India and Inner Asia: Commerce, Culture and Connectivity 0367752883, 9780367752880

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Contents
List of Contributors
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
1 Introduction
Part I Inner Asian Issues
2 Buddhist Heart of Asia in the Works of Nicholas Roerich: A Study
3 Harmonizing Ethnicity at the Contested Borderlands: A Case Study of Uyghurs of Xinjiang
4 Inner Asia in the “Geopolitical Game” of the Early 20th Century: Impact on the Trajectory of Mongol-Seeking Independence
5 Socio-Economic Impact of Climate Change: Experience From Inner Asia
Part II Geopolitics and Geo-Economics
6 Contemporary Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Significance of Inner Asia
7 The Region and Ideational Security: The Geopolitical Belonging of Central Asia in Inner Asia
8 Regional Cooperation and Sustainable Stability in Central Asia
9 New Foreign Policy Discourse on Silk Road in the Post–Cold War Period
10 Silk Road Shenanigans
11 Afghanistan as the Belt and Road Pivot for Asia
Part III Indian Connection
12 India and Its Inner Asian Neighbourhood in the Post–Cold War Era
13 India’s Connectivity With Eurasia: INSTC and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor
14 Indian Trade Along Afghan Routes From 6th Century BCE to 19th Century CE
15 India’s New Diplomacy in Central Asia: Analysing the First India-Central Asia Summit
16 Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

INDIA AND INNER ASIA

This book studies India’s historical, socio-cultural and trade linkages with Inner Asia. Inner Asia includes the landlocked regions within East Asia and North Asia that are part of today’s Western China, Mongolia, the Russian Far East and Siberia. The book examines issues of geopolitics, geo-economics, climate change and regional cooperation and discusses the importance of the fabled Silk Road for the countries of Inner Asia. It also analyses the impact India has wielded upon the region through its cultural traits and how Buddhism has remained a binding force between the people of the two regions. Lucid and topical, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers of Asian studies, Central Asian studies, area studies, geopolitics, international trade, international relations, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and foreign policy, and political studies. It will also be of interest to policymakers, bureaucrats, diplomats and think tanks. Mahesh Ranjan Debata, Associate Professor, Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Selbi Hanova, Independent Researcher, Turkmenistan

INDIA AND INNER ASIA Commerce, Culture and Connectivity

Edited by Mahesh Ranjan Debata and Selbi Hanova

Designed cover image: @gettyimages First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Mahesh Ranjan Debata and Selbi Hanova; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Mahesh Ranjan Debata and Selbi Hanova to be identifed as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-367-75288-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-77471-4 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-17156-0 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560 Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

CONTENTS

List of Contributors Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations 1 Introduction Asoke Kumar Mukerji PART I

Inner Asian Issues

viii x xi 1

13

2 Buddhist Heart of Asia in the Works of Nicholas Roerich: A Study Jojan Job

15

3 Harmonizing Ethnicity at the Contested Borderlands: A Case Study of Uyghurs of Xinjiang Veena Ramachandran

28

4 Inner Asia in the “Geopolitical Game” of the Early 20th Century: Impact on the Trajectory of MongolSeeking Independence Sharad K. Soni

44

vi

Contents

5 Socio-Economic Impact of Climate Change: Experience From Inner Asia Vikash Kumar PART II

Geopolitics and Geo-Economics

57

71

6 Contemporary Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Signifcance of Inner Asia G. M. Shah

73

7 The Region and Ideational Security: The Geopolitical Belonging of Central Asia in Inner Asia Selbi Hanova

86

8 Regional Cooperation and Sustainable Stability in Central Asia Ajay K. Patnaik

97

9 New Foreign Policy Discourse on Silk Road in the Post–Cold War Period Ramakrushna Pradhan and Atanu Kumar Mohapatra

111

10 Silk Road Shenanigans P. L. Dash

124

11 Afghanistan as the Belt and Road Pivot for Asia Satyam

136

PART III

Indian Connection

153

12 India and Its Inner Asian Neighbourhood in the Post–Cold War Era Mahesh Ranjan Debata

155

13 India’s Connectivity With Eurasia: INSTC and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor Gatikrushna Mahanta

169

Contents

vii

14 Indian Trade Along Afghan Routes From 6th Century BCE to 19th Century CE Sunita Dwivedi

184

15 India’s New Diplomacy in Central Asia: Analysing the First India-Central Asia Summit Manish S. Dabhade

197

16 Conclusion Selbi Hanova and Mahesh Ranjan Debata

210

Index

213

CONTRIBUTORS

Manish S. Dabhade is Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India P. L. Dash is former Professor and Director, Centre for Central Eurasian Stud-

ies, University of Mumbai and ICCR Chair Professor of International Relations at UWED, Tashkent Mahesh Ranjan Debata is Associate Professor at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Sunita Dwivedi is a Silk Road Traveller, Independent Writer and Researcher,

Delhi, India Selbi Hanova is Independent Researcher, Turkmenistan. Jojan Job is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Madras Christian College, Chennai, India Vikash Kumar is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Research in Rural and

Industrial Development (CRRID), Chandigarh, India Gatikrushna Mahanta is Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics, Zakir Hussain College, Delhi University, New Delhi, India

Contributors

ix

Atanu Kumar Mohapatra is Professor at the Centre for Studies and Research

in Diaspora, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India Asoke Kumar Mukerji is former Permanent Representative of India at the United Nations and Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi, India Ajay K. Patnaik is former Professor and Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Ramakrushna Pradhan is Professor at the Department of Political Science,

School of Social Sciences, Guru Ghasidas University, Bilaspur, Chhatishgarh, India Veena Ramachandran is Assistant Professor at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani Campus, Rajasthan, India Satyam is a Doctoral Research Scholar, Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School

of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India G. M. Shah is Professor and Honorary Director at the MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, India Sharad K. Soni is Professor and Chairperson at the Centre for Inner Asian

Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful to the UGC Area Studies Programme, Centre for Inner Asian Studies (CIAS), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India and the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) for the generous support. We owe a debt of gratitude to the Chairperson, all the faculty members, staf and students of Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University for their constant support. We are thankful to all the esteemed contributors for their valued and thoroughly researched chapters for this edited book. The views and opinions provided here are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their institutions or editors. We record our sincere gratitude to the Publisher, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Mr. Peter Sowden, Dr. Shashank S. Sinha, Ms. Antara Ray Chaudhry and Ms. Anvitaa Bajaj for helping in publishing this edited book. Mahesh Ranjan Debata Selbi Hanova

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB AIIB B3W BHEL BPO BRI BRICS BSF CACO CAEC CARs CAREC CASAREM CAU CBTA CCAP CIS CPEC EAEU ETIM EURASEC FFFAI FSG GABP GCM GDP

Asian Development Bank Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Build Back Better World Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited Business process outsourcing Belt and Road Initiative Brazil Russia India China and South Asia Border Security Force Central Asian Cooperation Organization Central Asian Economic Community Central Asian Republics Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market Central Asian Union Cross-Border Transport Accord Connect Central Asia Policy Commonwealth of Independent States China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Eurasian Economic Union East Turkistan Islamic Movement Eurasian Economic Community Federation of Freight Forwarders’ Associations in India Frontier Services Group General Authority of Border Protection (of Mongolia) General Circulation Model Gross domestic product

xii

Abbreviations

GWOT HPS IAEA ICABC ICCR IMU INOGATE INSTC IPGCFZ IPGL ISL ITEC JWG MCC MPP MPRP OBOR OECD OPEC PGII PLA PRC RATS RECCA SCO SEZ SPAs SREB SRES TAPI TRACECA TUTAP UNECE WHO XUAR

Global War on Terrorism Hydro Power Station International Atomic Energy Agency India-Central Asia Business Council Indian Council for Cultural Relations Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe International North-South Transport Corridor India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone India Ports Global Limited Iran Shipping Lines Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Joint Working Group Metallurgical Group Corporation (of China) Mongolian People’s Party Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party One Belt One Road Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan Shanghai Cooperation Organization Special Economic Zones Strategic Partnership Agreements Silk Road Economic Belt Special Report on Emission Scenarios Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan United Nations Economic Commission for Europe World Health Organization Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

1 INTRODUCTION* Asoke Kumar Mukerji

India’s connection with Inner Asia, which constitutes the fve republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Mongolia, three regions of China (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet) and Afghanistan, is as old as Methuselah. The foundation stone of this linkage was laid by overland trade that witnessed regular contacts between traders/merchants from India and the Inner Asian region. The knowledge, intellect and wisdom of India had percolated into the hearts and minds of people in Inner Asia, which has been refected in the writings, discoveries and explorations of scholars across the globe. The civilizational linkage between the two regions not only blossomed with the infux of religion and philosophy, arts and culture from India but also thrived for centuries in the form of cross-cultural exchanges. The reproduction of Ajanta in Dun Huang, replica of Kailasa Monolith on the Khullam or the work of Indian scholars/monks in Tibet, the overhaul of Kushan antiquities and so on demonstrate India’s academic pursuits as well as exemplify India’s age-old linkage with the people of Inner Asia. Sanskrit words, such as Ratna, Mani and Guru in Tibet and Mongolia, and the transformation of the word Vihara into Bukhara in Central Asia or of Sartha into Sart in western Turkestan are symbols of Indian culture in the entire Inner Asian region. In contemporary times, Nobel laureate Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore and several other Indian scholars and historians continued to highlight the role of Inner Asia in the life, culture * This chapter is the revised and updated version of the valedictory address delivered by the author at the International Seminar on “Ganga to Volga: India’s Connectivity with Inner Asia” on 6–7 March 2019, at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-1

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and civilizations of India, and narrated how races from Inner Asia had found their permanent habitat in India as well. In the past three decades, India’s relationship with the Inner Asian region/ people (with individual countries or group of countries of Inner Asia) has been revived, renewed and reoriented at bilateral, trilateral and multilateral levels through socio-cultural partnership, strategic partnership, economic cooperation and re-establishment of connectivity. India’s relations with Inner Asia (including Eurasia) have a rich history, as illustrated by people-to-people contacts over the centuries. This sense of a shared journey was captured in the collection of 20 historical short stories in Hindi, published in 1943 as Volga Se Ganga by Indian scholar and intellectual Rahul Sankrityayan, which were based on the dialogues of common citizens. The natural movement of people, ideas and trade between India and Inner Asia came to a sudden halt following the agreement between the British and Russian Empires in 1895, when they agreed to create the Wakhan Corridor as a bufer between the two empires. While this bufer, which was territorially part of the kingdom of Afghanistan, formalized two imperial spheres of infuence, it did not prevent the movement of intrepid explorers and revolutionaries across the space of Inner Asia. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while addressing the India-Russia Business Summit 2018 (New Delhi) on 5 October 2018, said: We are fortunate that the Ganga and Volga of Harmony and Friendship were always there, are there and will remain so. Our relations are expanding in almost every feld. Its cornerstone is mutual trust and understanding between the two countries. (Ministry of External Afairs 2018b) It is important to describe herewith the main facets of India’s interaction with Inner Asia through seven broad themes: (1) ethnicity, religion and culture; (2) India’s policy towards Central Asia; (3) Afghanistan and Central Asia; (4) trade; (5) connectivity; (6) energy; (7) environment; and (8) geopolitics and geostrategy. Ethnicity, Religion and Culture

The attention given by Indian scholars (Rahul Sankrityayan and Sadhu Ram Udhar Das) to the specifcs of the Altai region and Uyghur ethnicity is relevant to any wider discussion on the need for a civilizational dialogue between India and Inner Asia, including Eurasia. This includes the religious and cultural impact of Buddhism and Jadidism in this broader region. UNESCO’s major project to bring the civilizational aspect of Inner Asia to the wider

Introduction

3

public, through its monumental History of Civilizations of Central Asia, published in 2003 in fve volumes, was strongly supported by India. The interaction during the Buddhist and early Islamic period is preserved in the communities, writings, monuments and routes across a vast landmass starting from India and stretching all the way to Tibet, Central Asia, Siberia, Mongolia, China, the Korean peninsula and Japan. We are fortunate in having the record of this phenomenon in the form of primary sources such as diaries and memoirs, which document the vibrant human-centric interaction that has sustained relations between our two regions. A signifcant body of academic research has developed around this shared pool of knowledge, which represents a lasting legacy of the contribution of these pioneers to India-Inner Asia relations. Looking to the future, special mention deserves to be made of movements like Jadidism in the social and political evolution of the Turkic societies of Tsarist Russia and Central Asia, and the Suf traditions in joining individual and collective awareness of people from India to Inner Asia. Such movements, with their common quest for harmony and cooperation, as opposed to violent extremism and discord, represent a living tradition on the ground to sustain our relations in the years to come. The World Suf Conference hosted by India in New Delhi in March 2016 launched an important process on one aspect of this, which must be carried further at a time the world is convulsed by violent conficts and the global humanitarian crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and its efects. These setbacks impact on the national eforts of people across the world for a better future. It is useful to recall the words of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2016) while inaugurating this Conference. Modi said: At the beginning of a new century, we are at yet another point of transformation on a scale rarely seen in human history. In many parts of the world, there is uncertainty about the future, and how to deal with it as nations and societies. These are precisely the times that the world is most vulnerable to violence and conficts. The global community must be more vigilant than ever before and counter the forces of darkness with the radiant light of human values. India’s Policy Towards Central Asia

This is a subject that India’s premier university Jawaharlal Nehru University at New Delhi (along with other educational institutes working in this area of studies) has taken a special role in propagating, through the active encouragement of its eminent scholars and academics who have sought to create

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a network of Central Asian scholars across India. The time is ripe for their students/scholars to contribute to creating a vision of restoring connections between India and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). This will assist the operation of both “pro-active” and “new” diplomacy and the move from soft to hard power. India’s “Connect Central Asia” policy, articulated in 2012, and the pathbreaking visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to all the fve CARs in July 2015 that gave this policy a strategic dimension, have been carried forward by the frst India-Central Asia Dialogue in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) on 13 January 2019 (Ministry of External Afairs 2019). The combining of soft and hard power of Indian diplomacy is now becoming more visible, and its impact on the ground will help give substance to the expectations that the society and people of Central and Inner Asia have of India. Of course, the availability of new information and communication technologies using the easily available platform of modern smartphones and mobile telephony can play a major role in catalysing this vision. India has intensifed its structured interaction with the fve Central Asian states during the past year, emphasizing the four priorities of commerce, capacity enhancement, connectivity and contacts at the third Dialogue held in New Delhi in December 2021. The focus of this interaction is within the broader Inner Asian framework, including the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Central Asia

It has often been conceptualized that Central Asia and Afghanistan are an integral part of the Inner Asian region, whose combined population is close to 100 million people. In some aspects ethnicity, religion and culture link Central Asia with Afghanistan. So do the ancient trade routes being revived by modern connectivity proposals to integrate Afghanistan and Central Asia with the outside world, and vice versa. These bonds must be acknowledged and used to take this process forward. Into this process is thrown the role of the Taliban, who were brought back to power in Kabul by the precipitate withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in August 2021. Earlier, analysts underlined the widespread support of the Pakistani military and intelligence structures for the Taliban when they frst took power in Kabul in 1996 (Rashid 2000). There are several important questions facing well-wishers of Inner Asia today that emanate from the current situation in Afghanistan: (1) Have the Taliban who captured power in Kabul in 2021 become forward looking, sharing the aspirations of younger generations elsewhere in Inner Asia? (2) Will the Taliban be able to overcome their previous doctrinaire approach that erected huge barriers for inclusive socio-economic progress, including for women, children and minorities who form the bulk of

Introduction

5

Afghanistan’s population? (3) How will the ideological orientation of the Taliban afect the expectation of the international community for an efective response to counter terrorism emanating from the Af-Pak region? (4) Have the umbilical cords that connected the Taliban to Pakistan’s security agencies since the 1990s been cut completely? (5) How will the Taliban become adept at international diplomacy, to ensure Afghanistan’s rightful place as an integral part of, and not an obstacle to, regional integration in Inner Asia? Trade

Central Asia is historically known for hosting the trade of the fabled Silk Road. During Soviet times, this region was integrated into the overall Soviet economy primarily as a source for raw materials, with very few processing and manufacturing facilities. After their independence in December 1991 following the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the Central Asian countries have attempted to attract investment to establish manufacturing and generate employment using their natural resources. Some progress has been made in this direction, but the consequences of being located next to the “manufacturing centre of the world”–China – has meant that products made in the region are not competitive, especially for export. Consequently, Central Asia continues to be considered a raw materials exporter, and an importer of fnished products, by the trading community. The silver lining for the region is its demographic dividend with a growing and vibrant young population, and the focus across the world on trade in services. It is here that India, considered as a major trading nation in services trade, has attracted the attention of Central Asia. This opens the possibility for the development of skilled human resources, using the existing skilled labour in the region, and investments in services trade and eventually the digital economy. Due to the constraints of geography, this region will rely on new technologies to realize this potential, giving India a substantial role based on its own use of new technologies for socio-economic development through the Digital India platform. Connectivity

The other constraint for the region is the fact that it is land-locked and depends on viable and efective connectivity to access the international markets. Uzbekistan is a doubly land-locked country, which requires greater efort to overcome. The priority on regional integration announced by Uzbekistan in November 2017 may be seen in this context. This includes the current priority of Uzbekistan for constructing a railway link to connect Uzbekistan to the Arabian Sea port of Karachi in Pakistan. This requires overcoming major physical, political, technological and fnancial hurdles. However, attempts

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to overcome these have been initiated with the recent agreement between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to construct a 573-kilometre route from Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan to Peshawar in Pakistan via Kabul, to be fnanced by the World Bank. Four initiatives deserve special mention in the broader context. The frst is the impact of the Silk Road, on which the UNESCO initiated signifcant work since 1988, which helped generate awareness of the civilizational heritage of Central and Inner Asia. The second is the attempt to create a Digital Silk Road, in which one can conceptualize the cooperative contributions for creation of digital infrastructure as well as digital content. The third is the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which has been held hostage by the “hesitations of history” (to use this phrase in another setting) for far too long (Ministry of External Afairs 2018a). This is signifcant considering the impact the INSTC will have not only on Central Asia but also on Iran. The fourth is the potential of the connectivity project symbolized by Chabahar, which has already seen the movement of goods and ideas in both directions, to and from India to Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, an intriguing question remains on whether China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which focuses on providing connectivity infrastructure (both terrestrial and digital) for Inner Asia, will support or obstruct these initiatives. Energy

In terms of natural resources, conventional wisdom looks at the signifcance of this region from the perspective of two major natural resources: frst, its huge deposits of oil in and around the Caspian Sea, as well as signifcant deposits of natural gas in the deserts of Turkmenistan and the harsh topography of Siberia and the Arctic; second, the fow of water from the glaciers of the Pamirs, Hindu Kush and Himalayas that feeds into all the major river systems of Asia, including those originating in the Tibetan plateau. There are, however, other resources in Inner Asia connected with energy as well, including uranium for nuclear energy and the sun, for renewable solar power. As these dimensions of Central Asia become part of the global energy landscape, issues arise regarding the politics of oil; the role of water in agriculture, especially for growing cotton; safeguards on trade in uranium; and efective cooperation, including in manufacture of equipment to harness and use solar energy. Recent developments regarding the use of unilateral economic measures such as sanctions imposed on trade in oil and gas from Iran, and now Russia, illustrate the external challenges that can be inserted into a purely supplydemand market-driven growth of this sector, with a major economic fallout on socio-economic growth and investments in Inner Asia including Eurasia.

Introduction

7

Each country in this region is placed to contribute to the regional and global discussion on these issues, whether through organizations like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations or the International Solar Alliance, headquartered in New Delhi. The challenge will be to ensure that the voices of Inner Asia are heard and included in the global decisions taken on the use of energy for development. Environment

Climate change issues have been raised with relation to Central and Inner Asia ever since this region became the preferred testing ground for the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union and China. Perhaps the most wellknown popular movements during the Cold War on this issue concerned the Semipalatinsk Polygon, where the Soviet Union conducted over 450 nuclear tests, including about 300 underground tests. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, linking the main nuclear testing grounds of the United States and Soviet Union, gathered momentum as the Cold War ended, and contributed to raising awareness among the local populations of the adverse impact of nuclear tests on both human health and the environment. The other major environmental issue raised since Soviet times concerns the use of water from the region’s Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Predominantly exploited for growing cotton in large collective farms, the debate on the use of water sometimes overlooks the fact that the cotton of Central Asia is also a valuable cash-crop in world markets due to its quality. There have been two aspects of environmental concerns on this use of water. The frst concerns the depletion of the water resources of the region, symbolized by the Aral Sea problem, which has reduced the fourth-largest lake in the world in the mid-20th century to less than 10 per cent of its original size. The silver lining worth emulating in this area is Kazakhstan’s success in replenishing the waters of the North Aral Sea through a joint project between the government of Kazakhstan and the World Bank, which included the construction of the Kokaral Dam in 2005. Besides its major impact on the environment, the Aral Sea problem has signifcant socio-economic dimensions, which can contribute to social instability as demonstrated by recent events in the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan. The second aspect is the impact of the use of chemical fertilizers for cotton cultivation, which has adversely impacted the topsoil of the arable land of the region, making it less productive. Related to both these natural issues is the impact on human health, which has been well documented. Today, water has become a major issue on the agenda of Central Asian states, and in June 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted a historic resolution moved by Uzbekistan on behalf of the other Central Asian states on strengthening cooperation in

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Central Asia, in which the importance of developing and strengthening bilateral and regional cooperation in the rational and integrated use of water and energy resources in Central Asia was highlighted (United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia 2018). Geopolitics and Geostrategy

India and the broad Central Asian and Inner Asian regions are in the middle of current upheavals in international relations in the wider Eurasian landmass. At least four processes deserve to be looked at in this context. The frst is the process in which India is playing an active role, for integrating the region through ambitious connectivity proposals. Apart from boosting economic interaction and integration, the objective of this process is to revive the civilizational links that connect the millions of ordinary people living in this space. The second process is the increasing use of this region by the major powers for their own strategic advantage. These relate to using the Inner Asian region as a bufer against violent extremism from the south, or as a major transit space for trade and energy infrastructure, or as an area for adventurous expansionism. The third process is the revival of ethnicity and language, and particularly the role of these factors in the socio-political status of minorities in Inner Asia. The approach of the states of the region towards national minorities plays a critical role in this context. While historical analysis of the status of ethnic minorities across the borders of Inner Asia’s states has focused on traditional areas such as the situation of Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang province or the situation of the Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities in the politically contested and densely populated Fergana Valley, there is need to expand our focus to simmering issues that can add to instability in this region if not addressed in a cooperative manner through dialogue and diplomacy. Such issues include the status of the Tajik minorities in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, and the status of the ethnic Russian minorities across several Eurasian states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The fourth process is the role of this region in the eventual creation of an Asian Century. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2011) has projected that by “nearly doubling its share of global gross domestic product (GDP) to 52 per cent by 2050, Asia would regain the dominant economic position it held some 300 years ago, before the industrial revolution”. The stability, growth and integration of Inner Asia will be of critical importance for meeting this goal in the face of major challenges enumerated so far. In all these four processes, the role of China and India, home to three billion people today, will be signifcant for the future of Inner Asia/Eurasia. It is relevant to conclude by reminding ourselves that fve centuries ago, China

Introduction

9

and India accounted for close to half of global output in economic terms. Current trends indicate that by 2050, China and India will again be among the top three economies of the world, positioning themselves in the process to play a major role in bringing peace and prosperity to Inner Asia. Themes and Perspectives

For India, the Inner Asian neighbourhood assumes great importance, where there is a potential enemy (Pakistan) with whom India has fought four wars in the past seven decades or so; there is a ferce competitor–an economically and militarily superior power (China)  – that continues to pose serious challenges to India every here and there, the recent Chinese attack on India in Ladakh (in June 2020) being an example; there are resource-rich regions-cum-friendly nations such as Central Asia and Mongolia; and also there is a war-torn shattered security zone (Afghanistan). This edited book comprising 16 chapters (along with introduction and conclusion) is thematically structured and divided into three parts: (1) Inner Asian issues; (2) geopolitics and geo-economics and (3) Indian connection. In Part I, there are four chapters discussing various issues related to Inner Asia, from Buddhism and its thorough study and spread by Nicholas Roerich, ethnic groups in the contested borderlands, the geopolitical ballgame in Inner Asia in the 20th century that had impacted the Mongol-seeking independence and a burning issue like climate change. Culture matters the most while analysing issues related to Inner Asia. Buddhism has been the fagbearer of Indian culture that has remained the binding force between the people of the two regions and that is the main objective of Chapter 2, which discusses Nicholas Roerich’s observations on the enriching elements of Buddhism set against the backdrop of history, culture and geography of Asia, employing the research method of content analysis. It is interesting to see how Xinjiang, the lynchpin of China’s BRI and a contested borderland of the Inner Asian region, has become a witness to Chinese State project of “harmonizing” the Uyghur Muslims by redefning the role and demarcating the space of ethnicity, as elaborated in Chapter 3. The subsequent chapter (Chapter 4) aims at dealing with the geopolitical ballgame played by Russia and China in Mongolia, particularly during the early 20th century, which raises quite a few questions in which the issue of Mongolian independence is of paramount importance to the realities of today. Chapter 5 delineates key issues of climate change and studies its following socio-economic and environmental impact in the region: (1) nature and the pattern of environmental degradation; (2) loss of livelihood and forced migration of people; and (3) impact on health and food security. Part II consists of half a dozen chapters covering a whole of gamut of issues such geopolitics, geo-economics, regional cooperation, importance of the fabled Silk Road for the countries of the region and so forth. Chapter 6

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is an endeavour to study the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia, with special reference to Central Asia. The chapter is divided into fve broad sections. While the frst section deals with the defnition of key concepts and the framework of the study, the second, third and fourth sections narrate the geopolitical and geo-economic discourse surrounding Inner Asia in general and Central Asia in particular. The fnal section summarizes the main conclusions of the present study. The importance of regionalism and regional cooperation in Central Asia is ironically felt and in this context, Chapter 7 provides food for thought for touching upon regionalism in post–Soviet Central Asia as well as inter-state cooperation to understand how the states in the region identify themselves geographically, geopolitically and culturally, in addition to their collective response to security challenges. Since Central Asia remains at the heart of the Inner Asian region and the hub of many activities in recent years, cooperation among the states of the region will be the key, as Chapter 8 dilates upon. It broadly looks at the trends of regional cooperation in the region and how it has moved forward in past few years. It discusses how this cooperation could bring about stability in the broader Central Asia-Afghanistan region. A discussion on any issue related to Inner Asia will not be complete without discussing the fabled Silk Route, which was virtually the lifeline of the region in the ancient times and is a centre of debate and discussion in the modern and contemporary times. Chapter 9 gives new discourses/narratives on the Silk Route that has become the cynosure of all eyes, be it United States through its New Silk Road Initiative, or China with its 21st-century signature strategy BRI, or Russia opening up its Eurasian Economic Union gambit. Chapter 10 moves one step further, elucidating three factors that have catapulted the old Silk Road concepts to debates and discussions in post-Soviet years: (1) emergence of independent countries in Eurasia; (2) China’s rising thirst for business, commerce and energy; and (3) the proliferating markets from Turkey on the one hand, China on the other and Russia from the north and an entirely new network of communication links in Eurasia in the last quarter century. Chapter 11 establishes how Afghanistan, an important centre for trade along the ancient Silk Road, which brought a long period of prosperity to the region for almost 2 millennia lying at the centre of South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and West Asia can form the Asian pivot of the BRI. Part III is a conglomeration of fve chapters (including the conclusion) completely devoted to the Indian connection with the Inner Asian region. Chapter 12 argues that India has been considering the Inner Asian region as key to maximizing its national interests and international goals in this region, and has thus been trying to forge meaningful relationship with the key countries (CARs, Afghanistan and Mongolia) through strategic partnership, defence and military agreements, economic cooperation and peopleto-people contact. Lack of a direct geographical boundary with the Inner

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Asian region has been India’s Achilles Hill. However, the opening of Iran’s Chabahar as a port of promise and other routes through Iran, Chapter 13 argues, could give India access to the Eurasian region, thereby improving India’s connectivity with the region. Chapter 14 discusses Indian trade along the routes (Uttarapath, western routes to the Mediterranean, Wakhan Corridor route, Lapis Lazuli route, Sulaiman passes etc.) in the South-Central Asia region since ancient times. Chapter 15 shows that the frst India-Central Asia Dialogue, an important Indian foreign policy initiative in 2019 to boost its ties with the CARs, was a culmination of “new” diplomacy emerging in the past few years, especially the bilateral visits to all CARs by Narendra Modi in 2015, coupled with the growing geopolitical and geo-economic signifcance of Central Asia in Indian strategic calculus. The concluding chapter (Chapter 16) wraps up with the major fndings of this study. References Asian Development Bank. 2011. “Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century.” Executive Summary. Accessed April 10, 2020. www.adb.org/sites/default/fles/ publication/28608/asia2050-executive-summary.pdf Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2018a. “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue.” Accessed June 1, 2018. www.mea.gov.in/ Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shan gri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018 Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2018b. “Prime Minister’s Address at India–Russia Business Summit.” Accessed October 5, 2018. https://mea.gov.in/ Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30472/Prime+Ministers+address+at+India+Russia+ Business+Summit+October+05+2018 Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2019. “Press Statement by EAM after First India-Central Asia Dialogue.” Accessed January 13, 2019. www. mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30907/Press_Statement_by_EAM_ After_1st_IndiaCentral_Asia_Dialogue Modi, Narendra. 2016. “Sufsm is the Voice of Peace, Co-Existence, Compassion, and Equality; a Call to Universal Brotherhood: PM Modi.” March 17. Accessed March 20, 2020. www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-at-the-world-islamic-suf-conferencein-new-delhi-428276 Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA). 2018. “General Assembly Adopts Resolution on Strengthening Cooperation in Central Asia.” June 25. Accessed June 30, 2020. https://unrcca.unmissions.org/ general-assembly-adopts-resolution-strengthening-cooperation-central-asia

PART I

Inner Asian Issues

2 BUDDHIST HEART OF ASIA IN THE WORKS OF NICHOLAS ROERICH A Study Jojan Job

Introduction

Nicholas Konstantinovich Roerich (1874–1947), one of the greatest painters and writers of the 20th century, was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, in October 1874. He was also an accomplished archaeologist, philosopher, theosophist, scientist, traveller and explorer. Even from his childhood, he was curious to know about the mystic lands of the mountains across the globe, especially in the Himalayas. He visited those lands and learned the metaphysical aspects of the spiritual world. Roerich’s spiritually oriented works are best understood by setting them against geographical, historical, cultural and religious contexts. As a prolifc author, he published 64 poems under the title Flowers of Morya between 1916 and 1919. Besides, he had written masterpieces such as Adamant (1923), Altai-Himalaya (1929), Heart of Asia (1929), Flame in Chalice (1930), Shambhala (1930), Realm of Light (1931), The Invincible (1936), Himavat – Diary of Leaves (1946) and Himalayas – Abode of Light (1947). His works took readers to the sublime philosophical and aesthetic world of purity. The Himalayan ranges in Tibet (Brock 1926) and India are also portrayed beautifully in his works. Roerich makes particular note of the famous Silk Road in the Himalayan ranges. His expeditions made him to cross Karakoram, where he met hermits and visited Buddhist monasteries. Roerich yearned to acquire Buddhist wisdom, which led him to explore and understand deeply various facets of Buddhism. His journeys through various geographical areas of the fabled Silk Road enabled him to unearth and study some of the original scriptures of Buddhism, which are refected in his visual and literary works. Roerich was an enthusiastic observer of various DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-3

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aspects of Buddhist cultures in the Asiatic Himalayan mountain ranges. His observations found artistic expression in his paintings, while his essays and books recorded them philosophically. Roerich’s paintings are visual records of geographical, anthropological, social and cultural details of an era of Buddhism set against the geographical landscape of Asia. He discusses Buddhism in his works such as Himavat  – Diary of Leaves and in Himalayas  – the Abode of Light. In Himavat, Roerich dwells upon peace, beauty and knowledge. Because of these achievements, the famous Russian poet Maxim Gorki dubbed Roerich as “one of the greatest inductive minds of the age”. India’s frst Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1964) pays tribute to Roerich thus: When I think of Nicholas Roerich I am astounded at the scope and abundance of his activities and creative genius. A great artist, a great scholar and writer, archaeologist and explorer, he touched and lighted up so many aspects of human endeavour. The very quantity is stupendous – thousands of paintings and each one of them a great work of art. When you look at these paintings, so many of them of the Himalayas, you seem to catch the spirit of those great mountains which have towered over the Indian plain and been our sentinels for ages past. They remind us of so much in our history, our thought, our cultural and spiritual heritage so much not merely of the India of the past but of something that is permanent and eternal about India, that we cannot help feeling a great sense of indebtedness to Nicholas Roerich who has enshrined that spirit in these magnifcent canvases. It is against this background this chapter throws light on Nicholas Roerich’s observations on the enriching elements of Buddhism set against the backdrop of the history, culture and geography of Asia, employing the research method of content analysis. This chapter analyses some of Roerich’s famous literary works for the aforesaid purpose. This chapter is divided into sub-themes such as (1) Roerich’s international expeditions; (2) Roerich’s interests in humanism, culture and religion; (3) impact of the noble gospels of Buddhism on Roerich; and (4) conclusion. Roerich’s International Expeditions

Roerich undertook his expedition of the Inner Asian region during 1924– 1928. During his four-year expedition, he covered more than 25,000 kilometres. He has neatly recorded his visits to places such as Kashmir, Ladakh, Sikkim, Gangtok, Darjeeling, Kullu Valley, Karakoram, Taklamakan desert, Sin-tsian, Tianshan, Urumchi, Soviet Middle Asia, China, Siberia, Altai, Mongolia, the Gobi desert and the trans-Himalayan regions. His expedition helped him narrow down the focus of his search to the mythological land, Shangri-La. The long journey gave him clarity and invaluable insights for

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his philosophical concepts on life, nature and religions. The journey also kindled in him the enthusiasm to know about various cultures, ethnicities and humanity in general. Roerich was convinced that the narrow and limited practical approaches based on science and technology will only hasten the destruction of nature. He thought that only a philosophical understanding with a holistic perspective, which includes an open mind and respect for each and everything in nature, could save our planet. Roerich’s journeys through the Himalayan ranges and the interior regions of Inner Asia let him understand the relevance of human values and the need to have a compassionate approach to all living beings and nature in general. Roerich was keen to understand the human evolution. As an architect, he studied diferent styles of Russian architecture through diferent periods. The study of this architectural evolution urged Roerich’s philosophical mind to travel insightfully to the history of mankind. He left Russia at the age of 43 and by that time he had made his name as an author and painter. He was equally enthusiastic about philosophy and religion. Roerich was also interested in various cultures and wanted to know the role of human beings in this universe. The spiritual quest is unmistakable in Roerich’s works. In this context, Burns and Smith (1973) opine: To produce a pictorial record of lands and peoples of Inner Asia, Nicholas Roerich executed over 500 paintings during this single expedition. During these visits to Central Asia, he acquired a strong taste for Oriental mysticism and a considerable collection of Asian art treasures. In the chapter “Light in the Desert” (Roerich 1947), one can see many Chinese locations and read about the Mongols, caravans and Ghengis Khan. Roerich writes about the Tibetan sacred dance, the colourful Tibetan songs and the possession. He argues that the gorgeous display of colour and the trumpets with their victorious sound refect high quality. To save the planet and humanity, peace has to prevail across the world. Otherwise, human beings will make their life futile in the name of geographic boundaries and ethnic diferences. The tragic developments happening in recent times in countries like Afghanistan, Ukraine, Israel and Palestine remind us of the relevance of the words and works of Nicholas Roerich. The philosophy of peace is the very essence of his paintings. Thousands of his paintings found in museums and private collections portray the mountain peaks, people set against their ethnic backgrounds as well as mythological and spiritual characters. All these vivid pictures exhibit the quest for peace and spiritual elevation. As Shaposhnikova (2013) observes: The 20th century witnessed such a process in the lives of both Helena and Nicholas Roerich. They accomplished this by establishing contact with

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their Teacher, a Cosmic Hierarch, and maintaining the closest spiritual collaboration which resulted in the creation of the treatises of Living Ethics, a philosophy of cosmic reality. This philosophy of the Roerichs synthesized science and meta-science, and proposed a system of cognition necessary for forming a new cosmic mentality.” His works demonstrate the energy of human consciousness and the unity of everything. Roerich always believed that Russian culture has its roots in Indian philosophical traditions and in all his creative works one can see and feel the presence of this important aspect. According to Golodnikova (2009), Roerich had understood well that the Inner Asian region gives unique possibilities to study the past. The purpose behind Roerich’s expedition to Inner Asia (especially Central Asia) has been depicted by Golodnikova in the following words: The main purpose of the expedition was to create a pictorial panorama of lands and nations of Central Asia. The second purpose was to study the possibilities of new archaeological investigations and future expeditions in this region. The third purpose was to study the languages and dialects of Central Asia and to collect pieces of culture in these regions. Roerich produced 7,000 art works, which include wall paintings and mural paintings. In his work, Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary, Roerich describes various religions practised in and around Central Asia. He gives valuable insights about the lives of the people of this region and its adjacent areas. In his work Shambhala, one can fnd Roerich’s travel narratives on Tibet and the Central Asian countries and the philosophical and religious practices of these regions in 20th century. It is interesting to read the legends and parables which indicate the mystic land of Shambhala. In many of the Eastern prophesies, one can observe the appearance of Shambhala as a place where enlightenment and consciousness are projected. Roerich (2017a) reveals that through his journeys in Central Asia and Tibet, he was able to see the signs of Shambhala in the rock paintings and the popular legends in the countryside. According to Roerich, Shambhala is a place one can attain only through noble actions and deeds. In addition to the Inner Asian region, Roerich travelled to other countries as well. His visit to America proved productive, because during his stay in America in the 1920s, he planned his journey to India. Roerich’s visit to New York as a painter gave him the opportunity to exhibit his paintings, which received appreciation from the scholars, art critics and laymen. His interest in Buddhism made him embark upon the journey to the East. He reached India in 1923. After coming here, he started meeting intellectuals, painters, writers and scientists of India. At the end of 1923, he travelled in the mountainous

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region of the Himalayas, where he crossed more than 30 mountain passes, as described in his travel accounts. He studied the customs and religions of the people in that region, which helped him to reinforce his faith in the quality of human lives and humanity. It was in the year 1928 that the Roerich family settled in Kullu Valley and established a research centre. In Kullu, he discussed the outcome of his explorations as well as the study of botany, ethnology, archaeology and linguistics. His children collected a number of medicinal plants for detailed study in the context of Chinese and Tibetan medicinal tradition. Roerich died on 13 December 1947 in Kullu. Roerich’s Interests in Humanism, Culture and Religion

Roerich was a true believer in humanism and thought culture as an important part of human life. In Himavat – Diary Leaves, Roerich discusses the evolution, peace, aesthetics and the idea of culture. He considers culture as the love of humanity and the moving force. In his work, Flame in Chalice, Roerich’s prowess as a poet comes to the fore. The poems are simple and direct and reveal the mind of a universal citizen. George Gordan is quoted in the foreword of Himavat, (Roerich 2017b) who praises Roerich as “one of the greatest leaders of history”. According to Gordan: Nicholas Roerich is unquestionably one of the greatest leaders of history. Combined with his extraordinary breadth of mind, there is a sublime sympathy with the opinions of, and tolerance for, the prejudices of others. He has a marvelous equipment to be the leader of an international movement. He has power not only to plan but to act. He can translate his dreams into action. In the book The Invincible, Roerich’s dedication to spread sublime ideas to create a new consciousness for the human beings with a spiritual foundation has found prominent place. Further, in Beautiful Unity, Roerich (1946) says: Humanity is facing the coming events of cosmic greatness. Humanity already realizes that all occurrences are not accidental. The time for the construction of future culture is at hand. Before our eyes the revaluation of values is being witnessed. Amidst ruins of valueless banknotes, mankind has found the real value of the world’s signifcance. The Theosophical Society, which was founded in 1875, instilled in Roerich a keen interest to study the essence of Eastern religions. It was during 1909– 1915 that Roerich became a part of the Theosophical Society, which constructed a Buddhist temple dedicated to the Kalachakra tradition of Tibetan Buddhism in St. Petersburg. He was an avid reader of Rebus, especially the

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insightful pieces contributed by the celebrated Russian mystic and theosophist Helena Petrovna Blavatsky. The Theosophical Society’s motto satyat nasti paro dharmah (no religion higher than truth) inspired Roerich to explore the possibilities of Eastern religions, especially Buddhism. In his poems, articles and paintings, one can discern the refection of this infuence. Roerich was equally interested in history and archaeology. Roerich held that one cannot think of the future without the past. He was able to fnd various elements from the past to make the future better. He visited numerous temples and monasteries belonging to the Buddhist and Hindu faiths. Roerich was also wellversed in a number of books related to these religions. He had great respect for the Indian culture, geography, history, society and above all its people. In addition, Roerich was a missionary of peace and beauty. Bernardi (2013) sums up Roerich’s philosophy: “his philosophy set man inside a dense network of relationships: with himself, with his mentor or Guide, with other human beings, with other kingdoms, both subhuman and a super human”. According to Bernardi, the core of Roerich’s approach is giving value for the existence of the oriental philosophy which can create an ethical vision. It is important to highlight Abanindranath Tagore’s foreword to Roerich’s Beautiful Unity (1946). Tagore wrote: Nicholas Roerich has a place all his own in the world of Art. His pen too has carved out a niche for itself in the world of letters. The brush has a wider appeal no doubt, but the pen has a distinct function of its own; and in the hands of Nicholas Roerich it has for long exerted an infuence which is at once elevating and instructive. Indian scholar Chandra (2013) narrates the paintings of Roerich in the following words: The Himalayan paintings of Roerich are a hymn to the vital strength of Life and Nature, a dynamic potential for the biosphere and psycho sphere. Like Lord Buddha, Roerich sees with his “divine vision” (divya-chakshus) that every stone, every drop of water, every cell of the body is an endlessly fowing river of deep consciousness that enriches Homo sapiens in transutilitarian values. Roerich was a keen observer of religions, monuments, customs and the great migrations of people in Central Asia. Roerich interacted extensively with Lamas and sages, poets, philosophers and monks in places he visited, not to mention his in-depth study of the scriptures, mythologies and legacies. The journeys of Roerich helped in mapping mountain paths which has not been mentioned anywhere else. He also documented the great religious and

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cultural monuments, besides collecting and studying the folklores of places he visited. Roerich considered the Himalayas as the treasure trove of the world. His admiration for India stemmed from the fact that Buddhist philosophy helped the world become a better, peaceful place to live. He was fascinated by the Bhagavad-Gita, sayings and teachings of the Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore’s Gitanjali. Impact of the Noble Gospels of Buddhism on Roerich

Roerich was attached to all the great philosophical, poetic and humanistic values linked to peace and the conservation of culture of his era. As a highly enthusiastic kid, he was interested in archaeology, paintings, human culture and philosophy right from childhood. He always held the view that one can make the world a happier place through the pursuit of the beautiful. He was always keen to understand the ancient roots of human wisdom. This orientation and involvement led him to think and study more about Eastern culture as well as Buddhism and the Himalayas. Roerich was able to understand the mystic and mysterious nature of Asian Buddhism. He became a master of mysticism. He was able to see the heart of Asia. While describing Roerich’s expeditions of the Himalayas, Decter (1989) narrates the personality and sensitivity of Roerich in the following words: Once, in conversation, the artist (Roerich) compared himself to a fower that cannot tolerate being touched. The slightest touch and it closes. This is a very accurate analogy. Though he is as trusting and tolerant . . . as a child, he will hide in his shell if approached by anyone in the least indelicate way. Later on, Roerich’s expedition in the Inner Asian region (1925–1928) helped him seek the higher world of mysticism and spirituality in art. In his work Altai-Himalaya, he describes his journey in the Himalayas (Roerich 2017a). Roerich’s search for Shambala made him travel to various lands of Himalayas. Roerich has written extensively on the lives of Lamas and the Tibetan monasteries. He was not only an avid student of Buddhism but also a collector of books, artefacts and manuscripts related to the religion. It was in 1924 that Roerich started his series on Himalayas, staying in the countryside of Darjeeling. Roerich learned the Tibetan language and was able to engage in debates with the Lamas on the noble gospels of Buddhism. He was keen to understand the common source of the long heritage of Russian and Indian cultures. He marvelled at various aspects of the historical phenomena which integrate people living in diferent geographical, cultural, religious, social, economic, political, national, linguistic and regional contexts. In short, he was in search of the underlying philosophy of various cultures with special reference to Asia.

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According to Roerich, the Himalayan mountain ranges personify the element of sacredness that connects the countries in the Asian continent. In Himavat, he admires the Himalayas wholeheartedly. He wrote: “Even in the dark middle ages, remote countries dreamed of beautiful India, which was epitomized in the imagination of people by the mysterious sacred snowy giants” (www.roerich.org/roerich-writings-himavat.php). In Himavat, Roerich brings us various visuals from the Himalayan context such as (1) the sage who sings about the beauty of Himalayas, (2) the healing powers of musk which the rishis (saints) possess, (3) a Banaras sadhu who sits in sacred posture on the waters of the Ganges and (4) a Lama who levitates. Based on the Tibetan books which are preserved in the Gandola monastery, Roerich mentioned about the place in which the famous Buddhist teacher Padma Sambava meditated. He also shows the caves where Jetsun Milarepa, the Tibetan siddha, meditated. He says that life will be meaningless sans the concept of beauty. In Himavat, he also discusses the collection of Buddhist texts, especially the yellow manuscripts of Xinjiang’s Turpan region. McCannon (2003) talks about the artist Roerich’s passion for various forms of alternative spirituality in the following words: Curiosity about Russia’s cultural ties with Eurasia grew into a full-fedged fascination with Asia. Simultaneously, Roerich became enthralled by various forms of alternative spirituality. In this, he was spurred on by his wife, Helena, whom he met in 1899 and married in 1901. Together, the two of them pored over the writings of Vivekananda and Ramakrishna, read widely about Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, and plunged deeply into the Theosophical arcana preached by Helena Blavatsky. McCannon (2003) notes how Roerich gave up his earlier Russian particularism for universalism by the year 1910: small wonder, universal themes and the geographical areas like the Himalayas started appearing in his paintings and articles. Philosophical and religious quest became the staple of his works. Metaphors and symbols of Buddhism, which lead to spiritual elevation and insight to the mysterious nature of cosmos, metaphysics, pantheism and prophetic nature – all these became part of his art. Roerich’s universal approach became more and more visible when he uses the iconography of the Buddhist religion. He discusses the deep involvement of Roerich and his wife Helena in theosophy and Buddhism. When he was in Russia, he continuously thought of visiting India for spiritual edifcation. The Himalayan world of Tibet, Sikkim and Kashmir, where popularity and prevalence of Buddhism was witnessed, was of immense interest to Roerich. Brock (1926) has rightly observed: These are notes of landscapes powerfully and poetically pictured in words, of sights and sounds in the mountains and habitations of Sikkim and

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Kashmir – the tremendous sounds of religious ceremonial trumpets, the chiming of silver bells, notes of color and design in costume, sculptor’s and painter’s notes of faces and fgures. All these are of extraordinary vividness. After crossing Tibet and Ladakh, the expedition continues to Lahaul. Roerich writes: “The snowy peaks, colorful shrubs, fragrant juniper, and brightly tinted wild roses are not inferior to those of the most fertile plains of Tibet. Many of the sanctuaries, stupas, caves of hermits are not poorer than in Ladakh” (www.roerich.org/roerich-writings-himavat.php). Another masterpiece Heart of Asia  – Memories of Himalayas (Roerich 2007), as the title indicates, is a collection of articles based on his journeys in the Himalayas. The work notes that Roerich visited more than 50 Buddhist monasteries and several Buddhist teachers who resided in remote areas. One also witnesses the philosophical insights of Buddhist culture which were given by various Lamas. Roerich is enthusiastic more about the same because he can share it with the rest of the world. As noted in the aforementioned book, Roerich was believed to have crossed 35 mountain passes of the Himalayas through various geographical areas. Whereever he went, he learnt the culture, the language and the painting tradition of those regions, which helped him to paint the Himalayas with great insight. Roerich in his diary had maintained the precious moments and minute details which he had cherished in the Himalayas. No wonder, Roerich expressed through poetic words in his work, Himalayas – Abode of Light (1947): The majestic grandeur of the Himalayas has furnished a mine of precious lore for all the nations. Every country speaks of them in its own way, as the Sacred Land or the Abode of Wisdom. And India, which is the motherland of the Blessed One, knows that the ancient Rishis (saints) strengthened their spirit amid these marvelous regions. In Himalayas  – Abode of Light, Roerich (1947) wrote more about the lives in the Himalayas. In Realm of life and Himavat  – Diary Leaves one can relive the same spirit. In Himavat  – Diary Leaves, he talks about the real arrival of Shambhala. The presence of Lamas is a common theme in his works. His philosophical quest made him interact with many monks in monasteries as well as in various geographical regions of Asia. The Mongolian Lama who appears in Holy Guardian in Himavat tells him about the holy keepers. Roerich admires the gifts of the East in the same work. Here, he discusses agricultural products like tea, rice, indigo and so forth. Roerich was not happy with the way the Western countries portrayed the East. He is surprised to see the way Mongols love their country and their capacity to endure hardships like going without drinking water and food for days. In the continuation of the travel narratives, one can see his journey through the

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Rohtang Pass. Roerich’s description of snowy mountains, peaks and caves appeals to our minds as pure poetry. In Maitreya, Roerich (1932) opined: How beautifully India speaks of the end of the Black Age of Kali Yuga and the glorious beginning of the White Age of Satya Yuga. How majestic is the image of the Kalki Avatar upon the white steed! With equal heartiness the far-of Oirots await the White Burkhan. Our Old Believers who heroically go in quest of the “White Waters” in the Himalayas, make this difcult journey only in the name of the future. Roerich is happy to see here the abundant collection of Tibetan Buddhist literature. Roerich’s visit to the monasteries compelled him to write in detail about the hermits and the medicinal plants. He cared about the dances of the Lamas too. He has great respect for the Tibetan system of medicine. Roerich makes a note of cancer patients who were cured by the medicine given by Buddhist Lamas. Buddhism is one of the major religions which originated in ancient India and spread all over the world. Even though Buddha was a man, he was respected and accepted in most of the Asian countries as an awakened and enlightened human being. Scriptures, relics, monuments, concepts and temples connected to Buddhism are visible almost in all the Asian countries. As a physician, Buddha diagnoses the plight of human beings and gave solutions with eight-fold paths as prescriptions. In the last century, it was quite common for scholars and Indologists from various parts of the world to come to places connected to the Buddha and his philosophy. As an archaeologist, painter and traveller, Roerich also wanted to visit this Asian land in search of truth as well as to learn more about the concept of Shambhala. Travellers and scholars like Itsing and Xuanzhang had visited this land in the earlier times. Roerich is diferent from other travellers because he was not only a scientist and archaeologist but also a great painter. His expeditions in the Buddhist land were fruitful because he was able to gain insights into the philosophy of Buddha from the perspective of an artist. Roerich was able to convey the message of enthusiasm and faith to millions of people in India and abroad. Buddhism dwells upon the doctrine of the middle path. Most of the Buddhist monasteries and temples in Tibet, Mongolia and China belong to Mahayana Buddhism. Four Noble Truths and Eight-Fold Path are the basic ingredients of the Buddhist philosophy. Roerich was also inspired by the sublime aspect of the religion. In The Heart of Asia, he refers to the mountain ranges of Tibet and India. Roerich writes about the Buddhist presence in Sikkim in the following words: This blessed country, full of reminiscences of the illumined leaders of religions, leaves an impression of great calmness. Here lived Padma Sambhava, the founder of the Red Cap sect. Atisha, who proclaimed the

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teaching of Kalachakra, crossed this country on his way to Tibet. Here, in the caves, dwelt many ascetics, flling space with their powerful thoughts. (Roerich 2007) The reference to monasteries in Sikkim, the teaching of Padma Sambhava and the deep religious nature of people, the historical details of Buddhism in this geographical land, the miraculous power of Lamas – all are mentioned here. He also gives reference from various Buddhist sources. The reference of great patrons of Buddhism such as Nagarjuna, Asvaghosha, Shantha Rakshita and King Ashoka has also been given by Roerich. The declining monastery in Maulbeck and the gigantic image of Maitreya are referred here. The concept of Shambhala appears many times in the Heart of Asia as well as in Himalayas-Abode of Light; Roerich (1947), quotes the words of local people: There, behind that mountain, live holy men. They left the world in order to save humanity through wisdom. Many tried to go into their land, but few ever reached it. They know that one has to go behind that mountain. But as soon as they cross the ridge, they lose their way. In Mysteries, Roerich brings to our notice the ruins of Buddhist monasteries and temples. In Himalayan Prophesies, he refers again to the prophecies of Shambhala and Maitreya. In another article on Shambala, he quotes the scholars about the monasteries of Mongolia, Tibet and China. In Abode of Light, one can get insightful discussions on Shambhala, where a humble Roerich asks the Lama about Shambhala. During the long discussion, the Lama tells Roerich that they are guarded by Shambhala. The discussion continues in the next chapter, “The Knowledge of Experience”, where they talk about the great keepers of mystery on Shambhala. In the chapter,“Frontiers of Shambhala”, Roerich writes about the indications and legends about Shambhala. Here, Roerich also gives directions about the places where the hermit Milerapa meditated. He summarizes the teaching of Shambhala here: “The Teaching of Shambhala is a Teaching of Life. As in Hindu Yogas, this Teaching shows how to use the fnest energies, flling the macrocosms, which energies can as mightily be manifested in our microcosms” (Roerich 1947). Conclusion

In the introduction of the frst edition of Roerich’s Adamant (1923), Serge Whitman mentioned that “Roerich’s spirit has prophesied visions of a new world, where rife and discords are no more, and where the power of Beauty in Action flls mankind with inefable Love and understanding”. In the same edition, M. Highlander summarizes: “The world of Roerich is the World

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of Truth. His works link mortal souls with the world of unearthly revelations”. While discussing the implications of Buddhist alliance and Buddhist framework in the larger context of Roerich’s narratives and Eurasian future, Chatterjee (2013) sums up: Inner Asia’s cosmopolitan image has reappeared indicating it’s span across territories belonging to at least three time zones of Russia, China, Mongolia, Tibet and India. This re-conceptualization of Inner Asia has brought back to life Nicholas Roerich’s ideas about difused Eurasian cultures. So, we are faced with multiple hypotheses about the space that Inner Asia represents – a pan-Mongolian space, a colonial space depicted in the travel narratives of Nicholas Roerich and a Buddhist space of the lamaist tradition and a Buryat space. The unusual Buddhist locales visited by Roerich indicate the prominence of those sacred sites in a large Buddhist space. Roerich’s account refects the Transnationality of Buddhism and panMongolism on the one hand and hybrid local sentiments of inner Asia on the other. Nicholas Roerich was truly a cultural ambassador, whose harmonizing and synthesizing approach is discernible in his paintings that portray the Buddhist elements in the heart of Asia. As a teacher, scholar, explorer and painter, Roerich excelled with the purpose to build the new humanity. He built institutions to spread the language of beauty. References Bernardi, Marina. 2013. “Living Ethics: An Aspect of AgniYoga.” In Nicholas Roerich: A Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 167–171. New Delhi: Niyogi Books. Brock, H. I. 1926. “Roerich Seeks a Composite Messiah in Tibet.” The New York Times. July 4. Burns, Richard Dean and Charyl L. Smith. 1973. “Nicholas Roerich, Henry A. Wallace and the ‘Peace Banner’: A Study in Idealism, Egocentrism, and Anguish.” Peace and Change 1 (2): 41. Chandra, Lokesh. 2013. “A Caravan in Time and Space.” In Nicholas Roerich: A Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 185–193. New Delhi: Niyogi Books. Chatterjee, Suchandana. 2013. “Glimpses of Inner Asia.” In Nicholas Roerich: A Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 43–56. New Delhi: Niyogi Books. Decter, Jacqueline. 1989. Nicholas Roerich: The Life and Art of a Russian Master, 27. Rochester: Park Street Press. Golodnikova, I. Yu. 2009. “The Final Version of Roerich Expedition Map in Central Asia.” Moscow State University for Geodesy and Cartography. Moscow. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://icaci.org/fles/documents/ICC_proceedings/ICC2009/ html/nonref/7_6.pdf McCannon, John. 2003. “Apocalypse and Tranquillity: The World War I Paintings of Nicholas Roerich.” Russian History 30 (3): 301–321.

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Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1964. “Tribute to Roerich.” In Nicholas Roerich by His Contemporaries, 2–3. Bangalore: W. Q. Press. Roerich, Nicholas. 1923. Adamant. New York: Corona Mundi. Roerich, Nicholas. 1930. Shambhala. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company. Roerich, Nicholas. 1932. Maitreya. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum. Roerich, Nicholas. 1946. Beautiful Unity. Bombay: The Youths’ Art & Culture Circle. Roerich, Nicholas. 1947. Himalayas – Abode of Light. Bombay: Nalanda Publications. Roerich, Nicholas. 2007. Heart of Asia. Varanasi: Pilgrims Publishing. Roerich, Nicholas. 2017a. Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum. Roerich, Nicholas. 2017b. Himavat: Diary Leaves. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum. www.roerich.org/roerich-writings-himavat.phpv. Shaposhnikova, L.V. 2013. “A Caravan in Time and Space.” In Nicholas Roerich: A Quest & Legacy, edited by Manju Kak, 57–72. New Delhi: Niyogi Books. Tagore, Abanindranath. 1946. “Foreword.” In ‘Beautiful Unity’ by Nicholas Roerich. Bombay: The Youths’ Art & culture Circle.

3 HARMONIZING ETHNICITY AT THE CONTESTED BORDERLANDS A Case Study of Uyghurs of Xinjiang Veena Ramachandran

Introduction

Xinjiang represents contested borderlands in China’s political history. Once the centre of Buddhist culture, Xinjiang was inhabited by Indo-European people, followed by the Xiongnu empire (a confederation of nomads centered on current Mongolia). However, the imperial Chinese State could only control the region episodically. In 60 BCE, the Han dynasty drove the Xiongnu out of Tarim Basin to secure the Silk Road that passed through the area (Whitfeld and Williams 2004). Turks, Tibetans and Tang often fought for control of Xinjiang, but the Turkic Muslim Kara Khanid prevailed and later initiated the Islamization of Xinjiang (Mackerras 1998; Sinor 1998). Though the 13th century witnessed Mongol rule in Xinjiang for a brief period, Uyghurs, the Turkic Muslim people, prevailed again. In 1759, the Qing conquered the whole of Xinjiang. Even after the Qing’s conquest of Xinjiang, the cultural barrier was consistent. The Qing intellectuals believed that Xinjiang was too far and diferent from China proper, and it was too difcult to control Xinjiang. The Qing intellectuals’ imagining of the region also signifcantly crystallized modern China’s boundaries (Jia 2011). The Qing’s fall and subsequent Republican rule witnessed the Soviet Union–supported East Turkistan Republic (during the Ili Rebellion) from 1944 to 1949. However, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incorporated Xinjiang into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The incorporation, however, tried to deal with cultural diversity through Hanifcation of Xinjiang (Liu and Peters 2017), a strategy which was not unique to the PRC, as the Qing too encouraged the migration of Han peasants and Manchu bannermen to Xinjiang for the same purpose (Tyler 2004). DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-4

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Defning or redefning ethnicity in Xinjiang depends on the interaction between religious identity, Chinese highhandedness and brutality (Mukherjee 2015). More signifcantly, while religion is perceived as subversive in the Chinese political system, the State perceives a solid Muslim identity as challenging to maintaining stability. Therefore, in the ancient and contemporary contexts, Xinjiang represents the pivotal theatre of a non-inclusive Uyghur ethnicity with its Islamic orientations that constitute an existential challenge to the Han civilizational empire. The spatiality of Xinjiang, which is associated with China’s periphery, generates confusion regarding the historiography of Uyghurs; therefore, the Uyghurs are represented diferently in the historiographies of several countries. The PRC is uncomfortable with the expression “East Turkestan” as it implies contestation over the Chinese territoriality. The Chinese historiography represents Uyghurs as migrants in their homeland, citing the migration of Uyghur nomads from Mongolia in 840 CE establishing Han settlers’ presence much earlier. Chinese historiography is based on the construction of the long history of the “Chinese nation”, claiming that all the people populating the country have constituted one Chinese nation since ancient times. Thus, it denies the indigenousness of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. On the contrary, the Uyghur ethnocentric vision argues that Uyghurs are the indigenous population of Xinjiang, belonging to Turkic nationalities of Central Asian origin and having a more extended history than the Han Chinese in Xinjiang (Kamalov 2021). Uyghurs as China’s Ethno-Religious Challenge

Apart from the contestation over the historiography of Uyghurs, what creates political tension and a threat perception for the Chinese is Uyghurs’ ethno-religious complexity with strong Islamic identity and religiosity. China has a long history of dealing with ethnic minorities, while its ethnic policy combines Confucian and Communist traditions (He 2005). China’s nationmaking had the challenge of transitioning a multi-polar empire into a modern nation-state with a myth of historical continuity as a unitary state. Contemporary China, while making a grand unifed history, employs an (internal) imperial relationship with the Uyghurs because it is based on the narrative of people’s liberation of Xinjiang in the recent past: the subjugation of Uyghurs through appropriation of their history, identity, life and death, and more signifcantly, their religion; power asymmetry between the Chinese State and the Uyghurs managed through coercion and consent (Anand 2012). There is “little new about today’s pattern of relations between the State and religion in China. Government registration and monitoring of religious activities .  .  . have been a constant reality of organized religious life in both traditional and modern times only in varying degrees” (Bays 2004).

