid.). The condemning consequence of this is: “The Black Man is a castrated subject, a passive instrument for the enjoyment of the Other, and becomes himself only through the act of taking the power to spill blood from the colonizer and using it himself” (Mbembe 2017: 89). 111 Ibid. 112 “We rebel not against the idea that Blacks constitute a distinct race but against the prejudice of inferiority attached to the race” (Mbembe 2017: 90). 113 “The idea of an Africanity that is not Black simply became unthinkable” (Mbembe 2017: 91). 114 Cf. Mbembe 2017: 94. He states for example: “There exists instead an identity in the process of becoming” (Mbembe 2017: 95). 115 Mbembe 2017: 120.

Cosmopolitanism in the philosophy of Appiah and Mbembe 116 117 118 119 120

121 122

123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

133 134 135 136 137 138

139

140 141

69

Cf. Mbembe 2017: 169. Cf. Mbembe 2017: 169, 170. Mbembe 2017: 54. Ibid. Mbembe 2017: 55. Mbembe further says: “Our critique of modernity will remain incomplete if we fail to grasp that the coming of modernity coincided with the appearance of the principle of race and the latter’s slow transformation into the privileged matrix for techniques of domination, yesterday as today” (ibid.). And: “At first glance, the reasons put forth to justify colonialism were of an economic, political, military, ideological, or humanitarian order” (Mbembe 2017: 65). Mbembe 2017: 55. Mbembe 2017: 62. The term ‘black’ also implies a defect. “It mattered little that ‘Nègre’ designated the slave while ‘Black Man’ designated the African who had not yet been subjected to slavery” (Mbembe 2017: 72). He continues: “At the time, the term ‘Black Man’ was the name given to a species of human who, although human, barely deserved the name of human” (Mbembe 2017: 73). Mbembe observes: “Suddenly, to call someone a ‘Black Man’ was to define him as a being that was biologically, intellectually, and culturally predetermined by his irreducible difference” (ibid.). Cf. Mbembe 2017: 55, 56. Mbembe 2017: 7. Cf. Mbembe 2017: 13. Cf. Mbembe 2017: 10. Mbembe 2017: 13. Cf. Mbembe 2017: 15. Mbembe 2017: 7. Ibid. Mbembe 2017: 18. Mbembe 2017: 21. Mbembe also says: “After a brief intermission, the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first have witnessed the return to biological understandings of the distinctions between human groups” (ibid.). Ibid. Mbembe 2017: 22. Ibid. Mbembe 2017: 24. Ibid. Mbembe says, among other things: “If there is a secret to the colony, it is clearly this: the subjection of the native by way of desire” (Mbembe 2017: 119). In this context, in recourse to Lacan, he observes the ‘yawning gap’ of African writings on the topic of the self (cf. Mbembe 2017: 120). And Mbembe further observes: “That such a great psychic weight continues to be attributed to the colony is, strictly speaking, due to a resistance to confession: a resistance to confess the subjugation of Africans to desire, a resistance to confess that they had allowed themselves to be had, a resistance to admit that they had been seduced and fooled by the ‘great threat of the machinery of the imaginary’ that was the commodity” (ibid.). He thus continues Fanon’s interpretive approach, which, on the psychological, psychopathological and social levels, treats the individual subject as the starting point for his investigation of racist experience. Cf. Fanon, Frantz: Black Skin, White Masks. New York (Grove Press), 1967. Cf. Mbembe 2017: 35, 36. Mbembe 2017: 34, 35.

70 Rethinking Kant 142 Mbembe 2017: 36. 143 Cf. Ibid. Mbembe describes the perception of people of African descent as ‘blacks’, subjects of race, as a phantasmagoria (cf. Mbembe 2017: 40). On the other hand, Africa and its people become an image of the ‘return to one’s origin’, in particular in modern art, the ‘black model’ (Mbembe 2017: 41). “Anticolonial critique of an aesthetic, avant-gardist, and anarchist bent largely drew on the very colonial myths and stereotypes that it sought to invert” (Mbembe 2017: 43). Mbembe makes a similar observation as regards the Négritude movement (ibid.). Mbembe summarises the use of the term Africa as follows: “The critique of life as a critique of language is, then, precisely what the term ‘Africa’ invites us to undertake” (Mbembe 2017: 53). According to Mbembe, the term ‘Africa’ represents the fundamental negation of responsibility and justice (cf. Mbembe 2017: 54). He says: “This negation is the result of the work of race − the very negation of the idea of the common, or of common humanity” (ibid.). He continues: “In fact, other parts of the world are currently undergoing a process of ‘Africanization’. There is consequently something in the name ‘Africa’ that judges the world and calls for reparation, restitution, and justice. Its spectral presence in the world can be understood only as part of a critique of race” (ibid.). 144 Mbembe 2017: 34. In particular, the search for protection against dis­ appearance, for purity, for separation and for the desire to escape the principle of victimisation is important. 145 Mbembe 2017: 47. 146 Mbembe 2017: 48. In this context, Mbembe also speaks of “suspended humanity” (ibid.). 147 Mbembe 2017: 54. 148 Mbembe 2020b: 60. 149 Mbembe 2020b: 60–61. 150 Mbembe 2020b: 60. 151 Ibid. 152 Mbembe 2021: 212. 153 Mbembe 2021: 214. “It was moreover, this culture of mobility that colonization in its time attempted to freeze via the modern institution of the border. To recall this history of roaming and mobilities is to speak of mixtures, amalgamations, superpositions – an aesthetic of intertwining [entrelacement]. Nothing – not Islam, Christianity, ways of dressing, doing business, speaking, or even eating habits – escaped the steamroller of métissage and vernacularization. This was the case well before colonization. There is indeed a precolonial African modernity that has not yet been sufficiently accounted for in contemporary creativity” (ibid.). 154 Ibid. 155 Mbembe 2017: 102. 156 Cf. Mbembe 2015a: 1.

Bibliography Appiah, Kwame Anthony: In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1992. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction”. In: Gutmann, Amy (Ed.): Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition: Charles Taylor. Princeton, NJ (Princeton University Press), 1994, pp. 149–163.

Cosmopolitanism in the philosophy of Appiah and Mbembe

71

Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “Foreword”. In: Sassen, Saskia: Globalization and its Dis­ contents; Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York (The New York Press), 1998a, pp. XI–XV. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “The Illusions of Race”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: African Philosophy: An Anthology. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 1998b, pp. 275–290. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race”. In: Bernasconi, Robert; Lott, Tommy L. (Eds.): The Idea of Race. Indianapolis, IN (Hackett Publishers), 2000, pp. 118–135. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “Grounding Human Rights”. In: Gutmann, Amy (Ed.): Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry: Michael Ignatieff. Princeton, NC (Princeton University Press), 2001a, pp. 101–116. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “African Identities”. In: Boxill, Bernard (Ed.): Race and Racism. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2001b, pp. 371–382. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: Thinking It Through: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2003. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: “African Philosophy and African Literature”. In: Wiredu, Kwasi (Ed.): A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 2006, pp. 538–548. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers. London (Penguin Books), 2007a. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: The Ethics of Identity. Princeton, NJ (Princeton University Press), 2007b. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen. New York (W. W. Norton & Company), 2010. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity. London (Profile Books), 2018. Deng, Francis M.: “Human Rights in the African Context”. In: Wiredu, Kwasi: A Companion to African Philosophy. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 2006, pp. 499–508. Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 1–22 edited by the Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; vol. 24– 27 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin (De Gruyter), 1900 et seq. Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: The Cri­ tique of the Power of Judgment. Guyer, Paul (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2000. (Text cited as “KU”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul; Wood, Allen W. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2009. (Text cited as “KrV”.) Mbembe, Achille: “African Modes of Self-Writing”. In: Public Culture. 14(1), 2002, pp. 239–273. Available at: https://kexchange.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/ply.pdf (retrieved: 15 July 2023). Mbembe, Achille: “What Is Postcolonial Thinking? An Interview with Achille Mbembe”. In: Eurozine, 2008, pp. 1–13. Available at: www.cairn-int.info/article-E_ ESPRI_0612_0117–what-is-postcolonial-thinking.htm (retrieved: 26 August 2023). Mbembe, Achille: Sortir de la grande nuit: Essai sur l’afrique décolonisée: Suivi d’un entretien avec l’auteur. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2013a. Mbembe, Achille: “Africa and the Future: An Interview with Achille Mbembe”. In: Swissfuture. 03/2013b, pp. 1–6. Available at: https://africasacountry.com/2013/11/a frica-and-the-future-an-interview-with-achille-mbembe (retrieved: 26 August 2023).

72 Rethinking Kant Mbembe, Achille: Critique de la Raison Negre. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2013c. Mbembe, Achille: “Was bleibt von Immanuel Kant?” In: Zeit Online, 2015a, p. 1. Available at: www.zeit.de/2015/49/philosophie-immanuel-kant-vermaechtnis-philo sophen (retrieved: 26 August 2023). Mbembe, Achille: “Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive”. 2015b, pp. 1–29. Available at: http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbem be%20-%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the %20Archive.pdf (retrieved: 26 August 2023). Mbembe, Achille: Critique of Black Reason. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 2017. Mbembe, Achille: “Körper in Bewegung. Achille Mbembe im Interview.” In: Mittel­ weg 36. Zeitschrift des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung. 27(3), June/July 2018, pp. 61–74. Mbembe, Achille: Necropolitics. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 2019. Mbembe, Achille: Brutalisme. Paris (La Découverte), 2020a, p. 55. Mbembe, Achille: “Afropolitanism”. In: Nka: Journal of Contemporary African Art. 40, May 2020b, pp. 56–61. Mbembe, Achille: Out of the Dark Night: Essays on Decolonization. New York (Columbia University Press), 2021. Mill, John Stuart: Utilitarianism. Auckland (Floating Press), 2009a. Mill, John Stuart: On Liberty: Über die Freiheit. Stuttgart (Reclam), 2009b. Taylor, Charles: The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press), 1991.

3

Critical dialogue with Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism in the work of Wiredu and Gyekye

Kant’s universalism from the perspective of Wiredu Wiredu and Kant’s epistemic universalism Kant’s universalism is under intense criticism in contemporary African phi­ losophy. Political concepts such as Kwasi Wiredu’s model of consensus democracy develop proposals for solving African and global problems by confronting Kant’s universalism and concept of man. The experience of glo­ balisation and the necessity of taking the particular and local roots into account are addressed in the political concepts of contemporary African philosophy, while attempts are made to develop solutions for combining universalism and particularism − often in the sense of a ‘glocal’ concept. The question arises as to how the particular is linked to the claim to universal validity in contemporary concepts, or whether this claim has been aban­ doned. What concept of man are these theories based on? In addition to this, the significance of the particularistic in Kant’s universalist thinking, espe­ cially in connection with his concept of man, and the relevance of Kant’s theorems in African philosophies will be analysed. The theories of Wiredu will be explored as regards their referencing of Kant in his philosophical concepts. Kant’s epistemic universalism is located in the context of his historicalphilosophical, cosmopolitan conception. When discussing the political potential of universalism in the epistemological and ethical realm, culminating in an epistemic and moral cosmopolitanism, Höffe says: The current age of globalisation has bestowed new relevance and sig­ nificance to an ancient philosophical claim. Now that a variety of very different cultures participate, no longer merely ‘in principle’ but rather visibly, in the single world that we all share, we clearly require an equally visible form of argumentation that is independent of specific cultures and can therefore claim trans-cultural and inter-cultural, rather than ethno­ centric, validity. On analogy with an intrinsically global system of law and right, we could describe this form of thought as ‘cosmopolitan’ in an DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-5

74 Rethinking Kant epistemic rather than merely juridical sense of the word. The first Cri­ tique itself thus extends Kant’s already well-known political cosmopoli­ tanism into a form of epistemic cosmopolitanism that has hardly been properly acknowledged but is certainly just as important. And it also expands the principal interest of reason to encompass an explicit moral cosmopolitanism.1 Höffe explains his understanding of cosmopolitanism in Kant’s sense more precisely as “interest in the fate of humanity in general”.2 This ‘cosmopolitan reading’3 “attempts to present the structure of the single world that is common to all cultures from a theoretical point of view and to explicate the single faculty of reason that is equally common to all human beings”.4 In contemporary African philosophy Kwasi Wiredu is a particular propo­ nent of this method of establishing and spelling out a common knowledge based on inter- and transcultural commonalities as the foundation for a process of understanding between people of different cultures within the scope of a respectful dialogue with one another,5 and he references Kant in this context. Wiredu complains about the increasing relativism of knowl­ edge,6 which neither presupposes nor creates a common basis for thinking, and attempts in his theory to combine universalism and particularism.7 He is concerned about “the possibility of universal canons of thought and action”.8 For him, universals are the prerequisite for communication between different cultures: “This is important because without such universals intercultural communication must be impossible.”9 Despite “colonial and neo-colonial miscommunications”, Wiredu wishes to hold on to universalism and clear up misunderstandings regarding misuse in the post/colonial context of power: “More often than not the alleged universals have been home­ grown particulars. Not naturally, the practice has earned universals a bad name. But, rightly perceived, the culprits are the hasty purveyors of uni­ versals, not the idea of universals itself.”10 According to Wiredu, these universals of knowledge and morality are based on biological reasons and he refers to his “implicit biological orientation”.11 Wiredu defines three universal principles in particular: “I take the three supreme laws of thought and con­ duct, namely, the principles of non-contradiction, induction, and the cate­ gorical imperative (roughly so called) in the ‘[b]iological Foundation of Universal Norms.’”12 Wiredu notes that cultural factors determine this pro­ cess. However, all cultures possess universals in addition to particularistic characteristics. He states: “There are elements of both particularity and universality in culture, in any culture.”13 Intercultural understanding presupposes universally valid principles: Nevertheless, the fundamental biological similarity of all human beings assures the possibility of resolving all such disparities, for the foundation of all communication is biological. Cultural particularities are acci­ dental. What defines the human species are the universals of culture.

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 75 Thus any fundamental elucidation of the concept of communication must dissipate the cultural relativism which is a bar to intercultural dialogue and, hence, to international understanding.14 In contrast to Kant, Wiredu considers truth to be the objective validity of statements primarily under the aspect of consensus in an intercultural dialo­ gue or polylogue, which is enabled by biological universals. Kant, on the other hand, prefers the correspondence theory of truth, which he combines with the basic theorems of coherence and consensus theories of truth. According to the first Critique all three perspectives have some right, albeit no exclusive right, in determining the character of truth. And while it is clear that the concept of correspondence enjoys a certain pri­ vileged right in Kant’s eyes, it is not defended in the naive-realist manner which protagonists of the coherence and consensus theories of truth typically criticise. On the contrary, the new and revolutionary ‘Coperni­ can’ form of Kant’s argument criticises the critics who understand the notion of ‘correspondence’ in terms of a relatively naive realism.15 In order to avoid relativism, Wiredu bases his theory of consensus on a cultural universalism, which creates the preconditions for a possible con­ sensus. On closer investigation, it becomes apparent that cultural uni­ versalism is grounded on an epistemic basis which originates from underlying concepts; cognitive patterns and inferences, and thus is similar to Kant’s apriority in terms of its argumentative function. Wiredu locates the guaran­ tor for truth and agreement in the constitution of the human cognitive faculty itself, thus adopting a modified form of a Kantian concept. Parallel to this, he uses the theorem of freedom from contradiction to integrate a coherence theoretical assumption into his concept. Kant also assumes dif­ ferent forms of establishing coherence, for example the supreme principle of freedom from contradiction in analytical judgments, the synthetic ‘I think’, which creates the unity of the thinking subject; the concept of the world, which guarantees the unity of all objects; the concept of nature, which implies a link between laws of nature; and also the assumed teleological context, which leads to a conception of progress as regards man and history. Like Kant, Wiredu’s work demonstrates a shift from epistemic coherence − starting from the principle of freedom from contradiction − to politicalethical forms of coherence which are linked to consensus theoretical assumptions in ethics and politics. Höffe notes as regards Kant: “The lack of agreement suggests an epistemic state of nature, the absence of a common standard indirectly implies an epistemic state of right, and the prospect of agreement evokes the thought of epistemic peace.”16 In this context, Wiredu develops the model of consensual democracy based on the Akan idea of democracy, which he recommends as a model for political development in Africa instead of multi-party democracy.17 In the tradition of the Akan, the

76 Rethinking Kant creation of a consensus serves to resolve conflicts both within lineage and between ethnic groups. This recommendation for Africa’s political orienta­ tion originates from the fact that the former concept of democracy is anchored in the African tradition and is also socially supported by ethical communitarianism in Africa. The theoretical basis of Wiredu’s political concepts is his epistemology, which is based on universal principles. Language, logical reasoning and conceptual schemes in Wiredu − a comparison with Kant The elements of the human faculty of cognition mentioned by Wiredu refer primarily to forms of reasoning, in particular inductive and deductive rea­ soning. Logical reasoning implies inference and making judgments. In Kant’s case, inductive reasoning refers to the activity of reflective judgment as a conclusion from the particular to the general (cf. Log, AA 09:133). Accord­ ing to Kant, inductive as well as analogous reasoning only exhibit “assumed and comparative universality” (KrV B 4), and therefore cannot guarantee any truth. Reflective judgment can claim a ‘general’, but not a universal validity (cf. Log, AA 09:133). Kant prefers deductive conclusions based on a legal concept of deduction which is oriented towards the model of the acquisition of property − Kant speaks of an ‘original acquisition’18 (cf. ÜE, AA 08:221) of the structuring elements of sensibility, understanding and reason − and is used in his transcendental deductions to examine the condi­ tions of the possibility of cognition; gaining pure forms of perception; pure concepts of intellect and transcendental ideas such as God, soul and world. The Latin term deductio, on the other hand, means a conclusion in the sense of a logical syllogism. It can be noted that Wiredu understands deductive reasoning in the sense of deduction, believing that it is essential for a con­ sensus based on inductive19 and deductive conclusions to be reached in the communication process. The central aspect here is the commonality of the methodical approach vis-à-vis reasoning, not the lack of apodictic certainty or the necessity and strict generality as regards the conclusion reached. Wiredu does not make this claim, he is satisfied with a comparative general­ ity negotiated in the process of consensus building. The transcendental question in Wiredu’s philosophy is thus reduced to the question of the con­ dition for an intercultural consensus based on common procedures of rea­ soning; the principle of freedom from contradiction and conceptual schemes. In this respect, a similarity to Habermas’s discourse theory, which primarily stipulates the observance of discourse rules, can be identified. In contrast to thinkers like Foucault, who speaks of historical a priori, Wiredu does not proceed from social and historical variability as regards the aforementioned universal rules of formation. Wiredu does not follow the Kantian path of determining the pure forms of perception ‘space and time’, the ‘categories’ and the ‘ideas’ as synthetic a priori forms which structure human epistemology and guarantee the

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 77 objective knowledge of the world in a ‘paradoxical theory of correspon­ dence’, as Höffe calls it. For Kant, the synthetic a priori forms constitute the objects and thus enable an objective knowledge of the world. In his critical investigation of Kant’s synthetic a priori geometry against the background of the rise of non-Euclidean geometry Wiredu defends Kant’s argumentation that the existing ‘weakly non-Euclidean’ positions are logically reconcilable with them.20 Furthermore, he asserts that Kant’s synthetic a priori “is simply a species of intentional truth” and “will become analytic”.21 He states: “Finally, regarding my interpretation of the synthetic a priori as notional in the specific sense explained in the text, I wish to stress that this is a matter regarding which one cannot be dogmatic.”22 Wiredu views Kant’s synthetic apriority as one which is linked to the term and must be analytically gener­ ated. In addition to this, in contrast to Kant, he introduces the speaker’s opinion as a central element of logic, saying “we must recognise the cognitive element of point of view as intrinsic to the concept of truth”,23 without abandoning Kant’s emphasis on the rational. Truth presupposes a rational questioning of a judgement expressed as an opinion, in which the appro­ priateness of the judgement lies in the quality of the justification of assert­ ibility and in conformity with principles of rational investigation – “truth is rationally justified belief.”24 Using these criteria – “the canons of rational thinking”25 – in his critique of the absolute concept of truth Wiredu attempts to avoid the risk of relativism26 at both the interpersonal and also the inter­ cultural level.27 His objective is to generate consensus by means of rationally verifiable claims to truth based on shared rational procedures and concepts. The deeper reason against relativism is, as is already apparent in my earlier remarks, that it falsely denies the existence of interpersonal cri­ teria for rationality. That is what the denial of objectivity amounts to. Unless at least the basic canons of rational thinking were common to men they could not even communicate among themselves. Thus in seek­ ing to foreclose rational discussion the relativist view is in effect seeking to undermine the foundations of human community.28 In his pragmatically focused truth theory Wiredu demands the referencing of John Dewey’s concept of “truth [as] the same as warranted assertibility”29 and the process of ‘rational criticism’.30 When searching for truth, errors and falseness are always possibilities. Speaking on the issue of truth Wiredu asserts that there is a moral dimension, linking his concept of truth to moral demands and to criticism of claims to truth which have an absolutist char­ acter; the imposition of opinions on others and the right to be able to form one’s own opinion.31 His concept of truth attempts to counteract dogmatism, fanaticism, suppression and authoritarianism.32 He demands openness, call­ ing for the adoption of the scientific practice of promoting a thought process which embraces fallibility.33 In this context, epistemology, morals and poli­ tics are closely linked in Wiredu’s work, resulting in a concept which explores

78 Rethinking Kant the possibility of achieving the Good Society by means of improving socio­ political conditions and systems. In this regard he refers to Kant’s regulative ideas, which help to focus human endeavours on an objective.34 A utopian is not necessarily an optimist: or let me put it this way: the opti­ mism inherent in utopism must be an extremely long term optimism. Con­ sciousness of the multifarious causes which currently operate to keep the prospect of true social regeneration locked in the dim recesses of the future must imbue the utopian with a sense of the tragic character of human life.35 The correspondence theoretical theorem of truth which is criticised is, however, also addressed in a different way in Wiredu’s work. On the one hand by means of the cognitive scheme of the object, which is anchored in the fundamental conceptual constitution of all human beings across cultures, whereby the question of the specific form of the conceived object’s reference to the world is fundamentally laid out. Wiredu says: “In essence, the answer lies in the fact that the concept of object in general is a common possession of all humans. Operating with this concept is an essential aspect of the human way of interacting with the environment. It is what gives it a cognitive dimension.”36 The object reference is primarily arrived at by means of direct perception. For Wiredu, this means more precisely: “The word ‘direct’ here does not imply the absence of conceptualization.”37 In this process man strives for self-preservation and equilibrium: And because a basic imperative of this cognitive interaction is the drive for self-preservation and equilibrium, the essential discriminations of items of the environment, which the possession of the concept of object in general makes possible, will be of the same basic kind in actuality, if not necessarily in articulation, among all humankind.38 In contrast to Kant, the object reference is realised, substantiated, adjusted and, if necessary, corrected in the context of action. On the other hand, Wiredu discusses the linguistic implications of a possible correspondence between mental or linguistic representation and the world based on the con­ cepts of Akan, which are not substantiated and tend to be essentialised, thus focusing in particular on questions of translation. Wiredu assumes the funda­ mental translatability of all languages.39 Fayemi argues that there is an incon­ sistency in Wiredu’s thinking, between his attempt to decolonialise thinking by referencing African concepts such as The Akan Concept of Mind (1983); An Akan Perspective on Human Rights (1990) and The Akan Concept of Person­ hood (1992), which reveals a tendency for particularism, and his search for universals.40 It is my view that Wiredu is concerned with exactly this interac­ tion of universalism and particularism, thus the accusation of inconsistency cannot be maintained. The universal rules identified by Wiredu in the epis­ temic, ethical and cultural domains are incorporated into the relevant

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 79 particular forms, ensuring that mutual understanding; successful communica­ tion and effective joint action are possible, also beyond cultural borders. According to Kant, language as the ‘communication of [his] cognitions’41 (Refl, AA 16:39) is linked to thinking and enables linguistic communication. Kant says: “Since the form of language and the form of thought are parallel and similar to one another – we think in words and use language to share our thoughts – there is also a grammar of thought”42 (Vorl, AA 29:31). According to Kant, the logic of thinking is derived from the use of the mind and is thus of greater universality than the rules of speaking, which reveal a general grammar (Log, AA 9:12) across languages. The logic of thought is of paramount importance to Kant in this context. According to him, transcen­ dental grammar would have to be based on the categories of understanding and would thus form the basis of all existing languages. Philosophical lan­ guage requires a dissection of given concepts, which enables reliable com­ prehension. Kant rejects linguistic neologisms in the domain of philosophy; in cases of ambiguity he prefers a recourse to extinct languages such as Latin. This distinction between a logic of thinking and speaking cannot be found in Wiredu’s work. He locates all epistemic universals solely in the realm of language. According to Wiredu, the different languages create “variegations of patterns of thought” which,43 however, do prevent general understanding across cultural borders. Logic is also decisive for him as a means of creating coherence and consensus. However, unlike Kant, he does not consider the use of understanding with its categories to be the primary use, which manifests itself in thinking and speaking, but instead believes that common patterns in the communication process are only formed by coping with comparable life situations through the acquisition of language. For Wiredu, reason is specifically formed in the communication process on the basis of the biological similarities associated with being human. Kant, on the other hand, assumes an a priori structuring of the forces of knowledge such as sensibility, understanding and reason − in the sense of his concept of acquisitio originaria. 44 In addition to the deductive forms of reasoning, Wiredu reinforces con­ ceptual schemes as a common feature of human cognitive faculties, which are developed in the context of communication. The commonality of experiences, global and life references, and communicative situations associated with the biological constitution of the human being also results in supra-cultural com­ monalities as regards conceptual schemes. For Wiredu, this objectivity of epistemic concepts is decisive for human communication. He states: “As has already been amply emphasised, the objectivity of concepts is an essential condition of communication.”45 Discussing the significance of social interaction as regards the development of linguistic concepts he continues: The development of mind is the development of communication. We do not first develop a mind which then has to learn how to communicate. The objectivity of concepts is guaranteed by their social provenance.

80 Rethinking Kant This remark is not meant atomistically. Language is a system, and a concept is necessarily an element of language. Given the social estab­ lishment of a certain minimum of linguistic abilities, individual con­ ceptual inventiveness is possible and its results are interpersonally intelligible because of the rule-governed character of language.46 Wiredu understands culture in a broad sense as social forms and customary beliefs and practices of a human group. These phenomena themselves depend on the existence of language, knowledge, communication, interaction, and methods of transmitting knowledge to the born and the unborn. And this is the fundamental sense of the word ‘cul­ ture’. In this sense, one might sum up the preceding discussion by saying that the fact of language itself, i.e. the possession of one language or another by all human societies, is the cultural universal par excellence. 47 Kant examines similar questions of human differences as regards ways of life etc. in anthropology and physical geography, understanding culture in a narrower sense as the development of human abilities and practices as well as the sciences, arts, etc. which emerge during the process of perfection. “The production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in general (thus those of his freedom) is culture” (KU, AA 05:431). This is about the devel­ opment of the predispositions of humans, for example in a ‘culture of skill’; a ‘culture of training (discipline)’ (KU, AA 05:432), and in the ‘notes on aes­ thetics’ (Refl, AA 15:438). The communicative context is also decisive for Kant, whereby the ‘unsociable sociability’ (IaG, AA 08:20) inherent in human beings creates, on the one hand, a conflictual coexistence, but, on the other hand, the motivational basis for the continuous process of progress. Cultivation thus represents on the one hand an individual process of further development, but on the other also the same process for society as a whole. In Kant’s case, this is also linked to civilisation, particularly as regards how humans treat one another in accordance with moral standards, and, most prominently, with the moralisation of man, which is promoted by the ‘culture of taste’ (Cf. Refl, AA 15:438). The idea of the increasing perfection of man and human coexistence in the world cannot be found in Wiredu’s work. He does, however, call for greater human efforts for improvement, in particular in the overall socio-political domain. Correspondingly he explores questions concerning appropriate governance; the legitimation of power; civil partici­ pation; individual responsibility and finding common ground as a prerequisite for generating consensus. Moral theoretical and political implications in Wiredu’s and Kant’s work Kant and Wiredu also share the ethical-political orientation of their interest in dealing with epistemological topics. In both cases, epistemology is always

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 81 seen in the context of practical questions. Höffe states in this regard with reference to Kant: For the practical, or more precisely, the explicitly moral intention of Kant’s philosophy is first already manifest in his theory of knowledge itself rather than merely in his explicit theory of morality. Anyone who reads the work through to its final part, the ‘Doctrine of Method’, will come to recognise what is already implied in the introductory motto and the preface of the second edition: the Critique as a whole is practical philosophy in the emphatic sense of the word.48 He concludes: “This perspective is associated with the enormous importance that is here ascribed to morality.”49 And he also says: “While Kant restricts pure theoretical reason within its own limits and subjects the metaphysical excesses of the tradition to a rigorous investigation, he essentially elevates, by contrast, the status and range of morality as an expression of pure practical reason.”50 Höffe summarises: “On this account of the work, epistemic well­ being is merely an (admittedly indispensable) means for that principal ‘moral’ purpose which alone is what properly matters as far as the constitu­ tion of our reason is concerned (B 829).”51 With his moral ‘principle of sympathetic impartiality’,52 Wiredu also emphasises a universal moral prin­ ciple which is of political significance, referencing Kant when doing so. For both philosophers, epistemological theorems have implications of a moralpractical and political nature and are the foundation of practical and poli­ tical philosophy. For Kant, it is the a priori constitution of the human cognitive faculty and for Wiredu it is the “common norms of thought”53 which function as general rules to structure thought and guarantee the commonalities necessary for understanding in the epistemological realm, which also have practical consequences in a political sense. Wiredu notes a similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative and claims a universal validity in the moral sphere for the principle of ‘sympathetic impartiality’. On the [sic] these grounds it may be asserted that the principle of sympathetic impartiality is a human universal transcending cultures viewed as social forms and customary beliefs and practices. In being common to all human practice of morality, it is a universal of any non-brutish form of human life.54 The principle thus also creates the possibility of achieving consensus across cultural boundaries within the scope of moral action. In Wiredu’s words: “It seems clear, in any case, whether or not, as a matter of philosophy, people take this principle to be the basis of all morals, that, as a fact of ethical life, it is essential to the harmonization of human interests in society.”55 According to Wiredu, Kant’s categorical imperative is merely missing “the injection of a dose of compassion”56 in order to comply with the ‘principle of sympathetic

82 Rethinking Kant impartiality’. Wiredu’s rule envisages that we put ourselves in the position of the person affected by an action and react compassionately. When doing so he compares the procedure to the ‘golden rule’. According to Kant, gen­ eralisability as a formal assessment of subjective maxims in terms of their possible suitability as a general law or natural law is precisely what is inten­ ded to create impartiality. The only moral feeling Kant allows is respect for the law as a motivation for moral action; an emotion closely related to rationality. Kant mistrusts feelings such as compassion as regards their abil­ ity to be generalisable. Kant’s ‘harmonisation of interests’ is not based on content, but on formal procedures. An extension of the categorical impera­ tive − according to Wiredu’s proposal − would therefore not be in Kant’s interest. However, in another context Wiredu speaks of an objective side of morality, in which empathy with others seems less important: It is the kind which seeks its objective through the empathetic harmoniza­ tion of human interests. […] Empathetic or not, a certain minimum of harmonization of interests is indispensable to any tolerable form of human social existence. Hence morality, at least in its objective side, is humanly essential. Herein lies the universal obligatoriness of moral rules.57 The primary focus in this context is on the harmonisation of differing inter­ ests – also independently of empathy. Odera Oruka points out that this function could just as well be performed by Rawls’s principle of ‘rational egoism’ as a rational means of preserving our own interests through decep­ tion. According to Rawls, in the state of nature and even in the civil state humans lack ‘sympathetic impartiality’. Wiredu fails to rebut this argument. To be human entails (as Wiredu has shown) to be rational. But to be rational must be shown to entail to be human, if Wiredu wishes to fore­ stall the objection of rational egoism. Wiredu could perhaps comfortably provide this requirement, so that rationality and humaneness become coimplicants by invoking the Socratic doctrine of knowledge as virtue or by simply supplying some bridging argument of his own.58 Odera Oruka is incorrect in this regard; Wiredu locates his principle, and also his epistemic and culturally universal principles, in the human biological structure. The critique of Wiredu’s universalism must be applied in this con­ text – his biologism. Wiredu rebuts Oruka’s argument, firstly with a psycho­ logical argument – insufficient feelings of sympathy; expectations of other people’s reactions born out of sympathy or at least the hope of them cause a psychological breakdown – and, secondly, by classifying morality as an ideal and the feeling of sympathy. In truth, the problem of morality is not that human beings don’t have sympathy, but rather that they don’t always have enough of it. […]

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 83 Morality is an ideal, and a special one. We cannot do without a mod­ icum of it, but we must do without its maximum. Perhaps some beings can get by with impartiality without sympathy. But we humans need both.59 The first argument presupposes a human psychological nature which is linked to Wiredu’s biologism but needs to be derived in more detail. The second argument of classification cannot rebut Oruka’s critique, based on the Rawlsian principle, without an additional assumption. The feigning and/or imitation of ‘sympathetic impartiality’ when applying the principle of ‘rational egoism’ presupposes, in my opinion, that humans are already capable of this emotion in their natural state. The question is then merely whether this theorem can rightly be deemed a fundamental moral principle. Oruka’s proposal to supplement Wiredu’s universals, which originate from the domains of logic, the sciences, morals and communication, with ‘intui­ tion’60 are linked to his preference for speculative, utopian approaches in philosophy which favour both sages and also ‘path-finders’.61 Oruka also believes that ‘intuition’ is an essential factor to facilitate understanding as regards intercultural dialogue.62 Wiredu accepts this proposal as follows “I am not absolutely sure that this is an attribute of the mind distinct from those already taken note of in my discussion, but I can find no ground of objection to according it the status claimed by Oruka.”63 Fayemi provides a further suggestion to supplement the universals proposed by Wiredu, cham­ pioning the principle of causality, which can be found in every culture around the world. This principle may take culturally differing forms – thus in the West the focus is more on ‘event causation’, while in Africa ‘agent caus­ ality’ dominates. Common to both viewpoints are “temporal precedence, necessary connection, transitivity”.64 It may be presumed that Wiredu would view this proposal favourably. He himself devotes his attention to the issue in terms of the intervention and/or meddling of God in the holistic world view of the Akan, which states that the presumed holistic homogeneity means that no external intervention in the sense of a causality of a hierarchical order as in Christian thought is conceivable. It becomes apparent that the problem of causality in Wiredu’s work must be considered in more depth and scope. Wiredu also relies on Kant’s distinction between legal and moral beha­ viour, the latter representing a specific moral attitude in contrast to mere compliance with rules. “An individual is not deserving of moral appropria­ tion merely because he did something which promotes the requisite harmony of interests; he has to have done it in the requisite spirit. This last remark must again remind us of Kant.”65 Wiredu identifies the concept that moral action should contribute to people’s well-being as a central distinction from Kant’s thinking. Kant, in contrast, focuses on the obligatory nature of mor­ ality and considers hope for the supreme good as a possible compensation. It is thus clearly not the case that in Wiredu’s philosophy the moral principle is universal due to its formal normative character. Rather more, universality

84 Rethinking Kant refers to the fact that the principle of ‘sympathetic impartiality’ can be found all over the world and examples from Africa are provided in particular. Wiredu also states that inter- and transcultural understanding is possible in the domain of morality, indicating a common principle. Although Kant would reject this inductive path, which emanates from experience, his asser­ tion of the categorical imperative as a fact of pure reason remains on a comparable level, since he references the discoverable repertoire of reason as regards the constitution of man as a rational being. The verification is prac­ tical and not theoretical. By having the capacity to do something because he believes that he should do it, as manifested in an unconditional moral claim, man realises his freedom to act. Wiredu, on the other hand, refers empiri­ cally and practically to the actions of human beings based on the principle of equal living conditions in order to elaborate his point. Kant’s method thus differs greatly from Wiredu’s argumentative approach, although the search for universals in the domains of epistemology and morality, as well as the fact that they derive social and political implications from them, albeit in different respects, connect the two. Kant must be regarded as Wiredu’s most important dialogue partner. Wiredu develops his own philosophical theorems in a critical dialogue with Kant.

Gyekye’s critical dialogue with Kant’s universalism Kwame Gyekye − critique of the concept of man, universalism and cosmopolitanism in Kant’s work According to Kwame Gyekye, philosophy must be pursued with reference to human experience in order to develop, for example, concepts of freedom or justice based on logical apriority in reasoning. Thus, it is clear that philosophical or conceptual analysis cannot be undertaken or pursued in a social or cultural or historical vacuum; it has an experiential background and connections. This does not imply by any means that philosophical analysis is an empirical inquiry. For it is not: conceptual analysis includes a rigorous form of reasoning, which is an a priori, not empirical, activity. But what all this means is that there is surely a dynamic, practical relationship between the a priori and the empirical, within the framework of the enterprise of conceptual or philosophical analysis; one is indispensable to the other.66 Gyekye’s grounding of philosophy in the a priori of logical reasoning has Kantian traits, as does his historical-political orientation in philosophical thought, although he places greater emphasis on cultural aspects. For Gyekye, philosophy has, since antiquity, always tried to overcome problems which are specific to its era. In Gyekye’s work Kant’s question of the topi­ cality of philosophy for the social situation of his time, as particularly

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 85 emphasised in his writings on the philosophy of history which focus on the aspects of critique and Enlightenment, and his cosmopolitan concept, is oriented towards dealing with the specific conditions of postcolonial Africa. This includes, for example, issues relating to the legitimacy of rule; political corruption; the elaboration of a cultural concept for the development of Africa; the reappraisal of colonial and postcolonial experiences; African selfperception and identity; the definition of values and goals; and the development of new ways of thinking and acting. Despite the particularity of philosophi­ cal tasks, philosophy can be considered a universalist project because of the human commonalities to which it refers.67 While Kant bases his universalist concept of philosophy and the justification of universalism on the aspect of an a priori constitution of human reason; the formal and methodological significance of rationality in general and logic in particular, and on the structural performance of underlying categories, principles and ideas inde­ pendent of human experience, Gyekye assumes both the importance of logic and general human nature as regards aspects such as happiness, respect for life, and particularistic conditions, which either reveal universals in analysis and interpretation or develop a universal relevance in the long term in his­ torical development – a combination of formal and content-oriented uni­ versalism. Gyekye’s concept is characterised by a universalism which includes particularistic basic assumptions. In contrast to Kant, he distinguishes between an essentialist and a functional universalism, although it can be observed that contingent uni­ versalism may misrepresent itself as essentialist.68 As regards the two different forms of universalism, Gyekye notes: “African philosophers can make contributions to the global philosophical experience in both of these ways.”69 He also says: “While human nature or our common humanity will underpin the universality of some of their philosophical theses, the peculiar­ ity of some of the problems that will attract them will underpin the particu­ larity of some of their philosophical ideas, arguments, or proposals.”70 Thus, particularism remains important for Gyekye’s philosophy, whereas Kant’s geographical and anthropological analyses attribute it to the empirical side of human nature, which cannot provide access to universal insights but is nevertheless relevant in the context of his philosophical investigation insofar as a holistic view of man and his moral and cultural development in the political-historical global context requires the inclusion of his empirical nature. In contrast to Kant, Gyekye does not primarily determine human nature through human rationality, which is also decisive in the moralpractical domain, but by means of content-related aspects such as friendship, care and respect. Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism and Kant’s ethics When discussing Kant Gyekye’s most important point of reference is the former’s ethics.71

86 Rethinking Kant Thus, the eighteenth-century German philosopher Kant, on the basis of the rational inquiries into human nature, grounds the notion of human dignity or intrinsic worth on human capacity for moral autonomy, that is, rational freedom. Thus conceived, argues Kant, the human person ought to be treated as an end in himself.72 Gyekye highlights Kant’s topics of freedom; moral self-legislation; the ‘end in itself ’ character; and human dignity, interpreting and re-interpreting them within the scope of his philosophy. They form the foundation of his concept of the human. His theory of a restricted or moderate communitarianism,73 which assumes the significance of individual rights, is based on Kant. Kant’s idea of human autonomy, freedom and dignity leads to consequences under natural law as regards a conception of human rights, to which Gyekye refers in his reasoning. “Thus, a conception of human dignity – and moral or nat­ ural (human) rights that concomitantly flow from it – can be reached through a purely rational reflection on human nature.”74 Gyekye strengthens the Kantian theorem of the autonomous subject in the context of communitarianism: For, implicit in the communitarianism’s recognition of the dual features of the self − the self as an autonomous, assertive entity capable of eva­ luation and choice and as a communal being − is a commitment to the acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of the self and the moral rights that can be said necessarily to be due to it. The recognition by commu­ nitarian political morality of individual rights is thus a conceptual requirement.75 Gyekye concludes: “But the moderate communitarian view suggests that the claims of individuality and community ought to be equally morally acknowledged.”76 He also says: On this showing, communitarianism’s absorbing interest in the common good, in the provision for the social conditions that will enable each individual to function satisfactorily in a human society, cannot – should not – result in the willful subversion of individual rights. This is because, even though rights belong primarily to individuals, insofar as their exer­ cise will often, directly or indirectly, be valuable to a larger society, their status and roles will nevertheless (have to) be recognized by commu­ nitarian theory. If communitarianism were to shrug off individual rights, not only would it show itself as an inconsistent moral and political theory, but also it would, in practical terms, saw off the branch on which it was sitting.77 According to Gyekye, individual rights are also important in the commu­ nitarian framework and guarantee the functioning of the community. Like

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 87 Kant, Gyekye ascribes practical importance to the theorem, but again embedded in a communitarian context.78 Communal values such as solidar­ ity, peace, harmony and social stability are equally important for Gyekye and must be reconciled with individual rights. While Kant integrates antagonistic forces, conflicts and disputes into his concept of progress as a positive moti­ vating force, providing for legal and contractual agreements in order to organise coexistence between and within states as well as globally, Gyekye generally strives for “a life free from hostility and confrontation”.79 The preservation of the society’s integrity and values enjoins the indivi­ dual to exercise her rights within limits, transgressing which (limits) will end in assaulting the rights of other individuals or the basic values of the community. An individual exercising the right to free speech or expres­ sion, for instance, cannot be allowed to run berserk and engage in verbal and physical vandalism.80 According to Gyekye, individual rights must be applied on the basis of responsibility for the community. In Kant’s case, this includes not only examining the generalisability of moral maxims, but also distinguishing between the exercise of critique as a private individual and as a scholar. Where the former is obliged to integrate into the existing community and to abide by the law, the latter can and should address the world public in order to enable a critical analysis of the observed grievances and thus also social change. Kant emphasises the necessity of placing the individual in functional contexts to ensure the cohesion of society, giving preference to a reformatory path of social change. He is concerned with preserving the legal structures which have already been established and not falling back into the state of nature. Decisive here is human morality and a modified way of thinking, which is indispensable for the implementation of innovations. For Gyekye, the criterion for neglecting individual rights is their significance beyond the personal domain: “Individual rights to expressions that are of a strictly pri­ vate nature may not be disallowed, unless there is overwhelming evidence that such expressions can, or do, affect other innocent members of the society.”81 Gyekye concludes from this: “Individual rights, the exercise of which is meaningful only within the context of human society, must therefore be matched with social responsibilities.”82 It becomes apparent that Gyekye combines theorems of Kant’s philosophy, in particular his practical philoso­ phy, with the basic communitarian assumptions of African philosophy. There is a similarity to the communitarian theories of Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel and Amitai Etzioni, which Gyekye analyses critically. He particularly criticises the lack of significance attributed to individual decision-making and capacity to act and to individual law in these philoso­ phers’ concepts. This is precisely where Gyekye requires Kantian theorems to support his reasoning. For Gyekye, individual autonomy is both an effective factor for historical transformations as well as for creative innovations in

88 Rethinking Kant various areas of society. The advocates of strict communitarianism83 do not do justice to the freedom of the individual and the associated social implications, both theoretically or practically. It seems to me that moderate communitarianism offers a more appro­ priate and adequate account of the self and its relation to the community than the unrestricted or extreme or radical account, in that the former sees the self both as a communal being and as an autonomous, selfassertive being with a capacity for evaluation and choice, while the latter sees the activity of what I have referred to as the ‘mental feature’ of the person as wholly contingent upon, and determined by, the communal structure itself.84 Gyekye continues: Extreme or unrestricted communitarianism fails to give adequate recog­ nition to the creativity, inventiveness, imagination, and idealistic pro­ clivities of some human individuals in matters relating to the production of ideas and the experience of visions. The powers of inventiveness, imagination, and so on are not entirely a function of natural talents or endowments, even though they can only be nurtured and exercised in a cultural community.85 The individual’s power of innovation, if necessary in association with others, can take on reformative or revolutionary dimensions: The ideals or visions of the individual can be subversive or demoli­ tionary of existing societal values, practices, and institutions: what I called a revolutionary action can thus be understood generally as the activity of an idealistic or visionary individual (or; a group of idealistic or visionary individuals).86 In his concept of the person, Gyekye, in Kantian tradition, assumes the individual’s moral autonomy, freedom, free will and ability to choose, with­ out underestimating the importance of community for the development of personality. “The community only discovers and nurtures it.”87 According to Gyekye’s interpretation, the Akan philosophy also attributes rationality, morality and the ability to choose and to behave virtuously to the individual, regardless of communal influences, using Akan proverbs as justification. It is not only the community, as African philosophers such as Menkiti and Mbiti claim, which defines and shapes the person. Mbiti for example says: “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.”88 Gyekye characterises moderate communitarianism as “the model that acknowledges the intrinsic worth and dignity of the individual human person and recognises indivi­ duality, individual responsibility and effort.”89 He continues: “[N]o human