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This process has been identifed as “Sinicization” of organized religions. It involves aligning religious practices and faith with China’s culture, political ideology and legal system. The Nationalists and Communists followed the same pattern in the cultural construction of the identity between the Hans and the non-Hans. The domestic and imperial concerns of 20th-century China facilitated the process as all the non-Han ethnicities were categorized as one of the subgroups of the Han (Dikotter 2002). “The cultural construction of Han-non-Han moral hierarchical order was legitimized through the Marxist-Leninist theory of human social evolution by drawing on the evolution of human beings through primitive, slave, feudal and capitalist societies” (Morgan cited in Varutti 2010). Throughout Chinese history, ethnic minorities have been subordinated both culturally and politically by the Han. Moreover, within the hierarchical moral ladder, they were ranked in the order of their proximity to the “civilized and culturally superior” Han (Gladney 1994; Varutti 2010). Consequently, it led to the alienation of ethnic minorities and derailed the integration of those on the periphery, especially Tibetans and Uyghurs (Sautman 1997). In response to such contention, China employs civilizational rhetoric to integrate the borderland. Consequently, China ascribes the political usage of the cultural discourse of harmony to engage with the unequal and patronizing relation of power between the majoritarian civilizational-national core and the peripheral identities that render China imperial. Moreover, the reform era prioritized the preservation of stability and unity in Xinjiang and other ethnic minority peripheries. The quest for the same generated a socio-political consensus on harmonizing Uyghurs, diluting ethno-cultural identities to create loyal Uyghur citizens, who embrace Chinese identity as an aspirational one. Harmonization: A State Project in Xinjiang

Harmonization can be defned as a process that creates cultural and institutional hierarchies between the Chinese State and ethnic minorities. This process is geared to the objective of creating loyal ethnic minority citizens. In Chinese philosophical traditions, both Daoism and Confucianism present their notions of harmony. Daoism teaches harmony between humanity and the natural world, promoting passive harmonization by being more accommodating to the world. Confucianism ofers space for individual harmony – harmony between mind and body, ofering prominence to self-cultivation (Rekowski 2007). Confucian harmony is proactive and intends to generate harmonization where it does not exist. To be precise, Confucianism does not shy away from transforming society and the world to attain harmony. Daoism harmonizes with the world, while Confucianism harmonizes the world (Li 2008a).

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Harmony or harmonization is rooted in traditional Chinese culture, which proposes the founding of a utopia known as Datong (Great Unity or Great Harmony), an ideal Chinese world based on universal humanity and harmony. Tong in datong means sameness. It has also been called Taiping (太平, the State of Eternal Peace) (Guo and Guo 2008). Datong was also known as “One World Philosophy”. He or hexie (和, harmony, 和谐, harmonious) represents harmony with diversity, and datong means Great Unity. Harmony 和(he) makes its presence felt as a socio-political construct in the Chinese philosophical tradition since the pre-Qing period. He stands for a happy state, and the State of harmony has been compared to mixing diferent sounds to make music and various favours to make a soup. China exemplifes a harmonious state-society relationship based on ritual propriety (li) along with hierarchical moral order. China’s ethnic geography refects a “core-periphery (xia-yi)1 structure” with a hierarchical moral order insisting on compassion (ren) as a tool to engage with minorities (Fravel 2008). The assumption is that xia embodies this principle of ren and believes that everything under heaven will be peaceful if minorities too adhere to this moral principle (Liu 1999, 98–102). “Harmony” or “harmonizing”, from its classical to modern engagements, has become an inevitable political project of imperialism and nation-building in contemporary times. Harmony is thus part of the national unifcation project and hence is limited to the politics of the nation-state (Callahan 2015). It demands social behaviour that values loyalty to the regime irrespective of the nature of governance (Xiaohong and Qingyuan 2013). Harmonization, as a dynamic process, acknowledges strife as a constructive move towards greater harmony (Li 2006). While Confucian harmony does not have a problem accepting diferences, the challenge with Confucian harmony in contemporary times is that harmony exhibits holistic value orientation. Consequently, in the harmonization process, collective good prevails over individual good in the family, society and the State (Li 2008b). Indeed, the course of China’s ethnic management becomes signifcant, particularly as it moves towards new statism that combines socialism and Chinese civilization. This socialist-civilization dynamic essentially results in the combination of equality and hierarchy, and its infuence on ethnic management seems substantial (Callahan 2015). Harmony is reintroduced to emphasize order and stability, which intends to minimize and ignore social disparities and conficts in ethnic minority regions. Instead of emphasizing tolerance toward diversity (Chan 2010), harmony, being an ethnic management tool, translates to the stability and unity of the Chinese State being a priority in managing ethnic diferences. China’s attempts at invoking Confucianism legitimize the discourse of harmony as an efective statist tool to ensure social order and political stability in its nation-building process (Li 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Rosker 2013; Wang 2011; Xiaohong and Qingyuan

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2013) and national identity construction. China’s priorities of unity, stability and security choose “harmonization” as the preferred strategy for smooth Uyghur management and the creation of loyal Uyghur citizens. Uyghur Loyalty and the Islam Factor

Out of 55 ethnic minority groups designated by China, 10 are Muslims totalling 40 million people comprising less than 2 per cent of the country’s total population. These Muslim groups follow in descending order of their population size as the Huis, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Salars, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Bonans and Tatars. Huis account for nearly half of China’s Muslim population, who were till recently considered as China’s “preferred Muslims” because, throughout the modern era, the Chinese imams, scholars and pilgrims travelled to Muslim heartlands, imbibing knowledge and expertise that would help their fellow Muslims in China to adapt to the modern Chinese nation-state. Yihewani Muslim brotherhood was one such initiative that combined scriptural sensitivities of Islam with the political loyalty of the nation-state (Cieciura 2018). Some sympathizers of the Yihewani movement even extended their loyalty to the Communists during the civil war (Alle et al. 2003). Therefore, the political loyalty of the Muslims has been a decisive factor in Chinese political system. However, with the territoriality involved, Uyghurs were perceived as people at higher risk, while the Huis relatively have been on safe side. Islam was introduced to China by the Middle Eastern merchants during the Tang dynasty. During Yuan rule, Muslims came into China to serve as the administrators for Mongols, who married Han women and converted them to Islam. Muslims embraced adaptation and acculturation as a means to reconciling Islam with Confucianism. Reconciliation of Islam with Confucianism has always been a signifcant concern for the Muslim intellectuals in China. The dynamics between the Chinese emperor and Muslim minorities deteriorated with the Qing as they were territorially ambitious and wanted the hitherto borderlands with relative autonomy, such as Xinjiang, under the direct imperial purview. Consequently, Muslim-led revolts against the Qing were frequent. As the State met such rebellions with violent suppression, it ended a long accommodation period for the Muslims. The primary concern about Islam in China in the modern period is based on the hypotheses regarding Islam’s adaptation and integration into the mainstream Chinese social and political system. While the frst one suggests that Muslim groups reconcile the dictates of Islamic culture with the host culture, that is Chinese (Gladney 1990), the second hypothesis argues that Islam is not just resistant to adhering to Chinese border, but as minorities, Muslims are inherently problematic to a non-Muslim host state (Israeli 1978; Dillon 1997). Both hypotheses leave ample space for invoking the loyalty questions

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for Uyghurs. Subsequently, the question of Uyghurs’ loyalty towards China has evolved as a crucial political debate, particularly after the Urumqi riots (5 July 2009). Furthermore, the State reserves its role in defning Islam’s permitted space and scope as a religion in Xinjiang. The State identifes the moderate version of Islam with the notion that love for the Chinese nation should be more signifcant and above the love for Islam. With this categorization, the State conceives Uyghurs’ Islamic identity as a relatively more signifcant threat than the Islamic religiosity of the Huis. The general assumption is that Uyghurs are more assertive and informed about their ethno-religious identity and geopolitical tension, adding to the “security threat” perception. Chinese penetration into Islamic afairs of Uyghurs and its control over them suggests the strength of the preserved hierarchy between Islam and the State. Chinese-ness and Islam are considered incompatible because Islam disregards flial piety (xiao or li) and does not appreciate the locale of Chinese political sensitivity. Besides, the Muslim community (chose to) remain outside the Chinese virtue and refnement (Israeli 1978). In 2001, the Chinese Islamic Association initiated a project to reinterpret Islamic scriptures with the objective to curb misleading or extremist elements from infltrating the Muslim population. Its framework of interpretation was based on the principles of loving one’s country and religion (Doyon 2014). The project reinforces predominance of the State in defning terms and conditions and space of Islam and thereby enforcing political and ideological loyalty to the State. The state project of reinterpreting Islamic scriptures defes “three evil forces” (terrorism, separatism and extremism). The political connotations of the project led to the identifcation or defnition of two versions of Islam: moderate (the state-approved) and extremist (threat to stability) (Lipman 2004). The space of Muslim minorities under China is defned through fve phases based on the religious/cultural freedom enjoyed by the community: 1 Pre-Cultural revolution period, when the minorities enjoyed religious freedom. 2 The Cultural Revolution, when the Muslim minorities, along with others, were suppressed and tortured for their belief systems. 3 In the post-Mao era, the Communists adopted more fexible policies towards religious practices, including Islam. 4 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led global war on terror. 5 Post-Urumqi riot period. The fourth and the ffth phases of China’s Uyghur management shaped the space and purpose of Islam after that within the Chinese social and political order. With 9/11 the United States started the Global War on Terror and supported eforts in other countries to dismantle terrorist organizations. Taking

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advantage of this, the Chinese government defned Uyghur resistance as part of global Islamic terrorism and not an ethnic separatist issue as it used to be in the past (Chung 2002). The Urumqi riot adopted the stability-security paradigm to engage with the Uyghurs and launched “the peoples’ war on terror”, reiterating the need to reform ethnic and religious management, institutionally imparting patriotism. China interlinked stability maintenance in Xinjiang with national security discourse legitimizing the authorities’ surveillance measures (Xie and Liu 2021; Ramachandran 2017; Millward and Peterson 2020). It resulted in accelerating the public security budget (Famularo 2015), facilitating the pace of security initiatives. The State defned its objective to maintain a stable Xinjiang with harmonized Uyghurs to reassure the signifcance of the stability in China’s domestic politics and refects the stability-security conundrum in Xinjiang. Through the stability-security paradigm, the State re-engineers the space and meaning of ethno-religious complexity in Xinjiang. The signifcant consequences include China’s attempt to defne Uyghur-ness, which eventually resulted in the othering of Muslims by deethnicizing them. Defning Uyghur-ness and Othering of Muslims

The Chinese State in 2014 resorted to the strategy of re-engineering the Uyghur society. The re-engineering implies reinstating the indigenous attributes of the Uyghur ethnic minority to erase the Wahabi infuence in Uyghur society. The State thereby intervenes in the personal and cultural spheres of Uyghur lives, from dictating the physical appearance of the Uyghur men and women to managing their religious and educational practices. The Chinese State has prescribed traditional Uyghur attire for the Uyghurs so that it indicates their identity. The intention is to proscribe the conventional Islamic (Arabic) dressing style. For example, men are asked to wear doppa, the traditional prayer hat, but not to grow a beard (Shepherd and Blanchard 2017). Women are expected to embrace the “Atlas dress” and the doppa cap as standard symbols of Uyghur femininity instead of the Islamic veil (Leibold and Grose 2016). Project Beauty has been initiated as an extension of a re-engineering programme encouraging women to embrace their traditional attire instead of the Arabic importation, that is burqa (Grose 2020). Here, the State defnes progress and modernity as an absolute rejection of Islamic symbolism and embrace of traditional indigeneity. The State has implemented a few policies calling for a complete departure from the Arab infuence in the Islamic symbolism of Uyghurs. The State interprets certain Islamic practices rooted in Uyghur culture as approved and those imported from the Arab world as unapproved. The regulation bans over a dozen behaviours that authorities deemed “abnormal”.

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Unapproved Islamic teachings have been banned during ceremonies such as weddings and promote celebrations with patriotic “healthy” dance parties. It has violated the general reluctance of Uyghurs to convert their weddings into a festive occasion (Hoshur 2020). Besides, such gatherings are highly monitored by local ofcials. The Islamic divorce procedures were also outlawed, with the Uyghurs having to follow Chinese law in the case of divorce. As a natural outcome, the Chinese State has emerged as more oppressive in its surveillance tactics (Ramzy and Buckley 2019). The categorization of “involvement in ‘unlawful’ religion” in the context of Xinjiang not only reasserts the ethno-religious complexity of Uyghurs but also accentuates the Chinese State’s right to determine the defnitions of ethnicity and extremism by dictating the spatial boundaries of Islamic faith. Ofcially, the Chinese government has acknowledged the presence of internment camps, but has claimed they are re-education camps. Nevertheless, these camps, meant for de-extremifcation through political indoctrination, suggest how the Chinese State perceives these camps. Though the authorities acknowledge them as vocational training centres for criminals, there exists another interpretation as hospitals that treat Islam as an illness. They are meant to cure extremist thinking by locking them in extra-judicial custody for months in harmful conditions. The Chinese State has always treated religion as an addiction (Falun Gong could be an example) and used medical analogies like mental illness, tumour and so forth to suppress Uyghurs. As Sean Roberts (2018) argues, the Chinese State portrays the Uyghurs with strong Islamic religiosity as a biological threat to the Chinese society, and hence the physical separation, surveillance, detention and so forth are justifed. These camps force Uyghur inmates to memorize patriotic texts, confess their “faults”, criticize their religious traditions and denounce fellow internees (Shih 2018). The re-education camps are reminiscent of the Mao era, exemplifying the coercive shift of the Chinese State’s stability-security-secularization paradigm and the consistent push for an open declaration of loyalty to the Party-State by Muslim minorities from Xinjiang. The rationale or justifcation for these camps by the Chinese State has been the People’s War on Terror (which ensures civilian participation in counter-terrorism measures) and legitimizes various strategies of surveillance and suppression that execute indiscriminate use of de-extremifcation strategy enduring pervasive discrimination, religious repression and even cultural genocide. As per the Article 4 of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremifcation (China Law Translate 2017), de-extremifcation shall persist in the basic directives of the party’s work on religion, persist in an orientation of making religion more Chinese and under the law, and actively guide religions to become compatible with socialist society.

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Since the Chinese government confates extremism and Islam in the context of Xinjiang, de-extremifcation seems to erase the Islamic identity of the Uyghurs, citing doubts regarding their political loyalty. It feeds into the political conception that the Uyghurs are incorrect in their spiritual and political spheres. It was natural that as the People’s War on Terror replaced the “Strike Hard” campaign, the Chinese State did not shy away from directly targeting Islam, suggesting its Sinicization, formulating de-Islamization in Xinjiang. A Global Times report not only glorifes the de-extremifcation camps as a means to normalizing Uyghurs who are afected by the tumour of Islamic fundamentalism but highlights the same as an inevitable part of Xinjiang’s comprehensive development plan (Ai 2018). China proposes to expand the stability-security paradigm to the Hui majority province like Ningxia stressing the success of the Xinjiang stability-security model (Ai 2018). As a natural consequence the Huis are also reportedly incarcerated in de-extremifcation camps (Bunin 2020). Although the state diferentiates Islam and ethnicity, there has always been a fear of Muslims as the other. However, this apprehension has taken on a distinctly anti-religious (anti-Islam) tone. A few religiously motivated attacks, especially in Kunming, known as China’s 9/11, signifcantly started shaping the trajectory of the Han attitude towards Muslims in general, irrespective of their ethnicity (Trédaniel and Lee 2018). Moreover, the attempt of the State Ethnic Afairs Commission to push hard the Halal law received a backlash from the public and party intellectuals who argued that it would violate the separation of the state and church framework of the Chinese state (Erie 2016a, 2018). It fnally led Xi Jinping to reiterate that the Chinese state “must persist in the separation of church and state, persist in preventing religion from interfering with administration, judiciary, education, and other such state functions” (Erie 2016b). Apart from this clear position, Wang Zhengwei, who pushed for Halal legislation, was removed from his post (Hernéndez and Wu 2016). While the othering of the Uyghurs slowly spread to regions where the Huis are dominant, Islamophobia became the new normal. The death threats to the Imam of the Nangang mosque are clear evidence of how China is gradually treading the path of hatred towards Islam in general, irrespective of the respective ethnicity its proponents belong to (Shih 2018). The Han perceived both ethnic groups as potential threats and addressed Islam as a dangerous religion, integrating the Hui and the Uyghur under Islam’s umbrella, representing local and global concerns. The lack of transparency in mainstream media reports on Muslims in China conspires, in part, to add to the online hatred of Muslims. It is mainly because the government propaganda plays up pieces purporting to show how much Chinese Muslims have benefted from the government’s preferential policies. Also, the reportage on preferential policies damages the relationship between the

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Han and the Muslim ethnicities, as the Han tend to view these policies as unfair, especially in cases like the one-child policy, where China has ofered Muslims exemption. Apart from this, there is increased media reportage of domestic and international terrorism. A gradual de-ethnicization of Muslims has accompanied these concerted eforts to have Muslims categorized as a dangerous community to bring them under the monolithic umbrella of Islam. Besides, the rapid shift in geopolitics overwhelmingly ignored the cultural genocide and human rights abuses which were rather normalized in the reeducation camps. Changing Geopolitics and the Trajectory of Xinjiang’s Ignored Crisis

Beijing’s assertiveness at home and abroad during the COVID-19 pandemic, from zero-COVID-19 to mask diplomacy, has surprised the world. Even 3 years since the outbreak of the pandemic, the lockdowns are still spreading in China. In case of Xinjiang, much before the pandemic, millions of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities were reported to be detained in internment camps. Nevertheless, reports suggest they were not spared during the pandemic as the Chinese State pushed them to the COVID-19 frontlines (Wani 2020). From forced organ harvesting of Uyghurs to save the lives of COVID-19infected Han population to the sending of thousands of Uyghurs to mainland China’s manufacturing hubs at Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Zhejiang to keep their factories running amidst lockdown exemplify the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The heat-sensing cameras and face recognition systems to fght COVID-19 in China were employed in the high-tech oppression of Uyghurs. It can be said herewith that the COVID-19 technology is intimately tied to China’s surveillance state (Byler 2022). Beijing stayed on the sidelines during Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 when China was ready to play a constructive role in mitigating the crisis, envisioning itself as a responsible global power. Unlike in the past, in 2022, China did not show any signs of doubling down the narrative that Russia is defending itself against NATO’s expansionism and spreading disinformation about Russia in the Global South, facilitating the consolidation of non-liberal regimes (Oertel 2022). Most importantly, in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war since February 2022, there are many similarities between Ukraine and Xinjiang in their relationship with Russia and China, respectively. For instance, Russia and China consider Ukraine and Xinjiang as part of Russian or Chinese kinship based on their defnition of its long history and civilizational glory. Both these states, in their eforts to reclaim their past glory, employed the kinship theories to claim legitimacy over the Ukrainian and Uyghur populations respectively, who have distinct social and political identities diferent from those of their

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totalitarian aggressors (Bayraq 2022). Unlike in the past, solidarity from the liberal regime for such human rights violations is deteriorating. The U.S. Congress has approved the Uyghur Bill-2020 that authorizes the U.S. administration to identify the Chinese ofcials responsible for the mass incarceration, and to freeze their assets on U.S. soil and to deny their entry into the country (The Statesman 2020). At this moment, the silence of many Muslim nations is strange, with Turkey (Sudworth 2019) and Qatar (Fattah 2019) being the exceptions. Otherwise vocal about the rights of Muslim populations in other parts of the world, countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have prioritized their economic and strategic interests over human rights abuses of Uyghurs. Even they appreciated China’s developmental works and counter-terrorism eforts in Xinjiang. The on-going as well as expected investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) played an inevitable role in manifesting this silence in the Muslim world. Besides, since the inception of the BRI, China has recognized the strategic signifcance of the Islamic world, which includes the Central Asian region and the Arab world, predominantly because of the vast natural (oil) resources and the links they could ofer to international markets. In this context, the role of the Chinese Islamic Association in crafting the Xinjiang narrative for the Arabic-speaking audience is widely discussed too. The Chinese Islamic Association has adopted a three-pronged strategy to create the Xinjiang narrative: (1) enlightening the Arab audience about the uniqueness of Chinese Islam and warning about foreign infuence; (2) China’s proactive Haj diplomacy; (3) continuous engagement and interactions with the Islamic institutions and prominent Muslim leaders (Greer and Jardine 2020). The involvement of Frontier Services Group (FSG) in Xinjiang and their decision to open a training camp in Xinjiang indicates the transnational privatization of mass detention camps that will have long-term strategic implications (Roche 2019). The FSG is currently ofering security to BRI projects abroad. Every ofcial action in Xinjiang convinces us that China defeats the West at its own game. China’s attempt to identify Uyghur dissent with terrorism, extremism and separatism is nothing but the skilful usage of the post9/11 scenario in its favour. Furthermore, today China is prominent among the countries that engage in a state project of harmonization that, in practice, intends to dilute Uyghurs’ cultural identity. It sows the seeds of Islamophobia in China and has implications for other Muslim minorities (Hui). A global silence on the Uyghur issue legitimizes the Chinese model of ethnic minority management as harmonization as a project of redefning Uyghur identity poses challenges to the normative foundations of state-minority engagement. Conclusion

Harmonizing the non-Han ethnicities to the mainstream Chinese-ness emerges as a political strategy, diluting all other identities. The creation of

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a loyal minority population in the frontiers has continued as the primary objective of the Chinese State in Xinjiang as well as in other ethnic minority regions. However, the allegiance of ethnic minorities has attained its transition from loyalty to socialist values in the pre-reform era to loyalty towards a strong and stable Chinese State in the post-reform scenario. In the post–Urumqi riot scenario, though the Chinese State acknowledges the need to redefne the ethnic policy, there is no ofcial endorsement for a change in ethnic policy. However, China’s ofcial ethnic policy position portrays its preference for gradual ethnic policy reform. The debate on the need to de-politicize ethnic minorities in the post–Urumqi riot scenario, given the spectrum of scholarly debate, has adopted the course of de-ethnicization of Uyghurs and the Hui. Moreover, the Xinjiang issue and the security discourse chiefy preoccupy China’s engagement with Islam, and the de-ethnicization process has emerged as the remedy for ethnic confict in general, specifcally, the Uyghur discontent. China does have genuine apprehension towards religious extremism and terrorism, but it is limited by its apprehension towards securing and legitimizing Chinese rule over Xinjiang. Consequently, socio-political stability and domestic security dominate the de-extremifcation both as a discourse and as a political strategy. While China claims its policies in Xinjiang protect the region from becoming “China’s Syria” or “China’s Libya”, it is signifcant to revisit the Chinese state’s assurance of promoting and preserving ethnic unity as a post–Urumqi riot panacea. The trajectory of ethnic policy reform in the context of de-extremifcation and loyalty question confrms that it has not taken any positive cue from the much-discussed ethnic policy reform. In the process of containing political Islam, China’s continuous eforts to make Islam a monolith backfres and de-ethnicizes the Uyghurs, who constitute a signifcant part of China’s diverse (Muslim) ethnic population. Note 1 In the Confucian order, Xia (Han Chinese, or Zhongyuan) are the rulers while Yi (barbarians, outsiders or minorities) are the subjects; Xia is the centre, while Yi is the periphery; Xia consists of insiders and fellow countrymen, while Yi consists of outsiders and strangers; and Xia is superior while Yi is subordinate. The idea of Yi-Xia presupposes the Middle Kingdom and the central power of China.

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4 INNER ASIA IN THE “GEOPOLITICAL GAME” OF THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY Impact on the Trajectory of Mongol-Seeking Independence Sharad K. Soni

Introduction

The magnitude and complexity of a few dramatic episodes of the geopolitical game that unfolded in Inner Asian region in early 20th century were markedly greater for the Mongols, who had little options but to bear the brunt in seeking independence for present-day Mongolia. At that point of time, Mongolia was no diferent from other Inner Asian societies, most of which were overshadowed either by Russian or by Chinese overlords in terms of political powers. Chinese overlordship converted Mongolia into a vassal state of Manchu-controlled China (Qing dynasty) after Mongol leaders submitted to the Manchu emperor in the rite known as ketou in 1691 (Avery 2003). But Mongolia’s unique location at the heart of Inner Asia contributed much to have an edge over others in serving as the key site for development of most of the polities. This was more so because of its being not just an inner hinterland to Russia and China but by itself constituting a sphere which has its own unambiguous historical dynamics. Such historical dynamics of a geopolitical dimension saw the involvement of Russia, China and even Japan to some extent in the “geopolitical game” played in this part of Inner Asia. As a result, what came to the fore was a dramatic turn of events largely infuenced by Sino-Russian geopolitics in the early phase of the 20th century or more precisely between 1911 and 1921 that by no means can be described as favourable to Mongolia in securing the recognition of its independence. It was a “confused” decade, as Bawden (1991) describes, during which “Mongolia’s political status changed more than once”. The Revolution (October 1911) encouraged the Mongols to reassert their independence. The seeds of this revolution, however, were sown a few years DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-5

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ago in reaction to the advent of the New Policies launched in 1901 in the name of reforms by the Qings, which aimed not only to integrate the Inner Asian frontiers into China proper on the pretext of border-defence but also to turn traditional nomadic Mongols into modernizing Chinese. Atwood (2002) argues that “these factors played a major role, and were a good deal of the reason why the opposition to New Policies was so violent in Inner Asia”. Within China, the New Policies challenged the Qing authorities. The combination of the enforcement of the New Policies and the Chinese Revolution which followed, thus, caused the Mongolian Revolution (1911) that culminated at the end of 1911 into the proclamation of an independent Mongolia in Urga (the then capital of Mongolia) under the “theocratic” rule of a “charismatic” Buddhist leader, the eighth Jebsundamba Khutagt (Bogd Gegeen), popularly known as the Bogd Khan (Bulag 1998; Morozova 2009; Soni 2022). Afterwards, a sequence of events denying recognition of Mongolia’s independence appeared on the scene; this chapter argues that it was due to the impact of a geopolitical game played by Russia and China that the trajectory of the Mongol-seeking independence became an arduous task. This chapter recounts how the Mongolian quest for de facto independence had been fraught with insecurity and anxiety during a decade-long Mongol struggle for independence as stretched out between 1911 when they “proclaimed” independence and 1921 when they achieved “actual” independence. The idea of this chapter originated from the author’s previous works (2002, 2006), in which Mongolia’s struggle for independence was explored. In the following paragraphs, one may fnd similarities of events and related issues consistent with the earlier published work, but this chapter approaches the problem from a completely diferent perspective. On this count, a few fundamental questions concerning the very issue of Mongols seeking their independence need to be addressed as a framework before proceeding to discuss the Sino-Russian geopolitical game that pushed Mongolia into a delicate situation until it achieved actual independence: 1 Whether the proclamation of independence by the Mongols in 1911 can be termed as the “frst revolution for national independence” 2 Whether Russia engineered this revolution for independence of Mongolia 3 Whether it was a direct and univocal reply to an attack by the ManchuChinese on the very survival of the Mongols of Mongolia 4 Whether the difcult trajectory of Mongol-seeking independence at last resulted in turning the tide in its favour to ensure statehood for Mongolia Contrary to the traditional viewpoints, a number of hitherto inaccessible documents published by the Mongolian press during the democratic changes in Mongolia in 1990–1991 provide some grounds to investigate the aforementioned issues. As L. Jamsran noted in an article “Zag Zagaaraabaidaggui”

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(The Time Is Changing) published in Mongolian newspaper Ünen on 25 May 1991, the proclamation of independence following the Mongolian revolution was the result of an historical process that encouraged the outbreak of an indigenous nationalist movement, often referred to as the “frst revolution for national independence”. Another article “1911 Revolution: An Important Event” published in The Mongol Messenger on 10–16 December 1991 provides a clear picture of agreement with this proposition on the part of Mongolian historians, who argue that “the events of the 1911, by their nature and signifcance, were a national liberation revolution and not a movement, as was interpreted over many years”. Campi and Baasan (2009) acknowledge that “the frst [Mongolian Revolution] was an anti-Manchu, nationalist one aimed at achieving self-determination”. There is merit in all such arguments because strict implementation of the Qing’s New Policies in 1910 led to the growth of anti-Manchu feelings among the Mongols, which eventually developed into a national movement to resist Chinese domination in Mongolia (Soni 2002). However, to Lattimore (1935), the Mongolian Revolution “was not in reality either a rebellion or a revolution”, but “merely an assertion of the historical principle that Mongolia is not part of China”. Some scholars contend that although Russian help was sought in the Mongolian revolution, the Mongols themselves had to take action on it, as “Russia was not interested in seeing Mongolia become independent” (Baabar 1999). The proclamation of independence had indeed thwarted the Russian attempt to impose its intentions on Outer Mongolia (the present-day Mongolia). Bogd Khan soon realised that without Russian recognition Mongolia’s independence would remain meaningless, and what followed then was a clash of interests among Russia, China and Mongolia, though Mongolian desire was nothing more than a dejected subject often ignored by both the neighbours. Nevertheless, the 1911 proclamation of independence, as scholars believe, was not a scheme that was manipulated by Russians, but “was a direct and unambiguous reply to an attack [by the Chinese in the name of reforms] on the very survival of the Mongolian people” (Ewing 1980). Others describe the 1911 revolution as “the forerunner of the 1921 revolution”, as evident from the article published in The Mongol Messenger on 10–16 December 1991. In 1912, following the downfall of the Manchu-Qing dynasty, monarchy in China was abolished and a Republican government was established. However, the Republic of China obtained a renewed right to deny recognition of Mongolia’s independence (Bumochir 2018), thus starting the real geopolitical game between Russia and China on the self-proclaimed status of Mongolia. The Geopolitical Game Over Mongolian Status

The geopolitical game that historically emerged in Inner Asia points to the fact that Mongolia was the hotspot for dominance of both the Russians and

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Chinese due to its geostrategic location. While the Russians regarded Mongolia as a classic bufer state, the Chinese considered Mongolia as their part (Hyer 1997). Both Russians and Chinese played their own game in which the Mongols fell victims so much so that they became a Manchu subject and their independent status went into oblivion. The opportune time, however, came in 1911 when Mongolia asserted and proclaimed its independence. This changed status of Mongolia was a serious matter for the image of the Republican China considering that the latter had no control over a territory the inhabitants of which had until recently remained loyal to the Qing empire. The legal justifcation was that since Mongolia was part of the Qing empire, it should remain an integral part of the territory of the successive Chinese government (Friters 1949). The Presidential mandate of 1912 issued by the new Chinese government refused to recognize Mongolia’s independence and incorporated Mongolia as China’s integral part (Weigh 1928). Such an approach, however, failed to generate any favourable results. The proclamation of Mongolian independence was initially contemplated by the Chinese as “a mere child’s play which could be frustrated as easily as turning the palm of the hand” (Weigh 1928). But soon they realised that Russia might be playing a game on the issue of Mongol-seeking independence for its own advantage vis-à-vis China and Japan. At this juncture, Bogd Khan had little option but to seek Russian support (Hyer 1997). Despite immense contribution of the Mongolian revolution to Tsarist policy of expansion, Russia exhibited little or no eagerness to support the recognition of independence. Perhaps Russia preferred to “protecting and strengthening their economic and strategic interests in Mongolia” (Batsaikhan 2009; Soni 2022). When China issued a mandate declaring its fve races as Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan, the Russian policy took an activist shape and “the fate of Mongolia fell into the hands of the Tsarist diplomats” (Tang 1959). On the other side, having failed to dissuade Bogd Khan, China was puzzled as to whether to resort to arms or to diplomatic persuasion. The Russian Minister of Foreign Afairs stated in the Diet on 26 April 1912 that “Russia would see to it that China should henceforth cease to colonize Outer Mongolia, or to station troops there, or to interfere in its government” (Hsu 1926). For China, it was precarious to go for direct military action against Mongolia. In the meantime, a Russo-Japanese treaty of 8 July 1912 recognizing Russian and Japanese spheres of infuence over Mongolia and its adjoining areas encouraged Russia to play its wishful role in the on-going geopolitical game. Russia, therefore, became frm in its dealings with China on the Mongolian issue (Soni 2006). In the Sino-Russian geopolitics, Russia was well positioned to be the protector of Mongolia against China, though not being in favour of recognizing Mongolia’s full independence. Instead of trying to resolve the issue of Mongolian independence, Russia found out a two-stage solution: (1) to have an

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agreement with Mongolia and (2) then to deal with China (Tatsuo 1999). Russia decided to legalize independently the existence of Mongolia’s autonomy since Russia was not sure of reaching an agreement with China. On 3 November 1912, a Russo-Mongolian Agreement was concluded endorsing inter alia Outer Mongolia’s “autonomy” and its “right” to have its own national Army, besides an attached protocol defning Russia’s trade rights (Mac Murray 1921). The agreement, however, did not meet the expectations of the Mongol-seeking full independence, that is total separation from China apart from having a full control of its own foreign relations and inclusion of all Mongolia under its administration in order to unite all the Mongols (Soni 2002). Even the term “Mongolia” instead of “Outer Mongolia” was used in this agreement, but later the Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913 clearly defned the terms “Autonomy” and “Mongolia”. The Russo-Mongolian Agreement came as a big disappointment for Mongolians because instead of gaining “autonomy” and continuation of Chinese “sovereignty”, they intended to create a really sovereign state independent of both China and Russia. As a reaction to this agreement, China resisted and made a formal protest with Russian on the pretext that Outer Mongolia was “absolutely incapable” of concluding agreements with foreign powers. But it was not the issue that could have been resolved by protest; rather it was an issue that arguably pointed to “whether China was ready to fght the Russians or do the best it could on the basis the latter might choose to dictate” (Hsu 1926). Yet what could have been the best solution in the eyes of Russian and Chinese was opted by them, a turning point in their geopolitical game, which can aptly be described as real politicking on the Mongolian status. Both sides took steps to settle the Mongolian question in a manner, which substantially suited their purposes. In efect, China had to accept a compromise over Mongolia’s status. After difcult negotiations, the Russo-Chinese Declaration was signed on 5 November 1913, which granted autonomy to Mongolia under China’s suzerainty (Mac Murray 1921). In this Declaration, “Autonomy” meant Russian recognition of Chinese suzerainty and Chinese recognition of Mongol’s right to run their own “internal administration” and to control their commerce and industry as well as Chinese agreement not to deploy troops in Mongolia and abstain from colonizing it. Russia, on its part, bound itself not to keep troops in Mongolia with the exception of Consulate guards, not to interfere in any branch of the country’s administration whatsoever and to abstain from colonizing it. According to the Declaration, the government of autonomous Mongolia was given the right to conduct negotiations, even with other states, on economic matters, but was not allowed to negotiate with other states on the question of a political nature or to conclude political treaties (Mac Murray 1921). Bogd Khan, however, objected to the Russo-Chinese Declaration, saying, “it would not recognize any condition of dependency determined without its

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consent” (Clubb 1971). Although the objection was justifable, Clubb (1971) observes, “Outer Mongolia [Mongolia] was put in the position of a joint protectorate, with reduction of China’s authority indeed, but also with specifc reference to its suzerain authority, which made that country a vassal once more”. Even so, the Mongols had to remain contented only for the pledge in the Declaration that in the negotiations soon to follow, they could take a share on the basis of perfect equality with China and Russia and that their best interests would be given due consideration (Weigh 1928). The Declaration not only ofcially recognized Russian dominance over Outer Mongolia but also allowed the area to become a “Russian protectorate” (Ho-t’ien 1949). China, having failed to secure outright possession of the territory it claimed, had to set forth for counting on Russia’s good ofces to be used to ascertain its relations with Mongolia in subsequent negotiations. Russia-Mongolia-China Tripartite Agreement

Despite high hopes, China had to beneft in terms of re-establishing contacts with the Mongols following the Russo-Chinese Declaration; developments in Mongolia were hardly encouraging for them. Not only did the Mongols postpone the commencement of Russian-Mongolian-Chinese tripartite negotiations which China had proposed but also they opposed the entry of Chinese goods into Outer Mongolia (Friters 1949). Yet whatever the situation might have been, it was reported in June 1914 that the infow of Chinese settlers into (Outer) Mongolia had again set in motion, capitalizing on the fact that its exact boundaries were not yet settled (Friters 1949). At the same time, anxieties over early convening of a tripartite meeting also went up high in China, especially “when rumours spread that Russia had fortifed her position by several agreements with Outer Mongolia, of which one on railways was made public after its conclusion in September 1914” (Friters 1949). Eventually, a tripartite meeting of Russian, Chinese and Mongol representatives was convened on 8 September 1914 at Kiakhta, which continued until the latter part of May 1915 (Soni 2002). During the negotiations, all three parties had their own individual proposals. But Mongols did not get what they were asking for, and in spite of their resistance, they were forced to compromise on the status of autonomy and to recognize Chinese suzerainty over there. Arguments then followed over the interpretation of the concept of suzerainty and autonomy: the Chinese described suzerainty as power to rule, the Russians as self-autocracy and the Mongols as autocracy (Baabar 1999). Finally, the term “autonomous suzerainty” was used for Mongolia. The “Tripartite Agreement” with regard to Outer Mongolia was signed on 7 June 1915 (Mac Murray 1921). Combining the documents of the Russo-Mongolian and Russo-Chinese agreements, the Kiakhta Tripartite Agreement encompassed all the major provisions of

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Mongolia’s relations with China, Russia and other countries to be followed as mentioned in the following (Ho-t’ien 1949; Soni 2006): (i)

Mongolia recognized China’s suzerainty over its territory, while China and Russia recognized autonomy of [Outer] Mongolia constituting part of Chinese territory; (ii) The title Bogd Khan for Jebsundamba Khutagt as the religious head of [Outer] Mongolia was to be conferred by President of the Republic of China; (iii) China was allowed to have its representative posted in [Outer] Mongolia; and (iv) Russia secured extra-territorial rights in [Outer] Mongolia. The impact of the Kiakhta treaty was severe on the Mongols as they became a party to a document that recognized that “no political treaties could be made concerning their country without China’s approval” (Ballis 1956). Russia, on the other hand, practically retained all its wishful rights in Outer Mongolia, including the right of free trade. The agreement also recognized once for all the bifurcation of Mongolia into Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia. It recognized Inner Mongolia adjoining China as part of China and Outer Mongolia farther from China an autonomous territory under Chinese suzerainty. It was done to refrain the Mongols from reclaiming Inner Mongolia in future, which had been continuing as part of China since 1636. However, the Mongols had no option but to be disgruntled not only because they lost the independence that they had proclaimed in 1911 but also due to their failure to get back Inner Mongolia, Barga (Hulunbuir) and Uriankhai (Tannu Tuva) in the sphere of autonomous right they had secured (Baabar 1999). While Inner Mongolia and Barga were placed under the control of China, Uriankhai was turned into a protectorate of Russia, which was incorporated into former Soviet Union in 1940s (Batbayar and Soni 2007). The outcome of the tripartite agreement has been analysed by various quarters in very many ways, but one point which remains clear is that “the legal framework was completed for an Outer Mongolia dominated by Russia, but nominally part of China” (Schwartz 1964). Meanwhile, the Kiakhta agreement continued to remain a keystone of maintaining the status quo of relations among the three signatories until shortly after the Russian Revolution (1917). Taking advantage of the unrest in Russia, China succeeded in bringing about a “voluntary” cancellation of Mongolian autonomy (Weigh 1928). Abrogation of Tripartite Agreement on Mongolian Autonomy

World War I was followed by the Russian Revolution, allied intervention in Siberia and a Civil War in China. Geopolitics in the region witnessed changes

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in attitudes and deeds on the part of powers involved, which impacted the future of existing treaties and agreements, including the Kiakhta agreement. The terms of the treaties and agreements were reverted to as they best suited the interests of the parties concerned. During the period from the 1911 proclamation of Mongolia’s independence until the Russian Revolution, Russian policy towards (Outer) Mongolia was positioned “on the arrangement of the situation in such a manner that Mongolia and Russia together were too much for China, while China and Russia together were too much for Mongolia” (Friters 1937). In other words, “by manoeuvring in such a manner as to prevent coalition between Chinese and Mongols”, Friters (1937) underlines that “Russia was able to rule Mongolia by pretending that the Mongols were free, and also to keep the rest of the world away from interfering with its monopoly, by allowing it to be inferred that the Mongols were not free”. Russia’s involvement in World War I resulted in debilitating its Far Eastern policies only to become worse after the fall of Tsarist rule. In the wake of the Russian Revolution, Russia became embroiled in a Civil War and was not in a position to defend its protectorate, particularly Mongolia. During the Civil War, much of Russian-controlled Asiatic land was either reclaimed by China or taken over by anti-Bolshevik elements. The ideology of the Russian Revolution spread among the Mongolian masses, which further paved the way for various reactionaries to consolidate their command. A new geopolitical game henceforth began in the Mongolian part of Inner Asia. This time around, two new factors preponderated in Mongolia, that is the anti-Bolshevik or White Russian movements and the involvement of Japan (Tang 1959). As the Civil War in Russia reached its peak, it also spilled over near Mongolia’s borders. As a result, a handful of White Russian leaders, particularly Cossack Grigorii Mikailovich Semenov, began to play with the idea of a “Pan-Mongol movement” for creating a single Greater Mongolian State (Valliant 1972). Semenov planned to include the territories of Outer and Inner Mongolia, Buryat region of Siberia and the territories of the Tibetans, Kyrgyzs and Kalmyks of Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to Lake Baikal (Dallin 1950). However, the plan failed when Semenov was ousted from Siberia and Mongolia by the Red Army. The idea of a pan-Mongolian state continued for some time to be exploited by a small White army until it was fattened completely. So far as Japanese intervention is concerned, they preferred to support the White Russians, which infuenced tremendously both the regional and the central authorities in China (Rupen 1979). Taking advantage of the advance of White Russian forces in eastern Siberia, China decided arbitrarily to abrogate the tripartite agreement and abolish Mongolian autonomy (Rupen 1979). In March 1919, China reformulated its frontier policy to strengthen the guards of Chinese residents in Mongolia. The move was in contradiction with the Tripartite Agreement (1915), which disallowed stationing of both Chinese and Russian troops in Mongolia.

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The end of World War I and declaration of peace in Europe (1919) encouraged the Chinese to transform the so-called War Participation Bureau in China into the North Western Frontier Defence Force. Consequently, General Hsu Shu-cheng was appointed as Defence Commissioner for the North Western Frontier as well as Commander-in-Chief of the North Western Frontier Defence Force (Ho-t’ien 1949). One of the frst things Hsu did was to dispatch more troops to Mongolia, thereby increasing the number of soldiers in the Chinese Brigade at Urga. Upon his request to the Chinese authorities for giving him a free hand in dealing on the Mongolian subject, he was allowed to do so and soon became more or less the “Uncrowned King” of Mongolia (Weigh 1928). The frst ever meeting between the representatives of the governments of the United States and Mongolia took place for the sole purpose of Washington’s help to liberate the Mongols from Hsu’s oppression (Campi 1991). It is evident from the November 1919 episode, when a letter from Bogd Khan was handed over secretly to an American representative in Peking by a Mongolian delegation negotiating with China. The time coincided with America’s plan to open a consulate in Urga, though it was postponed only to establish such a consulate in Kalgan with Samuel Sokobin taking charge as frst American Consul on 1 April 1921 (Campi 1991). Unaware of the meeting between the American and Mongolian representatives, the Chinese President issued a decree on 22 November 1919 endorsing the “request” made by the Urga government to cancel their autonomy (Nemzer 1939). Mongolia’s autonomy was, thus, abolished together with the abrogation of the Tripartite Agreement (1915). An immediate Russian reaction to the Chinese decision came to the fore, but with the fall of Tsarist regime and the ensuing turmoil in Russia, it was not taken up seriously. The Mongol-seeking independence got another jolt, when China formally took over the authority of Mongolia at a ceremony in Urga in February 1920 (Bawden 1968). The treaties or agreements concluded previously on Mongolia’s status turned out to be practically insignifcant. The Final Show Down of Mongol-Seeking Independence

Undeniably, China had the upper hand in the geopolitical game that helped bring Mongolia into Chinese sphere, though majorly it was due to the fall of the Tsardom and the emergent situation thereof. But the question is: For how long Mongolia remained under Chinese sphere of infuence? General Hsu did everything he could do to use Mongolia as a base to pursue his own ambitions. In the meantime, Mongolia saw the emergence of revolutionary or more precisely resistance groups largely infuenced by the Bolshevik Revolution. These groups had their background in forming two small underground revolutionary groups in 1918 (Dashpurev and Soni 1992). Initially

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operated independently without having any organized form or programme, these two groups were known as the Urga group and the Consul’s group. But gradually, both the groups realized the need for establishing links with the Soviet Russia for their struggle to ensure national independence. Their joint eforts frst resulted in combining the two separate revolutionary groups into a single entity under the banner of Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) at a meeting on 25 June 1920. Later on, under the infuence of Bolsheviks, a more organized Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) came into being. In August 1920, the MPP sought support and assistance from the Soviet Russia in restoring Mongolian Autonomy. The next step was to take measures that could help strengthen revolutionary passion among the Mongolian masses besides providing a push to organize armed forces in Mongolia (Soni 2002). Sukhbaatar, popularly known as the father of Mongolian revolution, was able to enrol enough recruits within a short span of time following his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Notwithstanding the Mongolian revolutionaries becoming more and more active in challenging Chinese occupation, the situation in Mongolia took a serious turn when Japanese-backed Baron Von Ungern-Sternberg entered into Mongolia posing himself as Urga’s saviour. Ungern-Sternberg along with his band of White Russian guards took over Urga in October 1920, after which independence of (Outer) Mongolia was proclaimed under the nominal leadership of Bogd Khan with Ungern-Sternberg himself assuming the title of Commander-in-Chief of armed forces (Soni 2002). However, Ungern-Sternberg’s reign of terror by introducing oppressive measures afected the situation of Mongolia and the Mongols badly. Amidst this crucial moment, the frst Party Congress was being initiated by the Mongolian revolutionaries to have guiding instruments, such as a political platform, a provisional government and an army, for their future course of action. The Congress was held in Kiakhta on 1–3 March 1921 in which the Party platform, known as the “Kiakhta Platform”, bore the ofcial title “Proclamation of the Mongolian People’s Party, constituting the political platform of the Mongolian Revolution” (Rupen 1964). With the intent of expelling the Chinese militarists and Russian White guards led by Ungern-Sternberg, the MPP again convened in Kiakhta on 13 March 1921 and proclaimed a Mongolian People’s Provisional Revolutionary Government that called for the formation of a Constitutional government under the leadership of Bogd Khan (Ho-t’ien 1949, 99). The provisional government planned to release Kiakhta Maimaicheng (then a Chinese trading settlement on the Mongolian side of the border with Russia) from Chinese Army occupation. On 18 March 1921, the Mongolian People’s Army launched an ofensive against the Chinese troops and after their complete victory captured the town, which was subsequently renamed as Altan Bulag. This victory created a conducive atmosphere for a joint incursion of the Mongolian-Soviet forces against Ungern-Sternberg. On 10 April 1921,

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the People’s Provisional Government made an appeal to Soviet Russia for military aid to fght the White Russian Guards, their common enemy. However, “the Red Army did not enter Mongolia until Ungern actually attacked Russian Kiakhta” (Isono 1979). On 6 July 1921, a series of battles with the White Russian Guards the joint Soviet-Mongolian forces stormed Urga. On 8 July 1921, the key forces of both the Armies and the ofcials of the MPP and the Provisional Government entered Urga, signifying the independence of Mongolia. The fnal showdown of Mongol-seeking independence thus came with the capture of Urga, which brought the country under the command of Mongolian revolutionaries. The decade-long struggle for independence was achieved and Mongolia emerged as an independent state, but soon this small Inner Asian country began witnessing Soviet penetration that in essence proved to be a geopolitical move to restrict the Chinese from exercising any control over what it calls as its “lost territory” (Soni 2006). Conclusion

A series of developments that unfolded between 1911 and 1921 in the Mongol region of Inner Asia was essentially a part of the geopolitical game played by Russia and China. The impact of such developments was most visible on the trajectory of the Mongol-seeking independence that loomed large in the decade-long struggle for an independent statehood of Mongolia. At the outset, it was the Chinese revolution of 1911 that paved the way for (Outer) Mongolia to proclaim its independence. But soon Mongolia became a hotspot of Russia-China geopolitics, which tells the story of Mongolian insecurity towards its independent status. Whatever negotiations on the part of Russia and China that took place with or without Mongolia, they were all concentrated on denying the de facto Mongolian independence in favour of Mongolian autonomy under the suzerainty of China. Russia too was a gainer as it secured extra-territorial rights in Mongolia. However, Mongol-seeking independence got a jolt following the Russian revolution (1917), which inspired Mongolian revolutionaries to take their struggle to the fnal showdown. Finally, it was in 1921 that Mongolia with Russian/Soviet assistance achieved its “actual” independence from China after what is known as the second revolution, which was more organized in comparison to the 1911 revolution. At this point, one could surmise as Bulag (2012) argues: “Mongolian independence was not a Russian plot against China, but a Mongol exercise of subjectivity”. On the other hand, “Chinese failure to protect Mongolian independence by minding its own business risked losing Mongolia to Russia” (Bulag 2012). In the post-1921 period, Mongolia’s relations with Russia became too cosy so much so that it turned out to be a major irritant in the Sino-Soviet relations until the Soviet collapse in 1991. Today, a century-old independent Mongolia has been marching ahead along democratic lines with

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its geopolitically relevant foreign policy that emphasizes maintaining a balanced relationship with its two powerful neighbours – Russia and China. References Atwood, Christopher P. 2002. Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia’s Interregnum Decades, 1911–1931. Vol. 1. Leiden: Brill. Avery, Martha. 2003. The Tea Road: China and Russia Meet Across the Steppe. Beijing: China International Press. Baabar. 1999. Twentieth Century Mongolia. Cambridge: The White Horse Press. Ballis, William B. 1956. “The Political Evolution of a Soviet Satellite: The Mongolian People’s Republic.” Western Political Quarterly 9 (2): 293–328. Batbayar, Tsedendambyn and Sharad K. Soni. 2007. Modern Mongolia: A Concise History. New Delhi: Pentagon Press. Batsaikhan, Emgent Ookhnoi. 2009. A History of Mongolia: Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, The Last King of Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar: Institute of International Studies, Academy of Sciences. Bawden, C. R. 1968. The Modern History of Mongolia. New York: Praeger. Bawden, C. R. 1991. “Mongolia and the Mongolians: An Overview.” In Mongolia Today, edited by Shirin Akiner, 9–31. London: Kegan Paul International. Bulag, Uradyn E. 1998. Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bulag, Uradyn E. 2012. “Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of Independence and the 1911 Revolutions.” The Asia-Pacifc Journal 10 (52, no. 3): 1–16. Bumochir, Dulam. 2018. “Generating Capitalism for Independence in Mongolia.” Central Asian Survey 37 (3): 357–371. Campi, Alicia J. 1991. “Perceptions of the Outer Mongols by the United States Government as Refected in Kalgan (Inner Mongolia): US Consular Records, 1920– 1927.” Mongolian Studies 14: 81–115. Campi, Alicia J. and R. Baasan. 2009. The Impact of China and Russia on U.S.Mongolian Political Relations in the 20th Century. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press. Clubb, O. Edmund. 1971. China and Russia: The Great Game. New York: Columbia University Press. Dallin, David J. 1950. The Rise of Russia in Asia. London: The World Afairs Book Club. Dashpurev, D., and Sharad K. Soni. 1992. Reign of Terror in Mongolia, 1920–1990. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Ewing, Thomas E. 1980. “Ch’ing Policies in Outer Mongolia, 1900–1911.” Modern Asian Studies 14 (1): 145–157. Friters, G. M. 1937. “The Prelude to Outer Mongolian Independence.” Pacifc Afairs 10 (2): 168–189. Friters, G. M. 1949. Outer Mongolia and Its International Position. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. Ho-t’ien, Ma. 1949. Chinese Agent in Mongolia. Translated by John De Francis. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. Hsu, Shuhsi. 1926. China and Her Political Entity: A Study of China’s Foreign Relations with Reference to Korea, Manchuria and Mongolia. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Hyer, Eric. 1997. “The ‘Great Game’: Mongolia between Russia and China.” The Mongolian Journal of International Afairs 4: 62–71. Isono, Fujiko. 1979. “Soviet Russia and the Mongolian Revolution of 1921.” Past & Present 83: 16–40. Lattimore, Owen. 1935. “Prince, Priest and Herdsman in Mongolia.” Pacifc Afairs 8 (1): 35–47. MacMurray, John V. A., ed. 1921. Treaties and Agreements with or Concerning China, 1894–1919. Vol. 2. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Morozova, Irina Y. 2009. Socialist Revolutions in Asia: The Social History of Mongolia in the Twentieth Century. London and New York: Routledge. Nemzer, Louis. 1939. “The Status of Outer Mongolia in International Law.” American Journal of International Law 33: 452–464. Rupen, Robert A. 1964. Mongols of the Twentieth Century. Bloomington: Indiana University. Rupen, Robert A. 1979. How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History of the Mongolian People’s Republic, 1900–1978. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Schwartz, Harry. 1964. Tsars, Mandarins and Commissars. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co. Soni, Sharad K. 2002. Mongolia-Russia Relations: Kiakhta to Vladivostok. Delhi: Shipra Publications. Soni, Sharad K. 2006. Mongolia-China Relations: Modern and Contemporary Times. New Delhi: Pentagon. Soni, Sharad K. 2022. “Negotiating Mongolian Identity in the Eurasian Geopolitical Landscape.” In Transitions in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Polity, Identity and Strategic Choices, edited by Archana Upadhyay, 65–82. Abingdon: Routledge. Tang, Peter S. H. 1959. Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Other Mongolia: 1911–1931. Durham: Duke University Press. Tatsuo, Nakami. 1999. “Russian Diplomats and Mongol Independence, 1911–1915.” In Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, edited by Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman, 69–78. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Valliant, Robert B. 1972. “Japanese Involvement in Mongol Independence Movements, 1912–1919.” The Mongolia Society Bulletin 11 (2): 1–32. Weigh, Ken Shen. 1928. Russo-Chinese Diplomacy: 1689–1924. Bangor, ME: University Prints and Reprints.