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 89 society is absolutely communal or absolutely individualistic”.90 Gyekye speaks of an “autonomous character of the person”, which does not mean that this disposition is always realised and has no limits. “Even so, it can be exercised to the extent that is possible.”91 Through their visions, ideas, ideals and practices extending beyond the communal framework, individuals make a decisive contribution to social changes and innovations in society. This facilitates reform efforts and increasing social perfection at all different levels of community life. “The growth of culture as well as modifications in the cultural heritage of a people is invariably due to the intellectual and moral activities of some autonomous individuals with their unique qualities and endowments.”92 He continues: “But, even so, the innovative activities of such an individual are intended to extend and enrich, rather than entirely break with, certain aspects of the community’s history”.93 The individual’s ability to innovate also enables the individual to shape his or her personal identity. “The upshot is that personhood can only be partly, never fully, defined by one’s membership in the cultural community.”94 Critique, cultural borrowing and African traditions in Gyekye’s philosophy Gyekye determines the function of philosophy in the sense of a critical pro­ ject which firstly refers to the analysis, assessment and critical appreciation of our own culture. For example, he says: “Throughout history, philosophy has been used to criticize features of a culture with a view to improving the cul­ tures and making it more relevant to contemporary times. In this way, phi­ losophy has been most relevant to the development of human cultures.”95 This also involves a process of adaptation to the relevant social-historical phenomena of the time. He goes on to say: It is to say, rather, that philosophical thinking, taking its rise from a cultural experience, takes a critical look at the practices and values of a culture. It makes a critical evaluation of the culture, an evaluation that may result either in affirming (while also refining) certain aspects of the culture’s values and practices or in jettisoning aspects of the culture on various grounds: intellectual, moral, practical, and so on.96 Gyekye determines the investigation of African thinking, African traditions and African history, for example in the form of proverbs, symbols and practices, as a starting point for African philosophy. A critical investigation of the substance of foreign cultures is integrated into this procedure within the scope of cultural borrowing. In this context, Gyekye develops the theorem of appropriation, which includes adaptation to specific circumstances of the other cultural environment; a review of usefulness and, if necessary, change as regards other contexts. The adoption of cultural elements and technolo­ gies from Western countries requires the adaptation of the borrowed items to African culture or cultures. “In an ideal situation of cultural borrowing […]

90 Rethinking Kant some alien cultural product (such as technology) is not simply transferred; it is taken possession of by another people who are convinced that appropriat­ ing the technology will enhance their own scientific and industrial advance­ ment.”97 Gyekye criticises the passiveness which is usually associated with the adoption of a product from a foreign culture and seeks active appropriation which assumes ownership and is equally a critical appropriation. The vision articulated here regarding the acquisition and development of technology in a developing society that is interested in foreign technolo­ gical products for its own advancement is that of appropriation of tech­ nology − an approach that would necessarily feature active, adroit, and purposeful initiative and participation on the part of the recipients, an approach that would also allow for purposeful choice of the technological products needed by them.98 According to Gyekye, the visionary role of philosophy results from the critical philosophical project – based on critical hermeneutics. “A vision may, indirectly, derive from sustained critical attitudes to the culture (or some elements of it) that may result in a new, even revolutionary, outlook − phi­ losophically, morally, ideologically, and so on.”99 The visionary role of phi­ losophy proves to be a political task which, in addition to socio-cultural analysis, also provides goals and models of action, bringing about social transformation which aims to improve the individual’s life and human coexistence. The vision is inspired by the complex nature of the perceived in terms of adequate responses to the entire existential conditions in which human beings function, conditions that go beyond the purely economic and include political, social, moral, intellectual, and other aspects of the cultural whole. This vision presents a more serious conception of development.100 The visionary power of philosophy is associated with a speculative critique: I said a while ago that a part − a great part − of the philosophical enterprise is a critical speculation about human experience with its many­ sidedness. The speculative activity of philosophy involves a synthetic interpretation of human experience: its meaning, its underlying reality, and what it points (or may point) to in terms of the most appropriate goals of human life and society.101 Gyekye defines visions in this context as follows: “A vision is clearly a futureoriented condition or attribute which is expected, sooner or later, to come into reality; but it may not come into reality, perhaps not in its fullness.”102 He cites the democratic vision, the egalitarian vision and the vision of a just

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 91 103

society as examples. Gyekye’s visions operate as Kantian regulative ideas, but − comparable to Kant’s concept of the league of nations and eternal peace − are geared more towards the normative and socio-political founda­ tion of a society. Unlike Kant, however, Gyekye does not envisage a tele­ ology which supports his ideas. Parallel to this, visions are combined with the goal of arriving at a conceptual creation of the future and its associated practical implementation: “Now how is vision related to goal? In a sense vision and goal may be said to be conceptually related in that both are future-orientated phenomena; both of them are yet to be attained, objects of hope and desire.”104 While visions encompass long to very long periods of time, goals focus more specifically on the existential and the specific. The visionary quality of philosophy is combined with the normative in the sense of a goal, which should provide a direction to human thinking, feeling and acting. Gyekye notes in this context: “Such considerations become normative considerations, prescribing what ought to be the case, what ought to be attained. Thus, speculative activity will evaluate in normative proposals, which often embody a vision.”105 These visions paint a picture of future human society which is supported by philosophical views: [A] vision about the nature of an ideal society − its politics, values, and its culture generally. It was the vision about the dignity of the individual that led to the distinction by fifth century BC ancient Greek thinkers between nature (phusis) and convention (nomos), a distinction that sub­ sequently gave rise to the notion of ‘natural rights’, which after the second world war became ‘human rights’ (see my Tradition and Moder­ nity, 1997, [sic] p231f.) The awareness of nations regarding the funda­ mental importance of human rights was due mainly to the writings and arguments of philosophers.106 According to Gyekye, the holistic view of an era’s social dimensions and the concept of the future are always linked to critique. The legitimacy of the exercise of power and authority and criticism of corruption in African countries are central components. Taking his hermeneutic and speculative critique as a starting point, Gyekye develops concepts for shaping African states into metanational societies, combined with a moderate commu­ nitarianism, in which individuality as a critical authority of freedom should play a decisive role to remedy overemphasis on the community and its potential negative development. At this point, Gyekye refers specifically to Kant’s concept of the person, which is linked to the freedom and autonomy of the individual, and to the formula of the end in itself of his categorical imperative. Kant’s theorems provide an important foundation for Gyekye’s critical-negative and speculative-visionary critique. In contrast to Kant’s political vision of cosmopolitanism, Gyekye develops a concept of globalisation which goes beyond the constraints of an economic understanding: “I will concern myself with the general nature of the concept

92 Rethinking Kant of globalization. My intent will be to provide a philosophical background or foundation for globalization”.107 Globalisation is not a new phenomenon; referring to Appiah he states: “[T]he history of the human species [can be seen] as a process of globalization.”108 In this process of disseminating ideas, values, institutions, modes of action etc. in different domains such as tech­ nology, ethics, economy and art, which are adapted to the respective cultures and increasingly shared with each other, ideas, values or institutions are attributed “the status of universality or globality (if you will) by virtue of its historic significance or relevance or functionality or power of conviction on some such quality.”109 He also says: “At this point, that idea or value or practice would have become meta-contextual, for it would have transcended its original culture or historical context and would, thus, have gained the widest currency elsewhere.”110 For Gyekye, globalisation is a process which is generally accompanied by conflicts and associated with struggles for hegemony but also offers people the opportunity to become aware of their ‘common humanity’ and to connect with different cultures. Although this concept of an ‘open field of universality’ and ‘meta-contextuality’ is in opposition to Kant’s understanding of universality as laid out in the apriority of human reason, however, assume the significance, necessity and functionality of the universal − albeit in an empirical sense. “Ideal globali­ zation requires that nations or societies have the opportunity to choose which elements or features of an encountered culture they find attractive and consider worth adoption.”111 This concept of cultural universalism supports Gyekye’s goal of a ‘homogenisation of cultures’ without underestimating the ‘particularities of local or national cultures’.112 He thus pursues a path of combining universalism and particularism in the cultural sphere. For Gyekye, globalisation represents a “good process” and “an originally good idea”, which he links to the desire to achieve better mutual understanding and human coexistence in the world and closer relationships between humans. Gyekye thus lays the theoretical foundation for his concept of the metana­ tional state, which is oriented in particular towards overcoming ethical and national borders. It refers to the Akan proverb “Humanity has no bound­ ary”.113 Similarly to Kant, Gyekye’s concept of the human being represents in its generality a political concept which is about “the cultivation of […] humanity”.114 In contrast to Kant’s cosmopolitanism, Gyekye’s approach to globalisation focuses in particular on rapprochement through cultural exchange and less on the legal-organisational and political constitution of republics and the desired confederation of states. Referring to Kant, he also emphasises the position of the individual as a bearer of rights and as a cri­ tical authority − as a political corrective and antithesis to the communitarian understanding of politics, which stipulates the subordination of the indivi­ dual. Both philosophers regard the cultivation and moralisation of the indi­ vidual as an important basis for political change to achieve greater social freedom, stability and peace.

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 93 Political consequences of Gyekye’s ethics The autonomous character of the individual is also the basis for Gyekye’s political conception of a ‘metanational’115 society and ‘nation-building’,116 in which the individual is the essential political point of reference, not so-called ‘ethnicities’, to which he assigns a fictional character. In this context, Gyekye emphasises the importance of cultural borrowing117 as an element which cre­ ates common ground between cultures, which has always and continues to facilitate mixing and rapprochement between cultures. Gyekye’s theorem of ‘metanationality’ aims to solve the problems of multi-ethnic states, which, due to the increase in migration movements between cultures, today cause internal and interstate tensions and conflicts, both in the still relatively young states of Africa and in other parts of the world. Gyekye thus distances him­ self from the traditional understanding of the nation as based on Herder – namely a place of shared language and culture and the home of a specific people. The current political situation requires a change in thought as regards nation building in the multinational and/or multi-ethnic context – in the sense of the sociological definition of nation.118 The metanational state must overcome ethnically rooted nationalism with its destructive tendencies. A process of nation-building is required for this purpose119 “to evolve a common form of cultural and political life”.120 The creation of an open, democratic society is of crucial significance for this process121 and must facilitate social mobility, political participation, power sharing, decentralisa­ tion and a culture of consensus.122 On this basis, Gyekye criticises in parti­ cular the socialist concepts of the political elites developed after the formal independence of African countries, which incorrectly reference the communal character of African culture. His concept of the person combines individual autonomy with the relativity, interdependence and mutual responsibility of individuals in a community. According to Gyekye, however, the community in its various forms must also be viewed critically: but there are some relationships that can surely be said to be positively harmful to the individual’s development and interests, relationships, for instance, that are built on slavery, domination, humiliation, or dis­ crimination. The last category of social relationships represents the weaknesses and imperfections in the institution of community; but these relationships more truly reflect the defects in the human moral character.123 Gyekye defines human autonomy in more detail in the following quotation: The capacity for self-assertion that the individual can exercise pre­ supposes, and in fact derives from, the autonomous nature of the person. By autonomy, I do not mean self-completeness but the having of a will, a rational will of one’s own, that enables one to determine at least some of

94 Rethinking Kant one’s own goals and to pursue them, and to control one’s destiny. From its Greek etymology, ‘autonomy’ means, self-governing or self-directing. It is thus essentially the freedom of the person to choose his own goals and life plans in order to achieve some kind of self-realization. The actions and choice of goals of the individual emanate from his rational and moral will. Thus, the self-directing (or, self-determining) will also be selfassertive. Autonomy must be a fundamental feature of personhood, insofar as the realization of oneself – one’s life plans, goals, and aspira­ tions – greatly hinges on it, that is, on its exercise. Autonomy is, thus, valuable in itself.124 Unlike Kant, he does not link human autonomy to moral self-legislation and removes the theorem from the moral embrace, even if he does not deny the moral reference in principle. “Even though the concept of autonomy cannot be said to be morally neutral, it can nevertheless be said to be only partly moral.”125 Gyekye continues: “I do not see any conceptual link between autonomy and acting morally. There is, however, a conceptual link between autonomy and freedom, since a self-directing agent necessarily has the free­ dom to direct himself or herself.”126 Gyekye thus establishes a different focus to that of Kant, for whom moral self-legislation in the form of the catego­ rical imperative is the centre of his concepts of autonomy and freedom. Gyekye associates the primacy of society over individual law with the danger of tyranny in the domain of politics: “A strong and unrelenting insistence on the moral primacy or prerogative of the community can lead (and in post­ colonial African has led) to tyranny, political intolerance, and authoritar­ ianism.”127 Like Kant, he requires the autonomous, free individual, endowed with a personal will, as a counterforce to undesirable social developments. As a creative and critical authority and active being, the individual is of vital importance for the enhancement of all areas of society such as science, art, culture and politics. In contrast to Kant, Gyekye does not offer a cosmopo­ litan concept as a political model, but rather that of the metanational state and globalisation,128 which in turn could be a model for confederations of states; a thought which Gyekye himself unfortunately does not pursue. The theorems of logical apriority and universalism of the philosophical concept – in the case of the latter Gyekye differentiates between an essenti­ alist and a functional form – are combined with particularism, guaranteeing the universal validity of philosophical knowledge based on African human­ ism. In his political theory, Gyekye emphasises the need for decentralisation and the consideration of local structures at the national level of an individual state, while Kant focuses in particular on the relationship of states to one another within a federation of states regulated by legal agreements. In Gye­ kye’s work, the link between the local and the global is discussed at various levels, with both aspects being considered as compatible. Gyekye ultimately proceeds from the assumption of a world community based on Kant, thereby combining the local and the global:

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 95 The concept of a common humanity clearly lies at the base of references to ‘the international community,’ ‘the world community,’ ‘the global community’ frequently made by diplomats, politicians, and world leaders of different national or cultural communities. The reference and sig­ nificance of the references to the highest level of human community suggest the understanding and conviction that all human beings, irre­ spective of their local communities, are also members of a single large human community.129 With his concept of moderate communitarianism, he also attempts to develop a moral concept for the world community: This fact, at least in principle, clearly and insistently grounds the need to extend our moral concerns and responsibilities to members of ‘other’ communities – distant strangers. The communitarian ethic could be a vanguard in this enterprise.130 By emphasising the responsible individual, Gyekye focuses on the indivi­ dual’s personal autonomy and freedom and their moral competence in the context of the community − locally as well as globally. Kant’s theorems − in a modified form − play a key role in the philosophical context of Gyekye’s theory, also, and in particular, from a political point of view to justify its fundamental philosophical concepts.

Acknowledgements The passage on the philosophy of Wiredu is based on some translated parts of the text Rainsborough, Marita: “Kant revisited. Die kritische Ausei­ nandersetzung mit Kants Universalismus und Kosmopolitismus in der afri­ kanischen Philosophie”. In: Falduto, Antonio; Klemme, Heiner (Eds.): Kant und seine Kritiker – Kant and his Critics. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York (Olms Verlag), 2018, pp. 373–391. (Published with the permission of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.) Some sections in the second half of this chapter are similar to parts of the article Rainsborough, Marita: “Kwame Gyekye’s Critical Dialogue with Kant’s Ethics and its Political Consequences”. In: Jesus, Paulo; Rain­ sborough, Marita; Valentim, Inácio (Eds.): Kant em África e África em Kant, Special Edition of the Journal Estudos Kantianos, Marília, 8(2), Jul./Dez. 2021, pp. 53–67.

Notes 1 Höffe, Otfried: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: The Foundation of Modern Philosophy. Heidelberg (Springer), 2010, p. 9. 2 Höffe 2010: 20.

96 Rethinking Kant 3 Cf. Höffe, Otfried: ‘Königliche Völker’: Zu Kants kosmopolitischer Rechts- und Friedenslehre. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2001, Chapter 12. 4 Höffe 2010: 9. 5 “The proviso, however, is that the thing must be done in the spirit of respectful dialogue. This is a rather minimal condition, requiring only that ‘the other’ be recognized as an equal participant in rational or, if that is what it actually is, irrational discourse.” In: Wiredu, Kwasi: Cultural Uni­ versals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press), 1996, p. 2. 6 See the following essay on Wiredu’s critique of relativism: Wiredu, Kwasi: “Knowledge, Truth and Fallibility”. In: Kuçuradi, Ioanna; Cohen, Robert S. (Eds.): The Concept of Knowledge: The Ankara Seminar. Dordrecht (Springer Netherlands), 1995, pp. 127–148. 7 “This is the concept of responsibility that is pertinent to discussions of free will and determinism, for instance; it is in that sense that Akan moral casuistry would lead one to equate free will with responsibility. This argument needs of course, to be continued in an appropriate forum. But it serves here to illustrate a potentially fruitful interplay of conceptual universals with semantical particulars in intellectual discourse” (Wiredu 1996: 7). He summarises: “To sum up the basic message of this book: human beings cannot live by particulars or universals alone, but by some combination of both” (Wiredu 1996: 9). 8 Wiredu 1996: 1. 9 Ibid. 10 Wiredu 1996: 2. 11 Wiredu 1996: 1. 12 Wiredu 1996: 1, 2. 13 Wiredu 1996: 20. 14 Ibid. 15 Höffe 2010: 180, 181. Höffe explains: “Epistemologically regarded, for the cor­ respondence theory of truth an assertion is true if it agrees with (‘corresponds’ to) reality, for the coherence theory it is true if it ‘coheres’ with other, and per­ haps all other, assertions, and for the consensus theory it is true if it finds the ‘agreement’ of other, or ultimately all other, participants in the enquiry” (Höffe 2010: 180). 16 Höffe 2010: 76. However, legal certainty within the framework of his theory of law and peace does not imply “some idyllic notion of the absence of all conflict or controversy” (ibid.). 17 See the essay: Wiredu, Kwasi: “Democracy and Consensus in African Tradi­ tional Politics: A Plea for a Non-party Polity”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford, Cambridge, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, pp. 303–312. The African philosopher Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze is the most severe critic of Wiredu, accusing him of mis­ understanding the Western model of democracy. Cf. Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: “Democracy or Consensus? Response to Wiredu.” In: Eze, Emmanuel Chuk­ wudi: Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford, Cambridge, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, pp. 313–323. Eze argues that the model pro­ posed by Wiredu is not suitable for larger political units. Over and above this, it is not fully clear which basic common interests of human beings can be defined as signifying social harmony and how the simultaneous consideration of common and individual interests can be ensured. A further central point of criticism of Wiredu’s work is the use of the terms ‘holy’ and ‘ancestors’ to legitimise authority and political power, referencing the Akans’ concept of per­ suasive power embodied in the ideas of the chief when doing so. This, for Eze, represents a reliance on mythology, honouring of ancestors and religion. Eze

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 97

18 19

20

21 22 23

24 25 26

furthermore refers to the actual and potential exploitation of traditional Afri­ can concepts of consensus by African dictators. Emmanuel Ifeany, in his cri­ tique of Bernard Matolino’s essays on the topic, also criticises Wiredu’s concept of democracy as a ‘return-to-source project’ which is no longer suitable for the “multi-ethnic, culturally diverse and highly pluralistic societies today”. Cf. Ifeany, Emmanuel: “The Question of Immanence in Kwasi Wiredu’s Consensual Democracy”. In: Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy and Axiology. 15 (1), 2018, pp. 169, 162. He wants a less nationalistic approach to the question. See also Matolino, Bernard: “A Response to Eze’s Critique of Wiredu’s Con­ sensual Democracy”. In: South African Journal of Philosophy. 28(1), 2009, pp. 34–42 and Matolino, Bernard: “Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu’s Traditional African Polities”. In: Theoria. 63(146), 2016, pp. 36–55. Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: The­ oretical Philosophy after 1781. Allison, Henry; Heath, Peter (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2002, p. 312. (Texts cited as “ÜE”, “FM”.) “Let us call the principle of learning from experience the principle of induction (without prejudging any issues about the exact nature of induction). If these two principles, of non-contradiction and induction − principles that are, by any reckoning, basic to human knowledge − are implicit in the power of con­ ceptualization, then it is apparent that together they unite the human activities of understanding and knowing in such a way as to make it impossible that dif­ ferent peoples might be able to communicate, but unable in principle to argue rationally among themselves” (Wiredu 1996: 27–28). Wiredu, J. E. (alias Kwasi Wiredu): “Kant’s Synthetic A Priori in Geometry and the Rise of Non-Euclidean Geometries”. In: Funke, Gerhard; Kopper, Joachim (Eds.): Kant-Studien. 6(1–4), Bonn (H. Bouvier & Co.), 1970, pp. 5–27. Wiredu argues that in the post-Einstein era Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry are both useful, however should be applied to different domains. When explaining phenomena in outer space non-Euclidean positions are thus more suitable than Euclidean geometry (cf. Wiredu 1970: 10). Wiredu 1970: 17. Wiredu 1970: 27. Wiredu, Kwasi: Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1980, p. 115. In addition to this, Wiredu is interested in exploring logical reasoning as regards derivability and deductibility; the hypo­ thetical character of premises and conclusions and the relationship between the value of truth and validity. Logical reasoning is possible independent of the value of the truth of propositions. In his opinion, the axiom of non-contra­ diction requires the assumption of a concurrent and/or identical viewpoint as a cognitive impulse in combination with a claim to truth. “To return to the notion of truth claims, it is to be noted that the relevance of this too in logic has sometimes been contested. The suggestion is that it is of no interest to logic to determine issues of truth or falsity one way or another.” In: Wiredu, J. E. (alias Kwasi Wiredu): “Deducibility and Inferability”. In: Mind. 82(325), Jan. 1973, p. 39. Wiredu believes that logic has an obligation in this regard “truth is a constituent of the idea of relevance” (Wiredu 1973: 53). It is important to make the hypothetical character of contradictions and conclusions clear and to differentiate between evidential conclusions and hypothetical deductions. Wiredu 1980: 214. Wiredu 1980: 218. “When the relativist says that truth is personal – let us for convenience restrict our considerations to individualistic relativism – he means that each individual’s opinions are true in their own private ways. In other words, there are no interpersonal criteria for regulating beliefs and opinions” (Wiredu 1980: 219).

98 Rethinking Kant 27 Cf. Wiredu 1980: 232.

28 Wiredu 1980: 222. And: “The relativist just cannot make out any difference

between ‘true for him‘ and ‘held to be true by him’” (Wiredu 1980: 220). 29 Wiredu 1980: XII. 30 Cf. Wiredu 1980: 221. 31 “No, what I am maintaining is that my theory of the cognitive concept of truth contains the moral principle mentioned as an intrinsic part” (Wiredu 1980: 223– 224; cf. Wiredu 1980: 223). 32 Wiredu 1980: 122. 33 Wiredu 1980: 123. 34 Cf. Wiredu 1980: 88–89, 97, 98. 35 Wiredu 1980: 98. 36 Wiredu 1996: 25. 37 Wiredu 1996: 26. 38 Wiredu 1996: 25, 26. 39 According to Wiredu, the aspect of correspondence between knowledge and the world of objects does not arise in the Akan language, in which truth and fact are used synonymously. “The problem of how the concept of truth is related to that of fact therefore does not arise in Akan” (Wiredu 1996: 5). In addition, he considers a translation of the question into the Akan language to be possible and thus also an exchange on the mentioned conceptual scheme. Hallen draws attention to the problem of ‘disguised conceptual colonialism’ in connection with the untranslatability or inadequate translation of concepts from different cultures. Cf. Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem: “A Critique of Cultural Universals and Particulars in Kwasi Wiredu’s Philosophy”. In: Trames. 15(65/60), 3/2011, p. 269. 40 Fayemi 2011: 267. 41 Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Lec­ tures on Logic. Young, J. Michael (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1992, p. 150. (Texts cited as “Log”, “V-Log”.) 42 Own translation. See the original text: “Da die Form der Sprache und die Form des Denkens einander parallel und ähnlich ist, weil wir doch in Worten denken, und unsere Gedanken durch Sprache mittheilen, so gibt es auch eine Grammatic des Denkens” (Vorl, AA 29:31). 43 Wiredu 1996: 24. 44 Kant’s term acquisitio originaria originates from the discourse of natural law; he applies it to the sphere of epistemology. Kant says: “I acquire something when I bring it about (efficio) that it becomes mine. Something external is originally mine which is mine without any act that establishes a right to it. But that acquisition is original which is not derived from what is another’s. Nothing external is originally mine, but it can indeed be acquired originally, that is, without being derived from what is another’s” (MS, AA 06:258). In: Kant, Immanuel: The Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1991, p. 80. (Text cited as “MS”.) 45 Wiredu 1996: 18.

46 Wiredu 1996: 19.

47 Wiredu 1996: 28.

48 Höffe 2010: 14.

49 Ibid.

50 Höffe 2010: 15.

51 Höffe 2010: 21.

52 Wiredu 1996: 29.

53 Wiredu 1996: 34.

54 Wiredu 1996: 29.

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 99 55 56 57 58

59 60

61 62

63 64 65 66 67

68 69

Ibid. Ibid. Wiredu 1996: 64. Odera Oruka, Henry: “Cultural Fundamentals in Philosophy: Obstacles in Philosophical Dialogues”. In: Kuçuradi, Ioanna; Cohen, Robert S. (Eds.): The Concept of Knowledge: The Ankara Seminar. Dordrecht (Springer Netherlands), 1995, p. 169. Wiredu 1996: 202. “Intuition is a form of mental skill which helps the mind to extrapolate from experience and come to establish extra-statistical inductive truths or it enables mind to make a correct/plausible logical inference without any established or known rules of procedure” (Odera Oruka 1995: 171). Cf. Odera Oruka 1995: 179. “I am not denying the possibility of dialogue whether in formalized philoso­ phical situation or in the world between races and ideologies. What I wish to stress is the necessity to include intuition with all its positive and negative qua­ lities as an important factor in a dialogue” (Odera Oruka 1995: 176). In his essay, Odera Oruka draws attention to ‘cultural fundaments’ as an obstacle to inner philosophical discourse (cf. Odera Oruka 1995: 174–175). Wiredu 1996: 202. Fayemi 2011: 273–274. Ibid. Gyekye, Kwame: Philosophy, Culture, And Vision: African Perspective. Accra (Sub-Saharan Publishers), 2013, p. XII. “The universality of philosophical ideas may be put down to the fact that human beings, irrespective of their cultures and histories, share certain basic values; our common humanity grounds the adoption and acceptance of some ideas, values, and perceptions, as well as the appreciation of the significance of events taking place beyond specific cultural borders. This being so, problems dealt with by phi­ losophers may be seen as human problems − rather than as African, European, or Asian – and, hence, as universal.” In: Gyekye, Kwame: Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1997, p. 30. Gyekye distinguishes between an essentialist universalism, in which common values can be named, and a functionalist universalism, which is based on the gradual historical implementation of certain values, for example because of their quality and persuasiveness. “African philosophers can make con­ tributions to the global philosophical experience in both of these ways” (Gyekye 1997: 34). On the other hand, philosophy has a particular contextual position determined by the specific historical-political situation: “This is to endorse the doctrine of historical determinism that is belied by the fact that the mode of development of a colonized people, for instance, will most probably not be the same as that of a colonizing people: the problems of establishing stable democratic institutions in most developing, formerly colonized, nations of the world are a clear case in point. […] The universalist thesis cannot, therefore, be unqualifiedly true. […] This is what I consider the essential point of the particularist thesis” (Gyekye 1997: 30–31). Gyekye 1997: 33. Gyekye 1997: 34. He continues: “I conclude, therefore, that African philosophy, like the philosophies produced by other cultures, will have characteristics of both universality and particularity, for it will be concerned with ultimate goals that can be said to be shared by all human beings irrespective of their cultures and nationalities, and with social and cultural experiences and problems some of which may, in some sense, be said to be peculiar to the African people” (Gyekye 1997: 33).

100 Rethinking Kant 70 Gyekye 1997: 34. 71 Also, as regards the justification of the importance of religion for human life and thus also for the engagement with religious questions in philosophy, Gyekye refers to Kant. “But Kant, the great German philosopher, was also a very reli­ gious person; he was a believer; he was a Christian. I don’t think Kant would argue the banishment of religion from public life” (Gyekye 2013: 73). 72 Gyekye 1997: 63, 64. Gyekye quotes Kant: “Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as means for arbi­ trary use by this or that will: he must in all these actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end” (Gyekye 1997: 64). And: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but at the same time as an end” (ibid.). Gyekye quotes Kant, Immanuel: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. London (Hutchinson University Library), 1965, p. 95. (Text cited as “GMS”.) 73 Gyekye describes his theory as both consistent and practical: “It can be said, however, that restricted or moderate communitarianism is a consistent and viable theory, one that is not opposed to individual rights, even though it will consciously and purposively give equal attention to other values of the com­ munity, all (or some) of which it may occasionally regard as overriding. I hope, the falsity of the view that moderate communitarianism will have no or very little place for individual rights” (Gyekye 1997: 64–65). 74 Gyekye 1997: 64. 75 Ibid. He continues: “In other words, the derivation of individual rights from naturalism (humanism) or supernaturalism cannot be confined to an indivi­ dualistic framework; the derivation is not an activity or a characteristic or a possibility solely of an individualistic moral and social ambience” (ibid.). 76 Gyekye 1997: 66. And: “Communitarianism requires a great demonstration of moral sensitivity and expenditure of moral effort by the individual” (ibid.). 77 Gyekye 1997: 64. 78 “It is also a practical requirement at the practical level communitarianism would realize that allowing free rein for the exercise of individual rights, which obviously includes the exercise of the unique qualities, talents, and dispositions of the individual, will enhance the cultural development and success of the community” (Gyekye 1997: 64). 79 Gyekye 1997: 76.

80 Gyekye 1997: 65.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid. He continues: “The possession of rights becomes nearly inconsequential if

a viable framework for their meaningful exercise does not exist” (ibid.). And: “To the extent that the meaningful and continuous enjoyment of one’s rights is a function of the appropriate conditions of a social context, an overwhelming concern for the viability of that context is surely legitimate” (Gyekye 1997: 66). 83 Gyekye emphasises, “even though I believe that not all features of their position can be so characterized” (Gyekye 1997: 60). 84 Gyekye 1997: 59. 85 Ibid. 86 Gyekye 1997: 56. 87 Gyekye 1997: 53. He continues: “There is no denying the community’s role in the complex process involved in the individual’s realization of her goals and aspirations, though; yet, even so, the communal definition or constitution can only be partial” (ibid.). 88 Gyekye 1997: 37. Gyekye cites John Mbiti.

89 Gyekye 1997: 40.

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 101 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

97 98 99 100 101 102 103

104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128

129

Gyekye 1997: 41.

Gyekye 1997: 57.

Gyekye 1997: 58.

Ibid.

Gyekye 1997: 59.

Gyekye 2013: XVI.

Gyekye 2013: XIX. He also says: “Even though philosophical thought is

worked out within a culture, yet it turns [sic] round to take critical look at the culture itself. Throughout history, philosophy has been used to criticize features of a culture with a view to improving the cultures and making it more relevant to contemporary times. In this way, philosophy has been most relevant to the development of human cultures” (Gyekye 2013: XVI). Gyekye 2013: XXI.

Ibid.

Gyekye 2013: XIX.

Gyekye 2013: XX. Gyekye 2013: XVII. Ibid. Cf. Gyekye: “Thus, the political leaders of a nation may entertain a ‘democratic vision’; some social reformers, intellectuals and moralists may nurture an ‘ega­ litarian vision’, a vision of ‘a poverty-free society’, and a vision of ‘a just society’” (ibid.). Gyekye 2013: XVII–XVIII. Gyekye 2013: XVII. Gyekye 2013: XVI. Gyekye 2013: 118. Gyekye 2013: 119. Gyekye 2013: 124. Ibid. Gyekye 2013: 129. Cf. Gyekye 2013: 131. Cf. Gyekye 2013: 132. Gyekye 2013: 136. Cf. Gyekye 1997: 88, 89, 96, 101, 103, 287. Cf. Gyekye 1997: 82. Cf. Gyekye 1997: 226, 284, 296. Gyekye 1997: 80. Cf. Gyekye 1997: 85. Gyekye 1997: 86. Cf. Gyekye 1997: 89. Cf. Gyekye 1997: 89, 90. Gyekye 1997: 42. He continues: “But there is more to community than social relationships. Sharing, as I said, an overall way of life is most essential and basic to any conception of a community” (Gyekye 1997: 43). Gyekye 1997: 54. Gyekye 1997: 55. Ibid. Gyekye 1997: 76. Gyekye is a dedicated explorer of the possibilities for integration and the crea­ tion of a sense of community; reflections which could also be used outside Africa and globally to solve the societal problems of coexistence of different ethnicities, races, cultures and religions. Gyekye 1997: 74.

102 Rethinking Kant 130 Ibid. Kant implicitly includes this problem in his formally oriented universalism of the generalisability of personal maxims in moral action and in the formula of the end in itself of the categorical imperative.

Bibliography Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: “Democracy or Consensus? Response to Wiredu.” In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, pp. 313–323. Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem: “A Critique of Cultural Universals and Particulars in Kwasi Wiredu’s Philosophy”. In: Trames. 15(65/60), 3/2011, pp. 259–276. Gyekye, Kwame: Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1997. Gyekye, Kwame: Philosophy, Culture, And Vision: African Perspective. Accra (SubSaharan Publishers), 2013. Höffe, Otfried: ‘Königliche Völker’: Zu Kants kosmopolitischer Rechts- und Friedenslehre. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2001. Höffe, Otfried: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: The Foundation of Modern Philosophy. Heidelberg (Springer), 2010. Ifeany, Emmanuel: “The Question of Immanence in Kwasi Wiredu’s Consensual Democracy”. In: Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy and Axiology. 15(1), 2018, pp. 161–176. Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 1–22 edited by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften; vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; vol. 24– 27 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin (De Gruyter), 1900 et seq. Kant, Immanuel: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. London (Hutchinson University Library), 1965. (Text cited as “GMS”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1991. (Text cited as “MS”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. Young, J. Michael (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1992. (Texts cited as “Log”, “V-Log”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Allison, Henry; Heath, Peter (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2002. (Texts cited as “ÜE”, “FM”.) Matolino, Bernard: “A Response to Eze’s Critique of Wiredu’s Consensual Democracy”. In: South African Journal of Philosophy. 28(1), 2009, pp. 34–42. Matolino, Bernard: “Rationality and Consensus in Kwasi Wiredu’s Traditional African Polities”. In: Theoria. 63(146), 2016, pp. 36–55. Odera Oruka, Henry: “Cultural Fundamentals in Philosophy: Obstacles in Philosophical Dialogues”. In: Kuçuradi, Ioanna; Cohen, Robert S. (Eds.): The Concept of Knowl­ edge: The Ankara Seminar. Dordrecht (Springer Netherlands), 1995, pp. 167–181. Wiredu, J. E. (alias Kwasi Wiredu): “Kant’s Synthetic A Priori in Geometry and the Rise of Non-Euclidean Geometries”. In: Funke, Gerhard; Kopper, Joachim (Eds.): Kant-Studien. 6(1–4). Bonn (H. Bouvier & Co.) 1970, pp. 5–27. Wiredu, J. E. (alias Kwasi Wiredu): “Deducibility and Inferability”. In: Mind. 82 (325), Jan. 1973, pp. 31–55. Wiredu, Kwasi: Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1980.

Kant’s epistemological and ethical universalism 103 Wiredu, Kwasi: “Knowledge, Truth and Fallibility”. In: Kuçuradi, Ioanna; Cohen, Robert S. (Eds.): The Concept of Knowledge: The Ankara Seminar. Dordrecht (Springer Netherlands), 1995, pp. 127–148. Wiredu, Kwasi: Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press), 1996. Wiredu, Kwasi: “Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for a Non-party Polity”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi: Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, pp. 303–312.

4

Rereading Kant Philosophy as critique in the

philosophical concepts of

Serequeberhan and Odera Oruka

Critique of Eurocentrism in the philosophy of Tsenay Serequeberhan African philosophy as a critical endeavour mirrors and reflects African development – “Africa in metamorphosis”.1 In this context it focuses on the task of creating an African identity;2 the theoretical reappraisal of the Afri­ can past; mastering the present, in particular in its political-social, cultural and ethical dimensions; and the conceptualisation of the African future in the global context. African philosophy as critique, “the critical self-reflection of a culture”,3 also understands itself as being a “metaphilosophical dis­ course”4 which includes philosophising among its critical activities. Accord­ ing to Serequeberhan, the different orientations of African philosophy have one thing in common: This dispute, however, is grounded on a shared understanding that it is the present-day African situation as it arises out of the ambiguous and broken heritage of the African past that calls for thinking. Thus, these ‘essential problems’ are the lived concerns, the questions and issues, embedded in a concrete existential-historical-political horizon, that evoke questioning, that is, the discourse of African philosophy.5 In African philosophy, postcolonial and decolonial thinking become forms of critique making it primarily a practical political project. Serequeberhan speaks of “the political imperative of African philosophy”.6 In this context the types of critique which can be identified in contemporary African philo­ sophy and their different dimensions, implications and functions will be examined. Which Kantian theorems do African philosophers reference and what role does Kant’s philosophy play, in particular as regards the aspects of universalism, equality, race and colonialism? What function does this recourse have in the philosophical theories of African thinkers? In addition to this, the role which critique plays in the development of future concepts for Africa and its global integration will be considered. In this context, the philosophical concepts of Tsenay Serequeberhan and Henry Odera Oruka will be discussed in more detail. DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-6

Rereading Kant 105 The critique of Eurocentrism, which represents the core of postcolonial and decolonial theory in general and of African groundwork on literature, art, science, politics, etc., is an essential element of the project to decolonise thought in contemporary African philosophy − also and in particular as regards its own understanding of its philosophical task. Tsenay Ser­ equeberhan perceives the function of African philosophy as “concrete engagement with the traditional, historical, and contemporary situation of the continent”.7 Philosophy presents itself − in this respect he refers, for example, to Kant − as a critical enterprise which reflects its own function in a metacritique. “I will articulate what I take to be the critical task of the contemporary practice of African philosophy.”8 In this regard, he speaks of “de-constructive/critical efforts”.9 As regards Kant, he elaborates: “Kant, referring to his own era as ‘the age of criticism’, notes that, ‘everything must submit to critical scrutiny’ and be ‘able to sustain the test of a free and open investigation’, […] which is, properly speaking, the practice of philosophy.”10 Serequeberhan references Kwasi Wiredu when he speaks of “conceptual decolonization” as the task of philosophy.11 The aim is “to articulate coun­ ter-discourses”.12 He refines this as follows: “The critique of Eurocentrism is aimed at exposing and destructuring […] this basic speculative core in the texts of philosophy. This then is the critical-negative aspect of the discourse of contemporary African philosophy.”13 However, the focus is first and fore­ most on the question: “What is the critique of Eurocentrism and how does it relate to the practice of contemporary African Philosophy?”14 As an example of his ‘destructuring critique’, the philosopher systematically explores Kant’s philosophy of history in a hermeneutic critique, identifying a ‘double game’ as regards the aspects of ‘empire and colonialism’ and the universalism con­ tained in Kant’s philosophy.15 This requires further general investigation employing the critical-negative procedure of analysing philosophical texts of Western provenance, such as those of Marx and Hegel. “In this regard, Hegel and Marx specify systematically, in their own respective ways, the idea of European superiority which Kant, long before them, enunciated as the cen­ terpiece of his historicopolitical writings.”16 In his essay “Eurocentrism in Philosophy: Immanuel Kant”,17 Serequeberhan discusses Kant’s statements on humanity, race, colonialism, history, the principle of ‘unsociable socia­ bility’ and progress guaranteed by nature in the texts of historical philosophy in detail. He says: “[F]or Kant, non-European or non-white humanity prop­ erly speaking, lies beyond the pale of reason and thus of the possibility of rational self-redemption.”18 He cites Kant: “[B]ut in short: this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.”19 Historical progress could therefore in all likelihood only originate in Europe. Serequeberhan cites Kant: “[I]f one adds episodes from the national histories of other peoples, insofar as they are known from the history of the enligh­ tened nations, one will discover a regular progress in the constitution of states on our continent (which will probably give law, eventually, to all the others).”20 In this context he refers to the following quotation from Kant:

106 Rethinking Kant Only a learned public, which has lasted from its beginning to our own day, can certify ancient history. Outside it, everything else is terra incog­ nita; and the history of peoples outside it can only be begun when they come into contact with it. This happened with the Jews in the time of the Ptolemies through the translation from the Bible into Greek, without which we would give little credence to their isolated narratives. From this point, when once properly fixed, we can retrace their history. And so with all other peoples. The first page of Thucydides, says Hume, is the only beginning of real history.21 In contrast to non-European history, European history is regarded as ‘real’ history − a history which, according to Kant, leads to the moral perfection of man; to perpetual peace and to a cosmopolitan basic order embodied in a league of nations. Serequeberhan says: “Kant conflates his empirical concern with different ‘peoples’ (i.e. races, nations, etc.) with the credo that posits European history as the mandatory or requisite transcendental ‘meeting point of all particular histories’.”22 For Kant, the focus is on the universalistic project of Enlightenment.23 In fact, in as much as Enlightenment is concerned with ‘man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage’ and is thus – and necessarily so – a selfreflexive and self-reflective project of critical and rational self-emancipation, it cannot, on its own terms, be inclusive of non-European peoples.24 This universalistic approach conceals “Kant’s specific or particular orien­ tation: which is European history.”25 Serequeberhan asserts that Kant’s use of the term humanity is extremely problematic.26 Although Kant criticises − albeit only “sporadic[ally] and inconsistent[ly]”27 − the way in which Eur­ opeans treated non-European peoples; suppressed the natives and brought war, famine, etc.28 in Toward Perpetual Peace, taking the theorems of ‘uni­ versal hospitality’ and ‘world citizenship’ as his starting point, he uses the theorem of ‘unsociable sociability’ and the instrumental rationality necessary for the progress of mankind to justify it. Nature guarantees this through “the preordained will of Providence”.29 Serequeberhan understands reason in Kant’s works in the sense of instrumental reason: “As noted earlier, by ‘rational nature’ Kant has in mind the ratio at work in instrumental control, which then is the filling appropriate for ‘the empty place in creation’.”30 Serequeberhan claims that by comparing Tahitians with sheep, Kant is justi­ fying an instrumental attitude and treatment of them and other non-Europeans: “It is interesting to observe further that Kant sees a similarity between the Tahitians (and the rest of non-European humanity by extension) and sheep because − at least, if one is to judge by the illustrations he uses − sheep, for him, typify the paradigmatic example of a passive resource to be exploi­ ted.”31 Serequeberhan refers to the instrumental use of animals, which Kant explains in the essay Conjectural Beginning of Human History (1786), using

Rereading Kant 107 sheep as an example to illustrate the difference between humans and animals in connection with the question of the development of human reason in his­ tory. Serequeberhan’s interpretation is, however, untenable. Kant’s compar­ ison of Tahitians with sheep by no means implies that he does not regard them as belonging to the human species. In Kant’s text quoted above, the quotation below follows immediately after the passage used by Serequeberhan: This representation includes (however obscurely) the thought of the opposite: that he must not say something like this to any human being, but has to regard him as an equal participant in the gifts of nature − a preparation from afar for the restrictions that reason was to lay on the will in the future in regard to his fellow human beings, and which far more than inclination and love is necessary to the establishment of society. And thus the human being had entered into an equality with all rational beings, of whatever rank they might be (Genesis 3:22); […] namely, in regard to the claim of being himself an end, of also being esteemed as such by everyone else, and of being used by no one merely as a means to other ends.32 (MAM, AA 08:114) The significance of Kant’s critique of Europeans, which Serequeberhan repeatedly notes, should thus not be downplayed. Kant’s concept of the end in itself of the categorical imperative also contradicts Serequeberhan’s inter­ pretation since it rejects the treatment of human beings as mere means. Kant states: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”33 (GMS, AA 04:429) In Kant’s philosophy reason should not be understood in an instrumental dimension, as is evident in his epistemologi­ cal, ethical and aesthetic writings as well as in his historical texts. In the aesthetic dimension, for example, reason as an a priori capability enables a disinterested pleasure in nature and art alike and lies in the experience of beauty and the sublime in nature beyond an instrumental rationality. Rationality according to Kant cannot be understood as “rational control” and/or “proper utilization/control of reason”.34 It is an a priori capability attributable equally to all human beings, endowed with ideas and regulative principles for structuring human knowledge and action. According to Serequeberhan, the principle of ‘unsociable sociability’ con­ stitutes and justifies the metaphysical basis for the hostile and aggressive behaviour of Europeans towards other peoples and races. He states: “He cannot on the one hand impute to nature these expansionist drives and glorify her for making them possible, and simultaneously condemn the results or effects of these very drives. Conquest and expansion are thus part of the foresight and design of nature.”35 The theorem of ‘unsociable