5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE Experience From Inner Asia Vikash Kumar

Introduction

Climate change has been a fact throughout the history of creation and development of our planet. However, what makes the present case of climate change worthy of attention, acceptance and deep deliberation for mitigation of its negative impacts on human lives is the extent and variability associated with it. Climate change and its impact have not been homogenous in the geological history of earth, and nor would they be homogenous forever. Its impact on the entirety of our planet is unquestionable. Where the earlier phases of climate change have been natural, the current phase is a consequence of anthropogenic actions, results of which are visible in the form of highly erratic and extreme environmental and weather conditions observable as foods, droughts and so forth, posing a grave threat to the livelihood of people, particularly amongst the vulnerable sections of society with political, economic and social implications. The variability of impact of climate change on diferent regions is not a result of geography and geology alone, but also an efect of unequal access or exploitation of natural resources for economic growth. The Inner Asian region, comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Mongolia, three regions of China  – Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet, and Afghanistan, is one such region, which has been highly susceptible to consequences of climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2015). Further, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2019 has emphasized the high vulnerability of Central Asia to climate change (Vakulchuk et al. 2022). Industrialisation, deforestation, excessive use of fossil fuels, rampant exploitation of natural resources including land and water as well as unprecedented DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-6

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focus on economic development have been a global phenomenon and these have created a situation of high vulnerability in the Inner Asian region as well. The repercussions of these processes have led to accentuated efects of climate change for the people of the region with inter-regional as well as intra-regional impact. Climate change is not contained by national borders and thus the contiguity of this region as a whole stands susceptible to it. It is against this background that this chapter argues that though the countries of Inner Asian region have followed diferent development trajectories, they are collectively, as a region, facing issues of water security, loss of livelihood, health and food insecurity, protracted borders conficts, environmental degradation and large scale migration. The primary focus of this chapter is on the fve countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which form a large part of Central Asian region and delves on three major themes that have had socio-economic, political and environmental impacts on these countries individually as well as collectively. These themes emerge from thorough delineation of country-specifc studies and reports on impact of climate change. What requires further deliberation is the collective impact on the Inner Asian region. The chapter presents a synoptic discussion on the following: • Nature and pattern of environmental degradation • Impact on health and food security • Loss of livelihood and forced migration of people Nature and Pattern of Environmental Degradation

Since the breakup of the erstwhile Soviet Union into separate Central Asian countries, each country followed an overtly diferent development route. Of the fve Central Asian countries (part of the larger Inner Asian region), the level of development has been diferent in each. Consequently, there have been stark inter-regional diferences in terms of respective responses towards rapid growth of population; food and nutritional insecurity; agrarian challenges; rampant poverty and illiteracy; gender inequality; occasional yet persistent civil strife and political instability (Anderson and Pomfret 2004). Yet as a region, in spite of structural and institutional variability, Central Asia is vulnerable to adverse threats of climate change; rise in the number of climate refugees, displacement and possible migration due to severe weather events. The impact is visible in terms of economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities. This will lead to growing tensions over already scarce water resources, severe strain on the CARs, eco-migration, socio-economic inequalities and aggravation of intra-state political tensions and so forth (Vakulchuk et al. 2022). The current environmental issues of the region cannot be separated from its Soviet past. The vast available natural resources of the region were

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strenuously utilised for economic development. New land areas were identifed to make them arable and intense agriculture was practiced to feed a growing demand of the new middle class. Industrialisation happened at an unprecedented faster rate that caused over-exploitation of natural resources, thus misbalancing the natural eco-system. The unexplored area of the region became a feld of experimentation and exploitation to meet the needs and requirements of emerging industrial centres. The historical inter-linking of land and water rights in this region underwent change in the 1930s, delinking the two and creating land and water as two separate commodities ripe for over-usage and eventually exploitation (Strikeleva et al. 2018). As rightly observed by some scholars, “large-scale irrigation systems led to large water losses and consequently to secondary land salinization. For example, in Turkmenistan approximately 50,000 hectares of land were abandoned annually due to degradation by 1980” (Strikeleva et al. 2018). From the pre-Soviet to post-Soviet era, laws related to land and water use maximised the exploitation of these natural resources leading to their degradation over time. Even the changes implemented in these laws during diferent periods could not deal with the issue of their degradation. Land and water degradation in Central Asia have reached their current level owing to the historical baggage associated with it. The green steppes and pastures of Inner Asia or in general Central Asia are facing irreparable threat of ever-increasing land degradation. It is estimated that degradation happened to various degrees of more than 8 million hectares of irrigated land and more than half the pastures. The estimated annual cost of this during 2001–2009 was “about $6 billion, most of which due to land degradation ($4.6 billion), followed by desertifcation ($0.8 billion), deforestation ($0.3 billion) and abandonment of croplands ($0.1 billion)” (Strikeleva et al. 2018). This refers solely to the estimates of the economic cost. The impact could be worse in terms of health and human survival. These efects are refective of increasing infuence of climate change, which can no longer be considered as an impending danger. According to a prediction, based on calculated estimates, there will be a grave risk for the Central Asia region for shortages in availability of food and water by the year 2050, which would put at risk a large section of the populace already surviving on the margins. The already inequitable distribution of resources would further accentuate, leading to increased sufering for people of the region. Land and water degradation is the major problem being faced by the Central Asia region. Given the increasing demand for water for agricultural, domestic and industrial purposes and rising erratic weather conditions owing primarily to climate change, the situation would turn more critical. This situation is visible in form of increased temperature, decrease in precipitation in almost all the fve countries of the region leading to decreased water levels and its ever increasing shortage (Lioubimtseva and

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Henebry 2009). With  increasing population, demands for better standards of living including water, energy and food would increase the stress on already limited resources. The region is also facing confict over water resources between the countries with political, economic and humanitarian overtones; therefore constructive water management becomes the need of the hour in such a precarious scenario. The highly water-dependent economy of the republic of Uzbekistan, with almost 90 per cent dependence, may have to face extreme problems related to climate change (Khaydarov 2015). Uzbekistan’s current water defcit could increase to 7 billion cubic meters by the year 2030 and up to 15 billion cubic meters by the year 2050 given the decrease of water volumes in Syr Darya and Amu Darya (Asian Development Bank 2022). The Aral Sea, once the largest inland lake in the world, represents another proof of the anthropogenic destruction of a natural large water body. The Aral Sea, which is situated in the heart of Central Asia in Eurasian continent, is an inland sea sharing its body with two Central Asian Republics (CARs), namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Aral Sea is the fourth largest lake in the world covering 66,000 square kilometres with an average depth of 16 metres and maximum depth of 68 metres. The northern belt of the sea shares its coast with Kazakhstan and southern belt is located in the Autonomous region of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. Simultaneously, it is located approximately 600 kilometres away from the Caspian Sea. The Aral Sea used to have 1,100 islands separated by lagoons and narrow straits, which defne its name. In Kazakhstan, Aral means “island”, and is called “Kok Aral”, the largest among the islands. Although its location is very peculiar geographically, it is a terminal lake fed by two major rivers in Central Asia, namely Syr Darya and Amu Darya. There will be an estimated 10 to 15 per cent drop in water volumes in both the rivers by the year 2050. Even by 2050–2100, water volumes could decrease by up to 30 per cent in Syr Darya basin and 40 per cent in Amu Darya (Asian Development Bank 2022). The degradation, desertifcation and salination of the large seas are also a legacy of historical mismanagement. To cater to increased cotton production in the region, the Aral Sea basin became the water reservoir. The rivers of Amu Darya and Syr Darya that were feeding into the Aral Sea were diverted for cotton production leading to the current state of desertifcation of the sea. In the three decades from 1960 to 1990, the sea shrank to half its original size. According to an observation, “the drying out of the Aral Sea did not stop or decelerate during the decade of transition. Clearly, the newly independent countries of former Soviet Central Asia were primarily concerned with their own survival” (Spoor and Krutothe 2003). There has been increased salinity in the area. Besides, increased windstorms have led to decreased agricultural production and dying of fsh in the sea, thus having

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severe impact on human health. Because of the above factors, grave climate change impact for the entire region on the whole has become a glaring reality. Another consequence of Aral Sea destruction has been forced migration of the people to other places for better opportunities of survival. This forced migration has created a new category of “environmental refugees” within the region and beyond (Reuveny 2007). Similarly, shrinking of glaciers at a global level due to climate change is an established fact. Central Asia is no exception to this precarious trend. There has been a 30 per cent decrease in glacier surface area in Central Asia over the past fve or six decades. The melting of snowcaps combined with intensifying weather events has triggered natural calamities such as foods and landslides that are happening more frequently and severely (Asian Development Bank 2022). According to a couple of scholars, who have been working on the shrinking of glaciers in Central Asia, by the end of 20th century the size of glaciers in the region was 31,628 square kilometres, which has been constantly decelerating. Rates of change between −0.05 per cent per year and −0.76 per cent per year have been reported in the Altai and Tien Shan and between −0.13 per cent per year and −0.30 per cent per year in the Pamir (Barros and Field 2014). These rates depict regional variation, but the overall impact of this would be observable in corresponding shrinkage in availability of fresh water for survival. Glaciers are store houses of fresh water, their increasing melting would further lead to a situation of shortage of water (Sorg et al. 2012). Out of 8,492 glaciers in the republic of Tajikistan, nearly 20 per cent have already retreated and around 30 per cent are at risk of disappearing by 2050 (Sharifzoda 2019). The individual impact of such large-scale land and water degradation on each of the CARs could be gauged from the estimated economic losses in their GDPs. Around 3 per cent of the GDP for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 4 per cent for Turkmenistan, 10 per cent for Tajikistan and 11 per cent for Kyrgyzstan is the economic loss owing to these forms of natural resources degradation. The republic of Kazakhstan, considered to be one of the most developed countries of the Central Asia region, faces an estimated loss of its land up to 66 per cent due to degradation, which measures up to 48 million hectares of the area (Strikeleva et al. 2018). Though Kazakhstan’s economy is largely oil based, the efects of climate change have started impacting it in multiple ways, but not limited to increased intermittent periods of droughts, conversely increasing foods and landslides, disrupting the normal fow of activities for the people and impacting their livelihoods, survival, community and society. Over-grazing is a serious issue as well. For example, Kyrgyzstan faces up to 30 per cent pasture degradation due to over-grazing. Similarly, in Tajikistan, over-grazing eats away 89 per cent summer pasture and 97 per cent winter pasture. In Turkmenistan, 70 per cent land degradation is due to over-grazing (Strikeleva et al. 2018).

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Impact on Food Security and Health

It is an established fact by now that impact of climate change has regional variations not just between regions or countries but also within. With such changes and variations, the issues of food security and food production would have to be looked into according to the need and requirements of a particular region. Owing to climate change, regional variation in food production is increasing. Central Asian agriculture is largely based on irrigation and forms an important contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the countries of the region; however, climate stressors have begun altering the agro-production pattern. For instance, cotton production in the Republic of Uzbekistan and wheat production in the Republic of Kazakhstan are under threat due to adverse climatic conditions, such as heat waves, thus posing serious challenge to the economy and food security of the region. This may lead to high infation of food prices, further stressing already vulnerable populations (Food and Agricultural Organisation 2016). One study by the WHO (2022b) describes how heat waves have created havoc in a country with hot summers and vast rural areas like Tajikistan. Most importantly, heat waves have created difculties for breastfeeding of little children. If some regions experience a decline in food productivity owing to climate change, others may experience an increase in production. In certain regions of Asia, General Circulation Models (GCMs) and Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) depict a decline in rice productivity whereas some other crops show an increase in production in certain regions. Further, it is found that in Central Asia, some areas could be winners (cereal production in northern and eastern Kazakhstan could beneft from the longer growing season, warmer winters, and slight increase in winter precipitation), while others could be losers (western Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where frequent droughts could negatively afect cotton production, increase water demand for irrigation, and exacerbate desertifcation). This increases probability of malnutrition, impacting morbidity and mortality rates, especially among the children (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014). As it has already been mentioned, increased desertifcation of the Aral Sea basin and the geography of the region on the whole has led to increasing incidents of dust storms in the region, resulting in increased hospital admissions due to respiratory diseases and skin and eye infections (Barros and Field 2014). Moreover, a rise in temperature and changes in rainfall pattern could lead to “increased outbreaks of agricultural pests and diseases, such as locusts and wheat blast, including those travelling across national

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boundaries” (USAID 2018). Droughts already have afected the region especially in Kazakhstan where 66 per cent of the total land has been badly afected. Similarly, increasing desertifcation will engulf half the land in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in coming decades and potentially spread to large areas of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan making them arid and saline land. Nearly 40 per cent of the population of the region lacks access to clean water. A rise in temperature and erratic rain pattern not only afect agriculture, but also lead to outbreak of many diseases afecting both humans and animals alike. For instance, having been eradicated in 1960s, malaria made a resurgence in the 1990s because of increasing temperature, which happens to be favourable for vector- and water-borne diseases (USAID 2018). The consequences of climate change could prove to be further devastating in a situation of a sudden outbreak of a pandemic like COVID-19. Though studies are still being conducted for a thorough estimate of economic losses caused by the pandemic, its socio-psychological efects far outweigh and would probably take a longer time to reconcile with. The health infrastructure in all these countries got severely strained and loss of lives with prolonged morbidity are abound (UNDP 2020). The World Health Organisation (WHO) (2022a) has brought a Roadmap for Health and Well Being in Central Asia, 2022–2025, that steps up to face the major health challenges in the fve CARs. The Roadmap sets up a multisectoral plan that will help these Central Asian countries to overcome major obstacles for their health systems. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and the crisis in Ukraine, this has become an even more challenging task. According to the Roadmap, most of the countries experience major or signifcant challenges on their way to reducing the health burden of communicable diseases, trafc accidents and non-communicable diseases/ mental health. There is also room for improvement in other areas, such as environmental hazards and tobacco control. Loss of Livelihood and Forced Migration

The impact of climate change varies widely within the Central Asian region. Socio-economic and political disparities get exacerbated and add to the human vulnerability in the region, which are often transnational in nature. As far as climate change–induced displacement and migration are concerned, the region happens to be one of the most disaster-prone in the world, with over 200,000 lives lost and several millions of people afected by storms and foods alone between 2005 and 2014, while a heat wave in North and Central Asia in 2010 killed 56,000 people (Disaster Risk Reduction Division of UNESCAP 2020). Loss of livelihood and the resultant forced migration in search of new employment are common repercussions of climate change. The Central Asian region and its fragile eco-system are increasingly overburdened

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by the rising population. In addition to the detrimental efects of extreme events, the vulnerability of livelihoods in agricultural societies also stems from geographic environments, demographic trends, socio-economic factors, resource and market access, unsustainable water consumption, farming methods and lack of adaptive capacity. Khamza Sharifzoda (2019) summarises that climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of the following sudden and slow-onset disasters, leading to mass displacement primarily relating to the following: • Increased fooding in urban areas, rivers and glacial lake outburst foods: for instance, hundreds of people have been killed and many more afected so far due to outburst foods in the Shahimardan Valley, which Kyrgyzstan shares with Uzbekistan as well as Shakhdara Valley in Tajikistan’s Pamir mountains (Lochner 2014). • Sea-level rise, contributing to more severe storm surges, inundation, saltwater intrusion, salinisation of freshwater sources and soil, submergence, loss of ecosystem services, loss of land mass and erosion. More than half of the irrigated land has become saline in Uzbekistan. Similarly, the Aral Sea has constantly been facing extinction of its available fsh due to increasing salt concentration. • Hydrological changes in major river basins: for example, Tajikistan has 8,492 glaciers, around 20 per cent of which have already retreated, with up to 30 per cent at risk of disappearing by 2050. Disappearing glaciers will ultimately signifcantly decrease water supply in the region. As such, availability of water in the Amu Darya, one of the two main rivers in the region, is expected to decrease by 40 per cent. • Shifts in precipitation patterns and temperatures impacting agricultural production: Central Asia shows faster warming trends than the global average due its location in the arid mid-latitude region. Therefore, due to annual total precipitation and related extreme precipitation, drying trend has been found over the past decades in most parts of Central Asia, especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have a higher risk of drought that have serious impact on agricultural production (Liu et al. 2020). • Increased droughts, resulting in water scarcity and food shortages, exacerbating livelihood stress and increasing malnutrition. For example, water supply for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and regions of Syr Darya and Amu Darya are facing signifcant water defciency, food shortage and increased unemployment (Liu et al. 2020). The efects of any natural calamities or cataclysmic events create critical fnancial difculties for the governments in Central Asia. From 2000 to 2001, a territorial dry spell caused loss of more than $800 million because

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of loss of agrarian production in fve nations in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In Tajikistan, these losses were identical to 4.8 per cent of its GDP, and increased this poor nation’s current account defcit. The World Bank reports that the all-out yearly loss from quakes in the Kyrgyz Republic adds up to about $ 200 million, with $60 million in loss from foods and $2.6 million in harms from avalanches. Besides, roughly 25 per cent of Central Asia’s populace is employed in farming – which is one of the most vulnerable sections of the society being exposed to the hydro-meteorological calamities such as fooding or dry season (The World Bank 2018). Dangers, for example, foods, avalanches, torrential slides and mudfows likewise compromise the vocations and livelihood of more than 70 million people of the region. These progressively successive risks, notwithstanding their erratic and irregular efects, can also after some time drain out local and national spending plans, harm fnancial advancement and drive defenceless populaces into desperation (The World Bank 2018). Sudden weather changes due to global warming adversely afect local livelihood. For instance, the dry atmosphere forces shepherds to graze their sheep to ever more elevated areas in the mountains, where the grass is better than that of the lowland areas. On the other hand, in 2015, a major food which spread in most parts of Tajikistan damaged crops and infrastructural amenities including houses leaving 80 per cent of the population in Pamir without electricity and food. Similarly, mud slides damaged more than 1,500 houses in the south of Tajikistan the same year (2015) (Sharifzoda 2019). Trade is also routinely adversely impacted by natural disasters induced by climate change. For instance, every year the main trade route (M41) that passes through the region’s southern mountain regions is afected by avalanches, mudfows, rock falls, landslides and torrential falls, cutting of this signifcant path for communication and transportation. Environmental change is worsening the efects, and compromises Central Asia’s ecological stability, urban advancement and infrastructural trustworthiness. Such efects regularly bring about extreme fnancial strain and employment crisis in Central Asia (Caravanserai 2018). In Asia, nearly 20 per cent of the urban population lives in large cities while nearly half of the urban population dwells in small towns (The United Nations 2013). North and Central Asia are the most urbanised regions with over 63 per cent of the populace living in urban areas, except for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (UNESCAP 2011). It is expected that by the middle of the century the Asian urban population will grow by nearly 1.4 billion, which would amount to half of the world urban population. By the middle of this century, Asia’s urban populace will increase by 1.4 billion and will represent over half of the worldwide populace (The United Nations 2013). On the other hand, the southern and south-western regions of Asia are least urbanised with nearly 30 per cent people living in urban centres. Nevertheless, urbanisation

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is taking place at a higher rate within Asia with an average growth of 2.4 per cent per annum during 2005–2010 (UNESCAP 2016). There is a rapid change in the habitation pattern of the people in Central Asia. Fast urbanisation, especially youth migrating to urban centres in large numbers, has changed the livelihood pattern in the region. For instance, in Kazakhstan around 61 per cent of the population is employed in service sector, whereas number of people engaged in agriculture in 2015 was around 18 per cent, down from 45 per cent in 1991. Decreasing and inconsistent agricultural output caused largely by global warming is one of the root causes. Similarly, though the absolute poverty rate decreased from 64 per cent in 2001 to around 7 per cent in 2015, income inequalities are widening at a faster rate and loss of traditional livelihood is one the major reasons. As mentioned in the previous section, the cascading efects of COVID-19 had spilled over to afect income, employment and livelihood. A recent study by UNDP (2020) summarised the impact of the pandemic in Central Asian regions with at least three major ramifcations: “(i) a loss of wage income and revenues from informal work; (ii) a loss of remittances; and (iii) price infation, particularly food price infation”. The study further noted that due to the loss of income and employment, households experienced increasing levels of debt, inability to access afordable education and health care services. Women and the elderly were afected more than their respective counterparts. The Way Forward

The repercussions of climate change are felt globally with high inter- and intra-regional variations. The most vulnerable people would be further marginalised and would be the worst suferers of its impact. The inequitable distribution of climate change impact needs to be mitigated in a manner that is sustainable. The anthropogenic efects that have led to environmental and ecological changes downgrading the overall health of the biosphere cannot be reverted. However, its impact can be reduced by having better access to technologies and resources that mitigates its negative impact. Pressure on natural resources, particularly on land, water and energy sources, is ever increasing for day-to-day survival and livelihood requirements. Central Asia as a region is also vulnerable to the vagaries of the changing climatic conditions led by human interventions. There is a veritable need to develop their economies and ensuring public welfare in an environment of limited resources, already threatened by climate change, which also increases intra-regional confict. Despite being in an oil-rich region, the countries are facing tough situations in terms of health issues and migration of their populations. The desertifcation of Aral Sea basin, ever increasing salinity of the soil, excessive use of over-stressed water resources of the two rivers of Amu

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and Syr Darya and over-use of natural hydrocarbon resources have collectively impacted agricultural practices, health and thus survival and livelihood of the people and food and energy security of the region. In spite of international measures like the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, not much could be achieved at a global level to mitigate the impact of changing climate. The developed North, particularly United States of America, has had a paternalistic attitude towards this issue. Its lack of concern towards the Paris Agreement is a cause of concern and disappointment from a nation that claims ethical and moral standing on issues concerning global humanity and humanitarian causes. However, this development could be seen as an opportunity for the countries of the region to bolster collaborative eforts and establish a regional framework for climate change to further raise a combined voice at the multinational platforms. For this to happen, the CARs need to abide by the Paris Agreement. Central Asian countries that have mostly identifed with the European region after their independent formation can seek active collaborations in research and development not just with Europe, but with other Asian countries which are facing similar threats and issues. There is a comparative dearth of scientifc as well as social science studies on the overall impact of climate change on socio-economic indicators and survival of people in the region. The impact is not a speculation anymore, but a reality with observable consequences. This calls for a need to undertake collaborative eforts to mitigate the efects of climate change as much as possible. In this direction, the World Bank has initiated a fve-year Climate and Environment (CLIENT) Programme to support Central Asian countries to achieve cooperative, sustainable, resilient, and inclusive economic growth with a focus on climate resilience, resilient landscape restoration, urban air pollution management and circular economy, green, resilient, and speedy recovery for lives and livelihoods in rural and urban areas, including mitigating COVID-19 efects. The objectives of the programme are to promote a shared ecosystem to facilitate trans-boundary collaboration and catalyse a joint actions framework (The World Bank 2021). The countries of the region are now exploring various ways and means through collaborative and constructing dialogue to mitigate the challenges posed by the climate change. The Heads of States of Central Asian countries, in January 2018, initiated the 4th Aral Sea Basin Programme and adopted the concept for its development, specifcally referring to the multi-functional uses of water to ensure water, energy and food security. Given the geographical and strategic conditions of the region, it must be realised that the threat posed by climate change is a common issue. Another recent efort is the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) Economic Forum meeting held on 16 and 17 November 2022 in Almaty with high-level participants from the fve CARs and Azerbaijan. The theme of the meeting was “Greener and safer future”.

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The key issues deliberated upon at the Forum were assisting the countries with transforming their economic structure, transitioning to sustainable energy and adopting more digital technologies while ensuring the full participation of women in society. (UN Economic Commission for Europe 2022). The sudden outbreak of the recent pandemic warrants collective and sustained action framework. On the one hand the pandemic caused enormous loss of human lives and had devastating efects on economic, health and other social infrastructure across borders; it also gives an opportunity for the countries of the region to maximise investments in health and allied sectors to minimise the risks any future adverse efects of pandemics, climate change and environmental degradation. Therefore, its mitigation lies in common eforts through concerted and steady policy interventions and signifcant investment in institutional and infrastructural levels. The countries of the region need to fnd out sustainable solutions with long-term objectives for a sustainable future. References Anderson, K. H. and R. Pomfret. 2004. “Spatial Inequality and Development in Central Asia.” Research Paper 036. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. Asian Development Bank. 2022. “By the Numbers: Climate Change in Central Asia.” November 23. Accessed November 26, 2022. www.adb.org/news/features/ numbers-climate-change-central-asia Barros, Vicente R. and Christopher B. Field. 2014. Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Regional Aspects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Caravanserai. 2018. “Central Asia Eyes New Financial Means to Weather Natural Disasters.” Accessed May 2, 2019. http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/ cnmi_ca/features/2018/09/20/feature-01 Disaster Risk Reduction Division of UNESCAP. 2020. “E-Resilience in North and Central Asia.” Asia-Pacifc E-Resilience Toolkit of UNESCAP and ICT & DRR Gateway. Accessed April 20, 2020. https://drrgateway.net/e-resilience/region/ north-and-central-asia Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). 2016. Summary Report. Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia Climate Smart Agriculture Workshop Held in Bishkek. July 12–14. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Accessed January 22, 2019. www.ipcc.ch/site/ assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-Chap24_FINAL.pdf Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2015. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Khaydarov, Nizamiddin. 2015. “Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan: Agricultural Reforms versus Transboundary Water Issues.” Developing Country Studies 5 (10): 103–108. Lioubimtseva, Elena and Geofrey Henebry. 2009. “Climate and Environmental Change in Arid Central Asia: Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptations.” Journal of Arid Environments 73: 963–977.

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Liu, Y., et al. 2020. “Changes in Climate Extremes in Central Asia Under 1.5 and 2C Global Warming and Their Impacts on Agricultural Productions.” Atmosphere 11: 1076. Lochner, Adriane. 2014. “Kyrgyzstan’s Glacial Floods a Growing Risk, Development  & Society: Climate Change, Risk, Our World.” Accessed April 20, 2020. https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/kyrgyzstans-glacial-foods-a-growing-risk Reuveny, Rafael. 2007. “Climate Change-induced Migration and Violent Confict.” Political Geography 26: 656–673. Sharifzoda, Khamza. 2019. “Climate Change: An Omitted Security Threat in Central Asia.” The Diplomat. Accessed February 2, 2020. https://thediplomat. com/2019/07/climate-change-an-omitted-security-threat-in-central-asia/ Sorg, Annina, et al. 2012. “Climate Change Impacts on Glaciers and Runof in Tien Shan (Central Asia).” Nature Climate Change 2 (10): 725–731. Spoor, Max and Anatoly Krutothe. 2003. “‘Power of Water’ in a Divided Central Asia.” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 2 (3–4): 593–614. Strikeleva, Ekaterina, Iskandar Abdullaev and Tais Reznikova. 2018. “Infuence of Land and Water Rights on Land Degradation in Central Asia.” Water 10 (9). Accessed January 1, 2019. https://doi.org/10.3390/w10091242 The United Nations. 2013. “World Population Prospects.” June 17. Accessed June 15, 2018. www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/world-population-prospects-the-2012-revision.html UNDP. 2020. COVID-19 and Central Asia: Socio-Economic Impacts and Key Policy Considerations for Recovery. Accessed August 15, 2022. www.undp.org/eurasia/ publications/covid-19-and-central-asia-socio-economic-impacts-and-key-policyconsiderations-recovery UN Economic Commission for Europe. 2022. “UN Forum Looks to Support Central Asian Economies Bufeted by Continued Pandemic and Geopolitical Crisis.” November 16. Accessed November 17, 2022. https://unece.org/climate-change/ press/un-forum-looks-support-central-asian-economies-buffeted-continuedpandemic-and UNESCAP. 2011. “Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacifc, 2011: Sustaining Dynamism and Inclusive Development,” April 7. Accessed November 18, 2022. https://www.unescap.org/publications/economic-and-social-survey-asiaand-pacifc-2011-sustaining-dynamism-and-inclusive#:~:text=The%202011%20 edition%20of%20the,of%20a%20policy%20agenda%20for UNESCAP. 2016. “Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacifc 2015: Facts and Trends at the outset of the 2030 Development Agenda.” February 17. Accessed November 18, 2022. https://www.unescap.org/publications/statistical-yearbookasia-and-pacifc-2015 USAID. 2018. “Climate Risk Profle: Central Asia.” Fact Sheet. Accessed December 25, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/fles/resources/2018-April-30_ USAID_CadmusCISF_Climate-Risk-Profle-Central-Asia.pdf Vakulchuk, Roman, et al. 2022. “A Void in Central Asia Research: Climate Change.” Central Asian Survey. Accessed July 10, 2022. www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1 080/02634937.2022.2059447?needAccess=true The World Bank. 2018. “Boosting Financial Resilience to Natural Disasters in Central Asia.” Accessed April 2, 2018. www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/07/31/ boosting-fnancial-resilience-to-natural-disasters-in-central-asia

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The World Bank. 2021. Climate and Environment (CLIENT) Program in Central Asia. Accessed August 15, 2022. www.worldbank.org/en/topic/environment/brief/ climate-and-environment-program-in-central-asia#Overview World Health Organisation. 2022a. “Health Data: A Cornerstone for the WHO Roadmap for Health in Central Asia.” October 6. Accessed October 10, 2022. www.who.int/europe/news/item/06-10-2022-health-data-a-cornerstone-for-thewho-roadmap-for-health-in-central-asia World Health Organisation. 2022b. “‘Heatwaves Create Difculties for Breastfeeding’  – Tajikistan Steps Up for Babies’ Health.” August 1. Accessed August 10, 2022. www.who.int/europe/news/item/01-08-2022-heatwaves-createdifculties-for-breastfeeding-tajikistan-steps-up-for-babies-health

PART II

Geopolitics and Geo-Economics

6 CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICAL AND GEO-ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF INNER ASIA G. M. Shah

Introduction

In order to understand the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia, it is essential to defne frst the concepts of geopolitics, geo-economics and Inner Asia. The word “geopolitics” is derived from Greek word “ge” meaning earth, land, and Swedish, German and Danish word “politik” meaning “politics”. The term “geopolitics”, which is the study of the efect of geography on politics and international relations, was coined by Swedish scholar Rudolph Kjellen in 1916. Geopolitics can also be defned as “the study of infuence of such factors as geography, economics and demography on the politics, and especially the foreign policy of a state” (Merriam-Webster). The word “geo-economics” has been in usage since 1981 as a sub-feld of geopolitics and is attributed to Edward Luttwak and Pascal Lorot. Geo-economics is the “study of spatial, temporal and political aspects of the economies and resources” (Merriam-Webster). Geo-economics can be understood as the “interplay of international economics, geopolitics and strategy” (Wigell and Vihma 2016). Similarly, the concept of “Inner Asia” has its origin in the treatise of German geographer Alexander Von Richthofen, who divided Asia into two types of natural regions, “Central” and “Peripheral”, varying by their geological origin and physiographic features. Ivan Mushkatov defned Inner Asia as the aggregate of “all the landlocked regions of Asian mainland, having no fow of water into open sea and possessing the features of Khan-Khai”. The distinguishing features of Inner Asia from the “Outer Asia” are its landlocked nature, inland drainage and remoteness from the Atlantic, Pacifc, Arctic and Indian Oceans. Inner Asia comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-8

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Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Siberia in the Russian Federation (Sinor Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies). Inner Asia comprises the civilizations of Central Asia, Mongolia and Tibet as well as the surrounding areas and peoples that in certain historical periods were politically, culturally and ethno-lingually parts of these regions. The term “Inner Asia” was popularised in the English language by Owen Lattimore, who used the term “Inner Asia” in the context of the Qing dependencies of China from 1755 to 1911 (Lattimore 1988). The present chapter is an endeavour to study the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia with special reference to Central Asia. The chapter has been divided into fve broad sections. The frst section is an introductory section dealing with the defnition of key concepts and the frame of the study. The second section deals with the geopolitical and geo-economic discourse surrounding Inner Asia in general and the Central Asia in particular. The third section deals with the geopolitical signifcance of Inner Asia with special reference to Central Asia. The fourth section deals with the geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia with special reference to Central Asia. The ffth section summarises the main conclusions of the present study. A systematic account of the remaining four sections of the present study is given as under. Discourse on Inner Asia’s Geopolitics and Geo-Economics

It is imperative to highlight the narratives on geopolitics and geo-economics given by fve well-known scholars: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford John Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman, Samuel P. Huntinton and Zbignew Brzezinski. The American naval expert Alfred Thayer Mahan (1987) argued the geopolitical discourse that sea powers are more advantageous in dominating international politics. To him, Britain’s locational advantage as well as the choice to control the seaports and sea routes in the open oceans helped it to emerge as a dominant world power from 1850 onwards. Mahan wanted the United States to control the open oceans to dominate the world in general and surround the Eurasian supercontinent in particular. Similarly, the British geographer Halford Mackinder (1967) underscored the geopolitical signifcance of Central Eurasia, which he named as the pivot area. Mackinder narrated the mobility of horsemen in the vast steppe belt north of the Caucasus and the Hindu Kush-Himalayas and south of the Taiga forests. Mackinder opined that the large landmass of Eurasia spread over the river basins of the Volga, Yenisey, Amu Darya, Syr Darya and the Caspian Sea as the pivot of geopolitical infuence because of its central location in the supercontinent and ease of mobility for the conquerors who infuenced the historical processes far beyond Central Eurasia. The pivotal area or the “Heartland” was roughly defned as Central Asia from where the

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horsemen dominated Asia and Europe. Mackinder held the view that during the post-Columbian era, the Silk Route shifted to disuse as the international trade began to be carried out through the maritime routes. However, with the construction of the transcontinental railroad by Russia, the mobility of the pivot area was going to be renewed again. According to him, one who controls Eastern Europe can rule the Heartland, one who controls the Heartland will rule the World Island (comprising Asia, Europe and Africa) and one who controls the World Island can rule the world. Though Mackinder revised his Heartland Theory a couple of times in 1919 and 1939 to incorporate changing geopolitical realities, his categorisation of the Eurasia-centric world as Heartland, Inner Crescent and Outer Crescent with varying degrees of geopolitical signifcance remained unchanged. Nicholas Spykman (1944) agreed with Mackinder with respect to the geopolitical structure of Eurasia, but difered with him on the great geopolitical importance to the Heartland. Spykman coined the term “Rimland” for the Inner Crescent in 1944, which comprised the European Coastland, ArabMiddle Eastern desert land and Asiatic Monsoon Land. Spykman argued that the power of the Heartland could be contained by the surrounding “Rimland” given the latter’s advantage in population, resources and access to the sea. To him, Rimland countries like Japan, Britain and China would become the major powers due to their access to sea and would have greater contact and cooperation with the outside world. Samuel P. Huntington (1996) put forth the theory of “Clash of Civilizations” in 1996 in which he divided the world into the eight civilizational realms out of which the Orthodox Christian Civilization, Islamic Civilization and the Confucian Civilization fell in the Inner Asian region. Huntington saw not only the possibility of ‘West versus the Rest’ in the event of any clash among the civilizations during the post–Cold War era but also the possibility of the Heartland and Inner Crescent allying together on the basis of civilizational clash with the Outer Crescent in general and United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia in particular. To Western scholarship, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States was the brightest example of Huntington’s thesis. Zbignew Brzezinski (1999) identifed (1) geopolitically active players, (2) signifcant but inactive players, (3) geopolitical bolts and (4) the arch of instability in the Eurasian landmass. Within Inner Asia, China was regarded as an active geopolitical player whereas Russia was considered as a significant but inactive player. Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran were considered important geopolitical bolts because of their strategic location. The Greater Middle East and Central Asia were recognized as the arch of instability. Although geo-economics is comparatively a new sub-feld of geopolitics, the discourse on geo-economics has been indirectly an indispensable dimension of geopolitical analysis and theorisation throughout the 20th century.

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The Heartland theory of Halford Mackinder discusses the geo-economic signifcance of the Heartland region. Similarly, Nicholas Spykman accords very signifcant importance to the Rimland because of its vast human and natural resources. The discourse of the New Great Game in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region is intrinsically about control over the hydrocarbon resources, pipeline consortiums, transport corridors, fnancial investments and control over the business in the region. Contemporary Geopolitical Signifcance of Inner Asia

During the Cold War between the United States and the former USSR, America’s trade-driven maritime world aimed at containment and deterrence of the former USSR-led continental world in general and the Central Eurasian belt in particular. The American grand strategy of containing the growing infuence of former Soviet Union in the Rimland and the oceanic world in a blanket manner or selectively was informed by the geopolitical theories advanced by Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman and Sual O. Cohen. However, after the disintegration of former Soviet Union, the U.S. grand strategy in Eurasia in general and the Inner Asia in particular has been aiming at thwarting Russian resurgence, contain the growing infuence of China and defeat militant Islam. At the time of political transformation in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the post-Soviet space, Huntington and Brzezinski presented their theories of Eurasia, which characterised Inner Asia as a potentially dangerous geopolitical and ethnically highly volatile region. The political instability in Afghanistan, Iran and Indian states of Punjab and Kashmir had already started as a result of American foreign policy towards the former Soviet Union in the Rimland, but after the dismemberment of the communist bloc, the power vacuum in Inner Asia in the form of stability in the region was seriously threatened by the number of conficts in the Caucasus region, Central Asia, Xinjiang, Afghanistan and in the immediate neighbourhood of Inner Asia. The theses of Huntington and Brzezinski made United States highly concerned about the potential instability in Inner Asia (Brzezinski 1999; Huntington 1996). It is important to describe the situation in Inner Asia in this context. According to Legvold (2003), as a result of internal problems in Inner Asia such as economic uncertainty, disintegrating infrastructure and the potential for internal ethnic and ideological conficts and geopolitical situation of Central Asia, the region presented a complex set of challenges and prospects for the United States, China, Russia and the European Union. Iseri (2009) elaborated how U.S. foreign policy makers considered the Caspian region’s geostrategic implications for their country’s grand strategy in the 21st century, which aimed at China and Russia. To Klare (2003), the Global War on Terrorism was “the beginning of the New Cold War in south-central Eurasia,

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with many possibilities for crises and fare-ups, because nowhere else in the world are Russia and China directly involved and supporting groups and regimes that are opposed to the United States”. Dugin (2007) analyses the geopolitical role and interests of Russia, United States and China in Central Asia in the international relations centred on Inner Asia. Cooley (2014) prophesized that a new “Great Game” in Central Asia involving the United States, Russia and China could be a possibility. The main geopolitical objective of the United States is to secure Central Asia against the growing infuence of Russia, China, Iran and militant Islam. The Greater Central Asia project and Five Plus One (5+1) framework are a couple of U.S. tactics to promote regional cooperation within Central Asia and making these fve republics economically and politically strong enough to resist the temptation of their immediate neighbours in general and Russia and China in particular to fll the power vacuum in the region. The Central Asian countries in general and Kazakhstan in particular have favoured the multi-vector foreign policy to enhance their bargaining power against the energy-hungry economies of the world, especially Eurasia. There are several Central Asian countries that want United States as a balancer against growing Russian and Chinese infuence. The geopolitical goals of China in Central Asia are to challenge the U.S. interference in its Inner Asian neighbourhood. The conversion of Central Asia as a safe transit zone to link itself with the European market is its second important geopolitical objective. The containment of Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang province as well as militant Islam in Central Asia and Afghanistan through multilateral forum of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are the main geopolitical priorities of China in Central Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) coupled with border contiguity with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan justify the analysis of the Central Asian region as an integral part of the “China and the Global South discourse” although the region is not generally seen as a part of the Global South (Xiangming and Fakhmiddin 2018). After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Russia did not show much interest in Central Asia during the frst half of the 1990s as President Boris Yeltsin wanted to concentrate on internal issues. However, the Primakov doctrine described the Central Asian region as its backyard and near-abroad after 1995. Russia deepened its engagement with Central Asia more seriously when Vladimir Putin became Russian President in 2000. Multilateral frameworks such as the CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Customs Union were the instruments which Russia used to bring the Central Asian countries back in its own fold (Cooley 2014). In this context, it is important to highlight the assertion of geopolitical Eurasianism by Russia; its war with Georgia Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008; war with Ukraine in the Crimean Peninsula in 2014

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and Luhansk and Donetsk in 2022 as well as Russian alliance with Syria against rebels and recapture of Afghanistan by Taliban. Assertion of Geopolitical Eurasianism by Russia

Russian foreign policy towards Inner Asia has to be understood in the context of its post-Soviet self-image, geostrategic position and great power ambitions, especially during the Putin era. Voytek (2012) analyses how Russia has historically oscillated between the “Atlanticists” and “Eurasianists”, who have traditionally dominated Russia’s foreign policy discourse. Under Putin, Russia has shifted its diplomatic eforts away from collaboration with the transatlantic powers who compose the West and towards the nations and regions which are distinctively non-Western. Simultaneously, Russia has sought to reinforce the idea of “multipolarity” in the international system by opposing the United States and its allies on a variety of issues in an efort to undermine what they perceive to be “unipolar” system. In response to changing demographic realities as well as need for a more comprehensive national identity, the Russian leadership has increasingly embraced a conception of Russian statehood which traces its roots to the development of “Eurasianism”. The roots of “Eurasianism”, otherwise known as “geopolitical Eurasianism”, can be traced back to Slavophilism of the 19th century, classical Eurasianism of the early 20th century and the neo-Eurasianism that appeared in the post-Soviet period. Geopolitical Eurasianism has characterised Russian foreign policy over the past two decades; it not only addresses the changing, political, economic and domestic realities but also represents an intersection between geopolitics and the creation of national “Russian” identity. Thus both external and internal pressures have led to this shift in policy. Eurasianism is a rather nebulous term especially within the context of Russian foreign policy. At its core, it is a political ideology based on the idea that Russia inhabits a unique geographical place between Europe and Asia. It is, therefore, neither Europe nor Asia. Instead it constitutes a singular political space known as Eurasia. This idea is largely borne out of the contention that Russia “never seemed completely European to the Europeans, and although most of its territory was in Asia, it was never completely Asian to the Asians (Heller 2009). Hosking (2012) sums up: “Russia is an empire, it is not a nation-state. And it shouldn’t try to become one, because its large population is non-Russian”. Mackinder (1904) argued that whatever political entity controlled the Eurasian landmass, or the “great pivot”, would be destined to be the most powerful actor in the international system. Clearly the geopolitical considerations were a common element throughout all stages of development of Eurasianism. To Clover (1999), “Russia need not Westernise to modernise, but in its hard-line version, the movement envisions the Eurasian

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heartland as the geographic launchpad for a global anti-Western movement”. Eurasianism thus has been used to justify Russia’s great power status. A few examples of Russian assertion with traces of Eurasianism can be elaborated herewith. Firstly, in the late 1990s, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expanded their infuence in Eastern and Central Europe, formerly a Soviet stronghold. Vladimir Putin bitterly resented the loss of this bufer zone between Moscow and the West. For its part Georgia was moving further West, even joining the United States to fght the Iraq War in 2003. After the election of pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili in 2004, as Pruitt (2018) puts, “Georgia was clearly embarked on a process of trying to break out of Russia’s sphere of infuence. As far as Russia was concerned, this was an absolute priority. It had to maintain its sphere of infuence, and if it left Georgia go, then who could be next”. The roots of the Russia-Georgia confict go back to the time of Civil War within Georgia, following the Soviet disintegration, when two Georgian provinces  – South Ossetia and Abkhazia – sought to declare their independence. The relationship between Russia and Georgia became tense in late 2006 when Saakashvili accused Putin of supporting separatism in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In August 2008, both Russia and Georgia went to war and Russia formally recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Meanwhile, Georgia turned further away from Russian infuence in the aftermath of the confict and signed an association agreement with the EU in 2014. Secondly, the lasting consequence of the Russia-Georgia war was witnessed six years later in Ukraine, when Kremlin-backed forces seized control of Crimea (a Ukrainian autonomous republic whose population is predominantly ethnic Russian) and parts of the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014. The sequence of events is the following: (1) the overthrowing of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, who fed to Russia; (2) by early March 2014, Russian troops and pro-Russian paramilitary groups had efectively taken control of Crimea; (3) in a popular referendum on 16 March 2014, residents of Crimea voted to join Russia; (4) on 18 March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Crimea had always been part of Russia and signed a treaty incorporating the Crimea peninsula into Russia; (5) on 21 March 2014, Putin signed the legislation that formalised the Russian annexation of Crimea. Further, in April 2014, unidentifed gunmen equipped with Russian arms seized government buildings in south-eastern Ukraine that led to an armed confict. Putin referred to the region as Novorossiya (New Russia) evoking claims from the imperial era. Even though Russian and Ukrainian leaders met for ceasefre in Minsk, Belorussia on 5 September 2014, it didn’t stop the pro-Russian forces pushing back Ukrainian government forces for several months. In February 2015, Putin met with other world leaders at Minsk to approve a 12-Point Peace Plan to end confict in Ukraine.

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Thirdly, in his address before the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2015, Putin presented his vision of Russia as a world power capable of projecting its presence across the globe and painted the United States and NATO as threats to global security. Two days later, Russia joined the Syrian Civil War conducting wide-ranging hybrid warfare, which had shifted the balance of power in Syria. Putin boasted of a robust expansion of Russian military power, particularly in the feld of hypersonic weapons to make Russia great again. Fourthly, following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 after the international forces left the war-torn country, Russia took immense interest in extending its geopolitical infuence. It is important to note herewith that Russia was an active player in the geopolitical ballgame in Afghanistan during the Cold War, which is evident from the decade-long stay of Russian forces in Afghanistan, from 1979 to 1989. Russian moves in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover include the following: (1) not closing its embassy in Kabul; (2) ofering to mediate between the Taliban and the opposition; and (3) criticizing the United States for the mess in Afghanistan in the past two decades. Lastly, in late 2021, Vladimir Putin ordered a massive build-up of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border besides dispatching additional units to Belarus for joint military exercises. By February 2022 as many as 190,000 Russian troops were poised to strike into Ukraine from forward bases in Russia and Crimea and the Russian-backed enclave in Moldova. On 21 February 2022, Putin recognised the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk and three days later, on 24 February 2022, Putin began a special military operation (Ray 2022), which is continuing till date. Contemporary Geo-Economic Signifcance of Inner Asia

During the Cold War era, Moscow tapped hydrocarbon, mineral and agricultural resources of Central Asia without any interference of the outside world. The oil and gas pipelines, railway lines and roads connected Central Asia, Caucasus and Siberian regions with the European part of the Soviet Union. Thus the Soviet Union continued its monopoly on the geo-economics of Inner Asia. However, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the Central Asian and Caspian regions opened up for the outside world. The processes of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation enhanced the economic integration of Inner Asia with rest of the world. In the initial period, there was much hype about the hydrocarbon reserves of the Central Asian and Caspian regions prompting the energy-hungry economies, multinational companies, fnancial institutions and major powers to show immense interest in the geo-economics of Inner Asia in general and the Central Asian and Caspian region in particular.

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Central Asia accounts for about 4 per cent of the global energy deposits. The oil reserves in Central Asia and along the Caspian Sea coast amount to 17 to 33 billion barrels of oil per day. Kazakhstan’s total proven reserves constitute 37 billion barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion cubic metres of natural gas making the country one of the major oil producers. Kazakhstan’s natural gas reserves are around 8.6 trillion cubic metres. Turkmenistan has proven natural gas reserves of 265 trillion cubic feet. Uzbekistan has 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, the fourth highest in the Eurasian region and 19th in the world. (Xiangming and Fakhmiddin 2018). The geo-economic interests of American companies in Central Asia and the Caspian region have been to exploit the energy resources and export the hydrocarbon resources westward through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to avoid the Russian and Iranian monopoly over the regional energy resources. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline has U.S. backing to make Turkmen gas available for its South Asian allies. Similarly, the CASA-1000 hydropower transmission line to export the Kyrgyz and Tajik hydropower to Afghanistan and Pakistan enjoys the American support. The Greater Central Asia project and New Silk Road project of the United States announced in 2005 and 2011 respectively are American visions to enhance regional economic cooperation between South Asia and Central Asia to create conditions for political stability and economic development in Afghanistan within the larger inter-regional security and development framework. The Inner Asian region has been geo-economically very much signifcant for Russia right from the 19th century. The Russian and Soviet dependence on Central Asia for cotton, petroleum, natural gas, coal, uranium, minerals and Kazakh wheat has been a permanent feature of trade between the two regions. Historically, the oil and gas pipelines, railway lines, highways and other communication lines of Central Asia have been aligned towards the northwest running through central Russia to Moscow and other important urban and industrial centres of former Soviet Union. The diversifcation of energy markets and trade partners of Central Asia during the post-Soviet period has minimised the geo-economic signifcance of Central Asia for Russia. Moscow has tried to prevent the Central Asian governments from signing pipeline deals that moved gas or oil without going through Russia (Denoon 2015). The dependence on the Central Asian region has reduced over the past three decades. However, in the defence production sector, hydropower generation and energy trade, Russian companies are quite visible in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Labour migration from Central Asia to Russia, especially from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, is quite large. It has been estimated by the foreign ministry of Russia that around 5 million Central Asian labour migrants stay and work in Russia at any point of time. Russia transfers 2 per cent of its GDP to Central Asia in the form of remittances

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of the labour migrants. Almost half of the GDP of Tajikistan is constituted by the remittances from the migrant workers who mostly work in Russia and Kazakhstan. The geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia for China can be hardly overemphasized because the country is importing annually about 60 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Central Asia. Upon completion, Line D of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline will have an annual delivery capacity of 85 billion cubic metres, the largest gas transmission system in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s crude oil export to China is around 20 million tons of annually (Xiangming and Fakhmiddin 2018). Apart from energy exports, the Central Asian region is an important trade partner of China. The total trade turnover is 60 billion dollars annually. China is a huge investor in energy expansion and infrastructure development in Central Asia. In January 2011, Chinese General Liu Yazhou said, “Central Asia is the thickest piece of cake given to modern China by the heavens” (Pannier 2020). The Chinese BRI has been a gigantic infrastructure development project to link China through Central Asia with Europe. The development of Khorgos dry port on Kazakhstan-Xinjiang border is emerging as an important international trade centre within Inner Asia. Central Asia is becoming an important destination for the Chinese migrant workers working in agriculture, energy exploration and infrastructure development sectors in Central Asia. The “Look West” policy of China aims at developing the less developed western and south-western provinces of China. The regional economic cooperation between China and Central Asia is very important to realize this objective. However, Chinese geo-economic interests face the greatest hurdle in the form of protests and dissension among the local people against Chinese excesses. For example, in Kazakhstan, local people protested Chinese activities in April and May 2016 and further in October 2019. Similarly, in August 2019 a group of several hundred residents of Kyrgyzstan’s northern Naryn Province attacked Chinese workers from the Zong Ji Mining Company. Anti-Chinese sentiment is further stocked in Central Asia by Beijing’s policies towards Muslims in China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which has been especially noticeable in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A Chinese military facility in the remote high mountains of far eastern Tajikistan, not far from the Chinese and Afghan borders, too has created anger among the Central Asians. Chinese use of technologies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan for facial recognition through respective blacklisted Chinese companies such as Hikvision and the China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation have sparked resentment among the people of the region against China (Pannier 2020). Further, the economic situation in Central Asia in the past couple of years has been critical because of economic contraction in almost all the republics. Growth has remained sluggish despite a resumption of domestic economic

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activity, as seen in the gradual increase in transit and workplace mobility since governments began relaxing a number of lockdown restrictions around July 2020 following the COVID-19 pandemic. Besides, countries such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which are highly dependent on remittances of labour migrants from Russia and some other countries, have been seriously afected. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, where remittances amount to almost one-third of GDP, infows fell by 62 per cent in April 2020 at the height of frst lockdown in Russia. The estimated 500,000 migrants from Tajikistan in Russia in 2019 generated remittance infows equivalent to one-third of the GDP of the country. The signifcant collapse in remittances was 50 per cent in March 2020, which made the poverty situation more precarious. Of the 2.4 million people in Europe and Central Asia that the World Bank estimated will be pushed to poverty in 2020, about 58 per cent – some 1.4 million – live in Central Asia. There was a negative impact on the employment rate in Central Asia because of the COVID-19. For example, the unemployment rate in Uzbekistan increased from 9.4 per cent to 15 per cent between the frst two quarters of 2020 (OECD 2020). Falling exports in the frst half of 2020, for example, in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan by 22 per cent and 13 per cent respectively, along with the consequences of COVID-19 compounded due to falling global oil prices (State Statistical Committee of Uzbekistan 2020; Qaz Trade 2020). Conclusion

The Inner Asian region is defned as the central portion of Asia having inland drainage and landlocked nature as opposed to peripheral Asia connected to the Arctic, Pacifc and Indian Oceans. The Inner Asian region has geostrategic location in the Central Eurasia, because of which it has been considered as the geographical pivot. The Inner Asian region constituted the middle section of the historical Silk Route connecting the Chinese seacoast in the east with the Mediterranean seacoast in the West. The strategic location of the Inner Asian region in general and the Central Asian Heartland in particular has ofered both challenges and prospects for security and development to the countries of the region. Inter-regional and intra-regional cooperation is the way forward to avoid confrontation of geopolitical rivals and make use of the international inter-dependencies for sustainable peace and security in the region. The Inner Asian region has remained a theatre of geopolitics between the United States and Russian Federation and the Russian confict with both Georgia and Ukraine has been provoked by the eforts of United States to expand NATO membership in Central and Eastern Europe following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Similarly, the growing economic presence of China in Central Asia has flled the people in the region with suspicion about the eastern neighbour to push its western border further,

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which has given birth to anti-Chinese protests in Central Asia, especially in the republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted the economy of Central Asia during the year 2020 although the hydrocarbon-rich Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have not suffered as much as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan because of their dependence on remittances from the labour migrants from Russia. The decline in remittances has impacted to some extent Uzbekistan as well but its gold production and agricultural sector has helped it maintain positive growth in industrial and service sectors. References Brzezinski, Z. 1997. The Grand Chess-Board: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books. Clover, Charles. 1999. “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics.” Foreign Afairs. March–April, 78: 9. Cooley, Alexander. 2014. Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Game Power Contest in Central Asia. New York: Oxford University Press. Denoon, David. 2015. “The Strategic Signifcance of Central Asia.” In China, The United States and the Future of Central Asia, edited by David Denoon. New York: New York University Press. Dugin, A. 2007. Geopolitika Postmoderna: Vermena Noyykh Imperi. Petersburg: Amfora-Sankt. Heller, Peggy. 2009. “The Russian Dawn: How Russia Contributed to the Emergence of ‘the West’ as a Concept.” In The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy, edited by Christopher Browner and Marko Lethi, 33–52. London: Routledge Press. Hosking, Geofrey. 2012. “Slavophiles and Westernisers in Russia.” Interview by Valdai Discussion Club. March 21. Accessed July 29, 2022. http://valdaiclub.com/ politics/40240.html Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Iseri, E. 2009. “The U.S. Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty First Century.” Geopolitics 14 (1). Klare, M. 2003. “The Geopolitics.” Monthly Review 55 (3). Lattimore, Owen. 1988. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. London: Oxford University Press. Legvold, H. 2003. Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Nexus. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mackinder, Halford J. 1904. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal 23 (4): 421–437. Mackinder, Halford J. 1967. Democratic Ideals and Reality in the Politics or Reconstruction. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press. Mahan, A.T. 1987. The Infuence of Sea Power Upon History (1660–1805). Mincola, NY: Dover Press. Merriam-Webster. Accessed January 1, 2020. www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ geopolitics

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OECD. 2020. “Covid-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia.” OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19). Accessed July 29, 2022. https://read.oecd. org/10.1787/5305172-en?format=pdf Pannier, Bruce. 2020. “The Four Big Issues Central Asia Faced in 2019 (And They’re Not Going Away.” Radio Free Europe. Accessed July 29, 2022. www.rfel.org/a/ central-asia-2019-challenges-security-china-facial-recognition/30356077.html Pruitt, Sarah. 2018. “How Five Day War with Georgia Allowed Russia to Reassert Its Military Might.” August. Accessed August 14, 2022. www.history.com/news/ russia-georgia-war-military-nato Ray, Michael. 2022. “Vladimir Putin: Constitutional Changes and Attack on Ukraine.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 14, 2022. www.britanica. com/bibliography/Vladimir-Putin/Silencing-critics-and-actions-in-the-West Sinor Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies. Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University. Accessed August 14, 2022. https://sinor.indiana.edu/about/what-is-inner-asia/index.html Spykman, N. J. 1944. The Geography of Peace. Harcourt, NY: Brace and Company. Voytek, Steven K. 2012. “Eurasianist Trends in Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis.” Graduate Thesis/Dissertations and Problem Reports, 1. Accessed July 29, 2022. https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/1 Wigell, Mikael and Antto Vihma. 2016. “Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics: The Case of Russia’s Geostrategy and Its Efects on the EU.” International Afairs 92 (3): 605–627. Xiangming, Chen and Fazilov Fakhmiddin. 2018. “The Re-Centering Central Asia: China’s ‘New Great Game’ in the Old Eurasian Heartland.” Journal of Palgrave Communications 4 (71): 1–12.

7 THE REGION AND IDEATIONAL SECURITY The Geopolitical Belonging of Central Asia in Inner Asia Selbi Hanova

Introduction Recalling the centuries-old close civilizational, cultural, trade and people-topeople linkages between India and Central Asian countries, the Leaders looked forward to building a long term, comprehensive, and enduring India-Central Asia partnership based on mutual trust, understanding and friendship. Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-Central Asia Summit, 27 January 2022

The epigraph is from the Delhi Declaration of the frst India-Central Asia Summit in 2022, a meeting where political elites of India met with their counterparts from fve post-Soviet states of Central Asia. The quote is symbolic of the general declarative language that multi-lateral fora is known for in the region. This quote also represents a dominant theme in the academic literature between Delhi and fve country capitals, that of historical linkages, shared culture and the not-so-distant past of Indo-Soviet cooperation. This quote calls for more questions: how do India and Central Asia look at each other? What storylines do they have towards each other? And how do these storylines afect cooperation between India and fve post-Soviet states. Linking the overall theme of connectivity, this piece is ofered as a foodfor-thought for the researchers of regionalism in post-Soviet Central Asia and those in South Asia who study inter-state and specifcally inter-regional connections. It looks at how states in the Central Asia region so diverse as those in Inner Asia and South Asia with varying political legacies in the 20th century defne themselves and identify geographically, geopolitically and culturally. This chapter seeks to invite experts and policy makers to delve into the ideas DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-9

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that surface in the regionalism and inter-state cooperation in post-Soviet Central Asia comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Infuenced by the ideas expressed by Amitav Acharya (2011), as he seeks to uncover the norm acceptance in the Asian regionalism, this piece aims to argue for the need to study local voices in regionalist dynamic of post-Soviet Central Asia and it attempts to bring out the right theoretical and methodological lens to unpack the “geopolitical belonging” of Central Asia within Inner Asia and in its relations with South Asia. What requires to be researched and uncovered is how Central Asian states’ elites fnd themselves in relation to the “the development of geopolitical storylines, internal tensions and incoherencies in geopolitical scripts, and the ways in which the foreign policy process defnes ‘problems and ‘solutions’” (Tuathail 2002). Alasdair MacIntyre (2007) writes, “I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘of what story or stories do I fnd myself a part?’” In that regard, does post-Soviet Central Asia belong to Inner Asia, elsewhere in Asia or does it aspire to put itself outside of the Asian continent in its ideational self-representation? The responses of the local state elites to this question depend on how they view and describe the geographical space and their belonging there. The gist of this chapter is an invitation to unveil the ideational layer of regionalism to ofer more nuanced and thick explanations to the geopolitical understanding of region of Central Asia and its place in the map of the neighbouring South Asia and Inner Asia. Such a discussion is aimed at furthering the already existing Neorealist explanations with an attempt to capture the ways in which all these material concepts are understood and employed by state ofcials speaking on behalf of the states they represent, through their respective foreign policies towards the region and the rest of Asia. Moving to a more constructivist understanding of it as a process that is constantly re-created and formalized, we are equipped with an additional tool that is not always easily measurable in material terms, but that is equally useful to measure qualitatively, and that could, conceivably, ofer more insights into the “unquantifable” dimensions of the analysis. That is, what stories we tell each other about ourselves infuences our motivations and actions. To attempt to answer these questions, the chapter is divided into three parts, including the Theory Section that seeks to derive the right theoretical lens to look at the region; the Case Study Section follows and, fnally, the Conclusion, which attempts to draw parallels and understand the contribution that Central Asia brings as a case in Asian Studies from the ideational perspective. Theories: What Frames to Take to Analyse Regional Identity and Perceptions of Belonging?

While states are socialized by the international system and while norms, decision and rules form part of the “institutional context in which regional

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politicians operate, infuencing their professional socialization as well as their opportunity structure” (Stoltz 2001); there are also other ideational factors that require analysis. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch (2002), while looking at Iran and Syria as “middle powers” in the regional system, argue that foreign policy goals cannot be fully grasped without looking at the conceptions of roles, shaped by history and geography. They argue that the regimes that were conceived in the movements against Western penetration tend to “retain some aspiration to ‘organize the regional system’ against this penetration” by seeking the status of region’s middle powers, and their foreign policies are then directed “to balance external powers and their regional proxies, and to create regional spheres of infuence as bufers against external penetration” (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 2002). The ontologies and worldviews in Central Asia do not contain the element against penetration of foreign powers into the region, as they do not see the region as an important common value that requires preservation. In this regard, the region-construction or region-building requires changes in structures of meaning, that is the development and redefnition of political ideas, common visions and purposes codes of meaning, casual beliefs, and world views that give direction and meaning to capabilities and capacities  – in efect, the narrative-based production of spaces for state regulation. (Jones 2006) The alliances/bilateral cooperation frameworks that the states create, or become members of, tell us what narratives these states convey about themselves and what identities they represent there. For instance, International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea was established in 1993 in Nukus, Uzbekistan, to develop and fnd environmental, scientifc and practical projects and programmes aimed at environmental rehabilitation of areas afected by the Aral Sea disaster, as well as to address socio-economic problems of the region. Later, in 1997, the initiative merged with the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea, and a rotating 2-year presidency among fve of the states was established. All fve states joined the initiative showcasing that the shrinking Aral Sea is a common threat to the entire region and bringing forth the idea of environmental security, which was quite novel at a time but is a common speak currently. Display of this concept of environmental security put these states at the progressive lead in the 1990s. What are other ideas that we associate with regional ideas in Central Asia? The non-interference in the internal afairs of a state, emphasis on sovereignty and, subsequently, the protection of borders and securitization of the discourses of the common global security threats of terrorism and fundamentalism are a few defning characteristics of Central Asian security perceptions

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in general. An example of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is perhaps most telling as it was often mentioned as a “league of dictators” (Kagan 2006). The SCO and CSTO, the former with its proclaimed fght against three evils of extremism, terrorism and fundamentalism, the latter through its Russian hegemonic discourse, have been in the spotlight of academics. Both focus on their respective reading of non-interference. While putting the principle of non-interference at the heart of the SCO’s geopolitical identity applies certain limitations on its ability to serve as an active regional security actor”, the CSTO’s principle of non-interference, in view of the war in Ukraine, acts as “a reaction against international condemnation and punishment for their domestic policies aimed at regime security” (Aris and Snetkov 2013). Finding the most appropriate theories to approach the ideational layer of regionalism and the embedded-ness of the concept of “Central Asian region” among the elite of these states is a challenge. In that regard it is important to look at the concept of “regionness” of Central Asia, which is “the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject, capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region” (Hettne and Soderbaum 2000). Regionness denotes the constructed nature of regions, and it calls for thicker and deeper explanations that are beyond the classical defnition of a region as a group of states that share geographic proximity and economic and infrastructural interdependence. The process of Central Asia becoming a region is important in this discussion; moreover the region must be viewed not as an actor that interacts with other region-actors, but rather as one that opts for “looking at the actors, practices and processes of social and political interaction that defne the region not as a unitary actor but as “spaces or arenas for action’” (Riggirozzi 2012), where narratives are showcased and enacted. Having established the frame where region is an arena for dialogue of narratives, it is important to look at the specifc behavioural actions that these states engage in their symbolic meanings. Since being a state and acting as a state is important, sovereignty becomes central vis-à-vis the region and the interactions within it. Illustratively, analysing regional cooperation and regionalism projects in Central Asia, Alexander Cooley writes that the membership of Central Asian countries in these projects provides them with juridical sovereignty through the mutual recognition of their respective authorities and “a steady diet of regional summits and cooperative initiatives also allow these leaders to regularly emphasize their foreign policy profles and agendas to a domestic audience and captive media” (Cooley 2012). The author argues that though the international community maintains the mantra of the need for regional cooperation in Central Asia, “the preservation of national borders, as it turns out, is a key part of the region’s local rules” (Cooley 2012). While sovereignty and physical expression of it through borders is important

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for Central Asian elites, there are also key factors of creating storylines that infuence their stances on regional cooperation. Ted Hopf (1998) argues that where interests are absent, and we are faced with varying degrees of interests in inter-state cooperation in Central Asia, one should look at the social practices and structure, since “the social practices that constitute an identity cannot imply interests that are not consistent with the practices and structures that constitute that identity”. The practice of virtual regionalism as “a form of collective political solidarity with Russia against international political processes or agendas that are interpreted as challenging politically incumbent regimes and their leaders” (Allison 2008) hints at the absence of clearly defned mutual interest in creating a Central Asian union if we discuss integration. On the interests derived from identities, Hopf (1998) writes that U.S. intervention in Vietnam was consistent with multiple U.S. identities, “great power, imperialist, enemy, ally, and so on”, and consequently “durable expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufciently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behavior”. The question here is, then, what lies in the self-articulation processes of these state identities in the region that provokes virtual regionalism and the repeated rhetorical spells of cooperation. Cooley’s argument about mutual recognition through regional fora is essential; however, we need to look deeper into the narratives by states about the region. Comparatively, if we look at other regions, Kuniko Ashizawa (2008) traces the role of Japan’s self-recognition and self-narrative in regional policies and how a relatively inactive regional policy based on bilateral ties changed to a more self-assertive stance of Japan in creating APEC and ARF. The author’s fnding points to a conception of Japan as “the sole member of the West in Asia” and as “a one-time aggressor in the region” that changed the perception of the role of the state in the region. Ashizawa (2013) writes: In the process of conceptualizing a regional order, the concept of Japanese state identity as perceived by foreign policymakers – a “dual member of Asia and the West” (in both the APEC and the ARF cases) and a “past aggressor in Asia” (in the ARF case)  – manifested prominently in their thinking. The author analyses the change of perceptions based on the refections on the part of Japanese foreign policy makers about the tiers foreign policy in the early 1990s. The reasons for these tiers evolved from the refections on self-recognition after the end of the Cold War keeping the bilateral U.S.Japan relationship as one of the tiers and categorizing the relations with other states in other relevant tiers to maintain the opportunity for all possible arrangements open. Is there a Central Asian parallel? In fact, the Central Asian regional cooperation is tiered as well. It has the following analogous

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tiers: Russian (CIS, CSTO) and Chinese-Russian (SCO) and Western (OSCE, NATO Partnership for Peace programme) and a tier through UN agencies and projects as well as a separate tier with bilateral agreements of states with the United States, Russia, China, Turkey, Japan, Afghanistan and Iran. South Asia is not in the immediate frst tier. What theoretical conclusions do we draw from this discussion of various concepts? First, we distinguish that there is no ready-made theory to understand the complexity of the relations between the state elites’ storylines on regionalism and what constitutes a region in terms of ideas and narratives. In fact, this strand of theory on studying regional identity is yet to be elaborated and enhanced. Second, we recognize that a Constructivist study of the concept of identity might prove useful in this discussion, albeit the diffculties associated with assigning an identity to a corporate structure like a state, looking deeper into regional identity and then drawing analysis into the region. Biographical storylines produced by state elites to socialize their state within the international system is a conglomerate of a myriad of ideas stemming from value systems infuenced by history, culture and linguistics utilized for certain interests. Third, if we adopt the concept of regional identity, we arrive at a frame where we could start deciphering the complex processes within the regionalism and non-physical security of the region. The next section will guide us through some case studies. Central Asia and India: Storylines Beyond Great Games and History and Culture

The epigraph of this chapter is from the Delhi Declaration of the 1st IndiaCentral Asia Summit that mentions cultural, trade and people-to-people linkages, thus epitomizing the dominant storyline between Central Asia and India, tying it to the overall narrative about Silk Routes. The Kushan, Mughal and other historical references are often voiced in the dialogues between the states and India at various diplomatic fora. Certainly, the storylines are created on both ends: in the post-Soviet Central Asia about India and South Asia at large and in India towards the fve Central Asian states. A proper feld research is required to understand the narratives of Central Asians in each state and their respective political elites in India to be able to weave out those storylines beyond viewing India as an ally of USSR and a country of Bollywood-like lifestyles. There are clearly two distinct storylines as seen from Delhi: that of a distant region which is culturally and historically similar and that of a region of a new Great Game that is being taken over by Chinese investments, projects and infuence. On culture and history, for example, the Delhi Declaration mentions the role of Indian Cultural Centers and within the same paragraph a possibility of commissioning a “Dictionary of Common words used in India

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and Central Asian countries” and showcasing of a Buddhist exhibition in the Central Asian countries. This view has been dominant since 1991 and as Frederick Starr writes in the introduction to Nirmala Joshi’s edited book on Central Asia and India, “it is true that India was a rapidly rising power, but Central Asian leaders felt no compelling need to include it in their geopolitical or economic calculus. The Indians returned the compliment” (Joshi 2010). The narrative only started to change around the military operations in Afghanistan and has become more prominent since 2009 when the then President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev was invited to National Day celebrations in New Delhi. Since then, we witness visits and prominence of India in Central Asian afairs and a new calibrating of views between the fve states and India. A new Great Game between Beijing and New Delhi is another storyline present among Indian scholars looking from the outside. In this view the “One Belt One Road” initiative of China is tying the region into the large infrastructural project in addition to Chinese investments in on-going hydrocarbon, construction and transport sectors. India’s “One Earth One Health” is another concept that emerged from the COVID-19 pandemic giving way to “One Earth, One Family, One Future” thus signalling the global interlinkages. For Central Asian political elites trained in slogans from the Soviet period, these symbolic one liners attract attention and signal the motivations of states promoting them. Already in 2010 in China and India in Central Asia: A New “Great Game” Marlene Laruelle, Jean-Francois Huchet, Sebastien Peyrouse and Bayram Balci look at Beijing and New Delhi and their own internal worldviews, perceptions, motivations suggesting balancing tactics vis-à-vis Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. What about local voices of belonging? Where do populations and top elites in these countries see themselves in the cultural and social geography? The over-reliance on geopolitical analysis that has dominated the local and largely external academic research since 1991 had overlooked these local narratives and voices in practically all thematic spheres. Academic and policy circles often portrayed this part of post-Soviet space as a subject of the power play or an experimental case for EU-like functionalist projects. In this regard, the eforts of development agencies to foster cooperation were often associated with modernization rhetoric. Erik Ringmar (1996) brings forth an example of the so-called Third World, especially in Islamic countries, where a rhetorical battle is going on between modernizing “nation builders” and fundamentalist groups. This approach has been adopted in the way that various development assistance agencies ask for progress in reforms and democratization and induce intra-regional cooperation. For instance, the EU’s Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) goals involve intra- and inter-regional cooperation between the border agencies of the Central Asian states, which includes cooperation of law enforcement agencies present at the

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borders between each other internally within a state and externally with their counterparts in the neighbouring states, thus paving the way to the acceleration of EU-like “free movement of goods and people”. This would require the opening of the borders to the neighbours for the states, whose ontologies and worldviews are not socialized to view the signifcance of the neighbourhood or the apparent need to cooperate with the neighbour. As an example, Kyrgyzstan is faced with its storylines to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, having been drawn into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) by Russia and Kazakhstan and simultaneously seeking aid and donor investment outside of the region. Conclusion: Common Denominators and Parallels

The reason to present these ideas in India in 2019 in a conference dedicated to Inner Asia was to understand what Central Asia after almost three decades of the fall of USSR has in common with the rest of “Inner Asia” and India (as the term used in the title of this conference) and what possible lessons and parallels one could draw from the experiences in this specifc part of Asia, which had been undergoing waves of regionalism during de-colonization and the Cold War. While it is apparent that geographically Inner Asia experienced the presence of non-regional states in the entirety of the 20th century till the present, the need to study local views on the matter is crucial. Acharya (2007) writes that “local responses to power may matter even more in the construction of regional orders. How regions resist and/or socialize powers is at least as important a part of the story as how powers create and manage regions”. This chapter ofers an ideational framework to analyse the region and its belonging is aiming to invite scholars to explore this venue to fnd a more nuanced understanding of the issues and re-introduce Central Asia to South Asia ideationally and socio-culturally. In one of his online interviews in 2007, an Indian essayist and novelist Pankaj Mishra said: “if you belong to a small country that is geopolitically not that important, or strategically not that important, you have no place among nations. Those countries are neglected and left to fend for themselves”; providing an example of Nepal, the author said that it only appears if there is a regicide or a murder of a member of the royal family (Fay 2007). Similarly, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan seldom features in the mainstream global news unless there is an ethnic confict or an alleged coup d’état or some eccentricities of the political rule are showcased. Globally, the fve post-Soviet states of Central Asia are in the periphery of world politics. In and of itself, this geographic placement plays out in the domain of political imagination making the political elite of these states constantly re-defne the mission and the role of the states they represent.

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The regionalization in Central Asia entails production of a new geographical and political space with relevant norms, ideas and values, in addition to the geographic proximity, common languages and common historical and cultural reference points. Michael Keating (2003) notes that regional norms form a “system of action to frame issues and proposals” in the “space recognized by actors”, where they agree on decisions that they fnd legitimate for this system and space. The recognition of Central Asia as a space for action requires it being inter-woven within the narrative of the regional self-articulation in the bigger geographical space. Europeanization, which includes a multi-dimensional “difusion of distinctive forms of political organization and governance, and the promotion of European ‘solutions’ outside of EU territorial space” to motivate “change in the rational and structures of State action”, (Jones 2006), has been exercised through the United States and EU as well as the UN, ADB and World Bank projects. However, how does Asianization manifest itself? And in that regard, which Asianization route does Central Asia take? The reality of the absence of one organization where all fve post-Soviet states cooperate shows that “international region building is characteristically messy, problematic, and deeply contested” (Jones 2006). Cooperation in the region of Central Asia is cooperation between the representatives and the representations of the region in the form of their identities. The specifc character of the inter-state cooperation in this region is that of the closed borders and the emphasis on sovereignty, where cooperation discussion is carried out formally through the means of diplomatic meetings and, therefore, the formal meetings of the representatives of the state where “each speech is an identity-building project, with the resulting text serving as an instantiation of the Ministry itself” (Neumann 2007). Illustratively, Kyrgyzstan looks at the region pragmatically as an area of vulnerabilities, and therefore it selfarticulates as a state in need of international assistance to help it sustain its unique status in an otherwise unpredictable region. At the same time, the internal instability of a “small” and relatively “free” state presents challenges to the formation of a coherent state-articulated message to the domestic and foreign audiences. In addition, the actual reality of being physically dependent on the energy resources of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the understanding of its geographical location between Russia and China forces the state to maintain the neighbourhood in its storylines. Muratbek Imanaliev and Valentin Bogatyrev say that when it comes to the understanding of the region, “Central Asia started and ended in Moscow” (Imanaliev and Bogatyrev 2016). However, the fve states continue to be grouped together as one region within a bigger Asian continent. Is it semiAsian? How does it place itself in Inner Asia and vis-à-vis South Asia? As the discussion shows, the ideational domain of Central Asian cooperation requires further research in terms of testing the existing theories of regional

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identity building with post-Soviet experience of the fve states, thus enlarging the empirical dimension with necessary methodologies and fnding the suitable methods of inquiry. The venture into the ideational realm of political imaginations between storylines of Central Asia and India would provide insightful analysis for both researchers and practitioners to uncover the conceptions of the worldviews and the socialization of the ideas. The attempt is a challenging qualitative endeavour; however, it would expose an additional layer of regional fabric of post-Soviet Central Asia and its relations with South Asia and specifcally India. This discussion, although theoretical, is aimed at highlighting and signposting those ideas and invites all those interested in regionalism and regionalization of Central Asia in wider Asia to take note of these abstract notions and ideas that, nevertheless, play a crucial role in imagining the state, the region and the world and in turn looking at how this analysis aids the existing Realist and Geopolitical research. References Acharya, Amitav. 2007. “The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics.” World Politics 59 (4): 629–652. Acharya, Amitav. 2011. Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism. New York: Cornell University Press. Allison, Roy. 2008. “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia.” Central Asian Survey 27 (2): 185–202. Aris, Stephen and Aglaya Snetkov. 2013.“‘Global Alternatives, Regional Stability and Common Causes’: The International Politics of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Relationship to the West.” Eurasian Geography and the West 54 (2): 202–225. Ashizawa, Kuniko. 2008. “When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional InstitutionBuilding, and Japanese Foreign Policy.” International Studies Review 10 (3): 571–598. Ashizawa, Kuniko. 2013. Japan, the US, and Regional Institution-Building in the New Asia: When Identity Matters. New York: Palgrave. Cooley, Alexander. 2012. Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. 2002. Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System. London and New York: Routledge. Fay, Sarah. 2007. “Interview with Pankaj Mishra, March.” The Believer. Accessed March 3, 2018. http://staging.believermag.com/issues/200703/?read= interview_ mishra Hettne, Bjorn and Frederick Soderbaum. 2000. “Theorizing the Rise of Regionness.” New Political Economy 5 (3): 457–473. Hopf, Ted. 1998. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security 23 (1): 171–200. Imanaliev, Muratbek and Valentin Bogatyrev. 2016. “Yest li budeshee u TsA kak regiona?” (“Is There a Future for CA as a Region?).” Youth4Peace Webinar. March 21. Accessed April 21, 2020. www.youtube.com/watch?v=awGJZ0UQd5I

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Jones, Alun. 2006. “Narrative-Based Production of State Spaces for International Region Building: Europeanization and the Mediterranean.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96 (2): 15–431. Joshi, Nirmala. 2010. Reconnecting India and Central Asia. Emerging Security and Economic Dimensions. Singapore: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program. Kagan, Robert. 2006. “League of Dictators.” The Washington Post. April 30. Accessed May 30, 2019. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/ AR2006042801987.html Keating, Michael. 2003. “The Invention of Regions: Political Restructuring and Territorial Government in Western Europe.” In State/Space: A Reader, edited by Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones and Gordon MacLeod. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. Laruelle, Marlene, Jean-Francois Huchet, Sebastien Peyrouse and Bayram Balci, eds. 2010. China and India in Central Asia: A New “Great Game”. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 2007. After Virtue. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press. Neumann, Iver B. 2007. “A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand For, or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New.” International Political Sociology. June, 1 (2): 183–200. Riggirozzi, Pia. 2012. “Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a New Synthesis.” New Political Economy 17 (4): 421–443. Ringmar, Erik. 1996. “On the Ontological Status of the State.” European Journal of International Relations 2 (4): 439–466. Stoltz, Klaus. 2001. “The Political Class and Regional Institution-Building: A Conceptual Framework.” Regional and Federal Studies 11 (1): 80–100. Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. 2002. “Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United Sates’ Response to the War in Bosnia.” Political Geography 21: 601–628.

8 REGIONAL COOPERATION AND SUSTAINABLE STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA Ajay K. Patnaik

Introduction

Regional cooperation refers to mechanisms that countries in a geographical region create to promote common interests through mutual understanding. Regional cooperation is more efective when bilateral relations between states in a region are quite good. From this perspective, the prospect of deepening regional cooperation in Central Asia is much better today due to the improved bilateral relations in the last few years, between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for example. Within a short span of time, countries that had difculty with or practically no relations are coming closer. Borders are becoming open and movement of people has become relatively easier. There are also greater prospects of connectivity projects succeeding which would be helpful in economic progress as well as regional stability. As regional cooperation increases between the Central Asian Republics (CARs), the space for geopolitical competition will shrink though not become totally absent. Instead, external powers would seek engagement through economic and connectivity strategies. This chapter looks at the trends of regional cooperation in the region and how it is moving forward in last few years. It also discusses how this cooperation could bring about stability in the broader Central AsiaAfghanistan region. The Central Asian Region and Its Problems

The regional coherence of the Soviet period diminished with its disintegration. With the creation of new independent CARs, boundaries became rigid, thereby putting restrictions on free movement of people and goods. Relations DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-10

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between ethnic groups deteriorated, resulting at times in inter-ethnic riots. Ties between states became tense as Soviet-drawn borders were disputed. The issue of river water sharing had the potential of creating confict between the CARs. Economic blockades were witnessed, as were sealing and even mining of borders from time to time. Stoppage of energy supplies and building of large dams that divide countries into opposing camps aggravated the already deteriorating relations in some countries (Patnaik 2016). This author (2016) had underlined that today one talks of the region either in terms of cultural commonalities or as a geopolitical or security entity. This is in contrast to the Soviet period when Central Asia functioned as an integrated economic region. There were some eforts to integrate the region in the post-Soviet period, but without success. Even the latest attempt to economically integrate the region is led by Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union, which has Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as members. Uzbekistan from time to time closed its border with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, reduced legal crossing points and introduced visas for the citizens of those two countries. Tashkent followed an energy policy that was detrimental to the interests of its neighbours. It reduced hydropower imports from Tajikistan, due to which the latter could not sell its surplus power to Uzbekistan. Given the unreliability of Uzbekistan’s gas supplies in winter, Tajikistan resumed construction of the Rogun Dam, which Uzbekistan opposed fearing that this dam would reduce water supply downstream (Olcott 2010). The division within the region afected intra-regional trade and political relations. Trade between neighbours has been quite low, while that with Russia and China is quite high. Over the years trade within the region has declined drastically, while with the outside world it has been increasing. Further, inter-ethnic confict in one state afects political and economic relations with a neighbouring state. For example, after the Kyrgyz-Uzbek riots in south Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the volume of trade between the two declined (National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan 2012). Even sometimes states sought to settle these disputes by putting economic pressure on the neighbours by (1) closing the borders, (2) putting visa restrictions to prevent trans-boundary movement, and (3) cutting of energy supplies. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that various attempts at regional integration by the CARS have not succeeded. The evolution of the integration projects in Central Asia ranged from Central Asian Union (CAU), Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) and Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) to the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) that was formed in 2001 with members from outside the region as well. The Eurasian Economic Union, formed in 2015, has only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan from Central Asia as members, besides Russia, Belarus and Armenia. In 1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan set up the CAU. After Tajikistan joined it in 1998, the grouping was renamed as CAEC. However,

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each efort to revive the organization has not been followed up by policies that promote cooperation. These four countries had created CACO in 2002. After failing to establish a common market of the member states, the CACO in 2005 was merged with the EURASEC led by Russia (Patnaik 2016). Uzbekistan, which joined EURASEC in 2005, left the organization in 2008. Since then it has been a member of only one major multilateral regional organisation – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The situation, however, changed dramatically after Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s death. Shavkat Mirziyoyev became the new President, who took Uzbekistan along a new road to renew engagement with neighbours on a cooperative basis. With his initiative the meeting of the Heads of States of Central Asia was held in March 2018 at Astana (Kazakhstan). The unfolding of events since then has aroused hopes of stronger regional cooperation in Central Asia. This summit was followed by other summits in 2019 (Tashkent), 2021 (Avaza, Turkmenistan) and 2022 (Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan). The need for regional cooperation is not limited to trade, economy, energy and water issues only. Health and environment management have become major challenges. In a post-COVID-19-pandemic world, eforts towards global and regional cooperation can save the population from further sufering. The COVID-19 pandemic underlined the need for regional cooperation. Yet all the CARs did not have similar approaches. Turkmenistan and to some extent Tajikistan were in denial about pandemic spread. While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were proactive in their responses to the pandemic, Uzbekistan was taking the initiative with proactive undertakings, such as partnering with Slovakian factories to manufacture ventilators and other respiratory devices for Uzbeks and neighbouring countries, including Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. To Clement (2020), Uzbekistan is fnding its footing as “regional leader”. SCO members India, Russia and China, who developed their own vaccines, are in a position to help other member countries as well as the rest of the world. In December 2020, Uzbekistan made a deal to purchase 70 million doses of Sputnik V vaccine from Russian company Gamaleya to cover the entire Uzbek population in a two-dosage vaccination. Earlier, Uzbekistan had tried Chinese vaccines in the country (Hashimova 2020). SCO’s Special Working Group on Healthcare (SCO WHO) is selecting projects to set up a structure within the SCO framework similar to the World Health Organisation, which would work in the interests of improving medical services among SCO member states, developing disease-prevention capabilities and satisfying the needs of the population in high-tech medical treatments (Neapole 2020). Positive Developments in Bilateral Relations

Conficts over borders often sour bilateral relations between countries. At the same time, a resolution of border issues could lead to greater cooperation

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between states. The best example is the SCO, which emerged out of Shanghai Five to settle border issues between China and four CARs. Later, SCO members expanded their cooperation in combating terrorism, drugs and arms and human trafcking. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is an important institution of the SCO. Under RATS coordination, 20 terrorist attacks were prevented between 2011 and 2015, besides averting 650 crimes of terrorist and extremist nature and neutralizing 440 terrorist training camps and 1,700 international terrorists. More than 2,700 members of illicit armed groups and their accomplices were arrested, while 213 people associated with terrorist or extremist organizations were extradited (Alimov 2017). Within Central Asia, a widening of cooperation among states is visible today. Kazakhstan’s relations with other CARS have been mostly tension free despite contentious issues like water release by the upstream countries and border problems. Kazakhstan’s borders with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan had been settled in 2001 and the border with Kyrgyzstan was demarcated with the signing of a treaty on 25 December 2017. However, Uzbekistan has diferences over border demarcation with most of its neighbours. Though Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed a Treaty in 2001 to respect the Soviet-drawn border, its relations with two other countries, which also share the Fergana Valley, are more complicated. These three  – Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan  – have never really come to  terms with the Soviet-created borders and from time to time tensions along the borders have resulted in periodic closure and even laying of land mines on the borders. Relations, however, moved in a positive direction after Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed presidency. For example, the disputed border of 324 kilometres out of total 1,378 kilometres between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was unresolved till 2016. The presidents of both countries signed an agreement in 2017 demarcating 1,170 kilometres of the border, which left only about 208 kilometres to be demarcated (Toktogulov 2017). The UzbekTajik border, which had been more or less settled to the tune of 96 per cent (only 93 kilometres out of 1,332 kilometres remain disputed) by a Treaty on 5 August 2008, however, remained one of the most rigid and confict prone in the region. Movement of people and goods had remained practically absent until then. Tension along the border prevailed from time to time, which impacted relations in other spheres as well. There were exchanges of gunfre, for instance, on the Bekabad-Khujand border in November 2011 after a series of accusations and counter accusations post September 2011 (Akhmedov 2012). With improvement in relations, the Tajik government formed a new Commission on the border issue with Uzbekistan in late November 2017. The then head of State Committee for Land Management and Geodesy1 Rajabboy Ahmadzoda expressed hope that the dispute over the remaining

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border areas would be resolved soon (Aliyeva 2018). Several factors had afected inter-state relations since the early 1990s, which included border issues, claims of Tajiks over historical cities of Samarkand and Bukhara and the construction of the Rogun Hydro Power Station (HPS) in Tajikistan that could afect water fow downstream to Uzbekistan. This resulted in (1) a substantial drop in Uzbek-Tajik mutual trade, (2) scrapping of fights between their capitals and (3) blocking of Tajik railway cargoes transiting Uzbekistan’s territory. As a renewed efort, President Mirziyoyev visited Tajikistan on 9–10 March 2018, and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon made his frst-ever state visit to Uzbekistan on August 17–18, 2018. Rahmon’s visit resulted in 27 path-breaking agreements related to industry, standardization and certifcation, border crossing, recognition of education documents, geology, agriculture and culture and so forth. The visa regime was simplifed and transport connection between the two countries was restored. Bilateral trade was projected to increase from $US 500 million to $US 1 billion annually. The National University of Tajikistan and State University of Samarkand established cooperation. More than one million people had crossed UzbekTajik border in the frst nine months of 2018 (Tolipov 2018). In March 2018, Uzbek-Tajik Defence Ministries signed an agreement to cooperate on the transit of special cargo and military contingents through their territories. During the summit of both the presidents in August 2018, Uzbek and Tajik border guards conducted joint military-tactical exercises at Termez, where the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan intersect. Both sides announced that the two states agree to construct two other HPSs on the Zarafshan River. Rahmon even ofered to provide Uzbekistan with potable water from Tajikistan’s high mountainous Sarez Lake (Tolipov 2018). The Rogun Dam issue no longer looks like an insurmountable issue given the improvements in bilateral relations. The frst turbine of Rogun hydro-electricity project was operationalized on 16 November 2018. After meeting his Uzbek counterpart in March 2018, Rahmon expressed hope that “the existing hydropower facilities and those under construction will help resolve the region’s water and power issues”. Rahmon welcomed Uzbekistan’s support for the development of hydropower facilities in Tajikistan, including Rogun (Putz 2018a). Uzbek-Tajik energy trade has resumed too, which is a major breakthrough since Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the common power grid in 2009. In February 2018, Tajikistan agreed to supply 1.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity between April to September. The price was to be half of what Tajikistan charged Afghanistan in 2017. In return, Uzbekistan agreed to resume gas supply to Tajikistan, which had been stopped since 2012. Mirziyoyev had signed an agreement in March 2018 for supply of about 126 million cubic meters of natural gas annually by Uzbekistan to Tajikistan at a price of $120

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per 1,000 cubic meters, which is quite cheap compared to the $145 charged in 2008 and $300 in 2009 for the same amount of gas (Putz 2018b). The importance of water and energy for taking the bilateral relations forward was demonstrated during Mirziyoyev’s visit to Tajikistan on 10 June 2021, when both countries agreed to jointly develop plans to build two hydropower projects with a total capacity of 320 megawatts on the Zarafshan River in Tajikistan. Both also agreed to jointly build a 140-megawatt hydroelectric power station at Yavan (Tajikistan) at a cost of $282 million, followed by a second hydroelectric power station at a cost of $270 million and a capacity of 135 megawatts and production of 500–600 million kilowatt-hours (Shaikh 2021). In short, Mirziyoyev’s initiatives have resulted in enhanced levels of trade, economic, energy, travel, tourism and people-to-people contacts. Citizens from neighbouring countries can travel to Uzbekistan without a visa for various periods of time (3 months for Kazakh, 2 months for Kyrgyz and 1 month for Tajik citizens). At the Astana Summit (March 2018), Mirziyoyev gave details of trade with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, which reached nearly $3 billion in 2017, an increase of 20 per cent over 2016, in addition to vowing it to make $5 billion “in the coming years” (Eurasianet 2018). Connectivity and Sustainable Stability

An International Conference titled “Central Asian Connectivity: Challenges and New Opportunities” organised on 19–20 February 2019 by the Ministry of Foreign Afairs of Uzbekistan in Tashkent, in which this author participated, highlighted regional stability in Central Asia and how it can be achieved through connectivity and regional cooperation. It was generally recognized that border disputes, water and energy issues would destabilise the CARs and make it confict prone. However, the current trend seems to be in the direction of resolving these issues amicably. The more serious issue is the Afghan situation, especially with the exit of U.S. troops. Most of the discussions among the CARs focused on how to stabilize Afghanistan. The Uzbek leadership feels that connectivity and transport corridors could be the basis of development and stability of Central Asia and Afghanistan. This is in tune with the U.S. New Silk Road Initiative, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia-India-Iran-promoted International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) through Bander Abbas and India-Iran-funded Chabahar port project. On the eve of the Astana Summit, Mirziyoyev spoke about sustainable cooperation in Central Asia at an International Conference titled “Central Asia: One Past and a Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity” in Samarkand on 11 November 2017.

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He specifcally focused on the transit and logistical potential of the region that needs to be used more efciently to ensure accelerated development of transport infrastructure. Mirziyoyev gave the example of the newly opened Turkmenabad-Farab railway and automobile bridges over the Amu Darya River, which forms an important section of Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-IranOman transport and transit route. Incidentally, at the Ashgabat Agreement of 2011, this route was agreed upon and India joined it in February 2018. The Agreement enables India to utilize this existing transport and transit corridor to facilitate trade and commercial ties with Central Asia. It will synchronize India’s eforts to take forward the INSTC for enhanced connectivity. Mirziyoyev spoke of an agreement on the earliest start of construction of Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railroad, which would be “necessary to develop and adopt a region-wide Program of Development of Transport Communications” (Ministry of Foreign Afairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan 2017). Another major project promoted by the United States and its allies as part of the New Silk Road Initiative connects Central Asia with Afghanistan and South Asia is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. The construction along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border started in December 2015 and that on the Afghanistan-Pakistan section in February 2018. The gas from Galkynysh gas felds in Turkmenistan would be used for the purpose (Hydrocarbons Technology 2019). Other projects under the U.S. initiative include Cross-Border Transport Accord (CBTA) between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan; Central Asia-South Asia electricity project or CASA-1000; Tajikistan Cotton Processing Complex; and Afghanistan Pine Nut Processing Plant. The railway line between Uzbekistan’s Hairaton and Afghanistan’s Mazar-e-Sharif was completed with funding from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), for which the United States was instrumental. Uzbekistan hopes to earn an estimated $32 million annually from this project. A 670-metre truck bridge linking Tajikistan with Afghanistan was completed in 2007. Tashkent planned to extend this line from Mazar-e-Sharif to Herat, which could provide an opportunity to India for accessibility through Iran and Afghanistan to Central Asia. Uzbekistan also launched its own transmission line to Afghanistan in 2009 and by early 2010 it was already exporting 2.3 kilowatt-hours of power daily to Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul. In addition, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed agreements with both Afghanistan and Pakistan for the construction of a 1,300-megawatt power supply project with funding from ADB and the Islamic Development Bank (Blank 2012). Other major connectivity projects include Transport Corridor EuropeCaucasus-Asia (TRACECA), Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and CASA-1000. Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) is another multilateral organisation that includes Iran, Turkey and the CARS. ECO created a

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trade agreement – ECOTA – in 2003, as a result of which Sarakhs-Mashhad rail link between Iran and Turkmenistan opened in 1996, giving Central Asia access to the Persian Gulf (Tehran Times 2012). The improving regional cooperation among the CARs would thus help in the success of many of the connectivity projects promoted by diferent global and regional powers. At the same time, improved connectivity can contribute to regional stability by bringing in greater economic development and creating stakes for all the countries in the region to cooperate. The engagement of major global and regional powers in building infrastructure and promoting economic cooperation in Central Asia has helped the region in becoming a hub of East-West and North-South connectivity. In the long run, however, these projects would create strong economic bonds among CARs and help in common prosperity. It is also worth noting that competition between major powers in Central Asia has not resulted in the so-called “New Great Game”. This author (2016) has argued: Central Asian states have sought to take advantage of the multiple-power engagements in the region to extract maximum benefts for themselves without becoming subordinate to any big power. There have been eforts by external powers to focus on some states to advance their strategic goals – for example, Kazakhstan for Russia’s Eurasian integration project or Uzbekistan becoming the focus of American strategy of creating a geopolitical pivot to counter Russian infuence. On their part, CARs have been active players in regional geopolitics. They have used various strategies like multi-vector policy (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), neutrality (Turkmenistan), shifting strategic partners and equidistance policy (Uzbekistan) to protect their interests and maximise benefts. In short, CARs have not allowed their countries to be centres of power rivalry and confict. They have balanced the engagement of external powers quite well. In fact, some powers are together on many global issues and have a common interest in shaping the global order into an equitable and nondiscriminatory one. Russia, China and India are part of many multilateral groupings like Brazil Russia India China and South Asia (BRICS), SCO and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China and India are both interested in free trade agreements with the Eurasian Economic Union as well. If development is the answer to sustainable stability, then it is important that Central Asia achieves a certain degree of economic integration or at least greater economic openness within the region. There are many issues that have a bearing on inter-ethnic and inter-state relations, like poverty, unemployment and fall in income of the population, which can deepen ethnic and religious divides. These issues also push people towards extremism. Such

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threats can be mitigated by greater economic development, which require cooperation among the states. For example, energy- and water-sharing issues and the projects related to them require cooperation between states. Even infrastructure and connectivity projects require regional cooperation. Though the U.S.-promoted connectivity linking Central Asia with South Asia has sufered a setback due to its departure from Afghanistan and lack of infuence over the current Afghan regime, there are projects promoted by other countries that can move forward. From this perspective, the current trends in regional cooperation are extremely positive. Post-U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan and Regional Cooperation

After two decades of invasion, the last of the U.S. troops fnally left Afghanistan on 30 August 2021. The Taliban takeover of the country created many apprehensions about their role in the region. However, unlike its previous rule during 1996–2001, the current Taliban leadership has announced that it will not let terrorist groups to operate from its territory against other countries. The new regime has also reached out to other powers with the hope of being recognized internationally and normalize trade and economic relations. Afghanistan’s neighbours are also interested in a stable Afghanistan that does not spread instability across borders. China and Russia have reached out to Taliban, and Iran, Pakistan and CARs (except Tajikistan) are engaging with the Taliban (Bekmurzaev 2022). China was engaging with the Taliban even before it came back to power. A nine-member Taliban delegation led by Mullah Ghani Baradar met the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Tianjin on 28 July 2021 and assured that “it will not allow Afghan soil to be used for attacks against China in exchange for Chinese economic support and investment for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country”. It is an indicator of potential Chinese involvement in Afghanistan. China not only strongly criticized the United States for freezing Afghan assets, but also pledged $31 million in humanitarian assistance within a short period of less than a month of American withdrawal, with the frst batch of cargo from China landing in Kabul airport in September (Sherazi 2021). India, which felt isolated from Afghan developments in the beginning of Taliban takeover, is coming to terms with the new dispensation in Kabul. It started with humanitarian aid of 20,000 metric tonnes of wheat, 13 tons of medicines, 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines and winter clothing in the beginning of January 2022. A team from New Delhi also visited Kabul to oversee the distribution of these items (MEA 2022). Russia has quickly moved to establish diplomatic ties when it accredited an Afghan diplomat in April 2022. Out of the total 108 tons of humanitarian

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aid from Russia to Afghanistan, the frst batch was delivered on 18 November 2021 consisting of 36 tons (Business Standard 2021). Alarmed by Taliban takeover in Afghanistan and Western sanctions due to war in Ukraine, Moscow is eager to keep Eurasia stable and peaceful. Zardykhan (2022) analyses the apprehension of the CARs, three of which border Afghanistan (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). They intended to defend their borders through security reinforcement and diplomacy, primarily relying on Russian initiatives. There have been joint military exercises involving Tajik and Uzbek troops in August 2021 near the Tajik-Afghan border. In October 2021, the CSTO carried out military drills in Tajikistan, involving troops from all the six member states. Afghanistan still evokes security concerns, especially in Tajikistan, where Islamic State reportedly fred several rockets on 7 May 2022. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in the northern province of Kunduz in April 2022 that killed 33 people (Economic Times 2022). These developments would push Tajikistan further into Russian security protection. Russia has shown no more reluctance to get involved in Central Asia, like it did during internal turmoil in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. As protests gripped many parts of Kazakhstan in January 2022, President Tokaev requested Russia for help. As a result, CSTO peacekeeping troops went into Kazakhstan on 5 January and after stabilizing the situation returned on 19 January 2022. Nevertheless, despite security cooperation, the CARs have not come out in support of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. Their distancing from the Russian position was articulated in Kazakh President Tokaev at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (17 June, 2022). He expressed his country’s desire not to recognize Donetsk and Luhansk as independent countries. However, he denied any discord with Russia, whose leadership has good understanding with Eurasian partners (Satubaldina 2022). The recovery of Russian economy and its currency after the initial shock of Western sanctions enables Russia to play a leading role in bringing the Eurasian region together. In fact, Putin’s frst visit abroad since the military operation in Ukraine was to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan on June 28 and 29 2022 respectively. Tajikistan has a Russian military base, whose troops have been guarding the Tajik-Afghan border. The talks focused on cooperation in several areas related to security. In Turkmenistan, Putin attended the Summit of Caspian states, where leaders of Iran, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were present. Addressing the Summit, Putin pointed out the key goals of the Caspian states as further expansion of regional trade and investment links and mutually benefcial cooperation in industrial production and advanced technology. It is important to note herewith that Russia’s trade with the Caspian littoral states is constantly on the rise. For example, in 2021, mutual trade increased by more than one-third, or 35 per cent, to reach $34 billion and

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increased another 12.5 per cent between January and April 2022 (Kremlin website 2022). All the littoral states of the Caspian, except Turkmenistan, are members of the INSTC. Though Turkmenistan is not a member, it has its own connectivity agreement known as Ashgabat Agreement (in force since April 2016) that connects four CARs (except Tajikistan) through a multimodal transport corridor with the aim to enhance connectivity within the Eurasian region and synchronise the corridor with other such corridors including INSTC. Economic recovery in Russia would also help some countries in Central Asia, which depend a lot on the remittances of migrant workers working in Russia. The COVID-19 pandemic and Ukraine war has slowed down the demand for labour in Russia, which has severely afected the Central Asian economies. Before the war in Ukraine, there were four million Central Asian migrant workers in Russia (two million Uzbeks and a million Tajiks and Kyrgyzs each). Remittances accounted for 31 per cent and 27 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s GDP in 2020 respectively (Reliefweb 2022). While the migrants are reluctant to leave Russia, many returnees from Russia would like the situation to improve so that they can go back. This creates additional incentive to restore transport connectivity and improved relations with Russia. After the United States and its allies withdrew from Afghanistan, there is some hope that the CARs and Afghanistan would be less divided by geopolitical games of other powers, at least in the near future. Russia’s cooperation with China, Iran and India has increased, especially in the energy sector. They all are trying to engage with the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan. Within the region, this is the best time for inter-state cooperation and regional integration, rather than geopolitical division. Conclusion

Many connectivity projects were promoted in Eurasian region by diferent powers. The United States promoted the New Silk Road initiative to connect Central and South Asia through pipeline and infrastructure projects. China has pumped in huge investments through its BRI project. Russia has managed to draw Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia, India and Iran are actively promoting INSTC. The aforementioned projects and New Delhi-Tehran-Kabul link to Eurasia through Chabahar (Iran) can bring in much needed investments and develop the region. Development and stability in Central Asia is possible if there is greater cooperation between the states there. One example is Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan pipeline to China, which was brought about by cooperation of the three CARs. The INSTC involves the cooperation of a number of countries of Eurasia. Though the New Silk Road project would face difculties in the near

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future, BRI and Russia-India-Iran promoted INSTC are going to be important projects connecting the region. Following the war in Ukraine, Russia has stressed on trade with Asian countries due to which the INSTC has come into focus. The frst Russian cargo to India sent by train travelling around 3,800 kilometres using the INSTC reached Iran on 13 July 2022, from where goods were moved by ship to India. This route is expected to boost trade not only between Russia and India but also between other participating countries linked to this route like Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The potential benefts of many connectivity projects could not be fully realized due to lack of cooperation between the CARs. Though most of the CARs have been following multi-vector foreign policy and cooperating with all major powers, political and geopolitical considerations have also been factors in their orientation, which came in the way of a common regional mechanism or help in regional integration. Once internal cooperation develops in the region, external powers would have less room to manoeuvre or engage in competition with one another at the cost of the CARs. Many of the connectivity projects would beneft from the intra-regional cooperation and transport networks, open borders and smooth transit of goods within Central Asia. This is going to generate economic development and create a stable environment in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Thus, the process of inter-state and regional cooperation that has unfolded in the recent years augurs well for long-term and sustainable stability in Central Asia and its neighbourhood. Note 1 Geodesy is the science of accurately measuring and understanding of the shape and area of the earth or large portions of it, including its geometric shape, its orientation in space and its gravity feld, as well as changes in these properties with time.

References Akhmedov, Erkin. 2012. “Incidents and Tajik-Uzbek Border Highlights Uneasy Relations.” April 10. Accessed May 2, 2013. http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5851 Alimov, Rashid. 2017. “The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Counteracting Threats to Peace and Security.” UN Chronicle. Accessed April 7, 2021. www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/role-shanghai-cooperation-organizationcounteracting-threats-peace-and-security Aliyeva, Kamila. 2018. “Uzbekistan, Tajikistan to Mull Border Issues.” Azerinews. January 9. Accessed March 2, 2019. www.azernews.az/region/125212.html Astana Times. 2017. “Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Sign Agreement Regulating Border.” December 29. Accessed March 2, 2019. www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2017/12/29/ kazakhstan-and-kyrgyzstan-sign-agreement-regulating-border/

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Bekmurzaev, Nurbek. 2022. “Implications of the Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Central Asia.” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting (CABAR). April 4. Accessed July 22, 2022. https://cabar.asia/ en/implications-of-the-taliban-takeover-in-afghanistan-on-terrorism-and-violentextremism-in-central-asia Blank, Stephen. 2012. “Central Asian Perspectives on Afghanistan after the US Withdrawal.” Afghanistan Regional Forum. November 2. Washington, DC: Central Asia Programme, Elliott School of International Afairs: George Washington University. Business Standard. 2021. “First Batch of Russia’s Humanitarian Aid Arrives in Afghanistan.” November 19. Accessed July 23, 2022. www.business-standard. com/article/international/first-batch-of-russia-s-humanitarian-aid-arrives-inafghanistan-121111900189_1.html Clement, Victoria. 2020. “How Central Asia Copes with Covid-19.” April 22. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/tajikistan/how-central-asiacopes-covid-19 The Economic Times. 2022. “Islamic State Claims Rockets Fired from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.” May 8. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://economictimes.indiatimes. com//news/defence/islamic-state-claims-rockets-fired-from-afghanistaninto tajikistan/articleshow/91420400.cms?utm_source=contentofnterest&utm_ medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst Eurasianet. 2018. “Central Asia Leaders Confab But Stop Short of Binding Commitments.” March 16. Accessed March 2, 2019. https://eurasianet.org/centralasia-leaders-confab-but-stop-short-of-binding-commitments Hashimova, Umida. 2020. “Uzbekistan Launches Trials of a Chinese Vaccine, But Purchases Russian Vaccine.” The Diplomat. December 21. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/uzbekistan-hedging-vaccine-bets-withrussian-purchase/ Hydrocarbons Technology. 2019. “Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline Project.” Accessed March 3, 2019. www.hydrocarbons-technology. com/projects/turkmenistan-afghanistan-pakistan-india-tapi-gas-pipeline-project/ Kremlin Homepage. 2022. “Putin’s Address at the 6th Caspian Summit in Ashgabat.” June 29. Accessed July 23, 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68779 Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2022. “India’s Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan.” June 2. Accessed July 23, 2022. www.mea.gov.in/ press-releases.htm?dtl/35381/Indias+humanitarian+assistance+to+Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Afairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 2017. “Central Asia: One Past and a Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity.” Speech of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the International Conference on November 11, 2017 in Samarkand. Accessed October 10, 2018. https://mfa.uz/en/press/news/2017/11/13142/ National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan. 2012. Accessed August 10, 2014. www.stat.kg Neapole, Matthew. 2020. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and OSCE: Organizational Eforts vs Covid-19 in Central Asia.” Central Asia Programme (CAP). November 4. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://centralasiaprogram. org/shanghai-cooperation-organization-osce-organizational-efforts-covid-19central-asia

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Olcott, Martha Brill. 2010. “Rivalry and Competition in Central Asia.” Paper Presented at the Eurasia Energy Market Forum. Thun (Switzerland). Accessed April 29, 2019. https://docplayer.net/22667520-Eurasia-emerging-markets-forum-rivalryand-competition-in-central-asia-martha-brill-olcott-january-23-25-2010-thunswitzerland.html Patnaik, Ajay. 2016. Central Asia: Geopolitics, Security and Stability. London and New York: Routledge. Putz, Catherine. 2018a. “Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam Begins Operations.” The Diplomat. November 20. Accessed March 2, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/ tajikistans-megadam-rogun-begins-operations/ Putz, Catherine. 2018b. “Tajikistan Resumes Supplying Uzbekistan with Electricity.” The Diplomat. April 4. Accessed March 2, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/ tajikistan-resumes-supplying-uzbekistan-with-electricity/ Reliefweb. 2022. “Sanctions on Russia Already Hitting Remittance-Dependent Countries in Central Asia.” June 16. Accessed July 24, 2022. https://reliefweb. int/report/kyrgyzstan/sanctions-russia-already-hitting-remittance-dependentcountries-central-asia Satubaldina, Assel. 2022. “President Tokayev Answers Tough Questions at Economic Forum in Russia.” The Astana Times. June 18. Accessed July 23, 2022. https:// astanatimes.com/2022/06/president-tokayev-answers-tough-questions-ateconomic-forum-in-russia/ Shaikh, Zaki. 2021. “Analysis – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan Discuss Water, Afghanistan at Summit Level Meeting.” Anadolu Agency (AA). June 10. Accessed July 22, 2022. www. aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-uzbekistan-tajikistan-discuss-water-afghanistanat-summit-level-meeting/2273056 Sherazi, Zahir. 2021. “Will Afghanistan’s Powerful Neighbours Engage the Taliban?” Aljazeera. October 16. Accessed July 22, 2022. www.aljazeera.com/opinions/ 2021/10/16/will-afghanistans-powerful-neighbours-engage-the-taliban Tehran Times. 2012. “Ofcial: Iran’s Share of ECO Trade Stands at $10 Billion.” May 19. Accessed July 30, 2014. www.tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/98000ofcial-irans-share-of-eco-trade-stands-at-10-billionToktogulov, Beishenbek. 2017. “The Failure of Settlement on Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Issues: A Lack of Diplomacy?” Paper Presented at the ESCAS-CESS Joint Conference at American University of Central Asia (AUCA), June 29–July 2. Accessed March 2, 2019. www.researchgate.net/publication/328857542_The_Failure_of_ Settlement_on_Kyrgyz-Uzbek_Border_Issues_a_Lack_of_Diplomacy Tolipov, Farkhod. 2018. “Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Relations: The Long Way to Strategic Partnership.” The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. September 18. Accessed March 2, 2019. www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13533uzbekistan-tajikistan-relations-the-long-way-to-strategic-partnership.html Zardykhan, Zhar. 2022. “Central Asia’s Fears of Rising Militancy in Afghanistan as Moscow Invades Ukraine.” Global Voices. May 17. Accessed July 23, 2022. https://globalvoices.org/2022/05/17/central-asias-fears-of-rising-militancy-inafghanistan-as-moscow-invades-ukraine/

9 NEW FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE ON SILK ROAD IN THE POST–COLD WAR PERIOD Ramakrushna Pradhan and Atanu Kumar Mohapatra

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union was sudden and unexpected, which left both insiders and outsiders tentative with regard to orienting their approaches towards the new geopolitical peculiarity. This vagueness was quite refected not just in the policies of the United States, China and India but also in the Russian policy strategies immediately after the disintegration. To the southern periphery of the Soviet Union, a new geopolitical region emerged consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan collectively known as Central Asia. This region is believed to be in the global limelight in every epoch of history for its geopolitical locations and possessions as well. In every period of history, attempts were made to control and administer the region by regional and extra-regional powers to rule over the world. Even during the Tsarist period, there was a Great Game between Tsarist Russia and the British to gain control of the region then known as Middle Asia and Kazakhstan (Dadabaev 2018). During the Soviet period, the Marshall plan was perhaps aimed at luring the region with economic leverages and military support, then known as Central Asia or Inner Asia. Today, in the post-Soviet era, the region has exhibited a new kind of great game, which this chapter terms as “Silk Road rivalry” again to control and administer the region. It is with this rhetoric now that states of the region and beyond are striving hard to build closer engagements with the Central Asian region. This chapter focuses on four such Silk Road narratives adopted by the United States, China, Russia and India to transform Central Asia’s geopolitical landscape demonstrating their goals and objectives projected as

DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-11

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“self”, projecting as the best, proftable and accommodative in comparison to the rest as “others”. The content and nature of these Silk Road strategies have changed with time and the international environment. The concept carried diferent meanings depending upon the country that chose the Silk Road as a brand of its foreign policy (Dadabaev 2018). In this sense, the static concept of the traditional Silk Road got transformed into a social construction of that particular country’s foreign policy engagement with the region. This chapter, therefore, claims that the Silk Road is not a foreign policy doctrine but rather a discursive practice involving the grand design of the adopted country. With this premise, this chapter focuses on the Silk Road narratives of the United States, China, Russia and India for their engagement with the Central Asian countries and examines their social construction to stimulate a debate that Silk Road rivalry in Central Asia involves agenda promotion through historical connotation to prevail their alternative world views of “self” difering from the “others”. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), America’s New Silk Road Strategy, Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and India’s International NorthSouth Transportation Corridor (INSTC) have led to contending versions for revitalizing the antique trade routes linking Asia with Europe via the heartland region. The U.S. Silk Road strategy focuses on stabilizing Afghanistan, while China’s BRI hopes for economically integrating Central Asia into Beijing’s geostrategic orbit. On the other hand, Russia in recent times has reasserted its position through EAEU at least to play a dominant regional role, whereas India lately has come up with its version of the Silk Road known as INSTC to secure its much-needed energy security with the help of Central Asian energy resources. These stated Silk Road concepts are socially constructed to secure the interests of the respective countries by using the narrative as a proxy. Why these countries intend to use Silk Road discourses in their recent foreign policy orientation has a reason underneath: the geopolitics of Central Asia itself. It is imperative here to understand the centrality of Central Asia in the Silk Road diplomatic frameworks. Centrality of Central Asia: A Prelude

Central Asia refers to an area that largely extends from the Kipchak steppes of Central Russia to the Great Wall of China (Kaushik 1970). The geographical denomination of Central Asia is not an indigenous term. It dates back to the 19th century, when the Europeans named this region intending to establish a territorial identity for this region. Central Asia as a single geopolitical entity comprises fve independent republics and covers a vast area of approximately four million square kilometres that is almost one-sixth of the size of the former Soviet Union (Kaushik 1970). It stretches from the seashores of the Caspian Sea and River Volga in the west to China in the east and Russia in the north

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to Afghanistan and Iran in the south. Because of this unique geographical location, Central Asia, after its independence, both literally and fguratively changed the map of Asia and subsequently redefned the world politically. The geographical location of Central Asia at the heart of Eurasia situated in the middle half of the Silk Route is strategically vital for not only Russia and China but also the United States, Europe and other countries in Asia and outside. The CARs together share a border of 6,200 kilometres with Russia in the north, a 3,500-kilometre-long border with China in the east, approximately a border of more than 3,500 kilometres to the west with the Caspian Sea and a huge length of the inland border with Iran and Afghanistan in the southwest and the south (Akiner 1994). The geopolitical importance of Central Asia cannot be explained without taking recourse to Sir Halford John Mackinder’s view of “he who controls the heartland controls the world” (Mackinder 1904). Hitherto, the Mackinder thesis of the geographical pivot of history, Central Asia, was a little known landmass. Even when the Soviet Union administered the region, the importance of the region was hardly outlined anywhere barring the U.S. attempt of containment of communism through the Marshal Plan. Yet after independence, though quite often lumped together as a single entity, Central Asia is neither a common geographical landmass nor central to any of its neighbours. Despite its name and geopolitical location, Central Asia was not central to any of the regional and extraregional countries. For Russia, the region is no longer its hinterland in the post-Soviet period. In fact, the Russian Federation used a new term called the “Near Abroad” to indicate the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), which includes Central Asia in its foreign policy objectives. For the United States, the region remained unwanted and isolated following the Soviet disintegration and continued to be the same until 1994. While the European Union remains the primary object and vector of Turkey’s foreign policy, for Iran the Persian Gulf is still paramount in its orientation and security concern. It is beset with its domestic problems and the U.S. hegemonic attitude pointing towards it. China’s security lies to the east, with the Taiwan issue looming large over its foreign policy and relations to the Korean Peninsula and Japan following closely. India and Pakistan primarily focus on their bilateral relationships. Nevertheless, an impoverished region like Central Asia suddenly became the focal point of regional politics and global economics by virtue of its geostrategic location and geo-economic possessions. Its huge untapped oil and energy reserves and promising potentials in the hydro and nuclear energy front have once again put it right back in world politics. Energy Resources

Central Asia is rich in hydrocarbons with gas being the predominant energy fuel. While Kazakhstan has large reserves of oil and coal and signifcant

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amounts of uranium deposits, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have huge gas reserves. Kyrgyzstan is a leading producer of hydroelectricity. With proven oil reserves estimated to range from 9 to 40 billion barrels and natural gas reserves possibly exceeding 131 trillion cubic feet, Central Asia is poised to become a major world supplier of energy, especially in hydrocarbon. With 23,000 tons of uranium, Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and had the second-largest reserves as of 2016. It is also home to minerals including iron ore, coal, oil, gas, gold, lead, zinc, molybdenum and so forth in commercially viable quantities (Sajjanhar 2016). Uzbekistan has large reserves of gas, uranium and gold. Turkmenistan is endowed with the world’s fourthlargest reserves of natural gas. Tajikistan is blessed with huge hydroelectric potential. Kyrgyzstan is rich in gold and hydroelectric power. Since most of its reserves are undeveloped and promising, Central Asian energy excites international interests. In addition, the Caspian Sea, the world’s largest inland Sea, has a sea basin of around 700 miles. It is surrounded by fve riparian states of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and some part of Iran and adjacent countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Dekmejian and Simonian 2001). Iran is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC); the rest of the countries form a part of the former Soviet Union. Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan form a part of the non-OPEC and nonOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (non-OECD) group along with Latin America, Africa and China. The former Soviet Union contributes 11.60 million barrels per day of crude oil production in the group (Kramer 2009). Caught in the throes of the restructuring of global power relations after the Soviet collapse, the Caspian has emerged as a focus of world attention. Conceptualizing the Silk Road Rivalry

Through the analysis of the evolution of Silk Road narratives of the United States, China, Russia and India in Greater Central Asia, this chapter argues that the nature and content of these Silk Road strategies have changed with the time and international environment. Discarding the traditional notion of the Silk Road being a historical trade route and statistic concept, this chapter claims that the Silk Road narrative has been transformed into political and diplomatic strategies of the social construction of powerful states as foreign policy discourse – that is constantly shaped, imagined and re-interpreted. New Silk Road of the United States

The United States has come up with its own New Silk Road Strategy in June 2011 (Fedorenko 2013) to procure its interests in Central Asia, to maintain

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stability, to facilitate and enhance regional cooperation in trade, energy and transportation. It envisions plans for joint investment projects and regional trade blocs that have the potential to bring economic growth and stability to Central Asia. Following the surge of 30,000 additional troops into Afghanistan in 2009, which President Barack Obama had hoped would lay the groundwork for complete withdrawal a few years later, Washington began to lay out a strategy for supporting these initiatives through diplomatic means to enable Afghanistan to build an economy independent of any foreign assistance (McBride 2015). As part of this strategy, William Burns, the then Deputy Secretary of State, had outlined in 2014 that the main focus of the United States in the region was to build a regional energy market for Central Asia connecting with Afghanistan to meet its electricity consumption. If materialized the Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) could provide more than 1.6 billion consumers in India, Pakistan and the rest of South Asia with all-time energy supplies. Marc Grossman, the Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2011 and 2012, was in favour of connecting private sector investment and entrepreneurship and trade relationship among export industries like Afghani fruits and Pakistani cement to establish order in the region. The United States had taken several initiatives to get rid of Afghanistan and for that its Silk Road strategy envisioned several initiatives as narrated herewith. China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 had laid down a New Silk Road vision in the form of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in Astana (Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China 2013) to initiate and strengthen bilateral trade and economic relations between China and the Eurasian region. In a signifcant addendum in May 2015, China and Russia agreed in Moscow to integrate the former’s SERB with the latter’s vision of a trade and infrastructure network across Eurasia, the EAEU, which was launched in January 2015. The EAEU comprised the former Soviet Union states of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Dijak and Martens 2016). This reinforces Russia’s own “pivot to the East” and serves to dispel the perspective that Russia and China are natural adversaries. Moreover, the SERB directly links China to the EU, strengthening economic ties, eventually raising doubt that there is any new Great Game in Central Asia and the Caucasus involving Russia and China in an alliance against the West. Free trade and growing cooperation in a number of spheres further undermine the new Great Game thesis (Dijak and Martens 2016). These reasons assert that China has certain critical interests linked to the Central Asian geopolitics and geostrategic calculations in world politics. And the strategy it has in place makes her invincible and unchallenged,

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outclassing the West. Hence, the hitherto apprehension of a Great Game in energy-rich Central Asia has undoubtedly lost its character and has given way for Chinese domination in the heartland. However, how and why the region remains of such importance to China that Beijing cannot aford to lose the grip or let others stay for longer is still inexplicable. The BRI has been derived from the Chinese Yi dai Yi lu, which literally means One Belt One Road (OBOR) (Magari 2017), which is a commitment to easing bottlenecks to Eurasian trade by improving and building networks of connectivity across Central, Western and South Asia, as well as to reach out to the Middle East as well as East and North Africa (Amighini 2017). BRI is an attempt to revive the historical Eurasian Silk Road that is approximately 2,000 years old with vigour to reconnect Europe with Asia and Africa with the use of modern transportation, thereby boosting trade, investments, economic development and by improving diplomatic relations, scientifc progress and cultural exchange for all countries and regions across the Eurasian continent. This initiative gives due importance to Central Asia like its predecessor, the ancient Silk Road. The BRI has two separate roads: the SREB that is the overland part of the broader BRI, and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Route. Among the number of corridors the Silk Road encompasses, six of them are currently in some stage of planning or construction: the ChinaMongolia-Russia corridor; the New Eurasian Land Bridge; the China-Central Asia-Western Asia Corridor; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; the Indochina Peninsula Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (Magari 2017). In this context, Central Asia is the region most likely to receive maximum global attention. Chinese Interests and Initiatives in Central Asia Energy

China’s major energy partners in Central Asia are Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. As of August 2016, China was in control of 20 per cent of the Kazakh oil production and had constructed one of the world’s longest pipelines, running about 2, 300 kilometres from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang (Hart 2016). Beijing has been actively participating in exploring the Alktyuinks and Mangyshlak oil deposits and building an oil pipeline in the Kazakhstan-Xinjiang region (Pradhan 2010). The Chinese national oil company CNPC owns a signifcant stake in the Kashagan oil feld in the Caspian Sea while other Chinese companies own and develop several key oil felds in Aktobe city (Hart 2016). With Turkmenistan, China has negotiated to directly transfer the gases through the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. One of the most ambitious projects signed by China includes the 5,730-kilometre-long gas pipeline project estimated at $11 billion in Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China in

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which a consortium of companies from the United States, Japan and China have already been conducting preliminary surveys (Muller Kraenner 2008). In 2013 alone, China invested $15 billion in energy deals with Central Asian states. Besides, it fnanced two refneries in Kyrgyzstan, in Kara-Balta and Tomok, which are supplied by CNPC-run oilfelds in Kazakhstan and produce 1.35 million refned products annually (Hart 2016). The Chinese inroads into Central Asian energy markets have decisively oriented the fow of oil and gas from Central Asia eastward and have undoubtedly established a Chinese dominance in the region, which was earlier controlled by the West and Russia. Border Security

The peripheral security of China in Central Asia has two dimensions. First, it is the preservation of the stability, economic well-being, political order and security of its westernmost province XUAR, which shares a long and common border with Russia, Mongolia and three Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Intricately linked to this goal is the second aim of the creation of a friendly and secure belt of states around Xinjiang. A central aim of its regional security policy is to ensure that Central Asia remains free from the hegemonic control of powerful rivals such as the United States now that Russian power has considerably declined and partnership with Russia is seen to advance strategic goals. (Dutta 2003) The long border China shares with Central Asia was given priority by Beijing to resolve all disputes and stabilize the region critically linked to the security stability to its western border (Zhi 2016). Xinjiang is China’s largest province in size occupying roughly one-sixth of the country’s territory. It produces one-third of China’s cotton and explorations in the Tarim Basin have indicated the region to have the country’s largest oil and gas reserves (Zhi 2016). It is an ethnically mixed region with a 22-million-strong population consisting of Uyghurs, Hans and Kazakhs as the top three ethnicities population wise (Bovingdon 2010). Uyghurs and other Turkic tribes constituting the overwhelming majority of Xinjiang made its integration into China problematic. They were keen to join in Central Asian mainstream, because of their historical, cultural, linguistic and civilizational links and commonalities. Thus, there arose separatist movements. Taking serious note of the events, China for some years after 1991 waged a large campaign to crash the three evil forces of terrorists, religious extremists and separatists in Xinjiang. China believes that the separatists are backed by

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Al-Qaeda and other militants such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia and militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It accused outside powers especially the West and the overseas terrorist groups of being behind most of the violent separatist acts in Xinjiang. Since 1994, Beijing has negotiated border security as one party with the CARs as other parties (Zhi 2016). Two treaties have emerged from this robust arrangement: the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions (1996) and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regimes (1997) (Zhi 2016). China initiated the idea of the Shanghai Five in 1996 in collaboration with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to settle border problems of China with Russia and three states of Central Asia. Furthering this process China also transformed Xinjiang into a free market zone in 1998 in collaboration with Kazakhstan only to put an end to the ethnic crisis and for establishing cooperative relations with its Central Asian neighbours. This may also be pointed out as one of the most important reasons for the Chinese support of the United States in its Global War on Terror. Strategic Interests

Central Asia is a strategic area for China as well. China’s security policy rests upon four pillars (1) countering terrorism and Islamic militancy backing for Uyghur independence, (2) military cooperation, (3) countering the infuence of major powers in the region inimical to China, and (4) strongly infuencing Central Asia’s multilateral security arrangements which mostly originate from Central Asia. China also seriously views Central Asia’s opening as its road to the vast regions of Eurasia –the energy centres of Central Asia, Russia and the Middle East to Europe and the ports of Pakistan and the Gulf. Therefore, it is obvious on the part of China not to allow Central Asia to become Russia’s backyard and American chessboard. Hence, China has been cementing its position in Central Asia. Economic Interests

The increasing interests of China in Central Asia’s economy can be seen because of the following points. 1 Central Asia serves as a transit road for economic ties between China and Europe, South Asia and the Middle East. 2 Central Asia’s richness in natural resources (oil, gas, gold, uranium, cotton etc.) attracts international forces and enhances its economic importance. 3 The CARs turned the region into a vacant and easily accessible market for Chinese goods and a source of cheaper raw materials. Land transport

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communications ofered more advantageous conditions for Chinese exports. 4 The CARs can now establish direct ties with the Asia Pacifc. Some of them (Japan and South Korea) have come to the fore. In these conditions, China, connected with Central Asia by railways and highways, has become the most convenient and reliable link between Central Asia and the Asia-Pacifc, which is economically good for China. 5 Central Asia needs Chinese consumer goods. (Khojaev 2007) Therefore, it is not surprising to ascertain that after energy, economic relationship with Central Asia remains China’s topmost priority, even though the economy was not the driving force of Chinese engagement with the region in the early 1990s. In fact, the Chinese economic profle in Central Asia has remained far below in comparison with the United States and Russia until the initiation of Beijing’s Western Development Strategy. The geostrategic location of Central Asia provided further strength to China to use the region as a transportation hub linking China with West Asia and Europe. Further, the decision of Beijing to build a regional economic framework in Central Asia allowed it to enhance its economic development and political infuence in the region. Since 2009, however, China has diversifed its economic endeavour in Central Asia. At the moment, China is the biggest trading partner of four Central Asian states (except Uzbekistan). Although Russia still controls the majority of Central Asian energy exports, its economic clout is slipping into the hands of China. Beijing’s trade volume with Central Asian states as of 2016 was in total $50 billion (which declined to $41.6 billion in 2018) (Umarov 2020). Russian Strategy and the EAEU

Despite political, economic, personal and institutional links with Central Asia, Russia could not maintain its sway over the region due to its declining economic infuence. Therefore, early post-Soviet attempts to develop regional organizations failed until a Customs Union among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was formed in 2010. This evolved into the EAEU in 2015, whose Central Asian members include Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As always, Moscow’s main game is political, rather than economic. Kremlin understands well that in the realm of trade and fnance, Russia’s position in Eurasia is much weaker than China’s. Russia’s crucial strengths traditionally lie in the political-military and diplomatic domains. Hence, leaving economic initiatives to China, Moscow strives for the role of the chief architect of a Eurasian political and security order that would refect its preferences and coincide with the basic interests of the major powers active in the region.