108 Rethinking Kant sociability’, and with it also war, are initially assigned a mobilising role by Kant and thus also a positive function in the historical process. The increas­ ing morality of mankind; expanding trade relations; the increase in contracts between trade partners and peoples; and global civil rights are, however, able to increasingly compensate for, or avoid, negative consequences. Kant states in Toward Perpetual Peace that within the scope of the development process towards a cosmopolitan league of nations the number of wars should decrease, since the societies organised into republics will no longer be pre­ pared to accept their devastating consequences. It becomes clear that Kant’s contradiction, as Serequeberhan has pointed out, is refuted by a develop­ mental argument which could, however, be criticised. At this point, Ser­ equeberhan’s recourse to Layotard’s theorem of the end of the metanarrative could be used to criticise Kant’s concept of progress. Unlike Kant, Ser­ equeberhan argues that it is not the large states which guarantee security within a league of nations; on the contrary they tend to break agreements in order to assert their own interests. It is the smaller and medium-sized states which depend on a league of nations to guarantee their security. In contrast to Kant, the African philosopher emphasises the individual states’ interest in mutual assurances of security and their will to survive, while Kant takes the ideal of justice as his starting point. Applying this to modern times, Ser­ equeberhan calls for a strengthening of the United Nations’ General Assembly and a curbing of the Security Council’s veto power.36 In summary, he says: “Europe is for Kant, the measure and standard of humanity”37 and he speaks of “Europe’s hubris expressed in philosophical terms.”38 Serequeberhan also references Said, who says: “Imperialism was the theory, colonialism the practice of changing the uselessly unoccupied territories of the world into useful new versions of the European metropoli­ tan society.”39 This reveals a process of normalisation which has a normative nature: “This normality, as Said points out, is grounded on an ‘idea, which dignifies [and indeed hastens] pure force with arguments drawn from science, morality, ethics, and a general philosophy’.”40 According to Serequeberhan “[is] [t]his Idea or ‘general philosophy’ […] the metaphysical ground for the ‘normality’ and legitimacy of European global expansion and conquest: that is, the consolidation of the real.”41 The civilisation of non-European popu­ lations was based on the European model.42 The task is therefore to deconstruct the pretexts underlying this mindset and their underlying theorems. The de-structuring critique of the ‘pre-text’ − the Occidental surrogate for the heterogenous variance of human historical existence − is then the basic critical-negative task of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy. It is the task of undermining the European centered con­ ception of humanity on which the Western tradition of philosophy − and much more − is grounded.43

Rereading Kant 109 This ‘critical-negative project’ is, in particular, necessary because African self-perception is determined by the Western view, “Europe’s imperious gaze”,45 based on “the civilized/uncivilized dichotomy”.46 44

Consequently, we ‘see’ ourselves and our contemporary situation, at least partially, through the lenses conferred to us by the transmissions of this heritage. Thus, to explore this shared heritage in regard to how it sees and conceptualizes our lived humanity is a necessary precondition to critically appropriating it.47 Serequeberhan continues: “Today − in our global society − the dominant ideas are the ideas through which Europe dominates the world.”48 Parallel to this, Western hegemony is becoming less visible in modern times. “Today in our postcolonial present, we face a more covert hegemony which functions and implements global Euro-American domination through the Westernized segments of formerly colonized peoples.”49 He continues: “More than through physical force, Euro-America today rules through its hegemony of ideas, ‘through its ‘models’ of growth and development’”50 and speaks of a “testament of Western supremacy”.51 According to Serequeberhan, revealing this Western hegemony, which is not always visible, is one of the tasks of contemporary African philosophy. Serequeberhan understands critique primarily as a hermeneutic procedure or deconstructivist analysis of the investigation of philosophical texts.52 In this context he refers to ethnophilosophical, sage philosophical and politicalnational texts of the liberation struggle, which, in addition to scientifically oriented philosophical texts, constitute the central tendencies of African philosophy. Furthermore, he calls for a critical analysis of philosophical texts of Western provenance. What is also striking in this regard is, however, that Western texts are equally fundamental to his work, as in the case of selected texts by Lyotard, Vattimo, Taylor, Gadamer, etc. Serequeberhan, however, combines his call for critical reflection with a concept of cultural hybridity: The present reality of Africa is hybrid. It is, therefore, the content and composition of this hybridity that we must challenge, explore, and concretely sift through. This we can do by critically engaging and destructuring on the level of ideas the colonial project, ‘the epistemology of imperialism’, that control us from within.53 He thus opposes the idea of a hypothetical purity and authenticity of culture and an unquestioned return to a supposedly African tradition. His starting point remains the idea of intercultural or transcultural exchange between cultures, aiming “to cultivate a synthesis” and “a constant process of crossfertilization” to create “a new global community” or “a new humanity”.54 Serequeberhan strives for a “dialogue at a distance” with continental Eur­ opean philosophy: “We need to further cultivate this dialogue. We must

110 Rethinking Kant engage ourselves in shortening the distance in view of our ‘worldwide heri­ tage’ (Note 39) and what it calls for.”55 We must do justice to the “multi­ plicity, which constitutes the present world”, which is also associated with “a rethinking of our shared – unequal – past”.56 He goes on to say: “We have to counter, to the nature sanctioned logic of brute force, a logic of recognition, respect, and dialogue – a logic grounded in the finitude, or humanness, of our shared existence.”57 Serequeberhan combines deconstructivist analysis with reconstruction.58 His focus is on developing solutions for Africa’s current problems based on hermeneutic deconstruction. Philosophy strives to contribute to the empow­ erment of Africans both theoretically and practically: “For me as for them [he refers to the philosophers Owomoyela. Towa, Okolo and Wamba-DiaWamba] philosophy – and specifically African philosophy – is a historically engaged and politically committed explorative reflection on the African situation aimed at the political empowerment of the African people.”59 The political goal is “the establishment of participatory forms of democratic selfrule”, combined with “the imaginative and self-reliant modernization of the formerly colonized territory” and “a practice of economic transformation that is democratically controlled (i.e. directed, invested in, and managed) at a grassroot level.”60 Serequeberhan also says: “Is it not much more a question of instituting viable and sustainable economic strategies/arrangements, suited to their varied efforts at democratic self-rule, while fending off the constant ‘pressures emanating from the global system’?”61 This is associated with overcoming corruption and “moral pollution”62 and leading Africa out of its neocolonial63 position. The primary concern is to rediscover possibilities: “Indeed, to reimagine – invent, rediscover, retrieve – the lost possibilities that were, at one time, the raison d’être of the independence struggle: this is the task of contemporary African philosophy.”64 For Serequeberhan empower­ ment is linked to political action. Despite his extensive criticism of Kant, Serequeberhan refers positively to the former’s mindset: “And so, in being open and receptive to that which is disclosed in our postcolonial present, we just might, in the spirit of Kant, all of us and together, surmount the dangers signaled by 9/10 – 2001 and 1973.”65

Philosophy as visionary critique in Odera Oruka’s work Criticism, ethics and politics: global justice in Odera Oruka’s philosophy Within the scope of his project of sage philosophy 66 Odera Oruka’s concept of philosophy as a critical-reflexive thought process is − in contrast to eth­ nophilosophy − devoted to the reconstruction of indigenous heritage as indi­ vidual reflection. He rejects ethnophilosophy, which, as a collective philosophy, is based on the research findings of ethnologists, primarily focusing on collective myths, rituals and world views. Odera Oruka insists on a differentiation between myth and philosophy; it is only on this basis, he

Rereading Kant 111 argues, that philosophy can become a motor for progress and development in Africa and the world. According to Odera Oruka, comprehensible arguments and logical consistency are required to realise philosophy’s critical potential. His concern is to allow the sagacity-related dimension of philosophy to unfold − in combination with a consideration of cultural, social and histor­ ical impulses. For him, African philosophical sagacity plays an important role in the process of decolonialising thought in the postcolonial context. Sagacity should not, however, be equated with philosophy. Odera Oruka asserts: “Our concern in research into sages is not actually to prove the theory that sagacity is already philosophy. Our study focuses on philosophy within the context of sagacity; in other words, it is concerned with the overlap.”67 Similarly to Kant, in particular in his historical writings in the context of the Enlightenment and the cosmopolitan concept, Odera Oruka represents an application-oriented approach to philosophy. He promotes its social rele­ vance as, among other things, an orientation aid in the fight against socio­ economic discrimination; undesirable political developments and racist prejudices. His philosophy focuses on global justice and the human minimum, whereby absolute priority is given to ensuring human physical existence. In his ethics, which are based on a humanistic viewpoint, the human minimum embodies the minimal code for the identification of good. The ethical mini­ mum represents “the condition of the possibility of any ethical act”.68 Odera Oruka says on this subject: To ensure that all humans function with the necessary rationality and self-perception, they require a certain minimum of physical safety, healthcare and subsistence. For simplicity’s sake, let us refer to this minimum as the human minimum. Below this minimum it is still possible to be alive and a good person, however it is no longer possible to successfully exercise the functions of a moral agent or to act creatively.69 Odera Oruka’s ethics formulate a global claim of a universal nature, whose concern is to implement the demand for justice in the context of the inter­ national community. This contradicts the understanding of justice which, as is the case in the work of Kant and Rawls, is primarily focused on the indi­ vidual or the nation-state. Odera Oruka’s ethics must, in their fundamental nature, be understood as egalitarian ethics, whose central concern is to elim­ inate social inequality. Anke Graneß states in this regard “socio-economic dis­ tributive justice thus forms the core of his understanding of justice.”70 Distributive justice focuses on redistribution. The theory of global justice, which, in Odera Oruka’s philosophy, initially rigorously demands an egali­ tarian basic framework for the world, increasingly mutates into the principle of the human minimum.71 The human minimum envisages providing each individual with their basic requirements and is thus a regulative ideal. In contrast to Kant and Rawls’s theories of justice, in the work of Odera Oruka

112 Rethinking Kant the acquisition of private property is not included among fundamental human freedoms. Taking the jeopardising of human physical existence in Africa, caused by famines, wars, political mismanagement, exploitation, pol­ lution, etc., as his starting point, he ascribes greater significance to economic needs as primary rights than to political civil liberties. ‘Economic freedom’ forms the basis for all other freedoms; a contradiction of Euro-American philosophy’s fundamental viewpoint, whose most important advocate on the issue of freedom is Kant.72 Kant addresses poverty and social discrimination in particular in the context of their impact on the individual’s ability to exercise passive and active rights of citizenship; the threat to the republican state of nations and the interaction of states in terms of the security aspect. He does not focus on personal suffering; the impairment of lifestyle and the possibility of achieving satisfaction and happiness. The individual’s moral competence is, argues Kant, not endangered; it is, a priori, anchored in practical reason. Distributive justice, posits Odera Oruka, is the precondition for the exercising of human moral and political freedoms. Contrastingly, in Kant’s work justice is specifically defined not as distributive justice but as every individual’s possession of equal rights. The possibility of carrying out a moral action allows the individual to develop into a person,73 with the term ‘person’ based on the concept of the human being as a moral actor and including the human minimum as a right. The term ‘person’ thus differs from the Kantian concept of the person as a rational being, which is based on the concept of freedom in its abstract con­ text. Freedom is, according to Kant, the freedom to make decisions on moral action; the autonomy of self-legislation and responsibility and, as an ethically based concept independent of, for example, economic, social and historical dimensions with the reason endowed to human beings, as embodied in the apriority of the categorical imperative. Odera Oruka presents the human minimum as a precondition for the ability to act morally and for creativity, both as an absolute and also as a universal moral human right, which is simultaneously linked to the obligation to grant this right. This right is sub­ ordinate to the right to property. The power of disposition over national ter­ ritory, on which national wealth is based, is, in the final instance, also anchored in the right to property and thus does not provide any absolute right, also because, among other things, the legality of the territory acquisition cannot generally be proven. Kant also recognises the problem inherent in the acquisition of land and other goods as regards legitimacy and justice. He therefore postulates the regulative idea − based on the theory that everything on Earth is the communal property of everyone − of a universal will which generates consensus and thus republican states and the rule of law of all nations. This in turn leads to agreement on how just distribution should take place. Kant employs the assumption of a universal will as the guideline for political forming of the historical process and, simultaneously, as a vision for the future.74 He gives preference to a refinement of legal means and the republican state of nations as the basis for achieving consensus.

Rereading Kant 113 For Odera Oruka, the ability to carry out a moral action; reasonable selfdetermination and the ability to independently shape our lives are linked to the concept of the person. In contrast to Kant he does not, however, derive this from the socio-historical context in the social and economic regard, but instead views the issue from the individual, nation-state and global perspec­ tive and, in particular, from the economic angle. In contrast to Kant, Odera Oruka believes that it is possible to derive moral and legal demands from the empirical nature of humans. He says: “We […] need freedom only because we have certain needs to fulfil and freedom is a condition for such fulfilment. It seems, therefore, proper that before giving a definition of ‘liberty for X’s’ we must first of all give a definition of what we mean by X’s needs.”75 Although Kant’s historical philosophical writings take political, cultural and moral dimensions into consideration as factors for the development of the person, economic factors in the moral context remain unconsidered and moral action is characterised precisely by its detachment from heteronomy. Odera Oruka criticises Kant’s definition of a person as regards its hypostatisation of per­ sonal autonomy, contextualising its socio-economic and physical certainty while, however, retaining its conceptual definition to a large extent.76 When summing up the parallels to Kant Graneß states: There are obvious parallels to the Kantian approach, beginning with the definition of the person through the interrelationship of rights and obli­ gations to the differentiation between juridical and moral law. It should be noted that Odera Oruka’s concept waivers between natural law models (rights to which humans are entitled by virtue of being human) and the Kantian model (rights as the product of reason). On the one hand it is concluded that there is a right to a human minimum arising from the necessity of protecting human corporeality as the precondition for the exercising of all rights and obligations; on the other his under­ standing of ‘person’, ‘rights’ and ‘obligations’ is based on concepts of liberal autonomy.77 Odera Oruka takes his reflections on justice as the starting point to derive global ethical obligations for rich countries, using the principle of fair dis­ tribution of the world’s resources to establish the necessity of development aid. He argues that, independent of charity, reparations and the preservation of their own − generally economic and/or military − interests, rich countries have an obligation to provide development aid which is grounded in uncon­ ditional validity and the moral obligation to realise the human minimum, including the impulses of physical safety, health and subsistence. Kant does not envisage any such redistribution process between nation-states. Instead, he appeals to them to create a legal framework to support each individual’s strength and efforts to improve their personal circumstances and the achievement of active citizenship. A solid structure based on the division of powers and the rule of law will help to improve relationships between states

114 Rethinking Kant and also to move closer to the goal of a league of nations to achieve perpe­ tual peace. Viewed overall, the concept of global justice and the human minimum which underlies Odera Oruka’s philosophy indicates a cosmopoli­ tan focus, which, however, he does not further expand. The question of how global justice can be achieved, initially concerned with the specific form which the demand for the human minimum should take, thus remains unanswered. To this end, the human minimum must first be defined more precisely and intervention into national wealth78 must be legally and morally regulated. It must be clarified which institutions are responsible for the dis­ tribution process and how they can legitimise themselves. In their essence, solutions to these problems and questions require a cosmopolitan philosophy and/or make a cosmopolitan concept necessary; a solution which can be found in Kant’s work, although in different contexts. Odera Oruka argues that justice is based on the principle of distribution, a principle which other concepts of justice often question and criticise. Höffe, for example, instead demands a reciprocal principle of exchange, also based on intercultural acceptance, since distribution has paternalistic and/or maternalistic tendencies and generates a welfare mentality.79 Graneß poses the question: “Is distribution even a suitable paradigm for justice?”80 At the centre of Odera Oruka’s thinking is a critical dialogue with Rawls’s effica­ cious concept of justice. Rawls’s approach is based in particular on Aristotle’s understanding of justice. Justice is defined as a virtue, with a distinction made between distributive and commutative or restorative justice; the former distributes rights and obligations relating to the recipient on the basis of proportionality, while the latter assumes, for example in the case of com­ pensation and punishment, a formal equality of all individuals. In addition to this, Rawls references Kant’s concept of justice as the same freedom for all individuals and the Kantian concept of social consensus by means of con­ tractual agreements and the theory of the social contract, as developed by Locke et al. Rawls develops a set of rules which state that distribution is fair if there is universal agreement on its equality and impartiality – a kind of fair justice. The imaginary original state requires the conceptualisation of a social order − as a hypothetical social contract − on the assumption that indivi­ duals are unclear as to the social position which they will subsequently occupy. The outcome is a mutual protection of freedom in the Kantian sense and, over and above this, a distributive system of income which can be uni­ versally accepted, since unequal distribution should never negatively impact those who are in the worst circumstances and everyone has the same oppor­ tunities. Rawls thus opposes a utilitarian concept of justice. Basic freedoms such as political liberties; freedom of conscience and thought; personal free­ dom and the right to personal property precede the principle of difference and differentiation. Odera Oruka vehemently criticises Rawls’s assignment of private property to the preceding basic freedoms. Over and above this, he postulates the priority of a minimum subsistence level over the above-mentioned basic freedoms, thus turning the order of principles of justice on its head.

Rereading Kant 115 When doing so he differentiates between two different forms of ownership − “socially significant and socially insignificant personal property”,81 asserting that Rawls’s definition of property is imprecise. Rawls, however, specifically excludes ownership of means of production from basic freedoms, a fact which is overlooked by Odera Oruka and diminishes his criticism of Rawls.82 Rawls demands the ensuring of a minimum subsistence level,83 thus appear­ ing to give preference to a social market economy model. The African phi­ losopher Odera Oruka however asserts that Rawls’s theory is rooted in a social system based on the Westernised liberal market economy. Environmental ethics and philosophy of nature in Odera Oruka’s work In the context of his philosophy of nature Odera Oruka develops an ecophilosophy and a concept of environmental ethics.84 He says: We regard ecophilosophy as a totality of the philosophy of nature. In this sense ecophilosophy is broader than such subjects as environmental stu­ dies and environmental ethics. Environmental studies have so far, restricted themselves to the study of the earth and the atmosphere. Environmental ethics has not gone much beyond the attempt to consider the possibility of extending ethics from human beings to the non-human creatures on earth.85 He bases these assertions on the African differentiation between the visible world, jointly inhabited by humans and other creatures and in which some animals and plants are assigned a particular significance, and the invi­ sible world with its spirits, the dead and the unborn, which is traditionally held in high esteem in Africa. Taking these fundamental convictions as the starting point, nature must be treated with respect. His parental earth ethics86 are, asserts Graneß, concerned “at their core with the preservation of the whole world. The subtle connection of social impulses and our mode of thought means that the combatting of poverty is, in the final instance, environmental politics, climate protection and security policy rolled into one. The question of preserving the world is, in turn, inseparably linked to ensuring justice for every member of the community.”87 Odera Oruka pre­ supposes global interdependencies which link the fates of various parts of the world − in line with the idea of a network of being − and the necessity of striving for a global equilibrium. In this context he also emphasises the obligation of rich countries to provide development aid, referring to a par­ ental Earth insurance policy, a kind of insurance or security policy for the welfare of the world. Odera Oruka’s new ethics advocate humility and are also equally directed against both over-consumption and the lack of even the barest necessities with their damaging consequences for the whole world. Ethics are conceived of as no longer being solely anthropocentric but rather ecocentric. The increasing interdependency of a diverse range of factors

116 Rethinking Kant requires a focusing of human thought, feeling and action on the planet in its entirety; on the cycle of nature; and humans as part of the universe. Odera Oruka calls for a change of perspective in an epistemologically critical, moral and generally pragmatic sense. In this context, he uses the metaphor of the family − as a symbol for the global context − to provide examples for his concept and to make it imaginable. While Kant does not specifically examine the interrelationship of eco­ nomics and nature in his work, the special significance which his philosophy attributes to nature suggests his belief that respect for nature should be viewed as the fundamental factor behind human economic activity. In the Critique of Judgment Kant develops an alternative understanding of nature which includes the idea of a purposefully composed nature − nature as a system of purposes. Recki sees in this the model for a non-hierarchical rela­ tionship with nature as well as a rehabilitation of the sensuous, and the pos­ sibility of an ethics of nature in Kantian philosophy, which is, however, not fully developed. The higher appreciation of the sensorial is expressed in the assumption of the free play of cognitive powers in disinterested pleasure, the aesthetic experience of purposefulness without purpose, which has moral implications. Recki says: By describing nature as purposeful we also assume that it acts rationally − and thus has the form of reason which forms the basis for our view of ourselves as active beings. The concept of the purposefulness of nature is the expression of our own practical self-understanding of sensibly organized nature.88 Teleological thinking,89 however, remains an as if, since we refer to ourselves within it; the starting point for teleology thus remains anthropocentric. In this way, we as humans can experience how we “as reasonable beings fit into the world.”90 From this Recki derives an ethical respect for nature, a regard for nature in Kant’s philosophy. According to this argument, functionalistic interaction with nature is not as Kant envisaged. Höffe comments in this regard: “And the notion of the domination of nature […] plays no role whatsoever in Kant’s thought in general”.91 He continues: “Insofar as Kant’s Critique simply thematises the intrinsically scientific character that belongs to authentic knowledge, it treats the possible applications of such knowledge as epistemically irrelevant. In this way Kant indirectly rehabilitates Aristotle’s ideal of ‘theoria’ as genuine knowledge pursued entirely for its own sake.”92 Nature-philosophical con­ siderations are of paramount significance in Kant’s work, while his philoso­ phy also implicitly identifies nature-ethical consequences. Both Kant and Odera Oruka interpret nature in a comprehensive, factual manner, even if their focuses are different − Kant defines it in a teleological and Odera Oruka in a metaphysical sense. Neither view nature primarily in an instru­ mentalising manner. In the final instance, both philosophers believe that

Rereading Kant 117 nature provides the comprehensive framework for the human self-image. Over and above this, in Kant’s work nature is also the guarantor for the perfection of the human in a moral and political context. Odera Oruka’s philosophy establishes a dialogue between African theore­ tical elements and theorems of Western philosophy, with the objective of contributing to the solution of Africa’s social, economic and socio-political problems in a global context. He is particularly interested in enabling indi­ viduals to develop their morality, civic competence and creativity through the creation of a fairer world. The weakness of Odera Oruka’s philosophical considerations is the failure to elaborate on the implementation problems associated with his formulated goals. The socio-economic aspects and underlying economic and political categories associated with his ideas are not presented or are not sufficiently discussed.93 “In this sense, his theory remains largely an appeal to the moral responsibility of all mankind.”94 Graneß states: “Not having further defined the problem of responsibility is certainly one of the greatest weaknesses in Odera Oruka’s concept.”95 Fur­ thermore, the model of a flexible order of freedoms based on existing or changing social and historical conditions is preferable to the fixed order of dimensions of freedom stated and demanded by Odera Oruka.96 He fails to offer adequate answers, in particular as regards the implementation of his demands by institutions, legislation and treaties in national, international and transnational contexts. Odera Oruka’s vision of an autonomous, free individual and his emphasis on morality and the possibility of the indivi­ dual’s political participation is based on the Kantian concept of the person within the framework of moral and socio-political responsibility. The pro­ blems associated with the concept of equitable distribution are not examined in sufficient depth in Odera Oruka’s work, whereby it goes without saying that his goal of reducing and eliminating human need to the greatest extent possible in the poor countries of the world and a natural focus of actions must be given the highest priority. When referencing to Kant, the criticalnegative aspect dominates as regards the supposed abstraction and context independence of Kant’s theorems, such as the categorical imperative. A greater constructive-critical reference to Kant could have offered Odera Oruka impulses to fill theoretical gaps, especially with regard to the necessity of a political-legal constitution and institutionalisation in a cosmopolitanly oriented framework for the practical implementation of his demands.

Notes 1 Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “African Philosophy: The Point in Question”. In: Ser­ equeberhan, Tsenay (Ed.): African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. St. Paul, MN (Paragon House), 1991, p. 12. Serequeberhan quotes Okere, Theophilus: African Philosophy. A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of Its Possibility. Lanham, MD (University Press of America), 1983, p. 121. 2 “As Okere correctly observes, the discourse of African philosophy is located within the ‘movement in both artistic and intellectual life to establish a certain

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9 10

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17 18 19

[African] identity’” (Serequeberhan 1991: 12; Serequeberhan quotes Okere 1983: 121). Serequeberhan 1991: 18. Complete quotation: “African philosophy, if it is to be philosophy properly speaking, must be capable of being subsumed under a common notion of philosophy understood as the critical self-reflection of a culture engaged in by specific individuals in that culture” (ibid.). Serequeberhan 1991: 15. Serequeberhan 1991: 13. Serequeberhan 1991: 12. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “Introduction”. In: Serequeberhan, Tsenay (Ed.): African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. St. Paul, MN (Paragon House), 1991, p. XXI. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophy. New York (State University of New York Press), 2016, p. 11. And: “I will stake out a critical position in the debate on and also within African philosophy” (Serequeberhan 1991: 3). Serequeberhan 2016: 48. Serequeberhan 2016: 11. Specifying this task, Serequeberhan continues: “In sum, Philosophy is the practice of reflectively exploring grounding concerns that origi­ nate in specific cultures/regions. […] To speak of ‘European’ or ‘African’ philoso­ phy is to indicate the particular culture/region in and out of which ‘a specific type and intellectual activity (the critical examination [interpretative exploring] of fun­ damental problems)’ is being actuated. […] In like manner, the qualifiers ‘con­ temporary’, ‘modern’, ‘ancient’, and so on, indicate the time period or history (i.e. the historicity) in which this ‘specific type of intellectual activity’ is being under­ taken, in confronting and/or exploring the exigencies or concerns of its time” (ibid.). Here he refers on the one hand to Heidegger and on the other to Towa (see notes 20 and 21 in Serequeberhan 2016: 133). Serequeberhan 2016: 26. Serequeberhan 2016: 36. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “The Critique of Eurocentrism and the Practice of African Philosophy”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (Ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, p. 142. Serequeberhan 1997: 141. Serequeberhan 1997: 142. Serequeberhan 1997: 143. In his critique Serequeberhan refers to Jean-François Lyotard’s “incredulity towards metanarratives”, which Lyotard criticises in his book The Postmodern Condition, and Edward W. Said’s considerations on orient­ alism. According to Lyotard, these metanarratives are “the Christian narrative of the redemption of original sin through love; the Aufklärer narrative [i.e. Kant’s narrative] of emancipation from ignorance and servitude through knowledge and egalitarianism; the speculative narrative [i.e. Hegel’s narrative] of the realization of the universal Idea through the dialectic of the concrete, the Marxist narrative of emancipation from exploitation and alienation through socialization of work; and the capitalist narrative of emancipation from poverty through technoindustrial development” (Serequeberhan 1997: 145–146). Serequeberhan cites Lyotard, JeanFrançois: Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982–1985. Minneapolis, MN (University of Minnesota Press), 1992, p. 25. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “Eurocentrism in Philosophy: Immanuel Kant”. In: Ser­ equeberhan, Tsenay: Contested Memory: The Icons of the Occidental Tradition. Trenton, NJ (Africa Word Press), 2007, pp. 29–56. Serequeberhan 2007: 33. Cf. Serequeberhan 2007: 38. He cites Kant, Immanuel: Observations on the Feel­ ing of the Beautiful and Sublime. Berkeley, CA (University of California Press), 1960, p. 112. (Text cited as “GSE”.) Serequeberhan also quotes a reference in

Rereading Kant 119

20 21 22 23

24 25

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Kant’s text to Hume’s observation that “not a single one [of blacks] was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praise-worthy quality […]. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of men, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color” (Kant 1960: 74; quoted in Serequeberhan 2007: 36–37). The exemplary character of the Eur­ opean in general and the Germans in particular was also expressed in the com­ parisons of peoples made by Kant: “In these comparisons, just as the Oriental non-Europeans are ‘elevated’ by being compared with Europeans (i.e. Arabs and Persians by being likened to the Spanish and the French), to the same degree these Europeans are degraded relative to other Europeans” (Serequeberhan 2007: 40). Further he asks at this point: “[B]ut the Germans are not utilized as a standard of comparison. Are they above all this?” (ibid.) Kant Immanuel: “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”. In: Beck, Lewis White (Ed.): Kant: On History. Indianapolis, IN (Macmillan), 1963, p. 24 (quoted from Serequeberhan 2007: 41). Serequeberhan 2007: 42; he quotes Kant 1963: 24. Serequeberhan 2007: 32. “The ‘semblance’ of universality is indispensable because Enlightenment is aimed at saving not only European humanity, but humanity per se. For as Kant tells us in ‘An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?’ (1798), his concern is with ‘the totality of men united socially on earth and apportioned into peoples (universorum). The principal focus of his concern is the population of the earth as a whole’” (ibid.). Serequeberhan 2007: 40. Serequeberhan 2007: 33. He also states: “But Kant’s universalistic stance necessarily disregards this particularity, while presuming concern for it, for its global concern is grounded on its domineering stance towards others. It is, in fact, an effect of this particularity camouflaged as universality” (Serequeberhan 2007: 35). Cf. Serequeberhan 2007: 33, 34. The African philosopher refers to Michel Foucault at this point. Serequeberhan continues: “He [Habermas] does not even note Fou­ cault’s remark that the emancipatory hopes of the Enlightenment have a domineering and negative effect on the non-Western world” (Serequeberhan 2007: 35). Serequeberhan 2007: 44. He points out that Kant inconsistently compares the inhabitants of Tahiti with sheep in the “Review of Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind” (1785) and in “The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals” (1785) accuses the “South Sea islanders” of neglecting their duties and of having a tendency to “idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species − in a word enjoyment” (cf. Kant in Serequeberhan 2007: 44–45). Cf. Serequeberhan 2007: 43. He quotes Kant in this context: “But to this perfec­ tion compare the unhospitable actions of the civilized and especially of the com­ mercial states of our part of the world. The injustice which they show to the lands and peoples they visit (which is equivalent to conquering them) is carried by them to terrifying lengths. America, the lands inhabited by the Negro, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their discovery considered by these civilized intruders as lands without owners, for they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In East India (Hindustan), under the pretence of establishing economic under­ takings, they brought in foreign soldiers and used them to oppress the natives, excited widespread wars among the various states, spread famine, rebellion, per­ fidy, and the whole litany of evils which afflict mankind.” In: Beck, Lewis White (Ed.): Kant: On History. Indianapolis (Macmillan), 1963, p. 103. Serequeberhan stresses the importance of the above quotation from Kant: “[H]e makes the fol­ lowing remarkable and indeed very commendable statement” (Serequeberhan 2007: 43).

120 Rethinking Kant 29 30 31 32

33 34

35 36 37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62

Ibid. Serequeberhan 2007: 49. Serequeberhan 2007: 45. Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthropology, History, and Education. Zöller, Günter; Louden, Robert B. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2007, pp. 167–168. (Text cited as “MAM”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Prac­ tical Philosophy. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1996, p. 80. (Text cited as “GMS”.) Serequeberhan 2007: 47. He continues: “Thus, in the guise of rationality Kant enshrines the ‘desire to possess and rule’ as the standard bearer of the universality of reason, since without its driving force, the non-European world would squan­ der its existence in the idle pursuit of ‘mere pleasure’” (Serequeberhan 2007: 49–50). Serequeberhan 2007: 49. Serequeberhan 2016: 71. Serequeberhan 2007: 44. He continues: “The argument is not that Kant’s writings are in explicit league with conquest. Rather, his disinterested stance notwith­ standing, the aim is to reveal the beguiled and beguiling service his discourse renders European dominance. ii) Eurocentrism is not merely a kind of racism or ethnocentrism” (Serequeberhan 2007: 30). Serequeberhan 2007: 45. Said, Edward W.: The Question of Palestine. New York (Vintage), 1980, p. 78. Serequeberhan 1997: 144. Serequeberhan refers here to Said 1980: 77. Serequeberhan 1997: 144–145. “European civilization is both the standard and the model by which this deficiency is first recognized and then remedied” (Serequeberhan 1997: 145). Serequeberhan 1997: 146. Cf. Serequeberhan 1997: 142. He also states: “This, in my view, is one of the most important and basic tasks of the contemporary discourse of African philosophy; its critical-negative project − the critique of Eurocentrism” (Serequeberhan 1997: 157). Serequeberhan 2016: 20. Ibid. He continues: “His/her categories of thought are controlled, from within, by that what is exterior and foreign to the local setting” (Serequeberhan 2016: 21). Serequeberhan 1997: 155. Ibid. Serequeberhan 1997: 156. Ibid. Serequeberhan 2007: 30. He refers to Outlaw. Serequeberhan 2016: 26. Serequeberhan 2016: 35, 51 Serequeberhan 2016: 48. Serequeberhan remarks positively that contemporary continental philosophy critically discusses the historicity of the Occident and the negative, violent effects of its hegemony on the world (cf. Serequeberhan 2016: 49). Serequeberhan 2016: 48. Serequeberhan 2016: 72. Again, he refers to Outlaw. Serequeberhan 1991: XXI. Serequeberhan 2016: 32. Ibid. Serequeberhan 2016: 30. Serequeberhan adopts this expression from Kwame Gyekye. See note 116 in Serequeberhan 2016: 141.

Rereading Kant 121 63 Cf. Serequeberhan 2016: 27. In general Serequeberhan uses the term ‘post­ colonialism’. The term ‘neocolonialism’ serves to emphasise the continuation of colonial power structures following the formal independence of the former colonies. 64 Serequeberhan 2016: 36. 65 Serequeberhan 2016: 72. 66 Some African philosophers believe that sage philosophy has no philosophical character but instead merely represents an intelligent understanding of everyday life. Criticism centres, among other things, on the methodological procedure for interviews. In particular, philosophical sagacity is asserted to lack rationality and a systematic approach. These philosophers include, among others, Dismas Masolo and Peter O. Bodunrin. Cf. Masolo, Dismas: African Philosophy in Search for Identity. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press), 1994, pp. 135–136 and Bodunrin, Peter O.: “The Question of African Philosophy”. In: Odera Oruka, Henry (Ed.): Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy. Leiden (Brill Publishers), 1990, pp. 163–177. For Odera Oruka the key focuses are on the exploration and explanation of the tradition and roots of African philosophy − he compares African sage philosophy with Socrates in par­ ticular − to preserve heritage by recording it in writing and to facilitate and/or create the possibility of engaging in a critical dialogue with the body of thought obtained in this manner. 67 Odera Oruka, Henry: “Grundlegende Fragen der afrikanischen ‘Sage-Philosophy’”. In: Wimmer, Franz M. (Ed.): Vier Fragen zur Philosophie in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika. Vienna (Passagen), 1988, p. 48 (own translation). 68 Graneß, Anke: Das Menschliche Minimum: Globale Gerechtigkeit aus afrika­ nischer Sicht: Henry Odera Oruka. Frankfurt, New York (Campus), 2011, p. 99 (own translation). 69 Odera Oruka, Henry: “Philosophie der Entwicklungshilfe”. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren: Gerechtigkeit. 6, Vienna 2000, p. 9 (own translation). 70 Cf. Graneß 2011: 104. 71 Odera Oruka initially included the principle of the human minimum as an aspect of international justice. In his work international justice relates to inter-state relations and the issue of the relationship between government and the individual. It is grounded in the principles of territorial sovereignty and national surpluses (Cf. Graneß 2011: 105). 72 Cf. Graneß 2011: 101. 73 Graneß comments on Odera Oruka’s definition of a person: “A person is a rational, self-confident being who acts in a moral manner and is able to conclude a fair business transaction. His definition of a person thus goes beyond pure membership of the homo sapiens species” (Graneß 2011: 110; own translation). 74 Cf. Pinheiro Walla, Alice: “Private Property and the Possibility of Consent: Kant and Social Contract Theory”. In: Krasnoff, Larry; Madrid, Nuria Sánchez; Satne, Paula (Eds.): Kant’s ‘Doctrine of Right’ in the 21st Century. Cardiff (University of Wales), 2018, pp. 29–45. 75 Odera Oruka, Henry: The Philosophy of Liberty: An Essay on Political Philoso­ phy. Nairobi, Kenya (Standard Textbooks Graphics and Publishers), 1991, p. 53. He differentiates between primary and secondary needs, whereby he leaves cate­ gorisation based on regional and cultural differences open (cf. Graneß 2011: 127). Basic freedoms refer to fundamental needs such as food, accommodation, health, etc. and are of a biological and economic nature. They are the foundation for political, religious and cultural liberties such as freedom of opinion, of association and of the press (cf. Graneß 2011: 128–129). In line with this, the human mini­ mum is primarily concerned with human survival and not social and political

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84

85 86

participation (cf. Graneß 2011: 135). Taking this as her starting point, Graneß poses the question of the fundamental suitability of the human minimum to define the theory of the person. The latter emphasises self-determination and selfforming of the individual (cf. ibid.). Graneß asks: “Is the human minimum which he defines not too minimal in order to do justice to the qualities of a human being as that being defines them?” (own translation). Overall Graneß refers to “a reason-based argumentation as the basis for the right to a human minimum” (Graneß 2011: 124; own translation). Ibid. (own translation). The term ‘national wealth’ requires further clarification. Cf. Graneß 2011: 201. See in this regard Höffe, Otfried: Vernunft und Recht. Bausteine zu einem interkulturellen Rechtsdiskurs. Frankfurt am Main (Suhr­ kamp), 1998. For the reasons stated, Höffe is against development aid. The pre­ condition for Höffe’s view of justice is the individual’s ability to participate in transactions. Individuals who are not in a position to do this are, however, not taken into consideration. Furthermore, the conditions for carrying out the trans­ action process are generally not the same. According to Graneß the principle of ‘corrective justice’ also fails to function, since it dictates that the injustice suffered must have a significant impact on the present (cf. Graneß 2011: 209). In addition to preserving body and soul Höffe focuses on the ability to think and speak and the possibility of engaging in social contacts, thus already going beyond Odera Oruka’s definition of the human minimum in his first step. In contrast to Odera Oruka and in the Kantian tradition, he also calls for a global legal system within a federally organised world republic to institutionally realise his ideas. Höffe hopes that the nation-states will initially take responsibility for the social safe­ guarding of citizens. Graneß 2011: 117 (own translation). Odera Oruka, Henry: “John Rawls’ Ideology: Justice as Egalitarian Fairness”. In: Odera Oruka, Henry: Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum. Nairobi (East African Educational Publishers), 1997, p. 122. Cf. Graneß 2011: 162. Rawls says on this subject: “Finally, the government guarantees a social minimum either by family allowances and special payments for sickness and employment, or more systematically by such devices as a graded income supplement (a so-called negative income tax).” In: Rawls, John: A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 1971/1999, p. 243. Rawls does not, however, assume absolute poverty in this context and also sees no inter- and/or supra-state responsibility to combat poverty. Rawls’s primary frame of reference continues to be the nation-state. When discussing Western thought, he refers in particular to White’s idea of the significance of the smallest life form for the whole; to Linné’s belief in the interconnectedness of all living beings as regards a universal objective and to Darwin’s assumption of complex relationships and interdependencies between all living beings on Earth to provide examples for a common Earth ecophilosophy and cri­ ticises imperial ecophilosophy, which assumes human rule of the world. Cf. Odera Oruka, Henry; Juma, Calestous: “Ecophilosophy and Parental Earth Ethics (On the Complex Web of Being)”. In: Odera Oruka, Henry (Ed.): Philosophy, Humanity and Ecology: Philosophy of Nature and Environmental Ethics. Vol. 1. Nairobi (ACTS and AAS), 1994, pp. 117–118. In addition to this, Odera Oruka refers to Indian dharma; Hawaiian cosmology and Dogon cosmology (cf. Odera Oruka 1994: 121–123). Odera Oruka 1994: 119. Odera Oruka first uses this term in 1993 as an alternative concept to Garrett Hardin’s life boat ethics (cf. Graneß 2011: 137).

Rereading Kant 123 87 Cf. Graneß 2011: 116. 88 Recki, Birgit: Die Vernunft, ihre Natur, ihr Gefühl und der Fortschritt. Paderborn (Mentis). 2005, p. 61 (own translation). 89 “Reflected teleological thought is precisely what is not required to overcome anthropocentrism, but instead − as a condition of its possibility and purpose − actually reinforces it. Teleological thought − and thus its normative application − will not rid us of anthropocentrism” (Recki 2005: 62; own translation). 90 Ibid. (own translation). 91 Höffe 1998: 55. 92 Höffe 1998: 55–56. 93 Cf. Graneß 2011: 166–167. 94 Graneß 2011: 167 (own translation). 95 Graneß 2011: 212 (own translation). 96 Cf. Graneß 2011: 198 (own translation). Such a model can be found in Amartya Sen’s works. See Sen, Amartya: Development as Freedom. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1999.

Bibliography Beck, Lewis White (Ed.): Kant: On History. Indianapolis, IN (Macmillan), 1963. Bodunrin, Peter O.: “The Question of African Philosophy”. In: Odera Oruka, Henry (Ed.): Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy. Leiden (Brill Publishers), 1990, pp. 163–177. Graneß, Anke: Das Menschliche Minimum: Globale Gerechtigkeit aus afrikanischer Sicht: Henry Odera Oruka. Frankfurt am Main (Campus), 2011. Höffe, Otfried: Vernunft und Recht: Bausteine zu einem interkulturellen Rechtsdiskurs. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1998. Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 1–22 edited by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften; vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; vol. 24–27 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin (De Gruyter), 1900 et seq. Kant, Immanuel: Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. Berkeley, CA (University of California Press), 1960. (Text cited as “GSE”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1996. (Text cited as “GMS”) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Anthro­ pology, History, and Education. Zöller, Günter; Louden, Robert B. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2007. (Text cited as “MAM”.) Lyotard, Jean-François: Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982–1985. Minneapolis, MN (University of Minnesota Press), 1992. Masolo, Dismas: African Philosophy in Search for Identity. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press), 1994. Odera Oruka, Henry: “Grundlegende Fragen der afrikanischen ‘Sage-Philosophy’”. In: Wimmer, Franz M. (Ed.): Vier Fragen zur Philosophie in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika. Vienna (Passagen), 1988, pp. 35–54. Odera Oruka, Henry: The Philosophy of Liberty: An Essay on Political Philosophy. Nairobi, Kenya (Standard Textbooks Graphics and Publishers), 1991. Odera Oruka, Henry: “John Rawls’ Ideology: Justice as Egalitarian Fairness”. In: Odera Oruka, Henry: Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum. Nairobi (East African Educational Publishers), 1997, pp. 115–125.

124 Rethinking Kant Odera Oruka, Henry: Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical Minimum. Nairobi (East African Educational Publishers), 1997. Odera Oruka, Henry: “Philosophie der Entwicklungshilfe”. In: Polylog: Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren: Gerechtigkeit. 6, Vienna, 2000, pp. 6–16. Odera Oruka, Henry; Juma, Calestous: “Ecophilosophy and Parental Earth Ethics (On the Complex Web of Being)”. In: Odera Oruka, Henry (Ed.): Philosophy, Humanity and Ecology: Philosophy of Nature and Environmental Ethics. Vol. 1. Nairobi (ACTS and AAS), 1994, pp. 115–129. Okere, Theophilus: African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of Its Possibility. Lanham, MD (University Press of America), 1983. Pinheiro Walla, Alice: “Private Property and the Possibility of Consent: Kant and Social Contract Theory”. In: Krasnoff, Larry; Madrid, Nuria Sánchez; Satne, Paula (Eds.): Kant’s ‘Doctrine of Right’ in the 21st Century. Cardiff (University of Wales), 2018, pp. 29–45. Rawls, John: A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 1971/1999. Recki, Birgit: Die Vernunft, ihre Natur, ihr Gefühl und der Fortschritt. Paderborn (Mentis). 2005. Said, Edward W.: The Question of Palestine. New York (Vintage), 1980. Sen, Amartya: Development as Freedom. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1999. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “Introduction”. In: Serequeberhan, Tsenay (Ed.): African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. St. Paul, MN (Paragon House), 1991, pp. XVII–XXII. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “African Philosophy: The Point in Question”. In: Ser­ equeberhan, Tsenay (Ed.): African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. St. Paul, MN (Paragon House), 1991, pp. 3–28. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “The Critique of Eurocentrism and the Practice of African Philosophy”. In: Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (Ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 1997, pp. 141–161. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “Eurocentrism in Philosophy: Immanuel Kant”. In: Ser­ equeberhan, Tsenay: Contested Memory: The Icons of the Occidental Tradition. Trenton, NJ (Africa Word Press), 2007, pp. 29–56. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: Contested Memory: The Icons of the Occidental Tradition. Trenton, NJ (Africa Word Press), 2007. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic Explorations in African and Continental Philosophy. New York (State University of New York Press), 2016.

Part II

Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy

5

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work

Enlightenment, critique, parrhesia. Foucault and Kant’s concepts of person and humanity Michel Foucault is considered a strong critic of the classical philosophical con­ ception of the subject and examines modes of subject formation in contexts of knowledge and power. In Foucault’s work the human being is understood as a historical event which disappears like a ‘face drawn in sand’.1 With his critique of the basic theorem of man, Foucault formulates a universal attack on all anthropologically and/or humanistically based ways of thinking and, parallel to this, on the concept of the autonomous subject, as advocated in particular by Kant. For Foucault, man − both as subject and object − is not the starting point, central theme and guarantor of his philosophical theory, but embodies the episteme of modernity, which structures the thinking and knowledge of the current era. This applies in particular to the human sciences and contrasts with the epistemes of similarity in the Renaissance and representation in the Classical age. Man is thus a historical phenomenon. Foucault asserts that Kant achieves this change in his philosophical position as regards man by investigating the conditions of possibility of knowledge in his Critiques, which take the forms of perception, categories and regulative ideas inherent in human forms of knowl­ edge. Human reason with its categorical imperative also provides the basis for morality in Kant’s ethics. The shift or transformation that occurred with Kant’s analysis of human cognitive limitations therefore implies that man must create and uphold the order in the new world of modernity. […] Man is, however, only able to account for this order by turning the limitations that he finds there toward the self.2 According to Foucault, this use of the theorem of man to structure knowledge of man is already beginning to unravel and he says: [T]hat is to say that man, the idea of man, functioned in the nineteenth century somewhat similarly to the way in which the idea of God had DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-8

128 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy functioned in the course of the preceding centuries. People believed, and people still believed in the last century, that it was practically impossible for man to be able to tolerate the idea that God does not exist (it used frequently to be said that ‘If God does not exist, everything would be allowed’). People were appalled by the idea of a mankind able to func­ tion without God, hence the conviction that the idea of God had to be maintained for mankind to be able to continue functioning. Now you are saying to me: perhaps the idea of mankind has to exist even if it is only a myth for mankind to function. I’ll reply by saying: perhaps, but perhaps not. No more and no less than the idea of God.3 The transformation of structuralism, argues Foucault, is already apparent in its new emphasis on language and thus heralds the end of the episteme of man, with no clear indication of what will take its place.4 For Foucault the question of what could take the place of the episteme of man as a function to structure knowledge in post-modernity remains unanswered. Foucault asserts that there is no fixed nature of man; in each case it is shaped by the historical process. On the one hand, the subject fills empty spaces in discourses and is formed by power practices, on the other, accord­ ing to the ethics or aesthetics of the self, it also has the possibility of shaping itself by means of the practices of the self. This presupposes the subject’s consciousness and self-awareness. The individual should form his or her life on the basis of art as a role model. It becomes apparent that Foucault’s philosophy develops the concept of a self-formation of the subject in aes­ thetic, critical and moral respects, at the same time presupposing man as acting autonomously. Freedom and autonomy play an increasingly funda­ mental role in the subject’s self-conception. Foucault does not speak of man, mankind, person and personality but instead refers to an attitude, an ethos, which, while it does not refer to ‘humanity within us’ and the perfectibility of man as a species, is based on the individual capacity for criticism; morality and autonomy; and a potential for transformation. These changes relate on the one hand to the subject itself and, on the other, to a desired social con­ dition in which rigid power structures are broken down and the question of the art of governing can be posed. Foucault understands critique as “the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially ensure the de-sub­ jugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.”5 He asserts that this question of governing and/or being governed is also raised in Kant’s theory of the Enlightenment. In his essay What is Enlightenment? (1784) Kant complains about humanity’s state of immaturity, in which man allows others to guide him (leiten) without using his own understanding.6 Immaturity is the result of a lack of courage and resolve vis-à-vis authority.7 According to Foucault, Kant’s definition of Enlightenment is almost “a sermon” and must be understood as a “call for courage”.8 He continues:

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 129 What Kant was describing as the Aufklärung is very much what I was trying before to describe as critique, this critical attitude which appears as a specific attitude in the Western world starting with what was historically, I believe, the great process of society’s governmentalization.9 Kant’s critique relates primarily to an analysis of the limits of knowledge “as a prolegomena to the whole present and future Aufklärung”.10 Foucault regards Kant’s “separation […] between Aufklärung and critique”11 and his emphasis on the question of knowledge as problematic as regards the theo­ rem of critique, and suggests that “[i]t may take the question of the Aufklärung as its way of gaining access, not to the problem of knowledge, but to that of power”,12 understood as “an investigation of ‘eventualization’ (événementialisation)”.13 Parallel to this, he proposes an analysis of the knowledge-power nexus using the methods of archaeology and genealogy as well as taking into account the dimensions of strategy and relationships of interactions, which constitute different levels.14 Foucault asks: given this swinging movement, this slippage, this way of deporting the question of the Aufklärung into critique − might it not now be necessary to follow the opposite route? Might we not try to travel this road, but in the opposite direction?15 Foucault demands “as Kant said, to get out of one’s minority. A question of attitude. You see now why I could not, did not dare, give a title to my con­ ference since if I had, it would have been: ‘What is the Aufklärung?’”16 Foucault continues by explaining his understanding of the Enlightenment: I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation − one that simultaneously pro­ blematizes man’s relation to the present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject − is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an atti­ tude − that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.17 Kant, asserts Foucault, practiced a philosophical approach which he himself intends to adopt on the basis of modified philosophical assumptions – he criticises Kant’s transcendental philosophical concept – and using other methods such as archaeology and genealogy.18 Foucault clarifies Kant’s intention: “The one I have pointed out and that seems to me to have been at the basis of an entire form of philosophical reflection concerns only the mode of reflective relation to the present.”19 Here, Foucault refers in parti­ cular to Kant’s philosophical effort to identify social and political topicality.

130 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy For Foucault, Kant is both a historical example and a role model for his critique in the sense of truth-speaking, parrhesia. Foucault defines truthspeaking as declaring and personally standing up for the truth. His under­ standing of parrhesia must be located within the framework of the ethics and/or aesthetics of the self and understood in combination with Foucault’s interest in the formation of an individual lifestyle in accordance with his theorem of life as a work of art, which is equally based on an ethical understanding. In contrast to Kant, Foucault no longer seeks universal categories, forms and structures and does not attempt to examine the conditions for the pos­ sibility of cognitive judgments; morally appropriate action and aesthetic judgment in a transcendental philosophical project, thereby determining the limits of the appropriate use of reason and the difference between knowledge and belief, but instead attempts to identify the singularity and contingency of the supposedly universal in history. Critique, asserts Foucault, is aimed at possible transgressions, at exploring the possibility of “no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”20 Critique thus adopts a new emancipatory focus as a “historico-critical attitude”,21 in which “the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them”.22 This “historico-critical attitude must also be an experi­ mental one”.23 Foucault’s emphasis on the significance of Enlightenment, critique and parrhesia in Kant’s work must be seen particularly in the con­ text of his aesthetics or ethics of the self as a rehabilitation of the subject. The theorem of man thus simultaneously shifts back to the centre of his work. Despite his provocative and experimental approach, Foucault fails to for­ mulate the threshold for the restructuring of knowledge on the basis of a new episteme in the postulated transformational situation. It is precisely his recourse to Kant which illustrates this. Although Foucault rejects Kant’s theorems of man, humanity, person and personality and his teleological concept of the history of cosmopolitan orientation, he remains fascinated by Kant’s concepts of critique and Enlightenment as well as his concept of the subject based on the aspects of freedom and autonomy. Foucault’s re-read­ ings do not completely abandon the Kantian roots. A return to the theorem of man can be observed in his philosophy, presenting him as the philosopher of the threshold.

Parrhesia and critique in the context of politics and philosophy in Foucault’s work Foucault developed an ‘experimental’ philosophy and the concept of philo­ sophy as parrhesia. Unlike archaeology, which serves to identify the epis­ temes and rules of discourse which form knowledge, genealogy analyses the concretisation of principles of reflection; forms of power; modes of

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 131 subjectivation and their interactions to facilitate critique in the context of an analysis of current society. Foucault demands an attitude of critique which represents the ‘art of voluntary insubordination’ and ‘reflected indocility’. In the interplay of ‘politics of truth’ critique should have the ‘function of desubjugation’. Observing that Kant’s appeal for Enlightenment has been dis­ regarded, Foucault formulates an agenda of power analysis and the knowl­ edge-power nexus. Unlike Sartre, Foucault sees himself in the role of the ‘specific intellectual’ who, unlike the ‘universal intellectual’, does not present a certain concept of universally valid history and does not hold a universal truth. He regards history as an archive of monuments and events. Although his philosophy does not envisage predetermined development towards pro­ gress, as is the case in Kant’s work for example, it nevertheless presupposes that the shaping of human life in various contexts, both regarding individuals and also coexistence with others, is subject to human responsibility and thus a project of human shaping and emancipation. His ethics and aesthetics of the self use art as their point of orientation. For Foucault, history constitutes a human task, which is a matter of shaping the world, the social community and the self and requires human freedom. He links this process to the hope for a freer society which permits the individual to develop a way of life and make their life a work of art. Starting from his theorem of heterotopia, Foucault’s vision of the future can be called the heterotopia of historical becoming. According to Foucault, parrhesia − speaking the truth − links the three domains of his philosophy − knowledge, power and ethics and/or aesthetics of the self − to one another. Parallel to this, Foucault’s rethinking, bundling and shifting of his philosophical considerations − based on an analysis of the phenomenon of parrhesia − is linked to the definition of philosophy itself. This includes, among other things, truth-speaking, initially a political proce­ dure, finding its home in the philosophical, where it appears in various forms as critique. What is the connection between critique, parrhesia and philoso­ phy? What role does the concept of parrhesia play in Foucault’s philosophy as a whole? Why does Foucault require a new key concept? Parrhesia, as ‘saying everything’ and linked to freedom of speech, open­ ness and frankness, has a factual context in which the speaker expresses his thoughts and feelings honestly and genuinely. This is a different concept of truth based on correspondence theory, which, in the required correspondence of statement and object, not only takes the object as a starting point, but primarily the speaking subject and its attitude. The prerequisite for truthspeaking is that the truth is told: But does the parrhesiastes say what he thinks is true, or does he say what is really true? To my mind, the parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is true because it is really true. The parrhesiastes is not only sincere and says what is his opinion, but his opinion is also the truth. He says what he knows to be true. The second

132 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy characteristic of parrhesia, then, is that there is always an exact coincidence between belief and truth.24 Truth-telling25 is thus more than stating the facts; it also commits the speaker to the statement. “The word parrhesia, then, refers to a type of relationship between the speaker and what he says. For in parrhesia, the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his own opinion.”26 Par­ rhesia is associated with a moral quality of the speaker, who assumes responsibility for what has been said and takes on the personal risks asso­ ciated with critique. It is thus characterised by courageous mindset, which is the reason why Judith Butler, like Foucault, speaks of a ‘virtue’ in this respect.27 At this point, the link to the concept of critique as ethos is already evident. Truth-telling is perceived as a duty.28 “In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.”29 This also involves a specific relationship to ourselves and our fellow human beings. The concept of parrhesia must be located within the framework of the ethics and/or aesthetics of the self and be understood in the context of Foucault’s interest in shaping an individual lifestyle in accor­ dance with his theorem of life as a work of art, which is equally based on an ethical understanding.30 Both parrhesia and critique are social practices and must be viewed in the context of society as a whole when considering social actions in their performative character. In contrast to performative speech acts, which are determined by certain norms and rules of spoken situations and are bound to the role of the speaker in the speech act, truth-telling has an unknown effect and is risky.31 This type of truth-telling is not tied to the speaker’s institutional status and thus removes philosophical practice from the academic embrace. The focus here is on action-theoretical and linguisticphilosophical aspects of truth-telling, with which the act of parrhesia, due to its possible claim to shape policy, must at the same time be considered in its political dimension. According to Foucault, the investigation of parrhesia simultaneously represents “a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy”.32 Based on its political meaning, also in the institutional sense, parrhesia – viewed historically − first appears as free speech in Attic democracy,33 where it increasingly degenerates into chatter,34 and then, in the context of philo­ sophy, becomes linked to concern for the self. The aspect of telling ourselves the truth in a self-referential exercise thus shifts to the foreground, becoming a practice of self-shaping. “The objective of truth-telling is therefore less the city’s salvation than the individual’s ethos.”35 Truth-speaking as a “perma­ nent function of the discourse”36 therefore becomes a transformative selfpractice which results in the “aesthetics of the self”.37 Political parrhesia’s ambition to exert direct influence on the ruler and other political institutions is abandoned; from now on it has a more indirect political effect. In

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 133 Foucault’s concept truth-telling must be understood as a technique of the self, in which self-shaping also has political implications, in the sense that changing the self is always localised in the context of societal change, also in the political sense.38 Truth-telling is always located in history and within the context of the truth and a historical event, implying that Foucault’s investigation of parrhesia has a genealogical orientation. Foucault emphasises the link between parrhesia and critique, speaking of “positive or critical parrhesia” 39 and the link between bios and logos in the choice of a way of life in the philosophical sense.40 For Foucault, this opens up a new philosophical approach to truth which characterises the path of modern philosophy: For not only are these practices supposed to endow the individual with self-knowledge, this self-knowledge in turn is supposed to grant access to truth and further knowledge. The circle implied in knowing the truth about oneself in order to know the truth is characteristic of parrhesiastic practice since the Fourth Century and has been one of the problematic enigmas of Western Thought − for example, as in Descartes or Kant.41 Foucault does not follow this epistemological path of investigating the sub­ ject’s cognitive faculties in the subject-theoretical orientation; in contrast to Kant, he uses archaeological methods to search for epistemes; rules of dis­ course and positions of discourse, establishing a connection between knowl­ edge and power by applying the genealogical method. In Foucault’s work Kant’s a priori transforms into a historical a priori. Foucault distinguishes between two lines of philosophical enquiry into the question of truth. Firstly, the ‘analysis of truth’, the investigation of human cognitive faculties, argumentation and criteria for true statements and valid judgments and, secondly, the philosophical consideration of truth-telling, which focuses on the following questions: “[W]ho is able to tell the truth, about what, with what consequences, and with what relation to power”?42 He continues: What are the moral, the ethical, and the spiritual conditions which enti­ tle someone to present himself as, and to be considered as, a truth-teller? About what topics is it important to tell the truth? (About the world? About nature? About the city? About behavior? About man?) What are the consequences of telling the truth?43 Foucault poses this question in particular as regards the social function of philosophising, which contributes to the analysis of the social state and its development and therefore also touches on questions of power politics. The philosopher assumes personal responsibility for the findings presented to the public and is personally responsible for his statements. Foucault also calls the application of parrhesiastic techniques the “par­ rhesiastic game”44 or “truth game”,45 thus referring to its playful and

134 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy combative character. Parrhesia can be harmonious and friendly but can also be combined with aggressiveness to become a struggle, battle or war − an agonal game.46 Foucault speaks of a ‘power of truth’ which can counteract political power in a “parrhesiastic struggle with power”. The objective is to bring the interlocutor to a “new truth, or to a new level of self-awareness”.47 Foucault’s interest in the subject of parrhesia is guided by his objective “to construct a genealogy of the critical attitude in Western philosophy”.48 Foucault is concerned with the ‘relationship between truth and reality’: There is the relation of thought and reality in the process of pro­ blematization. And that is the reason why I think that it is possible to give an analysis of a specific problematization as the history of an answer − the original, specific, and singular answer of thought − to a certain situation. And it is this kind of specific relation between truth and reality which I have tried to analyse in the various problematizations of parrhesia. 49 When discussing Foucault’s reflections on parrhesia, Waldenfels identifies a lack of any consideration of the responsiveness of the Other, which arises from ‘hearing the truth’ and takes the alterity of the Other into account, as well as the inclusion of the in-between dimension in the dialogue.50 In prin­ ciple, Foucault considers the aspect of intersubjectivity,51 but the in-between, which manifests itself, for example, in the logos, is not regarded as a con­ nective element and could be divisive.52 In addition to this, theoretical assessment of the factual content of frank speech is also inadequate. These objections focus on the relativity of what is said, which is not, as is the case in Kant’s work, subject to the correct use of the powers of knowledge and guaranteed by the a priori. It has been demonstrated above that Foucault’s objective as regards referencing of facts or objects is indeed to record reality truthfully. For him, however, this manifests itself in the historical a priori which are revealed as regards knowledge and power contexts and forms of subject constitution. Historical-social problematisations point to the analysis of reality in relation to the world in its different aspects. Foucault thus believes that truth must be understood in terms of history. He also offers procedures – his archaeology and genealogy – for uncovering truth: ‘[H]ow can anyone figure out what is true?’ For our author [referring to Foucault], this is much ado about nothing, because the point at issue is precisely not the same from one era to another; as for the point that demonstrably belongs to a given era, the truth is perfectly explicable, devoid of any wobbly indeterminacy.53 For Foucault, this is a potentially connective element. The close link between morality and truth in Foucault’s work, however, raises questions, inasmuch as Foucault does not sufficiently strengthen the other side of the question of

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 135 truth − the criteria of truth − which is central to Kant’s work, for example, and does not further investigate the nature of this relationship. Waldenfels asserts that Foucault emphasises the perspective of the speaker and the perpetrator − similarly to speech act theory − and neglects the lis­ tener’s viewpoint and thus the alterity of the Other, who, for example, could be hurt by truthful words. Foucault is dismissive as regards the relational level of communications, noting the possible interpersonal division without considering aspects of communication theory54 in connection with questions of truth-finding. Waldenfels’s considerations reveal a basic structural assumption on the part of Foucault, according to which the relationship to the Other is interpreted as a secondary step. The Other remains remarkably abstract. In the philosophical debate, he only emerges on stage later. The starting point for Foucault’s philosophy remains the individuality of the thinking and acting subject, which, however, is located in the human context. As regards interpersonal communication, Foucault strengthens his theorem of friendship, which is intended as a model for human coexistence. Foucault’s assertion that modern philosophy primarily focuses on the analytics of truth and neglects philosophy as truth-telling justifies his agenda of the history of philosophy as parrhesia and his concern to make this the central theme of his philosophising − as a countermovement to current phi­ losophy and to compensate for what has previously been neglected. A detailed investigation of the connection between Kant’s analytics of truth and truth-telling reveals much subtler ramifications for the separately con­ ceived domains − an intertwining which can call into question Foucault’s juxtaposition and the thesis that modern philosophy neglects veridiction. Against this background, Foucault’s agenda of upgrading the practice of truth-telling appears less urgent. Kant’s primacy of practical reason provides an environment for his theory of the practical attitude when applying cogni­ tive faculties, which relates to the normative foundations of cognition; the virtues of the use of reason and epistemic responsibility in connection with the use of forms and principles of thought. There is thus more involved in this than the application of categories and rules, which Kant conceived a priori; this concerns an ethos of recognition. In this context, Kant speaks of logical norms which must be understood as procedural criteria for applica­ tion. Furthermore, he lists rules for the avoidance of errors: “Universal rules and conditions for avoiding error in general are: (1) to think for oneself, (2) to think oneself in the position of someone else, and (3) always to think in agreement with oneself” (Log, AA 09:57). These maxims of enlightened mode of thought; extended mode of thought and consistent or coherent mode of thought concern more than the application of formal rules; they presuppose an epistemic attitude. Subjective advocacy is formed in relation to these maxims in such a way that the subject is convinced of the truth of their cognitive judgment. In thinking for ourselves, the ethos of knowledge is combined with the task of Enlightenment, which involves the independent use of our own reason. For Kant, the ethical dimension of advocacy also

136 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy leads to the obligation to publicly present what is recognised as true and he thus assumes that the analysis of truth and the ethics of veridiction are deeply intertwined. Foucault’s interpretation of Kant focuses on the separa­ tion of these aspects and emphasising Kant’s shift to analysing reason in the three critiques which discuss the project of Enlightenment on the basis of analysing cognition − according to Foucault, this is a misguided path which he intends to correct. It becomes apparent that Foucault’s contempt for the analytics of truth results in other gaps. The relationship between analytics and veridiction which Kant is aiming for proves to be an interesting stimulus for Foucault to further explore. However, this does not render Foucault’s investigation of the power-knowledge nexus superfluous.

The concept of philosophy in Foucault’s work Foucault does not regard himself as a typical philosopher55 and sometimes questions the very idea of being a philosopher; he confers a special role on philosophy. His concept of philosophy as a diagnosis and analysis of the pre­ sent is developed on the basis of Kant’s concept of the Enlightenment as an emergence from self-imposed immaturity, while Foucault states that “It must take up the present in an attempt to anticipate its ruptures and how it points beyond itself toward what one would term a ‘pre-future’.”56 Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer and Thaning further state: “The Enlightenment is vitally important to Foucault, as this singular event introduces a paradigmatic tem­ porality of thought and history. This therefore results in the history of thought appearing as a series of ongoing departures from the past that allow new considerations to arise.”57 Kant regards the French Revolution in particular as an indication of people’s enthusiasm for possible progress in history. For Foucault, Kant’s ideas characterise the virtuality58 of history. “What is char­ acteristic of a virtual force is that it can never be fully realized or completely exhausted in what can become immediately present, although it still shapes this level in the form of a persisting dispositionality.”59 Within this framework philosophy becomes the ‘politics of truth’. Foucault states in this context: But what I am doing − I don’t say what I am cut out to do, because I know nothing about that − is not history, sociology, or economics. However, in one way or another, and for simple factual reasons, what I am doing is something that concerns philosophy, that is to say, the poli­ tics of truth, for I do not see many other definitions of the word ‘philosophy’ apart from this.60 The politics of truth is a practice of truth which provides philosophy with a practical dimension beyond the theoretical. In this context philosophy can be regarded as “problematizing its own discursive contemporaneity: a con­ temporaneity that it questions as an event” and its analysis references “a cultural totality characteristic of one’s own time”.61

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 137 Like Kant, Foucault observes the truth-telling of philosophy as opposed to rhetoric, which both view as the art of persuasion.62 Foucault says: “But where there is philosophy, there can be no rhetoric.”63 Waldenfels criticises this view of rhetoric, which in the Aristotelian understanding is also asso­ ciated with an ethos.64 In this respect, it becomes apparent that Foucault is referring to the sophistic conception of rhetoric, which Socrates already regarded as a tool for manipulating listeners, setting himself apart from it by means of his method of dialogue, irony and the so-called ‘art of midwifery (maieutics)’. As in Kant’s work, truth-telling occurs in public65 – in this context Kant refers to the scholar who addresses the public with his state­ ments – and parallel to this, equivalent to a more pedagogical concept, his concern is also to have a transformative influence on the minds of listeners and speakers. Foucault argues that this also results in a political problem, referencing Kant when doing so.66 In addition to this, Foucault uses the example of the Cynics to examine the parrhesiastic way of life as a critical attitude, focusing on analysing forms of power and government with the goal of “not to being governed like that”.67 According to Foucault, this critical practice has taken on various forms throughout history, such as Christian asceticism, revolutionary action68 and artistic creation. The “idea of a mode of life as the irruptive, violent, scan­ dalous manifestation of the truth”,69 which also constitutes the philosopher’s being and his relationship to his fellow human beings and thus intervenes in practical life in a special way, is decisive in this context. Foucault asserts that this is a form of philosophical critique and a tradition which he adheres to. Philosophy and parrhesia are so closely related that different forms of parrhesia mark the progress of philosophical thought: I think we can also do the history of philosophy, neither as forgetting nor as the development of rationality, but as a series of episodes and forms − recurrent forms, forms which are transformed − of veridiction. The history of philosophy, in short, as movement of parrhesia, as redis­ tribution of parrhesia, as varied game of truth-telling, philosophy envisaged thus in what could be called its allocutionary force.70 This demonstrates that there is a close link between philosophy, parrhesia, critique and Enlightenment in Foucault’s work. Philosophy and parrhesiastic critique must always have an experimental character as regards their mission of Enlightenment. Philosophical parrhesia brings together Foucault’s key questions about truth, power and the constitution of the subject. The result is a synopsis71 of the three directions of Foucault’s philosophical work, focusing on knowledge, power and subject in their forms of veridiction and techniques of governmentality and subjectivation. The concept of parrhesia, “which is situated at the meeting point of the obligation to speak the truth, procedures and tech­ niques of governmentality, and the constitution of the relationship to self”,72

138 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy thus proves to be a key concept in relation to Foucault’s problematisations, shifts and new directions of thought in combination with the establishment of new intersections, relationships and emphases between/of theorems in his philosophy. The connections which Foucault establishes between critique, Enlightenment, parrhesia and philosophy shed light on, and clarify, the orientation of his philosophy, revealing a coherent network made up of the various domains of his philosophical practice. Foucault’s critical project primarily aims at transformations of the subject through philosophy: All in all, it is a matter of searching for another critical philosophy, a philosophy that does not determine the conditions and limits of knowl­ edge concerning an object, but the conditions and countless possibilities of the transformation of the subject.73 The project of transforming the subject requires the closing of the gaps observed by Foucault. Kant’s interlocking of the ‘analytics of truth’ with veridiction illustrates the agenda of a prospective philosophy which applies Foucault’s ideas and goes beyond them.

Acknowledgements The section titled ‘Enlightenment, critique, parrhesia: Foucault and Kant’s concepts of person and humanity’ is published as part of the text: Rain­ sborough, Marita: “Critique. Enlightenment. Parrhesia. Michel Foucault’s Questioning of the Concepts of Person and Humanity in Kant’s Works”. In: Caranti, Luigi; Silva, Fernando (Eds.): The Kantian Subject: New Inter­ pretative Essays. London (Routledge); 2023, pp. 132-142.

Notes 1 Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. London (Routledge), 1989, p. 422. 2 Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius; Thaning, Morten S.: Michel Foucault: A Research Companion. Basingstoke (Palgrave Macmillan), 2016, p. 167. 3 Foucault, Michel: “Who Are You, Professor Foucault?” In: Carrette, Jeremy R. (Ed.): Religion and Culture. New York (Routledge), 1999, p. 102. 4 Foucault says, for example, in Les mots et les choses that “we must henceforth ask ourselves what language must be in order to structure in this way what is never­ theless not in itself either word or discourse” (Foucault 1989: 417). Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer and Thaning say: “In place of man, language has become the positive aspect that is located in everything” (Raffnsøe et al. 2016: 157). It can be noted that the relationship between language and the human being within the process of historical transformation is dynamic. For this reason, it cannot be assumed that the episteme of man will be ultimately transcended, but rather that it will fall into crisis or be transformed. Foucault does not close this theoretical gap. 5 Foucault, Michel: “What is Critique”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007a, p. 47.

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 139 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25

26

Cf. Foucault 2007a: 47–48.

Cf. Foucault 2007a: 48.

Cf. ibid.

Cf. ibid.

Foucault 2007a: 50. History “offered a greater opportunity to pursue the critical enterprise” than it did for Aufklärung itself (ibid.). Foucault 2007a: 58. Foucault 2007a: 59. Ibid. He is concerned with the “connections that can be identified between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge” (ibid.). Foucault 2007a: 64, 66. Foucault 2007a: 66–67. Foucault 2007a: 67. Vogelmann comments on this: “Foucault contrasts this shift from the Enlightenment to the Critique with his research as a reversal, as an attempt at a renewed shift. Critique should not be a self-restriction of reason, but a diagnosis of the limit, which it examines for possible fractures and thus makes experimental transgressions conceivable.” In: Vogelmann, Frieder: “Foucaults parrhesia – Philosophie als Politik der Wahrheit.” In: Gehring, Petra; Gelhard, Andreas (Eds.): Parrhesia. Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zurich (dia­ phanes), 2012, p. 226 (own translation). Foucault’s interest in the Enlightenment is particularly evident in his 1984 text Foucault, Michel: “What is Enlight­ enment?”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007a, pp. 97–119. Foucault explains his interest in Kant’s essay on Enlightenment as follows: “In his other texts on history, Kant occasionally raises questions of origin or defines the internal teleology of a historical process. In the text on Aufklärung, he deals with the question of contemporary reality alone. He is not seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future achievement” (Foucault 2007a: 99). Foucault 2007a: 109. Parallel to this, Enlightenment itself must be subjected to analysis: “We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment” (Foucault 2007a: 110). Foucault 2007a: 111. Foucault 2007a: 114. Ibid. This concerns the development of an “ontology of ourselves” (ibid.). Foucault 2007a: 118. Foucault 2007a: 114. Foucault, Michel: Fearless Speech. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2001, p. 14. This coincidence is a verbal activity and not, according to Descartes, an evidential experience. In contrast to modern philosophy the parrhesiastes of ancient philo­ sophy has no doubt he possesses the truth. This possession of truth is given by the morality of the speaker (cf. Foucault 2001: 14). Foucault distinguishes philosophical truth-telling from the truth-telling of the prophet, the sage and the technician or teacher. In these forms of truth-speaking the speaker is not taking any risk by making their statements. Cf. Foucault, Michel: The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2011, pp. 14–19 and 23–25. Foucault 2001: 12. Parrhesia in its political form is linked to a specific social situation and to a difference in status between the speaker and his audience. It is therefore dangerous for the speaker (cf. Foucault 2001: 13). Foucault prefers to speak of ‘speech activity’ rather than of a speech act in the sense of Searle or Austin (cf. ibid.). Waldenfels criticises Foucault’s concept of speech act theory: “Foucault subjects the speech act theory to an over-normalization and over­

140 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy

27

28 29 30

31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38

39 40

regulation that exerts a mechanising effect. Conversely, he ignores the key short­ coming of the speech act theory, which consists in the fact that it represents a mere speaker theory.” In: Waldenfels, Bernhard: “Wahrsprechen und Antwor­ ten”. In: Gehring, Petra; Gelhard, Andreas (Eds): Parrhesia. Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zurich (diaphanes), 2012, p. 68 (own translation). He con­ tinues: “With this abrupt opposition, he obstructs the possibility that frankness, as an excess of otherness within conventional speech acts and rhetorical techni­ ques, takes effect and elevates it beyond itself, similarly as a gift exceeds the economy of exchange” (ibid.; own translation). Waldenfels’s criticism must be concurred with. Cf. Butler, Judith: “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”. In: Ingram, David (Ed.): The political: Blackwell readings in continental philosophy. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 2002, pp. 212–226. Foucault says: “There is something in critique which is akin to virtue. And in a certain way, what I wanted to speak to you about is this critical attitude as virtue in general” (Foucault 2007a: 43). Foucault wishes to write a history of this critical attitude (cf. ibid.). Foucault says: “Parrhesia is thus related to freedom and to duty” (Foucault 2001: 19). Foucault 2001: 19–20. “These exercises are part of what we could call an ‘aesthetics of the self ’. For one does not have to take up a position or role towards oneself as that of a judge pronouncing a verdict. One can comport oneself towards oneself in the role of a technician, of a craftsman, of an artist, who from time to time stops working, examines what he is doing, reminds himself of the rules of his art, and compares these rules with what he has achieved thus far. This metaphor of the artist who stops working” is decisive for Foucault’s ethics and/or aesthetics of the self (Foucault 2001: 166). Cf. Vogelmann 2012: 205. Foucault 2001: 170–171. “Democracy is founded by a politeia, a constitution, where the demos, the people, exercise power and where everyone is equal in front of the law. Such a constitu­ tion, however, is condemned to give equal place to all forms of parrhesia, even the worst. Because parrhesia is given even to the worst citizens, the overwhelming influence of bad, immoral, or ignorant speakers may lead the citizenry into tyr­ anny, or may otherwise endanger the city” (Foucault 2001: 77). In this situation, a problematisation of the parrhesia begins (cf. Foucault 2001: 86). Waldenfels criticises this sharp juxtaposition of chatter and parrhesia (cf. Wal­ denfels 2012: 70). Foucault also speaks of “negative parrhesia, ignorant out­ spokenness” and of real parrhesia as critical parrhesia (cf. Foucault 2011: 73, 83). Foucault 2011: 65.

Foucault, Michel: The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège

de France, 1982–83. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2010, p. 331. Foucault 2001: 166. See also: “His final investigations illustrate once again that, for Foucault, personal existence and self-understanding are inextricably linked to the political and, more fundamentally, to the possibility of reconstructing the political context in gen­ eral.” In: Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius; Thaning, Morten S.: Foucault: Studienhandbuch. Tübingen (Fink, UTB), 2011, p. 344 (own translation). Foucault 2001: 85. Other forms of parrhesia refer to birth (genos) or law (nomos). The reference to life is prototypical in Socrates (cf. Foucault 2001: 102). Plato elaborates the pro­ blem of the relation between political parrhesia and ethical parrhesia (cf. Foucault 2001: 104). In the Cynic view, speaking the truth takes on a negative-critical,

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 141

41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60

mostly scandalous form − often in a provocative dialogue − as Foucault demon­ strates, citing Diogenes as an example (cf. Foucault 2001: 104–105). In Epictetus, the emphasis is on the philosopher’s ability to act as a spiritual guide through parrhesiastic practice (cf. Foucault 2001: 112). In Stoicism, it refers in particular to the relationship of the self to the truth based on the technique of asceticism, which enables the possibility of self-control (cf. Foucault 2001: 143). Foucault outlines these developments and shifts in his Berkeley Lectures. Foucault 2001: 107. Foucault 2001: 170. He also says: “And I would say that the problematization of truth which characterizes both the end of Presocratic philosophy and the begin­ ning of the kind of philosophy which is still ours today, this problematization of truth has two sides, two major aspects. One side is concerned with ensuring that the process of reasoning is correct in determining whether a statement is true (or concerns itself with our ability to gain access to the truth). And the other side is concerned with the question: What is the importance for the individual and for the society of telling the truth, of knowing the truth, of having people who tell the truth, as well as knowing how to recognize them?” (ibid.) Foucault 2001: 169. Cf. Foucault 2001: 141–142. Cf. Foucault 2001: 143. Cf. Foucault 2001: 133. Ibid. Foucault 2001: 170–171. Foucault 2001: 173. Foucault also says: “For I think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The pro­ blematization is an ‘answer’ to a concrete situation which is real” (Foucault 2001: 172). Unfortunately, Foucault does not further investigate the relationship of thought and reality which is envisaged here. “My intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with the problem of the truth-teller, or of truth-telling as an activity” (Foucault 2001: 169). Cf. Waldenfels 2012: 64–65. In this context Waldenfels refers to Foucault 2011: 5. Cf. Waldenfels 2012: 66. Veyne, Paul: “Foucault Revolutionizes History”. In: Davidson, Arnold I. (Ed.): Foucault and His Interlocutors. Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1997, p. 175. Waldenfels primarily refers to Paul Watzlawick in this context. “And if I’m not a philosopher in the conventional sense of the term – maybe I’m not a philosopher at all, and in any event, not a good philosopher – it’s because I’m not interested in the eternal, I’m not interested in what doesn’t move, I’m not interested in what remains stable when exposed to the shimmer of appearance. I’m interested in the event.” In: Foucault, Michel: “The Philosophical Scene: Foucault Interviewed by Moriaki Watanabe” (conducted 22 April 1978). In: Fisher, Tony; Gotman, Kélina (Eds.): Foucault’s Theatres. Manchester (Manchester University Press), 2020, p. 222. He continues: “In other words, we are crisscrossed by processes, movements, forces. We do not know what these processes and forces are, and the philosopher’s role is to diagnose those forces, to diagnose actuality” (ibid.). Raffnsøe et al. 2016: 435. Ibid. “Virtuality means the effective force contained and expressed in material or actual events” (Raffnsøe et al. 2016: 433). Ibid. Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2007b, p. 3.

142 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy 61 Foucault, Michel: “The Art of Telling the Truth”. In: Foucault, Michel: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. New York, London (Routledge), 1988, p. 88. “Kant’s text serves Foucault to sharpen his own historical philosophical position, understood as a critical philosophy that distinguishes itself from a transcendental philosophy or from an analytics of truth, as Foucault calls it: ‘What is happening today?’ ‘What is happening now?’ ‘What is this ‘now’ in which we all live and which is the site, the point [from which] I am writing?’” In: Stiegler, Bernd: “Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen und philosophische Episkopie: Philosophie und Geschichte in Michel Foucaults parrhesia-Vorlesungen”. In: Gehring, Petra; Gelhard, Andreas (Eds.): Parrhesia. Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zurich (diaphanes), 2012, p. 53 (own translation). Stiegler quotes Foucault 2010: 11. 62 Foucault notes the attempt to incorporate parrhesia into rhetoric. “Parrhesia is thus a sort of ‘figure’ among rhetorical figures, but with this characteristic: that it is without any figure since it is completely natural. Parrhesia is the zero degree of those rhetorical figures which intensify the emotions of the audience” (Foucault 2001: 21). 63 Foucault 2010: 352. 64 Waldenfels 2012: 68. 65 Cf. Foucault, Michel: “What is Enlightenment?” In: Rabinow, Paul (Ed.): Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume I. London (Penguin Books), 2000, p 307. He says: “There is Enlightenment when the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason are superimposed on one another” (ibid.). 66 “The question, in any event, is that of knowing how the use of reason can take the public form that it requires, how the audacity to know can be exercised in broad daylight, while individuals are obeying as scrupulously as possible” (Fou­ cault 2000: 308). He continues: “And Kant, in conclusion, proposes to Frederick II, in scarcely veiled terms, a sort of contract − what might be called the contract of rational despotism with free reason: the public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition, however, that the political principle which must be obeyed itself be in conformity with universal reason” (ibid.). 67 Foucault 2007a: 45. 68 In this context, Foucault also addresses terrorism. Thus “terrorism, as practice of life taken to the point of dying for the truth (the bomb which kills the person who places it), appear as a sort of dramatic or frenzied taking the courage for the truth, which the Greeks and Greek philosophy laid down as one of the funda­ mental principles of the life of the truth, to its extreme consequence” (Foucault 2011: 185). Foucault continues in this context: “Going after the truth, manifesting the truth, making the truth burst out to the point of losing one’s life or causing the blood of others to flow is in fact something whose long filiation is found again across European thought” (ibid.). Achille Mbembe develops his theory of necro­ politics and the power of death as an extension of Foucault’s concept of power which includes sovereign power, pastoral power, disciplinary power, biopower, etc., in order to expand these ideas. Cf. Mbembe, Achille: “Nekropolitik”. In: Pieper, Marianne; Atzert, Thomas; Tsianos, Vassilis (Eds.): Biopolitik – in der Debatte. Wiesbaden (VS Verlag), 2011, pp. 63–96. 69 Foucault 2011: 183. 70 Foucault 2010: 350. 71 “Parrhesia is the bottleneck through which history, philosophy and one’s own philosophy must pass. This is where forms of knowledge, relations of power and modes of self-constitution, or, in other terminology, the modes of veridiction, the techniques of governmentality and self-practices, or, and now using the terms of the Government of the Self and Others, the ontology of the present and the prag­ matics of the self, which explicitly distinguish themselves from an analytics of

Critique, parrhesia and philosophy in Foucault’s work 143 truth. Parrhesia acts as a sort of burning mirror that bundles or is at least sup­ posed to bundle the scattered light of one’s own philosophical interrogation” (Stiegler 2012: 54; own translation). 72 Foucault 2010: 45. 73 Michel Foucault cited in Defert, Daniel: “Es gibt keine Geschichte des Wahnsinns oder der Sexualität, wie es eine Geschichte des Brotes gibt”. In: Honneth, Axel; Saar, Martin (Eds.): Michel Foucault Zwischenbilanz einer Rezeption: Frankfurter Foucault-Konferenz 2001. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2003, p. 362 (own translation).

Bibliography Butler, Judith: “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”. In: Ingram, David (Ed.): The Political: Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy. Malden, MA (Blackwell Publishers), 2002, pp. 212–226. Davidson, Arnold I. (Ed.): Foucault and His Interlocutors. Chicago, IL (University of Chicago Press), 1997. Defert, Daniel: “Es gibt keine Geschichte des Wahnsinns oder der Sexualität, wie es eine Geschichte des Brotes gibt”. In: Honneth, Axel; Saar, Martin (Eds.): Michel Foucault Zwischenbilanz einer Rezeption: Frankfurter Foucault-Konferenz 2001. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2003, pp. 355–368. Foucault, Michel: “The Art of Telling the Truth”. In: Foucault, Michel: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. New York (Routledge), 1988, pp. 86–95. Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. New York (Routledge), 1989. Foucault, Michel: “Who are you, Professor Foucault?” In: Carrette, Jeremy R. (Ed.): Religion and Culture. New York (Routledge), 1999, pp. 87–103. Foucault, Michel: “What is Enlightenment?” In: Rabinow, Paul (Ed.): Ethics: Essen­ tial Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume I. London (Penguin Books), 2000, pp. 303–319. Foucault, Michel: Fearless Speech. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2001. Foucault, Michel: “What is Critique”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007a, pp. 41–81. Foucault, Michel: “What is Enlightenment?”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007a, pp. 97–119. Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2007b. Foucault, Michel: The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–83. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2010. Foucault, Michel: The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2011. Foucault, Michel: “The Philosophical Scene: Foucault Interviewed by Moriaki Watanabe” (conducted 22 April 1978). In: Fisher, Tony; Gotman, Kélina (Eds.): Foucault’s Theatres. Manchester (Manchester University Press), 2020, pp. 221–238. Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007. Mbembe, Achille: “Nekropolitik”. In: Pieper, Marianne; Atzert, Thomas; Tsianos, Vassilis (Eds.): Biopolitik – in der Debatte. Wiesbaden (VS Verlag), 2011, pp. 63–96. Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius; Thaning, Morten S.: Foucault: Studienhandbuch. Tübingen (Fink, UTB), 2011.

144 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius; Thaning, Morten S.: Michel Foucault: A Research Companion. Basingstoke (Palgrave Macmillan), 2016. Stiegler, Bernd: “Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen und philosophische Episkopie: Philo­ sophie und Geschichte in Michel Foucaults parrhesia-Vorlesungen”. In: Gehring, Petra; Gelhard, Andreas (Eds.): Parrhesia. Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zurich (diaphanes), 2012, pp. 49–61. Veyne, Paul: “Foucault Revolutionizes History”. In: Davidson, Arnold I. (Ed.): Fou­ cault and His Interlocutors. Chicago, IL (University of Chicago Press), 1997, pp. 146–182. Vogelmann, Frieder: “Foucaults parrhesia – Philosophie als Politik der Wahrheit”. In: Gehring, Petra; Gelhard, Andreas (Eds.): Parrhesia. Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zurich (diaphanes), 2012, pp. 203–229. Waldenfels, Bernhard: “Wahrsprechen und Antworten”. In: Gehring, Petra; Gelhard, Andreas (Eds): Parrhesia. Foucault und der Mut zur Wahrheit. Zurich (diaphanes), 2012, pp. 63–81.