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The kind of political order Russia envisions for Eurasia is essentially one of a concert of powers, a model that hails from 19th-century Europe and places a premium on relations among a few major countries: Russia, China, India and, with some qualifcations, Pakistan, Iran and maybe Turkey. Accounting for the bulk of continental Eurasia’s population, landmass and military potential, the six big players should collectively manage the security and economic afairs of the mega-region. Russia aspires to be the main security and diplomatic broker in Eurasia while leaving China with the role of the economic leader. As Gabuev (2016) puts it, “China would be the bank, and Russia would be the big gun”. Such an arrangement might hark back to the history of the European Community, when France acted as the political leader, while West Germany was the economic engine. Moscow’s preference for a new Eurasian order is refected in its diplomatic activism, such as its leading role in securing the admission of India and Pakistan into the SCO and in advocacy for the future membership of Iran. Comprising Eurasia’s most powerful non-Western nations, “Greater Eurasia” is being imagined as the antithesis to the Western-dominated world order. All the members of the prospective Eurasian concert – with the important exception of India – are autocracies or illiberal democracies. Beijing may well like the notion of illiberal Eurasian continentalism. Post-Pandemic World Order and the Silk Road Discourse

The post-pandemic world order has brought unprecedented transformation in world politics. The COVID-19 pandemic gripped the entire world and forced it into lockdown leading to serious health, humanitarian and economic crises all over the world. Indeed, the political implications of this pandemic are far reaching than the economic consequences. The pandemic has undoubtedly been the game changer of world politics. World politics hitherto dominated by the United States and Europe was worst hit by the virus. The UN, known for discussing anything and everything, couldn’t even organize a debate in the UN Security Council on Corona as successfully vetoed by China; the recent (in)-activities of World Health Organization (WHO) have led to many now openly naming and shaming it as the Wuhan Health Organization. If it is not a clear indication of the resurgence of Chinese infuence and riches of its power then what it is? Let us not be in delusion and accept it forthright that we are in a changed world order After Corona (AC) largely dominated by communist China. On top of this, the on-going RussiaUkraine war, a handiwork of the United States, has led to serious economic repercussions in the world by creating economic backlashes. If one sees the pandemic, re-emergence of Taliban and the Russia-Ukraine crisis, then its geopolitical genesis are pointing towards a reordered world politics with a resurgent China and a declining United States. Here what matters are the

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foreign policy narratives that the countries concerned are following to actualize their visions and dreams. China is way ahead of other countries in making a footprint just not its neighbourhood but also in the world without facing any substantial competition from Europe and America. The only country at the moment China is worried to cope up is India. Does India Have Any Strategic Narratives?

It can be noted herewith that New Delhi with disparate policies lacks a clear vision that can guide India in Central Asia. The region holds importance for India and has enough energy resources to mitigate India’s energy scarcity. If addressed efectively, Central Asia undoubtedly is critical for India’s national security and geostrategic perspectives. Hence, India needs to have a wellplanned strategy in place to broadly conceive its goals and aspirations in the region. India had come up with the Look North Policy towards the fag end of Rajiv Gandhi’s prime ministership but failed to consolidate its position in the region after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and largely remained disconnected for quite some time. The policy of neighbourhood relations of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee started warming up towards the region again but lacked vigour. When Dr. Man Mohan Singh adopted Connect Central Asia Policy in 2012, there were wide expectations that India would play an active role in the region but failed to its political apathy back home. However, with the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, through the Reconnect Central Asia Policy with its emphasis on connectivity, culture and commerce, India could make an entry into the region, which has been cemented further by the recent inclusion of India as a full member of SCO with Russian and Central Asian backing. Narendra Modi’s visit at one go to all the “fve stans” is unprecedented in history and symbolizes India’s keenness to engage with the region transforming the cultural afnity to that of commercial ventures. The recent development in INSTC is evidence enough to claim that India is also working out on a strategic narrative to make her presence felt in the heartland. International North-South Transportation Corridor

As part of his neighbourhood-frst policy, Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014 has pursued outreach to India’s neighbours. This, of course, has included unprecedented engagements with the immediate neighbours such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. India has shown keen interests to establish a cordial relationship with all the CARs. Importantly, New Delhi for the frst time has taken policy initiatives to project itself not just as the cultural capital for the heartland countries, but as a commercial partner with huge interests in their market and to invest heavily in the

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economy energy sectors for mutual benefts in business transactions. The INSTC has been one such commercial endeavour where both the regions are equally excited to connect through this roadway network connecting India with Eurasia through Chabahar of Iran and Caspian to Central Asia and Russia. If materialized at the earliest, the road will provide an alternative to the CARs compared to the BRI. Conclusion

As demonstrated, the narrative of the Silk Road has been successfully utilized by a number of states as a foreign policy framework to infuence the region known as a grand chessboard of world politics. The main thrust of this chapter has been to discard the static concept of the Silk Road as traditionally accepted and to project the notion as dynamic depending upon the time and international environment. It further argued that the foreign policy formulation of any country including the strategies it adopts has to do with its social construction to achieve its well-designed interests by setting the agenda in its favour. Finally, the frequent mention of Silk Road being an honest design having historical roots has been discarded by this chapter with the claim that “Silk Road” has been adopted as a trope for Central Asian policies. Its historical and cultural links are exhibited widely; academic conferences, cultural events and dialogue fora are organized more frequently for generating more interests among the public on Silk Road narration. But the question this chapter proposes to ask is why to sell the dream of Silk Road when multiple roads already exist? The answer to this question is perhaps to develop a social construction of the respective countries among the wider public about the honesty of their Silk Road propaganda. References Akiner, Shirin. 1994. “Post-Soviet Central Asia: Past Is Prologue.” In The New Central Asia and Its Neighbours, edited by Peter Ferdinand. London: The Royal Institute of International Afairs. Amighini, Alessia. 2017. China’s Belt and Road: A Game Changer? Milano: The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). Bovingdon, Gardner. 2010. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press. Dadabaev, Timur. 2018. “‘Silk Road’ as Foreign Policy Discourse: The Construction of Chinese, Japanese and Korean Engagement Strategies in Central Asia.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 9. Dekmejian, R. Hrair and H. Hovann Simonian. 2001. Troubled Waters – The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region. London: I. B. Tauris. Dijak, Meine Peter Van and Patrick Martens. 2016. “The Silk Road and Chinese Interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Case of Georgia.” Maastricht

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School of Management Working Paper No. 2016/12. August. Accessed August 24, 2018. https://ideas.repec.org/p/msm/wpaper/2016-12.html Dutta, Sujit. 2003. “China’s Emerging Ties with Central Asia.” In Central Asia: The Great Game Replayed, edited by Nirmala Joshi. New Delhi: New Century Books. Fedorenko, Vladimir. 2013. “The New Silk Road Initiatives in Central Asia.” July. Accessed July 13, 2019. www.rethinkinstitute.org/the-new-silk-road-initiativesin-central-asia/ Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China. 2013. “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries.” September 23. Accessed August 24, 2018. www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml Gabuev, Alexander. 2016. “Friends with Beneft? Russian-Chinese Relationship after Ukraine Crisis.” June 29. Accessed May 29, 2018. https://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/ friends-with-benefts-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953 Hart, Michael. 2016. “Central Asia’s Oil and Gas Now Flows to the East.” The Diplomat. August 18. Accessed December 18, 2019. http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/ central-asias-oil-and-gas-now-fows-to-the-east/ Kaushik, Devendra. 1970. Central Asia in Modern Times. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Khojaev, Ablat. 2007. “China’s Central Asia Policy.” Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal. Accessed April 30, 2019. www.ca-c.org/journal/2007-03-eng/03.shtml Kramer, Andrew E. 2009. “Putin’s Grasp of Energy Drives Russian Agenda.” January 28. Accessed February 28, 2018. www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/world/europe/ 29putin.html Mackinder, Halford. 1904. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal. April, 23 (4). Accessed April 25, 2019. www.jstor.org/stable/ 1775498?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents Magari, Palo. 2017. “Introduction.” In China’s Belt and Road: A Game Changer? edited by Alessia Amighini. Milano: The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). McBride, James. 2015. “Building the New Silk Road.” Council on Foreign Relations. May 22. Accessed August 25, 2019. www.cfr.org/backgrounder/buildingnew-silk-road Muller Kraenner, Sascha. 2008. China’s and India’s Emerging Energy Foreign Policy. Bonn: German Development Institute. Pradhan, Ramakrushna. 2010. Geopolitics of Central Asia: China-US Engagement. Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Verlag-Muller. Sajjanhar, Ashok. 2016. “India-Central Asia Relations: Expanding Vistas of Partnership.” Observer Research Foundation. June 22. New Delhi: ORF. Umarov, Temur. 2020. “China Looms Large in Central Asia.” Carnegie Moscow Centre. March 30. Accessed April 4, 2020. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81402 Zhi, Wang. 2016. “China’s New Silk Road Strategy and Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia.” Southeast Review of Asian Studies 38: 69–77.

10 SILK ROAD SHENANIGANS P. L. Dash

Introduction

In May 2016, Bukhara (Uzbekistan) hosted the 15th “Silk and Spice Festival” to commemorate the Silk Road heritage. Jointly organized by the Bukhara municipality, Bukhara Regional Branch “Uzbektourism” and the association of craftsmen “Hunarmand”, this festival is reminiscent of how traders and craftsmen in ancient times straddled the space. On 24–26 May 2019, the 18th festival was held in Bukhara, which has been an important commercial, cultural and tourist hub along the Silk Road that has played a crucial role as much in invasions as in commerce, art and culture. Three factors have catapulted the old Silk Road concepts to debates and discussions in post-Soviet years: (1) emergence of independent countries in Eurasia, which seek a better road network for communications as much within their territories as with their neighbours and beyond; (2) China’s thirst for business, commerce and energy that has been driving it to Eurasia in various directions to search business prospects; and (3) the proliferating markets from Turkey on one hand, China on the other and Russia from the north has mandated them to build broader roads, connecting rail network and even seek to link all these to new seaports and airports. As a result, an entirely new network of communication links has come up in Eurasia in the last quarter century. This has resulted in labour migration, movement of people and goods from one place to another, rapid exchange of inter and intra-state communications – in the ethos of commerce and globalization, albeit it could not galvanize a unity. Labour has a tendency to move from dry to green pastures, where standard of living is high and salary is good. And this tendency has driven millions of people from smaller post-Soviet states to Russia. Through Silk Road and DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-12

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other connecting routes, workers have congregated in Russia, supplying Russia the much needed human resources. Russia is, therefore, interested in better roads because those lead to faster movement of workforce. With many of the post-Soviet countries, Russia has signed bilateral or multilateral security agreements most of which imply that in the event of military confict, Russian aid would be supplied to erstwhile Soviet states. And troop movement is possible if roads are smooth. Russia has directly deep, strategic and economic interests in the Silk Road. The Tashkent Pact or the Collective Security Treaty of 15 May 1992 was a stepping stone in this direction. Big and small countries in Central Asia have been building arterial roads to link with the highways running through their countries. The new Silk Road concept by the United States has been debated threadbare. Similarly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received global attention. The same could be talked of Maritime Silk Route connecting Asian countries and beyond to the European and African continents. Besides, the highways in all the Central Asian Republics (CARs) through which the ancient Silk Road transported silk from China to Europe is receiving fllip. This chapter addresses some of these new developments in recent decades and analyses their implications for greater and faster-than-now communicability. It is no longer silk and spice alone, but a variety of goods that shufes hands through quick commercial transactions. Whether it is Barakholka in the suburbs of Almaty or Abu Sahi in the micro-borough of Tashkent, the Silk Road serves its purpose in Eurasia in an integrative fashion. How It All Began

It is important to mention herewith the contributions of several people in making the Silk Road historically strong and formidably irreversible as the Russia-India ties. The beginning was made by Afanasy Nikitin, a trader from Tver, who travelled to India as the frst Russian, long before Vasco da Gama came to India. Nikitin has documented the lifestyles of Indians, wrote about how and where he lived and left behind the imprints of his experiment and experience with Indians and the prevailing realities. Centuries later, those who followed the Russian trader were Indian scholar travellers  – Rahul Sankirtyayan and Madan Mohan Hardatt, who travelled along the Silk Road. Padma Bhushan Rahul Sankirtyayan was born as Kedarnath Pandey on 19 April 1893 in Pandaha village in Azamgarh district of Uttar Pradesh. His travelogues earned him the popular title as “Mahapandit”. His travel accounts were well depicted in Madhya Asia ka Itihas (History of Central Asia). Similarly, Madan Mohan Hardatta went from undivided Punjab in India to Afghanistan from where he crossed into Soviet border. He was arrested by Joseph Stalin’s police and exiled to Siberia. After his release, he landed up in Tashkent and found the department of Urdu and Hindi at the

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Oriental Faculty in Tashkent University (Myrkasymov 2014). The intercontinental outreach of these Indologists spanned across time and space and served as the transcendental connections of bilateral relations. Many other eminent personalities from one family, who made appreciable contribution by their endeavour, were the Roerich family. Migrating to the United States in the aftermath of the 1917 October Revolution, Nicholas C. Roerich looked eastward for spiritual solace in the 1930s and moved frst to the Altai mountains and then to Kullu valley in Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. From St. Petersburg to Washington, D.C., to Altai mountains to Kullu valley to Tataguni estate in suburban Bengaluru, wherever the family lived, it left a rich legacy of their valuable paintings. And everywhere there is a Roerich museum invariably containing something about India that testifes their devotions to spiritual India and its rich culture. The Roerich family synthesized East-West culture, when one of the sons married Indian actress Devika Rani and the other devoted his life to the study of Indology. Alongside the museums, they set up libraries, which demonstrated their inclination to research on India. Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore too contributed to the civilizational ties between the two regions. Both visited the Soviet Union in 1927. Tagore wrote about the vast experience of reforms in Soviet Russia. Jawaharlal Nehru was diferent and was so impressed by transformations in backward Central Asia that he wrote pages of panegyrics in the letters to his daughter Indira Gandhi in his book Glimpses of World History. Nehru’s sister, Vijayalaxmi Pandit, and eminent philosopher and India’s second President, Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, and well-known diplomats such as K. P. S Menon, Triloki Nath Kaul, Nurul Hasan and Inder Kumar Gujral (who later became India’s Prime Minister) together and individually connected both regions to the core of their peoples and relentlessly worked in bettering mutual ties. Belt and Road Initiative

With substantial economic growth in the 1990s and subsequent geopolitical and economic prominence worldwide, China forayed into the Eurasian arena in search of markets. It considered the Silk Road a natural corollary of its aspirations. China considered the Eurasian space the most suitable area for economic interaction. However, the area was laden with woeful infrastructure and network of communications. All countries put together in the Chinese periphery were no match for her growing economic and political clout, but they were a potential market. Therefore, it devised One Belt One Road (later known as Belt Road Initiative) – a concept that visualized natural expansion of the ancient Silk Road with many corollaries and arterial wings forging out from the main road and directed at many countries. Access to the CARs would bring China to the littoral countries of the Caspian Sea from where it could look to Iran for energy and access to the Persian Gulf.

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It also could look to the Caucasian states and an access through them to the Black Sea from where it could establish communication links with Turkey and other countries of southern Europe. In priority of things came all the CARs frst and Kazakhstan foremost. Laying road and rail network through them would open up wings of commerce and facilitate the fow of oil and gas to the underdeveloped parts of western China, particularly XUAR. This prodded China to visualize road and rail links in various directions: (1) the Eurasian continental bridge to connect developed parts of China’s eastern fank with Xinjiang and its capital Urumqi as the hub; (2) connecting Urumqi with Kashgar and trifurcate road connectivity from there – via Kyrgyzstan in the west to access Central Asia, build a road to Lhasa in Tibet and construct a highway via Pakistan to Gwadar – all this in one belt, but only in its southern wing; (3) the northern wing of this BRI explored possibilities of access to Russia via Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Kazakhstan is China’s gateway to Europe while Mongolia is the gateway to Siberia. China has pursued an active and integrative plan in the northern direction with Russia. Aware that Siberia is endowed with enormous resource potential and China has the manpower to exploit them, China’s resource exploitation was based on two aspects. Russia’s demographic profle in Siberia is poor and communication links are remote beyond cities, which are far too few. With just less than 7.5 million people residing in the huge space from east of Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, while on the Chinese side the demography is twenty times more, China considered it a golden opportunity to populate the region through porous Sino-Russian borders. Thus it planned several Special Economic Zones (SEZ) along its border with Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Russia. The BRI included pentagonal, integrative directions: (1) From Kashgar via Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia and beyond to Iran; (2) Eurasian direction that includes the oil rich space from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan and Russia; (3) Siberian direction, stretching via Mongolia and Ulan Ude to Vladivostok; (4) Tibetan direction stretches from Kashgar to Lhasa and China has been actively building a connecting road between the two cities; and fnally (5) South Asian direction, from Kashgar to Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea. One could easily conclude that with rising Chinese hunger for energy, the entire Chinese thrust around the BRI is an ambitious initiative to integrate countries rich with energy resources and consider the entire range as one belt, wherever the source of energy is located. Three countries – Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Pakistan – which come to the fore, are massively prone to road-building projects designed by China as part of the BRI. Quest for Outlets

The Chinese land deals with Kyrgyzstan in the Tengry peak as well as with Tajikistan in the mountains where Amu Darya originates are well known

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for how a mighty China could browbeat its small poor neighbours. In its search for infrastructure building, China has cut Kyrgyzstan in the middle into two halves. The natural north-south ethnic divide of Kyrgyzstan based on which there were military coups in the post-Soviet years to dethrone Kyrgyz leaders Askar Akaev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev is further split in an east-west divide by the road China has been building there (Panflova 2010). Kyrgyz leader Almazbek Atambayev was convinced of the need of the Chinese roads that would run through Kyrgyzstan. At the 13th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek on 12–13 September 2013 the construction of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line as part of regional economic cooperation was discussed. The railway line is not only a link between Kyrgyzstan and China, but also a facilitating transit corridor that provides Chinese access to Uzbekistan and beyond. It would bring transit proft to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and facilitate commercial transactions in the region. The railway project ftted perfectly within the framework of the “National Sustainable Development Strategy of Kyrgyzstan for the period 2013–2017” (National Council for Sustainable Development of the Kyrgyz Republic 2013), which focused on the development of infrastructure at an annual outlay of $230 million. However, critics pointed out that it may not solve Kyrgyzstan’s national problems and bring adequate benefts to the CARs (Bucsky and Kenderdine 2020). China needs access to Uzbekistan and farther into the Caspian Sea and Iran. And it has been pursuing its “Caspian Access Policy” in two clear directions: (1) via Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan through rail and roads and (2) via railway in Kazakhstan with two transit points – Khorgos and Dostlyk. However, this railway line may widen the north-south divide within Kyrgyzstan and exacerbate existing confrontation, where a pro-China lobby in north Kyrgyzstan may pit the more underdeveloped south in unending confict (Stratfor 2018). This commercial route is more viable for China because it can trade its stufs in Central Asia, less viable for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which produce goods that cannot be competitively sold in international markets. At some point closer to the Kamchik pass in Uzbekistan, there hangs a signboard, indicating how many kilometres is Kashgar from that spot, reminding everyone about the great Silk Road. From the interests of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, this road and a parallel rail line are need of the day. If Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan do not produce goods that are in demand in the Asian markets, they have other things to ofer including minerals, hydrocarbon and agricultural items. Therefore, many feel that Beijing has been consistently implementing energy and infrastructure projects such as laying the pipelines, building railroads and highways. Kyrgyzstan’s silver, aluminium, copper and coal, Uzbekistan’s gas, oil, coal and uranium and Tajikistan’s aluminium and uranium besides the gas

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connectivity with Turkmenistan are high on the Chinese radar. However, other than trading with raw material on terms advantageous to them, the Central Asian resource market has proved to be tricky in the past 25 years. Yet the Chinese persist in business through fnancing and building surface communication infrastructure across countries that have hooked the CARs to a Chinese tether of long-term loans. In some cases, the Chinese insist on authorities to consider the issue of transfer of deposits to China, particularly, the Sandyk aluminium deposit in Naryn oblast. Kazakhstan Corridor

The second outlet in the Eurasian direction via Kazakhstan is of utmost signifcance for China. Kazakhstan is a huge country with enormous natural and mineral resources China could access for its economic development, particularly of Xinjiang. In the decade 2005–2015, China had invested $23.55 billion in Kazakhstan compared to $3.88 billion in Turkmenistan, $3.61 billion in Kyrgyzstan, $1.51 billion in Uzbekistan and $ 1.24 billion in Tajikistan (Dash 2015). An amount of $10.24 billion in all the four CARs put together and $23.55 billion alone in Kazakhstan put the latter in the priority list of regional investment. These investments have spawned in energy and infrastructure sectors and paled the U.S. investment in Kazakhstan for 2005– 2014, which comprised just $14 billion (US Department of State 2015). Kazakhstan visualizes China as a business partner, which could use its transit corridor to Europe via Russia. Kazakhstan has partnered China for its own development in infrastructure and it seems both countries have joined hands to materialize the New Silk Road concept, of which Kazakhstan is an important and integral part. A key transit point on the way of Chinese goods to the markets in Europe, Kazakhstan is also a source of energy supply to China. Alena Zelenin, reporting from Astana in the Regnum News Channel on 7 November 2015, stated that the mood in Astana is serious about China’s BRI. Kazakhstan is determined to hasten the speed of its implementation. The hitch is that the land route will be signifcantly costlier: $3,000 via sea versus $8,000 on land route that pays transit tarif to many countries it passes through. Yet Kazakhstan readies itself to provide transit and serve as a corridor between China and Europe. Further, the land route will reduce time from 40–60 days to merely 13–14 days to cover a distance of 10,500 kilometres from Zhengzhou in China to Hamburg in Germany by train. The ease of speed delivery has surged land route freight trafc. In the frst 8 months of 2015, as many as 295 goods trains shuttled on return journey between China and Europe–an increase of 105 trains more compared to a year before and the shenanigans continue. In September 2013, when China launched the OBOR in Astana, it went unnoticed by Russia and other countries because it was then too vague. A

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few days later, Russia termed the proposal something as “intrusion in the Russian sphere”. However, months later when Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow, they not only endorsed the idea, but linked it to EAEU as a facilitator (Gabuev 2014). Ever since November 2014, when Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev announced his policy of NurlyZhol (Shining Path) that aimed at infrastructure building, signifcant activities have been under way within Kazakhstan. NurlyZhol visualizes an interconnectivity of road network and establishment of transport and logistics centres throughout Kazakhstan, particularly involving such cities as Almaty, Shymkent, Aktau, Pavlodar, Kostanay, Semey, Aktobe and Atyrau so that the country becomes the key distribution hub for goods to Russian and the CARs. Kazakhstan has received $3.9 billion loans from international fnancial institutions since 2015, so that 9,800 kilometres of public roads would be built or renovated. During the second stage (2020–2025) of this road-building project, the target of building nearly 4,000 kilometres of roads by 2022 (Bulatkulova 2021). Khorgos or the “Eastern Gates to Eurasia” has not only become a dry port, but an epicentre of commerce, a logistics centre and an SEZ for Chinese investment. This is the largest goods distribution centre in Kazakhstan spreading over an area of 149 hectares and one of the busiest dry ports along the Silk Road. In collaboration with Dubai Port World of UAE, the largest port operator in the world, Kazakhstan is strengthening the Khorgos dry port. Within its territory, Kazakhstan has been developing a bifurcate transport corridor “North-South”: the north accesses Russia and Europe and the South veers towards the trans-Caspian corridor through Aktau port, the west fanks of which goes to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and southern fank aims at Iran. An international automobile transit corridor is being built through Kazakhstan. This is the Eastern Europe-Western China road network between St. Petersburg and Lianyungang or the Shuangxi Highway, which is the virtual New Silk Road, the total length of which will be 8,445 kilometres of which 2,787 kilometres will pass through Kazakhstan. Besides, emphasis is being laid on Almaty, Ust-Kamenogorsk and Atyrau radial highways. In addition, the Borzhakty-Ersai rail line, an infrastructural basis for the ferry complex Kuryk that has a capacity of 4 million tons of cargo a year on the Caspian Sea, has been completed. Road and rail infrastructure development along the Caspian coast has become signifcant in view of the imperatives of oil transport and modernization of Kazakhstan’s only seaport at Aktau, along the trans-Caspian international transport corridor. The inter-linkages between the dry port at Khorgos and seaport at Aktau and the myriad arterial connectivity linking the two hubs together constitute the salience of the New Silk Road for Kazakhstan. Aktau port handled 14 million tons of cargo in 2014 compared to 7.9 million tons by Astrakhan and Makhachkala put together. Aktau is turning to be an important link in the

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International North-South Transport Corridor as well as a signifcant point along the Silk Road. Kazakhstan has already become the transit point for cargo transfer of China and Russia. Kazakhstan is emerging as a great facilitator of integration and interoperability within the Eurasian Economic Community and beyond. However, there is a stark imbalance in cargo movement: 90 per cent of all goods are coming from Asia to Europe, and most of these will pass via Kazakhstan. Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov (2015) has said: “forget the Great game, the New Silk Road is a Great Gain and a great beneft for us, for China, Russia, the USA, Europe, India, Iran, and Turkey, and of course, Kazakhstan”. Uzbek-Turkmen Corridor

In the Soviet years, Kazakhstan was not considered a part of Central Asia. All Soviet literature mentioned Kazakhstan separately from Central Asia. Therefore, China’s quest for a transport corridor to Europe via neighbouring Kazakhstan was a positive indication. The existing Beijing-Moscow rail line has been serving China and Russia for decades. Besides, three clear directions of communication links are in the ofng from China to Moscow and beyond to Europe: (1) an express rail line between Beijing and Moscow; (2) the one already operating through Kazakhstan as surface-sea links via Aktau; and (3) the one coming up when China would be linked via Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan through numerous tunnels. In this connection, the real ancient Silk Road is getting revived within Uzbekistan and beyond. Uzbekistan has the advantage of a massive eastwest expanse from Kyrgyz-Uzbek borders to Uzbek-borders near Termez and Uzbek-Turkmen borders across a long stretch of Amu Darya river. A visit to the town Khodjaev beyond Andijan close to Uzbekistan’s borders with Kyrgyzstan convinced the author about the real intentions of Uzbek authorities to broaden the roads and lay a rail line. From there on and westward through the Kamchik Pass – where a “chicken neck territory” connects Uzbekistan’s mountains with valleys – the road throughout is getting widened. As of 2016 and early 2017, with completion of Angren-Pap railway line, Fergana valley was well connected through a road and rail network within the territory of Uzbekistan. This massive road construction network underscores the importance the ancient Silk Road has for economic development of western Uzbekistan, which is an arid desert-like landmass. While the Silk Roads travelled in the south-western direction via Karshi to Shortan in Uzbekistan and via Bukhara and beyond to Merv and Nisha in Turkmenistan, the trajectory of the ancient Silk Road is slowly assuming a new connotation – that of an energy highway of transportation. These upcoming new roads and railway lines will connect

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Central Asia and the Caspian littorals in two directions: (1) with China and beyond in the east and (2) with Afghanistan and India in South Asia. The upcoming roads are looking up for greater commercial transactions with prospering economies of East and South Asia with Central Asia. Thus, Uzbekistan, aside from its eastern parts of the Fergana valley, has been laying considerable importance in furthering road and rail networks as much by itself as through neighbouring Turkmenistan. The major eforts of this Silk Road connection include the following: • Traditional Silk Road through Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva and beyond through Turkmen territory to Iran has been strengthened despite the fact that rail communication links among the CARs have been largely suspended and slowly getting resumed. • The completion of Angren-Pap railway line at a cost of $1.68 billion on the Silk Road. • The Chinese connectivity to this traditional route has been welcomed and new investments encouraged. • Uzbekistan has built in the past 5 years a rail link with Afghanistan, both with tacit acquiescence of Iran and the United States. • Many arterial roads within the country point out at these main networks and work is progressing in all directions. Conceptualized in June 2003 by the Heads of States of Iran and Uzbekistan at a meeting in Tehran, the construction of a 75-kilometre major transAfghan rail link of Khayraton-Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat with fnancial help from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was completed in 2010 and 70 per cent of the cargo is already being transported between the two countries (Dultaeva 2015). Uzbekistan is determined to engage Afghanistan in a big way in the communication networking system since both countries have a very central location at the juncture of South, Central and West Asia. The CASA Concept

The Uzbek position is complementary to the U.S. position with regard to considering Afghanistan as a new geo-economic pivot on the New Silk Road. The link between Central and South Asia is likely to remain in discussion and analysis for years to come for the very importance Afghanistan has in the new scheme of unfolding communication networks. It would end the isolation of the region and integrate the CARs with Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Washington viewed this integration essential in order to actively engage Afghanistan and the CARs in economic development programmes. In fact, the United States wished to economically integrate Afghanistan frst to the CARs and then to the wider world. The then U.S. Secretary of

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State Hilary Clinton then broached the new Silk Road Project idea with Afghanistan as the pivot during a meeting with 25 countries on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2011. This project had “characteristic of a formal act of intergovernmental or supranational engagement among 25 countries of European, American, South and Central Asian regions. It featured Afghanistan’s direct overland linkages with Central and South Asia for intra-regional trade” (Kaw 2014). The CASA concept is complementary to the Chinese and Russian position. The CASA is a blueprint of integration along the Silk and the Spice routes and has the integrative potential of uniting Central Asia with South Asia via Afghanistan. It aims at providing maritime access to land-locked and doubly land-locked countries of Central Asia with their access to Pakistan, Iran and India. The concept ought to pick up for commercial gains of all those involved in expanding their engagement in the region, but it requires a cooperative platform of ensuring peace and stability, which have so far been evading Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and the fve CARs. However, political fuidity and economic volatility and widespread apprehensions of spreading terrorism in the region are an impediment to implementation of the CASA concept. Maritime Silk Road

China has been pursuing a combination of two theoretical postulates of geopolitics for domination: Mackinder’s Heartland and Mahan’s Domination over the Seas. The eforts at the Central Asian and Kazakhstan direction culminated in realizing the frst one following which, or rather in the middle of it, China paid attention to Sea routes. It came out with Maritime Silk Route concept as oceanic extension of the ambitious communication links. Aware that the strength of a great power rests on its maritime capabilities, China has been assiduously pursuing its relations with South and South East Asian countries to have access to building deep seaports in these countries. Three countries in the periphery of India fgured prominently in this picture: Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – all surrounding India from three sides – the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The Maritime Silk Road has a number of moorings across the oceanic expanse. First, China has eked out a maritime strategy in the South China Sea to dominate the aquatic expanse through all its lanes and by-lanes, shelf and ridges and from year to year it has been strengthening its position. Second, it has taken up cudgels with Vietnam concerning its presence in the periphery of that country and claiming rifs and ridges with energy deposits. Third, it wishes to expand its maritime prowess via the Malacca strait to have unhindered business access to the Indian Ocean. Fourth, it has landed on a huge mission of building or modernizing ports across the expanse – Mergui and Sittwe in Myanmar,

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Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. Fifth, what has accentuated China’s discernible, geopolitical strategy is the road and rail connectivity China has been building in these countries. The Kashgar-Gwadar highway is as much a good example as the upcoming railway connectivity through Kyrgyzstan. These surface communication links are likely to facilitate swift movement of goods and labour force between and among the countries in the years to come. Finally, a grand plan for transnational and cross-country trade routes, both along maritime and surface, is emerging as the routes of commerce for the future of which rising China is the initiator and to a great extent implementer. Conclusion

In the years when railways were absent in Asia, what had begun as the journey of a trader from Tver to India via sea has turned the quest today to span in various directions – rails, roads and sea with many small and big actors at interplay. A rising power is always an aspiring power for domination. China has so far no control over the South China Sea – its primary deep sea access to warm waters along its developed eastern coast. The maritime domination of the United States prevails there. Thus future years will witness an intense jostle for power over the seas between the United States and China, while other Indian Ocean powers with marginal role in the region will play side with one or the other. The scenario on revival of the Great Silk Road in the European and Asian directions on the surface has so far been an unhindered Chinese sway, primarily due to massive Chinese investment in Kazakhstan, and secondarily because there is a complementarity of economic interest of concerned countries of the region. The tussle on the Asian theatre is largely between China on the one hand and a number of CARs on the other and Russia on the third front. The United States is here a marginal player, but it has been retaining its potency through its chosen regional actors. The arterial roads built within the region such as Angren-Pap rail line, Dustlyk-Kamchik road widening and 10 bridges over Amu Darya to connect Tajikistan and Afghanistan are feeder roads of integrative nature; the more of them, the better the economic prospects and faster the communication in an area full of mountains and deserts. While the interplay of these three scenarios of roads, rails and maritime directly concerns the Silk Roads, in geopolitical parlance there is diferent ground. The region is fecund with hostilities. A Russian scholar, A. Kazantsev (2013) predicts four upcoming scenarios for Central Asia: (1) a concert of powers – Russia and China on one side and the United States and European Union on the other; (2) loss of interest by big powers in the region due to nagging conficts and no tangible outcome in sight in the foreseeable future; (3) continuation of the Great Game

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strategy, where all big and small powers will vie for regional supremacy; and (4) regional hegemony of China over the entire region (Kazantsev 2013). A combination of all scenarios is the likely possibility because no one could exclude the United States, China, Russia and the EU from the emerging Silk Road in whichever direction you look. References Bucsky, Peter and Tristan Kenderdine. 2020. “The Fergana Valley Railway Should Never Be Built.” March 17. Accessed April 17, 2020. www.mei.edu/publications/ ferghana-valley-railway-should-never-be-built Bulatkulova, Saniya. 2021. “Nurly Zhol Infrastructure Project Pledges 95 Percent of Local Roads to be Improved by 2025.” Astana Times. October 28. Accessed October 20, 2022. https://astanatimes.com/2021/10/nurly-zhol-infrastructure-projectpledges-95-percent-of-local-roads-to-be-improved-by-2025/ Dash, P. L. 2015. “Modi in Central Asia: Will Modi’s July Forays Bring About a Change?” World Focus. November, 432: 39. Dultaeva, Sevara I. 2015. “Developing an Architecture of Transport Networks on the New Silk Road in Uzbekistan: Threshold of an Era.” In Central Asia and Regional Security, edited by P. L. Dash, Anita Sengupta and Murat Bakhadirov. Chandigarh: CRRID. Gabuev, Alexander. 2014. “Post-Soviet States Jostle for Role in China’s New Silk Road Project.” Hong Kong TDC. August 17. Idrissov, Erlan. 2015.“The Great Gain Not the Great Game: How Kazakhstan is Charting Its Own Course in the World.” November 16. Accessed October 17, 2018. https://astanatimes.com/2015/11/the-great-gain-not-the-great-game-howkazakhstan-is-charting-its-own-course-in-the-world/ Kaw, Mushtaq A. 2014. “New US Silk Road Project for Post -2014 Afghanistan: Myth or Reality.” Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies 9 (17). Kazantsev, A. 2013. “Whither Central Asia: Changing Role of Global Actors in Perspective 2020.” Russia and the Muslim World 6 (252). Myrkasymov, Surat. 2014. “Indelible Memories of an Unforgettable Teacher.” Dialogue Quarterly. January–March, 15 (3): 90–99. National Council for Sustainable Development of the Kyrgyz Republic. 2013. “National Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the Period of 2013–2017.” Accessed January 15, 2019. www.un-page.org/fles/public/ kyrgyz_national_sustainable_development_strategy.pdf Panflova, Victoria. 2010. “Kyrgyzskie kacheli.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. February 26. Stratfor. 2018. “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway to Improve Attractiveness of Central Asia.” January 19. Accessed February 18, 2019. https://worldview. stratfor.com/article/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-improve-attractivenesscentral-asia US Department of State. 2015. “Kazakhstan Investment Climate Statement.” May. Washington, DC.

11 AFGHANISTAN AS THE BELT AND ROAD PIVOT FOR ASIA Satyam

Introduction

Afghanistan’s long chequered history has largely been defned by its geography, which puts this war-torn country right at the “heart of Asia”. It proved to be an advantage during the two-millennium-long existence of the ancient Silk Road as Afghanistan fourished throughout this period both economically and culturally. However, by the 10th century AD, trade along the Silk Road began to reduce drastically mainly due to frequent wars in the region as well as the advancement in maritime technology. Further, as a result of the Great Game, Afghanistan by the 20th century found itself surrounded by Russian, Chinese, British and Persian empires. This left Afghanistan isolated from the rest of the world. The condition of Afghanistan was further deteriorated during the Cold War era that witnessed internal disturbances as well as external aggressions inside its territory. However, this turn of events led to the recognition of the geostrategic advantage of Afghanistan in international politics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991 triggered a huge shift in the geopolitics of Central Asia region, including Afghanistan, as it opened up this resource-rich region to the rest of the world for the frst time and also made the neighbouring states susceptible to traditional and non-traditional threats emanating from this region. This forced the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to form a more proactive policy with regard to this region, which would help China tap into the resources of this region without letting it worsen the security situation in Xinjiang. However, in the post-9/11 period, China’s foreign policy with regard to this region has expanded beyond the Xinjiang factor and now caters to its geopolitical ambitions as well. DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-13

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The recent power shift in Kabul that led to the return of Taliban has now forced China to put Afghanistan among the top priorities on its foreign policy agenda as a swift action from China right now is both necessary (in terms of securing Xinjiang from threats arising out of Afghan soil) and desirable (in terms of the opportunity that the current situation provides for China to present itself as a regional leader). It is against this backdrop that this chapter tries to present Afghanistan’s case as a possible “Pivot or Transit Hub” for the BRI in Asia by highlighting Afghanistan’s potential as well as its need for the same. The chapter argues that there has been a commonality of objectives behind China’s Afghan policy since 1991 and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which in turn points towards the importance of Afghanistan in achieving the dual objectives of securing Xinjiang and establishing geopolitical advantage in Asia. Afghanistan as a Transit Hub for Asia

Afghanistan was once dubbed as “the heart of the Silk Road”, “a route of prosperity and wealth” (Peyrouse 2007). Afghanistan’s geopolitical importance was well established around two millenniums ago, when it fourished a lot in this period. However, this very geopolitical situation led to the reversal of the period of prosperity into a period of insecurity, devastation and underdevelopment. In the post–Cold War period, with the U.S. focus on its initiative of “New Silk Road”, Afghanistan regained her historical geopolitical position (Starr 2007). This had prompted former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to afrm that “Afghanistan’s goal is to become a transit country for transport, power transmissions, gas pipelines and fbre optics” and that “in the next 25 years, Asia is going to become the world’s largest continental economy but that without Afghanistan, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia and West Asia will not be optimally integrated” (Starr and Kuchins 2010). It is believed that development of Afghanistan as a transit hub “would provide Afghanistan with the opportunity to exploit and maximize the value of its natural resources, build human capacity, create employment, pay for procurement of services, and capitalize on the economic potential of Central and West Asia” (Asian Development Bank 2011). The followings key factors highlight Afghanistan’s potential and its need to develop itself and be developed by the regional as well as global parties as “a transit and transport hub for Asia” and integrate various regional economies. Geographical Location

Halford Mackinder (1904) had described the region surrounding Afghanistan as “the heartland of Eurasia” and “the geographical pivot of history”.

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Kuchins (2011) has drawn a similar conclusion that “demonstrates the consensus of literature and experts on Afghanistan’s geo-strategic and geo-political importance in the region and the world”. Afghanistan shares its borders with six neighbouring countries  – Pakistan (2,430 kilometres), Iran (936 kilometres), Turkmenistan (744 kilometres), Uzbekistan (137 kilometres), Tajikistan (126 kilometres) and China (76 kilometres)–putting it right at the centre of the regional transport network. Afghanistan is at the crossroad of East, West, Central and South Asia and as Saikal (2014) points out, each of these regions has its own riches to complement one another in trade, industrial development and investment; for example, Central Asia is rich in gas, oil and gold; South Asia and the Far East in capital, technology, industry and trained manpower; and the Middle East in gas, oil and capital. Afghanistan’s development as a transit hub, therefore, will not only help connect these complementary areas with each other as well as with the rest of the world but will also provide Afghanistan with a much needed regular source of income in terms of transit fee. Foreign Trade Defcits and Transit Costs

As per the data received from Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2020), Afghanistan’s imports in 2019 amounted to $6776.18 million whereas the exports were $863.8 million with a huge trade defcit. Afghanistan is dependent on neighbours such as Iran, Pakistan, China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for trade. As almost all these imports comprise essential goods, it is not possible to reduce the quantity of these imports, which is in fact going to rise as long as the reconstruction works are not concluded; the advisable solution to reduce this trade defcit therefore would be to make substantial cuts in the import costs. It is clear from this information that Afghanistan’s geographical location that was once its strength has now become one of its major weaknesses. Afghanistan, therefore, needs to improve its connectivity with the neighbouring countries to secure access to the global markets and reduce its dependency. Afghanistan’s Natural Resources

There are undiscovered oil and gas reserves besides a copper ore reserve of around 240 metric tonnes, which according to American estimates is around $908 billion and $3 trillion as per Afghan estimates. To utilize these natural and mineral resources for a sustainable Afghan economy, Shroder (2008) suggests a “national level transport infrastructure” so that accessibility to the

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resources can be ensured and thus these resources can be explored. Shorder adds that the “regional” and “international” strategies require inter-regional and international trade and transit infrastructure to be able to transport the resources to the appropriate markets. Therefore, “pipelines, railway corridors and road linkages are a must for Afghanistan to get the maximum value out of its resources and stabilise its economy on the basis of the same” (Asian Development Bank 2011). International aid agencies recognized the importance of infrastructure in improving the “efciency of both the government and aid agencies” and therefore, “substantial investments were diverted towards the development of roads, dams, power lines and railways” (Shroder 2008). Regional Connectivity

Developing Afghanistan as a transit hub would require at least some level of pre-existing infrastructure in order for international actors to be a part of this endeavour. Afghan government under Hamid Karzai took the frst step towards developing regional cooperation to promote political, economic and regional security by hosting the frst Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) in 2005, which was followed by similar conferences in New Delhi (2006), Islamabad (2009), Istanbul (2010), Dushanbe (2012) and Kabul (2015). The 2015 RECCA had identifed these six diferent projects as being central to the attainment of its policy objectives: (1) The Lapis Lazuli Route that connects Central Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and South Asia and traverses through Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and China, and provides Afghanistan the shortest and most economical route to both Europe and China (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2018); (2) Iran-India Garland Highway, which is an extension to the Zaranj-Delaram highway constructed by India in 2009, plans to connect Afghanistan to the Iran’s Chabahar port through Iran’s existing road network (Times of India 2009); (3) Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan (TUTAP), which aims at the transfer of surplus energy from hydroelectricity-rich Central Asian countries to electricitydefcient Afghanistan and Pakistan (Daily Outlook Afghanistan 2016);(4) The Five Nations Railway Corridor, which aims to link China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran by a single rail link; (5) Central Asia and South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) aims at transferring excess hydroelectricity produced by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan (US Department of State 2015); (6) Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which could help meet both Pakistan’s and India’s growing energy needs and provide signifcant transit revenues for Afghanistan and Pakistan (Reuters 2015).

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These connectivity projects while providing the much required push to the idea of “Afghanistan as a Transit Hub” have also established the geo-strategic importance of Afghanistan. However, analysing the present situation in Afghanistan, it is found that the country is still far away from the desired level of “connectivity” and “development” that it seeks and had once enjoyed as part of the ancient Silk Road and therefore is in need of a “New Silk Road”. Afghanistan and the Silk Road Renaissance

The Silk Road renaissance in the modern and contemporary times led to the inception of many initiatives in the region, some backed by multilateral organizations like the EU and others by countries like the United States and China: (1) Turkey’s “Silk Road Project” announced in 2008 by Turkey’s Ministry of Customs and Trade that primarily focused on transportation, security, logistics and custom procedures at borders; (2) The U.S. New Silk Road Strategy, which was frst mentioned by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011), during her visit to India in July 2011, where she talked about “revitalisation of the ancient Silk Road” (Fedorenko 2013); (3) New Silk Road Initiative by Europe as “an internationally recognized programme, which was initiated with the aim of strengthening trade, economic relations and transport communication in the Black Sea basin, South Caucasus and Central Asia” (TRACECA 2012). None of the initiatives discussed has displayed the potential to develop the trade and transit infrastructure of the region in comparison to the One Belt One Road (OBOR) or the BRI by China. Belt and Road Initiative

The BRI was introduced as the Silk Road Economic Belt by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2013 in Kazakhstan and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in Indonesia. China’s National Development Reforms Commission (2015) elaborated on the BRI: [T]he overland Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on creating a Land Bridge spanning across Eurasia and developing China, Mongolia and Russia; China, Central Asia and West Asia; and China and Indochina Peninsula economic corridors by building international transport routes, with a focus on core cities along the Belt and Road and using economic industrial parks as cooperation platforms, on the other hand, Maritime Silk Road will connect major sea ports along the Belt and Road, focusing on jointly building efcient, secure and smooth transport routes. The Silk Road Economic Belt will also include “the development of fnancial cooperation, high speed railways, energy transportation infrastructure

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like  oil and gas pipelines, telecommunication linkages, electric grids etc” (Tsao 2015). Fallon (2015) has mentioned that the project will be funded by a Silk Road Fund amounting to USD 40 billion, established in December 2014 under the People’s Bank of China along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), amounting to USD 100 billion, and the New Development Bank or BRICS Bank, with an initial capital of USD 50 billion and a lending capacity of USD 34 billion annually. More than 70 countries had joined BRI by the year 2015, forming 62.3 per cent of the world population, 30 per cent of the world GDP, 38.5 per cent of the world land area and 24 per cent of the world household consumption (National Development Reforms Commission 2015). Highlighting the rationale of the BRI, Zhiping (2014) has said that “in China’s push for westward opening-up it is incumbent for it to include the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean into a broader cooperation involving West, Central and South Asia, dozens of European countries and a population of 3 billion people, for a wider Central Asian growth”. The BRI, as Fallon (2015) points out, has “a strong domestic angle”, that is “to develop its comparatively less advanced and less developed western region of Xinjiang, this is the reason why the Silk Road Economic Belt starts from the more advanced eastern coastal regions”. The BRI can thus be studied as an extension of China’s “Go-West” policy too, which aims to “develop its vast western reaches which have till now remained poor and have been compared to Siberia or American West” (The Economist 2000). Hongyi Harry Lai (2002) has pointed out that “there is a large diferential in the incomes of agricultural farmers in this area and those on the eastern coast and that only about 5 per cent of the total foreign investments have been aimed at this region in the past two decades”. The government, therefore, “diverted majority of its tax revenues and multi-lateral funding aid to the western provinces under this policy and is investing billions of dollars in this policy, making this one the biggest economic regeneration projects of all time” (China Daily 2011). However, ever since its inception, the BRI has been under constant watch of its critics who point towards a “grand-strategy” behind this initiative. According to Ying (2015), “the Chinese BRI has often been compared with the U.S. Marshall Plan which was aimed at increasing the United States’ infuence in Europe after the end of the Second World War in order to contain the Soviet infuence”. Some are therefore of the view that “the hidden objective of this initiative is to create its infuence in the Asian as well as the Eurasian region by creating China-centred infrastructure” (Rudolf 2015). Others compared it with “the ‘Great Game’ that took place in the same region, as a 100-year war between the great empires of the British and the Soviets during the nineteenth century” (China Briefng 2015). A major criticism of the

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BRI is that “China is investing such huge sums of money in the region to provide a larger market as an outlet for its industrial overcapacity” (The Economist 2015). These arguments lead us to the conclusion that there are at least two main objectives behind China’s BRI. Firstly, in a narrow sense, to develop, integrate and secure its western region, especially Xinjiang, and secondly, in a broader sense, to gain geopolitical advantage in Asia. The BRI is working towards China’s eforts to fll the infrastructure gap left by the Western countries in addition to helping countries boost their development. However, it can be argued that the events that have taken place in countries like Sri Lanka, Nicaragua and the Solomon Islands have proven to be more complex, controversial and political, and have been accompanied by social unrest and debt crisis. The United States’ 2018 Report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2018) has highlighted the “debt sustainability problems for the BRI countries” arising out of the fact that the Chinese commercial and policy banks have been the major source of fnancing BRI projects, rather than direct investment, and form the majority share (52 per cent) of the total outstanding loans and equity relating to BRI. Another issue pointed out by experts regarding BRI is that the countries that are unable to pay back Chinese debt end up providing China with an undue economic and strategic leverage and “in some cases threatening the sovereignty of host countries”. Further, it is also claimed in the report that BRI has “facilitated and justifed” the presence of Chinese military overseas and “could eventually create security problems for the United States and its allies and partners beyond China’s immediate maritime periphery”. Hurley et al. (2018), while terming the chances that BRI will be plagued with “wide scale debt sustainability problems” as unlikely, have stated that it is also unlikely that the BRI will avoid any instances of debt problems among its participating countries”. Jones and Hameiri (2020) have proved how Sri Lanka’s debt crisis was made, not in China, but in Colombo, and in the international (i.e. Western-dominated) fnancial markets. The data show that till 2016, the percentage of Chinese loans in general and specifc borrowings from Chinese for the Hambantota Port accounted for only 9 per cent and 4.8 per cent, respectively, of the total borrowings by the Sri Lankan government (Jones and Hameiri 2020). The fact that maturities and interest rates for the Chinese loans were around 15–20 years and 2.5 per cent, respectively, clearly shows that the pressure to repay the Chinese debt was not as severe as that of the debt from other foreign sources (Jones and Hameiri 2020). While the “debt-trap” allegations are difcult to prove and it is undeniable that the BRI has grown over time to become “the largest transnational infrastructure project ever undertaken by a single nation”, mounting evidence suggests that China itself is at present experiencing “its frst overseas debt

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crisis” due to unprecedented rate at which the loans granted for funding various projects under BRI are defaulting (The Economist 2022). Alternative to BRI

A $600 billion initiative, known as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), launched by the United States and its partners on 27 June 2022 at the G-7 summit in Germany, is being viewed as a Western alternative to the BRI (Singh 2022). This project aims to fll the infrastructure gap in “developing and middle-income countries” (Munjal 2022). The PGII is essential a re-launch of Build Back Better World (B3W) that was launched by the G-7 in June 2021 and both share the same objectives as principles. However, a major diference between the two projects is the clear and explicit mentioning of “hard infrastructure” projects in the PGII announcement which was absent from B3W (Savoy 2022). This puts the PGII directly against the BRI by China. When compared with the BRI, the PGII is focused more on the human development than mere economic growth and aims at “improving the quality of education and health care facilities (The Economic Times 2022). The PGII looks like a worthy competitor for the BRI, at least on paper, as it seems to be created with all the criticism in mind that the Western world has hurled towards the BRI over the years. However, it is too early to predict its future as we have seen many such ambitious initiatives by the West in the past which have failed to bring about the promised results, like the International North-South Transport Corridor or many of the “new Silk Road” projects mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter. Sino-Afghan Relations During 1990s

China’s foreign policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan in the post– Cold War era had three core interests of security, development and energy, which developed because of the erstwhile Soviet Union’s disintegration and out of China’s need for ensuring security in its north-western province of Xinjiang and its integration into the mainland (Clarke 2011, 123–128). China during the 1990s followed its “new security diplomacy” that worked towards reducing external tensions through “cooperation, multilateralism and regionalism” to “focus on domestic, political and social reform challenges” (Gill 2010, 26). Xinjiang’s geographical proximity as well as its cultural linkages to Central Asia which were perceived as an obstacle in its integration with China during the Cold War era were seen as an advantage in the post–Cold War period to achieve the same (Clarke 2011, 126–128).