6

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault

The displacement of language in Kant and his latent philosophy of language Kant did not make language an explicit subject of discussion in his Critiques and did not provide any specific concept of language philosophy. The accu­ sation that Kant “criminally neglected the issue of ‘language’”1 is an estab­ lished feature in the reception of Kant’s work. On the other hand, Kant’s language is often admired for its terminological precision; argumentation structure and linguistic metaphors. Kant’s language is viewed as a key ele­ ment of his philosophical deliberations.2 In Foucault’s work, in contrast, language appears, on the one hand, to dissolve into the discourse and to lose its importance; on the other, he develops an ontology of language, referring to the endless murmuring and noise of language. Foucault’s use of the lan­ guage of philosophy is also striking, although very little research has been carried out into its relevance for his philosophy. This provides the central issue for this investigation – what language-philosophical considerations can be identified in the work of Kant and Foucault and what is their relationship to the themes and objectives of their philosophical concepts? Is there a rela­ tionship between language-philosophical considerations and philosophical linguistics in the work of Kant and Foucault? Over and above this, is Fou­ cault’s referencing of Kant, in particular as regards the theorems of critique, liberty, autonomy and the ethics of courage, also reflected in aspects of his work concerning language and in his language-philosophical core assump­ tions or does Foucault not reference Kant in this context? What are the fur­ ther ramifications for Foucault’s reception of Kant within the overall scope of his philosophy? A closer investigation of Kant’s work reveals a speechlessness and/or an obsolescence of language in his transcendental philosophy, which persists despite the meta-critique of Hamann and Herder.3 The preoccupation with the problems surrounding the philosophy of language in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and in his Lectures on Metaphysics 4 is solely con­ cerned with the naming function of language,5 whereby language is viewed as an organon of thought. DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-9

146 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy And this separation of the levels [of being, thought and speech; of cog­ nition, thought and language] simultaneously creates the problem of connecting or mediating between the three levels. Kant attempts to solve this problem by subordinating language to thought and cognition. Transcendental philosophy puts consciousness not only before ontology, but also before language. These can only be conceived of as proxies, as counterparts.6 The language-mediating functions of thought are also omitted in this work. Kant excludes “language from the constitutive area” of thought and imagination, saying that “this reason, which takes precedence over language, is speechless”;7 he supports the “concept of the one, pure, non-language­ based reason”.8 In this context the question arises whether there are sys­ tematic reasons for Kant’s displacement of language.9 Villers says on this subject: Kant, however, must, for reasons which are inherent in the system, exclude dynamic language because he could otherwise no longer guar­ antee the apodictic natural necessity which he demands, and above all because he would otherwise be in danger (because of his psychologizing of ontology) of losing the world.10 The theory can thus be advanced that a consideration of language and/or an insight into the language-mediating functions of reason would not have been without effect on the fundamentals of Kantian philosophy. “Kant did not (want) to confuse reality per se with the reality of language”,11 says Damn­ janovic´, continuing: “This is why it is unacceptable to re-write Kant’s transcendental philosophy from the linguistic point of view.”12 Villers argues that an explicit language-philosophical foundation in Kant’s philosophy would also have resolved the “dogma of a dichotomy of receptivity and spon­ taneity” and thus “the dualistic postulate of the symmetry of cognitive powers”, which does not envisage any mediating third party.13 The problem of linking cognitive powers in Kant’s work thus remains unsolved. Kant’s strict apriority, based on logic and independent of language, is intended to ensure reliable cognition regardless of linguistic skill and to create an episte­ mological foundation. Historicisation via language would have contradicted Kant’s concern to create an ahistorical foundation of cognition and morality. Kant’s philosophy of the self is a further systematic explanation for the neglect of language in Kantian philosophy. Damnjanovic´ comments in this context, “in order to remain true to his transcendental philosophy of the self, Kant was forced to do without the position of a language philosophy of the ‘we’; language as a determining feature of human nature. As a result, lan­ guage remained a non-issue in Kant’s work.”14 Villers notes “that transcen­ dental philosophy was required to exclude dynamic language if it did not want to destroy its own foundations.”15

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 147 On the other hand, a latent philosophy of language is apparent in Kant’s work. Within the scope of his deliberations it is possible to identify the topics of language; the language of philosophy – also as regards his own philoso­ phy; ‘transcendental grammar’;16 an ethics of language and a politics of lan­ guage, which is interrelated in particular to the demand for truthfulness, and language-pragmatic, communicative, rhetorical17 and literary-aesthetic impetuses. For example, the audience and the public sphere play a crucial role within the context of the Kantian philosophy of Enlightenment (Aufklärung); their importance is also reflected in the genres selected by Kant, such as journalistic essays; pamphlets; experiments;18 observations;19 contracts; critiques;20 etc. In addition to this, content-related aspects of Kantian philosophy such as the as if; the ideal; schematism; symbols and analogies exhibit a language-philosophical dimension. Of particular sig­ nificance for Kant’s philosophy is, as illustrated by Ribeiro dos Santos, also his use of metaphors in his philosophical language and − seen in general terms − the latent metaphoricalism which is a distinctive feature of Kant’s philosophy overall.21 As posited by Villers, Kant develops “his latent philo­ sophy of language” in particular “in the form of a latent metaphoricalism.”22 Linguistic imagery plays an important role at various points of Kant’s philosophy, serving above all to illustrate abstract theoretical elements. In the case of schematism the focus is on the application of reason-related terms to phenomena, which, a priori, goes hand in hand with the processing of illus­ trative material based on principles. The image generated in the schema illustrates the term, not the object itself (cf. RGV, AA 06:65, Note). The process of subsumption presupposes transcendental schemata, processes of the purely productive power of imagination as a mediating third party (KrV B 177), which enables and/or creates a corresponding image for a term23 (cf. KrV B 180). The receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneity of reason participate equally in the cognitive process, whereby ideas are subsumed under terms and terms are substantiated. Although the Kantian schema is considered in pre- and non-linguistic terms and remains linked to the visual metaphor for characterisation of the cognitive process, which is significant for the history of philosophy, Villers argues that it still exhibits a latent lan­ guage, displaying a link to language and a linguistic immediacy of the images, which Herder already grants him.24 In the chapter “On beauty as a symbol of morality” of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (in Paragraph 59) the term ‘symbol’ is developed and must be viewed as a further element of the latent language of Kantian philosophy. Symbolisation allows concepts of reason to be illustrated aesthetically. It is, in addition to schematisation, another form of hypotyposis: All hypotyposis (presentation, subjecto sub adspectum), as making some­ thing sensible, is of one of two kinds: either schematic, where to a con­ cept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given a priori; or symbolic, where to a concept which only reason can think, and

148 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in a way merely analogous to that which it observes in schematization, i.e. it is merely the rule of this procedure, not of the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept. (KU, AA 5:351) The symbol is an indirect illustration of a term, whereby symbolisation is achieved through analogy. Kant’s view of analogy differentiates between a category analogy, which references the conformity of the characteristics and distinguishing features of a category, however, also bears the risk of circular reasoning, and a qualitatively understood relationship analogy, which is based on the relationship between reasons and consequences. Kant, however, strongly warns against arriving at conclusions based on the analogy (cf. KU B 448–450; RGV, AA 06:65, Note). Analogies cannot, argues Kant, com­ municate objective cognition; they serve solely to illustrate. Likewise, the symbol has only an illustrative function. The symbol of an Idea (or a concept of reason) is a representation of the object by analogy, i.e. by the same relationship to certain consequences as that which is attributed to the object in respect of its own con­ sequences, even though the objects themselves are of entirely different kinds […]. In this way I can indeed have no theoretical knowledge of the supersensible, for example, of God, but can yet have a knowledge by analogy, and such as it is necessary for reason to think […].25 (FM, AA 20:280) In addition to the symbol, Kant’s work also assigns an important mediat­ ing function to the aesthetic attribute. The aesthetic attribute (cf. KU, AA 5:315), the aesthetic presentation of an aesthetic idea, which supports an idea of reason, stimulates the imagination to greater extent than a term would, whereby the mind is enlivened; in other words, it experiences a creative impulse. Villers says on this subject: “Since, however, the power of imagina­ tion thus sets the ability to have intellectual ideas, reason, in motion (cf. KU B 194), the formation of aesthetic ideas leads ‘indirectly also to cognition’ (KU B 198).”26 Correspondingly, the intellectual ideal is contrasted with an ‘ideal of sensibility’ and/or an ‘ideal of the imagination’.27 The analogy is once again of crucial significance as regards the transcendental. In this con­ text Kant views the aesthetic idea as the counterpart to the idea of reason (cf. KU B 193), which is generated by the intellect, an important characteristic and/or power of the mind of the genius. It can be identified particularly in poetics and rhetoric. As is already the case for the symbol, the aesthetic attribute – both reference the analogy – is an expression of Kant’s metapho­ rical view of language. Moral law is an aspect of Kant’s practical reason

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 149 which provides a practical schema for a metaphorical process of symbol for­ mation (cf. KpV, AA 5:68–69). Viewed in the context of Kant’s latent meta­ phoricalism, the Kantian as if, a considering of something to be true in cases in which a conviction cannot be grounded either by reason or by rationality, but where the demands of practical reason only remain visible if the convic­ tion can be maintained, is of crucial significance. The as if is a manifestation of indistinguishability, when it is impossible to know whether something is real or not, whereby the use of terms; the illustration of facts; thought and human action are affected. The as if is, however, more than just a mere fic­ tion. The as if refers in particular to the regulative ideas of God and the immortality of the soul, underpinning human morality. Kant’s pragmatism of language;28 language ethics and politics of language, which are linked in particular to the demand for truthfulness and include communicative, rhetorical and literary-aesthetic impulses, furthermore demonstrate the significance of his latent philosophy of language at the socio-political level. For example, the audience and the public sphere play a crucial role within the context of the Kantian philosophy of Enlightenment (Aufklärung). Kant censures eloquence in the context of using rhetoric in the art of persuasion. When referring to them, Kant speaks of a ‘deceitful art’ used to achieve one’s own advantage (cf. KU, AA 05:328, Note). In contrast to this, Kant’s concern is with dialogue in the Socratic sense and with Enlightenment as an encouragement to use our own reason. Scholars should thus express public criticism of institutions, doctrines, etc. Kant argues that there is an unconditional imperative of truthfulness, which does not exclude the possibility of error but most certainly that of the lie29 (cf. VT, AA 08:421; MS, AA 06:429). In this context his principal focus is on the pragmatic dimension of human interaction. “Pragmatic is the cognition which can be generally used in society” (Refl, AA 15:660, R 1482; cf. also Log, AA 09:455; Vorl, AA 25:856; 25:1210). The pragmatic aspect promotes “what he [the human being] as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” (Anth, AA 07:119; cf. 07:246; 07:189; 07:214). The use of language is considered here in its socio-political, in particular critical, dimension, which in Kant’s philosophy of history primarily assumes a Utopian dimension through its cosmopolitan impulses and its tendency toward per­ petual peace. Here, the legal-juridical use of language, as is clear in the essay Toward Perpetual Peace, is of particular significance as regards the negotia­ tion of the contracts between states which are intended to promote further development of human beings as a race, in the final instance also from a moral perspective. In addition to this, Kant’s belief in progress, which extends beyond the individual and the social, is validated by his natural-teleological premises. Viewed as a whole, Kant’s metaphoricalism is linked not only to certain theoretical elements of his philosophy such as the symbol, attribute, analogy etc., but rather equally represents – among other things also by means of the metaphors which he uses in his philosophical language – the key to more

150 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy profound access to the Kantian philosophical system, extending to his poli­ tically focused language pragmatism, which must be viewed in particular in the context of his philosophy of history.

Language in the work of Kant as viewed by Foucault Foucault attributes a prominent role to language in Kant’s philosophy, thus indirectly contradicting the theory that Kant disregards language in his work. In his genealogical exploration of parrhesia30 Foucault draws attention to Kant’s form of critical parrhesia and its significance, undertaking an inter­ esting analysis of Kantian philosophy as regards the aspect of the ‘drama’ of discourse in the context of an exploration of philosophical truthfulness.31 When doing so, Foucault places himself and Kant in the tradition of par­ rhesia, which began in antiquity and is closely linked to the intent of philo­ sophy.32 In this context Foucault attempts to continue the Kantian project of Enlightenment in a modified form. In conclusion, given the movement which swung critical attitude over into the question of critique or better yet, the movement responsible for reassessing the Aufklärung enterprise within the critical project whose intent was to allow knowledge to acquire an adequate idea of itself − given this swinging movement, this slippage, this way of deporting the question of the Aufklärung into critique − might it not now be necessary to follow the opposite route?33 Contemporary critique should, argues Foucault, lead to Enlightenment, whereby the question of cognition must be subordinated to this goal. Although Foucault interprets the relationship between Aufklärung and critique in Kant’s work in a narrow, one-dimensional manner, its Enlightenment impetus is, how­ ever, of special significance for an understanding of Foucault’s philosophical objective and closely related to his referencing of the terms ‘immaturity’ – a lack of will; ‘autonomy’ – a lack in the relationship to the self; and ‘liberty’ in the sense of a practised experience in Kant’s work.34 Foucault says: “In the condi­ tion of majority, reasoning and obedience are disconnected.”35 He continues: “Aufklärung, on the contrary, gives freedom the dimension of the greatest pub­ licity in the form of the universal, and it maintains obedience only in this private role, let’s say in this particular, defined individual role within the social body.”36 The relationship between critique and issues of power and rulership in Foucault’s work becomes clear in the following quotation: And if it is necessary to ask the question about knowledge in its rela­ tionship to domination, it would be, first and foremost, from a certain decision-making will not to be governed, the decision making will, both an individual and collective attitude which meant, as Kant said, to get out of one’s minority. A question of attitude.37

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 151 Foucault argues that Aufklärung is linked to a particular form of critical truthfulness. Viewed in general terms, parrhesia is a speaking of the truth which involves a personal risk – in the mode of truthfulness, whereby the speaker himself both accepts responsibility as the subject of the statement and is also held responsible.38 Parrhesia is thus simultaneously attributed a subject-forming function in the ethical context. In Foucault’s work the pro­ blem of freedom of speech is “related to the choice of existence, to the choice of one’s way of life”39 and conceived of as a personal stance with an ethical dimension.40 In this context, Foucault views himself as, at the same time, being part of the Kantian tradition of parrhesia and its concept of ethics. The critical form of truthfulness combines with Kant’s concern with Enlightenment, in which the “dimension of the public […] is at the same time the dimension of the universal” and a “new distribution of government of self and government of others” takes place.41 Foucault’s exploration of Kant’s philosophy within the scope of his focus on parrhesia reveals this level. In this context, argues Foucault, the drama of discourse42 extends beyond the pragmatism of discourse.43 In contrast to the theory of the speech act, as espoused by English pragmatists such as Austin or Searle, his primary concern is the condition of reality of statements and – in the context of exploring parrhesia – the ontological self-commitment of the subject via the act of speech,44 which Foucault links overall with the concerns and history of philosophy. In this context, the theory of ‘truthfulness’ enables Foucault to consider the dimensions of knowledge, power and subject as a whole in his philosophy, whereby – seen from the perspective of the argumentation structure and viewed systematically – it fulfils a particularly important function. In addition to this, in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault makes language his subject of discussion, also as regards Kant’s concept of the Weltbürger (world citizen). Foucault says: “He is Weltbürger purely and simply because he speaks. […] His living in the world is, originally, residence in language.”45 In Anthropology the “value of the discourse”; the “Tischge­ sellschaft” and the “conversation” becomes manifest:46 “There, through the transparency of a common language, a bond linking everyone has to be established; no one should feel privileged, and no one should feel isolated; everybody, whether speaking or silent, has to be present together in the shared sovereignty of speech.”47 Kant’s Anthropology brings any “truth anterior to language” to light:48 It is a truth that is both more interior and more complex: it is in the very movement of the exchange, and that exchange realizes the universal truth of man. […] It is here that language takes, realizes, and rediscovers its reality; it is also here that man exhibits his anthropological truth.49 In its interpretation, Foucault’s emphasis on the communicative impetus of language in Kant’s Anthropology allows a new dimension of language in

152 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Kant’s work to be revealed, providing a crucial supplement to the central aspect of language’s naming function, which plays a key role in the reception of Kant, even if Foucault overexaggerates and overemphasises when doing so. Foucault can be credited with having drawn attention to Kant’s commu­ nication-related, language-pragmatic and language-dramatic considerations and thus having expanded our assessment of the implications of Kant’s phi­ losophy of language. Foucault asserts that, in Kant’s Anthropology, this is also reflected in the struggle with the German language as a philosophical language. In contrast to the Critiques, Latin no longer plays any significant role in Anthropology. 50 This also shows Kant’s concern to reach the public with his deliberations and to engage in a public philosophical dialogue – to the benefit of his project of Aufklärung. Foucault’s reception of Kant’s philosophy emphasises the communicative and, in particular, the language-dramatic aspects in Kant’s work, represent­ ing a shift in how the readings of Kant which complain about his disregard for language and/or which only speak of an implicit philosophy of language in his work are reread. Language in Kant’s work is given a central sig­ nificance by focusing the discussion on both the philosophical intention and the concept of the function of philosophy in Kant’s work as well as also Kant’s struggle to develop his own philosophical language. Over and above this, Foucault’s particular emphasis when referencing Kant’s Anthropology is less on the naming function of language than on its communicative aspect. He argues that language is of fundamental importance for Kant. Foucault presents Kant’s overall philosophy as a language-philosophical project of truthfulness in the form of critique with an ethical-political dimension.

Language, discourse and the murmuring of language in Foucault’s philosophy Foucault assumes that there is an ocean of language, which determines meanings at the discourse level and excludes the unspeakable. Language thus extends beyond the sovereignty of individual speech and is based on forma­ tion systems51 and formation rules which differ historically over time, for example as regards statement modalities. If language is truly located in the lonely sovereignty of the ‘I speak’, then nothing can limit it – neither the individual to whom it is directed; nor the truth of what is said; nor the values and presentation systems which it uses; in short, a discourse no longer takes place, it no longer commu­ nicates any meaning but rather merely exhibits its naked being as a pure external feature.52 The discursive focuses on excluding the language of madness, which Fou­ cault emphasises in his deliberations concerning literature – for example on Roussel as an alternative source of thought. This language represents an

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 153 epistemological counter-discourse, which, as an unpredictable entity, can turn its attention to what has previously been excluded and left unsaid. Madness53 represents a form of linguistic transgression. Literary forms of language can come close to the language of madness; literature is thus of particular sig­ nificance. In this context, the boundlessness of language in contrast to dis­ course, whose purpose is to avert the dangerous aspects of language, becomes clear. Limitation of language must be considered in relationship with, for example, institutional issues of power and is supported by dispositive processes. In his ontology of language, in which he explores language independently of its reference and signification function, Foucault presupposes a space of language which opens up; an emptiness of language; an endless murmuring and the phenomenon of language’s self-manifestation. The non-significant existence of language becomes apparent in particular in Foucault’s explora­ tion of literature. This also reveals its existential dimension, which is char­ acterised by a mirroring of death and desire. The experience of the interior and exterior, which necessitates an area of signification, requires rules which are based on a defining discourse and refers to the observation of the dis­ cursive order of language. The external space is not constituted by clear borders but rather shifts in a permanent process of boundary-setting and transgression. The issue at hand is the relationship of non-significant speech to the existing discursive order, which, in Foucault’s work, represents the beginning of the shift from an ontology of language to an analysis of dis­ course in the sense of an archaeology of knowledge. In this regard the exis­ tence of language represents the blind spot of the historical formation of knowledge formed by epistemes and/or epistemic coherence principles and discursive formation rules, etc. Foucault’s interest in the ontology of language results in an epistemic focus of his philosophical thought. A further aspect of the philosophy of language is linked to the subject’s self­ concern and relates to the development of an individual way of life. In his his­ torical exploration of parrhesia, which presupposes a personal stance in the sense of ethics and can be viewed as a self-technique of truthfulness and the associated self-concern, Foucault develops an ethic with respect to an aesthetic of the self which is concerned with the self-formation of the subject by means of self-technologies outside of, but not independent of, power relationships. The critical stance of truthfulness demonstrates the relationship between speech and self-formation and thus language as a means of subjectification. Reading and writing are of key significance within the scope of this process. In this regard Foucault − taking Kant as his starting point − emphasises critique and Enlightenment in the context of a specific way of life.

On philosophical language in the work of Kant and Foucault The character of Kant’s and Foucault’s philosophical language differs greatly. Kant’s language is analytical, subsuming and differentiating, striving to

154 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy achieve the most precise terminological version of its content and an exact delimitation from other terms by means of the corresponding choice of words. He devotes particular care to the explanation of terms, exploring the implicit meanings of words which, in order to improve their use, require clarification as regards terminological precision. The creation of new words is not at the heart of the Kantian enterprise; he does not take dead languages, such as, in particular, Latin as the language of scholars, as his point of orientation. According to Kant, philosophical conceptual analyses of lan­ guage should “purify, expand, determine but not change” (Refl, AA 15:377, 853). Philosophical language which develops, refines and intensifies thought – often in antagonistic confrontations – strives to achieve refining presenta­ tions of complex, innovative thought by means of hierarchical thought complexes and systematising and system-forming structures, frequently in a dispute with other philosophical arguments which are relevant to it in the specific context. In this context, Kant’s language demonstrates a challenging, dense and, in some cases, seemingly hermetic character. In his strivings to achieve precision Kant focuses in particular on mathematics. Mathematics and philosophy, however, are in many regards so different that philosophy should not attempt to imitate mathematics. As to the possibility of knowledge a priori, it did not strike the meta­ physicians as a radical difference, to be treated as an important problem, that mathematics proceeds on the terrain of the sensory, since reason itself can construct concepts for it, i.e. present them a priori in intuition, and thus know the objects a priori, whereas philosophy undertakes an extension of reason’s knowledge by mere concepts, where its objects cannot, as in the other case, be set before us, since they hover, as it were, ahead of us in the air. It was enough to extend a priori knowledge, even outside mathematics, by mere concepts, and that this extension contains truth is evidenced by the agreement of such judgments and principles with experience. (FM, AA 20:262) When discussing metaphysics and transcendental philosophy, Kant lays claim to a scientific character which is reflected in his philosophical language. In his metaphoricalism, which in addition to its function of providing explanation and simplifying understanding by means of imagery, also serves to express new ideas and interrelationships, Kant references various domains such as biology, chemistry and law. Foucault who, in contrast, takes literature as the primary orientation for his philosophical language, however also looks to the language of history; of social sciences and of biology. His descriptive, sober deliberations are often based on historical material; in part in the form of a document or monu­ ment, for example when discussing Herculine Barbin and Pierre Rivière, which he integrates into his work. The descriptive passages − for example on

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 155 imprisonment and punishment practices − make large sections of the text appear more like historical or socio-scientific writings; the philosophical intensification and penetration of the problem under discussion is only gra­ dually developed out of this material. Unlike Kant, Foucault is not con­ cerned with creating a specific philosophical language; he foregoes any claim to a particular linguistic form of philosophy. Philosophy as a process without any claim to a systematising overall view of humans and the world remains focused on facts and empirical findings. It develops an access point to the formalities and mechanisms behind the phenomena which is based both synchronously and diachronically on an archaeological and genealogical process, using an investigative language to identify and reveal principles and interrelationships. Foucault’s empirical starting point for his philosophical considerations reveals a high degree of openness as regards the material used, which is also equally reflected in the linguistic domain. Over and above this, Foucault also applies his process to philosophy itself, thus exploring, for example, historical forms of truthfulness in philosophy. On the other hand, it is also possible to identify a tendency towards the literarisation of philosophical language in Foucault’s work. This is in the tradition of Nietzsche − a figurative, meandering, questing, concealing lan­ guage which expresses a pleasure in the creative impetus of language itself. The metaphors employed, such as those referring to nature, are reflections of this aspect of Foucault’s philosophy. In this context, Foucault’s tendency to integrate artistic works into the philosophical discourse, such as literary works by Roussel, Blanchot and Borges among others, and visual works, such as by Velásquez, Monet and Magritte, is also of significance. This proximity to the literary/artistic is linked to the experimental aspect of Fou­ cault’s philosophy and philosophical language. Philosophy is called into question as a discipline and must reinvent itself. In his concept of language Foucault only references Kant as regards the language-dramatic aspect, expressed in parrhesia as a form of critique and Enlightenment − linked to a specific form of subjectification. In contrast to Kant, Foucault sees apriority and its crucial effects on the overall philosophical concept not in logical terms but rather in terms of the language of discourse theory and history. Liberty is not primarily viewed via the self-legislation of practical reason as an a priori, grounded in moral laws, but rather as logically anchored in the expression of power. It requires continual defence and/or conquering within the process of de-subjugation and is linked to a change in the quality of governmentality. While Kant identifies morality as the focus for determining liberty, Foucault sees liberty as being primarily anchored in the socio­ political context; in the context of freedom of self-realisation and the deter­ mination of a personal way of life and the courage to express criticism and make changes. Kant’s ‘revolution of thought’ should, states Villers, have equally “exten­ ded to language”54 and his transcendental philosophical impetus of ontology should also have had consequences for the philosophy of language. Villers

156 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy argues “What Kant lacks or what he shies away from is the understanding of language as a medium which has always linked and communicated receptiv­ ity and with spontaneity; sensibility and intellectualism; a connection to the factual and meaning.”55 He poses the question “whether Kantian reason does not also have a linguistic origin which has been suppressed.”56 He asserts: In the final analysis, these questions arising from Kant’s works can no longer be answered unambiguously; what, however, remains is the sus­ picion that even the highest cognitive ability, reason, could, contrary to Kant’s explicit intention, prove to be organized on the basis of language or, perhaps, even constituted on the basis of language.57 Foucault chooses to take the linguistic dimension and the historicisation of the a priori into consideration, attempting to close the gap which is apparent in Kant’s philosophy. Foucault can, furthermore, be credited with having drawn attention to the neglected dimension of language drama in his exploration of Kant’s philosophy of language. His archaeological and, in particular, his genealogical research methods result in an emphasis on the special form of Kantian parrhesia, in whose tradition he places himself, in his reception of Kant. In this context he simultaneously explores an aspect of Kantian research which has been neglected and still, today, is not paid enough attention. Foucault cannot thus be accused of neglecting linguistic issues, as is the case with Kant. The New Realism movement, however, in particular still sees a tendency to relativism and a loss of the world in Fou­ cault’s constructivist fundamental outlook.58 His discourse theoretical rever­ sal of Kant’s logical apriority runs the risk, avoided by Kant, of losing the world in its autonomy. Even if Foucault employs his concept of the ‘dis­ positive’ when considering the materialism of the cultural, by foregoing the concept of the duality of nature and culture and espousing a view of nature which is equivalent to an ‘engulfing’ of nature by culture, he fails to consider the material disposition and agential of the material. This neglect of the natural-philosophical and cosmological dimension results in a concept of the material seen solely from the cultural-philosophical perspective; in a reduc­ tion to the cultural dimension and an absolutisation of the cultural − a risk which Kant, among other things also by means of his often-criticised con­ cept of language philosophy, avoided.

Acknowledgement This chapter has been published as Rainsborough, Marita: “Kant and Fou­ cault’s philosophy of language and the use of language in their work”. In: Hulshof, Monique; Marques, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo (Eds.): A Lin­ guagem em Kant. A Linguagem de Kant. Marília, São Paulo (Oficina Uni­ versitária; Cultura Acadêmica), 2018, pp. 249–267.

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 157

Notes 1 Lütterfelds, Wilhelm: “Kant in der gegenwärtigen Sprachphilosophie”. In: Hei­ demann, Dietmar H.; Engelhard, Kristina (Eds.): Warum Kant heute? System­ atische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart. Berlin (De Gruyter), 2004, p. 150 (own translation). 2 Cf. Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel: Metaforas da Razão ou economia poetica do pensar kantiano. Lisbon (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian), 1985. 3 Kant was also aware of the language-philosophical views of pre-Socratic ancient philosophy on the relationship of being, thought and language and Aristotelian parallelism. According to Villers, Kant’s view of language even makes him “the heir to language-philosophical Aristotelism” – at the same time, however, also its overcomer. Cf. Villers, Jürgen: Kant und das Problem der Sprache: Die historischen und systematischen Gründe für die Sprachlosigkeit der Transzendentalphilosophie. Constance (Verlag am Hockgraben), 1997, p. 16, 295 (own translation). Villers notes “thought no longer links ontology and language, and/or retrospectively references objects, but rather imaginative consciousness constitutes objects first as phenomena, i.e. the level of thought assimilates that of being – whereby Aristotelism is conquered. Despite the rupturing of the static model of parallelism and the impetus of the cognitive process, Kant still continues to hold fast to the retrospective naming function of linguistic characters” (Villers 1997: 297; own translation). The level of thought, which precedes the level of language, is, according to Kant, also constitutive for ontology (cf. Villers 1997: 303). 4 Kant, Immanuel: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Louden, Robert B. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2006. (Text cited as “Anth”.) and Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics. Ameriks, Karl; Naragon, Steve (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1997. (Text cited as “V-Met”.) 5 Kant says: “All language is a signification of thought and, on the other hand, the best way of signifying thought is through language, the greatest instrument for understanding ourselves and others” (Anth, AA 07:192). He continues: “The faculty of cognizing the present as the means for connecting the representation of the foreseen with that of the past is the faculty of using signs. − The mental activity of bringing about this connection is signifying (signatio), which is also called signaling, of which the higher degree is called marking” (Anth, AA 07:191). Kant defines the ability to name objects as going beyond linguistic ability and including miraculous signs; natural signs and arbitrary and/or artificial signs (cf. Anth, AA 07:192–194). As regards natural signs he differentiates between demonstrative, rememorative and prognostic signs. In addition to linguistic signs, arbitrary signs also include notes (tones); characters; signs of gesticulation; coats of arms; medals, etc. (cf. Anth, AA 07:192). The ability to name objects is con­ cerned with indirect links through additional imaginings regarding the relation­ ship between imagining the object and the object. “The imagining, which is merely an instrument, used to bring forth (reproduce) another is the sign” (Refl, AA 15, No. 334). Linguistic signs, words, are the counterparts of objects, used to facilitate imagining of the object and characterisation (cf. V-Met/Mron, AA 29:887). They are formed freely and presuppose a productive ability of character­ isation. Kant views linguistic signs as marking signs (cf. Anth 07:191) which also serve as means of communication (cf. Refl, AA 16, No. 1620). 6 Villers 1997: 13, 14 (own translation).

7 Villers 1997: 15 (own translation).

8 Villers 1997: 289 (own translation).

9 Cf. Villers 1997: 5.

158 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy 10 Villers 1997: 6 (own translation). Villers thus contradicts Dimitrios Markis’ theory of an “after-effect of the collective unconsciousness of our philosophical language in Kant’s work.” In: Markis, Dimitrios: “Das Problem der Sprache bei Kant”. In: Scheer, Brigitte; Wohlfahrt, Günter (Eds.): Dimensionen der Sprache in der Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus. Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 1982, p. 113 (own translation). De Mauro, in contrast, supports the theory of an ‘extraordinary’ silence and a ‘systematic’ silence, which Villers references to sup­ port his arguments. Cf. De Mauro, Tullio. Einführung in die Semantik. Tübingen (Niemeyer), 1982, pp. 48–49. De Mauro says: “Kant understood that it was no longer possible […] to emphasize the creative function of speech and, at the same time, to insist on the authority of a trans-historical reason whose understanding would have had to result from the historical forms of language” (De Mauro 1982: 51; own translation). 11 Damnjanovic´, Milan: “‘Handle sprachlich’ – oder: Warum blieb die Sprache bei Kant unthematisiert?” In: Berthold, Lothar (Ed.): Zur Architektonik der Vernunft. Berlin (Akademie Verlag), 1990, p. 439 (own translation). 12 Damnjanovic´ 1990: 439–440 (own translation). He cites Liebrucks as an example of this attempt. Cf. Liebrucks, Bruno: Sprache und Bewusstsein: Die erste Revo­ lution der Denkungsart: Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main (Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft), 1968. 13 Villers 1997: 376 (own translation). 14 Damnjanovic´ 1990: 441 (own translation). 15 Villers 1997: 379 (own translation). Cf. also Damnjanovic´: “[H]e did not want to make either language as reality or consciousness as a fundamental existence absolute because he wanted to retain reality as an unrecognizable instance of objects in themselves and sensibility (Anschauung) as an instance which has equal precedence and rights to understanding and reason” (Damnjanovic´ 1990: 441; own translation). 16 General, universal grammar is subordinated to logic. It represents a grammar “which contains nothing more than the mere form of language in itself” (Log, AA 09:12–13). Transcendental grammar encompasses “the ground of human language” (V-Met-L2/Pölitz, AA 25:576). 17 Despite disparaging comments on rhetoric in the Critique of Judgment (KU B 216–217) it is possible to identify a rhetorical focus in Kant’s philosophy, for example in the dialogical impetus of dialectics. 18 “The Versuch is the German form of the essay. It is an open-ended investigation […].” In: Goetschel, Willi: Constituting Critique. Kant’s Writing as Critical Praxis. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 1994, p. 24. 19 “Observations and essays share an experimental character […]” (Goetschel 1994: 58). Goetschel argues that there are similarities to travelogues and “as a literary genre, offers the requisite inspecificity” (ibid.). 20 “Thus, with the Critique, a new, philosophical species of literature was created. The scope of its influence in the history of literary forms can hardly be estimated (so great is the role it has played)” (Goetschel 1994: 12). 21 Villers says on Kant’s latent philosophy of language: “The reconstruction of Kant’s latent philosophy of language, which reveals the hidden language of the transcendental philosophical concepts of the power of imagination, the schema and the intellectual ideal and in particular, however, Kant’s latent metaphor­ icalism in his theoretical elements of symbolic hypotyposis and the aesthetic ideal, has, over and above this, yet to demonstrate that not even a Kant has succeeded in completely ‘ignoring’ the role of language (the third Aristotelian level) in the cognitive process and that this displaced but virulent linguistic term threatens to transform his apriority of the intellect into a reason with origins and organization based in language” (Villers 1997: 6–7; own translation).

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 159 22 Villers 1997: 381 (own translation). 23 “Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of imagi­ nation, as a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a cer­ tain general concept. The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto” (KrV B 180). Schemata of categories can, in contrast to (purely) empirical terms, not be imagined as images. This is nothing but a pure synthesis, “a rule of unity according to concepts in general” (KrV A 142). 24 Cf. Herder, Johann Gottfried: “Metakritik.” In: Herder, Johann Gottfried: Sämtliche Werke. Vol. 21. Suphan, Bernhard (Ed.). Berlin (Weidmannsche Buchhandlung), 1877–1913 (Reprint Hildesheim, Olms-Weidmann 1994), p. 125. 25 Cf. Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Allison, Henry; Heath, Peter (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2002, p. 370. (Text cited as “FM”.) 26 Villers 1997: 359 (own translation). 27 Cf. V-Phil-Th, AA 28: 3. Kant cites the ‘ideal of beauty’ and the ‘ideal of happi­ ness’ as examples. When doing so, the focus is not on these items as specific terms but as ideas (cf. Villers 1997: 359). They cannot, however, create new concepts. “The ideals of sensibility are neither so creative that they could provide the sti­ mulus for the formation of new concepts nor can they be brought into relation­ ship with an existing concept and can thus ‘only improperly’ (KrV, B 598) be called ideals – Kant also occasionally disparagingly refers to these ‘creatures of imagination’ (KrV, B 598) as ‘chimeras’ (Vorl. ü. d. Metph., p. 42)” (Villers 1997: 360; own translation). 28 Precise analysis of the language-pragmatical level of Kant’s philosophy is an area of research which remains to be investigated. 29 Cf. Kant, Immanuel: “On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy”. In: Fenves, Peter (Ed.): Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida. Baltimore, MD (John Hopkins University Press), 1993, pp. 51–81. (Text cited as “VT”.) And: Kant, Immanuel: The Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1991. (Text cited as “MS”.) 30 Parrhesia as ‘frank talking’ can also deteriorate into ‘random speech’, meaning that its development per se is closely interconnected with critique; with speech, which is more than rhetoric and requires courage. It originated in 4th BCE Greece, primarily as a criticism of democracy. Cf. Foucault, Michel: The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2011, pp. 6, 10, 12, 34. 31 Cf. Foucault, Michel: The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–83. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2010, pp. 68, 69. Foucault says: “In this way I think one could make an analysis of the dramatics of true discourse and its different forms: the prophet, the seer, the philosopher, the scientist” (Foucault 2010: 69). 32 Foucault comments in this regard: “The history of philosophy, in short, as move­ ment of parresia, as redistribution of parresia, as varied game of truth-telling, philo­ sophy envisaged thus in what could be called its allocutionary force” (Foucault 2010: 350). 33 Foucault, Michel: “What is Critique”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 66–67. 34 Cf. Foucault 2010: 28, 37. 35 Foucault 2010: 36.

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51

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Foucault 2010: 37. Foucault 2007: 67. Cf. Foucault, Michel: Fearless Speech. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2001a, p. 13. Foucault 2001a: 85. Foucault continues: “And as a result, parrhesia is regarded more and more as a personal attitude, a personal quality, as a virtue which is useful for the city’s political life in the case of positive or critical parrhesia, or as a danger for the city in the case of negative, pejorative parrhesia” (ibid.). Foucault views truthfulness as being fundamentally an activity which has inter­ personal and communicative elements – in smaller groups; within the scope of communal life and in public life (cf. Foucault 2001a: 107–108). Kant, asserts Foucault, stands in the cynical tradition of critical parrhesia. In contrast to Kant, Foucault takes up the Socratic idea of concern for oneself in the context of par­ rhesia to an equal extent. In Socratic parrhesia concern for oneself takes centre stage, also envisaging a harmony between words and deeds and viewing political and ethical parrhesia as interconnected. It is deemed to be the origin of the phi­ losophical form of parrhesia. Parrhesia has, according to Foucault, an epistemic, a political and an ethical/aesthetic dimension and must be understood as primarily practical (cf. Foucault 2001a: 103–107). Foucault 2010: 36–37. “I think it is this retroaction − such that the event of the utterance affects the subject’s mode of being, or that, in producing the event of the utterance the sub­ ject modifies, or affirms, or anyway determines and clarifies his mode of being insofar as he speaks − that characterizes a type of facts of discourse which are completely different from those dealt with by pragmatics. The analysis of these facts of discourse, which show how the very event of the enunciation may affect the enunciator’s being, is what we could call − removing all pathos from the word − the ‘dramatics’ of discourse” (Foucault 2010: 68). “What is it that we call, or anyway what we could call the pragmatics of discourse? Well, it is the analysis of what it is in the real situation of the person speaking that affects and modifies the meaning and value of the utterance. To that extent, as you can see, analyzing or locating something like a performative falls squarely in the domain of a pragmatics of discourse” (Foucault 2010: 67). Gros, Frédéric: “Course Context”. In: Foucault, Michel: The Government of the Self and Others. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2010, p. 379. Foucault, Michel: Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2008, p. 102. Foucault 2008: 101–102. Foucault 2008: 101. Foucault 2008: 102. Foucault 2008: 102–103. “In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant is even embarrassed by his German, and considers it a limitation” (Foucault 2008: 98) Foucault continues: “That philoso­ phical reflection broke away from the universality of the Latin form in this way is important. Henceforth, philosophical language would see that it was possible to locate its place of origin, and to define its field of exploration within a given linguistic system” (Foucault 2008: 100). The language of antiquity must thus be viewed as general grammar in the sense of a representation of existence, as Foucault argues in The Order of Things. Cf. Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. New York (Routledge), 1989. Foucault, Michel: “The Thought of the Outside”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aes­ thetics, method, and epistemology: essential works of Foucault 1954–1984.

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 161

53

54

55 56 57 58

Faubion, James D. (Ed.). London (Penguin Books), 2000, p. 148. Original quotation: “Si, en effet, le langage n’a son lieu que dans la souveraineté solitaire du «je parle», rien ne peut le limiter en droit − ni celui auquel il s’adresse, ni la vérité de ce qu’il dit, ni les valeurs ou les systèmes représentatifs qu’il utilise; bref, il n’est plus discours et communication d’un sens, mais étalement du langage en son être brut, pure extériorité déployée”. In: Foucault, Michel “La pensée du dehors”. In: Foucault, Michel: Dits et écrits I. 1954–1975. Paris (Gallimard), 2001b, p. 547. Madness, for Foucault, is more than an anthropological category used to label a certain mental state; over and above this, it defines the relationship of speaking with the non-significant existence of language. The emptiness of language must also be assumed in the context of literary language; a self-implication and self­ referentiality of language, which, in the creative act, becomes a ‘meaningful dis­ course’. The figure of duplication and self-reflection is, in particular, an indication of the non-significant existence of language. This represents a form of speech which becomes lost in itself, only articulating language in and for itself. Literature thus also encompasses the questioning and rejection of language. Villers 1997: 7 (own translation). According to Villers this should have led him to the conclusion “that his fundamental problem of linking receptivity and sponta­ neity was nothing more than a pseudo problem; that he must replace the thoughts behind his philosophy, the connection of sensibility and reason, with the concept of communicating a relationship to the world and thought in and by language” (ibid.; own translation). Villers 1997: 366 (own translation). Villers 1997: 364 (own translation). Villers 1997: 365 (own translation). Foucault is, in this context, accused of neglecting the agentialism of the material and reality.

Bibliography Damnjanovic´, Milan: “‘Handle sprachlich’ – oder: Warum blieb die Sprache bei Kant unthematisiert?” In: Berthold, Lothar (Ed.): Zur Architektonik der Vernunft. Berlin (Akademie Verlag), 1990, pp. 433–444. De Mauro, Tullio. Einführung in die Semantik. Tübingen (Niemeyer), 1982. Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. New York (Routledge), 1989. Foucault, Michel: “The Thought of the Outside”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). London (Penguin Books), 2000, pp. 147–169. Foucault, Michel: Fearless Speech. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2001a. Foucault, Michel “La pensée du dehors”. In: Foucault, Michel: Dits et écrits I. 1954– 1975. Paris (Gallimard), 2001b, pp. 546–567. Foucault, Michel: “What is Critique”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 41–81. Foucault, Michel: Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext (e)), 2008. Foucault, Michel: The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–83. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2010. Foucault, Michel: The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2011.

162 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Goetschel, Willi: Constituting Critique. Kant’s Writing as Critical Praxis. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 1994. Gros, Frédéric: “Course context”. In: Foucault, Michel: The Government of the Self and Others. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983. London (Palgrave Macmillan), 2010, pp. 377–391. Herder, Johann Gottfried: “Metakritik.” In: Herder, Johann Gottfried: Sämtliche Werke. Vol. 21. Suphan, Bernhard (Ed.). Berlin (Weidmannsche Buchhandlung), 1877–1913 (Reprint Hildesheim, Olms-Weidmann 1994). Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 1–22 edited by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften; vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin; vol. 24–27 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin (De Gruyter), 1900 et seq. Kant, Immanuel: The Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1991. (Text cited as “MS”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. Young, J. Michael (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1992. (Texts cited as “Log”, “V-Lo”.) Kant, Immanuel: “On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy”. In: Fenves, Peter (Ed.): Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida. Baltimore, MD (John Hopkins University Press), 1993, pp. 51–81. (Text cited as “VT”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics. Ameriks, Karl; Naragon, Steve (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1997. (Text cited as “V-Met”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: The Cri­ tique of the Power of Judgment. Guyer, Paul (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2000. (Text cited as “KU”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology. Wood, Allen W.; Giovanni, George di (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2001, p. 107. (Text cited as “RGV”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Allison, Henry; Heath, Peter (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2002. (Text cited as “FM”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Notes and Fragments. Guyer, Paul (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2005. (Text cited as “Refl”.) Kant, Immanuel: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Louden, Robert B. (Ed.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2006a. (Text cited as “Anth”.) Kant, Immanuel: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, Paul; Wood, Allen W. (Eds.). Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 2009. (Text cited as “KrV”.) Liebrucks, Bruno: Sprache und Bewusstsein: Die erste Revolution der Denkungsart: Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main (Akademische Verlagsge­ sellschaft), 1968. Lütterfelds, Wilhelm: “Kant in der gegenwärtigen Sprachphilosophie”. In: Heide­ mann, Dietmar H.; Engelhard, Kristina (Eds.): Warum Kant heute? Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart. Berlin (De Gruyter), 2004.

Language in the work of Kant and Foucault 163 Markis, Dimitrios: “Das Problem der Sprache bei Kant”. In: Scheer, Brigitte; Wohl­ fahrt, Günter (Eds.): Dimensionen der Sprache in der Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus. Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 1982. Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel: Metaforas da Razão ou economia poetica do pensar kantiano. Lisbon (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian), 1985. Villers, Jürgen: Kant und das Problem der Sprache: Die historischen und system­ atischen Gründe für die Sprachlosigkeit der Transzendentalphilosophie. Constance (Verlag am Hockgraben), 1997.

7

History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy

History and counter-memory − Foucault’s understanding of history Foucault’s philosophy is controversially read as the ‘liberation of history’ and he is accused of ‘denial of history’.1 Foucault sees himself as a historian who, on the one hand, wishes to revolutionise the understanding of history and historical methodology and, on the other, aims to transform philosophy through history. He pursues history as a critique of society by relying on it to analyse contemporary society. History can represent a counter-memory in a critical manner by revealing the nexus between power and knowledge as well as subject formation processes through archaeological and genealogical pro­ cedures. What is Foucault’s view of history and what is the function of his­ torical thought in his philosophy? Can Foucault’s theory be regarded as a philosophy of history? What is the significance of the analysis of power in this context and what is its underlying concept of power? In addition to this, the question of the legitimacy of history arises from the attempt to define of a ‘history of the present’.2 In this context, Castel points out the danger that Foucault’s work could manipulate history.3 Foucault revolutionises our understanding of history, turning against the “Hegelian concept of history”.4 Veyne says: Foucault is the consummate historian, the culmination of history. This philosopher is one of the great historians of our era, beyond any doubt; but he might also be the author of the scientific revolution around which all historians have been gravitating. […] He is the first completely positivist historian.5 Veyne calls Foucault’s recourse to practices − away from the consideration of ideologies − a Copernican reversal.6 “The Foucault-style genealogy-history thus completely fulfils the project of traditional history; it does not ignore society, the economy, and so on, but it structures this material differently − not by centuries, peoples, or civilisations, but by practices.”7 In addition to practices, Foucault’s historical analysis also examines discourses and brings to light the mechanisms which make them function. “In history only DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-10

History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy 165 individual or even singular constellations exist, and each one can be fully explained on the sole basis of the means available.”8 Drawing on detailed descriptions, the methods of archaeology9 and genealogy constitute the methodological tools of his new understanding of history and complement each other. They “are only two aspects of a single sceptical-historical method that intends to do only one thing: the destruction of every universal claim”.10 The analysis of forms of problematisation also continues the application of “archaeo-genealogical analytics”.11 Foucault describes the outdated under­ standing of history as a “great sequence of events taken up in a hierarchy of determinations”; history is understood simultaneously as an “individual project and a totality”.12 Foucault, on the other hand, is concerned with contexts of power, knowledge and history, for truth itself must be understood historically.13 His investigation into the practices of power and knowledge reveals a hidden “play of dominations” and relationship of forces.14 This innovative focus is on the reconstruction of emergence and descent, with these factors not understood from the perspective of their ending or as uninterrupted continuity.15 For Foucault, emergence signifies a ‘place of confrontation’ of forces, which he calls ‘interstice’ in an attempt to char­ acterise it as a kind of ‘nonplace’ in its flexibility.16 Violence is integrated into a system of rules in the process of changing power structures.17 ‘Effective history’ in Foucault’s sense rejects a supra-historical perspective based on metaphysical assumptions which emanate from the absolute; Foucault wishes to explore emergence.18 Effective history studies what is closest, but in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance (an approach similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges to make a diagnosis and to state its dif­ ference). Historical sense has more in common with medicine than philosophy.19 The ‘real’ historian’s approach clarifies the perspective of his knowledge and does not attempt to convey the impression of supra-historical knowledge.20 We have already seen that Foucault’s theory of history is the most important means of a sceptical destruction of the supra-historical and universal. At the same time, this theory serves a critique of the present. Foucault’s theory of history thus has a dual and complementary func­ tion. A historical and sceptical on the one hand and a cultural critical on the other. It is used on the one hand against universalism and on the other against modernity.21 Foucault outlines his objective as follows: “[A use of history which] con­ structs a counter-memory − a transformation of history into a totally differ­ ent form of time.”22 History as counter-memory can also be understood as a

166 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy form of critique or Enlightenment and is thus a philosophical and political task. Foucault’s archaeologically and genealogically oriented understanding of history, with its distinctive objective and specific way of narrating history, searches for new methods, new object domains and new modes and forms of expression: This method, in which the metaphorical and discursive use of icono­ graphic symbols plays an important role, points to a new style of his­ toriography that seems as problematic as it is fascinating: first of all to the attempt to view history not as a given reality, but as a construct whose objects are not autonomous facts, but complex relational phe­ nomena constructed by the historian; also to the attempt to extend the object realm of historiography to fundamental but largely repressed cul­ tural, mental and sociological objects and to include all forms of dis­ course − from ‘traditional’ types of sources such as legal texts and political treatises to literature and painting; and finally to the objective of making the aesthetic and pictorial representations of historiography accessible to the epistemological interest of historiography and philosophy of history.23 Foucault searches for ruptures, gaps and discontinuities which reveal trans­ formations of forms of knowledge and power and demonstrate the epistemes, rules, subject positions and structures inherent in the historical formation. Thus, for example, the use of the ‘ship of fools’ metaphor, which alludes to the treatment of the mentally ill in the Renaissance era, followed by the subsequent practice of imprisoning the mentally ill, can be regarded as an example of the peculiarity of Foucault’s historiography. Facts and fiction tend to become indistinguishable.24 Foucault’s approach to history is fundamentally characterised by the con­ cern to read historical monuments on the basis of problematisations, espe­ cially as regards their significance for current socio-political situations. Foucault’s analysis of history always focuses on the present. Castel warns, however, of “the temptation to rewrite history on the basis of contemporary interests”25 and of the failure to develop questions within the context of the historical period. He is also critical of attempts to locate the beginning of current problematisations in the course of history.26 Castel expands on this when referring to the difficulty “to speak of the same problematization” in an observable process of permanent transformations.27 Discussing the selection of data in the context of the evaluated problematisation, he goes on to say: Therefore it leads to the ‘choice’ of significant elements from a past time. But obviously it does not reconstruct the totality of an epoch with all its institutions, its plurality of individuals and groups, its innumerable problems. How is it possible to avoid making an arbitrary or careless selection?28

History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy 167 Foucault would also often reference research and data from historians who would call his application “at best an approximation and at worst fiction”.29 Castel asks the question: “How does one justify a different reading of his­ torical sources, when the rules for handling them are a matter of historical methodology?”30 Foucault usually fails to reflect on the criteria used, but this is indispensable. Knowledge of the present may not be gained at the expense of knowledge of the past and historically proven facts must remain untou­ ched. The application of new categories, for example from other sciences, requires investigation − especially by historians. Furthermore, Castel demands that Foucault’s problematisations represent an increase in knowl­ edge compared to classical methods of historical science and to those of other sciences such as sociology and psychology.31 In this respect we must agree with Castel – Foucault’s findings, procedures and insights require critical analysis within the scope of the various sciences, and his historicaltheoretical basis requires a philosophical, philosophical-historical and scientific-theoretical discussion as regards all of its implications. Foucault’s revolutionisation of history has shaken the notion of what his­ tory is and what a historian is capable of. “Is Foucault still a historian? There is no right or wrong answer to this question, since history is itself one of those false natural objects. History is what one makes of it. It has never stopped changing; it does keep its eye fixed on an eternal horizon.”32 Foucault’s objective is to discuss the relationship between history and con­ temporary reality and to capture the aspect of transformation into something new in the past as well as in relation to the future.33 Veyne states: “What Foucault does will be called history and, by the same token, will belong to history, if historians avail themselves of the gift he is offering and do not find it too undeveloped.”34 The “fictionality of Foucault’s style of historiography” often shifts “the boundaries between fiction and historiography”35 through his literary writing style36 and “Foucault’s texts have to be read like science and literature”.37 I would like to add to this statement as follows – it is like philosophy in the guise of science and literature in the sense of an extended, experimentally expanding understanding of history and philosophy. Fou­ cault’s philosophy of history is a challenge to the philosophy of history and the science of history. Like a “history […] in its alterity”,38 we can equally speak of an ‘alterity of philosophy’ when considering Foucault’s work.

Power in the contexts of history and philosophy in Foucault’s work According to Foucault, the analysis of forms and practices of power is a central task of philosophy.39 He asks himself, as he calls it, a ‘naïve’ question: “[W]hat do power relations fundamentally consist of?”40 On the relationship between philosophy and power, Foucault says: And I wonder whether this opposition between philosophical reflection and the exercise of power would not better characterize philosophy than

168 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy its relation to science, because, after all, it’s been a long time since phi­ losophy could play the role of ground for science. On the contrary, the role of moderation against power is still worth perhaps being played.41 Foucault compares this task of philosophy with that of analytical philosophy, which focuses on the everyday use of language, defining the type of philoso­ phy which he demands as an analytical-political philosophy,42 in which the concept of the game is given a power-political turn.43 Foucault distinguishes between large and more modest games and intends to carry out a detailed analysis of the latter. He states that at a time when pastoral power is used in the political sphere − primarily a Christian religious power technique − a theoretical shift to these power techniques is necessary. In this context he also states that today opposition to power with its destabilising effect would be directed precisely against these individualising, controlling and supervising power techniques.44 Revolution as a form of resistance which seeks to over­ throw power is no longer the form of resistance which characterises the pre­ sent. Foucault asks: “As the 20th century draws to its close, do we witness something like the end of the age of revolution?”,45 noting that although the monopoly of revolution which has existed since the French Revolution no longer exists, it is nevertheless premature and inadmissible to proclaim the death of revolution as a form of resistance.46 Foucault’s reading of Kant’s historical-philosophical view of the French Revolution as a sign of the people’s will for progress illustrates the close relationship between the Enlightenment and the revolution in Kant’s work, although Kant is not a proponent of revolutionary measures. On the con­ trary, he criticises the revolution as destructive to the law, causing a relapse into the state of nature. Although this rejection of the revolution47 can be equally observed in Foucault’s work, the two questions ‘What is Enlight­ enment?’ and ‘What is Revolution?’ remain key themes for Foucault’s poli­ tical philosophy.48 They encompass a theoretical and practical dimension, forming the basis for a discussion of appropriate political action − also from an ethical point of view. Foucault investigates power as the interplay of various forces at the macrophysical and micro-physical levels, within the scope of which there are, on the one hand, institutionally secured power structures and forces which have become established elements of the game and, on the other, mechanisms and practices which determine people’s everyday actions on a small scale. In terms of its strategies and technologies, power acts productively by creating spaces of empowerment which equally affect the constitution of the subject. Foucault strives for a society in which the highest possible degree of selfdetermination can be achieved and in which power structures which have been established or are in the process of being established are broken down. For him, resistive action in various forms is integrated into the logic of power. Foucault identifies autonomy, self-determination and freedom as cri­ teria for the assessment of subject formation processes; forms of subjects and

History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy 169 social conditions, thus creating the unspoken normative foundation of his philosophy. Suárez Müller’s narrowing of the concept of the game in the sense of struggle and war results in his neglect of non-aggressive, non-violent forms of the exercise of power in the context of communication in Foucault’s theory of power. This causes him to reach an incorrect conclusion. He states: Thus the model of war seems to have reached its limits in Foucault’s work, for it is not struggle and war, but agreement and recognition of the institutional framework that thus become the defining concept of the regulatory ideal of a society that is as non-violent as possible.49 He demands: “The combative model of power would therefore have to be supplemented by a dialogical model of power.”50 This dialogical under­ standing must be viewed as already being integrated into Foucault’s defini­ tion of power as an interplay of forces, in which struggle and war represent only certain manifestations of the game. For Foucault, power and violence are relational concepts; violence must be regarded as an integrative component of power. He asserts that the distinc­ tion between a positive concept of power and power as a relationship of violence is based on the self-determination and freedom which are possible and granted to others within the scope of the interplay of forces. Violence in all its different forms may possibly destroy the potential of the participants to achieve freedom which is required for ‘power plays’, thus violence must be regarded as the margin of power. “Violence is paradoxically dangerous because it neutralizes the social struggle”, since it breaks “the other’s capa­ city for resistance”.51 Suárez Müller notes Foucault’s attempt to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate power via the concept of violence. How­ ever, it turns out that Foucault adopts different legitimation strategies as regards the various historical forms of power and violence. The forms of power explored by Foucault, such as sovereign power, pastoral power, dis­ ciplinary power, bio-power, etc., incorporate different concepts of violence and different ways of dealing with violence. While sovereign power shows and confirms its power through the use of violence up to and including kill­ ing, biopower, for example, requires racism − as state racism − in order to legitimise the physical use of violence. It becomes apparent that the various forms of exercising power − viewed synchronously as well as diachronically − are simultaneously accompanied by different ways of using violence and its legitimisation, which Foucault attempts to analyse. Foucault argues in a more differentiated way as regards the different aspects associated with the phenomena of power and violence than assumed by Suárez Müller. In his philosophy he formulates the claim that the freedom of the other must be respected when exercising power. In this context, he calls for an art of gov­ ernance at various levels of human action – related to the self; interpersonal communication and interaction; and governance in institutionalised contexts such as the economy and politics.

170 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy

Philosophy and theatre. On the stylistic aspect of Foucault’s philosophical writing Foucault’s philosophical thinking often focuses on literature, language and the visual arts, and is inspired by these in a variety of ways. What is the sig­ nificance and function of his literary, linguistic and art-theoretical con­ siderations and his investigations of works from literature, painting, photography and film in the overall framework of his concept of history, power and philosophy? Is there a conclusive theory of the aesthetic in Fou­ cault’s work and how is it linked to his aesthetics or ethics of the self ? Does it do justice to the peculiarity of aesthetic-literary and visual-artistic forms of expression or is the focus on Foucault’s functionalisation of literature and art? In this context, the link between theatre and philosophy and Foucault’s tendency towards dramatisation in writing are equally relevant. It becomes apparent that Foucault’s innovative approach to philosophy and history is also associated with a novel form of philosophical writing as literary or dra­ maturgical writing. His concept of philosophy as parrhesia raises the ques­ tion of truth-telling, in which the speaker expresses their attitude in a dramatic manner of speaking and writing. In the context of the implications associated with this, Foucault’s understanding of philosophy will be analysed as regards aesthetic questions. Greater attention will be devoted to Foucault, the aesthetician, art theorist and literary theorist. The interview focuses on the links to theatre, dramaturgy and dramatisation in Foucault’s philosophy. Foucault says: The questions ‘Who are we?’ and ‘What is going on?’ are very different from traditional questions – such as ‘What is the soul?’ or ‘What is eternity?’ Philosophy of the present, philosophy of the event, philosophy of what is going on, in a sense it’s a way of using philosophy to grasp what theatre addresses, for theatre always concerns itself with the event.52 Foucault uses a comparison with the theatre to define the content of philo­ sophy, in this case focusing on the event which is also at the centre of his concept of history, again illustrating his close relationship to literature in a different regard. He further expands the metaphor of theatre by adding: I would like to write a history of the theatre in which we tried to distin­ guish truth from falsehood; but that’s not the distinction that most interests me, it’s the constitution of what is staged and the constitution of theatre. It’s the theatre of truth that I would like to describe. How did the West construct a theatre of truth, a stage for truth, a stage for the rationality that has now become a sign of Western man’s imperialism, because its economy, Western economy, may have arrived at its apogee? The essence of the West’s way of life and its political domination have no

History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy 171 doubt come to an end. But there is something that has remained, which the West has left to the rest of the world, and that is a certain form of rationality, a particular perception of truth and error, a theatre of the true and the false.53 The theatre presents the true and the false in knowledge-power complexes in historical contexts, with knowledge structured by historical apriority. In addition to the content, stylistic similarities to theatre in particular bring this relationship to life. Foucault calls his writing ‘dramaturgical’ and admits to staging and intensifying events he describes. His writing is a form of drama­ tization.54 His focus also shifts to the aspect of spatiality, which he wishes to grasp using terms such as inside, outside, threshold, etc. and topos, hetero­ topia and utopia, while its relevance is considered as integrated into the metaphor of the theatre. According to Foucault, there is a theatrical aspect to power relations in particular and they “constitute this theatre”.55 Power relations and discursivity are closely related; taking the power-knowledge nexus as his starting point, Foucault speaks of a history of the human sciences as a prerequisite for an analysis of the present. In addition to general referencing of the theatre, Foucault repeatedly alludes to individual plays − especially Greek tragedies − in order to analyse them and develop and substantiate his philosophical thoughts. The literary texts are given a monumental character and treated like historical sources − similar to visual artistic media. Velázquez’s painting Las Meninas, which is an exemplary embodiment of the Classicist episteme of representation, is a famous example of Foucault’s approach to works of art.56 These objects are elements of the archive of linguistic and visual discourses which is being examined, each with its own specific codes, rules, etc. which are irreducible to one another. Foucault interprets the drama Oedipus Rex by Sophocles as a manifestation of the transformation of truth-finding in Greek thought; as a shift from truth-finding to the predestination and revelation of an existing truth in the sense of the prophetic-ideographical type of truth to the revela­ tion of truth through testimony and investigation − procedures of knowledge determination or law. The test, used as a vivid means of finding the truth in ancient Greece in the Classical era, is thus replaced by empirical reconstruc­ tion through an investigation of what has occurred. Foucault’s analysis of the transformation of law and forms of truth in ancient Greece is at the centre of his analysis of Oedipus Rex and other Greek tragedies. His interest focuses on the reconstruction of forms and transformations of knowledge and their significance for the formation of subjects and power constellations. They are examined in a historical context, particularly in relation to practices associated with them, with a special focus on law and politics. The tragedy Ion by Euripides is cited as another example of the substitu­ tion and devaluation of archaic thought − this time in relation to mythology − and the formation of a new democratic form of truth, parrhesia, in which people, not gods, vouch for truth. The tragedies Electra and Orestes by

172 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Euripides are also analysed from the perspective of parrhesia as an example of its positive and negative forms. The comparable methodological investi­ gation of Cervantes’ novel Don Quixote, interpreted by Foucault as a docu­ ment of transition, marking the shift from the episteme of similarity to the episteme of representation and thus reflecting the change from Renaissance thinking to Classicism, illustrates the significance of literature as a place of discourse for Foucault. According to Foucault, Borges’ literature, with its creative approach to categories of thought, allows the constructivist char­ acter of forms of thought; patterns of order; concepts and rules to become visible in the fictional in an explicit form, thus revealing their impact on both the social and the political in a general way. This reveals Foucault’s equal treatment of historical facts and fictional literary and visual products as monuments. Foucault’s dramaturgical writing appears primarily as a staging of events, such as the execution of Damiens at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, and as an exemplification, such as the model of the panopticon, in which Foucault depicts a prison building.57 It involves different procedures such as dramatisation, illustrative exemplification, concretisation and con­ trasting. Different types of texts and visual monuments stemming from dif­ ferent domains of knowledge such as biology, psychology, psychiatry, economics, linguistics, statistics, sociology, medicine, literature, visual arts, film, etc. are combined. Foucault’s writing also oscillates between the poeticmetaphoric, dramatic, scientific and philosophical − as a dramaturgy of parrhesia with a suggestive power. Literature and art play an important role in Foucault’s work: “It is no coincidence that almost all his important works rely on works of art or − as in the case of The Order of Things − are based on them.”58 SchröderAugustin notes in the context of Foucault’s analysis of Magritte:59 “This lit­ erary style, however, obscures a clear philosophical thought process.”60 He challenges Foucault’s perspective on the painter’s work in the sense of an autonomy of signs with Magritte’s objective being to reduce and overcome the distance between signs and reality “in a spontaneous act of ‘inspired’ and ‘immediate’ thought”.61 Foucault, however, does not consider recourse to the objectives of artists; works of art are regarded as independent monuments which are placed in historical-critical contexts during their archaeological and genealogical analysis. Literature belongs in the same field as all other cultural forms and expressions of thought of an era. This is well-known, however this insight is usually expressed by referring to influences, collective men­ talities, etc. I believe that even the way our culture uses language during a specific period is closely interlinked with all other forms of thought.62 Foucault’s philosophical thinking searches in particular for new approa­ ches to the construction of historical knowledge in the sense of philosophical truth-telling which integrate sensibility, corporeality and emotionality, going

History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy 173 beyond the application of stringent rationality. By using this approach, which is based on Nietzsche, Foucault challenges us in our understanding of methodology, history and philosophy.

Language, literature and the visual arts in Foucault’s work Michel Foucault’s analysis of aesthetic questions is linked to his epistemolo­ gical interest; aesthetic considerations are closely related to the investigation of processes of knowledge, power and subjectivation. Searching for the his­ torical forms of truth and validity in the domain of the discursive and dis­ positive, he examines the sayable and visible of certain historical periods in which epistemes or forms of historical a priori structure the knowledge of a time. He examines in particular literature, painting, film, photography and architecture. Aesthetic works incorporate systems of knowledge and power, but also offer counter-sites for new, alternative experiences. Foucault dis­ cusses a number of artistic works in detail, such as paintings by Velázquez, Monet, Kandinsky, Klee and Magritte; films by René Allio and photographs by Duane Michals. On the other hand, he develops a specific theory of lit­ erature and, to a certain extent, an art theory, in which he addresses questions regarding the creation and reception of art. The concept of the game as a literary-artistic, aesthetic and real life cate­ gory is at the centre of Michel Foucault’s aesthetics, determining, on the one hand, the specificity of the aesthetic and, on the other, the link between the aesthetic and real life, which is understood as the link between ethics and aesthetics in the transformation process of the subject in the sense of an ethical/aesthetic shaping of self. In Foucault’s work, games are more specifi­ cally characterised as a space which enables transgressions and are thus linked to processes of becoming a subject. Thus, Foucault goes beyond the autonomisation in the aesthetic undertaken by Derrida63 in his conception of play and – indirectly in the tradition of Schiller – lays claim to ethical rele­ vance in the process of subjectivation, which essentially concerns processes of power and the connection between power and knowledge, including a peda­ gogical dimension. In Foucault’s work, the concept of play is simultaneously at the centre of literary and art theory; subject theory and aesthetics. In order to do justice to the aesthetic dimension of literature and art, Foucault speaks of ‘quasi discourses’64 which exceed the discursive and include, among other things, peculiarities in the aesthetic. According to Foucault, literature also reveals the character of language: “Literature as a whole is linked to lan­ guage in the same way that thought is linked to knowledge. Language is the expression of literature’s unconscious knowledge.”65 He says: Beginning with Igitur […], Mallarmé’s experience (he was a con­ temporary of Nietzsche) unambiguously demonstrates that the idiosyn­ cratic, autonomous game of language is located precisely at the point where humans disappear. Since then it has been possible to say that

174 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy literature is the place where humans perpetually disappear, to the benefit of language. There can be no humans present where ‘language speaks’.66 This particularity of literature, its being able to express the ontology of language as well as ‘unconscious knowledge’, makes it a unique object of research. According to Foucault, discourse and ‘form’, ‘figure’ and ‘formal compo­ sition’, reveal a specific autonomy of the visual; they cannot be reduced to words and “each has their own mode of being; however they also maintain complex, interconnected relationships”.67 The analysis of systems and how they function reveals the distinctiveness of visuality as regards the question of visibility or invisibility − in particular in comparison to linguistic-dis­ cursive phenomena. Foucault regards the works of Goya, Bosch and Brue­ ghel as “forms of perception of typical experiences of madness of the time”.68 They present and enable different experiences which break down boundaries. The paintings of Manet and Klee reveal their character and ele­ ments as visual language, practices and materiality. The canvas; surface; network of horizontal and vertical lines and diagonals; materiality of colours; light and shadow; etc. highlight the specificity of painting. “[B]ut he made a representational play of the fundamental material elements of the canvas. He was therefore inventing, if you like, the ‘picture-object’, the ‘painting­ object’”.69 It is in this context that Foucault perceives a transformation of painting: “[T]his no doubt was the fundamental condition so that finally one day we can get rid of representation itself and allow space to play with its pure and simple properties, its material properties.”70 Paul Klee continues along Manet’s path: “Klee’s art works also break painting down into its individual elements and then put them back together. Although these elements may be simple, they are based on all of painting’s knowledge and are com­ pletely permeated by it.”71 For Foucault, Klee’s works of art can be regarded as prototypical for 20th century paintings in terms of their visual elements: I believe that, for our century, Paul Klee’s art is the best illustration of what the work of Velázquez represents for his era. Klee reveals all the gestures, actions, graphisms, traces, lines and areas which can be con­ stitutive for painting in a visible form, thus transforming the act of painting into painting’s broad, shining knowledge as such.72 The comparison with Velázquez reveals that art includes transformations of knowledge and their disruption by changing epistemes or discursive rules and gaps. Foucault also places the analysis of the aesthetic in the context of discourse analysis in the visual medium. His preoccupation with the domain of visuality occurs parallel to linguistic discursivity. The focus is on elabor­ ating the underlying rules for the formation of discourse and thus the search for the elements which structure perception and thought; for the historical a priori of the visual in the epistemological sense, without Foucault neglecting the peculiarity of the visual over the linguistic. The visible can thus be

History, power and art in Foucault’s philosophy 175 analysed as depicting the order of knowledge of a time/era, as Foucault explains in his famous analysis of the painting Las Meninas. In Foucault’s work, visual discourses are always located within the framework of referen­ cing knowledge, power and the subject. Thus, architecture as a power tech­ nique which forms the subject, for example the panoptic prison building, is also the focus of observations. In addition to the formative power of rules Foucault, however, also emphasises their fundamental potential to transform and transgress, and thus the possible emancipatory character of the visual in subject-forming terms. Foucault is concerned with freedom to shape oneself; with autonomy; with “how not to be governed like that”.73 The focus of his interest in visual questions can therefore be identified as the relationship between subject constitution and visuality, integrating the nexus of knowl­ edge and power. In Foucault’s work, the aspect of subjectivation constitutes the focus of analysis of the visual, while its anchoring in the epistemological, power, subject-theoretical and affective dimension is extended into the poli­ tical/ethical/aesthetic. In the aesthetics or ethics of the self, literature and art become the medium for the subject’s self-shaping in the sense that the individual uses works of art as role models to organise his or her life. The incorporation of the analysis of literary and artistic objects into phi­ losophical reasoning as can be observed in Foucault’s work varies from a rather functionalist approach within the framework of discourse and power theory to an aesthetic analysis of creative procedures and elements; the dis­ cussion of questions of authorship and reception; the constitution of the subject by means of aesthetic techniques and way of life as stylisation of the self − also in an ethical dimension. In the stricter sense of the word, com­ plexes of topics which can be attributed to the aesthetic or to an aesthetic theory are analysed in the context of the fundamental theorems of knowl­ edge, power and the subject of his philosophy. The manner in which litera­ ture and art are discussed is thus highly dependent on the argumentative context. Foucault does not present any elaborated aesthetic theory, but rather invites us to establish a context from the scattered considerations and thus expose or reconstruct his underlying aesthetic theory. On the one hand, Foucault’s aesthetics are located “in the field of tension between Kant and Nietzsche”74 and, on the other, correspond to the socio­ logical interest in literature and art expressed by Bourdieu. His “implicit aesthetics serve […] as a vanishing point of an approach that does not suc­ ceed without the means of philosophy”.75 Aesthetics must therefore be seen as an integrative part of his philosophy, thoroughly permeating it, and his­ torical source. This is another reason why it is also reflected in Foucault’s writing. “For Foucault, the experience of art and literature expresses the fundamental truth that every human framework of experience is basically an order that is consistent in itself, but is arbitrary in principle.”76 Aesthetics act, on the one hand, as a magnifying glass for the visible historical a priori in knowledge-power complexes in history, and, on the other, as an alternative world in which something new emerges and can be tested.

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Notes 1 Foucault is considered by many to be an “ahistorical and anti-humanist thinker”. In: Breitenstein, Peggy: Die Befreiung der Geschichte: Geschichtsphilosophie als Gesellschaftskritik nach Adorno und Foucault. Frankfurt am Main (Campus), 2013, p. 161. Breitenstein notes the existence of a philosophy of history as an ontology of the present in Foucault’s works. Regarding the accusation of denying history, see his note 158 on the same page. 2 Castel asks: “What use did Foucault make of history, and what use can be made of it in order to ‘problematize’ a current question?” In: Castel, Robert: “‘Pro­ blematization’ as a Mode of Reading History”. In: Goldstein, Jan (Ed.): Foucault and the Writing of History. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 1994, p. 237. 3 Cf. Castel 1994: 242. 4 Foucault, Michel: “The Philosophical Scene: Foucault Interviewed by Moriaki Watanabe” (conducted 22 April 1978). In: Fisher, Tony; Gotman, Kélina (Eds.): Foucault’s Theatres. Manchester (Manchester University Press), 2020, p. 227. 5 Cf. Veyne, Paul: “Foucault Revolutionizes History”. In: Davidson, Arnold I. (Ed.): Foucault and His Interlocutors. Chicago, IL (University of Chicago Press), 1997, p. 147. “Foucault is a historian of the purest sort: everything is historical, history is entirely explicable, and all words ending in -ism have to be rooted out” (Veyne 1997: 172). Suárez Müller states in this context as regards Foucault’s approach: “However, his critique of the idealistic theory of history is only possible because he adopts a positivist perspective, and is aware of its naivety.” In: Suárez Müller, Fernando: Skepsis und Geschichte: Das Werk Michel Foucaults im Lichte des absoluten Idealismus. Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 2004, p. 129 (own translation). 6 Veyne 1997: 150. Foucault is equally opposed to historicism and the Marxist understanding of history. 7 Veyne 1997: 181. Foucault states regarding this: “Some of them claim that I deny history. Sartre says that as well, I believe. About them it could be said, rather, that they are eaters of history as others have prepared it. They consume it pre­ processed. I don’t mean to say that everyone should construct the history that suits him, but it’s a fact that I have never been completely satisfied with the works of historians. Although I’ve referred to and used numerous historical studies, I’ve always insisted on doing my own historical analyses in the areas I was interested in.” In: Foucault, Michel: “Interview with Michel Foucault”. In: Foucault, Michel: Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume III. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). London (Penguin Books), 2002, p. 276. 8 Veyne 1997: 172. 9 “Every history is archaeological by nature and not by choice. Explaining history and making it explicit consists in first perceiving it whole, in relating the so-called natural objects to the specifically dated and exceptional practices that objectivized the objects, and in explaining the practices not on the basis of a unique motive force but on the basis of all the neighboring practices in which they are anchored” (Veyne 1997: 181). “Foucault, for his part, strips away the reassuring banalities, the natural objects in their horizon of promising rationality in order to restore to reality – the only reality, the unique reality, our reality – its irrational, ‘exceptional,’ uncanny historical originality” (Veyne 1997: 182). 10 Suárez Müller 2004: 122 (own translation). 11 Suárez Müller 2004: 126 (own translation). 12 Foucault, Michel: “On the Ways of Writing History”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aes­ thetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). New York (The New York Press), 2000, p. 280. 13 “Truth, and its original reign, has had a history within history”. In: Foucault, Michel: “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics,

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Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). New York (The New York Press), 2000, p. 373. He continues: “The genealogist needs history […]. He must be able to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats – the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities” (Foucault 2000: 373). Foucault includes the body in his analysis and states: “Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and his­ tory. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body” (Foucault 2000: 375–376). Cf. Foucault 2000: 376. Cf. ibid. Cf. Foucault 2000: 377. “The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; introducing themselves into this complex mechanism, they will make it function in such a way that the dominators find themselves dominated by their own rules” (Foucault 2000: 378). “‘Effective’ history differs from the history of historians in being without con­ stants. Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men” (Foucault 2000: 380). Foucault 2000: 382. “History has a more important task than to be a handmaiden to philosophy, to recount the necessary birth of truth and values” (ibid.). Cf. ibid. He continues: “Wirkliche Historie composes a genealogy of history as the vertical projection of its position” (ibid.). Suárez Müller 2004: 119 (own translation). Foucault 2000: 385. Foucault says: “They imply a use of history that severs its connection to memory, its metaphysical and anthropological model […]” (ibid.). Schröder-Augustin, Markus: Literatur und Kunst im Werk Foucaults. Berlin (dissertation.de), 2001, p. 46 (own translation). Cf. Schröder-Augustin 2001: 87 (own translation). And he continues: “The lit­ erary and the real, the fictional and the factual, the fool and the lunatic, all these appear in Foucault’s work undifferentiated on same level” (Schröder-Augustin 2001: 93; own translation). Schröder-Augustin concludes: “Overall, Foucault’s interpretation of the ship of fools in the context of Histoire de la folie raises more questions than it answers” (Schröder-Augustin 2001: 99; own translation). Castel 1994: 239. Castel says: “A problematization emerges at a given moment. How can this appearance be dated? What gives one the right to interrupt the move toward an undefined past with the assertion that this current question began to be formulated at such and such a moment in the past” (Castel 1994: 239). Castel further adds: “But in the case of problematization the task is even more demanding [compared to classifications of eras], since the unifying principle might not be the coexistence of its elements in the past but their relationship to a question being asked today” (ibid.). Castel 1994: 239. Castel 1994: 240. Ibid. Cf. Castel 1994: 251–252. Veyne 1997: 182. Foucault considers himself a historian: “It has been said that I’m a structuralist and antihistorian, whereas I have nothing to do with structur­ alism and I am a historian” (Foucault 2020: 227). He continues: “[I]t’s true that there was a way of avoiding, of stepping away from a particular way of doing history without also denying history, rejecting history, or criticising historians, but

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writing history differently. Barthes, for example, is a historian in the way I understand the term. It’s just that he doesn’t do history as it’s been done until now. This has been interpreted as a rejection of history” (ibid.). “It is therefore not sufficient for the diagnosis to focus on its own present as a given phenomenon. It must take up the present in an attempt to anticipate its ruptures and how it points beyond itself toward what one would term a ‘pre­ future’.” In: Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius; Thaning, Morton S.: Michel Foucault: A Research Companion. Basingstoke (Palgrave Macmillan), 2016, p. 435. Veyne 1997: 182. Cf. Schröder-Augustin 2001: 43–44 (own translation). Schröder-Augustin con­ tinues: “The spatially connoted metaphors were replaced in the 1970’s by more genetic-physical metaphors: ‘microphysics of power’, ‘capillary power techniques’, ‘dispositives’, ‘technologies of the self ’, ‘matrix’, ‘herd’ in the medical sense” (Schröder-Augustin 2001: 44; own translation). This impression is created, for example, by constructing metaphors and visual strategies of the space. Schröder-Augustin 2001: 45 (own translation). Schröder-Augustin criticises in this context: “Despite all the originality and diversity of Foucault’s theories, the lim­ itations are obvious: suggestive and confusing argumentation, a lack of identity and determination, and mythologization” (Schröder-Augustin 2001: 45–46; own translation). Raffnsøe et al. 2016: 150. “ Perhaps one could see that there is still a certain possibility for philosophy to play a role in relation to power, which would be a role neither of foundation nor of renewal of power. Perhaps philosophy can still play a role on a side of counter­ power, on the condition that this role does not consist in exercising, in the face of power, the very law of philosophy, on the condition that philosophy stops think­ ing of itself as prophesy, on the condition that philosophy stops thinking of itself either as pedagogy, or as legislation, and that it gives itself the task to analyse, clarify, and make visible, and thus intensify the struggles that develop around power, the strategies of the antagonists within the relations of power, the tactics employed, the foyers of resistance, on the condition in sum that philosophy stops posing the question of power in terms of good and bad, but rather poses it in terms of existence.” In: Foucault, Michel: “The Analytic Philosophy of Politics”. In: Foucault Studies. Transl. by Giovanni Mascaretti. 24, June 2018, p. 192. Fou­ cault continues: “After all, to this extent, the role of philosophy today could well be: what is it about the relations of power within which we are captured and within which philosophy itself has been entangled at least for one hundred and fifty years?” (Foucault 2018: 192). Foucault 2018: 192. Foucault 2018: 190. Foucault states: “In a similar manner, I think we could imagine a philosophy that would have as its task the analysis of what ordinarily happens in power relations, a philosophy that would seek to show what these relations of power are about, what their forms, stakes, and objectives are. As a result, a philosophy that would address the relations of power rather than the games of language, a philosophy that would address all these relations which traverse the social body rather than the effects of language which traverse and underlie our thought. We could ima­ gine, we should imagine something like an analytico-political philosophy” (Foucault 2018: 192–193). Foucault says regarding this aspect: “Relations of power too are played; they are games of power that we should study in terms of tactics and strategy, rule and accident, stakes and objective. It’s a little bit in this direction that I have tried to

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work and that I would like to indicate to you some of the lines of analysis one could follow” (Foucault 2018: 193). Foucault says: “To the contrary, when one takes a closer look, one is struck by all the techniques that were put in place and developed so that the individual does not escape power in any way, or surveillance, or control, or wisdom, or rectifica­ tion, or correction” (Foucault 2018: 199). Human sciences and statistics are involved in this process. “The individual has become an essential concern for power. Paradoxically, power is much more individualizing as it becomes more bureaucratic and state-centered” (Foucault 2018: 199). Foucault 2018: 197. Cf. ibid. Foucault considers revolutions a fact of history but warns of their destructive consequences. Cf. Foucault, Michel: “What is Revolution?” In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 83–95 and Foucault, Michel: “What is Enlightenment?” In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 97–119. Suárez Müller 2004: 108 (own translation). He goes on to say: “The abolition of resistance by consent is itself no longer to be understood as a struggle. But com­ munication does not cease to be power because it is also possible to control external actions by inner consent” (Suárez Müller 2004: 111; own translation). Suárez Müller 2004: 112 (own translation). Suárez Müller 2004: 109 (own translation). Foucault 2020: 223. Foucault 2020: 222. “So the books, as you correctly state – I flatter myself in speaking with so much indulgence, but anyway – are dramaturgies. I realise that this presents certain problems and I risk wrongly presenting as a significant or dramatic event some­ thing that might not have had the importance I attribute to it. Which is my weakness – it’s important to speak of one’s weaknesses along with one’s projects – that is a kind of intensification or dramatization of events that should perhaps be discussed with less ardour. Nonetheless, it’s important to provide as much opportunity as possible to those secret events that scintillate in the past and continue to have an effect on our present” (Foucault 2020: 223–224). Foucault 2020: 230. According to Tanke, the mirror in Velázquez’s painting refers equally to the epis­ teme of similarity − in the sense of an integration of historical forms, transfor­ mations, etc. and, in the painter’s depiction at the centre of the painting, to the future − in the sense of an approaching threshold to modernity and its episteme of man. Cf. Tanke, Joseph J.: Foucault’s Philosophy of Art: A Genealogy of Modernity. London, New York (Continuum), 2009, pp. 16–19. Foucault uses a representation of the panopticon developed by Bentham, which for him represents the paradigm of modern power in terms of the form of dis­ ciplinary power. The use of the pictorial metaphor can be regarded as a method of symbolising power and its functioning. Schröder-Augustin 2001: 10 (own translation). See also: Foucault, Michel: “This is Not a Pipe”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). London (Penguin Books), 2000, pp. 187–204. And: Prange, Regine: Der Verrat der Bilder: Foucault über Magritte. Freiburg im Breisgau (Rombach), 2001. Schröder-Augustin 2001: 60 (own translation). He continues: “The stringency of the constructions is often due to omissions, reinterpretations, or superimpositions of originals. You should not assume in your own analyses that something that is

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precise in detail is also a whole. Empirically and methodically, Foucault is unreliable” (Schröder-Augustin 2001: 13; own translation). Schröder-Augustin 2001: 60 (own translation). Own translation. See the original text: “La littérature appartient à la même trame que toutes les autres formes culturelles, toutes les autres manifestations de la pensée d’une époque. Cela, on le sait, mais on le traduit d’ordinaire en termes d’influences, de mentalité collective, etc. Or je crois que la manière même d’utiliser le langage dans une culture donnée à un moment donné est liée intimement à toutes les autres formes de pensée.” In: Foucault, Michel: “L’homme est-il mort? (entretien avec C. Bonnefoy)”. In: Foucault, Michel: Dits et écrits I. 1954–1975. Paris (Gallimard), 2001, p. 571. Cf. Sonderegger, Ruth: Für die Ästhetik des Spiels: Hermeneutik, Dekonstruktion und der Eigensinn der Kunst. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2000. Foucault, Michel. “What is an Author”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). London (Penguin Books), 2000, p. 215. Own translation. See the original text: “Toute la littérature est dans un rapport au langage qui est au fond celui que la pensée entretient avec le savoir. Le langage dit le savoir non su de la littérature.” (Foucault 2001: 572). Own translation. See the original text: “À partir d’Igitur […], l’expérience de Mallarmé (qui était contemporain de Nietzsche) montre bien comment le jeu propre, autonome du langage vient se loger là précisément où l’homme vient de disparaître. Depuis, on peut dire que la littérature est le lieu où l’homme ne cesse de disparaître au profit du langage. Où ‘ça parle’, l’homme n’existe plus” (Foucault 2001: 571–572). Own translation. See the original text: “chacun leur mode d’être; mais ils entre­ tiennent des rapports complexes et enchevêtrés”. In: Foucault, Michel: “Les mots et les images”. In: Foucault, Michel: Dits et écrits I. 1954–1969. Paris (Gallimard), 2001, p. 650. Schröder-Augustin 2001: 53 (own translation). Foucault, Michel: Manet and the Object of Painting. London (Tate), 2009, p. 79. He also says: “And Manet reinvents [or perhaps he invents!] the picture-object, the picture as materiality, the picture as something coloured which clarifies an external light and in front of which, or about which, the viewer revolves” (Foucault 2009: 31). Foucault 2009: 79. Own translation. See the original text: “La peinture de Klee, elle, compose et décompose la peinture dans ses éléments qui, pour être simples, n’en sont pas moins supportés, hantés, habités par le savoir de la peinture” (Foucault 2001: 572). Foucault further comments on the art works of Klee: “His work is not ‘art brut’ but rather a form of painting which recaptures the knowledge of its most fundamental elements. It is precisely these seemingly simplest, most spontaneous elements, even those which do not appear and should never appear, which Klee makes visible in his art works” (own translation). See also the original text: “Sa peinture n’est pas de l’art brut, mais une peinture ressaisie par le savoir de ses éléments les plus fondamentaux. Et ces éléments, apparemment les plus simples et les plus spontanés, ceux-là même qui n’apparaissaient pas et qui semblaient ne devoir jamais apparaître, c’est ceux que Klee répand sur la surface du tableau” (ibid.). Own translation. See the original text: “Il me semble que c’est la peinture de Klee qui représente le mieux, par rapport à notre siècle, ce qu’a pu être Vélasquez par rapport au sien. Dans la mesure où Klee fait apparaître dans la forme visible tous les gestes, actes, graphismes, traces, linéaments, surfaces qui peuvent constituer la peinture, il fait de l’acte même de peindre le savoir déployé et scintillant de la

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peinture elle-même” (ibid.). Foucault comments on the comparison to the paint­ ing by Velázquez: “Las Meninas included all the depictive elements – the painter; the models; the brush; the canvas; the reflection. They break down the image into all the elements which turned it into a representation” (own translation). See also the original text: “Les Ménines représentaient tous les éléments de la représenta­ tion, le peintre, les modèles, le pinceau, la toile, l’image dans le miroir, elles décomposaient la peinture elle-même dans les éléments qui en faisaient une représentation” (ibid.). Foucault, Michel: “What is Critique”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles (Semiotext(e)), 2007, p. 44. Schröder-Augustin 2001: 15 (own translation). Schröder-Augustin 2001: 81 (own translation). Schröder-Augustin 2001: 82 (own translation).

Bibliography Breitenstein, Peggy: Die Befreiung der Geschichte: Geschichtsphilosophie als Gesellschaftskritik nach Adorno und Foucault. Frankfurt (Campus), 2013. Castel, Robert: “‘Problematization’ as a Mode of Reading History”. In: Goldstein, Jan (Ed.): Foucault and the Writing of History. Oxford (Blackwell Publishers), 1994, pp. 237–252. Foucault, Michel: “This Is Not a Pipe”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). London (Penguin Books), 2000, pp. 187–204. Foucault, Michel. “What is an Author”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). London (Penguin Books), 2000, pp. 205–222. Foucault, Michel: “On the Ways of Writing History”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). New York (The New York Press), 2000, pp. 279–295. Foucault, Michel: “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”. In: Foucault, Michel: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume II. Faubion, James D. (Ed.). New York (The New York Press), 2000, pp. 369–391. Foucault, Michel: “L’homme est-il mort? (entretien avec C. Bonnefoy)”. In: Foucault, Michel: Dits et écrits I. 1954–1975. Paris (Gallimard), 2001, pp. 568–572. Foucault, Michel: “Les mots et les images”. In: Foucault, Michel: Dits et écrits I. 1954–1975. Paris (Gallimard), 2001, pp. 648–651. Foucault, Michel: “Interview with Michel Foucault”. In: Foucault, Michel: Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume III. Faubion, James D. (Ed.), London (Penguin Books), 2002, pp. 239–297. Foucault, Michel: “What is Critique”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 41–81. Foucault, Michel: “What is Revolution?” In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 83–95. Foucault, Michel: “What is Enlightenment?” In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007, pp. 97–119. Foucault, Michel: Manet and the Object of Painting. London (Tate), 2009. Foucault, Michel: “The Analytic Philosophy of Politics”. Transl. by Giovanni Mascaretti. In: Foucault Studies, 24, June 2018, pp. 188–200.

182 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Foucault, Michel: “The Philosophical Scene: Foucault Interviewed by Moriaki Watanabe” (conducted 22 April 1978). In: Fisher, Tony; Gotman, Kélina (Eds.): Foucault’s Theatres. Manchester (Manchester University Press), 2020, pp. 221–238. Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): The Politics of Truth. Los Angeles, CA (Semiotext(e)), 2007. Prange, Regine: Der Verrat der Bilder: Foucault über Magritte. Freiburg im Breisgau (Rombach), 2001. Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius; Thaning, Morton S.: Michel Foucault: A Research Companion. Basingstoke (Palgrave Macmillan), 2016. Schröder-Augustin, Markus: Literatur und Kunst im Werk Foucaults. Berlin (dissertation.de), 2001. Sonderegger, Ruth: Für die Ästhetik des Spiels: Hermeneutik, Dekonstruktion und der Eigensinn der Kunst. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2000. Suárez Müller, Fernando: Skepsis und Geschichte: Das Werk Michel Foucaults im Lichte des absoluten Idealismus. Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 2004. Tanke, Joseph J.: Foucault’s Philosophy of Art: A Genealogy of Modernity. London (Continuum), 2009. Veyne, Paul: “Foucault Revolutionizes History”. In: Davidson, Arnold I. (Ed.): Fou­ cault and His Interlocutors. Chicago, IL (University of Chicago Press), 1997, pp. 146–182.