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This change in approach towards the geopolitics of Xinjiang by China can be clearly seen through China’s eforts since the early 1990s to develop Xinjiang as “Eurasian Continental Bridge”, “a hub of New Silk Road” and recently as “a hub of Silk Road Economic Belt” for which huge investments were made in Xinjiang as well as Central Asia (Becquelin 2004). China’s approach towards Afghanistan during this period however remained negative as it was perceived as a source of Islamic radicalism. Therefore, China’s Afghan policy at this time mainly dealt with the “prevention of any potential spill over of radical Islamism and other non-traditional threats like trafcking of drugs and weapons” from Afghanistan into the troubled region of Xinjiang (Chang 1997). The threat of such spill over was more eminent at the time as Karakoram highway played an important role in China’s policy of increasing cooperation and linkages with Central and South Asia which facilitated not only legitimate but also illegal trade between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang (China) (Roberts 2004). This security threat encouraged China to initiate the formation of the Shanghai Five (now Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) in 1996. Thus, it can be said that China’s approach to Afghanistan in the 1990s was guided by “its interests in securing Xinjiang and developing constructive relations with the post-Soviet Central Asian republics” (Clarke 2016). Post 9/11

In the aftermath of 9/11, China found itself in a dilemma as it wanted “neither a Western victory in its backyard, nor a Taliban victory” both of which pose risks to Xinjiang and the adjacent region (Small 2014). Therefore, China remained more or less uninterested or least interested in Afghanistan with “limited engagement in the economic sphere” and “refusal to become directly involved in the security sphere” while maintaining a minimum necessary presence in the country (Wishnick 2014). China’s Afghan policy witnessed its frst major change in the post 9/11 era with Barrack Obama’s election as the President of United States in 2009 and the formulation of his “Af-Pak Strategy”. China suddenly became proactive in Afghanistan and risked the security of Xinjiang while also putting its relationship with its “all-weather friend” Pakistan at stake (Clarke 2016). This was a result of conficting views regarding Barrack Obama administration’s future plans for Afghanistan under its “Af-Pak Strategy” as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believed the U.S. forces are going to stay there for long, whereas the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Afairs predicted “withdrawal of the US forces” from Afghanistan (Small 2014). In any case, China had to increase its presence in Afghanistan either to counter America’s rising power in its “backyard” or to fll up the void created by the U.S. withdrawal in order to control the security situation in Afghanistan. By this time, however,

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a broader geopolitical calculus had emerged, encapsulated in President Xi Jinping’s BRI strategy, which, at its core, is an outgrowth of Beijing’s decades long agenda to integrate Xinjiang and utilize this region’s unique geopolitical position to facilitate a China-centric Eurasian geo-economic system (Clarke 2016). Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan (2021)

The fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 led to a change in Afghanistan’s leadership; however, China’s policy objectives with regard to Afghanistan remain the same. It is still mainly driven by China’s security concerns in Xinjiang in particular as well as of the larger region around Afghanistan in general. China has invested a considerable amount of money both in and around Afghanistan, especially since 2013 as part of the BRI programme and therefore has a lot to lose in case the security situation in the region deteriorates. A stable Afghanistan is what China desires and that is why it was quick to engage with the Taliban leadership post their takeover of Afghanistan and even kept its embassy open in Kabul (Kuo 2022; Henley and Burke 2021). In fact, China was the frst country to promise as well as provide assistance to Afghanistan and has since delivered more than 12 batches of humanitarian aid (Yau 2022). The Taliban too is likely to welcome China’s resumption of commercial activities in Afghanistan since the investment will “bring in much-needed funds”. Even in the best-case scenario, it is improbable that the Afghan economy, which is fragile and heavily dependent on foreign aid from the West (that has stopped as a result of various sanctions imposed on Afghanistan post Taliban’s return to power in August 2021), can recover to pre-Taliban levels (Jami et al. 2021). China has, on many occasions, shared its concerns regarding the Uyghur militants, linked to East Turkestan Islamic Movement or Islamic State-Khorasan, operating from Afghanistan under Taliban rule but the Taliban leadership has been reiterating since before the fall of Kabul that they will not “interfere in China’s internal matters” and “will not allow the soil of Afghanistan to be used against any other country”, and has called China its “principal partner” (Trofmov and Deng 2021; Kelemen 2022). Another factor that rationalizes Sino-Afghan partnership is that Afghanistan and the rest of the world, including China, have a common enemy, that is Islamic State Khorasan. The current situation in Afghanistan has presented a great opportunity for China to project itself as a regional leader and a peacemaker, a role it is performing very well by “leveraging its good relations with regional countries to create a regional consensus and push for all neighboring countries to support the Taliban in Afghanistan” (Yau 2022). Apart from the seven bilateral meetings held between Chinese and Afghan ofcials since April 2022, China has held three multinational meetings on

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Afghanistan with its neighbours and other interested parties. All these dialogues were aimed towards providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and help stabilise it. China hosted the latest of these multinational meetings attended by representatives from Afghanistan and nine other countries, including Russia and the United States, apart from its neighbours (The Indian Express 2022; Al Jazeera 2022). The third meeting resulted in commitments by the neighbouring countries in their individual capacity to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as to provide “tangible support to economic rebuilding” of Afghanistan (Yau 2022). It is understood that China’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan was shaped by two diferent objectives during diferent periods; initially, in the 1990s the objective to secure Xinjiang took prominence over other objectives while the post 9/11 period saw the emergence of a larger “geopolitical calculus”. Afghanistan and the BRI

For China’s investment initiatives, Afghanistan is a strategically signifcant location and its strategic location at the crossroads of West, Central and South Asia gives it an edge over its neighbours in terms of being a regional trade and transit hub. Afghanistan has enormous potential to connect with markets of South, Central and West Asia and to take advantage of its strategic location to advance domestic economic development (Oertel and Small 2021). Afghanistan too has shown its willingness to join the BRI ever since its inception in 2013 (Khalil 2017). In fact, Afghan ofcials believe that “Afghanistan would play a key role (within BRI) due to its strategic location” (Tolo News 2018). On 16 May 2016, Afghanistan’s inclusion into the BRI was formalized after the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the same (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2016). Shortly after this development, in August 2016 the frst train from China started its journey from western China, travelling through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to reach Afghanistan in September (Najafzada 2016). Afghanistan’s membership to AIIB was approved in March 2017, which further strengthened its integration with the BRI (Reuters 2017). Another major step in Afghanistan’s integration with BRI was the 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue that took place in December 2017, where Chinese Foreign Minister said that “his country and Pakistan will look at extending their $57 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan” (Tolo News 2017). The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan, which has resulted in various sanctions being imposed on the new administration as well as the apprehensions of foreign nations regarding the Taliban government, has halted all development activity in the country and it will take some time for the

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foreign agencies and actors to return to Afghanistan and resume their activities. Although China has been proactive in dealing with the new administration and was one of the frst countries to return to Afghanistan, it will still be difcult for the Chinese government to resume its operations in Afghanistan to the pre-Taliban level. Conclusion

To sum up, it can be inferred that while the events of 2021 have had a big impact on Afghanistan, both domestically and internationally, its dire need to develop itself as a “transit hub” in order to provide a sustainable source of income to its weak economy and to support its developmental and reconstruction still remains the same. The chapter also tries to establish Afghanistan’s potential as the Belt and Road pivot for Asia by highlighting its geostrategic importance. And through China’s perspective, it is quite clear, more than ever before, that a secure and stable Afghanistan, both in the political and the economic sense, is very important for the attainment of China’s dual policy objectives of securing Xinjiang and establishing a geopolitical advantage in Asia, an extension of which is the BRI. Therefore, expanding Afghanistan’s role in the BRI and considering and developing it as “Pivot” or “Transit Hub” for Asia is of signifcant value to both Afghanistan and China. However, considering the recent shift of power in Afghanistan and the resulting security situation, it will be naive to assume that Afghanistan’s inclusion in the BRI could be achieved in the near future. In the meantime, small infrastructure and development projects being undertaken by neighbouring countries will be very helpful in laying the ground work for future transnational projects. References Al Jazeera. 2022. “China Holds Multinational Meetings to Discuss Afghanistan.” March 30. Accessed August 1, 2022. www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/30/chinaholds-multinational-meetings-to-discuss-afghanistan Asian Development Bank. 2011. The New Silk Road: Ten Years of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program. Philippines: Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation. Becquelin, Nicholas. 2004. “Staged Development in Xinjiang.” China Quarterly 178 (2): 358–378. Chang, Felix K. 1997. “China’s Central Asian Power and Problems.” Orbis 41 (3): 401–425. China Briefng. 2015. “China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, Dezan Shira & Associates.” September 15. Accessed April 30, 2018. http://leadin gedgealliance.com/dev/ uploads/CB%202015%2009%20China’s%20Silk%20Road%20Economic%20 Belt.pdf China Daily. 2011. “‘Go West’ Policy Is an Economic Milestone for Nation.” Accessed January 28, 2019. www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-12/09/content_14236090.htm

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Clarke, Michael. 2011. Xinjiang and China’s Rise in Central Asia  – A History. London: Routledge. Clarke, Michael. 2016. “‘One Belt, One Road’ and China’s Emerging Afghanistan Dilemma.” Australian Journal of International Afairs 70 (5): 563–579. Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2011. “Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century.” US Department of State. July 2011. Accessed May 27, 2021. www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168840.htm Daily Outlook Afghanistan. 2016. “TUTAP Controversy Heightens.” May 14. Accessed May 27, 2021. http://outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_ id=15245 The Economic Times. 2022. “G7’s Global Infrastructure and Investment Initiative to Checkmate China’s BRI.” September 6. Accessed September 19, 2022. https:// infra.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/urban-infrastructure/g7s-global-infrastructure-and-investment-initiative-to-checkmate-chinas-bri/94015205 The Economist. 2000. “Go West, Young Han, Plans to Develop China’s Western Provinces Are About More than Economics.” Accessed April 28, 2016. www. economist.com/node/457567 The Economist. 2015. “The New Silk Road.” September 12. Accessed April 28, 2016; 17 June 2016. www.economist.com/news/special-report/21663326-chinaslatest-wave-globalisers-will-enrich-their-countryand-world-new-silk-road Fallon, Theresa. 2015. “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia.” American Foreign Policy Interests 37 (3): 140–147. Accessed June 3, 2018. http://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2015.1056682 Fedorenko, Vladmir. 2013. “The New Silk Road Initiatives in Central Asia.” Rethink Paper 10. Gill, Bates. 2010. Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Henley, Jon and Jason Burke. 2021. “China to Keep Kabul Embassy Open and ‘Beef Up’ Relations, Says Taliban.” The Guardian. September 3. Accessed August 1, 2022. www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/03/china-to-keep-kabul-embassy-openand-beef-up-relations-say-taliban Hurley, John, et al. 2018. “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” Centre for Global Development. March. Accessed May 5, 2021. www.cgdev.org/sites/default/fles/examining-debt-implicationsbelt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf The Indian Express. 2022. “China Shows Afghanistan Ambitions at Multinational Meetings.” March 31. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://indianexpress.com/article/ world/china-shows-afghanistan-ambitions-at-multinational-meetings-7845767/ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2018. “Towards Regional Economic Growth & Stability: The Silk Road through Afghanistan.” Embassy in Tokyo. January 22. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://www.tokyo.mfa.af/publications/towardsregional-economic-growth-and-stability.html Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2016. “Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and China Sign MoU of One Belt One Road.” Ministry of Foreign Afairs. June 18. Accessed July 20, 2020. http://recca.af/?p=1909 Jami, Maryam, Alamuddin Rizwan and Rajab Taieb. 2021. “Sino-Afghan Security Relations Beyond 2021.” Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Afghanistan and Institute of War and Peace Studies. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://library.fes.de/pdf-fles/ bueros/kabul/18638.pdf

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Jones, Lee and Shahar Hameiri. 2020. “Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’.” Chatham House. August 19. Accessed August 22, 2022. www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy/4-sri-lanka-and-bri Kelemen, Barbara. 2022. “China’s Non-Leadership in the Taliban’s Afghanistan.” The Diplomat. June 27. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/ chinas-non-leadership-in-the-talibans-afghanistan/ Khalil, Ahmad Bilal. 2017. “Linking Afghanistan to China’s Belt and Road.” The Diplomat. April 24. Accessed July 20, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/ linking-afghanistan-to-chinas-belt-and-road/ Kuchins, Andrew C. 2011. “A Truly Regional Economic Strategy for Afghanistan.” Washington Quarterly 34 (2): 77–91. Kuo, Mercy A. 2021. “China in Afghanistan: How Beijing Engages Taliban.” The Diplomat. December 25. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/ china-in-afghanistan-how-beijing-engages-the-taliban/ Lai, Hongyi Harry. 2002. “China’s Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects.” Modern China 28 (4): 432–466. Accessed June 2, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1177/009770040202800402 Mackinder, H. J. 1904. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” Geographical Journal 23 (4). Accessed January 2, 2018. www.iwp.edu/docLib/20131016_Mackinder TheGeographicalJournal.pdf Munjal, Diksha. 2022. “What Is the Status of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia?” The Hindu. July 5. Accessed August 1, 2022. www.thehindu. com/news/international/explained-what-is-the-status-of-chinas-belt-and-roadinitiative-in-south-asia/article65592306.ece Najafzada, Eltaf. 2016. “China Lays New Brick in Silk Road with First Afghan Rail Freight.” September 12. Accessed July 20, 2020. www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2016-09-11/china-lays-new-brick-in-silk-road-with-first-afghanrail-freight The National Development Reforms Commission. 2015. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.” The People’s Republic of China. Accessed June 27, 2016. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/ newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2020. “Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2018–19.” National Statistics and Information Authority. Accessed July 20, 2020. www. nsia.gov.af:8080/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Afghanistan-Statistical-Yearbook-2018-19_compressed.pdf Oertel, Janka and Andrew Small. 2021, “After the Withdrawal: China’s Interests in Afghanistan.” European Council on Foreign Relations. August 5. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://ecfr.eu/article/after-the-withdrawal-chinas-interests-inafghanistan/ Peyrouse, Sebastien. 2007. “The Economic Aspects of the Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement.” Silk Road Paper. September. Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Reuters. 2015. “Turkmenistan Starts Work on Gas Link to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India.” Accessed May 5, 2022. http://uk.reuters.com/article/turkmenistangas-pipeline-idUKKBN0TW05Q20151213 Reuters. 2017. “China-led AIIB Approves 13 New Members, Canada Joins.” March 23. Accessed July 20, 2020. www.reuters.com/article/us-china-aiib/chinaled-aiib-approves-13-new-members-canada-joins-idUSKBN16U0CG

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Roberts, Sean. 2004. “A ‘Land of Borderlands’: Implications of Xinjiang’s Transborder Interactions.” In Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, edited by Frederic A. Starr. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Rudolf, Moritz. 2015. “China’s ‘Silk Road’ Initiative Is at Risk of Failure.” The Diplomat. September 24. Accessed June 17, 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/ chinas-silk-road-initiative-is-at-risk-of-failure/ Saikal, Amin. 2014. “Afghanistan’s Geographic Possibilities.” Survival 56 (3): 141–156. Savoy, Conor M. 2022. “Future Considerations for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.” Centre for Strategic and International Studies. June 22. Accessed August 1, 2022. www.csis.org/analysis/future-considerationspartnership-global-infrastructure-and-investment Shroder, John. 2008. “Afghanistan’s Development and Functionality: Renewing a Collapsed State.” Geo Journal 70: 91–107. Singh, Rishika. 2022. “Explained: The G7’s Infrastructure Investment Plan to Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” The Indian Express. June 29. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/g7-infrastructure-investmentplan-china-belt-and-road-initiative-explained-7996374/ Small, Andrew. 2014. The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. London: Hurst. Starr, Fredrick S. and Andrew C. Kuchins. 2010. The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy. Silk Road Paper. May. Washington, DC: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Programme. Times of India. 2009. “India Hands Over Zaranj-Delaram Highway to Afghanistan.” January 22. Accessed May 27, 2021. http://timesofndia.indiatimes.com/ india/India-hands-over-Zaranj-Delaram-highway-to-Afghanistan/articleshow/ 4016669.cms Tolo News. 2017. “China to Include Afghanistan in $57 Billion Economic Corridor.” December 26. Accessed July 20, 2020. https://tolonews.com/business/chinainclude-afghanistan-57-billion-economic-corridor Tolo News. 2018. “Afghanistan Upbeat About China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” June 10. Accessed July 20, 2020. https://tolonews.com/business/afghanistanupbeat-about-china%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative TRACECA. 2012. “Welcome to TRACECA.” Accessed May 27, 2021. www.tracecaorg.org/en/traceca/ Trofmov, Yaroslav and Chao Deng. 2021. “Afghanistan’s Taliban, Now on China’s Border, Seek to Reassure Beijing.” The Wall Street Journal. July 8. Accessed August 1, 2022. www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistans-taliban-now-on-chinas-border-seekto-reassure-beijing-11625750130 Tsao, Ruby. 2015. “One Belt One Road: A Historical Perspective.” Chinese American Forum 31 (1): 11–14. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2018. “2018 Report to Congress.” One Hundred Fifteenth Congress. November. Accessed May 5, 2021. www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Executive%20Summary%20 2018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf (the in-text of this reference can be found in page 197) US Department of State. 2015. “U.S. Support for the New Silk Road, United States of America.” Accessed May 27, 2021. www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad/

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Yau, Niva. 2022. “China Takes Full Advantage of Taliban Isolation.” The Diplomat. July 6. Accessed August 1, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/china-takesfull-advantage-of-talibans-isolation/ Ying, Liu. 2015. “‘Marshall Plan’ Copycat Allegations Misleading.” Beijing Review. February 5: 20. Zhiping, Pan. 2014. “Silk Road Economic Belt: A Dynamic New Concept for Geopolitics in Central Asia.” Chinese Institute of International Studies. Accessed January 27, 2018. www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-09/18/content_7243440.html

PART III

Indian Connection

12 INDIA AND ITS INNER ASIAN NEIGHBOURHOOD IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA Mahesh Ranjan Debata

Introduction

India’s connection with Inner Asia is mostly civilizational and more than 2,000 years old. Regular overland trade between India and the kingdoms/empires/ khanates of Inner Asian entities such as Central Asia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Xinjiang and Tibet is a remarkable feature of this age-old linkage. The historical and cultural aspects of this relationship between India and Inner Asia were marked by religio-cultural-cum-spiritual linkage with the introduction, spread and prevalence of Buddhism, one of the foremost precursors of Indian culture. Buddhist gospels about India’s rich cultural heritage and spiritual thought percolated into the hearts and minds of the people of the entire region further leading to cultural eforescence in Inner Asia. Indian kings (Mauryan king Ashoka, Kushana king Kanishka and Vardhan king Harsh Vardhan) had popularized Buddhism in the region by sending their emissaries and courtiers to various kingdoms in Inner Asia. Buddhist monks, scholars, translators and travellers such as Kumarajiva (3rd century AD), Fahien (4th century AD), Hieun Tsang (7th century AD), Padmasambhava (8th century AD), Kamalshila (8th century AD) and Atisha (11th century AD) had contributed immensely to the growing spiritual relationship that had strengthened people-to-people bonding between the two regions. Buddhism remained the most important religious faith among the people of Afghanistan, Xinjiang and Central Asia for over eight centuries, till the advent of Islam in the region (Debata 2018). The Buddhist site at Tapa Sardar along the ancient southern route, which was a royal Kushan foundation known as the Kanika Maharaja Vihara (the temple of the Great King Kanishka), bears testimony to how Buddhism was a “hegemonic religious culture” in the region DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-15

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(Chavan 2020). The  people of Mongolia and Tibet follow Buddhism even today as their religion, culture and spiritual path. Further, the international trade route, or the Silk Route, which remained important from 3rd century BC to the 15th century AD, helped in integrating the unique cultural heritage of India and the Inner Asian region, and promoted the exchange of idea and intellect, and most importantly, trade and travelling. However, with India’s partition on 15 August 1947, India’s centuriesold overland trade connections with Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond were severed as India lost the direct geographical border with these regions to Pakistan. In this era of land connectivity amongst neighbouring nations, India has the biggest disadvantage that is lack of geographical connectivity with Inner Asia. Similarly, with the establishment of People’s Republic of China (PRC) in September 1949, India’s relationships (especially direct overland trade) with Xinjiang, Tibet and beyond (Mongolia) were cut of. India had to maintain indirect relationship with Central Asia for over four decades as part of the former Soviet Union (till the Soviet disintegration in 1991) and, with Xinjiang and Tibet as part of PRC, on a very low scale. Even the creation of independent Central Asian Republics (CARs) in the postSoviet period, with all its promises, hypes and brouhaha, could not do away with the geographical disadvantage India does have. For instance, to reach Central Asia, India needs to connect to Iran’s Chabahar port (which became functional in 2018) from where it can enter Afghanistan over land and then to Central Asia and beyond, may be Mongolia. Moreover, in post–Cold War period, there emerged a ray of hope for India to renew her age-old bonding with Inner Asia. This chapter argues that India considers the countries that are described as the “heart of Inner Asia”, such as the CARs, Afghanistan and Mongolia, as key to maximize its vital national interests in this region. Thus, this chapter discusses India’s policy towards these friendly neighbours in the post–Cold War period. This chapter argues that the present Indian government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has extended a more humane and pragmatic approach towards these valuable Inner Asian neighbours in the last eight years, keeping in view their signifcance to India’s vital stakes in the region, be it strategic, economic, energy or security. India’s Concerns and Stakes

Three important issues can be noted here with regard to India’s interests in its Inner Asian neighbourhood, and concerns over some issues: (1) geostrategic issues; (2) energy interests; and (3) security challenges (Debata 2017). Firstly, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union created a new political reality in and around Inner Asia. Economic and demographic potential, abundant natural resources such as energy (oil, natural gas, uranium,

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hydroelectricity etc.) and minerals of independent CARs (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) and their geographic location being at the crossroads of Russia, West Asia, South Asia and the Far East led the entire neighbourhood to a theatre of competition, confrontation and confict. Global powers such as the United States, Russia and China and regional players (India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) became party to a kind of geopolitical ballgame, which was described as the replication of “Great Game”, the 19th-century rivalry between Russia and Britain. In the new format of 21st century rivalry for geopolitical and geo-economic supremacy in the heart of Inner Asia, the United States was quick to begin its “strategic tryst” (Stobdan 2020) with two motives: (1) to keep Russia, its arch rival during the Cold War period, out of this region; and (2) to curb any Chinese advancements. It is important to recall here that the United States has been present in the region (in Afghanistan) since the Soviet Union’s Afghan misadventure in 1979, providing support and succour to anti-Soviet elements. Similarly, in response to Mongolia’s “third neighbour approach”, in the early 1990s, the United States tried to wean over this bufer between powerful fank states like Soviet Union and China for decades (Soni 2015). Russia’s intervention in the region aimed at frustrating United States’ sinister designs in its backyard (Central Asia), despite its disintegration. The saying in India that “when two people (Russia and United States here) quarrel, it is often the third person (PRC) who gains” became true in this context. The PRC took advantage of this U.S.-Russia rivalry and gained the maximum, be it trade, energy or security and stability of Xinjiang that shares borders with three CARs: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The PRC now controls the fow of goods and services to and from any country in Inner Asia. Almost all the countries in Inner Asia have welcomed PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By 2022, PRC’s total trade with Inner Asian countries of CARs, Mongolia and Afghanistan was nearly USD 80 billion (a total of USD 70 billion with CARs) (China International Import Expo 2023). Further, the PRC has acquired hydrocarbons from Central Asia, with one oil pipeline from Kazakhstan and one natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. Similarly, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) had signed a $3 billion agreement with Afghanistan in May 2008 to lease Mes Aynak copper feld (world’s second largest with a deposit of 14 million tons) for 30 years to mine $50 billion worth copper (Felbab-Brown 2020). This peculiar situation in the heart of Inner Asia also prompted some regional players like India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to play their part. This chapter would stick to India, which treaded cautiously and kept a close watch on the critical situation arising out in its extended neighbourhood, particularly the fear of encirclement either by China or by the United States, or any military presence (especially by the United States) in the region (Sikri 2008) that could potentially threaten India’s security and stability. India’s concern

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was genuine as it was not in the good books of the United States because of her favourable tilt towards Soviet Union. Similarly, the PRC was “the potential threat number one” (Indian Express 2008) because of its aggressive attitude and posture towards India after the India-China war (1962). It has been proved in the past few years the way PRC has tried to outshine India, be it Asia, Africa or anywhere else. Forget about Central Asia; even in India’s traditional stronghold South Asia, the PRC has won the confdence of Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh through considerable capital investments. And through strategic and defence cooperation, China has spread its strategic tentacles across the entire Inner Asian region. Secondly, Inner Asian and Caspian energy resources [(natural gas  – Turkmenistan), (oil – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), (uranium – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia), (hydroelectricity  – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), (copper – Afghanistan)] are believed to be helpful for India’s energy security and a viable alternative to oil imports from West Asia and nuclear energy support from former Soviet Union. Two factors are important to note here: (1) crisis-ridden West Asia, which catered to most of India’s oil needs; and (2) accelerated energy demand following rapid and robust economic growth. Since India’s 9 per cent growth rate target would take it towards the $5 trillion economy club by 2024–2025, there has been an enormous demand on its energy resources, energy systems and infrastructure (Niti Ayog 2020). Thirdly, the security situation in Inner Asia, especially Central Asia, Afghanistan and Xinjiang, is in shambles due to growth of radical Islamic extremism and compelling existence of local, regional and global terrorist infrastructure. Revival of Islam in the region owes its allegiance to Great Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 for ideological reasons and also to Saudi Arabia for funding. This state of afairs fuelled the existing Islamic movements. Islam that was under the strict control of governments in Central Asia and Caucasus and Xinjiang got a new lease of life just a few years before the Soviet disintegration because of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost and Perestroika and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s relaxation to Muslims of Xinjiang respectively. However, Islam in the Inner Asian region took a radical turn and an extreme form in the post–Cold War period because of (1) emergence of Mujahideen and Taliban in Afghanistan as believers and propagators of radical Islam; (2) rise of radical Islamic forces in Central Asia with Hizbut Tahrir as the fountainhead (Debata 2011); (3) growth of Islamic extremism in Xinjiang. What added fuel to the fre was the dangerous anti-state, anti-nation, anti-culture and anti-humanity activities of the ISIS and Al Qaeda, besides local militant and terrorist groups such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (Debata 2017). Moreover, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which was launched in Afghanistan immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States,

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minimized the threats from these hostile forces for a brief period. Most of the terrorists and their leaders were killed, including Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The ISIS has been dismantled in Iraq and Syria. Terrorist activities in Xinjiang are under control because of stern measures by China. However, the situation in Afghanistan remains grim. Taliban was back to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 after the international forces withdrew. But this has not stopped the ISIS being involved in several terrorist attacks in Afghanistan since then. Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban and Jaish-e-Mohammed are active too (Sen et al. 2020). Reconnecting India With the “Heart of Inner Asia”

India had established a diplomatic, political and economic relationship with Afghanistan in 1947 and with Mongolia in 1955. But the CARs, after being independent entities in 1991, looked at their age-old ally India for its benignity, secular credentials, non-intervening stance, no-nonsense approach and its biggest strength – loads of soft power. For example, this author (Debata 2008) found at a Conference in Tashkent the widespread appreciation for India’s soft power (historical link, cultural heritage and goodwill gestures). Looking retrospectively, within months of independence, presidents of the CARs of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan visited India in the year 1992 and solicited India’s presence in Central Asia and a major role in their nation-building process. In response, India continued its engagement with individual CARs at bilateral level and brought out a pragmatic policy Connect Central Asia in June 2012 to have all-encompassing cooperation (consular, commercial, connectivity and cultural) with these neighbours. Partnership on strategic lines, building regular economic cooperation and ensuring energy security with the aforesaid northern neighbours remain the main features of India’s policy. In order to upkeep vital Indian interests in the region, it is imperative to discuss Indian endeavours to reach out to these valued neighbours for better, long-term and meaningful cooperation. Strategic Partnership Agreements

The strategic concerns and security challenges in India’s Inner Asian neighbourhood have driven her to ink SPAs with these friendly, resource-rich and much-needed neighbours. Indian government has understood well the need and necessity of SPAs, especially when you have China as a formidable force on your neighbourhood, thwarting the advances made by any other country, be it the United States, Russia or India. Strategic partnership, which is a long-term interaction between two countries based on political, economic, social and historical factors, manifests itself in a variety of relationships

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(Gupta and Azad 2011). India has so far signed Strategic Partnership Agreements with more than 27 countries (besides EU and ASEAN), which include Inner Asian neighbours such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Mongolia. India signed an SPA frst with Kazakhstan, during Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s visit to India in January 2009. The Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership foresees comprehensive cooperation in all spheres. The “Joint Action Plan” on furthering strategic partnership between India and Kazakhstan (“Road Map”) for the period of 2011–2014 was signed. While signing the Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, India and Kazakhstan underscored the need for expansion of mutually benefcial cooperation, while adhering to their existing obligations under multilateral nuclear regimes (Ministry of External Afairs 2011a). The year 2011 has remained remarkably important as far as India’s strategic cooperation with the Inner Asian neighbours is concerned. Within a span of 5 months, India signed SPAs with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. During President Islam Karimov’s visit to India on 17–18 May 2011, Uzbekistan signed SPA with India to elevate the bilateral relationship to the level of a long-term and strategic partnership based on equality and mutual understanding (Ministry of External Afairs 2015b). The Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed on 4 October 2011 in New Delhi is the steady resolve by the two countries to extend their relationship to a new high. The importance of this Pact stems from the fact that this is Afghanistan’s frst such SPA with any foreign country, which is marked by a strong convergence over regional security and the shared threat from terror infrastructure in and around the region. The most important part of the Strategic Partnership is the point no. 4 Paragraph 2 under the head “Political and Security Cooperation”, which states: “Security cooperation between the two sides is intended to help enhance their respective and mutual eforts in the fght against international terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafcking in narcotics, money laundering and so on” (Ministry of External Afairs 2011b). Similarly, the SPA between India and Mongolia was signed on 17 May 2015, on the 60th anniversary of establishment of India-Mongolia diplomatic relations, during Indian Premier Narendra Modi’s visit to Ulaanbaatar. The partnership is guided by the universally recognized principles of sovereign equality of states, the principles of the United Nations Charter, collective interests of our peoples and the fundamental ideals of the Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Republic of India and Mongolia, signed on February 22, 1994, and other bilateral documents, would be their common yet a new objective of their respective foreign policies. (Ministry of External Afairs 2015a)

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During Mongolian President Khaltmaagiin Battulga’s visit to India on 19–23 September 2019, both India and Mongolia vowed to continue their Strategic Partnership and take it to a new level. The First India-Central Asia Dialogue in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) on 12 January 2019, a meeting of Foreign Ministers from India, all the CARs and Afghanistan, hailed India signing SPAs with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan as the “starting point for a new era in relations between India and Central Asia”. This historic meeting of great strategic minds of the participating countries (1) reafrmed “centuries-old ties between the peoples of India, Central Asia and Afghanistan”;(2) dubbed themselves as “natural partners”;(3) underlined the need to develop a “modern and comprehensive partnership”, which was envisioned by Prime Minister Modi during his landmark visit in 2015; and (4) set up the “India-Central Asia Development Group” to take forward “development partnership” between India and the CARs (Ministry of External Afairs 2019). The signing of four SPAs between India and her Inner Asian neighbours within a span of six years between 2009 and 2015 assumes great importance and shows India’s resolve to establish its presence in the region in a positive manner to secure her strategic interests. Energy Cooperation

A long-term, sustained and meaningful cooperation on energy resources and trade of natural resources is an important component of the partnership between India and these neighbours. India, after analysing its foray into the energy sector of this region, understood well the difculties in getting hydrocarbon resources from the region over land through pipelines. Though the eforts to bring hydrocarbon from the CARs through TAPI were initiated in the early years (1992) of the independence of the CARs, the frst phase of TAPI laying from Mary, near Galkynysh gas feld (Turkmenistan) to Afghan border, was done on 13 December 2015, and beginning of construction of Afghanistan-Pakistan section of TAPI was facilitated in February 2018 at Islim Cheshme (Serhatabat) near Afghan border (Debata 2020). India is still optimistic about TAPI, because India was the frst foreign country to visit after Turkmenistan’s new President Serdar Berdimuhamedov in March 2022. President Ramnath Kovind visited his Turkmen counterpart in April 2022 and stressed the importance of security along the TAPI pipeline if it is to be implemented (Burna-Asef 2022). In addition, nuclear energy of the region is what India has longed for earnestly. It is imperative to note here that Kazakhstan, which has 12 per cent of the world’s total uranium reserves, became the leading producer of uranium in the year 2009 with almost 28 per cent of world’s total production, which increased to 44 per cent of world’s total in 2018. In 2019, Kazakhstan has produced 22,808 tonnes and 19,500 tonnes in 2020 (World Nuclear

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Association 2021b). Mongolia has uranium reserve to the tune of 1.39 million tonnes. Uzbekistan is the seventh largest producer of uranium in the world, with a production of 2,404 tonnes in 2018 and 3,500 tonnes in 2019 (World Nuclear Association 2021a). The year 2009 is signifcant as far as India’s nuclear energy cooperation with these northern neighbours is concerned. India signed one MoU each with Kazakhstan and Mongolia. The MoU on civil nuclear cooperation was signed in 2009. Another MoU was signed in 2009 between the Department of Atomic Energy of India and the Nuclear Energy Agency of Mongolia for cooperation in the feld of peaceful use of radioactive minerals and nuclear energy. The year 2015 witnessed more meaningful and result-oriented energy cooperation between India and Kazakhstan, and India and Mongolia. Both the aforesaid MoUs worked as steppingstones to India’s Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Mongolia (May 2015) and Kazakhstan (July 2015) respectively. Similarly, India’s Department of Atomic Energy and JSC National Atomic Company (KazAtomProm) signed a long-term contract for sale and purchase of natural uranium concentrates (Ministry of External Afairs 2015e). As per the landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Kazakhstan signed on 6 July 2015, Kazakhstan, which caters to more than 80 per cent of India’s uranium requirements, has supplied India 9,000 tonnes of uranium, some 5,000 tons in the 2015–2019 period only (Business Standard 2019). India has imported 4,558 tonnes (2019–2022) from Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s national atomic company (World Nuclear News 2022). Kazakh company Samruk Energo and Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) of India agreed to cooperate in the energy sector for production, construction and reconstruction of thermal, hydropower, gas-turbine and other power plants and stations during the Kazakh-Indian Business forum in July 2015 (Eurasian Research Institute 2015). The 12th and 13th meetings of KazakhIndia Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientifc, Technical, Industrial and Cultural Cooperation at New Delhi respectively on 16–17 June 2015 and September 2017 have mainly focused on energy cooperation. During Prime Minister’s Modi’s visit to Mongolia in May 2015, both the countries vowed to have more cooperation in civil nuclear domain, such as societal and industrial applications of radio isotopes, exploration and mining of radioactive minerals in Mongolia. Prime Minister Modi, while welcoming Mongolia as partner in India’s economic transformation, noted that Mongolia’s rich mineral deposits, including radioactive minerals, could help ensure India’s low-carbon growth. The Joint Working Group (JWG) established between the atomic energy establishments of both countries agreed to explore opportunities for future collaborative actions in the spirit of mutual beneft. Modi announced a credit line of $1 billion for infrastructure sector in Mongolia, which is currently being utilized by Mongolia to build a frst oil refnery (Ministry of External Afairs 2018c). India’s Department

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of Atomic Energy and Uzbekistan’s Novoi Minerals & Metallurgical Company signed a Long Term Supply of Uranium agreement during Uzbek Prime Minister’s India visit on 18 January 2019, under which India will get 1,100 tonnes of uranium ore concentrates during 2022–2026 (Chaudhury 2019). Similarly, both India and Afghanistan had talked over a high-level institutionalized dialogue on access to and development of Afghanistan’s natural resources, particularly oil and mining sectors, and the substantial amount of uranium discovered in Helmand province (The Embassy of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2019). However, there has been no development in the past one year or so since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. It is heartening to note that India has now been able to harness the nuclear energy potential of Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Uzbekistan to feed its nearly two dozen indigenously built pressurized heavy water reactors. Connectivity Eforts

India now seeks to do away with the geographical disadvantage it has for not having direct borders with these neighbours. The political leadership of India and these northern neighbours calls for respect for sovereignty, regional integrity, good governance, transparency, practicality and reliability as the basis of connectivity initiatives. As a remarkable feat in this connection, India has started operating Air Freight Corridor between Kabul and Kandahar and New Delhi and Mumbai since 2017 (Modi 2019). India formally became a member of “Ashgabat Agreement” on 3 February 2018 to work on the establishment of an International Transport and Transit Corridor along with other member countries (Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) (Ministry of External Afairs 2018b). During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit at Qingdao (China) in 2018, Prime Minister Modi articulated the foundational dimension of Eurasia (which covers most part of Inner Asia) as being “SECURE” (Ministry of External Afairs 2018a) (Security of our citizens, Economic development for all, Connecting the region, Unite our people, Respect for Sovereignty and Integrity, and Environment protection issues), which is likely to guide India’s future engagement with the region, and connectivity. The frst India-Central Asia Summit was inaugurated on 27 January 2022 on a virtual mode by Prime Minister Modi, where all the fve Presidents of the CARs stressed on “connectivity” in addition to other issues. The proposal to hold a “Round-Table on Energy and Connectivity” among other important issues assumes great signifcance. Security Cooperation

As discussed earlier, security in and around the region has remained an intractable issue. To fend of security challenges, India has called upon these

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neighbours to make all out eforts and long-term cooperation. For example, during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Uzbekistan in July 2015, both countries reafrmed coordination of their law enforcement agencies and special services in a Joint Statement to expand cooperation in the felds of defence and cyber-security (Ministry of External Afairs 2015d), and counterterrorism (Ministry of External Afairs 2015c). Recalibration of India-Uzbek defence partnership was witnessed during the Indo-Uzbekistan Joint Field Training Exercise (FTX), known as DUSTLIK-I (2019), and its second and third editions respectively in 2021 and 2022. Similarly, India and Kazakhstan agreed to widen the scope of bilateral defence cooperation including regular exchange of visits, consultations, training of military personnel, militarytechnical cooperation, joint military exercises, exchange of special forces and so forth (Ministry of External Afairs 2015f). India and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement for defence cooperation, which aims at “deepening cooperation between India and Kyrgyzstan in matters relating to defence, security, military education and training, conduct of joint military exercises, exchange of experience and information, exchange of military instructors and observers”. Both the sides have been continuing bilateral military exercise “Khanjar” since December 2011 as an annual afair, the latest held in Bakloh (Himachal Pradesh, India) in March-April 2022. India and Mongolia support the evolution of open, balanced and inclusive security architecture in the region based on collective eforts, considering legitimate interests of all states of the region guided by respect for norms and principles of international law. During Modi’s visit to Mongolia in May 2015, both the countries expressed concern over the nature and spread of international terrorism in recent years and suggested cooperative measures of the international community without double standards or selectivity. They agreed to direct ofcials concerned to work together for the adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. While recognizing their shared interests in security of cyber domain, both the countries decided to work together to preserve the integrity and inviolability of this common global threat. India made a commitment to set up a cyber-security centre in Mongolia (Ministry of External Afairs 2015b), which is in the advanced stage of implementation. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the cooperation between the border security guards of both the countries. Mutual sharing of the experiences between Mongolian and Indian border forces will further strengthen the bilateral defence and security cooperation. Two MoUs on (1) cooperation in the feld of Border Patrolling and Surveillance and (2) cooperation between National Security Councils were signed (Ministry of External Afairs 2018c). Both sides have agreed to strengthen cooperation in the feld of border protection and management, especially between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and Mongolia’s General Authority of Border Protection (GABP) (Unurzul 2019).

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India’s security cooperation with Afghanistan assumes greater importance because of the security situation prevailing in this war-ravaged nation. Point no. 5 of the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, which states “India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces”, is important herewith. India agreed to continue to train Afghan security forces, as it has been doing for the past few years, and also provide lethal and nonlethal weapons to Afghanistan to strengthen its security infrastructure. Both countries are mulling over a high-level institutionalized dialogue on jointanti-terrorism eforts. India supports an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broadbased and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation, and underlining the need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the international community (Embassy of India, Kabul). However, the security situation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of international forces and subsequent Taliban takeover has remained a serious concern for India. The frst meeting of the National Security Advisers of India and all the fve CARs was held on 6 December 2022, which aims at boosting security in the region. India’s Soft Power

Soft power has been India’s most efective endeavour to renew relationship with these valued neighbours in Inner Asia. While emphasizing India’s history and cultural heritage linkage that has percolated into the hearts and minds of the people of Inner Asia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has talked about four commonalities between the two regions: “common interests”, “common issues”, “common heritage”, and “common historical space” (Dash 2015). It is a well-known fact that India’s relations with its northern neighbours have been multi-dimensional, deep, old and continuous from the ancient times till date. The major advantage with India while dealing with these valued neighbours, according to one former Indian diplomat, has been its soft power status with a plethora of virtues such as democracy, secularism, non-alignment, plural society, eclectic culture and signifcant technological and scientifc advancement (Bhadrakumar 2013). In this age of globalization, economy or trade may be ruling the roost, but culture matters the most. Indian government promotes culture as the fulcrum of her contact, cooperation and coordination with these friendly neighbours. The admiration, respect and friendliness Inner Asian people and Indians have towards each other is well known. This could be the basis of people-to-people contact between the two regions. India’s eforts during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 to provide all kinds of medical support, equipment, medicines and vaccines to more than 100 countries, including the CARs like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan, have been dubbed as “high mark of friendship and solidarity” (Asian News International 2020) by Kazakh President, Kassym-Jomart K. Tokayev.

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Conclusion

India has found Inner Asian neighbours as her “immediate”, “near”, “extended” or “northern” neighbours, who assume great importance for India from many angles, be it strategic, economic or security. Successive Indian governments in the post–Cold War period have made constant eforts to keep these neighbours in good humour. The “New India” under Prime Minister Narendra Modi not only feels it, but also thinks it wise to reach out to the countries in this strategically important neighbourhood, revive the old historical-cultural linkage, reinvigorate new avenues of cooperation and reap maximum dividends for the country’s national interest. Though not on great fnancial terms, but on strategic point of view, and from energy angle, India is gaining the confdence of these neighbours day by day and setting its foothold in the region. India, as the President of three important international summits (G-20, SCO and UN Security Council) in 2023, had organized the SCO summit and G-20 summit at New Delhi successfully. This will help asserting her stature as a global leader, and rebuilding faith and trust in the minds of the Inner Asian people as well as leaders and having an image makeover. India has to cash in on this unwavering faith by the people and political leaders of the CARs. The waning infuence of the PRC, especially the Chinese complicity in the COVID-19 conundrum, and resistance in the CARs (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) against Chinese activities in the region can be a boon in disguise for India to step up its activities in the region. References Asian News International. 2020. “‘High Mark of Friendship’: Kazakh President Thanks India for Medical Supplies to Combat Covid-19.” April 19. Accessed April 19, 2020. www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/high-mark-of-friendship-kazakhpresident-thanks-india-for-medical-supplies-to-combat-covid-1920200419010247/ Bhadrakumar, M. K. 2013. “The Geopolitics of Central Asia: India and the Scramble for Resources.” In Energy Security: India, Central Asia and the Neighbourhood, edited by Rashmi Doraiswamy. New Delhi: Manak. Burna-Asef, Sophia Nina. 2022. “India’s Plan to Realize TAPI.” The Diplomat. April 12. Access October 12, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/indias-planto-realize-tapi/ Business Standard. 2019 “India and Kazakhstan to Renew Uranium Supply Contract for 2020–24.” November 18. Accessed October 10, 2020. www.business-standard. com/article/pti-stories/india-kazakhstan-to-renew-uranium-supply-contractfor-2020-24-119111801605_1.html Chaudhury, Deepanjon Roy. 2019. “India Inks Deals to Get Uranium Supply from Uzbekistan.” The Economic Times. January 19. Accessed October 22, 2020. https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com Chavan, Akshay. 2020. “Uncovering Afghanistan’s Pre-Islamic Past.” July 29. Accessed September 29, 2020. www.livehistoryindia.com/history-daily/2020/07/29/afghanistanspre-islamic-past

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China International Import Expo. 2023. “China, Central Asian Countries Build up Strong Economic and Trade Ties”. May 18. Accessed October 13, 2023. https:// www.ciie.org/zbh/en/news/exhibition/focus/20230518/37515.html Dash, P. L. 2015. “When Central Asia Calls.” Indian Express. July 27. Debata, Mahesh Ranjan. 2008. “Central Asian Studies at JNU: Politics, Economy and International Relations.” Paper Presented at International Seminar on “Central Asia-India Dialogue: Building a Partnership on the Foundation of Rich Cultural and Historical Heritage”. Tashkent, Uzbekistan. March 14–15. Debata, Mahesh Ranjan. 2011. “Hizb-ut-Tehrir: The Destabilising Factor in Central Asia.” In Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, edited by K. Warikoo, 124–138. London and New York: Routledge. Debata, Mahesh Ranjan. 2017. “India-Xinjiang Historico-Cultural Linkages.” International Studies. January–October, 54 (1–4): 218–230. Debata, Mahesh Ranjan. 2018. “25 Years of India-Central Asia Relations: An Overview.” In Imagining India as a Global Power: Prospects and Challenges, edited by Sangit K. Ragi, Sunil Sondhi and Vidhan Pathak, 168–182. London and New York: Routledge. Debata, Mahesh Ranjan. 2020. “India’s Central Asia Push under Narendra Modi Government.” Indian Studies Review. January–June, 1 (1): 1–22. Embassy of India, Kabul (Afghanistan). “India-Afghanistan Relations.” Accessed April 30, 2020. https://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0354?000 The Embassy of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (London, UK). 2019. Accessed April  2, 2020. http://afghanistanembassy.org.uk/english/business-investment/ extractive-industries/ Eurasian Research Institute. 2015. “Recent Developments in India-Kazakhstan Energy Cooperation.” Akhmet Yassawi University. July 21–27. Accessed April 30, 2020. www.ayu.edu.tr/static/aae_haftalik/aae_bulten_en_30.pdf Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2020. “A BRI(DGE) Too Far: The Unfulflled Promise and Limitations of China’s Involvement in Afghanistan.” June. Accessed July 1, 2020. www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_afghanistan_ felbab_brown.pdf Gupta, Arvind and Sarita Azad. 2011. “Evaluating India’s Strategic Partnership Using Analytic Hierarchy Process.” IDSA Comment. September 17. Accessed May 17, 2019. https://idsa.in/idsacomments Indian Express. 2008. “China Potential Threat Number One: George.” March 30. Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2011a. “Joint Statement on PM’s Visit to Kazakhstan.” April 16. Accessed May 16, 2019. http://meaindia. nic.in Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2011b. “Text of Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” October 4. Accessed March 4, 2019. www.mea.gov.in Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2015a. “Joint Statement for IndiaMongolia Strategic Partnership.” May 17. August 11, 2019. https://mea.gov.in Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2015b. “Joint Statement for IndiaMongolia Strategic Partnership (May 17, 2015).” May 17. Accessed May 18, 2015. www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25253 Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2015c. “Joint Statement between Uzbekistan and India during the Prime Minister’s Visit to Uzbekistan.” July 6. Accessed April 6, 2016. www.mea.gov.in

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Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2015d. “List of Agreements Signed During the Visit of Prime Minister to Uzbekistan (6–7 July 2015).” July 7. Accessed April 6, 2016. www.mea.gov.in Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2015e. “List of Agreements Signed During the Visit of Prime Minister to Kazakhstan (7–8 July 2015).” July 8. Accessed August 11, 2019. www.mea.gov.in Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2015f. “Tej Kadam: IndiaKazakhstan Joint Statement.” July 8. Accessed April 6, 2016. www.mea.gov.in Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2018a. “English Translation of Prime Minister’s Intervention in Extended Plenary of 18th SCO Summit (June 10, 2018).” June 11. Accessed August 11, 2019. https://mea.gov.in/SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/29971/English_translation_of_Prime_Ministers_Intervention_ in_Extended_Plenary_of_18th_SCO_Summit_June_10_2018 Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2018b. “India-Turkmenistan Relations.” December. Accessed August 11, 2019. https://mea.gov.in Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2018c. “Brief on India-Mongolia Bilateral Relations.” January 25. Accessed March 25, 2019. https://mea.gov.in/ Portal/ForeignRelation/25_January_2018.pdf Ministry of External Afairs. Government of India. 2019. “Press Statement by EAM after First India-Central Asia Dialogue.” January 13. Accessed August 11, 2019. www.mea.gov.in Modi, Narendra. 2019. “PM Modi Addresses SCO Summit 2019 in Bishkek.” June 14, August 11, 2019. www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-addresses-the-sco-summit-inbishkek-545281 Niti Ayog. Government of India. 2020. “India 2020 Energy Policy Review.” August 11. Accessed August 29, 2020. https://niti.gov.in/sites/default/fles/2020-01/IEAIndia%202020-In-depth-EnergyPolicy_0.pdf Sen, Sudhi Ranjan, Ragini Saxena and Eltaf Najafzada. 2020. “Lashkar, Jaish, Taliban, IS-K ‘Joining Hands’ to Target Indian Interests in Afghanistan.” The Print. July 29. Accessed January 2, 2021. https://theprint.in/world/lashkar-jaish-talibanis-k-joining-hands-to-target-indian-interests-in-afghanistan/470105/ Sikri, Rajiv. 2008. “India’s Relations with Central Asia.” In Emerging Asia in Focus, edited by in P. L. Dash. New Delhi: Academic Excellence. Soni, Sharad K. 2015. “The ‘Third Neighbour’ Approach of Mongolia’s Diplomacy of External Relations: Efects on Relations between India and Mongolia.” India Quarterly 71 (1). Stobdan, P. 2020. India and Central Asia: The Strategic Dimension. New Delhi: Pentagon. Unurzul, M. 2019. “Joint Statement on Strengthening the Strategic Partnership between Mongolia and India.” September 23. Accessed April 2, 2020. https:// montsame.mn/en/read/201478 World Nuclear Association. 2021a. “Uranium of Uzbekistan.” February. Accessed April 2, 2021. www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-fgures/uranium-production-fgures.aspx World Nuclear Association. 2021b. “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan.” February. Accessed April 2, 2021. www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/ country-profles/countries-g-n/kazakhstan.aspx World Nuclear News. 2022. “Indian Minister Provides Uranium, Construction Updates.” April 5. Accessed October 5, 2022. www.world-nuclear-news.org/ Articles/Indian-minister-provides-uranium,-construction-upd

13 INDIA’S CONNECTIVITY WITH EURASIA INSTC and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor Gatikrushna Mahanta

Introduction

The Eurasian region holds economic and strategic signifcance for India. Although India has established friendly relations with the post-Soviet countries after their independence, it has not been able to use the opportunity to develop vibrant economic cooperation with these states. The former Soviet Union was India’s major trade partner. However, India’s trade with the 15 post-Soviet countries has varied from about 1.53 per cent to 2.16 per cent in the last eight years ending 2021–2022 (see Table 13.1). Connectivity has been one of the major hurdles in enhancing trade ties with Eurasia. There is a renewed Indian interest to develop ties with the region. For example, India’s Connect Central Asia Policy (2012) refects her interest to reengage the CARs. The policy emphasizes the need for greater connectivity with the region. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to all fve CARs and Russian city of Ufa for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in July 2015 indicates India’s interest in strengthening cooperation with Eurasia. India’s joining in the SCO in July 2017 as a full member provides India with a common platform to share with four CARs (except Turkmenistan) and two of their signifcant neighbours Russia and China. India has a strategic partnership with Russia and Kazakhstan, two important members of the EAEU. India shares a historical relationship and strategic partnership with Russia, which is India’s largest trading partner in the Eurasian region (Patnaik 2017). However, till now India-Russia trade has not achieved its actual potential. The trade between India and the Eurasian region takes place via the European route or East Asian route. Lack of direct access to the region DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-16

170

Countries

2014–15

2015–16

2016–17

2017–18

2018–19

2019–20

2020–21

2021–22

Russia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Ukraine Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia Belarus Moldova Estonia Latvia Lithuania Total India’s Total Trade % Share

6,346.23 952.35 38.53 58.09 105.03 226.31 2,587.89 308.96 92.29 105.02 230.31 10.22 186.15 134.34 215.15 11,596.87 758,371.89 1.53

6,172.79 504.84 26.90 32.24 115.50 139.89 2,010.21 110.47 36.82 107.04 200.63 12.70 205.72 141.07 302.44 10,119.26 643,298.84 1.57

7,489.36 642.16 31.93 42.26 78.92 155.51 2,791.63 501.93 31.38 122.45 210.73 18.45 199.96 155.25 367.15 12,839.07 660,209.46 1.94

10,686.85 1,032.81 59.53 74.24 80.46 234.39 2,686.07 626.29 33.91 104.30 255.39 8.71 140.86 164.85 293.23 16,481.89 769,107.15 2.14

8,229.91 851.91 32.60 26.52 66.27 328.14 2,731.82 191.34 26.85 132.58 282.91 9.02 172.53 273.97 339.51 13,695.88 844,156.51 1.62

10,110.68 2,458.29 30.46 23.80 37.89 247.06 2,524.60 327.12 42.05 94.17 203.21 8.96 119.50 384.79 372.86 16,985.44 788,070.32 2.16

8141.26 1030.92 43.87 54.51 60.64 295.01 2590.83 279.88 166.29 186.22 349.95 12.58 111.79 152.36 484.71 13,960.82 686,244.36 2.03

13124.68 560.89 34.68 46.09 114.36 342.53 3386.29 141.23 162.32 360.55 446.41 9.12 134.40 267.57 531.77 19,662.89 1,035,056.45 1.90

(Values in US$ Millions) Source: Prepared by the author from the data of Department of Commerce: Export Import Data Bank, Government of India. 2022. Accessed October 20, 2021. https://commerce-app.gov.in/eidb/iecntq.asp

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TABLE 13.1 India’s Trade with Eurasian Countries, 2014–2015 to 2021–2022

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is a major obstacle for strong economic ties. India could address the issue by implementing two routes passing through Iran: (1) International NorthSouth Transport Corridor (INSTC) and (2) India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor that connects Iran’s Chabahar port with Afghanistan and then to Central Asia. This chapter discusses the developments that have taken place in the INSTC and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor so far. It highlights the challenges the aforesaid two routes face. The chapter argues that the implementation of these routes through Iran can address India’s connectivity issues with the Eurasian region. International North-South Transport Corridor

INSTC is a 7,200-kilometre-long multi-modal (ship, rail and road route) and multi-national transport project, which was started by India, Russia and Iran. The Inter-Governmental Agreement on INSTC was signed on 12 September 2000 at St. Petersburg during second Euro-Asian Conference on Transport on 16 May 2002. INSTC has 13 members (Iran, Russia, India, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Oman, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Syria, Ukraine, Turkey and Kyrgyzstan) and one observer member (Bulgaria). Iran is the Depositary State, which shall inform the parties regarding accession by other countries to this Agreement and regarding cessation of this Agreement by any Party (INSTC Corridor 2018c). The details of the route are as follows: Mumbai to Bandar Abbas (Iran) by ship, Bandar Abbas to Bandar-e-Anzali and Amirabad (Iranian ports on the Caspian Sea) by road/rail, Bandar-e-Anzali to Astrakhan (Russia) by ship through Caspian Sea and from Astrakhan to Moscow and northern Europe by Russian railways (The Hindu 2003). Article 1.1 of the Inter-Governmental Agreement on INSTC describes transport network as follows: “transport infrastructure and transport mode providing transportation of passengers and goods by rail, sea, road, river and air routes. However, in case of India, transport infrastructure and transport modes providing transportation of goods by sea routes only” (INSTC Secretariat 2018d). The main objectives of the Corridor are as follows: • Increasing efectiveness of transport ties in order to organise goods and passenger transport along the international “North-South” transport corridor; • Promotion of access to the international market through rail, road, sea, river and air transport of the state Parties to this Agreement; • Assistance in increasing the volume of international transport of passengers and goods; • Providing security of travel, safety of goods as well as environmental protection according to the international standard;

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• Harmonisation of transport policies as well as law and legislative basis in the feld of transport for the purpose of implementing this Agreement; and • Setting up equal non-discriminative conditions for all types of transport service providers from all the parties in transport of passengers and goods within the framework of the international “North-South” transport corridor. (INSTC Secretariat 2018a) The Coordination Council of the INSTC was established at the St. Petersburg meeting in 2002 to oversee implementation of the Corridor. According to Article 6 of the INSTC agreement, a Coordination Council is to “regulate the issues related to implementation and application of the provisions of this Agreement” (INSTC Secretariat 2018b). Later on, two Expert Groups were established to facilitate the implementation of the route. Table 13.2 shows the suggestions of the frst Expert Group on the transit time from Mumbai to Moscow. The Corridor has been diversifed with the gradual addition of new routes. The western branch of the INSTC is a land route crossing through Azerbaijan connecting Astrakhan with Rasht (Iran). Azerbaijan’s section of the western branch and the Qazvin-Rasht section (164 kilometres) of the TABLE 13.2 Transit Time

Voyage Leg

Mode

Current Situation

Recommendation

Direct Service Indirect Direct Indirect (days) Service Service Service (with (days) (days) transhipment*) (days) Mumbai/Bandar Abbas Bandar Abbas Bandar Abbas/Bandar Anzali Bandar Anzali Bandar Anzali/ Astrakhan Astrakhan Astrakhan/Moscow Total Duration

Sea – Road

5 3 4

8 3 4

5 1 3

8 1 3

– Sea

7 4

7 4

4 3

4 3

7 7 37

7 7 40

3 5 24

3 5 27

– Rail-Road

Source: INSTC Secretariat. 2002. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Expert Group (1) constituted by the International “North-South” Transport Corridor Co-ordination Council on “Commercial & Operational Matters.”17–18 December. Accessed January 19, 2019. http:// instcorridor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/1st_EG1-Meeting_Mumbai-Dec-2002.pdf * Transhipment is transfer of cargo from one ship to other form of transport to another.

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Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway line (350 kilometres) in Iran have been completed (Azernews 2018). The construction of the Rasht-Astara railway line is under progress (Mammadova 2018). Once completed, the western branch would be the fastest and shortest land route connecting St. Petersburg and Bandar Abbas (Chatterjee 2018). The eastern branch is a 926-kilometre-long railway route connecting Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (ITK) that passes through western Turkmenistan and connects Uzen (western Kazakhstan) to Gorgan (northern Iran). The route became functional in 2014 of which 146 kilometres of the route lie in Kazakhstan, 700 kilometres in Turkmenistan and 80 kilometres in Iran (Tehran Times 2014). This route can be used from the Chabahar port after completion of Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad line, which will be benefcial for India (Roy 2015). The route reduces the distance between the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Europe by 600 kilometres and would integrate countries in the Eurasian region with Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf (Roy 2015). Progress on the Corridor has been slow, but developments since 2012 have increased optimism. In January 2012, New Delhi hosted a meeting of the INSTC member countries to discuss modalities for implementing the project. The meeting called for necessary cooperation of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey to complete the missing links in INSTC. Kyrgyzstan and Turkey are now members of INSTC, and Uzbekistan has shown interest to join. Further, the sixth meeting of the Experts Group I and II of the Coordination Council of INSTC project was held in May 2012 in New Delhi and the ffth Coordination Council meeting was held at Baku in June 2013. In 2012, the Expert Group of INSTC had suggested a dry run of container on INSTC and India had then volunteered to conduct it. It was completed in August 2014 by the Federation of Freight Forwarders’ Associations in India (FFFAI) with 2´20-foot containers on two routes: Nhava Sheva (Mumbai)Bandar Abbas-Baku and Nhava Sheva-Bandar Abbas-Amirabad-Astrakhan route via Caspian Sea (Daily Shipping Times 2015). The dry run showed that shipment cost of the cargo can be reduced by $2,500 per 15 tonnes of cargo (Prasad 2015). It suggested that the route through Bandar Abbas is the most efective route connecting India and Eurasian countries (Ministry of Commerce, Government of India 2014). The FFFAI in cooperation with India’s Ministry of Commerce organized the INSTC conference at Mumbai on 12 June 2015 to generate awareness about the Corridor among stakeholders. The sixth INSTC Coordination Council meeting and the seventh Expert Committee meeting were held on 19–21 August 2015 in New Delhi. The seventh Coordination Council Meeting of INSTC and eighth Meeting of Expert Groups were held in Tehran on 4–5 March 2019. All member countries (except Kyrgyzstan) attended the meeting. It was decided in the meeting to constitute a follow-up committee with a representative from each member country. It proposed to start a

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single transporting or forwarding company as a joint venture with equities of member countries to oversee the project. The joint venture would deal with various challenges like regulation and customs. Because of the pandemic, the INSTC Coordination Council Meeting in 2020 was not held; thus the progress of the project has been slowed down. Regular meetings of the institutionalized bodies of the INSTC highlight the willingness of member countries to speed up the implementation of the Corridor. The inauguration of Qazvin-Rasht railway line on 6 March 2019 is another milestone. Earlier, in October 2018, India-Kazakhstan-Iran-Turkmenistan meeting was held in India to create awareness among Indian entrepreneurs doing business in Eurasia through the eastern branch of INSTC. In 2022, greater activity in the INSTC route has been seen. The sanctions on Russia following the war in Ukraine have increased the signifcance of the INSTC route and there is increase in the volume of trade through INSTC. Due to Western sanctions, Russia is keen to see the route as a major corridor for trade with India and other countries. INSTC began operation in June 2022 with the frst shipment from St. Petersburg reaching Mumbai in July 2022. The cargo travelled from St. Petersburg by rail to Astrakhan port, then by ship to the Bandar-e-Anzali port, further by rail to Bandar Abbas port and from there by ship to Mumbai. Using the INSTC, Iran Shipping Lines (ISL) transported about 3,000 tonnes of goods and 114 containers during May– July 2022. Earlier in April 2022, ISL established an operational Working Group for developing transportation along INSTC. ISL has so far allocated 300 vessels to transport goods through the Corridor. At present, the bulk of trade through INSTC via Iran is primarily trade between Russia and India. Addressing the sixth Caspian Sea Summit (July 2022), Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted the INSTC as the key connectivity link between India and Russia, describing it as a “transport artery from St. Petersburg to ports in Iran and India” (Roy Chaudhury 2022). India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor

Given the India-Pakistan conundrum, the routes passing through Iran are ideal for India to connect with Eurasia, particularly with Central Asia and Russia. Another corridor connecting India with Eurasia via Iran is from Chabahar port, that is the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor. The Chabahar-Zahedan railway project will connect Chabahar port with Iran-Afghanistan border. From Zahedan, the ZaranjDelaram road developed by India will connect Iran with major Afghan cities. Further, extending this route to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan would add to regional integration and connectivity. This route addresses India’s concern to access Afghanistan.

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The Chabahar port is a crucial point in promoting trade and connectivity among India, Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. In May 2016, India, Iran and Afghanistan signed the Trilateral Chabahar Agreement to establish an International Transport and Transit Corridor, and to develop and operate the Chabahar port. This corridor will improve connectivity and trade with Afghanistan, which further can be extended to Central Asia. Chabahar reduces the burden on Bandar Abbas, which handles about 85 per cent of Iran’s seaborne trade and is highly congested (Ramachandran 2014). Chabahar can handle cargo ships bigger than 100,000 tonnes (Ramachandran 2019). Integrating Chabahar port with INSTC will further enhance regional connectivity. The frst phase of Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, developed by India, was inaugurated in December 2017. Shahid Kalantari and Shahid Behesti are the two terminals in Chabahar. The Shahid Kalantari terminal, the older port, handles about 2.1 million tonnes of cargo per year. With the operationalization of the Shahid Behesti terminal, the cargo-handling capacity of Chabahar port has increased to about 10 million tonnes per year. The capacity of Shahid Behesti terminal is expected to increase from present 8.5 million tonnes to 15 million tonnes on completion of Phase I of the project (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2022a). India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone (IPGCFZ), a subsidiary of India Ports Global Limited (IPGL), has been taking over logistics and cargo handling services of Chabahar port since 24 December 2018. It is expected that for fnancial transactions India, Afghanistan and Iran would open their bank branches, such as Pasargard, Iranian Bank in Mumbai, India’s UCO Bank in Tehran and Gazanfar, Afghan Bank in Chabahar (Stobdan 2017). India hosted second Maritime India Summit-2021 (virtually) on 4 March 2021, which was attended by the Ministers related to trade or transport of Afghanistan, Armenia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. The Chabahar port has emerged as a commercial transit hub for the region and has played a critical role in delivering humanitarian aid and emergency supplies to Afghanistan and Iran during the pandemic (Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2021b). India has shipped through Chabahar port 75,000 metric tonnes of wheat as humanitarian food assistance to Afghanistan in 2020. In 2021, India supplied 40,000 litres of pesticide to Iran to address the locust attack in Iran through this route (Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2022). The frst shipment of dried fruits from Afghanistan and aquatic products from Iran to South-East Asia took place through the Chabahar Port in 2020 (The Hindu 2021). Further, till July 2022, 2.5 million tonnes of wheat and 2,000 tonnes of pulses have been trans-shipped from India to Afghanistan through Chabahar. In a question put up in Indian Parliament (Question No. 1340) regarding the Chabahar port, the Government stated that from December 2018 to

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July 2022, Chabahar has handled 215 vessels, 16,000 twenty-foot equivalent units and 4 million tonnes of cargo (Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2022). It has handled several shipments and trans-shipments from countries like Russia, Brazil, Thailand, Germany, Ukraine, Oman, Romania, Bangladesh, Australia, Kuwait, Uzbekistan and UAE (Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2021a). To recognize the growing importance of Chabahar, the frst Chabahar Day was celebrated in 2021 during the Maritime India Summit-2021. This refects “India’s strong commitment to work together with all regional stakeholders to enhance connectivity in our region and provide unhindered access to the sea to the landlocked Central Asian countries through Chabahar” (Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2021b). The second Chabahar Day was celebrated in Mumbai on 31 July 2022. India’s Ministry of Ports, Shipping & Waterways and the IPGL observed Chabahar Day to promote optimum use of the port to connect India with landlocked Central Asia. India pushed to link Chabahar Port with INSTC as part of its trade and business outreach (The Economic Times 2022). The Minister for the Indian Ports, Shipping & Waterways observed: “Our vision is to make Chabahar Port a transit hub under the INSTC to reach out to CIS countries”. He stated, “The idea of INSTC via the vibrant Shahid Beheshti Port at Chabahar in Iran is an idea to connect the two markets using a multi modal logistical corridor. This will rationalise our logistics cost which will contribute towards the trade volume between the two regions” (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2022b). The Chabahar Port linking the Central Asian region with South Asian markets is a signifcant development promoting trade, economic cooperation and connecting people between the two regions (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2022b); it has thus emerged as a “commercial transit hub for the region” (Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2022). The India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor would link Chabahar port with the garland highways of Afghanistan through Zahedan and then it can be connected with the bordering CARs. In 2011, the Uzbek state railway company Ozbekiston Temir Yollari built a short 75-kilometre-single-rail link between Hairatan in Uzbek-Afghan border and Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan). Uzbekistan and Afghanistan are negotiating to extend the railway line of about 700 kilometres from Mazar-i-Sharif (north of Afghanistan) to Herat (west of Afghanistan) passing through Sheberghan, Andkhoy and Maymana towns. To make the Corridor more efective and economical, there is a need to connect Mashhad with Herat, which will link the northern part of Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad line with the garland highways (Stobdan 2017). India joined the Ashgabat Agreement in 2018. It was initiated in April 2011 and came into force in April 2016 to establish an international multimodal

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transport and transit corridor between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. The prime objective of the Agreement is to enhance connectivity within the Eurasian region and integrate it with other regional transport corridors, including the INSTC. India joined the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (Transports Internationaux Routiers Convention, 1975) in 2017 to facilitate seamless transfer of goods throughout Asian and European countries. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which administers the Convention, defnes TIR Carnet as a standard internationally recognized Customs Document. TIR Carnet serves as a proof of an internationally valid guarantee that is exemption from paying Customs duties during transit. Digital and paperless border formalities, which are required for eTIR came into force on 25 May 2021, will give impetus to digitalization. It will support green, contactless and resilient freight movements in the TIR including INSTC countries (The EurAsian Times 2021). Being a member of TIR Carnet, India now is part of the single transport corridor. The Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (ITK) railway line, also part of the INSTC, is a major route of the Ashgabat Agreement. The proposed Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad corridor could be connected to Sarakhs (Iran-Turkmen border) and in future linked to the existing Eurasian railway line that connects other parts of Central Asia (Stobdan 2018b). Further, if the Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad line materializes, the Chabahar port can also be connected with the INSTC. During Maritime India Summit-2021, India proposed to link the Chabahar port with the INSTC that can change the “geo-economy” of region (Haidar 2021). India’s Minister of External Afairs, in his address at the Maritime India Summit-2021, said: The INSTC is an important trade corridor project, wherein India is partnering with 12 countries to establish an economic corridor for the beneft of our peoples. We also welcome the interest of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan to join the multilateral corridor project. Establishing an eastern corridor through Afghanistan would “maximize its potential.” India has also proposed the inclusion of Chabahar in the INSTC route. (Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India 2021b) The SCO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in July 2022 emphasized improving connectivity. The sudden disruptions caused by the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine confict have highlighted the importance of secured and robust connectivity. India’s Minister of External Afairs S. Jaishankar indicated the signifcance of the Chabahar Port for improving India’s trade ties with the CARs and emphasised the port’s potential for enhancing economic cooperation in the SCO region (Girdhar 2022).

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Benefts of the Corridors for India

India’s interest in the progress of the south-north or north-south axis is driven by her energy interest in Iran, Central Asia and Russia and Afghanistan’s mining sector (Patnaik 2017). India is showing greater willingness to play a stronger economic role in the Eurasian region. The aforesaid two routes once fully operationalized will address India’s major handicap in establishing ties with the Eurasian region. Bypassing Pakistan, India can connect with Afghanistan and Eurasia via Iran. Lower cost and reduced transport time will make Indian goods economically viable. India depends on the sea route via the Red Sea, Suez Canal, Mediterranean, North Seas (via Rotterdam) and the Baltic Sea to St. Petersburg, and through China to transport goods to Russia. China, Europe or Iran routes are used to trade with Central Asia and other Eurasian countries. These routes are expensive and long. INSTC is a viable alternative as it is 40 per cent shorter and 30 per cent cheaper. The Suez Canal route takes 45–60 days, whereas the INSTC would take 25–30 days (Roy 2015). Once implemented, the INSTC will reduce travel time between Moscow and Mumbai by 15–20 days (The Hindu 2003). The INSTC will facilitate India’s access and trade with Central Asia, Russia and Europe. India-Russia trade is expected to grow from $6 billion in 2015–16 to $30 billion by 2025. Due to the Russia-Ukraine war and the subsequent Western sanctions on Russia, the INSTC is emerging as an efective alternate route for India-Russia trade. It is argued that with the operationalization of the Chabahar port and INSTC, India’s trade with Eurasia could grow up to $170 billion, including $60.6 billion export and $107.4 billion import (Stobdan 2017). The INSTC provides the countries in the region an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI projects in the Eurasian region connect Europe to China via the CARs and Russia giving China access to the resources of the region. China plans to connect Turkey and Iran via the BRI (Roy Chaudhury 2022). The completion of the rail link connecting western China and Tehran passing through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan makes Iran a vital point in BRI project (Dorsey 2020). The development and operationalization of the Chabahar port substantiates India’s growing eforts to connect with the Eurasian region. In October 2017, the frst shipment of 1.1 million tonnes of wheat from India to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port took place. The Chabahar port will broaden Afghanistan’s options, and reduce its dependence on Karachi port for transit. Afghanistan has reduced about 80 per cent of its cargo trafc from Karachi to Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. Afghanistan is likely to reduce its dependency on Pakistan for transit of Afghan goods by using the Chabahar port (Stobdan 2018b). The completion of the Shahid Beheshti terminal and India joining the Ashgabat Agreement and TIR Convention widen the “scope of Chabahar to

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become a vital gateway and the shortest land route to access Central Asia” (Stobdan 2017) and “fast-tracking implementation of the INSTC” (Stobdan 2018a). Analysts argue that India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor and Chabahar port can counter the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar port respectively (Stobdan 2017). The waiver of the U.S. sanctions on the Chabahar port in November 2018 is a positive signal for regional connectivity. Compared to Gwadar, the Chabahar port enjoys several advantages, as Sajjanhar (2018) describes: It is located in a peaceful region as opposed to Gwadar which is situated in a violent and terrorism prone province. The possibilities for establishing manufacturing and downstream petrochemical industries in Chabahar are much greater as ready, easy, cheap natural gas is available in plentiful in Iran. Above all, Chabahar is a natural harbour and can serve as the sourcing point for the INSTC which has also been taken up much more seriously in recent years. For the CARs, Chabahar ofers the shortest land route option for maritime trade. The Chabahar route provides a secure and commercially viable access to the Indian Ocean region for the CARs. It will not only provide connectivity, but also boost investments, thereby improving India’s cultural and political ties (The Economic Times 2022). Since the pandemic followed by Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 and the subsequent humanitarian crisis, India has used the Chabahar port to ship humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Iran too will beneft from the routes. Both the Corridors will increase Iran’s trade opportunities with the Eurasian region. These Corridors thus provide more avenues for the member countries by opening multiple trade and transport opportunities. The two routes can be further connected with other transport networks in the region, thereby widening its opportunities like the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and regional corridors like Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC). Challenges in Implementing the Corridors

The recent years have seen signifcant progress in the two Corridors, reinforcing the strategic signifcance of Iran for India’s connectivity with the Eurasian region. Eforts in the last few years explain the willingness of the members to fructify the two projects. These routes in addition to economic benefts hold strategic signifcance for India. Various challenges have impeded the implementation of the Corridors. Despite having addressed a number of issues, many more challenges are yet to be resolved. INSTC still sufers from several logistical issues like availability of funds for building various infrastructure projects and low level of container trade.

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The U.S. sanctions on Iran have also afected the progress of the INSTC. For example, the U.S. sanctions have impeded the development of the section from Bandar Abbas to northern Iran. Lack of funds for up-gradation due to the U.S. sanctions on Iran has slowed down the progress in this section. An unresolved issue is the payment and insurance for the Iranian part of the route. Banks are worried about Iran-related transactions, although transit goods are not covered by sanctions. The most important obstruction to the success of the INSTC route is the lack of banking channels (Srivastava 2022). For the India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor, security issues remain a serious impediment. The volatile situation of the Af-Pak region is a major threat to connectivity networks passing through this region. Active participation and cooperation of the CARs bordering Afghanistan, besides Iran and Afghanistan, are crucial for the implementation of the Corridor (Stobdan 2017). Conclusion

Enhancing transport network via Iran would address India’s connectivity issues with the Eurasian region and Afghanistan. As Iran is the vital link in the projects, U.S. sanctions on Iran impede the implementation of the transport network. For example, to build and upgrade the infrastructure for the INSTC huge funds are required; U.S. sanctions on Iran have afected the availability of funds. The waiver on the Chabahar port from the re-imposed U.S. sanctions on Iran in November 2018 is a welcome step that needs to be pursued for other projects too. Geopolitical dimensions will be crucial for the projects as both hold strategic signifcance. Further, the New Silk Route Initiative bypassing Iran is a U.S. initiative to enhance connectivity between South and Central Asia. Some analysts view INSTC as a Russian initiative to connect South Asia to Eurasia. Because of Western sanctions on Russia since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia is pushing hard to promote the INSTC route for trade with India and others in the region. The geopolitical dynamics associated with connectivity projects make it complex. Strengthening the Central Asian part of the INSTC project depends on cooperation of countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Regional organizations like the SCO could play a more active role in enhancing connectivity projects in the Eurasian space. To attract the CARs to participate in the Chabahar project and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor, India seeks cooperation from the SCO. Active participation of Afghanistan is necessary for the success of India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor. However, with the political changes in Afghanistan since August 2021, the future of the route seems ambiguous. It is important that the regional countries make concerted efort to address the Afghan crisis.

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Given India’s handicap in accessing the Eurasian space, India needs to explore various avenues. Economic ties, particularly trade ties, will defne India’s position in the Eurasian space, which at the moment is far below its potential. It is expected that through the EAEU, India would gain access to the huge Eurasian market. For its geo-political and geo-economic interests, India in cooperation with other countries needs to pursue steadily the INSTC and India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor projects. References Azernews, 2018. “Iranian Provinces to Beneft from Qazvin-Rasht-Astara Railway – MP.” November 23. Accessed April 17, 2019. www.azernews.az/region/141442. html Chatterjee, Sanchita. 2018. “International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) Connecting India – Central Asia.” International Journal of Research in Social Sciences. April, 8 (4). Daily Shipping Times. 2015. “Indian Delegation Visit’s Iran on International North South Transport Corridor Study for New Potential Routes to Russia and CIS Destinations.” January 16. Accessed February 10, 2019. www.dailyshippingtimes. com/news-upload/upload/fullnews.php?fn_id=9490 Dorsey, James D. 2020. “Flying Under Radar: Iranian Alternative to Suez and Belt and Road.” July 21. Accessed February 25, 2021. https://insidearabia.com/ fying-under-the-radar-iran-india-russia-alternatives-to-suez-and-belt-and-road/ The Economic Times. 2022. “India Invites C Asian, Iranian, Afghan Envoys on Chabahar Day.” August 2. Accessed August 21, 2022. https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/india/india-invites-c-asian-iranian-afghan-envoys-on-chabaharday/articleshow/93282540.cms?utm_source=contentofnterest&utm_medium= text&utm_campaign=cppst The EurAsian Times. 2021. “How an India-Backed Global Transit Corridor (INSTC) Could be an Alternative to the Suez Canal.” June 5. Accessed August 18, 2022. https://eurasiantimes.com/how-an-india-backed-global-transit-corridor-instccould-be-an-alternative-to-the-suez-canal/ Girdhar, Riya. 2022. “Jaishankar Advocates for Chabahar Port at SCO.” July 30. Accessed August 22, 2022. www.newsx.com/uncategorized/jaishankar-advocatesfor-chabahar-port-at-sco.html Haidar, Suhasini. 2021.“India Pushes for Chabahar in India-Iran-Russia INSTC Corridor.” The Hindu. March 4. Accessed May 4, 2019. www.thehindu.com/ news/national/india-pushes-for-chabahar-in-india-iran-russia-instc-corridor/ article33988009.ece The Hindu. 2003. “To Expand Trade with CIS nations-Exporters Urged to Use North-South Corridor via Iran.” October 12. Accessed May 16, 2019. www.thehindubusinessline.com/2003/10/12/stories/2003101200600500.htm The Hindu. 2021. “India Pitches for Including Afghanistan, Uzbekistan in INSTC.” The Hindu Business Line. March 4. Accessed May 4, 2021. www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/india-pitches-for-including-afghanistan-uzbekistan-in-instc/article33987631.ece

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INSTC Secretariat. 2018a. “Article 2: Objectives of the Agreement, Inter Governmental Agreement on International ‘North-South’ Transport Corridor.” Tehran. Accessed January 12, 2019. http://instcorridor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ Agreement.pdf INSTC Secretariat. 2018b. “Article 6 of Inter-Governmental Agreement on International ‘North-South’ Transport Corridor.” Tehran. Accessed January 12, 2019. http://instcorridor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Agreement.pdf INSTC Secretariat. 2018c. “Article 8, Inter-Governmental Agreement of International ‘North-South’ Transport Corridor.” Accessed January 12, 2019. http:// instcorridor.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Agreement.pdf INSTC Secretariat. 2018d. “Article 1.1 of Inter-Governmental Agreement on International ‘North-South’ Transport Corridor.” Tehran: International North-South Transport Corridor Secretariat. Accessed January 12, 2019. http://instcorridor. com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Agreement.pdf Mammadova, Narmina. 2018. “Qazvin-Rasht-Astara Railway Is Unique Project.” November 12. Accessed April 17, 2019. www.azernews.az/business/140719.html Ministry of Commerce, Government of India. 2014. “Dry Run Report 2014.” August. Accessed May 2, 2019. http://commerce.nic.in/publications/INSTC_Dry_run_ report_Final.pdf Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2021a. “Question No. 189 Status of Chabahar Project.” Parliament Q&A, Lok Sabha. December 10. Accessed August 22, 2022. www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/34624/QUESTION+NO+1 89+STATUS+OF+CHABAHAR+PROJECT Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2021b. “Address by External Afairs Minister on ‘Chabahar Day’ at the Maritime India Summit 2021.” Speeches & Statements. March 4. Accessed May 4, 2021. www.mea.gov.in/ Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33584/Address_by_External_Afairs_Minister_on_ Chabahar_Day_at_the_Maritime_India_Summit_2021 Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2022. “Question No. 1340 Construction of Chabahar Port.” Parliament Q&A, Rajya Sabha. July 28. Accessed August 22, 2022. www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/35552/QUESTION+NO1 340+CONSTRUCTION+OF+CHABAHAR+PORT Patnaik, Ajay. 2017. “Looking North: Framing India’s ‘Silk Road’ Strategy.” In Central Asia and South Asia: Economic, Developmental and Socio-Cultural Linkages, edited by Rashmi Doraiswamy. New Delhi: Manak Publications. Prasad, Jayant. 2015. “Iran Deal Spells Good Tidings for India.” April 10. Accessed May 12, 2018. www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-iran-deal-spellsgood-tidings-for-india/article7085906.ece Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 2022a. August 20. “Delhi.” Accessed August 22, 2022. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1853334 Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 2022b. “Mumbai.” July 31. Accessed August 22, 2022. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1846762 Ramachandran, Sudha. 2014. “India to Invest in Iran’s Chabahar Port.” November 26. Accessed April 26, 2018. www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/ item/13099-india-to-invest-in-irans-chabahar-port.html Ramachandran, Sudha. 2019. “India Doubles Down on Chabahar Gambit.” January 14. Accessed April 26, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/india-doublesdown-on-chabahar-gambit/

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Roy Chaudhury, Dipanjan. 2022. “Amid Curbs, India-Russia Trade via INSTC Booms.” The Economic Times. August 17. Accessed August 21, 2022. https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/amid-curbs-india-russia-trade-viainstc-booms/articleshow/93603407.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_ medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst Roy, Meena Singh. 2015. “International North-South Transport Corridor: Reenergising India’s Gateway to Eurasia.” IDSA Issue Brief. August 18. Accessed May 18, 2019. https://idsa.in/system/fles/issuebrief/IB_msroy_180815.pdf Sajjanhar, Ashok. 2018. “India and Iran Resolve to Focus on Connectivity and Economic Cooperation.” February 20. Accessed June 20, 2019. https://idsa.in/ idsacomments/india-and-iran-resolve-to-focus-on-connectivity-and-economiccooperation_asajjanhar_200218 Srivastava, D.P. 2022. “India-Iran Ties: A Former Ambassador Writes.” Indian Council of World Afairs (ICWA). Government of India. August 18. Accessed August 23, 2022. www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7779&lid=5187 Stobdan, P. 2017. “To Make Chabahar a ‘Game Changer’ Central Asian States Need to Be Roped In.” December 12. Accessed May 12, 2019. https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ to-make-chabahar-a-game-changer-central-asian-states_pstobdan_121217 Stobdan, P. 2018a. “India’s Economic Opportunities in Central Asia.” IDSA Policy Brief. September 18. Stobdan, P. 2018b. “Signifcance of India Joining the Ashgabat Agreement.” February 12. Accessed May 4, 2019. https://idsa.in/idsacomments/signifcance-ofindia-joining-the-ashgabat-agreement_p-stobdan-120218 Tehran Times. 2014. “Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan Railway to Facilitate Regional Trade.” December 4: 12196. Accessed September 11, 2018. www.tehrantimes.com/ component/content/article/94-headline/119986-iran-turkmenistan-kazakhstanrailway-to-facilitate-regional-trade

14 INDIAN TRADE ALONG AFGHAN ROUTES FROM 6TH CENTURY BCE TO 19TH CENTURY CE Sunita Dwivedi

Introduction

Among the South Asia countries, Afghanistan is the most strategically placed in terms of international routes aforded by its land and river ways. A look at the map of Afghanistan will help trace the network of routes converging and diverging from Afghan cities through several passes in the Hindukush and Pamirs, and the ranges on its border with Pakistan, namely the Safed Koh, Sulaiman and Toba Kakar and along rivers fowing into the valleys of the Oxus, Kabul and Indus. The export and import facility through numerous outlets provided by Afghan routes contributed to India’s prosperity and birth of hundreds of new cities along these routes, where commodities were produced for sale. Indian goods were transported across the world marts. Necessary raw materials which India needed for its industry and defence were imported. Besides, the Afghan routes were crucial in the spread and dissemination of Indian religion and art. Names of several villages and settlements along the Afghan trade routes into Central Asia prompt one to believe that a number of Indian traders had settled in and around Afghanistan. Even today, dry fruit dealers from Punjab are settled in Karte Parwan (Kabul). In 2013, this author had the opportunity to meet some of them at their Gurudwara over langar (community meals). Indian settlement “Mela” is located near the mouth of river Vakhsh, which was called Panjab in 13th century. Indians had migrated along the Wakhan Corridor and the Karakoram Highway to settle in Xinjiang’s Yarkand and Khotan, where rulers traced their dynasty from Indian kings (Barthold 2012; Mukhamedjanov 1999; Harmatta 1999; Puri 2000).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-17

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This chapter discusses Indian trade along the routes (Uttarapath, western routes to Mediterranean, Wakhan Corridor route, Lapis Lazuli route, Sulaiman passes etc.) in the South-Central Asia region, especially through the Afghan route. It gives a detailed account of the Indian and foreign commodities or goods traded along the routes as well. Levi (2007a) studied Indian trade and cultural and political exchanges with Central Asia via Afghan routes. Goods and commodities from every corner of India, especially from the northwest (now Pakistan), were traded. Markovits (2007) described that Multani traders from Punjab and Marwaris from Rajasthan (India) were settled in Astrakhan, Moscow and Nijni-Novogorod (Russia) in the 17th and 18th centuries. Astrakhan was a major terminus of the India-Russia route. During a visit to Bukhara, Burnes (2009) found about 300 Hindu traders living in a caravanserai of their own (Hindu serai), who were chiefy natives of Shikarpur in Sindh and had come to Bukhara after selling their wares in the trade hubs of Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul. Besides, says Burnes, one Hindu from Bombay was proceeding to the shores of the Caspian as well. Afghanistan functioned as a crucial conduit for Indian goods and for China’s Sichuan and Yunnan provinces as well. The proximity of India’s northeastern region with southwest China was mentioned by Xuanzang, when he was in Pragjyotishpur (Assam) in 7th century CE (Beal 1884). Xuanzang informed that Sichuan took only 2 months to reach by land. These southern routes to Balkh via India existed even in the 2nd century BCE, when Zhang Qian, the Chinese envoy, saw in Daxia (Baktria/Balkh) bamboo stufs and cloth made in Shu (Sichuan), which the merchants told him they had brought from Shendu (Hindu/India). Zhang Qian’s observation was corroborated by Marco Polo’s report on the southern route from Yunnan to India, which states: “in the Yunnan province, horses are of a large size and the young horses are carried for sale to India (Masefeld 2003). Afghanistan provided India connection with the whole of Asia, China southern Russia and through the Mediterranean and Black Sea with Europe along the following routes: 1 Northwards through Balkh and Termez into Central Asia on an ancient road now modernized as the M-39; 2 Westwards into Margiana along the Trans-Caspian route, now modernized as the M-37; 3 North-eastwards through Badakhshan and the Wakhan Corridor into the Pamirs termed as the Wakhan Route; 4 Eastwards along the Kabul-Jalalabad route (the ancient Uttarapath) via the Khyber Pass and across Punjab into the Gangetic plains. 5 Southern routes through Ghazni and Kandahar into the middle and lower Indus region into western India.

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Trade Along the Uttarapath

The Uttarapath, also called the northern highroad, linked the Ganges Valley with the Oxus valley. It connected the heart of India with the remote regions of Central Asia. It connected with China’s Tibet, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. It connected along coastal routes with southern India. It had sea links with South-East Asian countries through the Bay of Bengal. Running along the Himalayan foothills to Taxila, Peshawar and Kabul with extensions up to Bamiyan and Balkh, the Uttarapath carried the bulk of Indian goods to Afghan trading hubs of Kandahar, Kabul, Bamiyan and Balkh. The trading hubs of Ghazni, Kandahar and Herat were reached by mountain passes of the Sulaiman range. From here, the goods were carried to the marts of Margiana, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, and all along the valley of the Arys, Chuy and Ili rivers. Uttarapath’s Links With the Black Sea and Caspian

Trade routes coming from the Black Sea and the Caspian regions after entering the Oxus Valley could cross into Afghanistan either through Uzbekistan or through Tajikistan’s southern territories at Balkh and Kunduz, respectively. The main route from Balkh followed the Uttarapath from Kabul joining the Taxila-Patliputra route up to the Bay of Bengal. This was the “mother of all routes” for India’s trade with Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caspian region and southern Russia. Goods from southern India, mainly pearls, gems, spices, elephants and ivory, were brought to this route via the Dakshinapath (southern highroad) and its many branches running along the east and west coast of India to Tamil Nadu and Kerala, and sent up to Kabul and Balkh, and across the Oxus into Central Asia. The Uttarapath is known to have existed as early as the 5th century BC. Trapussa and Bhallika, two traders from Balkh, travelled with hundreds of wagons of merchandise as far east on the Balkh-Bengal route up to Sarnath, where they met the Buddha after his Enlightenment (Beal 1884). Rtveladze (2009) calls the Uttarapath as the “Great Indian Road”, which was used exclusively for transmitting Indian goods via Afghan routes. Rtveladze tracked the route running across the river Indus, crossing the Hindu Kush range into northern Afghanistan and along the river Oxus up to Chorasmia (Khorezm). Another route to Chorasmia ran through Kandahar-Herat (and Balkh) into Margiana and northwards through the Trans-Caspian region to Chorasmia. The Chorasmian route, according to Rtveladze, continued along the Uzboi channel to the Caspian Sea, and thence through modern Azerbaijan and eastern Georgia, it crossed the Surami Pass to reach the Rioni river valley (ancient Phasis). In the lower course of the Phasis (western Georgia, legendary Colchis), as reported by Pseudo-Scymnus, was situated a

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city bearing the same name and inhabited by people of six nations, including from those of India and Bactria). The routes were facilitating trade in Indian human resources to Central Asia and the Caspian. Ibn Batuta, in his travelogue Ibn Batuta Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354, writes about Indian attendants led by “Sunbul, the Indian”, in the service of Khatun Bayalun (the Byzantine emperor’s daughter), who was travelling from Astrakhan to Constantinople. Princess Bayalun, Christian wife of Sultan Öz Beg Khan, had been given permission to return to Constantinople to give birth to a child. Batuta mentions further that the Indian slaves were brought through mountain passes of the Hindu Kush, which had a history of slave trading (Gibbs 2006). In the 14th century, the best Indian craftsmen had settled in suburbs around Samarkand to build Ak Serai, an ambitious project of Amir Timur, and Bibi Khanum mosque (Gonzalez de Clavijo and Guy Le1928, 278–300). Major Trading Commodities

Kautilya’s Arthasastra (Chandra 1977; Kangle 1965) describes Indo-Afghan trade along the Haimavata marg or the Grand Route from Balkh to India via Hindukush. This was an easier route and was used for trade in horses, woollen cloths, hides and furs. The Arthasastra gives a long list of hides and furs coming from northwest India, eastern Afghanistan and Central Asia, rubies and lapis lazuli from Badakhshan mines and yellow and green jade from the Urungkash and Karakash rivers of Khotan. Horses

This route was frequented by animal traders (especially horse traders) from India, Afghanistan, the Trans-Caspian and Khorezmian deserts and Ferghana Valley, “to obtain good quality war horses from West and Central Asia” (Chakravarti 2016; Chandra 1977); they were taken as far east as Kaviripaddinam (Kaveripatnam) on India’s east coast (Warmington 1995). During Mauryan times, special physicians, trainers and feeders were appointed to take care of horses under the Asvadhyaksas or (superintendents of horses). The Arthasastra narrates: “of those ft for use, the best come from Kamboja, Sindhu, Aratta and Vanayu; the middling from Bahlika (Balkh) Papeya, Sauvira and Titala; the rest are inferior”. Kamboja was an ancient kingdom north of Gandhara; Arattu was a part of Punjab; Vanayu was known as Arabia or Persia, and Bahlika as Bactria; Sauviras was situated along the Indus to the north of the Sindhus (Kangle 1965). India was the largest market for horses during medieval period and beyond uptill the 18th century. The bulk of the supply of horses was produced by pastoral nomads in the Kalmuk and Kazakh steppes of southern Russia, Turkoman wastes

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east of the Caspian Sea and Afghan Turkistan. Italian traveller Niccolo Manucci estimated that in the 17th century over 100,000 horses were annually imported to India from Balkh, Bukhara and Kabul with some 12,000 going directly into the stables of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (Levi 2007b). According to Alam (2007), horses were imported to India in very large numbers from trans-Caspian region of the Margiana (Turkmenistan) right from the early Middle Ages. The Uttarapath received horses not only from Margiana and Persia, but also from the steppe lands of southern Russia via a route north of the Caspian Sea through Dashtikipchaq and Transoxiana down to Khyber Pass. Traders from Bengal, Gangetic plain and Deccan were seen in Kabul and Peshawar on their way to Khurasan, Transoxiana and Turkistan, and some of them were settled in Astrakhan, Bukhara and Samarkand. War Elephants

Indian war elephants were favoured by the Greeks. Mauryan rulers had established a department for elephants under the charge of hastadhyaksas and elephant forests were strictly guarded by hastvanaraksam (Kangle 1965). Eudemos, commander of Alexander’s garrison on the Indus, after the latter had left Punjab, obtained 120 elephants by treacherously slaying a native prince in 317 BC. The importance of elephants as war animals is highlighted in the Treaty of 303 BCE between Seleucus and Chandragupta Maurya following which the former received 500 war elephants in lieu of southern Hindukush territory conceded to the latter. Antiochus the Great of Syria (223–187 BC), who invaded the Indus region for elephants, crossed the Hindu Kush and compelled an Indian King Subhagsena ruling in Kabul Valley to surrender a considerable number of elephants (Smith 2008). Indian Ivory

Dosarene, identifed with southern Kalinga, and northern Andhra areas were noted not only for their fne elephants but for their excellent ivory (Chakravarti 2016). Indian ivory and tortoise shells were used for all kinds of ornaments, also in decorating statues, chairs, beds, sceptres, scabbards, chariots, carriages and book covers and its trading was done via both land and sea routes (Warmington 1995). The tusk of Indian elephants was traded along the Herat-Merv and Balkh-Nisa routes with the Parthian state and on the western routes to Rome, where tusks were turned into jewellery, chess pieces and the unique drinking vessels, called rhytons. Excavations in old Nisa Complex have uncovered ivory articles with fabulous decorations and rare treasures lying sealed inside rooms of the Treasury or the “Quadrate”. The ivory drinking vessels depicting Greek Gods were used for libation (Gafurov 2005).

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Excavations at Afghan city of Kapisa revealed valuable information on the trade in Indian ivory along the Kabul Valley (Puri 2000). Kapisa controlled the roads to the Etymandrus valley (Helmand river), to the Cophen (Kabul) valley and to the passes in the Hindukush leading to Bactria. Its modern name is Begram, north of Kabul, near Charikar. This famous Kushan city lying at the confuence of Panjshir and Ghorband rivers had in its palace several store rooms containing hundreds of articles of carved ivory brought from India. (Litvinsky 1999). Some collections brought from Begram by the Franco-Afghan archaeological excavations between 1920s and 1939 were displayed at the Musee Guimet, Paris. Ivory also reached the city of Talkhiz near Almaty (Kazakhstan) along the Ili River route, an extension of the Chuy Valley route, where a rare statue of ivory Buddha was found during excavations by K. Baipakov and Dmitry Voyakin. Indian Textiles

Weaving of textile was one of the foremost crafts of India, especially at Varanasi, Mathura, Bengal, Paithan, Tagara and Nasik. There were a number of weaving guilds or srenis (organizations), including two known weaving organizations of Nasik (Chakravarti 2016), which were well known in Central Asia and the West. Burnes (2009) gave frst-hand records of his journey into Kabul and onwards to Bukhara through Michnee in India’s northwest frontier regions (now in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) on the Kabul river route and trade between India and Central Asia through Afghanistan. According to Burnes, “trade with India was considerable” and that the wealth of Kabul was to be found “eastwards of the Indus”. Burnes listed (1) costly fabrics of Punjab exported to kingdoms of Persia, Tartary and China; (2) Punjab salt, condiments and fruits; shawls of Lahore and Delhi; (3) “kais” of Multan having the “strength of texture and brilliancy of hue”; and (4) satin of Multan called “atlass”. To Burnes, cotton produced in the Doab region between the Sutlez and the Beas and manufactured in Hoshiarpur and Rohun and furnished white cloth of various textures were cheaper than the British-manufactured ones. Plant Products, Salts and Precious Metals

There was also brisk trade in indigo and salt. Rock salt from the Salt Range near the Jhelum, coal, iron and gold found in the Acesines (Indus) and alum, sulphur and nitre were supplied along the cities of the Oxus (Burnes 2009). Indian gold was used to pay revenue and for the purpose of trade and worship. In Dalverzintepe city, across the Oxus from Balkh, were discovered inscribed gold tablets mentioning the monks of Kalyan seaport near Mumbai (Chakravarti 2016), showing the private property of the monks, and also the

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highlighting growing importance of commerce in the Buddhist Sangha. There is no authentic information whether the gold tablet was for worship at the Buddhist temple of Dalverzintepe or for trade in Surkhandarya. The remarkable treasure of gold jewellery and gold bars with inscriptions in Kharosthi, indicating their weight, prompts one to believe that Indians used gold for trading across the Oxus river (Litvinsky 1999). Western Routes to Mediterranean

Afghanistan’s Herat province shares its western border with Mashhad (Iran) and through Towraghundi (Turkmenistan) in north making it an important trading region. Today, the Herat route enters the trans-Caspian through the small oasis settlement of Tagtabazar, on the Murghab river. The road runs through the town of Kushka (Serhetabad), 90 kilometres from Tagtabazar (Brummel 2005). The route reaches the Caspian coast and across it to Baku in Azerbaijan. A branch route skirts the southern Caspian and reaches Teheran and onwards through West Asia to reach Turkey and Europe. A southern route through Isfahan runs to Alleppo and Damascus in Syria. Buryakov et al. (1999) inform that in ancient times, on their way from Roman territories, caravans passed along the Caspian coast and entered the land of Parthia. Merchants, who wanted to deal only with India, would turn southwards from Merv and undertake an easy journey through Afghanistan passing through Herat and Seistan and then eastwards to Kandahar from where passes along the river routes in the Sulaiman mountains could be followed up to the Indus (Warmington 1995). In the 4th century BCE, the Laghman-Susa route connected with Pataliputra in the east, possibly an overlapping of the Uttarapath, along which Mauryans were trading with the Mediterranean countries. The Mauryan king Bindusara was in touch with the Syrian king Antiochus I and could have used the Laghman-Susa route to Syria on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean for trade. Bindusara had requested his Syrian counterpart to buy fne wine, fg and a sophist for him (Chakravarti 2016). Further, emperor Asoka despatched his missionaries to the Greek kingdoms, probably along the same route. Indian merchants on their trade journey to the Black Sea region could also take the Taxila-Kapisa-Balkh highway to reach Merv from where a route ran to Khorezm (Roy and Kumar 2007). Today, the modern Highway M-37 passing between the Kopet Dagh mountains and the Karakum Desert across the oases cities of Nisa, Bagabat, Abiverd, Merv and Amul (Chardzhou) in southern Turkmenistan actually corresponds to the ancient route connecting Asia and Europe. The Laghman-Susa route became an important trade route in the 6th century BCE. Raw materials and painters from India were taken through this route for building the royal palace of Darius – the “Palace of the New Year”

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(the Naubahar), “in the very heart of Persis” (Manfredi 2002). Precious lapis from Bactriana (at Badakhshan), gold from India transported by camels, precious stones from the Paropamisus (the Hindukush), linen from India, turtle breast-plates from Taxila inlaid with ivory and coral and the precious yaka wood from Gandhara were brought for this purpose. Indian painters worked on the frescoes (Manfredi 2002; Livius 2004; Wikipedia). It is worthwhile to mention here the close relation between Indians, Gandharans and Persians that was witnessed on the walls of the apadana at Persepolis. “Gandarians” (people from Gandhara) and Indians used to carry gifts in bamboo baskets, swords and shields made out of ore excavated and smelted in Indian mines, and excellent breed of milching cattle (bufaloes) as presents for king Darius through the road to Susa. Two centuries later, during Alexander’s invasion of India, thousands of high breed cattle were sent to Macedonia through this route (Dandamayev 1999). An important road to the West also passed through the Zagros mountains linking Babylon to Ecbatana and running onwards to Bactria and borders of India from where gold, ivory and incense were sent to West Asia (Dandamayev 1999). Trade in Pashm

Indian “Shawl-goat” wool or pashm/pashmina or Kashmir wool was the most sought-after commodity in Afghanistan, Persia and Europe. When Sassanid Hormizd II (302–310) married the daughter of the king of Kabul, the bride’s trousseau carried the special pashm woollen fabrics of Kashmir. (Warmington 1995). Kashmiri pashm and safron were imported by Romans. Along the Afghan routes, Indian cotton fabrics from Madhura, Aparantas, Kalingas, Kasi, Vangas, Vatsas and the Mahiisas and a special fabric called “dukula” was prepared in Bengal, Magadh and Pundras were traded (Kangle 1965). An Indian fabric dyed in a colour obtained from “red-beetle” and red dye obtained from lac-insect (Tacharrdialacca) was exported to Persia and the West. But Chinese silk was the staple article of commerce and was traded along the western land routes through Parthia. It could come via the northern regions of the Afghan Wakhan route, through the routes into Taxila and from China via the southern Silk Road or down the Brahmaputra through Assam (along with the Assamese Muga silk) (Warmington 1995). Other traded items included aromatic spices, pepper, cinnamon, costus, cardamom, ginger, aloes, indigo, rice as cereal, and precious stones like diamonds, onyx, beryl, agate, carnelian, crystal, amethyst, opal, sapphire, ruby and turquoise. Skins of lion, tiger and leopard from India also reached the markets of Rome and lyceum (berries) from lyceum shrub was packed in the skin of rhinoceros and camel for export by India (Warmington 1995). Diferent varieties of sandalwood also reached the Mediterranean countries through the western routes: red and blackish red from Satana, Grameru,

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Devasambhava, Gosrsa and Jonga; parrot’s feather from Hari; whitish red from Mala; Safron colour from Mt. Kala; black and black variegated from Kosagara; colour of moss from Naga mountains; and brown from Sakala (Kangle 1965). Pearls from India’s southern kingdoms and the Gulf of Mannar were popular as well (Warmington 1995). The best pearls, which were big, round without a fat surface, lustrous, white, heavy and smooth, as the Arthashastra describes, came from Tamraparni, Pandyaka-vata, Pasika, Kula, Curni, Mt. Mahendra, Kardama, Srotasi, the Lake and Himavat (Kangle 1965). Indigo from Bengal and Bihar were brought via Afghan routes to Alleppo (Syria) and Europe. Numerous neelkothis (indigo stores) still exist all over the eastern provinces of India and Bangladesh. Punjab towns were stocked with indigo, both locally produced and those coming from other parts of the country, mainly Bihar and Bengal. Lahore and Agra were the chief market for indigo. Indigo, which reached Europe from Aleppo or the Levant, was known as Lauri or Lahori (from Lahore) (Alam 2007). Wakhan Corridor Route

Through Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, India was in contact with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and China’s Xinjiang. North-eastwards through Badakhshan, the route ran through the Wakhan Corridor into Xinjiang and onwards to Gansu Corridor (China). The Wakhan route, on its way to Kashgar, could enter southern Tajikistan and eastern Kyrgyzstan through passes in the Pamirs. Precious green and yellow jade mined in the rivers of Yarkand and Khotan and goods from Kashgar and the foothills of the Tien Shan and the Kun Lun were brought into Afghanistan through the Wakhan Corridor and distributed all over West Asia and India. This was also the route for Indian scholars and Buddhist texts to Tarim Basin and China. Xuanzang mentions some important states of the Wakhan during 7th century AD, where Tibetan musk was prized and traded. These were Po-to-ch’ang-na  – to the east of Himatala, identifed with Badakhshan, Ku-lang-na- to south-east of the former, identifed with modern Karran (in the upper Kokcha valley), Ta-mo-sit’ie-ti- to north-east of Karran, identifed with Wakhan valley (Beal 1884). A route that connected Badakshan to the Upper Indus valley passed through Yamgan, Karran, Wakhan and Shughnan as well (Beal 1884). Musk obtained from Musk Deer in the upper Indus and Gilgit region, extending to Tibet was exported through Persia to Rome (Warmington 1995). Lapis Lazuli Route

Lapis Lazuli route, an important route emanating from Wakhan ran from Badakhshan to Balkh, was followed by Xuanzang. Through this route passed blue stone lapis and bright red rubies of Badakhshan. Lapis was transported

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from the ancient mines to the countries of the Near East. To Rtveladze (2009), by the second half of the third and the frst half of the second millennium BC, the people of the Indus had opened up a route through the Khyber Pass going north from the Indus Valley to the valley of the Amu Darya to mine lapis lazuli in Badakhshan. This could probably have been the Kunar/Chitral Valley route that opened in Badakhshan region. A report titled “Sarazm-2006” by A. Donish Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography, Tajik Academy of Sciences, stated that from ancient burial tombs of Sarazm, near Penjikent along the Zerafshan valley, there was evidence of trade with India. Bracelets made of shell obtained from the Indian Ocean were found in the grave of a princess there. It was found during this author’s travel along the Surkhandarya and Zerafshan valley route that seashells were probably taken through Badakhshan routes or Surkhandarya route across the Oxus into the Zerafshan valley. Indian Trade Along Sulaiman Passes

Indian trade was also carried along the Gomal valley route that ran into Ghazni through the Gomal Pass and also along a third route running through the Bolan Pass into Kandahar. The aforesaid passes in the north-western frontiers of the subcontinent were crucial in commerce between India, Afghanistan, Persia and Trans-Caspia. While the Khyber Pass connected Kabul with Peshawar, the Bolan Pass along the Bolan river valley runs through the Toba Kakkar range of Baluchistan connected Kandahar with Quetta and Sibi. It was used as a gateway to and from South Asia and was the nearest route into southern Afghanistan through Jaisalmer, Sibi, Quetta, Kandahar and Herat into Persia. Northwards the Kandahar road ran through Ghazni to Kabul up to Kunduz and Balkh. Gomal Pass in the Hindukush falls midway between Khyber and the Bolan Pass. It takes its name from the Gomal river and is today located on the Durand Line (Afghanistan-Pakistan border). It connects Ghazni in Afghanistan with Tank and Dera Ismail Khan in Pakistan. Vigne’s (2004) journey in 1836 in the company of Lohani merchants from Derabund to Ghazni along the Gomal River gives us the idea about this trade route, the kind of Indian goods in demand and the interesting life and travails of the kaflas to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Lohani merchants, believed to have been goat herders from Ghor, or Mushkon, east of Herat, traded between India and Afghanistan. Such was the network of routes that the kaflas could easily divert from forks in the river and stream to supply Indian goods to new villages and forts on the way. Several Lohani kaflas, each with several thousand camels, horses and mules loaded with goods coming from all over India left for Ghazni between April and May. Vigne writes about three kaflas. The frst carried coarse goods of Moghiana (a town situated on the Chenab river), and the salt of Punjab. The whole of these goods

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were disposed of at Ghazni, Kabul and Kandahar. The camels of the second kafla were burdened with indigo purchased at Multan and Bahawalpur and chintz. The third kafla was the largest consisting of merchants travelling from Hyderabad, Kolkata, Benaras, Delhi and Jaipur cities of India. The bulk of their load consisted of kimkab/khinqhab or golden clothes of Benaras, English chintzes and calicos, gun locks, red tobacco or suruk, manufactured red silk or kaish, carpets and embroidery. From Ghazni, the Lohani kaflas travelled in the month of October bringing pomegranate, almonds, raisins, ruwash from Kabul, and Bokhara horses and cochineal. There were fve or six other kaflas, which annually passed the Hindukush for Bukhara, laden with various wares. (Vigne 2004). Bolan Pass Route

Burnes (2009) informs that the export for Central Asia (from India) might be landed at Bukkur/Bakkar, which may be considered the port of Shikarpur. It has an extensive connection with all parts of Asia and is situated on the plains below the Bolan Pass, the great defle through the Sulaiman mountains. The Bolan Pass through the Toba Kakkar range of Baluchistan is only 120 kilometres (75 miles) from the Afghan border. The Pass connects Sibi with Quetta. From the Bolan Pass a road runs up to the Khojak pass leading into Chaman on the Afghan border and into Kandahar. (Singh et al. 2004). Conclusion

Control of the Afghan trade routes was about controlling the economic corridor of Asia – the Haimavata marg (Uttarapath) extending up to Peshawar, Kabul and Balkh. This is believed to have led to the war between Chandragupta and Seleucus in Mauryan times. In a way, the “warfare” over trade routes has continued up to present times when China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is coming up as a rival to the “Great Indian Road” mentioned by E. Rtveladze. The Afghan routes made it possible for emperors and merchant guilds to patronize spread of Buddhism and Buddhist art outside the country. Asoka put up his important edicts along the Uttarapath and its branches, namely Kandahar-Ghazni Road, the Jalalabad-Kabul Road and along the Shalatak Road, which that attracted enormous trade from all over Asia and had a large foating population of Greeks, Persians, Bactrians and Indians. These routes transported Asoka’s Dhamma to the land of the Greeks besides transmitting Buddhist sutras into China and the land of the Turks. These routes popularized India’s Brahmi and Kharosthi scripts and introduced Hindu and Buddhist iconography in Central Asia’s art. These routes set the trend of the “Colossal Buddhas” of Bamiyan and Kakrak.

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The importance of Indo-Afghan collaboration of trade and trade routes can be understood from the fact that in the 12th century Hindu merchants were settled in Ghazni and trade had introduced fexibility in relations between diferent religious groups. For example, Muhammad Ghuri refrained from confscating the property of Wasa (Vaishya) Abhira, a wealthy Hindu merchant settled in Ghazni. Similarly, a Jain merchant, Jagadu, had constructed a mosque for his trading partners from Hormuz in 14th CE (Thapar 2008). The present status of Afghan routes and their Asian connectivity presents a grim picture to any traveller. The Wakhan corridor leads to nowhere. China has blocked the passage into the Pamirs. Afghan pleas of reopening this crucial route for trade have fallen on deaf ears. The Uzbek route (at Arytam near Termez) into Balkh at Hairatan is restricted for a traveller. Heavy police and army guard the Tajik route into Kunduz. Few travellers can venture on the Turkmen route beyond Tagtabazar into Afghanistan at Towraghundi. The Pakistan route through historic Khyber Pass and the Parachinar and Chaman, an entry point into Ghazni and Kandahar, shares the same fate. This has resulted in immense loss of trade opportunities to Afghanistan. The situation has resulted in impoverishment of Afghanistan and has deprived India of cheap and easy land transport to regions beyond Afghanistan. This calls for urgent measures to bring peace in Afghanistan and help restore and revitalize dormant and broken trade routes that for centuries have nourished India, Central Asia, China and the Mediterranean regions. This may seem a difcult task but not impossible as massive endowments of copper, iron, lithium, rare earths, uranium and precious gemstones lying largely untapped in the Afghan mountains will prompt any government in Afghanistan to see wisdom in dialogue with neighbours for skilled manpower, funding and technology. References Alam, Muzafar. 2007. “Trade, State Policy and Regional Change Aspects of MughalUzbek Commercial Relations, C 1550–1750.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 37 (3): 202–227. Barthold, W. 2012. Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion. Great Britain: E.J.W. Memorial Trust and Oxbow Books. Beal, Samuel. 1884. Si-Yu-Ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World. Delhi: Low Price Publications. Brummel, Paul. 2005. Turkmenistan. The Bradt Travel Guide. Chesam: Bradt Publications. Burnes, Alexander. 2009. Travels into Bokhara: A Journey from India to Cabool, Tartary and Persia 1831–1833. Vol. 2. Delhi: Asian Educational Service. Buryakov, Y. F., et al. 1999. The Cities and Routes of the Silk Road. Tashkent: Sharg. Chakravarti, Ranabir. 2016. Exploring Early India up to C. AD 1300. Delhi: Primus Books. Chandra, Moti. 1977. Trade and Trade Routes in Ancient India. Delhi: Abhinav Publications.

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Clavijo, Gonzalez de Ruy and Guy Le Strange, trans. 1928. Embassy to Tamerlane (1403– 1406), The Broadway Travellers. London and New York: Harper and Brothers. Dandamayev, M. A. 1999. “Media and Achaemenid Iran.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia Vol II. UNESCO. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Gafurov, B. G. 2005. Central Asia: Pre- Historic to Pre-Modern Times. Vol. I. Delhi: Shipra Publications. Gibbs, H. A. R., trans. 2006. Ibn Batuta Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354. Delhi: Manohar Publishers. Harmatta, J. 1999. “Religions in the Kushan Empire.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Vol. II, UNESCO, 320. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Kangle, R. P. 1965. TheKautilya Arthasastra. Vol. II. New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas. Levi, Scott C. 2007a. “India, Russia, and the Eighteenth-Century Transformation of the Central Asian Caravan Trade.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 42 (4): 519–548. Levi, Scott C., eds. 2007b. India and Central Asia Commerce and Culture, 1500– 1800. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Litvinsky, B. A. 1999. “Cities and Urban Life in the Kushan Kingdom.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia Vol. II. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Livius. 2004. Accessed March 20, 2019. www.livius.org/articles/place/persepolis/ persepolis-photos/persepolis-palace-of-darius/ Manfredi, Valerio Massimo. 2002. Alexander: The End of the Earth. Translated from Italian by Iain Halliday, 185, 190–193. London: Pan Books. Markovits, Claude. 2007. “Indian Merchants in Central Asia: The Debate.” In India and Central Asia Commerce and Culture, 1500–1800, edited by Scott C. Levi, 128. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Masefeld, John. 2003. The Travels of Marco Polo the Venetian. Delhi: Asian Educational Services. Mukhamedjanov, A. R. 1999. “Economy and Social System in Central Asia.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Vol. II, 289. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Puri, B. N. 2000. Buddhism in Central Asia. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Roy, J. N. and B. B. Kumar, eds. 2007. India and Central Asia: Classical to Contemporary Periods. Delhi: Concept Publishing. Rtveladze, Edvard V. 2009. Civilizations, States and Cultures of Central Asia. Tashkent: Forum of Culture and Arts of Uzbekistan Foundation. Accessed April 20, 2020. https://archive.org/stream/cyrusnasr_yahoo_Wol/Wolski%20_djvu.txt Singh, Sarina, et al. 2004. Pakistan and the Karakoram Highway. London: Lonely Planet Publications Pvt Ltd. Smith, Vincent A. 2008. History of India. Vol. II. New York: Cosimo Classics. Thapar, Romila. 2008. Somanatha: Many Voices of a History. Delhi: Penguin Books. Vigne, Godfrey T. 2004. A Personal Narrative of a Visit to Ghuzni, Kabul and Afghanistan and of a Residence at the Court of Dost Mohamed with Notices of Runjit Singh, Khiva and the Russian Expedition. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Warmington, E. H. 1995. The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Wikipedia. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Achaemenid_ conquest_of_the_Indus_Valley

15 INDIA’S NEW DIPLOMACY IN CENTRAL ASIA Analysing the First India-Central Asia Summit Manish S. Dabhade

Introduction

India hosted the frst ever India-Central Asia Summit, albeit virtually, on 27 January 2022, which coincided with the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and the fve Central Asian Republics (CARs)  – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. One of the highlights of the Delhi Declaration adopted at this Summit was the renewed emphasis on “the centuries-old close civilizational, cultural, trade and people-to-people linkages between India and Central Asian countries”, and all leaders expressing resolve “to building a long term, comprehensive, and enduring India-Central Asia partnership based on mutual trust, understanding and friendship” (Embassy of India 2022). This Summit attended by the Heads of States of all the fve CARs was a successful, expected culmination of India’s new diplomacy heralded by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his historic visit to all the fve CARs (6–13 July 2015), a frst by any Indian Prime Minister since their independence in 1991. This chapter argues that India’s new diplomacy in Central Asia has witnessed a transformational shift from Connect Central Asia to Act Central Asia especially from 2014 that included diplomacy at the highest levels, namely summitry, bilateral and multilateral, and the India-Central Asia Dialogue at the Foreign Ministers level driving an expansive but focused diplomatic agenda for India and the Central Asian states. For India, it marked a real, strategic and diplomatic attempt to penetrate its “extended neighbourhood” in the West with new ideas, policies and actions. Prime Minister Modi’s new summit diplomacy, what David Dunn calls “diplomacy at the highest level”, has re-energized the deepening ties between India and the region. DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-18

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This chapter has been divided into four sections. The frst section analyses the signifcant outcomes of the Summit in the form of the Delhi Declaration. The second specifcally identifes Indian objectives that guided its new diplomacy embodied in the Summit. The third section examines the multi-layered fabric of India’s new diplomacy in Central Asia especially since 2014. The conclusion explains the new Indian diplomacy leading to transforming of ties between India and the CARs and the challenges ahead. Delhi Declaration 2022: Principal Takeaways

The inaugural India-Central Asia Summit assumes signifcance as it was held in the backdrop of a rapidly changing security dynamics in South and Central Asia triggered by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban usurping power in August 2021. The Delhi Declaration contained landmark agreements and announced ambitious initiatives. At the broader level, it helped identify key areas of cooperation as well as challenges for India and the CARs. Looking at the Declaration, it can be said that Afghanistan, connectivity, security/defence and economic ties and post-COVID-19 recovery assumed primacy in the Summit deliberations and formed the centrepiece of the Declaration signed by all the Leaders (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022). At the symbolic level to commemorate three decades of diplomatic ties, all the leaders agreed on the “issuance of joint postal stamps”. At the more substantive level, the Declaration announced to hold India-Central Asia Summit every two years. Apart from the continuing India-Central Asia Dialogue being held at the Foreign Ministers’ level since 2019, there was an agreement “that the Ministers of Trade and Culture would meet at regular intervals to take forward cooperation in these areas”. It was also “agreed to continue regular meetings of Secretaries of the Security Council to discuss security developments in the region” (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022). The Declaration announced “the establishment of the India-Central Asia Centre in New Delhi which will serve as the Secretariat of the India-Central Asia Summit”. This Centre would lead to “better coordination and creation of ministerial-level platforms focusing on four areas including defence and security, trade and connectivity, among other issues” (Roy Chaudhury 2022). The idea was to create a nodal point of setting the multilateral as well as bilateral agenda for India and Central Asia to be deliberated at the highest levels of respective states. Also announced was the relevance of the proposal to create an India-Central Asia Parliamentary Forum to serve “as an important forum of interaction between the legislatures of these countries”. India, being the oldest and the largest democracy in the world, can signifcantly share its democratic and governance experiences to further strengthen democracy in these new, democratic republics (Tayal 2022).

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The Summit highlighted the centrality of collective eforts by India and the CARs to tackling the efects and after-efects of the pandemic. Thus, the leaders “called for collective eforts in the fght against the pandemic” and “stressed the importance of extensive vaccination, vaccine supply, transfer of technology, development of local production capacities, promotion of supply chains for medical products, and ensuring price transparency”. All leaders “expressed mutual gratitude to each other for timely assistance during the pandemic and agreed that early mutual recognition of Covid-19 vaccination certifcates will facilitate easier travel of citizens of their countries”. The leaders laid out a combined agenda that “called for a timely, transparent, efective and non-discriminatory international response to global health challenges including pandemics, for ensuring an equitable and afordable access to medicines and critical health supplies”. Taking note of Prime Minister Modi’s One Health One Earth approach, the Declaration “emphasized that the postpandemic world requires diversifed global supply chains that are based on trust, resilience and reliability”. Going further and highlighting the importance of transport in returning to normalcy after the pandemic, the Declaration endorsed the adoption, at the initiative of Turkmenistan, of the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/75/313 on “strengthening the links between all modes of transport to ensure stable and reliable international transport for sustainable development during and after the corona virus disease (Covid-19) pandemic” (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022). High Impact Community Development Projects for socio-economic development in the CARs based on Indian grants have emerged as the centrepiece of India’s engagements in the region in recent years. Thus, it was agreed to assess the on-going projects and ensure their speedy implementation. This has assumed a priority in light of the Indian $1 billion Line of Credit announced in 2020 for infrastructure projects in all the CARs. Additionally, all leaders agreed to further enhance India’s capacity-building and human-resource development initiatives under its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) scholarships. The Indian proposal to organize “customized” professional training programmes for the diplomats from all the Central Asian states was accepted too, in addition to India’s ofer to provide “more training slots and scholarships including customized training programmes to meet the requirements of Central Asian countries” (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022). Identifying the rather low level of trade and investments between India and the CARs, the leaders emphasized “the importance of making concerted eforts to boost trade and investment in sectors like medicine, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, education, information technology, business process outsourcing (BPO), infrastructure, agriculture and processing of agricultural products, energy, space industry, textiles, leather and footwear industry,

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gems & jewellery etc.”, and directed their respective Ministers to draw an agenda to enhance mutual trade and industrial cooperation between the two sides. Both sides expressed the desire of the newly established India-Central Asia Business Council (ICABC) to take necessary steps to fll this muchneeded gap. Both sides acknowledged the ICABC proposal to establish an India-Central Asia Investment Club to further promote investments in each other’s countries (Tayal 2022). The Declaration acknowledged the inherent and the most signifcant constraint in the further development of trade and commerce amongst themselves due to the landlocked nature and the absence of overland connectivity with India; it drew utmost attention to prioritizing development of more connectivity that could serve as a force multiplier at many levels. India and member-states in the region that were part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Ashgabat Agreement on International Transport and Transit Corridor invited other CARs to join these connectivity initiatives. The Indian proposal to include the Chabahar port and Turkmenistan’s proposal to include the Turkmenbashi port within the framework of the INSTC found support among all leaders. They also agreed to the Indian proposal to form a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the Chabahar port to discuss all issues to facilitate an unhindered movement of goods and services amongst India and all the CARs (Gupta 2022). Another important arena highlighted in the Declaration was the emerging defence cooperation between India and some states in Central Asia especially in the form of bilateral counter-terrorism exercises. All leaders laid emphasis on “the importance of regular dialogue between the Security Councils of their countries” especially in light of “the common challenges of terrorism, extremism and radicalization in the region”. In an acknowledgement of the rise of terrorism as the principal security challenge the region has been facing, the Declaration condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and emphasized the early adoption of the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022). Since Afghanistan remained central to peace, security and stability within South and Central Asia, the Declaration “reiterated strong support for a peaceful, secure and stable Afghanistan while emphasizing the respect for sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal afairs”. In an attempt to seeking a combined approach towards Afghanistan, it was agreed to establish a JWG on Afghanistan at senior ofcials’ level (Embassy of India Tashkent 2022). The frst India-Central Asia Summit, therefore, seemed to have succeeded to bring all the Heads of States to identifying the primary areas of cooperation and identifying the ways and means to jointly move ahead to achieve the objectives stated in the Delhi Declaration.