8

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy

Foucault and (post)colonialism An intensive dialogue can be observed between contemporary African phi­ losophy and the French philosophy of the 20th century. Michel Foucault is of paramount significance in this context. Foucault’s archaeological analysis of the structuring of Western knowledge; his genealogy of power and his inves­ tigation of the knowledge-power nexus are the focus of African philosophers’ interest, both in terms of content and of methodology. According to Fou­ cault, ‘colonial reason’ emerged as a means of differentiation from the Orient. Foucault’s thesis on the division of ratio forms the basis of African philosophers Valentin Yves Mudimbe and Achille Mbembe’s assertions when examining Western discourses in ethnology, anthropology, art etc. regarding Africa in pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial contexts as well as the African and Afrodiasporic dialogue itself, such as the Négritude movement and Pan-Africanism. In this context, Foucault’s power-theoretical questions also shift into the focus of African thinkers. How do Mudimbe and Mbembe reference Foucault; what aspects do they adopt, and when do they criticise Foucault’s remarks? What function does their recourse to Foucault’s theory have in their philosophies? Analysis of the Western concept of reason is one of Foucault’s main themes. In the universality of the Western ratio, there is this division which is the Orient: the Orient, thought of as the origin, dreamt of as the vertiginous point from which nostalgia and promises of return are born, the Orient offered to the colonising reason of the Occident, but indefinitely inac­ cessible, for it always remains the limit: the night of the beginning, in which the Occident was formed, but in which it traced a dividing line, the Orient is for the Occident everything that it is not, while remaining the place in which its primitive truth must be sought. What is required is a history of this great divide, all along this Occidental becoming, fol­ lowing it in its continuity and its exchanges, while also allowing it to appear in its tragic hieratism.1 DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-11

184 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Although Foucault’s philosophy does not focus on the issue of colonialism or postcolonialism, it always resonates in his work, inasmuch as he argues that Western reason, in contrast to the Orient, is determined by a divide. Foucault calls on us to write a history of this divide and, parallel to this, to critically question the universality of European reason. His criticism of the West’s colonial use of violence is made clear by the following quotation: Maybe could we always say that in order to know other cultures − nonWestern cultures, so-called primitive cultures, or American, African, and Chinese cultures etc., − in order to know these cultures, we had not only to marginalize them, not only to look down upon them, but also to exploit them, to conquer them, and in some ways through violence to keep them silent?2 In this context Foucault emphasises the violence manifested in the knowl­ edge process and in the acquisition of knowledge, which includes the control and hierarchical evaluation of the object of knowledge. Parallel to this, however, the manifestation of violence is also an expression of the hunger for power, which is reinforced by knowledge. Africa is subjected to the nexus of knowledge and power which manifests itself in the colonial project of the West. According to Foucault, colonies are heterotopic places of experi­ mentation for the Western powers, some of which are ascribed a quasi-utopian character of potential realisation,3 but are also places of horror, fear and the ever-present threat of loss of control. Foucault’s philosophy is primarily devoted to analysing the theorems of knowledge, power and subject and the relationship between them, which can be similarly significant for an analysis of questions relating to Africa. Foucault assumes that the structuring of knowledge is based on epistemes which define specific eras, which he calls historical a priori. These should not be understood as supratemporal forms, categories or ideas, but instead change within the scope of the historical process. They nevertheless shape knowledge of an era in such a way that it seems natural and necessary. Dis­ course formations are areas of knowledge which are subject to specific rules and offer certain subject positions, thus structuring historically situated dis­ courses on Africa as well as the discourses of Africans on their self-percep­ tion and identity in a specific way. Although Foucault himself does not apply the instruments of discourse analysis in this domain, they can be transferred to other domains of knowledge as a method of archaeological analysis. Using the method of genealogy, Foucault investigates the emergence of forms, functions and strategies of power in the macro and micro spheres. His concept of power is relational, productive and open and can be regarded as a game of power relations or a form of struggle. Over the course of the his­ torical eras, various forms of power replace each other and reappear in later times, mostly in modified form; in other domains and in new combinations. The structuring of knowledge and power is also crucial for subject

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 185 formation. Relating power strategies to the subject and providing the subject with certain empty spaces in the discourses of knowledge which it can or should occupy, shapes it in a special way. The subject, however, does not lose its capacity for self-determination and possible resistance to heteronomous forces in the interplay of power relations between power and knowledge. It does not lose its autonomy in Foucault’s work. In his ethics or aesthetics of the self, Foucault identifies the possibilities for shaping the self using socalled techniques of the self, which help the subject to shape itself in line with art as a role model. This potential of the subject forms the basis of its ability to criticise and change existing circumstances. In the postcolonial context, Foucault sees the necessity for the subject to work on itself in order to transform the formal independence which it has achieved into one which is practically applied. In this respect, Foucault distinguishes between practices of liberation and practices of freedom; the latter must be developed and maintained: [W]hen the colonized people attempt to liberate itself from its colonizers, this is indeed a practice of liberation in the strict sense. But we know very well that this practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that will still be needed if this people, this society, and these individuals are to be able to define admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society. This is why I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of liberation; again the latter indeed have their place, but they do not seem to me to be capable by themselves of defining all the practical forms of freedom.4 The practices of freedom require us to work on ourselves. In the African context this also entails a liberating approach to the aspect of race; Foucault does not, however, refer to this specifically. His examination of the issue of race focuses in particular on state racism, including the biopolitical form of power.

Discourse and power. Mudimbe’s rethinking of Foucault’s philosophy Mudimbe5 combines the archaeological deconstruction of the Western con­ cept of the African Other in ethnology, anthropology, etc. with an analysis of the African investigation of its roots, contents and implications and the search for an African identity. In the genealogical dimension, he discusses historical becoming and questions relating to the knowledge-power relation­ ship in colonial as well as postcolonial contexts thus become relevant. In addition to a recourse to discourse-analytical elements of Foucault’s theory this demonstrates the relevance of his concept of power for Mudimbe’s philosophical conception. Like Foucault,6 Mudimbe examines works of art to reveal the structures of thought and epistemological configurations which they contain. Based on the

186 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy examples of Hans Burgkmair’s painting Exotic Tribe (1508) and the paint­ ings Moor Dancers (1480) by Erasmus Grasser and Katleen the Moor Woman (1521) by Albrecht Dürer among others, he analyses the artistic representa­ tion of the exotic Other in the sense of the episteme of ‘similarity’, which structures Renaissance knowledge; as “blackened whites”; “the sameness signified by the white norm”.7 He contrasts this representation with that of a new ‘epistemological order’ as regards Foucault’s episteme of Classicism, ‘representation’, which uses taxonomies to make classifications based on categories of characteristics. Examples include Two African Men (1697) by Rembrandt and Four Studies of a Black Man’s Head (1620) by Rubens. Mudimbe says on this subject: [O]n the one hand, signs of an epistemological order which, silently but imperatively, indicate the process of integrating and differentiating fig­ ures within the normative sameness; on the other hand, the excellence of an exotic picture that creates a cultural distance, thanks to an accumu­ lation of accidental differences, namely, nakedness, blackness, curly hair, bracelets, and strings of pearls.8 Mudimbe examines the depiction of people of colour in European art start­ ing in the Middle Ages − especially in the works of Stefan Lochner, Rogier van der Weyden and Albrecht Dürer – when “Africa first emerged”9 up until the 20th century. “The Negro emerged naturally as the distant other, the curious other who stands outside the norm, the model that is the Eur­ opean.”10 For modern art with styles such as Cubism, Fauvism and Expres­ sionism, so-called ‘primitive’ African art becomes a source of inspiration for new creative ideas and forms of design. “The ‘barbarian’ becomes an alter­ native, as in the case of Gauguin, who, seduced by the epiphany of the dif­ ference, could proclaim: ‘primitive art is a nourishing milk’, and, more provocatively, ‘despite its beauty, the Greek has been an error.’”11 According to Mudimbe, the West’s approach to African art fluctuates between tenden­ cies towards anthropologisation or ethnologisation and aestheticisation. “‘African art’ and ‘primitive art’ are the products of invention […] but authentic (African) artists exert their freedom to escape this deterministic framework and invent […] a present and a ‘better tomorrow’”.12 The ‘African Art’ discourse formation,13 which developed in the 18th cen­ tury and is linked to a process of aestheticizing African cult objects, and ‘African Studies’ − the invention of Africanism − embody this change in thought structures described by Foucault, which in the context of relations between power and knowledge is coupled with the claim to European dom­ inance and domination. Mudimbe says on this subject: “At any rate, it is the ‘power-knowledge’ of an epistemological field which makes possible a dom­ ineering or humbled culture.”14 He argues that the ‘epistemological shift’ is also the basis for the attempt to classify humans in the 18th century.15 “Colonialism becomes its project and can be thought of as a duplication and

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 187 a fulfilment of the power of the Western discourses on human varieties.”16 Mudimbe’s concern is the unmasking of ‘epistemological ethnocentrism’ and ‘cultural ethnocentrism’,17 which is particularly apparent in anthropology and linked to European colonial aspirations. In this context he examines the concepts of Christian missionary work in Africa and ethnological and anthropological theories in relation to the construction of the self and the other. Mudimbe uses archaeological and genealogical methods to examine Western and African discourses, drawing on central Foucauldian concepts, contents and methods. For Mudimbe, African objects represent in particular “a live memory” and “a social practice of history”, thus embedding the “worked objects” in a historical framework of memory, testimony and time. “Did you really say history? Is there such a link that could rigorously link worked objects to their genesis and, at the same time, integrate their testi­ monies into a history of the society that produces them?”18 Mudimbe affirms his rhetorical questions: Indeed, African worked objects signify an ‘archival’ dimension with a commemorative function. They impress onto their own society a silent discourse and, simultaneously, as loci of memory, recite silently their own past and that of society that made them possible.19 He speaks of a ‘transformation of memory’ and of a ‘metamorphosis of memory’ as a post/colonial experience and form of epistemic use of violence which requires reconstruction.20 This applies to both the present and the future. Here, too, the choice of words used in the title nearly captures Mudimbe’s critical ambition and urge to question a tripartite segmenta­ tion of African history (precolonial, colonial, postcolonial). Reprendre, the French verb that Mudimbe does not translate for fear of not ren­ dering its complexity, conveys the idea of a continuum between the past and the present.21 In addition to visual art objects, Mudimbe is also interested in literary works. When discussing the ‘invention’ of African literature, he refers to Foucault’s rules of exclusion,22 such as external procedures, including privi­ leges of speaking and writing; the distinction between madness and ration­ ality; ‘internal’ procedures, including classification, authorship, distribution and commentary; and systems of scarcity and belonging to discourse. He uses these procedures to analyse African literature with the objective of demonstrating, among other things, the link to the conditions of “present­ day neocolonial postindependence”,23 for example as regards the languages used and the publishers and literary journals which are available. Mudimbe’s critique clearly relies on Foucault’s terminology and methodology to analyse the African literature of his time.24

188 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Furthermore, in the domain of literature he refers in particular to myths, fables and legends of antiquity in order to identify “the domain of GrecoRoman Africa” within them, for example as regards the significance of Libya. “How Libya has been included into, and excluded from, the domain of modern classical scholarship reflects methodological presuppositions of classical scholars themselves.”25 According to him, they reflect the basic structures of European knowledge which are already related to Africa. Mudimbe says: “[I]t gets us thinking how we make myth, how we make myth make our reality.”26 The analysis of myths reveals their historical core: “It tracks Mediterranean history as the history of myth.”27 He continues: “At any rate, reading them today is reading their history.”28 Like Foucault, Mudimbe refers to texts unusual for historiography, more literary in char­ acter, which are reinterpreted. This corresponds to a new understanding of history and a new perspective on the distinction between facts and fiction. This also reveals the relationship to the other: “[T]he concept designates an attitude and a relation to otherness and its transcription to Greek.”29 According to Mudimbe, the processes on which colonial thinking is based were therefore already conceived considerably earlier; in the historical pro­ cess they are subject to omissions, reassessments and new perspectives as well as epistemological shifts, restructurings and ruptures. “Mudimbe’s engage­ ment with Greco-Roman antiquity offers us an excellent case study for thinking about the relationship between postcolonial critique and colonial discourse.”30 He wishes to illustrate the beginnings “of the West’s love-hate relationship with Africa, an idyllic mother figure and political breakdown and strife”31 and “the presence of Africa at the origins of Europe”.32 In this context Mudimbe criticises the “universal Oedipus thesis” of Western con­ cepts, which is also the basis for structuralist ethnology and the European paradigm of progress in comparison to so-called African ‘primitivism’. Fraiture and Orrells state: “Just as the universalization of the Oedipus thesis reflects a Western ethnocentric perspective, so the classical Greek historians, who in Mudimbe’s reading wrote at least in part for the glory of their home, turn out to be ethnocentrically based.”33 They continue: “Mudimbe yet again demonstrates the connections and relationships between precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial inventions of Africa.”34 Mudimbe cites Foucault as regards his concept of history: History, as we know, is certainly the most erudite, the most aware, the most conscious, and possibly the most cluttered area of our memory; but it is equally the depths from which all beings emerge into their pre­ carious, glittering existence’ (2002: 218). There is no problem under­ standing that both the treatment and manipulation of history can quite naturally lead to a kind of violence that is part of all historical projects.35 It is necessary “to revise the concept of history altogether”,36 because history must be regarded as a construct in the Foucauldian sense. For Mudimbe the

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 189 Greek historian Herodotus is both the “father of history” and the “father of lies”.37 The violence involved in the process of historiography is an epistemic violence which must be understood in connection with certain power pro­ cesses and is thus located in the power-knowledge complex. “In this book [The Invention of Africa], Mudimbe is interested in showing how knowledge about Africa was also the production of power relations between Africans and its observers.”38 This form of power is the focus of Mudimbe’s analysis and reflects his agenda to decolonise thought. According to Mudimbe, the hidden use of violence must first be uncovered in order to make it accessible to change. In addition to epistemic power, the disciplinary power linked to the project of Christian conversion is particularly significant in Mudimbe’s theory. “It is not only a dream, but a politics that disciplines beings, space, and time in the name of unspoken models.”39 He continues: Throughout the long period of acculturation, an average of fifteen years, the candidate learns, in the Foucauldian sense, how to become ‘a docile body’. The seminary structures itself as a ‘panopticon’ through three main factors, the space, which reproduce a monastic model, the repartition of time, and the constitution of transparent consciousnesses.40 Here Mudimbe refers to Foucault’s model of the panopticon of Discipline and Punish, which is based on visual control and linked to its internalisation. Methods of pastoral power, which are concerned with guidance through the exploration of the individual soul, are also indirectly addressed. Mudimbe also refers to the spatial separation based on racial categories which has inscribed itself in collective memory.41 As regards the questions of knowledge and power, when referring to Africa he states: “It is, in any case, troubling to note that since the fifteenth century the will to truth in Europe seems to espouse perfectly a will to power.”42 He continues: [T]he will to truth of this history (that claims to be back to the Greeks) exemplifies a negative paradigm: any successful will to truth, converted to a dominating knowledge and actualized as an imperialist project (geographically internal or external), might transform itself into a will to ‘essentialist’ prejudices, divisions, and destructions.43 In his philosophy, Mudimbe proceeds in the sense of Jean-Loup Amselle from the universalising tendency of a logiques métisses, in which ‘ethnological reason’ is replaced by raison métisse and a “critical reappraisal of the politics of universality”44 is aspired to, thereby characterising it in a fundamental way and revealing its objective. In this context he refers to Herskovits’ demand for a ‘world literature’,45 transcultural dialogue and the concept of “levels of truth”.46 Mudimbe says: “As Walter Benjamin once put it, ‘Es existiert bereits als ein sich-Darstellendes’ [It already exists in a self­

190 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy representational manner; own translation]: Truth is always representing itself.”47 As regards Africa, according to Mudimbe it is possible to observe “a polysemic ‘idea’ of Africa” and “the complexity of the idea of Africa”, whose “multiple and contradictory discursive practices” require further ana­ lysis.48 The exploration of the truth in its various degrees and forms also relates to the appreciation of “composite memories”49 and the process of “rereading of the past”50 to rewrite African history in the global context. Mudimbe is critical51 of the Afrocentric project of searching for an authentic Africa, a romanticised African past and an idealised African tradition based on a concept of race, distinguishing between historical forms of “race-think­ ing” and “racism”.52 He draws attention to “the complexity of the relation­ ship between anticolonial/postcolonial thought and Western colonial intellectual framework”.53 His investigations are based on Foucault’s analy­ tical instruments; his thinking operates within the framework of the funda­ mental theorems of Foucault’s philosophy, whose paradigms, concepts and methods are related to new questions concerning Africa. Knowledge analysis, historical concepts and spatial thinking are of particular importance to him, as, in the context of Foucault’s theory of power, are epistemic power, pastoral power and disciplinary power.

Mbembe reading Foucault. The Critique of Black Reason, race and necropolitics Mbembe’s thoughts are based on Mudimbe’s theorem of the ‘invention’ of the continent54 and he explains his idea of Africa’s multiplicity, polyphony and specificity as follows: In other words, what we designate by the term ‘Africa’ exists only as a series of disconnections, superimpositions, colors, costumes, gestures and appearances, sounds and rhythms, ellipses, hyperboles, parables, mis­ connections, and imagined, remembered, and forgotten things, bits of spaces, syncopes, intervals, moments of enthusiasm and impetuous vor­ tices − in short, perceptions and phantasms in mutual perpetual pursuit, yet co-extensive with each other, each retaining on its margins the possibility of, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, transforming itself into the other.55 Mbembe, like Mudimbe, also references Foucault critically, examining both Western and African or Afrodiasporic discourses regarding questions of knowledge and power and how they are interlinked.56 Mbembe broadens the horizon of the analysis and, in contrast to Mudimbe, additionally includes forms of power such as biological power and sovereign power. He subjects Foucault’s theory of power to a critical appraisal and expands it to include a power-analytical investigation of the current socio-historical situation, for example applying the power form of necropolitics or necro-power.57 Mbembe

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 191 expands Foucault’s thinking in a critical manner. He also addresses the aspect of subject constitution through discourses as well as effects of power and refers in them to the African subject58 as a colonial59 and postcolonial subject,60 focusing on the aspect of race. The colonial subject’s identity and perceptions of itself are decisively shaped by this.61 The colonial subject is at the mercy62 of the sovereign power, which is associated with the right to kill, and the disciplinary power, which seeks a kind of ‘domestication’ of the subject − a ‘taming’ and ‘training’.63 According to Mbembe, the postcolonial subject is undergoing a process of becoming and must be subjected to close scrutiny in comparison to the colonial subject: “It has seemed enough to initiate some thinking about the postcolonial African subject, his/her history and his/her present in the world.”64 Based on these considerations, Mbembe develops the concepts of the postcolony 65 and Afropolitanism, thus differentiating himself from both postcolonial theory and subaltern studies. “By insisting too much on differ­ ence and alterity these discourses, however, lost sight of the importance of the fellow human, without whom it is impossible to consider an ethics of the closest – and even less so the possibility of a shared world; a common humanity.”66 Mbembe attempts to achieve this with his Afropolitanism, which is both a political and an ethical and aesthetic theory. Its subject is a global view of Africa − inclusion in the world context. The relationship between the colonised and the colonial master or former colonial master is also reinterpreted. Mbembe wishes to shift the emphasis of the argument away from a focus on the topic of ‘patricide’ to the aspect of “‘violence of brother to brother’”.67 The horizon of his political theory consists in “giving death to the death”, a utopia which can only be expressed “in poetic or even dream form”.68 Mbembe describes this utopia as a “projet radical” and as a “utopie radicale”.69 He also says: “The politics of life, in other words the African subject’s conditions of possibility to ‘attain themselves’, to develop their own sovereignty and, within the scope of this relationship with themselves, to achieve happiness, were at the core of the question I posed.”70 The narrative style of Mbembe’s writings can be described as poetic and is similar to Foucault’s dramatic style: I am searching for a way of writing which forces the reader to encounter their own senses. These encounters are only of interest insofar as they are fragmentary, fleeting, sometimes flawed. The focus is on encounters with the overloaded areas of African memory and its presence, as well as on domains of knowledge which are not included in classic social sciences: philosophy, art, music, religion, literature, psychoanalysis.71 The inclusion of various sciences and cultural phenomena; the emphasis on the historical moment as well as his literary-poetic style are influenced by Foucault’s philosophising. This style is thus based on his experimental understanding of philosophy and methods. Writing and reading become

192 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy experiences in the Foucauldian sense. “This way of writing is closely con­ nected to a form of reading, in particular everyday reading, this privileged place, in which the subject experiences their history. I insist on this notion of experience.”72 Mbembe continues: “These are also experiences in which the real and the fable are reflected in one another.”73 According to Mbembe, they show “the intertwining of the logics of turbulence and the logics of incompleteness”.74 As regards the method of presentation, Mbembe also draws on individual Foucauldian scenes, such as the portrayal of Damiens’ execution from Dis­ cipline and Punish. Mbembe cites a report on the execution of two criminals in Cameroon, on the one hand to illustrate the similarity of the narrative structure and, on the other, to point out the different location, the post­ colony.75 “However, as in the staged rituals examined by Foucault, the execution is definitely a public, highly visible act.”76 In this context, he states that submissiveness had to be shown unconditionally.77 Foucault’s ideas and, in particular, novels by Sony Labou Tansi and Samy Tchak78 are used to describe and analyse the postcolony, for example regarding its baroque character. As in Foucault’s work, fiction and reality enter into an imaginary relationship. According to Mbembe, the power of the postcolony is char­ acterised by an “economics of grandeur and a politics of lust”;79 “[t]he power is primarily expressed in an orgiastic mode”80 and assumes a male form: “Its symbol is the erect male phallus”81 – a “politics of sexual power”.82 The formation of the postcolonial subject takes place under these conditions of submission, which, according to Mbembe, have inherited unconditionality and impunity from colonial sovereignty.83 In this respect he speaks of the “commandement”.84 Postcolonial power is a patrimonial form of power which is based on the “trinity of violence, transfers, and allocations”:85 “[A] trinity constituting the foundation of postcolonial African authoritarian regimes.”86 Mbembe sees the postcolony as a power-knowledge complex in the Foucauldian sense, “made up of discontinuities, reversals, inertias, and swings”, as a relation of events in “multiple durées”.87 He asserts that the rulers and the ruled are bound together by “one and the same bundle of desires”88 and continues: More philosophically, it may be supposed that the present as experience of a time is precisely that moment when different forms of absence become mixed together: absence of those presences that are no longer so and that one remembers (the past), and absence of those others that are yet to come and are anticipated (the future).89 In addition to the dimension of temporal multiplicity the theorem of perceived as transit, dislocation and the loss of an enduring centrality, is significant for the understanding of Mbembe’s concept, in which subjectivity, multidimensional temporality and the absence of localisation are decisive. Mbembe is concerned with determining the distinctive characteristics of

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 193 the current African age, for example also as regards practices of excess and the vulgarity of power, madness and religion as an ‘ensemble of things’.90 Mbembe’s philosophy focuses on the question of the African subject. “The central concern was to rethink the theme of the African subject”.91 Mbembe wishes to “smooth the path for self-criticism and thinking responsibility”92 and assumes the “possibility of an autonomous African subject”.93 The subject should no longer be deprived of its identities.94 His objective is to include the dimension of the future, the possible and the horizon of the past; to work on the memory. He assumes that African subjects are “acting effectively” in the world context.95 According to Mbembe, Africa should henceforth be asso­ ciated with the conception and realisation of an autonomous and energetic African subject of responsibility which strives for reminiscence; the creation of justice and the shaping of the African future in a global context, departing from the paradigm of victimisation and from history as a fate suffered.96 As regards the global context, Mbembe observes a “tendency to universalize the Black condition” and a “rebalkanization of the world”, identifying a trend towards the constitution of a new human being as, for example, a “neuroeco­ nomic subject”; a contemporary process in which pictures have a particular meaning as “a key part of the deployment of a violence”.97 Mbembe asks what dangers the becoming black of the world – understood as an increase of subaltern humanity − entails for the realisation of universal freedom and equality.98 He asserts that the category of race is experiencing a resurgence in the 21st century: “Genomics, rather than marking the end of racism, has instead authorized a new deployment of race.”99 Genetic engineering makes it possible “to use medical techniques of molecular engineering to refashion life itself along lines defined by racial determinism. Race and racism, then, do not only have a past. They also have a future.”100 Mbembe notes in this context: “It does not matter that race does not actually exist as such, and not only because of the extraordinary genetic homogeneity of human beings.”101 Mbembe references Foucault’s observation of the link between state power and racism in the context of a biopolitical orienta­ tion in the domain of power strategies.102 In addition to the proliferation of racelogical thinking, Mbembe − in the spirit of Foucault − notes the “increasing power of the ideology of security”, which in turn justifies the growing use of control instruments and strategies.103 “Race, from this perspective, functions as a security device.”104 Parallel to this, as Foucault makes clear, a ‘culture of fear’ is established.105 According to Mbembe, the renewed recourse to race − often based on the aspects of ‘culture’ or ‘religion’ − represents an attack on the principle of the universally human: Procedures of differentiation, classification, and hierarchization aimed at exclusion, expulsion, and even eradication have been reinvigorated everywhere. New voices have emerged proclaiming, on the one hand, that there is no such thing as a universal human being or, on the other, that the universal is common to some human beings but not to all.106

194 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy Mbembe also vehemently rejects a ‘call to race’ in the black discourse, which serves to create a common ground and process the ‘feeling of loss’ and ‘the memory of a loss’.107 According to Mbembe, human identity should no longer be understood in the sense of a self-referential relationship, neglecting the aspect of belonging to a world. He strives for a new universality, at the centre of which is the concept of humanity. “A true politics of identity con­ sists in constantly nourishing, fulfilling, and refulfilling the capacity for self­ invention.”108 He continues: What we must imagine is a politics of humanity that is fundamentally a politics of the similar, but in a context in which what we all share from the beginning is difference. It is our differences that, paradoxically, we must share. And all of this depends on reparation, on the expansion of our conception of justice and responsibility.109 This politics of humanity assumes that “processes of mixing and interlacing cultures, peoples, and nations are irreversible”.110 This view forms the foun­ dations for the concept of Afropolitanism,111 which combines all of Mbembe’s ideas and is based on the mutual recognition of the vulnerability and finiteness of all human beings.112 According to Mbembe, this forms “the point of departure of every ethical elaboration whose aim, in the last instance, is humanity”.113 Mbembe expands Foucault’s area of exploration, including ‘the Orient’, which Foucault neglects, from an African viewpoint by taking African and Afrodiasporic experiences into consideration. In particular Mbembe carries out an analysis of colonial and postcolonial knowledge and power systems as well as subject forms. This expansion is entirely in line with Foucault, who was always conscious of the limitedness of his analyses and, in addition to this, always propounded the use of his concepts as “little tool boxes”.114 This exploration leads Mbembe to the recognition of new forms of knowledge and power and, ultimately, to a diagnosis of the current socio-political situation in the global context which goes beyond Foucault. He identifies it as the age of brutalism115 and subjects it to specific analysis. According to Mbembe, the postcolony is losing its singular character and becoming a global phenomenon;116 he speaks of a ‘becoming black of the world’, whereby postcolonial philosophy can provide the tools required to analyse global developments. Mbembe’s philosophy achieves the desideratum of crossing an epochal threshold, which is emergent in Foucault’s work, reveal­ ing, defining and reflecting on the characteristics of this new age. The diag­ nosis of the times is simultaneously an attempt to describe future developments which are already rooted in the present. The current age of brutalism combines architecture and politics, similarly to the way in which Foucault asserts this, for example as regards Bentham’s panopticon.117 It is associated with the emergence of new forms of power; new forms of knowl­ edge; new forms of subject and forms of physicality and sexuality which are

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 195 linked to a decentralisation of the phallus118 and also concerns the human self-image. The destructive element of brutalism must, argues Mbembe, be countered with a new politics of repairing and healing which does justice to the fragility and vulnerability of humans and our planet. In Mbembe’s age of brutalism the human paradigm, which Foucault forecast would lose its cen­ tral position as the episteme of the modern age, using the metaphor of the face sketched in the sand on the seashore being erased by the water119 to do so, has now disappeared for ever. The humanisation of objects and machines as well as the artificialisation of the human are creating a new animism which goes hand in hand with the changes resulting from nanotechnology, bio­ technology, information technology, neurosciences, etc. Mbembe’s ideas follow in Foucault’s footsteps and, thanks to this stimulus, go beyond them. His diagnosis of the times has the potential to provide important thoughtprovoking impulses and ideas for the development of solutions to pending problems. While Foucault remains a philosopher of the threshold, Mbembe crosses the threshold to rethink the world.

Notes 1 Jambet, Christian: “Konstitution des Subjekts and spirituelle Praxis”. In: Ewald, François; Waldenfels, Bernhard (Eds.): Spiele der Wahrheit: Michel Foucaults Denken. Frankfurt (Suhrkamp), 1991, p. 229. Jambet cites Foucault’s preface from the first edition of Madness and Civilisation (1961). According to Jambet, the experience of the Orient resembles that of irrationality. This basic idea is addressed by Edward W. Said in his book Orientalism. Cf. Said, Edward W.: Orientalism. New York (Pantheon), 1978. 2 Foucault, Michel: “Foucault – The Lost Interview”. Netherlands, 1971. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzoOhhh4aJg (retrieved: 15 July 2023). 3 Cf. Foucault, Michel: Die Heterotopien: Les hétérotopies: Der utopische Körper: Le corps utopique: Zwei Radiovorträge. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2005, pp. 20–21. 4 Foucault, Michel: “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Free­ dom.” In: Rabinow, Paul (Ed.): Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume I. London (Penguin Books), 2000, pp. 282–283. 5 His major publications include The Invention of Africa (1988), Parables and Fables: Exegesis, Textuality and Politics in Central Africa (1991), The Surreptitious Speech: Présence Africaine and the Politics of Otherness 1947–1987 (1992), Africa and the Disciplines, coeditor (1993), The Idea of Africa (1994), Tales of Faith: Religion as Political Performance in Central Africa (1997), Nations, Identities, Cultures, editor (1997), Diaspora and Immigration: A Special Issue of South Atlantic Quarterly, co­ editor (1997), The Normal and Its Orders, co-editor (2007), and On African Fault Lines: Meditations on Alterity Politics (2013). Masolo describes Mudimbe’s philo­ sophical concern as follows: “As is discernible from the titles and subject matter of his publications, Mudimbe’s major concern has been the politics of power and the invention of the identity of the Other, in this case the European invention of Africa through the writings and other practices that, together, led to the formation of the idea of Africa in the hands of her European colonizers.” In: Masolo, Dismas A.: “Africanizing Philosophy: Wiredu, Hountondji, and Mudimbe”. In: Afolayan, Adeshina; Falola, Toyin (Eds.): The Question of African Philosophy. New York (Palgrave Macmillan), 2017, pp. 61–73.

196 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy 6 In his book The Order of Things, Foucault refers, for example, to Velázquez’s painting Las Meninas in order to illustrate the episteme of ‘representation’ which is central to Classicism. 7 Mudimbe, Valentim-Yves: The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press; James Currey), 1988, p. 8. 8 Mudimbe 1988: 9.

9 Mudimbe in Fraiture, Pierre-Philippe; Orrells, Daniel (Eds.): The Mudimbe

Reader. Charlottesville, VA (University of Virginia Press), 2016, p. 184. 10 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 185. 11 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 192. 12 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 179. 13 “African tourist art and its contradictions (is it an art? In which sense and according to what kind of aesthetic grid?) are just an ad vallem consequence of the process which, during the slave trade period, classified African artefacts according to the grid of Western thought and imagination, in which alterity is a negative category of the Same. It is significant that a great number of European representations of Africans, or more generally of the continent, demonstrated this ordering of otherness” (Mudimbe 1988: 12). 14 Mudimbe 1988: 11. Mbembe further states: “From now on it will develop into a clearly visible power-knowledge political system” (Mudimbe 1988: 16). 15 “They formed part of the series of oppositions and of the levels of classification of humans demanded by the logic of the chain of being and the stages of pro­ gress and social development. Explorers just brought new proofs which could explicate ‘African inferiority’” (Mudimbe 1988: 13). 16 Mudimbe 1988: 16.

17 Cf. Mudimbe 1988: 15, 19.

18 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 198.

19 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 197.

20 Cf. Mudimbe, Valentim-Yves: The Idea of Africa: Bloomington, IN (Indiana

University Press; James Currey), 1994, p. 134. 21 Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 175. 22 Cf. Mudimbe 1994: 178, 179. 23 Mudimbe 1994: 183. 24 Mudimbe refers here to the essay by Foucault, Michel: “The Discourse on Language”. Appendix to The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York (Pantheon), 1972, pp. 215–237. 25 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 156. 26 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 159. 27 Ibid. 28 Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 161. 29 Ibid. Elsewhere, Mudimbe says: “And it is precisely this modern problematiza­ tion of objectivist historicism that the Bibliotheca anticipated in its effort to show that history was constantly being retold in numerous mythic media” (Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 162). 30 Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 123. 31 Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 122. 32 Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 120. Mudimbe goes on to speak of “the centrality of Africa in the Greek and Roman imagination” (ibid.). 33 Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 113. Mudimbe wishes to deconstruct and criticise the “historical paradigm of primitive/civilized which the Oedipus thesis installs” (cf. Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 112). “Foucault was a useful resource in Mudimbe’s attempt to debunk the universalization of Western ethnological and psychoanalytical narratives” (Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 111).

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 197 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56

57

58

59

Ibid. Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 137. Mudimbe quotes Foucault here. Mudimbe in Fraiture & Orrells 2016: XXIII. Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 118. Fraiture & Orrells 2016: XXIV. Mudimbe 1994: 112. Mudimbe 1994: 121. Cf. Mudimbe 1994: 136. Mudimbe 1994: 212. Mudimbe goes on to say: “These monstrosities [the slave trade, colonialism and Nazism] impacted on the idea of Africa. One might thus reflect about the similitudes and structural connections they have with both the Western will to knowledge and the will to power” (ibid.). Mudimbe 1994: 213. Mudimbe 1994: 53. Mudimbe 1994: 52. Cf. Mudimbe 1994: 55. Ibid. Mudimbe 1994: 211–212. Mudimbe 1994: 212. Mudimbe 1994: 211. “Mudimbe has nevertheless been critical of African and African American scho­ larship that has appropriated Western ideas about race under the guise of objec­ tivity in order to produce an idealised and romanticised depiction of an ancient African past. Whereas in 1973 Mudimbe subtly warned his Zairean readers about the relationship between ethnocentrism and historiography, so in the 1980s living in the United States, Mudimbe shows himself to be more openly critical of Afrocentric historical discourse” (Fraiture & Orrells 2016: 116). Cf. Mudimbe 1994: 100. For Mudimbe, Arthur de Gobineau marked the shift to ‘racism’ in the 19th century with his Essai sur l’inégalité des races. Fraiture & Orrells 2016: XXIV. Cf. Mbembe, Achille: On the Postcolony. Berkeley, CA (University of California Press), 2001, p. 173. Mbembe 2001: 242. Mbembe, for example, refers to Foucault’s work The Order of Things as regards the truth discourses of the 18th century on nature, the living and the char­ acteristics of man which support Europe’s leadership role. Cf. Mbembe, Achille: Critique of Black Reason. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 2017, pp. 16–17. “Necropolitical power proceeds by a sort of inversion between life and death, as if life was merely death’s medium. It ever seeks to abolish the distinction between means and ends. Hence its indifference to objective signs of cruelty. […] This is why necropolitical power can multiply it infinitely, […] as we see in all the contemporary theaters of terror and counterterror.” In: Mbembe, Achille: Necropolitics. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 2019, p. 38. “[T]he constitution of the African self as a reflexive subject also involves doing, seeing, hearing, tasting, feeling, and touching. […] Thus, the African subject is like any other human being: he or she engages in meaningful acts. (It is selfevident that these meaningful human expressions do not necessarily make sense for everyone in the same way.) The second observation is that the African sub­ ject does not exist apart from the acts that produce social reality, or apart from the process by which those practices are, so to speak, imbued with meaning” (Mbembe 2001: 6). According to Mbembe, the colonial subject is invoked in the relationship between the colonial ruler and the colonised through the gaze of the other: “Within this relationship, the colonized individual can be visaged only as

198 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy

60

61

62

63 64 65

66

67 68

power’s property, something that belongs to it. […] Indeed, being no more than a ‘body-thing,’ it is neither the substrate nor the affirmation of any mind or spirit.” In: Mbembe, Achille: On Private Indirect Government. Dakar (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa), 2000b, p. 9. He goes on to say: “As a force of production, he was in fact set apart, trained, compelled to do heavy work, obliged to bring him into submission, but also to extract from him the maximum possible usefulness” (Mbembe 2000b: 11). The postcolonial subject “is a subject of experience and a validating subject, not only in the sense that she/he is a conscious existence or has a perceptive con­ sciousness of things, but to the extent that his/her ‘living in the concrete world’ involves, and is evaluated by, his/her eyes, ears, mouth – in short, his/her flesh, his/her body” (Mbembe 2001: 17). In addition to emotionality, reason and rationality are also important elements when describing the African subject (cf. Mbembe 2001: 17). Cf. Mbembe 2000b: 20. Mbembe continues: “The colonial relationship qua relationship of subjection was, in fact, inseparable from specific modalities of punishment and from a concern for productivity at the same time. In the latter regard, it differs qualitatively from the postcolonial relationship” (Mbembe 2000b: 11). “A master-servant relationship bound him to the structure of power, the arsenal of paternalism not hesitating to express itself under the ideological mask of benevolence and the banner of humanism” (Mbembe 2000b: 17). The colonial ruler himself often speaks of “a burden” in this respect (Mbembe 2000b: 23). Cf. Mbembe 2000b: 16. Mbembe 2001: 17. “In this sense, we must say that the postcolony is a period of embedding, a space of proliferation that is not solely disorder, chance, and madness, but emerges from a sort of violent gust, with its languages, its beauty and ugliness, its ways of summing up the world” (Mbembe 2001: 242). Own translation. The original quotation is as follows: “Mais à force de trop insister sur la différence et l’altérité, ces courants ont perdu de vue le poids du semblable sans lequel il est impossible d’imaginer une éthique du prochain − encore moins d’envisager la possibilité d’un monde commun, d’une commune humanité.” In: Mbembe, Achille: De la postcolonie. Paris (Éditions Karthala), 2000a, p. XI. Mbembe continues: “On the other hand they turned the struggle between ‘father’ and ‘son’ – i.e. the relationship between the colonial master and those who have been colonised – into what was, in the final instance, a political paradigm in non-European societies, thus obscuring the intensity of the ‘vio­ lence of brother to brother’ and the problematic status of ‘sister’ and ‘mother’ among the siblings” (own translation). The original quotation is as follows: “D’autre part, en faisant de la lutte entre ‘père’ et ‘fils’ − c’est-à-dire du rapport entre colonisateur et colonisé − le paradigme en dernière instance du politique dans les sociétés non-européennes, ils ont occulté l’intensité de la ‘violence du frère à l’égard du frère’ et le statut problématique de la ‘sœur’ et de la ‘mère’ au sein de la fratrie” (Mbembe 2000a: XI). Own translation. The original quotation is as follows: “violence du frère à l’égard du frère” (Mbembe 2000a: XI). Own translation. The original quotations are as follows: “donner la mort à la mort” and “une forme poétique, voire onirique” (Mbembe 2000a: XVI). Mbembe does not believe that the crisis of postmodern nihilism, afropessimism, etc. “can be overcome by simply referencing concepts such as hybridity, diver­ sity and contingency” (own translation). The original quotation is as follows: “puisse être surmontée par un simple recours aux notions d’hybridité, de multiplicité et de contingence” (Mbembe 2000a: 29).

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 199 69 Mbembe 2000a: XVI. 70 Own translation. The original quotation is as follows: “La politique de la vie, c’est-à-dire les conditions de possibilité du sujet africain de ‘s’atteindre lui­ même’, d’exercer sur lui-même sa souveraineté et de trouver dans ce rapport à lui-même la plénitude de son bonheur, tel était donc le cœur de mon interrogation” (Mbembe 2000a: XVI–XVII). 71 Own translation. The original quotation is as follows: “J’étais à la recherche d’une écriture qui conduise le lecteur à la rencontre de ses propres sens. Mais ces rencontres, elles ne m’intéressent qu’en ce qu’elles sont fragmentaires, éva­ nescentes, hachées, quelques fois ratées. Il s’agit de rencontres avec des sur­ chargées de la mémoire et du présent africains et des régions de la connaissance qui ne se ramènent pas aux sciences sociales classiques: la philosophie, les arts, la musique, la religion, la littérature, la psychanalyse” (Mbembe 2000a: XVII). 72 Own translation. The original quotation is as follows: “Cette écriture est étroi­ tement liée à une manière de lire. Et notamment de lire la vie quotidienne, ce lieu privilégié ou le sujet fait l’expérience de son histoire. J’insiste sur cette notion d’expérience” (ibid.). 73 Own translation. The original quotation is as follows: “Ce sont aussi des expériences où le réel de la fable se reflètent l’un l’autre” (ibid.). 74 Own translation. The original quotation is as follows: “enchevêtrement des logiques tourbillonnaires et des logiques de l’inachèvement” (Mbembe 2000a: XVIII). Mbembe describes the struggle for an appropriate linguistic style with the following words: “Confronted with the absurdity of most discourses on the continent it appeared to me that one way to throw off the yoke would be to experiment with language, firstly by attempting to dynamite it. I attempted to carry out this demolition task by taking the indirect route of shortcuts, repeti­ tions and inventions; using a narrative style which draws on both memories and digressions as well as also sentences which pretend to be unambiguously ‘scien­ tific’, simply following one after another. My writings on Africa were sometimes open, sometimes hermetic, composed of rhythms, melodies and notes, in the tradition of a ‘shadow song’ (Senghor), which you not only have to listen to but also experience with all your senses to really hear it” (own translation). The original quotation is as follows: “Face au caractère absurde de la plupart des discours sur le continent, il me semblait qu’une manière de sortir du carcan était d’expérimenter avec la langue, et d’abord de tenter de la dynamiter. Ce travail de démolition, j’ai essayé de l’accomplir par le biais de raccourcis, de répéti­ tions, d’inventions, une manière de raconter qui fait usage tant de souvenirs et de digressions que le phrases qui voudraient claires, ‘scientifique’, alignées les unes a la suite des autres. Mon écriture de l’Afrique se voulait tantôt ouverte, tantôt hermétique, faite de rythmes, de mélodies et de sonorités, d’une certaine musique, à la manière d’un ‘chant d’ombre’ (Senghor) qu’il faudrait non pas l’ouïe seule mais tous les sens pour capter, pour entendre réellement” (Mbembe 2000a: XVII). 75 Cf. Mbembe 2001: 113. 76 Mbembe 2001: 115. 77 Cf. Mbembe 2001: 113. 78 Cf. Mbembe 2000a: XXVI. 79 Own translation. See the original text: “une économie de la somptuosité et une politique de la volupté” (Mbembe 2000a: XX). 80 Own translation. In the original text he says: “[q]uant au pouvoir lui-même, il s’exprime avant tout sur un mode orgiaque” (ibid.). 81 Own translation. In the original text he says: “Son effigie, c’est la verge en érection” (Mbembe 2000a: XXII).