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India’s New Diplomacy at the First India-Central Asia Summit

The frst Summit marked a strategic-cum-diplomatic high point for India in its Central Asia policy in terms of determining the trajectory of security, stability and a geostrategic equilibrium of its western frontiers and has showcased the salience of India’s extended neighbourhood approach “in addressing the emerging challenges in the region with strong determination, under the spirit of reformed multilateralism and transparency in global governance” (Bhattacharya 2022). Looking at the intensive engagement between the two in the past few years, there seems to be an agreement between India and the CARs on a shared vision and approach towards stabilizing a critically important geostrategic arena in India’s northern neighbourhood that would have increasing global signifcance in the years ahead. Continuing with the tradition with a huge symbolic signifcance coupled with a strategic intent, in December 2021, India decided to invite the Heads of States of all fve CARs as Chief Guests at its annual Republic Day celebrations on 26 January 2022. However, due to the pandemic, the Summit had to be held in a virtual mode. In his opening address at the Summit, Prime Minister Modi identifed three specifc objectives. The frst objective was to highlight “that cooperation between India and Central Asia is essential for regional security and prosperity”. Modi added that in Indian eyes, “Central Asia is central to India’s vision of an integrated and stable extended neighbourhood”. The second objective was “to give an efective structure to our cooperation. This will establish a framework of regular interactions at diferent levels and among various stakeholders”. The fnal objective, according to Modi, was “to create an ambitious roadmap for our cooperation”. Laying out an ambitious agenda, he emphasized that “through this, we will be able to adopt an integrated approach for regional connectivity and cooperation for the next 30 years” (PM India 2022). The announcement of the India-Central Asia Summit in December 2020 also drew attention from major players in the region. China, in fact, went ahead and organized a similar Summit with all the fve Central Asian Heads of States just two days before the Summit in Delhi (Sachdeva 2022). Zafar (2022) puts the number of initiatives announced in the Delhi Declaration in four broad categories: (1) regional security, (2) connectivity, (3)  economic relations and (4) cultural and people-to-people engagements. The focus was on institutionalizing the multilateral summit process and other high-level ministerial engagements other than the summit itself. On regional security, there seemed to be a convergence of interests in securing regional stability arising out of terrorism, extremism and drug trafcking. On the security dynamics emerging in Afghanistan, all the states supported a peaceful, secure and stable Afghanistan, central to their regional stability. India,

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in continued engagement with Afghanistan despite many connectivity hindrances, agreed to send humanitarian assistance and ofered to send food grains to the Afghan people. Regarding the connectivity domain, the Declaration openly acknowledged the lack of direct land route between India and Central Asia severely limiting the gamut of economic and trade ties possible between the two. Despite this, many measures introduced in past few years could serve to counter these real hindrances. These include India’s joining the Ashgabat Agreement in 2018, and the expansion and functioning of the INSTC connecting with increasing number of Central Asia and West Asia nodes. To Zafar (2022), it is in the domain of cultural and people-to-people engagements that India has an edge over many of the powers present in Central Asia. India’s deep, extensive civilizational, religious and cultural linkages covering a large part of Central Asia provide a human, popular bond that transcends geopolitics and geo-economics in the region. India’s telemedicine and health support during the pandemic have created immense goodwill for India in the region to its advantage and further cemented their ties. Looking at the Indian initiative and the multiple, game-changing outcomes of the Delhi Declaration, it can be argued that India’s new diplomacy in the India-Central Asia Summit was singularly driven by three core objectives: (1) the question of securing regional stability. India focused on building convergences amongst all the CARs on the importance of a peaceful, secure and stable Afghanistan. This was critically important to successfully counter the challenges of terrorism and extremism emanating with the Taliban in taking over power in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. (2) Indian diplomacy remained committed to signifcantly increasing and diversifying its economic and trade exchanges that were much below the actual potential. India’s trade with Central Asia stood at a mere $2 billion compared to the Chinese trade with the region that stood at around $100 billion. (3) Indian diplomacy remained focused on overcoming the inherent connectivity problems through a variety of means. The creation of the JWG on Chabahar Port and an agreement to include it in the INSTC marks a better appreciation of repeated Indian eforts to enhance connectivity with the region. These Indian eforts also provide a bufer to the energy-rich states to decrease their dependencies on any actors in Central Asia. The frst Summit marks the successful culmination of the series of new Indian diplomatic initiatives, bilateral and multilateral, that sought to deepen and expand ties between the two regions. According to Sachdeva (2022), India’s diplomatic energies in Central Asia in the earlier decades have been dictated by its Afghanistan, Pakistan and China policies and Russian and U.S. strategies in the region. Though the rising instability in Afghanistan will continue to infuence Indian strategies in Central Asia, the new diplomacy is a clear indication of New Delhi’s willingness to consider Central Asia’s strategic relevance in its own right.

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India’s New Diplomacy in Central Asia Since 2014

Central Asia has always been seen in major global capitals as Russia’s post– Cold War strategic and cultural “backyard” and China’s new “Far West” increasingly fushed with Chinese investments, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the last nine years. For Indians, the region has been seen as “Greater Central Asia” intrinsically linked to South Asia as part of its extended neighbourhood. Despite the historic and geographic proximity between the two regions, there had been a lack of real interest in each other for a variety of reasons. At one level, Central Asia’s landlocked geography, despite the proximity, was seen as an insurmountable obstacle to any further progress in their relationship. Similarly, despite age-old civilizational linkages going back thousands of years including the Silk Road, and the spread of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and beyond and the spread of Sufsm to India from Central Asia, both were tied down by recent history. With the gradual decline of the Silk Road, the emergence of the European “age of discovery” and the tightening embrace of Russia and China, Central Asia ceded to occupy the Indian strategic imagination. After India’s independence, its immediate neighbourhood and the intractable territorial disputes therein as well as the leadership of Afro-Asian nations became India’s top strategic and diplomatic priority. Also, India’s close relations with the former Soviet Union precluded any direct relationship with Central Asia. In fact, India’s only direct contact with the region was the establishment of its consulate in Tashkent in 1987. All the CARs, part of the former Soviet Union, became independent in December 1991. A special relationship between India and the former Soviet Union thus precluded any direct, close ties with the region. India too was seen preoccupied with its immediate neighbourhood, and its inward economic outlook. The end of the Cold War saw a dramatic change in the diplomatic outlook and engagements of India and CARs too. It saw high-level visits from both sides, but not any substantive progress in realizing actual potential of each other. India had traditionally preferred the bilateral track in developing ties with the CARs in an attempt to secure its limited, albeit crucial, objectives of access to these energy rich states. In an attempt to shed its historical baggage, India announced a “Connect Central Asia” policy in 2012 in Bishkek (Jha 2016). The primary goal behind this policy was, as the name suggests, re-connecting with the region which has a long-shared history with India. In the words of Indian strategic expert K. Subrahmanyam, “The Central Asian Republics (CARs) posed the most excruciating and complex challenges to Indian diplomacy judged whether by geostrategic compulsions or by India’s energy concerns”. India’s Minister of State for External Afairs E. Ahmed unveiled the “Connect Central Asia Policy” (CCAP) at the frst meeting of the India-Central Asia Dialogue, a Track II initiative, held over 12–13 June

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2012 in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) to fast-track India’s relations with the CARs. In his keynote speech, Ahmed mentioned that the policy calls for setting up universities, hospitals, information technology (IT) centers, an e-network in telemedicine connecting India to the CARs, joint commercial ventures, improving air connectivity to boost trade and tourism, joint scientifc research, and strategic partnerships in defense and security afairs. (Roy 2013) The key elements of this policy covered many important areas, including political cooperation, economic cooperation, strategic cooperation, regional connectivity, information technology (IT), cooperation in education, peopleto-people contact, medical cooperation and cooperation in regional groupings (Jha 2016). India’s intensive diplomatic engagements in Central Asia since Prime Minister Modi assumed ofce marked a beginning of its Act Central Asia policy, a logical extension of India’s CCAP. This was largely driven by the deteriorating security landscape in Afghanistan. According to Indian security planners, Afghanistan and Central Asia constitute the same geopolitical space and the threat of terrorism and radicalization emanating from Afghanistan has grave consequences for both India and Central Asia. The robust, increasing presence of China added another rationale for India to renew its diplomatic focus on the region. In a signifcant display of increased strategic interest in the Central Asian region, and what David Dunn describes as diplomacy at the highest level, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited all the fve CARs in a rare, single visit. This was indeed historic visit by an Indian Prime Minister since the independence of the CARs, and marked almost a quarter century of establishment of diplomatic relations between the two regions (Zafar 2016). This visit had both a bilateral and a multilateral, regional component. The bilateral summits saw the signing of a total of 22 agreements encompassing diverse felds such as energy, defence and military, science and technology, tourism, railways, culture and sports. In a signifcant move, India and Kazakhstan, during the Prime Minister’s visit, signed a bilateral agreement to purchase uranium. Kazakhstan now has become the source of around 80 per cent of India’s uranium imports (Sachdeva 2022). Similarly, India and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement to hold Khanjar, their bilateral military exercise on an annual basis. In 2016, both states agreed to “to construct a Mountain Training Centre to provide instruction, train personnel of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces and to host joint mountain training exercises” (Menon and Rajiv 2019). At the multilateral level, India participated in the BRICS Summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit (as an observer) in Ufa that led to

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a region-level engagement to with the CARs. Taking this ahead, and showcasing the region’s importance for India, this was signifcantly followed by inviting the President of Kyrgyzstan along with BIMSTEC states and Mauritius at the second swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi in May 2019 (Dutta 2019). In a very signifcant development, showing its renewed interest in Central Asia, India joined as a full member of the SCO in 2017, after 12 years as an observer. This brought another regional tier of the CARs in close diplomatic intercourse with India, other than China and Russia. However, the ties between India and Central Asia underwent a dramatic transformation, with India and Uzbekistan proposing an India-Central Asia Dialogue at the Foreign Ministers level to bring more coherence, create more opportunities and jointly address varied challenges in their ties. At the 2019 inaugural India-Central Asia Dialogue, India’s Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj reiterated India’s long-held position that “connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency, and equality. They must follow principles of fnancial responsibility and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity”. These remarks must be viewed against the backdrop of India’s strong sovereignty objections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is a vital component of the BRI. With increasing concerns being raised about BRI projects, India will not want to see the CARs relying exclusively on China for their exports or falling into the “debt trap”. At the Dialogue, India ofered extending development partnership to countries in the region wherein “we can bring our countries closer by taking up concrete projects, inter alia, under our Lines of Credit and Buyers’ Credit, and by sharing our expertise” (Ministry of External Afairs 2019). To further this goal, in a government-to-government initiative, India also proposed setting up of an “India-Central Asia Development Group” that would comprise representatives of all states and would be tasked to come up with concrete proposals. On Afghanistan, India reiterated “its support and commitment to peace, security and stability of Afghanistan; to promote inclusive Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled peace and reconciliation process and to assist in economic reconstruction of Afghanistan” (Ministry of External Afairs 2019). The joining of Afghanistan in the Dialogue carried remarkable signifcance in more ways than one. The participation of Afghanistan for India and the CARs acknowledged its place as a “bridge” to connect Central and South Asia. It brought out their shared interests to meet the unique challenges of connectivity and terrorism for India and Central Asia. For India, the Dialogue provided a frst, high-level diplomatic opportunity to show its renewed importance of the region, and what India’s Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj said “the starting point for a new era in relations between

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India and Central Asia”. For India, it also meant a reafrmation of the centuries-old ties between the peoples of India, Central Asia and Afghanistan: in Swaraj’s words, “comfortable” with each other. Most signifcantly, India saw itself and the region as “natural partners”. According to Swaraj, though her visit to the region then had already “achieved important results bilaterally with each one of the fve Central Asian countries”, it substantively “also set us thinking what we can do more together to substantially enhance economic engagement and development partnership between India and Central Asia”. Driven by taking this ahead, India further announced at the Dialogue that it now wanted “to build a modern and comprehensive partnership on these strong foundations”. Also, as “development partnership has emerged as an important component of India’s engagement with other countries”, Swaraj “ofered to extend this partnership to Central Asia as well, where we can bring our countries closer by taking up concrete projects, inter alia, under our Lines of Credit and Buyers’ Credit, and by sharing our expertise”. The frst India-Central Asia Dialogue, thus, provided a signifcant diplomatic opportunity to identify the shared interests, their shared challenges and construct new roadmaps to take the ties ahead for mutual benefts in a large number of arenas. The second India-Central Asia Dialogue, hosted by New Delhi in a virtual format on 28 October 2020, saw the attendance of the Foreign Ministers of the fve CARs and the Afghan Foreign Minister as a special invitee. The dialogue acknowledged the role of this mechanism in strongly furthering partnerships in diverse arenas such as politics, security, economics, trade, development and connectivity. This Dialogue too emphasized the “need for building a comprehensive and enduring India-Central Asia partnership based on historical, cultural, and civilizational bonds and traditionally close peopleto-people contacts” (Gupta 2020). In the context of the existing COVID-19 pandemic, India’s positive role in providing humanitarian and medical assistance to all the CARs in confronting the pandemic was duly acknowledged and all emphasized the need for more cooperation between the Sanitary and Epidemiological Services of both India and the CARs. The Foreign Ministers also welcomed the Indian initiative to extend $1 billion Line of Credit to them for development projects in the energy, Information and Technology, healthcare, connectivity, agriculture and other priority sectors. India made an ofer to grant assistance to High Impact Community Development Projects for socio-economic development of all the CARs in the Dialogue, which was also welcomed by all. Taking cognizance of the very low volumes of bilateral trade between the two sides, the Ministers agreed to make determined eforts to enhance trade and commercial ties. The launch of the India-Central Asia Business Council was seen as a welcome step. On the issue of Afghanistan, all the participating Ministers whilst welcoming the participation of Afghanistan in the Dialogue emphasized their “frm stand about the Afghan confict’s

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settlement on the principle of Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled peace process” and expressed their “interest in strengthening cooperation for Afghanistan’s development and economic reconstruction, including infrastructure, energy, transit, and transport projects” (Embassy of India Tashkent 2020). This Dialogue also highlighted the need for progress in the arenas of connectivity and culture. In totality, the Dialogue represented an excellent mechanism to identify a shared vision and approach to issues of regional stability, security and development. In December 2021, in a sign of strengthened, blooming partnership, all CARs decided to send their respective Foreign Ministers to attend the third India-Central Asia Dialogue and miss the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries organized by Pakistan, despite being its members. The Joint Statement of the Dialogue signed by all Foreign Ministers included “their readiness to joint celebrations marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Central Asian States in 2022”. The Foreign Ministers of the CARs “appreciated India’s assistance in supply of vaccines and essential medicines during their early stage of fght against Covid-19” and India’s External Afairs Minister S. Jaishankar “expressed gratitude for the supplies received from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and the ofer made by Turkmenistan during the second wave of Covid-19 in India in April-May 2021”. All the parties took note of the Outcome Document of the Regional Security Dialogue held on 10 November 2021, and emphasized that there was a broad ‘regional consensus’ on the issues related to Afghanistan, which includes formation of a truly representative and inclusive government, combating terrorism and drug trafcking, central role of the UN, providing immediate humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people and preserving the rights of women, children and other national ethnic groups (Ministry of External Afairs 2021). India’s diplomatic forays and focused energies in Central Asia seemed to be paying dividends in the form of an increasing plethora of diplomatic engagements at various summits, bilateral earlier and now multilateral, at the frst India-Central Asia Summit. Both sides have gradually progressed from a state of neglect dictated by history and geography to making concerted eforts to break the shackles. This has been singularly driven by the new diplomacy engendered by Prime Minister Modi and duly reciprocated by the leaders of the CARs taking into account mutual interests in a range of domains, geopolitics to geo-economics. The Delhi Declaration signed at the conclusion of the frst Summit stands testimony to this dramatic upswing in ties between India and Central Asia. Conclusion

As India showed a heightened urgency and interest in a full spectrum engagement of Central Asia through the frst India-Central Asia Summit, the rise

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of China with its mighty economic prowess embodied in the BRI and the growing China-Pakistan cooperation in Central Asia remain a primary challenge to India’s diplomacy in the years ahead. The return of the Taliban in Kabul has further complicated India’s security and diplomatic calculus. India’s connectivity agenda that had Iran and Russia at the fulcrum also look shaken because of increased Western economic sanctions against them. The on-going Russia-Ukraine war has further aggravated India’s new diplomacy in Central Asia. The geography of Central Asia has placed the region at the centre of rapidly transforming geopolitics and geo-economics in the 21st century. With a rather long history of civilizational and cultural linkages, India seems to be making diplomatic gains by its new diplomacy that has moved from the aspirational Connect Central Asia to a more robust, substantive Act Central Asia and has transformed India from being a relatively weak and largely absent observer into a real and relatively strong stakeholder in Central Asia. In conclusion, India’s new diplomacy in Central Asia evident in holding of the frst India-Central Asia Summit marked a successful return of India to Central Asia amidst increasing challenges in the years ahead. References Bhattacharya, Debasis. 2022. “India-Central Asia Summit: Shaping Geopolitics in the Extended Neighbourhood.” Raisina Debates. ORF. February 18. Accessed February 25, 2022. www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-central-asia-summit/ Dutta, Prabhash K. 2019. “Story Behind Narendra Modi’s Shift from SAARC to BIMSTEC.” May 28. Accessed February 26, 2022. www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ story-behind-narendra-modi-s-shift-from-saarc-to-bimstec-1536707-2019-05-28 Embassy of India Tashkent. 2020. “Joint Statement of the 2nd Meeting of the IndiaCentral Asia Dialogue.” October 28. Accessed February 26, 2022. https://eoi.gov. in/Tashkent/?pdf11775?000 Embassy of India Tashkent. 2022. “Delhi Declaration of 1st India-Central Asia Summit.” January 27. Accessed February 27, 2022. https://eoi.gov.in/tashkent/? pdf13991?000 Gupta, Pravesh Kumar. 2020. “Second India-Central Asia Dialogue: Major Takeaways.” November 30. Accessed February 26, 2022. www.vifndia.org/article/2020/ november/05/second-india-central-asia-dialogue-major-takeaways Gupta, Pravesh Kumar. 2022. “First India-Central Asia Summit: Some Major Takeaways.” January 31. Accessed February 20, 2022. www.vifndia.org/article/2022/ january/31/frst-india-central-asia-summit-some-major-takeaways Jha, Martand. 2016. “India’s Connect Central Asia Policy.” The Diplomat. Accessed February 26, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indias-connectcentral-asia-policy-2/ Menon, Rhea and Sharanya Rajiv. 2019. “Realizing India’s Strategic Interests in Central Asia.” Seminar. December 1. Carnegie India. Accessed February 26, 2022. https://carnegieindia.org/2019/12/01/realizing-india-s-strategic-interestsin-central-asia-pub-80576

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Ministry of External Afairs. 2021. “Joint Statement of the 3rd Meeting of the IndiaCentral Asia Dialogue.” December 19. Accessed February 20, 2022. www.mea. gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F34705%2FJoint_Statement_of_the_3rd_ meeting_of_the_IndiaCentral_Asia_Dialogue#.Yb7ttTT9af8.twitter Ministry of External Afairs, Government of India. 2019. “Joint Statement on the Outcome of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Dialogue ‘India  – Central Asia’ with Participation of Afghanistan.” January 13. Accessed February 26, 2022. www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30908/Joint_Statement_ on_the_outcome_of_the_First_meeting_of_the_Foreign_Ministers_of_Dialogue_ India__Central_Asia_with_participation_of_Afghanistan PM India. 2022. “PM’s Opening Remarks at the First Meeting of India Central Asia Summit.” January 27. Accessed February 2, 2022.www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/ pms-opening-remarks-at-the-frst-meeting-of-india-central-asia-summit/ Roy, Meena Singh. 2013. “India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy: Building Cooperative Partnership.” The Indian Foreign Afairs Journal. July–September, 8 (3): 301–316. Roy Chaudhury, Dipanjan. 2022. “India to Propose Biennial Summit with Central Asia and Secretariat in Delhi.” The Economic Times. January 25. Accessed August 26, 2022. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-to-proposebiennial-summit-with-central-asia-and-secretariat-in-delhi/articleshow/89101326. cms?utm_source=contentofnterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst Sachdeva, Gulshan. 2022. “India’s Central Asia Challenge.” East Asia Forum. April 14. Accessed September 2, 2022. www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/04/14/indiascentral-asia-challenge/ Tayal, Skand Ranjan. 2022. “Signifcance of First India-Central Asia Summit.” February 18. Accessed March 2, 2022. www.vifndia.org/podcast/2022/february/18/ Signifcance-of-First-India-Central-Asia-Summit Zafar, Athar. 2016. “PM Modi’s Visit Reinvigorates Ties with Central Asia.” Sapru House Paper. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Afairs. Zafar, Athar. 2022. “India-Central Asia Summit: A Milestone in Engagement with the Region.” ICWA Issue Brief. February 17. Accessed October 2, 2022. www.icwa. in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7074&lid=4798#_edn1

16 CONCLUSION Selbi Hanova and Mahesh Ranjan Debata

Inner Asia is a constructed region with unset boundaries, and they vary according to the viewer and according to the subject. The term itself is often used in the vocabulary of historians rather than policymakers; however, it remains in the vicinity of major power infuences of India, China, Russia, Iran and Turkey and is home to states that invariably take part in the power dynamics of the region and world at large. While the region is studied from the perspectives of diferent capitals in Inner Asia, be they Dushanbe or Ulaanbaatar, the idea behind this book was to gather these perspectives from Delhi and with Delhi. In this regard, the emphasis is given on Central Asia (yet another region whose boundaries are contested) and the projects and connections through this region. The main task here is to contribute to a better understanding between two entities (India and Inner Asian region) in the evolving global politics and bring forth the importance of the peripheral regions in the infrastructurally interconnected world full of complexities posed by regional conficts, digital innovations and climate change crises. It is found from the analysis of some 15 chapters of this book that Inner Asia is an important region of the world from the geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic point of view. In the post-Soviet period, the Inner Asian region has become the cynosure of all eyes, particularly when fve Central Asian Republics (CARs), often dubbed as the “heart” of Inner Asia, emerged in December 1991 from the ashes of the Cold War. The signifcance of the region stems from the landlockedness of the region, strategic location (being at the centre of Europe, Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia), abundant natural resources (especially oil and natural gas and uranium), etc. The sequence of events in past couple of years has afected the hearts and minds of the people of the region. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic in DOI: 10.4324/9781003171560-19

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2020 and a new war between Russia and Ukraine (since February 2022 till date) in the post-Soviet space adversely afected economies, supply chains and infrastructural links in this region and its neighbourhood. Adding to the complexity, Afghanistan headed by Taliban is a new ingredient in the intricate power setting. Taliban grabbed power in this war-torn country, following the withdrawal of international forces on 15 August 2021. Since four of the Inner Asian countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China) share border with Afghanistan, an apprehension of spillover of any sort from across the border still looms large. In addition, the current positions taken up by the United States of America, Russia and China on the Middle East crisis following the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 are going to aggravate the already vitiated atmosphere in Inner Asia. Inner Asia has become a theatre of competition and rivalry by big and regional powers in the last three centuries. For example, Tsarist Russia and British India struggled for power and infuence in Central Asia during 19thcentury old Great Game period. In the last leg of 20th century, the CARs fell prey to the sinister designs of the sole big power (the United States of America) and ambitious plans and programmes of regional powers (Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, etc.), who did not leave any stone unturned to nourish their goals. Similarly, the region has not been able to immune itself from the infuences of power rivalry in the past two decades of the 21st century. It is important to highlight how the global actor (the United States) and regional actors (Russia, China and India) have devised policies and initiatives to bring the Central Asian states to their fold. For example, China involves the CARs as the core of its Belt and Road Initiative, which has turned 10 this year. Similarly, the United States of America came up with C5+1, which is a renewed efort of its “Greater Central Asia” project, in order to counter Russia’s Eurasianism. India too has become a vital cog of the 21st-century power rivalry with its much avowed strategic initiative India–Central Asia Dialogue with the fve CARs under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Inner Asia has remained a focal point in India’s new-age foreign policy in the last nine years or so. It is pertinent to point out here that India has an age-old historical–cultural linkage with the Inner Asian region, which is more than 2,500 years old. The relationship between the two regions began with regular contacts between traders/merchants from India and Inner Asian region. The relationship ushered in a new phase with the introduction of Buddhism in the region. For a long time, till the advent of Islam, Buddhism remained the prevailing religion in and around the region. India’s rich cultural heritage and spiritual thought, gospels of Buddhism, which percolated into the hearts and minds of the people, further led to a cultural eforescence in the entire region. Besides, the ancient Silk Route helped in integrating the rich cultural heritage of India and Inner Asian region and promoted the exchange of idea and intellect and, most importantly, trade.

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The post-Soviet space provided India the much-needed opportunity to renew the decade-long linkage with the Inner Asian region. India understood well the importance of Central Asia for her strategic, security and economic interests. After a continuous engagement with the individual republics of Central Asia for over two decades, India came up with “Connect Central Asia Policy” in 2012 to establish a connectivity with the region and beyond. The relations between the two regions witnessed a new high during Prime Minister Modi’s “Look, Learn and Act North Policy”. Between May and December 2015, Modi visited seven Inner Asian countries – Mongolia (May), CARs (July) and Afghanistan (December) and signed a number of agreements. The main highlight of these visits was the signing of Strategic Partnership Agreement with Mongolia. The main intention of Indian leadership has been to establish a connectivity with this strategically important and resource-rich region so that India’s trade and commerce with this region can be stepped up. It will defnitely give a boost to the spread of Indian culture and tradition in and around the region. While discussing the establishment of connectivity between India and Inner Asia, it can be pointed out that there has been a glimmer of hope for India in the forms of Chabahar as port of promise, the INSTC and the Middle East Corridor. However, a few recent events (Afghanistan situation, Russia–Ukraine war, Middle East Crisis, etc.) have cast a shadow over these promising means of connectivity between India and Inner Asia. The amount of eforts and money India has pumped to achieve the much needed connectivity is considerable. Instead of losing hope, India should watch closely and carefully the events and incidents in the global corridor and start with a positive bent of mind and renewed vigour to fnd out other means to revive the trade and civilization linkage with Inner Asia.

INDEX

9/11 33, 158 12-Point Peace Plan 79 1911 Revolution 44–46, 54 Acharya, Amitav 87, 93 Adamant (Roerich) 15, 25 Afghan Bank 175 Afghanistan agreements with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 103; and BRI 146–147; establishing JWG on 200; as geo-economic pivot on New Silk Road 132; geostrategic advantage of 136; participation in India-Iran-AfghanistanCentral Asia Transport and Transit Corridor 180; post-U.S. withdrawal from 105–107; relationship with Central Asia 4–5; security cooperation with India 165, 205; and Silk Road renaissance 140; strategic partnership with India 160, 161, 165; Tajik minorities in 8; 145–146, 159, 163, 165, 179, 202, 211; US support of economy 115, Afghanistan as transit hub for Asia 137–140, 147; foreign trade defcits and transit costs 138; geographical location 137– 138; natural resources 138–139; regional connectivity 139–140

Afghanistan Pine Nut Processing Plant 103 Afghan National Security Forces 165 Af-Pak Strategy 144 Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 160 Ahmadzoda, Rajabboy 100–101 Ahmed, E. 203 Air Freight Corridor 163 Akaev, Askar 128 Ak Serai 187 Alam, Muzafar 188 Al-Qaeda 118, 158, 159 Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary (Roerich) 15, 18, 21 Altai 2 Altan Bulag 53 Amir Timur 187 Amu Darya 60, 66–67, 134 Angren-Pap rail line 134 Antiochus the Great of Syria 188, 190 Aral Sea 7, 60–62 Aral Sea Basin Programme (2018) 67 Arthasastra 187, 192 Ashgabat Agreement 103, 107, 178, 200, 202; 2018 163, 176 Ashizawa, Kuniko 90 Ashoka (king) 25 Asian art 17 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 8, 103, 132

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Index

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 104, 141 Asian regionalism 87 Astana Summit (2018) 102 Astrakhan 184 Asvaghosha 25 Atambayev, Almazbek 128 Atisha 24, 155 Atwood, Christopher P. 45 Aurangzeb 188 Baasan, R. 46 Baipakov, K. 189 Bakiyev, Kurmanbek 128 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 81 Balci, Bayram 92 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor 116 Baradar, Mullah Ghani 105 Battulga, Khaltmaagiin 161 Bawden, C. R. 44 Bayalun, Khatun 187 Beautiful Unity (Roerich) 19, 20 Beijing-Moscow rail line 131 Beijing’s Western Development Strategy 119 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 6, 38, 77, 82, 102, 107, 108, 112, 115–116, 122, 125–127, 129, 137, 140–143, 145–147, 157, 178, 203, 205, 208, 211 Berdimuhamedov, Serdar 161 Bernardi, Marina 20 Bhagavad-Gita 21 Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) 162 Bibi Khanum mosque 187 BIMSTEC 205 Bindusara 190 bin Laden, Osama 159 Blavatsky, Helena Petrovna 20, 22 Bogatyrev, Valentin 94 Bolan Pass 193, 194 Bolshevik Revolution 52–53 Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) 92 Border Patrolling and Surveillance 164 Border Security Force (BSF) 164 Borzhakty-Ersai rail line 130 Brazil Russia India China and South Asia (BRICS) 104, 141, 204 Brock, H. I. 22 Brzezinski, Zbignew 74–76

Buddha 24 Buddhism 2, 15, 16, 20–22, 24, 25, 194, 203, 211; Asian 21; cultures 16, 23; philosophy 21, 24; Transnationality of26 Build Back Better World (B3W) 143 Bulag, Uradyn E. 54 Burnes, Alexander 184 Burns, Richard Dean 17 Burns, William 115 Buryakov, Y. F. 189  Campi, Alicia J. 46 CASA 81, 103, 132–133 Caspian Access Policy 128 Caspian Sea Summit (2022) 174 Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline 82 Central Asia-China relationship 116–119; border security 117–118; economic interests 118–119; energy 116–117; strategic interests 118 Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) 98, 99 Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) 98 Central Asian Republics (CARs): depletion of water resources 7; emergence 111; energy resources in 113–114; energy use for development 6–7; environmental issue 7–8; geographical location of 112–113; India’s strategic narratives for 121; Kazantsev’s scenarios for Central Asia 134–135; oil and natural gas reserves in 80–81, 113–114; revival of ethnicity and language 8; use of chemical fertilizers 7; see also individual entries Central Asian Union (CAU) 98 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) 103, 179 Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) 115 Chabahar Day 176 Chabahar-Iranshahr-Zahedan-Mashhad corridor 177 Chabahar Port 102, 107, 156, 171, 173, 174, 175–180, 200, 202, 212 Chabahar-Zahedan railway project 174 Chandra, Lokesh 20

Index

Chandragupta Maurya 188, 194 Chatterjee, Suchandana 26 China 5, 7, 8–9, 133–134; access to CARs 126–127; Civil War in 50; control in Mongolia 49–54; control over South China Sea 133, 134; cooperation with Pakistan 208; de-ethnicization of Muslims 37, 39; de-extremifcation strategy 35–36, 39; diluting Uyghurs’ cultural identity 38; ethnic management 31, 38; ethnic policy reform 39; foreign policy 136, 137, 143, 144, 146; geo-economic signifcance of Inner Asia for 82– 84; geopolitics in Central Asia 77; Han and non-Han ethnicities 30, 38; historiography 29; investment in Kazakhstan 129–131, 134; Islam and Muslim population in 32–37; loans 142; Maritime Silk Route concept 116, 125, 133– 134; in Mongolia’s independence 46–48; nation-building 29, 31; one-child policy 37; relations with Russia 37–38; religion in 29; resource exploitation in Siberia 127; resurgence of infuence after Corona 120–121; security policy 118; stability-security paradigm 34, 36; state-society relationship 31; trade with Inner Asian countries 157; see also Xinjiang in China China-Central Asia-Western Asia Corridor 116 China Islamic Association 33 China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line 128 China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) 157 China-Mongolia-Russia corridor 116 China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation 82 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 116, 179, 194, 205 China’s 9/11 36 Chinese Ministry for Foreign Afairs 144 Chorasmian route 186 Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (2015) 162 “Clash of Civilizations” 75 Classical Eurasianism 78

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Clement, Victoria 99 Climate and Environment (CLIENT) Programme 67 Climate change impact on Central Asia 57–68; 4th Aral Sea Basin Programme (2018) 67; Climate and Environment (CLIENT) Programme 67; desertifcation of Aral Sea basin 60–61, 66–67; environmental issues 58–59; food security and health 62–63; land and water degradation 59–61; livelihood loss and forced migration 63–66; shrinking of glaciers 61; trade 65; UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) Economic Forum (2022) 67–68; urbanisation 65–66; vulnerability 57–58 Clinton, Hilary 133, 140 Clover, Charles 78 Clubb, O. Edmund 49 CNPC 116 Cohen, Sual O. 76 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 77, 89, 91, 106 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 76, 77, 91, 113, 175 Communism 113 Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 164 Confucianism 30, 31, 32 Connect Central Asia Policy (CCAP, 2012) 4, 121, 169, 197, 203, 204, 208, 212 Cooley, Alexander 77, 89, 90 Cosmic mentality 18 Counter-terrorism 35, 38, 118, 200 COVID-19 pandemic 3, 37, 63, 66–68, 83, 84, 92, 99, 107, 120, 165, 206, 210 Cross-Border Transport Accord (CBTA) 103 Cross-cultural exchanges 1 Cultural Revolution 33 Customs Union 77, 119 da Gama, Vasco 125 Daoism 30 Das , Sadhu Ram Udhar 2 Datong (Great Unity/Great Harmony) 31 Decter, Jacqueline 21

216

Index

Delhi Declaration of the 1st IndiaCentral Asia Summit (2022) 86, 91, 197–200, 202, 207 Democratization 92 Deng Xiaoping 158 Department of Atomic Energy of India 162–163 Devika Rani 126 Digital India 5 Digital Silk Road 6 Dubai Port World 130 Dugin, A. 77 Dunn, David 197, 204 DUSTLIK-I (2019) 164 Eastern culture 21 Eastern Europe-Western China road network 130 Eastern religions 19, 20 East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 145, 158 Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) 103–104 Economic Cooperation Organisation trade agreement (ECOTA) 103–104 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan 88 Eight-Fold Path 24 environmental refugees 61 environmental security 88 Eudemos 188 Eurasia 2, 6, 8; political and security order by Russia 119–120; see also India-Eurasia connectivity Eurasian continentalism 120 Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) 98, 99, 131 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 77, 93, 98, 104, 107, 112, 115, 119–120, 130, 169, 181 Eurasianism 77–80, 211 Eurasian Silk Road 116 Euro-Asian Conference on Transport (2002) 171 Europeanization 94 European Union (EU) 79, 92, 113  Fahien 155 Fallon, Theresa 141 Federation of Freight Forwarders’ Associations in India (FFFAI) 173 Five Nations Railway Corridor 139 Five Plus One (5+1) framework 77, 211

Flame in Chalice (Roerich) 15, 19 Flowers of Morya (Roerich) 15 Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries 207 Four Noble Truths 24 Friters, G. M. 51 Frontier Services Group (FSG) 38 G-7 summit (2022) 143 G-20 summit 166 Gabuev, Alexander 120 Gamaleya 99 Gandhi, Indira 126 Gandhi, Rajiv 121 Gandola monastery 22 General Authority of Border Protection (GABP) 164 General Circulation Models (GCMs) 62 geo-economics, defnition 73, 75 “geopolitical belonging” of Central Asia within Inner Asia 86–95; ideational layer of regionalism 87, 89, 95; regionalization, regionness, regional identity and security perceptions 87–91, 93–95; storyline between Central Asia and India 91–93 geopolitics, defnition 73 Ghani, Ashraf 137 Gitanjali (Tagore) 21 Glimpses of World History (Nehru) 126 globalisation 80, 165 Global Times 36 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 33, 76–77, 118, 158 Golodnikova, I. Yu. 18 Gomal Pass 193 Gorbachev, Mikhail 158 Gordan, George 19 Gorki, Maxim 16 “Go-West” policy 141 The Greater Central Asia project 77, 81 Great Islamic Revolution (1979) 158 gross domestic product (GDP) 8 Grossman, Marc 115 Gujral, Inder Kumar 126 Gwadar port 179 Haimavata marg 187 Halal law 36 Hamas attack on Israel (2023) 211 Hameiri, Shahar 142 Hardatt, Madan Mohan 125

Index

Hasan, Nurul 126 Heartland theory 74–76, 133, 137 Heart of Asia - Memories of Himalayas (Roerich) 15, 23–25 Hieun Tsang 155 High Impact Community Development Projects 199, 206 Highlander, M. 25 Hikvision 82 Himalayan Prophesies (Roerich) 25 Himalayas 6, 15–17, 19, 21–23 Himalayas - Abode of Light (Roerich) 15, 16, 23, 25 Himavat - Diary of Leaves (Roerich) 15, 16, 19, 22, 23 Hinnebusch, Raymond 88 Hizb-ut-Tahrir 118, 158 Hopf, Ted 90 Hosking, Geofrey 78 Hsu Shu-cheng 52 Huchet, Jean-Francois 92 Huis 32, 33, 36, 38, 39 Hunarmand 124 Huntinton, Samuel P. 74–76 Hurley, John 142 Ibn Batuta 187 Idrisov, Erlan 131 Imanaliev, Muratbek 94 imperialism 31 India 8–9; Chinese attack on Ladakh (2020) 9; confict with Pakistan 9; humanitarian aid to Afghanistan 105, 175, 179, 201–202, 207; New Delhi 121; strategic narratives for Central Asia 121 India and Inner Asia relationship 155– 166; concerns and stakes 156–159; connectivity eforts 163; energy cooperation 161–163; lack of geographical connectivity 156; reconnecting with “Heart of Inner Asia” 159; security cooperation 163–165; soft power 165; spread and prevalence of Buddhism 155–156; strategic partnership agreements (SPAs) 159–161 India-Central Asia Business Council (ICABC) 200, 206 India-Central Asia Centre, New Delhi 198 India-Central Asia Development Group 161, 205

217

India-Central Asia Dialogue 197; in Bishkek (2012) 203–204; in New Delhi (2020) 4, 206; in Samarkand (2019) 4, 161, 198, 205, 206, 211 India-Central Asia Investment Club 200 India-Central Asia Parliamentary Forum 198 India-Central Asia Summit (2022) 163, 197, 201–202, 207, 208 India-China war (1962) 158 India-Eurasia connectivity 169–181; benefts of Corridors 178–179; challenges in implementing Corridors 179–180; Connect Central Asia Policy (2012) 169 India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor 171, 174–177, 179–181 International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) 171–174, 177–181; trade 169–171 India-Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport and Transit Corridor 171, 174–177, 179–181 Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) 199 Indian Cultural Centers 91 Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme 199 Indian trade via Afghan route 184–195; along Sulaiman passes 193–194; along Uttarapath 186; Bolan Pass route 194; cultural and political exchanges 185; export and import facility 184; horses 187–188; ivory 188–189; Lapis Lazuli route 192–193; in pashm 191–192; plant products, salts and precious metals 189–190; textiles 189; Uttarapath’s links with Black Sea and Caspian 186–187; Wakhan Corridor route 192, 195; war elephants 188; Western routes to Mediterranean 190–191 India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone (IPGCFZ) 175 India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) 175, 176 India-Russia Business Summit (2018) 2 India’s new diplomacy 197–208; Delhi Declaration 2022 197–200, 202, 207; India-Central Asia Summit

218

Index

2022 197, 201–202; since 2014 203–207 Indochina Peninsula Corridor 116 Indo-Tibetan Buddhism 22 Indo-Uzbekistan Joint Field Training Exercise (FTX) 164 industrialisation 59 Inner Asia: cosmopolitan image 26; defnition 73–74, 83; see also individual entries Inter-Governmental Agreement (2000) on INSTC 171; Article 1.1 171 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 57 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 7 International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (1993) 88 International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) 6, 102, 103, 107, 108, 112, 121–122, 131, 171–174, 177–181, 200, 202, 212; Coordination Council of 172–174; Expert Group of 173 171–174, 177–181; trade 169–171 International Solar Alliance 7 inter-state cooperation 87, 90, 107 Interstate Council for the Aral Sea 88 Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) 103 intra-regional cooperation 83, 92, 108 Invincible, The (Roerich) 15, 19 Iran: Chabahar port 11; International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) 107, 108; as member of OPEC 114; pesticide supply from India 175; Russia’s cooperation with 107; SarakhsMashhad rail link 104; U.S. sanctions on 180 Iranian Bank 175 Iran-India Garland Highway 139 Iran Shipping Lines (ISL) 174 Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan (ITK) railway line 173, 177 Iseri, E. 76 ISIS 158 Islam(ic): in China 32–36; identity 29; moderate 33; political 39; radical/extremist 33, 158; revival in Inner Asia 158; symbolism 34 Islamic Development Bank 103

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 118, 158 Islamic State-Khorasan see East Turkestan Islamic Movement Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) 106, 145 Islamophobia 36, 38 Jadidism 2 Jagadu 195 Jaishankar, S. 177, 207 Jaish-e-Mohammed 159 Jamsran, L. 45 Japan: bilateral relationship with US 90; role of self-recognition and selfnarrative 90 Jawaharlal Nehru University 3 Jebsundamba Khutagt (Bogd Gegeen) 45–49, 53 Jetsun Milarepa 22, 25 Joint Action Plan (2011–2014) 160 Joint Statement of the Dialogue (2022) 207 Joint Working Group (JWG) 162, 200, 202 Jones, Lee 142 Joshi, Nirmala 92 Kaflas 193–194 Kalachakra tradition 19 Kamalshila 155 Kamchik Pass 128, 131 Kanika Maharaja Vihara 155 Karakalpak Autonomous Republic 7 Kara Khanid 28 Karakoram Highway 184 Karimov, Islam 99, 160 Karzai, Hamid 139 Kashgar-Gwadar highway 134 Kaul, Triloki Nath 126 Kautilya 187; Arthasastra 187 Kazakh-India Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientifc, Technical, Industrial and Cultural Cooperation 162 Kazakhstan 7, 57, 58, 98, 116; Chinese investment in 129–131, 134; defence partnership with India 164; developing international transport corridor 129–131; droughts in 63; energy resources in 114; land degradation in 61; nuclear energy cooperation with

Index

India (2009) 162, 163; oilfelds in 116, 117; protesting Chinese activities 82, 84; relations with CARS 100; Russian involvement in 106; strategic partnership with India 160, 161, 169; unemployment rate in 83 Kazakhstan Corridor 129–131 Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan pipeline 107 Kazantsev, A. 134 KazAtomProm, JSC National Atomic Company 162 Keating, Michael 94 Ketou 44 Khanjar 164 Khayraton-Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat rail link 132 Khorgos 82, 128, 130 Khyber Pass 193, 195 Kiakhta Maimaicheng 53 Kiakhta Platform 53 Kiakhta Tripartite Agreement see Russia-Mongolia-China Tripartite Agreement kimkab/khinqhab 194 Kjellen, Rudolph 73 Klare , M. 76 Kok Aral 60 Kovind, Ramnath 161 Kuchins, Andrew C. 138 Kumarajiva 155 Kyrgyzstan 57, 58, 98; anti-Chinese sentiment in 82, 84; border dispute with Uzbekistan 100; collapse in remittances from Russia 83, 84; defence partnership with India 164, 204; energy resources in 114 Kyrgyz-Uzbek riots (2010) 98 Laghman-Susa route 189, 190 Lai, Hongyi Harry 141 Lamas 20–24, 25 Lapis Lazuli route 139, 192–193 Laruelle, Marlene 92 Lashkar-e-Taiba 159 Lattimore, Owen 46 Lauri/Lahori 192 Legvold, H. 76 Levi, Scott C. 184 liberalisation 80 “Light in the Desert” (Roerich) 17

219

Liu Yazhou 82 Living Ethics 18 Look, Learn and Act North Policy 212 Look West policy 82 Lorot, Pascal 73 Luttwak, Edward 73 M-37 Highway 190 MacIntyre, Alasdair 87 Mackinder, Halford John 74–76, 78, 113, 133, 137 Madhya Asia ka Itihas (History of Central Asia, Sankirtyayan) 125 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 74, 76, 133 Mahayana Buddhism 24 Maitreya 24, 25 Manucci, Niccolo 188 Maritime India Summit-2021 175–177 Maritime Silk Road 116, 125, 133–134, 140 Markovits, Claude 184 Marshall Plan 111, 113, 141 Marxist-Leninist theory 30 McCannon, John 22 Memorandum of Understanding (2016) 146 Menon, K. P. S. 126 Middle East Corridor 212 Ministry of Commerce, India 173 Ministry of Ports, Shipping & Waterways, India 176 Mirziyoyev, Shavkat 99–103 Mishra, Pankaj 93 modernization 92 Modi, Narendra 2–4, 121, 156, 160–166, 169, 197, 199, 201, 204, 205, 211, 212 Mongolia 44–55; abrogation of Tripartite Agreement 50–52; autonomous suzerainty 49, 50, 54; autonomy 48, 50–54; defence partnership with India 164; “frst revolution for national independence” 46; Mongol-seeking independence 45, 47, 48, 52–54; New Policies (1901) 45, 46; nuclear energy cooperation with India (2009) 162, 163; proclamation of independence 45–47; RussiaMongolia-China Tripartite Agreement 49–50; Sino-Russian geopolitical game 44–49, 54;

220

Index

SPA with India (2015) 160–161, 212; Urga in 45, 52–54 Mongolian People’s Army 53 Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) 53, 54 Mongolian People’s Provisional Revolutionary Government 53, 54 Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) 53 Mongolian Revolution (1911) 45, 46, 53 Mongol Messenger, The 46 Muhammad Ghuri 195 Mujahideen 158 multilateralism 143, 201 Mushkatov, Ivan 73 Mysteries (Roerich) 25 Nagarjuna 25 National Development Reforms Commission (2015) 140 National Security Advisers of India 165 National Security Councils 164 National University of Tajikistan 101 Nazarbaev, Nursultan 130 Nazarbayev, Nursultan 92, 160 “Near Abroad” 113 neelkothis (indigo stores) 192 Nehru, Jawaharlal 16, 126; Glimpses of World History 126 neo-Eurasianism 78 Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement 7 New Delhi-Tehran-Kabul link 107 New Eurasian Land Bridge 116 New Great Game 76, 77, 91, 92, 104, 111, 115, 116, 134–136, 141, 211 “New India” 166 New Policies (1901) 45, 46 Nikitin, Afanasy 125 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 79, 80, 91 North Western Frontier Defence Force 52 Novoi Minerals & Metallurgical Company 163 Nuclear Energy Agency of Mongolia 162 NurlyZhol (Shining Path) policy 130 Obama, Barack 115, 144 October Revolution see Russian Revolution (1917) One Belt One Road (OBOR) 92, 116, 126, 129, 140 One Health One Earth approach 92, 199 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 7, 114 Oriental mysticism 17 oriental philosophy 20

Outcome Document of the Regional Security Dialogue (2021) 207 Ozbekiston Temir Yollari 176 Padma Sambava 22, 24, 25, 155 Pandit, Vijayalaxmi 126 pan-Mongolism 26 Pan-Mongol movement 51 Paris Agreement on Climate Change 67 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) 143 Pasargard 175 People’s Bank of China 141 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 28, 144 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 136, 156 People’s War on Terror 35, 36 Peyrouse, Sebastien 92 Polo, Marco 185 post-Soviet Central Asia: regionalism in 86, 87 Post-Urumqi riot period 33, 39 Pre-Cultural revolution period 33 Primakov doctrine 77 privatisation 80 Project Beauty 34 Pruitt, Sarah 79 Putin, Vladimir 77, 79, 80, 106, 130, 174 Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway line 173, 174 Radhakrishnan, Sarvapalli 126 Rahmon, Emomali 101 Realm of Light (Roerich) 15, 23 Reconnect Central Asia Policy 121 Red Army 51, 54 Red Cap sect 24 Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) 100 regional cooperation in Central Asia 97–108; connectivity and sustainable stability 102–105, 108; developments in bilateral relations 97, 99–102; independent Central Asian Republics (CARs) and its problems 97–99; post-U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan 105–107 regional economic cooperation 81, 82 Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) 139 regional integration 5, 98, 107 regionalism 86, 87 regionness 89

Index

Regnum News Channel 129 religious extremism 33, 35, 39, 158, 202 rhytons 188 Richthofen, Alexander Von 73 Rimland 75, 76 Ringmar, Erik 92 Roadmap for Health and Well Being in Central Asia (2022–2025) 63 Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich 15–26; Adamant 15, 25; admirer of Himalayas 16, 20–23; AltaiHimalaya: A Travel Diary 15, 18, 21; Beautiful Unity 19, 20; contribution in Silk Road 126; debates with Lamas on noble gospels of Buddhism 21; exploring Buddhism 15, 16; Flame in Chalice 15, 19; Flowers of Morya 15; Heart of Asia - Memories of Himalayas 15, 23–25; Himalayan Prophesies 25; Himalayas - Abode of Light 15–17, 23, 25; Himavat Diary of Leaves 15, 16, 19, 22, 23; on humanity 19; interests in humanism, culture and religion 19–21; international expeditions 16–19, 21, 23; Invincible, The 15, 19; “Light in the Desert” 17; Maitreya 24; Mysteries 25; narratives on Inner Asia 26; Nehru’s tribute to 16; passion for forms of alternative spirituality 22; Realm of Light 15, 23; Shambhala 15, 18, 21, 24; visit to Buddhist monasteries 23–26 Rogun Dam 101 Rogun Hydro Power Station (HPS) 101 Rtveladze, Edvard V. 186, 193, 194 Russia 5; annexation of Crimea 79; Civil War in 51; Cold War with United States 76; collapse (1991) 54, 80, 83, 111, 136, 143; confict with Georgia 79; dominance over Outer Mongolia 49, 50; and EAEU 119–120; economic recovery in 106–107; in favour Mongolia’s independence 47–48, 53, 54; foreign policy 78; geo-economic signifcance of Central Asia for 81; geopolitical Eurasianism by 77–80, 211; humanitarian aid to Afghanistan 105–106; infuence on Rimland 76; interest in Afghanistan 80; interest in Central Asia 77–78;

221

Kazakhstan as transit point for cargo transfer 129–131; in Mongolian Revolution (1911) 46; political reality in Inner Asia 156–157; relations with China 37–38; Semenov’s plan in Mongolia 51; status of ethnic minorities 8; strategic partnership with India 169; trade with Caspian littoral states 106–107; trade with India 178, 180; Tsarist rule in 3, 47, 51, 52, 111, 211; underground nuclear tests 7; war with Ukraine 80, 106–108, 120, 178, 180, 208, 211 Russia-Mongolia-China Tripartite Agreement 49–50 Russian Revolution (1917) 50, 51, 54, 126 Russo-Chinese Declaration (1913) 48, 49 Russo-Japanese treaty (1912) 47 Russo-Mongolian Agreement (1912) 48 Saakashvili, Mikheil 79 Sachdeva, Gulshan 202 Saikal, Amin 138 Sajjanhar, Ashok 179 Samruk Energo 162 Sankirtyayan, Rahul (Kedarnath Pandey) 125; Madhya Asia ka Itihas (History of Central Asia) 125 Sankrityayan, Rahul 2; Volga Se Ganga 2 “Sarazm-2006” 193 Sassanid Hormizd II 191 SCO’s Special Working Group on Healthcare 99 Seleucus 188, 194 Semenov, Grigorii Mikailovich 51 Semipalatinsk Polygon 7 Shahid Beheshti terminal 175, 176, 178 Shahid Kalantari terminal 175 Shambhala 24, 25 Shambhala (Roerich) 15, 18, 21, 24 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, Shanghai Five) 77, 89, 91, 99, 100, 104, 118, 120, 121, 128, 144, 163, 166, 169, 177, 180, 204, 205 Shantha Rakshita 25 Shaposhnikova, L.V. 17 Sharifzoda, Khamza 64 Shuangxi Highway 130 Sikkim 16, 22, 24–25 Silk and Spice Festival (2016) 124 Silk Road 5, 6, 15, 75, 83, 91, 111–122, 203, 211; Belt and Road Initiative

222

Index

(BRI) 112, 115–116, 125–127, 129, 140–143; Central AsiaSouth Asia (CASA) concept 132–133; Chinese energy and infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 127–129; contributions in making 125–126; discourse and post-pandemic world order 120–121; Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 112, 115, 119– 120, 130; International NorthSouth Transportation Corridor (INSTC) 112, 121–122, 131; Kazakhstan Corridor 129–131; Maritime Silk Road 116, 125, 133–134, 140; migration from post-Soviet states to Russia 124–125; old concepts 124; renaissance 140; rivalry 111, 112, 114; strategies 112, 114; US New Silk Road Strategy 112, 114–115, 125, 133, 140; Uzbek-Turkmen Corridor 131–132 Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 115, 140, 141 Silk Road Fund 141 Singh, Man Mohan 121 Sinicization 30, 36 Sino-Afghan relations 105, 137, 143–147; during 1990s 143–144; BRI 146– 147; post 9/11 144–145; Taliban takeover of Afghanistan (2021) 145–146 Smith, Charyl L. 17 Sokobin, Samuel 52 Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 127 Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) 62 Sputnik V vaccine 99 Spykman, Nicholas 74–76 Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa 21, 22 Stalin, Joseph 125 Starr, Frederick 92 State Ethnic Afairs Commission 36 State University of Samarkand 101 St. Petersburg Economic Forum (2022) 106 “Strike Hard” campaign 36 Subhagsena 188 Subrahmanyam, K. 203 Sufsm 3, 203 Sukhbaatar 53

Sulaiman passes 193–194 Sultan Öz Beg Khan 187 Summit of Caspian states 106 Swami Vivekananda 21, 22 Swaraj, Sushma 205–206 Syr Darya 60, 67 Syrian Civil War 80 Tagore, Abanindranath 20 Tagore, Rabindranath 1, 21, 126; Gitanjali 21 Tajikistan 57, 58, 98; border dispute with Uzbekistan 100–101; collapse in remittances from Russia 83, 84; energy resources in 114; energy trade with Uzbekistan 101–102; glaciers in 64; land degradation in 61 Tajikistan Cotton Processing Complex 103 Taliban 4, 80, 105–107, 120, 137, 145–146, 158, 159, 163, 165, 179, 202, 208, 211 Tashkent Pact (1992) 125 Taxila-Kapisa-Balkh highway 190 Tehrik-e-Taliban 159 terrorism 33, 34, 37–39, 88, 200, 202 The Theosophical Society 19, 20 Third World 92 Tibetan Buddhism 19 Tokayev, Kassym-Jomart K. 106, 165 traditional Silk Road 112, 132 Transport Corridor Europe-CaucasusAsia (TRACECA) 103, 179 Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions (1996) 118 Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regimes (1997) 118 Trilateral Chabahar Agreement (2016) 175 Turkey: Silk Road Project (2008) 140 Turkic societies 3 Turkmenabad-Farab railway and automobile bridges 103 Turkmenistan 57, 58, 116, 117; Central Asia-China gas pipeline 116; energy resources in 114; land degradation in 61 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-PakistanIndia (TAPI) gas pipeline 81, 103, 139, 161 Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-TajikistanAfghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP) electricity transfer 139

Index

UCO Bank 175 Ukraine-Russia war (2022) 37, 106– 108, 120, 178, 180, 208, 211 UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 200 UNESCO 2, 6 UN General Assembly 7, 80, 133 UN General Assembly Resolution A/ RES/75/313 199 United Nations (UN) 7, 120 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 177 United States 33; bilateral relationship with Japan 90; Cold War with Russia 76; exploiting energy resources in Central Asia 81; foreign policy 76; grand strategy 76; integrating Afghanistan to CARs 132–133; maritime domination of 134; in Mongolia’s independence 52; rivalry with Russia 157; supporting Afghanistan’s economy 115; withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan 144–145 United States’ 2018 Report 142 universalism 22 UN Security Council 166 UN Security Council on Corona 120 UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) Economic Forum (2022) 67–68 Urumqi riots (2009) 33, 34 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 142 U.S. Congress 38 US New Silk Road Strategy 102, 103, 107, 112, 114–115, 125, 133, 137, 140, 180 Uyghur Bill-2020 38 Uyghur-ness 34–37 Uyghur ethnicity 2, 8, 29; as China’s ethno-religious challenge 29–30; forced organ harvesting of 37; human rights abuses of 38; as indigenous population 29; Islamic identity 33, 36; as migrants from Mongolia 29; persecution 37; political loyalty and Islam factor 32–34; reeducation camps for 35, 37; Uyghur-ness and 34–37

223

Uzbekistan 7, 57, 58, 98; border dispute with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 100–101; collapse in remittances from Russia 84; constructing route for connectivity 5–6; defence partnership with India 164; energy resources in 114; energy trade with Tajikistan 101–102; land degradation in 64; laying road and rail networks through Turkmenistan 131–132; nuclear energy cooperation with India 163; SPA with India (2011) 160, 161; Tajik minorities in 8; unemployment rate in 83; water defcit 60 Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railroad 103 Uzbek-Turkmen Corridor 131–132 Vajpayee, Atal Behari 121 Vigne, Godfrey T. 193 virtual New Silk Road 130 virtual regionalism 90 Volga Se Ganga (Sankrityayan) 2 Voyakin, Dmitry 189 Voytek, Steven K. 78 Wakhan Corridor 2, 184, 192, 195 Wang Yi 105 Wang Zhengwei 36 War Participation Bureau 52 White Russian movements see antiBolshevik movements Whitman, Serge 25 World Bank 6, 7, 65, 67, 83 World Health Organisation (WHO) 63, 99, 120 World Suf Conference (2016) 3 World War I 50, 51, 52 World War II 141 Xi Jinping 36, 115, 130, 140, 145 Xinjiang in China 28, 136, 137, 142; as contested borderlands 28, 30; cultural linkages to Central Asia 143; deIslamization 36; ethnicity in 29; geopolitics and ignored crisis 37–38; Han Chinese in 29, 36, 37; Hanifcation of 28; harmonization 30–32, 38; Huis 32, 33, 36, 38, 39; incorporation

224

Index

into People’s Republic of China (PRC) 28; investments by China 144; Islamization of 28; Qing’s conquest 28; separatist movements in 117–118; Uyghurness and othering of Muslims 34–37; Uyghurs ethnicity (see Uyghurs ethnicity) Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 82, 117, 127 Xuanzang 24, 184 Yanukovych, Viktor 79 Yeltsin, Boris 77

Yihewani Muslim brotherhood 32 Ying, Liu 141 Zafar, Athar 201, 202 “Zag Zagaaraabaidaggui” (The Time Is Changing, Jamsran) 45 Zarafshan River 102 Zaranj-Delaram highway 139 Zardykhan, Zhar 106 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 159 Zelenin, Alena 129 Zhang Qia 184 Zhiping, Pan 141 Zong Ji Mining Company 82