200 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy 82 Own translation. In the original text the quotation is as follows: “[Cette] poli­ tique de la puissance sexuelle” (Mbembe 2000a: XXIII). However: “From that moment the symbol has a ghostly function. By attempting to go beyond its contours the physical form of power inevitably reveals its nudity and limits, exposing itself through this revelation and, paradoxically, proclaiming its vul­ nerability through the act which was intended to demonstrate its all-pervading power” (own translation). In the original text this passage is as follows: “L’effi­ gie joue, à partir de ce moment, une fonction spectrale. En cherchant à dépasser ses propres contours, le corps du pouvoir expose, par la force des choses, sa nudité et ses limites et, en les exposant, s’expose lui-même et proclame, de manière paradoxale, sa vulnérabilité dans l’acte même par lequel il prétendait manifester sa toute-puissance” (Mbembe 2000a: XXII–XXIII). 83 Mbembe 2001: 26. 84 Mbembe 2001: 31. 85 Mbembe 2001: 45. 86 Ibid. Mbembe notes: “Since enjoyment of a salary was almost always of moment to more than the individual who earned it, the salary as an institution was an essential cog in the dynamic of relations between state and society. It acted as a resource the state could use to buy obedience and gratitude and to break the population to habits of discipline” (ibid.). In addition to this, the state used the “private appropriation of public resources, to create allegiances” (Mbembe 2001: 46). “Thanks to these two forms of allocation, economic things were converted into social and political things” (ibid.). There is “the lack of a sharp distinction between public money and private property” (cf. Mbembe 2001: 51). In addition, “quasi-criminal methods” such as “racketeering, murder, violent seizure of property, and straightforward massacres” can be observed in many African countries as can the fact that “economic activity is increasingly like war activity” (Mbembe 2001: 50). Mbembe notes: “[T]hree major historical processes […]: first, the de-linking of Africa from formal international markets; second, the forms of its integration into the circuits of the parallel international economy; and third, the fragmentation of public authority […]” (Mbembe 2001: 67). The situation has deteriorated in the meantime: “Henceforth, ‘citizens’ are those who can have access to the networks of the parallel economy, and to the means of livelihood for survival that economy makes possible” (Mbembe 2001: 84). If “the army, the police, and the bureaucracy [are] operating like a racket, squeezing those it administers”, then “one is dealing with a novel historical formation” (ibid.). He goes on to say: “In other words, there is no longer dif­ ference between taxation and exaction” (Mbembe 2001: 85). Mbembe notes: “However, not enough stress has been laid on the decisive character of the international supports this process enjoys” (ibid.). In this context, Mbembe speaks of an “imperialism of disorganization”, which is about the “transfer of wealth to private interests” (cf. Mbembe 2017: 5). Speaking on the possibility of the constitution of a state power, he says: “It is well known that, all through the history of modern societies, taxation has provided the ultimate economic foun­ dation of the state, just as the monopoly of legitimate violence was one key to state-building” (Mbembe 2001: 89). He concludes: “[W]hat we are witnessing in Africa is clearly the establishment of a different political economy and the invention of new systems of coercion and exploitation. For the time being, the question is whether these processes will or will not result in emergence of a system of capitalized coercion sufficiently coherent to push through changes in the organisation of production and the class structure of African societies, and whether it will prove possible for the submission of Africans required by these processes, and the exclusion and inequalities involved, to acquire legitimacy, and for the violence that goes with them to be tamed to the point of again becoming

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 201

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102

103 104 105 106

107 108 109 110 111

112

a public good” (Mbembe 2001: 93). He continues: “The basic question, of the emergence of a subject with rights, remains unresolved” (ibid.). The aim must be that the state should “define itself as a common good” (ibid.). It becomes apparent that, in this situation of political upheaval, Mbembe hopes for the formation of states which guarantee the creation of law and the common good. Mbembe 2001: 14. Mbembe refers in note 41 to Foucault, Michel: “Revenir à l’histoire”. In: Dits et écrits. Paris (Gallimard), 1994, pp. 278–80. Own translation. In the original text he says: “Un même faisceau du désir”. In: Mbembe, Achille: Politiques de l’inimitié. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2016, p. 51. Mbembe 2001: 16. Cf. Mbembe 2001: 15. Ibid. Own translation. In the original text he says that he would like: “mieux ouvrir la voie à la critique de soi et à la pensée de la responsabilité” (Mbembe 2000a: XVII).

Mbembe 2001: 14.

Cf. Mbembe 2000a: 140.

Mbembe 2001: 17.

Cf. Mbembe 2017: 88.

Mbembe 2017: 4–5.

Mbembe 2017: 7.

Mbembe 2017: 21.

Ibid. Mbembe 2017: 34. In this respect Mbembe thinks like Appiah. “Foucault, dealing with racism and its inscription in the mechanisms of the state and power, noted in this regard that ‘the modern State can scarcely func­ tion without becoming involved with racism at some point, within certain limits and subject to certain conditions.’ Race or racism, ‘in a normalizing society’, he noted, ‘is the precondition that makes killing acceptable.’ He concludes, ‘Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murder­ ous functions of the State’” (Mbembe 2017: 32–33). He goes on to say: “Race reconciled masses, classes, and populations, and/or the legacies of natural history, biology, and political economy” (Mbembe 2017: 36). Cf. Mbembe 2017: 22. Mbembe speaks of the “merging of the civil, police, and military spheres with those of surveillance” (Mbembe 2017: 23). Mbembe 2017: 35. Mbembe 2017: 81. Mbembe 2017: 24. “Like the beginning of the nineteenth century, the beginning of the twenty-first constitutes, from this perspective, a significant moment of division, universal differentiation, and identity seeking” (Mbembe 2017: 24). He continues: “The racist subject sees the humanity in himself not by accounting for what makes him similar to others but by accounting for what makes him different” (Mbembe 2017: 36). Mbembe 2017: 34. Mbembe 2017: 178. Ibid. Mbembe 2017: 182. Mbembe understands ‘Afropolitan’ as a transnational culture in which philoso­ phy, art and aesthetics play an important role and which is endowed with an ‘esprit du large’ (‘spirit of openness’; own translation) as well as an experiment for a diverse society, a society of diversity. Cf. Mbembe, Achille: Sortir de la grande nuit: Essai sur l’afrique décolonisée: Suivi d’un entretien avec l’auteur. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2013, p. 233. Cf. Mbembe 2016: 10.

202 Foucault, Kant and contemporary African philosophy 113 Mbembe 2019: 176. See the original text: “le point de départ de toute élaboration éthique dont l’objet, en dernière instance, est l’humanité” (Mbembe 2016: 184). 114 Cf. Foucault, Michel: “From Torture to Cellblock”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961–1984. New York (Semiotext(e)), 1996, p. 149. 115 Cf. Mbembe, Achille: Brutalisme. Paris (La Découverte), 2020. 116 Cf. Mbembe 2020: 13. 117 Cf. Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York (Random House), 21995, pp. 195–228. 118 Mbembe 2020: 128. Mbembe discusses the plurality of bodies and affects as well as experimental sexuality such as technosexuality (cf. Mbembe 2020: 128–129). There is a reorganisation of the genders in this ‘onanist society’: “The patri­ archy has no longer any need for women” (own translation). See the original text: “les sociétés onanistes” and “le patriarcat n’a plus besoin de femmes” (Mbembe 2020: 121). 119 Cf. Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. New York (Routledge), 1989, p. 422.

Bibliography Foucault, Michel: “Foucault – The Lost Interview”. Netherlands, 1971. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzoOhhh4aJg (retrieved: 15 July 2023). Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. New York (Routledge), 1989. Foucault, Michel: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York (Random House), 21995. Foucault, Michel: “From Torture to Cellblock”. In: Lotringer, Sylvère (Ed.): Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961–1984. New York (Semiotext(e)), 1996, pp. 146–149. Foucault, Michel: “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom.” In: Rabinow, Paul (Ed.): Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984. Volume I. London (Penguin Books), 2000, pp. 281–301. Foucault, Michel: “Revenir à l’histoire”. In: Foucault, Michel: Dits et écrits I. 1954–1975. Defert, Daniel; Ewald, François (Eds.). Paris (Gallimard), 2001, pp. 1136–1149. Foucault, Michel: Die Heterotopien: Les hétérotopies: Der utopische Körper: Le corps utopique: Zwei Radiovorträge. Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 2005. Fraiture, Pierre-Philippe; Orrells, Daniel (Eds.): The Mudimbe Reader. Charlottesville, VA (University of Virginia Press), 2016. Jambet, Christian: “Konstitution des Subjekts and spirituelle Praxis”. In: Ewald, François; Waldenfels, Bernhard (Eds.): Spiele der Wahrheit: Michel Foucaults Denken. Frankfurt (Suhrkamp), 1991, pp. 229–248. Masolo, Dismas A.: “Africanizing Philosophy: Wiredu, Hountondji, and Mudimbe”. In: Afolayan, Adeshina; Falola, Toyin (Eds.): The Question of African Philosophy. New York (Palgrave Macmillan), 2017, pp. 61–73. Mbembe, Achille: De la postcolonie. Paris (Éditions Karthala), 2000a. Mbembe, Achille: On Private Indirect Government. Dakar (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa), 2000b. Mbembe, Achille: On the Postcolony. Berkeley, CA (University of California Press), 2001. Mbembe, Achille: Sortir de la grande nuit: Essai sur l’afrique décolonisée: Suivi d’un entretien avec l’auteur. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2013.

Foucault and contemporary African philosophy 203 Mbembe, Achille: Politiques de l’inimitié. Paris (Editions La Découverte), 2016. Mbembe, Achille: Critique of Black Reason. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 2017. Mbembe, Achille: Necropolitics. Durham, NC (Duke University Press), 2019. Mbembe, Achille: Brutalisme. Paris (La Découverte), 2020. Mudimbe, Valentim-Yves: The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press; James Currey), 1988. Mudimbe, Valentim-Yves: The Idea of Africa. Bloomington, IN (Indiana University Press; James Currey), 1994. Said, Edward W.: Orientalism. New York (Pantheon), 1978.

Conclusion

The critical investigation of Kant and Foucault in the context of con­ temporary African philosophy reveals a trend towards intercultural dialogue between Western and African and/or Afrodiasporic philosophy, which, as in the case of, for example, Achille Mbembe and Henry Odera Oruka, and in the form of Afropolitanism and ecophilosophy, indicates that a world philo­ sophy is emerging on the horizon. Contemporary African philosophy no longer focuses exclusively on questions concerning Africa in the colonial and/ or postcolonial context but instead also increasingly on analysing the current global situation and on the development of solutions to global problems. This opening of contemporary African philosophy is linked to a particular focus on Africa. Referencing of Kant and Foucault serves not only for cri­ tical reading and self-determination within the scope of negative differentia­ tion with the objective of decolonising thought but also, beyond this, as an argumentative and methodological stimulus and aid for the theoretical and methodological requirements of African philosophising – in the sense of a critical adaption. Kant’s philosophy offers points of reference to contemporary African phi­ losophy for critical engagement in two respects. Firstly, the discrepancy between Kant’s universalist concept of the human as a rational being, his cosmopolitanism and his theory on race and colonialism is criticised, for example by Serequeberhan, and, secondly, his epistemic and ethical uni­ versalism and cosmopolitan concept are positively referenced, for example in the work of Wiredu and Gyekye. Wiredu’s referencing of Kant is a particu­ larly important factor for the overcoming of epistemic and ethical relativism in order to propagate global understanding and cooperation based on his model of consensual democracy, which assumes a shared commonality of all humans. Gyekye requires the supposition of individual autonomy as a poli­ tical corrective and creative potential to develop his moderate commu­ nitarianism, while Appiah and Mbembe reference, among other things, Kant’s philosophy of history and cosmopolitanism. When critically examin­ ing Kant they develop progressive political concepts such as the metana­ tional state; partial cosmopolitanism and Afropolitanism. Kant thus plays an important role in contemporary African philosophy. The central aspects of DOI: 10.4324/9781032658759-12

Conclusion 205 his philosophy make him a relevant dialogue partner in the context of a developing intercultural philosophy. The cosmopolitan concepts of African and/or Afrodiasporic philosophers Appiah and Mbembe reference Kant’s theorems of world citizenship; world citizenship rights; peace and shared ownership of Earth, however are also significantly focused on other topics. Appiah, for example, champions the issues of identity and the ethics of honour, while Mbembe promotes theore­ tical discourse and the aesthetic dimension. The expansion and specification of their concepts is dependent on their corresponding objectives. Appiah is thus concerned with inclusion of the particular; with the question of how cosmopolitanism can be implemented by taking into account individual components such as cosmopolitan identity as a desirable form of identity, and with the motivational basis for cosmopolitan-oriented action based on the virtue of honour. In contrast to Kant, the lack of a teleological founda­ tion means that Appiah cannot assume that nature will encourage the trend towards cosmopolitanism and must thus locate its future realisation solely in individual action. His doctrine of virtue, derived from Aristotle, is combined with Mills’ consequentially focused ethical thinking and adherence to Kant’s process of universalisation – a combination which is, in theoretical terms, problematic. Appiah’s recognition of human rights is of great significance within the scope of his partial cosmopolitanism; and has Kantian roots in its structural function as a legal-institutional movement. Mbembe’s cosmopoli­ tanism appears as an enabling space for the plural, diverse and hybrid and is characterised by the basic concept of pluriversality. He does not reference Kant’s formal ethics in his philosophy. The basis for his Afropolitanism is an ethics of vulnerability which emphasises the shared commonality of all humans and forms the basis for human solidarity. Mbembe’s focus is on removing borders and facilitating mobility. With his demands for simplifica­ tion of the acquisition of citizenships and the facilitation of border crossings he goes beyond Kant’s concept of the right of world citizenship as a right of hospitality, considerably expanding it. In this context, Africa’s development in political, economic and cultural terms is at the centre of his thinking. Politics and aesthetics are closely linked in Afropolitanism since it is the aes­ thetic domain which, in particular, can promote and embody human cos­ mopolitan activity. While in Kant’s aesthetic theory the sensus communis, a human ability which makes communications easier, can be viewed as relevant to cosmopolitanism, for Mbembe aesthetic reception and production are core impulses for the cosmopolitan project – also in the Foucauldian sense as modes of subjectivation. The African philosophers Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu engage cri­ tically with Kant’s image of humanity and his universalism. For them, refer­ encing of Kant is a crucial element, but in different ways. The universalism developed by Wiredu is epistemic and ethical, taking the form of ‘cultural universalism’, with the principle of ‘sympathetic impartiality’ forming the basis for his socio-political concept. In contrast to Kant, the focus of social

206 Conclusion structuring as a consensus-promoting impulse is not on legal issues but instead on the process of understanding between humans based on similar ways of thinking; basic moral assumptions; lifestyles and goals. Critical investigation of Kantian universals in the epistemic domain culminates in the theoretical grounding of the possibility of consensus within his model of consensual democracy, which must be further specified and tested as regards its realisability in modern societies. While Wiredu emphasises the aspect of interpersonal communication based on epistemic and ethical cultural uni­ versals, Kant’s political thinking focuses on legal and organisational impulses to create a cosmopolitan legal system and establish a federation of states. In Gyekye’s work, Kant’s theorems support his concept of the person by the defining elements of autonomy, freedom and free will. Parallel to this, the role of the individual is outlined in the social context, for example as an innovative force in cultural and socio-political terms. This concept of the person is the basis of Gyekye’s theory of moderate communitarianism, which is at the centre of his philosophy and the starting point for moral, cultural and political considerations. Starting from Kant, the individual is described as a bearer of rights, making human rights justifiable. The political implica­ tions of this theory are far-reaching insofar as Gyekye uses it to derive the legitimacy of power and the essential function of the individual who has rights as a critical political force, developing his concept of the metanational global society, which is constituted by the individual. Gyekye’s political concept emphasises the individual’s responsibility and political participation and the relationship between morality and politics, thus attempting to coun­ teract abuse of power, corruption, despotism and tyranny. Gyekye’s attempt to combine individual rights with communitarian basic assumptions is a promising philosophical project – as is his rehabilitation of the term obliga­ tion. The theoretical discrepancies which become apparent and indicate that Gyekye has a tendency to prefer the collective however require an even deeper exploration of this problematic issue; a concern which is also illu­ strated by intense philosophical debate on Gyekye’s theory. It becomes clear that Kantian theorems have a central argumentative position in the philoso­ phies of Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, however are decisively altered within the overall framework of these African philosophies – completely in line with cultural borrowing and cultural adaptation. The theorem of critique is addressed by African philosophers in the con­ text of determining the task of African philosophy. Thus critique has a her­ meneutic dimension – referring to Kant’s philosophy among other things – as regards defining the position of the project of African philosophy in general; as regards the analysis of African cultures and African tradition, i.e. their sage-philosophical statements, proverbs and symbols, and as regards the philosophical texts of other cultures, especially of the West. Kant’s concept of critique in the sense of an investigation of the possibility of knowledge and morality in general − the determination of the fundamental principles of human thought and action − is not the focus of Serequeberhan and Odera

Conclusion 207 Oruka. The examples which are cited illustrate that the two philosophers offer different conceptions of critique. Serequeberhan can clearly be asso­ ciated with critical hermeneutics which have a deconstructivist orientation and primarily focus on the interpretation, unravelling and critical evaluation of contradictory and paradoxical contexts of meaning or the destruction of meaning and the analysis of the excluded. Serequeberhan himself speaks of “radical hermeneutics”.1 An essential objective of this hermeneutic or deconstructivist critique is the decolonisation of thought − in Kant’s words a ‘revolution of the mode of thought’ (KrV, B XI, continuing in B XIII). Cri­ tique in the work of both Serequeberhan and also Kant is metareflexive. It is conceived in a generalising, politicising way, as it can refer to cultural phe­ nomena of all kinds, socio-political aspects, institutions, etc. beyond the preoccupation with texts, as shown in Kant’s philosophy of history. This is a critique which addresses the world public. African contemporary philosophy does not, however, stop at this criticalanalytical, distance-based and distance-creating task, but develops, as Gyekye calls it, a productive, speculative form of critique which offers socio­ political, cultural and ethical visions for shaping individual nations and for Africa in a global setting. In addition to Odera Oruka and Gyekye, philo­ sophers such as Appiah, Mbembe and Wiredu are also important in this context. The recourse to Kant is also apparent in the visionary orientation of critique, for example in relation to the aspects of morality, world citizenship, world peace and cosmopolitanism. Contemporary African philosophy usually emphasises the practical dimension of critique, which should result in cultural, ethical, and political action. Thus, Odera Oruka develops a theory of the ethical minimum and ecophilosophy, concepts which require further development, for example as regards the concept of justice and their institu­ tional anchoring. Critical analysis of Africa’s transformation process as regards political structures; political legitimacy; the relationship between tradition and modernity and human coexistence is thus at the centre of contemporary African philosophy’s critical concern. On this basis, it devel­ ops socio-political concepts such as consensual democracy, the metanational state and Afropolitanism, which are often supported by Kant’s underlying assumptions, such as the autonomy and freedom of the individual, the dig­ nity and formula of the human being’s end in itself and the significance of law in its national, international and transnational dimension. As a result, the critical investigation of Kant by African philosophers is resulting in the development of concepts and visions which have significance beyond Africa. Foucault’s experimental philosophy is closely linked to critique, Enlight­ enment and parrhesia and represents the project of questioning social topi­ cality and its problematisation. In this regard Foucault draws heavily on Kant’s concept of Enlightenment and critique, whereby, in contrast to Kant, he sets a new accent by not allowing Enlightenment to be absorbed into the project of critique but instead interprets critique as a mode of Enlight­ enment. The objective is to transform the subject and society. Foucault

208 Conclusion strives for a society in which power structures do not become established and which allows the individual unlimited possibilities to use technologies of the self to develop a way of life in accordance with his theorem of life as a work of art. Analysis of discourse and power strategies and the knowledge-power nexus using the methods of archaeology and genealogy is required to achieve this. Furthermore, Foucault’s aesthetics and/or ethics of the self, which explore self-technologies as the precondition for formation of the self by itself, are of importance in this regard. It becomes clear that Foucault’s new understanding of philosophy is linked to a specific poetic-dramaturgical style of writing and includes new domains of knowledge such as psychoanalysis and monuments such as literary texts, art, films and sociological, psycholo­ gical and criminological texts in the investigation, whereby he questions the relationship between fact and fiction. Within this framework Foucault also presents a new concept of history which is closely linked to his under­ standing of philosophy and substantiates both the epistemic focus as regards the historic a priori as well as also historical-genealogical exploration of questions of power. For him, history is characterised by the event; has breaks, transformations and shifts; and questions the supra-historical and the universal. History can, according to Foucault, also represent a countermemory, providing an enabling space. With his innovative concept of philosophy, history and the subject and his methods of archaeology and genealogy Foucault offers many points of reference for contemporary African philosophy. They are important for a critical-productive and expanded reading, in particular for the analysis of knowledge formations, forms and strategies of power relating to Africa and subject forming processes in colonial and postcolonial contexts. Foucault’s ideas are thus an important foundation for new philosophical concepts which not only rethink the current socio-political situation in Europe and Africa but also on a global scale. Entirely in line with Foucault, possibilities of change for the modern subject as well as also political, social and aesthetic premisses of this process are critically evaluated within the scope of the sub­ ject’s contextual embedding. The reception of Foucault’s thinking in African and Afrodiasporic philosophy illustrates its current relevance for the solution of pending global problems. As shown in the work of Mbembe and Mudimbe, the productive connec­ tion to Foucault focuses on the archaeological and genealogical methods and discourse analysis, which can be used to break down both Western and African and/or Afrodiasporic discourses, also as regards their historical genesis. In addition to this, Foucault provides an instrument for the analysis of power processes and subject constitutions as well as the knowledge-power­ subject nexus. Foucault’s experimental philosophy is, particularly in the work of Achille Mbembe, also of importance in terms of a constructivist under­ standing of history. It does not view history as a continuum or process of progress and envisages an expansion of the documents and/or monuments which are referred to, such as literature and art, to include the critical task of

Conclusion 209 philosophy in the sense of truth-telling with an enlightening intention and an aesthetic focus on the ethical for an emancipatory shaping of the future. The aesthetic dimension plays an important role within the scope of contemporary African philosophy. Mudimbe succeeds in deciphering the various Western, African and Afro­ diasporic discourses of knowledge on Africa, revealing central impulses for the use of power. His view of history, inspired by Foucault, and its new per­ spective on the differentiation of fact and fiction and the related inclusion of literature and art as monuments in the analysis of knowledge must be con­ sidered central to his philosophical concern. In addition to this, the aspect of subject constitution in Foucault’s work is also of great importance for Mbembe’s work. He focuses on the becoming of the African subject in colo­ nial and postcolonial contexts. Over and above this, he expands his theore­ tical interest concerning the temporal dimensions of past, present and future, with all their diversity and overlapping, to include Africa in the global con­ text. His philosophy attempts to interpret the current social situation with its defining impulses, such as genetic engineering and communication technol­ ogy as well as new techniques of power, such as necro-power and digital power, and to focus on the constitution of the subject under these changing conditions. Mbembe thus breaks open the Afrocentric starting point to develop a philosophy which goes beyond Foucault to consider the world as a whole. With its cosmopolitan focus, Mbembe’s work follows in Kant’s footsteps. Due to its cultural borrowing contemporary African philosophy is char­ acterised by a tendency towards inter- and transculturality, whereby the objective of the philosophical theorems which are developed is to make a productive contribution by analysing both African and also global problems. Cross-cultural dialogue takes place primarily in the form of intertextual references and is thus, in keeping with the concept of transculturality, linked to the objective of providing universal insights for the world community and solving global problems. In addition to this, intercultural dialogue also references, for example, a critical investigation of cultural paradigms and products; of technology and science; political structures and religious prac­ tices and thus extends far beyond the intertextual dimension. The focus is on a dialogue and/or polylogue between the cultures with the objective of iden­ tifying new truths within the scope of a process of learning from one another which should do justice to both global and universal as well as also local and particular requirements. Contemporary, globally oriented African and/or Afrodiasporic philosophy is distinguished by a high level of interest in prac­ tical-moral and political issues, which, however, equally demonstrate a theo­ retical permeation, in particular with a slant towards the epistemic, power theoretical and subject philosophical views. In a critical rereading of Western philosophy, the African and/or Afrodiasporic philosophers Appiah, Wiredu, Gyekye and Mbembe focus in particular on the strengthening of the indivi­ dual in Africa, with a communitarian mindset, also politically; on the

210 Conclusion analysis of power; on a critical investigation of their own discourses regard­ ing Africa and on the development of political visions. When doing so, each has a different viewpoint on the concepts of inter- and transculturality and intertextuality, also as regards the referencing of their own origins. Emphasis on the individual should not, however, result in isolating oneself from the other because they are a stranger: “Kwasi Wiredu is right. We will only solve our problems if we see them as human problems arising out of special situation, and we shall not solve them if we see them as African problems, generated by our being somehow unlike others.”2 The philosophers’ dialogue and/or polylogue in the inter- and transcultural context must emphasise the universal human identity and what connects us with each other. Appiah thus says: Indeed, because the intellectual projects of our one world are essentially everywhere interconnected, because the world’s cultures are bound toge­ ther now through institutions, through histories, through writings, he [Crummell] has something to teach the one race to which we all belong.3 While Gyekye focuses on the concept of cultural borrowing, which is con­ cerned with the integration of the foreign into one’s own culture and engages in a critical discussion of processes of adaptation and transformation, Appiah aims for a conversation across boundaries, which places value on understanding between different cultures through communication, based on core human similarities as regards thought, feelings and action; a minimal con­ sensus and the development of new habits. Similarly to Appiah, Wiredu’s cross cultural dialogue is defined by the idea of a shared exchange, how­ ever in contrast to Appiah it places more emphasis on the significance of the African culture of origin in the sense of a cultural foundation. He is also always concerned with an investigation of the usability and appropriateness of what other cultures have to offer. “It would profit us little to gain all the technology in the world and lose the humanist essence of our culture.”4 Mbembe’s thinking outside the frame within the scope of his philosophy focuses on a critical cosmopolitan pluriversalism, which wishes to break through traditions of thinking and entrenched feeling and acting as regards epistemic and practical-moral issues within the overall cosmopolitan frame­ work and its philosophical concepts, whereby he is also concerned to over­ come anthropomorphism in thinking. In contrast to Mbembe’s, Appiah’s and Wiredu’s transcultural tendencies, which differ widely in terms of their content and methodology, Gyekye’s philosophical thinking focuses more on the intercultural, emphasising the independence of individual cultures while simultaneously also searching for transcultural commonalities, in particular as regards ethics. In his concept of cultural hybridity Serequeberhan strives for a dialogue at a distance, demanding an expansion of intercultural exchange. Taking his theorem of the human minimum, which goes beyond intercultural dialogue, Odera Oruka on the other hand believes that global

Conclusion 211 re-distribution of material goods is required, as is a new ecophilosophical attitude in order to safeguard human existence on the planet and to ensure better coexistence. The concepts of all the philosophers are based on a con­ sideration of African humanism. African philosophers and their philosophi­ cal concepts subscribe to world philosophy. Critical rereading of the work of Kant and Foucault and critical referencing of some of their theorems play an important role in this context.

Notes 1 Cf. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “Philosophy and Postcolonial Africa: Historicity and Thought”. In: Serequeberhan, Tsenay: The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse. New York (Routledge), 1994, p. 30. 2 Appiah, Kwame Anthony: In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1992, p. 136. 3 Appiah 1992: 27. 4 Wiredu, Kwasi: Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1980, p. 21.

Bibliography Appiah, Kwame Anthony: In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1992. Serequeberhan, Tsenay: “Philosophy and Postcolonial Africa: Historicity and Thought”. In: Serequeberhan, Tsenay: The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse. New York (Routledge), 1994, pp. 13–30. Wiredu, Kwasi: Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1980.

Index

Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to endnotes. Academic African philosophy 1 academic philosophy 4, 7 acquisitio originaria 79, 98n44 aesthetics 59, 60, 80, 128, 130–132, 170 Aesthetics of entanglement 59–61 African academic philosophy 7 ‘Africana philosophy’ 6 ‘African Art’ discourse formation 186 African contemporary philosophy 2, 207 African cosmopolitanism 52 African culture 4, 5, 89, 93, 206, 210 African humanism 4, 37, 94, 211 African philosophical phenomena 6 African philosophical sagacity 111 African philosophising 7, 204 African ‘primitivism’ 188 Afrocentrism 7, 52 Afrodiasporic philosophy 1–10, 35–37, 204, 208, 209 ‘Afropolitan’ culture 59 Afropolitanism 5, 36, 51, 52, 55, 59–61, 191, 194, 204, 205, 207; and aesthetics of entanglement 59–61; and concept of pluriversality 51–55 TheAkan Concept of Mind 78 TheAkan Concept of Personhood 78 An Akan Perspective on Human Rights 78 Akena, Kapumba 2 Allio, René 173 Althusser, Louis 15n46 Amselle, Jean-Loup 189 analysis 4, 6–10, 56–57, 84, 109, 127 analytical-political philosophy 168 Anglo-European philosophy 1, 8 antagonism 27, 28 antagonistic confrontations 154

anthropocentrism 53 anthropology 25, 27, 32, 34, 37, 80, 151, 183 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Kant) 25, 27, 34, 151, 152 anthropomorphism 61, 210 Appiah, Kwame Anthony 5, 9, 36, 37, 46, 47, 57, 59, 65n59, 65n60, 92, 204, 205, 207, 209, 210; Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers 36; The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen 45–46; In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture 46; partial cosmopolitanism 45–50 “archaeo-genealogical analytics” 165 Aristotelian ethics 47 Aristotle 65n59, 114, 116, 205 artistic-literary approaches to philosophy 6 ‘art of midwifery (maieutics)’ 137 Assmann, Aleida 17n56 autonomy 25, 31, 35, 49, 86, 93–94 Balakrishnan, Sarah 36 Barbin, Herculine 154 Bell, Daniel A. 48 Bentham, Jeremy 65n58 Benjamin, Walter 17n55, 189 Bernasconi, Robert 33, 41n52, 42n53 Bhabha, Homi 3 Blanchot, Maurice 155 Bohlken, Eike 4, 17n52 Borges, Jorge Luis 155, 172 Bosch, Hieronymus 174 Bourdieu, Pierre 175 Brueghel, Pieter 174 brutalism 194–195

Index broadened thought 28 Burgkmair, Hans 186 Butler, Judith 132

213

democracy 4, 51, 73, 132, 205 Derrida, Jacques 9, 10n1, 15n46, 173 “Devil’s race” 29 Dewey, John 77 Dhouib, Sarhan 3, 15n45 dialogue 2, 35, 45, 73, 84, 183 dialogue at a distance 109, 210 “dialogical nature of philosophy” 2 dialogical philosophy 5 Diemer, Alwin 5 discourse 2, 51, 104, 145 discourse theory 61, 76, 155, 156 distributive justice 111, 112 Don Quixote (Cervantes) 172 Dürer, Albrecht 186 dynamic cultural spaces 5

Castel, Robert 164, 166, 167 Cervantes: Don Quixote 172 Césaire, Aimé 67n78 Choe, Hyondok 4 Christian religious power technique 168 citizenship 29–30, 34, 45, 51 ‘civic patriotism’ 32 Classicism 172, 186 colonialisation 7, 59 communal values 87 communication theory 135 communitarianism 86 consensual democracy 5, 75, 204 “conceptual decolonization” 105 Conjectural Beginning of Human History (Kant) 106 consensus 34, 45, 50, 73, 206 contemporary cosmopolitanism 35 conversation across boundaries 210 cosmopolitanism 4, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 45–50, 74, 204, 205 Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (Appiah) 36 cosmopolitan nomadism 51 “Cosmopolitan Patriots” 36 cosmubuntuism 37 critical cosmopolitan pluriversalism 210 critical hermeneutics 7, 14n39, 90, 207 ‘critical-negative project’ 109 critical philosophical project 90 Critique of Black Reason (Mbembe) 190–195 Critique of Judgment (Kant) 60, 116 Critique of Pure Reason (Kant) 55 Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kant) 26, 46 cross-cultural communication 47 cross-cultural dialogue 6, 209, 210 cultural borrowing 89–93, 206, 209, 210 ‘cultural ethnocentrism’ 187 cultural hybridity 109, 210 cultural memory 8, 9, 18n56 cultural-moral judgments 32 cultural universalism 5, 75, 92, 205

‘economic freedom’ 112 egalitarianism 28 enlightenment 2, 35,46, 106, 127, 147 ‘Enlightenment humanism’ 46 ‘Enlightenment legacy’ 36 environmental ethics 6 environmentalism 37 environmental politics 115 epistemic cosmopolitanism 74 epistemic disobedience 15n44 epistemic universalism 73–76 epistemic violence 6 epistemology 76, 84, 109 ‘epistemological ethnocentrism’ 187 essentialism 2 Estermann, Josef 17n53 ethical cosmopolitanism 31 ethical minimum 111 ethical universalism 4, 50, 61, 73, 204 ‘ethnicities’ 93 ethics 6, 36, 45, 47, 51, 85, 93, 110, 115 ethnographic framework 17n53 ethnophilosophy 4, 110 Etzioni, Amitai 87 Euripides 171, 172 Eurocentrism 3, 6, 7, 52, 104–110, 105 European cultural and political dom­ inance 2 exchange 2, 61, 92, 109, 151, 210 Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi 5, 7

Damiens, Robert François 172, 192 Damnjanovic´, Milan 146 declaration of identity 56 decolonialism 7 decolonisation of thought 6, 52, 207

Fanon, Frantz 57, 58, 69n139 Fayemi, Ademola Kazeem 78, 83 feeling 32, 52, 82, 91, Fornet-Betancourt, Rául 3 Foucauldian theorems 10

214 Index Foucault, Michel 1, 2, 9, 10, 15n44, 15n46, 53, 56, 57, 58, 61, 76, 145, 160n40, 161n53, 178n42, 178n43, 183, 186, 189–195, 204, 207, 208, 209, 211; concept of philosophy in 136–138; history: and counter-memory 164–167; and philosophy in 167–169; Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology 151; and Kant’s concepts of person and humanity 127–130; language: discourse and murmuring of 152–153; literature and visual arts in 173–175; in work of Kant 150–152; Mudimbe’s rethinking of 185–190; The Order of Things 172; parrhesia and critique in context of politics and philosophy in 130–136; philosophical language in work of 153–156; philosophical writing 170–173; and (post)colonialism 183–185; What is Enlightenment? 128 Foucault of Eurocentrism 2 Fraiture, Pierre-Philippe 188 freedom 25, 32, 51, 75, 112, 128 freedom of speech 131, 151 Freud, Sigmund 15n46 future 29, 51, 90, 104 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 109 Gauguin, Paul 186 Geertz, Clifford 17n53 genetic engineering 193 Gerhardt, Volker 29, 30, 39n20 Glissant, Édouard 54, 55 global African philosophy 7 “globalization of philosophy” 5 global philosophising 5 Goya, Francisco de 174 Gramsci, Antonio 15n46 Graneß, Anke 111, 113, 114, 115, 117 Grasser, Erasmus 186 Greco-Roman antiquity 188 Griffin, James 49 Gudmand-Høyer, Marius 136 Gyekye, Kwame 6, 9, 35, 84, 87, 100n73, 101n128, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210; critique, cultural borrowing and African traditions 89–92; ethics 93–95; moderate communitarianism and 85–89 Habermas, Jürgen 29, 51, 76 Halbwachs, Maurice 18n56 Hamann, Johann Georg 145

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1, 51, 66n69, 105 “Hegelian concept of history” 164 Herder, Johann Gottfried 145, 147 hermeneutic deconstruction 110 hermeneutic philosophy 6 Herodotus 189 “heterogeneity of individuals” 34 “historico-critical attitude” 130 historicopolitical writings 105 Höffe, Otfried 73, 74, 75, 77, 81, 114, 116, 122n79 holistic homogeneity 83 ‘homogenisation of cultures’ 92 The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen (Appiah) 45–46 Hountondji, Paulin J. 6 hospitality 34, 51, 55, 61, 205 human communities 29 human cultures 89 human dignity 10, 28, 61, 86 human identity 47, 194 human minimum 111–114, 210 human morality 25, 49, 87, 149 human nomadism 5 human rights 4, 29, 34, 35, 46, 86, 112, 205, 206 humanity 3, 25, 46, 127, 191 Hume, David 106 Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (Kant) 31 ideal 31, 46, 83, 89, 91, 148, 169 identity 5, 47, 49, 89, 104, 185, 205 identity judgment 56 imperative 25, 35, 47, 61, 81, 104, 112, 127 individual 26, 28, 34, 48 individualistic nomadism 31 In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (Appiah) 46 “intellectual globalization” 56 inter- and/or transtextuality 8 inter- and transcultural commonalities 74 intercultural dimension 53 intercultural exchange 3, 210 interculturality 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 intercultural philosophy 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 “intercultural thinking” 3 interdisciplinarity 2 International Philosophical Symposium on Culture and Identity of Africa 5 intertextual examination 8

Index intertextual references 8

Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (Foucault) 151

justice 6, 31, 37, 46, 84, 110–111, 114,

195

Kandinsky, Wassily 173

Kant, Immanuel 1, 2, 9, 10, 34, 35, 38n1,

38n12, 39n29, 40n32, 40n37, 40n38,

41n39, 41n52, 42n53, 45–52, 59–61,

65n60, 66n69, 74, 75, 77, 84, 87, 91,

92, 94, 95, 102n130, 105, 116, 157n3,

157n5, 158n21, 175, 204, 205, 206,

207, 209, 211; in African and

Afrodiasporic philosophy 35–37; On

the common saying: that may be

correct in theory, but it is of no use in

practice 33; comparison with 76–80;

concepts of person and humanity

25–28, 127–130; Conjectural Beginning

of Human History 106; cosmopolitan

concept 28–30; cosmopolitan law 55;

Critique of Judgment 60, 116; Critique

of Pure Reason 55; Critique of the

Power of Judgment 26, 46;

displacement of language and latent

philosophy of language in 145–150;

epistemic universalism 73–76;

equality, universalism and world

citizenship in 30–32; ethics 85–89;

Eurocentrism in philosophy of Tsenay

Serequeberhan 104–110; Idea for a

Universal History with a Cosmopolitan

Purpose 31; language in work of

150–152; The Metaphysics of Morals

31, 33, 40n36; moral theoretical and

political implications in 80–84; Odera

Oruka, Henry 110–117; philosophical

language in work of 153–156; Second

Thoughts 33; Toward Perpetual Peace

28, 31, 33, 35, 40n36, 106, 108, 149;

universalism 84–95; universalism and

his concept of race 32–34

Kantian archetype 16n52 Kantian concepts of person and humanity 25–28 Kantian parrhesia 156

Kantian philosophical system 150

Kantian philosophy 9, 34, 116, 146, 147,

149, 150

Kantian schema 147

Kantian theorem 86, 104

Kantian tradition 46

215

Kantian traits 84

Kimmerle, Heinz 5, 14n37 Klee, Paul 173, 174

Kleingeld, Pauline 31, 32, 33, 41n39,

41n40, 41n52, 42n54

Kristeva, Julia 16n50 language: discourse and murmuring of 152–153; literature and visual arts in 173–175; logical reasoning and conceptual schemes 76–80; in work of Kant 150–152 liberal cosmopolitanism 47

liberal democracy 51

linguistic imagery 147

Lochner, Stefan 186

Locke, John. 114

logical reasoning 76, 84

Lyotard, Jean-François 9, 109

Mabe, Jacob Emmanuel 9, 18n59 MacIntyre, Alasdair 87

Mackie, John L. 48

Magritte, René 155, 172, 173

Manet, Èdouard 174

Marx, Karl 1, 15n46, 105

Mbembe, Achille 5, 9, 10, 36, 37, 51, 52,

53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,

66n68, 66n69, 67n78, 183, 190–195,

204, 205, 207–210; Afropolitanism

and aesthetics of entanglement 59–61;

Afropolitanism and concept of

pluriversality 51–55; Critique of Black

Reason 55–59, 190–195

Mbiti, John Samuel 88

Menkiti, Ifeanyi 88

metanational 6, 91, 93, 204

metanational state 6, 294

“metaphilosophical discourse” 104

metaphoricalism 154

The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant) 31,

33, 40n36

Michals, Duane 173

Mignolo, Walter D. 15n44 Mill, John Stuart 9, 45–50, 65n58 Mills, Charles W. 33

model of consensual democracy 5,

75

molecular biology techniques 58

Monet, Claude 155, 173

moral law 148

Mudimbe, Valentin Yves 10, 183,

185–190, 208, 209

Suárez Müller, Fernando 169

216 Index Nagl-Docekal, Herta 16n46;

Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika

(Postcolonial philosophising: Africa;

own translation) 7

natural-law justification 50

nature-philosophical considerations 116

necropolitics 54, 57

Négritude movement 56, 59

neoliberal erosion 51

Neugebauer, Christian 15n46 New Realism movement 156

Nietzsche, Friedrich 15n46, 155, 173, 175

Novalis 40n33 Odera Oruka, Henry 6, 7, 9, 14n36,

14n39, 37, 82, 83, 104, 204, 206–207,

210; criticism, ethics and politics

110–115; environmental ethics and

philosophy of nature in 115–117

Oedipus Rex (Sophocles) 171

On the common saying: that may be

correct in theory, but it is of no use in

practice (Kant) 33

ontology 145, 153, 174, 145, 153, 174

otherness 10, 53, 188

The Order of Things (Foucault) 172

Orrells, Daniel 188

Outlaw, Lucius 6

Pan-Africanism 36, 56

parental earth ethics 115

parental Earth insurance policy 115

parrhesia: and critique in context of

politics and philosophy 130–136;

Kantian 156; philosophical 137

parrhesiastic techniques 133

partial cosmopolitanism 5, 36, 45–50,

205

particularism 27, 32, 50, 73, 74, 78, 85,

92, 94

paternalism 34

patriotism 31, 32

perpetual peace 60, 61

philopractice 7

philosophical language 79, 153–156 philosophical parrhesia 137

philosophical thought 3

philosophical writing 170–173 ‘philosophy of exploration’ 3

philosophy of memory 7

pluriversality 53

poetic-dramaturgical style of writing

208

political civil liberties 112

political consequences of Gyekye’s ethics 93–95 political empowerment 110

political memory 18n56 political mobilisation 50

political universalism 9

politics: of Africanity 68n110, 69n138; of

possibility 52; theory of 28; of truth

136

polylogue 4, 8, 60, 75, 209

postcolonial African philosophy 6, 7

postcolonialism 7, 183–185 postcolonial philosophising 5

postcolonial philosophy 5, 7, 16n46, 194

postcolonial power 192

postcolonial theory 6, 7

postcolony 191

“post-racial universalism” 36

power 2, 26, 53, 57, 88, 90, 112, 128,

129, 164, 168–169, 183

Praeg, Leonhard 42n65 pragmatic anthropology 27

prima philosophia 4

principle of causality 83

principle of freedom 75, 76

principle of ‘rational egoism’ 82, 83

‘principle of sympathetic impartiality’

81, 205

principle of ‘unsociable sociability’ 105,

107

progress 26, 50, 75, 80

race and necropolitics 190–195 racial categorisation 59

racism 46

racist categorisations 58

“radical hermeneutics” 207

Raffnsøe, Sverre 136

Ramose, Mogobe B. 7, 16n49, 36

rational abilities 49

‘rational egoism’ 83

Rawls, John 9, 82, 111, 114, 115,

122n83

Rawlsian principle 83

Recki, Birgit 116

Rembrandt 186

Renaissance knowledge 186

republicanism 29, 32

resistance 168–169, 185

revolution 136, 155,

Ribeiro dos Santos, Leonel 147

right of world citizenship 34

Rivière, Pierre 154

rooted cosmopolitanism 46

Index Roussel, Raymond 155 Rubens, Peter Paul 186 sage philosophy 4 Said, Edward W. 108 Sandel, Michael 87 Schiller, Friedrich 173 Schlegel, Friedrich 40n33 Schröder-Augustin, Markus 172 Second Thoughts (Kant) 33 self-legislative processes 32 Senghor, Léopold Sédar 67n78 sensory-affective disposition 32 sensus communis 205 Serequeberhan, Tsenay 6, 9, 14n39, 104–110, 204, 206, 207, 210 ‘social-constructionist’ manner 18n56 socialist–nationalist orientation 1 society 2, 6, 28, 49, 51, 55, 59, 61, 78, 81, 108, 165, 187, 206 sociobiological transcription 57 socio-economic distributive justice 111 Sophocles: Oedipus Rex 171 speech 87, 131–132, 146, 151, Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty 15n44 state racism 169, 185 subject 2, 26, 111, 127–128, 145, 164, 191, subjective advocacy 135 ‘subpersons’ 33 symbolisation 147, 148 ‘sympathetic impartiality’ 83, 84 Tansi, Sony Labou 192 Taylor, Charles 49, 87, 109 Tchak, Samy 192 teleological thinking 116 Thaning, Morton S. 136 theory of global justice 111 theory of hereditability 32 theory of intertextuality 16n50 theory of moderate communitarianism 206 theory of politics 28 theory of rights 28 theory of ‘unsocial sociability’ 42n53 thinking outside the frame 51, 210 Thucydides 106

217

Toward Perpetual Peace (Kant) 28, 31, 33, 35, 40n36, 106, 108, 149 traditional African cultures 4 ‘transcendental grammar’ 147 transcultural commonalities 210 transculturality 3, 4, 5 ‘transcultural theory of modernity’ 12n16 transnational institutions 35 ‘ubuntu’ principle 37 understanding 2, 25, 74–75, 104, 164, 204 universalism 2, 28, 45–47, 73, 84–95; and his concept of race 32–34 universality 3, 34, 61, 183, 189 ‘universal’ philosophy 7 ‘unsociable sociability’ 27, 38n12, 80, 107–108 value 8, 45, 92, 151, van der Weyden, Rogier 186 Vattimo, Gianni 109 Velázquez, Diego 155, 171, 173, 174 Veyne, Paul 164, 167 Villers, Jürgen 146, 147, 148, 155, 157n3, 158n21, 161n54, 161n58 virtue 26, 82, 92, 132, 205 Waldenfels, Bernhard 53, 134, 135, 137 Westernised liberal market economy 115 What is Enlightenment? (Foucault) 128 Wimmer, Franz 16n46; Postkoloniales Philosophieren: Afrika (Postcolonial philosophising: Africa; own translation) 7 Wiredu, Kwasi 5, 9, 14n39, 35, 74, 75, 76, 98n39, 105, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210; critical dialogue with Kant’s universalism 84–95; epistemic universalism 73–76; language, logical reasoning and conceptual schemes in 76–80; moral theoretical and political implications in 80–84 Wood, Allen W. 36 world citizenship 29–30, 46, 51, 106, 205 World Congress of Philosophy 5